

**From:** (b)(6)  
**To:** [SecDef126](#)  
**Cc:** [Dunford, Joseph F Jr Gen USMC JS \(US\)](#)  
**Subject:** afghan pov  
**Date:** Wednesday, June 14, 2017 2:49:02 PM

---

Secretary Mattis and General Dunford,

Good to see/hear you on the Hill (and in the WH cabinet room).

Below message is from a wise younger Afghan, Kunar native, Khost U grad, and former self-professed extremist who has since moderated quite a bit. (He has family members still active on both / all sides of the eastern Afg / Waziristan fight -- )

Wish you the best in your ongoing deliberations. And hope our formal strategy rollout will include whole-of-govt framing (beyond X,XXX boots) that speaks to below -- deep cuts in aid/soft power will undercut the generational leaders over there we need across the decades ahead (as you well know ...)

Best from out west, and pls say hi to (b)(6),

(b)(6)

---

From: (b)(6)  
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 2:30 PM  
To: (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: more bad news

Friend;

I really appreciate your support. Definitely, it proud for us / Afghan to educate someone for guaranteed future of Afghanistan and defeat bad ideas through this way.

Torabora, is really a bad news, but still I am concerned that how it is possible with such a dramatic success. Few days earlier in FB (still not sure for its health), I seen some pictures of ISIS who are currently in PAK army but leads ISIS in JBD. If ISIS deepens its fингure in Tora bora, that will be a perfect base for their operation and a permanent headache for war against terrorism.

Quick question; do you expect that free hand to pentagon for deployment of US army will give a fruitful result without a clear strategy? I don't think so because until we not specify the factors for continuous terrorism and not take action against those factors, deployment will only result for lengthening war and more blood shed.

Sent from Outlook <<http://aka.ms/weboutlook>>

---

From: (b)(6)  
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 10:18:11 PM  
To: (b)(6)  
Subject: more bad news

(b)(6), I will keep trying to figure out a way to help your brother. i know medical training options in Kabul are not ideal, but I'm glad he has been selected for more expertise. I know you and family are proud of him, as you should be.

This is a bad headline.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/world/asia/isis-captures-tora-bora-afghanistan.html?smid=tw-share>

<<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/world/asia/isis-captures-tora-bora-afghanistan.html?smid=tw-share>>

ISIS Captures Tora Bora, Once Bin Laden's Afghan Fortress

<<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/world/asia/isis-captures-tora-bora-afghanistan.html?smid=tw-share>>

www.nytimes.com

Having expelled the Taliban, the Islamic State now has a base that is easy to defend and access to many other parts of the province, an Afghan official said.

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Subject:** DDD's book via Gen. Vogel  
**Date:** Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:21:10 AM

---

Dear Mr Secretary,

General Vogel just paid me a visit to discuss some issues related to the fight against ISIS and the phases to follow, and he graciously agreed to pass on our friend David's book to your office today.

I would have preferred to hand it over in person, but I realize how difficult to arrange that would be given your schedule. May I suggest acknowledging receipt of the book via a live phone call to David? I've put his phone number below.

With best regards,

[redacted] (b)(6)

DDD (cell): [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Donnelly, Sally SES SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#); [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#); (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fw: Daily Comms Report UNCLASSIFIED) (UNCLASSIFIED)  
**Date:** Friday, July 07, 2017 6:23:26 PM  
**Attachments:** [7 JUL TOPLINES PRESS GUIDANCE.doc](#)

---

Sir,

(b)(6)  
Albest,  
SBD

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.


Original Message

From: White, Dana W SES OSD (US) <(b)(6)>  
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2017 6:09 PM  
To: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD; Donnelly, Sally SES SD; Faller, Craig RADM SD  
Cc: Bunch, Lance Brig Gen SD; (b)(6) SD; (b)(6) SD; (b)(6) USAF  
OSD PA (US)  
Subject: Daily Comms Report UNCLASSIFIED) (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

All:

(b)(5)



Have a good weekend!

Dana

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED


ON TOP

(b)(5)



TOPLINES (attached):

(b)(5)



### THREE DAY FORECAST

Saturday, July 8

-- VCJCS remarks at 2017 Warrior Games closing ceremony, Chicago - 6:30 p.m. CDT

Sunday, July 9

--NSTR

Monday, July 10

-- SD meeting with Tunisia PM Chahed (enhanced honor cordon and pooled press topper) - 9 a.m.

-- USAF Brig. Gen. Grynkevich et al. discuss the future of air superiority @ AFA Mitchell Institute event, Capitol Visitor's Ctr. - 9:30 a.m.

-- Press Office gaggle - 11:30 a.m.

Tuesday, July 11

-- Air Combat Cmd Gen. Holmes @ AFA Breakfast, Capitol Hill Club, 300 First St. SE, Washington, D.C. - 7:30 a.m.

-- SASC nomination hearing for Richard Spencer to be SECNAV - 9:30 a.m.

-- SD meeting with Italy MoD Pinotti (enhanced honor cordon and pooled press topper) - 11 a.m.

Wednesday, July 12

-- CJCS OCONUS travel (through 15 Jul)

-- SLOTUS Mrs. Pence tours Wounded Warrior Healing Arts Exhibit, Pentagon Apex 1&2, 2nd Fl - 9 a.m. (closed press)

-- SASC nomination hearing for David Trachtenberg (PDUSD-Policy), Owen West (ASD SOLIC), Ryan McCarthy (USECARMY), Charles Stimson (Navy GC) - 9:30 a.m.

-- SD meeting with Croatia MoD Krsticevic (enhanced honor cordon and pooled press topper) - 11 a.m.

### ITEMS OF INTEREST

\* Budget Process. Patrick Kelley, CQ Roll Call, asked about the difference between appropriations and authorizations, and if DoD would have to 'find' money for any line items appropriated but not authorized. Resisted urge to refer him to Google and provided deep background 20,000 foot view response clarifying process.

\* Guantanamo. Queries from Wash Post and Huffington Post regarding a story by the Miami Herald about the band "Drowning Pool" and their entertainment of U.S. troops at Guantanamo bay. SOUTHCOM is responding.

\* Steel Import Review. In response to media queries regarding SECDEF ordering DLA to undertake a 60-day assessment of the importance of the steel industry to the national defense, we provided the following response: "The Department of Defense is engaged with the Department of Commerce and our interagency colleagues on the steel import review effort."


\* DASD CBO Interview. Coordinated phone interview between Wired magazine and DASD CBO Dr. Christian Hassell and Cmdr. Franca Jones, Chief, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (GEIS) Armed Forces Health Surveillance. This interview was a follow up to public presentations they made during the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine event, July 6.

\* DOJ/DNI GTMO visit. Multiple outlets asked for information on DOJ/DNI visit to GTMO today.


\* Military commissions. Coordinated media coverage of today's military commission hearing for US v. Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed Haza al Darbi.

\* Military commissions. Facilitated media session with Carol Rosenberg, Miami Herald, and military commissions prosecution for US v. Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed Haza al Darbi.

(b)(5)



(b)(6)



Deputy Director (Acting),  
Defense Press Operations  
W: 

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

## **NORAD / Flight Intercepts**

*Media inaccurately reported two F-15's were scrambled to escort Delta Airlines Flight 129 en route from Seattle to Beijing. The aircraft was forced to return to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport after a passenger assaulted an attendant and had to be restrained.*

### **Key Points**

- It is accurate Delta Airlines Flight 129 was forced to return to the Seattle-Tacoma airport. However, F-15's were on alert and not scrambled for this event.
- Meanwhile, during a separate event, two F-15 fighter aircraft out of Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, scrambled and intercepted in U.S. air space Canadian Sunwing flight 604 (enroute from Montreal, Canada, to Cuba) due to a disturbance onboard.
- The aircraft was diverted back to Montreal and NORAD aircraft escorted the commercial flight back to Montreal where it landed safely and was met by local law enforcement.
- The F-15 fighter aircraft that were scrambled to intercept Canadian Sunwing flight 604 were under the direction of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
- For more details please contact NORAD, the FAA or the airline.

## Iraq / Mosul Update

*The Iraqi Security Forces are on the verge of defeating ISIS in Mosul. Although some Iraqi officials have made statements generally alluding to ISIS' defeat, PM Abadi has not specifically declared Mosul as liberated. OSD, CENTCOM and CJTF will not get ahead of PM Abadi on declaring Mosul as liberated.*

### Key Points

- The Coalition welcomes Prime Minister Abadi's statement on the demise of the fake-caliphate. With the capital of ISIS's caliphate in Iraq - their primary population center, and source of revenue and power now almost completely liberated, I think it is fair to say ISIS's physical caliphate in Iraq no longer exists.
- ISIS is still a threat though and there is still tough fight ahead until before they are completely defeated. ISIS still must be defeated in Tal Afar, Hawija and Al Qaim - but their caliphate has now been exposed as a myth - and their capital is about to be liberated.
- The Coalition will continue to stand side-by-side with our Iraqi partners until Mosul is fully liberated and ISIS is defeated throughout all of Iraq.
- Today was Day 137 of the operation to liberate West Mosul. Yesterday, the ISF continued to make steady gains within the Old City of Mosul. There is less than half of a km<sup>2</sup> of the Old City still held by ISIS. The total gains including the greater area around the city since the West Mosul offensive started on Feb. 19, 2017, are 791 km<sup>2</sup> and 4,387 km<sup>2</sup> since the operation to liberate Mosul started Oct. 17, 2016.
- The total number of munitions delivered since Oct. 17, 2016, in support of operations to liberate Mosul is 29,767. These munitions have destroyed 362 VBIEDs, 787 buildings/facilities, 227 tunnels, 1,036 vehicles, 1,886 bunkers, 48 AAA, 688 artillery/mortar systems and 279 boats/barges.

## OIR / Civilian Casualties

*CJTF Operation Inherent Resolve released its monthly civilian casualty report today.*

### Key Points

- In the month of May, CJTF-OIR carried over 38 open reports of possible civilian casualties from previous months and received 61 new reports resulting from Coalition strikes in support of partner force operations to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
- Additionally, the Coalition began the assessments of 222 historical reports of possible civilian casualties received from Airwars.org. During this period, the Coalition completed the assessment of 141 reports, of which 114 were assessed to be non-credible and 27 were assessed to be credible resulting in 119 unintentional civilian deaths.
- To date, based on information available, CJTF-OIR assesses that, it is more likely than not, at least 603 civilians have been unintentionally killed by Coalition strikes since the start of Operation Inherent Resolve. A total of 180 reports were still open and being assessed at the end of the month. Coalition strikes are defined as ground artillery or air strikes conducted as part of the Coalition Air Tasking Order.
- We take all reports of civilian casualties seriously and assess all reports as thoroughly as possible. Although we are unable to investigate all reports of possible civilian casualties using traditional investigative methods, such as interviewing witnesses and examining the site, the Coalition interviews pilots and other personnel involved in the targeting process, reviews strike and surveillance video if available, and analyzes information provided by government agencies, non-governmental organizations, partner forces, and traditional and social media. In addition, the Coalition considers new information when it becomes available in order to ensure a thorough and continuous review process.

## **U.S.-Japan / Bomber Exercise**

*PACAF released statement and media reported on last night's U.S.-Japan bilateral training between the U.S. Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.*

### **Key Points:**

- U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force conducted training during a bilateral mission over the East China Sea July 6.
- Using Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, two B-1B Lancers assigned to the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, deployed from Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, flew a mission over the East China Sea with their Japanese counterparts. While bilateral operations like this have become increasingly routine, this mission marked the first time U.S. Pacific Command-directed B-1B Lancers have conducted combined training with JASDF fighters at night.
- Participating in bilateral training enables the operational units to improve their combined capabilities and tactical skills, while also building bilateral confidence and strong working relationships.
- On conclusion of the bilateral operations, the B-1Bs proceeded to the South China Sea before returning to Andersen Air Force Base.
- The recent mission demonstrates how the U.S. will continue to exercise the rights of freedom of navigation anywhere international law allows. These actions are consistent with long-standing and well-known U.S. freedom of navigation policies that are applied to military operations around the world.

## Steel & Aluminum Import Review

*Press reports, citing senior administration officials, say the Pentagon has raised concerns about how U.S. military allies might react if the White House imposes restrictions on steel and aluminum imports. Media have requested response to reports that SECDEF ordered DLA to undertake a 60-day assessment of the importance of the steel industry to national defense, following the Department of Commerce review of steel and aluminum imports.*

### Key Points

- The Department of Defense is engaged with our interagency partners, to include the Department of Commerce, on the steel import review effort.
- *(If pressed)* As with any pre-decisional matter, our interagency discussions are private.

## **Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI)**

*Press continue to report on enlistees who entered military service, or who are waiting to enter the service, through the MAVNI program. A September 2016 internal review and 2017 DoD IG investigation (provided to the HASC and SASC on June 28, 2017) revealed that some MAVNI enlistees had been permitted to enter without completed background checks and had not been adequately tracked, representing a security risk.*

### **Key Points**

- The Department of Defense is reviewing the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) pilot program due to potential security risks associated with the program. Due to pending litigation we are unable to provide any additional information at this time.
- The MAVNI program was put on hold, and no new accessions have signed enlistment contracts since June 2016.

## **Canada / Compensation of former GTMO detainee**

*Press reported that the Canadian government will apologize and give nearly \$8 million to Omar Khadr, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee who pleaded guilty to killing U.S. Army Sgt. First Class Christopher Speer in Afghanistan.*

### **Key Points**

- The United States government is aware of media reports detailing Canada's intention to compensate Omar Khadar.
- Any communication with Canada on this matter will be made through diplomatic channels.
- We will never forget the sacrifice that Sgt. First Class Christopher Speer and thousands of others like him have made in defense of our nation in the fight against terrorism.

## DOD AFTERNOON UPDATE | 27 MARCH AS OF 1600 HRS

TOP ISSUES (IN ROUGH ORDER BY PROMINENCE, VOLUME)

## SEC. MATTIS MEETING WITH QATARI MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE AFFAIRS

- **Sec. Mattis defended U.S. airstrikes:** “There is no military force in the world that has proven more sensitive to civilian casualties,” said Sec. Mattis when asked about recent airstrikes that have allegedly resulted in high civilian casualties. He said that the “U.S. is ‘keenly aware’ that it is fighting an enemy who ‘hides behind women and children.’” He added, “We go out of our way to always do everything humanly possible to reduce the loss of life or injury among innocent people. The same cannot be said for our adversaries.” [[Click here for CNN video](#)] (*Reuters, Washington Examiner*)

## COL. JOHN THOMAS BRIEFING

- **U.S. military does not intend to change the way it carries out airstrikes**, even as fighting in Mosul enters more densely populated areas, Col. Thomas told reporters. He added that “General Votel is not looking into changing the way we operate other than to say our processes are good and we want to make sure we live by those processes.” (*Reuters*)
- **CENTCOM reviewing 700 videos of every airstrike in Mosul** over a ten day period to investigate alleged casualties, said Col. Thomas. He added that the U.S. only bombed legitimate targets designated by Iraqi Security Forces. (*Washington Examiner*)

## GEN. THOMAS WALDHAUSER AT DEFENSE WRITERS GROUP

- **AFRICOM concerned about China opening up a military base in Djibouti** close to the U.S. military’s Camp Lemonnier, said Gen. Waldhauser. He said, “There are some very significant ... operational security concerns,” and “we’ve never had a base of, let’s just say, a peer competitor as close as this one happens to be.” (*Inside Defense, National Defense Magazine*)

## SYRIA / IRAQ / ISIS

*Syria*

- **The Tabqa Euphrates dam is not damaged or malfunctioning and engineers inspected its operations fully**, SDF spokeswoman Jihan Sheikh Ahmed said. Colonel Joseph Scrocca said the coalition was taking every precaution to ensure the dam’s integrity and that the dam was not in imminent danger. (*wires*)
- **A leading Kurdish politician said Raqqa would join a decentralized system of government** being set up by Syrian Kurdish groups and their allies once the city is freed from ISIS. Saleh Muslim, co-chair of the Syrian Kurdish PYD, said it would be up to the people of Raqqa to decide their future, but he thinks the city will choose to join the “democratic federal” system. (*Reuters*)
- **Hundreds of rebels left their last bastion in Homs**, resuming an evacuation expected to be among the largest of its kind under a Russian-backed deal with the government, state media and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. Heavy fighting between rebel groups and the army further north in Hama province over the weekend had delayed their departure from the city’s al-Waer district, the Observatory said. (*Reuters*)
- **Syrian rebels discovered extensive network of tunnels used by ISIS in al-Bab**: A spokesman for the U.S.-led coalition said ISIS’ use of tunnels in cities is “a challenge for our partner forces” and allows them to “move undetected.” (*Reuters*)

*Iraq*

- **U.S. sending over 200 soldiers to support Iraqi forces in retaking western Mosul**, military officials said. The troops from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C. are expected to leave for Iraq within 36 hours. They will be clearing roadside bombs and not engaging in direct front-line combat. (*NYT*)
- **Iraqi forces make new push in Mosul Old City**, according to the federal police. They added that the units were advancing towards the al-Nuri mosque area in an effort to “tighten the noose” on ISIS. Although, Iraqi parliament speaker suggested that operations would cease if more civilian casualties occurred in the city. (*Reuters*)

- **Iraqi and coalition commanders are being forced to change tactics in west Mosul**, *Reuters* reported, because of “risky close-quarters fighting in the narrow alleys of Mosul’s Old City near the [al-Nuri] mosque and reports of huge casualties after an air strike.”
  - U.S. Army Brig. Gen. John Richardson said Iraqi forces were considering isolating the Old City rather than fighting through it while opening up a second front to split militant ranks and clear the rest of Mosul. “They know the old city is the center of gravity and they know they are going to have to eventually go in and clear it. The mosque is symbolic. They have run into some tougher resistance, but it’s the terrain rather than the enemy,” said Brig. Gen. Richardson.

## MIDDLE EAST

- **11 dead after attack on government compound in southern Yemen**, officials said. They added that six security personnel and five attackers were killed. Deputy Governor Abdulfatah Ahmed accused al Qaeda of being behind the attack. (*Reuters*)
- **Syria sent a message via Russia that any further Israeli strikes will be met with Scud missiles**. (*Daily Mail*)

## DOD

- **Pentagon to review Lockheed Martin’s new heavy lift helicopter this week**: If approved, the Defense Department would order 24 King Stallion helicopters out of a total 200 planned for the Marine Corps. (*Daily Caller*)

## EUROPE / RUSSIA

- **No evidence to suggest that U.K. parliament attacker, Khalid Masood, was connected to ISIS or al Qaeda**, a senior counterterrorism official told *AP*.

## AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN

- **The Afghan government arrested a senior general on corruption charges** a year after he was deployed to crack down on fraud in Helmand province. Maj. Gen. Mohammad Moeen Faqeer was detained by the Attorney Generals’ Anti-Corruption Justice Center, defense ministry spokesman Dawlat Waziri said. *Reuters* noted that in early 2016, a U.S. military spokesman said the Pentagon was “very, very impressed” with Faqeer, saying “he is personally invested in turning around the [Afghan Army’s] 215th Corps.”
- **Afghan security ministers survive impeachment vote**: The Afghan defense and interior ministers and the head of the country’s intelligence service survived a vote of confidence called on Monday over the failure to tackle mounting insecurity and the Taliban insurgency. (*Reuters*)

## AFRICA

- **The Kenyan military said it killed 31 al Shabaab militants** in a raid in Baadhade district in southern Somalia, but the militant group denied it. Kenya said its ground troops were supported in the Sunday raid by helicopter gunships and artillery fire to strike two al Shabaab bases. (*AP*)
- **Suspected Boko Haram fighters stormed a village in northeast Nigeria** and killed three people on suspicion of collaborating with the military, security sources told *AFP*.
- **The Republic of Somaliland’s minister of foreign affairs penned an op-ed** for *WP* titled, “We’re not a part of Somalia, Mr. Trump — and don’t belong in your ban.”

## ASIA

- **The Philippines took delivery of two Japanese military surveillance aircraft** to help it patrol vital sea lanes in the South China Sea. Japan will lease a total of five surplus Beechcraft TC-90 planes to the Philippines, according to Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana. (*AFP*)
- **Philippine President Duterte said Philippine-U.S. relations remain strong** “and there is readiness to discuss more matters of mutual interest” with America, according to a statement sent by his spokesman after Duterte’s meeting with U.S. Ambassador Sung Kim. (*Bloomberg*)

## POLICY

- **U.S. and others boycotted UN talks to ban nuclear weapons**: While U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley said she supported a world without nuclear weapons, she added, “But we have to be realistic. Is there anyone who thinks that North Korea would ban nuclear weapons?” China, Russia, France, and U.K. among others also boycotted. (*multiple*)

**From:** [SecDef26](#)  
**To:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#)  
**Subject:** FW: Iraqi War Crimes  
**Date:** Thursday, May 25, 2017 10:42:34 PM  
**Attachments:** [IMG\\_8762.PNG](#)

---

Kevin - (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Jim

From: (b)(6) [mailto:\(b\)\(6\)](#)  
Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2017 10:54 AM  
To: SecDef26 <(b)(6)>  
Subject: Re: Iraqi War Crimes

Sir,

The ABC News piece was just finally released. It was delayed because Iraqi Government elements have been threatening to harm ABC's Baghdad staff and the photojournalist's parents for the past couple of weeks. Germany's Der Speigel also featured the story this week.

The online piece can be viewed here: <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/deepdive/brian-ross-investigates-the-torture-tapes-47429895>

The story will also be featured on World News Tonight during this evening's broadcast.

MG Martin again tweeted relatively explicit praise for the ERD on May 13th. A screenshot is attached for your reference.

Godspeed to you and your team, Sir,

(b)(6)

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 04:31 SecDef26 <(b)(6)> wrote:

Dear [redacted]  
[redacted]

I've not been looking much at my unclass nets. Thanks for forwarding these reports/background material. I've also not seen TV in a while; did ABC air their report(s)?

I'll look more deeply into these reports. I don't believe that we (Americans) either train or equip the ERD so it may take some time to collect info (indirectly).

Must rush this. Take care, thanks for keeping me in the loop. Best, Jim

From: [redacted] [mailto:[redacted]]  
Sent: Monday, May 8, 2017 12:37 PM  
To: SecDef26 <[redacted]>  
Subject: Iraqi War Crimes

Mr. Secretary,

I hope you have been keeping well since the last time we communicated following the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons against Khan Shaykhoon. I thank you and President Trump again for the integrity and courage you displayed, ensuring America's response was swift, proportionate, and on the right side of history. I firmly believe that the decisive lethal response sent exactly the right message to Assad and his Iranian, Russian, Iraqi, and Hezbollah allies.

I write to you today to once again discuss the topic that has vexed us for years: Iraq.

As you may recall, I collaborated with ABC News two years ago to expose the war crimes of Iraqi Government-aligned forces, many of whom the United States had spent \$25 billion training and equipping. Featured in dozens of videos and photos we gathered via social media, which the Iraqis had shot themselves and displayed online as war trophies, U.S. trained- and armed- Iraq Government forces were seen torturing, beheading, or summarily executing unidentified civilians with glee.

Without a doubt they were the most gruesome images I had ever seen – easily worse than anything I had seen while with the USG, and on par with the most graphic ISIS propaganda materials. Iraqi Forces, equipped with American M4s, Humvees, or MRAPs were featured beheading an individual and displaying his skull as a hood ornament on their Humvee; Iraqi special forces with SOF-spec M4s were seen torturing an unarmed, blindfolded detainee; and Iraqi Army elements appeared to summarily execute unarmed civilians in numerous other videos. The incidents were absolutely horrific – impossible to share with the public unabridged. After heavy editing, ABC did release the story in March 2015 via their Nightline evening news broadcast. The story may be seen here:

A couple of weeks later, at the Sulaimani Forum, a sort of mini-Manama Dialogue hosted annually in Iraqi Kurdistan, I ran into Falih al-Fayadh, the Iraqi National Security Advisor. I politely confronted him about the Iraqi war crimes and I asked him if they were ever going to hold their forces accountable, per Iraqi and international law. He responded furiously, insisting that they had to fight “fire with fire.” Fayadh, widely known across Iraq to have close personal relations with Qassim Soleimani, and widely believed to be a Qods Force asset, clearly wasn’t interested in upholding any semblance of the rule of law in Iraq. Unsurprisingly, ABC News has been unable to find any evidence that the incidents we uncovered were ever seriously investigated by the Iraqis, and as a result, we have seen no indications that anyone was ever held accountable.

As you are aware, Sir, the Iraqi Government’s excesses were a principal reason behind ISIS’ rise from the ashes of AQI. If these Iraqi atrocities continue unchecked, we will tactically defeat ISIS, only to see it mutate into a more virulent form several years from now. That is precisely what happened between 2003 and 2014, and I believe that is the trajectory we are currently on.

Fast-forwarding to today, I regret to inform you that war crimes carried out by Iraqi Government elements are ongoing, compelling ABC News to once again go public after months of investigation.

In a report that will be published in 24-48 hours, ABC News will chronicle the story of a brave Iraqi journalist who was embedded with the Iraqi Interior Ministry’s Emergency Response Division (ERD). Over a span of several months, ERD officers opened up to the journalist, allowing him to film them in high-definition as they carried out operations against ISIS. Bizarrely, they also allowed him to film them, or provided him cell phone videos, of them carrying out war crimes. As outlined further below and in the attached, the atrocities allegedly included:

1. Torturing unarmed detainees;
2. Executing detainees without due process; and even
3. Conspiring to conduct a raid near Mosul, specifically so that they could detain the male head of household, so they could rape his wife, whom they judged to be attractive.

As you are aware, Sir, these atrocities represent blatant violations of the Law of Land Warfare.

As I mentioned earlier, ABC News has gone to great lengths over the past several months to verify the accuracy of their upcoming report. They have had countless exchanges with the Iraqi Government, Embassy Baghdad, and LTG Townsend’s staff in Iraq, as documented in the attached email chain highlighting the death threats the Iraqi forces have made against the whistle-blower’s family. ABC as received conflicting accounts as to whether DoD is providing support for the Iraqi Interior Ministry and the ERB, with Colonel Brett Sylvia briefing Pentagon press and confirming it in January and then Colonel Joe Scrocca in April denying it.

Unfortunately, ABC has also taken note of IID and CJFLCC-OIR commander Major General Joseph Martin effusively praising Iraqi forces with ERB elements pictured within his tweets this year (see attached).

Having inherited a mess in the Middle East, I assume the Trump Administration is in the process of reviewing its Iraq policy. With that policy review presumably ongoing, I would respectfully urge you, Sir, to keep the following in mind:

1. I have reason to believe that the Iraqi Government, from its cabinet all the way down to the tea boys across the country, have been systematically and thoroughly penetrated by the IRGC, the Qods Force, and MOIS (the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence). You'll note in the attached photo, for example, that none other than Iraq's new Interior Minister and top law enforcement officer, Qassim al-Araji, a top Badr Corps commander, is pictured proudly strolling with Qassim Soleimani in 2015 (also note that Soleimani's bodyguard is armed with an American-furnished M4 rifle). But, please, Sir, don't take my word on this – please request an all-source intelligence assessment from the IC detailing how many Iraqi cabinet members and senior security officials are known or suspected of being either Qods Force assets or sympathizers.

2. Given the fact that I'm confident the IC will return to you with news that at least a plurality, if not an outright majority, of the Iraqi cabinet, is beholden to Tehran, I would urge a fundamental review of Washington's assessment of Iraq as an American "ally" deserving of billions of dollars of annual American investment.

3. The fact is, Sir, after more than six trillion dollars of direct and indirect costs, 4,500 KIA, and more than 32,000 WIA, Baghdad is, generally speaking, more operationally and ideologically aligned with Tehran than it is with the United States or our regional allies. Due to a complex series of historic, cultural, religious, social, and geographic realities, that will never change. The only part of Iraq that may - may - be salvageable is Kurdistan, and specifically the areas controlled by the Barzani family, but that's a topic for another day.

4. As a result, rather than continuing to effectively subsidize and strengthen a series of Iranian proxies masquerading as various elements of the Iraqi state, starting with, for example, Iraq's Interior Ministry, I believe it is in America's strategic interests to at least temporarily cease American assistance to Iraq, while mandating that all future assistance be conditioned on criteria that will help unite Iraqis and prevent the rise of additional Sunni or Shia extremists. These criteria should include things like meaningful, tangible progress towards national reconciliation, power-sharing, and revenue sharing; the criminal prosecution of sentencing of highly corruption party bosses and ministers who have looted hundreds of billions of dollars since 2003, exposing millions of Iraqis to poverty and misery, directly contributing to the rise of ISIS; the disbandment of the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces which are in reality Iranian-created, commanded, and controlled Shia militias and death squads operating with impunity as virtual statelets within the Iraqi state, much like Hezbollah has been able to do in Lebanon, with devastating strategic consequences. Regarding that final point, I would urge you to request detailed briefings from the IC on the Iraqi PMF's top three commanders: 1) Kataib Hezbollah's Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, 2) Badr Corps' Hadi al-Ameri, and 3) Asaib Ahl al-Haq's Qais al-Khazali -- now overtly subsidized by the Iraqi Government, they are also three of Qassim Soleimani's men in Iraq, and frankly, Sir, they represent the very worst of humanity.

Sir, I am not suggesting to you that the United States should undertake another effort to create a Jeffersonian democracy in Iraq.

I am, however, pleading with you to rationalize our strategy in the Middle East so that we can start supporting our allies while confronting and containing our foes with the very finite and precious lives and treasure available to our country.

As always, I thank you for your time and consideration.

Yours sincerely,

(b)(6)  


----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted] <[redacted]>  
To: [redacted] <[redacted]>

Good chatting with you. As always, thank you for your wise counsel.

Attached is a list of six incidents of alleged human rights violations in Mosul last fall by Iraqi Emergency Response Division officers and soldiers which were documented by a very brave Iraqi photo-journalist working for VII Photo, who licensed his work to ABC News. I sent the list to LTG Townsend's command, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the Iraqi MOI/Emergency Response Division command staff and to the Italian Carabinieri. We have been told very little in reply except that the DOD does not "currently" train, arm or assist E.R.D. because of Leahy Act restrictions. This flies in the face of combat videos we have obtained which, for example, show E.R.D. troops in combat carrying the "Carl Gustav" anti-tank weapon donated in abundance by the U.S. under the Iraq Train And Assist Fund. It also appears to contradict the on-camera briefing by Army [redacted] of Task Force Strike from Baghdad last January, who said the U.S. military is "advising" E.R.D., who he also praised:

<https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/article/1047532/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-col-sylvia-via-teleconference-from-bagh/>

Also attached is a file on Ali Abdul Hussein Abd, the E.R.D. "liaison" to the Coalition Forces and Italian Carabinieri, according to the Iraqi photo-journalist. The USEMB and LTG Townsend's spokesmen said they cannot "confirm or deny" that this man -- who is seen in hours of videos brutally torturing civilian prisoners later shown dead after being executed in the same room where they were tortured in Mosul -- ever worked for DOD or is or is not a U.S. citizen; Abd claims to be both, and he carried a U.S.-provided radio for deconfliction in ops.

The ABC NEWS story will be posted online Tuesday, May 9 and will air on "World News Tonight With David Muir" and "Nightline" that night.

Warmest Regards, James

[redacted]

ABC NEWS

National Security Investigative Reporter/Producer

mobile [redacted] <tel:[redacted]>

[redacted]

<http://cchs.gwu.edu/> (b)(6)



**Danger 6**  
@Danger6\_1ID



Watch the [#Iraqi](#) ERD send a message to  
[#ISIS](#) on [#saturdaymorning](#) in Western  
[#Mosul](#). [@CJTFOIR](#) [@CENTCOM](#)  
[@rupertthjones](#) [facebook.com/erdforcesbatt...](http://facebook.com/erdforcesbatt...)



5/13/17, 15:43

**21 RETWEETS 51 LIKES**

**From:** [Jim Mattis](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Subject:** FW: My Op-ed in today's Washington Post  
**Date:** Tuesday, July 18, 2017 5:39:46 AM  
**Attachments:** [OpEd by Sec. Carter - Washington Post 7.13.2017.pdf](#)

---

From: Jim Mattis [[mailto:j\[redacted\]](mailto:j[redacted])]  
Sent: Monday, July 17, 2017 5:28 AM  
To: 'SecDef26' [[\[redacted\]](mailto:[redacted])]>  
Subject: FW: My Op-ed in today's Washington Post

From: Ash Carter [[mailto:s\[redacted\]](mailto:s[redacted])]  
Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2017 3:40 PM  
To: Ashton Carter <[\[redacted\]](mailto:[redacted])>  
Subject: My Op-ed in today's Washington Post

Colleagues -

Attached is a piece published today in the Washington Post on the defeat of ISIS in Mosul and the path forward to achieving ISIS's lasting defeat.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-finally-defeat-the-islamic-state--and-make-it-last/2017/07/12/4d72ecc8-6717-11e7-a1d7-9a32c91c6f40\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.83fed36de531](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-finally-defeat-the-islamic-state--and-make-it-last/2017/07/12/4d72ecc8-6717-11e7-a1d7-9a32c91c6f40_story.html?utm_term=.83fed36de531)

Kudos to the troops and their leaders who made the win in Mosul possible.

Best,

Ash

**From:** [SecDef26](#)  
**To:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#)  
**Subject:** FW: My Recent Articles  
**Date:** Friday, May 12, 2017 7:52:18 AM  
**Attachments:** [Carter - StrongBalanced - Survival Dec16.pdf](#)  
[Carter - Nuke Deterrence - AI April2017.pdf](#)  
[Carter - 5Sided Box - NI December2016.pdf](#)  
[Carter - Rebalance - FA NovDec16.pdf](#)  
[Carter - StrategicTransition - NI Feb17.pdf](#)  
[Carter - Logic of US in ME - Survival April 2017.pdf](#)

---

Kevin – Could you ask [\[b6\]](#) to cull through these in hard copy, high-lighting any that I need to read? Thanks,  
M

From: Jim Mattis [[mailto:\[b6\]](#)]  
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2017 6:44 PM  
To: SecDef26 <[\[b6\]](#)>  
Subject: FW: My Recent Articles

From: Ashton Carter [[mailto:\[b6\]](#)]  
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2017 1:51 PM  
To: Ashton Carter <[\[b6\]](#)>  
Subject: My Recent Articles

Colleagues-

Attached are several articles I wrote over my last months as Secretary of Defense. They describe major strategic and management approaches I took at the Pentagon.

- \* Rebalance to the A-P and China Strategy
- \* Making DoD more Innovative
- \* Russia Strategy
- \* Middle East Strategy and Defeating ISIL
- \* Defense at a Time of Strategic Transition
- \* Nuclear Deterrence

I believe the logic of these approaches will carry them forward.

I look forward to working with all of you on the new and different issues of technology and global affairs I will be addressing from my new homes at Harvard and MIT.

Best,

Ash

© The International Institute for Strategic Studies

This content may be used for research and private study purposes. All rights reserved. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.iiss.org/terms-and-conditions>

SCROLL DOWN FOR DOWNLOADED CONTENT

# A Strong and Balanced Approach to Russia

**Ash Carter**

There were many symbolic ends to the Cold War. The most obvious was when the Berlin Wall was opened and East and West Germany reunified. But for many, the Cold War ended on more personal terms: a divided family reunited; a young student free to study abroad; citizens casting their first vote in a truly democratic election.

My career began in the Cold War, working on missile defence, space weapons, nuclear command, control, communications and intelligence, and MX missile basing (the last of which is now long forgotten, thankfully). For me, the Cold War ended when the last nuclear weapon rolled out of Ukraine. I was there in Pervomaysk that summer day in 1996 when sunflowers were planted where a Soviet missile silo once stood. As someone who dedicated the early part of his career to understanding – only in theoretical terms, happily – the technical capabilities and terrible nature of nuclear weapons, this moment demonstrated that, despite humanity's need for security, a country could choose to give up nuclear weapons.

That moment also demonstrated that the world could change: standing in Pervomaysk with US secretary of defense Bill Perry and Ukrainian minister of defence Valeriy Shmarov was their Russian counterpart, defence minister Pavel Grachev. The denuclearisation of Ukraine, after all, was the result of multilateral diplomacy carried out by far-sighted American, NATO, Ukrainian and, of course, Russian statesmen, dedicated to overcoming old geopolitical divisions and making a better world together. For those

---

**Ash Carter** is United States Secretary of Defense.

of us who had laboured throughout those decades of confrontation, this cooperation was a tangible demonstration of the benefits of the Cold War's quiet end and the new world's promise.

In the years following the end of the Cold War, the United States, Russia and many other nations often came together to contribute to a principled international order. States worked together to address pressing international security challenges, including the threat of loose nuclear material in the former Soviet Union and the horrors of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Although our relationship with Russia was never perfect, it was broadly constructive. Our two countries contributed meaningfully and consistently to the peace and stability of the post-Cold War world.

But in recent years, unfortunately, Russia's behaviour has changed. Rather than working to support the international order, Russia appears intent on spoiling decades of progress. Russia's aggression in Ukraine and Georgia, its contributions to the tragedy in Syria, its attacks in cyberspace, its violation of arms-control treaties and other international agreements, and, above all, its nuclear sabre-rattling, are not what the world expects of a responsible power in the twenty-first century. Rather, these actions undermine global security and erode an international order that has been of mutual benefit.

### **Russia and the international order**

Given Russia's aggressive and provocative behaviour in recent years, it can be easy to forget that it was not always so. Russia's contributions to the post-Cold War world did not end with sunflowers in Pervomaysk; in fact, the United States, Russia, NATO and other elements of the international community often worked together in the years after the Cold War in pursuit of a principled international order characterised by security cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the right of nations to make their own security and political choices, free from coercion and intimidation.

At the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies and partners deliberately sought a productive relationship with Russia. Rather than isolate Russia or treat it like a defeated power, we supported the Russian people and their institutions during the difficult days of transition follow-

ing the collapse of the Soviet Union, and worked consistently to integrate Russia into the international community.

This included bringing Russia into important international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Group of Eight (G8) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and establishing the NATO–Russia Council. The United States cooperated with institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to encourage economic liberalisation in Russia, and to shore up Russia’s economy amid the difficult transition from communism. And we sought Russian cooperation and support in meeting the pressing international issues of the day, in the belief that the international order would be stronger, and our actions would be more effective, if we worked together.

Russia was in large part a willing partner. In 1995, Russia joined the United States and NATO allies to bring peace to war-torn Bosnia and to end the ethnic cleansing of vulnerable populations there. Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, the United States and Russia cooperated to dismantle thousands of missiles and deactivate thousands of nuclear warheads, all to mitigate the danger that nuclear components might fall into the wrong hands. Russia also constructively participated in the denuclearisation of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and together with the United States reduced the nuclear threat through arms-control agreements such as START I, the 2002 Moscow Treaty and New START. In addition, Russia worked with the United States and the international community to address the challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations, Iran’s nuclear programme and other threats to global security.

It was no surprise that Russia, with its proven capabilities, unique and proud history, and dynamic people, should have been a leading voice and dedicated contributor to the post-Cold War international system. And yet, despite the progress we made together in the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia’s recent actions have sought to undo the principled order that it supported, helped solidify and benefited from.

In Europe, Russia is behaving in a manner reminiscent of the nineteenth century, rather than one befitting a responsible member of the modern international community. Russia has used its political, economic and military

power to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, flouting accepted international principles such as non-aggression as well as violating international agreements to which Russia is a party, such as the UN Charter, the Helsinki Accords, the NATO–Russia Founding Act and others. It has sought to intimidate Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states, as well as other countries along Russia's periphery, and used an array of tactics, including disinformation campaigns, in an effort to foster division in Europe and undermine institutions such as NATO and the European Union.

Russian actors have also violated important international principles in other areas, notably in cyberspace. As Director of National Intelligence

---

James Clapper and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson recently stated, the United States Intelligence Community is confident that the Russian government directed the recent hacking of emails from American political organisations, including the Democratic National Committee. With these hacks and subsequent disclosures, Russia evidently intends to interfere with the US electoral process – the essence of our democracy –

*Russia has made the situation in Syria more dangerous*

and attempt to undermine Americans' faith in our own political process and institutions. This is not a unique occurrence: Russia has repeatedly used similar tactics across Europe.

Meanwhile, in Syria, Russia has been throwing gasoline on an already devastating fire, prolonging a civil war that fuels the very extremism Russia claims to oppose. Russia entered the Syrian tragedy saying it wanted to counter the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) and end the civil war, which is the source of so much suffering, through a political transition. So far, Russia, with its support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad, has made the situation in Syria more dangerous, violent and intractable, prolonging the conflict and increasing loss of life. Russia has pursued a military campaign that has further isolated it from the international community, and employed tactics with unspeakable civilian costs. Russia is responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe it has helped fuel, and it must decide if it wants to influence the Syrian regime towards a political transition that

ends the civil war, or continue to inflict suffering on the Syrian people, with untold consequences. Despite our differences, the Defense Department de-conflicts its coalition operations in Syria with Russia through a professional military-to-military channel, which is active every day.

Alongside this troubling behaviour, Russia has also been aggressively modernising its warfighting doctrine, as well as its military capabilities, and is using those capabilities in provocative and destabilising ways. Russia has carried out major military exercises on the borders of its neighbours, reintroducing large-scale no-notice or snap exercises. These actions appear designed to sow fear and intimidation among the countries on Russia's periphery, and to evade existing transparency requirements, pursuant to the Vienna Document, for what constitute the largest exercises in Europe in over 20 years. Its aircraft have repeatedly and consistently violated the airspace of countries around the periphery of Europe. Its personnel have conducted unwarranted and unsafe intercepts of US and NATO ships and aircraft operating in international waters and international airspace, violating principles of due regard. And, through the new Russian approach to warfare, often referred to as 'hybrid warfare', it is conducting information-warfare campaigns with military and non-military means to destabilise a number of countries and to infringe upon their sovereignty.

Finally, and most disturbing of all, Russia is behaving irresponsibly and aggressively with respect to nuclear weapons. Russia has long been a nuclear power, but Moscow's recent sabre-rattling, combined with its building of new nuclear-weapons systems, raises serious questions about its leaders' commitment to strategic stability, their regard for the long-established abhorrence of brandishing nuclear weapons as tools of intimidation, and whether they respect the profound caution that Cold War-era leaders showed with respect to using nuclear weapons. We see this in Russian leaders' dangerous statements about using nuclear weapons in a potential war to deter or prevent us from coming to the aid of our European allies.<sup>1</sup> We saw it when Russia recently pulled out of a nuclear agreement, the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, without warning, and when it undermines long-standing nuclear accords, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, where it remains in violation of its

obligations not to possess, produce or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,000 kilometres, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.<sup>2</sup>

As it does all of this, Russia appears driven by misguided ambitions and misplaced fear. Russia wants to be considered, understandably, as the important power it is. Russia's history is indeed rich, and one of which its people should be proud. But in recent years, some in Moscow and the Kremlin have reinterpreted that history and used it to fuel grandiose visions rather than the power and prestige they deserve. Unfortunately, Russia's tendency is to pursue the sense of international respect its leaders believe it is owed by undercutting the work and contributions of others, rather than by creating or making any positive contributions of its own. It sows instability rather than cultivating stability. It lashes out, alleging that it fears for its own safety and future, even though no nation – neither the United States nor any other state – seeks to defeat it or constrain its potential. Just the opposite; the United States and many in the international community have expressed an interest in working more closely with Russia.

### **The Pentagon's new playbook**

In the face of Russia's aggressive behaviour, the United States will ensure that Russia cannot drag the US and the international community back to a darker past, while seeking to preserve the possibility that we can move forward again together into a brighter and more cooperative future.

The United States does not seek a new cold war with Russia, let alone a hot war. We do not seek an enemy in Russia; rather, we have long sought a peaceful relationship. But no one – neither in Moscow nor anywhere else – should forget that the United States will defend its allies, the principled international order and the positive future that order affords all of us. We will counter attempts to undermine our collective security. And we will not ignore attempts to interfere with our democratic processes.

In response to Russia's behaviour, the United States is taking a strong and balanced approach to address its actions and deter its aggression. We will take the steps required to protect and to strengthen ourselves, our

allies and partners, and the principled international order against Russia's aggression and coercion, while also preserving bilateral cooperation where interests align.

America's initial response to Russia's recent behaviour has included economic, diplomatic and military steps. Economically, the United States and our European partners have used modern, targeted sanctions in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine and illegal attempted annexation of Crimea. The United States and its partners have taken a number of diplomatic measures as well, including temporarily removing Russia from the G8 group of nations. This sent the message that Russian behaviour is unacceptable, and we have rallied a broad coalition of nations in support.

The Department of Defense has been taking steps in military terms as well. The DoD is not simply reprising the twentieth-century playbook used to contain Soviet ambitions during the Cold War, because that playbook is an imperfect match for the Russian challenge of today. Rather, we are responding to new threats by leveraging America's unique strengths, along with those of its allies and partners, in new and creative ways. We are adapting and innovating to meet new challenges such as cyber threats and hybrid warfare, to integrate our conventional and nuclear deterrence, and to adjust our military posture and presence in Europe to be more agile and quicker in responding to the threats that Russia poses.

Following this initial response, the United States is preparing for a longer-term situation of tension and military competition with Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, the transatlantic community has not had to prioritise deterrence against Russia. Unfortunately, we do now. As a result, the United States is adapting its deterrence posture in Europe, emphasising higher-impact approaches such as rotating forces into Europe, the prepositioning of armour and large-scale exercises throughout the Alliance. Our defence budget for fiscal year 2017 includes \$3.4 billion for our European Reassurance Initiative, more than quadruple what we allocated this last year.<sup>3</sup> That will allow us to rotate an armoured-brigade combat team into Europe on a persistent basis, and to preposition another armoured brigade's equipment to be used by American troops flown into Europe, in addition to the two brigades the United States already has stationed in Europe.

The United States continues to invest in military exercises with allies and partners to demonstrate resolve and build resilience, while enhancing inter-operability. In 2016 alone, for example, the United States will have conducted or participated in at least 175 exercises and events in the Baltic states, including 139 US events (15 in Estonia, 79 in Latvia and 45 in Lithuania) and 36 NATO, national and multinational exercises, events or activities.<sup>4</sup> We expect this frequency to continue in 2017. One example demonstrates the size and scope of this effort: the US military participated this spring in *Exercise Anakonda 16*, a joint exercise in Poland that included more than 20 countries and more than 25,000 participants, to deepen US and NATO habits of cooperation with allies and partners.

In the face of Russia's recent actions, the Defense Department is also updating and refining its contingency and operational plans, including ways to overcome emerging threats, such as cyber attacks, anti-satellite weapons and anti-access/area-denial systems. The Defense Department also continues to embark on a force-wide, all-service transition from an era focused on counter-insurgency operations to an era focused on the full spectrum of military operations. To do so, we are reinvigorating our training across the services to return to full-spectrum readiness, building in modularity, thinking more about simultaneity, and injecting agility and flexibility into our processes.

Innovative concepts and innovative capabilities go hand in hand. This year's Defense Department budget funds important new technologies that, when coupled with revised operational concepts, will ensure the United States can deter, and if necessary win, a high-end conventional fight in an anti-access/area-denial environment across all domains and warfighting areas, not just sea and air and land, but also in cyber, electronic warfare and in space. We are investing in the technologies that are most relevant to countering Russia, including new unmanned systems, enhanced ground-based air and missile defences, new long-range anti-ship weapons, the long-range strike bomber, and also innovation in technologies such as the electromagnetic railgun, lasers and new systems for electronic warfare, space and cyberspace.

The United States is also investing to modernise its nuclear deterrent, which is critical in light of Russia's nuclear sabre-rattling. Nuclear weapons play a key role in reinforcing deterrence, ensuring strategic stability and

limiting escalation should conflict occur. Accordingly, the United States plans to invest \$108bn over the next five years to sustain and recapitalise the nuclear force and associated strategic command, control, communications and intelligence systems, ranging from increased funding for manpower, equipment, vehicles and maintenance to technological efforts that will help sustain our nuclear forces, and more.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, our budget also fully funds the first stages of our plans to ensure that the capabilities required to sustain nuclear deterrence do not become obsolete. This includes building replacements for the *Ohio*-class ballistic-missile submarines; keeping strategic bombers effective in the face of more advanced air-defence systems, in part by replacing ageing air-launched cruise missiles with a more effective long-range stand-off weapon; replacing old intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with new ones that will be less expensive to maintain; and replacing F-16s in the dual-capable aircraft fleet with stealthy F-35s and the B61-12 gravity bomb. And, in the face of a renewed nuclear challenge from Russia, the department will take the steps necessary to ensure that America's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and reliable.

### **Investing in and adapting the NATO Alliance**

The United States is not alone in this effort. For more than 67 years, NATO has been the quintessential example of nations working together to respond to security challenges. And as it was during the Cold War, NATO will be critical to the security of the transatlantic community in the face of new and renewed threats. Some thought NATO would grow irrelevant after the Cold War. But it proved useful in many ways in the following decades, including by shaping the militaries of new democracies, including Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Today, the transatlantic community faces challenges very different from those of past decades. In the east, Russia is acting aggressively and advancing new forms of hybrid warfare. On the southern flank, the continuing refugee crisis is pressuring domestic institutions, and returning foreign fighters present real security threats. And further abroad, the transatlantic community faces threats in Afghanistan and with ISIL and other terror groups.

The Defense Department is helping NATO grow stronger, more agile and more adaptive so it can meet and overcome these new challenges, and nowhere are these efforts more important than in meeting the threat posed by Russia. Given increased Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic, we are working with our allies to build towards a continuous arc of highly capable maritime-patrol aircraft operating over the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap. We are making delivery of Europe’s first stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to the UK. And given Russia’s use of hybrid warfare – exemplified by the so-called ‘little green men’ in Ukraine – we are investing in additional rotational presence of US Special Operations Forces, which are particularly well equipped to help allies respond to such activities.

The United States is also encouraging its NATO allies to do more, and to use a new playbook as well. We are enhancing our capability to respond to crises wherever they occur. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force can deploy Alliance forces on 48 hours’ notice from multiple locations in Europe to any crisis on NATO territory. This is a real innovation, involving commitments from many members of the Alliance to respond to crises involving Russia or any other challenge.

The Alliance is also coming together to strengthen deterrence. At the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, four NATO countries, including the United States, announced that they will each deploy a battalion to one of the three Baltic nations and to Poland. The United States will lead the battalion in Poland, the United Kingdom will do so in Estonia, Canada will lead one in Latvia and Germany will do the same in Lithuania.

Meanwhile, NATO and its members are also providing support to partners such as Ukraine and Georgia, both of which have seen their sovereignty and territorial integrity violated by Russia. We are helping them to strengthen their capabilities for national defence, improve their ability to work with NATO and reform their defence institutions. These efforts took major steps forward in Warsaw, when NATO endorsed a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine and a substantial assistance package for Georgia, and with the signing of the US–Ukraine Partner Concept in September 2016 and the Memorandum on Deepening the Defense and Security Partnership with Georgia in July 2016.

Through all of these measures, we are building stronger networked security, enhancing our collective deterrence and defence posture, and demonstrating that Russia's behaviour does not undermine our alliances and partnerships but rather drives us closer together. Together with NATO allies and partners, the United States is helping stand up for the international principles and norms Russia has been violating.

To ensure NATO continues to do so, all NATO countries must accept their fair share of security responsibility to each other; and as allies we all must choose to invest in, develop and field new capabilities. NATO countries have made some progress on spending: since the 2%-of-GDP pledge made at the 2014 Wales summit, the vast majority of allies have stopped making cuts, and most allies have also committed to at least small increases in defence budgets; but there is still more to do. No country can retrench and escape responsibility for confronting the threats that face us all. NATO has to be more capable – and able, if necessary, to meet two or more challenges at once.

### **Holding the door open**

Given significant disagreements, the prospects for deep US–Russia cooperation are limited at present. But Russia is simply too big, too powerful and potentially too dangerous to be ignored or fully isolated. Accordingly, even as we take the steps outlined above, and even as we prepare for longer-term competition with Russia, we will work to preserve cooperation on issues where our interests align, and hold the door open to renewed partnership in the future.

The United States will continue to cooperate with Russia when it is willing and when its interests coincide with the interests of the international community. We have seen what good we can do when we work together, whether in producing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear programme, which has effectively cut off Iran's pathways to the fissile material for a nuclear bomb, or responding to North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations. The United States will continue to hold out the possibility that Russia will assume the role of respected partner, not one that is isolated and going backwards, as it is today. People in the United States

and Europe, and indeed in Russia, all benefited from our past collaboration. But it is up to the Kremlin to decide which path to take.

After all, we do not desire a hostile relationship with Russia; we want Russia to again become the partner with which we cooperated so fruitfully during the years after the Cold War. I remember that time personally. As the United States and Russia, and our policymakers, were blinking in the bright light of peaceful possibilities, we chose to work with common purpose. At Pervomaysk 21 years ago, in countering nuclear proliferation, when bringing peace to the Balkans, and more, we stood together and helped build a better world and a stronger international order. Our collaboration demonstrates that the United States and Russia can work together for the benefit of both our countries and the rest of the international community. Someday I hope to see that spirit rekindled.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> See, for example, Tom Parfitt, 'Vladimir Putin Issues New "Large Nuclear Power" Warning to West', *Telegraph*, 16 October 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/vladimir-putin/11167192/Vladimir-Putin-issues-new-large-nuclear-power-warning-to-West.html>; and 'Russia Threatens to Aim Nuclear Missiles at Denmark Ships If It Joins NATO Shield', Reuters, 22 March 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-russia-idUSKBN0M1oML20150322>.
- <sup>2</sup> US Department of State, 'Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments', July 2014, p. 8, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf>.
- <sup>3</sup> Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, '2017 Defense Posture Statement: Taking the Long View, Investing for the Future', US Department of Defense, February 2016, p. 18, [http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017DODPOSTURE\\_FINAL\\_MAR17UpdatePage4\\_WEB.PDF](http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017DODPOSTURE_FINAL_MAR17UpdatePage4_WEB.PDF).
- <sup>4</sup> General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, remarks at the 2016 US Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, La Vista, NE, 7 July 2016, [https://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/2016/178/2016\\_Deterrence\\_Symposium](https://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/2016/178/2016_Deterrence_Symposium).
- <sup>5</sup> Carter, '2017 Defense Posture Statement', p. 39.

# THE NATIONAL INTEREST

## Defense at a Time of Strategic Transition

By *Ash Carter*

February 28, 2017

Link: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/defense-time-strategic-transition-19623>

*Abridged remarks by then Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on receiving the CSIS Sam Nunn National Security Leadership Prize last month.*

Thanks for that kind introduction, John [Hamre], and for the first-ever Nunn Prize. This is a particular honor for me because I have such respect for both CSIS and for Sam Nunn.

Few people over the past 50 years have made more lasting and forward-looking contributions to America's security than Sam Nunn. As a Senator, Sam was a serious and studious steward of our national defense in the last decades of the Cold War and thereafter. As Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam was a leader in strengthening and reforming the Pentagon. And in the years since, he has been a true statesman, helping guide America's relationship with the world, particularly on nuclear weapons.

Through it all, Sam has demonstrated that he understands that America's defense is so vital that we, to whom it is entrusted, must ensure its continuity and excellence across the years, across the domains of armed conflict not just air and land and sea, but space, and cyberspace, across parties, from presidential administration to presidential administration—and in that connection, I'm committed to helping President-elect Trump and his team hit the ground running—and also across our government, and from strategic era to strategic era.

That last one is important and is the theme, I think, of what this recognition of Sam Nunn means. Sam and I worked closely together—a quarter century ago and with his friend and colleague Dick Lugar—to confront the unique challenges of another transition between strategic eras at the end of the Cold War.

Now, early in that transition, Sam and Dick—almost alone in the country and the world—foresaw a few important developments.

First, the Soviet Union’s was the first-ever disintegration of a nuclear power. Second, while people had considered accidental nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis, few appreciated that nuclear command-and-control would not, could not, be immune from the disintegration of a society in which such controls were embedded. And in that new situation, Sam and Dick knew that deterrence alone would not protect us against destruction. And third, they also appreciated that to prevent that new danger from becoming a threat, the United States would need to work with, and not against, the custodians of the former Soviet arsenal. And after having spent half a century and billions upon billions of dollars bringing the Soviet Union to its knees, we would need to help them, even fund them, to secure the vast nuclear legacy of the USSR.

That last idea, as many of us remember, and—as Sam later called it—was a little “wacky.” It was counter-intuitive, it was innovative, it was controversial at the time. But it was right.

More importantly, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program that was based on that idea worked: it helped the United States denuclearize Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, safeguard fissile materials, and destroy dangerous nuclear weapons systems.

It did so because Sam and Dick knew that at a time of strategic transition, we needed to be willing to take bold steps, consider things that seemed to be counterintuitive—some might even think wacky ideas—and develop new ways of thinking, operating, and investing to continue to keep the nation safe.

### ***Strategic Transition***

That’s an important lesson to remember today, at a time of great change—economic, and political, and military, and social, and technological change—and of greater and fiercer competition even than marked those early post-Cold War years—competition for the lead in technology and human talent, competition for power, and competition of ideas about how the world should be ordered.

In this time of strategic transition, and against this competitive background, the Department of Defense is making a corresponding transition, from an era dominated by over a decade of skillful but all-absorbing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns, to one where we must contend with a wider range of strategic problems.

Across this range, DoD is confronting today no fewer than five immediate, but distinct, and each evolving challenges. We’re countering the prospect of Russian aggression and coercion, especially in Europe—something we haven’t had to worry

about for the last 25 years, but now we do. We're also managing historic change in the Asia-Pacific—the single most consequential region for America's future. We're strengthening our deterrent and defense forces in the face of North Korea's continued nuclear and missile provocations. We're checking Iranian aggression and malign influence in the Gulf, and helping defend our friends and allies in the Middle East. We're countering terrorism and accelerating the certain and lasting defeat of ISIL. And, all the while, the Defense Department is also preparing to contend with an uncertain future—ensuring that our military is ready for challenges we may not anticipate today.

And the question I'll address in this acknowledgment of Sam tonight is the same as it's been to me for all the time I've been Secretary of Defense: which is how do we successfully confront these challenges and prepare for that uncertain future?

And the answer, fundamentally, is the same as it was 25 years ago: it has been necessary—it will be necessary—for DoD to change, to adapt, to innovate . . . not only to meet today's challenges, but ensure our defense's continued excellence well into that uncertain future.

So I want to speak tonight about the changes underway to respond today's challenges—focusing particularly on the military campaign to accelerate the lasting defeat of ISIL, our Strong and Balanced Strategy on Russia, and our rebalance to the vital and dynamic Asia-Pacific. And I'll also describe the actions underway—and innovations we're making—to ensure that the defense department has the technology, the operational plans, the organization, and the people to continue to defend our country and make a better world for decades to come.

### ***Campaign to Deliver ISIL a Lasting Defeat***

Let me start with ISIL. We've reached a critical milestone in our counter-ISIL campaign.

As we meet [in January 2017], American forces are engaged, with our coalition and local partners, in an intense effort to collapse ISIL's control over Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, bringing the great weight and our entire range of capabilities to bear in the enabling of capable and motivated local forces. The seizure of these two cities is necessary to ensure the destruction of ISIL's parent tumor—the primary objective of our military campaign in Iraq and Syria and to destroy both the fact and the idea that there can be an Islamic state based upon this ideology—put ISIL on an irreversible path to a lasting defeat.

Reaching this milestone is a direct result of deliberate actions taken since 2015. First, and going back to summer 2015, I've consolidated the efforts for Iraq and Syria under a single, unified command—streamlining our command-and-control for the fight against ISIL, which we had not had. Then, in October 2015, President Obama approved the first in a series of recommendations that I and our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joe Dunford made to accelerate the campaign against ISIL—introducing every single tool of our military into this fight. And I should tell you, by the way, that since then President Obama has approved every recommendation that the Chairman and I have taken to him for additional forces and capabilities, as we've seen and sought to seize opportunities to accelerate the campaign.

We then revised our overall Coalition Military Campaign Plan, setting out three objectives:

First, as I said, to destroy the ISIL cancer's parent tumor in Iraq and Syria. Now that's necessary, but it's not sufficient. So the second objective is to combat ISIL's metastases everywhere they emerge around world: in Afghanistan, in Libya, and elsewhere. And the third objective is to work with our intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement partners to help protect our homeland and our people from attack—ultimately DoD's most important mission.

The strategic approach of our military campaign in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere is to leverage all the tools at DoD's disposal to enable capable, motivated local forces to deal a lasting defeat to ISIL. This strategic approach is necessary because the only way to ensure that, once defeated, ISIL stays defeated, is to enable local forces to seize and hold territory rather than attempt to substitute for them.

And consistent with this approach, we've employed some of the U.S. military's most extraordinary capabilities, and some of our most specialized personnel—from air power and special operations forces, to train, advise, assist capabilities on the ground, to intelligence, cyber tools, logistics. These assets and our personnel have been able not only to help directly enable local forces on the ground; they also bring to bear the full weight of American and coalition military might.

By combining our capabilities with those of our local partners, we've been squeezing ISIL by applying simultaneous pressure from all sides and across all domains, through a series of deliberate actions to continue to build momentum. For example, when our special operators conduct raids, free hostages, gather intelligence, and capture ISIL leaders, it creates a virtuous cycle of better intelligence, more targets, more raids, more air strikes, and more opportunities we can seize to gain even more momentum.

As a result of all of this, for over a year now—play-by-play, accelerant after accelerant, town after town—the campaign has delivered the results we laid out and planned.

In Iraq, we've been helping the Iraqi Security Forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga to systematically dislodge ISIL from city after city—Ramadi, Hit, Rutbah, Fallujah, Makhmur, and Qayyarah, just to name a few. And our coalition is now [in January 2017] doing the same in Mosul—having isolated the city, the Iraqis with our help are on the verge of clearing eastern Mosul, and will then move west to clear the remaining portion of the city, right back at the Tigris. This is a complex mission that's going to take some time to accomplish, but ISIL's defenses are beginning to weaken and I am confident that ISIL's days in Mosul are numbered.

In Syria, we and our local partners put an end to ISIL's expansion and then began to systematically roll it back towards Raqqa, an important objective since it is the so-called capital of the so-called caliphate, and a hub for plotters of external attacks. After helping capable and motivated local Syrian partners defend Kobani, we and the coalition enabled them and other local forces to take Shaddadi, Tishrin Dam, Manbij, Jarabulus, Dabiq. And now [in January 2017] converging on Raqqa. As they successfully complete the isolation phase in the weeks ahead, we're helping them generate the additional local forces that will be necessary to seize and hold that city in the weeks to follow.

In addition to taking back territory, our campaign is yielding results in denying ISIL the finances, the supplies, the freedom of movement, and the command and control it needs to survive. We've systematically targeted ISIL-controlled oil wells, revenue depositories, trucks for smuggling and transporting—indeed, just last month [in December 2016], in one of the largest air strikes of this particular kind to date, we destroyed 168 trucks in one strike one evening.

We've also deliberately focused on severing the territory ISIL controls in Syria from the territory it controls in Iraq. Leaders of the terrorist group can no longer travel now between Raqqa and Mosul without the risk of being either hunted down by our Expeditionary Targeting Force or struck from the air. And since we began accelerating our campaign, we've killed the majority of ISIL's original cadre of senior leaders.

While these results in Iraq and Syria are encouraging, we must stay focused on the continued execution of this plan. The inevitable collapse of ISIL's control over Mosul and Raqqa will certainly put ISIL on a path to a lasting defeat. But there will still be much more to do after that to make sure that, once defeated, ISIL stays defeated. The fight against ISIL will continue in Iraq and Syria. In addition, the United States and

the coalition will need to continue to counter foreign fighters trying to escape and ISIL's attempts to relocate or reinvent itself, if they survive alive from Mosul or Raqqa.

And, of course, ISIL's lasting defeat will require the international community and the United States to stay engaged. In Iraq, we need to carry on our work to train, equip, and enable Iraqi Security Forces, including the Iraqi Army, police, border guards, counterterrorism forces, and other forces under the control of the Iraqi government, to liberate the remainder of Iraq, secure it and hold the areas cleared from ISIL even as we continue to support an inclusive and multi-sectarian, de-centralized Iraq.

And because, beyond security, there will still be towns to rebuild, services to reestablish, and communities to restore, the international community's stabilization and governance efforts cannot be allowed to lag too far behind the military campaign. This at my judgement at this point in the campaign is my biggest concern.

As I said earlier, success in Iraq and Syria is necessary, but it's not sufficient for dealing ISIL a lasting defeat. And that's why we're also focused on the other two critical objectives of our campaign, which are combatting ISIL's metastases around the world, and helping to protect the homeland.

When it comes to combatting the metastases, we've taken correspondingly strong actions in support of capable and motivated forces in Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. For example, alongside our Afghan partners, we recently commenced the third offensive against ISIL in Eastern Afghanistan. In previous two operations, we and our Afghan partners killed ISIL's top leader in the country and we also significantly degraded its capabilities and its ability to try to take root there.

Of course, destroying the ISIL cancer's parent tumor in Iraq and Syria and defeating its metastases must also help us meet our campaign's third objective, which is to protect the homeland. On that third objective, DoD is also working, as I said with our intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement partners both at home and abroad. For example, we've worked with the FBI to systematically eliminate members of an ISIL cell in Iraq and Syria that was inspiring attacks against our country, including against our armed forces. And we are continuing to prioritize ISIL's external operations.

The campaign against ISIL and its results are another example of our military's continued excellence and America's continued leadership in the Middle East and in the world.

No other nation could have brought to bear the combination of resources we have, or assembled the coalition we've built, and led the execution of a comprehensive campaign as the United States has done. No other nation could've done that. We did so in pursuit of our nation's interests—which in this case are aligned with many allies and partners who are also resolved to destroy ISIL; and we did so despite major, simultaneous, and growing military commitments in Europe and Asia, at the same time. And let me turn to them next.

### ***Standing up to Russian Aggression, Standing with NATO Allies***

First, I want to discuss Europe, where the Transatlantic Community is standing up to Russia's provocations and aggression.

That's a big change for many of us—Sam, me, and many other former Cold Warriors—who worked productively with Russia in the post-Cold War era. In the 1990s our two nations worked together—through the Nunn-Lugar program, and again on Kosovo, and I remember these and participated in both of them personally—with common, rather than cross, purposes.

Today, unfortunately, Russia's aggression and provocation appears to be driven by misguided ambitions and misplaced resentment.

We see that in Russia's aggression in Ukraine and Georgia, in its counter-productive role in the ongoing tragedy in Syria, its attacks in cyberspace, its hybrid warfare, its violation of arms-control treaties and other international agreements, and its nuclear saber-rattling.

These actions are not what the world expects of a responsible state in the twenty-first century; rather, each threatens to undermine global security and erode the principled international order that has been so good not only to America, but also to Russia and the rest of the world.

Let me be clear, the United States does not, should not, seek a cold, let alone a hot war with Russia. We don't seek an enemy in Russia. But we are also defending our allies, the principled international order, and the positive future it affords all of us. And we'll counter attempts to undermine our collective security.

To do so, the United States is following a Strong and Balanced Strategy. In it, we're addressing Russia's actions and deterring its aggression while pursuing and preserving bilateral cooperation where U.S. and Russian objectives can be aligned. This strategy does not simply recycle the twentieth-century playbook used to deter Soviet

aggression during the Cold War, because that playbook would not meet the Russian challenge or match the Russian challenge of today.

We haven't had to prioritize deterrence on the Transatlantic Community's eastern flank for over 20 years. And unfortunately, as I said, now we do. That's why the United States is strengthening our military posture and presence in Europe to be more agile and quicker in responding to the threats that Russia might pose.

Our last defense budget request included significantly more funding for our European Reassurance Initiative, now renamed the European Deterrence Initiative—more than quadruple what we allocated the year before.

That's intended to allow us—in addition to the two brigades we already have stationed in Europe—to rotate an Armored Brigade Combat Team into Europe on a persistent basis starting later this month. In fact, over the past few days, the equipment we're deploying to support that Brigade Combat team has arrived in Germany and is on the rails as we speak [in January 2017]. ERI in 2017 will also enable us to pre-position a brigade's worth of equipment and warfighting gear to be used by American forces flown into Europe, these among many other steps.

We're also increasing military exercises with allies and partners to demonstrate resolve and build their resilience, while enhancing inter-operability with them.

We're updating and refining our contingency and operational plans, including ways to overcome emerging threats such as hybrid warfare and anti-access, area-denial systems. We're investing in the technologies most relevant to countering Russia. And we're also recapitalizing our nuclear deterrent, because nuclear deterrence is not only the bedrock of our security, but also critical to sustain in light of Russia's nuclear saber-rattling.

The United States is not alone in any of this, of course. For more than 67 years, NATO has been the quintessential example of nations coming together to respond to collective security challenges. And as it did during the Cold War, NATO will be critical to preserving collective defense in the face of new and renewed threats.

To ensure it does so, NATO, too, is adapting to use a new playbook—one that prepares to counter cyber threats and hybrid warfare, to better integrate our conventional and nuclear deterrence, and much, much more.

That's why NATO created a Very-High-Readiness Joint Task Force that can deploy allied forces on 48 [hours'] notices to any crisis on allied territory. That's why NATO is also deploying four battalions to its eastern flank—one each in Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, and Poland—the latter, by the way, is where the United States will lead a battalion starting in April this year. And it's why NATO is providing support to partner countries like Ukraine and Georgia to help strengthen and reform their national defense institutions and to improve their ability to work with NATO.

Everything the United States is doing, both on its own and with NATO, will ensure that we continue to stand up to Russian aggression, and that we're ready for longer-term competition. But it's also necessary to keep the door open to working with Russia, when and where our interests align, or can be made to align. And as I said, there was a time, in the years after the Cold War, when Russia cooperated with the United States and other nations, contributing to the principled international order rather than undermining it. I remember that personally—and so do many of you. And perhaps someday, we'll see that spirit rekindled.

### ***Catalyzing a Principled & Inclusive Security Network in the Asia-Pacific***

Next, I want to discuss what the defense department has to do to carry out the security aspect of President Obama's rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The rebalance has ensured that DoD will continue to help provide the security necessary for that consequential region—home to nearly half the global population and nearly half the global economy—and allow it to remain a place where everyone can rise and prosper.

That's been American policy and practice since the end of World War II. Regardless of what else was going on at home or in other parts of the world—during Democratic and Republican administrations, in times of surplus and deficit, war and peace—the United States has remained economically, politically, and militarily engaged in the Asia-Pacific.

Now, unlike elsewhere in the world, peace and stability there has never been managed by a region-wide, formal structure like NATO in Europe. That's made sense because of the Asia-Pacific's unique history, geography, and politics.

Instead, the United States has long taken a principled and inclusive approach, and collaborated with a network of regional allies and partners to enable security and uphold important principles like resolving disputes peacefully; ensuring countries can make choices free from external coercion and intimidation; and preserving the freedom of overflight and navigation guaranteed by international law.

Because we did so, out of the rubble of World War II, economic miracle after miracle occurred. Think about it . . . first Japan, then Taiwan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia, and now, today, China, India, and others rose and prospered.

That progress has produced incredible changes in the region: populations are growing, education has improved, freedom and self-determination have spread, economies have grown more interconnected, and military spending and cooperation are both increasing.

Amid all this remarkable change and progress, America's interests and objectives in the Asia-Pacific have endured: we still want peace, stability, and progress there for all, including ourselves. But as the region has changed, our approach to how we advance our interests and uphold those enduring principles has had to change along with it.

Today, as the Defense Department has been operationalizing one phase after another of the military part of the rebalance, we're not only ensuring we remain the strongest military and primary provider of regional security; we're also connecting—and further networking—our allies and partners in a burgeoning Principled and Inclusive Security Network that will allow all of us to see more, share more, and do more to maintain security in the region.

In the rebalance's first phase, DoD sent tens of thousands of additional American personnel to the region, committed to homeporting 60 percent of our naval and overseas air assets to the Asia-Pacific, and began to modernize our regional posture around Guam as a strategic hub.

In the second phase, which we launched almost two years ago, we committed to sending some of our best people and our most advanced capabilities to the region—our newest submarines, aircraft, and surface warfare vessels, for example—even as we developed new and innovative strategies and operational concepts for the principal contingencies that could occur there.

We also significantly strengthened our bilateral alliances and partnerships. Nurtured over decades, tested in crisis, and built on shared interests, values, and sacrifice, we've now strengthened these relationships so they better reflect twenty-first-century security needs. There are many examples to point to in the region—whether it's our long-time alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia, or our newer growing partnerships with India, Singapore, Vietnam and others.

Now, in the third phase, it will be necessary to cement the progress we've made in the first and second, and more importantly, build upon it.

It will be necessary for the United States to continue to sharpen our military edge so we remain the most powerful military in the region, and the security partner of choice, by increasing and targeting investments in capabilities suited to the region to ensure we stay the best there.

We'll also continue to make "leap-ahead" technological investments—including some surprising ones—that will help us keep the lead in the Asia-Pacific, and elsewhere.

And we'll further catalyze the Asia-Pacific's growing Principled and Inclusive Security Network. Although it's not a formal alliance like NATO, this burgeoning network—built on trilateral and multilateral as well as bilateral relationships—is grounded in those principles I mentioned earlier. It's inclusive, since any nation and any military can contribute—that's the American approach.

That's all to the good for the region and the United States, but it's important to remember, the rebalance and this Asia-Pacific security network are not aimed at any particular country. The network's not closed and excludes no one. Although we have disagreements with China, including over its destabilizing behavior in the South China Sea—and its behavior is in fact driving many more to work more closely with us—we're committed to working with China where possible, to introducing measures to reduce risk, and to encouraging China to avoid self-isolation.

### ***The Strategic Transition & Innovation***

All this is happening today. But even as we confront the challenges of this time of strategic transition, it will also be necessary for DoD to lead and compete well into the future.

Today ours is the finest fighting force the world has ever known. There's no military that's stronger, more capable, more experienced, or more innovative. But that's not a birthright, it's not guaranteed. We can't take it for granted. We need to earn it again and again.

To do so, we have to invest and innovate for the uncertain future we face, as well as deal with the problems of today. And that's why I've been consistently pushing the Pentagon to think, as I put it, outside of our five-sided box to ensure that our technology, our plans, our organization, and above all, our people stay the best for decades to come. We've made the decisions and investments to ensure DoD maintains our dominance in every domain, not just sea and air and land, but also in space, and cyberspace.

We're pushing the envelope with research and development despite the budget woes to stay ahead of our competitors and at technology's frontier, by putting for example nearly \$72 billion dollars into R&D alone this next year. To give you a little context, that's more than double what Apple, Intel, and Google spent on R&D combined in 2015.

Beyond that, we've been building and rebuilding bridges between the Pentagon and America's technology community.

One way we're doing that is through our Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental, or DIUX—which I created to help connect with startups and other commercial tech firms in Silicon Valley, Boston, Austin, and everywhere in between. Those outposts are already producing results: DIUX has interacted with companies in over 30 states to help us adopt technologies more quickly that can help our warfighters accomplish their missions. We always will continue to need our excellent existing and traditional defense partners that help us build our amazing defense systems, but DIUX will also help better connect the Pentagon as a whole to the entire world of American innovation. That's an investment worth making. Because when I started my life in science and technology and national security most technology of consequence came from the United States, and most of that from government sponsorship. We're still an influential force, but it's not just the Defense Department anymore. To stay the best, we need to interact with the rest of the technological ecosystem.

We're also innovating operationally in our operations plans. Our core contingency plans are constantly being changed to apply innovation to our operational approaches—including ways to overcome emerging threats, such as anti-satellite weapons or hybrid warfare. We're building in modularity, planning in new ways for overlapping contingencies, and injecting agility and flexibility into our war plans.

Meanwhile we're making reforms across the DoD enterprise—streamlining our headquarters operations, lowering our health care costs, continuing to improve our acquisition process, and more. We're also continuing to support and seek improvements in the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols—which Sam Nunn had so much to do with—among other changes, to clarify the role and authority of the Chairman, and the Joint Chiefs, and the Joint Staff, and to help our Combatant Commanders be more efficient and agile and support me and the President, especially in the face of transregional and transfunctional challenges.

And we're ensuring DoD's a place where thinking boldly and differently is fostered. One way we're doing so is with the Defense Innovation Board I established last year, chaired by Google-Alphabet's Eric Schmidt. Its members are already making a mark. For example, on their recommendation, we have now a Chief Innovation Officer, which many companies have, by the way, to act as a senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense.

And lastly, and importantly Sam alluded to this, we're building what I call the Force of the Future . . . to ensure that amid generational, technological, and labor market

changes, we continue to attract and retain and develop the most talented people America has to offer, for what is after all an all-volunteer force.

In total, the Force of the Future initiatives span the career of a uniformed service member or DoD civilian—from recruiting men and women to join, to caring for, retaining, and developing them, and then to helping successfully transition those who want to move on.

And these initiatives include reinvigorating and expanding the geographic reach of our Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program, which by the way just had its 100th birthday last year; making common-sense improvements to military talent management and officer promotion; giving components the authority to directly hire civilians on college campuses—this is a big deal if you remember your mind-set in college; recognizing survey data indicating the importance of family life to retention—bearing in mind that our force is largely a married force—by expanding maternity and paternity leave and extending on-base childcare hours, and other steps of this kind.

And also, ensuring that DoD must be able to draw from 100 percent of the American population . . . and to compete for the best we must select the best based solely upon their qualifications to meet our high standards—not race, not gender, identity, sexual orientation—but rather, focusing on whether someone can meet our standards as the best person for the job.

### ***Conclusion***

In conclusion, because we’re doing all this, because DoD’s changing, and adapting, and innovating, because of our nation’s enduring strengths, I’m confident that its future is bright and that there are many opportunities for our country to seize.

But I can never forget—and we can never forget—and I’m even more mindful as my days as Secretary of Defense grow short, about who makes it all happen: it’s DoD’s people.

Each of our servicemembers and DoD civilians makes me proud, incredibly proud. There are almost 3 million of them serving across this country and around the clock, in every time zone on earth, in every domain—in the air, ashore, afloat, and even in cyberspace—all in service of this great nation.

All of them are defending not only the United States and its people; they’re also defending the values and the principles that define us, while they provide the security that will enable our children to live a better life.

Because they do so, we can gather here in safety and celebrate Sam Nunn. We can go to work tomorrow or study at one of America's world-class universities. We can live our lives and dream our dreams and enjoy the freedoms upon which this country was built, and for which so many generations of Americans have fought.

They make all that possible. And at a time when not as many serve, I want them all to know—I ask you to take a moment to reflect yourselves—that we don't take them for granted. Stephanie my wife and I begin every day thinking with them.

As all of you know, our mission is demanding and constantly changing. But I couldn't be prouder of them for what they do every day and what they've done for us. Their excellence is unparalleled. Their service is invaluable. And their sacrifices will never be forgotten. So, on that note let me just say, may God bless them, God bless our great country.

*Carter was the United States Secretary of Defense from 2015-2017. This is an abridged version of his remarks from January 11, 2017 upon receiving the CSIS Sam Nunn National Security Leadership Prize and Lecture.*

# # #

# The Logic of American Strategy in the Middle East

**Ash Carter**

At the IISS Manama Dialogue in December 2016, I spoke about the enduring logic of American strategy in the Middle East. With stops in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Israel as well as Bahrain, it was my seventh visit to the region since my confirmation as secretary of defense in February 2015.

My frequent travels to the Middle East were a manifestation of the US Defense Department's (DOD's) principled and relentless pursuit of US national interests in the region, and its continued commitment to working with regional allies and partners in ways that also enable them to advance their own interests. At the end of 2016, the US military posture in the Middle East included over 58,000 American personnel afloat and ashore, with more than 5,000 on the ground in Iraq and Syria, relying on some of America's most capable air, ground, maritime, and ballistic-missile-defence assets. These forces are countering terrorism, particularly the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) and Iran's malign influence, two of the five challenges American servicemembers are confronting around the world, including Russia's aggression, China's rise and North Korea's nuclear provocations.

With a new president and administration in Washington, policy and strategy reviews are, of course, to be expected. This transition has been, perhaps, more discomfiting than usual to some of our allies and partners as they, together with our adversaries, look for signals of intent in public

---

**Ash Carter** was the United States Secretary of Defense from 2015–17. This essay is adapted from his December 2016 remarks at the IISS Manama Dialogue in Bahrain.

comments and the president's tweets. I am convinced, however, that the long-time logic of American strategy in the Middle East is enduring. That logic is worth some explanation. The Middle East can be a region of great turbulence, confusion and internal strife. Its challenges can spill outside the region, including in the form of terrorism. But amid all this confusion, the DOD has long been certain and clear about its mission to protect and pursue America's national interests – these are the guiding North Star for America's strategy in the Middle East – and its willingness to work together with allies and partners in their pursuit.

America's enduring interests are why the DOD's commitment to the Middle East has been sustained for decade after decade, and why I am confident – despite changes in Washington and changes throughout the region – it will continue into the future.

---

*American  
interests start  
with protecting  
the American  
people*

Those American interests in the Middle East start, first and foremost, with protecting the American people. That requires the DOD to deter aggression; bolster the security of allies and friends, including Israel; ensure freedom of navigation in and around the Gulf; prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and check Iran's destabilising activities; and counter terrorism and violent extremism.

As is true elsewhere in the world, America's interests are not always exactly the same as those of its partner nations in the Middle East. Indeed, those nations themselves do not share identical interests. But more often than not, interests overlap or can be aligned. When they do, it is good for the United States, and good for many regional countries. In such cases, the DOD and regional militaries have been able to operate together effectively.

Such cooperation has been most effective where America has led by first building the capacity of, and then enabling, the forces of allies and friends in the region so that they can maintain lasting security both within and between states, in tandem with the awesome capabilities of the US military. The most recent example of this, of course, is the coalition campaign to deliver to ISIS the lasting defeat it deserves and that it will certainly receive.

## The campaign against ISIS

When I left the DOD in January, American and coalition forces were engaged in an intense effort to enable capable and motivated local forces and help isolate and collapse the Islamic State's control over both Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. The seizure of these two cities is necessary to ensure the destruction of the ISIS parent tumour in Iraq and Syria, and to put the group on an irreversible path to a lasting defeat.

Reaching this point in the campaign was the result of deliberate actions taken since 2015. First, in summer 2015, I made the deliberate decision to consolidate the efforts for Iraq and Syria under a single, unified command, streamlining the command and control for the fight against ISIS. Then, in October 2015, president Barack Obama approved the first in a series of recommendations that I and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joe Dunford, made to accelerate the campaign. Before leaving office, Obama approved every recommendation that Dunford and I took to him for additional forces and capabilities.

The next step in this process was to devise the overall coalition military-campaign plan, setting out three objectives. The first, necessary but not sufficient, was to destroy ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The second was to combat its emerging metastases around the world, including Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere. The third was to work with intelligence, homeland-security and law-enforcement partners to help protect the American homeland and people from attack.

The strategic approach of the coalition military campaign in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere was to leverage nearly all of America's military capabilities in support of capable, motivated local forces. The only way to ensure that ISIS, once defeated, stays defeated, is to enable local forces to seize and hold territory rather than attempt to substitute for them. The DOD employed some of the US military's most extraordinary capabilities, and some of its most specialised personnel – including airpower and special-operations forces, train–advise–assist capabilities on the ground, intelligence, cyber tools and logistics – to help directly enable local forces on the ground, with the full weight of American and coalition military might behind them. That allowed the coalition to take a series of deliberate actions to squeeze ISIS,

applying simultaneous pressure from all sides and across all domains, and build momentum. For example, US special operators conducted raids to free hostages, gather intelligence and capture ISIS leaders, but they also launched a virtuous cycle of better intelligence, more targets, more raids, more airstrikes, and more opportunities local partners can seize.

Play by play, accelerant after accelerant, town after town, the coalition military campaign delivered significant results. By the end of 2016, the Iraqi Security Forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga had systematically dislodged ISIS from city after city, including Ramadi, Hit, Rutbah, Falluja, Makhmur and Qayyarah. And the coalition began to do the same in Mosul, isolating the city, clearing eastern Mosul and beginning to move west to clear the remaining portion of the city. As of January 2017, ISIS's days in Mosul were numbered.

In Syria, the coalition and local partners put an end to the Islamic State's expansion and then began to systematically roll it back towards Raqqa – an important objective, since the city remains the so-called capital of the so-called caliphate, and a hub for plotters of external attacks. After helping capable and motivated local Syrian partners defend Kobani, the coalition enabled them and other local forces to take Shaddadi, Tishrin Dam, Manbij, Jarabulus and Dabiq. By January 2017, they were converging on Raqqa.

In addition to taking back territory, the campaign yielded results, denying ISIS the finances, supplies, freedom of movement, and command and control it needs to survive. The coalition also deliberately focused on severing the territory ISIS controls in Syria from the territory it controls in Iraq. By December 2016, leaders of the terrorist group could no longer travel between Raqqa and Mosul without the risk of either being hunted down by the US Expeditionary Targeting Force or struck from the air. And after the coalition began accelerating its campaign in 2015, the majority of ISIS's original cadre of senior leaders were killed.

America's local partners in Iraq and Syria have shown resilience and dedication in the fight against ISIS. Some have made the ultimate sacrifice. Enabled by the US-led international coalition, they had achieved impressive results on the ground even as the administrations in Washington changed. The inevitable collapse of ISIS's control over Mosul and Raqqa will certainly

put it on a path to defeat. But after the group is destroyed in Mosul and Raqqa, the fight in Iraq and Syria will continue. ISIS's lasting defeat will require the international community and the United States to stay engaged to train, equip and enable. In addition, the United States and the coalition will need to continue to both prevent foreign fighters from escaping and block ISIS's attempts to relocate or reinvent itself. Since we cannot perfectly predict what will happen after the coalition defeats ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the coalition must remain ready for anything.

Beyond security, there will still be towns to rebuild, services to re-establish and communities to restore. Stabilisation and governance efforts cannot be allowed to lag too far behind the military campaign. There will also need to be continued political support for an inclusive and multi-sectarian Iraq. For all its depravity, the threat of ISIS has done one good thing in Iraq: it has united the country in ways previously unimaginable, with Iraqi Army units fighting side by side with Kurdish Peshmerga thanks to the leadership of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Kurdish Regional Government President Masoud Barzani.

In Syria, however, even with the seizure of Raqqa and defeat of ISIS, the violence will not stop until an end is put to the tragic civil war there. Russia entered into that conflict saying it wanted to promote a smooth political transition that preserved the structure of the Syrian state, which is understandable and necessary to ending the civil war and restoring decent life to that tragically shattered country. And Russia said it would fight ISIS. But then it did neither of those things, and instead has only inflamed the civil war and prolonged the suffering of the Syrian people.

To combat ISIS's outgrowths around the world, the United States took correspondingly strong actions in support of capable and motivated forces in Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. In Libya, the United States provided air support to the Government of National Accord and its forces to isolate ISIS and collapse its control over Sirte, ejecting it from the city by December 2016. In Afghanistan, the United States expanded its forces' authority to proactively assist and enable Afghan partners in operations with strategic

---

*Violence  
will not stop  
until the civil  
war ends*

effects. President Obama decided to retain some 8,400 US troops there into 2017, rather than the 5,500 that had been planned earlier. The United States will also remain committed to financially supporting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. These robust commitments in authorities, forces and finances – reinforced by pledges made by NATO – will ensure the United States not only continues supporting the Afghan security forces, but also sustains a regional counter-terrorism platform in Afghanistan. For example, the United States launched, alongside Afghan partners, the third offensive against ISIS in eastern Afghanistan. The previous two operations killed the group's top leader in the country and also significantly degraded its capabilities and its ability to try to take root there.

In order to protect the American homeland, the DOD collaborates with its intelligence, homeland-security and law-enforcement partners both at home and abroad. For example, the military worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to systematically eliminate members of an ISIS cell in Iraq and Syria that was inspiring attacks against the United States, including against its armed forces.

No other nation besides the United States could have brought to bear the resources, assembled the coalition and led the execution of a comprehensive campaign as America has done in this fight. It did so in pursuit of American interests, and despite major, simultaneous and growing military commitments in Europe, where US forces have been deterring Russian aggression against NATO allies in Europe, and in Asia, where they are standing guard on the Korean Peninsula and rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region.

America also underwrote the international strategy that resulted in the 2015 agreement that verifiably prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The DOD maintained and strengthened its posture to deter Iranian aggression, act in any contingency, and stand with regional allies and friends to counter Iran's malign and destabilising activities. When Saudi Arabia's territory was threatened from Yemen, the United States also helped to defend it, while also countering al-Qaeda terrorists in Yemen and simultaneously pushing for a political process to help restore stability in that country.

But because America's interests again aligned with those of so many other nations, around the globe and in the Middle East, America did not

have to pursue ISIS alone. Dozens of nations are resolved to destroy the threat the group poses. It was purposeful and practical to counter ISIS as a coalition. That coalition has been decisive and effective, with over a third of campaign forces that were not local coming from partners other than the United States, enabling those local forces to take the fight to ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

### **Enabling security**

The US-led counter-ISIS campaign is emblematic of how the DOD has used America's military might to pursue its interests and support and enable friends and allies to pursue their own and those shared interests. The campaign has proceeded according to plan. Yet it also must be said that the response to ISIS from some regional countries has been inadequate. While the United States, NATO countries and the Iraqi government – including the Kurdistan Regional Government – have taken leading roles in this fight, some of the regional powers in the Middle East have not lived up to their full potential or met reasonable expectations of support, especially given their history, geographic location and stake in the outcome. Such regional powers are uniquely positioned to help enable local forces in the fight against ISIS, particularly in the political and economic aspects of the campaign.

In other cases, though, those powers themselves lack the necessary capability to play a larger role. So the United States is helping them build up their capabilities and capacity as well, through long-standing defence partnerships. Many of those relationships are time-tested friendships and alliances of half a century or more; some are more recent developments. With Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and, of course, Israel, our oldest ally in the region, the DOD has taken steps bilaterally to build their military capacity.

One result has been a greater ability for each nation also to act multilaterally. The DOD has built and strengthened connections with countries and militaries so all of them, including the American military, can plan, exercise, train and, when necessary, fight together, more efficiently and effectively than ever before. Given the Middle East's unique history and character, its security relationships have never been defined by a NATO-style formal

structure spanning the entire region. As a result, the DOD's engagement in the Middle East has most often been through bilateral relationships.

But that is changing; militaries across the region are partnering together in new ways. In the counter-ISIS campaign, countries in the region have contributed from the air, on the ground to help train and enable local forces, and by hosting coalition forces. On the waters in and around the Gulf, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and others participate in multilateral maritime coalitions to counter piracy and terrorism, and help ensure freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce. And in the dozens of bilateral and multilateral exercises each year, regional militaries are working together across a wide range of disciplines and physical domains, helping build inter-operability and coordination in areas such as explosive-ordnance disposal, de-mining, integrated air and missile defence, tactical air operations, naval operations, combined arms and special operations.

The DOD sought to bolster the region's security by making sure America's partners in the Middle East are capable of providing not only for their own interests, but also those shared around the greater region and with the United States. More than simply advancing American interests, this is how the United States is most effective in security cooperation in the twenty-first century: by supporting allies, friends and regional-security architectures in ways that help them grow stronger and more integrated, but that are also tailored to the needs and traditions of the respective regions.

In the future, it will be necessary for the United States to do more so that countries can work together in new and different ways. As agreed at the May 2015 summit between the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations hosted by Obama at Camp David, and the follow-on defence ministerial and summit in Riyadh in April 2016, the DOD sought to realise – and build upon – several commitments to help regional partners close critical shortfalls in core regional capabilities.

Firstly, to strengthen the capability of ground forces in the region – starting with special-operations forces and counter-terrorism forces, to better counter asymmetric threats – the DOD designed and implemented a Special

Operations Response Force Initiative that pairs elite special-operations units from GCC states with US forces to improve inter-operability and enhance joint planning. To further improve ground forces, it will also be necessary to focus on logistics, reconstruction and stabilisation, and counter-insurgency missions – all of which can help, for example, achieve lasting victory over ISIS.

Progress has also been made in the maritime domain. GCC states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, recently commanded Combined Task Force 152, one of the maritime task forces designed to patrol and secure the waters of the Gulf. In 2016, US and coalition forces interdicted four vessels covertly carrying illicit weapons from Iran, likely destined for Yemen. Meanwhile, through its robust naval presence in Bahrain, the US Navy continues to train with Gulf navies in a variety of exercises. To improve on this record, Gulf countries should participate in joint patrols to operate together more seamlessly, and bolster shared situational awareness.

As Iran continued to test and field missiles in defiance of the UN Security Council, the United States worked with allies and partners to improve ballistic-missile defence. The DOD sought to draw a blueprint for a regional ballistic-missile-defence architecture that would help integrate capabilities across the region, including the *Patriot* batteries deployed in several countries, the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar's future early-warning radar and more systems yet to come.

Finally, progress has also been made on cyber defence. With Iran demonstrating a capability in cyber operations, and violent extremists and sub-state actors exploiting the internet, the DOD conducted assessments with several countries in the region to help them further develop cyber-defence strategies and policy, identify critical infrastructure vulnerable to attack and build expert cyber workforces to close those vulnerabilities.

\* \* \*

The United States and its friends in the Middle East have a rich, proud history of mutual sacrifices, enduring commitments and, most importantly,

frequently aligned interests. But it is America's allies and partners in the Middle East that actually live in the region; the United States cannot take their place. The DOD can help, but only those states themselves can ensure lasting security. As I said to my Middle Eastern counterparts many times when I was secretary of defense and again in Manama: mutual interest requires mutual commitment.

Expecting any country to do more to realise its own interests is not unreasonable. I often also asked my counterparts to imagine what US military and defence leaders think when they have to travel to the region time and again to listen to complaints that the United States should do more, when it is plain to see that, all too often, the ones complaining are not doing enough themselves. These countries all need to get in the game and get serious about starting to partner more with each other, and investing in the right capabilities for the threat. Given the persistent challenges facing the region – and because the future is always uncertain – developing these core capabilities will be ever more crucial, and ignored at a country's own peril.

Although the DOD's commitment to this region – and the logic of it – has endured across strategic eras and across presidential administrations, security partnerships are inherently two-way streets. It will be necessary for countries in the region to not only help prevent them from growing excessively one-sided, but also to counter the perception that this is the case.

After all, there is a reason why the United States and countries across the Middle East continue to work together – why time and again, countries in the Middle East choose to do the most, buy the most, exercise the most and operate the most with the US Department of Defense. It is, in part, because the American military is the most capable, principled and reliable. It is, in part, the result of the lack of any good alternatives.

But it is also the result of what I – like many American government officials and soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines – have witnessed over my years of service in the DOD. Having worked for over three decades and for nearly a dozen defense secretaries in both Democratic and Republican administrations, having faced defence budgets both copious and constrained, and having served in times of war, peace and everything in between – including amid great turbulence in the Middle East, I have seen

the DOD remain engaged in the region for a simple reason: because it is good for America and America's security interests, and it is good for countries in the Middle East and for their interests as well. That is as true today as ever, and I am confident it will stay true in the years to come.

**From:** [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#); (b)(6) [SD](#)  
**Subject:** FW: proposed words for press statement  
**Date:** Sunday, June 18, 2017 8:10:42 PM

---

Sir,

Pushed you an updated missile story bd on SIPR just now.



Vr/Craig

Craig Faller  
RADM USN  
Sr Military Asst to SecDef

(b)(6) NIPR (b)(6)  
SIPR (b)(6)  
JWICS (b)(6)

**From:** [Sally Donnelly](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [\[redacted\] SD; Faller, Craig RADM SD; Sweeney, Kevin SES SD; Mikolay, Justin SES SD](#)  
**Subject:** King Salman's speech during POTUS trip  
**Date:** Monday, May 29, 2017 9:58:42 PM

---

Sir,

You asked for a copy of the speech delivered by King Salman during President Trump's visit. I have bolded what I think are the key lines.

Albest,  
SBD

"In the name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most gracious.

All praise is due to Allah, and Allah's peace and blessings be upon His messenger.

Mr. President Donald Trump of the United States of America; Your Majesty, Excellencies and Highnesses:

I welcome you in your second country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. May the leaders of the Arab and Muslim worlds allow me to welcome His Excellency President Donald Trump of the United States of America to an unprecedented historic summit that is being held at a very important and extremely serious time.

Our meeting with His Excellency President of the United States of America, a country enjoying strong bonds of friendship and relationship with many of our countries, does reflect His Excellency's keenness on enhancing cooperation and coordinating stances in various fields. The meeting significantly shows that our 55 Arab and Islamic countries attending the summit today with a population exceeding 1.5 billion, are an important partner in fighting the forces of extremism and terrorism and achieving world peace, security and stability. His Excellency holds many hopes and aspirations for cooperation with the Arab and Muslim world.

As we extend our thanks to and appreciation of His Excellency for his response to attend and participate in this summit, we reaffirm our happiness and gratitude for His Excellency's choice of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and this summit as His Excellency's first trip and external participation since assuming office. This does reflect the care given by His Excellency and his country to this summit. At the same time, we reaffirm that we share His Excellency the same noble feelings in terms of constructive cooperation to renounce extremism and work on countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, drying-up its sources, stopping all means of financing or disseminating terrorism, and firmly addressing this serious scourge on humanity as a whole.

We are meeting today at this summit to express the seriousness in taking rapid steps to promote a genuine partnership with the friendly United States of America in a way that serves our common interests and contributes to achieving security, peace and development for all mankind, which is confirmed by our Islamic religion.

Dear brothers and friends:

Due to our responsibility before Allah and then before our peoples and the world, we have to stand united to fight the forces of evil and extremism whatever their source, in compliance with the orders of our true Islamic religion. Islam was and will remain the religion of mercy, tolerance and coexistence which were confirmed by clear examples. During its bright eras, Islam provided the best examples in coexistence and harmony among interreligious and intercultural. But today, we see some who considered themselves as Muslims seek to present a distorted image of our religion where they seek to link this great religion with violence.

We say to our brothers, sisters, sons and daughters of Muslims everywhere that one of the most important purposes of Islamic law is self-preservation and there is no honor in committing crimes. Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance. Islam urged reconstruction of the land and prohibition of destruction and corruption. Islam considered killing an innocent as killing all people. Our way to achieve purposes of our religion and win the paradise is to spread the tolerant values of Islam based on peace, moderation and prevention of destruction and corruption on the ground.

We, as countries and peoples, condemn all forms of harm to relations of the Islamic countries with the friendly countries and classification of peoples and states based on religious or sectarian basis. Such abhorrent acts are only made as a result of attempts to exploit Islam as a cover for political purposes that fuel hatred, extremism, terrorism and religious and sectarian conflicts. The Iranian regime and its affiliated groups and organizations such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as ISIS (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda and others are clear examples.

The Iranian regime spearheads the global terrorism since Khomeini revolution until today. Since 300 years ago, we, in this country, did not witness terrorism or extremism until Khomeini revolution emerged in 1979.

Iran has rejected initiatives of good neighborhood provided by our countries based on good faith. Iran replaced these initiatives with expansionist ambitions, criminal practices, interferences in the internal affairs of other countries, flagrant violations of the international law, and violations of the principles of good-neighborliness, coexistence and mutual respect.

The Iranian regime erroneously thought that our silence a sign of weakness and our wisdom a retreat. Later on, we had enough of its hostile practices and interventions, as we have seen in Yemen and other countries in the region.

We say this, as we confirm, at the same time, our appreciation of and respect to the Iranian people, who will not be blamed for the crimes of their regime.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has long suffered from and was a target of terrorism because it is the focus of Islam and Qibla of Muslims. The terrorist thought is seeking to achieve its fake legitimacy and spreading through targeting Muslims Qibla and center of their gravity.

Thanks to Allah Almighty, we have succeeded to confront the terrorist acts, thwarted numerous terror attempts and helped our friendly countries all over the world to evade plots targeting their security and destabilizing their well-being.

Dear Brothers and Friends:

Pursuant to the efforts being exerted to fight terrorism, the Gulf Cooperation Council member countries concluded today a historic arrangement with the United States of America for taking firm measures to foil terror financing, i.e. establishing a center in the city of Riyadh aiming to root-out the sources of finance of terrorism. Thus, we look forward to more countries to join the center in future. This arrangement would be taken as an example as it is based on our current efforts in this regard. In the name of my brothers the leaders of Islamic countries now convening in Riyadh, I once again confirm that we would never be lenient in sending to justice whoever finance or support terrorism in any form or under any manifestation as he would be subject to decisive justice.

Mr. President,

Dear Brothers and Friends,

As part of our war against terrorism, we confirm our determination to wipe out Daesh organization and other terrorist organizations, regardless of their religion, sect or thought. This is why we have formed the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism, considered a pioneering step to besiege terrorism.

Terrorism is a result of extremism, no doubt. Amid the need to confront it, we announce today the launch of the International Center for Combating Extremism, a measure aiming, in collaboration with peace-loving countries and international organizations, at spreading the principles of moderation, confronting the attempts to lure the juniors, vaccinating families and societies against deviant thought and waging a fierce war against the weak logic and controversy of the terrorists.

Rooting-out terrorism will not be achieved through direct confrontation only, but also through achieving sustainable development in its capacity as the most successful vaccinating dose, with the help of God Almighty, a notion embodied in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's vision 2030 in all its aspects, citing the keenness to invest in the youths, empowering of women, diversifying the economy and developing the education. No doubt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supports and encourages every orientation of the brotherly and friendly countries aiming at activating sustainable development in their countries.

We stress that achieving peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis is a just and necessary quest that requires joint sacrifices and sincere determination for the interest of all. The international community ought to intensify

efforts to find a solution to the Syrian crisis to achieve the aspirations of the Syrian people and preserve Syria's unity and sovereignty.

Your Majesties, Excellences and Highnesses:

The hopes and aspirations of our peoples are great, and our responsibilities to achieve these aspirations are immense, but your concern and keenness will make us resolute to face these duties. We are determined to hold on to development as a strategic goal to confront extremism and terrorism and provide a prosperous life.

May Allah help us all to achieve success in what brings the good to our peoples. Peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you".

END

**From:** [Donnelly, Sally SES SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#); [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#); [White, Dana W SES OSD \(US\)](#); [Mikolay, Justin SES SD](#); [\[redacted\] \(b\)\(6\) SD](#); [\[redacted\] \(b\)\(6\) SD](#); [\[redacted\] \(b\)\(6\) CIV SD](#); [\[redacted\] \(b\)\(6\) CIV SD](#)  
**Subject:** Magazine article on Qatar crisis and Mattis/Tillerson roles.  
**Date:** Friday, June 30, 2017 11:34:18 AM

---

Sir,

This article from the American Conservative magazine—a ‘thought’ publication with a limited audience with most of its readership in Washington, DC. The author, Mark Perry has covered national security over the years, sometimes with good reviews of books, but many think his sourcing is often questioned. This is for your awareness.

SBD

Tillerson and Mattis Cleaning Up Kushner’s Middle East Mess

Are the adults in the room being thwarted?/The American Conservative

On March 25, 2011, a Qatar Air Force Mirage 2000-5, took off from Souda Air Base, in Crete, to help enforce a no-fly zone protecting rebels being attacked by Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi. Qatar was the first Persian Gulf nation to help the U.S. in the conflict.

Qatari operations were more than symbolic. The Qatari military trained rebel units, shipped them weapons, accompanied their fighting units into battle, served as a link between rebel commanders and NATO, tutored their military commanders, integrated disparate rebel units into a unified force and led them in the final assault on Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/26/qatar-troops-libya-rebels-support>. “We never had to hold their hand,” a retired senior U.S. military officer says. “They knew what they were doing.” Put simply, while the U.S. was leading from behind in Libya, the Qatars were walking point.

The Qatar intervention has not been forgotten at the Pentagon and is one of the reasons why Defense Secretary James Mattis has worked so diligently to patch up the falling out between them and the coalition of Saudi-led countries (including the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt), that have isolated and blockaded the nation. In fact, Mattis was stunned by the Saudi move. “His first reaction was shock, but his second was disbelief,” a senior military officer says. “He thought the Saudis had picked an unnecessary fight, and just when the administration thought they’d gotten everyone in the Gulf on the same page in forming a common front against Iran.”

At the time of the Saudi announcement, Mattis was in Sydney with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to dampen concerns about the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate accords. The two glad-handed Australian officials and issued a reassuring pronouncement on U.S. intentions during a June 5 press briefing [http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2017/jb\\_tr\\_170605e.aspx](http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2017/jb_tr_170605e.aspx) with that nation’s foreign and defense ministers. When the burgeoning split between the Saudis and Qatars was mentioned, Tillerson described it as no more than one of “a growing list of irritants in the region” that would not impair “the unified fight against terrorism ...”

But while Tillerson’s answer was meant to soothe concerns over the crisis, behind the scenes he and Mattis were scrambling to undo the damage caused by Saudi action. The two huddled in Sydney and decided that Tillerson would take the lead in trying to resolve the falling out. Which is why, three days after the Sydney press conference, Tillerson called on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt to ease their anti-Qatar blockade and announced that the U.S. supported a Kuwaiti-led mediation effort <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/06/271672.htm>. The problem for Tillerson was that his statement was contradicted by Donald Trump who, during a Rose Garden appearance on the same day, castigated Qatar, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/09/trump-qatar-sponsor-terrorism-middle-east> saying the emir “has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very high level.”

A close associate of the secretary of state says that Tillerson was not only “blind-sided by the Trump statement,” but “absolutely enraged that the White House and State Department weren’t on the same page.” Tillerson’s aides, I was told, were convinced that the true author of Trump’s statement was U.A.E. ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba, a close friend of Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner. “Rex put two-and-two together,” his close associate says, “and concluded that this absolutely vacuous kid was running a second foreign policy out of the White House family quarters. Otaiba weighed in with Jared and Jared weighed in with Trump. What a mess.” The Trump statement was nearly the last straw for Tillerson, this close associate explains: “Rex is just exhausted. He can’t get any of his appointments approved and is running around the world cleaning up after a president whose primary foreign policy adviser is a 36-year-old amateur.”

Worse yet, at least from Tillerson’s point of view, a White House official explained the difference between the two statements by telling the press to ignore the secretary of state. “Tillerson may initially have had a view,” a White

House official told the Washington Post <[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-countries-place-dozens-on-new-qatar-terror-list-deepening-dispute/2017/06/09/fd727fab-e750-4fdd-ac23-26256e8e0493\\_story.html?tid=a\\_inl&utm\\_term=.e0b3f7e91fc6](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-countries-place-dozens-on-new-qatar-terror-list-deepening-dispute/2017/06/09/fd727fab-e750-4fdd-ac23-26256e8e0493_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.e0b3f7e91fc6)>, “then the president has his view, and obviously the president’s view prevails.”

Or maybe not. While Trump’s June 9 statement signaled that the U.S. was tilting towards the Saudis and the UAE, Tillerson and Mattis have been tilting towards Qatar. And for good reason. “Every time we’ve asked the Qataris for something they’ve said ‘yes,’ which isn’t true for the Saudis,” the retired senior U.S. military officer with whom I spoke says. “It really started with the help the Qataris gave us in Libya, but it goes well beyond that. They’ve been absolutely first rate on ISIS. The Saudis, on the other hand, have been nothing but trouble – in Yemen, especially. Yemen has been a disaster, a stain. And now there’s this.”

That view has been reflected by both Mattis and Tillerson. Six days after Trump’s statement, Mattis met with Qatari Defense Minister Khalid al-Attiyah to sign an agreement shipping 36 F-15 fighters to the Gulf nation. The \$12 billion sale <<http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/14/politics/qatar-f35-trump-pentagon/index.html>> had been in the works for years, so Pentagon officials were able to claim that it had not been fast-tracked by Tillerson, whose department oversees arms transactions. But the Mattis announcement seemed suspiciously well-timed to signal Mattis’ and Tillerson’s views.

On the same day that Mattis was announcing the Qatar arms agreement, Tillerson told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that it would be a mistake to classify the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group, one of the primary reasons that the anti-Qatar coalition gave for isolating their Gulf neighbor. “There are elements of the Muslim Brotherhood that have become parts of government,” Tillerson said, naming Turkey and Bahrain as having brotherhood members in their parliaments. Those “elements,” Tillerson added, have renounced violence and terrorism. “So, in designating the Brotherhood in its totality as a terrorist organization . . . I think you can appreciate the complexities this enters into our relations with [governments in the region].”

But the single most important reason for the Qatar tilt is obvious to anyone who knows how to read a map. The U.S. leases the al-Udeid Air Base, southwest of Doha, which is home to the Air Force’s 379th Air Expeditionary Wing. The U.S. (and the Qataris), not only mount fighter-bombers from al-Udeid against ISIS units in Iraq and Syria, the base serves as the first line of defense against Iranian encroachments in the region. Even more crucially, al-Udeid not only protects America’s Persian Gulf allies, it protects Israel – and would be a launching point for U.S. aircraft against Iran were Israel to be attacked by the Islamic Republic.

More crucially, particularly from Mattis’s point-of-view, the Saudi-Qatar feud not only shattered the anti-Iran coalition the administration cobbled together during the president’s trip to Riyadh, it redrew the geopolitical map of the Middle East. In the wake of the Saudi-Qatar falling out, Turkey pledged its support for Qatar (and deployed troops to a Qatari military base to guard Qatar’s sovereignty), while Iran took steps to help ease the Saudi-imposed blockade.

“The Saudis and Emiratis have told us repeatedly that they want to weaken Iran, but they’ve actually empowered them,” a senior Pentagon consultant who works on the Middle East told me. The Saudi actions, this official went on to explain, have backfired. Instead of intimidating the Qataris, the Saudis have “thrown them into the arms of the Iranians.” The result is an uneasy, but emerging Turkish-Qatari-Iranian alliance backed by Russia. “This isn’t just some kind of Gulfie dust-up, where we can go out and hold everyone’s hands,” this Pentagon consultant says. “The Saudis have handed the Iranians a gift and we’re on the outside looking in.”

The official then shook his head. “Listen, I can certainly understand where Mattis and Tillerson are coming from. I mean, with friends like these, who needs enemies.”

Mark Perry is a foreign policy analyst and the author of *The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur*. His next book, *The Pentagon’s Wars*, will be released in October. He tweets @markperrydc <<https://twitter.com/markperrydc?lang=en>>

**From:** [redacted] SD  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#); [Donnelly, Sally SES SD](#); [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#); [Mikolay, Justin SES SD](#)  
**Subject:** OMB-cleared testimony  
**Date:** Sunday, June 11, 2017 3:59:38 PM  
**Attachments:** [FY 2018 Posture Testimony - OMB Cleared.docx](#)  
[FY 2018 Posture Testimony - OMB Cleared \(changes highlighted\).docx](#)

---

Mr. Secretary,

OMB has cleared your written testimony. Two files are attached: the first is the updated, clean copy and the second file highlights changes made.

OMB did not request any substantive changes. Edits include style (“Service members” vice “service members”) and a few changes to clarify text. These changes include:

- Pg 2: We need Congress to fully fund our request, “which requires an increase to the Defense budget caps” vice “which is above Defense sequestration caps”
- Pg 3: “annualized real defense budget increases of two to three percent” vice original “three percent” to align with Sec. Gates’ actual quote
- Pg 7: Improving our future readiness, “rapid adoption of off the shelf technologies” vice “exploitation of dual-use technologies”
- Pg 8: Changed to reflect Congress “support the Administration’s request” for additional resources; original omitted Administration-originated request
- Pg 11: BRAC will generate “\$2 billion or more” vice “\$2 billion”
- Pg 13: Added (based on AT&L request): “The President’s Nuclear Posture Review will look at all elements of U.S. nuclear forces to ensure that our nuclear deterrent, including our command, control, and communication systems, are appropriately tailored to deter emerging 21st century threats.”

Mr. Giambastiani will submit to HASC following your final approval of the revised language.

V/r,

[redacted]

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JIM MATTIS  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD  
MONDAY, JUNE 12, 2017**

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the **President's** budget request for Fiscal Year 2018.

I am pleased to be joined by Chairman Dunford and the Department's new Comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense David Norquist.

This budget request holds me accountable to the men and women of the Department of Defense. Every day, more than two million **Service** members and nearly one million civilians do their duty, honoring previous generations of veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed for our country. I am mindful of the privilege it is to serve alongside them.

We in the Department of Defense are keenly aware of the sacrifices made by the American people to fund our military. Many times in the past we have looked reality in the eye, met challenges with Congressional leadership, and built the most capable warfighting force in the world. There is no room for complacency and we have no God-given right to victory on the battlefield. Each generation of Americans, from the halls of Congress to the battlefields, earn victory through commitment and sacrifice.

And yet, for four years our military has been subject to or threatened by automatic, across-the-board cuts as a result of sequester – a mechanism meant to be so injurious to the military it would never go into effect. In addition, during nine of the past ten years, Congress has enacted 30 separate Continuing Resolutions to fund the Department of Defense, thus inhibiting our readiness and adaptation to new challenges.

I need bipartisan support for this budget request. In the past, by failing to pass a budget on time or eliminate the threat of sequestration, Congress sidelined itself from its active Constitutional oversight role. It has blocked new programs, prevented service growth,

stalled industry initiative, and placed troops at greater risk. Despite the tremendous efforts of this committee, Congress as a whole has met the present challenge with lassitude, not leadership.

For much of the past decade, my predecessors and prior members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that sequestration and the continued use of Continuing Resolutions would result in a steady erosion of military readiness. In 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, former Chairman of the House Budget Committee and the former Director of the Office of Management and Budget, testified sequester was “guaranteed to hollow out the force.”

I retired from military service three months after sequestration took effect. Four years later, I returned to the Department and I have been shocked by what I’ve seen with our readiness to fight. For all the heartache caused by the loss of our troops during these wars, no enemy in the field has done more to harm the readiness of our military than sequestration. We have only sustained our ability to meet America’s commitments abroad because our troops have stoically shouldered a much greater burden.

It took us years to get into this situation. It will require years of stable budgets and increased funding to get out of it. I urge members of this committee and Congress to achieve three goals:

- First, fully fund our request, which requires an increase to the Defense budget caps;
- Second, pass a FY 2018 budget in a timely manner to avoid yet another harmful Continuing Resolution; and
- Third, eliminate the threat of future sequestration cuts to provide a stable budgetary planning horizon.

Stable budgets and increased funding are necessary because of four external forces acting on the Department at the same time.

The first force we must recognize is 16 years of war. This period represents the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation's history. In more than a quarter century since the end of the Cold War, our country has deployed large-scale forces in active operations for more months than we have been at peace.

When Congress approved the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, our country never envisioned sending our military to war for more than a decade without pause or conscription. America's long war has placed a heavy burden on men and women in uniform and their families.

In recognition of these demands, Congress devoted more resources to recruiting and retaining members of the military. As a result, personnel costs as a fraction of the defense budget have risen over time.

Meanwhile, the war has exhausted our equipment faster than planned. Congress and the Department could not anticipate the accumulated wear and tear of years of continuous combat use. We have had to procure replacement gear and spend more money to keep gear serviceable and extend its service life. Due to this extensive use of our equipment across the force, operations and maintenance costs have also increased, rising faster than the rate of inflation during the past 16 years.

Worn equipment and constrained supplies have forced our personnel to work overtime while deployed or preparing to deploy. That too has placed an added burden on the men and women who serve and on their families. This further degrades readiness in a negative spiral, for those not in the fight are at a standstill, unable to train as their equipment is sent forward to cover shortfalls or returned for extensive rework.

My predecessor, Secretary Gates, stated annualized real defense budget increases of **two to three** percent above inflation are needed to sustain the All-Volunteer Force in a way that keeps personnel, modernization, and readiness accounts in balance. In the six years since the passage of the Budget Control Act, a period of declining, flat, or modestly increasing budgets, we have not kept this balance.

Not long ago we convinced ourselves that when we pulled out of Iraq and ceased combat operations in Afghanistan, we would take two or three years to “reset and reconstitute” the force. Today’s operations dictate the best we can do is “reset and reconstitute in stride,” a reality that imposes its own stress on the Force.

A second concurrent force acting on the Department is the worsening global security situation. Our challenge is characterized by a decline in the long-standing rules-based international order, bringing with it a more volatile security environment than any I have experienced during my four decades of military service.

The most urgent and dangerous threat to peace and security is North Korea. North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them has increased in pace and scope. The regime's nuclear weapons program is a clear and present danger to all, and the regime's provocative actions, manifestly illegal under international law, have not abated despite United Nations' censure and sanctions.

We also look on the prospect of a new era, one governed by today's economic realities and returning once again to a balance of powers. A return to Great Power competition, marked by a resurgent and more aggressive Russian Federation and a rising, more confident, and assertive China, places the international order under assault. Both Russia and China object to key aspects of the international order so painstakingly built since the end of World War II. Both countries are making their objections known by challenging established international norms, such as freedom of the seas and the sovereignty of nations on their periphery.

Moreover, the breakdown of the broader Mideast order has given rise to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Security vacuums have allowed a revolutionary Iranian regime to sow violence, provoke wider Sunni-Shia confrontation, and pursue regional hegemony. More broadly, this need to preserve our security also requires us to sustain the international presence in Afghanistan to help stabilize the South Asia region and deny terrorists a safe haven.

Instability in the Middle East spills over into other regions. Extremists and extremist ideologies have spread to Europe, Africa, and Asia. Numerous countries are dealing with forced migration of people seeking to escape violence and despair, reminding us that problems originating in ungoverned or combat torn areas don't remain there. The United States is engaged in the Middle East to help restore order and give the people who live there a more hopeful future, building a better security situation for Americans who want a safer and more prosperous world for our future.

As one observer of the world has noted, we are "faced with two problems: first, how to reduce regional chaos; second, how to create a coherent world order based on agreed-upon principles that are necessary for the operation of the entire system." That observer, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and his fellow members of the Greatest Generation witnessed first-hand the costs of military unpreparedness. They learned the paramount need to prevent hostile states from gaining dominance. And they understood that while there is no way to guarantee peace, the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.

Under any circumstances, however, reducing regional chaos in tandem with our interagency partners and international allies to help foster a coherent order requires adequate diplomatic and military resources.

Adversaries contesting the United States constitute a third force impacting the Department. For decades the United States enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain or realm. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every operating domain is contested.

Outer space, long considered a sanctuary, is now contested. This creates the need to develop capabilities and capacities for more resilient satellites designed to withstand persistent kinetic and non-kinetic attack.

Our dominance of the air is challenged by the proliferation of advanced integrated air defense networks and 5<sup>th</sup>-generation aircraft. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program,

longer range weapons, and unmanned systems will help us impose our will on potential adversaries while preserving our aircraft and crews in combat.

Our command of the seas is threatened by long-range, land-based guided munitions battle networks designed to attack our ships at increasingly longer ranges. Our undersea superiority, unquestioned since the end of the Cold War, and a key competitive advantage, is challenged by both Russia and China.

Our dominance on land in conventional, high-end combined arms maneuver is threatened by the introduction of long-range air-to-surface and surface-to-surface guided weapons, advanced armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons, and tactical electronic warfare systems.

Cyberspace is now a contested operating realm at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Finally, our air, naval, ground and logistics bases are all under threat of accurate, all-weather, day-night guided munitions bombardment. This will complicate our operations and make passive and active base defenses more necessary and urgent.

A fourth concurrent force acting on the Department is rapid technological change. Among the other forces noted thus far, technological change is one that necessitates new investment, innovative approaches, and when necessary, new program starts that have been denied us by law when we have been forced to operate under Continuing Resolutions.

Rapid technological change includes developments in advanced computing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, miniaturization, additive manufacturing, meta-materials, directed energy, and hypersonics – the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.

Many of these advances are driven by commercial sector demands and research and development. New commercial technologies will change society, and ultimately, they

will change the character of war. The fact that many of these technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that will continue to erode the conventional overmatch our Nation has grown so accustomed to.

In this competitive environment, the Department must pay much more attention to future readiness, and regaining our Joint Force conventional overmatch over time. We must be willing and able to tap into commercial research, recognize its military potential, and develop new capabilities and the operational and organizational constructs to employ them faster than our competitors.

We must also be prepared to deal with technological, operational, and tactical surprise, which requires changes to the way we train and educate our leaders and our forces, and how we organize for improved Departmental agility.

Improving our future readiness, **rapid adoption of off the shelf technologies**, and preparing to deal with surprise are critical to modernization efforts, but constrained budgets and acquisition regulations have limited our ability to keep pace with rapid changes and sustain our competitive advantage.

In response to these realities, the Department must develop new weapons and capabilities, adjust concepts of operations, adapt our training, and spend more time war-gaming and exercising to improve our ability to fight and win.

Each of these four forces – 16 years of war, the worsening security environment, contested operations in multiple domains, and the rapid pace of technological change – require stable budgets and increased funding to provide for the protection of our citizens and for the survival of our freedoms. Because as expensive as it is for the American people to fund the military, it is far less costly in lives and treasure than a conventional war that we are unable to deter because we are seen as weak.

I reiterate that security and solvency are my watchwords as Secretary of Defense. The fundamental responsibility of our government is to defend the American people,

providing for our security—and we cannot defend America and help others if our Nation is not both strong and solvent. So we in the Department of Defense owe it to the American public to ensure we spend each dollar wisely. President Trump has nominated for Senate approval specific individuals who will bring proven skills to discipline our Department’s fiscal processes to ensure we do so.

This first step to restoring readiness is underway thanks to Congress’ willingness to support the Administration’s request for additional resources in FY 2017 to rebuild our most urgent needs. Your support of \$21 billion in additional resources allowed the Department to address immediate warfighting readiness shortfalls and to help fund the acceleration of the fight against ISIS.

This additional FY 2017 funding addresses vital warfighting readiness shortfalls, a necessary investment to ensure our military is ready to fight today, by putting more aircraft in the air, ships to sea, and troops in the field. Additionally, the funding provided for more maintenance, spare parts, training time, flying hours, munition stocks, and manpower.

We all recognize that it will take a number of years of higher funding delivered on time to restore readiness. To strengthen the military, President Trump requested a \$639.1 billion topline for the FY 2018 defense budget. Of this topline, \$574.5 billion supports Department of Defense base budget requirements – warfighting readiness and critical program requirements, including intelligence community requirements. The balance, \$64.6 billion, supports Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requirements.

The Department’s FY 2018 base budget with its \$52 billion increase above the National Defense Budget Control Act cap is the next step to building a larger, more capable, and more lethal joint force. The FY 2018 budget reflects five priorities: restoring and improving warfighter readiness, increasing capacity and lethality, reforming how the Department does business, keeping the faith with Service members and their families, and supporting Overseas Contingency Operations.

The first priority is continuing to improve warfighter readiness begun in FY 2017, filling in the holes from trade-offs made during 16 years of war, and six years of continuing resolutions and Budget Control Act caps. This budget request, as directed by the National Security Presidential Memorandum “Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces” issued on January 27, 2017, identifies and improves shortfalls in readiness, specifically in training, equipment, maintenance, munitions, modernization, and infrastructure.

The 30-Day Readiness Review, completed as part of the development of the FY 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations, identified significant challenges to recovering readiness, including budget uncertainty, high operational tempo, and the time required to rebuild readiness properly. As a result of this review, the Department submitted the FY 2018 budget request to enable the Joint Force to counter national security threats, fulfill steady-state demand, and implement readiness recovery plans.

The Army remains globally engaged with more than 180,000 Soldiers committed to combatant command deterrence and counterterrorism operations. The FY 2018 budget will restore a larger, more capable and lethal modernized force to defeat emerging regional and global near-peer adversaries. Combat Training Center rotations and home station training will help the Army develop capabilities for full-spectrum warfare. Additional Soldiers, training, and equipment will enable the Army to make significant progress towards restoring and sustaining readiness longer.

The Navy will continue implementation of its Optimized Fleet Response Plan, reduce the long-term maintenance backlog, and train to ensure the Fleet is ready to fight. Requested funding provides stable and predictable maintenance and modernization plans, and forces trained to a single full-mission readiness standard. Predictably building readiness with continued implementation of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan will increase aircraft carrier availability, fund ship operations to the anticipated level of required operational days, and improve quality of work and quality of life for Sailors.

The Air Force will restore funding to its Flying Hour Program, increase aircraft sustainment, and grow training resource availability. These steps will enable personnel to regain proficiency in critical skill areas. Investments into training ranges will increase

capacity and modernize the simulated threats our young men and women need to overcome to counter adversaries. The Air Force will also invest in home station high-end training, reducing the requirement to deploy for training.

The Marine Corps is committed to remaining capable of responding to crises anywhere around the globe. FY 2018 investments emphasize readiness for deployed and next-to-deploy forces, maintenance for aging platforms, and funding to maintain critical modernization programs. Fully integrated Combined Arms Exercises for all elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Forces will help recover full-spectrum readiness.

The second priority is increasing capacity and lethality while preparing for future investment in the FY2019 budget, driven by results from the National Defense Strategy. The FY 2018 budget request addresses resource gaps in the capabilities, readiness, and capacity needed to project power globally in contested environments, while emphasizing preparedness for future high-end security challenges. The budget request supports this priority through investment in advanced capabilities to reassert our technological edge over potential future adversaries, while having more units ready to fight.

The FY 2018 budget request seeks to fill the holes and achieve program balance before beginning to significantly grow capacity in future years. Part of achieving a more capable force involves pursuing innovative ways to develop the force and concepts of operation to reverse unfavorable cost ratios adversaries would seek to impose on the United States in future warfighting environments. The FY 2018 investments include power projection capabilities, nuclear modernization, a stronger missile defense, space-based systems, and cyberspace operations. Several of these options will expand the competitive space to our advantage vice allowing an adversary to define a conflict. Our budget request also ensures that the nation's current nuclear deterrent will be sustained, and supports continuation of its much needed modernization process.

The third priority is reforming how the department does business. I am devoted to gaining full value from every taxpayer dollar spent on defense, thereby earning the trust of Congress and the American people.

The Department is committed to reforming the acquisition enterprise to improve its ability to be innovative, responsive, and cost effective. The Department has begun implementation of a range of reform initiatives directed by the 2017 NDAA, to include disestablishment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the establishment of the Under Secretaries for Research and Engineering, and for Acquisition and Sustainment. Consistent with section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, this change will be in effect by February 1, 2018, or sooner if I'm able to set the necessary conditions.

The FY 2018 budget request includes notable reform efforts. I urge Congress to support the Department's request for authority to conduct a 2021 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, a cornerstone of our efficiencies program. The Department currently has more infrastructure capacity than required for operations - and foreseeable growth scenarios won't appreciably change this. I recognize the severity of BRAC's impact on communities and the careful consideration that members must exercise in considering it. In order to ensure we do not waste taxpayer dollars I would therefore greatly appreciate Congress' willingness to discuss BRAC authorization as an efficiency measure. That authorization is essential to improving our readiness by minimizing wasted resources and accommodating force adjustments. Waste reduction is fundamental to keeping the trust of the American people and is a key element of the efficiency/reform efforts that Congress and the Administration expect of us. Of all the efficiency measures the Department has undertaken over the years, BRAC is one of the most successful and significant – we forecast that a properly focused base closure effort will generate \$2 billion **or more** annually – enough to buy 300 Apache attack helicopters, 120 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, or four Virginia-class submarines.

During Fiscal Year 2018 the Department is on track to enter into a full, agency-wide financial statement audit as required by statute. As part of this effort, the Department has established a Cost Decision Framework that leverages commercial best practices. This initiative will give decision makers the information they need to make a fully informed, cost-based decision.

The fourth priority is keeping faith with Service members and families. Military and civilian personnel are the foundation of the Department of Defense. The Nation's commitment to these patriots willing to serve our country is built into the FY 2018 budget request and is demonstrated by the number of initiatives and programs to support their professional development and their personal and family lives.

Comprising roughly one-third of the Department of Defense budget, military pay and benefits are the single largest expense category for the Department. I believe providing competitive pay and benefits is a necessity to attract and retain the highly qualified people needed in today's military. The right people are the Department's most valuable asset, but we must continually balance these requirements against other investments critical to readiness, equipment, and modernization to ensure the military is the most capable warfighting force in the world. Balancing resources is particularly important as the Department reshapes the force needed to remain effective in an uncertain future. Investment in military compensation, Blended Retirement, the Military Health System, and family programs are essential to fielding the talent we need to sustain our competitive advantage on the battlefield.

The fifth priority is support for Overseas Contingency Operations. The FY 2018 President's Budget requests \$64.6 billion, focusing on Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, increasing efforts to sustain NATO's defenses to deter aggression, and global counterterrorism operations. Specifically, ISIS and other terrorist organizations represent a clear and present danger. The U.S. remains united and committed with the 66 nations of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition – plus the European Union, NATO, Arab League, and Interpol – to destroy ISIS. We will continue to support partner nations' diplomatic and military efforts through a security cooperation approach. I am encouraged by the willingness of our allies and partners to share the burden of this campaign.

The FY 2019 budget, informed by the National Defense Strategy, will grow the All-Volunteer Force. The Department will work with President Trump, Congress, and this committee to ensure the budget request we present for FY 2019-2023 is sustainable

and that it provides the Commander-in-Chief with viable military options in support of America's security.

Judicious spending of America's public money is critical to ensuring security while maintaining solvency. We already know we face a dilemma between increasing personnel end strength and force structure on the one hand, and investing in equipment as well as research and development on the other hand. These challenges are compounded by the pressing need to recapitalize the nuclear triad and the sealift fleet in the 2020s. The President's Nuclear Posture Review will look at all elements of U.S. nuclear forces to ensure that our nuclear deterrent, including our command, control, and communication systems, are appropriately tailored to deter emerging 21st century threats.

I know we will have to make hard choices as we develop our new defense strategy and shape the FY 2019-2023 defense program. With the help of Congress, I am confident we can build a force that is necessarily more lethal without placing an undue burden on the American economy.

I am keenly aware members of this committee understand the responsibility each of us has to ensuring our military is ready to fight today and in the future. I need your help to inform your fellow members of Congress about the reality facing our military – and the need for Congress as a whole to pass a budget on time.

Thank you for your strong support and for ensuring our troops have the resources and equipment they need to fight and win on the battlefield. I pledge to collaborate closely with you for the defense of our Nation in our joint effort to keep our Armed Forces second-to-none.

Chairman Dunford is prepared to discuss the military dimensions of the budget request.

# # #

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JIM MATTIS  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD  
MONDAY, JUNE 12, 2017**

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2018.

I am pleased to be joined by Chairman Dunford and the Department's new Comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense David Norquist.

This budget request holds me accountable to the men and women of the Department of Defense. Every day, more than two million Service members and nearly one million civilians do their duty, honoring previous generations of veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed for our country. I am mindful of the privilege it is to serve alongside them.

We in the Department of Defense are keenly aware of the sacrifices made by the American people to fund our military. Many times in the past we have looked reality in the eye, met challenges with Congressional leadership, and built the most capable warfighting force in the world. There is no room for complacency and we have no God-given right to victory on the battlefield. Each generation of Americans, from the halls of Congress to the battlefields, earn victory through commitment and sacrifice.

And yet, for four years our military has been subject to or threatened by automatic, across-the-board cuts as a result of sequester – a mechanism meant to be so injurious to the military it would never go into effect. In addition, during nine of the past ten years, Congress has enacted 30 separate Continuing Resolutions to fund the Department of Defense, thus inhibiting our readiness and adaptation to new challenges.

I need bipartisan support for this budget request. In the past, by failing to pass a budget on time or eliminate the threat of sequestration, Congress sidelined itself from its active Constitutional oversight role. It has blocked new programs, prevented service growth,

stalled industry initiative, and placed troops at greater risk. Despite the tremendous efforts of this committee, Congress as a whole has met the present challenge with lassitude, not leadership.

For much of the past decade, my predecessors and prior members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that sequestration and the continued use of Continuing Resolutions would result in a steady erosion of military readiness. In 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, former Chairman of the House Budget Committee and the former Director of the Office of Management and Budget, testified sequester was “guaranteed to hollow out the force.”

I retired from military service three months after sequestration took effect. Four years later, I returned to the Department and I have been shocked by what I’ve seen with our readiness to fight. For all the heartache caused by the loss of our troops during these wars, no enemy in the field has done more to harm the readiness of our military than sequestration. We have only sustained our ability to meet America’s commitments abroad because our troops have stoically shouldered a much greater burden.

It took us years to get into this situation. It will require years of stable budgets and increased funding to get out of it. I urge members of this committee and Congress to achieve three goals:

- First, fully fund our request, which requires an increase to the Defense budget caps;
- Second, pass a FY 2018 budget in a timely manner to avoid yet another harmful Continuing Resolution; and
- Third, eliminate the threat of future sequestration cuts to provide a stable budgetary planning horizon.

Stable budgets and increased funding are necessary because of four external forces acting on the Department at the same time.

The first force we must recognize is 16 years of war. This period represents the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation's history. In more than a quarter century since the end of the Cold War, our country has deployed large-scale forces in active operations for more months than we have been at peace.

When Congress approved the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, our country never envisioned sending our military to war for more than a decade without pause or conscription. America's long war has placed a heavy burden on men and women in uniform and their families.

In recognition of these demands, Congress devoted more resources to recruiting and retaining members of the military. As a result, personnel costs as a fraction of the defense budget have risen over time.

Meanwhile, the war has exhausted our equipment faster than planned. Congress and the Department could not anticipate the accumulated wear and tear of years of continuous combat use. We have had to procure replacement gear and spend more money to keep gear serviceable and extend its service life. Due to this extensive use of our equipment across the force, operations and maintenance costs have also increased, rising faster than the rate of inflation during the past 16 years.

Worn equipment and constrained supplies have forced our personnel to work overtime while deployed or preparing to deploy. That too has placed an added burden on the men and women who serve and on their families. This further degrades readiness in a negative spiral, for those not in the fight are at a standstill, unable to train as their equipment is sent forward to cover shortfalls or returned for extensive rework.

My predecessor, Secretary Gates, stated annualized real defense budget increases and efficiencies of two to three percent above inflation are needed to sustain the All-Volunteer Force in a way that keeps personnel, modernization, and readiness accounts in balance. In the six years since the passage of the Budget Control Act, a period of declining, flat, or modestly increasing budgets, we have not kept this balance.

Not long ago we convinced ourselves that when we pulled out of Iraq and ceased combat operations in Afghanistan, we would take two or three years to “reset and reconstitute” the force. Today’s operations dictate the best we can do is “reset and reconstitute in stride,” a reality that imposes its own stress on the Force.

A second concurrent force acting on the Department is the worsening global security situation. Our challenge is characterized by a decline in the long-standing rules-based international order, bringing with it a more volatile security environment than any I have experienced during my four decades of military service.

The most urgent and dangerous threat to peace and security is North Korea. North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them has increased in pace and scope. The regime's nuclear weapons program is a clear and present danger to all, and the regime's provocative actions, manifestly illegal under international law, have not abated despite United Nations' censure and sanctions.

We also look on the prospect of a new era, one governed by today's economic realities and returning once again to a balance of powers. A return to Great Power competition, marked by a resurgent and more aggressive Russian Federation and a rising, more confident, and assertive China, places the international order under assault. Both Russia and China object to key aspects of the international order so painstakingly built since the end of World War II. Both countries are making their objections known by challenging established international norms, such as freedom of the seas and the sovereignty of nations on their periphery.

Moreover, the breakdown of the broader Mideast order has given rise to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Security vacuums have allowed a revolutionary Iranian regime to sow violence, provoke wider Sunni-Shia confrontation, and pursue regional hegemony. More broadly, this need to preserve our security also requires us to sustain the international presence in Afghanistan to help stabilize the South Asia region and deny terrorists a safe haven.

Instability in the Middle East spills over into other regions. Extremists and extremist ideologies have spread to Europe, Africa, and Asia. Numerous countries are dealing with forced migration of people seeking to escape violence and despair, reminding us that problems originating in ungoverned or combat torn areas don't remain there. The United States is engaged in the Middle East to help restore order and give the people who live there a more hopeful future, building a better security situation for Americans who want a safer and more prosperous world for our future.

As one observer of the world has noted, we are "faced with two problems: first, how to reduce regional chaos; second, how to create a coherent world order based on agreed-upon principles that are necessary for the operation of the entire system." That observer, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and his fellow members of the Greatest Generation witnessed first-hand the costs of military unpreparedness. They learned the paramount need to prevent hostile states from gaining dominance. And they understood that while there is no way to guarantee peace, the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.

Under any circumstances, however, reducing regional chaos in tandem with our interagency partners and international allies to help foster a coherent order requires adequate diplomatic and military resources.

Adversaries contesting the United States constitute a third force impacting the Department. For decades the United States enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain or realm. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every operating domain is contested.

Outer space, long considered a sanctuary, is now contested. This creates the need to develop capabilities and capacities for more resilient satellites designed to withstand persistent kinetic and non-kinetic attack.

Our dominance of the air is challenged by the proliferation of advanced integrated air defense networks and 5<sup>th</sup>-generation aircraft. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program,

longer range weapons, and unmanned systems will help us impose our will on potential adversaries while preserving our aircraft and crews in combat.

Our command of the seas is threatened by long-range, land-based guided munitions battle networks designed to attack our ships at increasingly longer ranges. Our undersea superiority, unquestioned since the end of the Cold War, and a key competitive advantage, is challenged by both Russia and China.

Our dominance on land in conventional, high-end combined arms maneuver is threatened by the introduction of long-range air-to-surface and surface-to-surface guided weapons, advanced armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons, and tactical electronic warfare systems.

Cyberspace is now a contested operating realm at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Finally, our air, naval, ground and logistics bases are all under threat of accurate, all-weather, day-night guided munitions bombardment. This will complicate our operations and make passive and active base defenses more necessary and urgent.

A fourth concurrent force acting on the Department is rapid technological change. Among the other forces noted thus far, technological change is one that necessitates new investment, innovative approaches, and when necessary, new program starts that have been denied us by law when we have been forced to operate under Continuing Resolutions.

Rapid technological change includes developments in advanced computing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, miniaturization, additive manufacturing, meta-materials, directed energy, and hypersonics – the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.

Many of these advances are driven by commercial sector demands and research and development. New commercial technologies will change society, and ultimately, they

will change the character of war. The fact that many of these technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that will continue to erode the conventional overmatch our Nation has grown so accustomed to.

In this competitive environment, the Department must pay much more attention to future readiness, and regaining our Joint Force conventional overmatch over time. We must be willing and able to tap into commercial research, recognize its military potential, and develop new capabilities and the operational and organizational constructs to employ them faster than our competitors.

We must also be prepared to deal with technological, operational, and tactical surprise, which requires changes to the way we train and educate our leaders and our forces, and how we organize for improved Departmental agility.

Improving our future readiness, rapid adoption of off the shelf technologies, and preparing to deal with surprise are critical to modernization efforts, but constrained budgets and acquisition regulations have limited our ability to keep pace with rapid changes and sustain our competitive advantage.

In response to these realities, the Department must develop new weapons and capabilities, adjust concepts of operations, adapt our training, and spend more time war-gaming and exercising to improve our ability to fight and win.

Each of these four forces – 16 years of war, the worsening security environment, contested operations in multiple domains, and the rapid pace of technological change – require stable budgets and increased funding to provide for the protection of our citizens and for the survival of our freedoms. Because as expensive as it is for the American people to fund the military, it is far less costly in lives and treasure than a conventional war that we are unable to deter because we are seen as weak.

I reiterate that security and solvency are my watchwords as Secretary of Defense. The fundamental responsibility of our government is to defend the American people,

providing for our security—and we cannot defend America and help others if our Nation is not both strong and solvent. So we in the Department of Defense owe it to the American public to ensure we spend each dollar wisely. President Trump has nominated for Senate approval specific individuals who will bring proven skills to discipline our Department’s fiscal processes to ensure we do so.

This first step to restoring readiness is underway thanks to Congress’ willingness to support the Administration’s request for additional resources in FY 2017 to rebuild our most urgent needs. Your support of \$21 billion in additional resources allowed the Department to address immediate warfighting readiness shortfalls and to help fund the acceleration of the fight against ISIS.

This additional FY 2017 funding addresses vital warfighting readiness shortfalls, a necessary investment to ensure our military is ready to fight today, by putting more aircraft in the air, ships to sea, and troops in the field. Additionally, the funding provided for more maintenance, spare parts, training time, flying hours, munition stocks, and manpower.

We all recognize that it will take a number of years of higher funding delivered on time to restore readiness. To strengthen the military, President Trump requested a \$639.1 billion topline for the FY 2018 defense budget. Of this topline, \$574.5 billion supports Department of Defense base budget requirements – warfighting readiness and critical program requirements, including intelligence community requirements. The balance, \$64.6 billion, supports Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requirements.

The Department’s FY 2018 base budget with its \$52 billion increase above the National Defense Budget Control Act cap is the next step to building a larger, more capable, and more lethal joint force. The FY 2018 budget reflects five priorities: restoring and improving warfighter readiness, increasing capacity and lethality, reforming how the Department does business, keeping the faith with Service members and their families, and supporting Overseas Contingency Operations.

The first priority is continuing to improve warfighter readiness begun in FY 2017, filling in the holes from trade-offs made during 16 years of war, and six years of continuing resolutions and Budget Control Act caps. This budget request, as directed by the National Security Presidential Memorandum “Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces” issued on January 27, 2017, identifies and improves shortfalls in readiness, specifically in training, equipment, maintenance, munitions, modernization, and infrastructure.

The 30-Day Readiness Review, completed as part of the development of the FY 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations, identified significant challenges to recovering readiness, including budget uncertainty, high operational tempo, and the time required to rebuild readiness properly. As a result of this review, the Department submitted the FY 2018 budget request to enable the Joint Force to counter national security threats, fulfill steady-state demand, and implement readiness recovery plans.

The Army remains globally engaged with more than 180,000 Soldiers committed to combatant command deterrence and counterterrorism operations. The FY 2018 budget will restore a larger, more capable and lethal modernized force to defeat emerging regional and global near-peer adversaries. Combat Training Center rotations and home station training will help the Army develop capabilities for full-spectrum warfare. Additional Soldiers, training, and equipment will enable the Army to make significant progress towards restoring and sustaining readiness longer.

The Navy will continue implementation of its Optimized Fleet Response Plan, reduce the long-term maintenance backlog, and train to ensure the Fleet is ready to fight. Requested funding provides stable and predictable maintenance and modernization plans, and forces trained to a single full-mission readiness standard. Predictably building readiness with continued implementation of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan will increase aircraft carrier availability, fund ship operations to the anticipated level of required operational days, and improve quality of work and quality of life for Sailors.

The Air Force will restore funding to its Flying Hour Program, increase aircraft sustainment, and grow training resource availability. These steps will enable personnel to regain proficiency in critical skill areas. Investments into training ranges will increase

capacity and modernize the simulated threats our young men and women need to overcome to counter adversaries. The Air Force will also invest in home station high-end training, reducing the requirement to deploy for training.

The Marine Corps is committed to remaining capable of responding to crises anywhere around the globe. FY 2018 investments emphasize readiness for deployed and next-to-deploy forces, maintenance for aging platforms, and funding to maintain critical modernization programs. Fully integrated Combined Arms Exercises for all elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Forces will help recover full-spectrum readiness.

The second priority is increasing capacity and lethality while preparing for future investment in the FY2019 budget, driven by results from the National Defense Strategy. The FY 2018 budget request addresses resource gaps in the capabilities, readiness, and capacity needed to project power globally in contested environments, while emphasizing preparedness for future high-end security challenges. The budget request supports this priority through investment in advanced capabilities to reassert our technological edge over potential future adversaries, while having more units ready to fight.

The FY 2018 budget request seeks to fill the holes and achieve program balance before beginning to significantly grow capacity in future years. Part of achieving a more capable force involves pursuing innovative ways to develop the force and concepts of operation to reverse unfavorable cost ratios adversaries would seek to impose on the United States in future warfighting environments. The FY 2018 investments include power projection capabilities, nuclear modernization, a stronger missile defense, space-based systems, and cyberspace operations. Several of these options will expand the competitive space to our advantage vice allowing an adversary to define a conflict. Our budget request also ensures that the nation's current nuclear deterrent will be sustained, and supports continuation of its much needed modernization process.

The third priority is reforming how the department does business. I am devoted to gaining full value from every taxpayer dollar spent on defense, thereby earning the trust of Congress and the American people.

The Department is committed to reforming the acquisition enterprise to improve its ability to be innovative, responsive, and cost effective. The Department has begun implementation of a range of reform initiatives directed by the 2017 NDAA, to include disestablishment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the establishment of the Under Secretaries for Research and Engineering, and for Acquisition and Sustainment. Consistent with section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, this change will be in effect by February 1, 2018, or sooner if I'm able to set the necessary conditions.

The FY 2018 budget request includes notable reform efforts. I urge Congress to support the Department's request for authority to conduct a 2021 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, a cornerstone of our efficiencies program. The Department currently has more infrastructure capacity than required for operations - and foreseeable growth scenarios won't appreciably change this. I recognize the severity of BRAC's impact on communities and the careful consideration that members must exercise in considering it. In order to ensure we do not waste taxpayer dollars I would therefore greatly appreciate Congress' willingness to discuss BRAC authorization as an efficiency measure. That authorization is essential to improving our readiness by minimizing wasted resources and accommodating force adjustments. Waste reduction is fundamental to keeping the trust of the American people and is a key element of the efficiency/reform efforts that Congress and the Administration expect of us. Of all the efficiency measures the Department has undertaken over the years, BRAC is one of the most successful and significant – we forecast that a properly focused base closure effort will generate \$2 billion or more annually – enough to buy 300 Apache attack helicopters, 120 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, or four Virginia-class submarines.

During Fiscal Year 2018 the Department is on track to enter into a full, agency-wide financial statement audit as required by statute. As part of this effort, the Department has established a Cost Decision Framework that leverages commercial best practices. This initiative will give decision makers the information they need to make a fully informed, cost-based decision.

The fourth priority is keeping faith with Service members and families. Military and civilian personnel are the foundation of the Department of Defense. The Nation's commitment to these patriots willing to serve our country is built into the FY 2018 budget request and is demonstrated by the number of initiatives and programs to support their professional development and their personal and family lives.

Comprising roughly one-third of the Department of Defense budget, military pay and benefits are the single largest expense category for the Department. I believe providing competitive pay and benefits is a necessity to attract and retain the highly qualified people needed in today's military. The right people are the Department's most valuable asset, but we must continually balance these requirements against other investments critical to readiness, equipment, and modernization to ensure the military is the most capable warfighting force in the world. Balancing resources is particularly important as the Department reshapes the force needed to remain effective in an uncertain future. Investment in military compensation, Blended Retirement, the Military Health System, and family programs are essential to fielding the talent we need to sustain our competitive advantage on the battlefield.

The fifth priority is support for Overseas Contingency Operations. The FY 2018 President's Budget requests \$64.6 billion, focusing on Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, increasing efforts to sustain NATO's defenses to deter aggression, and global counterterrorism operations. Specifically, ISIS and other terrorist organizations represent a clear and present danger. The U.S. remains united and committed with the 66 nations of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition – plus the European Union, NATO, Arab League, and Interpol – to destroy ISIS. We will continue to support partner nations' diplomatic and military efforts through a security cooperation approach. I am encouraged by the willingness of our allies and partners to share the burden of this campaign.

The FY 2019 budget, informed by the National Defense Strategy, will grow the All-Volunteer Force. The Department will work with President Trump, Congress, and this committee to ensure the budget request we present for FY 2019-2023 is sustainable

and that it provides the Commander-in-Chief with viable military options in support of America's security.

Judicious spending of America's public money is critical to ensuring security while maintaining solvency. We already know we face a dilemma between increasing personnel end strength and force structure on the one hand, and investing in equipment as well as research and development on the other hand. These challenges are compounded by the pressing need to recapitalize the nuclear triad and the sealift fleet in the 2020s. The President's Nuclear Posture Review will look at all elements of U.S. nuclear forces to ensure that our nuclear deterrent, including our command, control, and communication systems, are appropriately tailored to deter emerging 21st century threats.

I know we will have to make hard choices as we develop our new defense strategy and shape the FY 2019-2023 defense program. With the help of Congress, I am confident we can build a force that is necessarily more lethal without placing an undue burden on the American economy.

I am keenly aware members of this committee understand the responsibility each of us has to ensuring our military is ready to fight today and in the future. I need your help to inform your fellow members of Congress about the reality facing our military – and the need for Congress as a whole to pass a budget on time.

Thank you for your strong support and for ensuring our troops have the resources and equipment they need to fight and win on the battlefield. I pledge to collaborate closely with you for the defense of our Nation in our joint effort to keep our Armed Forces second-to-none.

Chairman Dunford is prepared to discuss the military dimensions of the budget request.

# # #

**From:** [Donnelly, Sally SES SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#); [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#); [Mikolay, Justin SES SD](#)  
**Subject:** Re: A thought for tomorrow and beyond  
**Date:** Sunday, February 26, 2017 7:05:35 PM

---

Sir,

Happy to talk in AM. Agree on all: I was just thinking there may be new players in the room who may not have heard you explain it directly, or may benefit from hearing your view again. (for example, by Trump memorandum, the Treasury Secretary, the Secretary of Energy and the UN Amb are all 'regular attendees' at a PC).

Sally Donnelly  
Senior Advisor  
to the [Secretary of Defense](#)

Unclass: [\(b\)\(6\)](#)

Secure: [\(b\)\(6\)](#)

From: SecDef26

Sent: Sunday, February 26, 2017 4:25 PM

To: Donnelly, Sally SES SD

Cc: Faller, Craig RADM SD; Sweeney, Kevin SES SD; Mikolay, Justin SES SD

Subject: RE: A thought for tomorrow and beyond

Thanks, Bumpy. Defeat of ISIS/AQ/Jihadist terrorists is a multi-generational effort for sure (like our Indian wars) something that has been discussed at length in the Pentagon and at the WH. I think we've pressed pretty hard already for the definition of the political end state: see the placemat with the definition of driving this down to a law enforcement level of handling as the military definition of our piece of the campaign, or see the definition of victory/political end state in my signed memo to the President (also ensuring that this is no longer an operational threat). If you're now saying the definition is insufficient please see me first thing in the morning since this is what we've spent a lot of time parsing out between the Chairman, IC, J-5 and Policy. We can talk secure today if necessary, I should be free from 1730 to 1805 this evening and again from 1930 to 2015 this eve. Jim

From: Donnelly, Sally SES SD  
Sent: Sunday, February 26, 2017 4:05 PM  
To: SecDef26 <[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>  
Cc: Faller, Craig RADM SD <[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>; Sweeney, Kevin SES SD <[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>;  
Mikolay, Justin SES SD <[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>  
Subject: A thought for tomorrow and beyond

Sir,

A thought for tomorrow, informed by conversations Sat at house and last week in building.

The task you have been given to 'defeat' is in a sense a narrow, operational one, but the 'solution' is one that will require a generation or more of governments responsive to their people. In that latter effort, the DOD can play a supportive role(IMET anyone?) but clearly not determinative. Also, Gen. Zinni started with THE question: what is the political endstate? And while all Administrations think in four year time periods, what can actually be accomplished in that time may be modest. Worth pointing out to a group not well schooled on some of this.

Sally Donnelly  
Senior Advisor  
to the Secretary of Defense  
Unclass: (b)(6)   
Secure: (b)(6) 

**From:** [SecDef26](#)  
**To:** [Donnelly, Sally SES SD](#)  
**Cc:** [Sweeney Kevin SES SD](#) (b)(6) [SD; Faller Craig RADM SD](#) (b)(6) [SD; Mikolay Justin SES SD](#) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Almost final Qatar talking points  
**Date:** Monday, June 12, 2017 11:39:32 PM

Thanks, Bump.   Jim

-----Original Message-----

From: Donnelly, Sally SES SD

Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 11:31 PM

To: SecDef26 <(b)(6)>

Cc: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD (b)(6) (b)(6) SD (b)(6) (b)(6)

Faller, Craig RADM SD  (b)(6)  (b)(6) SD  (b)(6)  (b)(6) SD

(b)(6) > Mikolay, Justin SES SD (b)(6)

## Subject: Almost final Qatar talking points

## Original Message

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

-----Original Message-----

Original Message

From: [Dorothy, Sunny \(SES-3\)](#) [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 7:37 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Re: Sorry--can I get final Qatar talking points?

(b)(5)

Sally Donnelly  
Senior Advisor  
to the Secretary of Defense

(b)(6)

Original Message

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 7:30 PM

To: Donnelly, Sally SES SD

Subject: RE: Sorry--can I get final Qatar talking points? SD asking for them...

(b)(5)

Best

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Donnelly, Sally SES SD [mailto: (b)(6)]

Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 6:27 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: Sorry--can I get final Qatar talking points? SD asking for them...

Standing by....Ever had an energized former Marine encouraging you to find success...:) ?

Sally Donnelly  
Senior Advisor  
to the Secretary of Defense

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 5:36 PM

To: Donnelly, Sally SES SD; (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Sorry--can I get final Qatar talking points? SD asking for them...

Yes

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

From: Donnelly, Sally SES SD [mailto: (b)(6)]

Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 5:26 PM


To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: Sorry--can I get final Qatar talking points? SD asking for them...

Sally Donnelly  
Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Defense

(b)(6)



**From:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Subject:** Re: CENTCOM Statement on Turkey Strikes (UNCLASSIFIED)  
**Date:** Tuesday, April 25, 2017 8:31:31 PM

---

Sir

Not ~~directed~~ - somewhat of a surprise. ~~Guided~~ by State TP's.

Kevin M. Sweeney  
Chief of Staff

> On Apr 25, 2017, at 7:45 PM, SecDef26 < (b)(6)> wrote:  
>  
> Kevin - was this statement ~~directed~~ or ~~guided~~ by OSD, State or NSS press guidance? Jim  
>  
> -----Original Message-----  
> From: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD  
> Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2017 6:47 PM  
> To: SecDef26 < (b)(6)>  
> Subject: CENTCOM Statement on Turkey Strikes (UNCLASSIFIED)  
>  
> Sir,  
>  
> FYI.  
>  
> KMS  
>  
> -----Original Message-----  
> From: White, Dana W SES OSD (US) [[mailto:mailto:\(b\)\(6\)@dod.mil](mailto:mailto:(b)(6)@dod.mil)]  
> Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2017 6:44 PM  
> To: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD < (b)(6)>  
> Cc:  (b)(6) USN OSD PA (US) < (b)(6)>;  (b)(6) USAF OSD  
PA (US) < (b)(6)>;  (b)(6) SD < (b)(6)>;  (b)(6) SD < (b)(6)>; Faller, Craig RADM SD < (b)(6)>;  (b)(6) Donnelly, Sally SES SD  
< (b)(6)>  
> Subject: RE: SD Statement on Turkey Strikes (UNCLASSIFIED)  
>  
> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  
>  
> Chief,  
>  
> Here's the quote and the CNN story link below:  
>  
> "We are ~~deeply concerned~~ that Turkey conducted airstrikes earlier today in northern Syria and northern Iraq without proper coordination with the United States and the broader global coalition to ~~defeat~~ ISIS. We have expressed our concern to the government of Turkey," spokesman Maj. Adrian J.T. Rankine-Galloway said. "These airstrikes were not approved by the Counter ISIS Coalition. ...  
>  
> "Given the extraordinarily complex battle space in these areas, it is vital that Turkey and all partners in the ~~defeat~~ ISIS effort coordinate their actions closely as we work together to maintain maximum pressure on ISIS and ensure the safety of all coalition personnel in theater."  
>  
> <http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/25/middleeast/turkish-airstrikes/>  
>

> V/R,

> Dana

>

>

**From:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#)  
**Subject:** RE: DoD Afternoon Update | 27 March 2017 (UNCLASSIFIED)  
**Date:** Monday, March 27, 2017 5:57:08 PM

---

Yes sir.

-----Original Message-----

From: SecDef26  
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2017 5:41 PM  
To: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD <(b)(6)>  
Cc: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD <(b)(6)>; Faller, Craig RADM SD <(b)(6)>  
Subject: RE: DoD Afternoon Update | 27 March 2017 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Thanks, Kevin. Pls tell PA I will continue this practice of occasionally taking a question during the photo spray (or whatever it's called when they photograph us at the outset of the bilats). M

-----Original Message-----

From: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD  
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2017 5:09 PM  
To: SecDef26 <(b)(6)>  
Subject: FW: DoD Afternoon Update | 27 March 2017 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Top story.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] [mailto:[REDACTED]]  
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2017 4:28 PM  
To: [REDACTED] SD <(b)(6)>; [REDACTED] SD <(b)(6)>;  
Borman, LeeAnn M SES OSD OASD LA (US) <(b)(6)>; Sweeney, Kevin SES SD  
<(b)(6)>; Donnelly, Sally SES SD <(b)(6)>; SD  
<(b)(6)>; CIV SD <(b)(6)>; Mikolay, Justin SES SD  
<(b)(6)>; Faller, Craig RADM SD <(b)(6)>; CIV OSD OUSD  
POLICY (US) <(b)(6)>; USN OSD PA (US)  
<(b)(6)>; CIV OSD PA (US) <(b)(6)>; [REDACTED]  
<(b)(6)>; USARMY OSD PA (US) <(b)(6)>; CIV JS OCJCS (US)  
<(b)(6)>; CIV OSD PA (US) <(b)(6)>; [REDACTED]  
<(b)(6)>; Hedger, Stephen HON SD <(b)(6)>;  
[REDACTED] USAF OSD OASD LA (US) <(b)(6)>; USN  
OSD PA (US) <(b)(6)>; Koffsky, Paul S SES OSD OGC (US)  
<(b)(6)>; [REDACTED] <(b)(6)>;  
USARMY OSD PA (US) <(b)(6)>; CIV OSD PA (US)  
<(b)(6)>; CIV JS OCJCS (US) <(b)(6)>;  
<(b)(6)>; [REDACTED] <(b)(6)>; Col  
USMC AFRICOM ACCC (US) <(b)(6)>; USAF CENTCOM CCCI  
(US) <(b)(6)>; USN COMPACFLT (US)  
<(b)(6)>; USARMY AFRICOM ACCS-PA (US)  
<(b)(6)>; USARMY SOUTHCOM SC-CC (US)  
<(b)(6)>; USN (US) <(b)(6)>;  
<(b)(6)>; USN NORAD-USNC SPC STF (US) <(b)(6)>; USSOCOM  
HQ <(b)(6)>; USN STRATCOM J020 (US)

<[b](6)>:[b](6) USARMY FORSCOM (US)  
<[b](6)>:[b](6) USN TRANSCOM TCPA (US)  
<[b](6)>:[b](6) Thomas, Edward W (Ed) JR Brig Gen USAF SAF-PA (US)  
<[b](6)>  
Cc:[b](6) <[b](6)>  
Subject: DoD Afternoon Update | 27 March 2017 (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DOD AFTERNOON UPDATE | 27 MARCH AS OF 1600 HRS TOP ISSUES (IN ROUGH ORDER BY PROMINENCE, VOLUME)

**SEC. MATTIS MEETING WITH QATARI MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE AFFAIRS**

. Sec. Mattis defended U.S. airstrikes: "There is no military force in the world that has proven more sensitive to civilian casualties," said Sec. Mattis when asked about recent airstrikes that have allegedly resulted in high civilian casualties. He said that the "U.S. is 'keenly aware' that it is fighting an enemy who 'hides behind women and children.'" He added, "We go out of our way to always do everything humanly possible to reduce the loss of life or injury among innocent people. The same cannot be said for our adversaries." [See attachment for CNN video link] (Reuters, Washington Examiner)

**COL. JOHN THOMAS BRIEFING**

. U.S. military does not intend to change the way it carries out airstrikes, even as fighting in Mosul enters more densely populated areas, Col. Thomas told reporters. He added that "General Votel is not looking into changing the way we operate other than to say our processes are good and we want to make sure we live by those processes." (Reuters)

. CENTCOM reviewing 700 videos of every airstrike in Mosul over a ten day period to investigate alleged casualties, said Col. Thomas. He added that the U.S. only bombed legitimate targets designated by Iraqi Security Forces. (Washington Examiner)

**GEN. THOMAS WALDHAUSER AT DEFENSE WRITERS GROUP**

. AFRICOM concerned about China opening up a military base in Djibouti close to the U.S. military's Camp Lemonnier, said Gen. Waldhauser. He said, "There are some very significant . operational security concerns," and "we've never had a base of, let's just say, a peer competitor as close as this one happens to be." (Inside Defense, National Defense Magazine)

**SYRIA / IRAQ / ISIS**

**Syria**

. The Tabqa Euphrates dam is not damaged or malfunctioning and engineers inspected its operations fully, SDF spokeswoman Jihan Sheikh Ahmed said. Colonel Joseph Scrocca said the coalition was taking every precaution to ensure the dam's integrity and that the dam was not in imminent danger. (wires)

. A leading Kurdish politician said Raqqa would join a decentralized system of government being set up by Syrian Kurdish groups and their allies once the city is freed from ISIS. Saleh Muslim, co-chair of the Syrian Kurdish PYD, said it would be up to the people of Raqqa to decide their future, but he thinks the city will choose to join the "democratic federal" system. (Reuters)

. Hundreds of rebels left their last bastion in Homs, resuming an evacuation expected to be among the largest of its kind under a Russian-backed deal with the government, state media and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. Heavy fighting between rebel groups and the army further north in Hama province over the weekend had delayed their departure from the city's al-Waer district, the Observatory said. (Reuters)

. Syrian rebels discovered extensive network of tunnels used by ISIS in al-Bab: A spokesman for the U.S.-led coalition said ISIS' use of tunnels in cities is "a challenge for our partner forces" and allows them to "move undetected." (Reuters)

**Iraq**

. U.S. sending over 200 soldiers to support Iraqi forces in retaking western Mosul, military officials said. The troops from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C. are expected to leave for Iraq within 36 hours. They will be clearing roadside bombs and not engaging in direct front-line combat. (NYT)

. Iraqi forces make new push in Mosul Old City, according to the federal police. They added that the units were

advancing towards the al-Nuri mosque area in an effort to "tighten the noose" on ISIS. Although, Iraqi parliament speaker suggested that operations would cease if more civilian casualties occurred in the city. (Reuters)

. Iraqi and coalition commanders are being forced to change tactics in west Mosul, Reuters reported, because of "risky close-quarters fighting in the narrow alleys of Mosul's Old City near the [al-Nuri] mosque and reports of huge casualties after an air strike."

o U.S. Army Brig. Gen. John Richardson said Iraqi forces were considering isolating the Old City rather than fighting through it while opening up a second front to split militant ranks and clear the rest of Mosul. "They know the old city is the center of gravity and they know they are going to have to eventually go in and clear it. The mosque is symbolic. They have run into some tougher resistance, but it's the terrain rather than the enemy," said Brig. Gen. Richardson.

## MIDDLE EAST

. 11 dead after attack on government compound in southern Yemen, officials said. They added that six security personnel and five attackers were killed. Deputy Governor Abdulfatah Ahmed accused al Qaeda of being behind the attack. (Reuters)

. Syria sent a message via Russia that any further Israeli strikes will be met with Scud missiles. (Daily Mail)

## DOD

. Pentagon to review Lockheed Martin's new heavy lift helicopter this week: If approved, the Defense Department would order 24 King Stallion helicopters out of a total 200 planned for the Marine Corps. (Daily Caller)

## EUROPE / RUSSIA

. No evidence to suggest that U.K. parliament attacker, Khalid Masood, was connected to ISIS or al Qaeda, a senior counterterrorism official told AP.

## AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN

. The Afghan government arrested a senior general on corruption charges a year after he was deployed to crack down on fraud in Helmand province. Maj. Gen. Mohammad Moeen Faqeer was detained by the Attorney Generals' Anti-Corruption Justice Center, defense ministry spokesman Dawlat Waziri said. Reuters noted that in early 2016, a U.S. military spokesman said the Pentagon was "very, very impressed" with Faqeer, saying "he is personally invested in turning around the [Afghan Army's] 215th Corps."

. Afghan security ministers survive impeachment vote: The Afghan defense and interior ministers and the head of the country's intelligence service survived a vote of confidence called on Monday over the failure to tackle mounting insecurity and the Taliban insurgency. (Reuters)

## AFRICA

. The Kenyan military said it killed 31 al Shabaab militants in a raid in Baadhade district in southern Somalia, but the militant group denied it. Kenya said its ground troops were supported in the Sunday raid by helicopter gunships and artillery fire to strike two al Shabaab bases. (AP)

. Suspected Boko Haram fighters stormed a village in northeast Nigeria and killed three people on suspicion of collaborating with the military, security sources told AFP.

. The Republic of Somaliland's minister of foreign affairs penned an op-ed for WP titled, "We're not a part of Somalia, Mr. Trump - and don't belong in your ban."

## ASIA

. The Philippines took delivery of two Japanese military surveillance aircraft to help it patrol vital sea lanes in the South China Sea. Japan will lease a total of five surplus Beechcraft TC-90 planes to the Philippines, according to Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana. (AFP)

. Philippine President Duterte said Philippine-U.S. relations remain strong "and there is readiness to discuss more matters of mutual interest" with America, according to a statement sent by his spokesman after Duterte's meeting with U.S. Ambassador Sung Kim. (Bloomberg)

## POLICY

. U.S. and others boycotted UN talks to ban nuclear weapons: While U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley said she supported a world without nuclear weapons, she added, "But we have to be realistic. Is there anyone who thinks that North Korea would ban nuclear weapons?" China, Russia, France, and U.K. among others also boycotted. (multiple)

-----  
[redacted]  
(b)(6)

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Media Analysis (OMNITEC Solutions, Inc.)

[redacted]  
(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#); [Donnelly, Sally SES SD](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Iraqi Immigration  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 31, 2017 7:29:55 AM

---

Sir,

Update from Policy & OGC:



---

**From:** SecDef26  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 24, 2017 10:24 AM  
**To:** Sweeney, Kevin SES SD <[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>  
**Subject:** FW: Iraqi Immigration

**From:** James Stavridis [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 23, 2017 1:40 PM  
**To:** SecDef26 <(b)(6)>; Sweeney, Kevin <(b)(6)>; Craig Faller  
<(b)(6)>  
**Subject:** Iraqi Immigration

Mr. Secretary, Shipmate Jim

You have both been a key supporter of the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs. As I am sure you know, because the Iraqi SIV program has been closed to new applications for almost three years, Iraqi national partners whose lives are at risk must be processed through the general refugee program. Because of limited processing, more than 50,000 Iraqis who meet these requirements -- having worked for us in various key roles -- are currently trapped in Iraq.

It seems inevitable that the overall cap on refugee admissions will be lowered this coming fiscal year, and I am concerned that will add to the backlogs and danger that these local partners and their families face. The President determines the number of refugees who can be resettled in a given year.

**I would urge you to exempt Iraqi partners applying through Iraqi program from the overall refugee quota** in the President's proposed refugee admissions.

Of course, exempting such applicants from the quota would not alter the vetting and screening processes; it would simply ensure that these partners continue to have a path to safety.

If you are willing to help with this important program, I would suggest that you have your team staff this, Jim, and that they work with Rex T at State to ensure that Iraqi local partners can reach safety.

I know you have SO much on your plate, but given your previous support for the special program, I wanted to suggest this idea of exempting from the overall number of refugees our former partners in Iraq.

Your shipmate, VR,

Jim

--  
James Stavridis, PhD  
Admiral, US Navy (Retired)  
Supreme Allied Commander at NATO, 2009-2013  
Dean, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy  
Tufts University  
160 Packard Avenue  
Medford, MA 02155

Office: (b)(6)

Find me on Facebook and Twitter

Facebook: (b)(6)

Twitter: (b)(6)

My newest book, "The Accidental Admiral" about my time at NATO is out


Available on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, USNI ...

<http://www.usni.org/store/books/biography-memoirs/accidental-admiral>

Two new books coming in 2017:

"The Leader's Bookshelf," the fifty books that make you a better leader -- March, USNI Press

"Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans" -- June, Penguin




**From:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Iraqi War Crimes  
**Date:** Thursday, May 25, 2017 10:56:16 PM  
**Attachments:** [IMG\\_8762.PNG](#)

---


Got it.

Kevin M. Sweeney  
Chief of Staff

On May 25, 2017, at 10:42 PM, SecDef26 <(b)(6)> wrote:

 Kevin – Could you forward this to Paul? I need to speak w/ him soonest. (b)(5)

 (b)(6) I can be free of intel by 0745. We're on sked to land around midnight tonight. Jim

From: (b)(6) [mailto:!\[\]\(a76428ab40aa0d9aaf430d62585f134b\_img.jpg\)\(b\)\(6\)>](#)  
Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2017 10:54 AM  
To: SecDef26 <(b)(6)>  
Subject: Re: Iraqi War Crimes

Sir,

The ABC News piece was just finally released. It was delayed because Iraqi Government elements have been threatening to harm ABC's Baghdad staff and the photojournalist's parents for the past couple of weeks. Germany's Der Speigel also featured the story this week.

The online piece can be viewed here: <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/deepdive/brian-ross-investigates-the-torture-tapes-47429895>

The story will also be featured on World News Tonight during this evening's broadcast.

MG Martin again tweeted relatively explicit praise for the ERD on May 13th. A screenshot is attached for your reference.

Godspeed to you and your team, Sir,

(b)(6)

<IMG\_8762.PNG>

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 04:31 SecDef26 <> wrote:

Dear 

I've not been looking much at my unclass nets. Thanks for forwarding these reports/background material. I've also not seen TV in a while; did ABC air their report(s)?


I'll look more deeply into these reports. 

 (b)(5)

Must rush this. Take care, thanks for keeping me in the loop. Best, Jim

From:  [mailto:]  
Sent: Monday, May 8, 2017 12:37 PM  
To: SecDef26 <>  
Subject: Iraqi War Crimes

Mr. Secretary,

I hope you have been keeping well since the last time we communicated following the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons against Khan Shaykhoon. I thank you and President Trump again for the integrity and courage you displayed, ensuring America's response was swift, proportionate, and on the right side of history. I   
 (b)(5)

I write to you today to once again discuss the topic that has vexed us for years: Iraq.

As you may recall, I collaborated with ABC News two years ago to expose the war crimes of Iraqi Government-aligned forces, many of whom the United States had spent \$25 billion training and equipping. Featured in dozens of videos and photos we gathered via social media, which the Iraqis had shot themselves and displayed online as war trophies, U.S. trained- and armed- Iraq Government forces were seen torturing, beheading, or summarily executing unidentified civilians with glee.

Without a doubt they were the most gruesome images I had ever seen – easily worse than anything I had seen while with the USG, and on par with the most graphic ISIS propaganda materials. Iraqi Forces, equipped with American M4s, Humvees, or MRAPs were featured beheading an individual and displaying his skull as a hood ornament on their Humvee; Iraqi special forces with SOF-spec M4s were seen torturing an unarmed, blindfolded detainee; and Iraqi Army elements appeared to summarily execute unarmed civilians in numerous other videos. The incidents were absolutely horrific – impossible to share with the public unabridged. After heavy editing, ABC did release the story in March 2015 via their Nightline evening news broadcast. The story may be seen here: <http://abcnews.go.com/International/dirty-brigades-us-trained-iraqi-forces-investigated-war/story?id=29193253> <<http://abcnews.go.com/International/dirty-brigades-us-trained-iraqi-forces-investigated-war/story?id=29193253>>

A couple of weeks later, at the Sulaimani Forum, a sort of mini-Manama Dialogue hosted annually in Iraqi Kurdistan, I ran into Falih al-Fayadh, the Iraqi National Security Advisor. I politely confronted him about the Iraqi war crimes and I asked him if they were ever going to hold their forces accountable, per Iraqi and international law. He responded furiously, insisting that they had to fight “fire with fire.” Fayadh, widely known across Iraq to have close personal relations with Qassim Soleimani, and widely believed to be a Qods Force asset, clearly wasn’t interested in upholding any semblance of the rule of law in Iraq. Unsurprisingly, ABC News has been unable to find any evidence that the incidents we uncovered were ever seriously investigated by the Iraqis, and as a result, we have seen no indications that anyone was ever held accountable.

As you are aware, Sir, the Iraqi Government’s excesses were a principal reason behind ISIS’ rise from the ashes of AQI. If these Iraqi atrocities continue unchecked, we will tactically defeat ISIS, only to see it mutate into a more virulent form several years from now. That is precisely what happened between 2003 and 2014, and I believe that is the trajectory we are currently on.

Fast-forwarding to today, I regret to inform you that war crimes carried out by Iraqi Government elements are ongoing, compelling ABC News to once again go public after months of investigation.

In a report that will be published in 24-48 hours, ABC News will chronicle the story of a brave Iraqi journalist who was embedded with the Iraqi Interior Ministry’s Emergency Response Division (ERD). Over a span of several months, ERD officers opened up to the journalist, allowing him to film them in high-definition as they carried out operations against ISIS. Bizarrely, they also allowed him to film them, or provided him cell phone videos, of them carrying out war crimes. As outlined further below and in the attached, the atrocities allegedly included:

1. Torturing unarmed detainees;
2. Executing detainees without due process; and even
3. Conspiring to conduct a raid near Mosul, specifically so that they could detain the male head of household, so they could rape his wife, whom they judged to be attractive.

As you are aware, Sir, these atrocities represent blatant violations of the Law of Land Warfare.

As I mentioned earlier, ABC News has gone to great lengths over the past several months to verify the accuracy of their upcoming report. They have had countless exchanges with the Iraqi Government, Embassy

Baghdad, and LTG Townsend's staff in Iraq, as documented in the attached email chain highlighting the death threats the Iraqi forces have made against the whistle-blower's family. ABC as received conflicting accounts as to whether DoD is providing support for the Iraqi Interior Ministry and the ERB, with [redacted] briefing [redacted] Pentagon press and confirming it in January and then [redacted] in April denying it.

Unfortunately, ABC has also taken note of 1ID and CJFLCC-OIR commander Major General Joseph Martin effusively praising Iraqi forces with ERB elements pictured within his tweets this year (see attached).

[redacted] (b)(5) [redacted], I would respectfully urge you, Sir, to keep the following in mind:

[redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

As always, I thank you for your time and consideration.

Yours sincerely,

(b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6) >  
To: (b)(6) >

Good chatting with you. As always, thank you for your wise counsel.

Attached is a list of six incidents of alleged human rights violations in Mosul last fall by Iraqi Emergency Response Division officers and soldiers which were documented by a very brave Iraqi photo-journalist working for VII Photo, who licensed his work to ABC News. I sent the list to LTG Townsend's command, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the Iraqi MOI/Emergency Response Division command staff and to the Italian Carabinieri. We have been told very little in reply except that the DOD does not "currently" train, arm or assist E.R.D. because of Leahy Act restrictions. This flies in the face of combat videos we have obtained which, for example, show E.R.D. troops in combat carrying the "Carl Gustav" anti-tank weapon donated in abundance by the U.S. under the Iraq Train And Assist Fund. It also appears to contradict the on-camera briefing by Army COL Brett Sylvia of Task Force Strike from Baghdad last January, who said the U.S. military is "advising" E.R.D., who he also praised:

<https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/article/1047532/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-col-sylvia-via-teleconference-from-bagh/>

Also attached is a file on Ali Abdul Hussein Abd, the E.R.D. "liaison" to the Coalition Forces and Italian Carabinieri, according to the Iraqi photo-journalist. The USEMB and LTG Townsend's spokesmen said they cannot "confirm or deny" that this man -- who is seen in hours of videos brutally torturing civilian prisoners later shown dead after being executed in the same room where they were tortured in Mosul -- ever worked for DOD or is or is not a U.S. citizen; Abd claims to be both, and he carried a U.S.-provided radio for deconfliction in ops.

The ABC NEWS story will be posted online Tuesday, May 9 and will air on "World News Tonight With David Muir" and "Nightline" that night.

Warmest Regards, James

(b)(6) [redacted]

ABC NEWS

National Security Investigative Reporter/Producer

mobile [redacted] (b)(6) >

(b)(6) [redacted]

(b)(6) [redacted]

**From:** [SecDef26](#)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Dunford, Joseph F Jr Gen USMC JS (US)  
**Subject:** RE: MOAB / Achin / Afghan reactions  
**Date:** Friday, April 14, 2017 5:41:06 PM

---

Tracking all (b)(6) I understand. Thanks, (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) [mailto: (b)(6)]  
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 4:46 PM  
To: SecDef26 <(b)(6)>  
Cc: Dunford, Joseph F Jr Gen USMC JS (US) <(b)(6)>  
Subject: Re: MOAB / Achin / Afghan reactions

Secretary Mattis,

Just hoping our multilayered 3D chess analysis in the region and country itself includes a hard look at / + equation of the Pashtun Juma Gul / Avg Joe mindset across hundreds and thousands of villages ... I know Gen Mick N is a very experienced war hand, and I respect him.

The governor in Khost (later assassinated) among many others who had family in Tora Bora schooled me well on the Pashtun -- that comment below abt "can kill his brother but can't bear a single slap from another's hand"

Best,

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 14, 2017, at 1:51 PM, SecDef26 <(b)(6)> wrote:

Thank you, (b)(6). Appreciate you keeping me in the loop. Best, Jim

From: (b)(6) [mailto: (b)(6)]  
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 11:48 AM  
To: SecDef26 <(b)(6)>; Dunford, Joseph F Jr Gen USMC JS (US)  
<(b)(6)>  
Subject: Fw: MOAB / Achin / Afghan reactions

Secretary Mattis, General Dunford,

Good morning. Just wanted to pass along the reactions from Afghans my inbox has been filling up with in the hours post-MOAB.

Realize the important geopolitical audiences rightly extend well beyond Afghans (and dead ISIS / Taliban), particularly in [redacted] neighborhood and with B. al-Assad

... but we should remember our Juma Guls / Avg Joes and their families too. Am sure the big papers will be getting Afghan street-level views soon in print as well. PDB probably not.

First is from a Nangahar doctor (who sent me the note a while back mourning Neil Armstrong's death ... that Hard/Soft -- Smart/Wise Power balance ... and Grand Canyon-sized gap that might fast develop)

Other views from Kunar, Khost, Kabul, beyond

Wishing you and our other leaders the best in these crucial times,

[redacted]  
(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

It is shaking ! The most biggest bomb is used in nangarhar by US army , people are completely shaked

From: [redacted]  
(b)(6)  
Date: April 14, 2017 at 1:14:58 AM MDT  
To: [redacted]  
(b)(6)  
Subject: Re: Big bomb

[redacted]  
(b)(6)

I just opened my account to email you people view

" Disgusting & Head to tail foolish decision against terrorism. Personally, I consider it a war against Afghans". ( Now you calculate what Afghans think about this action).

Another comments " As soon as ISIS, Taliban, Tajib, uzbek pashtoon... not make an alliance against Americans and not seek support from Russia, our home will be destroyed in such a manner"

" Is this stated in Quran that we should be ally to Americans. Let think to support Russia".

" Russia and China is our neighbor. According to Islam, Neighbor have more rights so let be friends with Russia and China, Get rid of America".

" We want that America destroy ISIS and terrorism, but they destroying us, Are we ISIS and Terrorist, if so, Let be terrorist and feel proud for that.

One of the guy, Whose father died in ANA, One brother in counter firing in Helmand, His one brother was slaughtered by Taliban, Commented " Today I realised that why Taliban killed my family. Today I forgive them all, What they did to my family member, they did good because my family supported killers of Humanity. Salute to Mullah Omar"



The way your government is fighting, This is truly lead all of us to destruction. We are working for people. One of your solider was killed in Achin, you know that, and such a reaction was done.

Please remind to your government to study Afghans behavior. Afghans can kill his brother, but can't bear a single slap from others hand".

Afghanistan is not a laboratory for your bombs.

Stop this experience. I can estimate the political and military purpose behind this bomb. I know that it was not actual target as it is shown, but this was not the time. This was not the place.



Sent from Outlook <<http://aka.ms/weboutlook>>

**From:** [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#) [b6] [b7d] SD  
**Subject:** RE: proposed words  
**Date:** Sunday, June 18, 2017 7:03:17 PM

---

Sir,

Solid copy

I like the changes – will run by CENTCOM, vr/Craig

Craig Faller  
RADM USN  
Sr Military Asst to SecDef

[b6]  
NIPR [b6]  
SIPR  
JWICS

---

From: SecDef26  
Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2017 6:50 PM  
To: Faller, Craig RADM SD <[b6]>  
Cc: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD <[b6]>; [b6] SD <[b6]>  
Subject: RE: proposed words

Craig – Edits below, feel free to adjust (brain dead here). CENTCOM can review for accuracy. M

---

From: Faller, Craig RADM SD  
Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2017 5:07 PM  
To: SecDef26 <[b6]>  
Cc: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD <[b6]>; [b6] SD <[b6]>  
Subject: proposed words

Sir, wanted to play back what you said on our telcon.

“We are unaware why the Syrian and Iranian regimes are firing into previously agreed de-confliction zones.

The Assad Regime’s combined arms ground attack into Coalition Forces engaged in fighting ISIS south of Raqqah, including the Regime conducting aircraft bombing into the de-confliction zone after being warned away, is inexplicable.

Today, the Iranian regime firing ballistic missiles into Raqqah, where Coalition Forces are fighting to seize the ISIS caliphate’s so-called capital, is also a clear violation of a counter-terrorist operating area previously established as a de-confliction zone, specifically designed to prevent this sort of dangerous activity.

We are working with Russia to figure out what the Assad regime and Iranians are up to.”

I left the number of missiles off since I suspect that info is still evolving.

If you are good with the words I will send to Dana.

Vr/Craig

Vr/Craig

Craig Faller  
RADM USN  
Sr Military Asst to SecDef

(b)(6) [redacted]  
NIPR (b)(6)  
SIPR [redacted]  
JWICS [redacted]

**From:** [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#)  
**To:** [SecDef26](#)  
**Cc:** [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Publications for You, the Deputy, and the SECDEF  
**Date:** Monday, March 13, 2017 6:54:17 PM

---


Wilco Sir, Vr/Craig

Craig Faller, RADM  
Sr Military Asst to SecDef

UNCLASS: (b)(6) 

NIPR: (b)(6) <[\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:(b)(6))>

SIPR: (b)(6) <[\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:(b)(6))>

From: SecDef26  
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 6:41 PM  
To: Faller, Craig RADM SD <>  
Cc: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD <>  
Subject: RE: Publications for You, the Deputy, and the SECDEF

Craig – Could you ask someone to print out Dr Collins' three articles? They look good and I want to study them.  
Thanks, Jim

From: Faller, Craig RADM SD  
Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2017 3:17 PM  
To: SecDef26 <>  
Cc: Sweeney, Kevin SES SD <>  
Subject: FW: Publications for You, the Deputy, and the SECDEF

Sir,

FYSA

Vr/Craig

Craig Faller

RADM USN

Sr Military Asst to SecDef

(b)(6) [redacted]  
NIPR (b)(6) [redacted]  
SIPR (b)(6) [redacted]  
JWICS (b)(6) [redacted]

From: (b)(6) CIV US NDU/CCO [mailto: (b)(6)]  
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2017 5:18 PM  
To: Faller, Craig RADM SD <(b)(6)>  
Subject: Publications for You, the Deputy, and the SECDEF

Admiral,

I write with two purposes.

First, I am an old friend of the SECDEF's (bio attached), beginning with our time together in DEPSECDEF Wolfowitz's front office. I have often sent him materials directly, but his civilian email is down, and I think it would be better to route my articles through you (or your designated representative) so that they can get into the queue in proper order. I enclose links to a few short pieces --- one on grand strategy, another on allies, and a third on "winning" in Afghanistan --- to serve as a test case.

- <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFO/Joint-Force-Quarterly-84/Article/1062026/toward-a-future-national-strategy-a-review-essay/>
- <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/316490-5-reasons-america-first-wont-work-without-our-allies>
- <https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/a-memo-to-the-next-president-on-winning-in-afghanistan/>

Second, I wanted to remind you that we have a great think tank over here at NDU, called the Institute for National Strategic Studies. Led by Dr. Rich Hooker, our 60-odd analysts --- most with the highest clearances --- cover a wide swath of issues. We can help you or SECDEF to go beyond what the staff can provide on a wide variety of subjects: China, Russia, ISIS, the Koreas, Afghanistan, and many others. (b)(6) our analysts, (b)(6) are among the most popular writers in the country on military strategy issues.

Our most recent products of note are a book on the strategic lessons of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a new book, which we sent to the SECDEF via Sally Donnelly called Charting the Course, 17 short articles meant to bring new officials up to speed on regional and functional topics.

Let me know how we can help you.

All the best,

Joseph J. Collins, Ph.D.

Colonel, USA retired

University Professor, and

Director of Center for Complex Opns.

Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU

(b)(6) [redacted],

(b)(6) [redacted], 24/7

(b)(6) [redacted] cellular



Joseph J. Collins

Dr. Joseph J. Collins was appointed Director of the Center for Complex Operations, a part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in July 2014, after a decade on the National War College faculty as Professor of National Security Strategy. Prior to that teaching assignment, Dr. Collins served for three years as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, the Pentagon's senior civilian official for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. His team led the stability operations effort in Afghanistan and created the Global Peace Operations Initiative, which President Bush took to the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit. From 1998-2001, he was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he did research on economic sanctions, military culture, and national security policy. In 1998, Dr. Collins retired from the U. S. Army as a Colonel after nearly 28 years of military service. His Army years were equally divided among infantry and armor assignments in the United States, South Korea, and Germany; teaching at West Point in the Department of Social Sciences; and a series of assignments in the Pentagon on the Army staff, in OSD Policy, and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Collins has also taught as adjunct faculty in the graduate divisions of Columbia University and Georgetown University Strategic Studies Program. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and holds a doctorate in Political Science from Columbia University. A former contributing editor of the *Armed Forces Journal*, he wrote *Understanding War in Afghanistan*, published by National Defense University Press (NDU Press) in 2011. He is an author in and the editor of *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War*, a book on the strategic lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. It was published in fall of 2015 by NDU Press.

**From:** [SecDef26](#)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Faller, Craig RADM SD](#); [Sweeney, Kevin SES SD](#)  
**Subject:** visit [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]  
**Date:** Monday, February 13, 2017 5:51:46 AM

---

(b)(6),

Thanks for following up, our Washington discussion was very helpful.

Either method will work. For delivering this note I could easily accept it directly from MoD Payne when I see her.

FYI, for passing any such information directly to my office POCs are my Sr Mil Asst RADM Craig Faller or my Chief of Staff Kevin Sweeney, both on the cc line.

Let's stay in touch.

Jim

---

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 5:39 AM  
To: Jim Mattis <(b)(6)>  
Subject: RE: visit [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Jim

I'm not sure this address will still work for you. But worth a try.

You and I talked about DPRK. Since I got back to Oz I've kicked this idea around with my defence and foreign affairs and int colleagues. We have some written points to pass on to you that I hope you will find useful.

The question is how to deliver them to you. A couple of options.

I get my guy in DC to deliver them to your office, personal for the Secretary.

Or, you are seeing Marise Payne in a few days and she could talk to them and/or pass them to you in writing - but would that be in too crowded a room?

Please let me know what you think.

All the best

(b)(6)

---

Sent with Good ([www.good.com](http://www.good.com) <<http://www.good.com>> )

From: Jim Mattis  
Sent: Wednesday, 11 January 2017 10:29:11 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: "Kevin Sweeney"  
Subject: RE: visit [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Thanks for staying in touch [redacted] and I'll see if I can do this once I get confirmed (which looks positive at this point). You've been busy and I would appreciate getting your views. I need to be a bit tentative about what I do/say between now and inauguration day when I'll finally have the consent of the Senate and executive authority to "act" as Sec Def. Any premature actions are strongly frowned upon so even setting up talks is awkward just now.

If you have a scheduler, that person could contact Kevin Sweeney (cc line) and they could tentatively work this meeting forward without my involvement, if that works for you.

All my best and hope to see you soon. Best, Jim

From: [redacted] [mailto:[redacted]]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2017 9:51 PM  
To: Jim Mattis <[redacted]>  
Subject: visit [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

UNCLASSIFIED

Jim

I'm going to be in DC for 5 or 6 days from 28 January, having spent three weeks travelling through Middle East (talking to likeminded and not-at-all likeminded – Tehran, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Ankara) about Syria, Iraq and ISIL – and with a side trip to Moscow.

If you have time, I would be very happy to come and share my thoughts with you and what I've picked up along the way – formally or informally. But given your impending status, I also get that this might not sit easily with Pentagon protocol. Please let me know what you think.

Best wishes and happy new year.

[redacted]

From: Jim Mattis [mailto:[(b)(6)]]  
Sent: Tuesday, 6 December 2016 8:45 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Congrats from Oz [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Thanks, Nick. No paygrade among friends. My sked is completely off-kilter w/ little predictability but we'll link up when the opportunity presents and were occupying the same space. Thank you for your note and all the best, Jim

From: [redacted] [mailto:[(b)(6)]]  
Sent: Monday, December 05, 2016 12:44 PM  
To: [redacted] <[redacted]>  
Subject: Congrats from Oz [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

UNCLASSIFIED

Dear Jim

My warmest congratulations on your nomination as SecDef. A tough job at any time, but with Syria, Iraq, Iran, ISIL, China and Russia, a job that will be even more important and fraught over the next few years.

I'm planning on touring the Middle East – including talking to people that the US doesn't much get to – in January, ending up in DC towards the end of the month, and after inauguration. You're moving way beyond my seniority/pay scale, but if you would like to have an informal chat as I pass through please let me know.

All the best

[redacted]