



(b)(6)	USAF
Special Assistant for Mr. Ray DuBois	

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Subject: Germany and Korea: U.S. Occupationa Experience and Post-Occupation Status

To: DSD Military Assistant (b)(6)
SD Military Assistant (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sirs,

I've attached the information as collected by (b)(6) OSD Historian, and his staff in response to the DSD Tasking.

Attached is a compilation of information relating to the above subject. Special attention has been given to the U.S. diplomatic-military relationship in the post-war transition period for both countries. In the main, this information has been drawn from primary source materials by (b)(6) and his staff. Please let me know if you have any further questions about the subject.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

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Germany and Korea: U.S. Occupation Experience and Post-Occupation Status

Germany



Establishment of U.S. Diplomatic Relations

5 May 1955 - End of Allied Occupation Authority in West Germany

5 May 1955 – U.S. Embassy reestablished in West Germany (Bonn).
James B. Conant (High Commissioner up to that date) Ambassador-
Designate. The position of United States High Commissioner for
Germany abolished.

9 May 1955 - Conant appointed Ambassador

19 February 1957 – Conant left post

U.S. Diplomatic/Military Relationship

According to President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10608, 5 May 1955, when the Federal Republic of Germany became a sovereign state:

The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission to the Federal Republic of Germany, hereinafter referred to as the Chief of Mission, shall have supreme authority, except as otherwise provided herein, with respect to all responsibilities, duties, and governmental functions of the United States in all Germany. The Chief of Mission shall exercise his authority under the supervision of the Secretary of State and subject to ultimate direction by the President.

The United States Military Commander having area responsibility in Germany, hereinafter referred to as the Commander, shall have authority with respect to all military responsibilities, duties, and functions of the United States in all Germany, including the command, security, and stationing of United States forces in Germany, the assertion and exercise of their rights and discharge of their obligations therein, and emergency measures which he may consider essential for their or the accomplishment of his mission. The commander may delegate the authority conferred upon him. If action by the Commander or any representative of the Commander, pursuant to the authority herein conferred, affects the foreign policy of the United States or involves relations or negotiations with non-military German authorities, such action shall be taken only after consultation with and agreement by the Chief of Mission or pursuant to procedures previously agreed to between the Chief of Mission and the Commander or his representative. Either the Chief of Mission or the Commander may raise with the other any question which he believes requires such consultation. If agreement is not reached between them, any differences may be referred to the Department of State and the Department of Defense for resolution.

The Chief of Mission and the Commander or his designated representatives shall, to the fullest extent consistent with their respective missions, render assistance and support to each other in carrying out the agreements and policies of the United States. . .

[Discussion of war criminals convicted by military tribunals.]

... If major differences arise over matters affecting the United States Forces in Germany, such differences may be referred to the Department of State and the Department of Defense for resolution.

This executive order also revoked the executive orders concerning the establishment of the position of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

The U.S. military continued to have occupation responsibilities in Berlin, not a part of the Federal Republic.

28 December 1955 – Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) established in Germany under direction of the U.S. Ambassador.

U.S. Forces

Nazi Germany surrendered unconditionally on 8 May 1945, when hostilities ceased. U.S. combat troops became occupation troops charged with establishing an occupation designed to control the population and stifle opposition. Their duties included guarding of military installations, railway transports, displaced persons camps, refugee camps and internment camps for captured enemy soldiers, suspected war criminals and blacklisted Nazi activists.

At the time of the German surrender in May 1945, the U.S. Army had over 1,600,000 soldiers in Germany. This number was rapidly reduced, and by 1946 the Army authorized a force of 277,584 men to garrison in the American occupation zone. By 1947, the occupation force had fallen to 119,367. After Germany regained much—though not all—of its sovereignty in 1949, the U.S. garrison reached a low of 79,370 men in 1950.

In 1946, a U.S. Constabulary force of three brigades made up of three regiments or 30,000 men was established and remained active until November 1950, when it merged into the Seventh Army. The Constabulary force was a light, mobile police presence.

All U.S. forces in Europe came under the European Command (EUCOM), headed by General Alfred M. Gruenther, 1953-1956.

Lt.Gen. Henry I. Hodes was the Seventh Army commander at Heidelberg in May 1955, when the military occupation of West Germany ended and sovereignty was re-established.

In 1955 the number of American troops in Germany numbered 220,428.

Political Background

1 July 1945 - The four Allied armies withdrew to their zones in Germany.

July/August 1945 - At the Postdam Conference the basic purposes of the occupation were declared:

1. Complete disarmament and demilitarization and elimination or control of all industry that could be used for military purposes;

2. To convince the German people that they had suffered total defeat and had only themselves to blame for their condition;
3. Destruction of the National Socialist Party, dissolution of all Nazi institutions, and prevention of any Nazi or militarist activity or propaganda;
4. Preparation for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

1946 – Elections held for local governmental bodies.

1947 – The British and U.S. zones merged economically as Bizonia, effective 1 January.

The Germans were given a major role in the administration of this entity.

1947 – Elections held for state legislatures.

1948 – The 3 Western zones made eligible for aid through the Marshall Plan.

1948 – The Allies agreed to permit the Western zones to unite as a semi-independent country. The representatives from the USSR walked out of the Allied Control Council. The Berlin Blockade began.

1948 – Currency reform was a turning point in restoring the German economy. It destroyed the black market. The absence of expenditures for a military establishment helped the recovery.

8 May 1949 – State assemblies approved the Basic Law (constitution), written by a German council. The Basic Law promulgated 23 May 1949.

14 August 1949 – Parliamentary elections held, subsequently leading to the election of Theodor Heuss as president and Konrad Adenauer, aged 73, as chancellor in September 1949.

2 September 1949 – The military government was terminated. John J. McCloy became the first U.S. High Commissioner.

21 September 1949 – The Western zones officially combined as the Federal Republic of Germany. The civilian administration of the Allied High Commission replaced the Allied Military Government for West Germany. The Allied High Commission proclaimed the Occupation Statute, superceding all military government legislation and granting the new Federal Government a considerable degree of autonomy.

7 October 1949 – Soviet authorities announced that their zone had become the German Democratic Republic.

1952 – West Germany regained most of its sovereignty with the ratification of the Convention on Relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic.

23 October 1954 – The Paris Agreements were signed which would lead to the restoration of sovereignty. In one of the agreements, the Federal Republic pledged not to produce biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and war vessels above a certain tonnage.

5 May 1955 – The Federal Republic gained full sovereignty; the Allied High Commission was dissolved; military occupation ended in the Federal Republic but continued in Berlin; Federal Republic admitted to NATO.

Korea

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

15 August 1948 - Republic of Korea proclaimed. John J. Muccio appointed U.S. Special Representative to Korea

7 April 1949 - John J. Muccio appointed Ambassador

1 July 1949 - Establishment of U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) as integral part of the American Mission in Korea (KMAG) under Ambassador Muccio.

8 September 1952- Muccio left post

25 August 1952 – Ellis O. Briggs appointed Ambassador.

12 April 1955 – Briggs left post.

U.S. Force Structure before and during the Korean War

The U.S. military occupation lasted from 1945 to 29 June 1949 when the last American combat troops left Korea.

In 1945 General MacArthur selected Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge as the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), and assigned the U.S. XXIV Corps, composed of the 6th, 7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions, as the occupation force.

On 4 January 1946 General Hodge activated Headquarters, U.S. Army Military Government in Korea. USAMGIK essentially took over the Japanese colonial government's organization, placing American officers in senior positions and some mid-level positions.

In February 1947 USAFIK's strength reached 60,982.

On 30 June 1949 when Headquarters, USAFIK, was deactivated, the interim military agreement signed by President Rhee and General Hodge lapsed, and the Koreans assumed complete and full control of their armed forces.

On 1 July 1949, with the final withdrawal of U.S. forces, KMAG was established, consisting of 500 officers and men. Initially it was intended only to provide advice and assistance in the development of internal security forces for the ROK government. The goal was to train an army of 50,000 men.

Before the North Koreans invaded South Korea, the KMAG worked in an atmosphere of domestic unrest, with the government facing urban political opposition while fighting continuously against guerrillas and brigands scattered throughout the rural areas.

During the Korean War, the KMAC focused on developing a trained, operationally competent ROK army.

During the Korean War the overall command of the U.S. and UN military forces in Korea resided in the Commander-in-Chief UN Command (CINCUNC) who was also the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Command, which included all U.S. armed forces in the area. The position was held by Generals Douglas MacArthur, Matthew B. Ridgway, and Mark W. Clark in succession during the war. The U.S. Eighth Army commanded U.S. troops in Korea, supported by the Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces Far East.

Far East Command disestablished in 1957. The commanding general Eighth Army served as CINCUNC. The headquarters moved to Seoul from Tokyo in 1957.

U.S. Diplomatic/Military Relationship

KMAC existed during and after the Korean War. According to an Army study on KMAC:

Originally the Department of the Army had intended to place KMAC under Ambassador Muccio's administrative direction while permitting General MacArthur [in Tokyo] to exercise operational control. However, MacArthur's experience with the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of the Philippines made him reluctant to accept a similar arrangement for KMAC. Unless he were granted authority to assign the objectives for KMAC, MacArthur felt that the group should be controlled by the U.S. ambassador. To safeguard military interests KMAC could be granted the right to communicate directly with the JCS on military matters, [and] MacArthur recommended that KMAC forward all military messages and reports through the Far East Command.

Thus KMAC's relationship to Ambassador Muccio and the American mission in Korea underwent a quick change. Since Muccio had the responsibility for carrying out U.S. policy in Korea and KMAC was an element of AMIK, he was given operational control of the group. . . . Although the KMAC operated under the control of Ambassador Muccio, the internal direction of the group was entirely in KMAC commander's hands. The relationship between AMIK and KMAC centered on U.S. military assistance to Korea. All matters relating to the means, methods, and degree of such aid were of mutual interest and were carefully coordinated by the two agencies either at formal meetings or on a personal basis. On most other matters, particularly those involving military command or administration, the advisory group reported directly to the Pentagon.

According to John Muccio concerning his duties as U.S. Special Representative, starting 15 August 1948, when the Republic of Korea was proclaimed:

My immediate concern was the transfer of all the functions of military government to the new government set up by the Koreans, under the direction of President Rhee. We transferred the police force, the whole police establishment, on the 11th of September of 1948. Between that and December 12th, we finally transferred the bank account to the new authorities. There was a constant transfer of responsibility from U.S. Military Government authorities to their new Korean counterparts. It was very intricate.

One interesting and complicating factor that plagued me during this period was the struggle between the Koreans that had come to the fore under U.S. Military Government and those appointed by the new government. The former came forward from 1945 to 1948, and later as the

United States authorities set up what was called the interim government, when Koreans were placed in authority with Americans as advisers. These Koreans who first worked with the Americans were sneeringly referred to by other Koreans as the "interpreter government." We must admit that their ability to understand and know some English had had a great deal to do with their selection.

Rhee did a thorough job of ignoring practically to a man those that had come to the fore during military government days. He set up his own hierarchy. And there's no love lost between the first group who considered themselves indispensable and the Koreans who were about to take over. That was the basic problem we faced at that particular time.

During the Korean War, Generals MacArthur, Ridgway, and Clark dealt directly with the Korean Government. Ambassador Muccio had a secondary role during the conflict as diplomatic representative to the Korean Government.

Of his time as Ambassador, 1949-1952, Muccio related no intractable problems:

We had – and it was the first time – a unified American mission, AMIK (American Mission in Korea), included KMAG, U.S. Information Agency, Economic Coordination Administration, as well as the normal Embassy unit with one JAS (Joint Administrative Service). . . . And I was definitely responsible for U.S. operations in Korea at the time. . . . Of course, once the military came back in a fighting situation then the question of the exact position of the U.S. Ambassador vis-à-vis the commanding officer responsible for U.S. military operations is a very subtle and very indefinite subdivision. "Delimitation" is a better word, of responsibilities. . . .

According to Ambassador Ellis Briggs, 1952-1955:

Embassy Seoul between 1950 and 1953 was a comparatively compact operation. Its primary task was the relationship with the venerable President Rhee, who was convinced that the proposed armistice with the Communists was iniquitous, and who repeatedly threatened to upset the negotiations. Those negotiations in turn were conducted on a military, not diplomatic, plane.

27 July 1953 – President Eisenhower advanced the idea to the Secretary of State of putting military and economic assistance to Korea under the theater commander.

28 July 1953 – The Bureau of the Budget, in response to a directive from the National Security Council, presented a report to the President on a U.S. organization for economic aid activities in Korea. The report recommended:

The present responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces for the security of Korea requires that he have overall responsibility for all United Nations and United States activities in that country, including economic programs for relief and rehabilitation.

29 July 1953 – At a meeting of the Secretary of State and other officials from Defense, Mutual Security Agency, and Bureau of the Budget (BoB), the BoB report was approved for submission to the President.

29 July 1953 – The Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs informed the Secretary of State that "the relations of the CINCUNC to the Ambassador [in Korea] have never been formally defined."

31 July 1953 – In draft memorandum to State, Defense, and Mutual Security Agency, the President indicated clearly that he wanted the theater commander to coordinate all economic activities in Korea, both UN and U.S. He stated:

I am particularly enthused over the opportunity here presented to the Armed Forces of this country to do something almost unique in all history. It is the opportunity of an army in a foreign land to contribute directly and effectively to the repairing of the damages of war; to rebuild and revivify a nation, and in so doing, to give itself the satisfaction of constructive and challenging work, dedicated to the preservation and enhancement, rather than to the destruction, of human values.

1 August 1953 – Secretary of State Dulles quoted President Eisenhower as saying that he “planned to utilize the armed forces in Korea as economic missionaries building bridges, roads, hospitals, factories, schools, etc.” Military officials were being instructed to make arrangements as quickly as possible.

Eventually, Congressional reaction led to limiting the military role to providing technical assistance.

1953 – U.S. Economic Administrator (C. Tyler Wood) appointed to oversee and coordinate U.S., UN, and Korean economic rehabilitation programs. Tyler was under the direction of CINUNC and Foreign Operations Administration in Washington.

Former Ambassador to Korea Ellis Briggs recounted:

The armistice and the defense pact naturally marked important milestones in the relations of the embassy with the ROK government. The Pentagon, after maneuvers to which once again I was not privy, persuaded the State Department that the nonmilitary aid program – a vast and impressive design for the rehabilitation and the industrialization of the Republic of Korea – should be initially under the military, “to be gradually phased into embassy control.” Here was a situation with as many built-in booby traps as the Communists were installing on their side of the Demilitarized Zone. In other hands that multibillion dollar aid plan could have left the unhappy American ambassador to Korea in permanently boiling oil.

Briggs did not know that the President had pushed for the military to control the aid program.

Former Ambassador Briggs described his interaction with military officials:

General Clark had retired to The Citadel to teach the Charleston boys to do squads right, and his replacement in the Tokyo High Command was four-star General Ed Hull, a gentleman in the Omar Bradley mold, who was helpful in every aspect of our relationship, which soon became close, cooperative, and friendly [unlike the Briggs-General Mark Clark relationship]. It was, furthermore, my everlasting good fortune that the program itself was placed in the honest and capable hands of C. Tyler Wood, a friend from my last tour of duty in the State Department after World War II. Max Taylor continued in command of the now shrinking Eighth Army on the peninsula.

Ty Wood’s, Max Taylor’s, and my views did not always coincide, but our recommendations for action – sometime relayed to Washington for approval – were never reached without open discussion among ourselves, frequently followed by a joint call on President Rhee.

Political Background

13 August 1945 – The U.S. proposed that the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea be accepted by Americans south of, and by Russians north of, the 38th Parallel. The Soviets immediately accepted the proposal. By the end of 1945 the 38th Parallel had become a permanent dividing line.

March 1946 – A Joint (U.S./U.S.S.R.) Commission to work out trusteeship proposals for Korea deadlocked.

February 1947 – The Korean People's Republic established north of the 38th Parallel.

September 1947 – At the request of the United States, the United Nations assumed responsibility for further efforts to unify Korea. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCK) established but refused entry into North Korea.

10 May 1948 – Elections held in South Korea under UNTCK supervision.

15 August 1948 – South Korea proclaimed as Republic of Korea; Syngman Rhee president; John J. Muccio Special Representative of the President of the United States to Korea; in the American zone, the military occupation ended. USAFIK not inactivated until June 1949 because of threats to the Republic of Korea from guerrillas and the Communist North Korea.

9 September 1948 – North Korea proclaimed as Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Kim Il-Sung premier.

December 1948 – Soviet troops leave North Korea.

29 June 1949 – American combat troop withdrawal from Korea completed.

12 January 1950 – Secretary of State Acheson, in his celebrated speech to the National Press Club, placed Korea outside the U.S. defense perimeter in the Pacific. Acheson based his assessment on the assumption that South Korea would not face open, armed aggression. The main military threat was "subversion and penetration." Acheson saw Communism thriving on economic and social turmoil. If Asian nations could develop strong, stable democracies, they could withstand Communist challenges.

25 June 1950-27 July 1953 - Korean Conflict

1 October 1953 – Mutual Defense Treaty, Republic of Korea and United States, signed. The treaty entered into force 17 November 1954.

General Observations

After World War II the United States undertook the occupation of Germany, Japan, and Korea below the 38th Parallel. It devoted extensive political, economic, and military resources to the occupation and the rehabilitation of these countries. This great effort, initially punitive in intent (for Germany and Japan), became transformed into a nation-building endeavor that eventually resulted in the creation of democratic systems in these states. A decade after the war, all three nations were free, independent, democratic entities with functioning economies that in time would make them among the world's more productive and prosperous countries. Moreover, they had become staunch allies of the United States.

This positive evolution was made possible by the following circumstances and salient characteristics common to these three countries:

1. Minimal or non-existent resistance to the U.S. occupation forces in Germany and Japan, both of which had disciplined and generally obedient populations.
2. Use of existing governmental institutions—police, bureaucracy, etc.—wherever deemed safe and possible.
3. Elimination or displacement of the defeated leadership of Germany and Japan, with the exception of the Emperor in Japan.
4. In each of these countries there existed (Japan) or emerged (Adenauer in Germany, Rhee in Korea) authority figures who were acceptable to their countrymen and to the United States, and who provided long-term leadership (15 years or more) that contributed to stability. Rhee encountered significant internal opposition during his tenure.
5. These countries did not have any significant ethnic or religious differences in their populations.
6. The Communist threat during the Cold War created a strong bond of lasting mutual interest between the United States and the occupied countries.
7. U.S. economic aid was indispensable to the economic and political recovery of the occupied countries. The Marshall Plan helped revive all of Western Europe.

8. The U.S. occupation or continued military presence in all three countries has lasted more than half a century. As of the end of 2003, U.S. military forces were still present in the three countries.
9. Germany and Japan did not have their own military forces for almost a decade after World War II. Korea began its own military forces in 1948.
10. The United States remained the paramount external political influence in these countries throughout the second half of the 20th century.
11. Critical events such as the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War caused a closer bonding between the United States and Germany and Korea. Even Japan benefited from the Korean War, which provided a strong stimulus to its economy.
12. Economic progress was regarded as the key to making everything possible in the three states during the 1950s and thereafter.