

April 22, 2002 7:51 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Authorization Bill

004

I cannot figure out what this *Financial Times* article is about that the Pentagon backed down from a proposal on reviewing large foreign acquisitions.

Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated, Peter Spiegel, "Pentagon Retracts Plan," *Financial Times*

DHR:dh
042202-8



Please respond by 05/03/02

22 Apr 02

U16605 02

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT VEHEMENT OPPOSITION FROM TREASURY

Pentagon retracts plan

By Peter Spiegel in Washington

The US Defense Department has backed down from its proposal to mandate a secretive, national security review of all large foreign acquisitions of American companies, bowing to pressure from within the Bush administration and across the Atlantic.

According to people familiar with the dispute, Pentagon officials grudgingly agreed to withdraw the pro-

vision - which it had inserted into a draft of the annual defence authorisation bill circulated within the administration - late last week after several agencies, particularly the Treasury and Commerce Department, vehemently objected.

The Pentagon wording, which it drafted without consulting other departments, would have required all overseas buyouts of US companies valued at more than \$100m to be cleared by the

Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS), an obscure inter-agency panel chaired by the Treasury and charged with ensuring such foreign acquisitions do not violate US national security.

Despite the Defense Department's retreat, critics of the proposal within the administration remain concerned that the provision may be put back into the bill by national security hawks on Capitol Hill, particularly

when it is armed ser- of the Hou tives and Pentagon ment.

Todd M. director of for Internati which repre iaries of fo. and which h. against the he was not Pentagon ha the requirem

COUNTER-COUP SUPPORT FROM BRAZIL

Chávez return helps regional democracy

S2

By R Ric



STW/146

April 22, 2002 12:39 PM

*Answered in
followed up
memo by
LD.*

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Extensions

210 Army (344)

Please find out when TRADOC comes up and whether or not I have a voice in whether or not Abrams is extended. I would like to know how long he has been there, when his due date is and who decides if he is extended.

Also, I would like to know who decides if anybody is extended. Is it just CINCs that I get involved in? What about the internal Service posts?

I would want to interview any possible replacements.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-7

.....
Please respond by 2/10/02

U16606 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12025

snowflake

5:52 PM

Answered by

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Admiral Giambartani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 9, 2002

SUBJECT: TRADOC

Some time ago I asked the TRADOC when is Abrams tour up, who picks the new TRADOC head for Abrams' replacement, who has that decision process, I assume it is a Presidential appointment and therefore I ought to be able to get into it. It is pretty darn important.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
050902.02

Please respond by: _____

05/09/02

11-L-0559/OSD/12026

4/23
0800
snowflake

April 22, 2002 12:36 PM

5/7

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Calling Me at Home

02050

Cables called me at 8 o'clock on Sunday morning and woke me up after I had been traveling Thursday and Friday and had to get up early on Saturday to get to Camp David. It was my one day to sleep. They called and said there was a fax for me from Doug Feith.

It just absolutely shouldn't be done. Someone has to use some judgment. Doug Feith had sent me a second draft of a speech he was giving to AIPAC on Sunday. I don't need to see something like that, and Cables ought to know better than to call me.

Why don't we see if we can figure out what kind of advice to give them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-5

22 Apr 02

Please respond by 02/02/02

Done

U16607 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12027

Snowflake

April 22, 2002 7:33 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jordan's Offer of Interpreters

Jordan

Should we be using more Jordanian translators and interpreters down in Guantanamo Bay? My impression is they will probably do a better job.

They have offered. Why don't we take them up on it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-4

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

aa APPROA

U16608 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12028

snovfale
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4
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April 22, 2002 6:48 PM

353

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Foreign Participation

Please read this memo. Do you think we ought to put something in the Defense Planning Guidance that would help pull some of this together?

Thanks.

Attach.
04/15/02 PDUSD(P) info memo to SecDef re: Foreign Participation

DHR:dh
042202-52

.....

Please respond by 05/03/02

22APR02

U16609 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12029

NEF0425

March 18, 2002 1:11 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Red Flag Training Program

Please read these memos on the Red Flag Training Program.

I think we ought to come up with who we would like to invite and who we would like to encourage to participate, rather than simply allowing those who are familiar with it to do it repeatedly.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/07/02 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Red Flag Training Program

DHR:dh
031802-43

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 22 2002

CAMERON FEITH RESPONSE ATTACHED. *4/22*
W/R Ed

SPB
4/20

EFH/24



POLICY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



SECDEF HAS SEEN I-005497/02

INFORMATION MEMO APR 22 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (Douglas J. Feith) 4/15/02

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 8 APR 15 2002

SUBJECT: Foreign Participation in Red Flag and Related Issues

- You indicated that we should decide what nations we would like to invite or encourage to participate in Red Flag, rather than allowing those most familiar with the program to participate repeatedly (~~Table~~).
- Foreign selection for Red Flag is a process internal to the Air Force. This stovepipe process reflects the way most DoD foreign activities are conducted:
 - There is no overarching system that enables OSD Policy to see, guide, or assess the wide range of DoD foreign activities. Our visibility is sporadic and uneven.
 - The CINCs, the Chairman, the Services, independent agencies, and OSD Under Secretaries each direct and oversee different types of security cooperation activities – exercises, training, education, information sharing, etc.
 - Different DoD components use different criteria for deciding which countries will participate in their programs, which may or may not reflect DoD priorities.

PROBLEM ↑
SOLUTION ↓

- DepSecDef has asked us to develop a more centralized approach to security cooperation that better integrates DoD foreign activities and programs with our evolving priorities, including our global defense posture.
- A near-term product that will reflect improved policy oversight is Theater Security Cooperation Guidance to guide the CINCs in their FY04 planning. We are finalizing the guidance for your signature.
- Over time, we recommend broadening that guidance to include all DoD entities that conduct activities with or in foreign countries. We are also working to develop a centralized knowledge base as well as institutionalized consultative mechanisms within



04-15-02 18:47 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/12031

DoD. These steps would enable us to better assess the alignment of our foreign activities with our global defense posture and objectives and make adjustments as warranted.

- We will report back to you on our efforts as they progress.
- On Red Flag specifically, policy priority is an important, but not pivotal factor, in deciding foreign participation.
 - The primary objective of Red Flag is to improve U.S. capability, and other bilateral and multilateral training opportunities exist to improve U.S. interoperability with priority countries.
 - Some nations that we may want to participate in Red Flag may be deterred by the cost; others may not have the proficiency level needed to make the training meaningful for U.S. forces.
 - We will follow up with the Air Force to ensure we are added to the decision process on foreign selection.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Mary Tighe, OUSDP, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/12032

February 21, 2002 10:33 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Red Flag

Please find out what the Red Flag people use as their gouge for deciding which countries they will allow to participate. Apparently the requests greatly exceed the slots.

I would be curious to know how they make their decisions. For example, I notice they did not include the Turks, which I would have thought would be a higher priority than some of the people they had.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022102-9

.....

Please respond by 03/08/02

3/8

CTCS RESPONSE ATTACHE
V/R
Ed



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFORMATION MEMO

2002 MAR -8 PM 1:43

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 1 8 2002

CM-217-02
7 March 2002

Handwritten: 3/7
3/7
3/7

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Participants in the USAF Red Flag Training Program

- For your Information, per your question on how participants are decided in the USAF Red Flag Training Program ~~(Tab A)~~.
- Of seven red flag training periods in FY02, three have been designated "US only" to fully integrate special access program training. For the four periods open to foreign participation, USAF Air Combat Command requests Deputy Under Secretary Air Force, International Affairs (SAF-IA) identify foreign participants. SAF-IA then solicits foreign participation for available periods.
- Germany and the United Kingdom are given the highest priority, and may participate in multiple exercises each year. Other allies are limited to one exercise per year and are selected based on their capability and how their participation contributes to both USAF training and Allied combined operations.
- Turkey did not request to participate in FY02.
- The attached USAF memo provides more detail, if needed (Tab B).

Prepared by: John P. Abizaid, LTG; USA; (b)(6)

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 3/7 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | 3/8 |
| MA BUCCI | 3/7 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 3/7 |

U04310 /02



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002
5 Mar 02

AFODM 04-02

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: RED FLAG INVITEE CRITERIA (DJSM-0182-02)

HQ Air Combat Command (ACC) uses USAF training requirements to determine how many and which Red Flag periods are available for allied participation. "US Only" Red Flag periods are reserved to fully integrate Special Access Programs / Special Access Required elements of the DoD. In FY02 there were three Red Flag periods designated "US Only" and three periods open to allied participation. For FY 03, there are three "US Only" periods and four periods open to allied participation.

In November of each year, HQ ACC forwards to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA), the Red Flag periods available for foreign air forces' participation. SAF/IA solicits foreign participation through their respective country desk officers. Allied participation is then established by SAF/IA and coordinated with representatives from ACC and Pacific Air Force HQ at an annual SAF/IA hosted scheduling meeting. The United Kingdom and Germany are given the highest participation priority. Both countries may participate in multiple Red Flag exercises annually. All other allies are limited to a maximum of one Red Flag period per year. In general, allied selection is based on consideration of allies' operational capability to perform the requested mission type, how allied participation enhances USAF AEF combat capability, and how participation enhances ability of allies to support combined operations. SAF/IA has final determination authority when a conflict exists between two allies competing for the same exercise mission type or on whether a country other than the UK or Germany participate in multiple Red Flag exercises.

For those Red Flag periods open to international participants in FY02, the following foreign air forces participated: UK, Canada, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy, NATO (AWACS), Singapore, and Israel. For FY 02, Turkey did not submit a request to participate in any international Red Flag periods and Norway cancelled, at their request.

CHARLES F. WALD, Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff
Air and Space Operations

11-L-0559/OSD/12035

April 22, 2002 6:44 PM

TO: Rich Haver
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Diabetes

Michelle Laxalt called and said that her friend at FDA knows about diabetes drugs. He and his associates are watching UBL, as is the world.

Looking at the videos, they feel there is a possibility that UBL may have poorly controlled Type I diabetes; if Type I diabetes is not well treated, it can spiral towards blindness, kidney failure and death.

If a person with Type I diabetes needs dialysis, they may need it up to three times a week. If so, they need multiple machines, because they have to keep them clean, and it is difficult to move them.

The question is—have we been talking to the Saudis or trying to find out who might be buying multiple machines? That conceivably could be a link to UBL.

Why don't you feed it into the process if you think it would be useful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-50

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

710

22 APR 02

U16610 02

1/24
1/20

STROWER

April 22, 2002 4:51 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: McGregor

Do you think I should meet McGregor?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-48

.....
Please respond by 05/03/02

000,71 SD



VIA ADM G.

4/25

Larry Di Rita
4/29

5/8

SECRET

Col Bucci

*Let's schedule
him sometime. With
all the ballyhoo, seems
fair for SecDef to
say hi and get a
name with a face.*

*Ask ADM G for
his thoughts, but let
me know with it.*

D. H. R.

*I mentioned to
you that it made
sense to me. Discussed
with ADM G, who
thinks it best not
to stir it up again. McGregor's
in place, everyone has settled
down, and he advises against
a meeting just now.*

22 APR 02

11-b-0559/OSD/12037 6611 02 4/26



April 22, 2002 3:03 PM

Done 5/1

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland Security Briefing

Here is the Homeland Security briefing. Should we brief the NSC, the Principals, on it?

384

Thanks.

Attach.
04/16/02 Homeland Security Transition Update

DHR:dh
042202-39

.....
Please respond by 05/03/02

5/1
Sec Def -
We will,
but too soon.
D. Rita

5/1

22 Apr 02

U16612 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12038



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Pre-Decisional DRAFT

7
Brak 1. P. 10

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 22 2002

Homeland Security

Transition Update
16 April 2002

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/12039



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Pre-Decisional DRAFT

Outline

- ⚡ Vision
- ⚡ Expectations
- ⚡ Definitions
- ⚡ New OSD Organization Core Functions
- ⚡ How it will work
- ⚡ Way Ahead

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



Vision

✦ Homeland Security is best accomplished --

- ❖ By building on State and local capabilities

✦ Role of Federal Government

- ❖ Enhance capabilities at lowest level of government
- ❖ Office of Homeland Security (OHLS)
 - Consolidate Federal Activity
 - Integrate National preparedness and response system
 - Encourage development of State and local capabilities



Expectations

✓ In event of national need, DoD will be a front-line actor

✓ Three broad circumstances:

❖ Extraordinary: Require DoD-unique capabilities, e.g.

- Combat Air Patrols
- Combat Assaults
- EOD

❖ Emergency: Augment capabilities of civil authorities , e.g.

- Post-event management
- Logistics, supply, mobility

❖ Temporary in Time/Limited in Scope: Assist/train state/local, e.g.

- Special Events
- Training First Responders
- Support to Law Enforcement



Definitions

✦ **Homeland Defense.** The protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression.

✦ **Civil Support.** DoD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.

✦ **Emergency Preparedness.** Those planning activities undertaken to ensure DoD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and the Secretary of Defense in a designated National Security Emergency.




New OSD Organization Core Functions

✓ **Provide the Secretary of Defense an organization to:**

- ❖ Develop strategic planning guidance for DoD's role in HLS
- ❖ Develop policy and guidance on Force Employment
- ❖ Bring focus to DoD in support of Civil Authorities
- ❖ Supervise DoD emergency preparedness activities
- ❖ Perform DoD domestic crisis management

| <u>Homeland Defense</u> (DoD Lead) | <u>Civil Support</u> (DoD Support) | <u>Emergency Preparedness</u> (DoD Support) |
|---|--|--|
| <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> Extraordinary </div> | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combat Operations within U.S. • Surge to meet Crisis | <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> Emergency </div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal Response Plan • Law enforcement allowed by statute • Routine support | <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> Temporary </div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconstitution & Continuity Operations • Training 1st Responders • Special Events |

How It Will Work





~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Way Ahead

- ⚡ Success of “matrixed” concept requires an element within each OSD component
- ⚡ Accelerated pace of establishing new organization requires rapid staffing
- ⚡ Standup requires selective accession of broad subject matter experts over next few weeks

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/12046

April 22, 2002 2:59 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita
Marc Thiessen
Tony Dolan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Russia

Russia

It seems to me that the argument that Russia can simultaneously assist Iran with their ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs, while arguing that the United States should not have missile defense, is a bit strange.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-37

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

22 Apr 02

U16613 02

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie Clarke

DATE: May 10, 2002

SUBJECT: Russia

Good point on the hypocrisy of Russia simultaneously assisting Iran with ballistic missile/nuclear weapons programs and arguing the U.S. should not have missile defense.

However, unless we're willing to be more blunt and public about Russia's mischief (and I don't think the Administration wants to do that), then it will remain an irritant to us and unknown to most.

11-L-0559/OSD/12048

1123
1330 snowflake

April 22, 2002 2:45 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Dean Godson

Please see if you can get a book or biography this fellow Dean Godson of the *London Telegraph* has written, so I can read it.

461

If he has written a good book, my instinct would be to cooperate with him and give him some of our papers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-36

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

4/23

Response attached

CONFIDENTIAL

4/23

22 Apr 02

U16614 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12049

April 23, 2002/Di Rita

Subj: Dean Godson

This is the author Richard Perle wants us to consider cooperating with.

The book on David Trimble that he has written is ^{not out yet} ~~unavailable~~ and I have not found any advanced reviews.

From a brief bio of him (below), he seems more of a Paul Gigot or Charles Krauthammer polemicist than an Edmund Morris or Richard Norton Smith biographer.

He may write a good book and offer a favorable point of view, but it would likely not be a definitive work as these things tend to be evaluated.

DEAN GODSON

Mr. Godson is a graduate of St. Paul's School, Gonville and of Caius College, Cambridge. Between 1983 to 1984, he served as Secretary in the US Navy (?) and in 1987-1989 as Special Assistant to John Lehman. Mr. Godson also served as a Research Fellow in the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies in 1990-1992. His political career includes Joint Deputy Chairman of Kensington and Chelsea Con Association. His newest book, *Himself Alone: David Trimble and the Ordeal of Ulster Unionism* is forthcoming. Currently, Mr. Godson serves as the Chief Editorial writer of the *Daily Telegraph*, the Associate Editor of the *Spectator* and Special Assistant to Chairman of Hollinger International and Chairman of Telegraph Group Limited since 1995.

April 22, 2002 2:37 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Demobilization

You should be looking into the subject of whether they are going to demobilize the warlords' forces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-34

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

AFghanistan

22 APR 02

U16615 02

April 22, 2002 2:08 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Goals

381

Here is a March 5 note from Newt Gingrich on goals in different engagements.

It seems to me Newt has a good point. I think we ought to sit down and look at how we are organized to deal with those very different activities. I think it takes different kinds of organization.

Larry, please set up a meeting for me to discuss this memo with Doug.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Goals in Different Engagements

DHR:dh
042202-27

.....

Please respond by 05/10/02

22 Apr 02

U16616 02

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

D-11

SECDEF HAS

APR 22 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2002 9:30 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Subject: secdef-6

V. You have three different sets of goals in different engagements: preventing, winning, and help with policing. You want to be so strong as to prevent engagements with Russia, China, a North Korean assault on the South, etc. You want to win when you engage at a major level (Afghanistan, Desert Storm). You want to keep the engagement at a very low level so the Congress and the media ignore it when you are merely policing (Yemen, Georgia, etc.). We kept small numbers of troops in El Salvador for years because they were too few to be a focus of attention for either the media or the Congress.

Each of these three patterns require very different rules of engagement and seriousness of planning.

April 22, 2002 1:58 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Forces Command

Dave

USJFCom

Here is a March 5 note on Joint Forces Command from Newt Gingrich. Do you think it would be useful to have a meeting with Newt, Gen. Hartzog, you and me for lunch sometime?

If so, please set it up.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Joint Forces Command

DHR:dh
042202-26

.....

Please respond by 05/10/02

22 Apr 02

U16617 02

05/10/02, 11:11 AM

Friday 10 May 2002

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 6:45am | Depart Residence (SA Tom Romero) <i>(no Round Table)</i> |
| 7:15am-7:30 | C/C Call |
| 7:35am-8:05 | PDB |
| 8:10am-8:15 | Breakfast |
| 8:20am-8:35 | CINCENT Update in Office w/CJCS, VCJCS, Wolfowitz, Feith |
| 8:40am | Depart River Entrance |
| 9:00am-11:00 | PC Meeting w/Franks (first hour), Situation Room, White House + 1 |
| 11:00am | Depart White House |
| 11:15am | Arrive River Entrance |
| 11:30am-12:00 | Honor Cordon & Meeting w/Italian MoD, SecDef Dining Room |
| 12:00pm-12:40 | Lunch w/Italian MoD (SecDef Office) |
| 12:45pm-1:00 | Press Avail. W/Italian MoD @ River Entrance steps |
| 1:05pm-1:10 | Photo Op w/Army Intern Class, SecDef Dining Room |
| 1:20pm-1:30 | Dell'Orto |
| 1:45pm-1:55 | Clarke Prebrief |
| 2:00pm-2:30 | Fox/Gingrich Interview, SecDef Dining Room |
| 2:45pm-3:30 | Gingrich, Hartzog <i>SMA</i> |
| 3:45pm-4:05 | Prep for Indonesian Visit w/Wolfowitz, Feith, Rodman, Brooks, Scher |
| 4:15pm-5:00 | NATO Trip Briefing w/Feith, Crouch, Brzezinski, Michel, Shannahan |
| 5:05pm-5:15 | CJCS |
| 5:20pm-6:00 | Central Asia Footprint w/Feith, Rodman, Crouch, CJCS, VCJCS, J-5, Ricardel |
| 6:15pm | Depart for Residence |

11-L-0559/OSD/12055

SECDEF HAS

APR 22 2002

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2002 9:29 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Subject: secdef-5

IV. Joint Forces Command should be the center of developing a joint doctrine and joint training system. Attached is a paper by General Bill Hartzog (US Army retired) explaining why the JFCOM mission should be focused and strengthened to make it the Secretary of Defense's instrument for functional transformation within the uniformed services

Hartzog paper will come as a separate attachment

Handwritten scribbles and signatures in black ink, including a large circular scribble and several overlapping lines and loops.

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2002 9:58 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Subject: hartzog memo on jfcom

this is General Hartzog's memo on refocusing jfcom, he is available any time you would like someone to work with him on this, newt

JFCOM And Change

Imperatives in the process of change

Meaningful change in a large bureaucracy requires, at least, five major steps:

- a strong, simple vision of what the end product might/could be
- the personal commitment and constant involvement of the senior leadership
- a cadre of committed disciples in each sub-element of the organization
- an agency responsive to the senior leadership to champion and institutionalize the elements of change
- a system of accountability with simple metrics to monitor progress during change

The SECDEF and DEPSECDEF have six clear anchors in their statement of vision that describes the thrusts to be pursued during transformation. Former Speaker Gingrich's paper outlines a process to pursue in imbedding the vision in DoD's leadership. This paper proposes the means to hasten the maturation of JFCOM as an agency to support the institutionalization of the elements of change throughout the uniformed elements of DoD in a lasting manner.

Warfighting issues

A number of continuing problems have resurfaced in many of our most recent operations that may be fixed by taking steps to speed the maturation of JFCOM.

- command and control technologies continue to be matured in service stovepipes (leading to weak joint situational awareness)
- with only a few exceptions, senior battlefield leaders tend to focus on tactical issues versus strategic and operational tasks (too much information? Too much irrelevant detail? Inadequate digitized leader training?) (when the going gets tough, senior leaders count petty cash?)
- the pace of development in ISR systems may have outstripped our joint commander's ability to use their output. (with more digitally agile commanders and staff, could we have greatly reduced sensor to shooter times?)

3/5/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/12057

How much ISR redundancy is good/needed?)

- doctrine (as it is currently defined) works best in a threat based environment. There is not currently a body of digested thought about how to create and sustain adaptability in an obscure or changing threat environment. (thus we reinvent new ideas with each operation)
- there is still considerable difficulty in both planning and execution of interagency activities during military operations (authorities? Doctrine? Practice? Budgets for overseas operations?)

JFCOM's role

The (then) Atlantic Command began its metamorphosis in 1994 from a classic regional unified command into the department's agency for the development and oversight for training, doctrine and combat development at the joint level. It has progressed steadily in that direction but has yet to become all that it can be. It is critical to lodge the full responsibility for joint training, doctrine and combat developments in a single agency because the synergies accrued are geometric. Conversely, the most sophisticated technologies are sub optimized without the broad understanding and the adequate training for their use. Today, general combat development thrusts are spread among all services/agencies with yet inadequate top-down guidance to insure jointness (compatibility, integration, etc.) as each new capability is developed.

The JROC plays a useful role, but its authoritative position suffers occasionally from its inability to execute rapid exploration of alternative possibilities. As an example, does each service need its "own" UAV to satisfy perceived service unique requirements? JFCOM is the appropriate agency to run rapid, troop based (or virtual) experiments with the legitimacy to fit into the spiral development model rather than relying on a less wieldy, linear, ponderous test and evaluation process that usually produces a near perfect answer after the need has passed.

In the training development arena, JFCOM offers an excellent JTF command and staff training program which, until recently has been insufficiently funded to insure training readiness of its clients. Additionally, there is a classic feeling of some of the other regional commands that no single CONUS based element (JFCOM) can train command and control elements for use in other theatres as well as the host CINC. If that is true, JFCOM should be staffed and funded adequately to become the world's expert in such training. The recent training programs for standing JTF headquarters for each regional CINC is a major step in that direction.

In the business of doctrine, there is an emerging notion that set plans on how to conduct warfare will not be needed in a future that demands adaptability. Clearly as previously stated, threat based plans are not useful if the threat cannot be predicted and studied, but, it will be imperative that there be a general understanding of a set of "plays" that, when executed, will generate a smoothly functioning combined, interagency and joint team. They can be simple, but should be digestible by both senior and mid grade battlefield leaders who will find themselves leading mixtures of combined, interagency and joint forces. JFCOM could be the centerpiece for the development, digestion and sustainment of such a body of thought. This process is currently split between JFCOM, the Joint Staff and the staff of each major department.

Steps to speed JFCOM maturation

The following steps could greatly speed the maturation of JFCOM as the lead agency in support of DoD transformation:

- relieve CINC JFCOM of his SACLANT role
- relieve JFCOM of its AOR
- place west coast Army, Navy and Marine Forces under COCOM of JFCOM
- designate JFCOM as the author of all joint doctrine
- assign the Armed Forces Staff College to JFCOM
- give JFCOM the responsibility for the Joint Mission Area
- give JFCOM the responsibility for review of all service requirements for interoperability
- consider the assignment of a former regional CINC as CINC, JFCOM and insure a length of tour that allows completion of key programs

----- Headers -----
 Return-Path: <dpavey@aei.org>

4/23 snowflake
1930
!

April 22, 2002 1:51 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Proposals

Here is a March 5 note on getting something done from Newt Gingrich, which I think is right on the mark.

If you have any thoughts, please let me know. I hope you are talking to him from time to time.

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SE

Attach.

03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: General Assessment for SecDef and Specific Proposals

DHR:dh
042202-25

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

Sir -

I have discussed DP6 & other issues w/ Newt over the last 6-8 wks.
He read an earlier draft of DP6.
will ask him in to read final.

SC
4/23

100.54

22 Apr 02

U16618 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12060

April 22, 2002 1:48 PM

320.2

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Follow-Up

I don't know that I got back to you on your memo of March 5 on Blue Force Tracker, Predator and alliance buy-in system, but I hope you are working the problem.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Newt Follow Up

DHR:dh
042202-24

22APR02

U16619 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12061

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

APR 22 2002

Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2002 9:49 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Subject: newt follow up

If it is not presumptuous I would like to follow up on

1. blue force tracker implementation
2. predator b for southern watch and for training centers and an assessment of total force requirements for predators and the consequent build up of production volume
3. developing an alliance buy in system to help our allies go through transformaiton- this needs one person dedicated to its development and I would like to work with that person

I will work on the development of the entrepreneural model of nation building and report back

thanks
newt

3.

snowflake

April 22, 2002 1:18 PM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your Memos

I have been rereading your file this weekend. The memo you sent to MacGrewgor on February 13 was first-class. Keep it up!

381

Thanks.

Attach.
02/13/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
042202-22

22 Apr 02

U16680 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12063

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

~~SECDEF HAS SEEN~~

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com - *Newt Gingrich*
 Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2002 7:45
 To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil
 Cc: Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil

APR 22 2002

Subject: for secdef and Paul

this is a memo I have sent to Colonel MacGrewgor, Admiral G already has a copy, could you give copies to Paul and the secretary, I am seeing Paul at 2:30 or 3 and sdecdef at 3:30 if they could have this by then it would help, thanks
 newt

have a strange (but by the history of change not unusual) proposal for you.

For the next 90 days I would like you to spend all your spare time on the assumption that we do not have to argue about transformation, we have to figure out how to implement it with minimum longterm resistance.

I would like you to assume that the promotion issue (that is transformation requires seeking out and promoting issues) is in principle understood, the Gallipoli danger is real (an aggressive risking taking secdef could like Churchill assign a doable task for a Patton to a General Haig and create a mess while a Kitchener could carry off a slow ponderous campaign he could not have carried off Gallipoli).

In this context I would like you to do three things:

1. every item you send me you should copy to your home computer and build into a file, that way you have security at the office without losing all your work.
 2. you should think through in each problem what the secdef would do if he understood the problem as you understand it and how he could do it with minimum confrontation and minimum disruption (the MacNamara problem of creating a united wall of senior officers who like muskox rally together and simply refuse to change is real and is one of Rumsfeld's legitimate concerns, a war of leaks and manipulation by the senior officers could arouse such enmity in congress that Rumsfeld could win a few fights as Macnamara did with thef-111 but they would be pyrric victories)
 3. you should write action memos with attached explanations and defenses as though you were a senior transformation planner
 4. on recurring problems, eg the lav you should put together a case for a challenge at the secdef level with a one page pres cis (the Marshall- Eisenhower rule that all major decisions can be reduced to 1 page) with a longer appendage explaining the reasoning
 5. you should assume all your papers will be read by opponents and non-supporters (two very different groups) so you should write them in clear, powerful but objective language and should rely on the facts to carry them--when necessary I will edit them and send you a proposed redraft to get your approval and to show you what I mean--you are now playing for massively bigger stakes than at any time in your career but you can't be angry, personal or petty and you can't allow your personal judgements to undermine your professional judgements.
- I no of no reformer at your level since Lt. Sims' effort to reform naval gunnery was supported by Theodore Roosevelt who has the level of interest you currently have from secdef and his senior people. While the slowness and carefulness of their handling your personal appointment should be and is frustrating , the amount of attention they are paying to your ideas should be gratifying. If we work this together you may look back on the next few months as the most creative period of your career and I am confident job changes will follow.

if you have any questions about this call me today at 202-262-1746

Newt

2/13/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/12064

snowflake

April 22, 2002 1:18 PM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your Memos

I have been rereading your file this weekend. The memo you sent to MacGrewgor on February 13 was first-class. Keep it up!

381

Thanks.

Attach.
02/13/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
042202-22

22 Apr 02

U16680 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12065

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

~~SECDEF HAS SEEN~~

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com — *Newt Gingrich*
 Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2002 7:45
 To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil
 Cc: Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil

APR 22 2002

Subject: for secdef and Paul

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if you have any questions about this call me today at (b)(6)

Newt

2/13/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/12066

April 22, 2002 1:10 PM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John McClaughry

I just reread the piece you sent me from our mutual friend, John McClaughry. I can't for the life of me imagine how it can get from here to there, but if you have an idea, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/11/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Operation Compassionate Renewal

DHR:dh
042202-19

Afghanistan

22 Apr 02

U16621 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12067

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com *Newt Gingrich*
Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2001 12:03 PM
To: wordenp@mail.policy.osd.mil; crice@psc.eop.gov
Cc: James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil;
felthd@mail.policy.osd.mil; libby@ovp.eop.gov
Subject: Fwd: Operation Compassionate Renewal

APR 22 2007



Re: Operation
Compassionate Re...

if we are trying to genuinely have "an agenda for peace and prosperity
in
every land" as President Bush told the United Nations yesterday then
these
ideas would be helpful and he should be recruited to help put together
some
new concepts.newt

cc: DiRita
Admiral Gambastiani

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: John McClaughry (Ethan Allen Institute) [john@ethanallen.org]
Sent: Saturday, November 10, 2001 12:13 PM
To: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Subject: Re: Operation Compassionate Renewal

ECDEF H/

APR 22 2002

Newt - pleased to do so (below) . Every week I think of perhaps a better way of putting it, but the idea is worth considering. (It only works in areas from when the Taloiban ahve beene xpelled - now Mazar i Sherif, which would be a splendid example.

I still have the paperwork on the US-Poland initiative that Haig killed in 1982, alas.

Mike Antonucci, who has years of experience in Afghanistan and many intelligence sources, thought the idea was terrific. There is a whole universe of people-to-people grassroots economic aid groups. Most of them

probably dont approve of bomb dropping, but would respond to an invitation for positive reconstruction.

Here's another idea: the more irrelevant the successor government in Kabul

is, the better off is everybody. Thepost-Taliban regime, whatever it is, ought to contract out the management of the country to a transnational joint

venture run by say a Chris Patten or a Peter Ueberroth, and let that enterprise manage the reconstruction. Otherwise thousands of desperately poor

Afghans will loot everything of value before it can be applied and quarrel

forever.. I proposed this for Kossova 3 years ago (WSJ-Europe), bringing in

successful expatriate Albanians to run the store, but nobody picked up on it.

I'll mail it to you (cant find the e-text right now)
Consider the possibilities.

From the Washington Times Sunday 10/14/01

Operation Compassionate Renewal

John McClaughry

America is moving into a war with a shadowy enemy, determined to find the evildoers and make them pay, using the full range of military force. Diplomats are working to persuade other governments to cooperate with, or at least condone, this military campaign.

Official statements do not, however, give much of a hint that the administration conceives of Operation Enduring Freedom as a campaign not only to rid the world of global terrorist movements, but also an opportunity to significantly improve America's relations with the nations and people of the Middle East.

The Afghans know that America's prime targets are the thousands of terrorists from 13 mostly Arab countries assembled in their country by

Osama

bin Laden. The Afghans do not want to become collateral damage when the United States zeroes in on the bin Laden bases. The sensible thing for the

Afghans to do is get the unwelcome foreigners out of their country.

President Bush noted this in his September 25 news conference, when he observed that the best way to rout out terrorists "is to ask for the cooperation of citizens within Afghanistan who may be tired of having the Taliban in place, or tired of having Osama bin Laden people from foreign soils in their own land..."

To put this thought into practice, the U.S. should make use of a popular

American practice, the recycling center. For each bin Laden foreigner brought across the border in good condition, the Afghan turning him in will earn \$2000, a handsome annual income in that country. (The benefit would be

reduced if the goods are in damaged condition.) The recycled terrorists would

then be interned and dealt with in some distant country which can use the

business, like Mauritania or Niger.

Now add to the recycling concept two other favorite Bush ideas:

compassionate

conservatism and vouchers. In addition to the cash bonus, the recycler will

earn for his village a \$10,000 voucher redeemable in badly needed community

improvements. The voucher would be redeemed directly by the village leadership, beyond the control of whatever government may emerge in that country.

Many voucher-financed community renewal projects would be eagerly undertaken

by governments wishing to take a stand with the U.S. against terrorism, but

not comfortable taking part in military missions that might kill innocent

civilians.

For instance, village leaders might apply their vouchers to pay for a team

from Australia to rebuild its irrigation system, or a Swiss team to create

and staff a health clinic, or a Norwegian team to open a school, or an Omani

team to build a mosque. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from many countries would undoubtedly offer their services.

Among the latter are a number of Muslim relief organizations, including Red

Crescent, Helping Hand, Mercy International, and Islamic Relief Worldwide.

Mosques all across the world would be likely to participate as a way of fulfilling their holy obligation of zakat (charity).

This combined effect would be the enlisting of Afghans in removing unwanted

foreigners from their country, as part of an internationally-assisted rebuilding of its shattered towns and villages. The recycling operation would

give the U.S. what it wants - suspected terrorists. The program would mobilize the idealism of millions around the world. It would be cheap

compared to what the U.S. will necessarily spend on its military campaign. It

could proceed through Ramadan, a month when Western military action against

Muslims is likely to provoke criticism from our Muslim allies. It is only

part of a solution, but it can work along with necessary military action and humanitarian relief programs. Even if the market incentive feature for getting Afghans to recycle alien terrorists is dropped, such a low-budget multinational grassroots aid program for the long-suffering Afghan people would weigh heavily in humanity's ethical scale. It would avoid the costly mistakes of government-to-government foreign aid, and reflect most favorably on President Bush and the United States.

A similar program (minus the terrorist recycling incentive) for assisting village-level agriculture and development in Poland was developed (by me) in the early Reagan White House. The concept was enthusiastically received by representatives of Solidarity, the Polish American National Congress, and the Catholic Church. The proposal worked its way up to a National Security Council meeting. Unfortunately, staunch opposition from the State Department, invariably hostile to people-to-people initiatives not controlled by its bureaucrats, eventually persuaded President Reagan to choose not to go ahead.

Sometimes history gives a good idea a second chance.

#####

John McClaughry is President of the free-market Ethan Allen Institute in Concord, Vermont. In 1981-2 he was Executive Secretary of the Cabinet Council on Food and Agriculture in the Reagan White House.

(b)(6)

Thirdwave2@aol.com wrote:

> john
> could you email me your operation compassion op ed so I can forward it to
> some people
> also if you have additional ideas along this line please send them to me
> at this email address
> thanks
> newt

--

John McClaughry
Ethan Allen Institute

(b)(6)

April 22, 2002 10:02 AM

000.S

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Transformational Campaign

Please take a look at this September 2001 memo from Newt Gingrich and the two of you set an appointment to see me about it to discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/01 Gingrich memo

DHR:dh
042202-18

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

22APR02

U16622 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Creating A Transformational Campaign Plan To Defeat Terrorism
Newt Gingrich
September 2001

APR 22 2002

The United States has the capacity to defeat terrorism with a minimum direct use of American forces. In both Afghanistan and Iraq there are very large numbers of people who want to replace the current dictatorships. In Afghanistan there is both a civil war in the north and two million people in refugee camps in Pakistan alone (not counting other refugee camps).

The 21st century American model of war in the third world should be the alliance between local light infantry and sophisticated American intelligence, communications and firepower. For example, a B-2 fly permanently overhead in Afghanistan with a Global Hawk providing real time data and an Afghan volunteers with a downlink phone and a laser designator. The B-2 can now be equipped with more than 60 five-hundred pound bombs. Each bomb can be dropped in response to Global Hawk or laser designator targeting. (Technically the GPS bombs are GPS targeted but the system could be designed to get a GPS designation from the Afghan volunteers and the distance from the laser.)

American firepower combined with the 30,000 northern insurgents could cause the Taliban enormous trouble. Combined with an American and Pakistan trained and American financed Afghan force in the south it could defeat the Taliban and return Afghanistan to a non-repressive Afghan government.

Similarly, the combination of overhead surveillance, large quantities of precision-guided munitions in B-2s and an alliance with Iraqi rebels could topple the Saddam regime. The U.S. would announce no drive zones and police them with reconnaissance drones with PGMs overhead. The rebels would be free to move while Saddam's Army would be isolated and frozen in place.

SecDef should establish a planning team with Centcom and J-3 to develop transformational campaign planning to create a decisive alternative to using American regular forces in either Afghanistan or Iraq. The team should include liaisons from DARPA and should be assigned the task of reporting as rapidly as possible a general outline of a campaign to install anti-terrorist regimes in both countries with a transformational force.

11-L-0559/OSD/12073

April 22, 2002 12:41 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*
SUBJECT: DoD Responsibilities

DoD.S

The more I think about it, the more DoD is being looked to as the entity responsible for finding UBL and Omar.

It seems to me that these are not DoD primary responsibilities. Rather, they are law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities, with DoD in a supporting role. I wonder how we ought to manage to shift the responsibility to people who do that, with us in a supporting role.

Please tell me what you think.

My sense is that the Director of Central Intelligence understands this, and Charlie Allen has been focusing on it continuously. I don't know the extent to which the Justice Department thinks of it as their responsibility or whether they have even put them on the ten most wanted list, if they have such a list.

Let's discuss this.

Thanks.

Done
7/26
LARRY DI RITA

DHR:dh
042202-16

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

22APR02

U16623 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12074

April 23, 2002 8:24 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Military Personnel

200.4

The pressure for higher end strength is a result of the fact that we have too few people on the spear point and too many people in headquarters, cooking in the Sinai and serving as "fellows" on Capitol Hill.

Please do a quick assessment by types of positions and locations. My guess is there are at least 15,000 people doing things that don't need to be done by uniformed personnel that we could shift into things that do need to be done.

Now is the time to do it. With respect to people, we ought to be able to fix the problems faster than we can with other high-demand low-density assets.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-2

.....
Please respond by 05/22/02

DR
Done 7/1
Larry Di Rita

Resked Chu/Abell, etc

23APR02

U16624 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12075

April 23, 2002 6:30 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Contractors

Have you thought of using contractors to train the Afghan army?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042302-24



Please respond by 05/17/02

23APR02

U16625 02

April 23, 2002 6:29 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief to President

AFghanistan

The next time you brief the President, he is going to want your assessment of the security situation on the ground.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042302-23



Please respond by _____

23 Apr 02

U16626 02

April 23, 2002 6:27 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Restitution

000.5

The next time we talk on the phone, I would like to visit with you about what we do for the families of people whose houses we blow up. Is it State Department, the Agency or us that feels a responsibility to treat people well, so the local environment is more hospitable to our troops?

If so, who is coordinating it?

Thanks.

DHR.dh
042302-22

.....

Please respond by 04/25/02

23 Apr 02

U16627 02

April 23, 2002 6:19 PM

Poland

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Poland

I met with the Polish Defense Minister today. They have offered up a lot of things. My instinct is for the U.S. to develop a much closer relationship with Poland.

I would like you to take a look at all the things we are doing and see where we can engage the Poles and work closely with them. If they want to help with de-mining, terrific. If they want to help with something else, let's try to get them engaged in it. If they have Special Forces people, let's try to have them work with ours.

You might look at the whole laundry list of what they offered up and see if we can include them in more things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042302-21



Please respond by 05/17/02

23 APR 02

U16629 02

April 23, 2002 12:04 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Force

Done
MG HAGENBAEY

322

Please find out the name of the general who is going to be head of the Standing Joint Task Force for Afghanistan and send it over to Colin Powell. He asked me for it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042302-12

.....
Please respond by 04/25/02

U16630 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12080

23APR02

April 23, 2002 11:58 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: LTG Brown

Let's take a look at Gen. Brown and get his background sheet up and see what we think about him for something.

He doesn't seem to pop up on any of the hot two- and three-star lists. Maybe he should.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042302-11

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

- SPECIAL OPS BACKGROUND
EXCLUSIVELY

- NOM'D FOR DCINC
CINCSOCOM

Done

*ibllw
deClint
DIA*

- STASER about
DIA

231.2

23APR02

U16631 02

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CODEWORD~~

January 7, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: File from General Ralston

Here is the file on the meetings with General Ralston on his way ahead. It is highly classified. I think you ought to figure out what you want to do with it—maybe keep one set and shred the rest.

EUCOM

Thanks.

Attach.
EUCOM Briefing Slides

DIR:dh
010702-1

.....
Please respond by _____

VADM G.

*1/8
0745 DR*

*ATTACHED WERE 3 COPIES OF
THE SLIDES YOU HAD ME FILE
ON 1/6/02. RECOMMEND SHRED
THESE COPIES (NO NOTES ON THEM)
(I HAVE THE COPIES) *JLR**

7 Jan 02

~~CODEWORD~~

U16631 /03

~~TOP SECRET~~
11-L-0559/OSD/12082

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

April 23, 2002 9:15 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Read Aheads

In the future, when I get read aheads for meetings with foreigners, I would like a piece of paper that shows precisely what they are doing with respect to Operation Enduring Freedom.

I have just been looking at the paper for the meeting with Scharping. It is really quite vague. I don't know what CTF-150 is, and it doesn't mention what they are doing with respect to training police. It is not well done. It has to be a lot better than this. We owe it to those people for me to at least be knowledgeable about what they are doing and say thank you to them for it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042302-9

.....
Please respond by 05/03/02

020 SD

23 APR 02

U16633 02

APR. 29. 2002 3:05PM 90004

April 23, 2002 8:21 AM

Done 5/1

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*
SUBJECT: Helicopters Overhead

Helicopters are flying around my house over and over and over again, obviously connected to the Vice President.

Could you please find out what they are doing, what they think they are doing, what they would do if there were a problem, and what their rules of engagement and role might be.

I find it very strange.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042302-8

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

452 H

COL B.

16634 02

23 APR 02
4/29

VADM G. ASKED IF YOU COULD CHECK THE ABOVE SNOWFLAKE OUT - ^{HE} SAID YOU SHOULD CALL MARK ROSENBERG (SP?) AT WHMO - BYPASS CAPT SHITN - TELL HIM VADM G TOLD YOU TO CALL - IF THERE'S ANYWAY TO GET AN ANSWER TODAY THE SMA WOULD APPRECIATE IT.

ALSO - NEED TO ANSWER AGAIN, HOW MANY PEOPLE DOES IT TAKE TO OPERATE CREWADER?

That's it, 1.

11-L-0559/OSD/12084

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

VADMG,

Sir,

On preliminary investigation, it is simply the VPOTUS' transportation. Each time a Helo lands at the Naval Obi. to pick up or drop off the VPOTUS, a spare orbits the area (right over the Boss' House). IT IS NOT AN ESCORT, only a spare.

There are no ROE for this situation.

COL B

4/29

April 24, 2002 1:13 PM

5/3

Dave

334NSC

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: DoD/NSC

You simply must get back to me with the relationship between the DoD and the NSC, or else I am going to have to do it myself.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042402-12

.....
Please respond by 05/03/02

24APR02

U16635 02

4/24
1:40

Snowflake

April 24, 2002 8:00 AM

Done
5/2

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Phone Calls

When we have a phone call and other people are going to be on it, I should be told that other people are on it. I thought I was talking to Tom Franks alone this morning.

In the future, I need to find a way to be told who is on phone calls. When a CINC calls me separately, I don't think you ought to get other people on unless you ask me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042402-1

.....
Please respond by 05/03/02

These are complete
Larry Di Rita
5/2

U16636 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12087

April 25, 2002 9:19 AM

352

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Joint Advanced Military School

I like this idea on the school that Andy Marshall sent in. Should we do it through the Defense Planning Guidance, or should we do a direct tasking?

If we do it right, and we use some key alliance partners like Poland, for example, it could be a terrific thing.

Why don't you fashion whatever you think ought to be done, and let's get it moving.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/11/02 Net Assessment info memo to SecDef re: Creation of a Joint Advanced Military School

DHR:dh
042502-6



Please respond by 05/24/02

25APK02

U16637 02



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

April 11, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DIRECTOR OF
 NET ASSESSMENT

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4002

FROM: Andrew W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: Creation of a Joint Advanced Military School

BACKGROUND

Three Services have very successful advanced military schools which are attended by a selected set of officers who are offered a second year after their junior level war college. The focus is on the operational level of warfare. These schools are very successful and provided the best of our operational planners. There is no joint school of this sort and our operational planning in our Joint Command staffs may not be as good as it could be.

SUGGESTION

Create a Joint Advanced Military School modeled on these very successful service schools. NDU is a plausible location for such a school. Attached are two short pieces from officers now teaching at the Army and Air Force Advanced Military Schools. They offer detailed advice on what it would take to organize such an effort and make it equally successful.

The Chairman should own this school. You may want to discuss this idea with General Myers.

| | |
|-----------------------|----------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | <i>4/19</i> |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | <i>4/22</i> |
| MA BUCCI | <i>5/29/02</i> |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | <i>2/21/02</i> |

DRAFT

Educating Joint Operational Level Planners

For the military forces of the United States, warfare in the modern era will be joint. There is no escaping this indisputable fact. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 clearly indicated to the Armed Forces that this is how to conduct business, and the Armed Forces responded by taking steps to ensure that all future operations would be joint in nature. At the operational level, there is no doubt that campaigns and major operations are planned and executed in a joint context, and that this trend will become even more pronounced in the future. Unfortunately, however, the education of joint operational level planners has not kept pace with the other initiatives the Armed Forces has undertaken to become truly joint.

At the intermediate level (officers in the grade of Major/Lieutenant Commander or Lieutenant Colonel/Commander), there is currently no joint course to educate officers in the operational art of war and to adequately prepare them for future assignments as joint planners on operational level staffs. Given the nature of modern warfare, and the complexity of joint operations, this is a shortcoming that needs to be addressed. Joint Force Commanders should and must have on their staffs the finest operational artists the joint professional military education system can produce.

Currently, there are three intermediate level, professional military education schools which are primarily oriented on the operational level of war, but all three are run by individual services, and, as such, have distinctive service slants. These three are the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the Air Force's School of

Advanced Airpower studies (SAAS), and the Marine's School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). All have been in existence for over a decade, and all have produced, arguably, the finest operational artists within their respective services. **In large part this is because all three educate officers in "how to think, rather than training them in "what to think" or "what to do."** While there is a joint intermediate level education course, the Joint and Combined Officers Staff Course, taught at the Joint Forces Staff College, it is not designed to produce joint operational artists. Instead, JFSC focuses on current Joint Planning processes. In other words, it teaches "what to do" vice "how to think."

Now that this shortcoming in the professional education of joint staff officers has been identified, the next step is to outline what needs to be considered in potentially developing a Joint educational course focused at the operational level. First and foremost, it should be consistent with the recommendations of the Skelton Panel Report, and fulfill the requirements of phase two of joint professional military education identified in the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD).

To grow and develop the future joint planners of the Armed Forces, the course should be intellectually stimulating and challenging, with extensive reading, academic debate and a written research requirement (modeled after the programs at SAMS, SAAS, and SAWS), incorporated into the program. **The program must be based in thorough understanding of the relevant theory, history, current doctrine and current affairs that will allow the student to gain an appreciation of not only how current Joint and Service concepts of operations have evolved to date, but more importantly to**

prepare them intellectually to adapt ways and means to effectively address the uncertainties of the future that they will most likely encounter.

The course should also be designed so it becomes an accredited, graduate degree granting institution. Implied in that would be a course length of between nine to twelve months. Acceptance into the course should be highly selective, as it is in the service courses, to ensure the “best and the brightest” officers fill key joint planning billets. Additionally, all students should be MEL 4 graduates of a Command and Staff College or ^{← MILITARY EDUCATION LEVEL} Naval Junior War College.

In keeping with the spirit of the Skelton Panel Report, the student and faculty mix should be equal among the services, whenever possible. The classes should be divided into seminar groups of no more than 13 students, where students should analyze and synthesize what they have read the night before and debate their ideas in a “Socratic type” discussion forum, and these seminar discussions should form the core of the instruction given at the course throughout the academic year. Additionally, there should be a robust and challenging program of “hands-on” planning exercises that allow the student to effectively synthesize and apply the knowledge of theory, doctrine and history gained in seminar discussions.

Seminar leaders should be senior military officers in the grade of Colonel/Captain or promoteable Lieutenant Colonel/Commander, who are National Defense University Graduates (with focused electives to prepare them as seminar leaders). An alternative would be to conduct a focused Fellowship for the seminar leaders, similar to the one conducted by SAMS, which is effectively a year of graduate-level preparation to be seminar leader. Additionally, the course should have permanent civilian faculty who are

charged with designing and developing the various classes, and when possible, should participate in class discussions. As a minimum, the permanent civilian faculty should be comprised of military theorists, historians, political scientists, and they should all have PhD's.

Advantage should be taken of existing joint professional military education programs, and existing joint schools. Consequently, thought should be given to establishing this new course at the National Defense University (NDU), at Fort McNair. There you will find a cadre of existing civilian faculty, an annual pool of senior service college graduates who could conceivably be used as seminar leaders, and a constant stream of talented guest speakers that the intermediate level officers could be exposed to. This also has the added advantage of not being located on a service specific post. Much as we all try to be non-parochial, that simply is not possible.

In this regard, placing the Joint Operational Planners Course under control of the National Defense University will serve several purposes. First, NDU is focused on education, while Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Joint Staff are focused on operations and training. What is needed are students educated for a career, vice prepared for current operations (which will invariably occur if the school is under JFCOM or the Joint Staff). Additionally, NDU is a joint education center and is dedicated to avoiding service-bias. In that regard, the school would remain truly joint. Finally, the course should not be co-located with the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) at Norfolk. That College is focused on preparation for the current assignment vice the long-term view absolutely necessary for education.

4

Finally, in keeping with the provisions of Title IV of the Goldwaters-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, a minimum of fifty percent of the graduates should be assigned to joint planning assignments upon graduation. Additionally, their future assignments should be monitored to ensure, whenever possible, they will serve on key joint staff positions.

Designing, developing, staffing, and resourcing this course will take time, and will not always be easy, but the return will definitely be worth the investment. The Army, the Air Force and the Marines have already shown they can produce operational artists for their own service, why can't the Armed Forces do the same thing for their Joint Force Commanders?

5

Proposal for a Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS)

Purpose: This paper advocates the formation of a Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) that parallels and complements the current, service-centric Advanced Studies Group (ASG) schools.

Background: The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps have post-intermediate service school programs (rank of major) designed to provide superior strategy education to a small, select group of officers. Each was a result of a push by Senator Sam Nunn and Congressman Ike Skelton to address a perceived shortfall in strategic education for the military. Collectively, they are called the Advanced Studies Group (ASG), and include the Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW).

The Problem: Although ASG schools produce officers with highly developed analytical, logical, and communication skills, each focuses narrowly on their service and is subject to service parochialisms, dogmas, and political constraints. In a time of rapid change where joint military action is increasingly important, there exists no school where top-shelf mid-grade officers can be educated in an environment where they are free to focus on strategy from a joint force planning and employment perspective.

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School: The basic idea of JAWS is to create a complementary ASG school that fills this important niche. JAWS would not only fill this niche, but it would be an integrating force within the ASG construct to force more innovative joint thinking at the other ASG schools through cooperative wargaming. The following bullets outline a notional JAWS concept of education.

- **Leadership and Structure:** The school's dean would be a terminally credentialed (Ph.D.) individual reporting directly to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and could be associated with the National Defense University for funding.
- **Students:** The student body would be comprised of no more than 40 officers, with equal numbers of intermediate service school graduates from each service. Each would have volunteered to attend the school. They would be selected based on their performance on an entry examination and a screening by a board of general officers on the Joint Staff. The students would receive Senior Service School in-residence credit for graduation from this school.
- **Education:** The school could be located in the Norfolk, Virginia or Washington, DC area. The faculty would be a mix of permanent civilians and military, all with Ph.D.s, and augmented by a distinguished visiting faculty. The curriculum would focus on strategy and policy, using a theory, evidence, application methodology, and would require a publishable thesis and oral examinations for graduation. Small (ten or less) seminars would facilitate discussion.
- **Assignments:** Because the school will be populated by volunteers, a superior faculty and curriculum will not be enough to attract a world-class student body. Only superior assignments and tracking of graduates will do that. The Chairman must institute a process for granting students assignments within their own services that provides optimal career opportunity, with the goal of turning at least one quarter of the student body into general officers.
- **Goal:** The goal of JAWS would be the production of truly joint officers who possess in-depth knowledge of the history, functions, structures, and cultures of each service; understand how those factors affect service perspectives and behaviors; appreciate how those differences contribute to national security; and can conceptualize how to combine service strengths and weaknesses into strategically advantageous joint operational concepts and policies.

Conclusion: This notional concept for JAWS would complement already successful ASG schools and fill an important, missing niche in elite officer strategic education.

April 25, 2002 9:08 AM

Done 4:30
PACOM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: PACOM

Did I sign a paper for the Deputy CINC in PACOM, and if so, why did we let that happen without having it go through Fargo? He is against it.

Please see me on it.

Thanks.

DIR:db
042502-4

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

.....
Please respo

4/29
VADM G

.....

Wanted you to see on its way in. We had a disconnect on DCINC PAC. Did not know it was moving until it was done

4/29
f -
aid Staffwork.
o should have been chance to weigh in. d Staser to re-engage.
Di Rita

Di Rita

4:30

ASAPR02

U16638 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12096

April 25, 2002 9:08 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: PACOM

Did I sign a paper for the Deputy CINC in PACOM, and if so, why did we let that happen without having it go through Fargo? He is against it.

Please see me on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042502-4



Please respond by 04/30/02

4/29

Sec Def -

Bad Staffwork.

ADM Fargo should have been given the chance to weigh in. Have asked Staser to re-engage.
Di Rita

January 4, 2002 6:42 PM

A-471.61

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Paper on Pros and Cons



You owe me a piece of paper explaining the pros and cons of going for populations with nuclear weapons as opposed to other targets.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-49

.....
Please respond by _____

SECDEF HAS S...

4/23

*Correct Reason attached!
4/24*

4/23

4/23

4/23

4 Jan 02

11:16 AM 10/16

TO: (b)(6)
Executive Secretariat
Larry Di Rita

⇒ C+D,

SEE SECDEF
GUIDANCE...
PLZ HELP ME
MAKE THIS HAPPEN.
THX
LWR

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ↙
DATE: October 12, 2002
SUBJECT: SecDef Memorandums

I want to start sending Andy Card copies of my memos that I send to the President, the Vice President, Condi or Colin.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
101202.08

312

Please respond by: _____

12 OCT 02

U16675 02

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 7 5 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone *sc* SEP 16 2002

SUBJECT: Conventional Forces/Special Forces

- You requested proposals on what we need to do to enable conventional forces to take on missions that Special Operations Forces (SOF) are now performing (TAB A).
- SOF missions/tasks that could be done by conventional forces to reduce operational demands on SOF include:
 - Training of foreign forces in de-mining, counterdrug, peacekeeping, and other conventional operations.
 - Serving as a "quick reaction force" (QRF) and conducting airlift missions for resupply and VIP transport in Afghanistan.
 - Conducting or supporting combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions.
 - Providing logistics support to SOF or conventional forward-deployed forces.
 - Supporting combatant command theater-level communications.
- Actions that could be taken to help mitigate stress on SOF include:
 - Authorizing SOCOM the "first right of refusal," which would enable the command to pick and choose training opportunities.
 - Prepare and task conventional forces to take over QRF missions in Afghanistan, as well as perform CSAR operations and provide communications and logistical support.
 - Direct the Services and component commands to fulfill their obligations under joint doctrine for common-service logistics.
 - Direct the Air Force and Navy to adequately resource their CSAR responsibilities.
 - Equip, train, and maintain skills for selected Army CH-47 and Air Force C-130 units to enable them to perform airlift missions in difficult environmental conditions.

322

16 Sep 02

→ ● We will work on these issues with SOCOM as it prepares its FY 2004-2009 program.

COORDINATIONS: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Eric Coulter, (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/12100

U16690 /02



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

FOUO
INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 11 2002

October 11, 2002 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
SUBJECT: Rep. Davis request for the Defense Science Board study on CVN-X
Response to Snowflake 091902-9

Handwritten signature: Powell Moore

334 DSB

- By memorandum dated 19 September 02 (Tab A), you requested the status of the Defense Science Board study on CVN-X and the plan for its distribution.
- The Defense Science Board CVN-X study was sent to the print shop on 11 October 2002 with an expected completion date of 16 October 2002.
- Upon completion, the report will be sent to Mr. Aldridge for release.
- Once the report is signed, my staff will ensure its distribution to the SASC and HASC as well as all key members including Rep. Davis. We have been in direct contact with Rep. Davis' staff, Mr. Chris Caron, on this subject and have ensured its delivery as soon as available.

Handwritten circled 'A'

Prepared by CDR Chris Aquilino, OSD/LA, (b)(6)

11 OCT 02

EF 2978
02/014540
10/15

October 1, 2002 11:59 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Germany's MoD

Please give me a paper that tells me what the new Federal Republic of Germany's Minister of Defense told Nick Burns.

Thanks.

DHR dh
100102-42

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

Germany

10/15
RESPONSE
ATTACHED

1 Oct 02

Larry Di Rita
10/15

Snowflake

August 1, 2002 9:01 AM

TO: ADM Fargo
Gen. LaPorte

CC: Gen. Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: China Strategy and the PLA

China

Here is an article I read some time back. I found it compelling and thought you would appreciate seeing it.

I would be interested in any reactions you may have.

Thanks.

Attach.

John W. Garver, "The [former] Coming War with America," Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology (undated)

DHR:dh
080102-9

.....
Please respond by _____

SECRET HAS SEEN *epmse*
 OCT 12 2002
10/11

1 Aug 02

March 11, 2002 12:42 PM

SUBJECT: PRC

Tickle for June 2002. I may want to send this to the replacements for Admiral Blair and General Schwartz.

Attach.

John W. Garver, "The [former] Coming War with America," Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology

DHR:Jh
031102-30

.....
Please respond by _____

7/31

T. 6/02

(b)(6)

Please do a snowflake to Admiral Fargo
and General LaPorte, or C.JCS
Dy, Sec
Voom-G
Felt

Gentlemen: I saw an article I read some time back
I found it compelling and thought you would
appreciate seeing it
I would be interested in any reactions you may have.

The [former] Coming War with America

John W. Garver

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs
Georgia Institute of Technology

In February 2001 the Newspaper and Periodical Department of China's State Press and Publishing Administration issued a Notice on Clarifying and Rectifying News Reporting on Military Affairs. The Notice stipulated that "All special periodicals and pages on military affairs published by local institutions should be reviewed by the General Political Affairs Department of the PLA and approved by the State Press and Publishing Administration." The notice said that in order to boost sales, some publications had made up or distorted military news, used sensationalized headlines and terminology to attract readers, and had even led to "serious disclosure of China's military secrets." Henceforth serious investigation and punishment would be applied to news publications that violated guidelines by fabricating stories on military affairs or by disclosing military secrets.¹

During the spring and summer of 2000 I had occasion to purchase at book stalls on the streets of several interior Chinese cities --- Yinchuan, Lanzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu --- examples of the publications which were later banned. During the same period I visited a number of eastern and coastal Chinese cities, but found none of these sensationalist journals there. These journals provide a window into a militaristic strain of China's new nationalism.

As the State Press and Publishing Administration Notice indicated, these magazines used sensationalistic headlines, text, and photographs to attract leaders. All of the magazines I ran across had high quality, glossy photographs on the outside covers showing Chinese soldiers rushing across beaches, some grasping knives in their mouths and faces covered with camouflage grease, or PLA ships, planes, tanks, and artillery blazing away. Amphibious assault vessels and troops were a favored theme. Similar photographs were liberally dispersed on inside pages.

The theme of these magazines was China's preparations for an upcoming war to recover Taiwan. All of the magazines were issued in months before or just after the March 2000 Taiwan election which Chen Sui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party won. The magazines were clearly part of a psychological warfare campaign intended to influence the voters of Taiwan not to vote for Chen and the DDP. The message was: a vote for Chen is a vote for war. They were also intended to deter Taiwan's rulers, whoever they might be, from reckless actions. A number of articles specified the taboo actions which would force China to resort to war: writing "Lee Teng-hui's 'two states theory'" into Taiwan's constitution, changing the formal name of the Taiwan state, changing the flag, formally declaring independence. Continued refusal to accept Beijing's "one country, two systems" concept, and/or "the one China principle" was also frequently identified as grounds for China's resort to military force against Taiwan.

Talk of war between China and Taiwan is not new or remarkable. What *is* new, and what is significant about these magazines and makes them worthy of consideration, is their open contemplation of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. In each magazine several articles wrote in graphic detail about a China-U.S. war. Writers

in all journals were agreed that the United States would enter a cross-Strait war over Taiwan --- although writers differed as to the scope of probable U.S. intervention. Most significantly, they agreed that China could defeat the United States in such a war. China, they agreed, could win a war with the United States over Taiwan. They described in considerable detail how this would be accomplished.

All of the dozen or so articles describing a U.S.-China war envisioned that conflict arising out of a cross-Strait China-Taiwan war that began with a PLA response to "Taiwan independence provocations." Scenarios for a PLA attack on Taiwan differed from article to article. Several articles envisioned, or argued in favor of, a swift, overwhelming, decisive PLA attack on Taiwan which could create a fate accomplished by bringing that island under PLA control before United States forces could deploy and respond in force. An article in one magazine published in Lanzhou, argued that at the start of a war over Taiwan, U.S. military strength in the region "would not be great" (bu hui tai duo) and "incapable of all out war with China" (bu zu yi dui zhongguo quanmian kaizhan).² The United States and its Japanese ally would therefore probably adopt very limited involvement --- e.g. declaring a protective zone around Taiwan for commercial ships and aircraft of neutral countries. In this event "China can make appropriate concessions to win time and conclude the Taiwan war." If the U.S. military again pressed in on China, China would respond with "counter-deterrence." China could consider "allowing its forces to clash with those of the United States" (bu xi yu meijun fasheng mocha), while using diplomatic channels to "convey regret." This would demonstrate China's resolve "while doing everything possible to control the situation."

During the initial period of the Sino-U.S. war, U.S. forces would not have completed their regional deployments and would therefore not take the initiative. During this period "the crux of [Chinese] counter-deterrence would be to convey to the United States and Japan that they cannot undertake 'limited intervention,' and that any intervention would necessarily mean all out war with China" (mei ri bu neng 'you xian jie ru,' yi dan jieru, jiu bixu yu zhongguo quan mian jiaozhan). The PLA could also put to sea large numbers of submarines to "struggle" with U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. The concentration of PLA strength in the East China Sea, i.e., between Taiwan and U.S. bases in Japan, would pose considerable threat to Chinese forces. But if the PLA followed the tactics of "drawing the enemy to our doorstep" and used shore-based anti-ship missiles, the battle "could continue for some period of time" (jinchi xiangdang yi duan shijiande). By these means U.S. forces might be dissuaded from intervening. If the United States nonetheless decided to intervene in a major fashion, "China can only be prepared to quickly escalate the war to a major nuclear war" (zhongguo zhi you junbei jiang zhanzheng xunshu shengji bu xi da hedazhan). Chinese willingness to wage a nuclear war with the United States over Taiwan "may compel the U.S. military not to dare to throw in major military forces, allowing China to win time and conclude the Taiwan war."

Another article in the same magazine also stressed the role of China's nuclear arsenal in deterring U.S. intervention in a Taiwan war.³ When it came to a major nuclear war, the article said, 200 warheads were no different from 5,000 warheads. The U.S. could be expected to intervene in a cross Strait war, but would limit its intervention to a "high technology local war to avoid setting off a nuclear war." Thus a U.S.-PRC war

over Taiwan would be confined to a limited area. China could then prevail by waging a long war of attrition. United States would not undertake a "direct contest with the mainland," but could be expected to give Taiwan military assistance. This would leave China "no choice but to declare that the whole nation is in a state of war" and send its submarines to attack U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. At the cost of twenty Chinese submarines for each U.S. carrier sunk, the PLA should be able to sink over three U.S. carriers. This would force the remaining three to four U.S. carriers to withdraw from the battle zone and return to their bases in Japan. These engagements would cost the PLA half of its warships and over 1,000 aircraft. But the result would deny U.S. forces air and sea superiority around Taiwan. The United States would also be "continually surprised by discovery of new PLA weapons" and by "an unbelievably rapid system for reinforcing" PLA forces.

At some point the United States might decide to bomb strategic sites deep in China. The U.S. would discover, however, that Chinese defenses were not weak. The U.S. would lose one out of every three "stealth aircraft" it sent to attack China. China's great size would give it a major strategic advantage. U.S. forces would find attack on targets deep inside China to be very difficult and costly. The war might continue for one year. Bridges, railways, highways, power stations, and military production facilities in China's coastal areas might be bombed and those regions generally "cease production." Yet the U.S. would find that China's state organs continued to function, electricity was still being delivered to China's coastal cities, and that China's war effort was still powerful. Munitions factories in China's "third front" --- which one article listed in some detail --- would continue to produce submarines, warplanes, and missiles. Finally

internal crisis within the United States would compel Washington to abandon the war. U.S. casualties would be far higher than anticipated. An economic crisis would ensue from the war. Finally the U.S. Congress would impeach the President responsible for the war and the new President would declare U.S. withdrawal from the Taiwan war. Japan would soon thereafter reach its own peace agreement with China. With U.S. forces out of the way, the PLA would mobilize a massive invasion force. This would force Taiwan's capitulation. The war would set back China's economy by 8 years, the author predicts. But within five years of the war, China's economy would have recovered and relations with the United States and Japan would be "normalized."

The lead article in another magazine argued that China enjoyed the major strategic advantage of being able to determine when a Taiwan war would be fought.⁴ The Taiwan independence elements in Taiwan were propped up by the United States and "will not be so stupid as to suddenly declare independence or take some other reckless independence moves." This meant that "When to fight a war over Taiwan will be determined by us, not by the United States or Taiwan" (shemo shihou kai da taiwan shi women shoule suan, er jue bu shi meiguo he taiwan). This would give China perhaps two to four more years to prepare for war. During this period China would enter the World Trade Organization. This meant that "the Western economies will become even more dependent" on the China market, and that "economic sanctions against the Chinese mainland will bring [the Western economies] even greater damage." During the several years before launching a war to recover Taiwan, the PLA could also carry out constant maneuvers against Taiwan. This would accustom the enemy to seeing large-scale military activity on the mainland adjacent Taiwan, and cause Taiwan and the U.S. to

eventually lower their level of alertness. These maneuvers could also be used as camouflage for secret concentration of forces for a swift attack on Taiwan. "Once exercises are finished, for every five tanks participating, leave two behind. For every five cannon, leave two behind, and hide them in previously prepared fortifications while using artificial tanks and cannot to make up the deficits and ostentatiously withdraw them. U.S. satellites will see how many we deploy and how many are withdrawn." PLA soldiers could be covertly deployed to frontline positions by using leave issued for National Day or New Years, then having them put on civilian clothes and "disappear among the masses" until the designated time. Shortly before the attack, aircraft from across China could be deployed to front line airfields within one or two hours. The result would be complete surprise. This would deny the U.S. adequate time to prepare for intervention.

At the appointed hour, coordinated assaults on Taiwan's beaches, harbors, and airports would establish beachheads through which large and heavily armed PLA forces would pour. The objective would be to bring all of Taiwan under full and effective PLA occupation within two weeks or at most a month. Once on Taiwan, PLA forces would root out all resistance and dig in deeply in preparation to resist possible U.S. invasion. Additional Chinese armies would be deployed to Taiwan as quickly as possible. This would confront the United States of the necessity of invading and wresting Taiwan from large, well-prepared, and determined PLA armies. This swift and resolute Chinese action in the opening stages of the war would create a fate accompli that could only be undone by major U.S. ground forces and, thus, casualties.

China would use diplomatic, legal, and economic measures to prevent U.S. intervention, but it could not hope that the U.S. would not intervene. Yet the experience of the Korean War demonstrated that the U.S. "will not, or will not dare, to formally declare war on China or launch a complete war against China." If the United States could not even defeat little Vietnam, how could it dare to take on China?, the author asked. "We can confidently say that a [U.S.-PRC] war over Taiwan will occur only in the Taiwan Strait, just as the Korean War was confined to the Korean peninsula."

Confronted by the prospect of major ground operations and thus U.S. casualties, the U.S. Congress would need some time, "at least several weeks or a month," to debate the question of war or peace with China. The longer the U.S. debate continued, the stronger the PLA position on Taiwan would become. U.S. businesses would oppose war with China because it would injure their commercial interests. Fear of U.S. casualties would be great; "The U.S. did not dare to fight a ground war in Yugoslavia [in 1999], how would it dare to fight a ground war with the PLA?" U.S. territory would not have been attacked; "Taiwan is not Pearl Harbor." The question before the U.S. Congress would be: "Should we send troops to attack a Taiwan occupied by China?" Eventually the Congress would decide that U.S. youth should not be sacrificed for the sake of Chinese matters. The U.S. "would abandon the idea of attacking Taiwan." That would leave only blockade of Taiwan. Blockade of Taiwan would, however, expose U.S. ships and aircraft to continual air and missile attack from PLA forces on Taiwan and the mainland. Moreover, it would create hardships for the people of Taiwan and thus condemn the United States before world opinion. In the end, "the United States would do nothing and tacitly accept the fact that China now has Taiwan."

Another article in the same magazine involved interviews with two individuals who were apparently the head or deputy head and a researcher at a PLA research center.⁵ These individuals also deemed U.S. intervention in a cross Strait war virtually certain, and felt that the crux of Chinese victory in such an eventuality was "understanding the confrontation between the United States and China." "U.S. intervention would probably be limited" (meiguo de jieru yingai shi you xiande), because the U.S. was unwilling to lose the China market and U.S. allies would be unwilling to go along with the United States. U.S. leaders would also fear that a war with China would require the blood of American youth. While a large-scale regional war or even a nuclear war were possible, they were not likely. A big war would not be advantageous to either side. Thus, indirect and limited U.S. intervention was most likely --- arms transfers, intelligence support, logistic support, and threatening maneuvers or even attacks on Chinese facilities by U.S. aircraft carriers. Ultimately, however, U.S. leaders would decide that U.S. interests in Taiwan were not important enough to entail major sacrifices to protect. The major reason the U.S. was engaged with Taiwan was not democracy, as the U.S. said. "Democracy" was simply a tactic used by the U.S. leaders to fool the people. U.S. interests in Taiwan were not very important, and had to do with partisan or even individual political advantage on the U.S. domestic political scene. Ultimately these sober facts would dominate U.S. policy, and the U.S. would acquiesce to Chinese take over of Taiwan.

The lead article of a third magazine also laid out a scenario of swift and massive PLA assault on Taiwan.⁶ PLA missiles, warplanes, and electronic warfare measures first paralyze Taiwan's defenses. Then PLA assault forces seize beachheads and harbors.

Mobilized commercial vessels then ferry large second echelon forces to Taiwan. Within a short period the island will be under PLA control. A series of subsequent articles discuss preparations for attack and seizure of Taiwan's Gaoxiong harbor, PLA amphibious capabilities and maneuvers, preparations for rapid nation-wide concentration of airplanes to areas adjacent to Taiwan. One article described how PLA M-9 and M-11 missiles could completely overwhelm Taiwan's within 3-4 hours. Another article detailed Chinese preparations transportation and communications links, railways, core airports, harbors and wharves, and other "critical installations" against air attack. All articles shared complete confidence in the PLA's ability to swiftly subdue Taiwan; one article estimated that Taiwan could hold out for five days.

Articles in this third magazine agreed that the United States would intervene in such a cross Strait war, but also maintained that such intervention would be very limited and ultimately ineffective. Public opinion polls in the United States indicated that a substantial majority was opposed to war with China for the sake of Taiwan.⁷ Anti-war sentiments were strong among American youth. Those youth were not willing to fight a war, and this was in accord with the "democratic spirit." The American "masses are generally unwilling to fight a war" (laobaixing pubian bu yuan da jiang de xintai). In the U.S., "Even one casualty produces a national outcry." U.S. interests in Taiwan were essentially "moral" and the U.S. people would be skeptical of sacrificing American youth for such interests. Ultimately the United States would conclude that "American lives are probably too valuable" (meiguoren de ming dagai tai zhi qian). Thus, "The probability of the U.S. sending forces to assist in the defense [of Taiwan] is not great."

Another article in the same magazine agreed. The United States would certainly act in the event of a cross-Strait war, but "U.S. actions will be based on U.S. national interests."⁸ This meant that U.S. intervention would be very limited. A U.S. war with China would mean that "U.S. economic, cultural, and military cooperation interests with China would suffer greatly in such areas as talks regarding the Korean peninsula, cooperation regarding nuclear disarmament, missile exports, arms control, and actions in the United Nations Security Council." To protect its interests in these areas "The United States will not brave the danger of a war with the China mainland for the sake of Lee Teng-hui's 'Taiwan independence,' even less will it deploy land, naval, and air forces to undertake a direct contest with the PLA." There was "no danger of an all-out China-U.S. war" because such a war would not accord with U.S. national interest. "China is a huge market and U.S. commercial circles are not willing to lose.

This article also pointed toward a Chinese strategy of threatened drastic escalation as a way of countering limited U.S. intervention. Limited U.S. intervention in the form of weapons transfers to Taiwan, intelligence cooperation, and aircraft carrier deployments was the most likely form of U.S. assistance to Taiwan. "Actually, if the U.S. adopts such hidden measures to support Taiwan in the midst of a PLA attack on Taiwan, this is equivalent to declaring war on China" (Ruguo meiguo zai zhongguo renmin jiefangjun dui tai kai zhan zhi huo xisu zaichu zhexie yinxing fangshi dui tai shishi zhiyuan de hua, nei jiu dengyu xiang zhongguo xuan zhan). This, in turn would "carry the danger of a major nuclear war which the American people are also unwilling to see" " (ruguo zhong mei zhijian jiaozhan de hua, nei jiang you hedazhan de weixian, zhe shi baokuo meiguo

renmin zai nei duo by yuanyi kan dao de). The next article discussed China's ability to produce tactical nuclear weapons.

Yet another magazine published in Beijing about the same time and dealing with the same issues, took a markedly less militaristic tone. This Beijing-published magazine spoke in far more general and less blood-curdling terms about a Chinese confrontation with the United States over Taiwan. This journal also contained no mention of possible threatened use of nuclear weapons by China. Interestingly, it also targeted Japan, rather than the United States, as the chief villain in the Taiwan situation.⁹ Yet articles in this Beijing-published magazine agreed in broad contours regarding the PLA's ability to thwart or defeat the U.S. in a cross-Strait conflict. Taiwan's military strategy was based on defeat of the first wave of a PLA assault and then holding out until U.S. help arrived, one article said.¹⁰ This was an illusion: "To want Americans to shed blood for Chinese affairs is absolutely and completely a dream." The U.S. "is not very likely to directly intervene" (bu tai keneng zhijie jieru). At most the U.S. would supply weapons to Taiwan. U.S. anti-war sentiment was strong. The U.S. withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines also left the U.S. without the capability to intervene effectively in a Taiwan Strait war and deprived the United States of the ability to "win a victory on China's doorstep." Like the non-Beijing magazines this one used lots of military-related photographs to spice up the issue.

Implications

The most obvious implication of this genre of literature is that fire-breathing, jingoistic, militaristic publications have a significant popular appeal in China. The fact

that these magazines proliferated across China's interior suggests that publishers recognize a market opportunity when they see it. The simplicity and stridency of this literature also suggests a powerful emotional appeal and potential popular support available to Chinese elites that successfully associate themselves with such appeals. It is also significant that publications containing contrary points of view --- e.g., arguing that China might lose a war with the United States over Taiwan with potentially huge political and economic costs --- are not allowed. At least, this author did not encounter publications containing such perspectives in his several months of searching book stores. The abundance of literature fanning jingoistic perspectives could combine with the dearth of counter-information to create a potentially quite dangerous situation.

More ominously, the thinking exemplified in these journals probably represents, to some extent at least, thinking within PLA circles. Articles usually reflected a high degree of familiarity with PLA weaponry, exercises, and planning, and were probably derived from reporter's discussions with PLA academics. It is also worth recalling that disclosure of military secrets was one reason given by the State Press and Publishing Administration for tightening control over such publications. The implication that these magazines probably reflect, to some degree, PLA thinking is deeply troubling.

The issue of whether the PLA is willing to undertake a war with the United States often comes up at conferences and security workshops in the United States. The most common view expressed at these meetings is that PLA leaders are sober, rational men who understand very well the immense gap in military capabilities between China and the United States. They therefore understand that China would lose a war with the United States and suffer heavy losses in the process. Thus, while PLA leaders may

occasionally rattle the saber and talk about war with the United States, they in fact are clear-eyed, rational men who will be deterred by superior U.S. power. Talk of war with Taiwan and the United States is a type of political theater intended primarily to warn and pressure Taiwan, but not as an expression of actual intent --- or so the orthodox thinking in the United States runs.

The consensus of the arguments contained in these magazines challenges this comforting, orthodox U.S. thinking. Many and in fact quite sound reasons are marshaled to demonstrate that China can win a war with the United States over Taiwan. The arguments made are not irrational, but solid, manifold, and all point in the same direction: China can win at acceptable costs a war with the United States over Taiwan. This suggests that the world of rational calculation inhabited by at least some PLA officers and analysts is fundamentally different from the rational world populated by U.S. security analysts. It is quite possible that the militaristic views expressed in these journals are a minority even within the PLA. It is equally possible, however, that those views may be widespread.

Key Chinese strategies in the event of a war with the United States over Taiwan are also apparent from these articles. One strategy is to respond to the limited U.S. intervention which is deemed most likely, with major escalations --- declaration of war, nationwide mobilization for all-out war, massed submarine attacks on U.S. carrier battle-groups, massive air and naval deployments cutting sea lanes between Taiwan and Japan, etc. If the U.S. then persists in intervention, China will threaten the United States with nuclear attack. This will create a political backlash in the United States against war with China for the sake of Taiwan. Public opinion will rebel at the prospect of nuclear war

and/or the cost of heavy U.S. casualties in the Far East. U.S. commercial interests will oppose war out of fear of losing the China market. U.S. leaders will fear the many problems that hostile China could create for the United States around the world. Finally, the U.S. will acquiesce to PLA moves against Taiwan. Peace will be restored between China and the United States with Taiwan under Chinese control.

U.S. awareness of such PLA thinking may go some distance toward explaining shifts by the Bush administration in early 2001. That administration's adoption of a less "ambiguous" commitment to Taiwan, clarification of U.S. willingness to accept losses for the sake of Taiwan, and insistence on missile defense, can all be seen as responses to the influence of such militant thinking within China and, apparently, within the PLA.

NOTES

¹ Newspapers that want to run military news must get government go-ahead, 8 February 2001, *China in the World Press*, <http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/0102081/1/B201020722.asp>

² "Jiefangjun neng zai tai hai zhanzheng zhong shuzhan shu jue ma?" (Can the PLA achieve a quick war and quick decision in a Taiwan Strait war?), Tai du jiu shi zhanzheng, shi jie yue kan (Taiwan independence is war, World Observer Monthly), Special issue, 2000. Lanzhou, Gansu., p. 18-19.

³ "Lun taihai zhanzheng qijian zhongguo dalu de kangdaji nengli" (On the ability of the Chinese mainland to hit back during a Taiwan Strait war), *ibid.*, p. 41-44.

⁴ "Tai hai zhanzheng li women hai you dou yuan," (A Taiwan Strait war is still some distance from us), Tai hai zhanzheng, Da dong fang (Taiwan strait war, Great east), occasional publication. Haikou, Hainan. No date, but apparently published in early 2000. p. 4-31.

⁵ "Zhongguo bu pa meiguo jiefu tai hai zhanzheng," (China does not fear American intervention in a Taiwan Strait war), *ibid.*, p. 32-35.

⁶ "Jiefangjun junshi xingdong shengji," (PLA military activities escalate), Xin shi ji, zhongguo sanjun de yanxi (New Century Newsweek, big maneuvers by China's military), June 1999, general issue # 128. Haikou, Hainan.

⁷ "Meiguo bu hui qingyi wuli jieru liangan fenzheng," (U.S. will not lightly intervene in a cross-strait conflict", *ibid.*, p. 76-77.

⁸ "Xifang hui junshi guanyu tai hei wei ji ma? (Will the west intervene militarily in a Taiwan strait crisis?), *ibid.*, p. 78-80.

⁹ 'Liangguolun' xia de taiwan jundui, Shijie hangkong hangtian bolan, (Taiwan's military under the 'two state theory,' Extensive survey of world aviation and space travel), Beijing, "Special Issue. No date of publication but apparently in April 2000. 112 pages.

¹⁰ "Qianli xun 'lao mu' meiguo hang mu: 'tai du' de mimi wuqi?" (Desperately seeking the U.S. aircraft carrier 'old Nimitz': the secret weapon of 'Taiwan independence?'), *ibid.*, p. 82-83.

(b)(6)

October 15, 2002 9:37 AM

381

TO: Honorable George Shultz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Guidelines

FYI.

Attach.
Guidelines

DIR db
101502-4

*As we discussed -
Thanks. I.*

1500202

U16752 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12121

Guidelines When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

Is a proposed action truly necessary?

- ***A Good Reason:*** If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, whatever is proposed to be done must be in the U.S. national interest. If people could be killed, ours or others, the U.S. must have a darn good reason.
- ***Diplomacy:*** All instruments of national power should be engaged before, during and after any possible use of force. The interaction between effective diplomacy and the potential use or use of force can be a powerful influence.
- ***Basis for the Action:*** In fashioning a clear statement of the underpinning for the action, avoid arguments of convenience. They can be useful at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later. Just as the risks of taking action must be carefully considered, so too the risk of inaction needs to be weighed.

Is the proposed action achievable?

- ***Achievable:*** When the U.S. commits force, the task should be achievable—at acceptable risk. It must be something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to understand our limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the U.S. simply cannot accomplish.
- ***Clear Goals:*** To the extent possible, there should be clear, well-considered and well-understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we can know when we have achieved our goals. To those who would change what is falls the responsibility of helping provide something better. It is important to understand that responsibility and accept it.
- ***Command Structure:*** The command structure should be clear, not complex—not a collective command structure where a committee makes decisions. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, which it most often will, have a clear understanding with coalition partners that they will do what might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. Avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that it compromises our goals or jeopardizes the command structure. Generally, the mission will determine the coalition.

Is it worth it?

- ***Lives at Risk:*** If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S. and coalition partners should recognize that lives will be put at risk.
- ***Resources:*** The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. Even with a broad coalition, the U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.

Public Support: If public support is weak at the outset, U.S. leadership must be willing to invest the political capital to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period of time may be required. If there is a risk of casualties, that fact should be acknowledged at the outset, rather than allowing the public to believe an engagement can be executed antiseptically, on the cheap, with few casualties.

- **Impact Elsewhere:** Before committing to an engagement, consider the implications of the decision for the U.S. in other parts of the world—if we prevail, if we fail, or if we decide not to act. U.S. actions or inactions in one region are read around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to the U.S. deterrent and influence. Think through the precedent that a proposed action, or inaction, would establish.

If there is to be action--

- **Act Early:** If it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully, early, during the pre-crisis period, to try to alter the behavior of others and to prevent the conflict. If that fails, be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail, plus some.
- **Unrestricted Options:** In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress, the public, the UN or other countries to support an action, the National Command Authorities should not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things (i.e., not to use ground forces, not to bomb below 15,000 feet, not to risk lives, not to permit collateral damage, etc.). That may simplify the task for the enemy and make the task more difficult. Leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy can simply wait us out.

Finally--

- **Honesty:** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners. Do not make the effort sound even marginally easier or less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less, or no more, than we are sure we can deliver. It is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

Note:

Guidelines, Not Rules: While these guidelines are worth considering, they should not be considered rules to inhibit the U.S. from acting in our national interest. Rather, they are offered as a checklist to assure that when the U.S. is considering the use of force, it does so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, and the opportunities. Our future promises to offer a variety of possible engagements. The value of this checklist will depend on the wisdom with which it is applied.

Decisions on military engagement always will be based on less than perfect information, often under extreme pressure of time. These guidelines can be helpful not in providing specific answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize available information.

Donald Rumsfeld
Rev. #3

October 15, 2002 10:23 AM

TO: Honorable Howard Baker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: New MoD

JAPAN

Thanks so much for your note on the new MoD for Japan. I was pleased to receive it and thank you for the thought. I look forward to meeting with him.

Regards,

DHR:dh
101502-12

U16753 / 02

15 OCT 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12124

SAB

SECDEF HAS SEEN 9/12

Burley, Kyle, CPT, OSD

OCT 15 2002

From: Baker, Howard H [BakerHH@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, October 11, 2002 5:57 AM
To: 'cableseso@osd.pentagon.mil'
Subject: A message for Secretary Rumsfeld from Ambassador Howard H. Baker, Jr.

Dear Don,

(7)

Today I paid a courtesy call on the new Minister of State for Defense, Shigeru Ishiba. I am impressed with him. As you recall, I knew his predecessor well and thought he would do a good job for us and he did. I believe that we have an even greater opportunity with Ishiba - he's young, aggressive and smart, and he wants to have the Self Defense Forces play a greater role.

I recommend that you see him when you can in the near future. It will pay dividends for us later on.

Sincerely,
Howard

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Snowflake

TAB A

1/29 0750

January 26, 2002 12:48 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Costs to Change Footprint

Please get me a piece of paper that shows what costs for each one of the separate proposals that Tom Franks has set up to rearrange the footprint in the Middle East. We need to know what the cost is before we decide what we want to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012602-14

.....
Please respond by 02/04/02

Middle East

29 Jan 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



OCT 17 2002

His Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz
Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defense
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Your Royal Highness:

I am hearing some excellent reports from General Franks about the improved cooperation between your military and ours. I want to personally thank you and let you know how much we appreciate your assistance.

General Franks tells me that you have decided to send a military liaison officer to our Central Command in Tampa to work with us on Operation Enduring Freedom. This is a welcome development and I hope it will be implemented as soon as possible. Time is of the essence.

We are at an historic juncture in the Middle East – one of those pivotal points that will be important not only to the US-Saudi relationship, but to the future of the entire region – and it is important to us to have our two countries together as we go forward.

Sincerely,

SAUDI ARABIA

17 Oct 02

U16802 02



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

OCT 11



EF-3078 I-02/014879 USDP 10/10/11

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

OCT 13 2011

SUBJECT: SECDEF letter to Prince Sultan

- You asked us to draft a letter thanking Prince Sultan for the recent support the Saudis have agreed to give the U.S.
I will meet with Sultan on 28 October in Riyadh when I am there for the U.S. /Saudi Joint Planning Conference. I can hand-deliver your personally-signed letter at that time.
Meanwhile we will have the embassy in Riyadh deliver a message text version of the letter upon your signature.
Recommend you sign letter at tab A

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Capt. Jay Smith, USN, (b)(6)

DASD [Signature]

PDASD(ISA)

11-30-02 1093 111



11-L-0559/OSD/12128

11/6-802-02-

10/11
1400

Snowflake

02/014879
EF307B

ISAJS

October 5, 2002 2:49 PM

TO: ~~Don Feith~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*
SUBJECT: Letter to Prince Sultan

NBSA
Jm 10/9

Let's draft a letter from me to Prince Sultan thanking him for their cooperation on the things they have come around on with respect to the air base and so forth.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100502-8

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



His Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz
Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defense
Riyadh Saudi Arabia

Your Royal Highness:

I would like to thank you for your recent decisions that allowed greater access to Saudi airspace for the aircraft of Operation Southern Watch, and that permitted us to place additional people in the Prince Sultan Air Base command facility for a key exercise. Because of these decisions, Southern Watch aircrews are able to operate more effectively, and we have been able to improve the combat readiness of our command elements.

Your decisions reflect a spirit of cooperation that is an important part of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and will enable us to succeed against the threats that challenge your region and the rest of the world.

Thank you again for your support.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/12130

His Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz
Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defense
Riyadh Saudi Arabia

Your Royal Highness:

I would like to thank you for your recent decisions that allowed greater access to Saudi airspace for the aircraft of Operation Southern Watch, and that permitted us to place additional people in the Prince Sultan Air Base command facility for a key exercise. Because of these decisions, Southern Watch aircrews are able to operate more effectively, and we have been able to improve the combat readiness of our command elements.

Your decisions reflect a spirit of cooperation that is an important part of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and will enable us to succeed against the threats that challenge your region and the rest of the world.

Thank you again for your support.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/12131

SECRET
202 OCT 17 04 15 02

October 15, 2002 11:15 AM

TO: Tom White
Gen. Shinseki

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Stryker in a C-130

Here is a response from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on whether or not the Stryker fits in the C-130.

It is pretty clear to me that we have a problem. I really can't understand why in the world the Stryker wasn't designed to fit in a C-130 without all these problems.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated CoS AF response to SecDef re: "Will the Stryker Fit on the C-130?"

DHR:dh
101502-19

.....

Please respond by 11/15/02

451

15 OCT 02

U16806 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/12132



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF

SUBJECT: Answer to your question, "Will the Stryker fit on the C-130?"

You asked, "Will the Stryker fit on the C-130?" The short answer is yes....but,...

Here are the "buts":


- The basic Stryker vehicle will fit on the C-130
- There are 11 variants of the Stryker (fitted with different equipment, armament, etc.)
- It appears that 4 of the 11 variants may not be transportable on the C-130 without varying degrees of folding and disassembly, due to configuration and/or weight
- The C-130 loaded with Stryker operates at the limits of allowable weight tolerance even before being fully loaded for combat
- Runway length, airfield density altitude and temperature all impose limits on aircraft performance
 - For example, the attached chart shows that the C-130 could not safely operate from several of the airfields we are using in Operation Enduring Freedom today

We also know that the C-17 can load 3 Stryker vehicles at one time

- Enduring Freedom has proven the C-17's versatility to operate from forward airbases
- Although the C-17 would be in great demand for other tasking in any contingency scenario, we do know the C-17 can do the job

Finally, we are working with the Army to demonstrate Stryker loading on both the C-130 and the C-17. Army and Air Force experts are working to fully understand the operational constraints and make them well understood.

*Mr. Secretary -
These issues are all
workable as far as we
know now -
John*


JOHN P. JUMPER
General, USAF
Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/12133



Employment Challenges

Take off Performance

| Airfield | Runway | Elevation | Average Temps Fahrenheit | | Max Take off Gross Weight | |
|-------------|---------|-----------|--------------------------|-----|---------------------------|---------|
| | | | High | Low | Day | Night |
| Seeb, Oman | 11,774' | 48' | 93 | 86 | 154,000 | 155,000 |
| Doha, Qatar | 15,000' | 35' | 108 | 90 | 148,000 | 154,000 |
| Shamsi | 9,120' | 2,441' | 99 | 90 | 140,000 | 143,000 |
| Jacobabad | 9,950' | 180' | 107 | 93 | 150,000 | 154,000 |
| Bagram | 9,856' | 4,895' | 99 | 64 | 126,000 | 139,000 |
| Kabul | 11,483' | 5,871' | 93 | 70 | 124,000 | 135,000 |
| Qandahar | 10,500' | 3,312' | 97 | 72 | 137,000 | 148,000 |

11-L-0559/OSD/12134

01010

SETUP
2002 OCT 17 01:13

October 7, 2002 9:20 AM

TO: Gen. Jumper
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Stryker

Will the Stryker fit on a C-130?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-20



Please respond by 10/18/02

451

7 OCT 02

SECRET

October 11, 2002 1:09 PM

TO: Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Stryker

The people who are going to observe the Stryker demonstration will be looking to see a Stryker that comes off the C-130 in combat condition—loaded with ammunition, full crew, fuel, etc.

451

Thanks.

DHR:dh
001192-15



Please respond by 10/25/02

11 OCT 02

U16808 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/12136

SEP 17 11 24 AM '02

October 15, 2002 10:52 AM

2002 OCT 17 11 24 AM '02

TO: Tom White

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Stryker in C-130

Attached is an assessment from Gen. Handy on the Stryker fitting in a C-130.

I can't imagine why the Army didn't get the Stryker designed to fit in a C-130.
 This is a concern.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/11/02 TRANSCOM memo to SecDef re: "C-130 Transport of Stryker"

DR:dh
101502-16

.....

Please respond by 11/21/02

451

15 OCT 02

U16810 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/12137

C144



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

508 SCOTT DRIVE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5357

11 October 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


FROM: TCCC

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: C-130 Transport of Stryker

OCT 15 2002

1. In response to your question "Does the Stryker fit on a C-130?" the short answer is yes, but the matter goes beyond "fit" to the issue of transportability. The size and weight of the Stryker creates C-130 specific operational challenges in three areas—aircrew and passenger safety aisle requirements, C-130 ramp/floor axle load limits, and C-130 aircraft performance (in particular payload/range and takeoff capability).
2. The size of Stryker does not allow for the published safety aisle requirements to be maintained. Therefore, we are proactively working with the program manager to ensure that reduced aisle ways will permit acceptable passage under emergency conditions. However, this reduced aisle way does present an increased risk to aircrew and passengers. The current plan is to test each of the 10 Stryker variants before granting any additional safety aisle waivers and to ensure both Air Force and Army personnel have specific emergency evacuation training.
3. Loading the Stryker into the C-130 is another issue under review. The Stryker center of gravity and combat weight, coupled with the C-130 ramp angle, are all critical to ensure the published C-130 ramp/floor load limits are not exceeded. The Infantry Carrier Vehicle version of the Stryker (at 36,250 pounds) proved to be within these limits as demonstrated during Millennium Challenge '02. In an attempt to gain more capability and flexibility, a study funded by the Army through the Air Force's C-130 System Program Office is underway to reexamine C-130 ramp and floor limits.
4. The C-130's payload/range capabilities must be considered prior to transporting the Stryker. There are a number of factors that can reduce the range significantly. Advanced planning will be required to avoid adverse conditions (i.e. high temperature, high altitude, high terrain, and/or short runways) that might otherwise prevent C-130 transport of the Stryker. To promote improved C-130 employment planning, Military Traffic Management Command in coordination with AMC produced a "White Paper" outlining C-130 airlift capabilities impacted by Stryker transport.
5. I assure you that USTRANSCOM continues to aggressively pursue efforts with the Air Force and Army in reaching joint solutions aimed at maintaining the Stryker's maximum combat capability while meeting C-130 airlift parameters.


 JOHN W. HANDY
 General, USAF
 Commander

cc:
CJCS

Printed on recycled paper



11-L-0559/OSD/12138

TOTAL P. 02

September 19, 2002 8:39 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Concerned Afghan Americans

Someone handed me this note and said he wanted to talk to me sometime about it.
It is kind of interesting. Please take a look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/17 Aslami ltr w/reply from POTUS

DHR:Jh
091902-12

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02

10/2
→ *Bill Jati -*
Thoughts?
Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
10/1



THE PRESIDENT

Sept 25, 2001

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 19 2002

Dear Ali -

I read your letter 7
Sept 17th with interest.

You made excellent
points which I will

keep in mind.

Best regards

John ZL

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 19 2002

September 17, 2001

President George W. Bush
The White House
Washington DC

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Afghan American community, we extend our deepest condolences for the terrible tragedy that was inflicted on our fellow Americans. We, who have lost multitudes of our mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters, through the aggression of the Soviet Union and most recently, through the atrocities of the Taliban and their murderous co-conspirators in the form of Osama bin Ladin and other vicious terrorists, feel the pain of every American family. Islam does not condone such horrific acts and condemns those who commit them.

Over the past twenty-two years, the Afghan population has suffered the destruction of life, liberty, history, culture and country. And over the same time period some of my fellow Afghans and I have been actively involved seeking help from all quarters, for the beleaguered people of our motherland.

Under the Soviet occupation, we lost over 3 million of our citizens. After the defeat of the Soviet Union on our soil, the World left Afghanistan without so much as a "thank you" for the sacrifice that our people made for the freedom that the world enjoys today without the "Evil Empire.

Since the occupation of Afghanistan by the Taliban and the bin Ladin hordes, we have lost countless others through genocide, starvation and ethnic cleansing.

The blame goes all around. The Russians for invading a peaceful nation, for no apparent reason. The Pakistanis, for creating and supporting the Taliban. The ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) of the Pakistan Military for the support and protection of the Taliban regime and the Osama Bin Ladin terrorists. Prince Turki, the Saudi Intelligence Head, a cousin of King Abdullah, for financing the Taliban and Osama bin Ladin. The Free World, for standing on the sidelines and allowing all these atrocities to take place without protest.

11-L-0559/OSD/12141

Needless to say that since the occupation of Afghanistan by the Taliban and the murderous Osama bin Ladin, both Afghanistan and the world has been put in a very perilous position. The biggest disaster and most heart-breaking being the recent murder of over 5000 innocent people at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

In Afghanistan, they have paralyzed the populace by locking away the female gender behind closed doors without any opportunity for education, work or medical treatment. They have isolated the country by cutting off the population from all sorts of public information such as radio, television, newspapers, computers and so forth. They have branded the country with their own system of Islam, which is alien to the rest of the Islamic world.

Osama bin Ladin, in my opinion is equal to some form of a misguided cult leader like Jim Jones of Guyana, or the Waco cult group or the Japanese cult that attempted to poison the subway stations in Tokyo. By creating his own form of a fanatical religion, he is attempting to cut across cultures and countries, in order to recruit his equally misguided followers from different poor countries.

In a short period of time, the Taliban and the bin Ladin hordes, have destroyed Afghanistan's historical heritage and culture. They have massacred hundreds of thousands of Afghans under their ethnic cleansing policies. They have exported their system of terror to other Nations, like Kashmir, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and now the USA. Together with bin Ladin's financial backing, they have built heroin refineries inside Afghanistan, producing about 75% of the world's heroin. The list of their atrocities is long and I hope, common knowledge, within the civilized world.

Mr. President, over the last 4 years, my countrymen and I met on various occasions with members of the State Department to warn them about the dangers that the Taliban and their "Guests" presented to the world, but to no avail. These meetings took place with different members of Congress, Robin Raphael, the former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia; Karl Inderfurth, the next Assistant Secretary among others. We left each meeting with utter frustration and concern. No one would listen to, or should I say act, on our warnings.

We sent letters to the media and President Clinton. Still no response.

Now we are at the doorstep of a new era. An even more dangerous era. One, which would destroy multitudes of innocent lives, unless we take proper steps to stop it. Osama bin Ladin, is but one head of a multi headed dragon. To kill the dragon we must cut off all the heads and the limbs as well.

To succeed in this endeavor, we must force the evil out of its hiding place. This cannot be done with bombs. Especially in a mountainous country like Afghanistan. They have holes to crawl into. But the poor people who stand in long UN sponsored bread lines, do not. If Afghanistan were to be bombed indiscriminately, the innocent will pay a heavy sacrifice for the wrongs of these Butchers. And the people would turn against us.

To destroy the wasps, one must destroy the hive. In Osama bin Ladin's case, the hive is the Taliban and the ISI of the Pakistani military. Therefore, in order to get to bin Ladin and his cohorts, we must destroy the Taliban's hold on Afghanistan and the Afghan people and to warn the Pakistan Government that any assistance to bin Ladin by the ISI or any other Pakistani group would be considered as an act of war against the USA. We have been informed that most of the younger officers of the ISI are pro bin Ladin. I would not be surprised if bin Ladin was not already whisked out of Afghanistan to a safe haven in Pakistan. The boarder between Pakistan and Afgjhanistan is very porous and not easy to control.

If this is the case, then it is even more crucial that the Taliban's base in Afgjhanistan be neutralized before bin Ladin or other terrorists could return to the source once more.

We strongly believe that if the United States and the Alliance that is being formulated against bin Ladin take the following steps then we can be assured of success in the venture to rid the world of the likes of this criminal and others like him.

- 1) Immediately make contact with the forces of the Northern Alliance and ask for their assistance in supplying the ground troops. Even though Masood has been assassinated, his legacy will continue the fight given the right backing. The alliance has about 15000 fighters with an additional 15000 available. They have already agreed to support the US plan and they have deep knowledge of the terrain and the culture of the country. Their many years fighting experience will be very crucial in the battle for Afghanistan and the world.
- 2) Make sure that their forces are well supplied with every type of modern arms and ammunition with a readily available supply line to the front lines.
- 3) Pakistan must close all boarders to Afghanistan and stop any shipment of fuel and munitions to the Taliban. Any Pakistani group breaking this embargo must be punished severely.
- 4) Pakistan must recall all the Pakistani religious students, civilians and military personnel fighting in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban, to immediately return to Pakistan. Any Pakistani national arrested in Afghanistan thereafter must be treated as a criminal.
- 5) The former King of Afghanistan must be asked to come out of retirement and once and for all call upon his countrymen, across all ethnicity, to stand shoulder to shoulder with the world and help free the nation from the jaws of evil. He is still well respected and we feel that the citizenry will respond positively to his call. If he refuses, then he should be bypassed immediately for a younger leader or leaders acceptable to all Afghans and not just one segment of the population. Unless an acceptable multi ethnic Leadership group acceptable to all could be established, or the Loya Jirga (grand council), could be convened to pick a leader, a viable candidate could be the son of King Amanullah (1919-1929), Crown Prince Ehsanullah, who resides in Geneva. If he does not accept, then another member of the same family could be selected. The reason for this is that the King

and the Amanullah family/King Habibullah family cut across all ethnic groups
The people know and trust them

The success of this operation, guaranteeing a peaceful Afghanistan will depend on such a policy. Throughout its rich and ancient history, Afghans have always rallied around a strong leader. Never around a policy. This is the reason that the Pakistanis created Mullah Omar, the so-called "supreme leader of the Taliban. Incidentally there is a very close family tie by marriage between Mullah Omar and bin Ladin.

In addition, bin Ladin has built the mansion for Mullah Omar with his own money.

- 6) Once the Northern Alliance ground troops are activated, then the US and its Allies must give total air support to the Alliance for the duration of the battle. This is where the air strikes are important. The way must be cleared for the advance of the ground troops, especially if in the beginning no more than the 30,000 troops can be mustered. Care must be taken for the stinger missiles that still may be in the hands of the Taliban.
- 7) Once the Taliban government is toppled, then, the King, or the former President Rabani or any such other person as acceptable to the populace, can be put in charge of a new government.
- 8) The US and its Allies must immediately, through the UN, assign a security force made up of countries that have not been involved in the Afghanistan turmoil. These troops could come from Turkey, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and other such countries.
- 9) The USA and allies must establish a no fly zone over Afghanistan and until such time that the new nation can re-establish its own military capacity, must provide it with the necessary ground and air security.
- 10) Immediately, steps must be taken to provide Afghanistan with funds for the redevelopment and re-building of its infrastructure.
- 11) Steps must be taken for the repatriation of the millions of refugees residing in Pakistan and Iran.
- 12) Steps must be taken to clear the landmines left behind by the Soviets.
- 13) Care must be taken that even if the Taliban hand over bin Ladin, the Taliban government must be neutralized in order to prevent other terrorists waiting in the wings to take over bin Ladin's place.

This, Mr. President, is but a simple summary of what we believe, can work to rid the region of the likes of bin Ladin with very minimal loss of civilian and American lives. It will stave off any long-term ill feelings towards the United States by the world body and will show that the US is truly a world leader. With what little the Northern Alliance possess, they managed to bomb the munitions depot at the Kabul airport the night of September 11, 2001. Just think what they can do if fully equipped and supported.

The bravery and determination and the love for freedom of the people of Afghanistan is legendary. These people can be a very vital part of the world arsenal in the new "long twilight struggle" against world terrorism

Mr. President, please help save the people of Afghanistan. For in doing so, you will save multitudes of innocent lives worldwide from the hands of animals like Osama bin Ladin and company.

Respectfully yours

Ali Seraj, Dr. Mohd. Aslami
Concerned Afghan Americans

Snowflake

20

October 15, 2002 6:11 PM

TO: Honorable George Shultz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Senator Miller's Paper

IT-29

Attached is Senator Zell Miller's paper. You'll find it interesting.

Thanks so much for your call this week. I will fix the guidelines and get a copy to you at Hoover. Keep the good ideas coming!

Best regards,

Attach.
Senator Miller Statement

DHR:dh
101502-65

15 Oct 02

U16828 / 02 2

11-L-0559/OSD/12146

Zell Miller, United States Senator from Georgia[Jump to Senator Miller's Home Page.](#)[Jump to Senator Miller's Press Page.](#)

October 3, 2002

**U.S. Senator Zell Miller, D-GA
Floor Statement on the Iraq Resolution**

"Madame President, I have signed on as an original co-sponsor of the Iraq resolution, and I'd like to tell you story about why I think it is the right path to take:

"A few weeks ago, we were doing some work on my back porch back home, tearing out a section of old stacked rocks, when all of a sudden I uncovered a nest of Copperhead snakes.

"Now, I'm not one to get alarmed at snakes. I know they perform some valuable functions, like eating rats.

"And when I was a young lad, I kept snakes as pets. I had an Indigo snake, a Bull snake, a beautiful colored Corn snake and many others. I must have had a dozen King snakes at one time or another. They make great pets and you only had to give them a mouse every 30 days.

"I read all the books by Raymond C. Ditmars, who was the foremost herpetologist of the day. That is a person who is an expert on snakes.

"For a while, I wanted to be a herpetologist, but the pull of being a big-league shortstop outran that childhood dream.

"I reminisce this way to explain that snakes don't scare me like they do most people. And I guess the reason is that I know the difference between those snakes that are harmless and those that will kill you.

"In fact, I bet I may be the only senator in this body who can look at the last three inches of a snake's tail and tell you whether it's poisonous or not. I can also tell the sex of a snake, but that's another story.

"A Copperhead will kill you. It could kill one of my dogs. It could kill one of my grandchildren. It could kill any one of my four great grandchildren. They play all the time where I found those killers.

"And you know, when I discovered these Copperheads, I didn't call my wife Shirley for advice, like I do on most things. I didn't go before the city council. I didn't yell for help from my neighbors. I just took a hoe and knocked them in the head and killed them. Dead as a doorknob.

"I guess you could call it a unilateral action. Or preemptive. Perhaps if you had been watching me you could have even called it bellicose and reactive.

3

"I took their poisonous heads off because they were a threat to me. And they were a threat to my home and my family. They were a threat to all I hold dear.

"And isn't that what this is all about?"

-30-

[Home](#) | [About Zell Miller](#) | [Legislation & Issues](#) | [Constituent Services](#) | [Press Room](#) | [Links](#)

[Privacy Policy](#)

4

204

October 15, 2002 4:47 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Special Forces and Army

322

Here is this article from *Newsweek*. Do you feel as though this problem is solved?

Thanks.

Attach.

Soloway, Colin, "I Yelled at Them to Stop'," *Newsweek*, October 7, 2002.

DHR:dh
101502-60

.....

Please respond by 10/28/02

150CT02

U16833 / 02

September 30, 2002 2:02 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: *Newsweek*

Attached is an article from *Newsweek*. Are your folks thinking about linking regulars with A-teams, as this article suggests?

Thanks.

Attach.

Soloway, Colin, "I Yelled at Them to Stop," *Newsweek*, October 7, 2002.

DHR.dh
093002-63

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

Newsweek
October 7, 2002



'I Yelled At Them To Stop'

U.S. Special Forces are frustrated. Kicking down doors and frisking women, they say, is no way to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan. A report from the front

By Colin Soloway

One afternoon in August, a U.S. Special Forces A team knocked at the door of a half-ruined mud compound in the Shahikot Valley. The servicemen were taking part in Operation Mountain Sweep, a weeklong hunt for Qaeda and Taliban fugitives in eastern Afghanistan. The man of the house, an elderly farmer, let the Americans in as soon as his female relatives had gone to a back room, out of the gaze of strange men. Asked if there were any weapons in the house, the farmer proudly showed them his only firearm, a hunting rifle nearly a century old. When the team had finished searching, carefully letting the women stay out of sight, the farmer served tea. The Americans thanked him and walked toward the next house.

They didn't get far before the team's captain looked back. Six paratroopers from the 82d Airborne, also part of Mountain Sweep, were lined up outside the farmer's house, preparing to force their way in. "I yelled at them to stop," says the captain, "but they went ahead and kicked in the door." The farmer panicked and tried to run, and one of the paratroopers slammed him to the ground. The captain raced back to the house. Inside, he says, other helmeted soldiers from the 82d were attempting to frisk the women. By the time the captain could order the soldiers to leave, the family was in a state of shock. "The women were screaming bloody murder," recalled the captain, asking to be identified simply as Mike. "The guy was in tears. He had been completely dishonored."

The official story from both the 82d Airborne and the regular Army command is that Operation Mountain Sweep was a resounding success. Several arms caches were found and destroyed, and at least a dozen suspected Taliban members or supporters were detained for questioning. But according to Special Forces, Afghan villagers and local officials living in or near the valley, the mission was a disaster. The witnesses claim that American soldiers succeeded mainly in terrorizing innocent villagers and ruining the rapport that Special Forces had built up with local communities. "After Mountain Sweep, for the first time since we got here, we're getting rocks thrown at us on the road in Khowst," says Jim, a Green Beret who has been operating in the area for the past six months. Special Forces members say that Mountain Sweep has probably set back their counterinsurgency and intelligence operations by at least six months.

Officers in the 82d insist their men did nothing wrong. In response to NEWSWEEK queries, public-affairs officers characterized the Special Forces involved in Mountain Sweep as "prima donnas" who were damaging the war effort by complaining to the press. Yet at a time when Washington is talking about expanding the mission in Afghanistan and increasing the number of large-scale operations like Mountain Sweep—and when Qaeda allies are stepping up terrorist attacks against the fragile government in Kabul—the criticism raises serious questions about the best strategy for fighting the low-intensity war.

Shahikot is where Al Qaeda and Taliban forces fought their last major battle against the Americans back in March. Some 50 soldiers from several Special Forces A teams have been operating in eastern Afghanistan's Paktia and Khowst provinces ever since. They've been working to win the villagers' trust

and cooperation—and largely succeeding, as NEWSWEEK found while accompanying some of them for two weeks on operations shortly before Mountain Sweep began. "The Americans in Gardez who have Toyota trucks, they are good guys," says Jan Baz Sadiqi, 46, district administrator in Zornat, the valley's population center. "They don't break into houses, and they don't terrorize people."

Then on Aug. 19, American commanders sent some 600 action-hungry members of the Army's 82d Airborne Division, Third Battalion, charging into Zornat and the Shahikot area. "Those guys were crazy," said one Special Forces NCO who was there. "We just couldn't believe they were acting that way. Every time we turned around they were doing something stupid. We'd be like, 'Holy s—t, look at that! Can you believe this!' " Another said: "They were acting like bin Laden was hiding behind every door. That just wasn't the way to be acting with civilians." Special Forces working in the region say that since Mountain Sweep, the stream of friendly intelligence on weapons caches, mines and terrorist activity has dried up.

The Special Forces have often had a stormy relationship with the rest of the Army. Conventional commanders sometimes regard the elite fighters as arrogant cowboys. Special Forces members respond that the regular Army is too rigid for the painstaking job of fighting a low-intensity conflict. "The conventional military has a conventional mind-set," said an SF officer. "It does not work when you have crooks and terrorists and all kinds of bad guys who blend into the population." In Afghanistan, the A teams have been out in the field, cultivating the friendship of villagers and tracking down terrorists. At the same time, regular soldiers like those of the 82d were, until August, mostly confined to their bases, just itching to get out and do the job for which they were trained.

In Shahikot, that wasn't the job that needed doing. "The 82d is a great combat unit," said a Special Forces NCO who took part in the mission. "A lot of us on the teams came out of the 82d. But they are trained to advance to contact and kill the enemy. There was no 'enemy' down there." The remaining Taliban forces melted into the civilian population after Operation Anaconda blasted them out of the caves of Shahikot in March. Since then, the Afghan war has become basically a low-intensity guerrilla conflict, with Taliban and Qaeda fighters operating in small cells, emerging only to lay land mines and launch nighttime rocket attacks against the Americans before disappearing once again.

The Special Forces were created to deal with precisely that kind of enemy. Each A team is made up of 10 or fewer noncommissioned officers, led by one warrant officer and one captain. Armed with M-4 rifles and light machine guns, they live, travel and work with local troops. They patrol isolated villages in ordinary Toyota pickups, talking to the inhabitants—and never go anywhere without someone who speaks the local language. They have been trained to assimilate local customs and sensibilities as carefully as possible. Many of them sported full beards until a few weeks ago, when a news photo of a whiskery Green Beret shook up the brass in Washington. A smooth-cheeked adult male is a strange sight for rural Afghans, but the generals ordered all troops to shave immediately.

Still, people back home—Pentagon brass and civilians alike—are asking why terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mohammed Omar are still running loose. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reportedly dressed down Gen. Dan McNeill in July for failing to capture more "high-value targets." Such impatience was likely a factor in launching Mountain Sweep. "It's the victory of form over substance, substituting action for results," says a Western diplomat who is worried about increasing complaints and warnings from areas where conventional operations are taking place. "It's thinking if you do a lot of stuff, something will happen. Something will, but it might not be what you want. The unhappiness is building." 

Villagers have made no secret of that unhappiness. In the village of Marzak, several witnesses say that 82d troops chased down a mentally ill man, pushed him to the ground, handcuffed him and then took

turns taking photos of themselves pointing a gun to his head. The office of Zormat administrator Sadiqi was flooded with complaints about the actions of some 82d units. "They knocked down doors, pouring into the homes, terrifying everybody, beating people, mistreating people," says Sadiqi. He says villagers demanded: "Why do the Americans come here and search our women? We don't need this kind of government!"

After the mission, the two SF teams submitted an "after-action review." NEWSWEEK has not seen the document, but sources say it describes in detail the problems the teams witnessed and suggests ways to avoid such problems in the future. The report set off a storm of recriminations. Col. James Huggins, commander of Task Force Panther, of which the Third Battalion is a part, says every platoon and squad leader in the battalion was questioned under oath, and their statements did not support the teams' charges. "I can't tell you 100 percent these things didn't happen," says Huggins. "All I can tell you is I looked, and can't find any evidence that they did." Officers involved have been accused of leaking classified reports to NEWSWEEK, and have been subjected to internal investigations.

Even as he defends his troops, Huggins says he's working to avoid problems in the future by increasing "cultural awareness" training, bringing in female military police to search Afghan women and keeping supplies of new locks on hand to replace those that are cut off during searches. As some Green Berets see it, the damage has already been done. Told that more operations like Mountain Sweep are being planned, one Special Forces NCO says: "It's over, then. We might as well go home, because we'll never succeed with big ops like that." Even so, Mike sticks up for the conventional Army. "Some SF guys will tell you we don't need regular forces out here, that we can do it all by ourselves," he said. "But that's impossible. The question is, how do you use those forces?" He recommends a model that has been successful in Afghanistan—pairing an A team with a company of regular infantry. "We need their muscle and firepower to support us when we go after the bad guys. But they need our brains, experience and skills to get the mission done," Mike says. "If you establish rapport with the people—establish you are not an occupying army—and prove you are here to support the transitional government, they will tell you where to find Al Qaeda." Among the Special Forces, the hope is that the U.S. command can learn from the mistakes of Mountain Sweep and get the job done right.

With Mark Hosenball, Holly Peterson and Suzanne Smalley

6

October 9, 2002 9:22 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Disseminate Testimony

032

Someone ought to get my Hill testimony to all senior DoD people, so that at least they have read it. I asked in the staff meeting, and not one of the Service Chiefs had even bothered to read it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-17

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

10/10 -

SecDef SWT -

Please draft short
transmittal letter from
me to all that attaches
SecDef testimony. *Tr.*

Di Rita

00002

U16842 / 02
11-L-0559/OSD/12154

Larry Di Rita
10/9

10/15
5
SHOW/Re

SECRET
OCT 21 11 7 10

10/7

October 10, 2002 2:47 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Morgan Murphy

Please take a look at this material on Morgan Murphy. See what you think of it and let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/10/02 Brennan fax to SecDef re: Morgan Murphy

DHR:dh
101002-11



Please respond by 10/25/02

10/17
To: GC Hayes
What do you think?
→
Larry

10/15
~~SecDef -~~
He sounds impressive,
I wonder if he is someone
who we could involve in
military commissions?

DIRTA
Larry Di Rita
10/15

EDWARD A. BRENNAN

(b)(6)

October 10, 2002

Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon - Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20330

Dear Don:

The high level of awareness that you and I are friends results in many requests, most of which I turn down. This one is a bit off the wall, but I'm taking the liberty of forwarding it to you.

It's a resume for Morgan Murphy, who I'm sure you remember was a colleague of yours in the Congress in the 70's. He also was involved with committees and projects dealing with the CIA. He believes that his experience might be helpful in today's world and I think he simply wants to be of help during these unsettled times. At any rate, I send it to you for your consideration.

(b)(6) join me in sending best wishes to Joyce and you. We continue to applaud your remarkable performance.

Best regards,



Hi Don —

I hope to see you
and Joyce soon —

Eric

Morgan F. Murphy

(b)(6)

Professional Experience

Partner, Murphy and Boyle Chartered, Chicago, Illinois, 1981 to present.

U.S. Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1970-1980.

Committees: Foreign Affairs
Space and Aeronautics
Select Committee on Crime
Rules
Select Committee on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control
Democratic Steering and Policy
Standards of Official Conduct
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Chairman--Subcommittee on Legislation

Attorney, General Trial Work; Criminal, Civil and Labor Law, 1962--1970.

Professional Affiliations

Admitted to law practice in Illinois and Federal Courts--1962
Admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States
Member of American and Illinois Bar Association
Member of American and Illinois Trial Lawyer's Association
Member of District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Civic Activities

Member of City of Chicago Library Board--1981 - 1986
Chairman, Villa Scalabrini Dinner--1986
Chairman, Mercy Hospital Dinner--1981
Trustee of Morgan Park Academy
President - Board of Advisors for Mercy Hospital
Chairman, Board of Directors, Mercy Hospital

Awards

Catholic Man of the Year--1976
Catholic Lawyers Guild of Chicago
Chicago South Chamber of Commerce--Annual Award for Midway
Airport reactivation--1978
Central Intelligence Agency--Award from Director, Admiral
Stansfield Turner, for outstanding leadership in legislative
work for the CIA and intelligence communities
Sigma Chi Fraternity--National Significant Award--1981
Numerous Civic and Neighborhood Awards

Educational

DePaul University School of Law--Juris Doctorate Degree--1962
Northwestern University--Bachelor of Science Degree--1955
Leo High School--1951 Graduate
Attended Saint Cajetan and Visitation Grammar Schools

Personal

(b)(6)

Officer--United States Marine Corp--2 1/2 years, including 1 year
of duty in Far East.

Bob Wiedrich Morgan Murphy calls it a day



ONCE YOU HAVE stood with a man in the shadow of death a few times, you get to know him very well.

In those moments of fear, you know his knees are shaking, just like yours. You know he wishes he were somewhere else, just like you. But he stands and awaits beside you. And he doesn't flinch.

Then you know your companion is a man dedicated to the job that he has set out for himself. And you know that if ever the two of you share another real fear, that man will stand with you, even in the face of death.

Such a man is Rep. Morgan Murphy Jr., the 47-year-old Democrat who has announced his intention not to seek reelection to his South Side 2d Congressional District seat.

I am proud to know him. I am proud to have worked with him.

And my life and profession have been enriched by the dangers we shared during seven years of investigating the international narcotics traffic in some of the most God-forsaken places on this earth.

I KNOW MORGAN Murphy probably better than any other public official with whom I have had contact in more than 20 years of newspapering.

Our joint ventures have taken us to such diverse lands as Thailand, Laos, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Mexico, and Western Europe.

And on each of these journeys, covering many thousands of miles of desert, jungle, and Mediterranean back alleys, Murphy devoted his skills as an attorney to gathering the facts needed to give American drug agents the legislative tools required for their endless fight.

Most often, Murphy used his own vacation time to conduct these inquiries, in behalf of the House committee on narcotics, crime, and intelligence of which he served during his 10 years on Capitol Hill.

Very often he dug into his own pockets to bankroll portions of the trips so that he never would be accused of junksteering at taxpayer expense.

I know, because I was there. And I know that Murphy ran me ragged, working 12 hour days under the most extreme conditions of physical and mental stress.

He believed that the work he was doing might save the lives of young Americans being deluged by overseas heroin. He knew that Congress should be in the forefront of that battle.

As a firm believer in the first-hand gathering of information, Murphy often had to overcome bureaucratic obstacles placed in his path by his own government.

However, it was the risk of personal investigations in some of the most ferociously primitive parts of the world that almost cost Murphy his life several times.

Once, Murphy nearly plunged through the unlocked door of a helicopter over the

Burma-Laos border during a violent maneuver to avoid hostile hill tribesmen dealing in dope.

Once, we held on in fear together as a jumbo jet suddenly dropped 1,000 feet to avoid a midair collision enroute to Central Asia.

And once, Murphy narrowly escaped a trap laid by opium overlords with whom he was attempting to negotiate a settlement in the jungles of northern Thailand. The settlement would have prevented several tons of narcotics from reaching the United States.

Murphy's congressional career, however, spanned more than the drug wars. He represented his district ably in other ways. He fought for a revival of Midway Airport. He fought to get federal help for the Port of Chicago and to generate more Great Lakes shipping.

He fought against the illegal dumping of TV sets by Japan that was costing American workers jobs. He successfully battled to win government guarantees of \$50 million in loans to save the Wisconsin Steel Co. works in South Chicago from folding.

And he devoted his energies to providing American intelligence agencies and the FBI with proper authority to protect national security and prevent constitutional abuses.

DURING HIS 10 years in Congress, Murphy lived in one room at the Washington Hilton Hotel, preferring to keep his family in his home district and returning on weekends to work in his Chicago office.

During that decade, his office handled 25,000 individual cases involving constituents with the federal government, ranging from Social Security claims to government home foreclosures.

In between, Murphy lectured school children on the dangers of drug abuse. And in 1972, he was first to disclose the growing heroin addiction problem among American troops in Viet Nam.

Now, Morgan Murphy Jr. is burned out. For reasons of health, he has decided not to seek reelection to a sixth term.

He intends to resume the private practice of law and devote more time to his family.

He has been a conscientious and dedicated public servant as well as an effective member of Congress. Next year, Murphy would have ranked second in seniority on the vital Rules Committee, through which all legislation funnels.

He could have gone on to become one of the most influential men on Capitol Hill. But he has given 10 years of his life to the service of his country. And now because his health is impaired, he will retire.

He has been privileged to serve the American people. And they have been fortunate to have his services. He will be missed in Washington.

...which had continued to hold the intelligence community up to international ridicule.

HE SPOKE WITH distaste of the men in government who had recklessly jeopardized national security with contrived information leaks that hindered the search for truth.

And he spoke with equal distaste of the folly of other men who had ordered pointless acts that had violated the law, constitutional rights, and human decency to the embarrassment of the nation.

Out of that controversy had emerged an assessment of the defects and weaknesses in the country's domestic and foreign intelligence operations.

...which would work together to protect both national security and civil liberties," Murphy said.

That legislation and other amendments and bills established the legal safeguards that intelligence agents also needed to perform their vital tasks without fear of later prosecution.

For the first time in decades, intelligence operatives and administrators had clearly defined limits which all understood. And with those laws, their self-confidence was restored.

"I'm proud of that legislation," Murphy said. "I'm prouder still of the job the committee did."

Which proves you don't need a frog meal to feel good.

Chicago Tribune 11-16-79

11-L-0559/OSD/12159

Congressman Murphy's Committee
Assignments, 96th Congress

1. RULES COMMITTEE. (See details of Rules' functions on next page.)
Ranks third on committee.
2. PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. Oversees the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies.
Ranks fourth on committee. Chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation.
3. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT (ETHICS). Oversees administration of House rules pertaining to conduct of House members. Ranks fifth on committee.
4. SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL. Investigates drug trafficking and makes recommendations to reduce drug abuse.
Ranks fourth on committee.
5. DEMOCRATIC STEERING AND POLICY COMMITTEE. Recommends assignments of Democratic Congressmen to the House's various legislative committees.
6. HOUSE STEEL CAUCUS. Recommends policies and legislation to help the American steel industry and U.S. steelworkers. Chairman of ad hoc committee on Buy-American legislation.
7. HOUSE PORT CAUCUS. Recommends policies and legislation to help promote the use and development of U.S. ports.

Quiet honor meant a lot for proud defender of CIA

SOME POLITICIANS have their friends throw lavish dinners for them so they can revel in prepared words of praise from the rostrum.

They hustle plaques and platitudes to inflate their egos. They collect awards like other people collect Green Stamps. They thrive on hypocrisy.

Morgan F. Murphy Jr., the South Side Chicago Democrat retiring from Congress this month after 10 years' service, doesn't go that route. He figures that any honors due him should result from hard work.

ADM. STANSFIELD Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, must feel the same way.

When he decided to recognize Murphy's post-Watergate efforts to restore integrity and public confidence in the nation's intelligence services, Turner didn't bury Murphy with words of praise.

He simply called Murphy over to the White House Executive Office Building and presented him with the CIA's unique award for outsiders — the CIA medallion, a massive bronze memento of appreciation for dedicated service to the nation.

In keeping with the agency's low profile, there were no ruffles or flourishes. The CIA didn't even issue a press release. It was a quiet ceremony.

NEVERTHELESS, MURPHY, the hulking ex-football player and Marine officer, was like a little kid when he proudly displayed the medallion back in Chicago, a day after the presentation last week.

Congress had adjourned. Murphy had stood for the last time on the floor of that historic House. So nostalgia possessed him as he reviewed his decision not to seek re-election after five terms because of ill health.

He reminisced about the traumatic days on the Pike Select Committee on Intelligence immediately after Watergate, when accusations of wrongdoing by the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation threatened to destroy America's intelligence capability.

He recalled the facts, the fabrications, and the insinuations that had combined to hold the intelligence community up to international ridicule.

HE SPOKE WITH distaste of the men in government who had recklessly jeopardized national security with contrived information leaks that hindered the search for truth.

And he spoke with equal distaste of the folly of other men who had ordered pointless acts that had violated the law, constitutional rights, and human decency to the embarrassment of the nation.

Out of that controversy had emerged an assessment of the defects and weaknesses in the country's domestic and foreign intelligence operations.



From that panel, named after its chairman, former Rep. Otis Pike (D., N.Y.), also had emerged the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, whose job it was to sort out the rhetoric from the facts needed to correct the abuses.

MURPHY WAS chairman of that group's legislative subcommittee, helping write several pieces of law that strengthened America's ability to protect itself from foreign spies, terrorism, and subversion while preserving the safeguards of a democracy. It was no easy task, balancing one need against the other.

One dilemma was the difficulty of prosecuting accused violators of national security whose trials might disclose secrets not worth risking at a public trial. Some defendants threatened to use such material in their defense, even though it was not relevant to the issues, in an effort to escape trial.

So in order to meet the need to protect a defendant's rights, while still protecting national security, the Murphy subcommittee drew up legislation creating a pre-trial procedure whereby a federal judge determined in chambers what could be disclosed legally in open court.

TO MAKE CERTAIN that all rights were preserved, Murphy called on the knowledge of intelligence experts, constitutional lawyers, and the American Civil Liberties Union.

"We had to prove that the executive and legislative branches could work together to protect both national security and civil liberties," Murphy said.

That legislation and other amendments and bills established the legal safeguards that intelligence agents also needed to perform their vital tasks without fear of later prosecution.

For the first time in decades, intelligence operatives and administrators had clearly defined limits which all understood. And with those laws, their self-confidence was restored.

"I'm proud of that medallion," Murphy said. "I'm prouder still of the job the committee did."

Which proves you don't need a free meal to feel good.

Chicago Tribune 11-16-79

11-L-0559/OSD/12161

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER

BROOKS McCOHMICK
Chairman, Executive Committee

August 13, 1979

Hon. Morgan F. Murphy
U.S. House of Representatives
2436 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington D.C. 20515

Dear Morgan:

Congratulations on the successful conclusion of the financing for Wisconsin Steel. Without your push and determination, I am convinced it would never have been realized. The City of Chicago is indebted to you for having contributed to the job security of 3,500 area residents.

Sincerely,



ATTACHMENT 10

EXECUTIVE OFFICES (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/12162

10

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Washington Office

October 24, 1978

The Hon. Morgan F. Murphy, Chairman
 Subcommittee on Legislation
 House Intelligence Committee
 H 405, U.S. Capitol
 Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Murphy:

We want to thank you for your work on behalf of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.

As you know, the ACLU views H.R. 7308 as a major reform of national security wiretapping which provides new protections for the civil liberties of citizens.


Under your chairmanship the Subcommittee on Legislation fashioned a bill which in several respects improved on the Senate version, S. 1566. Most of those improvements, particularly in the area of minimization, were accepted by the full Committee, the House, and the Senate and House conferees.

As the Committee considers charters next year, a similar effort will have to be made to strike a balance between national security and civil liberties concerns that does not sacrifice either. We of course look forward to working with you and other members of the Committee on this significant agenda.

Sincerely,



John H.F. Shattuck
 Director



Jerry J. Berman
 Legislative Counsel

cc: Jay Miller
 ACLU of Illinois


ATTACHMENT II

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 544-1681

John H. F. Shattuck, Director • Jay A. Miller, Associate Director • Kathleen Miller, Legislative Representative
 Pamela S. Horowitz, Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel • Ellen Leitzer, David E. Landau, Staff Counsel

Norman Dorsen, Chairman, Board of Directors • Arthur M. Weir, Executive Director

14-L-05559/CSD/12183



NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE

SEVENTEEN NINETY BROADWAY

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019 • 212-245-2104

July 31, 1979

The Honorable Morgan F. Murphy
2436 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Murphy:

I would like to express the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's appreciation for your vote against (H.J. Res, 74) Mottl Anti-Busing Bill. Your courage and actions in this regard have not gone unnoticed or unappreciated by the millions of Americans who want to move this nation away from the dark night of racial segregation and discrimination into the sunlight of equality of opportunity and equal protection of the law.

We look forward to working with you in the days ahead on issues of mutual concern.

Once again, thanks for your stand against those forces that seek to throw out the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution, and turn back the clock on racial progress in this nation.

Sincerely,

Benjamin L. Hooks
Executive Director

BLH:vp

ATTACHMENT 12

October 18, 2002 9:18 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lew Manilow

You ought to get Lew Manilow in one of these groups. He's terrific. He knows a lot about public diplomacy. He could be working with Charlotte Beers.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/23/02 Manilow letter and materials

DHR:dh
101802-1



Please respond by 11/01/02

334

18 OCT 02

U16900 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 18 2002

Mr. Lewis Manilow

(b)(6)

Dear Lew,

Thanks for your letter. Keep up the good work at the
CCFR. We need it!

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

U16899 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12166

LEWIS MANILOW

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 OCT -9 PM 4:12

(b)(6)

September 23, 2002

Secretary of Defense



SA0017012

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Don:

Thought you would be interested in foreign policy attitudes in Chicago.

I have been participating (actively) in meetings in Chicago, CCFR conferences and privately with the German Ambassador, President Carter and many locals.

Mainly, there is criticism for the Bush Administration. When I try to steer the conversation to why Hussein is risking war to get nuclear weapons and how deterrence will work once he gets them there is silence and change of subject. I got one response from the wrongheaded Prof. Mearshimer "proving" that Hussein couldn't use WMDs; I counterattacked to the delight of John Madigan.

For me, the case is clear but the problem is getting people to even think about Hussein and to stop the American game of political and sometimes conspiratorial criticism. This brings me back to the Bush or Beers public diplomacy, which as I wrote you in my last missive, is wrongly focused on the US's image rather than on Hussein's threat to the world.

Truly,

Lewis Manilow

LM:bt

11-L-0559/OSD/12167

U1623714/02

May 13, 2002 11:45 AM

470

TO: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crusader and Congress

Please give me a set of papers that have this type of information across the top and then list each Member of the U.S. Senate alphabetically, then do the same thing with each Member of the House of Representatives. Then staple the House separately from the Senate and return to me today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
05:302-34

.....
Please respond by 05/13/02

Jellal *Dove*
72

13MAY02

U16906 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12168

Currad.

| NAME - | Pro Learning D.D. | Learning D.D. | Unrecorded | Learning Ag. 10/11 | Agentic D.D. | Comments. |
|--------|----------------------|------------------|------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
|--------|----------------------|------------------|------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|

11-L-0559/OSD/12169

May 13, 2002 11:45 AM

*Done
Sbs*

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crusader

470

One of the items that has to be very clear on the Crusader are the timelines when Crusader was supposed to be introduced and when the future combat system was supposed to be introduced, which has an artillery piece on it and is different from the Crusader.

I need to know that information.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-33

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

5/13

*In progress getting the
timelines right on Mike Wynne's
brief and with the info
Wolf Wolfowitz has put
together. V/R EJ*

13M ay 02 02

show Wake

May 13, 2002 11:43 AM

5/14/02

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: U.S. News and World Report

Sir: Told the reporter that I certainly hadn't been in the last year and a half or so.

Letter to Sir

That business about me walking home from National Airport—I think that must be a throwback to when I was in Congress, which I had to do one day. But I certainly haven't done it recently—in fact, I haven't been to National Airport since I have been in the Pentagon.

I think his definition of "recent" is different than most. 009.750
T.C.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-32

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

13 May 02

U16909 02

May 13, 2002 11:40 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Tom White
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Crusader

470

We should make sure when we are discussing the Crusader, that our phraseology is that we are recommending to Congress that the funds for Crusader be redirected. Needless to say, under the Constitution, they are going to make the final decision.

Specifically, we ought not to say it is the Department of Defense that is killing it. What we are doing is recommending to them the disposition of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-31



Please respond by _____

13 May 02

U16910 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12172

May 13, 2002 9:49 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Keeping Count

337

George—I didn't know you folks kept track of how many times the people who receive the Daily Briefing ask questions.

See the attached *Time* magazine article.

Thanks.

Attach.
Time magazine, 05/13/02, p. 38.

DHR:dh
051302-18

13 May 02

U16915 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12173

of power once Saddam is driven out. Though he enjoys some backing in the White House and the Pentagon, both the CIA and the State Department deride him as a divisive, autocratic blowhard. Since he is a Shi'ite Muslim, Chalabi is viewed with suspicion by many of Iraq's powerful Sunni neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia. The Administration has recently increased contacts with an array of opposition figures, including many military defectors, though a much anticipated conference was scuttled by infighting over who would run it.

The smoothest regime-change scenario—a coup from within Saddam's own military ranks—is the least likely. At least six such coups have been attempted in the past decade, and all have failed miserably. With internal intelligence and security services at his disposal, Saddam has recently stepped up the pace of military purges, shifting around or simply executing any popular, effective officer who posed a potential threat. That leaves classic warfare as the only real alternative to a proxy war.

Hawks like Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Defense Policy Board chief Richard Perle strongly believe that after years of American sanctions and periodic air assaults, the Iraqi leader is weaker than most people believe. Rumsfeld has been so determined to find a rationale for an attack that on 10 separate occasions he asked the CIA to find evidence linking Iraq to the terror attacks of Sept. 11. The intelligence agency repeatedly came back empty-handed. The best hope for Iraqi ties to the attack—a report that lead hijacker Mohamed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence official in the Czech Republic—was discredited last week.

If links between Iraq and the Sept. 11 conspirators are elusive, links to al-Qaeda may not be. In the past three years, an armed group of Islamic extremists now known as Ansar al-Islam, led in part by a suspected Iraqi intelligence agent, Abu Wa'el, has waged a terror campaign in Kurdistan. Most recently, in April, three militants tried to kill the Prime Minister of eastern Kurdistan just as a State Department official was visiting the region. "It was a message to the U.S.," says a Kurdish investigator. Many of the 700 to 800 members of the group were trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and have returned

to Kurdistan since the fighting last year at Tora Bora, according to Kurdish officials.

With hard-liners seizing on such testimony as reason to attack, it falls to Secretary of State Colin Powell—whom many Administration hawks blame for preventing a march on Baghdad at the end of the Gulf War—to play the lonely diplomat. While batting down rumors that he is fed up and quitting, Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, are close to getting a new set of Iraqi sanctions at the U.N. But other Administration principals fear that Saddam is working his own U.N. angle for the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq, whose presence could make the U.S. look like a bully if it invades. "The White House's biggest fear is that U.N. weapons inspectors will be al-

Afghanistan as the Pentagon refuses to allow international peacekeepers past Kabul city limits. Since the Administration has made it clear that the objective is Saddam's ouster, he has no reason to behave: on his last legs, the Iraqi ruler would seemingly have no reason not to launch missiles laden with chemical or biological weapons against U.S. troops or Israeli cities.

Most important, Bush, unlike his father, has no big, bold provocation around which to build a coalition. Except for offering \$25,000 bounties to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, Saddam has been trying to stay out of trouble. Everyone knows he's a bad guy and a long-term danger, but as Republican Senator Chuck Hagel wonders, "How urgent is the threat?" And, one might add, how does it compare with the others the U.S. is facing? To many observers, it's a stretch to link any attack on Iraq to the broader war on terrorism. By fostering more anti-American resentment, a long-term neo-colonial presence in Iraq could breed a new generation of suicide bombers ready to wreak havoc on the U.S.

Saudi Arabia might feel compelled to block the U.S. from using its staging bases, though the war could be launched largely from Kuwait in the south and Turkey in the north, with assists from Bahrain and Oman. The Pentagon is preparing for such an eventuality, building a sophisticated combined air operations center at Al Udeid air base in Qatar to replace the one in Saudi Arabia. But if Saddam waits for the conflict to come to Baghdad, this could be an urban, house-to-house battle unlike anything current U.S. troops have ever experienced.

If that sounds like another potential Somalia, it's easy to understand why the President, for all his tough talk, is not about to rush into anything. "Bush cannot embark on a mission that fails," says Geoffrey Kemp, a former member of President Reagan's National Security Council now at the Nixon Center in Washington. "Given what happened to his father and the hype in this Administration, it would be the end." And for Saddam, yet another new beginning. —Reported by Massimo Calabresi, James Carney, John F. Dickerson, Mark Thompson, Douglas Walker and Adam Zagorin/Washington, Scott MacLeod/Cairo and Andrew Purvis/Kurdistan



lowed to go in," says a top Senate foreign policy aide.

From the moment he took office, Bush has made noises about finishing the job his father started. Sept. 11 may have diverted his attention, but Iraq has never been far from his mind. By the end of 2001, diplomats were discussing how to enlist the support of Arab allies, the military was sharpening its troop estimates, and the communications team was plotting how to sell an attack to the American public. The whole purpose of putting Iraq into Bush's State of the Union address, as part of the "axis of evil," was to begin the debate about a possible invasion.

Though the Israeli-Palestinian crisis has certainly got in the way, it is not the only potential stumbling block. Bush still has to show anxious Arab allies that the U.S. wouldn't leave a mess for someone else to clean up—which some feel is happening in

May 13, 2002 8:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting w/O'Neill and Ashcroft

000.5

I want to have a meeting sometime with Paul O'Neill and John Ashcroft to talk about how we can improve the shutting down of terrorist finances.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-11

.....

Please respond by 06/14/02

13 May 02

U16916 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12175

May 13, 2002 7:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: WWII Female Pilots

211

Please find out about this op-ed in the *Washington Post* about Arlington Cemetery not honoring female pilots of World War II.

Thanks.

Attach.
Julie I. Englund, "First-Rate, Second-Class," *Washington Post*, 05/12/02

DHR:dh
051302-9

.....
Please respond by 06/07/02

7/13
Settled Done
LARRY DI RITA 7/13

7/3 SECDEF HAS SEEN

~~SecDef~~

~~This is complete, FYI!~~

~~The Army worked very closely with the woman who wrote this to get appropriate recognition for her mother.~~

13 May 02

~~With respect to the broader~~

~~policy the Army has made some modifications that everyone seems okay with. I can brief you. DLR~~

U16917 02

11/4-L-0559/OSD/12176

washingtonpost.com

First-Rate, Second-Class

Why Won't Arlington Cemetery Honor the Female Pilots of WWII?

By Julie I. Englund

Sunday, May 12, 2002; Page B03

How do we honor the Greatest Generation, those brave and determined Americans who served in World War II, when they die? That depends. The men are eligible for an array of military tributes at Arlington National Cemetery, while the female pilots from that era qualify only for a perfunctory, second-class ceremony -- without even an American flag to mark their service.

I know about this inequity because my recently deceased mother, Irene Englund, is one of those pilots.

My mother learned to fly by landing on and taking off from the cliffs rising above the Pacific Ocean near her rural beach town north of San Diego, earning her license in 1938. When the call went out for pilots during WWII, she eagerly volunteered for service with a program that came to be called Women Airforce Service Pilots, or WASPs. Of the 25,000 women who stepped forward, only 1,074 -- including my mother -- were chosen to fly military aircraft on domestic missions, freeing up the male pilots for combat duty. The WASPs, under the direction of famed pilot Jackie Cochran, logged 60 million miles on 12,650 different aircraft, transporting military personnel, supplies and medical patients, towing aerial gunnery targets and ferrying war-weary planes to the scrap heap. The female pilots were often assigned planes with difficult reputations -- such as the B-26 and B-29 bombers. The WASPs had safety records equal to the male pilots.

My mother joined the WASPs in July 1943 with considerable flight experience. She was stationed in Sweetwater, Tex., at Avenger Field, training base for the WASPs. Later, she was sent to Dodge City, Kan., to B-26 bomber school, where she towed targets for air-to-air gunnery practice by male trainees using live ammunition. In Pueblo, Colo., she learned to fly the B-24, becoming one of a handful of women qualified to pilot this massive bomber, despite the military's initial fear that women lacked the strength to fly the four-engine plane. Over the next 17 months, she logged hundreds of hours on every kind of mission -- except combat.

In 1944, word began to circulate that the WASPs would be disbanded to make places for male pilots coming home from the war zones. The WASPs were told that they were welcome to stay on as secretaries. My mother liked to recall her response: She wasn't interested in flying a desk.

The WASPs were disbanded on Dec. 20, 1944. My mother's logbook shows that a male officer on his way to California let her take the pilot's seat for one final turn at the controls of "my favorite B-24 bomber" on her way home. It was one of the last flights for a woman in the cockpit of any American military aircraft for more than 30 years.

She was lucky to get a free ride. As any WASP will tell you, and as several histories of the group recount, the military didn't even give bus fare to most of the discharged WASPs. Nor did it pay to send home the bodies of the 38 women who were killed in the line of duty, which led some of the WASPs to take up a collection among themselves to foot the bills. One could argue the military was just applying a certain bureaucratic logic: The WASPs were federal civilian employees attached to the U.S. Army Air Forces, and therefore technically not members of the armed forces. But my mother had a different way

of describing how the military handled the WASPs' final days. "They just kicked us out and never even said thank you," she said.

It took 35 years for the WASPs to gain the status they so richly deserved. In 1977, Congress passed Public Law 95-202, granting them veterans' recognition. Two years later, on March 8, 1979, the secretary of defense declared the service of the WASPs to be active military, the final act in recognizing them as true veterans.

My mother passed away on Feb. 15, after a stroke. She was 85. When my father -- also a WWII vet -- died in 1996, his ashes were placed at Arlington. My mother proudly noted that when her time came, she, too, would be entitled to an Arlington funeral with military honors. She had no idea that the congressional act and the defense secretary's declaration had not settled the issue.

As my mother's health began to fail, I flew to New York for what would be my last visit with her. I remembered a ritual that she always observed as a passenger on commercial flights -- pausing at the cockpit door as she entered the plane, and introducing herself as a WWII pilot. The airline crew often made announcements over the PA system of the presence of a special guest. So as I boarded, I stopped by the cockpit to let them know that the daughter of a WASP was on board. I saw that both of the pilots were women.

Upon reaching my mother's bedside, I found her unable to move or speak, but still alert. As I told her the story of my flight -- and of the two female pilots -- she smiled broadly. I'm sure she was pleased at the thought that her WASP service had helped pave the way for them -- and for equal treatment.

When I called to make arrangements for my mother's ashes to be placed at Arlington, I was astonished and disappointed to learn that the cemetery deems her ineligible for military funeral honors. Despite the intentions of Congress and the secretary of defense, Arlington National Cemetery still maintains that the WASPs' legally granted rights do not qualify them for the same honors as men.

Arlington essentially offers two types of ceremonies for male vets of WWII. Enlisted men are entitled to "standard honors," which involves a military honor detail that accompanies the deceased, a rifle salute and a rendition of "Taps," followed by the folding and presentation of the American flag to his family. Officers are eligible for "full honors," which include the addition of a horse-drawn caisson draped with the American flag and a ceremonial band. My father, as a WWII Navy lieutenant, received full honors at his Arlington service.

None of this will be done for my mother. She is entitled only to a chaplain and to an airman carrying her ashes -- the same treatment accorded to a veteran's spouse. The greatest insult is that Arlington National Cemetery will not even provide a flag -- a final honor of her service to the nation -- as her ashes are placed next to my father's.

This is inexplicable. While it is true that Arlington faces a growing demand for funeral ceremonies as WWII-era veterans pass from the scene, Congress has spoken. In 1999, it enacted Public Law 106-65, requiring that the secretary of defense provide military funeral honors for any veteran, upon request. Certainly, my mother and the other WASPs should be considered veterans in every respect, not in name only.

It is difficult to believe that the sponsors of this measure, or the sponsors of the 1977 legislation granting veterans' status to the WASPs, intended for Arlington National Cemetery to treat these pilots differently from their male counterparts. The 1,074 WASPs served their country with equal dedication and

devotion. It would be a shame to treat the Greatest Generation as if it were only male.

An estimated 500 WASPs are still alive. For them, I hope this injustice can be remedied in time for the nation to honor them. My mother's service will be held on Flag Day, June 14. I am hopeful that Arlington's rules will be changed by then so that she can be laid to rest with honors -- including an American flag.

Julie Englund is dean for administration at Harvard Law School, and former treasurer and vice president for finance and administration at the Brookings Institution.

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May 13, 2002 7:52 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Pakistan

Pakistan

Please fashion a plan for us to put pressure on Musharraf to move faster. Let's talk to Gen. Franks about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-8

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

13 May 02

U16918 02

SHOW HERE

May 13, 2002 7:41 AM

Done
6/24

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CRS Report

120.1

Please tell me what this Congressional Research Service report on the Pentagon not fully funding assets is about.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/13/02 Nathan Hodge, "Report: Pentagon Strays from Fully Funding Assets," *Defense Week*

DHR:dh
051302-6

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

6/6
Zakheim response attached

Larry Di Rita
6/10

13 May 02

U16919 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12181

42
1480

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

2002 MAY 31 PM 5:07



COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

May 31, 2002, 3:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report on Incremental Funding

- The CRS reported that the Department's fiscal year (FY) 2003 budget request set new precedents for procuring items through incremental financing schemes and ignores the Department's longstanding full funding policy. The ¹DD(X), ²CVN(X), ³C-17, and the ⁴Air Force tanker lease proposal were cited as programs that the Department has incrementally funded or is considering to incrementally fund.
- The Department's full funding policy states that the total cost of a weapon should be fully funded in the year the item is procured. There are two exceptions:
 1. advance procurement for long-lead time materials and
 2. advance procurement of items that have been approved for serial production under multiyear contracts.
- The reasons to avoid incremental funding include:
 - It creates liabilities in following fiscal years and limits the Department's and Congress' flexibility to make rational planning decisions;
 - If follow-on funding is not appropriated, there is no useable end item;
 - It reduces cost consciousness as increases in cost can simply be added to subsequent increments.
- ① ● The first DD(X) ship is budgeted incrementally in Research and Development (R&D). Though this is a departure from how we have funded ships in the past, it makes sense to fund the first ship in R&D consistent with other acquisition programs. By funding this way, the ship design will not be "locked in," thereby

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | |

U091367/02

11 L 0559/OSD/12182

allowing changes in the ship design to be more easily made as new technologies are developed. Following ships will be fully funded in the procurement accounts similar to how we budget other weapons systems.

- ② ● The CVN(X) has advance procurement for long lead materials, nuclear components, and detail design efforts consistent with how previous aircraft carrier programs were funded. Construction of the CVN(X), however, is currently "split funded" over two fiscal years (i.e., FY 2007 and FY 2008). I intend to revisit this split funding in the upcoming Program/Budget review and hope to be able to fully fund the ship in FY 2007.
- ③ ● The C-17 multiyear procurement (MYP) plan reflects a departure from the Department's MYP funding policy. In this case, not only will advance procurement funds be used to buy long lead items and items in economic quantities, but it will also incrementally fund the fabrication of aircraft. This strategy allows the Air Force to sustain the current 15 aircraft per year production rate even though the budgeted amounts fully fund only 10 to 14 aircraft per year.
- ④ ● The Air Force proposal to lease tankers is currently being debated within the Department and is not currently in the FY 2003 budget request.
- Programs are reviewed during the budget review to ensure adequate funding.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Ron Garant, (b)(6)

Note:

I have instructed my staff to ensure full funding of programs. Pete Aldridge is in complete agreement. We have, yet again, to change DoD "culture."

-Dov

11-L-0559/OSD/12183

intuitive appeal and it makes his strategy more enticing than if it were just about power. At the same time, it doesn't make it any less risky. It means we could be fighting a lot of wars around the world."

In Iraq, Daalder says he prefers tackling the problem of weapons of mass destruction through United Nations weapons inspectors before considering military action, as some in the administration have advocated.

Similarly, Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development at the University of Maryland, College Park, believes keeping Hussein contained is preferable to a military attack that could destabilize Iraq and the whole region. Hussein is "ruthless and ambitious, but not a madman," Telhami says. "I think we should continue to deter him and limit his power."

Wolfowitz has expressed skepticism about the ability of inspectors to detect Hussein's work on weapons of mass destruction and views inspectors as only "part of a solution."

The larger solution, he says, is still on the president's drawing table. "There are some very big decisions that only the president can make," he says.

Then, the world may know the full measure of Wolfowitz's influence.

Pentagon correspondent Tom Bowman contributed to this article.

New York Times

May 13, 2002

7. Bees Learning Smell Of Bombs With Backing From Pentagon

By Andrew C. Revkin

Scientists working for the Pentagon have trained ordinary honeybees to ignore flowers and home in on minute traces of explosives, a preliminary step toward creating a buzzing, swarming detection system that could be used to find truck bombs, land mines and other hidden explosives.

The research, under way for three years, initially focused on using bees to help clear minefields. But the effort has broadened, the scientists say. In two tests last summer,

before the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, trained bees picked out a truck tainted with traces of explosives.

The work is in its early stages, and bees, like bomb-sniffing dogs, have limitations. They do not work at night or in storms or cold weather, and it is hard to imagine deploying a swarm to sniff luggage in an airport. But they also have extraordinary attributes, including extreme sensitivity to scent molecular trails and the ability to cover every nook around the colony as they weave about in search of food.

Pentagon officials acknowledge that the idea of bomb-sniffing bees has a public relations problem, a "giggle factor," as one official put it. But that official and scientists working on the project insist the idea shows great potential.

"It appears that bees are at least as sensitive or more sensitive to odors than dogs," said Dr. Alan S. Rudolph, program manager for the Defense Sciences Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which is overseeing the experimentation.

The Air Force Research Laboratory at Brooks Air Force Base, in Texas, has just completed an analysis of a round of tests of bees' bomb-sniffing ability and confirmed that they found the explosive chemical more than 99 percent of the time, project scientists said.

In coming weeks, the team plans the first field tests of a new radio transmitter, the size of a grain of salt, that could allow individual bees to be tracked as they follow diffuse trails of bomb ingredients to a source. Such a system would help if bees were used to search a wide area for hidden explosives.

But such sophisticated technology would not be necessary at, say, a truck stop, where the clustering of alerted bees would be apparent.

Scientists involved in the project said bees were also being considered for sniffing out illicit drugs, which release more volatile chemicals into the air and are easier to trace than explosives.

For many years, biologists, notably a group at the

University of Montana, have been training bees to prefer different scents, using sugar as a reward. After one bee learns the new cue, it somehow transfers that knowledge to others. Within hours, an entire hive, and sometimes adjacent hives, switch to searching for the new scent.

Scientists have found that it takes less than two hours to use sugar-water rewards to condition a hive of honeybees to eschew flowers and instead hunt for 2,4-dinitrotoluene, or DNT, a residue in TNT and other explosives, in concentrations as tiny as a few thousandths of a part per trillion.

In tests of 12 trained bee colonies last summer at the Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio, one to two bees an hour were seen flying around uncontaminated controls, while "we were getting 1,200 bees an hour on the targets," said Philip J. Rodacy, a chemist in the explosives technology group at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque. Sandia, the Southwest institute and the University of Montana are among many institutions contributing to the research.

One idea is to place a hive of trained bees near important security checkpoints to guard against potential terrorists, Dr. Rudolph of the defense research agency said. But he added that much more work had to be done before that could happen.

"It's not straightforward to move from watching bees hovering around a box to watching trucks parking in a weigh station for a minute," he said. "This is not a capability until we know how predictable it is."

The work is a facet of a much broader effort overseen by Dr. Rudolph to exploit the chemical sensitivity and mobility of bees, as well as moths and other insects, so they can scour broad areas for a whiff of a chemical. Over all, the Pentagon has spent \$25 million since 1998 on researching what it calls controlled biological systems, traits of animals that might be turned into war-fighting technologies.

Scientists are also exploring whether moplake insect

hairs can be used to screen the air for releases of biological or chemical weapons. Early tests have shown that bees are an efficient sampling mechanism for airborne bacterial spores, including those of a close cousin of the anthrax bacteria, said Dr. Jerry J. Bromenshenk, an entomologist at the University of Montana.

He and other researchers there have developed "smart hives" that monitor the comings and goings of the insects and, with equipment developed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, sip the air as bees return, to test for explosives.

Defense Week

May 13, 2002

Pg. 2

8. Report: Pentagon Strays From Fully Funding Assets

By Nathan Hodge

According to a report issued last week by the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress' non-partisan research arm, the Pentagon is chipping away at a longstanding budget policy that mandates full funding of weapons systems.

The Congressional Research Service, or CRS, suggested that, in the Pentagon's latest budget submission, the military may be setting "new precedents" for procuring items through incremental types of funding.

"Such precedents could further circumscribe the full-funding policy," the report reads. "This, in turn, could limit and complicate Congress' oversight of DOD procurement programs, or require different approaches to exercise control and oversight."

Since the 1950s, Congress has required the Pentagon to fully fund the total cost of a weapon in the year the item is procured; that policy is spelled out in an executive-branch circular from the Office of Management and Budget. But the Pentagon regularly uses alternative strategies for funding costly items, especially Navy ships.

There are two main exceptions to full-funding policy. Congress routinely approves

May 13, 2002 7:38 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ISA

020 ISA

The material that comes up through Rodman isn't working. You are going to have to start reviewing it and managing him, and putting structure into the process so that it starts getting better, like the material I get from Crouch.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-5

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

13 May 02

U16920 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12185

Snowflake
0802

May 13, 2002 7:27 AM

PACOM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: AORs

Antarctica

On Antarctica, those lines that go right up to Antarctica by EUCOM and SOUTHCOM, even though PACOM has the entire continent, seems to me to be unwise. I would have thought they would have stopped short, that SOUTHCOM would not have gone all the way to touch the land—it would have stayed offshore some distance—and that EUCOM would have also, and just left the whole thing to PACOM, but maybe I am wrong.

I also was looking at the Arctic Ocean, and I find the PACOM connection off Greenland going to Russia kind of strange. Let's talk about that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-2

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

*CPCS replied separately.
I agree w/ his comment.*

SC

MAY 18 2002

[Signature]

13MAY02

U16921 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12186

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: May 11, 2002
 SUBJECT:

000.715D

Colin Powell wants to sit down with me. He says we are trying to take away his military people. He thinks they are mutually beneficial. I agree with him.

We have got to decide what we are going to decide about State, NSC and CIA where it is useful to have military people as well as civilians.

Let's talk. I need an hour meeting with you to develop a philosophy so we can get all this garbage behind us. Set it up for Monday.

Thanks.

D

DHR/azn
051102.17

Please respond by: 5/13/02

SIR:

Copy already given to L. Di Rita.

Arlene

11MAY02

U16922 02

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
 Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: May 11, 2002

SUBJECT: **Crusader**


470

You have got to make sure that Shinseki, Myers and Pace are intimately involved in this study that is being done on the alternative to Crusader.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051102.15

Please respond by: 5/14/02



Done
5/17
LARRY Di Rita

11MAY02

U16923 02

showfile
020

2:24 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Admiral Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 11, 2002
SUBJECT: Visiting Dignitaries

091.112

We've got a problem with the Protocol people. We set a dignitary's time of arrival and sometimes the time of arrival is earlier than the time set. What they do then is to hold the dignitaries and the police escort down the road, and make them just sit there while they come up and tell me I should come downstairs.

I do not like keeping people waiting. I think it is rude and wrong. I think that in the future, I want to be down there every single time without people having to wait. That means they have got to figure out a way to know when they are going to arrive, and they have got to give me three minutes notice to walk down the stairs. It should not take a genius to figure out how to do that.

In recent days it has happened to me three or four times and I really find it awkward and embarrassing. Let's get it fixed.

Thanks.

Settle

DHR/azn
051102.02

Done
Larry Di Rita
SR

Please respond by: 5/20/02

11MAY02

U16924-02

11-L-0559/OSD/12189

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: May 11, 2002
 SUBJECT: NATO

France

Tell Crouch and that crowd that I do want to meet with the new Defense Minister of France Michele Alliot-Marie when I go to NATO.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051102.01

Please respond by: _____

11MAY02

U16925 02

May 10, 2002 11:19 AM

000.3

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Church of the Nativity

Now that the Church of the Nativity has been recaptured, I would like to know if the door was blown off. Please ask Denny, and have her tell me today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051002-12

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

5/10
1640

VADM G.

MAT LEIBNER ^(ESO) CONTACTED
CIA - TO QUOTE,
" DOORS NOT DAMAGED..."
HOWEVER THEY ARE NOT 100%
CERTAIN (FROM NEAR EAST ANALYST)
- WINDOWS DAMAGED? BULLET
HOLES
- NO REPORTED LOOTING.

10 MAY 02

STATE REPORTS

- NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- NO DAMAGE TO ICONS/ARTIFACTS
- LOTS OF CLUTTER. v/r L

U16926 02
11-L-0559/OSD/12191

May 10, 2002 9:08 AM

SYRIA

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Syria on UN Security Council

Please find out if the U.S. voted against or abstained on Syria becoming a member of the Security Council.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051002-9

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

5/13 -

SecDef -

The interim response is attached. Short

Answer: At least at ^{Deputy} Asst + Secretary level, they aren't saying or don't know. Still moving up the chain. *DR*

U16927 02
11-L-0559/OSD/12192

Larry Di Rita
5/14

Syria and UN Security Council Seat

How did US Vote?

- Syria received 160 votes (of the 178 voting nations) of the United Nations General Assembly.
- US did not publicly oppose Syrian ascension to the Security Council Seat.
- General Assembly voting for Security Council (UNSC) seats is anonymous.
- When asked how the US voted, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said "As is our longstanding practice and policy, we do not disclose how we voted in any of the elections."

- State Department Syria Desk Officer said that only USUN Negroponte, SECSTATE Powell and POTUS know how we voted.

} According to Luti.

What Were the Circumstances?

- Vote on Security Council 2-year membership occurred in October 2001, about a month after the start of the "Al Aqsa Intifada."
- To block Syria, US would have had to find another Asian/Arab state to contest the seat. (In the 1990s, UK opposed Libyan inclusion, instead supporting Egyptian position on the UNSC.)
- Election took place two years after "election" of Bashar al Asad to power, when many were still optimistic about prospects for new kind of Syrian leadership.

Prepared by: ISA/NESA

9/13 snowhare
1300

May 10, 2002 7:55 AM

032

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Outreach

We have to get more Congressional breakfasts and things like that going on.

We are going to drift away from Congress, and they are going to get after us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051002-7

.....
Please respond by 05/11/02

Settel

Done

Larry Di Rita
5/13

10 MAY 02

U16928 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12194

May 10, 2002 7:28 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Interim Brigades

322

Don't you think we ought to reduce the number of interim brigades?

Thanks.

DJR dh
051002-6

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

U16929 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12195

18 MAY 02

7:10 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
Terry Robbins
Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 10, 2002

SUBJECT: SF-278

Please review the attached document and let me know your thoughts. The filing deadline for Form SF-278 is Wednesday, May 15, 2002.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051002.01

Attach: Draft letter to Paul Koffsky RE: SF-278

(Handwritten signature)
Larry Di Rita

Please respond by: _____

250

10MAY02

U16930 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12196



TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie Clarke /s/

DATE: May 13, 2002

SUBJECT: SF-278

I think this is great and should go as is. The SF-278 is impossible to understand.

Piling on, as a supervisor I am required to sign the SF-278s of several people who work for me. My signature confirms that- "I conclude that the filer is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations...." The only way for me to truly know that is if I hired a lawyer/accountant to check each of their SF-278s in addition to mine.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600
ACTION MEMO

May 13, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel

D. J. Dell'Orto
May 13, 2002 2:25 PM

SUBJECT: Financial Disclosure Report (SF-278)

- Attached is your letter concerning your financial disclosure report. I have readdressed it to the Director of the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, and added a reference to pending legislation that seeks to make many technical changes and minor simplifications to the report.
- I have highlighted the language I have added, and have handwritten and bracketed those words of your original draft that I recommend you delete.
- Since this letter expresses your deeply-held personal beliefs, it is more appropriate for your personal rather than SecDef letterhead.
- Recommend signature.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Steve Epstein (b)(6)

Honorable Amy Comstock
Director
U.S. Office of Government Ethics
1201 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005-3917

Dear Ms. Comstock:

Attached is my Public Financial Disclosure Report (SF-278), due May 15, 2002.

{ I do not understand it. }
I have read it. I find it excessively complex and confusing. To be able to attest to every word, or the checks in every box, would take me days and probably weeks of reviewing mountains of records. I do not have the time.

Instead, I have hired an accountant to prepare it for me. He and his firm spent 490 man-hours to prepare the document at a personal cost to me of (b)(6)

They have used materials that they, my wife, my personal secretary in Chicago, and I maintain. We have done the best we can. If there are questions or problems, please contact my accountant, (b)(6) at (b)(6) located at (b)(6) (b)(6) the preparer of this document.

[down] While I'm aware that this form is required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Pub.L 95-521), which has been amended several times, and that your office has drafted legislation, which is presently awaiting action by the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, I strongly urge that an analysis be made as to the real value of this ridiculous document. I cannot believe that, as it is presently constituted, it serves any useful purpose. There is no doubt in my mind but that with a little effort, this document could be simplified to less than one third of its present length, and rewritten so it can be understood by the preparer as well as by the reader. *[mention of which is the case as it is currently written.]*

Please make this cover letter public as a part of my SF-278, in the event you make the SF-278 public.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/12199

DRAFT

May 10, 2002

Mr. Paul Koffsky
Department of Defense
Office of the General Counsel
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20003

RE: **Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report (SF-278)**

Dear Mr. Kossky:

Attached is my Disclosure Report (SF-278) due May 15, 2002.

I have read it. I do not understand it. I find it excessively complex and confusing. To be able to attest to every word, or the checks in every box, would take me days and probably weeks of reviewing mountains of records. I do not have the time.

Instead, I have hired an accountant to prepare for me. He and his firm spent 490 man-hours to prepare the document at a personal cost to me of (b)(6)

They have used materials that they, my wife, my personal secretary in Chicago and I maintain. We have done the best we can. If there are questions or problems, please contact my accountant, (b)(6) at (b)(6) located at (b)(6) the preparer of this document.

I strongly urge that an analysis be made as to the real value of this ridiculous document. I cannot believe that it serves any useful purpose. There is no doubt in my mind but that with a little effort, this document could be simplified down to less than one third its length, and rewritten so it can be understood by the preparer as well as by the reader, neither of which is the case as it is currently written.

Please make this cover letter public as a part of my SF-278, in the event you make the SF-278 public.

Sincerely,

Attach: SF-278

11-L-0559/OSD/12200

7:10 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
Terry Robbins
Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 10, 2002

SUBJECT: SF-278

Please review the attached document and let me know your thoughts. The filing deadline for Form SF-278 is Wednesday, May 15, 2002.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051002.01

Attach: Draft letter to Paul Koffsky RE: SF-278

Please respond by: _____

5/13

SecDef -

I have no problem with you attaching some type of statement. I might suggest leaving off the dollar value. If you leave a cost in, I'd be less precise. Also attached a draft insert for your consideration. D.R.A.

11-L-0559/OSD/12201

May 9, 2002 2:22 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Portugal

I just looked at this J.D. Crouch memo. I have amended it at the bottom.

I thought we put in place a process to solve this through NATO. The letter seems not to know that. Why not?

Thanks.

Attach.
04/30/02 ASD(ISP) Action Memo to SecDef, Letter to Portuguese Minister of Defense
[U07718/02]

DHR dh
050902-10

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

Portugal

9 May 02

U16931 02



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

SECDEF HAS SEEN 2002 MAY -3 PM 12:43



MAY 09 2002

ACTION MEMO

005326
I-02/006051-NATO
1-02/006051

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: J.D. CROUCH, II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

APR 30 2002

SUBJECT: Letter to Portuguese Minister of Defense

- Portuguese Minister of Defense Rui Pena sent you a letter expressing concern over the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and the extent to which it will affect the NATO Strategic Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT). (TAB B)
- In particular, Minister Pena believes that an American General Officer should continue as SACLANT so as to demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO's Integrated Command Structure.
- Minister Pena opined also that a decision to eliminate SACLANT and have a single strategic command located in Europe would produce negative results for NATO decision-making on military issues generally.
- Attached for your review and signature is a draft reply to Minister Pena. (TAB A)
 - The draft response expresses our commitment to have NATO decide the future of SACLANT.
 - I suggest you use the response as an opportunity to garner Mr. Pena's support for our position.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the attached letter to Minister Pena.

SecDef Decision:

_____ Agree (Sign the Letter)
_____ Other

[Handwritten signature]
4/17
SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA

Attachments

TAB B: Portuguese MOD Letter
TAB A: Letter to Portuguese MOD
TAB C: Coordinations

PRS/PRD ITEMS

DATE RECEIVED IN OSD: 4/4/02
SUSPENSE DATE: 4/12/02
RECEIVED IN C&D: 5/3/02
DAYS LATE: 21
Prepared by: (b)(6)

| | |
|-----------------------|-------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 5/13 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | 5/5/9 |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 5/6 |

U07718 102

04-30-02 11:22 AM
04-30-02 08:50 AM

59/OSD/12203



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

His Excellency
Rui Pena
Minister of National Defence
Portugese Republic

Dear Minister Pena:

Thank you for your letter regarding NATO and the future of the Alliance's Command Structure.


The changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) that I announced on April 17 will realign and streamline the U.S. military structure to better address 21st century requirements. Under the UCP, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) no longer will have responsibilities for homeland defense, but will focus on transformation.

Although it is our intention to divest the Commander, JFCOM of his duties as NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), we recognize that SACLANT is a NATO Command and its future must be decided ~~by consensus~~ within the Alliance.

I look forward to seeing you at the Defense Ministerial in June.

Sincerely,

*We have consulted with Sec on General
Bredemeyer and are putting in place
a process within NATO to handle these
this issue -*



May 9, 2002 8:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Corps of Engineers

322

What is happening on the Corps of Engineer—filling that post and thinking about spitting it out of the Department of Defense?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050902-4

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

5/8
SecDef: I have worked with Clay Johnson, Les Brownlee, and Sec Army to develop some criteria and candidates. We have a large pool that needs some winnowing down before we start interviewing. I've discussed briefly with Steve H. early on and will stay in touch as I develop solid candidates. Will advise. *Di Rita*

9
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2

U16932 02
11-L-0559/OSD/12205

5/10 show where
15200

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Admiral Giambartani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: May 9, 2002
SUBJECT: TRADOC

5:52 PM
5/17
Attelle - Done
5/21

210 Army

Some time ago I asked the TRADOC when is Abrams tour up, who picks the new TRADOC head for Abrams' replacement, who has that decision process, I assume it is a Presidential appointment and therefore I ought to be able to get into it. It is pretty darn important.

Thanks.

5/17
VADM G-
FYI, spoke with to him
Staser. He said he is also
"on the case."
extensively
Jarry
out this
out

DHR/azn
050902.02

Please respond by: 5/20/02

5/13
I'll mention to Staser that he should start collecting candidates.
SECRET - VIA ADM G
He is a 4-Star officer.
You will be able to get into it. You should discuss with Sec Army and Chief of staff lay out criteria, etc. He is due for replacement later this year
Ed
G-11-02

Larry Di Rita
5/13

U16933 02
11-L-0559/OSD/12206

showflake
5/10
5/10

5:52 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Admiral Giambartoni
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 9, 2002

SUBJECT: TRADOC

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

Some time ago I asked the TRADOC wher
TRADOC head for Abrams' replacement,
it is a Presidential appointment and therefo
pretty darn important.

STASER
STATUS

Thanks.

DHR/azn
050902.02

Please respond by: 5/20

5/13

I'll mention to Staser
that he should start
collecting candidates.

SECDEF - VIA ADM G

He is a 4-Star officer.

You will be able to get
into it. You should discuss
with Sec Army and Chief of
Staff lay out criteria, etc. He is
due for replacement later this year.

LARRY DI RITA
7/13

11-L-0559/OSD/12207

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Admiral Giambartani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 9, 2002

SUBJECT: TRADOC

Some time ago I asked the TRADOC when is Abrams tour up, who picks the new TRADOC head for Abrams' replacement, who has that decision process, I assume it is a Presidential appointment and therefore I ought to be able to get into it. It is pretty darn important.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
050902.02

Please respond by: 5/20/02



May 8, 2002 2:19 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: NSC/Detailees

DR
MDR
Dove
7/8

Please let me see a list of all the people who are detailed to the NSC, so I can find out what in the world she is doing and talking about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050802-39

NSC

Please respond by 05/31/02

5/9

~~John G. ...~~
~~...~~
~~...~~

89

5/13
See Def - The NSC
staff roster. Those highlighted
are DoD personnel

Note at Tab: We already have
contractors over there doing communications
and computer support. We believe there
are other positions that could be filled by
contractors, too

8/11/02

U16934 02

11L-0550/OSD/12209

Access Management

| | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|---------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Director | Soubers, Richard (Red) R. | NARA | \$67,162.00 | GS-13 | 05/13/97 | 05/13/02 |
| Administrative Assistant | Bolinaki, Charlene C. | WHSG- | \$46,937.00 | GS-10 | 04/15/85 | 01/20/05 |
| Technical Information Specialist | Cox, Jr., Richard F. | NARA | \$65,556.00 | GS-12 | 09/10/01 | 09/30/02 |
| Technical Information Specialist | Crawford, Bernard T. | NSC | \$39,686.00 | GS-09 | 12/06/99 | |
| Technical Information Specialist | Sonborn, Daniel R. K. | NSC | \$49,566.00 | GS-11 | 06/19/94 | |
| Review Officer Archives (NARA) | Smith, Michael P. | NARA/HP | \$50,205.00 | GS-12 | 02/20/96 | 01/15/02 |
| Review Officer Archives (NARA) | Stovel, Ferris (Chip) E. | NARA/HP | \$110,028.00 | GS-13 | 02/14/00 | 01/20/02 |
| Review Officer State Dept (DOS) | McIntyre, Stuart H. | DOS/HP | \$66,138.00 | GS-14 | 08/29/88 | 08/28/05 |
| Review Officer State Dept (DOS) | Suleer, Jack Arnold | DOS/HP | \$66,138.00 | GS-14 | 08/15/88 | 08/14/05 |
| Total of Salaries for Access Management: | | | \$522,751.00 | | | |

Administrative Office Staff

| | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Deputy Executive Secretary and Senior Director for Administration | Lukens, Lewis A. | DOS | \$77,797.00 | FS-2 | 07/30/01 | 07/29/02 |
| Administrative Officer | Paschall, III, Richard (Cmf) C. | DOS | \$64,930.00 | FS-3 | 07/30/01 | 07/29/02 |
| Personnel Liaison Officer | Dimal, Marsha L. | NSC | \$70,644.00 | GS-13 | 11/22/92 | |
| Financial Manager | Fertakis, Katherine J. | NSC | \$65,319.00 | GS-13 | 12/17/00 | |
| Security Officer | (b)(6) | CIA | \$74,352.00 | GS-14 | 07/06/98 | 01/31/02 |
| Administrative Assistant | Joshlyn, Gay L. | NSC | \$45,115.00 | GS-10 | 12/05/99 | |
| Program Assistant | Vandenberg, Cynthia A. | NSC/OCT | \$26,192.00 | GS-05 | 02/24/02 | |
| Security Officer (Temp) | (b)(6) | CIA | \$75,058.00 | GS-13 | 05/06/02 | 05/17/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant (Floater) | Lindsey, JaWuan L. | NSC | \$34,772.00 | GS-08 | 04/22/02 | |
| Total of Salaries for Administrative Office Staff: | | | \$510,026.00 | | | |

African Affairs

| | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------|-----|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Frazier, Jendayi E. J. | NSC | \$138,200.00 | SL | 01/22/01 | |
| Director for African Affairs | Milner, Michael W. | NSC | \$80,873.00 | GS-14 | 02/26/01 | |
| Director (Temporary) | (b)(6) | CIA | \$57,550.00 | GS-12 | 04/12/02 | 07/12/02 |
| Director for African Affairs | (b)(6) | DIA | \$67,427.00 | GS-13 | 06/18/01 | 06/18/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | (b)(6) | CIA | \$49,740.00 | GS-11 | 06/28/71 | 06/27/05 |
| Total of Salaries for African Affairs: | | | \$373,891.00 | | | |

Asian Affairs

| | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------|-----|--------------|--------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Moriarty, James F. | DOS | \$133,700.00 | PEMC-4 | 07/23/01 | 07/22/03 |
|--|--------------------|-----|--------------|--------|----------|----------|

| | | Home Agency | Salary | Grade | EOD | Projected End Date |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------|----------|--------------------|
| Director for Japan and Korea | Green, Michael J. | NSC | \$96,651.00 | GS-15 | 04/16/01 | |
| Director, Asian Affairs | Thomas, Jr., Harry K. | DOS | \$115,811.00 | FEBC-1 | 05/14/01 | 05/13/03 |
| Director for Asian Economic Affairs | Charbonnet, Laurent D. | DOS | \$92,894.00 | FS-2 | 03/12/01 | 06/30/02 |
| Director for Southeast Asia | Brooks, Karen B. | NSC | \$66,229.00 | GS-13 | 05/07/01 | |
| Acting Director for China and Taiwan | (b)(6) | CIA | \$68,436.00 | GS-13 | 03/21/02 | 05/20/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | (b)(6) | CIA | \$55,470.00 | GS-12 | 06/27/01 | 06/26/03 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Amos, Regina (Gina) F. | DOS | \$55,624.00 | FS-5 | 04/02/01 | 07/31/02 |
| Total of Salaries for Asian Affairs: | | | \$666,863.00 | | | |

Cyberspace Security Liaison Office

| | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------|-----|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Chairman, Cyber Board | Clarke, Richard A. | DOS | \$138,200.00 | SES-6 | 08/17/92 | 10/18/01 |
| Senior Director for Cyberspace Security Liaison | Kurtz, Paul B. | WH | \$105,000.00 | AD | 12/09/99 | 12/30/01 |
| Director for Cyberspace Security Liaison | (b)(6) | NSA | \$120,261.00 | SES-1 | 07/09/01 | 04/24/02 |
| Director for Cyberspace Security | Sachs, Marcus (Marc) H. | WH | \$105,000.00 | AD | 02/11/02 | |
| Executive Assistant, Cyberspace Security Liaison Directorate | Howerton, Barbara E. | WH | \$57,000.00 | AD | 01/14/02 | |
| Total of Salaries for Cyberspace Security Liaison Office: | | | \$525,461.00 | | | |

Defense Policy and Arms Control

| | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------|------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Miller, Franklin C. | DOD | \$133,700.00 | SES-6 | 01/22/01 | 01/21/03 |
| Director for Defense Policy | Bolton, Jr., Edward L. | USAF | \$82,980.00 | O-6 | 06/21/00 | 05/01/02 |
| Director for Nuclear Policy and Arms Control | Klotz, Frank G. | USAF | \$114,224.00 | O-7 | 07/09/01 | 07/09/03 |
| Director for Current Operations and Defense Readiness | Greenwood, Thomas C. | USMC | \$73,364.00 | O-6 | 07/10/00 | 07/09/02 |
| Director | (b)(6) | CIA | \$138,200.00 | SES-5 | 04/22/02 | 04/21/03 |
| Director for Arms Control Policy | (b)(6) | CIA | \$84,658.00 | GS-14 | 01/07/02 | 07/06/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Clark, Vicki M. | WHSG | \$48,443.00 | GS-10 | 01/29/01 | 01/20/05 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | (b)(6) | CIA | \$44,631.00 | IS-03 | 03/19/02 | 03/17/03 |
| Total of Salaries for Defense Policy and Arms Control: | | | \$720,200.00 | | | |

Democracy, Human Rights & International Operations

| | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------------|-------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Abrams, Elliott | USAID | \$133,700.00 | AD | 06/25/01 | 11/26/02 |
| Director for Democratization, Human Rights and Non-Government Liaison | Nemroff, Courtney R. | DOS | \$66,578.00 | FS-3 | 09/29/01 | 08/25/03 |
| Director for Democracy | Andrews, Mary (MC) C. | NSC | \$112,543.00 | GS-15 | 02/20/01 | |
| Director for Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peaceful Reconciliation | Banbury, Anthony (Tony) N. | NSC | \$98,744.00 | GS-13 | 05/18/00 | 05/17/03 |
| Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief | Dworkin, Jonathan T. | USAID | \$74,697.00 | GS-14 | 12/10/01 | 08/08/02 |
| Director for Governance and Development | Kramer, Stephen D. | DOS | \$119,682.00 | GS-15 | 04/08/02 | 08/30/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | (b)(6) | CIA | \$39,806.00 | IS-04 | 05/13/96 | 05/13/02 |
| Total of Salaries for Democracy, Human Rights & International Operations: | | | \$624,962.00 | | | |

European and Eurasian Affairs

| | | Home Agency | Salary | Grade | EOD | Projected End Date |
|---|--------------------------|-------------|----------------|--------|----------|--------------------|
| Special Assistants to the President and Senior Director | Fried, Daniel | DOS | \$133,700.00 | FEMC-5 | 01/22/01 | 01/21/03 |
| Senior Director | Schulte, Gregory L. | DOD | \$130,200.00 | SES-4 | 07/03/00 | 07/02/02 |
| Director for European Economic Affairs and EU Relations | Quannad, Pamela G. | DOS | \$97,561.00 | FS-2 | 04/23/01 | 04/22/03 |
| Director for Southeast Europe | Pitman, Howard (Dean) D. | DOS | \$73,560.00 | FS-2 | 06/06/00 | 06/05/02 |
| Director for Central, Eastern & North Europe, European and Eurasian Affairs | Andrusyszyn, Walter E. | DOS | \$131,615.00 | FECC-3 | 11/26/01 | 11/25/03 |
| Director for Russian Affairs | Robertson, Thomas B. | DOS | \$114,224.00 | FS-1 | 09/04/01 | 09/03/02 |
| Director for Aegean, South Caucasus and Central Asia | Bryzn, Matthew J. | DOS | \$87,561.00 | FS-2 | 04/15/01 | 04/14/03 |
| Director for NATO & Western European Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs | Volker, Kurt D. | DOS | \$90,188.00 | FS-2 | 08/22/01 | 08/21/03 |
| Associate Director, European and Eurasian Affairs | Lenti, Sarah M. | NSC | \$78,265.00 | GS-14 | 02/20/01 | |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Quinn, Mary E. | NSC | \$54,966.00 | GS-10 | 10/01/88 | |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Maxfield, Nancy H. | WHSG | \$42,893.00 | GS-10 | 06/26/89 | 01/20/03 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | (b)(6) | CIA | \$38,078.00 | IS-04 | 08/26/96 | 08/26/02 |
| Total of Salaries for European and Eurasian Affairs: | | | \$1,046,314.00 | | | |

Executive Secretary

| | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Executive Secretary | Diagon, Stephen E. | NSC | \$130,000.00 | EX-TV | 06/18/01 | |
| Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary | Millison, Cathy L. | NSC | \$75,857.00 | GS-13 | 10/27/74 | |
| Deputy Executive Secretary | Bash, Brooks L. | USAP | \$68,004.00 | O-6 | 01/18/00 | 05/03/02 |
| Deputy Executive Secretary | Pray, Jr., John I. | USAP | \$96,300.00 | O-6 | 04/22/02 | 04/19/03 |
| Special Assistant to the Deputy Executive Secretary | Joshi, M. Kay | WHSG | \$60,405.00 | GS-11 | 06/17/84 | 01/20/05 |
| Administrative Assistant | Neumann, Virginia R. | DOS | \$44,181.00 | FS-6 | 09/24/01 | 09/23/02 |
| Administrative Assistant | Winas, Alexant T. | NSC | \$70,362.00 | GS-08 | 10/22/00 | |
| Deputy Executive Secretary for Scheduling and Advance | Hanas, Mary A. | DOS | \$114,224.00 | GS-15 | 05/29/01 | 05/28/03 |
| Special Assistant for Scheduling and Advance | Elliott, Ruth E. | NSC | \$40,367.00 | GS-10 | 04/09/01 | |
| Total of Salaries for Executive Secretary: | | | \$651,823.00 | | | |

Intelligence Programs

| | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-----|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistants to the President and Senior Director | (b)(6) | CIA | \$133,700.00 | SES-4 | 07/09/01 | 07/08/02 |
| Director | (b)(6) | CIA | \$125,893.00 | SES-2 | 02/12/01 | 02/11/03 |
| Director for Counterintelligence | (b)(6) | FBI | \$92,128.00 | GS-14 | 07/09/01 | 07/09/03 |
| Director (ICAP) for Collection, Processing and Information | (b)(6) | NSA | \$53,969.00 | GS-13 | 05/05/97 | 01/30/03 |
| Director (Temporary) | (b)(6) | DIA | \$102,508.00 | GS-15 | 11/13/01 | 03/26/03 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Rodrick, Myrtle (NMN) | NSC | \$50,756.00 | GS-10 | 10/05/00 | |
| Administrative Support Assistant | (b)(6) | CIA | \$56,699.00 | GS-12 | 07/23/01 | 07/22/03 |
| Total of Salaries for Intelligence Programs: | | | \$608,623.00 | | | |

International Economic Affairs

| | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|-----|--------------|--------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Clout, Jr., John A. | DOS | \$133,700.00 | FEMC-4 | 04/30/01 | 04/29/03 |
|--|---------------------|-----|--------------|--------|----------|----------|

| | | <u>Home Agency</u> | <u>Salary</u> | <u>Grade</u> | <u>EOD</u> | <u>Projected End Date</u> |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Program Analyst | Manuel, Gregory A. | USAID | \$53,156.00 | AD | 06/25/01 | 06/25/03 |
| Director for International Financial Institutions | Lowery, Clay (NMI) | Treasury | \$120,261.00 | SES-1 | 04/09/01 | 04/08/03 |
| Director for International Trade | Lutman, Mary NMN | USTR | \$99,580.00 | GS-15 | 12/03/01 | 12/02/02 |
| Director for G-7/8 | Isles, Adam R. | DOJ | \$92,060.00 | GS-15 | 01/15/02 | 01/14/03 |
| Director for Energy, Development and the Middle East | Spirnak, Madelyn E. | DOS | \$125,863.00 | FEOC-2 | 09/17/01 | 09/16/03 |
| Director (CEQ) for International Environmental Issues | Hocht, Alan D. | EPA | \$133,700.00 | SES-6 | 09/24/01 | 09/23/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Adams, Mary Lou | DOS | \$57,490.00 | FS-4 | 05/22/01 | 05/21/03 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Mittler, Elaine M. | NSC | \$60,405.00 | GS-11 | 06/04/85 | |
| Total of Salaries for International Economic Affairs: | | | \$870,015.00 | | | |

Legal Adviser

| | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------------|--------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Senior Associate Counsel to the President and NSC Legal Adviser | Beilinger, III, John B. | NSC | \$138,200.00 | SL | 02/11/01 | |
| Deputy Legal Adviser | Wiegmann, John (Brad) B. | WHSG ✓ | \$114,224.00 | GS-15 | 08/28/00 | 01/20/05 |
| Deputy Legal Adviser | (b)(6) | CIA | \$119,682.00 | GS-15 | 05/06/02 | 05/05/03 |
| Deputy Legal Adviser | Scharfen, Jonathan (Joak) R. | USMC ✓ | \$73,364.00 | O-6 | 05/09/00 | 07/20/03 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Hunerwadel, Joan S. | NSC | \$60,405.00 | GS-11 | 10/23/88 | |
| Total of Salaries for Legal Adviser: | | | \$481,455.00 | | | |

Legislative Affairs

| | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------|--------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Andreas, George (Michael) M. | WHSG ✓ | \$133,700.00 | SES-6 | 02/26/01 | 02/25/03 |
| Director | (b)(6) | CIA | \$82,168.00 | GS-14 | 05/16/01 | 05/13/03 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Burrell, Christina L. | WHSG ✓ | \$48,173.00 | GS-10 | 01/31/88 | 01/20/05 |
| Total of Salaries for Legislative Affairs: | | | \$260,041.00 | | | |

National Security Advisor

| | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------------|--------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs | Rice, Condoleezza | WH | \$140,000.00 | AD | 01/20/01 | 01/20/05 |
| Executive Assistant to the APNSA | Waxman, Matthew C. | NSC | \$86,095.00 | GS-13 | 07/30/01 | |
| Special Assistant to the APNSA | Lineberry, Laura (Liz) B. | DOS | \$75,271.00 | FS-3 | 02/14/01 | 02/13/03 |
| Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor | Hadley, Stephen (Steve) J. | WH | \$140,000.00 | AD | 01/20/01 | 01/20/05 |
| Executive Assistant to the APDNSA | Crawford, Anthony K. | USA ✓ | \$54,763.00 | O-5 | 05/07/01 | 05/06/03 |
| Special Assistant to the APDNSA | Salva, Elizabeth A. | DOS | \$52,431.00 | FS-5 | 04/09/01 | 04/08/03 |
| Deputy Assistant to the President for Intern'l Economic Affairs & Deputy National Security Advisor | Edson, Gary R. | WH | \$110,000.00 | AD | 03/07/01 | 01/20/05 |
| Special Assistant to the DAPNSA | Gray, Wendy E. | NSC | \$64,975.00 | GS-12 | 11/14/86 | |
| Administrative Assistant to the APNSA/APDNSA | Barnett, Cheryl E. | WHSG ✓ | \$49,789.00 | GS-10 | 01/20/98 | 01/20/05 |
| Administrative Assistant to the APNSA/APDNSA | Cooper, Colby J | GSA | \$36,656.00 | GS-09 | 03/20/00 | 11/15/02 |
| Total of Salaries for National Security Advisor: | | | \$789,330.00 | | | |

Office for Combating Terrorism

| | | | | | | |
|--|----------------|-----|--------------|--------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Combating | Craig, John B. | DOS | \$133,700.00 | FEMC-4 | 10/17/01 | 10/21/03 |
|--|----------------|-----|--------------|--------|----------|----------|

| | | <u>Home Agency</u> | <u>Salary</u> | <u>Grade</u> | <u>EOD</u> | <u>Projected End Date</u> |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Terrorism | | | | | | |
| Senior Director for Strategic Communications and Information | Jones, Jeffrey B. | NSC/OCT | \$125,724.00 | SL | 11/04/01 | |
| Director for Military Issues | McRaven, William H. | USN ✓ | \$96,534.00 | O-6 | 10/22/01 | 10/21/03 |
| Director for International Threat Coordination | (b)(6) | CIA | \$131,881.00 | SES-2 | 01/29/02 | 04/29/02 |
| Director for Overseas Incident & Consequence Mgmt & HSC Liaison | Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. | DOE | \$137,901.00 | SES-3 | 07/06/98 | 07/20/02 |
| Director for Drugs and Latin America | Rzemieszewski, Robert F. | USCO ✓ | \$100,638.00 | O-6 | 06/18/01 | 06/17/03 |
| Director for Regional Affairs | Rasmussen, Nicholas J. | DOS | \$79,678.00 | GS-14 | 09/17/01 | 09/16/03 |
| Director for International Financial Affairs | Myers, Joseph (Jody) M. | Treasury | \$120,261.00 | SES-1 | 09/17/01 | 09/16/02 |
| Associate Director for International Financial Affairs | Passic, Gregory A. | US Customs | \$114,224.00 | GS-15 | 11/26/01 | 11/25/02 |
| Associate Director for International Financial Affairs, Office for Combating Terrorism | Peters, Gary J. | DOJ/OCT | \$119,682.00 | GS-15 | 02/11/02 | 02/10/03 |
| Director for Intelligence Analysis | Flohr, Linda C. | NSC/OCT | \$102,508.00 | GS-15 | 12/31/01 | 09/30/02 |
| Director for Intelligence Information Initiative | Piemick, Kenneth R. | FBI | \$107,405.00 | GS-15 | 02/18/02 | 04/29/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Urquidez, Sarah M. | NSC/OCT | \$54,986.00 | GS-10 | 11/16/01 | |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Melaur, Pamela S. | ATF | \$46,469.00 | GS-11 | 04/06/02 | 06/04/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Fioranza, Christopher M. | USCO | \$32,850.00 | E-6 | 08/22/01 | 08/21/03 |
| Total of Salaries for Office for Combating Terrorism: | | | 1,484,346.00 | | | |

Office of Press and Communications

| | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------|-----|---------------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Deputy Assistant to the President and Counselor to the National Security Advisor for Communications | Petez, Anna Marie | NSC | \$136,200.00 | SL | 05/27/01 | |
| Assistant Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Director, Public Affairs | McComack, Sean J. | DOS | \$63,038.00 | FS-3 | 02/12/01 | 08/30/03 |
| Assistant Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Director Public Affairs and Communications | (b)(6) | CIA | \$105,437.00 | GS-15 | 10/08/01 | 12/30/02 |
| Director for Speechwriting | Gibson, John D. | NSC | \$119,682.00 | GS-15 | 10/01/00 | 10/01/02 |
| Director for Speechwriting | Rees, Matthew R. | NSC | \$113,543.00 | GS-15 | 03/10/02 | |
| Special Assistant to the Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs | Wozniak, Natalie S. | NSC | \$79,473.00 | GS-13 | 07/19/92 | |
| Administrative Support Assistant to the DAP and Counselor to the APNSA for Communications | Williams, Mary C. | NSC | \$50,756.00 | GS-10 | 08/31/97 | |
| Total of Salaries for Office of Press and Communications: | | | \$624,501.00 | | | |

Office of the DNSA for Combating Terrorism

| | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|---------|---------------------|-------|----------|----------|
| DAP, Nat'l Director & Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism | Downing, Wayne A. | NSC/OCT | \$133,700.00 | SL | 10/09/01 | |
| Executive Assistant to the DAP, Nat'l Director & Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Ter | Marmud, Karen D. | NSC/OCT | \$78,265.00 | GS-14 | 11/04/01 | |
| Special Assistant to the DAP, Nat'l Director & Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Tero | Dacus, Jacqueline D. | DOS | \$49,727.00 | FS-6 | 06/18/01 | 06/17/02 |
| Total of Salaries for Office of the DNSA for Combating Terrorism: | | | \$245,632.00 | | | |

Proliferation Strategy, Counterpro & Homeland Def.

| | | <u>Home Agency</u> | <u>Salary</u> | <u>Grade</u> | <u>EOD</u> | <u>Projected End Date</u> |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Joseph, Robert G. | DOD ✓ | \$133,700.00 | SES-6 | 01/22/01 | 01/21/03 |
| Director | Koch, Susan J. | DOD ✓ | \$133,700.00 | SES-5 | 07/16/01 | 07/15/03 |
| Director for Defense Trade and Export Controls | Tucker, Maureen E. | Commerce | \$86,059.00 | GS-15 | 12/09/96 | 12/02/02 |
| Director | Rood, John C. | NSC | \$98,198.00 | GS-15 | 04/22/01 | |
| Director | Oxford, Vayt S. | DTRA ✓ | \$131,615.00 | SES-3 | 12/03/01 | 12/02/02 |
| Director for Defense Policy | McGee, Jimmy A. | USAF ✓ | \$63,896.00 | O-4 | 05/18/98 | 06/30/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Edwards, Joan K. | WHSG ✓ | \$67,327.00 | GS-12 | 01/20/00 | 01/20/05 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Mathews, Sonya NMJ | NSC | \$45,115.00 | GS-10 | 07/18/99 | |
| Total of Salaries for Proliferation Strategy, Counterpro & Homeland Def.: | | | \$739,139.00 | | | |

Records and Access Management

| | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------|-----|--------------|-------|----------|--|
| Special Advisor to the APNSA | Leary, William H. | NSC | \$115,488.00 | SL | 01/02/94 | |
| Assistant for Special Projects | Merchant, Brian T. | NSC | \$79,473.00 | GS-13 | 09/05/72 | |
| Total of Salaries for Records and Access Management: | | | \$172,519.00 | | | |

Records Management

| | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------|-------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Director | Pickin, John W. | NSC | \$91,308.00 | GS-14 | 09/05/75 | |
| Deputy Director | Dernes, Victoria J. | NSC | \$73,749.00 | GS-13 | 11/27/94 | |
| Senior Staff Information Assistant | Mansh, Thomas S. | NSC | \$45,115.00 | GS-10 | 05/20/96 | |
| Staff Information Assistant | Bellamy, Ralph C. | NSC | \$54,986.00 | GS-10 | 08/24/69 | |
| Staff Information Assistant | Good, Travis C. | NSC | \$31,397.00 | GS-07 | 08/15/99 | |
| Staff Information Assistant | George, Christopher L. | NSC | \$42,887.00 | GS-08 | 04/09/88 | |
| Staff Information Assistant | Robinson, Maurice C. | USA ✓ | \$41,090.00 | E-7 | 09/24/01 | 09/23/04 |
| Staff Information Assistant | (b)(6) | CIA | \$44,405.00 | GS-10 | 09/24/01 | 03/30/02 |
| Staff Information Assistant | Myers, Steven R. | NSC | \$31,397.00 | GS-07 | 03/24/02 | |
| Staff Information Assistant | Lee, Sang Won | NSC | \$31,397.00 | GS-07 | 05/07/00 | |
| Records Courier | (b)(6) | CIA | \$45,205.00 | GS-09 | 09/24/01 | 03/30/02 |
| Records Courier | (b)(6) | CIA | \$42,041.00 | GS-08 | 09/24/01 | 03/30/02 |
| Total of Salaries for Records Management: | | | \$537,540.00 | | | |

Southwest Asia, Near East and North African Affairs

| | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------|--------|--------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Khalilzad, Zalmay M. | NSC | \$138,200.00 | SL | 05/07/01 | |
| Director for Middle East Affairs | (b)(6) | CIA | \$95,129.00 | GS-15 | 02/04/02 | 02/03/03 |
| Director for Afghanistan and Iran | (b)(6) | DOS | \$63,038.00 | FS-3 | 12/18/01 | 12/17/03 |
| Director for North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula | Scott, David V. | DOS | \$61,202.00 | FS-3 | 06/04/01 | 06/04/02 |
| Director for Iraq and the Persian Gulf | (b)(6) | CIA | \$107,405.00 | GS-15 | 03/18/02 | 03/17/03 |
| Associate Director for Afghanistan | (b)(6) | CIA | \$55,694.00 | GS-12 | 04/29/02 | 06/28/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Cooper, Kathleen H. | WHSG ✓ | \$63,785.00 | GS-12 | 03/21/94 | 01/20/05 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Young, Peggy Lee | WHSG ✓ | \$49,346.00 | GS-10 | 03/25/03 | 01/20/05 |
| Total of Salaries for Southwest Asia, Near East and North African Affairs: | | | \$625,599.00 | | | |

Systems & Technical Planning

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|------------------|--------|-------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Deputy Director | Brennan, Gary E. | DISA ✓ | \$84,638.00 | GS-15 | 06/22/92 | 11/01/05 |
|-----------------|------------------|--------|-------------|-------|----------|----------|

| | | Home Agency | Salary | Grade | EOD | Projected End Date |
|---|---------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------|----------|--------------------|
| Chief, Acquisition and Resource Management Division | Carty, John J. | USN ✓ | \$80,000.00 | O-5 | 07/26/99 | 07/15/02 |
| White House Situation Room Systems Manager | Lundquist, Andrew | USAF - | \$39,204.00 | O-2 | 07/23/01 | 07/22/04 |
| Chief, Operations and Technical Services Division | Morton, Robert (Rob) J. | USAF - | \$ 00 | O-3 | 04/16/01 | 01/31/04 |
| Chief of Computer Operations | Weber, Anthony D. | USN - | \$47,617.00 | O-3 | 04/26/99 | 07/31/03 |
| Chief of Networks | Vila, Rafael rmi | USAF - | \$64,014.00 | O-4 | 03/30/01 | 03/29/04 |
| Assistant Chief of Computer Operations | Schreiber, Wendy L. | USAF - | \$35,812.00 | O-2 | 11/30/00 | 11/29/03 |
| Help Desk Technician and Asset Manager | Lowden, Michael R. | WHCA/USA - | \$24,280.00 | E-6 | 08/17/98 | 08/17/02 |
| Telecommunications Coordinator | Broadwick, Bonnie S. | USN - | \$36,339.00 | E-6 | 01/20/98 | 05/13/03 |
| Contractor, Systems & Technical Planning | Clifford, Donald N. | CNTR | \$ 00 | CNTR | 08/21/00 | 10/21/02 |
| Contractor, Systems & Technical Planning | Bryan, L. David | CNTR | \$ 00 | CNTR | 08/31/98 | 09/30/03 |
| Contractor, Systems & Technical Planning | Snyder, Julie Ann | CNTR | \$ 00 | CNTR | 12/01/95 | 12/01/05 |
| Contractor, Systems & Technical Planning | Figueredo, Orlando NMN | CNTR - USA | \$ 00 | CNTR | 10/06/01 | 10/08/02 |
| Contractor, Systems & Technical Planning | Piers, Shawn A. | CNTR | \$ 00 | CNTR | 10/22/01 | 10/21/03 |
| Contractor, Systems & Technical Planning | Blankenship, T. Renold | CNTR | \$ 00 | CNTR | 01/16/01 | 01/15/02 |
| Contractor, Systems & Technical Planning | Rucha, Joachim (J.D.) D. | CNTR | \$ 00 | CNTR | 09/17/01 | 09/17/02 |
| WHCA Technician, Systems & Technical Planning | Locks, Dwayne L. | WHCA/USAF - | \$ 00 | E-7 | 01/11/00 | 01/11/03 |
| WHCA Technician, Systems & Technical Planning | Depeeps, Michael B. | WHCA/USA - | \$27,074.00 | E-7 | 11/30/98 | 06/30/03 |
| WHCA Technician, Systems & Technical Planning | Kaika, Jean-Francois (JF) | WHCA/USN - | \$ 00 | E-6 | 11/30/98 | 11/29/03 |
| WHCA Technician, Systems & Technical Planning | Woodrum, Sharon M. | WHCA/USAF - | \$19,636.00 | E-3 | 05/03/01 | 05/02/05 |
| WHCA Technician, Systems & Technical Planning | Jordan, Kristine A. | WHCA/USAF - | \$26,000.00 | E-5 | 03/01/98 | 01/30/03 |
| Total of Salaries for Systems & Technical Planning: | | | \$477,590.00 | | | |

Western Hemisphere Affairs

| | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------|-------|--------------|--------|----------|----------|
| Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director | Mairto, John F. | USAID | \$133,700.00 | AD | 01/22/01 | 01/25/03 |
| Director for Andean Affairs | Weigold, Eva A. | DOS | \$56,184.00 | FS-3 | 05/07/01 | 05/31/02 |
| Director for Central America and Caribbean Basin | Gonzalez, Emilio T. | USA - | \$100,714.00 | O-6 | 01/02/02 | 01/01/04 |
| Director for North America | Mellherney, William W. | DOS | \$89,793.00 | FS-1 | 12/19/00 | 06/30/02 |
| Director (ICAP) for Ensam and Southern South America | (b)(6) | CIA | \$98,744.00 | GS-15 | 06/12/00 | 06/11/03 |
| Director for Western Hemisphere Economic Affairs | Sannis, John P. | DOS | \$125,883.00 | FE0C-2 | 06/11/01 | 06/10/02 |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Barbieri, Steven D. | NSC | \$43,705.00 | GS-10 | 11/18/01 | |
| Administrative Support Assistant | Hill, Rosanne M. | NSC | \$52,166.00 | GS-10 | 09/01/91 | |
| Total of Salaries for Western Hemisphere Affairs: | | | \$689,223.00 | | | |

White House Communications Agency

| | | <u>Home Agency</u> | <u>Salary</u> | <u>Grade</u> | <u>EOD</u> | <u>Projected End Date</u> |
|--|------------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Communications Supervisor | Rayes, David NMI | WHCA/USN ✓ | \$29,720.00 | E-7 | 12/01/99 | 06/01/03 |
| Communications Assistant | Erdahl, Douglas M. | WHCA/USAF ✓ | \$28,317.00 | E-5 | 11/04/97 | 09/15/03 |
| Communications Assistant | Beckfield, Mitchell P. | WHCA/USN ✓ | \$28,556.00 | E-5 | 05/21/01 | 03/20/04 |
| Communications Assistant | Bunting, J. (Chris) C. | WHCA/USAF ✓ | \$29,800.00 | E-5 | 08/13/01 | 08/12/06 |
| Communications Assistant | Laskowski, Gregory J. | WHCA/USN ✓ | \$22,750.00 | E-5 | 03/22/99 | 03/21/03 |
| Communications Assistant | Blackburn, John M. | WHCA/USA ✓ | \$19,416.00 | E-4 | 05/25/99 | 05/24/02 |
| Communications Assistant | Heyer, Scott C. | WHCA/USN ✓ | \$21,132.00 | E-5 | 04/24/00 | 08/15/03 |
| Communications Assistant | Tucker, Terrell G. | WHCA/USA ✓ | \$23,092.00 | E-5 | 12/03/01 | 12/02/05 |
| Total of Salaries for White House Communications Agency: | | | \$204,903.00 | | | |

White House Situation Room

| | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|--------|----------------|-------|----------|----------|
| Director | Loewer, Deborah A. | USN ✓ | \$94,313.00 | O-6 | 05/07/01 | 05/06/03 |
| Administrative Assistant | Payne, Raymond K. | USAF ✓ | \$27,582.00 | E-6 | 10/20/97 | 10/31/02 |
| Deputy Director | Sigler, Ralph H. | DISA ✓ | \$82,985.00 | GS-15 | 09/30/84 | 09/30/04 |
| Senior Intelligence Analyst | (b)(6) | NSA ✓ | \$69,631.00 | GS-13 | 01/03/00 | 01/02/02 |
| Intelligence Analyst, ICAP & Senior Duty Officer | (b)(6) | DIA ✓ | \$48,796.00 | GS-12 | 04/10/00 | 04/15/02 |
| Senior Duty Officer | Lynen, Clark R. | USA ✓ | \$44,420.00 | O-4 | 06/01/00 | 07/05/02 |
| Senior Duty Officer | Pedraske, Edward J. | USN ✓ | \$52,939.00 | O-3 | 04/23/01 | 05/01/03 |
| Senior Duty Officer | Schubert, Robert E. | USMC ✓ | \$42,232.00 | O-3 | 01/08/01 | 06/15/03 |
| Senior Duty Officer | Riley, Robert (Bob) J. | DOS | \$59,419.00 | FS-3 | 07/30/01 | 07/29/02 |
| Senior Duty Officer | (b)(6) | CIA | \$44,148.00 | GS-11 | 04/10/00 | 10/30/02 |
| Duty Officer | Joves, Alexander S. | USCG | \$52,044.00 | O-3 | 01/14/02 | 06/13/03 |
| Duty Officer | Green, Andrew W. | USAF ✓ | \$56,995.00 | O-4 | 05/21/01 | 05/20/03 |
| Duty Officer | Mathews, William (Dave) D. | USAF ✓ | \$42,231.00 | O-3 | 12/18/00 | 12/17/02 |
| Duty Officer | (b)(6) | DIA ✓ | \$65,319.00 | GS-13 | 09/23/01 | 09/22/03 |
| Duty Officer | (b)(6) | CIA | \$73,749.00 | GS-13 | 01/14/02 | 01/13/04 |
| Duty Officer | (b)(6) | NSA ✓ | \$56,297.00 | GS-12 | 10/23/00 | 10/22/02 |
| Duty Officer | (b)(6) | NIMA ✓ | \$53,156.00 | GS-12 | 09/24/01 | 09/23/02 |
| Duty Officer | (b)(6) | CIA | \$66,229.00 | GS-13 | 02/11/02 | 02/03/03 |
| Duty Officer | (b)(6) | NIMA ✓ | \$66,229.00 | GS-13 | 01/28/02 | 01/27/03 |
| Duty Officer | (b)(6) | NIMA ✓ | \$49,566.00 | GS-11 | 01/28/02 | 01/27/03 |
| Total of Salaries for White House Situation Room: | | | \$1,125,735.00 | | | |

Total Payroll: \$15,997,940.00

74 TOTAL DOD (INCLUDES 7 OSA CONTRACTORS)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 21 2002

The Honorable John Ensign
United States Senate
364 Russell Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Ensign:

Thanks so much for passing along my testimony on
Iraq to your colleagues in the Senate.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

33551D

21 Oct 02

U16947 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12218

10/15 snowflake
1530

October 10, 2002 12:24 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Ensign

Please make sure we draft a letter to Senator Ensign thanking him for sending my remarks to his Senate colleagues.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101002-7

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

→ *SWT*

Larry Di Rita

10/15

11-L-0559/OSD/12219



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTON MEMO

SECRET
CN-554-~~072~~ 001 21 11 0 05
19 October 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/19*

SUBJECT: Urban Warfare Review

- With regard to a review of assets involving urban warfare (TAB), I fully support your sense of the importance of the urban warfare mission. A Joint Staff program that began 3 years ago is moving toward your objectives.
- By way of background, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the formation of a joint urban operations group reporting to a Special Studies Group at the flag level. The group encompassed all Services and DOD agencies with contributions from the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analysis. Outputs included the "Handbook for Joint Urban Operations" (May 2000), "DOD Roadmap for Joint Urban Operations" (Draft November 2001) and the most recently approved Joint Publication 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations" (September 2002).
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense capped this effort by designating the Commander, USJFCOM, as the DOD Executive Agent for Joint Urban Operations on 17 September 2002. Accordingly, USJFCOM will be the primary DOD point of contact and proponent for joint urban operations doctrine, training and equipment; and will lead, coordinate and integrate the activities of the other DOD components.
- Commander, USJFCOM, plans to establish a Joint Urban Operations Center as the lead for the top-down national and theater review of urban warfare assets on 1 January 2003 in Norfolk, Virginia.

RECOMMENDATION: Approval of USJFCOM's plans to establish a Joint Urban Operation Center leading the top-down national and theater review of urban warfare assets.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/12220 U169610/02

TAB

October 1, 2002 6:35 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Urban Warfare Review

It strikes me that we may need a top down national review and theater review of assets involving urban warfare. I suppose it could be led jointly by the Joint Forces Command and CENTCOM, using the ongoing efforts in the Army and the Marines, but not controlled by them. It is a theater-level problem, and it ought not to be driven by tactics up, but rather by concepts down.

How do you propose we do this?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-5

.....

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/12221

vi? snowflake
3820

May 31, 2002 8:49 AM

130

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Audit by IG

In terms of my handling of all my accounts and travel and everything else, should we ask the IG to check me each year, so we have it done and no one will ever have to do it? I think it is a good idea. I used to do it when I was a CEO.

Please see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-13

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

Done
7/23

31MAY02

U16962 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12222

May 8, 2002 11:57 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Acknowledgement

Please find out if we have anything for the Philippine Scouts here in the Pentagon.
MG Soriano's father was a Philippine Scout.

I think we have something here for the Buffalo Soldiers, Japanese Americans—
and maybe even for the Navajo Code Talkers and the Tuskegee Airmen.

Please let me know if we have anything for all of those—a corridor, a portion of a
corridor or something.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050802-37

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

100

8MAY02

U16963 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12223

May 8, 2002 9:16 AM

4527

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tankers

I better have someone come in and explain to me this leasing problem with Boeing tankers. I just don't know who is for what or why.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050802-32

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

5/8

*John -
to schedule SecAF
(AT:L) 3rd being done,
check availability for visit by
SecAF.*

*Di Rita
5/8*

8 MAY 02

U16964 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12224

May 8, 2002 8:38 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Note from Gen. Welch

Attached is a note from Larry Welch on a letter I received from Howell Estes,
which is worth your reading.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/21/02 Welch ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
050802-25

.....
Please respond by _____

522

8MAY02

U16965 02

41-
1 400
General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret)

(b)(6)

April 21, 2002

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You invited me to comment on Howell Estes' letter on the possibility of a merger of STRATCOM and SPACECOM. At his request, Howell and I discussed his letter to you at some length, after the fact, so I have given considerable thought to his points both before and after that discussion.

I believe the key potential value of integrating (or merging) the two commands is a resulting global command of sufficient reach to provide for both better execution of increasingly important global combatant missions and better global support of regional combatant commands, also increasingly important. I believe that, after our discussion, Howell is more in agreement with that need. A combination of Space and Northern command saves a four star slot and avoids adding another combatant command but would not provide anything like the potential of a truly global command.

Regarding the concern about adequate attention to things nuclear, there are two aspects of interest - adequate attention to nuclear forces and planning, and support for sustaining a safe and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons. Regarding the first, Strategic Command inherited from the old Strategic Air Command a superb strategic planning staff that remains fully competent and well prepared for more complex demands. While responsibilities and demands of the "new triad" from the NPR remain only loosely defined and will add complexity, it has less to do with things nuclear than with global responsibilities for a wide range of missions and more global support for regional combatant commands.

As to the second, I see no reason to expect that the combatant command contribution to the effectiveness of stockpile stewardship would be degraded. There is a well-established process and organization to provide that support, to include the command's Strategic Advisory Group that currently provides CINCSTRATCOM with the needed technical expertise.


Regarding the need for proximity to have a robust space community, the new Peterson location will provide Army Space and Missile Defense Command significantly improved facilities and probably better focus. Still, proximity of component commands to

11-L-0559/OSD/12226

combatant commands is far less important than mission focus. Proximity has not, so far, done much for that since Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) component support is provided primarily by a subordinate numbered Air Force (14th AF) not located at Peterson and AFSPC does not provide component support for other SPACECOM missions such as computer network defense and attack. AFSPC also provides component command support to STRATCOM through another numbered Air Force (20th AF). Further, co-location is not a feature in many examples of well-focused component support e.g. EUCOM, SOCOM, and CENTCOM.

I agree you are facing an important and difficult decision, but I suggest that focus on the conditions for more effective global operations and better global support for regional operations is more likely to lead to the right set of solutions.

Warm Regards,



Larry D. Welch

May 8, 2002 7:25 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tom White

I need to nail down Tom White's flights and that issue. Has that been resolved?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050802-7

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

580

5/8 *MS/8*
CDEF HAS S...
MAY 08 2002 *ecdef-*

*Spoke to Joe Schmitz
and told him to please
wrap it up fast and
make his recommendations.
I asked him to think
in terms of days, not
longer.*

8 May 02

D. Rita

May 8, 2002 6:56 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: James Simon

I notice your friend Simon has taken the subject public.

That wasn't prudent!

Regards,

DHR:dh
050802-5

350.09

8 May 02

U16968 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12229



Gary Schmitt <gschmitt@newamericancentury.org> on 04/26/2002 01:54:50 PM

To: Abe Shulsky/PS/policy@policy
cc: "abe(h) shulsky" <ans5901@bellatlantic.net>
Subject: CIA says Rummy wrong

Defense Information and Electronics Report
April 26, 2002

Pg. 1

Senior CIA Official Says Rumsfeld 'Absolutely Wrong' On Intel Reform

A senior CIA official this week said Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is "absolutely wrong" to oppose placing all components of the intelligence community -- including those now under the authority of the Pentagon -- under

the centralized control of the director of central intelligence.

James Simon, assistant director of central intelligence for administration, said

he supports a recommendation advanced by retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, head of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to transfer the National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and

National Reconnaissance Office from the purview of DOD to direct DCI control.

"Brent Scowcroft generally had it right, the secretary of defense has it absolutely wrong," Simon told attendees of the an "E-Gov" conference in Washington, DC, April 23. "The fact of the matter is, if you're going to fix intelligence there's got to be somebody who can direct changes and make it stick."

Though Scowcroft's report is classified, media reports last November said it recommended shifting authority over the Pentagon intelligence agencies to the

DCI. Following that report, Rumsfeld made statements opposing such a change; he

has reiterated that opposition in recent comments to the press.

Rumsfeld told The Washington Post earlier this month that it is important to maintain multiple sources of intelligence information. Rumsfeld added that he

doubted Scowcroft's recommendation would be enacted.

Simon's comments come as a joint congressional committee prepares for hearings

on intelligence reform. The committee is expected to address a range of intelligence issues -- from proper levels of funding for various collection methods to possible administrative reorganization -- and recommend measures for

reform, according to congressional sources.

"Among the purposes of this joint effort is ascertaining why the intelligence

community did not learn of the Sept. 11 attacks in advance, and to identify what, if anything, might be done to better the position of the intelligence community to warn of and prevent future terrorist attacks and other threats of

the 21st century," the House and Senate intelligence committees stated in a February joint release. "The committees may seek to legislate changes to remedy

systemic deficiencies by the joint inquiry."

Past committee publications indicate lawmakers are sympathetic to the idea of

some kind of intelligence community reorganization.

"Today's intelligence structure is not suitable to address current and future

challenges," states the report on the fiscal year 2002 Intelligence

11-L-0559/OSD/12230

Authorization Act.

Echoing the sentiments of most advocates for increasing the DCI's authority, Simon said the lack of sufficient central budgetary and personnel authority in

the intelligence community hinders coordination of resources.

"Our current system does not give the DCI budgetary authority or . . . authority

over personnel," Simon said. To pursue serious reform the intelligence community

must "have a single authority that knows what the objective is and can pursue

it."

A Congressional Research Service report on intelligence issues earlier this year

said institutional inertia has historically limited the DCI's ability to exercise even the limited authority that position is granted under law.

"By law, the Director of Central Intelligence, currently George Tenet, has the

authority to set priorities and propose budgets for all agencies in the U.S. intelligence community," the report states. "In reality, however, most DCIs

have

concentrated most of the attention to the one agency over which they have direct

control, the CIA, and have limited their attempts to exert managerial control of

other intelliges."

Despite this history, Simon believes achieving greater central control of the

intelligence community is possible.

"Our system of government can be adapted to that purpose and I hope we'll find a

way to do it," he said.

-- Hampton Stephens

Gary Schmitt
Project for the New American Century
Executive Director
1150 17th Street NW Suite 510
Washington, DC 20036

(b)(6)



- att1.htm

11-L-0559/OSD/12231

TAB

October 1, 2002 6:35 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Urban Warfare Review

381

It strikes me that we may need a top down national review and theater review of assets involving urban warfare. I suppose it could be led jointly by the Joint Forces Command and CENTCOM, using the ongoing efforts in the Army and the Marines, but not controlled by them. It is a theater-level problem, and it ought not to be driven by tactics up, but rather by concepts down.

How do you propose we do this?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-5



U16969 / 02

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/12232

10 OCT 02

snovflake

May 7, 2002 9:05 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Anthrax

720

This is a homeland security idea from Newt on anthrax. Why don't you take a look at it and see who has it.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
050702-6

.....

Please respond by 05/24/02

7 May 02

U16975 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12233

(b)(6) CIV, OSD *From Newt Gingrich*

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2002 6:57 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Subject: for secdef depsecdef,anthrax

SECDEF HAS SEEN
MAY 07 2002

for secdef depscdef
from newt april 7,2002
anthrax

today's New York Times Story is a grim reminder that someone is still out there who could be working to improve their production and distribution technique for anthrax. There should be a plan in place for responding to a 20 city distribution either through the mail or in a coordinated series of distributed samples (eg in malls, athletic events,etc).

In particular there should be a plan for a deliberately paralyzing distribution in washington (eg the capitol, pentagon and white house via tours or visitors).

This probably won't happen but it could and we have no reason to believe we understand what is behind it or whether it could have triggered a copy cat who is growing and manufacturing anthrax as we wait.

Newt

for the Times article:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/national/07ANTH.html?todayshadlines>

EE 1511
02/00744-USD
May 7, 2002 9:01 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ashdown Meeting

5/10

Bosnia

I think you were in the meeting with Paddy Ashdown. Here is a note from Colin Powell.

Do you remember anything about this subject? I don't even remember him bringing it up. I remember we talked about the French, and it concerned him, but I don't remember him asking for a U.S. deputy for the Frenchman, do you?

Thanks.

Attach.
05/07/02 SecState fax to SecDef w/e-mail

DHR:dh
050702-5

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

7 May 02

U16976 02

NOV 7 02 15:36

05-07-02 16:15 IN
-L-0559/OSD/12235

May 8, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY

FROM: Douglas J. Feith /s/

SUBJECT: Ashdown Meeting

Pre your attached question:

Lord Ashdown did not request a US deputy for the French Deputy

HiRep at your May 3 meeting.

11-L-0559/OSD/12236

Frey, Patrice

From: Fane, Daria M
Sent: Monday, May 06, 2002 5:59 PM
To: Frey, Patrice(S)
Subject: FW: Follow-up to S-Ashdown meeting

As discussed

Daria Fane
Bosnia Desk Officer
EUR/SCE/AL Room 5428
(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 07 2002

~~Material~~
~~File~~
~~?~~

-----Original Message-----

From: Gregorian, Raffi
Sent: Friday, May 03, 2002 6:49 PM
To: Kelly, Craig(S)
Cc: Bogue, Janet L.(EUR)
Subject: Follow-up to S-Ashdown meeting

S = SECRETARY TOWN

Craig:

During the S-Ashdown meeting, Ashdown asked for assistance in obtaining an American to serve as the deputy in the Rule of Law Pillar. The issue came up in Ashdown's meeting with SECDEF Rumsfeld, and the British were under the clear impression that DoD might provide or otherwise produce a candidate for this position. S said he would speak to Rumsfeld about it soon to see what could be done.

Assuming he does make the call, Janet suggested I draft up some TPs in case he does call. Let us know if the draft points are sufficient or you'll need something more

S-Rumsfeld Call on Ashdown Request for American Deputy in Rule of Law

- Ashdown asked about providing an American to serve as the deputy in the all-important rule of law pillar in Bosnia.
- Says he raised it with you in his meeting, was under impression DoD would produce a candidate.
- Says he needs someone who is very capable administrator, preferably with a legal background. Would need to be the sort who could get on with the French diplomat who will be head of the rule of law pillar.
- Would also need to serve as key interlocutor for US and UK intelligence exploitation, since that material can't be shared with French.
- Do you have a candidate in mind? How can we support?

Raffi

Raffi Gregorian
Deputy Director (Bosnia)
EUR/SCE
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

FAX
TO

To Don RUMSFELD

RECEIVED HAS SEEN

FOR CONSULTATION.

7 2002

CD
7 MAY

May 6, 2002 11:33 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Weekly Meeting w/POTUS

337 WH

I need a private, one-on-one 30 minute-meeting every week with the President—
not in conjunction with a SVTC, PC or NSC meeting.

It seems to not be getting done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050602-31

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

6 May 02

U16977 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12239

May 6, 2002 11:25 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
SUBJECT: Ramifications of ICC Jurisdiction

015

I think we need to have a review of everywhere in the world we have military personnel and civilian DoD personnel, and determine what we are going to do about the ICC jurisdiction question with respect to each of those countries.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050602-29



Please respond by 05/31/02

6 May 02

U16978 02

May 6, 2002 11:03 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: King Abdullah Follow-Up

Saudi Arabia

I am now meeting with King Abdullah for the fourth time. Each time I have met with him, there has been a series of follow-up items that should have been followed up.

The problem is that each time I meet with him the next time, I never get a report back to me on what progress was made with respect to the follow-up items we had discussed at the prior meeting.

That is not acceptable. Peter Rodman has to get himself organized, so I have a report as to what took place in the last meeting and what happened in the intervening period that I promised him would happen. That is true with every person I meet from every country.

Let's draft a memo to Feith telling him that, so that these guys know that and they start doing it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050602-28

.....

Please respond by 05/10/02

6 May 02

U16979 02

Snowflake

May 6, 2002 10:58 AM

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Op-Ed

ISPAE1

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is an article by Charles Krauthammer that touches on some of the discussions we have had. I think it is well worth reading.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

Charles Krauthammer, "Jenin: The Truth," *Washington Post*, 05/03/02

DHR:dh
050602-27

6 May 02

U16980 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12242

Charles Krauthammer

Jenin: The Truth

"Jenin Camp Is a Scene of Devastation But Yields No Evidence of a Massacre."

—Headline, front page, The Washington Post, April 16.

"There is simply no evidence of a massacre."

—Peter Bouckaert, senior researcher, Human Rights Watch, Jenin. Jerusalem Post, April 28.

"Holley told Agence France-Presse that he did not see 'any evidence of a massacre. The Israeli army was fighting against some desperate [Palestinian] fighters here.'"

—Agence France-Presse, quoting Maj. David Holley, British military adviser to Amnesty International, April 28.



AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

A massacre is the deliberate mass murder of the defenseless. The "Jenin massacre" is more than a fiction. It is a hoax. "Palestinian Authority allegations," reported the Boston Globe (April 29), "... appear to be crumbling under the weight of eyewitness accounts from Palestinian fighters who participated in the battle and camp residents who remained in their homes until the final hours of the fighting. . . . All said they were allowed to surrender or evacuate."

And yet for weeks the world has been seized with the question of the "Jenin massacre." The U.N. Security Council called emergency meetings. The secretary general appointed a special investigating committee (now disbanded). The European press published the most lurid allegations. To say nothing, of course, of al-Jazeera TV.

All this for a phantom massacre. Yet this same Middle East conflict yields no shortage of real massacres:

- April 27: Adora, Palestinian gunmen enter residential quarters shooting everyone, including a 5-year-old girl shot through the head in her bed.
- April 12: Jerusalem, suicide bombing at a bus stop, 6 murdered.
- April 10: Yagor, suicide bombing on a bus, 8 murdered.
- March 31: Haifa, suicide bombing in a restaurant, 15 murdered.
- March 28: Eilon Moreh, shooting attack, 4 murdered.
- March 27: Netanya, suicide bombing at a Passover seder, 28 murdered.

These are massacres—actual, recent massacres. Massacres for which the evidence is hard. Massacres for which the perpetrators *claimed credit*. Where was the Security Council? Where was the Kofi Annan commission? Where was the world?

The United Nations' excuse will be that these murders were perpetrated not by states but by groups. But this is nonsense. The Palestinian Authority is a recognized government. The links of its top leadership to these murders is precisely the kind of question that warrants investigation. Yet the very idea that the United Nations would investigate Palestinian massa-

cris is absurd.

The fact that such an undertaking is unimaginable is what has made the past several months so deeply, despairingly troubling. The despair comes from the bewilderment of living in a world of monstrous moral inversion.

Take Jenin. What was the real story? That hand-to-hand, door-to-door combat, in an intensely built-up shantytown, among dozens of houses booby-trapped by Palestinian fighters, should have yielded somewhere between seven and 21 scattered civilian casualties is nothing less than astonishing. It testifies to the extraordinary scrupulousness of the Israeli army, which lost 23 soldiers in the battle, precisely because it did not want to cause the civilian casualties that come with aerial bombardment, as has happened everywhere from Grozny to Kabul. And yet Israel was investigated precisely for defending itself against massacres that warrant no investigation.

Palestinian apologists wave away this double standard with the magic mantra of "occupation."

More nonsense. Twenty-one months ago, Israel offered a total end to the occupation, ceding 100 percent of Gaza and 97 percent of the West Bank to the first Palestinian state ever. The Palestinians turned that down and took up the suicide bomb. By the Orwellian logic of today, the Palestinians are justified in perpetrating one massacre after another to end an occupation that Israel offered to remove almost two years ago.

For the "international community," as embodied by the United Nations, such inverted moral logic is the norm. This is what it must have been like living in the false consciousness of Soviet communism, where everyone had to publicly and constantly pretend to believe the official lies, all the while knowing they were lies. This is what it must have been like living in the 1930s, as the necessities of appeasement created a gradual inversion of right and wrong—the Czechs, for example, pilloried by official opinion in Britain and France for selfishly standing in the way of peace at Munich.

Churchill's great gift to civilization was not just that he rallied good against evil but also that he pierced a suffocating fog of self-deception by speaking truth to lies. Where is the Churchill of today, the official of *any* government, prepared to tell the United Nations that its frantic hunt for a phantom massacre *by Jews*—while ignoring massacre after massacre *of Jews*—is grotesque and perverse?

May 6, 2002 10:27 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intel

350.09

We have to start pushing on intel. It is not going right.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050602-18

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

6 May 02

U16981 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12244

4/2/02
snowflake

May 6, 2002 9:11 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Support for Transformation

There is a story that there are two groups forming in the retired military—those who are for transformation and those who are against it.

I think we ought to get Torie and the Service Secretaries thinking about how we could begin to support the group that is supporting transformation.

381

Maybe we ought to start having briefings for retired people. Maybe we ought to reach out to the people who have been particularly friendly to me from the Space Commission and Ballistic Missile Commission, and people I knew from before, like Jim Holloway and those who served with me.

Let's come up with a battle plan for that sometime in the next four or five days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050602-6

.....

Please respond by 05/13/02

Outread

done
LARRY DI RITA
7/8
27 MAY 9

Larry Di Rita
7/8

U16983 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12245

May 6, 2002 9:04 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Boards

Please show me the members of the Policy Board, the Science Board and all the other boards.

334

Also, I would like to see a list of anyone who is being proposed for DACOWITS.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050602-5



Please respond by 05/11/02

6 May 02

U16984 02

TO: David Chu
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: May 4, 2002
 SUBJECT:

What is the status of this July 31, 2001 memo?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
050402.15

Attach: Reductions snowflake dated 7/31/01

Please respond by:

5/13/02

020 UPR

4 May 02

U16985 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12247

July 31, 2001 3:38 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Reductions

I notice that you have 135 civilian and 85 military for a total of 220 in your shop. Why don't you get back to me with a plan as to how you plan to reduce that number by 10-20%?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073101-51

6/24

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 4, 2002

SUBJECT:

How are we doing on these Presidential statements that he made during the Campaign?

Thanks.

350,001,004

DHR/azn
050402.14

Attach: Campaign Statements snowflake dated 9/7/01

Please respond by: _____

5/20

5/31

Chu response attached

5/31/02

U16986 02

TO: Secretary White
Secretary England
Secretary Roche

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: September 7, 2001

SUBJECT: **Campaign Statements**

Attached are some materials that refer to statements made by the President on the subject of training in the military. You might want to be aware of them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
090701.20

5/29
6:00



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2002 MAY 29 AM 6:36

INFO MEMO

May 28, 2002 – 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 28 May 02*
SUBJECT: Gender Integrated Training – SNOWFLAKE

- Charlie Abell and I are personally reviewing gender-integrated training by:
 - Visiting each of the basic training facilities
 - Interviewing our major operational commanders about their view of the competence of the personnel they receive from the training establishment (i.e., does a change in policy have military merit?)
- We anticipate completing this survey by fall and would propose to report to you on its results at that time.

RECOMMENDATION: None required.

COORDINATION: None required.

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock, (b)(6)

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 6/1 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXFCSEC WHITMORE | <i>[Signature]</i> |



Memorandum

TO: JOSHUA BOLTEN
FROM: JOEL KAPLAN
DATE: 09/06/2001

SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS ON GENDER INTEGRATED
TRAINING

In response to your request, please find attached quotes that I believe represent the entirety of the President's and Dr. Rice's public comments during the campaign on the issue of gender-integrated training in the Armed Services.

As you'll see, the President spoke to this issue directly on two occasions. First, in response to a question about "gender-integrated training" generally, the President stated in a December 1999 interview with the *National Review* that he "[does not] believe in gender-integrated training," and that he "think[s] they ought to be separated." Second, the President gave a narrower response to a narrower question in a campaign-stop interview published the following month in *American Legion Magazine*. In that interview, the President answered a question on gender-integrated *basic* training by stating that "the [e]xperts . . . tell me that we ought to have separate basic training facilities." Dr. Rice, a member of the Kassebaum-Baker commission and the one expert to whom the President explicitly referred in his *American Legion* interview, had previously described the President's views in a press teleconference in September 1999. She explained in that interview that while the President's "view is that gender-integrated training above the basic training level is a very good thing, . . . we ought to look hard at the basic training and see if it might not be a good thing to have . . . separate gender training at the basic level, at least in the first several weeks."

(b)(6)

President Bush Quotes From Campaign

National Review
December 31, 1999

NR: What about gender-integrated training?

GWB: I don't believe in gender-integrated training. I think they ought to be separated.

The Washington Post
December 14, 1999
POLITICS; Bush Rules Out 'Co-Presidency'

In a wide-ranging interview with the conservative journal National Review, Texas Gov. George W. Bush held forth on women, the media, his New Year's plans and smoking in the White House...Should men and women train together in the military? "I don't believe in gender-integrated training. I think they ought to be separated. The training facilities ought to be separated."

American Legion Magazine
January 2000

The American Legion Magazine Editor John Raughter interviewed Bush at a campaign rally in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

Candidate Q & A

Q: What are your views on gender-integrated basic training.

A: The experts tell me, such as Condoleeza Rice (policy adviser to former President Bush), that we ought to have separate basic training facilities. I think women in the military have an important and good role, but the people who study the issue tell me that the most effective training would be to have the genders separated.

Dr. Rice Quote From Campaign

Press Teleconference

September 23, 1999, Thursday

HEADLINE: FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE DICK CHENEY HOLDS TELECONFERENCE WITH HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR RICHARD ARMITAGE TO DISCUSS GOVERNOR GEORGE W. BUSH'S

SPEECH ON DEFENSE POLICY AT THE CITADEL IN CHARLESTON, S.C.

QUESTION: What about gender-integrated training in boot camp?

RICE: Yes, his view is that gender-integrated training above the basic training level is a very good thing, once they're into military operational specialties, but that we ought to look hard at the basic training and see if it might not be a good thing to have gender – to have separate gender training at the basic level, at least in the first several weeks.

If you remember, this was a recommendation of a bipartisan panel, the Kassebaum-Baker panel. It was a very, very broadly gauged panel – civil rights lawyers, a Title 9 lawyer – and everybody on that panel unanimously recommended that basic training – that they look hard at basic training.

QUESTION: My understanding, though – when you said he's going to listen to his military commanders, it's my recollection that the majority of senior commanders oppose that recommendation.

RICE: I think that there – as I said, we'd look hard – he'd look hard at it. I didn't say he would always decide exactly what his military commanders said. I said he would listen hard to them.

QUESTION: So can we then say that he hasn't taken a position on it?

RICE: Yes. Are you through (ph)?

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 4, 2002

SUBJECT:


What is the status of the attached memo?

Thanks.

2002.4

DHR/azn
050402.13

Attach: Tour Length Snowflake 1/29/92



Please respond by: 3/17/02

6/17

Need briefing on Tour Lengths

45 min

5/17

Dr Chu - has a briefing that we want to schedule. (Human Resources Mgt.)

4 May 02

U16987 02

January 29, 2002 2:40 PM

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tour Length

I have to know what is happening about lengthening tours. I am convinced it is the right thing to do. There must be a way to do it.

One way to do it is incrementally, and lengthen the tours every year by a quarter of a year. Over a four-year term, we would have lengthened them by at least a year without causing any major changes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-27

.....
Please respond by 02/11/02

6/24

May 3, 2002 5:57 PM

6/21
SECURITY DIRECTIVE

TO: Pete Aldridge
Jim Roche
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Space

471.96

Please come up with a proposal as to how we sit down and think through all the problems we have with space.

I want to talk about immediate funding issues and systemic difficulties in our space work. We need to think of it strategically. We need to address tactically whether we are too dependent on space.

Thanks.

DMK:dh
030302-33

6/18
Aldridge response
attached.

.....
Please respond by 06/07/02

D. Rite


3 May 02

U16988 02

June 15, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense

CC: Jim Roche
Pete Teets
Steve Cambone
John Stenbit

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Space Review

You asked us to come up with a proposal to "think through all the problems we have with space." This is what we propose to do:

1. We are establishing a joint Defense Science Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board effort to provide observations and propose solutions. The utilization of these established Boards avoids a problem in the use of advisory committees, and we can bring in very good people with a variety of experience and viewpoints.
2. We are developing a Terms of Reference (TOR) for the effort. Bill Schneider has the task to develop the first draft. The tasks will include outlining our problems in management and funding space programs, industrial base capacity, systems engineering skill base, systemic issues, potential solutions and vision for the future (dependence on space, protection, access, and space control)
3. We are identifying candidates for the effort. Tom Reed is the leading candidate to chair the study effort, and others, like Tom Moorman, Dick Garwin, Bob Kohler, and Jimmie Hill, are on the list of candidate study participants.
4. We will set up a Steering Committee to guide the effort (Roche, Aldridge, Teets, Cambone, Stenbit, Pace/Cartwright, Don Kerr, Sean O'Keefe)
5. We will plan to have an interim report in time to influence the FY04 budget preparation and a final report to influence the DPG next year.

We will give you a status report when the TOR is complete and the study team is formed.

Action: Press on _____ Rethink this _____ See me _____

11-L-0559/OSD/12258

SHOW/Hide

(b)(6)

May 3, 2002 5:52 PM

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Gen. Hayden

Please see me about Mike Hayden's tenure—how long he has been there and how long we think we want to extend him for.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090302-31

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

020 NSA

SECDEF

We extended Hayden for one year... to 3-30-03. That will give him 4 years in the job.

He'd like to round out his tour in summer '03, at a minimum. This is for personal reasons. U16989 02

I think he would be willing to serve until summer '04 if asked, but he's apprehensive about changes in the Intel world (the transformation we are considering) and what they might mean to a 3-star Agency director. If he thought he was in the race for DDI, he'd be happy. Rich Haver thinks we should extend him for a year more (summer of '04)

3 May 02

IR Staser 5/15

May 3, 2002 5:50 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
SUBJECT: IG

Should we do something about this memo from Schmitz? Should we connect him with the Business Council?

334

Thanks.

Attach.
05/01/02 IG memo to SecDef re: BIC [U07595/02]

DHR dh
050302-30

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

3 May 02

U16990 02



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704
INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 03 2002

May 1, 2002, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Inspector General Support to the Business Initiative Council

- Under the Inspector General Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense is "the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for matters related to the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department." Given the obvious overlap of this statutory role with the mission of your Business Initiative Council (BIC), I have already informally offered my office's resources to assist the BIC in its efforts "to improve the efficiency of the Department of Defense business operations by identifying and implementing business reform actions which allow savings to be reallocated to higher priority efforts" (BIC Charter, dated August 9, 2001).

- In addition to suggesting management improvement initiatives, the knowledge and capabilities of this office could be highly useful to the BIC in terms of evaluating the merit of proposed initiatives and providing advice on the management controls and performance measures needed for successful implementation.

- As you acknowledged in your September 10, 2001, Bureaucracy to Battlefield speech:

"Change is hard. It's hard for some to bear and it's hard for all of us to achieve The old adage that you get what you inspect, not what you expect, or put differently, that what you measure improves, is true."

- As your Inspector General and "principal advisor . . . for matters related to the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department," I am proactively committed to improving the prospects for management reform success. My office is prepared to provide independent feedback on the status of individual initiative implementation efforts, ways to overcome barriers to implementation, and actual results.

- The attachment demonstrates the direct overlap of a number of BIC initiatives with recent activities of my office.

COORDINATION: USD(AT&L), April 30, 2002

Attachment:
As stated

| | |
|-----------------------|--------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | S/L |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | 4/3/02 |
| MA BUCCI | 5/1/02 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | S/L |

May 3, 2002 5:47 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NSA Personnel

I am told that NSA has let 2,000 out of 15,000 people go, about 14 percent, and in the process, they have hired close to 1,600 over the past two years. They have done it with incentives.

I would like you to find out how they have done it, what authorities they have used and why we don't seem to be able to do it here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050302-29

.....

Please respond by 06/07/02

020 NSA

3M ay 02

U16991 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12262

MAY. 7. 2002 8:48PM

showWare

May 3, 2002 5:44 PM

TO: ADM Ellis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: NSA

020 NSA

I talked to Mike Hayden today. I think it might be a good idea if you called him and got him to visit with you about NSA and their capabilities, particularly with respect to info ops.

I think it would be a helpful thing to get thinking about that early.

Thanks.

DHR:db
050302-28

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

MR. SECRETARY —

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED.

JK
J. Little

Response attached

3 May 02

U16992 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12263

May 7, 2002 1500

TO: The Secretary of Defense
FROM: ADM Ellis
SUBJECT: NSA

Mr. Secretary;

I have talked to Mike Hayden this afternoon, as you suggested, and arranged to accelerate my visit to NSA. In a wide-ranging discussion of both support for and execution of information operations (IO), I again confirmed that he and I share similar views on both the challenges and potential of effective info ops.

U.S. Strategic Command has a very close working relationship with NSA across the full range of their capabilities, even as we emphasize certain specific STRATCOM support requirements. This interaction is capably and continuously facilitated by the 17-member NSA staff element permanently assigned to this headquarters. Highlights include:

- We are hard-wired to the newly-created NSA Information Operations Technology Center (IOTC) in support of our Idaho Thunder info ops (IO) effort with which you are familiar. I have assigned a full-time resident liaison officer to Mike's IOTC and the Center's Director sits on our IO oversight group. In fact, he will be in the HQ this week for a periodic Idaho Thunder review.
- The support of NSA in our efforts to counter the strategic re-locatable target (SRT) set has been essential. I received an extensive update on that collective effort this morning and provided new guidance. The NSA experts will be at STRATCOM this week as we review interagency SRT progress and refine our integrated approach.
- NSA has generously credited the STRATCOM IO initiatives with helping shape its organizational and operational IO realignment.

In short, Mike Hayden well-remembers his early career here in Omaha at then-Strategic Air Command and remains a valued and fully-integrated partner in our info ops efforts. I believe that our linkage to NSA can and should be strengthened to address many of the nation's IO needs as we scope concepts for the merging of SPACECOM and STRATCOM. I look forward to discussing this issue with you during our upcoming meeting.

Warmest regards and very respectfully,

Jim Ellis

11-L-0559/OSD/12264

May 3, 2002 4:22 PM

5/7

Done

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Statue

005

If they give me a statue tonight, which I am told they will, please make darn sure I found out what they paid for it and that I write a check.

I do want to personally keep it. If has to go through Protocol first, fine.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050302-26

.....
Please respond by 03/03/02

5/7

SECRET

~~Statue~~

Protocol and General
Council's office have
processed the statue, value
\$950 (sheet attached).

3 MAY 2002

Recommend you make
out the check to
11-140559/OSD/17265
Plus Memorial For ...

U16993 02



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

May 7, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PROTOCOL

SUBJECT: Acceptance of Lone Sailor Award

On May 3, the United States Navy Memorial Foundation awarded Secretary Rumsfeld the Lone Sailor Award, which is awarded on a regular basis to a Sea Service veteran, who has distinguished himself in civilian life through public service and national leadership. The bronze figurine that comprises the award has a value of \$950.00.

Pursuant to section 2635.204(d) of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (Standards of Ethical Conduct For Employees of the Executive Branch), Secretary Rumsfeld may accept this award, including the figurine, since it constitutes a bona fide award for meritorious public service from an organization that is not substantially affected by Secretary Rumsfeld's performance of duties, and is awarded on a regular basis pursuant to written standards.

Please contact me if you have any additional questions.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Stephen Epstein".

Stephen Epstein
Director
Standards of Conduct Office

*For info, the
only other
recipient who
paid for the
award was
former Pres. Bush.*

May 3, 2002 4:11 PM

5/9 Action

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Background Sheet

020 SD

I asked Torie to get a revised background sheet for me to edit a long time ago, and I wanted to make sure we were consistent.

Please see that is done by close of business next Tuesday, May 7, so that I can edit it and then we can change everything and get the right things in there.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/05/02 SecDef memo to Di Rita, re: Background Sheet
03/19/02 SecDef memo to VADM Gre: Naval Reserves

DHR:dh
050302-24

.....
Please respond by 05/07/02

5/6

*Larry - see you
just the section on
Naval Reserve at the red
table.*

3 May 02

(1)

Version 2

Biography of Donald Rumsfeld

On January 20, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld was sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense. ~~As the~~ President's senior defense cabinet member, Secretary Rumsfeld is responsible for directing the actions of the defense department in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ~~and~~ campaign known as the war on terrorism. *The war on terrorism is being waged against a backdrop of great change within the Department of Defense. (A) from page (4)*

Prior to his appointment, the former Navy pilot served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Chief of Staff for President Ford, congressman from Illinois, CEO of two Fortune 500 companies, and as the 13th Secretary of Defense.

Secretary Rumsfeld was born in Chicago in 1932. He attended Princeton University on academic and ROTC scholarships graduating with a degree in History (A.B., 1954). He served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as an aviator and flying instructor.

Secretary Rumsfeld came to Washington in 1957, during the Eisenhower Administration, to serve as an administrative assistant to Congressman David Dennison and Congressman Robert Griffin. In 1962, after a stint with an investment banking firm, Secretary Rumsfeld, at the age of 30, was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a congressman from Illinois. He was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968.

Secretary Rumsfeld resigned from Congress in 1969 to serve in the Nixon Administration. From 1969 to 1970, he ~~became~~ ^{was} Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and Assistant to the President ~~(1969-1970)~~. From 1971 to 1972, he served as Counselor to the President, and

Director of the Economic Stabilization Program. In 1973, he left Washington to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974).

In August 1974, he returned to Washington to serve in the Ford Administration as Chairman of the transition to the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (1974) and eventually became President Ford's Chief of Staff (1974-1975). In 1975, at the age of 43, he was appointed to serve as the 13th Secretary of Defense, the youngest in United States history (1975-1977). In 1977, Secretary Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

From 1977 to 1985, Secretary Rumsfeld served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company. The successful turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981).

Secretary Rumsfeld later served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993. General Instruments pioneered the development of the first all-digital high definition television (HDTV) technology. Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman of Gilead Sciences, Inc.

Before returning for his second tour as Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld chaired the

Ballistic Missile Threat Commission and the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization.

During his tenure in the private sector, Secretary Rumsfeld continued to serve the American public, holding a variety of posts, including:

- Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control – Reagan Administration (1982 - 1986);
- President Reagan's Special Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982 - 1983);
- Senior Advisor to President Reagan's Panel on Strategic Systems (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the U.S. Joint Advisory Commission on U.S./Japan Relations – Reagan Administration (1983 - 1984);
- President Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the National Commission on [the] Public Service (1987 - 1990);
- Member of the National Economic Commission (1988 - 1989);
- Member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University (1988 - 1992);
- Member of the Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1989 - 1991);
- FCC's High Definition Television Advisory Committee (1992 - 1993);
- Member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (1999 - 2000); and

?

Secretary Rumsfeld's civic activities have included: service as a member of the National Academy of Public Administration; member of the U.S./Russia Business Forum; member of the boards of trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, the

Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Park Foundation; and Chairman of the Congressional Leadership's National Security Advisory Group.

~~Most recently during 2001~~ Under Secretary Rumsfeld's leadership, the ~~defense~~ department has developed a new defense strategy replacing the old model for sizing forces with a newer more modern approach. New approaches have been developed for balancing risks. The missile defense research and testing program has been reorganized and revitalized, free of the constraints of the ABM Treaty. DoD refocused on space capabilities and adopted a new approach to strategic deterrence that increases security while reducing strategic nuclear weapons. ~~Early in 2002, DoD will present a proposal for a new Unified Command Plan to President Bush.~~

Move to pg. 1

In early 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld proposed and the President approved a significant reorganization of the worldwide command structure, known as the Unified Command Plan.

Secretary Rumsfeld is married to the former Joyce Pierson. They have three children, Valerie Rumsfeld, Marcy Rumsfeld, and Donald Nicholas (Nick) Rumsfeld.



THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD

Secretary of Defense



Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld was in private business. Born in Chicago, Illinois, in 1932, he attended Princeton University on scholarship (AB, 1954) and served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as a Naval aviator.

He went to Washington, DC, in 1957, during the Eisenhower Administration, to serve as Administrative Assistant to a Congressman. After a stint with an investment banking firm, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968.

Mr. Rumsfeld resigned from Congress in 1969 during his fourth term to serve in the Nixon Administration as:

- Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Assistant to the President, and a member of the President's Cabinet (1969-1970); and, as
- Counsellor to the President, Director of the Economic Stabilization Program, and a member of the President's Cabinet (1971-1972).



In 1973, he left Washington, DC, to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974).

In August 1974, he was called back to Washington, DC, to serve in the Ford Administration successively as:

- Chairman of the transition to the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (1974);
- Chief of Staff of the White House and a member of the President's Cabinet (1974-1975); and, as
- The 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, the youngest in the country's history (1975-1977).

From 1977 to 1985 he served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and then Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company. The successful turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981). From 1985 to 1990 he was in private business.

Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993. A leader in broadband transmission, distribution, and access control technologies for cable, satellite and terrestrial broadcasting applications, the company pioneered the development of the first all-digital high definition television (HDTV) technology. After taking the company public and returning it to profitability, Mr. Rumsfeld returned to private business in late 1993. Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman of Gilead Sciences, Inc.

During his business career, Mr. Rumsfeld continued public service in a variety of posts, including:

- Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control – Reagan Administration (1982 - 1986);
- President Reagan's Special Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982 - 1983);
- Senior Advisor to President Reagan's Panel on Strategic Systems (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the U.S. Joint Advisory Commission on U.S./Japan Relations – Reagan Administration (1983 - 1984);
- President Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the National Commission on the Public Service (1987 - 1990);
- Member of the National Economic Commission (1988 - 1989);
- Member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University (1988 - 1992);
- Member of the Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1989 - 1991);
- FCC's High Definition Television Advisory Committee (1992 - 1993);
- Chairman, Commission on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998 - 1999);
- Member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (1999 - 2000); and
- Chairman of the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization (2000).

Mr. Rumsfeld's civic activities included service as a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the boards of trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Park Foundation. He was also a member of the U.S./Russia Business Forum and Chairman of the Congressional Leadership's National Security Advisory Group.

In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef_bio.html

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Name: Donald Henry Rumsfeld

Source of Commission: NROTC, Princeton University. Commissioned an Ensign on June 4, 1954.

Degree: BA in Government History, 1954, Princeton University.

Service Dates/Assignments:

| | |
|--|-----------------------|
| NAS Atlantic City, NJ | 15 Jun 54 – 26 Sep 54 |
| Naval Air Basic Training Command, NAS Pensacola, FL | 27 Oct 54 – 15 Jul 55 |
| Naval Air Advanced Training Command, NAS Corpus Christi, TX | 16 Jul 55 – 30 Jan 56 |
| Naval Station, Naval Base Norfolk, VA | 31 Jan 56 – 14 May 56 |
| NAS Pensacola, FL | 14 May 56 – 20 Jul 56 |
| NAAS Sauffley Field, Pensacola, FL | 20 Jul 56 – 22 Apr 57 |
| NAAS Corry Field, Pensacola, FL | 23 Apr 57 – 19 Nov 57 |

***Released from Active Duty 19 Nov 57**

***Entered Naval Reserve 19 Nov 57**

| | |
|--|------------------------|
| VS-662, NAS Anacostia, DC | 1 Mar 58 – 30 Jun 58 |
| Fleet Training Unit Atlantic, Norfolk, VA | 17 Nov 58 – 30 Nov 58 |
| VS-662, NAS Anacostia, DC | 30 May 59 – 30 June 59 |
| VS-731, NAS Grosse Ile, IL | 1 Feb 60 – 31 Oct 60 |
| VS-723, NAS Glenview, IL | 12 Mar 61 – 30 Jun 62 |
| VS-722, NAS Glenview, IL | 1 Jul 62 – 29 Jan 63 |
| 5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC | 29 Jan 63 – 30 Jun 67 |
| National War College, Washington, DC | 18 Jun 67 – 30 Jun 67 |
| 5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC | 1 Jul 67 – 30 Jun 68 |
| Office of Legislative Affairs, Washington, DC | 4 Dec 68 – 9 Dec 68 |
| 5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC | 1 Jul 69 – 12 Nov 70 |
| Naval Air Reserve Unit, NAF Washington, DC | 1 Jul 71 – 19 Nov 75 |

***Transferred to Standby Reserve – Inactive, 4 Dec 75**

***Transferred to Retired Reserve at rank of CAPT, 1 May 89**

TAB A

History of Promotions

ENS 4 Jun 54
LTJG 4 Dec 55
LT 1 Apr 58
LCDR 1 Feb 64
CDR 1 Jul 68
CAPT 1 May 74

History of Awards

National Defense Service Medal

3 April 2002

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Director of Naval Reserve (CNO N095E)
To: Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense
Subj: RESERVE CAREER ICO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. Sir, as we interpret the data you provided, SECDEF's Naval career would be categorized as follows:

- Served on active duty from June 1954 to November 1957
- Served in the Naval Reserve from November 1957 to November 1975.
- Transferred to Retired Reserve in May 1989.

2. A sample statement for inclusion in SECDEF'S biography is:

"Secretary Rumsfeld entered active Naval Service in June 1954 and served as a Naval Aviator. In 1957 he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975. Secretary Rumsfeld transferred to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989."

Very respectfully,



NOEL G. PRESTON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Naval Reserve

11-L-0559/OSD/12276

TAB B

April 5, 2002 1:31 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Background Sheet

Please give me hard copies of any background sheets that we are releasing on me—from this office, Torie's office, on the web site or via e-mail. I want to see them all and look at them.

Then give back to me this paper on my reserve status when you give me all the background sheets.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/19/02 SecDef memo w/response attached

DIR:dh
040502-13

.....

Please respond by _____

5/8
SecDEF -
A draft bio is attached. I have edited
a little.
Also Attached:
- Current bio in use
- NAVY service data.

D. Rita

March 19, 2002 9:26 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

BUDEF HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Naval Reserves

APR 05 2002

Here is a note I got from (b)(6) on my service in the Naval Reserve. You said I ought to include it. *YOU SHOULD.*

I am sure (b)(6) is wrong and that my records are wrong. I don't think I have full years in between. I may have a gap. *THERE IS NO GAP.*

Could you please have someone look at the records, and find out what I should say by way of the number of years I served in the Reserves. Please get me the actual information, so I can use it properly as you have recommended.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 Nestel response to SecDef, 031802-5

4/3
— ACTUAL DATA SHEET
FROM THE BUREAU OF

DHR:dh
031902-15

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02 NAVAL PERSONNEL (NOW CALLED NAVAL PERSONNEL COMMAND) IS ATTACHED. AT TAB A.

— RECOMMENDED STATEMENT OF YOUR SERVICE FOR YOUR BIO IS AT U1096

March 18, 2002 8:28 AM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Naval Service

Please check with (b)(6) and see if she can look in my Navy records and find out how many years I served in the Reserve. I know I served about 3½ years on active duty, from June 1954 to November 1957. I then went into the Reserves, and I cannot remember the year I stopped. I do remember my final rank was Captain, USNR.

Please see if she can find out the date of when I finally resigned from the Naval Reserve. I think it was because I was at NATO or the Pentagon. I know it continued from when I got out in 1957 well into the time I was an assistant to a Congressman and then a Congressman.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-5

.....

Please respond by 03/25/02

3/18/02

Sir -

You served 32 years in the Naval Reserves from Nov 57 to 1989. I'll see if we can get an exact date of departure.

- You were serving in the private sector in 1989, the year you resigned. In '89 you were a member of Nat'l Economic Commission & Consultant to US Dept. of state

11-L-0559/OSD/12279

(b)(6)

May 3, 2002 4:08 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Notes from Hoon Call

DR

Please make sure you write something up confidential on Hoon's comments, not for distribution to anyone in NATO.

He noted his desire to tidy up in Bosnia and the Balkans and reduce to one country. He said he was short of people and would be thinking about moving in that direction.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050302-23

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

3 May 02

U16995 02

7/13
15
Snowflake

May 3, 2002 8:54 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Egyptian MoD

Egypt

Tom Franks says he thinks I ought to invite the Egyptian MoD to the U.S. sometime in the fall. He thought it would be helpful to him if I did that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050302-15

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

5/7

To: ASD/ISA
Rodman

Please advise -

D. Rita

LARRY DI RITA
7/9

[Large handwritten signature]

5/13

→ Settle -

Done
LARRY DI RITA

3 May 02

U16996 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12281

May 3, 2002 8:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Professor Etzioni

Please have someone draft an appropriate letter to Amitai Etzioni at George Washington, as a result of this column.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/01/02, Amitai Etzioni, "An Earful on the War from America's 'Allies'," *Christian Science Monitor*

DHR:dh
050302-12

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

000.5

3 May 02

U16997 02

must limit its relations with Taipei. This message was delivered at his recent meeting with Henry Kissinger.

But Mr. Kissinger still lives in the world of the 1970s, when he scored his diplomatic triumphs. It is a world that no longer exists, and the Bush administration has moved beyond the precepts of that era. While grasping China's importance, the administration has diversified its portfolio of Asian friends. It has also sought to counter China's threat to Taiwan by pledging to do "whatever it takes" to defend the island, together with the development of a low-key but substantive security relationship.

What can Mr. Hu do about this unwelcome predicament for China? The reaction so far suggests that the scope of any protest is limited to calling an occasional and symbolic halt to U.S. fleet visits to Hong Kong. Rhetoric and reality have long diverged in China and today the chasm is clear for all to see. China's internal stability is increasingly dependent on good relations with the U.S. and other foreign powers, who pay the bills through imports and investment. Yet Beijing's rhetoric and foreign policy continues to undercut that relationship.

Absent a major liberalizing breakthrough on China's home front, this international isolation is likely to continue. Even though Washington and Beijing want Mr. Hu's visit to be "successful," no positive words can disguise the fact that China is unlikely ever to beguile the U.S. quite as she did from the 1970s through to the '90s.

Change will come to China ultimately, and with it a transformation of its world role. As a democracy, she would join the first rank of powers. But is there any evidence that Mr. Hu is the man to bring about this metamorphosis? His CV shows no trace of the radical reformist thinking that China desperately requires. Instead, he appears to be an utterly conventional communist, anointed by Deng Xiaoping to succeed Jiang Zemin; a man who once ran a government construction unit

and later struggled hard to crush the Tibetans, while party secretary for the province. He is weak, having no military connections or strong allies in his generation.

Although generational turnover is bound to bring some change in years ahead, what China needs is fundamental reforms to escape its current binds, both domestic and international. No one expects Mr. Hu to lead those changes and his meeting with the president will most likely only confirm this.

Mr. Waldron is director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania.

Christian Science Monitor
May 1, 2002

49. An Earful On The War From America's 'Allies'

By Anitai Etzioni

WASHINGTON - If you want to get a feeling for why America's allies are rapidly peeling off from supporting the war on terrorism, the following personal account may help.

It started when a voice from my German audience startled me with the flat statement: "You are in Afghanistan for the oil." When I responded in shock, "Oil?" he corrected himself, "Well, for the pipeline." (He was referring to a pipeline some corporations are considering running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to a port on the Arabian Sea.)

I was in Germany debating this issue as one of the 60 intellectuals who signed a letter from America supporting the war. The United States justified the war on three grounds: protecting innocents from harm (as distinct from sheer self-defense), a clear and present danger (not just a questionable threat), and that the situation cannot be plausibly mitigated through negotiations.

But back at the debate, organized in Berlin by the Aspen Institute, Ekkehart Krippendorff from the Free University, a well-known, left-leaning professor, argued that it is wrong in principle for intellectuals to

support a government. "They should be critical; you never know what a government will do with its power," he said.

During a dinner after the debate, Andrea Fischer, a member of the German parliament from the dovish Green Party, argued that any high-falutin moral blessing of a war was at best troublesome. "Just say it is in self-defense," she said.

At a meeting at the Center for Social Science in Berlin later the same day, a colleague quoted a counter-statement issued in the US by the left, mocking ours, calling us "celebrants of war," and arguing that the US had appropriated the right of self-defense.

I asked the audience, "fair enough, you are critical of what the US is doing. If it is ever justified to go to war, what are your criteria for a call to arms?" When I found no takers, I asked if fighting Hitler was just. This got me a lot of positive nodding, but also a voice from the back of the room: "Saddam is no Hitler; Sharon comes close."

In Afghanistan, the US had some very regrettable collateral damage, but also collateral gain. While the US did not set out merely to liberate women denied the right to work, to education, and to leaving their homes unescorted - or help all to enjoy some form of culture other than prayer - America did bring liberty to millions of Afghans. This, I said, brings up the question: If the US should not fight terror aimed at Americans, how about terror that wipes out other people?

Half a million people were slaughtered in Rwanda in 1994. Should the US intervene with force if another genocide looms? A woman from the audience argued that the UN should act, but it could not last time, because the US failed to pay its dues.

I asked why the European Union did not act on its own, if it was so critical of the way Americans do things? And if the Europeans preferred the way Dutch peacekeepers acted in Srebrenica, Bosnia, where 7,000 Muslims were slaughtered by Serbs while the peacekeepers refused to fire a

shot in their defense? I argued that the "collateral damage" of not acting was much higher than America's in Afghanistan, and that the US did its best to minimize it.

The response? I was told that the "official" number of civilian deaths in Afghanistan was 50,000 and that nobody knows what really happened since the US did not allow the press in.

At this point I lost it. I allowed that they could afford to be de facto pacifists, as long as Americans were the bullies, on call to save them. Who kept West Berlin free? Our airlift. Who stopped Hitler? The Dutch? The French? Who stopped the military expansion of communism in Europe?

Renowned historian Jürgen Kocka responded, "You are ... right. If it was not for the US, I would have grown up a Nazi. I am forever grateful."

I felt I had planted a seed, but many more need to be sown and nurtured if the American antiterrorism drive is to keep support overseas. It is time to reestablish the US Information Agency.

The US needs to consult with its allies more about the next moves in the war on terrorism, although America must make clear that if all the allies do is veto what the US considers must be done, without suggesting viable alternatives, America shall go it alone at the end of the day.

The US should also allow more press access during the next rounds of the war. But ultimately, I fear, Americans had better steel themselves to the fact that they shall have to carry much of the burden of defending the free world yet again, while critics crowd the coffee shops of Europe, trading paranoid stories about US motives and second-guessing every move.

It's sniping we Americans would rather do without, but it is often the price of leadership. *Anitai Etzioni is a university professor at George Washington University and author of 'The Monochrome Society.'*

TAB A

May 3, 2002 8:43 AM

Done 5/20

TO: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Leahy

Indonesia

I want a strategy developed to deal with Senator Leahy.

SAC/PO

I want to know what committee he runs, what the exact words in the amendment are, and who is on the committee.

I want an action plan, legislatively and administratively, so that we can begin to get military-to-military relationships with Indonesia.

This has just got to stop. It has to be done in the next 15 to 20 days, so that we can get it done before August. It is critically important for our country.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050302-10

.....

Please respond by 05/17/02

3 May 02

U16998 02



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

FOUO
INFO MEMO

May 20, 2002 1:00 PM

DSD

TW 5/20/02

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: Sen. Leahy and Resumption of Mil-to-Mil Contacts with Indonesia
Response to Snowflake 050302-10

- By memorandum dated 3 May 02 (Tab A), you requested background information on Sen. Leahy and his committee memberships, details on legislation which he has sponsored that impacts mil-to-mil contacts with Indonesia, and you directed that a legislative action plan be developed to overcome these restrictions.
- Patrick J. Leahy is a five-term Senator from Vermont (Tab B) who serves in various capacities as the fourth ranking Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC). Relevant for purposes of Indonesia, he is Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (SAC-FO) and serves on the Defense (SAC-D) and Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary (SAC-CJSJ) subcommittees.
- Sen. Leahy has been the most prolific advocate of foreign human rights legislation in Congress and the most outspoken opponent to the normalization of mil-to-mil relations with Indonesia. He has sponsored several legislative proposals that relate to Indonesia and East Timor (Tab B). Of specific concern on the issue of resumed mil-to-mil relations with Indonesia, is Section 572 of the FY02 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-115) (Tab C).
- Section 572 prohibits the use of FY02 International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program funds for assistance to Indonesian military personnel until the President determines and reports to Congress that both the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) have made progress in seven specific areas. These areas involve allegations of human rights abuses in Indonesia and East Timor and democratization of the TNI. A summary assessment for each of these seven areas, prepared by OSD-P (ISA), is at Tab D. Finally, section 572 contains no organic waiver provision. It could, however, be waived by the President under section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

11-L-0559/OSD/12285

- We will continue to work with State and press the Hill for support on this issue and will keep you apprised of our progress.

Prepared by COL Fred T. Pribble, OSD/LA, (b)(6)

10:17 AM

Action 5/6

TO: Admiral Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: May 4, 2002
SUBJECT: Army Legislative Liaison

I would like by the close of business today and by the time I leave to have a list of the total number of people in Army Legislative Liaison, where they are located, and the numbers and whether they are civilian or military and officers or enlisted.

020 Army

I would also like to know whether they are located in Capitol Hill or here.

Thanks.

SECRET

Info is attached.

Have also included an organization chart as you requested.

DHR/azn
05032.08

Please respond by: _____

*U/R
ED 5/4*

4 May 02

U16999 02

CDR S

11-L-0559/OSD/12288

37 officers
 57 civilians
 5 enlisted

Army Congressional Liaison

CAPITOL HILL

| Pentagon | CAPITOL HILL | | | | Total | |
|----------|--------------|-------|-------|--------|-------|----|
| | Civ | House | | Senate | | |
| | | Mil | Civ | Mil | Civ | |
| ER | 3 | 4/0 | 0 | 2/0 | 0 | 31 |
| LISTED | 45 | 0/1 | 3 | 0/1 | 3 | 60 |
| | 3 | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | 8 |
| | 51 | 4/1 | 3 | 2/1 | 3 | 99 |

85

11-L-0559/OSD/12289
 14



Legislative Liaison Functional Designation

OSD Definitions:

Legislative Liaison: Those individuals that have responsibility for direct and personal external contact and communications with the Congress on all Department of Defense issues. Their primary functional responsibility is to provide advice, information, and assistance to the Legislative Branch on all Department issues. This standard applies to OSD/CJCS, the Services, Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities.

Legislative Support: Those individuals that coordinate legislative issues within each command structure or organization. They are not responsible for external communication on legislative issues; rather, they coordinate internally with and assist those performing direct and personal legislative liaison functions with the Legislative Branch.

Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War



Recent Actions

Snapshot of Support to 2nd Session, 106th Congress:


- 519 trips with Members and staff
- 170 Congressional Hearings, including 45 high-level hearings which required prepared witnesses
- Over 35,000 written inquiries from Congress, including 700 for senior leader signatures
- 200 Army nominations for Senate confirmation
- 200 3 - and 4 - star General Officer visits to the Hill

*We respond to many Congressional concerns.
Some examples...*

- Corps of Engineers
- Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
- Transformation



Office Chief Legislative Liaison



LTC(P)
CHRIS
ROMIG

MG JOE TAYLOR

BE TIM LINSAY

OBTAINING NAMES FOR DIV'S ABOVE

OBTAINING NAMES FOR DIV'S ABOVE

Persua

May 3, 2002 8:13 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PPBS

What do you think about putting something in the Defense Planning Guidance that tells whoever is appropriate—I suppose it is Dov Zakheim—that we want to clean up the PPB system.

Please look at this note from the Secretary of the Navy.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/01/02 SecNav response to SecDef re: PPBS [U07237/02]

DHR:dh
050302-6



Please respond by 05/17/02

100.5

3 May 02

U17000 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12293

April 23, 2002 7:58 AM

TO: Under Secretaries
Service Secretaries
Chairman, JCS
Vice Chairman, JCS
Service Chiefs
PDUSD(P)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PPB System

Attached is a chart that was used in a briefing recently to explain the Defense PPB system.

When I saw it, I asked if it was a joke. It turns out it is apparently not meant to be a joke.

It struck me that those of us in the Senior Review Group ought to think about whether maybe it is a joke, even though it is not intended to be one.

Regards,

Attach.
2/02 Defense PPB System slide

DHR:dh
042302-1

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 03 2002

RESPONSE FROM SECNAV.

Please respond by _____


The PPBS system is actually more complex (disruptive!) than shown!! There are ^{also} multiple feedback loops and this is a huge manpower sink.

V/R Eds/z

055810SD/12294

U07237 102

DEFENSE PPB SYSTEM



- 0. President's Strategic Guidance
- 1. National Security Strategy
- 2. JSR/National Military Strategy
- 3. Defense Program Projection
- 4a. Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
- 4b. Chairman's Program Recommendations

- 5. Defense Planning Guidance
- 6. Program Objectives Memoranda
- 7. Program Review
- 8. Chairman's Program Assessment

- 9. Program Decision Memoranda
- 10. Budget Estimate Submissions
- 11. Program Budget Decisions
- 12. President's Budget

* Potential Defense Resources Board (DRB)/Expanded DRB
 * Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) & Revised NMS

202 GS
 DCS(J5/J8)
 OUSD(P)
 ODPA&E
 OUSD(C)

May 3, 2002 8:07 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: "Training Holidays"

What do you think of Tom White's attached response?

Thanks.

Attach.
04/24/02 SecArmy info memo to SecDef re: Training Holidays

DHR:dh
050302-5



Please respond by 05/31/02

2001

3m 5/2



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 03 2002



INFO MEMO

April 24, 2002, 8:45 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Thomas E. White*
Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

APR 24 2002

SUBJECT: Training Holidays

- In response to your note about "training holidays:"
 - ◆ The Army established a policy in 1999 of designating selected three-day, national holiday weekends as opportunities for local commanders to extend those weekends to four days. The net effect is that field training is not planned on those days, thus, allowing maximum opportunity for soldiers and civilians to secure authority to be absent.
- The purpose was, and continues to be, to:
 - ◆ Enhance the morale of soldiers, civilians, and families by adding predictability for personal and family time while managing hectic training schedules.
 - ◆ Enhance safety by providing more time for weekend holiday travel (reduce privately owned vehicle accidents).
 - ◆ Enhance retention (helped us recover from '98-'99 low point).
- "Training holidays" is merely a planning mechanism that has contributed enormously to morale, safety, and retention throughout the force. This is a great way to provide a little predictability to an otherwise demanding and fluid OPTEMPO.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: Note from Secretary Rumsfeld, Subj: Training Holidays, April 2, 2002

Prepared By: Colonel Joseph Schroedel, (b)(6)

| | |
|-----------------------|--------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 4/24 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | 5/1/02 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 4/24 |

Printed on Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/12297

April 2, 2002 7:36 AM

TO: Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Training Holidays

*4/29
SMA D. White*

Please take a look into this matter of "training holidays"—or Fridays off. Let me know what it is about.

Please explain.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/26/02 MA and SMA response to SecDef

DHR:dh
032602-3

.....
Please respond by COB 4 Apr 02

5/1
WHITE RESPONSE ATTACHED
*WR
ED*

SOS 5/1

May 3, 2002 8:04 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Deployment Orders

I would like a proposal from you folks on how we can cut the time to process deployment orders.

I am beside myself. I really think it is inexcusable that we are so bureaucratic and unprofessional.

Please get back to me by May 16.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050302-4

.....

Please respond by 05/16/02

370

3 May 02

U17002 02

10:13 AM

TO: John Stenbit
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: May 4, 2002
 SUBJECT:

What is the status on the backlog on security clearances? I believe that is in your area. Please respond.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 05032.01

Please respond by: _____ *5/8/02*

380 01

4 May 02

U17004 02



July 18, 2001 8:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Clearances

The idea of changing the security clearance update from five years to six years would change the backlog enormously. Other possible ideas would be to review the questions they are asking and to not require them to go back to the beginning—just go back to the last update.

Why don't we get some people thinking about that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071801-8

May 2, 2002 5:59 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DPB

Next time the Defense Policy Board comes in, I need more time with them. *etc*

I need to know in advance what issues Richard is going to talk to them about, so I can calibrate that before he has the meeting.

Afterwards, I need to know what they talked about —I don't mean the text, but the subject matter, so I will be ready when I go in.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050202-17

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

334

5/3
SecDef - Will do
On this point, though
you did calibrate him when
he came for lunch
a couple weeks back
I had subsequent
conversations to emp
size the points
in mac

U17005 02
11-L-0559/OSD/12302

5/2
0430
snowflake

May 2, 2002 2:27 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Distinguished Visitors

Please talk to the Protocol people, and tell them when someone is coming to meet me, even if they are early, I don't like them put in a hold.

I think Protocol ought to get the word up to me, and if I can possibly get down there in time, I will try to do it, rather than keeping people in hold until the scheduled time. They did that twice recently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050202-15

.....

Please respond by 05/10/02

Done

020 PRO

2 May 02

U17006 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12303

May 2, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Singapore

Please be sure I send a personal note thanking the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Singapore for the \$10 million contribution toward U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

I want to see the draft.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050202-8

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

DHR

STUDY DRAFT

2 May 02

U17007 02

420
1230



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

2002 APR 17 PM 5:21

467 6 A 2002

INFO MEMO

April 16, 2002, 2:21 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Singapore

- You may recall that at this morning's staff meeting I mentioned that Singapore had agreed to contribute \$10 million in assistance-in-kind to the Global War on Terrorism. I attach a self-explanatory letter from Defense Minister Tony Tan.

Attachments:

As stated

COORDINATION: NONE

4/30

Sec Def

By Kent L

Met for Lee Kuan Yew

meeting

Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

9/1

| | |
|-----------------------|--------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 4/30 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | 4/5/02 |
| MA BUCCI | 8/5/01 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 4/30 |



AMBASSADOR
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
3501 INTERNATIONAL PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20008
TEL: (b)(6)
FAX: [REDACTED]

April 16, 2002

Dr Dov Zakheim
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
(b)(6)

Dear *Under Secretary Zakheim,*

Could you please forward the attached faxed letter from Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Tony Tan, who is also Singapore's Minister of Defence to US Secretary of Defence, The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld. Singapore has pledged US\$10 million in kind towards US operations in Afghanistan.

The original letter will be sent to you once we receive it.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Chan Heng Chee'.

CHAN HENG CHEE

11-L-0559/OSD/12306



**DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE
SINGAPORE**

11 April 2002

The Honourable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
United States of America

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I am pleased to inform you that the Government of Singapore has considered the request of the United States Government for assistance-in-kind, and will pledge US\$10 million in kind towards the US operations in Afghanistan.

Singapore stands firm in our support for the international fight against terrorism, and this contribution underscores our commitment to support this effort. We regard the fight against terrorism as an endeavour of the highest importance. The civilised world must and will succeed in this endeavour.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Tonytan', with a horizontal line underneath.

DR TONY TAN KENG YAM

Paul

Larry - See that this is a get to for McConnell - DR

May 2, 2002 7:29 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator McConnell

Please get back to me with the answer to Senator Mitch McConnell's question about helicopters that he learned from Fort Campbell.

5/14

Thanks.

ASD/LA for Action - D, R, K

DHR:dh
050202-7

4524

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 10 2002

5/10

SECDEF -

Senator McConnell has learned from members of his staff and from members of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY that some shortfalls in the Army's overall helo fleet exist. These reported shortfalls fall into two categories:

- Those caused by Army Aviation being restructured.
- Those caused by losses in Afghanistan.

The attached paper from the Army provides more details (from LTGEN Byrnes, Director Army Staff).

V/R Ed

2 May 02

U17008 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12308

INFORMATION PAPER

DAMO-ZXG
9 May 2002

SUBJECT: Helicopters in The Army

1. Purpose. To provide information to the Secretary of Defense addressing reported concerns by Senator Mitch McConnell, KY, that there might be a shortage of helicopters in The Army.

45/9

2. Discussion.

a. The Army does have a shortage of helicopters (138 UH-60s). This is directly related to the Army's aviation transformation, a part of which includes the accelerated retirement of 1000 older airframes. To fill this shortage, thirty-six UH-60s were funded in FY 02 and should be delivered in FY 03. The remaining 102 UH-60s are programmed for funding in FY 03 to FY 10 and will be used to fully fill Army National Guard and Army Reserve units.

GEN SHINSEKI

b. In January 2002, the CSA approved the Army Aviation Transformation Plan. This is part of the overall plan to transform The Army. This effort will reduce the current Aviation force structure by 1000 airframes, accelerating the divesture of the Army's oldest airframes UH-1 (Huey), AH-1 (Cobra), and OH-58A/C (Kiowa). The plan also accelerates modernization across the Active and Reserve Components by aggressively pursuing recapitalization of the remaining airframes and cascading modern aircraft to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Many of the upgrades, achieved through recapitalization, address issues identified by Task Force HAWK, such as second generation forward-looking infrared, improved radios, internal auxiliary fuel tanks, improved aviation survivability equipment, video transmission/reception, and new video recorders.

c. The plan will also restructure and standardize attack (AH-64 Apache) and lift (UH-60) organizations across the Army. Restructure and standardization began this year and is scheduled for completion by FY 03, with the exception of 101st Air Assault Division. The Army senior leadership made the decision to delay the 101st Division's restructuring due to its current deployment.

d. The Army has sustained some battle damaged / destroyed helicopters during the Global War on Terrorism, which belong to the 160th Special Operations Regiment and 101st Air Assault Division stationed at Ft. Campbell, KY. Six MH-47s and one AH-64 have sustained significant battle damage during the Global War on Terrorism. Two MH-47s were destroyed; one in Afghanistan and one in the Philippines, and will be replaced with new purchases. Four MH-47s were damaged in Afghanistan; one

DAMO-ZXG

SUBJECT: Helicopters in The Army

has been fixed, one is undergoing maintenance test flights, and two are being repaired. One AH-64A was destroyed in Afghanistan and will be replaced with an aircraft from the operational readiness float account.

Army working to replace the [redacted] pool

Prepared by: LTC Ron Tuggle/DAMO-ZXG/

(b)(6) [redacted]

Approved by: COL Kuiper/Chief, Army Initiatives Group/

*MH
476.*

May 2, 2002 7:14 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO and AWACs

NATO 452

Let's think through what I do about the NATO AWACs. I think I should send a cable to our Ambassador to NATO and something to Lord Robertson. I should probably write the MoDs of the countries that supplied the AWACs crews.

We ought to think about something else we could do. It is a big thing, and we want to treat it right.

Please get our people thinking about it and come back to me with a comprehensive proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050202-3

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

2 May 02

U17009 02

May 1, 2002 9:30 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UN PKO and the ICC

Here is a list I received of UN Peacekeeping Operations.

It seems like we should be thinking about how our opposition to the ICC should be factored in as the UN mandates for these operations are renegotiated. It looks like a lot of them expire this year.

Thanks.

Attach.

~~03~~ 31/02 UN and Selected Non-UN Peace Operations as of March 31, 2002

DHR:dh
050102-11

.....
Please respond by _____

UN

1 May 02

U17010 02

May 1, 2002 8:13 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paul Nitze

I am going to speak at something called the "Lone Sailor Award" dinner Friday night. I am told that Paul Nitze might be there. Could you give me about three sentences I could say about Paul to introduce him to that crowd?

I know him well, but you know what might appeal to him. I remember when he was Secretary of the Navy back in the Johnson Administration, and then of course I worked with him on SALT matters when I was Ambassador to NATO. We have been friends ever since.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050102-9



Please respond by 05/02/02

335SD

1 May 02

U17012 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12313

May 1, 2002 8:09 AM

*Done w/CRS
Memo DTD
5/21/02
SF # 237/5*

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: TRANSCOM Issue

I

When I was in TRANSCOM, I promised John Handy I would do something. Was it to shorten the time for deployment orders?

II

Let's find out and see that we fulfill the promise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050102-8

.....

Please respond by 05/03/02

TRANSCOM

5/2

~~SECRET~~
PART I - YES, YOU PROMISED YOU WOULD SHORTEN THE TIME FOR PROCESSING DEPLOYMENT ORDER

II - I'LL WORK THIS.

*U/R
ED*

1 May 02

U17013 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12314

April 25, 2002 1:05 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting w/John Handy at TRANSCOM

My recollection is that some 36% of deployment orders were not signed until after the latest date for doing what the deployment order proposed. I am told that number now has been moved down to 20%.

I would like Feith and Pace to figure out what is going on. If this building is so complex that it cannot function, and we are so totally wrapped around our anchor chain, we are going to have to take layers out.

Please get back to me within the next 14 days with a proposal. One idea might be to include a tracking process to show the dates each DoD element receives a deployment order, how many people it goes to, and a proposal as to how we can limit the number of days each person can have it. We should reduce the number of places they have to go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042502-15

.....

Please respond by 05/10/02

May 1, 2002 7:49 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Corps of Engineers

Should the Defense Planning Guidance have something in it on moving the Corps of Engineers out of DoD? That is what I want to do, except for the portion that relates to the Defense Department.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050102-4

322



Please respond by 05/10/02

1 May 02

U17014 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12316

5) show file
13 30

4:58 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
DATE: April 30, 2002
SUBJECT:

I have got to see all the gifts that we give out. And I've got to get a bunch of them that I don't give out, Paul does. And I want to select the ones we are going to give out. It was terrible over there. It was just gastly!

Thank you.

005

DHR/azn
043002.19

Please respond by:

5 | 5 | 00

30
4/2002

U17015 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12317

8:15 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 30, 2002
SUBJECT: **Attached Newspaper Photo**

Here is a superb photograph! In the meetings you may recall that I have been talking to the Afghan leaders about how they can know how well things are going by measuring whether refugees are coming in or going out. I wonder if you could get a hold of this Chang W. Lee at *The New York Times* and see if we can get a print of that photo, just for my personal use. It is so beautiful, and interesting and relevant, that I would like to have it. In any event, I would like to have this back in case we can't find it.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
043002.12

Attach: Photo by Chang W. Lee @ NYT

Please respond by: _____

5/7/02

060

30 APR 02

U17017 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12318



A rainbow greeted the Gul family as they returned to Afghanistan after many years as refugees in Pakistan.

Ignoring Risk, Afghan Refugees Rush Home

FROM THE FRONT

By JOHN F. BURNS

MASTALI, Afghanistan, April 25 — When Umer Gul came home this month after 22 years as a refugee in Pakistan, his tears of joy spoke for the tide of Afghans now returning to a country where many had despaired of ever setting foot again.

Standing in the jutting wooden prow of the truck that carried his family up to this village near Jalalabad from Peshawar, the Pakistani frontier city, Mr. Gul was enraptured.

"Look at that! Such beauty!" he said, waving at fields of ripening

wheat stretching to distant mountains in a haze of green and yellow. The sun shone brightly in the sky. The end of the journey, a light rain lifted and a rainbow spread across the sky, arcing directly over this mud-walled village where Mr. Gul's ancestors dwelled for generations until Soviet forces invaded in December 1979.

Three months after the invasion, as Mujahid guerrillas fought their first battles with Soviet troops in eastern Afghanistan, Mr. Gul took his family down to Peshawar, beginning two decades as a casual laborer

in a city of 10 million people. He had no money, no family, and no home. All his middle years he spent as a laborer, and he had no money to bury his father in a coffin.

Now, however, Mr. Gul has returned to his country, but particularly to his village, where the Pakistani forces in 1979 had left Kabul a humanitarian disaster.

"It's something I've always wanted, the liberty of living in my own country," Mr. Gul said after he, his wife, Zar Gul, 56, and seven of their children and grandchildren gathered down from the war-torn hills

APPEARED ON THE FRONT PAGE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES

Continued on Page A12

8:03 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 30, 2002
SUBJECT: **Early Bird Article**

We had better sort out this active duty reserve article.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
043002.10

SRG

Attach: "Administration To Reduce Active-Duty Reserves" *Washington Post*, April 30, 2002

Please respond by: 5/6/02

30 Apr 02

Washington Post
April 30, 2002
Pg. 2

Administration To Reduce Active-Duty Reserves

By Reuters

The Bush administration plans to sharply reduce the number of reservists and National Guard troops on active duty, saying fewer are needed to protect key installations from terrorist attack, according to internal documents and administration officials.

A Defense Department memo dated March 16 calls for demobilizing 14,500 reservists and guard members by June 30, dropping the number on active duty to 68,000 from a post-Sept. 11 peak of more than 82,500.

The move comes despite a March 13 memo from Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld warning that U.S. forces were stretched "past the point where the department can, without an unbelievably compelling reason, make any additional commitments."

White House officials said the demobilization reflected a new assessment of the nation's security needs going forward, as well as concerns raised by businesses that want reservists and guard members back on the job.

Some Democrats said the reductions were designed to save money and ease the federal budget deficit, and criticized White House budget director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. for the cutbacks. "The country would be better off if military professionals were making military decisions, not Mitch Daniels," said David Sirota, spokesman for Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee.

TO: Jim Haynes
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 30, 2002
 SUBJECT: Attached Article

What is this lawsuit by Larry Flynt? Is it anything I need to worry about?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
043002.07

Attach: *US News and World Report*, May 6, 2002 "Hard-Core Reporting"

000.5

Please respond by:

5/8/02

[Signature]

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 08 2002

5/8 - 2/5/8
 SecDef -
 The view is that
 it is not something
 you should be giving
 much thought to.
 I've discussed with both Haynes
 and Dell'Orto. I'll get
 status of the suit and give

U17019 02
 11-L-0559/OSD/12322/ update. *D. Lita*

Washington Whispers

BY PAUL BEDARD

Your tax dollars at work: Was al Qaeda at OK City?

Rep. Dan Burton, chair of the House Government Reform Committee, is an unabashed investigator of the feds, no matter how far-fetched the charges. But even his own team thinks he has gone off the deep end with his latest project: allegations that Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh is tied to Islamic terrorists. McVeigh, the story goes, met in an Oklahoma City motel with Iraqi agents before the 1995 explosion. Part two: unsubstantiated reports that two 9/11 hijackers holed up with the suspected 20th attacker, Zacarias Mousaoui, in the same motel last July. Coincidence? Sources say Burton sent investigators to OK City to sniff around, tasked three staffers to the probe, and asked David Schippers, who led a House panel on Bill Clinton's impeachment, to advise. But that's not all: Burton wants more staff. While there's lots of circumstantial evidence to investigate, like an allegation that the FBI stopped an agent from looking into the Iraqi angle, the feds say it's a waste of money. Ditto some in his committee. "Some attorneys here," says a staffer, "think it's wacko."

Frankly speaking

There's new urgency among Senate Republicans to join the bandwagon to provide the elderly with a prescription drug benefit. GOP polling whiz Frank Luntz surveyed a large group—1,500 worthies in states key to the Republicans' gaining control of the Senate—and found it was the top issue. "Nothing matters more," Luntz says.

In the mail

The \$100,000 Chase Platinum MasterCard application you got in the envelope that looks exactly like the one reserved for tax returns and Social Security checks isn't really from the Treasury Department. It's a Chase scam to get you to open the envelope. And Treasury is angry. So mad it threatened legal action if the firm didn't stop mailing the applications in envelopes stamped "Financial Management Service," Treasury's check-cutting

agency, and "Official Business." Chase stopped, we learn, but only after "millions" had been sent out.

Tag teams

Chatter that Al Gore and Joe Lieberman would reunite their presidential and vice presidential ticket in 2004 before the primaries has other White House hopefuls thinking up their own pre-primary teaming. Namely, Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry with Georgia Gov. Roy Barnes or Sen. John Edwards of North Carolina. "It would paint a very clear picture of the past versus the present," says a Democratic strategist.

Hard-core reporting

Porn mogul Larry Flynt is putting his money where his mouth is as he pursues a First Amendment suit against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. His *Hustler* has dispatched a scribe to Bagram Air Base in



on't get Homeland Security Office Director Tom Ridge wrong when he disses the paranoia in many of us who reacted to 9/11 by mapping out home evacuation plans and stocking up on Dr Pepper and Spam. "I like the effort," Ridge cheers. He's matter-of-fact on security at home: If it feels good, do it. But it's not for him. "I don't lie awake at night." Not because the Vietnam War hero who looks like a pro wrestler thinks he's Mr. Tough. It's because he feels safe in his Harrisburg, Pa., home,

where he returns on weekends—and because any at-home security plan against terrorism is probably a wasted effort. For example, consider how his dogs would react to a panicked escape. "You'd be tripping over three Labs on your way out the one door, and that would be about it." And Ridge isn't big on other drills, like those scary classroom atomic bomb tests of the 1950s. "Now knowing what I know about an atom bomb, hiding under my desk in third grade probably wouldn't have given me much cover."

7:39 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 30, 2002
SUBJECT: **Attached Draft Letter**

Call Tom Korologos and tell him I am going to pass on the letter to Stonecipher since I don't know him, but thanks for the thought.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
043002.06

Attach: Draft letter to Harry Stonecipher

Please respond by: 5/3/02

3355D

30 April 02

U17020 02

FAX

**TIMMONS AND COMPANY, INC.
SUITE 850
1850 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20006**

PHONE: (b)(6)
FAX: [Redacted]

Number of pages (including cover page):

DATE: April 17, 2002

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Tom C. Korologos

(b)(6)

*SWT -
Pls. Draft something
short, tight.
D. Rita
4/8*

*would you please see if D.R.
can send/sign something like this
to Harry Stonecipher, vice chair of Boeing
who is retiring? the event where we
would read Don's letter is MAY 7.*

*so please send the letter back to me
and i'll get it into the right hands*

You're a great American!

11-L-0559/OSD/1232001K

DRAFT**Letter to Harry Stonecipher from Secretary Rumsfeld**

Dear Harry:

I hear you're attempting to retire from Boeing. I also understand it didn't work out when you tried it last year, something I know about only too well. I wish you luck this time – if anyone has earned the right to a change of pace it's you.

Harry, you have given the industry you know and love so well many years of tremendous service. Your record of accomplishment at General Electric alone would have been something to celebrate, but you went on to do even more – first at Sundstrand, then at McDonnell Douglas and finally at Boeing after the merger. Your performance has not only been a great and consistent elevating force for the aerospace industry, it has been an outstanding benefit to the national security of our country. You have earned and retained the gratitude of this department and the men and women in uniform who have served it over the years.

On behalf of the Defense Department, and the important missions for which we are responsible, I thank you for your wonderful work over the years and congratulate you on your retirement. And while you're enjoying your newfound leisure I hope you let us hear from you on occasion when you think we can use some advice.

Sincerely,

systems in the world.

In September 1994, Stonecipher was elected president and chief executive officer of McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis. At that time, McDonnell Douglas was one of the United States' top defense contractors and a world leader in the development and production of aircraft, missiles, space systems and defense-electronics products. McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing in August 1997.

Stonecipher is credited with enhancing the company's relationships with all McDonnell Douglas stakeholders - including customers, suppliers and employees. He started a broad-based employee incentive plan and a "continuous learning policy" driven by the McDonnell Douglas Learning Center, now known as the Boeing Leadership Center. Stonecipher's team instituted high-performance work teams, established centers of excellence, refocused the corporation on quality and developed an award-winning advertising campaign.

McDonnell Douglas financial performance soared under Stonecipher, with the stock increasing from \$18.48 just prior to his arrival to more than \$70 just before the consummation of the merger in August 1997.

In late 1996, with aerospace-industry consolidation well under way, Stonecipher requested and received authorization from the McDonnell Douglas board to negotiate a merger with Boeing. At completion of the merger in August 1997, Stonecipher was elected president and chief operating officer and a member of the board of Boeing.


Stonecipher received the Wings Club Distinguished Achievement Award for 2001. Other awards include the Association of the U.S. Army Award for defense and aeronautical industry leadership and the John R. Allison Award for outstanding contributions to national defense by an industrial leader. In November 1996, he received the annual Rear Admiral John J. Bergen Leadership Medal for Industry from the Navy League; the medal commands Stonecipher for his contributions - spanning three decades - to advancements in military aviation. In March 1998, he was named a Fellow in The Royal Aeronautical Society.

Stonecipher serves on the board of directors of Milacron Inc. and PACCAR Inc.

He was born May 1936 in Scott County, Tenn.

Contact: Public Relations, (b)(6)

March 2002



SECRET
2002 OCT 21 08:12 AM

October 21, 2002 8:12 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Past Experiences in Afghanistan

Attached is an interesting unclassified piece on Afghanistan that ought to provide some suggestions for us.

Doug, it should be particularly useful for you in fashioning that Afghanistan paper.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated, no author noted, memo: "British and Soviet Experiences in Afghanistan Offer Guideposts for US"

DHR dh
102102-5

.....
Please respond by 11/01/02

AFGHANISTAN

21 October

U17060- /02

11-L-0559/OSD/12329

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 21 2002

① To T-F FM:

British and Soviet Experiences in Afghanistan Offer Guideposts for US

The single most important lesson learned from the Soviet and British experience is that achieving our goals of reconstituting legitimate governance in Afghanistan and ensuring that it does not again become a terrorist safe haven must be accomplished by integrating them with Afghan interests. While the US has so far avoided some of the critical mistakes made by the British and the Soviets in their respective stints of occupying Afghanistan, Afghans' uncommon receptivity towards the US and the coalition could take a downward turn as coalition military operations and counter-terrorist pursuits wear on.

- Afghans have been largely amenable to the US and coalition presence in part because of the steps taken to minimize the US footprint and to bolster the perception that the US and international community are honest brokers, such as not intervening in local conflicts in the North and East.
- Nonetheless, the plodding pace of reconstruction, inadvertent bombings, and growing doubts about the continued commitment and attention to Afghanistan are beginning to chip away at Afghan goodwill.
- The recent announcement that the US, Japan, and Saudi Arabia would finance the repair of the Kabul-Kandahar road is an important step to show commitment in the Pashtun heartland, but disillusionment could deepen significantly if the security situation remains uneven or grows worse, and if foreign assistance continues to trickle in at a slow pace.

President Karzai needs to move quickly to minimize the perception that he is "controlled by foreigners," and play up the critical differences between himself and those leaders imposed by a foreign power. The danger is that he could be seen as another Shah Shuja—equated to the widely unpopular British-imposed ruler from the 1830s. Unlike Shah Shuja and the Soviet stooge Babrak Karmal, Karzai and his government—the latter still clearly a work in progress—were selected by Afghans at a Loya Jirga, an indigenous Afghan mechanism, in June.

- Hostile groups could play up US involvement in Afghanistan to emphasize the superficial similarities with past foreign actors, including our participation at the Bonn meeting and at the Loya Jirga, Karzai's unwavering support for US objectives, and the presence in his cabinet of many former expatriates, most of whom had been residing in the US.
- Karzai could help demonstrate Kabul's autonomy from foreign actors by creating more broadly representative government institutions that function as decision-making bodies. Forming a parliament—which was proposed at the Loya Jirga but has yet to be established—could help represent Afghan

ethnic groups' often-fractious interests and encourage genuine political parties to develop.

The international community could further assist Karzai in demonstrating Afghan independence by routing foreign aid through Kabul. ***Making Kabul the source of largesse would help wean regional Afghan leaders away from direct US support and lessen the risks to stability when US forces withdraw.***

- Direct payments to local and regional leaders for their cooperation could be viewed as similar to the subsidies the British paid for the tribes' acquiescence to Shah Shuja, which ultimately were insufficient to maintain their cooperation.

Given that Afghans are a fiercely independent people who have long been suspicious of foreigners—a trait likely derived from generations of repelling foreign invaders—they would probably best respond to clear US and coalition military objectives in Afghanistan. The British and the Soviets sealed their respective fates by pursuing their own agendas without regard for the Afghans' sensitivities and goals.

- For example, Afghans would probably appreciate clarification that military efforts are directed toward certain named individuals and that once these objectives have been achieved, military operations would cease but reconstruction assistance would continue.
- Keeping military operations against al-Qa'ida and Taliban as surgically focused as possible to minimize innocent casualties would help counter resentment of the US military presence.

7:40 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 30, 2002
SUBJECT: *Newsweek*

I think that this article in *Newsweek* suggests that I may want to do an explanation of this subject at an early press briefing.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
043002.05

Attach: "Rumsfeld's Big Worries," *Newsweek*, May 6, 2002

Please respond by: 5/3/02

040.7 SD

30 Apr 02

U17082 02



HIGH COSTS: The Defense secretary

March 13, Rumsfeld said: "The entire force is facing the adverse results of the high-paced optempo and perstem-po" (the number of operations and the strain on troops). In the memo, obtained by NEWSWEEK, Rumsfeld warned: "We are past the point where the Department can, without an unbelievably compelling reason, make any additional commitments." He adds: "It is time [to] begin to aggressively reduce our current commitments."

EXCLUSIVE
Rumsfeld's
Big Worries

THE MILITARY BRASS have warned that their forces are stretched thin, and worry about a long stay in Afghanistan, or a Mideast peacekeeping mission. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld insisted last month that talk of U.S. forces being "overextended and exhausted" was "a fundamental misunderstanding." But in a memo to the service secretaries two weeks earlier, on

Meanwhile, the Bush budget office won't pay for deployments already made. Since 9-11 the Pentagon has called up 83,000 Reserves and National Guard. The cost through the end of the fiscal year: \$5.3 billion. DOD documents show the budget office will allow only an extra \$3.5 billion, leaving DOD to pay the rest. Rumsfeld's answer: send 14,500 of the reservists home ASAP. But this will increase the strain on those remaining. Asked about these issues, a Pentagon spokesman said that Rumsfeld was traveling and DOD would have no comment.

JOHN BARRY


TRANSITION CRAZY, SEXY, COOL

She called herself Lisa (Left Eye) Lopes because a man once told her that eye was especially beautiful; the glasses she wore onstage had a condom in place of the left lens. She died in a car wreck last week in Honduras, where she'd been working at a child-development center. She was 30. She was the audacious rapper with the R&B act TLC, whose mix of right-mindedness and dirty-mindedness sold more than 10 million copies of the 1994 album "Crazysexycool." She burned down a \$2 million house belonging to her boyfriend, football star Andre Rison, then went into alcohol rehab. He still wanted to marry her. She was crazy, sexy, cool and more alive than most of us will ever be.

DAVID GATES



BEAUTIFUL EYE: Lopes



FIXING A BROKEN SYSTEM: On campus at UNC Chapel Hill

COLLEGE ADMISSIONS

The Latest on Being Early

HERE'S A TIP FOR HIGH-school kids who want to avoid the college-admissions frenzy: add the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill to your list. UNC is the first major university to drop "early decision" admissions. Early decision, which requires students to attend in return for getting a fat envelope months before the regular deadline, has become increasingly important—and controversial—at elite schools. More and more colleges are accepting larger numbers of students early, raising their yield (the percentage of accepted students who attend) and fueling a panic among students who believe they have to "go early" or they won't get in anywhere.

UNC's move came just a few

months after Yale president Richard Levin urged a halt. Levin and others contend that early decision favors richer kids who have access to better college counseling. But Yale says it won't change until its competitors do the same, and so far, only a couple of schools have heeded the call. In March, Beloit College, a top liberal-arts college in Wisconsin, announced that it would stop. UNC officials say their decision came after three years of trying to make early decision as fair as possible. Despite those efforts, says admissions director Jerome Lucido, early applicants were more likely to be white and affluent than regular applicants. It was important, he says, for UNC to "do the right thing." Anybody else?

BARBARA KANTROWITZ



April 29, 2002 2:35 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calendar/Travel

333 SD

When I am away, I can think bigger thoughts than when I am managing my "in box" at DoD.

To the extent I have time on trips, and they are not jam-packed, I have a chance to work with the staff accompanying me, get to know them better, and give them guidance that can pay dividends down the road. For the most part, they see me only in rushed meetings at DoD.

If that is true, it suggests that travel, despite my preference not to, is probably a good idea. It also gives Paul a chance to stretch his legs in the interagency process.

That being the case, I would like you to think about it, talk to Policy, and schedule a session with Feith, both of you, and me to sketch out trips through '03.

The trips should be designed to achieve our strategic goals, which I have put in a separate draft memo.

We should avoid starting on a trip right after another trip, like we did coming off the flight to Houston, where we didn't get to bed until after 1 a.m.

Second, we ought to try to plan trips so we don't get back so late that we start out the next day behind the curve—apart from jet lag.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042902 16



Please respond by 05/17/02

29 Apr 02

U17083 02

April 29, 2002 12:45 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is enormously important. They want to have the same NATO treatment that Ukraine does. My impression is that they ought to have it. What do we do to get the process started interagency, so that we can move that idea along?

If we could get some preliminary work done, I could bring it up with some of our friends when I go to the NATO meeting in June.

It may be something we would like Colin and the President to have in mind as they get ready for their NATO meetings.

Thanks.

DHR dh
042902 15

Please respond by 05/02

29 Apr 02

U17084 02

April 29, 2002 11:25 AM

322

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Special Forces

My impression is that we need more of them.

My impression is they need a stronger voice in the kinds of equipment they may need and the dollars they get.

They went in without Vipers. What do we do about it?

Thanks.

DHR.dh
042902.9

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

(2)

29 APR 02

U17085 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12336

April 29, 2002 11:10 AM

Done 5/3

322

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AORs

Please get me a list of each county in each AOR—with separate pieces of paper for each AOR.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042902.6

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

294PR02

U17086 02

CENTCOM

Afghanistan
Bahrain
Djibouti
Egypt
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Seychelles
Somalia
Sudan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan
Yemen

EUCOM

Africa

Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
Cote D'Ivoire
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Europe

Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Holy See
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav
Republic of
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
San Marino
Serbia and Montenegro
Kosovo
Slovakia
Slovenia

Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom

Middle East

Israel
Lebanon
Syria

PACOM

Asia Pacific Region

Australia
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Burma (Myanmar)
Cambodia
China
Comoros
Brunei
Cook Islands
Fiji
New Caledonia/French Polynesia (France)
India
Indonesia
Japan
Kiribati
Korea, Republic of
Korea, North
Laos
Madagascar
Malaysia
Maldives
Marshall Islands, Republic of
Mauritius
Micronesia, Federated States of
Mongolia
Nauru
Nepal
Niue
New Zealand
Palau, Republic of
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Russia
Samoa
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu

Vietnam

SOUTHCOM

Caribbean

Antigua & Baruba
Bahamas
Barbados
Cuba
Dominican
Dominican Republic
Grenada
Haiti
Jamaica
Puerto Rico
Saint Kitts & Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent & Grenadines
Trinidad & Tobago

Central America

Belize
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

Dependent Countries

Anguilla
Aruba
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Guadeloupe
Martinique
Montserrat
Netherlands Antilles
Turks & Caicos Islands
US Virgin Islands

North America

Mexico

South America

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
French Guiana
Guyana
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela

April 29, 2002 9:32 AM

Done 4-30

KYRGYZSTAN

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Invitation for Kyrgyzstan?

Please check with J.D. Crouch and see if we decided we thought it made sense to invite the MoD of Kyrgyzstan to the U.S. I have forgotten.

If so, why did we decide to do it?

Thanks.

DHR dh
042902 4

Please respond by 05/03/02

APR 29 2002
APR 29 2002
APR 29 2002

4/29

SecDef:

We did invite ~~the MoD~~ The Kyrgyz have delivered on everything we have asked for in OEF, and without the hassle that the Dabeks gave us. They want to do more. The ambassador, who we like, also recommended the visit. He will also be able to visit his three CENTCOM liaison officers, when they arrive in Tampa next month.

29APR02

U17087 02

11L-0559/OSD/12342

J.D. Crouch

April 29, 2002 9:30 AM

3335D

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Delegation

FOR INFO:
STAFF CALLS
"THESE"
"DAY BOOKS"

I would like for you to show me how people are going to be listed on a roster and how they are going to be listed on the calendars as a part of the official delegation.

My instinct is that you should list substantive people, starting in rank and titles, and then you should list public affairs people starting with rank and titles.

Please see me about it if you have questions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042902.2

Please respond by 05/03/02

5/10

SECDEF-

Here's a stab at the "travelling" roster. I'll do the same with the daily calendar + provide you with a separate example.

29APR02

FINAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
TO
KYRGYZSTAN, AFGHANISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, RUSSIA**

**APRIL 2002
DELEGATION ROSTER**

Secretary & Policy Staff: (8)

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Honorable J. D. Crouch II
VADM Edmund Giambastiani
Ms. Mira Ricardel
Dr. William J. Luti
Col Greg Akers, USMC
Ms. Delonnie Henry
Mr. Jim MacDougall

Total 36

Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Int'l Sec Policy
Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense
Dep. Asst. Secretary of Defense, Eurasia, ISP
Dep. Asst. Secretary of Defense, NESAs, ISA
Military Assistant, ASD/ISP
Confidential Assistant to Secretary of Defense
Country Director, Central Asia

Public Affairs: (4)

Honorable Victoria Clarke
Mr. Marc Thiessen
Lt Col Victor Warzinski, USAF
Ms. Kelly Tiedge

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs
Speechwriter
Military Assistant, ASD Public Affairs
Confidential Assistant, ASD, Public Affairs

Support: (10)

Col John Baxter, USAF, MD
Mr. Richard Kisling
Lt Col T. B. Galvin, USMC
CDR Jim Settele, USN
Mr. Joseph Wassel
Mr. Yuri Shkerov
Mr. Robert Ward
SA Eric Bruce
TSgt Anthony Jones, USAF
TSgt David Woll, USAF

Flight Surgeon
Director of Personal Security
Military Assistant/Trip Coordinator
Military Assistant, OSD ES
Director of OSD Communications
Russian Interpreter, State Dept.
OSD Photographer
OSD Security
OSD Communicator
OSD Communicator

Other Government Agencies: (2)

Rear Admiral James A. Robb, USN
• Mr. Richard E. Hoagland

CENTCOM J-5, CINC Representative
Dir. Caucasus & Central Asia, State Dept.

• Joining the delegation in Bishkek

Trip Coordinator: LtCol T. B. Galvin, USMC,

(b)(6)

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1

11-L-0559/OSD/12344

FINAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Traveling Press: (12)

Ms. Linda Kozaryn
Mr. Robert Burns
Mr. Charlie Aldinger
Mr. Jean Michel Stoulling
Mr. Steve Centanni
Mr. Greg Gursky
Ms. Ellen Uchima
Mr. Michael Hedges
Mr. Mark Thompson
Mr. Brian Hartman
Mr. Otto Kreisher
Mr. Jon Bascom

American Forces Information Service
Associated Press
Reuters
French Press Agency
Fox News
Fox News (Pool Television Camera)
Fox News (Pool Producer)
Houston Chronicle
Time Magazine
ABC
Copley News Service
ABC Radio

Trip Coordinator: LtCol T. B. Galvin, USMC, (b)(6)

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
TO**

KYRGYZSTAN, AFGHANISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, RUSSIA

**APRIL 2002
DELEGATION ROSTER**

Do this
Secretary & Personal Staff: (20)

- Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
- Honorable J. D. Crouch II
- VADM Edmund Giambastiani
- Ms. Mira Ricardel
- Dr. William J. Luti
- Rear Admiral James A. Robb, USN
- Col Greg Akers, USMC
- Col John Baxter, USAF, MD
- Mr. Richard Kisling
- (b)(6)
- Mr. Richard E. Hoagland
- Mr. Jim MacDougall
- Lt Col T. B. Galvin, USMC
- CDR Jim Settele, USN
- Mr. Joseph Wassel
- Mr. Yuri Shkerov
- Mr. Robert Ward
- SA Eric Bruce
- TSgt Anthony Jones, USAF
- TSgt David Woll, USAF

Total 36

- Secretary of Defense
- Assistant Secretary of Defense, Int'l Sec Policy
- Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense
- Dep. Asst. Secretary of Defense, Eurasia, ISP
- Dep. Asst. Secretary of Defense, NESAs, ISA
- CENTCOM J-5, CINC Representative
- Military Assistant, ASD/ISP
- Flight Surgeon
- Director of Personal Security
- Confidential Assistant to Secretary of Defense
- Dir. Caucasus & Central Asia, State Dept.
- Country Director, Central Asia
- Military Assistant/Trip Coordinator
- Military Assistant, OSD ES
- Director of OSD Communications
- Russian Interpreter, State Dept.
- OSD Photographer
- OSD Security
- OSD Communicator
- OSD Communicator

• Joining the delegation in Bishkek

(3) Support -

(4) Other GA Assets

Trip Coordinator: LtCol T. B. Galvin, USMC, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FINAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

② **Public Affairs: (4)**

Honorable Victoria Clarke
Mr. Marc Thiessen
Lt Col Victor Warzinski, USAF
Ms. Kelly Tiedge

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs
Speechwriter
Military Assistant, ASD Public Affairs
Confidential Assistant, ASD, Public Affairs

⑤ **Traveling Press: (12)**

Ms. Linda Kozaryn
Mr. Robert Burns
Mr. Charlie Aldinger
Mr. Jean Michel Stoulling
Mr. Steve Centanni
Mr. Greg Gursky
Ms. Ellen Uchima
Mr. Michael Hedges
Mr. Mark Thompson
Mr. Brian Hartman
Mr. Otto Kreisher
Mr. Jon Bascom

American Forces Information Service
Associated Press
Reuters
French Press Agency
Fox News
Fox News (Pool Television Camera)
Fox News (Pool Producer)
Houston Chronicle
Time Magazine
ABC
Copley News Service
ABC Radio

Trip Coordinator: LtCol T. B. Galvin, USMC, (b)(6)

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April 29, 2002 9:15 AM

Done
Discussed [unclear]
5/1 LD: SD in [unclear]

005

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gifts

9/4 Larry Di Rita

I have asked several times to have a chance to look at the gifts to decide which ones I like and which ones I don't. I have marked the ones I don't.

People keep telling me the gifts we are going to give are the ones I don't like. Is there some way we can get a connection between the times I told people what I like and what I don't like for gifts and the people who select the gifts? There must be some way to link them, so that we stop giving the wrong ones.

Help!

Thanks.

DHR:dls
042902.1

SECDEF HAS SEEN
5/1

Please respond by 05/10/02

29APR02

*SECDEF —
FOR EACH TRIP IN THE
FUTURE AS PART OF THE
PLANNING PROCESS, WE'LL
PROVIDE YOU A SUGGESTED
GIFT LIST FOR YOUR PRO.*

U17091 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12348

April 25, 2002 12:19 PM

Done 5/22

NORTHCOM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Northern Command

I would like a report on what the current planning is for the Northern Command. I sure don't want it to be as big as 450 people, and that is the last I heard.

The time to get this set right is early, not late.

Thanks.

DR:AM
042502-27

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

25 APR 02

U17092 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

INFO MEMO

CN-337-02

22 May 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

2002 5/22

SUBJECT: Northern Command

- The following is provided for your information to explain (TAB) the staffing plan for USNORTHCOM and provide an update of our current efforts to bring the command to initial operational capability on 1 October 2002. Full operational capability is 1 October 2003.
- The development of the requirements for USNORTHCOM continues. There will be no growth in joint billets. Slots for the initial cadre of the headquarters will come from the 15-percent headquarters reduction of the Joint Staff and unified commands. A 92-person transition team will be assigned effective 8 July 2002. To achieve initial operational capability, an additional 102 personnel will be assigned by 1 August 2002.
- Current estimates indicate that a stand-alone full operational capability headquarters will require 477 billets. This equates to 275 active duty, 14 Coast Guard (Department of Transportation), 70 full-time Reserve Component and 118 civilians. This is smaller than the current average size of 650 billets for the geographic unified commands.
- Manning USNORTHCOM's subordinate units (standing joint force headquarters, joint intelligence center and joint communications center) will require additional personnel. Two of the proposed organizations already exist, Joint Task Force (JTF)-Civil Support and JTF-6.
- We continue to look for further efficiencies based on the preferred location of Peterson, AFB. Continued evolution of organizational courses of action will permit refinement of manning requirements. Proposed courses of action will be provided for review within the next few weeks.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/12350

April 25, 2002 12:09 PM

110.01

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Supplemental Issues

Please screw your head into this problem with Admiral Clark, "forces for," Senator Inouye and Admiral Fargo. We need to get Fargo's head right on it. We need to figure out what the answer is and handle it.

You sent me a memo on it. When I am gone, please get involved in it and get Clark, England, Powell Moore and Larry Di Rita and see if you can come up with an answer.

If you are right that it ought to be solved sooner rather than later, let's see if we can do that.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/18/02 DepSecDef memo to SecDef re: Meeting w/Senator Stevens

DHR:dh
042502-25

.....
Please respond by 05/03/02

25APR02a

U17093 02

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: April 18, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Stevens

ADTS
ALB
ADBL

Don,

I had a meeting with Senator Stevens last night to talk about getting our Supplemental through. He made two points very sharply, among quite a few others:

1. He thinks we are making a big mistake by not resolving the "forces for" question with Inouye now, when Stevens desperately needs his help on the Supplemental. He says we are telling Stevens that this will get resolved sometime in August, and Stevens says he doesn't see why we can't resolve that now. I must say I agree with Stevens. I will talk to Cambone about getting it fixed.

2. He was very unhappy with Bill Schneider's comments about nuclear armed ballistic missile defense. He said he got calls from guys in bars in Alaska saying, "Does this mean there are going to be nuclear weapons in Fort Greeley?" We need to do something, I think, to really smash that story down. It will take more than just Bill not talking about it anymore, since the cat is out of the bag.

April 25, 2002 11:42 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Article

Afghanistan

If you haven't read this piece by O'Hanlon, you ought to.

Thanks.

Attach.
Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece"

DHR:dh
042502-21



Please respond by _____

25 APR 02

U17094 02

A Flawed Masterpiece

Michael E. O'Hanlon

ASSESSING THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN

THROUGHOUT most of the twentieth century, the U.S. armed forces were seen as an overmuscled giant, able to win wars through brute strength but often lacking in daring and cleverness. This basic strategy worked during the two world wars, making the United States relatively tough to challenge. But it failed in Vietnam, produced mediocre results in Korea, and worked in the Persian Gulf War largely because the terrain was ideally suited to American strengths.

What a difference a new century makes. Operation Enduring Freedom has been, for the most part, a masterpiece of military creativity and finesse. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) head General Tommy Franks, and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet devised a plan for using limited but well-chosen types of American power in conjunction with the Afghan opposition to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda. Secretary of State Colin Powell helped persuade Pakistan to sever its ties with the Taliban, work with Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, provide the bases and overflight rights needed by U.S. forces, and contribute to the general war effort. Besides pushing his national security team to develop an innovative and decisive war-fighting strategy, President George W. Bush rallied the American people behind the war effort and established a close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, making it far easier for the United States to work militarily in Central Asia. The U.S. effort to overthrow the Taliban deprived

MICHAEL E. O'HANLON is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. His most recent book is *Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration, 2001-2005*.

[47]

11-L-0559/OSD/12354

al Qaeda of its sanctuary within Afghanistan and left its surviving leaders running for their lives.¹

At their peak, the U.S. forces involved in the war effort numbered no more than 60,000 (about half of which were in the Persian Gulf), and Western allies added no more than 15,000. But the U.S.-led military campaign has hardly been small in scale. By the end of January, the United States had flown about 25,000 sorties in the air campaign and dropped 18,000 bombs, including 10,000 precision munitions. The number of U.S. sorties exceeded the number of U.S. sorties flown in the 1999 Kosovo war, and the United States dropped more smart bombs on Afghanistan than NATO dropped on Serbia in 1999. In fact, the total number of precision munitions expended in Afghanistan amounted to more than half the number used in Operation Desert Storm. (In addition, more than 3,000 U.S. and French bombs were dropped on surviving enemy forces in March during Operation Anaconda, in which some 1,500 Western forces and 1,000 Afghans launched a major offensive against about 1,000 enemy troops in the mountainous region of eastern Afghanistan.)

If the U.S. strategy has had many virtues, however, it has also had flaws. Most important, it has apparently failed to achieve a key war goal: capturing or killing Osama bin Laden and other top enemy leaders. Such hunts are inherently difficult, but the prospects for success in this case were reduced considerably by U.S. reliance on Pakistani forces and Afghan militias for sealing off enemy escape routes and conducting cave-to-cave searches during critical periods. If most al Qaeda leaders stay at large, the United States and other countries will remain more vulnerable to terrorism than they would be otherwise—perhaps significantly so.

But on balance, Operation Enduring Freedom has been very impressive. It may wind up being more notable in the annals of American military history than anything since Douglas MacArthur's invasion at Inchon in Korea half a century ago. Even Norman Schwarzkopf's famous "left hook" around Iraqi forces in Operation

¹Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, "At Camp David, Advise and Dissent," *The Washington Post*, January 31, 2002, p. A3; Bill Keller, "The World According to Powell," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 25, 2001, pp. 61-62.

Desert Storm was less bold; had it been detected, U.S. airpower still could have protected coalition flanks, and American forces could have outrun Iraqi troops toward most objectives on the ground. By contrast, Operation Enduring Freedom's impressive outcome was far from preordained. Too much American force (e.g., a protracted and punishing strategic air campaign or an outright ground invasion) risked uniting Afghan tribes and militias to fight the outside power, angering the Arab world, destabilizing Pakistan, and spawning more terrorists. Too little force, or the wrong kind of force, risked outright military failure and a worsening of Afghanistan's humanitarian crisis—especially given the limited capabilities of the small militias that made up the anti-Taliban coalition.

ZEROING IN

BEGINNING on October 7, Afghans, Americans, and coalition partners cooperated to produce a remarkable military victory in Afghanistan. The winning elements included 15,000 Northern Alliance fighters (primarily from the Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups), 100 combat sorties a day by U.S. planes, 300-500 Western special operations forces and intelligence operatives, a few thousand Western ground forces, and thousands of Pashtun soldiers in southern Afghanistan who came over to the winning side in November. Together they defeated the Taliban forces, estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 strong, as well as a few thousand al Qaeda fighters.

Various Western countries, particularly several NATO allies and Australia, played important roles as well. A formal NATO role in the war was neither necessary nor desirable, given the location of the conflict and the need for a supple and secretive military strategy. Still, NATO allies stood squarely by America's side, invoking the alliance's Article V mutual-defense clause after September 11, and demonstrated that commitment by sending five AWACS aircraft to help patrol U.S. airspace. Forces from the United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Canada appear to have frequently contributed to the effort in Afghanistan; forces from Denmark, Norway, and Germany also participated in Operation Anaconda in March. Allied aircraft flew a total of some 3,000 sorties on relief, reconnaissance, and other missions. As noted,

France dropped bombs during Operation Anaconda, and the United Kingdom fired several cruise missiles on the first day of battle as well. Numerous countries, including the Netherlands, Italy, and Japan, deployed ships to the Arabian Sea. The cooperation continues today, as major Western allies constitute the backbone of the UN-authorized stability force in Kabul.

The short war has had several phases. The first began on October 7 and lasted a month; the second ran through November and saw the Taliban lose control of the country; the third was characterized by intensive bombing of suspected al Qaeda strongholds in the Tora Bora mountain and cave complex in December; the fourth began with the inauguration of Hamid Karzai as interim prime minister and continues to date.

The war's first month had many analysts worried about the basic course of the campaign.

During the first part of the war, Taliban forces lost their large physical assets such as radar, aircraft, and command-and-control systems, but they hung on to power in most regions. Most al Qaeda training camps and headquarters were also destroyed. Although Taliban forces did not quickly collapse, they were increasingly isolated in pockets near the major cities. Cut off from each other physically, they were unable to resupply or reinforce very well and had problems communicating effectively.

In the first week of the war, U.S. aircraft averaged only 25 combat sorties a day, but they soon upped that total to around 100. (Some 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired in the early going; a total of about 100 had been used by December.) The United States comparably increased the number of airlift, refueling, and other support missions. U.S. air strikes by B-52 and B-1 bombers operating out of Diego Garcia typically involved six sorties a day; other land-based aircraft, primarily F-15Es and AC-130 gunships from Oman, flew about as much. Planes from the three U.S. aircraft carriers based in the Arabian Sea provided the rest of the combat punch. Reconnaissance and refueling flights originated from the Persian Gulf region and Diego Garcia. Some air support and relief missions also came from, or flew over, Central Asia, where U.S. Army soldiers from the Tenth Mountain Division helped protect airfields.

Most air attacks occurred around Afghanistan's perimeter, because the rugged central highlands were not a major operating area for the Taliban or al Qaeda. By the middle of October, most fixed assets worth striking had already been hit, so combat sorties turned to targeting Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the field. Aircraft continued to fly at an altitude of at least 10,000 feet, because the Pentagon was fearful of anti-aircraft artillery, Soviet SA-7 and SA-13 portable anti-aircraft missiles, and some 200-300 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles presumed to be in Taliban or al Qaeda possession. But most precision-guided weapons are equally effective regardless of their altitude of origin, provided that good targeting information is available—as it was in this case, thanks to U.S. troops on the ground.

The first month of the war produced only limited results and had many defense and strategic analysts worried about the basic course of the campaign. Some of those critics began, rather intemperately and unrealistically, to call for a ground invasion; others opposed an invasion but thought that a substantial intensification of efforts would prove necessary.

In phase two, beginning in early November, that intensification occurred. But it was due not so much to an increased number of airplanes as to an increase in their effectiveness. By then, 80 percent of U.S. combat sorties could be devoted to directly supporting opposition forces in the field; by late November, the tally was 90 percent. In addition, the deployment of more unmanned aerial vehicles and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft to the region helped the United States maintain continuous reconnaissance of enemy forces in many places. Most important, the number of U.S. special operations forces and CIA teams working with various opposition elements increased greatly. In mid-October, only three special operations "A teams," each consisting of a dozen personnel, were in Afghanistan; in mid-November, the tally was 10; by December 8, it was 17. This change meant the United States could increasingly call in supplies for the opposition, help it with tactics, and designate Taliban and al Qaeda targets for U.S. air strikes using global positioning system (GPS) technology and laser range finders. The Marine Corps also began to provide logistical support for these teams as the war advanced.

Three Air Campaigns in Comparison

| Operation | Total sorties flown | Total bombs delivered | Precision-guided bombs delivered |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) | 38,000 | 22,000 (est.) | 12,500 (est.) |
| Allied Force 1999 (Kosovo) | 37,500 | 23,000 | 8,050 |
| Desert Storm 1991 (Persian Gulf) | 118,700 | 265,000 | 20,450 |

NOTES: In Operation Allied Force, the United States flew 60 percent of the sorties and delivered 80 percent of the precision-guided bombs. In Operation Desert Storm, those contributions were 85 percent and 89 percent, respectively; in Operation Enduring Freedom, they were 92 percent and 99 percent, respectively.

SOURCES: Enduring Freedom (all data as of March 14, 2002): U.S. Air Force, March 15, 2002; Rear Adm. John Snuffelbeem, Department of Defense news briefing, January 25, 2002; Eric Schmitt, "After January Raid, Gen. Franks Promises to Do Better," *New York Times*, February 8, 2002, p. A20; William M. Arkin, "Old-Timers Prove Invaluable in Afghanistan Air Campaign," *Los Angeles Times*, February 10, 2002, p. A12. Allied Force: Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 150, 307. Desert Storm: U.S. General Accounting Office, *Operation Desert Storm* (Washington: GAO, 1997), p. 178; Thomas A. Keane and Eliot A. Cohen, "Summary Report," *Gulf War Air Power Survey* (Washington: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1993), pp. 184-85.

As a result, enemy forces collapsed in northern cities such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan over the weekend of November 9-11. Taliban fighters ran for their lives, provoking their leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, to broadcast a demand that his troops stop "behaving like chickens." Kabul fell soon afterward. By November 16, Pentagon officials were estimating that the Taliban controlled less than one-third of the country, in contrast to 85 percent just a week before. Reports also suggested that Muhammad Atef, a key al Qaeda operative, was killed by U.S. bombs in mid-November. Kunduz, the last northern stronghold of enemy forces where several

thousand Taliban and al Qaeda troops apparently remained, fell on November 24-25.

In late November, more than 1,000 U.S. marines of the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units established a base about 60 miles southwest of Kandahar, which the Taliban continued to hold. They deployed there directly from ships in the Arabian Sea, leapfrogging over Pakistani territory at night (to minimize political difficulties for the government of President Pervez Musharraf) and flying 400 miles inland to what became known as Camp Rhino. Their subsequent resupply needs were largely met using Pakistani bases. Once deployed, they began to interdict some road traffic and carry out support missions for special operations forces.

Meanwhile, Pashtun tribes had begun to oppose the Taliban openly. By November, they were accepting the help of U.S. special forces, who had previously been active principally in the north of the country. Two groups in particular—one led by Hamid Karzai, the other by another tribal leader, Gul Agha Shirzai—closed in on Kandahar. Mullah Omar offered to surrender in early December but in the end fled with most of his fighters, leaving the city open by December 8-9. Pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda resistance, each with hundreds of fighters or more, remained in areas near Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, Kandahar, and possibly elsewhere, but the Taliban no longer held cities or major transportation routes.

Why this part of the campaign achieved such a rapid and radical victory remains unclear. Taliban forces presumably could have held out longer if they had hunkered down in the cities and put weapons near mosques, hospitals, and homes, making their arsenal hard to attack from the air. Opposition fighters were too few to defeat them in street-to-street fighting in most places, and starving out the Taliban would have required the unthinkable tactic of starving local civilian populations as well.

Most likely, the Taliban got caught in positions outside major cities that they could neither easily escape nor defend. Once the Afghan opposition began to engage the enemy seriously in November

The Taliban got caught in positions outside major cities that they could neither escape nor defend.

and Taliban forces returned fire, they revealed their positions to American special operations personnel who could call in devastating air strikes. Sometimes they were tricked into revealing their locations over the radio. Even trench lines were poor defenses against 2-ton bombs delivered within 10 to 15 meters of their targets. Just what Taliban fighters could have done differently, once stranded in that open terrain, is unclear. They might have been better advised either to go on the offensive or to try to escape back into urban settings under cover of night or poor weather, although many U.S. reconnaissance assets work well under such conditions. But both approaches would have been difficult and dangerous, especially for a relatively unsophisticated military force such as the Taliban.

The third main phase of the war began in early December. By this time, U.S. intelligence had finally pinpointed much of al Qaeda's strength near Jalalabad, in eastern Afghanistan. In particular, al Qaeda forces, including Osama bin Laden, were supposedly holed up in the mountain redoubts of Tora Bora. Traveling with perhaps 1,000 to 2,000 foreign fighters, most of them fellow Arabs, bin Laden could not easily evade detection from curious eyes even if he might elude U.S. overhead reconnaissance. Thus, once Afghan opposition fighters, together with CIA and special operations forces, were deployed in the vicinity, U.S. air strikes against the caves could become quite effective. By mid-December, the fight for Tora Bora was over. Most significant cave openings were destroyed and virtually all signs of live al Qaeda fighters disappeared. Sporadic bombing continued in the area, and it was not until mid-January that a major al Qaeda training base, Zawar Kili, was destroyed. But most bombing ended by late 2001.

So why did bin Laden and other top al Qaeda leaders apparently get away? The United States relied too much on Pakistan and its Afghan allies to close off possible escape routes from the Tora Bora region. It is not clear that these allies had the same incentives as the United States to conduct the effort with dogged persistence. Moreover, the mission was inherently difficult. By mid-December, the Pentagon felt considerably less sure than it had been of the likely whereabouts of bin Laden, even though it suspected that he and most of his top lieutenants were still alive.

Although estimates remain rough, Taliban losses in the war were considerable. According to *New York Times* correspondent Nicholas Kristof, as many as 8,000 to 12,000 were killed—roughly 20 percent of the Taliban's initial fighting capability. Assuming conservatively at least two wounded for every person killed, Taliban losses could have represented half their initial fighting strength, a point at which most armies have traditionally started to crumble. Another 7,000 or more were taken prisoner. Kristof's tally also suggests that Afghan civilian casualties totaled only about 1,000, a mercifully low number despite several wrongly targeted U.S. bombings and raids during the war. Although a couple of those U.S. mistakes probably should have been prevented, they do not change the basic conclusion that the war caused relatively modest harm to innocents.

U.S. forces had lost about 30 personnel by the middle of March: about a dozen on the battlefield (8 during Operation Anaconda) and the rest in and around Afghanistan through accidents. Most were Marine Corps and Army troops, but other personnel were lost as well, including a CIA operative. The casualty total was 50 percent greater than those of the invasions of Grenada and Haiti in the 1980s but less than the number of troops killed in Somalia in 1992-93.

FOLLOW THE LEADER

ON THE WHOLE, Operation Enduring Freedom has been masterful in both design and execution. Using specially equipped CIA teams and special operations forces in tandem with precision-strike aircraft allowed for accurate and effective bombing of Taliban and al Qaeda positions. U.S. personnel also contributed immensely to helping the Northern Alliance tactically and logistically. By early November, the strategy had produced mass Taliban retreats in the north of the country; it had probably caused many Taliban casualties as well.

More notably, the U.S. effort helped quickly galvanize Pashtun forces to organize and fight effectively against the Taliban in the south, which many analysts had considered a highly risky proposition and CENTCOM had itself considered far from certain. Had these Pashtun forces decided that they feared the Northern Alliance and the United States more than the Taliban, Afghanistan might have become effec-

tively partitioned, with al Qaeda taking refuge exclusively in the south and the war effort rendered largely futile. Convincing these Pashtun to change sides and fight against the Taliban required just the right mix of diplomacy, military momentum and finesse, and battlefield assistance from CIA and special operations teams.

Yet despite the overall accomplishments, mistakes were made. The Pentagon's handling of the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was one of them. Whether these men should have been designated as prisoners of war can be debated. Neither group fought for a recognized government, and al Qaeda fighters satisfied virtually none of the standard criteria associated with soldiers. The Bush administration's decision not to designate the detainees as POWs is thus understandable, particularly since it did not want to be forced to repatriate them once hostilities in Afghanistan ended. But it probably would have been wiser to accord the detainees POW rights initially, until a military tribunal could determine them ineligible for POW status, as the Geneva Conventions stipulate.

The POW issue aside, the administration's initial reluctance to guarantee the basic protections of the Geneva Conventions to Taliban soldiers and its continued refusal to apply them to al Qaeda were unwise. These decisions fostered the impression that the detainees were not being treated humanely. This perception was wrong, but it became prevalent. Rumsfeld had to go on the defensive after photos circulated around the world showing shackled prisoners kneeling before their open-air cells; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard Myers talked somewhat hyperbolically about how the detainees might gnaw through hydraulic cables on airplanes if not forcibly restrained; and some Pentagon officials even suggested that the detainees did not necessarily deserve Geneva treatment, given the crimes of al Qaeda on September 11. But Rumsfeld's comments came too late, and America's image in the Arab world in particular took another hit.

The big U.S. mistake, however, concerned the hunt for top al Qaeda leaders. If Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Zubaydah, and other top al Qaeda officials are found to have survived, the war will have failed to achieve a top objective. Rather than relying on Afghan and Pakistani forces to do the job in December near Tora Bora, Rumsfeld and Franks should have tried to prevent al

Qaeda fighters from fleeing into Pakistan by deploying American forces on or near the border. U.S. troops should also have been used in the pursuit of Mullah Omar and remnants of the Taliban, even though this mission was less important than the one against al Qaeda leaders.

Admittedly, there were good reasons not to put many Americans in Afghanistan. First, Washington feared a possible anti-American backlash, as Rumsfeld made clear in public comments. Complicating matters, the United States would have had a hard time getting many tens of thousands of troops into Afghanistan, since no neighboring country except Pakistan would have been a viable staging base—and Pakistan was not willing to play that role.

But even though Rumsfeld's reasoning was correct in general, it was wrong for Tora Bora. Putting several thousand U.S. forces in that mountainous, inland region would have been difficult and dangerous. Yet given the enormity of the stakes in this war, it would have been appropriate. Indeed, CENTCOM made preparations for doing so. But in the end, partly because of logistical challenges but perhaps partly because of the Pentagon's aversion to casualties, the idea was dropped. It is supremely ironic that a tough-on-defense Republican administration fighting for vital national security interests appeared almost as reluctant to risk American lives in combat as the Clinton administration had been in humanitarian missions—at least until Operation Anaconda, when it may have been largely too late.

Furthermore, local U.S. allies were just not up to the job in Tora Bora. Pakistan deployed about 4,000 regular army forces along the border itself. But they were not always fully committed to the mission, and there were too few well-equipped troops to prevent al Qaeda and Taliban fighters from outflanking them, as many hundreds of enemy personnel appear to have done. Afghan opposition forces were also less than fully committed, and they were not very proficient in fighting at night.

What would have been needed for the United States to perform this mission? To close off the 100 to 150 escape routes along the 25-mile stretch of the Afghan-Pakistani border closest to Tora Bora would have required perhaps 1,000 to 3,000 American troops. Deploying such a force from the United States would have required several hundred airlift flights, followed by ferrying the troops and supplies to frontline positions via helicopter. According to CENTCOM, a new airfield might have had to be

created, largely for delivering fuel. Such an operation would have taken a week or more. But two Marine Corps units with more than 1,000 personnel were already in the country in December and were somewhat idle at that time. If redeployed to Tora Bora, they could have helped prevent al Qaeda's escape themselves. They also could have been reinforced over subsequent days and weeks by Army light forces or more marines, who could have closed off possible escape routes into the interior of Afghanistan. Such an effort would not have assured success, but the odds would have favored the United States.

How much does it matter if bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and their cohorts go free? Even with its top leaders presumably alive, al Qaeda is weaker without its Afghan sanctuary. It has lost training bases, secure meeting sites, weapons production and storage facilities, and protection from the host-country government. But as terrorism expert Paul Pillar has pointed out, the history of violent organizations with charismatic leaders, such as the Shining Path in Peru and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, suggests that they are far stronger with their leaders than without them. The imprisonment of Abimael Guzmán in 1992 and Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 did much to hurt those organizations, just as the 1995 assassination of Fathi Shikaki of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad weakened that group significantly. Some groups may survive the loss of an important leader or become more violent as a result—for example, Hamas flourished after the Israelis killed "the Engineer" Yahya Ayyash in 1996. But even they may have a hard time coming up with new tactics and concepts of operations after such a loss.

If bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and other top al Qaeda leaders continue to evade capture, they may have to spend the rest of their lives on the run. And their access to finances may be sharply curtailed. But they could still inspire followers and design future terrorist attacks. If successful, their escape would be a major setback.

EVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

EVEN THOUGH advocates of the famous "revolution in military affairs" have generally felt frustrated over the past decade, a number of important military innovations appeared in Operation Enduring Freedom. They may not be as revolutionary as blitzkrieg, aircraft-carrier

war, and nuclear weapons, but they are impressive nonetheless. Advocates of radical change have tended to underestimate the degree to which the U.S. military can and does innovate even without dramatic transformation.

Several developments were particularly notable. First, there was the widespread deployment of special operations forces with laser rangefinders and GPS devices to call in extremely precise air strikes. Ground spotters have appeared in the annals of warfare for as long as airplanes themselves, but this was the first time they were frequently able to provide targeting information accurate to within several meters and do so quickly.

Second, U.S. reconnaissance capabilities showed real improvement. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), together with imaging satellites and JSTARS, maintained frequent surveillance of much of the battlefield and continuous coverage of certain specific sites—providing a capability that General Myers described as "persistence."

Also notable were advances in battlefield communications. The networks established between UAVs, satellites, combat aircraft, and command centers were faster than in any previous war, making "persistence" even more valuable. The networks were not always fast enough, especially when the political leadership needed to intercede in specific targeting decisions. Nor were they available for all combat aircraft in the theater; for example, the Air Force's "Link 16" data links are not yet installed on many strike aircraft. But they did often reduce the time between detecting a target and destroying it to less than 20 minutes.

Perhaps most historic was the use of CIA-owned Predator UAVs to drop weapons on ground targets. Aside from cruise missiles, this was the first time in warfare that an unmanned aircraft had dropped bombs in combat, in the form of "Hellfire" air-to-ground missiles. There were also further milestones in the realm of precision weapons, which for the first time in major warfare constituted the majority of bombs dropped. They were dropped from a wide range of aircraft, including carrier-based jets, ground-based attack aircraft, and B-52 as well as B-1 bombers. The bombers were used effectively as close-air support platforms, loitering over the battlefield for hours until targets could be identified. They delivered about 70 percent of the war's total ordnance.

In addition to the laser-guided bomb, the weapon of choice for the United States quickly became the joint direct attack munition (JDAM). First used in Kosovo, it is a one-ton iron bomb furnished with a \$20,000 kit that helps steer it to within 10 to 15 meters of its target using GPS and inertial guidance. It is not quite as accurate as a laser-guided bomb but is much more resistant to the effects of weather. In the Kosovo war, only the B-2 could deliver it, but now the JDAM can be dropped by most U.S. attack aircraft. By the end of January, the United States had dropped more than 4,000 laser-guided bombs and more than 4,000 JDAMS as well.

Other ordnance was also important. Up to 1,000 cluster bombs were used, with accuracy of about 30 meters once outfitted with a wind-correcting mechanism. Although controversial because of their dud rate, cluster bombs were devastating against Taliban and al Qaeda troops unlucky enough to be caught in the open. A number of special-purpose munitions were used in smaller numbers, including cave-busting munitions equipped with nickel-cobalt steel-alloy tips and special software; these could penetrate up to 10 feet of rock or 100 feet of soil.

The ability to deliver most U.S. combat punch from the air kept the costs of war relatively modest. Through January 8, the total had reached \$3.8 billion, while the military costs of homeland security efforts in the United States had reached \$2.6 billion. The bills in Afghanistan included \$1.9 billion for deploying troops, \$400 million for munitions, \$400 million for replacing damaged or destroyed equipment, and about \$1 billion for fuel and other operating costs.

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

WHAT BROAD LESSONS emerge from this conflict? First, military progress does not always depend on highly expensive weapons platforms. Many important contemporary trends in military technology and tactics concern information networks and munitions more than aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles. To take an extreme example, B-52 bombers with JDAM were more useful in Operation Enduring Freedom than were the stealthy B-2s. Second, human skills remain important in war, as demonstrated best by the performance of special operations forces

and CIA personnel. The basic infantry skills, foreign language abilities, competence and care in using and maintaining equipment, and physical and mental toughness of U.S. troops contributed to victory every bit as much as did high-tech weaponry.

Third, military mobility and deployability should continue to be improved. The Marine Corps did execute an impressive ship-to-objective maneuver, forgoing the usual ship-to-shore operation and moving 400 miles inland directly. But most parts of the Army still cannot move so quickly and smoothly. Part of the solution may be the Army's long-term plans for new and lighter combat equipment. (The Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft may be useful, too, at least in modest numbers and once proven safe.) But the Army could also emulate the Marine Corps' organization, training, and logistics where possible—and soon. The task is hardly hopeless; Army forces were tactically quite mobile and impressive in Operation Anaconda.

Finally, the war showed that more joint-service experimentation and innovation are highly desirable, given that the synergies between special operations forces on the ground and Air Force and Navy aircraft in the skies were perhaps the most important keys to victory.

How do these lessons match up with the Bush administration's Quadrennial Defense Review of September 30, 2001, and its long-term budget plan of February 4, 2002? The administration has basically preserved the force structure and weapons modernization plan that it inherited from the Clinton administration, added missile defense and one or two other priorities—and thrown very large sums of money into the budget. The Bush administration envisions a national security budget (Pentagon spending plus nuclear weapons budgets for the Department of Energy) that will grow to \$396 billion in 2003 and \$470 billion in 2007. (It was \$300 billion when Bush took office and is \$350 billion in 2002.) The war on terrorism cannot explain this growth; its annual costs are currently expected to be less than \$10 billion after 2003. That \$470 billion figure for 2007 is a whopping \$100 billion more than the Clinton administration envisioned for the same year in its last budget plan.

The administration proposes replacing most combat systems with ones costing about twice as much.

For many critics who tend to focus on weapons procurement, the problem with Bush's plan is that it protects the traditional weapons priorities of the military services without seeking a radical enough transformation of the U.S. armed forces. But this common criticism is only half right. The Bush administration has an aggressive program for so-called defense transformation, principally in research, development, and experimentation, where it envisions spending an additional \$100 billion between 2002 and 2007. If anything, these plans are slightly too generous and ambitious.

In fact, the problem is the traditional one: the unwillingness to set priorities and to challenge the military services to do so as well, especially in the procurement accounts. Despite the lack of a superpower rival, the administration proposes replacing most major combat systems with systems often costing twice as much, and doing so throughout the force structure. This plan would drive up the procurement budget to \$99 billion by 2007 from its present level of \$60 billion.

A more prudent modernization agenda would begin by canceling at least one or two major weapons, such as the Army's Crusader artillery system. But the more important change in philosophy would be to modernize more selectively in general. Only a modest fraction of the armed forces need to be equipped with the most sophisticated and expensive weaponry. That high-end or "silver bullet" force would be a hedge against possible developments such as a rapidly modernizing Chinese military. The rest of the force should be equipped primarily with relatively inexpensive, but highly capable, existing weaponry carrying better sensors, munitions, computers, and communications systems. For example, rather than purchase 3,000 joint-strike fighters, the military would buy only 1,000 of those and then add aircraft such as new F-16 Block 60 fighters to fill out its force structure.

Other parts of the proposed Bush plan deserve scrutiny, too. After several successive years of increases, military pay is now in fairly good shape. In most cases, compensation is no longer poor by comparison with private-sector employment; as such, the administration's plans for further large increases go too far. The proposed research and development budgets, meanwhile, exceed the already hefty increases promised by Bush during his presidential campaign; given that research and development were not severely cut during the 1990s,

such growth seems excessive now. Finally, the Pentagon needs to reform the way it provides basic services such as military health care, housing, and various base operations. Unfortunately, if budgets get too big, the Pentagon's incentives to look for efficiencies often weaken. On balance, the planned increases in defense spending are roughly twice as much as necessary for the years ahead.

A final assessment of Operation Enduring Freedom depends on whether bin Laden and his top lieutenants have escaped Afghanistan. It could be a while before anyone knows; indeed, Rumsfeld has speculated that U.S. troops could remain in Afghanistan into 2003. A verdict will also have to await a better sense of where Afghanistan is headed. Whatever the stability of the post-Taliban government, it is doubtful that the Taliban and al Qaeda will ever control large swaths of the country again. But if pockets of terrorists remain in the country, or if Afghanistan again descends into civil war, the victory will be incomplete. In the former case, Afghanistan could still be an important if diminished asset for al Qaeda; in the latter, the U.S. image throughout the Islamic world may take another blow as critics find more fuel for their claims that Americans care little about the fate of Muslim peoples.

To prevent such outcomes, Washington needs to work hard with other donors to make reconstruction and aid programs succeed in Afghanistan. The Bush administration also needs to rethink its policy on peacekeeping. Its current unwillingness to contribute to a stability force for Afghanistan is a major mistake that U.S. allies may not be able to redress entirely on their own. A force of 20,000 to 30,000 troops is clearly needed for the country as a whole; several thousand troops in Kabul will probably not suffice.

That said, the situation in Afghanistan has improved enormously since October 7—and so has U.S. security. The Afghan resistance, the Bush administration, its international coalition partners, the U.S. armed forces, and the CIA have accomplished what will likely be remembered as one of the greater military successes of the twenty-first century. ©

April 25, 2002 11:40 AM

Dme 6/10

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chronology

3/2

I have looked at this chronology of action, which I pulled out of the package. It is unacceptable. I want to meet with you and sit down and figure out a way to change it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Chronology

DHR:dh
042502-20

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

ASAPROA

U17095 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12363

25 April 2002

SUBJECT: Chronology of Action SAS-D-020152

4/25

As requested by VADM Giambastiani:

26 Mar - Received advance copy from Joint Staff, awaiting JS coordination

10 Apr (PM) - Received Joint Staff coordination at USD(P)/SAS

14 Apr - Prepared coordination package

15 Apr (AM) - Action to SOLIC/signed by SOLIC

15 Apr - signed by DUSD(PS)

16 Apr - Action to OGC

19 Apr - Action from OGC to USD(P)

22 Apr - Action signed & returned from USD(P)/Notified SAB to move action thru VCJCS/CJCS

24 Apr - Notified of CJCS chop by SAB/Action to DepSecDef

~~SECRET~~

4/25

We're making headway on processing these CIA requests. The good news is that this request didn't take 3 1/2 months. The bad news is that it took a month. DE, SECDEF, FEPA
Prepared by: Walter Kennedy, SAS, (b)(6) my down the process. 11-L-0559/OSD/12364

April 25, 2002 11:20 AM

Transcom

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: TRANSCOM Orientation

One of the things I want to do is to see that all CINCs visit TRANSCOM and screw their heads into the important subject of logistics and they do it very early in their tenure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042502-19

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

25APR02

U17098 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12365

April 25, 2002 11:18 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: TRANSCOM and DLA

TRANSCOM

Let's make sure there is a time limit on the study to take a look at the connections between TRANSCOM and DLA. I don't want that thing to drag on. It shouldn't take more than a month to figure out what to do.

In business, you would give it to one or the other and tell them they need to keep what they should have and divest the rest.

My guess is that RAND could do a study on that in 14 days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042502-18



Please respond by 05/17/02

ASAPR02

U17099 02

April 25, 2002 11:11 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Deployment Orders

310

Should there be language in the DPG that reduces the number of people who sign off on deployment orders? If 20 to 30 percent of them aren't finally signed until after the event, something is fundamentally wrong.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042502-17

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

25 APR 02

U17100 02

April 25, 2002 11:10 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld PA
SUBJECT: ICC

015

One of the items for the ICC might be to get a bill passed that provides money for paying attorneys of former government officials to defend themselves in these things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042502-16



Please respond by 05/17/02

25APR02

U17103 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12368

T for DATE

April 25, 2002 10:55 AM

Done 5/17

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Millennium Challenge

353

What is my role going to be in the Millennium Challenge?

Thanks.

DHR:db
042302-14

Please respond by 05/10/02

5/29 4/5/10
→ SCDDF.
You have been invited to observe, but we haven't scheduled anything
You have written General Kernan to ask him to consider lessons learned from Afghanistan ~~and etc~~ as he preps for it (attached). He's briefing you next week.
Di Rita

ASAP RDA

U17104 02

17 May 1715-000.
11-L-0559/OSD/12369

Larry Di Rita

showWare

March 27, 2002 10:13 AM

TO: Gen. Kernan

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Millennium Challenge

I understand that you are executing Millennium Challenge this summer, and I'm looking forward to seeing the results of this important event. It struck me that it might be useful to apply to Millennium Challenge the lessons of Afghanistan and the transformation principles from the work we have been undertaking. If you have not yet been briefed on the transformation work that has been done by the Service Chiefs, the Joint Staff and the civilian leadership of the Department, I would like to have you briefed by Ken Krieg or Steve Cambone, PUSD(P).

I would appreciate it if you would brief me on the Millennium Challenge experiment and exercise plan as it relates to transformation and jointness sometime in the next 30 days. It is my understanding that the Services have been supportive of your efforts, particularly with respect to the joint and transformational aspects of the experiment. This is good—we need to give the right signals to all of DoD that we are serious about change and to let the Services know that they must work closely with Joint Forces Command on joint transformation and that they must cooperate with JFCOM's efforts.

I would also suggest that you share the Millennium Challenge execution plan with Art Cebrowski in the Transformation Office and with Steve Cambone. One other

11-L-0559/OSD/12370

individual who might be helpful is the Honorable Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, who has some very interesting ideas on transformation and has been in from time to time to share his thoughts.

I apologize for not getting this note off to you earlier in the year, and I do realize that the planning for Millennium Challenge is well underway; nonetheless, a country that may have to be ready to fight in hours ought to be flexible enough to not lock in exercises many months in advance.

I have asked Vice Admiral Ed Giambastiani in my office to be your point of contact on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-24.2

.....
Please respond by _____

April 25, 2002 10:54 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bill Schneider

You should talk to Bill Schneider about the issue of him talking about nuclear interceptors. That really is going to stir stuff up.

I don't know what you say to him. Maybe you ought to see me and we can talk about what you ought to say.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042502-13

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

A-47161

25 Apr 02

U17105 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12372

6/3
58
snowflake

May 31, 2002 8:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Think Tanks and Consultants

231.2

Please take a look at this *Insight* magazine article and tell me what you think it is all about and what we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.
Waller, J. Michael, "Clinton Undead Haunting Pentagon," *Insight*, 06/17/02

DHR:dh
053102-12

.....
Please respond by 06/20/02

7/23
Love

31 May 02

U17106 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12373

"The legacy that you are leaving here by being here is significant not just for America but for all of mankind," he told troops at the base, 125 miles north of the Afghan border.

The busiest time here was in January, when C-17 transport aircraft made nearly 20 sorties a day from Khanabad to Afghanistan; now the number is down to between three and four, Col. Love said.

Despite the reduced intensity of operations in Afghanistan, it doesn't look like the troops are preparing to pack up. Digging, leveling and building is going on, raising clouds of dust.

The troops have built a headquarters and a special forces' joint operations center, and are working on restoring runways that have not been repaired for over a decade. The base last saw heavy use by the Soviets in their failed Afghan campaign that ended in 1989, and fell into disuse after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

The soldiers were also building a bigger post office. Every day the base processes up to 20,000 pounds of mail addressed to the troops deployed here and in Afghanistan, Col. Love said.

Khanabad, more than 300 miles away from the Uzbek capital, Tashkent, is tightly scaled compared with the other U.S. base in Central Asia, located at a civilian airport just outside the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek.

A three-mile security belt around the Khanabad base maintained jointly with Uzbek security forces ensures no outsider can get near, and only residents or people with relatives there are allowed into the adjoining town.

U.S. officers at Khanabad declined to answer questions on base security or their mission. But some military police said they had dealt with al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners in Afghanistan.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his team are pulling their hair out trying to bring the Pentagon's policy apparatus into line with the president's wishes. At every turn, it seems, they run into entrenched bureaucrats, Clinton holdovers and others who not only pursue their own agendas but actively fund outright opponents of the administration.

The Pentagon's policy shop faces the tremendous challenge of serving as the brain of an open-ended international war on terror while also providing guidance on reshaping the nation's defenses to meet new threats and adopt new technologies. The first of these tasks was thrust upon it Sept. 11, when the Department of Defense (DoD) senior-management team was only a couple of months into the job; it since has remained that team's primary focus.

Daily headlines ranging from the shooting wars in the Middle East to a possible war between India and Pakistan to an escalation in narcoterrorist violence in Colombia and a host of other crises continue to show that the Pentagon can't pick the time or the place where its attention will be needed. Added to the mix are the quotidian tasks of negotiating five-year budget plans through a difficult election-year Congress, balancing the State Department's college of rationalizers on international arms and defense agreements with existing allies, new friends and old enemies — and trying to move ahead on presidential priorities such as defending the nation from missile attack.

With a clear and urgent set of missions and an experienced leadership, several observers ask why there isn't a clearer focus with a more purposeful movement on key policy issues at a time of tremendous popular support for the war, for the secretary of defense and for the president himself. Part of the answer lies in the degree to which the message is muddled — not only in the media, in Congress and within the DoD, but by the scores of Clinton holdovers and countless bureaucrats whose opposition to presidential initiatives and

policies is in fact funded by the Pentagon itself through internal think tanks and external consultants.

"This cognitive dissonance is to be found in three places: Pentagon and interagency-loan billets, the defense university system and in grants to contractors, academics and the 'CINC-tank' system of specialized regional policy shops — a series of self-styled policy centers created during the Clinton administration to bring what [conservative public intellectual] David Horowitz labeled 'tenured radicals' into the DoD ranks," says a Rumsfeld operative who asked to remain anonymous.

"CINC tanks" is shorthand for the five policy groups under the direction of the regional military commanders-in-chief (CINCs) that frustrated officials say have become sponsors of sinecures for shelved Clinton/Gore policy operatives. While not necessarily "radicals" in the political sense, such individuals have used their Pentagon-funded platforms to attack President George W. Bush's policies. The Honolulu-based Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the CINC-tank of the U.S. Pacific Command, has come under fire during the last year for sponsoring outspoken opponents of the president's initiatives. When Rumsfeld curtailed Chinese military access to the United States following Beijing's forced downing of a U.S. Navy intelligence aircraft last year, the center's director, retired Marine Lt. Gen. H.C. Stackpole, openly criticized the secretary's move. Stackpole also drew ire for allegedly undermining the president's missile-defense initiative by criticizing it publicly during a visit to Australia — one of the few countries wholeheartedly behind Bush's early national missile-defense plan.

The DoD's Africa Center for Strategic Studies is a virtual hive of left-wing activists at a time when Africa is of increasing importance as a theater of fighting international terrorism. One of the center's senior academic officials previously was with the International Human Rights Law Group, and was a World Bank

consultant and U.N. diplomat. The center's academic chair of civil-military relations is listed as "a development and gender consultant." Its academic coordinator is noted for her experience in "policy analysis and community activism" with the Washington Office on Africa, which actively sympathized with Soviet-backed revolutionary movements during the Cold War.

"The runaway CINC tanks are polluting the military officers they share billets with, they sow discord against the president's policies and legitimize criticism through their supposed representation of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], and they spin our allies' rising officers in the wrong direction," says a defense scholar currently trying to fix the problem for the Pentagon. "Some of the CINC tanks credentialize leftists and people with few legitimate credentials even as they deny the same opportunities to our good junior officers who are needful."

The National Defense University (NDU), in addition to educating U.S. military officers, plays host to research and advanced-studies institutes that focus on different defense areas. Adm. Paul Gaffney, the NDU's president, wins high marks for keeping the university on an even keel. Its Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) operates as a think tank for the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Insiders tell Insight that politicized Clinton appointees are being rotated out as soon as their contracts expire. "INSS was a problem area, but it's come a long way and still needs a little more work," says a longtime veteran of the Pentagon policy shop. "It needs good people who can follow national-security-related immigration and energy issues. It needs a Claire Sterling to connect the dots on terrorism, drugs and proliferation — a big-picture person who is cleared to study highly classified information and put the pieces together."

The late Claire Sterling was a journalist who defied the U.S. intelligence community's conventional wisdom in the late 1970s and early 1980s and

Insight Magazine
June 17, 2002

29. Clinton Undead Haunting Pentagon

By J. Michael Waller

pieced together a covert Soviet-sponsored operation in support of international terrorism that she dubbed the "terror network."

The Pentagon policy veteran adds: "It also needs some good China people. The China part of INSS is too small and it doesn't have the ability to fight the 'panda huggers' in every other institution of government. Congress tried to give INSS a strong China shop but refused funding when a panda hugger was to be appointed to run it."

It's hard for the defense secretary to promote the president's policies when members of his own think tank publicly undermine them, insiders tell *Insight*. Richard Sokolsky, a visiting INSS senior fellow, blasted Bush's nuclear-posture review in a *Washington Post* op-ed last January. Arguing that Bush's proposed unilateral cuts of 6,000 operationally deployed warheads to fewer than 2,200 didn't go far enough, Sokolsky compared them to President Bill Clinton's "timid" proposals of five years before. The INSS figure said that "it is hard to imagine a plausible contingency" that would merit Bush's plan to stockpile nuclear warheads, and said that Bush should make further radical cuts to help "Russian President Vladimir Putin defend his pro-American policy from domestic hawks." Sokolsky argued that the Bush plan leaves 10 times as many operational warheads as the United States ever would need. The United States should make further unilateral disarmament cuts until it had only "a few hundred" nuclear warheads, this Pentagon "expert" argued, keeping none in reserve.

"Those types of public articles undermine policy and don't serve the secretary or the president," says a senior Pentagon official dealing with nuclear-missile issues.

Nobody has produced a dollar figure, but it appears the national-security community is paying more people to oppose administration policy than to develop it. Some make a finer point: The money is going to political opponents of the administration to shape the administration's own policies. A

case in point, one critic says, was a May 6-7 National Security Agency-sponsored conference to map out a four-year strategy for homeland defense. Administered by ANSER, a major defense consulting firm, the conference recruited a range of policy experts from across the political spectrum. This created "an opportunity for the field's leading thinkers and practitioners to examine how the nation can cultivate an effective homeland-security posture for the long term," according to ANSER. It was "intended to provoke debate, develop new ideas and offer recommendations for policymakers who must design homeland-security policies, strategies and institutions."

But the invitation list shows that, apart from a few invited Bush-administration officials, the participants were weighted against the administration's conservative approach and included many former Clinton-Gore appointees. Even where a sponsored policy event was organized by friends of the administration, such as a November 2001 Rand Corporation conference to develop a new policy toward Cuba, out-and-out apologists for the Cuban regime such as Wayne S. Smith were included in the deliberations.

A source close to the Pentagon's policy office laments, "You have no idea how hard it is to work on the war, find extra hours to develop a forward-looking policy that tracks with the president's and SECDEF's [secretary of defense's] priorities and then try to advance it on the Hill or in the [decision-making] process, and find yourself outmanned by an opposition funded not by the leftist foundations or the congressional-opposition staff budget, but by your own policy shop's budget."

J. Michael Waller is a senior writer for Insight.

USA Today
May 29, 2002
Pg. 10D

30. It's All C
For The Pen
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By Lynne Pe

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showfile

May 31, 2002 8:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crusader

470

Please get me some answers on this article about Aldridge and Crusader.

Thanks.

Attach.
Inside the Army, "Aldridge Wrote January Memo to Convince Bush of Crusader's Worth,"
05/27/02

DHR jh
053102-11

.....
Please respond by 06/11/02

Done
5/23

31 May 02

U17107 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12376

depots are shriveling up, because investment in people and facilities has declined. The Pentagon lacks a strategy for adding to the depots the capabilities needed to maintain new weapons systems, the GAO says.

In addition, military program officials have told GAO that turning over too much work to contractors deprives the armed forces of the technical resources and sometimes the data rights that they need to adequately oversee their programs. They may lose the ability to properly gauge the cost-effectiveness of a contract change or the technical wisdom of a system upgrade, the officials said.

Georgia on their mind

In many cases, companies have partnered with Defense Department installations to maintain aircraft, ships, trucks and other equipment. Industry groups say that the partnerships may be imperiled by the pending provision. One executive at a top defense firm recently told Farrell that the company was reconsidering a possible partnership with Warner-Robbins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, Ga., because of the uncertainty the legislation has caused.

The Warner-Robbins center, in fact, is smack in the middle of this controversy. The language expanding the definition of core work was inserted by two Georgians: in the House Armed Services Committee bill by Saxby Chambliss (R) and in the Senate Armed Services Committee by Max Cleland (D).

The two men will vie for Cleland's Senate seat this fall. The race may be tight, and Robins AFB, where almost 26,000 people work, could be the difference between victory and defeat, congressional observers say. So the legislative language protecting depot jobs may be seen as bids by both men to sway those voters. Neither Cleland nor Chambliss were available for comment at press time.

Among the major new U.S. aircraft whose maintenance is up for grabs are the potential 2,852 Joint Strike Fighters, 339 Air Force F-22 Raptors and 222 C-17 Globe-

master III strategic transports. Some of the C-17 work is done today at Warner-Robbins, and employees there would doubtless like to receive more.

Chambliss told the Macon, Ga., Telegraph earlier this month that his proposal would cause more work to be done at Warner-Robbins and it would also protect jobs there from being outsourced to contractors.

But the legislation could affect weapons maintained at depots in states besides Georgia and in services besides the Air Force—from the Corpus Christi (Texas) Army Depot to the Portsmouth (N.H.) Naval Shipyard.

Revvng the lobby machine

To snuff out the measure, defense-industry trade groups and individual companies are revving up their lobbying machines. Farrell said that by this week, he expects to present to lawmakers a state-by-state breakdown of defense and aerospace jobs that might be lost because of the new plan. Farrell and Etherton represent two of the 10 groups in the Industry Logistics Coalition, which has written lawmakers about the issue.

Besides lost jobs at their companies, the groups say public costs will grow to support more federal workers and the infrastructure work that will be required to support them. In addition, they argue, when companies and depots vie for work, the fact of competition alone drives down the cost of maintenance contracts, and those savings—up to 40 percent in some cases—could be lost.

Farrell said the matter is a "big deal" that has engaged CEOs from defense companies.

"You go to a lunch, and you have industries—from small companies to large companies—at the table, and this is what they're talking about," he said. "And they absolutely are unwilling to bend on this. They think it has huge impact."

Referring to industry's lobbying plans, Etherton said: "Folks are getting worked up about it."

Inside The Army

May 27, 2002

Pg. 1

35. Aldridge Wrote January Memo To Convince Bush Of Crusader's Worth

A memo penned by the Pentagon's top acquisition official less than five months ago indicates the department's seemingly abrupt change of heart regarding the Crusader field artillery system is just as sudden as it appears.

On Jan. 23, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Pete Aldridge wrote a point paper intended to convince President Bush that Crusader was "a success story well worth sustaining." The memo was sent to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Army Secretary Thomas White and Defense Department comptroller Dov Zakheim. According to the paper, White concurred with the content and recommendations it contained.

Aldridge prepared the memo "in response to the president's continued concern over Crusader." He suggested the memo could be forwarded to Bush directly or used as talking points "for a personal discussion." According to Aldridge, White asked to accompany Rumsfeld should he meet with the president to discuss the program.

The paper was "written to return to basics: Why we need artillery; what are the artillery characteristics desired; and, what is the best artillery option," Paladin or Crusader II, Aldridge stated. Many of its assertions contradict recent testimony offered to Congress by Rumsfeld, Aldridge and Wolfowitz.

According to the paper, the "transforming Army has a need for massive, continuous, all-weather and mobile firepower within the battle area. While short-range tactical missiles and close air support can contribute, they cannot substitute for the flexibility, 24-hour presence, sustained lethality and close support of mobile cannon artillery," Aldridge wrote.

Yet, in rationalizing Crusader's termination since the May 8 announcement of its demise, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz have repeatedly claimed that guided, precision rockets and munitions will compensate for Crusader's absence.

Rumsfeld, at a May 16 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, also slammed Crusader's deployability. According to his estimate, it would take between 54 and 60 C-17 sorties to deploy a Crusader battalion. That would eat up more than half of the U.S. military airlift capability, he argued.

The Aldridge memo appears to counter the validity of that claim. It notes that "the majority of artillery will be delivered by sealift." Artillery must be moved rapidly by airlift "during times of extreme crisis," he acknowledged, but Crusader's size would not prevent such a deployment.

This mirrors statements offered by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki during the same May 16 hearing. Shinseki testified that the Army never intended to move a Crusader battalion by air; it would accompany other heavy armor on sea-based transports. If a contingency arose "where we needed massive firepower on short notice," the Army "could take a platoon of three Crusaders with its associated resupply vehicles and get them on six aircraft," Shinseki said.

"The contingency for which we would do that is to augment light forces on the ground or [to act] as the lead contingent for fires and security" before heavy forces arrive. Flying an entire Crusader battalion "was never in anyone's computation," Shinseki stated.

According to the letter, "a side-by-side comparison of Paladin and Crusader II clearly shows the comparative advantage of Crusader II." Aldridge pointed out the platform's 2000 redesign, which reduced the howitzer's weight by nearly 20 tons. "As we have said before, the current Crusader II," as he called the revamped system, "is not the 60-ton Crusader of the past."

A chart included in the letter lays out the differences between the two pieces of artillery, which Aldridge labeled the "only two options" for achieving the capabilities desired. Paladin's range is 30 kilometers; Crusader's is more than 40 km. Paladin can travel at speeds up to 27 kilometers per hour; Crusader does 48 kph. The Paladin rate of fire is one round per minute, while Crusader can achieve rates of 10 to 12 rounds per minute.

The targeting delay for Paladin is 10 to 12 minutes; for Crusader it is less than one minute, the chart states. Paladin's accuracy, as gauged by the circular error of probability, is 232 meters; Crusader's CEP is 96 meters.

Paladin is lighter -- 27 tons, compared to Crusader's 40 tons -- but it requires a five-man crew vs. Crusader's three-man team. That crew is protected against nuclear, chemical and biological agents in Crusader, but not in Paladin, Aldridge notes.

Resupplying a Paladin is a manual process requiring one hour; Crusader resupply is automatic and takes 10.4 minutes, according to the chart. Situational awareness for Crusader is digitally based; for a Paladin crew, it is "off-vehicle."

The systems are equally deployable; both can only fit two vehicles in a C-17. Paladin is less expensive at \$7.5 million per vehicle compared to Crusader, which was projected to cost \$11.2 million per copy, the paper states.

Aldridge concluded the memo by recommending the department proceed with the development of Crusader II.

"It has the warfighting features, to include lethality, deployability and mobility, we need," the letter states. "The alternative is to surrender the technological gains made in this program and defer the qualitative edge we require relative to potential adversaries well into the next decade."

Sources contacted by Inside the Army did not know how far up the administration hierarchy the memo was sent. At the May 16 hearing, Rumsfeld stated that, to his knowledge, Army Secretary White

had not met with the president to discuss Crusader.

At a May 8 press briefing to announce the termination decision, Rumsfeld was asked about the apparent abruptness of the cancellation decision. Why had the department waited until then to terminate the system, instead of doing so three and a half months earlier when it submitted the fiscal year 2003 defense budget to Congress?

"And an equally good question would be: 'Why wasn't it done the year before that? Why wasn't it done still a year before that, or any one of the six or seven years since it's been under consideration?'" he replied.

"It's just as possible it could have been made a year from now. But at some point you have to make it. And there's always going to be someone who says, 'Why isn't it later when you know more?' or 'Why isn't it earlier, for whatever reason?'" Rumsfeld stated. "But the fact is, there is no good time to do what we are today doing."

Rumsfeld denied that anything specific had occurred between January and May to precipitate the decision.

"It would be, I think, a misservice to suggest that there is a single thing or a new scrap of information or something that came along that was deterministic because the process doesn't work that way," he stated.

A call to Pentagon public affairs officials placed late on May 24 regarding the Aldridge memo was not immediately returned.

-- Erin Q. Winograd

New York Times
May 26, 2002

36. Talking The Talk His Own Way, By Golly By Eric Schmitt

WASHINGTON, May 25 — Ask Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld about hunting for Osama bin Laden, and the subject invariably turns to poultry.

"It's kind of like, as I said, running around the barnyard chasing a chicken," Mr. Rumsfeld said last November about

the elusive Al Qaeda leader. "Until you get it, you don't have it."

Since then, Mr. Rumsfeld has been asked so many times about the man he considers the ultimate "dead ender," he now answers with a grin, "How many times do I have to go back to the chicken coop?"

The secretary is more direct when asked whether he wants Mr. bin Laden, the mastermind of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, dead. "Oh, my goodness gracious yes, after what he's done?" says Mr. Rumsfeld, using an exclamation not normally associated with calling for someone's demise. "You bet your life."

Mr. Rumsfeld, whose phraseology has been called "Rummy speak" inside the Pentagon, is the latest in a long line of government officials who have put their own stamp on syntax. Moreover, his words have leavened a Pentagon parlance normally freighted with arcana and acronyms.

Take earlier this month, for instance, when Mr. Rumsfeld was busy canceling an \$11 billion Army artillery system known as the Crusader. Senior Army officials drew Mr. Rumsfeld's anger when he learned that they had faxed "talking points" in support of the 40-ton rapid-fire howitzer to sympathetic lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

"Some individuals in the Army were way in the dickens out of line," Mr. Rumsfeld told reporters. "Someone with an overactive thyroid seemed to get his hands in his mouth ahead of his brain. And that happens in life."

Mr. Rumsfeld seems to save his most pungent public remarks for the regular Pentagon news conferences he has clearly come to relish. His responses are unscripted, aides say, and are often delivered with a quizzical squint through wireless glasses, accompanied by a great flapping of arms and chopping of hands in the air.

Mr. Rumsfeld is an Illinois native, but linguists say that does not shed much light on the origins of his idiosyncratic utterances. (They are separate and distinct from "Rumsfeld's Rules," a pub-

lished list of adages he has collected over the years.)

"Some of these mannerisms and things he says came right out of the womb with him," said Victoria Clarke, the chief Pentagon spokeswoman, who confided that she and other top aides often find themselves, to their horror, unconsciously copying their boss's speech and mannerisms.

But friends say his remarks are also born of an unabashed enthusiasm for a job he first held a quarter-century ago, as well as a smart-alecky streak that helps warm up a military audience.

Speaking to American troops at an air base in Kyrgyzstan last month, Mr. Rumsfeld threw open the floor to questions: "Yell out what you'd like to know and if I know the answer, I'll tell you the answer, and if I don't I'll just respond, cleverly."

Mr. Rumsfeld will say how "old-fashioned" he is when it comes to keeping military secrets secret and the advice he gives to President Bush confidential. But he can also gush over the simplest form of new technology, as he did last fall at a Central Command briefing. "This is fantastic," Mr. Rumsfeld blurted. "I've got a laser pointer! Holy mackerel!"

Exclamations like these are a part of the Rumsfeldian linguistic fabric. He peppers his speech with "Gosh," "By golly," "Goodness gracious," and "You bet!"

It is a lexicon and style that has been parodied on "Saturday Night Live," converted into a collection of quotations on a British Broadcasting Corporation Web site, and become a Holy Grail for an online fan club (<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/rumsfeldfan>).

Rummy speak has caught the attention of linguists here and abroad who watch the secretary's televised briefings on CNN or C-Span.

"He's got a rhetorical style that's distinct from conventional bureaucrats," said Allan Metcalf, an English professor at MacMurray College in Jacksonville, Ill., who is executive secretary of the American Dia-

4/3 08 00 software
= 3

May 31, 2002 8:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Law

Please give me the entire law, not just Chapter 5 here.

Thanks.

Attach.
Chapter 5

DHR.dh
053102-9

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

7/23
Done
Larry Di Rita

030565

31 May 02

U17109 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12379

ties as the Secretary may

5/23

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

CHAPTER 5—JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

- Sec. 151. Joint Chiefs of Staff: composition; functions.
- 152. Chairman: appointment; grade and rank.
- 153. Chairman: functions.
- 154. Vice Chairman.
- 155. Joint Staff.

§ 151. Joint Chiefs of Staff: composition; functions

(a) COMPOSITION.—There are in the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the following:

- (1) The Chairman.
- (2) The Vice Chairman.
- (3) The Chief of Staff of the Army.
- (4) The Chief of Naval Operations.
- (5) The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
- (6) The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

(b) FUNCTION AS MILITARY ADVISERS.—(1) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

(2) The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified in subsections (d) and (e).

(c) CONSULTATION BY CHAIRMAN.—(1) In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of—

- (A) the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
- (B) the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(2) Subject to subsection (d), in presenting advice with respect to any matter to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be, of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to that matter.

(d) ADVICE AND OPINIONS OF MEMBERS OTHER THAN CHAIRMAN.—(1) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.

(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security

STOODER -
Here to the
section from
Title 10 regarding
the "military advisor"
aspects of the
Chairman and chiefs.
Di Rita
5/24

rity Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(e) **ADVICE ON REQUEST.**—The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.

(f) **RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS.**—After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.

(g) **MEETINGS OF JCS.**—(1) The Chairman shall convene regular meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall—

(A) preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(B) provide agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including, as the Chairman considers appropriate, any subject for the agenda recommended by any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff);

(C) assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying on their business as promptly as practicable; and

(D) determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be decided.

(Aug. 10, 1956, § 141, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 6.; Aug. 6, 1958, P.L. 85-599, § 7, 72 Stat. 519; Sept. 7, 1962, P.L. 87-651, § 204, 76 Stat. 519; Oct. 20, 1978, P.L. 95-485, § 807, 92 Stat. 1622; redesignated § 151 and revised in its entirety, P.L. 99-483, § 201, Oct. 1, 1986, 100 Stat. 1005; amended P.L. 102-484, § 911(a), Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2473.)

§ 152. Chairman: appointment; grade and rank

(a) **APPOINTMENT; TERM OF OFFICE.**—(1) There is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces. The Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years, beginning on October 1 of odd-numbered years. Subject to paragraph (3), an officer serving as Chairman may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(2) In the event of the death, retirement, resignation, or reassignment of the officer serving as Chairman before the end of the term for which the officer was appointed, an officer appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve as Chairman only for the remainder of the original term, but may be reappointed as provided in paragraph (1).

(3) An officer may not serve as Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the combined period of service of such officer in such positions exceeds six years. However, the President may extend to eight years the combined period of service an officer may serve in such positions if he determines such action is in the national interest. The limitations of this paragraph do not apply in time of war.

May 31, 2002 7:26 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: India and Pakistan

India

I have to decide who I am going to take with me if I go to India and Pakistan. My instinct is Ellis, if he is the one who is knowledgeable, and possibly Cambone.

Also, Larry, we have to decide when I go to India and Pakistan. It seems to me that it may very well be that I should go later rather than earlier, maybe after I go to the Gulf.

Please see me on calendar.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-3

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

~~DONE
Larry
I've talked
to Ellis & he's
in hot standby.~~

31 May 02

Done 7/18
COPY FOR [unclear]

U17110 02

May 31, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Finding Terrorists

000.5

I have to put together a group to sit down and talk about a critical DoD problem. We have a \$350+ billion budget and an Army, a Navy and an Air Force, but we are faced with the job of trying to find individual terrorists.

That never used to be a DoD job. But terrorists today are well-organized and well-financed, they are trying to get weapons of mass destruction and can impose enormous damage on the United States. So finding them has become a Defense Department task.

We are not organized, trained or equipped to do the job. It is basically an intelligence and law enforcement assignment.

Please figure out who we ought to sit down with—maybe Aldridge and three or four other people—so we can talk about what we do about it. Include Gen. Myers or Gen. Pace. It should happen today, or Saturday at the latest.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-1

.....

Please respond by 05/31/02

31 May 02

U17116 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12383

5/31 software
1330

May 30, 2002 2:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ballistic Missile and Space Commissions

334

Sometime we ought to get the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission and the Space Commission back in here for a lunch or a meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053002-8

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

7/23 Done

30 May 02

U17117 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12384

Snowflake

May 30, 2002 2:42 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: India and Pakistan

India

Please tell me why the White House, the President and Colin Powell all concluded I was going to India and Pakistan before I had finally decided to go?

My instinct always is to see the briefing I was planning to get before I made a final decision whether I would go or when I would go. The next thing I know, the President is announcing it in a press conference.

We are going to have to find a way to manage our affairs a bit more privately over here. Let's discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053002-6

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

30 May 02

U17118 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12385

5:31
1320

SHAREWARE

May 30, 2002 1:59 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Discretionary Positions

020 DOD

I need a report as to what specifically has been done to move forward the two Under Secretary discretionary positions for intelligence and homeland security.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053002-5

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

7/23
Done

30 May 02

U17119 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12386

October 19, 2002 11:05 AM

123

TO: Honorable Mitchell Daniels
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Decision

For planning purposes, we need to know what the President's decision is on the inflation plus \$10 billion for the final two years of the new Forward Year Defense Plan for DoD.

My impression is that he is for it, but at present OMB guidance is to the contrary.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101902-4

19 OCT 02

U17126 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12387

October 10, 2002 12:18 PM

C10/21

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Testimony Distribution

*Advise all
copy to Larry*

If it hasn't already been sent, please get Mark Kirk or one of our friends up on the Hill to send my testimony around to all members of the House of Representatives today, like Senator Ensign did. We could show them Ensign's letter as an example.

032

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101002-5

Please respond by 10/10/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

10/20

OCT 21 2002

Sec Def -

*Your testimony got
pretty wide distribution in
the House.*

J. White

10 OCT 02

U17129 / 02

May 30, 2002 8:32 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Clipping

Done
China

Please give me a copy of that clipping where Moriarity of the NSC was so out of line with respect to me. He is the individual I believe we said we did not want in meetings because he talks.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
053002-2



Please respond by 06/03/02

5/30
Attached. From
May 17 Washington
Times.

Larry Di Rita
5/31

30 May 02

U17144 02

are superior marksmen, not only with rifles but with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. They adapt quickly and change tactics.

- Osama bin Laden's cave complexes show a knowledge of engineering and safety. There are air vents to minimize the overpressure effect of stored munitions. The caves feature escape routes, with false turns to thwart a chasing enemy.

- There was more close combat in Operation Anaconda in March than media reports indicated. Soldiers' body armor saved lives.

- The Army's front-line transport helicopter, the Black Hawk, has trouble in high-altitude operation due to a balky tail rotor. Older Chinook CH-47s did most of the troop ferrying.

- In some hot landing zones, the Air Force was late in delivering prestrikes before the Chinooks landed during Operation Anaconda in the Shah-e-Kot Valley, south of Gardez. Some commanders sent in the choppers rather than let the al Qaeda and Taliban mass more troops.

Hot landing zones were the most glaring flaw in Anaconda. A Navy SEAL was killed when his Chinook received intense ground fire and had to back off a planned landing spot. The commandos went in to establish a blocking force to kill enemy fighters trying to escape from Shah-e-Kot.

New China wars

Pentagon officials are upset by what they see as an effort by pro-Beijing officials in the State Department and the White House National Security Council staff to discredit the harder-line policies on China of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

They cite as evidence a recent item in the Far Eastern Economic Review. The magazine stated that Michael Pillsbury, a key adviser to Mr. Rumsfeld who is fluent in Chinese, misinterpreted discussions between Mr. Rumsfeld and Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao about military exchanges.

The magazine article stated that the State Department's interpreter was forced out of the meeting and that Mr. Pillsbury's interpretation misled the Chinese vice president into falsely believing Mr. Rumsfeld was set for a full-scale resumption of U.S.-Chinese military exchanges. The Pentagon later disputed official Chinese press reports that said that.

A U.S. official familiar with the dispute said NSC China staffer James Moriarity was responsible for the critical magazine item. Mr. Moriarity declined to be interviewed. This official said Mr. Moriarity has criticized Mr. Rumsfeld in interagency discussions for supposedly being ignorant about Chinese affairs, despite the fact that Mr. Rumsfeld has traveled to China several times.

Pentagon spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Jeff Davis said yesterday he would not disclose details of who was permitted into the 45-minute meeting at the Pentagon on May 1. But he denied there were any language misinterpretations.

"The fact of the matter is we are confident that both parties on both sides of the table left with a full and complete understanding of what was said and what was agreed to," Cmdr. Davis said.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon's military exchanges with China, once a very public effort, are now secret. As part of the Bush administration's overall effort to keep more of its activities from the public, the latest

annual report to Congress on military exchanges carried a classified "confidential" label and will not be made public, we are told.

The secrecy on the exchange report contrasts sharply with earlier openness. In 1999, defense officials released to The Washington Times a detailed "game plan" for defense exchanges that outlined more than 80 activities by the U.S. and Chinese militaries, including visits by high-level officials, and trips by Chinese officers to sensitive U.S. military facilities, including a nuclear submarine base, joint training maneuvers in California and talks on logistics, a key weakness of Chinese military forces.

Mr. Rumsfeld cut off all military exchanges with China in April, but pro-Beijing officials are pushing to resume large-scale contacts. Mr. Hu, during his meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld, invited the defense secretary to visit China.

Kadish's future

"Will he stay long term or go?" is the question being asked by Pentagon insiders about Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish. As director of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, Gen. Kadish is the man who is attempting to make a reality of President Bush's vision of national missile defense.

He is said to be well-liked by Bush loyalists, and by his immediate supervisor, Edward Aldridge, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition.

The rank and file give him high marks for reorganizing the agency and presiding over a string of successful test intercepts.

Next month, he reaches the three-year mark as director, the normal tenure for senior officers in any one post. Insiders say he is ready to stay on, if he wins a fourth star from the Bush administration.

"He wants to stay there," said a Pentagon source. "He wants to be known as the person who brought it to reality."

Pam Bain, chief spokeswoman for the agency, said Gen. Kadish has been asked to stay on at least another year. As to a fourth star, "We've heard talk of that, but we don't hear it inside the building."

Crusader

The fact Army Gen. Tommy Franks never requested artillery for the war in Afghanistan played a role in the decision by the staff of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to recommend cancellation of the Crusader artillery system.

The Army seemed to sense early in the war that it needed to showcase artillery in Afghanistan or face criticism that in this new type of warfare, artillery was not needed.

Defense sources say a number of Army officials, including Undersecretary of the Army Les Brownlee, a retired Army colonel and Vietnam combatant, asked why Gen. Franks had not yet requested artillery.

Gen. Franks, who as head of U.S. Central Command is running the war, answered back that heavy mortars, not artillery, were the answers to cave-hidden al Qaeda fighters.

Armitage's record

We received a number of e-mails scolding us for writing, as many news outlets have done, that Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is a former Navy SEAL.

To set the record straight, Mr. Armitage was a Navy surface warfare officer who specialized in the special operations field of counterinsurgency. He completed three combat tours with the Riverine/advisory forces in Vietnam.

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough are Pentagon reporters.

Washington Times
May 17, 2002
Pg. 12

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

Iran's missile boats

China's military has sold Iran high-speed catamaran missile patrol boats, according to defense and intelligence officials.

The first of the new C-14 patrol boats was observed by U.S. military intelligence recently inside an Iranian port, according to officials familiar with intelligence reports.

According to the officials, China recently sent a delegation of technicians to Iran to help the Iranian navy train and equip the new boats.

"We've seen a small number," said one defense official. "These are designed to carry anti-ship cruise missiles and usually have one gun." The high-speed gunboat can carry up to eight C-701 anti-ship cruise missiles.

"It is a fast attack craft designed for high speed and low cost," said Richard Fisher, a specialist on the Chinese military with the Jamestown Foundation. "It is ideal for ambush attacks in narrow straits."

China sold Iran about 40 Hudong fast attack missile boats and more than 80 C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles during the mid-1990s and agreed to U.S. requests in 1998 to halt further C-802 sales.

A shipment of shorter-range anti-ship missiles were sent in January for Iranian coastal patrol boats. The missiles were identified as anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of about 10 miles, the same as the C-701.

The Bush administration is said to be investigating the missile boat transfers to see whether they violate U.S. proliferation laws.

The administration announced last week that it had imposed economic sanctions on eight Chinese companies and exporters, and on six Armenian and Moldovan companies for selling chemical weapons technology and cruise missile components to Iran. It was the third time in the past year that Chinese companies were sanctioned for selling missile and weapons goods to dangerous regions.

Afghan lessons

The Army puts importance on "lessons learned" even while an operation is in progress. Its Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., recently sent a team to Afghanistan to see what soldiers might do better next time.

A source provided us a synopsis of the team's findings:

- The Taliban and al Qaeda fighters are professional soldiers even though they do not wear uniforms. Some

7:10 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: May 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

Any gift over \$500 that I take I need to have an inventory form filled out by you with it, that I can look at, initial and then we can send to (b)(6) You are familiar with that inventory form. Let's get them going.

In the meantime go back and look at all the prior gifts that I have purchased and get inventory forms filled out on them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052802.05

Please respond by: 6/5/02

500

29 May 02

U17146 02

showtake

7:10 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DL
DATE: May 29, 2002
SUBJECT:

Make sure I see a copy of the letter that we send to the Hugh O'Brien Foundation and to Percy, thanking him for the nice thought about the award but how sorry I am I can't make it.

Thanks.

DL
LARRY DI RITA
6/4

DHR/azn
052802.03

Please respond by: 6/3/02

200.6

29 May 02

U17147 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12395



Nov 4th - Mon. - OPEN
Nov 12th - Tues - OPEN

Hugh O'Brian Youth Leadership

10880 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 410
Los Angeles, California 90024

Telephone: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

www.hoby.org

May 23, 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On behalf of the Board of Trustees of Hugh O'Brian Youth Leadership (HOBY), we are honored to inform you that you have been unanimously selected to receive HOBY's 2002 *Albert Schweitzer Leadership Award* in recognition of your selfless dedication toward the safety and betterment of our world. Should you accept this invitation, the Award will be presented to you at HOBY's annual awards dinner which will, for the first time, be held in your hometown of Chicago this fall.

I, Hugh O'Brian, New Trier Class of 1943, and your good friends Charles Percy, Ed Brennan, Sam Skinner, Jim Denny, Denis Healy, General Colin Powell and General James Jones are all fully supportive of the nomination and strongly endorse this invitation. In addition, Dr. Bruce Alberts, also a New Trier graduate and President of the National Academy of Science, is hopeful that you will accept the invitation.

The *Albert Schweitzer Leadership Award* pays deserved tribute to those individuals who have profoundly inspired others by their character, their values and their actions. It is presented to individuals who have distinguished themselves through service to mankind and who have contributed significantly through their leadership to the education and motivation of youth. Past recipients include President and Mrs. Gerald Ford, President and Mrs. George H. Bush, Vice President and Mrs. Richard Cheney, New York Governor George Pataki, Secretary of State and Mrs. Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense General Colin Powell, to name but a few. There is a complete list of the past recipients enclosed.

HOBY's mission is to seek out, develop and recognize leadership potential, commencing with high school sophomores. Through HOBY's Leadership Development Seminars, which take place each spring in the United States and Canada, and partnering leadership programs in Mexico, Israel and Hong Kong, HOBY has profoundly affected the lives of over 300,000 tenth graders since I founded the organization in 1958. This July, an outstanding boy and girl from each of the 90 seminar sites, as well as their peers from 35 other countries, will attend HOBY's World Leadership Congress (WLC) in Washington, DC. This outstanding week of learning will be coordinated by George Washington University. The 2002 WLC will transform itself into an international youth forum of student leaders who will convene to create a "Doctrine of Leadership." This document will be sent to the leaders of all the countries represented, as well as to President Bush and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan.

11-L-0559/OSD/12396

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
May 23, 2002
Page two

Through HOBY's Leadership for Service initiative, HOBY Ambassadors, the name given to seminar participants, are given the tools necessary to successfully complete 100 hours of volunteer service in their local communities. They serve as mentors to at-risk youth, coordinate food and clothing drives to help the homeless and the underprivileged and serve as peer counselors to prevent alcohol and substance abuse. An information package about the organization accompanies this letter.

The annual HOBY dinners held in New York and Los Angeles have become a meaningful way to showcase the impressive young people involved in the program. We very much hope to hold the event in Chicago this year and it would be wonderful if your schedule would enable you to come home to accept the tribute.

We are proposing the evenings of November 4, Election Day, or November 12, Veterans Day, for your consideration with the thought that you may need to be in Chicago. Please know that the Board of Trustees and all of your friends in Chicago are so hopeful that you will accept the award. If the specific dates are unacceptable, we can be flexible with the final date selection.

Mr. Secretary, you are so very deserving of the *Albert Schweitzer Leadership Award*. By accepting this tribute, you will give so many of us who love this country a chance to offer our collective thank you.

We look forward to your favorable reply.

Sincerely,



Hugh O'Brian
President, CEO & Founder
New Trier Class of 1943

c.c. Dr. Bruce Alberts
Edward A. Brennan
James M. Denny
Denis Healy
Edgar D. Jannotta
General James Jones
Honorable Charles Percy
Samuel K. Skinner
General Colin Powell

11-L-0559/OSD/12397

Long Range Calendar - Secretary of Defense - as of 05/21/02

NOVEMBER 2002

| Sunday | Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday | Saturday |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------|-------------------------|---|--|--------------------------|
| | | | | | 1 | 2 |
| 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 10 | 11 <i>Veterans Day</i> | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 Ministerial @ Chile w/JR (t) | 16 Ron Chile w/JR (t) |
| 17 RON Chile w/JR (t) | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 NATO Summit @ Prague | 22 Rachel's birthday NATO Summit @ Prague | 23 |
| 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 <i>DR to Taos</i> | 28 <i>Thanksgiving</i> <i>DR @ TAOS</i> | 29 <i>DR @ TAOS</i> | 30 <i>DR @ TAOS</i> |

NOVEMBER 2002

9:11 AM

6/24

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: May 28, 2002
 SUBJECT: CORP OF ENGINEERS

Talk to Marty Hoffmann before you start moving on that idea of moving the Corp of Engineers portion out of the Pentagon to Interior. He thinks it wouldn't work.

322

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052802.02

Please respond by:

6/3/02

6/17

Secret -

I've asked Ray Dubois to run our ideas by Marty.

I've ~~also~~ also asked ~~Marty~~ to meet Marty interview the candidates we have for the Civil Works position in the Army

28 May 02

(2)

Di Rita

U17148 02
 11-L-0559/OSD/12399 Larry Di Rita

6/21

TO: Gen. Tom Franks
CC: Gen. Dick MEYERS
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 28, 2002

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

I am told that water is a real problem in Afghanistan.

Do you think that it would make any sense for us to send some Corp of Engineer people over there to try to figure out where the water table is and what might be done?

Former Secretary of the Army Marty Hoffmann has an interest in this and raised the question with me. After you think about it, let me know your thoughts and if we think it is worth doing, Marty could be helpful to the Corp as to where to go and how to do it. Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052802.01

Please respond by: 6/3/02

Afghanistan

1

U17149 02

3:31 PM

6/24

TO: Larry DiRita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: May 28, 2002
 SUBJECT:

I ought to have a dinner for CINCs when they retire. They have all served 30-35 years. It just seems like it might be a nice thing to do like we did for Ryan and Shelton. I think Schwartz, Blair, Kernan are all leaving. Let's think about what is proper for me to do. I think just letting them slip off into the night is not the right way to do it. Same thing with the Chiefs, although they are here in town and I am much more likely to do something appropriate for them.

One thought is maybe I ought to just make a habit out of being at their farewell ceremonies.

Thanks.

5/29 -
Col B
Let's discuss at scheduling mtg.
D. Rita

335511

DHR/azn
 052802.01

Larry Di Rita
 5/30

Please respond by: 6/10/02

28 May 02

U17151 02

1:05 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *JH*
DATE: May 26, 2002
SUBJECT:

Done
6/4

Here is your draft memo to the President. I have revised it and I have revised the attachment. Why don't you get it up to date and get it back to me and I will get it over to him.

452 F

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052602.09

Attach: Snowflake dated 3/19/02 re: JSF

Please respond by: 6/2/02

26 May 02

U17152 02*

13
1403

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

2002 MAY 31 PM 3: 28

OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION

May 30, 2002, 9:00 AM

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef _____

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr., USD (AT&L) *PA 5/30/02*

SUBJECT: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Participation Update

- In response to your recent request (TAB B), I revised the Memorandum for the President that describes our activities on JSF and provides a "Fact Sheet" for his use (see TAB A).
- In addition to incorporating your revisions, I have updated the "Fact Sheet" to reflect current status. If this Memorandum generates any additional interest, we would certainly be happy to provide future updates to the White House and/or NSC staff.

COORDINATION: PD(GC), PDUSD(P) (at TAB C)

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend you sign the Memorandum at TAB A

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Frank Kenlon, AT&L/IC/P&A (b)(6)

| | |
|-----------------------|----------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | <i>5/30/02</i> |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | <i>6/3</i> |

W00415-02

11-L-0559/OSD/12403



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Joint Strike Fighter International Participation

Since you speak with foreign leaders regularly it might be helpful to you to have some information on those countries that have entered or are considering entering into cooperative agreements to produce the Joint Strike Fighter.

The United Kingdom and Canada have already joined us as cooperative development partners, and several other countries are nearing completion of their decision process to join.

The enclosed fact sheet summarizes the current status, and provides some points you may wish to use in your discussions with foreign heads of state.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
Vice President

11-L-0559/OSD/12404

For Official Use Only

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Participation

The Department of Defense (DoD), in consultation with State, Commerce, and the Congress, has been working since summer 1999 to bring foreign partners onboard to participate in JSF development. The JSF is a DoD program that is designed to address Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and Allied requirements to replace their aging F-16, F-18, and AV-8B aircraft beginning in 2010. Allied participation in the \$30B JSF development effort benefits the United States by bringing foreign investment into the program, enhancing future coalition warfare capabilities, and strengthening U.S. government and industrial ties. Current status:

United Kingdom—On board for \$2 billion since January 2001.

Canada—On board for \$150 million since February 2002.

Denmark— On board for \$125M since May 28, 2002.

Netherlands—Affirmative Dutch Cabinet recommendation to their Parliament for an \$800 million investment in February 2002. Final approval of partnership by Dutch Government may occur as soon as June 12, 2002.

Italy—Prime Minister forwarded a positive recommendation to Parliament for a \$1 billion investment in May 2002. Italian Parliamentary approval expected soon. Memorandum of Understanding document signature expected in June 2002.

Turkey—Announced its intention to join on March 18, 2002 at \$175 million. Final Government approval and Memorandum of Understanding document signature expected in June 2002.

Norway—Expected to join at \$125 million, with final approval expected in June 2002.

Australia—Still considering a \$150 million participation arrangement.

Singapore, Israel, Greece, and Poland—Each of these countries is considering some type of participation (possibly through Foreign Military Sales).

For Official Use Only

11-L-0559/OSD/12405



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

2002 APR 24 PM 4: 11

OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION
April 22, 2002, 3:00 PM

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef _____

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr., USD (AT&L)

Pete 4/22/02

SUBJECT: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Participation Update

- In response to your recent request (TAB B), I have prepared a Memorandum for the President that describes our activities on JSF, and provides a 'Fact Sheet' and a "Talking Paper" for his use (see TAB A). We have also been keeping the Office of the Vice President informed on JSF developments at the staff level, so I recommend we also provide the Vice President a copy for his information.
- Since the current situation on JSF remains dynamic – the Dutch Parliamentary decision is still pending – I decided not to put too much detail in the "Talking Paper". If this paper generates any additional interest, we would certainly be happy to provide future updates to the White House and/or NSC staff.

COORDINATION: PD(GC), PDUSD(P) (at TAB C)

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend you sign the Memorandum at TAB A

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Frank Kenlon, AT&L/C/P&A/ (b)(6)

[Redacted box]

2297-2002 AT

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 4/25 |

3

W00415 / 02



March 19, 2002 7:47 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JSF

I think it would be helpful if I had a note for the President telling him what the JSF is, what we are doing by way of getting other countries involved, and then what countries have agreed to do what and what countries are still pending.

That way, if he is talking to someone who has agreed to participate, he can say something nice about it. If he is inclined, he can say something to those that are still considering it.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/15/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: JSF International Participation

DHR:db
031902-8

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

4/23
Response package attached.
Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
4/29 (2)
Sp21 5/1/05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Joint Strike Fighter International Participation

Since you speak with foreign leaders ^{regularly} ~~from time to time~~ ^{it might} ~~be~~ helpful ^{to you} to have some information on those countries that have entered or are considering entering into cooperative agreements to produce the Joint Strike Fighter. (The United Kingdom and Canada have already joined us as cooperative development partners, and several other countries are nearing completion of their decision process to join.) The attached fact sheet ~~and talking paper~~ summarize the current status, and provide some points you may wish to use in your ^{discussions} ~~interactions~~ with foreign heads of state ~~or their~~ representatives.

Attachments:
As stated

cc:
Vice President

4

For Official Use Only

~~Talking Paper~~ -- Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Participation

The Department of Defense (DoD), in consultation with State, ^{Foreign} Commerce, and the Congress, has been working since summer 1999 to bring ~~non-U.S.~~ ^{foreign} partners onboard to participate in JSF development. The JSF is a ~~transformational~~ ^{transformational} DoD program that ~~will~~ ^{is desired} address ~~longstanding~~ Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and Allied requirements to replace their aging F-16, F-18, and AV-8B aircraft beginning in 2010. Allied participation in the \$30B JSF development effort ~~will~~ ^{will} benefit the United States by bringing foreign investment into the program, enhancing future coalition warfare capabilities, and ~~strengthening our~~ ^{strengthening our} ~~U.S.~~ government and industrial ties. Current status:

United Kingdom—Onboard for \$2 billion since January 2001

Canada—Onboard for \$150 million since February 2002

Netherlands—Affirmative Dutch Cabinet recommendation to their Parliament for an \$800 million investment in February 2002. Approval of partnership by Dutch Parliament may occur as soon as April 23, 2002, but could also be deferred until after Dutch elections in May 2002.

Italy—Prime Minister expected to make a positive recommendation to Parliament for a \$1 billion investment, with a final decision expected in May 2002.

Turkey—Announced its intention to join on March 18, 2002 at \$175 million. Final Government approval expected in May 2002.

Denmark— Announced its intention to join on March 13, 2002 at \$125 million. Danish Prime Minister traveled to Pax River, MD on March 25, 2002 to see the JSF demonstrator aircraft. Document signing ceremony scheduled for May 14, 2002.

Norway—Expected to join at \$125 million, with final approval expected in June 2002.

Australia—Still considering a \$150 million participation arrangement

Singapore, Israel, Greece and Poland—Each of these countries is considering some type of participation (possibly through Foreign Military Sales).

Talking Points:

- Joint Strike Fighter is a transformational program that is critically important to our nation's defense
- We are truly interested in having your nation participate with us in JSF development

For Official Use Only

11-L-0559/OSD/12409

**U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps Tactical Aviation
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)**



- The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will provide the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines, as well as Allied nations, with an affordable, new tactical aircraft for the 21st century. The JSF concept is a "family" of aircraft that will possess a high degree of commonality in design, with affordable variants that meet the specific requirements of each service.
- The U.S. Air Force variant is a low-cost, survivable strike fighter to complement the F-22 Raptor and replace the aging F-16 Fighting Falcon and the A-10 Thunderbolt. The U.S. Marine Corps variant is a supersonic, multimission short takeoff/vertical landing fighter to replace both the AV-8B Harrier and the F/A-18C/D Hornet. The U.S. Navy variant is a highly survivable, first-day-of-the-war, carrier-based fighter to complement the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
- The JSF program commenced a \$30B System Development and Definition effort in October 2001. Lockheed-Martin is the prime contractor for the aircraft. Pratt and Whitney and General Electric are prime contractors for engines.
- Initial JSF aircraft deliveries ^{are scheduled to} begin in 2008. Present plans envision production of 3,002 aircraft for the U.S. and United Kingdom: U.S. Air Force -- 1,763 aircraft; U.S. Marine Corps -- 609 aircraft; U.S. Navy -- 480 aircraft; and U.K. -- 150 aircraft.
- The United Kingdom and Canada have already joined the U.S. as JSF cooperative development partners. Other potential partners include: The Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, and Australia. International involvement by these partners, plus future foreign sales, may eventually result in the production of up to 3,000 additional JSF aircraft.

⑥

8:03 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 25, 2002

SUBJECT:

325

The attached on arming the National Guard is a good lesson for the future. Before we start charging off on domestic issues we get ourselves squared away.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052502.04

Attach: Snowflake dated 4/10/02 Re: Arming National Guard Personnel

Please respond by: _____

25 May 02
(9)

U17153 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12411

April 10, 2002 8:52 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
 Paul Wolfowitz
 Jim Haynes

CC: Tom White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Arming National Guard Personnel

23 Larry Di Rita

2/24

Here is a memo explaining a mistake we made here in the Department.

In the future, when we are going to be involved in something like this, we have to think through the matter before we just allow people to be deployed.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/27/02 GC info memo to SecDef re: "Arming National Guard Personnel in Title 32 Status"

DHR:dh
041002-9

.....

Please respond by 04/26/02

5/22

Dell Otto response attached

(D)

Larry Di Rita
9/23

(10)



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 13, 2002, 4:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel *Daniel J. Dell'Orto 5/13/02*

SUBJECT: Arming National Guard Personnel

- You indicated that the Department made a mistake by not attempting to influence governors' decisions with regard to arming and use of force rules for title 32 deployments for airport security and stated that, in the future, "we have to think through the matter before we just allow people to be deployed." (Tab A)
- In retrospect it would have been helpful to have developed general guidelines pertaining to National Guard "arming" and "rules for the use of force" before undertaking this mission. Although DoD could not mandate that the States adopt such guidelines, such general guidance might have encouraged the development of somewhat similar "arming decisions" and "use of force" rules for each state.
- The Chairman and I will recommend to appropriate DoD officials that DoD examine future requests for National Guard support using the following matrix:
 - Purpose of mission;
 - Funding;
 - Duty status of servicemembers;
 - Exit strategy; and
 - Guidance for developing "arming" and "use of force" rules.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness notes that the original decision to undertake this mission allowed only a few hours to respond to an urgent Presidential question; the alternative was to furnish 25,000 federal troops, who would have lacked proper standing, given that airport security was then a matter of local jurisdiction.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Jim Smyser, (b)(6)

11



11-L-0559/OSD/12413



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 10 2002

INFO MEMO

March 27, 2002, 11:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH/2/10/02*
SUBJECT: Arming National Guard Personnel in Title 32 Status

• You asked whether you have the legal authority to direct the arming and use of force rules for the National Guard personnel performing airport security support. You do not.

• National Guard personnel performing airport security support are doing so under the authority of title 32 of the United States Code. In title 32 status, the governors have "operational control" over the National Guard personnel. ~~DoD~~ provides funding. *US Gov't.*

• In addition, state law regarding use of force applies to National Guard personnel when in title 32 status. State laws regarding use of force are not uniform.

• You may, normally through the National Guard Bureau, attempt to influence the governors' decisions regarding arming and use of force rules for title 32 deployments.

• Should a governor refuse to modify arming or use of force rules to your satisfaction, you may refuse to fund that deployment of National Guard personnel in title 32 status.

• The practical problem in the airport security situation is that the President ~~directed~~ ^{federal} the deployment and the title 32 status (governors' control; ~~DoD~~ funds). This makes it difficult for you to refuse to fund, or threaten to refuse to fund, the deployment as leverage to get the governors to modify arming or use of force rules to your satisfaction.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Jim Schwenk; (b)(6)

12
4/9 -
SecDEF - A good lesson learned going forward. These people were deployed before anyone had thought it through. We could leverage the guard withdrawal by raising the issue. I will copy...
4/14/02
SP3
4/10



8:03 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: May 25, 2002
SUBJECT:

Let me know if you think you ought to talk to Lee Butler and see if he knows anything about India-Pakistan that we don't.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052502.03

Please respond by: 6/1/02

India

25 May 02

(8)

U17154 02

May 24, 2002 10:58 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Wayne Downing

095

Doug, please give me feedback on how you solve the Downing problem. I want that stopped, and I mean it.

Pete, in addition I would like you to call Downing to underline it and make sure you know what happened and that it doesn't happen again.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052402-13

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

24 May 02

U17156 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12416



May 24, 2002 10:17 AM *Dmr 5/28*

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CINC Tours

200.4

Please show me the tour lengths of all the CINCs and their deputies—when they started and when they hit one, two, three years, etc. I want to look at it on a single piece of paper.

Thanks.

D11R:dh
052402-10



Please respond by 06/07/02

U17157 02 *34 May 02*

11-L-0559/OSD/12417

| <u>POSITION</u> | <u>Incumbent/Service</u> | <u>Date Assumed</u> | <u>1-year</u> | <u>2-year</u> | <u>3-year</u> | <u>4-year</u> | <u>Comments</u> |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--|
| CDR, CENTCOM | Franks/USA | 7/6/00 | 7/6/01 | 7/6/02 | 7/6/03 | 7/6/04 | App'd 12-month extension |
| DCDR, CENTCOM | Delong/MC | 9/11/00 | 9/11/01 | 9/11/02 | 9/11/03 | 9/11/04 | App'd 12-month extension |
| CDR, EUCOM/SACEUR | Ralston/AF | 5/3/00 | 5/3/01 | 5/3/02 | 5/3/03 | 5/3/04 | Replacement-Jones/MC (Nom at OSD)- 7 mos.extension to Dec02 |
| DCDR, EUCOM | Fulford/MC | 8/2/00 | 8/2/01 | 8/2/02 | 8/2/03 | 8/2/04 | Replacement-Wald/AF (Nom at OSD) |
| CDR, JFCOM | Kernan/USA | 9/5/00 | 9/5/01 | 9/5/02 | 9/5/03 | 9/5/04 | Replacement-VADM G/USN (Nom at OSD) |
| DCDR, JFCOM | Mayer/USN | 11/21/00 | 11/21/01 | 11/21/02 | 11/21/03 | 11/21/04 | Working 3-month extension (depart Feb 03) No replacement ID'd |
| CDR, PACOM | Fargo/USN | 5/2/02 | 5/2/03 | 5/2/04 | 5/2/05 | 5/2/06 | |
| DCDR, PACOM | Case/AF | 10/2/00 | 10/2/01 | 10/2/02 | 10/2/03 | 10/2/04 | |
| CDR, UNC/CFC/USFK | Laporte/USA | 5/1/02 | 5/1/03 | 5/1/04 | 5/1/05 | 5/1/06 | |
| DCDR, UNC/CFC, USFK | Smith/AF | 11/20/01 | 11/20/02 | 11/20/03 | 11/20/04 | 11/20/05 | |
| CDR, SOUTHCOM | VACANT | | | | | | Replacement-Hill/USA (Nom at Senate) |
| DCDR, SOUTHCOM (2-star billet) | Speer/USA | 7/7/00 | 7/7/01 | 7/7/02 | 7/7/03 | 7/7/04 | |
| CDR, SPACECOM | Eberhart/AF | 2/18/00 | 2/18/01 | 2/18/02 | 2/18/03 | 2/18/04 | Nom'd Cdr, NORTHCOM (Nom at Senate) |
| DCDR, SPACECOM | Anderson/USA | 10/13/00 | 10/13/01 | 10/13/02 | 10/13/03 | 10/13/04 | App'd 12-month extension |
| CDR, SOCOM | Holland/AF | 10/27/00 | 10/27/01 | 10/27/02 | 10/27/03 | 10/27/04 | App'd 12-month extension |
| DCDR, SOCOM | Tangney/USA | 10/31/00 | 10/31/01 | 10/31/02 | 10/31/03 | 10/31/04 | Replacement-Brown/USA (Nom at OSD) |
| CDR, STRATCOM | Ellis/USN | 11/30/01 | 11/30/02 | 11/30/03 | 11/30/04 | 11/30/05 | Nom'd Cdr, Space/Strat (Nom at OSD) |
| DCDR, STRATCOM | Goslin/AF | 4/21/02 | 4/21/03 | 4/21/04 | 4/21/05 | 4/21/06 | |
| CDR, TRANSCOM | Handy/AF | 11/5/01 | 11/5/02 | 11/5/03 | 11/5/04 | 11/5/05 | |
| DCDR, TRANSCOM | Brown/USA | 10/3/99 | 10/3/00 | 10/3/01 | 10/3/02 | 10/3/03 | Replacement-Hughey/MC (Nom- confirmed) |
| CDR, NORTHCOM | VACANT | | | | | | Eberhart/AF nom'd for position (Nom at Senate) |

11-L-0559/OSD/12418

May 24, 2002 8:12 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Veterans

I do think the man in the veterans' organization was right—that people do want to help.


Please put together a group of people and see if we can figure out a way we can communicate the kinds of things people are doing. That will help the White House with the programs they have to communicate what it is people are doing to help.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
052402-3

Please respond by

06/28/02





2012

14 May 02

U17158 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12419

May 24, 2002 8:07 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gen. Kadish

What is this article in the paper about Kadish and people wanting to keep him and get him a fourth star?

I don't know what the situation is there. When does his tour end?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052402-2

.....

Please respond by 06/21/02

020 NDA

24 May 02

U17159 02

May 23, 2002 1:06 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Technology

Larry Di Rita
4/28

Please take a look at this article, and tell me what you think we ought to be doing.

Thanks.

Attach.

James Shinn, "Enlist Technies in the War on Terror," *Wall Street Journal*, 05/23/02

DHR:dh
052302-24

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

400.112

23 May 02

U17160 02

June 15, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge *Pete* 18 JUN 2002

Subject: Technology

You asked me to look at an article "Enlist Technies in the War on Terror" and to tell you what we should be doing (Attached). The answer is that we agree with the article, and we are doing a lot already in exploiting the data mining technology suggested:

--DARPA has established an Information Awareness Office to support decision-making, warning and pre-emption against terrorist threats using a variety of data sources. This office was established (John Poindexter is leading it) precisely for the purpose suggested in the article. We should try to get John on your calendar for a briefing on what he is doing.

--the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) at Ft. Belvoir has implemented the technology suggested in the article. I visited there and saw this technology working.

--DDR&E is leading our interactions with John Kasich's Silicon Valley Technology Group. I have been told that they identified several data mining technologies for DoD application.

--National Security Agency (NSA) is working with commercial Information Technology firms to improve data mining for counter-terrorism application.

--DARPA initiated a "New Technology Innovation for Homeland Security" partnership to identify applicable commercial technology and to facilitate cooperation among government, industry, academia and venture capitalists.

--the DoD Joint Counterintelligence Assessment Group (led by ASD-C3I) and the interagency Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force are using technology suggested in the article to successfully exploit large datasets.

I would like to set up a briefing for you on DARPA's Information Awareness Office.

Action: Set up briefing _____ No thanks _____

11-L-0559/OSD/12422

Wall Street Journal
May 23, 2002

Enlist Techies In The War On Terror

By James Shinn

The striking confidence with which Bush administration officials predict another al Qaeda terror attack on the U.S. is exceeded only by their ignorance about when or where it will occur. One thing is certain: The terrorists will turn our own technology against us again, the way they turned 737s into cruise missiles. Why not turn our technology against them first?

We need to get federal computers talking to each other, and then talking with the private sector. The days are gone when we could rely on smart analysts to "connect the dots" and identify a threat from the Soviet Union in Minsk or Novaya Zemla. Now we need smart computers to sift through millions of data-points and mouse-clicks to help flag terror cells in Jersey City or Tampa. Civilian firms do something similar every day when they screen for credit frauds or garden-variety deadbeats. Unfortunately, the fragmented computer systems at agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and INS rarely share information with each other, much less tap into civilian databases that contain the electronic footprints of terrorists.

This gap can be plugged quickly and at modest cost. A team of technology experts convened by the Council on Foreign Relations recently demonstrated how off-the-shelf techniques from the private sector, including database merge-and-search methods now used in many Internet applications, can be rolled out within six months.

For example, credit card companies use networked computer systems to follow cardholders as they rent cars, place long-distance calls, and use automated teller machines. These systems scan mountains of transactions data with data-mining software to flag suspicious users, dispatching real-time alerts to clerks or security guards when a potential miscreant surfaces.

In retrospect, the al Qaeda cell that attacked on Sept. 11 threw off a string of red flags that likely would have been detected by a networked system combining FBI watch-lists with transactions data-mining. Such a system would allow law-enforcement officials in a variety of locales to share leads and working hypotheses, an invaluable tool in fighting terror. The FBI agent in Phoenix or Minneapolis may be on to something vital; he just needs some data to test it, and a secure network on which to propagate it.

The challenge is to get the owners of civilian databases such as flight reservations and payment clearing houses to share slices of their information on a timely basis with a networked federal system, within acceptable limits of privacy protection and legal liability. If the feds can build the system, the companies will come. But the feds don't build anything quickly. Here is where civilian techies can ride to the rescue, at least in the short term.

Under the aegis of Homeland Security Office, a handful of civilian system designers and programmers can be pulled together in an emergency team charged with putting a prototype system in place quickly. The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks galvanized the high-technology community along with the rest of the nation. Many of my former colleagues in Silicon Valley wouldn't have been caught dead working for "Big Brother" before Sept. 11. Now they'd prefer not to be dead, period. Many technology vendors, such as Hewlett-Packard, Oracle and IBM, already have indicated their willingness to donate services and equipment to such a cause.

Meanwhile, within the Beltway, the federal leviathan is working on upgrades to build a counter-terror capability into computers that were designed for service, not security, and for insulating information, not sharing it. Unfortunately, Osama bin Laden's henchmen are unlikely to stand by until these upgrades are deployed in five years. Judging from past incidents, al Qaeda strikes every 18 to 24 months.

The federal government is spending billions of dollars on the war against terror abroad while ignoring the opportunity to create an effective shield at home. There are depressingly familiar reasons for this -- bureaucratic turf-warfare, congressional sniping, and the unwillingness of the Bush administration to bang bureaucratic heads together. Ultimately, it is a question of political will, not a question of technical complexity.

This administration has made the war on terror its top priority, and has repeatedly voiced confidence in the opportunities for a partnership between business and government. Now is the time to form that partnership -- and fast -- before al Qaeda turns our own technology on us again.

Mr. Shinn is a lecturer in Princeton's electrical engineering department and a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

May 23, 2002 9:06 AM

Done 6/24

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Bond's Proposal

6/4

325

We have to give some thought to Kit Bond's proposal that a Guard man be Deputy CINC.

One other thought would be to have a person who is familiar with the Guard be at the senior level somewhere on the civilian side.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052302-22

.....
Please respond by 06/07/02

S.R.-

- I discussed this w/ Gen Eberhard.
- If a Guard man is the DCINC, he could only do so on active duty. We cannot have the head of the Guard Bureau, for example, as DCINC.
- In any case, we need senior civilians with Guard experience. I think ~~McHale~~ is in the Guard or Reserves.

23 May 02

(yes) D. Hite 82 5/24

U17161 02

May 23, 2002 9:03 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Hollings

452C

I want to get some information and get educated on the question Fritz Hollings asked about C-17s.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052302-21



Please respond by 06/07/02

23 May 02

U17162 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12426

5/24 snowflake
1000

May 23, 2002 8:57 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dealings with the Hill

032

1. If I go back up to the Hill again with board charts to put up on an easel, I have to have someone there who knows how to do them. Larry Lanzillotta and the guy that were doing it fumbled for about five minutes.
2. At the breakfast with Warner and Levin, we had the wrong people. Someone has to ask me who should be there.
3. No one scrubbed Mike Wynne's briefing. It was not what we should have been doing with those two people, and I hadn't seen it or I would have known. But somebody ought to look at that stuff.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052302-18

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

DR
7/23
Done

83 May 02

U17163 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12427

May 23, 2002 8:52 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Kohl

I have to get back to Senator Kohl on those questions he asked about charter aircraft having no checks at all.

If it turns out he is right, would you please check with the Department of Transportation to find out, and then I want to get back to him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052302-17

.....
Please respond by 06/07/02

452

23 May 02

U17164 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12428

5/24 SHOW/FARE
1200

May 23, 2002 8:44 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland Security Report

384

Tom Ridge says the Pentagon has a report due to the Hill on June 24 on homeland security. I have never heard about it. He says he is working with our folks on it.

Please let me know about it.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
052302-16

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

7.3
Sec Def -
We received a draft
Friday, 5/28 It is
100 pages long. It is under
review by a lot of people
here.

*7/23
Pore*

23 May 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12429

U17165 02

SHOWWARE
1200

May 23, 2002 8:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Medical in Budget

How do we get the medical portion of our budget out of our budget?

Please tell me the total cost in the Pentagon budget this year for healthcare. I think it is \$28 billion.

I want to get it over to the VP.

Thanks.

DHR.db
052302-15

.....
Please respond by 06/04/02

7/23
Done

110.01

23 May 02

U17167 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12430

May 23, 2002 8:40 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Billets at Homeland Security

286.9 WH

Tom Ridge said he wants to talk to us about some billets and extending some people over at Homeland Security.

Please see me about it. I want to get into it myself.

Thanks.

DR:Jh
052302-14

.....
Please respond by 06/11/02

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

Settle

7/14 Done 7/15
LARRY DI RITA

7/1

~~Secret~~

*Your letter to
Lynn recently advises that
we are considering the
assignments as needed. The
only one they really care about
is General Lawton. We are
inclined to approve, on a reimburs-
able basis.*

23 May 02

U17168 02 *7/10*
11-L-0559/OSD/12431

Di Rita
Larry Di Rita

27 showWare
2833

Done
6/24

May 23, 2002 8:38 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Follow-up from Briefing

6/4

337

I understand from something that took place yesterday with Ellis and Eberhart that the Joint Staff is doing "federated targeting," whatever that means. That doesn't sound right to me.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052302-13

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

Sik:

The reference was to the work done at STRATCOM in support of the other CINCs. I'll double-check.

SC

23 May 02

U17169 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12432

SHOWTIME
4/23
200

May 23, 2002 9:38 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Senator Feinstein Question

381 510P

Carl Levin says the Feinstein question is that the Hill wants to get briefed on the SIOP or, if not the SIOP, some aspect of criteria for targeting.

Please have Powell Moore find out what he was talking about at breakfast and give me some details on the questions that were asked. If there is any written material, we can look at it. We have to develop a plan as to how we are going to deal with this, and I would like to lance the boil before it gets too big.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
052302-12

.....

Please respond by 05/01/02

7/23
Done

23 May 02

U17170 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12433

May 23, 2002 8:25 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: UCP Amendment

322

Ed, we have to go with Gen. Myers to the President and get him to sign the amendment to the UCP about STRATCOM and SPACECOM merging.

Larry, you should organize the briefings for the Hill on that subject.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052302-11

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

23 May 02

U17171 02

May 23, 2002 8:19 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SHAD Classified Information

370.64

Here is this piece of paper about declassifying material that someone handed me at that veterans' meeting. You might want to talk to Charlie Abell about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/02/01 SHAD Interagency Meeting Minutes

DHR:dh
052302-9

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

23 May 02

U17174 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12435

**SHAD Interagency Meeting
Minutes
2 March 2001
1300 to 1430**

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 23 2002

1. Attendees: *

| | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---------------|--------|
| Robert Claypool | * | MVHCB | (b)(6) |
| Susan Mather | | OPHEH | |
| Kelley Brix | * | ORD VHA | |
| Mark Brown | | OPHEH VHA | |
| Neil Otchin | * | OPHEH VHA | |
| John Kramer | * | OPHEH VHA | |
| Thomas Pamperin | * | VBA C&PS | |
| Bill Lanson | * | VBA C&PS | |
| Jim Benson | * | VA OPA | |
| Steven Westerfeld | | VA OPA | |
| Kevin Delaney | * | USACHPPM | |
| CAPT Mary Lambert | | USPHS OPHS/OS | |
| Michael Kilpatrick | * | OSAGWI-MRMD | |
| Dee Morris | * | OSAGWI-MRMD | |
| Austin Camacho | * | OSAGWI-MRMD | |
| Terry Garner | * | OSAGWI-MRMD | |
| Tom Rupp | | OSAGWI-MRMD | |
| Barb Goodno | | OSAGWI-MRMD | |
| Col Craig Postlewaite | | MVHCB | |
| Col Ken Hoffman | | MVHCB | |
| Col John Graham | | MVHCB | |
| CAPT Steve Matthews | * | MVHCB | |
| CDR Sally Brown | * | MVHCB | |

2. The meeting began with Dr. Claypool welcoming the attendees and asking for any revisions to the minutes of the February meeting. No changes were recommended.

3. OSAGWI-MRMD. Dee Morris is continuing to work with VHA and VBA on the claim for Mr. Robert W. Bates. She is reviewing the records and has contacted the VA Seattle Regional Office for additional file and medical record data.

a. Dee Morris reported the shipboard lists are being built. A system of analysis has been established. Databases are being populated. Declassifying pertinent documents to build linkages dates, ships, tests, and personnel continues. It was noted that much of the classified SHAD information would become unclassified on 1 October 2001.

b. Dee Morris developed draft SHAD Project Sheets (attached) that describe the tests, dates, locations, operations, and participating services. The draft SHAD templates were subsequently distributed to SHAD working group members. Members were asked to review the templates with their professional counterparts and provide comments and recommendations to Terry Garner.

4. VHA discussion. Dr. Neil Otchin recommended the SHAD templates should also include the ships and agents involved in the testing, as the informational sheets need to be designed to serve and inform both the veterans and clinicians. Discussion ensued that the hazards listed in the Under Secretary's For Health's Information Letter of December 1, 2000 should be included in one package vice requiring veterans or clinicians to have to search elsewhere for additional background data. Placing the hazards on web sites might limit a veterans access to information, and a clinicians time with their patient. It was felt a "self contained" SHAD Project Test sheet would be best for all.

5. VBA discussion. Tom Pamperin noted that to date there are fewer than 15 veterans known to VBA who have participated in Autumn Gold or Copper Head tests. These numbers are very small despite the SHAD outreach efforts to date. VBA was provided a list by Dee Morris of people on all ships known to be associated with Project Copper Head. VBA will check disability claims against the individuals on the list.

6. Health Risk Communication discussion: Mr. Kevin Delaney reiterated the importance of getting a consolidated Veterans Affairs, Public Affairs, and clinical input and response to develop SHAD Project sheets. This will enable the end product to be of maximum value to both the veteran and the clinical practitioners.

7. Action items included:

- a. Terry Garner, OSAGWI-MRMD, will collate Project SHAD Test template recommendations and revisions from the SHAD Working Group members, and provide a revised draft at the next meeting.
- b. VBA will review the Autumn Gold Test ship's list against the VA database for disability claims to see if specific clusters can be identified.

8. The meeting was adjourned at approximately 2:30 p.m. A follow-up meeting is scheduled for Friday, April 6, 2001, in the MVHCB conference room, Lafayette Building, 811 Vermont Ave., NW, at 1300.

Steven G. Matthews
CAPT, MSC, USN

May 23, 2002 7:43 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mobilized Army Reserves

326

Please find out what has happened to the Army here.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated, "Mobilized Reserve Component"

DHR:dh
052302-6

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

05/24/02

5/24

SECDEF - *su*

Please, the note
I've highlighted on
the attached page
I'm investigating
further.



23 May 02

VR
Ed

U17177 02 :
11-L-0559/OSD/12438



MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENT

Operation NOBLE EAGLE/ENDURING FREEDOM, 10 USC, section 12302



1. Reflects 1800 soldiers who will come on Active Duty for SFOR and force protection 28 May 2002.

2. Reflects the Navy's reduction in fleet and staff augmentation.





3. AEF Rotation and transition overlap resulted in the increase in Air Force numbers that began 4/15.

4. Represents a reduction in staff augmentation not a reduction in force protection or QRF battalions.

MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENT


Operation NOBLE EAGLE/ENDURING FREEDOM, 10 USC, section



11-L-0559/OSD/12440

MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENT

Operation NOBLE EAGLE/ENDURING FREEDOM, 10 USC, section 12302



| | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May |
|--------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Army | 907 | 14,356 | 16,481 | 20,892 | 24,582 | 26,577 | 27,663 | 28,111 | 30,213 |
| Air Force | 1,824 | 15,376 | 19,792 | 23,812 | 25,994 | 28,200 | 29,969 | 30,607 | 30,815 |
| Navy | 340 | 3,825 | 7,000 | 7,946 | 8,852 | 9,816 | 9,651 | 9,021 | 8,880 |
| Marine Corps | 0 | 454 | 1,120 | 1,515 | 3,172 | 4,465 | 4,398 | 4,388 | 4,288 |
| Coast Guard | 2,727 | 2,475 | 2,227 | 2,000 | 1,904 | 1,831 | 1,828 | 1,761 | 1,635 |
| Total | 5,798 | 36,486 | 46,620 | 56,165 | 64,504 | 70,889 | 73,509 | 73,888 | 75,831 |

Monthly data as of the last day of each month. May data is as of May 20, 2002

May 23, 2002 7:43 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Senator Voinovich

310,1

I saw Senator Voinovich. He said that he is working with David Chu, and that we need to put a full-court press on Joe Lieberman, so that he knows that we need the changes with respect to management of people necessary to be able to manage the Department.

I didn't know what he was talking about. Please let me know, and if I need to, I am happy to go after Lieberman.

Here is the piece of paper he gave me.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated, "Proposed Human Capital Amendment to FY 2003 Defense Authorization Bill"

DHR:dh
052302-5

.....

Please respond by 06/14/02

Done
1/9
AMY DI RITTO

J. H. [unclear]

23 May 02

U17178 02

Proposed Human Capital Amendment to FY 2003 Defense Authorization Bill

These three provisions were part of the package of 17 flexibilities specifically requested by the Department of Defense.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 23 2002


From Voinovich bill:

- **Alternative personnel systems**
 - Would give agencies more flexibility to meet the challenges of attracting, managing, developing and retaining the workforce they need to support the federal government's mission today and in the future.
 - Would create mechanisms for making a demonstration project permanent and extending the innovation to other federal organizations.
 - Would authorize the creation of permanent, OPM-approved alternative personnel systems designed to improve the agency's ability to accomplish its mission efficiently and effectively.

- **Hiring reform provisions**
 - Would allow the executive branch to streamline its staffing procedures while adhering to merit principles and veterans' preference, by allowing federal agencies to rank applicants in categories of basically qualified, highly qualified, or superior.

From Durbin/Akaka bill:

- **Increased student loan forgiveness authority**
 - Would expand the existing loan repayment program for federal employees that would allow an employee to receive \$10,000 in loan debt repaid per year. The maximum amount of loan repayment an employee is eligible to receive under this program is \$80,000. Under current law and OPM regulations promulgated earlier this year, the limit on loan forgiveness is \$6,000 per year up to a maximum of \$40,000 per employee.



software

May 22, 2002 12:16 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Interrogation Techniques

383.6

Please get this letter from Jim Hovey and the attachment by Martin Seligman communicated to Dunleavy, Speer, Myers and Pace. Have them look at it, and get someone working on it.

Second, please draft a letter thanking them for the letter.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/21/02 Hovey ltr w/05/20/02 Seligman memo re: Interrogation Techniques

DHR:dh
052202-22



Please respond by 06/11/02

22 May 02

U17179 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12444

JAMES W. HOVEY

(b)(6)

Sn-copy of
this was given
to LD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 22 2002

May 21, 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Re: Interrogation Techniques - Afghanistan vs. Guantanamo

Dear Don,

Martin Seligman is the top expert on learned helplessness - a phenomenon with major bearing on interrogation technique.

Attached is a memo from Seligman, based on an email to him from two Operation Anaconda interrogators, which compares techniques used in Afghanistan to those used in Guantanamo.

I urge you to at least scan the 3 or 4 numbered comparisons that the interrogators make in their email (page 2 of the memo).

Keep up the good work.

Best regards,

Jim

Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/12445

To: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

Priority: Urgent and Confidential

From: Martin Seligman (b)(6)
Fox Leadership Professor of Psychology
University of Pennsylvania

Re: Interrogation of Captives in Cuba

Date: May 20, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 22 2002

Executive Summary

Interrogations of captives in Cuba are not as effective as they could be largely because the prisoners are in groups and are allowed small victories that checkmate the interrogators. Two successful Anaconda interrogators returned from Afghanistan and recently visited the Cuba facility. Their insights are attached to this memo.

On Thursday, May 17, 2002, I addressed a gathering of military intelligence officers who specialize in interrogation and resistance to interrogation at our base in San Diego. As an expert on learned helplessness and depression, I discussed the optimal conditions for successful interrogation with this experienced group. Among this group were two interrogators, recently back from Afghanistan and Guantanamo. While they understand the pressures that the press and others have put on the DoD with regard to the conditions of captivity there, they see a missed opportunity at Guantanamo.

Several conditions lead to the successful extraction of vital information from captives: foremost among these are solitary confinement and the prevention of "small victories" (such as turban-wearing and mullah-consulting) by captives. Failure here can easily checkmate the best interrogators.

They respectfully suggest that interrogation under the present conditions at Guantanamo is less likely to produce the vital information that we need. Given this week's news this information might be urgently needed. They further suggest that it is not too late. Attached is an email that I received from them:

In the Interrogators' own words

Dr. Seligman... (b)(6) here from US Central Command. I and (b)(6) met you at the conference...(and on the bus).

We were interrogators in Afghanistan, and recently visited Cuba to observe the operations there.....subsequently, Dr (Col) Banks invited us to the conference.

Our activities are really no secret, just the information gleaned. The conditions we induced, the roles we played, and the projected perceptions are all versions of classic interrogation techniques.

We found that our most successful tactics (in Afghanistan) involved the following:

1. Friendly "tea sessions"revolving around food, drink and the joint venture of eating. These sessions focused on pleasurable things...and allowed the interrogator and detainee to bond.
2. Empowerment. This effort focused on those subjects that were hostile, or totally withdrawn/resigned. Here we gave the detainee the "ability" to make a decision that immediately affected their surroundings....(an extra blanket, some more food, some comfort items...etc) Our party line was that "you get to choose your future, and the way you want to live it...."
3. Isolation/silence. This worked for the positive and the negative. Those that wanted to get better treatment and not be subject to peer punishment sought iso. Those that thrived on the group, and were problematic..iso proved effective.
4. Change of venue. This worked well as it allowed the interrogator to manipulate the venue...for the positive or for the negative.

Now, after our visit in Cuba, we saw that the interrogators were motivated, talented, but constrained. That constraint comes from the top on down. We saw the following:

1. No venue change. The only meeting/interview/interrogation will occur in a booth. The same booth is always used. (There are several and they are identical.) This restricts the creativity of the interrogator.
2. Tea Sessions. We saw that the interrogators were limited at providing/sharing items and perhaps suspect of "providing aid and comfort to the enemy."
3. Group support. We saw that the detainees are allowed to communicate openly with each other. This solidifies the individual to the group and reduces the interrogators goal of divide and conquer.

Overall, we would like to see the interrogators given more flexibility to exploit their subjects as they see fit.

I and (b) have learned that sometimes the best changes come from the most unusual routes. Any assistance that you could provide in this arena would be greatly appreciated.

Best ways to reach us....

(b)(6) MSgt. Duty Phone (b)(6)

Currently assigned in Tampa. Police Officer from Detroit.

(b)(6) MSgt. Duty Phone (b)(6)

Same assignment. Police officer from Orlando.

I only ask that you do not give this information wide public dissemination.

It was a pleasure listening to you, and hopefully we can work together in some capacity.

Jon Hathaway

May 22, 2002 12:03 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

I talked to Gen. Franks yesterday. He feels we need to develop some Washington, DC-based thinking on how we manage the development of the army, the police and the border guards in Afghanistan.

When do we give them the weapons we have been capturing from Al Qaeda and Taliban? When do we give them the "in-kind" contributions we are raising—do we do it before the Loya Jirga, or after?

Please get a group together thinking about this, and then talk to me and give me a proposal before we go back to Gen. Franks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052202-20



Please respond by 06/07/02

22 MAY 02

U17180 02

May 22, 2002 12:00 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Sales

What do you propose I do about your memo dated 05/17/02 on C-130 sales?

I am confused. When I send a memo to you and you send a memo back to me, I would like the memo back to me to tell me what in the world you think I ought to do about it—what you think the next step ought to be.

7/11

Thanks.

*Response/Proposal
stated.*

Attach.

05/17/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Response to Your Question on C-130 Sales
[U08528/02]

D. Litz

DHR:dh
052202-19

.....

Please respond by 06/21/02

May 22, 2002 12:00 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Sales

4522c

What do you
I am confused
would like the
do about it—v

USD (AT&L)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

17/02 on C-130 sales?

end a memo back to me, I
would you think I ought to

Thanks.

7/11
Free to
letter.

7/11
Response/Proposal
stated.

Attach.
05/17/02 USD(
[U08528/02]

Question on C-130 Sales

D. Litz

DHR:dh
052202-19

Feel free to
improve on
my file.
D. Litz
7/12

.....
Please respon

22MAY02

U17181 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12451

7/11
1600



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JUL 10 PM 4:23

ACTION MEMO

June 28, 2002, 1000 A.M.

FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr., USD (AT&A) *[Signature]* 7/2/02

SUBJECT: Response to your question on C-130 Sales

- You asked what I think the next step ought to be to improve the C-130 sales position (~~TAB A~~)
- In my first note to you on the C-130 issue (~~TAB A~~), I advised that more than one year ago DoD had recommended to State that selected cargo aircraft be removed from State's U.S. Munitions List (USML) and transferred to the Commerce Department's jurisdictional authority, provided they are demilitarized. This included C-130s other than the current C-130J models. This would make foreign sales easier, by expanding the customer base beyond governments (a requirement for USML items) and broadening financing possibilities (Ex-IM Bank does not fund military items). If this is not feasible then consideration should be given to the development of an ITAR exemption for these older aircraft.
- State and Commerce, however, do not support the proposal to transfer the aircraft to the Commerce Department's jurisdictional authority. State is concerned because these aircraft are still designated as "major defense equipment" and some aircraft are currently owned by countries not entirely friendly to the United States. Since these aircraft would still be considered military aircraft and would not be considered a dual-use commodity, Commerce believes that assuming jurisdiction of these aircraft would be inconsistent with the dual-use basis for their control list.
- We have prepared a note for you to send Secretary Powell urging him to support and act upon our request. This will not resolve all of the issues concerning used C-130 sales as FAA certification is still an expensive matter for military aircraft. However, it will improve the chances. It will also help in our efforts to revise/reform the USML by removing items no longer a concern to us from a national security perspective.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memo at TAB A.

CONCURRENCES: Lisa Bronson DASD(CP&TSP)

Prepared By: Marvin Winkelman, IC/P&A(703)

(b)(6)

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 7/10 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | <i>[Signature]</i> |

2928-02





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Powell:

In April 2001 DoD provided the results of our review of the first 25% of the U.S. Munitions List (USML) under a State/DoD effort to review the entire list for currency and appropriateness. While some change based on DoD's recommendations has been made for categories concerning firearms, explosives, chemical/biological weapons and nuclear related technologies, our Departments are not in agreement on USML Category VIII concerning Aircraft. This category is still an open issue with no specific target date identified for resolution.

~~I am specifically concerned about our proposal~~ ^{We propose} to either transfer demilitarized older cargo aircraft to the export control jurisdiction of the Commerce Department or to ~~build on current EAR exemptions~~ to permit their sale to friendly governments without the need for an export license. ~~Failure to adopt either of these initiatives for these older cargo aircraft, which are of limited military significance, hampers sales options for those possessing them without benefiting any security concerns.~~ It also distracts both State and DoD licensing officers from more important work.

I am aware that Frank Miller at the NSC has been hosting interagency discussions to address this issue with Line Bloonfield, Jim Jochum from Commerce and Lisa Bronson from my office. Perhaps with your assistance we could help to facilitate a resolution of this matter.

Sincerely,

will facilitate to a broader range of countries than possible now - We don't attach any real security concerns to these aircraft, such as C-130s, and they could be of great benefit in a lot of poorer countries between State and DoD to update the U.S. Munitions list, which governs our export policies. There is one particular issue I would like to raise with you directly.



May 22, 2002 1:44 PM

352 DoD Schools

TO: David Chu
CC: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Schools

I am told that DoD schools are doing better on testing than the U.S. public schools. Please check that. If so, should we promote it as part of what we are doing for the men and women of the armed services? They apparently are producing students that compete better than the U.S. public schools do on average.

The interesting aspect is that DoD schools have the diversity of race and economic circumstance, and one would think they would be about like the U.S. schools.

It may be that military people are self-selected and have a higher degree of parental involvement.

You might want to talk to RAND about that. It is worth their thinking about.

Why don't you look into that and let me know how you think we ought to handle that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052202-18

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

22 MAY 02

U17182 02

1/23 software
5800

May 22, 2002 10:18 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: R&D for Hostage Rescue and Urban Warfare

450.112

I am disturbed about your May 18 response to me on hostage rescue and urban warfare. Would you please rewrite it and tell me what you think I ought to do?

Thanks.

Attach.

05/18/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: R&D for Hostage Rescue and Urban Warfare

DHR:dh
052202-17

.....
Please respond by _____

7/23
Done

22MAY02


U17183 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12455

SP2P
14/20

INFO ONLY

May 18, 2002



SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 22 2002

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge *Pete* 18 MAY 2002

Subject: R&D for Hostage Rescue and Urban Warfare

9/5/21
SP2P

Back in July, 2001, you sent me a note asking me to think about putting some R&D money into building capabilities we do not have to rescue hostages, deal with urban warfare, and function in areas that are not being governed.

I tasked this to DARPA, but never got a response, and I failed to follow up. I have now received a response from DARPA. We have found there is a lot of R&D going into these areas such as information technologies, micro-technologies and micro-vehicles, tagging and blue force tracking, improved miniature power sources, advanced communications, advanced sensors for unique penetration of buildings and foliage, robots, technologies that minimize the logistics support for special forces, and lethal and non-lethal weapons. All have application to significantly improving our capabilities in these unique environments.

What is missing is the integration of these technologies to solve a sometimes unique problem. That belongs to a CINC, such as JFCOM or SOCOM. I understand that JFCOM has already been assigned the urban warfare task. I will ask my staff to work with JFCOM, SOCOM, the Joint Staff and the other CINCs to develop some Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) proposals to integrate these technologies to improve our capabilities in the areas of interest. These ACTDs will permit "leave behind" capabilities for the CINCs.

Action. None required.

May 22, 2002 8:43 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Budget

*6/19
Larry Di Rita*

Dave Gled

110.01

Should we go back and try to get a two-year budget?

Thanks.

Attach.
05/01/02 USD(P&R) Memo to SecDef re: PPB [U07677/02]

DHR:dh
052202-12

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02


*6/17
Response attached*

Larry Di Rita
6/19

22MAY02

U17184 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12457



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



2002 JUN 14 PM 5:31

INFO MEMO

OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION

June 14, 2002, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Budget

- We should look into a 2-year budget. The major stumbling block has been the congressional appropriations committees which have never been receptive to a biennial budget. They have consistently viewed biennial budgeting as an executive branch attempt to reduce their constitutional oversight role.
- Regardless of congressional action, we are looking at streamlining the internal Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) process. We have an on-going PPBS reform effort with Ken Krieg. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) also directs the Senior Executive Council (SEC), under the leadership of the Secretary of the Navy, to work with the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself to undertake the replacement of the current rigid PPBS with a more streamlined and integrated process.
- My personal view is that we do not need to do all phases of the PPBS with equal intensity every year. Once an administration's planning guidance construct is in place and we have programmed funds to achieve the planning guidance goals and objectives, subsequent reviews should simply focus on fine-tuning the defense program based on fact-of-life changes.

| | |
|-----------------------|-------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | <i>buln</i> |

U09816-02



- I envision a 4-year cycle where we conduct an intensive planning and programming process in the first year of an administration and then conduct budget execution reviews that focus on performance in the years we do not conduct intensive programming. These execution reviews will help inform the annual budgets and will also incorporate the kinds of fact-of-life changes that inevitably arise (changes in inflation assumptions, new legislated requirements, program slippages, etc.). If the proposed legislative change to shift the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the second year of an administration is adopted, the QDR will occur the same year as an execution review.
- I will approach the appropriations committees to see if there is any receptivity to a biennial budget. In the meantime, I will work closely with Secretary England to recommend internal changes that reduce the rigidity and duplication of the convoluted PPBS chart illustrated.

COORDINATION: None

I also will work with OMB, as appropriate, regarding an execution review.

Prepared By: John Roth, (b)(6)

May 22, 2002 8:35 AM

381

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Plans

I really do think we have to look at war plans, contingency plans and ops plans, and have a section that explains when things become visible to the public.

It makes an enormous difference what can be done quietly and what cannot.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052202-9



Please respond by 6/14/02

22MAY02

U17185 02

May 22, 2002 8:10 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan Army Salaries

Afghanistan

Are you on top of this \$25 million to pay the Afghan Army salaries?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052202-5



Please respond by 05/31/02

22MAY02

U17186 02

Done 6/25

May 21, 2002 3:49 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: NSA

020 NSA

What is the date Gen. Hayden's tour ends?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052102-11

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

- TOUR ENDS 3/30/03
- STASER HOLCOMB + RICH
HAVER RECOMMEND EXTENDING
HAYDEN FOR 15 MONTHS TO
SUMMER '04
- HAYDEN'S TOUR @ NSA COMMENCED 3/20/99

21 Aug 02

V/R
ED 5/22



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

07 JUN 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR GENERAL/FLAG OFFICER MATTERS

FROM: AFSLMO

SUBJECT: Request to Extend Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden

The Air Force Chief of Staff requests you extend the joint tour length of Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden for 6 months through 30 September 2003. He has been serving as Director, National Security Agency since 30 March 1999. His mandatory retirement date is 1 April 2007. A copy of his military history is attached.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard S. Hassan".

RICHARD S. HASSAN
Brigadier General
Director, AF Senior Leader Management Office

Attachment:
Military History

11-L-0559/OSD/12463

General Officer Personnel Brief

Prepared: 29 MAY 02

AYDEN MICHAEL V

MIKE

19636-0513 Lieutenant General

Off-Sync NSA/DIR

Phone: **(b)(6)**

Current Assignment: DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; AND CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, FT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD

SERVICE DATA

DAS: 30 MAR 99
 EDOS: 30 MAR 99
 TPCSD: 02 JUN 97
 TAPCSD: 24 JUL 97
 TAPMSD: 14 JUL 97
 DOS: 11 MAR 97
 POLY DOS: 21 JUL 94
 PAY DATE: 02 JUN 97
 1405 DATE: 02 JUN 97
 SEC INV: 30 MAR 99
 SEC CLNC: DCID 1/74-04 OCT 97
 COMP CAT: LANG
 BTZ-GRADES: NONE
 DCRC: 01 MAY 95

GRADE HISTORY

MAJ 01 OCT 84 CPT 07 DEC 71
 BG 01 SEP 75 LT 07 JUN 70
 COL 01 NOV 70 1LT 01 JUN 67
 LTC 01 FEB 65
 MAJ 01 JUN 60

PERSONAL DATA

(b)(6)

DECORATIONS

| DECORATION | NR | DATE |
|----------------|----|-----------|
| DDG MDL | 02 | 05 MAR 99 |
| SSS MDL | 02 | 21 JUL 91 |
| LEGION MERIT | 01 | 19 JAN 93 |
| BRONZE STAR | 01 | 11 MAY 75 |
| MERIT SYNC MED | 03 | 09 SEP 69 |
| AF COMM MED | 01 | 07 DEC 71 |
| AF ACHIEV MED | 01 | 01 DEC 81 |

FLYING DATA

RATING: NOMATING
 ADOL: NONE
 AVN SVC DT:
 AVN SVC: NOT APPLICABLE
 EFF DT:
 ACFT YR HRS TOTAL-HOURS
 CMST-HOURS
 JET-HOURS

JOINT DATA

JSO STATUS: FULLY QUALIFIED ISO
 JSO QUAL: 1PME THRU < FULL IDA TR (IDA
 BG FROM QUAL: FIDADA
 JOINT TOUR: YES

EDUCATION DATA

| Military PME | | |
|----------------|---------------|----|
| ADR WAR COL | NON-RESIDENCE | 03 |
| ADMN FOR JC | RESIDENCE | 03 |
| AC & STAFF | NON-RESIDENCE | 71 |
| SQ OFF BCH | RESIDENCE | 74 |
| Degree History | | |
| MAS | HISTORY | |
| | DUQUESNE PA | 09 |
| BAC | HISTORY | |
| | DUQUESNE PA | |

ACQUISITION CORPS DATA

ACQUISITION CORPS: NO

ASSIGNMENT DATA

DEPOS: 15 MAR 99
 ODSO: 15 MAR 99
 STRD: 15 MAR 99
 LANG: BULGARIAN/NONE

OVERSEAS TOURS

| START | STOP | LOCATION |
|--------|--------|----------|
| 970917 | 190815 | KOREA |
| 970309 | 160801 | GERMANY |
| 140703 | 040201 | BULGARIA |
| 000731 | 000001 | KOREA |

| EFF-DT | AFSC | DUTY-TITLE | LEVEL | DET | NUM | KIND | TY | LOCATION | STATE | CMD |
|-----------|-------|--------------------------------|-------|------|------|--------------------|------|-------------------|----------|-----|
| 30 MAR 99 | 9600 | DIR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY | DDG | | 0000 | NATIONAL SECURITY | AGC | FT GEORGE G. MEAD | MD | ELM |
| 19 SEP 97 | 9600 | DCS, UNC KOREA | DDA | | 0000 | UNC KOREA | CMD | USA GARRISON YONG | KORUS | ZPA |
| 05 JAN 96 | 9600 | COMMANDER | DDA | | 0000 | AIR INTELLIGENCE | AGC | KELLY | TX | ITC |
| 10 MAY 95 | 0800 | F-2, USELCOM | DDA | HQJ | 0000 | AFELM BULCOM | DDI | STUTTGART-WAHRING | GERMANY | BUC |
| 23 OCT 91 | 0806 | CHIEF SEC STAFF GROUP | HAF | YOSK | 0000 | U S AIR FORCE | HQ | PENTAGON | VA | HAF |
| 02 JUL 91 | 0807 | CHIEF SEC STAFF GROUP | HAF | OSRD | 0000 | U S AIR FORCE | HQ | PENTAGON | VA | HAF |
| 15 SEP 89 | 0316 | DIR FOR DEFENSE POLICY | DDJ | DNJC | 0000 | AFELM WHITE HOUSE | GREC | WASHINGTON | DC | ELM |
| 08 FEB 88 | 0216 | CHIEF, POLICY BR, STRATEGY DIV | HAF | XOX1 | 0000 | U S AIR FORCE | HQ | PENTAGON | VA | HAF |
| 19 JUN 87 | 0217 | INTL POL MIL AFF OFF STRAT DIV | HAF | XOX2 | 0000 | U S AIR FORCE | HQ | PENTAGON | VA | HAF |
| 30 JUL 86 | 0213 | INTL POL MIL AFFAIRS OFFICER | HAF | XOX3 | 0000 | U S AIR FORCE | HQ | PENTAGON | VA | HAF |
| 09 JUL 84 | 0910 | DEPT FT ACTY AIR ATTACHE | DDG | WCD | 0000 | AFELM DIA/ATTACHES | DIA | SCRA | BULGARIA | ELM |
| 26 JAN 83 | 60910 | STUDENT ATTACHE TRAINING | STU | ASCL | 0000 | AFELM DIA | DIA | BOSSLYN | VA | ELM |
| 05 AUG 82 | 0003 | STUDENT | STU | | 0000 | AFELM AFSC | JCS | NOBOLK | VA | ELM |
| 14 FEB 82 | 0176 | CHIEF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION | W/B | | 0051 | TACTICAL FIGHTER | WING | OSAN | KOREA | PAP |
| 09 DEC 81 | 0076 | CHIEF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION | W/B | | 0051 | COMPOSITE | WING | OSAN | KOREA | PAP |
| 01 SEP 81 | 0006 | CHIEF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION | W/B | **** | **** | *** | ** | UNKNOWN EAST | UNKW | BAP |
| 04 APR 81 | 3006 | CHIEF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION | W/B | | 0051 | COMPOSITE | WING | OSAN | KOREA | PAP |
| 02 AUG 80 | 0073 | CHIEF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION | W/B | | 0051 | COMPOSITE | WING | OSAN | KOREA | PAP |
| 08 JUN 80 | 3054 | STUDENT DIA | STU | ISCL | 0000 | AFELM DIA | DIA | ANACOSTIA | DC | ELM |
| 03 SEP 79 | 0054 | STUDENT DIA | STU | OPB | 0000 | AFELM DIA | DIA | ANACOSTIA | DC | ELM |
| 30 MAR 76 | 0940 | ASST PROF AEROSPACE STUDIES | STUD | 0005 | 0000 | AIR FORCE ROTC | CORP | WINDSOR | VT | AET |
| 19 JAN 76 | 0940 | SQ OFF SCHEM D CES | STU | 0065 | 0000 | AIR FORCE ROTC | CORP | MAXWELL | AL | AUN |
| 30 JUL 75 | 0940 | ASST PROF OF AEROSPACE STUD | DTCH | 0265 | 0000 | AIR FORCE ROTC | CORP | WINDSOR | VT | AUN |
| 12 MAY 75 | 0054 | CH CURRENT INTEL DIV | ADIV | | 0000 | AIR DIVISION | DIV | ANDERSEN | GUAM | SAC |

11-L-0559/OSD/12464

HAYDEN MICHAEL V

TOTAL P. 02

JUN JUN-25 2002 12:43 PM

No. 15115 P. 2



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN



Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden is director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, Fort George G. Meade, Md. The NSA/CSS is a combat support agency of the Department of Defense with military and civilian personnel stationed worldwide. He is the department's senior uniformed intelligence officer.

The general entered active duty in 1969 after earning a bachelor's degree in history in 1967 and a master's degree in modern American history in 1969, both from Duquesne University. He is a distinguished graduate of the university's Reserve Officer Training Corps program. The general has served as commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and director of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, both headquartered at Kelly Air Force Base. He also has served in senior staff positions in the Pentagon; Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; National Security Council, Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in the

People's Republic of Bulgaria. Prior to his current assignment, the general served as deputy chief of staff for United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea, Yongsan Army Garrison.

EDUCATION:

- 1967 Bachelor of arts degree in history, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- 1969 Master's degree in modern American history, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- 1975 Academic Instructor School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
- 1976 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
- 1978 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force, Ala.
- 1980 Defense Intelligence School (postgraduate intelligence curriculum), Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, D.C.
- 1983 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
- 1983 Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. January 1970 - January 1972, analyst and briefer, Headquarters Strategic Air Command,

Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.

2. January 1972 - May 1975, chief, Current Intelligence Division, Headquarters 8th Air Force, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
3. May 1975 - July 1975, student, Academic Instructor School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
4. July 1975 - August 1979, academic instructor and commandant of cadets, Reserve Officer Training Corps program, St. Michael's College, Winooski, Vt.
5. August 1979 - June 1980, student, Defense Intelligence School (postgraduate intelligence curriculum), Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, D.C.
6. June 1980 - July 1982, chief of intelligence, 51st Tactical Fighter Wing, Osan Air Base, South Korea
7. July 1982 - January 1983, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
8. January 1983 - July 1984, student, air attaché training, Washington, D.C.
9. July 1984 - July 1986, air attaché, U.S. Embassy, Sofia, People's Republic of Bulgaria
10. July 1986 - September 1989, politico-military affairs officer, Strategy Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
11. September 1989 - July 1991, director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council, Washington, D.C.
12. July 1991 - May 1993, chief, Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
13. May 1993 - October 1995, director, Intelligence Directorate, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany
14. October 1995 - December 1995, special assistant to the commander, Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
15. January 1996 - September 1997, commander, Air Intelligence Agency, and director, Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
16. September 1997 - March 1999, deputy chief of staff, United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea, Yongsan Army Garrison, South Korea
17. March 1999 - present, director, National Security Agency/chief, Central Security Service, Fort George G. Meade, Md.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
- Legion of Merit
- Bronze Star Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
- Air Force Commendation Medal
- Air Force Achievement Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

- Second Lieutenant Jun 2, 1967
- First Lieutenant Jun 7, 1970
- Captain Dec 7, 1971
- Major Jun 1, 1980
- Lieutenant Colonel Feb 1, 1985
- Colonel Nov 1, 1990
- Brigadier General Sep 1, 1993
- Major General Oct 1, 1996

Lieutenant General May 1, 1999

(Current as of May 1999)



Jun 25, 2002 12:45PM

No. 1511 P. 6 of 1

Frutiger, Russell L, COL, JCS SJS

From: Hall, Sally J., LTC, OSD-P&R
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 9:00 AM
To: Frutiger, Russell L, COL, JCS SJS; Jackson, John J., Col, JCS ODJS
Subject: FW: NSA extension
Re:

Can you tell me if extension for Hayden is now summer of 04? (VADM Holcomb's note below). Thanks, LTC Hall

-----Original Message-----

From: S & J Holcomb (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 17, 2002 6:41 PM
To: LTC Sally J. Hall OSD(P&R)
Subject: NSA extension

Sally Jo,

AtGen Hayden is now talking "summer of '04" I'm told. Please be sure the extension reflects that.

Itaser

--S & J Holcomb

-- (b)(6)

5/21/02
snowflake

May 21, 2002 7:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Green Berets

Please find out if this is true—that we are recruiting civilians for the Green Beret force.

Thanks.

Attach.

Dave Moniz, "Guard Called on to Meet Demand for Commandos," *USA Today*, 05/21/02

DHR:dh
052102-4

340

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

Larry Di Rita

21 May 02

U17189 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12469

retired Army colonel and former chief of staff for the Army's Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C.

The active-duty Army's 6,500-member Green Beret force is stretched so thin that its soldiers — including those eligible for retirement — are barred from leaving the service.

The National Guard's involvement in Afghanistan was not widely publicized. But Guard officials say several hundred Guard Green Berets have been sent overseas or to domestic military bases.

Sgt. Gene Arden Vance, 38, was killed when his unit came under attack near the Pakistan border. Vance was a member of the 19th Special Forces Group assigned to the West Virginia National Guard. He is the second Guard member to die in Afghanistan. Another National Guard Green Beret, Sgt. 1st Class Daniel Romero, 30, of Pueblo, Colo., died April 15 in Kandahar when rockets that were being destroyed exploded prematurely.

National Guard officials would not say how many Special Forces troops have been called up. Regional officials said about 300 Green Berets from the West Virginia Guard and several hundred from Alabama are involved.

Many of the National Guard's 2,000 Special Forces troops are former active-duty soldiers, including some who served in special operations. One Pentagon official said the Guard's Green Berets often train with the active-duty military, and it's no surprise that they are in Afghanistan, where commandos have performed a variety of covert missions.

Special Forces soldiers typically operate in 12-man teams that are expert at hiding, scouting territory and spotting the enemy. The small teams usually have linguistics specialists who are familiar with local culture and customs.

The Pentagon has in recent months debated whether to enlarge its elite forces. Privately, senior officials say they fear that doing so could result in lowered standards for those selected.

Green Berets, Navy SEALs and other units put their trainees through rigorous courses that often eliminate about half of those who apply. National Guard Special Forces troops have similar training.

In an effort to boost its Green Beret force, the Army recently announced a program to recruit civilians. The Army has typically selected mid-career soldiers as Green Beret candidates.

Contributing: Jonathan Weisman.

Philadelphia Inquirer
May 21, 2002

7. British General's Ouster Raises Doubt

The chief of the nation's troops in Afghanistan will be reassigned. A day earlier, officials praised him.

By Barry Renfrew, Associated Press

LONDON - Britain's handling of its forces in Afghanistan was in confusion yesterday after officials said a general was being replaced, just one day after the government rejected criticism that he had botched the mission.

The Defense Ministry announced that Brig. Gen. Robin Lane, who has been at the center of a dispute over the performance of British troops in Afghanistan, would be reassigned next month. The ministry acknowledged he was being moved earlier than normal.

The move caused surprise and dominated news headlines because it came during an active operation and just one day after Defense Minister Geoff Hoon had praised Lane.

"He is doing a tremendous job in very difficult conditions and he deserves - and gets - our complete support," Hoon said Sunday.

The government later said the decision to reassign Lane had been made in February. It did not explain the announcement's timing or say where Lane was being reassigned.

Lane, who heads a force of about 1,700 Royal Marines, has been lambasted in the media, which have cited unidentified top military officials as

saying he botched Britain's military deployment.

Lane annoyed senior British and U.S. officials when he told reporters May 8 that the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban was "all but won." U.S. officials rejected any talk of a date to end the mission.

In October, Lane contradicted government statements that British forces were ready for combat in Afghanistan, saying they needed more training.

Yesterday, top British military commanders expressed confidence in Lane and insisted he was not being dismissed, but they acknowledged mistakes had been made in the way the announcement was handled.

Adm. Sir Michael Boyce, the country's top military commander, said he had "absolute and total confidence" in Lane and threatened to dismiss officials caught leaking hostile information.

Boyce insisted Hoon would not have known about the plan to move Lane, who holds perhaps the most visible post in the military.

Boyce lashed out at critical media coverage of British operations in Afghanistan but conceded the military was partly to blame by creating expectations that the marines faced major battles. Despite several major operations, the marines have yet to fire a shot in combat.

"I guess I am as responsible as anybody else," Boyce told journalists.

Baltimore Sun
May 20, 2002

8. Weapon Of Future Getting Baptism In Afghanistan Pentagon predicts pilotless aircraft will soon fill crucial role

By Tom Bowman, Sun National Staff

WASHINGTON - The U.S.-led conflict in Afghanistan may one day be remembered less for the ouster of the Taliban or as the first salvo in the war on terrorism than for the pilotless aircraft that cruised silently and almost unseen above the barren landscape.

The aircraft, called unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, are in their infancy but will become crucial around 2020, Pentagon officials predict. Making long, high loops over a battlefield, they will provide live video of enemy forces, even peering through dense jungle foliage. Others will eavesdrop on communications, drop precision bombs or land in rugged terrain to resupply U.S. troops.

Historians of the future may view the Afghanistan campaign as a turning point in warfare, like the Battle of Crecy in 1346, when the English used an emerging technology - the longbow - to defeat the French.

In Afghanistan, a Predator drone fired a Hellfire air-to-ground missile - a first in combat - and streamed real-time video to U.S. warplanes, allowing pinpoint targeting. Another drone, the Global Hawk, made its debut last fall 65,000 feet over Afghanistan, lingering above the battlefield for up to 35 hours, tracking enemy vehicles and transmitting photos to U.S. commanders in Afghanistan. [the drone is] pretty much battle-proven now," Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, logistics and technology, said at a recent meeting with reporters. "Everybody's got a UAV concept going."

The Pentagon plans to spend \$5 billion to research, develop and buy drones over the next five years, nearly doubling the money spent in the past decade. Advocates say that besides providing round-the-clock battlefield surveillance, a \$35 million Global Hawk, or a smaller drone, is less expensive than manned aircraft, which can easily cost twice as much, and there is no risk to aircrews.

Pilotless aircraft can tackle the most dangerous missions, such as attacking air defenses, said Lt. Col. Doug Boone, who oversees UAVs for the Air Force. Then manned aircraft can move in to finish off the enemy.

But technical hurdles remain, defense analysts and Pentagon officials say, and

May 20, 2002 6:35 PM

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Personnel

205

Please get me a piece of paper by Tuesday night, close of business, that tells me how many people we are pulling out of airports, borders, CAPs, Kosovo, Bosnia and so forth over the coming period. There are thousands of people that we were using a month ago that we are not going to be using in the next two, three or four months.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-68

.....

Please respond by 05/21/02

20 May 02

U17190 02

May 20, 2002 6:08 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Gen. Pace
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pakistan Briefing

Pakistan

I need to see the "Effect of a Pakistani Nuclear Exchange" briefing in the next day or two. They have had plenty of time to horse around with it.

Let's get it done and get it up here. Then I can look at it and put some structure into what I think I am going to want.

Thanks.

DHR:ch
052002-62

.....
Please respond by 05/22/02

20 May 02

U17192 02

Done
030

May 20, 2002 5:52 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Absentee Voting

014.35

People are going to be voting again in November 2002. There was a big flap in the last election about absentee ballots and people not getting their votes counted. Subsequently, Cohen initiated a study on absentee ballots for military people. That study came in; David Chu is working the problem.

It seems to me we ought to get a very effective program going, so we don't end up getting criticized for making the same mistakes that were made last time. If we are going to fall into potholes, we ought to fall into potholes we discover rather than ones people have already fallen into.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-59

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

20 May 02

U17194 02



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 29, 2002, 1:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes* 5/29/02

SUBJECT: Absentee Voting

- You asked me to work with David Chu and Torie Clark to ensure that our voting assistance program runs smoothly this year and does not repeat any mistakes from election year 2000 (Tab A).

- After the 2000 election, members of the General Accounting Office and the Department of Defense Inspector General's office reviewed the Federal Voting Assistance Program run for many years by Doc Cooke's staff.

- Those reviews made several suggestions for improving the program. In the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress legislated other changes.

- I am told that all suggestions and changes have been implemented, and will get with David and Torie to follow up as necessary.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Jim Schwenk; OGC(P&HP), (b)(6)

CC: USD(P&R)
ASD(PA)



11-L-0559/OSD/12474

Snowflake

May 20, 2002 5:28 PM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Colombia

Colombia

Here is an e-mail from Newt Gingrich on Colombia. What do you think about that?

If you think we ought to do something, please let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.
Newt Gingrich e-mail to SecDef, "Victory in Colombia" 03/19/02

DHR:dh
052002-57

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

30 May 02

U17195 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12475

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD copied to Dr Wolkowitz

Adm. G
D.R.itz

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 19 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2002 7:04 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Subject: for secdef and depsecdef
for secdef and depsecdef
from Newt 3/19/2002

Victory in columbia

Southcom and Socom should be tasked with establishing a joint working group to think through victory in columbia. That group should be assigned contacts at cia,dea,treasury and state and should coordinate with wayne downing at nsc. They should draw on the history of defeating insurgencies:

- Phillippines 1898-1902
- Nicaragua with Marines 1920s
- Malaya 1950s
- Greek Civil War 1940s
- Pacification in South Vietnam


They should include the principles of entrepreneurial nationbuilding which Paul O'Neill and others are beginning to develop.

They should have access to DARPA and to all programs being developed for surveillance, intelligence, etc. They should seek Cebrowski's advice on network centric warfare applied to jungles,urban areas and insurgencies.

Colomybia is hard but not impossible.

If you designate a person to lead this I will be glad to advise Downing and them until they can bring you a report. This should be a small cell with full time or near full time focus and 90 to 120 days to report.

Snowflake



May 20, 2002 5:15 PM

Done 6/20

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chechnya and Urban Warfare

Russia

Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich. Do you think someone in your shop could take a look at this issue?

Attach.

Newt Gingrich e-mail to SecDef, "Chechnya, Urban Warfare and Guerilla Movements"
05/03/02

DHR:dh
052002-53

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

6/17

*RESPONSE
ATTACHED*

*v/r
Including package to forward
to Mr. Gingrich ^{6/18} Harry Di Rita*

30 May 02

U17196 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12477

June 13, 2002

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andrew W. Marshall

SUBJECT: Chechnya and Urban Warfare


Fundamentally, the answer to whether we are studying Chechnya is, "Yes." Russian experiences in Chechnya, as well as those of the Chechens, have been well documented. Several organizations, both in and outside the government, have taken steps to learn from the conflict.

I have included a small packet of information you may find useful to pass on to Mr. Gingrich. The below individuals may serve as good references for him should he seek additional information.

- Dr. Russell Glenn, RAND, (b)(6)
- Mr. Duane Schattle, DASD R&P, (b)(6)
- Mr. Dave Dilegge, Adroit Systems Inc., (b)(6)
- Mr. Lester Grau, FMSO Ft. Leavenworth, (b)(6)

An overview of the subject literature highlights the following salient items:

- * Urban warfare involves extremely complex terrain, spreading not only out and up, but also down – all of it well cluttered with obstacles and canalizing features.
- * Communications are extraordinarily difficult making command and control of forces problematic.
- * Targeting is complicated not only by the difficulty of finding the enemy in such complex terrain, but also by the desire to preserve the city's infrastructure as much as possible. This has implications for the tactics and munitions used.


A. W. Marshall

11-L-0559/OSD/12478

May 20, 2002 5:13 PM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crusader

470

The President is lined up solid on Crusader. We are working the inside piece.

Thanks for the e-mail.

DHR:dh
052002-52

30 May 02

U17197 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12479

May 20, 2002 5:11 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Crusader

470

Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich on canceling the Crusader.

Attach.

Newt Gingrich e-mail to SecDef, "Sect. White and the Crusader Decision" 05/03/02

DHR:dh
052002-51

.....
Please respond by _____

30 May 02

U17198 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12480

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

(Newt Gingrich)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Friday, May 03, 2002 8:02 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

MAY 20 2002

Subject: Crusader and white

for secdef depsecdef

Sect. White and the Crusader decision

Newt may 3,2002

If the decision is made to kill the Crusader it will be the key test of who runs the Pentagon.

As I have told both of you either redirecting it a la MacGregor or killing it is defensible. What really matters is that once you have decided you impose your will and win. If you win your power to change the building will go up. If you can be beaten on this first big change decision your power to run the building will shrink dramatically.

First, you need to get your own team in line. White is a civilian appointee. It is not his prerogative to fight his superiors. If he can't sign up for your decision and throw himself into implementing it he should resign. If he will not resign fire him immediately. It will convince the rest of the building you are deadly serious. You cannot allow him to snipe and gripe.

second, line up the president so secdef and omb can send a veto signal. If restoring Crusader is a choice between pleasing members of the Congress and pleasing secdef Congress will almost always choose to please its own members. If saving Crusader requires overriding a presidential veto it will be impossible.

You MUST win this fight once you start it.

May 20, 2002 5:08 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
Rich Haver

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hughes Briefing

337

Don't you think the Hughes briefing ought to be re-done to fit surprise, warning and the issues about their coming up now?

Let me know what you think and how we ought to go about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-50

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

20 May 02

U17199 02

**CONCEPT AND OUTLINE FOR THE
"RUMSFELD BRIEF"**

SECRET//NOFORN

MAY 24 2001

As a result of two meetings between Speaker Gingrich and Rich Haver the following concepts for a "Threat" briefing are recommended:

- A. Needs to be presented by someone like John Hughes (DIA), Cuban Missile Crisis spokesman to President Kennedy
- B. Title----Protecting America and her Allies in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Change, Alternative Title-----"Securing the Peace"
- C. Apply Newt's first law:
 - a. Listen
 - b. Learn
 - c. Help
 - d. Lead
- D. Need to fold in the 4 basics
 - a. Vision
 - b. Strategy
 - c. Projects (Operations to Military)
 - d. Tasks (Tactics to Military)
- E. Be all inclusive, don't worry about time, worry about boredom engagement the objective:
 - a. All Members of Congress
 - b. All Important Staff of Congress
 - c. Senior Interagency Players
 - d. Elite Media
 - e. Elite Citizens
 - f. International Audience
- F. Theme--- A presentation of facts about which we are uncertain--- "common facts not commonly shared about a common problem"
- G. Don't start until September, need time to make it great and dynamic always a "rough draft"

- H. Need a “briefer” and a “note taker,”
- I. We are OPEN to CHALLENGES and IMPROVEMENT! Make this a participatory meeting of people with shared concerns
- J. NSC-68? We are back to drafting the seminal document for the next 50 years, needs time to mature and unfold, consensus to build and appreciation of the common facts and good to develop THIS IS NOT 1977, IT IS 1947!
- K. Keep the Secretary behind the lines, maneuver room necessary, OSD isn't telling, OSD is asking and considering
- L. Have a 4 hour version ready to go to at anytime
- M. Want the settings to be intimate, structured and interactive
 - a. Common Facts the most important input
 - b. Common unknowns help consensus building
 - c. Give them unclassified materials to take away
 - d. Give them an e-mail site to come to with comments recommendations, questions
- N. Objective to create an on going dialogue and establish a common factual base for challenging our ideas and directions
- O. Participatory dialogue to reorient the national security concepts of the country for the next 50 years.
- P. Need murder boards to work this out in advance
- Q. Strong point on the why we don't know, denial and deception, must introduce and illustrate what we used to know and not know, what we face today
- R. Sequence the introduction with assertive conclusions. Secretary or his representatives will have to present conclusions in order to get the dialogue going, need people to argue with us.
- S. Can Hollywood help?

OUTLINE

- A. **Setting the Stage, Unpreparedness and isolationism are unacceptable (Introduction-----10 minutes)**
 - a. Examples of the positive results of American engagement and protection forward for ourselves and our allies
 - b. Partnership with Allies and common goals for peace and prosperity
 - c. What kind of world would it be if America was not strong, forward and engaged?

- B. **Why are we worried? (Heart of the message-----40 minutes)**
 - a. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Surprise
 - b. Expanding world market for the technology, materials, and knowledge
 - c. Missiles and other delivery means
 - d. Emerging Anti-Americanism an issue
 - e. We are battling indifference
 - f. Can't measure ourselves against one danger, must look at unpredictable multiple combinations
 - g. The issue of US resolve, causality tolerance, quotes from the other side about US resolve in the face of large losses
 - h. Stress the Scientific and Technical revolution. We are at the beginning, will be profound over the next 50 years.
 - i. The speed of change is accelerating. Strategic Surprise can happen faster and from more unexpected directions
 - j. Space matters, dependence high, protection low, vulnerable in multiple dimensions
 - k. Information Warfare message important, what is real?

- C. **Challenges that must be met for the United States to be secure in the 21ST century! (Challenges these worries present----10 minutes)**
 - a. Procurement
 - b. Basing
 - c. Research and Development
 - d. Counter R & D
 - e. Legislative oversight
 - f. Command and Control in a real time TV world
 - g. Systems for leading Alliances

- D. Change theme to conclude (The answers-----?? Minutes)
- a. Changes in Capabilities
 - b. Changes in Structure, Budget and Law
 - c. Creating effective waste avoiding Pentagon
 - d. Real change in Executive and Legislative leadership

snw/Re
4/20
1

May 20, 2002 5:06 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: General Montgomery

333

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on what General Montgomery did. Do you think we ought to try to get some folks to give us a briefing?

Thanks.

Attach.
Newt Gingrich, e-mail to SecDef, "Directed Telescope" 05/03/02

DHR:dh
052002-49

.....

Please respond by 06/14/02

Done
5/20
Larry Di Rita

30 May 02

U17200 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12487

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Friday, May 03, 2002 9:39 AM
To: (b)(6)@ed.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: directed telescope
for secdef,depsecdef
directed telescope
from newt may 4,2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 2 @ 2002

General Montgomery used a system of young officers to go to the front and report directly back to him. He called it his directed telescope. It strikes me that secdef ought to have about five Lt. cols. assigned to be traveling constantly and serving as eyes and ears. Each Lt. col. should have a senior non-com as a traveling companion so the non-com can be checking out enlisted reality while the officer talks with the officers about their realities.

Montgomery found it very helpful to have a sense of the complexity of the front or of a problem area (eg a depot that was jammed up and not shipping rapidly enough). The reports were both much faster than through the chain of command and had a vividness that could not be communicated in a structured environment.

As the officer-noncom teams learned what Montgomery was looking for they got better and better at keeping him briefed.

This is a system worth experimenting with if you do not already have it.

May 20, 2002 4:34 PM

TO: Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dick Garwin

000.5

Here is an article by Dick Garwin on bioterrorism. Have you thought about adding him to the Defense Science Board? I sure do like him. He is a serious, honest, straightforward, down-the-middle person.

Thanks.

Attach.

Garwin, Gomory and Meselson, "How to Fight Bioterrorism," *Washington Post*, 05/14/02

DHR:dh
052002-45

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

20 May 02

U17201 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12489

washingtonpost.com

How to Fight Bioterrorism

By Richard L. Garwin, Ralph E. Gomory and Matthew S. Meselson

Tuesday, May 14, 2002; Page A21

Government authorities have asked citizens to participate in the war on terrorism by being alert. Alertness does matter. The alertness of the flight crew of American Airline Flight 587 enabled it to see in the lighting of a match something more -- and the alertness and actions of passengers and crew then thwarted the terrorist attack and avoided the destruction of the aircraft and its passengers.

But many of us still wonder what concrete actions we can take as individuals to counter terrorism, or to make ourselves or our families safer. There is in fact much we can do to counter bioterrorism, in many ways the most daunting form of terrorism. Bioterrorism is human intervention to spread disease. Historically the usual role of humans has been to fight the spread of disease through clean water and personal hygiene, and to counter the disease once it enters humans with nutrition, antibiotics and vaccines. Now we see the deliberate transmission of anthrax through the U.S. mail, hardly its natural method of infection, and there are, unfortunately, many other possibilities. We can intervene to inhibit this man-aided spread of disease -- this time not by cleaning the water but by cleaning the air we breathe. Many pathogens, including anthrax and smallpox, can be spread through the air. However, these airborne pathogens can be removed by filtering the air, making the task of a bioterrorist more difficult and less rewarding.

This improved environment will be needed. Aside from the immediate terrorist threat from abroad, the rapid advance of knowledge about molecular biology is making it easier every year for very small extremist groups, whether from abroad or from the United States, to equip themselves with what are in fact biological weapons of mass destruction. We need to counter this threat. It is one that will not go away.

Beyond deterring bioterrorism, filtering air in buildings is likely to also produce a significant public health dividend, in reducing the spread of ordinary respiratory illness. Air filtering will pay an immediate health dividend and will make us, our families and our country more resistant to the unavoidable threat of bioterrorism.

There are several ways to filter air. All help, and all are complementary to the defenses erected by antibiotics and by vaccines. Antibiotics and vaccines act to strengthen the body's defenses against a pathogen that has already entered; air filtering acts to prevent pathogens from entering the body in the first place.

People worry, rightly, that the heating ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, found in most large buildings, could be exploited by terrorists to spread anthrax. But HVACs can also work the other way around. Equipped with proper filters, as they are today in hospital operating rooms and in semiconductor manufacturing plants, they can clean the air they circulate. What is required is to put the right filters into the HVAC system -- and this can usually be done at affordably low cost. The filtered system then becomes not a conduit for, but a defense against, bioterrorist attack.

Individual homes and offices can also be strengthened against airborne pathogens by making use of individual portable filter fans that can be bought and simply plugged in. These fans are widely used

today by people who have allergies and are made by many major manufacturers. Filter fans will clean the air even of particles considerably smaller than the usual airborne pathogens. These fans process air about 1,000 times faster than a person breathes it, so a free-floating particle in a closed-in area is much more likely to end up in the fan's filter than in a human lung. If the elderly anthrax victim from Connecticut, who died of airborne anthrax, had had a filter fan in her room, she might be alive today.

There are also possibilities beyond what is commercially available today. A product that would be easy to make and would be significant in bioterrorism defense of an individual home is an inward-facing window fan unit equipped with proper filters. This unit would clean the air that is pulled into a house and maintain positive pressure in the house so that air does not leak in.

Another commercially available option is simple masks. These are not elaborate "gas masks" but look more like a surgeon's mask or the masks worn in some Asian countries by people with colds. These masks can fold up and fit in your pocket. There are commercially available versions of these that are made of material that, like the filter fans, filter out pathogen-sized particles.

While filter fans and HVACs are always on and will filter out pathogens whether or not we know they are present, masks are different. You won't tend to have one on unless you know there is a problem. But it is likely that many bioterrorist attacks, ranging from the small-scale delivery of an anthrax parcel to a large-scale smallpox outbreak, will reveal themselves at some point. Then masks can play a vital role in self-protection and in limiting the spread of a contagious disease. And a simple mask can provide significant protection while opening mail.

Humans are intervening to spread disease; let us intervene to create an environment that makes the spread of disease through the air much more difficult. It can be done. Demand will spur both better products and the independent testing of what already exists. But much can be done with what is already available. Let us start now.

Richard L. Garwin is Philip D. Reed senior fellow for science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ralph E. Gomory has been president of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation since June 1989 and is a director of The Washington Post Co. Matthew S. Meselson is the Thomas Dudley Cabot professor of the natural sciences at Harvard.

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May 20, 2002 4:24 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Israel Compared with Iraq

ISRAEL

Here is some unclassified intel that shows the infant mortality rates in different countries. Israel is 8 per thousand; Iraq is 63.5 per thousand. Illiteracy rate: Israel is 4 percent; Iraq is 42 percent.

The GDP per capita in Israel is about \$16,000/year; in Iraq it is about \$2,000/year.

We ought to build a case on the comparison. There are other data we could use. It is worth weaving into some of our memos.

Thanks.

Attach.
Demographic Indicators for North Africa and the Middle East, 2002 (5-02)

DHR dh
052002-43

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

20 MAY 02

U17202 02

May 20, 2002 4:18 PM

TO: Denny Watson
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan Refugees

Afghanistan

I would like see if we can get some reasonably accurate, specific information as to what the refugee flow is in Afghanistan. I am referring to both refugees coming in from outside the country and also internally displaced persons.

I would like to get some real, hard granularity as to where people are coming from and where they are going. The reason I am asking is that it is a near perfect indication that people think it is better where they are going than where they have been.

I would also like to know if they are returning voluntarily and/or due to word of mouth, or are they being physically assisted by NGOs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-42

.....

Please respond by 06/07/02

20 May 02

U17203 02

5/21/02
1400
snowflake

May 20, 2002 2:21 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Holcomb and Cambone

Please set up an appointment for Staser Holcomb and Steve Cambone to see me on this Gen. Hayden memo.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/402 Holcomb response to SecDef re: Gen. Hayden

DHR:db
052002-31



Please respond by 05/31/02

Settelle 7/1
Done
Larry Di Rita
7/8

030 NSA

20 May 02

U17208 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12494

(b)(6)

May 3, 2002 5:52 PM

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Gen. Hayden

Please see me about Mike Hayden's tenure—how long he has been there and how long we think we want to extend him for.

Thanks.

DHR:ch
090302-31

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

SECDEF

We extended Hayden for one year... to 3-30-03. That will give him 4 years in the job.

He'd like to round out his tour in summer '03, at a minimum. This is for personal reasons.

I think he would be willing to serve until summer '04 if asked, but he's apprehensive about changes in the Intel world (the transformation we are considering) and what they might mean to a 3-star Agency director. If he thought he was in the race for DDI, he'd be happy. Rich Flavin thinks we should extend him for a year more (summer of '04)

Staser 5/15

May 20, 2002 4:11 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Global Hawk Briefing for Goss

452R

We need to get a briefing for Porter Goss on Global Hawk and what its role is. I need to see the briefing before that happens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-40



Please respond by 06/14/02

20 May 02

U17210 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12496

May 20, 2002 3:25 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Data on Congressional Contacts

032

By tonight I need the data on number of contacts with Congress, the number of people doing Congressional relations—I think it is 400—the number of reports we are currently sending, the number of phone calls, letters, hearings, etc.—all the data on interaction with Congress.

I am sick of this “not consulted” stuff. How many briefings have we done up on the Hill? How many CINC visits, how many Chief visits, how many senior civilian visits, how many times have I briefed the House and the Senate?

Let’s get all that stuff aggregated. This is nuts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-34



Please respond by _____

7/21

20 May 02

U17211 02

May 20, 2002 1:43 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
Rich Haver
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NSA

OOB NSA

A report on television over the weekend said the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence claims that the CIA, FBI and NSA are not responding "properly" to their requests.

I would like you to find out what they are talking about with respect to NSA and please tell me this week—by Tuesday evening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-26

.....
Please respond by 05/21/02

20 May 02

U17213 02

5:11 PM SHOWTIME
12:00

May 20, 2002 1:23 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland Security Council Meetings

334

I want to start seeing all of the invitations I get to go to the Homeland Security Council meetings, and then I want to decide whether I want to go. I want to see the agendas.

I have to get my arms around this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-22

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

7/1

Ok.

Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
718

20 May 02

U17214 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12499

May 20, 2002 1:22 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DSB Study on Crusader

Please get me the Defense Science Board study on Crusader that recommended it be canceled. Apparently, Armitage testified on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-21

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

334 DSB

20 May 02

U17215 02

721 showWare
100

May 20, 2002 12:57 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Board Appointments

SECRET WAS SEEN
MAY 21 2002

334

I don't want anyone appointed to the Policy or Defense Science Boards, DACOWITS or any of these boards without my okay. I don't want people to get too far down the line with them.

ok

Is Phil Merrill on the Defense Policy Board? I understand he may become head of the Ex-Im Bank. If so, we would have to take him off.

ok

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-18

.....
Please respond by 07/14/02

7/1

SecDef →

Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

7/11
7/9

20 May 02

Settled - Done - 7/14
Larry Di Rita
7/14

U17216 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12501

May 20, 2002 11:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gift Form

I want to re-do the gift form something like this.

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef Decision draft paper

DHR:dh
052002-16

.....

Please respond by 06/07/02

005

Dove

7/8

20 May 02

U17217 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12502

•
:
.

SecDef Decision

Submit to GSA

DoD retain for:

- Library donation
- DoD
- SecDef Office (label "DoD Property")

Retain for SecDef:

- To keep in office (label "SecDef Property")
- To take to Kalorama
- To take to Taos

Payment Required:

- To donor
- To U.S. Government

Make check payable to:

May 20, 2002 11:16 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting w/Abizaid

I want to see Gen. Abizaid and talk to him for 10 minutes.

Don't tell him the subject, but please give me this piece of paper in the folder for my meeting with him.

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef note

DHR:dh
052002-15

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

DCS-77 SD

20 May 02

U17218 02

~~Mc Freeman~~

~~Mc Neal~~

~~2 STAFF
OSMAD
Conway 5-7~~

~~Mc
Gen Marshall
Proprietor~~

~~7/24-8/15~~

~~Abezeid
on McKeen~~

May 20, 2002 10:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Contacts

032

We need a Congressional plan that is going to me in more contact with Senators and Congressmen. I think we need more breakfasts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-10

.....
Please respond by 06/07/02

Love

20 May 02

U17219 02

May 20, 2002 10:16 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Media Report

Do you know anything about this report that the NSC had a "covert military program" to aid "beleaguered anti-Taliban guerillas" in Afghanistan on September 10, ready for President Bush's approval?

I have never heard of this.

Thanks.

Attach.

Bob Drogin, "U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11," *Los Angeles Times*, 05/18/02

DHR:dh
052002-8

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

Afghanistan

20 May 02

U17220 02

stan, guiding in giant C-17 cargo planes within hours.

But it was the "terminal attack" skills of Decker and his fellow combat controllers -- there are only 400 in the entire U.S. military -- that distinguished them on the battlefield once the Special Forces A teams were inserted into Afghanistan.

As the war wore on, the weapon of choice became the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a 2,000-pound bomb that is guided to its target by signals from satellites.

The JDAM made its battlefield debut in Kosovo in 1999, providing all-weather precision capability for the first time. Unlike laser-guided bombs, a JDAM's guidance system is not impeded by cloud cover.

But without combat controllers and other Special Forces troops on the ground in Kosovo, most strike aircraft could only take off on combat missions with predetermined target coordinates.

The presence of Special Forces in Afghanistan made flexible targeting possible, officials said, greatly reducing the amount of time it took to identify and attack targets.

Instead of taking off with pre-programmed bombs, fighters and bombers flew into Afghanistan and were assigned to specific combat controllers on the ground, who gave them targets to attack.

"A JDAM allows you to target faster," said a combat controller named Jason, who did not want his last name used. "I can hit six different targets with six different JDAMs on one drop -- and it will totally shift the momentum of the battle."

Combat controllers must understand the capabilities of every jet in the sky and the blast radius of the different weapons they drop. In Air Force parlance, every bomb has a PI factor -- short for "personnel incapacitation."

For a 2,000-pound bomb, for example, controllers know that friendly forces must be 500 meters away to ensure their safety. A 2,000-pound bomb is so powerful that, even at 225 meters -- a distance greater than two football fields

-- the PI factor would be 10 percent, meaning that 10 percent of friendly forces would be incapacitated for at least five minutes.

Another combat controller, a 27-year-old staff sergeant named Mike, who also asked that his last name not be used, returned here from Afghanistan with a whole new appreciation for personnel incapacitation. He was 50 feet away from a JDAM detonation.

He had just called in an airstrike on Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners during a riot at the Qala-i-Jhangi prison outside Mazar-e Sharif in late November. But instead of entering the enemy's coordinates into the bomb, a pilot apparently punched in those of Mike and other friendly forces instead.

A Northern Alliance tank absorbed much of the impact. "I can't see anything, I can't hear anything, my whole body is in shock from the explosion," Mike said, describing how the blast propelled him 30 feet into the air. "Before I hit the ground, I thought, 'I'm probably dead right now.'"

Although the blast flipped the tank upside down and killed several Northern Alliance fighters inside, Mike survived, suffering only scratched corneas and perforated eardrums.

Not everyone was so fortunate. Tech. Sgt. John A. Chapman, a combat controller, was one of seven soldiers killed in early March when a helicopter inserting Special Forces troops during the U.S. offensive against al Qaeda in the Shahikot valley came under fire. Another was shot on the battlefield north of Kandahar in December and lost an arm.

Back in Special Forces training, Mike remembers the ribbing he took when he arrived at Fort Bragg, N.C., for Army jump training. "You show up as an Air Force controller and they say, 'What are you doing here?'" Mike recalled. "We've always been the guys in the middle of the mix, the guys no one really talks about -- until now."

Los Angeles Times
May 18, 2002

14. U.S. Had Plan For Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11

Military: The proposal was awaiting Bush's approval Sept. 10, White House says. Aid for Northern Alliance had been hammered out.

By Bob Drogin, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON -- Moving to stem the criticism of its actions leading up to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the White House said Friday that it was on the verge of approving a \$200-million covert military program to aid beleaguered anti-Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan last summer.

The proposal, developed after repeated CIA attempts to capture or kill Osama bin Laden had come to naught, was finalized Sept. 10 and was awaiting President Bush's approval when the suicide sky-jackers crashed commercial airliners into the Pentagon and World Trade Center.

Officials said the plan, known as a national security presidential directive, was viewed as an extension of secret CIA operations already underway in and around Afghanistan, rather than a first-time effort to attack Bin Laden. But the plan also reflected intense frustration among policymakers. The Clinton administration had tried both diplomacy and arms sanctions in an unsuccessful campaign to convince the Taliban ruling elite to surrender Bin Laden and his top lieutenants.

White House officials said Bush's senior national security team--including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice--had agreed at a Sept. 4 "principals committee" meeting to try another tack by backing Northern Alliance guerrillas.

The White House described the plan, parts of which were previously reported, as congressional critics stepped up their demands for an independent investigation into whether the Bush administra-

tion ignored clues that might have averted the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

The furor was sparked when news reports this week revealed that the CIA had advised Bush on Aug. 6 at his regular morning briefing that Al Qaeda might seek to hijack a commercial jet.

Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, said Friday that the title of the president's intelligence brief that day was "Bin Laden Determined to Strike the United States."

It was because of such threats, Fleischer said, that the proposed covert aid program was "a comprehensive, multi-front plan to dismantle the Al Qaeda."

He said it included directions for the Pentagon "to develop military options" as well as efforts to "dry up" the group's financial sources.

But other officials said the plan did not propose using U.S. airstrikes or American ground troops, which later played a crucial role in driving the Taliban from power.

Victoria Clarke, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said Central Command never received orders to move forces or military assets in preparation for a campaign in Afghanistan before Sept. 11. "It was not a Pentagon battle plan at all," she said.

The plan had special urgency, however, because U.S. intelligence agencies, as well as other governments' spy services, were picking up a crescendo of threats of possible terrorist strikes last summer.

"The chatter level went way off the charts," Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, recalled recently, "and had been for several months."

The CIA had opened a special unit at headquarters to track the Saudi terrorist after he moved to Afghanistan in 1996 and was able to intercept conversations on his American-made satellite phone until he changed phones, officials said.

In September 1998, a month after Al Qaeda operatives bombed two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the Clinton

administration fired 70 missiles at an Al Qaeda training camp in eastern Afghanistan.

The target was chosen, intelligence officials said, because an electronic intercept had indicated Bin Laden would be present. He wasn't.

Intelligence officials said the agency later began training and arming proxy forces in Pakistan, Uzbekistan and inside Afghanistan, hoping they would capture or kill Bin Laden. They didn't.

Other CIA operatives used remote-controlled Predator drone aircraft, then armed only with cameras, to search for Bin Laden. And covert teams of CIA paramilitary officers entered the country at least once in hopes of grabbing Bin Laden.

"We had people who had been in and out of Afghanistan," said a senior intelligence official.

In a recent speech, Jim Pavitt, head of the CIA clandestine service, said the agency's covert operations inside Afghanistan paved the way for last fall's rout of the Taliban.

"We knew who to approach on the ground, which operations, which warlord to support, what information to collect," he said. "Quite simply, we were there before the 11th of September."

Northern Alliance commanders, in particular, had pleaded for American support in meetings with the CIA and other officials. They sent emissaries armed with maps and other intelligence to Washington, and met U.S. diplomats in Europe and Central Asia.

But some U.S. policy planners warned that the ethnic minorities in the group, and the groups' political ambitions to rule in Afghanistan, could draw the United States into a new round of the factional fighting that had ravaged the country for a decade.

"The argument was it was politically untenable—that it could create a civil war," one official recalled of the debate within the State Department. "But there were other people who said, 'Who cares?'"

A State Department official in the Clinton administration said the proposal to arm

the Northern Alliance was discussed "the whole year of 2000," especially after the U.S. destroyer Cole was attacked by suicide bombers in a small boat in Yemen.

But no decision was made because President Clinton left office before the FBI concluded that it was Al Qaeda that attacked the Cole, the former official said.

Before its term ended, the Clinton administration successfully fought at the United Nations to impose an arms embargo on the Taliban, beating back moves to extend the ban to other armed groups in Afghanistan.

At the time, the Northern Alliance was getting assistance from Russia and Iran.

"We wanted to punish the Taliban, and we made it very specifically clear we were not going to cut off the Northern Alliance," the official said.

"The issue was how do you take out Al Qaeda?" he added. "Do you do the full mass invasion, which was really not an option prior to 9/11?"

"No one seriously considered that. The only other option ... was to support the Northern Alliance in varying degrees."

Times staff writers Esther Schrader and Josh Meyer contributed to this report.

Los Angeles Times
May 19, 2002
Pg. 11

15. Unmanned U.S. Spy Plane Crashes

By Associated Press

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — An unmanned U.S. spy plane crashed Saturday near a remote village in southern Pakistan, not far from a military base being used by American forces, U.S. and Pakistani officials said.

The Predator's wreckage was found near Karim Bakhsh, about 15 miles northeast of Jacobabad, and was being examined by U.S. soldiers, local police official Mohammed Mustafa said.

"The plane, which was on a routine surveillance mission, lost contact with the Jacobabad air base at 3:30 a.m.," he said.

In Washington, Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Michael Humm said the plane was returning from a mission when it crashed and that enemy fire was not involved.

The cause of the crash was under investigation, he said.

Washington Post
May 18, 2002
Pg. B3

16. Bush Taps Next Naval Academy Leader

The Pentagon announced yesterday that President Bush has officially nominated Rear Adm. Richard J. Naughton to become superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy.

Naughton, 55, a veteran fighter pilot, currently commands the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center in Fallon, Nev. He will take over at the Annapolis military college from Vice Adm. John R. Ryan, who is retiring after a four-year term.

Navy Secretary Gordon R. England recommended Naughton for the Annapolis posting last month.

Bush has also recommended that Naughton, a two-star admiral, be awarded a third star and elevated to vice admiral.

Raleigh News & Observer
May 19, 2002
Pg. 1

17. Eased Standards 'Fix' Osprey

As flight tests resume for the troubled tilt-rotor craft, the Navy has lowered its performance requirements.

By Joseph Neff, Staff Writer

The V-22 Osprey, the U.S. military's futuristic tilt-rotor aircraft, is about to return to the sky for test flights after being grounded for 17 months.

A pair of crashes in 2000 that killed 23 Marines and a record-doctoring scandal last year are history now, defense officials say.

"All of the problems with the program have been fixed," Navy Secretary Gordon R. England said in an interview with Pentagon reporters early this month.

The Navy fixed some of the problems, however, by rewriting key requirements -- in effect, by moving the goal posts. In addition, much remains unknown about what may be the Osprey's most dangerous flaw: a tendency to roll over when it enters an unstable aerodynamic condition called "vortex ring state."

"They've got a lot of work to do," said Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's chief weapons tester from 1994 to 2001. "I'm not against the Osprey, but I've never seen this much work required at this stage of an aircraft development."

Among the altered specifications are these:

*The Navy no longer requires that the V-22 be able to land safely in helicopter mode without power.

*Required protection from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has been eliminated.

*A requirement for "combat maneuvering" capability has been watered down.

*Reliability standards have been changed and lowered.

*A requirement that troops be able to exit the cabin door at low altitude via a rope or rope ladder has been eliminated.

Based at Marine Corps Air Station New River near Jacksonville, the Osprey is a revolutionary aircraft that takes off like a helicopter, then tilts its huge rotors forward and flies like an airplane. The Marines are counting on the Osprey to be their 21st-century transport aircraft. In airplane mode, it can fly farther and faster than the aging helicopters it is designed to replace.

The Osprey has been grounded since December 2000, shortly after four Marines were killed in a crash near Camp Lejeune. A crash earlier that year in Arizona killed 19 Marines.

The damage continued to pile up in 2001 when it was disclosed that a Marine officer had ordered the falsification of records to make the Osprey look more reliable.

The program has been plagued by skipped testing, cost overruns, missed deadlines and a pattern of not being

May 20, 2002 10:12 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ICC and U.S. Troops

015

I want to see a list of all the countries in the world, annotated to show those that have signed the ICC and ratified it, and annotated to show which countries we have troops in.

The point is, if we have that list, we can know immediately when I am meeting with someone, and we can decide if we want to initiate action to get the agreements we need for signatory countries where we have troops or where we might put them in.

I need to get a sense of that pretty soon. Please have someone pull that together.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-7

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

20 May 02

U17221 02

May 20, 2002 10:01 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Graphics for Testimony

Here is a chart that shows the Army funding projections. This might be a good chart to have up during testimony, because we can show that it isn't going to just happen. I think we ought to include the timeline also.

I also think we ought to include the other charts in the packet of materials that we pass out, so people will have hard copies in front of them and can see them—it would include the two we used before, the timeline, and the other IOC chart. I think this current Army investment chart is worth looking at also.

Thanks.

Attach.
Current Army Investment Plans

DHR:dh
052002-6

.....
Please respond by 05/20/02

Done
5/21

10:01

20 May 02

U17225 02

January 14, 2002 11:24 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NIC Assessment

Please take a look at this ballistic missile threat assessment and let me know what you think of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/2001 NIC Assessment: "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015"

DHR:dh
011402-32

.....
Please respond by 01/28/02

Sik-
See Attached.
JK

373.24

14 Jan 03

U17225 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/12512



SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 14 2002

Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Produced by the National Intelligence Council

11-L-0559/OSD/12513

December 2001

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate

**This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board under the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.**

*Prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic and Nuclear Programs. Inquiries may be directed to the NIO
through the Office of Public Affairs on (b)(6)*

Preface

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has requested that the Intelligence Community (IC) produce annual reports containing the latest intelligence on ballistic missile developments and threats and a discussion of nonmissile threat options. This paper is an unclassified summary of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that is the fourth annual report.

The NIE describes new missile developments and our projections of possible and likely ballistic missile threats to the United States, US interests overseas, and military forces or allies through 2015; updates assessments of theater ballistic missile forces worldwide; discusses the evolving proliferation environment; and provides a summary of forward-based threats and cruise missiles. We examine future ballistic missile capabilities of several countries that have ballistic missiles and ballistic missile development programs. Each country section includes a discussion of theater-range systems and current and projected long-range systems.

Our assessments of future missile developments are inexact and subjective because they are based on often fragmentary information. Many countries surround their ballistic missile programs with extensive secrecy and compartmentalization, and some employ deception. Although such key milestones as flight-testing are difficult to hide, we may miss others. To address these uncertainties, we assess both the earliest date that countries *could* test various missiles, based largely on engineering judgments made by experts inside and outside the Intelligence Community, on the technical capabilities and resources of the countries in question, and, in many cases, on continuing foreign assistance; and when countries would be *likely* to test such missiles, factoring into the above assessments potential delays caused by technical, political, or economic hurdles. We judge that countries are much less likely to test as early as the hypothetical “could” dates than they are by our projected “likely” dates.

In making these projections, we examine the level of success and the pace individual countries have experienced in their missile development efforts and consider foreign technology transfers, political motivations, military incentives, and economic resources. We have not attempted to address all of the potential political, economic, and social changes that could occur; we have projected missile developments between now and 2015 independent of *significant* political and economic changes. For example, some countries that currently have hostile or friendly intentions toward the United States could change significantly over the next fifteen years. As we prepare each annual report, we review strategic trends that could indicate such changes in order to make any necessary adjustments in our projections.

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|---|----|
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Key Judgments

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Most Intelligence Community agencies project that before 2015 the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly from Iraq—barring significant changes in their political orientations—in addition to the longstanding missile forces of Russia and China. One agency assesses that the United States is unlikely to face an ICBM threat from Iran before 2015.

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles already pose a significant threat overseas to US interests, military forces, and allies.

- **Emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the missile systems in their inventories—posing ever greater risks to US forces, interests, and allies throughout the world.**
- **Proliferation of ballistic missile-related technologies, materials, and expertise—especially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities—has enabled emerging missile states to accelerate missile development, acquire new capabilities, and potentially develop even more capable and longer range future systems.**

Unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015—with or without arms control.

- **Although Russia still maintains the most comprehensive ballistic missile force capable of reaching the United States, force structure decisions resulting from resource problems, program development failures, weapon system aging, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and arms control treaties have resulted in a steep decline in Russian strategic nuclear forces over the last 10 years.**

The Intelligence Community projects that Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015, but Beijing's future ICBM force deployed primarily against the United States—which will number around 75 to 100 warheads—will remain considerably smaller and less capable than the strategic missile forces of Russia and the United States.

- **China has three new, mobile strategic missiles in development—the road-mobile DF-31 ICBM; the longer range road-mobile DF-31 follow-on; and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).**
- **These programs date from the mid-1980s and are the basis of Beijing's efforts to field a modern, more survivable strategic deterrent to the United States and Russia.**

North Korea's multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which is capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized (several hundred kg) payload, may be ready for flight-testing.

- North Korea in May 2001, however, extended its voluntary moratorium on long-range missile flight-testing until 2003, provided that negotiations with the United States proceed.
- A Taepo Dong-2 test probably would be conducted in a space launch configuration, like the Taepo Dong-1 test in 1998.
- The North continues to develop missiles.

Iran is pursuing short- and long-range missile capabilities.

- Tehran has 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that could be launched in a conflict.
 - Iran is pursuing an ICBM/space launch vehicle (SLV) system. All agencies agree that Iran *could* attempt a launch in mid-decade, but Tehran is *likely* to take until the last half of the decade to flight test an ICBM/SLV; one agency further believes that Iran is unlikely to conduct a successful test until after 2015.

Iraq, constrained by international sanctions and prohibitions, wants a long-range missile and probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-variant missiles.

- If UN prohibitions were eliminated or significantly reduced, Iraq would be likely to spend several years reestablishing its short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force, developing and deploying solid-propellant systems, and pursuing MRBMs.
- All agencies agree that Iraq *could* test different ICBM concepts before 2015 if UN prohibitions were eliminated in the next few years. Most agencies, however, believe that it is *unlikely* to do so, even if the prohibitions were eliminated. Some believe that if prohibitions were eliminated Iraq would be *likely* to test an ICBM masked as an SLV before 2015, possibly before 2010 if it received foreign technology.

Several countries *could* develop a mechanism to launch SRBMs, MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles from forward-based ships or other platforms; a few are *likely* to do so—more likely for cruise missiles—before 2015.

Nonmissile means for delivering weapons of mass destruction do not provide the same prestige, deterrence, and coercive diplomacy as ICBMs; but they are less expensive, more reliable and accurate, more effective for disseminating biological warfare agents, can be used without attribution, and would avoid missile defenses.

Foreign nonstate actors—including terrorist, insurgent, or extremist groups that have threatened or have the ability to attack the United States or its interests—have expressed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials.

Discussion

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Introduction

The ballistic missile remains a central element in the military arsenals of nations around the globe and almost certainly will retain this status over the next fifteen years. States willingly devote often scarce resources in efforts to develop or acquire ballistic missiles; build the infrastructures necessary to sustain future development and production; and actively pursue technologies, materials, and personnel on the world market to compensate for domestic shortfalls, gain increased expertise, and potentially shorten development timelines.

Most US Intelligence Community agencies project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly Iraq—barring significant changes in their political orientations—in addition to the strategic forces of Russia and China. One agency assesses that the United States is unlikely to face an ICBM threat from Iran before 2015.

The threats to the US homeland, nevertheless, will consist of dramatically fewer warheads than today owing to significant reductions in Russian strategic forces. China has been modernizing its long-range strategic missile force since the mid-1980s, shifting from reliance primarily on silo-based liquid-propellant CSS-4s to mobile solid-propellant systems. The Intelligence Community projects that by

2015, the total number of Chinese strategic warheads will rise several-fold, though it will remain still well below the number of Russian or US forces.

North Korea has extended until 2003 the missile launch moratorium it announced late in 1999, although the North continues to work on the Taepo Dong-2 program. The Taepo Dong-2—capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload—may be ready for flight-testing. The initial test likely would be conducted in a space launch configuration. Iran also is pursuing a longer range missile capability.

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly if armed with WMD, already pose a significant threat overseas to US interests, military forces, and allies. Moreover, the proliferation of missile technology and components continues, contributing both to the production of SRBMs and MRBMs and to the development of even longer range systems.

The trend in ballistic missile development worldwide is toward a maturation process among existing ballistic missile programs rather than toward a large increase in the number of countries possessing ballistic missiles. Emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the missile systems in their inventories—posing ever greater risks to US forces, interests, and allies throughout the world. A decade ago, US and allied forces abroad faced threats from SRBMs—primarily the Scud and its variants. Today, countries have deployed or are on the verge of deploying MRBMs, placing greater numbers of targets at risk.

Proliferation of ballistic missile-related technologies, materials, and expertise—especially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities—has enabled emerging missile states to accelerate the development timelines for their existing programs, acquire turnkey systems to gain previously non-existent capabilities—in the case of the Chinese sale of the M-11 SRBM to Pakistan—and lay the groundwork for the expansion of domestic infrastructures to potentially accommodate even more capable and longer range future systems.

North Korea has assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing technology source for many programs. North Korean willingness to sell complete systems and components has enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than otherwise would have been possible—notably the sale of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The North also has helped countries to acquire technologies to serve as

the basis for domestic development efforts—as with Iran’s reverse-engineering of the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile technology.

States with emerging missile programs inevitably will run into problems that will delay and frustrate their desired development timelines. The impact of these problems increases with the lack of maturity of the program and depends on the level of foreign assistance. Most emerging missile states are highly dependent on foreign assistance at this stage of their development efforts, and disturbance of the technology and information flow to their programs will have discernible short-term effects. The ready availability of assistance from multiple sources, however, makes it likely that most emerging missile states will be able to resolve such problems and advance their missile programs, albeit with a slippage in development time.

Projecting When a Country *Could* and *Is Likely* To Test an ICBM

Expertise from inside and outside the Intelligence Community was used to examine many possible options for ICBM development and to determine when a country *could* test each option, based largely on technical, industrial, and economic capabilities. These judgments indicate when countries would be capable of testing if they met certain conditions, such as beginning engine testing by a certain date. This formulation also addresses what a country may be capable of achieving if a decision were made to try to field a missile as rapidly as possible and if the program progressed without significant delays. Other factors—including potential technical problems, motivations and intentions, and political and economic delays—then were applied to assess the likely timing of the country testing an ICBM. These judgments provide the Intelligence Community assessments of the most *likely* course of events based on a variety of factors.

Providing assessments of when a country *could* and *is likely* to test an ICBM takes into account uncertainties and cases where a solid evidentiary base is not available for making more definitive assessments. The availability of foreign assistance is frequently a critical driver in both formulations, and is so noted, especially when foreign assistance accelerates the program dramatically. These assessments of future missile developments are, by their nature, subjective. This Estimate examines the level of success and the pace individual countries have experienced in their missile development efforts and considers foreign technology transfers, political motivations, military incentives, and economic resources. But it does not attempt to address *all* of the potential political, economic, and social changes that could occur; it projects missile developments between now and 2015 independent of *significant* political and economic changes. As each annual report is prepared, we review strategic trends that could indicate such changes and make necessary adjustments to the projections.

The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against *US forces or interests* is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature. More nations have ballistic missiles,¹ and they have already been used against US and allied forces during the Gulf war. Although the missiles used in the Gulf war did not have WMD warheads, Iraq had weaponized ballistic missile warheads with BW and CW agents and they were available for use.

Some of the states armed with missiles have exhibited a willingness to use chemical weapons with other delivery means. In addition, some nonstate entities are seeking chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and would be willing to use them without missiles. In fact, US territory is more likely to be attacked with these materials from nonmissile delivery means—most likely from terrorists—than by missiles, primarily because nonmissile delivery means are less costly, easier to acquire, and more reliable and accurate. They also can be used without attribution. Nevertheless, the missile threat will continue to grow, in part because missiles have become important regional weapons in the arsenals of numerous countries. Moreover, missiles provide a level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that nonmissile means do not.

Russia

Russia maintains the most comprehensive ballistic missile force capable of reaching the United States, although force structure decisions resulting from resource problems,

¹ Although during the Cold War many Warsaw Pact nations had ballistic missile units, a decision to use these missiles would have been made by the USSR—not independently by the Warsaw Pact nations.

program development failures, weapon system aging, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and arms control treaties have resulted in a steep decline in Russian strategic nuclear forces over the last 10 years. From a high of approximately 10,000 warheads in 1990, Russia now maintains almost 4,000 warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs.

- Russia currently has about 700 ICBMs with 3,000 warheads and a dozen SSBNs² equipped with 200 launchers for SLBMs that can carry 900 warheads.
- In the current day-to-day operational environment—with all procedural and technical safeguards in place—an unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian strategic missile is highly unlikely.

Strategic Missile Forces

ICBMs. Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) is extending the service lives of its older ICBMs—silo-based SS-18s and SS-19s, and road-mobile SS-25s—in part to compensate for the slow deployment of its newest ICBM, the SS-27.

Russia's ICBMs and US Missile Defense

Concerns over the US Missile Defense (MD) program have led several high-ranking Russian political, military, and industry officials to openly discuss military countermeasures to the system. The SS-27—developed in the 1980s as a response to the Strategic Defense Initiative—probably is the basis for Russia's most credible responses to MD.

SLBMs. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, developmental problems, and resource constraints have resulted in significant

² SSBN is the acronym for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

SSBN/SLBM program delays and the requirement to simultaneously extend the service lives of older systems while maintaining newer, more capable systems.

The Intelligence Community has various projections of Russia's strategic forces for 2015, all less than 2,000 deployed nuclear weapons. The availability of resources, inclusion of missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and the success of development programs are the key factors in determining the ultimate force size.

Theater Ballistic Missile Force

Russia has the most technologically evolved and best-equipped, maintained, and trained theater ballistic missile force in the world today. The SS-21 and SS-26 SRBMs provide Russian general-purpose ground forces with a rapid, precision-guided, theater deep-strike capability.

China

Strategic Missile Forces

China's current ICBM force consists of large, liquid-propellant missiles armed with single nuclear warheads. Of these ICBMs, about 20 are CSS-4 silo-based missiles that can reach targets in the United States. The Chinese also have about a dozen CSS-3 ICBMs that are almost certainly intended as a retaliatory deterrent against targets in Russia and Asia. China also has a medium-range SLBM (the CSS-NX-3/JL-1).

Beijing is concerned about the survivability of its strategic deterrent against the United States and has a long-running modernization program to develop mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs. The IC projects that by 2015, most of China's strategic missile force will be mobile.

China has three new, mobile, solid-propellant strategic missiles in development—the road-mobile CSS-X-10 ICBM (also called the DF-31), which is now in the flight-test stage; a longer range version of the DF-31; and the JL-2 SLBM. This modernization effort, which dates from the mid-1980s, forms the foundation of Beijing's efforts to field a modern, mobile, and more survivable strategic missile force.

- China could begin deploying the DF-31 ICBM during the first half of the decade.
- Beijing could begin deploying the DF-31 follow-on ICBM and JL-2 SLBM in the last half of the decade.

China has had the capability to develop and deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system³ for many years, including a MIRV system. The IC assesses that China could develop a multiple RV system for the CSS-4 ICBM in a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its *mobile* ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles and would be costly.

The IC has differing projections of the overall size of Chinese strategic ballistic missile forces over the next 15 years, ranging from about 75 to 100 warheads deployed primarily against the United States. MIRVing and missile defense counter-measures would be factors in the ultimate size of the force. In addition, China would have about two dozen shorter range DF-31 and CSS-3 ICBMs that could reach parts of the United States.

Theater Ballistic Missile Force

China maintains a robust CSS-5 MRBM force and continues to increase the capabilities of its SRBM force deployed opposite Taiwan.

³ Multiple reentry vehicle payload systems include those that independently target each RV in the system (MIRVs) and those that do not provide independent targeting for each RV (MRV).

Conventionally Armed Ballistic Missiles

China's leaders calculate that conventionally armed ballistic missiles add a potent new dimension to Chinese military capabilities, and they are committed to continue fielding them at a rapid pace. Beijing's growing SRBM force provides China with a military capability that avoids the political and practical constraints associated with the use of nuclear-armed missiles. The latest Chinese SRBMs provide a survivable and effective conventional strike force and expand conventional ballistic missile coverage.

The IC projects an SRBM force in 2005 of several hundred missiles.

North Korea

North Korea has hundreds of Scuds and No Dong missiles and continues to develop the longer range Taepo Dong-2, which will enable the North to target the United States. In May 2001, however, Kim Chong-il unilaterally extended the North's voluntary flight-test moratorium—in effect since 1999—until 2003, provided negotiations with the United States proceeded.

Ballistic Missile Programs

Taepo Dong-2. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2—capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload—may be ready for flight-testing. The North probably also is working on improvements to its current design. The Taepo Dong-2 in a two-stage ballistic missile configuration could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 10,000 km—sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental United States. If the North uses a third stage similar to the one used on the Taepo Dong-1 in 1998 in a

ballistic missile configuration, then the Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 15,000 km—sufficient to strike all of North America. A Taepo Dong-2 flight test probably would be conducted as an SLV with a third stage to place a small payload into the same orbit the North Koreans tried to achieve in 1998.

No Dong. The 1,300-km-range No Dong remains the longest-range ballistic missile North Korea has deployed.

WMD Payload Options

The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons, although the North has frozen plutonium production activities at Yongbyon in accordance with the Agreed Framework of 1994. North Korea also has chemical and biological weapons programs.

Foreign Assistance

North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles and has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts.

Iran

Iran's missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 MRBMs, a few hundred SRBMs, and a variety of unguided rockets. Tehran's longstanding commitment to its ballistic missile programs—for deterrence and war-fighting—is unlikely to diminish.

Ballistic Missile Programs

Shahab-3. The 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 MRBM—based on the North Korean No Dong—is in the late stages of development. **ICBMs/SLVs.** In addition to SRBM and MRBM development, Iran is likely to develop space launch vehicles to put satellites into orbit and to establish the technical base from which it could develop IRBMs/ICBMs capable of delivering payloads to Western Europe and the United States. Iran is likely to test these vehicles initially as SLVs and not as ballistic missiles to demonstrate an inherent IRBM/ICBM capability without risking the potential political and economic costs of a long-range missile test. Iran certainly is aware of the North Korean SLV/missile program and the benefits P'yongyang has tried to gain from the inherent ICBM capability posed by the Taepo Dong-1 and -2.

- All agencies agree that Iran *could* attempt to launch an ICBM/SLV about mid-decade, although most agencies believe Iran is *likely* to take until the last half of the decade to do so. One agency further judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve a successful test of an ICBM before 2015.
- Iranian acquisition of complete systems or major subsystems—such as North Korean TD-2 or Russian engines—could accelerate its capability to flight-test an ICBM/SLV.
 - If Iran were to acquire complete TD-2 systems from North Korea, it could conduct a flight test within a year of delivery, allowing time to construct a launch facility. Iran is unlikely to acquire complete ICBM/SLV systems from Russia.
 - In contrast, a halt or substantial decrease in assistance would delay

by years the development and flight-testing of these systems.

WMD Payload Options

The Intelligence Community judges that Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapon. Most agencies assess that Tehran could have one by the end of the decade, although one agency judges it will take longer. All agree that Iran could reduce this time frame by several years with foreign assistance. Iran has biological and chemical weapons programs.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance—particularly from Russia, China, and North Korea—will remain crucial to the success of the Iranian missile program for the duration of this Estimate.

Iraq

Baghdad's goal of becoming the predominant regional power and its hostile relations with many of its neighbors are the key drivers behind Iraq's ballistic missile program. Iraq has been able to maintain the infrastructure and expertise necessary to develop missiles, and the IC believes it has retained a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles, launchers, and Scud-specific production equipment and support apparatus. For the next several years at least, Iraq's ballistic missile initiatives probably will focus on reconstituting its pre-Gulf war capabilities to threaten regional targets and probably will not advance beyond MRBM systems.

Ballistic Missile Programs

Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq had several programs to extend the range of the Scud SRBM and became experienced working with liquid-propellant technology. Since the Gulf war, despite UN resolutions limiting the range of Iraq's missiles to 150 km, Baghdad has been able to maintain the infrastructure and

expertise necessary to develop longer range missile systems.

- A military parade in December 2000 showcased Al Samoud missiles on new transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). The liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably will be deployed soon.
- The IC assesses that Iraq retains a small covert force of Scud-variant missiles, launchers, and conventional, chemical, and biological warheads.

We cannot project with confidence how long UN-related sanctions and prohibitions will remain in place. They plausibly will constrain Iraq during the entire period of this Estimate. Scenarios that would weaken the prohibitions several years from now also are conceivable, allowing Iraq to reconstitute its missile infrastructure and begin developing long-range missiles before the end of the decade. The discussion that follows addresses developments that *could* and are *likely* to occur should UN prohibitions be significantly weakened in the future.

Iraq is likely to use its experience with Scud technology to resume production of the pre-Gulf war 650-km-range Al Hussein, the 900-km-range Al Abbas, or other Scud variants, and it could explore clustering and staging options to reach more distant targets. Iraq *could* resume Scud-variant production—with foreign assistance—quickly after UN prohibitions ended.

- With substantial foreign assistance, Baghdad *could* flight-test a domestic MRBM by mid-decade. This possibility presumes rapid erosion of UN prohibitions and Baghdad's willingness to risk detection of developmental steps, such as static engine testing, earlier. An MRBM flight test is *likely* by 2010. An imported MRBM *could* be flight-tested within months of acquisition.

For the first several years after relief from UN prohibitions, Iraq probably will strive to reestablish its SRBM inventory to pre-Gulf war numbers, continue developing and deploying solid-propellant systems, and pursue MRBMs to keep pace with its neighbors. Once its regional security concerns are being addressed, Iraq may pursue a first-generation ICBM/SLV.

Although Iraq *could* attempt before 2015 to test a rudimentary long-range missile based on its failed Al-Abid SLV, such a missile almost certainly would fail. Iraq is unlikely to make such an attempt. After observing North Korean missile developments the past few years, Iraq would be more likely to pursue a three-stage TD-2 approach to an SLV or ICBM, which would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon-sized payload to the United States. Some postulations for potential Iraqi ICBM/SLV concepts and timelines from the beginning of UN prohibition relief include:

- If Iraq could buy a TD-2 from North Korea, it *could* have a launch capability within a year or two of a purchase.
- It *could* develop and test a TD-1-type system within a few years.
- If it acquired No Dong's from North Korea, it *could* test an ICBM within a few years of acquisition by clustering and staging the No Dong's—similar to the clustering of Scuds for the Al Abid SLV.
- If Iraq bought TD-2 engines, it *could* test an ICBM within about five years of the acquisition.
- Iraq *could* develop and test a Taepo Dong-2-type system within about ten years of a decision to do so.

Most agencies believe that Iraq is *unlikely* to test before 2015 any ICBMs that would threaten the United States, even if UN prohibitions were eliminated or significantly

reduced in the next few years. Some believe that if prohibitions were eliminated in the next few years, Iraq would be *likely* to test an ICBM probably masked as an SLV before 2015, possibly before 2010. In this view, foreign assistance would affect the timing and the capability of the missile.

WMD Payload Options

Baghdad had a crash program to develop a nuclear weapon for missile delivery in 1990, but coalition bombing and IAEA and UNSCOM activities significantly set back the effort. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iraq, unconstrained, would take several years to produce enough fissile material to make a weapon. Iraq has admitted to having biological and chemical weapons programs before the Gulf war and maintains those programs.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance is key to Iraqi efforts to develop quickly longer range missiles. Iraq relied on extensive foreign assistance before the Gulf war and will continue to seek foreign assistance to expand its current capabilities.

Libya

Ballistic Missile Programs

The imposition of UN sanctions has impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its longer range missile programs. Nevertheless, even if Libya were to obtain a No Dong-class MRBM, Tripoli would be likely to continue to try for longer range systems to increase the number of US and NATO targets it can hold at risk. If a missile were offered with range sufficient to strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe, Libya would try to obtain it.

Libya lacks the infrastructure required to develop by 2015 a ballistic missile system

with sufficient range to target US territory. Libya's paths to obtaining an ICBM during the time frame of this Estimate probably would be to purchase a complete missile system or to set up a foreign assistance arrangement where foreign scientists and technicians design, develop, and produce a missile and the necessary infrastructure in Libya.

WMD Payload Options

Libya has biological and chemical weapons programs. Libya would need significant foreign assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, but Tripoli's nuclear infrastructure enhancements remain of concern.

Foreign Assistance

Libya's missile program depends on foreign support, without which the program eventually would grind to a halt.

Syria

Missile Programs

Syria maintains a ballistic missile and rocket force of hundreds of FROG rockets, Scuds, and SS-21 SRBMs. With considerable foreign assistance, Syria progressed to Scud production using primarily locally manufactured parts.

Syrian regional concerns may lead Damascus to seek a longer range ballistic missile capability such as North Korea's No Dong MRBM. The IC judges that Syria does not now have and is unlikely to gain an interest in an ICBM capability during the time frame of this Estimate.

WMD Payload Options

Syria has developed CW warheads for its Scuds and has an offensive BW program. The IC remains concerned about Syria's intentions regarding nuclear weapons.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance is critical to Syrian efforts to improve its production capabilities and to gain access to export-controlled components and technology.

India

New Delhi believes that a nuclear-capable missile delivery option is necessary to deter Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and thereby preserve the option to wage limited conventional war in response to Pakistani provocations in Kashmir or elsewhere. Nuclear weapons also serve as a hedge against a confrontation with China. New Delhi views the development, not just the possession, of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles as the symbols of a world power and an important component of self-reliance.

Missile Programs

Growing experience and an expanding infrastructure are providing India the means to accelerate both development and production of new systems. New Delhi is making progress toward its aim of achieving self-sufficiency for its missile programs, but it continues to rely on foreign assistance.

Converting the Indian SLV into an ICBM?

Rumors persist concerning Indian plans for an ICBM program, referred to in open sources as the Surya. Some Indian defense writers argue that possession of an ICBM is a key symbol in India's quest for recognition as a world power and useful in preventing diplomatic bullying by the United States. Most components needed for an ICBM are available from India's indigenous space program. India could convert its polar space launch vehicle into an ICBM within a year or two of a decision to do so.

- The 150-km-range Prithvi I SRBM continues to be India's only deployed ballistic missile.
- The Prithvi II SRBM is a modified Prithvi I with an increased range of 250 km.
- The Agni series, which probably will be deployed during this decade, will be the mainstay of India's nuclear-armed missile force.
- The Sagarika SLBM probably will not be deployed until 2010 or later.

Foreign Assistance

India continues to push toward self-sufficiency, especially in regard to its missile programs. Nevertheless, New Delhi still relies heavily on foreign assistance.

Pakistan

Pakistan sees missile-delivered nuclear weapons as a vital deterrent to India's much larger conventional forces, and as a necessary counter to India's nuclear program. Pakistan pursued a nuclear capability more for strategic reasons than for international prestige.

Ballistic Missile Programs

Since the 1980s, Pakistan has pursued development of an indigenous ballistic missile capacity in an attempt to avoid reliance on any foreign entity for this key capability. Islamabad will continue with its present ballistic missile production goals until it has achieved a survivable, flexible force capable of striking a large number of targets throughout most of India. Pakistan's missiles include:

- The short-range Hatf I, which Pakistan also is attempting to market, as it is relatively inexpensive and easy-to-operate.

- M-11 missiles that Pakistan acquired from China in the 1990s. (The M-11 SRBM—called the Hatf III in Pakistan—is a single-stage, solid-propellant missile capable of carrying a payload at least 300 km.)
- Ghauri/No Dong MRBMs that Pakistan acquired from North Korea.
- The Shaheen I, a Pakistani-produced single-stage, solid-propellant SRBM.
- The Shaheen II, a road-mobile two-stage solid-propellant MRBM that Pakistan is developing. (Based on several mockups publicly displayed in Pakistan, the Shaheen II probably would be able to carry a 1,000-kg payload to a range of about 2,500 kilometers.)

Foreign Assistance

Foreign support for Pakistan's ambitious solid-propellant ballistic missile acquisition and development program has been critical.

Forward-Based Missile Threats to the United States

Several countries are technically capable of developing a missile launch mechanism to use from forward-based ships or other platforms to launch SRBMs and MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) against the United States. Some of these are likely to develop and deploy forward-based systems—more likely cruise missiles—during the period of this Estimate. Nevertheless, long-distance strikes against the United States probably would be operationally difficult. Other methods would be less complicated—CBRN terrorism, for example.

Ballistic Missile Threats

An SRBM or MRBM could be launched at the United States from a forward-based sea

platform within a few hundred kilometers of US territory. Using such a sea platform would not pose major technical problems, but the accuracy of the missile probably would be reduced significantly because of the movement of the ocean. Still, the accuracy probably would be better than for some of the ICBMs discussed in this Estimate. The simplest method for launching a shipborne ballistic missile would be to secure a TEL onboard the ship and launch the missile from the TEL. Somewhat greater accuracy could be obtained by placing the TEL on a stabilization platform to compensate for wave movement. Another option would be to add satellite-aided (GPS or GLONASS) navigation to the missile.

The Land-Attack Cruise Missile Threat

One to two dozen countries probably will possess a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) capability by 2015 via indigenous development, acquisition, or modification of such other systems as antiship cruise missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles. Most LACMs will have a range of a few hundred km—posing primarily a theater-level threat—but with sufficient range to be forward-deployed on air- or sea-launch platforms.

Cruise Missile Threats

From a technical standpoint, cruise missiles are a better alternative than ballistic missiles in launching from forward areas. Many countries would therefore see these missiles as advantageous in attacking the United States. The most plausible alternative for a forward-based launch would be a covertly equipped commercial vessel.

Technically, cruise missiles can be launched from fighter, bomber, or even commercial transport aircraft outside US airspace. Both the perceived US capability to detect and track threats approaching the coast, and the

limited range of most foreign fighter and bomber aircraft, however, tend to mitigate such a threat. Modifying a commercial aircraft to become a cruise missile platform would entail significant aerodynamic, structural, electrical, and possibly flight control system modifications. Cruise missile launches from a submarine would have the advantage of being relatively covert. The technical sophistication required to design or to modify a cruise missile for launch from torpedo or missile tubes, however, almost certainly would require detailed assistance from the defense industry of a major naval power.

Nonmissile WMD Threats to the United States

Nonmissile means of delivering weapons of mass destruction do not provide the same prestige or degree of deterrence and coercive diplomacy associated with ICBMs. Nevertheless, concern remains about options for delivering WMD to the United States without missiles by state and nonstate actors. Ships, trucks, airplanes, and other means may be used. In fact, the Intelligence Community judges that US territory is more likely to be attacked with WMD using nonmissile means, primarily because such means:

- Are less expensive than developing and producing ICBMs.
- Can be covertly developed and employed; the source of the weapon could be masked in an attempt to evade retaliation.
- Probably would be more reliable than ICBMs that have not completed rigorous testing and validation programs.
- Probably would be much more accurate than emerging ICBMs over the next 15 years.

- Probably would be more effective for disseminating biological warfare agent than a ballistic missile.
- Would avoid missile defenses.

Terrorist Interest in CBRN

Foreign nonstate actors—including terrorist, insurgent, or extremist groups—have used, possessed, or expressed an interest in CBRN materials. Most of these groups have threatened the United States, and all of them have the ability to attack the United States or its interests. The events of September 11 and its aftermath have caused the Intelligence Community to focus significantly more resources on the threat from terrorism, and we are obtaining more information on potential terrorist actions.

May 20, 2002 9:34 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainees

383.6

Should we be thinking about asking countries to take their detainees, if we don't want them, rather than asking them if they would like them?

It seems to me our goal is to reduce our numbers, and it is worth thinking about shifting the burden.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-4



Please respond by 06/07/02

30 May 02

U17226 02

May 20, 2002 12:01 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
Gen. Pace
Larry Di Rita
Tony Dolan

OCG.5

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Early Warning

Here is an article from 1985 that extracted some remarks from a speech I gave that year to the annual convention of the Association of the U.S. Army

Attach.

Donald Rumsfeld, "Increasingly, Terrorism Is the Work of Countries, not Individuals," *Newport News Pilot*, 04/06/85

DHR:dh
052002-1



Please respond by _____

30 May 02

U17228 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12531

Donald Rumsfeld

allR
I knew you'd been saying these things for some time; but I was surprised today to find words I've heard over the past year come at me from this April 8, 1985 clip. f clip
fascinating
NP 5-15-02

Increasingly, terrorism is the work of countries, not individuals

Recently, I was reminded of Winston Churchill's phrase, "the unnecessary war," when I read an article in *The Wall Street Journal* whose author wondered whether those born after World War II really see clearly that it need not have happened had so many in Poland and France and Britain not ignored the gathering storm and in America had more realized that two great oceans had become ponds.

Those who prayed for peace were not more or less moral, nor were those who marched in America to protest the horrors of war. But war came because weakness invited it.

Those in Europe who laid down their arms, or had none, had peace. But it was the peace of occupation and subjugation. And when war came, the blame rightly fell on those in authority who had not maintained their strength and their freedom. There were debates; some said prepare; others said, no, it would be provocative.

I see a reason for encouragement in the United States and elsewhere. For despite the cries to cut the budget and for neutrality, there's a growing resistance to the idea that any human condition is acceptable as long as it includes peace.

The types of possible conflict

in the world today range from terrorism through guerrilla war, conventional to nuclear. A great deal of thinking is given to the risks at the nuclear end of the spectrum as opposed to the probabilities at the lower end of the spectrum. But certainly the reality of terrorism and its urgency today are clear.

Increasingly, terrorism is not random nor the work of isolated men. Rather, it is state-sponsored by nations using it as a central element of their foreign policy. In short, terrorism has a home. Terrorism is nothing more or less than the sustained, clandestine use of force to achieve political purposes. It is a

great equalizer, a force multiplier. It's cheap, deniable, yields results, low risk, and, thus far, generally without penalty.

And terrorism works. A single attack sponsored by a small, weak nation, by influencing public opinion and morale can alter the behavior of great nations or force tribute from wealthy nations. Unchecked state-sponsored terrorism is creating a change in the balance of power.

While security is important, terrorist attacks can take place at any time, in any place, using any technique and regrettably, it's not possible to defend against every target in every

place at every time against every form of attack.

Defense has its limits and its costs. Terrorism is a form of warfare and it must be treated as such. As with other forms of conflict, weakness invites aggression. Simply standing in a defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. Terrorism must be deterred. As is clear, the principal targets of terrorism are the values and the interest of democratic nations.

As Middle East envoy, one rubs up against that problem each day. Several facts about terrorism have been dramatically brought home in recent years. First, as Lenin wrote, with characteristic terseness, "the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize." There are ways to deter terrorism, not to stop all terrorism or to eliminate all casualties, for casualties will continue at some level, but to at least deter the growth of terrorism, and we as a country had best get about it.

Today there are two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union is a superpower not because of the persuasiveness of its political ideology — certainly not because of the dynamism of its economy. It's a superpower purely and simply because of ships, guns, tanks, planes, missiles, raw military power, and

the options and opportunities they provide.

There's a danger in becoming fascinated with the nuances, the subtleties, and the intricacies of foreign policy and diplomacy and in focusing on them, ignoring that they either are underpinned with power or they are not. To the extent they are not, sovereignty is at the sufferance of others.

Today the Soviet Union is in a vastly different circumstance than was the case during the Cuban missile crisis. As a result, we must conduct ourselves as a country in a manner that reflects the reality that we don't have an excess of power today.

Our goal cannot simply be to manage a crisis or conflict brilliantly, not with the power and reach of weapons today. The goal must be to manage ourselves in a way that crises are less likely to occur. Given the narrower margin for error and the long lead times involved, we have to behave with a farsight-

edness and good sense and be willing to invest before the fact so that we assure our ability to contribute to peace and stability in the 1980s and the 1990s.

Extracted from remarks by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the annual convention of the Association of the United States Army.

11-L-0559/OSD/12532

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1300

May 17, 2002 4:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Anthrax

720

What are we going to do about Hutchison and anthrax?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-21

.....
Please respond by 05/20/02

*Settle
Completed
5/21*

*5/20
Dep Sec is meeting him
Tuesday, 5/21 If it
works, you may join.
May be on Hill (at Senator
Hutchinson's request) and
not do-able for you.
D. Rita*

17 May 02

Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/12533

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