OPERATIONAL TEST
AND EVALUATION

INFO MEMO

JAN 2 6 2015

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

SUBJECT: (U) Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E) Report on the Joint Battle Command – Platform (JBC-P)

- (U) I have attached at TAB A my MOT&E Report on the JBC-P Software Build 6.0 and a classified annex at TAB B, required by Section 2399 of Title 10, United States Code. In the report, I conclude the following:

  - (U) The Army Test and Evaluation Command conducted the JBC-P MOT&E, from April 23 through May 17, 2014, at Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), New Mexico. Testing was adequate and was conducted in accordance with a Director, Operational Test and Evaluation approved test plan.

  - (U) The JBC-P Software Build 6.0 is not operationally effective. It did not support Army and Marine Corps leaders, Soldiers, and Marines with the critical capabilities of Command and Control (C2) messages, and identifying battlefield hazards when operating from Tactical Operational Centers (TOCs) and on-the-move in tactical vehicles.

  - (U) While Software Build 6.0 delivered several enhanced capabilities, it introduced deficiencies that significantly detracted from mission capabilities and led to an assessment that the JBC-P was not effective. This is a reduction in capability from the November 2013, JBC-P Software Build 5.0 Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E), which assessed the system as effective. Additionally, JBC-P continued to demonstrate deficiencies during the MOT&E that were observed during the 2013 JBC-P Software Build 5.0 IOT&E and that continue to degrade user confidence in the situational awareness information provided by JBC-P.

  - (U) Several JBC-P software deficiencies reduced the units' ability to conduct missions and reduced the unit's confidence in JBC-P situational awareness and enemy survivability alerts. Over 900 false Mayday messages occurred during testing. The system also presented false locations for blue forces and was not effective in transmitting and receiving C2 messages. Additionally, it displayed icons falsely showing units moving at speeds up to 200 kilometers per hour, including icons for both stationary units and tactical ground forces.

- (U) JBC-P provided chat capability that effectively supported unit leaders during operational missions.

- (U) JBC-P Logistics (JBC-P Log), a component of the JBC-P, did not support the Army brigade's logistics mission. Soldiers experienced difficulty in interrogating radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, and JBC-P Log allowed operators to create duplicate RFID tags that portrayed the same cargo in different locations across the brigade.

- (U) The Marine Corps participated with a battalion attached to an Army brigade. JBC-P demonstrated the capability to operate in a joint operational environment.

- (U) The JBC-P Software Build 6.0 is not operationally suitable. JBC-P is not reliable for most versions of hardware. Some configurations performed well, but most did not meet the Mean Time Between Essential Function Failure (MTBEFF) requirement of 290 hours. Fifty-eight percent of JBC-P Essential Function Failures were due to software. JBC-P meets the user's Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) maintainability requirement.

- (U) JBC-P Software Build 6.0 is not survivable. The classified annex to this report details those deficiencies. It has significant cybersecurity issues that would place a unit's ability to succeed in combat at risk.

- (U) Section 2399 provides that submission of my report to the Congressional defense committees may be accompanied by such comments as you wish to make. I will provide copies to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Congressional defense committees.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: TABs A and B

Prepared by: (b)(6)