

~~SECRET~~

## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP 15 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY  
COUNCIL


SUBJECT: Afghan National Army (ANA) Growth Proposal brief

The Secretary of Defense has asked that the briefing slides regarding above subject be forwarded to Mr. Hadley and LTG Lute for their consideration. No further action is required.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

Should you require additional information CDR [REDACTED] will be able to assist.  
He can be reached at [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

  
William P. Marriott  
Executive SecretaryAttachment:  
As stated

Unclassified when separated from classified attachments

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL RECYCLING PROGRAM



PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

OSD 77241-08




Afghanistan

15 SEP 08



(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)







## Item 1 (1 of 1)

- (S) Increase Afghan ownership of the ANSF, including allowing them to announce and build international support for proposed expansions of the force.**

### Response:

(b)(1)

**requesting support for increasing ANA to 122K structure plus appropriate training population. (b)(1) requested support at July meeting of JCMB. OSD is working a roll-out plan. CSTC-A will continue to assist the Afghans preparing for formal announcements and discussions at JCMB.**



## **Item 2 (1 of 3)**

**(U) Address the issue of sustaining the ANSF, including expectations regarding Afghan and international support of the proposed increase and the commitment to building, training, and sustaining the force.**

### **Response:**

- ANSF (122K ANA and 82K ANP) Sustainment will cost approximately \$3.1B per year (FY10 constant dollars) after the initial investment period. This is consistent with prior analysis showing +100M /10K force increase plus new Air Corps sustainment cost and is consistent with POTUS briefing.**





## ANA Fiscal Sustainability Assumptions

Item 2 (2 of 3)

- **Afghan Contribution**
  - **8% Afghan GDP growth rate** (ref: World Bank Report, 30 Jan 08)
  - **30% of Domestic Revenue to Security Sector**
  - **Security Sector contribution not to exceed 3-5% of GDP by 2020**  
(UN Development Program (UNDP) Enhanced Security Goal 9)
  - **Continued expectance for rising commodity prices (food/fuel) will exert adverse pressure on Afghanistan's ability to bear greater security costs.**
- **International Support**
  - **We believe there will be international support for ANA growth manifested in continued commitment of international troops.**
  - (b)(1)
  - **An international trust fund (Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan – like) established specifically share the long-term ANA sustainment costs would be beneficial.**


(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~



## IRoA's Funding of Security Sector Increases Proportionate to Afghan GDP Growth

Item 2 (3 of 3)



- IRoA contributions based on GDP growth per World Bank Report
- US contributions based on 134K ANA and 82K ANP
- Non-US International contributions not shown (Jan 07 to present = less than \$200M)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~





## Item 3 (1 of 1)

**(U) Explain the growth in the operating costs, which have increased significantly since earlier forecasts.**

**Response:**

- **ANSF FY09 Operating Costs are \$2.2B**
- **ANSF FY10 Operating Costs are projected for \$3.4B**

**The growth is due to:**

- **\$504M increase due to increased ammunition consumption and use of US NATO ammo vice Warsaw Pact ammo (changed weapon systems)**
- **\$305M increase due to increase in soldier strength by 42K**
- **\$177M increase due to Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE)** (b)(1)
- **\$144M increase due to 40% increase in the cost of fuel**
- **\$69M increase due to inflation planned at 5.4%**

**+\$1.2B Total projected increase**

<b>FY09 Cost: \$1,358 per man</b>	<b>FY10 Projected Cost: \$1,683 per man</b>
-----------------------------------	---

**NOTE: A detailed breakdown/justification for operating costs to be provided in the FY10 Budget Submission in Aug08.**

~~SECRET~~



## Item 4 (1 of 2)

**(U) Identify U.S. funding requirements, including recommending the type of funding (e.g., supplemental Afghan Security Forces Funding, traditional security assistance, or if a new authority is required).**

**Response:**

- **The ANSF (ANA/ANP/Detention Opns) FY10 Budget Proposal funding requirement is \$7.4B**
- **Fielding 122K ANA by end of FY12 was briefed to POTUS as a 3-yr investment cost of \$4.9B (\$11.9B total ANA cost).**
- **The cost has been further refined to accomplish growth for a 3-yr investment of \$3.0B (\$10.1B total ANA cost). The refinement includes frontloading facilities and equipment in the FY10 budget.**
  - **Purchase long lead infrastructure and equipment in FY10 at \$2.2B**
  - **Remaining cost distributed between FY11 and FY12**
- **All U.S. funding should remain 2-year Afghan Security Forces Funding in execution until capital investments are completed in order to respond to the dynamic operational environment and preserve flexibility.**
- **CSTC-A receives Title 10 funds through CJTF-101 for internal operational costs. These costs are not included in the ANSF funding figures.**




# Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan



## Steady State ASFF Sustainment Cost with 122K ANA (Then Year Dollars)

Item 4 (2 of 2)





## Item 5 (1 of 4)

**(U) Identify U.S., Afghan, and international manning requirements to implement the plan and when they will need to be filled.**

- Pay particular attention to the challenge of establishing a professional Afghan Officer and Ministry of Defense/Ministry of Interior Civil Service corps, and identify what incentives and policies might be needed to maintain literate, experienced, and competent leaders.

**Response:**

- Growth in the ANA to 122K over the period of FY09 to FY14 will require [redacted] embedded training teams (ETTs) and (b)(1) PAX (individual augmentees) or (b)(1) IBCTs (unit sourcing). The requirement for additional teams is dependent upon the approved fielding schedule of the new units contained in the growth to 122K.
- International support to the training mission is currently manned at 36 OMLTs of the 67 teams required in the NATO CJSOR based on the 80K ANA. When the sourcing formulas are extended to the 122K force, the NATO requirement expands to (b)(1) OMLTs. Increased NATO support to this mission will mitigate US requirements.
- Additional mitigation may be achieved by restructuring the ETTs in ANA units that reach CM1. Because the teams are also facilitating support and service support functions (CAS, Medevac, logistics) this effort must be done over time in conjunction with the increased ANA CS/CSS capability.
- CSTC-A JMD should be sourced at (b)(1) to handle the fielding and sustainment of the increased force.

(b)(1)





## Item 5 (2 of 4)

- **Establishing a professional corps of officers and civilians must occur regardless of size of force structure.**
  - **On the uniformed side, this is addressed in the maturation of the current force with the expansion of the Professional Military Education (PME) venues for both the officer and NCO Corps. IRoA must pass National Military Service Legislation to establish law for promotions, retirement and other programs in order to fully transition to a professional force. Draft legislation has been developed and is being staffed.**
  - **CSTC-A MOD/MOI professional development programs continue to be conducted in collaboration with coalition partners to enhance the skills and professionalism of the Civil Service Corps. IRoA must also develop and pass National Civil Service Legislation in order to build a professional civilian work force. IRoA work towards the Civil Service Law lags behind efforts for the military.**
- **CSTC-A is currently reviewing incentives required to man and shape the force, to include enlistment and reenlistment bonus options as well as special pays for certain professional positions.**



(b)(1)








# ANA Incremental Build To Structural Objective

Item 5 (4 of 4)





## Item 6 (1 of 3)

**(S) Clarify the assumptions made about the security situation, and establish processes for assessing changing circumstances, and managing Afghan expectations.**

### **Response:**

- **Friendly Facts and Assumptions**

- **ANSF must be sufficient to disrupt threat and deny insurgent safe havens.**
- **ANSF must geographically replace the US and Coalition maneuver force footprint.**
- **ANSF must protect population throughout the entire country.**
- **ANSF must possess an inherent combat support and combat service support capability.**
- **ANSF must enable the Afghan Government to expand the governance to all provinces.**
- **ANSF must be able to “live among the people” to gain public support.**
- **ANA will continue to be regarded the legitimate force.**
- **(b)(1)**
- **IC will provide enabler support to Afghan until capability is established.**





## Item 6 (2 of 3)

- **Threat assumptions**

(b)(1)



Threat Assumptions are reviewed constantly during all CSTC-A processes.

- **CSTC-A maintains a consistent and comprehensive process for assessing the development of the ANSF that is horizontal in terms of function and vertical in our ability to assess the leadership from the Ministerial to battalion level.**
- **The plan for growth of the ANSF remains situation dependent. Semi-annual reviews of the ANSF force structure will be conducted in Feb&Aug to validate requirements based on the current threat. The winter assessment will inform the IRoA MOD/MOI solar-year programmatic cycles which are being developed now. It is key that the IRoA be an integral part of this assessment process.**









## Item 7 (1 of 4)

~~(S)~~ Provide greater detail on what the proposed force laydown looks like.

### Response:

Combat Capability	ANA Combat Battalion
ANA Strength by 2010 (80k)	49
12 ISAF Combat Battalions (Equivalent)	18
Expansion of Afghan Governance and protection population (COIN Doctrine)	11
Total Combat Battalions Equivalent Requirement	78
Combat Enablers & Sustainment	
Engineers, Artillery, CSS/CS Bns	(b)(1)
Garrison Support, Institutional Capacity and Capability shortfalls	

# ANA Growth from 80K to 122K Structure

Item 7 (2 of 4)



## Forces to Address Capability Gaps

- Combat Forces
  - 26 Infantry Battalions
  - 5 Corps Artillery Battalions
  - 5 Quick Reaction Companies
  - 3 Commando Battalions
- Expanded Air Corps
  - Battlefield mobility
  - Airborne ISR and Light Attack
- 5 Corps Engineer Battalions
- Institution Capacity Increase
- 5 Garrison Support Units

## Facilities to Enable Forces

- 5 Brigade Garrisons
- 16 Kandak-sized Camps
- Additional Commando, Engineering Battalion, and Forward Operating Bases
- Warehouses (Class I, II, IV, VII)
- Fuel Depots
- 201st Corps HQ move to Gamberi Garrison
- Gamberi Garrison Regional Military Hospital

## Equipment to Acquisition Objective

- Organizational Clothing and Items of Equipment
- Personal and Crew Served Weapons
- Trucks
- Armored Fighting Vehicles
- Artillery Pieces
- Engineering Equipment
- Tactical Communications Equipment
- Helipad Equipment
- Medical Equipment

## Funding (\$K)

ANA 80K to 122K Growth Structure	FY10	FY11	FY12	Total
Infrastructure	1,178,581	432,720		1,611,301
Equipment/Trans	1,048,937	109,199	55,769	1,213,905
Training and Ops	90,822	126,837	124,731	342,390
Sustainment	203,809	135,697	69,436	408,942
<b>Total ANA</b>	<b>2,522,149</b>	<b>804,453</b>	<b>249,936</b>	<b>3,576,538</b>




(b)(1)





(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC §465








## Item 8 (1 of 1)

- (S) Assess the return on investment in terms of timeline and expected impact for U.S. and International Security Assistance Force presence.**

### **Response:**

(b)(1)




- As the ANSF grows and matures, we expect their expanding capabilities to directly impact the enemy's ability to operate. Over time we anticipate the need for ISAF troops will decrease. However, it is too early to develop timelines or projected ISAF force structure requirements.**



## Item 9 (1 of 1)

~~(S)~~ Highlight enduring requirements for international coalition support to the ANSF.

### Response:

- (b)(1) 
- ANSF will also require continued training assistance through the mid-term.
- ANSF will require external fiscal support of approximately \$3.1B per year to sustain a 122K ANA and 82K ANP (in FY10 dollars) .





## Item 10 (1 of 2)

**(S) Articulate a vision for reforming the Afghan National Police (to include defining the national/local balance) and set a schedule to reevaluating its force structure.**

**Response:**

- **CSTC-A continues to support the Department of State and Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) leads on policy reforms for the Ministry of Interior and the visions for the organization.**

- **The following CSTC-A observations are provided:**

(b)(1)

- [REDACTED]
- CSTC-A, in partnership with the State Dept, EOPOL and the IC, has assisted the MOI in developing a restructure plan that is awaiting Presidential Karzai's approval. The plan realigns functions to minimize opportunities for corruption while maximizing operational effectiveness and ensuring proper financial management. This coincides with MOI leadership changes when necessary.
- The near-term focus for ANP bottom-up reform is to train, develop and professionalize the existing force structure. Focused District Development (FDD) will continue to reform Afghan Uniformed Police, completing the reform by end of FY12 (assuming Police Mentor Teams are resourced to the required levels by early FY2009).



## Item 10 (2 of 2)

- **(S) CSTC-A observations continued:**
  - Current FDD efforts have demonstrated that a reformed, professional police force, properly trained and equipped, can properly execute its duties while significantly reducing civilian casualties and other collateral damage.
  - ANP will realign to the SY1387 Tashkil (organizational structure) by early FY 2009. The composition is: 20 Battalions of Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the remainder of the force assigned to local police districts, provincial police, Border Police Battalions, C2 structure, and other specialty police. Once in this structure, areas with reformed police will begin to be assessed to determine what the current structure with reformed police districts is capable of.
  - Given the pace of reform, constrained by PMT manning shortages, FDD and other reform programs will not have progressed sufficiently to make an informed assessment until NET late 2010.
  - To help combat corruption we are also assisting in executing rank reform, pay reform/pay parity, electronic pay system, electronic funds transfer, identification cards, and biometrics.