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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



14 September, 2001

~~POLICY~~  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY) /s/ [initials]  
(Douglas J. Feith, 695-5136)

SUBJECT: Strategic Planning Guidance for the Joint Staff (U)

~~(S)~~ Below is a list of states that (1) conduct terrorism against the U.S. and its interests, and (2) categories of high-value assets and capabilities critical to each regime. Actual target analysis and selection will be conducted by the Joint Staff in concert with OSD.

**Afghanistan (U)**

~~(S)~~ The strategic purpose of the campaign in Afghanistan is to alter the behavior of the Taliban regime and defeat al-Qaida. We will compel the Taliban to help destroy al-Qaida or we will inflict severe punishment if the Taliban fail to do so. If the Taliban do not fulfill our demands, the follow-on military objective will be to undermine the regime's ability to defend itself against U.S. and Northern Alliance forces, and to cripple its ability to govern Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ The campaign might begin with a final warning to the Taliban regime, telling them to deliver the remaining elements of al-Qaida to U.S. forces, and to assist U.S. forces to defeat al-Qaida, or we might announce at the start of the campaign that it will continue until they deliver al-Qaida to coalition forces.

~~(TS)~~ If the Taliban government does not comply, serious punishment should threaten the regime's existence at the strategic and operational levels. This should include direct attacks against the Taliban strategic leadership; Taliban military leadership and units engaged in the civil war with Northern Alliance resistance forces; and government control over the rest of the country. [REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ A successful campaign would mean the elimination of the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan, and a serious reduction in the Taliban regime's ability to defend itself against the Northern Alliance. Elimination of the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan can be accomplished only if sufficient pain can be inflicted on the Taliban regime. There is some question, however, about whether or not an air campaign by itself can tip the balance in the civil war in favor of the Northern Alliance. There is a view that the commitment of ground forces is necessary to achieve the goal.

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#### **Iraq (U)**

~~(TS)~~ The strategic purpose of the campaign in Iraq is to eliminate a regime that engages in and supports terrorism and otherwise threatens U.S. vital interests. Initially, Saddam's regime should be deprived both of its ability to control Iraq through repression and the ability to profit from the illegal sources of income that allow him to finance terror abroad. In conjunction with the campaign, we may want to offer amnesty for defecting Iraqi military units.



~~(TS)~~ The list of targets can be expanded considerably if U.S. ground forces are used to seize and control objectives. Most prominent of these objectives are the oil fields in

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northern and southern Iraq. The southern oil fields produce 60 percent of Iraq's oil and are located within 60 miles from the Kuwait border. Seizing the southern oil fields (instead of destroying them) removes the oil weapon from Saddam's options.

~~(S)~~ A great deal of damage can be inflicted from the air, but the ultimate successful outcome of this campaign may depend on a willingness to commit ground forces. In any event, this effort will require a more substantial and prolonged campaign than DESERT FOX.

DASD *WJL* 7/14

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