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### Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY to LOGCAP CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN

**REFERENCES.** See ANNEX N, Appendix 4.

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE PLAN. Iraq.

TASK ORGANIZATION. See ANNEX A.

- 1. SITUATION. See Base PLAN.
- 2. MISSION. See Base PLAN.
- 3. EXECUTION. The Executive Summary contains BRS Proprietary Data extracted from ANNEX A (Task Organization) and ANNEX R (Rough Order of Magnitude). In accordance with the modified Statement of Work from the U.S. Army Operations Support Command dated 8 Nov 2002, pages containing proprietary data are clearly marked in the footer as follows:
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  - b. Pages i, v, vi, and vii contain BRS Proprietary Data and are marked accordingly.
- 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See ANNEX I.
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
  - a. Command. See Base PLAN, ANNEX A
  - b. Signal. See Base PLAN, ANNEX H.

### **ACKNOWLEDGE:**

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| <b>OFFICIAL:</b> |           |
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| o)(6)            | BRS D/PGM |

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Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN

# **Executive Summary Overview**

**Purpose.** Brown & Root Services (BRS) will support the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in the assessment of damage, repair, maintenance, resumption and/or continuity of the operations of the oil infrastructure of Iraq.

**Mission.** This mission is essentially divided into two parts. The first is to return the infrastructure to pre-hostility production levels (estimated at 2.4 million barrels per day (MM BPD)). The second is to restore production capacity to 3.1 MM BPD. As indicated in the Statement of Work, supporting tasks include assessments, repairs, and maintenance of said infrastructures. Production, distribution, and sales activity will involve existing Iraqi personnel and organizations whenever possible, subject to and consistent with guidance from appropriate authorities.

**Synopsis.** BRS has considered the following scenarios: best case, most probable case, and worst case. **Table 1** illustrates the approximate project schedules and ROM for the two target levels, by scenario.



**Table 1. ROM and Production Schedules** 

The 'best case' scenario assumes no intentional or collateral damage and refurbishes the oil infrastructure to the required production capacity. The 'most probable case' scenario assumes damage in the southern and northern oil fields. The 'worst case' scenario assumes maximum damage that disables the oil infrastructure.

Further information on the concept of operations, execution and ROM for the Contingency Support Plan is included in the Executive Summary.

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#### **Executive Summary**

- 1. Introduction. Brown & Root Services (BRS) will support the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in the assessment of damage, repair, maintenance, resumption and/or continuity of the operations of the oil infrastructure of Iraq. Servicing the oil and gas industry is BRS' core business and that expertise, combined with our experience supporting U.S. military operations, prepares us to successfully execute this mission. BRS' in-depth understanding of the petroleum industry, U.S. military operations, and the Middle East enabled BRS to develop a comprehensive plan for CENTCOM. This plan provides CENTCOM with the industry best practices and innovative solutions required to:
  - **a.** Assess the condition of, effect repairs to, and maintain continuity of operations of the Iraqi energy infrastructure and all related systems and facilities.
  - **b.** Place initial priority to affect a quick fix of the oil infrastructure to a safe, manageable, and operational condition.
  - c. Return to the pre-hostility production level (estimated at 2.4 MM barrels per day (BPD)) of crude oil daily plus the derivative natural gas and refined petroleum products.
  - **d.** Restore to the pre-hostility production capacity of 3.1 MM BPD plus derivative natural gas and refined petroleum products.
  - e. Execute the plan from Notice to Proceed (NTP) until 90 days after the Government notifies BRS of its intent to compete for the continuity of operations beyond that point. If BRS is not the selected contractor, BRS will continue operations through transition and hand-off to the successor contractor.
- 2. Critical Assumptions. The assumptions for this CSP are detailed in the Base Plan, Annex F (Construction & Engineering Services), Annex I (Service Support), and Annex R (Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM)). The most critical of those are as follows (items d. through h. will be requested on an as-needed basis after NTP):
  - a. The CSP is executed under the terms and conditions of the LOGCAP III contract.
  - **b.** BRS will receive notice of CSP start date and limited NTP at least 30 days prior to plan execution NTP to begin execution planning, hiring Assessment Team personnel and initiate procurement of critical equipment. (See Required Actions for CSP Execution, page vii).
  - c. Receive upgrade of DPAS rating for existing LOGCAP III contract from a DO-C9 to the highest level, DX-01.
  - d. Receive waiver for advance notification & consent requirements for air freight.
  - e. Receive waiver from full & open competition subcontracting requirements.
  - f. Receive waiver for "Buy American Act" clause.
  - g. Receive waiver for U.S. flag carriers (air & sea) requirements.
  - h. Receive waiver for \$2,500 limit on purchases without prior approval from PCO.
  - i. Iraqi energy infrastructure sites are in a benign condition, i.e., no fighting, clear of unexploded ordnance, and chemical and biological weapons.
  - **j.** The priority of work is to restore crude oil production to pre-hostility levels (estimated at 2.4 MM BPD). Concurrent with that, BRS will begin assessments of, and make recommendations regarding the optimization of GOSP performance and the repair, replacement, and operation of the gas plants and oil refineries to restore production capacity to 3.1 MM BPD.





- **k.** The repair/replacement plan presented within this CSP is based on system production capabilities provided by the Government and BRS assumes that the pre-hostility level (estimated at 2.4 MM BPD) remains and/or is available for production.
- 1. BRS, in conjunction with the Government, will select the oil company to conduct marketing and sales. BRS will provide to the U.S. Government the procurement information necessary to support the selection. All sales activity will involve existing Iraqi personnel (Host Country Nationals (HCNs)) and organizations whenever possible, subject to and consistent with guidance from appropriate authorities. BRS will award the subcontract to the company recommended by U.S. Government.
- **m.** BRS will receive necessary power at battery limits of each oil production/shipping facility from others.
- **n.** Sufficient information necessary to allow BRS personnel without security clearances to participate in project execution will be declassified.
- **o.** BRS based the ROM on providing operations and maintenance (O&M) of the oil facilities for 90 days after restoration at each individual facility.
- 3. Concept of Operations. The CSP for Repair and Continuity of Operations of the Iraqi Oil Infrastructure is the BRS plan for overcoming the obstacles that would be faced to mobilize, deploy, and provide the support required to assess, repair, maintain, and resume and/or continue operations of the oil infrastructure of Iraq. Production, distribution, and sales activity will involve existing Iraqi personnel and organizations whenever possible, subject to and consistent with guidance from appropriate authorities.

BRS has considered the following scenarios: best case, most probable case, and worst case to the Iraqi oil infrastructure. Based on the current information, for the crude production from the existing fields, the restoration scenarios provide oil production buildup as in illustrated in **Figure 1** (next page). The best case scenario would reuse the existing equipment and employ current HCN workers. The most probable damage scenario presumes 50 percent damage to Iraq's oil infrastructure. In addition, the equipment that survives and is adequate for reuse will be repaired or refurbished to operate alongside new equipment that replaces irreparably damaged facilities. The 'worst case' scenario assumes maximum damage that disables the oil infrastructure. The BRS response in the worst case will provide replacement of existing facilities with new equipment based on the name plate capacity of each Gas Oil Separation Plant (GOSP).

The design bases in the scenario discussions cover both "production" and "capacity" level references. Production refers to barrels of oil (reported via intelligence information) that is treated and actually flowing at current rates from the existing equipment to the export locations or the refineries. The current production level is deemed sustainable and can be recovered by using current operational wells. Capacity refers to the maximum volume of the oil the equipment in place can process if enough wells are on stream. This is also termed "base plate" or "name plate" capacity.

A "quick fix" phase is planned that will initially take advantage of the larger Rumailah Field in the southern region. The South Rumailah sector of this field is near Kuwait, south of the canal, and easiest to secure and protect. The assumption is made that priority will be given to seize and protect the network of four existing South Rumailah GOSPs along with the pipelines and export facilities.

All the fields in the south region, both north and south of the canal provide a level of up to 2.1 MM BPD production of treated oil. Combining all the currently operable northern fields, the total plan



would encompass repair and refurbishment of the facilities of all 22 known fields and would reach capacity levels of 3.1 MM BPD. Repair and refurbishment will be based on nameplate capacity.

BRS designed a four-phase plan to meet the requirements for the assessment, repair, maintenance, and resumption and/or continuity of the operations of the oil infrastructure of Iraq. Figure 2 outlines the four phases of operations and the key events targeted for completion in each phase.

|   | ne an  |                 |               |                           |
|---|--|-----------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Continuous Planning                    | NTP  | -30 days        | -30 days      | -30 days                  |
| 2. NTP/Initial Deployment of              | Arrival of Assessment                      | +72 hrs         | +72 hrs       | $\div 72$ hrs             |
| Advance Party<br>3A. Assessment/Initial   | Teams A                                    | *14 days        | +14 days      | $\pm 14$ days $7^{\circ}$ |
| Restoration of Oil<br>Infrastructure      |  |                 |               |                           |
| a. Assessment/Design<br>Engineering       | Begin Engineering and<br>Procurement (E&P) | + 90 days       | + 90 days     | +60 days                  |
| b. Begin Restoration of crude oil systems | Begin Oil Production                       | +810 days       | +30 days      | +30 days 🦿                |
| c. Planning for                           | Begin                                      | On Order        | On Order      | On Order                  |
| Derivative Natural                        | Repair/Restoration                         |                 |               |                           |
| Gas and Refined<br>Petroleum <sup>2</sup> | Plan                                       |                 |               | 21. <sup>111</sup>        |
| d. Wellfires                              | Fires extinguished                         | . + 730<br>days | + 480<br>days | N/A                       |
| 3.B. Maturation                           | 2.4 MM BPD                                 | +840 days       | + 540<br>days | +0 days <sup>3</sup>      |
|   | 3.1 MM BPD                                 | + 943<br>days   | + 730<br>days | + 578<br>days             |

#### Figure 1. Phases of the Operation

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> All days are approximate.

<sup>2</sup> Starts as soon as is practical; timeline is driven by conditions at gas plants and refineries.

<sup>3</sup> Assumes 2.4 MM BPD is current production and that HCN employees remain at the facilities.



4. Command and Control. Responsibilities for planning and executing the CSP lie with the BRS LOGCAP Program Manager (PGM),<sup>[D](6]</sup> and will be executed through the CSP Project Manager (PM), as illustrated in Figure 2.



### Figure 2. The BRS CSP Organization

BRS does not perform Marketing & Sales functions. The Government or CENTCOM will select a firm for BRS to subcontract Marketing & Sales services. As with all work under the CSP, the sales activities will involve existing Iraqi personnel and organizations whenever possible. See Annex G (Marketing & Sales).

To establish sufficient communication support for the geographically dispersed assessment and project execution teams, BRS will establish multiple communications systems with redundant capability. Initial secure communications will be coordinated with and provided by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Southwest Division (USACE SWD).

BRS will self-deploy to the theater. In the early stages of the operation, BRS will depend on military transportation to access the oilfields. As the project matures, BRS will provide supplemental transportation, including aviation support in theater.

This capability will support:

- Rapid deployment of BRS personnel and equipment between geographically dispersed sites;
- Efficient cross leveling of personnel and equipment to address the dynamic environment; and
- Emergency evacuation issues as necessary.
- 5. Logistics. See Annex I, CSP Plan. BRS will provide portions of all required logistics to support CSP operations in Iraq. During the initial portion of Phase 3A, Assessment/Initial Restoration, BRS will need military air transport to rapidly move the assessment teams within Iraq.
- 6. **ROM Estimates.** The ROM was prepared with guidance provided in the SOWs, by USACE, and by CENTCOM, and using assumptions listed in Annex R. Figure 3 (next page) compares CSP cost data by production rates and scenario. The repair cost for refineries and gas plants could not be estimated due to the unknown condition of the facilities.



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## Figure 3. ROM Comparison



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### Figure 3. ROM Comparison continued

- 7. Required Actions for CSP execution. In order to execute this plan, BRS would require a limited NTP with associated funding, at least 30 days prior to deploying personnel to Iraq, to complete the following required activities:
  - **a.** Continuous Planning. The current planning cell will continue execution planning and update the CSP as warranted.
  - b. Hire/Train Advance Party/Assessment Teams. BRS must hire new personnel and/or transfer personnel from other projects, in-process and train them prior to deployment with the Advance

V/I BRS Proprietary Data. In addition to protection under Federal Acquisition Regulation 3.104, this page contains BRS proprietary information. As such, this information may be withheld from the public because disclosure would cause a foreseeable harm to an interest protected by one or more Exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC Section 552. Furthermore, if the SECRET level classification is downgraded, it is requested that any Government entity receiving this information act in accordance with DoD 5400.7-R, and consider this information as being for official use only (FOUO), and mark, handle and store this information so as to prevent unauthorized access.

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Party (including fire fighting specialists) and initial Assessment Teams. The skill sets for these personnel require specialized training; the personnel associated with these skill sets must first be recruited. Once hired, personnel training may include but is not limited to:

- 1) Communications training on satellite telephones;
- 2) Personnel Protective Equipment-NBC;
- 3) Iraqi customs and procedures;
- 4) Force protection/security measures; and
- 5) Military customs and protocol.
- c. Critical equipment. BRS will start preparing specifications for critical items upon NTP. Procurement activity will begin after preliminary assessment of oil infrastructure facilities.
- d. Purchase and preposition four sets of fire fighting equipment. BRS will purchase and preposition four sets of fire fighting equipment in Kuwait (sufficient equipment to fight two fires at two geographically separate locations simultaneously).

The activities listed above assume 30-day advance notice of NTP and fundamentally affect the entire project schedule.

e. Establishment of LNOs at Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as required, CENTCOM, Combined Coalition Land Forces Component (CCLFC), and U.S. Navy Central Command (NAVCENT).

### 8. Applicable Documents:

- a. LOGCAP Worldwide Management and Staffing Plan (WMSP) with Annex N (Contractor Internal Operations Procedures)
- b. Army Regulation (AR) 570-9, Host Nation Support
- c. AR 700-137, LOGCAP
- d. AR 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force
- e. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-21, Contractors on the Battlefield
- f. Department of the Army (DA) Pam 690-80, Use and Administration of Local Civilians in Foreign Areas during Hostilities
- g. Report of the Group of United Nations Experts Established Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of the Security Council Resolution 1284 (2000)
- h. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment Iraq Special Report (30 Aug 2002)
- i. Oil Information Administration, Department of Oil Country Analyses Briefs for Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (2002)
- j. Central Intelligence Agency World Fact book for Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (2002)