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IMMEDIATE
O 151211Z MAR 92
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2372
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WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

ZYUW RUEHM0A7516 0751211

SECDEF WASHDC
RSC WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
OSIA WASHDC

RUSSIA. VELIKOV CHAIRS AN INTERAGENCY GROUP FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISARMAMENT. THIS GROUP, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO HAVE NO EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY. VELIKOV'S INFLUENCE SEEMS TO STEM LARGELY FROM HIS DIRECT ACCESS TO YELTSIN. VELIKOV ADMITTED TO US THAT HE DOES NOT DIRECTLY CONTROL THE RUSSIAN SSD DELEGATION AND THAT ITS MEMBERS REPORT TO THEIR MINISTERS. AS DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPHS 25-26, VELIKOV'S AGENDA DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM OTHER RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE SSD PROCESS. WHAT IS CURRENTLY LACKING IN THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS A CENTRAL DECISION-MAKING BODY WHICH CAN TAKE DECISIONS AND MAKE THEM STICK AS GOVERNMENT POLICY.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 10 MOSCOW 007516

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACDA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PRL, PARM, ACDA, NMIC
SUBJECT: DELEGATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY, SECURITY, AND DISMANTLEMENT (SSD): SUMMARY REPORT OF MARCH 5-13 MEETINGS IN MOSCOW

1. THIS IS SSD-2-M-04H. ~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ TEXT

2. SUMMARY. THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF SEVEN DAYS OF MEETINGS WITH THE RUSSIAN SSD DELEGATION IN MOSCOW. DURING THIS PERIOD, GENERAL BURNS AND DRS. BARKER AND TURNER ALSO HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH ACADEMICIAN VELIKOV WHO OSTENSIBLY HEADS THE RUSSIAN DISMANTLEMENT EFFORT. WE INITIALLY FOCUSED ON FIVE TOPICS BASED ON THE PAPERS SECRETARY BAKER PROVIDED TO FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV ON FEBRUARY 10 -- STORAGE FACILITIES FOR NUCLEAR COMPONENTS AND FISSILE MATERIALS; SAFE SECURE RAILCARS; WEAPONS TRANSPORTATION CONTAINERS AND KEVLAR BLANKETS; CONTAINERS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION/STORAGE OF FISSILE MATERIAL; AND NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE. DURING THE FINAL DAYS, WE ALSO BEGAN DISCUSSIONS ON THE REMAINING TWO BAKER PAPERS ON NATIONAL SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONTROL AND THE DISPOSITION OF PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM. THE TEXT OF A NON-PAPER, DISCUSSED WITH THE RUSSIANS, SUMMARIZING THE CONCLUSIONS WE REACHED, OPTIONS FOR ASSISTANCE, AND NEXT STEPS IS IN PARAGRAPH 30. END SUMMARY.

WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE

3. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY WE HAVE FACED IS DETERMINING WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE DISMANTLEMENT ISSUE IN

DELIVER ONE HARD COPY TO NMCC/DDO

ACTION JS:NMCC-CHM-J(1) JS:SATT-J(1) (R,C)
INFO CJCS(1) J3(3) JIDS(1) NMCC/DDO(1) JS(2)
QUAL CONTROL(1) JS:START-J(2) JS:SOVGEN-J(1)
JS:MURK-J(1) JS:POLICY-J(1) SHAPE LND(2)
JS-CTBS-J(1) JOE-J(1) SECDEF-W(1) DARPA(1) SDIO(8)
ASD:RA(2) USDA:PBL(1) USDA:AE(1) USDA:TMP(1)
USDA:IP(2) ASD:PA(1) GC(1) ASD:PAE/EPF(1)
ASD:PAE/TNF(1) OASD:C3I-INT(1) USDP:SPACEPO(1)
USDP:DASDEUR(2) USDP:DSAA(1) USDP:FHRA(1)
USDP:DTSA/SP(1) USDP:DTSA/TD(1) USDP:SDBS(1)
USDP:PPEAP(1) USDP:SFP(1) USDP:HIA(1) USDP:TNF(1)
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USDP:EV ECON(1) USDP:EUR POL(1) USDP:REE(1)
USDP:MATOPOL(1) USDP:DSOSAMP(1) DI(1)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CRO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PH
+OSIA WASHINGTON DC
+DIA WASHINGTON DC//OPAC/OPNA//
+MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
+SAFE

4. AMBASSADOR PALENYKH, THE RUSSIAN DCC COMMISSIONER, ASSUMED THE CHAIR OF THE RUSSIAN SSD DELEGATION WHEN WE ARRIVED IN MOSCOW. HOWEVER, THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 10, WE WERE TOLD THAT PALENYKH HAD "TAKEN ILL" AND THAT GENERAL-LT ZELENTSOV WOULD ASSUME CHARGE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE ROUND. PALENYKH HAD DESCRIBED ZELENTSOV, WHO LED THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION IN OUR FIRST TWO ROUNDS OF TALKS, AS HIS "CO-CHAIR." ZELENTSOV HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT OUR TIME HERE TO DOMINATE THE DIALOGUE. HE HAS HIS OWN UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE ON THESE ISSUES. HE VIEWS U.S. ASSISTANCE LARGELY AS A COST-AVOIDANCE EXERCISE FOR RUSSIA AND CONTINUALLY TELLS US THAT OUR ASSISTANCE WILL NOT ACCELERATE RUSSIAN DISMANTLEMENT. PALENYKH, IN CONTRAST, HAS TRIED TO PUT A MORE POSITIVE FACE ON THE PROCEEDINGS. THE UPSHOT OF ALL THIS IS THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE STILL NOT SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE.

5. WHILE WE CAME TO MOSCOW WITH THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS NECESSARY FOR NUTS AND BOLTS DISCUSSION OF AN ASSISTANCE PACKAGE, OUR TALKS ARE STILL TO A LARGE EXTENT ON A POLITICAL LEVEL. RUSSIAN EXPERTS WERE AVAILABLE IN PLENTIFUL NUMBERS BUT, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THEY STATED IN FRUSTRATION THAT THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE MEETINGS ONLY A DAY OR TWO, OR EVEN HOURS, BEFOREHAND. ONCE ENGAGED, HOWEVER, THE EXPERTS WERE RESPONSIVE AND, IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, USEFUL AND IN-DEPTH TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE.

6. AFTER THE CLOSING SESSION, GENERAL-LT ZELENTSOV MADE THE POINT TO GENERAL BURNS THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE IS INDEED SERIOUS ABOUT U.S. HELP IN A "COOPERATIVE EFFORT"

(b)(1)
AND HE HIGHLIGHTED HIS INTEREST IN U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, EQUIPMENT AND BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 10 MOSCOW 007516

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACDA

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TRANSPORTATION TO HELP DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM.

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR NUCLEAR COMPONENTS AND FISSILE MATERIAL

7. THE PRIMARY RUSSIAN AID REQUEST IN THE SSD GROUP HAS BEEN FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LARGE, STORAGE FACILITY FOR THE LONG-TERM STORAGE OF FISSILE MATERIAL. THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL IS EXPENSIVE AND, IN SOME RESPECTS, GOLD-PLATED. E.G., THE REQUEST FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PAYMENTS TO BUILD SUCH THINGS AS

Department of Energy Declassification Review	Determination (Circle Number(s))
1. Classification Retained	2. Classification Changed To:
3. Contains No DOE Classified Info	4. Coordinate With:
5. Classified	6. Classified Info Bracketed
7. Other (Specify)	
Review Date: 1/27/01	Authority: DD
Derived From: []	2nd Review Date: 10/16/01
Declassify On: []	Authority: []
	NS-00 Review Authority: DD

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HOUSING AND SCHOOLS TO PLACATE THE LOCAL COMMUNITY WHERE THE FACILITY WILL BE LOCATED. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT TONED DOWN THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR THIS AID, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOW TALKING ABOUT ONE FACILITY INSTEAD OF TWO, AND THE COST ESTIMATE APPEARS TO BE MOVING MORE IN LINE WITH OUR EXPERIENCE.

8. A RUSSIAN EXPERT ON STORAGE FACILITIES ARRIVED FROM ST. PETERSBURG ON MARCH 10 TO BEGIN DISCUSSION ON THEIR PRELIMINARY DESIGN. THE STORAGE FACILITY IS ONLY IN THE FEASIBILITY STUDY PHASE AND, THEREFORE, THE DESIGN CONCEPTS ARE PRELIMINARY. THE FINAL DESIGN WILL BE COMPLETED IN 1993. THE CURRENT PLAN IS TO BUILD THE FACILITY IN THE AREA OF TOMSK. CHELYABINSK HAS BEEN RULED OUT AS A SITE DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION FROM OTHER NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN THE AREA. A THIRD UNNAMED LOCATION IN THE URALS IS ALSO STILL BEING CONSIDERED. THE FACILITY IS TO BE DESIGNED TO A VERY HIGH STANDARD FOR SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SECURITY. THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE IT TO CONTAIN AUTOMATED NUCLEAR HANDLING EQUIPMENT SUFFICIENT TO EXAMINE INDIVIDUAL CONTAINERS AND REPACKAGE MATERIAL IF NECESSARY, BUT IT WILL NOT BE CAPABLE OF ANY CHEMICAL PROCESSING OR REFABRICATION THAT MAY BE REQUIRED FOR END USE APPLICATION OR OTHER DISPOSITION. BASED ON THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THE RUSSIANS CONSIDER ONLY AN UNDERGROUND FACILITY AS APPROPRIATE TO THEIR NEEDS.

9. THE FACILITY WILL HAVE A STORAGE AREA OF ROUGHLY 40-50 THOUSAND SQUARE METERS. IT IS TO BE BUILT IN TWO PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE, WHICH WILL COMPRISE ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE FACILITY'S STORAGE AREA TOGETHER WITH ITS INDEPENDENT MATERIAL HANDLING AND SUPPORT FACILITIES, WILL BE COMPLETED AS EARLY AS LATE 1995. THE SECOND SECTION IS TO BE OPERATIONAL IN 1997. UNDER THE RUSSIAN PLANS, THE COMPLETED FACILITY WILL ACCOMMODATE ROUGHLY [REDACTED] FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGE CONTAINERS OF RUSSIAN DESIGN. THE COST OF THE COMPLETED FACILITY IS ESTIMATED BY THE RUSSIANS TO BE 1.5-2 BILLION RUBLES, BASED ON THE CURRENT RUBLE VALUE.

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10. THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION HAS PROVIDED US WITH A COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS THAT WERE USED DURING THEIR PRESENTATION. THEY HAVE ALSO COMMITTED TO PROVIDING US THE FEASIBILITY STUDY THEY ARE CURRENTLY CONDUCTING BY MARCH 31 OF THIS YEAR. THIS DATA WILL HELP US IN OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE FACILITY REQUIREMENTS AND COSTS.

11. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED OUR CONCERN THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA APPEARS TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE RUSSIAN TIMETABLE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ZELENTSOV SAID THAT THE \$400 MILLION WOULD HAVE ONLY A NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT IN THIS REGARD. AT ONE POINT HE STATED THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE TOTALING \$1.4 BILLION OVER THREE YEARS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO ACCELERATE THEIR SCHEDULE, BUT HE DECLINED TO BE MORE PRECISE AND DID NOT RETURN TO THE SUBJECT. NEVERTHELESS, AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR MEETINGS THE RUSSIANS AGREED TO PROVIDE US AN ESTIMATE OF HOW U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LONG-TERM STORAGE FACILITY WILL ACCELERATE THE COMPLETION OF THE FACILITY AND THE PROCESS OF DISMANTLING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS ESTIMATE WILL ASSUME U.S. AID OF \$150 MILLION, INCLUDING BOTH MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT.

12. THE RUSSIANS HAVE REPEATED IN L ARGELY FAMILIAR

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACDA

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SECURITY, AND DISMANTLEMENT (SSD):
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TERMS THEIR ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF EXISTING MILITARY STORAGE FACILITIES AND EXISTING HARDENED CIVILIAN AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FOR STORAGE. THEY ARGUE THAT THESE APPROACHES ARE EITHER NOT FEASIBLE OR THAT THEY ARE AS COSTLY AS BUILDING A NEW FACILITY.

13. WHEN WE BROACHFD THE IDEA OF IDENTIFYING INTERIM STORAGE FACILITIES AS A MEANS OF REDUCING THE BOTTLENECK IN THE ELIMINATION PROCESS WHILE A LONGER-TERM STORAGE FACILITY IS CONSTRUCTED, ZELENTSOV EXPRESSED INTEREST, BUT ONLY IF THIS ASSISTANCE WAS IN ADDITION TO AID FOR THE LONG-TERM STORAGE FACILITY. HE SAID THAT IF INTERIM STORAGE HAD TO BE BUILT AT RUSSIAN EXPENSE, THEY INSTEAD WOULD LEAVE WEAPONS IN A NON-DISMANTLED (BUT DISABLED/INOPERABLE) STATE UNTIL THE LONG-TERM STORAGE FACILITY WAS COMPLETE. IN THE WORKING GROUP'S NON-PAPER, WE STATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOP SAFE AND SECURE INTERIM STORAGE FACILITIES, OR OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE, IF IT WOULD ACCELERATE THE DISMANTLEMENT PROCESS.

14. IN SUM, THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR A NEW, LARGE, LONG-TERM STORAGE FACILITY WAS THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE WHEN WE ARRIVED AND IT REMAINS SO. VELIKOV'S IDEAS FOR SELLING OFF PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH 25 BELOW WOULD MAKE THE NEED FOR SUCH A LARGE FACILITY EVEN MORE QUESTIONABLE. THIS ISSUE WILL ULTIMATELY HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IN CONNECTION WITH DECISIONS ON THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF FISSILE MATERIAL REMOVED FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS.

SAFE, SECURE RAILCARS

15. THE PROVISION OF 25 SAFE, SECURE RAILCARS APPEARED TO BE A PROMISING AREA FOR ASSISTANCE WHEN WE ARRIVED IN MOSCOW, BUT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS HAVE STYMIED OUR EFFORTS TO BRING THIS TO FRUITION. IN EXPERTS DISCUSSIONS, BOTH SIDES IDENTIFIED SEVERAL PROBLEMS IN CONVERTING U.S. RAILCARS FOR USE ON RUSSIAN TRACK. THE MOST INTRACTABLE PROBLEM PROVED TO BE THE MATING OF THE U.S. RAILCARS TO RUSSIAN CARRIAGES OR TRUCKS. THE LACK OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN COUPLING DEVICES AND BRAKE SYSTEMS ALSO PROVED TO BE FORTHIDABLE PROBLEMS.

16. THESE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS MAY HAVE SOLUTIONS, BUT AT A HIGHER COST AND WITH SIGNIFICANT TIME DELAYS (1 TO 3 YEARS) THAN WAS ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED. THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK, HOWEVER, WAS THE RUSSIAN RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION'S ASSERTION THAT ANY MODIFIED U.S. RAILCARS UNDERGO A THREE YEAR PERIOD OF TESTING BEFORE THEY COULD BE CERTIFIED FOR OPERATION ON RUSSIAN RAILROADS. THIS ACCUMULATED TIME LAPSE WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE BENEFIT OF THE U.S. RAILCARS TO THE RUSSIAN DISMANTLEMENT EFFORT.

17. THIS OUTCOME STILL LEAVES THE RUSSIANS WITH THEIR STATED NEED FOR [REDACTED] SAFE, SECURE RAILCARS TO TRANSPORT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN OUR NON-PAPER, WE AGREED TO CONSIDER THE RUSSIAN SIDE'S REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE MODIFICATION OF RUSSIAN RAILCARS TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY FEATURES. THE RUSSIANS ARE TO PROVIDE US BY MARCH 31 SPECIFIC TECHNICAL PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE.

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WEAPONS CONTAINERS/KEVLAR BLANKETS

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18. THE RUSSIANS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE UK TO FULFILL THEIR PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE 250 SUPERCONTAINERS WITHIN THE 30 MILLION POUND STERLING THAT HAS BEEN ALLOCATED TO PROVIDE BOTH THESE CONTAINERS AND ARMORED TRUCKS. THE RUSSIANS SAY THEY DO NOT EXPECT TO CONFIRM ANY AGREEMENTS WITH THE BRITISH UNTIL THEIR EXPERTS RETURN TO MOSCOW IN APRIL. THE RUSSIANS ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE BOTH TO ACCEPT SUPERCONTAINERS FROM THE BT

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BRITISH AND TO PRODUCE SOME INDIGENOUSLY WITH U.S. SUPPORT. THE RUSSIANS HAVE APPARENTLY CONSTRUCTED SOME PROTOTYPES BUT WILL NOT BEGIN TESTING THEM UNTIL MID-YEAR. THEY SAY THAT THEY LACK SUFFICIENT ARMOR FOR MASS PRODUCTION OF THEIR SUPERCONTAINER AND THAT, EVEN IF THE ARMOR WAS AVAILABLE, THEY LACK THE MONEY TO PAY FOR IT. THEY HAVE SOUGHT OUR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING ARMOR AND, POSSIBLY, THERMAL INSULATION FOR USE IN THEIR CONTAINERS.

19 SINCE WE HAVE CONFIRMED WITH THE BRITISH THAT THEY HAVE THE LEAD ON THIS ISSUE, WE DID NOT GIVE THE RUSSIANS ANY ENCOURAGEMENT ABOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA. IN THE NOW-PAPER, WE STATED THAT WE WERE UNWILLING TO DISCUSS ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA BECAUSE THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT IT WILL PROVIDE SUPERCONTAINERS TO RUSSIA, THUS FULFILLING ITS REQUIREMENT.

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20. KEVLAR WAS A BIG HIT WITH THE RUSSIANS. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED ITS UTILITY TO THEM IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. IN THE SHORT TERM, THEY ARE LOOKING FOR BLANKETS AS TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTES FOR THE WEAPONS SUPERCONTAINERS THEY HOPE TO BUILD OR RECEIVE FROM THE UK.

(b)(1)

21. WE HAVE WORKED OUT AN AGREED PROGRAM TO PROVIDE TWO TYPES OF PROTOTYPE BLANKETS BY MAY 1 AND JOINTLY TEST THEM. THESE TEST RESULTS WILL ALLOW US TO DEVELOP AN OPTIMAL DESIGN TO MEET RUSSIAN REQUIREMENTS AND DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF BLANKETS TO BE PROVIDED.

FISSILE MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION/STORAGE CONTAINERS

22. THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS IDENTIFIED A NEED FOR TRANSPORTATION/STORAGE CONTAINERS FOR FISSILE MATERIAL. AFTER TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON U.S. AND RUSSIAN CONTAINERS, THE RUSSIANS MADE CLEAR THAT THEIR PREFERENCE IS TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES FUND THE PRODUCTION OF A RUSSIAN-DESIGNED CONTAINER. THEIR PREFERENCE IS BASED, INTER ALIA, ON THE SMALLER SIZE OF THEIR CONTAINER WHICH THEY SAY IS OPTIMAL FOR THEIR NEEDS AND MINIMIZES STORAGE SPACE REQUIREMENTS; THEIR BELIEF THAT THEIR PROPOSED CONTAINER WILL MEET IAEA CRUSH TEST STANDARDS, FOR WHICH U.S. CANS HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED; AND THE PRESENCE OF BALLISTIC PROTECTION AND OTHER ADDITIONAL SECURITY FEATURES IN THEIR DESIGN. U.S. EXPERTS HAVE CONCURRED IN THIS APPROACH.

23. THE RUSSIANS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR PRODUCING CONTAINERS OF THEIR DESIGN IN RUSSIA. THEY MAY BE ABLE TO PRODUCE THE CONTAINERS THEY SAY THEY

NEED AT WELL BELOW THE COST AT WHICH THE U.S. COULD PROVIDE SUCH CONTAINERS OR CONTAINERS OF OUR OWN DESIGN. HOWEVER, THE FATE OF THE RUBLE AND INCREASING PRICES IN RUSSIA MAKE ANY COST ESTIMATES SUSPECT. THERE ARE THREE OPTIONS IN PLAY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW: 1) PRODUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN-DESIGNED CONTAINER IN RUSSIA WITH U.S. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, 2) PRODUCTION OF THIS CONTAINER IN THE UNITED STATES, OR 3) ASSEMBLY OF THE CONTAINER IN RUSSIA UTILIZING AT LEAST SOME COMPONENTS OR MATERIALS THAT HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES. UNDER THE LATTER OPTION, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RUSSIANS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN U.S. INSULATING MATERIALS FOR USE IN THEIR CONTAINERS.

24. AS A NEXT STEP, THE RUSSIANS HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE US DETAILED PRODUCTION DRAWINGS OF THEIR TRANSPORTATION/STORAGE CONTAINER BY MARCH 31. BASED ON THESE DRAWINGS AND ANSWERS TO ANY FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS WE MIGHT HAVE, WE WILL EVALUATE AND ASSESS THE PRODUCTION COST OF THESE CONTAINERS AND THE FEASIBILITY OF PRODUCING THEM IN THE UNITED STATES. IF WE UNDERWRITE PRODUCTION OF CONTAINERS IN RUSSIA, WE COULD FACE SOME DIFFICULT ISSUES IN ENSURING THE TRANSPARENCY NECESSARY TO BE CONFIDENT THAT U.S. FUNDS ARE SPENT PROPERLY. PRODUCTION IN RUSSIA WILL ALSO BT

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NOT EMPLOY AMERICANS OR RESULT IN MONEY BEING SPENT IN THE U.S. ECONOMY. ON THE OTHER HAND, U.S. PRODUCTION COULD BE HAMPERED BECAUSE WE CURRENTLY LACK SOME OF THE MATERIALS USED IN RUSSIAN-DESIGNED CANS AND TYPICALLY UTILIZE DIFFERENT MANUFACTURING PROCESSES. WE ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER THE IMPLIED POLITICAL AND LEGAL LIABILITY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. PRODUCTION.

VELIKOV'S WORLD

25. VELIKOV BELIEVES RUSSIAN PRIORITIES INCLUDE BOTH: 1) THE RAPID DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND 2) STABILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY. HE BELIEVES A KEY CONTRIBUTION TO A STABILIZATION

IF FUND COULD COME FROM REVENUES GENERATED BY THE SALE OF URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM RECOVERED FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS, THIS FISSILE MATERIAL COULD BE PROCESSED INTO REACTOR GRADE FUEL IN RUSSIA PRIOR TO SALE, OR BE SOLD TO RESPONSIBLE COUNTRIES IN ITS WEAPONS GRADE STATE. VELIKOV PREFERS THE LATTER IDEA BECAUSE IT COULD GENERATE CURRENCY FOR THE RUBLE STABILIZATION FUND AND ELIMINATE RUSSIAN STOCKS OF SURPLUS FISSILE MATERIAL MORE QUICKLY. HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS HIS IDEAS IN A BILATERAL GROUP INITIALLY IN ORDER TO SEEK U.S. SUPPORT AND THEN CREATE A MULTILATERAL FORUM INCLUDING THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE POTENTIAL PURCHASERS, I.E., THE U.S., BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY AND JAPAN.

26. VELIKOV'S POSITION PUTS HIM AT ODDS WITH THE RUSSIAN SSD DELEGATION (INCLUDING THE SUBGROUP ON THE DISPOSITION OF HEU AND PU) ON TWO POINTS. FIRST, IF PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS ARE PUT ON THE MARKET, THIS WOULD LARGELY ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR A NEW, LARGE, LONG-TERM STORAGE FACILITY FOR FISSILE MATERIAL, THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY OF THE RUSSIAN SSD GROUP. SECOND, VELIKOV'S PROPOSAL CALLS

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FOR THE RAPID DISMANTLEMENT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE GORBACHEV AND VELTSIN INITIATIVES. THIS WOULD REQUIRE SOME INTERIM STORAGE AND IS IN CONTRAST TO THE POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN SSD DELEGATION WHICH APPEARS PERFECTLY CONTENT WITH THE CURRENT YEAR 2000 PLAN AND SEES NO PRESSING REASON TO ACCELERATE IT.

----- ACCIDENT RESPONSE -----

27. U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR ACCIDENT RESPONSE EXPERTS MET EIGHT TIMES AS A SUBGROUP OF THE SSD DELEGATIONS. THE RUSSIAN TEAM WAS A MIX OF EXPERTS FROM THEIR WEAPON DESIGN LABORATORIES (b)(1), (b)(1) MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, MINATOM, AND THE MOO. THE U.S. TEAM PRESENTED FORMAL BRIEFINGS OR WRITTEN SUMMATIONS (INCLUDING APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS) ON ALL OF THE AGENDA ITEMS DESCRIBED IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL PROVIDED BY SECRETARY BAKER TO FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV ON FEBRUARY 18.

28. DUE TO A LACK OF RUSSIAN PREPARATION, THE MEETINGS INITIALLY WERE VERY ONE-SIDED. WHEN THE U.S. TEAM PRESSED FOR A MEANINGFUL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, THE RUSSIANS CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE MEETING (BUT NOT ITS AGENDA) ONLY A FEW HOURS BEFORE THE FIRST SESSION WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE ON MARCH 9.

29. ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIAN TEAM PROVIDED VERY FEW MATERIALS, THEY DID OFFER SOME GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THEIR APPROACH AND INDICATED AREAS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN U.S. METHODOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND EQUIPMENT. THEIR OVERALL APPROACH, THEY CLAIMED, WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES, E.G., COORDINATION BETWEEN MOO AND MINATOM ACCIDENT TEAMS, WITH THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY DETERMINED BY OWNERSHIP OF THE WEAPON INVOLVED.

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30. THE RUSSIANS CLEARLY WERE VERY INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING THE BROAD RANGE OF U.S. ACCIDENT RESPONSE-RELATED EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED IN OUR BRIEFINGS, AS WELL AS

U.S. TRAINING IN ITS USE. IN A RARE EXPLICIT PLEA FOR HELP, ZELENTSOV COMMENTED THAT "WE ARE MOVING A LOT OF WEAPONS, AND WE HAVE A NEED FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT." PROBABLY AT ZELENTSOV'S URGING, RUSSIAN ACCIDENT RESPONSE EXPERTS SUBMITTED A COMPREHENSIVE EQUIPMENT "WISH LIST" WHICH WE HAVE PROMISED TO EVALUATE. ZELENTSOV INDICATED THAT THE LIST WAS PRELIMINARY BUT HE COULD PROVIDE NO MORE DETAILS THAN HIS EXPERTS DID. THE RUSSIANS ALSO SEEMED INTERESTED IN AN EVENTUAL EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT NUCLEAR ACCIDENT EXERCISES, BUT PROBABLY NOT IN THE NEAR TERM.

THE DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM

31. THE SUBGROUP ON THE DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AND PLUTONIUM (PU) MET FOR ONE THREE HOUR SESSION ON MARCH 13.

32. THE RUSSIAN EXPERTS LARGELY FOLLOWED THE RUSSIAN SSD DELEGATION LINE, TAKING THE POSITION THAT THEY WERE PLANNING FOR THE LONG-TERM STORAGE OF HEU AND PU FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS AND, THIS, WERE FOCUSED ON THE NEED FOR A NEW LONG TERM STORAGE FACILITY AND THE CONTAINERS NECESSARY FOR FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGE

(b)(1)

33. THE RUSSIAN EXPERTS DID INDICATE AN INTEREST IN WORKING ON A BILATERAL BASIS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON A COOPERATIVE PROGRAM TO USE HEU AND PU AS FUEL, BUT STATED THAT THIS WOULD BE A MUCH MORE COMPLICATED ISSUE THAN STORAGE. THEY DENIED THAT RUSSIA HAD ANY PLANS TO SELL PU OR MOX FUEL, ALTHOUGH THEIR ABILITY TO USE INTERNALLY THE AMOUNTS THAT WILL BE GENERATED BY THEIR DISMANTLEMENT PROGRAM IS LIMITED. THE RUSSIANS SAID THAT, AS A RULE, THEY DID NOT INTEND TO USE HEU AS FUEL AND THAT EXCESS HEU WOULD BE BLENDED DOWN TO LEU FOR COMMERCIAL POWER REACTOR FUEL. THE RUSSIANS INDICATED THAT THEY HAD SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY FOR THIS PURPOSE. IN GENERAL, THE RUSSIAN EXPERTS APPEARED HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS ARISING FROM THE DISPOSAL OF FISSILE MATERIAL AND THEY INDICATED NO DISAGREEMENT WITH THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES WE ENUNCIATED, BASED ON OUR GUIDANCE, ON THE PEACEFUL USE OF HEU AND PU.

34. THE RUSSIAN EXPERTS' STATEMENTS WERE NOT IN LINE WITH VELIKOV'S VISION AS OUTLINED ABOVE. THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED THAT A STRUCTURE FOR DECISION-MAKING ON THE QUESTION OF HEU AND PU USE WAS STILL IN THE FORMATIVE STAGE, BUT THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT A NEW INTERAGENCY GROUP, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVE FROM MINATOM AND THE MOO, WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE NEAR TERM AND BE CHAIRED BY VELIKOV.

35. THE U.S. SIDE PROVIDED THE RUSSIANS A LIST OF
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 07 OF 10 MOSCOW 007516

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACDA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, ACDA, MURC

SUBJECT: DELEGATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY,
SECURITY, AND DISMANTLEMENT (SSD):
SUMMARY REPORT OF MARCH 5-13 MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW

QUESTIONS AND A PROPOSED AGENDA FOR A FOLLOW-ON MEETING ON THE DISPOSITION OF FISSILE MATERIAL.

ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 08 OF 10 MOSCOW 007510

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACDA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, ACDA, MNUC
SUBJECT: DELEGATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY,
SECURITY, AND DISMANTLEMENT (SSD):
SUMMARY REPORT OF MARCH 5-13 MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW

BY THE UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE
MANNER OF ASSISTANCE, AND THE NEXT STEPS NEEDED TO
FACILITATE U.S. DECISIONS.

FISSILE MATERIAL CONTAINERS:

THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR (b)(1)
TRANSPORTATION/STORAGE CONTAINERS FOR FISSILE
MATERIAL. THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN SIDES HAVE CONCLUDED
THAT U.S.-DESIGNED CONTAINERS ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH
RUSSIAN DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, THE TWO SIDES
HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE TRANSPORTATION/STORAGE
CONTAINERS SHOULD BE BUILT TO RUSSIAN SPECIFICATIONS.

THE TWO SIDES HAVE CONSIDERED THREE OPTIONS FOR
PRODUCING RUSSIAN-DESIGNED CONTAINERS. FIRST, SUCH
CONTAINERS COULD BE PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES.
SECOND, THESE CONTAINERS COULD BE PRODUCED IN RUSSIA
WITH U.S. ASSISTANCE. FINALLY, RUSSIAN-DESIGNED
CONTAINERS COULD BE ASSEMBLED IN RUSSIA, BUT INCLUDE
SOME COMPONENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED IN THE
UNITED STATES.

THE RUSSIAN SIDE STATED THAT ITS PREFERRED OPTION IS
TO PRODUCE THE CONTAINERS IN RUSSIA. IN ORDER TO MAKE
ITS DECISION ON THIS ISSUE, THE UNITED STATES REQUIRES
PRODUCTION DRAWINGS FOR THE RUSSIAN-DESIGNED
CONTAINER. THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE A
COMPLETE SET OF SUCH PRODUCTION DRAWINGS TO THE U.S.
EMBASSY BY MARCH 31, 1992.

BASED ON THE PRODUCTION DRAWINGS PROVIDED BY THE
RUSSIAN SIDE, THE UNITED STATES WILL DEVELOP ESTIMATED
COSTS FOR THE CONTAINERS. FOLLOWING REVIEW OF THIS
DATA, THE UNITED STATES WILL DECIDE ON THE FORM OF
ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED.

TRANSPORTATION SUPERCONTAINERS:

THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR (b)(1)
SUPERCONTAINERS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL. THE U.S. SIDE HAS
DECIDED NOT TO DISCUSS ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THESE MEETINGS BECAUSE THE UNITED KINGDOM
HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT IT WILL PROVIDE (b)(1)
SUPERCONTAINERS TO THE RUSSIAN SIDE, THUS FULFILLING
THIS REQUIREMENT.

ARMORED BLANKETS:
THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR (b)(1)
ARMORED BLANKETS. THE UNITED STATES AGREES IN
PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE THESE BLANKETS TO AUGMENT THE
PROTECTIVE CAPABILITY OF EXISTING CONTAINERS FOR
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING TRANSPORT TO, AND
MOVEMENTS WITHIN, STORAGE AND DISMANTLEMENT FACILITIES.

THE U.S. SIDE WILL PROVIDE TO THE RUSSIAN SIDE BY
MARCH 31, 1992 ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THE
PROPERTIES OF KEVLAR, INCLUDING FIRE RESISTANCE,
DENSITY, WEATHERING AND DURABILITY. THIS INFORMATION
WILL BE PROVIDED THROUGH THE U.S. EMBASSY.

IN ADDITION, TO FACILITATE A DECISION ON ASSISTANCE,
THE UNITED STATES WILL PRODUCE BY MAY 1, 1992: 1) ONE

36. THE SUBGROUP ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND
CONTROL MET FOR TWO SESSIONS ON MARCH 12-13. WE
BRIEFED ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR ACCOUNTING AND
CONTROL. AS IN OTHER AREAS, THE RUSSIAN EXPERTS
CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD LITTLE OR NO NOTICE OF THE
MEETINGS. NO REPRESENTATIVE FROM GOSATOMNAZOR, THE
RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE NRC, WAS PRESENT. STILL, THE
RUSSIANS DID OFFER AN IMPROMPTU BRIEFING ON SOME OF
THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THEIR NATIONAL SYSTEM.

37. THE RUSSIANS HAVE A VERY LIMITED STATE SYSTEM FOR
ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AND THAT, IN THE PAST, THEY
HAVE LARGELY BEEN CONCERNED WITH ITEM CONTROL (E.G.
WARHEADS) RATHER THAN BULK NUCLEAR MATERIAL.
AUTHORITY FOR THE USE AND PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL, INCLUDING SAFETY, RADIATION PROTECTION AND
MATERIAL CONTROL IS NOW VESTED IN THE NEW STATE
COMMITTEE FOR THE SUPERVISION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIATION
SAFETY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (GAN). THE RUSSIANS
LACK AN "ATOMIC ENERGY ACT." CONSEQUENTLY, GAN HAS
MINIMAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFE REGULATION, BUT NO
LEGAL AUTHORITY TO COMMIT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TO A
PLAN OF ACTION IN THIS AND OTHER AREAS. THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION HAS DISRUPTED
THEIR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE NECESSARY LAWS AND
REGULATIONS.

38. WE NEED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF RUSSIAN
FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THEIR
PROBLEMS AND ASSESS POTENTIAL AREAS FOR SPECIFIC U.S.
ASSISTANCE. THE RUSSIANS WERE RELUCTANT OR UNABLE TO
PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION, AT LEAST AT OUR
INITIAL MEETINGS.

39. WE LEFT RUSSIAN EXPERTS WITH FOUR PROPOSALS THAT
WE STATED COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE MAY-JUNE
TIMEFRAME: 1) A FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN MAY TO PROVIDE
A U.S. BRIEFING ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, 2) A VISIT TO
TWO U.S. FUEL FABRICATION FACILITIES WITH THE HOPE
THAT FOCUSING ON A SPECIFIC TYPE OF FACILITY WILL
ENCOURAGE DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR
ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, FACILITATE
U.S. ASSISTANCE, 3) A RECIPROCAL U.S. VISIT TO A
RUSSIAN FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY, AND 4) A FOLLOW-UP
MEETING TO DISCUSS FUTURE COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.
THE RUSSIANS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD GIVE OUR
PROPOSALS CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

NON-PAPER SUMMARIZING RESULTS OF SSD MEETINGS

40. THE TEXT OF A NON-PAPER SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS
OF OUR MEETINGS IN MOSCOW IS PROVIDED BELOW. THE
RUSSIAN SSD DELEGATION AGREED THAT THIS PAPER IS A
FAIR SUMMATION OF THE PROGRESS WE MADE AND THE CURRENT
STATUS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE
TO THE RUSSIAN OBLIGATIONS AND THE TIMETABLES
SPECIFIED.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
SSD WORKING GROUP MEETINGS
MARCH 5-13, 1992

THE SSD WORKING GROUP MET IN MOSCOW MARCH 5-13, 1992
TO ADDRESS AREAS OF POTENTIAL U.S. ASSISTANCE AND
COOPERATION IN THE SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO
DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE AND
COOPERATION IN THE AREAS IDENTIFIED BELOW. THE
FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED DURING
THE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, OPTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED

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(b)(1)

THE U.S. SIDE WILL CONSIDER THE RUSSIAN SIDE'S REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE MODIFICATION OF RUSSIAN RAILCARS TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY FEATURES. TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A U.S. DECISION ON SUCH ASSISTANCE, THE RUSSIAN SIDE WILL PROVIDE TO THE UNITED STATES BY MARCH 31, 1992 SPECIFIC TECHNICAL PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY FEATURES FOR RUSSIAN RAILCARS.

ACCIDENT RESPONSE:

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 09 OF 10 MOSCOW 007516

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACDA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, ACDA, MMUC
SUBJECT: DELEGATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY,
SECURITY, AND DISMANTLEMENT (SSD):
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THIS INFORMATION, THE UNITED STATES WILL DECIDE ON THE FORM OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED.

NUCLEAR MATERIALS STORAGE FACILITY:

THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR A FACILITY FOR THE LONG-TERM STORAGE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS INDICATED THAT THE LACK OF SUCH A FACILITY IS ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL BOTTLENECKS IN ITS DISMANTLEMENT PLANS. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR SAFE AND SECURE STORAGE OF URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS.

THE RUSSIAN DESIGN FOR A LONG-TERM STORAGE FACILITY IS AT AN EARLY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR ITS PLANNED FACILITY TO THE U.S. EMBASSY BY MARCH 31, 1992. THIS STUDY WILL CONTAIN THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION TO ENABLE THE UNITED STATES TO ASSESS IN DETAIL ALL MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE FACILITY'S DESIGN INCLUDING COST, PHYSICAL STRUCTURES AND SECURITY.

AT A LATER DATE, THE RUSSIAN SIDE WILL SPECIFY HOW U.S. ASSISTANCE (FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL) WILL ACCELERATE THE COMPLETION OF THE FACILITY AND THE PROCESS OF DISMANTLING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS A WORKING ASSUMPTION, THIS JUDGMENT WILL BE BASED ON THE PROVISION OF \$150 MILLION IN U.S. ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT.

BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THE UNITED STATES WILL DECIDE ON THE FORM OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED.

RAILCARS:

THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR (b)(1) RAILCARS TO PROVIDE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORT. BASED ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE, THE TWO SIDES HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE TIME REQUIRED TO MODIFY AND TEST THE 25 U.S. SAFE, SECURE RAILCARS FOR USE IN RUSSIA WOULD BE TOO LONG TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE PROCESS OF DISMANTLING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE, THE TWO SIDES HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY WILL NO LONGER JOINTLY PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE OF MODIFYING THE 25 U.S. RAILCARS.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 10 OF 10 MOSCOW 007516

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ACDA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, ACDA, MMUC
SUBJECT: DELEGATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY,
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(b)(1)

THE RUSSIAN SIDE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT UPON THE DELIVERY OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED EQUIPMENT, THE UNITED STATES WOULD PROVIDE TRAINING IN ITS USE.

THE SIDES AGREED THAT FURTHER MEETINGS ON ACCIDENT RESPONSE ARE NECESSARY. THE SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT PARTICIPATION BY EACH SIDE AS OBSERVERS AT A NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT EXERCISE OF THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF FUTURE EXCHANGES.

THE U.S. SIDE WILL EVALUATE THE RUSSIAN SIDE'S REQUEST TO DETERMINE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION IN PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO A NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT WITH A POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT RELEASE OF RADIATION. THE U.S. SIDE AGREES THAT PROPER TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE USE OF ANY U.S. EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE RUSSIAN

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SIDE WOULD BE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM OF COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE.

OTHER AREAS OF ASSISTANCE:

BOTH SIDES PLACE A HIGH PRIORITY ON THE RAPID DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN ORDER TO ACCELERATE DISMANTLEMENT, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOP SAFE AND SECURE INTERIM FACILITIES FOR STORING URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS.

THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER ASSISTANCE IF SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT ACCELERATION OF THE RUSSIAN DISMANTLEMENT SCHEDULE.

ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR FISSILE MATERIAL/DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM:

WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT MEETING, THE SIDES BEGAN DISCUSSION OF ISSUES REGARDING THE UTILIZATION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM THAT ARE BECOMING AVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF THE DISMANTLING OF NUCLEAR ARMS, AS WELL AS ORGANIZATION OF A SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WAS HELD IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THE SIDES SET FORTH THEIR APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THESE PROBLEMS.

THE SIDES CONSIDER IT USEFUL TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THE AFOREMENTIONED ISSUES IN ORDER TO AGREE ON MEASURES THAT COULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE SIDES TOWARD DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD.

END TEXT.
COLLINS BT