

(59)

Secretary of Defense Day Book

For

Sept 30, 2004

(fill in date).

This document is unclassified
when separate from

~~SECRET/NF~~

(fill in classification)

attachment

SecDef Control #

OSD 78292-04

INDEX FOR DAYBOOK

Folder: HC & Mtg w/Colombian MOD

- Subject:

Read ahead for Secretary of Defense

- Date:

09/28/2004

From:

USP

Pgs/End(s):

2/3

OCN:

I-04/012748

Folder: SLRG

- Subject:

Defense Information Systems Agency POM/BES FY 06-11

- Date:

09/30/2004

From:

DISA

Pgs/End(s):

8/0

OCN:

Colombian Prep

~~September 29, 11:45am-12:15pm~~

HC & Mtg w/ Colombian MoD

September 30, 3:00-3:30pm

DepSecDef _____
USD(P) *Copy provided*
I-04/012748-WHR *Y/A*
9/29/04

READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Meeting with JORGE URIBE, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF COLOMBIA

Addressed as: Mr. Minister, Pronunciation ooh-REE-beh

30 September 2004, 3:00 – 3:30 PM

From: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), 695-4351 28 SEP 2004

(U) Purpose: MOD Uribe is accompanying President Uribe to UNGA, Sep 28 – 1 Oct.

- o This is Minister Uribe's first solo office call with you; however, he visited you with President Uribe 22 March 2004.

(U) Attendees: US: SECDEF, CJCS Myers, USD(P) Feith, ASD O'Connell, DASD Pardo-Maurer. Colombia: MOD Jorge Uribe, DCM Bernardo Ortiz, Personal Secretary Alejandro Vargas, Counselor Juan Jose Quintana.

(U) Background/Issues:

(U) Our Strategy: "Effective Sovereignty + Expanded Authorities" (NSPD 18)

- Our current policy is working and enjoys bipartisan support.
- It complements President Uribe's "Democratic Security Strategy" and helps Colombia fight a unified campaign against drugs and terrorism.
- Our policy is changing the threat to Colombia—from a *military* problem requiring external assistance to a *police* problem Colombia can handle on its own.

~~(S)~~ Plan Patriota Military Campaign

- After great success around Bogotá, the Colombian military is entering areas it has not seen for 40 years. The current phase targets the FARC in its jungle sanctuaries.

(U) Negotiations with the AUC – Paramilitaries

- President Uribe is focusing his military effort against the FARC, while pursuing talks to demobilize a fragmented (but powerful and dangerous) AUC.
- The AUC is splitting into "hardliners" involved in the drug trade, and politically-motivated "moderates" willing to negotiate a demobilization.
- AUC hardliners are killing the AUC moderates in order to seize control of the talks.

SECRET//NOFORN

23-09-04 17:45 IN

Prepared by: LTC (b)(6) ISA/WHA (b)(6)
Classified by: R. Pardo-Maurer, DASD-WHA
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d)
Declassify on: 23 Sep 2014

AS OF 9/28/2004 2:45 PM

(U) Colombia and Venezuela

- Recent border incidents are stoking tensions. Chavez is manipulating the issue to justify arms purchases (including Russian attack helicopters and fighters).
- Colombia is concerned over Chavez's plans to purchase Mig-29 fighters.

(U) Air Bridge Denial (ABD) Program

- Since you got the ABD program running again, in August 2003, Colombia has forced down 32 drug planes—17 with U.S. assistance.
- They don't shoot the planes in the air—they force them down and then destroy them.
- The next step is for Brazil and Central America to work more closely with Colombia.

~~(S//NF)~~ The Three US Hostages

- The hostages' location is unknown. We are pursuing all leads, with Colombia's help.
- SOUTHCOM is prepared to act on (b)(1), 1.4(c)

(U) Colombia and GWOT

- Uribe was the only South American president to support OIF publicly.
- Colombia "sounded out" a troop offer to Iraq, but made no formal offer.
- Colombia's experience fighting narcoterrorists is relevant to Afghanistan. We'd like their MOD to agree to a mechanism to share lessons learned.

(U) Bilateral Working Group and 6th Defense Ministerial of the Americas

- The Colombia bilateral working group will be in Medellín in October.
- The DMA-6 is scheduled for mid-November in Ecuador.

(U) Article 98

- President Uribe signed an Article 98 agreement on 17 September 2003, after your personal intervention. Congressional ratification not required.

Attachments:

TAB A – Talking Points

(b)(1)

TAB C – Colombia: Reelection Consensus

A

9/29/04

I-04/012748-WHR

TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Meeting with JORGE URIBE, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF COLOMBIA

- Your military is doing a great job in reasserting control over Colombia's territory, and enjoys an impressive approval rating (78%) because of it.
- A key strength of our Colombia policy is that it has firm bipartisan support.
 - We want to maintain that support in any follow-on to Plan Colombia.
- The Hill is closely following your discussions with the AUC paramilitaries.
 - Who is in charge of the AUC now? Where are these talks headed?
- I hear you've destroyed 32 drug planes with the Air Bridge Denial program.
 - I'd be interested in your thoughts on a regional approach, now that Brazil is implementing its own "shoot-down" policy.
 - Perhaps we should discuss this with the Central Americans at the Defense Ministerial, in Quito. I know they want to do more in this area.
- What is your view on President Chavez and the situation in Venezuela?
- I hear President Chavez wants to buy Mig-29s fighters. He already has F-16's.
 - What can he possibly want MiG-29s for?
- We should keep our colleagues at the Defense Ministerial focused on the region's permeability to narcoterrorists.
 - You could help by highlighting the links between organized crime, drug-trafficking, and terrorism. The Central Americans would welcome your lessons learned.
 - The *Bilateral Working Group* in Colombia next month is a good opportunity to coordinate our efforts.
 - We'd like to talk with you about setting up a mechanism to apply lessons learned from Colombia for Iraq and Afghanistan.
- I appreciate your continued efforts to find our three U.S. hostages.

Prepared by: LTC (b)(6) ISA/WHA, (b)(6)

AS OF 9/29/2004 1:02 AM

B

7


~~CONFIDENTIAL/20140824~~

09/03/2004

~~(C)~~ Colombia: Reelection Consensus

~~(S)~~ Colombia's President Uribe enjoys broad public support for his administration and reelection. His reelection amendment continues to leap the necessary congressional hurdles and it appears increasingly likely that Uribe will be permitted to stand for reelection in 2006.

~~(S)~~ Based on Uribe's performance, 60 percent now agree with a proposed amendment to allow a president to serve two terms, according to a July-August INR Office of Research poll. Though Colombians traditionally have opposed presidential reelection, majority backing for the proposal exists across all social groups, particularly the upper and upper-middle classes.




~~(C)~~ Uribe's personal popularity and overall job approval ratings outstrip those of any other Colombian president in the last 15 years (Gaviria, 1990-94; Samper, 1994-98; and Pastrana, 1998-2002). One key to Uribe's public support is the apparent progress he has made on critical issues that have ranked as Colombians' top concerns for more than two decades: the war with the guerrillas, drug trafficking, and corruption (see Figure 1). Approval of Uribe's management of these three issues surpasses that of his immediate predecessors, Samper and Pastrana. Uribe also is getting a bounce from two consecutive years of solid economic growth, with additional growth forecast

through 2005.

(U) Institutional impact

(C) The decade before Uribe's ascension was marked by a sharp decline in public faith in national institutions owing to general government ineffectiveness, rising levels of violence, and narcotics-related corruption. Polling has shown a strong link in some Latin American countries between the public's overall views toward democracy and opinion concerning specific incumbent governments. Because Uribe's administration has built on the apparent progress on the issues noted above that began in the second half of the Pastrana administration (as Plan Colombia was getting under way), the urban public's view of institutions has become more favorable than during the 1990s (see Figure 2).



(U) Amendment moving forward

(C) Following August 19 approval by a Senate committee, the reelection amendment now faces only final approval by the Senate and committee and plenary approval by the lower chamber of Congress, which it must receive by December 15. Organized opposition to the amendment is dwindling, and even Uribe's probable opponent in the 2006 election now concedes the amendment's passage is virtually assured.

CONFIDENTIAL//20140824
Reason for Classification: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b) and (d)
Declassify on: 20140824

SLRG

September 30, 4:00-5:30 p.m.

Close Hold

Defense Information Systems Agency



POM/BES FY 06-11

**Lt Gen Harry Raduege
Director, DISA
Commander, JTF-GNO
30 September 2004**

Close Hold



This is DISA

Close Hold

FY 06 Resource Base

Working Capital Fund

- Telecommunications \$1,306M
- Computing \$694M
- Customer managed comm \$841M
- Enterprise acquisition services \$1,496M

Appropriated

- Joint programs \$1,239M
- White House support \$140M

Non-DWCF Reimbursable \$248M

OEF and OIF Support

- Increased satellite bandwidth 10-fold *
- Increased fiber bandwidth 138-fold *
- Provided secure satellite phones
- Forward presence with CENTCOM
- CPA – IT planning, contracting, installation

* From pre-9/11 levels

Joint Missions

- Global DoD network – voice, data, video
- Global network operations and defense
Director, DISA = Commander, JTF-GNO
- Combat support data centers
Processing up; cost down
- C2 systems development and support
- DISA Field Offices at each COCOM
- Major acquisitions: more bandwidth and common network services
- Presidential / White House support

People – on board today

- 4,978 civilians
- 1,701 military (847 White House)
- Located in 24 states, 7 countries



POM/BES FY06 - 11 STRATEGY

Close Hold

- **Sustain day-to-day operations**
- **Surge for warfighting**
- **Transition DoD to net-centric capabilities**
- **Change workforce skills mix for increased productivity**



POM/BES FY06 - 11

Close Hold

FORCE MANAGEMENT



Decrease
Risk

- ✓ Supports STRATCOM network C4 mission
 - Force provider to Joint Task Force Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO)
- ✓ Increases investment in human capital
 - Develops leaders, retains talent
 - Increases workforce technical depth

OPERATIONAL



Decrease
Risk

- ✓ Strengthens GIG operations and defense
 - Operationalizes network operations
- ✓ Accelerates transition to a net-centric force
 - Funds next generation initiatives
 - Reduces legacy programs

FUTURE CHALLENGES



Accept
Risk

- Continues transition to net-centricity
 - Begins follow-on Joint C2 program; sustains legacy
 - Plans for converged voice, data, video on an Internet Protocol-based network

INSTITUTIONAL



Decrease
Risk


- ✓ Aligns Balanced Scorecard and POM
- ✓ Simplifies network planning, financing
 - Streamlines cost recovery
- ✓ Improves management of overhead, indirect costs
 - Assures full cost accountability




POM/BES FY06 - 11

Close Hold

People vs Network Capabilities




DOD Network vs Internet Performance*




DISA targets less than 100 milliseconds (ms) delay and less than one percent packet loss

* Internet performance (Source: InternetTrafficReport.com)

Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE)







OEF and OIF Support





Combat Support Computing Transformation Results

Close Hold





POM/BES FY06 - 11 ISSUES

Close Hold

Net-Centric Operations

- **Building a secure Internet-like DoD backbone**
 - **Joint C2 and common services**
 - **Strengthen network operations**
 - **Seeing benefits already in war**
- **Build jointness and security into information technology acquisitions from the start**
- **Transitioning -- on the fly -- from legacy**
- **Bringing in new entities to join the network**
- **Remain flexible to new network demands; e.g., ISR**



POM/BES FY06-11 Summary

Close Hold

- **DISA's POM is compliant with the SPG and JPG**
- **Continuously balancing among risks**
- **Transitioning from legacy**
- **Moving to net-centric operations**