



POLICY

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

#8

28 November 1981

MEMO TO SECDEF

We now are at a critical juncture regarding Sharon's visit and the possible linkage by them of the MOU with the Sinai peacekeeping force.

On the MOU text, the Israelis have come quite a way to our position by abandoning their draft and negotiating on the basis of ours, much shorter draft. But two or three critical issues remain that may not be resolvable.

On Issues I and II, I believe, we could accept the Israeli counter-proposal without any damage to our concerns.

Issues III and IV are more difficult, since they reflect different conceptions about the course of our Strategic Cooperation. One might fudge the issue now, or we could hold firm. In the latter case, you could propose to take it up with Sharon, thus inducing him (perhaps) to come and reducing the risk that they reject the compromise on the Sinai peacekeeping force.

I'll be at the office until about 4 P.M., in case you want to call me on secure.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 02MAY2024 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552

Fred C. Ikle

Declassify: Declassify in Part: X Deny in Full:

Reason: 3.3(b)(5)(6)

MDR: 18-M-1176

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DEP SEC HAS SEEN

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CRITICAL REMAINING ISSUES

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Authority: EO13526 F.C.
Chief, Records and Declass Div, WHS
Date: 02MAY2024

I. The Proxy Issue:

The Israelis insist on a reference to "proxies" or "Soviet-controlled forces". They offered the following options:

Option (1): insert "Soviet-controlled forces introduced into region"

Option (2): insert "caused by direct or indirect threats region (as defined by the Parties)."
(parenthesis is option for US)

II. Too Frequent Reference to Soviets:

Israelis want us to mention Soviets only in Preamble and once in Article I. The Israelis fear, they say, domestic criticism for "becoming target of Soviets", and being "manipulated" by United States.

III. The Land Forces Issue:

Israelis propose the following language:

Article II, Para. 1.a.: "Cooperation between the Armed Forces of the Parties, including joint US-Israeli Air and Naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean, as shall be determined by the Parties." This would reappear as

Article III, Para. 2.a.: "Cooperation between the Armed Forces of the Parties, including joint US-Israeli exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean."

Here, we clearly have a difference in the two approaches to the MOU.



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(b) The Israeli side wants, as Tamir puts it: "a framework for 50 years which looks West (into the Arabian Peninsula as well as East into the Mediterranean). From now on, we are going to persuade all -- your President, your Government, your Congress, etc., -- that we are the main means to protect the Free World in the Mid-East."

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Hence, the Israelis insist upon including discussions between US and Israeli land forces. Thus, the words "Armed Forces" vice "cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean to cope with Soviet air and naval forces."

IV. The Prepositioning Issue: The Israelis want a reference to prepositioning not restricted to medical supplies. As they put it:

"We (the Israelis) need an 'open door' for other kinds of cooperation besides medical supplies. Without this, we won't sign. We will start with the Eastern Mediterranean, but we must go further."

LESS IMPORTANT CHANGES

Changes A in Draft (p. 4):

Israeli proposed changes which seemed fully acceptable to us.

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Changes B in Draft (p. 4):

Israelis want reference to UN Charter. This is a State Department issue, and State and Israeli lawyers will work out acceptable language.

Changes C in Draft (p. 4):

Reference to Governments here is the same as in 1979 Agreement.

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F.C

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

ON

STRATEGIC COOPERATION

PREAMBLE

This Memorandum of Understanding reaffirms the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel and builds on the mutual security relationship that exists between the two nations. The Parties recognize the need to enhance Strategic Cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region. Noting the long-standing and fruitful cooperation for mutual security that has developed between the two countries,

editorial decided to
the Parties have established a framework for continued consultation
1 ref. enhance their national security by deterring
and cooperation to deter such threats to the whole region.

The Parties have reached the following agreements in order to achieve the above aims:

ARTICLE I

United States-Israeli Strategic Cooperation, as set forth in this Memorandum, is designed against the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the ^{Soviet Union} ~~USSR~~ or Soviet - - -

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forces introduced into the region. It has the following broad purposes:

a. To enable the Parties to act cooperatively and in a timely manner to deal with the above mentioned Soviet threat. (2)

b. To provide the Parties with military assistance for operations of their forces in the area, that may be required to cope with this threat.

c. The Strategic Cooperation between the Parties is not directed at any State or group of States within the region. It is intended solely for defensive purposes against the above mentioned threat.

ARTICLE II

ad. 1. The fields in which strategic cooperation will be carried out to ^{prevent} ~~deter~~ the above mentioned threat from endangering the security of the region include:

a. Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, including joint US-Israeli planning and exercises, designed to cope with Soviet air and naval forces as shall be determined by the Parties; (3)

b. Cooperation for the establishment and maintenance of joint readiness activities, as agreed upon by the Parties.

c. Other areas within the basic scope and purpose of this agreement, as may be jointly agreed.

2. Details of activities within these fields of cooperation shall be worked out by the Parties in accordance with the provisions of Article III below. The cooperation will include, as appropriate, planning, preparations, and ~~or~~ exercises.

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ARTICLE III

d. 1. The Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defense ^{shall} ~~have~~ decided to establish a Coordinating Council to further the purposes of this Memorandum:

a. To coordinate and provide guidance to Joint Working Groups;

b. To monitor the implementation of cooperation in the fields agreed upon by the Parties within the scope of this agreement;

c. To hold periodic meetings, in Israel and the United States, for the purposes of discussing and resolving outstanding issues and to further the objectives set forth in this Memorandum. Special meetings can be held at the request of either Party. The Secretary of Defense and Minister of Defense will chair these meetings whenever possible.

2. Joint Working Groups will address the following issues:

a. Air and naval cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, including joint US-Israeli exercises. } ③

b. Cooperation for the establishment of joint readiness activities, including access to maintenance facilities and other infrastructure, consistent with the basic purposes of this agreement.

c. Cooperation in research and development, building on past cooperation in this area.

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d. Cooperation in defense trade.

e. Other fields within the basic scope and purpose of this agreement, (such as questions of prepositioning of medical supplies), as agreed by the Coordinating Council.

(4)

3. The future agenda for the work of the joint working groups, their composition, and procedures for reporting to the Coordinating Council shall be agreed upon by the Parties.

ARTICLE IV

This Memorandum shall enter into force upon completion of the required procedures by each Party. ~~and remain in effect until terminated by either side~~ If either ^{Party} ~~side~~ considers it necessary to terminate this Memorandum of Understanding, ^{it may do so by notifying} ~~it will notify~~ the other ^{Party} ~~Government~~ six months in advance of the effective date of termination.

(A)

ARTICLE V

Nothing in the Memorandum shall be considered as derogating from previous agreements and understandings between the Parties.

(Add reference to UN charter)

(B)

For the United States Government

For the Government of Israel

(C)

Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

Ariel Sharon
Minister of Defense

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