

SEP 17 2019

The Honorable James M. Inhofe  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to sections 171a(e) and (j)(2) of title 10 U.S. Code, enclosed is the Annual Report on the Activities of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System (NLC3S), including the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment determination.

This report summarizes the Council's actions in 2018, along with proposed activities for Future Years Defense Program 2020-2024. Based on Council actions over the last year, we continue to invest significant resources to address NLC3S gaps and deficiencies. The NLC3S enterprise remains capable of accomplishing its current operational requirements. However, threats to NLC3S capabilities are increasing. Many of the critical systems, platforms, and facilities comprising the NLC3S architecture are approaching or past planned life spans. Continued budgetary support is required to modernize aging systems and architectures to ensure the enterprise remains safe, secure, and reliable.

We appreciate your continued concern for and support of our men and women in uniform. A similar letter is being sent to the other congressional defense committees.

RONALD A. BOXALL  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Performing the Duties of the  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
as co-chair of the Council on Oversight of  
the National Leadership Command, Control,  
and Communications System

Sincerely,

ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc:  
The Honorable Jack Reed  
Ranking Member

SEP 17 2019

The Honorable Adam Smith  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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and Communications System

Sincerely,

ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc:  
The Honorable William M. "Mac" Thornberry  
Ranking Member

SEP 17 2019

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby  
Chairman  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,



ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc:  
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy  
Vice Chairman

SEP 17 2019

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey  
Chairwoman  
Committee on Appropriations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Chairwoman:

Pursuant to sections 171a(e) and (j)(2) of title 10 U.S. Code, enclosed is the Annual Report on the Activities of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System (NLC3S), including the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment determination.

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as co-chair of the Council on Oversight of  
the National Leadership Command, Control,  
and Communications System

Sincerely,

ELLEN M. LORD  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
and Sustainment

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc:  
The Honorable Kay Granger  
Ranking Member

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# Department of Defense



The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense (DoD) is approximately \$23,000 in fiscal years 2018–2019. This includes \$18,000 in expenses and \$5,080 in DoD labor.

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## 2018 Report

**(U) Title 10 U.S.C. §171a(e) and (j)(2) National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System Annual Report and Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment Determination**

~~Classified By: Dana Deacy~~  
~~Reason: 1.4(e)(D)(2)~~  
~~Declassify On: 31 May 2044~~

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## **(U) INTRODUCTION**

**(U)** Section 1052 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 (Public Law 113-66) amends Chapter 7 of Title 10, United States Code, to add Section 171a. This new section establishes within the Department of Defense (DoD) a “*Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System*” (CONLC3S). Section 1052 also requires (as amended by the NDAA for FY 2017 (Public Law 114-328)) that “*During the period preceding January 31, 2021, at the same time each year that the budget of the President is submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, and from time to time after such period at the discretion of the Council, the Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the activities of the Council. Each report shall include the following:*

- (1)** *(U) A description and assessment of the activities of the Council during the previous fiscal year. [Contained in Section I of this report]*
- (2)** *(U) A description of the activities proposed to be undertaken by the Council during the period covered by the current future-years defense program under section 221 of this title. [Section II]*
- (3)** *(U) Any changes to the requirements of the command, control, and communications system for the national leadership of the United States made during the previous year, along with an explanation for why the changes were made and a description of the effects of the changes to the capability of the system. [Section III]*
- (4)** *(U) A breakdown of each program element in such budget that relates to the system, including how such program element relates to the operation and sustainment, research and development, procurement, or other activity of the system. [Section IV (Enclosure 1)]*
- (5)** *(U) An assessment of the threats and vulnerabilities described in the reports and assessments collected under subsection (f) during the previous year, including any plans to address such threats and vulnerabilities. [Section V]*
- (6)** *(U) An assessment of the readiness of the command, control, and communications system for the national leadership of the United States and of each layer of the system, as that relates to nuclear command, control, and communications. [Section VI]*
- (7)** *(U) Council determination as to whether the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system and its C2 system have met all warfighter requirements for operational availability, survivability, and durability. [Section VII]*

**(U)** The DoD submits the following report on the activities of the Council.

## **I. (U) ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL DURING 2018**

**A. (U) GENERAL.** In 2018, the Council convened eight in-person/video teleconference meetings and one paper-only meeting to discuss the performance of specified NLC3S<sup>1</sup> responsibilities. In addition, there were two in-person meetings of the four-star level National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC) Executive Management Board (EMB) and 10 in-person meetings of the two-star level NLCC Senior Steering Group (SSG) that covered some subjects not presented to the Council.

**(U)** Following the first three Council meetings, which focused on architecture, Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) program prioritization, and the FY 2018 NDAA requirements,



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<sup>1</sup> NLC3S is the congressional term for what the Department of Defense refers to as the National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC).

the Council co-chairs directed a shift to a new work plan cycle to maximize the number of NC3 program reviews prior to the Services' Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 2020 formal submissions in August. This cycle consisted of Council meetings preceded by an SSG, eliminating EMBs, due to the more rapid pace of approximately one Council meeting per month. In September, the Council returned to non-program review agendas, but at the same pace and without EMBs.



(U) Numerous working groups (WG) and sub-working groups feed the Council governance process. These include the NC3 Issues WG; the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Transition WG; the Low Frequency (LF)/Very Low Frequency (VLF) WG; the NC3 Assessments WG; the Hybrid Solution WG; and the NC3 System High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) WG (NC3SHWG), which generally meet every one to two months.

**B. (U) PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS (INCLUDING INTEROPERABILITY)** (Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR): Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Offices of Collateral Responsibility (OCRs): White House Military Office (WHMO); DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO)).





(U) Additional performance assessment activities include:

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
**C. (U) VULNERABILITY IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION (OPRs: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Joint Staff; Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). OCRs: National Security Agency (NSA); DoD CIO).**




**D. (U) ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT** (OPR: Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).  
OCRs: NSA; CDRUSSTRATCOM; Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM);  
Services.


(U) In 2017, DISA/Joint Systems Engineering and Integration Office (JSEIO) established the NLCC Systems Engineering and Architecture Review Board (SEARB) to fulfill its DepSecDef task to "provide systems engineering and integration (SE&I) functions (including, but not limited to requirements, configuration management, technical assessments, and architecture)." The SEARB meets on a monthly basis, as does the JSEIO NLCC Architecture Council. Figure 1 below depicts the SEARB's organizational structure. The SEARB has taken on additional importance as the NC3 Governance Improvement (NGI) Implementation Plan (I-Plan) was approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in October of 2018. The NGI construct will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in early April 2019. Under this new construct (discussed in section III, changes to NLCC requirements), CDRUSSTRATCOM now has responsibility for NC3 operations, requirements, and SE&I. The SEARB will play a role in accomplishing the latter task and will provide recommendations to the Council for changes to enterprise strategy (new capability development, continued legacy sustainment, etc.) based on identified threats. The NLCC SEARB will be the SE&I interface to the NLCC/NC3 governance process. Led by the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) Deputy and comprised of the senior systems engineering representatives from the NLCC community, the SEARB serves as the NLCC technical advisor to the NEC Commander and coordinates with the NLCC SSG, NLCC EMB and NLC3S Council as shown in the following diagram.







**E. (U) RESOURCE PRIORITIZATION (OPR: All)**






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
F. (U) OTHER



**II. (U) ACTIVITIES PROPOSED TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE COUNCIL DURING THE CURRENT FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM**

Table 3 is the Council Work Plan for 2019. Table 4 is the Council Work Plan for 2020-2023.


**A. 2019 Council Work Plan:**



**B. 2020-2023 Council Work Plan:**



### III. (U) CHANGES TO NLC3S REQUIREMENTS MADE DURING PREVIOUS YEAR



(U) A new DoD Directive 3020.26, "DoD Continuity Policy" was published February 14, 2018. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), as Defense Continuity Coordinator, established by Presidential Policy Directive-40, "National Continuity Policy," has the role to establish communication requirements in support of continuity as part of USD(P)'s responsibility for continuity strategy and policy.

(U) The Joint Staff consolidated two CJCS Instructions (CJCSIs), CJCSI 5123.01, "Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)," and CJCSI 3170.01, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JROC)," into one document, CJCSI 5123.01H, "Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)." The major change to JCIDS adds a section to describe multiple entry points into JCIDS, which includes a description for CCMDs and Services to use, whether it is to meet an urgent/emergent need or deliberate planning need, or to support insertion of a science and technology prototype or other innovative approaches.

(U) FY 2019 NDAA language did not add any additional Council reporting actions. The following are FY 2018 NDAA Council reporting actions as described in section 1651, *Annual Assessment of Cyber Resiliency of NC2 System*; section 1654, *Oversight of Delayed Acquisition Programs by the Council*; section 1657, *Oversight of Aerial-Layer Programs by the Council*; and section 1658, *Security Classification Guide for Programs Relating to NC3 and Nuclear Deterrence*.

(U) The Council reviewed the Navy's draft NC3 Security Classification Guide developed for FY 2018 NDAA 1658 compliance. The Council directed Joint Staff to develop a joint, enterprise-level SecDef- and CJCS-approved NC3 Security Classification Guidance memo.

### IV. (U) BREAKDOWN OF NLC3S PROGRAM ELEMENTS.

See Enclosure 1.

### V. (U) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES DESCRIBED IN THE REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS COLLECTED UNDER SECTION 1B. DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR, INCLUDING ANY PLANS TO ADDRESS SUCH THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES.

See Sections I.B and I.C.

**VI. (U) ASSESSMENT OF READINESS OF NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) To address NC3 readiness challenges, in October 2018, the SecDef designated the Commander, USSTRATCOM as the NC3 enterprise lead with increased responsibilities for operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration. In addition, he established the USD(A&S) as the NC3 enterprise capability portfolio manager with increased responsibilities for resources and acquisition. The DepSecDef and CJCS will provide leadership and oversight, and will conduct semi-annual NC3 enterprise reviews.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



