



POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

BT020



For Parney: 29, 30, 31, 38, 39, 40
Walsh: 18

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I-44025/95
26 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM PARDEW, BOSNIA TASK FORCE

FROM: GEN: KEN HEATH

Prepared by: John Demeter, x59282

SUBJECT: 14 June HAC Transcript on Contingency Operations and Bosnia

Please find attached one copy of the transcript of the hearing before the HAC on contingency operations and Bosnia. The Committee has asked that this copy be edited and returned to the Committee, along with any inserts for the record and responses to questions for the record by Friday, 14 July. Specific instructions for editing the transcripts can be found next under. Please note the following:

- Respond to the following questions and inserts:
Questions: 13,18,19b,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,37-41
Inserts: p47/L1092, p48/L1105
- Also, please review and edit the text as necessary (typos & word fixes -- not extensive rewrites). Your office is responsible only for statements and responses provided by OSD representatives.
- Please clear the transcript through OSD Security Review in 2C757 prior to returning it to my office.
- Please return the edited and cleared transcript, along with inserts for the record to me or to John Demeter in 3D777 no later than 1600 Thursday, 13 July, so we can get it to OUSD(C) for submission to the Committee.

The new majority plans to enforce strict rules for submissions of transcript edits. None will be accepted after the deadline. The transcript will go to print regardless of late submissions.

Thanks for your help. Please feel free to call with any questions.



TAKEN QUESTIONS FOR CONGRESS

POLICY: 13, 18, 19b, 24-33, 37-41

June 14, 1995

**National Security Subcommittee hearing on DOD Contingency Operations &
Bosnia (Perry, Shalikashvili)**

Question: What are the "mechanics" of delivering arms to Muslim forces if the decision was made to do so?

- Is it necessary to pass through Croatian territory to provide equipment to the Muslims?


- What is the likely response of the Croatians to arms for the Muslim forces passing through Croatian territory?

Answer: For all practical purposes, the weapons, ammunition and related military equipment and supplies needed to arm the Muslims must cross Croatian territory to reach the government of Bosnia. The government of Croatia, which is also subject to the arms embargo, would probably demand a portion of the items going to Bosnia as the price of its cooperation.

Question: Provide for the record the level of arms the Muslims are currently receiving from outside sources.

- Provide for the record the countries who are providing those arms.

Answer: (b)(5) There is evidence some weapons of former East Bloc manufacture have found their way into Bosnia.



Need much more
classification
level

INFORMATION PAPER DRAWDOWN AND FUNDING FOR THE RRF

Purpose: This paper outlines how the Joint Staff proposal for drawdown can be accomplished and describes the NSC options for RRF funding.

JOINT STAFF DRAWDOWN PROPOSAL :

The Joint Staff proposes drawdown authority under Section 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act to provide support to the RRF. Current drawdown availability is \$75 million under Section 506(a)(1), the entire amount available any one fiscal year, and \$7 million under Section 552(c)(2), of a total of \$25 million permitted any one fiscal year.

We understand that you support the proposal. The RRF equipment requirements are in excess of the \$7.0 million remaining in Section 552(c)(2). The Joint Staff has requested that we also seek emergency drawdown authority under Section 506(a)(1). Total anticipated drawdown requirement at this time is \$10.4 million and would cover the expense of:

- strategic lift (\$7.7M); TACSATs (\$.4M); Comms for TACC (\$.008M); laser designators (\$1.4M); and NVGs (\$.9M).
- the Joint Staff did not recommend provision of UH1 or AH64 helicopters.

The steps to accomplish this drawdown are as follows:

- 1) DoD provides State with the estimated costs for the drawdown requirement;
- 2) State drafts a memo for interagency review which notifies the Congress and justifies specific drawdown authority;
- 3) After interagency approval, the memo goes to the President for approval;
- 4) Once the President approves the justification memo, State notifies Congress which begins the 1-day notification period after which the President directs the drawdown.
- 5) Note that Congress can object but they cannot deny a Presidential drawdown decision.

The Joint Staff is developing estimates for an additional equipment request (comm gear, helo defensive aids and secure IFF, hand-held GPS receivers, etc.) from the UK which may add significantly to any drawdown requirement.

FUNDING OPTIONS FOR THE RRF:

There are two main funding options for the RRF. The NSC (Dick Clark) is expected to offer a modified version of the "Voluntary Fund." The other option is a fully assessed UN operation in which the USG would be expected to pay its normal 30.4% UN peacekeeping assessment.

Option 1: Voluntary Fund: The UN Security Council would authorize establishment of a Voluntary Fund into which nations could contribute to the RRF, with Germany, Japan, and the Arab nations as the likely targets for contributions.

Option 2: Regular Peacekeeping Assessment. This is not likely to be supported. Choosing this course sets the Administration on a collision course with Congress and possibly sets a dangerous precedent of giving Congress the opportunity to, in effect, veto US support of UN peace operations.

A sub-option would be a combination of Option 1 & 2 above and use the Voluntary Fund to decrease the amount of a UN assessment.

OSD/ISA
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS

Date: June 21, 1995

Memorandum for: SecDef
Through: Mr. Lodal
Dr. Nye
From: Joe Kruse *JK*
Subject: Foreign Policy Group Meeting on Bosnia

The NSC paper does a good job of laying out the issues:

- what to do in support of the RRF
- what to do on the diplomatic front
- what to do in the long run

I suggest you start by discussing long-range strategy. To the extent the group agrees on that, it should be easier to talk about the RRF and next diplomatic steps. Shali has his own ideas about long-term strategy (summary slide attached), which I assume he has discussed with you.

The Long Run

We favor an RRF-enhanced UNPROFOR that will do its job more effectively while we work diplomatically to isolate Pale and force it to accept the Contact Group plan.

Many things can derail this strategy. For example,

- unilateral lift could run UNPROFOR out of Bosnia
- the RRF could be tested by the Serbs and come up short, in which case UNPROFOR contributors themselves will decide to pull out of Bosnia.

In both cases UNPROFOR will leave, but the terms and manner of its departure will be different. In the first, the US will assume moral, political, humanitarian, and military responsibility for what subsequently happens in Bosnia (or it will abdicate

those responsibilities, leaving the Bosnians to fend for themselves in what could be a bloodbath). In the second, the international community assumes the responsibility for developing and implementing a post-UNPROFOR strategy.

We need to develop a post-UNPROFOR strategy. We have not really discussed this within our own government, much less with our allies. But we have discussed with Bosnian government officials, whose private views are quite different from their public line. ("Let us die with dignity.")

Your Oval Office meeting is not the right place to work on the elements of this strategy, but here are some starting propositions:

(b)(5)

- we will not commit to feed or preserve the eastern enclaves.
- we will not become Bosnia's air force.
- we will use airpower to prevent any further territorial conquest by the Serbs.
- we will lift the arms embargo and provide modest amounts of arms to the Bosnians. The purpose is not to underwrite Bosnian offensive military action but to ensure the defense of territory now held (with the swap of the enclaves for the "Sarajevo connector").

The Rapid Reaction Force

We need to make clear to Congress and our allies that we support the RRF:

- we are unable to fund as a regular UN assessment, but
- we will make the case to Congress that the United States should make a substantial voluntary contribution.
- we should also move *immediately* to undertake unilateral initiatives, using existing authorities, to support the RRF. This means implementing the Perry Paris initiatives ASAP. Doing so is a test of the President's prerogative as commander-in-chief. (See attached paper for details on costs and procedure.)

Diplomatic Strategy

This is basically the State Department's lead. There is considerable interest in resuming direct contact with Karadzic. The French want to do it; Carl Bildt, the new Contact Group mediator, wants to do it; even Shali seems to favor it.

I don't see what it gets us. Basically resuming talks with the Bosnian Serbs means reversing once again our strategy of trying to isolate them. Jimmy Carter tried this in January; after several weeks we judged his effort a failure and went back to our old strategy. It took us about four months to get back on track. I don't see what has changed that would make this approach any more fruitful now. Besides, "going to Pale" is not a strategy; it's an itinerary. What will the Contact Group negotiator do when he gets to Pale?