

TRENDS IN ELITE AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR: WORKSHOP REPORT

LONG TERM STRATEGY GROUP

(b) (7)(C)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the discussion and key findings from a 20 July 2010 workshop convened by the Long Term Strategy Group (LTSG) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The workshop was aimed at considering the historical views of the American intellectual class toward US foreign policy, and how those views might affect contemporary or future foreign policy and strategy. The discussion built on an LTSG monograph by (b) (7)(C) that examines the history of American intellectuals' cosmopolitan worldview, and its traditional opposition to the more nationalistic forms of patriotism. A group of subject matter experts was assembled to discuss which intellectual trends might be salient for the future of US strategy. A read-ahead paper and agenda were circulated to participants prior to the event. These documents along with a list of participants can be found in the appendices at the end of this report.

Major findings from the discussion at the workshop include:

- American intellectuals have for the last century held considerably more cosmopolitan views than their non-intellectual counterparts. This division between cosmopolitan intellectuals and non-intellectuals can be traced back to the divide between the New England Puritans and the frontier Scotch-Irish settlers in the 18th century. During World War II and the early Cold War, America's cosmopolitan intellectuals effectively entered into a deal with the US government to aid in the creation of America's foreign policy, in return for influence within the US government. This bargain broke down in the 1960s with the trauma of the war in Vietnam.
- A future bargain between the intellectuals and the government may be unlikely, however, given the trend in US intellectualism toward greater cosmopolitanism and greater hostility to patriotism. This trend is likely to continue even in the face of significant outside shocks, and will probably have significant effects on the interaction of the United States with more patriotic foreign rivals.
- The trend of American intellectuals toward greater cosmopolitanism is also at odds with the continued patriotism of the non-elite citizens of America, and could lead to increasing domestic political dysfunction in coming years, perhaps even culminating in civil violence, in the view of one participant.
- Rapid changes in US society, driven by shifts in technology, demography, education, and family structure as well as the rise of the all-volunteer professional military, may be undermining US patriotism and national unity. A program of universal military service could be an effective way to help re-unite the various segments of US society and restore a sense of national unity and purpose.

INTRODUCTION

The terms of reference for the workshop were to examine how the American intellectual establishment might affect US foreign policy and strategy today and in the future. Historically, American intellectuals have developed a reputation for being cosmopolitan (rather than nationalistically patriotic) and largely anti-war. These beliefs generally have put them outside of mainstream US views. The workshop sought to examine this historical division, as well as speculate on how it might affect foreign policy in the future. An LTSG monograph by (b) (7)(C)(b) (5) discussing the origins of the US intellectual tradition and its past influence on US foreign policy, was circulated as the read-ahead material for the workshop. The monograph has been submitted separately.

The workshop sought to identify key trends in US intellectual thought and in US society in general that would have a significant impact on the conduct of US foreign policy.

FRAMEWORK

The workshop began with a presentation by (b) (7)(C) of his work on the development of US intellectual culture and its interaction with the US foreign policy establishment in particular and the US population in general.

The current discussion emerged from an earlier paper considering why, contrary to the prediction of Alexis de Tocqueville, Americans have been and continue to be a warlike people. Tocqueville believed that the commercial tendencies of Americans would make them unlikely to go to war, and predicted that if there were an American civil war, it would be short and bloodless. This prediction was incorrect, as was his prediction that Americans would shy away from war. Tocqueville's prediction failed to account adequately for the influences of the Scotch-Irish culture on successive waves of immigrants to the United States.

The Scotch-Irish originally hailed from the border regions of northern England and southern Scotland, a region that had by the 18th century had known nearly five centuries of sectarian violence. Violence was an important and personal component of private life. The largest wave of immigration to North America in the 18th century was composed of Scotch-Irish pioneers. They settled on the frontier, where their legacy of low-intensity conflict served them well in their endemic warfare with Native Americans.

The early culture of what would one day become the United States was formed from the interaction between the frontier Scotch-Irish and the New England Puritans. In contrast to the rough and ready Scotch-Irish, East Anglian Puritans believed that violence properly belonged in the public sphere, and had to be sanctioned by a body of disinterested elders. Puritans made up a significant component of the early US intellectual class, and seemed to have held views that were quite different from those of the frontier Scotch-Irish.

Against that backdrop, the question at hand was: do American intellectuals hold substantially different opinions from the general population (especially on questions of foreign policy), and if so, why? Most importantly, what consequences would this difference have for contemporary and future America?

In brief, it is possible to overstate the difference between educated and less educated Americans in the realm of foreign policy. Historically, college educated Americans were more supportive than their less educated compatriots of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, while college and high school educated Americans were equally supportive of the second Gulf War.

However, some significant differences of opinion do break down along educational lines. Those with post-graduate degrees (other than MBAs) were consistently less supportive of the second Gulf War than regular college educated Americans by an average of near 10 percent. This division between the highly-educated intellectuals and the general US population is backed up by further studies on the subject. At the beginning of *Who Are We?*, Samuel Huntington provided a series of quotations suggesting these intellectuals are not only anti-war, but also opposed to US patriotism. What could account for this division of opinion?

From the eighteenth century on, highly educated Americans saw themselves in opposition to Scotch-Irish culture, and tried to establish a place for themselves, first in Greenwich Village, and then in universities. The first modern clash between these two divergent cultures came during World War I, when many Columbia University professors resigned in opposition to the pro-war university policies of Columbia president Nicholas Murray Butler, in order to found the New School of Social Research. At that point, the new identity of the cosmopolitan, independent intellectual was established. These new independent intellectuals saw war as a threat to the social and intellectual freedom they believed they required.

World War II and the early Cold War period were anomalous, in that highly educated Americans supported the war, abandoned a disinterested intellectual position, and served in the highest levels of government. In effect, a grand bargain was reached in which intellectuals were given high positions in the establishment in return for supporting US interests. When this bargain broke down under the stress of events in the 1960s, intellectuals returned to the oppositional stance they had held since their emergence in the early 20th century.

Despite the traditional opposition of the intellectual class to US foreign policy, no less an intellectual than Walter Lippmann once worked enthusiastically for the US government. It is interesting to ask whether a new alliance between the US Government and American intellectuals could be formed. After all, intellectuals in the United States have never been a monolithic block – many even supported the second Gulf War at its outset.

The presentation concluded by highlighting several of the areas in which the paper could be improved by future discussion. The paper's thesis concerned the government-intellectual bargain of the 1940s-1960s, and speculated how such a bargain might be reconstituted. If the paper's thesis were incorrect, however, a possible alternative explanation might see a general trend driving intellectuals further and further away from the government. In this case, it would be very difficult to unify the intellectual class behind any national effort.

The paper also failed to address all of the arguments about the end of the government-intellectual bargain in the 1960s. On one hand, there is the view (held by Nixon) that the intellectual class opposed the war in Vietnam because it could be drafted. On the other hand, there is the view that anti-war opposition was both well-considered and moral. The paper's decision to focus on the views of intellectuals as a function of their class interest is enlightening, but may do a disservice to the actual content of those views.

Finally, the paper did not address other important questions, including: why the US elite no longer serves in the US military, or how the intellectual divide might map onto red and blue state partisanship. The paper's discussion of the importance of economic class on foreign policy views was incomplete, although it sought to outline the traditional anti-war views of bankers, as well as the growth of the US financial sector.

Having established a basic framework for the workshop and outlining several topics that could prove fruitful for discussion, the floor was opened for discussion from the expert participants. Discussion was wide-ranging, covering US history, contemporary politics, and future scenarios.

THE PAST

The history of US intellectualism and its interaction with US foreign policy and strategy composed a large portion of the day's discussion.

THE PURITANS AND THE SCOTCH-IRISH

The basic narrative established in the read-ahead paper explained how the Scotch-Irish frontier culture managed to become the dominant American cultural tradition, gradually assimilating all of the waves of immigrants that would follow it. One participant was curious as to why new immigrants throughout the 19th and 20th centuries would have assimilated into the Scotch-Irish tradition rather than that of the Puritans.

A few possible solutions were suggested. First, historical records show that the Scotch-Irish enjoyed a sizeable demographic advantage, yielding much higher birthrates than their Puritan opposites. This demographic advantage translated into a geographic one, as well: the Scotch-Irish dominated the frontier regions where many newly-arrived immigrants would ultimately settle. Along these frontiers, the Scotch-Irish culture of violence, far from being dysfunctional, was actually a necessity for survival.

Also important was the role of the Puritan clergy in transmitting the Puritan culture across generations and to new immigrant arrivals. Over time, this institutionalized clergy became increasingly disconnected from the lives of their congregants. As a result, the Puritan clergy lost its moral content and fervor, devoting themselves instead to more intellectual, theological pursuits. Puritanism's basis in Calvinist theology and its embrace of the concept of predestination and the Elect may have contributed to its inability to connect with the general populace. Ideologies which specify the "us" as elite and the "you" as common rarely manage to flourish in democratic polities.

In the end, the Puritans lost out to the Methodist and Baptist preachers from the Scotch-Irish traditions, whose very lack of institutional security forced them to engage the general population on an emotional and spiritual level. This embracing evangelism stands in stark contrast to the closed Elect of Puritan society. Cut off from the general public, New England Puritanism gradually degenerated into a sort of provincialism, and even the descendants of the clerical elite eventually abandoned it.

If Puritanism's downfall was its institutional nature and remote clergy, another participant asked, how then did Catholicism manage to flourish in the United States throughout the 19th century? The response was that as Tocqueville noticed, Catholicism in the United States tended to emphasize open-hearted populist evangelicalism over intellectualism. The American Catholic Church gradually distanced itself from Rome and embraced many of the cultural traditions of the Scotch-Irish Methodists and Baptists, allowing it to grow and thrive in its new American environment.

REPUBLIC & EMPIRE

Participants returned at several points to the historical dilemma faced by American intellectuals when confronted with the idea of aggressive military action on the part of the United States. Many American intellectuals recoiled from what they saw as the blatant imperialism of the Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars, as well as the annexation of the Philippines and the ensuing conflict there.

Intellectuals in the United States generally observed a sharp divide between acceptable “defensive” wars and imperial “offensive” wars, which were thought to be un-American.

These feelings against offensive, imperialist war probably were linked to the legacy of American exceptionalism. Americans from their earliest days had sought to separate themselves from what they saw as the corruption of the Old World and its practices. The fear remained strong that if the United States engaged in aggressive war, it would inevitably become like the empires of the Old World. This view was shared by many small town Midwestern Americans, as well as by intellectuals.

WAR AND MASS PARTICIPATION

Large scale war, and particularly mass participation in it, has helped shape the beliefs and actions of entire generations of Americans. The American Civil War was one such war of mass participation. Approximately 10 percent of the US male population would end up as casualties at some point during the conflict. Despite the ability of rich and influential individuals to escape the draft, many from the upper classes and the intellectual establishment would still serve, as can be seen by the many names of Civil War casualties listed in Harvard’s Memorial Church.

The post-Civil War generation was greatly influenced by the experience of the war, which inculcated in the general US populace the lessons of the “virtuous war,” fought for freedom and national unity. Theodore Roosevelt, himself too young to have fought in the war, was pained by the fact that his own father hadn’t served in the military. This legacy was a lasting one: many of the national and military leaders of the United States during the First World War had been trained by men who had fought at Gettysburg. One participant did note, however, that the post-Civil War generational effect failed to explain the emergence of the first modern anti-war intellectuals around 1900, when the Civil War’s influence remained very strong.

World War II had a similar effect in decisively shaping an entire generation of Americans. The contrast between the World War II and the Korean War was harsh. The conflict in Korea was fought primarily by the relatively small regular army and many called-up reservists, without significant mass participation. Reservists called to active duty would disappear for two years, and then return, often as if nothing had happened. As a result, very few Americans actually had any contact with the war, and the Korean conflict had relatively little direct affect on US culture.

COSMOPOLITANISM & UTOPIA

One participant noted that a common thread connecting the Puritan clergy to the early American intellectuals of the early 20th century was their common belief in utopian ideals. Both the Puritans and the early intellectuals believed that the world was gradually moving toward a better place, and that one day a perfect world could be realized. As regards foreign policy, this utopianism inevitably led to movements to abolish war. Another participant added that the continued propagation of democracy by the United States could be seen as a continuation of this ideal.

Utopianism has an important link to the cosmopolitanism that characterizes intellectuals in the United States, because both utopianism and cosmopolitanism rely on a belief in the triumph of “reason” common to all people, regardless of their experiences. This cosmopolitan ideal stretches at least back to the time of

the Greek cynics, whose leading voice, Diogenes, claimed to be a citizen of the world. Diogenes cosmopolitanism was taken up by the Roman stoics, who were the first to seriously suggest that there was a universal reason that existed beyond passion and parochial loyalty. Only by removing oneself from one's passions and loyalties can one see the universal reason that unites all people. Stoic cosmopolitanism was linked to early utopianism because the very passions and loyalties that stoics sought to abjure were, according to the utopians, the causes of violence and difficulty.

Stoic cosmopolitanism enjoyed a revival during the Renaissance, when many classical ideas were brought back into vogue, and from there was carried over into the Enlightenment. Rousseau's *First Discourse* expressed the utopian ideal that men would eventually move past the need for violence and into a better future. The universal, cosmopolitan reason of the Stoics flowed almost directly into Kant's work on perpetual peace, achieved through the application of a universal reason that knows no local ties or loyalties. Utopianism and cosmopolitanism moved hand-in-hand into the contemporary era, as well. Famous examples cited during the workshop include Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion*, a book explaining how in the future reasonable men would avoid the increasing costs and risks of war, published with exquisite irony in 1910.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Discussion about the development of US intellectualism, government, and society in the 20th century turned several times to the key role that nuclear weapons have played since the end of World War II. One participant suggested that the advent of nuclear weapons may actually have driven intellectuals to work with the government, since nuclear war was far too important to be left to the generals. Henry Kissinger is perhaps typical of these involved intellectuals, although the establishment of the RAND Corporation also marks an attempt to engage intellectual individuals who were interested in the problems posed by the nuclear age.

THE PRESENT

Some discussion also concerned the contemporary views and impact of American intellectuals on foreign policy.

WAR & LIMITED PARTICIPATION

Some participants were concerned that the end of mass participation in warfare was having a detrimental effect, both on US society in general and the military in particular. As in George Orwell's *1984*, war, one participant suggested, was becoming easily-ignored background noise. Holidays like Memorial Day and Independence Day have become fictitious celebrations in which people feel compelled to make something of their patriotism and pay lip service to the sacrifices of those actually serving in the military. Because there is no draft, only a relatively small group of Americans actually fight in wars; as a result, US society's comprehension of the value of military service and the sacrifice entailed in war has greatly diminished.

The diminished impact of war on US society led to questions of whether war for the United States was becoming a more tolerable state of affairs than in the past. Participants disagreed on whether Americans are actually becoming more tolerant of war. Some noted that the political costs of war today seem quite low; for example, President Obama was essentially able to carry forward the Bush war policies with little difficulty. Other participants disagreed, saying that the economic costs of sustained war would ultimately make it unacceptable to the US people. However, even with ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military budget remains low compared to the heights of Cold War expenditure.

Several participants also criticized the growing disconnect in the military from general US life. The US military went through a difficult growth period in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, ultimately emerging as the all-volunteer professional force of today. One participant suggested that this shift to a professional military force diminished the ideological purity of the United States military: while soldiers forty or fifty years ago had a clear idea of who they were fighting for, today's military is much more like the mercenary armies of the 17th and 18th centuries than the citizen armies of World War I and World War II. US military leaders also came under criticism for fostering a culture of "award inflation," in which the proliferation of ultimately meaningless commendations has led to an officer culture that values flashy ribbons over actual achievement.

The demographic differences between the general US public and the military were also cited, especially the tendency for the military to be more conservative politically and more evangelical religiously.

MODERN INTELLECTUAL CULTURE

Much of the discussion on the views of contemporary intellectuals centered on the content of those views, but participants also suggested that in modern intellectual culture, certain individuals can enjoy great prestige and wield great influence over others. Increasingly, one participant argued, "trophy intellectuals" like Noam Chomsky whose prestige perhaps outweighs their actual intellectual merit can have great influence, not only over intellectuals, but over US culture in general. Intellectual leaders like Chomsky have played an important role in casting the debate concerning the Iraq War not simply as opposition to a specific war, but instead as opposition to war in general.

The views and influence of “trophy intellectuals” can create intellectual distortions, when the ideas of leading intellectuals that are flawed but nonetheless interesting become diluted and dispersed throughout the intellectual community, resulting in vulgarized versions that are still flawed but entirely uninteresting. The increased availability of higher education today makes this trend particularly pernicious, as it is increasingly easy to become an “intellectual” by simply picking up the vulgarized trends emerging from leading intellectuals.

MODERN EDUCATION

Participants agreed that contemporary intellectuals in the United States are attempting to utilize the education system to advance some of their own particular causes. One important cause was that of non-violence. The contemporary education system (controlled as it is by the intellectuals) now stresses the fact that violence is never a good thing. Those who resist this indoctrination are disciplined. While once the willingness to fight violently for oneself and one’s ideas was a key component of being an American man, the current generation of young Americans has little to no experience of violence.

Even at the level of higher education, participants agreed, the move toward non-violence is visible. This trend goes back at least to the fight in the late 19th century between Abbot Lawrence Lowell and Theodore Roosevelt over football at Harvard University. Lowell wanted to get rid of football because he thought it promoted physicality and violence over reason and learning, while Roosevelt wanted football retained because it taught people to stand up for themselves and pull for their team.

Despite this trend toward non-violence, however, an enormous interest in violence remains. Violent books, movies, television, and video games are gaining in popularity; it was even suggested that violent sports have an advantage (one reason the World Cup is not popular in the United States, it was argued, is that it is not as violent as football). This violent fantasy, however, contrasts strongly with real violence: in violent fantasy, the violence is exaggerated while the context and emotional content is removed.

The impact of American intellectuals on education in the United States also has a tendency to work against the creation of small groups with strong identities. Part of this stems from the anti-violence movement, which seeks to curtail violent bonding activities – the Lowell-Roosevelt debate over football is an early example. A more contemporary example concerns Harvard’s decision to randomize student placement in houses. Previously, students had had the opportunity to apply for various houses after their freshman year, allowing the creation of strong house identities. As Harvard University’s demographic became more ethnically diverse, the University opted to remove this self-selection process in order to prevent self-ghettoization along racial or religious lines. The randomization process effectively ended any sort of standing house identity.

Participants suggested that the breakdown of institutional loyalty is actually having an impact on the operation of higher education institutions. Modern faculty members are actually encouraged to betray their own organization by soliciting offers from other institutions of higher education, and using these offers to leverage better pay or tenure from their own institution.

This combination of anti-violence and anti-group education leads to a tendency to vilify war and denigrate the study of conflict. Programs that study military affairs must be concealed behind politically-

correct names (i.e., the “Grand Strategy” program at Yale), while intellectuals who study conflict are vilified and ostracized by their peers.

FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS

A major question posed to participants was how the views of American intellectuals affected the perceptions of foreign observers. Even as recently as the 1950s and 1960s, participants agreed, there was a very real sense abroad of the United States as admired and beloved. Examples included the honor received by Secretary of State George Marshall at Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation, and the outpouring of sympathy in the United Kingdom following the death of President John Kennedy.

At the same time, not all foreign perceptions of the United States have been as flattering, or as useful. The North Vietnamese, for example, were convinced throughout the Vietnam War that it was only a matter of time before the United States would quit. North Vietnamese leaders and soldiers were encouraged by the perceived strength of the anti-war movement in the United States. The aftermath of the Vietnam War has been even more damaging for the reputation of the United States. One participant wondered why, even though the United States remained committed to Vietnam for twelve years despite high material and human costs, the ultimate conclusion of most observers was that the United States is a paper tiger, simply because US soldiers ultimately left.

In any event, the Vietnam War (and the perceived role of US anti-war intellectuals in it) has played an important role in foreign perceptions of the United States ever since. One example cited was that of Saddam Hussein, who believed not that he could beat the United States outright but rather that he could inflict sufficient costs to force the United States to give up.

THE FUTURE

The major purpose of the workshop was to examine the past, present, and future impact of American intellectuals on US foreign policy. Much of the afternoon was spent discussing various future trends and scenarios.

PATRIOTISM VERSUS COSMOPOLITANISM

Many participants were skeptical of the suggestion put forward at the beginning of the discussion that there might be a future bargain between the intellectual establishment in the United States and the US government, similar to the foreign policy establishment of World War II and the early Cold War. Instead, many participants instead saw a general trend toward greater intellectual cosmopolitanism in the future, in sharp contrast to the patriotism that still dominates America's non-intellectual heartland.

A participant noted that this trend toward greater cosmopolitanism is coming at a time when some other important actors, such as China, are perhaps moving in the other direction, seeking for themselves a distinctly Chinese role in global affairs rather than as a member of a community of nations. The universal reason of cosmopolitanism will have difficulty when it seeks to encounter, understand, and engage the fiercely patriotic and parochial loyalties that are emerging in the developing world.

ACTION, REACTION, RE-REACTION

If, as several participants suggested, the United States is moving toward a more cosmopolitan future, what sort of reactions can we expect from the rest of the world? Some participants suggested that potential rivals – especially those who retain strong patriotic feelings – could be emboldened by the perceived softness of US cosmopolitanism to challenge the United States. The result could be greater difficulties for US foreign policy in the near future.

A participant suggested that one effect of this increased difficulty could be a return of the United States to a neo-isolationist position, drawing down commitments abroad. The war in Afghanistan is already a tough sell to the US people. With Iran moving toward a nuclear weapon and the United States drawing down its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States could already be signaling to other powers its hope to take a less active role on the world stage. Other participants countered that, even if potential rivals *perceive* that the United States is hoping to decrease its global presence, it is unlikely that Americans in the near future will be willing to surrender their place as number one on the global pecking order.

What, if anything, could reverse this trend toward cosmopolitanism in American intellectual culture? Adversaries and rivals could see America's cosmopolitan attitude and draw-down in the Middle East as an opportunity to challenge a declining US-led world order. Would this sort of challenge reverse the trend from cosmopolitanism back toward patriotism? Participants agreed that many factors would weigh on the American reaction. Continued economic difficulties, for example, will tend to focus US attention on domestic affairs rather than foreign ones. Politicians may fear that the costs of standing up to foreign adversaries would be unacceptable to the general public, and so stand down to save their offices.

Perhaps the most important factor influencing the response of the United States to a challenge would be the nature of the challenge itself. Americans would react very differently to a direct attack on the homeland than to a more nebulous, far-off threat. One participant noted that the most recent attacks on the homeland by al-Qaeda operatives have been conducted by US citizens (albeit with foreign training); thus, a future direct attack might be perceived by Americans more as a domestic incident than a foreign one. Other participants added that Americans would probably not respond very vigorously to Iran's developing a nuclear weapon; in fact, Iran's development of a nuclear weapon might actually make Americans less willing to directly confront Iran unless the Iranian leadership directly attacked the United States first.

One participant suggested that our allies could perhaps mitigate the shift of the United States away from international commitment and activism. If the Gulf States perceived that the United States was pulling out of the Middle East, they might try to find ways to invite us or force us back in. Another participant countered that the disappointment of World War One was a major factor in driving Americans way from international commitments, even when we were invited by major European powers to participate in a new security framework. The aftermath of the Iraq War could see similar disillusionment and disengagement.

Finally, participants were generally skeptical of whether large ideological shifts would help restore a more active, robust US foreign policy. Ideological differences have little effect on the conduct of current foreign policy, participants argued: look at the terrible things that happen regularly in Iran or Saudi Arabia, with little impact on our foreign policy. These issues barely register at all on the consciousness of most Americans.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL TURMOIL

One participant suggested that the more troubling divide would not be the cosmopolitan United States versus its patriotic foreign rivals, but rather the cosmopolitan American Intellectuals versus the patriotic US heartland. Many, many Americans are suspicious and resentful of the East-West coast intellectual establishment. This suspicion has reached new heights in recent years, as the liberal elite has tried to push its agendas (gay marriage, universal healthcare, globalized economic polices, etc.), on an increasingly-resentful US heartland. All the while, issues that concern heartland Americans (especially immigration) are largely ignored by the liberal intellectual establishment.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE

In general, participants believed that the rapid social changes throughout US society (caused by changes in everything from technology to demographics to family structure) were undermining the sense of national unity and purpose that the United States has enjoyed in the past. President Bush's inability to rally the nation to some new grand objective in the aftermath of 9/11 was cited as a particularly disappointing example of US disunity and weakness. Some participants suggested that a scheme of universal military service might be a method by which the United States could maintain or build its social cohesion. Universal military service would help to bring Americans from all walks of life together and provide them with a common formative experience, as well as foster a sense of national identity. Similar programs, like Teach for America, could also be expanded or improved upon to provide a similar effect.

TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The question of how American intellectuals have and will continue to influence foreign policy led to many interesting questions for future consideration.

- Is cosmopolitanism eclipsing patriotism in the United States? How will this shift affect the conduct of US foreign policy?
- What sort of shocks could push the United States back from cosmopolitanism toward patriotism? Further spread of radical Islam in the Middle East? The development of an Iranian nuclear weapon? Another major terrorist attack on the homeland? Would these events spur a more activist, patriotic foreign policy, or simply drive the United States toward neo-isolationism?
- How do other countries view the United States? How does our domestic political discourse influence their perceptions of us? How will the United States interact with nations that do not share our developing cosmopolitan mood?
- Has domestic political dysfunction (red state versus blue state, coasts versus heartland, etc.) reached the point that it could spill over into violence? Is another Civil War lurking in the future of the United States?
- Could universal military service be successfully harnessed to restore a spirit of national duty and patriotism to the United States? Could it help heal the fissures developing along class and racial lines in American society?

APPENDIX

AGENDA

Trends in Elite American Attitudes Toward War

Long Term Strategy Group

20 July 2010

Workshop Agenda

0830-0845	Welcome and introduction
0845-0915	Paper presentation
0915-1000	Education
1000-1015	Break
1015-1100	Religion
1100-1145	History – 1960s, other formative experiences
1145-1230	Working lunch
1230-1315	Alternative explanations
1315-1400	Conclusions
1400	Adjourn

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