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CM-578-02

31 October 2002

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RB/10/31*

SUBJECT: Colombia Military Options Study (S)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ In regard to your inquiry (TAB A) as to what US forces might do for Colombia if requested, TAB B is the USSOUTHCOM's Colombia Military Options Study. *Concur in the well-done study.*
- (S) The study provides a range of options to assist the Colombian Government in regaining control of its territory and will be a useful framework when considering requests to provide more assistance.
- (S) *(b)(1)*
(b)(1)
- (S) The new policy and legislation will allow us to judiciously pursue the options contained in the study and assist the Colombian Government in achieving effective sovereignty over its national territory.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

*SIR,
I RECOMMEND ASKING GEN
HALL TO COME BRIEF YOU ON
THIS STUDY SO WE CAN HAVE A
DISCUSSION.*

*VR
Dsch*

Prepared By: George W. Casey, LTG, USA; Director, DJ-5; *(b)(6)*

Classified By: George W. Casey, LTG, USA, DJ-5
Reason: 1.5(a,d)
Declassify On: 23 October 2012

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SECDEF CONTROL#

March 20, 2002 7:12 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Colombia Policy

I don't know what is going to happen with respect to U.S.-Colombia policy. It is clear there are different views in both the Congress and in the Executive Branch, which is not surprising. It poses some tough issues.

I wonder if it might make sense for SOUTHCOM and SOCOM to be tasked with establishing a joint working group to think through what we might do in Colombia if we are asked. It seems to me we would have to decide what victory would be, and then think through a plan to achieve what we decide to characterize as victory.

The group might be in contact with folks at CIA, DEA, Treasury and State, and also probably coordinate with Wayne Downing at NSC.

There is a lot of history in defeating insurgencies—in the Philippines from 1898-1902, in Nicaragua with the Marines in the 1920s, during the Greek civil war in the 1940s, in Malaysia in the 1950s and even in some pacification efforts in South Vietnam that worked during the 1960s and 1970s.

Certainly, if we end up doing something, it would fit into the nation-building category, which the administration has not favored. On the other hand, it could use the principles of entrepreneurial nation-building that Secretary O'Neill and others are beginning to develop.

Tab A

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The working group might want to talk to DARPA to see what programs are being developed for surveillance, intelligence, etc. that might be useful. They might also want to talk to Cebrowski on network-centric warfare as applied to jungles, urban areas and insurgencies.

I suspect this should be a very small cell that would report back to us in 90 days.

My view is that Colombia is a hard case, but, nonetheless, I think we ought to be seeing what, if anything, might be done.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DMC:sh
03/29/02

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Please respond by 03/29/02

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**Playing to Win: Turning the Tide in
Colombia**
1 August 2002



**Colombia Military
Options Study**

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1 August 2002

Playing to Win: Turning the Tide in Colombia



Colombia Military Options Study

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(b)(1), (b)(5)

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(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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