

**RE: New York Times Inquiry - Social Media Impostor Accounts**

(b)(6) DMA PROD (US)

**Sent:** Tuesday, February 26, 2019 8:37 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Thank you, (b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, February 26, 2019 8:34 AM

**To:** (b)(6) CIV DMA PROD (US) (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: New York Times Inquiry - Social Media Impostor Accounts

(b)(6)

We did a straightforward prep with (b)(6) and (b)(6) new assistant (b)(6). The time just changed to 1430-1500.

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**From:** (b)(6) CIV DMA PROD (US)

**Sent:** Tuesday, February 26, 2019 7:40 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (US)

**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Subject:** Fwd: New York Times Inquiry - Social Media Impostor Accounts

(b)(6)

Just an FYSA note. (b)(6) is still out sick but will help prep (b)(6) for the interview this morning.

V/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6) >

**Subject:** New York Times Inquiry - Social Media Impostor Accounts

Hi (b)(6)

Wanted to give you a heads up. Last week, I began assisting a press officer with a New York Times reporter's inquiry about what the Pentagon is doing to combat fraudulent social media accounts impersonating DOD leaders (and junior enlisted), which is a problem - some COCOMS report several hundred in one year. I connected them with the DOD's Twitter and Facebook government reps. I listened in on a background conference call w/ Twitter today at 1100. (b)(6) asked if I would be able to speak

on camera tomorrow, but since I am sick (and lost my voice) [REDACTED] went to see if [REDACTED] was available. Not sure what the outcome was from the ask. Here is the email from the reporter.

As discussed with [REDACTED] just now, our story is a deep look at the phenomenon of people posing as veterans and active members of the military on social media, often to perpetrate scams.

(b)(6)

So, I would love to chat with someone there about whether the Defense Department or military is doing anything about this and, if so, what.

Some other specifics I'm wondering:

- Has anyone in the military or Defense Department had discussions with Facebook officials about this issue? What has that relationship been like?
- How does the military handle impostors it finds on social media for its members? Does it have a different policy for accounts impersonating rank-and-file servicemen and women versus those impersonating officers?

I'm going to be in DC on Tuesday and would love to chat with someone there who has dealt with this issue. I am reporting this for a larger print piece, but the Times is also filming a documentary on the story, so we would like to also film an interview if possible.

(b)(6)

**RE: CID - NY Times**

(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, February 27, 2019 9:27 AM

**To:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US)

(b)(6)

I appreciate the notes. I would be very interested in any responses to the last two questions she posed.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, February 27, 2019 9:07 AM

**To:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: CID - NY Times

Here are the notes from (b)(6) interview. Seems like they are targeting Facebook.

Yesterday, (b)(6) an investigative reporter for the New York Times interviewed me for both a print article and a video documentary on our processes for combating imposter social media accounts.

While I was looking forward to discussing the ways in which we collaborate with you to help identify and then remove these accounts - it was evident early on that he had his own agenda which was that the social platforms were not doing enough.

To that end - I want to give you a courtesy heads up that (1) this interview occurred and a documentary will likely be released in the future on this issue, and (2) to provide you some context for his line of questioning.

During the interview, he referenced an excel spreadsheet of hundreds of accounts he had identified on both Facebook/Instagram that were imposter accounts --- using military officers and service members to raise funds for various issues.

His questions kept circling back to "Do you believe that Facebook is doing enough to combat imposters and take down these fake accounts?"

During the interview, he specifically asked if we thought Facebook should be using the facial recognition feature to take down these accounts that imposter our military service members.

I remained diligent that we are working with you guys to help identify and remove these accounts as quickly as possible.



- He then referenced an account that had been up since 2018 - as to point out that we are not being effective in removing imposter accounts.
- I want to reiterate ~ I appreciate all of your teams efforts in our previous collaborations to remove accounts and simply want to raise this to your awareness.
- Are you all receiving similar feedback? Any new steps/actions?
- Can my team or our public affairs offices in the military services do anything better to help report these accounts? How can we collaborate better?

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**From:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 27, 2019 9:01 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US)  
**Subject:** RE: CID - NY Times

(b)(6)

The decision to engage is pending. Can you share the talking points and messages that (b)(6) used for the interview? We would also appreciate any notes that came out of the interview. I know the CID PAO also conducted an interview with them, and based on his comments and any notes you can provide, that will inform the decision here on whether Army Public Affairs will engage.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 26, 2019 6:24 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: CID - NY Times

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks for letting me know. (b)(6) conducted the interview today. We started working this last week and were in touch with Facebook and Twitter liaisons before the process.

Do you have plans to engage?

Thank you,

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

On Feb 26, 2019, at 14:11, (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

(b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6)

The Army received a query from New York Times about social media impostors, specifically on Facebook. The reporter is Jack Nicas, and his request is at the very bottom of this email. We want to know if OSD has also been approached and what your plan is for engagement on it.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Believe LTG Cardon met with leaders from FB et al., when he was the CG, ARCYBER, but can't say that he met directly w/ the FB CEO.

At the time, it was reported that FB employed 3x govt reps to deal with imposters among its 1.75 billion global users. Background slides attached.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) 701st MP Group (CID)

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

(b)(6)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR: (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: CID - NY Times

Thanks (b)(6) And for the record, I never met with the CEO of Facebook, but if the reporter would like to get me a meeting with the CEO, I would really appreciate it.

-----Original Message-----

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: CID - NY Times

All,

Just finished my interview. It was the reporter below that has contacted OCPA. No doubt their intent is to target Facebook for a good portion of this problem. I sidestepped numerous questions attempting to get me to pinpoint and blame Facebook. I made the point several times that the fraud appears on all social media platforms. I explained that we (CID) and the Army work with many social media sites to remove fraudulent posts, but they continually pop up. The reporter pulled up a spread sheet on his laptop during the interview to demonstrate all the accounts he found since yesterday on (b)(6) etc. I also explained that PAOS in the Army continually monitor their senior leaders for false accounts. Again, as predicted, the entire focus of this is to go after Facebook. I am not recommending that (b)(6) grant an interview. It will do us no good to slam Facebook while we are working this issue. Additionally, the reporter said that he knew (b)(6) met with the CEO of Facebook. I did not confirm any info on that.

(b)(6)

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attachments.

(b)(6)



FYI,

According to the NY Times reporter I am conducting an interview with at 1030 today, my line of questioning is all related to handling the romance scam calls and not on the Facebook issue described below. I do think the issues will be merged for the final story, but they didn't reveal that. I will give you an update after my interview is completed.

(b)(6)




(b)(6)



(b)(6)



(b)(6) My team does the social media for the Army. We don't knock down imposters.

(b)(6) We only report them to Facebook or the other companies. When the request came to us, I immediately thought of  based on the work that we've done with him and the fact that he seems to be the SME in terms of imposters.

(b)(6)





(b)(6) Office of the Chief of Public Affairs  
(b)(6) Pentagon, Room 1D445  
(b)(6)

Email: 

Office: 

Cell: 

-----Original Message-----



(b)(6) 7/5/2019 RE: CID - NY Times (b)(6)  
(b)(6) From: Grey, Christopher P CIV USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Sent: Monday, February 25, 2019 1:21 PM (b)(6)  
To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)  
USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
Subject: CID - NY Times

(b)(6)

I am scheduled to do an interview with NY Times tomorrow on "romance scams" for NY Times TV. There was no mention of this issue below. I will circle back with the reporter to ask. The reporter I am working with is Rolake Bamgbose. Wondering why the PAO team at OCPA who works with Facebook to knock down imposters would not do this interview as opposed to CID agents.  
thanks

(b)(6)

USA Criminal Investigation Command (CID) Quantico, VA

(b)(6)

(b)(6) [www.cid.army.mil](http://www.cid.army.mil)

(b)(6) -----Original Message-----

(b)(6) From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)  
(b)(6) Sent: Monday, February 25, 2019 9:10 AM  
To: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)  
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

(b)(6)

I apologize for sending this directly to you instead of your PAO. I couldn't remember who that is.

Please remember that your command does not need to agree to everything the reporter is asking for. If there is a more limited amount of support you would like to provide, that would work too.

(b)(6) Let me know if you need anything from this end.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Office of the Chief of Public Affairs  
(b)(6) Pentagon, Room 1D445  
(b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)  
Office: (b)(6)  
Cell: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

(b)(6) 7/5/2019 RE: CID - NY Times (b)(6)  
From: [redacted] USARMY 701 MP GP (US) [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 5:09 PM  
To: [redacted] USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media (b)(6)

(b)(6) Thanks [redacted]  
I will push this up the chain to gauge their response.

(b)(6) [redacted]  
-----Original Message----- (b)(6)  
From: [redacted] USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)  
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 4:53 PM  
To: [redacted] USARMY 701 MP GP (US) [redacted]  
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media (b)(6)  
[redacted]

See the email traffic below. I think you are the more appropriate person to discuss with the New York Times, pending your leadership's approval. We can work the coordination piece on this end to get them in touch with you.

(b)(6) [redacted]

(b)(6) [redacted]

(b)(6) U.S. Army  
(b)(6) [redacted]

Office of the Chief of Public Affairs  
Pentagon, Room 1D445

Email: (b)(6) [redacted]  
Office: (b)(6) [redacted]  
Cell: (b)(6) [redacted]

(b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6)  
From: [redacted] USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 3:23 PM  
To: [redacted] USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)



(b)(6) 7/5/2019  
(b)(6)  
RE: CID - NY Times  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) (b)(6)  
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Thanks (b)(6) - I think this should really go to DMD and all the work they do with fake profiles and the relationship they have built with FB.  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) - thoughts?

(b)(6)

Army Public Affairs  
1500 Army Pentagon Room 1E475  
Washington, D.C. 20310

(b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)  
(b)(6)  
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 1:49 PM  
(b)(6)  
To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

When Mark Zuckerberg conducted his nationwide tour of all states he asked if he could visit USASOC. The public explanation was that he wanted to visit soldiers and families in NC on his tour. He actually came to discuss VR/AR technology with the command.



(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
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(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
During the meeting, we spoke with Mark about LTG Tovo's issues with fake FB profiles. We asked for a dedicated method to delete them when they popped up. From that point I submitted all Tovo fake profiles to FB when I found them. Mark was not aware, or said he was not aware, that fake profiles were an issue with military senior leaders.

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Los Angeles, CA

Office:

Cell:

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
On Feb 22, 2019, at 09:13, (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

wrote:

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
I've added (b)(6) from DMD to this. It might be better for the reporter to talk with (b)(6) first on this.

Can you give me the gist of the 5W's on your discussion with FB?

(b)(6)

Army Public Affairs

1500 Army Pentagon Room 1E475

Washington, D.C. 20310

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Email:

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
-----Original Message-----

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 11:18 AM

To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

(b)(6)  
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

(b)(6)  
This morning I received a NYT query noted below. I wanted to forward to you for guidance on response.

(b)(6)

Los Angeles, CA

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 5:53 AM

To: (b)(6) USSOCOM USASOC HQ

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

(b)(6)

My name is Jack Nicas and I'm a reporter for the New York Times. I'm reaching out because I'm working on a larger story about military impostors on social media. I know this is a major issue for active servicemen and women and veterans, with many scammers stealing their identities to pose as them on Facebook and Instagram to cheat people out of money.

I understand you were part of a group from the military who met with Facebook about this issue. I'd love to touch base to discuss Facebook's response and whether it has worked. Ideally we can speak on the record, and we are actually also filming a documentary on the story, so we would love to have you on camera. I'll be in DC on Tuesday. But I also can speak confidentiality if needed. FYI, I have also been in touch with the public affairs department about this issue and they are looking into it.

I'm at 508-864-3864 if you have a few minutes to discuss today.

Thank you,

Jack Nicas

Reporter

The New York Times

508-864-3864 <[tel:\(508\)20864-3864](tel:(508)20864-3864)> | @jacknicas <

[CAUTION]%Caution-<http://www.twitter.com/jacknicas>[%CAUTION] > My stories <

[CAUTION]%Caution-<https://www.nytimes.com/by/jack-nicas>[%CAUTION] >

7/5/2019

RE: CID - NY Times

<8Sept\_4-Star Forum\_Imposter brief\_FINAL.PPTX>



7/3/2019

FW: [Non-DoD Source] Case# 0108314418: Impersonation - AFSpaceC [ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001dSeP8:ref]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**FW: [Non-DoD Source] Case# 0108314418: Impersonation - AFSpaceC**  
**[ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001dSeP8:ref]**

[redacted] USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO [redacted]

**Sent:** Monday, March 18, 2019 4:25 PM

**To:** [redacted] CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

Thank you so much for your help with this!

The email I received is: Twitter Support Case 0108314418

Verification would be also greatly appreciated!

(b)(6) USAF

Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO

(b)(6)

**From:** Twitter Support <support@twitter.com>

**Sent:** Saturday, March 16, 2019 12:20 PM

**To:** AFSPC/PA Workflow <pa.wf@us.af.mil>

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Case# 0108314418: Impersonation - AFSpaceC [ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001dSeP8:ref]

**IMPORTANT: Your response is required in order for Twitter to continue investigating the reported account.**

Hello,

Thanks for sending your report regarding impersonation on Twitter.

**Our next steps:**

First, we need to confirm your identity. Below you'll find instructions and a link you can use to upload a copy of your valid government-issued photo ID. Then we'll review and process your report. We can't review your report until the documentation is received.

**Your next steps:**

Review the instructions below and upload the requested documentation. Please make sure to upload a legible copy so we can review the full name and photo on the ID. This information will be kept confidential and your documentation will be deleted.

**Instructions:**

- Click on the link below and upload a copy of your valid government-issued photo ID (e.g., driver's license or passport).
- If you are reporting an account that is not using the name that appears on your government-issued photo ID, you must also include documentation demonstrating that the name used by the account you're reporting is associated with you (e.g., proof of registration of your trade name or pseudonym).

Upload link: <https://twitterinc.secure.force.com/u?e=pa.wf@us.af.mil&cn=0108314418>

Please note that accounts in compliance with Twitter's parody, commentary, and fan accounts policy (<https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy>) are not considered in violation of our impersonation policy (<https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-impersonation-policy>).

Thank you,

Twitter

ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001dSeP8:ref

[Help](#)

Twitter, Inc. 1355 Market Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA 94103



**RE: COMPLETED: General Raymond Verified Social Media Account**

(b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)

**Sent:** Thursday, March 21, 2019 9:55 AM**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Thank you so much for your help! The boss was very excited about the blue check mark. I really appreciate your willingness to help me on this. I am sure it will not be the last time so I will be completing weekly scans and letting you know if something comes up.

You are amazing!

(b)(6) USAF

Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO

(b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)**From:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)**Sent:** Thursday, March 21, 2019 6:17 AM**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)**Subject:** COMPLETED: General Raymond Verified Social Media Account

Good morning (b)(6)

Checking in to see how everything is going. I see Twitter took down the fake account and made the exception to verify.

Please do a regular/weekly scan on all social platforms for impersonators for your organization and leaders even if they do not have accounts. We submit them through a government service portal for FB and IG. That is the same for all accounts impersonating service members.

Please let me know if you need assistance.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Mobile: (b)(6)

Pentagon Desk: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Mar 18, 2019, at 16:07, (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6) wrote:

Good Afternoon,

We have been experiencing problems with people pretending to be General Raymond (Air Force Space Command Commander) on Twitter. Is it possible to get him verified (his handle: @AFSpaceCC)? He has all of



the requirements below. Also I have tried reporting the accounts that are pretending to be him and was wondering if there is a way to know if these reports are received and acted on.

Thank you for your help!

(b)(6) USAF  
Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO  
(b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 27, 2019 9:01 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (USA)  
**Subject:** RE: Verified Social Media Accounts

Good morning,

I've submitted the requests. Here is what you need to do for Twitter.

When you have a chance, could you please ensure the following minimum requirements are in place for the new account:

- Login verification is activated
- Associated email must be governmental
- Profile and Cover photo are not Twitter's default photos
- Bio specifies the person's official title or the purpose of the org/agency/division
- A link to the org/agency/division/campaign's official website is added to the profile

We also recommend adding a Twitter button to your website that links to the Twitter profile. This will help people find your profile quicker and easier.

Finally, the account has to be active and Tweeting before we can submit a verification request.

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 22, 2019 3:40 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (USA)  
**Subject:** RE: Verified Social Media Accounts

Ma'am,

Our Twitter handle is @US\_SpaceCom and our Facebook is <https://www.facebook.com/US-Space-Command-1543842622385857/>

We would like to get these verified before the official stand-up (sometime in April/May). Any help would be appreciated!

Thank you.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6) USAF  
Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO  
COMM: (b)(6)  
DSN: (b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, February 21, 2019 4:45 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAI (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Verified Social Media Accounts

What you want is for the account(s) to become verified. I can help to make that process easier. Just to clarify, is @USSPACECOM the correct handle? I'm seeing it being used.

<https://twitter.com/usspacecom>

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/United-States-Space-Command/134875119867335>

Thank you,  
Aimee

(b)(6)  
Mobile: (b)(6)  
Pentagon Desk: (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

On Feb 21, 2019, at 17:55, (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO  
(b)(6) wrote:

Good Afternoon,

Thank you for the continued resources! I do have one question for you.

As previously discussed, we have secured social media accounts for the new USSPACECOM but have not posted anything on these accounts yet. What is the process to get the blue check mark on these accounts (before they are used) so they can go active immediately after the stand-up ceremony of USSPACECOM?

Thank you for your help in advance!

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6) USAF  
Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO

7/3/2019

RE: COMPLETED: General Raymond Verified Social Media Account

COMM: (719) 554-5163

DSN: 692-3731



**RE: COMPLETED: General Raymond Verified Social Media Account**

(b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)

**Sent:** Thursday, March 21, 2019 9:55 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

Thank you so much for your help! The boss was very excited about the blue check mark. I really appreciate your willingness to help me on this. I am sure it will not be the last time so I will be completing weekly scans and letting you know if something comes up.

You are amazing!

(b)(6)

Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)**Sent:** Thursday, March 21, 2019 6:17 AM**To:** (b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)**Cc:** (b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PA (b)(6)**Subject:** COMPLETED: General Raymond Verified Social Media Account

Good morning Lt Shimkus,

Checking in to see how everything is going. I see Twitter took down the fake account and made the exception to verify.

Please do a regular/weekly scan on all social platforms for impersonators for your organization and leaders even if they do not have accounts. We submit them through a government service portal for FB and IG. That is the same for all accounts impersonating service members.

Please let me know if you need assistance.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Mar 18, 2019, at 16:07, (b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6) wrote:

Good Afternoon,

We have been experiencing problems with people pretending to be General Raymond (Air Force Space Command Commander) on Twitter. Is it possible to get him verified (his handle: @AFSpaceCC)? He has all of

the requirements below. Also I have tried reporting the accounts that are pretending to be him and was wondering if there is a way to know if these reports are received and acted on.

Thank you for your help!

(b)(6)

Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 27, 2019 9:01 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PAO  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (USA)  
**Subject:** RE: Verified Social Media Accounts

Good morning,

I've submitted the requests. Here is what you need to do for Twitter.

When you have a chance, could you please ensure the following minimum requirements are in place for the new account:

- Login verification is activated
- Associated email must be governmental
- Profile and Cover photo are not Twitter's default photos
- Bio specifies the person's official title or the purpose of the org/agency/division
- A link to the org/agency/division/campaign's official website is added to the profile

We also recommend adding a Twitter button to your website that links to the Twitter profile. This will help people find your profile quicker and easier.

Finally, the account has to be active and Tweeting before we can submit a verification request.

---

**From:** (b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 22, 2019 3:40 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (USA)  
**Subject:** RE: Verified Social Media Accounts

Ma'am,

Our Twitter handle is @US\_SpaceCom and our Facebook is <https://www.facebook.com/US-Space-Command-1543842622385857/>

We would like to get these verified before the official stand-up (sometime in April/May). Any help would be appreciated!



Thank you.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, February 21, 2019 4:45 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PAI (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Verified Social Media Accounts

What you want is for the account(s) to become verified. I can help to make that process easier. Just to clarify, is @USSPACECOM the correct handle? I'm seeing it being used.

<https://twitter.com/usspacecom>

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/United-States-Space-Command/134875119867335>

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Feb 21, 2019, at 17:55, (b)(6) AFSPC AFSPC/PAO  
(b)(6) wrote:

Good Afternoon,

Thank you for the continued resources! I do have one question for you.

As previously discussed, we have secured social media accounts for the new USSPACECOM but have not posted anything on these accounts yet. What is the process to get the blue check mark on these accounts (before they are used) so they can go active immediately after the stand-up ceremony of USSPACECOM?

Thank you for your help in advance!

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO



7/3/2019

RE: COMPLETED: General Raymond Verified Social Media Account

(b)(6)

A large rectangular area of the document is redacted, indicated by a solid gray fill. The redaction covers the majority of the page's content area.

**Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: FW: Impersonation Account - Case# 0108314418**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Thursday, March 21, 2019 8:17 AM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:** Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]

Hi Lauren,

Thank you so much for assisting with the takedown and verification. This will give the SpaceCom commander and their public affairs folks peace of mind. You guys are the best!

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Mar 18, 2019, at 18:56, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) wrote:

Thanks, lady!

---

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, March 18, 2019 6:43 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** Twitter Government & Politics

**Subject:** Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: FW: Impersonation Account - Case# 0108314418

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Thank you - case has been escalated and verification request for the General submitted.

On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 3:10 PM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6) wrote:

Hey!

The account to be verified: @AFSpaceCC

Caution-<https://twitter.com/AFSpaceCC> < Caution-<https://twitter.com/AFSpaceCC> >

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Mar 18, 2019, at 18:07, (b)(6) <Caution-  
(b)(6)> wrote:

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

Hi there!

Looping in our gov box. I see the case#, but can you also send over the link to the profile you would like verified?

Thanks,

(b)(6)

On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 2:09 PM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

--  
(b)(6)

@TwitterGov <Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/TwitterGov <Caution-  
https://twitter.com/TwitterGov > > | @Policy <Caution-Caution-  
https://twitter.com/Policy <Caution-https://twitter.com/Policy > >

--  
(b)(6)

@TwitterGov <Caution-https://twitter.com/TwitterGov > | @Policy <Caution-  
https://twitter.com/Policy >



**RE: Fraudulent Accounts - Response Required**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, March 22, 2019 3:11 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

I can check twitter accounts on Mondays.

Kindly,

(b)(6)

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>

LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Sunday, March 17, 2019 10:45 AM

**To:** DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media <dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil>

**Subject:** Fraudulent Accounts - Response Required

Team,

This is really important. Reminding everyone to do this. Is Monday a good day for everyone?

For those who did not attend Twitter training, get with Harry for the reporting qualifiers and process.

<https://help.twitter.com/forms>

<https://politics.fb.com/help>

Use this spreadsheet to record and provide the reporting status.

[https://docs.google.com/file/d/1VZIV-MFDPCnfsmKtG2hQRyBulCe3hK6u/edit?](https://docs.google.com/file/d/1VZIV-MFDPCnfsmKtG2hQRyBulCe3hK6u/edit?usp=doclist_api&filetype=msexcel)

[usp=doclist\\_api&filetype=msexcel](https://docs.google.com/file/d/1VZIV-MFDPCnfsmKtG2hQRyBulCe3hK6u/edit?usp=doclist_api&filetype=msexcel)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** (b)(6) OSD (USA)" (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)" (b)(6) DMA  
Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media" <[dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil](mailto:dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil)>  
**Subject: RE: Fraudulent**

(b)(6)

Good question. Each platform manager does their own scrub and the other organizations will take care of their own leaders. We are only looking for big DOD accounts, SD, Mr. Summers (ATSD), Ms. Joiner (P/DATSD) and former SDs.

Thanks.

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)  
**Sent:** Monday, January 14, 2019 11:46 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD (USA); DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media  
**Subject: RE: Fraudulent**

(b)(6)

Do you want platform managers to work this in or could one person be assigned to scrub across platforms every Monday?

Also, what should we be looking for and how far in the weeds do we go? SecDef and big DOD pages only? CJCS pages (or does the Joint Staff do that?)?

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)



DoDLive blog: [www.dodlive.mil](http://www.dodlive.mil)<<http://www.dodlive.mil>>

Follow the DoD on social:

<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense/>

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense/>

<https://www.youtube.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

---

From: (b)(6) CIV OSD (USA)  
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2019 9:28 AM  
To: DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media  
Subject: Fraudulent

Team,

Please do a weekly social media scan for any imposter accounts. Is Monday a good day for everyone?

Thanks,

(b)(6)



**FW: Fraudulent Accounts - Response Required**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Friday, March 22, 2019 12:13 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

Harry,

Only one person has responded. Please help me to ensure the team is aware.

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Sunday, March 17, 2019 10:45 AM

**To:** DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media <[dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil](mailto:dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil)>

**Subject:** Fraudulent Accounts - Response Required

Team,

This is really important. Reminding everyone to do this. Is Monday a good day for everyone?

For those who did not attend Twitter training, get with (b)(6) for the reporting qualifiers and process.

<https://help.twitter.com/forms>

<https://politics.fb.com/help>

Use this spreadsheet to record and provide the reporting status.

[https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1hzO6\\_znFFyKhoV-T\\_Mkm6l78oFu3AtBfnwtXGAoJLD0/edit#gid=1004302472](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1hzO6_znFFyKhoV-T_Mkm6l78oFu3AtBfnwtXGAoJLD0/edit#gid=1004302472)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** (b)(6) OSD (USA)" (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)" (b)(6) "DMA  
Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media" <[dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil](mailto:dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil)>  
**Subject:** RE: Fraudulent

(b)(6)

Good question. Each platform manager does their own scrub and the other organizations will take care of their own leaders. We are only looking for big DOD accounts, SD, Mr. Summers (ATSD), Ms. Joiner (P/DATSD) and former SDs.

Thanks.

From: (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)  
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2019 11:46 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD (USA); DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media  
Subject: RE: Fraudulent

(b)(6)

Do you want platform managers to work this in or could one person be assigned to scrub across platforms every Monday?

Also, what should we be looking for and how far in the weeds do we go? SecDef and big DOD pages only? CJCS pages (or does the Joint Staff do that?)?

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)

Armed with Science blog: <http://science.dodlive.mil/>

DoDLive blog: [www.dodlive.mil](http://www.dodlive.mil)<<http://www.dodlive.mil/>>

Follow the DoD on social:

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<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense/>

<https://www.youtube.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

---

From: (b)(6) CIV OSD (USA)  
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2019 9:28 AM  
To: DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media  
Subject: Fraudulent

Team,

Please do a weekly social media scan for any imposter accounts. Is Monday a good day for everyone?

Thanks,

(b)(6)



**RE: Fraudulent Accounts - Response Required**

(b)(6) USAF (USA)

**Sent:** Monday, March 25, 2019 8:38 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA); DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media

Good morning,

I am acknowledging this email and yes, I will spend a part of every Monday going through doing a sweep for fraudulent accounts.

V/r

(b)(6)

"Sic Parvis Magna" - Greatness From Small Beginnings

DOD Links:

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Sunday, March 17, 2019 10:45 AM

**To:** DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media <[dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil](mailto:dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil)>

**Subject:** Fraudulent Accounts - Response Required

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[usp=docslist\\_api&filetype=msexcel](https://docs.google.com/file/d/1VZlV-MFDPCnfsmKtG2hQRyBulCe3hK6u/edit?usp=docslist_api&filetype=msexcel)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** (b)(6) OSD (USA)" (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)" (b)(6) "DMA  
Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media" <[dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil](mailto:dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil)>  
**Subject: RE: Fraudulent**

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Thanks.

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)  
**Sent:** Monday, January 14, 2019 11:46 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV OSD (USA); DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media  
**Subject: RE: Fraudulent**

(b)(6)

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Also, what should we be looking for and how far in the weeds do we go? SecDef and big DOD pages only? CJCS pages (or does the Joint Staff do that?)?

Thanks!

V/R,

(b)(6)



Armed with Science blog: <http://science.dodlive.mil/>

DoDLive blog: [www.dodlive.mil](http://www.dodlive.mil)<<http://www.dodlive.mil>>

Follow the DoD on social:

<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense/>

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense/>

<https://www.youtube.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

---

From: (b)(6) OSD (USA)  
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2019 9:28 AM  
To: DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media  
Subject: Fraudulent

Team,

Please do a weekly social media scan for any imposter accounts. Is Monday a good day for everyone?

Thanks,

(b)(6)



**Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Escalation of Fraud Accounts**

cstrom@twitter.com on behalf of Twitter Government &amp; Politics [gov@twitter.com]

Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2019 5:48 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Happy to help!

Have a great night,

--

**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com &lt; Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com &gt; | follow us: @TwitterGov &lt; Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov &gt;

On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 5:40 PM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) < Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > wrote:

Thanks for your quick response! You guys are the best and always take such great care of us.

The Air Force leads (b)(6) copied here will be in contact on behalf of their subordinate organizations.

**From:** cstrom@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:cstrom@twitter.com > <cstrom@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:cstrom@twitter.com > >, **On Behalf Of** Twitter Government & Politics

**Sent:** Wednesday, March 27, 2019 5:28 PM

**To:** (b)(6) HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV USAF SAF-PA (USA)

(b)(6) USAF (US)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Escalation of Fraud Accounts

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Hi (b)(6)

Thank you for reaching out here! We have escalated these requests, so the Twitter Support Team will reach out directly with any additional questions.

Don't hesitate to let us know if you have any questions or concerns in the meantime!

--

**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > < Caution-Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov < Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov > >

On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 5:24 PM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) < Caution-Caution-mailto:(b)(6) > > > wrote:  
Caution-mailto:(b)(6) %C2%A0%3c%C2%A0Caution-

Hello there,

I am providing case numbers for escalation on behalf of the US Air Force.

Twitter Case #0109260645  
Twitter Case #0109260813  
Twitter Case #0109260692  
Twitter Case #0109260728  
Twitter Case #0109260756

Thank you in advance!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Caution-Caution-<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense> < Caution-<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense> > < Caution-Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=kRPyUmu0FcxbO1eIA5HkJUARX7Qq1kygmyBjEHNmKfsZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2ftwitter.com%2fDeptofDefense> < Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=kRPyUmu0FcxbO1eIA5HkJUARX7Qq1kygmyBjEHNmKfsZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2ftwitter.com%2fDeptofDefense> > >  
Caution-Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense> < Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense> > < Caution-Caution-[https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=B-SPfsQ3tDeZUd4\\_1FrYppur9GBw5f0n3dYeiwWmQ4UZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.instagram.com%2fdeptofdefense](https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=B-SPfsQ3tDeZUd4_1FrYppur9GBw5f0n3dYeiwWmQ4UZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.instagram.com%2fdeptofdefense) < Caution-[https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=B-SPfsQ3tDeZUd4\\_1FrYppur9GBw5f0n3dYeiwWmQ4UZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.instagram.com%2fdeptofdefense](https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=B-SPfsQ3tDeZUd4_1FrYppur9GBw5f0n3dYeiwWmQ4UZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.instagram.com%2fdeptofdefense) > >  
Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense> < Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense> > < Caution-Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=7P5lgqTrCe0qBaM7opW3ZCddQdUguEw3D5li2K1BxIwZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.facebook.com%2fDeptofDefense> < Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=7P5lgqTrCe0qBaM7opW3ZCddQdUguEw3D5li2K1BxIwZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.facebook.com%2fDeptofDefense> > >  
Caution-Caution-<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> < Caution-<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> > < Caution-Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=FMiMQYUjZQP0iZLXjfqAu1BnNtuzwUpBbdcLUBjg57gZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.linkedin.com%2fcompany%2funited-states-department-of-defense> < Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redirect.aspx?C=FMiMQYUjZQP0iZLXjfqAu1BnNtuzwUpBbdcLUBjg57gZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.linkedin.com%2fcompany%2funited-states-department-of-defense> > >  
Caution-Caution-<https://www.defense.gov> < Caution-<https://www.defense.gov> > < Caution-Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/> < Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/> > >



**RE: Fraud Accounts**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2019 5:56 PM

To: (b)(6) JS OCJCS (US)

They keep popping up like weeds.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) JS OCJCS (US) (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2019 5:46 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fraud Accounts

Thanks for flagging.

I'll engage FB tomorrow. Just reported 5 or so for VCJCS.

V/r,

(b)(6)

Stay connected:

<http://www.jcs.mil/>

<http://www.facebook.com/TheJointStaff>

<http://twitter.com/thejointstaff>

<http://www.youtube.com/thejointstaff>

<http://www.flickr.com/photos/thejointstaff>

<http://www.instagram.com/thejointstaff/>

<http://www.linkedin.com/company/thejointstaff/>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2019 5:36 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media <dma.meade.prod.list.dod-social-media@mail.mil>

Subject: Fraud Accounts

Good afternoon,

I have been in contact with some of you about (b)(6) The New York Times reporter, who came to the DC area to do a print story and documentary about fake social media accounts impersonating military leaders to scam people. Sharing with you the list of accounts he provided. Some of you have taken action on these but it's something he referenced during an interview with (b)(6) As you can see, he is interested in targeting Facebook. Google his name to see previous articles.

Please let me know if you need assistance for the reporting process.

(b)(6)

Real officer

Title



Impostor name

URL

Joseph Dunford

chairman of joint chiefs of staff

Joseph Dunforde

Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/afsal.ajsal.7?ref=br\\_rs](https://www.facebook.com/afsal.ajsal.7?ref=br_rs) < Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/afsal.ajsal.7?ref=br\\_rs](https://www.facebook.com/afsal.ajsal.7?ref=br_rs) >

Joseph Dunford

chairman of joint chiefs of staff

Joseph Dunforde

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

Gen David Lee Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

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David L Goldfein

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David L. Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

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David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

Gen. David L Goldfein

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David Goldfein



air force chief of staff

David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

Official David L Goldfein

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air force chief of staff

David L Goldfein

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air force chief of staff

Gen David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

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air force chief of staff

Gen David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

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David L Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

David Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

Gen David L Goldfein

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Gen David L Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

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air force chief of staff

David L. Goldfein

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Gen. David L. Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff



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David Goldfein

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Gen David L. Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

David L. Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

David L Goldfein

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David Goldfein

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David L Goldfein

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David Goldfein

air force chief of staff

David Goldfein

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**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fake Twitter**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, March 27, 2019 5:23 PM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF SAF-PA (USA)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF (US)

(b)(6)

Thanks for the case numbers. I am copying you on the email to the Twitter Gov & Politics group and our liaison (b)(6)

(b)(6) The group is very responsive and will handle the majority of requests and issues. I email/copy (b)(6) on items that need to be escalated.

I did give her contact information to someone from your office who attended last the training at Twitter DC earlier this month. Please do not share her direct email with people outside of your office. (b)(6) prefers if the services direct their requests through the lead office.

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) USAF SAF-PA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, March 27, 2019 4:40 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF (US) (b)(6)

**Subject:** FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fake Twitter

(b)(6)

Below are the twitter case numbers WRG to the Gen Wolter's fake twitter accounts. If there is anything else you need or need for me to do, please let me know.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) USAF USAFE USAFE PA/USAFE-AFAFRICA/PAO (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, March 27, 2019 6:32 AM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF SAF-PA (USA) (b)(6) (USA)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fake Twitter

Ma'am,

Below are the case numbers for the 5 fake twitter accounts-- I could not find any more.

Twitter Case #0109260645

Twitter Case #0109260813

Twitter Case #0109260692

Twitter Case #0109260728

Twitter Case #0109260756

Respectfully,

Capt Selena Rodts  
USAFE-AFAFRICA PA

**From:** (b)(6) USAF USAFE USAFE PA/PA (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 27, 2019 8:30 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) USAF HAF SAF/SAF/PAI (b)(6) USAF USAFE USAFE  
PA/USAFE-AFAFRICA/PAO (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) US Air Force HAF SAF/PA (b)(6) US Air  
Force HAF AF PUB AFFAIRS AG FO/PAI (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fake Twitter

(b)(6)

Thank you for your help!

(b)(6)

Please take care of submitting a form for each of Gen Wolters' fake Twitter accounts (there are 5 last time I looked) and then forward the case numbers to (b)(6) and (b)(6). Hopefully this won't take too long!

v/r (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) USAF (US) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 26, 2019 9:34 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) USAF USAFE USAFE PA/PA (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) US Air Force HAF SAF/PA (b)(6) US Air  
Force HAF AF PUB AFFAIRS AG FO/PAI (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fake Twitter

Ma'am,

The verdict from the Twitter govt rep was the following:

1. Submit a form for each one using <https://help.twitter.com/forms>. You will receive an email with a case number, and the email will let you know if the account meets the impersonation requirements.
2. Send or forward the case numbers to me and (b)(6) (CC'd) and we will pass them to the govt rep.

Sorry this wasn't as quick a fix as we would have liked, but I'm hopeful we can get this taken care of together. Thanks,

(b)(6)

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)



(b)(6)


**From:** (b)(6) USAF USAFE USAFE PA/PA (b)(6)**Sent:** Monday, March 25, 2019 11:35 AM**To:** (b)(6) USAF (US) (b)(6)**Subject:** FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fake Twitter

(b)(6)

Below are the fake accounts. Thank you for your help in getting these deleted.

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)**Sent:** Monday, March 25, 2019 4:24 PM**To:** (b)(6) USAF USAFE USAFE PA/PA (b)(6)**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Fake Twitter.

 Joined January 2019

**1,600** Following **137** Followers

Not followed by anyone you're following

**Tweets** Tweets & replies Media Likes

## Who to follow



**이슬비**

@ajFE9c5D3bPz3qU

호기심 많아요

Follow



**Stephen R. Lyons**

@StephenRLyons3

Fo



o2-de 3G

16:21

61% 



[Follow](#)

# Wolters D Tod

@WoltersTod

📍 Afghanistan 📅 Joined July 2018

31 Following 2 Followers

Not followed by anyone you're following

[Tweets](#) [Tweets & replies](#) [Media](#) [Likes](#)

## Who to follow


(b)(6)







(b)(6)



o2-de 3G

16:20

61%



Follow

**Tod Wolters**

@TodWolters

I am motivated by life itself, because life is

what you made it.

📍 | 📅 Joined August 2017


28 Following 7 Followers

Not followed by anyone you're following

**Tweets** Tweets & replies Media Likes

## Who to follow

(b)(6)



o2-de 3G

16:22

60%



[Follow](#)

# Tod D. Wolters

@TodDWolters1

📍 United States 📅 Joined February 2019

24 Following 3 Followers

Not followed by anyone you're following

**Tweets**

Tweets & replies

Media

Likes

## Who to follow

(b)(6)

(b)(6)





**RE: Tyndall Twitter-verified**

(b)(6) A1C USAF ACC 633 ABW/PA (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, May 31, 2019 2:09 PM**To:** (b)(6) DMA (USA)

Hello (b)(6)

The email associated with Tyndall's IG is [tyndallafb.325fw@gmail.com](mailto:tyndallafb.325fw@gmail.com). The link to our site is already on the bio. I'm somewhat new to social media, what exactly is Twitter Media Studio used for?

Let me know if anything else is needed, and thank you again for your help.

V/r,

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) DMA (USA) (b)(6)**Sent:** Friday, May 31, 2019 11:39 AM**To:** (b)(6) USAF ACC 633 ABW/PA (b)(6)**Subject:** RE: Tyndall Twitter-verified

Hello (b)(6)

Thanks for getting back to me. I am working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. Twitter no longer does verifications but have generously agreed to help the DOD.

You have great timing. Your Twitter account looks ready to verify and I will submit the request today with the batch. We're looking at a two-week turnaround. Do you need access to Twitter Media Studio?

Please add the official website URL to the IG account bio area. Also send me the email associated with that account and I will submit that one today as well.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>  
<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>  
<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>  
<https://www.defense.gov>

**From:** (b)(6) USAF ACC 633 ABW/PA <[alexandra.singer@us.af.mil](mailto:alexandra.singer@us.af.mil)>**Sent:** Friday, May 31, 2019 12:08 PM

7/3/2019

RE: Tyndall Twitter-verified

**To:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Subject:** Tyndall Twitter-verified

Good morning (b)(6)

I just saw your message on Twitter about getting Tyndall AFB verified. I'm part of the new team TDY'd here temporarily, and I'd love to get the Twitter verified while I'm here!

Let me know what I can do to make that happen. Thank you for reaching out!

v/r

(b)(6)

**[Non-DoD Source] Impostor Take Down | Job: 354907191796855**

(b)(6) Facebook [case++aazq427ffyhxdc@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2019 12:50 PM

To: (b)(6) CIV (US)

Cc: (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) USAF AFSOC PA (US); (b)(6) USAF (US); (b)(6) CIV USAF (USA); (b)(6)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

----

Hi (b)(6)

You're welcome and thank you for the update!

Upon further review, I found that the account (Caution-  
<https://www.facebook.com/ibrahim.nizeyimana.58>) has already been disabled.

Feel free to let me know if you have any additional questions regarding this inquiry and I would be happy to help.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

>On Tue Apr 23, 2019 08:51:01, (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA wrote:

>Hi (b)(6)

>Thank you so much for reviewing the account I reported.

>I noticed this morning that the imposter account is now using a profile photo of our commander here at Air Force Special Operations Command. Is there any way we can have this photo removed? I have reported this account again, but just wanted to check with you to see if there was anything I could do on my end.

>Imposter account: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/ibrahim.nizeyimana.58>

>Official account: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/COMAFSOCOfficial/>

>I greatly appreciate your time and effort. Thank you.

>Respectfully,

>(b)(6)

>-----Original Message-----

>From: Facebook <case++aazq427ffyhxdc@support.facebook.com>

>Sent: Monday, April 22, 2019 3:31 PM

>To: (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

>Cc: (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/PA (b)(6)

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/PA (b)(6)  
>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impostor Take Down | Job: 354907191796855

>Hi (b)(6)

>After reviewing this with our specialists, we found that we aren't able to remove the account you reported because they don't violate Facebook policy or they have already been unpublished.

>We can only remove accounts that falsely claim to represent your official presence on Facebook. Fan pages and opinion pages don't violate Facebook policy.

>If you believe that an account is infringing on your intellectual property, you can report it here: Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/help/intellectual\\_property](https://www.facebook.com/help/intellectual_property)

>Please feel free to reach out if you have any additional questions regarding this inquiry and I would be happy to help.

>Best regards,

>(b)(6)



(b)(6)  
>>On Mon Apr 22, 2019 11:32:35, (b)(6) wrote:  
>>Hi (b)(6)  
>>I hope you are having a great day! My name is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team. While (b)(6) assisted with claiming your username on Instagram, I'll be helping with your request to remove an unauthorized Facebook account (Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/ibrahim.nizeyimana.58>).  
>>I'm currently working with our specialists to review this further and as soon as I have an update, I will loop back.  
>>If you have any additional questions or concerns regarding this inquiry, please feel free to reply to this email and I would be happy to help.  
>>Best regards,

(b)(6)  
>>>On Mon Apr 22, 2019 10:10:54, (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA wrote:  
(b)(6)

>>>My name is (b)(6) and I work for Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs. I greatly appreciate all of the proactive and efficient assistance you provided in order to get our command social media accounts verified. Thanks again!  
>>>Another account we operate is a Facebook page for our commander, Lt. Gen Brad Webb (@COMAFSOCOOfficial). This account is not verified and is frequently impersonated. Unfortunately, we are currently dealing with another impersonator. Following your instructions below, I reported the impostor's profile and filled out the form to report a Facebook page that is impersonating a public figure.  
>>>I wanted to reach out to you personally to see if there were any additional steps I could take in order to have this account removed. Furthermore, would it be possible to verify our commander's page? Perhaps this will deter impersonators in the future.  
>>>Our account link: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/COMAFSOCOOfficial/>  
>>>Imposter account link: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/ibrahim.nizeyimana.58>  
>>>Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you so much for your time.  
>>>Respectfully,

(b)(6)  
>>>-----Original Message-----  
>>>From: Facebook <case+aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com>  
>>>Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 11:21 AM  
>>>To: (b)(6)  
>>>Cc: (b)(6) USAF  
>>>AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)  
>>>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Handle Update | Job: 588208835030932 Hi

(b)(6) We reviewed your Account  
>>>(Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>) and determined that it's eligible for verification. You'll now see a blue check-mark next to your username on your profile and in search results on Instagram.  
>>>Please note that verified Accounts must remain public, have a profile picture and post content.  
>>>We strongly recommend you turn on two-factor authentication to help  
>>>protect your Instagram Account. For details about how to set up  
>>>two-factor authentication and keep your Account secure in the future,  
>>>please follow the security tips in the Help Center:  
>>>Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090/>  
>>>Our team is happy to help you further establish your authentic  
>>>presence by removing impostor Accounts. If you're being impersonated,  
>>>please follow these instructions to report impostor Accounts:  
>>>Caution-[www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296](https://www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296)  
>>>If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.  
>>>Thanks,

(b)(6)  
>>>Facebook Client Support Analyst  
>>>Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.  
>>>>On Fri Apr 5, 2019 09:38:54, Salem wrote:  
>>>>Hi (b)(6)  
>>>>Thanks for submitting this request. We've changed your username (Caution-



<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>), and this should be reflected throughout the system soon.

>>>>>If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

>>>>>Thanks,

>>>>>(b)(6)

>>>>>Facebook Client Support Analyst

>>>>>Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>>>>>On Tue Apr 2, 2019 15:14:44, Fujikawa, Aimee F CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:

>>>>>(b)(6)

>>>>>Correct. Yes, please.

>>>>>Thank you so much!

>>>>>(b)(6)

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>> On Apr 2, 2019, at 18:08, Facebook <case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com> wrote:

>>>>>

>>>>> Hi Aimee,

>>>>>

>>>>> This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team. I work alongside (b)(6) and (b)(6) and I'm happy to assist you today.

>>>>>

>>>>> While (b)(6) works on your Page username change request, I'll be helping with your Instagram username claim and Instagram verification requests here. I understand that you would like to claim the username (Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>) with the Instagram Account (Caution-[https://www.instagram.com/afsoc\\_official/](https://www.instagram.com/afsoc_official/)), and then verify the resulting Instagram Account (Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>). I have applied to claim the username (), and I will contact you after your application has been processed. I will apply to verify the Instagram Account (Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>) once the username has been changed.

>>>>>

>>>>> If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

>>>>>

>>>>> Thanks,

>>>>>

>>>>>(b)(6)

>>>>> Facebook Client Support Analyst

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

**RE: Twitter verification**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Monday, April 15, 2019 10:20 AM

To: (b)(6) USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b)(6)

Cool! I am going to copy you on the emails for the Marines accounts.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, April 15, 2019 8:43 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) <aimee.f.fujikawa.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Twitter verification

I took (b)(6) job at USMC.

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 5:35 PM

To: (b)(6) USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Twitter verification

Turnover? Where are you going?

(b)(6)

NORTHCOM

(b)(6)

INDOPACOM

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

USSOCOM

(b)(6)

AFRICOM

(b)(6)

EUCOM

(b)(6)

NATIONAL GUARD

(b)(6)

Marines

(b)(6)

AIR FORCE

(b)(6)

OCPA

(b)(6)

Tony O'Bryant

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

ARMY

(b)(6)

SFC Kyle J. Richardson

(b)(6)

COAST GUARD

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 3:32 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Twitter verification

Sure thing. I'm certain some of those POCs are outdated.

I'm working my turnover binder still. Do you have a directory of our counterparts and also the COCOM POCs?

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 3:31 PM

To: (b)(6) USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)

Subject: RE: Twitter verification

WOW! Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b)(6)



Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 3:27 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Twitter verification

Please see attached for a list of all Navy social media registered with us.

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 3:20 PM

To: (b)(6) USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)

Subject: RE: Twitter verification

(b)(6)

We are in the process of logging them.

Yes, please. That would be helpful.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 2:21 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Twitter verification

(b)(6)

Can you provide a list of Navy commands that you've contacted?

I can save you some work by providing you a list of our registered accounts and their POCs.

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 2:13 PM

To: (b)(6) MC3 USN, USS JOHN C. STENNIS

Cc: (b)(6) USN COMCARSTRKGRU THREE (USA); (b)(6)

(b)(6) USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b)(6) USN CHINFO  
WASHINGTON DC (USA)  
Subject: RE: Twitter verification

(b)(6)

The verification request for @stennis74 was submitted yesterday and can take up to two weeks. The blue check will just appear without notice, so please keep an eye out. Copying Navy Social Media POCs and my colleague (b)(6)

I also requested Twitter Media Studio, which should be available today. Not sure if you already had it. It's available from the account page in the drop down from your profile icon in the tool bar area.  
[https://media.twitter.com/content/media-twitter/en\\_us/articles/products/2018/media-studio.html](https://media.twitter.com/content/media-twitter/en_us/articles/products/2018/media-studio.html)

Twitter didn't have any issues with the account so there is no need to talk on the phone. :)

Working on IG and FB verifications next week. That process is a little more involved. Those accounts look good and there is nothing else needed at this time.

Have a great weekend!

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USN, USS JOHN C. STENNIS

(b)(6)  
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 1:53 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USN COMCARSTRKGRU THREE (USA)

(b)(6)  
Subject: RE: Twitter verification

Ma'am,

We only have Stennis twitter, Instagram, and Facebook. I'm not sure if Instagram or Facebook do verification things. None of our chain of command has any official social media. It would just be the ship's page(s).

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/stennis74>

Instagram : <https://www.instagram.com/stenniscvn74/>

Facebook : <https://www.facebook.com/stennis74>

We can talk on the phone if you would like to set up a time with PAO and I, however we have a significant time difference, so it would be better to email for the foreseeable future. But if you would prefer to speak on the phone it is possible, just give me a couple times and dates EST and I will see if when we can facilitate.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)  
John C. Stennis Media

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)  
Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2019 3:52 PM

To: (b)(6) USN, USS JOHN C. STENNIS

Cc: (b)(6) USN, USS JOHN C. STENNIS

Subject: Re: Twitter verification

Hello (b)(6)

Thanks for your email. Does your organization have any other accounts?

I am working to review and verify official accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams which is a big problem. Also, for @DeptofDefense account posts, we'd like to make sure the accounts we tag are legitimate and verified.

Would you mind sending links to the official accounts (verified and not) to include commanders/chief, if applicable. Please feel free to forward my email and loop in your chain of command.

I'd like to take a look at them and then discuss on the phone if that's possible. Does that sound good?

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Apr 11, 2019, at 01:46, (b)(6) USN, USS JOHN C. STENNIS  
(b)(6) wrote:

Good Morning (b)(6)

I am (b)(6) and I monitor the Stennis social media and after talking to PAO, we would be very interested in getting our accounts verified. Thank you so much for reaching out to help us with this! Any advice you can give would be greatly appreciated.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

John C. Stennis Media

**Re: @DIU\_x Twitter Verification**

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2019 9:46 PM

To: (b)(6)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

We have a Facebook and Linked in page

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 17, 2019, at 9:40 PM, (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

Nice to e-meet you. Thank you for responding.

I am working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. We also want to ensure accounts the @DeptofDefense tags and mentions are verified. Twitter no longer does verifications but have generously agreed to help the DOD.

The @DIU\_x account looks ready for verification and I will submit the request tomorrow. I will also request for access to Twitter Media Studio in case you don't already have it.

Are there any other official accounts in need of verification?

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

On Apr 17, 2019, at 18:21, (b)(6)

wrote:

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

We are a DoD entity. Let me know what you need from us.

Johanna

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 17, 2019, at 4:00 PM, (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) via General DIUx Questions <questions@diux.mil < Caution-mailto:questions@diux.mil > < Caution-Caution-mailto:questions@diux.mil < Caution-mailto:questions@diux.mil > > > wrote:

Good afternoon,



My name is (b)(6) and I am (b)(6) at the Pentagon.

I am working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. We also want to ensure the @DeptofDefense account tags and mentions are verified. Twitter no longer does verifications but have generously agreed to help the DOD. The @DIU\_x account looks ready for verification and I will submit the request this afternoon. Please let me know if you are interested.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DMA Pentagon Bureau

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Caution-Caution-<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>. < Caution-Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?>

C=kRPyUmu0Fcxb01eIA5HkJUARX7Qq1kygmyBjEHNmKfsZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2ftwitter.com%2fDeptofDefense >

Caution-Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense> < Caution-Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?C=B->

SPfsQ3tDeZu4d\_1FrYppur9GBw5f0n3dYeiwWmQ4UZXdFpRk3VCA...&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-  
www.instagram.com%2fdeptofdefense >

Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense> < Caution-Caution-<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?>

C=7P5lgqTrCe0qBaM7opW3ZCddQdUguEw3D5lI2K1BxlwZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.facebook.com%2fDeptofDefense >

Caution-Caution-<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> < Caution-Caution-  
<https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?>

C=FmIMQYUjZQP0iZLXjfaU1BnNtuzwUpBbdcLUBJg57gZXdfRpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.linkedin.com%2fcompany%2funited-states-department-of-defense >

Caution-Caution-<https://www.defense.gov> < Caution-Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/> >

## Social Media Verification

(b)(6) PACOM J00SEL (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, April 17, 2019 7:11 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USINDOPACOM JO (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Aloha!

Thank you for reaching out to me concerning Social Media platform verification status.

Please let me know the next steps. Looking forward to working with you and most of all..., Mahalo!

Yours aye,

(b)(6)

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

**[Non-DoD Source] Re: @LeapFrogs Navy Parachute Team verified accounts**

Public Affairs [leapfrogspao@gmail.com]

Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 1:44 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

Ma'am,

Thank you for the assistance. We also have Instagram @navyparachuteteam and YouTube @NavyLeapFrogs

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6) | USN.

U.S. Navy Parachute Team Public Affairs Officer

On Wed, Apr 17, 2019, 6:25 PM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6) wrote:

Hello (b)(6)

Thanks for emailing!

I am working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. Twitter no longer does verifications but have generously agreed to help the DOD.

Your Twitter account looks ready to verify and I will submit the request tomorrow. We're looking at a two-week turnaround. I found the Facebook account and will work on verifying that platform next week. Will circle back with any updates. Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/leapfrogs/> < Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/leapfrogs/> >.

Awesome cover photos on both!

Thank you,  
Aimee

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

On Apr 17, 2019, at 18:36, Public Affairs <leapfrogspao@gmail.com < Caution-mailto:leapfrogspao@gmail.com > > wrote:

Ma'am,

We would love your assistance with getting our social media accounts verified. Please let me know what you may need from us.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

U.S. Navy Parachute Team Public Affairs Officer



**RE: Fraudulent FB accounts: DLA Distribution Europe Commander**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 5:19 PM

To: (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) [Christine.Born@dla.mil]

Christine,

Closing the loop on the fake account. Please keep a log for these.

Reference: 2609205042640293

<https://www.facebook.com/pachu.pachu.5667901>

Hitting the easy button!

(b)(6)

---

From: (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 4:05 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fraudulent FB accounts: DLA Distribution Europe Commander

Thank you. Have a great weekend.

---

From: (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 4:02 PM

To: (b)(6) CIV DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fraudulent FB accounts: DLA Distribution Europe Commander

Hi (b)(6)

Nice meeting you on the phone.

As mentioned, I submitted a form for the imposter account. Reference 2609205042640293.

Sharing some resources with you.

**FACEBOOK/INSTAGRAM:**

Here is the link to the Facebook/Instagram Government and Politics Advocacy Concierge (GPAC) portal:

<https://www.facebook.com/business/clientsupport>

Please let me know if you have issues with accessing it.

**TWITTER:**

I will submit the request for verification and Twitter Media Studio access this afternoon. Verification can take two weeks. TMS is one day.

For Twitter support, everything starts with a case number. If you find imposter accounts, report them and send me the case number for escalation.- I will help with the initial report.

<https://help.twitter.com/forms>

**LINKEDIN:**

February training presentation attached.

**ACCOUNT REGISTRATION:**

Details on registering DOD social media are available on [defense.gov](https://defense.gov)

here: <https://dod.defense.gov/Resources/Register-A-Site/tab/Social/?page=DOD>

SOCIAL MEDIA HUDDLE:

<https://www.facebook.com/groups/181298759282608/>

SHORT LINK:

<https://go.usa.gov/>

Thanks! Have a great weekend!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[aimee.f.fujikawa.civ@mail.mil](mailto:aimee.f.fujikawa.civ@mail.mil)

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>

<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

<https://www.defense.gov>

---

**From:** (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 18, 2019 10:55 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Fraudulent FB accounts: DLA Distribution Europe Commander

Ok. Pls call (b)(6)

(b)(6)

DLA Public Affairs

(b)(6)

On Apr 18, 2019, at 10:47 AM, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
(b)(6) wrote:

Just got called into another meeting. Let's talk this afternoon, ok?

---

**From:** (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 18, 2019 8:47 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fraudulent FB accounts: DLA Distribution Europe Commander

Thanks (b)(6) No I am at DLA, Fort Belvoir. Yes you can call (b)(6) at 0930. Thank you

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 18, 2019 8:29 AM



To: (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: Fraudulent FB accounts: DLA Distribution Europe Commander

Good morning (b)(6)

I can definitely help with this and show you how to report, I'll be available after 9:30 and will give a call.

Do you work at the Pentagon?

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

On Apr 18, 2019, at 06:45, (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US)  
(b)(6) wrote:

Good morning (b)(6)

I am the social media manager at Defense Logistics Agency. We sometimes get reports of fake accounts on some of our commanders. This one is from one of our commanders in Europe. I do not have a Government Facebook POC I can forward to to ask them to remove the account. Do you have a POC or can you help me get this taken down?

Here is the link. He has included photos of screen captures.

<https://www.facebook.com/pachu.pachu.5667901>

thank you very much.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DLA Public Affairs

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) USARMY DLA DISTRIBUTION (US)

(b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 4:22 AM

To: (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DLA INFO OPERATIONS (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Fraudulent FB accounts: DLA Distribution Europe Commander

(b)(6) thanks for helping out with this case. Below is the URL for the first “fake” posting I found a few weeks back which was removed by FB and returned within 24 hours with new pictures. This is the site that was originally using my DLA command photo. The site has used several versions of profile and timeline pics which are pulls from DLA or Central Washington University sites where I worked in the Army ROTC Department. The current profile pic is of Army Second Lieutenant Joey Knight—I’ve also asked him to report to FB and his security manager.

I’ve attached the FB screen shots I’ve been taking over the past month. Note I was not able to get a screen shot of the below URL before it was initially removed but included the profile (DLA Command Photo) pic and original timeline pic, another photo off DLA.mil of a press/media release.

<https://www.facebook.com/pachu.pachu.5667901>

Please let me know if you need anything else and thanks again for all the help.

Cordially,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Germersheim, Germany

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) DLA INFO OPERATIONS (USA)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2019 9:56 PM

To: (b)(6) USARMY DLA DISTRIBUTION (US)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DLA DISTRIBUTION (USA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) DLA INTELLIGENCE (USA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) DLA INTELLIGENCE (US)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fraudulent FB accounts: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

As I mentioned on the phone earlier today, everything indicates that these accounts were setup to conduct romance scams (for financial gain for criminals). Basically, it’s not a “security” risks, but could be used to defame you...For the ones that have any of your official military or DLA owned images, I just submitted a request for DLA Public Affairs to consider assisting you with the take down. (Granted, the main one that did have this type of content, you mentioned you were able to get taken down.)

I just spoke with the Deputy Director for DLA Public Affairs and they were unsure at the time if they could assist. I submitted an official inquiry to them and they just



responded. Christine Born from DLA Public Affairs

(b)(6)

noted in the attached e-mail that they could help you. Please reach out to him for assistance and provide him with the links for the profiles you want removed and the PowerPoint that you sent to us, as that could help to justify the removal of all of those accounts.

Side Note: Any profile that has your photo in it, you have the ability to report to Facebook...your name/likeness may be a more uphill battle...but you could request a takedown under their impersonation/fraud rules, or if necessary, under US copyright laws. Even if you never submitted a copyright for the image, you could cite 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) and the poster not having the rights to use your personal image.

(U//FOUO) I did not identify anything beyond the criminal realm and the usage of the profiles for romance scams.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) DLA INTELLIGENCE (US)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2019 9:13 AM

To: (b)(6) USARMY DLA DISTRIBUTION (US)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) DLA INFO OPERATIONS (USA)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DLA DISTRIBUTION (USA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) DLA INTELLIGENCE (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fraudulent FB accounts: DLA Distribution Europe Commander

(b)(6)

Thanks very much for this additional information. The (b)(6) piece is also good to know. We'll stand by for (b)(6) input.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) USARMY DLA DISTRIBUTION (US)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2019 9:05 AM

To: (b)(6) DLA INTELLIGENCE (US)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) DLA INFO OPERATIONS (USA)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DLA DISTRIBUTION (USA)

(b)(6)

CIV DLA INTELLIGENCE (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fraudulent FB accounts: (b)(6)

(b)(6) team, thanks for the assistance on this, greatly appreciated.

“Can you tell if anything has been posted on the accounts, other than what you showed me? Can you see to whom the accounts are connected?”

(b)(6) to your questions above I cannot see what else, if anything, has been posted. I didn't want to friend them because they would have access to my profile but if you look at who is “liking” the photos you can see their network.

FYSA there is another guy out there named “jonackiss ivanovich” but he isn't using any of my photos...

Cordially,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) DLA INTELLIGENCE (US)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2019 2:11 PM

To: (b)(6) DLA INFO OPERATIONS (USA)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY DLA DISTRIBUTION (US)

(b)(6)

DLA DISTRIBUTION (USA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) DLA INTELLIGENCE (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: Fraudulent FB accounts: (b)(6)

Good Morning (b)(6)

The (b)(6) informed us today that two fake Facebook accounts have been established in his name. Details are below, and he provided screenshots in the attached file. Most notably, he was able to get FB to take one down, and it reappeared not long after.

Since we cannot immediately determine if there is a foreign nexus, do you have any insight? Within your authorities, is there a way to determine anything about the origin of the accounts? Does something like this require a human at a keyboard, or could it have been generated by a bot? We welcome any feedback or guidance you have, as I'm a caveman when it comes to anything cyber.

I've cc'd (b)(6) as well as (b)(6) (b)(6) is the (b)(6)  
at Germersheim.

Please contact me with any questions.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Counterintelligence and Insider Threat Specialist  
Defense Logistics Agency  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) USARMY DLA DISTRIBUTION (US)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2019 5:42 AM

To: (b)(6) DLA INTELLIGENCE (US)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DLA DISTRIBUTION (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: Facebook Impersonator (Who to Report to in DLA)

(b)(6) first of all I assume you're not the correct person to report this to or resolve but wanted to see if you can get me to the next gate.

BL is I now have two impersonators on Facebook that have surfaced in the past month. One is using the profile name, (b)(6) and the other (b)(6) My personal profile is (b)(6) I have reported both of these to FB with mixed response.

They have been pulling photos of me off DLA.mil and my former assignment at Central Washington University so my personal account has not been compromised at this point.

I've included the screen shots of this activity over the past few weeks for SA. Also note that the "Ackiss Jonathan" was temporarily removed by FB and then resurfaced a few days later with new pics—current profile pic is of one of my former ROTC Cadets (b)(6) The (b)(6) site was removed this morning by FB but I expect that to resurface soon.

Let me know if you have any thoughts on who to push this to for awareness.

Cordially,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USA

(b)(6)

Germersheim, Germany

(b)(6)



<RE: Inquiry - Facebook Takedown for LTC?.eml>

<Ackiss FB Imposter 2.pptx>



**RE: PACOMSEL Verification**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (US)

Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 5:33 PM

To: (b)(6) USINDOPACOM J0 (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

I work part time in Building 700. I can drop in around 1230 if that works!

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USINDOPACOM J0 (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 11:27 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (US) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DMA (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

(b)(6)  
Subject: RE: PACOMSEL Verification

(b)(6)

Nice to e-meet you. Are you in the building? SgtMaj is available between 1145-1300. Let me know what works for you?

Thanks!

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USA  
U.S. INDOPACOM

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) PACOM J00SEL (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 11:24 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (US)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DMA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: PACOMSEL Verification

Thanks (b)(6)

I have some open time tomorrow. (b)(6) is on this email and can work out a great time for a meeting tomorrow. Always look forward to seeing you.

(b)(6) - can you please find a great window of opportunity tomorrow?

Yours aye,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USMC

(b)(6)

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

From: (b)(6) CIV (b)(6) DMA (US)

(b)(6)

Date: Friday, Apr. 19, 2019, 04:29

To: (b)(6) PACOM J00SEL (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) USINDOPACOM J0  
(b)(6)  
DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)  
Subject: RE: PACOMSEL Verification

Will do!

Happy to help and since we have a service lead here, we can help with several support request by either expediting or advocating for client platform request.

Here is more information about the Social Media Government and Politics Advocacy Concierge (GPAC).

- There are designated "service leads" across the DoD (including DoD agencies), Services, Combatant Commands and other major commands designated to the GPAC who act as liaisons to the tech companies Facebook/Instagram, Twitter, and Google

- A service lead can vouch for your unit to expedite actions in a full range of technical and operational platform requests, including:

- Verified badges
- Name/Username changes
- Fake or duplicate removal
- Account merges
- Hacked account reports

The service leads also should be able to share information to ensure your social media activities align with the tech company terms of service agreements.

Aloha!

V/R

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) PACOM J00SEL (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2019 11:23 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (US)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USINDOPACOM J0 <melody.pavur@pacom.mil>; Ortiz, Alan N

CIV DMA PROD (USA) <alan.n.ortiz.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: PACOMSEL Verification

Thanks (b)(6) Hope to see you on Friday. I am returning from Vietnam with the COM.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USMC

(b)(6)

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (US)

(b)(6)

|>>

Date: Thursday, Apr 18, 2019, 15:44

To: (b)(6) PACOM J00SEL

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USINDOPACOM J0

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

As (b)(6) helps you with verification, let me drop by tomorrow; we already handle (b)(6) impostors and it will be too easy to roll you into the process!

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) U.S. Indo- Pacific Command

Defense Media Activity

Forward Center - Pacific

(b)(6)

On Apr 17, 2019, at 22:23, (b)(6) PACOM J00SEL

(b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6)



Aloha and Mahalo!

Yes, so many out there. I usually check for those using my name and report them myself. So, so many out there. I usually get messages from people who sadly fall prey to the scams.

Worse, are the people using the publicly released photos with a different name.

But I do appreciate the effort on the verification process/status.

Would like to personally thank you one day for your assistance.

Please keep me posted on the next steps.

Yours aye,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

Date: Thursday, Apr 18, 2019, 08:09

To: (b)(6) PACOM J00SEL

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USINDOPACOM J0

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DMA HQ DMA (US)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DMA PROD (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: PACOMSEL Verification

(b)(6)

Aloha!

Nice to e-meet you. Thank you for emailing back.

I am working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. Twitter no longer does verifications but have generously agreed to help the DOD.

The @PACOMSEL Twitter account looks ready for verification and I will submit the request tomorrow. I can also help with the Facebook and Instagram accounts later this week. <https://www.facebook.com/PACOMSEL/>

[https://instagram.com/pacomsel<https://instagram.com/pacomsel?utm\\_source=ig\\_profile\\_share&igshid=1h5nkmmqu1tpd>](https://instagram.com/pacomsel?utm_source=ig_profile_share&igshid=1h5nkmmqu1tpd)

Is anyone doing regular searches for impersonators? I work closely with

(b)(6) (copied) at the DMA Forward Center there. He and his team are great and can support with removal of fraudulent accounts, as needed.

Will circle back with any updates. Take care.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

On Apr 17, 2019, at 19:12, (b)(6) PACOM J00SEL

(b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6)

Aloha!

Thank you for reaching out to me concerning Social Media platform verification status.

Please let me know the next steps. Looking forward to working with you and most of all..., Mahalo!

Yours aye,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command



**Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Twitter Verification- April 18**

cstrom@twitter.com on behalf of Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]

**Sent:** Friday, April 19, 2019 10:49 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

Perfect, thank you!

--

**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov >

On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 10:26 AM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6) wrote:

Super! I will let them know. Thanks for the update 😊

Sorry – It's @NavyLeapFrogs

**From:** (b)(6)

(b)(6) On Behalf Of Twitter Government & Politics

**Sent:** Friday, April 19, 2019 10:18 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) <aimee.f.fujikawa.civ@mail.mil < Caution-

(b)(6)

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Twitter Verification- April 18

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

Great, thank you! All of the accounts now have access to Media Studio and have been passed along for verification review.

When you have a chance, could you confirm the @LeapFrogs account?

--

**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > < Caution-Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov < Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov > >

On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 8:08 PM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

wrote:

Good evening Twitter Team,

I am requesting your assistance in getting the following accounts verified and access to TMS.

@LeapFrogs  
@DIU\_x  
@SPAWARHQ  
@DLAMIL  
@USArmyLogistics  
@USASOCNews  
@PacificSubs  
@tatumvay - TMS only

Thank you!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Page Verification | Job: 331043784279659**

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 23, 2019 12:02 PM**To:** Facebook [case++aazq427e6ki25e@support.facebook.com]**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) USAF (US);  
(b)(6) USAF (USA)

(b)(6)

Thank you so much for your assistance! I appreciate your efficient support.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

AFSOC Public Affairs

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Facebook &lt;case++aazq427e6ki25e@support.facebook.com&gt;

Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2019 9:33 AM

To: (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC

AFSOC PA/PA (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA

(b)(6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Page Verification | Job: 331043784279659

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks for your request to verify your account (<https://www.facebook.com/COMAFSOCOfficial/>). Your account has already been verified!Our team is happy to help you further establish your authentic presence by removing imposter accounts. If you're being impersonated, please follow these instructions to report imposter accounts: [www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296](https://www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296).

If you have any other questions about this request, please let me know.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst

Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

&gt;On Mon Apr 22, 2019 11:27:32, (b)(6) wrote:

&gt;Hi (b)(6)

>My name is (b)(6) with Facebook Client Support. While (b)(6) works on your verification request, I'll be helping with your request to verify <https://www.facebook.com/COMAFSOCOfficial/>.

&gt;I am looking into your request with our specialists and when I have an update I will loop back to you.

&gt;In the meantime, please let me know if you have any other questions or concerns about this request.

&gt;Thanks,

(b)(6)

&gt;Facebook Client Support Analyst

&gt;&gt;On Mon Apr 22, 2019 10:10:54, (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA wrote:

(b)(6)

&gt;&gt;My name is (b)(6) and I work for Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs. I



greatly appreciate all of the proactive and efficient assistance you provided in order to get our command social media accounts verified. Thanks again!

>>Another account we operate is a Facebook page for our commander, Lt. Gen Brad Webb (@COMAFSOCOfficial). This account is not verified and is frequently impersonated. Unfortunately, we are currently dealing with another impersonator. Following your instructions below, I reported the imposter's profile and filled out the form to report a Facebook page that is impersonating a public figure.

>>I wanted to reach out to you personally to see if there were any additional steps I could take in order to have this account removed. Furthermore, would it be possible to verify our commander's page? Perhaps this will deter impersonators in the future.

>>Our account link: <https://www.facebook.com/COMAFSOCOfficial/>

>>Imposter account link: <https://www.facebook.com/ibrahim.nizeyimana.58>

>>Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you so much for your time.

>>Respectfully,

(b)(6)

>>AFSOC Public Affairs

(b)(6)

>>-----Original Message-----

>>From: Facebook <case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com>

>>Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 11:21 AM

>>To: (b)(6)

>>Cc: (b)(6) USAF

>>AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

>>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Handle Update | Job: 588208835030932 Hi

(b)(6) We reviewed your Account

>>(https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/) and determined that it's eligible for verification. You'll now see a blue check-mark next to your username on your profile and in search results on Instagram.

>>Please note that verified Accounts must remain public, have a profile picture and post content.

>>We strongly recommend you turn on two-factor authentication to help

>>protect your Instagram Account. For details about how to set up

>>two-factor authentication and keep your Account secure in the future,

>>please follow the security tips in the Help Center:

>><https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090/>

>>Our team is happy to help you further establish your authentic

>>presence by removing impostor Accounts. If you're being impersonated,

>>please follow these instructions to report impostor Accounts:

>>[www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296](https://www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296)

>>If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

>>Thanks,

(b)(6)

>>Facebook Client Support Analyst

>>Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>>>On Fri Apr 5, 2019 09:38:54, Salem wrote:

(b)(6)

>>>Thanks for submitting this request. We've changed your username

(https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/), and this should be reflected throughout the system soon.

>>>If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

>>>Thanks,

(b)(6)

>>>Facebook Client Support Analyst

>>>Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>>>>On Tue Apr 2, 2019 15:14:44, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:

>>>>Hi (b)(6)

>>>>Correct. Yes, please.

>>>>Thank you so much!

>>>>(b)(6)

>>>>

>>>>

>>>>



>>>>> Pentagon Desk: 703-697-7795

>>>>> (b)(6)

>>>>> On Apr 2, 2019, at 18:08, Facebook <case++aazq3dkv6m7jx1@support.facebook.com> wrote:

>>>>>

>>>>> Hi (b)(6),

>>>>>

>>>>> This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team. I work alongside (b)(6) and (b)(6), and I'm happy to assist you today.

>>>>>

>>>>> While (b)(6) works on your Page username change request, I'll be helping with your Instagram username claim and Instagram verification requests here. I understand that you would like to claim the username (<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>) with the Instagram Account ([https://www.instagram.com/afsoc\\_official/](https://www.instagram.com/afsoc_official/)), and then verify the resulting Instagram Account (<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>). I have applied to claim the username (), and I will contact you after your application has been processed. I will apply to verify the Instagram Account (<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>) once the username has been changed.

>>>>>

>>>>> If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

>>>>>

>>>>> Thanks,

>>>>>

>>>>> (b)(6)

>>>>> Facebook Client Support Analyst

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>>

>>>>

>>>

>>

>

**100% Verification - AFSpecOpsCmd / COMAFSOCOOfficial**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, May 01, 2019 2:41 PM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF SAF-PA (USA); (b)(6) USAF SAF-PA (US); (b)(6) USAF SAF-PA (USA); (b)(6) USAF SAF-PA (USA)

Hi (b)(6),

Closing the loop on your account verification process, handle streamlining and fraud incident.

If you would like to write a note to thank the Twitter and FB/IG support teams, please draft one and I will send it in on your behalf.

**Best Practices:**

We strongly recommend turning on two-factor authentication that helps protect the accounts. For details about how to set up two-factor authentication and to keep the account secure in the future, please follow the security tips in the Help Center:

<<https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090>>

<<https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/two-factor-authentication>>

Please report any suspicious activity or imposter accounts via the links below and send the case number to your SAF/PA contacts.

Facebook/Instagram: <<https://www.facebook.com/help>>

Twitter: <<https://help.twitter.com/forms>>

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DMA Pentagon Bureau

(b)(6)

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>

<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

<https://www.defense.gov>

(b)(6)/5/2019  
(b)(6)

RE: 182nd AW Verification (UNCLASSIFIED)

**RE: 182nd AW Verification (UNCLASSIFIED)**

(b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA)

Sent: Monday, May 13, 2019 12:11 PM

To: (b)(6) (USA); (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Cc: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

Awesome, thanks! Associated email address is Lealan.c.Buehrer.mil@mail.mil.

//SIGNED//

(b)(6)

182d Airlift Wing  
2416 S. Falcon Blvd., Peoria, IL 61607

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, May 13, 2019 10:05 AM

To: (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: 182nd AW Verification (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Great, thanks! (b)(6) I'll need the email address associated with your Instagram account to request verification.

v/r,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Monday, May 13, 2019 10:57 AM

To: (b)(6) NG NGB (USA) (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: 182nd AW Verification (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6) - You're welcome and welcome back! I am not sure about FB and IG but will hand the rest of the verification over to you.

I submitted the Twitter verification and Twitter Media Studio request last week. TMS is now available but verification can take two weeks.

Here is some information about TMS:

You now have access to Twitter Media Studio (TMS). Information about TMS can be found here [https://media.twitter.com/content/media-twitter/en\\_us/articles/products/2018/media-studio.html](https://media.twitter.com/content/media-twitter/en_us/articles/products/2018/media-studio.html).

Two ways to access from the desktop (logged in):

- From your homepage, click on your small icon located on the toolbar (top right of page) and find it in the dropdown.
- From the URL, scroll down to bottom of the page for the blue "Login to Media Studio" button.

Some features:

- Scheduling
- Multimedia library
- Posting video - choose/upload a thumbnail, write a title and short description, upload srt files (open captioning for Section 508 compliance)
- Sharing video

To access shared videos in TMS, click on "Library" (top left) and select "Shared Media." To preview the video click on "Tweet." (Don't worry, it will not tweet the video out) You can add your text there and schedule or publish.

I hope you enjoy the benefits of TMS! Please let me know if you have any questions.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) NG NGB (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, May 13, 2019 7:48 AM

To: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) CIV USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: 182nd AW Verification (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Thanks so much for the assist, (b)(6) If you need further assistance, I'm back and able to help!

Regards,

(b)(6)

111 S. George Mason Dr,  
Arlington, VA 22204

(b)(6)

<https://www.nationalguard.mil>  
<https://www.facebook.com/TheNationalGuard>  
[https://www.twitter.com\\_USNationalGuard](https://www.twitter.com_USNationalGuard)  
<https://instagram.com/us.nationalguard>  
<https://www.flickr.com/photos/TheNationalGuard>



(b)(6) 7/5/2019

RE: 182nd AW Verification (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6) <https://www.youtube.com/TheNationalGuard>

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA)

Sent: Monday, May 6, 2019 9:09 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) <todd.a.pendleton2.civ@mail.mil>; Norville, Samantha J 1st Lt USAF 182 AW (USA) <samantha.j.norville.mil@mail.mil>;

(b)(6) NG NGB (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD. (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: 182nd AW Verification

Roger that, thank you ma'am!

//SIGNED//

(b)(6)

182d Airlift Wing

2416 S. Falcon Blvd., Peoria, IL 61607.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, May 6, 2019 7:30 AM

To: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) NG NGB (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD. (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: 182nd AW Verification

Hello TSgt Buehrer,

Thanks for your email.

(b)(6) (National Guard POC) and I are working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. Twitter no longer does verifications but have generously agreed to help.

(b)(6) is currently on leave but I can assist with your accounts. I'll review them and get back with anything that needs to be done before the request.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Mobile: 667-967-4181

Pentagon: 703-697-7795

Room 2D956

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

(b)(6) On Apr 15, 2019, at 12:14, (b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6) Good morning (b)(6)

Yes, we would be interested in getting our accounts platform verified. We currently operate a Facebook (which has the soft verification stamp), Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube -- all under the @the182aw handle. Please let us know what the steps are, and thanks!

//SIGNED//

(b)(6)

<https://web-nita01.mail.mil/owa/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Note.SMIME.MultipartSigned&id=RgAAAAAfd5xnCAwCQqJnVYmHVth5BwDrDI3LmH2bS7aPkcP6...> 2/3



7/5/2019

RE: 182nd AW Verification (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6)  
182d Airlift Wing  
2416 S. Falcon Blvd., Peoria, IL 61607

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: U.S. Dept of Defense (via Twitter) <notify@twitter.com <mailto:notify@twitter.com> >

Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 9:49 PM

To: (b)(6) USAF 182 AW (USA) (b)(6)  
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] U.S. Dept of Defense (@DeptofDefense) has sent you a Direct Message on Twitter

(b)(6)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

@DeptofDefense: Hi there, My name is (b)(6) I am the DOD Social Media lead. I'd like to help get your accounts verified if that is something you are interested in. Please email me at (b)(6)

< Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaution-  
www.twitter.com%2Fdirect\_messages%2Fcreate%2FDeptofDefense%3Fuser\_id%3D66369181%26cn%3DbWVzc2FnZQ%253D%253D&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=591245dc5d1b86a712bdc343a7e4d76f21f5e9cb&iid=dd1 >

< Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaution-  
www.twitter.com%2FDeptofDefense%3Fcn%3DbWVzc2FnZQ%253D%253D%26refsrc%3Demail&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=4c64b1c332bb444 >

(b)(6)

U.S. Dept of Defense sent you a Direct Message. < Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaution-  
www.twitter.com%2Fdirect\_messages%2Fcreate%2FDeptofDefense%3Fuser\_id%3D66369181%26cn%3DbWVzc2FnZQ%253D%253D&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=4c64b1c332bb444 >

Hi there. My name is (b)(6) I am the DOD Social Media lead. I'd like to help get your accounts verified if that is something you are interested in. Please email me at (b)(6)

Reply < Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaution-  
www.twitter.com%2Fdirect\_messages%2Fcreate%2FDeptofDefense%3Fuser\_id%3D66369181%26cn%3DbWVzc2FnZQ%253D%253D&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=4c64b1c332bb444 >

Settings < Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaution-  
www.twitter.com%2Fsettings%2Femail\_notifications%3Fcn%3DbWVzc2FnZQ%253D%253D&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=17fb368860de7f0bb76: > | Help < Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.twitter.com%3Fcn%3DbWVzc2FnZQ%253D%253D&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=a0958133241c5d9a6e6aabcac1f > | Opt-out < Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.twitter.com%3Fcn%3DbWVzc2FnZQ%253D%253D&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=0c27714e475263e6d8fb79572b5e101e1fbc16ed&iid=dd11dcfc9bc8407c84b567f90f80b81b&uid=2196046621&nid=2: > | Download app < Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaution-  
www.twitter.com%2Fdownload%3Fcn%3DbWVzc2FnZQ%253D%253D&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=4034107f352cab4c54c42e5e1115378e3251f >

Twitter, Inc. 1355 Market Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA 94103 < Caution-https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2F%3Frefsrc%3Demail&t=1&cn=MTEwOTE2MTQwOmRtX21lc3NhZ2VfZW1haWw%3D&sig=870b174fe43d434fdbcb2355ae00405e088d9e4c5&iid=dd1 >

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED.

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED.

**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonator Accounts | Job: 2236453679954571**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2019 4:08 PM

To: Facebook [case++aazq4wvipzvzwr@support.facebook.com]

Cc: (b)(6)

Hi (b)(6),

Thank you! I appreciate your assistance with this.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>  
<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>  
<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>  
<https://www.defense.gov>

-----Original Message-----

From: Facebook <case++aazq4wvipzvzwr@support.facebook.com>

Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2019 4:06 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonator Accounts | Job: 2236453679954571

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Hi (b)(6),

This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team. I work alongside (b)(6) and (b)(6) and I'm happy to assist you today.

I understand that you would like to take down the following impostor Accounts:

1. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

2. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

3. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

4. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

5. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

6. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

7. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

8. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

9. Caution-[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

I am looking into these Accounts, and I will contact you with what I find.

If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst

>On Thu May 16, 2019 11:25:48, wrote:

>Hi (b)(6)

>We have received your question and your reference number is 2236453679954571. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>

>

>We'll be in touch soon!

>

>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>

>Sincerely,

>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>Facebook

>



**[Non-DoD Source] Impersonator Accounts | Job: 2236453679954571**

Facebook [case++aazq4wvipzvzwr@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2019 5:36 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Cc: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----  
Hi (b)(6),

Thanks for taking the time to report these unauthorized Accounts (1-9). We have removed them from Facebook.

If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst

Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>>On Thu May 16, 2019 13:17:26, Salem wrote:

>>Hi (b)(6),

>>I have applied to take down the impostor Accounts (1-9), and I will contact you when your application has been processed.

>>If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

>>Thanks,

>>(b)(6)

>>Facebook Client Support Analyst

>>>On Thu May 16, 2019 13:06:23, Salem wrote:

>>>Hi (b)(6),

>>>This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team. I work alongside (b)(6) and (b)(6), and I'm happy to assist you today.

>>>I understand that you would like to take down the following impostor Accounts:

>>>1. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6)

>>>2. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/

>>>3. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/

>>>4. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/

>>>5. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/

>>>6. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/

>>>7. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/

>>>8. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/

>>>9. Caution-https://www.facebook.com/

>>>I am looking into these Accounts, and I will contact you with what I find.

>>>If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

>>>Thanks,

>>>Salem

>>>Facebook Client Support Analyst

>>>>On Thu May 16, 2019 11:25:48, wrote:

>>>>Hi (b)(6),

>>>>We have received your question and your reference number is 2236453679954571. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.



>>>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>

>>>>

>>>>We'll be in touch soon!

>>>>

>>>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>>>>

>>>>Sincerely,

>>>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>>>>Facebook

>>>>

>>>

>>

>

## Instagram Imposters

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Thursday, May 16, 2019 4:04 PM

**To:** (b)(6) PACOM J00SEL (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Hello (b)(6),

What is the email address used to log into your Instagram account? I need it to report the imposters.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>

<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

<https://www.defense.gov>

**FW: CID - NY Times**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, March 29, 2019 1:14 PM

**To:** (b)(6) JS OCJCS (US)

FYSA ...

---

**From:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, February 27, 2019 9:01 AM

**To:** (b)(6) HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: CID - NY Times

(b)(6),

The decision to engage is pending. Can you share the talking points and messages that Ms. Joiner used for the interview? We would also appreciate any notes that came out of the interview. I know the CID PAO also conducted an interview with them, and based on his comments and any notes you can provide, that will inform the decision here on whether Army Public Affairs will engage.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, February 26, 2019 6:24 PM

**To:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: CID - NY Times

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks for letting me know. (b)(6) conducted the interview today. We started working this last week and were in touch with Facebook and Twitter liaisons before the process.

Do you have plans to engage?

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

On Feb 26, 2019, at 14:11, (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

(b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6)

The Army received a query from New York Times about social media impostors, specifically on Facebook. The reporter is (b)(6), and his request is at the very bottom of this email. We want to know if OSD has also been approached and what your plan is for engagement on it.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (US) (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 12:01 PM

To: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) CIV USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) CIV (US) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: CID - NY Times

Believe LTG Cardon met with leaders from FB et al., when he was the CG, ARCYBER, but can't say that he met directly w/ the FB CEO.

At the time, it was reported that FB employed 3x govt reps to deal with imposters among its 1.75 billion global users. Background slides attached.

(b)(6)

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

(b)(6)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

JWICS: (b)(6)



-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US)

Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 11:27

To: (b)(6) CIV USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (US) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (US) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: CID - NY Times

Thanks (b)(6). And for the record, I never met with the CEO of Facebook, but if the reporter would like to get me a meeting with the CEO, I would really appreciate it.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV USARMY USACIDC (USA)

Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 11:19 AM

To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)

(b)(6) CIV USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)

USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

USARMY USACIDC (US) (b)(6)

Subject: Re: CID - NY Times

All,

Just finished my interview. It was the reporter below that has contacted OCPA. No doubt their intent is to target Facebook for a good portion of this problem. I sidestepped numerous questions attempting to get me to pinpoint and blame Facebook. I made the point several times that the fraud appears on all social media platforms. I explained that we (CID) and the Army work with many social media sites to remove fraudulent posts, but they continually pop up. The reporter pulled up a spread sheet on his laptop during the interview to demonstrate all the accounts he found since yesterday on Gen Milley, Fulford, etc. I also explained that PAOS in the Army continually monitor their senior leaders for false accounts. Again, as predicted, the entire focus of this is to go after Facebook. I am not recommending that (b)(6) grant an interview. It will do us no good to slam Facebook while we are working this issue. Additionally, the reporter said that he knew Palmer met with the CEO of Facebook. I did not confirm any info on that.

(b)(6)

USA Criminal Investigation Command (CID) Quantico, VA

(b)(6)

[www.cid.army.mil](http://www.cid.army.mil)

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Original Message

From: (b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA)

Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 8:14 AM

To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US); (b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA); (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

Subject: RE: CID - NY Times

FYI,

According to the NY Times reporter I am conducting and interview with at 1030 today, my line of questioning is all related to handling the romance scam calls and not on the Facebook issue described below. I do think the issues will be merged for the final story, but they didn't reveal that. I will give you an update after my interview is completed.

(b)(6)

USA Criminal Investigation Command (CID) Quantico, VA

(b)(6)

[www.cid.army.mil](http://www.cid.army.mil)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

Sent: Monday, February 25, 2019 1:24 PM

To: (b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)

USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: CID - NY Times

(b)(6)

My team does the social media for the Army. We don't knock down imposters. We only report them to Facebook or the other companies. When the request came to us, I immediately thought of (b)(6) based on the work that we've done with him and the fact that he seems to be the SME in terms of imposters.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, February 25, 2019 1:21 PM

To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)



Cc: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) USARMY USACIDC (USA) (b)(6)  
USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)  
Subject: CID - NY Times

(b)(6)

I am scheduled to do an interview with NY Times tomorrow on "romance scams" for NY Times TV. There was no mention of this issue below. I will circle back with the reporter to ask. The reporter I am working with is (b)(6) Wondering why the PAO team at OCPA who works with Facebook to knock down imposters would not do this interview as opposed to CID agents.  
thanks

(b)(6)

USA Criminal Investigation Command (CID) Quantico, VA

(b)(6)

[www.cid.army.mil](http://www.cid.army.mil)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)  
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2019 9:10 AM  
To: (b)(6) CIV USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)  
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

(b)(6)

I apologize for sending this directly to you instead of your PAO. I couldn't remember who that is.

Please remember that your command does not need to agree to everything the reporter is asking for. If there is a more limited amount of support you would like to provide, that would work too.

Let me know if you need anything from this end.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)  
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 5:09 PM  
To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

Thanks (b)(6).

I will push this up the chain to gauge their response.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 4:53 PM

To: (b)(6) USARMY 701 MP GP (US) (b)(6)

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

(b)(6)

See the email traffic below. I think you are the more appropriate person to discuss with the New York Times, pending your leadership's approval. We can work the coordination piece on this end to get them in touch with you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 3:23 PM

To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) (b)(6)



(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

Thanks (b)(6) - I think this should really go to DMD and all the work they do with fake profiles and the relationship they have built with FB.

(b)(6) - thoughts?

(b)(6)

Army Public Affairs

(b)(6)

From: Bockholt, Matthew R LTC USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

<[matthew.r.bockholt.mil@mail.mil](mailto:matthew.r.bockholt.mil@mail.mil)>

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 1:49 PM

To: Turner, Kathleen T. COL USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) <[kathleen.t.turner.mil@mail.mil](mailto:kathleen.t.turner.mil@mail.mil)>

Cc: Garcia, Lisa Ann COL USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) <[lisa.a.garcia1.mil@mail.mil](mailto:lisa.a.garcia1.mil@mail.mil)>; Hyde,

Timothy A LTC USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA) <[timothy.a.hyde.mil@mail.mil](mailto:timothy.a.hyde.mil@mail.mil)>

Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

When Mark Zuckerberg conducted his nationwide tour of all states he asked if he could visit USASOC. The public explanation was that he wanted to visit soldiers and families in NC on his tour. He actually came to discuss VR/AR technology with the command.

During the meeting, we spoke with Mark about LTG Tovo's issues with fake FB profiles. We asked for a dedicated method to delete them when they popped up. From that point I submitted all Tovo

fake profiles to FB when I found them. (b)(6) was not aware, or said he was not aware, that fake profiles were an issue with military senior leaders.

(b)(6)

On Feb 22, 2019, at 09:13, (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

(b)(6)

wrote:

(b)(6) - I've added (b)(6) from DMD to this. It might be better for the reporter to talk with (b)(6) first on this.

Can you give me the gist of the 5W's on your discussion with FB?

(b)(6)

Army Public Affairs

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 11:18 AM

To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

(b)(6)

This morning I received a NYT query noted below. I wanted to forward to you for guidance on response.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2019 5:53 AM

To: (b)(6) USSOCOM USASOC HQ

(b)(6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] New York Times inquiry - military impostors on social media

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

(b)(6)

My name is Jack Nicas and I'm a reporter for the New York Times. I'm reaching out because I'm working on a larger story about military impostors on social media. I know this is a major issue for active servicemen and women and veterans, with many scammers stealing their identities to pose as them on Facebook and Instagram to cheat people out of money.

I understand you were part of a group from the military who met with Facebook about this issue. I'd love to touch base to discuss Facebook's response and whether it has worked. Ideally we can speak on the record, and we are actually also filming a documentary on the story, so we would love to have you on camera. I'll be in DC on Tuesday. But I also can speak confidentiality if needed. FYI, I have also been in touch with the public affairs department about this issue and they are looking into it.

I'm at (b)(6) if you have a few minutes to discuss today.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

Reporter  
The New York Times

(b)(6)

[CAUTION]%Caution-http://www.twitter.com/(b)(6)

[CAUTION]%Caution-https://www.nytimes.com/(b)(6)

&lt;8Sept\_4-Star Forum\_Imposter brief\_FINAL.PPTX&gt;

**Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Impersonator Accounts - (b)(6)**

(b)(6) on behalf of Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]

Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2019 4:59 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Hj (b)(6)

Apologies for the confusion - what are you looking to do here with the account?

We are happy to provide best next steps from there!

\*\*

**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov >

On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 10:59 AM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) > wrote:

(b)(6) has also given her permission for me to access this account as well.

< Caution-https://twitter.com/(b)(6) Caution-https://twitter.com/(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, May 29, 2019 10:40 AM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics

**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Impersonator Accounts - Karen Parrish

Good morning,

I have been communicating with (b)(6) the owner of the account, via DM. She is not able to update the handle or profile herself and has given me permission to access it. Would it be possible to temporarily change the login so I can go in and update it. Once that is completed, I would like to return the login access to her.

<Caution-https://twitter.com/(b)(6) < Caution-https://twitter.com/(b)(6)

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) on behalf of Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > ]

**Sent:** Monday, May 06, 2019 5:31 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Impersonator Accounts - (b)(6)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Thank you for the details! We have escalated this, so the support team will reach out directly with any questions.



**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > < Caution-Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov < Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov > >

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 5:11 PM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) > > wrote:

Good afternoon,

There is a former Department of Defense (DOD) News writer who is no longer employed by or associated with the DOD. She is tweeting as her former position I sent her a DM today to change the handle, bio and link. I have also submitted two separate forms for each of the accounts below, I received a case number for one of the submissions.

Active account: Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/(b)(6)

https://twitter.com/(b)(6)

https://twitter.com/(b)(6)

Inactive account using the position as writer and Caution-Caution-url: Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/ParrishAFPS < Caution-https://twitter.com/ParrishAFPS > < Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/ParrishAFPS < Caution-https://twitter.com/ParrishAFPS > >

Case# 0113329941

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DMA Pentagon Bureau

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense > < Caution-Caution-https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?

C=kRPYUmu0Fcxb01eIA5HkJUARX7Qq1kygmyBjEHNmKfsZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2ftwitter.com%2fDeptofDefense < Caution-https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?

C=kRPYUmu0Fcxb01eIA5HkJUARX7Qq1kygmyBjEHNmKfsZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2ftwitter.com%2fDeptofDefense > >

Caution-Caution-https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense < Caution-https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense > < Caution-Caution-https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?C=B-

SPfsQ3tDeZUd4\_1FrYppur9GBw5f0n3dYeiwWmQ4UZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.instagram.com%2fdeptofdefense < Caution-https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?C=B-

SPfsQ3tDeZUd4\_1FrYppur9GBw5f0n3dYeiwWmQ4UZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.instagram.com%2fdeptofdefense > >

Caution-Caution-https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense > < Caution-Caution-https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?

C=7P5lgqTrCe0qBaM7opW3ZCddQdUguEw3D5li2K1BxIwZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.facebook.com%2fDeptofDefense < Caution-https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?

C=7P5lgqTrCe0qBaM7opW3ZCddQdUguEw3D5li2K1BxIwZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.facebook.com%2fDeptofDefense > >

Caution-Caution-https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense < Caution-

https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense > < Caution-Caution-https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?

C=FMIMQYUjZQP0iZLXjfqAu1BnNtuzwUpBbdcLUBjg57gZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.linkedin.com%2fcompany%2funited-states-department-of-defense < Caution-https://web-mech01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?

C=FMIMQYUjZQP0iZLXjfqAu1BnNtuzwUpBbdcLUBjg57gZXdFpRk3VCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fCaution-Caution-www.linkedin.com%2fcompany%2funited-states-department-of-defense > >

Caution-Caution-https://www.defense.gov < Caution-https://www.defense.gov > < Caution-Caution-https://www.defense.gov/ < Caution-https://www.defense.gov/ > >

7/3/2019

Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Impersonator Accounts - Karen Parrish

||

**Account Verification**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Monday, June 03, 2019 3:50 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Thank you for crossposting and responding to my message.

I am working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. Please let me know what accounts need verification. Please feel free to forward this email or copy anyone involved.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>

<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

<https://www.defense.gov>



## **Customer Journey Canvas**

### **1. What people are involved?**

- Account manager: Reporting/follow up, their leaders for the follow up; Leaders: Updates/follow up
- Some leaders and their spouses (Gen. Lengyel and Gen. Dunford) report\*
- I am the touch point between the DOD and Twitter, and handle incidences for all the DOD organizations outside of the military Services
- I am the liaison between the Service social media leads/branches and DOD. The DOD team conducts a weekly scan of impostors - leader/organizational names photos/links/representations, etc
- The military Service leads are also in direct contact with Twitter through gov@twitter.com

### **2. What touchpoints do you interact with?**

- The social media manager usually contacts me directly by phone/email or both.
- They are instructed to submit a form (<https://help.twitter.com/forms>) and send me a case number which I escalate to Twitter via email.
- Twitter responds very quickly. It has been a clean and simple process. The account is removed or we work together to fix it. The account manager and I document it, go over best practices and move on.
- There has not been a hacking or scam case reported to me. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) also does independent scans of key DOD leaders (Acting SecDef Shanahan and Gen. Dunford) on their own.

### **3. What do you feel at a specific moment?**

- Alert, focused, and on a mission
- I didn't know how to respond to this initially. In the military (civilian or service member) I am/was never asked how I feel, but the individuals reporting the incident are very concerned and anxious. They receive pressure from their leadership who share the same concern. My leadership is concerned but are reassured things will be taken care of and I keep them abreast of anything serious
- In my opinion, it's a reality check for the individual reporting - they seem to take it personally, which increases their awareness; some still bring up their one incident
- More serious cases are when fake accounts message people within their agency/organization and sometimes ask for money
- Example: Gen. Lengyel's fraud activity across all platforms (more than 2,000 already reported in 2019) and how the National Guard Bureau has three employees looking for imposters on a daily basis. Lengyel and his spouse actively search for and check in on the reporting progress. Another leader also said someone's mother sent an imposter money.

### **4. What do you think at a specific moment?**

- This is a priority, so I stop what I am doing and act immediately
- I am curious as to who created the fake account, review the account and who (in our organization) follows them. I look at how they are impersonating (characteristics) and what kind of content they are posting. If it's not harmful (threatening) my primary focus is taking it down to prevent any further or potential damage. Threatening tweets are screenshotted and reported to the IT security manager.

### **5. What tech was involved?**



- Weekly manual, Boolean searches/scans of variations of names, logged on a spreadsheet
- Everything starts with a form! We use online Twitter Forms (briefed by (b)(6) at our March 7th training) to report fraud and general assistance. It's quick and easy. It's what they brief during their training sessions, and is preferred for tracking/reporting purposes and it is what I teach all the Service leads.

#### **6. What are the opportunities to improve your experience?**

- No improvements
- Twitter is efficient and effective. They have been very responsive to my questions, concerns and urgent requests
- I am very thankful they are working with the DOD to take on the additional workload of assisting us in verifying dozens of accounts
- In my experience working at the DOD for the past two years - Twitter is the main platform used by its leaders and is the only platform of relevance

#### **Notes from the breakout meeting with Lauren:**

1. Transitioning @ActingSecDef and @ChiefPentSpox accounts, Nikki Haley, and the Calif. Governor account examples
2. Institutional handles (business only, in compliance) vs. personal accounts (their own views, family, thoughts, sharing, etc.)
3. Including some items in the policy - Including actions and engagements (not just posts) as part of the strategy
4. Creating content specifically for mobile handheld devices (appearance, delivery, engagement)
5. Limitations the DOD experiences with engaging and replying to accounts. Use @DOD\_Outreach to engage/interact with the public. Is it less formal w/reduced screening during live coverage of events
6. Twitter challenges 9M accounts each week that have bot-like characteristics
7. New way of staffing the verification using Google Sheets
8. Next training session at Twitter DC
9. Rebuilding the AFN Pacific region's social media presence and providing them training opportunities
10. Collaboration with Office of Naval Research with their disinformation associate to work on removal of malicious accounts.
11. Talked about how to prevent a fake account from being created.

\*List of [DOD](#) leader accounts:

Secretary of Defense

Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan: <https://twitter.com/ActingSecDef>

Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary of Defense/CFO [David L. Norquist](#) (@DepSecDef account)

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs [Jonathan Rath Hoffman](#):

<https://twitter.com/ChiefPentSpox> (account in transition)

Principal Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs [Charles E. Summers Jr.](#) (former Acting ATSD/PA)

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategic Engagement [Kim Joiner](#)

### The Joint Staff

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. Joe Dunford: <https://twitter.com/thejointstaff>

Archived account: <https://twitter.com/GenDunford>

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley: <https://twitter.com/ArmyChiefStaff>

Marines Chief of Staff Gen. Robert B. Neller: [https://twitter.com/CMC\\_MarineCorps](https://twitter.com/CMC_MarineCorps)

Navy John Richardson: <https://twitter.com/CNORichardson>

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Paul J. Selva (does not have Twitter):

National Guard Chief of Staff Air Force Gen. Joseph L. Lengyel: <https://twitter.com/ChiefNGB>

### Military Branches

<https://twitter.com/USArmy>

<https://twitter.com/USNavy>

<https://twitter.com/usairforce>

<https://twitter.com/USMC>

<https://twitter.com/USNationalGuard>

<https://twitter.com/USCG> (part of DHS)

### Combatant Commands

<https://twitter.com/INDOPACOM>

<https://twitter.com/USAfricaCommand>

<https://twitter.com/Southcom>

<https://twitter.com/USNorthernCmd>

<https://twitter.com/USSOCOM>

<https://twitter.com/CENTCOM>

[https://twitter.com/US\\_Stratcom](https://twitter.com/US_Stratcom)

[https://twitter.com/US\\_EUCOM](https://twitter.com/US_EUCOM)

[https://twitter.com/US\\_TRANSCOM](https://twitter.com/US_TRANSCOM)

[https://twitter.com/US\\_CYBERCOM](https://twitter.com/US_CYBERCOM)

Example of impersonated leader in Combat Zones: Army Gen. Scott Miller

Campaign in Afghanistan: <https://twitter.com/ResoluteSupport>

Archived account for Army Gen. Austin S. Miller: [https://twitter.com/commander\\_rs](https://twitter.com/commander_rs)



**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Handle Update | Job: 588208835030932**

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, June 10, 2019 2:03 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** Facebook [case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com]; (b)(6) USAF (US); (b)(6) USAF (USA); (b)(6) USAF AFSOC PA (US)

(b)(6)

As always, thanks for all your help! ☺

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

AFSOC Public Affairs

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, June 7, 2019 5:11 PM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

**Cc:** Facebook <case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com>; (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/PA

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/PA (b)(6)

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: [Non-DoD Source] Handle Update | Job: 588208835030932

Hi (b)(6),

I reported the three accounts and the Facebook team have removed them. Please add to your the accounts reported and outcome to your record.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

On Jun 7, 2019, at 11:52, (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA

(b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6),

Hello! We have previously worked together to tackle and remove accounts created to impersonate our Air Force Special Operations Commander, Lt. Gen. Brad Webb. I need your expertise once again.

I have reported the following imposter accounts several times, however, the accounts have not yet been disabled. Unfortunately, we have had multiple people reach out to us with signs of fraudulent messaging.

Official account: <https://www.facebook.com/COMAFSOCOOfficial/>

Imposter accounts: <https://www.facebook.com/Lt-Gen-Brad-Webb-320615782173171/> ,  
<https://www.facebook.com/LtGenBrad-Webb-428216757758274/> , <https://www.facebook.com/Lt-Gen-Brad-Webb-353777602160802/>

I would greatly appreciate any assistance you can provide. Thank you so much!

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

AFSOC Public Affairs

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA

Sent: Monday, April 22, 2019 12:04 PM

To: 'Facebook' <[case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com](mailto:case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com)>

Cc: (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/PA

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/PA

(b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Handle Update | Job: 588208835030932

(b)(6)

My name is (b)(6) and I work for Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs. I greatly appreciate all of the proactive and efficient assistance you provided in order to get our command social media accounts verified. Thanks again!

Another account we operate is a Facebook page for our commander, Lt. Gen Brad Webb (@COMAFSOCOOfficial). This account is not verified and is frequently impersonated. Unfortunately, we are currently dealing with another impersonator. Following your instructions below, I reported the imposter's profile and filled out the form to report a Facebook page that is impersonating a public figure.

I wanted to reach out to you personally to see if there were any additional steps I could take in order to have this account removed. Furthermore, would it be possible to verify our commander's page? Perhaps this will deter impersonators in the future.

Our account link: <https://www.facebook.com/COMAFSOCOOfficial/>

Imposter account link: <https://www.facebook.com/ibrahim.nizeyimana.58>

Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you so much for your time.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

AFSOC Public Affairs

(b)(6)



-----Original Message-----

From: Facebook <[case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com](mailto:case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com)>

Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 11:21 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USAF AFSOC

AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Handle Update | Job: 588208835030932

Hi (b)(6),

We reviewed your Account (<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>) and determined that it's eligible for verification. You'll now see a blue check-mark next to your username on your profile and in search results on Instagram.

Please note that verified Accounts must remain public, have a profile picture and post content.

We strongly recommend you turn on two-factor authentication to help protect your Instagram Account. For details about how to set up two-factor authentication and keep your Account secure in the future, please follow the security tips in the Help Center:

<https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090/>

Our team is happy to help you further establish your authentic presence by removing impostor Accounts. If you're being impersonated, please follow these instructions to report impostor Accounts: [www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296](https://www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296)

If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst

Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

On Fri Apr 5, 2019 09:38:54, (b)(6) wrote:

Hi (b)(6),

Thanks for submitting this request. We've changed your username (<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>), and this should be reflected throughout the system soon.

If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

Thanks,

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email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

On Tue Apr 2, 2019 15:14:44, (b)(6) DMA  
HQ DMA (USA) wrote:

Hi (b)(6),

Correct. Yes, please.

Thank you so much!



On Apr 2, 2019, at 18:08, Facebook  
<[case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com](mailto:case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com)>  
wrote:

Hi (b)(6),

This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team. I work alongside (b)(6) and (b)(6) and I'm happy to assist you today.

While (b)(6) works on your Page username change request, I'll be helping with your Instagram username claim and Instagram verification requests here. I understand that you would like to claim the username (<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>) with the Instagram Account ([https://www.instagram.com/afsoc\\_official/](https://www.instagram.com/afsoc_official/)), and then verify the resulting Instagram Account (<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>). I have applied to claim the username (), and I will contact you after your application has been processed. I will apply to verify the Instagram Account (<https://www.instagram.com/AFSpecOpsCmd/>) once the username has been changed.

If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst

**[Non-DoD Source] Re: Meeting Notes**

(b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, June 10, 2019 9:58 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

Hi (b)(6)

Thank you very much for taking the time to write down your additional thoughts and notes. Your input was especially valuable for our Twitter Service team to understand what your workflow and experiences are like.

Please enjoy the rest of your leave!

(b)(6)

On Sun, Jun 9, 2019 at 8:52 AM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6) wrote:

Hi (b)(6)

Thanks to you and the Twitter team for the opportunity to speak with everyone during the feedback session! Finally had a few minutes to put some notes (attached) together.

(b)(6)

--  
(b)(6)

@TwitterGov < Caution-<https://twitter.com/TwitterGov> > | @Policy < Caution-<https://twitter.com/Policy> >



**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Handle Update | Job: 588208835030932**

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**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** Facebook [case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com]; (b)(6) USAF (US); (b)(6) CIV USAF (USA); (b)(6) USAF AFSOC PA (US)

(b)(6)

As always, thanks for all your help! ☺

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

AFSOC Public Affairs

(b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, June 7, 2019 5:11 PM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSOC AFSOC PA/AFSOC/PA (b)(6)

**Cc:** Facebook <case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com>; (b)(6) AFSOC AFSOC PA/PA

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Thank you,

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I have reported the following imposter accounts several times, however, the accounts have not yet been disabled. Unfortunately, we have had multiple people reach out to us with signs of fraudulent messaging.

Official account: <https://www.facebook.com/COMAFSOCOOfficial/>

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<https://www.facebook.com/LtGenBrad-Webb-428216757758274/> , <https://www.facebook.com/Lt-Gen-Brad-Webb-353777602160802/>

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Imposter account link: [https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

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
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<[case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com](mailto:case++aazq3dkv6m7jxl@support.facebook.com)>  
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If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please feel free to reach out.

Thanks,



7/3/2019

RE: [Non-DoD Source] Handle Update | Job: 588208835030932

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst

**Re: Fraudulent FB account: I need access**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2019 12:35 PM

To: (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US)

Cc: (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD. (USA)

(b)(6) - Please see the response from FB.

Thanks for contacting us. We reviewed your request and found that some of the accounts you reported were currently active and falsely claiming to be the official presence of Lt. Gen. Darrel K. Williams on Facebook. We've removed those accounts from Facebook:

Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>  
Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>  
Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>  
Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>  
Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>

(b)(6)

We've also unpublished any Pages you've reported that we found to be an unauthorized presence or non-compliant with the Facebook Pages Terms. The admin of those Pages now has the option to leave them unpublished or to republish them with a different name.

Additionally, if any of the remaining accounts is infringing on the intellectual property of Lt. Gen. Darrel K. Williams, you can report it here: [Caution-https://www.facebook.com/help/intellectual\\_property/](https://www.facebook.com/help/intellectual_property/)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

On Jun 11, 2019, at 10:23, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:

(b)(6)

Hi (b)(6),

Wonderful! Looking forward to meeting you all in person.

Good job with the findings! I have submitted the account to FB for review and removal. Reference #2459086304319214.

Please continue to do regular scans across all platforms and keep a log.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, June 10, 2019 10:32 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (USA); (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US)  
**Subject:** RE: Fraudulent FB account; I need access

Thanks Aimee

I'm ccing my bosses. Joe and I plan to attend your June 19 meeting.

So far I have found 5 sites using his image and identifying as the DLA director LTG Darrell Williams. He does not have a Facebook account.

[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))  
[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))  
[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))  
[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))  
[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

I found another two that are less contentious.

[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))  
[https://www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](https://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

thanks

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, June 7, 2019 3:03 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fraudulent FB account; I need access

(b)(6)

Please send me the links and I will report them.

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DLA PUBLIC AFFAIRS (US) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, June 07, 2019 9:36 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Subject:** Fraudulent FB account; I need access

(b)(6)

I need access to this portal to report some fake pages we found on our general. Thank you

I plan to attend the June 19 meeting you are having so hope to meet you there.

7/3/2019

Re: Fraudulent FB account: I need access

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DLA Public Affairs

(b)(6)

Sharing some resources with you.

FACEBOOK/INSTAGRAM:

Here is the link to the Facebook/Instagram Government and Politics Advocacy Concierge (GPAC) portal: <https://www.facebook.com/business/clientsupport>

Please let me know if you have issues with accessing it.



**Re: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 2459086304319214**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 11, 2019 12:33 PM

**To:** Facebook [case++aazzqm3zv7nvaw@support.facebook.com]

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA); (b)(6)

Hi (b)(6)

Thank you for your prompt action and reply! I will let their public affairs team know.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

@DeptofDefense

On Jun 11, 2019, at 12:22, Facebook <[case++aazzqm3zv7nvaw@support.facebook.com](mailto:case++aazzqm3zv7nvaw@support.facebook.com)> wrote:

Thanks for contacting us. We reviewed your request and found that some of the accounts you reported were currently active and falsely claiming to be the official presence of Lt. Gen. Darrel K. Williams on Facebook. We've removed those accounts from Facebook:

Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>  
Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>  
Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>  
Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>  
Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/>

We've also unpublished any Pages you've reported that we found to be an unauthorized presence or non-compliant with the Facebook Pages Terms. The admin of those Pages now has the option to leave them unpublished or to republish them with a different name.

Additionally, if any of the remaining accounts is infringing on the intellectual property of Lt. Gen. Darrel K. Williams, you can report it here: Caution-  
[https://www.facebook.com/help/intellectual\\_property/](https://www.facebook.com/help/intellectual_property/)

**RE: JBLM social media verification (UNCLASSIFIED)**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 11, 2019 10:38 AM

**To:** (b)(6) USARMY USAG (USA)

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (US); (b)(6)

Hello (b)(6)

Thanks for emailing. I am working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. Twitter no longer does verifications but have generously agreed to help the DOD.

Please place the URL from the Twitter profile and add it to the link section. Does the account need access to Twitter Media Studio as well?

Would you also like to update your handle to match the FB one?

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) USARMY USAG (USA)

**Sent:** Thursday, June 06, 2019 2:03 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media

**Subject:** JBLM social media verification (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Hello (b)(6),

Thank you for reaching out to JBLM on Twitter! I'd love to work with you to get our accounts verified. Please let me know what you have in mind.

V/r,

(b)(6)

Digital Content Manager  
Joint Base Lewis-McChord  
Garrison HQ Public Affairs Office  
1010 Liggett Avenue  
JBLM, WA 98433

(b)(6)

JBLM News: <https://www.army.mil/jblm>

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

**RE: Twitter Verification - MARFORCYBER**

(b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, June 12, 2019 8:09 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)**Cc:** (b)(6) USMC TRANSCOM JECCJPSE (USA)

Hi (b)(6),

Our website is supposed to go live this week, but might get pushed until next week. We will let you know once it is updated.

Thank you for your support!

R/s,

(b)(6)

MARFORCYBER Office of Communication

(b)(6)

Twitter: @MARFORCYBER

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)**Sent:** Tuesday, June 11, 2019 9:50 PM**To:** (b)(6)**Cc:** (b)(6) USMC TRANSCOM JECCJPSE (USA)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Twitter Verification - MARFORCYBER

Hi Amanda,

Please let me know when the website is up and the URL is updated in the profile. Twitter is being very particular for verifications lately and I want to avoid anything that may delay the process.

Thanks!

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)**Sent:** Tuesday, June 04, 2019 1:46 PM**To:** (b)(6)**Cc:** (b)(6) USMC TRANSCOM JECCJPSE (USA)**Subject:** RE: Twitter Verification - MARFORCYBER

Thank you for updating the URL.

I am submitting the next batch on the 17th. After that, verification can take up to two weeks.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6)**Sent:** Tuesday, June 4, 2019 11:46 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)**Cc:** (b)(6) USMC TRANSCOM JECCJPSE (USA)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Twitter Verification - MARFORCYBER



(b)(6)

Thanks for your assistance. I just added our URL and we have no additional accounts to verify. We will have our own website live in the next week or two and we will update that URL with our new website once we are live.

Access to Twitter Media Studio would be very helpful to us as well.

R/s,

(b)(6)

MARFORCYBER Office of Communication

(b)(6)

Twitter: @MARFORCYBER

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 4, 2019 9:16 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

USMC TRANSCOM JECCJPSE (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Twitter Verification - MARFORCYBER

Hello (b)(6)

Thank you for responding. Nice to e-meet you.

I am working to review and verify all official DOD social media accounts in an effort to reduce imposters and scams. Twitter no longer does verifications but have generously agreed to help the DOD.

The account looks good but one thing needs to be done. Please add the URL to the official page to the bio section. Also, does the account need access to Twitter Media Studio?

Are there any other accounts in need of verification?

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>

<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>

<https://www.defense.gov>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)



Sent: Tuesday, June 4, 2019 9:05 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USMC TRANSCOM JECCJPSE (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: Twitter Verification - MARFORCYBER

Good morning Aimee,

I'm emailing you in regards to your offer to help verify our official Twitter account, @MARFORCYBER.

The Twitter account is run by our Communication Strategy Office and is the official account for U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command.

I've cc'd my Chief, (b)(6), and my replacement, (b)(6).

Please let us know what we can do to assist.

R/s,

(b)(6)

MARFORCYBER Office of Communication

(b)(6)

Twitter: @MARFORCYBER

**RE: Official IG**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, June 19, 2019 8:24 AM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFGSC 5 BW/PA (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Please send me the email addresses associated with the base and CCC accounts. It is required for the verification request.

Also, did you want to update the @username and URL for FB and TW so they match? If they are available.

@MinotAFB

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) USAF AFGSC 5 BW/PA (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 18, 2019 3:49 PM

**To:** (b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Subject:** Official IG

Good Afternoon,

Can you add another official account for us here at Minot AFB. Instagram: Rough\_Rider3 which is the official IG of our new 91MW Command Chief. Thank you.

V/R,

(b)(6)

NCOIC, Command Information

5th Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base

(b)(6)

**RE: DOD Scams article- update**

(b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, June 28, 2019 2:45 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) CIV DMA PROD (USA)

I know! After the 4<sup>th</sup> is fine by me since we're all still trying to get our bearings.

(b)(6)

Social Media/Public Affairs Specialist  
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

(b)(6)

Website: [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)

Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

Twitter: @DeptofDefense

YouTube: [youtube.com/DeptofDefense](https://youtube.com/DeptofDefense)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, June 28, 2019 2:43 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: DOD Scams article- update

Yes, or even after 4<sup>th</sup> of July. It's going to be another very busy week!

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, June 28, 2019 2:26 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: DOD Scams article- update

We can talk about that Monday. I'm not sure we have any at DMA left who could help!

(b)(6)

Social Media/Public Affairs Specialist  
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

(b)(6)

Website: [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)

Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

Twitter: @DeptofDefense

YouTube: [youtube.com/DeptofDefense](https://youtube.com/DeptofDefense)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, June 28, 2019 2:14 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: DOD Scams article- update

I think we should do a video to go with it.

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, June 28, 2019 2:05 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DOD Scams article- update

Lovely. That probably falls under general military impersonations, but I'll add it to the list!

(b)(6)  
Social Media/Public Affairs Specialist  
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

(b)(6)  
Website: [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)  
Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)  
Twitter: @DeptofDefense  
YouTube: [youtube.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.youtube.com/DeptofDefense)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, June 28, 2019 1:49 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD  
(USA) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DOD Scams article- update

(b)(6) also brought up a catfish scam where military leader impersonators are catfishing women saying they are divorced.

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 20, 2019 1:34 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD  
(USA) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DOD Scams article- update

We don't have to use that specific example but can speak generally.

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 20, 2019 1:24 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DOD Scams article- update

Good to know. I'll add that in there!

(b)(6)  
Public Affairs Specialist  
DOD Social Media

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

Website: [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)

Facebook: facebook.com/DeptofDefense

Twitter &amp; Instagram: @DeptofDefense

YouTube: youtube.com/DeptofDefense

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)**Sent:** Thursday, June 20, 2019 10:57 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)**Subject:** RE: DOD Scams article- update

Wonderful!

I am not sure if this is already included, but I know some impersonators are asking friends/relatives of people they know for money. An SEL just told me someone's mother sent an imposter money because she thought it was him.

**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)**Sent:** Thursday, June 20, 2019 10:23 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA) (b)(6)**Subject:** DOD Scams article- update

I'm finally getting back on the DOD scams warning article page!

So far, from what I've found, I'm able to touch on romance scams, sextortion, sales schemes, advance fee schemes and service member impersonations. I think that's a good start to write an article from, but if you can think of any other important scams off the top of your heads, let me know!

(b)(6)

Public Affairs Specialist

DOD Social Media

(b)(6)

Website: [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)

Facebook: facebook.com/DeptofDefense

Twitter &amp; Instagram: @DeptofDefense

YouTube: youtube.com/DeptofDefense

**RE: Verifying your Twitter feed (UNCLASSIFIED)**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Friday, June 28, 2019 3:10 PM

To: (b)(6) USARMY 780 MI BDE (USA)

(b)(6)

I just tried calling you back.

Twitter no longer does verifications BUT has agreed to help the DOD because we have a problem with fake accounts and imposters. I'm running into two meetings so I'm sending this for you to review. The account needs a URL in the profile area.

**Verification Requirements**

When you have a chance, please ensure the following minimum requirements are in place for each of the accounts. Send me the links and let me know once they are set.

- Login verification/2-Factor authentication is activated
- Associated email must be campaign/institutional/governmental
- Profile and header images are not Twitter's default photos
- Bio specifies the person's official title or the purpose of the org/agency/division
- The URL to the org/agency/division/campaign's official website is added to the profile
- They have tweeted natively recently and regularly (not just retweets)
- The Facebook and Instagram accounts are not linked to Twitter
- Remove the setting that links posts from Instagram and Facebook
- Provide the email associated w/ the IG account verification
- Specify whether or not the account needs access to Twitter Media Studio
- Write a brief justification on how/why the content and unit fits in to the SecDef's/DOD's efforts.
- Do you have other accounts that need verification? Please send the links for those also.
- For IG verification, send the email address associated with the account.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY 780 MI BDE (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, June 28, 2019 12:26 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Verifying your Twitter feed (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

Per the Army Public Affairs Social Media site at <https://www.army.mil/socialmedia/managers/>, I requested to add the account to the Army's Social Media Directory.

When I went to the Twitter page to verify the account at <https://verification.twitter.com/request>, the site seems to be down at the moment.

v/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer  
780th Military Intelligence Brigade (Cyber)  
310R Chamberlin Ave., Fort Meade, MD 20755

(b)(6)

"Everywhere and Always...In the Fight"



-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2019 12:20 PM  
To: (b)(6) USARMY 780 MI BDE (USA)  
(b)(6)  
Subject: RE: Verifying your Twitter feed (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hi (b)(6),

When you say register, do you mean registering with Army or submitting a request for verification?

Verification can take 2-3 weeks depending on how busy Twitter is.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

<https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense>  
<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense>  
<https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense>  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense>  
<https://www.defense.gov>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY 780 MI BDE (USA)  
(b)(6)  
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2019 12:12 PM  
To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
Subject: FW: Verifying your Twitter feed (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Good afternoon,

I was hoping you can assist. I did register our Twitter account through the Army.mil Social Media site; however, I'm not sure how long that will take.

Our Twitter account is: <https://twitter.com/780thC>

v/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer  
780th Military Intelligence Brigade (Cyber)  
310R Chamberlin Ave., Fort Meade, MD 20755

(b)(6)

"Everywhere and Always. In the Fight"

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY ARCYBER (USA)  
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2019 12:04 PM

To: (b)(6) USARMY 780 MI BDE (USA)

(b)(6)

Subject: Verifying your Twitter feed (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Hi (b)(6) ...

As discussed, (b)(6) did the legwork to verify our Twitter feed, and I'm sure she'd do the same for yours. Her address is:

(b)(6)

Thanks again. I'm off to salute your new feed!

V/R,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

U.S. Army Cyber Command  
Public Affairs Office  
8825 Beulah St.  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

(b)(6)

Follow ARCYBER on:

Web: [www.arcyber.army.mil](http://www.arcyber.army.mil)

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/arcyber>

Flickr: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/army-cyber>

LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/company/10791785>

-----  
ABOUT US: United States Army Cyber Command directs and conducts integrated electronic warfare, information and cyberspace operations as authorized, or directed, to ensure freedom of action in and through cyberspace and the information environment, and to deny the same to our adversaries.

Interested in the challenge of joining the Army Cyber team? Check out military and civilian cyber career and employment opportunities by clicking on the "Careers" tab at [www.arcyber.army.mil](http://www.arcyber.army.mil)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED



**[Non-DoD Source] Facebook Verification | Job: 446095102881252**

Facebook [case++aazq56jnt5pjtz@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Monday, July 01, 2019 4:21 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----  
Hi (b)(6),

The Page Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/SchrieverAirForceBase/> was verified. Let me know if you have any issues with this request.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>On Thu Jun 27, 2019 13:55:53, Drew wrote:

>Hi (b)(6),

>My name is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team and I am more than happy to assist you with your inquiry. I understand you are requesting verification of the Facebook Page, Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/SchrieverAirForceBase/>. The DoD Page (114648515718) is already verified. >Please note, I have filed a request for review. I will keep you updated along the way and you can expect a response once a viable resolution has been reached.

>In the meantime, should you have any further questions regarding this inquiry, please feel free to reach out.

>Thanks,

>(b)(6)

>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>>On Thu Jun 27, 2019 13:01:42, wrote:

>>Hi (b)(6),

>>We have received your question and your reference number is 446095102881252. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>

>>

>>We'll be in touch soon!

>>

>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>>

>>Sincerely,

>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>>Facebook

>>

>

**[Non-DoD Source] Re: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699 [ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001ib1nt:ref]**

(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2019 7:12 AM

To: Twitter Support [support@twitter.com]; (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Hello,

I have access to the email that submitted the report. Standing by for further instructions. Thank you.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

On Tue, Jul 2, 2019, at 10:48 AM Twitter Support <support@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com > > wrote:

**PLEASE NOTE: we need you to respond before we can continue our investigation into your recent report.**

Hello,

Thanks for bringing this to our attention. Please note, we'll need you to respond to this message before we can continue our review of your report.

As part of our investigation, we need to confirm that you are an authorized representative of the company or organization.

If you filed your report from an email address associated with the organization's email domain, please reply to this message, confirming you have access to this email address.

If your report wasn't filed from an email address associated with the organization's email domain, we'll need you to do one of the following:

- Option 1: Refile your report using an email address associated with the organization's email domain (such as john@brandname.com < Caution-mailto:john@brandname.com > ),
- Option 2: Use the link below and upload documentation showing you have authority to act on the company or organization's behalf. This should include a signed statement from the company or organization confirming that you are their authorized representative, a copy of your business card, and a valid government-issued photo ID (e.g., driver's license or passport). Your information will be kept confidential and your documentation will be deleted after we resolve the issue.

Please use this link < Caution-https://twitterinc.secure.force.com/u?e=seabreeze2019pa@gmail.com&cn=0119096699 > to upload documents for option 2.

Please keep in mind, accounts in compliance with Twitter's parody, commentary, and fan accounts < Caution-https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy?

utm\_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%201&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%201&utm\_content=parody-account-policy are not considered in violation of our impersonation policy < Caution-https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-impersonation-policy?

utm\_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%202&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%202&utm\_content=twitter-impersonation-policy

Thanks,

Twitter

ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001ib1nt:ref

7/3/2019

[Non-DoD Source] Re: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699 [ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001ib1nt:ref]

Twitter, Inc. 1355 Market Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA 94103



**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Tuesday, July 02, 2019 12:16 PM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]

Thanks, team!

**From:** (b)(6) **On Behalf Of** Twitter Government & Politics

**Sent:** Tuesday, July 2, 2019 10:12 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) <aimee.f.fujikawa.civ@mail.mil>

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Great, thank you! We have escalated this to our team internally.

--

**Twitter Government & Elections**

[gov@twitter.com](mailto:gov@twitter.com) <Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com> | follow us: @TwitterGov <Caution-<http://twitter.com/twittergov>>

On Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 5:26 AM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)


(b)(6) wrote:

Good morning,

I am escalating an imposter report on behalf of Exercise Sea Breeze. The real account is Caution-<https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze> <Caution-<https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze>>. Screenshot of the imposter account is enclosed.

(I've already submitted a verification request for the real account that is in the works.)

Thanks for your support!







Blocked

# ExSeaBreeze

@ex\_breeze

0 Following 0 Followers

## @ex\_breeze is blocked

Are you sure you want to view these Tweets? Viewing Tweets won't unblock @ex\_breeze.

View Tweets



Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Facebook: facebook.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense >  
Twitter: twitter.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense >

Instagram: [instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense) < Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense> >

LinkedIn: [linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense) < Caution-  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> >

Website: [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/) < Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/> >

**Re: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699 [ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001ib1nt:ref]**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2019 5:27 AM  
To: (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b)(6)

I have escalated the imposter account and will keep you updated.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)  
Twitter: [twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)  
Instagram: [instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)  
LinkedIn: [linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)  
Website: [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov)

On Jul 2, 2019, at 04:51, Sea Breeze 2019 (b)(6) wrote:

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Good morning Ma'am,

Thank you for the guidance on dealing with the imposter profile. Below is the email I received after reporting the account. Please let us know if there's anything else you need from us.

V/r,

(b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Twitter Support** <[support@twitter.com](mailto:support@twitter.com)> <Caution-<mailto:support@twitter.com>>>  
Date: Tue, Jul 2, 2019, at 10:48 AM  
Subject: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699 [ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001ib1nt:ref]  
To: (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

**PLEASE NOTE: we need you to respond before we can continue our investigation into your recent report.**

Hello,

Thanks for bringing this to our attention. Please note, we'll need you to respond to this message before we can continue our review of your report.

As part of our investigation, we need to confirm that you are an authorized representative of the company or organization.

If you filed your report from an email address associated with the organization's email domain, please reply to this message, confirming you have access to this email address.

If your report wasn't filed from an email address associated with the organization's email domain, we'll need you to do one of the following:

- Option 1: Refile your report using an email address associated with the organization's email domain (such as [john@brandname.com](mailto:john@brandname.com) <Caution-<mailto:john@brandname.com>> ).

- Option 2: Use the link below and upload documentation showing you have authority to act on the company or organization's behalf. This should include a signed statement from the company or organization confirming that you are their authorized representative, a copy of your business card, and a valid government-issued photo ID (e.g., driver's license or passport). Your information will be kept confidential and your documentation will be deleted after we resolve the issue.

Please use this link < Caution-<https://twitterinc.secure.force.com/u?e=seabreeze2019pa@gmail.com&cn=0119096699> > to upload documents for option 2.

Please keep in mind, accounts in compliance with Twitter's parody, commentary, and fan accounts < Caution-[https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy?](https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy?utm_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%201&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%201&utm_cc_policy=are%20not%20considered%20in%20violation%20of%20our%20impersonation%20policy)

[https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy?utm\\_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%201&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%201&utm\\_cc\\_policy=are%20not%20considered%20in%20violation%20of%20our%20impersonation%20policy](https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy?utm_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%201&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%201&utm_cc_policy=are%20not%20considered%20in%20violation%20of%20our%20impersonation%20policy) < Caution-[https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-impersonation-policy?](https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-impersonation-policy?utm_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%202&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%202&utm_cc_policy=are%20not%20considered%20in%20violation%20of%20our%20impersonation%20policy)

[https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-impersonation-policy?utm\\_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%202&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%202&utm\\_cc\\_policy=are%20not%20considered%20in%20violation%20of%20our%20impersonation%20policy](https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-impersonation-policy?utm_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%202&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201830%202&utm_cc_policy=are%20not%20considered%20in%20violation%20of%20our%20impersonation%20policy)

Thanks,

Twitter

ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001ib1nt:ref

[Help](#) < Caution-<http://support.twitter.com> > | [Privacy](#) < Caution-<https://twitter.com/en/privacy> >

Twitter, Inc. 1355 Market Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA 94103



**[Non-DoD Source] Impersonator | Job: 474908366657680**

Facebook [case++aazq5to7eqkgwe@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2019 5:39 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Cc: (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA); (b)(6)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----  
Hi (b)(6),

Thanks for your report about unauthorized accounts. We've removed the account (Caution-[https://www.instagram.com/mark\\_t\\_esper2/](https://www.instagram.com/mark_t_esper2/)) you reported from Instagram.

Feel free to reach back out if you have any questions or concerns regarding this request.

Thanks,

(b)(6)  
Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit:  
Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>>On Tue Jul 2, 2019 13:49:48, Briana wrote:

>>Hi (b)(6),  
>>This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team and I work alongside (b)(6) and (b)(6). I am happy to assist with your request to remove this impostor account (Caution-[https://www.instagram.com/mark\\_t\\_esper2/](https://www.instagram.com/mark_t_esper2/)) of Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper.  
>>I am working with my internal team to review this account for removal. I will keep you posted on updates as they become available.  
>>Let me know if you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter.

>>Thanks,

>>(b)(6)  
>>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit:  
Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>>>On Tue Jul 2, 2019 12:36:41, wrote:

>>>Hi (b)(6),  
>>>We have received your question and your reference number is 474908366657680. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

>>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>

>>>

>>>We'll be in touch soon!

>>>

>>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>>>

>>>Sincerely,

>>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>>>Facebook

>>>

>>

>

**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 2:39 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USN COMUSNAVEUR USNAF (USA)

(b)(6) and Team,

You're very welcome! I am happy to be able to help.

The nice note you wrote has been sent to the Twitter team. They appreciate the feedback.

Feel free to reach out anytime!

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 2:25 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USN COMUSNAVEUR USNAF (USA)

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

(b)(6). Thank you so much for all your help in getting the accounts verified and the fake accounts taken down.

Please relay the following message to twitter:

Thank you for helping us verify out Twitter account. And more importantly thank you for being so quick to take down the imposter account that was putting out bad news. The response time on our request was amazing and we greatly appreciate your support in ensuring that content and messages are not distorted by imposters.

From the Exercise Sea Breeze Public Affairs Team, Thank you!

(b)(6) and Team

Thank you (b)(6)

---

On Wed, Jul 3, 2019 at 8:50 PM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

<(b)(6)> wrote:

(b)(6)

The fake account has been suspended and you should see a blue badge verification on the official account. If you would like to write a note of thanks to Twitter for the take down and quick turn verification (can take 2-3 weeks) I will be happy to relay it.

Please continue to monitor for impostors/suspicious activity and report it immediately like you did. Follow the platforms' guidelines to ensure the account managers keep the account secure.

Facebook/Instagram Best Practices:

We strongly recommend turning on two-factor authentication that helps protect the accounts. For details about how to set up

two-factor authentication and to keep the account secure in the future, please follow the security tips in the Help Center:

<<Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090> < Caution-  
<https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090> > >>

<<Caution-<https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/two-factor-authentication> < Caution-  
<https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/two-factor-authentication> > >>

#### Twitter Best Practices:

Report issues (fraud and other requests) here and send me the case number for escalation.

<<Caution-<https://help.twitter.com/forms> < Caution-<https://help.twitter.com/forms> > >>

Best

practices:

1.  
Use two-Factor authentication
2.  
Remove the setting that links posts to Instagram and Facebook (a couple of the accounts on the list are doing this)
3.  
Ensure their account recovery information is updated
4.  
Be careful not to retweet, like or comment from the official account (thinking it's your personal). People have gotten fired for errant tweets!
5.  
Use go.usa.go short links
6.  
Once verified, please do not touch the handle. Doing this will remove the blue badge verification.

Happy 4th of July!

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 02, 2019 8:22 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) USN COMUSNAVEUR  
USNAVAF (USA)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699 [ref:\_00DA0K0A8.\_5004A1ib1nt:ref]

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.



Good morning Ma'am,

Could you please give us an assist with Twitter? I submitted the form as you recommended, but Twitter doesn't seem to like the "official email" being a Gmail account. I'm thinking if it came from some kind of government account, they'd be more willing to play ball.

Regardless, I have no direct experience with this. If it would be better coming from one of us, I'm sure we can make that happen somehow, too.

V/r,

(b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **support@twitter.com** <Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com> <Caution-Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com <Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com> > > <support@twitter.com <Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com> <Caution-Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com <Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com> > >

Date: Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 1:58 PM

Subject: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699 [ ref:\_00DA0K0A8,\_5004A1ib1nt:ref ]

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hello,

Thank you for the information, but we need this report to be sent from the company email address for the brand. Please refile your report from an official organization email address here: Caution-Caution-<https://support.twitter.com/forms> <Caution-<https://support.twitter.com/forms>> <Caution-Caution-<https://support.twitter.com/forms>> > .

This will create a new request tied to that address, and we can continue to process your claim via that email address.

Thanks,

Twitter Support

7/3/2019

RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699

Help < Caution-Caution-http://support.twitter.com < Caution-http://support.twitter.com > > |  
Privacy < Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/en/privacy < Caution-  
https://twitter.com/en/privacy > >

Twitter, Inc. 1355 Market Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA 94103

ref:\_00DA0K0A8.\_5004A1ib1nt:ref

**RE: Dan Scavino offering to help with SPACECOM Twitter verification**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 12:30 PM

**To:** (b)(6) JS OCJCS (USA)

Hi (b)(6)

SpaceCom now good with the verification.

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) JS OCJCS (USA)

**Sent:** Sunday, June 30, 2019 9:58 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Subject:** Re: Dan Scavino offering to help with SPACECOM Twitter verification

Okay.

I'll let Dan know.

(b)(6) ;)

On Jun 30, 2019, at 4:54 AM, Fujikawa, Aimee F CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6) wrote:

(b)(6) there is no reference number. I did a direct request to the team. They did respond right away with access to TMS, so I believe they are working it.

SpaceCom does not have their official web site up yet.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

Twitter: [twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)

Instagram: [instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)

LinkedIn: [linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

Website: [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov)

V/r,

(b)(6)

Joint Staff Public Affairs

9999 Joint Staff Pentagon (b)(6)

Washington, D.C. 20138-9999

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Stay connected:

<http://www.jcs.mil/>

<http://www.facebook.com/TheJointStaff>

<http://twitter.com/thejointstaff>

<http://www.youtube.com/thejointstaff>

<http://www.flickr.com/photos/thejointstaff>

<http://www.instagram.com/thejointstaff/>

<http://www.linkedin.com/company/thejointstaff/>

On Jun 29, 2019, at 21:47, Witten, Christianne M CIV JS OCJCS (USA) <[christianne.m.witten.civ@mail.mil](mailto:christianne.m.witten.civ@mail.mil)> wrote:

(b)(6), dear, here's his latest DM to me:

We're on it - have them send me the reference # so we can call and get it done.

Do you have a reference number for the verification request you've been working?

; ) Maybe we can connect tomorrow for brunch?

V/r,

(b)(6)

Joint Staff Public Affairs

9999 Joint Staff Pentagon (b)(6)

Washington, D.C. 20138-9999

O: 571-256-7413

(b)(6)

Stay connected:

<http://www.jcs.mil/>

<http://www.facebook.com/TheJointStaff>

<http://twitter.com/thejointstaff>

<http://www.youtube.com/thejointstaff>

<http://www.flickr.com/photos/thejointstaff>

<http://www.instagram.com/thejointstaff/>

<http://www.linkedin.com/company/thejointstaff/>



**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Case# 0119240180**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 1:37 PM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

I see the fake account has been suspended. Thank you so much!

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 1:05 PM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Case# 0119240180

My apologies! I am not sure if the account manager submitted the form correctly. I just submitted one on their behalf. Case# 0119240180.

Real account: [https://twitter.com/ex\\_breeze](https://twitter.com/ex_breeze)

Impersonator: [https://twitter.com/ex\\_breeze](https://twitter.com/ex_breeze)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 10:06 AM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699

A ticket is already in place. It's in the subject line but I will include it here - # 0119096699.

---

**From:** cstrom@twitter.com [cstrom@twitter.com] on behalf of Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 10:01 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

Hi (b)(6),

When you have a chance, could you

file an impersonation report at [Caution-https://help.twitter.com/forms/impersonation](https://help.twitter.com/forms/impersonation) < [Caution-https://help.twitter.com/forms/impersonation](https://help.twitter.com/forms/impersonation) > ?

After completing the form, you'll receive a confirmation email with a Case# in the subject line.

Please send us that number and we  
will expedite the case!

--

**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-  
http://twitter.com/twittergov >

On Wed, Jul 3, 2019 at 9:01 AM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6) > > wrote:

Good morning,

The impostor account has been populating the feed with the official account's content. Can the removal of the fake account be removed? And can the verification of the official account be expedited?

Official account: <Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze < Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze > >

Impostor account: <Caution-https://twitter.com/ex\_breeze < Caution-https://twitter.com/ex\_breeze > >

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Tuesday, July 02, 2019 12:16 PM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics

**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket #. 0119096699

Thanks, team!

**From:** (b)(6)

(b)(6) > > On Behalf Of Twitter Government & Politics

**Sent:** Tuesday, July 2, 2019 10:12 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699



All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Great, thank you! We have escalated this to our team internally.

--  
**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > < Caution-Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov < Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov > >

On Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 5:26 AM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Good morning,

I am escalating an imposter report on behalf of Exercise Sea Breeze. The real account is Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze < Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze > < Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze < Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze > > . Screenshot of the imposter account is enclosed.

(I've already submitted a verification request for the real account that is in the works.)

Thanks for your support!



## @ex\_breeze is blocked

Are you sure you want to view these Tweets? Viewing Tweets won't unblock @ex\_breeze.

View Tweets



Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Facebook: facebook.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-http://facebook.com/DeptofDefense > < Caution-  
Caution-https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-  
https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense > >

Twitter: twitter.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-http://twitter.com/DeptofDefense > < Caution-Caution-  
https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense > >

Instagram: instagram.com/deptofdefense < Caution-http://instagram.com/deptofdefense > < Caution-  
Caution-https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense < Caution-  
https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense > >



LinkedIn: [linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense) < Caution-  
<http://linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> > < Caution-Caution-  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> < Caution-  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> > >  
Website: [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/) < Caution-<http://defense.gov> > < Caution-Caution-  
<https://www.defense.gov/> < Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/> > >

**RE: USSPACECOM Verification**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 12:28 PM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAI (b)(6) USAF AFSPC PA (USA)

I see Twitter is verified.

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, June 28, 2019 12:21 PM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAI; (b)(6) USAF AFSPC PA (USA)

**Subject:** RE: USSPACECOM Verification

Facebook is verified.

---

**From:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAI (b)(6)

**Sent:** Thursday, June 27, 2019 6:20 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) USAF AFSPC PA (USA) (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: USSPACECOM Verification

(b)(6)

Great! I just added the stracom URL to the facebook bio.

Thanks for all the support.

(b)(6)  
United States Air Force

Air Force Space Command Public Affairs, NCOIC Command Information

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

**Sent:** Thursday, June 27, 2019 2:40 PM

**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAI (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: USSPACECOM Verification

Short turn Twitter verifications requested for both. They are away for a conference and will be slow to respond.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

Twitter: [twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)

Instagram: [instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)

LinkedIn: [linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

Website: [defense.gov](https://defense.gov)

On Jun 27, 2019, at 16:04, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6) wrote:

I've submitted the Facebook verifications. Please add the Stratcom URL to the Spacecom bio or it will delay the process.

The gray check is not the same as the blue badge verification.

---

**From:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 26, 2019 5:47 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF DMA PROD (US) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: USSPACECOM Verification

(b)(6)

Here is the requested information:

Twitter: [https://twitter.com/US\\_SpaceCom](https://twitter.com/US_SpaceCom)

(the bio URL is currently stratcom.mil because the website is not yet set-up)

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/USSpaceCom/>

Schriever:

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/SchrieverAFB>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/SchrieverAirForceBase/>

Thank you!

(b)(6) USAF  
Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 26, 2019 3:14 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAI (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: USSPACECOM Verification

Please don't forget the bio URL as mentioned during the call. They will kick back the request.

You can also hide the profile and cover photo posts in the FB timeline. A description can still be added if you choose.

Can you send the URLs to the accounts?

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

Twitter: [twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)

Instagram: [instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)

LinkedIn: [linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

Website: [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov)

On Jun 26, 2019, at 16:56, (b)(6) USAF AFSPC AFSPC/PAO

(b)(6) wrote:

Hello,

I apologize for the quick call! We have just posted, changed the cover photo, changed the profile photo and updated the bios for USSPACECOM Twitter (@US\_SpaceCom) and Facebook (@USSpaceCom). Can you please help get us verified on Facebook and try with Twitter too?

Thank you for your help, I can't tell you enough how much I appreciate it!

(b)(6)

USAF

Air Force Space Command Public Affairs Peterson AFB, CO

(b)(6)



**About your recent Twitter report 0119096699**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2019 1:49 PM

To: Sea Breeze 2019 (b)(6) USN COMUSNAVEUR USNAVAF (USA)

(b)(6)

The fake account has been suspended and you should see a blue badge verification on the official account. If you would like to write a note of thanks to Twitter for the take down and quick turn verification (can take take 2-3 weeks) I will be happy to relay it.

Please continue to monitor for impostors/suspicious activity and report it immediately like you did. Follow the platforms' guidelines to ensure the account managers keep the account secure.

**Facebook/Instagram Best Practices:**

We strongly recommend turning on two-factor authentication that helps protect the accounts. For details about how to set up

two-factor authentication and to keep the account secure in the future, please follow the security tips in the Help Center:

<<[<https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090>>](https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090)>>

<<[<https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/two-factor-authentication>>](https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/two-factor-authentication)>>

**Twitter Best Practices:**

Report issues (fraud and other requests) here and send me the case number for escalation.

<<[<https://help.twitter.com/forms>>](https://help.twitter.com/forms)>>

**Best**

practices:

1,

Use two-Factor authentication

2,

Remove the setting that links posts to Instagram and Facebook (a couple of the accounts on the list are doing this)

3,

Ensure their account recovery information is updated

4,

Be careful not to retweet, like or comment from the official account (thinking it's your personal). People have gotten fired for errant tweets!

5,

Use go.usa.go short links

6,

Once verified, please do not touch the handle. Doing this will remove the blue badge verification.

Happy 4th of July!

(b)(6)

**From:** Sea Breeze 2019 (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 02, 2019 8:22 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) USN COMUSNAVEUR  
USNAVAF (USA)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: About your recent Twitter report 0119096699 [ref: \_00DA0K0A8.\_5004A1ib1nt:ref]

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Good morning (b)(6),

Could you please give us an assist with Twitter? I submitted the form as you recommended, but Twitter doesn't seem to like the "official email" being a Gmail account. I'm thinking if it came from some kind of government account, they'd be more willing to play ball.

Regardless, I have no direct experience with this. If it would be better coming from one of us, I'm sure we can make that happen somehow, too.

V/r,

(b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** support@twitter.com <Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com> <support@twitter.com <Caution-mailto:support@twitter.com>>

**Date:** Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 1:58 PM

**Subject:** About your recent Twitter report 0119096699 [ref: \_00DA0K0A8.\_5004A1ib1nt:ref]

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hello,

Thank you for the information, but we need this report to be sent from the company email address for the brand. Please refile your report from an official organization email address here: Caution-<https://support.twitter.com/forms> <Caution-<https://support.twitter.com/forms>> .

This will create a new request tied to that address, and we can continue to process your claim via that email address.

Thanks,

## Twitter Support

[Help](#) < Caution-<http://support.twitter.com> > | [Privacy](#) < Caution-<https://twitter.com/en/privacy> >

Twitter, Inc. 1355 Market Street, Suite 900, San Francisco, CA 94103

ref:\_00DA0K0A8,\_5004A1ib1nt:ref

**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Facebook Verification | Job: 891225241222716**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2019 12:15 PM

To: Facebook [case++aazq5ryi6r6lif@support.facebook.com]

Cc: (b)(6)

Hi (b)(6),

Thank you for verifying their account! This is very helpful as they are already experiencing imposter accounts.

(b)(6)

From: Facebook [case++aazq5ryi6r6lif@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Monday, July 01, 2019 5:33 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Facebook Verification | Job: 891225241222716

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----  
Hi (b)(6),

We reviewed the Page (Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/SeaBreezeexercise>) and determined that it's eligible for verification. You'll now see a blue checkmark indicating that the Page is the authentic presence on Facebook.

We strongly recommend you to ask the admins of the Page to turn on Two-factor authentication that helps protect their Facebook accounts. For details about how to set up two-factor authentication, please follow the security tips in the Help Center: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090>

If you have any questions or concerns in regard to this inquiry, please let me know and I'll be glad to assist.

Thanks,

(b)(6)  
Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>On Mon Jul 1, 2019 10:00:41, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:  
>Hi (b)(6),  
>Thank you. They need to add the URL and I am waiting to hear back from them.  
>(b)(6)

>-----Original Message-----

>From: Facebook <case++aazq5ryi6r6lif@support.facebook.com>

>Sent: Monday, July 1, 2019 12:47 PM

>To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

>Cc: (b)(6)

>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Facebook Verification | Job: 891225241222716

>All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the  
>identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained



>within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.  
>-----  
>Hi (b)(6),  
>Thank you very much. I'm currently processing this verification request for  
>the Page (Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/SeaBreezeexercise>) alongside our  
>specialists and I'll loop back here as soon as I have an update to provide.  
>Feel free to reach out if you have any questions or concerns.  
>Thanks,  
>(b)(6)  
>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on  
>Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or  
>Caution-Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.  
>>On Mon Jul 1, 2019 07:42:59, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:  
>>Hello (b)(6),  
>>Here it is.  
>>Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/SeaBreezeexercise/>  
>>Thank you!  
>>(b)(6)  
>>-----Original Message-----  
>>From: Facebook <case+aazq5ryi6r6lif@support.facebook.com>  
>>Sent: Monday, July 1, 2019 10:37 AM  
>>To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
>><(b)(6)>  
>>Cc: (b)(6)  
>>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Facebook Verification | Job: 891225241222716  
>>All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify  
>>the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links  
>>contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a  
>>Web browser.  
>>-----  
>>Hi (b)(6),  
>>This is Dean with the Facebook Client Support Team and I'm happy to  
>>help with this verification request.  
>>If you don't mind, could you please send us over a direct link to this  
>>Page we're needing to verify? It appears it may be  
>>Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/SeaBreezeexercise> but just  
>>want to be 100% sure.  
>>Let me know if you have any questions or concerns and I'll be glad to assist.  
>>Thanks,  
>>(b)(6)  
>>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your  
>>business on Facebook visit:  
>>Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or  
>>Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.  
>>>On Sun Jun 30, 2019 05:32:31, wrote:  
>>>Hi (b)(6),  
>>>We have received your question and your reference number is 891225241222716.  
>>>We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us  
>>>within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.  
>>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser  
>>>Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads:  
>>>Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>  
>>>  
>>>We'll be in touch soon!  
>>>  
>>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains  
>>>([support.facebook.com](https://support.facebook.com), [fb.com](https://fb.com)) to receive our response for your inquiry.  
>>>  
>>>Sincerely,  
>>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team  
>>>Facebook  
>>>  
>>  
>



**[Non-DoD Source] Case# 0119240180: Brand Impersonation - ex\_breeze**  
**[ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001iLLQ:ref]**

Twitter Support [support@twitter.com]

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2019 1:00 PM

To: (b)(6) HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Hello,

This is a confirmation that we've received your report regarding impersonation on the Twitter platform. Someone from our team will review it and reply to you shortly.

Please note: Twitter allows parody, commentary, and fan accounts. Accounts in full compliance with our parody, commentary, and fan account policy are not considered in violation of our impersonation policy.

Thanks,

Twitter Support

ref:00DA0000000K0A8.5004A00001iLLQ:ref

[Help < Caution-http://support.twitter.com >](http://support.twitter.com) | [Privacy < Caution-https://twitter.com/en/privacy >](https://twitter.com/en/privacy)

Twitter, Inc. 1355 Market Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA 94103

**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Case# 0119240180**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 1:37 PM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

I see the fake account has been suspended. Thank you so much!

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 1:05 PM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Case# 0119240180

My apologies! I am not sure if the account manager submitted the form correctly. I just submitted one on their behalf. Case# 0119240180

Real account: [https://twitter.com/ex\\_breeze](https://twitter.com/ex_breeze)

Impersonator: [https://twitter.com/ex\\_breeze](https://twitter.com/ex_breeze)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 10:06 AM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699

A ticket is already in place. It's in the subject line but I will include it here - # 0119096699.

---

**From:** cstrom@twitter.com [cstrom@twitter.com] on behalf of Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]

**Sent:** Wednesday, July 03, 2019 10:01 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Cc:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

Hi (b)(6),

When you have a chance, could you

file an impersonation report at [Caution-https://help.twitter.com/forms/impersonation](https://help.twitter.com/forms/impersonation) < [Caution-https://help.twitter.com/forms/impersonation](https://help.twitter.com/forms/impersonation) > ?

After completing the form, you'll receive a confirmation email with a Case# in the subject line.



Please send us that number and we  
will expedite the case!

--

**Twitter Government & Elections**

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-  
http://twitter.com/twittergov >

On Wed, Jul 3, 2019 at 9:01 AM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6) > wrote:

Good morning,

The impostor account has been populating the feed with the official account's content. Can the removal of the fake account be removed? And can the verification of the official account be expedited?

Official account: <Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze < Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze > >

Impostor account: <Caution-https://twitter.com/ex\_breeze < Caution-https://twitter.com/ex\_breeze > >

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Tuesday, July 02, 2019 12:16 PM

**To:** Twitter Government & Politics

**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699

Thanks, team!

**From:** (b)(6)

(b)(6) > > On Behalf Of Twitter Government & Politics

**Sent:** Tuesday, July 2, 2019 10:12 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Imposter Ticket # 0119096699

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Great, thank you! We have escalated this to our team internally.

--

### Twitter Government & Elections

gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > < Caution-Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com < Caution-mailto:gov@twitter.com > > | follow us: @TwitterGov < Caution-Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov < Caution-http://twitter.com/twittergov > >

On Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 5:26 AM (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

> > > wrote:

Good morning,

I am escalating an imposter report on behalf of Exercise Sea Breeze. The real account is Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze < Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze > < Caution-Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze < Caution-https://twitter.com/ExSeaBreeze > > . Screenshot of the imposter account is enclosed.

(I've already submitted a verification request for the real account that is in the works.)

Thanks for your support!



## @ex\_breeze is blocked

Are you sure you want to view these Tweets? Viewing Tweets won't unblock @ex\_breeze.

View Tweets



Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Facebook: facebook.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-http://facebook.com/DeptofDefense > < Caution-  
Caution-https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-  
https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense > >  
Twitter: twitter.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-http://twitter.com/DeptofDefense > < Caution-Caution-  
https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense < Caution-https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense > >  
Instagram: instagram.com/deptofdefense < Caution-http://instagram.com/deptofdefense > < Caution-  
Caution-https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense < Caution-  
https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense > >

LinkedIn: [linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense) < Caution-  
<http://linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> > < Caution-Caution-  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> < Caution-  
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense> > >  
Website: [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/) < Caution-<http://defense.gov> > < Caution-Caution-  
<https://www.defense.gov/> < Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/> > >



**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Instagram Verification | Job: 399608220656070**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2019 12:16 PM

To: Facebook [case++aazq5rykzssek6@support.facebook.com]

Cc: (b)(6)

Hi (b)(6),

Thank you so much! They are very appreciative of the assistance and quick turnaround,.

(b)(6)

From: Facebook [case++aazq5rykzssek6@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Monday, July 01, 2019 5:59 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Cc:

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Instagram Verification | Job: 399608220656070

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----  
Hi (b)(6),

We reviewed this Instagram account (Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/exerciseseabreeze/>) and determined that it's eligible for verification. You'll now see a blue checkmark next to their username on their profile and in search results on Instagram.

Please note that verified accounts must remain public, have a profile picture and post content. We strongly recommend that they turn on Two-factor authentication that helps protect their Instagram account. For details about how to set up two-factor authentication and keep their account secure in the future, please follow the security tips in the Help Center: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/help/213481848684090/>.

Our team is happy to help them further establish their authentic presence by removing impostor accounts. If they're being impersonated, please follow these instructions to report impostor accounts: Caution-[www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296](https://www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296).

Feel free to reach back out if you have any questions or concerns regarding this request.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>>On Mon Jul 1, 2019 07:18:31, Briana wrote:

>>Hi (b)(6),

>>This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team and I work alongside (b)(6). I am happy to assist with your request to verify this Instagram account (Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/exerciseseabreeze/>).

>>I am working with my internal team to review this account for verification. I will keep you posted on updates as they become available.

>>Let me know if you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter.

>>Thanks,

>>(b)(6)

>>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit:  
Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>>>On Sun Jun 30, 2019 05:27:46, wrote:

>>>Hi (b)(6),

>>>We have received your question and your reference number is 399608220656070. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

>>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>

>>>

>>>We'll be in touch soon!

>>>

>>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>>>

>>>Sincerely,

>>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>>>Facebook

>>>

>>

>

**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Instagram Verification | Job: 2343716869288472**

(b)(6) CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Monday, July 01, 2019 11:29 AM

**To:** Facebook [case++aazq5rykyyac7w@support.facebook.com]

**Cc:** (b)(6)

Hi (b)(6)

Thank you!

They are updating their URL in the bio area.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Facebook <case++aazq5rykyyac7w@support.facebook.com>

Sent: Monday, July 1, 2019 11:18 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Instagram Verification | Job: 2343716869288472

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

Hi (b)(6),

After reviewing this inquiry, it appears that this verification request (Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/exerciseseabreeze/>) is currently being processed by Briana on Job 399608220656070.

For updates, or to provide information, please reply to that email thread. This will ensure that your request is handled quickly and efficiently.

If you're having trouble locating the original thread, search your emails for subjects containing 399608220656070.

Kind Regards,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst

To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>>On Mon Jul 1, 2019 07:35:18, Crystal wrote:

>>Hi (b)(6)

>>This is Crystal with Facebook Client Support and I'll be happy to assist with the Instagram verification for Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/exerciseseabreeze/>.

>>I'm working with our specialists to review this request and I'll circle back as soon as I receive an update.

>>In the meantime, should you have any further questions regarding this inquiry, please feel free to reach out.

>>Thanks,

>>Crystal

>>Facebook Client Support Analyst

>>To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>>>On Sun Jun 30, 2019 05:27:50, wrote:

>>>Hi (b)(6)

>>>We have received your question and your reference number is 2343716869288472. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

>>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>

>>>

>>>We'll be in touch soon!

>>>

>>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>>>

>>>Sincerely,

>>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>>>Facebook

>>>

>>

>



**[Non-DoD Source] Thanks for contacting the Facebook support team**

Facebook [case++aazzqmyppfosj6@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2019 3:07 PM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----  
Hi (b)(6),

We have received your question and your reference number is 634536627024945. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>

We'll be in touch soon!

Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

Sincerely,  
The Global Marketing Solutions Team  
Facebook

**[Non-DoD Source] We have an update about @ex\_breeze 0119240180 [ ref: \_00DA0K0A8.\_5004A1iLLQ:ref ]**

support@twitter.com

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2019 1:23 PM

To: (b)(6)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Hello,

Thanks for sending us your report. We reviewed the account, and removed it for violating our rules < Caution-

[https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules?](https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules?utm_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201990&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201990&utm_content=PCT%20)

[utm\\_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201990&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201990&utm\\_content=PCT%20](https://help.twitter.com/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules?utm_source=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201990&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PCT%20Identity%20RT%201990&utm_content=PCT%20)

We appreciate your help! Just so you know, any documents you sent us to review will be deleted.

Can you take a minute to rate your experience and complete a short survey?

Overall, how satisfied are you with Twitter's support?

1

< Caution-[https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=1&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

[gf\\_q\[7621002\]=1&gf\\_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=1&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

2

< Caution-[https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=2&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

[gf\\_q\[7621002\]=2&gf\\_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=2&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

3

< Caution-[https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=3&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

[gf\\_q\[7621002\]=3&gf\\_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=3&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

4

< Caution-[https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=4&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

[gf\\_q\[7621002\]=4&gf\\_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=4&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

5

< Caution-[https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=5&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

[gf\\_q\[7621002\]=5&gf\\_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO](https://twitter.getfeedback.com/r/pBPSVXzf?gf_q[7621002]=5&gf_unique=5004A00001iLLQQA2+a2pG0000000DCFqIAO&CaseID=5004A00001iLLQQA2&RTID=a2pG0000000DCFqIAO)

1 = Very Dissatisfied

5 = Very Satisfied

We appreciate your time and feedback.

Thanks,

Twitter

[Help](#) < Caution-<http://support.twitter.com> > | [Privacy](#) < Caution-<https://twitter.com/en/privacy> >

Twitter, Inc., 1355 Market Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA 94103

ref: \_00DA0K0A8.\_5004A1iLLQ:ref

**Re: Fake Army Page**

(b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 1:47 PM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Yes, absolutely.

V/r

(b)(6)

Army Digital Media Division  
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

(b)(6)

On Jul 5, 2019, at 13:06, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
wrote:

(b)(6) - Do you want to report this?  
<https://www.facebook.com/Army.U.S.1>

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)  
[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)  
[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)  
[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

**RE: Fake SecArmy IG**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 8:30 AM

**To:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

You're welcome.

Only if they need the IG email address but you're copied on the job submission.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)

[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)

[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

---

**From:** (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 8:03 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Subject:** Re: Fake SecArmy IG

Thanks, (b)(6)

Is that something you need?

Let me know how I can help.

V/r

(b)(6)

Army Digital Media Division  
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

(b)(6)

On Jul 5, 2019, at 07:24, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) (b)(6)  
wrote:

(b)(6),

I will try to take this account down but I don't have the login for SecArmy.

<[https://www.instagram.com/secretary\\_of\\_the\\_army\\_/](https://www.instagram.com/secretary_of_the_army_/)>

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)

[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)

[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 330000994618202**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 12:05 PM

To: Facebook [case++aazq5sdgyov4yy@support.facebook.com]

Cc: (b)(6)

Done!

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

twitter.com/DeptofDefense  
instagram.com/deptofdefense  
facebook.com/DeptofDefense  
linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense

---

From: Facebook [case++aazq5sdgyov4yy@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 11:52 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 330000994618202

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----  
Hi (b)(6),

For updates, or to provide information, we ask that you please reply to that thread to ensure the request is handled quickly and efficiently. I will be reaching out to (b)(6) now to get them up to speed on the issue.

Best,

(b)(6)  
Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit:  
Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 08:09:49, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:

>Hi Dean,

>I was wondering if you could help with another job, if possible. There was a ticket I submitted earlier this morning for these two accounts - # 2229355030451784.

><Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/Mark-Thomas-Esper-816728815373380/>>

><Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/Mark-T-Esper-2155903697859387/>>

>Thank you.

>(b)(6)

>twitter.com/DeptofDefense  
>instagram.com/deptofdefense  
>facebook.com/DeptofDefense  
>linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense

>  
>From: Facebook [case++aazq5sdgyov4yy@support.facebook.com]  
>Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 10:53 AM  
>To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
>Cc: (b)(6)  
>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 330000994618202  
>All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.  
>-----  
>Hi (b)(6),  
>Thank you for the follow up! If anything else is needed from our end please let me know and I'll be glad to assist further.  
>Best,  
>Dean  
>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-https://fb.me/learn-blueprint or Caution-Caution-https://politics.fb.com/.  
>>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 07:51:01, Fujikawa, Aimee F CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:  
>>That worked! It's gone.  
>>Thank you.  
>>(b)(6)  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>twitter.com/DeptofDefense  
>>instagram.com/deptofdefense  
>>facebook.com/DeptofDefense  
>>linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense  
>>  
>>From: Facebook [case++aazq5sdgyov4yy@support.facebook.com]  
>>Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 10:49 AM  
>>To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
>>Cc:  
>>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 330000994618202  
>>All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.  
>>-----  
>>Hi (b)(6),  
>>Are you seeing the same after clearing your cache or through another browser?  
>>Thanks,  
>>(b)(6)  
>>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-Caution-https://fb.me/learn-blueprint or Caution-Caution-Caution-https://politics.fb.com/.  
>>>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 07:46:34, Fujikawa, Aimee F CIV DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:  
>>>Hi (b)(6),  
>>>I just wanted to let you know this account is still up.  
>>>Thank you.  
>>>(b)(6)  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>twitter.com/DeptofDefense  
>>>instagram.com/deptofdefense  
>>>facebook.com/DeptofDefense  
>>>linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense  
>>>  
>>>From: Facebook [case++aazq5sdgyov4yy@support.facebook.com]  
>>>Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 10:40 AM  
>>>To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
>>>Cc:  
>>>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 330000994618202

>>>All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

>>>-----

>>>Hi (b)(6),

>>>After further review, this account (Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/mark.esper>) has been removed from Facebook for violating our impostor policy.

>>>If you have any other questions or concerns in regard to this inquiry, please let me know and I'll be glad to assist.

>>>Thanks,

>>>(b)(6)

>>>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>>>Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>>>>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 07:06:36, Dean wrote:

>>>>Hi (b)(6),

>>>>This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team and I'm happy to help get a further look into this account (Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/mark.esper>) impersonating Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper.

>>>>I'm currently investigating into this further alongside our specialists and I'll loop back here as soon as I have an update to provide.

>>>>Let me know if you have any questions or concerns and I'll be glad to assist.

>>>>Thanks,

>>>>(b)(6)

>>>>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>>>>>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 06:29:07, wrote:

>>>>>Hi (b)(6),

>>>>>We have received your question and your reference number is 330000994618202. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

>>>>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-Caution-Caution-Caution-<https://www.facebook.com/business/help>

>>>>>

>>>>>We'll be in touch soon!

>>>>>

>>>>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>>>>>

>>>>>Sincerely,

>>>>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>>>>>Facebook

>>>>>

>>>>

>>>

>>

>



**RE: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 330000994618202**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 10:50 AM

To: Facebook [case++aazq5sdgyov4yy@support.facebook.com]

Cc: (b)(6)

That worked! It's gone.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

twitter.com/DeptofDefense  
instagram.com/deptofdefense  
facebook.com/DeptofDefense  
linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense

---

From: Facebook [case++aazq5sdgyov4yy@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 10:49 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Cc:

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 330000994618202

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----

Hi (b)(6),

Are you seeing the same after clearing your cache or through another browser?

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit:  
Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 07:46:34, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:

>Hi (b)(6),

>I just wanted to let you know this account is still up.

>Thank you.

>(b)(6)

>twitter.com/DeptofDefense  
>instagram.com/deptofdefense  
>facebook.com/DeptofDefense  
>linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense  
>

---

>From: Facebook [case++aazq5sdgyov4yy@support.facebook.com]

>Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 10:40 AM

>To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

>Cc:

>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 330000994618202

>All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

>-----

>Hi (b)(6),

>After further review, this account (Caution-Caution-https://www.facebook.com/mark.esper) has been removed from Facebook for violating our impostor policy.

>If you have any other questions or concerns in regard to this inquiry, please let me know and I'll be glad to assist.

>Thanks,

>(b)(6)

>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-https://fb.me/learn-blueprint or Caution-Caution-https://politics.fb.com/.

>Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few minutes. I appreciate your feedback and thank you for contacting Facebook.

>>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 07:06:36, (b)(6) wrote:

>>Hi (b)(6),

>>This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team and I'm happy to help get a further look into this account (Caution-Caution-https://www.facebook.com/mark.esper) impersonating Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper.

>>I'm currently investigating into this further alongside our specialists and I'll loop back here as soon as I have an update to provide.

>>Let me know if you have any questions or concerns and I'll be glad to assist.

>>Thanks,

>>(b)(6)

>>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-https://fb.me/learn-blueprint or Caution-Caution-https://politics.fb.com/.

>>>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 06:29:07, wrote:

>>>Hi (b)(6),

>>>We have received your question and your reference number is 330000994618202. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

>>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-Caution-https://www.facebook.com/business/help

>>>

>>>We'll be in touch soon!

>>>

>>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>>>

>>>Sincerely,

>>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>>>Facebook

>>>

>>

>

**[Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 2177244165728491**

Facebook [case++aazq5scubvhe7f@support.facebook.com]

Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 11:01 AM

To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

-----  
Hi (b)(6),

Thank you. We're glad we could help you today and appreciate you being a member of the Facebook community.

Enjoy your weekend!

Thanks,

(b)(6)  
Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 07:38:52, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:

>(b)(6) - Thank you so much! I will fill out the feedback form now.

>Thank you.

>(b)(6)

>[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)

>[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://instagram.com/deptofdefense)

>[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

>[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

>

>From: Facebook [case++aazq5scubvhe7f@support.facebook.com]

>Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 10:30 AM

>To: (b)(6) HQ DMA (USA)

>Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA)

>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 2177244165728491

>All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

>-----

>Hi (b)(6),

>Thanks for your report about unauthorized accounts. We've removed the accounts you reported from Instagram.

>Impostor Accounts Removed:

>1. Caution-Caution-[https://www.instagram.com/secretary\\_of\\_the\\_army/](https://www.instagram.com/secretary_of_the_army/)

>2. Caution-Caution-<https://www.instagram.com/esperdon1/>

>Feel free to reach back out if you have any questions or concerns regarding this request.

>Thanks,

>(b)(6)

>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-<https://fb.me/learn-blueprint> or Caution-Caution-<https://politics.fb.com/>.

>Please help us improve our Customer Support by taking a few minutes to complete a brief survey about your experience with me. You'll receive an email linking to our survey in the next few

minutes. I appreciate your feedback, and thank you for contacting Facebook.  
>>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 06:56:41, (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA) wrote:

>>Hi (b)(6),

>>Thank you for your help! Looking forward to the update.

>>Thank you.

>>(b)(6)

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>twitter.com/DeptofDefense

>>instagram.com/deptofdefense

>>facebook.com/DeptofDefense

>>linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense

>>

>>From: Facebook [case++aazq5scubvhe7f@support.facebook.com]

>>Sent: Friday, July 05, 2019 9:47 AM

>>To: (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

>>Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA OCPA (USA); (b)(6)

>>Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Impersonation | Job: 2177244165728491

>>All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

>>----

>>Hi (b)(6),

>>This is (b)(6) with the Facebook Client Support Team and I work alongside (b)(6). I am happy to assist with your request to remove the impostor accounts of Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper.

>>Impostor Accounts Under Review for Removal:

>>1. Caution-Caution-Caution-https://www.instagram.com/secretary\_of\_the\_army\_/

>>2. Caution-Caution-Caution-https://www.instagram.com/esperdon1/

>>I am working with my internal team to review these accounts for removal. I will keep you posted on updates as they become available.

>>Let me know if you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter.

>>Thanks,

>>(b)(6)

>>Facebook Client Support Analyst - To learn more about growing your business on Facebook visit: Caution-Caution-Caution-https://fb.me/learn-blueprint or Caution-Caution-Caution-https://politics.fb.com/.

>>>On Fri Jul 5, 2019 04:37:04, wrote:

>>>Hi (b)(6),

>>>We have received your question and your reference number is 2177244165728491. We will respond within 1 business day. If you don't hear from us within that time frame, please be sure to check your spam folder.

>>>In the meantime, we encourage you to visit the Facebook Advertiser Help Center to find detailed information related to Facebook Ads: Caution-Caution-Caution-

https://www.facebook.com/business/help

>>>

>>>We'll be in touch soon!

>>>

>>>Note: Please make sure that you whitelist Facebook's domains (support.facebook.com, fb.com) to receive our response for your inquiry.

>>>

>>>Sincerely,

>>>The Global Marketing Solutions Team

>>>Facebook

>>>

>>

>



**RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy**

(b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:58 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

This one is gone too.

<https://www.instagram.com/esperdon1/>

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)

[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)

[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:57 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

Got it - that was fast!

v/r

(b)(6)

DOD Social Media

(b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:56 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

(b)(6) - this one has been removed.

[https://www.instagram.com/secretary\\_of\\_the\\_army\\_/](https://www.instagram.com/secretary_of_the_army_/)

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)  
[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)  
[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)  
[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:30 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)**Subject:** RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

Here is the job number for this one:

<https://www.facebook.com/mark.esper><https://www.facebook.com/mark.esper>

Job #330000994618202

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)  
[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)  
[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)  
[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:29 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)**Subject:** RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

Cool, thanks! I'll take the first one off the new tracker then, but leave the one you're reporting now. Send me the reference # once you do and I'll add it to the tracker.

(b)(6)

Social Media/Public Affairs Specialist  
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

(b)(6)

Website: [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)

Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

Twitter: @DeptofDefense

YouTube: [youtube.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.youtube.com/DeptofDefense)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:26 AM**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

There's this one:

<https://www.facebook.com/markt.esper.129> - they will not remove this one since it's not using his photo/header/link or posting as him.

And this one:

<https://www.facebook.com/mark.esper> - NOPE! I am reporting this one now.  
(could be his legit one though?)

Real SecArmy FB: (<https://www.facebook.com/SecArmy/>)

Real SecArmy TW: (<https://twitter.com/SecArmy>)

Real SecArmy IG: ([https://www.instagram.com/secretary\\_of\\_the\\_army/](https://www.instagram.com/secretary_of_the_army/))

Real A/SD TW: (<https://twitter.com/EsperDoD>)

Real IG: (<https://www.instagram.com/esperdod/>)

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)  
[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)  
[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)  
[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:17 AM

**To:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)

**Subject:** RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

There's this one:

<https://www.facebook.com/markt.esper.129>

And this one:

<https://www.facebook.com/mark.esper>  
(could be his legit one though?)

(b)(6)

Social Media/Public Affairs Specialist  
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

(b)(6)

Website: [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)

Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)

Twitter: @DeptofDefense

YouTube: [youtube.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.youtube.com/DeptofDefense)



**From:** (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:15 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA); (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)  
**Subject:** RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

Which platform is it on? Can you send the link? I want to look at it.

Yes. Please add it to the sheet and let me know which ones are new.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[twitter.com/DeptofDefense](https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense)  
[instagram.com/deptofdefense](https://www.instagram.com/deptofdefense)  
[facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)  
[linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-department-of-defense)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)  
**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 9:11 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA); (b)(6) DMA HQ DMA (USA)  
**Subject:** RE: Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

How can you tell they're impostor accounts? Just guessing?

For example, I found this one that I imagine is an impostor account:  
@mark.esper

But I'm not 100% sure. Do I still put it in the spreadsheet as an impostor account?

(b)(6)

Social Media/Public Affairs Specialist  
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

(b)(6)

Website: [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)  
Facebook: [facebook.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.facebook.com/DeptofDefense)  
Twitter: @DeptofDefense  
YouTube: [youtube.com/DeptofDefense](https://www.youtube.com/DeptofDefense)

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**From:** (b)(6) DMA PROD (USA)  
**Sent:** Friday, July 05, 2019 7:57 AM  
**To:** DMA Ft Meade PROD List DOD Social Media  
**Subject:** Fraud accounts - A/SD and SecArmy

Team - good morning!

(b)(6) has already found some fraud accounts for Dr. Esper!



She's asked me to create his own spreadsheet to track imposter accounts so I've started one here:

<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Tk8u2EahKVrwu3STMzYb0VCuYBwDKAggJmsAK-d-8oU/edit#gid=202954660>

When you get a moment this morning please conduct a search across all platforms, update the spreadsheet, and indicate in the fraud account tab under notes that the imposter account is waiting to be reported.

Call, g-chat, or email with questions - thank you!

v/r

(b)(6)



Requester Default Category: Educational or Non-Commercial Scientific

### Custom Fields

Requester Control # :

Previous Address 2 :

### General Information

Action Office Instructions

Request Type

Requester Category

FOIA

Educational or Non-Commercial Scientific

### Shipping Address

Street1

Street2

City

State

Country

Zip Code

1585 Massachusetts Ave

Suite 5018

Cambridge

Massachusetts

United States

02138

### Request Information

Description Document

Description

DOD\_FOIA.pdf

The Harvard Law School Cyberlaw Clinic is submitting the attached FOIA request on behalf of Dr. Amy Johnson. A request for a fee waiver is included in the attached document.

Date Range for Record

Search:From

Date Range for Record

Search:To

01/01/2002

02/07/2019

### Fee Information

Willing Amount

\$100

### Custom Fields

Requester #



February 7, 2019

**U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
ATTN: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs  
1400 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1400**

**VIA FAX: 301-225-0510**

**Re: Freedom of Information Act Request  
Social Media Impersonation Incidents**

Dear FOIA Officer,

This letter constitutes a request ("Request") under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, for information related to any fake social media pages or accounts purporting to represent the Department of Defense ("DOD").

**I. Background**

I am a postdoctoral fellow at Amherst College's Center for Humanistic Inquiry, as well as a Research Affiliate at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. For the past several years I have been studying the government's use of social media from an anthropological perspective.

In connection with my research, I have filed multiple FOIA requests seeking documents from federal agencies concerning the use of public-facing social media accounts. This FOIA request is part of a multi-agency survey that I plan to use to investigate how different agencies respond to impersonation.



## II. Record Request

Therefore, under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, I hereby request the following records:

1. Any documents or materials that discuss practices for addressing problems of impersonation, identity theft, fraud, or scams, including but not limited to guides, manuals, handbooks, policies, or presentations used to instruct or train DOD staff.
2. Any documents or materials used to instruct or train DOD staff in the use of social media, including but not limited to guides, manuals, handbooks, policies, or presentations.
3. Any documents or materials that discuss fake DOD social media<sup>1</sup> pages or accounts, including but not limited to communications concerning the discovery of these pages, communications between agencies or branches of the federal government concerning these pages, and any documents that speak to the identity of the parties behind the creation of these pages.
4. Any documents or materials that discuss individuals who have made, or are currently making, false claims about DOD awards or titles on any online dating service accounts or social media accounts.
5. All correspondence, including but not limited to "direct messages" (i.e., private, user-to-user messages on any platform), emails, or voicemails between representatives of the DOD and social media providers, including but not limited to Disqus, Facebook, Flickr, GitHub, Google+, Instagram, LinkedIn, Medium, Pinterest, Tumblr, Twitter, and YouTube.
6. All communications made by DOD staff to federal agencies or members of Congress investigating or considering an investigation of social media-based interference with government processes, provided such communications also reference any fake DOD social media pages or accounts or any other case of online impersonation of DOD content.

For parts 1, 3, 4, and 6 of this request, the following key terms can be used to narrow the search: fake, false, phony, bogus, fraudulent, impersonate (and all its verb forms), impersonator, impostor, scam, identity theft, imitation, rogue, counterfeit, mock, sham, hoax, parody.

provided electronically in its native file format.<sup>2</sup> Alternatively, I request that the record be provided electronically in a text-searchable, static-image format (PDF), in the best image quality in the agency's possession.

### **III. Request for a Fee Limitation and Public Interest Fee Waiver**

I also ask that any fees be waived, as I believe this request is “it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government,”<sup>1</sup> and disclosure is not in my commercial interest. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).

The information requested concerns government activities. For the reasons above, this information is clearly likely to contribute to the public understanding of said activities – in particular, the DOD's response to impersonation, and how frequently such impersonations happen. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). This information will help the public understand the challenges of social media use.

Given my background, I believe that my expertise can help inform the public in this debate, “contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding of” the DOD's response to such social media-based tactics and such tactics in general. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). This request primarily concerns disseminating information relating to the proper, or improper, functioning of the DOD System.

Finally, I possess a negligible, if not nonexistent, commercial interest in the information because my primarily and overriding goal is to inform the public of—not profit from—the information requested. I study how governments use social media as part of my research.

Alternatively I request that any fees be assessed in accordance with a reduced fee category for educational institutions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). As a postdoctoral fellow, I qualify as an Educational Requester, because Amherst College, an accredited U.S. educational institution, sponsors my research and I will incorporate the requested information into a scholarly work contributing to public knowledge of government activity and disseminated to the public.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B).

<sup>3</sup> *See Sack v. Dep't of Defense*, 823 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

At a minimum, I request that any fees be assessed in accordance with a reduced fee category for representatives of the news media. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). I qualify for this reduction as a member of the news media, because Amherst College and I regularly publish news for public consumption.

In the event that fees cannot be waived, I accept all charges up to \$100, and request that if charges are to exceed that amount, you contact me.

\* \* \*

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions about handling this request, you may telephone me at 510-757-8833 or email me at [ajohnson@cyber.harvard.edu](mailto:ajohnson@cyber.harvard.edu).

Sincerely,



Amy Johnson, PhD  
C/O Mason Kortz  
Harvard Law School Cyberlaw Clinic  
Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society  
1585 Massachusetts Ave. Suite 5018  
Cambridge, MA 02138



As we aren't able to search any other organization's drives other than PA; the requestor will have to file with DMA and other parts of DoD for investigations as stated.

(b)(6)

Government Information Specialist  
FOIA, OATSD-Public Affairs  
Pentagon, Room 2E989  
703.693.6219

-----Original Message-----

(b)(6)

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, April 5, 2019 12:33 PM

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: 19-F-0705

(b)(6)

The requester has responded with the following:

Set the date range for January 1 2008- present, as I want to capture the DoD's various Twitter experiences. Also, she is requesting all part of the request to be searched by your office (PA) and DMA. She also states that part 4-6 will likely turn up little in PA's files and perhaps vice versa for DMA. However, since both handle aspects of the larger phenomenon, there may be bits that nonetheless turn up with regard to the other's focus. Does this seem doable?

Please advise.

-----Original Message-----

(b)(6)

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 3:01 PM

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: 19-F-0705

(b)(6)

The scope narrowed to simply PA is reasonable for our purposes, since we don't have any control over any documents we do not generate or prepare for release.

However, in terms of the subject and time frame, the requester is seeking for parts 1-3 training/material in regards to social media.

I don't believe the majority of DoD had anything thing to do with social media from 2002-2008 (i.e. the DoD 'joined' Twitter in August 2009., and the Pentagon Press Secretary only 'joined' in 2011), so the time frame should probably be one search, 2011 to the present.



In terms of structure for parts 4-6, these seemingly are investigations that would be conducted by various commands in response to fraud or Stolen Valor, etc. As PA does not conduct investigations, there would be very little material generated. PA likewise does not control social media functions, rather that falls under Defense Media Activity (DMA).

If the requester still chooses to have PA do a search and review of training material from the agreed timeframe for parts 1-3, the search will probably not yield any hard results that the requester is seeking.

With this above narrowed scope we could go forward, but it might be worth it to inform them of DMA's role and see if they want to redirect the case to them.

(b)(6)

Government Information Specialist  
FOIA, OATSD-Public Affairs  
Pentagon, Room 2E989  
703.693.6219

-----Original Message-----

(b)(6)

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 2:02 PM

(b)(6)

To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: 19-F-0705

(b)(6)

Finally heard back from the requester.

In terms of narrowing the request:

With regard to offices, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs seems the key starting point. With that narrowing, would it perhaps be possible to do a two-stage search process in terms of the time frame? So, perhaps 2002-2010 and then 2011-present? Or, if that's too complicated, perhaps just from 2009-present.

Does this work? If so, which would work in terms of time frame?

-----Original Message-----

(b)(6)

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 6, 2019 8:32 AM

(b)(6)

To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: 19-F-0705

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Looking at the request again, as [REDACTED] noted that it is very vague and broad, covering the whole of representatives of DoD in regards to social media policies.

Perhaps it may help ask the requester to limit the years, or tailor it to specific commands/DoD entities?

search in more than thirty minutes and that the request can be completed due to review of procedures. Another thing to bring to their attention is that they need to specify a particular division within DOD that they want us to provide a search for. Simply stating DOD in the search doesn't provide an office for us to search for.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 6, 2019 8:17 AM

Subject: RE: 19-F-0705

The requester did state in the initial request that the date range was from January 1, 2002 - present. Does it need to be narrowed to even more specificity? Just wanted to double check before making contact.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 6, 2019 7:21 AM

Subject: 19-F-0705

I wanted to follow up with you concerning the initial request you made for case number 19-F-0705. The scope of the information you are requesting needs to be narrowed to specific dates. This will ensure that we aren't bombarded with irrelevant information when performing our search. It would also be great if you could specify the particular office within DOD that you would recommend we include in the search. Simply requesting DOD records for particular items is too broad and would garner an immense amount of information.

Thank you.

Government Information Specialist  
FOIA, OATSD-Public Affairs  
Pentagon, Room 2E989  
703.614.7953

