


U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE GUIDELINES REVIEW

- (U) The Defense Guidelines were initially established in 1978 to focus the Alliance on the challenges of the Cold War, and for the first time defined bilateral roles and missions in the defense of Japan. They were revised in 1997 to reorient the Alliance for the post-Cold War world, by providing the framework for Japanese support to U.S. forces in a regional contingency and giving the Self Defense Forces (SDF) roles beyond the defense of Japan.
- (U) The U.S.-Japan Joint Statement issued at the 2+2 meeting in October 2013 serves as the formal announcement to undertake another revision of the Guidelines in order to address the evolving security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

• (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



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
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Classified by: David Helvey, DASD/East Asia
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)
Declassify after: 20390430

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, JAPAN~~

**Meeting with Defense Minister Itsunori
Onodera**
("oh-noh-deh-rah")


- (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)
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
(b)(1) : Sec. 1.4(a)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, JAPAN~~

**Meeting with Foreign Minister Fumio
Kishida**
("KEE-shee-dah")

- (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)
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~~SECRET/REL to USA, JAPAN~~




JAPAN SECURITY INITIATIVES

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)
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Classified by: David Helvey, DASD/East Asia
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)
Declassify after: 20390430

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



UNCLASSIFIED

JAPAN-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

(U) In 2013, Prime Minister Abe visited all 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), underscoring that the region is one of his key foreign policy priorities. He more than doubled the number of summit meetings with his ASEAN counterparts from 12 to 26, and increased Foreign Ministerial meetings from 9 to 15 over the year. The focus on Southeast Asia is part of the Abe Cabinet's foreign policy theme of "proactive pacifism," aimed at linking Abe's goals of boosting Japan's security posture to peaceful diplomacy and dovetails with our own ASEAN-centric rebalance policy. A key outcome of October's "2+2" ministerial meeting between Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, and their Japanese counterparts was Japan's agreement to contribute more proactively to regional and global peace and security. In February 2014, the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Japan Development Dialogue was held in Washington, the result of a commitment made during the December 2013 trip of the Vice President to Tokyo. The Dialogue resulted in the announcement of increased ODA policy coordination with an emphasis on Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

(U) Japan is one of the strongest supporters of the ASEAN framework, viewing a strong, unified ASEAN as better capable of standing against countries that bully and challenge international norms and practices, e.g. in the South China Sea. Japan funds a multitude of assistance projects for ASEAN, particularly to the Lower Mekong countries—Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Thailand—to enhance the region's economic and political connectivity. In December, Japan hosted a special Japan-ASEAN Summit to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Japan-ASEAN ties. The summit's joint statement language on "freedom of overflight"—a reference to China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) announcement—demonstrated that ASEAN countries share Japan's concerns about China's recent assertiveness. Meanwhile, Japan announced a new loan package of 2 trillion yen to be paid over the next five years to help achieve ASEAN connectivity goals, along with another 100 million USD grant aid to enhance connectivity and narrow development gaps, and 300 billion yen for infrastructure development, capacity building, and humanitarian assistance.

(U) Japan is keenly interested in developments in the South China Sea, as Tokyo sees disputes there as having implications for its own disputes in the East China Sea. Japan has sought to help develop the maritime capacities of Southeast Asian countries, particularly to Vietnam and the Philippines, which have faced most direct pressure from China on their competing claims. Abe agreed in 2013 to provide the Philippines with yen loans to fund the purchase of ten new coast guard patrol vessels costing approximately one billion yen (\$11 million) each, as part of Japan's official development assistance. In addition, Japan has held discussions with Vietnam on providing Japanese patrol ships to the Vietnam coast guard to help counter China's growing claims to contested reefs and islands in the South China Sea. In ASEAN meetings and at the East Asia Summit, Japan, in concert with the United States, has been one of the most vocal proponents of an early conclusion of a Code of Conduct, which would lay out a framework for the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea.

(U) Japan has also played a leading role in assisting the opening and development of Burma, with which Japan sees itself as having a special relationship and which Japanese businesses describe as the "last frontier" of overseas markets. In January 2013, Japan forgave the Burmese

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
UNCLASSIFIED

government over \$5 billion worth of unpaid loans and pledged nearly \$1 billion in new loans. Japan is largely focusing on infrastructure development and investing in its flagship Thilawa Special Economic Zone. Japan also announced in January 2014 nearly \$100 million in grants for humanitarian assistance to ethnic minorities. Japan has also provided limited support for Burma's role as 2014 ASEAN chair, mostly in training for Burmese bureaucrats and the press.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, JAPAN~~

Meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
(“AH-bay”)


- (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)
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~~SECRET//REL to USA, JAPAN~~

(b)(1) : Sec. 1.4(a)

REALIGNMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN

- (U) Significant progress was made on implementing our bilateral realignment plan in 2013, especially regarding the realignment of U.S. Forces deployed in Okinawa. We are now closer than ever to realizing the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF); we released to the public a bilaterally-developed consolidation plan for our bases in Okinawa; and progress continues to be made on the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam.
- (U) After a prolonged process, the Governor of Okinawa approved the landfill permit for the FRF on December 27, 2013, which will be built by extending the runway and associated facilities into the waters surrounding the existing Marine Corps Camp Schwab. This represents the last major legal and political obstacle to the construction of the FRF.



- (U) The GoJ has agreed to fund about \$28M in projects over the next three years to sustain operations at the existing MCAS Futenma.
- (U) On April 5, 2013, the United States and Japan released to the public a “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa,” as called for by the 2006 Realignment Roadmap and 2012 2+2 statement. The consolidation plan is intended to establish a U.S. force posture on Okinawa that maintains regional deterrence while mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on

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local communities, thus ensuring that U.S. presence is politically sustainable over the long term.

- (U) The plan provides estimated timelines for the return of about 2,500 acres of property on Okinawa as Marines and other activities relocate to new facilities on and off of the island. It also clearly delineates and describes responsibilities for each step of the process.

- (U) Specifically, the plan directs the total or partial return of six U.S. facilities and areas in the following three categories:
 - (U) 1) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of necessary procedures, including parts of Camp Foster and Kinser;
 - (U) 2) Areas eligible for return once the replacement facilities in Okinawa are provided, including Camp Lester, parts of Camps Foster and Kinser, the Kuwae Tank Farm, Naha Military Port, and MCAS Futenma; and
 - (U) 3) Areas eligible for return as U.S. Marine Corps forces relocate from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including parts of Camp Foster and the remainder of Camp Kinser.

- (U) The timelines for the return of the above facilities are event-driven. Each facility or area is associated with a “no earlier than” return date based on best-case estimates following the completion of necessary steps and procedures by the U.S. and Japanese governments. The timelines are subject to delay, depending on such elements as progress of Japan’s efforts to prepare relocation sites on Okinawa and progress on the United States’ efforts to relocate Marine Corps forces to locations outside of Japan. A summary of return timelines for each facility and area is attached.

- (U) The consolidation plan was developed reflecting the precepts that regular training and exercises, as well as the availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure the readiness, employability, and interoperability of U.S. forces, and that adequate capacity of U.S. facilities and areas is necessary to meet peacetime and contingency requirements.

- (U) Other accomplishments in 2013 include: bilateral agreement on a cost breakdown for the funding of Guam relocation construction projects, including GoJ funding of new training facilities; and revision of the Guam International Agreement regarding the handling of GoJ cash contributions (\$3.1B in FY12 dollars), which was signed by SecDef, SecState, and their counterparts at a 2+2 meeting in October. To date, the GoJ has transferred more than \$900 million to the U.S. Treasury to implement the realignment process.


ATTACHMENT: List of Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas

REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

(U) Senkaku Islands / East China Sea

- ~~(C)~~ The Japanese government has complained for years about Chinese fishing vessels operating near the Senkakus. In fall 2010, a Chinese fishing boat rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels, instigating the worst deterioration of bilateral relations in years.

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



- (U) We have continually told the Japanese government privately and publicly that the United States does not take a position on the sovereignty of the islands, but the islands do fall under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security as territory under the administrative control of Japan.

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



(U) North Korea

- (b)(1); (b)(6); Sec. 1.4(a)



- (U) North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and continued provocations demonstrate the importance of enhancing our ballistic missile capabilities—including deploying a second TPY-2 ballistic missile defense radar to Japan.

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

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(U) South China Sea

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHUCK HAGEL

April 2014 Trip to Japan: Scope Note / Policy Priorities

SCOPE NOTE

Trip Overview:

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)
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Classified by: David Helvey, DASD/East Asia
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)
Declassify after: 20390430

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

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Trip Objectives:

- (U) 1) Preview your trip to China.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)


- (U) 2) Reaffirm U.S. Treaty obligations and reassure Japan of the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific Rebalance.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

- (U) 3) Encourage Japan to improve relations with South Korea to enable greater trilateral cooperation. Support Japanese engagement in Southeast Asia.


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- (U) 4) Build on momentum from the October 2013 2+2 meeting to encourage continued progress on key bilateral security initiatives.


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Key Issues:

- (U) U.S. Commitment to the Asia-Pacific Rebalance.

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are working to be in a position to officially announce the deployment during your visit.

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)
-

- (U) 2+2 Initiatives.

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

Additional Issues that May Be Raised:

- (U) Prime Minister Abe's Yasukuni Visit.

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

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- (U) New Arms Export Policy

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

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- (U) Space and Cyber Issues.


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
guidelines revision. You should also reference the recent work of bilateral working groups that were established to build this cooperation.

Landmines:

- (U) Okinawa Impact Mitigation Measures.



- (U) CV-22 Deployment.



**READ-AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
Meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe [“AH-bay”]
April 5, 2014
Kantei**

From: Kelly Magsamen, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

Meeting Purpose: (U) You are meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister in his office at the Kantei (the Japanese equivalent to the White House) to discuss Alliance cooperation and the regional security environment. You last met with the Prime Minister at the 2+2 meeting in Tokyo in October 2013.

Objectives:

- ~~(S)~~ Preview your trip to China;
- ~~(S)~~ Reaffirm U.S. Treaty obligations and reassure Tokyo of U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific rebalance;
- ~~(S)~~ Highlight the importance of building U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation, and welcome Japanese engagement in Southeast Asia;
- ~~(S)~~ Support Abe’s efforts on collective self-defense and endorse a bold revision to the defense guidelines; and
- ~~(S)~~ Thank Abe for his efforts in securing approval of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) landfill permit.

Attendees: *USG:* Secretary Hagel, Ambassador Kennedy, Chief of Staff Lippert, other TBD.
GoJ: Prime Minister Abe, others TBD.

Background:

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)


Prepared by: (b)(6) APSA/EAS, (b)(6)

Classified by: David Helvey, DASD/East Asia

Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)

Declassify after: 20390430

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)




Attachment:
Abe Bio

TALKING POINTS

- **(U) China**

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



- **(U) U.S. Commitment to the Rebalance**

- (U) 2014 QDR promotes the rebalance; focuses on enhancing alliances and preserves capability investments in the Asia-Pacific.

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



- **(U) Regional Cooperation**

- (U) President Obama places high priority on the trilateral relationship; must seize on positive momentum from recent summit in The Hague.

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



- (U) Also welcome Japanese efforts to increase security cooperation with Southeast Asian nations.


— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



- **(U) Bilateral Security Initiatives**


- (U) U.S.-Japan Alliance is cornerstone of regional security and stability.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



- **(U) Ukraine**

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)




- **(U) (IF RAISED: New Arms Export Policy “3 Ps”)**

- (U) Welcome a relaxed and simplified arms export policy that promotes defense industrial cooperation with the U.S. and other partner nations.
- (U) Will lower costs, increase efficiencies, and improve Alliance capabilities.

- **(U) (IF RAISED: Yasukuni Visit)**

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)



~~SECRET~~

**READ-AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
Meeting with Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera ["oh-noh-deh-rah"]
April 6, 2014
Ministry of Defense**

From: Kelly Magsamen, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

Meeting Purpose: (U) You are meeting with the Japanese Defense Minister in his office at the Ministry of Defense to discuss Alliance cooperation and the regional security environment. You last spoke with Defense Minister Onodera during a phone call on January 4, 2014.

Objectives:

- ~~(S)~~ Preview your trip to China;
- ~~(S)~~ Reaffirm U.S. Treaty obligations and reassure Tokyo of U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific rebalance;
- ~~(S)~~ Encourage Japan to improve relations with South Korea to enable greater trilateral cooperation, and support Japanese engagement in Southeast Asia;
- ~~(S)~~ Underscore importance of guidelines review and stress that it should reflect Japanese decisions on collective self-defense; and
- ~~(S)~~ Encourage Japan to begin construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) as soon as possible.


Attendees: *USG:* Secretary Hagel, Ambassador Kennedy, Chief of Staff Lippert, others TBD.

GoJ: Defense Minister Onodera, others TBD.

Prepared by: (b)(6), APSA/EAS, (b)(6)
Classified by: David Helvey, DASD/East Asia
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)
Declassify after: 20390430

~~SECRET~~

Background:

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)
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Attachment:
Onodera Bio

TALKING POINTS

- **(U) China**

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

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- **(U) U.S. Commitment to the Rebalance**

— (U) 2014 QDR promotes the rebalance; focuses on enhancing alliances and preserves capability investments in the Asia-Pacific.

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

- **(U) Regional Cooperation**

— (U) President Obama places high priority on the trilateral relationship; must seize on positive momentum from recent summit in The Hague.

— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

— (U) Also welcome Japanese efforts to increase security cooperation with Southeast Asian nations.


— (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)

- **(U) Bilateral Security Initiatives**

— (U) U.S.-Japan Alliance is cornerstone of regional security and stability.


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- **(U) Ukraine**

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)

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- **(U) (IF RAISED: New Arms Export Policy “3 Ps”)**

- (U) Welcome a relaxed and simplified arms export policy that promotes defense industrial cooperation with the U.S. and other partner nations.
- (U) Will lower costs, increase efficiencies, and improve Alliance capabilities.

- **(U) (IF RAISED: Cyber and Space Security)**

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)

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**READ-AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
Meeting with Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida ["KEE-shee-dah"]
April 6, 2014
Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

From: Kelly Magsamen, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

Meeting Purpose: (U) You are meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister in his office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss Alliance cooperation and the regional security environment. You last met with Foreign Minister Kishida in Washington on February 7, 2014.

Objectives:

- ~~(S)~~ Preview your trip to China;
- ~~(S)~~ Reaffirm U.S. Treaty obligations and reassure Tokyo of U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific rebalance;
- ~~(S)~~ Encourage Japan to improve relations with South Korea to enable greater trilateral cooperation, and support Japanese engagement in Southeast Asia;
- ~~(S)~~ Underscore importance of guidelines review and stress that it should reflect Japanese decisions on collective self-defense; and
- ~~(S)~~ Encourage Japan to begin construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) as soon as possible.


Attendees: *USG:* Secretary Hagel, Ambassador Kennedy, Chief of Staff Lippert, others TBD.

GoJ: Foreign Minister Kishida, others TBD.

Prepared by: (b)(6), APISA/EAS, (b)(6)
Classified by: David Helvey, DASD/East Asia
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)
Declassify after: 20390430

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
- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)
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Attachment:
Kishida Bio

TALKING POINTS


- **(U) China**

– (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)



- **(U) North Korea**

– (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)




– (U) What is Japan's view?

- **(U) Regional Cooperation**


– (U) President Obama places high priority on the trilateral relationship; must seize on positive momentum from recent summit in The Hague.

– (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)




– (U) Also welcome Japanese efforts to increase security cooperation with Southeast Asia nations.

– (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)




- **(U) U.S. Commitment to the Rebalance**

- (U) 2014 QDR promotes the rebalance; focuses on enhancing alliances and preserves capability investments in the Asia-Pacific.


- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)


- **(U) Bilateral Security Initiatives**

- (U) U.S.-Japan Alliance is cornerstone of regional security and stability.

- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(a)


- **(U) Ukraine**

- (b)(1)


~~SECRET~~

- (U) **(IF RAISED: New Arms Export Policy “3 Ps”)**
 - (U) Welcome a relaxed and simplified arms export policy that promotes defense industrial cooperation with the U.S. and other partner nations.
 - (U) Will lower costs, increase efficiencies, and improve Alliance capabilities.

~~SECRET~~

