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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6 May 1989

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Review of Nuclear Testing Policy ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am forwarding their views on the National Security Council policy review paper on Further Restrictions on Nuclear Testing.

~~(S)~~ The Chiefs point out that thus far, the United States has been unable to identify any further restrictions on nuclear testing beyond the 150-kiloton limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) that would be consistent with national security. They also express the view -- which I share -- that it is unlikely that the United States will be able in the foreseeable future to identify any such restrictions. Accordingly, the Chiefs state that the best military advice is represented by dropping the commitment to immediate follow-on negotiations.

~~(S)~~ I believe the United States should enter into negotiations only when it has clearly defined negotiating objectives, and is prepared to negotiate in good faith. To do otherwise is a sure prescription for arriving at a bad outcome -- damaging U.S. security interests and reputation. Therefore, appreciating the military advice of the Chiefs, I strongly believe that U.S. security interests would be best served if we proceed to follow-on negotiations only after arms reduction agreements in other areas have increased U.S. security and enhanced stability, and we have been able to identify further restrictions on nuclear testing, based on such agreements, that would be consistent with U.S. security. U.S. policy, as stated in the President's September 1988 report to the Congress, should be so clarified.

~~(S)~~ If any further clarification of U.S. policy is deemed necessary, such clarification should emphasize that arms reduction agreements, nuclear and non-nuclear, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for further restrictions on nuclear testing. Not every arms reduction will necessarily provide a basis for identifying an acceptable additional limitation on testing.

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
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(However, U.S. policy should emphasize that the United States is prepared to examine each specific arms reduction to see if it provides a basis for a specific further restriction on testing that would contribute to U.S. security and international stability.

Attachment
a/s



Donald J. Atwood
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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