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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEB 14 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Principles for the New Iraqi Government

Attached is a paper suggesting some principles for the new Iraqi Government that we have discussed at PC meetings and elsewhere over recent days.

Attach: 2/6/06 Principles for the New Iraqi Government

DR:ca
020606-13

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Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes

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OSD 75351-06

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02/06/06
1630

Principles for the New Iraqi Government

The Principals discussed, and the President approved, a set of principles that were issued to guide U.S. Policy in the formation of the Iraqi government.

The revised principles below seek to take into account changes on the ground since those principles were agreed on. They are offered for your consideration.

We should encourage an Iraqi government that:

- forms quickly, in a process that all parties consider to be fair.
- is centrist and broadly inclusive.
- derives its authority from the December 2005 election results, i.e., not on the basis of a separate negotiation among the ethnic and sectarian groups.
- operates on clear, unambiguous constitutional lines.
- is led by a decisive, effective "war leader" prime minister.
- agrees, from the time of its formation, to a unified purpose and program of government and that it will govern from the center.
- has a four-year version.
- keeps competent civilian employees and military officers in place.
- appoints ministers
 - on the basis of competence and integrity.
 - who see their ministries as part of a unified national effort, and not as the property of the ethnic or sectarian group to which the minister belongs.
 - We should recommend ways to minimize the impact of ethnic identification of the ministries, such as arranging ministries in functional clusters and appointing ministers from different groups to the ministries in the cluster and to the DPM position supervising the cluster.

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- of Defense and Interior who transcend burdensome former ties to militias
- of Finance and Oil who have acknowledged credibility in their fields.
 - o The Finance Minister should understand the priority of spending on security.

We need to avoid an Iraqi Government that:


- forms on the basis of ethnic entitlement.
- gives authority without responsibility or accountability.
- provides for extra-constitutional veto of prime ministerial decisions.
- is headed by a weak, indecisive prime minister.
- regards ministries as belonging to a specific ethnic or sectarian group.
- We should guard against Sadrist appropriation of the social services ministries.
- replaces career employees in a "spoils system."
- is under Iranian influence.
- No figure in the security ministries or intelligence service should be under the direction of any non-Coalition government.
- appoints Defense and Interior Ministers who are weak, incompetent, and/or tied to militias.

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OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
MAR 03 2005
2005 JUN -3 AM 7:21

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: **DOUG FEITH**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: New Iraqi Government

Regarding the subject of getting everything done that needs to be done, between now and the time a new Iraqi government is elected and immediately thereafter, I said to Condi that I thought we ought to have either a team or each of us have a team to catalogue it all and then get work started on each of the items that are necessary. I asked Doug Feith about it. He said he already had the inventory done and sent me this paper.

Iraq

I am unfulfilled.

Please take over responsibility for seeing that this gets done. Come back to me and brief me about once every two weeks as to what's happening. Someone has to get hold of this. It is very, very important.

Thanks.

Attach.

- 1/31/05 SD memo to USD(P) [Snowflake #013105-12]
- 1/28/05 SD memo to USD(P) [Snowflake #012705-21]
- 2/3/05 USD(P) memo to SD [OSD 02494-05]

DHR:dh
022805-17

3 mar 05

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Please respond by 3/24/05

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88D 10581-05

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ES-2196
051001509

2005 FEB -4 PM 3:16

January 31, 2005

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: List of Iraq Items

I need a list of the things we are going to have to be doing over the coming year with Iraq, such as the SOFA, and the like. Let's look ahead and plan it now.

Thanks.

DWJ:m
013105-12

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

2/7 ^{add} _{2/28}
SIR _____
Attached
v/r
J

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OSD 02498-05
31-01-05 PC9763 IN

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -4 PM 3:16

ES-2167
05/001413

JAN 28 2005

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: List of Items to Discuss with New Iraqi Government

We need to prepare a list of the things we will want to discuss with the new Iraqi government. For instance, when we do the SOFA and other types of things, what kind of briefings we want to set up for the people after they are elected, etc.

Thanks.

DMR:w
012705-21

.....
Please respond by

2/3/05

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OSD 02494-05

29-01-05 P04:03 IN

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *Out 2/28*
2005 FEB -4 PM 3:16

INFO MEMO

ES-1267, 1509, 1589
I-05/001413
DepSecDef _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *3 FEB 8 2005*

SUBJECT: Discussions with New Iraqi Government

You asked for a list of things to discuss with the new Iraqi government and for a recommendation on briefings for incoming senior Iraqi officials (Tab A).

- Timing: although the Transitional Administrative Law provides up to six weeks for a cabinet to be selected and empowered, the process could move much faster.

- We should be prepared for discussions with incoming officials by February 15th or as soon thereafter as they are identified or take office.

• Key dates in 2005:

Feb 15- Mar 15: Formation of Iraqi Transitional Government

June 8: Security Council review of multinational force (MNF) mandate under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546

October 15: Ratification of Permanent Constitution

December 15: Election of New Government

December 31: Installation of New Government.

December 31: Expiration of the MNF mandate under UNSCR 1546 (based on completion of the political process)

Topics we might brief:

- To all cabinet ministers and above:
 - MNF-I Iraq Campaign Plan and transition to Iraqi local and regional control
 - The status and roles of the military in a democratic society

MA SD	BRAND	SAS	2/9
TSA SD	SA DSD	2/9	
EXEC SEC	MZ/9		
ESR MA	KSV	29-05	1709 2/2

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OSD 02494-05

- To the Presidency Council, Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, Ministers of Defense and Security, and National Security Committee of the National Assembly:
 - Iraqi Security Forces (including military and police) train-and-equip program
 - Coordination with MNF-I, including planning and conducting combined operations
 - Developing the ministries and coordinating with them
 - Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (this would enable U.S. forces to provide direct logistics support to Iraqi military forces in the field)
 - Defense Attaché exchange
 - Common strategy for the required Security Council review of the MNF mandate under UNSCR 1546 (June 8, 2005). (Note: we and the Iraqis should be prepared to counter French or other demands for a Coalition withdrawal at the end of 2005.)

Topics the Iraqis may raise with us:

- Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). SOFA-like protections are currently afforded to the MNF pursuant to CPA Order No. 17 (revised), which like all CPA orders will remain in effect until "rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." (TAL, Art. 27[C]). Therefore, the ITG could through legislation decide to rescind or amend CPA Order No. 17. Although it is too early to know whether the ITG would want to enact such legislation, should it do so we would need to engage in negotiations of a SOFA.
- Longer-term Basing Arrangements. (We may want to consider combining SOFA and facilities access provisions for the long term into a single text for negotiation.)
- Other specific issues, e.g., MNF-I's authority to detain persons, U.S. current use of property such as the International Zone and portions of BIAP.

Prepared by C. Straub ISA-NESA-NG, [REDACTED]

DUSD (NESA) _____

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December 23, 2002 8:20 AM

283 JUN 18 AM 9:00

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*
SUBJECT: Iraq List of Problems

IRAQ

Please update this list over the holidays. Take off the things that are OBE and then edit it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/15/02 SecDef memo re: Iraq List of Problems

DHR:dh
122302-11

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Please respond by 01/03/03

23 Dec 02

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF CONTROL X02000 /03

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October 15, 2002
7:45 AM

SUBJECT: Iraq: An Illustrative List of Potential Problems to be Considered and Addressed

Following is an illustrative list of the types of problems that could result from a conflict with Iraq. It is offered simply as a checklist so that they are part of the deliberations.

1. If US seeks UN approval, it could fail; and without a UN mandate, potential coalition partners may be unwilling to participate.
2. A failure to answer this question could erode support: "If the US pre-empts in one country, does it mean it will pre-empt in all other terrorist states?"
3. US could fail to restrain Israel, and, if Israel entered the conflict, it could broaden into a Middle East war.
4. Syria and Iran could decide to support Iraq, complicating the war.
5. Turkish military could move on the Kurds or the Northern Iraqi oilfields.
6. The Arab street could erupt, particularly if the war is long, destabilizing friendly countries neighboring Iraq ~ Jordan, Saudi Arabia, GCC states, Pakistan, etc.
7. While the US is engaged in Iraq, another rogue state could take advantage of US preoccupation— [REDACTED]
8. While preoccupied with Iraq, the US might feel compelled to ignore serious proliferation or other machinations by [REDACTED] and thereby seem to tacitly approve and acquiesce in unacceptable behavior, to the detriment of U.S. influence in the world.
9. Preoccupation with Iraq for a long period could lead to US inattentiveness and diminished influence in South Asia, which could lead to a conflict between nuclear armed states.

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10. Oil disruption could cause international shock waves, and with South America already in distress.
11. Iraqi intelligence services, which have a global presence including in the US, could strike the US, our Allies and/or deployed forces in unconventional ways.
12. 
13. US could fail to find WMD on the ground in Iraq and be unpersuasive to the world.
14. There could be higher than expected collateral damage—Iraqi civilian deaths.
15. There could be higher than expected US and coalition deaths from Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction against coalition forces in Iraq, Kuwait and/or Israel.
16. US could fail to find Saddam Hussein and face problems similar to the difficulty in not finding UBL and Omar.
17. US could fail to manage post-Saddam Hussein Iraq successfully, with the result that it could fracture into two or three pieces, to the detriment of the Middle East and the benefit of Iran.
18. The dollar cost of the effort could prove to be greater than expected and the contributions from other nations minimal.
19. Rather than having the post-Saddam effort require 2 to 4 years, it could take 8 to 10 years, thereby absorbing US leadership, military and financial resources.
20. US alienation from countries in the EU and the UN could grow to levels sufficient to make our historic post World War II relationships irretrievable, with the charge of US unilateralism becoming so embedded in the world's mind that it leads to a diminution of U.S. influence in the world.

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21. US focus on Iraq could weaken our effort in the global war on terrorism, leading to terrorist attacks against the US or Europe including a WMD attack in the US, that theoretically might have been avoided.
22. World reaction against "pre-emption" or "anticipatory self-defense" could inhibit US ability to engage in the future.
23. Adverse reaction to the US could result in the US losing military basing rights in the Gulf and other Muslim countries.
24. Recruiting and financing for terrorist networks could take a dramatic upward turn from successful information operations by our enemies, positioning the US as anti-Muslim.
25. The US will learn, to our surprise, a number of the "unknown unknowns," the gaps in our intelligence knowledge, for example:
 - Iraqi WMD programs could be several years more advanced than we assessed;
 - Iraqi capabilities of which we were unaware may exist, such as UAVs, jamming, cyber attacks, etc.
 - Others one might imagine!
26. Fortress Baghdad could prove to be long and unpleasant for all.
27. Iraq could experience ethnic strife among Sunni, Shia and Kurds.
28. Iraq could use chemical weapons against the Shia and blame the US.
29. Iraq could successfully best us in public relations and persuade the world that the war is against Muslims.

Note: It is possible of course to prepare a similar illustrative list of all the potential problems that need to be considered if there is no regime change in Iraq.

DHR/dh
Iraq List of Problems