TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305

(U) Title: WSEG Report No. 148, Strategic Offensive Weapon Employment in the Three Period About 1975 (U), August 1969. Short Title: WEPS.

(U) Conducted by: WSEG

(U) Purpose: The purpose of the study is to explore problems and issues related to employment of U.S. strategic forces in the middle 1970's, particular emphasis is given to problems associated with MIRV weapons and defended targets.

(U) Methodology: The capabilities of programmed U.S. forces were examined to determine the main features of strategic employment in terms of U.S. strategic weapon systems and U.S. strategic forces were considered. Attack strategies based on potential targets and military targets represented in detailed data bases. Major uncertainties in U.S. force capabilities, enemy target characteristics, intelligence projections of Blue-Silver capabilities, and the manner in which hostilities develop were considered by applying range of estimates to such factors as force size, probabilities of survival, and CEP, and target characteristics such as silo hardness. Attack alternative and planning guidelines were developed and then refined on the basis of detailed "topical" studies. Major topical studies included footprints constraints for MIRVs; enemy ABM defenses; nuclear weapons; and the vulnerability of strategic systems.

(b)(1) Principal Findings:

7. In addition to the preceding findings the study developed, in several areas, new methodologies applicable to strategic offensive planning.
1. (U) **Title and Date:**

WECC Report No. 148, “Strategic Offensive Weapons Employ-
ment in the Time Period About 1975 (U),” August 1969. Sheet Title: WECC.

2. (U) **Questions Addressed:**

The purpose of the study is to explore the problems and issues related to the employment of U.S. Strategic Forces in the middle 1970's; particular emphasis is placed upon the problems associated with MXV weapons and defended targets.

3. (U) **Effort Involved:**

Six WECC military and seventeen IDA civilian professionals worked fifteen months on this study.

4. **(TS) Principal Findings:**
6. (U) In addition to the preceding findings, the study developed, in several areas, new methodologies applicable to strategic offensive planning.

5. (U) Decisions Affected by the Study: Utility

6. (U) Appraisal of Quality:

The study is a comprehensive treatment of many important strategic planning factors for the mid-1970's; analytical investigations were effectively combined with realistic operational planning considerations.
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution 

Subject: Follow-on Study: Strategic Offensive Forces (U)

1. Reference my memorandum, same subject, undated.

2. Attached is a strawman flimsy of a proposed memorandum to the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. This memorandum would provide terms of reference for follow-on studies.

3. A final flimsy will be prepared after further discussion and coordination among the Services and the Joint Staff action officers.

4. Proposed schedule of events under MOP 132 will be discussed at the initial action officers' meeting on 16 December.

7 MAR 1974 INVENTORYED

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ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP

Subject: Strategic Warfare Studies 1975-1981 (U)

1. ( ) Reference is made to:
   a. CM-2384-67* to the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, which is a statement of continuing requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for WSEG study and analytical support to the Joint Program for Planning.
   b. SM-351-67** dated 13 May 1967, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that WSEG study the employment of strategic offensive weapons in the presence of enemy defenses for the mid-range period.

2. ( ) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that WSEG study problems in programming and development of US strategic offense weapon systems in the mid-range period and including 1981. The study should include the implication of significant changes in the capabilities and effectiveness of Soviet and strategic forces, possible in the period extending to 1981, and should evaluate the force planning alternatives open to the United States to counter adverse changes and to maintain a US strategic posture capable of achieving US military objectives.

3. ( ) Purpose and Objective. The primary purpose of this study will be to provide . Therefore, the primary study objective should be to develop methodologies and analyses for determining the , as well as possible Emphasis

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* Attachment to JCS 2089/29
** Enclosure to JCS 2012/304
*** Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3

Enclosure
should be given to the identification of plausible and possible trends and developments in weapons and to relating these developments to objectives and strategies in the JSOP. Specifically, the study should be

4. ( ) Study Tasks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff require specific consideration of the following:

a. The Soviet threats to US strategic forces in the period beyond that covered in WSEG Report 148, i.e., from 1975 on out.


c. Changes and international developments which can affect the capabilities of both the United States and the USSR, including possible arms limitation agreements on the development or deployment of strategic systems.

d. Both US and USSR weapons systems of the following types:

1. Advanced air, ballistic missile and satellite (including anti-missile and anti-bomber) and, in turn, new bomber penetration systems designed to counter the build-up of new defenses.

2. Improved counter-ICBM capabilities.

3. Within the context of the preceding tasks, the study should consider the following specific problem areas: (This section will include any special study requirements desired by DDR&E, the Services, or the Joint Staff, but within the context of paragraphs 4a through d.)

Enclosure
5. General guidelines on study methodology, scope and forces are as follows:

   a. Methodology
      (1) The study must consider the objectives as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JSOP and the operative objectives upon which the programmed forces are based must be considered in evaluating capabilities of US strategic forces. Each will therefore be

      (2) The study should focus on the forces and of force elements. Analysis should be in and should and absolute merits of various
deffective comparisons.

      (3) The study should relate employment considerations, such as developed in WSEG Report 148, to currently proposed and conceptual weapons design. This is an area which was deferred, in the study program leading to WSEG Report 148, to follow-on study of forces in the post-1975 period.

      (4) The study should include force employment considerations in the context both of US initiation and US retaliation (with bomber attacks where appropriate)

      (5) The study must consider the total US strategic capability in evaluating strategic offensive forces.

      (6) The study must consider the role of strategic forces in accomplishing the US damage-limitation objectives and
increasing the survivability of US strategic offensive weapon systems. Physical interactions between these forces and Soviet defensive forces, must be considered in determining the effectiveness and required capabilities of US strategic offensive forces.

Finally, i.e., the survivability of US strategic offensive forces under attack by projected Soviet strategic offensive weapons. 

b. Scope

(1) The study should concentrate on the employment of future US strategic offensive weapons in the presence of future Soviet defenses; a major portion of the study effort should be directed to ballistic missiles equipped with MIRV employed against heavily defended urban-industrial and military complexes.

(2) While primary emphasis should be on the period after 1975, the study may include analyses of forces prior to 1975 such as study areas not sufficiently developed in WSEG Report 148, or

(3) The study should consider those study areas in WSEG Report 148 which are applicable to weapon systems in the post-1975 time period, or which require more detailed analysis than was accomplished in the previous study. Examples are:

(a) 

(b)
(4) The study should be responsive to analysis requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based on changes or possible changes to force structures induced as a result of SALT. In addressing the full range of US strategic objectives, the recent analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to National Security Study Memorandum No. 64 which indicated a possible need for US capability to deter or to respond to nuclear attack by the capability is adopted by the United States as a necessary element of strategy, new force planning considerations will be introduced into the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. In this event, the study should be extended as necessary to include this form of warfare, related US objectives, force capabilities, and requirements. Supplementary instructions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be provided as required.

c. Forces

(1) While it is not the intent of the study to examine or to seek judgments on, questions of overall force structure size or composition, it is necessary that the analyses of offense and defense missile interactions include the kinds of strategic missile systems which the US force may include and the kinds of Soviet missile defenses they may have to counter. Accordingly, the analysis should include consideration of US strategic offensive ballistic missile systems of each type recommended for the US force through 1980.

(2) Where quantitative assumptions are necessary for force interactions, the force level objectives in Book II, Volume II, JSOP 72-79 will be used as a basis. Adjustments in the quantities of newer systems entering the inventory would be provided as required.
during that period should be made to support meaningful
analysis of such systems, considering the threats and US
objectives. 

SAFEGUARD Phase II 

The study should 

The study should 

which appear

capable of contributing to US force capabilities within the
mid-range period and which may warrant development. The
study should develop an analytical base on which judgments can be reached in recom-

mending objective force levels.

Baselines for quantitative Soviet and forces

will be those forces in the current Joint Intelligence

Estimate for Planning, as updated. The higher-than-expected

threat will be the updated high end of the National

Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP).

Upward and downward excursions may be made as

necessary to support analyses if properly identified and

justified in the analyses.

Soviet area and terminal bomber and missile defenses

should be structured to minimize the US options for prefer-

tential attacks by missile or bomber delivered weapons.

6. ( ) Users of the Study. Data from this study will be used

primarily by:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services for mid-range

planning (the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP)).

Enclosure
b. The DDR&E and military services for weapon systems development considerations.

7. ( ) Study Schedule. It is proposed that the study be conducted in two phases geared to the development of JSOP 73-80 and 74-81. The study program should include a first report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 31 August 1970 for use in the preparation of Volume II, JSOP 73-80. The final study report should be provided in August of 1971 in phase with the following cycle for JSOP FY 74-81. Interim progress briefings with written briefing summaries should be scheduled when appropriate to meet the requirements of DDR&E and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. ( ) Continuing Coordination. To insure understanding of requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the application of results as the study progresses through its phases, close liaison with the J-5 Directorate of the Joint Staff should be maintained to coordinate questions on assumptions, objectives, strategy and criteria to be use.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP


1. On 8 November 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the assessment in the Appendix hereto for inclusion as a preface to WSEG Report 148. It is requested that this assessment be transmitted to the holders of WSEG Report 148 and accompany any additional distribution of the report.

2. Without attachment, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ROY L. CROMPTON
Brigadier General, USAF
Secretary

Attachment
1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted this report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapons systems.

2. [(S) There are important cautions which must be observed to avoid making erroneous conclusions when using the report. For proper understanding, the principal findings and conclusions, as summarized in Volume I of the report, must be considered in context with the purpose of the study and with the analyses contained in the topical studies, Volumes II-X. Footnote comments in the report must be noted carefully to assure complete understanding of each discussion.

Following are specific comments:

(b)(1)
WSEG REPORT 148 - STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT IN THE TIME PERIOD ABOUT 1975 (U)

Reference: JCS 2012/304-4

DECISION 7 MAR 1974 INVENTOED

1. At their meeting on 4 November 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after making amendments, approved the recommendations contained in paragraph 14 of this report. On 8 November 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved further changes to this report.

2. This Decision replaces page 15. Holders are requested to substitute the additional attached revised pages 19 through 32, incl., incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

3. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with copies of the subject report, was forwarded as JCSM-698-69, dated 20 November 1969, to the Secretary of Defense. The memorandum in Enclosure B, together with copies of the subject report, was forwarded as SM-743-69, dated 20 November 1969, to the Director of Strategic Target Planning. The memorandum in Enclosure C, together with copies of the subject report, was forwarded as SM-744-69, dated 20 November 1969, to CINCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and CINCSAC. The memorandum in Enclosure D, together with copies of the subject report, was forwarded as SM-745-69, dated 20 November 1969, to the Director, Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff. The assessment of WSEG Report 148 in Enclosure E was bound as the first document inside the first cover of Volume I of the subject report. The Director, J-5, was requested by SM-746-69, dated 20 November 1969, to take the action indicated in subparagraph 14f.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
WSEG REPORT 148 - STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
EMPLOYMENT IN THE TIME PERIOD ABOUT 1975 (U)

THE PROBLEM


FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In SM-351-67,** dated 13 May 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) to conduct a study of strategic offensive weapons employment in the presence of defenses during the full mid-range period. This study was requested for use in mid-range JSOP planning and in strategic operational planning.

3. Phase I of the study was completed and reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in WSEG Report 132,*** Strategic Offensive Weapons Employment in the Presence of Defenses (WEPS), dated June 1968. This report, which provided a definition of Phase II of the study program, was approved by the Joint Staff in J-5 SM 1118-68.**** WSEG Report 132 provided that Phase II of the study would cover the period 1970-1975, would use US programmed forces, and would focus on weapon employment. Also, it recognized that studies covering the period beyond 1975 and weapon system design implications would be follow-on study efforts.

4. WSEG Report 148,dated 26 August 1969, is the report on Phase II of the study and is the final report in response to SM-351-67.

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion, see Enclosure F.

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*Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3
**Enclosure to JCS 2012/304
***Attachment to JCS 2012/304-2
****Attachment to 1st N/H to JCS 2012/304-2
CONCLUSIONS

6. The report is responsive to the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the exceptions indicated.

7. WSEG Report 148 should be noted and regarded as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems.

8. The report and the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the report should be provided to the Secretary of Defense for his information.

9. The report and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be provided to the Director of Strategic Target Planning for his comments and use in further study definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. Based on Memorandum of Policy No. 39, the report and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be provided to the commanders of unified and specified commands who have a SIOP role.

11. The report and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be provided to the Director, Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff.

12. To insure that each user of the report is aware of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on use of the report, comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be bound in Volume I of WSEG Report 148 as guidance to users.

13. Follow-on study requirements should be determined and, if appropriate, tasked to WSEG as soon as possible. This should be done as a separate action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with copies of the report,* which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

*Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3
b. The memorandum in Enclosure B, and copies of the report,* which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 9 above, be forwarded to the Director of Strategic Target Planning.

c. The memorandum in Enclosure C, and copies of the report,* which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 10 above, be forwarded to CINCLANT, USCENTEUR, CINCPAC, and CINCSAC.

d. The memorandum in Enclosure D, and a copy of the report,* which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 11 above, be forwarded to the Director, Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff.

e. The memorandum in Enclosure E, which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 12 above, be bound as the first document inside the front cover of Volume I of the report.*

f. Follow-on study requirements to support the Joint Program for Planning be determined and, if appropriate, referred to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group as soon as possible.

g. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands.

h. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

i. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officers:  Colonel R. A. Miller, USAF
                 Colonel W. F. Graves, USA
                 Captain V. D. Maynard, USN
                 Strategic Forces and Analysis Branch, J-5
                 Extension 77251/77252/52145

* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


1. (U) Reference is made to WSEG Report 148, which is a report on a study of strategic offensive weapons employment. The general purpose of this study was to illuminate and explore problems and issues related to the employment of US strategic weapons in the middle 1970s.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems. The report, with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for your information.

3. (TS) The report treats some important strategic planning factors for the mid-1970s. The major substantive areas considered are:

   a. The application of MIRVs and other US force elements to realistic target data bases and consideration of smaller yield weapons in conjunction with more finely detailed target representations.

   b. The penetration of projected Soviet ABM defenses.

   c. The vulnerability of offensive and defensive systems to nuclear effects.

   d. The role of the manned bomber forces and the problem of penetrating air defense.

* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3

(TS) Downgraded to NS 2012/304-4

Attachment not automatically classified.
4. (c) A major feature of the study is the recurring attempt to devise methodologies to deal with uncertainties and to examine, in parametric terms, the adequacy of strategic weapons employment and plans in the face of these uncertainties in the mid-1970s. Several new techniques were developed to handle weapons employment problems.

5. (c) There are important cautions which must be observed to avoid making erroneous conclusions when using the report. For proper understanding, the principal findings and conclusions, as summarized in Volume I of the report, must be considered in context with the purpose of the study and with the analyses contained in the topical studies, Volumes II-X. Footnote comments in the report must be noted carefully to assure complete understanding of each discussion. Following are specific comments:

(b)(1)
6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is removed from the RESTRICTED-DATA category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Signed
DAVID I. LIEBMAN
Major General, USAF
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING


1. (U) Reference is made to WSEG Report 148," which is the report on a study of strategic offensive weapons employment requested by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (copy attached). The general purpose of this study was to illuminate and explore problems and issues related to the employment of US strategic weapons in the middle 1970s.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems. The report, with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for your information.

3. (T5L) There are important cautions which must be observed to avoid making erroneous conclusions when using the report. For proper understanding, the principal findings and conclusions, as summarized in Volume I of the report, must be considered in context with the purpose of the study and with the analyses contained in the topical studies, Volumes II-X. Footnote comments in the report must be noted carefully to assure complete understanding of each discussion. Following are specific comments:

(b)(1)

* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3
** Enclosure to JCS 2012/304
4. (U) To assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in defining further study effort, your comments on the following would be appreciated:

   a. Value of the report in illuminating factors to be considered in design and structure of future strategic offensive forces.


   c. Other comments as desired.

5. (U) The study group which prepared this report may be tasked for follow-on studies on strategic forces employing the mid-range target in the 75 ppt area. Volume I of the report will be reported to you and, if desired, study areas within the context of the study program outlined in this section for tasking the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group.

6. (U) Considering the broad scope of the study and the great detail contained in the 10 volumes, it is desired that your staff have sufficient time for a thorough review before making comments. If staff resources will permit, general comments and recommendations are desired within 20 days after receipt of the report.

7. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is removed from the RESTRICTED-DATA category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ROY C. CROMPTON
Brigadier General, USAF
Secretary

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander in Chief, Atlantic
US Commander in Chief, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command


1. (U) Reference is made to WSEG Report 148, which is the report on a study of strategic offensive weapons employment requested by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The general purpose of this study was to illuminate and explore problems and issues related to the employment of U.S. strategic weapons in the middle 1970s.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems. The report, with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for your information.

3. (TS) The report treats some important strategic planning factors for the mid-1970s. The major substantive areas considered are:

a. The application of MIRVs and other U.S. force elements to realistic target data bases and the consideration of smaller yield weapons in conjunction with more finely detailed target representations.

b. The penetration of projected Soviet ABM defenses.

c. The vulnerability of offensive and defensive systems to nuclear effects.

d. The role of the manned bomber forces and the problem of penetrating air defense.

* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3
** Enclosure to JCS 2012/304
4. (c) A major feature of the study is the recurring attempt to devise methodologies to deal with uncertainties and to examine, in parametric terms, the adequacy of strategic weapons employment and plans in the face of these uncertainties in the mid-1970s. Several new techniques were developed to handle weapon employment problems.

5. (c) There are important cautions which must be observed to avoid making erroneous conclusions when using the report. For proper understanding, the principal findings and conclusions, as summarized in Volume I of the report, must be considered in context with the purpose of the study and with the analyses contained in the topical studies, Volumes II-X. Footnote comments in the report must be noted carefully to assure complete understanding of each discussion. Following are specific comments:

(b)(1)
6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is removed from the RESTRICTED-DATA-category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Signed

ROY C. CROMPTON
Brigadier General, USAF
Secretary

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT CONTINENTAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION PLANNING STAFF


1. (U) Reference is made to WSEG Report 148, which is the report on a study of strategic offensive weapons employment requested by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The general purpose of this study was to illuminate and explore problems and issues related to the employment of US strategic weapons in the middle 1970s.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems. The report, with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for your information.

3. (TS/REL) The report treats some important strategic planning factors for the mid-1970s. The major substantive areas considered are:

   a. The application of MIRVs and other US force elements to realistic target data bases and the consideration of smaller yield weapons in conjunction with more finely detailed target representations.

   b. The penetration of projected Soviet ABM defenses.

   c. The vulnerability of offensive and defensive systems to nuclear effects.

   d. The role of the manned bomber forces and the problem of penetrating air defense.

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* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3
** Enclosure to JCS 2012/304
4. A major feature of the study is the recurring attempt to devise methodologies to deal with uncertainties and to examine, in parametric terms, the adequacy of strategic weapons employment and plans in the face of these uncertainties in the mid-1970s. Several new techniques were developed to handle weapon employment problems.
6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is removed from the RESTRICTED DATA category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ROY C. CHROMETT
Brigadier General, USAF
Secretary

Attachment
ENVELOPE E

ASSESSMENT OF WSEG REPORT 148

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted this report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapons systems.

(b)(1)
5. A major feature of the study is the recurring attempt to devise methodologies to deal with uncertainties and to examine, in parametric terms, the adequacy of strategic weapons employment and plans in the face of these uncertainties in the mid-1970s. Several new techniques were developed to handle weapons employment problems.

6. This study should be considered in conjunction with other past and current studies as part of an analytical database which can be useful in making judgments on strategic offensive weapons employment.

7. A proposed follow-on study program is contained in Volume I, Section XI. These proposals relate closely to the original tasking directive (SM-351-67), which referred to design implications and force planning methodologies in addition to force employment considerations. Such follow-on studies in areas defined and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also be in consonance with CM-2384-67,* which defined continuing requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for WSEG study and analytical support. An immediate assessment of requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for further studies on strategic offensive forces appears timely and necessary to give the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group further guidance.

*Attachment to JCS 2089/29