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NUCLEAR STOCKPILE REPLACEMENT

J-L/NF  
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ISSUE:

When older warheads in the European nuclear stockpile are replaced with warheads associated with LRTNF modernization, should the replacement occur on a one-for-one or greater than one-for-one basis?

The High Level Group concluded that LRTNF modernization should occur without increasing the size of the nuclear warhead stockpile in Europe. Thus, as LRTNF warheads are deployed, older warheads associated with obsolete systems will have to be reduced at least at a rate of one excess warhead going out for every long range warhead coming in.

While the High Level Group has not indicated that warhead replacement should occur at a greater than one-for-one rate, this approach could be considered if necessary to satisfy the concerns [redacted] (b)(1) that the role of nuclear forces not be increased as LRTNF modernization takes place. Although the effect of such a replacement policy would be to reduce the overall size of the European nuclear weapon stockpile, it could be a useful way to promote widespread participation in LRTNF modernization. On the other hand, we should guard against taking so many warheads out that it adversely affects our military capability, for, in addition, we must consider the NATO/Warsaw Pact nuclear balance in short and medium range nuclear capability, which is projected to continue to move in the Pact's favor during the 1980s.

The European Stockpile, 1979

The table below shows the warheads authorized for deployment in Europe at the end of FY 1979. For comparison purposes SACEUR's stated nuclear weapons requirements for 1979 is a benchmark of the military view of what is needed.

Warhead Type	Number	
	Authorized	SACEUR Requirement
(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC §2168(a) (1)(C)--(FRD)		
[Redacted Table Content]		

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Candidates for Withdrawal

If we must take warheads out of the stockpile to facilitate Allies' consensus on LRTNF modernization, we should do so in a way which minimizes the adverse effects such reductions would have on our military capability. By 1985, we project that the stockpile will contain those warheads which are in excess of SACEUR's military needs:

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC §2168(a) (1)(C)--(FRD)



(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC §2168(a) (1)(C)--(FRD)

There might also be some excess bombs in the stockpile -- [redacted] by one estimate -- which could be taken out without substantial loss in effectiveness.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

In addition, while the remaining [redacted] NIKE HERCULES and [redacted] Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs) have some military capability, there is a body of opinion which argues that some of these systems could be dropped from the stockpile because, as defensive systems, they lack the requisite shock and decisiveness to be a strong deterrent to the enemy. However, SACEUR believes these defensive systems could be effective in support of conventional forces in critical tactical situations. Also, the NIKE HERCULES is capable of employment in a surface-to-surface role, which enhances its military utility as a nuclear delivery system. Moreover, the JCS consider that the nuclear defense of Europe requires the military capability which these weapons provide, thus justifying their retention in the stockpile.

Nonetheless, if these additional bombs, ADMs and NIKE HERCULES warheads were also subject to withdrawal from Europe, then the excess warheads available could range from the [redacted] However,

the Joint Staff believes that a responsible upper limit should be determined only after detailed study. While recognizing that such a study may show some additional excess warheads, the Joint Staff cannot endorse any withdrawals beyond the presently projected excess of (b)(1) at this time.

Warhead Reductions Required

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC §2168(a)(1)(C)--(FRD)

The number of warheads to be taken out during modernization would depend in part on the size of the LRTNF increase. Force structure Options A through D, being considered by the SCC, range from [redacted] warheads. Included in these Options, however, are varying numbers of Pershing II missiles whose warheads replace Pershing I.A. warheads on a one-for-one basis, making the net increase due to Pershing replacement effectively zero.

Another factor which would influence the size of reductions is that we may wish to take out warheads at a greater than one-for-one rate -- for example, taking two or three excess warheads out for every LRTNF deployed. The following table shows warhead reduction requirements for various assumptions of excess for LRTNF warhead exchange rates.

Warhead Exchange Rate    Option A    Option B    Option C    Option D

(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC §2168(a)(1)(C)--(FRD)

[Redacted table content]

In addition to withdrawing warheads associated with LRTNF modernization, there may be other reasons for withdrawals. For example, an MBFR agreement containing our current Option III offer would require withdrawal of (b)(1) warheads. (Approximately (b)(1) would go out with nuclear delivery systems also withdrawn under MBFR, requiring a net reduction of (b)(1) warheads associated with other systems.) More warheads might also be replaced on a one-for-one basis in conjunction with modernization of other than long range systems -- e.g., SACEUR's Short Term Measures Program which could involve around (b)(1) warheads.

TNF Stockpile Decisions

Figure 1 depicts for each of the LRTNF options various combinations of warheads that could be withdrawn depending on the exchange ratios of excess warheads taken out for long range warheads put in; on whether MBFR Option III is executed; and on whether the Short Term Measures take place. These potential withdrawals are compared with the warheads which could be in excess of military needs.

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Figure 1 serves to illustrate the very complex nature of decisions associated with withdrawal of excess warheads associated with LRTNF modernization. For example, if Option B were selected, the Figure shows that with a warhead exchange rate of 1:1, we can modernize LRTNF and protect MBFR Option III and handle most of the Short Term Measures Program with the excess warheads we know we will have available. If we were to decide to trade for long range warheads at a 3:1 ratio, however, we would have to either take out more NIKE HERCULES, Atomic Demolition Munitions, and bombs than we now have plans for, or we would have to forego improvements like the Short Term Measures Program and MBFR Option III.

More importantly, Figure 1 illustrates the range of uncertainties which we would have to resolve before we could be assured that a more than one-for-one exchange could be accommodated without opening up the possibility of cutting into the military utility of the European stockpile. Primarily, the future of ADMs and Allied NIKE HERCULES systems would be at stake. And beyond that, the de facto residual stockpile ceiling such reductions would infer may limit the flexibility needed for future stockpile modernization.

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