

American National Strategy 2007-2017

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper surveys the trends that may shape the future security environment, the predispositions and characteristics of hostile Islamic groups and China, and the enduring strengths of the United States in order to develop a notional national strategy for the United States over the next ten years. The future security environment is likely to be characterized by:

- Demographic factors – including the contraction and aging of Europe; increasing, continued rapid growth of populations in the Islamic world with the exception of Iran; and increasing problems in China as the result of the one family, one child policy. The United States and India will have a more favorable demographic position. Japan will contract and age, but will remain internally cohesive
- Economic factors, which continue the shift in global economic power to Asia and away from Europe, and continued poverty, absent oil revenues, in the Islamic world.
- Technology trends dominated by the diffusion of existing technologies globally, and the continued progress in smaller, networked information devices.

The leadership of China, it is argued, will tend to:

- Perceive and be sensitive to the formation among Chinese people of links across regions to oppose the rulers in Beijing and to fear and react to this perception by means of internal counter-intelligence operations and executions;
- limit or control Chinese contacts with foreigners when the domestic political position of the rulers seems insecure; and
- act swiftly, using surprise, to neutralize or destroy foreign opponents when there is an opportunity to make great gains.

The Islamist forces will:

- tend to perceive and react to enemy internal weakness,
- tend not to perceive or react to the organized social and military strengths of adversaries
- and, as a result, overplay their hands by actions that draw a massive reaction, and on which they do not follow up over time.

The enduring strengths of the United States are:

- A political system that can act decisively in a sustained manner if the competition is understood to be a defensive struggle in which all Americans are being protected against an attack that was not chosen and cannot be avoided.

- The US's economic and technological capacity and high levels of internal political stability relative to other countries will be available and can be mobilized by strategies that are seen by the American people as necessary for the defense of the United States.

The first US move should be to continue its current activities in Iraq and against Islamist groups, but in a way that lays the ground for a shift of additional resources and activity devoted to Asia in ways that are perceived by the American people as defensive or legitimate, and that take into account the American sensitivity to the Islamist threat. Hence, the United States should state that, given the increasing problems with nuclear proliferation and the Islamist world, it will be willing to help friendly states develop greater capabilities to defend themselves against the dangers of nuclear proliferation and Islamist attacks. The elements of this strategy include:

- Liberal, subsidized arms and technology transfer programs to India and Japan that are defensive in nature. Rather than resisting the trend towards the diffusion of technological capabilities, the United States should work with it.
- The United States should increase its ISR capabilities globally and in Asia-Pacific region as part of broader Proliferation Security Initiative programs. This should lead to extended air and maritime exercises with Japan and India.
- The United States should announce a "Manhattan Project"-like effort to find or invent new technologies that help find clandestine nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons facilities, by means of sensors of all kinds. This should be part of a broad effort to maintain the American lead in military technologies, while increasing its transfers of older technologies.
- The United States should increase funding for long-range strike forces capable of neutralizing deep buried structures to support its anti-proliferation efforts.

All this will result in an estimated increase in US GDP devoted to defense to about 5-6% a year.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to apply the intellectual guidance set forth in the paper, "Thinking About Strategy," to the current position of the United States, looking forward approximately ten years. To recall, the key recommendations of that paper were to:

- Identify where it is we wish to be as the consequence of our interactions with the adversary and others,
- bound the uncertainties associated with efforts to anticipate the future interactions with adversaries so that the planning exercise becomes tractable, in order to
- identify the enduring strengths of the United States, and
- choose actions that lead the adversary into paths of action favorable to us.

More specifically, the task will be to identify the *trends* that we believe we can reliably project into the future about the nature of the *future security environment* and to think through the nature of a *long term competition* with an adversary or adversaries by identifying his predispositions, strengths, and weaknesses, and our own, so that we can choose courses of action that allow us to elicit behavior that allows us to employ our *enduring strengths* against the adversary's points of weakness, while safeguarding ourselves against the exploitation of our own weaknesses. It will be important to identify the predispositions of the adversary so that we can more reliably identify actions that will elicit predictable forms of enemy behavior, and identify relative strengths and weaknesses so that the behavior we elicit is in areas in which we have natural advantages, so that the adversary is "playing our game."

In the paper, we will tentatively identify trends of relevance, and adversary characteristics, in order to drive the exercise towards the generation of notional strategies. But it should be emphasized that these are tentative findings, and notional strategies, and that one major function of this paper is to identify areas of research that could be conducted to confirm or alter these initial observations, and the strategies based upon them.

GOALS, ALTERNATIVE END STATES, AND THE ENDURING STRENGTHS OF DEMOCRACIES

One of the characteristics of the Cold War that made the formulation of American strategy somewhat less difficult was the relative clarity of the end state that our strategy was supposed to produce. We had essentially the goal of preventing negative shifts in the status quo defined in terms of areas of political and military influence and control relative to the Soviet Union. We wished to preserve the existing division of influence in Europe and Northeast Asia and preserve the existing levels of political influence in the then non-industrialized regions of Asia and the Middle East against efforts to change the status quo by military means. In addition, we sought to preserve American military supremacy in the maritime environment, understood in terms of maintaining the freedom of the seas, and the right of American military vessels to operate within three miles of other countries. In other words, we had goals that were seen as essentially defensive.

At present, there appear to be at least three sets of adversaries, actual and potential, and a variety of end states that are acceptable or desirable. An increasingly powerful China is one potential adversary, and a variety of acceptable end states can be identified in competitions with that country. Sunni fundamentalist non-governmental actors capable of conducting attacks on civilian targets in the United States and elsewhere in the world constitute a second set of hostile actors, and Shi'ite groups acting with the support of the government of Iran constitute a third. There is a fourth set of actors of interest to us that is less easy to define, and that is potential coalitions of states that may try to limit or thwart American influence, while not wishing to engage in military conflict with us. Such states include Russia and perhaps other states. While not pursuing a positive agenda, this potential coalition may need to be dealt with because it constrains American action in areas, such as China and the Middle East, of importance to us.

The greater complexity of the actors facing us now relative to the single adversary of the Cold War has been frequently noted. What has received less attention is the fact that the American choice of political goals or desired end states is not arbitrary, such that equally reasonable strategies can be constructed for a wide range of political goals. This is not the conventional wisdom. Strategic planning exercises, to avoid the appearance of partisanship, usually try to be neutral with regard to alternative political goals that could be chosen by the United States. On this argument, the strategic planner can serve the policy preferences of any individuals or groups. The strategic planning exercise can be objective and empirical, but it should not take sides with regard to political goals.

This paper takes a different position, and argues that there is empirical data about the character of the United States that pushes the strategic planning exercise towards some goals and away from others. While more than one goal can be chosen, all goals are not equally compatible with the character of the United States. Specifically, the political choice of the goal pursued will have a large impact on the size and character of the forces that the United States can bring to bear, and on the duration of costly efforts that the United States can, in practice, make in support of its strategy. To use the terminology developed for this exercise, the enduring strengths of the

United States in a long-term competition will depend on the nature of the goals and end states pursued. As a result, there can be no useful discussion of the enduring strengths of the United States, and thus no discussion of the nature of the interactions towards which we may wish to move, independent of the initial choice of goals. The means available are not independent of the ends pursued. Political choices will have a major impact on the moves we will be able to make, and how long we will be able to sustain them. This is an empirical observation that appears to be the result of fundamental characteristics of democracies. We will return to this in the section on enduring strengths and weaknesses.

For now, we will simply assert that the goals of the United States in this exercise will be defensive, defined either in terms of not losing influence and control in the world relative to the position that the United States currently enjoys in East Asia and in the Middle East. The key point is that the strategy should be such that the United States is perceived by its citizens to be acting defensively in order to mobilize and unify the nation behind a sustainable long-term strategy. Alternative strategies are compatible with this requirement.

TRENDS, DISCONTINUITIES, AND THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

What may be the nature of the security environment in which the United States will operate during the next ten years? In this section, we will lay out current thinking about the trends that will shape the environment in order to construct a surprise-free picture of the world, a world in which trends continue as they are now observed. This survey of trends is meant to be suggestive and illustrative, and not definitive, particularly with regard to technology trends. Then, the paper will try to examine what may be the new or less obvious trends that could produce a very different kind of world.

THE SURPRISE FREE WORLD

Most informed observers would characterize currently observable trends, and their impact, in the following ways.

Demography would be the most predictable trend, certainly looking out ten years. Demographic trends would suggest that, generally, improvements in female literacy lead to secular declines in birth rates, and that improvements in education levels lead to increased life expectancy. As a result, among the richer industrial states of the world, where these phenomena first occurred, birth rates have declined, while life expectancies have increased. Uniquely among the richer states, the United States as a result of immigration and the birth rates associated with immigrants will have population growth, and a population that is growing older as the result of increased life expectancy, and not as the result of an overall decline in the number of young people. While the aging of the population of the United States will create additional burdens on American government budgets, as the ratio of older to younger people increases, it will be a manageable burden, since older people will also be healthy for longer periods of their lives, and capable of working longer. The problem of large cohorts of people too old to work, even given the improvements in health, will only have an impact in the years after the next fifteen years.

The position of the United States stands in sharp contrast to the position of all of Europe and Japan, which have birth rates far lower than the replacement rate, such that the populations of these countries will shrink and age, and the aging of the populations will be the result of absolutely fewer, as well as relatively fewer, younger people. The rate of economic growth in those countries will be affected to the extent that the reduction in the size of the labor force affects GDP, assuming no significant increases in the trends in labor and capital productivity in those countries. The current economic growth in western Europe that is the result of labor movement from eastern Europe to western Europe will reduce and reverse when the workers now moving west return home. Within west Europe, the portion of the population that comes from North Africa, other Arab speaking areas and Islamic countries will continue to grow more rapidly than the non-Arab, non-Islamic populations within those countries, though good census data that could confirm and refine this observation is not available in France or elsewhere.

What will be the consequences of these demographic trends? Here, factors other than demographic trends enter the picture, and the impact of the trends is more uncertain than the trends themselves. Current thinking tends to assume the following consequences. The burden of supporting larger numbers of older people in countries with a shrinking labor force will create pressures on the governments of those countries to spend a larger portion of available revenue on support for the non-working population, leaving less revenue, given current policies, and other things equal, for other discretionary activities, including military spending. This assessment would only be overturned if government policies significantly improved productivity growth rates. The range of policy discussions in France and Germany do not now suggest that such a shift is likely, but policy shifts as large as this did occur in the United Kingdom in the 1970s. If those shifts do not occur, the economies of Europe and Japan will grow absolutely, but shrink relative to the United States. The military expenditures of those countries will not grow and may shrink, absolutely and relative to the United States, unless the security threats perceived by the governments of those countries lead them to reduce the ratio of resources allocated to social welfare programs relative to military programs. This does not appear to be out of the question in Japan, but does now seem unlikely in Europe.

More speculative still is the question of the impact of differential birth rates within the Islamic and non-Islamic populations of west Europe. If the poorer, less well assimilated Islamic populations of west Europe grow more rapidly than the rest of the population, the potential for social tension appears likely, as more social welfare resources have to be devoted to those identifiable, less well integrated groups. Animosity towards those groups appears to be increasing. Islamist organizations are active organizing the younger portions of the Islamic communities. The potential for future violent outbursts, religiously based or not, is not clear, and deserves study. The reaction of the non-Islamic portion of the European populations should also be the subject of study.

Related to this is the question of the social behavior of aging populations. Conventional wisdom now would suggest that older populations are more conservative, and thus less bellicose than younger populations, on the basis of American public opinion poll data, that regularly displays less support for foreign wars (in Korea and Vietnam) among older cohorts relative to younger cohorts. However, this limited pacifism may not hold in the case of wars fought on the territory of one's own country, or for wars that are perceived to be defensive. It has been widely noted that the Serbian and Croatian components of the population of the former Yugoslavia were shrinking and aging relative to the Moslem populations of that country, yet these components were very aggressive in their conduct towards the Moslem populations. This may be the result at the level of social groups of a phenomenon that is observable at the individual level, a phenomenon that is captured in what is called prospect theory. Widely replicated experiments have shown that when choices are presented to individuals, their willingness to adopt riskier (higher variance) choices goes up as the choices are presented in terms of avoiding losses, relative to the same choices presented in terms of seeking gains. Older populations, it has been argued, have more to lose relative to what they may gain, as a result of the accumulation of assets over a life time, and the decreased span of time they have left in which to seek gains. They may, as a result, react to direct challenges to their security by seeing them as presenting them with losses that have to be avoided. If so, older countries may be more risk acceptant than younger populations. A weaker version of this statement is that all populations, young or old,

will be more risk acceptant if confronted with the clear prospect of loss, and this may reduce or overwhelm the conservatism of age. Again, data to confirm and refine this observation is not available.

Looking beyond the United States, Europe, and Japan, the current demographic trends in China appear to be driven by the consequences of the one family, one child policies adopted in that country in 1979. The hope was that improvements in per capita income would be easier to achieve with slower population growth. However, one unintended consequence of this policy 27 years later appears to be a sharp increase in the number of older people relative to people in the labor force, as the babies who were not born 27 and fewer years ago create smaller cohorts of people relative to people born before the policy was implemented. Given the time lags involved, this problem can be expected to be more serious in the future, though there is disagreement about how large and when the economic impact of this phenomenon will be visible. To the degree that Chinese economic growth was and will be driven by increased numbers of people born in rural areas migrating to cities, the impact could be considerable. However, since the policy has not been implemented uniformly (exemptions are given for some rural families, some ethnic minorities, and corruption is likely to have mitigated the impact of the policy) in ways that may escape official attention, more research would be useful.

There are additional unintended consequences of the one family, one child policy. First, the preference for boy children, and the availability of sonograms, has led in China to selective abortions, which, combined with infanticide, has created an increased gender imbalance, with more men than women reaching marriageable age. Given that men prefer to marry women younger than themselves, the larger number of men born before the 1979 policy change will face smaller cohorts of women born after 1979, exacerbating the problem for some years to come. Statistical analysis shows that increases in gender imbalances are associated with increases in social violence, including foreign wars, in countries experiencing these imbalances. Another unintended consequence of the radical birth control program is the damage it has done to the structure of traditional Chinese families. One family, one child means no brothers or sisters, and, after a generation, no uncles or aunts, and no cousins. The extended family that provided a social network and welfare for the Chinese, independent of the state, does not exist to the extent that the one family, one child policy is actually implemented. Anecdotes suggest that this policy is already producing middle aged women who have one child and one grandchild, and who are so not fully occupied with family matters, and who seek other sources of social connections, including those provided by religious movements. Finally, the Chinese government has offered exemptions to this policy to Islamic minorities in the west of China, as a privilege that is granted in order to gain the compliance to Han Chinese rule of non-Han Chinese citizens. This exemption, however, has created a growing population of Islamic youths, growing pressures for the construction of additional Islamic schools, and resentment among the Han Chinese people who live in the west but who are not granted exemptions from the one family, one child policy.

India, together with the United States, is a major country that will have a growing and relatively young population, though the pressure for male children combined with medical technology is producing a gender imbalance in that country as well. Data on relative population growth rates among the Islamic and non-Islamic populations within India should be examined with an eye to future internal tensions in that country.

Demographic data on the Islamic world more generally should be explored. After having had a major surge in births in the period 1979-1990, Iran experienced a sharp drop in birth rates relative to the rates in the 1980s, with a current crude birth rate of 17 births per year per 1,000 population, while fertility rates dropped from seven in the 1980s to 2.2 in 2000, and stood in 2005 at 1.8, or below replacement rates. Comparable figures are 14 crude births per 1,000 in the United States 30 per 1,000 in Bangladesh and in Pakistan, 29 per 1,000 in Saudi Arabia, 23 in Egypt, 22 in India and Indonesia, and 21 in Jordan (with 8-10 births per 1,000 in Europe). More data and analysis would be useful. What may be the impact of the observed differences in birth rates between Sunni and Shi'ite (Iran) populations in the Middle East? What are the population projections by age cohort in these countries?

Economic growth rates are more volatile than demographics, but over long periods of time, some general trends do seem to be visible. The real growth rate of the Chinese GDP, absent major discontinuities, does appear to be sustainable at rates at least twice as fast as those in the United States for the next fifteen years (6%/year relative to 3%/year), and perhaps three times that which has been displayed over decades in Europe and Japan (2%). The economy of India will grow on a sustained basis perhaps one and one-half times as fast as that of the United States (5%/year). If these very rough estimates of rates of growth are correct and continue, the shift in the economic balance away from Europe and towards Asia that has been visible since the middle 1980s will continue. Within Asia, the balance will shift more towards China and India, and away from Japan. Europe and Japan will thus be the big losers, since differences of 1%-5% in economic growth per year, beginning in the 1980s and sustained over four decades, will result in major shifts in relative wealth, though on per capita income basis they will remain among the wealthiest countries. In the Islamic world, absent the revenue from oil, GDP growth is expected to be slow.

Technology trends are even more difficult to forecast, but two trends seem relatively evident and stable. First, in a surprise-free world, the continued diffusion of technology from the countries that first developed them to a wide range of countries able to reproduce those technologies will reduce the size and duration of technology advantages that are

- not based on large investments in human capital and tacitly held knowledge, and
- which do not have large financial capital costs.

To the extent that a technology can be captured in a written set of routine techniques and procedures, the availability of well-trained engineers around the world and the ease with which written information can be transferred will make the rapid spread of technology possible. This has been the case in the technologies relevant to the production of fissile material, where poor countries have succeeded in producing plutonium and enriched uranium, and ballistic missile technology. It is likely to be the case, for example, with pharmacology, but not the case with regard to jet engine technology.

Second, the cost of computational power is expected to continue to decline sharply in the manner predicted by Moore's law, and increased levels of connectivity among collectors and users of data. In other areas, the cost of air and sea transportation, and power generation and storage

efficiencies will improve slowly along currently observable lines, at perhaps 1%-3%/year. No breakthroughs in nuclear weapons technology are expected in this world. The biological sciences will continue slowly to extend life spans, and the active portion of those life spans, but otherwise not generate major changes in individual or social behavior.

What kind of world would be produced by the continuation of these trends? To some extent, the future world appears to look much as it does today, only more so, as Europe continues to recede demographically and economically relative to China, India, and the United States. The decline of Europe may accelerate as a result of social tension within Europe between Islamic and non-Islamic populations. The poverty and instability of the Islamic Middle East will continue, and may increase Islamic migration to Europe, which will cause additional problems there. The Islamic world, except Iran, is likely to have major social problems associated with large cohorts of young males, and the corruption that follows from placing control of oil revenue in the hands of elite groups. Unknown at this time are the implications of different population growth rates across Sunni-Shi'ite religious lines. The Islamic world will continue to be demographically and economically troubled and internally unstable, and this may produce internal violence and externally directed violence in the Islamic Middle East. This, in turn, will place the free flow of oil from the Middle East at risk.

In some ways the world may be different from the way it is today. Nuclear weapons are likely to be in the hands of a larger number of countries, including Japan, Taiwan, and Iran. Another significant difference may be that China and, to a lesser extent, India will be less stable, and may develop major internal or external problems that reduce their freedom of action. The unprecedented rapid urbanization of China, the growth of religious movements, and differentials in population growth rates across the Han/non-Han Chinese line all appear to contribute to the potential for tensions and conflict in China. The increasing gender imbalance is likely to increase social violence in China and India. China will face major issues in sustaining traditional family social networks, and growing Islamic and Christian organized religious movements (or mass, non-religious movements) are likely to be the consequence.

This is independent of the possibility of an economic downturn in China that is the result of oil price rises due to social instability in the Middle East.

Differential population growth rates across religious lines may affect India, either internally or as it faces poor and unstable Islamic neighbors in Pakistan and Bangladesh, which will remain fertile ground for Islamist movements.

In this context, the United States looks to enjoy a favored position. It may become more of a safe haven for middle class people willing and able to flee disorder in Europe and China and the Middle East, which will increase the gap in economic growth rates between Europe and the United States. Japan may look better in fifteen years than it does now. While it will not experience the economic or demographic growth of China, its internal cohesion has historically been extraordinarily high. In a world in which its neighbors have internal and regional problems, Japan may have more effective, useable national power relative to the current balance in the region.

In the military field, the major technology trend appears to be continued rapid improvements in the ability to collect, transmit, and process data. Slow but steady growth in power generation and storage technologies plus smaller and more power-efficient micro and nano scale electronic technologies may make possible swarms of small sensors that can power themselves and network autonomously with each other, such that the character of naval surface warfare and ground warfare may shift to favor finders as opposed to hidiers. Combined with long range strike capabilities, this may accentuate the need for stealth or other signature reduction measures, that will make existing surface naval and ground platforms obsolete more quickly. This trend will in some ways favor and in other ways hurt the United States, which has large-scale investments in both the new technologies and the older platforms.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE SURPRISE-FREE WORLD

Major deviations from this surprise free world could occur in a variety of ways.

- The basic demographic picture of the world could change as the result of sudden and large-scale lethal epidemics in Asia and elsewhere.
- Nuclear weapons use could change the current perception that nuclear weapons are useful for deterring nuclear attacks, but little else. The cause of this shift could be technological progress or political decisions.
- The biological sciences could produce means to alter human nature in controllable ways.
- The observable decline in the nuclear family in Europe and North America could lead to different forms of social loyalty, and perhaps the decline of older patterns of allegiance, such as nationalism.

All of these changes, except the first, would appear to shift national power away from the United States, since nuclear weapons technology, as opposed to other military technologies, are more broadly diffused, since other countries and political systems may face weaker constraints on the use of biological methods for altering human behavior, and since the national cohesion of the United States is one of its current strengths.

ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENT LONG TERM COMPETITION

This section will try to summarize the dominant patterns of behavior of two major potential adversaries of the United States, China and the elements in the Islamic world hostile to the United States. It will then discuss the enduring strengths of the United States. Together with the description of the future security environment sketched above, this will form the basis for a discussion of strategies for long-term competitions with those actors.

CHINA

There are several ways of characterizing China so as to make it possible to anticipate the reaction of China to events and to our actions.

Perhaps the view that is most widespread in the United States is the following. The people and the government of China want essentially what the people and government of the United States want. They seek security from threats and prosperity for themselves. They have been the victims of European and Japanese colonialism, and faced the hostility of the United States in the Cold War, but they were willing to cooperate with the United States in the containment of the Soviet Union. Now, they simply wish to be secure from possible attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of China in the matter of Taiwan, to have secure supplies of energy in order to ensure that the GDP of China continues to grow, and to wield a measure of influence in the region and the world commensurate with China's economic power. China will react positively to American concessions to it in the matter of Taiwan (the United States should push Taiwan to accept Beijing's terms), North Korea (the United States should accept the current regime in North Korea and its nuclear weapons programs), and Japan (the United States should compel Japan to remain, effectively, a demilitarized nation). If the United States makes these concessions, China will grow ever less likely to seek and use military or political power in hostile ways, abroad or at home against the Chinese people. That will set the stage for the increased participation of the Chinese in the world economy in ways that are consistent with the economic and political interests of the United States. As China grows more wealthy and satisfied in its region, the Chinese political system will become more democratic and less nationalistic. If the United States does not make concessions, China will react defensively, by increasing its military power. China will become more nationalistic, less democratic, and more willing to challenge the United States internationally.

The second view is that China seeks to become the only dominant power in Asia, from the Middle East to the central Pacific. It is patient and self-disciplined, and understands that an open challenge to the United States would reveal this intention, and mobilize the United States in opposition to China before China has become adequately strong to defeat American counter-measures, that might include interfering with the supply of oil to China or support to elements in Taiwan, Japan, and in China itself that are hostile to the current regime in Beijing. Therefore, American concessions will be accepted, and used as the basis to extend Chinese power and influence further, until American influence in Asia is removed or neutralized. If the United

States does not make concessions, China will not react in an overtly hostile manner. Time is on the side of China, in this view. So China will react by continuing to develop stronger bi-lateral relations with the countries on its borders, building negative influence (the ability to block hostile measures) in international organizations, and using its economic and lobbying efforts to reverse American policies. China has learned the lesson from the missile crises of the early and mid 1990s that overt displays of military capabilities (launching ballistic missiles) and threatening diplomacy (asking if the United States if it would be willing to trade Los Angeles for Taipei in a nuclear exchange) work less well than quiet opposition and the offer of money to opponents. The Chinese leadership believes that the growth of Chinese power, first economic then military, is irreversible, on this account. It can be patient, and does not need to react sharply to American or Japanese opposition. This is perhaps the dominant view of those who are concerned about the growth of Chinese power.

A third view holds that China is as ambitious as assumed in the second model, but more sensitive and volatile than that model allows for. On this third view, China has a history that is thousands of years old, a history in which power competitions among competing elites have not been moderated by ideas of political legitimacy that are independent of victory, and so have been uninstitutionalized and unrestricted (the view of F. W. Mote in his book Imperial China, for example). This China builds walls to keep out foreigners when Chinese leaders are insecure about their domestic political position (Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China). Deception and sudden strikes have been effective at demoralizing domestic opponents and have been attempted against foreign enemies (the view of Jacqueline Newmyer in work for the Long Term Strategy Project, supported by the account of Mao's goals in 1949 and 1950 provided by Chen Jian in China's Road to the Korean War), particularly when those sudden strikes are executed in order to capitalize on external trends and dynamics (François Jullien in his book, The Propensity of Things). In this view, there is also a long history in China of social forces clandestinely organizing themselves across regions, at times with religious motivations, and with foreign support or inspiration (Jonathan Spence in his works Treason by the Book and God's Chinese Son, but see also the history of Soviet penetration of the CCP). Chinese leaders, on this argument, are at certain moments playing a game in which everything can be lost, to rebellions, to foreigners, to competing elites, and great stakes can be won. To reduce a complex argument to simple terms, the leaders of this China will:

- Tend to perceive and be sensitive to the formation among Chinese people of links across regions to oppose the rulers in Beijing, and to fear and react to this perception by means of internal counter-intelligence operations and executions;
- limit or control Chinese contacts with foreigners when the domestic political position of the rulers seems insecure; and
- act swiftly using surprise, to neutralize or destroy foreign opponents when there is an opportunity to make great gains.

This China, in contrast to the second China, may not be patient and relatively willing to disregard stimuli and provocations, but may instead, act suddenly in what to Westerners may seem unprovoked over-reactions, as it did externally in Korea in 1950, India in 1962, the Soviet border areas in 1969, Vietnam in 1979, and the Taiwan area in 1996, and as it did internally against the Falun Gong movement.

The strategy developed by the United States, if it is to be sustained, consistent, and successful, has to take into account the fact that most people in the United States believe that the behavior of China is predicted by the first model, which is why there is so much opposition to the policies enjoined by the second model. As a result, American policy has tended to oscillate between hard and soft lines. This paper will argue that the third model better captures the observed behavior of China, but also that American policy must act on the basis of both the third model and the belief that many Americans have in the first model, if it is to command the support of the American people over long periods of time.

ISLAMIST ACTORS

The term Islamist actors is meant to capture the groups ranging from Al Qaeda to Salafi Sunni Muslims to Hezbollah who are active in unconventional attacks on the United States. Again, the range of models that are used to anticipate the reaction of Islamists is wide. One view is that they seek autonomous national homelands that are free from American or Israeli oppression or coercion, and, if and when that is achieved, all attacks on the United States will cease. A second view is that they seek nothing less than the conversion of the entire world to Islam or, failing that, the death of all infidels. Their actions are limited only by their capabilities.

A third view developed by Martin Kramer speaks more directly to the likely responses of the Islamists to American actions. In his paper "Islamist Decision Making," written for the Long Term Strategy Project, Kramer notes that Islamist groups are quick to understand the weaknesses of western societies, for example, their sensitivity to casualties. He also notes, however, the inability to perceive the strengths of western societies when they are united and aroused, and the lack of an organized intelligence function in the Islamist groups that provides data about hostile military organizations, as opposed to hostile societies. In addition, he notes the lack, so far, of carefully planned "phase two" Islamist operations to follow initial success. This appears to be a crucial weakness. To quote:

The sum effect of Islamist bias is this: Islamists tend to underestimate the underlying power base and collective resolve of their foreign adversaries.

They eagerly embrace evidence of dissent in the ranks of their enemies (which they assiduously cull from the Western media), and filter out contrary evidence as disinformation that has been deliberately disseminated so as to mislead and demoralize them. Such underestimation has led them to act prematurely and overplay their hands. Tactical surprises such as 9/11, even when carefully coordinated in "phase one," lack a carefully planned "phase two."

(Such was the case in the Sadat assassination as well. Ayman al-Zawahiri called the abortive uprising in Upper Egypt that followed the assassination "poorly planned," since it "disregarded any figures about the enemy's strength and matériel.") It is as though the one single act was expected to trigger a favorable chain reaction. When their enemies do rally, rather than retreat, Islamists are often surprised at the force of the reaction, for which they have rarely made adequate preparations.

In support of this argument, Kramer documents the intelligence weaknesses of Islamist groups. Their inability to appreciate US or Israeli strength without the support of intelligence provided by Arab and Iranian states is significant:

Absent that support, their record is one of failure. In the 1990s, Algerian Islamists launched a jihad against the regime, in the belief that it had been weakened significantly by its decision to nullify free elections. That decision, so the Islamists believed, had cost the regime the support of France and the West; in a head-to-head confrontation, the Islamists would prevail. The Islamists did not have the intelligence support of any state. In the resulting civil war, the regime's security services enjoyed a systemic superiority in intelligence gathering and processing, to the point where it successfully manipulated the Islamists, setting faction against faction and conducting psychological operations that destroyed public sympathy for Islamism. The Algerian war ended in 100,000 deaths, but the regime prevailed, delivering Islamism a significant defeat.

Another example is that of the Palestinian Hamas during the second Intifada. Hamas did not initiate the Intifada, but it attempted to usurp place of primacy in it, through its "self-martyrdom" operations. But while it enjoyed widespread sympathy in the Arab-Islamic world, and some limited logistical support from Iran, it did not benefit from continuous intelligence cooperation from any state. The reason: the continuing legitimacy of Yasir Arafat prevented states from entering a close liaison with Hamas. While Hamas proved capable of launching several sporadic terror campaigns within Israel, Israel's conventional military forces took back the initiative in the spring of 2002 by reoccupying much of the West Bank and stepping up incursions into Gaza. The reoccupation reestablished Israel's superiority in intelligence collection, and within two years it had decimated the operational and leadership ranks of Hamas, including two rapid-succession assassinations of the movement's top leaders. These have yet to be "avenged."

In sum, Islamist groups and movements are not a match for states in the realm of intelligence-based warfare, unless they themselves are allied to or supported by states. An Islamist group can launch a terror campaign without state support, but its impact will be uneven and its progression will be sporadic. For Islamists to wrest territory from a regime or a foreign power, they need a state partner or state sponsor. It is precisely the dearth of such states that explains why Islamists have not succeeded in replicating the Iranian revolution over the last quarter of a century, with the exception of Afghanistan, which they promptly lost by miscalculating the impact of 9/11. Islamists are capable of mimicking behavior that requires integration of borrowed tactics and tradecraft. But because they are locked into a position of total disdain for their enemies, they have no dynamic strategy, only an unchanging belief system. Islamists have closed parts of their minds to the flow of information. This remains their greatest weakness.

In addition, Kramer argues that a key Islamist measure of success is achieving state power, so strategies aimed at ending Islamist control of the state, in Iran, for example, may emerge as decisive. Finally, Kramer asks "What are the precise counter-measures that Islamists fear?" He then appears to conclude that targeted killing is the appropriate tactic.

To summarize, this model argues that Islamist groups

- tend to perceive and react to enemy internal weakness,
- tend not to perceive or react to the organized social and military strengths of adversaries,
- and, as a result, overlay their hands by actions that draw a massive reaction, and on which they do not follow up over time.

THE UNITED STATES: GOALS, PROPENSITIES, AND ENDURING STRENGTHS

There are at least two models of the behavior of the United States that have been offered over the last 60 years, and a third, older model that dates back to Thucydides. Each of them suggests that there are persistent characteristics of the American political system that allow us to anticipate its reactions to external stimuli and to derive from these persistent characteristics guidance as to how to generate and sustain effective American national strategies.

The first and, until recently, the fashionable view of political scientists (for example, Allan Stam and Dan Reiter, *Democracies at War*) was that democracies were wiser than all other forms of government. Statistically, democracies won the wars that they initiated somewhat more frequently than oligarchies or dictatorships. Since the same people who bore the costs of war made the decision to go to war, decision-making in democracies was prudent and careful.

Democratic debate seemed to ensure a more open flow of information to decision-makers, and the need to generate a broad consensus before taking action ensured that wars chosen by democracies would end in victory. To be sure, this view rested on observations of a relatively small number of democratic great powers, in a data set dominated by the United States and Great Britain. The errors of France in World Wars I and II were not captured because France "won" both of those wars. The French errors in Algeria and Vietnam did not count because those wars were "extra-systemic" wars. The errors of Israel in Lebanon did not count because those wars fell below the threshold of 1,000 battle deaths, and so on. Despite these issues, the superiority of democracy in war was the accepted view.

This contrasted dramatically with the second view that was dominant earlier in the 20th century. In the period during and immediately after World War II, members of the American foreign policy elite, bitter at the unwillingness of the United States to involve itself more directly in European affairs before the outbreak of World War II, were conscious of what they felt to be the flaws of the political system of the United States. Americans were distant from Eurasia, and preoccupied with their current well-being. The American people were short sighted and self-centered. They had forced the withdrawal of the United States from efforts to maintain the stability of Europe after World War I, had ignored the rise of Hitler, and were most likely to relapse into military and diplomatic withdrawal from Europe once the war was over. George Kennan, in his memoirs, likened the American people to a great dinosaur with a brain the size a pea, which took days to react to injuries to its extremities. By the time the brain was aware that a leg had been bitten, extensive damage had been done. In private, he wrote of the need for a government that was not accountable to the American people. Reinhold Niebuhr, the "realist" theologian wrote that, given the observable failings of the American people, elites had a moral obligation to lead and rule in the realm of foreign affairs. Democracy could not make decisions about foreign policy quickly enough, and so democracy had to be dispensed with.

This view, of course, was first set forth by Alexander Hamilton in the 70th essay in the Federalist Papers, in which he asserted that "celerity of action" was the quality most needed in the conduct of foreign affairs. He could be an advocate of the new constitution, he wrote, only because he believed that the new republic would have the necessary capacity for rapid decision and action. But this was to be achieved, he wrote, by adopting the practice of the ancient Romans, and, in time of emergency, suspending the republic and instituting a dictatorship. The American president, he wrote, would have the necessary dictatorial powers in time of war and crisis. The domestic liberties (and the political system) of the United States would have to be subordinated to the needs of foreign policy. At the National Constitutional Convention he said:

It has been said that respectability in the eyes of foreign Nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper object of republican Government was domestic tranquility and happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No government could give us tranquility an happiness at home which did not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad.

This statement drew from Thomas Paine the predictable response:

A splendid government—a strong energetic government.... What can make an adequate satisfaction for the loss...suffered in attaining such a government.... If we admit this consolidated government it will be because we like a great, splendid one. Some way or another, we must be a great and mighty empire; we must have an army, and a navy, and a number of things. When the spirit of America was in its youth, the language of America was different: liberty, sir, was then the primary object.

Both men, in different ways, agreed that a democracy that protected the rights of its citizens, and consulted with them, was not fit to be a great power. They disagreed about what to do next, Hamilton arguing that democracy had to be modified or abandoned when necessary to be a great power, Paine arguing that status as a great power had to be rejected in order to keep democratic liberties. These two positions became the persistent poles in recurring debates about American foreign policy, described by Henry Adams when summing up the debate between the Republicans, led by Jefferson, and the Federalists in his biography of Albert Gallatin. The difference, he wrote:

lay in the question of how far a government could safely disregard the use of force in politics. Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Gallatin maintained that every interest should be subordinated to the necessity of fixing beyond [doubt] the cardinal principles of true republican government in the public mind. The Federalists maintained that republican principles would take care of themselves, and the government could only escape war and ruin by ever holding the drawn sword in its hand.

Or, more tersely, Republicans believed that "government must be ruled by principles; to which the Federalists answered, the government must be ruled by circumstance."

Following from this, Hamilton and his successors argued that American foreign policy had to be made by the executive branch, by elites, either in secret, out of the eye of the public and the representative branch of government, or by manipulating the passions of the people. In the immediate aftermath of the Revolutionary War, the United States needed to be mindful of the power of Great Britain, but the American people were passionately hostile to that country. Hence, when the Jay Treaty was negotiated and made concessions to Great Britain, it had to be negotiated and ratified in secret. Writing his first *Camillus* essay in defense of the Jay Treaty, Hamilton repeated the dilemma facing prudent elites ruling democratic governments controlled by passionate electorates:

It was to have been foreseen that the treaty which Mr. Jay was charged to negotiate with Great Britain...would have to contend with many perverse dispositions, and some honest prejudices. The truth, unfortunately, is that the passions of men stifle calculation; that nations, the most attentive to pecuniary considerations, easily surrender them to ambition, jealousy, to anger or to revenge.

When the United States did rise to the position of a great power, in this view, a third, more pragmatic approach emerged. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Dean Acheson were willing, consciously, to take into account the slowness with which the American people were aroused to large scale action, and to structure their strategies not simply in response to the expected reactions of foreign nations, but in anticipation of the expected long term reaction of the American people. In 1940 after the fall of France and the Italian and German invasion of North Africa, the war in Europe had the potential to affect American security, but the political forces opposed to entry into war were still very strong. The reaction of FDR is instructive. Without giving his staff clear instructions, he maneuvered them into writing a speech in May 1941 on Pan American Day, in which he did not discuss the German conquest of Europe, but the direct threat to the United States. The Nazis planned to take the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands. Modern bombers in Africa were only seven hours from Brazil. The United States had to act in self-defense. FDR was proclaiming an unlimited national emergency, in self-defense. The "United States is mustering its men and its resources only for the purposes of defense—to repel attack." FDR personally wrote the next line: "When your enemy comes at you in a tank or bombing plane, if you hold your fire until you see the whites of his eyes, you will never know what hit you. Our Bunker Hill of tomorrow may be several thousand miles from Boston." Nonetheless, he did not urge the United States to declare war on Germany, even when, later in the year, German submarines torpedoed the USS GREER and the USS KEARNEY, and sank the USS REUBEN JAMES. Instead, those attacks were the occasion for another speech to arouse and unite the United States in self-defense:

America has been attacked. The USS KEARNEY is not just a Navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman, and child of this nation. Illinois, Alabama, California, North Carolina, Ohio, Louisiana, Texas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arkansas, New York, Virginia, those are the home states of the honored dead and wounded of the KEARNEY. Hitler's torpedo was directed at every American, whether he lives on our seacoasts or in the innermost part of the nation....

In short, FDR withheld action in an effort to build the strongest sense that if the United States had to go to war, it was NOT choosing to do so but was compelled to do so in self-defense. To quote the historian Robert Dallek: "In short, if he were to avoid painful wartime divisions, the nation would have to enter the fighting with a minimum of doubt or dissent, and the way to achieve this was not through educational talks to the public or strong executive action, but through developments abroad which aroused the country to fight."

This was, of course, the same approach adopted by Abraham Lincoln in the months before the outbreak of the civil war. Elected president in a controversial election, he was committed to limiting the area of slavery in the United States in order eventually to bring about its demise, but much of the country did not support his agenda. When the southern states seceded, he did not attack them, but re-supplied Federal forts in southern states so that the secessionists would have to commit a visible attack on Federal property, so that the war would be perceived, not as a war chosen to abolish slavery, but a war forced on the Union in response to a direct attack. Even earlier, this was the strategy adopted by Pericles at the time of the Peloponnesian war. The

power of Athens was increasing, and it was encroaching on the alliance system of Sparta, but Pericles urged the Athenians not to attack, but to wait until Sparta invaded the territory of Athens. He urged the Athenians to fight a defensive war, and not to expand their empire, all in order to unite the city in a war that would be perceived as a war of self-defense, even though the underlying cause of the war was the growth in Athenian power.

In the aftermath of World War II, and facing the expansion of Soviet power, American leaders consciously portrayed their actions as being simply acts of self-defense. The expansion of United States aid to Greece and Turkey was the immediate cause for the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine. This program was initially presented to Congressional leaders by George Marshall in very narrow terms, as a program to replace the aid that Great Britain previously had provided to countries in the eastern Mediterranean. When the Congressional leaders balked, Dean Acheson asked to speak, and said that Greece and Turkey were the crossroads of the world. If communism were not stopped there, it would spread like a plague across three continents. The leader of the Congressional delegation turned to Truman and said that if the president presented the policy in those terms to the American people, he would support him. The Truman Doctrine was, of course, presented as a program to support free people, anywhere, against Communist subversion and aggression. Acheson understood that he was exaggerating the threats posed to the American people, and portraying a program to stabilize the eastern Mediterranean as a program to defend the United States. While this might not produce a nuanced foreign policy, it would arouse and unite the American people to do what was necessary. Or, as Acheson wrote in his memoirs, if in persuading the American people to accept the sacrifices called for by the establishment the Marshall Plan and NATO, American leaders painted a picture of the world that was exclusively black and white, with no shades of grey, they were only doing what was necessary.

Events in the period 1949-1950 also confirmed the importance of defensive strategies for arousing and uniting the United for a long-term competition. NSC-68 was formulated and called for a much larger military effort to check the Soviet Union, but it was the Korean War that created the perception that the Soviet Union was willing to engage in military aggression in the pursuit of its goals and so generated the political support to fund the programs that NSC-68 called for. The Solarium Project laid out one defensive and two offensive strategies: containment, roll back, and preventive war. Containment was adopted. Although limited and clandestine plans to subvert the Soviet empire were also retained, the clear message was that the strategy of the United States was to deter and defend against Soviet military aggression. This policy was sustained for forty years.

The basic points are reasonably clear:

- Democracies do tend to have short term and self-interested perspectives.
- In the short term, and for narrow purposes, the preferences of the general public can be circumvented by secret or low visibility strategies, but this gives a decisive advantage to the opponents of these strategies, who can defeat them by revealing them.

- The American political system can act decisively in a sustained manner if the competition is understood to be a defensive struggle, in which all Americans are being protected against an attack that was not chosen and cannot be avoided.
- The enduring strengths of the United States—its economic and technological capacity, its high levels of internal political stability relative to other countries—will be available and can be mobilized by strategies that are seen by the American people as necessary for the defense of the United States.

FORMULATING AN ILLUSTRATIVE LONG-TERM STRATEGY

How can we draw together our limited understanding of the future security environment, the character of Chinese and Islamist decision-makers, and our understanding of our own goals and enduring strengths into a set of actions that elicit reactions from our adversaries that lead them into interactions, the terms and outcomes of which we can anticipate to be more favorable to ourselves than alternative courses of action? The strategy presented below is incomplete, but suggests how the methodology and analysis presented earlier might result in a strategy.

FIRST MOVE TO RED

The first observation is that demographic and economic factors are such that the Islamist forces are likely to grow in number, will have greater access to lethal technologies, and will use that population base and technology to try to kill large numbers of Americans. They will have the sustained capacity to create disorder in the oil producing areas of the Middle East. However, the Islamist forces are unlikely under foreseeable circumstances to be able to create large-scale cohesive political units capable of aggregating large amounts of social power, or conducting sustained campaigns (the exception to this observation would be in the case of the emergence of a charismatic religious leader who could unite Islamic peoples).

China, on the other hand, will, if it does not experience large scale social and political unrest, be capable of aggregating national economic power on a scale comparable to that available to the United States, and be able to formulate and conduct sustained programs. India will also be growing economically, and, in this time frame, Japan will still be an economically and technologically powerful player. Because of its sensitivity to domestic unrest and to uncontrolled foreign contacts with its people, China is likely to devote increasing resources to domestic surveillance and control, and to forces and infrastructure that allow it to increase its military and diplomatic control over the territories on its borders and the ocean areas within range of land based aviation and attack submarines in this period.

Hence, the opening moves in the game are likely to be Islamist actors attacking oil fields in the Middle East, terrorist attacks using more lethal weapons against the citizens of the United States, and gradual Chinese efforts to create zones within which its money and military power create local conditions such that local governments do not wish to side with the United States against China. It will provide low levels of assistance to countries such as Iran and North Korea, as a way of keeping the United States focused on problems other than China.

FIRST MOVE TO BLUE

China is far more powerful than the Islamist actors, and will be even more powerful in the future if it remains stable internally, and represents more of a challenge to the current distribution of political power in Asia and globally than does the Islamist threat. However, the United States political system believes that China is not hostile, and should not be pushed into hostility.

Therefore, the United States will react more strongly to the perception of lethal threats from the Islamic world, in Iraq and at home, than to the gradual shift of influence to China in Asia. Efforts by American leaders to increase the level of American military presence and capabilities in Asia will be resisted because of the demands for the use of American military power against Islamist forces. In addition, if American military forces and activity in Asia are seen as having been deployed in opposition to China, even if they are objectively in the defense of the status quo, they will be perceived as unnecessarily aggressive by the majority of the American people, and so will not be supported unless they can be kept secret. Efforts within the region, by India, Japan, and perhaps South Korea, to resist and limit the expansion of Chinese influence and power are possible, but China will try to portray those regional efforts as "destabilizing" or "militaristic," in order to isolate those countries from the United States.

Hence, the United States should take actions that are pertinent to the conflict with the Islamist actors, but useful also in shaping the Asian and global environment.

The first US move should be to continue its current activities in Iraq on a long-term basis, and to act against Islamist groups, but in a way that lays the ground for a shift of additional resources and activity devoted to Asia in ways which are perceived by the American people as defensive or legitimate, and that take into account the American sensitivity to the Islamist threat. Hence, the United States should state that, given the increasing problems with nuclear proliferation and the Islamist world, the United States will be willing to help friendly states develop greater capabilities to defend themselves against the dangers of nuclear proliferation and Islamist attacks.

- Liberal, subsidized arms and technology transfer programs to India (which must be prepared to deal with Iran and Pakistan) and Japan (which must deal with North Korea) that are defensive in nature (anti-ballistic missile, anti-ship, anti-submarine warfare [ASW]), as well as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) technologies, including unmanned vehicles, should be offered to those countries. Japan and India have requested such transfers in the past, and are interested in more transfers now. If necessary, the United States should make the offer more attractive by offering sensitive production technologies. Rather than resisting the trend towards the diffusion of technological capabilities, the United States should work with it.
- The United States should increase its own ISR capabilities globally in the Asia-Pacific region as part of broader Proliferation Security Initiative programs. This should lead to extended air and maritime exercises with Japan and India, and other countries willing fully to participate and share information (including stationing personnel on foreign ships and submarines), including China.
- The United States should announce a "Manhattan Project"-like effort to invent new technologies that help it find and neutralize clandestine nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons facilities, by means of sensors of all kinds. This should be part of a broad effort to maintain the American lead in military technologies, while increasing its transfers of older technologies, and conforms to the expected trend towards improved information sensors and networks.

- The United States should increase funding for long-range strike forces capable of neutralizing deep buried structures to support its anti-proliferation efforts.
- All this will result in an increase in US GDP devoted to defense to about 5% a year.

Operationally, the United States should work with the submarine forces of Japan and India in increasing their range and effectiveness, and conduct forward submarine patrols of its own against hostile countries.

SECOND MOVE TO RED

The American actions will lead hostile countries with nuclear weapons programs to spend increasing amounts of resources on hiding and protecting their facilities and weapons. This may be to the advantage of the United States. If we cannot find those facilities now, we will spend money, and if we force the adversary to spend more money, and, at worst, we are still not able to find those facilities, enemy resources will have been diverted towards defensive purposes. We will spend a lot of money, but a smaller share of our GDP than the share of enemy GDP devoted to additional hiding and protecting efforts. We may well increase our relative ability to find, if the trends in smaller, networked sensors provide benefits. In either case, we will further strain the already weak economies of Iran and North Korea. We are rich, and we should encourage competitions in spending with poor countries.

These measures, defensive in nature, will be perceived by the Chinese as increasing the zones of control of countries on its borders with which it has conflicted relations and so limiting the expansion of Chinese zones of control. This could lead the Chinese down one of two paths.

If the Chinese feel secure and are patient, they could do nothing dramatic in response to the United States, Japanese, and Indian increases in activity. They would complain about the "militarization" of the Pacific, but given the very real problems with North Korea and Pakistan, Japanese and Indian governments would not be likely to be pushed off the path of greater defensive measures. The correct move for China might be to do nothing, and wait for the problems of Pakistan and Bangladesh to occupy India, and to wait for the predicted, but longer-term decline of Japan. If China bided its time, and did not increase its offensive capabilities, this would not be an outcome unfavorable to the United States.

But on current behavior, it is more likely that the Chinese would increase their military spending, and the result would be a peacetime competition, more or less intense, in defense spending in which China is competing against the United States, India, and Japan. This is a competition on terms favorable to the United States with regard to the balance of economic power, and favorable because it keeps the Chinese focused on preventing local powers from reducing Chinese military influence in areas close to China, thus inhibiting Chinese efforts to develop Chinese influence beyond those regions. China would also be likely to increase its support of Iran, to divert the United States. This would create the perception in the United States that China was the ally of hostile Islamist forces, and increase the willingness of the American political system to oppose China.

If China is not secure, or if it perceives "arrogant" Japanese behavior, or is concerned that the United States is on the brink of successfully encircling China, and that higher levels of Chinese military spending over the long term might reduce its GDP growth rates, which are crucial for regime legitimacy, China might decide on a bold move to disrupt the alignment of forces against it. This might take the form of a strike against Japanese naval forces, against Indian or Japanese island positions, or demonstrations of nuclear weapons capabilities. If China does this, it will have effects that will mobilize the United States, Japan, and India. It would be a mistake. But China has made such mistakes in the past.

OFFLINE CONTINGENCIES

The rapid urbanization and increasing wealth of China might lead to severe social unrest. An oil price spike that is the result of unrest in the Middle East could cause a global economic contraction that stops or reverses Chinese economic growth. In either case, the prospect for serious internal political problems within China would exist. The correct move in this case would be for the United States to offer asylum and dual citizenship to any Chinese citizen who had families in the United States or who demonstrated a certain level of wealth and education, or who was sponsored by a church in the United States. This would be an enormous windfall for the United States – despite any problems of its being used for intelligence penetrations of the United States – and would play to one of our enduring strengths, which is our assimilationist political culture.

CONCLUSION

As stated at the outset, this is a notional strategy. The trends discussed are plausible, but not deeply researched. Other strategies are compatible with the logic of the trends and actors presented. In particular, an American strategy of military withdrawal to the Western Hemisphere would play to the defensive strategic orientation of the United States. This strategy, which effectively, would cede strategic dominance to China in all of Asia, is worth exploring. But the purpose of this monograph was to show how the methodology for developing strategies by the author in a separate monograph could be applied in practice.