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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

I-95/57342

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: BOSNIA TASK FORCE *[Signature]* 9 JAN 99
Prepared by Maj Keith Baron, BTF, 614-0661

SUBJECT: Military in Bosnia Past June 98 and Forward Presence
Along Pacific Rim
ACTION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To respond to Congressman McHale's letter, in Tab B, about
U.S. troops in Bosnia past June 1998 and his thoughts
on forward presence along the Pacific Rim.

DISCUSSION: (b)(5)

COORDINATION: GC _____ LA _____

RECOMMENDATION: (b)(5)

SECDEF DECISION: Approved: _____ Disapproved: _____ Other: _____



14-M-4807



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**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000**



(b)(5)

**Honorable Paul McHale
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20515-3815**

(b)(5)

Dear Congressman McHale:

(b)(5)

Sincerely,





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



(b)(5)

Honorable Paul McHale
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20515-3815

Dear Congressman McHale:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

LA

Sincerely,





THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



Honorable Paul McHale
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20515-3815

Dear Congressman McHale:

(b)(5)



Sincerely,

**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1000**

**Honorable Paul McHale
United States Congress
Washington, DC 20515-3815**

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
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November 5, 1997

The Honorable William Cohen
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary
The Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Among those who attended last night's discussion at the White House, the universal consensus is that the exchange of views was enormously productive. There will be some grumbling, but ultimately, I believe the Congress will provide support and funding for a military presence in Bosnia after June, 1998. The option of a renewed war is simply unacceptable. It is essential, however, that the size and capability of the follow-on force be tailored to the mission -- calls for the "fewest number of troops," while understandable, should be resisted. A robust force structure deters attack and saves lives.

I enjoyed your comments delivered earlier today to the John Quincy Adams Society and noted with particular interest your references to forward presence. Enclosed is the first section of an edited transcript covering a Pacific briefing which I delivered two weeks ago. The second portion of this transcript will be completed later this week -- I'll mail you a copy once printed. As indicated in the enclosed transcript, I believe that we must reaffirm our Pacific commitment, while redeploying several key elements of our forward presence, most notably, our forces on Okinawa.

Please give my very best to General Jones and Colonel Mattis. I look forward to seeing you soon.

Sincerely,



Paul McCale
Member of Congress

Briefing by Congressman Paul McHale

US National Security Interests Along The Pacific Rim:
Forward Presence for the 21st Century

Edited Transcript
October 23, 1997

PART I

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome and thank you for coming.

My purpose today is to offer some personal observations concerning our nation's Pacific military preparedness. Though based in part on academic analysis and past congressional testimony, these conclusions are strongly influenced by the meetings, conversations and briefings I have experienced while traveling extensively throughout the Pacific region during the past year. In what I hope is a timely submission, these comments are presented for your consideration just one week prior to the official state visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin.

Because we have a wide range of experience and expertise in the audience this morning, some of my comments, at least initially, will be conveyed on a level that for many of you will be basic. I hope that my introduction is helpful for some, without being tedious for others. If I fail to strike the appropriate balance, let me apologize in advance.

In 1903 John Hay, Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State, said, "The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic is the ocean of the present and the Pacific is the ocean of the future." That recognition remains absolutely valid as we enter the 21st Century.

Our first challenge is to understand the Pacific military region in context. I'd like to take a moment to examine how the Pacific fits into the overall command structure.

The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 implemented a public policy decision, made by the Congress after close Department of Defense consultation, to dramatically alter the way in which we command US forces in battle. Rather than relying upon duplicative layers of military and civilian bureaucracy, blurring and confusing the distinction between force providers and warfighters, we decided instead to invest enormous operational responsibility in our regional commanders in chief (CINCs), subject only to the guidance and constraints imposed by the Secretary of Defense and the President. In effect, each of these four star officers was told, by law, that within the applicable region of the world, the duty to deter and, if necessary, fight and win our nation's wars would be the personal, professional and moral responsibility assigned to the CINC.

Under Goldwater-Nichols and drawing upon the personnel and material made available to him by the various force providers, the regional CINC is expected to successfully execute the battle plan. Each regional CINC has been told in clear statutory language, "You will fight and win the war." Accordingly, in law and practice, the regional CINC has now been identified as the nation's pre-eminent warfighter -- the leader at the front. During Desert Storm, for instance, General Norman Schwarzkopf became known to the world as our warfighting CINC in the Gulf.

The Pacific Command (PACOM) may well be the single most important combatant leadership assignment within the entire system of regional CINCs. PACOM covers an area of substantial economic opportunity, but with significant and ever-increasing military risk.

As we enter the 21st Century, our regional economic interests within PACOM reflect a variety of important factors, including evolving democracies, enormous Asian markets, astounding growth

rates and the vast natural resources found along the Pacific Rim. It is my belief, however, that our current disposition of military force is poorly tailored to protect vital American interests in the Pacific, while inappropriately reflecting the international conditions and threat environment of the Pacific region as it existed in the immediate post-World War II era. Our forces are not properly deployed to protect our interests. There is, in my view, a dangerous 50-year mismatch.

The vital American interests in the Pacific are undeniable. The Pacific Command covers 50 percent of the earth's surface and includes 60 percent of the world's population. PACOM reaches from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of Africa, from the Arctic to the Antarctic, encompassing the states of Alaska and Hawaii and containing seven of the world's largest armed forces.

In terms of economic opportunity the statistics again, I think, are compelling. At present about 38 percent of all US trade is in the Pacific. That's double the amount of trade that we have with Europe. It is, in fact, more than the combined U.S. trade with all of North and South America. Moreover, it has been estimated that approximately 60 percent of the world's economic growth during the next decade will take place in the Pacific. When considered in that context, it becomes obvious that the US economic opportunities in the Pacific region are extraordinary.

Admiral Joseph Prueher is our current Pacific CINC. He commands 304,000 men and women in uniform, about 100,000 of whom are forward deployed along the Pacific Rim. Two-thirds of his command consists of sailors and Marines - some 215,000 naval personnel. During our recent visit to Admiral Prueher's headquarters in Hawaii, Congressman Lane Evans and I had an opportunity to receive a command brief, followed by a more extensive and wide-ranging private discussion with the Admiral. Throughout these meetings my focus of attention was upon the forward presence of 29,000 American military personnel on Okinawa.

The extensive US military deployment on Okinawa is, in my view, the clearest mismatch between an evolving threat environment and an obvious US vulnerability.

In terms of adequate support for modern military training, Okinawa, which is under Admiral Prueher's jurisdictional responsibility, is too small, too developed and too vulnerable to a Chinese or North Korean missile attack. The brutal military reality is that in a matter of minutes nearly one-third of the Marine Corps' Pacific strength could be annihilated. Effective redeployment of the surviving forces would be impossible. These are sobering words - words that we who are engaged in US defense planning must weigh with the utmost gravity.

When I was much younger and thinner and had an even shorter haircut, I was a Marine second lieutenant on Okinawa. That was back in 1973-74. I was a rifle platoon leader with the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines and spent almost a year forward deployed on Okinawa, a tour that also included a naval deployment to the Philippines and assignment to a contingency off the coast of Cambodia. I have vivid and detailed memories of Okinawa, especially the terrain. Will Rogers once said, "Buy land, they're not making no more of the stuff." That observation captures, in a nutshell, the dilemma confronting Admiral Prueher and his subordinate leaders.

Our military presence on Okinawa retains enormous symbolic value in terms of several different political and diplomatic relationships. It is a clear and continuing assurance to the central Japanese government that the US remains committed to the security of Japan and determined to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula. Our forces on Okinawa send a similar message - though perhaps less enthusiastically received - of US Pacific engagement to the Chinese. Unfortunately, the symbolism of our presence has been largely overtaken by the reality of Okinawan land development and the improving power projection capabilities of potential regional adversaries, particularly China and North Korea.

Okinawa was extensively developed two decades ago. If anything, the commercial and residential development has dramatically increased during the past 20 years, to include new highways, residential areas, commercial complexes, tourist resorts and private businesses. A finite quantity of

Okinawan real estate is being converted to an ever-increasing area of civilian use. Artillery fire, tank maneuver and most forms of meaningful live fire training are no longer possible on the island. In short, the commercial and residential development of Okinawa, as advocated by the civilian population and governmental leaders of Okinawa, is incompatible with modern military training.

The strategic bottom line is clear: We have too much of our Pacific force located on too small a piece of Okinawan real estate; too close to our potential adversaries, under the umbrella of a possible enemy attack, where even in peacetime our sailors and Marines are severely limited in terms of combined arms training opportunities. My major concern is really one of dispersion.

It is estimated, in unclassified material, that the Chinese may have as many as 500 nuclear weapons. Unclassified material indicates the high probability that North Korea has sufficient plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon and possibly as many as five or six. As you are well aware, China has the missile capability to strike Okinawa today. In addition, as you have read in the newspapers over the last few days, North Korea is rapidly developing that same missile capability.

What made sense in the late 1940s and 1950s in terms of a large American presence on Okinawa, no longer makes sense today when viewed in light of the principle of dispersion or when considered in terms of the continuing and inevitable Okinawan land development. It is almost unbelievable that we would consider keeping so much of our Pacific presence within such a confined geographic location.

In my view, to provide the kind of forward presence and modern military training that we need, our nation should incrementally and significantly decrease - perhaps not eliminate, but decrease - the size of the American force on Okinawa. There are some demanding political and diplomatic imperatives that would encourage us to keep a military presence, but much smaller in size and more specialized in mission. The time has come to realize that in order to achieve a higher, more secure level of readiness, most of our air, land and naval forces on Okinawa should be redeployed to other areas throughout the Pacific region. This should not be seen as a sign of disengagement. On the contrary, I would advocate a larger Pacific force, better deployed.

We talked to Admiral Prueher about that and obviously there are many sensitive areas. When the mainland government in Japan sees in the news media a printed account of an American discussion concerning the withdrawal of US forces from Okinawa, there is considerable resistance. That kind of proposal is well received on Okinawa itself, but it is not well accepted by the central Japanese government.

Moreover, we have to be cautious that a potential adversary such as China, not misinterpret our redeployment as a lessening of American interest in the Pacific. Because of that, we have to make sure that the redeployment of force, as I think it will inevitably occur, takes place over an extended period of time and in such a manner that we not send any false signals of weakness or disinterest to any potential adversary. Also we have to be careful not to send a message to the Japanese government that we are any less committed to Pacific security now than we have been in the past. The prospect of a rapidly rearming Japan could easily trigger great instability, perhaps even an arms race, throughout the Pacific region.

So, where do we go from here? When you look at the power projection capability that China will likely have by the year 2010 and the missile capability that North Korea will likely possess in the not-too-distant future, the redeployment of US forces is inevitable. The question is where do we go? How ought we redeploy our Pacific forces to effectively defend our vital interests?

The remaining portion of my presentation will focus on the need to create and the structure to achieve a forward Pacific presence for the 21st Century.

Part II will appear next week