

September 3, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Foreign Aid

received 9/4
9:00am.

DR

DP

Here is an interesting article by Carol Adelman. She thinks the U.S. is not getting credit in foreign aid circles for all the humanitarian and civil affairs work the DoD does because we cannot capture the costs.

Please tell me what we think we should do about this, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/21/02 Adleman, Carol ltr to SecDef w/OpEd from *WSJ*, "A1

DHR:dh
090302-1

.....
Please respond by 09/27/02

35902

U15018 / 02

(b)(6)



August 21, 2002

The Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Don:

I am attaching an Op-Ed piece I did today in the *Wall Street Journal* on American generosity in international giving. It is a rebuttal to all those who claim that America is "stingy" when it comes to international assistance. Because America's foreign aid total of \$10 billion ranks last in terms of our GNP, we're criticized, even though we give the highest in absolute dollar amounts, and our private sector gives some \$34 billion each year, more than three times official foreign aid.

In the process of doing this research (I'm doing the lead chapter for a big USAID report), I discovered something interesting. According to the person who collects all the data for the U.S. official aid number, since 1991 certain costs of DOD can be included in this official figure. These include military costs related to election monitoring, infrastructure, rebuilding in-country narcotics support, threat reduction and demobilization, and post-conflict peace-building operations.

The person at USAID who collects these numbers says he knows he is not getting all the allowable DOD costs, since your accounting system isn't set up to automatically capture them. For example, if you build a bridge, or road, or hospital as part of a larger military operation, and the facilities are used by the populace, the expenditures may not be listed separately and thus are not being counted as part of our official aid.

We don't know how much is not counted or how difficult it would be to get the break-outs, but it would be interesting and worthwhile to see. In short, it's quite possible that including all these allowable costs could raise our official foreign aid total significantly. This would lower criticism significantly as well because it could change our ranking among nations. It could provide real help to the Administration when dealing with all the critics who say we are not doing enough, when, in fact, we are doing plenty.

Sincerely,

Carol Adelman

SOLVING TOMORROW'S PROBLEMS TODAY

11-L-0559/OSD/11241

413775-02

1015 18TH
STREET, N.W.
SUITE 300
WASHINGTON,
DC
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INDIANAPOLIS
WASHINGTON



THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

ONLINE

August 21, 2002

COMMENTARY

America's Helping Hand

By CAROL ADELMAN

At the upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg later this month, the U.S. will again be pilloried for being stingy on foreign aid. U.S. government aid as a percentage of GNP does indeed rank last. Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden are lauded for being on top.

But the figures, counting only public sector contributions, are deceptive. Americans help others abroad -- just as they do domestically -- primarily through private donations, foundations, corporate and university giving, religious offerings, and direct help to needy family members. Scandinavians and other Europeans give abroad primarily as they do at home -- through government.

So, at the guilt-fest in Jo'burg, the U.S. delegation should tell the real story of American generosity abroad. While there are no complete figures for international private giving, conservative estimates from surveys and voluntary reporting are impressive: Americans privately give at least \$34 billion overseas -- more than three times U.S. official foreign aid of \$10 billion.

Latest Figures

International giving by U.S. foundations totals \$1.5 billion per year, according to the latest figures. Even this shortchanges the "mega-donors" such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, because its biggest outlays came after the latest figures were tabulated.

Corporate philanthropy has also become a significant part of the total. Once disallowed by U.S. courts, charitable giving by U.S. businesses now comes to at least \$2.8 billion annually. And cooperation between

corporations and foundations has become common: When Merck gave \$50 million for an HIV/AIDS program in Botswana, it was matched by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

This doesn't begin to touch the work of America's NGOs, whose missions help the needy around the world. Groups like Catholic Relief Services and Save the Children give a whopping \$6.6 billion in grants, goods and volunteers. Religious overseas ministries contribute \$3.4 billion, including health care, literacy training, relief and development. Even the \$1.3 billion U.S. colleges give in scholarships to foreign students is more than Australia, Belgium, Norway, or Switzerland gave in total foreign assistance in 2000.

There's another way that the U.S. contributes as well, one that speaks volumes about this country's real gift to the world. As Mexican President Vicente Fox says, the "real heroes" are immigrants who send money to families back home. Personal remittances from the U.S. to developing countries came to \$18 billion in 2000 and provide in Mexico for example, the third largest source of foreign exchange. U.S. Treasurer Rosario Marin, who sends money to her aunt in Mexico, calls remittances "one of the most important transactions between our two countries."

Some international economists have seen that such remittances should be considered a central part of any development strategy. But overturning the status quo won't be easy: Former president Jimmy Carter has said he hopes these remittances and other private donations won't be used to excuse what he considers American stinginess on foreign aid.

Yet such private giving is a much faster and more direct way of helping. Remittances don't require the expensive overhead of government consultants, or the interference of corrupt foreign officials. Studies have shown that roads, clinics, schools and water pumps are being funded by these private dollars. For most developing countries, private philanthropy and investment flows are much larger than official aid.

This is good news to them, and to most Americans, who are skeptical of official foreign aid. While the public supports U.N. and government aid for humanitarian crises, only 9% want our foreign aid to increase while 47% want it cut.

The skepticism is sound: The three historical purposes of foreign aid -- humanitarian relief, security assistance, and economic development -- have been uneven in their degrees of success. Government humanitarian relief efforts have generally gone well, delivering food, medicines and shelter during crises. But other forms of assistance are not so reliable.

Consider security assistance: Foreign aid has helped solidify bases agreements, gained allies during the Cold War, and rallied support for the Gulf War and the war against terrorism. Yet, we are learning that the roots of terrorism have been nurtured by governments of some of our largest aid recipients, particularly Egypt, which receives \$2 billion annually.

Likewise the impact of U.S. foreign aid on economic development. Our aid has trained thousands of foreign students and built thousands of kilometers of roads, bridges and sewage systems. Yet, without economic and political systems to sustain these investments, the investment has no long-term effect.

While foreign aid should continue to help countries in humanitarian relief, it must turn to partnerships with the private sector. Our best efforts on an official level will come through building lasting institutions in the countries we wish to help -- not lasting government contracts with Beltway consulting firms.

Official aid, at its best, should aim to work itself out of a job by encouraging local philanthropy and self-sufficiency. Our aid can foster open markets and societies abroad by supporting institutions which seek to liberalize politically and economically -- training in the rule of law, government transparency, free press, intellectual property. We must abandon the "donor" mentality and begin to consider ourselves a partner and a matchmaker for the developing world.

Answer Criticisms

In Johannesburg, the U.S. delegation can answer the criticisms they will face with four additional key points. First, that our government gave more foreign aid, in absolute terms, than any other country in 2001, topping second-ranked Japan. Second, the U.S. has long provided the most foreign direct investment in developing countries, which creates real

sustainability in economic development. Third, the U.S. provides the bulk of the world's R&D, which saves millions of lives with improvements in food and medicines. And, finally, we give far and away the most militarily, which helps make the world safe for economic growth and democracy.

Americans are a most generous people, clearly the most generous on earth in public -- but especially in private -- giving. For too long already, the percentage of U.S. official development assistance has hidden the real extent of giving which exemplifies the American spirit. We have much to explain, but nothing to apologize for, in Johannesburg.

Ms. Adelman, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, was assistant administrator of the Agency for International Development from 1988 to 1993.

URL for this article:
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1025867409136100965.dpm.00.html>

Updated August 21, 2002

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 8 2002

Ms. Carol Adelman
Hudson Institute
1015 18th Street, N.W. Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20036

092

Dear Carol:

Thank you for sending me your Wall Street Journal article titled "American Generosity in International Giving." You are right that the United States is not given sufficient credit in the international community for Department of Defense financial and material assistance. We do have financial systems to track the costs of this aid.

Dov Zakheim tells me he will work with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Public Affairs office to "get the facts out on the street".

Thank you for your recommendation.

Sincerely,

cc:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Defense Security Cooperation Agency

800702



U15655 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11246



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 SEP 17 AM 8:04

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 - 4:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 18 Sep 02

SUBJECT: Muslim Senior Officers

There are six active duty colonels who state they are Muslim in their official records. There are no active duty general or flag officers who state they are Muslim. Attached is a table of active duty members by Service and grade who are recorded as Muslim.

0003

Just under eleven percent (10.8 percent) of the force have no religious preference recorded. Another 20.9 percent state that they have no religious preference.

Attachment: as stated



11-L-0559/OSD/11247

U15183 /02

18 Sep 02

RELIGION AFFILIATION MUSLIM - AUGUST 2002

GRADE	ARMY	A.F.	M.C.	NAVY	TOTAL
E01	62	27	18	38	145
E02	99	26	39	61	225
E03	229	115	123	234	701
E04	470	130	93	239	932
E05	417	188	90	245	940
E06	342	101	68	88	599
E07	191	79	22	14	306
E08	30	12	7	3	52
E09	9	6	1	2	18
W01	10	0	0	0	10
W02	15	0	1	0	16
W03	6	0	2	0	8
W04	0	0	2	0	2
O01	19	6	1	0	26
O01E*		5	3	0	8
O02	21	4	9	0	34
O02E*		2	1	0	3
O03	53	19	1	0	73
O03E*		8	4		12
O04	13	11	1	0	25
O05	6	1	0	0	7
O06	3	3	0	0	6
TOTAL	1995	743	486	924	4148

* Indicates prior enlisted experience

(b)(6)

TO: ~~Admiral Giambastiani~~ LTG CRADDOCK
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: August 22, 2002
 SUBJECT:

6:35 PM
 SECRET
 2002 SEP 17 11 09 21

Please find out how many Muslim senior officers we have, from colonel up.
 Do we know that kind of information?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 082202.12

Please respond by: 9/4/02

U14952 / 02



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 SEP 17 11:09:05

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 – 3:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 9/18/02

SUBJECT: State Detailees – SNOWFLAKE

My understanding from the Executive Secretary is that the MOU process should be completed by the end of next week (i.e., approximately September 27). This will allow time for Policy and others to review both the positions at State to which DoD personnel would be detailed, and the positions in DoD to which State Department personnel would be assigned.

For those positions deemed almost certain to be approved, we are already processing the paperwork to effect the assignments.

This information has been conveyed to State (Linc Bloomfield).

Attachment: Incoming Correspondence



11-L-0559/OSD/11250

U15184 /02

9/10/02
snowflake

September 9, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: State Department Detailees

Colin Powell said we are pretty well sorted out on our agreement between State and Defense that we each have about 50 people going each way, and he would like to get it solved. It is hurting him with respect to one particular person. Can we get it fixed this week?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090902-8

.....
Please respond by 09/13/02

11-L-0559/OSD/11251

7-10-02

September 9, 2002 7:40 AM

040 STATE

TO: Larry Di Rita
David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: State Department Detailees

Colin Powell said we are pretty well sorted out on our agreement between State and Defense that we each have about 50 people going each way, and he would like to get it solved. It is hurting him with respect to one particular person. Can we get it fixed this week?

Thanks.

DHR dh
090902-R

.....
Please respond by 09/13/02

95ep02

September 3, 2002 12:11 PM

9/13

SWT -

Please draft
letter thanking
and regretting.

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D
SUBJECT: Redskins/Philadelphia Eagles Game

My friend (b)(6) called. His office phone is (b)(6) He says that the Philadelphia Eagles owner, Jeffrey Lurie, would like Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace to come on Monday night, September 16, when they play the Redskins in D.C.

D. Rita
Larry Di Rita
9/13

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

(Handwritten signature/initials)

DHR:dh
090J02-20

.....
Please respond by 09/10/02

T 9/5

9/3
Call say no ✓

09/15/02

U.S.

35p 02

September 19, 2002 10:22 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your September 18 Note

Jordan

I got your note of September 18 about the message from Jordan. Needless to say, I agree. Our folks here are working on that as part of declaratory policy in the right time and the right way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091902-18

.....

Please respond by _____

19SEP02

Saturday

3:29 PM

TO: J. D. Crouch
John Stenbit
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

30 min

DATE: July 13, 2002

SUBJECT: Galileo

On the Galileo system issue, I really want a full court press on this. I do not want to end up with some unacceptable compromise. We need to get the State Dept. active, we need to get the EU Ambassador active and we need to get the NATO Ambassador going hard.

If I have to, I will send a letter to every minister of defense and tell them how strongly we feel, how damaging it is. There is absolutely no rhyme or reason for them to be doing this.

4/3/02

Money, time and effort ought to be spent on improving NATO's capabilities rather than fighting off rear guard actions on mischief like this.

Thanks.

→ *9/13*
Col B -
Hold for Sked
mtg -
D, put

DHR/azn
071302.03

SECDEF -

Please respond by: 7/24/02 YOU ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET W/STENBIT & CROUCH ON THIS TOPIC TODAY AT 1:00.

10/1/02

ca/21



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400
INFO MEMO

EP 28500

SEP 20 2002
ow

2002 SEP 05 11:09:00

USDP *[Signature]* 9/23/02
I-02/013617

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *[Signature]*

SEP 20 2002

Iraq

SUBJECT: Hussein Remarks

- You asked (next under) for a list of things that Saddam Hussein and his Administration have been saying.
- Since before last year's attacks on the United States, threatening rhetoric has been a consistent feature of Iraqi rhetoric—both in statements by Saddam and in the official Iraqi press:
- Iraqi threats before 11 September 2001:

“Does the United States realize the meaning of opening the storehouses of the universe with the will of the Iraqi people?...Does it realize the meaning of every Iraqi becoming a missile that can cross to countries and cities?”

**Babil (the newspaper of Saddam's son Uday), Editorial
29 September 1994**

Three days before the attack on the United States, Babil advocated "transferring the confrontation . . . inside the US society."

- Since 11 September 2001, Iraqi threats and gloating have continued:

“The United States reaps the thorns that its rulers have planted in the world.”

**Saddam Hussein, Iraq TV
12 September 2001**

205 epaz



“Americans should feel the pain they have inflicted on the peoples of the world...”
Saddam Hussein , “Open Letter to the Peoples of the United States”
15 September 2001

“It seems that [President Bush] did not learn from the 11 September events...as long as Bush does not view these reasons in a real and effective way, the same reasons—which are condescension, arrogance, robbery of the rights of others and aggression on them—will remain valid ones for the repetition of these events.”


Dr. Abd al-Razzaq al-Dulaymi, “Bush Administration Will Pay for its Mistakes,” Babil
14 September 2002

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by, Dr. Larry Franklin,

(b)(6)

DASD



PDASD

Snowflake

EF2500

7:24 AM

ISAIRA
-NEJA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 12, 2002
SUBJECT: **Hussein Remarks**

02/013617

Somebody ought to prepare a list of the things that Saddam Hussein and his administration have been saying so we can get them to the members on the hill who are friendly. Senator Sessions, for example, asked for them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
091202.12

Please respond by: 9/21

*ISA lead
Suspense - 9/19*

Snowflake

EF2800
7:24 AM

ISAIRA
-NESEA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 12, 2002
SUBJECT: Hussein Remarks

02/013617

Somebody ought to prepare a list of the things that Saddam Hussein and his administration have been saying so we can get them to the members on the hill who are friendly. Senator Sessions, for example, asked for them.

IRAA

Thanks.

DHR/azn
091202.12

Please respond by: 9/21

ISA lead
Suspense - 9/19

12 Sep 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9998

SECRET
2002 SEP 26 11 08

INFO MEMO

CH-511-02
26 September 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Reducing Demands on Special Operations Forces

- In response to your request for a proposal on what can be done to shift tasks currently done by special operations forces (SOF) to conventional forces (TAB), the following interim response is provided:
 - My staff has solicited input from the combatant commanders and Services on their recommendations for transferring SOF missions to conventional forces. Once their inputs are received, final recommendations on SOF missions that are candidates for conventional force assignment will be forwarded.
 - Initial analysis indicates there are several SOF missions (or portions of missions) that could be shifted to conventional forces.
 - Specifically, there are theater security cooperation activities, exercises, operational missions and garrison activities (support taskings) where appropriate conventional forces could replace special forces. Additionally, there are domestic programs where special forces skills are not required.
 - Tasks that could be taken on now by conventional forces:
 - Fleet support missions (detachments deploying with carrier battle groups and Marine expeditionary units). Members of Marine expeditionary units are capable of conducting many of these SOF missions.
 - Intelligence support related to persons indicted for war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.
 - Tasks that could be taken on by conventional forces with additional training:
 - Counterdrug Training Support missions and Humanitarian Demining operations. (SOF would continue tasks in countries where there is limited or no access.)
 - Dignitary support and personal security detachments.
 - Training foreign armies.
 - Domestic support to law enforcement.

Sir, will be back soon with the proposed missions and the training implications.

VR Dick

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General G. S. Newbold, USMC; Director, J-3 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/11261

U15525 / 02

TAB

August 15, 2002 6:11 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Conventional Forces/Special Forces

I would like a proposal from you as to what we need to do to get conventional forces capable of doing more of what Special Forces and Special Operations are now doing. What can Special Forces and Special Operations forces do less of so that regular forces can pick up some of those responsibilities earlier? That will reduce the demand on Special Ops and Special Forces, which would be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081502-29

.....

Please respond by 09/06/02

07 0116 10

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/11262

TAB

August 15, 2002 6:11 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Conventional Forces/Special Forces

322

I would like a proposal from you as to what we need to do to get conventional forces capable of doing more of what Special Forces and Special Operations are now doing. What can Special Forces and Special Operations forces do less of so that regular forces can pick up some of those responsibilities earlier? That will reduce the demand on Special Ops and Special Forces, which would be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081502-29

.....

Please respond by 09/06/02

15AUG02

U15526 / 02

Tab

02 AUG 15

11-L-0559/OSD/11263



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 SEP 27 AM 10:40

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

September 26, 2002 – 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 26 Sep 02

SUBJECT: 3- and 4-Star Time-in-Grade Waivers--SNOWFLAKE

- This responds to your concerns (Tab A) about having to sign waivers for officers having served fewer than three years in grade.
- About half of the O-9/O-10 population retired with a time-in-grade waiver prior to January 2001.
- We are turning around the liberal use of waivers through your continued emphasis on longer tours. This calendar year you have approved only eight waivers, 26% of all O-9/O-10 retirements (Tab B). In general, the Military Departments indicate that officers will serve three years to retire in grade, and tour lengths are being adjusted to three-years (vice the previous two-year tour). Time-in-grade waivers will be requested only under unusual and hardship circumstances
- Officers must serve three years in grade to retire in that grade, and Congress tacitly endorsed that position when it allowed *your* authority to grant time-in-grade waivers to lapse in December 2001. By law, the President must now approve all time-in-grade waivers and his authority may not be delegated. We could, of course, develop legislation to redelegate authority back to you. Only if such authority could be further redelegated would we relieve the paperwork burden on you.
- We do not notify Congress when a time-in-grade waiver is granted. By law, however, you must certify to the President and Congress that the officer served satisfactorily in grade for retirement in that grade (Tab C). Last year we proposed legislation that would eliminate your certification requirement, but Congress did not endorse the proposal.
- We have several initiatives working to ascertain the effects of keeping senior officers either longer in careers or longer in particular positions. I will get back to you in the near future with the results of those studies and their recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATIONS: Tab D

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: LTC Sally Jo Hall, (b)(6)




11-L-0559/OSD/11264

U15617 /02

TAB

A



September 9, 2002 7:14 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: TIG Waivers

If I have to sign so many waivers for having served less than three years in grade, then there is something wrong with the process. Either we are not managing personnel right, the rule is wrong, or who has to decide all these things is wrong. Why do we have to send them to the Congress on something this minor?

Let's try to get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090902-1

.....
Please respond by 09/30/02

TAB

B

3- and 4-Star Retirement Waiver Usage
from
January 1, 2001-Present

CY01		No Waivers	Waivers	Total Approved	% with Waivers	CY02		No Waivers	*Waivers	Total Approved	% with Waivers
	O-10	5	3	8	38%		O-10	4	3	7	43%
	O-9	16	10	26	39%		O-9	19	5	24	21%
Total		21	13	34	38%	Total		23	8	31	26%

*3- and 4-star retirement waivers approved for CY02 include:

<u>Name/Position</u>	<u>Reason for Waiver</u>
Gen Kernan, USA Cdr, JFCOM	Did not extend in position
VADM Mayer, USN, Dep Cdr, JFCOM (Selected ADM Giambastini, USN as Cdr, JFCOM)	Policy--Cdrs and Dep Cdrs of combatant cmd will not be of same Service
Gen Fulford, USMC, Dep Cdr, EUCOM (Selected GEN Jones, USMC as Cdr, EUCOM)	Policy--Cdrs and Dep Cdrs of combatant cmd will not be of same Service
Gen Williams, USMC, Asst Comdt	Normal 2-year tour (USD(P&R) nonsupport)
Lt Gen Newbold, USMC, J-3 Joint Staff	SecDef/CJCS directed
VADM Haskins, USN, Inspector General, USN	To accept visiting professor of leadership position at the Naval Academy (USD(P&R) nonsupport)
LTG McFarren, USA, CG, Fifth Army	Normal 2-year tour (USD(P&R) nonsupport)
LTG Zanini, USA, CG, Eighth USA/CofS, UNC/CFC/USFK	Normal 2-year tour (USD(P&R) nonsupport)

TAB

C

CHAPTER 69—RETIRED GRADE

Sec.	
1370.	Commissioned officers: general rule; exceptions.
1371.	Warrant officers: general rule.
1372.	Grade on retirement for physical disability: members of armed forces.
1373.	Higher grade for later physical disability: retired officers recalled to active duty.
[1374.]	Repealed.]
1375.	Entitlement to commission: commissioned officers advanced on retired list.
1376.	Temporary disability retired lists.

§ 1370. Commissioned officers: general rule; exceptions

(a) **RULE FOR RETIREMENT IN HIGHEST GRADE HELD SATISFACTORILY.**—(1) Unless entitled to a higher retired grade under some other provision of law, a commissioned officer (other than a commissioned warrant officer) of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who retires under any provision of law other than chapter 61 or chapter 1223 of this title shall, except as provided in paragraph (2), be retired in the highest grade in which he served on active duty satisfactorily, as determined by the Secretary of the military department concerned, for not less than six months.

(2)(A) In order to be eligible for voluntary retirement under any provision of this title in a grade above major or lieutenant commander, a commissioned officer of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps must have served on active duty in that grade for not less than three years, except that the Secretary of Defense may authorize the Secretary of a military department to reduce such period to a period not less than two years in the case of retirements effective during the period beginning on October 1, 1990, and ending on December 31, 2001.

(B) The President may waive subparagraph (A) in individual cases involving extreme hardship or exceptional or unusual circumstances. The authority of the President under the preceding sentence may not be delegated.

(C) In the case of a grade below the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral, the number of members of one of the armed forces in that grade for whom a reduction is made during any fiscal year in the period of service-in-grade otherwise required under this paragraph may not exceed the number equal to two percent of the authorized active-duty strength for that fiscal year for officers of that armed force in that grade.

(3) A reserve or temporary officer who is notified that he will be released from active duty without his consent and thereafter requests retirement under section 3911, 6323, or 8911 of this title and is retired pursuant to that request is considered for purposes of this section, to have been retired involuntarily. An officer retired pursuant to section 1186(b)(1) of this title is considered for purposes of this section to have been retired voluntarily.

(b) **RETIREMENT IN NEXT LOWER GRADE.**—An officer whose length of service in the highest grade he held while on active duty does not meet the service in grade requirements specified in subsection (a) shall be retired in the next lower grade in which he served on active duty satisfactorily, as determined by the Secretary of the military department concerned, for not less than six months.

(c) **OFFICERS IN O-9 AND O-10 GRADES.**—(1) An officer who is serving in or has served in the grade of general or admiral or lieutenant general or vice admiral may be retired in that grade under subsection (a) only after the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to the President and Congress that the officer served on active duty satisfactorily in that grade.

(2) In the case of an officer covered by paragraph (1), the three-year service-in-grade requirement in paragraph (2)(A) of subsection (a) may not be reduced or waived under that subsection—

(A) while the officer is under investigation for alleged misconduct; or

(B) while there is pending the disposition of an adverse personnel action against the officer for alleged misconduct.

(d) **RESERVE OFFICERS.**—(1) Unless entitled to a higher grade, or to credit for satisfactory service in a higher grade, under some other provision of law, a person who is entitled to retired pay under chapter 1223 of this title shall, upon application under section 12731 of this title, be credited with satisfactory service in the highest grade in which that person served satisfactorily at any time in the armed forces, as determined by the Secretary concerned in accordance with this subsection.

(2) In order to be credited with satisfactory service in an officer grade (other than a warrant officer grade) below the grade of lieutenant colonel or commander, a person covered by paragraph (1) must have served satisfactorily in that grade (as determined by the Secretary of the military department concerned) as a reserve commissioned officer in an active status, or in a retired status on active duty, for not less than six months.

(3)(A) In order to be credited with satisfactory service in an officer grade above major or lieutenant commander, a person covered by paragraph (1) must have served satisfactorily in that grade (as determined by the Secretary of the military department concerned) as a reserve commissioned officer in an active status, or in a retired status on active duty, for not less than three years.

(B) A person covered by subparagraph (A) who has completed at least six months of satisfactory service in grade and is transferred from an active status or discharged as a reserve commissioned officer solely due to the requirements of a nondiscretionary provision of law requiring that transfer or discharge due to the person's age or years of service may be credited with satisfactory service in the grade in which serving at the time of such transfer or discharge, notwithstanding failure of the person to complete three years of service in that grade.

TAB

D

SUBJECT: 3- and 4-Star Time-in-Grade Waivers

COORDINATION:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Signature and Date</u>
Acting DASD(MPP)	Mr. Carr	<u>BC 9-25-02</u>
Assistant Secretary of Defense (FMP)	Mr. Abell	<u>CJA 9-25-02</u>

showfile
9/9/02

September 9, 2002 7:14 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: TIG Waivers

210

If I have to sign so many waivers for having served less than three years in grade, then there is something wrong with the process. Either we are not managing personnel right, the rule is wrong, or who has to decide all these things is wrong. Why do we have to send them to the Congress on something this minor?

Let's try to get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090902-1



Please respond by 09/30/02

95epoz



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
2002 SEP 27 PM 12:37

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

August 6, 2002 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu 21 Sep 02
(signature and date)

SUBJECT: Update on the Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program

The purpose of this memo is to update you on the many activities underway to improve the ability of military personnel, their families and overseas citizens to vote in the 2002 elections.

- DepSecDef on March 26, 2002 promulgated the DoD Voting Action Plan for 2002-2003, emphasizing personal delivery of the Federal Post Card Application to eligible voters; the form is used for voting registration and for requesting absentee ballots. That Plan was transmitted to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USD(P&R), ASD(PA), ASD(RA) DoD IG and the Directors of Defense Agencies (Tab A).
- On May 2, 2002, DepSecDef instructed the Service Secretaries, ASD(PA), and the DoDIG to underscore support of the "Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)" (Tab B).
 - Requires unit commanders to appoint quality personnel as Voting Assistance Officers.
 - Requires commanders to ensure IN-HAND delivery of voting materials to military personnel and eligible family members.
 - Reminds commanders of the statutory requirement to report Voting Assistance Officer performance on annual fitness reports.
 - Solicits command support to ensure Voting Assistance Officer training is conducted and Voting Assistance Officers participate.
 - Directs that all ships be provided the necessary equipment and training to ensure that voting materials are postmarked. Ground-based forces are served by military post offices that already postmark voting materials.
 - Directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to implement a comprehensive public affairs strategy in support of the Voting Action Plan.

- Reminds commanders of the statutory requirement for Service Inspectors General to conduct annual assessments and compliance reviews of the voting assistance programs.
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has recorded a video message to Service members encouraging their participation in the election process.
- The DoD's FVAP has issued the "2002-03 Voting Assistance Guide" that provides comprehensive instruction regarding absentee voting procedures. This guide is available in hard copy and on-line via the Internet. The guide was sent directly to the Services for distribution at the unit level and to the Department of State.
- To date, the DoD's FVAP has conducted 90 workshops worldwide to train Voting Assistance Officers in their duties for the 2002 mid-election year.
- The DoD's FVAP has initiated an electronic voting demonstration to be implemented for the 2004 general election.
- The DoD's FVAP is working with the States on voting election reform legislation to facilitate voting for the Uniformed Services and overseas citizens.
- The DoD's FVAP is working with the US Postal System to expedite voting materials.
- We will undertake a mid-course check with the Service IGs to identify any remaining problems, for action prior to the November elections.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Ms. Polli Brunelli, FVAP, (b)(6)

TAB

A



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MAR 26 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND
READINESS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Federal Voting Assistance Program — 2002 - 2003

As a fundamental basis of our democracy, all Americans have the right to elect their representatives. In 2002, 34 U.S. Senators, all members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 37 State Governors, and thousands of state and local officials will be elected. Members of our Uniformed Services and their eligible family members deserve every opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Commanding officers and heads of Department of Defense Components at all levels of command should ensure that these citizens know they have the opportunity to vote.

The Voting Assistance Program deserves our personal support and highest priority. It is incumbent upon each of us to support the Program, ensure all personnel are informed of the importance of voting, and that they have an opportunity to exercise their right to vote.

Attached is the Voting Action Plan for 2002 - 2003. This plan places special emphasis on command support and, in the case of absentee voters, ensuring the personal delivery of Federal Post Card Applications for registration and absentee ballot request to those who are eligible.

Please forward a copy of your implementing plan to the Director of Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to the attention of the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program by April 15, 2002.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Paul Wolfowitz", is centered on the page.

Attachment
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/11277

U04843 02



FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

VOTING ACTION PLAN 2002 - 2003

I. PURPOSE

To implement the Federal functions of the *Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)*, administer the provisions of DoD Directive 1000.4, disseminate information and guidance, and coordinate tasks related to the Program.

II. OBJECTIVE

To ensure that the following voters are provided all necessary voting information, including voting age requirements, election dates, officers to be elected, constitutional amendments, other ballot proposals, and absentee registration and voting procedures:

1. Members of the U.S. uniformed services, including the Armed Forces (including the Coast Guard), commissioned members of the Public Health Service and NOAA, and merchant marine in active service;
2. Family members of (1.) above;
3. U.S. citizens temporarily outside the United States;
4. U.S. citizens outside the United States by virtue of employment;
5. Family members residing with (4.) above;
6. Other U.S. citizens residing outside the United States.

III. TASKS

- A. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973ff.(c)(1), the head of each Government department, agency, or other entity shall distribute balloting materials and develop a non-partisan program of information and education for all employees and family members covered by the *UOCAVA*. Each department or agency with employees or family members covered by the *UOCAVA* shall designate an individual to coordinate and administer a Voting Assistance Program for the department or agency to include, where practicable, those initiatives in one through five below and paragraph III. C. below. The name, address, and telephone number of this individual will be provided to the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program and will be prominently posted within departmental or agency directories and websites. (See page 12 for contact information.) In addition:

1. The Secretary of State shall designate a Voting Action Officer at Department of State headquarters to oversee the Department's program and a U.S. citizen employee at each U.S. embassy or consulate to assist to the fullest extent practicable other U.S. citizens residing outside the United States who are eligible to register and vote.

2. Each embassy and consulate should have sufficient quantities of materials to include Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) Forms, SF-76, and Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB), SF-186, needed by U.S. citizens to register and vote. Embassies and consulates will also inform and educate U.S. citizens regarding their right to register and vote, and will publicize voter assistance programs.

3. Each embassy or consulate Voting Assistance Officer should work on a nonpartisan basis with recognized U.S. citizen organizations in the consular district to facilitate voter information, voter registration, and absentee ballot transmission.

4. The Department of State's Voting Action Officer shall coordinate with the Director, FVAP in the development and conduct of "Overseas Citizens Voters Week" (week of June 30 through July 6, 2002) for citizens outside the U.S. Develop programs to support the objective of creating an educational awareness and motivation to participate in the general election, and disseminate information on voting and voting assistance. Publicize the importance of early action on the part of the voter in order to obtain a ballot for the general election well in advance of election deadlines. Note - In many cases, a separate FPCA request must be submitted for a ballot for the general election.

5. Each Department's Voting Action Officer shall assist, as requested, embassy and consulate Voting Assistance Officers with post-election surveys of civilians outside the U.S. The survey's findings will be used in formulating plans for future voting assistance programs, and as a part of the Seventeenth Report on the Federal Voting Assistance Program. Departments and agencies shall not conduct independent surveys of the voting program without prior approval of the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program.

B. The Director of the Federal Voting Assistance Program shall:

1. Coordinate all aspects of the Federal Voting Assistance Program and perform all tasks assigned to the Presidential designee by the *UOCAVA*.

2. Advise DoD components and other executive branch departments and agencies concerning Federal, state, and local election laws and procedures.

3. Assist eligible *UOCAVA* citizens to register and vote.

4. Publicize the right of citizens to register and vote.
5. Review and coordinate the informational and educational effort directed toward all persons covered by the *UOCAVA*.
6. Provide information on elections, including dates and offices involved.
7. Conduct a series of training workshops and program orientations at military installations in the continental United States and overseas locations for Voting Assistance Officers and for interested civilian groups and organizations.
8. Conduct training workshops and program orientations in consultation with state and local election officials.
9. Ensure the IN-HAND delivery of FPCA applications to all eligible voters in accordance with DoD Directive 1000.4.
10. Actively collect and share best practices identified by Service, Agency/Department, and State voting assistance programs.

C. Commanders/Heads of DoD components shall:

1. Ensure continuing command support at all levels for the Voting Assistance Program.
2. Designate a uniformed officer of general or flag grade in each military Service as the Senior Service Voting Representative who is responsible for Service-wide implementation of respective voting assistance programs. The senior officer will also manage the voting program for Reserve component members who have been called to active federal service. The Senior Service Voting Representative shall appoint a Service Voting Action Officer who preferably should be a civilian employee (GS-12 or higher) to administer the voting program for that Service. If a military member is assigned as Service Voting Action Officer, that member should be at least an O-4, if an officer, or at least an E-8, if an enlisted member.
3. Designate Voting Assistance Officers at every level of command with one senior Voting Assistance Officer on each installation and at each major command who is assigned responsibility to coordinate the program of subordinate units and also coordinate with tenant command Voting Assistance Officers. Each Reserve component shall also designate a Voting Assistance Officer at its headquarters level. Where possible, Installation Voting Assistance Officers should be a DoD civilian GS-12 or higher. If a military member is assigned as the Installation Voting Assistance officer, that officer should hold the grade of O-4 or higher. Designate a Unit Voting Assistance Officer, at the O-2/E-7 level or above

within each unit of 25 or more permanently assigned members. All such designations shall be in writing. Guidance for the maximum number of military and family members served by each unit Voting Assistance Officer will be provided by the Service Voting Action Officer as required by DoD Directive 1000.4. When military personnel, including noncommissioned officers, are designated as Voting Assistance Officers they are authorized in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 1000.4, to administer oaths in connection with registration and voting. All Voting Assistance Officers shall be trained and instructed in the procedures necessary to carry out their assigned responsibilities. Voting Assistance Officers should be readily available and equipped to give personal assistance to voters for Federal, state, local, and other jurisdictional elections during 2002-2003. In addition, any person who appears to need assistance in reading or understanding any English language material relating to voting or voter registration should receive immediate assistance in the appropriate language. Designate at least one well-advertised fixed location on bases, installations and ships where absentee voting materials and voting assistance is available to all military personnel.

4. Train all Service members (including Reserve component personnel) during years of Federal elections on all aspects of the voting program, to include familiarity with the FPCA and FWAB.
5. Encourage access to the FVAP Web Site (www.fvap.ncr.gov) for all voting information and materials. If World Wide Web access is not available, ensure that voting information and related materials such as the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide*, and changes thereto; necessary quantities of the FPCA, for registration and absentee ballot requests; and FWAB, are obtained and disseminated in a timely manner. FPCAs are to be purchased in sufficient quantities (recommend four per person including eligible family members) to furnish registration and ballot request support for all primary and general elections for all military and eligible family members, and overseas DoD civilian personnel. FWABs are to be purchased in sufficient quantities and disseminated (recommend one per person including eligible family members) to all locations, including Navy vessels. Adequate supplies must be made available to National Guard and Reserve Forces when activated. Publish procedures regarding ordering of FPCAs, FWABs, and other voting materials.

Note: While the FWAB is used primarily for Federal offices under special conditions by voters who are located outside the U.S., some jurisdictions allow use of the FWAB for state and local elections by voters located in the U.S. This information is contained in the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide*. Additional exceptions will be announced by the Federal Voting Assistance Program, if and when they are authorized.

6. The Chief/Director of each Reserve component shall coordinate with the Senior Service Voting Representative and the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program, to maintain a contingency absentee voting program for the National Guard and Reserve units and personnel who have been activated and deployed. The contingency absentee voting program shall ensure that all deployed personnel -- Active, Guard and Reserve -- are able to exercise their absentee voting rights. The scope of the program should include the availability of adequate supplies of the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide*, FPCAs and FWABs. The Chief/Director of the Reserve component shall ensure a unit Voting Assistance Officer is appointed within each activated unit to serve as a liaison with the FVAP.

7. Ensure the IN-HAND delivery of FPCAs as follows:
- a. By January 15th of each calendar year to all Armed Forces members and their eligible family members, overseas civilian employees of DoD components and eligible family members.
 - b. By August 15, 2002 to Armed Forces members and their eligible family members, and to civilian employees of DoD components and eligible family members residing with or accompanying them, who are serving outside the territorial limits of the United States.
 - c. By September 7, 2002 to Armed Forces members and their family members within the U.S.

This distribution is in addition to FPCAs provided for use in primary elections.

8. Emphasize the week of September 1-7, 2002, as "Armed Forces Voters Week." Commanding officers and Voting Assistance Officers will develop comprehensive command-wide voting awareness and assistance programs and activities to include local events publicizing the upcoming election and focusing on the importance of voting during this week. Activities scheduled should include voting programs aimed at informing eligible voters on procedures required to obtain absentee ballots for the general elections including dissemination of supporting materials.

9. Require Inspectors General of the Military Services to include the command voting program as an item for specific review at every organizational level to ensure that persons covered by the *UOCAVA* are informed of, and provided an opportunity to exercise, their right to vote. This review will include an assessment of whether the command has adequately provided Voting Assistance Officers who are appointed, trained, and equipped to give proper assistance and whether the command has sufficient quantities of materials to conduct an effective voting assistance program. Results of these inspections pertaining specifically to the voting program, to include findings of need for additional materials or training, will be reported to the cognizant commander and the Military Service Inspector General concerned. The Senior Service Voting

Representative will report the findings to the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program.

10. Establish and publicize the availability of communication lines (telephone, facsimile, e-mail, web page) to link unit Voting Assistance Officers with their respective Senior Service Voting Representative or Voting Action Officer at the departmental level. Emphasis shall be placed on providing rapid, accurate responses, and solutions to voting-oriented problems.

11. Establish and maintain a Voting homepage on the Component's website. This Voting homepage will provide Component-specific information regarding the Component's Voting Action Plan, the identification of and links to the assigned Voting Assistance Officers within the Component, procedures to order voting materials, and links to other government voting websites, including a link to the FVAP website.

12. Authorize "priority" precedence when using DSN for voting assistance when it does not interfere with mission program accomplishment.

13. Ensure access to command fax machines for transmission of election materials when it does not interfere with mission program accomplishment.

14. Require Installation Voting Assistance Officers to provide their office telephone numbers and e-mail addresses to the telephone operators at their installations. Require Installation Voting Assistance Officers to maintain and provide to the Service Voting Action Officer a list of all unit Voting Assistance Officers serving at the installation that includes names, e-mail addresses and office telephone numbers. The Service Voting Action Officer shall provide the Director, FVAP with the office telephone numbers and e-mail addresses for every Installation Voting Assistance Officer, to be updated quarterly.

15. Ensure that all Armed Forces personnel receive at least one briefing, training period, or information period of instruction devoted to the absentee voting process during recruit training and within all leadership curricula and, for all members, again in each year in which elections for Federal office are held. Emphasis should be placed on the availability of voting information, supporting materials, personal assistance, and the importance of registering and voting.

16. Ensure all major command, Installation and Unit Voting Assistance Officers attend a FVAP Voting Assistance Workshop during years with elections for Federal offices. If the installation is not scheduled to receive FVAP workshop training, major command, Installation and Unit Voting

Assistance Officers should attend training at a nearby installation when possible. Voting Assistance Officers at remote locations can access FVAP website for training.

17. Ensure on-site senior command support at each installation for FVAP training workshops and orientations held at the installation, emphasizing attendance of every Voting Assistance Officer stationed at the installation. A senior officer, O-6 or above, will be designated to represent the installation/command and introduce the program. The host Installation Voting Assistance Officer will invite Voting Assistance Officers from nearby installations, and the senior command at these installations should coordinate transportation requirements to maximize attendance by Voting Assistance Officers stationed on each installation.

18. Ensure sufficient copies of the FPCA are included in orientation packets for new and permanent change of station (PCS) personnel at all personnel centers. Personnel, including their family members, should be advised to notify their local election official of their change of address.

19. Conduct an Information Support Program along the guidelines set forth in the DoD Voting Information Support Plan, 2002-2003 at Appendix A.

20. Coordinate voting information support materials with the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program.

21. File an "After Action Report" by January 15, 2003 with the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program summarizing successes and/or problems experienced in the conduct of the Program.

22. Assist in conducting a survey of military members, civilian employees outside the U.S., and unit Voting Assistance Officers in the manner specified by the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program.

23. Revise command / organization directives or instructions on voting assistance as necessary.

24. Provide for continuing evaluation of command voting programs.

25. The Services will designate at least one well-advertised fixed location on bases, installations, and ships where absentee voting materials and assistance is available to all military personnel, civilian employees and their family members. Locations may include legal assistance offices, family service centers, community centers, etc.

IV. SCHEDULE

A. PHASE I -- Preparation and Initiation During Period of November 1, 2001 - Spring 2002.

1. Disseminate the Federal Voting Assistance Program Action Plan 2002 - 2003 to Military Departments, Combatant Commands, other DoD components, and participating Federal departments and agencies.
2. Develop and implement Service, Command, Department and Agency Voting Action Plans for the 2002-2003 elections.
3. Encourage access to the FVAP Web Site (www.fvap.ncr.gov) for all voting information and materials. If World Wide Web access is not available, ensure distribution of voting information which is available prior to publication and distribution of the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide* and any changes thereto.
4. Ensure procurement and distribution of FPCAs and FWABs, which are purchased by each Uniformed Service, department and agency and distributed through normal supply channels.
5. Provide installation telephone operators with the name, mailing address, e-mail and office telephone number of the installation Voting Assistance Officer by January 1, 2002. The installation Voting Assistance Officer shall generate and maintain a directory containing names and office telephone numbers of all local unit Voting Assistance Officers, including tenant organizations, by January 1, 2002.
6. Service Inspectors General, through scheduled command inspections, shall review command voting assistance programs and plans and determine whether unit Voting Assistance Officers are appointed and trained and have sufficient supplies to provide voting assistance.
7. Information efforts shall begin with commanding officers and Voting Assistance Officers conducting command information programs prior to primary elections and repeating, as necessary, to inform and motivate military personnel and their family members to exercise their right to vote in primary and general elections. Family members will be encouraged to participate in these programs.

B. PHASE II -- Registration and Primary Elections During Period of January-October 2002. This phase will require careful planning and execution of voting assistance programs in order to inform potential voters of the primary elections scheduled to begin in early 2002.

1. Voting Assistance Officers shall attend a Voting Assistance Workshop and shall concentrate on providing absentee registration and voting

assistance to personnel and eligible family members for Federal, state and run-off primary elections.

2. Ensure procurement and distribution of FWABs for use by citizens in overseas areas and on Navy vessels. The FWAB may be used only for the general election (Federal offices) under conditions specified in the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide*. Some jurisdictions may allow use of the FWAB for state and local elections by all absentee voters as specified in the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide*.

3. Ensure IN-HAND delivery of FPCAs to personnel overseas, as listed in paragraph III.C.7, above, by August 15, 2002.

4. Conduct "Armed Forces Voters Week" (week of September 1-7, 2002) and "Overseas Citizens Voters Week" (week of June 30 to July 6, 2002). Develop programs to support the objective of creating an awareness and motivation to participate in the general election. Publicize the importance of early action on the part of the voter in order to obtain a ballot for the general election well in advance of election deadlines.

Note: In many cases, a separate FPCA request must be submitted for a ballot for the general election.

5. Continue agency and command information programs and dissemination of voter information.

C. PHASE III -- Requesting Ballots for the General Election During Period of August - November 5, 2002.

1. Continue disseminating voting information.

2. Ensure IN-HAND delivery of FPCAs to personnel within the United States, as listed in paragraph III.C.7, above, by September 7, 2002.

3. Communicate how and when to use the FWAB and recommend its use if the voter meets the criteria and does not receive the regular absentee ballot in sufficient time to vote and return it to be counted.

D. PHASE IV -- Evaluation During the Period of November 6 - December 31, 2002.

1. Assist, as requested, with post-election surveys of military members, overseas civilian employees and Unit Voting Assistance Officers. The survey's findings will be used in formulating plans for future voting assistance programs, and as a part of the Seventeenth Report on the Federal Voting Assistance Program.

2. Participate in and support the reports as required by paragraphs III. C. 19 and 21, above.

V. ESSENTIAL MATERIALS

A. 2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide (2002-03VAG)

1. This is the basic reference document of the Federal Voting Assistance Program and provides all Voting Assistance Officers with the necessary information to give potential voters the following assistance:

- a. Explanation of current procedures for absentee registration and voting in each state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

- b. Absentee registration and voting deadlines established by the states, territories, and other jurisdictions, along with dates of primary and general elections.

- c. Addresses, including ZIP codes of local election officials in each state, territory, and other jurisdictions.

2. Encourage access to the FVAP Web Site (www.fvap.ncr.gov) for all voting information and materials. If World Wide Web access is not available, the initial distribution of the *Guide* to Government Departments, including the Department of Defense and the Military services agencies and other organizations will be followed by distribution of subsequent published changes to the basic document during the 2002 - 2003 time period.

B. Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) for Registration and Absentee Ballot Request (Standard Form 76).

1. The FPCA, a postage-free form, is authorized by law for use by persons covered by the *UOCAVA*. (See paragraph II above).

2. Because there are differences in treatment accorded the FPCA by the various states and other jurisdictions, the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide* should be consulted to determine how each particular jurisdiction authorizes use of the FPCA by voters.

3. FPCAs are requisitioned within each Uniformed Service through normal supply channels in accordance with established directives. Other government departments and agencies may requisition this form through

General Services Administration (GSA) channels. It is available to citizens outside the U.S. from State Department embassies and consulates.

4. An on-line version of the FPCA that is accepted by 45 states is available at the FVAP website. This on-line version provides an alternative to citizens who cannot obtain the card stock version and must be placed in an envelope with proper postage affixed.

C. Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB) (Standard Form 186).

1. The FWAB is authorized by law and may be used in general elections for Federal office by overseas voters who make timely application for, and do not receive, regular absentee ballots. For those who wish to use the FWAB, the following criteria must be met:

a. The request for a regular absentee ballot must have been received by the local election official at least 30 days before the general election. (Some states may allow its use in primary and run-off elections—see the *2002-2003 Voting Assistance Guide* for details.)

b. The FWAB may be submitted only from locations outside the United States except for some states which will accept a FWAB mailed from within the United States (see the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide* for details). The United States is defined as the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa. Ships homeported in the United States may use the FWAB when at sea.

c. The FWAB must be received by the local election official not later than the deadline for receipt of regular absentee ballots under state law.

2. All Service installations outside the U.S. and naval vessels at sea should stock a sufficient supply of these ballots for use by voters as outlined above. Consult the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide* for detailed instructions on the FWAB. Additionally, some jurisdictions may authorize the FWAB to be used in state and local elections by other categories of absentee voters depending on state law. The *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide* contains procedures which include the extent to which the FWAB may be used in each state. The FVAP will provide the widest dissemination of this information. Organizations should have available one FWAB for everyone covered by the *UOCAVA*.

NOTE: ONLY THOSE VOTERS WHO MAKE A TIMELY APPLICATION FOR THEIR REGULAR STATE BALLOT AND MEET ALL THE CRITERIA MAY USE A FWAB.

D. Other Voting Information Materials.

1. See the DoD Voting Assistance Information Support Plan (Appendix A).

E. The Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program may be contacted concerning any aspect of the program. Correspondence should be directed to:

**Director
Federal Voting Assistance Program
Department of Defense
Washington Headquarters Services
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155**

Telephone number:

E-mail address:

Home Page:

Fax number:

(b)(6)

A rectangular box with a black border, containing the text "(b)(6)" in the top-left corner. The rest of the box is empty, indicating that the contact information for the Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program has been redacted.

Appendix A: DoD Voting Information Support Plan 2002-2003

Appendix A

DoD VOTING INFORMATION SUPPORT PLAN 2002-2003

I. PURPOSE

To inform the Uniformed Services, DoD components and other Federal agencies of the coordinated schedule for multi-media dissemination of voting information for the 2002 and 2003 elections. The Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) will act as overall coordinator of media materials produced or distributed in support of the Voting Action Plan 2002-2003.

II. OBJECTIVES

- A. Provide voting assistance officers at all levels with information regarding the 2002 and 2003 primary and general elections so that they may assist interested voters within their organizations.
- B. Plan and conduct a multi-media internal information program, utilizing internal media of the DoD and other Federal agencies to reach all eligible voters covered by the *Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)*.
- C. Provide information through appropriate information channels to ensure that all organizations are aware of the availability of voting assistance for their personnel.
- D. Ensure that the Uniformed Services, DoD components and Federal agencies are aware of information materials produced and of procedures to obtain them.
- E. Stress "Armed Forces Voters Week" (week of September 1 to 7, 2002) and "Overseas Citizens Voters Week" (week of June 30 to July 6, 2002) in conducting voting assistance activities.
- F. Implement a systematic release of materials in accordance with the phased program outline in Section IV of this Plan to ensure that all eligible voters are aware of voting procedures.

III. TASKS

A. The Director, FVAP will:

- 1. Coordinate all aspects of the 2002-2003 DoD Voting Assistance Information Support Plan.
- 2. Prepare all source material on voting information for use within DoD, other Federal agencies and other interested groups.
- 3. Coordinate all special information requirements in support of special programs (Armed Forces Voters Week and Overseas Citizens Voters Week) and other events as developed.
- 4. Operate the DoD Voting Information Center in a nonpartisan manner to provide information on elections, including dates and offices involved.
- 5. Actively collect and share best practices identified by Service, Agency/Department, and State voting assistance programs.

B. The American Forces Information Service will:

1. Coordinate with the Director, FVAP, all aspects of information for release to include: radio, television and print media materials.
2. Provide other information support as required by the Director, FVAP.

C. The Military Departments will:

1. Ensure that clear channels of communications are established throughout each Service expediting all voting information down to unit level.
2. Establish Service voting information direct "Hot-Lines" to link unit voting assistance officers with their respective Service Senior Voting Representative or Voting Action Officer.
3. Direct Service internal information media to publicize all aspects of the 2002 and 2003 voting assistance program. Furthermore, each Service will monitor the information support to ensure that voting information is being disseminated in a timely, effective and non-partisan manner.
4. Procure, produce, and distribute voting information materials and ensure that voting assistance officers at all echelons are in receipt of adequate materials to enable them to assist individuals covered by the *UOCAVA*.

D. Other Federal agencies will:

1. Perform all functions listed above, as applicable, if their agencies employ individuals stationed outside the U.S.
2. At the request of the Director, FVAP, coordinate with foreign media for the publication of voting information in media that have been identified as sources of information by U.S. citizens outside the U.S.

IV. PHASED PROGRAM SCHEDULING

A. Phase I - November 1, 2001 - Spring 2002

The Director, FVAP will publish the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide*, distribute information and other motivational posters developed for 2002, and operate the DoD Voting Information Center.

B. Phase II - January 1 - October, 2002

1. The Director, FVAP will prepare and disseminate voting information on state and local primary elections and continue operation of the DoD Voting Information Center.
2. The Director, FVAP will make available for distribution a motivational poster.
3. American Forces Information Service (AFIS) will conduct specialized, multi-media activities emphasizing registration for and voting in primary and general elections. In addition to distributing news releases and related features, American Forces Press and Publications Service (AFPPS) will

provide military newspaper editors the graphic support necessary (line art and cartoons) to supplement their text. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) will continue overseas broadcasting of voting spot announcements and features.

4. Military Services will have their Voting Action communication lines in operation not later than January 1, 2002. Military Services will ensure that telephone information operators at every military installation are provided with the name, e-mail addresses and office telephone number of the installation voting assistance officer. Installation voting officers shall generate and maintain a directory containing names, e-mail addresses and office telephone numbers of all local unit voting assistance officers by January 1, 2002. Military Services will provide the Director, FVAP with the office telephone numbers and e-mail addresses for every installation voting assistance officer, to be updated quarterly.

5. All departments and agencies will ensure that voting assistance materials are distributed expeditiously to all echelons for use by voting assistance personnel and ensure voting assistance personnel are aware of procedures to obtain additional materials if needed.

6. Military Departments will ensure that commanding officers or voting assistance officers provide at least one briefing, training, or information period devoted to registration and voting procedures. Ensure that these or other sessions are made available to spouses and eligible dependents, and ensure that incoming personnel are provided voting guidance if they arrive in a unit after the voting information briefing is conducted.

7. Military Departments will monitor command internal information media ensuring that voting information is being made available to eligible voters.

C. Phase III - August - November 5, 2002

1. The Director, FVAP will continue to release information on elections and operate the DoD Voting Information Center.

2. AFRTS facilities will intensify the radio and television campaigns to alert eligible voters overseas as to deadlines for registration and motivate them to request absentee ballots and vote.

3. AFIS will intensify print media campaign to inform all eligible voters of deadlines for registration and requesting absentee ballots.

4. AFPPS and AFRTS will publicize "Armed Forces Voters Week" (week of September 1, 2002), making the shift in emphasis from voting in the primary elections to voting in the November 5, 2002, general election.

5. Military Departments, the State Department, and other departments and agencies (as applicable) will plan and publicize local "Armed Forces Voters Week" (week of September 1, 2002) and "Overseas Citizens Voters Week" (week of June 30, 2002) activities. Military Departments should utilize local "on-base" community groups to generate support for the voting program and the State Department should utilize embassy and consulate facilities.

6. Military Departments and applicable agencies should conduct second briefings to ensure that newly appointed voting assistance officers are trained.

Second briefings should be considered for personnel covered by the *UOCAVA*, shifting emphasis from primary to general election information.

7. Military Departments will continue monitoring command information channels ensuring that voting information is being made available.

V. LIST OF INFORMATION SUPPORT MATERIALS AND SERVICES

- A. FVAP World Wide Web Home Page. Located at <http://www.fvap.ncr.gov>, the page provides an overview of the FVAP as well as electronic access to many of the materials listed in this section. In addition, this site provides election information, and links to state government home pages and other sites with election information and results.
- B. 2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide. (2002-2003VAG).
- C. Posters. 2002-2003 voting posters will be available for use by the Armed Forces, State Department, and other government agencies. Initial requirements for posters will be coordinated by FVAP with DoD components and other government agencies. Distribution is made through normal supply channels. These posters will also be available for sale to the public through the Government Printing Office.
- D. News Articles and Features. News and feature articles on the Voting Assistance Program - 2002-2003, emphasizing primary elections, "Overseas Citizens Voters Week," "Armed Forces Voters Week," and the general election, will be released to all media. Departments and/or agencies outside the DoD will be sent this information for their use as appropriate.
- E. DoD Voting Information Center (VIC). The DoD Voting Information Center will be in operation 24 hours a day providing information on candidates. Anyone may call the VIC on DSN 425-1343, (703) 588-1343 or the appropriate toll-free number listed at the end of this section under "Ombudsman Service."
- F. Voting Information News (VIN) Newsletter. The VIN is a monthly publication that is primarily distributed on-line in PDF format and via e-mail in text format to Voting Assistance Officers. The newsletter contains information on elections and other voting-related matters of interest to citizens covered by the *UOCAVA*. VIN should be distributed as extensively as possible throughout your organization. Voting Assistance Officers are encouraged to extract information from VIN and copy articles for internal media use.
- G. FVAP Electronic Transmission Service. The FVAP provides the Electronic Transmission of Election Materials Service. Where allowed by state law, a military or overseas citizen may electronically transmit the FPCA for registration/ballot request, receive the regular blank absentee ballot by fax, return the voted ballot by fax, or any combination of these three. Election materials may be transmitted to local election officials through the following numbers: DSN 223-5527, (703) 693-5527 or (800) 368-8683.
- H. Ombudsman Service. The FVAP provides an Ombudsman Service for both the voter and local election officials to provide resolution to problems which cannot be solved locally or answers to questions concerning procedures for registration and ballot requests, including the timely receipt of ballots. Citizens and local election officials may call for assistance using the international toll-free numbers below, and contained on the inside back cover of the *2002 - 2003 Voting Assistance Guide*. The number for citizens in the United States and Canada is 1-800-438-VOTE (8683). Assistance is available during normal business hours, Eastern Time, or a recorded message may be left at other times.

The following numbers for Ombudsman assistance may be dialed directly from the individual countries to reach the FVAP. No cost is incurred by the caller. They should be dialed exactly as they appear here, without affixing prefixes for international calls.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Access Code</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Access Code</u>
ANTIGUA	1-877-8333886	LUXEMBOURG	0800-9087
AUSTRALIA	1-800-1-27668	MALAYSIA	1-800-80-3709
BAHAMAS	1-8778333886	MARSHALL ISLANDS	1-877833-3886
BAHRAIN	800-687	MEXICO	001-8778333886
BARBADOS	1-800-534-2104	NETH ANTILLES	001-8778333886
BELGIUM	0800-76834	NETHERLANDS	0800-0249769
BERMUDA	1-8778333886	NEW ZEALAND	0800-441388
BRAZIL	000-814-550-3742	NICARAGUA	001-800-2201349
CANADA	1-800-438-8683	NORWAY	800-15501
CAYMAN ISLANDS	1-877-833-3886	PANAMA	001-800-5071351
CHILE	800-201844	PHILIPPINES	1-800-1-114-0831
CHINA	10-800-120-0241	POLAND	0-0-800-1112-561
COLUMBIA	980-915-4710	PORTUGAL	08008-12816
COSTA RICA	0800-0120204	RUSSIA	8-10-8002-0283011
DENMARK	80-882544	SINGAPORE	800-1203425
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1-8001561554	SOUTH AFRICA	080-09-97300
FINLAND	0-800-1-19515	SPAIN	900-931912
FRANCE	0800-914727	ST VINCENT	1-877-8333886
GERMANY	0800-1007428	ST. KITTS/NEVIS	1-877833-3886
GREECE	00800-12-5268	SWEDEN	020-79-6876
GUYANA	1-800-877-8333886	SWITZERLAND	0800-895623
HONG KONG	800-908809	TAIWAN	0080-13-9817
HUNGARY	06-800-13824	THAILAND	001-800-12-066-3305
INDONESIA	001-803-011-2583	TRINIDAD & TOBAGO	1-800-934-7340
IRELAND	1-800-55-5189	TURKEY	00800-151-0733
ISRAEL	1-800-9203230	UNITED KINGDOM	08-001-698035
ITALY	800-874729	UNITED STATES	1-800-438-8683
JAMAICA	1-800-666-3819	URUGUAY	000-413-598-2492
JAPAN	00531-120076	VENEZUELA	8001-2913
KOREA	00798-14-800-4399		

TAB

B



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MAY -2 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC
AFFAIRS)
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Command Support for the Federal Voting Assistance Program

Each Service Secretary shall provide overall and continuing command support to the Department of Defense's Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) to ensure that all active duty Uniformed Services members and their eligible family members can exercise their right to register and vote absentee.

The Voting Action Plan for 2002-2003 directs Commanders and Component Heads to designate Voting Assistance Officers. These Voting Assistance Officers should be appointed from among the Services' very best. There shall be one senior Voting Assistance Officer at each installation and at every level of command to coordinate subordinate unit and tenant command Voting Assistance Officer activities. The Chief/Director of Reserve components shall provide voting assistance to members called to active duty. Commanders shall ensure the timely IN-HAND delivery of the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) form for registration/absentee ballot request to all Armed Forces members and their eligible family members. Voting Assistance Officers at overseas installations shall ensure the timely dissemination of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB) to all locations, including afloat vessels. Commanders shall ensure that all Voting Assistance Officers are trained and equipped to provide assistance to Armed Forces members. The National Defense Authorization Act of FY02 (NDAA FY02) specifies that performance evaluation reports for Voting Assistance Officers will comment on that individual's performance as a Voting Assistance Officer.

Recent DoD IG and GAO reports comment on the value of FVAP's voting officer training workshops. Command support is needed to ensure that these regional workshops are supported, publicized and well attended. Participation in training is an element in the continuing evaluation of command voting programs required by DoD Directive 1000.4. Commanders shall ensure access to the FVAP website (www.fvap.ncr.gov). The 2002-2003 Voting Assistance Guide and the online FPCA, as well as other voting information, materials, and training are available on this site.

U07202 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11297

461-02

The Secretary of the Army, as Single Manager of the Military Postal Service (MPS), will take action to coordinate with the U.S. Postal Service, Navy, Coast Guard and Military Sealift Command (MSC) to provide postmarking/cancellation capability for all deployed vessels. The Secretary of the Army will promulgate requirements and procedures for conducting surveys in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of FY02 to determine status of voting materials within MPS and provide consolidated reports to Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program, Department of Defense. The Secretary of the Army will also provide adequate policies to ensure all voting materials are postmarked as soon as these materials are delivered to the mail handler on deployed vessels or the MPS, and ensure expeditious processing within MPS, who will provide recommended mailing deadline dates to meet required due dates.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) will plan, prepare, and execute a comprehensive public affairs strategy in order to coordinate the efforts of public affairs officers at every echelon of command in support of the Voting Action Plan.

The NDAA FY02 mandates that the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps Inspectors General (IG) conduct annual effectiveness and compliance reviews of voting assistance programs. Each Service IG shall submit a report on the results of the review to the DoD IG by January 31 of each year. The DoD IG will report results to the Congress not later than March 31 of each year (beginning in 2003). The DoD IG will conduct assessment and compliance reviews annually at selected installations.



cc:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant of the U. S. Coast Guard
Public Health Service
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Merchant Marine
Assistant Secretary of State
(ATTN: Mr. Grant Green, Human Resources, State Department)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 8 2002

Ms. Carol Adelman
Hudson Institute
1015 18th Street, N.W. Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20036

092

Dear Carol:

Thank you for sending me your Wall Street Journal article titled "American Generosity in International Giving." You are right that the United States is not given sufficient credit in the international community for Department of Defense financial and material assistance. We do have financial systems to track the costs of this aid.

Dov Zakheim tells me he will work with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Public Affairs office to "get the facts out on the street".

Thank you for your recommendation.

Sincerely,

cc:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Defense Security Cooperation Agency

8 OCT 02



U15655 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11299



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN

2002 SEP 27 PM 3:50
2002

ACTION MEMO

September 27, 2002, 2:00 PM

DepSec Action _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Foreign Aid

- Carol is right. I recommend that you ask ASD(PA) and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to publicize what we are doing in the realm of humanitarian or other foreign assistance.
- Carol sent you her article that appeared in the Wall Street Journal. In her article, she states that DoD is not getting credit for the foreign assistance because we are unable to track what we have spent.
- In fact, the DSCA *does* track our foreign assistance costs. DSCA tracks funds for drawdowns, humanitarian assistance, and disaster aid.
- According to DSCA, the DoD obligated \$56.9 million for assistance programs during this fiscal year. Included in our costs was \$5.053 million for the humanitarian rations given out in Afghanistan.
- However, the DSCA does not have a process for publishing our foreign assistance. Accordingly, DSCA should work with ASD(PA) to do so.
- Attached for your signature is a letter to Ms. Adelman stating the DoD does track humanitarian assistance spending, and plans to improve the media outreach efforts.

RECOMMENDTION: Sign the attached letter to Carol Adelman *(next under)*

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachments:
As stated

Files Done 10/4

Prepared By: John Evans, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>C10/7</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>10/30</i>



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SEP 27 2002 3:50 PM

CDR Greg Wittman
Navy Military Assistant
OSD Executive Secretariat

(b)(6)

September 27, 2002, 2:00 PM

Action _____

MEMORANDUM

10/11

TO: C+D

SUBJ: U15655/02

*Please send back to Camp
for edits per TSA.*

*Thanks
[Signature]*

Defense Security
Assistance in the realm of

Journal. In her article,
assistance because we are

DSCA tracks funds for

assistance programs
million for the

ing our foreign
PA) to do so.

ing the DoD does track
the media outreach

(next under)

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: John Evans,

(b)(6)

[Handwritten initials]

SPL ASSISTANT DI WITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/11301

U15655-02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Ms. Carol Adelman
Hudson Institute
1015 18th Street, N.W. Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Carol:

Thank you for sending me your Wall Street Journal article titled "American Generosity in International Giving." ~~I share your concern that Department of Defense (DoD) is not fully recognized for our financial and material assistance to the international community. DoD has the legal means to provide stocks and supplies to our friends in other countries, and to fund humanitarian and disaster assistance. DoD has financial systems that track the costs of this aid.~~

You are right that the U.S. is not given sufficient credit in the international community for DoD we do have

~~I do agree with your recommendation that we strengthen our communication efforts, and for this reason, I have asked the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to work with Tomie Clark's office to "get the facts out on the street".~~

De Public Affairs

Thank you for your recommendation. ~~I will act upon it.~~

Sincerely,

Don Jackson tells me he will work

CC:
ASD(LPA)
DSCA





SECRET
2002 AUG 21 10 58 12

August 21, 2002

The Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Don:

I am attaching an Op-Ed piece I did today in the *Wall Street Journal* on American generosity in international giving. It is a rebuttal to all those who claim that America is "stingy" when it comes to international assistance. Because America's foreign aid total of \$10 billion ranks last in terms of our GNP, we're criticized, even though we give the highest in absolute dollar amounts, and our private sector gives some \$34 billion each year, more than three times official foreign aid.

In the process of doing this research (I'm doing the lead chapter for a big USAID report), I discovered something interesting. According to the person who collects all the data for the U.S. official aid number, since 1991 certain costs of DOD can be included in this official figure. These include military costs related to election monitoring, infrastructure, rebuilding in-country narcotics support, threat reduction and demobilization, and post-conflict peace building operations.

The person at USAID who collects these numbers says he knows he is not getting all the allowable DOD costs, since your accounting system isn't set up to automatically capture them. For example, if you build a bridge, or road, or hospital as part of a larger military operation, and the facilities are used by the populace, the expenditures may not be listed separately and thus are not being counted as part of our official aid.

We don't know how much is not counted or how difficult it would be to get the break-outs, but it would be interesting and worthwhile to see. In short, it's quite possible that including all these allowable costs could raise our official foreign aid total significantly. This would lower criticism significantly as well because it could change our ranking among nations. It could provide real help to the Administration when dealing with all the critics who say we are not doing enough, when, in fact, we are doing plenty.

Sincerely,

Carol
Carol Adelman

SOLVING TOMORROW'S PROBLEMS TODAY

013775-102

1015 18TH
STREET, N.W.
SUITE 300
WASHINGTON,
DC
20036
202-223-7770
202-223-8537
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INDIANAPOLIS
WASHINGTON

 **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**
ONLINE

August 21, 2002

COMMENTARY

America's Helping Hand

By CAROL ADELMAN

At the upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg later this month, the U.S. will again be pilloried for being stingy on foreign aid. U.S. government aid as a percentage of GNP does indeed rank last. Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden are lauded for being on top.

But the figures, counting only public sector contributions, are deceptive. Americans help others abroad -- just as they do domestically -- primarily through private donations, foundations, corporate and university giving, religious offerings, and direct help to needy family members. Scandinavians and other Europeans give abroad primarily as they do at home -- through government.

So, at the guilt-fest in Jo'burg, the U.S. delegation should tell the real story of American generosity abroad. While there are no complete figures for international private giving, conservative estimates from surveys and voluntary reporting are impressive: Americans privately give at least \$34 billion overseas -- more than three times U.S. official foreign aid of \$10 billion.

Latest Figures

International giving by U.S. foundations totals \$1.5 billion per year, according to the latest figures. Even this shortchanges the "mega-donors" such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, because its biggest outlays came after the latest figures were tabulated.

Corporate philanthropy has also become a significant part of the total. Once disallowed by U.S. courts, charitable giving by U.S. businesses now comes to at least \$2.8 billion annually. And cooperation between

corporations and foundations has become common: When Merck gave \$50 million for an HIV/AIDS program in Botswana, it was matched by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

This doesn't begin to touch the work of America's NGOs, whose missions help the needy around the world. Groups like Catholic Relief Services and Save the Children give a whopping \$6.6 billion in grants, goods and volunteers. Religious overseas ministries contribute \$3.4 billion, including health care, literacy training, relief and development. Even the \$1.3 billion U.S. colleges give in scholarships to foreign students is more than Australia, Belgium, Norway, or Switzerland gave in total foreign assistance in 2000.

There's another way that the U.S. contributes as well, one that speaks volumes about this country's real gift to the world: As Mexican President Vicente Fox says, the "real heroes" are immigrants who send money to families back home. Personal remittances from the U.S. to developing countries came to \$18 billion in 2000 and provide, in Mexico for example, the third largest source of foreign exchange. U.S. Treasurer Rosario Marin, who sends money to her aunt in Mexico, calls remittances "one of the most important transactions between our two countries."

Some international economists have seen that such remittances should be considered a central part of any development strategy. But overturning the status quo won't be easy: Former president Jimmy Carter has said he hopes these remittances and other private donations won't be used to excuse what he considers American stinginess on foreign aid.

Yet such private giving is a much faster and more direct way of helping. Remittances don't require the expensive overhead of government consultants, or the interference of corrupt foreign officials. Studies have shown that roads, clinics, schools and water pumps are being funded by these private dollars. For most developing countries, private philanthropy and investment flows are much larger than official aid.

This is good news to them, and to most Americans, who are skeptical of official foreign aid. While the public supports U.N. and government aid for humanitarian crises, only 9% want our foreign aid to increase while 47% want it cut.

The skepticism is sound: The three historical purposes of foreign aid -- humanitarian relief, security assistance, and economic development -- have been uneven in their degrees of success. Government humanitarian relief efforts have generally gone well, delivering food, medicines and shelter during crises. But other forms of assistance are not so reliable.

Consider security assistance: Foreign aid has helped solidify bases agreements, gained allies during the Cold War, and rallied support for the Gulf War and the war against terrorism. Yet, we are learning that the roots of terrorism have been nurtured by governments of some of our largest aid recipients, particularly Egypt, which receives \$2 billion annually.

Likewise the impact of U.S. foreign aid on economic development. Our aid has trained thousands of foreign students and built thousands of kilometers of roads, bridges and sewage systems. Yet, without economic and political systems to sustain these investments, the investment has no long-term effect.

While foreign aid should continue to help countries in humanitarian relief, it must turn to partnerships with the private sector. Our best efforts on an official level will come through building lasting institutions in the countries we wish to help -- not lasting government contracts with Beltway consulting firms.

Official aid, at its best, should aim to work itself out of a job by encouraging local philanthropy and self-sufficiency. Our aid can foster open markets and societies abroad by supporting institutions which seek to liberalize politically and economically -- training in the rule of law, government transparency, free press, intellectual property. We must abandon the "donor" mentality and begin to consider ourselves a partner and a matchmaker for the developing world.

Answer Criticisms

In Johannesburg, the U.S. delegation can answer the criticisms they will face with four additional key points. First, that our government gave more foreign aid, in absolute terms, than any other country in 2001, topping second-ranked Japan. Second, the U.S. has long provided the most foreign direct investment in developing countries, which creates real

sustainability in economic development. Third, the U.S. provides the bulk of the world's R&D, which saves millions of lives with improvements in food and medicines. And, finally, we give far and away the most militarily, which helps make the world safe for economic growth and democracy.

Americans are a most generous people, clearly the most generous on earth in public -- but especially in private -- giving. For too long already, the percentage of U.S. official development assistance has hidden the real extent of giving which exemplifies the American spirit. We have much to explain, but nothing to apologize for, in Johannesburg.

Ms. Adelman, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, was assistant administrator of the Agency for International Development from 1988 to 1993.

URL for this article:
<http://online.wsj.com/article-SB10250874011341086UE.d.m.00.html>

Updated August 21, 2002

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September 3, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
Doug Feith

received 9/4
9:00am.

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Aid

Larry Di Rita
10/7

Here is an interesting article by Carol Adelman. She thinks the U.S. is not getting credit in foreign aid circles for all the humanitarian and civil affairs work the DoD does because we cannot capture the costs.

Please tell me what we think we should do about this, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/21/02 Adleman, Carol ltr to SecDef w/OpEd from WSJ, "A1

DHR:dh
090302-1

.....
Please respond by 09/27/02

10/4 -
30k term proposed
response attached.
D. Rita

Larry Di Rita

August 19, 2002 5:27 PM

C119

Afghanistan

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Efforts in Afghanistan

Larry Di Rita
9/9

Please think about our taking the lead in some major effort in Afghanistan, like road building or well digging or something that is going to be highly visible. We could get some money from the U.S. and from other people, get some materials and in kind contributions and then hire a bunch of Afghans to do the work.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081902-40

.....
Please respond by 09/13/02

USD(c)
↓

9/26

9/9

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 10 2002

Dov - As we discussed, leverage this with CentCom/CoE, etc, as you have indicated in your newly-minted role as DoD security coordinator!

SECDEF - I believe this proposal can press on even with the glitch in getting Dov an Administration-wide imprimatur. The proposal attached is an AIF-DoD exemplar.

19AUG02

Larry Di Rita
11-L-0559/OSD1153092 / 02

523
4/9



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 10 2002



INFO MEMO

August 28, 2002, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Ideas for Afghanistan

- You asked for my views on how we can take the lead in some highly visible reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
- Over the last seven months, OSD Policy has worked with CENTCOM to allocate approximately \$7 million for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan using DoD Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds. U.S. Civil Affairs soldiers have employed tens of thousands of Afghan workers to construct 50 schools; establish 15 medical facilities; dig 89 wells; construct a national teachers college; and, build a national veterinary center for agricultural research. OSD Policy plans to provide CENTCOM with an additional \$10 million in FY03 OHDACA to funds similar projects.
- CENTCOM has allocated almost half of its initial \$7 million for projects in Kabul and Bagram. I think that we should add some high visibility projects in the key provinces of Kandahar, Bamian, and Balkh. These three regions also cover Afghanistan's major ethnic groups (Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek).

Kandahar

- U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been weakest in Kandahar. The majority ethnic Pashtun populace is also the most susceptible to Taliban propaganda. To date, the U.S. has expended \$0.6 million in OHDACA funds on reconstruction projects in Kandahar. If we were to make Kandahar our highest priority for assistance, the local populace might become more sympathetic to U.S. efforts, and dispel notions that our policies favor one ethnic group over another (e.g., Tajik over Pashtun).
- We could undertake the following projects totaling \$19.4 million in and near Kandahar using FY03 OHDACA funds:
 - Rebuild the road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt in Orzughan province (\$19.2 million).

11-L-0559/OSD/11310

U15675 / 02

- Provide basic school supplies to Afghan schools, including, blackboards, pencils, notebooks, and backpacks for students (\$0.2 million).

Bamian

- Bamian is the poorest province in Afghanistan, the most geographically isolated, and the most destroyed by war. The road network is defunct. CENTCOM has expended only \$0.144 million in OHDACA funds for reconstruction projects in Bamian.
- We should try to improve Bamian's road network to reduce the population's isolation, increase commerce, and improve its living standard. We could undertake the following projects in Bamian totaling \$8.0 million using FY03 OHDACA funds:
 - Rebuild the inter-provincial roads from Bamian to Towtamderrah, and Bamian to Yawkolang (\$2.5 million).
 - Rebuild the road from Bamian to Panjab Junction (\$5.5 million).

Balkh

- To date, DoD has provided \$0.247 million in OHDACA support to Balkh province. By increasing our reconstruction efforts in this province, we could bolster the allegiance of key regional commanders (Dostam, Atta, and Daoud) for U.S. efforts.
- We could undertake the following projects to support Balkh using \$6.6 million in FY03 ODHACA funds:
 - Rebuild the Mazar-e-Sharif – Termez highway (\$6.4 million).
 - Provide school supplies to Afghan schools (\$0.2 million).

Additional Ideas

- Every effort should be made to obtain maximum public relations benefit from recent and future activities. On September 12, President Bush will announce a major highway project with USAID. I recommend that we include the DoD effort as a part of this announcement.

COORDINATION: Attached

ATTACHMENT: As stated

cc: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Prepared By: Josh Boehm (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/11311

COORDINATION

Bill Luti

USD(P)/ISA/NESA

August 29, 2002

Joe Collins

USD(P)/ISA/SOLIC

August 29, 2002

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

9/26

To: USJ(C)

Afghanistan

You should see/
embellish as necessary
based on your added
responsibilities.

[Handwritten Signature]

Larry Di Rita

26 SEP 02

15664 / 02 9/21



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-497-02

17 September 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 9/17*

SUBJECT: Projects in Afghanistan

- The following is provided in response to your request (TAB) concerning projects in Afghanistan that the Seabees and Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) can do quickly and for which we can find the money. I have reviewed the types of projects these organizations and others can accomplish in the near-term.
- US Central Command (USCENTCOM) is managing a humanitarian assistance program as an integral part of its theater security strategy. Current projects include drilling drinking water wells, upgrading utility systems, repairing bridges and roads and constructing or repairing medical facilities and schools. Projects are funded from various DOD accounts, including Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).
- USCENTCOM indicates that it is prepared to obligate up to \$12 million of FY 03 OHDACA funds, if provided by OSD, to support contracted humanitarian assistance efforts. Army Corps of Engineers or Naval Facilities Engineering Command is capable of negotiating and awarding such contracts. Such contracts will employ local nationals, develop indigenous skills and add resources to the Afghan economy.
- Contracting is the best method to accomplish these projects. Military engineer forces in Afghanistan will continue to be fully employed in force protection and operational missions for the foreseeable future. Conducting humanitarian assistance projects with military forces will require deploying additional forces into Afghanistan. Such deployment would increase the force footprint in the region, as well as reduce the availability of military engineer units to support combat operations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/11314

U15676 / 02

August 19, 2002 5:47 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Projects in Afghanistan

What can the Seabees and the Corps of Engineers do in Afghanistan quickly, for which we can find the money?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081902-42

.....
Please respond by _____

Tab



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 10 2002



INFO MEMO

August 28, 2002, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Ideas for Afghanistan

- You asked for my views on how we can take the lead in some highly visible reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
- Over the last seven months, OSD Policy has worked with CENTCOM to allocate approximately \$7 million for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan using DoD Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds. U.S. Civil Affairs soldiers have employed tens of thousands of Afghan workers to construct 50 schools; establish 15 medical facilities; dig 89 wells; construct a national teachers college; and, build a national veterinary center for agricultural research. OSD Policy plans to provide CENTCOM with an additional \$10 million in FY03 OHDACA to funds similar projects.
- CENTCOM has allocated almost half of its initial \$7 million for projects in Kabul and Bagram. I think that we should add some high visibility projects in the key provinces of Kandahar, Bamian, and Balkh. These three regions also cover Afghanistan's major ethnic groups (Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek).

Afghanistan

Kandahar

- U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been weakest in Kandahar. The majority ethnic Pashtun populace is also the most susceptible to Taliban propaganda. To date, the U.S. has expended \$0.6 million in OHDACA funds on reconstruction projects in Kandahar. If we were to make Kandahar our highest priority for assistance, the local populace might become more sympathetic to U.S. efforts, and dispel notions that our policies favor one ethnic group over another (e.g., Tajik over Pashtun).
- We could undertake the following projects totaling \$19.4 million in and near Kandahar using FY03 OHDACA funds:
 - Rebuild the road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt in Orzughan province (\$19.2 million).

28 August

U15675 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11316

- Provide basic school supplies to Afghan schools, including, blackboards, pencils, notebooks, and backpacks for students (\$0.2 million).

Bamian

- Bamian is the poorest province in Afghanistan, the most geographically isolated, and the most destroyed by war. The road network is defunct. CENTCOM has expended only \$0.144 million in OHDACA funds for reconstruction projects in Bamian.
- We should try to improve Bamian's road network to reduce the population's isolation, increase commerce, and improve its living standard. We could undertake the following projects in Bamian totaling \$8.0 million using FY03 OHDACA funds:
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 - Provide school supplies to Afghan schools (\$0.2 million).

Additional Ideas

- Every effort should be made to obtain maximum public relations benefit from recent and future activities. On September 12, President Bush will announce a major highway project with USAID. I recommend that we include the DoD effort as a part of this announcement.

COORDINATION: Attached

ATTACHMENT: As stated

cc: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Prepared By: Josh Boehm, (b)(6)

COORDINATION

Bill Luti

USD(P)/ISA/NESA

August 29, 2002

Joe Collins

USD(P)/ISA/SOLIC

August 29, 2002

August 19, 2002 5:27 PM *C/19*

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Efforts in Afghanistan

LARRY DI RITA
9/9

Please think about our taking the lead in some major effort in Afghanistan, like road building or well digging or something that is going to be highly visible. We could get some money from the U.S. and from other people, get some materials and in kind contributions and then hire a bunch of Afghans to do the work.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081902-40

.....
Please respond by 09/13/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 10 2002

USD(c)

Dov - As we discussed, leverage this with CentCom/COE, etc, as you have indicated in your newly-issued role as DoD security coordinator.

SECDEF - I believe this proposal can press on even with the glitch in getting Dov an Administration-wide imprimatur. The proposal attached is an AIF-DoD gameplan.

Larry Di Rita
11-L-0559/OSD115162 / 02
Di Rita
523
9/9

Snowflake

HP FOR ACTION

EP 113 -
29 000000000000

September 16, 2002 6:00 PM

Japan

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Japan

In the Kawaguchi meeting, we agreed to provide her information on the U.S. contribution to the global war on terrorism, Afghanistan and the maritime intercept program.

They have no idea of what we are putting into it. She says members of their Diet say we are not doing very much, and therefore, they shouldn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091602-41

.....
Please respond by 09/27/02

16Sep02

09-19-02 17:06 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/11320

U15690 /02

June 3, 2002 1:26 PM

TO: Service Secretaries
Under Secretaries
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

To Don? Do you see? DR

400.13

This recent report about wasteful spending bothers me and I know it does you, too.

I sure hope that when you have all investigated the problems here, that we don't decide there is no one to be held accountable. These sound like very poor decisions, and we are never going to change the culture around here without imparting the appropriate sense of urgency about our responsibilities as stewards of taxpayer money.

Please look into this and into our spending practices generally and let me know what course of action you recommend.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hoffman, Lisa; Scripps Howard News Service, "\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought by Army and Air Force," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 05/30/02

DHR:dh
060302-29

Please respond by 07/12/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

8/17

30 SEP 2002

Rocke response attached. You saw Army + AF on 13 July, ~~400.13~~



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

AUG 15 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT: Contingency Funds Expenditures

- This responds to your concerns regarding Air Force contingency funds expenditures in support of our on-going operations in Southwest Asia. In its report, the GAO criticized the Air Force for “questionable expenditures” categorized as “repetitive” or “seemingly unneeded.” We conducted a detailed analysis of the purchases cited by GAO and concluded the expenditures complied with applicable fiscal rules and laws. However, the purchase with appropriated taxpayer money of certain morale-enhancing supplies and services, although permissible, illustrated that stronger guidance and oversight are warranted. As a result, we are reviewing our policies concerning the proper use of contingency funds and our policies for contingency funding of “semi-permanent” sites like Prince Sultan Air Base.
- Most of the “seemingly unneeded” purchases were either mislabeled or inadequately described in the units’ summary purchase logs that were provided to GAO. For example, at Prince Sultan Air Base, the purchase log entry listed only two line items, “loveseats and armchair.” The supporting source documents disclosed a contract award (not purchase card) for 115 individual items including loveseats; armchairs; coffee, library, and end tables; and office chairs to be used in the Base Learning Resource Center. When considered with complete descriptions, these purchases are similar to those made in non-deployed or “permanent” environments. However, better judgment and more conservative discretion should have been exercised in purchasing some items like the Sumo Wrestling Kit (two padded suits and mat used for recreational wrestling). Proposed changes to the Financial Management Regulation (FMR) should preclude such expenditures; however, to ensure increased scrutiny, the Air Force has taken the following actions:
 - The Air Force now emphasizes proper oversight of contingency funds in training for financial managers prior to deployment.
 - The Air Force Comptroller has directed commanders to increase financial management oversight over contingency fund expenditures.

11-L-0559/OSD/11322

- Deploying commanders have strengthened internal controls regarding purchase oversight, review and documentation.
- The Air Force has changed contracting policy requiring purchase card records to be retained longer to help ensure their availability for oversight and other reviews.
- The Auditor General is reviewing contingency fund purchases in more detail including applicable internal controls, repetitive purchases, as well as contingency fund purchases beyond those cited in the GAO report. He will also add to the annual audit plan our processes for procuring items with contingency funds to ensure I am apprised of any irregularities in this area.
- The Air Force is reviewing its policies concerning the proper use of appropriated funds for morale-enhancing supplies and services during contingency operations, including extended deployments at “semi-permanent” sites, e.g., Prince Sultan Air Base.
- Beginning this year and continuing into next, funds for contingency accounts are provided directly to the military departments. When coupled with increased oversight and guidance by our comptrollers, this will lead to better accountability and control. In sum, the Air Force is taking positive steps to strengthen internal controls to preclude questionable expenditures, make proper use of appropriated funds, and promote prudent use of taxpayer dollars. We will provide a more detailed version of our review to the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: NONE

Point of Contact: Roscoe Higginbotham,

(b)(6)



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

2002 OCT -8 PM 2:25

INFO MEMO

October 7, 2002, 7:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *D* OCT 8 2002

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending – Secretary of Air Force Response

You asked whether I agreed with Secretary Roche's Info Memo of August 15, 2002, pertaining to the General Accounting Office (GAO) report on contingency fund spending (TAB A).

- I commend Secretary Roche on the corrective actions taken by the Air Force to prevent a future recurrence of the situations highlighted by the GAO. The Air Force's actions will lead to better accountability and control.
- Nevertheless, Secretary Roche missed a central point of the GAO report. The Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) funds are appropriated solely for the purpose of financing warfighting and operational costs of a contingency operation. The Components are not to use OCOTF resources to finance administrative; general support; or Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs even when these costs are directly related to a specific operation. The Air Force used OCOTF funds to finance support efforts.
- I sent a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller) on August 29, 2002, clarifying the Department's financial policy regarding the appropriate use of the OCOTF in financing contingency operations. I attach a copy of that memorandum (TAB B). I believe that this policy clarification will ensure the proper stewardship of the taxpayers' money.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

400.13

7 OCT 02



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

AUG 29 2002

Mike

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)

SUBJECT: Contingency Funding Expenditures

I commend you on the steps the Air Force is taking to prevent a future recurrence of the situations highlighted by the General Accounting Office. I would like to clarify the Department's financial policy regarding the appropriate use of the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) funds in financing contingency operations.

The OCOTF funds are available only to support the warfighting and operational aspects of a contingency operation. As such, these funds should not be utilized to finance administrative, general support, or Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs, even when these costs are associated with a contingency operation. While MWR programs are vital to the morale of Service members serving in a contingency environment; and we support these efforts, it must be clear that DoD Components must use their normal Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation funding when financing these costs.

I hope this letter clarifies the use of OCOTF funds. If I can help resolve this situation in anyway, please contact me.

Dov

Dov S. Zakheim

11-L-0559/OSD/11325



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

INFO MEMO

380.01

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, *WJ Haynes* General Counsel of the Department of Defense
SUBJECT: Release of Classified Information

- You asked whether we ought to include a provision in our personal services and other contracts requiring individuals to state that they will not release classified information.
- Essentially, we already do so.
- Under the Federal Acquisition Regulations (Tab A) and DoD Supplement (Tab B), for contracts that require contractor employees to have access to classified information—
 - DoD's *National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual* (excerpt at Tab C) requires each affected contractor employee to sign the same nondisclosure agreement required for all DoD employees (Tab D).
 - DoD contractor employees with access to Top Secret, Special Access Program (SAP), or Special Compartmented Information (SCI), also must orally attest to their security responsibilities (Tab B).
 - DoD Regulation 5200.1-R (excerpt at Tab E) requires that all DoD personnel, including employees under personal services contracts for experts and consultant services, who require access to classified information must sign the same nondisclosure agreement.
 - Each contract must include a contract clause that requires the contractor to sign a security agreement (Tab F) and to comply with DoD's *National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual*.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Helen Sullivan

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/11326

U15738 / 02

305EPO2

showing
5:30
1 -

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: July 23, 2002
SUBJECT:

Larry Di Rita
9/27

Maybe we ought to think about everything that we allow people to sign; contractors and everything else where they explicitly say that they will not release classified information.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072302.04

Please respond by: 7/29

SECDEF HAS SEEN *Response Attached*
SEP 30 2007 *SFB*

9/24
(I took all the tabs off Package was quite thick. Di Rita)

U15737 / 02
11-L-05597OSD/11327

2:15 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 28, 2002
RE:

Is there anything I can do to help Cofer Black?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092802.01S

231.2

28 Sep 02

U15839 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11328



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

October 2, 2002

The Honorable Kristin Krohn Devold
Minister of Defense
Kingdom of Norway

Dear Minister Krohn Devold:

I agree with your suggestion that NATO could be useful as a vehicle for consultation on Homeland Defense issues. The Alliance's Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) would be a likely forum for such consultations.

The U.S. has been trying to use the SCEPC to develop Allied capabilities to respond to the consequences of a terrorist attack, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. Homeland Defense consultations in this forum could improve Allied preparedness to respond in a coordinated fashion to such contingencies.

We should ask our NATO representatives to talk to other NATO Allies to come up with proposals on Homeland Defense issues for the SCEPC agenda.

Sincerely,

Norway

20402

U15843-02



11-L-0559/OSD/11329

S A R A H D I S K E T T E T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
R E L E A S I N G D O C U M E N T

CREATION DATE: 041002
CREATION TIME: 08480000
SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03
MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME: DONALD H. RUMSFELD
ORG: OFFICE: SECDEF PHONE:
TOC FILE CRC: 29782

FILENAME	MSG TYPE	PREC 	ACTION CLASS 	DATE/TIME GROUP	FILETIME SSN	TOT/ TOR	SPECAT CIC	CRC
DEVOLD	DD173	RR	UU	RE DY 040856Z	OCT02		ZYUW N	19556

SECDEF

ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER


DONALD H. RUMSFELD

OCT 2 2002

U15843-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11330

UNCLASSIFIED

01 01 040856Z OCT 02 RR RR UUUU AA ZYUW

NO

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

AMEMBASSY OSLO

INFO USDAO OSLO NO

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//

UNCLAS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO NORWAY MINISTER OF DEFENSE

1. SECRETARY RUMSFELD HAS SIGNED THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO MOD KROHN DEVOLD. REQUEST THAT AMEMBASSY FORWARD THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO MINISTER KROHN DEVOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE KRISTIN KROHN DEVOLD
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
KINGDOM OF NORWAY

DEAR MINISTER KROHN DEVOLD:

SECDEF-C/SECDEF-N

DONALD H. RUMSFELD SECDEF
CRC:

UNCLASSIFIED

040856ZOCT02

U15843-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11331

UNCLASSIFIED

01 01 040856Z OCT 02 RR RR UUUU AA ZYUW

NO

(PARA) I AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT NATO COULD BE USEFUL AS A VEHICLE FOR CONSULTATION ON HOMELAND DEFENSE ISSUES. THE ALLIANCE'S SENIOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE (SCEPC) WOULD BE A LIKELY FORUM FOR SUCH CONSULTATIONS.

(PARA) THE U.S. HAS BEEN TRYING TO USE THE SCEPC TO DEVELOP ALLIED CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF A TERRORIST ATTACK, INCLUDING THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. HOMELAND DEFENSE CONSULTATIONS IN THIS FORUM COULD IMPROVE ALLIED PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND IN A COORDINATED FASHION TO SUCH CONTINGENCIES.

(PARA) WE SHOULD ASK OUR NATO REPRESENTATIVES TO TALK TO OTHER NATO ALLIES TO COME UP WITH PROPOSALS ON HOMELAND DEFENSE ISSUES FOR THE SCEPC AGENDA.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) DONALD RUMSFELD

3. END OF TEXT.

SECDEF-C/SECDEF-N

DONALD H. RUMSFELD SECDEF
CRC:

UNCLASSIFIED

040856Z OCT 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11332

11/01
1601

Snowflake

cab

August 12, 2002 9:24 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Norway and Homeland Defense Consultations

This was recommended by the Norwegian MoD. If we are going to do this, let's go ahead and get back to her, tell her we are going to do it and ask her what she is going to do.

Thanks.

Attach.

07/19/92 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef re: Homeland Defense Consultations in NATO

DHR:dh
081202-15

.....
Please respond by 9/26/02

11/12/02
1640 RECEIVED IN ISP
TASKED TO NATO/EUR

SECDEF HAS SEEN
9/26 - SEP 30 2002
Jeddel - A draft letter to Norwegian MoD attached.
If you're okay, I'll get it out.

Larry Di Rite
9/27

11-L-0559/OSD/11333

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

Reb 290

Dear Minister Krohn Devold:

I agree with your suggestion that NATO ^{could be useful} be used as a vehicle for consultation on Homeland Security and Defense issues. The Alliance's Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) would be ^{a likely} an ideal forum for such consultations.

^{U.S.} The United States has been trying to use the SCEPC to develop Allied capabilities to respond to the consequences of a terrorist attack, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. Homeland Security and Defense consultations in this forum could ^{improve} enhance Allied preparedness to respond in a coordinated fashion to such contingencies.

We should ask our NATO representatives to ^{talk to} ~~press~~ the other NATO Allies to come up with proposals on Homeland Security and Defense issues for the SCEPC agenda.

Sincerely,

09-30-02 10:54 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/11334

September 30, 2002 11:48 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Evaluation Team

Let me know if you follow up on Sultan's request for a team to evaluate their stocks of WMD, protective gear and the like.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-40

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

Saudi Arabia

30 Sep 02

U15849 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11335

September 30, 2002 11:52 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: The North

Iraq

If the UK isn't going to work in the north and the Turks may not, and the Kurds may not be enough, we are going to need some U.S. forces. Let's discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-43



Please respond by 10/11/02

30 Sep 02

U15850 02

Snowflake

September 30, 2002 11:46 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief

IT 99

The next time you're up, you need to brief me and then the President on Fortress Baghdad.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-39

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

30 Sep 02

U15851 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11337

September 30, 2002 1:04 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Next Briefing

In the next briefing of the plan, we need to have a very good look at humanitarian activity and civil affairs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-49



Please respond by 10/15/02

092

305802

U15852 02

September 30, 2002 2:02 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *Newsweek*

Attached is an article from *Newsweek*. Are your folks thinking about linking regulars with A-teams, as this article suggests?

Thanks.

Attach.
Soloway, Colin, "I Yelled at Them to Stop'," *Newsweek*, October 7, 2002.

DHR:dh
093002-63

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

AFghanistan

30 Sep 02

U15853 02

Newsweek
October 7, 2002

'I Yelled At Them To Stop'

U.S. Special Forces are frustrated. Kicking down doors and frisking women, they say, is no way to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan. A report from the front

By Colin Soloway

One afternoon in August, a U.S. Special Forces A team knocked at the door of a half-ruined mud compound in the Shahikot Valley. The servicemen were taking part in Operation Mountain Sweep, a weeklong hunt for Qaeda and Taliban fugitives in eastern Afghanistan. The man of the house, an elderly farmer, let the Americans in as soon as his female relatives had gone to a back room, out of the gaze of strange men. Asked if there were any weapons in the house, the farmer proudly showed them his only firearm, a hunting rifle nearly a century old. When the team had finished searching, carefully letting the women stay out of sight, the farmer served tea. The Americans thanked him and walked toward the next house.

They didn't get far before the team's captain looked back. Six paratroopers from the 82d Airborne, also part of Mountain Sweep, were lined up outside the farmer's house, preparing to force their way in. "I yelled at them to stop," says the captain, "but they went ahead and kicked in the door." The farmer panicked and tried to run, and one of the paratroopers slammed him to the ground. The captain raced back to the house. Inside, he says, other helmeted soldiers from the 82d were attempting to frisk the women. By the time the captain could order the soldiers to leave, the family was in a state of shock. "The women were screaming bloody murder," recalled the captain, asking to be identified simply as Mike. "The guy was in tears. He had been completely dishonored."

The official story from both the 82d Airborne and the regular Army command is that Operation Mountain Sweep was a resounding success. Several arms caches were found and destroyed, and at least a dozen suspected Taliban members or supporters were detained for questioning. But according to Special Forces, Afghan villagers and local officials living in or near the valley, the mission was a disaster. The witnesses claim that American soldiers succeeded mainly in terrorizing innocent villagers and ruining the rapport that Special Forces had built up with local communities. "After Mountain Sweep, for the first time since we got here, we're getting rocks thrown at us on the road in Khowst," says Jim, a Green Beret who has been operating in the area for the past six months. Special Forces members say that Mountain Sweep has probably set back their counterinsurgency and intelligence operations by at least six months.

Officers in the 82d insist their men did nothing wrong. In response to NEWSWEEK queries, public-affairs officers characterized the Special Forces involved in Mountain Sweep as "prima donnas" who were damaging the war effort by complaining to the press. Yet at a time when Washington is talking about expanding the mission in Afghanistan and increasing the number of large-scale operations like Mountain Sweep—and when Qaeda allies are stepping up terrorist attacks against the fragile government in Kabul—the criticism raises serious questions about the best strategy for fighting the low-intensity war.

Shahikot is where Al Qaeda and Taliban forces fought their last major battle against the Americans back in March. Some 50 soldiers from several Special Forces A teams have been operating in eastern Afghanistan's Paktia and Khowst provinces ever since. They've been working to win the villagers' trust

and cooperation—and largely succeeding, as NEWSWEEK found while accompanying some of them for two weeks on operations shortly before Mountain Sweep began. "The Americans in Gardez who have Toyota trucks, they are good guys," says Jan Baz Sadiqi, 46, district administrator in Zormat, the valley's population center. "They don't break into houses, and they don't terrorize people."

Then on Aug. 19, American commanders sent some 600 action-hungry members of the Army's 82d Airborne Division, Third Battalion, charging into Zormat and the Shahikot area. "Those guys were crazy," said one Special Forces NCO who was there. "We just couldn't believe they were acting that way. Every time we turned around they were doing something stupid. We'd be like, 'Holy s—t, look at that! Can you believe this!' " Another said: "They were acting like bin Laden was hiding behind every door. That just wasn't the way to be acting with civilians." Special Forces working in the region say that since Mountain Sweep, the stream of friendly intelligence on weapons caches, mines and terrorist activity has dried up.

The Special Forces have often had a stormy relationship with the rest of the Army. Conventional commanders sometimes regard the elite fighters as arrogant cowboys. Special Forces members respond that the regular Army is too rigid for the painstaking job of fighting a low-intensity conflict. "The conventional military has a conventional mind-set," said an SF officer. "It does not work when you have crooks and terrorists and all kinds of bad guys who blend into the population." In Afghanistan, the A teams have been out in the field, cultivating the friendship of villagers and tracking down terrorists. At the same time, regular soldiers like those of the 82d were, until August, mostly confined to their bases, just itching to get out and do the job for which they were trained.

In Shahikot, that wasn't the job that needed doing. "The 82d is a great combat unit," said a Special Forces NCO who took part in the mission. "A lot of us on the teams came out of the 82d. But they are trained to advance to contact and kill the enemy. There was no 'enemy' down there." The remaining Taliban forces melted into the civilian population after Operation Anaconda blasted them out of the caves of Shahikot in March. Since then, the Afghan war has become basically a low-intensity guerrilla conflict, with Taliban and Qaeda fighters operating in small cells, emerging only to lay land mines and launch nighttime rocket attacks against the Americans before disappearing once again.

The Special Forces were created to deal with precisely that kind of enemy. Each A team is made up of 10 or fewer noncommissioned officers, led by one warrant officer and one captain. Armed with M-4 rifles and light machine guns, they live, travel and work with local troops. They patrol isolated villages in ordinary Toyota pickups, talking to the inhabitants—and never go anywhere without someone who speaks the local language. They have been trained to assimilate local customs and sensibilities as carefully as possible. Many of them sported full beards until a few weeks ago, when a news photo of a whiskery Green Beret shook up the brass in Washington. A smooth-cheeked adult male is a strange sight for rural Afghans, but the generals ordered all troops to shave immediately.

Still, people back home—Pentagon brass and civilians alike—are asking why terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mohammed Omar are still running loose. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reportedly dressed down Gen. Dan McNeill in July for failing to capture more "high-value targets." Such impatience was likely a factor in launching Mountain Sweep. "It's the victory of form over substance, substituting action for results," says a Western diplomat who is worried about increasing complaints and warnings from areas where conventional operations are taking place. "It's thinking if you do a lot of stuff, something will happen. Something will, but it might not be what you want. The unhappiness is building."

Villagers have made no secret of that unhappiness. In the village of Marzak, several witnesses say that 82d troops chased down a mentally ill man, pushed him to the ground, handcuffed him and then took

turns taking photos of themselves pointing a gun to his head. The office of Zormat administrator Sadiqi was flooded with complaints about the actions of some 82d units. "They knocked down doors, pouring into the homes, terrifying everybody, beating people, mistreating people," says Sadiqi. He says villagers demanded: "Why do the Americans come here and search our women? We don't need this kind of government!"

After the mission, the two SF teams submitted an "after-action review." NEWSWEEK has not seen the document, but sources say it describes in detail the problems the teams witnessed and suggests ways to avoid such problems in the future. The report set off a storm of recriminations. Col. James Huggins, commander of Task Force Panther, of which the Third Battalion is a part, says every platoon and squad leader in the battalion was questioned under oath, and their statements did not support the teams' charges. "I can't tell you 100 percent these things didn't happen," says Huggins. "All I can tell you is I looked, and can't find any evidence that they did." Officers involved have been accused of leaking classified reports to NEWSWEEK, and have been subjected to internal investigations.

Even as he defends his troops, Huggins says he's working to avoid problems in the future by increasing "cultural awareness" training, bringing in female military police to search Afghan women and keeping supplies of new locks on hand to replace those that are cut off during searches. As some Green Berets see it, the damage has already been done. Told that more operations like Mountain Sweep are being planned, one Special Forces NCO says: "It's over, then. We might as well go home, because we'll never succeed with big ops like that." Even so, Mike sticks up for the conventional Army. "Some SF guys will tell you we don't need regular forces out here, that we can do it all by ourselves," he said. "But that's impossible. The question is, how do you use those forces?" He recommends a model that has been successful in Afghanistan—pairing an A team with a company of regular infantry. "We need their muscle and firepower to support us when we go after the bad guys. But they need our brains, experience and skills to get the mission done," Mike says. "If you establish rapport with the people—establish you are not an occupying army—and prove you are here to support the transitional government, they will tell you where to find Al Qaeda." Among the Special Forces, the hope is that the U.S. command can learn from the mistakes of Mountain Sweep and get the job done right.

With Mark Hosenball, Holly Peterson and Suzanne Smalley

September 30, 2002 10:12 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Post-Saddam

Iraq

Attached is an interesting article by Robert Kaplan.

Thanks.

Attach.

Kaplan, Robert D., "A Post-Saddam Scenario," *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 2002.

DHR:dh
093002-14



Please respond by _____

305802

U15854 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11343



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SEP 30 2002

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This is a special preview of material from our November 2002 issue, available for sale at newsstands October 15.

The Atlantic Monthly | November 2002

A Post-Saddam Scenario

Iraq could become America's primary staging ground in the Middle East. And the greatest beneficial effect could come next door, in Iran

BY ROBERT D. KAPLAN

.....

The constellation of overseas bases with which the United States sustained its strategic posture throughout the Cold War was a matter not of design but of where Allied troops just happened to be when World War II and its aftershocks—the Greek Civil War and the Korean War—finally ended. The United States found itself with basing rights in western Germany, Japan, Korea, the eastern Mediterranean, and elsewhere. In particular, our former archenemy, Germany, precisely because America had played a large role in dismantling its Nazi regime, became the chief basing platform for U.S. troops in Eurasia—to such a degree that two generations of American soldiers became intimately familiar with Germany, learning its language and in many cases marrying its nationals. If the U.S. Army has any localitis, it is for Germany.

A vaguely similar scenario could follow an invasion of Iraq, which is the most logical place to relocate Middle Eastern U.S. bases in the twenty-first century. This conclusion stems not from any imperialist triumphalism but from its opposite: the realization that not only do our current bases in Saudi Arabia have a bleak future, but the Middle East in general is on the brink of an epochal passage that will weaken U.S. influence there in many places. Indeed, the relocation of our bases to Iraq would constitute an acceptance of dynamic change rather than a perpetuation of the status quo.

Two features of the current reality are particularly untenable: the presence of "unclean" infidel troops in the very Saudi kingdom charged with protecting the Muslim holy places, and the domination by Israeli overlords of three million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Neither will stand indefinitely. President Bush's refusal to force the Israelis out of the West Bank has heartened neoconservatives, but it is a temporary phenomenon—merely a matter of sequencing.

Only after we have achieved something more decisive in our war against al Qaeda, or have removed the Iraqi leadership, or both, can we pressure the Israelis into a staged withdrawal from the occupied territories. We would then be doing so from a position of newfound strength and would not appear to be giving in to the blackmail of those September 11-category criminals, the Palestinian suicide bombers. But after the Israelis have reduced the frequency of suicide bombings (through whatever tactics are necessary), and after, say, the right-wing Israeli leader Ariel Sharon has passed from the scene, Bush, if he achieves a second term and thus faces no future elections, will act.

But first the immediate issue: Iraq. The level of repression in Iraq equals that in Romania under the Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu or in the Soviet Union under Stalin; thus public opinion there is unknowable. Nevertheless, two historical cultural tendencies stand out in Iraq: urban secularism and a grim subservience. Whenever I visited Baghdad in the past, the office workers at their computer keyboards had the expressions that one imagines on slaves carrying buckets of mud up the steps of ancient ziggurats. These office workers labored incessantly; a cliché among Middle East specialists is that the Iraqis are the Germans of the Arab world (and the Egyptians are the Italians). Iraq was the most fiercely modernizing of Arab societies in the mid twentieth century, and all coups there since the toppling of the Hashemite dynasty, in 1958, have been avowedly secular.

Given the long climate of repression, the next regime change in Iraq might even resurrect the reputation not of any religious figure but of the brilliant, pro-Western, secular Prime Minister Nuri Said, who did more than any other Iraqi to build his country in the 1940s and 1950s. As in Romania, where the downfall of Ceausescu resurrected the memory of Ion Antonescu, the pro-Hitler nationalist executed in 1946 by the new Communist government, the downfall of Iraq's similarly suffocating autocracy could return the memory of the last great local politician murdered in the coup that set the country on the path to Saddam Hussein's tyranny.

Iraq has a one-man thugocracy, so the removal of Saddam would threaten to disintegrate the entire ethnically riven country if we weren't to act fast and pragmatically install people who could actually govern. Therefore we should forswear any evangelical lust to implement democracy overnight in a country with no tradition of it.

Our goal in Iraq should be a transitional secular dictatorship that unites the merchant classes across sectarian lines and may in time, after the rebuilding of institutions and the economy, lead to a democratic alternative. In particular, a deliberately ambiguous relationship between the new Iraqi regime and the Kurds must be negotiated in advance of our invasion, so that the Kurds can claim real autonomy while the central government in Baghdad can also claim that the Kurdish areas are under its control. A transitional regime, not incidentally, would grant us the right to use local bases other than those in the northern, Kurdish-dominated free zone.

Keep in mind that the Middle East is a laboratory of pure power politics. For example, nothing impressed the Iranians so much as our accidental shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner in 1988, which they believed was not an accident. Iran's subsequent cease-fire with Iraq was partly the result of that belief. Our dismantling the Iraqi regime would concentrate the minds of Iran's leaders as little else could.

Iran, with its 66 million people, is the Middle East's universal joint. Its internal politics are so complex that at times the country appears to have three competing governments: the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei and the goons in the security service; President Mohammad Khatami and his Western-tending elected government; and the former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose *bazaari* power base has made him a mediator between the other two. Sometimes Iranian policy is the result of subtle arrangements among these three forces; other times it is the result of competition. The regimes of Iraq and Iran are fundamentally different, and so, therefore, are our challenges in the two countries.

Vastly more developed politically than Iraq, Iran has a system rather than a mere regime, however labyrinthine and inconvenient to our purposes that system may be. Nineteenth-century court diplomacy of the kind that Henry Kissinger successfully employed in China with Mao Zedong and

Zhou Enlai will not work in Iran, simply because it has too many important political players. Indeed, because so many major issues are matters of internal bargaining, the Iranian system is the very opposite of dynamic. Iran's foreign policy will change only when its collective leadership believes there is no other choice.

Iranian leaders were disappointed not to see an American diplomatic initiative in 1991, after the United States bombed Baghdad—which, like the shooting down of the civilian jet, had greatly impressed them. Also likely to have been impressive to them was President George W. Bush's "axis of evil" speech (Iran's orchestrated denunciations notwithstanding). Overtures to the moderates in Iran's elected government, as the White House has already admitted, have not helped us—we will have to deal directly with the radicals, and that can be done only through a decisive military shock that affects their balance-of-power calculations.

The Iranian population is the most pro-American in the region, owing to the disastrous economic consequences of the Islamic revolution. A sea change in its leadership is a matter of when, not if. But a soft landing in Iran—rather than a violent counter-revolution, with the besieged clergy resorting to terrorism abroad—might be possible only if general amnesty is promised for those officials guilty of even the gravest human-rights violations.

Achieving an altered Iranian foreign policy would be vindication enough for dismantling the regime in Iraq. This would undermine the Iranian-supported Hizbollah, in Lebanon, on Israel's northern border; would remove a strategic missile threat to Israel; and would prod Syria toward moderation. And it would allow for the creation of an informal, non-Arab alliance of the Near Eastern periphery, to include Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Eritrea. The Turks already have a military alliance with Israel. The Eritreans, whose long war with the formerly Marxist Ethiopia has inculcated in them a spirit of monastic isolation from their immediate neighbors, have also been developing strong ties to Israel. Eritrea has a secularized population and offers a strategic location with good port facilities near the Bab el Mandeb Strait. All of this would help to provide a supportive context for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. A problem with the peace plan envisioned by President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, in the summer of 2000, was that coming so soon after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, it was perceived by many Arabs as an act of weakness rather than of strength. That is why Israel must be seen to improve its strategic position before it can again offer such a pullback.

Of course, many Palestinians will be unsatisfied until all of Israel is conquered. But in time, when no Israeli soldiers are to be seen in their towns, the seething frustration, particularly among youths, will turn inward toward the Palestinians' own Westernized and Christianized elites, in Ramallah and similar places, and also eastward toward Amman.

In regards to Jordan and our other allies, U.S. administrations, whether Republican or Democratic, are simply going to have to adapt to sustained turbulence in the years to come. They will get no sympathy from the media, or from an academic community that subscribes to the fallacy of good outcomes, according to which there should always be a better alternative to dictators such as Hosni Mubarak, in Egypt; the Saudi royal family; and Pervez Musharraf, in Pakistan. Often there isn't. Indeed, the weakening of the brutal regime of Islam Karimov, in Uzbekistan, will not necessarily lead to a more enlightened alternative. It could just as likely ignite a civil war between Uzbeks and the ethnic Tajiks who dominate the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara. Because Uzbekistan is demographically and politically the fulcrum of post-Soviet Central Asia, those advocating "nation-building" in Afghanistan should realize that in the coming years there could be quite a few more nations to rebuild in the region. For this reason some in the Pentagon are intrigued by a basing

strategy that gives us options throughout Central Asia, even if some countries collapse and we have to deal with ethnic khanates.

Our success in the war on terrorism will be defined by our ability to keep Afghanistan and other places free of anti-American terrorists. And in many parts of the world that task will be carried out more efficiently by warlords of long standing, who have made their bones in previous conflicts, than by feeble central governments aping Western models. Of course we need to eliminate anti-American radicals (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a case in point) who are trying to topple Hamid Karzai's pro-Western regime. But that doesn't mean we should see Karzai's government as the only sovereign force in the country. Given that the apex of Afghan national cohesion, in the mid twentieth century, saw the Kabul-based regime of King Zahir Shah controlling little more than the major cities and towns and the ring road connecting them, the prospects for full-fledged nation-building in Afghanistan are not only dim but also peripheral to the war on terrorism. We forget that the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not spark the *mujahideen* uprising. The spark came in April of 1978, in the form of the Kabul regime's attempt to extend the power of the central government to the villages. However brutal and incompetent the methods were, one must keep in mind that Afghans have less of a tradition of a modern state than do Arabs or Persians.

In any case, the changes that may be about to unfold in the Middle East will clear Afghanistan from the front pages. In the late nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire, despite its weakness, tottered on. Its collapse had to wait for the cataclysm of World War I. Likewise, the Middle East is characterized by many weak regimes that will totter on until the next cataclysm—which the U.S. invasion of Iraq might well constitute. The real question is not whether the American military can topple Saddam's regime but whether the American public has the stomach for imperial involvement of a kind we have not known since the United States occupied Germany and Japan.

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2002 OCT -2 PM 3: 04

September 19, 2002 7:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chem-Bio

370.64

Congressman Taylor asked me about these chem-bio units. Please find out what a unit costs. He kept saying New Orleans has a million people, but they don't have chem.-bio and only have 18 suits.

My guess is they are not that expensive and they could buy it themselves, with a million people.

Thanks.

DHR dh
091902-2



Please respond by 10/04/02

→ Pete Verga ^{9/30}

Please check on this and let me know. Thanks.

Larry

19 SEP 02



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301



2002 OCT 16 AM 9:31

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2002 0800hrs

Jarris
FOR: THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter F. Verga, Special Assistant for Homeland Security *VF Verga*

325

SUBJECT: Response To Congressman Taylor's Concerns Reference Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Protection for New Orleans (CCD Control # U15884-02)

- WMD-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) are part of an inter-state emergency response force designed to arrive within 6 hours after being requested by local authorities to fill gaps in capability or to relieve exhausted local response resources.
- The FY2001 analysis used 2000 census data and determined that 32 teams and the resulting geographical distribution of these teams provides optimum coverage for the entire population of the US and its territories (see Tab A).
- The Department's placement of the 32 teams ensures that a WMD incident anywhere within the US can be supported within established criteria.
- The 62nd CST is located in Carville, LA, approximately 70 miles west-north-west of New Orleans (see TAB B).
- Congressman Taylor has been pressing for a WMD-CST in each state.
- The equipment, training, and operational costs for a WMD-CST have been determined to be approximately \$8.865 million.

COORDINATION: NONE


Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: LTC Harris/HSTF/ (b)(6)

16 OCT 02



32 Teams - 150 Mile Radius




212,697,946 people (85.48%) within 150 miles of a team
Includes 115 of the top 120 (96%) major metropolitan areas

FY2001 WMD-CST Stationing

- Alaska
- Arizona
- Arkansas
- California(2)
- Colorado
- Florida
- Georgia
- Hawaii
- Idaho
- Illinois
- Iowa
- Kentucky
- Louisiana
- Maine
- Massachusetts
- Minnesota
- Missouri
- New Mexico
- New York
- Ohio
- Oklahoma
- Pennsylvania
- South Carolina
- Texas
- Virginia
- Washington

- FY 2001
- Michigan
- Tennessee
- Kansas
- Alabama
- West Virginia



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Carville, LA
US

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CRD

September 19, 2002 8:09 AM

110.01 HNGS

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Testimony Prep

We have to stop doing this. Suddenly, on the 19th, I'm handed the letter dated the 16th from Carl Levin inviting me to testify.

I need to read those things when I am preparing my testimony. I need to read them before, not the morning of the event.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091902-5

9/30
Sec Def -
SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 02 2002
Powell's note is attached. From the letter in there pretty much as soon as we saw it. Fact is, they did not seem to have one and threw one together when we started asking about it, it seems.
D. Levin

195EPOa



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 02 2002

September 26, 2002 6:20 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: Letter from Senators Levin and Warner reference Snowflake 091902-5

- The incoming letter inviting you to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the subject of Iraq was dated 16 September, but it was not signed by Senator Warner until late in the day on 17 September. It was mentioned by Senator Levin in your conference call with him and Senator Warner at 4:15 p.m. on September 17, but he acknowledged it had not been transmitted at that point in time because it had not been cleared by Senator Warner.
- My office received the letter, via fax, at 5:28 p.m. on the 17th. It was forwarded soon after to your office as part of the briefing package for the 19 September SASC hearing on Iraq.
- Attached are the snowflake and Levin-Warner letter.

Attachments:

As stated

110,01 ANG5

26 SEP 02

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United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20610-6060

TAB 1

September 16, 2002

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is to confirm the invitation for you and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday, September 19, 2002, at 2:30 p.m. in Room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. If necessary, a closed session in Room S-407 of the Capitol will follow the open session.

The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on U.S. policy toward Iraq, including the possibility of the use of military force against Iraq in the event that the situation relating to Iraq's non-compliance with a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, including their efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction, is not resolved through diplomatic or other means. The Committee is especially interested in hearing your assessment of the situation in Iraq and the readiness of our military forces to conduct operations in and around Iraq. The Committee is also interested in hearing your views on the challenges associated with such operations; the amount of resistance our forces could expect to encounter; the nations that might be expected to contribute troops or to otherwise support such an operation and the conditions, if any, that might be required for such support; the problems that would have to be overcome if such support was not available; the difficulties if U.S. and allied forces have to operate in a chemical or biological weapons environment; the impact, if any, that the use of armed force against Iraq could have on Operation Enduring Freedom and other deployments and operations of the U.S. armed forces; and such other matters as you believe may bear on this subject.

Committee rules require that government witnesses provide a prepared statement. Please provide your statement, both on disk (in WordPerfect or Microsoft Word format) and 150 copies, at least 48 hours before the hearing. Please provide letter-

11-L-0559/OSD/11355

size copies of any charts or handouts for distribution to Members and staff. Your staff may contact Mr. Rick DeBobes at (202) 224-7510 or Mr. Chuck Alsop at (202) 224-9537 of the Committee staff to resolve any questions you or your representatives may have in preparing for this hearing.

We look forward to seeing you at the hearing.

Sincerely,



John Warner
Ranking Member



Carl Levin
Chairman



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

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110,01 HNGS

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 BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 RICK SANTORUM, PENNSYLVANIA
 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS
 WAYNE ALLARD, COLORADO
 TIM WUTCHINSON, ARKANSAS
 JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA
 SUSAN COLLINS, MAINE
 JIM BUNNING, KENTUCKY

DAVID S. LYLES, STAFF DIRECTOR
 JUDITH A. ANSLEY, REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

TAB 1

September 16, 2002

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is to confirm the invitation for you and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday, September 19, 2002, at 2:30 p.m. in Room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. If necessary, a closed session in Room S-407 of the Capitol will follow the open session.

The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on U.S. policy toward Iraq, including the possibility of the use of military force against Iraq in the event that the situation relating to Iraq's non-compliance with a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, including their efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction, is not resolved through diplomatic or other means. The Committee is especially interested in hearing your assessment of the situation in Iraq and the readiness of our military forces to conduct operations in and around Iraq. The Committee is also interested in hearing your views on the challenges associated with such operations; the amount of resistance our forces could expect to encounter; the nations that might be expected to contribute troops or to otherwise support such an operation and the conditions, if any, that might be required for such support; the problems that would have to be overcome if such support was not available; the difficulties if U.S. and allied forces have to operate in a chemical or biological weapons environment; the impact, if any, that the use of armed force against Iraq could have on Operation Enduring Freedom and other deployments and operations of the U.S. armed forces; and such other matters as you believe may bear on this subject.

Committee rules require that government witnesses provide a prepared statement. Please provide your statement, both on disk (in WordPerfect or Microsoft Word format) and 150 copies, at least 48 hours before the hearing. Please provide letter-

11-L-0559/OSD/11358

C/101

September 19, 2002 8:09 AM

110.01 HNGS

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Testimony Prep

We have to stop doing this. Suddenly, on the 19th, I'm handed the letter dated the 16th from Carl Levin inviting me to testify.

I need to read those things when I am preparing my testimony. I need to read them before, not the morning of the event.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091902-5

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 02 2002

*9/30
Sec Def -*

Powell's note is attached. From the letter in Dave pretty much as soon as we saw it. fact is, they did not seem to have one and threw one together when we started asking about it, it seems.

D. L. L.

195202

U15886 /02

1150
0800
snowflake

EF2223

02/010427
July 15, 2002 8:44 AM

file

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Al Qaeda Assets

Why don't we start a plan to go after the \$100 million of frozen Al Qaeda assets and get it used to pay back people who were harmed by Al Qaeda.

000.5

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071502-8

.....

Please respond by 08/09/02

15
5/21/02

07-16-02 06:50 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/11360

U15896 /02

JUL 16 02 06:50

September 16, 2002 9:54 AM

received 9/17 8:30 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.
SUBJECT: Costs

I think we ought to come up with a figure as to what we spent thus far in Afghanistan, since January 2001, even before September 11.

Then we ought to come up with what the rest of world has spent to liberate and reconstruct Afghanistan.

We ought to say what we are spending every day to keep the terrorists out.

We need some data.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091602-24

.....

Please respond by 10/04/02

16500a

U15897 / 02



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY

2002 OCT -3 AM 6:51

INFO MEMO

October 1, 2002, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DOCT 2 2002*

SUBJECT: Costs

- You asked how much we and our coalition partners have spent to liberate and reconstruct Afghanistan.
- To date, we have spent approximately \$12.6 billion to liberate Afghanistan. This estimate excludes the \$15.7 billion spent on intelligence programs, Pentagon reconstruction, and Operation Noble Eagle.
- Prior to September 11, 2002, DoD did not spend any money in Afghanistan.
- Combat operations in Afghanistan have declined in recent months. In January 2002, we were spending approximately \$45 million a day. We are currently spending about \$32 million a day.
- We estimate that the monthly costs for Operation Enduring Freedom will remain relatively stable in FY 2003, at \$1.0 billion. However, if new pockets of al Qaeda cells are discovered those costs may increase.
- To date, we believe that the international community has spent approximately \$4.6 billion to liberate and begin the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Below is a stratification of the \$4.6 billion.
 - Logistical Support Provided to the United States: \$1.0 billion
 - Direct Coalition Support (Assets and Personnel): \$2.4 billion
 - Humanitarian/Reconstruction Funds Disbursed: \$1.2 billion
- This \$4.6 billion may be understated since it does not include expenditures in support of the International Security Assistance Force administered by the United Nations. A better estimate will not be known until mid November.

COORDINATION: See attached

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans (b)(6)

U15899 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11362

Afghanistan

10CT02

COORDINATION PAGE

SUBJECT: Costs

OUSD(P)	Mustafa Popal, (ISA/NESA)	Oct 2, 2002
JCS (J-8)	General J.E. Cartwright	Oct 1, 2002

September 16, 2002 9:54 AM

received 9/17 8:30 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Costs

I think we ought to come up with a figure as to what we spent thus far in Afghanistan, since January 2001, even before September 11.

Then we ought to come up with what the rest of world has spent to liberate and reconstruct Afghanistan.

We ought to say what we are spending every day to keep the terrorists out.

We need some data.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091602-24

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02

10/1

NATO 413.77

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: September 24, 2002
SUBJECT: _

Why in the world are we pushing AGS if we've already invested money in a system that does the same thing? If NATO wanted to do it, and they wanted to money in it that's one thing, but why should we put money in it?

I don't get it.

9/30
Response Attached

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 02 2002

DHR/azn
092402.02.

245902

U15902 / 02

Please respond by: 11 L 0559/OSD/11365

September 30, 2002 10:42 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: General

Is there a General Odverno, a two-star?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-21

210 Army

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 09 2002

SECDEF

YES. MG RAY ODILRNO IS THE COMMANDER
OF THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION AT FORT HOOD,
TEXAS. HE HAS BEEN IN COMMAND 1 YEAR THE
END OF THIS MONTH.

C

30 Sep 02

U15904 / 02

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 02 2002

SEP 18 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, (b)(6) KJ 1/25/02

SUBJ: Carnegie Endowment Paper on "Coercive Inspections"

IRAQ

- Paper proposes that UN Security Council impose a "coercive inspections" regime on Iraq, backed up by an "international" (but primarily U.S.) "Inspection Implementation Force" (IIF). This military force could accompany inspectors to enforce access to suspect sites.
- In return, U.S. would pledge not to invade Iraq "as long as international inspections are working."
- **In effect, U.S. would limit its concern to WMD – Saddam's tyranny and support for terrorism would no longer be adduced as reasons for regime change.**
- The IIF must be "so composed that it can quickly become an invasion force if necessary."
- This would reinforce the notion that any Iraqi interference with the inspection regime could serve as a *casus belli*.
- But it also requires **maintaining a relative large U.S. force in the region for at least two years**, to provide the immediate augmentation to the U.S. elements of the IIF. (Other country's IIF elements would not be required to participate in an invasion.)
- There are practical issues which are not resolved satisfactorily in the paper:
 - Who would determine when IIF was used, and who would be responsible for its safety? (Paper gives "civilian control" of IIF to Hans Blix, who would be authorized to commit a relatively small, primarily American, military force to operations under potentially dangerous conditions.)
 - Who would determine when "Iraqi obstruction of the inspection process" was serious enough to "release the United States from its pledge not to invade"? (Paper implies that Blix would).

185902

09-14-02 19:06 III

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U15908 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11367

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- Main risk is that, if we pursue a UN Security Council resolution on “coercive inspections,” we will get bogged down in a long negotiation about the inspection regime.
- It seems unlikely we could obtain a clear authorization to use force in response to **any** Iraqi obstruction of inspections.

Prepared by Abc Shulsky,

(b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/11368

EF2806

02/013632

September 12, 2002 7:58 AM

A. Shulsky

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Iraq

Please take a look at this Carnegie Endowment paper, "Iraq: A New Approach" and tell me if there are any good ideas in it.

Thanks.

Attach.

"Iraq: A New Approach," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002.

DHR:dh
091202-9

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 02 2002

Response
ATE (leaf)
SPS
9/28

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 12 2002

IRAQ

A NEW APPROACH

AUGUST 2002



CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
*for International
Peace*

11-L-0559/OSD/11370

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	6
A New Approach: Coercive Inspections	7
<i>Jessica T. Mathews</i>	
1. A Military Framework for Coercive Inspections	13
<i>Charles G. Boyd</i>	
2. Intelligence Support for Weapons Inspectors in Iraq	17
<i>Rolf Ekeus</i>	
3. Multilateral Support for a New Regime	21
<i>Joseph Cirincione</i>	
4. Persuading Saddam without Destabilizing the Gulf	27
<i>Patrick Clawson</i>	
5. Calculations of Iraq's Neighbors	31
<i>Shibley Telhami</i>	
6. The Russian Elite and Iraq: An Unexpected Picture	33
<i>Rose Gottemoeller</i>	
7. The UNSCOM Record	37
<i>Stephen Black</i>	
8. The IAEA Iraq Action Team Record: Activities and Findings	41
<i>Garry B. Dillon</i>	
9. New Inspections in Iraq: What Can Be Achieved?	45
<i>Terence Taylor</i>	
10. Establishing Noncompliance Standards	49
<i>David Albright</i>	
11. Tracking Iraqi Procurement	51
<i>Fouad El-Khatib</i>	
12. The Legal Basis for UN Weapons Inspections	55
<i>David Cortright</i>	
Glossary	62
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	64

A NEW APPROACH

Coercive Inspections

Jessica Mathews

The summary proposal that follows draws heavily on the expertise of all those who participated in the Carnegie discussions on Iraq and on the individually authored papers. Further explanation and greater detail on virtually every point, especially the proposal's military aspects, can be found therein.

With rising emphasis in recent months, the president has made clear that the United States' number one concern in Iraq is its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). No link has yet been found between Baghdad's assertively secular regime and radical Islamist terrorists. There is much else about the Iraqi government that is fiercely objectionable but nothing that presents an imminent threat to the region, the United States, or the world. Thus, the United States' primary goal is, and should be, to deal with the WMD threat.

In light of what is now a four-year-long absence of international inspectors from the country, it has been widely assumed that the United States has only two options regarding that threat: continue to do nothing to find and destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs, or pursue covert action or a full-scale military operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein. At best, the latter would be a unilateral initiative with grudging partners.

This paper proposes a third approach, a middle ground between an unacceptable status quo that allows Iraqi WMD programs to continue and the enormous costs and risks of an invasion. It proposes a new regime of coercive international inspections. A powerful, multinational military force, created by the UN Security Council, would enable UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams to carry out "comply or else" inspections. The "or else" is overthrow of the regime. The burden of choosing war is placed squarely on Saddam Hussein.

The middle-ground option is a radical change from the earlier international inspection effort in which the playing field was tilted steeply in Iraq's favor. It requires a military commitment sufficient to pose a credible threat to Iraq and would take a vigorous diplomatic initiative on Washington's part to launch. Long-term success would require *sustained* unity of purpose among the major powers. These difficulties make this approach attractive only

Jessica Mathews | 7

in comparison to the alternatives, but in that light, its virtues emerge sharply.

Inspections backed by a force authorized by the UN Security Council would carry unimpeachable legitimacy and command broad international support. The effort would therefore strengthen, rather than undermine, the cooperation the United States needs for long-term success in the war against terrorism. It would avoid a direct blow to the authority of the Security Council and the rule of law. It would avoid setting a dangerous precedent of a unilateral right to attack in "preventive self-defense." Although not likely to be welcomed by Iraq's neighbors, it would be their clear choice over war. Regional assistance (basing, over-flight rights, and so on) should therefore be more forthcoming. If successful, it would reduce Iraq's WMD threat to negligible levels. If a failure, it would lay an operational and political basis for a transition to a war to oust Saddam. The United States would be seen to have worked through the United Nations with the rest of the world rather than alone, and Iraq's intent would have been cleanly tested and found wanting. Baghdad would be isolated. In these circumstances, the risks to the region of a war to overthrow Iraq's government—from domestic pressure on shaky governments (Pakistan) to governments misreading U.S. intentions (Iran) to heightened Arab and Islamic anger toward the United States—would be sharply diminished.

Compared to a war aimed at regime change, the approach greatly reduces the risk of Saddam's using whatever WMD he has (probably against Israel) while a force aimed at his destruction is being assembled. On the political front, coercive inspections avoid the looming question of what regime would replace the current government. It would also avoid the risks of persistent instability in Iraq, its possible disintegration into Shia, Suni, and Kurdish regions, and the need to station tens of thousands of U.S. troops in the country for what could be a very long time.

A year ago, this approach would have been impossible. Since then, however, four factors have combined to make it achievable:

- ▶ greatly increased concern about WMD in the wake of September 11,
- ▶ Iraq's continued lies and intransigence even after major reform of the UN sanctions regime,
- ▶ Russia's embrace of the United States after the September 11 attacks, and
- ▶ the Bush administration's threats of unilateral military action, which have opened a political space that did not exist before.

Together, these changes have restored a consensus among the Security Council's five permanent members (P-5) regarding the need for action on Iraq's WMD that has not existed for the past five years.

CORE PREMISES

Several key premises underlie the new approach.

- ▶ *Inspections can work.* In their first five years, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which was responsible for inspecting and disarming Iraq's chemical, biological, and missile materials and capacities, and the IAEA Iraq Action Team, which did the same for Iraq's nuclear ones, achieved substantial successes. With sufficient human and technological resources, time, and political support, inspections can reduce Iraq's WMD threat, if not to zero, to a negligible level. (The term *inspections* encompasses a resumed discovery and disarmament phase and intrusive, ongoing monitoring and verification extending to dual-use facilities and the activities of key individuals.)
- ▶ *Saddam Hussein's overwhelming priority is to stay in power.* He will never willingly give up pursuit of WMD, but he will do so if convinced that the only alternative is his certain destruction and that of his regime.
- ▶ *A credible and continuing military threat involving substantial forces on Iraq's borders will be necessary both to get the inspectors back into Iraq and to enable them to do their job.* The

record from 1991 to the present makes clear that Iraq views UN WMD inspections as war by other means. There is no reason to expect this to change. Sanctions, inducements, negotiations, or periodic air strikes will not suffice to restore effective inspection. Negotiations in the present circumstances only serve Baghdad's goals of delay and diversion.

- ▶ *The UNSCOM/IAEA successes also critically depended on unity of purpose within the UN Security Council.* No amount of military force will be effective without unwavering political resolve behind it. Effective inspections cannot be reestablished until a way forward is found that the major powers and key regional states can support under the UN Charter.

NEGOTIATING COERCIVE INSPECTIONS

From roughly 1997 until recently, determined Iraqi diplomacy succeeded in dividing the P-5. Today, principally due to Iraq's behavior, Russia's new geopolitical stance, and U.S.-led reform of the sanctions regime, a limited consensus has reemerged. There is now agreement that Iraq has not met its obligations under UN Resolution 687 (which created the inspections regime) and that there is a need for the return of inspectors to Iraq. There is also support behind the new, yet-to-be tested inspection team known as the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC, created in December 1999 under Resolution 1284). Because three members of the P-5 abstained on the vote to create UNMOVIC, this development is particularly noteworthy. The May 2002 adoption of a revised sanctions plan was further evidence of a still fragile but real and evolving convergence of view on the Security Council.

Perhaps paradoxically, U.S. threats to act unilaterally against Iraq have the potential to strengthen this limited consensus. France, Russia, and China strongly share the view that only the Security Council can authorize the use of force—a

view to which Great Britain is also sympathetic. All four know that after eleven years of the United Nations' handling of the issue, a U.S. decision to act unilaterally against Iraq would be a tremendous blow to the authority of the institution and the Security Council in particular. They want to avoid any further marginalization of the Council since that would translate into a diminution of their individual influence. Thus, U.S. threats provide these four countries with a shared interest in finding a formula for the use of force against Iraq that would be effective, acceptable to the United States, and able to be authorized by the Council as a whole. *That formula could be found in a resolution authorizing multinational enforcement action to enable UNMOVIC to carry out its mandate.*

Achieving such an outcome would require a tremendous diplomatic effort on Washington's part. That, however, should not be seen as a serious deterrent. Achieving desired outcomes without resort to war is, in the first instance, what power is for. Launching the middle-ground approach would amount, in effect, to Washington and the rest of the P-5 re-seizing the diplomatic initiative from Baghdad.

The critical element will be that the United States makes clear that it forswears unilateral military action against Iraq for as long as international inspections are working. The United States would have to convince Iraq and others that this is not a perfunctory bow to international opinion preparatory to an invasion and that the United States' intent is to see inspections succeed, not a ruse to have them quickly fail. If Iraq is not convinced, it would have no reason to comply; indeed, quite the reverse because Baghdad would need whatever WMD it has to deter or fight a U.S. attack. *Given the past history, many countries will be deeply skeptical. To succeed, Washington will have to be steady, unequivocal, and unambiguous on this point.*

This does not mean that Washington need alter its declaratory policy favoring regime change in Iraq. Its stance would be that the United States continues to support regime change but will not take action to

force it while Iraq is in full compliance with international inspections. There would be nothing unusual in such a position. The United States has, for example, had a declaratory policy for regime change in Cuba for more than forty years.

Beyond the Security Council, U.S. diplomacy will need to recognize the significant differences in strategic interests among the states in the region. Some want a strong Iraq to offset Iran. Others fear a prosperous, pro-West Iraq producing oil to its full potential. Many fear and oppose U.S. military dominance in the region. Virtually all, however, agree that Iraq should be free of WMD, and they universally fear the instability that is likely to accompany a violent overthrow of the Iraqi government.

Moreover, notwithstanding the substantial U.S. presence required for enforced inspections and what will be widely felt to be an unfair double standard (acting against Iraq's WMD but not against Israel's), public opinion throughout the region would certainly be less aroused by multilateral inspections than by a unilateral U.S. invasion.

Thus, if faced with a choice between a war to achieve regime change and an armed, multilateral effort to eradicate Iraq's WMD, all the region's governments are likely to share a clear preference for the latter.

IMPLEMENTING COERCIVE INSPECTIONS

Under the coercive inspections plan, the Security Council would authorize the creation of an Inspections Implementation Force (IIF) to act as the enforcement arm for UNMOVIC and the IAEA task force. Under the new resolution, the inspections process is transformed from a game of cat and mouse punctuated by diversions and manufactured crises, in which conditions heavily favor Iraqi obstruction, into a last chance, "comply or else" operation. The inspection teams would return to Iraq accompanied by a military arm strong enough to force immediate entry into any site at any time with complete security for the inspection team. No terms

would be negotiated regarding the dates, duration, or modalities of inspection. If Iraq chose not to accept, or established a record of noncompliance, the U.S. regime-change option or, better, a UN authorization of "use of all necessary means" would come into play.

Overall control is vested in the civilian executive chairman of the inspection teams. He would determine what sites will be inspected, without interference from the Security Council, and whether military forces should accompany any particular inspection. Some inspections—for example, personnel interviews—may be better conducted without any accompanying force; others will require maximum insurance of prompt entry and protection. The size and composition of the accompanying force would be the decision of the IIF commander, and its employment would be under his command.

The IIF must be strong and mobile enough to support full inspection of any site, including so-called sensitive sites and those previously designated as off limits. "No-fly" and "no-drive" zones near to-be-inspected sites would be imposed with minimal advance notice to Baghdad. Violations of these bans would subject the opposing forces to attack. Robust operational and communications security would allow surprise inspections. In the event surprise fails and "spontaneous" gatherings of civilians attempt to impede inspections, rapid response riot control units must be available.

The IIF must be highly mobile, composed principally of air and armored cavalry units. It might include an armored cavalry regiment or equivalent on the Jordan-Iraq border, an air-mobile brigade in eastern Turkey, and two or more brigades and corps-sized infrastructure based in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Air support including fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft and continuous air and ground surveillance, provided by AWACS and JSTARS, will be required.

The IIF must have a highly sophisticated intelligence capability. Iraq has become quite experienced in concealment and in its ability to penetrate

and mislead inspection teams. It has had four unimpeded years to construct new underground sites, build mobile facilities, alter records, and so on. To overcome that advantage and ensure military success, the force must be equipped with the full range of reconnaissance, surveillance, listening, encryption, and photo interpretation capabilities.

The bulk of the force will be U.S. For critical political reasons, however, the IIF must be as multinational as possible and as small as practicable. Its design and composition should strive to make clear that the IIF is not a U.S. invasion force in disguise, but a UN enforcement force. Optimally, it would include, at a minimum, elements from all of the P-5, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, as well as others in the region.

Consistent with the IIF's mandate and UN origin, Washington will have to rigorously resist the temptation to use the force's access and the information it collects for purposes unrelated to its job. Nothing will more quickly sow division within the Security Council than excesses in this regard.

Operationally, on the civilian front, experts disagree as to whether UNMOVIC's mandate contains disabling weaknesses. Although some provisions could certainly be improved, it would be unwise to attempt to renegotiate Resolution 1284. Some of its weaknesses can be overcome in practice by tacit agreement (some have already been), some will be met by the vastly greater technological capabilities conferred by the IIF, and some can be corrected through the language of the IIF resolution. Four factors are critical:

- ▶ *Adequate time.* The inspection process must not be placed under any arbitrary deadline because that would provide Baghdad with an enormous incentive for delay. It is in everyone's interest to complete the disarmament phase of the job as quickly as possible, but timelines cannot be fixed in advance.
- ▶ *Experienced personnel.* UNMOVIC must not be forced to climb a learning curve as UNSCOM did but must be ready to operate with maxi-

mum effectiveness from the outset. To do so, it must be able to take full advantage of individuals with irreplaceable, on-the-ground experience.

- ▶ *Provision for two-way intelligence sharing with national governments.* UNSCOM experience proves that provision for intelligence sharing with national governments is indispensable. Inspectors need much information not available from open sources or commercial satellites and prompt, direct access to defectors. For their part, intelligence agencies will not provide a flow of information without feedback on its value and accuracy. It must be accepted by all governments that such interactions are necessary and that the dialogue between providers and users would be on a strictly confidential, bilateral basis, protected from other governments. The individual in charge of information collection and assessment on the inspection team should have an intelligence background and command the trust of those governments that provide the bulk of the intelligence.
- ▶ *Ability to track Iraqi procurement activities outside the country.* UNSCOM discovered covert transactions between Iraq and more than 500 companies from more than 40 countries between 1993 and 1998. Successful inspections would absolutely depend, therefore, on the team's authority to track procurement efforts both inside and outside Iraq, including at Iraqi embassies abroad. Accordingly, UNMOVIC should include a staff of specially trained customs experts, and inspections would need to include relevant ministries, commercial banks, and trading companies. As with military intelligence, tracking Iraqi procurement must not be used to collect unrelated commercial or technical intelligence or impede legal trade.

CONCLUSION

War should never be undertaken until the alternatives have been exhausted. In this case that moral imperative is buttressed by the very real

possibility that a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein, *even if successful in doing so*, could subtract more from U.S. security and long-term political interests than it adds.

Political chaos in Iraq or an equally bad successor regime committed to WMD to prevent an invasion from ever happening again, possibly horrible costs to Israel, greater enmity toward the United States among Arab and other Muslim publics, a severe blow to the authority of the United Nations and the Security Council, and a giant step by the United States toward—in Zbigniew Brzezinski's phrase—political self-isolation are just some of the costs, in addition to potentially severe economic impacts and the loss of American and

innocent Iraqi lives, that must be weighed.

In this case an alternative does exist. It blends the imperative for military threat against a regime that has learned how to divide and conquer the major powers with the legitimacy of UN sanction and multilateral action. Technically and operationally, it is less demanding than a war. Diplomatically, it requires a much greater effort for a greater gain. The message of an unswerving international determination to halt WMD proliferation will be heard far beyond Iraq. The only real question is can the major powers see their mutual interest, act together, and stay the course? Who is more determined—Iraq or the P-5?

A MILITARY FRAMEWORK FOR COERCIVE INSPECTIONS

Charles G. Boyd, Gen., USAF (Ret.)

The premise underlying the framework presented below distinguishes between Saddam Hussein with and without weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, or chemical. Without such weapons he is a problem for the Iraqi people; with them he is a problem—a huge one—for the rest of the world. Thus, the objective of the United Nations—and the United States—should be to disable rather than remove him, since that is the only course of action that can be sanctioned in international law and the only one likely to attract significant multilateral support. It may also have the added benefit of making Saddam's future removal easier for the Iraqi people.

The framework assumes that the United States can persuade the UN Security Council's permanent members (P-5) to accept the concept of *coercive* inspections by conditionally forswearing its own unilateral option of military invasion. The condition of the forswearing would be that Saddam complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions pertaining to WMD inspections as well as to the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement (Resolution 687).

Yet a second assumption is that Saddam will never, under any conceivable circumstances, comply with any effective inspection terms unless he becomes convinced that the alternative is his certain destruction and that of his regime. A coercive U.N. inspection program must therefore be accompanied with

an unambiguous assurance that Iraqi obstruction of the inspection process would release the United States from its pledge not to invade. That assurance, to be credible and utterly clear, must be made in the form of a Security Council resolution, which builds on Resolution 687 and the UNMOVIC charter (Resolution 1284). It could, but need not, seek to commit all participants in the inspection program to participation in an invasion should Saddam invite it by obstructing the process. At that point, the United States could proceed unilaterally or with a coalition of the willing.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The basic concept of a coercive inspection program is one in which a robust military enforcement arm would be added to support UNMOVIC and IAEA, through adoption of the new Security Council resolution mentioned above. An Inspection Implementation Force (IIF) would consist of modern air and land forces sufficient to impose entry into or destruction upon any potential weapons site, or, with augmentation, transition into a credible invasion force.

The inspection program would consist of two phases: (1) initial disarmament or certification; and (2) ongoing monitoring and verification. For the purposes of this paper, the latter phase will not be developed other than to assume that once certification has been accomplished, force requirements

will be largely reduced, and most of the IIF may be withdrawn from each host country. Provisions for its rapid reconstitution would, however, be included in the resolution should Saddam choose to resume obstruction of the inspection process.

The initial disarmament phase would consist of locating and disassembling or destroying all WMD weapons, materials, and related facilities. It would continue until the UNMOVIC executive chairman certifies full Iraqi compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions and Gulf War WMD provisions. No time limit should be placed on this phase, but with adequate team composition it should be accomplished in less than two years.

Once chartered, the executive chairman must have full authority to choose:

- ▶ All inspection details as to location, timing, and duration without further instructions from the Security Council;
- ▶ Whether and to what purpose U.N. military forces will accompany inspection teams;
- ▶ When the operations of Iraqi air and ground forces will be proscribed (corresponding to periods during which inspection operations are under way); and
- ▶ What reconnaissance targets are to be covered by the IIF forces in service of the inspection process (that is, reconnaissance tasking authority).

Choice of, and confidence in, the UNMOVIC executive chairman will be crucial to the success of the inspection program because he must be vested with considerable power and freedom to operate independently from Security Council day-to-day supervision and instructions. The Security Council should retain the power to remove the executive chairman if necessary but must determine not to interfere with his authority in the field.

Since this concept depends for its success on the use of powerful military forces to ensure inspectors can go where they wish and see what they want, the executive chairman must have the authority to determine when and to what purpose the IIF accom-

panies the inspectors. Some, perhaps a majority, of the inspections will be conducted under fairly benign circumstances in which a sizable accompanying military force will not be required and might even be an impediment to the atmosphere the inspectors are trying to create. Other inspection sites may be prized highly by both inspectors and the Iraqi government and require powerful forces with unmistakable intent to ensure immediate access. Still others may produce circumstances in which the executive chairman chooses to withdraw his inspectors and call for destruction of the site by on-call air power. These choices should be left to the executive chairman, always with an eye toward ensuring sufficient force to succeed in the task while providing complete security for the inspection team. The size and composition of these forces and method of employment should be left to the IIF commander.

When inspections are to be conducted in which the chief inspector requires accompanying force, the safety of the inspectors and the success of their mission must be assured by restricting all Iraqi military operations in the air and on the ground. "No-fly" and "no-drive" zones must be established throughout that region of the country in which the inspection is being conducted. No Iraqi ground forces would be allowed to assemble and move; no air forces—fixed wing or helicopter—would be allowed to fly. The IIF commander, through established notification procedures, would inform Iraq of the time, duration, and area throughout which Iraqi forces must stand down. Any violation of that prohibition would constitute a hostile act subjecting the offending Iraqi forces to attack and destruction, as well as the military installations from which they came. It would also constitute Iraqi noncompliance, in the clearest form, with conditions of the Security Council resolutions and would release the United States and its potential coalition partners from the pledge not to invade.

Intelligence, always key to military success, is equally so to the envisioned inspection program. Discovering illicit weapons programs and storage sites and overcoming very effective Iraqi concealment

techniques will require sophisticated planning and teamwork.

The kind of intelligence capability that only the United States can provide must be made available to the inspectors: satellite and U-2 imagery, Global Hawk, Predator, relevant electronic surveillance, and other covert capabilities. A military photo interpreter unit should also be provided by the IIF. The executive chairman would be able to define the intelligence requirements to be fulfilled by the IIF commander.

Operational and communications security must be of the highest order in this concept of operations. Whereas true surprise inspections were not routine throughout UNSCOM's history, they must now become the standard. To avoid the problem of Iraq moving illicit materials before the inspectors arrive and to reduce the problem of civilian mobs gathering "spontaneously" at the intended inspection site, the exact time and location of inspections must be utterly unknown to the Iraqis in advance.

Operational security will be enhanced by not requiring advance approval of inspections from New York. UNSCOM's frustration with Iraqi bugging of their rooms and facilities can be avoided this time with the help of top-rank security professionals. The IIF can also provide state-of-the-art encrypted communications capability as well as special equipment for conducting private, secure interviews with Iraqis.

INSPECTION IMPLEMENTATION FORCE: COMPOSITION AND TASK

The force in support of the inspection program must be carefully constructed to fulfill the following requirements:

- ▶ *Robust and responsive enough to support any size inspection team on any size inspection site, including those previously designated "sensitive" or off limits, such as presidential palaces or even military bases.* When used, the force accompanying inspectors must constitute an utterly intimidating presence on any potential inspection site.

- ▶ *Small enough, and multinational enough, that it does not appear to be an invasion force looking for an excuse to invade.* The objective of removing Saddam's WMD but not Saddam himself must be credible—not only to Saddam but also to those whose support we seek in the region and the Security Council.
- ▶ *So composed that it can quickly become an invasion force if necessary.* This means an adequate amount of pre-positioned equipment and supplies such that, with the addition of troops, it can be turned into a fighting force. It also means a force composed in such a way that no critical tasks are left to the multinational players, in the event that some choose not to participate should an invasion be required.

The force required for enforcing the inspection program must be very mobile, principally involving air-mobile and armored cavalry units. It must also have very rapid response units trained and equipped for riot control, in the event that the element of surprise fails and Iraq is able to assemble a civilian crowd for disruptive purposes. A notional force suited to this mission would include an armored cavalry regiment or equivalent on the Jordan-Iraq border, an air-mobile brigade or two in eastern Turkey, and two or more brigades with corps-sized infrastructure, poised in northern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, around which an augmentation force could be developed if necessary.

Air support would be critical, since the safety valve during inspection operations will be those aircraft enforcing the no-fly, no-drive zones. The IIF commander will decide what areas will be restricted from Iraqi use, and for what duration, in support of inspector activity. During those periods, continuous air and ground surveillance with AWACS, JSTARS, Predator, and Global Hawk will be required, as well as the lethal force provided by fighter and fighter bomber aircraft. Iraq is currently denied use of 60 percent of its airspace by forces of Southern and Northern Watch but not to the degree of denial envisioned in this concept of operations. IIF air forces

must be capable of sustaining no-fly, no-drive coverage for up to a 24-hour period over two-thirds of Iraqi territory. The force required to do that would be two to three times the current Northern and Southern Watch components in equipment and personnel.

Although the United States could deploy all of the constituent force elements for the duration of an effective inspection program, a more international solution would have far more political value. One of the most important ways to convey the Security Council's seriousness will be to collect implementation force elements from the states most concerned with and affected by Iraq's clandestine weapons programs, with of course the exception of Israel and Iran. A combined force with components from the P-5 as well as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan would not only collect a significant array of military capabilities but would also signal powerful political resolve to Saddam's regime. Although most of the named states would be unable to contribute major military units, collective participation at any level will convey a strong international community commitment to countering proliferation. The cost of operating these forces should be defrayed by Iraq, under the provision of Article 9 of Resolution 1284.

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

Although any number of arrangements might suffice for the command of the implementation force, the Security Council should establish or authorize the simplest practical setup. Just as civilian authorities set objectives for U.S. forces (and U.S. officers are responsible for achieving those objectives), UNMOVIC's executive chairman would set tasks for the UN implementation force commander. That commander, on behalf of the United Nations, would command the resources, determine the appropriate levels of force, and exercise the latitude needed to accomplish authorized missions. One overall command can direct and integrate the operations of air and ground units, even if units are widely distributed to ensure regional security. Each

ground force component's responsibilities would normally be set by geographical boundaries, and each could include elements from several different nations. Air elements from different nations routinely work together in the region and could be integrated into a responsive command structure. Selecting commanders and staff members from the large collective body of those who have studied and experienced Iraqi military practices will further magnify the raw military potential of the combined force. The overall commander of the IIF should be from the nation committing the largest number of forces, presumably the United States.

With the Security Council defining the overall outcomes that the inspection program must accomplish to end sanctions and blunt Iraq's threat to its neighbors, and the executive chairman setting specific inspection objectives, the IIF will have the unique and critical role of compensating for the eventualities no policy body can foresee. The implementation force must therefore be extremely well equipped, well trained, and in a high state of readiness.

The notional force described above is intended for purposes of approximate scale only. Current military planners with sophisticated planning tools not available to this author can define force type and size with far greater precision. That will be the easy part of turning this concept of operation into a real plan.

Of greater difficulty will be forging the political solidarity necessary to confront the issue of Iraq's WMD in an effective manner. Two principles described earlier are indispensable to the success of this or any concept of effective weapons inspection in Iraq: (1) inspections must be conducted at the location, time, and duration of the inspector's choosing, and (2) any major incident or pattern of Iraqi obstruction of the inspection process will ensure a full-scale invasion to follow. Given that choice—and no other—Saddam Hussein will relent.

With the future of threat reduction depending on the precedent set in eradicating Iraq's illicit weapons, all nations should view the concept of coercive inspection backed by force as an investment in their future security.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR WEAPONS INSPECTORS IN IRAQ

Rolf Ekeus

For a UN inspection organization there are two principal approaches to obtaining necessary data on Iraq's WMD program: One is on-site inspections carried out by its own inspection teams; the other is intelligence sharing by governments. Although the former is by far the most important, especially with regard to quantity, intelligence sharing has proven indispensable for a successful inspection regime. More than 30 governments provided UNSCOM with intelligence data, but more regular intelligence sharing was limited to fewer than five.

There are certain requirements to make such cooperation effective and feasible:

- ▶ Governments must have confidence in the competence of the leadership and arrangement of the UN inspection team. This requires professional handling and protection of data provided to the future inspection organization (UNMOVIC).
- ▶ The head of information collection and assessment in the inspection organization should be an expert with a background in intelligence. In UNSCOM, first a Canadian and then a British citizen were in charge of this work. Both had credibility in the eyes of the major potential contributor organizations because they had worked inside the military intelligence organizations of their respective home countries. The

United States and the United Kingdom can be expected to provide significant intelligence, but it is necessary that the head of the information collection and assessment unit comes from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand, because their respective intelligence organizations cooperate broadly and are credible in the eyes of the United States. The senior American in the organization should preferably have a good standing with the U.S. intelligence community as well.

- ▶ The inspection organization cannot handle defectors in regard to their protection, families, identity, and so on, but it is important that some selected experienced inspection personnel be allowed to carry out debriefings and interviews directly. Those who have had in-country experience—in other words, the UN inspectors—are best placed to interview Iraqi defectors, who are notoriously imprecise about locations and dates. UN inspectors, knowledgeable about local geography and other circumstances, could be much more effective in debriefings than other personnel without such skills.
- ▶ Feedback is essential for effective work. Thus, the providing organization must be given the chance to get access to the inspection organization's assessment of the usefulness of its intelligence. This

Rolf Ekeus | 17

can be done by information about inspection activities or internal analysis for which the shared intelligence has been used. Only then can the government in question evaluate the credibility of its sources. Therefore, a dialogue must be created between the user and provider of such sensitive information. However, the inspection organization must protect this dialogue from other governments: It must be a matter of a purely bilateral exchange of information.

- ▶ In UNSCOM's experience, a pre-condition for a government's cooperation about information on companies in its country that had, wittingly or unwittingly, supplied material to Iraq's WMD program was that all information about such companies—or access to their management or technical personnel—was absolutely confidential in relation to other governments, including allies.
- ▶ Starting in 1996, UNSCOM applied some in-country listening arrangements in support of inspections, which raised reasonable suspicions that Iraq was hiding material from the inspectors by moving sought-after equipment or components in the country to avoid detection. This type of asset is politically sensitive and must be handled with discretion under the personal direction of the head of the inspection organization. Such operations require close cooperation, including protected communications, with supporting governments. Here, there is a temptation for supporting governments to use the system for "extracurricular" purposes: This must be avoided at all costs. Some clumsy efforts in that direction were made during UNSCOM inspections. They brought some harm to UNSCOM's credibility and yielded nothing of value to the perpetrator.

OVERHEAD IMAGERY

No inspection regime would be effective without access to overhead imagery—satellite or other.

UNSCOM had an excellent and flexible system in its arrangement with the United States, which provided it with imagery taken from high-altitude reconnaissance flights. Under UNSCOM auspices, the United States was operating U-2s over Iraq from a base in Saudi Arabia. The U-2 flights were employed either with high-resolution cameras directed at sites, factories, and installations associated with the WMD project or with a "sweep-camera" that could cover large areas of Iraqi territory. The latter was useful for detection of new construction activities such as facilities above- and underground or work on roads, the electrical grid, or water supply installations. Linked to the potential of quick on-site inspections, the U-2 operations became a uniquely effective tool of inspection.

U-2 operations would work well for a new inspection regime, provided that the inspection regime is free to determine the objects for photography. Furthermore, as was the case for the UNSCOM-United States cooperation, the imagery must be the property of the inspection organization, and no sharing with other governments should be done without prior approval of the United States.

Because of the large quantity of imagery, a primary screening by the United States would be helpful, because the inspection organization would otherwise be forced to employ a number of additional staff for photo interpretation (UNSCOM had only two such staff members). Screening areas concerning images especially requires a large number of photo interpreters. To help with this task, Israeli photo interpreters assisted UNSCOM under arrangements worked out in cooperation with the U.S. government.

Considering the small but not insignificant risk of attack by Iraqi air defense on the U-2, arrangements must be made to protect the U-2. UNSCOM practices could be followed. Thus, 24 hours prior to the planned entry of the U-2 into Iraqi airspace, the Iraqi government should be notified concerning points of entry and exit. Of course no approval is expected, but Iraq must recognize

the notification before the entry into Iraqi airspace. The U-2 aircraft must carry UN insignia, and the pilot must carry UN inspector identification.

SATELLITE IMAGERY

Ideally, satellite imagery should be made available to the international organization. However, satellite imagery, due to secrecy rules, is under strict

governmental control, which makes its use restrictive and not available for the flexible needs of an international organization. With radically improved resolution quality, commercial satellite imagery can be of some use, but such imagery would require considerable capability for photo interpretation, which would also limit its usefulness for an international organization.

MULTILATERAL SUPPORT FOR A NEW REGIME

Joseph Cirincione

As the dominant military power on the planet, the United States alone can conduct a wide range of military operations against Iraq. But it does not have to act alone. There is now considerable support in the UN Security Council for enforcing a robust inspection regime to bring Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions. Such joint action offers considerable promise of success with few of the risks attendant large-scale unilateral military operations in the Gulf.

Since the mid-1990s, however, the Security Council has been deeply divided over Iraq and unable to take effective measures. The council-mandated disarmament process has been highly politicized, and the integrity of inspections compromised. Nonetheless, the Security Council remains the most important source of international legitimacy in dealing with questions of international peace and security.

In the absence of international support, unilateral military action against Iraq may well entail serious short-term and long-term problems for the United States and the international legal system the United States has helped create. In addition to global economic disruptions and regional instability, there will be serious consequences for the rule of law and international institutions, particularly the relevance of the UN Charter and the authority of the Security Council.

PAST DIVISIONS UNDERMINED INSPECTIONS

The history of UNSCOM demonstrates that strong political support from the Security Council for the inspection agency is not only a prerequisite for UNSCOM's success but also its lifeline. Serious divisions in the Security Council, particularly among its permanent members, constantly undermined UNSCOM's work in Iraq and eventually prevented it from implementing its mandate. As Iraq's influence grew in the council, UNSCOM's integrity was questioned, while attempts were made to shift the burden of proof to UNSCOM. Operation Desert Fox deepened the council's schism, as Anglo-American military action angered the other P-5 members. In the end, the credibility of UNSCOM was badly damaged by its special relationship with Washington and its reported involvement in espionage activities, which eventually cost it the council's support and precipitated its demise.

Divisions within the Security Council also overshadowed the future of the new inspections body, UNMOVIC. A paralyzed Security Council was not able to agree on a new omnibus resolution establishing a new inspections system for nearly one year. Even when the council finally adopted Resolution 1284 in December 1999, its division was manifested by the abstentions of three permanent members, seriously weakening UNMOVIC's mandate

Joseph Cirincione | 21

at its inception. It is little surprise that Iraq quickly rejected the new mandatory resolution adopted under Chapter VII.

The council's continued divisions had negative effects on the sanctions regime too. As the humanitarian situation gravely deteriorated (as a result of Iraq's refusal to implement the council-mandated humanitarian program over five years), Russia, China, and France also became advocates of Iraq's humanitarian cause. Iraq finally accepted the oil-for-food program in 1996, but the program has accorded Iraq a powerful economic leverage in the council. Because the program allows Iraq to choose its trade partners, Baghdad has actively exploited the program to cultivate its influence in the council and mobilize its allies to change the council's policy by granting them lucrative trade deals. The Clinton administration's relatively hands-off policy toward Iraq in the wake of Desert Fox lent a hand to Iraq (albeit unwittingly). In the fall of 2000, a paralyzed sanctions committee was unable to act on Baghdad's bid to erode the sanctions, which allowed Baghdad to restore international air links.

NEW SUPPORT FOR UNMOVIC

Recently, however, council unity has gradually returned. There is now a strong consensus in the council on the need for the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq and unanimous support for UNMOVIC.

As the Bush administration brought Iraq back into focus, its initiative to revamp the sanctions regime in the spring of 2001 created a new dynamic in the Security Council. Washington's active diplomacy resulted in French and Chinese agreement to restructure the sanctions regime by adopting the Goods Review List (GRL). After September 11, Russia joined the U.S. effort to fight terrorism and the relationship between the two countries warmed considerably. As Washington threatened to take military action against Baghdad, Moscow stepped up its efforts to persuade Baghdad to accept weapons inspections, and in November 2001 Moscow joined

the consensus on Resolution 1382 (2002) in which the council expressed its intention to adopt the GRL within six months. This led to the adoption of resolution 1409 in May 2002—the most sweeping restructuring of the sanctions regime yet. Thus, the council was able to restore agreement on the most important humanitarian issue.

Although the council enjoys a new spirit of cooperation on Iraq, this does not mean that the P-5 is now completely united on Iraq issues. Russia, for example, remains eager to negotiate a "comprehensive" settlement, and some differences remain concerning the secretary-general's role.

REGIME CHANGE

Following Desert Fox, and claiming to have degraded Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver WMD, the Clinton administration quietly disengaged from Iraq. Desert Fox was not aimed at bringing Iraq back into compliance with Security Council resolutions but was an attempt to neutralize Iraq's WMD programs militarily. As a consequence, with the exception of the continued enforcement of the "no-fly" zones, U.S. military threats on Iraq diminished significantly. There was a corresponding increase in Iraqi recalcitrance.

The Bush administration's military threats have had a significant impact on Iraq's position on weapons inspections. A year ago, Iraq was adamant, rejecting Resolution 1284 and declaring its firm rejection of anything associated with the resolution, especially UNMOVIC and its executive chairman, Hans Blix. Iraq repeatedly stressed that it had completed its disarmament obligations and flatly rejected the possibility of weapons inspections. However, as the United States stepped up its threat to change the Iraqi regime by force, the Iraqi leadership resumed dialogue with Secretary-General Annan, hinting at the possibility of accepting inspections.

In his dialogue, the secretary-general has sought to focus on the return of weapons inspectors, but Iraq has claimed that no major disarmament issues remain, while attempting to shift the focus of dis-

cussions to the mechanism of lifting sanctions, no-fly zones, U.S. threats on its government, and the creation of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the Middle East (alluding to Israel's nuclear weapons program). As long as there were no immediate military threats, the Iraqi leadership did not need its trump card—weapons inspections—to stave off U.S. strikes. In addition, from Iraq's perspective, the United Nations, along with the Arab League, is a useful policy tool to mobilize global and Arab opinion against the United States. The Iraqis thus try to use the secretary-general and weapons inspectors to serve as convenient buffers to U.S. military action. In a sense, they are "human shields" for the Iraqi leadership.

USE OF FORCE

Despite the council's unity regarding the new sanctions regime and the resumption of weapons inspectors, it remains sharply divided over the way forward on the issue of disarmament in Iraq, particularly the prospects for the use of force. Russia, China, and France, albeit to varying degrees, remain important allies for Baghdad. Even if Iraq continues to reject weapons inspections, they would not support U.S. military action—especially if Washington's declaratory objective is to overthrow the regime. Generally speaking, these nations can be expected to oppose to the use of force against Iraq to the greatest extent possible.

This is not limited to Iraq issues. Russia and China, and to a lesser extent France, are wary of the Bush administration's unilateral policies, especially regarding its perceived haste in resorting to military force. Russia and China are particularly averse to the use of force, as was demonstrated during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military campaign in Kosovo. They also have serious concerns about the implications of the use of force for issues of their own concern, such as Chechnya, Taiwan, and Tibet. The three nations share the view that only the Security Council can authorize the use of force—a view to which Great

Britain is also sympathetic. Increasingly unsettled by U.S. power and its developing unilateralism, they would seek to check U.S. military action through the United Nations. Although U.S. primacy is indisputable outside the United Nations, within the Security Council the United States remains equal to these other nations as a veto-wielding permanent member.

These council members fear, however, that despite their strong opposition, the United States administration still prefers military solutions to these international security issues, sidestepping the United Nations, as in the case of Kosovo. The irony is that adamant opposition from other council members could drive the United States away from the Security Council, further marginalizing the council and the United Nations. Washington's unilateral resort to military force would certainly undermine the council's authority and credibility, and correspondingly, the power and prestige accorded to the other permanent members.

Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom are well aware of this dilemma. This suggests that even though they oppose Washington's use of force to remove Saddam Hussein, they may realize that it is in their interest to work out a formula for the use of force against Iraq that is acceptable to the United States and that can be authorized by the council as a whole. It follows that if Washington seeks the Council's authorization for the use of force to "support inspections," opposition from Russia, China, and France may not be insurmountable—although it may still require considerable diplomatic efforts.

THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

In light of the growing unity among the P-5 regarding Iraq issues, the United States could first pursue the goal of establishing an effective inspection regime through the current system established by Resolution 1284. The current process, including UNMOVIC's preparatory work and the secretary-general's effort to bring inspectors back to Iraq, enjoy broad international support.

There are several immediate options for improving the effectiveness of inspections and increasing the pressure on Iraq to accept inspections:

- ▶ *Measures under Article 41.* The United States could pursue vigorous and creative diplomacy to explore various UN-mandated measures that have not yet been tried. For example, a number of measures enumerated in the Article 41 of the UN Charter have not been applied, such as complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations. The council could also reinstate travel bans on ranking Iraqi officials. In addition, the United States could seriously pursue the establishment of an international tribunal on war crimes in Iraq. Confronted with the possibility of all-out U.S. invasion, other council members would be more willing to consider these measures. They will certainly increase pressure on the Government of Iraq to accept weapons inspections.
- ▶ *Use of force to support inspections.* The United States could seek Security Council authorization for the limited use of force to coerce Iraq into accepting weapons inspections. A new council resolution could contain a deadline for Iraqi compliance. This option offers an important diplomatic advantage for the United States by according international legitimacy to military action against Iraq. Negotiations in the council may require considerable time and effort and may also result in certain constraints on the use of force and rules of engagement. Nonetheless, the international community would accept the legitimacy of U.S. military action and even extend military assistance. This option would also provide incentives to other council members. It would preserve the council's unity and authority. Faced with the prospect of all-out U.S. invasion, even Iraq's staunch allies in the council may be swayed to agree to take decisive measures against Iraq, including use of force. They share

Washington's concern about Iraq's WMD programs, but they seek to control them through the United Nations.

- ▶ *Subcontracting inspections.* It might be possible to persuade other P-5 members to replace Resolution 1284 with a new inspections system fashioned after the "subcontract" model—that is, inspections would be conducted by a coalition of "willing" governments. UNMOVIC's current mandate would be implemented by groups of inspectors provided by like-minded governments. UNMOVIC could be totally disbanded or significantly reduced to a liaison office to the secretary-general. The concept of subcontracting is nothing new in UN peacekeeping operations. Since the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the United Nations has subcontracted peacekeeping operations to a coalition of governments in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), East Timor (UNTAET), and Afghanistan (ISAF). In these cases, peacekeeping forces are not traditional UN peacekeepers led by UN commanders; rather, they are multinational security operations authorized by the Security Council.

The subcontracted inspections model may have some merits—it would be more agile and coherent and much easier to achieve synergy between inspections and military operations. But it would require colossal diplomatic efforts to persuade Russia, France, and China to consent to this model. Although the council is united on the need for weapons inspections in Iraq, there remain serious differences as to how the United Nations should devise and implement an effective inspection system. Should Washington seek to reinforce the current inspections regime based on Resolution 1284, it would encounter a number of challenges in achieving the unity of the P-5. The council's current unanimous support for UNMOVIC did not come easily. Therefore, it remains an open question whether the council will support any attempt to alter the current inspections regime based on

Resolution 1284. Russia, France, and China would resist any dilution of UNMOVIC's UN character and object to reinstating a system similar to UNSCOM. Reestablishing a "Super UNSCOM" would require a new Security Council resolution.

COERCIVE INSPECTIONS: THE MIDDLE GROUND

A most viable approach would appear to be the use-of-force option. Without changing the current inspection system established by Resolution 1284, the Security Council could authorize the use of force specifically for the purpose of enforcing inspections. Because all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council regarding Iraq's disarmament obligations were adopted under Chapter VII, it would be a logical course of action for the Security Council to order enforcement action. As in the case of Operation Desert Storm, a coalition of like-minded countries would deploy armed forces and initiate military action so that UNMOVIC inspectors could carry out its mandate. Decisions on the modality of military operation, such as air cover, military escort, and limited occupation, could be left to a coalition of governments. Meanwhile, reaffirming the previous council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 687 and 1284, including its commitment regarding sanctions, would increase international legitimacy, the credibility of the Security Council, and hence the legitimacy and credibility of U.S. diplomacy.

Finally, a new diplomatic initiative should take into account the timeline of the current process initiated by the secretary-general. Should Iraq accept UNMOVIC inspections, this would trigger a new process centered on UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Obviously, such a process will generate a new dynamic in the council.

CONCLUSION

Although disarmament in Iraq requires a rigorous inspection system that at least threatens the use of force, the council's unity and international support are also critical in establishing effective inspections. Securing other P-5 members' agreement remains a major challenge for the United States. In the face of Baghdad's diplomatic offensives and shared interests with council members, Washington will have to commit to consistent and strenuous diplomatic engagement with other P-5 members to achieve and preserve council unity.

The P-5's recent positions on Iraq indicate positive developments and hint at useful clues to future action. First, the council is now united on the need for weapons inspections and unanimously supports UNMOVIC. Second, the U.S. threat to change the Iraq regime has engendered changes on the part of Russia, France, and China, signalling their willingness to agree to more decisive measures on Iraq. Third, Washington's vigorous diplomatic engagement with other P-5 members is required for obtaining international support for military action, and its sustained focus on Iraq is key to achieving P-5 unity in the Security Council. Finally, while a divided Security Council has limited the secretary-general's use of his good offices, a united council could allow him to play a supportive role by conveying a strong, unequivocal message to Iraq.

It should be obvious that it is always in Washington's interest to secure the council's support for its policy goals and the international legitimacy this confers. It now appears possible that the United States could develop an acceptable formula for multilateral military action to support inspections and secure council authorization for the limited use of force.

PERSUADING SADDAM WITHOUT DESTABILIZING THE GULF

Patrick Clawson

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein seems unlikely to cooperate with the inspections mandated by UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) in the absence of credible threats of the use of force. Comprehensive economic sanctions did not have that effect. Saddam showed that he could endure comprehensive sanctions longer than the international community could sustain them; in the end, it was the United Nations that substantially loosened the restrictions rather than Saddam who cooperated with UNSCR mandates. It also seems unlikely that Saddam would be induced to cooperate were there a "light at the end of the tunnel," because it seems that his ambitions are so grand that he cannot be accommodated.

Indeed, the prospect of limited air strikes may be insufficient to secure Saddam's cooperation. Saddam seems to have decided that such air strikes will be episodic rather than sustained and that the limitations the United States will impose on itself about what targets to hit will prevent the strikes from being regime-threatening. At the least, air strikes have to date not been sufficient to secure Iraqi cooperation with UNSCR mandates, which suggests that Iraqi cooperation may come only with a credible threat of regime overthrow.

Making the threat of regime overthrow credible will not be easy, given the heated rhetoric used by the last three U.S. presidents, which to date has not produced much. U.S. coup-promotion activ-

ity has not impressed Saddam. Nor has U.S. assistance to the Iraqi opposition led Saddam to feel sufficiently threatened so as to cooperate with UNSCR-mandated inspections. He may well question U.S. resolve to commit the forces necessary for his overthrow. In this environment, it seems unlikely that any U.S. declaratory policy, no matter how explicit or severe, will be sufficient to secure Saddam's cooperation with the inspections.

Even if persuaded of U.S. resolve, Saddam may believe that regional states will be unwilling to provide the United States the access it would need to carry out regime-threatening military action. He would have good reason to believe that Turkey and the Arab Gulf monarchies prefer the status quo, with a weakened Iraqi regime and an implicit U.S. security guarantee in the event of Iraqi aggression, to the alternatives—either the "bad" alternative of a failed state in Iraq or the "good" alternative of a democratic pro-Western Iraq. (A federal democratic Iraq with a largely autonomous Kurdish region is a very bad precedent in Turkish eyes, whereas the Saudis would not like losing their position as the United States' privileged partner in the Gulf, nor would they like seeing Iraq become an oil superpower displacing Saudi Arabia's position as lynchpin of the world oil market.) Saddam may also believe that he can successfully pressure regional states not to give U.S. forces sufficient access to threaten his regime; after all, he has had great success with the

Patrick Clawson | 27

argument that Iraq will be in the region forever while the United States may leave.

If this analysis is correct, then securing continuing Iraqi cooperation with inspections will require a sustained U.S. presence in the region enforced by a U.S.-led military force of a size and character sufficient to threaten the overthrow of Saddam's regime. But such a force could threaten the stability of the Persian Gulf in at least two ways: by bringing into question the close security cooperation between the United States and regional states and by undermining the stability of the Gulf monarchies.

ENDANGERING U.S.-REGIONAL TIES

Were they to agree to a sustained U.S. presence aimed at Iraq's regime, regional states would think they were doing the United States a considerable favor. In return, they would expect the United States to address some of their concerns; in particular, the Arab monarchies would expect U.S. pressure on Israel, and Turkey would anticipate military aid, better access to U.S. trade and finance, and assistance in its relations with the European Union. But many in the United States would regard a continuing U.S. deployment on Iraq's borders as a favor to the regional states, because those states would be the ones being protected from Saddam. There would likely be calls for the regional states to assist with other U.S. foreign policy objectives in return for the U.S. protection against Saddam, similar to the pressure on Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s to finance a variety of U.S. initiatives (from Somalia to the Korean peninsula) and to participate in peace talks with Israel. With the regional states expecting the United States to do them favors and at least some in the United States expecting the regional states to do the United States favors, the potential for disappointment and disagreement is great. This will not help U.S. relations with the regional states and could lead to a serious deterioration of relations.

Even setting aside the potential asymmetric expectations, it would hardly be surprising if regional states were reluctant to sign on to a continuing

threat against their neighbor Iraq. Constructing an alliance to threaten another state is no easy task. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was hard enough to hold together as a defensive alliance. Despite the close societal ties between the United States and Western Europe, it is by no means clear that NATO could have worked had it been an alliance designed to attack the Soviet bloc. Asking the Gulf Arab monarchies to sign up to an alliance for attacking Iraq is particularly difficult because of the strong historical and social links between those states and Iraq. It would be very difficult for Arab states to cooperate with former colonial powers in an attack on a fellow Arab state.

UNDERMINING THE STABILITY OF THE GULF MONARCHIES

Preserving monarchical rule in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is not and should not be a long-term U.S. objective; monarchy is not a system the United States wishes to promote, and monarchies are not necessarily particularly stable. That said, at present, the alternative to the Gulf monarchies is probably worse: There is every reason to think that overthrow of the monarchies would be at the hands of anti-Western, anti-democratic Islamists. For that reason, the United States may well have a short-term interest in ensuring the stability of the Gulf monarchies, while encouraging them to move toward more transparent and accountable governments with legislatures that have more powers and are more freely selected.

The existing U.S. troop presence in the Gulf is unpopular with social conservatives and nationalists in the GCC states. How much political impact this generates is unclear. After all, the GCC states are not democracies, and the ruling families have traditionally conducted foreign and security policy without much reference to popular opinion. The redeployment of U.S. forces to desert bases, far from the sight of the civilian population, has lowered the profile of the U.S. presence. That said, a large-scale U.S. presence, especially if it were poised to

strike hard at Iraq, would sit badly with many in the GCC countries. That would provide an opportunity for the Islamist opposition to reach out to a larger audience with their violent anti-regime message. The ruling regimes have been intensely aware of the Islamist danger and have been prepared to take strong action to keep a lid on the opposition, so it seems quite unlikely that any of the GCC regimes would be overthrown in the wake of a larger U.S. military presence. However, if some GCC regime already faced serious internal problems—splits in the ruling family, serious socioeconomic problems, and so on—then the larger U.S. military presence could become a rallying point for anti-regime agitation.

Furthermore, there is a risk that GCC regimes might seek to redirect criticism about the U.S. presence into criticism of the United States instead of criticism of their own regimes for cooperating with the United States. This was certainly the strategy in the 1990s, with the result that radical anti-Western forces were able to win the recruits needed for repeated attacks on U.S. targets, from Khobar Towers to the *USS Cole* to the World Trade Center.

Besides the two destabilizing impacts of a sustained large U.S. military presence analyzed above, a third potential problem would be an Iranian perception that the United States is preparing for a strike against the Islamic Republic. Any military force suitable for threatening Saddam's regime would also provide a capability that could be used

against Iran, and any prudent military planner has to worry about capabilities as much as intentions. On top of which, the Bush administration's hostility to the Islamic Republic's hardliners and its evident interest in promoting democratic forces could lead the revolutionaries who control Iran's levers of power to worry that the United States would use its military force in the Gulf against Iran if the opportunity presented itself. Certainly in the last few months, there have been many serious Iranian analysts and policy makers who have assumed this is the U.S. intention. The risk is that a U.S. force designed to secure Iraqi cooperation could lead to acute tensions with Iran that could escalate into periodic military confrontations, along the lines of the U.S.–Iran naval clashes in 1988–1989—clashes that included the largest surface naval confrontation of the last half century.

WHAT TO DO?

It is by no means apparent how to press Saddam into permitting inspections without threatening the stability of the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the most realistic way to frame the issue is to say that restarting inspections will require a continuing substantial U.S. force presence of a sort that will complicate U.S. relations with Gulf countries and may threaten their internal stability, and then to allow the reader to judge whether that risk is worth taking.

CALCULATIONS OF IRAQ'S NEIGHBORS

Shibley Telhami

In designing a strategy to gain the support of Iraq's neighbors for limiting Iraq's nuclear potential, it is important to begin by separating the strategic calculations of governments in the region from their domestic political calculations.

At the strategic level, governments in the region generally favor preventing Iraq from becoming a nuclear power, especially under Saddam Hussein. Even Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates, who fear Iran more than they fear Iraq and who worry about weakening Iraq too much, support measures to limit Iraq's nuclear capabilities, including reinstating international monitors. But some states, especially Iran and Syria, also worry about overwhelming U.S. power in the region. Their calculations are thus more complex: They do not want to see Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, but they also fear U.S. dominance—and in Syria's case, Israeli strategic dominance—especially U.S. occupation of Iraq. This leads to the following considerations: On the one hand, any option that would rule out a U.S. military campaign may get their support; on the other, trust in the United States is so low that there is the belief that uncertainty about Iraq's nuclear potential may be a major deterrent to U.S. war plans.

Even aside from public sentiments, one should not underestimate the strategic reluctance of other states in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, to support a U.S.-led war on Iraq for two reasons: (1) states

in the region fear the possible disintegration of Iraq or the continued instability emanating from Iraq; and (2) they fear possible U.S. military-political control of Iraq that would alter the strategic picture to their disadvantage. All this suggests that, strategically, states in the region could rally behind an international plan to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear capabilities, if they could be persuaded that this option is indeed intended as a genuine alternative to the war option and not part of a process designed to lay the groundwork for justifying a war.

On the domestic political level, no state in the region can ignore public sentiment in the era of the information revolution. Certainly one of the major barriers to getting the support of Arab governments for a war option is public pressure. Indeed, much of the public in the Arab world is sympathetic to Iraq's efforts in general. It is important then to understand how the public in the region, including the elites, views this issue. First, most people there do not understand that the policy to prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is based on UN resolutions. Instead, they see the policy as a strategy intended to prevent only Arab states from acquiring such weapons. Second, those who do understand the role of UN resolutions raise the question of "double standards" in applying those resolutions, always with examples from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Third, the sense of humiliation and helplessness is so pervasive in the region after the

violence on the Israeli–Palestinian front of the past several months that many wish for an Arab deterrent, even if possessed by Saddam Hussein. Fourth, while many wish for such an outcome, most do not believe that it is likely and see the entire focus on this issue as tactical, intended to justify keeping Iraq in a box or declaring war on it. This view has become even stronger in recent months, with the public in the region increasingly identifying U.S. interests with Israeli interests and perceiving the United States as dominating decisions at the United Nations. Fifth, there is continued empathy with the suffering of Iraq’s population and a prevailing assumption that the sanctions, not the Iraqi regime, are ultimately to blame for this suffering.

Even so, the public in the region is not likely to mobilize against steps by governments in the region to contain Iraq’s capabilities, such as support for the reinstatement of UN monitors, in the same way that it would likely mobilize in the event of war. The difficulty comes when Iraq defies measures to contain its programs. It is clear that Iraq could gain a great deal of sympathy, especially in the event of punitive measures for lack of compliance—something we have often witnessed in the past. In other words, Iraq could have the capacity to time its defiant actions for maximum sympathy, such as at times of high regional anger over U.S. policy toward the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. So any effective policy would have to be designed to reduce this possibility.

Taking these strategic and political calculations into account, an effective policy intended to gain the cooperation of Iraq’s neighbors in limiting Iraq’s nuclear potential would have to include several important elements:

- ▶ *Securing strong U.S. assurances that it intends the policy as an alternative to war and that if the policy*

succeeds, the war option will be off the table. But even if the implied threat of war in case peaceful measures fail is projected in the name of the United Nations, not the United States, there should be no illusion: Most actors in the region will continue to see U.S. moves as tactical, intended ultimately to justify the war option.

- ▶ *Making progress in the Palestinian–Israeli negotiations.* It is hard to imagine any successful policy toward Iraq, military or otherwise, as long as violence continues unchecked. A full settlement of this conflict is not a necessary condition; rather, a de-escalation of the violence and the onset of a genuine political process that projects hope will be important for securing regional cooperation for U.S. policy toward Iraq.
- ▶ *Providing incentives, in addition to threats, to Iraq.* This will be important in securing Iraqi cooperation, especially given the public sympathy with Iraq in the region. These incentives could include lifting economic sanctions completely and allowing for increasingly normal relations between Iraq and its neighbors. These measures would also go a long way toward addressing regional public concerns about the hardship in Iraq. But it is important to recognize the implications of such an approach: It entails that the priority of limiting Iraq’s WMD capabilities supersedes the objective of removing Saddam Hussein.
- ▶ *Beginning a forum for addressing WMD on a regional basis, focusing on strategic concerns about the uneven proliferation of weapons in the region.*
- ▶ *Differentiating among Iraq’s neighbors.* Not every state has the same concerns, even if most have much in common in their attitude toward Iraq.

THE RUSSIAN ELITE AND IRAQ: AN UNEXPECTED PICTURE

Rose Gottemoeller

Our interest is that Iraq should have a stable and predictable regime, friendly to Russia. And naturally, we do not want to see weapons of mass destruction produced there. We are convinced that the political resource for resolving problems with Iraq has not been exhausted. However, if the United States does not correct its unbearable urge to fight as soon as possible, that resource may never be used.

—Dmitry Rogozin, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, State Duma of the Russian Federation¹

Rogozin's statement of Russia's current interest in Iraq is succinct and interesting because it does not stress the economic issues that are so often assumed to be the driving force behind Russian policy. Instead, he focuses on requirements for stability, predictability, and the absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United States clearly articulates similar requirements. So if Rogozin represents a view widely held among Russian elites, then there is a basis for cooperation between Russia and the United States in trying to address the Iraq problem.

The *if* is a big one, however, because it contains several elements. First is the obvious one: Do Russian political elites really share Rogozin's view that

stability, predictability, and an absence of WMD are at the heart of Russian interests in Iraq? The second is only slightly less obvious: Would Rogozin and the Russian elites ever go along with the notion of moving quickly to a military invasion of Iraq? And if they did go along, would they be willing to extend Russian military support to the invasion? Alternatively, would they press hard for a different solution, one that would emphasize diplomacy and a strengthened inspection regime?

This paper examines these questions to provide a sense of how Moscow might react to precipitate U.S. use of military force or to efforts to craft an alternative solution. The paper draws exclusively on sources in the Russian media and on that basis

1. Dmitry Rogozin Comments, *Izvestiya*, April 30, 2002.

forms a picture of likely public and elite opinion in Russia. It does not emphasize Western sources or the diplomatic record, except to the extent that it is reflected in Russian media commentary.

Before launching into an examination of recent comments on these issues in the Russian media, it is worth noting that since September President Putin has often taken pro-American steps that go against the flow of elite opinion in Russia. No matter what views are being expressed in the Duma, the press, or among the intelligentsia, therefore, Putin may decide to acquiesce to the Bush administration in whatever they do in Iraq. This acquiescence, however, might be a far cry from providing active support to a military operation. It might be more akin to the Russian attitude toward the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: Moscow would stress that the U.S. policy is a mistake, but not one to which the Russian Federation will respond either with anger or precipitate action of its own.

THE QUESTION OF RUSSIAN INTERESTS

On the question of how the elites define Russian interests in Iraq, the oil interest group seems to be running to type. For example, Konstantin Kagalovsky, board member of the Yukos oil company, inveighed against an invasion of Iraq “by our American friends.” He was not, however, focused only on the difficulties that this would cause for Russia—he noted that the consequences of such an attack would be deeply contrary for both “us and America.” At the same time, he cautioned against the “gift horse” that the United States was offering:

The Americans are telling us that it is very important for us that there be a different regime in Iraq, and that they will guarantee that that regime will make Iraqi debt payments to us... The Americans also promise that once a new Iraqi regime is in place, they will help

us get contracts in Iraq... Both of these positions are a raw deal, but now they are going to be supported in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies.²

Kagalovsky's comments illustrate that elite positions in the oil industry are as would be expected: suspicious that the new advantages that the Americans are offering would be better than the promises that they already have in hand from the Iraqis. More interesting is his portrayal of the approach inside the Russian government: Although he and his industry are holding firm, the government agencies are moving toward the U.S. view. This conveys clearly that elite opinion in Moscow is by no means stuck on the Russian oil industry position.

It must be said, however, that of the commentators reviewed for this analysis, only Rogozin was so succinct in portraying Russian interests as rooted in stability, predictability, and the absence of WMD in Iraq. Indeed, the lack of widespread geostrategic analyses in the current media discussions was striking, but it may reflect no more than a temporary silence among those, such as Yevgeny Primakov, who have traditionally been the voice of a “Eurasian” policy for the Soviet Union and Russia. In other words, the current preeminence of Putin's U.S.-leaning policy may have temporarily silenced those who would normally have been articulating more of a geostrategic view of Russian interests.

THE QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION

The lack of a Russian consensus on its interests in Iraq does not, however, imply ready Russian support for U.S. military action. On the contrary, Russian experts stress both that the United States will have to go it alone and that U.S. forces should not expect a repeat of the easy time that they had in toppling the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.

2. Konstantin Kagalovsky Interview, *Vremya MN* [Moscow News], April 17, 2002.

As Alexei Arbatov commented in an interview in May, "Using aerial bombardment alone in Iraq will not do the trick; the United States will need a ground operation. In Afghanistan, the ground operation was carried forward by the Northern Alliance, under the leadership of Russia and the USA. But in Iraq, no one will want to do this dirty work for the Americans."³

One commentator went so far as to say that Iraq for the United States will be as Carthage was for Rome: an eventual victory but won only after a long war that significantly taxed the Roman Empire.⁴ This image of an imperial power about to enter a quagmire is one that a number of Russians seem to relish, perhaps based on their own experience in Chechnya. However, they do not specifically compare Iraq to Chechnya. Instead, they warn against "naïve" hopes, such as counting on "marionette-style fighters from the ranks of (Iraqi) dissidents."⁵

Thus, the answer to the question of whether Russia would support a U.S. invasion of Iraq with its own military forces is a clear *no*: As far as Russia is concerned, the United States will have to go it alone. The more general question of whether Russia would go along with such an invasion has a more nuanced answer, however. Russian elites seem ready to stand aside and let the Americans go forward if they are determined to do so. As Georgy Mirsky put it, "Russia will not hinder the Americans."⁶

In some sense, Russian commentators may be preparing their public for what they believe will be the likely response from the Kremlin: Putin's acquiescence to a U.S. invasion of Iraq, similar to the case of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

THE QUESTION OF AN ALTERNATIVE OPTION

A number of Russian commentators echo Rogozin's view that political tools for addressing the crisis have not been exhausted.⁷ They note that Iraq has not so far refused dialogue with the United Nations. They also note that as soon as others walk away from diplomatic efforts, the Iraqi leader will be tempted to preempt the situation.⁸ This attitude indicates that Russia, if it should acquiesce to U.S. military action, will continue to press on the diplomatic front as well.

Even more naturally, the Russian elites would be positively disposed to a reasonable alternative to a full-scale U.S. invasion. The scope and definition of that alternative is not clear from the Russian media, except to emphasize a strong commitment to continued engagement at the negotiating table. However, the current Russian stance at the United Nations suggests that a use of force to support inspections might not be out of the question, if only to maintain the continued viability and legitimacy of the UN system.

Moreover, although they do not occupy the first rank of argument, the interests of Russian companies would not be disregarded. Russian media commentators convey the sense that they are simply waiting for the giant to falter. This would not be because they expect to gain in the old Cold War zero-sum sense, but because they believe it will create the conditions for a new political process. In this, Russian experts would hope to take a decisive role, especially to support the interests of Russian companies.⁹

3. Alexander Kurzanov interview with Alexei Arbatov, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, May 23, 2002. This view that the United States will not be able to engage in "push-button warfare" and will have to do its own dirty work is currently common in the Russian press. See, for example, Georgiy Mirsky Comments, *Izvestiya*, April 30, 2002; and Sergey Sergeev, "Baghdad Marsh," *Vek*, May 17, 2002.

4. Sergei Norka, "Head to Head," *Vek*, June 7, 2002.

5. Rogozin, *Izvestiya*.

6. Mirsky, *Izvestiya*.

7. See, for example, Vladimir Skosyrev, "Iraqi 'Nut' Difficult to Crack," *Vremya MN*, April 30, 2002; Sergeev, "Baghdad Marsh"; and Norka, "Head to Head."

8. See, for example, Vladimir Skosyrev, "To Get Soaked in Self-Defense," *Vremya MN*, June 18, 2002.

9. This argument has already been present in the Russian press. See Skosyrev, "Iraqi 'Nut' Difficult to Crack."

CONCLUSIONS: ENGAGING RUSSIA

To sum up, Russian elites will not be tied fast by Russian oil companies in regard to defining Russian national interests in Iraq. Likewise, they will not be driven to precipitate steps against the United States, in the United Nations or elsewhere. At the same time, they will likely urge, and strongly so, the continuation of a diplomatic-political process to resolve the crisis. This could include the option of armed support to inspections.

The flip side of their attitude in the political arena is that although they might acquiesce to a U.S. invasion of Iraq, Russian elites will be unwilling to lend military support to the United States. It is difficult to tell from existing media commentary, but this unwillingness may well extend to supporting roles that are now well established in Afghanistan, such as the sharing of intelligence data.

This summary leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, what would be the Russian attitude toward other former Soviet states that chose to support a U.S. military operation? Would Russia object strongly to the U.S. use of military bases on former Soviet territory? What means would it use to pressure its neighbors against providing such support? Russian elites have not been speculating widely on such issues, although it seems likely that Russia would try to prevent widespread U.S. staging from countries that are its partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Another set of questions revolves around what goals Russia would have for itself in a continuing political process. "Advantage for Russian companies" is a straightforward goal but too simple when juxtaposed against the very evident elite opinion that vic-

tory will not come easily and that the United States may in fact become bogged down in Iraq. In that case, Russia might have to step up to a more active role in solving the Iraq problem. What that role might comprise is difficult to see, given that Russia has not traditionally been good at engineering face-saving remedies for other parties at the negotiating table. At the moment, however, the Kremlin seems to be setting itself up for just such a role.

These two sets of questions highlight both problems and opportunities that may emerge in engaging Russia in a middle-ground option involving the use of force to support inspections. On the problem side, complex tensions are already arising between Moscow and Washington as Putin tries to walk a line between pushing for continued progress on the diplomatic front and acquiescing too quickly to a U.S. invasion. Those in Washington who are strong supporters of invasion might be tempted to conclude that Russia is not a reliable partner. Its role as an interlocutor might therefore be prematurely diminished.

On the opportunity side, the strong interest of Russia in a continued political-diplomatic process, when joined with the diversification of its policy away from simple oil company interests, means that Russian decision makers might be able and willing to play an active role in formulating a middle-ground option. Russian commentators already emphasize that Russia is urging Iraq to embark on a more flexible policy toward the West.¹⁰ If that role can be developed successfully, then Moscow could be very helpful. The dynamic between the problem and opportunity sides, however, will be decisive in determining whether this outcome is possible.

10. See, for example, Elena Suponina, "Baghdad Changes Color: Russia Forces Iraq to Be Like Everyone Else," *Vremya novosti*, May 21, 2002.

THE UNSCOM RECORD

Stephen Black

Following the Gulf War, as an integral part of the cease-fire agreement, the UN Security Council imposed on Iraq a total ban on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and certain ballistic missile systems. The prohibition was implemented by the director general of the IAEA and a new organization, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Under Resolution 687 (1991), Iraq was required to declare its WMD programs, including extant weapons and related facilities. UNSCOM and an Action Team (AT-IAEA) established by IAEA's director general were tasked with verifying Iraq's declarations, eliminating proscribed items and facilities, and instituting a system of ongoing compliance monitoring. The cease-fire resolution called for immediate on-site inspections of both declared capabilities and those sites designated by UNSCOM. In addition to facility access, a subsequent exchange of letters between the UN Secretary-General and the Government of Iraq secured for investigators a host of complementary rights and privileges: full freedom of movement into and within Iraq; full rights to request, record, and retain any relevant items or documents; right to conduct interviews; freedom to conduct both ground and aerial surveillance; right to collect and analyze samples of any kind; and right to install equipment for inspection and monitoring purposes. While Iraq was

permitted to have an observer present for interviews and aerial inspections, there were no substantive operational limits placed on UNSCOM and AT-IAEA.

Despite the complexity of the task, both UNSCOM and the Action Team remained small organizations throughout the 1990s. UNSCOM comprised 21 international arms control experts, administered by an executive chairman. Based in New York, the executive chairman led an office of about 50 headquarters staff and another 50 support staff at field offices in Bahrain and Baghdad. The Action Team was based in Vienna with about a dozen staff members. Headquarters personnel planned inspection missions, with additional mission staff seconded by supporting governments.

Even with an annual budget of only about \$30 million, UNSCOM managed to field more than 250 visiting inspection teams between 1991 and 1998 and maintained a permanent monitoring presence in Iraq for five years. The vast majority of the personnel and equipment utilized by the commission was provided at no cost by supporting governments.

On-site inspections were the principal means of verification used by UNSCOM and the Action Team. Teams of varying sizes—from three to more than 80 inspectors—conducted short-notice and no-

Stephen Black | 37

notice inspections of a range of Iraqi installations, including declared WMD stores; declared research, development, and production sites; dual-use facilities; and undeclared locations suspected of proscribed activities. On-site inspections included, among other things, simple factory tours, environmental sampling, materials and equipment inventories, physical surveys, and document and computer searches. Other teams confined their inspections to conference rooms where they interviewed Iraqi military personnel, weapons scientists and engineers, industrial managers, financial officers, and high government officials. The teams were supported by aerial inspections conducted by both commission helicopters and a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.

Inspections were the principal source of information, but investigators also operated a host of sensor and monitoring systems to verify Iraqi compliance. As part of their search for undeclared WMD assets and to facilitate ongoing monitoring, UNSCOM and AT-IAEA installed and operated a network of remote monitoring video cameras, chemical air sampling systems, aircraft- and vehicle-mounted gamma ray detectors, helicopter and man-pack ground penetrating radar, and other specialized information collection systems. In addition to their own operations, UNSCOM and AT-IAEA requested and received sensitive national information from supporting governments. Other important sources of data were suppliers of equipment and materials to the Iraqi WMD programs, Iraqi defectors, and open-source information.

Contrary to the incomplete initial Iraqi declarations of April 1991, UNSCOM and AT-IAEA were able to uncover vast amounts of undeclared weapons, materials, and facilities. By using the full spectrum of inspection rights and information sources, the investigators either located or forced the disclosure of major aspects of Iraq's WMD infrastructure.

Iraq initially denied that it had conducted any nuclear activities outside of those already under IAEA safeguards and that all were in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Inspec-

tions, however, revealed a massive, covert, multi-facility effort directed toward the production of nuclear weapons, several undeclared uranium enrichment projects, and a crash program to utilize safeguarded reactor fuel in a nuclear device.

While Iraqi ballistic missile activities were public knowledge, the full extent of the program was not. Investigations proved that Iraq had not disclosed all relevant missile systems and forced Iraq to declare more than 80 SCUD missiles, more than ten mobile missile launchers and related equipment, at least 45 chemical and biological weapons special warheads, successful programs to indigenously produce SCUD-type missile components, and efforts to continue proscribed missile research and development covertly.

The chemical weapons (CW) investigation similarly started with basic knowledge of the Iraqi program but with uncertainty about its scale and scope. As a result of inspections, Iraq increased its initial declarations by about 30,000 CW munitions (filled and unfilled); admitted a range of CW research and development efforts including the VX nerve agent, incapacitating agents, and binary munitions; and yielded for destruction hundreds of pieces of CW manufacturing equipment. The chemical team also oversaw the destruction of all declared CW munitions, agents, precursors, and research, development, and production facilities.

Discovery of the Iraqi biological weapons (BW) program was one of the commission's greatest successes. Despite long-running Iraqi denials, commission investigators proved the existence of an offensive Iraqi BW program. Under pressure from UNSCOM, Baghdad was forced to declare several BW production facilities; bulk production of BW agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin; and production of BW munitions, including at least 25 SCUD warheads and more than 150 aerial bombs.

The successes achieved in investigating the Iraqi WMD programs belie a much larger difficulty encountered by the disarmament regime. Despite the requirements of the cease-fire agreement, in the spring of 1991 the Government of Iraq decided to

actively conceal important aspects of its proscribed programs, most notably its entire nuclear and biological weapons programs. The concealment policy evolved over the course of 1991 and eventually included releasing to inspectors only a portion of its WMD holdings. Iraq released the least modern, least effective weapons but retained sufficient records and documents to allow the restart of the WMD programs and as much of its WMD and missile research, development, and production infrastructure as possible, often under the cover of permitted dual-use activities.

Iraq's concealment policy and operations were coordinated by high-ranking officials and involved a number of intelligence and security organizations. The concealment process used a host of techniques to mislead and obstruct investigators, including rapid evacuation of designated inspection sites; unsupervised, unrecorded unilateral destruction of proscribed materials; denial of access to inspection sites; destruction of documents prior to inspection; and a pervasive system of surveillance capable of providing advanced knowledge of inspection sites and topics.

Although UNSCOM and AT-IAEA were able to confirm many Iraqi claims and in some cases

produce a technically coherent picture of past WMD activities, after almost eight years of intensive work they were never able to claim complete, or even sufficient, knowledge. When disarmament work was halted in 1998, the commission considered Iraq's ballistic missile, CW, and BW declarations to be incomplete and inaccurate. The myriad lingering questions and areas of uncertainty fall roughly into two categories. First, investigators are uncertain of the completeness of Iraqi declarations: It appears that Iraq has not declared all relevant activities and materials. Barring significant, good faith Iraqi cooperation, quantitative accounting for proscribed materials will remain incomplete. Similarly, Iraq's effort to conceal know-how, technical capabilities, and WMD-related infrastructure calls into question the investigator's qualitative knowledge of the weapons programs. Although a complete qualitative knowledge is not specifically necessary for disarmament accounting, it is a critical component of the long-term monitoring of Iraq's dual-use infrastructure. Iraq's policy of concealment and its known past efforts to retain proscribed items serve to magnify these uncertainties as they may represent just the tips of icebergs.

THE IAEA IRAQ ACTION TEAM RECORD: ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS

Garry B. Dillon

The report of the IAEA director general to the Security Council on October 8, 1997, (S/1997/779) provides a comprehensive summary of the IAEA activities and findings regarding the investigation, destruction, removal, and rendering harmless of significant components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program. In this report the IAEA concluded, *inter alia*, that its mandated activities had resulted in a coherent picture of Iraq's program; that there were no indications of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing a nuclear weapon; nor were there any indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.

These conclusions were recorded in conjunction with the recognition that some uncertainty is inevitable in any countrywide technical verification process that seeks to ensure the absence of readily concealable items or activities. At the time of reporting, it was the IAEA view that the few remaining uncertainties did not detract from its ability to implement effectively its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) of Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials or their related activities and facilities. It was also the IAEA view that the investigation of

the remaining uncertainties, or any other matter that may come to light, was provided for and could be accomplished within the scope of the OMV plan. Nothing arose to change these views from October 1997 to December 1998.

ACTIVITIES OF THE IAEA IRAQ ACTION TEAM

The first IAEA inspection in response to its mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 687 commenced in Iraq on May 15, 1991. As of October 1997, the IAEA had completed a series of 30 inspection campaigns in Iraq involving some 500 site inspections and utilizing more than 5,000 person-days of inspector resources. During those campaigns the IAEA supervised the destruction of more than 50,000 square meters of factory floor space of nuclear program facilities, some 2,000 weapons-related items, and more than 600 metric tons of special alloys. The IAEA also arranged for and supervised the removal from Iraq of all weapons-usable nuclear material—essentially highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel—and accounted for and placed under its control, all other known nuclear materials—some 500 tons of natural uranium in various chemical compounds and some 1.8 tons of low enriched (2.6 percent) ura-

Garry B. Dillon | 41

niium dioxide. In addition to these activities, the IAEA began phasing in its OMV activities in November 1992 and commenced its continuous presence in Iraq through the establishment of the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group in August 1994.

The results of the inspections and discussions with Iraqi counterparts showed that by January 1991, through its Tuwaitha-based Atomic Energy Commission and later through the Nuclear Weapons Project (coded Petrochemical 3, or PC-3), Iraq

- ▶ had procured and domestically produced substantial amounts of natural uranium compounds at Al Qaim and had built and commissioned plants at Al Jesira to convert such compounds to supply materials for production-scale enrichment processes;
- ▶ had investigated several processes for the enrichment of uranium, including diffusion, electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and centrifuge, as well as laboratory-scale work on laser isotopic separation (LIS) and chemical and ion-exchange separation processes;
- ▶ had built and was in the process of commissioning a 15kg HEU/EMIS plant at Al Tarmiya and was building a similar plant at Al Sharqat;
- ▶ had, with significant foreign assistance, developed and successfully tested a workable single-cylinder centrifuge and was building a centrifuge machine production facility at Al Furat;
- ▶ had produced more than one ton of natural uranium metal and was further developing purification, casting, and machining technologies;
- ▶ was equipping and commissioning a major facility at Al Atheer for the production of HEU-“fueled” nuclear weapons;
- ▶ had, in conjunction with Al Atheer, carried out a semi-empirical program at Al Qa Qaa for the

production of explosive lenses and was soon to “cast” the first full-scale explosive package;

- ▶ had, in the second half of 1990, embarked upon a “crash program” to extract the HEU material from the research reactor fuel to produce a single nuclear weapon;
- ▶ had irradiated in the Tuwaitha IRT-5000 research reactor domestically produced natural uranium targets and separated gram quantities of plutonium; and
- ▶ had undertaken three field experiments with radiation weapons containing radioactive materials produced by irradiating zirconium dioxide (actually its hafnium impurity) in the IRT research reactor.

Although Iraq had been close to the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot-cascading of single cylinder centrifuge machines,¹ and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon, by December 1998 the IAEA was satisfied that there were no indications of Iraq having:

- ▶ produced a nuclear weapon;
- ▶ produced more than a few grams of weapons-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes;
- ▶ otherwise acquired weapons-usable nuclear material; or
- ▶ retained any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.

Furthermore, all of the safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that Iraq had planned to divert to its crash program, had been verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.

1. Iraq's capabilities with respect to machine manufacture and particularly cascading are prudently overstated.

IRAQ'S COOPERATION

Cooperation is very difficult to measure. An inspection authority is likely to be afforded cooperation until it requires information or access that the inspected party does not wish to provide. Unless the authority requires such information or access, it may conclude that it has received the ill-described "full cooperation," although it may, from its own perspective, have asked all the wrong questions and visited all the wrong locations. It must also be recognized that the manner in which the inspection authority asks for information or access can greatly affect the response of the inspected party.

Iraq's cooperation with the IAEA has been variable, starting at a low level with Iraq's initial complete denial of its clandestine nuclear program, soon dipping lower with the denial of access to a military site where EMIS components were being concealed, and reaching its nadir during the two "stand-offs" occurring in inspection number six (September 22–30, 1991).²

It is distinctly feasible that the improvements in cooperation, which gradually followed these confrontations, resulted from Iraq's realization that it was impossible to continue to deny that its clandestine program was not specifically dedicated to nuclear weapons production. Iraq's cooperation was tested on many occasions with the IAEA's introduction of "capable site" inspections that involved visits to locations with no known association with Iraq's nuclear program but that the IAEA judged to have capabilities to support prohibited nuclear activities. Apart from a few politically motivated grumbles, Iraq provided the necessary cooperation to facilitate these inspections, which by December 1998 had involved more than 60 sites.

It is fair to summarize Iraqi cooperation as being essentially adequate from late 1991 until diffi-

culties reemerged in August 1998 with Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM and eventually the IAEA. It is also fair to say that Iraq's motivation to cooperate was shattered by the statement that, regardless of Iraq's compliance, the embargo and the sanctions would not be lifted as long as President Saddam Hussein remained in power. Fortunately, as it would be regarded in some quarters, Iraq could be relied upon to make yet another public relations blunder and emerge as the "villains of the piece."

FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL RESOURCES

Like most such ventures, the UNSCOM–IAEA activities in Iraq received a surfeit of moral support and, after Iraq's "unfrozen assets" were exhausted, woefully inadequate financial resources. The IAEA Iraq Action Team was limited to a budget of no more than \$3 million per year, in addition to logistical services provided through UNSCOM. To complete its mandated activities, the Action Team drew on the inspection resources of the IAEA Department of Safeguards—for which the department received no compensation—and cost-free personnel resources from IAEA member states. For the future, the costs of full operation of the IAEA's OMV plan in 1998 were estimated to be in the range \$10 to 12 million per year, in addition to logistical services to be provided through the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and to require some 20 person-years of human resources. On an annual basis, the task was assessed to include but not be limited to 500 site inspections, 100 key personnel interviews, 100 capable site inspections, and 200 ground-based radiation surveys, to be comple-

2. Following the IAEA team's discovery of a cache of technical documents at the Al Niqabat Centre, the team was detained for five hours, after which the Iraqi counterpart removed, sanitized, and later returned the documents. The next day the Iraqi counterpart prevented the IAEA team from leaving the Al Khyrat complex with a second cache of documents, a standoff that lasted 96 hours.

mented by fixed and rotary wing aerial radiation surveys, in parallel with a wide-area monitoring plan involving vegetation, aquatic, deposition, and aerosol sampling and analysis.

It would be relatively easy to justify twice the effort, but it is far from clear that this would bring twice the assurance. For comparison, the IAEA's OMV plan translates to about 2,000 person-days of inspection per year, but the total person-days of inspection expended by the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 1998 was 10,500.

Another apposite, though perhaps oversimplified, comparison assumes that the real product of the IAEA Department of Safeguards is person-days of inspection, from which simple arithmetic would yield a unit cost of approximately \$10,000. Averaging ten person-days of inspection per year to have been spent in Iraq from 1980 to 1990 results in an undoubtedly overstated total "investment" of \$1,000,000 over the decade. During that same

period, Iraq is variously estimated to have spent up to \$5,000,000,000! These are scarcely the statistics of an even playing field.

CONCLUSION

Technical inspection authorities that are comprehensively and competently staffed, adequately funded, and supported by unwavering political support for their mandate can provide a satisfactory level of assurance of compliance.

This conclusion presupposes that the "complyee" is able to recognize some benefit from compliance. In a cease-fire context, the "carrot and stick" approach to motivation seems to be entirely appropriate. However, the carrot should represent a tangible benefit, not merely the withholding of the stick. Indeed, during 1998, Iraq repeatedly claimed that "the light at the end of the tunnel had gone out."

NEW INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ: WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED?

Terence Taylor

The purpose of this brief paper is to lay out some issues for discussion in relation to the conduct of possible future inspections in Iraq. The UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency are doubtless taking account of the points raised in this paper (and others) in their planning. In offering some thoughts on ways to enhance the inspection process, this paper is not intended to imply that the inspection organizations are not already doing so.

MANDATE

UN Security Council Resolution 687 remains the basis for the obligations placed on Iraq with regard to cooperating with UN inspection teams. Any agreement on the return of inspectors should adhere as closely as possible to Resolution 687, which the Government of Iraq has repeatedly affirmed. Any dilution of the resolution's obligations would seriously impede inspections under the aegis of UNMOVIC and IAEA. The success or otherwise of the inspectors would depend heavily on the degree of cooperation offered by Iraq. As the experience of the previous inspection system demon-

strated, even limited cooperation can yield substantial results. However, the task of UNSCOM and the IAEA was further complicated by Iraq's elaborate deception and concealment plans. Eventually, by 1998, Iraq withdrew all cooperation once it was clear that the UN Security Council was becoming even more divided and that the threat of the use of substantial and destabilizing force had faded from the scene. This brief analysis will not deal with these external political and military issues. Nevertheless, it needs to be appreciated that a high degree of agreement in the Security Council and a perception in Baghdad of the possibility of the use of substantial military force were key elements that induced a limited but sufficient degree of cooperation to allow UNSCOM and the IAEA to achieve important successes.

INSPECTION PROCESS

Although the impact of external dynamics is critical to the inspection process, UNMOVIC and the IAEA should maximize their chances of success by exploiting as far as possible the internal dynamics of inspection procedures.

The views in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the IISS or any other organizations.

Terence Taylor | 45

Critical elements of this process include:

- ▶ *Reestablishing the baseline.* A fundamental initial step would be to confirm the current state of knowledge of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, drawing on the information available when inspectors were last in Iraq. In particular inspectors will need to confirm the location of key dual-use equipment that was tagged and monitored by the inspectors.¹ If all aspects of Resolutions 687 and 715 are to be met, a system of monitoring will have to be put in place to help ensure continuing compliance by Iraq with its obligations. This will require the re-opening of a verification and monitoring center in Iraq.
- ▶ *Addressing unresolved issues.* Uncovering the critical unresolved issues in relation to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs will be the most challenging aspect facing any future inspection organization. The Security Council has been unanimous on at least one issue, which is that Iraq has not divulged all that is required to meet its obligations under Resolution 687. At the request of Iraq, a series of Technical Evaluation Meetings, attended by a wide range of independent experts (not UNSCOM), was held from February to July 1998. After four sessions the experts concluded that Iraq had not met its obligations in particular in relation to the production of VX nerve agent, the disposal of missile warheads, and its biological weapons program.

It will be important to adopt a plan that deals with these two challenges simultaneously from the start. If the inspectors return, a most important period to exploit would be the very early part of the inspection process, when Iraq is likely to perceive that it is in its interest to demonstrate coop-

eration. This early period would provide the best opportunities to uncover inconsistencies and new information but would allow no time for a learning curve for the new inspectors.

The Iraqi side has a detailed knowledge of what was known to UNSCOM and the IAEA and is very experienced in receiving inspectors, handling visits to sites, and preparing for interviews. They will have learned from the earlier experience of the occasions when they inadvertently allowed UNSCOM and the IAEA to obtain access and information directly related to the WMD programs. If Iraq decides that it is in its interest to allow the inspectors to return, without a real intention of declaring and dismantling all aspects of the prohibited programs, it would most likely seek to introduce the maximum amount of predictability into all aspects of the inspection process and to minimize the degree of flexibility in procedures. In addition, future inspectors are likely to be faced with a carefully prepared and subtle concealment plan. The Iraqi regime has unrivaled experience in such activities and has had ample time to prepare.

MEASURING COOPERATION

A key factor in enhancing the capabilities of UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections in Iraq will be an understanding of how UNMOVIC commissioners and the IAEA can measure the extent of true cooperation by the Iraqi side. This is needed to convey to the UN Security Council a convincing assessment of Iraqi compliance with the relevant agreements. Aspects that would require some sort of criteria for measurement of cooperation could include:

- ▶ *Access.* The extent to which the Iraqi side allows prompt and unimpeded access to sites in re-

1. Under procedures agreed with Iraq, the inspectors placed serial numbers on key dual-use equipment (for example, fermentation equipment, flow meters, and the like). Under the terms of Resolution 715, UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring teams made regular inspection visits to ensure equipment was in place and was not being misused. Certain areas such as missile testing sites were placed under continuous video surveillance. Another important activity was environmental monitoring for levels of radioactivity to help monitor compliance with the nuclear aspects of Resolution 687.

sponse to requests in accordance with the mandate allowed under Resolution 687 is a most important criterion. Promptness in allowing access is as important as the degree of access allowed. In making an assessment, the degree of cooperation shown in the case of site inspections carried out without notice would be particularly important. There has been a history of the Iraqi side trying to politicize access to sites that they consider to be sensitive by attempting to impose delay or completely deny access. Such attempts in future should reflect negatively in any assessment. In 1996 (by a memorandum of understanding, or MOU, only) and in 1998 (under an MOU endorsed by Resolution 1154), special arrangements were made for access to sensitive sites. These included introducing additional independent experts and senior diplomats and inevitably led to delays and a serious degradation of the inspection process. These MOUs were developed for particular circumstances and need not set precedents for future UNMOVIC and IAEA activities.

- ▶ *Information.* There has been some backsliding on information and activities already admitted by the Iraqi government. For example, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz has stated on CNN in May 2002 that while Iraq did produce biological weapons agents, they did not put them into weapons delivery systems. It is clear from UNSCOM documentation that evidence was found that the Iraqis had done so and had later admitted to it.² Such actions during any future inspection process would clearly constitute a serious breach of Iraq's obligations. Because the Security Council is on record agreeing that Iraq has not yet met all its obligations in regard to accurately declaring its WMD and prohibited missile programs, the extent and the promptness with which new information is given would

be vital measures of genuine cooperation. Some of the key matters that remained unresolved when inspections ended in 1998 included missiles and biological and chemical weapons. For example, the Iraqis cannot account for critical missile components, including warheads and rocket fuel, or explain the whereabouts of 17 tons of growth media for biological agents. Nor has Iraq given a satisfactory explanation of the disposal of 4,000 tons of precursor chemicals. These chemicals could be used to manufacture thousands of chemical weapons. Further, the United Nations does not know the whereabouts of many thousands of chemical munitions. Iraq would have to make substantial and early progress in handing over convincing explanations of these issues and others to demonstrate genuine cooperation.

- ▶ *Personnel.* While the focus in considering Iraqi weapons programs is often on weapons and equipment, information on the personnel directly engaged in the programs is equally important. In relation to future compliance, the activities and whereabouts of key personnel may even be more important. Under the previous inspection system, UN inspectors were denied access to key personnel on a number of occasions. Also not all the key personnel have been disclosed, particularly in relation to the biological weapons program. An important demonstration of cooperation would be the readiness of the Iraqi side to make such people promptly available for interviews when requested. Also the Iraqi side should be prepared to allow inspectors to conduct interviews at, for example, interviewees' normal place of work and not only in set-piece interviews.
- ▶ *Technical support of inspections.* An important support to inspectors under the previous system was aerial surveillance provided by high-

2. An example can be found in the UNSCOM Executive Chairman's report to the UN Security Council of October 10, 1995.

level aircraft (U-2) and helicopter-borne teams. There may now be additional or alternative means of providing such surveillance, for example, with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Aerial support will also be needed to conduct the *environmental monitoring*. Another area requiring a clear understanding and agreement is in sample taking and analysis. The readiness of Iraq to make and comply with the necessary agreements to enable these and other essential support activities to take place would be an important indicator of genuine cooperation.

- ▶ *Security of personnel and information.* The previous inspection system was, from the beginning, subject to an aggressive Iraqi effort to steal information through illegally obtaining documents, electronic eavesdropping on inspectors in their accommodations and offices, and intercepting telephone and facsimile communications. These efforts were directed at all parts of the system from New York to the inspectors in the field. UNMOVIC and the IAEA are well aware of this experience and are no doubt planning the appropriate measures to assure the security of information and communications to prevent their operations from being compromised. If Iraq should be found to be conducting such activities against the inspection organizations in future, this should be viewed as a most serious breach of its obligations, signifying that Iraq is not cooperating seriously.

CONCLUDING POINTS

The challenge facing the new inspection organization, should it be deployed in Iraq, of having a complete grasp of all the background information should

not be underestimated. The Iraqi side will have the details at their fingertips. It is vitally important that UN member states provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA with any new information they might have on activities since the ending of inspections in 1998. Resolution 687 calls on all UN member states to assist in the effort to find and dismantle Iraqi WMD and prohibited missile programs including by supplying information. Returning inspectors would face a particular challenge in assuring the degree of continuing compliance since inspectors were withdrawn in 1998 in addition to satisfying outstanding issues on past weapons programs. For example, on the nuclear side, work on components for nuclear weapons (apart from the fissile material element) was extraordinarily difficult to uncover even in the period from 1991 to 1998. Rigorous and continuous compliance monitoring is essential for any serious assurance that Iraq is observing its obligations. Such monitoring can only be successful with proper cooperation by the Iraqi authorities. This in itself will be an important measure to assess Iraq's seriousness in meeting its obligations.

As stated earlier, although inspectors can enhance their capabilities with astute planning, retaining maximum flexibility to achieve some element of surprise, and making sure that full technical support can be provided (in particular overhead surveillance), the external dynamics will most likely be the determining factor. In particular, if the Security Council does not remain resilient and united in backing the inspection process and compelling Iraq to meet its obligations, all the efforts of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, no matter how imaginative they might be, will come to naught. Iraqi perceptions of the possible use of substantial force will also have a direct bearing on the degree of its cooperation.

ESTABLISHING NONCOMPLIANCE STANDARDS

David Albright

Any inspection system in Iraq must have a clear definition of when Iraq is not complying with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions that mandate that it does not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or the ballistic missiles to deliver them. Iraq has often violated its commitments under these resolutions during the last eleven years. Too often Iraqi noncompliance was tolerated, or Iraq was given repeated opportunities to comply. A future inspection system must include a set of "redlines" that demonstrate noncompliance and, if crossed, are sufficient justification for actions by members of the Security Council. The most important redlines are adequate cooperation and transparency.

The fundamental resolution governing Iraq verification requirements remains Resolution 687 adopted in April 1991. Under this resolution, Iraq is to "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision," of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons-related assets, and longer-range ballistic missiles programs (ranges over 150 kilometers). Iraq is to accept the implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that these programs are not reconstituted. With regard to its nuclear weapons program, Iraq is permanently prohibited from possessing separated plutonium or

highly enriched uranium or obtaining technology for producing such materials.

Resolution 687 and several subsequent Security Council resolutions have led to an extensive system of inspections and ongoing monitoring in Iraq. The IAEA Action Team, UNMOVIC, and its predecessor UNSCOM have had an extensive understanding of when Iraq did not comply, or, conversely, when it did comply, with its fundamental obligations. These concrete experiences provide a strong foundation for creating a set of standards to determine noncompliance under a future inspection regime.

The best judges of whether Iraq is complying with its obligations remain the IAEA Action Team and UNMOVIC. Each group should retain the authority to determine noncompliance in its respective area of responsibility. Although the Security Council is responsible for deciding a course of action in the event of noncompliance, the inspectors should make the fundamental decision about Iraqi compliance based on a set of technical verification measures and standards.

The first and foremost measure of compliance is Iraqi cooperation. Although Iraq can legitimately resist certain requests by inspectors, the inspection authorities have extensive experience in judging whether Iraq is cooperating with core requirements.

A lack of cooperation, as judged by either inspection agency, should be sufficient by itself to find that Iraq is in noncompliance with its obligations.

Efforts by Iraq to impose unilaterally limitations on the inspectors should be viewed as noncooperation. The inspection agencies and the Security Council must maintain their right to determine the rules and obligations of the verification process.

Another equally important indicator of compliance is transparency. Inspectors should be able to verify Iraqi compliance with minimal effort. To that end, Iraq should take steps to make its industrial activities, its decision-making processes, its facilities, and its imports visible to the inspectors. The inspection agencies should not have to create elaborate ruses to obtain information from Iraq, as was too often the route forced on UNSCOM. In addition, the inspectors should not have to find a "smoking gun" to prove noncompliance. If inspectors detect a pattern of evasion or camouflaging activities and receive no satisfactory explanation of such behavior, they should conclude that Iraq is in noncompliance with its obligations.

Iraq has accepted a wide range of specific verification requirements that provide the methods for the inspectors to determine technically that Iraq is free of WMD and in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. Iraq must, for example, permit inspectors regular and no-notice access to designated sites, submit full and complete declarations, answer questions from inspectors, produce

personnel for questioning and discussion, permit monitoring of sites, equipment, and individuals, and allow environmental monitoring. Iraq can never be expected to provide one hundred percent compliance with all such requirements. A local authority may temporarily deny access to a site, despite the wishes of the central Iraqi government. Iraqis may slight a declaration. They may overlook questions, view them as too difficult to answer, or be just lazy. However, a pattern of not fulfilling these requirements is sufficient to conclude that Iraq has not complied with its obligations. In addition, the inspectors must gain sufficient insight and knowledge through these activities to conclude that Iraq is complying with its obligations.

Too often in the past, the international community viewed the Iraqi inspection process as a "cat-and-mouse game" in which inspectors were expected to demonstrate that Iraq was hiding banned activities or otherwise not in compliance with its obligations. Through dramatic unannounced inspections, the use of information from intelligence agencies or defectors, or old-fashioned detective work, inspectors often did uncover a prodigious amount of secret Iraqi WMD activities. But such an approach was not sustainable and cannot be a basis for an inspection process in the future. The international community, and in particular the Security Council, must understand that the burden of proof is on Iraq to demonstrate compliance.

II

TRACKING IRAQI PROCUREMENT

Fouad El-Kharib

A credible mechanism to detect potential illegal procurement attempts by Iraq represents a key element of a comprehensive monitoring strategy in nonproliferation. Such a mechanism is required to deter Baghdad's regime from acquiring goods and technologies necessary for the development of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) force.

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

Seeking to Develop Indigenous Capabilities

The embargo imposed on Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran-Iraq War and the UN sanctions after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm have constituted a double-edged sword. On one hand, they slowed down Iraq's acquisition of WMD. On the other, they pushed Iraq to pursue actively the development of an indigenous capability. Those indigenous efforts were and are still premised on low reliability, low technology, relatively low safety, and particularly pragmatic experimentation.

Regardless of international sanctions, from 1993 and at least until 1998, Iraq covertly negotiated transactions with more than 500 companies from more than 40 countries around the globe, scattered

from the Western world to Eastern Europe and Asia. Competitive deals, some worth several million dollars, were negotiated with the support of small trading companies established in the Middle East or within Iraq—the so-called local market. They covered a wide variety of goods and technologies to restore, upgrade, and expand the country's industrial and military assets. Traders did not foresee any problem in procuring specific raw materials or machinery from well-known foreign companies. Some contracts were to be fulfilled with foreign currency payments, and some through barter terms involving Iraqi oil products. Not all the transactions were finalized: Some were terminated in their early stages; others were to be implemented after the lifting of the embargo. Nonetheless, some contracts were actually implemented and resulted in the delivery of goods to Iraq. All of those transactions were undertaken in violation of UN sanctions, through a highly centralized procurement network with a constantly evolving pattern involving various ministries.

Since 1998, numerous press reports mentioned Iraq's continuing illegal procurement attempts from foreign countries of goods subject to monitoring by weapons inspectors.

Difficulty Enforcing Export-Import Legislation

Outside of Iraq, the effectiveness of export-import controls as a tool for limiting the spread of WMD-related technologies is being called into question by economic globalization and a complex array of international developments.

Today more countries are beginning to show greater awareness, willingness, and interest in international cooperation on nonproliferation and export controls. At the state level and on a legal basis, institutions necessary for effective export control systems are more or less established. However, many governments often face a daunting task in implementing those controls. They lack resources and, at times, the will to enforce national legislation to comply with international standards. Also there remain a number of countries that are faced with government corruption and political or economic instability—all of which have relegated export control issues to a very low priority. Some of these countries may serve as transit points to leak dual-use technologies and equipment to countries or groups of concern. In those cases, local customs authorities are poorly trained and ill equipped to identify sensitive material or technologies, which hinders effective implementation and enforcement of export laws. In addition, most of the proscribed procurement from foreign companies may be undertaken following legal and international routes with appropriate low-signature measures to conceal the true end-use objective.

Despite Iraq's efforts to produce everything indigenously, a conservative assessment would conclude that today Iraqi engineers and scientists certainly still depend on foreign expertise, imported critical components, spare parts and materials, especially in the nuclear, missile, and chemical fields and to a lesser extent in the biological field. Such a reality tends to moderate the clear and present danger and suspicions about what actually could have been achieved by Iraq since 1998. Nevertheless, all experts agree that vigilance is necessary. Technical breakout scenarios identified by UNSCOM are still

possible, as dual-use technologies and knowledge are spreading worldwide more freely and easily. Moreover, implementation without hampering civilian application remains ethically confusing due to the dual-use aspects of research, industrial equipment, and material.

TRACKING IRAQI PROCUREMENT: WHAT COULD BE DONE?

There is no silver bullet solution to impair illegal or undeclared procurement attempts. However, determined implementation of a mix of internationally endorsed measures could contribute to deterring Baghdad from pursuing such objectives while remaining credible vis-à-vis the international community. Those measures embrace new national legislation and improved information strategies, appropriate support and allocation of resources to UNMOVIC and the IAEA Action Team, and planning of intrusive export-import focused multidisciplinary inspections.

Legislation and Information Strategies

As additional political signs of cooperation, the Iraqi government could pass legislation on reporting of proscribed rearmament efforts to an international authority, including procurement-related attempts, to be both legal and praiseworthy. It could amend its constitution to reflect its resolve not to procure, develop, acquire, or use any WMD. Baghdad could also accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Important UN-sponsored information dissemination efforts could be engaged to increase awareness about WMD proliferation risks and export-import regulations, especially in industry circles. The international community should also engage in improving the education and training of customs control agents worldwide.

Mechanisms for updating lists of controlled items should be streamlined into timely responses to challenges posed by newer techniques, processes, and materials being developed as substitutes to controlled items.

In the medium term, severe international penalties for export control violations should be elaborated and imposed when WMD-related items are involved. Personal responsibilities should be involved.

Quality and Quantity of the Resources Made Available to UNMOVIC

Tracking illegal procurement cannot be undertaken without external, fresh, and reliable information to assist in verifying the compliance of Iraq and the completeness of its import declarations. Aside from access to open-source information, requests for intelligence materials should be renewed and stressed to supporting governments.

Currently few customs experts work in UNMOVIC. Those who do mainly review Iraq's requests for imports to identify dual-use goods from prohibited items in the UN Security Council Resolution 1051 list or the GRL of goods.¹ Instead of hiring private contractors for trade controls at border posts, training a pool of UNMOVIC customs experts to conduct on-site inspections in conjunction with multidisciplinary teams should be strongly promoted.

Operations Undertaken by Weapons Inspectors

The minimum UNMOVIC can and should do is what UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team already did. It is recommended that strong multidisciplinary operational planning for the purpose of intrusive monitoring of procurement attempts be well thought out.

Beyond traditional on-site inspections of declared or undeclared industrial sites by internationally mandated bodies, access to all premises on Iraqi territory should be implemented as stated in UN Security Council Resolution 687 to deter Iraqi citizens from undertaking trade or financial operations related to illegal procurement activities. Inspecting the follow-

ing bottlenecks could contribute to identifying undeclared end-users or proscribed activity:

- ▶ Border posts on roads but also rail and civilian and military air and maritime ports and routes could be randomly checked by technical inspections teams combined with highly competent customs experts. On-site monitoring could be complemented by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) aerial surveillance of unusual routes.
- ▶ The structural compartmentalization of the Iraqi programs tends to preserve the secrecy surrounding potential illegal procurements. Nevertheless, a highly centralized and hierarchical paper processing system at ministry levels is its Achilles' heel. Intrusive challenge inspections of commercial departments in various ministries and commercial banks could unveil suspect trading activities.
- ▶ Diplomatic premises abroad could also be subject to challenge inspection upon strong evidence or suspicion of financial assistance and attempts to use immunity to cover up illegal transactions.²

Continual monitoring or unannounced spot inspections of government-owned or private trading companies could be rewarded with catches of whole procurement networks of proscribed activities. But it should be noted that once a company's illegal activity has been unveiled, it has often been disbanded and a new one created elsewhere. Such efforts would be a high-value, low-probability "fish and catch game," especially in the absence of reliable current intelligence information.

Conversely, what should such monitoring *not* be? Monitoring procurement activities should not be designed to be limited to monitoring a specific site, some specific Iraqi program, or any specific declaration process. It should be designed to catch proscribed procurement activities, undertaken by Iraq, whether they are undertaken inside or outside the

1. The Goods Review List (GRL) is a list of import items subject to ongoing monitoring.

2. Closer analysis by legal advisers of articles 22, 24, and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) is necessary to ascertain the legality of such an option within the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 1284.

country. It should not, however, impede nonprohibited procurement activities. Tracking Iraqi procurement should not be about military, technical, or commercial intelligence. International inspectors should take into consideration Iraq's legitimate concerns and protect confidential business and security information of the Government of Iraq not relevant to applicable UN Security Council resolutions. Notwithstanding, all efforts should be made to uphold the dignity of individuals faced with such highly intrusive measures. This should by no means restrict access to sites or relevant information of interest pertaining to importation of material and technologies related to proscribed programs.

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?

First, despite UN sanctions, Iraq has demonstrated over the last few years its intention to import dual-use goods and monitored items to enhance indigenous industrial capacities. It has also demonstrated its ability to smuggle proscribed items. Second, in many countries, the enforcement of international

export controls standards is still flawed and subject to relatively easy deception measures.

Whatever happens in Iraq, several of the proposed measures can be initiated without being too costly. Their implementation would reinforce the international efforts by setting new standards, improving awareness and expertise of the potential actors.

When monitoring resumes, the first six months might offer the maximum opportunities for discoveries; meanwhile Iraq's level of cooperation would be expected to score high. However, during this period, the newly trained inspectors will be under the burden of re-baselining all their data on old and possible new sites, as well as establishing programs to monitor such sites. Most inspectors will be obtaining their first real field experience, while being under extreme political pressure to provide quick results. After a year, one can expect the inspectors to become familiar with the country and its facilities, but the level of cooperation on the Iraqi side might progressively decrease. Beyond initial discoveries, the deterrent factor of the proposed measures will remain.

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS

David Cortright

The UN arms inspection effort in Iraq is the most comprehensive, most intrusive weapons monitoring program ever established. The successful completion of the program is crucial to the security of the region and the world and may serve as a precedent for future disarmament efforts. This paper explores the legal basis for that effort. It begins by examining the main provisions of the two primary UN Security Council resolutions mandating the disarmament of Iraq. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the two resolutions, which reveals a number of ambiguities and contradictions in the existing legal framework. The paper addresses these ambiguities and concludes with options for a diplomatic strategy to induce Iraqi acceptance of renewed weapons inspections.

RESOLUTION 687: THE FUNDAMENTAL MANDATE

When the Government of Iraq signed the Gulf War cease-fire agreement in 1991, it thereby accepted the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 687. Section C of that resolution specifies Iraq's disarmament obligations and establishes UN mechanisms for

implementing this disarmament mandate. By agreeing to Resolution 687, Iraq accepted unconditionally "the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of all its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including:

All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto. . . .

All ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometers, and related major parts and repair and production facilities. . . .

Nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable materials or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above.¹

To implement this resolution, Iraq was directed to submit within fifteen days a "declaration" on the locations, amounts, and types of all specified weapons.² Resolution 707 (1991) reiterated this

1. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687* (1991), April 3, 1991, par. 8 and 12.

2. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, par. 9(a).

demand in calling for Iraq to submit a “full, final, and complete disclosure” of its weapons activities and capabilities.³ During the 1990s Iraq submitted nearly two-dozen such disclosures to UN officials. All of these disclosures were subsequently shown to be false.⁴

Resolution 687 directed the secretary-general to form the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to carry out on-site inspections of Iraq’s biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, based on Iraq’s declarations. Iraq was directed to yield possession to UNSCOM of all specified weapons and related items and to destroy all specified missile capabilities and launchers under UNSCOM supervision.

Resolution 687 further ordered that “Iraq shall not acquire or develop nuclear weapons.” It directed the IAEA to carry out on-site inspections of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, with the assistance and cooperation of UNSCOM. The IAEA was also directed to implement a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the prohibition on nuclear weapons activities.⁵

Resolution 687 noted that the disarmament actions to be taken by Iraq “represent steps toward the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery.” Four preambulatory paragraphs in the resolution made reference to the objective of establishing a Middle East zone free from WMD.⁶

In Section F of Resolution 687, the Security Council decided that, upon council agreement that Iraq has met the requirements of the disarmament mandate, the prohibitions against importing Iraqi oil and against financial transactions with Iraq “shall have no further force or effect.”⁷

Subsequent Security Council actions sought to

implement the work of UN weapons inspectors, as follows:

- ▶ Resolution 699 (1991) approved the operational plans for UNSCOM and IAEA, as submitted by the secretary-general in documents S/22614 and S/22615. The implementation plans envisioned three stages for the inspection process: (1) the gathering and assessment of information; (2) the disposal of weapons and other specified facilities; and (3) ongoing monitoring and verification. The plans approved in Resolution 699 covered the first two stages.
- ▶ Resolution 707 (1991) condemned Iraq’s violations of its commitment to comply with the UN disarmament mandate and demanded “full, final, and complete disclosure” of all aspects of its WMD programs. The resolution provided UNSCOM and IAEA complete air surveillance rights and demanded that they be allowed “immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all” sites they wished to inspect.
- ▶ Resolution 715 (1991) approved the operational plans for ongoing monitoring and verification developed by UNSCOM and IAEA, as submitted by the secretary-general in documents S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1. The operation plans approved in Resolutions 699 and 715 gave UNSCOM and the IAEA unprecedented and extraordinary powers to conduct intrusive inspections.
- ▶ A list of import items subject to ongoing monitoring was approved in Resolution 1051 (1996) and was revised as the Goods Review List in Resolution 1409 (2002).

3. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 707, S/RES/707* (1991), August 15, 1991, par. 3(i).

4. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “UNSCOM: Between Iraq and Hard Place?” *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2002), p. 142.

5. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, par. 12 and 13.

6. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, par. 14.

7. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, par. 22.

RESOLUTION 1284: RENEWING THE MANDATE

Following the departure of UNSCOM from Iraq in December 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 in December 1999 creating a new weapons inspection body, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission. The resolution also developed a new plan for the fulfillment of the UN disarmament mandate.

The adoption of Resolution 1284 reflected two contrasting developments, as articulated in the preambulatory paragraphs: Iraq's partial progress toward the implementation of the disarmament provisions of Resolution 687, and Iraq's failure to implement those provisions fully.⁸

The weapons inspection provisions of Resolution 1284 assumed that much of the work of disarming Iraq had already been achieved, and that the disarmament mandate could be completed through a series of tasks that UNMOVIC would identify and then accomplish within a year. The resolution envisioned the following timeline for the completion of weapons inspections:

- ▶ sixty days after entering Iraq UNMOVIC and IAEA will submit for Security Council approval a work program for implementing a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification and accomplishing "key remaining disarmament tasks"; and
- ▶ one hundred twenty days after the ongoing system of monitoring and verification is fully operational, if Iraq is cooperating in all respects, the Security Council would suspend sanctions for renewable periods of 120 days.

COMPARING 1284 AND 687

An analysis of Resolution 1284, in comparison to Resolution 687, reveals the following:

- ▶ The new arrangements under Resolution 1284 reaffirm all the terms of the UN disarmament mandate. UNMOVIC is granted all the powers and responsibilities that were given to UNSCOM in Resolution 687. The role of IAEA as stated in Resolution 687 is reaffirmed. The Government of Iraq is required to fulfill all the obligations imposed upon it in Resolution 687 and "shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect."⁹
- ▶ Resolution 1284 introduces new disarmament requirements without specifying what those obligations would entail. Paragraph 2 of the resolution declares that UNMOVIC will establish and operate a "reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification." No definition of the term *reinforced* is provided, either in the resolution or the approved UNMOVIC work plan. The resolution calls upon UNMOVIC to "identify . . . additional sites" to be covered by such a system. According to the Government of Iraq, the number of sites previously monitored was more than 500. The new language thus suggests "a certain direction toward expanding the number of sites."¹⁰ The operational plan for UNMOVIC approved by the Security Council in April 2000 offers no specific guidance on the operation of a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification.¹¹ The requirements for such a sys-

8. See preambulatory paragraph 9 in United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, S/RES/1284 (1999), December 17, 1999.

9. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, S/RES/1284 (1999), December 17, 1999, par. 4.

10. Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Analysis of Security Council Resolution 1284," December 1999, available at <<http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/iraq/for-ministry/iraq-mfa-res1284.htm>>.

11. United Nations, *Note by the Secretary-General Transmitting the Organizational Plan for the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission Prepared by the Executive Chairman*, S/2000/292, April 6, 2000, par. 14-16.

tem are important because the suspension of sanctions is contingent upon satisfactory reports that this system is fully operational.

- ▶ Resolution 1284 places the burden for specifying Iraq's disarmament obligations on UNMOVIC rather than on the Baghdad government. Paragraph 7 of Resolution 1284 requires UNMOVIC and the IAEA to develop work programs for implementing "the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations" under Resolution 687. The same paragraph further decides that "what is required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise."¹² This language is very different from that of previous measures, which required Iraq to submit a "declaration" (Resolution 687) or a "full, final, and complete disclosure" (Resolution 707) of all of its weapons capabilities.
- ▶ The operational and staffing plans for UNMOVIC differ from those of UNSCOM. Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1284 makes UNMOVIC accountable to the secretary-general. The executive chairman of UNMOVIC is instructed to report to the Security Council through the secretary-general. By contrast, the chairman of UNSCOM reported directly to the Security Council. Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1284 specifies that UNMOVIC staff will be international civil servants subject to Article 100 of the UN Charter.¹³ Staff members of UNSCOM were provided by, paid for, and accountable to their individual governments. Under the provisions of Resolution 1284, UNMOVIC staff members are part of the UN Secretariat and are not to be

held accountable to or influenced by any single UN member state.

- ▶ Resolution 1284 states that UNMOVIC shall take over all assets and archives of UNSCOM and that it shall assume UNSCOM's part in agreements previously negotiated with the Government of Iraq.¹⁴ UNMOVIC thereby inherited two previous agreements, one negotiated by UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus in June 1996 and the other by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in February 1998, that specify modalities and procedures for inspecting so-called sensitive sites.¹⁵ Presumably these agreements still hold.
- ▶ Section D of Resolution 1284 alters the procedures for the lifting of sanctions as an inducement for Iraqi cooperation. In place of the language of paragraph 22 of Resolution 687, which declares that upon completion of the specified disarmament tasks, "sanctions shall have no further force or effect," Resolution 1284 states merely that the Security Council "expresses its intention" to suspend sanctions for 120 days if the chairmen of UNMOVIC and IAEA report that Iraq has cooperated "in all respects."¹⁶ Continuing this suspension would require an affirmative vote by the Security Council every 120 days. This gives any permanent member of the council the power to terminate the suspension.¹⁷
- ▶ The suspension of sanctions outlined in Resolution 1284 is subject to "the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures" to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items referred to in paragraph 24 of Resolution 687, namely weapons and military-related goods.¹⁸

12. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 7.

13. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 5 and 6.

14. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 11.

15. de Jonge Oudraar, "UNSCOM: Between Iraq and Hard Place?" p. 143.

16. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 33.

17. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 35.

18. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 33.

Resolution 1284 expresses the Security Council's intention to approve arrangements for such measures before it decides to suspend sanctions.¹⁹

- ▶ The previous language of Resolution 687 concerning a Middle East zone free from WMD is mentioned only once in a preambulatory paragraph and is not included in the text of Resolution 1284, thereby weakening the legal commitment to this objective.

ADDRESSING AMBIGUITIES: UNMOVIC'S MANDATE

As noted, the legal foundation for insisting upon comprehensive, intrusive inspections in Iraq remains solid. Resolution 1284 does not weaken the disarmament mandate established in Resolution 687. However, there is an apparent contradiction between the acknowledgement in the preamble to Resolution 1284 of "the progress made by Iraq toward compliance" and the provisions in paragraph 2 of that resolution calling for a "reinforced" system of monitoring and the inspection of "additional sites." Further ambiguity is introduced by the language of paragraph 7 of Resolution 1284, which places the burden for defining the "remaining disarmament tasks" on UNMOVIC rather than the Government of Iraq. This seems to imply, contrary to available evidence, that Iraq has provided adequate disclosures in the past and that the responsibility for completing the disarmament process rests primarily with UNMOVIC.

A contradiction also exists between the requirement of paragraph 4 of Resolution 1284 that UNMOVIC be allowed "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas" and the provisions of paragraph 11 that UNMOVIC "shall assume" UNSCOM's part in the legal agreements previously negotiated with the Government of Iraq. The February 1998 memorandum of un-

derstanding between the UN secretary-general and the Government of Iraq, which was approved by the Security Council in Resolution 1154 (1998), established modalities for independent experts and senior diplomats to accompany inspectors at sensitive sites. As noted by Terence Taylor, the former chief inspector of UNSCOM, these procedures slowed and degraded UNSCOM inspections. Nonetheless, paragraph 11 of Resolution 1284 indicates that UNMOVIC is bound by this agreement.

It is safe to conclude from the above that UNMOVIC faces a more restrictive legal framework and operating environment than UNSCOM did. The new agency may not be "UNSCOM Lite," as some have suggested, but it faces unique obligations and restrictions. These are the result of the political differences within the Security Council that produced the sometimes contradictory language of Resolution 1284. They also reflect the results of UNSCOM's nearly eight years of experience and the significant progress that was achieved in eliminating most of Iraq's WMD. Because the political climate has changed and much of the work of disarming Iraq has already been accomplished, it seems clear that UNMOVIC will be required to operate under a more limited mandate than its predecessor.

UNCERTAINTY OVER THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS

Another major contradiction concerns the terms and conditions for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. On the one hand, Resolution 1284 offers specific benchmarks and a timetable for the easing of sanctions pressure (120 days after the reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification system is fully operational). But the resolution also significantly weakens the commitment to lifting sanctions. The resolution merely expresses the Security Council's "intention" to suspend rather than its obligation

19. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 36.

to do so. Resolution 1284 employs the term *suspend* rather than *lift*, and it requires that the suspension must be renewed by an affirmative Security Council vote every 120 days.

The ambiguities in this area have direct bearing on the diplomatic prospects for inducing Iraqi acceptance of renewed weapons inspections. Without a clear commitment to the lifting of sanctions in return for compliance, it will be difficult to persuade the Baghdad government to permit the return of weapons inspectors. According to former UNSCOM chair Rolf Ekeus, "the language of suspension injects an element of instability and insecurity. That is probably the major reason why Iraq has been withholding its approval of the resolution."²⁰

Uncertainty about the lifting of sanctions is reinforced by the position of U.S. government officials, who have stated their intention to maintain sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. In a March 1997 speech at Georgetown University, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that the United States does not accept the view that sanctions should be removed when Iraq fulfills its obligations to the United Nations.²¹ In November 1997 President Bill Clinton remarked that "sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as [Hussein] lasts."²² In light of these and other statements from U.S. officials, the Iraqi government could reasonably conclude that the United States would oppose any lifting of sanctions, regardless of whether or not it complies with weapons monitoring. The U.S. government position of maintaining permanent sanctions against Saddam Hussein goes beyond the legal mandate of UN policy and is not authorized in Security Council resolutions. It is a major obstacle to the prospects for inducing Iraqi cooperation with UN weapons inspections.

A further obstacle to the suspension or lifting of sanctions is the absence of a Security Council plan to establish an ongoing arms embargo against Iraq, as required by Resolution 1284. Paragraph 33 of that resolution makes any suspension of sanctions subject to the "elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures" to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited weapons. Nothing has been done to consider or develop such arrangements, however. This is a significant omission because the "effective financial measures" referred to in the resolution are bound to be complicated, especially in light of a provision of paragraph 36 referring to "payment" for authorized civilian exports and imports. This is an oblique reference to the UN escrow account, which currently controls all revenues from approved oil sales and provides payment for the import of civilian goods into Iraq. Reference to the matter of "payment" raises the contentious issue of whether and how oil revenues are to be returned to Iraqi government control. The Security Council has not yet considered whether or how this is to be done, with what degree of continuing UN monitoring or control. Until this matter is addressed and decided, according to the language of paragraphs 33 and 36 of Resolution 1284, the council cannot suspend sanctions.

INDUCING IRAQI COMPLIANCE

To resolve ambiguities in the conditions for lifting sanctions and to provide an incentive for Iraqi cooperation, the Security Council should clarify and restate the original commitment in Resolution 687 that sanctions will be lifted when the UN disarmament mandate is fully implemented. This would provide a carrot to accompany the many sticks that have been applied or threatened to gain Iraqi com-

20. "Shifting Priorities: UNMOVIC and the Future of Inspections in Iraq, An Interview with Ambassador Rolf Ekeus," *Arms Control Today*, March 2002, p. 5.

21. Madeleine K. Albright, "Preserving Principle and Safeguarding Stability: United States Policy Toward Iraq," speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1997.

22. Quoted in Barbara Crossette, "For Iraq: A Doghouse with Many Rooms," *New York Times*, November 23, 1997, p. A4.

pliance. Inducement strategies have been successful in other settings, notably North Korea, as means of persuading targeted regimes to accept nonproliferation and disarmament objectives.²³ Experience has shown that incentives are most effective in these settings when they are strictly conditioned on compliance and when they are accompanied by cred-

ible coercive pressures. Any inducements offered to Iraq must be linked to clear and unequivocal compliance by the Baghdad regime.²⁴ The lifting of sanctions must be subject to certification by UNMOVIC and the IAEA that Iraq's capabilities for developing WMD have been fully eliminated.

23. For a thorough analysis of the North Korea case, see Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).

24. For a fuller discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of inducement strategies, see David Cortright, ed., *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), a report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

October 1, 2002 3:54 PM

TO: Honorable Mitchell Daniels

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: FYDP 2004 to 2009

100-58

When I met with the President, the Vice President, Andy and Condi a week or two ago, I brought up the subject of DoD's FYDP 2004 to 2009.

I told him my understanding was that OMB staff was suggesting that he had previously agreed to inflation plus \$10 billion for DoD for each year going forward for FY 02-07, but that that did not include the two years not in the current FYDP and therefore DoD should plan only for inflation for the last two years, FY 08 and 09, not inflation plus \$10 billion.

I came away from my meeting with the President feeling that he does approve of the inflation plus \$10 billion going out the full FYDP 2004. My recollection was he came up with that formulation last year.

I did not press him on the issue, because I didn't feel it was proper with you not there. I sure didn't want to try to argue your case for you. 

Would you please work with your folks in OMB, so that for planning purposes we can continue on that basis? If I am not correct, please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-74

1 OCT 02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

EF0792U 9/9/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
approved
OCT 03 2002

SECDEF SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

I-02/013353

MEMORANDUM FOR CATHY MAINARDI, CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT TO
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: PROTOCOL *McNulty 9.20.02 Honor Cordan*

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (Douglas J. Feith) *SEP 12 2002*

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (J.D. *Crouch II*)

PURPOSE: Schedule a meeting with NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson

DESCRIPTION:

- Robertson on 21-23 October will make a final Washington visit before NATO's Prague Summit, 21-22 November.
- He will review the major Summit issues, such as the capabilities initiative, command and force structure reviews, enlargement, NATO-Russia and missile defense
- Other topics might include the campaign against terrorism, Iraq, Balkans/Macedonia operations, the ICC, and ESDP.
- Robertson will seek a full set of meetings with principals and possibly the President, who last April hosted a working dinner for Robertson, including SecDef.
- SecDef will see Robertson at the NATO Informal Ministerial in Warsaw 24-25 September, but the major Summit issues will evolve rapidly after that.

NATO 091.112

DATE/TIME: October 21-23, 30 minutes TBD.

ATTENDEES: SecDef, MA, USDP Feith, ASD/ISP Crouch, DASD/Eur-NATO Brzezinski, Director/NATO Townsend, notetaker. Robertson, 3-4 staff, U.S. Amb. Burns.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef meet with Robertson.

SECDEF DECISION:

 OCT 3 2002
Approve *21 Oct 1:45 - 2:15*

 Other

09-12-02 19:41 IN

1250 of 62
(action items 1515 + Press following)

Prepared by: Rod Fabrycky, ISP/NATO (b)(6) 9/9/02

U15975 02

11-L-055 SD/11424

C 9/26

August 12, 2002 9:24 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Norway and Homeland Defense Consultations

This was recommended by the Norwegian MoD. If we are going to do this, let's go ahead and get back to her, tell her we are going to do it and ask her what she is going to do.

Norway

Thanks.

Attach.

07/19/92 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef re: Homeland Defense Consultations in NATO

DFIR JH
081202-15

.....
Please respond by _____

122
1640 RECEIVED IN ISP
TASKED TO NATO/EUR

9/26 - SECDEF HAS SEEN
SEP 30 2002
→ SecDef - A draft letter to Norwegian MoD attached.
If you're okay, I'll get it out.
Larry Di Rita
9/27
R. H. ...

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 8 2002

Reb 290

Dear Minister Krohn Devold:

could be useful

I agree with your suggestion that NATO ~~be used~~ as a vehicle for consultation on Homeland ~~Security and~~ Defense issues. The Alliance's Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) would be ~~an ideal~~ *a likely* forum for such consultations.

U.S.

The ~~United States~~ has been trying to use the SCEPC to develop Allied capabilities to respond to the consequences of a terrorist attack, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. Homeland ~~Security and~~ Defense consultations in this forum could ~~enhance~~ *improve* Allied preparedness to respond in a coordinated fashion to such contingencies.

talk to

We should ask our NATO representatives to ~~press the~~ other NATO Allies to come up with proposals on Homeland ~~Security and~~ Defense issues for the SCEPC agenda.

Sincerely,

09-30-02 10:54 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/11426

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 11, 2002

SUBJECT:

Yemen

Where do we stand on Yemen hot pursuit? The President said we should go ahead and move it into the PC as soon as we got going. Where do we stand?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
091102.05

~~SECDEF~~ SECDEF HAS SH...

OCT 04 2002

BRIEFING TO YOU COMPLETED TODAY.

REVISIONS BEING MADE, AS DIRECTED, IN PREP FOR TAKING IT TO PC.

11SEP02

02 SEP 13 10:21

October 3, 2002 7:06 AM

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Perspective Paper

Do you have a paper from years ago that talks about the policy perspective and the staff perspective? It's a short paper that Paul Wolfowitz remembers.

If you have one, please give me a copy.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
100302-1

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

020700D

3 OCT 02

U16037 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/11428
*Copy handwritten to SECDEF office
11 Oct 02 by Eric Trawson*



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

October 4, 2002

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andrew W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: Perspective Paper

I searched my files and came up with two possible papers Paul Wolfowitz might be referring to. They are attached. Let me say in addition, that very often staffs do not understand or share the perspective of top-level leaders. For example, when I worked for Kissinger on the NSC, I undertook studies of the performance of the intelligence community in times of crisis. One of the first things that emerged was that the sorts of questions that Kissinger raised, or the concerns that Nixon and Kissinger had, were not understood or shared by the people in State or in the Intelligence Community. They were answering questions they did not understand fully or made no sense to them giving their view of how the world worked. The top-level people were concerned with the longer-term consequences of the way in which the crisis came out, in particular, the perceived role of the United States with successful outcomes. The people down in the bureaucracy seemed entirely concerned with the crisis itself, getting it over quickly, seeing it as a problem that had to be solved. In contrast top-level people often saw it as an opportunity, either to achieve some other end, or to gain reputation. The latter seemed to be especially scorned by the people in the bureaucracy.

Later, when I lectured to mid-career CIA groups, I used to explain this situation to them by saying that it was if there was a chess game, two players at the board, but each had a group of advisors. The problem was that the advisors didn't know what the game was all about. They might know a few of the moves, but they did not really understand the game, so that their advice was often useless.

I have other stories that reflect the different perspective of leaders and staffs if you want to hear them. Staffs tend to focus on process and on quantifiable aspects of problems, the leaders are (should be) focused on broader issues for which the analysis methods of the staffs are inadequate, or do not deal with.

During the strategic review of last year, it struck me how wedded people in DoD are to responding to threats. The notion that we should be causing other people problems and worrying less about threats seems something that they find difficult to take onboard. Earlier experiences with the effort to introduce competitive strategies were similar. There is a blindness to the problems of potential opponents that can be exploited.

Attachments



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

4 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT ELLSWORTH

SUBJECT: The Role of the Second Deputy

After reviewing the package describing the functions of a second Deputy Secretary in the Department of Defense, I have reached the following conclusions:

-- I do not favor the second Deputy for Operations as described either in the materials you gave me, nor in the Blue Ribbon Panel report.

-- I have a number of reasons for rejecting that proposal which include: (1) that I do not see that it can be carried out effectively as described; and (2) that I believe that there is an alternative description of the position or the role of a second deputy that meets other needs and does seem feasible.

A summary of the reasons against include that I believe there would be a good deal of resistance from the Services to the intrusions of a Deputy for Operations if he really tried to intervene in the day-to-day operations of forces. Moreover, in peacetime, the operations in which one would want to intervene are rather few in number. Moreover, in a crisis period, the deputy would be swept aside by the Secretary of Defense, who would have to immerse himself in the operational problems of the crisis. All this does not mean that there are not problems in the current command structure from the President through the Secretary to the Services. I have been struck by some problems of crisis management which could be helped by a better interface between the civilian and military staffs in those situations. Perhaps ad hoc groups could be formed to assist the Secretary in managing crises or his participation in the management of crises by the President and NSC structure. Of particular need are better mechanisms for getting political insight and judgment into the process when military forces are used for political effect. My impression of how things worked under Nixon and Kissinger was that when military forces were being used for political effect, the orders

OSD/NA Files
AWM Bookcase
Notebook "Net Assessment History
Book, Vol. I: 1970-1977"

11-L-0559/OSD/11431

went directly from the President and Kissinger through the Joint Chiefs to the local commander, who was left on his own without very much guidance or direction as to how best to actually achieve the desired effect. I feel that it would be useful to have staffs in the Defense Department to give guidance and write appropriate orders to the people in the field. This staff could coordinate all measures used to achieve the effects that were being sought. They would also be a focal point for using our intelligence services to find out whether in fact the desired effects were being achieved. In any case our intelligence services might be involved in the psychological warfare aspects of publicizing and enhancing the effect of the posturing of our military forces.

There are some operational problems that I think could be handled better, but I believe that they are associated with crises, they cannot in themselves justify a second deputy, and moreover, at the time of the crises, the Secretary himself would probably become directly involved.

Why do I favor a second deputy? If I were the Secretary of Defense, I would want someone to help me bring to the consideration of a wide range of defense problems a longer term perspective. I would like someone to undertake appropriate studies and assessments of longer term problems, develop policy and organizational proposals for dealing with emerging problems and opportunities, etc. The reason I would want someone to spend time on this is that if I looked at what had happened to my predecessors, I would notice that the day-to-day pressure of events would prevent me from spending enough time to provide that kind of perspective on my own. I would note that within the building there is now no focal point for longer term planning or the consideration of longer term and more basic problems of defense organization and grand strategy. The whole focus of the Pentagon (the part of the Department the Secretary is mainly involved with except in case of crisis or his direct role in relations with foreign governments) is on the day-to-day relations with the Congress and the rest of the bureaucracy and, above all, on the yearly budgeting and programming cycle. I would not have this second deputy own or direct a part of the Pentagon staff as such. He might have special relations and responsibilities with respect to some parts, including from time to time some elements in which structural and organizational changes were being carried out to implement decisions made as the result of his recommendations. He would focus on longer term problems and special projects and carry out the appropriate analyses, develop plans and proposals for actions. He would work with the Secretary of Defense helping him to keep a focus on the longer term aspects of problems. In order to perform his role he would have funds to conduct studies and to develop strategies for competing with the

Soviets, etc., and the authority to form task forces, study groups, and draw upon all of the resources of the Department that could be useful to him in these functions.

The point of this kind of an arrangement would be to assume that the other deputy could remain specialized to the day-to-day management problems, the yearly budgeting and programming cycle. This is a crude specification for splitting the responsibilities within Defense. I think a good deal more thought and perhaps some experimentation in running the Department with two deputies, one focused primarily on the day-to-day management and the other on longer term and more basic problems, is needed. A more sophisticated allocation of responsibilities among the three top managers, the Secretary and the two deputies, would emerge over the next few years. There are clearly some problems in drawing upon specific analogies with the business world in designing this splitting of functions. The Defense Department is not like an ordinary business. It is in the business of getting ready to go into action when required. It is also in the business of displaying to others that we have adequate military capabilities and, hence, deterring actions on their part, reassuring our allies, etc. But there are also some similarities between the typical business situation and that of the Defense Department. Further thought is needed, but I am very attracted to the analogy which I have used with you before of the difference between the Chief Executive Officer (the first deputy) and the Chairman of the Board (the second deputy who helps the Secretary play this role). The following quotation from Anthony Jay's Corporation Man expresses very well how it works out in the business world. I include it here because it expresses so well the importance of the difference in perspective that is inherent in the two roles.

The chief executive officer is the peak of the operational activities by the corporation. All the day-to-day and year-by-year research and development and production and sales are under his authority, and the year's profit-and-loss account is the index of his achievement. He stands at the summit of the corporation and looks down at all those who toil on the slopes and foothills and plains below. He marks strength and weakness, success and failure, scarcity and plenty, and decides what must be done to maximize the good and minimize the bad. And beside him, just a step higher up, stands the chairman -- but he is looking in the opposite direction, not inward at the organization but outward at the world in which the corporation has to survive. He is preoccupied with long term finance and relations with the capital market; with the community, and the corporation's reputation within it; with the governments it

has to deal with and the laws that may be passed which will affect the corporation; with long term shifts in technology and markets and materials which may affect the sort of corporation they will have to become in five or ten years' time.

When the chairman does turn around and look inward, he does not share the chief executive's obsession with results and return on capital and earnings per share. He cares about them, of course, but they are already being looked after. His preoccupation is with decisions that may change the whole nature of the corporation for the worse. Suppose the chief executive wants to sack thirty executives; in some corporations it would be accepted as a correct decision, but in others it would send a shock wave to the farthest outposts. In the latter case the chairman would have to balance the saving of salaries against the damage to morale. Suppose the chief executive wanted to start up a range of cheap products and enter a new market, or lower the excessively high technical standards of the corporation's engineering; the chairman might know that these decisions would do irreparable damage to the confidence of customers and the pride of employees even though the short term profits would be impressive. Equally, a single unjust act, if it helps to avert imminent danger, may not worry the chief executive too much; the chairman sees that it may make all the most valuable staff start to reconsider what sort of organization they are offering a lifetime's allegiance to, and he may think the price too high. It is the chairman who is the more worried about recruitment and training and developing managers; as with his other preoccupations, these concern not so much what the corporation does or will do, but what it is and will be.

This distinction is not between two halves of a job that becomes too big for one man: on the contrary, the difference is so profound that it is practically impossible to discharge both duties properly at the same time. The present and the future do not run in harness: their demands and emphases move at a different pace and sometimes pull in opposite directions, and it is rarely satisfactory if the conflict takes place in a single man's mind. If one man tries to do both jobs, one of them is likely to go by default. Sometimes it is the chairman's job that goes, and the company is driven by a brilliant and thrusting opportunist who achieves outstanding short term changes which he himself has precipitated; sometimes it is the chief executive's job that goes, and the company is wise, just

and thoughtful, and returns two percent on its assets. There has to be a proper tension between the present and the future, and a tension requires the application of a force at each end.

Notice in particular the point that is made that "this distinction is not between two halves of a job that becomes too big for one man; on the contrary, the difference is so profound that it is practically impossible to discharge both duties properly at the same time." What I see the second deputy doing is providing a longer-term perspective on the problems of the Defense Department. What this means is that he will be asking different kinds of questions than anyone else; more correctly, he will be putting all of his time on questions others ask intermittently, if at all. Are we in the right business? How is the environment going to change? What will we have to do to adapt to it? Do we have the right strategy for competing with our major adversaries? For hedging against uncertainties? What are our strengths and weaknesses? What future problems are we not addressing? What are our future opportunities? What are the future implications of our current weapon systems? Are our R&D efforts directed toward future problems or opportunities? Are our rationales for particular programming decisions myopic? Too narrow? Consistent with our strategy for competing? Others talk about these occasionally, but there is no serious attention to them.

Other, and more organizationally oriented questions, would relate to longer term problems in the personnel area. For example, the second deputy would be the ideal person to undertake studies of: Should we reinstitute the draft? Do we have the right personnel to provide high quality intelligence analysis to the Secretary of Defense and the other top level Defense decision makers? Should Defense change its policies with respect to the contracting or external studies and analyses in order to obtain higher quality analyses of the environment and appropriate adaptive strategy? How can we make more use of all of the talent in this country?


A. W. MARSHALL

From ^{an} not confessing ourselves
Essays in Honor of Albert and
Roberta Wohlstetter.

16

Strategy as a Profession for Future Generations

Andrew W. Marshall

A Visit to Chartres and Jouy

One of Albert Wohlstetter's distinctive characteristics has always been his search for the absolute best of whatever is available. This has been true of everything: people, technical advice, furniture, medical care, and, perhaps most importantly, food. In the mid-1950s, travel to Europe increased for many people at RAND. In the fall of 1956 my wife and I were in Paris at the same time as the Wohlstetters—Albert, Roberta, and Joanie. Harvey DeWeerd was also there. Early one Sunday morning the six of us went off to see the cathedral at Chartres in a car Albert had rented. Albert had also noticed there was a one-star restaurant nearby, in the small town of Jouy. He telephoned to reserve a table.

It was unusually cold for November and, of course, the church was unheated. His enthusiasm and tutelage were unbounded while we muttered quietly and froze. Not a tympanum, portal, window, or carving went unnoted, inside or out. Finally we drove off to Jouy—ravenous and shivering. It was the first occasion for my wife and me to experience the wonderful French custom of a splendid Sunday midday meal. Our expectations were high—and were realized! A charming rustic inn, with gleaming copper pans hanging in an open kitchen. The ebullient patron and his wife all smiles and welcoming bon jours, a beaming presence in a room full of warmth and appetizing odors.

I cannot remember the entire meal, but its main features were two roast pheasants with appropriate garnishment and an excellent raspberry soufflé. Both the cathedral and the meal were memorable and excellent. We owe that to Albert and his effort to make the most of every occasion.

* * *

How does one become a strategic thinker? What sort of training

or apprenticeship is useful? What is a strategist? These are all difficult questions. For one thing there are problems of defining *strategic thinking*, or what strategy is. These definitional problems seem to be intractable, and to some extent it may be a matter of recognizing strategic thinking when one sees it. But, in general, strategy as contrasted to tactics deals with the coordination of activities at the higher levels of organizations. Strategy also focuses on longer-term goals and reflects a cast of mind that focuses on shaping the future rather than simply reacting to it.

Our vocabulary and use of words in these areas are seldom precise or accurate. The word *strategy* tends to be used in many ways. In particular I would note that in the national security area, which is the main focus of this piece, there is a constant tendency to think of military strategy as related principally to the application of resources in a possible future war and the general guidance for more detailed planning for specific contingencies. The result is that there is relatively little discussion of strategies for the peacetime management of our military organizations and for the allocation of resources over time so as to develop more efficient, effective, competitive military forces with appropriate doctrines and concepts of operations. Given the existence of nuclear weapons, the highest priority objective for the United States has been deterrence of large-scale war. In this we have been largely successful. Therefore, the strategic management problem in our national security establishment has been the peacetime competition to preserve and indeed enhance in the future our ability to deter the Soviet Union from actions adverse to our interests. Now even this definition of our priority objective may need serious amendment as we move into a more truly multipolar world.

It is clear that some people seem more readily able to address issues of strategy or the strategic management of our national security efforts. They have a willingness and a self-confidence to address larger, more basic issues than do others. They often appear to bring a very different perspective to the discussion of the issues of what our strategy ought to be. How do they get this way? What sort of training is useful? This is what I want to address in the next two sections.

What Environments Produce Strategists?

This is a question that deserves extensive study. All I can do is draw upon my experience in and observations of the environment at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and early 1960s and my later experience in government in the period 1972 to the present. One disadvantage of focusing on RAND as a producer of strategists is that it clearly biases the discussion toward an analysis of the development

of people whose role has been advisers in the sense that Herb Goldhamer treated in his book, *The Adviser*.¹ There are other routes to being a strategist, including those who reach high positions in the military services or enter government service from other career lines such as the law or investment banking. But the case of RAND is perhaps of special interest because it did provide in the 1950s and early 1960s an environment that produced a number of people who are now acknowledged as major strategic thinkers.

The RAND Experience

There was something special about the RAND environment from the late 1940s through most of the 1960s. For one thing, especially in the late 1940s and the 1950s, there was a sense of being on the leading edge, of dealing with the centrally important problems. The invention of nuclear weapons and several other technology developments at the end of World War II produced a situation that was quite new, one in which the issue of what our strategy should be was extremely important. Another aspect of this situation, given the large increase in destructive power nuclear weapons introduced, was that there were no experts. Two small weapons had been used at the very end of World War II; what larger numbers of weapons might do to change the nature of war was unclear. Nobel prize winners were no better than graduate students in thinking about the relevant issues, and at meetings and working groups at RAND in the early days there was no hierarchy. This was an ideal situation for younger people (the average age of the professional staff at RAND in 1950 was about twenty-eight), who were immediately treated as equals and valued for what they could contribute to the discussions. This is a rare situation, certainly not characteristic of academia or normal organizations, and it led to the rapid development of individuals who were willing to address the broadest issues of national security. There was also a sense of having a preferred position with respect to access to information on the new developments taking place in weaponry, in particular in the design of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, and other relevant technology.

Two other things favored the development of strategic thinking and innovation at RAND. One was the freedom RAND had to select the problems and the issues on which it worked. This is very different from the environment in contract studies organizations, especially now. The other was the presence of several remarkable men who set the intellectual tone and style of much of the broader analysis that began in the early 1950s. Two I would name are Charles Hitch and John Williams, the heads respectively of the Economics and the Mathematics

Divisions. Apart from their own intellectual contributions, their interest in the cultivation of full-ranging discussion, their intellectual fairness, and their interest in the development of younger people and of new methods of analysis all favored innovation.

One of the interesting things that happened at RAND was the success of the economists in assuming a leading role in the direction of a number of important studies and, more generally, in shaping the way in which RAND addressed national security issues. Initially the economists were brought into what had been largely a technological organization to deal with what was called the military worth function. It had become clear to the technical people that they needed some assistance in thinking about the objectives that military weapon systems were to achieve. There was also some interest in the economics of defense, especially as it dealt with issues of mobilization, and in the targeting of an opponent's industrial capacity and assessing damage to industrial societies from strategic bombing. The economists soon played a much larger and more central role in managing and directing a number of the successful studies. Why was this?

Herman Kahn and I used to discuss this puzzle. We had a number of hypotheses. For one thing the economics of the situation, broadly conceived, were important. What things cost, the level of resources that nations are able to devote to defense over an extended period—these all shape one's views as to the kinds of weapon systems that are desirable and feasible. But another advantage the economists had was that they knew from their own experience that experts could be wrong. Indeed, they also knew that much discussion of economic problems is foolish and that many widely held views, even among responsible people, are faulty. The experience of engineers and physicists is different. In those fields there are real experts who are much more likely to be right than are others. Economists, therefore, were more intellectually comfortable in the situation that existed with respect to nuclear warfare, in which there were no experts.

One of the people in the economics department who was the first to lead and manage a large RAND study was Albert Wohlstetter. Beginning in the early 1950s, he examined a set of issues connected with the basing of long-range bombers. The results of that study are discussed elsewhere in this book. I want to note what seems to me one of the major innovations or inventions Albert made in the conduct of that study. In previous large RAND studies, the practice had been to lay out a number of alternative systems or programs at the very beginning of the study. The study itself focused on evaluating which of the alternative systems was the most cost-effective.

Albert's approach was different. He started with a few alternatives to the existing plan or program, but as the study went on he evolved improved alternatives. He was also less rigid than had been the practice in setting down the criteria, the objective functions, the measures of effectiveness at the beginning of the study and simply sticking with them. His evolutionary approach developed additional criteria and tests of performance as more understanding of the problems and the issues emerged. This was, in my judgment, a crucial invention for doing these kinds of studies, because one would learn much more about the nature of the issues and the problems, how one ought to look at them, and what criteria were relevant as one went further along in the studies. Also, this way of conducting the analysis had the advantage of inventing additional and better alternatives to examine as one went along.

Another aspect of the situation at RAND that was exceptionally favorable to strategic thinking and innovation during the early period was the practice of inviting first-rate people to come and spend the summer. This created an environment in which the important thing was to try to tap into the very best talent in the whole country. The objective was not to do the best that RAND could do with its existing staff, but in a sense to do an analysis that was the best that the country as a whole could accomplish. By its very nature, any organization is limited in the amount and variety of talent, backgrounds, and insights that it can include among its staff. This attitude of searching for the very best people and drawing on the best talent is a key to excellence in broad thinking about any problem or issue. Unfortunately, most organizations do not operate this way.

There is perhaps a natural history to most organizations. When they are first formed they are focused on a mission, they recruit people who are enthusiastic and who devote themselves to the goals of the organization. As time goes on the organization becomes less flexible, accumulates some deadwood, and has some difficulty in sustaining the original vitality. Organizations sometimes are formed in especially suitable environments that allow them to flourish for a time. Then the external environment changes and the organization declines in vitality. In any case, the RAND of the 1950s and early 1960s was a remarkable place, both for the talent it recruited and for its atmosphere and intellectual dynamic. It was also remarkable for its boldness in addressing broader questions of strategy. It is, therefore, not surprising that some interesting and influential people developed there.

The U.S. Government

The next experience that is perhaps relevant comes from my time in government. Beginning in the middle 1970s, 11-L-0559/OSD/11438

attempts to initiate strategic planning activities in the Department of Defense and in the direction of some strategic planning experiments. In particular, James Roche, then a navy commander, and I wrote several papers during 1975-1976 to promote strategic thinking in the Defense Department. We also sponsored contractor research on some aspects of strategic planning. This experience led me to believe that, while systems analysis had been a liberating force during its early development, by the middle 1970s it had become a constraint on thinking strategically. People who were systems analysts found it difficult to address the sorts of questions that we felt needed to be considered in strategic planning. People with a business background or a combination of business school and military service seemed to be among the best at taking up and addressing the questions we wanted dealt with.

We saw it as a vaccination problem: some backgrounds promoted strategic thinking and others seemed to inoculate people against it. Why is that? To some extent, the systems analysts had by that time developed routine approaches to analysis and perhaps had ceased paying sufficient attention to the complex consequences of acquiring the systems they dealt with. James Schlesinger made a comment to me a number of years ago that systems analysis proceeds by trivializing the measurement of effectiveness while perfecting the analysis and the estimate of costs. Programmatic actions, the acquisition of particular weapon systems, the adoption of a new concept of operations, or the setting of new objectives for military forces have complex consequences, including their effects upon the beliefs, actions, and resource allocation patterns of the potential opponents. Most of these consequences are not usually considered in the standard kinds of analysis. One result is that the top leadership of the Department of Defense often get remarkably little assistance from their staffs when truly strategic decisions are addressed. This is because the focus of the work of the staffs, the criteria they use, and their measures of effectiveness are too narrow to account for the considerations that top-level decision makers in fact want to consider, are concerned with, and take into account as best they can.

Some decisions have larger and different consequences than others. For example, a decision to pursue or create a major strategic defense capability is different from a decision among several alternative programs for the next generation of fighter aircraft. The former involve going into a new business for the U.S. military (although it is a business we once were in), the latter the continuation of an existing business. Different issues are involved, different forms of analysis seem needed and existing analysis methods tend to treat the two types of decision

the same way. Part of the problem may be that much if not all of the existing analysis methodology was developed to assist in procurement or operational-planning decisions. Other methods of analysis are necessary when the questions are more like: What businesses should I be in? Where are my competitive advantages? One advantage people from the business world or business schools may have is that they are used to addressing these kinds of questions, though often with analysis methods that are less systematic.

What Backgrounds and Experiences Are Conducive to Strategic Thinking?

There is no specific set of disciplines that must be mastered to be a strategist. People who think strategically come from a number of different backgrounds. Among those whom I have met and feel that I know personally the best academic backgrounds seem to be economics, business school, applied technology (especially for those who have been in the business world), and in some cases political science. But what seems to be central is a cast of mind that is questioning, eclectic, able to devise the broadest kinds of issues and goals, and able to formulate appropriate ways of achieving these goals. A high tolerance for the uncertainty that necessarily accompanies any effort to think forward five, ten, or twenty years is required. For many people, some period of intense involvement in an important, large-scale project or enterprise has proved to be crucial.

World War II was such an experience for a number of people and, indeed, there may be a generational factor at work: living in interesting times may contribute to being a good strategist. People who were involved—even if only in staff positions or on the peripheries—in some major decision-making body connected with that war had a special quality about them. Experiences in World War II clearly had a significant impact on a number of the people who were at RAND during the 1950s. Because they contained many people with World War II experience the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had a character to them that favored strategic thinking. This characteristic of administrations has gradually eroded since the late 1950s.

The changes that we now see in the security environment of the United States will force another major effort of rethinking our situation, our goals, and our strategies. It might, therefore, be a period in which a new generation of strategic thinkers will emerge as a result of the critical experiences they will go through in the next decade.

Turning to the question of what kind of academic study or professional training might be useful, I would start with economics and business

school training, especially business schools that have strong programs in business policy and strategy. My recommendation about economics is, however, a guarded one. Since the 1940s and 1950s, economics training has become too mathematical, too focused on the acquisition of particular analytic tools that are not, in fact, of much use in the national security area. Something like the first courses in graduate school may be enough. They are important, however, because people who do not have a sense of macroeconomics and the fundamental trade-offs that societies have to make find it difficult to think clearly about the long-term implications of devoting large, possibly excessive, percentages of gross national products (GNPs) to military uses. The current state of the Soviet Union is in some part the result of decades of a heavy military burden, with perhaps on the order of 25 to 30 percent of GNP devoted to the military and the external empire.

In the early 1980s, when the first initiatives were taken within the Defense Department to encourage application of a set of ideas that later were labeled as competitive strategies, I had a discussion with the chief of one of the military services. His reaction to the idea of designing some military programs so as to impose increased costs upon the Soviets was negative, or at least cautious. He had two arguments against focusing on increasing Soviet costs or expenditures. The first was that the Soviets would simply spend the extra money, there were no reasons for them not to do so; the second was that our own budgets fluctuate so much that it was unwise to stimulate a competition which we ourselves might not sustain. The second of these arguments has real merit to it. The first shows an unawareness of the long-term consequences for the Soviets of high levels of military expenditures or of possible trade-offs between individual programs the Soviets might be compelled to make, since resources always are limited.

Another virtue of economics training, or for that matter business-school training, is that a modest amount of mathematics is acquired, as is some sense of the importance of technology and an ability to interact more effectively with technologists and hard scientists. This was one of the advantages the economists had over the political scientists at RAND in the early 1950s: quantitative analysis was something the economists were used to and their interest in or ability to discuss and understand what the technologists were up to was somewhat better than that of the political scientists.

Demography is another area that deserves much more attention than it has had in the past in the development of strategy. The relationship of demography to political and military behavior is likely to be an area of increased importance and attention. Demography is brought into discussions of strategy and broad national policy,

but in only the most obvious and limited ways. William McNeill recently wrote a small volume addressing some of the broader relationships of demography to political behavior.² As in other of his works, he provides a number of hypotheses and sketches out areas that deserve considerably more attention.

Additional fields of interest are cultural anthropology, ethology, and some areas of psychology. In some ways a new understanding of man is emerging, based on study of the evolution of man and human society and on new analyses of the biology of man, in particular the functioning of the brain. How men process information, make decisions, and behave are central issues on which much new knowledge exists and more will be available in the future.

But above all, if I had a suggestion to make, it would be that people study, in any case at least read, history of all kinds: military history, of course, but also economic and technological history. The history or analysis of past wars is a major antidote to the narrow focus of many existing methods of analysis of defense issues. Most discussion of strategy and defense programs is, if anything, too focused on technology and weaponry and not enough on the other factors that often dominate actual warfare. Also, if one considers the extended competition between states such as Rome and Carthage, the issue of why the Romans won in the end may shed interesting light on the key variables that need to be considered in our conceptions of strategy.

Another thing that is of great importance is to understand the differences in the ways in which other nations are likely to perceive situations and react to them. Specialized studies of the strategic cultures of the Soviet Union, China, India, Japan, and the European nations are of great use. Some of this can be gained by reading the history of these nations, especially the development of their military and other national security organizations. Other aspects relate to the particular cultural characteristics of these societies.

The Future of Strategy

We are at a major turning point in the history of the world. A new structure is emerging, a more multipolar world with more complex alliance arrangements. Technology is likely to change the nature of warfare, much as it did in the period of the 1920s and 1930s. Then the development of naval aircraft and aircraft carriers revolutionized war at sea; on land the development of the tank and rugged, portable radios led to the invention of the panzer division and new concepts of operations that changed the nature of theater warfare; and, of course, there was the development of tactical and strategic air forces.

New weapons required the development of new doctrines, new concepts of operations, and new kinds of military organizations to exploit fully the new technology. How we are to maintain the U.S. military and national security position over the course of the next twenty years is a central issue that will have to be addressed. What our strategy should be for the more complex competition that is emerging will require consideration of many aspects of the changing security environment and changing technology. We will need to know much more than we now do about the emerging regional powers, as well as about the likely major actors, their strategic orientation, their strengths, and their weaknesses.

It is to be hoped that new centers of strategic thought and innovation will arise and a new generation of strategists and military innovators will develop to deal with these problems.

Notes

1. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Advisers* (New York: Elsevier, 1978).
2. William H. McNeill, *Population and Politics Since 1750* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1990).



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
INFO MEMO

2002 OCT -7 AM 9:44



October 3, 2002, 7:05 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *D* OCT 4 2002

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Reconstruction Assistance for Afghanistan

- This memo supplements the analysis that General Myers provided you on Afghan reconstruction on September 17, 2002.
- The Chairman highlights both the fine work that our civil affairs personnel have undertaken in Afghanistan using Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds, and the potential role of the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) in Afghan reconstruction.
- CJCS states that CENTCOM is prepared to obligate \$12 million for OHDACA projects in FY03. With these funds, our civil affairs personnel, who have embedded engineer and contracting elements, could drill drinking water wells, upgrade utility systems, repair bridges and roads and construct or repair medical facilities and schools. We will not be able to undertake any large reconstruction initiatives with FY03 OHDACA funds, however.
- I think that DoD efforts could be both robust and highly visible if we get foreign nations and NGO's (e.g. Asian Development Bank and World Bank) to fund major reconstruction projects in northern Afghanistan, and get the COE to manage those projects.
- I met with Under Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee, Ambassador David Johnson (State's Afghanistan coordinator), DASD Joseph Collins, and representatives from the NSC and the COE to examine an expanded role for the COE in Afghanistan reconstruction. There is broad consensus that the COE could be very effective in an Executive Agent/Program Manager function.
- We determined that the COE could assist international financial institutions in the development of roads in Northern Afghanistan, particularly the "Ring-Road" that runs from Herat – Mazar-e-Sharif – Kabul. It has extensive construction management

experience in Afghanistan; between 1960-67 it managed the construction of nearly one-third of Afghanistan's road network.

- Additionally, the COE could supervise smaller DoD road and bridge projects to connect Afghanistan with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. These affordable projects would enhance security and re-supply, and create trade opportunities in the region. My staff is investigating whether DoD has the legal authority to fund these projects with DoD appropriations.
- On Tuesday, October 9, the COE will provide me a white paper on how it would help rebuild roads and infrastructure in Northern Afghanistan, and provide me cost estimates. Among other things, the COE will outline how it would:
 - Work with the Afghan Transitional Authority to evaluate the highest priority projects.
 - Submit construction plans, procedures, and timeline to the Afghan Government for review.
 - Jump-start the project by organizing Requests for Proposals (RFPs).
 - Employ as many local Afghan workers as possible so militia members are provided employment opportunities.
- If the COE's white paper is convincing, and if we have the requisite authorities, I will propose that we explore the early creation of a COE program management donor center in Afghanistan. We will have to identify funding to support the center.
- If the COE takes on this function, it will need to complement, not usurp, the role of US military civil affairs personnel who are managing OHDACA programs.
- On a side note, I had a cordial meeting with India's Afghan reconstruction coordinator, Arun Singh. India is enthusiastic about working with the U.S. in Afghanistan in the coming months. India has already done considerable reconstruction work in Afghanistan. Only the U.S., Japan, U.K., and Germany have committed more funds to Afghan reconstruction in 2002 than India.

COORDINATION: ATTACHED

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Josh Boehm, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/11442

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

9/26

To: USD(c)

You should see/
embellish as necessary
based on your added
responsibilities.

Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

U15664 / 02^{2/21}

9/17
1200



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-497-02

17 September 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RBM 9/17*

SUBJECT: Projects in Afghanistan

- The following is provided in response to your request (TAB) concerning projects in Afghanistan that the Seabees and Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) can do quickly and for which we can find the money. I have reviewed the types of projects these organizations and others can accomplish in the near-term.
- US Central Command (USCENTCOM) is managing a humanitarian assistance program as an integral part of its theater security strategy. Current projects include drilling drinking water wells, upgrading utility systems, repairing bridges and roads and constructing or repairing medical facilities and schools. Projects are funded from various DOD accounts, including Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).
- USCENTCOM indicates that it is prepared to obligate up to \$12 million of FY 03 OHDACA funds, if provided by OSD, to support contracted humanitarian assistance efforts. Army Corps of Engineers or Naval Facilities Engineering Command is capable of negotiating and awarding such contracts. Such contracts will employ local nationals, develop indigenous skills and add resources to the Afghan economy.
- Contracting is the best method to accomplish these projects. Military engineer forces in Afghanistan will continue to be fully employed in force protection and operational missions for the foreseeable future. Conducting humanitarian assistance projects with military forces will require deploying additional forces into Afghanistan. Such deployment would increase the force footprint in the region, as well as reduce the availability of military engineer units to support combat operations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4 (b)(6)

August 19, 2002 5:47 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Projects in Afghanistan

What can the Seabees and the Corps of Engineers do in Afghanistan quickly, for which we can find the money?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081902-42

.....
Please respond by _____

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/11445

COORDINATION

USD(P)/SOLIC	DASD Joseph Collins	October 3, 2002
J-4 (Logistics)	CAPT David Stewart	October 3, 2002
USD(P)/ISA/NESA	Mustafa Popal	October 3, 2002



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

OCT -7 AM 9:44



INFO MEMO

October 4, 2002, 4:49 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ* OCT 4 2002

SUBJECT: Recommendation of Executive Agency Task Force

- In response to growing criticism of the Executive Agent system, I established a Task Force this summer to study the causes of Combatant Command and Service dissatisfaction and evaluate potential reforms.
- Combatant Commands do not perceive that their budgets have increased commensurately with the increase in contingency operations. Physical infrastructure, command and control, and information technology improvements at Combatant Command headquarters have not been adequately funded. Conversely, the Services often view their Executive Agent responsibilities as an unfair burden on Service budgets.
- The attached white paper provides the details of the Task Force's analysis and recommendations. The Services, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands reviewed an earlier version, and their comments have been incorporated. The alternatives evaluated were:
 - *Retain the current system.* Maintains the status quo, with the Services continuing to serve as Executive Agents.
 - *Reform Executive Agency.* Retains Executive Agency, but enlarges Service responsibilities to address causes of the friction. Proposed reforms would standardize the level of support between the Combatant Commands and the Services, and provide a forum and process to adjudicate disputes.



11-L-0559/OSD/11447

U16049 /02

- *Centralize Combatant Commands budgets in the Joint Staff.* Replaces the Executive Agent system with a centralized budget administered by the Joint Staff. Allows funding to follow the chain of command. Requires increased manpower at the Joint Staff to manage centralized Command budgets.
- *Adopt separate budgets for the Combatant Commands.* Replaces the Executive Agent system with separate budgets for each Combatant Command. Gives each Command full responsibility for all aspects of its budget. Requires increased manpower at each Command to manage the budget.
- I concur with the study's recommendation to "Reform Executive Agency" and recommend the following reforms:
 - require Executive Agents to capture all Combatant Command headquarters costs in their budgets
 - rewrite the directive governing Executive Agents for Combatant Commanders to better define the responsibilities of Executive Agents
 - under exceptional circumstances, issue special guidance to Executive Agents
 - include a more intensive review of Command budget exhibits and prioritize unfunded requirements at the OSD level.
- While separate budgets for the Combatant Commands may be attractive, I do not recommend that alternative because it would require increased overhead at each Command. The "Reform Executive Agency" alternative will allow us to better review Command budgets and prioritize unfunded requirements.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Wayne Schroeder, (b)(6)

Attachments

11-L-0559/OSD/11449

EXECUTIVE AGENTS FOR COMBATANT COMMANDS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For nearly half a century, the administrative and logistic support of the headquarters functions of the Combatant Commands has been included in the Service budgets. The Services serve as Executive Agents, budgeting for such functions as civilian personnel salaries, construction and maintenance of headquarters facilities, travel, and other overhead expenses.

The Combatant Commands and the Services have become dissatisfied with the Executive Agent system. In response to this dissatisfaction, the Senior Executive Council (SEC) asked the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to undertake another study of this issue. This study examines the four logical alternatives:

- **Alternative 1 - Retain the current Executive Agent system.** The status quo.
- **Alternative 2 - Improve the Executive Agent system.** The Executive Agent system would be retained, but several improvements would be made. The Executive Agents' responsibilities would be expanded to include the Combatant Commands headquarters operations costs. DoD Directive 5100.3 (Support of Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Joint Commands) would be rewritten to define in more detail the types of costs that Executive Agents must fund. On an exception basis (such as during a national emergency), *special guidance* would be issued by the DoD Comptroller to the Executive Agents specifying unusual Combatant Command funding requirements that should be included in the Services' budgets. The DoD Comptroller would conduct an annual review of the Combatant Command budgets.
- **Alternative 3 - Centralize budgets for Combatant Commands in the Joint Staff.**
- **Alternative 4 - Adopt separate budgets for each Combatant Command.**

Alternatives 3 and 4 would both require additional overhead and staffing at the Combatant Command headquarters and at the Joint Staff. Both alternatives would also eliminate the reprogramming advantages that accrue from having the relatively small Combatant Command headquarters budgets embedded within the large Service budgets.

Recommendation

Alternative 2, Improve the Executive Agent System. Although Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 all appear to provide some advantages to both the Services and the Combatant Commanders, Alternatives 3 and 4 would also have significant disadvantages. Comptroller recommends that an FY 2004 Program Budget Decision be written containing all four alternatives and that Alternative 2 be cast as the recommended alternative.

EXECUTIVE AGENTS FOR COMBATANT COMMANDS

Introduction

For nearly half a century, the administrative and logistic support of the headquarters functions of the Combatant Commands has been included in the Service budgets. The Services serve as Executive Agents, budgeting for such functions as civilian personnel salaries, construction and maintenance of headquarters facilities, travel, and other overhead expenses. A list of these Executive Agent assignments is found at Attachment I.

Using the Services as Executive Agents for the Combatant Commands worked well for many years. Shortly after the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) polled the Combatant Commands to see if they wanted to have their own budgets. Only two commands (the Southern and Central Commands) were in favor of making such a change. The other commands wanted to retain the Executive Agent system, citing their lack of staff and experience to take on the additional budgeting workload and their view that the outcome would be an unnecessary duplication of programming and budgeting functions between the Services and the Combatant Commands. Additionally, these older and more mature commands generally had experience and familiarity in turning to their Executive Agents on resource issues in a way the newer commands did not. The Joint Chiefs of Staff opted to retain the Executive Agent system.

Recent Developments

In the last several years there has been a growing dissatisfaction by both the Combatant Commands and the Services with the Executive Agent system. As overseas contingency operations have increased in the last twenty years, the role of the Combatant Commands has also increased. However, the Combatant Commands do not perceive their budgets to have grown commensurately.

At the same time, the aging physical infrastructure of the Combatant Command headquarters has made it necessary to renovate old facilities or build new facilities. Similarly, technological changes are forcing the headquarters to update their command, control, communications (C3), and information technology (IT) systems. The areas of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) are the most frequently mentioned as being impacted by the continuation of the Executive Agent system. It has been difficult to convince the Services to budget for facilities, C4ISR, and IT improvements.

The Services have had their own budget problems in recent years as they have struggled to recapitalize aging ship, aircraft, and ground systems, while at the same time investing in new transformational capabilities. As the funding requests from the Combatant Commands to the

Services increase, the friction between the two parties has also increased, and the Services often perceive their Executive Agent responsibilities to be an unfair burden on the Service budgets.

In response to the dissatisfaction with the Executive Agent system, the Joint Staff tasked Hicks and Associates, Inc. to study whether Combatant Commands should have their own budgets. In June 2001, Hicks and Associates recommended that the Executive Agent system be replaced by a joint budget controlled by CJCS. The joint budget would include not only the headquarters functions of the Combatant Commands but also a number of Chairman Controlled Activities (CCAs) such as the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, the Information Operations Center, and the Joint Warfighting Center.

Joint Staff and Comptroller Reforms (2001)

The Joint Staff and the Comptroller evaluated the Hicks and Associates recommendations in the summer of 2001. They agreed that a separate budget for the Combatant Commands was not an appropriate reform. Instead, Joint Staff and Comptroller recommended improvements to the current system, using existing processes and databases. To increase the visibility of Combatant Command budgets and to exercise the desired level of control and oversight, the following process improvements were recently implemented:

- The Joint Staff, in conjunction with the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPA&E) developed a Combatant Command Joint Manpower Review Process, which includes a review of Combatant Command missions and associated manpower requirements.
- The Comptroller and DPA&E developed processes to require full visibility of Combatant Command direct Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding – from programming to budgeting to execution. It is O&M funding that seems to be the most problematic to the Combatant Commands.
 - For programming, beginning with FY 2004, the Services' Program Objective Memoranda give full visibility to all Combatant Command direct O&M funding.
 - For budgeting, beginning with the FY 2003 budget, the Services submit separate exhibits for each Combatant Command's O&M funds.
 - For execution, beginning with FY 2002, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) prepares accounting reports that track the execution of Combatant Command O&M funds.

However, despite these process improvements friction between the Combatant Commands has continued into 2002.

Air Force Proposal to the Business Initiatives Council (BIC)

In the spring of 2002, the Air Force submitted a proposal to the Business Initiatives Council (BIC) to change the way Combatant Commands are funded. Unlike earlier proposals to

create a joint budget for Combatant Commands, the Air Force BIC initiative addresses headquarters operational costs in addition to the administrative and logistic support costs addressed by the earlier proposals. These headquarters operational costs are currently funded through the Service components of the Combatant Commands rather than through the Executive Agent process. In some cases, the Combatant Commands "tax" their Service components to finance these costs. In other cases, the predominant Service component within the Combatant Command is asked to seek the funds from within his parent Service.

The Air Force BIC initiative proposed two alternatives to the status quo. One retains the Executive Agent system but expands the responsibility of the Executive Agents to include Combatant Command headquarters operations costs. The other creates a separate budget for Combatant Commands, including both the administrative and logistics costs and the headquarters operations costs.

Description of Alternatives

The remainder of this paper will examine the alternatives raised by the Air Force BIC initiative and formulate additional alternatives. No claim of savings will be made for any of the alternatives. However, it is likely that workload would shift between organizations in some of the alternatives.¹ This paper raises several important questions. Does the Executive Agent system now in place work? If not, can the system be modified to make it work? If not, what alternative systems could be created in its place? The logical alternatives are as follows:

- **Alternative 1 - Retain the current Executive Agent system.** The Services would continue serve as Executive Agents for the Combatant Commands.
- **Alternative 2 - Improve the Executive Agent system.** The Executive Agent system would be retained, but several changes would be made:
 1. The Executive Agents' responsibilities would be expanded to include the Combatant Commands headquarters operations costs.
 2. DoD Directive 5100.3 (Support of Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Joint Commands) would be rewritten to define in more detail the types of costs that are included in (a) administrative support, (b) logistics support, and (c) headquarters operations costs. These expanded definitions would constitute *standing guidance* to the Executive Agents as to their financial responsibilities to the Combatant Commands. A conference of the Combatant Commanders representatives would be part of the rewriting process.

¹ This paper does not attempt to answer the question of whether or not the Combatant Commands are adequately funded in current budgets. It only addresses the process by which such resource allocation decisions are made. Nor does this paper address Executive Agent responsibilities unrelated to the Combatant Command headquarters, as this type of Executive Agency is being addressed by the draft Department of Defense Directive 5100.88 that is currently in coordination.

3. On an exception basis (such as during a national emergency), *special guidance* would be issued by the DoD Comptroller to the Executive Agents specifying unusual Combatant Command funding requirements that should be included in the Services' budgets. Such guidance would be issued at least three months prior to the due date of the budget submissions to allow the Services to make whatever tradeoffs are necessary.
 4. The DoD Comptroller would conduct an annual review of the Combatant Command budgets. The Joint Staff would provide a prioritized list of Combatant Command unfunded requirements to the Comptroller for consideration. If necessary, a Program Budget Decision would be published to address unfunded Combatant Command programs. The Combatant Commanders' Initiatives Fund (CIF) would continue to finance unforeseen contingency requirements critical to joint warfighting readiness and national security interests during the year of execution. Currently, legislative authority is being sought to increase the CIF funding limitation of \$25 million to \$40 million.
- **Alternative 3 - Centralize budgets for Combatant Commands in the Joint Staff.** The Executive Agent system would be replaced with a centralized budget administered by the Joint Staff. The centralized budget would include the Combatant Commands headquarters operational costs as well as their administrative and logistics costs. The budget would be part of the Defensewide appropriations.
 - **Alternative 4 - Adopt separate budgets for each Combatant Command.** The Executive Agent system would be replaced with separate budgets for each Combatant Command. The centralized budget would include the Combatant Commands headquarters operational costs as well as their administrative and logistics costs. The budget would be part of the Defensewide appropriations.

Evaluation of Alternatives

The balance of the paper will address the pros and cons of these alternatives, and recommend a course of action.

Alternative 1 – Retain the current Executive Agent system. The current system has functioned well for many years. It puts the brunt of the programming and budgeting workload upon the Services and allows the Combatant Commands to focus upon their warfighting missions. As the providers of support to multiple Combatant Commands, the Services ensure that commonality is retained across the Combatant Commands and that redundancy, and stove piping does not occur. The Services also provide a filter to ensure that lower priority Combatant Command programs are not funded at the expense of higher priority Service programs. The inclusion of the relatively small Combatant Command budgets within the larger Service budgets provides the senior leadership the ability to rapidly reprogram funds into the Combatant Command budgets with minimal difficulty. Finally, the recent improvements in visibility of Combatant Command funds, which are just now beginning to bear fruit, will eliminate much of the confusion over funding levels that previously caused friction between the Combatant Commands and their Executive Agents.

On the other hand, the current system is not perceived to be satisfactory by either the Services or by the Combatant Commands. Considerable friction has arisen between them in the formulation of the FY 2004 budgets. As the Services review budget proposals from the Combatant Commands, they often exclude from their budgets new Combatant Command initiatives or program growth that they believe should be jointly funded by all Services or funded by a topline increase from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A particular cause of friction in recent years has been the manner in which Combatant Command headquarters operations are funded: the Combatant Command has to rely upon one of his Service components to obtain the funds necessary for the operational costs of the joint headquarters.

Alternative 2 – Improve the Executive Agent system. This alternative has all the benefits of Alternative 1 and several additional benefits. First, by enlarging the Executive Agent responsibilities to include Combatant Command headquarters operations, one of the major causes of current friction would be eliminated. Combatant Commands would gain the flexibility of being able to shift funds between their administrative and logistic support budgets and their headquarters operations budgets. Second, the expanded definitions of the support to be provided by the Executive Agents would eliminate much of the conflict between the Combatant Commands and the Services. It would also standardize the level of support provided by the different Services, eliminating the variations that exist today. Third, the Comptroller's review of the Combatant Command budgets would provide a forum for the adjudication of any disputes that might arise between the Combatant Commands and their Executive Agents.

Although this alternative solves some of the problems of the current system, it leaves in place the two most fundamental problems: (a) requiring the Services to budget for programs that are considered a lower priority, and (b) requiring the Combatant Commands to go through an additional echelon (the Services) to get their budgets approved (i.e., funding does not follow the chain of command).

Alternative 3 – Centralize budgets for the Combatant Commands in the Joint Staff. This alternative would eliminate the current friction between the Combatant Commands and the Services by taking the Services completely out of the process. Hicks and Associates cite two other benefits. First, it would be more consistent with the principal that funding should follow the chain of command, aligning responsibility with authority. Second, it would allow the Department's leadership to see what the joint components of the Department are costing and would lead to more effective oversight. (It should be noted, however, that the recent reforms implemented by the Comptroller and the Joint Staff provide virtually the same visibility of Combatant Command costs without centralizing the budgets.) Finally, like Alternative 2, the headquarters operations costs would be in the same budget as the administrative and support costs.

There are several disadvantages to this alternative. First, the Joint Staff would need to add additional manpower to manage the centralized budget, and this might serve to distract the Joint Staff from its primary mission. Second, the Combatant Commands would now be pitted against each other in the competition for resources from the same centralized budget. Third, increasing the budgets of the Combatant Commands during the execution year without recourse to supplemental appropriations or the use of transfer authority, would require reprogramming

funds from the Defense Agencies, as they are the only other entities in the Defensewide appropriations.

Alternative 4 – Adopt separate budgets for each Combatant Command. This alternative would eliminate the current friction between the Combatant Commands and the Services by taking the Services completely out of the process. It would give each Combatant Command full responsibility for all aspects of its budget, similar to how a Defense Agency manages its budget. Unlike Alternative 3, no additional staffing would be required at the Joint Staff, as the funds would not flow through them. It would allow the Department's leadership to see what the joint components of the Department are costing and would lead to more effective oversight. Finally, like Alternatives 2 and 4, the headquarters operations costs would be in the same budget as the administrative and support costs.

There are some drawbacks to this proposal. First, both the Combatant Commands and the Comptroller would need to add additional manpower to manage the increased workload. Second, by putting each Combatant Command into a separate budget line item, it would become more difficult to reprogram funds between Commands to take care of emergent problems.

A tabular summary of the four alternatives is found at Attachment 2.

Recommendation

Alternative 2, Improve the Executive Agent System. Although Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 all appear to provide some advantages to both the Services and the Combatant Commanders, Alternatives 3 and 4 would have significant disadvantages. Comptroller recommends that an FY 2004 Program Budget Decision be written containing all four alternatives and that Alternative 2 be cast as the recommended alternative.

Prepared by: Charlie Baker, OUSD(C)(P/B), (b)(6) [@osd.pentagon.mil](mailto:osd.pentagon.mil)

Attachment I
List of Executive Agent Assignments
For Combatant Commands

<u>Combatant Command</u>	<u>Executive Agent</u>
U.S. European Command	Army
U.S. Southern Command	Army
U.S. Joint Forces Command	Navy
U.S. Pacific Command, except U.S. Forces Korea	Navy Army
U.S. Central Command	Air Force
U.S. Northern Command	Air Force
U.S. Special Operations Command, except Joint Special Operations Command	Air Force Army
U.S. Transportation Command	Air Force
U.S. Strategic Command	Air Force
U.S. Element, North American Air Defense Command	Air Force

Attachment 2
Summary of Executive Agent Alternatives

	<u>Alternative 1</u>	<u>Alternative 2</u>	<u>Alternative 3</u>	<u>Alternative 4</u>
	Retain current Executive Agent system	Improve the Executive Agent system	Centralize budgets in the Joint Staff	Separate budgets for each Command
Whose budget	Services	Services	Joint Staff	Combatant Commanders
Includes Hqtrs Operations	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Provides visibility of O&M costs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Maximizes reprogramming flexibility	Yes	Yes	No	No
Requires Joint Staff manpower increase	No	No	Yes	No
Requires Combatant Command manpower increase	No	No	Yes	Yes



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

2002 OCT -8 PM 2:25

INFO MEMO

October 7, 2002, 7:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *D* OCT 8 2002

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending – Secretary of Air Force Response

You asked whether I agreed with Secretary Roche's Info Memo of August 15, 2002, pertaining to the General Accounting Office (GAO) report on contingency fund spending (TAB A).

- I commend Secretary Roche on the corrective actions taken by the Air Force to prevent a future recurrence of the situations highlighted by the GAO. The Air Force's actions will lead to better accountability and control.
- Nevertheless, Secretary Roche missed a central point of the GAO report. The Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) funds are appropriated solely for the purpose of financing warfighting and operational costs of a contingency operation. The Components are not to use OCOTF resources to finance administrative; general support; or Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs even when these costs are directly related to a specific operation. The Air Force used OCOTF funds to finance support efforts.
- I sent a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller) on August 29, 2002, clarifying the Department's financial policy regarding the appropriate use of the OCOTF in financing contingency operations. I attach a copy of that memorandum (TAB B). I believe that this policy clarification will ensure the proper stewardship of the taxpayers' money.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

400.13

7 OCT 02



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

AUG 29 2002

Mike

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)

SUBJECT: Contingency Funding Expenditures

I commend you on the steps the Air Force is taking to prevent a future recurrence of the situations highlighted by the General Accounting Office. I would like to clarify the Department's financial policy regarding the appropriate use of the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) funds in financing contingency operations.

The OCOTF funds are available only to support the warfighting and operational aspects of a contingency operation. As such, these funds should not be utilized to finance administrative, general support, or Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs, even when these costs are associated with a contingency operation. While MWR programs are vital to the morale of Service members serving in a contingency environment; and we support these efforts, it must be clear that DoD Components must use their normal Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation funding when financing these costs.

I hope this letter clarifies the use of OCOTF funds. If I can help resolve this situation in anyway, please contact me.

Dov

Dov S. Zakheim

11-L-0559/OSD/11460

June 3, 2002 1:26 PM

TO: Service Secretaries
Under Secretaries

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

*To Don?
Do you agree?
DR*

400.13

This recent report about wasteful spending bothers me and I know it does you, too.

I sure hope that when you have all investigated the problems here, that we don't decide there is no one to be held accountable. These sound like very poor decisions, and we are never going to change the culture around here without imparting the appropriate sense of urgency about our responsibilities as stewards of taxpayer money.

Please look into this and into our spending practices generally and let me know what course of action you recommend.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hoffman, Lisa; Scripps Howard News Service, "\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought by Army and Air Force," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 05/30/02

DHR:dh
060302-29

Please respond by 07/12/02.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

8/17

30 SEP 2002

Roche response attached. You saw Army + AF on 13 July.

~~400.13-02-02~~

*W/R
Ed*

U15706 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/11461



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

AUG 15 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT: Contingency Funds Expenditures

- This responds to your concerns regarding Air Force contingency funds expenditures in support of our on-going operations in Southwest Asia. In its report, the GAO criticized the Air Force for “questionable expenditures” categorized as “repetitive” or “seemingly unneeded.” We conducted a detailed analysis of the purchases cited by GAO and concluded the expenditures complied with applicable fiscal rules and laws. However, the purchase with appropriated taxpayer money of certain morale-enhancing supplies and services, although permissible, illustrated that stronger guidance and oversight are warranted. As a result, we are reviewing our policies concerning the proper use of contingency funds and our policies for contingency funding of “semi-permanent” sites like Prince Sultan Air Base.
- Most of the “seemingly unneeded” purchases were either mislabeled or inadequately described in the units’ summary purchase logs that were provided to GAO. For example, at Prince Sultan Air Base, the purchase log entry listed only two line items, “loveseats and armchair.” The supporting source documents disclosed a contract award (not purchase card) for 115 individual items including loveseats; armchairs; coffee, library, and end tables; and office chairs to be used in the Base Learning Resource Center. When considered with complete descriptions, these purchases are similar to those made in non-deployed or “permanent” environments. However, better judgment and more conservative discretion should have been exercised in purchasing some items like the Sumo Wrestling Kit (two padded suits and mat used for recreational wrestling). Proposed changes to the Financial Management Regulation (FMR) should preclude such expenditures; however, to ensure increased scrutiny, the Air Force has taken the following actions:
 - The Air Force now emphasizes proper oversight of contingency funds in training for financial managers prior to deployment.
 - The Air Force Comptroller has directed commanders to increase financial management oversight over contingency fund expenditures.

11-L-0559/OSD/11462

- Deploying commanders have strengthened internal controls regarding purchase oversight, review and documentation.
- The Air Force has changed contracting policy requiring purchase card records to be retained longer to help ensure their availability for oversight and other reviews.
- The Auditor General is reviewing contingency fund purchases in more detail including applicable internal controls, repetitive purchases, as well as contingency fund purchases beyond those cited in the GAO report. He will also add to the annual audit plan our processes for procuring items with contingency funds to ensure I am apprised of any irregularities in this area.
- The Air Force is reviewing its policies concerning the proper use of appropriated funds for morale-enhancing supplies and services during contingency operations, including extended deployments at “semi-permanent” sites, e.g., Prince Sultan Air Base.
- Beginning this year and continuing into next, funds for contingency accounts are provided directly to the military departments. When coupled with increased oversight and guidance by our comptrollers, this will lead to better accountability and control. In sum, the Air Force is taking positive steps to strengthen internal controls to preclude questionable expenditures, make proper use of appropriated funds, and promote prudent use of taxpayer dollars. We will provide a more detailed version of our review to the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: NONE

Point of Contact: Roscoe Higginbotham, (b)(6)

October 7, 2002 9:23 AM

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Kernan
CC: GEN. MYERS
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Would you please give me a paper in short, simple bullet points as to what you think you learned from Millennium Challenge that we ought to apply to Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-22

.....

Please respond by 10 | 25 | 02

OCTO2

snovflake

October 7, 2002 9:21 AM

TO: Gen. Handy
CC: Gen. MYERS
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Stryker

Will the Stryker fit on a C-130?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-21

.....

Please respond by 10/18/02

7
4520

NOCTO2

ADVANCE -
UNEDITED
UNASSIGNED

June 20, 2002 2:50 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Priority List

By tomorrow, please get the priority list I asked for a week ago Friday from Pace, Myers, Cambone, Feith, Wolfowitz, Di Rita and Giambastiani.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-23

020 DOD

.....
Please respond by _____

4-5 most important things DOD needs to do!

1. Fix INTELL
2. Rework PPBS
3. Begin to merge/combine OSD/JS offices
- especially critical: Crisis Action Teams
4. Identify 3-5 countries of great significance & develop their capabilities, e.g.,
 - Poland
 - Turkey
 - Vietnam
5. Establish an exotic research program - Blatelly Park - on 2-3 hard problems:
 - Bio-mechanics
 - New propulsion - land, sea, air, space

20 Jun 02

D. Cambone

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith *DJF* 6/21/02

SUBJECT: Priorities

Here are my priority projects for the remainder of the year. I have not prioritized the items within each tier.

Tier One

- Policy Organization - Restructuring and Personnel
 - Including Creation of Homeland Security Office
- War On Terrorism Strategy
- War Plans Review
- Security Cooperation Guidance (formerly: CINCS' theater engagement guidance)
- Global US Footprint (for Europe, Asia, and Middle East)

Tier Two

- China
- Russia
- India
- NATO Reorganization
- Export Controls
- Intel Support for Policy
- Nuclear Posture Review Implementation (including missile defense program)
- ICC and other treaties

020 JAD

21 Jun 02

FOR SECDEF

21 June 2002

Things to Get Done

- Global War on Terrorism

- Develop a plan that prioritizes and sequences actions against terrorist organizations and countries that support terrorism worldwide
- Revise "Tank" process to get more active participation of the Joint Chiefs and to provide better advice to the Secretary
- Organize the U.S. Government for combat
 - Establish NORTHCOM and define/refine its homeland security responsibilities, resources and linkages
 - Establish task specific interagency organizations subordinate to the National Security Council to orchestrate efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, etc.
 - Reorganize the Intelligence Community
- Define global basing, staging, access, and Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) requirements for the next 20 years
- Change the Regime in Iraq

020 DDD

- Joint Requirements Oversight Council

- Complete the Operational Availability study directed in the DPG and institutionalize the process
- Drive development of future warfighting concepts, architectures and capabilities
- Orchestrate initiatives to fill capability gaps and identify trade-offs

- Transformation

- Execute the Defense Planning Guidance
- Execute the Contingency Planning Guidance
- Modify our Professional Military Education syllabi
- Reform DOD business practices

21 Jun 02

COPY TO: DEPSECDEF
CJCS

VR
[Signature]

GIAMBASTIANI

21 June 2002

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Subj: Priority List

Here are my inputs regarding a priority list for the remainder of this first term of office. You specifically asked for 4 or 5 items so I have purposely kept this list short and related to those items which I feel will have lasting impact long past this administration.

- Institute a system of metrics by department, agency and/or service. Trend analysis is essential and we are not even close in DOD to measuring much of anything significant. What we do measure is more input oriented than output oriented. Discipline in monitoring these metrics will have long-term benefits as you discussed on many occasions. Hold line managers accountable for metrics.
- Conduct a "Joint" Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) vice a service lead BRAC. Service participation is essential but stove piping until the endgame will result in a sub optimized BRAC. Put someone of stature in charge of BRAC for DOD with the requisite authority and accountability who has no other responsibilities. You'll get what you invest in this process.
- Reform the Civil Service sector in DOD and provide for improvements such as the elimination of promotions simply for pay purposes. If you think we have too many Admirals and Generals both active and reserve, just count the number of Senior Executive Service personnel on the rolls.
- Job One for DOD is to successfully pursue the Global War on Terrorism.
- Take the complexity out of the Acquisition system in order to allow for quicker time to market. We have too many people and too much infrastructure in this process. We need to have an Acquisition system "BRAC".
- Transformation of our war fighting capabilities, Intel support and command structure. You have a lot of detail from all in the recommendations they've provided you with— suffice to say I'm working on authorities and recommendations to help in more detail here with regard to how JROC and JFCOM can play. My review for example of our Joint experimentation process is that we have one in name only.

020 D&D

21 June 02

V/R
Ed

11-L-0559/OSD/11469

U16203 /02

May 31, 2002 11:51 AM

319.2

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DPG Studies

LARRY DI BENE

*u/a
6/20*

I need a complete listing of all studies being done under the DPG, with an idea of the dates they will be finished—that is to say, roughly the dates they will leak.

Thanks.

DHR:db
053102-34

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

31MAY02

242

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

INFO MEMO

August 6, 2002, 1:00 PM

169

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

Pete 8/6/02

SUBJECT: Contractors

- You asked me to let you know what I think we ought to do about the attached note. It states that one of the current contractor's consultants indicated that the contractor sees DoD as a customer that could be taken advantage of because it lacks relevant knowledge and that this was a great way to generate cash and get the government to pay for other business development expenses.
- We should do nothing. I've never, in my 40 years associated with defense contractors, heard such a view being expressed..
- We have tough controls in place to manage and protect our interests. The DCAA, DCMA and the DoDIG, as well as the GAO, conduct a variety of reviews of our contractors, and we have in-place civil and criminal penalties to punish wrongdoers. In fact, these controls deter some companies from wanting to do business with DoD.
- All of our efforts in AT&L, and the Service's acquisition community are to make sure the government is a "smart buyer." Our contracting philosophy carefully balances risk and reward to get the warfighters what they need as quickly as possible. While I wouldn't doubt that we will have audit problems with some of our suppliers in the future, by and large, they are forthright and dedicated and desire to continue a positive relationship with DoD.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Ted Godlewski, (b)(6)

6 Aug 02

*SJS
8/9*

June 25, 2002 9:25 AM

TO: David Chu
Pete Aldridge
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Contractors

Please take a look at the attached note, and let me know what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Note

DHR:dh
062502-24

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

8/9

Aldridge response attached.

Rec'd 0900
6/26

One of the current contractors' consultants stopped in this week and talked about the current contractors point of view which truly was worse than we had appreciated. They portrayed the sense that they saw the DoD as a customer that could be taken advantage of because they lacked relevant knowledge and that it was a great way to generate cash and get the government to pay for your other business development.

October 9, 2002 9:44 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Multinational Military Cooperation

091.3

Here is some material from Charles Moskos that has been marked. It is interesting. What do we do about it?

Thanks.

Attach.

Moskos, Charles, "Multinational Military Cooperation: Enhancing American Military Effectiveness," prepared for HQ, USAF and SAIC, August 2002.

DHR:dh
100902-23

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

902702

U16253 02

**Multinational Military Cooperation:
Enhancing American Military Effectiveness**

Prepared for
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
and the
Science Applications International Corporation

August, 2002

Charles Moskos
Department of Sociology
Northwestern University
Evanston IL 60208

(b)(6)



FINAL REPORT

11-L-0559/OSD/11475

~~ABSTRACT~~

Multinational Military Cooperation: Enhancing American Military Effectiveness

The significance of international military cooperation can scarcely be overstated. In the post-Cold War era, the United States has participated in a growing number of multinational missions across the globe. The American response to the September 11 terrorist attack highlighted how America's national security relies not only on military technology but also on good relations with foreign military entities. The core thesis is that American military officers can play a key role in countering incipient and overt perceptions of American arrogance.

This report is based on ~~interviews with international officers (IOs)~~ at American war, command and staff colleges in each of the services. These IOs participate in the program known as International Military and Education and Training (IMET). Similar interviews were conducted at the Joint Service Command Staff College in the United Kingdom. Additionally, interviews were held with officers from various countries at SHAPE in Belgium. Field observations, moreover, were made in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Overall, the level of multinational cooperation is quite remarkable. Indeed, one finding is that military officers often find themselves more comfortable with fellow military officers from other countries than they do with civilian staff of the same nationality. Yet, Americans must accept the reality that because our nation is preeminent in economic and cultural influence as well as military might, even our allies may have some resentment, albeit at a low level. Awareness of steps that can ~~reduce such resentment can lead to more effective military cooperation.~~

Certain problem areas are analyzed with attendant ~~recommendations for improvement.~~ At the IMET level, these include: (1) ~~make~~ medical insurance available for family members of all foreign officers; (2) ~~decrease~~ the classified material unavailable to IOs because of security classifications; (3) ~~add~~ more curriculum content on multinational operations; (4) ~~be~~ alert to the unique status of Arab IOs; and (5) ~~make~~ more effort to incorporate the spouses of IOs into the American social scene.

Regarding multinational headquarters, recommendations for American officers include: (1) some use of non-English phrases in social interaction with IOs; (2) avoid speaking too quickly or using acronyms that are not familiar to IOs; (3) be alert to the stereotype of Americans as having a "zero-defects" or "check-point" mentality and an obsession with work; (4) encourage more cross-national informal activities; (5) read something about the home country of a fellow IO with whom one regularly works; and (6) rethink the career paths of Foreign Area Officers such as closing a military career with a shift to a position in the State Department, C.I.A. or D.I.A.

(A)

Multinational Military Cooperation: Enhancing American Military Effectiveness

"International skills are true force multipliers and essential to our ability to operate globally."

General John P. Jumper
Air Force Chief of Staff
August 26 2002

I. Introduction

The significance for the United States of international military cooperation can scarcely be overstated. In the post-Cold War era, multinational missions have been recurring across the globe. These range from surveillance missions over Iraq, peacekeeping forces in the Balkans, the war in Kosovo, as well as humanitarian missions ranging from Somalia to Haiti to East Timor. International military cooperation assumed even more importance with the expansion of NATO and the Partnership for Peace initiatives in Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries.

Most significantly, 11 September highlighted the unpredictability of threats to our national security. The American counterattack on the perpetrators of terrorism could not have been as effectively carried out without support from allies. The war in Afghanistan again demonstrated that access to foreign airfields was a key requirement of effective use of American air power. The role of the International Security and Assistance Force is crucial in the establishment of a post-Taliban regime in Kabul. In any impending military action against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, multinational military support would again be a major factor. Only by a better understanding the reaction of partners in multinational missions can the efficacy of American military operations be maximized. The core thesis is that American military officers can play a key role in countering incipient and overt perceptions of American arrogance.

That the United States is the world's preeminent superpower goes without question. The French Foreign Minister coined the term "hyperpower" to describe America's new status. The German president has warned Americans that "when it comes to the use of military means, partners have to be ready to speak with each other and listen to each other."¹ This at the same time that the European Union is on the road to develop a common defense policy and force. An astute observer of America's international role has described U.S.A.-European relations as one of "drifting apart."²

In a survey of opinion-makers around the world, conducted in December, 2001, a striking finding was that 66 percent of West Europeans (in contrast to 28

percent of the Americans) thought the United States acts mainly in its own interests rather than taking into account the interests of its partners in the fight against terrorism.³

However overdrawn, characterizations of American "unilateralism" and cultural naivety are a key factor affecting our nation's military effectiveness. The possibility of war with Iraq has further highlighted differences between the United States and its potential allies. Reactions to the uniqueness of American preeminent global position -- economic and cultural as well as military -- are not so well understood in the United States. It is commonly observed that our education system and media foster an insular mentality. In brief, as we enter the 21st century, American's national security will rest not only military technology and force size, but also on good relations with actual and potential military allies.

Obviously, resentment of America is multifaceted and complex. A major arena of improving international military cooperation is that of relationships between American and non-American officers in a variety of settings such as multinational missions, military professional schools, and international military headquarters. Of course, individual behavior cannot erase generalized resentment toward American superpower status, but individual American officers can make a big difference. The greater the interpersonal understanding of coalition partners, the greater the efficacy of American military operations.

The purpose of this report is to suggest some fresh ways to think about international military cooperation and thereby to specify concrete actions that will enhance America's military effectiveness. We shall indicate areas of cultural irritants between American and non-American military officers and to suggest practical ways of reducing these irritants. Of course, disputes and irritants are inevitable in multinational forces even as they are in single nation operations.

The plan of this report is five-fold:

1. an overview of theoretical issues
2. description of the methodology employed
3. factors affecting international military cooperation in three case studies:
 - a. International Military Education and Training in the United States
 - b. a comparative analysis of international military education in the United Kingdom
 - c. international relations at NATO headquarters
4. problem areas affecting international military cooperation
5. recommendations to alleviate those problems

II. Theoretical Issues

The literature on cultural diversity in multinational civilian organizations is extensive.⁴ Obviously, multinational civilian organizations differ from multinational military organizations, but some lessons from the civilian experience may be transferable to the military setting. Issues of trust formation are at the core of organizational effectiveness. It has been suggested that trust formation processes differ among cultures that hold different values, thus making the creation of mutual trust in multinational setting more difficult to achieve. Yet, the literature on diversity in multinational organizations also includes arguments that diversity may increase the task-relevant skills available within an organization and perhaps result in better quality decisions.

In what has become a classic study of cultural differences, Geert Hofstede specified four dimensions along which culture values may vary: (1) the respect and deference given by subordinates to superiors in a given culture, (2) whether a person's core identity is defined by personal choices and achievements or by the character of the groups to which he or she is attached; (3) the extent to which members of a culture prefer detailed plans and orders versus those who feel comfortable in ambiguous circumstances; and (4) the relative emphasis on personal assertiveness versus interpersonal harmony.⁵ To this list, I would add how various national groups may have different time perspectives as reflected in conceptions of accuracy, punctuality and speed.

Based on Hofstede's categories, Joseph Soeters conducted a study of the value orientations among the cadets of thirteen military academies in Europe.⁶ The core findings were that the military cadets shared significant shared values of a European wide culture, even while displaying cultural differences based on national affiliation. Speaking broadly, West European countries are more amenable to the concept of overarching international bodies than are Americans.

A survey of American reservists who volunteered to serve in the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai revealed low levels of acceptance of non-Americans.⁷ Only a quarter of the respondents responded in the affirmative to the question "people from most countries are pretty much alike." Asked whether one can trust foreign nationals as much one can trust people from the United States, only about one in seven agreed.

A study of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus found that officers who served in the multinational headquarters increasingly identified with fellow officers from other countries, but increasingly held the United Nations civilian staff in low regard.⁸ That is, the major line of organizational difference was between military personnel and civilians, not between the different national contingents. Something similar seems to have occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo with regard to, on the one hand, United Nations and NATO civilian staff, and, on the other, military officers from the participating nations. There is, moreover, always some tension between the multinational command and "national" control of troops.

In sum, differences in national cultures while important should not obscure the fact there is also a military culture common to armed forces around the world, especially Western armed forces, who share similar professional education and social identity.⁹

III. Methodology

Three categories of research sites were visited: (1) American war and staff colleges; (2) the Joint Services Command and Staff College in the United Kingdom, and (3) the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium.

A major research undertaking was conducted at each of the war and staff colleges in the United States. Research visits were made to each of the following institutions of professional military education (PME): National War College (Washington, D.C.), Industrial College of the Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.), Army War College (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), Air War College (Montgomery, Alabama), Marine Corps University (Quantico, Virginia), Army Command General Staff College (Leavenworth, Kansas), Air Command Staff College (Montgomery, Alabama), and Navy Staff College (Newport, Rhode Island.). Interviews were conducted with non-Americans officers who were participants in the program known as International Military Education and Training or IMET.¹⁰ These officers are fully incorporated with their American cohort into the general academic program in all these institutions, with partial exception of the Navy Staff College.¹¹

Note: For convenience sake, we shall refer to non-American military officers as International Officers or IOs, the most common designation (though, depending on locale, the terms International Fellow or International Military Student are also used).

The interviews were conducted toward the end of the academic year 2000-2001, a time when the IOs could have a retrospective view of their American experience. The typical interview setting was to have four or five IOs and one American officer present for a 90 minute session. All told, 82 IOs were interviewed, about one in five of all IOs attending war or staff colleges in the United States during the time of the field research. In addition, faculty and American students at the war/staff colleges were also interviewed. In all the site visits, meals and informal discussions with IOs and American staff members added to the information collection.

In March, 2001, interviews were conducted at the Joint Services Command Staff College (JSCSC), Shrivenham, England. The JSCSC is equivalent of the command and staff college in American PME. The purpose was to compare and contrast the international military education given at a British staff college with that of the United States. Again, the typical interview setting was to have four or five IOs and one British officer present for a 90 minute session. Fifteen officers

were interviewed in this manner as well as discussions with British staff members.

Also in March, 2001, interviews were conducted at NATO headquarters in Belgium. Over two days, sessions were held in which some twenty officers, principally IOs, were interviewed.

In connection with other research activities, the principal investigator was also able to interview IMET graduates in their home countries. These included Chile, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, field research has been conducted with American forces in numerous multinational operations over the years, including the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.

The interview guides are given in Appendices 1 and 2. Remarks pertaining to perceptions of national differences by both American and non-Americans are given in Appendix 3. To protect the confidentiality of the interviewees, identifications of individuals by nationality in remarks that might be viewed as sensitive will not be given.

Several aspects of this methodology must be noted. It should be stressed that the data collection was qualitative, not quantitative. In seeking to ascertain opinions of international military cooperation, information is better acquired through an empathetic interviewer than through survey methods. Unlike statistical approaches, a qualitative approach to national cultural difference helps apprehend the subtle attributes of group differences that come to play in international organizations.¹²

Using a semi-structured interviewing technique, it was also possible to obtain a more complete understanding of the social context of the IOs and their American counterparts. Inasmuch as the research seeks to describe cultural aspects of international military cooperation, the qualitative method is deemed most appropriate. Obviously, personality variations among military officers obviously contribute to different evaluations of their international experience.¹³ Here, however, we focus on foreign officers as a sociological category and seek to uncover national similarities rather than personality differences among IOs.

IV. International Military Cooperation: Findings

A. International Military Education and Training (IMET)

In 2001, close to 9,000 foreign military officers coming from over 100 countries received some form of professional training in American military programs. The largest of these programs is known as IMET for International Military Education and Training. The analysis presented here deals with foreign military officers in American war and command staff colleges, the acme of the IMET program. This group, some 400 annually in recent years, are the elite of

the various military education programs. Such officers are generally viewed as on the way up in their home military organizations.

Although the academic programs and curriculums differ somewhat between the various war/staff colleges, there are essential similarities. Typically, IOs come together for an orientation period in the summer preceding the start of the academic program in the fall. The orientation period is generally for three or four weeks. This initial time is when the IOs get to know each other as well as the Americans who manage the local IMET program.

The first distinction in the process of "settling in" of the IOs is between those who come with family members and those who do not. An informed estimate would be that three-quarters of the IOs come with families. Unlike the unaccompanied IOs, those with families must quickly find housing usually on the civilian economy. While some unaccompanied IOs also rent on the local economy, the large majority of the unaccompanied live in bachelor officer quarters on base. Although being accompanied by one's family increases settling-in problems, it is almost universally regarded as worth the trouble by the IOs. As one IO put it, IMET without a family is a "remote tour." There is a general feeling that it is only with one's family, especially with children, that one can acquire the full American experience.

All war/staff college schools have a "sponsor" system for their foreign students. These sponsors are both military and civilian. Military sponsors are generally fellow students of the IOs. Certain faculty members, civilian or military, can also be sponsors of IOs. The key sponsor role, however, is often played by a civilian from the local community. As a general rule, IOs have closer relations with civilian sponsors than with military sponsors who are fellow students. IOs see their fellow American students as very busy with their own time demands. And indeed, American students often see their war/staff college year as a time to reconnect with their families. IO-American relations vary, of course, from distant to close, but, generally, are very positive.

It is also a reality, however, that wives of IOs coming from non-English speaking countries often have a poorer command of English than their husbands. This means that such wives are often somewhat isolated from the American society. (The general view is that the wives of Islamic IOs lead the most sheltered lives.) For this reason, English language classes for IO wives are extremely valued. Sometimes these classes are taught on a volunteer basis by American officer wives or the wives of IOs coming from English-speaking countries. In some areas, English-language programs are run by volunteers in the local community. The Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, runs a particularly well regarded English course for the spouses of IOs at Maxwell Air Force Base.

IOs with school-age children are particularly concerned with the local educational system. Typically, IOs have children in the elementary or middle school levels. The quality of local public schools in IMET programs is quite

varied. These range from very good schools in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Leavenworth, Kansas, and Newport, Rhode Island; to mixed reviews in Quantico, Virginia; to not well regarded in Montgomery, Alabama. Virtually all military officers at Maxwell Air Force Base, American and foreign alike, send their children to private or parochial schools. At the National Defense University, in Washington, D.C., nearly all IOs with school-age children live in Northern Virginia or Montgomery County, Maryland.

The common experience for IOs with non-English speaking elementary school children goes something like the following. "By Christmas, they have learned English. By the end of the school year, they are the best in the class." This may be an exaggeration, but one hears it often. From the IO viewpoint, a very significant side benefit of the IMET year is the opportunity for their children to learn fluent English.

Friendships across national lines vary, of course, by individual personality, but some general patterns reappear. Because of the shared experience of being in a new country, and because of the nearly month long orientation period, strongest friendships occur among the IOs themselves. I observe a similar pattern among international students at my own civilian university.

IOs from the so-called "ABC" countries -- Australia, Britain, and Canada -- often become the de facto intermediaries between the IOs as a collectivity and the American personnel at the war/staff college. IOs from these countries, while native English speaking, are, nevertheless, still not Americans. This unique position of having a foot in both camps gives "ABC" students a unique position in just about every war or staff college.

Among IOs, there is a natural tendency to group with fellow IOs of the same linguistic or cultural backgrounds. This is most notable among Arabs and Latin Americans. To some degree it also pertains to IOs coming from countries that shared a British or French colonial period. (A Trinidadian IO remarked that a fellow officer from Sri Lanka was also a good cricket player.) Again speaking generally, American students find it easiest to make friends with those from the ABC countries followed by IOs from Europe. Still, not to be lost sight of, there is a remarkable degree of interaction between all categories of students regardless of nationality.

Curriculum. IOs note that in seminars involving role playing, American students typically assume a problem is an American problem and are much less likely to recognize the utility of a multinational or international entity. IO critiques of the curriculum are, not surprisingly, that it is too American centric. Still, as one IO said: "But after all, we are in an American war college."

IOs often see some of the mandatory courses as a waste of time and, almost to a person, would prefer more electives than their American counterparts. Likewise, IOs almost universally find lectures to be less informative than

seminars. IOs also seem to have a general preference for civilian over military instructors.

A very strong complaint of IOs is that certain classes are closed to them because they contain classified information. This fosters a perception among IOs that they are second-class members at the war/staff college. Even more bothersome is when IOs are used as assistants to the Americans rather than full participants when class exercises simulate a strategic crisis. A Scandinavian officer put it succinctly: "Either fully include us or exclude us. Half way in is worse than being all the way out."

An integral part of the IMET experience is the field trip. These trips are major events at all war/staff colleges. For the IOs such trips usually include a visit to Washington, D.C., military bases, but also American historical sites and even industrial/commercial enterprises. These trips are extremely well regarded by the IOs. The only downside is that to be accompanied by one's spouse requires that the IO pay a hefty share of the bill.

As with English-language capabilities, there is great variation with the computer proficiency among the entering IOs. Computer expertise increases exponentially during the course of the academic year. Unlike the situation with the American students, however, notable differences in computer literacy can persist among some IOs through the end of the IMET year. Still, for many IOs the Internet becomes a way for daily checks of their home country newspapers.

Student Perceptions. It must be stressed that the IMET experience is typically a most positive one not only for the IOs, but for the American officers who see the IO presence as a great boon to the academic curriculum. Only by awareness of some of the negative attitudes of the two groups, however, can we proceed to make concrete recommendations to improve international military education.

American officer perceptions of IOs vary, but show some patterns. A widespread American view is that IOs represent the best and worst of the total student body. The most intellectual students are almost always seen as among the IOs. For those IOs regarded as at the bottom of the cohort, many Americans believe that such IOs are non-promotable at home and therefore should be screened before their acceptance into IMET. Another common view is that IOs are less involved in physical training than the American officers. What must be stressed, however, is that the overriding view of American students is that IOs give them an international perspective they would otherwise never have obtained.

IO perceptions of Americans also show definite patterns. Many Europeans see Americans as "taking themselves too seriously" or "not knowing how to enjoy themselves." Also, Americans are seen as displaying a "check point mania" and a "zero defects" mentality. Despite a lot of American rhetoric about thinking "out of the box," there is little real encouragement of independent thinking. The most

prevalent stereotype, by far, is that Americans are not as aware of the larger world as are the IOs. Many IOs are surprised that they are not queried more about their home country. Though one European IO remarked: "Maybe Americans don't know as much about Europe as we do, but they know more about Asia and Latin America than we do."

Very noteworthy, American officers with extensive multinational experience share many of the same perceptions of American officers as do the IOs. Namely, that Americans do not have enough understanding of foreign sensibilities and the international scene. This must be placed in the context of the overall finding: the IMET program is very highly regarded by the overwhelming majority of IOs.

B. Joint Services Command and Staff College, United Kingdom

The Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) in Shrivenham, England, is the British equivalent of the command and staff college in the United States. Non-British officers are officially referred to as Overseas Students, though International Students is used in common parlance. For consistency, we shall refer to the non-British students in the United Kingdom as International Officers (IOs) as we did with regard to non-American students in the United States. There are both differences and similarities in comparing the JSCSC with its American counterparts.

First the differences. IOs make up a substantially larger proportion of the student body at JSCSC. For the academic year 2000-01, 90 of the 327 students were non-British. Another difference is that the course of instruction begins with a joint period, then goes into single service components, then back to a joint program. One other major difference, all IOs and their families are covered by the national health insurance while in the United Kingdom.

But the similarities between the USA and the UK are more significant than the differences. In both countries, the IOs have an intensive period together in the orientation phase before the start of the regular academic year. The orientation period is three weeks at the JSCSC. Best friends tend to be fellow IOs. Again, as in the USA, all IOs are supposed to have good command of English, but in reality there is great variance. A sponsor system exists much like the American one. JSCSC field trips are an important part of the IO experience in the United Kingdom, just as they are in war/staff colleges in the United States.

Evaluations of IOs by the British students, parallel those of American officers in the USA. IOs are seen as the best and the worst of the students. Again, some IOs are seen as making the most significant contribution in classroom discussions and others as being slackers.

Another similarity is that many of the IOs view the curriculum as too host nation centric (the Army component at JSCSC is also viewed as too tactical).

The overly British content receives the same mixed reviews from the IOs as does the overly American content in the war/staff colleges in the United States. Again as in the USA, there is a tendency for native-English speaking IOs to take a leading intermediary role with the British administration. When I mentioned the "ABC" country phenomenon in American war/staff colleges, I was told by an IO that we have a "double A and C situation here," i.e. America, Australia, and Canada.

All IOs become members of the Coromant Club, named after the bird that can fly, dive into the water, and walk on land. A statute of three coromants, each representing a service, dominates the main lobby of the JSCSC building.

In comparing IO family life at the JSCSC with the counterpart in the United States, several differences can be noted. Close to 90 percent of the IOs at the JSCSC are accompanied with their families, somewhat higher than the ratio of IOs at American war/staff colleges. IOs and their families at the JSCSC all live in relatively comfortable on-base housing, thus mitigating the "settling-in" problems of IOs often found in the American situation. The local schools are considered good and the IO children do very well. Because many of the British officer students are living on campus as temporary bachelors, while going home on weekends, there is more bonding during the school week between host country students and IOs than is usually the case in America. As in the American war/staff colleges, an International Day is held once during the academic year. This is the day when IOs and their wives prepare a display of their home country, often with local national food.

The bottom line for the IOs at the JSCSC, as in the American war/staff colleges, is that it is the proverbial "best year of their life."

C. NATO Headquarters

Some 800 officers serve in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In addition to the large majority of NATO officers, the headquarters staff also includes some number of Partnership for Peace (PFP) officers from the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The typical tour length is about two years, somewhat longer for junior officers. Americans use the term "Shapian" to describe the headquarters group collectively and often refer to the non-Americans as "Euros." Again, for convenience sake, we shall continue to use IOs, or international officers, to refer to non-American officers.

Best friends tend to be fellow native language speakers, especially for the Americans. Those who live on the SHAPE compound tend to have more cross-national ties than those who live on the civilian economy. Same national friendships, due to language competency, tend to be much more common among the enlisted ranks than is found for the officers. As is true for the IMET and JSCSC students, the Internet is widely used for home country news.

Quality of family life and educational opportunity for the children of SHAPE staff is well regarded by both Americans and IOs. At the elementary school level, there are many national schools, e.g. American, Belgium, British, Canadian, Dutch, German, Italian. For the IO children coming from other countries, the definite tendency is to send their children to English language schools. The International High School, in reality an American secondary school, is highly esteemed. The International High School attracts students from across the widest variety of national contingents. One concern for many IOs, however, is that a high school diploma from the International High School may not be advantageous for their children's admission into universities in the home country. (Of note, the "nerd versus jock" distinction seems to be a unique peculiarity of American students at the International High School. Some things never change!)

As is the case in the American and British war/staff colleges, the wives of IOs tend to be somewhat less international than their officer husbands. A significant social event at SHAPE is the monthly meeting of the Officer Wives Club. Some 350 to 400 spouses attend these luncheon meetings. The Catholic Women group at the chapel is seen as the most international venue for SHAPE wives.

The overriding finding is that the level of respect and cordiality between the officers of the various nationalities at SHAPE is remarkably high. Contributing to this collective "Shapian" self-identity are the common military culture, the common experience of being "away from home" in a foreign country, the transient nature of the assignment, and, not to be overlooked, the positive evaluation of the mission they are committed to.¹⁴

V. Concerns and Issues

Looking first at the IMET program, there are some concerns that come up regularly in all of the war/staff colleges. In ascending order of importance, they are differences in income of IOs while in the United States, English language competence, and the lack of medical and hospital coverage for family members of IOs.

Inasmuch as IOs receive salaries from their home countries, income disparities between those IOs coming from wealthy nations and those from impoverished nations are unavoidable. These differences are mitigated to a degree by living allowances covered in IMET funding. Still, as one IO put it: "We have everything from princes to paupers." Similar perceptions occurred at the JSCSC in the United Kingdom.

The stereotype of the Arab prince flaunting his expensive car and the third-world officer barely getting by is a common one. Since September 11, my sources report, Arab students in IMET have made special efforts to dispel incorrect perceptions regarding Islam. The status of Arab IOs is one that requires sustained attention.

These income differences mean that IOs from the poorer countries cannot keep up with the level of hosting or off-duty social events easily afforded by American officers or others from economically advanced countries. Still, many informal IO events are, in the words of a British officer, "delicately organized" to allow the well off to help out the less well off.

English language deficiencies are most pronounced in written performance. It is generally understood, though never stated, that those without good English-language skills are not held to the same standards as those with fluent command of the language. One American war college student put it plainly. "To talk to an IO with poor English is just too much work." (Note: I felt the same way in a few of my interviews with IOs.)

But of all the concerns, by far and away, the most significant was the lack of medical coverage for family members of many of the IOs. The same issue was raised repeatedly by those American military staff members who manage the IMET program. The policies concerning medical coverage of family members of IOs while in the United States vary greatly from country to country. But in most instances, family members with medical needs extending beyond what can be treated at the base clinic are in serious financial trouble. In such cases, major medical treatment or hospitalization is not covered by an insurance plan.

As one American military officer on the staff of a war college put it, "Our big fear is that there will be at least one major medical emergency in each class." The plight of these uninsured family members affects not only the family directly involved, but is widely discussed within the whole cohort, especially so among the IOs.

Looking at multinational headquarters more generally, a key issue is whom is accountable to whom. This is related to on whom does one's promotion depend. In all international military organizations, one's immediate superior is likely to be other than a fellow national. But the promotion to higher rank must come from within one's home military organization. Moreover, senior officers in both SFOR (Bosnia) and KFOR (Kosovo) reported that there is always a probability that in sensitive missions, a commanding officer would report to the home country before the international headquarters.

Military-civilian interactions also confound matters. Here, as previously noted, there may be better cooperation between military officers of different nationalities than between military officers and civilian officials of the same nationality. The proportion of civilians in a multinational headquarters is also a variable.

VI. Recommendations

Interviews with IOs and American officers lead to several major recommendations to improve international military cooperation. We group these by setting: IMET and multinational headquarters.

A. IMET

1. The most pressing issue in the IMET program in the United States is to obtain some kind of health insurance for the family members of all IOs. This is the universal recommendation of all the American civilian and military personnel who deal with IOs. The sums involved would not be exorbitant, but the return in good will would be immeasurable. Alleviating this problem would significantly benefit the positive impression of IMET on all IOs.

2. In the IMET program in the United States, there should be a review of what must be classified material in the curriculum. The exemption of IOs from classified materials aggravates an incipient feeling of being second-class citizens in the academic program. The consensus among American students at the war/staff colleges is that most of what is classified is pretty innocuous. At the minimum, IOs, as do all American military officers, should be able to use .mil for computer access. Even the "Early Bird" (the daily collection of newspaper articles on security and military developments) can be accessed only by using .mil. American military officers consistently say it should be easy to build a computer "firewall" between what is really sensitive material and what is not.

3. In the IMET program in the United States, consideration should be given to some modification of the curriculum in our war/staff colleges. Not only the IOs, but many American students believe that the curriculum should have more coverage of alliance operations, coalition warfare, peacekeeping, international organizations, and so forth. As one American officer put, "the curriculum is still in the big war" mode. Of course, professional military education in the United States must necessarily have a strong American content. But some re-thinking is in order on what is required as to maximize the future benefits of a war/staff college year for both the American and international students.

4. Prior to their arrival at a war/staff college, some number of IOs attend the English language program at Lackland Air Force Base. This program is very well run, but some of the students wish the program include more on military terminology, more tutoring on English writing, and some computer instruction. Some of the IOs also reported they felt their rank was not respected by being placed in living quarters with Spanish-speaking enlisted personnel coming from Puerto Rico.

5. Special attention needs to be given to selection of civilian and military sponsors of IOs from Islamic countries, especially those of Arab origin.

6. In both the American war/staff colleges and the JSCSC in the United Kingdom, IOs made the point that inviting non-native English speakers to give an occasional lecture would be seen as recognition of the multi-nationality of the curriculum. If need be, use an interpreter. As one IO put it, "There are smart people who don't speak English."

7. Recommendations of a less sweeping nature follow: (a) Make English language courses more available to IO wives and consider having an elective course that wives can take while their husbands are attending the regular program; and (b) Insure that incoming IOs receive some kind of hard copy of the IMET program before they depart, inasmuch as the Internet is not always convenient for many IOs in their home countries.

B. Multinational Headquarters

Derived in part from the SHAPE experience as well as observations made at international headquarters in Bosnia and Kosovo, some recommendations on international military cooperation follow.

1. Even an occasional use of a phrase or word in a fellow officer's native language is appreciated, e.g. bon jour, guten tag, graci, etc. Such phrases are particularly well received by IOs coming from smaller countries whose native languages are not widely spoken outside of the home country.

2. American officers should be alert to the reality that they often speak too fast for easy comprehension by IOs. Similarly, a reliance on acronyms without explanations must be avoided.

3. American officers should offer to check memos written by non-native English speakers. Also, with computers, grammar/spelling checks are great practical aid.

4. Inquire of IOs as to events in their countries. Such inquiry should be informed by being conversant with current events in other countries. As an American officer at SHAPE put it: "Americans get their news from The Stars and Stripes. Even a Herald Tribune will be left unread on a waiting room table." In this regard, reading international coverage in The Economist would greatly advance the knowledge of American officers of an IO's home country. At a minimum, American officers should be required to read at least an encyclopedia entry on the country of a fellow IO with whom they regularly work.

5. One proposal by an American officer is rather intriguing, though unlikely to be implemented. Namely, use British spelling at international headquarters. This would put Americans at a slight disadvantage, but would make Americans appear less "super-powerish."

6. A common stereotype of Americans is that they are too work oriented and "don't know how to have good time." Special consideration should be focused on enhancing inter-personal activities across national lines, though more informal dinners, drinking occasions, and excursions.

7. Foreign Area Officers (FAO) career paths should be subject to rethinking. American officers who possess foreign language competencies and in-depth knowledge of particular countries are a valuable national security resource. This is particularly true for those countries outside of the major European nations. In most cases, a FAO will not reach general rank. Some thought should be given to how a FAO, toward the end of a military career, might shift over to a position in the State Department, the C.I.A, or D.I.A.

8. Advantage should be taken of visiting comedy groups that could poke some fun at Americans (and others) at multinational military headquarters. One such group is Boom Chicago, an improvisational comedy troupe, based in Amsterdam. Boom Chicago is frequently asked to do corporate shows along similar lines. See andrew@boomchicago.nl (Full disclosure: Andrew is the son of the author of this report.)

Item: Camp Bondsteel, the American base in Kosovo, has unintended but positive consequences on international military goodwill. Many allied military personnel who served in Kosovo reported that the highlight of their tour was spending a few days on leave at Camp Bondsteel. They reflected fondly on the dining facilities (including American fast food chains), PX items and prices, internet access, entertainment facilities, etc.

VII. Conclusion

Sustaining international military coalitions in which America takes part is vital to our national security. The missions can vary tremendously: conventional warfare, anti-terrorist campaigns, air surveillance, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, among others. America must accept the reality that because our nation is preeminent in economic and cultural influence as well as military might, even our allies may resent us at some level. Our alertness to steps that can reduce such resentment can only lead to more effective multinational cooperation. This will greatly serve our military and our nation. Much is at stake.

Appendix 1. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR IMET RESEARCH

1. Self Introduction and thanks for participation
2. Inquiry as to family status
3. Since you have been here, what happened that you did not expect?
4. What did you expect to happen that did not happen?
5. How much of what you learned here will be useful when you return to your home country?
6. What did you think of the course of instruction? Are there any changes you would recommend?
7. Who are your best friends here?
8. How does your family find living in America?
9. What field trips did you take? Which were the most interesting, which the least?
10. Any other observations or comments?

Throughout: probe for how Americans are viewed in comparison with officers of other countries.

Throughout: probe for perceptions of American arrogance.

Appendix 2. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SHAPE RESEARCH

1. Self introduction and thanks for participation
2. Inquiry as to family status
3. Since you have been here, what happened that you did not expect?
4. What did you expect to happen that did not happen?
5. Who are your best friends here?
6. What do you think is most valuable part of being assigned to SHAPE?
7. Do you any recommendations and how to improve international military cooperation?
8. Any other observations or comments?

Throughout: probe for how Americans are viewed in comparison with officers of other countries.

Throughout: probe for perceptions of American arrogance.

Appendix 3. SELECTED QUOTES FROM INTERVIEWEES

A. International Officers (IOs) on IMET Curriculum

1. Slovakia: Inevitable there would be too much on emphasis on America, especially in reading materials. But why so much on the US Constitution, which Americans should know anyhow. Better to compare the US constitution with constitutions of other countries. This would be more interesting and better for the Americans too.

Romania: Of course, the IOs want to learn about their own region and the American role in that region. East Europeans cannot be too interested in Latin America.

Australia: We are supposed to be taught leadership, but never any real discussion with a leader. We need to talk about real-life problems rather than abstract principles of leadership.

Norway: Reading Alexander Hamilton is very difficult. But when I was asked by instructor to compare USA and Norwegian constitutions, I found this excellent. This is a very good way to get IOs interested.

Bulgaria: Expected more about military strategy and the future of the military. Too much on US history. After all, the US Civil War is not really applicable today.

Hungary: I went to staff college under the communist system and now the American system. Here we learn how to think. Russians staff school was sheer memorization.

Germany: Much less pressure in the British advanced course. Brits more gentlemanly in their school. Here there are real pressures in term papers and exams.

Turkey: There is an unwritten competition between the old guard who has Soviet PME, those who go to Germany or France for PME, and those who are USA IMET graduates.

B. Non-Americans on Americans.

Netherlands: In America, everything not specifically allowed is forbidden. Check point mania. Zero Defects. Despite "out of box" rhetoric, little encouragement of independent thinking.

Italy. Americans see PME as a credential and hoop to go through. IOs seem PME as a novel military experience. We had to through all kinds of channels just

to get six officers excused from a mandatory lecture [they needed a yearbook meeting].

Netherlands: The USA is not driven just by money or power. Patriotism is very strong, unlike at home.

Czech Republic: Language barriers are number one in fostering anti-Americanism or the perception that Americans are arrogant. Without good English, the non-Americans feels rebuffed from start.

Britain: We tease the Americans for being so super power, but when we were in East Timor, Australian logistics were "in rag." Thank God we had an American aircraft carrier off shore to help us out.

Australia: I was told when going to USA, you are going to a foreign country. Drive-in ATMs, laws against leaving children in the car. I was told "you won't be making any good American friends." Not really true.

Norway: Why did we have to be told not to shoplift at the PX? I found this demeaning.

Egypt: There are different levels of friendship. Americans start by being friends from the beginning, but don't follow up. Somewhat frustrating because Americans pull away when favors asked. For IOs, friendships start much slower, but are much deeper.

Canada: The American attitude is you need us, we don't need you.

Malaysia: I don't find the American officers as arrogant. It is the State Department types who are the worst.

Denmark: Friends? Absolutely none of the Americans have an interest in us. Maybe there are afraid to display their lack of knowledge of Europe. Americans don't really open up.

Poland: Americans are not arrogant. Maybe they are not as familiar with Europe as we are, but they know more about the Middle East and South American than do the European IOs.

Australia: I expected USA and Australia to be alike, but surprised at the differences. USA is much more bureaucratic, inflexible, and bound by regulations.

Britain: The USA works 24 hours a day. But all the countries, even those are less organized, get the job done too. We saw a European with a sandwich on his desk the other day working on the computer at lunch time. "Your American passport came in the mail?"

Finland: Americans are big on "presentism." Are present at work, but not really working. European more efficient.

Britain: We are better at intelligence than America because we are openly cynical. Just look at how we get people to commit treason for her Majesty's government. The USA uses money. The Soviets used both money and blackmail. We use thwarted ambition.

Greece: Americans are hardworking, tolerant and patient people, although a people of a superpower. Or course, there is anti-Americanism in particular countries. In the former Warsaw Pact countries, there are still some number of communists in the military ranks. Anti-Americanism in Western developed countries is only a result of jealousy. It is human nature to be jealous.

Poland: I've been here for almost a year and no American has asked me what's happening in my home country.

Germany: Americans build a fence around themselves. Look at the PX and the schools. US wives in Bonn, never left the kaserne on their own. American officers here are not interested in learning about Belgium. You should select American officers who speak other languages. American officers are stationed in Germany for two years and learn no German.

Germany: Germans are straight-forward, speak what they really think, no secret agenda. Americans pretty much the same way, that is why we get along best.

C. Non-Americans on Non-Americans

British officer: [Re Sarajevo, 1998] Americans: for God's sake don't let any American get killed. We Brits have done this for years; this is a low threat environment. French -- let's plan to do something tomorrow.

New Zealand: I expected stronger language skills among the IOs. Maybe a third have real problems with English. On the other hand, some may put up language deficiency as a sort of shield not to participate.

Norway: Poles, Czechs and Hungarians stand aloof from the other Europeans. Want to be with the USA, Brits, and Canada. Use English even if more comfortable with German. The three new NATO countries are the most anti-EU military forces.

Italy: The challenge here is much bigger at home because we must represent our nation as well as our rank and military specialty. We must speak in a foreign language. And there is much great variability among the officers of the same rank here than one would find in one's home country.

Canada: It is natural for people who speak the same language to associate more with each other. But the herding instinct wears off over the year -- except for the Arabs.

D. Americans on Non-Americans

IMET: We try to pull IOs into seminar discussions. Nobody cuts off an IO like they would an American.

IMET: Some IOs can become "very needy." Will latch on to one person. This is one reason we seem to be superficial. Because we are.

SHAPE: Broadly speaking, Europeans don't see as much of a contradiction between a supranational NATO identity and their own national identity as do the Americans and the Brits.

E. Americans on Americans

IMET: Americans are arrogant in the sense they take charge. But after, who is in charge?

IMET: Of course, the IOs are more likely to make more friends among themselves than with Americans. This is because of the common experience of being foreign in America and because of the summer prep course. Americans are not really arrogant, we are just culturally insensitive.

SHAPE: We are in a hurry to get things done. Non-Americans always take things more slowly. We are looked upon as intellectually inferior because we can speak only one language.

SHAPE: Americans come to work early, stay later than anyone else. In August, Europeans close down. Also take 10 days for Christmas.

SHAPE female officer: American women working in multinational headquarters have special problems re sexual harassment. There are different definitions of harassment in Italy and Turkey, for example. We don't know how to handle it. Telling a foreigner to stop not as easy as telling an American.

SFOR: There are some US military who do a great job in getting along with and understanding foreigners, but they do it on their own. Americans are ignorant that they are arrogant. At least the French know they are arrogant.

Footnotes

The mode and presentation of the data collection reported herein are the sole responsibility of the principal investigator and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Air Force or the Science Applications International Corporation.

¹ New York Times, Feb. 23, 2002, p. A8.

² Peter W. Rodman, Drifting Apart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations (Nixon Center, 1999).

³ Pew Research Center, reported in International Herald Tribune, Dec. 20, 2001, pp. 1,6.

⁴ Susan E. Jackson, ed., Diversity in the Workplace (Guilford Press, 1992); Efrat Elron, "Top Management Teams Within Multinational Corporations: Effects of Multicultural Heterogeneity," Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1997), pp. 393-412; P.M. Donley, J.P. Canno; M.R. Mullen, "Understanding the Influence of National Culture on the Development of Trust," Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23 (1998), pp. 601-620. See also Monteagle Stearns, Talking to Strangers: Improving American Diplomacy at Home and Abroad (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁵ Geert H. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Difference in Work-Related Values (Beverly Hill, CA: Sage, 1980).

⁶ Joseph L. Soeters, "Value Orientations in Military Academies: A Thirteen Countries Study," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 24 (1997), pp. 7-32. See also Joseph L. Soeters, et al. "The Importance of Cultural Information in Multinational Operations," Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, Nr. 4, 2001, pp. 55-65; Donna Winslow and Peer Everts, "Inter-Cultural Challenges for NATO," in Gustav Schmitt, ed., NATO: The First Fifty Years (London: McMillan Academic, 2000), pp. 34-49.

⁷ David R. Segal and R.B. Tiggel, "Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers to Military Missions in the Post-Cold War World," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23 (1997), pp. 373-390.

⁸ Charles Moskos, Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force (University of Chicago Press, 1976).

⁹ For an insightful current account, see Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler, Western Unity and the Transatlantic Security Challenge, (Garmisch, Germany: Marshall Center, 2002). See also R.A. Preston, "The Multi-Cultural and Multi-National Problems of Armed Forces," in New Dimensions in Military History, ed., Russell F. Weigly (Presidio Press, 1975); Roger A. Beaumont, Joint Military Operations (Greenwood Press, 1993); Richard L. Kugler, U.S.-West European Cooperation in Out-Of-Area Military Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994); and Efrat Elfron, Boas Shamir, and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Why Don't They Fight Each Other? Cultural Diversity and Operational Unity in Multinational Forces," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 26 (1999), pp. 73-98.

¹⁰ For background information on IMET, I relied especially on John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training: An Assessment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995). An update of this significant study is in preparation. Also relevant are Fred A. Coffey, Jr., Best Dollar Spent: A Look at the Informational Program for Foreign Military Officers (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1985); Spiro C. Manolas and Louis J. Samelson, The United States International Education and Training Program, DISARM Journal, (spring, 1990), pp. 1-13; General Accounting Office, Security Assistance: Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program, (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June 14, 1990); R.F. Grimmett, International Military Education and Training Program (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1996).

¹¹ Unlike the typical 11-month programs at the other war and staff colleges, the Naval Staff College (NSC) has terms of 5 and 1/2 months. Typically, there are 32 students per class of which one is an American. The parallel College of the Naval Command and Staff College has not international students. The benefits of this model are that more small countries can participate if their officers are away from their home countries for only a half year rather than whole year. And, in fact, the NSC has a much higher proportion of non-European and poorer countries than any other IMET program. The downside is that there is much less interaction between IOs and American students and the curriculum has to be compressed.

¹² On field research, see Thomas D. Cook and Charles S. Reichardt, Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Evaluation Research (Sage, 1979); Jerome Kirk and Marc L. Miller, Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research (Sage, 1986); and Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods (Sage, 1999).

¹³ See, Schahresad Forman and Peter Zachar, "Cross-Cultural Adjustment of International Officers During Professional Military Education in the United States," Military Psychology, Vol. 13 (2001), pp. 117-128.

¹⁴ Of some note is that the German perception of American military personnel, even at SHAPE, derives from their observations of the stereotypic insular life on U.S. military bases in Germany.



CHIEF's Sight Picture

26 August
2002

An Expeditionary Language

At the beginning of the 21st Century the United States faces a dynamic and evolving security environment. America's security is now truly a global issue and the men and women of the United States Air Force are tasked to meet that challenge. We find ourselves executing an expeditionary concept that focuses us on the business of rapid deployment in response to conditions ranging from humanitarian assistance to full-scale conflict. The expeditionary air and space force concept describes who we are today and where we're going tomorrow.

Post-September 11th operations reinforce the reality that future missions and contingencies will require greater sophistication and understanding of our international security environment. Just as we need pilots, intelligence specialists, satellite operators, and jet engine mechanics, our expeditionary force requires airmen with international insight, foreign language proficiency, and cultural understanding. Recent operations underscore our need to establish a cadre of professionals proficient in foreign languages and area studies—men and women who have the right skill sets to shape events and rapidly respond to world-wide contingencies. These international skills are true force multipliers and essential to our ability to operate globally.

Developing such a global cadre will require a much-needed "culture change." To that end, I strongly encourage the pursuit of such skill sets and experiences through regional/international studies degree programs, foreign languages, and overseas assignments. I expect commanders to fully support and emphasize the importance of this to their charges. To be truly successful at sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and contributing to multi-national operations, our expeditionary forces must have sufficient capability and depth in foreign area expertise and language skills.

I urge each of you to develop tomorrow's expeditionary airmen. America's security depends upon it.



John P. Stinger
AIR FORCE
Air & Space Power

EF2802
02 / 0 / 3635

September 12, 2002 4:30 PM

SOLIC

000.7

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Guidance

We want to get Torie some guidance, on paper, so we can send a letter to mayors, governors and/or the press, saying that we are purposely doing things on an irregular and unpredictable basis, and we are doing it for a good reason. The goal is to mystify the situation for people who might want to attack our country.

When we deploy Avengers or Stingers, then take them out or put them back in, it is unhelpful for the press to report it almost as it is happening. If mayors or governors know why we don't want to tell them each time we make an adjustment, they can be more understanding.

Obviously, the press can and will go ahead and do whatever they want. On the other hand, if they would like to be helpful, they might find ways to not consistently and immediately demystify things for the enemy.

When we do this, we will want to copy Tom Ridge. We ought to get this fashioned fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091202-3S

.....
Please respond by 09/30/02

1252P02

12:51 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: June 11, 2002
 SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement

When I was in Bahrain, questions were raised about the Rules of Engagement for the MIOs.

They think that on non-compliant boardings, only if they think UBL or the very top leaders of Al Qaida are aboard ship, can they board it.

Let's talk about it and get Tom Franks, and see what has happened.

Thanks.

385

DHR/azn
 061102.05

Please respond by: 6/20/02

11 Jun 02
 6/24

ATCS response attached.

V/R

TAB

Ed

Snowflake

June 20, 2002 3:14 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: South Korea

Korea

When I go to South Korea, I need to have some ideas as to how that place ought to be organized, and I need to get a good briefing on it before I go. I am convinced the place has to be readjusted to fit the new circumstance. I am told the new MoD is friendly and wants to help.

I am convinced Korea can do more logistically than they are doing. We just have to ask it of them. There ought to be better burden sharing, and we ought to get them to modernize, transform and buy the right weapons.

I am told we could save hundreds of millions of dollars a year if we reorganize the place.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-26

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

26 Jun 02

U16294 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11503

June 20, 2002 11:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Preserving Records

Please take a look at these two paragraphs marked "L.D." and tell me if you think there is anything we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/21/02 Pardo ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
062002-18

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

314.7

20 Jun 02

U16295 02

(b)(6)

ROBBINS & ASSOCIATES
333 WEST WACKER DRIVE, SUITE 830, CHICAGO, IL 60606

(b)(6)

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: (b)(6) BP
DATE: May 21, 2002
SUBJECT: Chicago Office

When we met on May 2, you asked me to tell you what I'm doing and if I thought I was duplicating anything being done in your office there.

First, what I'm doing:

- Bill paying & deposits
- Contributions
- Bank statement reconciliation
- (very) occasional travel plans for Joyce
- Monthly reports *← Submit to every 2 months*
- Tracking car insurance, property insurance, real estate tax, ditch fees and other regular required payments
- Financials - as requested *— go to twice a year.*
- Financial work as directed by Robbins & Associates - which is next to nothing. I have been talking with them about ways my time can be better utilized. They seem to have succumbed to corporate deafness. I have an appointment 5/23 with Linda Stawicki to try to get the message across again.
- "The Book" - now ending *— excellent.*
- Clips - current
- Clips - historical. Cataloguing and preserving them in a more archive-safe format. (I've catalogued over 3,600 articles from 2002 through 1984.)

*Detach
Show me*

Sergeant (b)(6) review with me of clips, photos and archives turned up one place where I may be duplicating and that is clips from *The New York Times*. The Pentagon clips from the *Washington Post*, *Washington Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *USA Today* and *New York Times*. I clip from *Chicago Tribune*, *Daily Herald*, *New York Times* and *U.S. News & World Report*. I also glean Internet photos daily and print some for the clip book that I haven't seen in the newspapers. We also both keep the magazine articles that we get - *Vanity Fair*, *Reader's Digest*, etc.

*Time -
Newweek
Other*

However, the Pentagon clips only those articles that headline you; I clip anything with your name in it, which has been our custom. I don't feel my clipping is duplicative and wish to continue to do it.

L-D.

The Pentagon clip and photo books *look* beautiful. However, I have concerns about the archival quality of them. I asked Lee, the clips person, if the books were archivally safe. She didn't seem to understand what I was talking about. I'm no archivist, but it looks to me like the books have highly acidic black inserts and glaciene plastic pages, both which will break down the paper more quickly and which I am working hard to eradicate from the old clip books. Also, the articles are kept whole and sometimes folded to fit into the pages; this damages paper quickly, as well as encourages handling of the paper – taking it out, unfolding it, etc. – by those who will use it in the future. I'd be interested to find out why the Pentagon does not use more archive-friendly books, if, indeed, that is the case. Same for the photo books.

L-D.

The Pentagon is putting the articles and the photos on CDs, but I don't believe they are cataloguing what is on each beyond putting down what dates are covered. (b)(6) was checking on that. For example, the CD would say it's for January 1 – March 31, 2002; however, there would be no listing of what headlines or what photos are on the disk. This makes them user-unfriendly.

It's my understanding that when you leave, you'll get photo, clip, and speech binders and their corresponding CDs. (For speeches, they keep the original copy with your hand notes on it, which is excellent.) You will also get all the videotapes.

Duce 11

One question is – where you will put all of it when you leave!!

It's great to have all the information on CD, as it can be very helpful in searching and retrieving; however, technology changes so quickly that information stored digitally can be quickly found useless, which is why it's so important to preserve the paper copies as best we can. For example, many of the computer files that I used when I first started for you in 1991 can no longer be opened because the technology has advanced beyond them. We may get to be a "paperless society," but I don't think it's going to happen soon.

Note this from an article in *Wired* magazine:

With the limits of analog technology, some say that digital storage is the wave of the future. "It's clear that our culture is moving towards electronic preservation," said Jack Rakove, a history and American studies professor at Stanford University. "It's cheaper, more efficient and easier to search." But digital archiving technology is costly and relatively untested. Others say that digitization is no panacea. Paper and microfilm remain the only proven forms of preservation.

Technology used to transmit digital information changes so rapidly that it's often difficult for those trying to preserve it to keep pace.

Anyone who remembers floppy disks or Betamax knows that relying on technology that may be rendered obsolete is a risky endeavor. Electronic files could be degraded within decades unless archivists can build stable archives.

"There's a high risk for the long-term integrity of these digital files," said Paul Conway, head of Yale University Library's preservation department.

"An archival medium is something that will last forever," Nesbit said. "CD-ROMs haven't been around that long.... We don't know if they'll be around in 20 years."

Bottom line is, we still need to keep the paper, and we need to keep it well.

June 20, 2002 11:13 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Gen. McCaffrey

020HLS

Please feed to Clay Johnson that General Barry McCaffrey is not the right guy for Homeland Security. If they start tilting that way, I would like to be given a heads up, so I can weigh in.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-17



Please respond by _____

26Jun02

U16296 02

1/3
- 100
Snowflake



JUN 21 2002
gr

EP 1919 UA
02/004339-USD
June 20, 2002 10:41 AM

TBA

UK

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D
SUBJECT: Letter to UK

Please draft a letter from me to the UK thanking them for the good job they did on ISAF.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-14

.....
Please respond by 06/25/02

7/7

Byes
Can't you do variations on the basic letter. They shouldn't get identical letters.
D. Di Rita
Larry Di Rita 7/8

Response Attached

SBD
7/3

2002 Jun 20

U16297 02

11-L-0559/QSD/11509

06-21-02 13:09 17

JUN 21 02 11:09



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

FF19224
pen
6/25
USDP A. J. J. 2/3/07

ACTION MEMO

I-02/009339

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _____

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

SUBJECT: Letters to UK MOD and Chief of General Staff

- Attached for your review and approval are letters to the British MOD and the Chief of the General Staff commending UK leadership of the ISAF.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letters to UK MOD and Chief of General Staff
(Next under).

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, NESA, (b)(6)

DASD W. J. Rodman

PDASD _____



June 20, 2002 7:44 AM

0005

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Scorecard

I think we need a scorecard for the global war on terrorism.

For example, we ought to have a weekly report on the number of arrests and show the countries where they have been arrested, the number of detainees, the amount of money in bank accounts that has been frozen and the number of accounts, the number of sweeps in Afghanistan, number of MIOs, the number of people trained in different countries, and progress in Afghanistan in terms of some measurements, like refugees coming in.

We ought to get a series of indicators. Please have someone pull it together and see if we can't get the interagency group to do it. The President asked for this six months ago, and it has never happened. Why?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
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Please respond by 07/19/02

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