

# Deputy Secretary of Defense Office Files

## ~~SCI~~ Cross-Reference Sheet

*A document containing SCI material has been removed from this location. It has been stored, appropriately, as indicated below.*

Subject: Turkey: Kongra Gel Update		
Date (DOC): 2 Apr 04	Original Control Number:	Number of pages: 2
Location - <del>SCI</del> Box # <del>SK1</del>		
Comments: DIA Joint Intelligence Task Force - CT paper		

# Deputy Secretary of Defense Office Files

## SCI Cross-Reference Sheet

*A document containing SCI material has been removed from this location. It has been stored, appropriately, as indicated below.*

Subject: Terrorism/Turkey:		
Date (DOC): 20 Nov 03	Original Control Number: serial: 3/00/34022-03	Number of pages: 2
Location - <del>SCI</del> Box # <del>SIK</del>		
Comments: Date 202234Z Nov 03  3N 2002-260-01 CFI CRT DIP FPR		

January 6, 2004

Gentlemen:

Enclosed you find our latest proposal for supporting special security operations in Iraq. It revolves around the unfilled positions of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. Some 8000 unfilled authorizations, and the debate on who can fund and equip these forces.

In Northern Iraq, the 101st is pulling out to be replaced by a single brigade. Yet, the attacks are increasing. The border is mostly unguarded. Despite media claims, the insurgency grows even in KDP and PUK territory. Air mobility will almost cease to exist in the north. U.S. helicopter lift will be cut by over 40% over two months. No regional quick reaction forces exist to respond to pipeline, transmission line, and railroad attacks.

Western desert forces will be scaled back. Borders remain extremely porous. Attacks on fuel convoys from Jordan and Turkey are increasing. Available convoy escort forces cannot meet the demands today.

Southern transport infrastructure attacks are on the rise, just as five Divisions start moving down roadways protected by Phase IV self defense rules of engagement. Unrest in the cities along the supply routes are exasperated by the growing fuel shortages. The two product lines supplying Baghdad are precarious targets. Cell phone and Internet expansion will increase the insurgency's ability to synchronized attacks.

The attached proposal provides the leadership, mobility and sustained logistics to support a small high quality special defense corps to serve as regional quick reaction forces. It provides convoy escorts, route surveillance, border protection, and quick response forces to support pipelines, railroads and transmission lines. Helicopters and trucks are critical to mobility. Company Support Team advisors will provide essential leadership, training and mentoring required for success. These teams are modeled after Battalion Support Teams previously used in Africa.

To date, many contractors have been unable to meet the challenge for a variety of reasons. It is time to expand to other companies with a track record of getting it done quickly for the U.S. Government. While the argument continues about the future security forces in Iraq, the situation deteriorates. The question over security force funding is really academic given the Supplemental Appropriation. Someone in Washington or Baghdad needs to act quickly. It is well known, specially trained mobile forces can make the difference between winning and losing.

Regards,

(b)(6)

Senior Vice President