



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY
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12 February 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR JPRA/CC

FROM: JPRA/HF

SUBJECT: al Qaeda Resistance Training

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ A senior Department of Defense (DOD) psychologist recently reviewed captured and recovered al Qaeda training manuals and documents. These manuals and documents provided critical information on al Qaeda resistance to interrogation training, along with their methods for exploitation of intelligence sources and captives.
2. ~~(S/NF)~~ These documents indicate al Qaeda possesses a far more sophisticated capability to train their operatives in resistance to interrogation than formerly suspected. References to resistance strategies and postures, ^{(b)(1)} [redacted] are found repeatedly throughout these documents. The use of a "pre-coordinated security plan" by al Qaeda operatives held in captivity is well referenced. This "security plan" is addressed frequently and is ^{(b)(1)} [redacted] for use in captivity. IAW these documents, captured al Qaeda operatives are told to "complain about treatment; claim they have been tortured, even if this is not the case; ask to see a medical doctor; ask for legal counsel; contradict prior statements made under duress; and always fall back on the predetermined "security plan." These documents discuss resistance posture and instruct the operative(s) to remain composed, pause before responding, think of the correct answer before talking, use physical and psychological incapacilities, be disruptive only when it is to their advantage, and several other resistance postures ^{(b)(1)} [redacted]. The documents also contain instruction on establishing prison camp organization and communications inside the camp, as well as reminding al Qaeda members to "remember" to use their ability to communicate from captivity to sources on the outside. Included in a chapter adjacent to the resistance information is a lengthy section on the use of covert communication for field operatives.

Classified by: HQ JPRA/CC
Declassify on: XI
Reason: 1.5C, EO 12958

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ From these documents, it is clear al Qaeda possesses the knowledge to provide a sophisticated level of resistance training. It is likely this sophisticated training may be given to their higher-risk operatives (those in foreign countries and senior leadership). The documents also suggest a less advanced level of resistance training is taught to regular al Qaeda members. One of Usama bin Laden 's (UBL) senior staff is identified as an expert in resistance training. This individual is further identified as the key individual responsible for resistance instruction provided to al Qaeda members. The cumulative amount of information found in these documents makes it clear to those familiar with resistance training that the following critical facts must be acknowledged and considered:

- (a) ~~(S/NF)~~ al Qaeda has the knowledge to teach resistance at both a sophisticated and basic level.
- (b) ~~(S/NF)~~ The probability is high that al Qaeda operatives and senior leaders receive the sophisticated training.
- (c) ~~(S/NF)~~ Junior level al Qaeda members are receiving basic captivity and resistance training, most likely in their recruitment training camps.
- (d) ~~(S/NF)~~ We have significantly underestimated al Qaeda capability to prepare their senior leaders, high level operatives, and junior level soldiers to deal with captivity and interrogation.

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ One likely source for the sophisticated resistance information and its ~~(b)(1)~~ is an al Qaeda member who was on active duty in the U.S. Army and stationed at Ft. Bragg NC. One of the documents identifies him as having passed information to al Qaeda in Manchester England some time prior to 11 September 2001.

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ This information is obviously important to DoD and the U.S. Government in terms of knowing the capability of our enemy to resist captivity and interrogation. Additionally, a sophisticated knowledge of resistance training gives those who possess it a sophisticated means of exploiting others. It is necessary to ensure U.S. military forces understand this enemy resistance and exploitation. It should not change ~~(b)(1)~~ ~~(b)(1)~~ but being forewarned of this al Qaeda capability is important. Given this knowledge, the enemy will not unnecessarily catch potential U.S. captives off guard with a sophisticated level of resistance and exploitation knowledge.

6. (U) Recommendations: ~~(S/NF)~~

- a. ~~(S/NF)~~ Ensure the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Personnel Recovery (PR) receives this information to provide appropriate guidance to DoD and Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), as deemed necessary.

- b. ~~(S/NP)~~ Given the level of resistance to interrogation and exploitation training sophistication found in the documents, ^{(b)(1)} [redacted] providing resistance training Subject Matter Expertise (SME) to assist those responsible for questioning and interrogating al Qaeda prisoners may be helpful. *(NOTE: The consensus of the individuals who studied these documents is if al Qaeda members have received resistance training [and it is likely they have], junior level soldiers are more likely to have received the less advanced resistance training of which al Qaeda is capable. However, there may be higher level operatives and leaders mingled in among the others. These individuals are likely to have been trained in the more sophisticated resistance training method. Resistance training SMEs could assist interrogators by explaining the resistance training approaches which may have been used to train prisoners and, through prisoner observation, help identify who these individuals might be.*

- c. ~~(S/NP)~~ ^{(b)(1)} [redacted]
[redacted]

^{(b)(6)} [redacted]