SECRET



5201121	
 KAI-TR 16-95	17 November 1995

2. Common Concerns (U)

(U) All syndicates agreed on the need for an integrated BW defense plan to establish a baseline for the development of all future BW passive measures. An integrated BW defense plan would include policy, planning, coordination, and programmatic elements.

0.2742		 	
(b)(1)			
,,,,			
	•		

- (U) b. Intelligence concerns, in the areas of both exploitation and sharing, were important to warfighters and to the scientific and technical support community. Intelligence about the nature of BW in regions of interest is of obvious benefit to the warfighter; it can also provide the programmatic community information necessary to ensure that planning, research, development and acquisition take place as needed to counter the BW threat. The sharing of this information with allies could encourage them to become more self-sufficient in selected areas of BW detection and protection. In turn, this may have an effect on an enemy's willingness to use BW weapons if the enemy perceives the level of BWPD preparation of the forces in opposition to be high.
- (U) c. Logistical concerns were addressed in syndicate play. Concerns ranged from the disruption of key air ports of debarkation/sea ports of debarkation as a result of the use of BW weapons, to the interruption and/or saturation of lines of communication in the target country after the use of BW weapons.

KAPOS ASSOCIATES INC.	 3 ——
KAPOS ASSOCIATES INC.	 • ——

SECKET	
KAI-TR 16-95	17 November 1995
(b)(1)	
	·
	•
(U) f. Syndicates were concerned that allied forces	s around the world would no
be able to participate at an equal level of burden-sharing regarding BW	defenses. These nations ma
not be able to afford the cost, or possess the ability/willingness to pro-	duce and employ BW defens
measures with their forces. Other nations need to appreciate that the U.	S. cannot provide the world'
needs for BW vaccines, equipment or medical support. At home, the	severity of the BW threat and
the dimensions of BWPD must be conveyed to Congress and to the	•
(U) g. There was a concern regarding a hoped-for linl	k between deterrence and high
BW defense readiness.	
E 11 GOLDING A GOLDINGSS.	
(U) h. Finally, players were concerned with the need	for a U.S. declaratory policy
concerning BW. This concern emerged from syndicate discussions tha	t recognized a paradigm shift
in the art of war that would occur upon the initial use of biologica	
•	ii weapons against 0.5, and
coalition forces.	
	•
KAPOS ASSOCIATES INC.	a
SECRET	