

Communications Plan for DOD IG Report Hotline Allegations against JIEDDO

1. (U) **PURPOSE:** This communications plan provides a way forward for JIEDDO leadership after the Department of Defense Inspector General issues its report. This plan's intent is to identify the communications goals, provide planning guidelines and principles, and identify potential mitigation strategies.

2. (U) **SITUATION:** DOD/IG issued a draft report dated Sept. 30, 2013 entitled "Hotline Allegation of a Questionable Intelligence Activity Concerning the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center (COIC)." On Dec. 18, 2014, WHS FOIA office notified OASD/PA the redacted version of the report was being released to 11 reporter's FOIA requests.

2.1 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **IMPACT.**

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

Of specific note, this substantiated IG finding is only the second such finding in four years. The report title was tweeted and released to subscribers of the IG listserv April 4, 2014. The title was posted on the IG website the same day. A redacted report is only available via a Freedom of Information Act request. Should there be numerous FOIA requests, the redacted report will be posted on the IG webpage. It should be noted that DOD IG has a backlog of FOIA requests, so it may take months before a redacted report is available.

2.2 (U) **FINDINGS.** The report had the following summarized key findings:

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ JIEDDO leadership directed analysts to intentionally collect open-source data on a U.S. person.
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ JIEDDO used unauthorized/uncoordinated cover to collect information telephonically and via social media.

2.3 (U) **RECOMMENDATIONS AND REFERRALS.** The report contained 10 recommendations, five for the Deputy Secretary of Defense and five for the JIEDDO director. Of the five actions for JIEDDO, three have been completed and the other two were responded to in JIEDDO's response to the draft report and included in the final report. Seven issues were referred for appropriate action.

2.4 (U) **ANALYSIS.**

2.4.1 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ JIEDDO has received negative media in the past, [Redacted]

[Redacted] The fact that this is only the second substantiated IG finding in four years makes this report particularly newsworthy. [Redacted]

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2.4.3 (U//FOUO) (b)(5)

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Negative coverage also would be replicated via social media as JIEDDO developments can become hot topics among followers.

3. (U) GOALS: The primary goal of this communications plan is to ensure senior leaders have talking points and messages to respond to query and a clear course of action for both public and internal engagements regarding this report with the ultimate desire to mitigate damage to the continued mission of JIEDDO.

4. (U) POSTURE:

(U) Passive — respond to query when appropriate to media, Congress and other audiences.

5. (U) RESPONSE TO QUERY

Background: I want to emphasize 3 points in this statement below 1) Collection of information on US Person's is not illegal and collection within the intel community has multiple meanings. What JIEDDO did wrong was how analysts stored and treated that information. These actions were a result of human error and not adhering to our standard operating procedure. 2) a recent Intel Oversight inspection praised JIEDDO progress and 3) the information collected on US Persons in the cases of the companies redacted from the report was all open source. That information was not from surveillance or other techniques. It was simply Internet searches.

On record:

We appreciate the IG's review of JIEDDO's programs and processes and take allegations of this nature very seriously.

Since the report was issued, JIEDDO has increased focus across the enterprise on intelligence oversight, including ongoing training for the entire workforce. JIEDDO has published a new standard operating procedure, appointed an inspector general and has conducted a number of spot checks of its IO program. Of note, as part of its regular schedule, DOD recently conducted an intelligence oversight inspection of JIEDDO. While DOD has not yet issued its final report, indications show there will be no significant findings and JIEDDO did very well. In fact, JIEDDO received many laudatory comments during the inspection out brief on corrective actions taken over the past year in its intelligence oversight program.

The IG substantiated the allegation that JIEDDO's COIC illegally or inappropriately collected info about U.S. persons. The incidents involved regarded technicalities of policy and process and were corrected as soon as it was recognized. Many of the IG's recommendations to assure such actions do not occur in the future have already been acted upon.

The report substantiated some allegations and listed 10 recommendations; five recommendations were for the JIEDDO director.

As the letter attached to the report from the JIEDDO director mentions, context is very important regarding the alleged deficiencies in the first 3 findings. These violations, for which JIEDDO only partially concurred, represent a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of collection and analysis activities at the COIC, the remainder of which complied with DoD directives. These deficiencies were the result of human error and deviations from existing JIEDDO procedures, and were of a very technical nature.

JIEDDO has completed three of the five recommendations. The remaining recommendations were responded to in a letter included in the IG report. It is important to note that many of the recommendations in the report will be enacted naturally as JIEDDO transitions to a smaller footprint for the future.

6. (U) THEMES AND MESSAGES:

6.1 (U) IG REPORT

- JIEDDO takes allegations of wrongdoing seriously and was fully cooperative in the IG investigation and process.
- These findings were a technicality in policy and corrected as soon as recognized.
- JIEDDO completed three recommendations. The other two recommendations directed to JIEDDO were addressed in responses to the report through the Deputy Secretary of Defense and were included in the final report.

6.2 (U) HME

- Homemade explosives remain the preferred main charge of the insurgency in Afghanistan, accounting for more than 80 percent of all IED events.
- Calcium ammonium nitrate fertilizer and potassium chlorate are the predominant precursors used as the main charge of HME-based IEDs in Afghanistan.

- The U.S. government and our allies are implementing efforts to identify those who knowingly provide terrorists and insurgents access to HME precursors in Afghanistan, synchronizing intelligence and applying non-kinetic targeting across the multinational, U.S. interagency spectrum.
- JIEDDO works with U.S. agencies to leverage all available tools and authorities of our governments — freezing assets, opening criminal cases, adding people and business to the denied entities list — to combat the HME threat.

6.3 (U) Attack the Network

- Threat networks are resilient, adaptive and interconnected.
- Countering threat networks is the ability to proactively find and fix IED builders, suppliers, financiers and distributors, and then exploiting their vulnerabilities.
- We counter threat networks by enhancing our ability to fuse operational information and intelligence, from all sources, to produce actionable intelligence — analytical products that meet the needs of both our operational commanders and our domestic security partners.
- Countering threat networks is only accomplished through a robust and powerful network of partners with whom analytical tools, methodologies, and most importantly, information and intelligence is shared to identify, and then exploit, the vulnerabilities of threat networks.
- JIEDDO applies a suite of innovative tools to enable analysts to organize intelligence from more than 200 data sources, resolve identities, correlate events, research patterns of life and geospatially render this information on a map to produce a blended intelligence picture that directly supports operations.
- This layered analysis approach has facilitated coalition force operations against HME production and cache sites, resulting in significant battlefield interdictions.
- Performing advanced analytics supporting the rapid identification of threat network activities and pushing this relevant analysis quickly to deployed forces for action saves lives.

6.4 (U) Whole of Government

- There is no single solution to defeat the IED threat. We need to integrate a range of efforts — supported by a collaborative whole-of-governments approach — to detect and neutralize threat networks and devices.
- Understanding DoD can't address this threat alone, JIEDDO has worked hard to build relationships and open the lines of communications with various partners.
- We established an interagency forum, co-chaired by JIEDDO, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Department of State Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, consisting of U.S. intelligence and interagency partners, federal law enforcement, key allies (UK, Canada and Australia) and our commanders in Afghanistan to achieve a more effective effort to disrupt threat networks employing IEDs against U.S. and coalition forces.
- This level of collaboration, coordination and teamwork has made progress in addressing the HME challenge in Afghanistan.

- JIEDDO's unique ability of tactical analysis and response to threats supports planning and operations from tactical to strategic levels with fused operations and intelligence, trends analysis and anticipatory threat/gap analysis capabilities. Attacking the network is a proactive and decisive action.
- Sharing information seamlessly and fusing data across the attack-the-network enterprise is imperative to defeat the threat networks whose weapon of choice has become the IED.

7. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:** The following section will be considered ~~U//FOUO~~ unless approved for release by the JIEDDO director. At that point, approved Q/A will no longer be considered ~~FOUO~~. Because detailed questions would not be possible without access to the report, this Q/A section is dependent upon IG release of a redacted report.

7.1 (U) FATIMA:

Q1: Why did JIEDDO collect information on U.S. companies? Was this information used to influence international business?

A: In an effort to curb the use of homemade explosives in Afghanistan, JIEDDO, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the interagency (including co-chairs of the Homemade Explosives Community of Seniors) and DIA (who is a active participant), identified the predominance of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers produced by the Fatima Group as the main ingredient used in homemade explosives in Afghanistan. To determine partners to help restrict the flow of HME from Pakistan into Afghanistan, JIEDDO reviewed relationships between the Fatima Group and various American financial institutions. Information gathered was from open sources available to the public. Prior to any actions taken, a review of Procedure 2, DoD 5240.1-R and a legal review were conducted to proceed. The information was used to inform and educate potential partners.

Q2: What U.S. companies did JIEDDO have records on?

A: The company names have been redacted from the IG report, however JIEDDO's general council advised the companies they were a party to this report and no further actions have been taken. The information collected on these US companies was all open-source and publicly available to anybody via the internet.

Q3: If the intelligence community had no evidence Fatima Group had connections to illicit activities, why did JIEDDO pursue them?

A: JIEDDO has worked closely with the Fatima Group to help its leadership understand the problem of how their legally produced product was being used for illicit purposes. JIEDDO has even conducted tests at the invitation of the Fatima Group of its efforts to reformulate its product into a less detonable fertilizer. Fatima Group representatives were very concerned about their product getting into the hands of insurgents in Afghanistan.

Upon JIEDDO working with the Fatima Group and Pakistani officials to highlight the problem, the Fatima Group took significant steps on its own accord to help curb the flow of its fertilizer products into Afghanistan, including ceasing distribution of AN-based fertilizers to border areas in Pakistan.

The coordination between the government of Pakistan, Fatima and JIEDDO in evaluating Fatima's efforts to reformulate their product into a potentially less-detonable substance is unprecedented.

Q4: When the Fatima Group attempted to gain market share in the U.S. through (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) did JIEDDO have anything to do with ending Fatima's relationship with that bank?

A: JIEDDO did not request (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to take any action.

Q5: When the Fatima Group attempted to open a fertilizer plant in Indiana under the name (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) did JIEDDO have anything to do with Governor Pence's decision to disapprove the state's funding?

A: JIEDDO officials responded to the governor's requests for information about the homemade explosive and IED threat in Afghanistan. JIEDDO did not attempt to influence Governor Pence's decision.

7.2 (U) OTHER COLLECTIONS

Q1: Why did JIEDDO collect information on U.S. hostages when that is clearly outside your mission area?

A: Context is very important regarding the findings that JIEDDO collected information on U.S. persons. JIEDDO's primary purpose is to provide support to combatant commanders regarding IEDs. Support to Special Operations Forces is integral to that mission. JIEDDO has embedded liaisons with every combatant command including U.S. Special Operations Command with access to unique analytical tools used to perform counter-IED functions. The supported unit asked if these tools could be used to help answer some questions regarding a U.S. person being held hostage. This analytical tool was focused solely on the insurgency holding the hostage and no U.S. person data was involved in this support. The result was an analysis that provided a general location of foreign nationals who held a U.S. person captive.

This enabled SOF to adjust course.

This research was incidental to support JIEDDO was already providing for counter-IED purposes to the SOF Task Force.

The cited violation represents a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of collection and analysis activities ongoing at the COIC. The deficiencies resulted from human error and deviations for existing JIEDDO procedures. JIEDDO is in the final stages of approving a standard operating procedure on handling U.S. person's information.

Q2: Why did JIEDDO collect information on a U.S. Marine near the Pentagon when domestic collection of information falls outside your scope?

A: Context is very important regarding the findings that JIEDDO collected information on U.S. persons. The Marine in question reportedly was carrying bomb-making materials. This was a clear linkage to JIEDDO's counter-IED mission and procedures were followed to review regulations.

JIEDDO leaders conducted a deliberate decision on whether to pursue this problem. The COIC researched possible foreign terrorism linkages to this U.S. person who was detained with an IED and al Qaeda literature in his possession. The sole purpose of the JIEDDO research on this event was to determine if JIEDDO had any data in its threat network database that linked this person to foreign terrorist groups.

The cited violation represents a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of collection and analysis activities ongoing at the COIC. The deficiencies resulted from human error and deviations for existing JIEDDO procedures. JIEDDO is in the final stages of approving a standard operating procedure on handling U.S. person's information.

Q3: What did JIEDDO have to do with the FBI's investigation into two people arrested in Bowling Green, Kentucky?

A: The Bowling Green, Kentucky, incident was a big win against the potential for terrorist activity within America's borders, but was solely an FBI story. JIEDDO had little involvement. JIEDDO simply responded to a request from the FBI lead in Iraq for any IED-related information on non-U.S. persons. JIEDDO provided classified information from our databases on a 2006 IED incident in Iraq.

Additionally, U.S. forces perform weapons technical intelligence in theater to collect and exploit information from individuals, IEDs and components to understand threat networks, IEDs and components. The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, operated by the FBI in partnership with JIEDDO and other governmental stakeholders, supported the Bowling Green investigation by using biometric data collected by U.S. forces and forensic techniques to definitively link the suspects to components collected from an unsolved IED event in Iraq during the time period.

More importantly is the lesson learned from this incident — that within the interagency, our databases and systems need to be able to work together while still maintaining the right controls to ensure those who cannot, by law, do not have access to law enforcement sensitive information. Information sharing is key.

Q4: Why wasn't anyone court-martialed or otherwise punished/held accountable?

A: It is not illegal to collect information on U.S. Persons and JIEDDO has the authority to aggregate information collected by others within the intelligence community. To do so requires strict adherence to intelligence oversight rules. What JIEDDO analysts failed to do in the cited incidents was properly label and compartmentalize the information on US Persons while conducting work that involved US Persons data. So the violation wasn't that JIEDDO "collected info" on US Persons. The issue is in how JIEDDO analysts stored that information. In other instances, Information gathered was from open sources available to the public. Prior to any actions taken, a review of Intelligence Oversight procedure 2, DoD 5240.1-R and a legal review were conducted to proceed. These violations represent a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of collection and analysis activities ongoing at the COIC. The deficiencies resulted from human error and deviations for existing JIEDDO procedures.

In the instance regarding the one finding in the report where a contractor working for JIEDDO posed as a Student -- the contractor was acting on direction from her supervisor, another contractor. The contracted company removed that supervisor from employment at JIEDDO. JIEDDO does not have the authority to conduct human intelligence.

7.3 (U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

Q1: Has JIEDDO ever collected foreign intelligence, human intelligence or used social media for collection purposes?

A: JIEDDO is not identified as a DoD intelligence component and not authorized to conduct such actions. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight recommended and the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed to changes to DoDD 2000.19E, JIEDDO's founding document, to clarify the COIC's role with regard to intelligence functions, roles and responsibilities, as well as assign an executive agent for JIEDDO's external intelligence oversight.

Q2: What are JIEDDO's procedures for ensuring any information on U.S. persons isn't stored on JIEDDO computers and isn't improperly disseminated?

A: If an analyst pulls data and begins an analytical project, it is subject to all laws and regulations concerning collection on U.S. persons. When information about a U.S. person is included in the data pull, the analyst follows the procedure in DoD regulations that allow a 90-day period to determine if the material is needed to conduct the mission and if it meets specific criteria, including foreign terrorist connections. If this is the case, the JIEDDO analyst prepares a written memo explaining the rationale to retain, store and disseminate the material. The memo gets a legal review at JIEDDO and must be approved. Weekly, JIEDDO conducts a deliberate review of material to retain and purge. This is not an automated process.

Material review is the responsibility of individual analysts and the Intelligence Oversight Program. Any noted violations by the IG report were self-reported, notified up the chain of command, treated like a violation of information [aka "spillage"] and dealt with according to law and policy. A JIEDDO standard operating procedure is in place to ensure information is marked correctly to prevent improper dissemination of information.

The cited violations represent a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of collection and analysis activities ongoing at the COIC. The deficiencies resulted from human error and deviations from existing JIEDDO procedures. JIEDDO is in the final stages of approving a standard operating procedure on handling U.S. person's information.

Q3: The IG report says JIEDDO lacks proper intelligence oversight. What do you think?

A: While JIEDDO is not identified as a DoD intelligence component, JIEDDO has sought staff oversight and guidance from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD (IO)) and has actively implemented recommended changes from its input.

The last ATSD (IO) staff assistance visit was Oct 25, 2013 and a formal inspection is scheduled for September 2014. JIEDDO has re-written the Intelligence Oversight Standard Operating Procedure to reflect recommendations from the ATSD (IO) staff assistance visit, and extracts from this SOP are in the new JIEDDO IO policy letter and analyst's handbook.

Training has been tailored and monitored, and self-reporting of accidental violations has occurred with quarterly reports submitted. The ATSD (IO) has recommended changes to DoDD 2000.19E, JIEDDO's founding document, to clarify the COIC's role with regard to intelligence functions, roles and responsibilities, as well as assign an executive agent for JIEDDO's external intelligence oversight.

JIEDDO feels that the comment, leadership failed to give intelligence oversight the appropriate level of attention, is not supported by the facts.

As part of its regular schedule, DOD conducted an intelligence oversight inspection of JIEDDO in the fall of 2014. While DOD has not yet issued its final report, indications show there will be no significant findings and JIEDDO did very well. In fact, JIEDDO received many laudatory comments during the inspection out brief on corrective actions taken over the past year in its intelligence oversight program.

Q4: The IG report talks about an August 2011 letter from ATSD (IO) to JIEDDO detailing deficiencies in the COIC's Intel Oversight Program. Can I get a copy of the letter and did you comply with the recommendations?

A: This letter reflected deficiencies under a previous intelligence oversight officer who is no longer with JIEDDO or DoD. These deficiencies were addressed through a change in the intel oversight officer appointment, a new standard operating procedures and an increased emphasis on systematic review of materials JIEDDO handles that may contain US persons.

Q5: Why is the COIC's authority with regard to intelligence collection unclear? Has it ever exceeded its authorities?

A: The COIC's creation, roles and responsibilities are tasks derived from JIEDDO's founding document, DoDD 2000.19E. At the time this document was developed, the COIC did not exist, so specific organizational functions were not included in JIEDDO's founding document. DoDD 2000.19E directed the JIEDDO director to:

- Establish a joint common operational picture and joint common intelligence picture of the IED system in the Global War on Terrorism
- Collect and analyze data from the field to assess the effectiveness of current intel support to combatant commanders
- Develop and track response to priority intel requirements
- In coordination with operational chain of command, develop new Intel support and intel requirements against IED threats to ensure the combatant commanders' needs are met

These tasks provide JIEDDO the authority to collect raw data under the auspices of research and conduct intelligence-related activities. As for extending authority broader than what was in its original tasking, comments from officials in the IG report make it clear JIEDDO operated with the awareness of its chain of command. The ATSD (IO) has recommended changes to DoDD 2000.19E, JIEDDO's founding document, to clarify the COIC's role with regard to intelligence functions, roles and responsibilities, as well as assign an executive agent for JIEDDO's external intelligence oversight.

Q6: According to DoDD 2000.19E, OUSD(I) was tasked to develop policy for JIEDDO intelligence activity. Did that happen?

A: This is a question for OSD.

Q7: Does JIEDDO still collect information on US persons, in any fashion? If not, when did it stop? If so, why does it continue to do so despite not being a designation US intelligence agency? Does JIEDDO have the authority to collect intel?

A: JIEDDO is part of the Department of Defense. As such we focus on foreign enemies and threats. However, any complete look at a theater of war will include some US person data. For example, if an enemy were to detonate an IED next to a truck of US soldiers, then were captured, the names of the soldiers in the incident would be part of the incident report. Further, we consider US corporations to be US persons, as required by regulation.

So if the IED used a US manufactured garage door opener, that company name would be part of the incident report.

It is not illegal to collect information on U.S. Persons and JIEDDO has the authority to aggregate information collected by others. To do so requires strict adherence to intelligence oversight rules. What JIEDDO analysts failed to do in the cited incidents was properly label and compartmentalize the information on US Persons while conducting work that involved US Persons data. So the violation wasn't that JIEDDO "collected info" on US Persons. The issue is in how JIEDDO analysts stored that information.

In other instances, Information gathered was from open sources available to the public. Prior to any actions taken, a review of Intelligence Oversight procedure 2, DoD 5240.1-R and a legal review were conducted. Please recognize these violations represent a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of collection and analysis activities ongoing at the COIC. The deficiencies resulted from human error and deviations from existing JIEDDO procedures.

JIEDDO is not a DoD intelligence component. Nor is an infantry platoon that sees and reports the location of an enemy tank. But both units can observe and report critical intelligence information.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight recommended and the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed to changes to DoDD 2000.19E, JIEDDO's founding document, to clarify the COIC's role with regard to intelligence functions, roles and responsibilities, as well as assign an executive agent for JIEDDO's external intelligence oversight. JIEDDO does not have any spies, satellites or phone taps. JIEDDO has paid for IED detectors (superior metal detectors), IED forensics and robots that can investigate IEDs. The information from those projects is used to save the lives of soldiers in all war zones.

What this means is that we do not "task" Intelligence Community (IC) assets to go and get us information. However, we do have access to IC databases. The information in the databases is not considered "collected" by JIEDDO until we reach into that database and take a chunk of data for use on an analytical project. Once US Persons info is identified within the data, that's when Intel Oversight procedures come into play.

Q8: Does JIEDDO continue to retain US person data beyond the 90 day limit? If so why; if not, when did it stop?

A: That 90 day limit regards how long an analyst has to decide whether somebody is 1) a US Person and 2) has a direct linkage to the mission.

If an analyst pulls data and begins an analytical project, it is subject to all laws and regulations concerning collection on U.S. persons. When information about a U.S. person is included in the data pull, the analyst follows the procedure in DoD regulations

that allow a 90-day period to determine if the material is needed to conduct the mission and if it meets specific criteria, including foreign terrorist connections. If this is the case, the JIEDDO analyst prepares a written memo explaining the rationale to retain, store and disseminate the material. The memo gets a legal review at JIEDDO and must be approved. Weekly, JIEDDO conducts a deliberate review of material to retain and purge. This is not an automated process. Material review is the responsibility of individual analysts and the Intelligence Oversight Program. Any noted violations by the IG report were self-reported, notified up the chain of command, treated like a violation of information [aka "spillage"] and dealt with according to law and policy. A JIEDDO standard operating procedure is in place to ensure information is marked correctly to prevent improper dissemination of information.

An illustrative example will help here. That 90 day limit regards how long an analyst has to decide whether somebody is 1) a US Person and 2) has a direct linkage to the mission. Let's say you run a search for "IED makers in the middle east" on a database and get a result of a list of 10 people, all foreign. You start gathering information on one of those people to see if we can prevent that person from hurting US soldiers. One piece of information that comes from a public records search is that the person is married to Jane Schmo of Dothan, Alabama. At the point you realize Ms. Schmo is a US citizen, that's when the 90 day clock starts running to determine if Ms. Schmo has a connection to the project you are working and whether you can retain and forward the information. At the 45 day point, let's say the analyst determines there is a direct linkage, that Jane Schmo has suspicious travels in the Middle East. At that point, the analyst can both retain the information beyond 90 days and disseminate the information. We would of course forward the information to the FBI, JIEDDO does NOT have a domestic law enforcement mission. We would also forward Ms. Schmo's name to soldiers in Afghanistan, so if they interact with her, they know about her husband and can protect themselves. If, at the 90 day point, the analyst determines there is not a direct linkage, then the information is purged.

With that example in mind, we segregate files containing US persons information so that we can restrict access, regularly review and delete the old data and keep track of dates. JIEDDO is focused on the mission to defeat the IED as a strategic weapon. That mission does include incidental pieces of information about US persons, which we handle as any professional organization would, by minimizing and auditing.

Q9: What rules govern when JIEDDO disseminates US person data? Does it continue to do so?

A: Procedure 4 of DoD Regulation 5240.1R covers dissemination of information. Additionally, JIEDDO Directive 5240.01, JIEDDO's published standard operating procedure, and JIEDDO policy letter #13 all cover our intelligence oversight program.

Q5: Does LTG Johnson still believe, as the IG cites him, that for JIEDDO & the COIC to stop collecting intelligence would jeopardize the C-IED fight in Afghanistan?

A: Yes. But again -- make sure you understand that the definition of "collection" as it applies to JIEDDO is that we "collect" intel from other original intel sources. JIEDDO is not authorized to "collect" info as an original source.

Q6: Why does the COIC Chief of staff intentionally mislead inspectors about whether or not JIEDDO collects intelligence?

A: The COIC Chief of Staff did not intentionally mislead inspectors. The text of the redacted report can be interpreted to mean there was elusive behavior, as some media reports concluded. In reality, the dispute involved a miscommunication over the nuances of the definition of "collection" as it applies to the intelligence community versus how it applies to JIEDDO. JIEDDO is not an original collection source. Instead, JIEDDO aggregates data to produce operational intelligence for the warfighter. The term collection as it applies to JIEDDO means that JIEDDO takes (collects) information from another intelligence database for use in analytical projects. The term collection as it applies to the intelligence community involves a task to gather data from an original source, such as through electronic surveillance or human intelligence activities. JIEDDO is not authorized to do such activities.

7.4 (U) JIEDDO ORGANIZATION

Q1: If JIEDDO is misusing its intel billets as the IG report says, why shouldn't the intel community take them away?

A: JIEDDO is undergoing a significant reduction in staff levels as the organization converts itself into an enduring capability for the department. As we move forward, JIEDDO will right size to align with the changing operating environment — retaining the ability to provide quick-reaction capabilities to combatant command priorities. Analyzing which billets are intel and which are not is a part of this downsizing.

Q2: What does the Open Source Analysis Augmentation Center (OSAAC) do?

A: The Open Source Analysis Augmentation Center provides general open-source research in support of JIEDDO counter-IED analyses.

Q3: Why does JIEDDO use contractors to conduct intelligence? Isn't that inherently governmental work?

A: JIEDDO's COIC integrates operational information with intelligence gathered from more than 300 data sources to create actionable intelligence and analysis on threat networks directly for warfighters and combatant command requests. Contractors are a valuable and integral part of JIEDDO and have been since the task force stood up in

2003. Their work supports intelligence operations downrange with intelligence/ operations analysts forward deployed in Afghanistan down to the battalion level. Since its inception in 2007, the COIC has provided thousands of products in response to warfighter requests for information. Contractors provide JIEDDO with the ability to rapidly change skill sets and adjust to changes in the threat.

Q4: The IG report says part of the JIEDDO mission shifted from “defeat the network” to “attack the network.” When did this happen and why? What’s the difference?

A: The terminology was never “defeat the network.” It was “defeat the IED system” at one time. June 27, 2005, acting DSD England issued the first DoDD 200019.E which formally organized and jointly manned the Joint IED Defeat task force. This directive identified and defined three components of focus: (1) defeat of the IED; (2) defeat of the IED system; and (3) training the force. These three components formed the framework for the three lines of operation that would come to define how the JIEDD Task Force and JIEDDO would approach IED defeat. The change from defeat the IED system to attack the network occurred in the fall of 2006. Following extensive mission analysis, then director, retired Gen. Montgomery Meigs, in coordination with U.S. Central Command, changed the line of operation to “attack the network” to solidify JIEDDO’s offensive orientation toward the problem. Getting left of boom requires going after or “attacking” the networks using IEDs. That change was reflected in the legislation that established the Joint IED Defeat Fund, which breaks down each line of operation in public law.

Q5: Does JIEDDO have an inspector general yet? If not, when is an inspector general supposed to come on board? Has one been appointed, and if so, who is it?

A: Yes. JIEDDO has an inspector general appointed. His name is Mr. William A. Rigby.

7.5 (U) IG REPORT SPECIFICS

Q1: What is the status of the referrals the IG made such as the criminal referral?

A: Please query the agencies to whom the referrals were made.

Q2: Has JIEDDO taken any of the IG’s recommendations and acted?

A: There were five specific recommendations from the DoD IG to the JIEDDO director. (Refer to the report for specifics). JIEDDO has acted on three of the recommendations already and has responded to the other two.

Q3: When did all of this occur?

A: The hotline allegation to the IG occurred in mid-2012 for activities in 2011-2012.

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