

SEP 17 2019

The Honorable James M. Inhofe  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to sections 171a(e) and (j)(2) of title 10 U.S. Code, enclosed is the Annual Report on the Activities of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System (NLC3S), including the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment determination.

This report summarizes the Council's actions in 2018, along with proposed activities for Future Years Defense Program 2020-2024. Based on Council actions over the last year, we continue to invest significant resources to address NLC3S gaps and deficiencies. The NLC3S enterprise remains capable of accomplishing its current operational requirements. However, threats to NLC3S capabilities are increasing. Many of the critical systems, platforms, and facilities comprising the NLC3S architecture are approaching or past planned life spans. Continued budgetary support is required to modernize aging systems and architectures to ensure the enterprise remains safe, secure, and reliable.

We appreciate your continued concern for and support of our men and women in uniform. A similar letter is being sent to the other congressional defense committees.



RONALD A. BOXALL  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Performing the Duties of the  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
as co-chair of the Council on Oversight of  
the National Leadership Command, Control,  
and Communications System

Sincerely,



ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc:  
The Honorable Jack Reed  
Ranking Member

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From Classified Enclosure



SEP 17 2019

The Honorable Adam Smith  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to sections 171a(e) and (j)(2) of title 10 U.S. Code, enclosed is the Annual Report on the Activities of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System (NLC3S), including the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment determination.

This report summarizes the Council's actions in 2018, along with proposed activities for Future Years Defense Program 2020-2024. Based on Council actions over the last year, we continue to invest significant resources to address NLC3S gaps and deficiencies. The NLC3S enterprise remains capable of accomplishing its current operational requirements. However, threats to NLC3S capabilities are increasing. Many of the critical systems, platforms, and facilities comprising the NLC3S architecture are approaching or past planned life spans. Continued budgetary support is required to modernize aging systems and architectures to ensure the enterprise remains safe, secure, and reliable.

We appreciate your continued concern for and support of our men and women in uniform. A similar letter is being sent to the other congressional defense committees.

Sincerely,



RONALD A. BOXALL  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Performing the Duties of the  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
as co-chair of the Council on Oversight of  
the National Leadership Command, Control,  
and Communications System



ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc:  
The Honorable William M. "Mac" Thornberry  
Ranking Member

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From Classified Enclosure



SEP 17 2019

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby  
Chairman  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to sections 171a(e) and (j)(2) of title 10 U.S. Code, enclosed is the Annual Report on the Activities of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System (NLC3S), including the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment determination.

This report summarizes the Council's actions in 2018, along with proposed activities for Future Years Defense Program 2020-2024. Based on Council actions over the last year, we continue to invest significant resources to address NLC3S gaps and deficiencies. The NLC3S enterprise remains capable of accomplishing its current operational requirements. However, threats to NLC3S capabilities are increasing. Many of the critical systems, platforms, and facilities comprising the NLC3S architecture are approaching or past planned life spans. Continued budgetary support is required to modernize aging systems and architectures to ensure the enterprise remains safe, secure, and reliable.

We appreciate your continued concern for and support of our men and women in uniform. A similar letter is being sent to the other congressional defense committees.

RONALD A. BOXALL  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Performing the Duties of the  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
as co-chair of the Council on Oversight of  
the National Leadership Command, Control,  
and Communications System

Sincerely,

ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc:  
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy  
Vice Chairman

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From Classified Enclosure



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SEP 17 2019

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey  
Chairwoman  
Committee on Appropriations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Chairwoman:

Pursuant to sections 171a(e) and (j)(2) of title 10 U.S. Code, enclosed is the Annual Report on the Activities of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System (NLC3S), including the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment determination.

This report summarizes the Council's actions in 2018, along with proposed activities for Future Years Defense Program 2020-2024. Based on Council actions over the last year, we continue to invest significant resources to address NLC3S gaps and deficiencies. The NLC3S enterprise remains capable of accomplishing its current operational requirements. However, threats to NLC3S capabilities are increasing. Many of the critical systems, platforms, and facilities comprising the NLC3S architecture are approaching or past planned life spans. Continued budgetary support is required to modernize aging systems and architectures to ensure the enterprise remains safe, secure, and reliable.

We appreciate your continued concern for and support of our men and women in uniform. A similar letter is being sent to the other congressional defense committees.



RONALD A. BOXALL  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Performing the Duties of the  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
as co-chair of the Council on Oversight of  
the National Leadership Command, Control,  
and Communications System

Sincerely,



ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc:  
The Honorable Kay Granger  
Ranking Member

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From Classified Enclosure

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# Department of Defense



The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense (DoD) is approximately \$23,000 in fiscal years 2018–2019. This includes \$18,000 in expenses and \$5,080 in DoD labor.

Generated on 2019Apr05 RefID: E-1CCE9DF

## 2018 Report

**(U) Title 10 U.S.C. §171a(e) and (j)(2) National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System Annual Report and Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment Determination**

~~Classified By: Dana Dancy~~  
~~Reason: 1.4(a)(1)(2)~~  
~~Declassify On: 31 May 2044~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



## **(U) INTRODUCTION**

(U) Section 1052 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 (Public Law 113-66) amends Chapter 7 of Title 10, United States Code, to add Section 171a. This new section establishes within the Department of Defense (DoD) a "*Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System*" (CONLC3S). Section 1052 also requires (as amended by the NDAA for FY 2017 (Public Law 114-328)) that "*During the period preceding January 31, 2021, at the same time each year that the budget of the President is submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, and from time to time after such period at the discretion of the Council, the Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the activities of the Council. Each report shall include the following:*

- (1) (U) *A description and assessment of the activities of the Council during the previous fiscal year.* [Contained in Section I of this report]
- (2) (U) *A description of the activities proposed to be undertaken by the Council during the period covered by the current future-years defense program under section 221 of this title.* [Section II]
- (3) (U) *Any changes to the requirements of the command, control, and communications system for the national leadership of the United States made during the previous year, along with an explanation for why the changes were made and a description of the effects of the changes to the capability of the system.* [Section III]
- (4) (U) *A breakdown of each program element in such budget that relates to the system, including how such program element relates to the operation and sustainment, research and development, procurement, or other activity of the system.* [Section IV (Enclosure 1)]
- (5) (U) *An assessment of the threats and vulnerabilities described in the reports and assessments collected under subsection (f) during the previous year, including any plans to address such threats and vulnerabilities.* [Section V]
- (6) (U) *An assessment of the readiness of the command, control, and communications system for the national leadership of the United States and of each layer of the system, as that relates to nuclear command, control, and communications.* [Section VI]
- (7) (U) *Council determination as to whether the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system and its C2 system have met all warfighter requirements for operational availability, survivability, and durability.* [Section VII]

(U) The DoD submits the following report on the activities of the Council.

## **I. (U) ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL DURING 2018**

**A. (U) GENERAL.** In 2018, the Council convened eight in-person/video teleconference meetings and one paper-only meeting to discuss the performance of specified NLC3S<sup>1</sup> responsibilities. In addition, there were two in-person meetings of the four-star level National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC) Executive Management Board (EMB) and 10 in-person meetings of the two-star level NLCC Senior Steering Group (SSG) that covered some subjects not presented to the Council.

(U) Following the first three Council meetings, which focused on architecture, Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) program prioritization, and the FY 2018 NDAA requirements,

---


<sup>1</sup> NLC3S is the congressional term for what the Department of Defense refers to as the National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC).



the Council co-chairs directed a shift to a new work plan cycle to maximize the number of NC3 program reviews prior to the Services' Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 2020 formal submissions in August. This cycle consisted of Council meetings preceded by an SSG, eliminating EMBs, due to the more rapid pace of approximately one Council meeting per month. In September, the Council returned to non-program review agendas, but at the same pace and without EMBs.


(U) Numerous working groups (WG) and sub-working groups feed the Council governance process. These include the NC3 Issues WG; the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Transition WG; the Low Frequency (LF)/Very Low Frequency (VLF) WG; the NC3 Assessments WG; the Hybrid Solution WG; and the NC3 System High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) WG (NC3SHWG), which generally meet every one to two months.

**B. (U) PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS (INCLUDING INTEROPERABILITY)** (Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR): Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Offices of Collateral Responsibility (OCRs): White House Military Office (WHMO); DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO)).






(U) Additional performance assessment activities include:

- 
- 


**C. (U) VULNERABILITY IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION** (OPRs: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Joint Staff; Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). OCRs: National Security Agency (NSA); DoD CIO).





**D. (U) ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT** (OPR: Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). OCRs: NSA; CDRUSSTRATCOM; Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); Services.

(U) In 2017, DISA/Joint Systems Engineering and Integration Office (JSEIO) established the NLCC Systems Engineering and Architecture Review Board (SEARB) to fulfill its DepSecDef task to "provide systems engineering and integration (SE&I) functions (including, but not limited to requirements, configuration management, technical assessments, and architecture)." The SEARB meets on a monthly basis, as does the JSEIO NLCC Architecture Council. Figure 1 below depicts the SEARB's organizational structure. The SEARB has taken on additional importance as the NC3 Governance Improvement (NGI) Implementation Plan (I-Plan) was approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in October of 2018. The NGI construct will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in early April 2019. Under this new construct (discussed in section III, changes to NLCC requirements), CDRUSSTRATCOM now has responsibility for NC3 operations, requirements, and SE&I. The SEARB will play a role in accomplishing the latter task and will provide recommendations to the Council for changes to enterprise strategy (new capability development, continued legacy sustainment, etc.) based on identified threats. The NLCC SEARB will be the SE&I interface to the NLCC/NC3 governance process. Led by the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) Deputy and comprised of the senior systems engineering representatives from the NLCC community, the SEARB serves as the NLCC technical advisor to the NEC Commander and coordinates with the NLCC SSG, NLCC EMB and NLC3S Council as shown in the following diagram.





[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]




**E. (U) RESOURCE PRIORITIZATION (OPR: All)**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~





~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

F. (U) OTHER




~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**II. (U) ACTIVITIES PROPOSED TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE COUNCIL DURING THE CURRENT FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM**

Table 3 is the Council Work Plan for 2019. Table 4 is the Council Work Plan for 2020-2023.

**A. 2019 Council Work Plan:**




**B. 2020-2023 Council Work Plan:**





### **III. (U) CHANGES TO NLC3S REQUIREMENTS MADE DURING PREVIOUS YEAR**



(U) A new DoD Directive 3020.26, "DoD Continuity Policy" was published February 14, 2018. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), as Defense Continuity Coordinator, established by Presidential Policy Directive-40, "National Continuity Policy," has the role to establish communication requirements in support of continuity as part of USD(P)'s responsibility for continuity strategy and policy.

(U) The Joint Staff consolidated two CJCS Instructions (CJCSIs), CJCSI 5123.01, "Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)," and CJCSI 3170.01, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JROC)," into one document, CJCSI 5123.01H, "Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)." The major change to JCIDS adds a section to describe multiple entry points into JCIDS, which includes a description for CCMDs and Services to use, whether it is to meet an urgent/emergent need or deliberate planning need, or to support insertion of a science and technology prototype or other innovative approaches.

(U) FY 2019 NDAA language did not add any additional Council reporting actions. The following are FY 2018 NDAA Council reporting actions as described in section 1651, *Annual Assessment of Cyber Resiliency of NC2 System*; section 1654, *Oversight of Delayed Acquisition Programs by the Council*; section 1657, *Oversight of Aerial-Layer Programs by the Council*; and section 1658, *Security Classification Guide for Programs Relating to NC3 and Nuclear Deterrence*.

(U) The Council reviewed the Navy's draft NC3 Security Classification Guide developed for FY 2018 NDAA 1658 compliance. The Council directed Joint Staff to develop a joint, enterprise-level SecDef- and CJCS-approved NC3 Security Classification Guidance memo.

### **IV. (U) BREAKDOWN OF NLC3S PROGRAM ELEMENTS.**

See Enclosure 1.

### **V. (U) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES DESCRIBED IN THE REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS COLLECTED UNDER SECTION LB. DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR, INCLUDING ANY PLANS TO ADDRESS SUCH THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES.**

See Sections I.B and I.C.



**VI. (U) ASSESSMENT OF READINESS OF NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


(U) To address NC3 readiness challenges, in October 2018, the SecDef designated the Commander, USSTRATCOM as the NC3 enterprise lead with increased responsibilities for operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration. In addition, he established the USD(A&S) as the NC3 enterprise capability portfolio manager with increased responsibilities for resources and acquisition. The DepSecDef and CJCS will provide leadership and oversight, and will conduct semi-annual NC3 enterprise reviews.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



(b)(1)



VII. (U) FY 2017 NDAA SECTION 1661 ON WHETHER THE INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM AND ITS COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM HAVE MET ALL WARFIGHTER REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY, SURVIVABILITY, AND ENDURABILITY.

See Enclosure 2.

SIGNED:



RONALD A. BOXALL  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Performing the Duties of the  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
as co-chair of the Council on Oversight of  
the National Leadership Command, Control,  
and Communications System



SEP 17 2019

ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment



## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AACE	Aircrew Alerting Communications EMP
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
AEHF	Advanced Extremely High Frequency
AF	Air Force
AFCPT	Air Force Command Post Terminal
AFSPC	Air Force Space Command
ASAT	anti-satellite
Ao	operational availability
AoA	analysis of alternatives
BSA	Balanced Survivability Assessment
CAPE	Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
C2	command and control
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
CCIC2S	Combatant Commander's Integrated Command and Control System
CCMD	Combatant Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM	Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
CDRNORAD	Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CMS	Crisis Management System
COG	continuity of government
CONLC3S	Council on Oversight of the National Leadership C3 System
COOP	continuity of operations
CT	Cyber Team
CVR	Common VLF Receiver
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
DoD CIO	Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
DRSN	Defense Red Switch Network
DSP	Defense Support Program
DSP-A	Defense Support Program - Augmentation
DSS	Decision Support Services
DZ	digitalization
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EAM	emergency action message
EMB	Executive Management Board
EMP	electromagnetic pulse
ESS	Evolved Strategic SATCOM
EWR	early warning radar
FAB-T	Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight-Terminals
FET	Force Element Terminal
FPAK	force package
FOC	full operating capability
FSBS	Fleet Submarine Broadcast System
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GASNT	Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminals




GEO	geosynchronous orbit
HAND	High-Altitude Nuclear Detonation
HEMP	High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
HEO	highly elliptical orbit
HPTS	High Power Transmission System
IC	intelligence community
ICD	Initial Capabilities Document
INSER	Integrated Nuclear Survivability and Endurability Report
IOC	Initial Operating Capability
IT	information technology
ITW/AA	Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment
JCIDS	Joint Capability Integration and Development System
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JROCM	Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum
JRSC	Jam-Resistant Secure Communications
JSEIO	Joint Systems Engineering and Integration Office
LBUCS	Low-Band Universal Communications System
LCC	Launch Control Center
LF	Low Frequency
LFTS	Low-Frequency Transmit System
MAT	Mobile AEHF Terminal
MCCC	Mobile Consolidated Command Center
MEECN	Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MGS	Mobile Ground System
MILSTAR	Military Strategic and Tactical Relay
MPAS	Mission Planning and Analysis System
MRT	Miniature Receive Terminal
MMRT	Modified MRT
MR-TCDL	Multi-Role Tactical Common Data Link
MW	missile warning
NC2	Nuclear Command and Control
NC3	Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
NC3SHWG	NC3 System HEMP Working Group
NAOC	National Airborne Operations Center
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NEAT	NAOC-Executive Airlift-ABNCP-TACAMO
NEC	NC3 Enterprise Center
NER	Nuclear Enterprise Review
NGI	NC3 Governance Improvement
NLC3S	National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System
NLCC	National Leadership Command Capability
NMHS	Navy Modernized Hybrid Solution
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPES	Nuclear Planning and Execution System
NSA	National Security Agency
NUDET	nuclear detonation
OCR	office of collateral responsibility
O&M	Operations and Maintenance



OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPR	office of primary responsibility
PAGCN	Phoenix Air-Ground Communications Network
PH	Polo Hat
PM	Program Manager
PNVC	Presidential and National Voice Conferencing
POA&M	Plan of Action and Milestones
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PSA	Principal Staff Assistant
RT	Red Team
S2E2	SBIRS Survivable and Endurable Evolution
SACCS	Strategic Automated Command and Control System
SACCS-R	SACCS-Replacement
SATCOM	satellite communications
SBIRS	Space-Based Infrared System
SCAMP	Single-Channel Anti-Jam Man Portable
SCG	security classification guide
SEARB	Systems Engineering and Architecture Review Board
SECN	Survivable Emergency Conferencing Network
SE&I	Systems Engineering and Integration
SSG	Senior Steering Group
TACAMO	Take Charge and Move Out
TF	task force
UMM	(LF) Unified MEECN Mode
USD(A&S)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USINDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VLF/LF	very low frequency/low frequency
VPS	Very Important Person Special Airlift Mission (VIPSAM) Protected SATCOM Terminal
WG	working group
WHMO	White House Military Office
WWSVCS	World Wide Secure Voice Conferencing System



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



(U) Note: This input is extracted from a more comprehensive Congressionally-directed NLCC Subsidiary Budget Exhibit, which has been forwarded under separate cover by the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) Section 1661 of the NDAA of 2017 (Public Law 114-328) directed the CONLC3S to produce an annual assessment on “whether the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system and its command and control system have met all warfighter requirements for operational availability (Task #1), survivability (Task #2), and durability (Task #3).”


2. (U) 2018 Assessment Executive Summary

3. (U) Background





~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

a. (U) As a critical component of the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System, the ITW/AA System is required to provide unambiguous, timely, accurate, and continuous (24/7 days a week) tactical warning and attack assessment information to the President, SecDef, CJCS, and Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) on a continuous basis throughout a conflict or other national crisis. (CJCSI 6210.02C)



c. (U) In reference to the ITW/AA responsibilities delineated in CJCSI 5119.01C and CJCSI 6210.02C, CDRUSSTRATCOM and CDRNORAD jointly assign USSTRATCOM J3 and NORAD J3 as the ITW/AA Functional Managers. USSTRATCOM and NORAD staffs are responsible for working directly with and, as necessary, establishing agreements with the Office of the SecDef, the Joint Staff, other CCMDs, Military Services, defense agencies, non-defense agencies, and foreign governments to ensure the successful accomplishment of the ITW/AA mission.



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



[REDACTED]

f. (U) The ITW/AA endurable missions use facilities, equipment, and systems that are information sources, correlation nodes, forward user systems, personnel at those locations, and communications paths between all components. The ITW/AA endurable missions require unambiguous, timely, accurate, and continuous information. Endurable elements will endure through all phases of conflict with predictable and graceful performance degradation as the threat environment becomes increasingly hostile. Endurable systems will meet at least the minimum requirements for a survivable system and will be technically designed to avoid and/or withstand physical destruction from nuclear weapons (e.g., mobile or physically hardened or sufficiently proliferated to ensure survival after attack by the most stressful projected threat). The missile warning/NUDET detection capabilities are required to have endurable elements. (CJCSI 6210.02C)


4. (U) 2018 ITW/AA Assessment (2017 ITW/AA Assessment results were similar):

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



**5. (U) Risks**



**6. (U) Mitigation**



**7. (U) Way ahead**

- a. (U) USSTRATCOM is working with the ITW/AA system force provider and DoD leadership to resolve Strategic Missile Warning mission risks in accordance with national priorities.



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b. (U) USSTRATCOM is developing longer-term architectural solutions to meet ITW/AA requirements.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~