



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

**SECRET**  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

June 23, 1992

*QNM*

*D27*

*cc: NWA  
INA  
NST*

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<i>VE</i>
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with Ambassador Ho Jong, DPRK Deputy at the UN,  
22 June 1992

(S) I had learned that Ho was attending a meeting conducted by the Carnegie Institute in New York City on Democracy in South Korea. I was listed as one of the speakers. I arranged to have inter-agency clearance for talking points for me to give to Ho in a private meeting in New York.

(S) After my public presentation on the security situation in South Korea at the meeting, Ho made a rejoinder (this initial exchange between Ho and myself was being televised by a Korean broadcasting system). Ho stressed three points: (1) that the IAEA inspection of North Korea had been very successful; (2) that American arms sales were the largest in the world and far exceeded any other country and (3) his estimates of the power balance on the Peninsula differed from mine. I answered Ho telling him I was fully aware of the limits of the IAEA inspections. They were in fact preliminary to full bilateral inspections to which North Korea had already agreed. It was essential these bilateral inspections be carried out. I agreed that American arms sales were probably the largest in the world but they were at least open. On the contrary, North Korea's arms sales were secret. North Korea was exporting ballistic (Scud) missiles to volatile countries and we had to find out about them through the back door. North Korea should lay their cards on the table, as we had. I would like to see North Korean order of battle on the Peninsula. The North Koreans had ours on North Korea. I would like to see what their's looked like on South Korea. I reminded Ho that General Stilwell, in the summer of 91, had offered to provide the North Koreans with his own O.B. on North Korea and they had refused to accept it. Later North Korea had relented and wanted the O.B., but this time Stilwell refused to give it to them. I

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
*Lot: 02D290 Box: 34  
N. Korea 1992 (June-Dec)*

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*James R. Lilley*  
James R. Lilley

Attachment  
Talking Points

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**TALKING POINTS TO BE USED BY ASD LILLEY WITH HO JONG**

- We are pleased that you finally submitted your nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections.
- However, many questions remain, and an essential way to answer them is via a credible bilateral inspection regime. We hope that you take seriously your negotiations with South Korea on the bilateral inspection regime. I understand you may meet again very soon.
- We are also aware that you are maintaining your forward deployed posture in North Korea and are modernizing your forces, including your missile force. This creates the suspicion that you have not given up an aggressive posture on the Korean peninsula.
- President Kim Il Sung has said he wants good relations with the U.S., but frankly, there are still suspicions as to your intentions on the nuclear program and on conventional buildup. We look forward to you dispelling these suspicions, including through agreements in both the jncc and the joint military committees.
- As you know, we have granted some licenses for sales of humanitarian goods to your country. This is part of the policy we established in 1988, and which is still in effect. However, continuation of this policy hinges on the presumption that there is continued progress on relevant issues, including the nuclear issue.
- Under Secretary Kanter told Kim Young Sun in New York in January that our high level dialogue to improve relations can begin only after satisfactory implementation of both the IAEA and bilateral inspections. That remains our position.
- So I hope that you will see it is in your interest to quickly come to an agreement with South Korea on a credible, reciprocal, effective bilateral inspections regime which allows for challenge inspections.

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DISTRIBUTION:

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Mr. Charles Kartman, State/EAP (Korean Affairs)

~~(S) (C) (USC) (4052) (S)~~

Mr. Ron Lehman, ACDA

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400



19 JUL 1992

I-13330/92

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Draft Language for Demarche to Seoul: Fast Breeder  
Reactor Program (U)

(U) NPP and EAPR have agreed on the following language for  
a demarche to Seoul on the South Korean breeder reactor program.  
EAPR will pass this language to the Korea desk at State.

DRAFT LANGUAGE

(C) Recent reporting (attached) indicates that the South  
Koreans have budgeted money to develop a fast breeder reactor  
program. We believe that this program would be in violation of  
the spirit of the December 1991 North-South agreement to forego  
reprocessing.

(U) Breeder reactors are designed to produce plutonium.  
The only way to obtain this plutonium is through chemical  
separation--i.e., reprocessing. Therefore, an R&D program in  
breeder technology, by extension, could result in the development  
of indigenous reprocessing facilities. In other industrial  
countries, fast breeder development has been accompanied by  
concomitant development of nuclear fuel reprocessing.

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*Henry D. Sokolski*  
Henry D. Sokolski  
Deputy for Non-Proliferation Policy

Coordination: EAPR \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Norm Wulf, ACDA  
Gary Samore, State

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