



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

CPA
memo

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *SJF 4/6/03*

SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Please ask (b)(6) to call (b)(6), the Rand economist,
at (b)(6) to discuss:

- (b)(6) memo on oil revenues; and
- How (b)(6) can help provide economic policy support and analysis for the CPA.

My idea is that (b)(6) could do it either from his current position in Rand or by moving to Washington and working out of the Pentagon. It may be useful for (b)(6) to visit the CPA in Baghdad.

We are eager to assist and (b)(6) is a capable guy. We need to hear from Peter if we are to help him.



(b)(6)

CV, OSD-POLICY

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:58 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Hebrew documents cache

We will do an initial assessment downtown today
best (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2003 4:58 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Hebrew documents cache

-----Original Message-----

From: feith (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 04, 2003 6:23 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Hebrew documents cache

(b)(6) - SD sent you a snowflake yesterday on this cache that is said to
hav
e been found in Iraqi intell hq. A few additional points for you:

Natan Sharansky, now a minister in Israeli gov't, wrote to VP Cheney
about
this. That may be how SD learned of this.

I've been told that the docs are in danger of imminent irreversible
damage
or destruction and some are ancient and priceless.

I trust that action can be taken to rescue the docs and get them
restored
and catalogued and analyzed without prejudice to whoever has ownership
rights. We should not let interesting legal questions about cultural
property and other rights delay the rescue of these documents.

All the best.

Doug

(b)(6)

CPA
Emails

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: feith [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 8:22 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Friday SD phone call

[REDACTED] - you may want to mention the following items on the call this morning, as each has been the subject of a SD snowflake or two:

1. Plan to use Alaska-style system for getting some oil revenues into the hands of Iraqi people.
2. Cong. Wolfe's idea about having a team, perhaps led by Hamre and Gordon Sullivan, do a quick study visit to Iraq.
3. Rescue of the medieval Hebrew documents that have been reported to have been found in the wet basement of the Iraqi intell hq in Baghdad.

My office will be happy to pursue and assist on all these items. I think it might be a good idea simply to mention to SD that you have seen his snowflakes on these matters and that we'll work them with you.

All the best.

Doug

(b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: faith (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 6:11 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: Memo to Bremer on (b)(6)

(b)(6) - Please do a memo from me, to send out this morning:

Please ask (b)(6) to call (b)(6) (give contact info) to discuss:

(b)(6) memo on oil revenues, and

How (b)(6) can help provide economic policy support and analysis for the CPA.

My idea is that Ben could do either from his current position in Rand or maybe by moving to Washington and working out of the Pentagon. It may be useful for (b)(6) to visit the CPA in Baghdad.

We are eager to assist and Ben is a capable guy. We need to hear from (b)(6) if we are to help him.

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: felth [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2003 6:02 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Cong. Wolfe's report

[REDACTED] - As you know, SD was impressed with Wolfe's report and likes the idea of a small team, perhaps led by [REDACTED] and Gen. Gordon Sullivan (ret.), going to Iraq for some days and doing a tour and a report on reconstruction efforts.

Please give us your views.

I assume you received a copy of the Wolfe report to SD and you have access to the Hamre CSIS study on the internet. If not we'll get them to you.

Doug

(b)(6)

CIV. OSD-POLICY

From: felth (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2003 5:56 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(6) oil revenue memo

(b)(6) - It would be useful to get your thoughts (or those of Peter M) on the memo from
(b)(6) about using an Alaska-model for oil revenues.

Doug

[redacted] CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: felth [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, June 04, 2003 8:23 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Hebrew documents cache

[redacted] - SD sent you a snowflake yesterday on this cache that is said to have been found in Iraqi intell hq. A few additional points for you:

Natan Sharansky, now a minister in Israeli gov't, wrote to VP Cheney about this. That may be how SD learned of this.

I've been told that the docs are in danger of imminent irreversible damage or destruction and some are ancient and priceless.

I trust that action can be taken to rescue the docs and get them restored and catalogued and analyzed without prejudice to whoever has ownership rights. We should not let interesting legal questions about cultural property and other rights delay the rescue of these documents.

All the best.

Doug

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: felix (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 02, 2003 8:18 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Penalties order

(b)(6) - Good. I'll get back to you on this when I hear from NSC staff on their Pub Affairs ideas.

Doug

IRAQ-CSIS

JUN 18 2003

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (L. PAUL BREMER)**

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DFP 6/18/03*

Subject: CSIS Team to Iraq

As you recall, Congressman Frank Wolf mentioned the "Play to Win" report by the Center for the Association of the United State Army (AUSA) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in his recent Iraq report to Secretary Rumsfeld. On June 13, LTG Skip Sharp and I met with John Hamre, head of CSIS and former DepSecDef, to explore the possibility of a CSIS-AUSA team going to Iraq.

We discussed a small team (no more than three or four people) going to Iraq as informal consultants to you and OSD. They would look at reconstruction efforts and make recommendations based on what they saw and what they know of reconstruction efforts in other countries. SecDef thinks there may be value in Hamre's leading such a group to Iraq. If you agree, I'll put Hamre in touch with the appropriate person on your staff.

Attached is the CSIS proposal. The proposal doesn't specify that Hamre will personally be on the team in Iraq, but I think he must participate. A key question is whether the team should go immediately, so their thoughts can be input for the campaign plan now in the works, or whether they should go in late July.



In addition to meeting with key coalition officials, it would be necessary to travel throughout Iraq and have a way to meet and talk with Iraqi citizens from all walks of life. Some of the time should also be spent outside of the official bubble with others who are active on the ground (e.g., NGOs). Given the brief time in country, our team could split up and cover different regions, but these kinds of details and the development of an itinerary should await direction from the field.

As I mentioned, we see ourselves as informal consultants, and as such would seek no compensation. We would expect the government to pay for travel to and from the United States and local costs. There would be a need for security support, transport, interpreters, and basic housing. If it would be easier to work through an existing contract, that would be fine.

Our goal would be to take a fresh, independent look at the reconstruction efforts and challenges ahead, provide honest reporting, and make recommendations that would help this significant challenge succeed. In addition to briefings, we would produce an executive report, which would be made available to the public upon the completion of the project.

We look forward to further discussions with the two of you and (b)(6) in the coming days. Because I will be on travel status, (b)(6) will serve as the point of contact. She can be reached as follows:

Office: (b)(6)
Mobile: (b)(6)
email: (b)(6)

Thank you again.

Best wishes,

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

Post- Conflict Reconstruction Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Attachments: as noted

Cc Representative Frank Wolf
Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense
(b)(6), Senior Military Aide to Mr. Henry

Center for Strategic and International Studies • 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006



Biographies of potential team members:

[REDACTED] currently serves as a Senior Adviser in the International Security Program and [REDACTED] of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS. [REDACTED] co-authored several recent reports on post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq. [REDACTED] is also a visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, where he was previously the Frederick H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy. From 1999-2001, [REDACTED] served as UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva. He was the first Director of the Office of Transition Initiatives at the U.S. Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C. (1994-1999), where he helped to start political development programs in over 20 war-torn regions, from the Philippines to Rwanda, from Bosnia to Haiti. A graduate of Harvard College [REDACTED] earned his M.B.A. from Boston University [REDACTED], with an emphasis on public management.

[REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] International Affairs Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations. She is spending the year at CSIS, where she is working with CSIS's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. She has co-authored several recent CSIS reports on post-conflict Iraq. [REDACTED] most recently worked as an attorney-adviser in the Legal Adviser's Office at the U.S. Department of State, where she focused on foreign assistance and appropriations law issues. Prior to that, Crocker served as the Deputy U.S. Special Representative for the Southeast Europe Initiative in Rome, Italy focusing on economic reconstruction issues. She has previously served as the executive assistant to the Deputy National Security Advisor, and as an attorney-adviser at the State Department working on economic sanctions matters. She received a B.A. from Stanford University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a Masters in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School.

[REDACTED] is a Senior Strategic Analyst at the Institute for Defense Analysis. Previously he served as Executive Director of the Role of American Military Power program at the Association of the United States Army and as a Co-Director of the CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. [REDACTED] served as an officer in the United States Army. His final assignment was as the Chief, Strategy Division, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, (J-5), the Joint Staff. During his military career, [REDACTED] served as Senior Speechwriter to the Chief of Staff, Army, Military Liaison Team Chief to the Republic of Slovenia, and Assistant Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy. He served as the Operations Officer of a Cavalry Regiment in the Gulf War, and commanded an armored battalion and an armored brigade. His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, two Legions of Merit, Bronze Star, and Purple Heart. Feil received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and a M.A. in Political Science from Stanford University.

[REDACTED] is a Senior Program Officer at the UN Foundation. Previously, she was Senior Fellow in the Role of American Military Power program at the Association of the United States Army and as a Co-Director of the CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. She served as Senior Policy Advisor for the Bureau for Humanitarian Response at the U.S. Agency for International Development, and was



assigned by USAID to be a Senior Social Scientist and Attorney at the World Bank's Post-Conflict Unit. She also served as Senior Advisor to the Office of Transition Initiatives at USAID. Mendelson holds a faculty appointment at The American University's School of International Service in Washington, D.C. and at Georgetown University's Center for National Security Studies. Mendelson received a J.D. from Washington College of Law at The American University, a Ph.D. in Latin American history from Washington University, St. Louis, and a M.A. of International Affairs, with a Certificate of Latin America Studies from Columbia University in New York.

(b)(6) currently serves as (b)(6) of the Council on Foreign Relations and (b)(6) of its program in Washington, D.C. Previously, he served as a (b)(6) of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS. He has published numerous articles on post-conflict reconstruction, including on East Timor and Afghanistan. (b)(6) served as Deputy to U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, and as Director in the Office of Global and Multilateral Affairs of the National Security Council. He was Senior Associate at the International Peace Academy, and has also worked with the U.S. Agency for International Development in Kenya and CBS News in China. (b)(6) received his Ph.D. and M.P.A. from Princeton University and his Bachelor's degree from UCLA.

P. 01/02

2 Was
Emoy May 10, 2003

MEMO TO: Doug Faith

FROM: Paul Bremer

SUBJECT: DeBe's authentication

I have reworked the draft on DeBe's stratification. I would intend to issue this upon or soon after my arrival. It would be best to make as much of this public as possible to underscore the Coalition's seriousness of purpose in DeBe's stratification.

Could someone please rework the message as a draft public announcement from me leaving in it as much of the content as we feel can appropriately be made public. The parallel message from [REDACTED] disbanding military institutions is an excellent model.

CC: Paul Wolfowitz, Gen Franks, Gen Garner, Jim Haynes

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May 12 5:41 PM

05-12-03 07:08 IN

**CHANGES TO: "Draft near-term policy guidance on
de-Baathification," 9 May 2003**

1. Add new Paragraph A as follows: "A. It is the intention of the CPA to extirpate the Ba'ath Party, its structure and members from Iraqi society. This instruction establishes procedures to effect these objectives."
2. Changes to Paragraph B: (a) Change "Should be banned" to "are banned." (b) Change "should be removed" to "are to be removed." (c) Change "should be investigated" to "could be investigated." (d) Change "may be interned" to "are to be interned." (e) Change "may be handled" to "are to be handled."
3. Changes to Paragraph C1: (a) Change "should be removed" to "are to be removed." (b) Change "All full members" to "Any such persons who prove to be full members."
4. Changes to Paragraph C2: (a) Change "should be investigated" to "are to be investigated." (b) Change "may be interned" to "are to be interned."
5. Changes to Paragraph C3: (a) Change "in their positions" to "in their prior positions."
6. Changes to Paragraph C5: (a) Change "should be instituted" to "are to be instituted."

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: [REDACTED] felth [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, May 28, 2003 6:25 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Economic Support

[REDACTED] - You have raised with SD and me the issue of arranging good economic support for the CPA to augment the advice you are getting from your in-country team.

I have lined up [REDACTED] to help us. He is a very talented economist at Rand who served as a senior staffer for the Council of Ec Advisers in the Reagan WH.

[REDACTED] will organize a team that can help with policy support and coord with Treasury.

At my request, [REDACTED] has done a good short piece on creating an Iraqi Permanent Oil Fund, on the Alaska model, to get a substantial portion of the oil revenues into the hands of the Iraqi people. This is an idea suggested to SD by several top economic policy experts. SD asked me to look into it.

I'll fax [REDACTED] paper to you on Wed. You may want to have [REDACTED] call [REDACTED].

Let me know what you think.

All the best.

Doug

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: Keith (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2003 8:13 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: IA Fast-Slow approach

(b)(6) - I am comfortable with what you have outlined and I infer you have been moving out on this approach.

I have not yet put a paper forward to SD to send back to you on the subject, however. Given DSD's personal involvement in this issue, I thought it best to raise the matter with SD when DSD returns from his travels on Tues or Wed.

You may want to update us on your thoughts or IA-related activities before then.

All the best.

Doug

CIV, OSD-POLICY

Don

From: faith [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2003 6:21 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Iran

QCPA

[REDACTED] - If possible, I'd like to talk with you secure at 7:30am today, before the roundtable meeting with SD, regarding your good memos.

The roundtable is at 7:45am. I'll be in my office at around 7:20 or five minutes later.

If necessary, you can try to reach me secure in my car thru Cables either on my cell phone or car phone, tho those connections can be dicey. Try after 7am.

All the best.

Doug

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: faith [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2003 6:15 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: CCC

[REDACTED] - Did you select Selka to chair the CCC and did he accept?

Doug

6/17/03 email S

(b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: feith (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 16, 2003 6:47 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Links between CPA and Washington

Please print out.

Also, please find out from Jaymie what Bremer is referring to here.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bremer, Paul
To: feith feith
Cc: (b)(6)
Sent: Jun 13, 2003 7:36a
Subject: RE: Links between CPA and Washington

Doug

Thanks for the note. (b)(6) briefed me fully on the conversation you had when I was traveling. Anything we can do to improve coordination is inherently good. Our principle remains that we do the policy and interagency coordination here, and reach back for help when we need it. Your proposal, as I understand it, should help you support us in a timely way, which is important because we don't have much time out here. I certainly appreciate all the work you and your colleagues are doing to make that more effective.

I have alerted Jaymie to a major disconnect on economic issues, which I had suspected would be a problem, as you will remember, due to the lack of economic people at OSD. Jaymie will hopefully straighten out the immediate problem with Treasury.

Thanks for your continued support and help.

LFB

-----Original Message-----

From: feith feith (mailto:(b)(6))
Sent: Friday, June 13, 2003 2:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Links between CPA and Washington

(b)(6) - We haven't had a chance to talk since the SVTC I conducted with (b)(6) and (b)(6) earlier this week. I would like your thoughts on the new linkages we have created (eg the Baghdad and Washington secretariats, the weekly SVTC we are instituting, the twice weekly DC meetings on CPA matters).

My sense is that these have improved our work. I hope you have been briefed on the presentation that (b)(6) made on the SVTC about how we are working to discipline the system by which requests for policy, action and information are handled between the CPA and Washington. We worked hard on this and I think it is useful in (1) increasing our responsiveness to you, (2) giving the interagency greater visibility into your work and (3) keeping all our work more orderly.

I'd like your perspective.

We are continuing to think about new ways to connect better.

You are doing heroic work and have our admiration.

All the best.

Doug

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: faith (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2003 7:58 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Penal law order

(b)(6) - An update for you. I have discussed the death penalty issue with DOD's general counsel, SD and with Steve Hadley.

I think we are all comfortable with maintaining the suspension for the time being, but Hadley said White House lawyers were concerned about how the suspension is phrased and how it would be discussed in the press guidance.

(b)(6) told me late on Friday that the NSC staff lawyer, (b)(6) has some proposed language. I plan to ask Jim Haynes, the DOD GC, to call Bellinger either today (Sat.) or Monday, get his thoughts and then we'll pass them to you.

Doug

CNV, OSD-POLICY

From: felth [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, May 30, 2003 7:15 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Local Elections

Re: your local election policy paper. SD personally rewrote it and asked us to do a further extensive rewrite. SD has it now for the 3d time in the last 24 hours. This has been quite a drill.

SD was not unhappy about the essence of the policy in the draft you sent, but he had numerous problems with organization, phrasing, ambiguity, etc. I realize you didn't have a chance to edit it yourself. I am explaining all this because it gives you some more insight into how he works and because I want to explain why what you're going to get is so different from what we received.

In any event, a SD-approved draft now exists and should be on its way to you as of Friday evening, Washington time.

All the best.

Doug

(b)(6) **CIV, OSD-POLICY**

From: feih (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2003 6:21 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: R&T

(b)(6) - If possible, I'd like to talk with you secure at 7:30am today, before the roundtable meeting with SD, regarding your good memos.

The roundtable is at 7:45am. I'll be in my office at around 7:20 or five minutes later.

If necessary, you can try to reach me secure in my car thru Cables either on my cell phone or car phone, tho those connections can be dicey. Try after 7am.

All the best.

Doug

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: felth [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2003 8:15 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: CCC

[REDACTED] - Did you select Belka to chair the CCC and did he accept?

Doug

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: faith (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 28, 2003 6:04 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Reports to interagency

(b)(6) - I have been getting a stream of requests from Armitage, Hadley and others for a more regularized system of keeping the interagency informed about the work in Iraq.

Pete Pace and I will meet today on our proposed "policy on policies" which should help organize lines of communications and help protect you from agency end runs. We'll be coming to you with ideas.

Meanwhile, SD yesterday approved our regular communications proposal, which deals with things like the morning phone calls with you. It also has a reporting template to allow us to track progress in various areas. We'll send this to you today. Tell me if you want to make changes.

It would be helpful to get from you a top ten list of things you need from Washington. We should update this continually.

Specific interagency requests for info -- I promised to ask you for:

Salary structure you are using for Iraqis.

Plan to replace the Saddam dinar.

All the best.

Doug

JUN - 4 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DF 4/7/03*

Secretary Rumsfeld would like a report that shows data on which regions of Iraq the OCPA people have visited and how frequently. He wants to be able to gauge how solid are our assessments of circumstances in the various regions.

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to Iraq OFF

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY (L. PAUL BREMER)

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program

*Redo
sign for
me
Put
date on
attachment.*

- As you may know, an interagency Task Force is reviewing the pricing of 760 (roughly 10%) of the approved and funded OFF contracts. Those contracts, valued at \$7B, represent 60% of committed funds.
- The Task Force has reviewed the first 628 contracts. Attached are its initial recommendations.
- The potential savings from implementing the recommendations could be significant
 - Up to \$600M saved if overpriced contracts are renegotiated; and
 - \$2-3B saved if overpriced and questionable contracts are cancelled.
- The CPA has the authority to advise the UN Secretary General to either cancel or *eventually* negotiate adjustments in OFF contracts. If cancelled, the amounts ~~would be~~ deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq. If adjusted, the amounts could be used to meet current reconstruction and humanitarian requirements.
- You may want to consider the Task Force's recommendations, as you determine how to proceed with the OFF program. My staff is ready to help you.

Attachment

a/s

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OFF TASK FORCE INTERIM FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Interim Findings

- Of the 628 contracts already reviewed, roughly 50% were assessed to likely be overpriced. The average overpricing is 22% per contract.
- The total value of the contracts assessed to be overpriced is approximately \$2.8B; potential overpricing in the contracts is roughly \$600M.
- The OFF program reflects heavy dependence on old technology, particularly in the electrical sector; significant variability in prices for identical items; and little itemization of training, spare parts, and transportation costs.
- Several items of questionable value were identified, such as contracts for Cigarette Paper, Mercedes Benz Sedans, Sports Halls and larger-than-expected quantities of spares, passenger vehicles and other items such as maize headers.

Recommendations Regarding OFF Contracts

- Request documentation from suppliers for overpriced OFF contracts;
- Assess whether contract terms regarding spares or other items should be amended and whether contracts for "old technology" or items of questionable value are essential for immediate needs;
- Require adjustments in contracts that are overpriced.

Recommendations for Post-OFF Contracting

- Require that future contracts itemize transportation, insurance, and deliverables, including spare parts, services, or other items;
- Require suppliers to provide detailed specifications on items being supplied and detailed cost data for unique (sole source) items; and
- Require competitive bidding for commodity items; limit the use of middlemen.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AMB Paul C. Brew

MEMO FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
FROM: ~~SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~ *Donald Rumsfeld*
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program

- At my direction, an interagency Task Force is reviewing 760 (roughly 10%) of the approved and funded OFF contracts. Those contracts, valued at \$7B, represent 60% of committed funds.
- My charge to the Task Force was to determine the price reasonableness of the contracts and identify ^{any} issues and concerns that should be brought to your attention and to the attention of the administrators of the UN Oil For Food (OFF) Program.
- The final results of the review are due by 22 August. ^{however} However, the Task Force does not expect its ~~conclusions~~ ^{its} or recommendations will change ~~markedly from those it has~~ ^{reached} based on review of the first 628 contracts.
- ^{may want to} ~~I ask that you consider the Task Force's findings, summarized next under, as you~~ ^(attached) ~~evaluate how to proceed with the OFF program.~~ ^{with}
- The potential savings from implementing the Task Force recommendations could be significant – up to \$600M ~~could be saved~~ if overpriced contracts are renegotiated; \$2-

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

3B or more could be available to the CPA if overpriced and questionable contracts are postponed (i.e., cancelled).

cancelled

- The CPA has the authority to advise the UN Secretary General to either postpone action on or negotiate adjustment in the terms or conditions of OFF contracts. If postponed, the contract amounts would be deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq; if adjusted, the contract amounts could be used to meet current reconstruction and humanitarian requirements.

cancel

- My Washington-based staff is ready to help you ~~should you decide to seek~~ adjustment or postponement of the remaining OFF contracts.

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OIL-FOR-FOOD (OFF) TASK FORCE

INTERIM FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Interim Findings

- The Task Force is reviewing 760 (roughly 10%) of the approved and funded OFF contracts. Those contracts, valued at \$7B, represent 60% of committed funds.
- Of the 628 contracts already reviewed, roughly 50% were assessed to likely be overpriced. The average overpricing is 22% per contract.
- The total value of the contracts assessed to be overpriced is approximately \$2.8B; potential overpricing in the contracts is roughly \$600M.
- The OFF program reflects a heavy dependence on old technology, particularly in the electrical sector; significant variability in prices for identical items; and little itemization of training, spare parts, and transportation costs.
- Several items of questionable value were identified, such as contracts for Cigarette Paper, Mercedes Benz Sedans, Sports Halls and larger-than-expected quantities of spares, passenger vehicles and other items such as maize headers.

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Recommendations Regarding OFF Contracts

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- Assess whether contract terms regarding spares or other items should be amended and whether contracts for "old technology" or items of questionable value are essential for immediate needs;
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- Require that future contracts itemize transportation, insurance, and deliverables, including spare parts, services, or other items;
- Require suppliers to provide detailed specifications on items being supplied and detailed cost data for unique (sole source) items; and
- Require competitive bidding for commodity items; limit the use of middlemen.

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POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

MAY 28 2003



MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR BREMER

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DFJ 5/28/03*

SUBJECT: Response to Your Mass Graves Proposal

I agree we need to take immediate action to secure mass grave sites, preserve the evidence they contain and assist Iraqis in identifying the bodies. The policy should note, however, that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz directed the Secretary of the Army to secure and preserve evidence of Iraqi regime atrocities.

I recommend you revise the policy as follows:

- Coordinate with the Army:

Any FBI efforts in assessing and prioritizing the sites. (The Army is already working with the FBI on the Afghanistan investigations.)

The deployment of the humanitarian response and international forensics teams.

The proposal to create evidence coordination teams and a central evidence repository.

- The action plan suggests that USCENCOM provide light security with augmentation by local Iraqi security forces at each site. It would be best, I think, to make maximum use of local security forces with USCENCOM providing overall supervision and responsibility.

The above has been reviewed by lawyers from the DoD General Counsel, the Army and the Joint Staff. They concur. I don't think the document needs the Secretary's personal review. I have discussed the proposal with him in general terms.



20 May 2003

ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary of Defense

FROM: L. Paul Bremer *LB 5/21*

RE: Mass Graves

As you know, some of the confirmed mass grave sites have been temporarily secured by the military to exploit for evidence of war crimes. The military has not secured many remaining sites which, although they pose evidence of crimes against humanity, do not present evidence of war crimes. While I have not yet visited the site at Hillah (I will Thursday), I understand from Jay Garner's recent trip there that at least some local leaders are satisfied with the degree of U.S. involvement, which is minimal. We will take this experience into account as we move forward.

Whatever we do, we must recognize that Iraqi families would like to conduct their own search for lost relatives. However, uncoordinated exploitation of grave sites diminishes the probability of identifying the missing and disadvantages those families who are not able to reach the mass grave site quickly. In addition, failure to preserve evidence may hamper future prosecutions by the new Iraqi government against the perpetrators. The international community and human rights organizations have urged us to take action to secure these sites and to bring forensics teams.

We are working on a mass graves policy that would provide security as required at sites that have not yet been subject to extensive digging. At sites that are already overrun with an emotional grieving population, I would not call on the military to remove families, but would deploy teams to work with local Iraqis in encouraging a more systematic process. I have attached a draft Action Plan for your review.

I would also like to urge rapid deployment of the FBI-led assessment team. I understand that there is some discussion of deploying Administration policy officials to accompany the FBI team. I think that any deployment of Administration policy officials should wait until after the assessment by the technical teams.

MASS GRAVES: ACTION PLAN

STEP ONE: PUBLIC AWARENESS AND ASSESSMENT

Public Awareness Program

- ORHA has initiated a media campaign through Al Sabah, Iraqi Media Network and other media outlets to explain to the public the necessity of preserving grave sites to facilitate identification of the missing and gather evidence of regime atrocities.
- We have also engaged local and religious leaders in this process.

Assessment teams

- An FBI-lead team will deploy immediately to Iraq to assess and prioritize mass graves.
- The FBI-led effort will be assisted by other coalition assessment teams, including the following: UK – Forensics investigative team of 8 to arrive within 24 hours and begin with al Hillah sites, ORHA is coordinating; Denmark – Danish team 2 forensics experts currently collocated with ORHA judicial assessment team to begin to assess sites. Australian, Norwegian and Dutch governments have expressed initial interest.

STEP TWO: SECURITY AND SUPPORT

A. Sites subject to overwhelming local attention (e.g., Hillah)

Humanitarian Response Team:

- We will deploy a Humanitarian Response Team to Hillah and any other grave site subject to extensive digging. The Teams will work with local leaders to implement a systematic process including: outreach of families; orderly digging; detailed examinations of personal effects; records of all remains identified; Des Certificates; witness interviews; and documentation of all information found at the site.

Military Support

- The military will continue to support grieving families by providing water, the plastic bags, gloves, and masks.
- The military will assist in coordinating the efforts of NGOs, IOs or international expert forensics teams who may be on the scene.

B. Sites that have not been subject to extensive digging

Investigative and Forensics Teams to Investigate and Exhume Mass Graves

- Following the initial assessment and prioritization, Forensics Investigative Teams from the coalition will be deployed to conduct exhumations. These teams will be coordinated out of ORHA offices at the Iraq Forum.

- The teams will hire and train local Iraqis in digging grave sites.

Local Guard Force

- When possible, CENTCOM will provide light security at prioritized sites. As a longer-term measure, we will fund the salaries of local Iraqis to guard mass graves (Estimate: \$75,000).
- The local force will protect sites using the minimum force necessary (Lethal force only in Self-Defense; Light Weapons only).

STEP THREE: IDENTIFICATION

Identification Services / Missing Persons

- We will announce establishment of an Iraqi Committee on Missing Persons to collect the records of disappeared and create a national database. We will work with existing Iraqi organizations, such as the Committee for Free Iraqi Prisoners, to establish interview teams to collect data.
- We will develop a mechanism for integrating information on missing persons with the results of the forensics examination. (Estimate: \$1 million)
- We will create outreach programs for families to provide emotional support.

STEP FOUR: PROSECUTION

Central Evidence Repository

- ORHA will work with DRL and S/WCI to request Evidence Coordination Teams from the coalition who will assess and create centralized and systematic warehouses for the storage, documentation and preservation of evidence.
- The Evidence Coordination Teams will train local experts in handling and preservation of forensics evidence.

CJTF-7 MASS GRAVE SITES

Note: Mass Grave is defined as 3 or more bodies buried in same grave; confirmed by U.S. military on-site visit.
 = 12. Completed Investigations = 7. Atrocities = 1. War Crimes = 0

Ref #, City	MSC AO	Current Remarks
C-141, al-Lang	VC	Ongoing. First site assessed as unimpaired. Still working two other sites.
1. Kharak 38SM1343910266 38SM13439116 38SM13439116	VC U-49 May U-14 May	
2. Lahe Habbaniyah 38SL13466597254 38SL13466597254	V-Corps S-29 Apr	Ongoing. CID investigating for crimes against humanity. 26 May, GPS Lat/Long provided NCS 11 48.01 E043 31 02.03.
3. Mosul 38SL13466597254	VC U-29 Apr	Completed. No conclusive evidence of crimes against humanity.
4. Al Samawah 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254	MEP S-02 May	Ongoing. CID is working w/ TF Hope IAW Frago 66. 25 May - Sending 43 remains to US & UK for analysis. Returns to site in 3-4 weeks to retrieve all remains. Require some support, and earthmoving equipment (D-9 bulldozers). Working heading accommodations.
5. Al Hilla 38SM13466597254	MEP U-02 May	Completed. No evidence of US or KU.
6. Al Hilla 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254	MEP S-22 Apr S-05 May	Ongoing. Investigating IAW FRAGO 67; possible KU gravesite.
7. Al Khar 38SM13466597254	MEP S-08 May	Pending. No investigative activity initiated.
8. An Najaf 38SM13466597254	MEP S-03 May	Ongoing. HET team conducting assessment.
9. Al Khar 38SM13466597254	MEP S-14 May	Pending. No investigative activity initiated.
10. Al Nahr 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254 38SM13466597254	MEP S-23 May	Pending. No investigative activity initiated.
11. Karbala 38SM13466597254	VC S-16 May	Pending. No investigative activity initiated.
12. Ash Sham 38SM13466597254	VC S-18 May	Pending. Initial is verifying location.



CFLCC MASS GRAVE MATRIX AS OF 24 MAY 03

[illegible]

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: Bremer, Paul (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 24, 2003 10:51 AM
To: Feith CIV Douglas
Subject: UN Resolution

Q Tray
UN

Doug

On another subject, I am a bit uneasy by a phrase in John Negroponte's statement at the vote on the UN resolution. He said: the resolution provides a framework for "...member states, the United Nations, and others in the international community to participate in the administration...of Iraq...". I am not a lawyer, but I do not see how the resolution has any of those folks participating in the administration of Iraq. It is not in our interest that they do so. Am I missing something here?

LPB

-----Original Message-----

From: Feith, Douglas, CIV, OSD-POLICY [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Saturday, May 24, 2003 5:09 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: British troops

(b)(6)

I'll work it this morning with SD.

We gave talking pts to him yesterday (on Friday) but I heard that the call to Hoon didn't happen for some reason. I need to get up to date on this when I get to the Pentagon this morning.

I had a good talk with Clay yesterday.

All the best.

Doug

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

Handled