

THE U.S. MARINE CORPS' USE OF CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

(b)(6)
BY (b)(6)

16 MAY 2007

PREPARED FOR THE DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT

(b)(4)

The U.S. Marine Corps' Use of Cultural Intelligence for Stability Operations

Introduction

In late 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05 identifying stability operations as "a core U.S. military mission" that should "be given priority comparable to combat operations" and that the department should "be prepared to conduct and support." The directive defined stability operations as "military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions." The immediate goals of stability operations, according to the directive, are "to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs." The long-term goals are to foster indigenous capacity to secure essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society."¹

One of the key challenges of stability operations is for our forces to understand the culture of the country in which they are operating, that is, cultural intelligence. The sources of the insecurity and disorder that stability operations seek to counter are often rooted in the beliefs, values, organizations, institutions, and symbols of the indigenous culture. Addressing the roots of disorder and winning the loyalty of the population therefore requires a deep understanding of the indigenous culture.

The U.S. Marine Corps has been a leader in the development of cultural intelligence for stability operations. In the early 1990s, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) became the executive agent for the Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program's Country Handbook Program. The handbooks serve as ready-reference publications that provide U.S. military personnel with essential information for conducting effective operations in various countries around the world. They typically include a large chapter on culture. By the late 1990s, MCIA initiated a line of cultural intelligence products. Due in part to the experience it had acquired and the products it offered, MCIA was given the lead on cultural intelligence for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program in 2005. That same year, the Marine Corps also established the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning to

¹ Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 28 Nov. 2005, p. 2.

serve as the central Marine Corps agency for operational culture training and language familiarization.


In order to gain greater insight into the military's ability generally and the Marine Corps' ability specifically to innovate and adapt to challenges such as those posed by stability operations, the Office of Net Assessment sponsored the Marine Corps Organizational Culture and Cultural Intelligence for Stability Operations project. The project, which is conducted by Strategic Analysis and Assessments, Scitor Corporation, tries to understand more clearly how organizational culture affects a military service's ability to adapt and innovate to new challenges by using the Marine Corps' experience with cultural intelligence for stability operations as a case study.

This paper is one component of that project. Its purpose is not to grade or judge the Marine Corps' use of cultural intelligence but simply to understand its experience more clearly and identify insights that may be useful for senior decision-makers within the Department of Defense. The next section of the paper defines the various types of cultural intelligence and discusses how they might be used in military operations. It is followed by a study of the Marine Corps' historical experience with cultural intelligence and a summary of current Marine Corps efforts in the field. The paper then examines some of the challenges the Marine Corps may face with respect to cultural intelligence before offering some concluding remarks.

Cultural Intelligence and Military Operations

Cultural intelligence, as used in this paper, is defined as information regarding the "shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society use to cope with their world and with one another."² In stability operations, cultural intelligence includes information about the culture or cultures of the host nation populace and potential or real adversaries. It can be thought of encompassing three broad categories of information: cultural awareness, operational cultural intelligence, and strategic cultural intelligence (See Figure 1).

² Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (15 Dec. 2006), p. 3-6.



Cultural awareness includes an understanding of culture, both American and foreign, as well as a knowledge of basic information regarding the language, social structure, ethnic composition, religious composition and beliefs, customs and attitudes, etiquette and taboos, and gestures and symbols of a culture. Cultural awareness is particularly important at the tactical level. In Iraq, for example, Marines fired their weapons unnecessarily at Iraqi civilians because they interpreted the black flags Shia Muslims traditionally fly from their homes as symbols of hostility. Similarly, Marines had to learn through experience that Iraqis' demonstrative hand gestures and different understandings of personal space were not threatening.³ Cultural awareness is typically acquired through cultural training, professional military education, and professional reading rather than the intelligence process, although

³ Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Force Quarterly* 38 (2005): p. 44.

MCIA's most well-known products, the Cultural Smart Cards, also focus on increasing the cultural awareness of troops on the ground.⁴

Operational cultural intelligence is information regarding the social networks, political structures (formal and informal), religious ties, economic links, and tribal connections of a society and how they affect the way the society operates. Possession of current, precise operational cultural intelligence enables commanders to tailor their operational plans to conditions on the ground and increase their effectiveness. As an example of how operational cultural intelligence might shape operations, a participant at a workshop in support of the project recounted anecdotally that historians conducting research in the former East German archives discovered Soviet war plans to invade Iran during the Cold War. Commanders along the various axes of attack were issued different orders based on the tribes they could expect to encounter along their routes. Similarly, a lieutenant stationed in Iraq with the 82nd Airborne Division recently recounted how his company used its knowledge of the Iraqi naming system and its understanding of the importance of sub-tribes to uncover a sizable arms cache. After finding one cache, they asked the local sub-sheik who owned the land where it was located. They used the names the sheik provided to search for other parcels of land owned by the same family and found a second cache.⁵

Operational cultural intelligence requires more detailed cultural knowledge than cultural awareness and an understanding of how that knowledge shapes the battlefield. Dedicated military intelligence organizations are therefore important sources of operational cultural intelligence, as are deployed operational units. As the above story of the discovery of the weapons cache suggests, effective operations can drive intelligence, which in turn produces more effective operations.⁶

⁴ LtCol James L. Higgins, Maj. Michelle L. Trusso, and Maj. Alfred B. Connable, "Marine Corps Intelligence," *Marine Corps Gazette* (Dec. 2005): p. 23.

⁵ Lt. Brendan Hagan, 82nd Airborne Division, e-mail dated 24 Mar. 2007, in "Tom Ricks's Inbox," *Washington Post*, 29 April 2007, p. B3.

⁶ Higgins, Trusso, and Connable, "Marine Corps Intelligence," p. 23; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, pp. 3-1 – 3-2.

Strategic cultural intelligence is information that illuminates how a nation's culture (or cultures) shapes its policies over the long term. It provides senior civilian and military leaders with the broader cultural picture and context they need to identify their strategic objectives with respect to foreign nations and the means they will use to attain those objectives.⁷ It tends to take a long-term view and depends more heavily on the work of anthropologists and historians who are able to devote significant time to the study of a particular culture, country, or region. One example of strategic cultural intelligence is the anthropologist Ruth Benedict's study of Japanese culture during World War II, later published as *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. Benedict's work highlighted the importance of the emperor in Japanese popular culture and influenced significantly the American offer to allow the emperor to continue to reign as part of the surrender. Similarly, if American leaders in 2003 had more fully appreciated the tribal nature of Iraqi culture, they may have been more prepared for the rise of tribal centers of authority when the Ba'athist regime was deposed or might have developed plans for establishing a new central authority more expeditiously.⁸

The utility of cultural intelligence, broadly defined as cultural awareness, operational cultural intelligence, and strategic cultural intelligence, is not limited to stability operations. As instructional materials handed out to Marine lieutenants at the Basic School note, "all military operations are about people. Hostile, neutral, or friendly, people are the center of gravity in what militaries do." There are good reasons to believe, however, that cultural intelligence is particularly important for stability operations. Meeting the needs of the local population usually figure prominently among the short-term goals of stability operations. Understanding the local culture and utilizing indigenous social systems can help forces conducting stability operations meet local needs effectively. In Iraq, for example, British soldiers in Basra understood the importance of tribes and the associated patronage system.

⁷ This paper focuses on culture at the level of the nation-state and smaller. Some analysts believe that transnational movements and organizations pose the greatest challenges to the future security of the United States. To the extent that such movements and organizations possess cultures that are distinct from and independent of the cultures of the nation-states from which their adherents or members originated, those cultures are outside the scope of the paper.

⁸ McFate, "Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," p. 44.

They filled local councils with tribal leaders and gave them large sums of money to distribute as needed. The tribal leaders used the patronage system to distribute the resources to the community successfully. Cultural intelligence can also help forces conducting stability operations meet their long-term objectives of building indigenous capacity. A Marine captain assigned to build a judicial system refurbished the local courthouse, found the 1950 Iraqi constitution on the internet, and used it as the basis for his reconstruction efforts. Because the system was culturally familiar, the Iraqis perceived it as legitimate. Frustratingly, restrictions on the employment of Ba'athists forced the Marine to suspend his efforts.

The Marine Corps' Historical Experience with Cultural Intelligence

The Marine Corps' long history of stability and counterinsurgency operations has influenced its approach to cultural intelligence. Two experiences in particular, the small wars in Central America and the Caribbean during the interwar era and the Combined Action Program in Vietnam, have shaped the attitudes, approaches, and the methods of the Marine Corps with respect to cultural intelligence. From those experiences, the Marine Corps developed an appreciation of the importance of cultural intelligence. To gather cultural intelligence, the Marine Corps devised an approach that emphasized putting Marines in position to interact on a regular basis with the indigenous population; to organize and distribute the intelligence, it developed reporting systems and country handbooks. It also confronted the challenges of developing adequate language skills and disseminating intelligence in a timely fashion. The legacies of these experiences continue to shape the Marine Corps' use of cultural intelligence for stability operations.

Central America, the Caribbean, and the Small Wars Manual

During the first several decades of the 20th century, the U.S. Marine Corps redefined its role in the American military establishment. Marines came ashore not only to protect the lives and property of Americans abroad, but also, in the words of historian Allan Millett, "to alter the political behavior and even the institutions of another country."⁹ Such operations, called small wars by the Marine Corps, combined military force with diplomatic pressure to

⁹ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 148.

intervene in the affairs of another state whose government was unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory in order to protect U.S. national interests.¹⁰ From the end of the Spanish-American War until the mid-1930s, small war operations constituted the Marine Corps' primary mission. A generation of Marine officers spent virtually their entire careers in colonial service.¹¹

When the period began, the Marine Corps lacked its own doctrine to guide the conduct of small war operations. Consequently, the Corps relied on the Army's experience combating insurgents in the Philippines to shape its initial approach. The Army's doctrine, however, contained no discussion of the unique intelligence requirements of small war operations.¹² The Marines therefore developed their own views on the types of intelligence needed in small wars and how best to obtain that information as they conducted a series of campaigns, most notably in Haiti from 1915 to 1934, the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1921, and Nicaragua from 1926 to 1933. Lessons learned from the Marines' experience in those campaigns, including insights regarding intelligence in small wars, were collected and presented in the *Small Wars Manual*, originally issued as a series of pamphlets in 1935 and updated and published as a cohesive whole in 1940.

The Marine Corps quickly realized that intelligence was critical to the successful conduct of small wars. In a 1921 *Marine Corps Gazette* article, Maj. Earl H. Ellis identified the building of intelligence services as one of the four key functions Marines would need to undertake to defeat insurgencies. The intelligence services, Ellis explained, would gather and disseminate all information pertinent to taking the correct political and military actions.¹³ As the *Small Wars Manual* later noted, the type of intelligence required "includes not only information of the military situation, but the political, economic, and social status of the occupied area,

¹⁰ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington: GPO, 1940), p. I-1.

¹¹ Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, p. 150.

¹² Keith B. Bickel, *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 2001), p. 59.

¹³ The other three functions Ellis identified were the establishment of provost services (essentially martial law), garrisoning, and combat. Bickel, *Mars Learning*, p. 132.

together with the attitude and activities of the civil population and political leaders insofar as those elements may affect the accomplishment of the mission."¹⁴

Cultural intelligence was viewed as particularly important in these small wars. Marines lived in close proximity with other cultures for extended periods as they conducted small unit operations to combat insurgents, supervised public works, oversaw local civil administration and elections, supervised the flow of food and supplies, and organized and trained indigenous constabularies.¹⁵ The *Small Wars Manual* used the term "psychology" for what we now call cultural intelligence and often equated cultural traits with racial characteristics. Nevertheless, the manual argued that understanding the culture, including the customs, religion, morals, politics, and education, of the local population was vital to success in small wars. It called for "a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development." A sound understanding of the local culture would help Marines "understand the possible approaches [to the problem] and the repercussion to be expected from any actions which may be contemplated." Marines would thus perceive more accurately when they should be tactful and when they should be firm. They would also be in a better position to obtain additional intelligence from the loyal and neutral population.¹⁶

Cultural intelligence was an area of emphasis for the elaborate intelligence services the Marines built up in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. "At brigade and lower headquarters" in both countries, notes historian Graham Cosmas, "intelligence officers collaged, evaluated, and distributed information."¹⁷ In Haiti, the intelligence effort was hampered by the lack of Marines who were able to master the Creole language or understand the culture.¹⁸ In the Dominican Republic, the Marines demonstrated a greater familiarity with the language and

¹⁴ USMC, *Small Wars Manual*, p. II-19.

¹⁵ Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, p. 152.

¹⁶ USMC, *Small Wars Manual*, pp. I-18, I-19, I-26-7.

¹⁷ Graham A. Cosmas, "Cacos and Caudillos: Marines and Counterinsurgency in Hispaniola, 1915-1924," in *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy, 18-20 October 1989*, eds. William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 300.

¹⁸ Bickel, *Mars Learning*, pp. 84-85, 92; Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, p. 209.

the culture. Moreover, their work improving local markets, building roads, promoting agriculture, and providing charity brought the Marines closer to Dominicans and enabled them to develop personal ties. The Marines gained respect from the populace as a result and were able to develop better intelligence than they had in Haiti, where they remained more separate from the population.¹⁹

Placing Marines in positions where they could interact with the population regularly and gather information became one of the Marine Corps' primary approaches for collecting cultural intelligence. The *Small Wars Manual* directed that "local garrisons must become so familiar with their subdistricts that any changes or unusual conditions will be immediately apparent."²⁰ Company commanders were supposed to stay abreast of not only the cultural characteristics but also the status of irrigation, road, and bridge projects, the levels of telegraph and telephone service, and the performance of government functions such as the postal service and sanitation, within their command district.

To keep track of the cultural intelligence collected by stationing Marines amongst the local population, the Marine Corps established reporting and auditing systems that served a purpose similar to modern databases. Communal books were established for each town or village to record the finances and public works of that community. Because district commanders were required to audit all the books of their subcommanders on their inspection trips each month, they became extremely knowledgeable regarding the state of affairs within their jurisdictions. The regular reports the district commanders submitted provided a clearer picture of the overall nature of the insurgency.²¹

In addition to systems of regular reports and audits, the Marine Corps also used country handbooks to organize and present cultural intelligence. When the Marines came ashore in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, they lacked adequate intelligence and maps. They

¹⁹ Bickel, *Mars Learning*, p. 115.

²⁰ USMC, *Small Wars Manual*, p. II-27.

²¹ Bickel, *Mars Learning*, pp. 77, 175.

therefore devoted significant effort to collecting local information and mapping the countryside. In the Dominican Republic, the collected intelligence was used to prepare a two-volume handbook of strategic information about the country. In future campaigns, the *Small Wars Manual* recommended that similar studies of the theater of operations should be compiled prior to arrival in theater for use by all officers, from the force commander to junior patrol leaders.²²

The Marine Corps' cultural intelligence effort in Central American and the Caribbean during the interwar era, although pioneering, also faced several challenges. One of the principal challenges was a lack of language skills among Marine Corps officers. The *Small Wars Manual* recognized that "knowledge of the character of the people and a command of their language are great assets." In some cases, the Manual noted, it was virtually impossible to understand a culture without speaking the language. All officers were urged to study and acquire a working knowledge of the language.²³ Yet, as noted above, few Marines were able to master the Creole language in Haiti and the Marines' intelligence effort suffered as a result.

A second significant challenge was collecting and disseminating intelligence in a timely fashion. A regimental commander in the Dominican Republic declared: "Though a vast amount of information is secured, the greater part of it is of no value, either by reason of absolute inaccuracy...or by reason of delay in delivery."²⁴ As the campaigns on Hispaniola continued, the Marines turned to technology to accelerate the flow of information. In Haiti, they used the telephone to maintain contact between general headquarters and town garrisons and field wireless sets to link bases in the field with district headquarters. In the Dominican Republic, they also began relying on telephone and radio to speed the collection and dissemination of time-sensitive information.²⁵

²² Bickel, *Mars Learning*, pp. 122-23; USMC, *Small Wars Manual*, p. II-28.

²³ USMC, *Small Wars Manual*, p. I-26.

²⁴ Col. C. Gamborg-Andresen, Third Provisional Regiment, Report to Brigade Commander, 27 Feb. 1919, quoted in Cosmas, "Cacos and Caudillos," p. 300.

²⁵ Bickel, *Mars Learning*, pp. 85, 123; Cosmas, "Cacos and Caudillos," p. 300.

Despite the gains made in Haiti and the Dominican Republic through the use of new technology, Marines continued to struggle with gathering and distributing adequate and timely intelligence in Nicaragua. Intelligence reports from field commanders were sent to headquarters once a month; they were out of date by the time they were received. As a result, the Marines in Nicaragua tended to rely on contact with the enemy in the field.²⁶ In the hope of avoiding such problems in the future, the *Small Wars Manual* stressed that "the rapid dissemination of military intelligence to all organizations concerned is fully as important as the collection of original information."²⁷

Vietnam and the Combined Action Program

Soon after Marine combat forces entered South Vietnam in 1965, they launched counterinsurgency efforts that drew on the legacies of the small wars campaigns in Central America and the Caribbean during the interwar era. The most notable of these efforts was the Combined Action Program, which many Marines believed (and still believe today) was a direct descendant of the programs the Corps used to train native constabularies in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.²⁸ The program integrated Marine rifle squads with a Vietnamese Popular Forces (militia) platoon to provide continuous security to Vietnamese villages and the surrounding population. Although intelligence collection was only one of a CAP platoon's missions, the implementation of the Combined Action Program and some of the challenges it faced highlight important continuities in the Marine Corps' historical experience with cultural intelligence.

The primary mission of the Marines arriving in Vietnam was to occupy and defend three enclaves in the I Corps area: Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai. To secure the 10 square miles

²⁶ Bickel, *Mars Learning*, pp. 174-175.

²⁷ USMC, *Small Wars Manual*, p. II-32.

²⁸ Lawrence A. Yates, "A Feather in their Cap? The Marines' Combined Action Program in Vietnam," in *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy, 18-20 October 1989*, eds. William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), fn 11, p. 324; Capt. Keith F. Kopets, "The Combined Action Program: Vietnam," *Military Review* (July-August 2002): p. 78.

of the Phu Bai enclave, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Taylor, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, and his executive officer, Major Cullen C. Zimmerman, developed a plan to integrate Marine rifle squads with the local militia platoons. The plan was approved up the chain of command and the first CAP platoons began patrolling in the fall of 1965. The experiment quickly produced results – Viet Cong activities were disrupted and intelligence collection improved. Within months, CAP platoons began operating around Da Nang. By early 1966, they were operating in all three of the Marines' enclaves in the I Corps area.²⁹

The CAP approach reflected the Marines' belief, based in part on their small wars' experience, that success in counterinsurgency required getting close to people in order to collect better intelligence and provide them with security. Each CAP platoon consisted of 14 Marines, a Navy corpsman, and 34 militia members, who lived, worked, fought, and slept in a single Vietnamese village. Their mission was to protect the people, train the militia, destroy the insurgent infrastructure, and collect local intelligence. Interacting on a regular basis with the militia and the villagers, Marine leaders believed, would foster mutual trust and respect and improve the Marines' understanding of the indigenous culture. Over time, the platoon would obtain more and better intelligence that would help it destroy the local guerilla infrastructure.³⁰

Although the success of the CAP platoons varied depending on time, place, and personnel, they did register some significant successes. Unit effectiveness was monitored by a monthly reporting system similar to the ones established in Haiti and the Dominican Republic several decades earlier. The system sought to quantify indicators of pacification for the villages in which the CAP platoons were stationed. In a number of villages, the presence of CAP platoons reduced violence and improved security, permitting greater freedom of movement and higher turnout at elections. According to the Marines' statistics, CAP platoons provided greater security at a faster rate than militia platoons that protected villages alone. Moreover,

²⁹ Yates, "Feather in their Cap," pp. 309-10; Kopets, "Combined Action Program," pp. 78-79.

³⁰ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 173; James A. Warren, *American Spartans: The U.S. Marines, A Combat History from Iwo Jima to Iraq* (New York: Free Press, 2005), p. 221; Yates, "Feather in their Cap," p. 312.

the CAP units achieved that security at lower casualty rates than units engaged in search and destroy missions.³¹

Just as the Combined Action Program's emphasis on encouraging interaction between Marines and the local population and its reporting system to monitor the pace of pacification mirrored approaches and tools employed during the small wars campaigns, so too did some of the cultural intelligence challenges that the Marines faced in Vietnam resemble ones they had confronted several decades earlier. Among the greatest hurdles the CAP Marines faced were the language and cultural barriers. Most of the Marines were junior enlisted men in their teens or early twenties. Learning a new language and developing more than a cursory understanding of a complex culture would have been a tall order even with extensive instructional time, much less with the few weeks of training provided.³²

The Marine Corps' Current Experience with Cultural Intelligence

In response to recent operational demands, the Marine Corps has developed an ambitious effort to improve cultural training and intelligence. The two lead organizations in the Marine Corps' cultural intelligence effort are the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. Collectively, their initiatives are improving current Marines' abilities to understand and interact with foreign cultures and laying a solid foundation for improved cultural intelligence in future stability operations.

The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning

The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) was established in 2005 in order to develop, in the words of then-Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Michael W. Hagee, an operationally focused "understanding of the people we are trying to help and the people we are fighting: their culture, what they think is unimportant, what they think is important," through focused training for the operating forces, individual training and

³¹ Yates, "Feather in their Cap," p. 320; Krepinevich, *Army and Vietnam*, p. 174.

³² Krepinevich, *Army and Vietnam*, p. 173; Yates, "Feather in their Cap," 315, 317-18; Kopets, "Combined Action Program," p. 80.

professional military education, distance learning, and professional reading.³³ CAOCL's mission is to "ensure that Marines are equipped with operationally relevant regional, culture, and language knowledge to allow them to plan and operate successfully in the joint and combined expeditionary environment in any region of the world in current and potential operating conditions while targeting persistent and emerging threats and opportunities."³⁴ CAOCL pursues this mission along five main axes: the development of operational culture training modules and curricula for professional military education; the support of mobilizing and deploying units; the assignment of micro-regions for study by career Marines; the provision of operationally relevant language support; and the conduct of in-theater research to ensure that the curricula, training modules and products of the first four axes are timely, accurate, and relevant to the needs of the operating forces.

The CAOCL effort likely to have the greatest impact over the long run is its comprehensive program to integrate operational culture learning into every level of training and education that Marines encounter during their service (See Figure 2). Recruits receive a basic introduction to operational culture concepts from their drill instructor. The goal is simply to introduce culture learning concepts into their frames of reference and ensure that they appreciate the importance of cultural knowledge. As Marines advance in rank, they continue to receive appropriate cultural education in the schoolhouses. Once an appreciation of the value of cultural intelligence has been instilled, the next step is to improve Marines ability to understand, analyze, and interact with foreign cultures. For example, *Operational Culture 101 + Current Operation Environment* is the first in a series of classes that introduce junior leaders to the "how" and "why" of navigating the "human terrain." This course also includes information relevant to the current operating environments where sergeants and lieutenants might be deployed. At the Command and Staff College, Marine officers are required to take a course that provides a basic anthropological framework for thinking about culture and then applies that framework to potential operations in two regions of the world. Distance learning

³³ Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning brochure, available at http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/includes/CAOCL_Brochure.pdf.

³⁴ Ibid.

other tasks. CAOCL works closely with the Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group at MCAGCC to develop training events that reinforce appropriate interactions with the local population and take cultural considerations into account. The exercise reinforces the notion, first learned by the Marines during their small wars campaigns, that cultural knowledge and intelligence are essential to the success of the mission.³⁶

The third function of CAOCL is to help make career Marines experts on a particular region of the world as part of the Career Marine Regional Studies (CMRS) program. Career Marines study and familiarize themselves with the language of one of seventeen "micro-regions" designated by CAOCL, in conjunction with other Marine organizations, based on forecasts of emerging threats and opportunities around the world. The program seeks to provide each career Marine with greater in-depth knowledge of a small region of the world so they are able to provide on-call expertise to their commanders at all levels. If operational cultural knowledge and language skills are seen as a pyramid, the regional experts are expected to fill a role in the middle of the pyramid between the foreign area officers at the top, who are the most well-educated and highly trained regional and language experts in the Marine Corps, and the tens of thousands of Marines who have received country- and mission-specific pre-deployment training at the bottom. At the moment, there are no plans to coordinate the assignment of regional experts with unit deployments. Because Marine units are so often redirected to locales very distant, both geographically and culturally, from their original destination, there is a concern that filling them only with experts on their original destination will make them inflexible and less able to adapt should their orders change. The Marine Corps appears willing to rely on chance and the law of averages to ensure that commanders will have experts on the relevant regions within their units. In a few years, however, the Marine Corps expects that solid knowledge of several countries, one region, and some minimal capability in two or more foreign languages will be the norm for mid-career Marines. It should be noted that the regional expertise system has not yet been fully implemented, so the details may change.

³⁶ Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group, "Exercise Mojave Viper: Training for the Current Fight," *Marine Corps Gazette* 90 (Dec. 2006): 48-49.

Figure 3 – USMC Operational Language Learning Opportunities



Finally, CAOCL provides operationally relevant language support for Marines (see Figure 3). There is a strong emphasis on the operational relevance of the language support CAOCL offers. As noted earlier, a lack of language skills has historically been a challenge for the Marine Corps' use of cultural intelligence. However, language training can be time-consuming and expensive.³⁷ There are also specialized organizations within the Department of Defense that provide extended, intensive language training in a classroom setting. The Marine Corps and CAOCL have therefore chosen to rely heavily on web- and computer-based distance learning and to focus on four niche aspects of language education for Marines: pre-deployment familiarization to a level permitting Marines to convey meaning and understand the essentials of indigenous responses; elementary-level language learning for career Marines in support of their regional culture learning focus; mid-career sustainment of

³⁷ Interviews with faculty at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College indicated that early efforts to teach language at the school consumed more than 75 percent of the school's budget and produced little measurable return.

language capability for heritage-speakers and school-taught Marine linguists; and provision of information about and evaluation of DOD, academic, and commercial resources for language study.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) provides tailored intelligence and services to the Marine Corps, other services, and the Intelligence Community based on expeditionary mission profiles in littoral areas. In 2005, MCIA was tasked with being the lead for cultural intelligence by the Department of Defense and setting the baseline for culture for the intelligence community. The three main objectives for the culture program within MCIA are to collect the relevant cultural data, to compile it in products to be used by different levels of the military, and to keep the data 'alive' by incorporating post-deployment feedback and lessons learned into a database.

The products that MCIA produces support the range of cultural intelligence from cultural awareness to operational cultural intelligence and strategic cultural intelligence.

Drawing on the Marine Corps' experience in its small wars campaigns and the lessons embodied in the *Small Wars Manual*, the first cultural intelligence product MCIA issues on a country is a detailed, in-depth country handbook that serves as a reference publication. This handbook typically numbers three hundred pages and provides basic reference information pertinent to military personnel. Geography, history, military, forces, and communications and transportation networks are some of the topics covered. Depending upon the country, the quantity and depth of the information varies. In the current handbooks for both Syria and Iraq, there are lengthy appendixes that have military equipment recognition charts, relevant Arabic words and phrases, international road-signs, and guides to health maintenance for deployed personnel. In the Iraq handbook, there is an additional appendix titled *Developing Effective Relationships* that focuses on topics such as building trust and venues of distinction. This new appendix appears to reflect the growing need among military personnel for the 'so what?' factor. The appendix outlines the relevance of some of the basic social customs discussed earlier in the handbook to situations military personnel might encounter. For example, under *Venues of Distinction* it says,

"Iraqis especially appreciate being publicly received in venues that combine a sense of power and personal favor (for example, at President Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas; aboard Air Force One; at Camp David and in the Oval Office). They might lobby to be invited to these types of places. Iraqis with regular access to these venues may be asked by other regional leaders to deliver messages. In the case of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, Iraqis prefer to be received or invited to U.S. military controlled facilities like the CPA or CJTF-VII headquarters in Baghdad or the Polish Multinational Division Headquarters at Babylon."³⁸

The preceding quotation suggests that some of the examples in the handbooks may not be appropriate for its most likely readership. The intent of the country handbook seems to be to provide basic background information to Marines, especially inexperienced ones, deploying to a country for the first time, but it is unclear how many of those reading the handbook will be in a position to hand out invitations to Camp David or the Oval Office. Moreover, while it is important to know that it is a sign of respect and showing of honor to invite an Iraqi to a venue such as Camp David, it is even more important to emphasize that if the military wants to increase the status of an Iraqi within the audience of other regional leaders, inviting him to places like Camp David might accomplish this.

Once MCIA has completed a country handbook they proceed to making a smaller, more operationally tailored *Cultural Field Guide*. The cultural field guide focuses more on ethnicity, physical appearance, cultural geography, cultural history, population, religion, ethnic groups, cultural attitudes, and customs, among other cultural topics. Depending upon the country, the field guide may pay greater attention to ethnic groups over cultural history or vice versa. The cultural field guides also focus more on the implications of certain cultural aspects on military operations, similar to the Appendix O in the country handbook mentioned above. In the Iran cultural field guide, there is a section on the *cultural influences on military effectiveness* that examines the leadership, doctrine and strategy, operational planning,

³⁸ Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, *Iraq Transitional Handbook*, Appendix O, Dec 2003 DOD-2630-IRQ-005-04.

intelligence, small unit skills, logistics and maintenance, training, unit cohesion and morale, and technology and innovation of the Iranian military.³⁹

There is also a deeper analytical component in the field guides that not only looks at the various individual aspects of a culture but also highlights how certain pieces may shape different cultural styles of warfare. The cultural field guide for Iran, for example, identifies two important components of the Iranian military: the Artesh, a conventional fighting force left over from the Shah's pre-1979 military; and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, an Islamic army with an unorthodox doctrine of jihad and people's war and close ties to the clerical regime. " It then examines how their historical legacies and self-conceptions shape their approaches to offensive and defensive conventional warfare and to irregular or unconventional warfare. According to the guide, "the Artesh considers itself a national army comparable to the best fighting forces of the world and does not readily accept non-conventional assignments...The IRGC, in contrast, traces its origins to the anti-Shah insurgents of the 1960's and 1970's. After the 1979 Revolution, the IRGC became a home guard and assumed a more Islamic outlook. However, segments of the IRGC retain the memory of their original success as a guerilla force. This makes them both adept at counterinsurgency operations to carry out their mission and competent at exporting guerilla training."⁴⁰

One of the most familiar and widely used MCIA products is the *Culture Smart Card*. The culture smart card is typically the last cultural intelligence tool MCIA produces. As demand for basic cultural information increases from troops on the ground and the operational environment continues to change rapidly, MCIA has taken to developing culture smart cards and the more detailed country handbooks and cultural field guides in tandem. The culture smart card is much smaller and less detailed than the handbook or field guide and covers the Do's & Don'ts, cultural customs, cultural etiquette, cultural attitudes, ethnic groups, population, military attitudes, religion, cultural history, centers of authority, social structures, clothing, diet and dwellings as well as key language phrases and greetings and gestures.

³⁹³⁹ Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, *Iran Cultural Field Guide* Oct 2006 DOD-2630-IRN-003-07.


⁴⁰ Ibid.

While the cultural aspects included on the smart card are similar if not the same to those covered in the handbook and field guide, they are meant to be brief descriptions of the basic elements of culture and are often illustrated by graphs and charts that are clear and easy to read. The level of cultural knowledge available on a smart card is sufficient to aid the soldier in interacting with a foreign population in basic day-to-day circumstances and includes the relevant information a soldier needs to complete his mission.

The country handbook, cultural field guide, and culture smart card are the three main cultural intelligence tools that MCIA produces and makes available to not only the Marine Corps but also to the other services. However, MCIA is also working continuously to develop their understanding and range of materials to meet the demand for cultural intelligence. One of their latest products, for which they have created a partial prototype, is currently referred to as *cultural geography*. Cultural geography is MCIA's attempt to take cultural intelligence and superimpose relevant information on a geographical map of a country or region.⁴¹ The current prototype is a map of the coastal regions of Kenya titled *Kenya's Cultural Geography: A Humanitarian Perspective of Coast Province* (See Figure 4). The large, center portion of the map is titled ethnic diversity and shows ethnic make-up, densely populated locations, livelihood (including tourism and merchants, areas dependant upon the wet season, and those areas that are agrarian, hunter/gatherer etc.), as well as areas of interest (such as land disputes and disaffected Swahili populations). Surrounding the borders of the main map are several graphs and digital images that depict other important cultural information. Two graphs focus on the age distribution of the population and another the distribution of malnourished children, while another set of graphs and digital images of the Coast Province of Kenya illustrate the media audience over the course of a day and the media outlets over population density. There is also a small section that has recommendations such as "pay close attention to the weather; this will affect the number of disease carrying insects". The map is detailed and magnified enough to be advantageous to the operational planner.

⁴¹ Interview with Major Ben Connable, USMC, April 2007.

Figure 4 – MCIA Prototype Map of Kenya's Cultural Geography




Cultural Intelligence Challenges for the Marine Corps

Despite its significant experience with cultural intelligence for stability operations and its extensive current programs in the area, the Marine Corps faces several challenges with respect to cultural intelligence.

One challenge is that the actual structure of the Marine Corps' operational culture knowledge and language skills effort may not match the theoretical model upon which it is based. As noted above, the Marine Corps envisions operational culture knowledge as a pyramid, with Foreign Area Officers and linguists trained by the Defense Language Institute at the top, CMRS experts in the middle, and Marines who have received country- and mission-specific training at the bottom. Discussions with Marines and a recent article in *Marine Corps Gazette*, however, suggest that the Marine Corps FAO program may not be producing FAOs with the language and cultural skills necessary to fill their intended position at the top of the pyramid. FAO is a secondary, not a primary Military Occupational Specialty, in the Marine Corps. As a result, Marine FAOs typically lack the time to gain true expertise in their area of focus or to maintain their perishable language skills. They are, in the words of one Marine major, "an inch deep and a mile wide in cultural capability and expertise" and their language capability is "all over the map."⁴²

Figure 5 – Planned and Actual Structure of
USMC Culture & Language Effort



Languages have historically been one of the greatest challenges the Marine Corps' cultural intelligence efforts have faced. As the *Small Wars Manual* suggests, in some cases language skills are a prerequisite for cultural understanding. During the interwar era, the Marine

⁴² Maj. Alfred B. Connable, "FAO Revisited: Establish the Criteria and Provide the Capability," *Marine Corps Gazette* (Feb. 2007): 17-18.

Corps addressed the challenge by requiring all officers to study Spanish in the classrooms at Quantico. Today, however, the Corps has moved away from providing extended, intensive classroom language training for any Marines other than a very small cadre of FAOs and linguists. Instead, the Corps has sought to provide operational language learning opportunities throughout Marines' careers. Before a unit deploys, Marines receive tactical language training focused on the current operation. The emphasis is on acquiring basic survival language skills and learning a few key phrases. Language modules are also embedded in professional military education. In addition, survival level language training to support the CMRS program will be offered in 30-day courses at "home station" language centers. Finally, Marines can take advantage of distance learning programs to maintain or improve their language skills at various points in their careers.

The Marine Corps must also overcome the often tense relationship between the military and academic worlds. During World War II, anthropologists such as Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict worked closely with the military to provide insight into foreign cultures. Unhappiness with the Vietnam War and concern that the work of anthropologists was being used to support unpopular but pro-American regimes in Latin America effectively ended such collaboration in the 1960s. The rift still has not healed. David Kilcullen, an Australian Army officer and anthropologist who has served as the State Department's chief counterterrorism strategist and is currently advising the U.S. military in Iraq, describes the relationship between government and the discipline of anthropology, as "broken."⁴³ Hugh Gusterson, a professor of cultural studies at George Mason University, has argued that anthropologists who work for the military "prostitute their craft."⁴⁴ Montgomery McFate, another anthropologist who has worked closely with the U.S. military, has observed that "academic anthropologists hate me for working with DoD."⁴⁵ Finding anthropologists who have the necessary skills and are willing to work with the military may therefore prove

⁴³ George Packer, "Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the 'War on Terror?'," *The New Yorker* (18 Dec. 2006): p. 65.

⁴⁴ Gusterson quoted in Matthew B. Stannard, "Montgomery McFate's Mission: Can One Anthropologist Possibly Steer the Course in Iraq?," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 29 Apr. 2007.

⁴⁵ Packer, "Knowing the Enemy," p. 65.

difficult. MCIA's recent search for a cultural anthropologist, a field research methodologist, and a cultural geographer was reportedly challenging.

One of MCIA's biggest challenges is keeping cultural intelligence "alive." Units returning from deployments frequently comment that the cultural information they received in pre-deployment training was out of date or irrelevant for the area where they were stationed. While the Marine Corps has become better in the past few years at capturing lessons learned and incorporating them into doctrine, education, and training, MCIA is taking a lesson from Marine Corps history and trying to create a database of cultural intelligence. The database will work with and be integrated into the wikis of the intelligence community.

MCIA's cultural intelligence database is still in the early stages, but the experience of the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) with databases and models for instability-induced conflict may provide some useful insights. CAA launched an effort to predict instability-induced conflict in 1999. It has collected open source data on 14 key indicators at the national level, such as gross domestic product, literacy, infant mortality, and percentage of the population that belongs to the largest religious and ethnic groups, and uses algorithms to forecast and analyze complex threats. The methodology is extremely data intensive; large amounts of data and consistent definitions are critical. There have been experiments with the methodology at the provincial level, but data was difficult and costly to obtain.⁴⁶ The Marine Corps has traditionally established its databases for cultural intelligence after Marines have already come ashore in a particular country. CAA's experience suggests, however, that the Corps may want to identify countries where it may be deployed in the future and begin standardizing definitions and collecting data now.

Another possible solution to the challenge of keeping cultural intelligence current is the Human Terrain Team (HTT) developed by the Army. Each five-person HTT will be comprised of experienced cultural advisors, including a cultural analyst and a regional studies analyst. HTTs will be embedded in each forward-deployed brigade or regimental staff and will gather ethnographic, economic, and cultural data relevant to the battlefield in order to support

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

analysis and decision making. They will conduct focused studies on cultural or ethnographic issues and maintain a current ethnographic and socio-cultural database of the area of operations in support of the brigade or regimental commander. They will also be able to call on a network of subject-matter experts who are knowledgeable about the cultural and ethnographic areas they support.⁴⁷ The first HTT arrived in Afghanistan in March 2007 and another is scheduled to go to Iraq in July 2007.⁴⁸

The Marine Corps's principal cultural intelligence and training organizations, MCIA and CAOCL, may also need to clarify their roles in the joint arena. MCIA was designated as the Defense Department lead for cultural intelligence in 2005. Yet the designation carried with it no authority over the other services to dictate norms and standards for cultural intelligence production and dissemination. As a result, there are often disparities and overlaps among the services' cultural intelligence efforts. CAOCL, although not officially designated as the lead organization for cultural training, has emerged as the *de facto* lead. The culture centers of the other services often look to CAOCL as an example of how to develop and implement cultural training. CAOCL's programs, however, are designed to meet the needs of the Marine Corps, not the other services. Although the other services' cultural centers may benefit from studying CAOCL's initiatives, copying them blindly may lead to duplication and misallocation of effort.

Another challenge for the Marine Corps as it develops its cultural intelligence program is gauging the pace of change. CAOCL's cultural training efforts have intentionally been introduced incrementally in order to minimize resistance. Although the desire to avoid backlash is understandable and appears to have been effective thus far, it has limited awareness of the Marine Corps' cultural training efforts both inside and outside the Corps.

⁴⁷ Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and Capt. Don Smith, "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century," *Military Review* (Sept.-Oct. 2006).

⁴⁸ The first five HTTs were originally scheduled to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan in the fall of 2006. Part of the delay is attributable to difficulties finding qualified personnel who are willing to deploy. However, at least one person we interviewed suggested that the HTTs have met resistance because they were introduced without building an adequate foundation of support and have been pushed too hard. The HTT experience may underscore the wisdom of CAOCL's incremental approach. Interview with senior civilian working for the Marine Corps, 16 May 2007.

Discussions at the March 2007 Culture Summit sponsored by the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) revealed that few attendees were familiar with CAOCL's activities. Similarly, an April 2007 article in the *Gazette* called for a mandatory cultural education program that would largely duplicate CAOCL's efforts. Although the article was clearly outdated and had been submitted some two years earlier, the fact that the most widely-read publication in the Marine Corps published it indicates a disturbing lack of awareness of the Marine Corps' cultural knowledge training.

Finally, there is the challenge of institutionalizing cultural intelligence and culture training within the Marine Corps. Although the Marine Corps has a long experience with cultural intelligence dating back to the interwar era, if not earlier, it has at times abandoned its cultural focus. For much of the Cold War, cultural training became synonymous with cultural sensitivity training and was viewed with scorn by Marines in the field.⁴⁹ A similar danger exists today. If cultural training and intelligence becomes too closely associated with irregular warfare, there is a danger that it will be discarded should the Marine Corps choose to re-emphasize traditional expeditionary operations. There are at least a few reasons to believe that the Marine Corps would like to move away from irregular warfare. The 2006 Commandant's Planning Guidance emphasizes a rededication to core values and the warrior ethos as well as conventional competencies.⁵⁰ The Marine Corps plans to use the bulk of the end strength increase announced in January 2007 to add a regimental combat team rather than units more suited to understanding foreign cultures and countering asymmetric adversaries.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Higgins, Trusso, and Connable, "Marine Corps Intelligence," p. 23.

⁵⁰ Gen. James T. Conway, 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Commandant's Planning Guidance* (2006).

⁵¹ "DoD News Briefing with Under Secretary of Defense David Chu, Lt. Gen. Stephen Speakes, and Lt. Gen. Emerson Gardner from the Pentagon, U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript (19 Jan. 2007) available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3871>; Frank G. Hoffman, "Troop Level Increases: Pyrrhic Victory?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 133 (Apr. 2007): p. 10; Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Future of U.S. Ground Forces: Challenges and Requirements," Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 April 2007 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007), p. 5.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has conducted a significant number of stability operations. Such operations, because they require the military to interact regularly with the local populace in order to provide security, restore essential services, meet humanitarian needs, and build indigenous capacity, require a solid understanding of foreign cultures. Since the future may include more stability operations, the U.S. military could benefit from improving its capabilities to collect and employ cultural intelligence for stability operations.

This paper has proposed that cultural intelligence can be understood as comprising three categories of information: cultural awareness, operational cultural intelligence, and strategic cultural intelligence. Cultural awareness includes an understanding of culture as a concept and a knowledge of basic cultural information. Operational cultural intelligence includes an understanding of how various cultural elements interact and affect the way a society operates. It places a premium on current, precise information. Strategic cultural intelligence looks at how a nation's culture might influence its policies over the long term. It provides the broader cultural picture and context needed to formulate effective strategy.

The Marine Corps' historical and current experience with the use of cultural intelligence for stability operations highlights several insights senior decision-makers in the Department of Defense may find useful as they seek to increase the services' cultural awareness and their ability to collect and employ operational and strategic cultural intelligence. To improve *cultural awareness*, the most fundamental requirement appears to be simply an understanding of the importance of culture in military operations. The Marine Corps first learned this lesson during its small wars campaigns in the interwar era. Although the Corps' commitment to culture waxed and waned over the years that followed, it never completely disappeared. It provides the foundation for the Corps' ambitious current program to increase cultural awareness. Central to that program are efforts such as CAOCL's participation in pre-deployment training and MCIA's culture smart cards. The greatest challenge to improving cultural awareness, however, has always been and will likely continue to be language. At the moment, the Marine Corps has chosen to focus on equipping Marines with only basic language survival skills. If the *Small Wars Manual* is correct that true cultural understanding

requires an ability to speak the language, that choice may effectively cap the level of cultural awareness Marines are able to attain.

The Marine Corps' efforts to improve *operational cultural intelligence* have been supported by its belief in the importance of placing Marines in positions where they are able to interact with the local population regularly and gather information. Databases such as the one MCIA is currently developing have historically been an important method for collating and organizing operational cultural intelligence once it is collected. Typically, such databases are created once a stability operation begins, but the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense may want to consider developing such databases now for selected areas of the world in order to be prepared for future stability operations. The Marine Corps also appears to be laying a solid foundation for the improvement of operational cultural intelligence in the future by embedding operational culture learning at every level of training and education and by fostering the development of regional expertise through the CMRS program. Greater coordination of the assignments of regional experts with unit deployments, to the extent it is possible, may increase the gains from the program when it is fully implemented. The largest hurdle to improving operational cultural intelligence historically has been timeliness. New technology for collaboratively organizing information and updating it quickly, such as the wikis to which MCIA plans to link its cultural intelligence database, may help keep operational cultural intelligence alive. Dedicated, forward-deployed units that are able to access additional information resources as needed, such as the Army HTTs, may also improve the timeliness of operational cultural intelligence.

Improving strategic cultural intelligence is likely to be the greatest challenge, both for the Marine Corps and for the Department of Defense as a whole. Historically, the Marine Corps has tended to focus on tactics and operations and leave strategy to others. The Corps' cultural training and intelligence program appears to be following the same pattern. To date, those efforts have focused almost entirely on the tactical and operational levels, although embedding culture learning into training and education may eventually produce senior leaders who value strategic cultural intelligence and are able to employ it effectively. In the short term, however, other organizations, such as the Joint Staff and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, will likely bear primary responsibility for the improvement of strategic cultural intelligence.

The Marine Corps appears to have laid a solid foundation for the future. MCIA boasts an impressive range of cultural intelligence products, many of which provide useful cultural intelligence at the tactical and operational level, and is seeking to improve its data, methodologies, and products. CAOCL is striving to embed operational culture training and learning throughout the Marine Corps, but only time will tell if its efforts will be successful. It has consciously chosen a gradual approach, which has minimized resistance to its efforts but may also have limited awareness of them. It will also be years before Marines who have been able to take advantage of all the culture learning opportunities available become senior leaders. Nevertheless, provided the Marine Corps does not move away from irregular warfare as its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan draws down, those future Marine leaders should be better prepared to use cultural intelligence effectively in stability operations.