Pages 1-13

Withheld in Full

Under Exemption (b)(6)

TAB

B

Pages 15 – 17

Withheld in Full

Under Exemption (b)(6)

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION 1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

AS OF 1400 OCTOBER 28, 2015

MONDAY 2 NOVEMBER

0815 ARRIVAL WASHINGTON DULLES EMIRATES FLT EK231

POINT OF CONTACT: (b)(6)

1000 DEPART WASHINGTON DULLESENROUTE TO

MARRIOTT RESIDENCE INN PENTAGON CITY

1045 ARRIVAL AT MARRIOTT RESIDENCE INN PENTAGON CITY,

550 ARMY NAVY DR, ARLINGTON, VA 22202

PHONE: (703) 413-6630

1100 RECOVERY DAY/RON

TUESDAY 3 NOVEMBER

0815 VANS DEPART HOTEL: (MARRIOTT RESIDENCE INN PENTAGON CITY)

POINT OF CONTACT: (b)(6

0900 ARRIVAL AT ABRAHAM LINCOLN HALL ENTRANCE

MET BY:

DR. MICHAEL BELL

CHANCELLOR, COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (CISA)

0900-0925 OFFICE CALL WITH NDU-VP (CONFIRMED) + 5 MEMBERS OF

DELEGATION (TO BE ASSIGNED BY (b)(6)

(LOCATION: TJ ROOM)

0925-0930 WALK TO ALH 1651

COUNTERINSURGENCY FOCUS

LOCATION: CASL SITUATION ROOM (ALH 1651)

0930-0945 ADMINISTRATIVE

0945-1045 IRREGULAR THREATS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

DR. THOMAS A. MARKS

1045-1100 BREAK

1100-1200 COMPARING DAESH AND THE TALIBAN

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION

1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE – PENTAGON – NESA CENTER DR. HASSAN ABBAS

1200-1330 LUNCH IN NDU CAFÉ

1330-1430 GULF SECURITY: PAST AND PRESENT DR. GEOFFREY GRESH

LOCATION: CASL SITUATION ROOM (ALH 1651)

1430-1445 BREAK

1445-1500 COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS & CISA WALKING

TOUR

DR. MICHAEL BELL, CHANCELLOR

1500 VANS DEPART FOR HOTEL

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION 1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

WEDNESDAY 4 NOVEMBER

0800 VANS DEPART HOTEL

0845 GROUP ARRIVES TO NDU

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN DEFENSE

LOCATION: CASL SITUATION ROOM (ALH 1651)

0900-1000 CRAFTING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

DR. MICHAEL BELL

1000-1030 BREAK, MOVE TO NEXT SESSION

1030-1130 DIVIDE INTO GROUPS

1030-1130 STUDENT SESSION - CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-FAIL? RETHINKING LOCAL -

LEVEL COUNTERINSURGENCY

DR. DAVID UCKO

FACULTY ONLY SESSION - CURRICULUM & ASSESSMENT PANEL

LOCATION: DR. CUSHMAN OFFICE (ALH 2106)
DR. CHARLES CUSHMAN, ACADEMIC DEAN

1130-1230 LUNCH IN NDU CAFÉ

1230-1330 BROWNBAG WITH (b)(6) - TOPIC TBD

1330-1430 OVERVIEW OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

MARK PHILLIPS, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, NDU

1430-1445 BREAK

1445-1545 SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION

DR. SEAN MCFATE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR

1545 VANS DEPART FOR HOTEL

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION

1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

THURSDAY 5 NOVEMBER

BUS DEPARTS NDU

| 0815 | VANS DEPART HOTEL |
|-----------|--|
| 0845 | GROUP ARRIVES TO NDU |
| 0900-1000 | (b)(6) LEADERSHIP IN FIGHTING DAESH |
| 1000-1015 | BREAK |
| 1015-1100 | INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY TED LARSEN |
| 1100-1145 | OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM STUDY GROUP: BRIEFING MG (RET.) AZIZ/ LTC JASON AWADI |
| 1145-1230 | LUNCH |
| 1230-1330 | REFUGEES IN CRISIS: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION (NGO) COMMUNITY RAED ALBOUR |
| 1330-1430 | THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES DR. MICHAEL RUPERT |
| 1430-1445 | BREAK |
| 1445-1545 | REFLECTIONS FROM A CISA IRAQI GRADUATE YOUNIS AL DULAIMI, BG (RET.) IRAQ ARMY CT SERVICE |

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION

1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 6

0800 VANS DEPART HOTEL

0845 GROUP ARRIVES TO NDU

TODAY'S LOCATION: ROOM 2135B, ABRAHAM LINCOLN HALL

0900-1200 SIMULATION EXERCISE, CENTER FOR APPLIED STRATEGIC

LEARNING (CASL)

ROOM: 2135B

1200-1330 LUNCH

1330-1430 MIDDLE EAST – PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

DR. JUDITH YAPHE, VISITING PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

ROOM: 2135B

1430-1530 STATE/JOINT STAFF BRIEFING

"U.S. - IRAQ BILATERAL RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE AND

NATIONAL SECURITY"

ROOM: 2135B

1530 GROUP PHOTO WITH CHANCELLOR

GIFT EXCHANGE

LOCATION: CISA HALLWAY/CREST

1545 VANS DEPART FOR HOTEL

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION 1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

SATURDAY 7 NOVEMBER

0700 - UTC CULTURAL DAY

POINT OF CONTACT: (b)(6)

SUNDAY 8 NOVEMBER

0700 - UTC CULTURAL DAY

POINT OF CONTACT:

| MONDA' | Y 9 NOVEMBER | | | |
|--------|---|--|--|--|
| 0500 | VANS DEPART HOTEL FOR CARLISLE BARRACKS, ROOT HALL | | | |
| 0820 | ARRIVE ROOT HALL | | | |
| 0830 | OFFICE CALL WITH COMMANDANT OR DEPUTY COMMANDANT WITH | | | |
| 0830 | WALKING TOUR (All except (b)(6) Root Hall | | | |
| 0900 | COMMAND BRIEF / USAWC ENTERPRISE OVERVIEW CCR Provost, United States Army War College | | | |
| 0955 | SCHOOL OF STRATEGIC LANDPOWER BRIEF CCR | | | |
| 1050 | CSL BRIEFING in conference room. CCR | | | |
| 1200 | PKSOI Overview and Lunch Upton Hall | | | |
| 1400 | DMSPO. Lesson Development Discussion Moore Room | | | |
| 1530 | AHEC Tour AHEC | | | |
| 1630 | DEPART AWC FOR WASHINGTON DC | | | |
| 1930 | ARRIVAL HOTEL (MARRIOTT RESIDENCE INN PENTAGON CITY, RON | | | |
| | | | | |

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION

1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

TUESDAY 10 NOVEMBER

| 0830 | DEPART FOR PENTAGON | | |
|-------------|---|--|--|
| 0900 | ARRIVE PENTAGON METRO ENTRANCE FOR BADGING INTO PENTAGON MET BY MICHAEL KAUFFMAN | | |
| 0930 - 1030 | PENTAGON TOUR | | |
| 1045-1145+ | G3/5/7 TRAINING DIRECTORATE NCOES PANEL WITH SERGEANTS MAJOR (SGMS OVERTON, CLARK AND BALL) | | |
| 1145 | NO HOST LUNCH AT PENTAGON DINING AREA | | |
| 1245 | DEPART FOR NESA | | |
| 1300 | ARRIVAL NESA | | |
| 1315 | NESA PRESENTATIONS | | |
| | NESA AND OTHER REGIONAL CENTERS THE EMERGING SECURITY LANDSCAPE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM IRAN AFTER THE NUCLEAR DEAL CHANGES IN OIL MARKETS - ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS | | |
| 1600 | VANS DEPART NESA | | |
| 1645 | ARRIVAL HOTEL/RON | | |

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION

1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

WEDNESDAY 11 NOVEMBER (VETERAN'S DAY)

POINT OF CONTACT: (b)(6)

| 0800 | BREAKFAST | | |
|------------|--|--|--|
| 0930 | DEPART HOTEL FOR ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEREMONY VETERANS DAY CELEBRATION | | |
| 1000 | MEET LIZ MOORE AND PROCEED THROUGH SECURITY CHECKS AND MOVE TO OUR SEATS IN SECTION C OR I (SEE DIAGRAM) | | |
| 1100 | CEREMONY BEGINS | | |
| 1200 | CEREMONY ENDS/VIEW GUARDS AT THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN/VISIT OIF SECTION | | |
| 1230 | ARRIVE BACK AT THE HOTEL | | |
| 1245 – UTC | CULTURAL DAY POINT OF CONTACT: (b)(6) | | |
| THURSDAY | 12 NOVEMBER | | |
| 0600 | CHECKOUT AND DEPART HOTEL FOR WASHINGTON DULLES POINT OF CONTACT: (b)(6) | | |
| 1015 | DEPART EMIRATES FLT (EK323) FOR ISLAMABAD | | |

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION 1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

| (b)(6) | TATTOTAL DEL ENGE GITTERGITT | A THIN THIN GOLLLOL | 1 Entinoun | NEGA OEMIEN |
|--------|--|---------------------|------------|-------------|
| | (b)(6) | | | |
| | (0)(0) | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | 1.0 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | The second secon | | | 16 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

IRAQ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY DELEGATION 1-12 NOVEMBER 2015

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY- ARMY WAR COLLEGE - PENTAGON - NESA CENTER

PARTICIPANT ROSTER

| (b)(6) | |
|--------|------|
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | -121 |

APPENDIX 2. NDU POLICY 5.00 NON-ATTRIBUTION/ACADEMIC FREEDOM

DATE LAST UPDATED: July 29, 2011

- 1. Academic Freedom is defined in the university's values as: Providing the climate to pursue and express ideas, opinions, and issues relative to the university purpose, free of undue limitations, restraints, or coercion by the organization or external environment. It is the hallmark of an academic institution.
- 2. The National Defense University subscribes to the American Association of University Professors' statement on academic freedom, issues in 1940. That statement defines academic freedom in terms of:
- a. Freedom of research and publication of results
- b. Freedom of classroom teaching
- c. Freedom from censorship when faculty speak or write as citizens
- 3. The statement also includes faculty responsibilities in academic freedom:
- a. Faculty, when action as private citizens, should make every effort to indicate that they are not institutional spokespersons.
- b. Controversial issues not pertaining to the subject should not be introduced.
- c. Peer review is vital and encouraged.
- d. Institutional missions could limit academic freedom.
- 4. Free inquiry is essential to the National Defense University because the senior officers and government officials who are educated here will assume a variety of roles in their future assignments, as future policy makers, advisors, and leaders. NDU graduates must be ready to discuss, challenge, question, and determine national policy.
- 5. So that guests and university community members may speak candidly, the university offers its assurance that presentations will be held in strict confidence. Our policy on non-attribution provides that, without the expressed permission of the speaker, nothing will be attributed directly or indirectly in the presence of anyone who was not authorized to attend the lecture.

APPLICABLE REGULATION: Title 10, United States Code; DoD Directive 5230.0, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release; NDU Reg. 360-1, Academic Freedom and Public Information

NDU PROPONENT: Vice President for Academic Affairs.

CISA Hosts Seminar for Iraqi National Defense College Students and Faculty

On 3-6 November, The College of International Security Affairs (CISA), National Defense University (NDU), hosted a group of 13 Iraqi faculty and students (rank of Brigadier and higher) from the National Defense College of Iraq. The group was led by Lt. General Abbas Fezea, and the visit was funded by the Iraqi government.

Over the course of four days at CISA, the group took part in a series of briefings on topics such as "Irregular Warfare", "Developing National Security Strategy", "Role of Religious Leadership in Fighting Daesh", and an "Overview of the U.S. Professional Military Education System". CISA also hosted a panel of policy makers, which included Brigadier Michael Fantini, Principal Director for Middle East, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Mr. Joseph Pennington, Iraq Office Director, Department of State. CISA alumni from Jordan and Iraq also provided briefings on humanitarian and security challenges facing the Middle East. Finally, the group took part in a wargaming exercise led the NDU Center for Applied Strategic Learning that focused on counterinsurgency.

Following the academic sessions at NDU/CISA, the Iraqi delegation spent a day at the U.S. Army War College, the Pentagon, and attended the Veteran's Day ceremony at Arlington Cemetery.

Iraq 3 November 2015

PLANNING

Date Requested: 3 November 2015

Time of office call: 0900-0930

Full Schedule: 0900-0930: Office Call

Pre-brief: N/A

Head of delegation: LTG Abbas Fazil, Primary Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi National Defense Unievrsity

in delegation: 14 in delegation (5 faculty, 7 students, 2 US escorts), TBD for office call

Purpose:

Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq envisions dividing the group at all education locations and provide an opportunity for separate but parallel lines of engagement focused on professionalization of forces, Law of War, Profession of Arms, International Laws, Curriculum and Faculty Development, etc.; including a tour of your facilities. He would also like to visit PKSOI at Army War College; the Counter Terrorism Center at West Point; CISA and INSS at NDU and any other programs you believe would be beneficial to the Iraq NDU faculty and

students.

NDU benefit: Increase bilateral leadership relations between the two institutions

Background: (b)(6) NESA Liaison Officer at CENTCOM, emailed Daniel and Ben to inquire about a visit.

Iraq has stopped sending students to NDU in recent years.

NDU SMEs: Denise Natali (INSS)

IFs: N/A

NDU Ldrship: SVP, Dr. Bell

Gift Exchange: N/A (will occur during CISA portion)

ORF: N/A

Uniform: Class B
Status: Tracking

Table of Contents:


- A. Biographies
- B. Background Paper
- C. Articles cited in background paper
- D. List of Iraqi alumni
- E. Complete visit agenda
- F. North Korea 2025 Conference Visit Agenda (for SA regarding SVP's schedule)

IRREGULAR THREATS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Dr. Tom Marks for WACS




CISA/NDU
3 Nov 2015
tamarks@aol.com



▶ "IW" REAPPEARED DUE TO ITS USE IN AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT

PLUS: Expeditionary or Local?



LIKELIHOOD

Irregular Defeat

Catastrophic



Traditional

(Regular)

Disruptive

6 Feb 2006 QDR "Challenges"


If you're fighting, it's not a "challenge" anymore...





It's warfare

Focus of Strategy Contrasting Regular & Irregular Warfare



Politics is about contending visions of society: who gets what (rights, resources, privileges, obligations)



WAR IS AN EXPRESSION OF POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS"



AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1763-75-83)

SINCE 9-11, WE HAVE FOUGHT A WAR AGAINST A FORM OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Terrorism is (1) violence used (2) by non-state actors (3) to attack the innocent* (4) in pursuit of political ends *persons & property as per laws of war STREATE War on Sucticulty

the challenge for strategy "TERRORISM" COMES IN TWO FORMS

Terrorism as a METHOD of action Terrorism as a LOGIC of action


Michel Wieviorka, The Making of Terrorism (1993/2004)



METHOD used by insurgents
One tool (method) among many
in building a new world
LOGIC used by "terrorists"
"Violence as an end unto itself"

It's in the *JOC Irregular Warfare (Sep 07)* (different words, of course)





TWO STRATEGIC TERMS IN PLAY

INSURGENCY:

• An armed *political* campaign — mass mobilization (using lots of methods) to form a counter-state to challenge the state for political power in a contest of legitimacy

TERRORISM:


• Violence as *political* communication — sub-state actors use a method that becomes an end unto itself, the logic for all action, inverting the political process (no masses)

"PROPAGANDA BY THE DEED"



• CORK OR ICEBERG? MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR STRATEGY!!






Cork or Iceberg?



MAURITANIA

ILEVA

TEMPLATE FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION





Frame & Narrative: Back to the Future



Frame

"Jihad" (with the ultimate goal of establishing a caliphate)






- Narrative "We are fight [sic] for our land destroyed by the British, Islam polluted by the Western culture, and against Muslims corrupted by democracy"
 - Abubakar Shekau, video message (2009)



Roots: Who are those guys?





STRATEGY: ENDS - WAYS - MEANS

Boko Haram control

Boleo Haram's control of local sovernment arres in northeast Nigeria.



Source Renders

5 QUESTIONS TO "INTERROGATE" IRREGULAR WARFARE STRATEGY

- · What is its political content?
- Who are its allies outside the movement?
- · How does it use violence?
- · How does it use non-violence?
- · What is it doing internationally?


THE ANSWERS WILL UNFOLD IN TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE DIMENSIONS





BALANCE DETERMINED BY THREAT STRATEGY: MOBILIZING THE PEOPLE OR CAPTURING/KILLING THEM?









MailOnline

FREE - On the App Store

View

= MailOnline News

Scroll down for video



The photograph of a youthful IS fighter posing with a rifle has been identified as Melbourne teen Jake Bilardi





Response: Cork or Iceberg?


IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA

100 km

Google


50 miles









If "Population Centric" -> System Speaks for






Who speaks for the people?



IW: "Politicians" Turn Grievances into Cause




NARRATIVE CHALLENGES STATE LEGITIMACY



LEADERS # FOLLOWERS

Followers
want
grievances
"solved" –
OBJECTIVE
SUBJECTIVE






Iceberg is Most Dangerous

Type A

DYNAMIC PROCESS
CONTEXT CAN CAUSE CHANGE

Type B





LEGITIMACY = Center of Gravity → People will defend what is theirs



HOW DOES THIS RELATE TO GV





BIN LADEN: LEGALLY TERRORIST ANALYTICALLY GLOBAL INSURGENT

- Bin Laden was a neo-Guevarist INSURGENT
- top-down mobilization
 - But some "AM" in AQAM use bottom-up mobilization (people's war)
 - Each Theater of "GWOT" different




Every Theater has Unique Battlespace & Threat Profile





WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN "LOCAL" IS NOW "GLOBAL" DEEP/DEEP BATTLE "FAR/FAR ENEMY" Not just geographic KAZAKHSTAN Black Sea Caspian Sea TURKEY AUKISTAI PAKISTA



Clockwise from top
left: Omar Khyam
and Salahuddin
Amin, defendants
linked to an alleged
bomb plot;
Mohammed Junaid
Babar, a
prosecution
witness; and
Mohammed Momin
Khawaja, awaiting
trial in Canada in
connection with
same case.




"Al-Qaeda" but AQAM









SO WHAT TO DO?

PRES: "WHAT IS THE ONE THING WE LACK?"

TM: "A PLAN"

PRES: "WE DON'T HAVE A PLAN?"

TM: "NO SIR, YOU DON'T"

PRES: "WHY NOT?"

TM: "DON'T ASK ME!
YOU'RE THE
PRESIDENT!"

PRES: "YOU HAVE A POINT"

How Irregular Counter Works: "Armed Political Reform"

- GET IN PLACE THAT WHICH IS CORRECT
- GET IN PLACE THAT WHICH IS SUSTAINABLE
- PLAY FOR THE BREAKS

SIR ROBERT THOMPSON (TO MARKS)


Response
Begins by
Analyzing
Roots of
Conflict







"Two things were obvious: there is nothing worse than to fight the wrong way, and the key is the people. We had to ask ourselves, why do the people have a problem, why are they taking up arms?"

SAIYUD KERDPHOL (to Marks)



Armed capacity is the shield for "solution"





GLOBALIZATION HAS BEEN A DIRECT CONTRIBUTOR TO GLOBAL WARMING -**BOTH WEATHER** AND **GROWTH OF** VIOLENT **EXTREMISM**

New "Insurgent" Reality



LEGITIMACY?

TODAY, ARE
"THE PEOPLE"
NECESSARY?




CHALLENGE: "War of the Mind" Now Dominant


- Tactical/Instrumental: leveraging tools of cyber-domain
- Strategic/conceptual:

 leverages balance or
 interface between
 tangible and intergible
 worlds to concorreality
 (seeing no longer believing;
 believing is seeing)






USG COUNTERTERRORISM MODEL



Terrorists think globally, organize regionally, act locally

CT may well be CT, but "Expeditionary COIN" ≠ "Local COIN"


USG COUNTERTERRORISM MODEL




Terrorists think globally, organize regionally, act locally

POLICY AND BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS ≠ DOCTRINE

So Global Insurgency → Global COIN?






REGIME SURVIVAL AND THE POLITICS OF BASING

GEOFFREY F. GRESH

Gulf Security and the U.S. Military



U.S. Worldwide Basing



Southern Asia Harm'. a Shorte SSIA -CITAL Tyrula *Novembersk AAPPRIA A Okhousa Chris Literan Destin INCRAINE KAZAKHSTAN Donels'k" MONGOLIA . Harbin Ochreni Deijing Yinchuen* Tarin - Tyongyong Mouth Golmud Lonzhou Putilic CHINA Ocean . XFari HAN Naning. , Chasa . Wishan - Chonodu PAKISTAN inipur" BAHRAIN Fud tou? SAUDI _ Hunming ARABIA Melabor Nestor Ser it Decree INDIA Moriena Mariena shareta (U.S.) Arabian Phopowie Element Sea SUDAN South China GLAM! **Andamen** CHOLAS PEDERATED STATES Newton PALAU ALIADICA MALDIVES T Philippins MILO Victoria British Indian Goode DO Touristay. Jakaita. SEVONELLES TURKE TANZATE The second Giordeninine R opposite Hort Mores Indian Ocean Assistant and Center slapin pursupatua COMMON Chick's (Kenting) intende (AUSTRACIA) Antaragerivo Scale 1160,000,000 AUSTRALIA Dampler Miller Gylmidrical Profession

1000 Baconelina

1000 Alles


Trees of Carricant

Boundary representation to not necessarily authorizative.


803064AI (R00941) 5-04

120


Global Chokepoints and Oil Routes millions of borrets per day A Risk of mines - Navigation Challenge - Risk of piracy/ettacks on oil tarriors heavy traffic poses challenge for oil tenkers in intratraits Most of the alliquisaino through the Straits of Turkish Straits Flormuz goes to Japan. India and China Strates of Hormuz Canalate Piphly susceptible to pirmay and tanker attacks Babel Patiema Mandab Canal Most of the oil Stratts that passes Malaceax Involunt the canal is headed U.S. naval presence for the U.S. under the Oburna administration Less than 10% of Poreven Gulf od goes to the U.S.



Bahrain's Base Politics Today



Origins of U.S. Basing in the Gulf





PRINCIPAL FOREIGN TRANSPORT AND FERRYING ROUTES


ARMY AIR FORCES - 30 JUNE 1942

FABITA LANIER


Saudi Arabia 1945-1962









U.S. Military Basing in Saudi Arabia: 1990-2003



Conclusion





Southern Asia - Profes FRANKS S Mosoow. Tyruse - September Sea of - Chikk LACRAINE KAZAKHSTAN MONGOLIA ... Herblo #Oromol PREMISTAN Belling Ynchuen* Kash! Tianen Pytot Dyano North . Ookmid _Loneboy Pacific. CHINA Ocean . Xfan THAN Linesa . Chengd East Crists PAKISTAN Jaiman . Fuzziou SAUDI _Kurening - tidalpus ARABIA Harac blumbac Arabian PIRKODINE See MANHEN DUDAN (Mayne PHULIPPINES MOLA: PEDERATED STATES LANKA Nicobar PALAU Coldmbo MALDIVES (ENE SUMALIA Mográlehu Elopentar British Indian Ocean Territogy Violoda SEYGBELLES (UL MI) TANZANI Indian Ocean Orishmes (sland (Copps : (Robling) Milards AUSTRIALIA Canana BCA6 1.00,000,000 **AUSTRALIA** MISSEY, Delinoliscal Protection Trutte of Carabori Hohin Microsielees Houndary representation is not necessarily authoritative 1000 Marc 803064AI (P(00941) 5-04




Shanghai Cooperation Organization










IRAQ NATIONAL
DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY
"Preliminary
Considerations for
Developing Strategic
Plans"

3-6 NOVEMBER 2015
NATIONAL
DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY

Dr. Michael S. Bell Chancellor

Fort Bragg, NC Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.



افغانستان مكتب مجلس الامن القومي و الاعتبارات الاولية لتطوير خطط الاستراتيجية

14 August 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY



المستشار الدكتور مايكل اس بيل


Fort Bragg, NC Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Agenda

Preliminary Considerations for Developing National Strategic Plans

- Strategy
- General Phases of Strategy Development
- 9 Preliminary Questions
- Strategy Elements
- Understanding Strategic Risk

جدول الاعمال



Strategy—Definitions

Grand Strategy:

The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power and influence to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.

Military Strategy:

The art and science of employing armed forces under all conditions to achieve national security objectives in peace and war.

"Strategy is a system of makeshifts. It is more than a science, it is the application of science to practical affairs; it is carrying through an originally conceived plan under a constantly shifting set of circumstances."

Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke On Strategy, 1871

تعاريف الستراتيجية

الاستراتيجية الكبرى:

فن و علم تطوير و تطبيق و تنسيق ادوات السلطة و نفوذ القومية لتحقيق الاهداف التي تساهم في الامن القومي.

الاستراتيجية العسكرية:

فن و علم من استخدام القوات المسلطة في ظل جميع الظروف لتحقيق اهداف الامن القومي في حلة السلم و الحرب.

الاستراتيجية هي نظام تغير الاحوال بحسب سرعة تغير الظروف هي اكثر من العلم بل هي تطبيق العلم لشؤون العملية, انها تطبق من خلال خطة التي اعدت اصلا في ظل مجموعة من الظروف المتغيرة باستمرار.

المشير هيلموت فون غراف حول الاستراتيجية 1871.

Hierarchy: Strategies, Operations, Tactics

| Harris (| Primary Focus | Primary Participants | Primary Input | Primary Output |
|---|--|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| National Strategies | National Objectives | Chief of State & Governmental Advisers | National Power | National Plans |
| National Security Strategies | National Security Objectives | Chief of State & Security Advisers | Suitable National Power | National Security Plans |
| National Military Strategies | National Military Objectives | Chief of State, Defense Ministers & Military Advisers | Military Power | National Military Plans |
| Theater Military Strategies "Grand Tactics" | Regional Military Missions | Defense Ministers, Military Advisers, & Theater Commanders | Unilateral or Coalition Forces | Unilateral or Coalition Plans & Operations |
| Operational Art & Tactics | Subordinate Military Missions & Tasks | Subordinate Military Commanders | Joint or Service Forces | Joint or Service Plans & Operations |

Interdependent, but requirements for sound strategies come first.

التسلسل الهرمي: الاستراتيجيلت, العمليات, التكتيكات

| | التركيز الاساسي | المشاركات الاساسية | المدخلات الاساسية | المخرجات الاساسية |
|---|---|--|----------------------------------|--|
| الاستراتيجيات القومية | الأهداف القومية | رنيس البلاد مع مستشارين حكوميين | القوة الوطنية | خطط وطنية |
| ستراتيجيات الامنية القومية | الآهِداف الامنية القومية | رئيس البلاد مع مستشارين الامنيين | القوة الوطنية المناسبة | خطط متعلقة بامن القومي |
| ستراتيجيات العسكرية القومية | الأهداف التستكرية القويمية | رنيس البلد مع وزران الدقاع و مستشارين عسكريين | القورة العسكرية | خطط عسكرية وطنية |
| ستراتیجیات المیادین العسکریة الاستراتیجیة الکبری | مهمات عسكرية اقليمية | وزراء الدفاع و مستشارین عسکریین و قیادات المیدان | قوات التحالف او قوة احادية. | خطط التحالف او خطة احادية مع العمليات |
| فن العمليات و التكتيكات | مهمات التابعة للمرؤوسين العسكريين و مهمات اخرى | قيادات المرؤوسين العسكريين. | قوات المشتركة او قوات الخدمة. | خطط للقوات الخدمية او قوات مشتركة مع العمليات |

Interdependent, but requirements for sound strategies come first.

General Phases

The general phases in strategy development or any strategic planning process are:

- Input and Definition
- Formulation and Development
- Refinement
- Test and Validation
- Revision and Finalization
- Approval and Dissemination
- Implementation and Execution

These phases can be compressed, omitted, sequential, or overlapping. Depending upon time and circumstances, some may be cursory and others more deliberate.

مراحل العامة

المراحل العامة في تطوير استراتيجية او اي عملية التخطيط الاستراتيجي هي:

1- البيانات و التعريف.

2- البناء و التطوير.

3- تصفية, تحسين.

4-اختبار والتحقق من الصحة.

5- مراجعة و اكمال

6- موافقة و نشرها.

7- تطبيق و تنفيذ

يمكن تقليل هذه المراحل, حذفها, متابعتها, او مداخلتها, كل هذا يعتمد على الوقت و الظروف, قد يكون بعض من هذه التقليل سطحية و غيرها عمدية.

Preliminary Considerations

The process of strategy development can be facilitated by considering nine preliminary questions.

- Purpose
- Authority
- Scope
- Audience
- Available Time
- Approaches for Document Development
- Mechanisms for Input
- Document Structure or Form
- Primary strategic perspective

Some tentative answers may change during the process in response to circumstances, guidance, or greater clarity.

الاعتبارات الاولية

من الممكن تسهيل اجراءات تطور الاستراتيجي و ذلك من خلال النظر الى تسعة اسئلة اساسية:

- 1- الغرض.
 - 2- السلطة.
 - 3-نطاق.
 - 4-جمهور.
- 5-الوقت المتاح.
- 6-منهجية تطوير الوثيقة.
 - 7- اليات الادخال.
- 8-هيكلية استمارة الوثيقة.
- 9-المنظور الاستراتيجي الاساسي.

قد تتغير بعض الاجوبة الاولية اثناء العملية, و ذلك بناء على الظروف و التوجيهات او مزيد من التوضيحات.

Purpose

What purpose is the strategy or strategic plan intended to serve?

Options include:

- Respond to existing or future challenges
- Provide strategic assessment to reorient policy
 - Adjust priorities, readiness, resources, policies
- Transform government or Armed Forces
 - Force structure or staff reforms
 - Modernization Force composition or component mix
- Guide doctrine and capability development
- Determine mobilization requirements, guide future warplanning, or direct current operations or campaigns

ما الهدف من الاستراتيجية او تخطيط استراتيجي؟ تشمل الخيارات التالية:

استجابة لتحديات الحالية او المستقبلية.

توفير تقييم استراتيجي لاعادة المنهج, ضبط الاولويات, الاستعدادات, الموارد, و • السياسات.

تحويل القوات الحكومية المسلحة: اصلاحات هيكل القوة او الموظفين. التحديث او مزج المكونات المختلفة. – عقيدة التوجيه و تنمية القدرات.

تحديد متطلبات التعبئة و توجيه تخطيط الحربي او توجيه العمليات الحالية المباشرة او توجيه الحملات العسكرية.

Authority

Under whose or what authority will the strategy be issued or released and are additional authorities required to fully achieve the desired purpose?

Determine who will sign, endorse, and release strategy.

Authority can be formal and informal:

- Explicit or formal authority:
 - Constitutional or legislative sanction
 - Executive order or Federal regulation
 - Presidential or Prime Minister's directive
 - Defense Minister's or Senior Military Officer's duties
- Informal support of national and Ministerial leadership also essential for strategy efforts to be effective or influential

تحت اية سلطة يصدر او يحرر الاستراتيجية؟ و هل يتطلب سلطات اضافية لتحقيق الغرض المطلوب بشكل كامل؟

حدد من الذي يقوم بالتوقيع, او تايد لتحرير الاستراتيجية. يمكن السلطة ان تكون رسمية او غير رسمية:

السلطة الرسمية تقوم بما يلي: • العقوبات الدستورية والتشريعية.

اوامر التنفيذية و ضوابط المركزية.

توجيهات رئاسة الدولة او رئيس الوزراء. واجبات وزير الدفاع او ضابط الاقدم.

الدعم غير الرسمي من قبل قيادات وطنية و الوزارية ضرورية لتكون جهود الاستراتيجية فعلة او مؤثرة.

What is the scope of the strategy and how broad, inclusive, sensitive, or visionary is it intended to be?

Potential options:

- Classified document, public statement, or a mixture such as a public document with classified annexes or supporting plans
- Military and Defense specific or more broadly integrated with other instruments of national power
- Conventional, external threats or broader security challenges from internal and external sources and in domains such as cyber
- Existing forces or future capabilities
- Immediate, mid-term out to 3-5 years, or a longterm view of perhaps 10-20 years

ما هو نطاق الاستراتيجية و مدى توسعها, و شموليتها, و حساسيتها, او ما هي الرؤى ورائها؟

الخيارات المحتملة:

وثيقة سرية, بيان عام, او دمج لوثيقة سرية مع بيان عام مع مرفقات سرية و خطط الدعم.

دمج الجيش التابعة للدفاع بشكل اوسع مع عناصر اخرى لدى قوات الدولة. التهديدات الخارجية التقليدية او تحديات اوسع من قبل مصادر داخلية و الخارجية و في مجالات اخرى مثل انترنيت.

القوات الموجودة والقدرات المستقبلية. •

الرؤى الحالية والرؤى الوسطية من 3-5 سنة, او رؤى طويلة الامد من 20-10 سنة.

Audience

Who are the intended audiences for the document, what interests do they have, and their relative importance?

- Subordinate organizations and personnel (direct and guide)
- Supported or supporting Government Agencies (inform)
- Parliament (inform and prepare)
- People (educate)
- International community (assure, deter)
- Partners—regional, European, international (demonstrate, assure)
- Potential adversaries and competitors (dissuade, deter)

من المخاطب من كتابة الوثيقة؟ ما هو مصالحهم و مدى اهميتها لهم؟ من هم منظمات و الافراد التابعة ؟ هل هم مخاطبين المباشر. بدعم من الوكالات الحكومية ألبرلمان, اعلام و اعداد. •

الناس, التوعية.

المجتمع الدولي, ضمان و درع الشركاء الاقليمية و الاوروبية و الدولية, برهان و الضمانامكانية الخصوم و المنافسين, العدول و الردع.

في حالة كتابة الاستراتيجية لابد الاخذ بالاعتبار المؤسسات المتستفيدة منها و مدى • اهمينها لتلك المؤسسات.

Available Time

What is the timeline for the development of the strategy and are there events—both internal and external—that could impact the development, finalization, or implementation of the strategy?

Possible impacts:

- Emerging immediate priorities—changes in security conditions, readiness challenges, new borders
- Emerging crisis
- Budgetary submissions or hearings
- Political campaigns and election schedules
- International conferences, summits, or deadlines

ما هو الجدول الزمني لوضع الاستراتيجية و هل هناك احداث على المستوى الداخلي او الخارجي التي يمكن ان تؤثر على وضع الاستراتيجية او اكمالها او تنفيذها؟

التاثيرات المحتملة:ظهور الاولويات الانية, تغير الحالات الامنية, تحديات الجاهزية, حدود جديدة.

ظهور الازمات.

طلبات الميزانية, او جلسات الاستماع.

جدول الانتخابات و حملات الانتخابية, المؤتمرات و القمم الدولية او سقف زمن النهائي.

Approaches for Document Development

How participative do we want the strategy document development, validation, and approval process to be?

- Three basic approaches for developing or formulating the document affect its fundamental character:
 - Consensus or parallel
 - Leader's vision
 - Planning Staff group
- Input:
 - Continuous or one-time
 - Who gets to provide input—Does everyone get a vote
 - Are any inputs valued more highly than others
- Staffing: How resolve dissenting, conflicting or differing views during finalization and approval

منهجية تطوير او صياغة الوثيقة

كيف نصوغ الوثيقة الاستراتيجية حتى تكون شاملة و نافذة و ما هي اجراءات الموافقة عليها؟

يوجد ثلاث مناهج اساسية و التي تؤثر على طابع الوثيقة الاستراتيجية وهم كالاتى:

منهج الاجماع و منهج متوازي.

روأى القائد.

التخطيط الجماعي

المدخلات:

المدخلات الدائمية او مدخلات لمرة واحدة.

من الذي يقوم بتوفير المدخلات, هل الكل يحصلون على صوت؟ هل قيمة المدخلات يختلف من واحد الاخر؟

الموظفين: كيف نحل الخلافات, و الاراء المتضاربة في مراحل اكمال و الموافقة على الوثيقة الاستراتيجية.

Mechanisms for Input

- How do we intend to staff the document?
- Process: Formal to Informal—Virtual staffing, webbased, or email postings
- What level? How much time?
- Periodic staffing throughout process:
 - Conferences to take initial input or resolve differences
 - Standing Working Group or Strategic Review Team
 Joint Strategy Working Group
 - Strategy Division, J-5, the Joint Staff
 - Other Joint Staff Directorates
 - Representatives of Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy (OSD-P) and State Department
 - Military Service Headquarters Planners
 - Combatant Command Planners
 - Defense Agencies

أليات الادخال

كيف ننوي توظيف الوثيقة الاستراتيجية?

الاجراءات: الاجراءات الرسمية و غير الرسمية, التوظيف الظاهري و التوظيف من خلال وسائل التواصل او من خلال ايميلات.

على اي مستوى؟ و كم من الوقت يستغرق؟ التوظيف الدوري خلال الاجراءات:

مؤتمرات لاخذ البيانات الاولية او لفض الخلافات.

الفريق المستمر في العمل او فريق مراجعة الاستراتيجية.

فريق العمل الاستراتيجي المشترك

قسم الاستراتيجية جي-5 و الاركان المشتركة.

مديريات الاركان المشتركة الاخرى.

ممثلين عن مكتب وزير الدفاع -سياسة مع وزارة الخاجية.

مخططي مقرات القيادة للخدمة العسكرية.

المخططين للقيادات القتالية.

وكالات الدفاع.

Document Structure or Form

How do we want the strategy document and its implementing strategic plans to be structured?

- Integrated single strategic document
- Hierarchy as in U.S. with supporting strategies/plans:
 - National Security Strategy
 - National Defense Strategy
 - National Military Strategy
- A compromise between the two:
 - National Security and Defense Strategy
 - National Military Strategy
- Supporting plans:
 - Development identified or directed by the Strategy
 - Key aspects incorporated within the Strategy or as annexes to the base document

هيكلية استمارة الوثيقة

كيف تريد الهيكلية الوثيقة الاستراتيجية و خطط تنفيذها؟ وثيقة استراتيجية واحدة متكاملة.

التسلسل الهرمي كما هو الحال في الولايات المتحدة مع دعم خطط الاستر اتيجية.

ستراتيجية الامن القومي

ستراتيجية دفاع القومي.

ستراتيجية العسكرية القومية

حل الوسط بين الطرفين:

الامن القومي مع ستراتيجية الدفاع. ستراتيجية العسكرية القومية.

خطط الدعم:

تحديد التطور او تنمية و نوجيهها من قبل الاستراتيجية. ادرجت الجوانب الرئيسية ضمن الاستراتيجية او كمرفق للوثيقة الاساسية.

Primary Strategic Perspective

What is the dominant strategic perspective or force planning approach?

APPROACH PRIMARY FOCUS

Top Down Objectives

Bottom Up Current force and capability

Threat Adversary capability

Hedging Uncertainty

Technology Technological superiority


Fiscal Budget

منظور اساسي استراتيجي

ما هو منظور ستراتيجي المهيمن او فرض نهج التخطيط؟


| النهج | تركيز اساسي |
|--------------|------------------------|
| على الى اسفل | اهداف من اع |
| تصاعدي | القوة الحالية و القدرة |
| تهدید | القدرة المعادية |
| التحوط | عدم اليقين |
| تكنلوجيا | التفوق التكنلوجي |
| المالية | الميزانية |

Strategy Elements



A reciprocal, non-linear relationship between each of the elements.

عناصر الاستراتيجية



هناك علاقة غير متقاطعة متبادلة بين كل العناصر.

Strategy Elements

- ENDS = interests, objectives, or requirements
- WAYS = optional courses of action or approaches to achieving ends
- MEANS = tools to apply toward ends in the various ways; instruments of national power and influence, available forces, resources, future forces

Strategy involves prioritization and prediction. There are consequences of strategic choices and decisions. Changed circumstances, invalid assumptions, and disconnects between ends and means contribute to risk.

عناصر الاستراتيجية


الغايات: عبارة عن مصالح, اهداف, او متطلبات.

طرق: مضامير اختيارية للعمل او نهج لتحقيق الاهداف و وصول الى الغايات.

الوسائل: استعمال الادوات باتجاه الغايات او نهايات من خلال طرق مختلفة, ادوات السلطة الوطنية و النفوذ, القوات الموجودة, الموارد, و القوات المستقبلية.


استراتيجية ينطوي على تحديد الاوليات و التنبوات. و هناك عواقب في اتخاذ القرارات و الخيارات الاستراتيجية. ان تغير الظروف و افتراضات غير صحيحة, و قطع بين الغايات و الوسائل كل هذا يساهم في خلق المخاطر.

An Approach to the Elements of Strategy



The alternative approach—Ends-Means-Ways—is possible but tends to limit consideration of changes to forces or capabilities.

مدخل الى عناصر الاستراتيجية



يمكن أن نجد بديلا لمدخل أو نهج الغايات الوسائل الطرق ولكنه يؤدي الى اعتبارات محدودة في تغيرات على القوات أو القدرات.

AT Appropriet to the Elements of Curateon

Risk Considerations

- Risks can be <u>anticipated</u> or <u>unanticipated</u>
- Anticipated risks should be mitigated in the plan
- Dimensions of risk for planning and assessment:
 - Operational (major lines of effort or operations)
 - Future Challenges
 - Force Development (Sustainability)
 - Political/Diplomatic
 - Strategic (holistic)
- Also: Consider risk tolerance—probability of occurrence and consequences

Changed circumstances, invalid assumptions, and disconnects between ends and means contribute to risk.

اعتبارات المخاطر

يمكن ان يكون المخاطر متوقعة او غير متوقعة.

ينبغي ان يخفف المخاطر المتوقعة اثناء وضع الخطة لالستراتيجية. •

ابعاد المخاطر للتخطيط و التقييم:

التشغيل, خطوط رئيسية للجهود و العمليات.

التحديات المستقبلية.

تطوير القوة, الاستدامة.

سياسي/ دبلوماسي.

ستراتيجية, بشكل كلي.

ايضا: اخذ بنظر الاعتبار احتمالية حدوث المخاطرو نتائجها.

التغير في الظروف و افتراضات غير صحيحة و قطع العلاقة بين الغيات و الوسائل كل هذا يؤدي الى حدوث المخاطر.

Consequences

Every strategic choice has consequences.

- Anticipated
 - Expected costs
 - Expected benefits
- Unanticipated
 - Assumptions rendered invalid
 - Security environment changes—Political, economic, military, international
- The strategy should have a mechanism for decision-makers to address consequences and associated risks.

كل الخيارات الاستراتيجية لها النتائج.

نتائج المتوقعة:

التكاليف المتوقعة.

الفوائد المتوقعة.

النتائج غير المتوقعة: افتراضات الغير صالحة.

تغيرات في البيئة الامنية تؤودي الى تغيرات السياسية, الاقتصادية, العسكرية, الدولية.

يجب ان يكون لستراتيجية ألية لصناع القرار لمعالجة العواقب و المخاطر المرتبطة بها.

Risk

Risk is produced by an imbalance been the ends and the selected ways and required means to achieve those ends.

Reconciliation of risk involves strategic choices:

- Accept risk and bluff
- Reshape strategies
 - Alter ends
 - Modify or compress objectives
 - Discard objective as too costly—withdraw
 - Transform means
 - Reduce waste and promote greater efficiency
 - Modify force, mobilize more assets
 - · Cultivate allies
 - Change strategy to pursue ends through different ways
 - Shift to a different strategic approach—offense to defense
 - Employ other elements of power

مخاطرة

ان المخاطر هو نتاج وجود عدم التوازن بين الغايات و الطرق المختارة و وسائل المطلوبة لتحقيق تلك الغايات.

ان وضع حل للمخاطر تتضمن خيارات استراتيجية:

تقبل المخاطر و الخدع.

اعادة تشكيل استراتيجبات.

تعديل الغايات:

تعديل او جمع الاهداف مع بعض.

تجاهل الهدف اذا كان مكلفا للغاية, انسحب.

وسائل التحويل:

تقليل من هدر الكلفة و تعزيز قدر اكبر من الكفاءة.

تعديل السلطة, وحشد مزيد من الممتلكات

تشجيع الحلفاء.

تغيير استراتيجية لمتابعة الفعاليلت من خلال طرق مختلفة.

حول الى نهج استراتيجية مختلفة من الهجوم الى الدفاع.

توظيف عناصر اخرى للسلطة.

Risk Assessment Techniques

- Develop courses of action on the range of scenarios:
 - Most likely, most demanding, and most dangerous
 - Avoid basing decisions on "excursions" alone
 - Analysis of discrete challenges is easier but may not be as useful as a comprehensive approach
- Risk is assessed by commanders against the missions and tasks assigned by the strategy:
 - Military and Operational risk—based on ability to accomplish individual missions or tasks within the specified time and with available resources
 - Strategic risk—ability of the force to simultaneously achieve all objectives outlined in the strategy

تقييم تكتيكات المخاطر

تطوير مسارات العمل على مجموعة من السيناريوهات:

على الارجح, اكثر تطلبا, والاكثر خطورة.

تجنب اتخاذ قرارات استنادا الى الظواهر الاولية وحدها.

تحليل التحديات منفردا هو عملية سهلة و لكن غير مفيدة مثل تحليل النهج الشامل.

تقييم مخاطر مهمات استراتيجية الموضوعة من قبل القادة:

يستند مخاطر عسكرية و العملياتية على امكانية انجاز الماهم الفردية ضمن وقت محدد و الموارد المتاحة.

مخاطر الاستراتيجية هو قدرة السلطة لتحقيق جميع الاهداف في وقت واحد التي وردت في الاستراتيجية.

Testing or Validating the Strategy

- Test or validate the strategy—options include:
 - Trusted agent, senior advisors or "gray beard" review
 - Red Team the strategy from the adversary's perspective
 - Wargame-scenario-based tabletop discussion
- Confirm assumptions—consider anticipated consequences and impact of invalid assumptions
- Identify disconnects between ends/ways/means
- Reconcile disconnects
 - Shortfalls and capability gaps—and associated risks
 - Disagreements based on different strategic perspectives or threat estimates
 - Present to leadership for resolution
- Revise and refine strategy to reflect validation insights

اختبار او التحقق من صحة الاستراتيجية

تشمل اختبار او التحقق من صحة الاستراتيجية ما يلي:

التحقق من قبل وكيل موثوق به, او اقدم مستشارين.

التحقق من الاستراتيجية من وجهة نظر الخصم.

اختبار المناورة و السيناريوالموضوعة على اساس القرار الجماعي.

تأكد من افتر اضات و العواقب المتوقعة و تأثير أفتر اضات غير صحيحة.

تحديد قطع الاتصالبين الغايات و الطرق والوسائل.

تصحيح قطع الاتصال:

تصحيح العجز و الثغرات و المخاطر المتعلقة.

حل الخلافات الموجودة على اساس وجهات النظر الاستراتيجية والتهديدات المتوقعة. قدم الحلول القيادة الاخذ القرار بشأنها.

مراجعة وتنقيح استراتيجية لتعكس فاعلية الرؤى.

Strategy Implementation

The Strategy can direct plans or contain annexes to:

- Revise doctrine
 - Updated operational concepts
 - Reorient education and training programs; prep for new missions
- Update warplans and contingency plans
 - Revise General Defense Plan
 - Military Support to Civil Authorities
 - Counterinsurgency or Counterterrorist plans
- · Adjust force basing and posture
- Define force capability requirements
 - Adjust force composition
 - Basis for program development and acquisition decisions
 - Provides basis for budget justification
 - Assess risk and impact of timing decisions
- Basis for strategic assessment and advice to leaders
 - Periodic review of strategy and risks
 - Common framework to assess risk and timing of decisions

تطبيق استراتيجية

استراتيجية يمكن ان توجه خطط او تحتوي على مرفقات ل: تنقيح العقيدة.

تحديث مفاهيم التشغيلي.

اعادة توجيه برامج التعليم و التدريب, اعداد لمهمات الجديدة.

تحديث خطط مناورات و الطواري:

تنقيح الخطة العامة للدفاع.

دعم عسكري للسلطات المدنية.

خطط محاربة التمرد و الارهاب.

تكييف و توطيد السلطة.

تحديد متطلبات قدرة السلطة:

ضبط تشكيل السلطة.

اساسیات لبرنامج تطویر و استحواد القرارات.

تقديم اساسيات لتبرير الميزانية.

تقييم المخاطر و تأثيرها على نقة قرارات

اساسيات لتقييم استراتيجي و تقديم النصح للقادة:

مراجعة دورية للستراتراتيجية و المخاطر.

اطار العمل المشترك لتقييم المخاطر و الدقة في اتخاذ القرارات.

Strategy Pitfalls to Keep in Sight

- Imbalance of ends/ways/means
 - Lack of leader involvement, awareness or buy-in
- Incorrect assumptions
 - Failure to identify and challenge implicit assumptions
- Strategic countermoves
 - Strategy remains static; not adaptive or interactive
 - Adversaries have choices; arrogance and underestimation
- Faulty implementation
 - Strategic monoism or dominance of a single perspective
 - Emphasis on efficiency (cost) over military effectiveness (flexibility, training, professionalism, morale)
 - Disconnects between strategy and implementing plans and budgets
 - Friction associated with execution and change

مطبات استراتيجية لاخذ بنظر الاعتبار

عدم التوازن بين الغايات و الطرق و الوسائل: نقص في تدخل القادة و نقص الوعي و الدعم.

أفتراضات غير صحيحة:

الفشل في تحديد و تحدي الافتراضات الضمنية.

استراتيجية مضادة:

استراتيجية تبقى ثابتة, غير قابلة للتكيف او تفاعل. يوجد لدى الخصوم خيارات مثل الغطرسة و الاستخفاف.

تنفيذ خاطيء:

أستر اتبجية الوحدوية او هيمنة من منظور واحد:

التركيز على مدى الكفاءة ومقارنة بالتأثير العسكري في باب المرونة, التدريب, الاحتراف و روح المعنوية.

عدم الربط بين استراتيجية وتنفيذ الخطط و الميزانية الاحتكاك المرتبطة بتنفيذ و التغيير.

Questions?




أسئلة

ARTIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Strategic Planning Process

National Step 1: Specify National Interests Interest Threats & Step 2: Appraise Opposition Challenges Pol-Mil Step 3: Identify Key Objectives **Objectives** Foreign **Domestic** Preferred **Policies Policies** Strategy Step 4: Formulate Strategies Mismatched Ends/Means Required Step 5: Allocate Resources Resources **Estimated** Risks **Available** Resources Step 6: Reconciliations Revised Strategy &/or Resources

اجراءات تخطيط استراتيجية



THE FIVE FALLACIES OF CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD

COUNTER-INSURGENCY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

DAVID H UCKO

Central to the counter-insurgency campaigns conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade has been the concept of 'clear-hold-build' – the notion that government legitimacy can be spread like ink across a page by, first, clearing an area of insurgents; second, holding that area securely; and, third, building infrastructure and undertaking local development projects. In this article, David H Ucko explores five fallacies surrounding the concept to show that it cannot be applied indiscriminately. Instead, it needs to take account of the individual features of each locality, each village – because the page is rarely blank before the ink is applied.

ver the last ten years, 'clearhold-build' has emerged as a dominant approach to counterinsurgency (COIN).1 The prevalence of the approach in both doctrine and practice stems from its seemingly intuitive logic: security forces first clear areas from insurgent control, then hold them securely to prevent insurgents from returning, which in turn allows for the build phase, in which civilians and military forces engage in development and political projects to assist the local population and increase support for the recognised government. Ideally, clear-hold-build allows government control and perceptions of its legitimacy to spread, resulting in the gradual defeat of the insurgency. The common metaphor, established by French General Joseph-Simon Galliéni at the close of the nineteenth century, is that 'the pacification and thorough occupation of territory (advances) by the method of the oil slick, by progressively spreading from the centre to the periphery'.2 Another metaphor, associated with U5 and UK counter-insurgency campaigns

of the mid-twentieth century, is that of ink-spots spreading across blotting paper. The end-state of both images – an area completely covered either with oil or ink – represents a stable government capable of governing over the entirety of its territory.

Clear-hold-build is nothing new, and its sequencing and theory of victory tend to be accepted as axioms of modern counter-insurgency. Yet its implementation has often yielded significant frustration. In Afghanistan, for example, NATO commanders used the disparaging phrase 'mowing the grass' to describe the repeated clearing of areas only for them to be re-infiltrated by the insurgents. Similarly, the appropriation in 2010, and in the United States alone, of more than \$52 billion to 'stabilize and strengthen the Afghan economic, social, political and security environment' has not translated into the linear type of progress one may expect from the clearhold-build model.3

In light of the prevalence of clear-hold-build in current military thinking, and the substantial difficulties

of implementing it in the field, it is necessary to ask whether this approach is at all valid. The key question is what accounts for the gap between prescription and practice. Focusing predominantly on the hold and the build phases, this article presents five fallacies that, while rarely stated outright, tend to colour the discussion and application of clear-hold-build. Exploring these fallacies helps to explain the contradictions between expectations and outcomes pointed to above and brings out valuable nuance to an approach whose simplicity is a key factor in its axiomatic status. The point is not that the doctrine is necessarily wrong but that, given the sui generis nature of insurgency, particularly at the micro level, it should be applied for the questions it raises, not for the all-encompassing answers that it cannot possibly provide. Thus problematised, the true requirements for clear-hold-build come into focus, something that in turn should induce great modesty about what counterinsurgency can achieve, and realism as to what it will require.

This article was downloaded by: [King's College London]

On: 29 June 2013, At: 13:03

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41

Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



The RUSI Journal

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20

The Five Fallacies of Clear-Hold-Build

David H Ucko

To cite this article: David H Ucko (2013): The Five Fallacies of Clear-Hold-Build, The RUSI Journal, 158:3, 54-61

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847,2013.807586

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.



NATO soldiers construct a Mabey Bridge in Camp Ghazi, Afghanistan, while training the Afghan National Army how to assemble and disassemble the bridges for future use around the country. Image courtesy of MCC Jason Carter/ISAF/Flickr.

The First Fallacy: Building is the Easy Part

It is easy to mistake the build phase as the simplest of the three stages. The assumption here is that once the clearing of villages or towns is complete and forces hold this territory, the requirements for building are comparatively light. Despite a number of caveats, NATO's counterinsurgency doctrine strongly implies that by the build stage, 'core grievances' will have been 'identified' and 'immediate problems addressed'.4 Similarly, NATO's Counterinsurgency Training US-led Center - Afghanistan (CTC-A) suggests in its guidance that even in the hold phase, 'military and police forces have control of the area' and 'government agencies ... [are] poised to regain control'.5 Where such conditions obtain, all that remains - it would seem - is to share the peace dividend.

Unsurprisingly, then, the challenges of the build phase are often underestimated in practice, too: witness, for example, the unfortunate pledge of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander and US General Stanley McChrystal following the 2010 offensive

in Marjah, Helmand Province, that once the clearing phase was over, 'We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in'.6 As it happened, there were insufficient US and Afghan forces to provide security during the hold phase; the Taliban was able to intimidate the local population, beheading those who co-operated with the foreigners; and the Afghan government failed to dispatch a sufficient number of local administrators or police.7 As Frances Z Brown puts it, 'the district governor "rolled in" to take charge ... [and] was rolled right out of Marjah four months later in the same proverbial box in which he came'.8 To a large degree, progress was slow because 'no one who planned the operation realized how hard it would be to convince residents that they could trust representatives of an Afghan government that had sent them corrupt police and inept leaders before they turned to the Taliban'.9

Rather than the 'happy home stretch' of counter-insurgency, 'build' is arguably its most difficult phase. The challenges include deploying a local police force and competent, accountable host-nation agencies, and for them to be accepted by

the local population. Whereas clearing and holding call for fairly traditional military tasks - combat operations and area security - building implies the establishment of a 'new normal', requiring intimate and sustained engagement with local structures, capabilities, aspirations and fears. In this manner, building brings to the fore intensely political questions of control and authority: it forces commanders to ask why local leaders have or lack legitimacy - and how this state of affairs can be changed. Such questions demand complex answers. It follows that when the 2006 US Army and Marine Corps field manual on counterinsurgency suggested that, to build host-nation legitimacy, troops should try 'collecting and clearing trash' and 'digging wells', it was being less than helpful.16 Picture the hapless commander who, having cleared trash and dug a well, realises that the drivers of conflict in this particular town relate not to the provision of basic services but to poor governance, corruption, predation by the central or provincial government, longstanding factional disputes, or a heady mixture of all of these.

Western counter-insurgency doctrine has improved substantially since 2006, but building host-nation legitimacy remains profoundly challenging.11 Specifically, it requires the ability to identify and engage with informal sub-state structures in ways that contribute to mission objectives; an ability to identify the drivers of conflict and to address them through community engagement; and the type of knowledge and skills all too rarely found within the Western bureaucracies of intervention, not least within the military, which nonetheless tends to be the lead agent in this type of work. Perhaps of greatest importance to third-party interventions, it also requires a local ally willing and able to play its part, for without such a partner any progress made is strictly ephemeral. For all of these reasons, building is anything but easy.

The Second Fallacy: Clear-Hold-Build Spreads Governance to Ungoverned Areas

In discussions of counter-insurgency and of clear-hold-build in particular, there is a tendency to view progress as the gradual expansion of governance to previously 'ungoverned areas'. A key assumption here is that protracted conflict has led to the collapse of institutions and related governance capacity and that it is up to the state to restore services so as to gain local support. Such thinking underpins the ink-spot strategy, whereby government control is spread across the land, but those who use this metaphor typically evince less concern for what was on that paper before the ink was applied. In fact, the metaphor is critically flawed, as there is no societal equivalent to a blank piece of paper: each target area has its own political and social texture that must be understood for engagement to be effective

In practice, too, many Western interventions are marked by a failure to anticipate, locate and engage with informal structures and preferences and, in virtually all cases, such shortcomings become costly. Even in the immediate chaos of post-invasion Iraq, 'commanders faced situations in which Iraqis had spontaneously established local authorities of some sort, especially in areas where pre-existing political parties

and movements had a head start'.12 The challenge, as in Afghanistan, was to detect and engage with these developments in ways 'that favour stability, though doing so without rewarding intimidation and violence'.13 In Iraq, this did not happen: a lack of familiarity on the part of military commanders and of plans on the part of the Coalition Provisional Authority made for a haphazard approach that shifted from desperate improvisation to technocratic rigidity, and which ultimately pushed issues of local governance to one side.14 In Afghanistan, the Bonn process (which helped to create the modern Afghan state, beginning with the 2001 Bonn Agreement) centralised political power in the capital, confining provincial politics to an afterthought. As Martine van Biljert explains, 'the provinces were largely seen as ungoverned spaces and few policymakers were aware that there were still functioning, albeit very rudimentary, administrative structures at almost all levels of subnational government'.15 Importantly, there were also strong non-governmental authority structures in place.

This last point leads on to Somalia. Despite holding the unenviable reputation of being a chronically failed state, the lack of state authority in Somalia has not prevented local communities from self-organising and developing the types of coping mechanisms that on aggregate allow for some semblance of governance - even if it is 'governance without government'.15 As Ken Menkhaus explains, 'through an amalgam of customary law, sharia law, and the influence of business people and various professional associations, a messy, loose and fluid mosaic of authorities emerged that collectively added up to something far removed from anarchy', 17 Somalia exemplifies the broader trend discerned by Mats Berdal and David Keen, that war and instability also produce - alongside their destructive effects - an 'alternative system of power, profit and protection', and that these must inform all efforts at local engagement, both during and post conflict.18

There is therefore something wrong with the notion of 'ungoverned spaces', as it equates statelessness, or state collapse, with a lack of governance

or community organisation. This point matters because how these areas are understood determines how they are approached during the build phase. If war-torn areas are seen as places where politics have completely broken down and institutions are entirely absent, the go-to solution is commonly to spread state control and functions as a remedy to state failure. On the other hand, if these spaces are seen as governed, albeit informally or rudimentarily, then the task is not to re-impose state control but to co-opt local structures in ways that benefit both centre and periphery and that lock both into a new national compact.

A further consideration is that rather than constituting a stabilising factor, the remedy of 'more state' can be highly threatening to faraway communities. In Somalia, for example, the 'state' that Western interventions typically seek to re-create has, historically, been a catalyst for criminality, violence and communal tensions. As a result, the international focus on recreating this leviathan as a cure to 'state failure' has repeatedly reawakened the 'worst instincts of Somalia's elites', which may help to explain the chequered record of 'state-building' in that country.19 Similarly, in Afghanistan, an authoritative survey of communities by Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder reveals widespread memories of abuse, injustice and cruelty perpetrated by people within or allied with the state,20 It follows that a greater or more intrusive state presence is not, in such contexts, a recipe for greater stability and that counter-insurgents will need to be far more creative in tying the periphery to the centre.

The Third Fallacy: Building is about Giving the Local Population a Better Life

Due to the fact that the build phase will often involve projects that improve the living standard of conflict-affected populations, it can easily be misunderstood as a charitable exercise, motivated by altruism, and concerned above all with service delivery. This framing can be appealing and serve a propagandistic function, but actually prosecuting counter-insurgency in this manner is highly unadvisable. First, altruism and service delivery by outsiders

is sustainable only so long as the outsiders stay. Second, what outsiders do will rarely increase the legitimacy of the central government in whose name the counter-insurgency is being fought. These considerations point to a need to reassess why the build phase is undertaken and, on that basis, how it should be implemented in order to achieve those objectives.

In answering these questions, a distinction between short-term and longterm development comes into play. In the short term, when security is still contested, there may be a need for some low-level build activities - such as the provision of water and the removal of litter - to encourage the local population to assist in what is, after all, the occupation of their town or village. As Ryan Evans found in Helmand Province, small-scale projects can help to buy consent and encourage locals to provide information on threats and other developments.21 Yet while this overlap between the hold and build phases is often inevitable, it also raises fresh challenges. It brings into question what types of reconstruction, development and governance-related projects are appropriate in the short term, and to whom counter-insurgents should listen when making these decisions. Once projects have been selected, the question then becomes who can execute them - and how they can do so - without fuelling venality and rivalries, or otherwise harming longer-term interests. The challenge, simply put, is how best to engage quickly and with inadequate information yet without entrenching counter-productive practices.

The general principle should be to keep initial projects to a bare minimum without unnecessarily alienating the local population. These projects are strictly transactional and flow from a military force rather than the governmental system that the force is seeking to protect. The UK Stabilisation Unit's guidance on 'quick-impact projects' is instructive in this instance, defining them as 'simple, generally - but not exclusively - small scale, low cost, rapidly implemented projects that serve as down payments on promises of political and economic progress buying time for, and confidence in, a government'.22 The point is to avoid 'doing harm' by distorting the local market, inadvertently rewarding one side over another, or providing incentives for predatory actors or war-like behaviour.²³

This conservative approach, motivated by the limited understanding that typifies early engagement, offers a corrective to the popular counterinsurgency notions that 'money is ammunition' and that 'the best weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot'.24 While there is truth to these statements, they can encourage profligacy on the part of commanders seeking to make friends and influence people. In an uncertain and insecure environment, it is easy to confuse money spent with consent bought, or short-term transactional agreements with a longer-term harmony of interest. Indeed, much like ammunition, money must also be used discriminately and be targeted precisely in order to produce the desired effect.25

When security is in place, longerterm development projects can be considered. At this point, the purpose is no longer to produce consent but to address the drivers of violence and, ultimately, meet mission objectives. This task calls for the identification of those factors that engender alienation and fuel the insurgency. Where the drivers of conflict are purely economic - poverty, unemployment or lack of services, for example - the response can be as commonly imagined by aid agencies: to lift the population out of poverty by providing employment opportunities or public goods. This type of intervention can be effective where the insurgents lack popular support or where a lack of options and opportunities compel individuals to partake in insurgent activities, in return for hard cash or other goods. Participation is then largely apolitical and can, in a strictly relative sense, be easily remedied. Problematically, the grievances and drivers of violence in a conflict zone tend to be in essence both political - be it the result of poor governance, abuse or discrimination - as well as economic. As Leon Trotsky recognised, 'the mere existence of privations is not enough to cause an insurrection; if it were, the masses would always be in revolt. It is necessary that the bankruptcy of the social regime ... should make these privations intolerable, and that new conditions and new ideas should

open the prospect of a revolutionary way out'.25

Where grievances are political, build activities will need to be entirely rethought and even then may not be effective. From a strategic perspective, it serves little to no purpose building a school or creating jobs if the cause of conflict is corruption, predation or repression on the part of the local government.27 Indeed, absent concerted political reform, it is difficult to see how build activities will remedy deeply political grievances. This assessment should give pause for thought, particularly as most grievances are political rather than just economic. As such, counter-insurgents need to be far more modest about what build activities can achieve, while acknowledging that turning a blind eye to privations or the inadequate delivery of basic services are also likely to inflame. The challenge is thus to do what is possible, without doing harm, and while recognising that much more will be needed - typically socio-political reform - to get to the root of the problem.

The Fourth Fallacy: The More Projects Completed, the Better

Where the build phase is understood as altruistic service delivery for a war-torn population, the metric of success is typically considered to be the number of projects completed to this end. Institutional or political pressures to show progress reinforce this metric, with success then seen in the disbursal of funds or completion of projects. The short tours of most civilian and even of some military personnel exacerbate the problem, as all those returning will want to have something to point to as a sign of their success in theatre. Unfortunately, the result will often be profligacy and waste.

The issue here is that project completion is an inadequate metric of success and leads to a misplaced emphasis during build-phase activity. Far more important than money spent or projects launched is the political advantage produced. Simply put, this phase is not about building infrastructure or delivering services for the local population but about involving it in the process in a manner that creates new allies, confers power to the local leadership and, ideally, improves the

perception of the central government. It follows that counter-insurgents should be careful in taking the lead in the build phase; instead, the challenge is to locate the correct representatives at the community, local and central levels, facilitate agreement on what needs to be done and ensure that ensuing projects are executed in ways that alter local incentives for violence and improve the government's standing.

Regrettably, practice tends to be focused on output rather than outcome, and marked by a tendency to neglect, rather than include, the community. In some cases, this omission stems from linguistic limitations, difficulties in identifying local partners or a lack of security - each of which can inhibit engagement. In others, however, it is because of a critical misunderstanding about what counter-insurgency is all about. As Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson note, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), a US programme for commanders to distribute funds quickly for humanitarian reconstruction projects, initially demanded only two signatures for local spending - that of 'the battlespace owner and the PRT (provincial reconstruction team]'.28 When quick progress is needed, these two individuals would then often decide on a project's shape, size and location. The result is that international groups proceed unilaterally, producing, at best, duplication and waste and, at worst, aid projects that are unresponsive to local needs, that raise expectations but are unsustainable, or that reward corruption and poor governance.

In other cases, it is the central government that is excluded. The more complex a project, and the more pressure for its completion, the more likely it is that contractors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) will be brought in to implement it. The danger with depending on outsiders in this manner is that they obviate involvement by the local community and by the state, which stunts the growth of local capability, of central responsiveness, and of the coreperiphery relationship.29 Even PRTs are at risk of becoming 'parallel governance and funding structures, which substitute government functions and

unintentional competition for legitimacy'. 30 Furthermore, working without the state can also mask its lack of interest or buy-in, without which any progress will ultimately be reversed.

Having outsiders proceed in isolation allows for the appearance of swift progress, yet runs counter to long-term effectiveness. As such, counter-insurgents must approach the build phase as a means of connecting local-level projects to the host-nation government in such a way as to create an enduring relationship. This process is typically delicate and protracted. It raises a number of key questions that counter-insurgents must be able to answer as they embark on the build phase; how a state can recover from a legitimacy deficit within a particular community or part of the country; what the modalities of control between centre and periphery will be; and what level of decentralisation is acceptable in this relationship, so that local desires for autonomy are accommodated but communities are nonetheless included within the state. Responding successfully to such questions will require, once more, a detailed political, social and cultural understanding of the societies undergoing

The Fifth Fallacy: The 'Myth of the Village'

discussions of centre-periphery relations, it can be tempting to equate the relative powerlessness of the village, its fragile form of governance, and its distance from the politics of the capital with an essentially benign orientation or innocent mindset. This analytical tendency is particularly common where the state displays predatory behaviour - repression, brutality, corruption - or is simply incompetent. It results in the characterisation of villagers as apolitical, as simple folk, and as wanting most of all to be left alone to their customs and mores. Samuel Popkin calls this the 'myth of the village': the notion that politics at the local level represents some sort of refuge from the politicking, graft and day-to-day venality of the capital.31 The problem with this myth is that it cloaks local-level dynamics that may require urgent redress. Indeed, local politics can be as corrupt, unaccountable and brutal as those of the centre; local mechanisms - be

they councils, justice systems or industry – can be equitable or exploitative, legitimate or coercive.

It follows that the challenge for counter-insurgents is not just about engendering state acceptance at the local level, but ensuring that local leaders can win community support and yield legitimacy. This effort calls for an ability to gauge the behaviour and acceptability of local partners and engage accordingly. Where the local political economy is exploitative and conflict-generating, counter-insurgents will be expected to take action and replace corrupt leaders. If they do not, and if they are perceived to be bolstering such leaders, their 'constituents' will be pushed toward the insurgency and government legitimacy will suffer. Yet elsewhere, illicit or criminal practices may have local legitimacy and counter-insurgents' attempts to establish 'good governance' may then be destabilising. Drug eradication provides a key example. Be it in Colombia or Afghanistan, ill-sequenced or poorly executed efforts to eradicate drug cultivation have unwittingly raised the profitability of narcotics cultivation and deprived poor and desperate farmers of income - both of which benefit the insurgents.32

In other words, counter-insurgency forces must know when to intervene and the likely effects of doing so. To aid engagement, Stephen Jackson suggests a typology of conflict entrepreneurs, conflict opportunists and conflict dependents, 'whose fragile survival livelihoods have become intimately bound up in economic violence and are easily damaged by incautious international responses'.33 Jackson is quick to note that the framework does not imply 'an ethics of intervention': 'that one should care not at all about the fates of conflict entrepreneurs, only a little about those of conflict opportunists, and a good deal about those of dependents'.34 Successful engagement will require establishing contact with the perpetrators of violence or those who have benefited economically from war. Not only can 'conflict entrepreneurs ... provide certain kinds of public goods otherwise notably absent', but more forcefully, the actors most capable of coercion and economic predation are also those most likely to upset a peace that does not account for their interests. The difficulty lies in compelling these violent actors to adapt their strategy in such a way that their interests are met but violence is replaced with peaceful profit-making. As James Cockayne notes, such engagement needs to be more than pragmatic: if, 'as in Bosnia and Afghanistan, the central state's legitimacy is made too dependent on the continuing loyalty and effective performance of actors who are deeply entwined with the illicit economy, we may be setting that state up for corruption, illegitimacy and failure'.35

While working to 'turn' the conflict entrepreneurs, counter-insurgents must also offer their followers sustainable ways out of violence. As Michael Shurkin states, 'The trick is to keep the older, conservative privileged groups on board while bringing newer groups into the political arena without causing the former to feel threatened and the latter to feel overly disappointed. Both have to be given incentives to enter the system and stay in it'.36 Counter-insurgents must therefore be able to discern which individuals are potential partners for peace and which are ripe targets for law enforcement. Again, the need for local understanding looms large - yet as Frances Brown reminds us, 'understanding murky village power structures is challenging on a seven- or twelve-month tour'.37

Policy Implications

Frances Brown points to a broader problem with the clear-hold-build approach to counter-insurgency: Western bureaucracy is not set up for the successful use of this model.38 The states that engage in foreign polities do not foster the knowledge needed to understand non-state actors, informal politics and local-level economics.39 To some degree, the problem is a fixation on the state - the capital - at the expense of the periphery, while, to an extent, the issue in counterinsurgency is an overriding focus on the insurgents, at the expense of other actors whose actions and loyalties can be as critical to success. Finally, time pressures, career incentives and personnel policies also discourage the development of the type of understanding needed for effective intervention, resulting in templates being unquestioningly imported from previous experiences or unchecked assumptions determining policy.⁴⁰

The lack of local understanding has resulted in ad-hoc measures to fill the gap. The US military has experimented with human terrain teams and the UK with its Defence Cultural Specialist Unit. These structures were devised mid-stream to provide commanders with the necessary understanding of the ethnographic, cultural, political and economic aspects of the society in which they were operating. Some of these ad-hoc solutions have worked fairly well, but they also tend to suffer from the problems typical improvisation: uneven capacity, scale, training and co-ordination.41 If Western states are serious about their expeditionary ambitions, it would be more prudent to address shortcomings in understanding and capability through concerted institutional reform.

This raises the question of where these capabilities should reside. The armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and other expeditionary NATO powers have demonstrated an ability to learn from and adapt during ongoing operations. As a result, doctrine for counter-insurgency and for clearhold-build operations has improved dramatically over the course of the last decade. Still, it is questionable whether these armed forces are capable of developing the wide range of skills and knowledge required for the associated tasks. The issue goes beyond the typical constraints on bureaucratic change, and touches upon a deeprooted unwillingness on the part of many Western armies to upset the existing structures and capabilities of the armed forces. Indeed, despite ten years of intense engagement with counter-insurgency, neither the US nor the UK military has made the fundamental realignments necessary in force structure, budget allocation and education - to prepare for irregular war or for the 'full-spectrum operations' or 'hybrid threats' spoken of in doctrine.42

A common reaction to this conundrum is to point to the special operations forces as the institution most suited to counter-insurgency.⁴³ There is

merit to this argument, given the unique competences of the special operations community. The comparative, if still tentative, success of Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan provides one example of how future campaigns may be conducted. This programme. formalised in 2010, relies upon a select number of special operations forces 'to establish trust-based relationships and then work and live with villagers in strategically important rural areas', to establish security, encourage local governance and create 'opportunities for economic development'.44 The point here would be to send fewer but better-trained troops, who can work through and with local structures and enable them to take the lead. Yet for all the advantages of smaller, more specialised engagement, it should also be clear that elite units cannot easily be produced en masse; they are 'special' precisely because they constitute a minority. Beyond such questions of scale and availability, this approach also relies upon having a partner with whom to collaborate: it is, for example, questionable whether a small-footprint approach similar to VSO could have worked in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003 or in other similar 'post-conflict' settings.

If the military is deployed in future counter-insurgency campaigns, it should ideally be accompanied by civilians capable of taking the lead in governance, development and other matters typically seen as beyond the military's remit. Given the broad swathe of skills necessary for clear-hold-build, what would be needed is a force comprising both military and civilian expertise and both analytical and practical skills. Yet this vision is far removed from the current situation on the ground. As is now well known, the lack of resources, authorities and deployability among civilian agencies - not to mention the lack of institutional interest in working with the military in conflict zones - have all drastically limited the civilian footprint in theatre.45 The result is that the military is burdened with more civilian tasks, even though it does not necessarily receive the required instruction and training to enable it to succeed in carrying them out. There are also deeper problems afoot, relating to organisational culture and the poor co-ordination between military and civilian personnel even in theatre. Civilian staff and military personnel have different priorities and, on occasion, focus; information-sharing is hampered by institutional parochialism and security concerns; and timelines differ, both in terms of the period spent in theatre and expectations regarding the pace of progress. For all of these reasons, the follow-up and seamless civil-military co-ordination required for the successful implementation of the clear-holdbuild approach is often found wanting. The implications of this finding should weigh heavily on those powers with expeditionary ambitions, as it points to a need for a hybrid civil-military body that is able to overcome these constraints.

A more fundamental requirement is to formulate a clear strategy that aligns ends, ways and means. The confusion in Afghanistan - both among allies and between government departments is whether the intervention was, and continues to be, conducted in order to build an Afghan state, to counter Al-Qa'ida, to curb the drug trade or to build schools for girls. Greater clarity on the reasons for fighting would also help to provide a much-needed focus to the build phase, and to the counterinsurgency effort more generally, so that activities can be prioritised and approached accordingly. The alternative

 muddling through with no unified sense of purpose – will produce waste, contradiction and, typically, collapse.

Conclusion

There is a disconcertingly large gap between the intuitive logic of clearhold-build and its complexity in practice. Whereas the approach is universal in its most basic form, its implementation in theatre is intensely political and contextspecific. Each oil- or ink-spot requires counter-insurgents to form a unique relationship with the local community and to find ways of tying it to the state in whose name the counter-insurgency is being waged. This challenge calls for a careful understanding of local-level politics, fears, aspirations and interests. Commanders must be able to locate the drivers of conflict and tailor activity accordingly. A final variable, on which doctrine is mostly silent, is the possibility that the central government whose legitimacy is at stake is disinterested in the types of reforms deemed necessary for progress. Unless such attitudes can be changed, progress will be slow and probably transient.

For all this, clear-hold-build can still be helpful as a strictly heuristic device, used to explore the likely challenges of counter-insurgency – and of other military intervention geared toward stabilisation and conflict resolution. By addressing the types of difficulties covered in this article,

the doctrine can be of tremendous help in pointing commanders toward the right questions. The answers, however, can only be found through careful study of the case at hand. Even then, and with the best possible understanding, there may be a need for greater modesty about what can be achieved, particularly where capabilities are lacking and local partners are unwilling. Most fundamentally, like any operational concept, clear-hold-build is nothing without a resourced and comprehensive strategy; in its absence, it — and counter-insurgency — will fail.

David H Ucko is an associate professor at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University. He is the author of Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare (Columbia University Press, 2013), The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Warfare (Georgetown University Press, 2009), and co-editor of Reintegrating Armed Groups after Conflict (Rautledge, 2009).

This article draws on research conducted for the RAND Corporation's Insurgency Research Board. The views expressed in this article are those of the outhor and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

Notes


- 1 Clear-hold-build garners more attention, in terms of numbers of pages, than any other approach in US, UK and NATO counter-insurgency doctrine. See US Army and Marine Corps, Field Manual No. 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2006), pp. 5-18-S-25; British Army, Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms, Part 10: Countering Insurgency (Warminster, Land Warfare Centre: 2009), pp. 4-12-4-16; NATO, AJP-3.4.4, 'Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)', 2009, pp. 5-13-5-18. The latter manual even frames it as 'the NATO preferred operational approach to COIN', p. S-13.
- 2 Joseph-Simon Galliéni, Neuf ans à Modogoscor (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1908), p. 49 – author's translation. For context, see Thomas Rid, 'The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine', Journal of Strategic Studies (Vol. 33, No. 5, October 2010), pp. 750–51.
- 3 Curt Tarnoff, 'Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance', Congressional Research Service, 12 August 2010, p. 1.
- 4 British Army, Countering Insurgency, pp. 5–18.
- 5 CTC-A, 'A Counterinsurgent's Guidebook', version 2, Camp Julien, Afghanistan, November 2011, p. 38.

- 6 Dexter Filkins, 'Afghan Offensive is New War Model', New York Times, 12 February 2010.
- 7 Dion Nissenbaum, 'McChrystal Calls Marjah a "Bleeding Ulcer" in Afghan Campaign', McClotchy, 24 May 2010.
- 8 See Frances Z Brown, 'The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance: Lessons for Transition', United States Institute for Peace Special Report No. 316, September 2012, p. 6.
- Nissenbaum, 'McChrystal Calls Marjah a "Bleeding Ulcer" in Afghan Campaign'.
- 10 US Army and Marine Corps, Field Monuol No. 3-24, p. 5-21.


- 11 Contrast, for example, the US Army's Field Manual No. 3-24 (published in 2006) and the British counter-insurgency manual of 2009.
- 12 International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government?', Middle East Report No. 33, 27 October 2004, p. 7.
- 13 Mats Berdal, Building Peace after Wor, Adelphi Paper No. 147 (Abingdon: Routledge for IISS, 2009), p. 126.
- 14 ICG, 'Iraq', p. 13. See also George Packer, The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq (London: Faber & Faber, 2006), p. 297. There were, as always, exceptions: for example the experience of the 101" Airborne Division in Mosul in 2003–04.
- 15 Martine van Biljert, 'Between Discipline and Discretion', Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Briefing Paper Series, May 2009, p. S.
- 16 See Ken Menkhaus, 'Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping', International Security (Vol. 31, No. 3, Winter 2006/07).
- 17 See David H Ucko, 'The Role of Economic Instruments in Ending Conflict: Priorities and Constraints', Report on IISS Roundtable, National Press Club, Washington DC, 6 May 2009, p. 9.
- 18 Mats Berdal and David Keen, 'Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications', Millennium (Vol. 26, No. 3, 1997), p. 797.
- 19 Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: States Collapse ond the Threat of Terrorism, Adelphi Paper No. 364 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 11.
- 20 Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, 'Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan', Feinstein International Center, January 2012, p. 37.
- 21 Ryan Evans, 'The Qualified Success of Southwest Babaji', Human Terrain Team AF25, 12 May 2011, p. 26. See also Fishstein and Wilder, 'Winning Hearts and Minds?', p. S4.
- 22 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'Stabilisation Quick Impact Projects – QIPs', Stabilisation Unit, London, p. 19.

- 23 The 'do no harm' approach stems from Mary B Anderson, Da No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
- 24 See, respectively, US Army and Marine Corps, Field Manual No. 3-24, p. 1-27; British Army, Countering Insurgency, p. 3-16.
- 25 Evans, 'The Qualified Success of Southwest Babaji', p. 5.
- 26 Leon Trotsky, trans. Max Eastman, The History of the Russian Revolution (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2008), p. 353. 1 am thankful to Ryan Evans for alerting me to this source.
- 27 Fishstein and Wilder, 'Winning Hearts and Minds?', pp. S7–S8; Berdal, Building Peace after War, p. 129.
- 28 Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson, 'The Commander as Investor: Changing CERP Practices', PRISM (Vol. 2, No. 2, March 2011), p. 121.
- 29 Jamie Boex and Charles Cadwell,
 'The Effectiveness of the State,
 Intergovernmental Relations, and the
 Success or Failure of the International
 Strategy in Afghanistan', Policy Brief,
 Urban Institute Center on International
 Development and Governance, February
 2010, p. 4. See also the experience of
 US Army Colonel Christopher Kolenda in
 northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan, as
 recounted in Ucko, 'The Role of Economic
 Instruments in Ending Conflict', p. 7.
- 30 Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022, "Winning "Hearts and Minds" in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations', 11–14 March 2010, p. 14.
- 31 Samuel Popkin, as cited in D Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 125. See also Berdal, Building Peace after War, p. 127.
- 32 This dynamic can be seen in Colombia and in Afghanistan. See, respectively, Karen Balletine and Heiko Nitzschke, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict', in Robert Picciotto and Rachel Weaving (eds), Security and Development: Investing in Peace and Prosperity (Abingdon:


- Routledge, 2006), p. 164, and Evans, 'The Qualified Success of Southwest Babaji', p. 19.
- 33 Stephen Jackson, 'Protecting Livelihoods in Violent Economies', in Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke (eds), Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 165.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 See Ucko, 'The Role of Economic Instruments in Ending Conflict', p. S.
- 36 In Michael Shurkin, 'Subnational Government in Afghanistan', Occasional Paper, RAND, 2011, p. 2.
- 37 Brown, 'The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance', p. 14.
- 38 Ibid., p. 16.
- 39 See, for example, Major-General Michael Flynn's assessment of US intelligence in Afghanistan, in Michael Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul D Batchelor, 'Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan', Voices from the Field series, Center for a New American Security, January 2010, p. 7.
- 40 Berdal, Building Peace ofter War, p. 29.
- 41 David H Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2D13), p. 120.
- 42 For the US and UK experiences, see respectively David H Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Ero: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), and Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis.
- 43 See, for example, Thomas Henriksen, Afghoniston, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2010).
- 44 Robert Hulslander and Jake Spivey, 'Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police', PRISM (Vol. 3, No. 3, June 2012), pp. 128–29.
- 45 Thomas S Szayna, Derek Eaton et al., Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).

















- trafficking, piracy, armed groups, and other sources of instability Create integrated and comprehensive strategies, policies (and laws), and campaign plans for addressing contemporary security
- Operate effectively across the broad spectrum of conflict, to include traditional war, hybrid contingencies, as well as against irregular and asymmetric threats or in counterinsurgency and stability operations
- Anticipate emerging threats and evolving chellenges; remain careerlong learners
- Integrate globally with a range of partners and lead teams as part of joint, inter-agency, multi-national, or international security efforts



التعليم القائم على النتانج تسعى كلية شؤون امنية دولية الى خلق خريجيين الذين لديهم تفكير استراتيجي و قادرين على: فهم البيئة الامتية المعاصرة , التشمل: من مهم البيان المسلمين و الشار أمام المسلمين ال صياعة استراتيجيت متكفلة و تدفقة و السياست و القرآئن و غلط لعملات لتمدي التحديات الاسئية ﴿ المعاصرة، سيسمره. للعل بما طبق عبر سلسلة والمثل من الصراعات انتشال العرب التقايلية ، الطوار و نو طابع متعد. التهديدات غير نقامية و غير متدفحة أو في مطلحة الارهاء و عدم الاستقرار توقع تهديدات و التعنيات للفاحة ، و عن طلب اعظم على مدر طويل. الانتماج علميا مع مجمرعة من الشركاء و اللوق الرائدة في اطار مشترك بين الوكالات، و متحد جنسيفتر او جهود امنية عقلية.


























- Normally Wednesdays from 0900-1015
- · Mandatory Attendance for Students:
 - Service Class A Uniform for military
 - Business Professional for civilian
- Follow on student-led seminar 1030-1130 (executed in Phase I seminars with Phase I faculty)
- · President's Lecture Series-
- 3x per month
- Chancellor's Lecture Series monthly as schedule allows



منتدى القيادة الاستراتيجية يبدأعادة أيام أربعاء من ساعة 9 الى 10:15. الحظور الزامي للطلاب: ملابس درجة أولى للسكريس. ملابس رسية للطنين . و بليه ندوة للطلاب من ساعة 10:30 الى 11:30 تطبيق المرحلة – الاولى للمحاضرات مع مرحلة أولى الكلية. سلسلة محاضرات المستشار حسب الوقت. •




























































التعليم القائم على النتائج

تسعى كلية شؤون امنية دولية الى غلق خريجيين النين لديهم تلكير استراتيجي و قادين على:
على: فهم البينة المعاصرة التثمل :
الإمطال الفيل المنية المعاصرة التثمل المدينة المعالم المعارف المعار


























- Normally Wednesdays from 0900-1015
- · Mandatory Attendance for Students:
 - Service Class A Uniform for military
 - Business Professional for civillan
- Follow on student-led seminar 1030-1130 (executed in Phase I seminars with Phase I faculty)
- · President's Lecture Series
 - 3x per month
- Chancellor's Lecture Series monthly as schedule allows

المرحلة الاولى: أساسيات لقيادة أستر اتيجية

السفيات لقيادة استر اتيجية:

السفيات لقيادة استر اتيجية:

المرف على المنظرات و القليد للآدة .

المنافة المناوة المناوة المناوة الماسرة .


المنافة المناوة المناوة المناوة المنافة المناصرة .

المنافة المناوة المناوة المناوة المنافة المناصرة .

المنافة المناوة المناوة المناوة المنافة المنافق المنافق


منتدى القيادة الاستراتيجية يبدأعادة أيام أربعاء من ساعة 9 الى 10:15. الحظور الزامي للطلاب: الحظور الزامي للطلاب: ملابس درجة أولى للسكرتين. ملابس دمعية المدين . ملابس دمعية المدين . و يليه ندوة للطلاب من مباعة 10:30 الى 10:30 المي المحاضرات مع مرحلة أولى الكلية. المداخرات مع مرحلة أولى الكلية. محاضرات شهريا. • ماسلة محاضرات للمستقدار حصب الوقت. •

























































































Destroying all the religious places.

Requiring the women to wear veils and gowns and have decency and not to get out of their houses unless they have necessity according to (Islamic legislation).

Bauning the trading drinking alcohol, drugs, and smoking.

No statute to remain and all graves shall be destroyed. Any one who works with the government and the military troops and police forces will be killed.


The door of redemption is open for those who need It is owe allocate places to receive the repentant.










































National Defense University



Mr. Daniel Magalotti
International Student Management Office
4 November 2015

Imagine, Create, and Secure a Stronger Peace...



U.S. Professional Military Educational Institutions





| Years o | | Rank | | | | | | | Course <u>Duration</u> |
|---------|---|------|---|-----------|---|---|--|--|---------------------------|
| 27-30 | * | ** | PINNACLE & KEYSTONE | } 2 pe | er year | | | | 1 WK |
| 24-30 | | * | CAPSTONE | | | | | | 2 WK 5 WKS |
| 16-23 | * | Y | NATIONAL EISENHOWER CISA I WAR SCHOOL (P | RMC | MARINE WAR OLLEGE | COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE | AIR WAR COLLEGE | ARMY WAR COLLEGE | 10 MOS |
| 12-23 | * | Y | JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE | CC | MARINE CORPS DMMAND ID STAFF OLLEGE | NAVY COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE | AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE | ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF | 3-10 MOS |
| 1-8 | | | | EXPE W | MARINE CORPS DITIONARY ARFARE CHOOL | NAVY SCHOOLS FOR SURFACE, SUBMARINE, OR AVIATION | AIR FORCE SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL | ARMY BRANCH SCHOOL | 3-6 MOS |
| | | | JOINT | M | ARINE ORPS | NAVY | AIR FORCE | ARMY | |

Service Schools



National Defense University Mission



National Defense University supports the joint warfighter by providing rigorous Joint Professional Military Education to members of the U.S. Armed Forces and select others to develop leaders who have the ability to operate and creatively think in an unpredictable and complex world.





Chain of Command





Dr. Ashton Carter Secretary of Defense



Gen Joseph Dunford Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



LtGen Thomas Waldhauser Director J7, Joint Force Development





MajGen Frederick Padilla President, National Defense University



NDU's Strategic Stakeholders























Strategic Guidance



We will update the joint PME curriculum across the force to emphasize key leader attributes.

We will explore how best to adapt our learning institutions to serve a global Joint Force, evaluating degree accreditation and distance-learning delivery methods.

-18th Chairman's 2nd term Strategic Direction to the Joint Force



"Education is a fundamental pillar of leader development, but ... education is only part of the solution"

-CICS Guidonce Memo 28 June 2013

Strategic Leadership

Training

Education


Professional


Experience

Strategic Leadership Creative and Critical Thinking Strategic Aspects of JPME

International Fellows Network







Current CHOD/MINDEF/SECDEF

Current Chief of Service

Key Gov't /Diplomatic Post

- 1800 + Alumni
- 129 countries represented





Students

National War College Fisenhower School for National Security & Resource Strategy College of International Security Affairs Information Resources Management College Joint Forces Staff College

CAPSTONE

Research & Strategic Support

Academic Support

Institutional Support

International Programs & Outreach



Strategic Goals



1. Education and Leader Development:

Educate, develop and inspire national security leaders to meet the nation's needs.

2. Scholarship:

Create, preserve and disseminate knowledge intrinsic to advanced joint education and leader development.

3. Institutional Enablers:

Create integrated solutions and services that support advanced joint education and focus on customer service, collaboration, effectiveness, efficiency, innovation and fiscal responsibility.

4. University Improvement:

Evolve and reform the processes, practices, structures, organization and culture to foster institutional collaboration and integration.





Students

National War College Fisenhower School for National Security & Resource Strategy

College of International Security Affairs Information Resources Management College Joint Forces Staff College

CAPSTONE

Research & Strategic Support

Academic Support

Institutional Support

International Programs & Outreach

Institute for National Strategic Studies

- Center for Technology & National Security Policy
- Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Center for Complex Operations
- Center for Strategic Research
- Center for Study of Chinese Military Affairs

NDU Press





Students

National War College Eisenhower School for National Security & Resource Strategy College of International Security Affairs Information Resources Management College Joint Forces Staff College

CAPSTONE

Research & Strategic Support

Academic Support

Institutional Support

International Programs & Outreach

- Registrar

- Libraries

Institutional Research

Ethics

Center for Applied Strategic Learning

Health and Fitness





Students

National War College Eisenhower School for National Security & Resource Strategy College of International Security Affairs Information Resources Management College Joint Forces Staff College

CAPSTONE

Research & Strategic Support

Academic Support

Institutional Support

International Programs & Outreach

- Human Resources
- **Resource Management**
- Information Technology
- **Events**
- Security
- **Facilities**
- **Multimedia Services**
- **Secretariat**





Students

National War College Fisenhower School for National Security & Resource Strategy College of International Security Affairs Information Resources Management College Joint Forces Staff College

CAPSTONE

Research & Strategic Support

Academic Support

Institutional Support

International Programs & Outreach

International Student Management Office –
Strategic Communications –



Components



Students

National War College Eisenhower School for National Security & Resource Strategy College of International Security Affairs Information Resources Management College Joint Forces Staff College

CAPSTONE

Research & Strategic Support

Academic Support


Institutional Support

Programs & Outreach




NDU JPME Student Demographics





Total Students: 378




Total Students: 618



NDU JPME Student Demographics








Faculty Demographics: NDU JPME II Master's Degree Programs



FACULTY DEMOGRAPHICS AY 2014-2015*



^{*}Please note this only includes faculty who teach in JPME II Master's Degree programs



NDU Educational Methodology



Graduate-level Education

- Foster critical, analytical, conceptual thinking
- Small, diverse / interagency classes
- Limited contact hours (13-18 hours/week requiring preparation)
- Emphasis on the core component (70%)
- Use of case studies and simulations

Standards - Integrated Curriculum

- 400-500 pages/week reading
- Seminar discussion
- Research papers
- Frequent Assessments

Accreditation





- Accredited by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (Civilian)
- Accredited by DoD through the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Accreditation Criteria (Military) for all Officer Professional Military Educational Program (OPMEP) Learning Areas





DoD Accreditation Process for Accreditation of Joint Education



- Responds to Congressional guidance to establish strict standards
- Provides CJCS oversight and assessment; mandates currency, fosters improvement
- Modeled on civilian accreditation standards
- PAJE Sequence:
 - Accreditation: Initial PAJE review or after substantive change
 - Reaffirmation: Every 6 years after
 Accreditation
 - Conditional
 Accreditation/Reaffirmation: 1-3 year
 length, situation dependent. Never twice
 in a row.

Legislative Requirements for JPME:

- National Military Strategy
- Planning
- Doctrine
- Command & Control
- Force Requirements & Development
- Operational Contract Support
- National Security Strategy
- Theater Strategy & Campaigning
- Planning
- Joint/Interagency/Multinational Integration



Desired Leader Attributes for JF 2020



- The ability to understand the security environment and the contributions
 of all instruments of national power
- 2. The ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty
- 3. The ability to anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions
- The ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding
- The ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms
- 6. The ability to think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations



2015-16 Curriculum





Planning & Assessment

Develop the individual student assessment and learning plan

6 weeks

Strategic Leader Foundational Course

Phase 1:

Phase 2:

33 weeks

College Core Curricula

- · Cyber (iCollege)
- Irregular Warfare/CT (CISA)
- Joint Campaign Planning (JFSC)
- · National Security (NWC)
- Resourcing & Acquisition Strategy (ES)
- Specialized Studies

Electives

Tailored Leader Development
 Individual Strategic Research Project

Common Academic Calendar

Planning & Assessment

- Empirical feedback from students, faculty and customers for continuous program improvement
- · Graduate career-long learning plan development

3 weeks

Phase 3:

Capstone

- Capstone
 Project
- Career
 Long

Learning

Engaging graduates

National War College






Mission:

Educate future leaders of the Armed Forces, Department of State and other civilian agencies for high-level policy and command and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy.

Curriculum:

- > Strategic Leader Foundation
- The Military Instrument of Statecraft
- The Non-Military Instruments of Statecraft
- > The Global Context
- Overseas Engagement
- US Domestic Context
- Individual Student Research Project
- > Electives





Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy





Mission:

Prepare selected military and civilians for strategic leadership and success in developing our national security strategy and in evaluating, marshalling, and managing

Curriculum:

- Strategic Leader Foundation
- Defense Strategy and Resourcing
- Economics of National Security
- National Security Policy and Strategy
- > Strategic Leadership
- Industry Analytics / Industry Studies
- > Acquisition (Part of DSR)
- > Electives









Mission:

Educate and prepare civilian and military national security professionals and future leaders from the United States and partner nations for the strategic challenges of the contemporary security environment.

Curriculum:

- > Strategic Leader Foundation
- Power, Ideology, & Legitimacy
- Geostrategy
- Policy Analysis and Critical Thirking
- Strategic Thought
- Area of Concentration / Elective
- > Thesis Research

Counterterrorism

Irregular Warfare
International Security Studies
Homeland Security & Defense



Information Resources Management College *iCollege*






Mission:

Prepare military and civilian leaders to direct the information component of national power by leveraging information and information technology for strategic advantage.

Master of Science in Government Information Leadership

Certificates and Concentration Areas:

- Chief Financial Officer Leadership
- · Chief Information Officer
- Chief Technology Officer
- Cyber Leadership
- Cyber Security
- Enterprise Architecture
- · Government Strategic Leadership
- Information Operations
- Information Technology



Joint Forces Staff College








Mission:

Educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives.

JAWS produces world-class warfighters prepared to operate in a fast paced, often chaotic environment.

Curriculum:

- Strategic Leader Foundation
- > Planning
- > History
- Strategy
- > Synthesis
- Exercises and Simulations
- > Research Seminar
- Overseas Field Research



(38 students)

Joint Forces Staff College







Mission:

Educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives.



Joint and Combined Warfighting School



Joint Continuing & Distance Education School


- Advanced Joint Professional Military Education
- Senior Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (ends 9/2015)

Joint Transitions Course

Joint Medical Planners Course

Joint Command, Control and Information Operations School

- Command, Control, Communication, Computers & Intelligence
- Information Operations





Capstone









Capstone is a Congressionally-mandated course, regulated by law; attendance is required within two years of selection.

Capstone ensures newly-selected General and Flag officers:

- Know how to integrate the elements of national power in order to accomplish national security and national military strategies
- Know how joint, interagency, and multinational operations support national strategic goals and objectives
- Appreciate the fundamentals of joint doctrine and the Joint Operational Art

Pinnacle











Pinnacle conveys to prospective joint/combined force commanders an understanding of national policy and objectives with attendant international implications and the ability to operationalize those objectives/policy into integrated campaign plans.

The overarching goal is to set conditions for future success in the joint, combined, and interagency arenas by using advanced knowledge of operational art to underpin the instinct and intuition of the prospective commanders.

Keystone











Keystone educates Command Senior Enlisted Leaders (CSELs) currently serving in or slated to serve in a general or flag officer-level joint headquarters or Service headquarters that could be assigned as a joint task force.

CSELs get an opportunity to visit, receive briefings, interact with and become thoroughly familiar with operations at NDU, JOM in Norfolk, and possibly JIATF-S, SOCOM, CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM.



*

Questions?


Lesson Sensitize the population to what's going on



Minister of Defense of Liberia addresses a crowd on why the new military is necessary

Lesson


Sensitize the population to what's going on



Comic books, radio dramas, and radio interviews helped reach less literate audiences

Lesson Sensitize the population to what's going on





A risk of conflating sensitization and recruitment?

Lesson

Human Rights Vetting is Essential

(yet curiously rarely done...well)

I. Public Records Audit



II. Investigation



III. Public Vetting




Vetting in Liberia was "a notable success – the best, several experts said, they had witnessed anywhere in the world"

International Crisis Group

Liberia: Uneven Progress In Security Sector Reform Africa, Report N°148, 13 January 2009

Recruitment Process



75% attrition rate, first year

Lesson

Contractors are here to stay

Benefits

- Cheaper
- Sometimes better
- Surge capacity
- Innovation
- Specialized skills sets
- Flexible: less beholden to bureaucratic red tape or turf wars

Risks

- Ethical and legitimacy concerns
- Conflicts of interest between client and contractor
- Control and safety of an armed industry
- Moral hazard for policy makers that lower barriers of entry to armed conflict

<u>Lesson</u> Be humble



More Lessons Learned

More Lessons Learned

For the Defense Sector

- It may be necessary to start over and DDR the legacy forces
- Vigorously vet all candidates
- Inculcate respect for the rule of law, human rights norms and international humanitarian law into all levels of training
- Foster allegiance to the constitution rather than an individual leader
- Force structure and doctrine must reflect the country's needs
- Defense-oriented force posture with limited force-projection capability
- Force size constrained by government's ability to pay salaries
- Limited artillery, armor, intelligence, fighter aircraft and special operations
- Smaller, well-trained, volunteer force preferable
- Create a professional culture based on merit
- Eschew ill-fitting foreign templates for doctrine, SOPs etc
- Balanced ethnic mix in the ranks
- Literacy is important

Be humble

Questions?



Sean McFate, PhD

sean.mcfate@gc.ndu.edu

+1.202.685.7770

http://seanmcfate.com



تحول قاطع أمني

دكتور شيان مكفيد أستاذ مشارك في جامعة دفاع وطني زميل الأقدم مستشارية أتلانتك مساعد بروفسور في جامعة جورج تاون مدرسة , شؤون خارجية.

كيفية التحول

كيف نحول جهاز الجيش و الشرطة بشكل كامل من رمز • لأرهاب الى أداة للديمقر اطية؟

كيفية التحول

كيف نستطيع أن نحول شخصية عسكري أو شرطي من أداة • تخويف الأطفال الى شخصية ينظر اليه الأطفال للحماية

كيفية ألتحول

- نزع سلاح, تسريح, إعادة الأدماج
 - إصلاح القاطع الأمني •
- توطيد إحتكار دولة للقوة لدعم سيادة قانون •

كيفية ألتحول

لا ندرس موضوع نزع سلاح, تسريح, إعادة الأدماج •

كيفية التحول

- بناء قدرة مشتركة •
- تحويل قاطع أمني •
- [إصلاح قاطع أمني]
 - مساعدة قوات أمنية •
- الدفاع الخارجي, الداخلي •

إصلاح القاطع الأمني

إن تحويل القاطع الأمني هو مهمة معقدة, خصوصا الى قاطع • مهني, مؤثر, شرعي, غير سياسي, و قاطع مسؤول الذي مهني, مؤثر شرعي, غير سياسي و قاطع مسؤول الذي يساند تطبيق سيادة القانون.

القاطع الأمني •

هو عبارة عن منظمات و مؤسسات التي تقوم بحماية الدولة و • مواطنيها من التهديدات الأمنية.

تصنيف القاطع الأمني

- هيئات الرقابة: •
- تنفيذي, مجلس العموم او البرلمان. •
- المؤسسات التي تشرف على الجهات الأمنية: •
- وزارة الداخلية, وزارة الدفاع, وزارة العدل. •
- الجهات الفعلية التي في تماس مباشر مع المواطنين:
- القوات المسلحة, الشرطة, حرس الحدود, قوات تابعة لدائرة الهجرة, النح. النح السجون النح.
- ملاحظة: لا تعتبر القوات الأمنية الغير قانونية مثل امراء الحرب, ميليشيات, الأرهابيين جزأ من القوات الأمنية و إنما لا بد من نزع سلاحهم, و تسريحهم ثم ادماجهم بالمواطنين.

الإطار التحليلي للقاطع الأمني

- القاطع الأمني الفرعي للجيش هي قوات عسكرية و جهات تطبيقية هي: قوات عسكرية, قوات دفاع مدني, قوات حرس وطني, ميليشيات, و برلمانيون. اما الجهات المؤسساتية الفاعلة فهي: وزارة الدفاع و الجهات المراقبة هي: الجهات التنفيذية, التشريعية, مع البرلمان
- اما الجهات التطبيقية للقاطع الأمني الفرعي للشرطة هي: شرطة,قوات حماية السجون, قوات عدلية جنائية, حرس رئاسي اما الجهات المؤسساتية الفاعلة فهي: وزارة الداخلية و وزارة العدل. و الجهات المراقبة هي: الجهات التنفيذية, التشريعية, العدلية, برلمان, قواطع البلديات الحكومية, و الجهات المستشارين.
- و بالنسبة الى الجهات التطبيقية لقوات تنظيم الحدود فهي: السيطرة على الحدود, الهجرة, خفر السواحل, سلطات الجمارك. اما الجهات المؤسساتية الفاعلة فهي: وزارة الداخلية و وزارة الدفاع. و جهات مراقبة: الجهات التنفيذية و التشريعية و البرلمان و العدلية وقواطع البلديات الحكومية و مستشارين. و كذلك القاطع الأمني الفرعي للعلاقات الخارجية: السفارات, الملحقيات و ضباط الأرتباط الأمني و جهات مؤسساتية فاعلة: وزارة الخارجية و وزارة الدفاع. و أما الجهات المراقبة: جهات تنفيذية, تشريعية, برلمان. وأخير آ القاطع الأمني الفرعي للاستخبارات هي مصادر من الجهات المتحالفة. و جهات مؤسساتية فاعلة: وكالات إلاستخبارات, و يراقبون من مصادر من الجهات المتحالفة. و جهات مؤسساتية فاعلة: وكالات التنفيذية, التشريعة, و البرلمان.

دروس من ساحات

درس: إصلاح القاطع الأمني هو إجراء اكثر من تدريب و تسليح

إصلاح القاطع الأمني هي عبارة عن عملية سياسية عميقة لا بد من اتمامها • بالشراكة مع الدولة المعنية بالاصلاح.

أن العملية التقنية لوحدها لا تنجح.

إنها عملية شاملة و معقدة هناك مثالين لذلك:

لا بد ان يرتبط بعملية إصلاح المالية و محتاج جيش من الاختصاصيين و دمج المدنيين للتدريب.

كيفية التحول

- تدريبات تكتيكية: تعلم كيف تطلق النار. •
- تدريبات مدنية: تعلم على من تطلق الرصاص و لماذا.

درس: توعية سكان بماذا يحدث

تقوم وزارة الدفاع الايبيرية بتحدث مع الناس حول سبب • ضرورة وجود جيش جديد.

درس: توعية الناس حول الأحداث

توعية الناس من خلال كتب مصورة, المسلسلات الاذاعية, و • المقابلات الاذاعية يساهم في توعية الناس الأميين.

درس: توعية الناس حول الأحداث

خطر الخلط بين النوعية و التوظيف. •

درس : التدقيق في مراعات حقوق الأنسان امر ضروري. [قلما أشياء الغريبة

- عولج بشكل صحيح].
 - 1- مراجعة السجلات العامة.
 - 2- قيام بالتحقيقات.
 - 3- قيام بالتدقيق العام.

برأي اكثرية الخبراء عملية التدقيق في ليبريا كانت عملية ناجحة ما كان لها مثيل في العالم حسب تقرير من قبل مراقبيين في جماعة الأزمات الدولية.

إجراءات التوظيف

بعد المرور بالمراحل التالية من كل 100 مرشحين 75 منهم • يفشلون و المراحل: حملات عامة , مرشحين يقدمون طلبهم بالترشيح, الفحص البدني, إمتحان القراءة و الكتابة, فحوصات طبية, تدقيق , مجلس الترقية المشترك, مجلس مراجعة المشترك, قبول المرشح.

درس: بقاء المقاولون بشكل دائم

- الفوائد: أرخص, أحسن بعض مرات, القدرة على تدخل سريع, إبتكار, مجموعة من المهارات المتخصصة, مرونة: أقل بيروقراطية أو إلتزام.
- أما المخاطر: المخاوف ألشرعية و ألاخلاقية, تصادم المصالح بين المقاول و ألمكول, سيطرة و سلامة صناعة الأسلحة, مخاوف معنوية, ألخطر الأخلاقي لصناع السياسة و التي تؤدي الى خفض الحواجز لدخول في صراعات مسلحة.

دروس أكثر

- إنه من الضروري أن نبدأ من جديد و نجعل من عملية نزع سلاح و تسريح و دمج للمجتمع إرثا للقوات غير نظامية.
 - القيام بعملية تدقيق المرشحين بنشاط أكثر.
- غرس ألاحترام لسيادة القانون و معايير حقوق ألانسان و القانون الدولي في كل مراحل التدريب. تعزيز الولاء للدستور و ليس للأفراد.
 - لابد أن ينعكس عقيدة و هيكلية القوات المسلحة إحتياجات البلاد.
 - تضيق قدرة القتالية للبلد بحيث يسيطر على الداخل و ليس لها قوة للتصادم خارج البلاد.
 - قوات مدفعية محدودة, دروع, إستخبارات, طائرات مقاتلة, و عمليات قتالية خاصة.
 - يفضل وجود قوات متطوعة صغيرة عددا و لكن مدربة بشكل جيد.
 - إصنع تراث مهنى مبنية على جدارة.
 - تجنب معلومات اجنبية مسيئة للعقيدة.
 - تحقيق التوازن بين خليط عرقى في الرتب العسكرية.
 - محو الأمية عملية مهمة.

هل هناك أي أسئلة؟



Security Sector Transformation

Sean McFate, PhD

Associate Professor, National Defense University

Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service



How exactly does one transform the military and police from a symbol of terror into an instrument of democracy?

How does one transform a soldier and policeman from a person a child runs away from in fear to a person a child runs toward for protection?

Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR)

+ Security Sector Reform (SSR)

consolidates a state's monopoly of force to uphold its rule of law

we're going to skip DDR...

Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)

Security Sector Transformation (SST)

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Security Force Assistance (SFA)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

the complex task of transforming the security sector into a professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable sector that supports the rule of law.

Security Sector

those organizations and institutions that safeguard the state and its citizens from security threats

Taxonomy of the Security Sector

Oversight Executive, Bodies congress or parliament Institutions **Ministry of Interior** that manage **Ministry of Defense** security actors **Ministry of Justice** Operational actors in Armed forces, law direct contact with the enforcement, border population control. immigration, prisons, etc.

Note:

non-statutory security forces (e.g., warlords, militias, terrorists) are not a part of the security sector by definition and should be 'DDRed'

Analytical Framework of the Security Sector

| Security Sub- Sector | Operational Actors | Institutional Actors | Oversight Actors Executive, Legislative, Parliament | |
|-------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| Military | Military, civil defence forces, national guards, militias, paramilitary | Ministry of Defence | | |
| Law Enforcement | Police, gendarmerie, prison, criminal justice, presidential guard | Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice | Executive, Legislative, Parliament, Judiciary, Municipal and District | |
| Border Management | Border control, immigration, coast guard, customs authorities | Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence | Governments and Councils | |
| Foreign Relations | Embassies, attachés and security liaison officers | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence | Executive, Legislative, Parliament | |
| Intelligence | Collection assets | Intelligence agencies | | |

Lessons from the Field



Lesson

SSR is more than 'train & equip'

•SSR is a deeply political process that must be accomplished in partnership with the country undergoing the reform

•Purely technical manner will not succeed


- •Inherently comprehensive and complex effort (2 examples):
 - -Must be tied to Financial Ministry reforms
 - -Army of privates
 - -Integrate civics into training



Tactical training: Know how to shoot





Civics training: Knowing who to shoot and why














































































Force/Barrier Purchases

Government: Max 12 forces on board; cost of force is \$6 (start in capital city); cost of barrier is \$6, cost to move barrier is \$3; barriers go in capital city or in the brown areas only.

<u>Insurgent:</u> Max of 10 forces on board; cost of force is \$6 (start in insurgent base OR any area on the board that is fully enclosed by insurgent barriers; cost of barrier is \$6, cost to move barrier is \$3.

Movement Rules:

Government: Forces may move in any cardinal direction: up, down, left, or right (NOT diagonal). Number of moves = number forces on board x 2. No requirement to use all moves; unused moves are forfeited.

Insurgent: Forces may move in any direction: up, down, left, right or diagonal. Insurgent team loses the ability to move diagonally (includes force strength calculation) if the Government holds the Governance and Rule of Law objective. Number of moves = number forces on board x 2. No requirement to use all moves; unused moves are forfeited.

Turn Overview:

Insurgent:

- 1. Purchase forces and/or barriers
- 2. Move forces and then adjudicate combat (combat is adjudicated after the insurgent player has completed all movement)
- 3. Resource Collection
- 4. Adjust the Popular Support Tracker

Government:

- Pay \$1 per force Note: If the government CANNOT pay all of its forces because it does not have enough funds, a die roll determines the status of each unpaid force in the following way:
 - Roll 1 or 2: No change, force remains on the board as is
 - Roll 3 or 4: Force deserts and is removed from the board
 - Roll 5 or 6: Force defects. The blue force is removed from the board and a red force is placed in its former position
- 2. Purchase forces and/or barriers
- Move forces and adjudicate combat (combat is initiated when two forces attempt to occupy the same square. Be sure to make all desired movements before initiating combat, as this will immediately begin the combat phase, and all unused moves are surrendered)
- 4. Resource Collection
- 5. Adjust the Popular Support Tracker



Winning Conditions:

Government: 65 popular support resources or eliminate all insurgent forces on the board.

<u>Insurgent:</u> 26 popular support resources, or force the government out of the Capital City, or eliminate the government forces entirely.

Set-Up:

Government: Total of six (6) blue forces; two (2) forces must start within the Capital City.

<u>Insurgent:</u> Total of (6) red forces; two (2) forces must start within the boundaries of the insurgent bases.

<u>Both:</u> Each team has four (4) remaining forces, which are placed on any vacant "X" square. For the remaining forces, the government player places one, followed by the insurgent player, alternating this pattern until all forces have been placed. Two forces cannot occupy the same square on the board.

Resource Collections

Government: Start with \$6, but must pay forces \$1 per force, per turn.

Earn \$1 for each green "resource" square occupied or touching an occupied square. Government forces may collect the resource in the squares they occupy, plus any resource in each surrounding square (up, down, left, right and diagonal). The following are exceptions: If an insurgent barrier lies between the government force and an adjacent resource, the barrier prevents the government from collecting that resource, and for each turn cycle, each square can offer only one resource. This means that if an insurgent force has already collected a resource from a specific square in the first part of the turn cycle, the government cannot collect that resource in the second half of the turn cycle. If a government player surrounds an area of the capital city with friendly barriers, it may gain ALL resources within that enclosure as long as at least one government force in the enclosed area.


Insurgent: Start with \$0; earn a resource of \$1 per green "resource" square if it is occupied by an insurgent force (even if the force is enclosed by government barriers) or if it is enclosed by insurgent barriers. If an insurgent player surrounds an area of an objective base with friendly barriers, it may gain ALL resources within that enclosure as long as at least one insurgent force remains in the enclosed area.

Popular Support Collection:

Popular support is NOT cumulative—at the beginning of each turn, popular support for both players returns to zero (0). Popular support is counted by each yellow "popular support" square occupied by a force or within an area enclosed with friendly barriers (with at least 1 force in the area).

Objective Base Controls

| Objective Base | If Controlled by Government | Roll die at the start of turn and collect the number of monetary resources indicated by die roll | | |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Economic Opportunity | Roll die at the start of turn and collect the number of monetary resources indicated by die roll | | | |
| Governance and Rule of Law | and Rule of ability to move diagonally | None | | |
| Infrastructure Development | Total allotted moves increases by six per turn | Total allotted moves increases by six per turn | | |
| Messaging | Cost of purchasing new forces decreases from \$6 to \$3 | Cost of purchasing new forces decreases from \$6 to \$3 | | |
| Provision of Services | Add +7 Popular Support | Add +7 Popular Support | | |
| Security | Add +1 to force strength during combat | Add +1 to force strength during combat | | |



Combat Results Table:1

This table provides the odds of winning any particular battle.

Government: Insurgent

- 1.) G1: Government player loses 1 unit and loses % of resources in hand (round down)
- 2.) G2: Government player loses up to 2 attacking units** and loses % of resources in hand (round down); Loss of 1 associated barrier (if applicable, attacker selects which barrier to remove*)
- 3.) GR: Government units involved in combat retreat to any unoccupied 'X' on the board and lose of % resources in hand (round down)
- 4.) DRAW: Attacking force retreats to position occupied at the beginning of the turn
- 5.) 11: Insurgent player loses 1 unit and loses ¼ of resources in hand (round down)
- 6.) 12: Insurgent player loses up to 2 defending units** and loses ¼ of resources in hand (round down); Loss of 1 associated barrier (if applicable, defender selects which barrier to remove*)
- 7.) IR: Insurgent units involved in combat retreat to any unoccupied 'X' on the board and lose of ¼ resources in hand (round down)
- ***For all possible scenarios not included in the chart above, round to the disadvantage of the roller.

| Die Rolf\ ODDS | 1:4; 1:3; 2:5 (-) | 1:2 | 2:3; 3:4 | 1:1 | 4:3; 3:2 | 2:1 | 5:2; 3:1; 4:1 (+) |
|----------------|-------------------|-----------|----------|------|----------|------|----------------------|
| 1 | 1R | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| 2 | DRAW | IR | IR | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 |
| 3 | GR | DRAW | DRAW | IR | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| 4 | G1 | GR | DRAW | DRAW | IR | 11 | 11 |
| 5 | G1 | G1 | GR | DRAW | DRAW | IR | 11 |
| 6 | G2 | G2 | G1 | GR | GR | DRAW | IR |


¹ If all forces within a base are defeated, any barriers that remain after adjudication are left in place. If multiple forces are eliminated in combat, the first force to be removed will be the force in the contested square. The second force will be selected by the loser.






Humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan


RAED ALBDOUR













The refugee crisis in Jordan

- Flordan is host to about 1.4 million Syrians
- Around 630,000 refugees officially registered

While some 83 per cent of all refugees have settled in host communities, particularly in the urban area of Amman and the northern governorates of Jordan

- > 17 per cent are hosted in refugee camps (Za'atry , Azraq and EIC camps)
- By October 2015, roughly US\$1.03 billion had been committed to the JRP2015, which corresponds to 34 per cent of the funding requirements.




Jordan humanitarian response


- Jordanian government has kept the border open to refugees fleeing for safety.
- The attitude of the Jordanian authorities, and of the Jordanian population, to the influx of Syrian rafugees has been largely welcoming.
- > Syrian refugees have been allowed to settle in Jordan's cities.
- Registered refugees have also been allowed to access government services on essentially the same terms as fordanian citizens
- At the community level, many Jordanian families have opened their houses to Syrian refugees with tribal, kinship and familial connections
- Syrians no N account for 7% of the country's population.




Impact of Influx of Syrian Refugees on **Host Communities**

- Health care, Syrians in public hospitals has increased dramatically by almost 250%
- Housing Cost of living for Jordanians has increased considerably, especially for
- Employment , Labor market
- Education
- -Social










fordanian Armed Forces response to the Syrian

- Protection the reference on the crusting points
- ≥Illegal prossing terroist groups.
- Receiving the refuges and do the registration (Rabas al Sarhan)
- Medical care for the wounded and the sick people
- Provide the basic needs to all refugee at the crossing points.
- . Host the refugee in the designated area until transfer to the camps.
- Escort the refugee to the camps.
- Frovide the protection within the camps (in cooperate with the Police forces)
- Escort and protect all UN and NGOs convoys carrying refugee needs



Syrian Refugees Crises Refugees Triage

- Jordanian Armed forces doctrine supports a system to make
- At crossing points, Refugees are assessed and assisted by JBGF soldiers qualified as Tactical Medics along with JRMS medical personnel
- At Clinics, causalities are triaged and primary Health Care
- Medevac to the nearest Government Hospital if medical intervention required







Contextual Background

- * War in Syria entering fifth year with no predictable resolution in the near future
- * 80% of Syrian refugees in Jordan live outside camps
- * Disproportionate humanitarian response focusing on camp activities
- Infrastructure within host communities, strained even before Syrian crisis, unable to cope
- Rising tensions between host community and refugee population over limited resources
- . 47% of communities stated conflict over housing as a source of



Shelter Challenges in Host Community

- * Refugees are unable to pay rent savings have been depleted, many have accrued high debt and are at risk of exploitation
- Support is needed, but direct rental support (cash for rent) may have inflationary effect on market and contribute to host community tensions
- · Refugees lack security of contract and standard leases heavily favor landlords, increasing rates and risks of eviction
- Affordable accommodation is often inaccessible to basic essential services, including health and education



Security of Contract

- Synan refugees often do not formalize written
 leases of register with municipalities.
- Lack of Clear information regarding fordamen landford-tenant regulations
- No coundinated system for minituring of existings.
- Lack of secure lease may affect refugers ability to obtain legal status and may expose them to exploitation
- Refugees reluctant to approach points or courts to assert their rights





Opportunities for Intervention

- Root problem is inadequate number of shelters available for growing needs amongst Syrians and Jordanians
- Unfinished buildings are common in Jordan.
 Incremental construction is done as money is available and new apartments generally kept within family and provided to adult children.
- Banks offer loans at high interest rates and home loans or mortgages are uncommon





Shelter Approach - Simplified

- "Advertise" need for unfinished buildings within local community and owners contact NRC through hotline
- NRC teams visit properties to determine suitability and technical team prepare contract
- Conditional payments up to 2,000 USD maximum provided in installments
- Engineers follow-up through implementation and confirm when property completed and can move in
- Assessment and selection of Syrian families based on vulnerability criteria and referrals from UNHCR/INGOS
- Lease agreements prepared and signed by landlord and leaseholders for between 12 to 18 months



NRC Approach - Simplified

- · Handover of cases from Shelter following move-in
- NRC case managers conduct outreach visits during first month and distribute one-time moving cash grants
- Follow-up visits with both landlord and tenants conducted every two months for duration of lease
- Case managers trained in mediation to be able to resolve disputes between landlord and tenants
- Information and counseling on access to essential services, legal status and other protection issues
- Housing, land and property (HLP) legal guidance and support to NRC Shelter and external shelter actors



Programme To Date

Since Urban Sheker Programme began in July 2013:


- 658 contracts signed
- 4,445 Synan refugees moved into new shelter
- 1,370 housing units completed
- 681 cash grants distributed
- + 1,797 outreach vists
- 484 information and counselling services provided





Urban Shelter Funding Breakdown

- Funding for Urban Shelter Programme currently provided by BPRM, DFID. ECHO, CIDA and UNHCR
- Additional funding for current ICLA activities through SIDA and NMFA







Next Steps

- Geographic expansion into Jerash. Alloun and potentially Zarqa by end-2015
- Group information sessions on HLP and civil documentation issues through NGOs and NRC Drop-In Centre
- Improving host community-refugee relations by working with mukhtars and community leaders
- Further development and dissemination of HLP guidance as Shelter Working Group co-lead
- Undertake research on women's HLP rights amongst Syrian refugees





Conclusion

- \star The humanitarian response in Jordan has met essential measures of impact and effectiveness.
- The capacity of the Jordanian Armed Forces to provide essential services, and not only to the refugees but also to its own citizens, has certainly been tested and put under great strain,
- The international humanitarian community has responded, and in a large scale way.
- The major UN humanitarian agencies, including UNHCA, UNICEF and WFP, have all sought to address needs of urban refugees and their efforts have been important.
- We still have to do more



"Real Victories are those that protect human life, not those that result from its destruction or emerge from its ashes"

- King Hussein -



Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, D.C. 20319

October 27, 2015

Judith S. Yaphe

Dr. Yaphe specializes in Iraq, Iran, and the strategic environment in the Arab/Persian Gulf region. From 1995 through 2013 she served as Distinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Ft. McNair, DC. Before joining INSS, Dr. Yaphe served for 20 years as a senior analyst on Near East-Persian Gulf issues in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA. She received the Intelligence Medal of Commendation and other awards for her intelligence work and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service, the highest award given a civilian employee of the Department of Defense on her retirement. Currently, Dr. Yaphe is a Visiting Professor of International Affairs in the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University, where she teaches courses on U.S. Security Policy in the Middle East and seminars on Iraq, Iran and the Gulf Arab states. Her publications include Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (NDU, 2005) with Col. Charles Lutes; Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (NDU Press, 2001) with Dr. Kori Schake; and The Middle East in 2015: The Impact of Regional Trends on U.S. Strategic Planning (NDU Press: 2002) as well as many journal articles and reviews on Iraqi history and politics. Dr. Yaphe is researching a book on security and politics in post-Saddam Iraq. She has also directed projects on Islamic Activism and U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and North Africa, and Iran after 25 Years of Revolution.

Dr. Yaphe frequently briefs senior U.S. and foreign officials and has testified before Senate and Congressional committees on Iraq, terrorism, and regional strategic issues. She served as an adviser to the Iraq Study Group headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and the Hon. Lee Hamilton; its report was published in 2006. Dr. Yaphe received a B.A. with Honors in History from Moravian College, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania and the Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History from the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. She received NDEA and NDFL fellowships and wrote her doctoral dissertation on *The Arab Revolt in Iraq*, 1916-1920. She has taught Middle Eastern history at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana campus and at Goucher College. She is a non-resident fellow in the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington and a member of the Middle East Studies Association, the Middle East Institute, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Dr. Yaphe's publications include:

- "The European Spring of 1848 and the Arab Spring of 2011: Lessons to be Learned?" with Eisenhower School Professor Steven Kramer, *Journal for Mediterranean Studies*, Summer 2014.
- "Syria and its Neighbors after Civil War," Strategic Forum and Prism. It analyzes the impact of civil
 war on Syria and its neighbors, the spillover of sectarian fighting to Iraq, Lebanon and the wider
 Middle East, and recommendations for regional and U.S. policymakers on how to end or contain
 the conflict.
- "Iraq, Is the Experiment Over?" Foreign Policy online in early June 2012. Other publications on Iraq include
- "Iraq and its Gulf Arab Neighbors: Avoiding Risk, Seeking Opportunity," in *Iraq, its Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis, and the Reordering of Power,* (USIP, 2012).
- "Until They Leave: Liberation, Occupation, and Insurgency in Iraq," in Iraq Between Occupations, Amatzia Baram, ed., Praeger, 2010.
- "Republic of Iraq: State of the Nation or State of Mind," in Government and Politics in the Near East and North Africa, (NY: Westview), January 2011.
- "After Saddam: Restoring Balance in the Gulf," paper presented at Gulf Research Centre Conference, Cambridge University, July 2010 and to be published by GRC.
- "Report on Gulf Security Issues," INSS Event Report, April 26, 2010.
- "Expats and Oligarchs: Expatriate Labor and Security in the GCC States," paper presented for Transnational Currents in the Gulf: People, Money and Ideas conference at Boston University, March 24, 2010.
- "Next Steps in Yemen," INSS Event Report (US Government distribution only), March 18, 2010.
- Judith S. Yaphe, ed., Farideh Farhi, Bahman Baktiari, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Nuclear Politics in Iran," *INSS Middle East Security Perspectives*, No.1 (May 2010).
- "Parliament and Politics in Iraq: Old Wine in New Bottles," INSS Research Memorandum, March 1, 2010.
- "Crisis in Iran: Short-Term Threat or Long-Term Challenge to Regime Stability?" INSS Research Report, November 9, 2009.
- "Iraq: Are We There Yet?" Current History, December 2008.
- "Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: How Should the United States Respond," INSS Strategic Forum 237 (November 2008).
- "After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq," INSS Strategic Forum 230, (March 2008).
- Chapter on "The U.S. and Iran on Iraq: Risks and Opportunities," for book on Iran's Foreign Policy, ed. Anoush Ehteshami et al., University of Durham, Durham, UK, Spring 2007.
- Review of William Polk, *Understanding Iraq*, in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2006), pp.802-804.
- "Iraq," in Government and Politics in the Middle East, 5th ed. (NY: Westview) 2006.
- "Iraq and the New Regional Security Dynamic," in *Critical Issues Facing the Middle East: Security, Politics, and Economics, James Russell, ed., Palgrave, 2006.*
- "If Iraq Fails: Strategic Consequences for the U.S.," BitterLemons, 24 March 2006.
- Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, with Col. Charles Lutes, McNair Paper 69, NDU, 2005.
- "Iraq's Insurgents: What do they want?" Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International Piece, Vol. 2, Issue 9 (October 2004).
- "America's Shia Dilemma," Bitter Lemons, October 2004.

- "U.S. Approaches to Regional Security Issues in the Middle East," in *Divided Diplomacy and the Next Administration: Conservative and Liberal Alternatives*, eds. Henry Nau and David Shambaugh, George Washington University, October 2004.
- "The View From Basra: Southern Iraq's Reaction to War and Occupation, 1915-1925," in The Creation of Modern Iraq, 1914-1921, eds. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian, Columbia University Press, 2004.
- "Turbulent Transition in Iraq: Can It Succeed?" INSS Strategic Forum 208, June 2004.
- "Iraq Considered: a review essay," Middle East Journal, vol. 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 295-300.
- "Liberating Iraq," Current History, January 2004, pp. 11-16.
- "Iraq's Sunni Arabs: Part of the Past, Part of the Future?" Carnegie's Arab Reform Bulletin, 7 November 2003.
- "Iraq in War and Occupation: What went right? What could go wrong?" The Middle East Journal, July-August, 2003.
- Political Reconstruction in Iraq: a Reality Check, with Marina Ottaway, Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, March 2003.
- "The Challenge of Nation Building in Iraq," in U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the British Experience, ed. Michael Eisenstadt (WINEP, 2003).
- "Gulf Security Perceptions and Strategies," in *The United States and the Persian Gulf*, ed. by Richard D. Sokolsky (NDU: 2003).
- "U.S.-Iraq Policy: Will it be war?" for Naval War College Conference, Newport, July 2002.
- "Reinventing Iraq: Regional Impact of U.S. Military Action," *Middle East Policy*, vol. IX, no. 4 (December 2002).
- "Iraq Before and After Saddam," Current History, January 2003.
- "America's War on Iraq: Myths and Opportunities," Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change, ed. by Toby Dodge and Steven Simon, (London: Adelphi Paper 354, 19 September 2002).
- "Iran-U.S. Relations: Is Normalization Possible?" Strategic Forum no.188 (January 2002).
- "Three Crises in Search of a Policy," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 25 (Winter 2001).
- "Iraq: The Exception to the Rule," (U.S.-Iraq policy), *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2001), pp. 125-137.
- "Middle East and Persian Gulf," in Strategic Challenges for the Bush Administration: Perspectives from the Institute for National Strategic Studies, (NDU Press, 2001).
- "Tribalism in Iraq: the Old and the New," Middle East Policy, Vol. VII, No. 3 (June 2000).
- "U.S. Policy Towards Iraq," RUSI International Security Review, December 1999.
- "Do No Harm: a study of Arab perspectives on NATO's Mediterranean initiatives," in *The Mediterranean Quarterly* (November 1999).
- "Iraq: Human Rights in the Republic of Fear," in *Human Rights and Governance in the Middle East*, (London: Avebury Press, 1998).
- "Persian Gulf Futures III: Saudi Arabia: Uncertain Stability," Strategic Forum, No. 125, (INSS, NDU, July 1997).
- "Islamic Radicalism: Shifting Approaches to Power but Not to Islamic Goals," *Strategic Forum* No. 104, (INSS, NDU, February 1997).
- "Islamic Radicalism in North Africa: Force Works, For Now," Strategic Forum, No. 88, (INSS, NDU, October 1996).



BIOGRAPHY



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL A. FANTINI

Brig. Gen. Michael A. Fantini is the Principal Director for Middle East Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington D.C. He formulates and provides oversight of defense policy and national security strategy for 14 Middle East nations, to include Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. In addition, he coordinates with the National Security Council staff, Congress, Joint Staff, State Department, partner governments, U.S. embassies, and combatant commanders in the development and execution of DoD policy for the Middle East.

General Fantini graduated from the Catholic University of America and was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at Howard University. Following graduation, he served in a variety of operational assignments as an F-16 pilot, instructor pilot and weapons officer. He has commanded a fighter squadron, the 332nd Expeditionary Operations



Group in Balad, Iraq, the 82nd Training Wing, Sheppard AFB, Texas, and the 451st Air Expeditionary Wing, Kandahar, Afghanistan. He has served in multiple staff positions, including Chief of the Fighter Weapons Branch, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Programs; Operations Officer and Deputy Division Chief of Global Force Management at the Joint Operations Directorate; Director, Combat Force Application and Operational Capabilities Requirements. In his previous assignment, General Fantini was Commander, Kandahar Airfield (NATO), Kandahar, Afghanistan. As COMKAF, he was responsible for the operational efficiency and readiness of Kandahar Airfield. He acted as Senior Airfield Authority and a task force commander-equivalent in defense of the airfield exercising centralized coordination of airfield operations, logistics, NATO assets, and real estate management while leading all force protection actions in defense of nearly 22,000 assigned and attached personnel.

General Fantini is a command pilot with more than 3,200 hours in the MQ-9, F-16, T-37 and T-38.

EDUCATION

1986 Bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 1994 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

1996 Master's degree in aeronautical science, Embry-Riddle University, Daytona Beach, Fla. 1998 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence

2000 Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va.

2005 Master's degree in national security studies, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.C.

2011 U.S. Air Force Leadership Enhancement Program, Center for Creative Leadership, University of North Carolina, Greensboro

2013 Combined / Joint Special Operations Component Commanders Course, Joint Special Operations University, MacDill AFB, Fla.

ASSIGNMENTS

- 1. February 1987 November 1988, Student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
- 2. November 1988 July 1989, F-16 Student Pilot, 72nd Tactical Training Fighter Squadron, MacDill AFB, Fla.
- 3. July 1989 May 1992, F-16 Pilot, Instructor Pilot, 68th Fighter Squadron, Moody AFB, Ga.
- 4. May 1992 July 1993, Flight Commander, 35th Fighter Squadron, Kunsan AB, South Korea
- July 1993 January 1994, Student, Weapons Instructor Course, USAF Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
- 6. January 1994 November 1996, Weapons Officer, Assistant Operations Officer, Hill AFB, Utah
- 7. November 1996 May 1999, Flight Commander, Assistant Operations Officer, USAF Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
- 8. May 1999 July 2000, Chief, Fighter Weapons Branch, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Programs, the Pentagon, Washington D.C.
- 9. July 2000 August 2001, Student, Marine Corps Staff College, Quantico, Va.
- 10. August 2001 April 2002, Chief of Safety, Aviano AB, Italy
- 11. April 2002 July 2002, Operations Officer, 510th Fighter Squadron, Aviano AB, Italy
- 12. July 2002 July 2004, Commander, 510th Fighter Squadron, Aviano AB, Italy
- 13. July 2004 June 2005, Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.C.
- 14. June 2005 January 2006, Operations Officer, Joint Operations Division-CENTCOM, J-3, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- 15. January 2006 May 2007, Operations Officer and Deputy Division Chief, Global Force Management, Joint Operations Directorate, J-3, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington D.C.
- May 2007 June 2008, Chief C4 Capabilities Division, Directorate of Operational Capabilities Requirements, Joint Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington D.C.
- 17. June 2008 June 2009, Commander 332d Expeditionary Operations Group, Joint Base Balad, Iraq
- 18. June 2009- May 2011 Chief, Combat Force Application, Directorate of Operational Capabilities Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington D.C.
- 19. May 2011- April 2012 Director, Combat Force Application, Directorate of Operational Capabilities Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington D.C.
- 20. April 2012 September 2013, Commander, 82nd Training Wing, Sheppard AFB, Texas
- 21. November 2013 January 2014, Commander, 451st Air Expeditionary Wing, Kandahar, Afghanistan and Commander Kandahar Airfield (NATO), Kandahar, Afghanistan
- 22. January 2014 January 2015, Commander, Kandahar Airfield (NATO), Kandahar, Afghanistan
- 23. January 2015 present, Principal Director for Middle East Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

- 1. June 2005 January 2006, Operations Officer, Joint Operations Division-CENTCOM, J-3, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- 2. January 2006 May 2007, Operations Officer and Deputy Division Chief, Global Force Management, Joint Operations Directorate, J-3, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington D.C.
- 3. January 2014 January 2015, Commander, Kandahar Airfield (NATO), Kandahar, Afghanistan
- 4. January 2015 present, Principal Director for Middle East Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: command pilot Flight hours: more than 3,200 Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, AT-38, F-16, MQ-9

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster Bronze Star with oak leaf cluster Defense Meritorious Service Medal Meritorious Service Medal with five oak leaf clusters Air Medal with four oak leaf clusters Aerial Achievement Medal with six oak leaf clusters Joint Service Commendation Medal Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with three oak leaf clusters Combat Readiness Medal with four oak leaf clusters National Defense Service Medal Air Force Overseas Short Tour Ribbon Air Force Longevity Service Award Ribbon with six oak leaf clusters Air Force Training Ribbon NATO Non-Article Five Medal (ISAF) General Emblem of Honor (Romania) Commemorative Medal for Military Operations (Slovak Republic)

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant Sept. 24, 1986
First Lieutenant Sept. 24, 1988
Captain Sept. 24, 1990
Major June 1, 1998
Lieutenant Colonel Mar. 1, 2002
Colonel July 1, 2007
Brigadier General April 2, 2013

(Current as of September 2015)

11/3/2015

Iraq and its Neighbors. Security Perceptions and Realities

November 6, 2015

Dr. Judith Yaphe
Institute for Middle East Studies
George Washington University
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
judith.yaphe@gmail.com

Remembering Iraq. Two Years Ago

- · Iraq was not yet in the grips of a war with ISIS.
 - No Islamic Caliphate
 - Arabs and Kurds were quarreling over selling oil, who owns Kirkuk, and when (not if) the Kurds would declare their independence; Sunni Arabs complained about disenfranchisement, political discrimination, social isolation, and rampant sectarianism encouraged by Iran; and Iraq's politicians in all sects and parties spent their energies making war on each other while they tried to maneuver for greater power and control of the state and its resources.
 - Electricity, water, and other basic human needs unavailable, neglected in many areas of the country while provinces sought more authority and revenue from hydrocarbon resources and the state and the provinces failed to deliver the needed goods and services to the people.
 - The situation in Kurdistan somewhat better in terms of availability of basic resources but questions over political power, wealth distribution, and demands for disputed territories went unanswered.

Remembering Iraq. One Year Ago

- Large areas of Iraq from Fallujah and Ramadi to Mosul had fallen to ISIS control; the Islamic Caliphate had been declared
 - Prime Minister Nurl al-Maliki was blamed for creating the climate of sectarianism and ignoring the threat of ISIS; he dismissed from office by his political party, Supreme Leader Khamenei, Shia pre-eminent cleric Ayatollah Sistani, Iran and the US;
 - Haldar al-Abadi new prime minister, promises reforms, an end to sectarian divisions in
 his government, and seems willing to devolve certain powers to the provinces in a
 federal power-sharing system Kurds and other provinces were demanding; he fires
 generals, the deputy prime ministers and vice presidents, eliminates ministries, sends
 parliament bills for approval of Kurds' contracting oil sales and the creation of a new
 national guard to police the provinces. Well done, we thought.
 - But Iraq's politicians, especially Mr. Maliki, refuse to cooperate, choosing instead to
 focus their energies on denying Abadi sufficient power to govern, competing with each
 other for greater position and control of the state and its resources. The state and the
 provinces failed to deliver the needed goods and services to the people.
 - Meanwhile, Kurdistan and many areas of Iraq are overwhelmed by refugees fleeing war
 and ethnic cleansing by the Islamic caliphate, fear of sectarian militias; Yazidis and other
 minorities not sufficiently Muslim according to IS standards were captured, killed, forced
 to convert, and especially for the women enslaved.
- · Where is the state?

Iraq Today

- Iraq appears to be in a dangerous stagnation
 - Domestic politics has not improved; the prime minister seems unable to act, the parliament shows little ability to act and politics seem to be in disarray.
 - The war goes on, with advances and set-backs in the Anbar and Baiji regions; terrorist attacks are common occurrences in and around Baghdad.
 - The caliphate continues "governing." Since governing can be as simple as rule by terror accompanied by cooption—and ISIS seems good at both.
- What is the strategy? Who are we fighting? How are they organized? Why is the Caliphate more dangerous than al-Qaida? Or is it?

How Iraq Views the Region

- Syria. support for Government. President Assad; Shia militias fighting to defend shrines, regime; support for divided Syria?
- Iran.grateful for immediate assistance; issue of militias loyal to Iran, Supreme Leader vs those loyal to Abadi, Ayat Sistani?
- Saudi/GCC: Shia sympathies for Shia of Bahrain, Saudi? Is Saudi seen as plausible ally against Islamic Caliphate/ISIS? Fenced borders? Assad?
- Russia joint headquarters Baghdad for what?
- U.S., Balance vs Iranian, Russian interests? Who can help? Will U.S. keep commitments?

How the Region Sees Iraq

- Syria. efforts to destabilize Iraq since 2003 but a Sunnistan linkage unlikely and leverage, not independence, probably goal of most Sunni Arabs.
- Iran. Is strategy evolving or are tactical adjustments likely?
- Saudi/GCC. An Iraqi Islamic republic under Shia majority government not preferred choice but common enemy, shared interests, Yemen war as experiment in use of military force to support political goals? Saudi goals in so-called proxy wars unclear.
- Russia. Is Moscow's war on Chechen, Russian and Central Asian Muslims important? Trust issues? What does Russia want in Syria, Iraq, Iran?
- U.S. Mixed views but polls indicate growing popular support for anti-ISIS effort.

What does Iran want in Iraq? 1

- Is Iran changing its strategy in Iraq, or just making tactical adjustments?
 - 1989-2003: No interference; support for Iraqi Islamic opposition
 - Since 2003: Support a weak but united government that can keep Iraq whole but is unable to ever threaten its neighbor again. It has succeeded in that.
 - Iran has not shown an interest in occupying Iraq (does it have to?) or to advance territorial claims or to seek reparations for 1980-88 war – yet.
 - Iraq's Shia remain Arab, not Persian, Independent in spirit but realistic to know that there
 is little they can do to counter Iranian influence in their country.
 - Iran has friends as well among the Kurds and many Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians are friends
- If there is to be a change, it would be tactical—more support for a
 stronger center. The United States still has some influence and leverage
 in and with Iraqis, but that could disappear as the situation in Syria
 worsens and as Iran and Russia feel more empowered to act without fear
 of reaction from the West, the U.S., NATO.

What does Iran want in Iraq? 2

- An alternative scenario. Limited goals and a compromise?
 - Uncertainty over political situation in Iraq? Who responsible for failure in Mosul? Supreme Leader Khamenei as well as Dawa Party, Ayatollah Sistani, U.S., etc urged Maliki to resign, but who is Abadi and what does he want? Popular demonstrations seeking economic reforms, social change?
 - Unwilling to fight to liberate all of Iraq? What if Iran decides can no longer afford military investment in Iraq, will it fight to liberate Mosul, Anbar etc? Or will it agree to a compromise with the Islamic caliphate stay away from our borders and the Holy shrines and we will not fight you?
 - Shift more to political role for new militias after war or sooner?
- What will Iran do to minimize costs if ISIS is not defeated?

Game Changers

- What happens in the region, happens in Iraq, through Iraq, with Iraq.
 - What is the significance of the Russia-Iran alliance in Syria and Iraq?
 new "center" in Baghdad for Russian-Iranian-Iraqi operations against ISIS? Overflights Caspian-Iran-Iraq-Syria?
 - Role of Iran in strategic and operational planning in military confrontation with ISIS, in resolving domestic political disputes, backing Syria policy and determining President Assad's fate? Many of the attacks targets in Syria come thru Iranian and Iraqi airspace, part of Moscow's coordination with Gen Qassem Suleimani, who is in charge of Iranian military ops in Syria and Iraq. Who is fighting in Iraq IRGC? Qods Force? Regular army?
- Not questioning Baglidad's willingness to be part of anything that will defeat ISIS; issue for Iraq and U.S. is who can we trust?

Look Ahead. After ISIS, What?

- Will there be a new role for militias? Iranian-backed militias, government militias, Sistani volunteer militias, and who knows how many private warlord controlled militias? Who controls them and what happens when the war for Iraq is over, assuming there is an end point? Do these militias go home? Maybe. Do they disarm? Never, this is Iraq! Do they change shape and become political parties and if so, to whom or what are they loyal?
- Iran will over-reach. How much is Russian military assistance worth to Tehran? How deep and long will Iran battle ISIS in Iraq? There will be a cost. Tehran now sees it needs a stronger central authority to protect Iranian interests and security. They thought Maliki was that person; they were wrong and he was rejected by Supreme Leader Khameini and Ayatollah Sistani. Sistani is a red-line for the Islamic Republic they may not like him but they cannot oppose him or try to manipulate the Hawza in Najaf. One Iraqi told me, Iran has 2 goals in Iraq, keep ISIS away from its borders and protect the shrine cities. What will they do to minimize costs if ISIS is not defeated?

Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria

- Kurds uncertain on next move? When Baghdad is weak, Kurds usually press
 hardest and are most demanding. Demand Kirkuk, may or may not care about
 Mosul, insist will keep disputed territories occupied while ISIS was taking Mosul, is
 independence the answer?
 - They need Iran and Turkey to acquiesce to independence and borders—I don't think that will happen.

- Oil and revenue problems remain.

- Barzani as president for life—he is now in the 10th year of an 8-term presidency. Will Kurds return to 1990s intra-Kurdish war?
- But the Kurds have now done the wrong thing. Recent violent protests Irbil,
 Sulaymaniyah. Is it a coup? The KDP has forced the resignation of all Gorran
 members of the KRG cabinet, including its senior parliamentary speaker and
 accuses party of provoking demonstrations, 10 people are reported killed by KDP
 security forces. No reaction from Baghdad. Question is: Are the Kurds using the
 ISIS crisis to their advantage -- first in occupying disputed territories rather than
 defending against ISIS and now in creating a crisis to insure political control and
 eliminate a growing challenge to their political control in the KRG? What is to be
 gained if you win this battle and lose the war? And why is Baghdad ignoring Kurds?
- Answer depends on where Kurds are, who enemy is, what is needed to survive.

Some Final Observations

- · Several recommendations on Iraq come to mind.
 - Let Abadi govern. He and Iraq need to show results. His rivals need to support his efforts and stop trying to weaken his authority, as little as it may be, and work constructively to keep government functioning. The public demonstrations since last summer continue as do the demands for political reform, electricity 24/7, clean water, better security. He needs to control the security organizations, especially the militias.
 - Parliament needs to approve the oil negotiations with the KRG and the proposed law
 creating national guard units. Without reasonable concessions to basic needs in the
 KRG (at least until last week) and assurances to the Sunnis waivering between and
 willing to cooperate with Raghdad, ISIS cannot be defeated, Mosul will not be retaken.
 - The militias must be brought under control and prevented from seeking revenge on Sunni Arabs and other held responsible for the crimes of Saddam Hussyn. No more ethnic cleansing in the name of 'we won, it's ours, they must go." The demographic shifts from old to new Iraq are great but the country needs all its people to defeat ISIS and reconstruct the new Iraq or no one will win, it will not be united, and its people will not reconcile and live safely and free.
- Iraq can remain united and it can develop as self-governing provinces under a form of
 governance which distinguishes between national (federal) and provincial (states)
 obligations. Or it can divide into 3 or more weak states unable to defend themselves, their
 territory, resources, and people. Iraq then will depend on its neighbors for security, export
 and import of needed goods and services.

This briefing is Unclassified/For Official Use Only THE COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Intelligence and Counter-insurgency

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY



05 November 2015

Ted Larsen
Visiting Faculty,
NCTC

Fort Bragg, NC Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

- Counterterrorism Versus Counterinsurgency
- Intelligence
- Different Missions Different Support
- Intelligence Support to CT
- Intelligence Support to COIN
- Command Responsibility
- Concluding Thoughts

***CT Versus COIN

- Counterterrorism Activities and operation taken to neutralize terrorist and their organization and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.
- Counterinsurgency Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its roots causes.

Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

- Intelligence is a "cross-cutting" enabler of all instruments of national power.
- Intelligence results from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information.
- It is concerned with foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.
- Elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct covert and clandestine operations.

Intelligence Support to CT

- Must identify and stop the threat before it materializes.
- CT intelligence is very different from traditional intelligence.
 - Terrorist organizations are a very hard target.
 - It is not only known terrorists; it is anyone who might commit an act of terrorist.
- Significant roles for: SIGINT, Liaison partners, document exploitation, and interrogation.

Intelligence Support to CT

Tactical warning versus strategic warning.

· Global reach, global liaison.

· Different analytic approach.

Very time sensitive, perishable information.

 Relationship between the policy maker and intelligence analyst is much different.

Intelligence Support to COIN

- It is not just the threat, it is the population.
- Goes beyond HUMINT and SIGINT:
 - Population centric information,
 - Census data,
 - Patrol and PRT Debriefs,
 - Shura minutes,
 - Polling data.
- Build a map for leveraging popular support and marginalize the insurgency itself.

Intelligence Support to COIN

- Very different set of analytic challenges:
 - What do the local think about the insurgents,
 - Do they feel safer or less safe when government forces are in the area,
 - What disputes exist between villages and tribes,
 - Local "personalities" that can drive a wedge between the population and insurgents.
- Tactical-level information is laden with strategic significance.
- Send analysts down from Higher HQs to ensure information flows up.

Intelligence Support to COIN

- Intelligence is the commander's responsibility
 - Establishes priority intelligence requirements
 - Sets proper collection and production
 - Demands critical information flows up
 - Expects intelligence summaries to incorporate all activities—civil affairs, PRTs, local govt., security
- Different Organizational Structure
 - Information Centers for "White" Sociocultural
 - Fusion Centers for "Red" Find, Fix, and Finish

Concluding Thoughts

 Two different missions, two vastly different approaches to providing intelligence support.

As always, leadership is the key.

Challenge analysts and collectors.

Be a demanding consumer of intelligence.