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SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 00300

PARIS FOR SECDEF

TAGS: OVIP (CARLUCCI, FRANK), PREL, MARR, US, SA
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF DEFENSE PRINCE SULTAN AND
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI DISCUSS GULF POLICIES

REFERENCE: RIYADH 00288

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NOTE: PLEASE CANCEL REFTEL. THIS CABLE CONTAINS
CORRECTIONS DICTATED BY SECDEF PARTY.

3. SUMMARY: DURING MEETING WITH MODA PRINCE SULTAN
JANUARY 9, SECDEF SOUGHT PRINCE SULTAN'S VIEWS ON THE
GULF WAR. PRINCE SULTAN SAID SAUDI ARABIA WOULD ASSESS
TIVELY DEFEND ITS AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE
VIOLENCE IN THE GULF ITSELF, HE THOUGHT, COULD BE AD-
DRESSED BY THE ALLIES. SECRETARY CARLUCCI BELIEVED IT
WOULD BE WORTHWHILE FOR THE ALLIES AND THE GCC STATES TO
WORK OUT A COMMON APPROACH TO GULF SECURITY. PRINCE
SULTAN WONDERED IF A COMMON GCC-ALLIED FRONT MIGHT CAUSE
THE SOVIET UNION TO SIDE WITH IRAN. THE SECRETARY GAVE
CATEGORICAL NEGATIVE RESPONSE, AND SULTAN THEN MUSED
ABOUT HOW TO COUNTER SOVIET PLOY. PERHAPS WE SHOULD
TELL SOVIETS THAT ANY UN FORCE SHOULD BE ON LAND AS WELL
AS IN GULF. THE SECRETARY AFFIRMED THE RUSSIANS WOULD
NOT REPEAT NOT SIDE WITH THE IRANIANS OVER THE ARABS, IF
FORCED TO CHOOSE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL, THEREFORE, TO PRESS
FOR AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN. AFTERWARDS, WE COULD
LISTEN TO WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAD TO SAY. PRINCE SULTAN
FURTHER EXPLAINED THE KINGDOM'S PREDICAMENT: IT HAS A
CREDIBLE DEFENSE CAPABILITY BUT DID NOT WANT TO USE IT
EXCEPT AS A LAST RESORT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT COULD
NOT AFFORD TO REFLAG ITS VESSELS BECAUSE THE SAUDI
PUBLIC WOULD THEN ASK, "WHAT HAVE WE BOUGHT ALL THESE
WEAPONS FOR?" PRINCE SULTAN AGAIN APPEALED FOR A
RELIABLE, CONTINUING MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE
U. S. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ON THIS POINT,
NOTWITHSTANDING CRITICS IN CONGRESS AND THE PRESS, THE
PRESIDENT SUPPORTS SUCH COOPERATION AND WILL PREVAIL.
END SUMMARY.

4. SECRETARY CARLUCCI'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF
DEFENSE PRINCE SULTAN TOOK PLACE IN PRINCE SULTAN'S
PALACE ON JANUARY 9, 1988. ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS AT
THE MEETING WERE AMBASSADOR PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN AND
AMBASSADOR HUME HORAN.

5. AFTER THE CONVENTIONAL PLEASANTRIES, SECRETARY
CARLUCCI SAID THE SITUATION IN THE GULF WAS LOOKING
BETTER. HE HAD SEEN IMPRESSIVE EXAMPLES OF U. S.-SAUDI
COOPERATION DURING HIS VISIT TO THE EASTERN PROVINCE.
THESE AND OTHER EXAMPLES OF COOPERATION WERE NOT LOST ON
THE IRANIANS. THEY WERE HAVING AN EFFECT. THE IRANIANS
MIGHT BE FANATICAL, BUT THEY ARE NOT STUPID.

6. THE SECRETARY TOLD PRINCE SULTAN THAT AMONG MANY

ACTION USDP:SPECIAL HANDLING(13) (R,M,C)
INFO SECDEF(1) SECDEF(9) USDP:P&L(1) ASD:PA(2)
ASD:PA&E(1)

SUBJECTS OF COMMON INTEREST. THE GULF UNDOUBTEDLY HAD
TOP PRIORITY. WE CONTINUE TO NOTE WITH CONCERN THE ACTS
OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MERCHANT SHIPPING. THE U. S. GOVERN-
MENT WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN PRINCE SULTAN'S VIEWS
OR COUNSEL.

JAN 12 1988

7. PRINCE SULTAN OBSERVED THAT GULF VIOLENCE HAD BOTH A
REGIONAL AND A MULTILATERAL QUALITY. SAUDI ARABIA HAD
ALWAYS MAINTAINED AN ASSERTIVE DEFENSIVE POSTURE WITH
REGARD TO ITS AIRSPACE, ITS TERRITORY, AND TERRITORIAL
WATERS. IT WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO WITH THE ASSISTANCE
OF AN EFFECTIVE AIR FORCE AND NAVY. IT WAS, OF COURSE,
ESSENTIAL THAT THE U. S. CONTINUE TO COOPERATE AND PRO-
VIDE ASSISTANCE TO THESE TWO BRANCHES OF THE SAUDI ARMED
FORCES SO THEY COULD CONTINUE TO DO THEIR JOB. IN
ADDITION, SAUDI ARABIA HAS THE CAPABILITY OF PROJECTING
FORCE BEYOND ITS TERRITORIAL LIMITS. SUCH A CONSIDERA-
TION, IN TURN, RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION IN THE GULF.

8. PRINCE SULTAN BELIEVED THE U. S. AND ITS ALLIES HAD

SECTION 02 OF 03 RIYADH 00300

PARIS FOR SECDEF

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CARLUCCI, FRANK), PREL, MARR, US, SA
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF DEFENSE PRINCE SULTAN AND

A RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRAFFIC IN THE GULF. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS
RESPONSIBILITY, IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THEM TO ACT
AGAINST INCIDENTS OF IRANIAN VIOLENCE. IF THEY WERE TO
DO SO, THEY WOULD SEND A CLEAR, BELIEVABLE SIGNAL TO THE
IRANIANS.

9. SECRETARY CARLUCCI SAID IT WAS MOST DESIRABLE THAT
THE U. S. AND SAUDI ARABIA WORK CLOSELY TO IMPROVE GULF
SECURITY. NEITHER PARTY SHOULD ACT IN ISOLATION; IN
FACT, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR GULF SECURITY THAT ALL RESPON-
SIBLE GULF NATIONS AND THEIR FRIENDS WORK TOGETHER.
IRAN HAD LONG BEEN AN EXPANSIONIST POWER AND WAS LIKELY
TO REMAIN ONE.

10. PRINCE SULTAN AGREED THAT CLOSE COORDINATION AND
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GULF COOPERATION STATES AND
THEIR WESTERN ALLIES WAS MOST IMPORTANT. IN CONSIDERING
SUCH AN APPROACH, HOWEVER, SAUDI ARABIA NEEDED TO LOOK
TO ITS OWN FORCES IN THE GCC. WHEN ONE SPEAKS OF THE
GCC, ONE SPEAKS OF SAUDI ARABIA. THE KINGDOM WAS NINETY
PER CENT OF THE GCC. AS PRINCE SULTAN CONSIDERED A MORE
CLOSELY COORDINATED, JOINT EFFORT IN THE GULF, HE, AS A
SAUDI, HAD THIS THOUGHT: WOULD SUCH AN EFFORT PROMPT
THE SOVIETS AND IRAN TO MOVE CLOSER TOGETHER? UNDER
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, MIGHT THE RUSSIANS GIVE A GREEN
LIGHT TO SOME OF THEIR SATELLITE NATIONS, SUCH AS
POLAND, NORTH VIETNAM, AND NORTH KOREA, WHICH COULD THEN
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ARMS TO IRAN? AND WOULD THE WAR THEN
GO ON IN A MORE POLARIZED, INTENSE FASHION?

11. PRINCE SULTAN SOUGHT THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON A
CONFIGURATION FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REGIME IN
THE GULF. WHAT IF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME--INCLUDING
THE SOVIETS--WERE SET UP, ON LAND AND SEA, TO STOP GULF
HOSTILITIES? THAT WAY, IF THE RUSSIANS COOPERATE, THE
RESULTS WOULD BE GOOD; AND IF THE RUSSIANS WISH NOT TO
COOPERATE, A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT WOULD
STILL BE UNDERWAY, WITH THE RUSSIANS CLEARLY MARKED AS
AN UNCOOPERATIVE ELEMENT. WHAT DID THE SECRETARY THINK
OF SUCH AN IDEA?

12. PRINCE SULTAN SOUGHT THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON THE
SOVIET PLOY OF A UN FORCE FOR THE GULF. WHY NOT TELL

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PAGE 1
110704Z JAN 88
03 SECT MSG

SECRET SPECAT

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THE SOVIETS THAT ANY SUCH FORCE SHOULD BE ON LAND AS WELL AS AT SEA. THAT WOULD PUT THE SOVIETS ON THE SPOT. WHAT DID THE SECRETARY THINK?

13. REGARDING THE SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE COORDINATED ALLIED ACTION AGAINST IRANIAN NAVAL ATTACKS, PRINCE SULTAN BELIEVED PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC MIGHT BROACH THE TOPIC WHEN HE SAW THE SECRETARY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE THOUGHT THE U. S. WOULD FIND THE FRENCH INTERESTED.

14. THE SECRETARY AGAIN STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF A CLOSER CONCERTED EFFORT INVOLVING ALL THE GCC STATES, THE U. S., AND ALLIES. THE WEST SHOULD NOT DO THIS ALONE. THE SAUDIS AND OTHER GCC STATES HAD TO PARTICIPATE. (IN SUBSEQUENT TALK WITH SULTAN AND BANDAR ENROUTE TO AIRPORT, THE SECRETARY DROVE THIS POINT HOME BY SAYING THAT SAUDI SHIPS AND PLANES WOULD NEED TO OPERATE WITH OURS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS BEFORE WE COULD EVEN CONSIDER ALTERING OUR PRESENT MISSION TO COME TO THE AID OF NON-U. S. FLAG VESSELS IN DISTRESS. WHILE THE U. S. DID HAVE A STRATEGIC INTEREST IN THE GULF, THE SAUDIS HAD A GREATER ONE. THEY HAVE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND SHOULD EMPLOY IT. WITHOUT THEIR SHARING THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND RISKS, CARLUCCI COULD NOT JUSTIFY EXPOSURE FOR U. S. FORCES. MOREOVER, SAUDI COOPERATION WITH U. S., USING WEAPONS WE HAD SOLD THEM, WOULD MAKE POSITIVE IMPRESSION ON U. S. OPINION. SULTAN AGREED TO CONSIDER THIS IDEA AND ASKED FOR MORE DETAILS AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE INVOLVED FOR SAUDIS.)

15. TO THIS, PRINCE SULTAN RESPONDED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD TO VIEW THE GULF CRISIS FROM A PROPER PERSPECTIVE. HE BELIEVED IT WAS ESSENTIAL, IN THE FIRST PLACE, THAT EVERYONE KEEP PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS. IN ADDITION, AS SAUDI ARABIA LOOKED TO THE FUTURE, IT SAW A CONTINUATION OF IRANIAN MENACE. THE NEXT PILGRIMAGE SEASON WAS ONLY FIVE MONTHS AWAY, AND IRAN WAS MAKING IT

~~SECRET SPECAT~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 RIYADH 00300

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PARIS FOR SECDEF

TAGS: OVIP (CARLUCCI, FRANK), PREL, MARR, US, SA
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF DEFENSE PRINCE SULTAN AND CLEAR THAT IT REMAINED AS HOSTILE AS EVER TO SAUDI ARABIA. IRAN'S THREATS WERE INCESSANT. FOR ITS PART, SAUDI ARABIA WAS DETERMINED THAT THE TROUBLES OF LAST YEAR WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECUR--EVEN IF IT MEANT CUTTING BACK ON IRANIAN PILGRIMAGE TRAFFIC. SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT ALLOW ITS SECURITY TO BE MENACED OR THREATENED BY IRAN.

16. IN THIS RESPECT, PRINCE SULTAN APPEALED FOR AN ASSURED, CONTINUED U. S. MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID SAUDI ARABIA'S ARMED FORCES WERE CONDITIONED TO AMERICAN EQUIPMENT. ADMITTEDLY, U. S. EQUIPMENT WAS SOMETIMES VERY EXPENSIVE, AND WE OFTEN HAGGLED OVER THE TERMS. BUT OUR RELATIONSHIP WAS SUCH THAT KING FAHD VERY MUCH WANTED TO PRESERVE A CONSTANT RATIO OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAT WAS APPROXIMATELY EIGHTY PER CENT U. S. VERSUS TWENTY PER CENT OTHER. NONE OF SAUDI ARABIA'S LEADERS WANTED THAT RATIO TO DIMINISH, MUCH LESS REVERSE ITSELF.

17. PRINCE SULTAN GAVE SOME FURTHER VIEWS ON SAUDI ARABIA'S RELATIONSHIP TO A GULF SECURITY REGIME. HE SAID THAT IN THEORY HE COULD--RIGHT NOW--PLACE A NUMBER OF THE KINGDOM'S COMMERCIAL VESSELS UNDER THE U. S. FLAG--JUST AS KUWAIT HAD DONE. BUT, ONE MUST REMEMBER THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS "NINETY PER CENT" OF THE GCC, AND IT CAN'T DO AS KUWAIT DID. SAUDI PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT ALLOW IT. SULTAN SAID THAT ON TELEVISION, AND ABOVE

THEIR OWN CITIES, SAUDIS SEE THEIR AIR FORCE ON DISPLAY. THEY HEARD CONSTANTLY OF THEIR MODERN NAVY. IF SAUDI ARABIA WERE TO PLACE THE AMERICAN FLAG ON ITS OWN SHIPS, HOWEVER, PEOPLE WOULD ASK "WHAT WAS ALL THIS ARMAMENT FOR?" THEY WOULD SEE IT AS A DEROGATION OF SOVEREIGNTY.

18. SAUDI ARABIA UNDOUBTEDLY COULD PROJECT FORCE--EVEN INTO INTERNATIONAL WATERS--BY SEA AND AIR. BUT IF IT DID SO, IT WOULD HAVE ITSELF ESCALATED THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN THE GULF. THE KINGDOM HAD A CREDIBLE SELF DEFENSE AND EARNESTLY LOOKED TO U. S. COOPERATION TO MAINTAIN AND INCREASE THIS DEFENSE CAPABILITY. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT WANT TO TAKE UP ARMS, OR RESORT TO THEM, EXCEPT AS A CLEAR, LAST RESORT.

19. SECRETARY CARLUCCI OBSERVED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD TO MAKE ITS OWN JUDGMENTS ABOUT GULF SECURITY. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE U. S., HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS TOLERABLE. OUR OPERATIONS WERE A SUCCESS. OUR OWN CONVOYS WERE PLYING THE SEA LANES UNDER OUR ESCORT AND WERE NOT BEING ATTACKED.

20. SECRETARY CARLUCCI COULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIABLE AND CONTINUING MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE U. S. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROBLEMS IN THE PAST. MORE RECENTLY, THOUGH, THE SITUATION SEEMED TO BE IMPROVED. A BILLION DOLLAR ARMS SALE HAD GONE THROUGH CONGRESS WITHOUT AN OPPOSING VOTE. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT THE CONGRESS IS NOW MORE CONSIDERATE OF WHAT IS IN THE U. S. NATIONAL INTEREST THAN IN TIMES PAST. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT ONE HEARD A MIXTURE OF OPINIONS FROM THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESS ABOUT OUR POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE KINGDOM. SOME OF THESE OPINIONS WERE CRITICAL. BUT THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT WAS CLEAR AND WOULD PREVAIL. MOREOVER, SUCH A U. S. POSITION WOULD CONTINUE UNCHANGED, HE BELIEVED, AFTER THE 1988 ELECTIONS.

21. PRINCE SULTAN AGREED, THEN EXCUSED HIMSELF TO GO TO THE AIRPORT TO MEET PRESIDENT MUBARAK. HE AND THE SECRETARY AGREED TO MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE SECRETARY'S AUDIENCE WITH THE KING.

22. THIS MESSAGE WAS SEEN AND CLEARED BY THE SECDEF'S PARTY.

23. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HORAN# BT

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PAGE 2 OF 2
110704Z JAN 88
03 SECT MSG