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Overall, the paper neither mentions nor takes into account the effect of treaty constraints on the threat. The conditions attached to reduction of the stockpile would mean that we would not be deterring the same level of threat. This is a broad conceptual difference which line changes cannot repair and which must be factored in. Also, the paper consistently asserts that CW can be deterred only by CW. State believes that a triad of conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons is the most effective deterrent.

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3 November 1989
Version 4

IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE IN CHEMICAL WARFARE
DETERRENCE STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE, OR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS
REQUIRED BY A REDUCED CW RETALIATORY CAPABILITY

1. Background.

~~(S)~~ In National Security Directive 24 (NSD 24), President Bush asked for recommendations for any changes that may be required in our strategy of deterrence, force structure, or force deployments as a result of the reduced availability of retaliatory chemical weapons.

~~(S)~~ As a feature of the chemical weapons arms control initiative, the United States has committed itself to very substantial reductions in its chemical weapons stockpile. The objective is to reduce to a 500 agent ton level within eight years after entry into force of a chemical weapons convention. In the interim, the United States will reduce its CW stockpile to less than 20% (i.e. 5,000 agent tons) of current levels, provided the Soviet Union agrees to reduce its CW stockpile to the same level.

(U) Deterrence of the use of chemical weapons against the U.S. or its allies is the objective of the U.S. chemical warfare policy. That deterrence is built upon two separate, yet equally significant pillars: retaliation and defense. Should either of these pillars be weakened, the other must, of necessity, be strengthened in order to keep CW deterrence viable.

(U) Components of ^{CURRENT} U.S. deterrence strategy include:

-- (U) A declaratory policy that the U.S. will not initiate chemical warfare, but reserves the option to retaliate-in-kind, often referred to as a "no first use" policy.

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-- A declared policy that the U.S. reserves the right to retaliate against CW attacks with any weapons in its arsenal.

-- (U) A defensive policy that maintains the facilities, expertise, and programs to develop and improve our chemical protection capability. All U.S. forces are trained and equipped to defend against CW attack, survive, and continue to perform their responsibilities. These forces must include specialized chemical defense units and medical units to support that objective. Chemical defense is an absolutely essential element of deterrence because it moderates the effectiveness of CW attack on U.S. forces.

-- (U) A modernized retaliatory stockpile consisting of safer binary chemical weapons.

2. (U) Current Capabilities.

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~~(S)~~ The current US unitary chemical stockpile is in excess of [redacted]. This stockpile quantity was designed to implement a doctrine of sustained chemical operations. Ninety percent of the unitary stockpile is no longer militarily useful. The military doctrine that emerged during the early 1980's was to rapidly terminate the use of chemical weapons by being able to remove the advantage to the CW user of continuing to use CW.

3. (U) Current Stockpile Objective

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~~(S)~~ In October 1985, in the support of the new doctrine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established an objective of [redacted] agent tons for binary chemical weapons in short, medium, and long range delivery systems, and different agents for each range. This stockpile level was derived from analysis of chemical warfare in Europe, Korea, and Iran and developed with unified command inputs involving traditional methods for target selection, weapon system densities, and threat capabilities. The [redacted] ton binary weapons objective was further qualified as a US-only, 30-day deterrent global stockpile and represented a reasonable retaliatory capability to operate in the theater presenting the highest requirement, i.e. Europe.

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4. President's Stockpile Objectives

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President Bush has stated his commitment to eliminating chemical weapons. While talks proceed on a multilateral CW convention, the U.S. has agreed to reduce its CW stockpile to 20% of current levels (5,000 agent tons) provided the Soviet Union agrees to reduce to the same level. The U.S. will further reduce to a 500 ton stockpile within eight years after a CW convention enters into force, provided that the Soviet Union is a party. Within two years after all CW-capable states have acceded to the treaty, the U.S. will destroy the remainder of its stockpile.

(Rationale: JCS objectives are appropriate as history, but the President's objectives are the guiding principle.)

5. a. U) Implications of Change.

Deterrence Doctrine

~~(s)~~ Reduction to a 5000 ton and then 500 ton stockpile requires a reassessment of current deterrence doctrine which depends heavily upon deterring CW by the threat of responding with CW. Since a possible adversary would know precisely the size of our stockpiles, and thus limits of CW capability, it will be necessary to increase the credibility of deterring CW use by the threat of retaliation by nuclear or massive conventional means. We should declare that we will use these means, in addition to CW, if we so choose. No alterations of nuclear or conventional force posture are necessary to effect this change in doctrine.

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Deterrence by chemical weapons will be an important part of the triad of deterrence as long as we have a 5000 ton stockpile. However, it becomes of only marginal significance when we reduce to 500 tons. This small tonnage would not be a credible deterrent alone in the European theatre. The Soviets could have undeclared stockpiles even though they claimed to have only 500 tons, and if so our 500 tons would not deter. We would have to depend upon nuclear and conventional deterrence in that theatre. In Third-World scenarios the 500 tons could serve as a limited deterrent in certain situations, but in general Third-World states would most be deterred from using CW against US or friendly forces if they were certain they faced massive conventional retaliation. It is unlikely that the nuclear threat in Third-World situations would have much credibility.

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"Force Posture Changes Needed For New Stockpile Objectives

A. 5,000 agent ton stockpile"

~~(TS)~~ A stockpile level of 5,000 agent tons will require some minor changes to U.S. deterrence strategy, force structure, and force deployments. The modernized binary weapon systems should continue to contain three systems and will provide the retaliatory capability to support current deterrence strategy. The declaratory policy of no first use should be retained. An appropriate retaliatory response must include chemical use options for prompt, effective retaliation [at all ranges on the battlefield]. At the 5,000 ton level, chemical weapons remain a decisive weapon.

DELETE

COMMENT

Paragraph 1 - Sentence 4 - Delete "at all ranges on the battlefield" or offer further explanation. Rationale: It is not clear why retaliation is essential at all ranges on the battlefield. Presumably, we would retaliate for an adversary's CW use with the most efficient application of our own CW, for example by saturating his C3I nodes, CS/CSS locations, LOC interchanges, ports, railheads, etc.

DELETE

~~(TS)~~ [The 5,000 agent ton target falls 40 percent short of the JCS recommended capability.] Thus, CW defense [and a warm production base] are more critical than ever. CW protection programs should be upgraded to accelerate development and fielding of systems that reduce debilitation to force effectiveness. Protective masks, agent antidotes and pre-treatments, improved protective clothing, stand-off detection and other critical defensive systems must be developed and fielded to assure force survivability.

COMMENT

Paragraph 2 - Delete first sentence. Rationale: First sentence unrelated to the remainder of the paragraph.

Paragraph 2 - Change second sentence to read: "Thus, CW defense is more critical than ever." Rationale: The only true deterrent to CW use against U.S. forces is to make it ineffective. This satisfies the doctrinal requirement to "rapidly terminate the use of chemical weapons by being able to remove the advantage to the CW user of continuing to use CW." Maintaining a warm production base will not allow for "rapid" termination and, if maintained after the U.S. has met its stated stockpile objectives, will compromise our negotiations.

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Force Posture

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~~(S)~~ The industrial base, technical expertise, and production facilities needed for three binary systems also contribute to deterrence and provide a safeguard should a CW breakout occur. No changes in conventional or nuclear force structure are required.

COMMENT

Omit entire paragraph. Rationale: We would have to reconcile maintenance of an industrial base for continued binary production with any obligations under international agreements. We must also look closely at reduced resources and funding and determine if we can afford to maintain idle factories on the chance that they might have to be geared up some day. Given production lag time, a warm production base will not provide a safeguard should CW be used against us.

B. 500 agent ton stockpile

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~~(S)~~ The 500 agent tons does not support the current strategy of deterrence because it provides an inadequate retaliatory capability. Response options and sustaining CW readiness must be examined in a new context. The 500 agent ton stockpile will require changes in policy and force posture:

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Response options and sustaining CW readiness must be examined in a new context as negotiations proceed on a multilateral CW convention and on U.S.-Soviet bilateral reductions in CW stockpiles. The 500 agent ton stockpile will require changes in policy and force structure:

-- ~~(S)~~ 500 agent tons cannot provide global deterrence. 500 tons provides insufficient munitions to effectively respond to either a global war or a European scenario involving Soviet Forces; however, 500 agent tons is likely a militarily credible deterrent for other single regional scenarios.

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Delete this paragraph or factor in two points:
1) the U.S. will only go to 500 tons upon signature of a CW treaty to which at least the Soviets are a party, and 2) CW is not the only retaliatory option available.

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REPLACE

~~(S)~~ [A measured response policy must be developed] which includes overwhelming attacks of selective, high value targets and/or ensured destruction of enemy CW production and storage facilities. The declaratory policy of no-first-use of CW should be retained. The policy should also continue to state that the US views CW use as a grave matter and reserves the option to respond with all means available to include conventional, chemical, and nuclear to halt chemical weapons use and to deny the attacker the capabilities to continue CW use.

["A measured response policy including retaliatory options other than CW must be developed"

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-- ~~(S)~~ [A 500 agent ton stockpile retaliation should be full and immediate. Protracted employment would only serve to further degrade the potential impact retaliation has to force early termination.] CINCs should be delegated conditional release authority to respond with chemical weapons in a timely manner. A response could only be initiated by a CINC after use of CW against U.S. forces and only within the limits of the National Command Authority-approved rules of engagement.

COMMENT

(Delete first two sentences. Rationale: This seems to contradict the preceding point on the need for a measured response policy. Presumably using all of our stockpile at once would be at the extreme end of the measured response options.)

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-- ~~(S)~~ A key provision of a 500 agent ton stockpile should be an operational deployment policy. The capability to respond rapidly, even at significantly reduced levels, not only promotes deterrence, but studies indicate that a rapid response is a key to gaining force parity. Limited quantity deployments of binary weapons aboard Naval vessels would provide a rapid response capability. Operational deployments coupled with a "neither confirm nor deny" policy add risk factors to a potential attacker.

Delete this paragraph or explain why an operational deployment policy is either desirable or necessary, as first tick argues that 500 agent tons provides insufficient munitions to respond effectively to either a global war or a European scenario involving Soviet forces. The paper presumes that 1) the Navy would be willing and able to deploy CW aboard its ships, 2) all the mechanisms would be in place to handle and employ these weapons in theater, 3) the U.S. would be willing and able to deploy CW to a theater of operations during a period of rising tensions prior to actual initiation of hostilities. We doubt all three presumptions.

~~DELE~~ -- ~~(S)~~ Current storage plans have binary weapons in three CONUS depots. A policy option is to centrally store the 500 agent ton stockpile. Central storage facilitates deployment planning and promotes rapid deployment in the event of a crisis on an as-needed basis. Also gained as an additional reinforcement of deterrent value is the warning/indication provided to a potential adversary as binary weapons are deployed into a theater of operations.

Delete last sentence. Rationale: The idea of providing warning or indication of CW deployment as a deterrent to first use presumes that we would tell an adversary that we were deploying CW to an unstable region prior to hostilities, during a period of rising tensions when every effort is being made to reduce them. This is politically and diplomatically infeasible. Since immediate and massive retaliation is the desired solution, this would make a case for emphasis on the BIGEYE program as an air-delivered munition which could be launched from the U.S. against strategic targets in the theater of operations.

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C. Protection and Detection

-- ~~(S)~~ CW protection programs and related CBW medical programs must be enhanced both by resource application and Executive Branch policy. Historically, CBW defense programs have been reduced corresponding to the drawdown in retaliatory programs. United States military forces must be equipped with state-of-the-art protection and detection equipment to negate any perceived advantage by an enemy. Technical base research, development, and testing programs must be supported toward developing countermeasures against potential threats.

-- ~~(S)~~ The existence of the CW treaty will encourage the perception that the CW threat has largely disappeared. Therefore, intelligence and warning programs must continue to monitor CW capabilities, and an effective chemical protection program must be maintained. Depot stocks of CW defensive equipment must be available and pre-positioned in quantities. Training systems and novel approaches to CW defense readiness must be developed to ensure military units and individuals do not completely lose the ability to react to chemical warfare situations. More emphasis on joint training and joint doctrine development is needed to identify common equipment, doctrine, and training requirements. Technical base research and development must continue and focus on verification, detection,

identification, and medical treatments of emerging CW-spectrum threats.

-- ~~(S)~~ No U.S. military force structure is dedicated solely to CW retaliation. All weapons systems that deliver CW munitions are multi-purpose. Chemical defense units should be enhanced. No cuts in force structure would be appropriate.

-- ~~(S)~~ Operational considerations such as support of strategic and operational doctrine, target selection, weapon/agent mix, and logistical procedures must be developed, analyzed, and exercised for small quantities of weapons.

-- (U) Another key doctrinal aspect of operations in a CW environment includes the concept of avoidance. By being able to locate and isolate large areas contaminated by persistent chemical agents, forces can avoid becoming casualties and preclude decontamination operations. Avoidance doctrine requires detection and identification systems and units that need to be fielded.

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-- ~~(S)~~ Industrial base, technical expertise, and productions and storage facilities should be maintained as part of the 500 agent ton stockpile and continue to provide the safeguard against a CW breakout. No changes in conventional or nuclear force structure are required.

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Delete paragraph. Rationale: As above, we would have to reconcile the maintenance of an industrial base for continued binary production with any obligations under international agreements. Given production lag time, a warm production base will not provide a safeguard should CW be used against us.

6. (U) Key Changes Needed Under a 500 Agent Ton

~~(S)~~ Change the declared policy to a measured response policy to retaliate with the full range of response options and the full intention to deny an attacker the ability to continue CW use.

~~(S)~~ Enhance CW intelligence and warning programs for both short and long term requirements to collect CW intelligence, to monitor verification implementation, and to monitor research, development, and testing trends in potential threat states.

~~(S)~~ Enhance CW protection programs, retain key CW defensive force structure, and expedite fielding critical defensive systems.

~~(S)~~ Emphasize joint training and doctrine to promote CW defensive readiness.

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~~(S)~~ Adopt a policy which provides for operational deployments of binary weapons.

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(U) Maintain the industrial base, technical expertise, and production facilities to serve as a treaty safeguard.

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7. (U) Conclusions.

~~(S)~~ Deterrence strategy has consisted of a credible retaliatory capability and an effective defensive posture. This strategy can be supported with a modernized 5,000 agent ton stockpile, but not with a 500 ton stockpile. With such a small stockpile an enhanced CW defense program with a strong technical base research, development, and testing program must be a matter of policy, a measured response policy adopted, and a priority national intelligence program in-place to affect deterrence. Joint training and doctrinal procedures are needed to ensure CW readiness is maintained. Policy options which permit operational deployments of binary weapons are needed to support rapid retaliation. The industrial base with related production facilities and technical expertise must be maintained as a safeguard. Without these elements, the risks to U.S. military forces of reduction to 500 agent tons are not acceptable.

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(Substitute the following paragraph in place of the original:)

Deterrence strategy has consisted of a triad of credible retaliatory capabilities including nuclear, conventional and CW, in addition to defensive and detection programs. The CW portion of the deterrent triad remains valid with a 5000 agent ton stockpile, but not with a 500 ton stockpile. Thus doctrine must be changed to emphasize nuclear and conventional, but especially the more credible conventional, deterrence as well as a strong defensive program, when our stockpile is reduced to 500 tons.

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