



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20 July 1994

In reply refer to:
I-94/16596

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

SUBJECT: DoD Support for Humanitarian Efforts in Rwanda (U)

(U) Last night, prior to my NightLine taping, we met to discuss DoD support to ameliorating the horrendous conditions in Rwanda. Dick Clarke and Doug Bennett joined Walt Slocombe, Admiral Owens and an array of OSD and Joint Staff representatives in the meeting. Let me offer you a synopsis.

(U) During the next 24-48 hours we plan to move on several fronts. First, USCINCEUR will deploy a survey team to Goma in Zaire. The team, to include experts in logistics, health and sanitation, engineering and transportation, will have two functions: to assess possible DoD assistance and to start helping UN and French authorities in areas of our expertise such as flight scheduling, airfield throughput operations, onward movement of supplies, security, communications support, and health services. Second, we will dispatch another team to France to facilitate coordination with their MFA and MOD. Third, we will offer to augment the UNHCR with a logistic planning cell in Geneva.

(U) After our deployed experts feed us back some analysis, we are willing to consider further steps. Here is a list of some possible responses:

- Deploy runway repair team
- Provide night capability at Goma airfield
- Deploy an airlift control element
- Provide excess medical supplies
- Deploy preventative medicine elements
- Provide water distribution equipment, bladders, ROWPUs
- Provide trucks
- Provide rations

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- Deploy Special Forces Teams or a Group
- Deploy PSYOP unit(s)
- Provide civil affairs personnel to assist in the UN relief operation
- Provide additional airlift


(U) Funding: Approximately \$8M of the \$15M DoD humanitarian assistance funds identified for transportation support remain. State is passing \$19M to the UN which may be helpful as we work in concert with UNHCR; perhaps State and other agencies can offer other similar contributions. Beyond that we see two possibilities. The first is a Presidential drawdown under section 506a2, but that isn't cash and would mean pulling goods and services out of serving Army units, with possible impact on readiness. We would also be willing to pursue an emergency DoD reprogramming.

(C) As we begin to immerse ourselves more deeply, two factors are critical. First, we will be playing a supportive role to the UN and the French, nothing more. Second, while we work to save lives in Zaire, the international community must find a way to convince Rwandan refugees to return home as soon as possible.

(C) Currently, Hutu refugees prefer the uncertainties of Goma to what they see as almost certain death at the hands of avenging Tutsis. Security in Rwanda is key to bringing the refugees back. UNAMIR forces in Rwanda must provide this security; working in tandem with UNHCR, they must become a "magnet" to draw Hutus home as U.S. forces helped draw Kurds back to northern Iraq. As I told Ted Koppel last night, our model is not Somalia but Provide Comfort.

(C) Your staff is working with State and USUN to try to reconfigure UNAMIR from a heavy mostly African force to a light force with a substantial component of First World militaries with the logistical skills to assist in refugee repatriation and humanitarian assistance inside of Rwanda. Walt alerted Bob Hunter yesterday that we and the UN may be calling on our NATO allies in this regard. At the same time, we must continue to facilitate political reconciliation through international and bilateral channels. State is working this and of course we stand by to help.

cc: Strobe Talbott
General Shalikashvili



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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

9 June 1994

I-94/36222

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Senator Kennedy Letter on Jamming of Rwandan Radio
Broadcasts (U)

(U) Purpose: To respond to the Secretary's request for information about the use of DoD assets to jam Rwandan radio stations.

(C) Summary: On 1 June, Senator Kennedy wrote the Secretary to ask that DoD, in concert with UN allies, jam Rwandan radio broadcasts which are inciting violence. While DoD does have assets which could jam the station (with limited effectiveness), their use would be expensive and legally contentious.

(C) Discussion: One of the media used by Hutu extremists to encourage the slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda has been local radio. In late April, DoD was asked to investigate possibilities for jamming these transmissions. Frank Wisner responded to Tony Lake's request on 5 May (TAB A).

(C) There is no effective means of jamming the radio station from a ground station outside of Rwanda. With this in mind, the only suitable jamming platform is Commando Solo, an Air National Guard asset (TAB B). It costs approximately \$8,500 per hour and requires a semi-secure area of operations due to its vulnerability and limited self-protection. To be fully effective, the Rwandan transmissions would need to be jammed 24-hours a day until the massacres ended -- a very expensive, dangerous and open-ended prospect.

(C) If conducted unilaterally, jamming has been determined by State and DoD lawyers to be troublesome legally because it violates international transmissions agreements. If done through UN auspices, this action would probably require a Chapter VII mandate, which is not the case currently. Whether conducted unilaterally or through the UN, the executing agency's neutrality would be called into question.

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



3 MAY 1994

I-94/16545

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF


SUBJECT: Response to State Request for DoD Assets (U)

~~(C)~~ The attached memorandum requests that Defense undertake preliminary planning to jam fixed and mobile radio broadcasts originating in Rwanda that are inciting ethnic violence.

~~(C)~~ Request that Joint Staff provide ISA with a range of options to carry out this operation, as well as any other information relevant to making a decision on the viability of such an operation.

(U) We have sent a copy of State's memorandum to OSD General Counsel for a legal opinion.

(U) Point of contact for this action is LTC Johnson, x72771.


Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.

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cc:
Exec Sec

ISA/MEA(A)
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MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

DATE: 020657MAY95 FROM: CDR YOUNG EXT: 49413

SUBJ: NSC-Chaired Meeting on US Assistance to Rwanda

	ACTION	INFO	RETAIN
<i>12</i> DIRECTOR	_____	XXX	_____
VICE DIRECTOR	_____	XXX	_____
→ DEP DIR, PMA	_____	XXX	_____
<i>John</i> CH, MEAF DIV	_____	XXX	_____

TO: OJ-5

SIR,
I have you verbal
dissect on this - here
are details for your
quick scan.

me JG 2

Sir: Susan Rice chaired meeting on 1 May at 1700 to discuss US assistance to Rwanda and possible conditions for continued USG support to the gov't of Rwanda (GOR). Attendees included Joe Nye & Vince Kern (OSD), MG McIlvoy & CDR Young (Joint Staff), Pru Bushnell & Steve McIlvane (DOS & AID) and [REDACTED]

- There was consensus from I/A to continue current USG policy on Rwanda unless investigation into Kibeho shows intentional killing (planned/premeditated) by the RPA.
- It was agreed that IC must do more to provide GOR with support mechanism to improve judicial system and cope with overcrowded detention centers.
- USG-developed benchmarks* will be used to judge GOR performance, but USG would not explicitly condition USG assistance on GOR adherence to benchmarks, noting that there are areas in which GOR cannot completely comply without outside assistance.
- USG will explore other avenues available to increase assistance to GOR (i.e., other sources of funding, pushing to move current World Bank Programs, etc.).
- DOS was tasked to send series of cables to : 1) garner personnel support from countries to staff Kibeho Commission of Inquiry; 2) other interested countries to state USG policy position on Rwanda; and 3) AMEMBASSY Kigali to get feel for GOR thoughts on having UNAMIR and ICRC assist in working with moving/resetting IDPs into communes.

V/R,

Wayne Young
WAYNE YOUNG
CDR, USN
J5MEAF, 49413

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(S) RWANDA INTERAGENCY TELECON: On 9 May, MEA, PK/PE, and SO/LIC reps participated in the daily interagency teleconference on Rwanda. ~~The interagency continues to grope for a cheap, doable, high-probability-of-success solution that will play well in the world press.~~ While most seem to think that only the imposition of a large and heavily armed force can stop the killing (Chapter VII), no one (except Susan Rice at the NSC and a few folks in refugee affairs at State/AID) appear ready to sign up to that (expensive, and potentially bloody) option. There is no sign of a D.C. on the near horizon. Over the weekend, State circulated an "options" paper for interagency comments. PK/PE has drafted the PK/PE, SO/LIC, and MEA-action officer level coordinated response (our responses closely mirror those of EUCOM and the Joint Staff, i.e., lots of careful thinking needs to be done before we start supporting the concept of putting people in Rwanda) and will distribute that paper for MEA and SO/LIC chop on Tuesday. The next interagency teleconference on Rwanda will be at 1600, Tuesday the 10th. (LtCol Harvin)

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MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

DATE: 131400Jul95 FROM: CDR YOUNG EXT: 49413

SUBJ: Rwanda/Burundi SVTS Summary

	ACTION	INFO	RETAIN
DIRECTOR	_____	XXX	_____
VICE DIRECTOR	_____	XXX	_____
DEP DIR, PMA	_____	XXX	_____
CHIEF, MEAF DIV	_____	XXX	_____

(U) Sir, the following are highlights from the 1100, 13 July Rwanda/Burundi SVTS chaired by DOS.

RWANDA

• (C) RPA and Zairian forces exchanged small arms fire across the Rwanda/Zaire border after shots were heard emanating from the Panzi refugee camps located in Zaire just across the Rwandan border. Reason for initial gunfire is unknown, neither force crossed the border, only three injuries reported, considered to be isolated incident.

• (X) Lifting of the UN arms embargo against Rwanda will be discussed at next Wednesday's Perry/Christopher/Lake luncheon. Rwandan representative to the UN submitted a request to UNSC to lift the embargo. DOS feels that individual UNSC members will support lifting the embargo or abstain from voting, resulting a resolution to lift the embargo. The USG, including the JS, supports incrementally lifting the embargo to support demining and non-lethal military training, but has not taken a formal position on completely lifting the embargo. The Rwanda/Burundi IWG supports lifting the embargo. DOS developed an options paper on lifting the arms embargo. UN/MEAF will coordinate 136 on DOS option paper recommending JS approve lifting the embargo.

• (X) Ethiopian government holds firm to withdrawing forces from UNAMIR. USG may be asked to provide airlift for redeployment and will support if reimbursed. UN is restrained by funding and will attempt to redeploy contingent by other means.

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BURUNDI

- ~~(C)~~ OSD/DOS representatives will meet with congressional Foreign Affairs committee staff Friday, 14 July to provide briefing on current situation in Burundi and actions taken thus far by USG to preclude outbreak of massive violence and humanitarian crisis. OSD (Kern) pushed for DOD representation at the meeting even though DOS feels that there will be very little, if any, discussion on DOD options or services to be provided. JS presence is not needed at this meeting but Kern will probable request JS presence if any meetings are held with the Armed Forces committee staff.


- ~~(C)~~ An ANTI-Tutsi hate radio controlled by Hutu extremists is broadcasting from the vicinity of the Burundi/Zaire border. USG (OSD/SOLIC) will research options, along with legal and technical requirements, to shut down the broadcasts and provide recommendations for interagency discussions and dissemination to interested parties.

- ~~(C)~~ NSA (Tony Lake) will meet with representatives from 19 major NGOs at the White House at 1630, 25 July to brief them on the current situation in Burundi and actions taken thus far by USG to preclude outbreak of massive violence and humanitarian crisis. The meeting will also be used to receive feedback from NGOs on their activities in the country. Other participants will be DOS/Tim Wirth, OSD/Walt Slocombe and AID/Brian Atwood.

REGIONAL

- ~~(C)~~ DOS requested that IA provide its comments on a Tanzanian idea for establishing an all-African peacekeeping force. The IA agreed that it was an idea worth pursuing noting that such a force would be lacking in resources (logistical, material, technical) and would require considerable assistance from western nations.

V/R,


Wayne Young, CDR, USN

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MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

DATE: 211300Jul95 FROM: CDR YOUNG EXT: 49413

SUBJ: Peacekeeping Core Group SVTS

	ACTION	INFO	RETAIN
DEP DIR, PMA	_____	XXX	_____
CHIEF, MEAF DIV	_____	XXX	_____

Sir, the following are Rwanda/Burundi highlights from the 1100, 21 July Peacekeeping Core Group SVTS.

- ~~(C)~~ **RWANDA: LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO.** General feelings among the international community range from a partial to complete lifting of the embargo. Permissive countries opposing complete lift (UK/France) seem poised to abstain from voting rather than casting a vote to veto. The USG position would strongly influence the UNSC votes. NSC, DOS and OSD support lifting the embargo under conditions restricting further distribution of arms outside of Rwanda. JS proposed position (UNDIV routing form 136) supports EUCOM's stance for a partial lifting of the embargo for non-lethal equipment. DOS will draft a cable to USUN for interagency clearance which contains USG guidance on the embargo.
- ~~(C)~~ **BURUNDI: ALL AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.** DOS was task to take the lead in compiling a paper showing what assistance (financial and logistical) the USG could provide for such a force. JS was requested to provide an input on military support (logistical, training, equipment) that could be made available. Understanding that the GOT did not make a request for equipment, bilateral or through the UN or OAU, it is impossible and would be imprudent to develop a list of what military assistance can be provided. However, J3, J4, and LC will be solicited for general inputs on what the US military might be able to contribute to such a force.
- ~~(C)~~ **BURUNDI: An ANTI-Tutsi hate radio** controlled by Hutu extremists is broadcasting from the vicinity of the Burundi/Zaire border. Interagency agrees that USG can technically and legally contribute to silencing the radio. ~~(S)~~ OSD/SOLIC will present options to shut down the broadcasts and provide recommendations for interagency discussion. At a minimum, if inherent forces (Zaire/Burundi) cannot locate and destroy the radio, OSD/SOLIC suggests assisting the Burundian government in procuring the equipment required to jam the radio and providing training on using the equipment.

V/R,

Wayne Young, CDR, USN

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DOC JS 22

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MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

DATE: 251330Jul95 FROM: CDR YOUNG EXT: 49413

SUBJ: Rwanda IWG Meeting Summary

	ACTION	INFO	RETAIN
DIRECTOR	_____	XXX	_____
VICE DIRECTOR	_____	XXX	_____
DEP DIR, PMA	_____	XXX	_____
CHIEF, MEAF DIV	_____	XXX	_____

Sir, the following are highlights from the 1100, 25 July Rwanda IWG meeting held at DOS.

- ~~(S)~~ **LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO.** DOS forwarded cable to USUN outlining instructions for addressing the UN on lifting the arms embargo. DOS will assist in drafting a resolution lifting the embargo with conditions preventing further transfer of arms outside of Rwanda. The resolution will also contain language to place UN observers at key airports in Zaire to monitor arms flow, and to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate arms embargo violations in the region. NSC/DOS will schedule a meeting to brief congressional staff members on the USG position to lift the embargo. NSC (Rice) stated that USG would not provide arms to Rwanda. Non-lethal assistance/training such as IMET and demining would continue to be provided.

• ~~(S)~~ (S) (C) 50 USC 3403(g) Section 4

- ~~(S)~~ **UN WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL(WTC).** The WCT is still being established. Reports have been received that a Rwandan suspected of committing genocide is residing in the US. Currently there is no US legislation in place to deal with the suspected individual. DOS is researching avenues available to detain or deport the individual.

V/R,

Wayne Young, CDR, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOC JS 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

DATE: 271400Jul95 FROM: CDR YOUNG EXT: 49413

SUBJ: Rwanda IWG Meeting Summary

	ACTION	INFO	RETAIN
DIRECTOR	_____	XXX	_____
VICE DIRECTOR	_____	XXX	_____
DEP DIR, PMA	_____	XXX	_____
CHIEF, MEAF DIV	_____	XXX	_____

Sir, the following are highlights from the 1200, 27 July Rwanda IWG SVTS chaired by DOS.

BURUNDI

- (U) To assist the UNHCR in reducing or eliminating the need for DOD involvement in a potential humanitarian crisis in Burundi, DOS/OFDA will approach the UNHCR on hosting a meeting of major NGO and international governmental water experts to better define and possibly reduce the services that might be requested from DOD. OSD/OFDA will also demarche UNHCR to approach other governments to assist in meeting anticipated water needs.
- (C) International preventive diplomacy has been credited with assuaging the declining situation in Burundi. The IWG will continue to seek new initiatives to bring about reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi parties. MEAF will explore with EUCOM the possibility of using MMCP money that might be transferred from APAC funding to support mil-mil contact with Burundi.

RWANDA

- (C) [REDACTED]

V/R,

Wayne Young, CDR, USN

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DOC JS 25

Met Tue @ 1100

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MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

SUBJ: Burundi/Rwanda IWG Meeting

Sir, the following are highlights for the 1100, 8 Aug Burundi/Rwanda IWG meeting (Agenda Attached).

GENERAL

- ~~(S)~~ **WHITE HOUSE MEETING.** The USG is gravely concerned about the political and security situation in Rwanda and Burundi, particularly the continued deterioration in Burundi. The NSC discussion paper addresses options that could provide a strategy to bring long-term stability to Rwanda and Burundi. Paper will be used for discussion at Rwanda/Burundi Meeting 1300, 9 August. Meeting will be chaired by Deputy NSA Nancy Soderburg at the White House Situation Room. MG MCILVOY will attend. *Inter. Policy, at drafting meeting - come up w/ mem. Defined draft.*
- **(U) CARTER/MOBUTU DISCUSSIONS.** DOS will present. *DOS - available at August*
BURUNDI *Stop Arms - prevent incursions from Zaire* *NSC - state radio disarmament - more heavy weapons - arrest leaders of FAR in genocide*
- ~~(S)~~ **AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE (APF).** DOS was tasked to take the lead in compiling a paper showing what assistance (financial and logistical) the USG could provide for such a force. JS provided OSD and DOS with generic logistic information and listing of legal authorizations for supporting an APF. JS/J4 states that Defense Logistics Agency has consumables (rations, boots, clothing, etc.) warehoused that would cost pennies on the dollar. Itemized list of requirements, similar to what the UN has provided in the past, would be used to check availability of items. OSD will check with DSAA to find the status of durable equipment that might be available (i.e., transport units, hardware items).
- ~~(S)~~ **ARMS EMBARGO/ASSETS FREEZE.** There has been discussion in the IA to place sanctions on Burundi to deter extremists, military, and militia actions that are destabilizing the government. One action is to freeze the assets of those individuals and organizations that are involved in atrocities against civilians or actions directed towards destabilizing the government. A second consideration is to place an arms embargo on the military to thwart continued actions taken against civilians in Burundi. The current effort to enforce the prevention of arms flow to the Ex-FAR is expected to slow the flow of weapons to the Burundi Hutu militia also.
- **(U) COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.** UNSYG wants a UN commission of inquiry to investigate atrocities and human rights abuses in Burundi covering cover the period from the 1993 military coup to the present.

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DOC JS 27

~~SECRET~~

The commission will name individuals suspected of wrong-doings, and make recommendations on what justice should be served. USG position is to support the resolution. A draft has been provided to USUN. Although all UNSC members support the establishment of a commission, there were differences in views over whether explicit commitments should first be sought from the GOB before establishing the process or whether that would entail unacceptable delay. The SC president intends to meet with the Burundi Permrep to obtain the views of his authorities.

- **BURUNDI EMERGENCY PLANNING.** UNHCR's coordinator for Rwanda/Burundi says they are 75 percent ready for major refugee outflow from Burundi. Infrastructural, financial, and political constraints are holding up the remaining 25 percent. Tanzanian government border stance remains a problem. DOD has already been informally informed that its assistance will be needed to supplement the supply of water. JS and the interagency are aggressively supporting the UNHCR in its attempts to bridge the water gap and preclude having to call on USG/DOD for support.

- **BURUNDI POLICE.** DOS will present.

RWANDA

- **(U) PRISON UPDATE.** U/SYG Hansen of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) convened an emergency meeting of donor countries to discuss appalling prison conditions and how to improve the situation. Another meeting will be held in August with operational experts who can discuss the possible use of military and civil defense assets. A popular recommendation to the GOR is to weed out prisoners against whom the evidence is scanty and prevent revenge killings of released prisoners by calling upon the population at the grassroots to respect ministry of justice decisions to release prisoners.


- **(C) LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO.** JS cleared DOS cable to USUN forwarding a draft resolution on lifting the embargo. With the exception of perambulatory language calling for the GOR to improve its policy on detaining genocide suspects and improving conditions in over crowded prisons, the draft resolution embodies the same content of the cable already cleared by the JS.

- **FYI: MASSIVE REPATRIATION MAY OCCUR ON 15 AUGUST.** Madame Theater, an Australian Pentecostalist, is in Zaire to lead refugees back to Rwanda based on a vision from God. UNHCR and an estimated 20,000 refugees are taking the matter seriously. 15 August also coincides with the beginning of the

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5) USC 6403(a) Section 6

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5) USC 6403(a) Section 6

~~SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
AFRICA REGION

Date: 9 June 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR Walt Slocombe

SUBJECT: Response to SecDef's Question Re: Jamming of
Rwandan Radio Transmissions

The attached memo for your signature responds to SecDef's questions about jamming Rwandan radio stations as a result of a letter from Senator Kennedy (attached). He wants a response by 1200 today.

As you are aware, we've already gone through this before. We have attached our previous response to the NSC at Tab A. FYI, even State lawyers said this was a non-starter, back in early May.

VINCENT D. KERN
Director

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MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

DATE: 121530SEP95 FROM: CDR YOUNG EXT: 614-9413

SUBJ: Rwanda/Burundi IWG Meeting Summary

Sir, the following are highlights from the 1100, 12 Sep IWG.

- ~~(S)~~ Rwanda has requested that the UN leave 55 APC's behind for RPA use once it departs Rwanda in Dec of 1995. Since 6 are on lease from the US and the remainder were provided to the UN by the USG, there are USG stipulations that must be met before a transfer can take place. This issue, as well as other requests for military equipment, has led to the need for the USG to establish a policy for providing the GOR with lethal and non-lethal military support. A 136 will be routed establishing a JS position in preparation for interagency discussion (TBD) on the subject.

- ~~(S)~~ AMB Krueger will be in CONUS throughout the remainder of September and possibly October. The following is his assessment of the situation in Burundi.

- The pace of violence will increase as the civilian government continues to be marginalized by the army and extremists.

- Hutu government leaders, being undermined by Tutsi leaders, may resign thereby removing the legitimacy to government that is implied by their presence.

- UNSR Abdellah is overly optimistic in expectations that negotiations alone will solve the problem in Burundi. Tougher methods such as sanctions and the commission of inquiry will have to be applied.

- The Tutsi military is the principle cause of the deaths in Burundi.

- (U) UN will ask the USG to provide personnel (investigators, judges, etc.) to support the commission of inquiry into the Burundi coup of 1993 and the commission of inquiry to investigate the illegal shipment of arms to the Ex-FAR.

- (U) UNHCR/Ogata is cautiously optimistic about repatriating the 1.2 million refugees in Zaire back to Rwanda by Dec 95. A meeting GOZ and GOR foreign ministers and the UNHCR is sked for 18 Sep.

- (U) DOS has been requested by UNHCR to provide another US retired military officer to serve as the deputy director of security for the refugee camps in Zaire. DOS will send tasker to OSD to support the request. The previous candidate, COL Foulds USA, Ret., was denied a visa by Zaire because of his background in the intelligence community.

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DECLASSIFIED

BY Joint STAFF

DATE 7/9/2012

DOC JS 30



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



5 July 1994

In reply refer to:
I-94/16583

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: DIRECTOR, RWANDA TASK FORCE
Prepared by: MAJ Bittrick, ISA/MEA, x79753 & Michael
Greenspon, S&R(PK/PE), x52322

SUBJECT: Response to French Policy Shift (U)
ACTION MEMORANDUM

BACKGROUND: ~~(S/NF)~~ On 23 June the French deployed to Rwanda IAW UNSCR 929, which mandates a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation to protect at-risk civilians. Following the capture of Kigali and Butaré by the Rwandan Patriotic Front last weekend, the French commander declared southwest Rwanda an RPF no-go zone. On 5 June, the French requested of State that the U.S. provide airlift for 60 soldiers from Senegal to the Central African Republic (CAR-the French staging area) and we expect State to forward the request to DoD on 6 July.

DISCUSSION: ~~(S/NF)~~ UNSCR 929 authorizes the French and other interested member states to deploy troops to Rwanda to "contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas." The French claim their decision to secure southwest Rwanda conforms to that mandate. We disagree and ~~(b)(1)~~

~~(b)(1)~~ The French government has explicitly stated their forces will not allow the RPF to enter their zone; the French ground commander has said he will fire "without hesitation" on any RPF forces that attempt to pass his security positions. Conversely, Rwanda Interim Government forces and Hutu militias, both perpetrators of acts of genocide, remain all too free to operate against unarmed, unprotected Tutsis and moderate Hutus in southwest Rwanda (despite French efforts to protect Tutsis at a few locations).


~~(S)~~ On 5 July, we received a formal French request to move sixty Senegalese soldiers with personal gear to Bangui, CAR, possibly as soon as tomorrow (6 July). The change in the French stance leads us to believe the USG should relook its previous policy of unquestioned support of the French-led deployment pending interagency consensus:

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~~SECRET / NOFORN~~



DOC AF 15



(C) (b)(1)

(b)(1) Our defense attaché in Paris reports the French J-3, citing Senegalese impatience, requested a response NLT noon 6 July or the flight would be flown by French airlift on 7 July. (b)(1)

(b)(1) Finally, we are concerned that Senegalese participation in the French-led interpositional force would make them unacceptable as participants in UNAMIR II, further delaying the increasingly overdue UN deployment.

RECOMMENDATION: In our response to the French request for airlift, we go slow until we better understand the French political rationale for its urgency.

APPROVE _____

OTHER _____

ASD/ISA _____

ASD/SOLIC: cleared by PDASD Connolly

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~~TOP~~ **IWG MEETING ON RWANDA:** On 26 April, LtCol Harvin attended a State AF DAS Pru Bushnell hosted IWG on "Next Steps in Rwanda." DASD Pat Irvin, FCMA's Director Sue Patrick & COL Mike Beraud, PK/PE Mike Greenspon, and two Joint Staff J-5 reps also attended. DAS Bushnell presented the following short-term USG policy objectives in Rwanda and assigned/solicited Action Offices:

1. Stop the On-going Massacres Now
 - a. Demarches on Gov. of Rwanda and RPF -- AF/C
 - b. Demarches to France and other Govts. -- AF/C & EUR
 - c. Use personal contacts with GOR & RPF leaders -- Ex-AmEmbassy Kigali personnel
 - d. Institute Economic Sanctions -- killed by unanimous vote
 - e. Issue high-level public statements, including name-calling -- AF/P
 - f. Call on Zaire and Uganda to halt arms transfers to Rwanda (both bi-lateral and at UN) -- IO
 - g. Keep ONUMUR and UNAMIR in-country -- IO
 - h. Insist the GOR reopen telephone lines -- AF/C
 - i. Launch a radio campaign -- AF/P
 - j. Coordinate closely with UN on UN initiatives -- IO
2. Achieve a Ceasefire
 - a. Pressure the GOR, RPF, the OAU, UN, and the key governments to get all parties to return to the negotiating table -- AF/C, AF/RA, IO
 - b. Find resources to support/facilitate the talks -- AF/RA (\$1M in ESF to TZ, also now scrubbing OAU conflict resolution account)
 - c. Support UN efforts to achieve a ceasefire -- IO
 - d. Support a ceasefire monitoring mechanism -- IO, AF/RA
 - e. Support naming a Presidential Special Representative(s) (Could name more than one, i.e., one for Humanitarian, one for Negotiations) -- AF/C
 - f. Support adding a military rep to the OAU planning staff for a few months -- AF/RA
3. Resume Negotiations within Arusha Framework
 - a. Formulate USG positions on negotiating points -- PM
 - b. Call for independent, international investigations -- L, HA
 - c. Maintain observer groups at Arusha talks -- AF/C
 - d. Discuss alternatives if Arusha talks fail or never resume -- PM, L
4. Prevent Violence from Spreading Outside Rwanda's Borders
 - a. Demarche host government in neighboring countries -- AF/C
 - b. Urge neighbors against involvement in Rwandan conflict -- AF/C
 - c. Support an OUR presence in Burundi (47 arrived 26th) -- IO
 - d. Halt arms sales/transfers to region -- IO
 - e. Support high level U.S. political and military visits to Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi -- AF/RA
 - f. Conduct formal consultations with OAU -- AF/RA
5. Launch Immediate Humanitarian Assistance
 - a. Get \$15M ERMA (refugee assistance) drawdown approved -- (Mr. Tarnoff will call Mr. Lake)
 - b. Continue weekly in-house coordination meetings --

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- AF/C, AID, OSD (Pat Irvin)
- c. Support transfer of funds from Title I to Title II (FPP)
(OMB says up to \$46M could be transferred, \$11M en route) -- AF/C, AID
 - d. Encourage WFP to allocate food in region to Rwanda
(WFP has 2 months of food for both RW and BU) -- AID
 - e. Examine possibility of establishing refugee safe areas in Tanzania, possibly with the use of UN police forces
-- AF, AF/C, IO
6. Create a Public Affairs Strategy on U.S. Policy on Rwanda
- a. Focus Rwandan radio listener attention on how situation seen from outside -- AF/P, USIA, VOA
 - b. Brief Human Rights groups, NGO's and Hill on situation
-- AF, AF/C

At the conclusion of this discussion, Ms. Patrick pointed out to the group that none of these measures were going to take the "bloody machete out of the hands of the killers who were as we spoke continuing to massacre innocent people." This "the Emperor has no clothes" remark immediately put DAS Bushnell and AF/C Director Amb. Arlene Rander on the defensive. They requested any suggestions that might be considered to stop the killing more effectively. However, no one suggested sending in UN, OAU, or regional troops to seize control of the country, restore order, and oversee the installation of a transitional government of national reconciliation (possibly the only effective option, and one with almost no support at State or at the NSC). (LtCol Harvin)

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS



16 June 1994

1-94/16576

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THROUGH: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MIDDLE
EAST AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FROM: DIRECTOR, RWANDA TASK FORCE *W*
Prepared by: MAJ Bittrick, Africa Region, x79753

SUBJECT: French Reentry into Rwanda? (U)
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U) Purpose: To provide an update on current French planning for possible operations in Rwanda in response to your e-mail query.

~~(S) Summary:~~ On 14 July, French Foreign Minister Juppé asserted that the situation in Rwanda had deteriorated to the point that France and its European and African allies are prepared to deploy military forces. Since that time, informal diplomatic communications have confirmed that the French may be ready to intervene on a unilateral basis although they would prefer to act multilaterally with support from Western and African allies under a UN umbrella.

~~(S) Discussion:~~ The French are considering sending a military force into Rwanda to provide humanitarian support and promote an end to the fighting. As confirmed by Minister Mallet's call to Walt Slocombe (MFR next under), our embassy in Paris has informal indications that the MOD is looking for ways to implement this possible shift in policy.

~~(S) French plans call for the deployment of several thousand (State reads 2,000) soldiers at a yet unspecified time. These troops would fan out quickly to provide security for humanitarian enclaves. Initial staging would be from Goma, Zaire - on the border with Rwanda and in the middle of the Hutu heartland.~~

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(C) State has responded quickly to the French statements. This morning, George Moose (AS/AFR) met in Paris with senior French counterparts, urging caution on the use of military force. Also, SecState was to call Foreign Minister Juppe this morning to talk about the issue. We are awaiting feedback from this discussion. (b)(1)

(C) The French have also talked to the UN about their planning and state that the UNSYG has responded positively. The Perm-5 has been convoked for a special meeting on Rwanda this afternoon.

(C) We see five reasons why the French are considering re-engaging:

- Sincere repugnance with the horrific events in Rwanda (b)(1)
- Desire to maintain Francophone sphere of interest in Africa
- Response to criticism from the French press that French arms have permitted the massacres to occur on a grand scale
- Counterweight to heightened USG involvement (especially with 50 APCs about to be delivered)

(C) The French strongly backed the Hutu Government during the recent civil war, to include stationing a blocking force in the capital. Consequently, the RPF rebels, who control over half the country, will be very leery of the reintroduction of French forces. They will see French troops in the Hutu heartland of western Rwanda as an interpositional force meant to prevent the RPF from liberating endangered Tutsis behind government lines unless the French quickly sought to disarm Hutu militias and protect displaced Tutsis.

(C) The U.S. needs to walk a fine line. We do not want to discourage a French initiative that could save lives by moving quickly while African forces were only getting geared up to intervene. In that regard, the Senegalese have said it would take them three months to deploy and then only after they received additional equipment. (b)(1)

(b)(1) On the other hand, we do not want to give up our honest broker role with both Rwandan parties by appearing to side with the Hutus (who are culpable for almost all of the violence against civilians). Nor do we want to see a situation where the violence were expanded by fighting between the RPF and the French.

CC

DASD Sewall

DASD Kruzel