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
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1992

MEMO FOR: UNDER SECRETARY KANTER
UNDER SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ
ADM JEREMIAH
ADM STUDEMAN

SUBJ: Strengthening Iraq Sanctions

Attached is the paper drafted by Richard Haass that attempts to capture the consensus in our July 1 Iraq meeting and subsequent discussions. Please let me know if you wish to make further comments.


JON HOWE

ATTACHMENT

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STRENGTHENING THE IRAQ SANCTIONS REGIME

Saddam has been able to hang on to power in large part because key elements of his Sunni Arab power base have escaped for the most part the burden of sanctions. Critical to Saddam's hold on this key constituency is keeping open the Baghdad-Amman highway for illegal imports. Some 85% of all goods entering Iraq travel over the highway from Jordan, and, most important, virtually all the sanctions violations enter from Jordan. The Intelligence Community estimates that at least 10%, and maybe 30%, of the goods entering Iraq from Jordan are illegal under UN sanctions. In contrast, Iraq's borders with Syria, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are closed (except for minor smuggling), and we have not detected significant sanctions violations across those borders in the last two years. The only other open border is with Turkey, but the bulk of the goods crossing there go to the Kurdish-controlled northern provinces.

Our efforts to date to persuade Jordan to improve sanctions enforcement have failed. Two recent developments could alter that. The foiled coup in Baghdad on June 29, 1992, which Saddam blames on Jordan could lead to a crisis in Iraqi-Jordanian relations that in turn could prompt Jordan to reduce what it allows to reach Iraq. In addition, in recent days Jordan has tightened sanctions enforcement even as Amman rejected our Aqaba plus plan. This said, it is too soon to say if either event will have a long term impact on the sanctions problem. We can not count on them to do what we want done on the Jordan border. Indeed, either or both could lead to a further deterioration in Jordan's sanctions enforcement should King Hussein decide that appeasement of Saddam is the wisest course.

The Maritime Interception Force in the Gulf of Aqaba has intercepted almost 14,000 ships, boarded about 4,500 and diverted close to 300 for detailed inspection since August 1990. The MIF, however, has no authority to prevent goods manifested for Jordan from arriving in Aqaba, where they can be reexported to Baghdad. "Tightening" MIF operations would do little more than slow down what would still eventually reach Iraq. Therefore, the only viable approach for improving sanctions enforcement appears to be to erect an inspection regime inside Iraq.

U.N. Inspectors at Turaybil

The best option is to create a new inspection mechanism on the Iraqi side of the border at Turaybil. The inspectors would focus on inspecting the roughly 600 trucks which cross the border each day. Off-highway movement would also need to be monitored by random inspections (perhaps supported by U.S. technical means) to ensure that it was kept to acceptable limits. Some 100-150 UN inspectors likely would be required to carry out the task, possibly with some U.N. guards to discourage harassment. The

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benefits of this approach would be immediate. Food and medicine would still reach Baghdad but the bulk of sanctions violations would cease. Iraqi front companies in Amman would lose their primary means of moving goods into Iraq. This approach also has the virtue of focusing on Iraq, not Jordan, allowing us to pursue a peace process-focused relationship with Amman.

A New Resolution?

A key issue is whether we would need a new resolution to establish an inspection regime inside Iraq. Existing U.N. resolutions, especially UNSCR 665, provide considerable legal authority to create such a regime but do not explicitly authorize one. We may need a new resolution to forge the consensus needed to create an inspection regime. Tactically, however, we would argue that a resolution is unnecessary and that a statement by the Security Council President or the Secretary General would suffice. If necessary, we could barter our agreement to support a new resolution for a willingness by others to go that route procedurally.

To best secure Perm Five support, we will make the initial approach at the highest level, taking advantage of consultative opportunities on the margins of the G-7 and CSCE meetings. After making the case for taking this step, we would emphasize that our goal is monitoring and enforcing existing resolutions, not a fundamental shift in goals or objectives. To avoid either an anti-Jordanian label or creating new loopholes that would again require a new resolution to fix, it may be necessary in any new UNSCR to apply the regime to all of Iraq's borders or at least those open to crossborder traffic. The reality is that almost all the effort would be focused on the Baghdad-Amman highway.

Should we fail to secure U.N. support we could try a coalition approach, i.e. a ground equivalent of the MIF inside Iraq. This would lack the legitimacy of a U.N. regime and probably face serious political/diplomatic hurdles. The threat of such an approach could be helpful to rally support in the Council.

What is the "or else?"

Iraq is almost certain to try to block creation of such a force even if we gain UNSC support. We would need to have a credible threat to use force to persuade Saddam that he must allow the U.N. inspectors to take up their position. The preferred approach would be to threaten retaliatory military action against targets in Iraq if Saddam does not accept the U.N. inspectors. Military industrial facilities which have reopened due to illegal imports are one possible target set; so too are the sort of facilities we have targeted if Saddam interferes with UNSCOM activities. This approach was successful in forcing Saddam to accept the UNSCOM helicopters last September. It is an indirect approach, however, which depends upon deterrence rather than defense.

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