

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

20 February 1975

Memo For Secretary Ellsworth

The attached MEMCON concerning YF-16 issue in Europe is provided for your information. Copies have been furnished Secretary McLucas and the Deputy Secretary.

Attachment
as

(W)
JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
Major General, USA
Military Assistant

#84

NATO 452 (300-100) 1975, box 75 330-79-00058

NATO 452

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Chief, Records and Declass Div, WHS
Date: 23AUG2024

Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 23AUG2024 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. 552
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Reason: FOIA 5 U.S.C § 522 (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. § 424
MDR: 18-M-2098

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O-5D (written)

VA-ISA

X-452LWF

1343 hours
18 February 1975

Telephone conversation between Dr. Stutzle, private secretary to MOD Leber and General Wickham:

Calling on behalf of Minister Leber to put a personal message through to Secretary Schlesinger dealing with their telephone conversation yesterday.

1. MOD Leber has been in contact with MOD Vredling and raised all points the Secretary asked him to.

2. Vredling's reply was that subject is still under discussion between the four countries involved. In addition, the conversation with Vredling led to the following points:

Apart from the Belgian MOD, there seems to be a kind of trend which leads away from the French Mirage and goes in direction of the YF-16. The reason for this is that the French Mirage is reported to be 25% more expensive than the YF-16. The Belgian MOD personally still tries to get some kind of concession from the French in terms of price to reduce the lead of the YF-16.

Now Leber wishes to make two points to Secretary Schlesinger:

1. The U.S. Government should reply to all the questions put by the four countries as early as possible.

2. Vredling has the impression that the U.S. offer of the YF-16 is based on an exchange rate of 1 American dollar equivalent to 2.40 Dutch guilders and that this includes no price guarantee. Derived from that there is a kind of risk involved which is due to the changing exchange rate dollar Dutch currency and it might be a risk for him if there is a fluctuation in the exchange rate or there is no price guarantee; a risk which he might find very hard to bear if no solution to the price guarantee can be found.

Another point MOD Vredling mentioned is that somebody in the USAF must have created the impression that USAF will reserve the right to change the YF-16 model according to U.S. needs and not according to Dutch needs. Even if the Dutch should buy, the U.S. would still reserve the right to make changes and alterations to the aircraft. Maybe it is a misunderstanding between the two.

It is MOD Leber's impression that the Dutch MOD goes in the direction of the YF-16 but he would very strongly urge Secretary Schlesinger to be patient until 10 April because that is the day on which Vredling has got to appear before a Party Committee of his own party and give all the details. While he could not confront them with a decision already made, it is necessary for him to have all the information requested earlier. MOD Leber will remain in close contact with the Dutch MOD and pass on information.

~~SECRET~~

BRIEFING BOOK



FOR YOUR MEETING WITH

NETHERLANDS MOD
HENDRIKUS VREDELING
10 MARCH 1975

Prepared by:

OASD (ISA)



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Declassified in Full
Authority: EO 13526
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Date: 23AUG2024

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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Refer to: I-21388/75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Overview of Netherlands MOD Vredeling Visit, 10 March 1975

Minister Vredeling took the initiative to seek a meeting with you to discuss the issue of F-104 replacement aircraft purchase in order to prepare himself for his presentation to the Netherlands Cabinet meeting scheduled for 14 March. Ambassador Gould has reported that Vredeling dined with him at the US Embassy and said that his major concern is that whatever action is taken at this point should not preclude the European aircraft industry from having the capability of producing a technologically qualified aircraft to replace the F-5s during the mid-1980s. Because Vredeling appears to accept the technical and performance superiority of the US F-16 over the Mirage and the Viggen, his concern is that in selecting the F-16 he might weaken the European aircraft industry's prospects for future viability. Vredeling sees this specifically in The Netherlands need to replace 100 NF-5's during the 1980s. Vredeling's strong Europeanism has again come to the forefront and is the root of his dilemma. Coupled with this is a reported lack of a strong political base within his own Labor Party or in Parliament where anti-military expenditure and anti-nuclear forces are to be reckoned with. Vredeling's own Director of Information, acting as a stalking horse, has suggested that the US consider "buying back" the F-16s halfway through their lifecycle, to be replaced by a European designed and built aircraft in the 1980s. He feared that in the absence of such an approach support for the US solution might erode and force a postponement of the replacement decision indefinitely.

Within the Consortium itself, a number of factors appear to be converging to force a postponement of a common decision. In Belgium the tilt remains toward the Mirage; in Norway the current Parliamentary situation appears likely to preclude anything more than a statement of intent to buy; in Denmark the influence of the Trade Union Council urging a Viggen "buy" could be compelling. However, Embassy Copenhagen reports that new MOD Orla Moller, told US Ambassador Crowe that he's confident Denmark will opt for the F-16 after a lengthy Parliamentary debate. Hence the multilateral situation is as much in flux as Vredeling's own internal situation.

~~DECLASSIFY on 31 Dec 1983~~

~~Classified by Director, European Region, ISA~~

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Date: 23AUG2024

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If, in fact, the revitalization of the European aircraft industry is the driving concern underlying Vredeling's hesitancy to opt immediately for the F-16, then the quality and breadth of the US proposals at both the industrial and technological levels should help ease his concern that cooperation with the US might endanger the future viability of the European industry. As Dr. Currie has pointed out to the Consortium Ministers and staff, cooperation with the US will be beneficial. The industry's future depends heavily on having first class technology and the US proposals will enable the Consortium industries to acquire a lasting capability in many high technology areas such as electronics, radar, propulsion and weaponry. We are committed to the infusion of many of our latest technologies into the Consortium's aerospace industry.

Also, in terms of the Netherlands' initiatives looking toward "specialization" within NATO, the US package provides the best means of long-term capability for confronting future threats. US deployment of the aircraft to Europe allows for an immense amount of interoperability, complementarity and common support.

With respect to the overall Netherlands defense effort (Tab 2), the Dutch delegation at NATO does not have great concern about the forthcoming DPC specific recommendations on the implementation of the Defense plan.

The March 14 Cabinet meeting should see Vredeling making a firm recommendation on the Netherlands' choice. Because Vredeling appears not to have crystallized his thinking except for generalized and symbolic notions, his US meetings could be critical. He will be looking for us to guide him to firm ground on which to base his case for selecting an American solution.

LATE DEVELOPMENTS

On March 6 General Dynamics' Vice-President Otto Glasser met with Mr. Clements and Mr. Ellsworth and furnished the materials at Tab 5 which he believes would be useful in talking with Vredeling. Vredeling's Defense Information Director Slighting (who will be with Vredeling) has said Vredeling would like to have any intelligence we have about the comparative combat capabilities of the F-16 as against Soviet aircraft. He would also like to know any information we have that USSR plans the construction of an air superiority fighter for the 1980s. He would use both to counter the arguments of a segment of his own Labor Party that F-16 procurement gives added impetus to the "arms race." (Embassy The Hague Message, Tab 6). Dr. Currie has asked DIA to have a fifteen minute briefing available to give to Vredeling if you desire. DIA will also furnish a brief on the subject (Tab 7).

Norway. On 6 March, US Ambassador Byrne met with Norwegian Prime Minister Bratteli and subsequently MOD Fostervoll and reports that he believes he was successful in convincing them of the need for Norway to stay with the Consortium and participate in a financial commitment rather than withdrawing and giving a "letter of intent" as the Prime Minister had believed might be done in view of Parliamentary pressures (Embassy Oslo Message, Tab 8).

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 MAR 1975

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~~SECRET~~


Robert Ellsworth
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

DETAILS OF VISIT

NAME & TITLE OF VISITOR: Hendrikus Vredeling, The Netherlands
Minister of Defense

TIME & DATE: 1600 Hours, 10 March 1975

LOCATION: Your Office

HOW TO ADDRESS VISITOR: Mr. Minister or Minister Vredeling

PARTICIPANTS:

US

SecDef
ASD/ISA Robert Ellsworth
Ambassador Kingdon Gould, Jr.
Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Dir.,
Defense Research & Engineering
Mr. Frank Shrontz, Assistant
Secretary AF (I&L)
LTG Howard Fish, DASD, Security
Assistance
MG John A. Wickham, Jr., Mil
Asst to SecDef
Mr. Charles Lloyd, Asst for
Central Europe (ISA)

NETHERLANDS

Minister Hendrikus Vredeling
Ambassador Robert Tamenoms-Bakker
Mr. Albert J. Sligting, Director
Defense Information
Col Johannes J. F. Van Brussel,
Air Attache, Netherlands Embassy

RECENT MEETING WITH MOD VREDELING

September 13, 1974 with other MODs in Consortium

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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ACTION

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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4453

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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 918

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4847

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RUFHOM/AMEMBASSY ROME 3167

RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 3130

BT

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 1849

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, NL

SURJ: LABOR PARTY CONGRESS

1. LABOR PARTY CONGRESS ON PEACE AND SECURITY OPENED

PAGE 1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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AFTERNOON APRIL 10. ONLY BUSINESS COMPLETED FIRST DAY WAS ELECTION MRS. IEN VAN DEN HEUVEL AS NEW PARTY CHAIRMAN. SHE HAS BEEN ACTING CHAIRMAN SINCE APPOINTMENT FORMER CHAIRMAN VAN DER LOUW AS MAYOR OF ROTTERDAM, AND IS KNOWN AS ARDENT PACIFIST AND FERVANT PROMOTER OF EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN.

2. IN POST-ELECTION STATEMENT VAN DEN HEUVEL EXPRESSED HOPE CONGRESS WOULD NOT PASS MOTION AGAINST DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN NATO AS THIS COULD ONLY EMBARRASS LABOR MEMBERS OF CABINET AND MIGHT CAUSE REPLACEMENT OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT BY ONE MUCH MORE TO RIGHT. BUT SHE ALSO SAID "NATO IS CREEPY BUSINESS" AND THAT SHE DOESN'T HAVE MUCH TIME FOR NATO. SHE SAID PARTY WAS NOT WILLING TO WAIT MUCH LONGER FOR CON RECOGNITION OF PRG. SHE WAS CRITICAL OF MOD VREDELING'S ANNOUNCED PREFERENCE FOR F-16 AS SUCCESSOR TO F-104'S AND SAID SHE HOPED LABOR PARTY AND ITS MEMBERS IN PARLIAMENT COULD CONVINCE GOVERNMENT TO "WITHDRAW FROM THESE WICKED PLANS."

3. MOST NOTABLE EVENT ON OPENING DAY OF CONGRESS DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN CONVENTION HALL BUT IN TV STUDIO WHERE MOD VREDELING GAVE INTERVIEW WHICH CAUSED UPROAR AMONGST HIS LABOR PARTY COLLEAGUES. VREDELING SAID THAT IF LABOR PARLIAMENTARIANS DID NOT SUPPORT HIS RECOMMENDATION FOR REPLACEMENT OF F-104'S HE WOULD RESIGN. IMPLICATION IS THAT BY HIS RESIGNATION VREDELING WOULD CAUSE CABINET CRISIS WHICH COULD BRING ABOUT FALL OF DEN UYL GOVERNMENT.

Resign

4. PARTY LEADERS REPORTEDLY WERE FURIOUS WITH MOD'S STATEMENT AND WAY IN WHICH IT WAS MADE. LABOR LEADER IN PARLIAMENT VAN THIJN, WHO EARLIER IN THE DAY HAD MADE CONCILIATORY STATEMENT ABOUT VREDELING, SAID NEITHER HE AND OTHER LABOR PARLIAMENTARIANS NOR PARTY CONGRESS COULD BE INFLUENCED BY SUCH PRESSURE. LABOR PARTY'S DEFENSE SPOKESMAN DANKERT SAID MOD'S THREAT PUT MONKEY WRENCH IN COMPROMISE THAT WAS BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN CABINET AND LABOR PARLIAMENTARIANS ON THIS MATTER.

5. LABOR PARTY EXECUTIVE HAS PRESENTED CONGRESS WITH DRAFT ON SELECTION OF 104 SUCCESSOR WHICH ASKS IT BE LOWEST IN COST AND SOPHISTICATION WHICH WOULD SATISFY

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

14 MAR 1975

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Refer to: I-21517/75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Netherlands MOD Visit

Participants:

Netherlands Side

Minister Hendrikus Vredeling
Ambassador Robert Tamenoms-Bakker
Director, Defense Information - Albert J. Sligting
Air Attache, Netherlands Embassy - Col Johannes J. F. Van Brussel
Aide to the Minister - Major W. C. Louwerse

US Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - Robert Ellsworth
US Ambassador to The Netherlands - Ambassador Kingdon Gould, Jr.
Secretary of the Navy - J. William Middendorf
Director, Defense Research & Engineering - Dr. Malcolm R. Currie
Assistant Secretary AF (I&L) - Frank Shrontz
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Security Assistance - LTG Howard Fish
Military Assistant to SecDef - MG John A. Wickham, Jr.
Director, Office of International Security Policy, State Dept - Leslie Brown
Deputy Director, European Region (ISA) - Ralph Jefferson
Director, Security Assistance Operations, DSAA (ISA) - Richard R. Violette



Time & Date: 1430-1600 Hours, 10 March 1975

Location: Deputy Secretary Clements' Briefing Room

1. ~~(S)~~ Aircraft Briefings

Following introductory remarks by Mr. Ellsworth, Dr. Currie began the meeting by noting that the DIA briefing would present intelligence on Soviet

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fighter aircraft as projected through the next ten years. An Air Force briefing would give a comparison of the F-16 with other aircraft. He noted that the purpose of the US lightweight fighter program were three-fold, (1) to achieve a military capability against the Warsaw Pact; (2) to sustain a vital aerospace industry in the Alliance; and (3) to create an aircraft which would be interesting to a wider audience. He noted that the F-16 brought together a number of technologies, such as the best engine with the economy inherent in a fan engine. In addition to the low initial cost involved, the F-16 provided economy in training and in the cost of fuel over the 10 to 15 year life of the aircraft. The aircraft also incorporates composite materials and proven innovations in aerodynamics. This, he noted, was complemented by its avionics which, in effect, are a generation beyond the F-15. He particularly stressed its ability to look down at enemy aircraft flying at low levels and its ability to map which gives it tremendous air-to-ground capability. The F-16 is a multipurpose aircraft. Minister Vredeling expressed the view that, although the aircraft had been developed for air superiority, it apparently had a strong ground support capability. Dr. Currie said that the navigation system of the F-16 in air-to-ground work is equivalent to the best the US has, that of the A-7. Dr. Currie noted the US commitment of the F-16 to Europe and the mutual benefits that would be inherent in coproduction and logistics support. He described this as a thrust towards standardization.

Minister Vredeling asked if under the Consortium program there would be any exceptions to the continued transfer of technology. Dr. Currie responded that there would be no exceptions but that there would be some phasing of technology transfer, such as in the heart of the lookdown radar where the decision concerning the digital processing system and its design knowledge would depend upon the capability of the countries to receive it. Minister Vredeling asked whether there would be any political difficulty in such technology transfer phasing, whether DOD could make that decision alone or whether Congress would decide. Dr. Currie said Defense would make the decision, although Congress was interested in assuring that transfer would not go to the Soviets or China.

2. ~~(S)~~ Soviet Fighter Aircraft

[REDACTED] outlined the history of Soviet fighter aircraft development and pointed out the likelihood that a new Soviet fighter is being developed for the 1980s. This would probably result in some 350 air superiority fighters deployed by the 1985 time period.

OSD FOIA 5
U.S.C. §
552(b)(3); 10
U.S.C. § 424

DIA FOIA 5
U.S.C. §
552(b)(3); 10
U.S.C. § 424

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[REDACTED] described the activities of the Soviet fighter design bureaus and noted that they continue in existence and that recently aircraft had been observed being trucked out of Moscow for testing. One aircraft did not fit the specifications of any known aircraft and could be a new type. Mr. Boyd concluded with the statement that development of the new type is likely in view of the history of Soviet accomplishments in high thrust-to-weight ratios and in maneuverability. This, he said, makes it unlikely that they will stop making advanced aircraft.

3. ~~(S)~~ Comparison of F-16 with other Fighter Aircraft

LTC Gentry noted that in the 1972 initiation of the program, the USAF was seeking an aircraft with the best maneuvering and handling qualities so as to provide a precision weapon platform and weapon capability in an aircraft with a high degree of persistence. With the use of slide charts, Colonel Gentry showed that the F-16 could provide faster and tighter turning with twice the acceleration of the F-4E. He noted that air combat is not generally conducted at over Mach 1.9 and that to achieve Mach 2.5 to 3 the cost is extremely high. Dr. Currie pointed out that even slight differences in the rate of turning capability enable an aircraft to dominate the battle. In the case of the F-16, Col Gentry said, it and the F-15 are the first aircraft able to gain altitude during the time they are maneuvering in close combat. Colonel Gentry concluded by noting that the US believed that it had done its homework and secured an aircraft capable of defeating the threat.

4. ~~(S)~~ Discussion with Minister Vredeling

Mr. Ellsworth asked Minister Vredeling to outline any problems that he would like to discuss with those present. Minister Vredeling noted that one of the questions he is asked is whether the Netherlands should have an aircraft for air superiority purposes--whether it is necessary. Some had suggested that an air-to-ground capability for the Netherlands would be sufficient, with air superiority provided, for example, by the US or in some other way. He asked whether the F-5 could discharge the air superiority role. General Fish said the F-5 would not be able to fulfill this mission in the 80s; not even F-4s would be able to. Dr. Currie noted the F-16 aircraft is multi-purpose and the role to be performed depends upon the decision by the Netherlands government as to which of its functions it wishes to emphasize. For example, to optimize an air superiority capability you would not carry the weapons pylons used in ground support action. In the ground support role, it has both the ability to map the ground and to carry extremely heavy loads.

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Minister Vredeling said that he also was concerned with the political argument that we are perhaps obliging the Russians to develop a more advanced fighter. Dr. Currie said that in his view, as technologies advance, it is inevitable that they will be incorporated into new aircraft. LTG Fish noted the long period of service expected of the F-16 and cited the fact that the F-4 had begun in 1954. The F-16 is at the beginning period of its life and its technology would put European industry into the best position. Dr. Currie commented that the Soviets do not seem to be in a reactive mood. Rather, they follow their own ideas of development. He said that about 90% of qualified Soviet scientists and technicians are working on military matters and that the Soviet goal as shown in government statements is to achieve technological military superiority. Mr. Ellsworth said that the Soviets will do what they feel is necessary in technology and in military weapons development. What they have to do they do without necessarily reacting to US moves. There is no evidence that the Russians will unilaterally restrain such efforts. With respect to MBFR, these negotiations are seeking to bring some restraint between the opposing forces in Europe, but the conclusions are some time away. Mr. Ellsworth also observed that it appears inevitable that the emergence of technology will be exploited for military purposes by nation states. Dr. Currie noted that we now have the Vladivostok Agreement and our goal is to draw down the numbers, but this then creates a demand for better quality within the fixed number. Mr. Ellsworth said that as tensions are reduced, we may look forward to a gradual diminution of weapons.

5. ~~(C)~~ Aircraft Industry in Europe

Minister Vredeling described the long term problem for small countries that will develop as a consequence of a decision now on the F-104 replacement. He noted that while larger countries could have Air Forces with a full mix of aircraft it appears that countries like Belgium and the Netherlands are limited to medium class aircraft. He said that while Europe had been a good customer of the US it was necessary for Europe to be able to do something for itself. Mr. Ellsworth said that in 1985 the aircraft industry in Europe will be producing such aircraft as the Viggen, Mirage, MRCA, Jaguar, and the Alpha Jet. The F-16 production would only constitute 15% of European military aircraft production. Although there is an aircraft industry in Europe, there is not a European aircraft industry organized as a entity. He thought that the procurement of the F-16 would not preclude nor preempt the organization of a European aircraft industry, but rather, on the contrary, the technology advances inherent in the F-16 might be helpful to its program. Secretary Shrontz also noted that third

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country sales of the F-16 would keep a business base for the European aircraft industry even without European follow-on orders. Minister Vredeling said even if the European aircraft industry does not exist it might be worthwhile to develop it, that there is no room for cut-throat competition. Secretary Shrontz said that the true participation by Europe in final design decision and production of the F-16 would be helpful to the creation of the European aircraft industry. Minister Vredeling noted that Holland and Belgium had to be careful not to jump too far so as to avoid taking a decision for both the F-104 replacement and the 1980 aircraft at this one time.

The meeting adjourned at 4 p.m. for Minister Vredeling's meeting with Secretary Schlesinger.

Memorandum of Conversation
Prepared by:
Mr. Charles T. Lloyd
OASD(ISA) European Region
14 March 1975

Approved:

H. Bergold
Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
DASD, European &
NATO Affairs (ISA)

Date: 14 MAR 1975

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Date: 23AUG2024

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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 APR 1975

In reply refer to:
I-21890/75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: SecDef - Norwegian MOD Meeting

Participants:

Norway Side

Minister of Defense Alv Jakob Fostervoll
Ambassador Søren Christian Sommerfelt
Under Secretary, Ministry of Defense - Laase Aasland
Co-production Coordinator, Ministry of Defense - Parlow Andresen
Inspector General for Flying, RAAF - Brigadier K. Bjoerge-Hansen
Defense Attache - RAdm Thorleif Pettersen

US Side

Secretary of Defense - James R. Schlesinger
Deputy Secretary of Defense - William P. Clements, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - Robert Ellsworth
US Ambassador to Norway - Thomas R. Byrne
Secretary of the Air Force - John L. McLucas
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Security Assistance, LTG Howard M. Fish
Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State Dept. - James E. Goodby
Military Assistant to SecDef - MG John A. Wickham, Jr.
Military Assistant to DepSecDef - LTC Peter M. Dawkins
Assistant for Northern Europe (ISA) - Dr. Joseph Annunziata

Time & Date: 1430-1530 hours, 24 March 1975

Location: Secretary Schlesinger's Office

1. ~~(S)~~ F-104 Replacement

Minister Fostervoll began by stating that the problem of the F-104 replacement is now not as large as it could have been. There is now a good chance that the Defense Ministers of the four European members of the proposed Consortium

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records and Declass Div, WHS
Date: 23AUG2024

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will come to an agreement at their next meeting, on April 3, though the position of the Belgians is still uncertain. SecDef asked if MOD Fostervoll knew the position of the Dutch. MOD Fostervoll said the Dutch position could depend on that of the Belgians. He intended to encourage the Belgians to decide in favor of the F-16 by emphasizing the advantages of keeping the group together, the need for standardization in NATO, and the fact that he has no authority to choose any aircraft other than the F-16. He expected that on April 3 all the Defense Ministers would declare which aircraft they prefer. If the Belgians chose the Mirage, he intended to call for an adjournment of the meeting so the ministers can consult further with their governments. Another meeting would then be called, at which time the Belgians would hopefully agree with the other three countries on the F-16. MOD Fostervoll had talked to Dutch MOD Vredeling on March 22 and given him information which MOD Vredeling could use in persuading the Belgians; however, he had not received word on MOD Vredeling's approach to the Belgians.

Mr. Clements expressed his understanding that news reports in Norway might point out that Minister Fostervoll does not have full authority to select the F-16, and that the governmental Defense Commission still has authority to withdraw Norway from the Consortium at a relatively small termination cost. MOD Fostervoll was concerned that we might misinterpret such statements. It is not unusual for politicians to say words which may seem to be at variance with their intent. SecDef said he was pleased to receive advance notice of MOD Fostervoll's approach in obtaining political acquiescence for his decision. He then asked whether MOD Fostervoll intended to sign the Memorandum of Understanding before the May 15 deadline? MOD Fostervoll responded yes, if the Belgians agree. Mr. Clements added that if the Belgians do not agree, this will complicate matters and MOD Fostervoll will have to consult again with his Parliament. SecDef asked about the probability that the Belgians will agree. MOD Fostervoll replied that the Belgians are under considerable pressure not to choose the F-16, but that it is important for the four European countries to stay together. The Belgians have perhaps most to gain from the F-16. There will be extreme pressure on the Belgians after the other three countries have made clear on April 3 that no other airplane than the F-16 is acceptable. SecDef asked whether the matter would then have to be considered by the Belgian cabinet. MOD Fostervoll said that was so. SecDef commented that the proposed procedure was very encouraging.

MOD Fostervoll said that at times the maneuvers in this operation may have appeared to be confusing. In Norway, the Defense Commission had created some difficulty. Since the F-104 replacement problem was part of the next Norwegian long-term defense plan, this decision should normally be made by the Defense Commission in 1976. A governmental decision to purchase the F-16 by May 15 seems to preempt the Defense Commission's right to make that decision. That is why he must underscore the termination provision in the Memorandum of Understanding.

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MOD Fostervoll then asked under what conditions the Consortium could continue if Belgium chose not to participate. SecDef said he did not think this was an insuperable problem. Mr. Clements agreed, but said a new arrangement would have to be figured out. MOD Fostervoll pointed out that he would have to present to Parliament any new arrangement for continuing with three European members in the Consortium if Belgium chose not to participate on April 3. He then reiterated his strong support for the F-16 on the grounds of strengthening NATO and bringing about greater standardization.

2. ~~(S)~~ Roland II SHORADS Missile

MOD Fostervoll reported that, although no decision has so far been made within the Norwegian government or Parliament, funds have already been authorized by Parliament for the acquisition of a SHORADS missile. There have been some political problems with the French Crotale. He was satisfied with the applicability to Norway's situation of the transportable version of the Roland II which the US is developing. He would be interested in acquiring the US version; but when the final decision will be made is not yet known. Mr. Aasland noted that a Cabinet decision will be made after Easter. The MOD will propose to the Cabinet to acquire the Roland II. They would like a government-to-government contract and would submit a letter of intent when appropriate. SecDef said he thought there would be no difficulty in this matter and no time pressure for getting the process under way. He inquired whether the Norwegians had visited facilities here and received our evaluation of the Roland II. MOD Fostervoll replied that they had.

3. ~~(S)~~ British Defense Review

MOD Fostervoll expressed some concern over the possible effect of British force reductions on the capability of Netherlands Marines to reinforce Norway in the event of war. He would like to take up a discussion of the implications of the reductions within the EuroGroup (Chaired by British MOD Mason), but he would not want to go too far in criticizing the British plans. He asked whether SecDef has expressed his views on the matter. SecDef said he had expressed his views. He was reluctant to accept the thinning out on NATO's flanks, but he was satisfied that there will be no diminished effort on the central front. The British made their decision out of political and economic necessity, and regret it, whereas the Dutch seemed to be more forthright about their reductions. Mr. Bergold suggested that the Netherlands is sensitive about its reductions and realizes it has impaired its capability. Perhaps by the time of the EuroGroup meeting, the Netherlands may have re-evaluated its reduced capability. Ambassador Sommerfelt asked whether there were any consequences for the US resulting from the British review. SecDef said it might require the earmarking of more forces for Norway. He then asked if Norway was planning to do something about the situation. He recalled that Britain is spending about 5.8% of its GNP on defense, while Norway is spending less than 4%. MOD Fostervoll said he could not give a good answer to that question. SecDef noted that we must have a certain amount of sympathy for Britain as a declining world power.

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4. ~~(S)~~ Portugal

MOD Fostervoll inquired as to the latest developments in Portugal. Mr. Bergold said there was not much encouraging news. The Armed Forces Movement would apparently strengthen its control over the composition and policy direction of the government. SecDef noted that we will have to face the reality that the Communists will have de facto control over the government, in that compromises will have to be made with them. Mr. Bergold added that approximately half the Cabinet ministries are expected to be filled by Communists and Communist sympathizers. Ambassador Sommerfelt asked whether the Communists would be able to control the "young Turks" of Portugal. SecDef replied that it would be an unsettling experience from the Communist standpoint. Portugal would not be as easy to control as some of the East European countries, though the Communists have some experience in equally volatile Cuba. Ambassador Sommerfelt asked what would happen to the US base in the Azores. SecDef said that remains to be seen. The new government would probably hesitate to do anything about it immediately, but prospects appear bleak. We would also have to consider how to deal with Portugal in NATO councils. Secretary McLucas pointed out that NATO has a precedent in the voluntary absence of the French from certain NATO military planning councils, but we don't know whether the Portuguese will do the same.

5. ~~(S)~~ Spain and NATO

SecDef brought up another NATO matter concerning the Iberian peninsula. He recalled NATO's current relationship with Spain and suggested that with the potential loss of Portugal to NATO Spain could be helpful in compensating for that loss. Although Spain had provided substantial support for NATO for many years, Norway objected to a closer relationship of Spain to NATO. With the weakening of NATO's southern flank through the unsettling conditions in Turkey, Greece, and Portugal, this might be the time for Norway to reconsider its position regarding Spain's relationship to NATO. While understanding that MOD Fostervoll could give no immediate response to this suggestion, SecDef asked him to report the changing situation in NATO's southern flank to his government, and to suggest to it that the prospective departure of Franco from the scene in Spain might provide the occasion for regularization of relations with Spain. NATO could use the added support of Spain. At the moment, the US was discussing its basing agreements with Spain, and the Spanish were insistent in pointing out that they have been providing substantial support for NATO, while continuing to be ostracised from NATO. A reconsideration of NATO policy towards Spain was more important to NATO now than ever before.

MOD Fostervoll recognized that we must encourage the rise in governments of democratic forces we would like to see in power. Norway, for example, had provided advice and economic support for the moderate forces in Portugal. Events happened so quickly in Portugal in the last few days that the situation had not been discussed thoroughly in the Cabinet. The communique of the recent Nordic Council meeting showed that the member countries, including Norway and Denmark, were very much concerned about the situation in Portugal. What conclusions would be drawn by the Labor Party and the labor unions was as yet

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unknown. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs would have to formulate his views on Norway's and NATO's relationships with Portugal and Spain. We would follow this up with further bilateral discussion.


The general meeting was concluded at 1530 hours, followed by a private meeting between SecDef and MOD Fostervoll.

Memorandum of Conversation

Prepared by:

Dr. Joseph Annunziata
OASD(ISA)EurReg
31 March 1975

Approved by:


Robert E. Ellsworth
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

Distribution:

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INTERNATIONAL
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Declassified in Full
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Chief, Records and Declass Div,
WHS

Refer to: I-23081/75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: SecDef - Norwegian MOD Meeting (U)

Participants:

Norway Side

Minister of Defense - Alv Jacob Fostervoll
Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to NATO - Rolf T. Busch
Secretary General, Ministry of Defense - Caspar Stephansen
Chief of Secretariat for Security Affairs, Plans Division, Ministry
of Defense - Ole Martin Engh
Defense Counsellor at NATO - Johs. Leine

US Side

Secretary of Defense - James R. Schlesinger
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - Robert Ellsworth
Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to NATO - David K. E. Bruce
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
Military Assistant to SecDef - MG John A. Wickham, Jr.
Director, European and NATO Affairs (ISA) - MG D. P. McAuliffe

Time and Date: Approximately 1800 hours, 23 May 1975

Location: US Mission to NATO, Brussels

1. (U) Because the Secretary was delayed in seeing MOD Fostervoll on his arrival, Mr. Ellsworth met with the Norwegians and discussed the problem of the Norwegian proposal to procure the US version of the ROLAND II air defense system (see separate MemCon). A summary of the topics discussed with the Secretary is contained in the paragraphs below.

2. ~~(S)~~ F-16

MOD Fostervoll opened the meeting by referring to his just-completed discussion with Mr. Ellsworth about the ROLAND problem. Both he and the

Director, European Region

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Secretary agreed that the US must handle this problem promptly (SecDef commented in a humorous vein that we are notorious in our ability to handle French problems). Fostervoll then went on to discuss the situation pertaining to the F-16 aircraft. He said that his parliament is expected to vote in favor of procuring the F-16. Concerning the other members of the four-nation consortium, decisions are expected soon in The Hague, Brussels, and Copenhagen. The Danish decision is at hand both in the government and the party of the MOD; however, the Danish MOD would like to be the last one, among the four nations, to announce the decision. Fostervoll said that he would talk to the MOD in an effort to persuade the Danes to go ahead now on their decision. He planned to go to The Hague that evening to be on hand for (although not present at) the Dutch Cabinet Meeting expected to run late that night. Concerning Belgium, a final discussion is expected to take place in their parliament next week (week of 26 May). He said that the chances are high that "we will succeed" and the four nations will sign by the end of May. The possibility, previously discussed with Secretary Schlesinger, of three of the nations going together on this is now out of the question. Fostervoll was still not sure of the Belgian outcome, indicating that he is not clear on the dimensions of the problem there. Some of the problem relates to the French aircraft industry and its appeal in Belgium; another is tied up in the question of the French-speaking versus Flemish-speaking sides; also there appears to be some problem in the relationship between the Prime Minister and the MOD. Fostervoll concluded by saying that if Belgium decides against the F-16, he believes that the Netherlands may decide not to purchase any aircraft (i.e., do nothing).

3. ~~(S)~~ Flank Reinforcement

Secretary Schlesinger said he talked with the Norwegian Chief of Defense Staff, Gen. Zeiner-Gundersen, when he visited Washington about increasing carrier operations in Norwegian waters. The Secretary said that he is directing that the US Marines give more attention toward NATO's Northern Flank, and commented to Fostervoll that this is something of a benefit from our withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Fostervoll accepted this as good news. The Secretary then asked if there was still a problem in the relationship between West Germany and Northern Norway. Fostervoll responded that it is getting better, and that cooperation is growing, particularly in the defense area. If it continues to improve, he expects that eventually it will be possible for German units to exercise in the northland. In an aside, Fostervoll said that most Norwegians now regard the new Germany as the Germany of Willy Brandt. Brandt is highly regarded in Norway, and is a former Norwegian citizen. Secretary Schlesinger asked if the British are still on board in the north. Fostervoll expressed some concern but said he has not yet talked to MOD Mason about this. He is also concerned about the capability to deploy Marines of the Netherlands to the northland. Since these are carried by British ships, this capability may be affected by the UK Defense Review. Fostervoll said he would like to offer to the UK the argument that Norway depends upon that reenforcement capability.

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4. ~~(S)~~ Spain and NATO

The discussion then turned to the issue of recognition by NATO of the potential contribution of Spain to the defense of Western Europe, a proposal put forth by the US in the Restricted Session of the DPC. Minister Fostervoll stated that this subject, which was then receiving prominence in the press, as well as the question of South African bases, would result in a new round of questions in NATO capitals and could provoke harsh comments about Spain and about NATO membership. (Note: The comment about South African bases resulted from some inaccurate comments made to the Dutch press the evening before by the Dutch MOD Vredeling, taking out of context part of the discussion in the DPC Restricted Session.) Fostervoll's concern was that the treatment of Spain in the DPC Communique and in public statements by NATO Ministers could prematurely stir up animosity about Spain in Europe. Secretary Schlesinger responded that he hoped it would serve to awaken interest and generate serious thinking about Spain, so that there could be some recognition of the value to the Alliance of Spain after Franco. He commented that to convey the view to Spain that they are a pariah will not be helpful to the Spanish people or their evolving relationship with Europe. Ambassador Bruce stated that the Spanish have felt isolated and that this feeling has helped to keep Franco in power. He went on to say that we (the US) are continually asked to consult with the Alliance on those actions we take which are of mutual interest. The fact that we are, in effect, consulting about developments in our bilateral relationship with Spain should not now result in a row in NATO. Secretary Schlesinger concluded by noting that Spain is an emotional issue in Europe, particularly in Northern Europe, and we should all seek to normalize relationships with that country. There is something of a parallel situation in Yugoslavia with Tito. We should, he commented, treat these situations as objects of analysis and move toward resolution of the problems.

Memorandum of Conversation

Prepared by:

Major General D. P. McAuliffe

Approved by: 

Robert E. Egan

Assistant Secretary of Defense

International Security Affairs

Date: 6/3/75

Declassified in Full

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Chief, Records and Declass Div, WHS

Date: 23AUG2024

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a strong antimilitaristic tradition. In wanted to leave NATO, a NATO ling to most Socialists carried out a e Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ame too late to much influence the f that year. In the program the party h Air Force. In their reasoning the arguments used by critics of the ecialization and standardization. The the two services within NATO most g redundant and wasting money that In their 1968 program the Dutch ce and Hawk batteries to the Army, : United States,* and the integration ith the Army and the Navy.⁵ In 1971 l with the points largely unchanged. Since the other parties did not share blished the Air Force felt safe for the

the whipping boy of NATO. Lately nage of longhaired Dutch soldiers, system was one of the most clever he Dutch forces ranked among the

headache for Dutch politicians and mmittees studied the question while tee committee report of December the Dutch Air Force. Operating out was to provide:

adrons until 1968 when the number was in and German nuclear squadrons the Dutch the United States. Norway and Denmark

Since the Netherlands also has a Naval Air Force the air forces together covered all the tasks of considerably larger powers such as Germany or Italy. A subsequent study by the Van Rijckevorsee Committee led to the same conclusion in July 1973.

Both the Air Force and the Socialists knew that the crucial point in time was to be when the Starfighters, acquired in 1961-63 were to become obsolete. The Socialists wanted to use this occasion not to replace them but to have a team B air force of Northrop Freedom Fighters until they too became obsolete and the goal of no Dutch Air Force at all could be achieved. The Air Force had rather different ideas about its own future. Defense Minister den Toom had begun cooperation with Norway and Canada in 1970 both concerning the F-5 that all the three nations had in their inventory, but also to see whether they could buy the same combat plane for the future. Traditional close ties between Norway, the Netherlands, and the Canadian role on the Northern flank in war time made such cooperation logical. His successor, de Koster, Defense Minister from July 1972 continued the same cooperation and also decided to invite specific firms to offer their aircraft.

In July 1972 de Koster invited Dassault, Saab, and Northrop to come in with offers for the Mirage F, the Viggen and the Cobra. The Cobra at the time was only a paper plane, but the YF-17 was due to fly in 1974 and the Dutch knew the Cobra program better than most. Excluded already at this point were the F-5 E Tiger and the BAC/Dassault Jaguar. Although not formally in the Dutch running the last two planes were to pop up again and again throughout the story.

So far the Dutch Air Force could be content. All the three planes invited in were of team A quality and would if selected lead to a continuous Dutch Air Force with both an A and a B team. But of course in politics anything could happen up to the point when the contracts were signed.

In May 1973 the dreaded event occurred: a new Centre-Left coalition was formed and the Socialist Henk Vredeling became Defense Minister. Three younger Socialists, Dankert, de Vries, and Stemerdink were the party's defense experts, but Vredeling had a distinguished international career as an expert on agriculture behind him, and it was time for him to become a cabinet member. He was also quite a guy. Tough and eccentric he became known for his remarks on how he hated uniforms, but the Dutch armed forces were bickering amongst themselves and the new Prime Minister den Uyl thought that Vredeling would be a good man to run the Defense Ministry. James Schlesinger liked him a lot as did his international mentor, the German Defense Minister Georg Leber. Throughout his period in office he often consulted with these two colleagues, more experienced in defense matters.

As good soldiers the Dutch Air Force brass had a contingency plan that they now put into action. The Netherlands wanted specialization studies to be undertaken by NATO and when Vredeling brought up the issue in the Defense

Danfer, Arms Deal

30 / ARMS DEAL

The April 3, 1975 meeting of the defense ministers only went so far as to say that the F-16 was the best combat aircraft, and that other factors now would decide the outcome since all the three remaining aircraft were adequate for the European missions. The effort to put pressure on the reluctant Belgian through meetings by the other three nations to discuss a three-country solution was difficult to assess. As late as May, the Belgian reaction was still in doubt, even when the three other nations signed the memorandum of understanding with the U.S. government on May 30th. Exploiting his position to the hilt, Vanden Boeynants, the Belgian defense minister, came to Washington on June 1, for final talks with Secretary Schlesinger. On behalf of his own government and those of his three partners, Vanden Boeynants managed to clarify a great many things and gain further concessions from Schlesinger.³⁵

On June 9, the signed Belgian MOU was sent to Washington where Defense Secretary Schlesinger signed it the next day. This, along with the Preliminary Contract, signed bilaterally between each of the four defense ministers and the U. S. Secretary of Defense, covering the first year of the program, closed the deal.³⁶ The real problems were about to begin.

Since the Korean W "forward" position around the Mediterranean. To keep carriers in all, due to tra carriers had been either a under Admiral Zumwalt, loadings so that all ships co Navy was planning to decr maintain that number dur facilitated force planning s same force structure.² Abou equipment number of the reserve and pipeline added

The brown-shoe avia when Admiral Zumwalt t accordingly ample. Two tr main attack airplanes: LTV A-6 all-weather heavy-atta

The fighter cover for F-4 Phantom, the most con and the U. S. Air Force ali had at first not done well i enemy, no threat was ever Soviet Union rather than V