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APPENDIX

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-445-77
30 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Comprehensive Test Ban (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ In view of the importance of comprehensive test ban (CTB) issues to all aspects of the nation's nuclear weapons posture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that greater attention should be given to key CTB issues within the Department of Defense. Development of a sound US CTB position will depend to a large extent upon the DOD's presenting, in the intragovernmental arena, well-conceived positions on national security and related technical issues. A number of important questions remain to be resolved before a coherent DOD position can be presented. Some of these are:

- a. What is the national intent with regard to maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile under a CTB?
- b. What low-yield experiments are advisable under a CTB in order to assure confidence in the stockpile and maintain design expertise in the laboratories?
- c. How should this "permitted experiment" issue be addressed at intragovernmental and international levels?
- d. How is long-term stockpile reliability achieved under a CTB? (For example, should a small number of standardized warhead designs be settled upon? Should these designs be modernized? What rebuilding rate is necessary? What are the cost and technological penalties of standardizing materials and processes so as to avoid future change?)

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Appendix

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- e. Would an extended transition period (several years) at a reduced underground test threshold be valuable for redesigning the US stockpile for maintenance under a CTB?
 - f. To what degree can new delivery systems and conceptual weapon systems be adapted to existing nuclear warhead designs without weapons testing?
 - g. What measures constitute adequate verification?
 - h. What are the required CTB safeguards, and what added costs should be budgeted for them and programmed now?
 - i. What urgent efforts are necessary (while testing is still permitted) for an effective transition into a CTB?
2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that three specific actions be taken now to accelerate development of a comprehensive DOD position on these and other important CTB issues, to achieve better DOD-Department of Energy (DOE) cooperation, and to promote discussion of these matters at intragovernmental levels:
- a. First, and most urgently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the issue of "permitted experiments under a CTB" must be raised at the national level prior to the departure of the US Negotiating Team for the 5 December plenary session in Geneva. Their concern here is to assure that US negotiators understand--prior to presenting papers or discussing the issues with the Soviets--that a CTB should provide for some low-yield nuclear experiments which, among other factors, can assist in assuring confidence in the stockpile. This is likely to be a controversial issue within the US Government, but it is believed that it is critical to national security. Full addressal is already late, but the United States should not compound the problem by opening new and more detailed discussions with the Soviets until a generalized national position on this matter has been given the negotiators. Annex A contains a proposed memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs raising this issue.
 - b. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you establish a temporary CTB Task Force within the DOD. In their judgment, the issues are of such breadth and complexity that they cannot be handled adequately without

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(Revised by Decision - 30 November 1977)

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a dedicated organizational structure. Since the issues are largely technical and the work focuses on R&D and acquisition--not just of nuclear weapons, but of delivery systems as well--they suggest that a representative of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering chair this effort. Other key members of the Task Force should be from CASD(ISA), OATSD(AE), OJCS, DIA, DNA, and the Military Departments. Since the DOE is directly involved in many of the issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that DOE be invited to participate in Task Force work. Annex B contains a proposed memorandum establishing this CTB Task Force.

c. Third, a fully effective working relationship with DOE should be achieved for continuing, in-depth communication on the issues summarized in paragraph 1 above. DOE has principal responsibility for many of these issues, and close DOD-DOE cooperation is essential to effective solution of CTB problems already identified and likely to arise in the future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you take the initiative by sending the proposed memorandum in Annex C to the Secretary of Energy raising the issue. The memorandum also invites his participation in the DOD CTB Task Force.

3. (U) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the national security and technical aspects of a CTB are of such importance as to require significantly increased attention within the DOD and closer DOD-DOE cooperation. Moreover, they should be addressed as an urgent matter in the Special Coordination Committee prior to resumption of substantive negotiations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

GEORGE S. BROWN
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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JCS 2482/406-1

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Appendix

(Revised by Decision - 30 November 1977)

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JCS 2482/427-1
23 January 1978
Page 2

NOTE TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ON
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN ISSUES (U)

(U) The attached joint talking paper, 19 January 1978, subject as above, is circulated for information.

Joint Secretariat

730 (2 DEC 77) W1

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19 JAN 1978

TALKING PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, SCC MEETING, 19 JANUARY 1978

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Issues (U)

PURPOSE OF MEETING: To review the key comprehensive test ban (CTB) issues prior to the 23 January resumption of the trilateral CTB negotiations in Geneva.

ISSUE: On-Site Inspections (OSI) -- Should the U.S. delegation table a proposal for a form of "voluntary" OSIs, and if so, when?

The Director, ACDA, has proposed a form of "voluntary" as opposed to "mandatory" OSI to be tabled as soon as possible to avoid an impasse in the CTB negotiations. Tab A contains the detailed proposal. Tab B contains the SecDef response to the ACDA proposal and Tab C contains the Chairman, JCS, response. Tab D contains the ISA analysis of the issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- DOD agrees with the suggested approach on the OSI issue but has reservations on the timing of such a proposal and its linkage to other key issues. We want to insure that this substantial shift in our historic position is presented at the stage of the negotiations when it will be most likely to obtain a maximum reciprocal impact on other key issues. Specifically, we should try to link any change in our position on OSI to obtaining sufficient internal seismic stations to provide a high degree of verification assurance.
- The JCS further believe that OSI should be addressed as part of the overall verification problem, to include how to deal with permitted nuclear experiments.

ISSUE: Internal Seismic Installations -- Should the U.S. delegation table a specific proposal on internal seismic installations which could include a specified maximum number of installations?

The SCC Working Group has prepared a position paper reviewing the basic technical requirements of internal seismic installations and sets forth a U.S. position on the number of internal installations required, methods of determining locations, ownership, maintenance, use of U.S. and Soviet equipment, nationality of manning, and data transmission (Tab F). The details are in general agreement with the U.S. position established for the December round, except that until now a specific number of required installations has never been proposed for possible tabling. A technical analysis of this issue (Tab H) indicates that 20 is probably a safe number for negotiating purposes but that considerably more study is required to reach a number in which we have greater confidence.

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RECOMMENDATION: Given the exceptional importance of the seismic verification issue in a CTB, we should not table any specific number. The SCC Working Group agreed to 20 internal seismic installations (assuming a mix of both single stations and arrays). While this is probably a safe negotiating number, no authoritative technical analysis exists to support such a position. However, the U.S. delegation may, at their discretion, table the provisions of the proposal (Tab F) minus any specific number.

ISSUE: PNE Protocol -- Should the US delegation reaffirm the US position on a PNE protocol?

- The Soviets maintain that the PNE protocol should be in the form of a three year moratorium during which negotiations would be conducted to find a means to accommodate PNEs in a CTB regime. Failing to reach agreement on accommodation after three years, parties would be free to resume conduct of PNEs. The US position is that the protocol should ban PNEs throughout the duration of treaty or until an accommodation is reached and will keep the matter under consideration.
- The respective positions on this issue could eventually result in an impasse, necessitating some movement on the moratorium (or time limit) question.

RECOMMENDATION: The US must remain firm in the position that the protocol must run concurrently with the treaty, because unconstrained resumption of PNEs by the Soviets will result in unilateral military advantage in the absence of a US PNE program. Moreover, resumption of PNEs would undermine the US non-proliferation objectives, since it could be interpreted by some states to justify nuclear explosions.

OTHER ISSUES: Other CTB issues as presented in the December SCC are to be reviewed. The Presidential instruction (Tab G) reviews these issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS: No change from December position on other issues.

Approved by:

Walt Stoenbe
Cechy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

J. J. Hamlin Director, Joint Staff
VADM, USA

Coordination:

Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering

s/M.E. Key Deputy (see next under)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Atomic Energy

Attachments - 8
a/s

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



THE JOINT STAFF

DJSM-910-78
3 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

Subject: Guidance to CTB Delegation

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft instruction message* circulated on 1 June 1978 and do not concur with this message.
2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that an approach which deals with only one part of the Presidential Directive should be avoided. The overall approach to negotiations which addresses all the elements involved should be developed in Washington before the delegation is instructed on this important matter. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will reserve judgment on any part of the instructions until the entire approach is presented.
3. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that guidance to the delegation can be better addressed after the SCC meeting now scheduled for Monday, 12 June 1978.

Philip D. Shutler

PHILIP D. SHUTLER
Major General, USMC
Acting Director

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BY JS

DATE 9/24/02

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM 914-78

5 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Subject: Guidance to CTB Delegation (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to your proposed message,*
subject: "CTB Negotiations: Delegation Guidance,"
(State CTB Message #17), and to my memorandum to
you, dated 3 June 1978, this subject (DJSM 910-78)**
2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe
that we should not proceed with negotiations on this
very important matter until the negotiating strategy
has been developed by the interagency. Likewise, the
SCC should be given the opportunity to review the
complete guidance when developed.

Philip D. Shutler

PHILIP D. SHUTLER
Major General, USMC
Vice Director, Joint Staff

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BY JS

DATE 9/29/02

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- * On file in Joint Secretariat
- ** Attachment to JCS 2179/758

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



THE JOINT STAFF

DJSM-925-78
6 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

Subject: Guidance to CTB Delegation (U)

1. (U) Reference:

a. LDX message number 4728 and attached proposed message,* subject "CTB Negotiations: Delegation Guidance," 6 June 1978.

b. DJSM 910-78,**subject as above, 3 June 1978.

c. DJSM 914-78,**subject as above, 5 June 1978.

2. ~~(S)~~ There still does not appear to be any urgency in proceeding with negotiations on this very important matter until the negotiating strategy has been reviewed by the Special Coordination Committee.

3. ~~(S)~~ The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed in references b and c remain valid, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend the message proposed in reference a not be dispatched.

DECLASSIFIED

BY JS

DATE 9-24-02

Signed

PHILIP D. SHUTLER
Major General, USMC
Vice Director, Joint Staff

- * On file in Joint Secretariat
- ** Attachment to JCS 2179/758
- *** Attachment to JCS 2179/758-1

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Prepared by:
COL J. C. Bowden, USA
Maritime/UN Neg Div
x73800

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



THE JOINT STAFF

DJSM-1001-78
16 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN MARCUM, NSC

Subject: Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Instructions (U)

1. (U) Reference IDX message number 555 and attached memorandum with draft instruction cable for the CTB Delegation, subject "CTB Negotiations," 14 June 1978.
2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft message circulated by the NSC Staff on 15 June 1978 regarding instructions to the CTB Delegation. They recognize that the SOC discussion of national seismic station networks led to a consensus that the number of arrays in the USSR could be relatively small compared to the number of seismic stations. However, the network of stations prescribed in these instructions would make a zero-yield comprehensive test ban treaty essentially unverifiable. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot concur in these instructions.

Phillip D. Shuttler

PHILLIP D. SHUTTLE
Major General, USMC
Vice Director, Joint Staff

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DATE 9/24/02

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Prepared by:
J.C. BOWDEN, Jr.
COL, USA
Maritime Negotians,
J-5, X-55675

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

DJSM 1012-78
21 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN MARCUM, NSC

Subject: Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Instructions (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ Since some questions have been raised, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to clarify their position on the proposed instruction to the CTB negotiators referred for coordination on 14 June 1978. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the decision to proceed with a zero yield Comprehensive Test Ban has been made by the President. They further recognize that the proposed instructions accurately reflect their debrief by the Acting Chairman, JCS, of the majority view in the SCC relative to the seismic station network that would be proposed to the Soviets. However, the Joint Chiefs have serious reservations about verification and did not want to convey the impression that they believed the proposed network would assure adequate verification of the treaty. DJSM-1001-78* was forwarded to reflect that concern.

2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff accept the proposed message* as being an adequate reflection of the majority view at the SCC and therefore pose no objection to the proposed message, recognizing that their position on verification has been overruled.

* Attachment to JCS 2179/758-3
** On file in Joint Secretariat

SIGNED

PATRICK J. HANNIFIN
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

Prepared by:
COL J. C. Bowden, Jr., USA
Maritime/UN Negotiations
Division, J-5
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DATE *9/29/02*

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THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM-1982-78
11 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Subject: CTB Review Conference (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ Reference your memorandum with a memorandum from the Director, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, OASD(ISA), 7 December 1978, subject as above, which proposed that the review conference be empowered "to review the operation of the Treaty and to consider the question of whether there should be subsequent treaty prohibitions, depending on the effect of the Treaty on the security interests of its parties and on the extent to which the objectives of the Treaty have been achieved."
2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Staff does not concur in the proposed formulation on the following grounds:
 - a. ~~(S)~~ PD/NSC-38 states ". . . there would be a review conference to determine whether to negotiate a replacement treaty" which clearly places emphasis and limits on the review conference function which is to decide "whether to negotiate". The proposal under consideration significantly changes this emphasis to address ". . . whether there should be subsequent treaty prohibitions. . . ." The extent of deviation is such that a readdressal of the Presidential guidance would be required.
 - b. ~~(S)~~ We find the words "depending on the effect of the Treaty on the security interests of its parties and on the extent to which the objectives of the Treaty have been achieved" unclear and misleading. The review conference should not be empowered to determine the effect of a CTBT on security interests of the United States or any other country. Further, the objectives of the treaty are not stated and even if incorporated in the body of the Treaty text would be difficult to evaluate by the review conference.

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
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3. (S) In nonconcurring with the proposed language, the Joint Staff believes the current ad referendum treaty text "to consider the question of whether there should be a replacement treaty" is representative of the intent expressed in the Presidential Decision. If policy considerations require modification of this position, we suggest the following formulation ". . . to consider the question of whether there should be future treaty arrangements." We recommend that any change to the current ad referendum language be adopted through Special Coordination Committee action.


JOHN A. WICKHAM JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

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SECDEF HAS SEEN

25 SEP 1978



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-301-78

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Nonproliferation Value of a Comprehensive Test Ban (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully studied your memorandum of 10 July 1978, subject as above. While they agree that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a serious US national security issue, they remain unpersuaded by the evidence you have presented on the potential nonproliferation benefits of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) of the type currently under discussion.

2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been unable to establish to their satisfaction any causative relationship between a ban on nuclear testing and the cessation of the development of nuclear weapons by states without such weapons. They feel at this point that a nation's decision to develop nuclear weapons is dependent upon perceptions of vital self-interest, not upon the existence of a CTB. Further, they believe the benefits stated in your memorandum would be uncertain and debatable in the case of a CTB of unlimited duration, and that significant nonproliferation benefits would not be derived from the type of CTB now being considered by the United States--one of 3- to 5-year duration with an announced option to resume testing.

3. (S) Clearly, there are divergent views concerning the nonproliferation benefits of a 3- to 5-year CTB followed by resumption of testing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe

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
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that an interagency paper weighing the nonproliferation impacts and the national security risks of a CTB should be developed for consideration by the National Security Council. The Secretary of Defense has been so advised.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, USA
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy to:

Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Energy
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

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