

~~Top Secret~~

12

OPERATION



KINGPIN

TOP SECRET CONTROL
Copy No. _____
Case No. 97-F-1230
Doc. No. _____
Document No. 5

~~Top Secret~~

RECOMMENDED NMCC CONFERENCE ROOM ACCESS LIST

SECDEF	DDOs
DEPSECDEF	Director, DIA and Deputies for Production
ASD - Public Affairs	Director, NSA
Chairman, JCS and Joint Chiefs	BGen Allen, USAF
Director, Joint Staff	BGen Baldwin, USA
Operations Deputies	RAdm Engen, USN
LTG Knowles	BGen Blackburn, USA
J-3	Mr. Zaslow, NSA Rep
Deputy J-3	Captain Train, USN

OPERATIONS PERSONNEL

(Will be on a shift bases)

Col Mayer, USA, Chief Special Ops Div, J-3	DIA Representatives
Col Gibson, Dep SACSA	Capt J. S. Harris, USN
Col Norman, Opns Officer	Cdr John Bruce, USN
Col Rice, NMCC Opns Officer	Capt N. J. Nash, USAF
LTC Little, Opns Officer	Capt J. E. Kennedy
LTC Pattee, Opns Officer	Mr. R. C. Guemther
LTC Hatch, Opns Officer	Mr. J. T. Berbrich
	SSgt S. E. Graves, USA
	Draftsmen
	Sp Jordan
	Draftsman Downing
	Mrs. P. L. Earley, Secretary

SCENARIO

This operation provides for a raid in North Vietnam to be conducted by Army Special Forces personnel assaulting the Son Tay prison camp in Air Force helicopters assisted by a Navy air diversion. The most advantageous period for this undertaking is between 21 and 25 November when predictions of conditions for light and weather are most favorable. The concept includes feints to confuse the enemy and mask the main effort which will employ one HH-3 helicopter to land within the prison compound to gain immediate access and surprise.

The Son Tay prison camp is located approximately 20 NM NW of Hanoi, well away from civilian habitation, in rice paddies about one KM NW of Son Tay City, sometimes referred to as Son Tay Citadel (Fig 1).

The Camp consists of two separate portions; the walled compound, and an Admin Support area outside the wall containing an estimated 45 Vietnamese, including dependents (Figs 2 and 3). US PWs are apparently housed in the four large buildings in the compound having a wall about seven feet in height and two, possibly three, guard towers along the west wall. The communications/headquarters building is outside the compound and is the terminus of the only visible power and telephone lines. The remainder of the structures are guard quarters or support buildings. There are indications that 70 PWs, 49

of which have been positively identified, are within the camp.

US Forces arrive in this objective area by air, according to a precisely timed movement from Thailand over Laos and into NVN from the west. After the proper NCS approvals and weather clearance, and at approximately 4 hours prior to the actual assault landing, the first aircraft, a specially configured C-130 designed for essential enroute and pinpoint terminal navigation, departs Takhli for Nakhon Phanom. At this location the C-130 is joined by 4 A-1 aircraft and both elements proceed to a H/C air refueling point north of the Plaine de Jarres. Shortly thereafter, a second similar type C-130 launches from Takhli, overflies Udorn, and proceeds to this same refueling point (Fig 4). The assault helicopters, 1 - HH-3 and 5-HH-53s depart Udorn in time to rendezvous with their refueling aircraft, and complete refueling by H-1:00.

H-1:00 is the time that these forces combine and form 2 groups, with the lead C-130 and the H/Cs comprising the first group followed in 10 minutes by the other C-130 with 4 A-1s.

These two groups then continue in trail, crossing high points on the route in Laos at 2000 feet above ground level, and descending to 1000 feet as they move into North Vietnam about 38 minutes prior to TOT. The NVN NW radar network

should not detect the penetration until it enters the Red River Valley at approximately 12 minutes prior to TOT and, from that point on, the formation is subject to continuous tracking by enemy radar (Fig 5).

Just prior to the appearance of the force from the west, diversionary penetrations by Navy air, consisting of two staggered thrusts toward the coast by squadron-sized forces beginning at H-20 minutes, are expected to trigger a conventional air attack response by the North Vietnamese. The real effort will then be competing for resources and attention (Fig 6).

Additionally, 8 F-4s are available for MIG CAP and cycle into the objective area in flights of 2 to perform orbits both NE and SE of Hanoi. They depart Udorn in time to be on station by H-hour under the control of COLLEGE EYE (EC-121s) orbiting over the Gulf of Tonkin providing enemy and friendly air order of battle information to the command center located in the TACC-NS at Da Nang. An RC-135 (b)(1) aircraft also orbits in the Gulf and functions as the alternate mission control with the airborne mission coordinator aboard. The Mission Commander, General Manor, is at the tactical air control center located at MONKEY MOUNTAIN near Danang and is able to monitor developments as they unfold and direct the forces accordingly (Fig 7).

The formation approaches the first IP at approximately 500 feet. There are excellent navigation features along the approach route and both the first IP and the final IP are distinctive lakes, easily discernible by airborne equipment. Assault tactics commence one-half mile from the target on signal from the lead C-130. The helicopters will slow up and descend while the C-130 jumps up to 1500 feet and releases flares directly over the prison. The HH-3 and three assault HH-53s should be within thirty seconds of landing at H-hour when the flares ignite (Fig 8).

After dropping flares over the prison, this first C-130 makes a right turn and drops fire fight simulators southeast of Son Tay city to split and divert attention of enemy forces possibly billeted in the town. The C-130 then continues to the southwest and drops two firebombs, marker flares, and fire fight simulators in the vicinity of an ammunition storage area four kilometers southwest of the target. The firebombs serve the dual purpose of creating a diversion and providing a highly visible anchor point for two A-1s to come forward and orbit, beginning at H+30 seconds. This anchor is located at the most probable source of any ground threat to the prison operations.

The C-130 then proceeds west to a point where it can function as a UHF/DF aid for A-1s and H/Cs when they depart the target. The HH-53s, after disembarking their troops

at the prison, move to relatively isolated areas four kilometers to the northwest where they will land and wait until called back by the Ground Commander (20 - 30 minutes).

The reserve, with one C-130, the remaining 1 A-1s, and 2 empty HH-53s not used in the assault turn right, out of the line of flight, 3 minutes away from the target and form a helicopter and A-1 pattern north of Ba Vi Mountain with the C-130 holding west of the Black River (Fig 9).

Having left the assault helicopters about 30 seconds out from the target, we will return to the ground operation that these troop carrying aircraft will initiate. The ground attack force consists of 56 Army Special Forces personnel commanded by Colonel Arthur D. Simons. This ground force is organized into three groups; command, assault, and support. The essentials of this operation are surprise, speed, and simplicity.

The attack starts with a heliborne assault on Son Tay PW camp at H-30 seconds with three helicopters making flare-lighted west-southwest firing approaches. The guard towers communication center, and guard quarters area are neutralized. H-hour puts the lead helicopter, the HH-3, on the ground in the courtyard of the PW compound. The assault group aboard this helicopter, consisting of three

action elements, secures the inside of the compound and the demolitionist blows the wall near the southwest corner. This force then proceeds to designated cellblocks to release and guide PWs to a control point (Fig 10). Immediately after the assault group lands inside, helos #1 and #2 with the command and support groups, land outside to the south of the compound in cultivated rice fields.

The support group sweeps through the area housing communication facilities and enemy support troops, including compound guards. The bridge north of the objective is secured, the communication cable on the bridge cut, and the bridge span closest to the objective blown. Buildings immediately across the road are swept. The command group establishes blocking positions on the road south, the canal southwest, and the southwest corner of the compound wall from which the PWs will be exited.

The final phase finds organized and closely controlled aircraft loads being moved to the pickup point, one load at a time, for final count, loading, and takeoff. Ground forces are phased out of the area with PW loads, and security elements are rolled back to the pickup point. These security elements, the last PWs along with the ground force commander, depart the objective area on the last aircraft. All aircraft depart the target area individually, with time and route

separation for safety, bound for Udorn where provisions have been made for reception and treatment. The HH-3 will be left in the compound and destroyed with a timed explosive charge.

The support element has four thirty-pound prepared satchel charges for dropping the bridge span at the south end and adhesive charges for cutting the cable.

A-1 aircraft provide air cover and early warning to the ground force and are responsive to enemy threats with 20 MM cannon fire, rockets, and bombs.

In the event that "hard" confinement cells are encountered, a capability exists of cutting through 3/8 inch steel plate with back-packed oxy-acetylene gear, removing locks with compound bolt cutters, and cutting through hardwood stocks with chain saws. Great trouble along this line is not anticipated.

The ground commander is positive that the operation will succeed. He has personally selected every man on this mission - they are all volunteers, dedicated, and free from any discernible defect. The training was thorough, definitive, and intense.


The aircrews are among the best available. They were also individually selected and all aircraft commanders are volunteers. The forward looking infrared navigation systems recently installed in the two C-130 lead aircraft have performed very well, as has a (b)(1) placed on

three A-1 aircraft just prior to the operation. Dress rehearsals, to include complete full profile missions, have been conducted with the special munitions and electronic equipment selected, to achieve a peak in forces.

In all planning and training, security has been uppermost of all priorities. We have in the group, highly qualified security personnel and have incorporated their ideas into every facet of operational planning and deception. A communications monitoring unit was established at the Eglin AFB pre-deployment training site (b)(1) assisted in the security endeavor. Project personnel have been thoroughly briefed on the security requirements and charged with the responsibility for compliance.

In all cases, the location and TOT of our operation have been closely held. D-day, and H-hour, plus required code word meanings, were passed verbally from designated members of the Joint Task Group to required element commanders only. Formatted messages are being used whenever possible in our communications for: execution approval, delays, or cancellation. Secure communications have been established with General Manor in Da Nang, Admiral McCain and selected personnel in the NMCC to provide as much of the real-time progress of the operation as the deliberately limited traffic will permit.

If resources in support of this operation reveal that the enemy may have determined our objective, the operation will be cancelled.



VM/R-2

GULF

VM/R-2

TONKIN

FIG 1





FIG 2

21 08 36N 105 30 01E



LEGEND

 PW CELLS

 PROBABLY ENEMY OCCUPIED

 ADMIN & SUPPORT BLDGS.

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


FIG 4

FOPCES

PRIMARY MISSION

1 - C-130E [ENROUTE NAVIGATION] -

12 USAF

3 - HH-53 [ASSAULT] -

13 USAF, 42 SPEC. FORCES

1 - H-3 [COMPOUND ASSAULT] -

3 USAF, 14 SPEC. FORCES

2 - A-1 [GROUND SUPPORT] -

4 USAF

RESERVE

1 - C-130E

2 - HH-53

2 - A-1

SUPPORT

1 - RC-135 [COMBAT APPLE]

2 - EC-121 [COLLEGE EYE]

2 - HC-130 [HELICOPTER TANKER]

8 - F-4 [MIG CAP]

NAVY DIVERSION

10 - F-4/F-8

4 - RA-5

8 - A-4/A-7

8 - A-6

14 - VARIOUS SUPPORT

TARGET AREA TACTICS





FIG-8

TARGET AREA TACTICS

F-4
MIS
CAL
NE OF H



HAN
20 N

F-4
MIS
CAL
SE OF H



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SON TAY PW CAMP

21 08 36N 105 30 01E

HH-53 HOLDING
AREA 1 KM

BRIDGE
DEMO

SON
CON

TRENCHES

BAMBOO GATE

CONCERTINA
WIRE ON WALL

COMO
BLDG

ASSAULT

TRENCHES


1/2 C APPROACH

LEGEND

 PW CELLS

 PROBABLY ENEMY
OCCUPIED

 ADMIN & SUPPORT



KINGPIN

EVENT	H-HOUR COUNT	NORTH VN/THAILAND		EASTERN STANDARD	
		PLAN	REAL	PLAN	REAL
NCA APPROVAL					
1st WEATHER "GO"	H-9:00	1718		0518	
2nd WEATHER "GO"	H-5:00	2118		0918	
1st C-130 (STRIKE) DEP TAKHLI	H-4:10	2208		1008	
2nd C-130 (ASSAULT) DEP TAKHLI	H-3:20	2258		1058	
HEL0s (ASSAULT) DEP UDORN	H-3:00	2318		1118	
A-1s (STRIKE) DEP NKP	H-2:40	2338		1138	
REFUELING COMPLETE	H-1:00	0118		1318	
CROSS LAOS-MVM BORDER	H-0:38	0140		1340	
BEGIN NAVY COASTAL DIVERSION (45 MIN)	H-0:20	0158		1358	
I.P. ENROUTE TO TARGET	H-0:06.5	0211.5		1411.5	
ASSAULT LANDING	H-0	0218		1418	
EXTRACTION & WITHDRAWAL FROM TARGET	H-0:20 to H+0:30	0238 to 0248		1438 to 1448	
RECOVER AT UDORN					

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ALTERNATE PLANS

Blue Plan

Organization and Forces: Same as basic plan minus Assault Group, due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

Scope of Operations: Command Group breaches wall, clears compound and releases PWs; Support Group assumes responsibility for area outside compound to include bridge and road/canal junction. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

Red Plan

Organization and Forces: Same as basic plan minus Command Group due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

Scope of Operations: Assault Group lands within compound, neutralizes guard towers, main gate and buildings, releases and guides PWs; Support Group secures area north, east and south of compound, destroys bridges and communications cable, provides control point for evacuation of PWs. Support Group aircraft mini-gun fires increased. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

Green Plan

Organization and Force: Same as basic plan minus Support Group due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

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Scope of Operation: Assault Group lands within compound, neutralizes Guard Towers, main gate and buildings within compound, releases PWs. Command Group lands in field near Building 7B, secures area north, east and south of compound; establishes control point for evacuation of PWs. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

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TASK ORGANIZATIONS (U)

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Commander</u>
Joint Contingency Task Group	B/G L. J. Manor
Army Component (JCTG)	Col A. D. Simons
Air Force Component (JCTG)	B/G L. J. Manor
Support:	
HQ 7th Air Force	COM7AF
Task Force 77	COMTF77
432 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing	COM432TRW
56 Special Operations Wing	COM56SOW
834 Air Division	COM834AD
3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group	COM3ARRG
82 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron	COM82SRS
552 Airborne Early Warning Wing	COM552AEWW
307 Strategic Wing	COM307SW
US Force 779	COMUSF779
Military Airlift Command	COMMALC
505th Tactical Control Group	COM505TCG
6924th Security Squadron	6924SCTYSQ

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COMMAND POSTS

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Location</u>
National Military Command Center (NMCC)	Pentagon
CINCPAC	Camp Smith, Hawaii
CINCPACFLT	Kunua, Hawaii
COM 7th FLEET	Western Pacific
COMTF 77	Yankee Station
CINCPACAF	Hickam AFB, Hawaii
COM 7 AF	Tan Son Nhut, RVN
DEPCOM 7/13AF	Udorn, RTAFB, Thailand
COMJCTG Overseas Headquarters and Staging Base	Takhli, RTAFB, Thailand
Employment Command Post- Tactical Air Control Center North Sector	Son Tra, RVN (Monkey Mountain)
Ground Force, HH-53, H-3, F-4, HC-130 Element Command Posts	Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
C-130 Element Command Post	Takhli RTAFB, Thailand
A-1 Element Command Post	Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB, Thailand
RC-135 Element Command Post	Kadena AFB, Okinawa
KC-135 Element Command Post	Utapao RTAFB, Thailand
EC-121 Element Command Post	Korat RTAFB, Thailand/ Danang AFB, RVN
Navy Diversionary Aircraft Command Post	Yankee Station
Recovery Base	Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
Redeployment Base	Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

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COMMUNICATIONS

Communications Systems

NMCC to CINCPAC and COMJCTG.

- An unsecure voice conference will be established on day of operation at 0900 local between selected personnel at CINCPAC, NMCC and TACC-North (Monkey Mountain). Secure teletype and secure voice will also be available between these points, but not in the conference mode. .

COMJCTG to Subordinate Elements.

- Established Tactical Air Control circuitry provides unsecure and secure voice and secure message communications to element command posts.
- Installed aircraft communications provide unsecure voice circuits between all aircraft and COMJCTG. Utilization of an airborne relay eliminates line of sight communication difficulties.
- Ground Force Commander UHF and FM communications provide unsecure voice circuits to aircraft. Contact with COMJCTG through airborne relay.
- Ground Forces limited by FM unsecure voice circuit.
- Ground Forces will also use visual communications to avoid compromise over unsecure voice circuits precluded by use of pre-established code words.

Communications Support

- The Deputy Director for Operations (Command and Control) will provide personnel and facilities required at the NMCC for:
 - Fast reaction procedures for transmission of "Go/No-Go" execution approval.
 - Receipt, handling, and delivery of reports on the employment phase of combat operations and/or completion of the mission.
- CINCPAC will provide communications support to COMJCTG as required to include command and control voice and record communications to include "RED ROCKET" capabilities to the NMCC, 7 AF, 7 FLT, CTF77, Takhli, Utapao, Udorn, Nakhon Phanom, Korat, and TACC-NS.

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- CINCPACAF and 7 AF provide communications for use of existing Tactical Air Control G/A/G communications systems in-theater, use of capabilities of the TACC-NS.
- CINCPACFLT, 7 FLT, and CTF 77 will provide communications to support the COMJCTG and as directed by CINCPAC to include communications support for the Diversionary Mission and for CTF 77 interface with JCTG.
- 355th Combat Support Group, Takhli, will provide communications support to COMJCTG as required to include voice and record communications to the units supporting the mission.
- The following organizations will provide support to JCTG elements in their locations to include use of communications capabilities at the TUOC, TACC, or Command Post:
 - 432 TAC RECON Wing, Udorn
 - 56th SOWG, Nakhon Phanom
 - 307th STRAT Wing, Utapao
 - 388 TAC Fighter Wing, Korat
- COMJCTG will coordinate with CINCPAC and obtain authority to utilize and/or establish the communications capabilities to be provided by CINCPAC and subordinate elements.

Communications Nets

- The NMCC will use "RED ROCKET" procedures to send NCA mission approval/delay/cancellation messages to CINCPAC and the COMJCTG. The Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (EMATS) and the telecon circuit to CINCPAC will both be used to send "RED ROCKET" messages to CINCPAC. CINCPAC will be responsible for transmitting the messages to their selected subordinate units including the COMJCTG.

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Employment Phase COMJCTG Long-Haul Communications

The Employment Phase communications network will consist of existing long-haul secure record communications and command and control secure and/or nonsecure voice circuits.

Reports required by NCA/JCS/CINCPAC/COMJCTG will be transmitted on existing secure command and control record communications circuits.

If required, reports specified above can be accomplished by verbal reports via existing secure and/or nonsecure voice communications capabilities.

COMJCTG will make the final in-theater decision to launch, delay, or recall forces. COMJCTG may notify the 7AF Command Center duty officer of his decision and the Command Center will have the responsibility for notifying all the addressees/units. Normal 7AF mission notification, verification, and/or recall procedures for supporting forces will be used.

COMJCTG Tactical Ground/Air/Ground Communications

USAF Operational Control Net. To provide COMJCTG the capability to monitor and/or direct the control of the F-4 MIG CAP aircraft through the COLLEGE EYE aircraft and operational direction of the Airborne Mission Coordinator.

USAF Operational Reporting Net - Provides:

- Communications for enroute mission reporting from the Primary and Reserve Element Aircraft to COMJCTG.
- An alternate USAF operational control net for COMJCTG.
- SAR communications as required.

US Navy Operational Control Net (Diversionary Mission).
To provide the COMJCTG the capability to monitor/coordinate his operations with that of the Navy Diversionary Mission.

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- Direct activation of forward air guide net (FM) and enter as alternate net control station as required.
- Be prepared to employ backup audio and visual communications for command and control of major subordinate groups elements.

Search and Rescue Operations

- Coordinated by Air Force HC-130 (Crown) which will guard ground command net (FM) and air ground net (UHF) as well as SAR guard frequencies required to coordinate SAR operations.
- All ground force personnel will be provided an AN/PRC-90 radio for emergency search and rescue operations. In the event that all other communications means fail during ground operations, the AN/PRC-90 may be used by ground force group/element leaders for communications with the ground force commander on PRC-90 alternate guard frequency.

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DECISION POINTS - 21 NOVEMBER

<u>Time (EST)</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Authority</u>
0518	First Weather "Go/No-Go"	COMJCTG
0918	Final Weather "Go/No-Go"	COMJCTG
Before 1008	Abort operation prior to launch	CJCS/COMJCTG
Up To 1208	Delay launch for weather	COMJCTG
1008-1418	Abort operation en route	CJCS/COMJCTG
1418-1448	Operational decisions at objective	COMJCTG/CO Gnd Force
Any Time	Cancel operation (pre-arranged Code Word)	NCA/CJCS

NOTE: 24 hour weather delay may be directed by COMJCTG for a D-day of 23 Nov and 24 Nov with no change in H-hour. A delay for a D-day of 25 or 26 Nov will require a new H-hour of one hour later. A new D-day of 27 Nov or after will revert to original H-hour.

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EXPECTED REPORTS..

<u>Report</u>	<u>Responsible HQ</u>
* NCA approval	JCS
* Acknowledge receipt of NCA approval	JCTG
First weather "Go/No-Go" (H-9:00)	JCTG
Final weather "Go/No-Go" (H-5:00)	JCTG
* Launch (H-4:10)	JCTG
Refueling complete (H-1:00)	JCTG
Cross Laos - NVN Border (H-0:38)	JCTG
Cross I.P. (H-0:06 1/2)	JCTG
TOT (H-Hour)	JCTG
Cross NVN-Laos Border	JCTG
Return refueling complete	JCTG
* Recover at Udorn (H+3:30)	JCTG
PWs undergoing medical clearance procedures. Names forwarded (H+5:00)	JCTG
PWs depart Udorn by C-141 for CONUS (H+6:00)	JCTG

NOTE: Times in parenthesis are approximate for action to occur. Reports to NMCC will be received at a later time.

* Required.

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NMCC OPERATIONS DUTY

20 Nov 70 - 21 Nov 70

Team One

(0930 Hrs, 20 Nov 70 - 2000 Hrs, 20 Nov 70)

Col E. E. Mayer, USA, Chief Special Ops Division,
J-3

Col W. C. Norman, USA, Ops Officer, Special Ops
Division, J-3

Col F. C. Rice, USAF, Ops Officer, NMCC

Team Two

(2000 Hrs, 20 Nov 70 - 0800 Hrs, 21 Nov 70)

Col B. P. Gibson, USAF, Dep SACSA, J-3

Lt Col D. C. Hatch, USAF, Ops Officer, Special
Ops Division, J-3

Lt Col J. R. Pattee, USAF, Ops Officer, Special
Ops Division, J-3


Lt Col N. R. Little, USAF, Ops Officer, Special
Ops Division, J-3

NOTE: Appropriate DIA representation will be present.

SCHEDULE OF BRIEFINGS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
19 Nov	1700	Col Mayer briefs DDOs in Office of SACSA.
19 Nov	1500	SACSA briefs Mr. Henkin in Office of SACSA
20 Nov	on call	SACSA conference with BGen Allen, USAF, BGen Baldwin, USA, RAdm Christiansen, USN and Colonel Disilvio in Senior Authorities Room.
20 Nov	1315	SACSA briefs selected participants in NMCC Conference Room

Note: Other briefings will be conducted as required during progress of operation.



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~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~
~~NO FORN~~

SON TAY P.O.W. CAMP

P.O.W. CELLS

P.O.W. CELLS

SUPPORT BLDGS

SUPPORT BLDGS

SUPPORT BLDGS

GUARD SHACK





RENTAL
SPECIAL HANDLING
(NO FORT)

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

NORTH VIETNAM

**SON TAY MILITARY SCHOOL
AND TRAINING FACILITY**

21 06 35N 105 29 12E

BE NO 0616 00205



PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DAAR-9

6 JUN 70

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GN DISSEM

NORTH VIETNAM

SON TAY ARMY BKS W

21 05 26N 105 27 15E



0000

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 JUN 70

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



NORTH VIETNAM

SON TAY ARMY SUPPLY DEPOT

21 05 40N 105 29 18E



BE NO 0616 00144



PREPARED BY THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIAAP-9

6 JUN 70

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~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

NORTH VIETNAM

TRUNG HA ARMY BKS PHU NHIEU

21 13 29N 105 21 33E

BE NO 0616 00996



PREPARED BY THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIAAP-9


6 JUN 70

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

NORTH VIETNAM

SONG DONG ARMY BKS & SCHOOL

21 03 30N 105 30 05E



05

CE AGENCY

6 JUN 70

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~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



NORTH VIETNAM

TONG ARMY BKS

21 05 00N 105 28 10E



BE NO 0616 02282




PREPARED BY THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIAAF-9

6 JUN 70

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



NORTH VIETNAM

SON TAY SCHOOL

21 08 18N 105 30 45E



BE NO 0616 01882



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DIAAP-9

6 JUN 70

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~NO DISSEM~~

NEW BUILDING 

ED COMPOUND
NEW CONST 

NORTH VIETNAM
CAM DAI BKS

AND SUSPECTED PW DETN INSTLN N-36

21 09 40N 105 22 18E

00308

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 JUN 70



SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM



NORTH VIETNAM

SON TAY GOVT

CONTROL CENTER

21 08 20N 105 30 30E

BE NO 0616 00192

6 JUN 70


~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

NORTH VIETNAM

SON TAY STORAGE AREA SW

21 06 40N 105 27 30E

BE NO 0616 05097



FOREIGN DISSEM
CAN, AST, NZ & RVN

NORTH VIETNAM

SON TOC EW SITE

21 01 00N 105 29 45E

KNIFE REST

SPOON REST

ACE


KNIFE REST

RATOR

COMMO VAN

0000

21 AUG 70



SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NORTH VIETNAM

AAA AND SAM TRAINING FAC NEAR SON TAY

SON TAY 2 MILES

SON TAY ARMY
SUPPLY DEPOT

UNOCCUPIED

AMMO
STORAGE
AREA

SA 2 TRAINING

37 MM

ZPU 4

57 MM

TONG
AIR FIELD

PROB 100 MM

UNOCCUPIED

6 JUN 70





SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

HOA LAC AFLD

12 MAR 69

PSP ADDED TO RUNWAY





BHQ 674 19 July 70.

5.21



~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



NORTH VIETNAM

VIET TRI AMMO STG

21 10 10N 105 22 10E

BE NO 0616 00000



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6 JUN 70

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



COMPOUND

BE NO 0616 04929



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DIAAP-9

9 JUL 69

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

EX UK CA AST NZ RVN GP 1

