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Headquarters
JOINT CONTINGENCY
TASK FORCE, WASHINGTON
D.C. 22301

TRAINING PLAN
JCTF

TITLE PAGE

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TRAINING PLAN
JCTF

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TRAINING PLAN

REFERENCES:

a. JCS ~~Top Secret/Sensitive/LIMDIS~~ 6986, DTG 081502Z August 1970 .

b. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub 1) (U).

c. Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2) (U).

d. Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance (JCS Pub 3) (U).

e. Joint Contingency Task Group OPlan ~~(TS/Sensitive)~~

f. Maps: ONC H-24 (U).

TIME ZONE: Central Daylight Saving Time

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A, Task Organization.

1. ~~(TS)~~ SITUATION.

a. General.

(1) Operations under this plan support reference e.

(2) The existence of a North Vietnamese prisoner of war camp at Son Tay has been established. Intelligence sources have confirmed the presence of US personnel at Son Tay.

(3) A JCS study has concluded that forcible recovery of US prisoners of war from Son Tay is feasible.

(4) The Secretary of Defense has approved and the JCS have directed the activation of a Joint Contingency Task Group to accomplish detailed planning and conduct air and ground training in preparation for a direct action mission to forcibly recover US prisoners of war from Son Tay. The Services and DIA will provide staff personnel and operational units on a TDY basis.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

(a) Direct implementation of this plan.

(b) Direct Service Chiefs to pass operational control (OPCON) of designated elements/personnel to COMJCTG.

(c) Direct the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to provide intelligence support/personnel as required.

(d) Direct Services/agencies to provide administrative, logistical and communications support as required.

(2) National Security Agency (NSA). By mutual agreement provides personnel in accordance with Annex A, Task Organization, and additional support as required.

(b)(1)

[redacted]

(3) Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA). As directed by Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(a) Passes operational control of designated Continental Army Command (CONARC) elements/personnel to COMJCTG (Annex A, Task Organization).

(b) Provides additional personnel augmentation in accordance with Annex A, Task Organization.

(c) Provides for administrative, logistical and communications support for the operation of JCTG as required.

(d) Provides JCTG with audio support (Annex J, Psychological Operations).

(5) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(a) Provides personnel in accordance with Annex A, Task Organization.

(b) Provides for administrative, logistical and communications support for the operation of the JCTG as required.

(6) Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(a) Passes operational control of designated Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Military Airlift Command (MAC) elements/personnel to COMJCTG (Annex A, Task Organization).

(b) Provides additional personnel augmentation in accordance with Annex A, Task Organization.

(c) Provides, through Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), administrative, logistical and communications support for the operation of the JCTG at Eglin Air Force Base and Eglin Air Force Base (b)(1)

2. ~~(TS)~~ MISSION. Select, train, and prepare for deployment a joint force capable of air and ground operations necessary to forcibly recover US prisoners of war from Son Tay prison camp in North Vietnam.

3. ~~(TS)~~ EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. The operating/planning staff of the Joint Contingency Task Group will identify, select, and train the forces needed to accomplish the mission. Force composition will be predicated on a clandestine infiltration to the point of penetration of North Vietnamese airspace; on a reserve force capable of both replacing primary force

element and performing the search and rescue function; on the element of surprise; and on a hostile environment. Paramount consideration in force selection will be quality and capability of equipment and quality and experience of personnel. Training objectives and methods are as outlined in Annex C, Operations.

b. Commander, Army Forces.

(1) Identify unilateral training requirements.

(2) Develop unilateral training schedules.

(3) Accomplish unilateral training.

c. Commander, Air Forces.

(1) Identify unilateral training requirements.

(2) Develop unilateral training schedules.

(3) Accomplish unilateral training.

d. Operations Staff, JCTG.

(1) Identify joint training requirements.

(2) Develop joint training schedules.

(3) Accomplish joint training.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) This plan is effective for planning and execution upon receipt.

(2) COMJCTG will coordinate facilities and support requirements at Eglin Air Force Base.

(3) Uniforms will be devoid of all distinctive badges and insignia denoting Special Forces, Special Operations Force, unit, or theater of assignment affiliation.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Logistics. See Annex G.

b. Personnel. See Annex H.

c. Budget and Finances. See Annex I.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command. See Annex D.

b. Signal. See Annex E.

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Annex A to JCTG Training Plan
TASK ORGANIZATION

References. See basic plan.

1. (S) PURPOSE. This annex provides a list of the forces required to conduct training for IVORY COAST.

2. (S) JOINT CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP.

POSITION	GRADE	SERVICE	NAME
Commander	0-7	USAF	B/Gen Manor
Deputy Commander	0-6	USA	Col Simons
Chief, Plans & Operations	0-6	USAF	Col Frisbie
Plans Officer	0-5	USAF	Lt Col Kraljev
Plans Officer	0-4	USAF	Maj Ropka
Plans Officer	0-4	USAF	Maj Peshkin
Plans Officer	0-6	USN	Capt Campbell
Plans Officer	0-4	USN	Lt Cdr Hershey
Plans Officer	0-4	USA	Maj J. Morris
Plans Officer	0-3	USA	Capt Meadows
Defense Analyst			
Air Order of Battle	0-3	USAF	Capt Knops
Ground Order of Battle	0-3	DIA	Capt Hinson (USMC)
Signal Intelligence Officer	0-5	NSA*	Lt Col Kennedy (USAF)
Photo Interpreter	0-3	DIA	Capt Jacobs (USAF)
Communications/Electronics Officer	05/03	USA*	
Communications/Electronics Officer	05/03	USAF	
Logistics/Transportation Officer	0-4	USA	Maj B. Morris
Weather Officer	0-4	USAF	Maj Grimes
Security Officer	0-4	USA	Maj Newman
Security Officer	0-4	USAF	Maj Beyea
Medical Officer	0-5	USA*	Lt Col Cataldo (MD)
Cover and Deception Officer	0-4	USAF	Maj Macomber
Sergeant Major	E-9	USA	SGM Davis
Operations Sergeant	E-	USA	MSG Gann
Clerk-Typist	E-	USA	SFC Sherrod
Clerk-Typist	GS-6	USAF	Miss Strosnider

*Part-Time

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Annex A to JCTG Training Plan
TASK ORGANIZATION

3. ( ) Eglin Liaison Office

POSITION	GRADE	SOURCE
Chief	05/04	JCTG
Logistics/Transportation Officer	05/03	Eglin AFB
Clerk	E7/E4	Eglin AFB

4. ( ) Eglin Training Office

POSITION	GRADE	SOURCE
Operations Officer	05/03	Eglin AFB/JCTG
Clerk	E7/E5	Eglin AFB

5. ( ) Air Element

a. US Army

(1) US Army Continental Army Command

(a) Two UH-1H aircraft

b. US Air Force

(1) 1st Special Operations Wing, Eglin Air Force Base (b)(1) Florida

(a) Two C-130 Combat Talon aircraft

(b) Two A-1E aircraft

(c) One C-123 or A-1 aircraft for flare ship support

(2) Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Training Center, Eglin AFB, Florida

(a) One HC-130P aircraft

(b) Three HH-53 aircraft

6. ( ) Ground Element

a. US Army

(1) US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance

(a) Assault force composed of approximately Special Forces personnel

(b) Support force composed of approximately Special Forces personnel.

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Annex B to JCTG Training Plan
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

References. See basic plan.

1. (~~TS~~) MISSION. To train a force composed of US Army and US Air Force elements at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, during the period commencing 15 August 1970 in preparation for a prisoner of war recovery operation on the Son Tay Prison Camp for the purpose of forcible recovering approximately 50-100 US prisoners of war held in North Vietnam.

2. (~~TS~~) LIMITING FACTORS.

a. Weather. Pertinent climatology for August, September, and October is as follows:

b. Security. The security aspect of the training phase is vital to the success of the operation. Potential threats are compromise due to surveillance or unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure.

c. Aircraft Availability. Improvement in logistics support is required to provide sufficient CH-53 sorties to support this operation yet not impact significantly on the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Training Center SEAsia replacement training program nor on SEAsia rescue mission capabilities.

d. Ground Facilities. Facilities within the Eglin complex are required as follows:

(1) Office space for a Training and Coordination Office to serve as a point of contact for the Washington Planning Staff.

(2) Office space for a Base Liaison Office to serve as a point of contact for Eglin Air Force Base support personnel.

(3) Billeting and support facilities for the ground combat and support element which satisfy operational and security requirements.

THIS ANNEX CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES.

e. Range Availability. Ranges are required as follows:

(1) Training range within the Eglin Complex where a simulation of the Son Tay Camp will be conducted and assault training conducted to include live firing and flare operations.

(2) An airfield location in Northern Georgia which will serve as a target for profile missions conducted out of the Eglin Complex.

(3) Range priority for scheduled training operations is required.

f. Availability of PACAF Aircrews. CH-53 and A-1 aircrews from PACAF resources must be selected and arrangements made for transportation to Eglin AFB closing no later than 7 [illegible]

3. (S) Supporting Operations of Friendly Forces.

a. Operations being conducted in the Eglin Complex which are likely to support the JCTG training operations by providing reasonable cover and/or deception are as follows:

(1) Limited Night Recovery System Operational Test. This Air Force Category III test of advanced rescue equipment and tactics is being accomplished within the Eglin Complex using HH-53 aircraft, crews and Eglin base support.

(2) Normal ARRTC Training. Day and night training in formation, air refueling, gunnery, tactical approaches, and flare operations is conducted at the airfields and ranges in and around the Eglin Complex.

(3) Task Force Read. The purpose of this operation is to conduct Special Forces training operations in and around the Eglin Complex.

(4) (b)(1) US Army Special Forces are participating in testing by conducting vehicular operations in the Eglin Complex.

(5) US Army Ranger training is conducted from (b)(1) within the Eglin Complex.

b. Time Relationships.

(1) Limited Night Recovery Operations are scheduled for completion by the end of September 1970.

(2) ARRTC training is conducted continually.

(3) Task Force Read will complete operations by end of August 1970.

(4) US Army Special Forces participation in (b)(1) is a continuing program.

(5) Ranger training is a continuing program.

4. (S) Phases of Accomplishment. Training in the Eglin Complex will be conducted in three phases: Phase I, preparation; Phase II, specialized training; and Phase III, joint training.

a. Phase I.

(1) Summary of Operations. During the preparation phase personnel will be selected for the operation, augmentation personnel will deploy to the Eglin Complex, and certain preliminary training will be accomplished.

(2) Timing.

(a) HH-53 Element. CONUS aircrews will be selected prior to 15 August 1970. Day formation and night formation and refueling sorties will be flown with HC-130

and A-1 aircraft during the period 15-31 August 1970. PACAF augmentation personnel will be identified and will proceed to Eglin AFB Aux Fld #9, Florida, reporting NLT 6 September 1970.

(b) HH-3 Element. Aircrews will be selected prior to 31 August 1970. PACAF augmentation personnel will be identified and will proceed to Eglin AFB (b)(1) Florida, reporting NLT 6 September 1970.

(c) HC-130 Element. The Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Training Center will provide formation and air refueling support during the period 15-31 August 1970.

(d) A-1 Element. Aircrews will be selected prior to 20 August 1970. Night formation sorties will be flown with HH-53 and HC-130 aircraft during the period 21-31 August 1970. PACAF augmentation personnel will be identified and will proceed to Eglin AFB (b)(1) Florida, reporting NLT 6 September 1970.

(e) C-130 Element. Aircrews and ground support personnel will be selected, aircraft, aerospace ground equipment, and suitable supply items will be prepared for deployment by 27 August 1970. Aircrews, support personnel and aircraft will deploy to Eglin AFB, Florida and prepare for operations commencing approximately 1 September 1970.

(f) UH-1H Element. Aircrews will be selected and aircraft prepared to deploy to Eglin AFB, Florida, and prepare for operations commencing approximately 1 September 1970.

(g) Ground forces will be selected by 1970, travel to Eglin AFB, and prepare for operations commencing approximately 1970.

(3) Objectives. The objectives of the preparation phase are to select and assemble personnel and equipment and accomplish preliminary training.

(4) Forces. See Annex A, Task Organization.

b. Phase II.

(1) Summary of Operations. During the specialized training phase, the UH-1, HH-3 and C-130 will be integrated into formation training. Day formation, night formation and rendezvous, and mission profile missions will be flown. Ground forces will conduct training and prepare the objective area mockup.

(2) Timing. Specialized training will be conducted from 1-15 September 1970. See detailed training schedules in Annex C, Appendices 2 and 3.

(3) Objectives. The objective of the specialized training phase is to achieve high levels of proficiency in training in preparation for the ground phase.

(4) Forces. See Annex A, Task Organization.

c. Phase III.

(1) Summary of Operations. During the joint training phase objective area operations will be practiced. Aerial and ground assault operations, objective area tactics, recovery, emergency procedures, and complete mission profile training will be practiced.

(2) Timing. Joint training will be conducted from 16 September - 13 October 1970. See detailed training schedule in Annex C, Appendix 4.

(3) Objective. The objective of the joint training phase is to perfect objective area operations to insure high confidence in mission success.

(4) Forces. See Annex A, Task Organization.

5. (S) Development of the Objective: During Phase II, materials must be assembled at Eglin AFB under the direction of the Base Liaison Office. Plans for the objective will be completed and furnished by the Washington Planning Staff no later than 1 September 1970. Construction planning details and construction will be accomplished in the Eglin Complex by the Army Commander. The objective will be available for air assault training no later than 10 September 1970.

6. (TS) Command Relationships and Coordination.

a. Commander, JCTG is responsive to the planning and guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS staff supervision is exercised by the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities.

b. The Commander, Joint Contingency Task Group exercises operational control of the forces assigned to include control of composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control will be exercised through the commanders of subordinate forces. Logistics coordination will be exercised to the extent necessary to meet the essential logistics needs of subordinate command in the accomplishment of the JCTG. See Reference , Basic Plan. See Appendix 1 for diagram of JCTG Organizational Structure.

c. No change in command is planned during the time frame of this Training Plan.

d. Coordination instructions. See Appendix 2 for diagram of JCTG coordination.

(1) Commander, JCTG coordinates support of all Eglin operations through his command element at Eglin, the Training and Coordination Office. The Training and Coordination Office coordinates support requirements with the Liaison Officer, who reports to the Base Commander, Eglin AFB.

(2) Scheduling of aircraft and aircrew assets of the ARRTC is coordinated by the Training and Coordination Office with the Commander, ARRTC.

(3) Scheduling of aircraft and aircrew assets of the Special Operations Force is coordinated by the Training and Coordination Office with the Commander, 4407th Combat Crew Training Squadron and Commander, 319th Special Operations Squadron.

(4) Joint training will commence on order of the JCS or not later than 15 September 1970.

(5) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and execution as indicated.


COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS DURING TRAINING PHASE
JCTC ORGANIZATION
Commander JCTC
Dep Cmdr JCTC
Washington Planning Staff
Eglin Training & Coordination Office
Commander Army Forces
Commander Air Forces
— Ground Element
Assault Force
Support Force
— Air Element
Aircrews (2)
Aircraft ? UH-1H
Support
— Air Liaison Office
— HH-53 Aircrews (5)
CONUS
PACAF
— HH-3 Aircrews (2)
— C-130 Resources
Aircrews (2)
Aircraft (2)
— A-1 Aircrews (4)
CONUS
PACAF
Command
Operational Control


Commander JCTC Dep Commander JCTC
AFDC
ARRTC
SOF
Washington Planning Staff
Eglin Training & Coordination Office
Base Commander
HH-53
1st Special Operations Wing
HH-3
4407 CCTS A-1
Commander Army Forces
Commander Air Forces
Task Group Liaison Office
HC-130
319 SOS C-12D
COMMAND AND COORDINATION
EGLIN AFB, FLORIDA
Command
Operational Control
Liaison and Coordination

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Annex C to JCTG Training Plan
OPERATIONS ANNEX

Operation: IVORY COAST

References. See basic plan.

1. (S) Concept of Operation.

a. Mission: To train a joint force at Eglin AFB, Florida commencing 15 August 1970 for approximately three months in preparation for a joint exercise for the purpose of weapons and tactics development.

b. Purpose:

(1) To assemble resources providing support as required.

(2) To conduct training in day and night formation, air refueling, air rescue operations, and objective area maneuver.

(3) To conduct tactics development operations.

(4) To conduct mission related material development.

(5) To prepare for deployment to designated bases.

c. Method: The training operation will be conducted in three phases: Phase I, Preparation; Phase II, Specialized Training; and Phase III, Joint Training.

(1) During the preparation phase personnel will be selected for the operation, augmentation personnel will deploy to the Eglin Complex and certain preliminary training will be accomplished. Tactics and material development will continue throughout all three phases.

(2) During the specialized training phase, UH-1, HH-3, and C-130 aircraft will conduct formation training. Day and night formation, rendezvous and mission profile missions will be flown. Ground forces will conduct unit training and prepare an objective area mockup.

(3) During the joint training phase, objective area operations will be practiced. Aerial and ground rescue operations, objective area tactics, recovery, emergency procedures, and complete mission profiles will be perfected. Personnel will prepare for deployment to designated bases.

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2. (S) Force Composition.

a. US Army Forces.

(1) Air: Two UH-1H aircraft, two aircrews and necessary maintenance support personnel to operate out of Eglin AFB, Florida.

(2) Ground: Approximately 115 Special Forces troops to operate from Eglin AFB Aux Fld #3.

b. US Air Forces.

(1) HH-53 element: Four pilots from ARRTC, one pilot from (b)(1) five pilots from PACAF, additional aircrew and maintenance support resources from Eglin AFB. Coordination for aircraft availability and scheduling will be accomplished between the Eglin Training and Coordination Office and Commander, ARRTC.

(2) HH-3 element: One pilot from PACAF and one pilot and additional aircrew and maintenance support resources from ARRTC. Coordination for aircraft availability and scheduling will be accomplished between the Eglin Training and Coordination Office and Commander, ARRTC.

(3) HC-130 element: Aircrews, one HC-130 aircraft from ARRTC. Coordination for aircraft availability and scheduling will be accomplished between the Eglin Training and Coordination Office and Commander, ARRTC.

(4) A-1 element: Four pilots from PACAF and four from the 4407 CCTS, Eglin AFB (b)(1) Coordination for aircraft availability and scheduling will be accomplished between the Eglin Training and Coordination Office and Commander, 4407 CCTS.

(5) C-130 element: Two complete aircrews, two Combat Talon configured C-130E aircraft and support personnel will deploy to and operate from Eglin AFB. Coordination for aircraft availability and scheduling will be accomplished between the Eglin Training and Coordination Office and the C-130 Mission Commander.

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3. (S) Force Operations. A block diagram indicating the general flow of training is at Appendix 1. Ground training Program of Instruction is at Appendix 2. Air element training is described below:

a. Phase I - Preparation.

(1) Training in day and night formation and air refueling will be flown by HH-53, HC-130, and A-1 aircraft during the period 15-31 August 1970. See Appendix 3, TAB C, page , for training mission objectives and schedule.

(2) Mission profiles will follow as closely as possible those flown by the ARRTC for day missions as influenced by range availability and weather.

(3) Timing, refueling procedures, tactics, and crew procedure to include flight safety and abort procedures will be determined by the Eglin Training and Coordination Office based on existing SOF, ARRTC, and Eglin AFB procedures in coordination with commanders of applicable units.

(4) Training requirements for UH-1 crews to be accomplished prior to arrival at Eglin AFB are indicated at Appendix 3, TAB D.

b. Phase II - Specialized Training

(1) C-130E, HH-3 and UH-1 aircraft will be integrated into formation training. Day formation, night formation and rendezvous, and mission profiles will be flown during the period 1-15 September 1970. See Appendix 3, TAB D, page C-3-C-2 for training mission objectives and schedules.

(2) Mission profiles will follow as closely as possible those flown by the ARRTC for day missions as influenced by range availability and weather.

(3) Timing, refueling procedures, tactics and crew proeedure to include flight safety and abortpprocedures will be determined by the Eglin Training and Coordination Office based on existing SOF, ARRTC, and Eglin AFB procedures in coordination with commanders of applicable units.

c. Phase III - Joint Training

(1) Joint training in objective area operations will be practiced. Aerial and ground rescue operations, objective area tactics, recovery, emergency procedures, and complete mission profiles will be practiced during the period 16 September - 13 October 1970. See Appendix 3, TAB C, page , for training mission objectives and schedule.

(2) See Appendix 3, TABS E and F for representative mission profiles for HH-53 and HH-3 aircraft.

(3) See Appendix 4 for description of joint training schedules and objectives.

(3) Mission profiles will follow as closely as possible those flown by the ARRTC for day missions as influenced by range availability and weather.

(4) Timing, refueling procedures, tactics, and crew procedure to include flight safety and abort procedures will be determined by the Eglin Training and Coordination Office based on existing SOF, ARRTC, and Eglin AFB procedures in coordination with commanders of applicable units.

4. (S) Command and Control.

a. Headquarters Location.

(1) The JCTG is responsive to the planning and guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

(2) Task group headquarters:

(a) JCTG initially located in Washington, D.C.

(b) On order of Commander, the training element of the JCTG headquarters will move to and be located at Eglin AFB, Florida.

b. Command Lines. Organization of the JCTG is at Annex B, Appendix 1. Command relationships are as shown in Annex B, Appendix 2.

c. Tactical Communications. Frequencies and procedures will conform to Eglin AFB local procedures. See Annex E, Communications-Electronics.

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ANNEX C, APPENDIX 1
SCHEDULE OF TRAINING

1. (S) Block diagram of training operations at Eglin AFB is at TAB A.

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ANNEX C, APPENDIX 2
GROUND TRAINING

1. (S) The ground training Program of Instruction which will be used by the Commander, Army Forces for the Specialized Training Phase is at Tab A - L

2. (S) Mission. To train selected US personnel in the necessary specialized techniques and skill to conduct a JCS directed exercise.

3. (S) Purpose: To prescribe the instruction to be presented to all personnel participating in this exercise.

4. (S) The following instruction and training will be presented/ conducted.

Block	Subject	Hours	Tab
100	General Subjects	14	A
200	Physical Training	60	B
300	Patrolling Technique	17	C
400	Range Firing and Weapons	83	D
500	Demolitions	12	E
600	Air Operations	27	F
700	Navigation	3	G
800	Medical Training	4	H
900	Communications	4	I
1000	Special Training	8	J
1100	Special Projects	50	K
1200	Photography	2	L

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Tab A General Subjects

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	Reference
101	Processing of personnel and commanders briefing	2	L,C	Operational briefing, policies and facilities available, conducted by designated staff personnel	SOP
102	Medical and dental evaluation and immunizations	6	L	Conducted by surgeon and medical personnel to evaluate personnel medical and dental status	Conducted by Surgeon
103	Issue/Turn in Special Equipment	6	L	Issue special equipment necessary to commence training and to conduct operational training missions	

C - 2 - A

Note: L= Lectures
C= Conference
D= Demonstration
PE= Practical Exercise

Tab B Physical Training

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	Reference
201	P.T. (Army Drill 1) and Runs	60	D, PE	Begin with eight repetitions of Army Drill # 1 and a half mile run with full patrol harness and weapon. It is increased each day until the 7th day when 12 repetitions of Army Drill No. 1 and a 2-mile run will be conducted. Army Drill No. 1 is maintained at 12 repetitions and the run is increased each day up to 3 miles and maintained throughout the training.	FM 21-20

Tab C Patrolling

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	References
301	Patrol Equipment	1	L	Explain and demonstrate the standard patrol equipment. Demonstrate standard procedures for wearing, comfort, and accessibility.	
302	Patrol Preparation	8	L,C, PE	Instruction in all phases of planning and preparation, utilizing troop leading procedures for a raid operation from time warning order is issued until infiltration. Each patrol member's duties are explained. Patrol brief back is explained.	FM 7-20 FM 21-75
303	Patrol Organization and Security	2	L,C,	Explain the basic organization, composition, and responsibilities of each patrol member. Instruction in security measures, area of responsibility, and warning systems for raid operations.	FM 21-75
304	Immediate Action Drill (IAD)	6	L,D, PE	Instruction in methods of breaking contact when engaged from the front, flanks, or rear. Instruction includes a demonstration, practical exercise including a live fire IA drill during range operations	FM 31-21 FM 31-20

Tab D Range Firing and Weapons

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	References
401	Range Operation Order Range Safety	.5 .5	L,C L,C	Necessary information to move personnel to range and training areas. Bring range safety to all personnel's attention	OP Eglin AFB Range SOP
402	Weapons Firing	10	L,C, PE	All personnel zeros their individual weapons. Fire for familiarization the M-79, M-72 (LAW), grenades, and pistol cal .45. An instructive firing and an IA live fire drill and course will be negotiated by all personnel. Formal instruction will be presented on the M-79, M-72 (LAW) and grenade.	FM 23-12 23-71 23-72 21-37 21-33 23-20 23-29
403	Weapons Firing at Night	60	L,C, PE	Conduct weapons training with individual and organic weapons to familiarize all personnel with problems of night firing situations and cause personnel to attain required accuracy.	
404	Weapons Firing from Helicopters	12	L,C, PE	To familiarize all personnel in firing automatic weapons from helicopters in flight with the goal of attaining proficiency and accuracy of fire from helicopters in flight to ground targets. All personnel will participate in a live fire exercise with primary emphasis placed on the conduct of night firing with and without the use of illumination.	

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Tab E Demolitions

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	References
501	Preparation of Prepared Charges	4	L,C, PE	Instruct personnel in the techniques of pre-made charges.	FM-5
502	Placement, Firing or Detonation of Prepared Charges	4	L, PE	Instruct all personnel in the methods and techniques of placement and detonation of charges and explosives.	
503	Special Demolition for Material Destruction	4	L,C, PE	Instruct all personnel in the construction techniques and placement of special demolitions for material and equipment destruction.	

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	Reference
601	Forward Air Control Procedures	4	L,C,	To teach all personnel the sources, availability, and coordination of close ground support. Types of ordnance information required, and how to communicate with the FAC will be taught by the Air Liaison Officer.	
602	Methods of Insertion and Extraction	20	L,D, PE	Practical exercises using helicopters rigged with rope ladders, rappel ropes, and McGuire rigs. All personnel will demonstrate satisfactory skill with all methods in both insertion and extraction. Exercises will be conducted in both day and night situations with emphasis placed on night operations.	
603	Helicopter Orientation	1	L,C,	Explanation of the basic capabilities and limitations of the UH-1D, H, HH-3 and HH-53 helicopters.	PAM LB, B-1 DA Chart of characteristics of Army ACFT Aircraft Operating Handbook (-1)
604	Loading and Unloading Procedures	2	L,C, PE	Teach personnel the correct procedures of loading helicopters prior to infiltration, the fastest means of unloading when going into an LZ and the best method of re-entering the helicopter on extraction. Practical exercises are conducted during day and night by all personnel.	

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Tab G Navigation

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	References
701	Map and Compass Review	2	L,C,	Briefly refresh all personnel in advanced navigation and map reading techniques to include UTM and military grid system. Point of origin, intersection and resection, elevation, relief, and profiles will be covered.	FM 21-26
702	Determining Directions Using Field Expedients	1	L,C, PE	Shadow tip method of determining directions and time, directions at night, and directions using a watch.	FM 21-26 SF Handbook

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Tab H Medical Training

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	Reference
801	Special Medical Drugs	1	L,C	Teach all personnel how to recognize and administer special drugs which may be used by combat patrols	Current Med Rubs
802	Life Saving Steps and Albumin Blood Unit	2	L,C PE	Detailed explanation of steps to be used to treat combat casualties in all situations and the use of the albumin blood expander unit.	FM 21-11 FM 27-11 TM 8-30
803	Special Wounds and Situations	1	L,C	Special instructions in combat emergency treatment. Wounds to the head, chest and stomach.	TM 8-30 FM 27-11

Tab I Communications

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	References
901	Communications Procedures	1	L	Explain proper radio procedures and the reasons for standard operating procedures.	FM 24-1 FM 24-18
902	Ground to Air Signals	1	L,C	Teach all personnel the techniques and use of the following signalling devices, mirror, strobe lights and gun flares.	FM 23-30 FM 31-21 FM 31-20
903	Radio Set AN/PRC-25, HT-1 URC-10, PRT-4 and PRR-4	2	L	Teach the characteristics, capabilities and operation of these five (5) radios.	TM 11-5820 398-12 Instr manuel for transceiver HF-10

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Annex J Special Training

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	References
1001	Handling of Recovered Personnel	2	L, PE	Familiarize personnel with methods of personnel recovery and awareness of problem areas. This instruction will be presented by the project surgeon or designated personnel.	
1002	Evasion, Escape, and Survival	2	L,C	Teaches personnel the principals of evasion, escape and survival. Teach survival methods and resources available for living off the land.	FM 21-75 21-77 30-7 31-20
1003	Methods and Techniques of Entering Restricted and Confinement Areas	4	L,C, PE		

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Tab K Special Training Projects

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	References
1101	Construct Mock Targets, Sand Tables, and Target Mock Up	50	PE	To provide intimate knowledge of objective area	SOP as Directed by Commander

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Tab L Photography

Block	Subject	Hrs	Type	Scope of Instruction	References
1201	Basic Photography with Pen EE 35 mm Cameras	2	L,PE	To teach the basic photographic characteristics, functions and procedures in combat operations. Primary instruction will be directed toward night photography using infra red techniques.	FM 31-20 TM 11-401

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ANNEX C, APPENDIX 3
AIR TRAINING

1. (S) Flying training requirements for the Eglin training phase are indicated at TAB A.

2. (S) Schedule of flying training missions is at TAB B.

3. (S) Description of flying training missions is at TAB C.

4. (U) Recommended training accomplishments for UH-1 pilots prior to 1 September 1970 is at TAB D.

5. (S) Representative flight plans for HH-53 and HH-3 profile missions are at TABs E and F, respectively.

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FLYING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

PHASE DATES	NO FLIGHTS	UNIT	ACFT	DURATION OF FLT	FLYING HOURS	
Preliminary Formation Training 15 Aug-1Sep	2	Day Formation	3 HH53 1 HC130*	2+00 2+00	12 4	*Rescue C-130
	3	Night Formation & Refueling	3 HH53 3 A-1 1 HC130*	3+00 2+00 3+00	27 18 9	*Rescue C-130
Full Formation and Profile 1 Sep-15 Sep	1	Day Formation	1 HH53 1 UH1 2 A-1 1 C130E*	2+00 2+00 2+00 2+00	2 2 4 2	*Mission C-130
	3	Night Formation & Rendezvous	1 HH53 1 UH1 2 A-1 1 C130E	2+00 2+00 2+00 2+00	6 6 12 6	
	1	Mission Profile with Rendezvous	3 HH53 1 UH1 2 A-1 1 C130E 1 HC130	6+00 2+00 6+00 6+00 5+00	18 2 12 6 5	

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Annex C, Appendix 3, Tab A

Assault Training 15 Sep-13 Oct	2	Target Assault (Landing Phase) Approx 10 times	3 HH53 1 UH1 1 C-130E	3+00 3+00 3+00	18 6 6	
	5	UH-1 Landing	1 UH1	2+00	10	
	2	Target Assault Landing & Recovery Approx 6 Times	3 HH53 1 UH1 2 A1 1 C130E	3+00 3+00 3+00 3+00	18 6 12 6	
	2	Target Assault Emergency Recovery Approx 8 Times	2 HH53 1 UH1 2 A1 1 C130E	2+00 2+00 2+00 2+00	8 4 8 4	
	2	Abbreviated Mission Refuel Rendezvous Assault Holding Recovery Approx 4 times	3 HH53 1 UH1 2 A1 1 C-130E 1 HC130	3+00 3+00 3+00 3+00 3+00	18 6 12 6 6	

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Dress Rehearsal	1	Full Mission Profile	3 HH53 1 UH1 2 A1 1 C130E 1 HC130 1 [illegible]	6+00 2+00 6+00 4+00 3+00	18 2 12 4 3	
Totals	23				346	

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Annex C, Appendix 3, Tab B
Schedule of Flying Training Missions

1. (U) Mission requirements by date, aircraft, mission number and available moon.

Mission Number	Aircraft Type	Date	Moon
1	A E	20 Aug	30%
2	A E	21	20%
3	A C	24	6%
4	A C	26	0%
5	A C	28	0%
6	A B C D	31	0%
7	A B C D	2 Sep	0%
8	A B C D	4	6%
9	A B C D	8	30%
10	A B C D E	9	50%
11	D	) Missions to be scheduled prior to 2 Sep 70, if possible, other wise will be accomplished on an as avail- able bases at Eglin AFB.	30%
12	D		20%
13	D		6%
14	D		0%
15	D		0%
16	A B D	11 Sep	70%
17	A B D	14	80%
18	A B C D	16	100%
19	A B C D	18	91%
20	A B C D	21	64%
21	A B C D	23	44%
22	A B C D E	25	26%
23	A B C D E	28	6%
24	A B C D E	30	0%

Legend:

A = HH-53
B = C130 E
C = A-1
D = UH-1 and/or HH 3
E = HC-130

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2. (U) Calendar schedule:

AUGUST

9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20 (1)	21 (2)	22
23	24 (3)	25	26 (4)	27	28 (5)	29
30	31 (6)					

SEPTEMBER

		1	2 (7)	3	4 (8)	5
6	7	8 9	9 (10)	10	11 (16)	12
13	14 (17)	15	16 (18)	17	18 (19)	19
20	21 (20)	22	23 (21)	24	25 (22)	26
27	28 (23)	29	30 (24)			

[redacted]

ANNEX C, APPENDIX 3, TAB C
MISSION DESCRIPTIONS

[redacted]

Mission 1 (Day)

Day formation. Objective: Increase proficiency in echelon formation. To be conducted with one HC-130 as lead with three HH-53 in W-155A, W-152 or W-1 as north of Crestview as a last resort. Altitude 1000' MSL as AGL if over land. Flight will consist of at least two rendezvous, four join-ups and formation in left echelon only. Helicopter lead will be rotated among all the HH-53s. Airspeed 120K (Ref. ARRTC Form, Guide). Requirements. 1 HC-130, 3 HH-53, spares, a range, briefing covering objectives and procedures.

Mission 2 (Day)

Day formation. Objective: To continue increasing proficiency in echelon formation. May be omitted if not needed. (Reference and Requirements remain the same as for Mission 1.)

Mission 3 (Day and Night)

Night formation and Air Refueling. Objective: to increase proficiency in night formation and refueling of three HH-53s and one HC-130. In addition, to introduce three A-1s to the formation. Again, conducted over a water range, if possible. Flight will begin at least one hour before dark so that the A-1s can have the benefit of daylight for the first half of their flight. For the first two hours the flight will consists of at least two rendezvous, four join-ups and formation in left echelon for the HH-53s. One of the HH-53s will crossover so that the A-1s may fly in right echelon on the HC-130, both day and night. (Reference same as Mission 1.) After an hour of night flying, the A-1s will be released and the HH-53s will begin refueling practice on the left side of the tanker. Flight will terminate when all HH-53s have circulated through the refueling position for multiple hook-ups on each receiver. (Reference T.O. 1-1C-1-20.)

[redacted]

Requirements. One HC-130, thee HH-53, three A-1s and spares for each, ranges, joint briefing covering objectives and procedures.

Mission 4 (Night) — Same as Mission 3.

Mission 5 (Night) — Same as Mission 3.

Mission 6 (Day) — Day formation. Objective: To introduce the C-130E and the UH-1 to the formation of HH-53 and A-1 aircraft. The flight will be conducted over a water range, if possible, otherwise north of Crestview. The force will consist of the C-130E, one HH-53, two A-1s and one UH-1. The C-130 will get at least three join-ups. The standard position of the HH-53 on the C-130 lead's left wing, the UH-1 on the right wing and the A-1s on the UH-1's right side will be established here and flown throughout the remainder of the training flights.

Requirements. As stated, plus spares for each aircraft and joint briefing.

Mission 7 (Night) — Night Rendezvous and Formation. Objective: To increase proficiency of all aircraft to rendezvous and fly in tight formation. Force composition, ranges, and procedures will be the same as Mission 6. The force may be increased up to three HH-53s. The HH-3 will be introduced into the formation for at least one flight (7, 8, 9) and will at some time fly in the UH-1's spot, or on the C-130's right wing.

Requirements. As stated, plus spares for each aircraft and joint briefing.

Mission 8 (Night)	Same as Mission 7.
Mission 9 (Night)	Same as Missions 7
Mission 10 (Night)	Mission Profile with Rendezvous (Day). Objective: To run the entire mission profile, omitting only the target activity. Aircraft will be loaded to approximate gross weight to be expected on the mission. Ground forces will accompany. Requirements. The force will consist of three HH-53s, one C-130E, one HC-130, two A-1s, one H-3 and one UH-1, plus one spare for each aircraft and a joint briefing.
Missions 11, 12, 13, 14, & 15 (Day and Night)	Target Landings. Objectives: To perfect and practice techniques for landing and deplaning in the target area. The series of flights will begin during daylight and shift to night when pilot proficiency has been demonstrated. Requirements. Both the UH-1 and the HH-3 will participate in these missions, not necessarily on the same dates.
Mission 16 (Day)	Target Assault Landing Phase (Day). Objective: To practice the terminal phase including landings. Of special importance is the flare delivery timing. Spotter chutes will be substituted for flares with ground observers evaluating the timing and position of the drops. Deplaning is also an important element. At least ten landings should be made. The HH-3 and UH-1 will alternate landings.

Mission 17 (Day) — Same as Mission 16 with the introduction of the loading (or recovery) phase.

Mission 18 (Night) — Target Assault - Landing Recovery. Objective to perfect and practice the most efficient techniques possible for landing and on-loading. People as a first choice (50 per aircraft) or equivalent weight will be aboard for take-offs. Flares will be used and A-1s introduced into this phase.

Requirement. The force will consist of three HH-53s, one UH-1, one HH-3, two A-1s and one C-130E. The maneuver should be practiced at least six times. A joint briefing will be conducted.

Mission 19 (Night) — Same as Mission 18.

Mission 20 (Night) — Target Assault - Emergency Recovery. Objective: To practice the various emergency recovery procedures which may become necessary. These will include en route and terminal problems. They will also include flare drop from C-130E and helicopters. Recoveries will be effected both by landing and hoisting. The A-1s will closely participate and direct, when feasible, the en route recovery.

Requirements. The force will consist of three HH-53s, one C-130E, one UH-1, one HH-3, and two A-1s. A joint briefing will be conducted.

Mission 21 (Night) — Same as Mission 20.

Missions 22 and 23 (Night)

Abbreviated Mission Profile. Objective: To tie together all elements which have previously been developed and practiced separately. The profile will contain every element of the mission but will be shortened by reducing en route time to that necessary to end one phase and properly begin the next. As many will be practiced as time will allow. The HC-130 will be used on at least one profile.

Requirement. The force will consist of three HH-53s, one C-130E, one HC-130, two A-1s, one HH-3, and one UH-1.

Mission 24 (Night)

Full Mission Profile. Objective: To run through the entire mission to prove timing and capability.

Requirements. The force will consist of three HH-53s, one C-130E, one HC-130, two A-1s, one HH-3, and one UH-1. A joint briefing will be conducted.

NOTE Any mission or part thereof can be changed [redacted] directed. [redacted] this. based on demonstrated proficiency or the belief that a mission should be altered to better serve the overall training objective. The flying time is a guide and may be overflown or underflown as the mission commander decides.

Annex C, Appendix 3, TAB D
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR UH-1 PILOTS

1. (U) Practice formation flight.

a. Day sorties: sufficient to prepare for night flying.

b. Night sorties: build proficiency to be able to fly a sortie of at least one hour and a half of tight formation. Mission speed will be greater than 100 Kn IAS. Practice rendezvous and rejoin. Requirements: two aircraft.

2. (U) Practice assault landings.

a. Day sorties: sufficient to prepare for night flying.

b. Night sorties: practice spot landings with longitudinal axis of aircraft on a fixed heading. Be prepared to accomplish assault landings following night formation flight, see 1b above. Requirement: one aircraft.

Location	NM	IAS / GS	Time Total / Leg	Den Alt	Fuel Flow	Fuel Used	Fuel Remain	Weight Remvd	Weight Added	Weight Gr Wt	Power Reqd	Power Avail
T/O	-	-	-	2M	1200	100	9396	100	-	39880	83%	100%
Climb	10	90 / 90	:06 / :06	↗	2460	396	9000	396	-	39484	76%	76%
ARCP I	95	105 / 120	:54 / 48	10M	2100	1700	7300	1700	-	37784	-	-
A/R Completion Point	50	105 / 120	1:19 / :25	10M	2000	830	7970	830	1500	38454	-	-
IP	145	105 / 120	2:31 / 1:12	10M	1900	2300	5670	2300	-	36154	-	-
Target	10	120 / 120	2:36 / :05	2M	2300	200	4370	200	-	35954	78%*	100%
2nd T/O	-	-	2:41 / :05	2M	2000	170	5300	170 + 3600**	-	32184	75%	100%
Loiter	-	-	3:11 / :30	2M	2000	1000	4300	1000 + (+ 500***	-	30684	-	-
Target	-	-	-	2M	-	-	4300	-	-	30684	-	-
3rd T/O	-	-	3:16 / :05	2M	2300	200	4100	200	7950****	38434	94%	100%
OIP	10	150 / 150	3:20 / :04	2M	2200	150	3950	150	-	38284	75%	100%
ARCP II	145	140 / 160	4:15 / :55	10M	2200	2000	1950	2000	-	36284	65%	76%
A/R Completion Point	50	105 / 120	4:40 / :25	10M	2000	830	2620	-	1500	36954	50%	76%
Recovery	105	140 / 160	5:20 / :40	↘	2000	1350	1270	1350	-	35604	60%	100%

NOTE: See page C - 3 - E - 2 for remarks

A. Inbound - Proceed with mission. 650 lbs. remaining at ARCP II tanker would be moved upstream to meet receivers, thereby increasing reserve.

B. Outbound - Proceed to 1st alternate recovery base with fuel reserve of 1100 lbs. (60 NM/25 min) or to 2nd alternate with fuel reserve of 450 lbs. (120 NM/45 Min)

C. Both in-and outbound -

Missed Both If enough fuel - land at 1st alternate. If not enough, land at site under ARCP II

Note If loiter fuel is reduced by 50% - recovery can be at 2nd alternate for sure and possibly at primary recovery base.

* 40' Hover
** 18 Pax Deplaned
*** Ammo expended
**** 35@ 150/15 @ 180

Location	NM	IAS / GS	Time Total / Leg	Den Alt	Fuel Flow	Fuel Used	Fuel Remain	Weight Remvd	Weight Added	Weight Gr Wt	Power Reqd	Power Avail
T/O	-	-	-	2M	1600	100	3900	100	-	21,000	99%	103%
Climb	12	78	:08 / :08	↗	1500	200	3700	200	-	20,800	-	-
ARCP I	93	105 / 120	:54 / :46	10M	1280	1000	3600	1000	-	19,800	79%	79%
A/R Completion Point	50	105 / 120	1+19 / :25	10M	1200	500	4600	500	1500	20800	79%	79%
IP	145	105 / 120	2:31 / 1:12	10M	1000	1200	3400	1200	-	19600	79%	79%
Target	10	120	2:36 / :05	2M	1000	100	3300	100	-	19500	102%*	103%
2nd T/O	-	-	-	2M	1600	100	3200	100 + 3000	-	16400	83%*	103%
Loiter	-	-	3+06 / :30	2M	1000	500	2700	500	-	15900	-	103%
Target	-	-	-	2M	-	-	2700	-	-	15900	79%	103%
3rd T/O	-	-	3+11 / :05	2M	1200	100	2600	100	3000	18800	96%*	103%
OIP	10	140	3+15 / :04	2M	1400	100	2500	100	-	18700	85%	103%
ARCP II	145	110 / 125	4+25 / 1:10	10M	1200	1400	1100	1400	-	17300	79%	* 79%
A/R Completion Point	50	105 / 120	4+50 / :25	10M	1000	420	1680	420	1000	17880	79%	79%
Recovery	105	115 / 132	5+38 / :48	↘	1000	800	880	800	-	17080	75%	103%

* 40' Hover

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HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

ANNEX F (U)
OPERATIONS SECURITY/COVER AND DECEPTION (U)

REFERENCES: a. Basic Plan, JCTG ANNEX K, "Counterintelligence and Security"; ANNEX L, "Public Affairs/Information"; ANNEX E, "Communications-Electronics."

b. SM-780-69, Operations Security (S)

c. AFM 55-12, Cover and Deception (S)

1. ~~(TS)~~ OPERATIONS SECURITY.

a. ~~(S)~~ Background. The Operations Security Concept is concerned with the manner in which operations are planned, rehearsed, and conducted so that the patterns, procedures, and sequence of events which develop, do not in themselves reveal classified information about the mission but act in support of the cover and deception.

b. ~~(TS)~~ Execution.

(1) Planning. All plans, messages, orders and other correspondence must be developed with the awareness that the enemy can and does identify and exploit vulnerable activities and must be designed to provide the highest degree of security possible without degrading the effectiveness or safety of the operations.

(2) Training. During the Training Phase, operations must be continually examined to insure that vital information is not revealed and that procedures being used follow those developed in the plan. Necessary changes must be fully coordinated to preclude confusion and excessive communications.

(a) Air Operations.

1. Flight plans, air traffic control coordination, communications, and preflight activities must be monitored to insure that activities

and communications do not reveal important information.

2. Airborne operations will be monitored for possible repetitive mission profiles or aircrew procedures which could reveal an intended area of operations or staging location.

(b) Ground Operations will be monitored for possible disclosure of the intented area of operation, the location of the forward base of operations or the fact that PWs may be involved.

(c) Communications, both telephone and radio, will be monitored by Communications Security (COMSEC) personnel. These personnel will not be briefed in any way concerning the actual mission or the cover mission of the JCTG, but will attempt to identify a mission by an analysis of monitored communications. (See ANNEX E - Communications-Electronics.)

2. (~~TS~~) COVER AND DECEPTION.

a. Cover Plan.

(1) The basic foundation of the cover plan (b)(1)



(2) The classification of the cover plan, without reference to the fact that it is a cover plan, is ~~SECRET SENSITIVE.~~ The classification of the cover plan with

reference to the fact that it is a cover plan is ~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE.~~

(3) Varying levels of classification of the cover plan are listed below and can be used according to the situation and the need to know:

(a) Unclassified Official Use Only. For release to support personnel or Public Information Officers if necessary (See ANNEX L): "The unit is involved in a classified mobility training exercise."

(b) Secret: (b)(1) [redacted] at Eglin AFB, Florida."

b. To preclude any inadvertent admission concerning the true capabilities, intent, and the actual operational plan for the JCTG, all personnel who have knowledge of the true mission of the JCTG will be thoroughly briefed concerning the cover mission, the requirement for security, and their individual responsibility concerning the maintenance of this security.

c. All other personnel assigned to JCTG will be thoroughly briefed on the cover mission and the security aspects involved (b)(1) [redacted] All personnel will be apprised of

punitive consequences which would result from a security violation. (See ANNEX K for Counterintelligence and Security.)

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TALKING PAPER

on

NAVY DIVERSION

- There are many factors which militate for the Navy Diversion
  - -- Which should appear to be a bombing raid but in reality
    - --- will be a night reconnaissance of HAIPHONG area.
  - -- It may flush the MIG 21s, thus precluding interferrence from MIGs departing PHUC YEN
    - --- We must assume enemy radar will track our primary force for 20-30 minutes prior to TOT.
    - --- Expected MIG 21 reaction is 25 minutes
  - -- It will greatly increase enemy communications and confuse decision making at key enemy command centers
    - --- Make the enemy choose between two threats with Navy apparently aimed at very vulnerable HAIPHONG area
    - --- Makes enemy commit MIG 21s toward the Navy, if launched.
  - -- Probably overshadow reports of helicopters on ground action in west which will inhibit flow of instructions to
    - ---- Any enemy aircraft, if airborne
    - ---- AAA/AW units
    - ---- Artillery units
    - ---- Ground forces in the target area
- To succeed the diversion must present a <u>real</u> threat
- However, it need not be hazardous to the Navy
- Airborne and self-contained warning and deceptive systems should obviate MIG or SAM threat to Navy
- Tactics can be planned to avoid penetration of hostile area if threat considered too great
  - -- COMCTF 77 will make this decision
- Although the Navy Diversion is not critical to the success of the operation
  - -- The potential benefit outweighs low tactical risk

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Cy # 2 of 2

JCTG-TS-70-041

- There is little political risk in the Diversion since we can admit to this portion of the operation
  -- Without exposing the primary mission
- Importance of primary mission easily justifies the effort and even a minor loss if encountered

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TALKING PAPER 15 Nov 70

On

Leaving HH-3 in the Compound

- Although it is possible to land the HH-3 in the compound with a take-off, air refueling and landing at home base
  - -- I do not recommend this procedure since landing and taking off from the compound
    - --- Complicates the planning and training
    - --- Probably will require a few more seconds hovering at the most critical and dangerous portion of the operation
    - --- Will cause distraction and confusion and possible danger from debris from the rotar blades to the Special Forces and PWs while taking off during the ground operation or
      - ---- delay and vulnerability to ground fire at the end of the ground operation.
- Whereas, if the aircrew know they have to land in that compound as quickly as possible no matter what
  - -- The planning, training and the ground operation is more simple and therefore, more reliable.

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~~SENSITIVE~~

JOINT CONTINGENCY
TASK GROUP

COMJCTG OPLAN (S)

~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~
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JOINT CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SUBJECT: COMJCTG OPLAN (S)

SEE DISTRIBUTION (ANNEX Z)

1. (S) Forwarded herewith is COMJCTG OPLAN (S) which provides for an operation in SOUTHEAST ASIA.

2. (U) This plan is responsive to a requirement established in JCS TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/LIMDIS 6986, DTG 081502Z August 1970, which was distributed to the Services and DIA.

3. (S) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and for implementation when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. (S) Elements of this plan were coordinated during preparation with the Services, and the Commander, Military Airlift Command.

5. (U) Supporting plans will not be prepared.

6. (U) When separated from the Enclosure, this letter is downgraded to SECRET.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LEROY S. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander
Joint Contingency Task Group

1 Encl
JCTG OPLAN (S)

SPECIAL HANDLING
INSTRUCTIONS

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HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (U)

1. (TS) The long title of this plan is COMJCTG OPLAN - Southeast Asia Operation (S). The short title is COMJCTG OPLAN (S).

2. (U) This document is classified to protect information revealing operational plans of US military forces. Information contained herein will be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan.

3. (U) The information contained in this document is disseminated on a "Special Handling Required -- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis.

4. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

5. (U) Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without permission of the headquarters is prohibited.

6. Certain portions of this plan may be downgraded as required to allow dissemination to those personnel whose duties require such information, and to support the post-mission Public Information program.

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LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
28 August 1970

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

CONJCTG OPLAN - SOUTH ASIA OPERATIONS (TS)

(U) REFERENCES: a. JCS TOP SECRET/LIMDIS 6986, DTG 081502Z August 1970.

b. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub 1).

c. Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2).

d. Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance (JCS Pub 3).

e. Joint Contingency Task Group Training Plan. *1*

f. Maps and Charts. ANNEX B.

(U) TIME ZONE: Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu).

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: ANNEX A.

1. (TS) SITUATION.

a. General.

(1) The existence of a North Vietnamese prisoner of war camp at SON TAY has been established. Intelligence sources have confirmed the presence of US personnel at SON TAY. A JCS study concluded that forcible recovery of US prisoners of war from SON TAY is feasible.

(2) The Secretary of Defense approved and the JCS directed the activation of a Joint Contingency Task Group to plan and train to conduct a direct action mission to forcibly recover US prisoners of war from SON TAY.

(3) Forces to execute this plan have been identified, selected, and trained under reference e.

(4) Because of the close interaction of all facets of this operation and the stringent security requirements associated with it, this OPLAN will include certain pre-deployment actions, deployment, employment, and redeployment.

(5) The concepts and procedures contained in this plan are subject to change based on experience gained in training, updated intelligence and theater coordination.

b. Enemy. ANNEX B.

c. [illegible].

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

(a) Designates Execution Day for deployment.

(b) Designates Execution Day for employment (D-Day).

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(2) National Security Agency (NSA). By mutual agreement provides personnel in accordance with ANNEX A, airborne intelligence collection platforms, and additional support as required.

(b)(1)

(4) Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC). As directed by the Joint chiefs of Staff:

(a) Provides aerial tanker support as required.

(b) Provides airborne intelligence collection platforms as required.

(c) Provides airborne radio relay aircraft as required.

(5) Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(a) Passes operational control of designated Continental Army Command (CONARC) elements/personnel to COMJCTG (Annex A)

(b) Provides for administrative, logistical, and communications support for the operation of JCTG as required.

(c) Provides psychological operations support to JCTG as required (ANNEX C).

(6) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(a) Provides personnel in accordance with ANNEX A.

(b) Provides for administrative, logistical, and communications support of the JCTG as required.

(7) Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(a) Provides forces from Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Military Airlift Command (MAC) to COMJCTG (ANNEX A) as required.

(b) Provides additional personnel augmentation in accordance with ANNEX A.

(c) Provides for administrative, logistical, and communications support for the operation of the JCTG as required.

(d) Provides, through Military Airlift Command (MAC), airlift support for force deployment and redeployment in accordance with ANNEX C.

(e) Provides, through MAC, airlift support in accordance with ANNEX N and ANNEX D.

(8) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(a) Assumes operational command of JCTG in accordance with ANNEX J.

(b) Directs component commands/agencies to provide administrative, logistical, and communications support to COMJCTG as required.

(c) Provides additional personnel augmentation to JCTG as required.

(d) Directs component commands/agencies to pass operational control of designated elements/personnel to COMJCTG.

(e) CINCPAC will insure that appropriate post mission follow-up action is taken.

(9) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). As directed by CINCPAC, provides forces necessary to execute the diversionary action outlined in ANNEX L.

(10) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF). As directed by CINCPAC:

(a) Passes tactical control of designated 7th Air Force and Aerospace Rescue and Recovery elements/personnel to COMJCTG (ANNEX A).

(b) Directs 7th, 13th, and 7/13th Air Forces to provide administrative, logistical, and communication support to COMJCTG as required.

(c) Provides additional personnel augmentation as required.

2. (TS) MISSION. When directed, JCTG deploys, conducts air and ground operations necessary to forcibly recover US prisoners of war from SON TAY prison camp in NORTH VIETNAM, and redeploys.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. ANNEX C.

b. Tasks.

(1) Commander, Army Forces.

(a) Insures combat readiness of ground forces involved.

(b) Prepares ground elements/personnel for deployment.

(c) Accomplishes briefings necessary to insure required [illegible].

(d) Monitors and assesses current intelligence data to insure exploitation of changing situation.

(e) Advises COMJCTG on matters pertaining to the ground assault as the mission develops.

(f) Recommends changes and/or alternatives as dictated by the changing objective area situation.

(g) Prepares ground elements for redeployment.

(2) Commander, Air Forces.

(a) Insures combat readiness of air forces involved.

(b) Prepares air elements/personnel for deployment.

(c) Accomplishes briefings necessary to insure required air/ground coordination.

(d) Monitors and assesses current intelligence data to insure exploitation of changing situation.

(e) Advises COMJCTG on matters pertaining to the air operation as the mission develops.

(f) Recommends changes and/or alternatives as dictated by the changing objective area situation.

(g) Prepares air elements for redeployment.

(3) Commander, Joint Contingency Task Group (COMJCTG).

(a) Insures and reports readiness of JCTG to JCS.

(b) Deploys JCTG to staging base.

(c) Coordinates movement of in-theater air assets to staging base.

(d) Conducts mission briefings.

(e) Directs and controls mission execution.

(f) Directs and controls Search and Rescue efforts as required.

(g) Coordinates aeromedical evacuation requirement.

(h) Conducts mission debriefings.

(i) Redeploys JCTG to home stations.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) This plan is effective for planning upon receipt and execution when directed.

(2) Weather delays will be announced by COMJCTG.

(3) COMJCTG will coordinate facilities and support requirements at the designated staging base.

(4) Mission debrief of JCTG forces will be conducted at a joint debriefing on D+1.

(5) Uniforms of personnel assigned to JCTG will be devoid of all distinctive badges and insignia denoting Special Forces, Special Operations Force, theater of assignment, or unit affiliation.

(6) Electrical transmission of messages will be minimized.

4. (U) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION.

a. Concept of Support. The critical operational security aspect and extreme sensitivity of the JCTG mission, as well as the limited size of the operational forces involved in accomplishing that mission, are the basis for a support concept which minimizes normal staff support arrangements. The JCTG staff has identified requirements for logistical and administrative support and arranged to meet these requirements using a variety of stratagems in order to protect the security of the mission. Principally, the JCTG works directly with supporting agencies through Service channels.

b. Logistics. ANNEX D.

c. Personnel. ANNEX E.

d. Public Affairs. ANNEX F.

e. Environmental Services. ANNEX H.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command Relationships. ANNEX J.

b. Command Posts. The designations and locations of headquarters involved in executing this plan are as follows:

Headquarters	Location
National Military Command Center (NMCC)	Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301
CINCPAC	Camp Smith, Hawaii
CINCPACFLT	Kunia, Hawaii
COM7TH FLEET	Western Pacific
COMTF77	Yankee Station
CINCPACAF	Hickam AFB, Hawaii
COM7AF	Tan Son Nhut, RVN
DEPCOM 7/13AF	Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
COMJCTG	
CONUS Headquarters	Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301
CONUS Training Site	Eglin AFB, Florida
Overseas Headquarters and Staging Base	Takhli RTAFB, Thailand
Tactical Air Control Center - North Sector	Son Tra, RVN
Recovery Base	Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
Redeployment Base	Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

c. Succession to Command.

(1) CINCPAC assumes command when the JCTG crosses longitude 140°W.

(2) CINCPAC passes execution order to COMJCTG when received from the NMCC.

(3) COMJCTG executes the assault force and the Navy Diversion from his Command Post at TACC-NS.

d. Signal. ANNEX K.

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander
Joint Contingency Task Group

ANNEXES

A TASK ORGANIZATION

B INTELLIGENCE

C OPERATIONS

D LOGISTICS

E PERSONNEL

F PUBLIC AFFAIRS

H ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

J COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

K COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

L DIVERSION

M OPERATION SECURITY/COVER AND DECEPTION

N RETURNEE PROCESSING

X IMPLEMENTING CHECK LIST

Z DISTRIBUTION

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

ANNEX A TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
TASK ORGANIZATION (U)

ORGANIZATION	COMMANDER
Joint Contingency Task Group	B/G L. J. Manor
Army Component (JCTG)	Col A. D. Simons
Air Force Component (JCTG)	B/G L. J. Manor
Support:	
HQ 7th Air Force	COM7AF
Task Force 77	COMTF77
432 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing	COM432TRW
56 Special Operations Wing	COM56SOW
834 Air Division	COM834AD
3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group	COM3ARRG
82 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron	COM82SRS
552 Airborne Early Warning Wing	COM552AEWW
307 Strategic Wing	COM307SW
(b)(1),(b)(3):50 § 403(g) Section 6 of	
Military Airlift Command	COMMAC
505th Tactical Control Group	COM505TCG
6924th Security Squadron	6924SCTYSQ

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander
Joint Contingency Task Group

APPENDIX:

1 Time-phase Force and Deployment List

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
TIME-PHASE FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (U)

To be provided.

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ANNEX B TO [illegible] OPLAN (~~S~~)
INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. APPENDIX 4, Maps and Charts

b. ANNEX H, Environmental Services

(U) This annex does not conform the format of the JOPS. Instead, it is divided into sect[illegible] which synthesize elements of the JOPS INTELLIGENCE ANNEX [illegible] lting in a final product which is responsive to operatio[illegible] requirements. The four sections deal with the air defens[illegible]/offense threat, the ground force threat, the advisory and warning function of SIGINT support, and the target objective. It assumes a prolonged penetration of northwestern NORTH VIETNAM by special purpose helicopters and propellor aircraft at low-altitude and jet fighter aircraft at medium to high altitude.

1. (~~TS~~) ESTIMATED AIR DEFENSE/OFFENSE THREAT. The northern sector of the NORTH VIETNAM Air Defense Surveillance/Weapons Systems, at this time is relaxed.

a. Radar/SIGINT. The NVN [redacted] (three radar stations, LACS) Radar Systems have to this time demonstrated equipment limitation prohibiting accurate track capability, and often even acquisition, against targets below 2,500 feet over LAOS. (See APPENDIX 7 for location of enemy radar.)

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(1) The NVN [redacted] networks targeted against THAILAND and LAOS are capable of monitoring the mission from takeoff. Also, they are capable of monitoring US, THAI, and LAO communications, which could compromise the mission prior to its execution. These SIGINT/[redacted] networks are tactical in nature and possess a direct alert and warning function. These high-quality networks (NVN [redacted]) represent a major threat to a successful mission.

(2) The seven station NVN Northwest Radar Network should not detect the primary force until it reaches the RED RIVER VALLEY (H-10 minutes). At H-10 minutes the NVN Air Defense Control Centers should be already focusing their attention on the MIG CAP and the Navy diversionary effort along the Northeastern NVN coast. Based on past experience the MIG CAP mission entering the area from the west should appear as a MIG trap. The appearance of the slower flying aircraft at H-10 should give the appearance of a coordinated MIG CAP/SAR effort. The Navy diversionary effort should attract their attention at H-20 minutes.

b. SAM/[illegible]. [illegible]ming no prior warnin[illegible], the [illegible]/AAA reaction time within the target area should exceed twenty-five minutes, from initial detection. The 234th Air Defense Regiment Headquarters [illegible] organization formerly [illegible] 1965. [illegible] volved [illegible] in [illegible] vicinity of its new area of operations. Further, the regimental mission is now the training of new crews. [illegible] one [illegible] the battalions is presently located in the target area This battalion should not be able to effect a guided launch since the target objective is in its "dead zone." Elements of the

battalion's AAA support may be in position to engage with 85/57/37/23mm or AW in a sector or barrage mode; however, the mission low-altitude profile should prohibit effective reaction and engagement. SAM system "going hot" procedure should last throughout the initial ground operations phase (for any area battalion) affording a high degree of safety to the assaulting helicopters and orbiting support aircraft.

(1) A significant factor contributing to area NVN weapons control confusion is the lack of US helicopter and propellor aircraft overhead, within 30nm of the target area since early 1966. Conversely, NVNAF helicopters and propellor aircraft have been transiting the area, since that time, on a fairly regular basis to include night missions.

(2) Based on an analysis of SAM deployment patterns over the past twenty-four months, there is a 95% probability that no line battalion will be in position to launch against the F-4 CAP flights, while in their orbit areas.

c. GCI/Fighter. The NORTH VIETNAMESE Air Intercept Force has at least 82 MIG-21, 39 MIG-17 and 33 MIG-19 line fighters available for combat. This statistic is, however, completely misleading in that there are presently only 6 MIG-21 and 8 MIG-17 night qualified pilots. Two of these, both MIG-21 pilots, are qualified at low-altitude, but neither has flown the intercept profile necessary since early November 1967 at which time they performed it in combat. There are six GCI stations available, within the HANOI/SON TAY/YEN BAI area, to support an intercept. However, the station at SON TAY is training related, as is the airfield, and the station at YEN BAI is not presently complemented with a night fighter force and, consequently, no night intercept control. The remaining four stations belong to the PHUC YEN Fighter Operations Chief and the Senior GCI Controller. It is unlikely that a MIG-21 pilot (night-qualified) -- controller is readily available to man a station at the same time that two other night-qualified pilots are available for the intercept. The primary MIG-17 force is located at KEP. It would have the same basic problem coupled with control distance. Further complicating the overall control problem is the possibility of targets to the east and west.

(1) Additionally, there is no night strip alert presently in effect. Assuming pilot availability, minimum reaction time would be 25-30 minutes.

(2) Historically, the NVN night fighter force reacts when their own special mission aircraft are airborne, or major transportation efforts are in progress and hostiles approach the area; or, a night bombing profile has become so stereotyped that an intercept mission can be planned and practiced.

(3) Within the broad concept of these criteria, the intercept controller should either withhold commitment or launch against the Navy diversion. The launch from PHUC YEN or KEP would probably be designed to distract the Navy force from the overloaded HAIPHONG-HON GAY wharf and storage areas, rather than actually to engage. The NVN MIG controller would probably avoid any contact with USAF F-4 CAP flights in the MIG hold areas due to the possibility of weapons mismatch in the event of a head-on engagement.

(4) At best, since the objective is in the path of one of the established MIG takeoff patterns from PHUC YEN, the MIGs may attempt a quick pass through the area to disrupt or abort the mission. A ground attack mission by the MIG force is

unli' 'y without a local range controller. The SON TAY nort .at area is the MIG, IL-28 bombing and strafing rang and possibly a new test area for a non-airmobile unit. However, aircraft and personnel reaction time for these types of missions should not allow for execution.

(5) MIG attack on a capped, low-profile egress is unlikely without weeks of prior tactics exercises.

2. (TS) GROUND FORCE THREAT. Military facilities capable of housing approximately 12,000 personnel are located within 10-15 minutes driving time from SON TAY Camp. However, despite the large number of facilities within this area, the primary external threat to the actual ground operations would probably come from the military installations 4-10 kilometers south and southwest of the target and from any troops billeted within SON TAY City. The military facilities to the south and southwest consist of a series of installations along motorable roads with the closest one being SON TAY Military School and Training Facility.

a. This installation, currently undergoing reconstruction, is capable of billeting approximately 1,900 troops and is 10-15 minutes night driving by secondary road from the target. (This does not include reaction time prior to actual vehicle movement which we estimate, at best, is ten minutes.) Cargo vehicles, prime movers and utility vehicles in addition to field artillery have been identified at various times within this camp. Firebombs and simulated fire fight devices will be dropped as a diversionary effort to prevent timely reaction by ground forces in this area.

b. Numerous vehicles and some AAA have been identified at the other installations within the target area; however, the numbers and location of vehicles/equipment have varied considerably from photo mission to photo mission. This can be accounted for by the large amount of construction and training activity associated with the various military installations throughout the area.

c. No military facilities have been positively identified at SON TAY City, and at this time, there is no firm information on the military capabilities of the local militia. Reports indicate that the 12th Infantry Regiment and the 34th Artillery Regiment are located in the general target area. Both regiments are associated with training of units scheduled for infiltration to the south. Information dated September 1970 indicates these units are moving south to an unknown location.

d. Action has been initiated to more accurately locate the above units and their subordinates and to identify other units which may be located within the SON TAY area.

NOTE: Since the NVN air defense and ground self-defense/training forces have always maintained a fluid posture, threat analysis will require continuous updating. For example, the NVN Air [illegible] recently conducted maneuvers to determine [illegible] and [illegible] posture for the next six months. This makes continual analysis doubly important at this time.

3. (TS) SIGINT SUPPORT. All pre-mission intelligence update support will be provided by the SIGINT Support Group (SSG) subordinate to CINCPAC, as required by the Joint Contingency Task Group. This will be accomplished through SSG access to all source intelligence for fusion analysis purposes. The Chief of the SSG

has been tasked to establish special coordination of airborne and land-based SIGINT collection facilities to insure:

a. Timely warning of mission compromise.

b. Identification and warning of threat and threat status prior to and during the mission entrance, target operations, and exit from the objective area.

c. Formulation of SIGINT recall plan procedures.

d. Supply of all SIGINT-derived weather data.

e. Overall mission flight following.

f. Supply of data for vector of fighter forces by an airborne platform.

g. Trigger initiation of VHF jamming.

h. Centralization of all these mission-related data to a central command post, the Tactical Air Control Center North Sector at Son Tra, RVN.

i. Immediate/Preliminary Post Mission Wrap-Up based on a fusion of all source intelligence data.

4. (TS) TARGET OBJECTIVE. See Target List at APPENDIX 4 and Target Description at APPENDIX 7.

a. Location. SON TAY PW Camp N-69 (BE No. 0616-04929) is located 20nm WNW of HANOI and 0.6nm NW of SON TAY City, the capital of HA TOY Province.

b. Physical Description.

(1) Surrounding Area. The camp is located in a flat relatively isolated area of rice paddies and small garden plots well away from civilian habitation. The camp is bounded on the west and north by the SONG CON River and on the east by an unnumbered north-south road which connects with Route 11 in SON TAY. The area south of the camp is comprised of rice paddies bounded by an east-west irrigation ditch 400 feet to the south.

(2) The Camp. The Camp consists of a walled compound and and outside administration and guard quarters area.

(3) The PW Compound. (See enclosed map for details.) The compound contains five buildings capable of housing PWs. In addition, two latrines and a well are located in the south-west corner of the compound.

(4) Administration/Support Area. The administration of the camp is centered on Building No. 7A on the attached map. Communications lines are visible entering this building. Analysis of all intelligence sources indicated that up to [illegible] personnel may be quartered in the barracks and houses shown on the map.

LEROY J. MANOR
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Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

a. AFR Series 124, OSI Manuals, and OSI Supplements for AFRs and AFMs.

b. ONI 64-2A, subject: Counterintelligence Manual for Naval Intelligence.

c. AR 38-5, subject: Safeguarding Defense Information.

d. AFR 205-1, subject: Physical Security Manual.

e. AR 380-10, subject: Military Security, Department of the Army, Policy for Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments.

f. AR 380-11, subject: Military Security, Maximum Classification Levels for Releases in Accordance with the Department of the Army Policy for Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments.

g. Quarterly US Counterintelligence Reports.

1. (TS) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. To establish general procedures and furnish guidance concerning counterintelligence and security.

b. Mission. Develop plans to secure the true purpose of the JCTG (see ANNEX M - Cover Plan) and to preclude evidence of US involvement in this sensitive operation until the operation has been completed.

c. Definitions.

(1) Counterintelligence. That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations, or material against sabotage.

(2) Security.

(a) Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, observation, sabotage, annoyance, surprise, or subversion.

(b) A condition which results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures which ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.

(c) With respect to classified matter, the condition which prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information which is safeguarded in the interest of national defense.

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(d) Protection of supplies or supply establishments against enemy attack, fire, theft, and sabotage.

2. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION. See reference g.

3. ~~(TS)~~ SECURITY SITUATION.

a. Maximum effort will be made to preclude evidence of US involvement in this sensitive operation. Dissemination of the information concerning this operation will be limited on a strict must-know basis, and the operational force will be restricted to the minimum size necessary to ensure mission accomplishment. The operational force referred to in this annex will consist of USAF Security Police (SP) and the Special Forces (Security Police) personnel. The Army will provide six Special Forces personnel to assist the security force for the staging base. This Special Forces security force will be supplemented by USAF SP personnel as required. It is anticipated that ten USAF SP personnel will be required at the staging base during the period D-5 to D-1. (The SPs will be obtained from the SP Squadron, TAKHLI RTAFB.)

b. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI), USAF, will conduct all counterintelligence investigations of USAF interest. HQ USAF will direct that OSI provide one Special Agent to assist in the security precautions of this operation and to conduct necessary investigations of USAF interest. The Military Intelligence (MI), USA, will conduct any required counterintelligence investigations concerning the USA personnel. MI will provide one MI agent for this operation.

c. Enemy Forces. ANNEX B.

d. Friendly Forces. ANNEX A.

4. ~~(TS)~~ EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Counterintelligence.

(a) In accordance with appropriate Service regulations, OSI and MI will conduct required investigations in all matters of a counterintelligence nature including allegations of espionage, treason, sedition, subversion, disloyalty, security violations, disaffection, sabotage, and insurgency relating to or involving personnel, material, activities, or organizations.

(b) OSI and MI will attempt to safeguard this operation against compromise, and if the operation is compromised, will provide the command element with an estimate of the situation.

(c) Intensify attempts to identify enemy agents or suspected agents, front organizations, subversive, sabotage, and insurgent groups.

(d) Accelerate efforts to identify enemy intelligence, counterintelligence, security and police organizations and personnel.

(e) Detect the operational activity of the above cited organizations, and neutralize and/or negate their efforts through effective security measures and counterintelligence operations targeted against non-US, as well as US, forces in the operational area.

(2) Security.

(a) Security of classified defense information. Component commanders will safeguard defense information in accordance with applicable Service regulations and ensure that classified material is given maximum security during this operation. Commanders will arrange for the arrest, detention, and evacuation of persons considered dangerous to military security and establish restricted areas in all sensitive locations, ensuring a constant screening of all personnel having access to these locations. Courts-martial and other disciplinary jurisdiction over personnel, units, and detachments of Service component forces will be exercised in accordance with the regulations and procedures of their respective Services.

b. Tasks for the Security Units.

(1) Systems Security.

(a) Assessment of vulnerability.

(b) Normal physical security objectives.

(c) Emergency security objectives.

(d) Requirements for external physical security.

(e) Dispersal and deployment.

(f) Security warning and alert procedures.

(2) Special Security Tasks.

(a) Disposition of security risk personnel.

(b) Communications Security (COMSEC). COMSEC practices and procedures will be in accordance with existing Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions. Secure on-line circuits will be used instead of off-line circuits whenever possible. Encrypted For Transmission Only (EFTO) procedures will be used on all unclassified message traffic until such requirement is removed by the appropriate official. Attention will be given to the physical security of crypto materials and communications-electronics (C-E) sites. Transmission security will be stressed to all users of communications equipment to preclude the compromise of sensitive information by disclosure over nonsecure communications circuits. All communications concerning this operation will be kept to a minimum.

(c) All personnel assigned to this operation will be thoroughly briefed concerning the necessity for security, their individual responsibilities concerning the security requirement, and the consequences if the operation is compromised. Whenever the forces or operations of the employment forces are subject to surveillance at TAKHLI RTAFB, precautionary measures will be taken to conceal the true capability, mission, and objective of the employment force. Training or briefing must be located at concealed sites, with appropriate security guards. In locating supply points, storage areas, training areas, etc., maximum effort will be made to safeguard the actual mission of the employment force. Prior to the disestablishment of the JCTG or the reassignment of individual personnel, a debriefing will

be conducted and each individual will be required to sign a statement indicating his awareness of the permanent security classification of the JCTG and his acknowledgement that any violation of such security would constitute grounds for punitive action.

5. ~~(C)~~ LOGISTICS. A facility at TAKHLI RTAFB, THAILAND must be obtained that will conceal the activities of the employment force.

6. (U) CENSORSHIP. Not applicable.

7. (U) COLLECTION PLANS. Not applicable.

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX B TO ANNEX B TO CONCEPT PLAN (S)

1. (S) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. This appendix provides a listing of fixed targets which could require attack by USAF aircraft using conventional weapons in support of this operation.

b. Targeting Concept. Targets listed in this appendix are those considered to be a threat to ground operations near the objective. The geographic area used to select these targets is an irregular area, the boundary of which is within an estimated twenty minutes night driving time of the objective. Only permanent installations with the capability of a surface reaction are included. If vehicular reaction from any of these installations is observed, it will be neutralized by the A-Fs orbiting in the objective area. No pre-emptive strikes are planned. Installations posing a threat to air operations are excluded (PHUC YEN Air Field, etc.) due to the minimal threat involved (see ANNEX B) and the low profile nature of the operation. Although SON TAY City militia and police are located within 1,000 meters of the objective, this target is excluded from the list. This decision is based on the lack of information about the exact location of threat units within the city and the high probability of civilian casualties even if exact locations become available. The destruction of the road bridge at 210841N/1053002E should serve to isolate the above forces from the objective area and largely neutralize this threat.

2. (S) TARGETS FOR CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. Listed at TAB A in BE No. order are the military installations posing a threat as conceived in 1b above.

[redacted]

[redacted] 6 [illegible] copies

HEADQUARTERS [illegible]
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
TARGET LIST

ICCD	SOURCE OF DIRECTION	BE NUMBER	INSTALLATION NAME	GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATE	COUNTRY CODE	CATEGORY CODE	REMARKS
22 Aug 70	JCS AIF	0616-00144	SON TAY Army Supply Depot and Barracks	210540N1052918E	VN	92000	AAA training facility at this target is prob[illegible] the only AAA threat in the objective area.
31 Jul 70	DIAAP-9	0616-00192	SON TAY Government Control Center	210820N1053030E	VN	54000	NOTE: No longer Government Control. Target is not an active industry. (Product unknown.)
22 Aug 70	DIA AIF	0616-00205	SON TAY Military School and Train-Facility	210635N1052912E	VN	90120 90130	[illegible]
22 Aug 70	DIA AIF	0616-00305	SONG DONG Army Barracks and School	210330N1053005E	VN	90110 90130	
6 Jun 70	DIAAP-9	0616-00308	CAM DI Army Barracks and Possible PW Detention Institution N-36	210940N1052218E	VN	90000 75900	No evidence of US PW's at this installation.
31 Jul 70	DIA AIF	0616-00996	TRUNG HA Army Barracks PHU RHIEU	211329N1052133E	VN	90110 92000	This installation is too remote to hinder our operation.

ICOD	SOURCE OF [illegible]NCTION	BE NUMBER	INSTALLATION NAME	GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATE	COUNTRY CODE	CATEGORY CODE	REMARKS
31 Jul 70	DIA AIF	0616-02282	TONG Army Barracks and Vehicle Storage and Repair	210500N1052810E	VN	92021 90110	
31 Jul 70	DIAAP-9	0616-05086	VIET TRI Ammunition Depot	211010N1052210E	VN	92010	
6 Jun 70	DIAAP-9	0616-05097	SON TAY Storage Area Southwest	210639N1052805E	VN	92000	Formerly SON TAY U/I Inst (UCO) 616-00000
31 Jul 70	DIAAP-9	0616-05098	SON TAY Army Barracks Southwest	210626N1052727E	VN	90110	BE No. is newly assigned.
22 Aug 70	DIA AIF	0616-08414	TONG Airfield	210550N1052807E	VN	90120	Not OPR as airfield. Use for SAM and truck driver training.
31 Jul 70	DIA AIF	0616-08593	HOA LAC Airfield	210157N1052958E	VN	80050	
31 Jul 70	DIAAP-9	0616-00000	Road Bridge over SONG CON	210841N1053002E	VN	44100	This bridge will be neutralized by ground forces.
22 Aug 70	DIAAP-9	0616-00000	SON LONG EW Site (New)	210605N105	VN		

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CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO CONTINGENCY PLAN (S)
MAPS, CHARTS, AND GEODETIC DATA (MC&G) (U)

1. (S) SITUATION.

a. Available Products.

(1) Maps and charts necessary to support this plan have been selected from the following series:

(a) Jet Navigation Charts (JN)
Scale: 1:2,000,000

(b) Operational Navigation Charts (ONC)
Scale: 1:500,000

(c) Joint Operation Graphics (JOG)
Scale: 1:250,000

(d) Topographic Maps (AMS Series L7014)
Scale: 1:50,000

(e) Sectional Charts (For CONUS Training)
Scale: 1:500,000

b. Capabilities. One intelligence officer assigned to the Task Group will be the MC&G Force.

c. Supporting Capabilities.

(1) Pentagon Map Library.

(2) DIA Map Library.

(3) Map Libraries of CONUS Training and Deployment Sites.

d. Assumptions. That the geographic areas of operation will be confined to those listed in ANNEX C.

2. (U) MISSION. To provide adequate MC&G support to insure successful air and ground planning of the operations.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of MC&G Operations. A minimum of MC&G materials will be furnished along with pertinent target photos to the CONUS training site for aircrew briefing and mission planning to the deployment site for final briefing. This package will contain sufficient MC&G supplies to support both air and surface elements involved. Material which may disclose the identity, location or nature of the mission or objective will be secured for use by COMJCTG, his staff and other key personnel when approved by the [illegible] will be withheld as long as possible from [illegible] "[illegible] now" requirement, and in cases [illegible] to mission accomplishment.

b. Tasks. A single package containing the necessary MC&G materials for planning and operations will be transported to training and deployment sites at appropriate times.

6 19

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

Supply and Storage. An adequate supply of and maximum storage security for MC&G materials will be provided throughout the operation.

HEADQUARTERS [illegible]
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. [illegible]
28 August 1970

A[illegible] 6 [illegible] B [illegible] OPLAN (S)
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF SON TAY PW CAMP (S)

INTRODUCTION. SON TAY PW Camp is located in a low, flat, relatively isolated area of rice paddies and small garden plots well away from civilian habitation. The camp is bounded on the west and north by the SONG CON River and on the east by an unnumbered north-south road which crosses a small bridge and connects with Route 11 to SON TAY CITY 0.6 NM to the north and east. The area south of the camp is composed of rice paddies and small garden plots and is interrupted by an east-west irrigation canal 400 feet to the south.

The camp consists of a walled compound in which an estimated 69 US PWs are housed and an Administration/Support area immediately east and south of the walled compound. The latter area is estimated to contain 45 Vietnamese including dependents. Figure 1 and the enclosed map indicate the relative position of buildings in these areas. A detailed description of these two areas follows.

1. (TS) THE PW COMPOUND.

a. Security Wall and Guard Posts. The wall surrounding the PW quarters buildings is of masonry construction and varies in height from approximately 7.5 feet on the east side to nearly 9 feet outside, at the guard tower on the southwest corner. The wall is six to eight inches thick between the supporting posts and ten to twelve inches thick at the posts. The supporting posts are spaced seven feet apart (centers) throughout (See model and figures 3, 4, and 5.).

(1) The south wall is 140 feet long and ranges in height from 7.5 feet at the east end to nearly 9 feet at the west end. A wooden door is located in this wall 25 feet from the east end. The door is 2.5 feet by 5 feet and opens into the compound (See map and figure 4). The threshhold is raised one foot above ground level. A masonry guard tower (Map No. 2b) is located at the west end of this wall. This tower is approximately four feet square and rises four feet above the wall. Six masonry steps lead up to a small stoop along the south wall as shown on the map. (See Figure 5.)

(2) The east wall is 185 feet long and is interrupted 65 feet from the south end by a gate and guard shack. This wall appears to be a uniform 7.5 feet in height. [illegible] guard shack and gate (Map # 1[illegible]) are partially shielded [illegible] trees and as a result construction and dimensions are not known. See figure [illegible] [illegible] south [illegible] of masonry construction and integral with the wall.

(3) The north wall is 116 feet long and 7 feet high. A guard tower (Map 2A) is located at the west end of this wall with a ladder approach from the south. Construction is masonry and is integral with the walls (one model incorrectly shows the guard towers as separate structures). All guard tower windows and doors are open with the exception of canvas flaps for weather shielding. (See Figure 3.)

(4) The south wall is 185 feet long and 8 to 9 feet high on the outside (slightly less on the inside). This wall contains a slight dogleg near its midpoint. A latrine (Map 3) is located on this wall fifty feet from the south end. The compound wall appears to serve as the rear wall of this latrine.

(5) Buildings within the compound number six, including four PW cells (buildings 5A and 5B being considered as one) and two latrines. Also indicated on the map are numerous trees (with approximate heights indicated), a well (#9), and an old building foundation (#6). Clothes lines at the positions shown were noted on July 1969 photos. June 1970 photos indicate tht the clothesline running across #6 has been moved and now runs from latrine #3 to latrine #4 and then to guard tower #2B. PW compound building descriptions are as follows:

MAP NO.	DESCRIPTION
3	Latrine, masonry, 12x15 and 12 feet high with screening wall on east side. The door is on the east end of the north wall and opens out.
4	Latrine, masonry, 10x15 and 9 feet high with screening wall on north side. Door is on north end of east wall and opens out.
5A	PW cellblock, 55x25 feet, single story masonry with tile roof. A covered walkway, approximately four feet wide, surrounds south, west, and probably the north side. This makes the enclosed area approximately 50x17 feet. The openings in this building are not known but it is predicted that one door and two windows exist on the west end and probably two doors and several windows on both the north and south sides. See Figure 2.
5B	PW cellblock, 55x30 feet, single story, masonry, with tile roof. No covered walkway exists on this building. The known openings in this building are shown in Figure 2. It is predicted that four to six windows and one or two doors are [illegible] openings [illegible] opening outward. Doors open out as shown and also appear to be wooden.

NOTE: Buildings 5A and 5B are connected externally and it is probable that a door or passageway exists between these two buildings.

MAP NO.	DESCRIPTION
5C	PW cellblock, 20x16 feet, single story, masonry. This building and 5D below were constructed in September-December 1969 when expansion of the camp took place. No low-altitude photos are yet available to confirm any openings except those shown in Figure 3. Since these two buildings were constructed for the specific purpose of housing PWs, it should be assumed that physical security is considerably better here than in buildings 5A, 5B and 5E. Barred windows and steel or heavy wooden doors should be expected on these two buildings. Based on the size and location of building 5C, it is considered likely that it is used for isolation purposes.
5D	PW cellblock, 37x16 feet, single story, masonry. Photography of November and December 1969 indicates that this building has three, north-south, internal dividing walls which indicate that possibly eight cells are present. The only openings known are those shown on Figure 3. It is probable that a door is present in the west end based on the porch roof shown. The north wall probably has one or more doors and several windows.
5E	Probable PW cellblock and PW messing building, 50x28 feet, one and one half stories, masonry construction. A small masonry lean-to, attached to the southwest corner measures 6x7 feet and has a small door on the south side. Figure 4 and the scale model indicate other openings known to exist. Openings on the west side are based on 1967 photos and include two doors and four windows.
6	Building foundation, 25x30 feet. The building formerly on this foundation was dismantled in 1967 when the initial compound was expanded to include building 5E and the wall built. This probably was done to afford a better view for a guard placed in tower 2B. This foundation is at ground level and has become less distinct since 1969.
9B	Well, six feet in diameter, depth unknown. This well is unlined and the opening is at ground level. A circular wellcover with a painted five-point star was noted on July 1970 photos (see scale model) adjacent to the well and on August 1970 photos covering the well. A concrete water tank, 2x4 feet by 2 feet high, is located adjacent to the well on the south side (see model). This well and tank are probably used for PW's laundry.
	NOTE: Additional concrete tanks are noted near buildings 5A, 5B and 5E. (See model.)

2. (S) THE ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT AREA.

a. The Administration and Support Area is composed of 19 structures used to administer the compound and house camp personnel and their families. (July 1969 photos confirm the presence of dependents at the camp.) Buildings 4A, 7A, 8D, 8E, 8F, 11, 12, 13A, 13B and 13D were present in 1967 prior to the conversion of the facility to its present function. 13D was built in late 1967 or early 1968. Buildings 13B and 7B were constructed during the fall of 1969 at the same time cellblocks 5C and 5D were built. Building 8C was reduced in size by half at this same time. It is probable that building 7B assumed the function of 8C at this time (guard quarters).

b. A three-strand wire fence surrounded all the buildings in existence in 1967. As wall construction progressed, this fence was partially removed in the compound area but still exists around the admin/support area. A poorly constructed bamboo gate allows access to the north side of the area (see map and model). Remnants of the fence are still visible outside and parallel to the west compound wall and could possibly impede movement on foot in the river bank area. It is probable that the wire present on the compound wall near the southwest corner was at one time part of this fence.

c. Concrete electric power poles lead into the camp from the south but no lines are visible on the poles (see map and model). It is possible that lines were placed underground during 1967 when active bombing was still taking place. This is also true of the wooden poles leading to the camp from the north. The bridge over the SONG CON contains probable communications lines attached to west side, further supporting the theory that lines run underground to the camp. (See TAB A to this appendix for detailed description of this bridge.) It should be noted that no external lighting is visible at the compound or in the admin/support area.

d. A fish pond, a well, and numerous trees complete the description of the admin/support area. The open area between building 8C and the road is devoted to gardens as are the areas south and north of the compound. Admin/support area building descriptions are as follows:

MAP NO.	DESCRIPTION
4A	Latrine, masonry, 7x22 feet, with screening wall on east side. The door is on the east end of the north wall.
7A	Probable camp headquarters, single story masonry with tile roof, 40x27 feet. A covered walkway with open access on each end exists on both the north and south sides of the building. This makes the useful internal space approximately 40x20 feet. Figure 7 shows the south and east sides of the building. The openings are as shown. The west end is identical to the east and with two shuttered windows and two arched entrances as shown. A vent is visible near the peak of the roof making it probable that an attic exists. A "T"-shaped

MAP NO.	DESCRIPTION
	pole with insulators is attached to the east end of the building and probably serves as the terminal for electric power and possibly telephone. A double clothes line is visible leading from the base of this pole to building 8D. Clothes have also been seen hanging from a line strung between pillars on the southwest side of the building. Based on this information, it is probable that the west end is living quarters and the east end is camp administration and communications.
7B	Probable guard quarters, single story, masonry, 60x25 feet. This building was constructed in the fall of 1969 at the same time the PW compound was expanded. It is probable that it houses the bulk of the guard force of the camp. No photos are available showing the building under construction. Therefore, no internal floor plan is possible. Openings on the south and east sides are shown on Figure 8. It is probable that the west end is similar to the east end. Based on foot traffic patters visible on recent photos, it is probable that two doors exist in the north side approximately 15 feet from each end. Four or five windows are probably also present in the north side.
8A	Support or family quarters, single story, masonry with thatch roof, 25x20 feet. The only opening visible on photos is a centered window in the south end. Based on foot traffic patterns, it is probable that the main entrance is in the west side with a second door likely in the east side. A window probably exists in the north side.
8B	Support or family quarters, single story, masonry with thatch roof, 17x22 feet. Figure 7 shows the known openings on the south and east sides. It is probable that a window is present on the west side and at least two windows on the north side.
8C	Support or family quarters, single story, masonry with thatch roof, 25x25 feet. This building had a 25x25 feet wood frame extension attached on the south side, which was dismantled in the fall of 1969 as building 7B was being built. The only known openings are the two doors shown in Figure 9. It is probable that one or more windows exist in the west, east and north sides.
8D	Support/possible PW interrogation, single story, masonry, 36x22 feet. A covered walkway runs along the west and north sides of this building. The known openings are shown in Figure 10. The east wall is blank as shown. It is probable that a door is present near the center of the west side and at least one door and two windows in the north side.

MAP NO.	DESCRIPTION
8E	Shower/water storage, single story, masonry with wooden roof with shingles. Although the building is now completely roofed, Figure 11 shows it as it appeared in July 1969 with the south room unroofed. This was done to better show the internal structure. It is possible that this building serves as a bathing facility for PW personnel. Foot traffic in the vicinity indicates light use.
8F	Laundry building, single story, masonry with tile roof, 12x12 feet with a second small shed immediately west, 8x16 feet. The presence of the well 9A and concrete wash tanks adjacent to these small buildings indicates that they may be used for laundry and possibly for washing of vegetables, etc. No openings exist in the south side of 8F; two small windows are noted in the east side and the west side probably has two similar openings. A door is probably centered in the north side facing the well. Openings in the adjacent shed are unknown. See Figure 8.
9A	Open well, approximately seven feet in diameter with masonry casing (rim), projecting approximately two feet above ground. A stilted tripod bucket lift made of wooden poles is used to lift water from the well.
11	Probable kitchen, single story, masonry, 20x24 feet with chimney at peak of tile roof. A covered walkway runs part way along the west side. Known openings are as shown in Figure 12. A door and one window are confirmed in the west side.
12	Probable food storage and mess hall, single story, masonry with tile roof, 27x23 feet. Known openings are as shown on Figure 12. A stoop is visible on the north side of this building indicating a door is centered on this wall. Openings on the west are unknown but probably include at least three windows.
13A	Probable family housing, single story, masonry with tile roof, 10x17 feet. A door is present on the east side and a window on the south side. Other openings are unknown. See Figure 13.
13B	Family housing, single story, masonry with tile roof, 26x18 feet. Known openings are as shown in Figure 13 and the model. A stoop is visible on the west side indicating a door is present near the south end of the west wall. A covered walkway is present on the north side indicating the presence of a door probably centered in the wall with windows on either side.
13C	Family housing, single story, masonry with thatch roof, 26x18 feet. This building has been built

since July 1967 and [illegible] known of the openings. Based on foot traffic patterns a door is presumed in the south side near the center of the wall. There are probably a minimum of two windows on each of the four sides.

12D Family housing, single story, masonry with tile roof, 25x27 feet. A covered walkway runs the length of the east side with a door centered in this wall and one window on either side of the door. No openings exist in the south side other than the walkway entrance. A door is centered in the west wall with a window on either side. A well and latrine are located 25 feet southeast of the house. The door to the latrine is on the north side. The well is open and approximately six feet in diameter with a rim raised two feet above ground level. See Figure 14.

13E Family housing, single story, masonry with thatch roof, 30x18 feet. No openings are identifiable on photos but foot traffic patterns indicate the main entrance is centered in the north wall with windows probable on all four sides. A latrine is located near the northwest corner of the building with the door on the east side. See Figure 15.

3. (TS) POPULATION ESTIMATE. The following population estimates are based on square footage of buildings and other reliable collateral intelligence sources.

a. PW Population. Estimates have ranged from 55 to 100 PW personnel within the compound. Recovery plans have been made based on the higher figure. The latest figure is 69 and this should be considered the current best estimate.

b. Guard Population. Current intelligence indicates that 45 Vietnamese are housed at the camp. The estimated breakdown is as follows:

(1) 25 men (military)

(2) 10 women (dependents)

(3) 10 children (dependents)

[illegible] photos taken [illegible] 1966 and [illegible] additional photos, [illegible] 1970. [illegible] to lack of photos [illegible]. An attempt [illegible] being made at this time to achieve [illegible] coverage and updates will continue as film [illegible] received. All views are from the southeast. (Refer to [illegible] 2-6-B1 for structure numbers.)

FIGURE 1. [illegible] to show relative [illegible]



FIGURE 2. PW cellblock buildings 5A and 5B and building foundation 6.



FIGURE 3. Guard tower 2A, buildings 5C, 5D and portions of the west and north walls



FIGURE 4. Buildings 4 and 5E, building foundation 6, and portions of the south and east walls.



FIGURE 5. Guard towers 2B and 2C, latrine 3, well 9B, latrine 4A, and building 8E. The upper guard tower (2C) is an artist's conception based on high altitude photos. The existence of this tower is in doubt pending receipt of better quality photos.

FIGURE 6. Artist's conception of the gate (Map 10). It is probable that a guard shack is located on the right side of the gate. View is from inside the compound looking east.



FIGURE 7. Buildings 7A, the camp headquarters, and building 8B, [illegible] view.

FIGURE 8. Guard quarters building 7B, laundry area buildings 8F and well 9A. The fish pond is at right.



FIGURE 9. Building 8C showing the former extent of the building and a pull-up bar mentioned in a collateral intelligence source. See text.



FIGURE 10. Building 8D, support and possible prisoner interrogation.



FIGURE 11. Building 8E as it appeared in July 1969. The roof has now been extended over the room on the south end.



FIGURE 14. Family housing unit, building 13D with well and latrine.



FIGURE 15. Family housing 13E with latrine.



FIGURE 12. Kitchen and messhall buildings 11 and 12.



FIGURE 13. Family housing buildings 13A, B, C, and a latrine.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: Three-span, single lane, deck-type bridge, [illegible] feet [illegible] and 14 feet wide.

Substructure: The substructure consists of two concrete abutments and two supporting piers. The piers and abutments are rounded and taper upward to a flat surface approximately 14 feet long and 4 feet wide (see photo). The stringers used to support the deck are not visible on photography. It is probable that six or more wooden beam stringers would be necessary for support. It is also possible that three or more steel "I" beams are present as primary stringers.

Deck: The deck consists of approximately 90 logs placed across the stringers and fastened both to the stringers and to longitudinal logs along the railings. The logs are each approximately six inches in diameter. Planking has been placed on top of the log deck the full length of the bridge (see photos). The planking is approximately 2.5 feet wide and is probably in excess of 2 inches thick.

Above Deck Structure: Structures above the deck level include four white concrete guardrail supports, two on each end of the bridge. These are each 12-16 inches thick and 6 feet long and 3 feet high. A rope guardrail supported by probable wooden poles spaced at four foot intervals is visible on either side of the bridge.

Communications Cable: A probable communications cable crosses the bridge supported on poles extending approximately four feet out from the west side of the bridge. Access to this cable can be gained most easily at a point adjacent to the southwest concrete guardrail support.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: The above analysis is based primarily on the two following aerial photographic missions: DOQ200 of 4 July 1969 and DOQ209 of 9 July 1969. The latest mission checked to verify the continued validity of this interpretation is GS263, 6 June 1970, GS272, 31 July 1970 and GS292, 3 October 1970.

6 19

SON TAY PW CAMP N 69

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C. [illegible]
25 August 1970

ANNEX C [illegible] OPLAN (TS)
OPERATIONS (U)

1. (TS) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. To provide concepts of operation for certain predeployment, deployment, employment, and redeployment activities inherent in the JCTG mission.

b. Mission. See basic plan.

c. Concepts and tactics contained in this ANNEX may change as a result of experience gained in training, refinements in planning, updated intelligence, and theater coordination.

d. D-Day and H-Hour references in this ANNEX are based on Zulu date and time unless otherwise noted. D-Day, H-Hours will be determined by the Commander, following receipt of authority for execution, based on objective area weather conditions.

2. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. Predeployment. Predeployment actions closely allied with deployment and employment actions are in-theater coordination and arrangements for forces and facilities and preparations for deployment.

(1) IN-THEATER COORDINATION. Extensive coordination is required in-theater to generate the necessary forces, obtain facilities, and insure that the concept of operations interfaces satisfactorily with established in-theater procedures. APPENDIX 6 is a diagram of required in-theater actions.

(2) PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT. Preparations for deployment commence upon completion of training on/about D-15. Five days are required to prepare the two C-130E lead aircraft for deployment scheduled on/about D-11. Final preparations for deployment of ground forces will be made on D-6 and the ground force and operations staff will deploy from CONUS via C-141 on/about D-5.

b. Deployment. Forces deploying to the staging base from the CONUS will be airlifted by the two C-130E mission aircraft and three C-141 MAC aircraft. C-130Es will use call signs, routes, and en route procedures consistent with patterns established by other C-130 aircraft. The C-141s will also adhere to established MAC routes and procedures. Special emphasis will be placed on maintaining security aboard aircraft and at en route stops. The mission C-130Es will close at the staging base on/about D-5. The ground forces and CONUS staff will close on/about D-3. Forces deploying from the CONUS consist of:

[illegible]	2 Officers
[illegible]	[illegible]
	2 [illegible]
Ground Operations Staff	1 Officer
	1 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 6 [illegible]

Ground Force [illegible]	15 Officers 60 EM
C-130 Aircrew	15 Officers* 13 EM
HH-53 Aircrew	10 Officers* 9 EM
A-1 Aircrew HH-3 Aircrew	10 Officers ** 3 Officers ***
	2 EM
C-130 Aircraft Maintenance	1 Officer 24 EM
Munitions Technicians	4 Civilians **** 2 EM
Total	180

* 4 officers TDY from PACAF
** 5 officers TDY from PACAF
*** 1 officer TDY from PACAF
**** Air Force Logistics Command Electronics Technicians (2)
Texas Instruments technical representatives (2)

c. In-Theater Forces/Facilities.

(1) FORCE ALERTING. The in-theater operations/planning staff will visit 7th Air Force and bases in SVN supporting the operation. The in-theater staff will proceed from SVN to the staging base on/about D-12 and will survey facilities and initiate required preparations for accommodating the JCTG. On/about D-17 appropriate members of the in-theater operations/planning staff will commence a series of visits to units in THAILAND providing personnel and aircraft. In most cases wing commanders will be contacted and provided a complete list of required support and instructions. The wing commanders then will begin identifying personnel and posturing aircraft, maintenance, and support to fulfill the requirements. The wing commanders will be provided the minimum information necessary to accomplish their tasks and will be briefed on security procedures and cover stories (See ANNEX C-6) and pass word verbally as recommended by intelligence community.

(2) FORCE GENERATION. Timing and sequence of force generation will depend upon factors such as availability and posture of resources and other commitments. The following is the desired sequence of force generation by type of aircraft.

(a) HH-53s. A minimum of seven in-commission aircraft (five mission aircraft and two ground spares) will be required to support this plan and will operate from UDORN. In the event seven in-commission aircraft cannot be generated from the UDORN unit, additional HH-53s will be obtained from DANANG. Maintenance peaking will commence on/about D-5 and flying activities during the five days prior to D-Day will be limited insofar as possible to flight test and actual SAR requirements. The [illegible] checked daily and will be [illegible] D-Day. [illegible] aircraft will be available for movement to the staging base NLT 1100Z on D-3. (9 enlisted crew members will be provided from CONUS).

(b) HC-130. HC-130 aircraft operate from CAM RANH AIR BASE, RVN. Two HC-130s are required for the mission plus one spare. The [illegible] aircraft will stage to UDORN

RTAFB at D-3. [illegible] peaking for the [illegible] commence on/about [illegible] period will be [illegible] mission. [illegible] will be [illegible] and will be [illegible] 1900Z [illegible] Day. [illegible] crew [illegible] will be [illegible] from [illegible] members will be [illegible]

(c) HH-3. HH-3 helicopters are assigned to DANANG AIR BASE, RVN. One HH-3 is required for the mission and one additional HH-3 will be required as a ground spare. Two HH-3 helicopters will be positioned at UDORN RTAFB on D-5 and will operate from that base. Maintenance peaking will be accomplished during the period D-5 to D-1.

(d) A-1. Two squadrons of A-1 aircraft are assigned to the 56th SOW, NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB (25 U-e). Four A-1 aircraft are required for the mission and will operate from that base. A-1E aircraft with dual controls are required. Additionally, one airborne and one ground spare aircraft will be required. Mission aircraft and spares will be withdrawn from normal operations for modification and maintenance peaking on/about D-6. The COMBAT MARTIN ALQ 128 VHF Jamming System will be installed in three mission aircraft by 5650 maintenance personnel with advice and assistance from an Air Force Logistics Command team. Ordnance and fuel load will be specified at a future date.

(e) C-130E. Two C-130E lead aircraft will arrive at the staging base on/about D-6 with crews and aircraft maintenance personnel. Systems peaking and maintenance test flights will be conducted on D-5 to D-2 as required.

(f) F-4. Two F-4 fighter bomber squadrons are assigned to the 432 TRW, UDORN RTAFB. Eight F-4s are required for MIG CAP and will operate from UDORN. One senior fighter operations officer from the 432 TRW will proceed to the staging base on/about D-7 to finalize MIG CAP tactics and prepare and present briefing to F-4 aircrews. Mission aircraft will be withdrawn from flying activities and peaked for the mission on/about D-3. Mission aircrews will be available for movement from UDORN to the staging base NLT 1000Z D-3. In addition to the MIG CAP, two F-4s will be on strip alert (air defense) at Udorn.

(g) RC-135. RC-135 aircraft (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] routinely fly a track terminating in east central LAOS. The JCTG Airborne Mission Coordinator will be aboard the RC-135 and will function as the Alternate Mission Commander in event the Mission Commander at DANANG is unable to communicate or control the mission. The Airborne Mission Coordinator will proceed so as to board the RC-135 at takeoff at (b)(1) [redacted]

(h) KC-135. Aerial [illegible] will be coordinated and [redacted]
(b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 § 403(g) Section 6 of



(k) Airlift. Airlift support will be required to move mission aircrews from their operating bases to the staging base and return. One aircraft (with backup) will be required to airlift approximately 25 aircrew members from UDORN RTAFB to the staging base on D-3. Two aircraft (with backup) will be required to airlift approximately 50 Army troops and 50 aircrew members from the staging base to UDORN and NAKHON PHANOM 1425Z hours (D-1). Either a Korat C-47 or a mission C-130 will transport the EC-121 crew members to KORAT. One T-39 (with backup) will be required to airlift the Mission Commander and a small staff from the staging base to DANANG, RVN NLT H-8:00 hours.

(l) Diversion. ANNEX L.

(m) Ground Force. The ground force will arrive via C-141 from CONUS at the staging base on D-3. The ground force will be accompanied by necessary support personnel.

d. Employment.

(1) BRIEFINGS. CONUS and in-theater aircrews and ground forces will close at the staging base NLT 1700Z, D-3. Mission briefing will be conducted in three daily phases during the three days preceeding the mission. A diagram of the scheduled briefings is at APPENDIX 7.

(a) GENERAL BRIEFINGS. On D-2 at 0700Z (1400L) all personnel participating in the operation will be given a general briefing on the mission, schedule of activities, and administrative and security procedures. Subsequent to this joint briefing, Army and Air Force elements will separate for general briefings and discussion of their respective activities.

(b) MISSION BRIEFING. From 0500Z-0900Z (12-1600L) on D-1 aircrews will receive a detailed mission briefing and will then complete preliminary flight planning. Army forces will conduct weapons testing during this period. At 0900Z (1600L) a brief back of the mission by both air and ground elements will be conducted.

(c) FINAL BRIEFING. At 1100Z (1800L) on D-1 (H-8) final briefings on late weather, intelligence, and last minute instructions will be conducted. Following this

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 § 403(g) Section 6 of

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 § 403(g) Section 6 of

(a) The EC-135 will be on station when the mission force departs.

(b) MIG CAP F-4s will depart as required to meet assigned TOTs. Continuous KC-135 tanker support will be available for the F-4s

(c) COLLEGE EYE EC-121 and the KC-135 radio relay aircraft will proceed to stations in the GULF OF TONKIN arriving NLT H-45 minutes.

(d) The Strike Force lead aircraft (C 130E) will depart from TAKHLI at approximately H-4:10, perform airborne radar, navigational and ECM checks and arrive over NAKHON PHANOM at H-2:40. Five A-1 close support aircraft will depart NAKHON PHANOM at this time and join up on the C-130E which will lead them along the flight plan route to the objective area.

(e) The Assault Force lead aircraft (C-130E) will depart from TAKHLI at approximately H-3:20, perform airborne radar, navigational and ECM checks prior to overflying UDORN at H-2:20 and arrive at the end of refueling to take over the Assault Formation lead from the primary HC-130 (Refuel Aircraft) at H-1:00.

(f) Two tankers (HC-130Ps) will take off from UDORN at approximately H-3:10 and H-3:05. The primary HC-130 will rendezvous with the assault helicopter force between H-3:00 and H-2:50 and proceed along the flight plan course to the refueling area to the north of the PLAINE DES JARRES. The spare HC-130 will fly above and behind the formation until the refueling is completed and the assault C-130E takes over the Assault Force lead. The primary HC-130 will then return to UDORN for refueling leaving the spare orbiting in north central LAOS. After refueling at UDORN the primary HC-130 will join the spare and await the return of the mission aircraft from H+ 1:25 to H+ 1:55. Either HC-130 will be prepared to rendezvous with and refuel the HH-53s or to act as CHOWN in event a rescue operation becomes necessary.

(g) The Assault Force helicopters (one H-3 and five HH-53s) will take off from UDORN at approximately H-3:00, rendezvous with the primary HC-130 and fly together in close formation conducting inflight refueling between H-1:30 and H-1:00.

(h) [illegible] will [illegible] sufficient altitude to give them at 1000 ft AGL clearance within 5 NM left and right of track. When over a turning point before the [illegible] will broadcast on UHF his estimated time of arrival at the start descent turning point (at approximately H-0:20).

(4) TARGET AREA TACT[illegible] Target area tactics incl[illegible] assault, ground diversion [illegible] aircraft holding, ground operation[illegible] and recovery.

(a) Targ[illegible] area [illegible] tactics are depicted in Appendix [illegible]. The formation [illegible] proceed descending to 5[illegible]' AGL from the pre-IP to the [illegible] which [illegible] the east bank of [illegible] (210[illegible]7N 10[illegible]10[illegible]) 11.[illegible] (H-6-1/2 minutes). [illegible] approach provides several good [illegible] and visual check points [illegible] avoids populated and possible [illegible] areas. Two minutes after the IP (210642N 1052210E) two reserve HH-53s will [illegible] the formation and proceed to their holding area (210[illegible]50N 1052[illegible]35E). They will remain in the area under the direction of the ground forces commander. Upon reaching a point 3-1/2 NM from the target, the assault C-130 E will climb to 1500' AGL and accelerate to 130 KIAS. The lead C-130E will drop flares over the target to provide light for the HH-3 helicopter to land within the compound and for the two HH-53 troop helicopters to land adjacent to the support areas. The third HH-53 will climb and be prepared to drop additional flares in event the flares dropped by the C-130E are not properly positioned.

(b) GROUND DIVERSION AND AIRCRAFT HOLDING.

1. After dropping flares over the compound, the assault C-130E will remain at 1500' AGL and start a right hand turn making diversionary drops. [redacted] Additionally, the assault C-130E will drop two stabilized fire bombs, simulators and marker log flares in an ammunition storage area, 4 kilometers southwest of the objective. The firebombs serve a primary purpose of providing a highly visible reference point for the A-1 close support aircraft. The firebombs in conjunction with the [redacted] will serve to divert and confuse enemy ground forces stationed in that area. The assault C-130E will then depart the area and proceed to a holding area (2050N 103 59E). This aircraft will serve as a UHF/DF navigational aid for the HH-53s and A-1s when they depart the objective area for the return flight.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

2. The strike formation will arrive at the IP (500' AGL) two minutes after the assault force. One minute after crossing the IP 3 A-1s will break from the formation and climb to 3000' MSL in a holding orbit. At H-01-1/2 minutes (5 NM from the objective area) the strike C-130E will make a right turn to the West and proceed to 210608N 1052328E where two stabilized fire bombs and marker log flares will be dropped. These markers will be used as an anchor point for the reserve A-1 aircraft. The holding area is 3 minutes from the objective area. The two primary A-1s will start a climb to 3000' when the strike C-130 starts his turn to the right. They will arrive over the objective area at H+ 00-1/2 minutes and [illegible] orbit to provide surveillance of access roads to the objective area. After dropping the markers the strike C-130E will proceed to a random [illegible] [illegible] support and [illegible] rescue [illegible] is required.

(c) GROUND OPERATIONS. APPENDIX 11.

(d) [illegible]. The ground commander will command air and ground forces during the ground phase of the operation.

PHANOM at H-2:50 hours. Two reserve HH-53s and the second HC-130P (tanker) depart UDORN H-2:30 hours. Primary and reserve forces, with ten minute spacing, proceed in loose formation to a position 75nm north of the SKYLINE TACAN where the A-1 and C-130E lead aircraft will rendezvous with their respective forces. All aircraft will continue in loose formation until refueling is completed northeast of the PLAINES DES JARRES. At that time the air spare A-1 will withdraw to NKP. The two HC-130 aircraft will orbit in north central LAOS and await return of the mission aircraft. The HC-130s will be prepared to rendezvous with and refuel the HH-53s or to act as CROWN in event a rescue operation becomes necessary. After refueling the primary and reserve formations (with ten minute spacing) will join in close formation and descend to 2000' AGL. If the UH-1 assault helicopter is used, the primary force will proceed to the Lima Site where the UH-1 will join the formation. The route from the Lima Site (or end of refueling track if the HH-3 is used) to the target will follow the general course depicted in APPENDIX 9. After crossing into NORTH VIETNAM at H-38 minutes the formations will descend to 1000' AGL. The formation will descend to 500' AGL upon reaching level terrain in the RED RIVER VALLEY. The pre-initial point will be the distinctive junction of the RED and BLACK RIVERS (21°14'15N, 105°21'10E). This point will be reached at H-5 1/2 minutes.

(4) TARGET AREA TACTICS. Target area tactics include assault, ground diversion and aircraft holding, ground operations, and recovery.

(a) ASSAULT. Target area air tactics are depicted in APPENDIX 10. The formation will proceed at 500' from the pre-IP to the IP which is a bend in the RED RIVER (21°12'45N, 105°26'46E) 5nm (2 1/2 minutes) from the target. The southwest bank of the RED RIVER then provides an accurate course line leading to the target. Upon reaching a point 2nm from the target, the lead C-130E will climb to 1500' AGL while the helicopters decelerate. The lead C-130E will drop four flares over the target to provide light for the assault helicopter to land within the compound and for the two HH-53 troop helicopters to land adjacent to the support areas. The third HH-53 will be in position to drop additional flares, if needed, and to deliver minigun fire support as required.

(b) GROUND DIVERSION AND AIRCRAFT HOLDING.

1. After dropping flares over the compound the lead C-130 will turn right to 210° and proceed at 1500' AGL for fifty seconds and drop two stabilized fire bombs, additional flares and fire fight simulators in the vicinity of an ammunition storage area. The firebombs serve a primary purpose of providing a highly visible anchor point for the A-1 close support aircraft. The firebombs in conjunction with the fire fight simulators and flares will serve to divert and confuse enemy ground forces stationed in that area. A-1 aircraft will then begin a random orbit between the fires on the ground and radio beacons activated by friendly ground forces at the target. Orbit patterns will provide surveillance of access roads to the target.

2. After dropping the markers/diversion the C-130E will turn north and one minute later (H+1 minute and 50 seconds) will drop four flares. These flares

An pre-established [illegible] prisoners and [illegible] are formed, the ground commander will call in [illegible] HH-53s. En route time from their waiting site to the [illegible] will be two minutes or less. If a threat [illegible] the ground commander will direct the A-1s in [illegible]. If the threat is more visible to [illegible] A-1s, the lead A-1 aircraft commander will recommend a course of action to the ground commander and obtain approval to engage the threat.

(e) F-4 MIG CAP. USAF F-4s will provide fighter cover for the recovery force. This MIG CAP will provide air cover for the friendly air or ground forces, and also focus enemy attention on the Navy diversion, since it will appear as a normal MIG trap for HAIPHONG area operations. The F-4s will depart UDORN, refuel and proceed to predesignated orbits. If it becomes evident that flights after the first flight are not required, the COLLEGE EYE controller after coordination with the airborne coordinator will instruct follow-on flights to return to the tanker before entering the objective area. The first flight and subsequent flights if committed will orbit over two anchor points southeast and northeast of HANOI respectively. In addition, two F-4s will be on strip alert at DANANG for air defense of the RC-135. The air cover F-4s will consist of four flights of two aircraft each, which cycle between the tankers and the holding areas over NVN. The first two F-4s will depart so as to arrive at the holding areas over NVN at H-Hour. The F-4s will be in a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) air defense configuration and will carry ORC 160-8 (ECM) pods. They will be authorized to engage MIGs in free-fire zones above 5,000' AGL, west of 105° 45W longitude (HANOI). If MIGs attack the primary force, the F-4s would be vectored toward the attack but not attempt a low-level engagement. This tactic is designed to divert the MIGs rather than destroy them and does not require F-4 proficiency in low-level attacks.

(f) NAVY DIVERSION. ANNEX L.

(g) EGRESS OR RECOVERY. Egress for the assault force will be single ship and will begin when the first HH-53 is loaded. When the last HH-53 departs the target area the A-1s will follow the same general departure plan. This will place the A-1s with ECM equipment in the best position for VHF jamming should enemy interceptors pursue the helicopters. Altitude separation will be maintained between the HH-53 and A-1 aircraft. As the last A-1 crosses the BLACK RIVER the strike C-130E will depart his holding area on a course north of the HH-53 and A-1 exit route. The A-1 and strike C-130E will be in a position to support a SAR effort if required. The HH-53s will rendezvous and refuel with the HC-130s orbiting in LAOS. The strike C-130E will pass under the north west of the HH-53s and A-1s in LAOS en route to a holding area (1935N 10255E) where it will provide UHF-DF navigational aid to the returning aircraft. After the HH-53/A-1 have passed this orbit position, the strike C-130E will RTB. [illegible] aircraft will recover at UDORN AIR BASE. Returnees will begin processing and medical [illegible]

[illegible] PHANOM will be released. All other mission and the majority of the [illegible] personnel, as well as mission C-130Es, will return to [illegible].

(5) [illegible]. [illegible] period (D+1), [illegible]. Both unilateral and [illegible] "lessons learned" from [illegible]. [illegible] support personnel [illegible] redeployment to CONUS. [illegible] and close at [illegible]. The [illegible] to LOCKHEED [illegible], CALIFORNIA, [illegible] the purpose of [illegible] the two C-130E aircraft. Augmenting maintenance personnel, support equipment, and one aircraft will remain at ONTARIO. The second C-130E will then proceed to POPE AFB, arriving NLT D+9.

e. Delay Procedures. Delays will be implemented in twenty-four hour increments. When high-level mission approval is received, two weather "go/no-go" decisions will be made each mission day by the JCTG Commander. The first decision will be made at H-9:00 hours. If the weather is predicted to be unsuitable (see para f - Weather Criteria), higher headquarters and all launch bases and supporting facilities will be notified that the mission is delayed. The decision at this time will preclude the necessity to perform final briefings and extensive last-minute aircraft preparations. If the weather is satisfactory at H-9:00 hours, launch bases and support facilities will be notified and mission preparations will continue. The final weather "go/no-go" will be made at H-5:00 hours just prior to departure of the C-130E lead aircraft from TAKHLI.

f. Weather Criteria. The mission commander is responsible for determining weather suitability for the conduct of this operation. The following general criteria will apply:

(1) Launch. IFR minimums, provided aircraft can be radar vectored to a VFR condition ten minutes prior to reaching refueling and rendezvous areas.

(2) Refueling. Requires a continuous open vertical layer of 1000 feet or more at any altitude between 7000 feet and 10,000 feet MSL and 5+mi visibility in the open layer.

(3) Refueling to Objective. Requires not more than 20% total sky cover within 2000 feet of flight altitude. Clouds at flight altitude may not exceed three minutes penetration time (six miles). Air-to-air visibility will be five miles or better. Surface winds will not exceed fifteen knots.

(4) F-4 MIG CAP and Navy diversion. Not more than 30% sky cover between the surface and flight altitude.

g. H-Hour Change. H-Hour will remain the same for D-Day through D+2. In order to remain within desired moonlight parameters, H-Hour will be one hour later, i.e., original H+1:00 on D+3 and D+4. On D+5 and days thereafter H-Hour will revert to the original H-hour.

h. Emergency procedures are detailed in APPENDIX [illegible].

i. [illegible] considerations, see APPENDIX 13.

3. ([redacted]) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

a. Readiness, Alert, and Marshalling. In view of the many elements involved in this operation and the absolute necessity to avoid compromise, extraordinary security precautions will be taken in readying operational forces. Tasking will be accomplished by visits to bases and units providing support. Wing or squadron commanders will be given general instructions and frag orders on an exclusive basis and containing only the information essential for their role in the operation. Electrical communications will be avoided to the maximum extent possible and only the messages detailed in ANNEX K will be used in executing the operation. APPENDIX 16 contains general instructions and frag order formats which will be hand-carried to elements supporting this operation.

(1) Aircraft readiness requirements are listed by aircraft type and date below.

AIRCRAFT TYPE	NUMBER	DATE AVAILABLE	TIME READY FOR PROJECT*
C-130E	2	D-5 days	H-6 hours
HC-130 P	3	D-3 days	H-5:00
Primary	2		
Spare	1		
HH-53	7	D-5 days	H-5:00
Primary	5		
Spare	2		
HH-3	2	D-5 days	H-5:00
Primary	1		
Spare	1		
A-1	6	D-6 days	H-5:00
Primary	4		
Spare	2		
F-4	8+	D-3 days	A/R
Primary	8		
Spare	A/R		

* Ready for preflight time is defined as takeoff time minus two hours.

(2) Ground force readiness is indicated in APPENDIX 8.

(3) Alert. The JCTG will be executed by the JCS through CINCPAC. See ANNEX K. No special alerting procedures are necessary.

b. Rules of Engagement.

(1) Any aircraft attacking or acting in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack COMJCTG assigned forces will be engaged. No pursuit is authorized into territorial seas or airspace of Communist China.

(2) COMJCTG, Airborne [illegible] Coordinator and CO[illegible] EYE [illegible] are [illegible] to direct engagement of airborne [illegible] forces under the provisions of paragraph b(1) above.

(3) Nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the requirement of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such attack, the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force.

(4) Target Area Aircraft No Fire Zone. Commencing at H+30 seconds, no firing will be conducted by aircraft into the target area except as directed by the ground commander. This rule will be in effect until the last HH-53 is airborne. The external boundaries of the area are: on the north, a line through the bridge coordinate 522380; on the east, a line 200 meters east of the north-south road from the bridge coordinate (522380) to road junction 518377; on the south, a line through road junction 518377 to river curve coordinate 517373; and on the west, a line along the west bank of the river to the bridge at 522380.

c. Air Operations. See APPENDIX 17 for sequence of air elements engaged in this operation.

(1) Positive Control Area/Zone Procedures. The procedures outlined in 7AF OPLAN 730 do not apply to COMJCTG assigned forces.

(2) Border/Buffer Zone, SAM and Hostile Aircraft Warnings.

(a) 7AF TACC-NS is the single manager of the 7AF Border Warning System. NVN/LAOS Border warning requirements/ procedures do not apply to COMJCTG assigned forces. CHICOM border/buffer zone procedures still apply. 7AF TACC-NS is the primary agency for reporting CHICOM border/buffer zone violations (7AF OPLAN 730 reporting procedures apply).

(b) COMBAT APPLE and BIG LOOK are the primary sources of general area SAM warnings. EA-3B and EA-6A also can detect SAM emissions and transmit warnings. To reduce voice clutter on guard channel, SAM warnings will be issued to the MIG CAP on ________ MHZ.

(c) Hostile aircraft warnings will be issued by all agencies that have a capability to detect and identify hostile aircraft. The hostile aircraft warning procedures outlined in 7AF OPLAN 730 apply.

(3) Fighter Protection. USAF F-4 (8) aircraft will be utilized as MIG CAP. Flights of two aircraft will be sequenced to a north and south holding area to deter an NVN airborne attack on COMJCTG assigned forces. USN BARCAP forces may be used if available. MIG CAP aircraft will be under the control of COLLEGE EYE.

(4) Air Refueling Tracks. MIG CAP forces will require 'pre-strike' and 'post-strike' refueling. (TBP in-theater) ________ track will be utilized. If required, (TBP in-theater) track will be utilized for emergency refueling of USN forces. Refueling procedures outlined in 7AF OPLAN 730 apply.

(5) Command and Control. COMJCTG will control assigned forces [illegible] In the event of communications failure at the TACC-NS, the Airborne Mission Commander aboard COMBAT APPLE (RC-135M) will assume control of assigned forces.

d. Nuclear. Not applicable.

e. Chemical Warfare. A-1 aircraft operating in support of th[illegible] ground commander may be equipped with anti-personnel are[illegible]al [illegible] interdiction munitions utilizing CS persistent riot control [illegible]nt for use only in an extreme emergency such as a sizable [illegible] of enemy forces. APPENDIX 2.

f. Electronic Warfare. C-130E and A-1 aircraft will be equipped with a passive and active electronic warfare capability. APPENDIX 3.

g. Psychological Operations. APPENDIX 4.

h. Unconventional Warfare. Not applicable.

i. C&D. ANNEX M.

j. OPSEC. ANNEX M.

4. (U) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. None.

5. (~~TS~~) LIMITING FACTORS. Launch decision based on weather conditions will be made by COMJCTG. He may delay the mission up to two hours on D-Day or reschedule the mission, i.e., a weather delay of twenty-four hours.

b. Compromise. Indication of compromise will result in mission cancellation. COMJCTG will recommend a cancellation to CINCPAC who will make the abort decision and prepare to redeploy JCTG forces to the CONUS.

c. Delay in Execution. COMJCTG may delay the mission up to two hours on D-Day awaiting delayed execution or reschedule the mission.

APPENDICES

2 CHEMICAL WARFARE

3 ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS

4 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

6 IN-THEATER ACTIONS

7 PRE-MISSION BRIEFING

8 FORCE DISPERSAL

9 EN ROUTE TO TARGET

10 ASSAULT

11 GROUND OPERATIONS

12 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

13 EVASION AND ESCAPE

14 COLLEGE EYE OPERATIONS

15 TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER - NORTH SECTOR

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C COMJCTG OPLAN
CHEMICAL WARFARE

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy. It is not likely that the enemy has the capability to utilize chemical weapons (CW) in the operational area.

b. Friendly. Friendly forces are not required to use CW in support of this operation except in case of extreme emergency.

2. ALTERNATIVE MISSIONS. COMJCTG will prepare to employ riot control agents as required and authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the concept of operations of the basic plan.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. A-1 aircraft operating in support of the ground commander may be equipped with anti-personnel area denial and interdiction munitions utilizing CS persistent riot control agent for use against enemy forces proceeding to the objective area. These weapons will be used only in an extreme emergency and if wind conditions preclude drift of CS agent into the objective area. Emergency targets are envisioned as concentrations of enemy forces in vehicles or low points along roads to the objective area which might be used to delay or concentrate the enemy.

b. Weapon Allocations. Theater allocations are not affected by this OPLAN.

c. Tasks. Commander, 56th SOW will be prepared to load one armament release station with one canister each on six mission A-1 aircraft as directed by COMJCTG.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) CS will be expended only when authorized by commander JCTG.

(a) On targets south of the objective area if the wind is from the west to the north.

(b) On targets north of the objective area if the wind is from the south to the west.

(2) A-1s will expend CS within 10 kilometers of the objective area only with the concurrence of the ground commander.

4. (U) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION. Theater procedures apply.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Theater procedures apply.

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28 August 1970

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS (U)

1. (TS) SITUATION.

a. Enemy. ANNEX B.

b. Friendly.

(1) Electronic warfare capabilities.

(a) C-130.

1. TRIM 7. An ECM system designed to visually identify threat warning, radar frequency, and relative bearing of threat radars. Manual or automatic active deceptive ECM is provided against tracking AAA and SA-2 radar.

2. TRIM 9. An ECM system, similar in operation to the TRIM 7, for use against airborne intercept (AI) radars.

3. APR 25/26. A radar homing and warning (RHAW) system which detects and displays threat radar signals from either ground based or airborne sources. The relative bearing to each signal source is displayed as long as the characteristics of the signal are within parameters preset within the set.

4. ALE 28. A chaff dispenser utilizing tapeless chaff for use against AAA, AI, and SAM radars.

(b) A-1. ALQ-128 (installed in the rear compartment of three A-1 aircraft). A high power voice communications jamming set operating in the VHF (100-160 MHZ) range. In operation the receiver section searches the 100-160 MHZ band and, upon interception, signals are automatically analyzed, and jammed with appropriate modulation.

(c) F-4.

1. ALQ-87 (QRC 160-8) pods configured for standard MIG CAP missions.

2. AR 25/26 RHAW (same as C-130 above).

c. Assumptions. If significant changes in the enemy Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) are detected, ECM configuration and/or tactics will be adjusted accordingly.

2. (TS) MISSION. To provide the electronic countermeasure capability necessary to protect mission aircraft directly involved in the JCTG operation.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Mission aircraft will maintain ECM silence until a threat is positively identified. Threat warnings will be issued by either the RC-135 COMBAT APPLE aircraft, EC-121T COLLEGE EYE aircraft or the Tactical Air Control Center - North Sector indicating type

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[illegible] threat, location, and [illegible] affected. F-4 aircraft will [illegible] [illegible] pods as required for [illegible] CAP operations. [illegible] be used only when necessary to break radar lock which threatens [illegible].

b. [illegible]

(1) [illegible]-135 Electronic Warfare Officers (EWOs) will assure that their equipment is in peak operating condition before take-off and will continually monitor their equipment to assess the electronic threat and take appropriate countermeasures when necessary.

(2) Aircrews of A-1 aircraft equipped with the ALQ-128 will insure that the equipment is in peak operating condition before takeoff, and ready to operate upon crossing the LAOS/NVN border. Individual ALQ-59s will be operated only upon instruction issued by the RC-135.

(3) F-4 aircraft will operate ALQ-87 pods as required for normal MIG CAP operations.

5. (TS) SPECIAL MEASURES IFF silence will be maintained by the assault and strike force when operating outside of Thailand except when directed by the Commander JCTG or the Airborne Mission Coordinator. Start or Stop IFF Squawk will be directed by appropriate assigned code words. MIG CAP forces will keep their IFF/SIF "ON" at all times.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCE: Map attached to ANNEX B.

1. (S) SITUATION.

a. General. This annex provides planning guidance for the conduct of psychological operations (PSYOP) in the objective area by a Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG).

b. Enemy Situation. Refer to ANNEX B.

c. Friendly Situation. PSYOP will be conducted only by personnel of the US Army Special Forces Primary Force. Refer to APPENDIX 12 to ANNEX C.

d. Assumptions.

(1) North Vietnamese guard force personnel in the objective area will be vulnerable to PSYOP.

(2) North Vietnamese intelligence will thoroughly search the objective area after the operation.

2. (S) MISSION. Develop a plan for conducting PSYOP in conjunction with the JCTG mission and:

a. To alert US prisoners of war that they are being rescued.

b. To provide the US prisoners of war with instructions which will aid in their safety and extraction.

c. To advise prison guards that this is a rescue operation of US prisoners of war only and their safety requires they do not engage the recovery force.

(b)(1)

3. (S) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Loudspeaker. An assault helicopter will land inside the compound with US Army Special Forces personnel equipped with a tape recorder loud speaker system. (Refer to APPENDIX 5 to ANNEX D.) The tape recorder will be preloaded prior to departure from the base of operations with two messages to be repeated three times.

(a) The first message in English will be directed to the US prisoners of war.

(b) The second message in North Vietnamese will be directed to the guard personnel at the prison compound.

SPECIAL HANDLING
(SPECIAL)

6 19

(2) **PSYOP.** A designated member of the ground force leave compromising material in the compound for subsequ discovery by North Vietnamese intelligence. The design member will place a note in North Vietnamese on the body of a wounded or dead prison guard with the planned date and time of the landing inside the compound.

b. Coordinating Instructions. COMJCTG will coordinate with Central Intelligence Agency all aspects of PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts and PSYOP.

4. (U) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION. APPENDIX 5, ANNEX D.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. ANNEX J.


NOVEMBER
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
NCA CONCURRENCE
NCA EXECUTION
DEPART CONUS
RETURN
DEPART CONUS
VISIT CINCPAC
ARRIVE STAGING BASE
VIST UTAPO
VISIT CAMRANH
VISIT DANANG
VISIT OKINAWA
VIST UDORN
VISIT NAKHON PHANOM
INTELLIGENCE STAFF ARRIVES
OPEN STAGING FACILITY
STAGING FACILITY READY
PREPARE C-130E FOR DEPLOYMENT
C-130E DEPART EGLIN
C-141 DEPARTS
C-141 ARRIVES
C-130E ARRIVE
C-141 WITH CONUS FORCES DEPARTS EGLIN
C-141 WITH CONUS FORCES ARRIVE
IDENTIFY IN-THEATER CREWS
COLLECT IN-THEATER AIRCREWS
START TO PREPARE IN-THEATER AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT READY
GENERAL BRIEF
MISSION BRIEF
FINAL BRIEF

APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN

PREMISSION BRIEFINGS



ALL TIMES [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS JOINT CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
20 AUGUST 1970

MISSION BRIEFING AND FORCE DISPERSION



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CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
EN ROUTE TO TARGET (U)

(TS) See attached map which indicates an approximate route alignment from departure bases to the objective area.

SPECIAL HANDLING
(CODEWORD)
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
22°
105°
DESCENT H-0+19
IP H-0+6-1/2
BORDER H-0+38
20°
20
105°

APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C TO CONCEPT OPLAN (U)
ASSAULT OPERATIONS (U)



1. [illegible] Ground Force is divided into three [illegible] and Support Group [illegible] personnel, [illegible] USAF crewmen, organized as follows:



2. (TS) SCOPE OF OPERATIONS.

a. Command Group.

(1) Composition. (See para 1 above.)

(2) Mission. Secure south wall, act as reserve for Assault and Support Groups, act as control point for evacuating prisoners to helicopters.

(3) Actions of Individual Elements. (See flow chart TAB A.)

[illegible] conduct [illegible] operation. Prep[illegible] special equipment for release of PWs [illegible] within the compound as required. [illegible] service [illegible] others, as required.

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[illegible] helicopters.

[illegible] of [illegible] landing point. [illegible] from the beach. [illegible] Ground Force Control Point.

(d) Security Element # 3 clears water pump area (river/canal junction). Moves to a predetermined point midway on the canal, establishes a security post, and prepares to reinforce Security Element # 2.

(e) Pathfinder and Demolition Element moves directly to and destroys power line pole located approximately 50 meters southwest of landing point. If demolition charge fails to destroy (drop) the pole, a red light will be placed on or near the base to identify a danger area for returning HH-53 pilots. Element then selects two landing points and places guidance lights for returning HH-53s. With the exception of landing/warning lights, the area will be blacked out at this stage of the operation. The element then assumes duties as pathfinders to assist pilots in landing.

b. Assault Group.

(1) Composition. (See para 1 above.)

(2) Mission. Secure inside of PW compound, to include guard towers, gates, and main buildings. Release and guide PWs to Ground Force Control Point.

(3) Action of Individual Elements.

(a) Assault Group Command Element moves to and clears guard tower 2-B, and establishes Control Point at building 3 (latrine). Demolitionist breaches hole near southwest corner of wall for evacuation of compound. Demolitionist then checks demolition system for destruction of the helicopter within the compound and awaits orders to destroy the helicopter. Members of the Assault Group locate the senior PW as soon as possible and determines the exact number and location of all PWs within the compound. Helicopter crew executes fire prevention measures and joins Assault Group Leader.

(b) Action Element # 1 clears guard tower 2-A at northwest corner of compound, proceeds to cellblocks 5-C and 5-D, enters, releases, and guides PWs to Group Control Point.

(c) Action Element # 2 clears Building 5-E, proceeds to cellblock 5-A, enters, releases, and guides PWs to Group [illegible]

[illegible] gate [illegible] ved by support [illegible], proceeds to cellblock 5-B, [illegible], releases, and guides PWs to Group Control Point.

(c) Elements [illegible] their primary [illegible] to information re[illegible] the [illegible] in other PWs in [illegible] covered in the [illegible].

[illegible] Support Group.

(1) Composition. [illegible]

(2) Mission. Secure area north and east of c[illegible] and to include Lights 156 meters north.

(3) Action of Individual Elements.

(a) Support Command Element destroys guard quarters 708, secures outside of compound wall, establishes contact with, and relieves Action Element # 3 at [illegible]n gate, transfers photographer to Action Element # 3, [illegible] Administration/ Communications buildings 7-A/8-B.

(b) Support Element # 1 passes through Support Command Element, destroys bridge and communications cable.

(c) Support Element # 2 neutralizes buildings east of north - south road believed to be officers quarters, secures all documents, establishes security at PW complex road junction.

d. Ground Force Extraction Plan. The ground force extraction plan is keyed to the number of PWs and to maintenance of unit integrity within subordinate force groups. Using weight as the primary factor, 60 personnel are considered the maximum for any one helicopter on extraction. The first extraction aircraft is to be loaded with those PWs (not to exceed 49) assembled at the Assault Group Control Point. These PWs will be accompanied by two complete elements of the Assault Group, one attached photographer and the three-man USAF crew. The second aircraft will contain up to 41 PWs accompanied by one element of the Assault Group and the entire Command Group. The third aircraft has space for 30 PWs who will be accompanied by the remaining Assault Group element, the Ground Force Command Party and the entire Support Group. Accountability of force members is exercised by the Chain of Command and the use of a Marshalling Area Control Officer (MACO) who is primarily responsible for an accurate count of PWs and Ground Force Members but also organizes and directs loading. MACO report on load composition is passed to Ground Force Commander who releases helicopter from extraction point. The senior Ground Force member aboard the departing aircraft makes a recount and passes the result to the Ground Force Commander through the Aircraft Commander. If the number of PWs exceed 120, or if the PW assembly is slowed excessively, the reserve extraction helicopters will be utilized as necessary.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	([illegible])
[illegible]SAULT	[illegible] [illegible] #3 [illegible]	2 3 3	[illegible]	[illegible]	Hq [illegible]		([illegible])
SUPPORT	Photographer [illegible]	1			Ground [illegible] Cmd Gp Hq Spt Gr (-) Spt El #1 Spt El #2	 6 6 7 5	(25)
		10		18		30	(58)

All excess equipment, i.e., bolt cutters, power saws and oxy-cetylene torches, will be destroyed at the landing zone in order to reduce weight. All friendly WIA/KIA will be recovered and extracted. To the extent possible, WIA/KIAs will be recovered by individual elements. Assistance from other elements will be provided upon request to the Ground Force Commander.

1. [illegible] ORGANIZATION AND SCHEME. Same as basic plan minus [illegible] Group due to aircraft loss or abo[illegible] prior to reaching [illegible] area.

2. [illegible] SCOPE OF OPERATIONS. Command Group breaches wall, clears compound and relieves PWs; Support Group assumes responsibility for area outside compound to include bridge and road/canal junction. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo comensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

a. Command Group.

(1) Composition. Same as basic plan.

(2) Mission. Breach south wall; enter compound; clear towers, gate, and main buildings; release and guide PWs to Ground Control Point.

(3) Actions of Individual Elements.

(a) Command Group Element moves to exit hole in south wall, enters compound, clears Bldg 4 and establishes Command Post/Control Point. Torch and photographer passed to Security Element # 1. MACO and Doctor detached to Ground Force Commander with no change of duties from basic plan.

(b) Security Element # 1 neutralizes Buildings 8E and 4A, breaches south wall east of Guard Tower (G.T.) 2B, enters compound, clears G.T. 2B and Bldg 3. Immediately clears area outside building within inner compound, clears G.T. 2A, enters cellblocks 5C and 5D, releases, and guides PWs to Group Control Point at Building # 4.

(c) Security Element # 2 immediately upon landing emplaces machine gun in cleared area southwest of compound and neutralizes G. T. 2B and 2A. Enters compound through breached wall, clears cellblocks 5A and 5B, releases, and guides PWs to Group Control Point at Building 4.

(d) Security Element # 3 neutralizes Building 8D, enters compound through wall door at east end of south wall, clears Building 5E, secures main gate, receives photographer and torch from Support Command Element at main gate, releases and/or guides PWs to Group Control Point as directed.

(e) Pathfinder/Demolition Element clears pump house southwest of compound at river[illegible] al junction, destroys [illegible]

b. Assault Group. (Not applicable)

c. [illegible] Group.

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(1) Comp[illegible]tion. [illegible]

(2) [illegible] Secure [illegible] north, east, and south of compound and [illegible] compound.

(3) Actions of Individual Elements.

(a) Support Command Element clears Building 7B, secures east wall and main gate. Passes photographer and torch to Command Group Element at gate, destroys Commo/Admin Building 7A, clears Buildings 8A, [illegible], 8C, neutralizes Building 13D by fire from vicinity of Building 7A.

(b) Support Element # 1 clears Buildings 11 and 12, neutralizes Buildings 13A, 13B, 13C enroute to bridge, destroys communications cable and bridge with demo charges, provides security on northeast approaches and Forward Air Guide (FAG) for close air support.

(c) Support Element # 2 moves to, clears Building 13E, establishes road block southeast of compound at road/canal junction, provides Forward Air Guide (FAG) for close air support.

i. Ground Force Extraction Plan.

GROUP	HELO #1	NO.	HELO #2	NO.	HELO #3	NO.	TOT
COMMAND	Scty El #1 Scty El #2	3 3	Scty E. #3 Hq Cmd Gp (-)	3 5	MACO Pathfinder	1 2	(17)
ASSAULT	Omitted						
SUPPORT			Photographer	1	Hq Spt Gp (-) Spt El #1 Spt El #2 Gnd Fr Comd Gp	6 7 5 6	(25)
		6		9		27	(42)

All excess equipment, i.e., bolt cutters, power saws and oxyacetylene torches, will be destroyed at the landing zone in order to reduce [illegible] [illegible]ted.

[illegible] to the Ground Force Commander.

[illegible] 1967

[illegible] 11 TO ANNEX [illegible] ([illegible])
[illegible] TO GROUND [illegible]

1. [illegible] ORGANIZATION AND FORCES. Same as basic plan minus Command Group [illegible] to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

2. [illegible] CONCEPT OF OPERATION. Assault Group lands within compound neutralizes guard towers, main gate and buildings, releases and guides PWs; Support Group secures area north, east and south of compound, destroys bridge and communications cable, provides control point for evacuation of PWs. Support Group aircraft mini-gun fires increased. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

a. Command Group. (Not applicable)

b. Assault Group.

(1) Composition. Same as basic plan.

(2) Mission. Lands assault helicopter within the compound, neutralizes guard towers, main gate, buildings; releases and guides PWs to Control Point at main gate; prepares assault helicopter for destruction on order.

(3) Actions of individual elements.

(a) Assault Group Command Element moves to, clears, and occupies guard tower 2B, establishes control point at building 3. Demolitionist breaches wall near wouthwest corner for alternate evacuation of compound. Demolitionist checks demolition system aboard helicopter and awaits orders to destroy helicopter. Locate senior PW as soon as possible to determine the exact number and location of all PWs within confinement complex. USAF helicopter crew executes fire prevention measures and joins Assault Group Leader.

(b) Action Element # 1 clears guard tower 2A at northwest corner of compound, proceeds to cellblocks 5C and 5D, enters, releases, and guides PWs to Group Control Point at main gate.

(c) Action Element # 2 clears Building 5E, proceeds to cellblock 5A, enters, releases, and guides PWs to Group Control Point at main gate.

(d) Action Element # 3 secures main compound gate entrance, clears area outside 5E, links up with Support Group Command Element; receives torch and photographer, proceeds to cellblock 5B, enters, releases, and guides PWs to Group Control Point at main gate.

(e) Elements completing their primary mission react [illegible] other [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] basic plan.

(2) [illegible] secures area north, east, and south of [illegible] communications cable, establishes [illegible] evacuation of PWs and provides MACO.

[illegible]

6 19

(3) Action of Individual [illegible].

(a) Support Group [illegible] Element provides [illegible] Ground Force command group [illegible] and establishes Ground Force [illegible] at [illegible]. [illegible] Group Command Element clears Building [illegible], neutralizes Building [illegible] by fire, provides [illegible] assault [illegible] at main gate, [illegible] communications equipment, clears Buildings 8, [illegible] 8C and neutralizes Building 13D by fire. Establishes [illegible] evacuation control point at main gate and becomes second in command of entire ground force.

(b) Support Element # 1 clears Buildings 11 and 12, passes main gate, clears Buildings 13A, 13B, 13C, destroys bridge and communications cable, provides covering fire at bridge and Forward Air Guide (FAG) for close air support. Further neutralize Building 13D by fire, if necessary.

(c) Support Element # 2 clears Buildings 8D and 8E respectively, clears pump house at river/canal junction, destroys telephone pole on edge of LZ, emplaces lights for helicopter LP, provides MACO, establishes road block at river/canal junction with Forward Air Guide (FAG) for close air support.

(d) Ground Force Extraction Plan.

GROUP	HELO #1	No.	HELO # 2	NO.	HELO #3	NO	TOT
COMMAND	Omitted						
ASSAULT	Action El #2 Action El 33 USAF Crew	3 3 3	Action El #1 Hq El	4 3			(16)
SUPPORT			Photographer Torch	1 1	Hq Spt Gp(-) Gnd Fs Comd Gp Spt El #1 Spt El #2	5 3 7 5	(22)
		9		9		20	(38)

All excess equipment, i.e., bolt cutters, power saws and oxy-acetylene torches, will be destroyed at the landing zone in order to reduce weight. All friendly WIA/KIA will be recovered and [illegible]. To the extent possible, [illegible] will be recovered [illegible] will [illegible] Commander.

[illegible]

1. [illegible] Same as basic plan [illegible] Group due to [illegible] or abort prior to reaching target area.

2. (TS) [illegible] OF OPERATION. Assault Group lands within compound, neutralizes guard towers, main gate and buildings within compound, releases PWs. Command Group lands in field near Building 7B secures area north, east, and south of compound; establishes control point for evacuation of PWs. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

a. Command Group.

(1) Composition. Same as basic plan.

(2) Mission. Secure area north, east, and south of compound; cover bridge by fire; establish control point for evacuation of PWs.

(3) Actions of Individual Elements.

(a) Command Group Element detaches MACO to Ground Force Commander, accompanies Security Element # 3 to main gate, relieves Assault Group Element at main gate, becomes second in command of entire Ground Force Element.

(b) Security Element # 1 clears Buildings 8C, 8E, 4A, passes through Command Group at main gate, detaches photographer and torch to Assault Group Element at main gate, links up with Security Element # 3 at Building 13A, secures and destroys bridge and communications cable.

(c) Security Element # 2 clears Buildings 7B and 13E, moves to and establishes road block at road/canal junction and provides Forward Air Guide (FAG) for close air support.

(d) Security Element # 3 remains with Command Group Element initially; clears Buildings 11, 12, 7A, 8A, 8B, 8C; detaches from Command Group Element at main gate; neutralizes Buildings 13A, 13B, 13C, 13D; links-up and covers Security Element # 1 by fire at bridge; and provides Forward Air Guide (FAG) for close air support.

(e) Pathfinder/Demolitionist moves to river/canal junction, clears pump house, destroys telephone pole near LZ, establishes helicopter LPs, provides security observation to south approaches.

b. Assault Group.

(1) Composition. [illegible]

[illegible]

(3) Actions of Individual Elements.

[illegible]

(a) Assault Group C[illegible] [illegible] shown as plan [illegible] of [illegible] plan.

(b) Action Element # 1. No change.

(c) Action Element # 2. No change.

(d) Action Element #3. No change.

c. Support Group. (Not applicable)

GROUP	HELO #1	NO	HELO #2	NO	HELO #3	NO	TOT
COMMAND			Torch Photographer	1 1	Gnd Force Cmdr Hq,Cmd Gp(-) Sct El #1(-) Sct El #2 Sct El #3	3 6 3 3 3	(20)
ASSAULT	Action El #2 Action E. #3 USAF Crew	3 3 3	Action E. # 1 Hq El	4 3			(16)
SUPPORT	Omitted						
		9		9		18	(36)

All excess equipment, i.e., bolt cutters, power saws and oxy-acetylene torches, will be destroyed at the landing zone in order to reduce weight. All friendly WIA/KIA will be recovered and extracted. To the extent possible, WIA/KIAs will be recovered by individual elements. Assistance from other elements will be provided upon request to the Ground Force Commander.

TAB D TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)



[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
28 August 1972

[illegible] (U)

1. [illegible] emergency situations may result from accidents or enemy air and/or ground action before, during, or after target area operations. These variables compounded by the number and types of aircraft involved in the operation create a wide variety of possible contingencies. Because of this, it is not feasible to develop specific concepts for all possible emergency situations. However, emergency procedure guidelines are necessary for each of the major phases of the operation.

a. Accident/Loss En Route to Target. The mission commander is responsible for continuing or aborting the mission in event of an accident or loss en route to the target. The major detriment will be the impact of the accident on the ability to continue the mission. As examples:

(1) Loss of one A-1 aircraft will not abort the mission.

(2) Loss or abort of non-troop carrying HH-53s, strike force lead C-130E's or HC-130 tanker,will not abort the mission.

(3) Air abort of the RC-135 will not abort the mission.

(4) In event of loss of the strike force lead C-130E prior to crossing into NORTH VIETNAM, the assault force lead C-130E will replace the strike force lead and the mission will not be aborted.

(5) Abort of the mission due to abort/loss of assault force lead C-130E or troop carrying UH-1H/HH-3/53 between the NORTH VIETNAM border and the pre-IP will be at the discretion of the mission commander. After reaching the initial IP the mission will continue.

(6) The lead C-130E aircraft commander may abort the mission at any time an enemy air or ground to air threat seriously jeopardizes the formation.

Rescue of downed aircrews/troops will be initiated by mission force resources only after target area operations are completed. Rescue operations will be conducted in a conventional manner with an HC-130 acting as CROWN for the rescue operations. The RC-135 will render assistance as required.

b. Target Area Operations. Emergencies during target area operations can result from threats to or loss of US ground or air forces. Threats may be area threats which are beyond the visibility of US air and ground forces or they may be local threats which are visible to the on-scene forces. Prior to landing the mission commander is responsible for [illegible] area [illegible] lead C-[illegible] are responsible for taking appropriate action to protect their formation from local threats. [illegible] during the strike operations on the target [illegible] with coordination and advice from the [illegible] and close support element leader (A-1) is [illegible] the conduct of the operation. Recovery

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of the ... force and p... oners will be the primary concern during t... hase of the o...ration. Recovery of downed aircrews will not ...ndertaken until recovery of the ground force is assured. ...ue operations will then be initiated in a conventional ...ner using remaining or on-call resources as required. The following are examples of methods of reacting to various threats.

(1) Area threat. The mission commander may have visibility of threats to the operation which would require cancellation, delay, or acceleration of certain phases of the target area operation. If this occurs prior to landing at the target, the mission commander or Airborne Mission Coordinator will issue appropriate instructions to the lead C-130Es which will relay the instructions to their formations. If the threat develops during the ground operation the mission commander or Airborne Mission Coordinator will relay a recommended course of action to the ground commander through the close air support element leader (A-1).

(2) Local threat (target area). Emergencies in the target area will generate from threats to the ground forces and/or the recovery aircraft. The ground force commander and close air support element leader will coordinate closely in countering such threats.

(a) Infantry. If a sizable force of enemy infantry approaches the target, the ground commander may have the best visibility of the situation and will mark the target for the A-1s or give them strike instructions. The ground commander will be responsible for insuring that the threat is sufficiently suppressed to afford safe return of the recovery helicopters.

(b) Mounted infantry (trucks or tracked vehicles). It is probable that the close air support element will be first to observe a threat of this nature. The close air support element leader will advise the ground commander of the threat, formulate tactics, and engage the threat when approved by the ground commander. If the threat is beyond the visibility of the ground commander, the close air support element leader will be responsible for advising the ground commander that it is safe to call in recovery helicopters.

(c) Artillery. In the event artillery fire is received in the target area, the ground commander will advise the close air support element leader of the approximate incoming azimuth. The close air support element will attempt to locate the gun positions and will attack them on order from the ground commander. The ground forces will be prepared to move to an alternate recovery site in event the artillery fire cannot be supressed.

(d) AAA/AW. In the event anti-aircraft artillery or automatic weapons fire is encountered which poses a threat to recovery operations, the close air support element will advise the ground commander of the threat and advise the ground commander when it is neutralized.

(e) Enemy aircraft. The mission commander or Airborne Mission Coordinator will notify the ground commander if it becomes evident that an enemy air-to-ground or air-to-air attack is imminent. The ground commander in coordination with the Airborne Mission Coordinator will assess the

[illegible] and [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] enemy [illegible]

([illegible]) Co[illegible], the [illegible] elements, will [illegible] priorities [illegible] direct engagement of [illegible] in [illegible] of urgency.

(g) Threat to waiting helicopters. In the event troop [illegible] HH-53 helicopters waiting on the ground at the primary holding site are threatened they will depart immediately for the alternate holding site north of the [illegible]LD RIVER. If required, [illegible] will drop a flare and the helicopters will land at the fringe of the light.

c. Egress Emergency Procedures. Rescue of aircrews downed during egress will not be undertaken until the helicopters carrying US ground forces and prisoners have departed NORTH VIETNAM. Rescue forces may be marshalled near the site of the downed aircrew during the withdrawal period but will not be committed until the recovery aircraft have departed NORTH VIETNAM. Rescue operations will then be conducted in the conventional manner.

severity and expected duration of the attack and take action accordingly. The ground forces will be prepared to move to an alternate recovery site in event of a prolonged enemy air-to-ground attack.

(f) Combination threat. In the event of multiple threats, the ground commander in coordination with other elements, will be prepared to establish priorities and direct engagement of threats in order of urgency.

(g) Threat to waiting helicopters. In the event troop lift HH-53 helicopters waiting on the ground at the primary holding site are threatened they will depart immediately for the alternate holding site north of the RED RIVER. One helicopter will drop a flare and the helicopters will land at the fringe of the light.

c. Egress Emergency Procedures. Rescue of aircrews downed during egress will not be undertaken until the helicopters carrying US ground forces and prisoners have departed NORTH VIETNAM. Rescue forces may be marshalled near the site of the downed aircrew during the withdrawal period but will not be committed until the recovery aircraft have departed NORTH VIETNAM. Rescue operations will then be conducted in the conventional manner.

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK G
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
EVASION AND ESCAPE (U)

1. (S) PURPOSE. To outline general procedures for Evasion and Escape (E&E).

2. (S) GENERAL.

a. Training. Special Forces (SF) personnel and aircrews will be trained during predeployment operations in E&E procedures to include; physical conditioning, use of E&E ground equipment (see APPENDIX 5, ANNEX D), individual and group pick-up by helicopter. Special considerations in training will be given to the problems encountered in E&E for groups consisting of approximately two PWs for each SF/aircrew member. Mission personnel will receive instruction in the final briefing on recognition systems used (b)(1),(b)(3):50 § 403(g) Section 6 of (b)(1) in E&E support.

b. Intelligence. (b)(1)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 § 403(g) Section 6 of

DIA will scan aerial photography of these selected SAFE areas and pinpoint the location of all areas capable of use as emergency landing zones. Spacing between LZs will be a minimum of ten miles wherever possible. The locations of these SAFE areas and LZs will be briefed to mission personnel. The location of known and suspected enemy ground forces will be plotted along the route and will be a major factor in selection of SAFE areas.

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HEADQUARTERS JOINT
COUNTER POLICY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX C TO CONJCTG OPLAN (S)
COLLEGE EYE OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. 7th Air Force Operation Plan 468-68, COMBAT LIGHTNING (S).

b. 7th Air Force Operation Plan 730, 28 March 1970 (NF).

1. (U) SITUATION.

a. Enemy. ANNEX B.

b. Friendly. ANNEX C.

2. (S) MISSION. COLLEGE EYE (EC-121T) aircraft will provide MIG warnings to friendly aircraft, commit MIG CAP aircraft against MIG aircraft and forward air surveillance data to the TACC-NS.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Two COLLEGE EYE aircraft will orbit over the GULF OF TONKIN for the duration of the operation. The primary orbit over the GULF OF TONKIN is located at 1930N/10640E with stabilizations point at 1900N/10700E (flight altitude 15,000'). The backup aircraft will orbit at same location at 10,000 feet.

(2) Mission objectives are to provide: MIG warnings to friendly aircraft, commitment of MIG CAP, and air surveillance of the task force.

(3) Two EC-121T aircraft will deploy to KORAT AB on or about 10 October 1970 under the cover of continuing SEAOR-62 Category II testing which was conducted in July and August 1970. The supporting ground radio terminal will be deployed from TAINAN AB to UDORN RTAF in sufficient time to be operational prior to the arrival of the aircraft at KORAT RTAFB.

(4) COLLEGE EYE will commit MIG CAP/BARCAP against NVN airborne forces in accordance with the Rules of Engagement. See Annex C, paragraph 3b.

(5) MIG CAP BARCAP aircraft will not be directed to descend below 5000' AGL, however, MIG CAP will be directed to continue pursuit at 5000' AGL in an attempt to draw off the attacking force or deter it from attacking the task force.

b. Tasks, Commander, COLLEGE EYE Task Force.

(1) Conduct daily tests of the digital data link within the capabilities of the equipments. Tests will not be conducted over LAOS/NVN or north of 17° over the GULF OF TONKIN.

(2) A minimum of one SSIR Cleared Senior Director will be available on each aircraft. All crews will be combat ready and preferably with previous SEAsia experience.

(3) Secure voice communications, digital data links, IFF/SIF and etc. will be operational before leaving the

6 - 19

[illegible] on route to the [illegible]. [illegible] communications will be via HF.

(4) COLLEGE EYE Senior Director will [illegible] operation if communications are lost with the TACC-NS [illegible] Airborne Mission Coordinator.

(5) All detected tracks over NVW will be [illegible] to the TACC-NS. Secure voice communications will be used as backup to the data link.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Commander, 553rd Reconnaissance Wing, KOKAT NTLFB will provide maintenance support as required.

(2) CINCPACAF will obtain necessary theater clearances for the purpose of TEMOR-82 Category II Tests.

4. (U) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION.

a. Logistics. Commander, 13th Air Force will provide necessary life support.

b. Administration. Reports will be submitted in accordance with existing test directives.

5. (U) COMMAND SIGNAL. See ANNEX K, Communications-Electronics.

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
[illegible], D.C. [illegible]
[illegible] 1970

[illegible] TO ANNEX C TO COMBAT [illegible]
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER - NORTH SECTOR (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. 7th Air Force Operation Plan 468-68, COMBAT LIGHTNING, 1 September 1967 (S/NF)

b. 7th Air Force Operation Plan 710, 28 March 1970 (TS)

1. (U) SITUATION.

a. Enemy. ANNEX B.

b. Friendly. ANNEX C.

2. (S) MISSION. The TACC-NS will monitor the airspace over NORTH VIETNAM (NVN), act as single manager of the 7AF Border Warning System and 7AF primary hostile aircraft warning agency, and provide COMJCTG with the necessary capabilities to centralize his control of the entire operation.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) The TACC-NS is digitally connected with ground based radars, alternate TACC-NS at UDORN, IRON HORSE, COLLEGE EYE, and the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) afloat. All airborne tracks over NVN will be made available to COMJCTG.

(2) The capabilities of the radio-relay aircraft will be utilized to permit COMJCTG to have direct contact with all his elements (except ground forces) from an operational position within the TACC-NS.

(3) Primary MIG CAP for F-4s control is delegated to COLLEGE EYE. TACC-NS will act as a backup intercept control agency.

(4) Secure communications with external agencies will be utilized if available. If secure voice communications are not available, unsecure voice transmissions, other than intercept control information, will be limited to the use of code words. In the event of an emergency, transmissions may be made 'in the clear.'

(5) NVN/LAOS border warning requirements do not apply to this operation. CHICOM border warning procedures still apply.

(6) Rules of Engagement outlined in 7AF OPLAN 730 do not apply to the MIG CAP/BARCAP (USN) force. See Annex C, para 3b for Rules of Engagement.

(7) MIG CAP/BARCAP will not be directed to descend below 5000' AGL. If a MIG descends to below 5000' AGL, MIG CAP will continue pursuit at a 5000'AGL level in an attempt to draw off the MIG or deter it from attacking the task force.

[redacted]

(8) COMJCTG will not assume responsibilities assigned to the 7AF Battle Commander (TACC-NS) that are outlined in appropriate 7AF OPLANs.

(9) All detected tracks [illegible] that meet the criteria [illegible] Annex C will be classified Confirmed Hostile.

(10) Interface operational procedures outlined in 7AF/CTF-77/1st MAW OPLAN 586-70 apply. See Annex K Communications - Electronics for additional subscribers to the voice and digital data communication nets.

b. Tasks.

(1) TACC-NS will provide COMJCTG an operational position where he may view the entire air situation over NVN and have direct voice contact with the airborne elements.

(2) All tracks detected by the UDORN radar and COLLEGE EYE will be initiated into the system at the alternate TACC-NS at UDORN. Within their capability, the alternate TACC-NS will monitor the air situation over NVN and appropriate radio channels to ensure it is capable of supporting COMJCTG if required.

(3) Six UHF channels plus guard will be made available to COMJCTG. Additional channels should be obtained from the MONKEY MOUNTAIN CRC, if TACC-NS requires additional channels for other missions.

(4) The TACC-NS and alternate TACC-NS will provide full manning during the period of this operation.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) COMJCTG will coordinate his activities with the 7AF Battle Commander (TACC-NS) to prevent mutual interference with other operations.

(2) 7AF Battle Commander will coordinate refueling requirements, handoffs of support aircraft, and border warning procedures with appropriate CRC/CRPs to insure the mission proceeds in an efficient manner and there is no inadvertent or premature exposure of this operation.

(3) COM505TACCONGRP will make necessary arrangements with Commander, VNAF MONKEY MOUNTAIN CRC on determinating required UHF channels from the CRC to TACC-NS.

4. (U) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION.

a. Logistics. Not applicable.

b. Administration. The TACC-NS will, within their capability, record the digital air situation display and UHF voice communications. These recordings will be retained for thirty days unless otherwise directed by COMJCTG.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command. ANNEX J.

b. Signal. ANNEX K.

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
READINESS, ALERT AND MARSHALLING (U)

1. (TS) SITUATION.

a. Enemy. ANNEX B.

b. Friendly. BASIC PLAN.

2. (TS) MISSION. To provide a secure method of conveying necessary information to in-theater elements supporting the JCTG operation.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Instructions and formats for frag orders for each element supporting this operation are enclosed at TABS A thru I. These instructions and frag orders will be hand-carried by JCTG personnel. These will be briefly reviewed with key personnel at CINCPAC and CINCPACAF and they will be carefully reviewed with key personnel at HQ 7th Air Force to insure compatibility with current in-theater practices and procedures. The instructions and frag order formats will be completed at 7th Air Force and certified by appropriate authority. Members of the JCTG will then hand-carry these documents to the appropriate wing, squadron or detachment commanders. Each set of instructions includes recommended security precautions which the unit commanders will be encouraged to follow. Electrical communications will be used only if time does not permit face-to-face coordination. Facilities for limited access message communications exist at all key staging/launch bases and unit commander will be briefed on the use of these facilities. Project officers will be designated at each of these bases. Project officers will be available on a 24-hour per day basis commencing D-3 and will send and receive messages for the unit commander.

b. Tasks. General instructions and frag orders, if appropriate, for the following units are contained in TABS A-I.

(1) 3ARRG, TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN

(2) 40th ARRS, UDORN RTAFB, THAILAND

(3) 39th ARRS, TUY HOA AB, RVN

(4) 37th ARRS, BIEN HOA AB, RVN

(5) 432nd TRW, UDORN RTAFB, THAILAND

(6) 56th SOW, NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB, THAILAND

(7) (b)(1),(b)(3) 50 § 403(g) Section 6 of

(8) 307th SW, UTAPAO AB, THAILAND

(9) DET ___, 552nd AEW, KORAT RTAFB, THAILAND

4. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. See TABS A-I.

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HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

TAB A TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (U)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDER, 3rd AEROSPACE RESCUE GROUP, TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN (U)

1. (TS) GENERAL. A special operation will be conducted by a Joint Contingency Task Group during the period 15-30 November 1970 and will be supported by units assigned to the 3AERG. TABS B-D contain instructions for each 3ARRG units supporting this operation. Security considerations prohibit full disclosure of the exact nature and timing of the operation. However, each unit commander will be provided sufficient information to perform his assigned functions. You will not inform members of your staff of this operation unless it is absolutely essential. If members of your staff must be informed, you will delay informing them to the last practicable time that will allow them to perform their duties. Communications pertaining to this operation will be hand-carried or conducted verbally face-to-face. With the exception of a special message system which will be explained by the bearer of these instructions, electrical communications (messages, radio or telephone) local or long-distance will not be used.

2. (TS) SUPPORT REQUIRED. No support will be required from Headquarters 3ARRG. Aircraft required from 3ARRG units are:

5 HH-53C (plus 2 ground spares) HH-53B are not acceptable)

2 HC-130 (plus 1 ground spare)

1 HH-3 (plus 1 ground spare)

Additional details regarding this support are contained in TABS B-D.

3. (TS) COMMAND AND CONTROL. The Commander, Joint Contingency Task Group is responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of this operation. COMJCTG has coordinated closely with key personnel at PACAF and HQ 7AF to insure compatibility of JCTG operations with procedures established in SEAsia. 3ARRG forces assigned to the JCTG will be under operational control of COMJCTG:

a. From 17 November 70 to mission completion or cancellation for personnel reporting to the staging base.

b. From H-10, D-Day to mission completion or cancellation for personnel and aircraft not reporting to the staging base.

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HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

TAB TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDER, 40th AEROSPACE RECOVERY RECOVERY SQUADRON, UDORN RTAFB, THAILAND (U)

1. (TS) GENERAL. A special operation will be conducted by a Joint Contingency Task Group during the period 15-30 November 1970 and will be supported by 40 ARRS. Security considerations prohibit full disclosure of the exact nature and timing of the operation. However, you will be provided sufficient information to perform your assigned functions. You will not inform other personnel in your unit of this operation unless it is absolutely essential. If other members must be informed, you will delay informing them until the last practicable time that will allow them to perform their duties. Communications pertaining to this operation will be hand-carried or conducted verbally face-to-face. With the exception of a special message system which will be explained by the bearer of these instructions, electrical communications (messages, radio or telephone) local or long-distance will not be used. The Commander, 3 ARRGhas been provided with this information.

2. (TS) SUPPORT REQUIRED.

a. Aircraft. Five HH-53C helicopters are required for the mission. An additional two ground spare HH-53s will be required. Maintenance peaking should commence on/about 15 November 1970. Flying activities during the next five days will be limited insofar as possible to flight test and actual SAR requirements. The aircraft will all be equipped with three 7.62 Miniguns and will have operational aerial refueling systems. The seven HH-53s will be thoroughly checked daily. You will request assistance from the Commander, 3AERG in event you are unable to provide the seven in-commission aircraft.

b. Personnel. Six aircraft commanders from ARRTC/TAC and four pilots from in-theater HH-53 units have been trained extensively in the CONUS. These officers will deploy from the CONUS to a staging base where they will receive final briefings. Nine enlisted crew members have also been trained. Six enlisted crew members will be required from your unit. These personnel will be available for movement from UDORN to the staging base NLT 1100Z on 17 November 1970.

3. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. You will be advised of a preliminary "go/no-go" decision NLT H-9:00 D-Day or daily thereafter if delays are encountered. If the preliminary "go/no-go" is affirmative, all aircraft will be rechecked and prepared for departure by 1400Z. A final "go/no-go" decision will be disseminated NLT H-5:00. Delays will be made in 24-hour increments as required. All aircrew members will receive extensive briefings at the staging base during the period commencing 17 November 1970. In addition to mission peculiar information, these briefings will include all required E&E intelligence, mission no/call sign and other appropriate theater information. [illegible] approximately two hours prior to scheduled departure time. Special emphasis will be placed on conducting predeparture activities at UDORN as discreetly as possible. The aircraft will return to UDORN five-six hours after departure. The aircrews will be debriefed and returned to their units.

[illegible] SECRET (NOFORN)

4. (TS) COMMAND AND CONTROL. The Commander, JCTG is responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of this operation. COMJCTG has operational control of all JCTG personnel at the staging base and will assume operational control of HH-53 aircraft at H-5:00 on D-Day. A representative of COMJCTG will be at UDORN during the operational period and will provide additional information and assistance as required.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
28 August 1970

TAB C TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN [illegible]
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDER, 39TH AEROSPACE RECOVERY SQUADRON, CAM RANH AIR BASE, RVN (U)

1. (~~TS~~) GENERAL. A special operation will be conducted by a Joint Contingency Task Group during the period 15 - 30 November 1970 and will be supported by 39 ARRS. Security considerations prohibit full disclosure of the exact nature and timing of the operation. However, you will be provided sufficient information to perform your assigned functions. You will not inform other personnel in your unit of this operation unless it is absolutely essential. If other members must be informed you will delay informing them until the last practicable time that will allow them to perform their duties. Communications pertaining to this operation will be hand-carried or conducted verbally face-to-face. With the exception of a special message system which will be explained by the bearer of these instructions, electrical communications (messages, radio or telephone) local or long-distance will not be used. The Commander, 3AERG has been provided with this information.

2. (~~TS~~) SUPPORT REQUIRED.

a. Aircraft. Two HC-130 aircraft are required for the mission. One additional aircraft will be required as a ground spare and the aircraft will be in standard rescue configuration with operable refueling systems. The three aircraft will be positioned at UDORN RTAFB on 17 November 1970. The aircraft will be checked daily and will not be flown except for flight test or actual SAR missions.

b. Personnel. In addition to two full mission crews you will provide a detachment commander and sufficient maintenance personnel to insure readiness of the aircraft. The officer mission crew members will be available for movement from UDORN to the staging base by 1100Z on 17 November 1970.

c. Equipment. Sufficient spare parts and unique AGE will be provided from your resources to support this operation. A listing of common AGE will be prepared and provided to the JCTG liaison officer at UDORN who will make necessary arrangements for support.

3. (~~TS~~) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. One HC-130P pilot has undergone extensive training in night refueling in the CONUS and will join with 39 ARRS crews at the staging base. The officer crew members will attend detailed mission briefings commencing 17 November 1970 and will be sufficiently familiar with the details of the operation to function as CROWN in the event rescue operations are necessary. The officer crew members will be returned to UDORN two hours prior to departure on D-Day. The detachment commander will insure availability of enlisted crew members at that time. Aircraft commanders will brief enlisted crew members prior to departure.

4. (~~TS~~) COMMAND AND CONTROL. The Commander, JCTG is responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of this operation. [illegible] operational control of all JCTG personnel at SAR staging base and will assume operational control of HC-130 aircraft at UDORN on D-Day. A representative of COMJCTG will be at UDORN during the operational period and will provide additional information and assistance as required.

~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~
~~NOFORN~~

Copy No. 6 of 19

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
28 August 1970

TAB D TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN ~~68~~
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDER, 37TH AEROSPACE RECOVERY SQUADRON, BIEN HOA AB, RVN (U)

1. (~~TS~~) GENERAL. A special operation will be conducted by a Joint Contingency Task Group during the period 1 -30 November 1970 and will be supported by 37ARRS. Security considerations prohibit full disclosure of the exact nature and timing of the operation. However, you will be provided sufficient information to perform your assigned functions. You will not inform other personnel in your unit of this operation unless it is absolutely essential. If other members must be informed, you will delay informing them until the last practicable time that will allow them to perform their duties. Communications pertaining to this operation will be hand-carried or conducted verbally face-to-face. With the exception of a special message system which will be explained by the bearer of these instructions, electrical communications (messages, radio or telephone) local or long-distance will not be used. The Commander, 3AERS has been provided with this information.

2. (~~TS~~) SUPPORT REQUIRED.

a. Aircraft. One HH-3 aircraft is required for the mission. One additional HH-3 ground spare aircraft will be required. Both aircraft will be in position at UDORN RTAFB on 17 November 1970. The aircraft will be in standard rescue configuration. The aircraft will be checked daily and will not be flown except for flight test or actual SAR missions. The aircraft will be in optimum condition and capable of meeting or exceeding performance standards.

b. Personnel. Aircrew personnel will not be required from your organization for the operation. Sufficient personnel to insure aircraft readiness will be required.

c. Equipment. Sufficient spare parts and unique AGE will be provided by 37 ARRS to support this operation. A listing of common AGE will be provided to the JCTG liaison officer at UDORN who will make necessary arrangements for support.

3. (~~TS~~) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Three aircraft commanders and an enlisted crew member have been trained extensively in the CONUS. This crew will arrive at UDORN H-5:00 on D-Day and will depart UDORN at approximately H-3:20 hours.

4. (~~TS~~) COMMAND AND CONTROL. The Commander, JCTG is responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of this operation. COMJCTG has operational control of all JCTG personnel at the staging base and will assume operational control of HH-3 aircraft at H-5:00 on D-Day. A representative of COMJCTG will be at UDORN during the operational period and will provide additional information and assistance as required.

~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~
~~UDORN~~
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HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

TAB E TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN [illegible]
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDER, 432nd TACTICAL
RECONNAISSANCE WING, UDORN RTAFB, THAILAND (U)

1. (TS) GENERAL. A special operation will be conducted by a Joint Contingency Task Group during the period 15-30 November 1970 and will be supported by 432TRW. Security considerations prohibit full disclosure of the exact nature and timing of the operation. However, you will be provided sufficient information to perform your assigned functions. You will not inform other personnel in your unit of this operation unless it is absolutely essential. If other members must be informed, you will delay informing them until the last practicable time that will allow them to perform their duties. Communications pertaining to this operation will be hand-carried or conducted verbally face-to-face. With the exception of a special message system which will be explained by the bearer of these instructions, electrical communications (messages, radio or telephone) local or long-distance will not be used.

2. (TS) SUPPORT REQUIRED.

a. Aircraft. Eight F-4 aircraft are required to support this mission. Sufficient ground spares will be provided to insure that the eight mission aircraft are airborne on schedule. Aircraft will be in CAP configuration and will carry ALQ-87 ECM Pods.

b. Personnel. Eight mission aircrews and one spare aircrew will be provided. Aircrews will be available for movement from UDORN to the staging base NLT 1100Z 17 November 1970. In addition to aircrew personnel, one fighter operations officer (05-06) will proceed to the staging base on D-6 to assist the JCTG staff in preparing and presenting mission briefings.

3. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Two weather "go/no-go" decisions will be made by COMJCTG daily commencing D-Day. The preliminary weather "go/no-go" will be made at H-9:00. The final weather "go/no-go" decision will be made at H-5:00. Both decisions will be forwarded to you by the most expeditious means available. Aircrews will receive extensive briefings at the staging base during the period commencing 17 November 1970. They will be returned to UDORN on D-Day at H-5:00. Aircraft will depart in flights of two at approximately twenty minute intervals commencing H-1:15. Tanker support will be provided on Lemon refueling track.

4. (TS) COMMAND AND CONTROL. The Commander, JCTG is responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of this operation. COMJCTG has operational control of all JCTG personnel at the staging base and will assume operational control of F-4 aircraft at H-5:00 on D-Day. A representative of COMJCTG will be at UDORN during the operational period and will provide additional information and assistance as required.

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28 August 1970

TAB F TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDER, 56th SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING, NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB, THAILAND (U)

1. (TS) GENERAL. A special operation will be conducted by a Joint Contingency Task Group during the period 15-30 November 1970 and will be supported by 56SOW. Security considerations prohibit full disclosure of the exact nature and timing of the operation. However, you will be provided sufficient information to perform your assigned functions. You will not inform other personnel in your unit of this operation unless it is absolutely essential. If other members must be informed, you will delay informing them until the last practicable time that will allow them to perform their duties. Communications pertaining to this operation will be hand-carried or conducted verbally, face-to-face. With the exception of a special message system which will be explained by the bearer of these instructions, electrical communications (messages, radio or telephone) local or long-distance will not be used.

2. (TS) SUPPORT REQUIRED.

a. Aircraft. Five A-1E aircraft (with dual controls) are required for this mission. In addition to the five mission aircraft, two ground spare aircraft will be provided. Three aircraft will be removed from service on or about 15 November 1970 so that special electronic systems can be installed. Remaining aircraft will be withdrawn from service and maintenance peaked on 17 November 1970. Ordnance loads (see c below) will be prepared and ready for uploading NLT 19 November 1970.

b. Personnel. Aircrew personnel will not be required from your organization for this mission. Two project officers will be provided as points of contact for this operation. One of these officers will be available at all times commencing 17 November 1970 until the mission is completed or cancelled. In addition to ground crew personnel, three sheet metal and six electricians will be required to install the special electronic systems. Three technicians from WRAMA will accompany the systems and will arrive at NKP on or about 13 November 1970. Installation of these systems will be given top priority.

c. Equipment. Additional equipment required to support installation of the special (classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) equipment is as follows:

(1) Camping and splicing tools for electricians.

(2) Electric or air powered drills for sheet metal technicians.

(3) Power units (preferably three) which output three phase, 400 cycle AC (minimum 7.5 KVA); 150 Amp 28 V DC; and 115 V, 60 cycle AC.

(4) Work stands.

(5) Secure storage area for about 300 cubic feet of classified equipment and security at installation site and thereafter for equipment installed on aircraft.

(6) Storage space for a small quantity of SECRET documents

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~~NOFORN~~

[illegible] They will receive [illegible] three days prior to D-Day and will be [illegible] at approximately H-4:00. Aircraft will [illegible] at H-4:00.

[illegible]. The Commander, JCTG is responsible [illegible] conduct of this operation. COMJCTG has operational [illegible] control of A-1H aircraft at H-5:00 on D-Day.

[redacted]

[redacted] operations. You will not inform other personnel in your unit of this operation unless it is absolutely essential. If other members must be informed, you will delay informing them until the last practicable time that will allow them to perform their duties. Communications pertaining to this operation will be hand-carried or conducted verbally face-to-face. With the exception of a code word system which will be explained by the bearer of these instructions, electrical communications (messages, radio or telephone) local or long-distance will not be used.

2. (TS) SUPPORT REQUIRED.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

a. Aircraft. One RC-135 aircraft is required to support this mission. This aircraft will be spared as necessary to insure that an aircraft is on station (standard orbit) during the period H-5 to H+1.

b. Personnel. The aircrew may be modified as necessary to support this operation. One Mission Supervisor will proceed to the staging base NLT 17 November 1970 for detailed mission briefing. Two officers will be designated as project officers [redacted] and will be scheduled to insure 24-hour availability from 17 November 1970 until the operation is completed or cancelled.

[redacted]

3. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. COMBAT APPLE will support the Airborne Mission Coordinator for this operation. The COMBAT APPLE schedule will be adjusted to provide daily missions from 19 November until the operation is completed or cancelled. The Mission Supervisor will receive detailed operations briefings while at the staging base and will be returned [redacted] with Airborne Mission Coordinator NLT 03002 on D-Day. Weather "go/no-go" decisions will be made by CJCTG on D-Day and days thereafter at H-9:00 and H-5:00. This information will be passed to COMBAT APPLE by code word. Continuation of the COMBAT APPLE mission is at the discretion of the Mission Supervisor if the operation is delayed. (See attached frag order.)

4. (TS) COMMAND AND CONTROL. The Commander, JCTG is responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of this operation. COMJCTG has operational control of all JCTG personnel at the staging base and will assume operational control of COMBAT APPLE at 1400Z on D-Day.

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~~SENSITIVE~~

FRAGMENTARY ORDER

RC-135M (COMBAT APPLE)

PART III

MISSION NO._____

CODE WORDS

DELAY CODE WORD_____

EXECUTION CODE WORD_____

RECALL CODE WORD_____

PART V - COMMAND AND CONTROL

COMBAT APPLE will be responsive to COMJCTG during the period of this operation. COMJCTG will be physically located at the 7AF TACC-NS (MOTEL). In the event of communications failure at the TACC-NS, the Airborne Mission Coordinator will assume direct control of COMJCTG assigned forces.

PART VI - SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Provisions will be made to accommodate the Airborne Mission Coordinator and_____personnel from the COMJCTG staff. Contact COMCJTG CALL SIGN Gearbox 351.7 on MHz. COLLEGE EYE CALL SIGN FROG will be contacted on_____MHz. Call signs and frequencies for other forces participating in the mission will be in the possession of the Airborne Mission Coordinator.

If an unknown aircraft is detected on an intercept course to the COMBAT APPLE, contact the ATACC-NS CALL SIGN_____on_____MHz and request the F-4 strip alert aircraft be scrambled to intercept the unknown aircraft. MIG warnings will be issued on Guard channel.

C-16-G-2

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

[redacted]
[redacted]
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
25 August 1970

[redacted]

[redacted], CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF (C)

1. (TS) GENERAL. A special operation will be conducted by a [redacted] during the period 15-30 November 1970 and will be supported by 3d TFW. Security considerations prohibit full disclosure of the exact nature and timing of the operation. However, you will be provided sufficient information to perform your assigned functions. You will not inform other personnel in your unit of this operation unless it is absolutely essential. If other members must be informed, you will delay informing them until the last practicable time that will allow them to perform their duties. Communications pertaining to this operation will be hand-carried or conducted verbally face-to-face. With the exception of a special message system which will be explained by the bearer of these instructions, electrical communications (messages, radio or telephone) local or long-distance will not be used.

2. (TS) SUPPORT REQUIRED.

a. Aircraft.

(1) KC-135. [redacted] KC-135 tanker aircraft are required to refuel eight USAF F-4s supporting this operation. [redacted] KC-135s will be required to provide emergency refueling for USN aircraft operating in the GULF OF TONKIN.

(2) Radio Relay. One KC-135 radio relay aircraft will be required to support this operation.

(3) Spare Aircraft. Spare aircraft will be provided as necessary to insure that above aircraft are on station at specified times.

b. Personnel. Two project officers will be designated as points of contact for this operation at UTAPAO. These officers will be scheduled to provide 24-hour availability from 17 November 1970 until the mission is completed or cancelled.

3. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Weather "go/no-go" decisions will be made by CJCTG on D-Day, and days thereafter if delays are encountered, at H-9:00 and H-5:00. This information will be provided to your command post by the most expeditious means possible.

a. KC-135 tanker - See attached frag order.

b. KC-135 radio relay - See attached frag order.

4. (TS) COMMAND AND CONTROL. The Commander, CJTG is responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of this operation. COMJCTG will assume operational control of KC-135 tanker aircraft at H-1:00 hours and

~~TOP SECRET~~

FRAGMENTARY ORDER

KC-135 REFUELING AIRCRAFT

PART III

MISSION NO. ____________________

CODE WORDS

DELAY CODE WORD ____________________

EXECUTION CODE WORD ____________________

RECALL CODE WORD ____________________

MISSION COMPLETED CODE WORD ____________________

PART V - COMMAND AND CONTROL

The provisions of 7AF OPLAN 730 apply.

PART VI - SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Eight MIG CAP aircraft CALL SIGN FALCON 1-8 will require 'pre-strike' and 'post strike' refueling. 7AF refueling track Orange extension will be utilized. Procedures outlined in 7AF OPLAN 730 apply. MIG CAP aircraft will require refueling in flights of two aircraft. Initial flight will require 'pre-strike' refueling at H-55. Balance of 'pre-strike' refuelings will be cycled at approximately 15 minute intervals. 'Post-strike' refueling should begin at approximately H+50 with flights of 2 aircraft cycling every 15 minutes. If the strip alert F-4(2) aircraft are scrambled it is possible that they may also require 'post-strike' refueling. Upon receipt of 'mission completed' code word, tanker aircraft supporting COMJCTG will contact 7AF BLUE CHIP for further instructions.

1700Z Lemon 75,000 outbound - 5 a/c F-105G
1800 LLM 37,000 inbound - 4 a/c F-105G

Orange 20M extension 64,000 outbound 8 a/c F-4D
50,000 inbound 4 a/c F-4D

CALL ALTITUDE - 20M
1 Navy Tanker KC-135
Brown track (drogue)
20/1830Z on station

~~TOP SECRET~~

RADIO RELAY

DAY VFR

CALL SIGNS

DAY CODE WORD

EXECUTION CODE WORD

RECALL CODE WORD

PART V - COMMAND AND CONTROL

Radio-relay aircraft will be under the direct control of the TACC-NS (MOTEL) from H-1:45 until H+1:30 (unless directed otherwise by COMJCTG) at which time control will revert to 7AFCC BLUE CHIP. In the event of communications failure at the TACC-NS, the Airborne Mission Coordinator CALL SIGN Cover Sheet will assume direct control of the radio-relay aircraft.

PART VI - SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Center line orbit will be flown: 1900N/10630E to 1920N/10745E. Time on Station: H-45 minutes. RR will maintain orbit altitude at FL330.

Eight radio-relay channels will be available.

Channel one receive/transmit 351.7 MHZ,
transmit/receive 379.0 MHZ.

Channel two receive/transmit ~~295.7~~ MHZ,
transmit/receive ~~243.0~~ MHZ.

Channel three receive/transmit ~~292.8~~ MHZ,
transmit/receive ~~322.2~~ MHZ.

Channel four receive/transmit MHZ,
transmit/receive MHZ.

MHZ,
MHZ.

MHZ,
transmit/receive MHZ.

Channel seven receive/transmit _____ MHZ,

transmit/receive _____ MHZ.

Channel eight receive/transmit _____ MHZ,

transmit/receive _____ MHZ.

RR will be capable of relaying digital data between COLLLEGE EYE and ATACC-NS. IFF/SIF will be on at all times. Mode II code - STANDARD _____. Contact COLLEGE EYE CALL SIGN FROG on 319.4 MHZ, TACC-NS CALL SIGN MOTEL on 351.7 MHZ, and Airborne Mission Coordinator CALL SIGN Coversheet on _____ MHZ. RR will fall back to below 1830N when advised that fighter protection is no longer available. COLLEGE EYE or PIRAZ (RED CROWN) will advise if an onknown aircraft is on an intercept course with the RR at which time the RR will proceed south until otherwise directed.

(b)(1)

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~~SENSITIVE~~

FRAGMENTARY ORDER

COLLEGE EYE

PART III

MISSION NO._____

CODE WORDS

DELAY CODE WORD_____

EXECUTION CODE WORD_____

RECALL CODE WORD_____

PART V - COMMAND AND CONTROL

COLLEGE EYE aircraft will be under direct control of the TACC-NS (MOTEL). In the event of communications failure at the TACC-NS, the Airborne Mission Coordinator will assume direct control of COLLEGE EYE and the MIG CAP.

PART VI - SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Two COLLEGE EYE aircraft (EC-121T) will fly an ETHAN BRAVO track. Primary aircraft will operate at FL150 and backup aircraft at FL100. Time on station ETHAN BRAVO track H-45. Aircraft will proceed to BRAVO track below NVN radar coverage. Aircraft will remain clear of Navy ships by at least five miles when at low level, one mile when at assigned flight level. En route position reports will be forwarded via secure UHF communications when crossing the 18° and 19° parallels. IFF/SIF will be on at all times. Mode II code: primary aircraft_____; backup aircraft_____. Monitor progress of task force on 322.2 MHZ and Guard. MIG CAP CALL SIGN FALCON will be controlled on 235.8 MHZ. Contact Airborne Mission Coordinator CALL SIGN Coversheet on_____MHZ. TACC-NS CALL SIGN MOTEL on 351.7 MHZ. CE will issue MIG and border warnings on Guard. BIG LOOK CALL SIGN_____will be contacted on _____MHZ. PIRAZ CALL SIGN Red Crown will be contacted on 351.7 MHZ. COLLEGE EYE will take up the fallback orbit when USN fighter aircraft are not above 19° parallel and MIG CAP are not

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in one of the holding areas or when an unknown aircraft is detected on an intercept course to the [redacted] aircraft. (b)(1),(b)(3):50 § (b)(1),(b)(3):50 § 403(g) Section 6 of



(PRIMARY)
REFUEL HELIOS
JOIN UP
AERIAL REFUELING
FLARES
HOLDING
HOLDING AREA
LAND UDORN
MIG CAP
2 F-4
DEPART UDORN
REFUEL
NORTH HOLDING AREA
SOUTH HOLDING AREA
5-F-105G
SUPPORT A/C
(COLLEGE EYE)
(COMBAT APPLE)
(BIG LOOK)
(RADIO RELAY)
GULF OF TONKIN ORBIT
REFUELING OVER NE THAILAND
RADIO RELAY ORBIT OVER GULF
PASSENGER STOP
NAVY DIVERSION

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

ANNEX D TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
LOGISTICS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2)

b. Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy Guidance (JCS Pub 3)

c. FM 101-10

1. (S) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. This annex provides policy and guidance for logistic support of US forces conducting operations detailed in this plan.

b. Concept of Logistical Support.

(1) Basic logistical policy and guidance contained in references (a) and (b) apply. Commander, Joint Contingency Task Group exercises logistical coordination or control to the extent necessary for the overall effective coordination of logistical matters of the Task Group.

(2) Each Service is responsible for its own logistical support except when otherwise provided for by agreement as to common servicing, joint servicing, or interservice agreement.

(3) Standard items of military supplies and equipment will be used to the maximum extent possible, augmented when necessary and practical, with locally procured items.

c. Assumptions. That current logistical requirements will remain constant.

d. Resource Availability. Not applicable.

e. Planning Factors. Army FM 101-10 and pertinent Air Force tables.

f. Responsibilities.

(1) Continental Army Command will arrange for logistical support for the US Army element.

(2) Commander, Armament Test and Development Center (Air Force Systems Command), Eglin AFB, is responsible for local logistical support for Headquarters, Joint Contingency Task Group while at Eglin AFB in accordance with interservice agreements.

6 19

(3) US Air Force:

(a) Plan and arrange for the logistical support of the Air Force element.

(b) Plan and arrange for airlift of elements of the JCTG as required.

(c) Plan and arrange for logistical support for JCTG when a forward operating base is established.

2. (S) SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. General Guidance. Reference b applies. Supply and distribution will be in accordance with appropriate Service directives.

b. Specific Guidance.

(1) Distribution and allocation.

(a) JCTG serves as focal point for coodination and regulation of supply support.

(b) Service elements must provide for supply support of their respective units. Interservice support should be arranged where efficiency and economy of operation can be enhanced. See APPENDIX 5 for list of special equipment.

(c) Supply accountability is ended at time of departure from training area.

(d) Logistical contact points:

1. For Air Force: as determined.

2. For Army:

a. JFKCENMA, Fort Bragg

b. Base Supply, Eglin AFB

(2) Level of Supply: as determined by Service component commanders.

(3) Salvage: not applicable.

(4) Local Purchase: see Armed Forces Procurement Regulation (Reference b, Section XIII, Chapter 2).

(5) POL: supplies will be drawn from existing base stocks. Since no extraordinary requirement is necessary, no APPENDIX 1 is furnished.

(6) Inter-Service Logistic Support: see JCS Pub 3, Section VI, Chapter 1. Agreement has been reached with Eglin AFB for support of Army element.

(7) Graves Registration: APPENDIX 2.

3. (U) MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION. Each Service is responsible for maintenance within their own elements. In the interest of economy and practicality, interservice agreements may be utilized and joint maintenance facilities established.

4. (S) MEDICAL SERVICES. The JCTG will coordinate its medical requirements as indicated in APPENDIX 2.

5. (U) TRANSPORTATION. Service elements will develop and furnish transportation requirements in accordance with reference b. APPENDIX 4.

6. (U) BASE DEVELOPMENT. Not applicable.

7. (U) FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE. Not applicable.

APPENDICES:

1 NOT APPLICABLE

2 GRAVES REGISTRATION

3 MEDICAL SERVICES

4 MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION

5 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT LIST

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander
Joint Contingency Task Group

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
GRAVES REGISTRATION (U)

(U) REFERENCE: Section XVI, Chapter 2, JCS Pub 3

1. (S) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. To provide graves registration policies for the JCTG.

b. Scope. Theater arrangements pertain.

c. Policy. See paragraph 021603 of JCS Pub 3.

2. (S) SITUATION.

a. General. In view of the nature of the operation, every effort will be made to recover deceased personnel for evacuation through existing channels.

b. Enemy. ANNEX B.

c. Friendly. ANNEX C.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Remains will be evacuated to UDORN AFB for subsequent disposition through Air Force Graves Registration channels.

b. Assignment of Tasks.

(1) Commander, EGLIN AFB, Florida is responsible for mortuary activities at EGLIN AFB.

(2) USAF is responsible for mortuary activities at UDORN AFB.

4. (S) SPECIAL GUIDANCE. Theater policy and arrangements pertain.

a. Appropriate records will be maintained to insure evacuation of remains.

b. In the event remains cannot be recovered, identification and positive proof of death will be made IAW theater procedures.

5. (U) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION. Accounting and disposition of personal effects will be in accordance with Service directives.

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28 August 1970

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
MEDICAL SERVICES (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949

b. Chapter 4, JCS Pub 3

c. Policy for Processing US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel (U) (EGRESS RECAP), JCS 2478/141, 20 March 1968

1. (S) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. To provide policy guidance and to establish general procedures concerning medical services in support of the basic plan.

b. Applicability. This appendix applies to all units listed in ANNEX A.

c. Objectives.

(1) Returned and/or wounded personnel will be placed under military medical auspices as quickly as possible.

(2) All returned personnel will be returned to the CONUS as quickly as possible after it has been determined that the individual is medically cleared for air travel.

2. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. The JCTG may utilize present USAF medical facilities in THAILAND, including those at UTAPAO, UDORN and TAKHLI. MAC will provide aeromedical evacuation to the CONUS, and within the CONUS.

b. Severely ill and severely wounded patients will be stabilized at UDORN (or alternate TAKHLI) and a determination will be made at that time as to the feasibility of their further evacuation to UTAPAO, CAM RANH BAY or CLARK AFB. Normal EGRESS RECAP procedures will apply. At approximately H+5 hours the C-141 MEDEVAC aircraft from CLARK AFB will land at UDORN and internees or wounded capable of continuing the trip will be evacuated to ANDREWS AFB in accordance with ANNEX N.

3. (S) TASKS

a. The JCTG Medical Officer will advise the COMJCTG on existing medical facilities in THAILAND, the status of evacuation routes and internee health stability prior to CONUS return. In addition, he will:

[redacted]
(EXCLUSIVE)
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(1) Screen health records of all personnel involved in the operation aspect of JCTG.

(2) Review health records and other data on the PWs suspected of being present at SON TAY.

(3) Coordinate all preventive medicine activities.

b. COMJCTG will coordinate with MAC and PACAF for aeromedical evacuation of patients from UDORN, THAILAND (or alternate) to ANDREWS AFB. For medical evacuation points and airfield locations in support of intertheater and intratheater aeromedical evacuation see TAB A.

c. USAF hospital units at the redeployment base and recovery base will operate and support joint-use medical facilities.

4. (U) THEATER EVACUATION POLICY. Other than above, existing PACOM directives will apply.

5. (U) MEDICAL REGULATING. Existing PACOM regulations apply.

6. (U) JWBCA. Existing PACOM regulations apply.

7. (U) PREVENTIVE MEDICINE. The JCTG Medical Officer will be responsible to the COMJCTG in all matters of mess, sanitation, personal hygiene, food and water discipline, and any medication necessary to accomplish the mission. He will assure that all personnel in the JCTG are instructed on the problems of malnutrition, dehydration, fatigue, and stress effects on the undernourished. Any additions to current immunization requirements will be determined by the JCTG Medical Officer.

8. (U) MISCELLANEOUS MEDICAL SUPPORT

a. Dental Service. No additional dental support is required other than the existing services available at the recovery and redeployment bases.

b. Veterinary Service. Not applicable.

9. (U) MEDICAL SUPPLY. ANNEX D.

10. (U) PLANNING FACTORS. See EGRESS RECAP/AF

11. (U) REPORTS. Casualty reporting will be in accordance with the established procedures of the Service concerned.

12. (U) HOSPITALIZATION. No planning factors required.

13. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. Not applicable.

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CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO COMJCTG OPLAN (U)
AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION PICKUP POINTS (U)

(U) The following listing represents tactical and intratheater aeromedical evacuation points in Thailand from which C-141 aircraft can operate.

AIRFIELD	COORDINATES
UDORN	102° 45' E 17° 25' N
TAKHLI	100° 18' E 15° 15' N
UTAPAO	101° 0' E 12° 40' N

At present no casualty staging units are set up on the above airfields and it is estimated that a four-hour warning period is necessary to accomplish this.

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CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
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28 August 1970

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX D TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. JCS Pub 3, Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance (U)

b. TM 55-450-15, Air Movement of Troops and Equipment (Administrative) dated Sep 1968

c. SM 680-68, Mobility System Planning Policies and Procedures

d. AFR 76-38/AR 59-8 Military Airlift Command-Requirement Submission Space Assignments and Priorities

1. (S) CONCEPT OF MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS:

a. Force transportation requirements prior to deployment will be satisfied by Tactical Air Command through Commander, USAF Special Operations Force. Deployment transportation requirements will be satisfied by COMJCTG capability and by Military Airlift Command (MAC). COMJCTG will deploy two COMBAT TALON C-130Es. The COMBAT TALON aircraft will carry mobility support kits and a portion of the maintenance force. The remainder of the JCTG will move by MAC special mission and channel airlift. Special mission airlift will be required for the JCTG main force, munitions, and necessary support equipment. Elements of the JCTG staff will proceed via channel traffic to make necessary enroute stops for coordination purposes.

b. Transportation Policies. As prescribed by references a, c, and d.

2. (S) COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. JCTG will obtain airlift in CONUS prior to deployment from organic resources, from Commander, USAFSOF, or from Commander TAC. Support requirements for MAC airlift will be coordinated IAW reference d.

b. MAC will provide airlift from Eglin AFB to the staging base as required. Two MEDEVAC aircraft will be provided for redeployment of applicable personnel. See ANNEX N. Two C-141 will be required to airlift the JCTG main force to CONUS points.

c. Theater airlift resources will be provided to transport JCTG troops, aircrews, and staff elements to intra-theater points.

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d. JCTG C-130E aircraft will return to CONUS points as required.

e. USAF bases will provide cargo loading and unloading equipment at POE, POD, and intermediate locations as necessary.

3. (U) CAPABILITIES AND LIMITING FACTORS: Not applicable.

4. (U) ESTIMATE OF TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS: TAB A.

TAB: A - TIME-PHASED DEPLOYMENT LIST.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX D TO COMJCTG OPLAN (~~S~~)
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT LIST (U)

1. (~~S~~) SIGNAL/ELECTRONICS. Provided from US Army sources:

a. 14 ea AN/PRC 77 with 100 Batteries BA 4386/PRC-25

b. 25 ea AN/PRC 9 with 150 Batteries BA 4505/U6

c. 25 ea AN/PRC 4 with 150 Batteries BA 399/U

d. 55 ea AN/URC 10 with 200 Batteries BA 1387/U

e. 9 ea PRC 74 with 25 Batteries BA 386/PRC 25

f. 6 ea AN/PRC 41 with 18 Batteries BB 451/U

g. 2 ea TD-1197S - channel alignment indicator

h. 5 ea loudspeakers with 20 Batteries BA 30

i. 50 ea flashlight, plastic, right angle with 200 Batteries BA 30

2. (U) ORDNANCE. Provided from US Army sources.

a. 50 ea Compass, Lensatic

b. 600 ea Magazine, 20 rounds f/M16 rifle

c. 500 ea Magazine, 7 rounds f/Cal .45 Pistol

3. (U) QUARTERMASTER. Provided from US Army sources.

a. 100 ea goggles, dark lens

b. 25 ea machete w/scabbard

c. 25 pr gloves, Mans, wireman

4. (U) ENGINEER

a. 10 pr cutter, bolt, rigid head

b. 3 ea chain saw, gasoline powered (Commercial)

c. 2 ea chest, demolition, electric and nonelectric

d. 2 ea chest, carpenters

e. 50 pr cutters, wire

f. 10 ea, axe, firefighters

g. 30 headlamps (Commercial)

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h. 2 ea Mallet, wood, 40 pound

5. (U) DEMOLITIONS/EXPLOSIVES. Provided from US Army sources.

a. 125 ea TNT, ½ lb block

b. [illegible] Block, C4, 1 lb

c. [illegible] et Fuze, time

d. 2500 feet Det Cord

e. 1000 ea Cap, detonating, electric

f. 1000 ea Cap, detonating, nonelectric

g. 1500 ea Ignitor, fuse

6. (U) SPECIAL E&E EQUIPMENT FOR SPECIAL FORCES. Provided from USAF on loan:

a. 60 ea pen flares

b. 60 ea medical kit, individual aircrew, survival, in small plastic case

c. 60 ea mirror, signal, air to ground

d. 60 ea AN/PRC 90 radios with batteries

e. 100 ea survival kit, tropical, wet climate

f. 900 ea long range patrol rations*

g. 300 ea rations, indigenous, assorted*

h. 600 ea pint cans of water**

* To be aboard HH-53s in case of emergency landing (1/3 in each HH-53).

7. (U) Aircrews will obtain standard equipped aircrew survival vests from their in-theater take-off base.

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX D TO COMJCTG OPLAN (~~S~~)
NONNUCLEAR AMMUNITION (U)

1. (~~TS~~) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. To indicate how JCTG ammunition requirements will be met.

b. Users. Users requiring support during this operation are as follows:

JCTG
Air Component
Ground Component

COMM 432TRW

COMM 56SOW

COMM 40ARRS

COMM 37ARRS (if applicable)

2. (~~TS~~) CONCEPT OF AMMUNITION SUPPLY OPERATIONS. COMJCTG ammunition requirements for use in the operational area will be airlifted to THAILAND in organic JCTG aircraft or in MAC aircraft supporting JCTG deployment or provided from existing theater stocks. Commanders in-theater will use existing theater stocks

3. (~~S~~) RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Commander, Army Component, JCTG will identify and obtain from US Army stocks his training and mission ammunition requirements.

b. Commander, Air Force Component, JCTG will identify and obtain from US Air Force sources his training and unique mission ammunition requirements.

4. (U) LIMITING FACTOR. None.

5. (U) AMMUNITION SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS. TAB A.

TAB:

A - ESTIMATE OF AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX D TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)

	ITEM	ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION D-DAY	WEIGHT
AIR AMMUNITION			
Mission Peculiar (Airlifted to THAILAND)	Flare M8A-1	42	800
	Ground Marker	12	240
	Napalm	6	5,500
	Fire Fight Simulator	48	100
GROUND AMMUNITION	5.56 (M-16)	15,000	1,500
	7.62 Linked	4,000	100
	.45 Caliber	750	20
	40mm M-79	100	75
	66mm LAW	25	75
	Grenade, Frag	120	150
	Ground Flare	50	75

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ANNEX E TO COMJCTG OPLAN (U)
PERSONNEL (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. JCS Pub 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Chapter III, Sections 4 and 5.
b. JCS Pub 3, "Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance," Chapters 1, 8, and 9.

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. To provide policy guidance, state requirements, assign responsibilities, and establish procedures to insure adequate personnel support for this plan.

b. Concept of Personnel Support. Personnel support will be provided on a TDY basis from existing resources by unified commands, Services, and agencies concerned.

c. Supporting Appendices. Because of the specific purpose of this operation, handling and treatment of US prisoners of war (PW's) is the subject of a separate annex (ANNEX N).

2. (U) PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.

a. General Guidance. The administration and discipline of all personnel will continue as a primary responsibility of parent Service and/or agency. Commander, JCTG will exercise only such control over the administration and discipline of the component elements of his command as is essential to the performance of his mission. Each component commander is responsible for the internal administration of his command.

b. Specific Guidance.

(1) Reporting Procedures. Reporting procedures will be established by each component/element commander based on his requirements. Reporting will be phased to insure timely support of the CJTG mission with paramount consideration given to security.

(2) Replacement Policies. Once selected, personnel will be released from this task group only with the express approval of COMJCTG. Should an individual be released for any reason after learning the primary mission of the JCTG, appropriate security precautions will be taken to preclude compromise.

(3) US Citizen Civilian Personnel. Contracting for US civilian personnel will be in consonance with existing Department of Defense and Departments of Army and Air Force directives as appropriate.

(4) Captured, Missing and Detained US Military Personnel. Reporting and processing will be in accordance with existing theater directives.

(5) Enemy Prisoners of War. Captured enemy personnel, if any, will be returned to the recovery base where processing and handling will be in accordance with existing theater directives.

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(6) Morale and Welfare. The morale and welfare of the personnel of each Service are primarily the responsibility of the component commander of that Service. However, the morale and welfare of all personnel are the responsibility of CDRJCTG insofar as they affect the accomplishment of his mission.

(7) Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting will be in accordance with established procedures of the Service concerned.

(8) Decoration and Awards. Awards of decorations and medals shall be in consonance with policies and regulations of the Armed Forces, or as prescribed by higher authority. COMJCTG may recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to the respective Chiefs of Service, through command channels, awards to individuals assigned to his command.

(9) Hostile Fire Pay. Existing Department of Defense, Service, and theater direction shall apply in determining eligibility for hostile fire pay.

(10) Travel Procedures. The provisions of Joint Travel Regulations shall apply to all travel associated with this operation provided security is not compromised.

(11) Military Law, Discipline, and Order. Basic law and its administration will be in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, as revised. Non-judicial punishment will be administered by the component commander of the individual concerned.

3. (U) FINANCE AND DISBURSING.

a. General Guidance. Commander, JCTG will insure that provisions are made for the timely payment of all personnel assigned to his command.

b. Specific Guidance.

(1) Currency controls. Existing theater directives governing currency control shall apply.

(2) Pay functions.

(a) Pay for military personnel will be in accordance with established procedures of the parent Service concerned.

(b) Pay of US civilians will be in accordance with provisions of the Classification Act of 1949, as amended.

4. (U) LEGAL. Legal Assistance. Commander, JCTG will insure that legal assistance is available to all personnel through existing resources.

5. (U) POSTAL AND COURIER SERVICES.

a. General Guidance. Commander, JCTG will, through his component commanders, insure that all personnel are aware of the grave security implications associated with this operation. The need for absolute security with respect to personal mail will be stressed.

b. Specific Guidance. Existing mail facilities and channels will be used for incoming and outgoing personal mail.

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28 August 1970

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E TO COMJCTG OPLAN ~~(S)~~
PERSONNEL LISTING (U)

NO.	JOB TITLE	GRADE	AFSC/MOS	SOURCE
Command				
1	Commander	07	0026	TAC
1	Vice Commander	06	31542	CONARC
2				
Staff				
1	Aviation Line Officer	06	1310	USN
4	Ops Staff Officer	04/06	1516	USAF
1	Infantry Officer	06	31542	USA
1	Defense Analyst	03/04	8054	USAF
1	Intel Staff Officer	04	8016	USAF
2	Photo Interpreters	03/04	8045	DIA
1	Weapons Director	05	E1716	USAF
4	Ops Security Officer	04	39300	USN/ USAF/ USA
1	Medical Staff Officer	05	33100	USA
2	Log Support	04	34010	USA/ USAF
17				
Aircrew				
3	Pilot C-130	03/04	1055B	USAFE
4	Pilot C-130	03/05	1055B	TAC
3	Navigator	03/04	153S	TAC
3	Navigator	03	153S	USAFE
2	Elec Warfare Officer	03/05	157S	TAC
1	Elec Warfare Officer	04	157S	USAFE
4	Flight Engineer	E4/5	A43570A	TAC
2	Flight Engineer	E4/5	A43570A	USAFE
2	Loadmaster	E4/5	60770	TAC
3	Loadmaster	E4/5	60770	USAFE
2	Radio Operator	E4/5	A29372E	TAC
1	Radio Operator	E5	A29372E	USAFE
5	Pilot A-1	03/05	1115	TAC
5	Pilot A-1	03/05	1115	PACAF
10	Pilot HH-53	03/05	1115	MAC*
2	Pilot HH-3	03/05	1115	MAC**
2	Pilot HC-130P	04/05	1055B	MAC
5	Para Rescue	E4/6	92370	MAC
2	Flight Engineer	E4/6	A43570	MAC
61				
Aircraft Support				
1	Maintenance Officer	03	4344	TAC
4	Aircraft Mechanic	E4/5	43171F	TAC
2	Jen Engine Rpm	E3	43250	TAC
1	Prop Rpm	E5	42171B	USAF
1	Asses Rpm	E4	42271	USAF
1	Hydraulic Rpm	E5	42172	USAF
1	Electrician	E4	42370	USAF

* 5 from PACAF
** 1 from PACAF

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NO.	JOB TITLE	GRADE	AFSC/MOS	SOURCE
1	Flight Director/ Instrument Tech	E4	42270	USAF
4	Radar Doppler Tech	E4/6	30174	USAF
2	ECM Tech	E4/5	30173	USAF
1	Auto Pilot Tech	E5	32570	USAF
1	Radio Tech	E5	30170	USAF
1	Supply Tech	E3	64750	TAC
21				
Army				
1	Ground Force CO	05	31542	TIS
1	Ground Force	03	31542	TIS
9	Ground Force	03	31542	JFKCMA
1	Opn Sgt	E9	11F55	JFKCMA
1	Admin Sgt	E9	1165S	JFKCMA
1	Medic	E8	91Z5S	JFKCMA
8	Opn Sgt	E8	11F5S	JFKCMA
12	Intell	E7	11F4S	JFKCMA
7	Lt Wpns Ldr	E7	11B4S	JFKCMA
7	Heavy Wpns Ldr	E7	11C4S	JFKCMA
5	Radio Operator	E7	05B4S	JFKCMA
6	Demolitionist	E6	12B4S	JFKCMA
5	Lt Wpns Ldr	E6	11B4S	JFKCMA
1	Radio Repairman	E7	31Z4S	JFKCMA
65				

TOTAL 166

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
28 August 1970

ANNEX F TO COMJCTG OPLAN (U)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (U)

(U) REFERENCES:
a. DOD Directive 5122.5
b. DOD Directive 5230.9
c. JCS Policy Letter (SM-399-68), dated 18 June 1968
d. AR 360-5
e. AR 360-6
f. AR 381-2
g. AFR 111-17
h. AFR 190-6
i. AFR 190-8
j. AFR 190-9
k. AFR 190-12
l. AFR 190-18
m. AFR 190-23
n. AFR 200-9
o. AFR 200-12
p. OPNAVINST 03822.5A
q. OPNAVINST 3040.2A
r. OPNAVINST 5720.6

1. (~~TS~~) SITUATION

a. General. The purpose of this ANNEX is to furnish general procedures and guidance on information and public affairs.

b. Friendly Situation. ANNEX C.

c. Enemy Situation. ANNEX B.

d. Assumptions.

(1) Any unauthorized disclosure of the operation could lead to inquiry by news media personnel.

(2) News media interest in all personnel will be intense upon completion of the operation.

(3) Access to all personnel upon completion of the operation cannot be delayed indefinitely, except for medical or security reasons, or when an individual elects not to meet with the press.

(4) The integrity, health, and legal rights of the individuals and their families, as well as the welfare of the remaining prisoners of war, must be safeguarded.

2. (~~TS~~) MISSION. Develop plans to provide for the release of information pertinent to the recovery of US prisoners of war interned in NORTH VIETNAM. The information released should emphasize the humanitarian motivation of the mission and reveal the plight of US prisoners of war interned in NORTH VIETNAM.

3. (~~TS~~) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. The security requirements and considerations for uniformity among the armed forces necessitate

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that the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs (ASD/PA), exercise overall responsibility and authority for Public Affairs in accordance with reference c. He will be responsible for the Public Affairs aspects of the operation to include deployment, employment, and other continuing coverage when this information is declared releasable by the Commander, Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG). All contact between JCTG personnel and newsmen, e.g. media interviews, press conferences, public statements, answers to queries, etc., will be coordinated and approved by ASD/PA after approval or release of individuals from control by the COMJCTG. Particular care will be taken to preclude divulging sensitive sources and methods. See ANNEX M for plausible cover stories to protect these sources.

b. Tasks.

(1) ASD/PA has overall responsibility for Public Affairs matters of all JCTG and returned personnel. With coordination of COMJCTG, the ASD/PA will:

(a) Provide Public Affairs guidance concerning all Joint Contingency Task Group personnel and processing of returned personnel by the military Services.

(b) Coordinate Public Affairs activities relating to the operation with the Department of State and other interested agencies of the US Government.

(c) Act as final approval authority within the DOD for proposed public statements, requests for interviews, press conferences, and answers to media queries.

(2) SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF INFORMATION (SAOI), SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF INFORMATION (SAFOI), and SECRETARY OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF INFORMATION (SNOI) AS REQUIRED will comply with EGRESS RECAP procedures.

c. Coordinating Instruction. Time phased and/or contingency proposed news themes if required. (These instructions to be modified when advice from a Psychological/Political Advisor is available to the JCTG):

(1) Employment.

(a) Success. The news release will emphasize the exact nature of the recovery operation.

(b) Partial Success. The news release will emphasize the general nature of the recovery operation.

(c) Aborted Operation. No news release advised, however, if the NORTH VIETNAMESE Government releases news of the operation, the US Government news release could emphasize this was a reconnaissance in force to evaluate increased logistical support by NVN government to their forces in LAOS.

(d) Cancelled. No news release advised.

4. (U) ACCREDITATION: Not applicable.

5. (U) FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP. Not applicable.

6. (U) ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES: News media representatives will not accompany the JCTG until completion of the operation. ASD/PA representatives will meet the MEDEVAC aircraft at the mid-point return refueling stop to provide advice and guidance to appropriate PWs and JCTG personnel.

7. (U) SECURITY: Correspondents will not have access to JCTG personnel until approved by ASD/PA. However, all personnel will

be cautioned that no correspondent is cleared for classified information and will refer all queries to COMJCTG.

8. (TS) AUDIO VISUAL:

a. In order to provide for photographic coverage for subsequent public news release, two qualified US Army Special Forces personnel of the recovery force will take appropriate photographs within the prison compound.

b. Photographers will take pictures of:

(1) Recovery force efforts to free prisoners.

(2) Confinement conditions in the prison compound, especially evidence of cruel and unusual treatment.

(3) The photographers will carry two rolls of film each which will be turned over to a member of the JCTG staff at UDORN RTAFB, after return from the recovery operation. The film will be carried to CONUS on the C-141 carrying the returnees and COMJCTG, and delivered to an individual designated by the JCS at Andrews AFB.

(4) Each photographer will be equipped with two 35mm Pen-EE cameras with attachments to assure quality pictures and positive equipment function.

9. (S) INTERNAL INFORMATION: Commanders will emphasize operational security in briefings and debriefings which will be conducted in four phases.

a. Deployment. Briefings will be presented from D-4 to D-1. See ANNEX C.

b. Employment. Briefing will be presented on D-1.

c. Redeployment. Refer to APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX B.

d. Other. Personnel released prior to completion of the operation will be debriefed. (Refer to APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX B).

LEROY S. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

Appendices:

1. Personnel Requirements N/A
2. Equipment Requirements for Joint Information Bureau N/A

(b) Partial Success. The news release will emphasize the general nature of the recovery operation.

(c) Aborted Operation. No news release advised, however, if the NORTH VIETNAMESE Government releases news of the operation, the US Government news release could emphasize this was a reconnaissance in force to evaluate increased logistical support by NVN government to their forces in LAOS.

(d) Cancelled. No news release advised.

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[redacted] will carry two rolls of
The [redacted] will carry [redacted]

f [redacted]ch which will be turned over to a member o
t CTG staff at Udorn RTAFB, after return from the recovery operation. The film will be carried to CONUS on the C-141 carrying the returnees and COMJCTG, and delivered to an individual designated by the JCS at Andrews AFB.

(4) Each photographer will be [redacted] with two 35mm Pan-EE cameras with attachments to assure quality pictures and positive equipment function.

9. (U) INTERNAL INFORMATION. Commanders will emphasize operational security in briefings and debriefings. [redacted] be conducted in four phases.

a. Deployment. Briefings will be presented from D-4 to D-1. See ANNEX C.

b. Employment. [redacted]

c. Redeployment. Refer to APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX B.

d. Other. Personnel released prior to completion of the operation will be debriefed. (Refer to APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX B).

Appendices:

1. Personnel Requirements N/A
2. Equipment Requirements for Joint Information Bureau N/A

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
23 August 1970

ANNEX H TO CONJCTG OPLAN (U)
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (U)

(U) REFERENCES: 1st Weather Wing Special Study 105 Series

1. (U) GENERAL:

a. Purpose. This ANNEX provides weather support for operations envisioned in this plan.

b. Concept of Environmental Support. Military Airlift Command (MAC), through the Air Weather Services (AWS) is responsible for providing meteorological support for all United States Army and United States Air Force forces. Weather support of US Navy forces is the responsibility of the Naval Weather Service (NWS). Specific support to the operation will be provided through the staff weather officer attached to the Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG). He will have direct access to any US military meteorological functions deemed necessary.

c. Assumptions.

(1) Weather intelligence data will be available to the mission commander via immediate relay through secure digital circuits.

(2) Weather data from the LAO net will be available.

d. Responsibilities.

(1) USAF Security Service (USAFSS) Site DANANG.

(a) Provides relay of weather data about NORTH VIETNAM as required to the JCTG.

(b) Upon notification provides one weather analyst to assist the staff weather officer to the JCTG.

(2) 1st Weather Group (MAC). Provides upon request any required weather support to include, if necessary, one officer or NCO to assist the JCTG weather officer.

2. (U) SITUATION.

a. The time frame envisioned for the operation falls in the best weather period of the year in northern NORTH VIETNAM, with strong diurnal patterns. Typhoons enter the SOUTH CHINA SEA with a frequency of 1.1 per month in October, and 0.4 per month in November. Other than the presence of a typhoon there is a small probability of unfavorable weather:

b. Special Considerations.. A pinpoint air landed, night operation deep in hostile territory requires good visibility at and below flight level with adequate moonlight or starlight. Landing inside and outside the compound will be influenced by flare drift and descent, surface wind, dust, and soil bearing capacity. Air support of ground operations will be dependent upon normal visibility and ceilings plus surface wind for such ordnance as tear gas and/or white phosphorous. The takeoff direction of MIGs on nearby airfields will depend upon wind direction.

3. ~~(TS)~~ EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Planned operations will be highly weather vulnerable and therefore require close monitoring of available weather data. Surface meteorological data about NORTH VIETNAM will be primarily from special sources. LAO surface data will be obtained from the Special Operations Weather Net within the country. Upper air information is available through both classified and unclassified sources.

(2) The strongly repetitive character of monsoonal climates places a high value on close weather monitoring for several days prior to launch. Security requires that a normal pattern of events be established, therefore transmission of necessary data will begin considerably in advance of the operation. Beginning 1 October, cryptographic weather observations will be relayed immediately to required receiving sites.

(3) After launch, NORTH VIETNAM weather data will be transmitted via secure digital circuits to the JCTG weather officer at either UDORN or DANANG for use of the mission commander.

(4) Detailed prelaunch briefings will be conducted by the JCTG staff weather officer.

b. Tasks and Responsibilities.

(1) 1st Weather Group will support the operation by maintaining its routine observations and forecasting function and providing requested climatological support. It is not anticipated that any member of HQ 1st Weather Group will have knowledge of the mission.

(2) 10th Weather Squadron will provide normal weather function at the launch and recovery site and will provide direct support to the JCTG staff weather officers (SWO). If requested, 10th Weather Squadron will provide an officer or NCO from its Special Operation Weather Team as a full-time assistant to the JCTG, SWO. No member of the squadron will have knowledge of the mission.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Direct coordination with various weather organizations is authorized.

(2) Direct coordination with appropriate USAF Security Service organizations is authorized.

4. (U) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION. ANNEX D.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command. The JCTG staff weather officer is responsible to the commander, JCTG. All weather personnel and weather analysts attached from in-theater resources will be under the operational control of the JCTG SWO.

b. Signal.

(1) Weather data will be transmitted to TAKHLI and UDORN as appropriate and disseminated within the TACC-NS to the mission commander as appropriate.

(2) At D-10 surface and upper air weather data for NORTH VIETNAM will be transmitted via secure digital circuits to TAKHLI and TACC-NS. Relay of data will be immediate upon receipt.

(3) Standard weather communication sources will be available throughout the operation.

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

APPENDICES:

1 CLIMATOLOGY

2 LIGHT DATA

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CONTINGENCY TASK F
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 1 to ANNEX H to COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
CLIMATOLOGY (U)

1. (S) By the latter half of October, the autumn transition season has been replaced by the northeast monsoon over RED RIVER VALLEY and NORTHERN LAOS. A regular diurnal sequence evolves with fair skies from midnight to 0400 LST at which time low stratus forms over rivers and valleys while uplands remain relatively clear. October and November are good weather months over northern NORTH VIETNAM and LAOS. These two months are the least cloudy of the year with very light precipitation, good visibility, and light upper winds and light night surface winds.

2. (S) Climatological Data.

Enroute Cloudiness

01-03 LST

	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
% ≥ 500 ft	97	97	97	100
% ≥ 2,000 ft	71	90	92	99
% ≥ 5,000 ft	43	60	67	58
% ≥ 8,000 ft	39	52	64	52

Objective Cloudiness

01-03 LST

% ≥ 500 ft	99	99	99	99
% ≥ 2,000 ft	89	88	81	81
% ≥ 5,000 ft	69	70	58	54
% ≥ 8,000 ft	67	68	54	46

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Enroute Visibility

	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
≥ 3 MI	85	93	98	98

Objective Visibility (01-03 LST)

≥ 3 MI	93	96	96	93

Precipitation Enroute (01-03L)

% Freq Precip	9	3	< 1	2
% Freq TSTMS	6	4	0	0

Precipitation Objective (01-03L)

% Freq Precip	3	2	4	2
% Freq TSTMS	2	3	3	0

Fog Enroute (% Freq)

22-00L	1	-	5	-
01-03L	3	5	15	1
04-06L	2	3	15	2

Fog Objective (% Freq)

22-00L	1	3	-	4
01-03L	3	3	11	5
04-067	1	13	12	11

Surface Wind Enroute (01-03L)

Prevailing Dir & Speed	SW/<4	VRBL/<4	E/<4	E/<4

Surface Wind Objective (01-03L)

Prevailing Dir & Speed	SE/<4	NW/<4	NW/<4	NW/<4
% <4 Kts	57	68	71	75

Surface Temperatures ^{0}F

Mean Max	90	88	84	78
Mean Min	78	76	71	65
TOT Temp	78-80	75-77	70-72	67-69

FAVORABLE MOON
(East Moon 15-45° above horizon)
Local Standard Time

OCTOBER

Date	19(M)	20 (T)	21 (W)	22 (T)	23 (F)	24 (S)	25 (S)	26 (M)
Favorable 15°	18/2208	19/2208	20/2303	21/2359	0054	0147	0238	0328
EOT Range 45°	18/2316	0012	0108	0203	0258	0351	0442	0532
Moonrise	18/2010	19/2106	20/2201	21/2257	22/2352	0045	0136	0226
Illumination	.79	.70	.61	.51	.42	.32	.24	.16
Nautical Twilight	0604	0604	0605	0605	0605	0606	0606	0607

NOVEMBER

Date	18(W)	19 (T)	20 (F)	21 (S)	22 (S)	23 (M)	24 (T)	25 (W)
Favorable 15°	17/2148	18/2244	19/2337	0028	0117	0205	0254	0343
EOT Range 45°	17/2352	0048	0141	0232	0321	0409	0458	0547
Moonrise	17/2046	18/2142	19/2235	20/2326	0015	0103	0152	0241
Illumination	.77	.68	.59	.50	.40	.31	.23	.15
Nautical Twilight	0620	0621	0621	0622	0622	0623	0623	0625

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

ANNEX J TO COMJCTG OPLAN (U)
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: JCS Pub 2

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. This annex establishes relationships between commanders and agencies participating in this operation.

b. Scope. The command relationships established by this annex pertain for the period of this operation to include deployment, employment, and redeployment.

2. (U) COMMAND LINES.

a. Command arrangements prior to deployment are shown at APPENDIX 1.

b. Command arrangements when CINCPAC assumes operational command are shown at APPENDIX 2. COMJCTG is directly responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of this operation. COMJCTG will:

(1) Act as a single point of contact for coordination with COM7AF, COMTASK FORCE-77 and other external agencies supporting the operation.

(2) Coordinate air operations with CTF-77. (Yankee Station Commander).

(3) Exercises tactical control over all ground and air assets assigned to this operation.

c. COMJCTG insures that theater resources shown in APPENDIX 5 are available and operationally ready for mission execution. COMJCTG takes command of these resources at approximately H-5 hours for mission execution. Resources revert to normal command arrangements when aircraft land at recovery bases.

d. COMJCTG will exercise operational control/tactical control of all forces assigned or allocated to support the operations as outlined in the BASIC PLAN.

e. Control of forces employed under this plan will be centralized. The Tactical Air Control Center - North Sector (TACC-NS) will provide COMJCTG with operational and intelligence data on as near real time as possible.

f. Flow of command during the phases of the operation from predeployment to return are shown at APPENDIX 3.

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3. (TS) MISSION CONTROL AND COORDINATION.

a. COMTASK FORCE-77 provides US Naval air resources in support of the operation.

b. Tactical Air Control Center - North Sector (TACC-NS).

(1) Provides digital display of data from the alternate TACC-NS at UDORN, IRON HORSE (classified aircraft), COLLEGE EYE (EC-121), COMBAT APPLE (RC-135M), and the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) afloat.

(2) TACC-NS will be the focal point for providing coordination of the air effort.

(3) Through the use of the radio-relay aircraft, provide direct UHF communications with all elements of the task force except the ground forces.

c. Airborne Mission Coordinator.

(1) In the event the TACC-NS becomes inoperative or COMJCTG is unable to communicate with the task force, the Airborne Mission Coordinator aboard the RC-135 will assume tactical control of the assigned forces. The Airborne Mission Coordinator will be an Air Force O-6 fully cognizant of the entire operation.

(2) Provides a further extension of the COMJCTG command and control system when required.

d. COLLEGE EYE. Directs the MIG CAP in the interception of MIG aircraft.

4. (TS) PROCEDURES. COMJCTG will maintain direct control of all air operations and be approving authority for all changes to the procedures outlined in this plan.

a. Tactical Unit Commanders will direct execution of sorties as directed by COMJCTG/7AFCC.

b. Area Radars. USAF MIG CAP aircraft will contact the applicable radar monitoring agency after take-off for flight following to tanker. NVN/LAOS border warning procedures do not apply to the MIG CAP nor to the assault and strike forces.

c. MIG CAP will contact COLLEGE EYE after crossing NVN/LAOS border for flight following and control.

d. Airborne Mission Coordinator will maintain an up-to-date air picture based on SIGINT sources and coordination with the TACC-NS.

e. Tactical Air Control Center - North Sector (TACC-NS).

(1) Control will be accomplished by the use of UHF communications through the radio relay aircraft.

(2) Abort orders during the employment phase will be issued on Guard Channel (243.0 MHZ) using appropriate code words.

(3) Commitment of MIG CAP to MIG aircraft will be delegated to COLLEGE EYE.

f. COLLEGE EYE.

(1) Acts as extension of COMJCTG command and control system in providing MIG warnings to friendly aircraft and commitment of MIG CAP aircraft.

(2) MIG CAP aircraft will be utilized to deter MIGs from interfering with the task force.

(3) Backup aircraft will assume COLLEGE EYE responsibilities in the event of equipment failure on the primary aircraft.

5. (U) JCTG organization prior to deployment is shown at APPENDIX 4.

6. (U) JCTG organization for mission execution is shown at APPENDIX 5.

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group



COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT

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

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COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
CINCPAC ASSUMES COMMAND

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX J TO COMJCTG
OPLAN (S)
COMMAND FLOW (U)
MISSION PHASE

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28 August 1970



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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX J TO COMJCTG OPLAN [redacted]
PREDEPLOYMENT JCTG ORGANIZATION [redacted]



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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX J TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
JCTG THEATER ORGANIZATION (S)



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28 August 1970

ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN [illegible]
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. NMCC Operating Procedure 9-18, FAST REACTION PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLING FORCES WORLDWIDE, 30 April 1970.

b. DOD Flight Information Publications, Pacific and Southeast Asia.

c. CINCPAC Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (CINCPAC CEOI).

d. CINCPAC Communications-Electronics Instructions (CINCPAC CEI).

e. Procedures for the Use of IFF Mark X (SIF) in PACOM (CINCPAC 2380 Serials 00926 and 00927 of 3 June 1966).

f. Pacific Command Frequency Allocations and Uses (PACOM FAU).

g. 7AF OPLAN 730, 28 March 1970.

h. Southeast Asia TDS Interface OPLAN 586-70, 1 February 1970.

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. The purpose of this annex is to specify the Communications-Electronics support required by the Joint Contingency Task Group and to assign responsibilities for providing that support.

b. Situation.

(1) General. BASIC PLAN.

(2) Enemy. ANNEX B.

(3) Friendly.

(a) The Deputy Director for Operations (Command and Control), Joint Staff, will make available the personnel and facilities of the National Military Command Center to communicate with CINCPAC and selected subordinate units, CINCSAC and selected subordinate units, and COMJCTG.

(b) CINCPAC will provide communications support for the operational mission including in-theater communications support to COMJCTG and communications support to the NMCC.

[illegible] 6 19

(c) CINCSAC will provide Radio-Relay Aircraft as required.

(d) CINCPACAF/7AF will provide communications support to JCTG as directed by CINCPAC and as specified in this annex.

(e) CINCPACFLT will provide communications support for Diversionary Operations action and for CTF77 interface with JCTG.

(f) Fast reaction procedures using "RED ROCKET" messages to all involved units will be the method used for transmission of "Go/No-Go" approval from the National Command Authorities (NCA).

(4) Assumptions. Existing Communications-Electronics assets/facilities will be available and adequate to support this operation.

2. (S) MISSION. To provide the JCTG the rapid and responsive communications required to respond to National Command Authorities and accomplish the assigned JCTG operational mission. Specific requirements are:

a. Utilization of fast reaction "RED ROCKET" communications procedures and capabilities at the NMCC, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, 7AF, 7FLT, CTF77, TACC-NS, TAKHLI, UDORN, NAKHON PHANOM, UTAPAO and KORAT. Capability is to include prior alert notification from the NMCC via Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network (JCSAN) to CINCSAC and CINCPAC and acknowledgement of receipt via JCSAN and message from CINCPAC and CINCSAC for their involved units.

b. Secure record, secure and nonsecure voice communications between the NMCC, CINCPAC, TACC-NS, TAKHLI, and KORAT.

c. Secure record, secure and nonsecure voice communications between TACC-NS, 7AF, TAKHLI, UDORN, NAKHON PHANOM, UTAPAO, and KORAT.

d. Secure record and nonsecure voice communications between COMJCTG (TACC-NS and/or TAKHLI) and CTF77.

e. COMJCTG capability to monitor nonsecure and/or secure radio communications between Navy Control and the CTF77 Tactical Air Elements.

f. Nonsecure and/or secure radio communications between COMJCTG at TACC-NS, the Airborne Mission Coordinator in the RC-135 and the COLLEGE EYE aircraft.

g. Nonsecure radio communications between COMJCTG, the Airborne Mission Coordinator (RC-135), the Strike and Assault Element Aircraft, the Ground Force Commander, and the SAR Coordinator (HC-130). All aircraft in the Strike and Assault Elements (C-130E, A-1, HH-3, HH-53) will possess the capability to monitor and enter this radio net.

h. As required, the Airborne Mission Coordinator (RC-135) will provide direct or indirect radio relay between the Ground Force Commander and COMJCTG at TACC-NS via the A-1 or C-130E aircraft as required.

i. Nonsecure radio communications between the Strike and Assault Element Aircraft, the SAR Coordinator (HC-130), the Ground Force Commander and selected Ground Force Groups and Elements.

j. Nonsecure radio communications between the Ground Force Commander and subordinate Groups and Elements.

k. Nonsecure radio communications between the Army Ground Force Group Commanders and subordinate tactical elements.

l. Nonsecure radio communications for Army and Air Force personnel to establish required SAR contacts.

m. Access to existing command and control communications at the TACC-NS for alerting and directing required returnee medevac C-141 aircraft and for redeployment direction and coordination.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

a. Guiding Principles.

(1) COMJCTG Deployment Phase communications will be provided by use of existing NMCS, DCS, and CINCPAC Command and Control, Long-Haul, Common-User Communications systems, as required.

(2) Except for the Command and Control communications capability through CINCPAC to the NMCC, COMJCTG Employment Phase Communications will be provided by interfacing the existing Tactical Air Control Ground/Air/Ground (G/A/G) communications systems with those systems integral to the Air Force and Army elements of the JCTG.

(3) COMJCTG Redeployment Phase communications will be provided by use of existing NMCS, DCS, and CINCPAC Command and Control and Long-Haul, Common-User communications systems, as required.

(4) Communications security is essential to maintain surprise and to deny the enemy access to operational information. Administrative and deployment communications will be kept to an absolute minimum on a strict must-know basis. During the employment phase, except when absolutely essential to safety of flight and mission accomplishment, command and control traffic and mission progress reports will be accomplished by [illegible] code words, or secure [illegible]. Unit [illegible] will be date [illegible] transmitted electrically. This information will be passed verbally to commanders concerned. Subsequent messages will refer to D-Day and H-Hour. (See Appendix G for code word lists.)

(5) IFF/SIF Procedures:

(a) Discrete MODE 2 SIF Codes will be assigned to each aircraft for selective identification by control elements. A MODE 1 code will be assigned according to the mission of the aircraft.

(b) IFF MODE 3 codes will be used as directed by CINCPAC and en route planning documents.

(c) See ANNEX C, APPENDIX 3 for additional guidance.

b. Operational Concept, Capabilities and Limitations. ANNEX C.

c. Tasks and Responsibilities.

(1) The Deputy Director for Operations (Command and Control), Joint Staff, will provide personnel and facilities required at the NMCC for:

(a) Utilization of "RED ROCKET" fast reaction procedures for transmission of "Go/No-Go" execution approval to CINCPAC, CINCSAC, 7AF, 7FLT, CTF77, TAKHLI, UDORN, NAKHON PHANOM, TACC-NS, UTAPAO, and KORAT. (See APPENDIX 1.)

(b) Receipt, handling, and delivery of reports on the employment phase of combat operations and on completion of the mission from CINCPAC, COMJCTG, and CTF77. (See APPENDIX 2.)

(2) CINCPAC will provide communications support to COMJCTG as required to include:

(a) Command and Control voice and record communications including "RED ROCKET" capabilities to the NMCC, 7AF, 7FLT, CTR77, TAKHLI, UTAPAO, UDORN, NAKHON PHANOM, KORAT, and TACC-NS. (See APPENDIX 1.)

(b) Required frequency allocation or coordination actions.

(3) CINCSAC will provide Radio Relay Aircraft as required and "RED ROCKET" communications capabilities to and from the NMCC and UTAPAO.

(4) CINCPACAF and 7AF will provide communications support to COMJCTG as required and as directed by CINCPAC to include use of existing Tactical Air Control G/A/G communications systems in-theater, use of the capabilities of the TACC-NS, and as outlined in the appendices to this ANNEX.

(5) CINCPACFLT, 7FLT, and CTF77 will provide communications support to COMJCTG as required and as directed by CINCPAC to include communications support for the Diversionary Mission and for CTF77 interface with JCTG.

(6) 355th Combat Support Group, TAKHLI, will provide communications support to COMJCTG as required to include voice and record communications to the units supporting the mission.

(7) The following organizations will provide communications support to JCTG elements at their locations to include use of communications capabilities at the TUOC, TACC, or Command Post:

(a) 432 Tac Recon Wing, UDORN

(b) 56th SOWG, NAKHON PHANOM

(c) 307th Strat Wing, UTAPAO

(d) 388th Tac Fighter Wing, KORAT

(8) COMJCTG will coordinate with CINCPAC and obtain authority to utilize and/or establish the communications capabilities in APPENDIX 2.

(9) The JCTG Air Force Component Commander will coordinate as necessary to establish the communications capabilities in APPENDIX 3 by utilization of equipment integral to the operational aircraft.

(10) The JCTG Army Component Commander will enter and/or establish the communications capabilities in APPENDIX 4 by utilization of equipment organic to his forces.

(11) The Ground Forces Commander at the objective assumes net control authority for Air/Ground nets as follows:

(a) VHF FM En Route and Ground Command Net - at H+30 seconds.

(b) UHF En Route and Air/Ground Net - at H+1 minute. (See APPENDICES 3 and 4.)

(12) Voice call sign assignments for this operation are provided in APPENDIX 5.

(13) Frequency assignments are shown in APPENDICES 3 and 4.

4. (U) SPECIAL MEASURES. Each individual in the objective area will have been provided an AN/PRC-90 radio for search and rescue operations. See ANNEXES C and D.

5. (U) LOGISTICS. ANNEX D.

6. (U) ADMINISTRATION.

a. All units supporting the JCTG will maintain communications logs and records as specified in standing operating procedures. Logs will be treated at TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE and will be maintained for 90 days.

LEROY D. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

[redacted]

b. Units supporting the JCTG will have Project Officers appointed to receive JCTG traffic.

APPENDICES:

1 EXECUTION APPROVAL COMMUNICATIONS

2 EMPLOYMENT PHASE COMJCTG LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS

3 CJCTG TACTICAL GROUND/AIR/GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

4 GROUND OPERATIONS COMMUNICATIONS

5 PRIMARY VOICE CALL SIGN ASSIGNMENTS

6 CONSOLIDATED CODE WORD LISTING

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

APPENDIX 1 to ANNEX K to COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
EXECUTION APPROVAL COMMUNICATIONS (U)

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. Purpose. To specify the communications means to be used in transmitting the mission execution approval/delay/cancellation from the National Command Authorities (NCA).

b. Applicability. This APPENDIX applies to CINCPAC, CINCSAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMJCTG, and their subordinate units.

c. Objectives. To specify communications procedures to be used in satisfying the requirements of paragraph 2a of Basic Plan C-E ANNEX.

2. (U) NETWORK. TAB A reflects the organization/location to which the NCA approval/message will be sent.

3. (U) PROCEDURES.

a. The NMCC will use "RED ROCKET" procedures to send NCA mission approval/delay/cancellation messages to the COMJCTG and the organizations involved in the project.

b. The Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (EMATS) will be the primary means used to send NCA approval/delay/cancellation messages to CINCPAC and CINCSAC. The backup method will be the telecon circuit to CINCPAC and common-user circuits to CINCSAC. The Senior EA (Emergency Action) officer in the NMCC will alert CINCSAC and CINCPAC command centers via JCSAN that a "RED ROCKET" message is about to be sent. If message is transmitted by other than EMATS and telecon due to communication outage, the EA officer will make a second alert notification to inform CINCSAC and CINCPAC the manner in which the message will be sent. CINCSAC and CINCPAC will use "RED ROCKET" procedures to send the message to their involved units. The CINCSAC unit is located at UTAPAO and the CINCPAC units/locations are: 7AF, 7FLT, CTF77, KORAT, TAKHLI, UDORN, NAKHON PHANOM and TACC-NS. CINCSAC and CINCPAC will submit voice reports to the NMCC concerning receipt and non-receipt of "RED ROCKET" messages as soon as possible, but not later than 20 minutes after the DTG of the "RED ROCKET" message. All the addressed subordinate commands will be identified as having received or not received. Subsequent voice reports will be provided as soon as possible thereafter, confirming the receipt of the message by the excepted subordinate commands. As soon as possible, but not later than 60 minutes after the DTG of the "RED ROCKET" message, a message report by exception of all addressees not yet in

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receipt of the message will be pr[illegible]red. Only the addressees which have not acknowledged receipt wi[illegible] identified. Negative reports are required. Subsequent reports [illegible]t be provided as soon as possible thereafter, confirming the re[illegible]ipt of the message by the excepted addressees.

c. While the command element is en route to DANANG from TAKHLI, COMJCTC may be contacted through the TAKHLI TUOC, ATACC-NS or TACC-NS.

d. TAB B is an example of the "RED ROCKET" message including the addressees that will be used to transmit the mission execution approval/delay/cancellation from the National Command Authorities.

TABS:

A EXECUTION APPROVAL COMMUNICATIONS NET

B NCA APPROVAL MESSAGE

[redacted]

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28 August 1970

TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO CONJCTO OPLAN (U)

EXECUTION APPROVAL COMMUNICATIONS NET (U)



NOTE: The above reflect existing record communication links utilized for "RED ROCKET" communications for fast reaction control of forces from the NMCC.

[redacted]

TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K
TO COMJCTG OPLANS

NCA APPROVAL MESSAGE (U)

JOINT MESSAGEFORM	RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]	
TYPE MSG: BOOK / MULTI / SINGLE	
PRECEDENCE	
ACTION: FLASH	
INFO	DTG

FROM: JCS

TO: ZEN/CSAF
ZEN/CSA
ZEN/CNO
CINCPAC
7AF COMD CEN TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN
CTF77
TACC-NS SON TRA RVN
355 COMBAT SUPPORT GP TAKHLI RTAFB
THAILAND

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION

CJCS

SECRET RED ROCK (MESSAGE NUMBER)

SUBJECT: (CODE WORD)

1. THIS IS A RED ROCKET MESSAGE. DELIVER TO (CODE WORD) PROJECT OFFICERS.

2. APPROVAL GRANTED FOR EXECUTION ON OR AFTER (D-DAY REPEAT D-DAY) OR D-DAY PLUS (NUMBER) REPEAT D-DAY PLUS (NUMBER).

3. CINCPAC SUBMIT VOICE AND MESSAGE REPORTS OF RECEIPT BY APPLICABLE SUBORDINATE UNITS.

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASER	SIGNATURE
	F. C. RICE, COL, USAF CSO, NMCS OPS DIV	59570		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]			DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH WILL BE USED.

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CONTIN[illegible] TASK GROUP
WASHIN[illegible], D.C. 20301
28 Aug[illegible] 1970

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
EMPLOYMENT PHASE COMJCTG LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS (S)

1. (S) GENERAL:

a. Purpose. To provide COMJCTG the communications capability required for direction of and coordination with his subordinate elements prior to launch, recall after launch, and for required response to CINCPAC and the NMCC.

b. Applicability. This APPENDIX applies to the NMCC, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, 7AF, and their subordinate commands/units.

c. Objectives. To specify the communications means to be used in satisfying the requirements of paragraph 2b and c of the basic C-E ANNEX.

2. (S) CONCEPT:

a. The Employment Phase communications network will consist of existing long-haul secure record communications and command and control secure and/or nonsecure voice circuits. TAB A.

b. Reports required by NCA/JCS/CINCPAC/COMJCTG will be transmitted on existing secure command and control record communications circuits.

c. If required, reports specified in paragraph 2b above can be accomplished by verbal reports via existing secure and/or nonsecure voice communications capabilities.

3. (S) PROCEDURES:

a. COMJCTG will make the final in-theater decision to launch, delay, or recall forces. COMJCTG may notify the 7AF Command Center duty officer of his decision and the Command Center will have the responsibility for notifying all the addressees/units in TAB A. Normal 7AF mission notification, verification, and/or recall procedures for supporting forces will be used.

TAB:

A COMJCTG LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS

[illegible] (ORN)

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1

TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN
EMPLOYMENT TRANS. CONCEPTS LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS (U)



NOTE: The above communications will be satisfied by existing secure record and non-secure voice communications.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K COMJCTG OPLAN
COMJCTG TACTICAL GROUND/AIR/GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

1. GENERAL.

a. Purpose. To specify the communications means to be used in integrating existing Tactical Air Control Ground/Air/Ground communications systems with those systems integral to the Air Force and Army elements of the JCTG.

b. Applicability. This appendix applies to CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, 7AF, and JCTG and their subordinate units.

c. Objectives. To specify communications nets/frequencies to be used in satisfying the communications requirements of paragraphs 2e, f, g, h, and i of the basic C-E ANNEX.

2. NETWORKS.

a. USAF Operational Control Net.

Purpose. To provide COMJCTG the capability to monitor and/or direct the control of the F-4 MIG CAP aircraft through the COLLEGE EYE aircraft and operational direction of the Airborne Mission Coordinator (See TAB A).

b. USAF Operational Reporting Net. The purpose of the net is to provide:

(1) Communications for enroute mission reporting from the Primary and Reserve Element Aircraft to COMJCTG.

(2) An alternate USAF operational control net for COMJCTG. (See TAB B.)

(3) SAR communications as required.

c. US Navy Operational Control Net (Diversionary Mission).

Purpose. To provide the COMJCTG the capability to monitor/coordinate his operations with that of the Navy Diversionary Mission (see TAB C).

d. VHF FM Enroute and Ground Command Net. The purpose of the net is to provide:

(1) Enroute communications for the Primary and Reserve Element aircraft.

(2) Close air support direction and coordination (see TAB D).

6 of 49

e. UHF Enroute and Air/Ground Net. The purpose of the net is to provide:

(1) Enroute communications (via relay as required) between COMJCTG, the Assault and Strike aircraft, and the Airborne Mission Coordinator.

(2) Communications (via relay as required) between the Ground Force Commander and COMJCTG. (See Annex 4.)

(3) SAR communications as required (see TAB E).

TABS:

A USAF OPERATIONAL CONTROL NET

B USAF OPERATIONAL REPORTING NET

C USN OPS CONTROL NET (DIVERSIONARY MISSION)

D VHF FM EN ROUTE AND GROUND COMMAND NET

E UHF EN ROUTE AND AIR/GROUND NET

F USAF/USN VOICE COORDINATION NET

G INTERFACE DATA-LINK COMMUNICATIONS

(NOFORN)

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO CONJCTG OPLAN (S)
USE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL NET (U)



Frequency Assignment:
Primary UHF:_____
Secondary UHF:_____

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
USAF OPERATIONAL REPORTING NET (U)



Frequency Assignment:
Primary HF/SSB:_____
Secondary HF/SSB:_____

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
USN OPS CONTROL NET (DIVERSIONARY MISSION) (S)



Frequency Assignment:
Primary UHF:_____
Secondary UHF:_____

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DICTION)

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28 August 1970

TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
VHF FM EN ROUTE AND GROUND COMMAND NET (U)



* Assumes net control at H+30 seconds.
** Enters net when directed.

NOTE: See para 3j, APPENDIX 4, ANNEX K, and TAB B, APPENDIX 4, ANNEX K for additional details.

Frequency Assignment:
Primary FM: _____
Secondary FM: _____

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TAB E TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN [redacted]
UHF EN ROUTE AND AIR/GROUND NET (U)



* Assumes net control at H+1 minute.

NOTE: See para 3j, APPENDIX 4, ANNEX K, and TAB B, APPENDIX 4, ANNEX K for additional details.

Frequency Assignment:
Primary UHF: _____ TX 292.2
Secondary UHF: _____ RX 292.2

[redacted]

Note: will monitor
TX 292.8
RX 292.8

[redacted] SPECIAL HANDLING
[redacted] NOFORN)

[redacted]

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[redacted]

USAF/USN VOICE COORDINATION NET

NOTE: A KC-135 radio relay aircraft will provide automatic relay of UHF and



TAB G , APPENDIX 3, ANNEX K

INTERFACE DATA - LINK COMMUNICATIONS



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HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
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28 August 1970

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN (U)
GROUND OPERATIONS COMMUNICATIONS (U)

1. (U) GENERAL:

a. Purpose. The purpose of this Appendix is to establish policies and procedures for ground force communications during employment phase ground operations.

b. Situation. Annex C, Appendix 11, basic operation plan.

2. (U) MISSION. To establish and operate a reliable and responsive communications system for conduct of ground operations during employment phase.

3. (U) EXECUTION.

a. Guiding Principles.

(1) During employment phase, Air Force communications channels will be utilized to pass "Go/No-Go" decision to ground force elements en route to target area.

(2) Radio transmissions during ground operations will be kept to the minimum essential for command and control. Format messages/code words will be used to report accomplishment of mission phases.

(3) During ground operations, the ground force commander, as the overall "on scene" commander, will establish and control communications to subordinate ground elements, air strike elements (A-1s) and air assault elements (HH-53s).

b. Operational Concept. Ground force communications system, to include air/ground communications, will be established in target area with primary and alternate voice radio nets, backup audio (bullhorns), and visual (flares) communications means (TAB A).

c. Ground Force Commander:

(1) Activate net control station in ground force command radio net (FM) as the primary communications with subordinate ground force group leaders and for alternate communications with subordinate air strike (A-1) and air assault (HH-53) elements (TAB B).

(2) Activate net control station in air/ground radio net (UHF) as primary communications with subordinate air strike and air assault elements and for relay of critical reports to COMJCTG (TAB B).

(3) Direct activation of forward air guide net and enter as alternate net control station as required (TAB B).

(4) Be prepared to employ backup audio and visual com- [redacted] subordinate [redacted] (TAB A).

[redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING
[redacted]UFORN

[redacted]

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d. Command Group Leader (Ground Force):

(1) Activate command group radio net (FM) for command and control of subordinate security-pathfinder/demo elements (TAB C).

(2) Enter ground force command net (FM) (TAB B).

(3) Ensure that Security Elements #2 and #3 have communications means and procedures for coordination of close air support on forward air guide net when directed by ground force commander (TAB B).

(4) Be prepared to employ backup audio communications for internal command and control.

(5) Be prepared to respond to ground force commander backup visual communications (TAB D).

e. Assault Group Leader (Ground Force):

(1) Activate assault group radio net (FM) for command and control of subordinate action elements (TAB C).

(2) Enter ground force command net (FM) TAB B).

(3) Be prepared to employ backup audio communications for internal command and control.

(4) Be prepared to respond to ground force commander backup visual communications (TAB D).

f. Support Group Leader (Ground Force):

(1) Activate support group radio net (FM) for command and control of subordinate support elements (TAB C).

(2) Enter ground force command net (FM) TAB B).

(3) Be prepared to assume alternate net control station in ground force command net as required (TAB B).

(4) Be prepared to employ backup audio communications for internal command and control.

(5) Be prepared to respond to ground force commander backup visual communications (TAB D).

(6) Ensure that Support Elements #1 and #2 have communications means and procedures for coordination of close air support on forward air guide net when directed by ground force commander (TAB B).

g. Air Strike Element (A-1s):

(1) Enter air/ground net (UHF) as primary communications with ground force commander and relaying of ground force commanders reports to COMJCTG (TAB B).

(2) Guard ground force command net (FM) for purpose of monitoring ground action and as alternate communications with [illegible] (TAB B).

(3) Activate forward air guide net as net control station when directed by ground force commander (TAB B).

(4) Be prepared to respond to ground force commander visual communications signals (TAB D).

h. Air Assault Element (HH-53s):

(1) Enter air/ground net (UHF) as primary means of receiving ground force commanders extraction and recovery directions (TAB B).

(2) Guard ground force command net (FM) as alternate means of receiving ground force commanders extraction and recovery directions (TAB B).

(3) Be prepared to respond to ground force commander visual communications signals (TAB D).

i. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Air strike and air assault elements. En route to target area, aircraft radios will be preset to ground command net (FM) and air ground net (UHF) frequencies. These frequencies will be used for en route communications, as directed by air mission commander. Ground force commander activates ground force command net and air ground net and assumes net control at H+30 seconds (TAB B).

(2) Ground force group leaders enter ground force command net immediately upon touchdown in target area (TAB B).

(3) Close air support leader (A-1) will relay ground force commanders requests for call up of airlift helicopters as required.

(4) Air strike elements discontinue guard of ground force command net (FM) and enter forward air guide net (FM) upon receipt of ground force commander's approval of initial forward air guide directed mission. Air strike elements communicate with forward air guides when directed by ground force commander to respond to a specific close air support request. Forward air guide net is deactivated upon termination of ground force operations in target area.

4. (S) SPECIAL MEASURES.

a. The Airborne Relay Link (A-1E - KC-135) is the primary communications between COMJCTG and the ground forces commander during ground operations, accordingly, the air ground net (UHF) is critical both for relay of COMJCTG command communications and as the primary "on scene" radio net for the ground commander's control of subordinate air elements in the target area (TAB A).

b. Search and rescue operations (SAR) will be coordinated by Air Force HC-130 (Crown) which will guard ground command net (FM) and air ground net (UHF) as well as SAR guard frequencies required to coordinate SAR operations.

c. All ground force personnel will be provided an AN/PRC-90 radio for emergency search and rescue operations. In the event that [illegible] fail during ground operations, the [illegible] ground force group/element leaders for communications with the ground force commander on PRC-90 alternate guard frequency.

[redacted]

SECRET

5. (S) LOGISTIC:

a. Annex D.

b. Pathfinder Beacons and SAR individual radios will be provided on loan basis from US Air Force resources.

c. Ground Force Communications Electronics Equipment will be provided on loan basis from US Army resources.

6. (TS) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command. Ground force command post: Annex C, Appendix 8, basic operation plan.

b. Signal. Ground force SOI Index 1-1 in effect.

TAB A Ground Force Communications Concept

TAB B Radio Nets, Ground Force Commander

TAB C Radio Nets, Ground Force Group Leaders

TAB D Visual Communications and Ground Beacon

[redacted]



APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG Ground Force Communications Concept (U)

TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON D. C. 20301
28 August 1970

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO COMJCTG OPLAN (U)
[redacted], GROUND FORCE COMMANDER (U)

1. (S) GROUND COMMAND NET (FM).

a. Net Control: Ground Commander.

b. Time Activated: H+30 seconds.

c. Frequency Assignment: Primary FM 53.0

Secondary FM 53.4

d. Legend:

X - Net Control Station

+ - Alternate Net Control Station

O - Enter

- - Guard/Monitor

e.

Stations in Net	Function	Call Sign
Ground Commander	X	Wild Root
Assault Group Leader	O	Blue Boy
Support Group Leader	+	Green Leaf
Ground Command Group Leader	O	Red Wine
Air Strike Element (A-1s)	-	Peach 01, 02, 03, 04, 05
Air Assault Element (HH-53s)	-	Apple 01, 02, 03, 04, 05
Marshalling Area Control Officer	-	Red Wine 5
COMARCOM	-	Axel
SAR Coordinator (HC-130)	-	Crown

2. (S) AIR GROUND NET (UHF).

a. Net Control: Ground Commander

b. Time Activated: H+1 minute

c. Frequency Assignment: Primary (UHF) 322.2

Secondary (UHF) 282.8

[redacted]

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[illegible]

1. [illegible]. To conduct a coordinated [illegible] air recon[illegible] designed [illegible] an air attack in the [illegible]. This apparent [illegible] is to confuse the enemy [illegible] and to [illegible] enemy's Air Defense air[illegible] toward this diversionary attack.

2. (S) [illegible].

a. Experience has demonstrated that a large naval air attack in the HAIPHONG area can confuse and saturate the enemy's Ground Air Defense organization. Also, this could draw the enemy's Air Defense MIGs toward positions to counter such an air attack. This operation is intended to draw the enemy's air defense capability to this apparent attack.

b. It is unlikely that actual bombing will be politically feasible. Therefore, to cause additional confusion and concern on the part of the enemy, flare drops near selected targets in the coastal area are desired to further divert the enemy's attention.

c. Although the primary purpose of this mission is diversion, it does offer the opportunity to conduct extensive air reconnaissance in conjunction with the diversionary air attacks. In order to provide a more positive, credible mission, at the operating level, the reconnaissance aspects of the mission will be emphasized, but not to the detriment of the primary purpose.

d. The naval operational commander will provide the supporting naval forces required for the accomplishment of this mission.

3. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Recent intelligence indicates that the enemy night air defense capability has been at a relatively low level of alert. To avoid premature alerting of the enemy, the diversion flights should be launched from the current Yankee Station rather than moving the station north. Air refueling will be provided as necessary from Navy tankers.

b. The Navy diversion will consist of two waves of aircraft.

(1) The first wave will consist of approximately fifteen aircraft. This wave will penetrate the coast at H-20 minutes and remain until H+5 minutes. The aircraft will consist of a mix of fighters, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft as dictated by standard procedures. Flaring of the coastal area in the vicinity of HAIPHONG is desired.

c. The second wave will also consist of a mixed group of approximately fifteen aircraft. The second wave should include eight to ten A-6 aircraft flying typical A-6 profiles. The North Vietnamese air defense personnel are adept at recognizing the A-6 profile and the A-6 capability is greatly respected by the enemy. By placing the A-6s in the second wave it is anticipated that considerable pressure will be added to that already existing on the

NVN air defense system. The second wave commences its diversion in the target area at H+10 minutes and departs the area at H+25 minutes.

c. Based upon available intelligence of expected enemy reaction times, by H+25 minutes, the enemy fighters if launched will need to recover for fuel. By the time they can take off again, the diversion will have accomplished its objective.

e. One EC-121/EP-3 BIG LOOK aircraft will be on station at H-2+55 minutes and remain on station for approximately 6 hours. This aircraft will serve as a normal GOT/RT station, provide MIG/SAM warning and give vectors toward MIGs if applicable for both Navy and Air Force fighters.

f. Pertinent US Air Force operations in this area are described in ANNEX C.

4. (U) PLANNING.

a. It is intended to allpw the Task Group Commander flexibility in planning the details of this operation. The primary requirement is to divert the NVN Air Defense System from H-20 to H+25 minutes. Employment of support aircraft such as refuelers, ECM, and SAR will be in accordance with standing operating procedures. Additional Navy operational considerations are in APPENDIX 2.

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

APPENDICES

1. NAVY DIVERSION SCHEDULE

2. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

[redacted]
[redacted]
WASHINGTON, [redacted]
26 August 197[redacted]

[redacted]

H - 2 hours and 55 minutes - BIG LOOK aircraft on station.

H - 1 hour and 15 minutes - KC-135 tanker crosses 16°N.

H - 45 minutes - Tanker on station.

H - 45 minutes - First wave of diversion arrives at tankers.

H - 30 minutes - First wave departs tankers.

H - 20 minutes - First wave arrives over target area.

H - 20 minutes - Second wave arrives at tankers.

H + 5 minutes - First wave departs coast; second wave is five minutes from target.

H + 10 minutes - Second wave commences diversion in target area.

H + 25 minutes - Second wave departs target area.

6 19

HEADQUARTERS [illegible]
COMMANDER [illegible]
WASHINGTON, D.C. [illegible]
26 August 1970

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX L TO CINCPAC OPLAN [illegible]
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (U)

1. (S) Flight profiles and flaring of targets are to be accomplished in such manner as to draw enemy aircraft to the east or northeast of HAIPHONG and MIG bases as much as possible and cause maximum fuel consumption on initial launch.

2. (S) Flaring and reconnaissance should be done on targets in which the enemy would ordinarily expect US and SVN forces to have bonafide military interest, e.g. marshalling points, docks, power facilities, etc.

3. (S) Although diverting the NVN air defense net and MIG assets is the primary purpose of the Navy effort, it does offer an opportunity for reconnaissance that will lend more credibility to the basic diversion and provide for update of Essential Elements of Intelligence (EEI).

4. (S) Engagement with the enemy shall be in accordance with standing rules of engagement.

6 . 19

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
23 August 1970

ANNEX TO _____ PLAN (U)
OPERATIONS SECURITY/COVER AND DECEPTION (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. ANNEX B, "Counterintelligence and Security"; and ANNEX F, "Public Affairs" (TS).

b. SM-780-69, Operations Security (S).

c. AFM 55-12, Cover and Deception (S).

1. (TS) OPERATIONS SECURITY.

a. (S) Background. The Operations Security (OPSEC) concept is concerned with the manner in which operations are planned, rehearsed, and conducted so that the patterns, procedures, and sequence of events which develop, do not in themselves reveal classified information about the mission but act in support of the cover and deception plan. Therefore, constant attention must be directed toward achieving the highest degree of operations security in all phases of the employment phase.

b. (TS) Execution.

(1) Planning. All plans, messages, orders, and other correspondence must be developed with the awareness that the enemy can and does identify and exploit vulnerable activities and must be designed to provide the highest degree of security possible without degrading the effectiveness or safety of the operations.

(2) Predeployment. Preparations for deployment must be worked as far in advance as possible to preclude an increasing level of activity which could reveal that deployment is imminent.

(a) Airlift requirements must be planned for minimum ground time.

(b) Personnel preparations must be completed well ahead of the scheduled deployment date to allow for last-minute changes.

1. Immunizations must be up-to-date.

2. Supplies and personal equipment must be available in sufficient quantities to preclude a last-minute frantic search.

(3) Deployment.

(a) To insure isolation from the training phases, the nickname IVORY COAST must remain with the training contingent and a new nickname assigned to the employment force.

6 19

(b) [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible] mation will be identified [illegible]

3. Communications security will be observed.

(c) All insignia, badges, and other identifying markings will be removed from uniforms, and be kept prior to deployment.

(4) Employment.

(a) Preparation. Activities at the staging base must be completely isolated and planned to provide for an extended stay in the event of a delay. Pre-mission briefings must be conducted in an area secure from visual, as well as aural, surveillance. Mission personnel must be sanitized before final aircraft boarding.

(b) Execution. Aircraft call signs which are reserved for the operations will be assigned to the force (see ANNEX E - Communications-Electronics). Radio silence must be maintained except for necessary communications which will be made by HF-CW or secure voice. Position reporting and any emergency reporting en route to the objective will be accomplished utilizing HF CW-Codes. (See ANNEX E - Communications-Electronics, and ANNEX C, APPENDIX 6 - Ground Operations). Radio security will be maintained during egress and recovery.

(c) Redeployment. Security and isolation must be maintained during mission critiques and debriefings. CONUS recovery will be accomplished in as a secure manner as possible considering the situation at the time and the eventuality that the operation could be employed at another time.

2. (TS) COVER AND DECEPTION.

a. Cover Plan.

(1) The foundation of the cover plan is a cover mission which portrays the JCTG as a special task group, organized at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, whose mission is to provide for the planning and training of a contingency force in-being to be available for immediate deployment to designated locations for the possible evacuation of kidnapped or isolated US Embassy personnel or other US Nationals. Deployment would be at the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) The classification of the cover plan, without reference to the fact that it is a cover plan, is ~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~. The classification of the cover plan with reference to the fact that it is a cover plan is ~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

(3) Varying levels of classification of the cover plan are listed below and can be used according to the situation and the need-to-know:

(a) Unclassified Official Use Only. For release to support personnel or Public Information Officers if necessary (See ANNEX N): "The unit is involved in a classified mobility training exercise."

(b) Secret: "Units of the Army Special Forces and Air Force Special Operations Forces are conducting training exercises for contingency evacuation of US Nationals from threatened areas.

b. To preclude any inadvertent admission concerning the true capabilities, intent, and the actual operational plan for the JCTG, all personnel who have knowledge of the true mission of the JCTG will be thoroughly briefed concerning the cover mission, the requirement for security, and their individual responsibility concerning the maintenance of this security.

c. All other personnel assigned to JCTG will be thoroughly briefed on their particular portions of the cover mission and the security aspects involved so they will believe it is the true mission of the force. If possible, individuals will be assigned tasks related to the cover mission to enable them to give plausible replies to questions. Personnel will be warned against compromising the mission during off-duty hours by talk or activities. All concerned personnel must be impressed with the sensitive nature of information relative to JCTG's activities and the importance of security. All personnel will be apprised of punitive consequences which would result from a security violation and that counter-intelligence/military intelligence have been assigned to mission to detect leaks.

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

HEADQUARTERS JCS
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C.
28 August 1970

[redacted] TO [redacted] OPLAN [redacted]
[redacted] PROCESSING(U)

(U) REFERENCE: JCS Letter (SM-309-68), dated 18 June 1968

1. (U) PURPOSE. To outline procedures for the initial medical examination on landing at UDORN AIR BASE, movement and treatment of returnees repatriated as a result of this operation.

2. (U) GENERAL.

a. Due to the political impact of forcible recovery from the camp, existing DOD and JCS instructions, and Service PW handling plans (EGRESS RECAP) are NOT applicable.

b. Two C-141 MEDEVAC aircraft will be prepositioned at a PACOM base which would not cause special attention, such as CLARK AFB, on one hour alert and land at UDORN approximately H+5-1/2. Medical staff personnel, equipment, and special bland diet and other medical supplies for these aircraft will be obtained by the Hospital Commander at a designated PACOM hospital. (See ANNEX D - Medical.)

c. Upon landing at UDORN, the returnees will be moved by ambulances to the base hospital where they will be isolated and physically evaluated to determine if they are capable of undertaking the flight to ANDREWS AFB. A flash message will be sent to the NMCC listing full name, rank, SSN or Service Number, and Service of each returnee. It is estimated that most of the recovered PWs will be available for boarding the C-141 approximately 3-1/2 hours after landing at UDORN. The flight to ANDREWS will require approximately 21 hours.

d. Returnees determined incapable of making the flight to ANDREWS will be released from the JCTG and will remain at the UDORN hospital under the control of PACAF and will be moved to the CONUS under expedited standard sick and wounded procedures. EGRESS RECAP procedures apply for these individuals.

e. Aboard the C-141 will be the returnees, medical personnel, the Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG) Commander, and a small contingent of the JCTG staff. A small staff from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs will join the flight at an en route refueling stop if press exploitation of the operation at this time is considered desirable. Prime consideration will be given to the desires and to the physical well-being of the returnees. The senior medical officer aboard will determine which PWs are physically capable of brief interviews with the press at ANDREWS. Within the security considerations of the Commander, JCTG, the ASD/PA staff aboard will brief and advise only those returnees who are determined medically able and who desire press interviews, as [redacted] of the JCTG. (See ANNEX F.)

[redacted]

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[illegible]. Upon arrival at ANDREWS AFB, the returnees who are [illegible] [illegible] capable of brief press interviews will be [illegible] [illegible] and immediately moved from the C-141 to either the [illegible] BETHESDA or WALTER REED Hospitals, depending [illegible] [illegible] of the returnees. Special police [illegible] [illegible] ANDREWS at that time to isolate these returnees [illegible] the [illegible], noise, and excitement of the press and the [illegible]. Necessary arrangements for returnees to meet their next-of-kin will be made by the respective Services at the hospital concerned. (See ANNEX F for remaining Public Affairs matters.) After the returnees are released to the Services, the policy for processing of returned PWs will be in accordance with existing Service plans (EGRESS RECAP).

LEROY J. MANOR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander,
Joint Contingency Task Group

HEADQUARTERS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
28 August 1970

ANNEX Z TO COMJCTG OPLAN (S)
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6 19

HEA[illegible]TER[illegible]
[illegible]CY [illegible]
WA[illegible]ON, [illegible]
28 August 19[illegible]

[illegible] CONTINGENCY OPLAN (S)
[illegible] CHECKLIST (U)

CINCPAC

Brief appropriate staff members.
Identify point of contact officers (2).
    Location.
    Phone Numbers.
    Cable Address.
Review communications procedures (at CINCPAC).
Review RC-135 set up with Lt Colonel Kennedy, obtain letter of instructions, if required.
CINCPAC letter of instruction.

MACV

Brief COMUSMACV.

7th AF

Brief Commander, 7AF.
Review instructions to supporting units.
Obtain letter of introduction.
Finalize frag orders.
Finalize radio frequencies.
Establish in-theater airlift requirements.
Identify two point of contact officers.
    Location.
    Phone Numbers.
    Cable Address.
    HEAVY STONE Focal Point.
Issue code word list.
Location of ordnance.
Thai based F-4 alert posture.
KC-135 tanker alert posture.

Takhli

Compound facilities.
    Beds.
    Messing.
    Briefing Rooms.
    Operations Office.
    Personnel Exposure (visibility).
    Communications.
    Transportation.
    Storage Space.
    Ammo/Munitions Storage.
    Fork Lifts.
Base.
    Billeting.
    Messing.
    Communications.
        HEAVY STONE.
        [illegible]
        [illegible]
    Aircraft Parking (C-130E & Airlift).
        Security.
    Tower and Approach Control.
    Transportation.
    Ground Support Equipment.
    Small Arms Range.

Okinawa

Letter of Instructions.
Flag Orders.
Frequencies.
Code Words.
Communications Procedures.
Focal Point Officers.
Location.
Phone Numbers.
Cable Address.
COMBAT APPLE Communications Access.

DaNang (Monkey Mountain)

Facilities and Communications.
Point of Contact.
Location.
Phone Numbers.
Cable Address.
Access List for Staff.
Transportation DaNang - MM - Return.
Code Words.
Transportation to COM7FLT and CTF77 for Navy briefers.

Udorn

Contact 7/13 Commander.
Letter of Instructions to:
40 ARS.
437 TRW.
Aircraft Parking Areas.
On-loading Areas.
Off-loading Areas.
Hospital Facilities.
Billeting and Transportation.
Staff.
Aircrews.
TDY Maintenance and Support.
Office for Liaison Officer.
Telephone.
Debriefing Facilities.
Location.
Equipment.
Survival Gear for:
5 HH-53s.
1 HH-3.
Storage Space for Mission Supplies.
Tower and Radar Suppression.
HEAVY STONE Focal Point.
mament Support for Installation of HH-53 Flack Suppressors.

Phanom

r of Instructions.
ify Points of Contact:
Location.
Phone Numbers.
ble Address.
and Transportation for WRAMA Team.
for WRAMA Team.
Hotel.
uipment for 10 A-1 Crew Pilots.
uipment for C-130Es:
ases and Chest Packs.
ons.
cal Point.

Letter of Instructions.
Frag Orders.
Identify Points of Contact.
    Location.
    Phone Numbers.
    Cable Address.
Code Words.

Korat

Letter of Instructions.
Frag Order.
Identify Points of Contact.
    Location.
    Phone Numbers.
    Cable Address.
Code Words.

Cam Ranh

Letter of Instructions.
Point of Contact.
    Location.
    Phone Number.

Bien Hoa

Letter of Instructions.
Point of Contact.
    Location.
    Phone Number.