

CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RELEASE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION

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TO: (See Note) Chief, Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155**Note:** Regular mail address shown above. For drop-off/next day delivery, use:
Room 2A534, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155**1. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION**

a. TYPE Article	b. TITLE Redefine Readiness or Lose: How the focus on today's readiness has come at the expense of modernizing for tomorrow
c. PAGE COUNT 6	d. SUBJECT AREA Military readiness and modernization

2. AUTHOR/SPEAKER

a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) Brown, Charles Q	b. RANK GEN	c. TITLE Chief of Staff of the Air Force
d. OFFICE Headquarters, U.S. Air Force		e. AGENCY Department of the Air Force

3. PRESENTATION/PUBLICATION DATA (Date, Place, Event)

"War on the Rocks" (warontherocks.com)

4. POINT OF CONTACT

a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) Ryder, Patrick S. Brig. Gen.	b. TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code) (b)(6)
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5. PRIOR COORDINATION

a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) Kirby, John F. SES	b. OFFICE/AGENCY ATSD(PA) / OSD(PA)	c. TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code) (b)(6)
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6. REMARKS

This article is co-authored by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger.

7. RECOMMENDATION OF SUBMITTING OFFICE/AGENCY

a. THE ATTACHED MATERIAL HAS DEPARTMENT/OFFICE/AGENCY APPROVAL FOR PUBLIC RELEASE (qualifications, if any, are indicated in Remarks section) AND CLEARANCE FOR OPEN PUBLICATION IS RECOMMENDED UNDER PROVISIONS OF DODD 5230.09. I AM A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE (civilian or military), AND NOT A CONTRACTOR, AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THIS RECOMMENDATION FOR RELEASE ON BEHALF OF:

Gen. Charles Brown, Chief of Staff of the Air Force

b. CLEARANCE IS REQUESTED BY _____ (YYYYMMDD).

c. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) Ryder, Patrick S.	d. TITLE Director, Public Affairs
e. OFFICE SAF-PA	f. AGENCY Department of the Air Force

g. SIGNATURE

RYDER.PATRICK.S. (b)(6)

Digitally signed by RYDER.PATRICK.S. (b)(6)
Date: 2021.03.12 08:40:21 -05'00'

h. DATE SIGNED (YYYYMMDD)

20210312

Mar 12, 2021

REDEFINE READINESS, OR LOSE:

Department of Defense
OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW

How the focus on today's readiness has come at the expense of modernizing for tomorrow.

By General Charles Q. Brown, Jr. and General David H. Berger

"To remain economically and militarily competitive, and to ensure American leadership into the next century, policy makers and the Pentagon must navigate a major course correction in how we invest in national security."

- Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, House Armed Services Committee

In the halls of the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, military, civilian, and Congressional leaders regularly discuss the "readiness" of our armed forces. Department of Defense leadership, including Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs, testify annually to Congress about the readiness of the forces. We commit resources to building it, develop metrics to measure it, and strive to create and maintain more of it – *but what exactly is readiness?* As Service Chiefs with services increasingly pulled in multiple directions in both time and space, we have had an increasing number of both formal and informal discussions on what readiness really means, and what it should mean. This is a continuation of those discussions and, while there are only two of the Service Chiefs on the by line, we have had likeminded conversations with our fellow Service Chiefs -- the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of Space Operations.

Our argument is simple: The Joint Force requires a holistic, rigorous, analytical framework to assess readiness properly. Over past decades, readiness has become synonymous with 'availability' – largely a measure of military units available for immediate deployment and ready to "fight tonight" – while 'capability' took on a lesser role in the calculation. Perhaps appropriate for an earlier era, this framework for readiness is poorly suited to an environment characterized by great power competition. It largely ignores the capabilities of these "ready" forces and begs the question, ready for what? As the recently released, bipartisan *Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020* states, "The national security challenges the United States faces today are existential, and they cannot be met by simply *doubling down on old models of policy and investment* [emphasis added]." Our current readiness model strongly biases spending on legacy capabilities for yesterday's missions, at the expense of building readiness in the arena of great power competition and investing in modern capabilities for the missions of both today and tomorrow.

We propose a broader framework for readiness to better integrate elements of current availability, effects across combatant commands, future availability and readiness, and modernization efforts. There is a natural tension between Combatant Commander and Service Chief requirements. To most effectively address this tension, we, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should embrace a framework for readiness that manages the relationship between today's combatant command requirements with the modernization imperatives required to enable future Combatant Commanders for tomorrow. Without a fundamental reexamination of the concept of readiness, we will continue to spend limited resources on maintaining legacy capabilities, at the expense of investing in the modern capabilities we need to compete with the People's Republic of China and Russia. Finally, part of this discussion must include a more precise understanding of risk—to what, for how long, and probability. Used in many different ways today, accurate risk statements must always account for these factors. If not, the risk assessment is

incomplete. While not the subject of the article, much has been written on risk from the business and financial sectors that should inform our thinking on the topic.

The Current Force May Be Available - But It's Not Ready

While some readers may have reservations, understand the conclusions articulated above are not new. Consider just two examples, former Secretary Mattis and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dunford. In the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the former Secretary notes, “we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding.” He continued by identifying the absence of combat credibility and combat-credible forces as one of the main shortfalls, and closed by noting, “a more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners” is our objective. Despite the presence and availability of our current capabilities and forces, the former Secretary rightly concluded we were failing to deter our adversaries’ hybrid activities, losing the gray zone competition, and losing our warfighting advantage. If our advantage is eroding as articulated in the NDS, it seriously begs the question of whether our current readiness approach and force structure can reverse the trend.

In May 2019, then-Chairman Joseph Dunford discussed the readiness of the force in relation to Chinese threats during a discussion hosted by the Brookings Institute. There, General Dunford noted the continued militarization of the South China Sea, including “10,000-foot runways, ammunition storage facilities, [and] routine deployments of missile defense capabilities.” He went on to comment, “if the militarization of the islands has plateaued, it’s because the islands have now been developed to the point that they provide the military capability China required.” Accepting General Dunford’s assessment, we are left asking – *How did, and does, our joint force readiness contribute to competing and deterring China from achieving their operational and strategic objectives in the South China Sea?* Based on what occurred, one could submit our joint force readiness—whether in *availability* or *capability*—clearly fell short.

How did a ready, combat-credible force built to compete, deter, and win fail to prevent the Chinese from achieving their operational and strategic objectives to-date in the South China Sea? The answer is obvious. The capability of the forces present were not ready, despite their *availability*, to compete, deter, and win against peer adversaries like China.

For those who still disagree and conclude we possess the lethality and combat credibility required for great power competition, please consider the following examples. Between 2004 and 2007, more than a dozen advanced attack helicopters were shot down in Iraq; not by advanced air defense systems, but by ground fire from insurgent groups in Iraq. While we continue to procure the latest version of those *exact same platforms*, they remain just as vulnerable today and consume billions of dollars in limited resources. In 2010, a North Korean submarine sunk an advanced South Korean warship. If a similar attack was launched today on a large US surface combatant, would the outcome be any different? In 2018, a Syrian S-200 air defense system dating back to the 1960s shot down an Israeli 4th generation F-16 operating at high altitude. In 2019, swarming drones and cruise missiles were employed by Iran to attack Saudi Aramco facilities. During the most recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian ground forces that we would have labeled “ready” based on their availability, were easily targeted and destroyed by Azerbaijani forces employing a mature precision strike regime to include swarms of loitering munitions

and lethal unmanned systems. In just 20 days, hundreds of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other pieces of traditional ground combat equipment that were ready, were also destroyed by a more sophisticated modern adversary employing capabilities that were both available *and* providing advantage. While we could provide dozens of additional recent examples to reinforce further the point that a force with substantial and obvious capability deficits cannot be a ready force, it is unnecessary. We have either reached, or are fast approaching, a point whereby many of our legacy systems can **never** be made ready—available and capable—for a great power adversary.

What Is A Ready Force In 2020-2035?

In his 1995 book *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences*, Dr. Richard Betts articulates a framework for thinking about readiness that remains highly applicable today. Betts argues we need to ask three key questions as we consider readiness: (a) ready for what? (b) ready for when? and (c) ready of what? (or, “what needs to be ready?”). The first question is straightforward: what missions or operations do you expect the force to perform? Betts’ second question is temporal, highlighting the complex tradeoffs between short and longer-term elements of structural readiness, such as modernization. The answer to the first two questions largely shapes the last; based on the missions and timelines prioritized, it suggests some capabilities must be prepared for immediate employment, while others can be mobilized more gradually. Viewed through this framework, it is clear our approach to readiness today inappropriately weights near-term availability far greater than any other aforementioned elements of readiness.

Ready for what? Strategic guidance documents help us answer Betts’ first question – we need a Joint Force for great power competition, with emphasis on China and Russia. The Defense Department and Joint Force have undoubtedly shifted toward a focus on all domain conflict with a peer adversary over the previous four years. Unfortunately, the release of these documents as well as new operating concepts, did not properly recalibrate the discussion on readiness. Readiness remains inappropriately weighted in favor of what is available to fight a narrow range of scenarios today with what we currently have on hand. As a result, over time we have gained significant inertia pursuing capabilities and platforms based on previous commitments and requirements – many of which existed over a decade ago and well prior to the release of existing strategic guidance. While we understand we cannot simply hit reset and make a clean break from today’s force to our future force design, we must work to “break the chain” of program inertia and reevaluate our readiness efforts based on the current strategic context. The Department currently has no mechanism to assess current combatant command requirements, risk over time, and progress toward readiness for pacing threat conflict in 2030 or 2035.

Based on assessments conducted by senior military and civilian leaders over the past several years, to include multiple wargaming iterations, the prevailing wisdom is that the readiness and modernization trend lines indicate the collective Joint Force is not ready to satisfy the demands of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. Rather, we have directed significant resources to ensure they are ready for dozens of other lesser requirements predicated upon an ability to project power across strategic distances in permissive environments. Both of our services have been pulled in directions far from our roots and respective core missions – air superiority and naval expeditionary operations.

Ready for when? The “fight tonight” perspective is a handcuff the Joint Force needs to break. Our most stressing contingency plans require months of force deployment, so costly efforts to keep our forces prepared to meet them “tonight” risks future readiness and modernization imperatives necessary for a high-end fight. This points again to the tension between Service and Combatant command requirements; we must ask, “Who owns the risk and when should they own it?” Betts’s work is again a useful guide. He distinguishes between operational readiness – the efficiency and combat effectiveness of individual elements of the force, and structural readiness – essentially the capacity or “mass” of the force, but considered relative to what is required to achieve victory against a given real-world adversary. In Betts’s terms, our present approach to readiness places far too much weight upon near-term operational and structural readiness.

Ready of what? We cannot reasonably answer the question “ready of what” (less confusingly, “what needs to be ready”) until we answer the first two of Bett’s questions. Under the current readiness paradigm, our answer to “what needs to be ready?” is “the stuff we have today.” However, as we observed earlier, the Defense Department in general has not followed a path to make itself *truly* ready for the tomorrow’s priority challenges (e.g. ready for what?). Were we to do so, we would find that our understanding of both operational and structural readiness must place far more weight on factors related to Service modernization. The availability of obsolescent or otherwise unsuitable equipment (for example, old, increasingly expensive to operate, vulnerable aircraft unsuited for a high-end fight) is of marginal relevance at best to a strategy that prioritizes readiness for conflict with revisionist great powers. We would also find ourselves confronting the relationships among the different types of readiness and the time horizons (“ready for when”) during which we want to maximize readiness. “Immediately” is certainly an answer to “ready for when,” but it is a myopic answer with harsh tradeoffs. All else being equal – notably budget top lines – maximizing our readiness to fight now with the equipment and personnel we currently have necessarily forecloses opportunities to invest in the equipment and personnel we need in the future.

So what should we do? Prescribing exact answers to the balance of investments we would need to make in consideration of these complex tradeoffs is not the purpose of this article – arguing we must have a common framework for honestly surfacing and making decisions on these issues most certainly is. Leaders in the Defense Department, to include ourselves, need to put our heads together and provide the structure, discipline, and analytical rigor to properly consider these tradeoffs and balance risk. As a starting point, we recommend a readiness framework that integrates four primary elements to help us answer all three questions from Betts: First, how proposed allocation changes to support combatant command requirements directly effect that command and associated risk levels. Second, the direct, secondary, and tertiary effects on other combatant commands and their associated risk. We cannot properly measure the impact of readiness decisions in a strategic vacuum; it requires a global, integrated view over both space and time. Third, the effect on future force readiness and offerings – how deploying additional resources now will sacrifice both their combat readiness and availability, limiting options to address future crises and requirements. Finally, and perhaps most challenging, the impact on our ability to effectively modernize for a high-end fight. Using big-data, machine learning, and AI, we should be able to build a model that accurately reflects these elements. For instance, if a command requests an additional unit or capability now, we should immediately know exactly how it effects that command; how it would

affect all other combatant commands; how it will affect future near-term readiness; and finally, what it will cost us in trying to modernize our capabilities for 2035.

Building a rigorous, analytical readiness framework incorporating these elements will help us better balance the risks and tradeoffs between immediate requirements and availability, future availability and readiness, and modernization. Freeing ourselves from the tyranny of short-term operational readiness concepts may also help us envision alternative strategies. Serious consideration of Betts's question "ready of/with what" may remind us that the present force structure we work so hard to keep available is not the only potential set of military tools that could be applied to our current and future problems. Different answers to "ready with what" are conceivable even once we have agreed on "ready for what." To take a perhaps extreme example, the Kennedy Administration's "Flexible Response" doctrine offered a very different approach to the Cold War Soviet threat from that of the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" strategy. These radically different concepts generated equally radical differences in measuring tradeoffs and balance among the various elements of readiness.

The Consequences of Failure—and Success—Are Profound

If we maintain our target fixation on current force availability and fail to adapt and modernize fast enough, wargaming suggests mission failure as the likely outcome for the Joint Force. Unless we accelerate the changes we need, through modernization of capabilities relevant to overcoming those of our adversaries, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Joint Force will be ill prepared to compete, deter, and win. Urgent actions are required now within the entire defense community – our Services, industry, the Department, and Congress – to facilitate the necessary changes. Those actions must provide the departments and the individual military services the authorities they need to shift funding from accounts related to sustainment of legacy programs and those programs that do not create or sustain an enduring warfighting advantage over our peer competitors, and reallocate that capital to truly transformative modernization. As the *Future of Defense Task Force Report* noted, we must "identify, replace and retire costly and ineffective legacy platforms."

To be clear, this is a two-step process. We cannot simply cut resources for near-term readiness or legacy capacity in the name of *savings*. Rather, we must put those savings into transformative modernization as part of our larger future force design model. Likewise, the Departments and Services must make a compelling case, and be empowered, to reduce existing programs of record in accordance with other systemic changes across the services. Demonstrating to our primary competitors that we have the strength, adaptability, innovativeness, will, and resilience to meet current and future challenges is an essential element of competition. It is vitally necessary if we are to deter unimaginably destructive future armed conflict and establish a steady-state of vigorous but largely non-violent great power competition. Should deterrence fail, we must be prepared to fight in defense of America's interests—and win. Our Nation has rightly come to expect much from its Air Force and Marine Corps, and we cannot disappoint.

We have done this before, and together we can do it again while avoiding perceptions of creating winners and losers. Today's Air Force and Marine Corps, and our assumed dominance of the air and littorals, were shaped by innovative and courageous individuals throughout our storied histories. Seeing the need for change when others did not, our forebears overcame the traditionalist opposition of their day, forged new

199 technologically advanced capabilities, and developed novel operational concepts that paved the way for
200 the many successes to which our shared history bears witness. We can do it again. If we are bold enough
201 and committed to providing the military advice needed to overcome our present orientation, we can shape
202 our future proactively. The alternative, as various military institutions have discovered to their sorrow in
203 the past, is being forced to re-shape ourselves reactively, after experiencing catastrophic loss and potential
204 defeat. To do this, we must not let our focus on near-term availability consume the resources necessary to
205 generate truly relevant future readiness through adaptive modernization. We have a unique, but limited,
206 window of opportunity; the time to act is now.

DRAFT

Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA)

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 10:31 AM
To: West, Timothy A CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA); Riley, Tina L CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Thanks. But the author is not Sue Gough, the authors are GEN Brown and GEN Berger. I'll fix the entry in SRTA.

From: West, Timothy A CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 10:24 AM
To: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

21-S-1399

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 10:13 AM
To: West, Timothy A CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6); King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: Schwartz, Jill A CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

This is not the article from the CSAF-CMC. Which case number is that article?

v/r,
Cameron

From: West, Timothy A CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 8:01 AM
To: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: Schwartz, Jill A CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6); Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Case 21-S-1394 has been created and placed in the Policy Teams folder.

Tim West

From: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 7:53 AM
To: West, Timothy A CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Importance: High

Good morning Tim,

Please obtain a case number for Cameron for this op-ed regarding Readiness. It seems to have high interest. They are working the DD1910 now. I've acknowledged receipt, and already forwarded the document to Cameron.

R,

Wally

From: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 7:00 PM
To: Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6) King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Kirby, John
F SES (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Importance: High

Hi, Frosty, Wally,

I do not know if HQ USAF or USAF Public Affairs (SAF-PA) has sent the attached to DOPSR, but requesting an expedited review, please. The attached is a commentary about readiness co-written by Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Brown and Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen Berger, which USAF & USMC plan to send to War on The Rocks (WOTR) for publication. It's a follow-up to a previous joint Op-Ed. ATSD(PA) is good with it, and wants it to get out. CJCS is tracking also. We'll try to chase down a DD1910 with USAF overnight/tomorrow morning, but I wanted to get this to you now due to the high-level interest. There's still a lot of people out there who confuse PA, DOPSR, and Policy reviews and the process for pre-publication security reviews.

Regards,

Sue

Defense Press Operations, OSD(PA)

**Defense Office of Prepublication &
Security Review**
Coordination Record
SECURITY REVIEW

21-S-1394/0

03/12/2021

To: SECDEF >> JS

Case Number: 21-S-1394/0

Type of Document: ARTICLE

Pages: 4

Classification: Unclassified

Source: CIV - Daniel R. Green

Requester: Green, Daniel

Purpose: PUBLIC RELEASE

Subject: Confronting China: The Role of the Reserves in Great Power Competition

The attached material is forwarded for review in accordance with the following guidelines. Questions concerning this case should be directed to:

CAMERON MORSE, Room: 2A534, (b)(6) Email: (b)(6) Unclassified Fax: (703) 614-4956

Please advise if reviews required other than: JS

A reply is requested by: 03/15/2021

COORDINATION OFFICE ACTION

To: Defense Office of Prepublication & Security Review, DOPSR, 2A534, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155

Review by this office in accordance with guidelines below, result in the following recommendation concerning clearance for publication.

Check One:

☒ **No Objection as Received.**

☐ **Recommended Changes.**

☐ **No Objection Subject to Amendments** made by this office (in black pencil). Amendments and rationale (security and policy) are annotated on page numbers listed below

☐ **Objection.** Amendments to permit publication are impracticable. Reasons stated below.

(Continue on reverse side if necessary)

typed name, title, organization	phone number	date	signature
(b)(6)			

Instructions: It is the policy of the Department of Defense to authorize and encourage the public release of information concerning the Department of Defense consistent with security requirements, and other exemptions to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

Security: Reviewing agencies should identify information known to be classified within the meaning of Executive Order 13526 (DoD Regulation 5200.1R) or information which in the judgement of the reviewing agency warrants classification. In the latter case, it is requested that reasons for this judgement be given and recommendations made for appropriate classification.

Policy: Material originated with the Department of Defense for public release should, in addition, be reviewed for conflict with established policies and programs of the Department of Defense or those of the national government. If change is necessary, reviewing agencies are requested to recommend acceptable substitute language where practicable, or specify needed change in sufficient detail to permit acceptable revision.

Editorial: Editorial review is not the responsibility of the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review and reviewing agencies should not make editorial corrections. However, obvious errors of fact should be indicated.

Case Number: 21-S-1399/0 **Source:** OSD/PA - Gough, Susan

Subject: REDEFINE READINESS, OR LOSE: How the focus on today's readiness has come at the expense of modernizing for tomorrow.

Purpose: PUBLIC RELEASE **Event Date:** **Pages:** 6

Requester: Brown, Charles **Document Type:** PAPER

Date Received: 03/12/2021 **Classification:** Unclassified **Typist:** TWest

Suspense Date: 03/15/2021 **Date Completed:**

Reviewer Worksheet: **Action Officer:**

Notes:

Comments (continue on reverse side if necessary):

ASD/PA: no objections

In House: no objections

JS: no objection

CLEARED
For Open Publication

Mar 12, 2021

Department of Defense
OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW

DOPSR Action

Recommended Action

- ☐ Cleared
- ☐ Cleared with Recommendations
- ☐ Cleared as Amended
- ☐ Not Cleared
- ☐ See Memo Attached

Initials/Date _____

Final Action

- ☒ Cleared
- ☐ Cleared with Recommendations
- ☐ Cleared as Amended
- ☐ Not Cleared
- ☐ See Memo Attached

Initials/Date

(b)(6)

Digitally signed by

(b)(6)

Date: 2021.03.12 13:03:32 -05'00'

Case should be indexed under the following keywords: _____

Kemp, Rotonya M CIV WHS ESD (USA)

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 1:07 PM
To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA); Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Attachments: 21-S-1399 cleared DD form 1910.pdf; 21-S-1399 cleared Readiness article.pdf

Sue,

DOPSR has no objections to the publication of the article by GEN Berger and GEN Brown. Attached is a copy of the cleared DD form 1910 and a cleared copy of the article. The "Unclassified" and "Draft" markings must be removed prior to publication. If you have any questions or concerns please contact us. Is there anyone else we should send this clearance to?

v/r,

Cameron R. G. Morse
Policy Team Lead
Defense Office of Prepublication
and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155
703-614-4928 (unsecure)
703-614-4956 (fax)

How are we doing?

** Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD **

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 1:03 PM
To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

I am thinking of a disclaimer, guess it's a reflex at this point. I'll clear it without one.

v/r,
Cameron

From: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 1:01 PM
To: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Jointly opining is my understanding, but as the chiefs they can speak authoritatively on their respective Services. Are you thinking about a disclaimer?

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 12:50 PM
To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Importance: High

Sue,

I'm ready to wrap this one up but I have one last question. Do we know if the two generals are speaking on behalf of the Department on this? Or are they just opining together? Thanks!

v/r,

Cameron R. G. Morse
Policy Team Lead
Defense Office of Prepublication
and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155
703-614-4928 (unsecure)
703-614-4956 (fax)

How are we doing?

** Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD **

From: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 10:10 AM
To: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Importance: High

Cameron,

Please see latest below.

R,

Wally

From: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 10:08 AM
To: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Hi Wally,

Here's the DD1910. Brig. Gen. Ryder confirmed that it has been cleared by CJCS Gen. Milley. Brig. Gen. Ryder also asked for clearance today, if at all possible, as we past the original publication date (it's not indicated on the form because he basically signed what I sent him, and I hadn't put in a date in that block last night).

Regards,

Sue

I'm teleworking today; if you need to talk, please call (b)(6)

From: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 8:00 AM

To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Hi Susan,

I've assigned the case to Cameron Morse, he's our Policy Team Lead. He's already tasked the JS, but we're wondering if they've already seen it?

R,

Wally

From: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 7:00 PM

To: Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6); King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6) Kirby, John

F SES (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Importance: High

Hi, Frosty, Wally,

I do not know if HQ USAF or USAF Public Affairs (SAF-PA) has sent the attached to DOPSR, but requesting an expedited review, please. The attached is a commentary about readiness co-written by Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Brown and Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen Berger, which USAF & USMC plan to send to War on The Rocks (WOTR) for publication. It's a follow-up to a previous joint Op-Ed. ATSD(PA) is good with it, and wants it to get out. CJCS is tracking also. We'll try to chase down a DD1910 with USAF overnight/tomorrow morning, but I wanted to get this to you now due to the high-level interest. There's still a lot of people out there who confuse PA, DOPSR, and Policy reviews and the process for pre-publication security reviews.

Regards,

Sue

Defense Press Operations, OSD(PA)

Kemp, Rotonya M CIV WHS ESD (USA)

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 1:07 PM
To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA); Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Attachments: 21-S-1399 cleared DD form 1910.pdf; 21-S-1399 cleared Readiness article.pdf

Sue,

DOPSR has no objections to the publication of the article by GEN Berger and GEN Brown. Attached is a copy of the cleared DD form 1910 and a cleared copy of the article. The "Unclassified" and "Draft" markings must be removed prior to publication. If you have any questions or concerns please contact us. Is there anyone else we should send this clearance to?

v/r,

Cameron R. G. Morse
Policy Team Lead
Defense Office of Prepublication
and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155
703-614-4928 (unsecure)
703-614-4956 (fax)

How are we doing?

** Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD **

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 1:03 PM
To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

I am thinking of a disclaimer, guess it's a reflex at this point. I'll clear it without one.

v/r,
Cameron

From: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 1:01 PM
To: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Jointly opining is my understanding, but as the chiefs they can speak authoritatively on their respective Services. Are you thinking about a disclaimer?

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 12:50 PM
To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Importance: High

Sue,

I'm ready to wrap this one up but I have one last question. Do we know if the two generals are speaking on behalf of the Department on this? Or are they just opining together? Thanks!

v/r,

Cameron R. G. Morse
Policy Team Lead
Defense Office of Prepublication
and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155
703-614-4928 (unsecure)
703-614-4956 (fax)

How are we doing?

** Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD **

From: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 10:10 AM
To: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Importance: High

Cameron,

Please see latest below.

R,

Wally

From: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 10:08 AM
To: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Hi Wally,

Here's the DD1910. Brig. Gen. Ryder confirmed that it has been cleared by CJCS Gen. Milley. Brig. Gen. Ryder also asked for clearance today, if at all possible, as we past the original publication date (it's not indicated on the form because he basically signed what I sent him, and I hadn't put in a date in that block last night).

Regards,

Sue

I'm teleworking today; if you need to talk, please call (b)(6)

From: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 8:00 AM

To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Hi Susan,

I've assigned the case to Cameron Morse, he's our Policy Team Lead. He's already tasked the JS, but we're wondering if they've already seen it?

R,

Wally

From: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 7:00 PM

To: Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6); King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Kirby, John

F SES (USA) (b)(6)

Subject: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks

Importance: High

Hi, Frosty, Wally,

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Regards,

Sue

Defense Press Operations, OSD(PA)

West, Timothy A CIV WHS ESD (USA)

From: King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 7:53 AM
To: West, Timothy A CIV WHS ESD (USA)
Subject: FW: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Attachments: Readiness_CQB_DHB_v5.2 26 Feb 21.docx

Importance: High

Good morning Tim,

Please obtain a case number for Cameron for this op-ed regarding Readiness. It seems to have high interest. They are working the DD1910 now. I've acknowledged receipt, and already forwarded the document to Cameron.

R,

Wally

From: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) (b)(6) >
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 7:00 PM
To: Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6) King, Walter J CIV WHS ESD (USA) (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Kirby, John
F SES (USA) (b)(6)
Subject: HOT FOR DOPSR REVIEW: CSAF-CMC Article for War on The Rocks
Importance: High

Hi, Frosty, Wally,

I do not know if HQ USAF or USAF Public Affairs (SAF-PA) has sent the attached to DOPSR, but requesting an expedited review, please. The attached is a commentary about readiness co-written by Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Brown and Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen Berger, which USAF & USMC plan to send to War on The Rocks (WOTR) for publication. It's a follow-up to a previous joint Op-Ed. ATSD(PA) is good with it, and wants it to get out. CJCS is tracking also. We'll try to chase down a DD1910 with USAF overnight/tomorrow morning, but I wanted to get this to you now due to the high-level interest. There's still a lot of people out there who confuse PA, DOPSR, and Policy reviews and the process for pre-publication security reviews.

Regards,
Sue
Defense Press Operations, OSD(PA)