

## FY03-07 DPG Studies and Reporting Requirements

<b>Study or Plan Title</b>	<b>DPG Page</b>	<b>Final Report</b>	<b>Lead</b>	<b>Coordination</b>	<b>Status</b>
Station an IBCT in Europe by 2007	9	Mar-02	Secretary of the Army	Briefing to SEC 12 March	
"At Sea" Reloading of Land Attack Cruise Missiles	10	Mar-02	Secretary of the Navy		In work
"Horizon" Concept of Crew Rotation	10	Mar-02	Secretary of the Navy		In work
Comprehensive Readiness Reporting System	10	Mar-02	USD (P&R)	Secretaries of Military Depts., CJCS	In work
Feasibility of a Littoral Warfare Training Center	10	Mar-02	Secretary of the Navy	USCINCPAC	In work
Homeporting and Stationing of SSGNs	10	Mar-02	Secretary of the Navy	Combatant Commanders	In work
Homeporting Surface Combatants in WESTPAC	10	Mar-02	Secretary of the Navy	USCINCPAC	In work
Realignment of SOF World-Wide Assets	10	Mar-02	ASD SO/LIC	USCINCSOC	In work
Reloading Munitions in Forward Areas	10	Mar-02	Secretary of the Air Force	Combatant Commanders	In work
Relocation of MPSRON-1 from EUCOM to CENTCOM	10	Mar-02	Secretary of the Navy	USCINCCENT USCINCEUR	In work
Joint National Training Center	11	Mar-02	USCINCJFCOM	Secretaries of Military Depts., CJCS, USD (P&R)	In work – briefed to SEC 21 Feb

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Transformation of Military Training to Better Enable Joint Operations	11	Mar-02	USD (P&R)		Secretaries of Military Depts., CJCS, USCINCFJFCOM, USD (AT&L)	In work – briefed to SEC 21 Feb
Cross-Service Use of Testing and Training Ranges	12	Mar-02	Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation		USD (P&R)	In work
Development of a Strategic Human Resources Plan	12	Mar-02	USD (P&R)		Secretaries of Military Depts., Component Heads	In work
Revised OPTEMPO Metrics	12	Mar-02	USD (P&R)		Secretaries of Military Depts., CJCS	In work
Assignment of Housing for Junior Personnel	13	Mar-02	USD (P&R)			On hold – USD(P&R) to revise completion date
Civilian Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve	13	Mar-02	USD (P&R)			In work
Metrics to Track Educational Opportunities, Child Care, Physical Fitness, Spouse Employment, Pay and Compensation; Housing; and Medical Support	13	Mar-02	USD (P&R)	Secretaries of Military Depts.		In work
Optimum Steady-State Recapitalization Rates	13	Mar-02	Secretaries of Military Depts.			Briefing to SEC 5 March

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Quality of Life Support Services' Infrastructure	13	Mar-02	USD (P&R)	Secretaries of Military Depts.	In work
Relocation Processes and Policies	13	Mar-02		USD (P&R)	In work
Capabilities to Counter ISR Operations Against the U.S., U.S. Allies and Friends	14	Mar-02		Secretaries of Military Depts.	In work
Role of DoD Intelligence Assets in support of Standing Joint Task Forces	14	Mar-02		CJCS	In work
Enemy Use of Chemical or Biological Agents to Deny U.S. Forces Access and to Impede Combat Operations	17	Mar-02	USD (P)	CJCS, Director (PA&E)	In work
Cost and Relative Operational Contribution of Converting Additional SSBNs to SSGNs by FY 2007	18	Mar-02		Secretary of the Navy	Cancelled – study rendered moot by Nuclear Posture Review
Attack of Critical Mobile Targets	19	Mar-02		CJCS	COMPLETE
Service UAV Programs	19	Oct-01		Secretaries of Military Depts.	COMPLETE – info provided to USD(AT&L) UAV task force
Reusable Launch Technologies and Systems	20	Mar-02		Secretary of the Air Force	In work
Follow-on Mobility Requirements	22	Mar-04		USCINCTRANS	ON HOLD – to be transferred to CJCS/OSD lead

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Heavy Lift Sealift Shortfall	22	Mar-02	Secretary of the Navy		In work	
Integration of Naval Aviation Force Structure	22	Mar-02	Secretary of the Navy		Briefing to SEC 5 March	
Options to Retire Less Capable Aircraft	22	Oct-01	Secretary of the Air Force		In work – due date moved to March 02	
Recapitalization of UH-60, CH-47 and AH-64 Aircraft	22	Oct-01	Secretary of the Army		COMPLETE	
Retiring the Air Force's Oldest C-130 Aircraft	22	Mar-02	Secretary of the Air Force; USCINCTRANS		In work	
Funding :Levels for On-going Interoperability Improvement Efforts for Legacy Systems	23	Oct-01	CJCS		COMPLETE	
Assessment of Modernization Programs: F-22, JSF, V-22, LD/HD Assets, Aircraft Carrier, Crusader, DD-21	24	Dec-01	Senior Executive Council	JROC (Note 2)	COMPLETE	
Installations	25	FY2004 Budget Review	Secretaries of Military Depts.		In work	
Inventory Management Practices and Balances	26	FY2003 Budget Review	USD (Comptroller)	USD (AT&L)	COMPLETE	
Modernization of DoD Business Practices and Financial Management Systems	26	Sep-02	USD (Comptroller)	Secretaries of Military Depts., USD (AT&L), CIO	In work	
Reduction of Overhead Costs and Performance Based Logistics	26	Mar-02	Secretaries of Military Depts.		In work	

February 26, 2002 11:10 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Demands

*f* *RECD/SPW*

*L* *APR 3 2002*

I want to give a talk at the NSC soon, when the President is there, about how the demands for people from our organization and for us to respond to requests from other organizations actually affects human beings in the Department of Defense.

To do that, I will need to know the number of detailees we have assigned to all these departments and agencies.

I need to know how many stop-loss people we have held in, and I need to know how many Guard and Reserve have been activated and for how long.

Then I need to explain that when you are dealing with civilians, it is one thing. Those civilians are all from the Washington area, they all want to live here, and they are all here because they want to be here in the Government. When we are dealing with uniformed people, and we prevent them from getting out when their tours are up, or we activate them and take them out of their private employment for month after month and keep them away, it begins to adversely affect the country, because it puts in jeopardy the total force concept—where we can in fact use the Guard and Reserve for things that are truly needed—for the military things they signed up for.

If I could get some good data on that, then I think maybe I could explain it in a way that people understand that they have to stop asking the Pentagon for additional people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022602-12

Please respond by 03 / 08 / 02

**U22400 103**

11-L-0559/OSD/13554

July 1, 2002 8:24 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Congressional Bureaucracy

Please see if you can find out how many Congressional employees there are today and what the Congressional budget was in 2000 or 2001, so I can expand the attached chart.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/24/79 US News and World Report

DHR:dh  
070102-71

Please respond by 08/02/02

*U22402 103*

11-L-0559/OSD/13555



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

August 16, 2002 1230 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs  
SUBJECT: Response to request regarding the number of Congressional employees (Snowflake #070102-71)

Number of Congressional employees (only calculated biennially):

1997: 24,070  
1999: 23,604  
2001: 22,238

Levels of appropriated spending for the same years:

FY 1997: \$2.203 billion  
FY 1999: \$2.581 billion  
FY 2001: \$2.730 billion

I have take the liberty of attaching an article that appeared in *Roll Call* in November of 2001. This article is similar to the one attached to the Secretary's request.

Attachment:  
As stated

8/24  
*It .. interesting that  
the staff size is tailing off,  
but Congressional budget keeps  
going up.*

Prepared by Michael Ralsky, Special Assistant for Transformation and Budget at (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/13556

# Capitol Hill's Growing Army of Bureaucrats

**By leaps and bounds, Congress is building up its staff at a cost of hundreds of millions. Critics ask: Does it do more harm than good?**

Quick to condemn bloated bureaucracy elsewhere, Congress is belatedly waking up to a staff explosion in its own back yard.

Senators and House members are complaining because, with three times the work force, Congress is enacting far fewer laws than it did 20 years ago.

Just meeting the congressional payroll costs taxpayers more than 550 million dollars a year—12 times as much as in 1960. Including the Library of Congress and other support agencies, Congress's total budget tops 1.1 billion dollars.

Critics charge that this outpouring of money has produced a vast legislative bureaucracy that impedes Congress's pace and efficiency. Yet most lawmakers insist that, given today's complex issues and their own heavy workloads, they cannot make do with less staff.

The situation is acutely embarrassing for Congress at a time when voters are crying out for austerity in government. "It is hard to crack down on the federal bureaucracy when we don't do anything about our own," comments Senator William L. Armstrong (R-Colo.).

Stable for many years, congressional staffs began to grow in the 1950s. Twenty years ago, Congress got by with a 128-million-dollar budget and 6,382 staffers. Today's billion-dollar Congress has a work force of nearly 20,000—roughly 37 employees for each senator and House member.

Nowhere is staff proliferation more striking than at a congressional hearing. Senators and representatives are routinely attended by a half-dozen aides apiece, some of whom seem to do little more than pour coffee.

For example, at a hearing on the new strategic-arms treaty, 17 Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers stood by to

assist six committee members. At another hearing, 27 aides were on hand to serve the two senators present.

"Senators and staff are literally stumbling over themselves," protests Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.).

With so many aides scurrying about, Congress is fast running out of places to put them all. As a stopgap measure, millions of dollars have been spent to acquire dilapidated old hotels and apartment buildings near the Capitol and convert them into rabbit warrens of office space. Under construction is a third Senate office building, costing 137 million dollars, to provide still more room. The House, with three huge office buildings already, is planning its fourth.

**Some of the rewards.** For those who work on Capitol Hill, life can be rewarding. While low-level clerks usually earn about \$12,000 a year, experienced secretaries can make \$31,000 and top aides up to \$52,687.

In addition, staff members share most of the tax-supported perquisites of members of Congress: Generous pensions, liberal vacations, discount meals and cigarettes, low-cost loans through a credit union, free parking and, in many cases, opportunities for travel.

But there also are drawbacks to Capitol Hill jobs, such as long, uncertain working hours and a lack of security that is endemic to politics.

What's behind this urge to expand? Experts cite several causes: Deepened rivalry between Congress and the White House, Republican demands for their own minority staffs on committees and the sheer complexity of drafting and monitoring legislation in such highly technical areas as energy and the environment.

It is among "professional" staffers—those directly involved in shaping legislation—that hiring has been most dramatic. The number of these skilled, top-salaried employes has doubled in the Senate and quintupled in the House in the past 20 years.


Lawmakers once trusted the accuracy of expert advice and information provided by the administration in power. But that began to change during the Vietnam War and Watergate, when many members started to doubt what they were being told by the White House. Some built their own staffs of experts to delve into controversial issues.

Congress's drive for independent expertise has led it to hire hundreds of people to study the federal budget. After years of wrangling with the White House over spending priorities, the House and Senate in 1974 set up their own budget committees, each with a staff of 80. For good measure, a separate Congressional Budget Office with 200 employes has been created to furnish broad research analyses for both houses.

"Members want to make independent judgments on an issue without having to rely on the administration in power," says Aubrey L. Sarvis, chief counsel to the Sen-

\$1,158  
mil.  
(est.)

## Congress's Own Bureaucracy In 25 Years, Staff Quadrupled... While Costs Rose 16 Times





Copyright 2001 Roll Call, Inc.  
Roll Call

November 15, 2001  
Correction Appended

**LENGTH:** 1605 words

**HEADLINE:** From Humble Beginnings, Hill Staff Explodes

**BYLINE:** By Suzanne Nelson

**BODY:**

In March 1961, during debate on a House resolution to increase each Member's clerk-hire allowance, a Representative from Iowa and member of the House Administration Committee rose to oppose the measure.

Although Rep. John Kyl (R-Iowa) noted that the amount of the increase didn't appear large, an additional clerk for each office, he said, would require "allowances for another desk, another typewriter, more materials, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the next step would then be request for additional office space and, ultimately, new buildings."

The resolution, like so many others before it and many since, passed.

Construction on what was to become the Rayburn Office Building began the following year.

At the turn of the last century, most Representatives had only one full-time clerk; a handful had two. The Senate's ratios were even smaller, with not even a full-time assistant for each Member. Today the number of staffers (including committee staff and officers) in the House totals 8,758, and in the Senate it's 6,054, according to the American Enterprise Institute's "Vital Statistics on Congress." As demonstrated last month by the evacuation of the House and Senate office buildings - and the ensuing isolation of most Members from their full staffs - Congress relies heavily on its army of aides to assist in every aspect of lawmaking.

But the history of how Hill staff grew to its current level can't be found within the text of a single legislative branch appropriation bill or even within a handful of House or Senate resolutions. Although a few bills, notably the Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970, significantly and permanently altered the nature of Congressional staff, the story of its growth is really only told through the slow erosion of Members' resistance to it.

Staffing in both the House and Senate began as clerical assistance on committees. Prior to 1856, any help was provided on a part-time basis and limited almost entirely to times when Congress was in session. That year saw the authorization of full-time clerks for the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.

It wasn't until 1885, however, that individual Senators were allowed personal clerks. The House followed suit in 1893.

Supporters of the 1893 resolution cited an expanding workload and demand for improved constituent service. Giving each Member his own clerk was also seen as an impetus for reform of the committee structure, according to "Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking." Prior to 1893 only committee chairmen had clerks. As Rep. Newton Blanchard (D-La.), who had been opposed to clerk-hire authorization in the past, put it:

"I believe if we adopt this proposition ... it will result in a great reform in bringing about later the abolition of from 15 to 20 useless Committees of the House that are now maintained simply because of the pressure upon the Speaker for committee chairmanships."

Opponents of the 1893 measure asserted that the work of Congressional offices could be handled by Congressmen themselves and that any assistance would amount to an indirect bonus to Members' salaries.

Rep. Samuel Peel (D-Ark.) stood up during floor debate and said that his office received 40 to 50 letters a day which he answered personally in longhand. Other Members blamed Congress itself for the growing workload, claiming that casework and correspondence had increased only because of the "bad seed and worthless documents" sent out by the institution, and the fact that people had been taught to "look to the government for everything."

Supporters of the measure retorted that those not in need of the additional assistance could decline the money and allow it to remain in a contingent fund.

These themes would resurface again and again in both the House and Senate. Members would point to the strain of an expanding workload but at the same time worry that their constituents would perceive a vote for additional staff as a disguised pay raise. Recognizing the importance of efficiency and economy in government, but disagreeing as to how to achieve both, proponents of additional aides have largely triumphed over the naysayers, however vigilant.

And thus began the cyclical pattern that led to an ever-burgeoning number of Congressional staffers.

One body authorizes funds for added staffing in response to its Members' demand (with few exceptions, the Senate and the House have recognized the other's sovereignty in matters of their own clerk hire). Gradually Members appoint the maximum number of allowable aides. Demand once again builds up for increased assistance, and the process begins again.

The debate in each body over increasing staff allowances once consumed hours, even days, of floor time. Since 1920 it has been largely relegated to discussion in committee or subject to automatic decision-making procedures.

The result has been a 4,498 percent increase in **legislative branch appropriations** from 1946 to 2000. The Consumer Price Index rose only 783 percent in that same period, according to AEI.

One of the reasons cited for increasing clerk hire was Congress' need to stake its independence from the executive branch. By 1946 the influence of the second branch of government had increased significantly, at least in Congress' perception, and there was a general feeling that the imbalance could be remedied with a larger Congressional support structure.

This desire to match White House influence served as the catalyst for the creation of the Special Joint Committee on the Reorganization of Congress and the passage of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act the following year. Among broad reforms, including the creation of the Legislative Reference Service (which became the Congressional Research Service in 1971) and a reduction in the number of standing committees in both bodies, the act provided administrative assistants for the Speaker and the Majority and Minority leaders. A proposal of the Joint Committee to provide assistants for all Members was dropped, but a supplemental appropriations bill later in the year provided administrative assistants for Senators and Senate policy committees.

By the late 1960s jealousy and distrust of the executive branch again brought changes in the size and scope of Congressional staff. A sense of impending crisis brought on by the Cold War centralized power in the presidency at the expense of Congress and the Supreme Court. In addition to the proliferation of executive agencies during this period, the size of the White House staff grew exponentially. Whereas Franklin D. Roosevelt had a staff of 100, Richard Nixon's staff totaled more than 6,000.

"Already power has flowed from the legislative branch to the executive branch in an almost unbroken stream," Rep. Bertram Podell (D-N.Y.) said on the floor in 1969. "In previous eras the pendulum has swung back the other way. ... Now this is no longer the case in large measure, and there exists a danger of power remaining permanently on the executive side."

Nixon himself compounded Congress' desire for a strong, independent infrastructure - Watergate incited strong distrust between the two branches.

In order to better evaluate the president's budget and obtain information independent from the Office of Management and Budget, Congress established the Congressional Budget Office in 1974. Its creation, along with the expansion of the CRS and the General Accounting Office, "reflected a basic factor underlying the growth of congressional staff," according to "Vital Statistics."

Congressional staffs also experienced seismic growth in those years. Between 1972 and 1976, staff in the House jumped from 5,280 to 6,939. The Senate's growth was proportionally even greater: from 2,426 to 3,251 in just four years.

The ballooning of the Senate's staff came in part as a result of a contentiously debated 1975 resolution, S. Res. 60, which allowed Senators to appoint personal staff aides for committees on which they serve.

Excavation for the Hart Senate Office Building began in December of that same year, just two decades after construction had begun on Dirksen. By the time of its delayed completion in 1986, Senate office space had tripled in three decades.

The accretion of Congressional staff, however, came with its own predicament. Historically, increasing the number of aides to deal with an expanding workload gradually caused the antidote to bring about the next predicament. More caseworkers often meant more casework. More legislative aides translated into more drafted legislation.

In August 1979 Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) bestowed one of his then famous "Golden Fleece" awards - aimed at provoking scorn at ridiculous spending by the Pentagon or an executive agency - on his own institution for "the eruption of its staff and spending over the past decade."

"Senators and staff are now stumbling over themselves," he continued. "Additional staff generates additional bills and additional work, much of it unneeded at a time when Congress has difficulty coping with its regular, routine and oversight functions."

Apparently Congress got the message. By the early 1980s the size of the Congressional staff began to plateau, and after 1986 the number of staffers in the House and Senate began, and continues to, steadily decline. And although a fiscal 2000 supplemental appropriations bill allowed a 9.6 percent increase in the Member's Representational Allowance, it was largely spent on technology and bolstering salaries to compete with the executive branch.


**CORRECTION-DATE:** November 19, 2001

**CORRECTION:**

The chart that accompanied Thursday's story ("From Humble Beginnings, HillStaff Explodes") juxtaposed the lines depicting staff growth in the House with that of the Senate. Additionally, "House Staff" and "Senate Staff" indicated staffs of personal offices only and didn't include committee staffs, which were graphed separately.

**LOAD-DATE:** November 15, 2001

Page 24 ROLL CALL Tuesday, November 25, 2002



11-L-0559/OSD/13562

X  
July 3, 2002 12:37 PM

TO: Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: CENTCOM Info

The CIA is getting reports back apparently from someone in the CIA who is with the CENTCOM group investigating the incident near Kandahar. The reports are getting to CIA, being processed and then being given to the briefers and then me before we are getting anything from Mike DeLong. How can that be?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070302-7

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Please respond by 07/12/02

CENTCOM  
2002

2002

U22403 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13563

snowflake

June 3, 2002 5:39 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *dk*  
SUBJECT: James Moriarity

James Moriarity, who works for you, is making quite a name for himself. Please take a look at this.

Thanks.

Attach.

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," *Washington Times*, 05/17/02

DHR:dh  
060302-10

060302  
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2002

U22404 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13564

are superior marksmen, not only with rifles but with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. They adapt quickly and change tactics.

- Osama bin Laden's cave complexes show a knowledge of engineering and safety. There are air vents to minimize the overpressure effect of stored munitions. The caves feature escape routes, with false turns to thwart a chasing enemy.

- There was more close combat in Operation Anaconda in March than media reports indicated. Soldiers' body armor saved lives.

- The Army's front-line transport helicopter, the Black Hawk, has trouble in high-altitude operation due to a balky tail rotor. Older Chinook CH-47s did most of the troop ferrying.

- In some hot landing zones, the Air Force was late in delivering prestrikes before the Chinooks landed during Operation Anaconda in the Shah-e-Kot Valley, south of Gardez. Some commanders sent in the choppers rather than let the al Qaeda and Taliban mass more troops.

Hot landing zones were the most glaring flaw in Anaconda. A Navy SEAL was killed when his Chinook received intense ground fire and had to back off a planned landing spot. The commandos went in to establish a blocking force to kill enemy fighters trying to escape from Shah-e-Kot.



**NOTE**

#### New China wars

Pentagon officials are upset by what they see as an effort by pro-Beijing officials in the State Department and the White House National Security Council staff to discredit the harder-line policies on China of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

They cite as evidence a recent item in the Far Eastern Economic Review. The magazine stated that Michael Pillsbury, a key adviser to Mr. Rumsfeld who is fluent in Chinese, misinterpreted discussions between Mr. Rumsfeld and Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao about military exchanges.

The magazine article stated that the State Department's interpreter was forced out of the meeting and that Mr. Pillsbury's interpretation misled the Chinese vice president into falsely believing Mr. Rumsfeld was set for a full-scale resumption of U.S.-Chinese military exchanges. The Pentagon later disputed official Chinese press reports that said that.

A U.S. official familiar with the dispute said NSC China staffer James Moriarity was responsible for the critical magazine item. Mr. Moriarity declined to be interviewed. This official said Mr. Moriarity has criticized Mr. Rumsfeld in interagency discussions for supposedly being ignorant about Chinese affairs, despite the fact that Mr. Rumsfeld has traveled to China several times.

Pentagon spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Jeff Davis said yesterday he would not disclose details of who was permitted into the 45-minute meeting at the Pentagon on May 1. But he denied there were any language misinterpretations.

"The fact of the matter is we are confident that both parties on both sides of the table left with a full and complete understanding of what was said and what was agreed to," Cmdr. Davis said.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon's military exchanges with China, once a very public effort, are now secret. As part of the Bush administration's overall effort to keep more of its activities from the public, the latest

annual report to Congress on military exchanges carried a classified "confidential" label and will not be made public, we are told.

The secrecy on the exchange report contrasts sharply with earlier openness. In 1999, defense officials released to The Washington Times a detailed "game plan" for defense exchanges that outlined more than 80 activities by the U.S. and Chinese militaries, including visits by high-level officials, and trips by Chinese officers to sensitive U.S. military facilities, including a nuclear submarine base, joint training maneuvers in California and talks on logistics, a key weakness of Chinese military forces.

Mr. Rumsfeld cut off all military exchanges with China in April, but pro-Beijing officials are pushing to resume large-scale contacts. Mr. Hu, during his meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld, invited the defense secretary to visit China.

### **Kadish's future**

"Will he stay long term or go?" is the question being asked by Pentagon insiders about Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish. As director of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, Gen. Kadish is the man who is attempting to make a reality of President Bush's vision of national missile defense.

He is said to be well-liked by Bush loyalists, and by his immediate supervisor, Edward Aldridge, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition.

The rank and file give him high marks for reorganizing the agency and presiding over a string of successful test intercepts.

Next month, he reaches the three-year mark as director, the normal tenure for senior officers in any one post. Insiders say he is ready to stay on, if he wins a fourth star from the Bush administration.

"He wants to stay there," said a Pentagon source. "He wants to be known as the person who brought it to reality."

Pam Bain, chief spokeswoman for the agency, said Gen. Kadish has been asked to stay on at least another year. As to a fourth star, "We've heard talk of that, but we don't hear it inside the building."

### **Crusader**

The fact Army Gen. Tommy Franks never requested artillery for the war in Afghanistan played a role in the decision by the staff of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to recommend cancellation of the Crusader artillery system.

The Army seemed to sense early in the war that it needed to showcase artillery in Afghanistan or face criticism that in this new type of warfare, artillery was not needed.

Defense sources say a number of Army officials, including Undersecretary of the Army Les Brownlee, a retired Army colonel and Vietnam combatant, asked why Gen. Franks had not yet requested artillery.

Gen. Franks, who as head of U.S. Central Command is running the war, answered back that heavy mortars, not artillery, were the answers to cave-hidden al Qaeda fighters.

### **Armitage's record**

We received a number of e-mails scolding us for writing, as many news outlets have done, that Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is a former Navy SEAL.

To set the record straight, Mr. Armitage was a Navy surface warfare officer who specialized in the special operations field of counterinsurgency. He completed three combat tours with the Riverine/advisory forces in Vietnam.

*Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough are Pentagon reporters.*

6/26  
100<sup>2</sup>

June 17, 2002 5:04 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Question on Al Qaeda in Kashmir

6/25/02

Sir, As discussed  
I have spoken with  
both papers' reporters.

Let's send a letter to all the papers that said I had changed my position or retracted my position on the Al Qaeda in Kashmir, and send them the actual transcripts and get that set straight. Otherwise, it will just get rehashed. The *Washington Times* is the worst and the *London Telegraph*, I think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061702-59

Please respond by 06/28/02

X

U22405 103

2004/6/1

11-L-0559/OSD/13568

SNOWFLAKE

June 18, 2002 8:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Gender-Integrated Training

Please call David Chu and tell him that I just read the President's statements here on gender-integrated training. I agree with the President.

I hope if he thinks he is coming out differently, he will give me a heads up.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/28/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Gender Integrated Training [U08941/02]

DHR:dh  
061802-7

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please respond by* 5/19/02

*Revd 8/*

**U22407 103**

11-L-0559/OSD/13569



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2002 MAY 29 AM 6:36

SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

May 28, 2002 – 10:00 AM

JUN 18 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 28 May 02*  
SUBJECT: Gender Integrated Training – SNOWFLAKE

- Charlie Abell and I are personally reviewing gender-integrated training by:
  - Visiting each of the basic training facilities
  - Interviewing our major operational commanders about their view of the competence of the personnel they receive from the training establishment (i.e., does a change in policy have military merit?)
- We anticipate completing this survey by fall and would propose to report to you on its results at that time.

RECOMMENDATION: None required.

COORDINATION: None required.

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	6/1
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	46/4
MA BUCCI	1
EXECSEC WHITMORE	6/12

11-L-0559/OSD/13570

U08941 / 02

snowflake

2:48 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: May 4, 2002  
SUBJECT:

6/3 *Jerry Di Re*  
How are we doing on these Presidential statements that he made during the Campaign?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
050402 14

Attach: Campaign Statements snowflake dated 9/7/01

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

5/31

*Chu Response attached*

*Jerry Di Re*

6/3 *M6/4*

U16986 102

U08974 102

11-L-0559/OSD/13571

June 25, 2002 9:42 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace  
Dov Zakheim  
Tom White  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Bow Wave

How do we get the issue as to dealing with the bow wave front and center in the weeks ahead, so that the outcome of the studies and the budget build reflect the need to deal with the bow wave?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062502-27

Please respond by 07/26/02

25 Jun 02

U22408 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13572

snowflake

# CLOSE HOLD

June 26, 2002 7:00 AM

TO: Doug Feith Tom White  
Gen. Myers Gordon England  
Gen. Pace Jim Roche  
Dov Zakheim David Chu  
Pete Aldridge Andy Marshall  
LTG Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Need for Urgency

HOT

Please make comments on the attached brief. I went through an earlier version of this with the senior staff on Tuesday.

**Do not copy or distribute. Mark your comments right on the brief.**

Please return it to Larry Di Rita by noon on Friday, June 28.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

06/25/02 A Need for Urgency

DHR:dh  
062502-77

Please respond by 06/28/02 NOON

26 June 03

U22409 103

11-L-05508-3573

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

DRAFT

# A Need for Urgency and Multiple Leadership Cen Throughout DoD

6/25/2002

DRAFT

11-L-05540574  
~~CLOSE HOLD~~

# Highlights of Progress Made over the First 18 Months

- War on Terrorism
- Quadrennial Defense Review
  - New Strategy
  - New Force Sizing
  - New risk balancing
- Nuclear Posture Review
  - New Triad
  - Offensive Reductions
- ABM Withdrawal/Restructured Missile Defense Program
- Space Commission Implementation
- New Unified Command Plan
  - Northern Command
  - Space/Strat Merger
- Contingency Planning Guidance Rewrite
  - Speed/relevance of plans
- Key Weapons Decisions
  - Crusader to FCS/Precis
  - DD-21 to DD-X
  - SSBN to SSGN
  - B-1 Modernization
  - Navy Area-Wide Cancer
  - SBIRS Restructuring
  - ~~V-22 RESTRUCTURING~~
  - Laser Comms
  - C4ISR Funding,  
~~SHIP SWAP~~
- Realistic budgeting/cost
- Navy/Marine Tactical Air Consolidation
- Army/AF HQ Rationalization

6/25/2002

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/13575

# **The Next 6 Months**

- Development of the FY 2004-09 program is critical to our success on transformation.
- We must focus sharply over the next 6 months if we are to accomplish the things our country needs done.
- This will take an even greater sense of urgency at all levels of DoD.
- To achieve a new level of urgency will require energizing multiple leadership centers throughout DoD.

# What Military Challenges Are More Likely Over the Next 15 Years

## Types of Challenges

- Terrorism
- Chemical
- Biological
- Radiation/Nuclear
- Surface-to-Air Missiles
- Cruise Missiles
- Ballistic Missiles
- SWARMS/Mines
- Diesel Subs
- Cyber
- Disinformation
- Non combatants / Non Lethal

## Places the US Could be Challenged

- Manhunts for key terrorists
- Combat in rural Ungoverned Areas
- Combat in Urban Areas
- Combat in Littoral Areas—SWARMS
- Homeland Defense—Supporting New Military Tasks in U.S.
- Preventive Attacks on WMD/Terrorist States
- Attacks on Information Systems
- Attacks on Space Capabilities

Note: DoD has a capabilities (not threat) based strategy. We can know the challenges we will face, but not necessarily where, when or even from whom the challenges will come. The US must count on surprise and little or no warning.

# **Where is the US likely to be relatively vulnerable and/or in need of improvement over the next 15 years?**

- Actionable Intelligence
    - Human Intelligence
  - Speed of deployment
  - Information Operations
  - Mobility
  - Weight/Mass
  - Access to/Operations in Space
  - Cyberspace
- ✓ SPACE VULNERABILITY*
- Lack of Hardening
  - Organizationally Slow, and/or Inept
    - U.S. Government Inter-Agency System
    - DoD internal process
    - DoD contractor and high-tech
    - Slowness of action/reaction
    - Domestic security

# In next 15 years, what Systems/Capabilities/Activities are likely to be...

## ...Of Relatively Greater Utility

- Truly Joint Warfighting Forces
- Standing (ready) Joint Task Forces
- Precision Weapons
- Special Operations
- Unmanned Systems
- Rapidly deployable ground forces
- Capabilities with small logistic footprints
- Long Range Systems
- Peacekeepers—US and US-led
- Training Other Nations' Militaries
- Pre-deployed Assets
- Assets less vulnerable to WMD
- Sea Basing
- Cyber Offense/Defense
- Network Centric Warfare
- Space-based C4ISR

## ...Of Relatively Less Utility

- Assets slow to deploy
- Reserve assets that require activation, except in the case of homeland defense.

## ...Of Relatively Less Utility, but necessary as deterrent

- Heavy Land Combat Systems
- Air Superiority Aircraft
- Blue Water Combat Ships

CARRIERS  
Sea Bases  
SSBNs  
SSTOs  
Deterrent  
or offensive?

# **Over the next 15 Years, which Relationships/Regions could take on...**

- Greater Importance**
- China
  - India
  - Indonesia
  - Turkey
  - Central Asia
  - Vietnam

- ...Relatively Greater Danger**
- Iran
  - Pakistan
  - Indonesia
  - Turkey
  - Latin America
  - China

- ...Relatively Less Danger**
- Western Europe
  - Central Europe
  - Russia

# **Countries the U.S. Could Be Allied With**

## **Allied with Whom**

Pakistan

Turkey

Jordan

Taiwan

Russia

Vietnam/India

NATO

Several Latin

American Countries

## **Where**

Against terrorists

Iraq, Syria, Iran

Iraq , Syria, Iran

Taiwan Straits

Russian Far East, Central Asia

China

Multiple possible locations

Latin America

# The Way Ahead

- Senior civilian/military leadership to refine this outline and set priorities. What's missing?
- Get agreement on tasks/goals/due dates/leads
- Establish milestones in each area
- Fashion the way ahead
  - Senior Level Review Group (SLRG), as with QDR/DPG
  - Mechanism to engage two levels below SLRG
  - Engaging Congress
  - Engaging the public, contractors, press, etc.

# URGENT TASKS

<b>TASK</b>	<b>GOAL</b>	<b>INTERIM REPORT</b>	<b>COMPLETION DATE</b>	<b>ACTION OFFICERS</b>
GWOT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refashion DoD to do the task</li> </ul>			SecDef/CJCS
Organize/Train/ Equip for the new security environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information Operations</li> <li>• Urban Warfare</li> <li>• 'Manhunts'</li> <li>• Cyber/Space Defense</li> <li>• Cruise Missile Defense</li> </ul>			Service Planners Service Secretaries & Chiefs JROC Cambone (PA&E)
Intelligence Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reorganize to fit new security environment</li> </ul>			Stenbit Haver Cambone
Homeland Defense Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reorganize for new homeland security tasks</li> </ul>			DepSecDef
Shaping Geo-political Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moderate Muslim States</li> <li>• Improvements to current alliance structures</li> <li>• Refashioning U.S. global 'footprint'</li> </ul>			Wolfowitz/Feith (USD(P)) Pace VCJCS
Combatant Command Rationalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Headquarters/Component Command Restructuring for GWOT</li> <li>• Standing Joint Task Forces</li> </ul>			SecDef/CJCS
DPG Studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complete and made program and resource decisions for '04 budget</li> </ul>			Cambone / <i>Skarlicki</i> Zakheim <i>Seylevantes</i>
NSC Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop Proposals for           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Better subcommittee work products</li> <li>○ Better focus on key interagency tasks</li> </ul> </li> </ul>			Feith (USD(P)) Casey (DJ-5)

## OTHER IMPORTANT TASKS

<b>TASK</b>	<b>GOAL</b>	<b>INTERIM REPORT</b>	<b>COMPLETION DATE</b>	<b>ACTION OFFICERS</b>
DoD Processes (Financial, Budgetary, Acquisition)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shorten/De-Layer</li> <li>• Rationalize</li> <li>• Eliminate Redundancies/Steps</li> <li>• Speed Decision-making</li> </ul>			Zakheim (USD(C)) Aldridge (USD(ATL)) Cartwright (DJ-8)
Budget Reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transition away from Non-Defense Activities           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Health Care Entitlements</li> <li>○ Veterans Activities</li> <li>○ Other</li> </ul> </li> </ul>			Zakheim Haynes (GC)
Service Structure Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fewer Levels within Services</li> <li>• More Flexibility/Rapid Deployment</li> </ul>			Service Secretaries Chiefs
OSD/Joint Staff Rationalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eliminate Redundancies</li> <li>• Accelerate Processing Time</li> <li>• Speed Decision-making</li> </ul>			SecDef CJCS
Service Redundancies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Merge Common Activities           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Legal</li> <li>○ Medical</li> <li>○ Chaplain</li> <li>○ Dependent Support (Commissary/Exchange)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>			Service Secretaries Service Chiefs
Respect Taxpayers' Dollars	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Find and root out waste in every corner of DoD</li> </ul>			Zakheim (USD-C)

**DRAFT**

11-L-0559/OSD/13584

Attachment 1 - (2)

May 1, 2002 7:54 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Lease

✓  
DN

Please find out for me what this lease negotiated by the Army Corps of Engineers for 20 years for a hotel is about, when it was done and why we can't just sell the whole thing.

Also, please find out if David Chu is really urging people to use this facility. That is a little awkward.

601

Thanks.

Attach.

05/01/02, Al Kamen, "In the Loop," *Washington Post*

DHR.dh  
050102-5

.....  
*Please respond by* 05/21/02

1 May 02  
70001

U22410 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13585

with 300,000 American soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen at a full military ceremony at 4 p.m. Thursday at Marine Corps Base Hawaii in Kaneohe.

He will replace retiring Adm. Dennis Blair as the head of a force of 190 warships and 400 combat aircraft. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz will be the guest speaker at Thursday's change of command.

Also approved by the Senate last night was the promotion of Gen. Leon J. LaPonte to be the commander in chief of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command in South Korea.

Fargo will become the U.S. Pacific commander as there continue to be threats of armed conflict between China and Taiwan, between North Korea and South Korea, and between India and Pakistan.

Vice Adm. Walter F. Doran has been nominated to replace Fargo as Pacific Fleet commander. His nomination was among the 1,349 promotions approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee last night and sent to the floor action. Final action is expected to take place tonight.

Doran, 56, has been serving as assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since September 2000. Fargo, 53, took over as Pacific Fleet commander on Oct. 8, 1999.

In 1958 the command of the Pacific Fleet was separated from that of the Pacific Command. Since then, chiefs of the Pacific Command have been:

>> Adm. Felix B. Stump, Jan. 14, 1958-July 31, 1958.  
>> Adm. Harry D. Felt, July 31, 1958-June 30, 1964.  
>> Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, June 30, 1964-July 31, 1968.  
>> Adm. John S. McCain, Jr., July 31, 1968-Sept. 1, 1972.  
>> Adm. Noel A.M. Gayler, Sept. 1, 1972-Aug. 30, 1976.  
>> Adm. Maurice F. Weisner, Aug. 30, 1976-Oct. 31, 1979.  
>> Adm. Robert L.J. Long, Oct. 31, 1979-July 1, 1983.  
>> Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., July 1, 1983-Sept. 18, 1985.  
>> Adm. Ronald J. Hays, Sept. 18, 1985-Sept. 30, 1988.  
>> Adm. Huntington Hardisty, Sept. 30, 1988-March 1, 1991

>> Adm. Charles R. Larsen, March 1, 1991-July 11, 1994.  
>> Lt. Gen. Harold T. Fields, July 11, 1994-July 19, 1994.  
>> Adm. Richard C. Macke, July 19, 1994-Jan. 31, 1996.  
>> Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, Jan. 31, 1996-Feb. 20, 1999.  
>> Adm. Dennis C. Blair, Feb. 20, 1999-May 2, 2002.

Washington Post

May 1, 2002

Pg. 23

### 13. In The Loop

By Al Kamen

Training Center ISO Critical Mass.

Looking for an "off-site" facility for your staff to vent frustrations, improve typing skills or get motivation? Call the Department of Defense. The folks there have a brand-new, snappy training center, and it sounds like they'd be willing to cut you a real good deal.

Why's that? Because the 201-room hotel and conference complex in south-central Massachusetts, just leased for 20 years for \$167 million, is "experiencing less than full utilization," a Defense official says. Maybe much less.

The center, built after a decade of furious lobbying by Massachusetts officials for a DOD facility on the site of a former American Optical Co. complex in Southbridge, was to be used to train GS-12 to GS-15 civilians in the Defense Leadership and Management Program.

The lease, negotiated by the Army Corps of Engineers, calls for the Pentagon to pay for 40,000 room-nights a year at \$209 per room for 20 years. The leadership program trainees were expected to fill more than half the rooms.

The center opened in January -- a month after a Pentagon review concluded that the 1,115 trainees in the program would be better served if they were trained at colleges and universities close to their homes and families. That way, the training could be tailored to individual needs and be more flexible and efficient.

What's more, the training program would save plenty on

travel, hotel, overhead and other expenses.

That certainly makes sense. But what about the new training center with "32,000 square feet of exclusive-use office space and 29,000 of exclusive-use training space . . . amphitheater for 250 with desktop Internet connections, a ballroom for 300, a dining facility for 216 . . . and athletic facilities?"

"I urge you to use this state-of-the-art facility and benefit from pre-paid lease arrangements during fiscal year 2002," Undersecretary of Defense David S.C. Chu said in an April 11 memo to all the department bigwigs. "Currently, any organization using the facility would not be required to pay for use of training or conference facilities or for hotel room[s]," Chu said. Can't get much better than that.

But wait! "In addition, we are seeking permanent tenant(s), so if you have long-term training needs, we would like to explore sub-leasing options with you," Chu said.

The bids may redefine "low-ball."

### On the Move

Adm. Dennis Blair, the U.S. military commander for Pacific operations (CINCPAC) who was last seen being edged out by Gen. Richard B. Myers for chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is being replaced Thursday by Adm. Tom Fargo. Blair is to become a senior fellow at the Institute for Defense Analysis, a Pentagon think tank in Alexandria.

Washington Post

May 1, 2002

Pg. 2

### 14. 150 Water Projects

Halted For Army Corps Review

By Michael Grunwald, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Army Corps of Engineers is suspending work on about 150 congressionally approved water projects to review the economics used to justify them, an unprecedented response to mounting criticism of Corps analyses inside and outside the Bush administration.

Maj. Gen. Robert H. Griffin, civil works director of the Corps, announced yesterday that his agency will "pause" work on billions of dollars worth of active projects that are not yet under construction. The move came a week after Griffin suspended a \$311 million deepening of the Delaware River in response to a critique by the General Accounting Office, and his memo yesterday cited "serious questions in regard to the accuracy and currency . . . and the rigor of the review process for some projects."

The Corps will not provide a list of affected projects until the end of the week, but sources said they will include scores of the agency's most controversial efforts to build levees and pumps for flood control, dredge rivers and ports for navigation, and pump sand onto beaches for recreation. Some projects could be delayed temporarily, others indefinitely.

Corps spokesman Homer Perkins said he assumed the list would include most of the projects highlighted in a Washington Post series in 2000, from a \$165 million flood-control pump in the Mississippi Delta to a \$690 million barge-canal widening in New Orleans to a \$108 million jetty project in North Carolina.

"This action is part of a more comprehensive initiative to ensure that Corps projects are a sound investment for our nation and are proposed in an environmentally sustainable way," Griffin said. "It is essential that Corps projects keep up with the pace of change."

The review could freeze a fifth of the Corps workload, an unheard-of self-examination for one of the oldest, biggest and most embattled federal agencies. Every presidential administration since Franklin D. Roosevelt's has tried to rein in the Corps, but it has flourished with help from its patrons in Congress, who have used its projects to steer money and jobs home. Now the Corps seems to be echoing its critics, a response to the least friendly political climate in the agency's 227-year history.

Griffin said the Corps will re-analyze every one of its pre-

11-L-0559/OSD/13586

SNOWFLAKE

May 2, 2002 9:02 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Discuss Japan at Press Briefing

*Arrv Di Rita*  
*AV*  
Gen. Franks want us to consider mentioning at a press briefing what Japan is doing.

Japan has supplied two destroyers and one oiler that are now working in the North Arabian Sea. In addition, they have supplied some C-130 assistance on general humanitarian activities. Finally, they have served as co-hosts for the donor's conference.

*John G.*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050202-13

Please respond by 05/10/02

*5/7*

*Clarke response attached.*

*V/R  
Ed*

*2 May 02*

*5/7*

*U22411 103*

11-L-0559/OSD/13587

May 6, 2002

TO: SECDEF  
FROM:   
Torie Clarke  
SUBJECT: Discuss Japan at Press Briefing

Done. A reporter for one of the Japanese daily newspapers asked about the very same topic at today's press briefing.

Attachment:  
Page 9 and 10 of the Transcript, DoD News Briefing, 3 May 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/13588

But to be so naive as to think that they cannot communicate between one another, I think we'd be remiss. Are they as effective as they were when we began this campaign? I think not.

Q: How many people do you now have in detention in Afghanistan? And is the intention to move all of them or some of them, most of them, to Guantanamo Bay?

ROSA: We've got -- let me check the figures. We've got 224 in Afghanistan today. And the second part of your question is, are we going to move them?

Q: Is that the intention, to move most or all of them to Guantanamo Bay? Or any of them?

ROSA: We don't really talk about plans for detainees, what we're going to do and where they're going to go or individual movements. We just don't do that.

CLARKE: And there isn't one intention for all of them. We've said all along we have no intention and no desire to keep large numbers of them for any great period of time. Some will go back to the country of origin. You know, different processes for different ones. But just in terms of managing expectations, we will be moving them around, and we probably are going to get out of the daily tick-tock of exactly how many in each place, because half the time we'd be behind schedule and not be able to give you an absolutely accurate number. And it's just not useful for people to have -- or safe -- for people to have a lot of information about who exactly is where and when are they moving.

Let's go to Jim, and then back there.

Q: You mentioned a rocket attack near Khost. Was that today? And can you give more details, the target --

ROSA: (To staff) Do we have the date? I want to say it was the 2nd.

STAFF: Second of May.

ROSA: Second of May.

Q: And what did it hit?

ROSA: I can't tell you what it hit. It hit in the vicinity of the Khost airfield. I don't know what particularly it hit. We have some troops in that Khost area, but fortunately, none of our folks were injured.

Q: Were others injured?

ROSA: Don't know.

CLARKE: Let's go back here. Yes, sir?

Q: What do you say on Japanese support in the war against terrorism so far? Did

leadership of this building specifically request Japanese government P-3 and Aegis destroyers?

CLARKE: You know, being in the region last week, we were constantly reminded about one of the great strengths of this effort; that's been the support of so many different countries, including Japan. Very quickly after September 11th, they stepped up to the plate and really pitched in in terms of support for the coalition. It includes some airlift capability. I believe we've got two destroyers and one oiler in the Northern Arabian Sea. It's been very helpful, it has been very useful in the war. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has met recently with some of the Japanese leaders, and I believe Doug Feith is meeting with some today, and they're having discussions about how to continue that kind of participation, which has been so wonderful.

And you're right, Aegis ships and some P-3 aircraft are the things -- some of the things under consideration that we think would be helpful.

I'm sorry, go ahead.

Q: Is it a request or just saying it's helpful?

CLARKE: I was not in the meeting, so I don't know exactly the tick-tock of the conversation, but I know we have expressed the views that those things -- those kinds of things would be helpful, in addition to everything that was already done.

Tony?

Q: Torie, I came in a little late, so excuse me if this has already been asked. But on this Army "talking points," can you clarify whether Secretary Rumsfeld asked Secretary White to have the Army IG look into the circumstances surrounding the document?

CLARKE: My understanding is that Secretary White initiated the Army IG investigation.

Q: Now, can I follow up? The Army IG -- traditionally, those reports are not released to the public; the Army has traditionally not given them up. Can we get some assurance from you that whatever they come up with will be released, given the gravity of the situation and the fact that it involves defending a multi-billion-dollar weapons program?

CLARKE: I can't do it right now, but we can take the question and we'll look into it, see what we can do.

Q: (Off mike) -- If you can, just look.

CLARKE: Sure.

Q: The whole issue of can they investigate themselves will also come up, you know, properly investigate charges against officials.

May 3, 2002 9:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ivanov Letter

Don't have Wolfowitz send this. I am already back here. Just send the attached letter.

Thanks.

Attach.  
SecDef Itr to MoD Ivanov

DHR:dh  
050302-17

Please respond by 05/06/02

3335D

3 May 02

U22412 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/13591



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Honorable Sergey Borisovich Ivanov  
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation  
Ministry of Defense  
Moscow, Russia

Dear Minister Ivanov,

I enjoyed our visit. I hope it was useful from your standpoint.

While I was gone, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz approved the dispatch of our first trainers to Georgia. As I recall, I told you it would probably begin in a few days. It turns out it actually began in one day, rather than a few.

I hope you have a good holiday.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/13592

*Please copy [unclear]  
to [unclear] crowd  
Dep Sec*

Dear Mr. Minister:

I tried to reach you by phone two days ago, but was told that you were off for the May 1 holidays. I hope that you are enjoying some well-earned rest.

I am sending this message to let you know that I had approved, in Secretary Rumsfeld's absence, the dispatch of our first trainers to Georgia. The Secretary was unaware of this when he met you or he would have informed you himself. As I know the Secretary has indicated to you directly, our intent with this training is to give the Georgians the ability to provide law and order on their side of the border, thereby contributing to your security as well.

S/2  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

SecDef -  
DepSec would  
like to send this  
to Sergei Ivanov  
but wants you to  
see first.  
 D. Reitman

11-L-0559/OSD/13593

May 9, 2002 12:11 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mrs. Rumsfeld's Flights

I want to find out all the government flights Joyce has been on since I have been Secretary of Defense. Somewhere you have a list of which ones I have paid for and which ones I did not, because it was supposedly official business.

I want to see the entire list. I may want to pay for every and any flight she is on, which I assume we have done.

Let me see it, and I will take a look and decide what I want to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050902-6

.....  
*Please respond by* 05/24/02

9 May 02

U22413 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13594

3:08 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
DATE: May 11, 2002  
SUBJECT: Crusader

Let's make sure that the Crusader chronology and the testimony are worked through Myers, Pace and Shinseki so they have a chance to know precisely what we are getting ready to say and they are given a chance to give us any suggested corrections.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
051102.10

*Please respond by:* 5/13/02

*11 May 02*

**U22414 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/13595

May 13, 2002 9:55 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Transformation

Please come up with a proposal for me to establish a small office somewhere, with one, two or three people, so that they can keep Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Myers, Pace and you informed and tracking all of the transformation projects we have going.

That office will be the one that sees that things happen and reports to us every week or two as to who is doing what and where we need to do more.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
051302-19

.....  
*Please respond by 06/14/02*

*Steve —  
SD + I have  
talked. We  
Rosen —*

*13 May 02*

U22415 103


11-L-0559/OSD/13596

7:51 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *(DR)*  
DATE: April 15, 2002  
SUBJECT: *Washington Post Article*

Please tell me what this article from the Sunday April 14, 2002 *Washington Post* is about; "Military Courts Get New Powers from White House."

Thanks.



snowflake

May 31, 2002 4:01 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Manual for Courts-Martial

Please look at this note on this *Washington Post* article. I would think someone at least ought to tell me that something like that is going over to the President, even if I don't have to sign it.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/22/02 GC info memo to SecDef re: Forwarding to the President Amendments to MCM

DHR.dh  
053102-44

-----  
*Please respond by* 06/21/02

31 May 02  
DOL

U22417 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13598



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 31 2002

INFO MEMO

May 22, 2002, 9:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJHaynes 5/22/02*

SUBJECT: Forwarding To The President Proposed Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial

- You asked who sends to the President proposed amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), specifically referencing the 2002 Amendments signed April 11<sup>th</sup>. I do, on your behalf.
- The President implements the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) through MCM provisions governing military justice practice and procedures. Executive order 12484 directs an annual review of the MCM be conducted and proposed amendments be forwarded to the President for approval.
- On your behalf in accordance with DoD Directive 5500.17 procedures, I oversee this annual review of the MCM, including the Department's coordination and approval.
- I forward proposed changes to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Director obtains any required Federal agency coordination and transmits the proposed changes to the President for review and approval.
- Because MCM amendments involve the military's criminal justice system and procedures, the Federal agency coordination typically only involves the Department of Justice.
- The 2002 Amendments reflect the 1998, 1999, and 2000 DoD annual reviews that each year OMB had declined to send to the President. The reviews included MCM conforming changes to several UCMJ legislative amendments. Last year, OMB requested we consolidate all previous reviews. On October 1, 2001, I forwarded the consolidated package of prior annual reviews to the Director of OMB.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC(P&HP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/13599

# Military Courts Get New Powers

*Life Sentences, Adultery Prosecutions Among Rules Bush Invoked*

Associated Press

Military courts could sentence some criminals to life without parole and forbid witnesses to talk to reporters under changes to the manual for courts-martial issued by the White House.

The changes also spell out for the first time rules for prosecuting members of the military for adultery. The rules say the adultery must either damage military order and discipline or hurt the military's reputation.

The new rules, issued Friday, take effect May 15. As commander in chief, President Bush has the power to write regulations controlling military courts.

Bush's new rules allow military courts to sentence defendants to life in prison either with or without parole for serious crimes such as murder, rape and kidnapping. Previously, the courts could sentence those criminals to a life sentence with no determination of whether parole would be allowed.

The new rules also allow military judges to issue "gag orders" prohibiting witnesses or parties to a case from discussing the case outside the courtroom. Civilian courts sometimes issue such orders to prevent public statements judges believe could improperly influence jurors.

Eric Seitz, a California lawyer who has been involved with more than 1,000 court-martial cases, said



FILE PHOTO BY PATRICK HAGERTY  
FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

the gag order could be unconstitutional, depending on how broadly it is applied.

"I suppose that in the military people can be ordered not to communicate to people outside the command structure," Seitz said. "But outside of that, there may be a problem with a military judge ordering civilians not to talk."

Adultery by a member of the military is a crime that can lead to a dishonorable discharge and up to one year in prison.

The new rules state that adultery "is clearly unacceptable conduct" but that to be a crime it "must either be directly prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting." That means the adultery must have a divisive effect on a military unit or be so well-known that it dishonors the military.

In deciding whether to charge someone with criminal adultery, commanding officers should consider circumstances including the rank

In 1997, Lt. Kelly Flinn quit the Air Force rather than face court-martial for adultery.

of the offenders, the misuse of government time or resources, whether the adultery persisted despite orders to halt it and its impact on the military unit.

"The way in which adultery is pursued as a crime has been vastly unfair for years," Seitz said. "High-ranking officials have affairs in full view of other officials and then the military decides to make an example of a private. If these rules create a more fair situation, I am for it."

Earlier rules had said that adultery must damage military discipline or hurt the military's reputation to be a crime, but they did not spell out how that was to be determined.

The military had several public cases of adultery during the late 1990s. In 1997, Lt. Kelly Flinn, the Air Force's first female B-52 pilot, resigned rather than face adultery charges for an affair with the husband of another Air Force member.

Flinn's case led to charges by critics that there was a double standard that shielded male officers from adultery charges.

Since then, at least four generals and admirals have been punished for adultery and related offenses. They include retired Maj. Gen. David Hale, the highest-ranking Army officer to face a court-martial since 1952, and Sergeant Major of the Army Gene C. McKinney, then the Army's highest-ranking enlisted soldier.

10:20 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TM*  
DATE: April 17, 2002  
SUBJECT: Gingrich Memorandum

I just looked over this note from Newt on the DPG. This is an excellent memo and I agree with almost everything on it.

Either get things in there that he suggested, or else see me about them and let's discuss it if you think they should not be in there. Let's talk about why.

Thanks so much.

DHR/azn  
041702.06

Attach: Newt Gingrich Memo dated 4/15/02 Re: DPG

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

4/24/02

17 Apr 02

U22418 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13601

For secdef, depsecdef

From Newt *Newt*

Observations on the draft DPG April 15,2002

Steve let me read the current draft of the DPG on Friday and I made the following notes:

1. under training the Joint Forces Command should get the equivalent of a budget line comparable to Socom, JFCOmn should be able to buy training forces, etc from the services and should have the power of the purse to implement transformational training and joint experiments. Eventually this might be a congressionally legislated line P-12 (Socom is P-11) but in the interim this can be achieved by budget directive.
2. Objective 4 of the QDR transformational goals should be expanded to include a section on Public Information Operations precedent to the section on technical information operations. Winning both the strategic and tactical public information campaigns are the sine qua non of being able to sustain allied and American public opinion ad therefore sustaining the ability to implement campaigns. This has to be recognized as a major directive and institutionalized or it will never happen. One option would be to make this the seventh transformational goal.
3. Objective 3 of the transformational goals in the QDR includes urban and jungle "in all weather and terrains...persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid deployment." the urban and jungle problems are so hard they should be separately identified as goals.
4. on page 2 , after transforming our business operations you should add "a focus on enhancing value and taking the cost out of activities". This combines Paul O'Neil's focus on adding value (the Toyota production model) with the Wal-Mart formula.
5. page 3 the Army goal of "a rapidly deployable, complete and integrated" force requires a change in the personnel system. Since 1917 we have been using an individual replacement system in the Army which clearly weakens unit cohesion. A "swift defeat corps" ought to have stable personnel who train together and fight together.

*See me*

- 6.page 4, the airborne electric attack system should specify developing a UCAV option ✓
- 7.page 7. item 6leveraging information technology should include the concept of developing a franchise system by which selected allies could plug into our worldwide capital base and thus dramatically expand their capabilities at limited cost to themselves. This franchising model for allies should become a major component of how DOD goes through transformation.
8. page 8—are we ensuring that bandwidth requirements overseas (where as I understand it our military bandwidths are now being used for civilian purposes) are compatible with our next generation bandwidth planning.
9. page 8—in business transformation include the provision of the most modern and effective health (an estimated \$4 billion a year reform) ↗
10. page 8. Train as we fight should be joint. The “overarching training plan” should be joint and should be driven by JFComm. ↗ +
11. Page 8. we should try to buy systems at the optimum procurement rate and force changes and savings elsewhere. The savings over a generation of buying at an optimum versus a stretched rate is enormous. ↗ +
12. page 8—we should be calculating lifetime costs of systems including pensions and health benefits (note the guess that the CVNX with electric drive could save 75,000 man years of labor in running it during a 50 year lifetime). ↗ +
13. Page 10 “transforming intelligence capabilities should apply outside DOD to the whole intelligence system.
14. Page 10 paragraph 4: “willingness in some cases to emphasize new alternate substitute capabilities and forego some current weapons systems and invest in more transformational capabilities.” I do not see how either the IAV or the new army attack helicopter survive this standard.
15. page 10, we should consider shifting the deployments from Germany to Poland and Romania, cheaper, more room, better climate for our personnel. ↗ +

16. "improving the rotation ratios" both requires changing the Army individual replacement system and looking at the human equivalent of high value, low density systems. Some types of uniformed personnel are very much in demand, others are not. We should analyze which skills are in short demand and have constant ops tempos and which don't and shift training and unit size accordingly.

17. page 6 "hard and deeply buried targets" we have to consider that in many cases this is going to require boots on the ground because the volume of construction is now beyond our ability to cope with by airpower unless we use nuclear weapons. In large construction we may need eyeballs inside to see what is there. We need to think this through as thoroughly as we think through aircraft takedowns by Delta Force etc.

18. page 6 We should have a current UAV or UCAV squadron much sooner than this envisions. This is one of the real technological drivers of transformational change at an operational level and it should happen much faster than this envisions. We should not let the better future preempt a very useful present.

19. Page 4 in attacking land targets Col. Bruner and General Worden's more radical efforts to develop suborbital reusable fast delivery systems should be explicitly included up to the prototype stage.

20. page 3 denying sanctuary requires a dramatic increase in our capabilities in urban and jungle warfare. We badly need a direction to DARPA-Socom to work together to produce new capabilities in these areas. This needs to be a top down approach which really rethinks capabilities (note the SOSUS, AWACs examples of systems changing an entire approach to warfare rather than just improving submarines or fighter planes). General Keane understands this issue.

21. page 6, on space operations we need a specific goal of creating an order of magnitude improvement in the cost of putting weight into space.

22. page 7-interoperability—we need to set deadlines for fielding blue force trackers. The Air Force is already doing this. We should start by fielding it in the "Swift defeat Corps" which should be the model

of jointness. It should be used in training for all services as soon as possible if we are to train as we will fight.

23. page 7—could the joint maritime patrol assignment be done by a UAV or UCAV? +
24. reforming professional military education so it adopts transformational outlook and skills should be in the DPG. +
25. page 11—defense of the homeland should be embedded in the National Guard rather than the active or reserve forces. It should be assumed for planning purposes that the active and reserve force and up to 40% of the current Guard could be involved in overseas operations while the other 60% of the Guard focuses on response, recovery and reconstitution in a large homeland security crisis. ?
26. page 12—“swiftly defeat the efforts” should include more humanitarian, more SOF and not just more technology. +
27. Page 12—personnel tempo—we need a strategy to make airport policing entirely a civilian function and keep uniformed personnel away from it.
- 28.page 12—strengthening joint operations—if we are going to create joint standing task force headquarters how many current headquarters can we disband as no longer necessary. We want fewer layers of decisions not more. +
29. page 12—on experimentation: how do we create a climate and system which encourages bottoms up experimentation? Cebrowski is particularly good on the dangers of the Joint staff trying to centralize experimentation. This requires deep thought and should be assigned to someone. +
30. page 12. Quality of life—we should shift to the private sector model of having expediters move people with one phone call (Krieg can expand on this). It will save money and dramatically ease the problem of movement for families. +
31. The six transformational goals need to be integrated rather than stovepiped. They should fit together into a synergistic whole rather than be pursued in separate boxes.

32. page ten—needs a bullet on strategic intelligence gathering and analysis including institutions beyond DOD.

33. page 10. needs a bullet on multi-theater real time coordination. Unlike the World War II team around Marshall we do not today have a system which handles crises with simultaneity. We tend to become sequential and focus on the crisis of the moment. Our role as a global system engaged in transformational change requires both wider and (in time) deeper management reach.

34. page 10-strengthening alliances and partnerships should be the place for an explicit commitment to a franchise model of transformation in which trusted allies acquire dramatically more capability per dollar by being part of the American global capital investment.

35. page 17 we need to rebuild the Guard and Reserve employer partnership for longer term mobilizations possibly with tax credits. This may also be worthy of an annual white house event honoring employers who participate.

36. page 18—the IBCT is an idea whose time has passed. The lessons of Afghanistan should lead to a profound thinking of how we project power. The IBCT costs too much to achieve too little.

37. page 21—flattening the command process might begin by starting with two techniques: first, use a blank page and describe a logical simple system and then ask why we would add any additional layers. Second, use the Peter Drucker technique of asking, if we were not already doing this would we start and if not why are we still doing this?

38. page 22—Homeland defense has to be designed assuming a war is underway and already absorbing DOD's attention.

39. page 29—missile defense—we should look at long loiter UCAVs to execute a launch phase destruction system.

40. page 35—we need “project underground” an assessment of current mining and tunneling techniques, the rate of their improvement and a projection of what another decade of this activity by potential opponents will create in terms of hidden capabilities and how we should respond to that reality.

52. page 57 large aircraft infrared countermeasures should be put on civilian airliners since the next cycle might involve ~~sams~~ against civilian airliners

53. page 59 the science and technology components of the services should be thoroughly overhauled since I consistently hear that the labs are not doing very good work. DARPA should also be rethought in an effort to get at a much more transformational relationship with the emerging frontiers of science.

shewake

April 10, 2002 8:52 AM  
*Don S/H*

TO: Gen. Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Haynes

CC: Tom White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Arming National Guard Personnel

Here is a memo explaining a mistake we made here in the Department.

In the future, when we are going to be involved in something like this, we have to think through the matter before we just allow people to be deployed.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/27/02 GC info memo to SecDef re: "Arming National Guard Personnel in Title 32 Status"

DHR:dh  
041002-9

Please respond by 04/26/02

U22419 103  
*10 Apr 02*

11-L-0559/OSD/13608



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 13, 2002, 4:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel *Daniel J. Dell'Orto 5/13/02*

SUBJECT: Arming National Guard Personnel

- You indicated that the Department made a mistake by not attempting to influence governors' decisions with regard to arming and use of force rules for title 32 deployments for airport security and stated that, in the future, "we have to think through the matter before we just allow people to be deployed." (Tab A)
- In retrospect it would have been helpful to have developed general guidelines pertaining to National Guard "arming" and "rules for the use of force" before undertaking this mission. Although DoD could not mandate that the States adopt such guidelines, such general guidance might have encouraged the development of somewhat similar "arming decisions" and "use of force" rules for each state.
- The Chairman and I will recommend to appropriate DoD officials that DoD examine future requests for National Guard support using the following matrix:
  - Purpose of mission;
  - Funding;
  - Duty status of servicemembers;
  - Exit strategy; and
  - Guidance for developing "arming" and "use of force" rules.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness notes that the original decision to undertake this mission allowed only a few hours to respond to an urgent Presidential question; the alternative was to furnish 25,000 federal troops, who would have lacked proper standing, given that airport security was then a matter of local jurisdiction.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Jim Smyser, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/13609



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS S...

APR 10 2002

INFO MEMO

March 27, 2002, 11:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *W.Haynes 4/10/02*  
SUBJECT: Arming National Guard Personnel in Title 32 Status

- You asked whether you have the legal authority to direct the arming and use of force rules for the National Guard personnel performing airport security support. You do not.
- National Guard personnel performing airport security support are doing so under the authority of title 32 of the United States Code. In title 32 status, the governors have "operational control" over the National Guard personnel. ~~DoD~~ provides funding. *US.gov't.*
- In addition, state law regarding use of force applies to National Guard personnel when in title 32 status. State laws regarding use of force are not uniform.
- You may, normally through the National Guard Bureau, attempt to influence the governors' decisions regarding arming and use of force rules for title 32 deployments.
- Should a governor refuse to modify arming or use of force rules to your satisfaction, you may refuse to fund that deployment of National Guard personnel in title 32 status.
- The practical problem in the airport security situation is that the President directed the deployment and the title 32 status (governors' control; ~~DoD~~ funds). This makes it difficult for you to refuse to fund, or threaten to refuse to fund, the deployment as leverage to get the governors to modify arming or use of force rules to your satisfaction.

*4/4/02  
SPZ  
HCO*

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Jim Schwenk; (b)(6)

 11-L-0559/OSD/P 3610

*SECDEF - A good lesson learned going forward. These people were deployed before anyone had thought it through. We could leverage it through withdrawal by raising guard withdrawal by raising L. Arming issue. I will copy to SSGI*

## **COORDINATION**

**Subject:** Arming National Guard Personnel

SecArmy	Thomas E. White	did not date coordination
USD(P&R)	David S.C. Chu	dated April 23, 2002
VCJCS	GEN Peter Pace	dated May 1, 2002

snowflake Re

March 25, 2002 10:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PM*  
SUBJECT: Rotary in Taos

My daughter tells me everyone in Taos is excited because I have agreed to speak at the Taos Rotary in May. How could they have come to that misunderstanding, unless they know something I don't?

Thanks.

DHR/dh  
032502-21

Please respond by 53

2

be received by the other block  
physically. The first action after the  
efflux of energy will be to move the  
block towards City. It is also observed  
that the energy is released in the  
direction of motion.

C. J. May M. arr. Di Rita  
4/1

1

?

— 1 —

9/3

22 The Developer can now open the project configuration file, and add the following code exactly as it is shown in the code. (C)

25 Mar 02

U22420 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/13612



Urgent  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

202 FEB 27 AM 7:52

Rotary Club of Taos-Milagro  
P O Box 167, Ranchos de Taos  
NM 87557

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D C 20301-1000

Re: New Mexico Rotary Convention May 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>, 2002

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

On behalf of Rotary District 5520 (all of New Mexico and El Paso, Texas) I would like to request that you speak to our convention on Friday or Saturday, May 17<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup>, in Taos, New Mexico. We expect about 450 to 500 Rotarians to meet in Taos. It will be the first time in the history of Rotary that they have met in Taos. We are doing our best to make this a special occasion for the visitors. You would certainly help our efforts and that of the President in northern New Mexico.

We full well realize that your best plans may be interrupted by world events. We can arrange the speaking time to fit your schedule since you will be at home. The Taos Rotary Club, along with the Rotary Clubs of Angel Fire, Espanola, and Los Alamos are hosting this convention.

Thank you for your consideration. We have meet before at the Taos County Republican meeting and at the Taos Land Trust. We have some common ties from the past that we will discuss sometime here in Taos. Thank you for the job you are doing for America.

Sincerely,

John D. Rumsfeld  
Secretary

(b)(6)

Secretary of Defense



SA0003786

U03508 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13613

newlake  
snowflake

12:54 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: April 15, 2002  
SUBJECT: Calendar

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 15 2002

You had better regret this Taos thing so they know I am not going to be able to make it.

Thank you.

Dan

DHR/azn  
041502.30

Attach: 2/27/02 Invite re: NM Rotary Convention

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

4/17/02

X

U22421 103 20-6851

11-L-0559/OSD/13614



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 FEB 27 AM 7:52

Rotary Club of Taos-Milagro  
P O Box 167, Ranchos de Taos  
NM 87557

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D C 20301-1000

Re New Mexico Rotary Convention May 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>, 2002

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

On behalf of Rotary District 5520 (all of New Mexico and El Paso, Texas) I would like to request that you speak to our convention on Friday or Saturday, May 17<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup>, in Taos, New Mexico. We expect about 450 to 500 Rotarians to meet in Taos. It will be the first time in the history of Rotary that they have met in Taos. We are doing our best to make this a special occasion for the visitors. You would certainly help our efforts and that of the President in northern New Mexico.

We full well realize that your best plans may be interrupted by world events. We can arrange the speaking time to fit your schedule since you will be at home. The Taos Rotary Club, along with the Rotary Clubs of Angel Fire, Espanola, and Los Alamos are hosting this convention.

Thank you for your consideration. We have meet before at the Taos County Republican meeting and at the Taos Land Trust. We have some common ties from the past that we will discuss sometime here in Taos. Thank you for the job you are doing for America.

Sincerely,

John D. Farr  
Secretary

(b)(6)

Secretary of Defense



SA0003786

11-L-0559/OSD/13615

U03508 /02

TO: Dov Zakheim  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: April 15, 2002  
SUBJECT: Financial Management Architecture

9:09 AM

SECURITY HAS BEEN  
APR 18 2002

Dave

100.5

I just read your memo of April 9<sup>th</sup> on Financial Management Architecture. I am concerned. If we are going to spend \$100 million, we certainly ought to have a department-wide agreement as to what kind of an architecture we want; what the goal is, what the objective is. The last thing I want to do is to take the system we have and make it perfect. It is a lousy system in the sense it does not produce the kind of information we want. I think you better get a darn good briefing prepared for the senior people in the department so we can have a discussion about it and see what you think you are doing and we give everyone in the department a chance to calibrate it. I am quite worried about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
041602.16

Please respond by:

4 | 23 | 08

15 Apr 02

U22422 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13616



COMPTROLLER

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100**

**INFO MEMO**

April 17, 2002, 1:59 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Financial Management Architecture

- The new financial management architecture effort is aimed to do precisely what you indicated in your memo to me of April 15.
- The contract plan is to entitle DoD to reengineer its financial management system. It involves streamlining and reorganizing business processes to enable DoD to adopt industry best practices. It will result in the definition of standards for all DoD units to employ data the same way.
- The effort derives from extensive consultation with the new Defense Business Practices Implementation Board, the Business Initiative Council (which is chaired by Pete Aldridge and includes the Service Secretaries), the Senior Executive Council, and with other senior OSD leadership.
- We are ready to brief you at any time on the contract, the plan behind it, its objectives, and our findings to date.

*Will check back  
Dov S. Zakheim*  
COORDINATION: NONE

11-L-0559/OSD/13617



COMPTROLLER

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

LETTER OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

April 9, 2002, 6:53 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *Dov*

SUBJECT: Financial Management Enterprise Architecture

- Sam Di Rita*
- A centerpiece of our ongoing financial management reform effort is the development of an enterprise architecture or a "blueprint" for transforming DoD's financial practices.
  - Today, we awarded a "blanket purchase agreement" to IBM for contractual support to develop the Department's Financial Management Enterprise Architecture. As the lead contractor, IBM teamed with Accenture, American Management Systems (AMS), DynCorp, KPMG, and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).
  - This is a huge task. But, based on IBM's own internal business transformation, we think that they have the necessary experience to successfully accomplish this contractual effort.
  - The architecture will be completed in 1 year, but the agreement allows for 4 option years to maintain the architecture. The agreement has an estimated value of between \$50 million and \$100 million, depending upon the number of tasks issued against it.
  - I will speak to the press about the award tomorrow at 1:15 p.m. *(This happened on Wednesday, 4/10.)*

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

Prepared by: John Makepeace, OUSD(C)/BMSI, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>4/10</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>4/11</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>31-3-4/11</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>204/10</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/13618

U06433 /02

# 236

April 25, 2002 1:01 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Artillery

*Pinned at File  
MTG on SIE*

Senator Bunning raised the question about the 101<sup>st</sup> general saying he asked for artillery and was told no.

We raised it with Franks and DeLong. Their answer was that the Army always wants to bring their artillery. That's what they normally do. The CENTCOM land forces commander assessed the threat and the terrain, and decided the mission to task didn't make sense. He told them they shouldn't bring their artillery, that mortars would be the weapons of choice.

You might have someone go back up and talk to Senator Bunning and report back.

It was not decided in the Pentagon. It was not decided by Tom Franks. It was decided by the Army Land Component Commander, through a discussion process, and proved to be the right decision, as I understand it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042502-24

.....

Please respond by 05/17/02

25 Apr 02

U22423 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13619



**CHAIRMAN  
OF THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Date: MAY - 8 2002

**MEMO TO:** The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

Mr. Secretary,

Sir, the attached letter sent to Sen Bunning explains the rationale for not deploying artillery in Afghanistan. I will keep you informed of any further discussions with Sen Bunning on this topic.

*VR Dick*



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0999

8 May 2002

The Honorable Jim Bunning  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-1703

Dear Senator Bunning,

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld informed me of your questions regarding the decision not to deploy the 101st Airborne Division's organic artillery to Afghanistan. I greatly appreciate the concern shown for our soldiers.

Lieutenant General Mikolashek, the ground commander in the region, decided not to request the deployment of artillery to Afghanistan. As part of his decision, General Mikolashek carefully evaluated the mission, threat and terrain and decided that a mixture of 81mm and 120mm mortars was the appropriate weapon system for the challenges posed by the mountains of Afghanistan. Mortars provide to US troops advantages in mobility, responsiveness and rates of fire that howitzers do not possess. The choice of mortars over artillery reflects the commander's judgment of the best weapon to accomplish the mission and took into account the ability of US air assets to deliver precision munitions at any time.

Thank you again for your support of the Nation's military.

Sincerely,

RICHARD B. MYERS  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/13621

April 22, 2002 2:42 PM

471

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Smart Artillery Rounds

F

Please take a look at this memo on the artillery round. Should we get that fed into the DPG? I think so.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/15/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Question Regarding Smart Artillery Rounds

DHR:dh  
042202-35

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

22 Apr 02

U22424 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13622



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

2002 APR 15 AM 11:03

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 22 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

**USD(AT&L) has seen APR 15 2002**

SUBJECT: Question Regarding Smart Artillery Rounds

- You asked, "How do we get a smarter artillery round?"
  - The Information Paper at Tab A identifies three possible alternatives for obtaining a Smart Artillery Round. These are: (1) Use of existing inventory; (2) Off-shore procurements; and (3) Completion of an existing RDT&E program.
  - Within our list of possible alternatives for a "smarter artillery round," I recommend that we issue guidance to the Army to accelerate the Excalibur projectile. Excalibur's range (out to 47 kilometers), its payload options (both a unitary (high explosive) and smart, sensor-fuzed submunitions), and its guidance system (inertial navigation system and global positioning system) underscore the value of Excalibur as a "smart artillery round." \*
- \* DPC

Prepared By: Walt Squire, OUSD(AT&L)/S&TS/LW

(b)(6)

90016-2002AT

RELEASER	RITA	4/16
SPM	2002	
EXCESED WHITMORE		

11-L-055 OSD/13623

U06689 /02

## INFORMATION PAPER

QUESTION: "How do we get a smarter artillery round?"

SUMMARY: There are three different ways of providing our artillery forces with a "smart" round capability. These are: (1) drawing from existing inventory; (2) off-shore procurements; and (3) completion of the RDT&E program for a "smart" projectile.

### EXISTING INVENTORY:

- Copperhead: In the mid-1980's, the Army completed the development and fielded in excess of 20,000, 155mm Copperhead rounds. After launch the projectile "homes in on" a laser spot designated on the target by a ground, forward observer. The time between laser designation and projectile launch is a little less than 20 seconds. For this reason, Copperhead is not effective against moving (armored) targets.
- SADARM (Sense and Destroy Armor): The Army terminated procurement of SADARM in Fiscal Year 2000. SADARM is a 155mm, thin-wall, projectile which carries two SADARM sub-munitions to the target area. The sub-munitions have a sensor suite which utilizes Infrared and Active and Passive millimeter wave radar. SADARM is actually a counter battery weapon as moving (armored) targets would move outside of its footprint during the projectile's flight. There are 348, full-up SADARM projectiles which are approved as conditional release. The contractor is Northrop/Aerojet Electro Systems. An average unit cost in production would be \$50-60K.

OFF-SHORE PROCUREMENTS: There are potential sources that could deliver spin-stabilized sensor-fuzed munitions; however, the availability timelines vary.

- BONUS: BOFORS Defence and GIAT Industries have developed 155 BONUS under a common specification for the Swedish and French Armies. BONUS is a projectile carrier for two "smart" submunitions. The submunitions use a passive, multi-channel, IR-sensor, and the BONUS carrier is equipped with a base bleed for extended range. A total of 800 Bonus rounds would be purchased and delivered by mid 2003 for an estimated unit price of \$25-35K.
- SMArt 155: SMArt 155 is another submunition carrier with a more robust sensor suite. The submunitions use millimeter wave radar and radiometer as well as infrared sensors. SMArt 155 is manufactured by GIWS of Nuremberg, Germany. A total of 1600 SMArt 155 rounds could be purchased and delivered by the end of 2002 for an estimated unit price of \$50-60K. There are two submunitions in each SMArt, 155mm projectile.

COMPLETION OF ARMY's RDT&E PROGRAM: The Army's RDT&E program to field a precision guided "smart" artillery projectile is Excalibur. Excalibur is being developed in three blocks – block I contains a unitary (high explosive) warhead, block II adds smart, sensor-fuzed submunitions as in BONUS or SMArt 155, and block III adds

target discriminating capabilities to the unitary warhead. Given an accurate target location, the on-board guidance (GPS/INS) and navigational control system enables this projectile to come within 10 meters of the intended target (irrespective of range). This precision allows much less collateral damage. A production milestone decision for block I is scheduled for Fiscal Year 2006. Army estimates the first year unit production cost to be \$90K per round; average unit production cost is estimated at \$30K per round.

*We are looking at accelerating Excalibur  
in FY04.*

snowflake

Recd Sigs - 3/18/02  
1736

March 15, 2002 9:35 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Artillery Round

LW —  
#031901

How do we get a smarter artillery round?

Thanks.

bHR:dh  
031502-18

Please respond by 04/15/02

4/16

Response attached!

copy to: DeGambone  
done - lw

Larry Di Rita

4/16

4/4/02

U05644 102

11-L-0559/OSD/13626

Rm 2  
S13

April 1, 2002 9:35 AM

100.54

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*  
SUBJECT: Shifting Forces

Should the Defense Planning Guidance address the question of how we might shift the total numbers of forces to have less in Europe and more in Asia, and how we can shift the forces that are currently in each of those places from less of a defense force to more of a lily pad force?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040102-10

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02



1 Apr 02

U22425 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13627

Action  
S-12

April 1, 2002 9:05 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Notes from Meeting

h5.54  
100.54

Please think through our meeting with Andy Marshall the other day and the ideas that came up. What do you think about including them in the Defense Planning Guidance?

I am looking at your memo from March 22, talking about reorganization of NATO forces and headquarters.

You had a point on transforming the Polish military and the U.S. connecting there. You talked about fashioning a new initiative with Vietnam. Andy Marshall talked about focusing on information warfare, robotics and interface between the biological sciences and getting the Defense Science Board going on that. He talked about changing the culture in the Department and seeing that careers in the right areas are rewarded. He mentioned the School of Advanced Military Studies that the Army has to train planners, and trying to make it joint. He raised the question of how we tilt towards Asia and the reorganizing of the stackpole activity out in Hawaii.

Please think through how some of that could be reflected in the Defense Planning Guidance.

Another issue, of course, is how do we get the Middle East countries, the Muslim countries, to modernize and start behaving.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040102-4

.....  
Please respond by 04/26/02

20 Apr 1

U22426 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13628

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo for Cebrowski

April 9, 2002 7:51 AM

SECDEF was

Done 7/18

03/11/02

Please send this memo on the semantics of transformation to Cebrowski.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/11/02 SecDef memo to PDUSD(P) re: Semantics of Transformation [031102-42]

DHR:dh  
040902-7

Please respond by 04/12/02

381

9 Apr 02

U22427 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13629

March 11, 2002 3:05 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *OK*  
SUBJECT: Semantics of Transformation

The more I think about it, the more I wonder if the word "transformation" is a good one. It sounds like it starts and ends, but we really need more of a culture and a set of processes that are swift, deft, agile and allow the institution to change as needed. We need a culture that encourages change, new ideas, new approaches and that systematically resists bureaucratic rigidities.

It makes me wonder if in Chapter 6 of the Annual Report we ought to tone down a bit on the word "transformation" and beef up what I just said. What we are really looking for is not a transformation, but a culture that encourages transforming.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-42

---

*Please respond by* 03/22/02

U12103~~2~~/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13630

X April 8, 2002 9:37 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: "Force Closure" and Operational Availability

"Force closure" and operational availability are subjects that have to be in the DPG. In effect, what I am talking about is what force from what Service, or what capability within what time limit, has to be where and how long or what cycle they are available for.

That clearly is a metric we have to impose on the DPG and make sure that before we go into the POM process that that has gotten a lot more clarity than it currently has. It is a way we can bring these Services up through the needle head on something critically important.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040802-19

.....  
*Please respond by* 04/26/02

20 Apr 2002

U22428 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13631

Doe  
Sleev

April 5, 2002 10:07 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Note to Norway's MoD

SECDEF WAS ON

SPU 2 &amp; 7/11/02

I want to get a note off to the Minister of Defense of Norway about the Norwegian mine clearer who was injured in a mine accident yesterday.

Please tell Torie we may want to mention it in a press conference.

Norway

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040502-11

.....  
*Please respond by 04/08/02*

X

5 Apr 02

U22429 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13632

SNOWMAKERS

April 4, 2002 4:17 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *MR*  
SUBJECT: Peacekeeping Force

Here is this Al Hunt article. Someone ought to tell him the following:

1. Colin Powell never had a proposal for a sizeable international peacekeeping force that anyone in the Government is aware of.
2. There are no countries standing in line to add international peacekeepers.
3. The U.S. had to provide support for the Brits to get them to take the lead, and will have to provide even greater support to get the Turks to succeed the Brits, now that the Brits have said they are not going to continue to lead the force. The U.S. is now out raising money to help pay the Turks and others to sustain the international peacekeeping force at the current size. The Turks refused to succeed the UK in the lead unless all agreed the ISAF would only be in Kabul and would stay roughly the same size.
4. There is not one person who has proposed that there be an expansion of the international peacekeeping force who has offered a single soldier or a single dollar to help do it.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/04/02 Al Hunt, "A Presidency in Disarray," *The Wall Street Journal*

DHR:dh  
040402-7

Please respond by 04/12/02

APR 12 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/13633

U22430 103



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

April 11, 2002

Mr. Al Hunt  
Executive Editor  
The Wall Street Journal  
1025 Connecticut Avenue NW  
Suite 800  
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Hunt:

Regarding your April 4, 2002 piece, "A Presidency in Disarray," there are a few points I would like to bring to your attention regarding international peacekeeping forces and operations in Afghanistan.


In your article you state, "In a victory for Defense Chief Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell's hope to send a sizable international peacekeeping force into Afghanistan has been rejected." This is simply not true. Colin Powell has never proposed a sizeable international peacekeeping force for Afghanistan.

There are no countries standing in line to add international peacekeepers. The United States has worked closely with the British, and now with Turkey to establish and sustain the international peacekeeping force at its current size. The affected nations are still negotiating the details for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), its location and its size.

There isn't one person who has proposed that there be an expansion of the international peacekeeping force who has offered to help do it. As Secretary Rumsfeld stated in his March 28, 2002 press briefing, "It's an awful lot easier to stand back and point a finger and say why isn't something bigger, better or longer or richer or more of this, than it is to say, 'Okay, I'll line up and help.'"

The war on terrorism is unlike any conflict the world has ever seen. It is a global war with global implications. Both President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have stated numerous times that this war will not be an easy one, it will take considerable time and effort from the United States and Coalition members in order to win. The American people understand that and strongly support the efforts that have achieved considerable success in a relatively short time.

Sincerely,

  
Victoria Clarke  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

Attachments: Transcripts of Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks.

11-L-0559/OSD/13634

Wall Street Journal  
April 4, 2002

**Politics & People**

## A Presidency In Disarray

By Al Hunt

President Bush's post 9/11 political veneer is cracking.

He has had his worst weeks since the terrorist attacks on America. His Middle East policy (a charitable description) is feckless: While violence raged on the West Bank and in Israel last Saturday, the president appeared clueless. U.S. goals in Afghanistan and Iraq are under siege.

It's only a little better domestically. The self-styled apostle of free trade turned craven and protectionist when confronted by the potent steel and lumber industries. In signing a campaign finance reform bill -- in the dead of the morning with few around -- Mr. Bush was graceless. After terrorism, what is the Bush message?

To be sure, George Bush's poll ratings have slipped only slightly from the stratospheric post-Sept. 11 levels. But conventional Washington wisdom underrates his vulnerabilities.

"We may be seeing a reprise of Bush One," ventures independent pollster John Zogby. Six months after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, that President Bush was still riding high, but a collapse was on the horizon.

Not surprisingly, this White House prefers parallels to two other predecessors: George W. Bush, they say, is like Ronald Reagan, a man of principle, who says what he thinks and does what he believes. And he's the anti-Clinton, above crass calculations and petty politics.

Sure.

Imagine the outcry if Mr. Clinton's United Nations representatives voted against the Israelis on a Saturday morning and the president was trotted out only hours later expressing a different view. Or if President Clinton sent his vice president on a highly publicized overseas mission that turned out disastrously. Remember "amateur hour" in foreign policy? And what a hypocrite Mr. Clinton would have been called if, as a supposed free trader, he raised taxes, in the form of higher tariffs, to placate important electoral and contributor bases.

Let's go to the Gipper. Suppose a campaign-finance reform bill, authored by an arch-enemy and with provisions he opposed on principle, was sent to his desk. Ronald Reagan might have reasoned the principles really mattered and vetoed the bill. Or, if not, he would have graciously signed it -- and taken credit for it. Mr. Bush, who a passive White House press corps continues to tell us is a strong or at least secure president, didn't want to ruffle the right-wing. Even more, he couldn't stomach a signing celebration with his enemy, John McCain.

The Bush political advisers don't want him to use political capital in a Middle East quagmire. They have a point. How do you play honest broker without pressuring the Israeli tanks to back off, yet how do you criticize Israel for responding to terrorism as we did?

Septuagenarians Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat never will negotiate a peace. And what follows isn't encouraging. Mr. Arafat is a duplicitous political coward, but if the Israelis get rid of him, his successor likely will be more radical. By late this year, Mr. Sharon probably will be replaced by former Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, who would take an even harder line.

Yet the only hope for a lower level of violence and preconditions that later, under different leaders, might produce an accord, is an active U.S. engagement and leadership of the sort this administration eschewed. The smartest move -- one that would test how secure George W. Bush and Colin Powell truly are -- would be to enlist Democrat George Mitchell, author of a peace proposal, to direct a concerted U.S. effort. Don't hold your breath.

The connection between Israeli-Palestinian violence and toppling Saddam Hussein appears to have surfaced only during Vice President Cheney's trip to the region. Six months ago most hawks on Iraq expected that the campaign would either be successful by now or well underway.

The situation in Afghanistan also is troubling. In a victory for Defense Chief Don Rumsfeld, Colin Powell's hope to send a sizable international peacekeeping force into Afghanistan has been rejected. The likely result: Iran will control western Afghanistan, radical Muslims will control much of the East, heroin and terrorism will flourish and the courageous new Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai, will be restricted to a small enclave around Kabul.

The president seems oblivious to the recent warning of former United States Ambassador Richard Holbrooke that "if Afghanistan is important enough to wage war over -- and it is -- it's equally important to stabilize and rebuild" that country, even if that's "long and costly."

This has upset Mr. Karzai, the nervous Pakistanis and much of the anti-terrorism alliance. Indeed, public opinion, not elite opinion, all over the world, has turned decidedly negative on George W. Bush and his politics. Mr. Zogby soon will release a survey of five Arab and five non-Arab countries which will show clear identification with American culture and the American people but with growing opposition to George W. Bush and his policies. Foreign policy shouldn't be conducted by international polls, but it's tough to marshal support for efforts like toppling Saddam if leaders face public resentment.

Domestically, unlike his father, George W. Bush doesn't face an economic downturn, but he too has a limited agenda. Midterm elections are about turnout. Democrats have more upside with the emergence of health care, particularly prescription drugs, and worries over Social Security, as major issues this fall.

Enron, by itself, isn't a big deal politically. But this administration's willingness to give business interests -- particularly energy -- a blank check presents an opening for Democrats. The argument: If these guys control everything -- the presidency, House and Senate -- these special interests will bankrupt you.

President Bush may be aided by the timidity of the opposition. At periodic caucus meetings, Democrats hear from consultants who warn them against raising taxes, Enron, the Middle East or most any other controversies.

But high poll numbers notwithstanding, public embrace of Mr. Bush's leadership is softening. A small indicator: Opening Day of the baseball season in Baltimore Monday the president, a huge baseball fan, appeared on the centerfield JumboTron, amid patriotic flourishes, with a message; the crowd ignored him. Several minutes later the University of Maryland basketball coach, Gary Williams, appeared on the same screen to a tremendous ovation.

TO: SECDEF  
FROM: Torie Clarke  
DATE: April 18, 2002  
SUBJECT: Peacekeeping Force

I have attached a copy of the letter I sent to Al Hunt passing along your points on the peacekeeping force. Al is normally better than this. I was surprised to see he missed the boat so much on this one.

11-L-0559/OSD/13637

**Snowflake**March 1, 2002 9:15 AM  
*2/2*TO: Torie Clarke  
*Tarie*FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
*DR*SUBJECT: PR on Nigeria  
*Nigeria*

I want to get you talking to Joe Ralston's people and get some good PR on the work we are doing to deal with the ammunition dump in Nigeria. We need to get good public notice of that in the world, particularly in Africa and the UN.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030102-13Please respond by 03/03/02  
*3/3/02**Nigeria attached**Ann O'Brien**Mar 02**U22431 103*

11-L-0559/OSD/13638

25 March 2002

TO: Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: *Torie Clarke*

SUBJECT: PR on Nigeria

We are working with the DASD for African Affairs as our avenue to increase the U.S. media interest on our efforts in Africa, specifically the EOD cleanup mission in Nigeria.

Our approach to continue spreading the word on this mission will be as follows:

1. Provide a briefing from the Pentagon briefing room to allow the Office of African Affairs the opportunity to discuss our overall efforts in Africa, specifically the EOD cleanup mission in Nigeria.
2. Increase public awareness by providing information on the cleanup mission to selected NGOs.
3. Working with the Foreign Press Center to increase awareness with the rest of the international media community.
4. Aggressively follow-up any media interest with additional interviews.

Meetings are scheduled this week with the Office of African Affairs to finalize this approach and to set up the Washington briefings.

Note: Gen. Ralston and his European Command Public Affairs Office have already pushed the story hard with their regional media and have received excellent coverage thus far. Our effort from here will continue the great work they have started. Examples of some of the media coverage from the region are attached.

[<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Mar2002/s20020301experts.htm>](http://ebird.dtic.mil/Mar2002/s20020301experts.htm)

Lagos (Nigeria) Guardian  
March 1, 2002

## **U.S. Bomb Experts Evolve Measures To Protect Residents**

By Alifa Daniel and Jide Olatuyi, Abuja

To prevent panicky steps and another round of destruction in Lagos, the United States bomb disposal team already in the country to detonate unexploded ordinance are working out guidelines that will enable Nigerians react appropriately to its operations.

The U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Howard Jetter, told journalists in Abuja yesterday that the guidelines would ensure that there is no further loss of lives.

According to him, some of the guidelines might be stable, some might be unstable and we have a situation here where we certainly don't want any further loss of lives".

Already, the team has advised those living or travelling around the Cantonment to "stay out of the area if at all possible".

Similarly, they should not "pick-up, disturb or touch any suspicious objects (as) unexploded ordinance is deadly and can explode at any time".

"If you see a suspicious object, move away from it and immediately notify the authorities so that the object can be removed or rendered inert", the team urged.

The envoy explained that the U.S. is not charging Nigeria for the exercise because "it is an American tradition to help a friend during a period of trial or trouble".

"The Nigerian government and people showed the same type of friendship after September 11 attacks, with an outpouring of support and messages of solidarity and brotherhood that my country will not forget," he remarked.

Jetter said President George Bush was lending the helping hand based on an appeal from President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The EOD experts, according to him, will be in Nigeria for two months, but added that if the Federal Government seeks an extension of the team's stay to help with other ordinance related matters, the American government would consider the request.

About 45 of the 60-member comprehensive task force are already in the country.



## Unexploded Bombs for Detonation Today

**This Day (Lagos)**

March 7, 2002

Posted to the web March 7, 2002

By Chika Amanze-Uwachukwu

Lagos

Bombs disposal experts from Nigeria and the United States of America, will today commence controlled detonation of unexploded bombs at the Ikeja military cantonment the venue of January 27 bomb explosions, which claimed many lives.

The exercise which takes off from 12 noon would last for several weeks as part of efforts aimed at making the environment safe after the tragic incident.

A release signed by Dele Alake, the state commissioner for Information and Strategy advised those living around the cantonment to take precautions, be very vigilant and to avoid tampering with suspicious objects for their own safety.

Members of the public are urged not to panic or be unduly alarmed by these detonations to be carried out within the Ikeja cantonment.

In his word: All those resident in or near the Ikeja cantonment are advised to take extra precautions, be very vigilant and avoid suspicious objects for their own safety.


"Government calls on members of the public, especially children, not to toy with any strange objects in their surrounding particularly in highly vegetated areas.

"Any such discovery should be promptly reported to the Police. Parents and guardians are urged to please keep a watchful eye on their children and wards in this regard," The Minister of State of Defence Alhaji Lami Batagarawa has on Tuesday disclosed that the detonation had started. He also advised Lagosians not to panic.

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## Detonation of Bombs Begin At Ikeja Cantonment

This Day (Lagos)

March 6, 2002

Posted to the web March 6, 2002

By Bennett Oghifo

Lagos

Military authorities have announced that a controlled detonation of bombs would commence this morning at the Ikaja Military Cantonment.

The detonation of unexploded bombs left after the tragic events of January 27 would be done between 9 am and 1pm by American and British bomb experts, and is expected to last for two months.

Addressing the Press yesterday, the Minister of State for Defence (Army), Alhaji Lawal Batagarawa said the American team consisted of 60 soldiers drawn from the Explosive Ordnance Department (EOD).

Batagarawa said Nigerian soldiers from the Nigerian Army Ordnance Corps and Nigerian Army Electrical, Mechanical and Engineering (NAEME) would participate in the detonation to understudy the American soldiers.

Batagarawa advised Lagosians not to panic at the sound of explosions, and residents of Ikeja and the neighbourhood of the Cantonment, particularly residents of Adekunle Fajuyi Street in Ikeja GRA to stay away from the area within the hours designated for the detonation. The street, he said, would be closed within the period.

Present at the briefing were the Chief of Policy and Plans Army, Major General David Enahoro, the GOC 81 Division, Brigadier General Abdul Tanko and the 9 Brigade Comander, Brigadier General George Emdin, and the American Deputy Defence Attaché, Col. Oliver Cass.

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Classmates



## US Team On Bomb Mop Up Arrives

**This Day (Lagos)**

February 28, 2002

Posted to the web February 28, 2002

By Ndubuisi Francis  
Lagos

A United States Air Force Hercules C-5 plane yesterday arrived Lagos with explosives detection and detonation equipment in the latest attempt to mop up the metropolis of bombs following the January 27 bomb blasts that rocked the city.

The silver-coated plane, marked AMC 70042 Travis, arrived the Nigerian Air Force wing of the Murtala Muhammed Airport at about 1.15 p.m, having on board some soldiers and several bomb detection and detonation equipment.

A spokesman of the U.S. military personnel who arrived a day earlier, Major William Thurmond, told journalists that the plane could not arrive on Tuesday due to logistics problems adding that it came with the equipment needed in the cleaning up of the environment after the bomb explosions.

The plane, is capable of refuelling while in flight and was flown into Lagos by a 10-member crew of reservists.

Thurmond, said reservists are civilians who make themselves available annually to execute military assignments such as the one the U.S. team is now embarking on in Nigeria.

He said the Travis plane arrived Nigeria from the Travis Air Force base in California and would depart after off-loading the equipment.

It is instructive that some personnel from the United States Explosive Ordnance Disposal(EOD) unit Tuesday arrived to begin the clean-up exercise.

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## Operation "Avid Recovery" Begins

March 1, 2002

LAGOS, NIGERIA - The main element of U.S. Army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts arrived in Nigeria Wednesday and has begun preparation to assist the Nigerian armed forces with clearance of unexploded ordnance.

The soldiers joined a small advance party that arrived last week, bringing the overall strength of soldiers and Department of Defense civilians involved with this operation to approximately 60.

This deployment of soldiers is part of the U.S. government's response to assist the Nigerian government in the aftermath of the tragic events resulting from the explosion of munitions stored at the Ikeja Cantonment Area in Lagos, Nigeria last month. The mission has been designated Operation AVID RECOVERY.

The majority of the soldiers deploying to conduct this operation, including all of the EOD experts, are assigned to units within the 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) from US Army Europe. The 21st TSC is based in Germany. The Task Force is commanded by Maj. Allen Cassell.

The explosive ordnance disposal experts are from the 720th Ordnance Company (EOD) and are commanded by Capt. Brian Winningham. The 720th is based in Mannheim, Germany.

In addition to the EOD experts, other soldiers with unique skills and equipment will make up the Task Force. These additional personnel will provide medical, communications and logistical support to the EOD experts.

The Task Force's medical needs will be met by soldiers from the 160th Forward Surgical Team (FST) based in Landstuhl, Germany. Other medical professionals from the 30th Medical Brigade and the First Armored Division will augment the FST. The FST will provide emergency medical, surgical and critical-care life support.

This operation has been carefully planned with close cooperation between the U.S. Army and Nigerian government and military representatives, numerous civilian contractors and other authorities. Explosive ordnance disposal specialists from the United Kingdom will also support the clearance effort.

The precise techniques that the EOD soldiers will employ to deal with the unexploded ordnance are not releasable to the public. In general terms, the EOD soldiers will conduct a detailed survey and inspection of the cantonment area, identifying and marking unexploded ordnance. If the unexploded ordnance is deemed stable enough, the EOD specialists will transport it to a safe location away from populated areas for destruction.

If the unexploded ordnance is determined to be too unstable to move safely, it will be destroyed in place using controlled detonations of explosive charges. The Task Force will inform the public through the local media prior to beginning controlled detonations on the cantonment area. These explosions will be relatively small and will occur mainly between the hours of 9 AM and 1 PM.

In addition to stabilizing the cantonment area, the U.S. Army EOD experts will provide training for the public on the dangers of ordnance and the Nigerian military personnel assisting them will be

instructed on the proper handling of explosive ordnance.

The U.S. Army EOD experts will be in Nigeria for approximately two months.

- 30 -

*For more information, please call the U.S. Consulate in Lagos at +234-(234)-1-261-0050, 261-0078. Fax: +234-1-261-9856, or U.S. Army Europe at +49-6221-57-7364/8934/7549.*

*U.S. European Command makes its first distribution of media releases using a listserv. If you would like to subscribe for breaking news when it is first released, please visit the following URL: <http://listserv.dtic.mil/listcgi/wa?SUBED1=eucom-release-I&A=1>. After you fill in required information and click "Joint the list," our server will send a confirmation message. Click on the appropriate line.*

## Work on Nigerian accident site enters second week

15 Mar 02

LAGOS, NIGERIA -- U.S. Army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts and Nigerian soldiers have entered their second week of work on the Ikeja Cantonment Area.

As of Wednesday, Mar. 13, the EOD experts working to clear unexploded ordnance on the cantonment area said that they were on schedule and that the work was proceeding according to plan.

To date, the Nigerian and U.S. team has accomplished the following:

- \* They have begun clearing the area around the mosque & football pitch
- \* Approximately 900 pieces of unexploded ordnance were destroyed in place with controlled detonations
- \* Approximately 850 pieces of unexploded ordnance were taken to an offsite area and destroyed
- \* Approximately 1,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance were marked for transport to the offsite area and later demolition
- \* Approximately 2,000 pounds of scrap metal was disposed of
- \* Nine buildings were cleared of unexploded ordnance

Experts estimate that the area adjacent to the mosque will be declared cleared in the next week. They next plan to begin clearing unexploded ordnance on the east side of the former ammunition transfer depot.

Because this area is adjacent to occupied housing, residents in the area may be asked to leave the area for a few hours on certain days. Nigerian authorities will notify affected residents in advance of any requirement to temporarily leave the area. The authorities will make every attempt to minimize inconvenience, but will actively enforce the safety cordon to prevent injury or loss of life for anyone nearby.

The controlled detonations required to destroy items of unexploded ordnance determined too dangerous or unstable to handle will continue for the next several weeks. People living in the vicinity of Ikeja should expect to hear these small detonations on weekdays between the hours of 9 AM and 1 PM.

As has been previously announced, all people living in the area around Ikeja, especially parents, are reminded to look out for and stay away from any suspicious objects. If suspicious objects are found, they should report the hazard to the authorities as soon as possible.

In order to ensure the safety of themselves and the residents near Ikeja, the U.S. EOD experts remind everyone to stay out of the area. The Nigerian Army has established a cordon around the hazard zone and no one should attempt to enter it. Members of the Nigerian military will man this cordon and will actively prevent persons from entering.

- 30 -

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[Operation Avid Recovery](#) | [Operations](#) | [Nigeria](#)

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Operation Avid Recovery | Operations | Nigeria

## Progress Report: Ordnance disposal in Lagos continues

20 Mar 02

LAGOS, NIGERIA -- U.S. Army and British explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts and Nigerian soldiers continue working on the Ikeja Cantonment Area. As of Tuesday, Mar. 19, the EOD experts working to clear unexploded ordnance on the cantonment area said that they remained on schedule.

To date, the Nigerian, British and U.S. team has accomplished the following:

- \* They continue to clear the area around the football pitch
- \* The area in the vicinity of the mosque will be clear by the end of this week  
Destroyed in place approximately 7,000 pieces of unexploded with controlled detonations (this includes 5,000 pieces of small arms ammunition, defined as smaller than 20mm)
- \* Transported and destroyed approximately 3,950 pieces of unexploded ordnance at an offsite area  
Marked approximately 3,900 pieces of unexploded ordnance for transport to the offsite area and later demolition
- \* Disposed of approximately 2,500 pounds of scrap metal
- \* Cleared nine buildings of unexploded ordnance

In the next few days the experts plan to begin clearing unexploded ordnance on the north side of the former ammunition transfer depot. The focus of their efforts will be the area between the Ninth Regiment Medical Center and the Cantonment Primary School.

Because this area is adjacent to occupied housing, residents in the area may be asked to leave the area for a few hours on certain days. Nigerian authorities will notify affected residents in advance of any requirement to temporarily leave the area. The authorities will make every attempt to minimize inconvenience, but will actively enforce the safety cordon to prevent injury or loss of life for anyone nearby.

The controlled detonations required to destroy items of unexploded ordnance determined too dangerous or unstable to handle will continue for the next several weeks. People living in the vicinity of Ikeja should expect to hear these small detonations on weekdays between the hours of 9 AM and 1 PM.

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-- 30 --

1  
snowflake

April 2, 2002 6:42 AM

slip

7/5

Date

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Nigeria

Nigeria

What you need on Nigeria is photographs or video, and you need to get a television network interested.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/25/02 ASD(PA) memo to SecDef re: Nigeria

DHR:dh  
040202-6

Please respond by 04/19/02

2 Apr 02

U22432 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13651

snowflake

March 1, 2002 9:15 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *VM*  
SUBJECT: PR on Nigeria

I want to get you talking to Joe Ralston's people and get some good PR on the work we are doing to deal with the ammunition dump in Nigeria. We need to get good public notice of that in the world, particularly in Africa and the UN.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030102-13

.....

*Please respond by* 03/08/02

*3/8/02 1/3/02  
Response attached*

*Larry Di Rita*

**U22431 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/13652

*Shu  
0600*

25 March 2002

TO: Donald Rumsfeld  
FROM: *Torie Clarke*  
SUBJECT: PR on Nigeria

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 01 2002

We are working with the DASD for African Affairs as our avenue to increase the U.S. media interest on our efforts in Africa, specifically the EOD cleanup mission in Nigeria.

Our approach to continue spreading the word on this mission will be as follows:

1. Provide a briefing from the Pentagon briefing room to allow the Office of African Affairs the opportunity to discuss our overall efforts in Africa, specifically the EOD cleanup mission in Nigeria.
2. Increase public awareness by providing information on the cleanup mission to selected NGOs.
3. Working with the Foreign Press Center to increase awareness with the rest of the international media community.
4. Aggressively follow-up any media interest with additional interviews.

Meetings are scheduled this week with the Office of African Affairs to finalize this approach and to set up the Washington briefings.

Note: Gen. Ralston and his European Command Public Affairs Office have already pushed the story hard with their regional media and have received excellent coverage thus far. Our effort from here will continue the great work they have started. Examples of some of the media coverage from the region are attached.

11-L-0559/OSD/13653

March 15, 2002 8:40 AM

Re: [REDACTED]

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Guarding Bases

What is the story on this article about getting contractors to guard military bases?

Please have someone tell me about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/13/02, Jason Peckenpaugh, GovExec.com, "Defense Pushes to Allow Contractors to Guard Military Bases"

DHR:dh  
031502-9

.....  
*Please respond by* 03/29/02

*[Handwritten mark resembling a checkmark or a stylized 'C']*

15 Mar 02

U22433 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13654

port scheduled for release today based on Pentagon statistics, also says gay discharges have more than doubled since 1994, after the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy was implemented. It permits gays to serve in the military as long as they do not engage in homosexual conduct or reveal their sexual orientation.

The advocacy group faulted the Bush administration and U.S. military commanders for allowing a "pervasive anti-gay sentiment to fester and grow" throughout the ranks, concluding: "Harassment continues in epidemic proportions."

While federal law bans gays from military service, "don't ask, don't tell" prohibits commanders from asking service members about their sexual orientation or pursuing investigations absent evidence of homosexual conduct or a service member's acknowledgment. The policy was expanded in 2000 to prohibit harassment of service members suspected of being gay.

But SLDN, a privately funded organization based in Washington, alleges in its report that every branch of the military has "virtually ignored" an "anti-harassment action plan" adopted in 2000 by Defense Secretary William S. Cohen. It was adopted after the slaying of Army Pfc. Barry Winchell in 1999 by fellow soldiers at Fort Campbell, Ky., who suspected he was gay.

The group singled out Army leadership for tolerating anti-gay harassment, reporting that 616 men and women were discharged from the Army for being gay, including 222 at Fort Campbell, more than any other Army installation.

"The story in the Army this year, much more so than in the past, is about failed leadership driven by callous indifference," the group stated. "Army leaders, up and down the chain of command, have failed to implement the safety and training initiatives launched in the wake of Pfc. Winchell's murder."

Lt. Col. James Cassella, a Pentagon spokesman, took strong exception to the group's findings, saying the military's commitment remains "stead-

fast" to enforcing the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. "We're taking extraordinary measures to foster an environment that's free of any type of harassment based on respect for fellow service members," he said.

Cassella said gay discharges often do not connote harassment, since service members who go to their superiors and acknowledge that they are gay are discharged from the military as a matter of law.

"Discharges and harassment are two different things," he said. "Discharges relate to people who are in violation of the homosexual conduct policy."

Elaine Kanellis, an Army spokeswoman, said 92 percent of the Army's 616 gay discharges were based on "simple statements" by soldiers that they are gay. "All that is required is for the soldier to claim they are homosexual," Kanellis said. "Those claims are routinely accepted at face value and not investigated."

Kanellis and Col. Tom Begines, chief of Army media relations, attributed the large number of gay discharges at Fort Campbell, home of the 101st Airborne Division, to a policy decision made after Winchell's murder to expedite the processing of gay discharges for the safety of gay service members.

"The increase should be viewed as preventative rather than punitive," Begines said. "All of that, I think, is to the Army's credit."

Kanellis said that once the expediting of gay discharges at Fort Campbell was discontinued late last year out of concern that nongay service members were improperly obtaining gay discharges as an easy way to leave the military, the number of gay discharges dropped from 33 in July to three in December.

C. Dixon Osburn, executive director of SLDN, responded that there is a strong correlation between increases in gay discharges and increased harassment. "The fact that this is the highest number of discharges since 1987 says something to us," Osburn said. "There are reasons for that, and

one of the reasons for that is harassment."

GovExec.com

March 13, 2002

## 21. Defense Pushes To Allow Contractors To Guard Military Bases

By Jason Peckenpaugh

The Defense Department should be allowed to use contractors to guard military installations, federal procurement chief Angela Styles and four Defense officials told a House panel on Wednesday.

Styles said the Bush administration supports repealing a law that prohibits the military from hiring contractors as security guards. The issue of who guards military bases is a management decision and should not be dictated by statute, she told lawmakers on the Military Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

"You can have a security guard that is carrying a weapon, using force, and protecting the lives of people who you may decide is inherently governmental," said Styles. "You have other security guards that may not be inherently governmental, and that [decision] should be left to the department or agency, and should not be made by statute."

The 1998 Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act requires federal employees to perform all jobs deemed "inherently governmental."

Defense officials at the hearing echoed Styles' remarks. "When I first was honored to take this job, the first question I asked was why aren't we using private contractors [as security guards]?", said Mario Fioro, the Army's assistant secretary of installations and environment. Fioro, who oversaw contractor security guards in a previous job with the Energy Department, said contractors could allow managers to provide better security with fewer employees.

"Right now I'm using 130 to 150 National Guard soldiers in several of my facilities to protect these places," he said. "I think I'd be a heckuva lot better off if I could use good civilian workers to do it."

The Readiness Subcommittee has considered repeal of the statute (Section 2465 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code) before, but Congress has never approved it. The American Federation of Government Employees, the largest federal employee union, vowed to fight any attempt to scrap the law.

"We will not allow the safety and security of personnel and installations to be jeopardized by rent-a-cops," said an AFGE spokesman. "Pentagon officials have obviously learned nothing from the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks."

Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, also expressed reservations about overturning the law, noting that Congress recently voted to federalize airport security. Security at military bases should be no less of a priority than airports, he said.

"I think that when you federalize security guards to take care of airports, it is a serious business," he said. "It's also a serious business to be able to protect those workers that work in military facilities, and families who might be living inside these facilities."

But Styles and the Defense officials said that contractors could handle security duties if they were well paid and highly trained. This is possible if the government specifies exactly what it requires in the contract, she said.

"It's a matter of ... in the opening solicitation of your contract saying we must have 'X' kind of person who is paid 'X' amount of money with 'X' skills," said Styles. "That way you ensure that your contract has the right type of person in place to be a security guard."

Michael Wynne, undersecretary of acquisition, technology and logistics at the Defense Department, H.T. Johnson, assistant secretary, installations and environment at the Navy, and Michael Dominguez, assistant secretary of manpower and reserve Affairs, U.S. Air Force, joined Styles and Fioro in calling for a repeal of the law.

March 14, 2002 8:11 AM

RECORDED MAIL COPY  
TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: GPS

Jim Schlesinger told me last night that Europe is going to go ahead with their own GPS system. That is a disaster. If we move fast, maybe we can get it stopped.

Let's get on it immediately. Someone needs to call Schlesinger and get a work plan as to what we ought to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031402-5

.....

Please respond by 03/21/02

LARRY - SD  
BROUGHT THIS  
UP THIS MORNING  
+ ATT + C3I  
TOOK FOR ACTION

FEB 2002

U22434 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13656

Re: [REDACTED]

March 18, 2002 11:06 AM

4/8

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Military Appointments

Please see me on this memo on military appointments.

Thanks.

Attach.  
02/26/02 GC Memo to SecDef re: Military Appointments

DHR:dh  
031802-28

-----  
*Please respond by* 03/29/02

210(3&4)

18 Mar 02

U22435 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/13657



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002

INFO MEMO

February 26, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Military Appointments

- WJH/mr 2/27/02
- Your memorandum of February 18, 2002 asked: "What would it take to change the rules so that Chiefs were appointed for two years with the possibility of two additional years, the way CINCs are; i.e., appointed for two years with the possibility of extensions?"
  - The following statutes prescribe the term of service for the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, respectively: 10 U.S.C. 3033, 5033, 5043 and 8033. Section (a)(1) of each statute says the same thing: that the Service chief is appointed for a period of four years and that in a "time of war or during a national emergency declared by Congress, he may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years."
  - The statutes also provide that the Service Chiefs serve at the pleasure of the President. This authority appears to have been used sparingly in order to relieve Service Chiefs when their superiors were dissatisfied with their performance.
  - To change the term of appointment would require a change to each of the listed statutes. Amended language could specify a renewable two-year term, or, alternatively, could specify no length of term (as is currently the case for Vice Chiefs and combatant commanders.).

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: James Smyser, OGC

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/13658

10:22 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 18, 2002  
SUBJECT: Military Appointments

*RJH*  
*JL*

What would it take to change the rules so that Chiefs were appointed for two years with the possibility of two additional years, the way CINCs are; i.e., appointed for two years with the possibility of extensions?

Thank you.

OHR/azn  
021802.08

Please respond by: 2/25

*3/4*

*SECDEF-*

*HAYNES RESPONSE*

*ATTACHED. BACK IN THE  
60'S, SERVICE CHIEFS  
USED TO HAVE 2 YR*

*U12812 102*

*TERMS RENEWABLE. ARIEIGH,  
11-L-0559/OSD/13659 END 3 TUE MAR 2002*

March 20, 2002 10:08 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Abuse

Please find out about Captain Moss, who spent all this money in Hawaii. I think that is disgraceful.

Find out if he is retiring on a waiver to maintain his grade—I want to stop it if he is. Ask the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO what they are doing about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/20/02 Al Kamen, "In the Loop—Missiles and Gazebos, the Caper on the Beach,"  
*Washington Post*

DHR:dh  
032002-14

.....  
*Please respond by 04/05/02*

000.5

20 Mar 02

U22436 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13660

the Pentagon to reclassify the pilot as missing in action last year.

"Our conclusion is that we don't know for sure what happened to him, but the Iraqis do know, and we certainly do not exclude the possibility that he could be alive and still be held captive," Adm. Wilson said.

"We simply do not know for sure, but continue to pursue with vigor to try to resolve this case," the three-star admiral said.

Sen. Pat Roberts, Kansas Republican, questioned Adm. Wilson and CIA Director George J. Tenet about the case during a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

U.S. intelligence officials told The Washington Times last week that new intelligence information gathered over the past several months indicates Cmdr. Speicher is being held prisoner in Iraq and has been limited to a few visitors in his cell.

Mr. Roberts said during the hearing that the Pentagon is considering whether to change Cmdr. Speicher's status from missing to prisoner of war.

Recent war movies like "Black Hawk Down," "We Were Soldiers," and "Saving Private Ryan," highlight the idea that "we leave no one behind," Mr. Roberts said, noting "that is what we did with reference to a young man by the name of Michael Scott Speicher."

"I've been saying that ... we did leave somebody behind, and mistakes were made; that's probably the nicest way I can put it," Mr. Roberts said.

Mr. Roberts took issue with recent statements by unidentified Pentagon officials who said it is not likely that Cmdr. Speicher is alive and that Saddam would not keep someone prisoner for 11 years.

The senator said that contrary to those claims, the Iraqi leader held an Iranian pilot as a prisoner for 17 years before releasing him.

"To try to determine what is in Saddam's head, I think, is rather foolhardy," Mr. Roberts said.

"I will tell you what's in his head: It's a dark center of evil, representing man's inhu-

mance against man with self-preservation stuffed in there with all of that."

He compared the Iraqi leader to Stalin and Hitler.

Adm. Wilson said the Pentagon last summer set up a new "cell" within the intelligence service devoted to prisoner-of-war and missing-in-action issues.

"That cell has been up and running since summer and has done enormously good work in preparing for combat operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, taking all the steps that we can to try to lay the framework so that something like the unresolved case of Cmdr. Speicher doesn't happen again," Adm. Wilson said.

Washington Post  
March 20, 2002

Pg. B3

#### **19. Academy Chief Calls For More Midshipmen**

The superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy has proposed increasing the number of midshipmen to address a shortage of Navy and Marine Corps officers.

Speaking before the academy's 15-member Board of Visitors in Annapolis, Vice Adm. John R. Ryan said he would like the student population to increase from its current limit of 4,000 to 4,400. That would add 83 ensigns to the Navy and 17 second lieutenants to the Marine Corps each year, Ryan said.

Congress limited military academies in 1995 to no more than 4,000 students. Before then, the academy had a brigade of 4,400 midshipmen and still has the infrastructure to care for them, said Cmdr. Bill Spann, U.S. Naval Academy spokesman.

Washington Post  
March 20, 2002

Pg. 31

#### **In The Loop**

#### **20. Missiles And Gazebos, The Caper On The Beach**

By Al Kamen

As if living in Hawaii weren't spectacular enough, Navy Capt. Brian W. Moss, commander of the Pacific Mis-

sile Range Facility at Barking Sands, Kauai, decided his government-owned house needed some fixing up.

So he decided to put up a couple of gazebos on the beach by the house that were originally to cost \$15,000, and to spruce up the house interior. When it was all done, the gazebos alone cost \$119,000 and the total bill for improvements came to \$177,000, according to an inspector general's report obtained by local television station KHON.

The report said Moss spent about \$13,000 for carpeting, including about \$2,700 to fly the carpet in from the mainland after he rejected locally available stuff, according to the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. The IG's report said the money he used was not authorized for that purpose.

But Moss wasn't relieved of his command and the Navy would not say what disciplinary action was taken, except to call it "very appropriate and effective."

Word at the Pentagon is the discipline didn't really amount to much. Moss was stripped of his authority over housing funds, but that was happening anyway to base commanders throughout the Navy under a streamlining effort. And Moss, who's retiring soon, apparently underwent "administrative counseling," a defense official said.

The problem, it seems, is that after much head-scratching, the Pentagon brass, though not happy about all this, couldn't determine precisely what the violations were. We're told the old rules were so poorly written that it wasn't clear whether Moss directly violated anything.

"We locked the barn door after this horse was built," a defense official reflected yesterday.

In all fairness, these are some mighty fine gazebos, with showers, wet bar and fridge.

New York Times

March 20, 2002

#### **21. 16 Of 21 B-2's Have Cracks Near Exhaust, Officials Say**

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, March 19 — The Air Force has discovered cracks on the rear sections of 16 of its 21 B-2 stealth bombers, Pentagon officials said today.

The development raises questions about the long-term future of the problem-prone aircraft, the most expensive in the world.

The cracks, which ranged in length from less than an inch to nine inches, were all on titanium plates behind the jets' engine exhausts.

The disclosure is a setback for a group of lawmakers and military officials pushing the Pentagon to buy more of the planes, which have been effective in attacking distant targets with highly precise bombs. The manufacturer, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, has offered to build 40 more of the aircraft at a cost of \$735 million each, a significant reduction from the \$2.2-billion-a-plane price of the existing fleet.

The Air Force has determined that the cracks do not pose an immediate danger to the B-2's, and, though none of them have been used over Afghanistan in recent months, the service has continued flying them on scheduled training missions, an Air Force spokeswoman said.

But maintenance crews are now required to measure each of the cracks after every flight, to see if they are growing.

A new report by the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation found that the average B-2 was available for combat duty just 31 percent of the time last year, down from 37 percent the year before; the Air Force sets a goal of having aircraft available for combat 60 percent of the time. Much of the B-2's down time is spent removing blemishes from its delicate, radar-absorbing skin.

The Air Force said that it was unclear what was causing the cracks, and that a solution

Date 3/22

March 26, 2002 3:59 PM

S E C U R I T Y

491-A Aut.

F

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: COOP

## OPERATIONS

We have to get a very clear rule on Continuity of Government—that when they are required to be out of town, they ought to be on business. They ought to be visiting troops or doing something that is business-related and not something that is vacation-related.

381

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032602-1

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

26 Mar 02

U22437 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13662

March 11, 2002 2:42 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Directive on Tooth-to-Tail

5

320.2

Please draft a directive for my signature to send to the Service Secretaries and the Under Secretaries telling them I want them to come back to me with a proposal as to how they can increase the tooth-to-tail ratio and get more people out of support functions and more people into the teeth part of the equation.

Second, I would like them to find ways they can outsource and license out various activities currently being performed by uniformed personnel, so that uniformed personnel can be freed up to do military functions that are core responsibilities of the military.

Please make sure the draft has been approved by David Chu, Paul Wolfowitz, Steve Cambone and been run by Gen. Myers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-40

.....  
*Please respond by* 04/01/02

11 Mar 02

U22438 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13663

~~SENSITIVE~~

8:45 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
DATE: March 1, 2002

**SUBJECT: Pentagon Executive Dining Rooms**

The five, six or seven dining rooms in the Pentagon are costing the taxpayers \$6M more than what people are paying for their food, if one included the cost of rent, insurance, equipment, employees and the like. There are about 2,000 senior people using them. Something is wrong. That is not fair to the taxpayers.

The users of the dining rooms ought to pay the full cost. That means that if DoD wants to leave them like they are, everyone who has the privilege of using them will have to pay \$3,000/year or \$250/month to eat there, in addition to what they pay for their food.

If we did that, it is clear that probably half of the people would decide not to use them. That means that instead of 2,000 people using them, it would be 1,000 people using them, and the cost per person would not be \$250/month, but twice that; or \$500/month. That fee is higher than any exclusive club I know of.

That suggests to me that those who now use them would want to reduce the cost. If we reduced the cost from \$6M to \$2M, that would be a fee of \$1,000/year/person, or about \$85/month. However, even at that price, a lot of people would not want to pay the \$85/month and probably half would drop out and so it would be closer to \$160-175/month for the people left.

A year has gone by. That means we have unwittingly cost the taxpayers \$6M. That pains me! Let's get this fixed in the next 30 days without fail. Get back to me with some options within seven days that will cover the full cost. The taxpayers don't need to pay for our lunches. Further, representative funds should also pay the fully burdened cost.

Thank you.

DHR/a2n  
030102.04

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

3/7/02

W  
331.  
4

1 Mar 02  
20 Mar 02

~~SENSITIVE~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/13664

U22439 103

March 29, 2002 9:23 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: First Interim Brigade

I thought we had agreed that the first interim brigade would go to Europe, not to Fort Lewis. What happened?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032902-21

Please respond by 04/12/02

*3/4/02*  
CAMBONE RESPONSE ATTACHE

V/R C  
Ed  
7/11/02

U22440 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13665

Sep 3/1

04/01/02 4:07 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone

SUBJECT: First Interim Brigade

The agreement was that an interim brigade would be sent to Europe by 2007.

This was designed to give the Army time to work out the operational capabilities of the IBCTs, redo their political agreements with Stevens, Inoyue, Murtha, Dicks, etc., and make arrangements to move unit(s) presently in Europe back to the US.

7  
L  
11-L-0559/OSD/13666

March 28, 2002 4:32 PM

X

SUBJECT: Talk to CJCS

I want to talk to Gen. Myers about the Joint Staff area down there and how ugly it is in terms of being wasteful of taxpayers' money.

DHR:dh  
032802-17

0205CS

28 March

U22441 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/13667

SNOWFLAKE

March 25, 2002 1:30 PM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: GPS

Here is a memo from Bill Schneider. I think you ought to press forward and get it into the Defense Planning Guidance, don't you?

Thanks.

Attach.

02/28/02 Defense Science Board (Schneider) memo to SecDef re: GPS

DHR:dh  
032502-41

Please respond by 04/05/02

U22442 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13668



DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

SECDEF HAS SL.

MAR 25 2002

BILL SCHNEIDER  
FORWARDED PER YOUR  
REQUEST AT DSB MEETING

February 28, 2002

43/2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Global Positioning System

I would like to submit the following recommendations concerning the Global Positioning System (GPS) in response to your request at the Defense Science Board Quarterly meeting on 27 February.

The GPS signal is extremely susceptible to very simplistic countermeasures, particularly electronic jamming. This vulnerability of GPS is widely known, extensively studied, and carefully documented. There have been numerous successful R&D efforts to investigate methods for making the system more robust. Most of these developments have not been fielded, primarily because we have yet to experience an intentional disruption of GPS service to date.

The concern is that our dependence on GPS is increasing dramatically. Once thought of as simply a vehicle navigation system, GPS is now used extensively for precision missile and weapon guidance, air and space navigation, precision registration of sensor imagery, and most recently for timing and synchronization of an increasing number of data communication systems. If the signal were denied, the impact would be widespread and severe.

We recommend that the following steps be taken now to begin fielding fixes to GPS vulnerabilities in critical application areas before we experience threats to GPS in combat:

- (1) A subset of existing receivers in selected applications (particularly focused on precision guided munitions) be modified to provide a factor of 100 times more resistance to jamming. This investment should be made in selected programs beyond the recent plus-up for GPS anti-jam capability in the JDAM procurement program. Increase research and technology investments to provide future enhancements.
- (2) An overarching GPS anti-jam master plan be developed to ensure that all future military receiver procurements for critical applications be equipped to provide substantially increased jamming resistance.

- (3) Plans to modify the space segment of GPS to transmit more power with increased accuracy be accelerated. A spiral development acquisition approach should be formulated that will provide increasing anti-jam and precision navigation in successive satellite block buys.
- (4) Options be maintained so that we can deny hostile forces access to GPS as desired.

There are extensive details concerning these recommendations in the following classified DSB and Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) reports:

DSB 2001 Summer Study on Precision Targeting

DSB Jan 2000 GPS Phase III

DSB Feb 1997 Global Positioning System Phase II

DSB Dec 1995 Global Positioning System

NRAC Dec 1999 Global Positioning System (GPS)



William Schneider, Jr.  
Chairman, Defense Science Board

cc:

USD(AT&L)

PDUSD(AT&L)

419

March 25, 2002 12:55 PM

4/8

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*

SUBJECT: Leaning Forward

*T. Dave*

W  
8  
—

There is no question in my mind but that John Handy is leaning forward—take a look at this.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/09/02 CINCTRANSCOM memo re: USTRASNSCOM Logistics Transformation Efforts

DHR:dh  
032502-36

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

25 Mar 02

U22443 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/13671



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

508 SCOTT DR  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62226-5357

SECDEF

MAR 25 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

FROM: TCCC

SUBJECT: USTRANSCOM Logistics Transformation Efforts

1. I am pleased to report to you that USTRANSCOM is making tremendous progress in the transformation of logistics support to your forces around the world. In partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency, we established the Strategic Distribution Management Initiative, introducing value chain processes to improve the speed and reliability with which critical materiel is delivered to those forces. Based on lessons learned, we are now integrating DOD's historically stovepiped strategic supply and transportation processes into a seamless, agile end-to-end distribution system. Early pilot programs with USEUCOM and USCENTCOM have validated our efforts (for example, reduced air delivery times to Bosnia by 37 percent and reduced worldwide over-ocean delivery times by up to 26 percent), and we are working to expand our initiatives to all our global shippers and customers.
2. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM has further validated this transformation. The integrated processes we established in peacetime transitioned rapidly to war and allowed us to maintain the flow of critical materiel to forces throughout Central Asia. After the FAA's grounding of civilian air carriers immediately following the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, we quickly surged military air to clear accumulated cargoes and provide critically needed capability as commercial air operations ramped back up. Additionally, we created new distribution networks into a remote and hostile environment, while concurrently supporting customers throughout other regions of the world. This operation has also affirmed a crucial shift in DOD's approach to force projection and sustainment. From the traditional model of "first deploy, then sustain," we are now simultaneously deploying and sustaining forces to multiple theaters as part of the global war on terrorism. USTRANSCOM is using value chain principles on a daily basis to balance and integrate the flow of units, personnel, and sustainment to meet the needs of deployed forces.
3. We ask for your continued support in this transformation of defense distribution into a value-added process. Through implementation of sound business practices, we are supporting our customers--your forces--more efficiently and effectively than ever before. As partners in this effort, your feedback and continued support will make it possible to accelerate this transformation. I look forward to working closely with you as we move forward and will continue to provide periodic updates on our progress.

Very respectfully

JOHN W. HANDY  
General, USAF  
Commander in Chief

cc: SECDEF, CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC

APPENDIX

3/22

4/3/23

Printed on recycled paper

11-L-0559/OSD/13672

March 25, 2002 7:50 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Intel Budget/Guidance

We are building our budget off our Defense Planning Guidance. What kind of Defense Planning Guidance is the Intelligence Community Director putting out while he starts to build his budget, which intersects with our budget?

We need to get a meeting on that and come to some understanding, I think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032502-1

Please respond by 04/17/02

25 Mar 02

U22444 103

11-L-0559/OSD/13673

Snowflake

July 30, 2002 7:05 AM

SUBJECT: Getting Joint

We have to figure out a way to get joint earlier.

Some thoughts:

1. Get the joint responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command.
2. Instruct the Service Secretaries.
3. The best joint service is with the CINC, rather than the Joint Staff.
4. Ask Cebrowski for initiatives.
5. Ask Buck Kerman to give us a series of suggestions.

DHR:dh  
073002-1

U22531 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/13674

SNOWFLAKE

January 4, 2002 5:13 PM

1/04/02 5:13 PM

TO: Steve Hadley

WHITE HOUSE  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: PC Meeting

You will recall we had Joe Ralston, CINCEUR, brief the PC on what is being done in that area of responsibility.

Yesterday I had a brief from Denny Blair, CINCPAC. I think it would be a good idea if he briefed the PC as well if you folks want to schedule it. He can do it by SVTC.

334 NSC

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010402-37

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

4 Jan. 02

W00015 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13675

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

January 7, 2002 7:31 AM

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *(initials)*  
SUBJECT: DoD Programs—Terminated or Reduced

DOQ/OSD

In one of our recent meetings you indicated you would like to see the list of programs we have eliminated or reduced.

I have attached that list. As the Vice President said in that meeting, we will undoubtedly be hearing about these once the Congress comes back into session and you announce the Fiscal Year 2003 budget. When Congress gets the budget and Members discover the intention of the Department to discontinue or reduce these programs, there will be a good deal of clamor from the Hill on these matters. You will undoubtedly receive phone calls, letters and/or visits from Members of the House and Senate on a number of these.

Respectfully,

Attach  
List of Reductions and Cuts

DHR:dh  
122901-2

7 Jan 02

~~SENSITIVE~~  
~~EYES ONLY~~

W00019 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13676

~~DRAFT -- EYES ONLY - SENSITIVE~~

1/7/2002 9:49 AM

*FY 2003 Major Defense Program Reductions, Postponements, Terminations*

<u>Navy</u>	(\$Millions in FY03)
• Slowed Production of Amphibious Transport Ships (LPD)	-1,033
• DD-21 Terminated/Convert to DD-X R&D program	+111
• Postpone next generation nuclear aircraft carrier	-309
• Terminate Navy Area Missile Defense	-100
• Reduce V-22 purchase by 32 Aircraft (15 next year)	-403
• Begin Phase-out of 19 Spruance-Class Destroyer	-70
• Begin Phase-out of F-14 Fighter Aircraft/S-3 Anti-sub Aircraft	-35
• Complete Phase-out of Inchon-class helicopter carrier	-48
<u>Air Force</u>	
• Postpone/Restructure Low-Altitude Space Based IR System	-785
• Begin deactivating Peacekeeper ICBM	+137
• Deactivate 33 of 90 B-1 Bombers	-120
• Begin phase-out of 14 C-5As and 56 C-13Os Cargo Aircraft	0
<u>Army</u>	
• Begin Phase-out of 1000 Vietnam-era Helicopters	-100
• Terminate 19 army 'legacy' ammo/weapons programs	-631
<u>Department-wide</u>	
• 15 percent Headquarters staffing reduction	-320
• 10-15 percent Defense Agencies cuts	-100
• Close overseas nuclear storage sites	<u>-64</u> 3,870
<u>Other:</u>	
• Deep cuts to non-reimbursable DoD detailees	
• Congressional Passage of 2005 Base Closures	

~~DRAFT -- EYES ONLY - SENSITIVE~~

11-L-0559/OSD/13677

January 7, 2002 11:16 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Newt Minow for the Democrat Slot on the Broadcasting  
Board of Governors

Attached is some material on Newt Minow. He is world-class—talented, brilliant and dedicated. I can vouch for him in every respect. I understand there is a Democrat vacancy. This man is a star. I urge you to consider him.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/15/01 Minow ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
010702-23

130.02

7 Jan 02

W00022-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13678

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WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER

WRITER'S E-MAIL ADDRESS

November 15, 2001

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Don:

Like every American, I want to help.

I can contribute to our efforts to communicate what America stands for through the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and the new Radio Afghanistan. As a nation, we have not been sufficiently imaginative in communicating, especially in the Middle East.

The federal agency in charge, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, is by law a bi-partisan group appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. There is a Democratic vacancy right now.

If you think well of the idea, please give this letter and enclosures to the appropriate person in the White House. A number of Democratic Senators (Durbin, Biden, Lieberman, Dodd, Rockefeller) think well of me, and Charlotte Beers and I have been friends for many years.

Enclosed are two pieces I have written on these issues in the *New York Times* and *USA Today*, and my own background. As you know, I have been given different bi-partisan assignments by three Presidents over the past forty years.

There is a negative, as you well know. I am a senior citizen, 75 years old. But sometimes, gray hair helps.

11-L-0559/OSD/13679

SIDLEY & AUSTIN

CHICAGO

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
November 15, 2001  
Page 2

All best,



Newton N. Minow

NNM/ks

Enclosures

Essay

WILLIAM SAFIRE

## Equal Time for Hitler?

WASHINGTON

The primary source of information for the average Afghan is the radio, often a transistor made 30 years ago. The 20 transmitting towers of the Taliban's Radio Sharlat (meaning "Islamic law") are spewing out hatred of America all the time.

Why is there no Radio Free Afghanistan broadcasting the truth about the consequences of harboring the headquarters of terrorism?

Why are Afghans not told that their rulers' decision to hide Osama bin Laden is the direct cause of the withdrawal of U.N. relief and the starvation that they now face?

Why are the voices of revered, mainstream Muslim clerics not broadcast denouncing the perversion of Islam by the terrorists, and reminding the faithful that murder by

### America is asleep at the microphone.

suicide will lead not to heaven but to eternal damnation?

Before a single bomb is dropped on a suspected training camp, the U.S. should be doing what it knows best how to do: using psychological warfare to weaken the grip of the terrorists on the local population.

We are failing to make life more difficult for the terrorists in their caves because the Bush war planners have not thought of it yet. The chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, overseer of our several official overseas broadcasters, is an amiable Gore fund-raiser long awaiting replacement. The Voice of America leadership is even more vacant.

Which U.S. government broadcaster should be charged with stirring anger among Afghans at rulers eager to bring further devastation to their country? That mission of countering Radio Sharlat's propaganda should go to RFE/RL, the "radio-free" outfit experienced in acting as a surrogate free press in repressive nations like Iran, Iraq and China.

But evenhanded journalists at the V.O.A., backed by political holdovers on the Broadcasting Board, don't want those hard-sell types invading their turf. The V.O.A. broadcasts to Afghanistan with fine impartiality in the Dari, Pashto, Urdu and Arabic languages, and yesterday stepped up its time on the air; RFE/RL broadcasts only in Turkmen and Uzbek, understood in Afghanistan's north, where our problem is not.

In the squabble over a measly \$15 million in expansion money, here is why the V.O.A. is the wrong voice in this area in wartime:

On the day after the twin towers catastrophe, a V.O.A. reporter in London broadcast an account of two interviews. One was with a cleric who "warns that no accusations against Islamists or Arab groups should be made before knowing the full truth." This was "balanced" by an interview with Yasin al Serri, identified only as "a leader of Egypt's largest Islamist group, the Gamma'a Islamiyya, which has worked to overthrow the Egyptian government."

Listeners were not informed that this terrorist group killed 58 foreign tourists and 4 Egyptians four years ago. The reporter said that al Serri "warns that retaliation by Washington will only lead to more violence. He lays the blame for the unprecedented assault on the U.S. financial and military policy in the Middle East."

Stung by criticism of this broadcast, Andre de Nesnera, the V.O.A.'s news director, admitted that the extremist was improperly identified, but argued that for the agency to remain "a credible news organization," such interviews with terrorists "will be part of our balanced, accurate, objective and comprehensive reporting, providing our listeners with both sides of the story."

After a call from Jesse Helms's office protesting "equal time for Hitler," the bureaucratic warming the vacant V.O.A. director's seat issued a belated guideline that "we will not give a platform to terrorists or extremist groups."

The nation is on a kind of war footing. Even in peacetime, news credibility does not flow from splitting the moral difference between good and evil. In the climate of today's undeclared war, private media in democracies are free to take either or neither side, but U.S. taxpayer-supported broadcasting is supposed to be on our side.

That's why we need an American signal in Afghanistan's live languages with a clear, truthful message: Bin Laden and his gang are the cause of present and future misery, and the scoundrels who murder innocents are eternally punished by Allah.

And for the Pentagon's choosers of "targets of value": consider, in the first strike, the score of towers and mobile transmitters of Radio Sharlat.

To the Editor:

William Safire (column, Sept. 20) is exactly right: we should use radio to get the truth directly to the Afghan people. The Afghans do not know that their starvation is the result of their dictators' efforts to protect Osama bin Laden. We allow the Taliban to monopolize all information available to Afghan men, women and children.

We made the same mistake for years with Slobodan Milosevic, enabling him to have exclusive access to the ears, eyes and minds of the people of Serbia. Radio, loud and clear, is inexpensive and effective. But if we are to succeed in building opposition to terrorism, we must pay as much attention to launching ideas as we do to launching bombs.

Newton N. Minow

Chicago, Sept. 20, 2001  
The writer is a former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.



By Ted S. Warren, AP

## For Big Hurt, the pain subsides

Frank Thomas hitting stride again after rough year ■ 1C



Thursday, February 15, 2001

### The Forum

# How would U.S. react now to a '13 days' crisis?

By Newton N. Minow

After my wife and I saw the movie *Thirteen Days*, we remained sitting silently in the dark theater for a few minutes, unable to move. We were frozen back in time to our own days in Washington during the Cuban missile crisis.

Like others in the audience old enough to remember October 1962, I thought about where I was, how frightened I was for my family and the world — and how much has changed since then, not all of it for the better of our country.

As President Kennedy's chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), I was in New York on Oct. 22, 1962, working with European and American broadcasters to develop international communications satellites. At 7 a.m., I received an urgent call from Pierre Salinger, Kennedy's press secretary, who simply said, "National emergency! Get to the White House at once." I raced to the next shuttle flight and was in the White House in less than two hours.

Salinger was waiting with Don Wilson, deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency, which then supervised the Voice of America (VOA). Soviet missiles with nuclear capability were in Cuba, they said, aimed at the United States. Kennedy, who would speak to the nation at 7 p.m., wanted his speech translated into Spanish and sent by VOA to the Cuban people.



New Line/Beacon Pictures via CNS

Tense times: Scene from the movie *Thirteen Days*, about the Cuban missile crisis.

VOA radio signals to Cuba were completely jammed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, but VOA engineers had found six U.S. commercial radio stations that broadcast strong signals into Cuba. My assignment was to arrange for these commercial stations to carry the VOA and the president's message to the Cuban people at 7 p.m.

"One condition," Salinger added. "This is a deep secret. You can't tell the stations what is going on." As an inexperienced 36-year-old, I mumbled OK and raced to my office.

I swore our senior FCC staff to secrecy and explained the assignment. They were aghast. This, they said, violated every rule they could think of; no commercial station had ever been taken over, even during wartime. But this was more urgent: We were trying to avert nuclear war.

Working with VOA engineers, we quickly determined there were seven broadcast stations, not six, plus two shortwave stations capable of reaching Cuba, and that AT&T could patch a line from the VOA transmitters to all nine stations without delay. I also brought in a senior FCC commissioner, Robert Bartley, our national defense expert. Bartley was the nephew of former House speaker Sam Rayburn. I figured that would help once news of this reached Congress.

After we had the technology in place, I told Salinger I had to inform the stations and request

their cooperation. By this time, rumors were spreading of a national emergency, and Salinger didn't want that done because of the risk of leaks. But when I insisted, he said use your own best judgment. I called each station and asked that the person in charge give us a phone number where we could reach him or her at 6 p.m. for an urgent conference call from the White House. And, I added, this was a national emergency, with lives at stake — no leaks, please.

There were no leaks. At 6 p.m., Bartley, Salinger and I called the nine stations' representatives. We requested their help as citizens and asked that they announce at 7 p.m. that their stations would broadcast the VOA in Spanish to Cuba. All agreed. As I left the White House, I saw President Kennedy and gave him a thumbs up: The Cuban people would hear his speech. I went home, listening to the speech on my car radio. More scared than I had ever been as a soldier in the China/Burma/India theater during World War II, I hugged my wife and children and prayed.

The next morning, I was invited to part of the meeting of the executive committee dealing with the missile crisis. American intelligence reported that many Cubans had heard the VOA loud and clear. Our plan had worked. President Kennedy looked at me and said let's do it again tonight. I left to start all over again. This went on every night for the duration of the week.

Then it was all over. Several weeks after the crisis ended, a few of the stations called and asked where they should send their bills. I asked, what bills? They politely said they had canceled evening commercials for a week; who was going to make up the revenue losses? They had a point, but I had no budget for this. Nor did anyone else. Finally, I suggested to Salinger that the president invite the broadcasters to lunch in the White House to thank them personally and have their pictures taken with him. This worked. No bills were sent.

The next year, however, the president of a small religious college asked to see me. His college, he said, had both a radio and a TV station. The radio station was doing fine, but the TV sta-

tion had a minor technical regulatory problem at the FCC. I said I was sorry to hear that. He then looked in my eyes and said, "Chairman Minow, do you remember when you asked us to help you and the president with our radio station during the Cuban missile crisis, and we helped in every way we could?" I said, "Yes, I remember." He then looked even more deeply into my eyes, took my hand, and said, "Chairman Minow, in view of how we helped you, do you think you could find it in your heart to ... " I interrupted him and said, "I got your message. Consider it done."

I later called the staff and asked that the technical regulatory question be dropped. Today, I'd probably be investigated by a special prosecutor, but I would do it again.

Those memories, prompted by seeing *Thirteen Days*, made me reflect on how dramatically things have changed. In 1962, I saw how powerful the blockade was in putting pressure on the Soviet Union and Cuba to back down. But while we were cutting off Cuba from supplies, we were opening up Cuba to information, and that, too, played a role. Today, the VOA has the techniques and power to surmount jamming. Technologies such as communication satellites, the Internet and cable networks such as CNN have erased national boundaries. Like Joshua's trumpet, they make old walls tumble down.

But while a new world has opened up, another world has closed down. I wonder whether we could get the same level of cooperation today that made our efforts possible in 1962, when news organizations held their stories and broadcasters gave up their evening broadcast time. Everyone did this without rancor, jockeying for position or bureaucratic wrangling.

The Cuban missile crisis lasted 13 days. In today's information age, would President Kennedy have been forced to act in 13 hours? Or even 13 minutes? I worry less today about whether we have the technology to respond than about whether we have the character.

Newton N. Minow was Federal Communications Commission chairman from 1961 to 1963.

NEWTON N. MINOW

BACKGROUND

Place and Date of Birth:

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

(b)(6)

Home Address:

(b)(6)

or

c/o Sidley Austin Brown & Wood  
10 South Dearborn Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Family Information:

(b)(6)

Education:

Schools Attended:

Milwaukee Public Schools  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Degrees:

B.S. - Northwestern University, 1949  
J.D. - Northwestern University, 1950

Honorary Degrees:

LL.D. - Brandeis University, 1963  
LL.D. - University of Wisconsin, 1963  
LL.D. - Northwestern University, 1965  
LL.D. - Columbia College, 1972  
LL.D. - Governors State University, 1984  
LL.D. - DePaul University, 1989  
LL.D. - RAND Graduate School, 1994  
LL.D. - University of Notre Dame, 1994  
LL.D. - Roosevelt University, 1996  
LL.D. - Barat College, 1996  
LL.D. - Santa Clara University School of  
Law, 1998

Professional History:

1965 to present:	Sidley & Austin (1)
1963 to 1965:	Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Director, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
1961 to 1963:	Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, by Appointment of President John F. Kennedy
1955 to 1961:	Partner, Stevenson, Rikkind & Wirtz (part of Paul, Weiss, Rikkind, Wharton & Garrison)
1953 to 1955:	Associate, Mayer, Brown & Platt
1952 to 1953:	Assistant Counsel to Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, State of Illinois
1951 to 1952:	Law Clerk to Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, U.S. Supreme Court
1950 to 1951:	Associate, Mayer, Brown & Platt

- (1) Including service with a predecessor firm, Leibman, Williams, Bennett, Baird & Minow, which consolidated with Sidley & Austin on October 15, 1972 (Partner, 1965-1991; Counsel 1991- )  
Also, Sidley & Austin merged with Brown & Wood in May 2001 and is now known as Sidley Austin Brown & Wood

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Arthur Andersen & Co., Public Review Board (Chairman, 1974-1983)  
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) (Chairman, 1978-1980; Director, 1973-1980)  
RAND Corporation (Chairman, 1970-1972; Trustee, 1965-1975, 1976-1986, 1987-1997;  
Advisory Trustee, 1997- )  
Trustee and Former Chairman, Chicago Educational Television Association  
(Chairman, 1967-1973; Trustee, 1964-1991; Life Trustee, 1991- )  
Trustee, Mayo Foundation (1972-1981); Emeritus Trustee (1981- )  
Trustee, Northwestern University (1975-1987); Life Trustee (1987- )  
Trustee, University of Notre Dame (1965-1977, 1983-1996); Life Trustee (1996- )  
Trustee, Chicago Orchestral Association (1975-1987); Life Trustee (1987- )  
Trustee, Carnegie Corporation of New York (Chairman, 1993-1997; Trustee, 1987-1997)  
Trustee, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1987-1993)  
Chairman, CBS Foundation (1986-1991)

Civic and Public Service Directorships (Continued):

Chairman, Bi-Partisan Study of Campaign Costs in the Electronic Era, Twentieth Century Fund  
Chairman, Board of Overseers, Jewish Theological Seminary (1975-1977)  
Co-Chairman, Presidential Debates, Sponsored by League of Women Voters (1976, 1980)  
Director, Commission on Presidential Debates (1993- )  
Director, Bi-Partisan Advisory Commission for 1988 and 1992 Presidential Debates  
Member, Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, appointed by  
President George Bush (1992)  
Former Member, U.S. Department of State's Advisory Committee on International Communications  
and Information Policy  
Member, Commission on Public Interest Obligations of Digital Broadcasters, appointed by  
President Bill Clinton, 1998-1999

Academic Appointments:

Visiting Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1986)  
Director, The Annenberg Washington Program Communications Policy Studies, Northwestern  
University (1987-1996)  
Annenberg Professor of Communications Law and Policy, Northwestern University (1987- )

Legal Memberships:

American Bar Association, Fellow of  
Chicago Bar Foundation, Fellow of

Civic and Public Memberships:

Center for Public Resources Judicial Panel  
Chicago Committee, Council on Foreign Relations  
Commercial Club of Chicago (President, 1987-1988)  
Visiting Committee, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1980-1986)  
Visiting Committee, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University (1968-1974)

Club Memberships:

Century Association (New York)  
Chicago Club  
Mid-Day Club

Honors and Awards:

John Henry Wigmore Award, Northwestern University School of Law (1950)  
Named One of Ten Outstanding Young Men in the United States (1961)  
George Foster Peabody Broadcasting Award (1962)  
Phi Beta Kappa Distinguished Broadcasting Award (1965)  
Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar (1977-1978)  
Northwestern Alumni Medal (1978)  
Ralph Lowell Public Broadcasting Award (1982)  
Man of the Year Award, Notre Dame Club of Chicago (1988)

Honors and Awards (Continued):

Elected Fellow, American Academy of Arts & Sciences (1989)  
Abraham Lincoln Centre Humanitarian Service Award (1990)  
Harvard Club of Chicago/Chicagoan of the Year (1991)  
The Fellows of the Phi Beta Kappa Society Award (1999)  
Silver Gavel Award, American Bar Association (1998)

Military Service:

U.S. Army – 1944 to 1945 (Sergeant, China-Burma, India Theater)

Miscellaneous:

Co-Author of *Abandoned in the Wasteland: Children, Television and the First Amendment*, published in 1995 by Hill & Wang (division of Farrar, Straus & Giroux)  
Author of *Equal Time: The Private Broadcaster and The Public Interest*, published in 1964 by Antheneum Publishers, New York City  
Contributor to *As We Knew Adlai*, published in 1966 by Harper & Row, New York City  
Contributor to *Public Interest and The Business of Broadcasting*, published in 1988 by Quorum Books, New York City (Edited by Jon T. Powell and Wally Gair)  
Co-Author of *Presidential Television*, published in 1973 by Basic Books, Inc., New York City  
Co-Author – Weil Lecture, *Electronics and the Future*, Oxford University Press, 1977, New York City  
Co-Author of *For Great Debates*, published in 1987 by Twentieth Century Fund, New York City  
Co-Author of *Lines of Battle*, published in 1987 by Time Books  
Author of *How Vast the Wasteland Now*, published in 1991 by the Gannett Foundation Media Center at Columbia University in the City of New York  
Co-Author of *Opening Salvo: Who Should Participate in Presidential Debates*, published in 1999 by The Century Foundation (formerly the Twentieth Century Fund)  
Co-Author of *A Digital Gift to the Nation: Fulfilling the Promise of the Digital and Internet Age*, published in 2001 by The Century Foundation (formerly the Twentieth Century Fund)  
Numerous Newspaper, Magazine and Professional Journal Articles

August 14, 2001

~~showtime~~

T 11/19  
11/19/01

~~5.30 PM 11/19/01~~  
November 19, 2001 11:20 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Newt Minow

Attached is a letter from Newt Minow. He is a wonderful, talented, brilliant, dedicated human being. I consider him a close friend and can vouch for him in every respect.

He indicates there may be a vacancy on the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

I can think of no one who would be better than Newt. He may be 75, but he has the energy of a 40-year-old and brain cells as fine as Einstein's

Let me know what I should do, who I should talk to. I think he would be a world-class appointment.

Regards,

cc: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Honorable Karl Rove

Attach.  
11/15/01 Minow ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
111901-13

11-L-0559/OSD/13688 WDI456-01

SNOWFLAKE  
11/19/01

December 14, 2001 10:25 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TA*  
SUBJECT: Newt Minow

Please see what the status is of this possibility of Newt Minow becoming a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. I would like to weigh in with whoever I have to weigh in with.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/19/01 SecDef memo to VP

DHR:dh  
121401-12

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*12/19*

*→ SecDef -*

*I'm told the*

*fix is in on some other  
candidates but have placed  
a call to Andy Card to  
re-assert your strong ~~support~~ support*

*that Mr Minow be appointed.*

*We haven't spoken yet but I will*

*11-L-0559/QSD/13689/tomorrow. Di Rita*

*PLH  
DVR*

January 7, 2002 11:46 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Detainees

We are going to be moving these Al Qaeda prisoners out of Afghanistan and Pakistan into U.S. ships and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It seems to me with that being the case, we need to have the ability to use non-lethal riot agents aboard aircraft and ships, at Guantanamo and anywhere we are dealing with these problems.

Why don't we get that authority on an oral basis now and get your paper refashioned to include it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010702-35

7  
Jan  
02

W00023 102

11-L-0559/OSD/13690

January 8, 2002 12:04 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*  
SUBJECT: Cabinet Spouses to State of the Union

Are the spouses of the Cabinet going to be invited to the State of the Union speech? I think it would be a good idea. It is not clear to me that they were last time.

Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010702-56

11-L-0559/OSD/13691

W00027 102

8 Jan 02  
2002

2:56 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Steven Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: January 9, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Bounty Program**

I believe it could be hurting our efforts to find the top Al Qaida and Taliban leadership in that we do not have clarity on the reward or the bounty programs. The reward program is apparently run by State Department, the bounty program by CIA. You may wish to get an inter-agency activity going so that we all understand and the world has clarity.

I have raised it with both Colin and George, but I think it is going to have to be done at the staff level.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
01092.02

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

W00036 /02

Afghanistan

qJAN01

11-L-0559/OSD/13692

Snowflake

January 9, 2002 4:28 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: CENTCOM Briefings

I do think we ought to move Tom Franks' briefings to once every two weeks instead of every week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010902-29

CENTCOM

9 Jan 02

W00045 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13693

January 10, 2002 8:53 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Bartley Piece

Attached is an article from Bob Bartley that is well worth reading if you missed it.

Regards,

Attach.

01/07/02, Bartley, *Wall Street Journal*, "Conquering Guilt, Forging a new Era?"

DHR:dh  
011002-10

5.000  
1

10/01/2002

W00046 1/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13694



# OpinionJournal

from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL *Editorial Page*

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 10 2002

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## THINKING THINGS OVER

### Conquering Guilt, Forging a New Era?

In the 20th century, terrorism worked. Those days are over.

BY ROBERT L. BARTLEY

Monday, January 7, 2002 12:01 a.m.

As we enter the new year the nation is still mourning the tragedy of September 11, but the time has arrived to take pride in its response. Whether militarily in Afghanistan or psychologically at home, American society has performed magnificently. The year 2002 will determine whether this is a fleeting mood, or whether national gravitas marks the beginning of a new era.

Osama bin Laden and his suicide corps badly misjudged the American character, like Hitler and Tojo before them. The terrorist mastermind assumed that the Americans would blow up a few empty buildings and go back to their feckless life, as they had many times before. Instead, they united behind George W. Bush in projecting an army into notoriously difficult terrain halfway around the globe, destroying every military target in sight, largely sparing civilians, uniting an uncertain international coalition and a fractious local leadership. In some 100 days, just as the fires at the World Trade Center finally stopped burning, military resistance collapsed.

OBL himself has not been captured, whether cornered in Khost or fled to Baghdad. But he has done us the favor of releasing a videotape showing himself a beaten man, physically haggard and rhetorically defensive. He sounds an uncertain trumpet, unlikely to rally new legions to his cause. Indeed, the much-vaunted Arab "street" has already fallen silent before the demonstration of U.S. power.

Terrorists around the world are also on the run. Yasser Arafat, who commands a minestate forged by assassination of moderate West Bank mayors and dispatch of suicide bombers into pizza parlors, now finds himself on the sidelines. No one cares that Israelis ban him from Christmas eve in Bethlehem. Meanwhile, Yemen is sending troops to close terrorist training camps, just as President Bush demanded. Under pressure from the U.S., Pakistan is moving against terrorists threatening to take it into a war with India.

---

In the 20th century terrorism has been a path to political leadership, historian Paul Johnson remarked in *Forbes* just after the attack. A century of liberalism, focused on compassion toward claims of grievance, gave us terrorist/statesmen ranging from Menachem Begin to Jomo Kenyatta to Eamon de Valera to Robert Mugabe. Now, he suggested, we may enter "a quite different climate of opinion in which security of life and property will be given absolute precedence over pity. . . ."

When the Romans kept the peace or the Royal Navy suppressed pirates and the slave trade, he noted, terrorists were summarily executed. Vigilance, usually far short of summary execution,

kept the peace, and peace in turn built prosperity. The 19th century was a far more civilized time than the bloody era that opened with a terrorist attack in Sarajevo in 1914 and ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The new seriousness in America is now pregnant with the possibility of consolidating a new century of safety, peace and spreading prosperity.

That the U.S. has the military power to do this is beyond serious question. The combination of precise munitions from the sky and special operations teams on the ground has transformed warfare; there are apt comparisons with the way the long bow at Agincourt ended the era of mounted knights. This is not to suggest constant U.S. intervention in each of the world's quarrels, let alone building democracies and modern economies overnight. The key is building a new climate of opinion, new expectations around the world.

This much depends on the U.S. maintaining the momentum it gained after September 11. The new year must redeem President Bush's promises to pursue al Qaeda terrorists in other nations, and indeed to strike at other terrorists and their state sponsors. Yemen or Somalia and the Philippines may be mopped up without a major U.S. effort, but two large obstacles remain. One is of course Iraq, where Saddam Hussein is building nuclear weapons he intends to target on the U.S. The other is Lebanon, the largest complex of terrorist camps remaining, under the sponsorship of Hezbollah (and Hamas), which has become a political pet in Arab and European minds. If a year from now we haven't broached these targets, the promise of a new era will be dwindling away.

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Even with the current success, it is not hard to imagine. Osama and his ilk might be forgiven for believing the U.S. a muscle-bound giant; after all, many Americans were saying the same things. Ever since the intellectual and political establishment changed its mind on Vietnam in 1968, American elites have been reciting a litany of phrases such as "mission creep," "body bags," "imperial overreach," "world policeman" and so on. The melody uniting these lyrics was one of American guilt--guilt at being too powerful, too prosperous, and in past eras to be atoned, too assertive.

Quenching that guilt was perhaps the biggest single impact of September 11. Its lesson was not only that the U.S. cannot drop off the globe, but that it cannot opt out of leadership. With power comes responsibility; if the U.S. fails to take the lead against world power, no one else will. At the same time, America's success and prominence makes it a perpetual target; evil is abroad in the world, and if we don't find and stop it, it will find us. Malcontents and maniacs around the world attach their grievances to the civilization we have helped build; in defending ourselves we defend peace and civilization in the world.

The burden of leadership falls directly on George W. Bush. Pressures to temporize on terrorism are already manifest and will grow as immediate threats recede; only presidential determination can overcome them. A new era, too, cannot be consolidated in the foreign arena alone. In the new year, Mr. Bush will have to make the point that the serious minds who can so ably run a war are also the best minds to run an economy, nurture better education, make environmental trade-offs and save a faltering Social Security system.

It's promising that President Bush sees 2002 as a "war year," and feels he was put in office to fulfill a mission. His potential mission is nothing less than building a world order for a new century.

*Mr. Bartley is editor of The Wall Street Journal. His column appears Mondays in the Journal and on OpinionJournal.com.*

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January 14, 2002 8:46 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Senior Executive Council

Mr. President,

The Senior Executive Council we established at the Pentagon includes the three Service Secretaries and the Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Attached is a report they sent me as to their work during 2001.

I am sending it along to you because it indicates a number of programs that have been eliminated, restructured or reduced, a subject you have raised with me on a couple of occasions.

Respectfully,

Attach.

"What SEC did in 2001"

DHR:dh  
011402-15

SEC

14 Jan 02

W00057 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13697

## What SEC did in 2001

### Agreed on an agenda for change – 4 pillars

- implementing strategy of transformation (changing resource allocations)
- encourage talent to enter and stay in military and civilian service
- modernizing business process and infrastructure
- innovation in the industrial base (development work still needs to be done)

### Resource Allocation Highlights (highly difficult without team approach)

Built programs and budgets that met vast majority of guidance

Fully funded acquisition programs historically underfunded

Killed, restructured or accelerated retirement over 30 programs that needed to change (eg DD-X – see attached list)

Jointly designed and funded a pool programs (\$15B over five years) of transformation accelerating programs like laser communications

Continued restructuring “business-focused” agencies (more to be done in 2002)

### Headquarters Realignments

Designed and announced (beginning to execute) realignments in Army and Air Force – models were shared to speed development

Agreed to approach on Executive HQ review and started redesign work

### BMDO Support

Board of Directors role for BMDO

Redesigned BMDO organization, design process strategy, and national program office approach to meet goals of President and Secretary

Championed capabilities-based requirements process (rather than threat based) for developing and fielding missile defense systems

Support of best talent available to BMDO

### Transformation Directorate

Worked with Admiral Cebrowski to define role and work

### Post-9/11

Development of approach on Pentagon physical security (especially Rt. 110)

Worked with staffs to develop many issues for decision (taking that work off Deputy's and Secretary's desks)

### Other Management Issues

Supporting and advocating financial modernization process (led by USD(C))

Worked through EFI approach, will serve as internal senior review board, and advocated during hill review

Opposed creating a new agency for testing range management agency, and steered to creation of an intra-DoD strategy

Developing, directing and linking work of Business Innovation Council

Agreed to develop and implement a Joint Training Center

SENSITIVE

Programs Terminated / Restructured

**DD-21 Terminated, to DD-X.**

DD-X is an-R&D only program for a family of ships—cruisers, destroyers and small littoral ships

**Restructured V-22, expanded flight testing**

Problems with V-22 safety and reliability forces a production slow down and more comprehensive flight test program

**Deactivate Peacekeeper ICBM**

Part of nuclear weapons reductions

**F-14 and S-3 phase-out**

Begin the removal of older and expensive to operate aircraft

**Slowed Production of LPD Amphibious Transport Ships**

Schedule delays and cost overruns required restructuring

**Eliminated 14 C-5As and 56 C130s**

Begin the retirement of older, less reliable aircraft

**Removed 33 B-1s**

Applied savings to modernization of remaining aircraft

**Removed 17 B-52s**

Reduced attrition reserve, one to NASA

**Terminate 19 legacy programs**

Army terminated smaller, marginal programs

**Restructure Comanche, remove concurrency**

Weight increase and excessive concurrency in development requires a change in the program to more spiral development

**Phase-out 1000 older Army helicopters**

Begins phase out of Viet Nam era helicopters

**Phase-out DD-963s**

Begins phase out of older, expensive ships

SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/13699

**SENSITIVE**

**Terminate Navy Area Missile Defense**

Technical and cost problems created an Nunn-McCurdy breach, and program cannot be certified in current form. Terminate and restructure.

**Delay CVN-X**

Delay new carrier production to outside the FYDP

**Restructure SBIRS-High**

Program delay of two years require rephrase, in Nunn-McCurdy breach

**Delay SBIRS Low – 2 years.**

Technical problems and large cost increase requires a program restructure, new technology insertion.

**Close overseas nuclear storage sites**

Some number of sites closed, weapons reduced

**15% Headquarters reduction**

Headquarters staffing has not been reduced as much as active force

**10-15% Reduction in the "business" Defense Agencies**

Productivity and out sourcing permits manpower reductions

**Army and Air Force Headquarters Reorganization (Navy to follow)**

Eliminates staff duplication

**SENSITIVE**

**11-L-0559/OSD/13700**

## What is SEC focusing on in 2002?

### Continuation of 2001 work, especially

- EFI development
- Missile defense development process
- Financial systems modernization
- Engaging the organization through Business Innovation Council

### Driving Transformation

Increasingly defining what it will be through strategic planning during planning cycle,  
and

Shifting resources to support those decisions in budget process

### Defense Agencies

Including thorough review of DLA, DFAS and DISA

### Executive Headquarters Redesign

Restructuring, Refocusing and Reorganizing OSD/Joint Staff

### Redesign PPBS and Resource Allocation Process throughout Department

### Development of a Management Scorecard

### Develop a strategy on Spurring Innovation in the Industrial Base

January 14, 2002 10:08 AM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kissinger's Piece

The attached is well worth reading.

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/13/02 Kissinger, *Washington Post*, "Phase II and Iraq"

DHK:dh  
011402-24

14 Jan 02  
b7c

14 Jan 02  
b7c

W00058-102

11-L-0559/OSD/13702

## Phase II and Iraq

By Henry A. Kissinger

Sunday, January 13, 2002; Page B07

As military operations in Afghanistan wind down, it is well to keep in mind President Bush's injunction that they are only the first battles of a long war.

An important step has been taken toward the goals of breaking the nexus between governments and the terrorist groups they support or tolerate, discrediting Islamic fundamentalism so that moderates in the Islamic world can reclaim their religion from the fanatics, and placing the fight against terrorism in the context of the geopolitical threat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq to regional stability and to American friends and interests in the region. But much more needs to be done.

Were we to flinch, the success in Afghanistan would be interpreted in time as taking on the weakest and most remote of the terrorist centers while we recoiled from unraveling terrorism in countries more central to the problem.

Three interrelated courses of action are available:

- (a) To rely primarily on diplomacy and coalition-building on the theory that the fate of the Taliban will teach the appropriate lessons.
- (b) To insist on a number of specific corrective steps in countries with known training camps or terrorist headquarters, such as Somalia or Yemen, or those engaged in dangerous programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, such as Iraq, and to take military action if these steps are rejected.
- (c) To focus on the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in order to change the regional dynamics by showing America's determination to defend regional stability, its interests and its friends. (This would also send a strong message to other rogue states.)

Sole reliance on diplomacy is the preferred course of some members of the coalition, which claim that the remaining tasks can be accomplished by consultation and the cooperation of intelligence and security services around the world. But to rely solely on diplomacy would be to repeat the mistake with which the United States hamstrung itself in every war of the past half-century. Because it treated military operations and diplomacy as separate and sequential, the United States stopped military operations in Korea as soon as our adversaries moved to the conference table; it ended the bombing of North Vietnam as an entrance price to the Paris talks; it stopped military operations in the Gulf after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

In each case, the ending of military pressure produced diplomatic stalemate. The Korean armistice negotiations consumed two years, during which America suffered as many casualties as in the entire combat phase; an even more intractable stalemate developed in the Vietnam negotiations; and in the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein used the Republican Guard divisions preserved by the armistice to restore control over his territory and to dismantle systematically the inspection provisions of the armistice agreement.

Anti-terrorism policy is empty if it is not backed by the threat of force. Intellectual opponents of military action as well as its likely targets will procrastinate or agree to token or symbolic remedies only.

Ironically, governments on whose territory terrorists are tolerated will find it especially difficult to cooperate unless the consequences of failing to do so are made more risky than their tacit bargain with the terrorists.

Phase II of the anti-terrorism campaign must therefore involve a specific set of demands geared to a precise timetable supported by credible coercive power. These should be put forward as soon as possible as a framework. And time is of the essence. Phase II must begin while the memory of the attack on the United States is still vivid and American-deployed forces are available to back up the diplomacy.

Nor should Phase II be confused with the pacification of Afghanistan. The American strategic objective was to destroy the terrorist network; that has been largely accomplished. Pacification of the entire country of Afghanistan has never been achieved by foreigners and cannot be the objective of the American military effort. The United States should be generous with economic and development assistance. But the strategic goal of Phase II should be the destruction of the global terrorist network, to prevent its reappearance in Afghanistan, but not to be drawn into Afghan civil strife.

Somalia and Yemen are often mentioned as possible targets for a Phase II campaign. That decision should depend on the ability to identify targets against which local governments are able to act and on the suitability of American forces to accomplish this task if the local governments can't or won't. And given these limitations, the United States will have to decide whether action against them is strategically productive.

All this raises the unavoidable challenge Iraq poses. The issue is not whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical. Iraq's policy is implacably hostile to the United States and to certain neighboring countries. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. It is working to develop a nuclear capability. Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by evicting the international inspectors he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possibility of a negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international community.

If these capabilities remain intact, they could in time be used for terrorist goals or by Saddam Hussein in the midst of some new regional or international upheaval. And if his regime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will elevate him to a potentially overwhelming menace.

From a long-range point of view, the greatest opportunity of Phase II is to return Iraq to a responsible role in the region. Were Iraq governed by a group representing no threat to its neighbors and willing to abandon its weapons of mass destruction, the stability of the region would be immeasurably enhanced. The remaining regimes flirting with terrorist fundamentalism or acquiescing in its exactions would be driven to shut down their support of terrorism.

At a minimum, we should insist on a U.N. inspection system to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, with an unlimited right of inspection and freedom of movement for the inspectors. But no such system exists on paper, and the effort to install it might be identical with that required to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Above all, given the ease of producing biological and chemical weapons, inspection must be extremely intrusive, and experience shows that no inspection can withstand indefinitely the opposition of a determined host government.

But if the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is to be seriously considered, three prerequisites must be met:

(a) development of a military plan that is quick and decisive, (b) some prior agreement on what kind of structure is to replace Hussein and (c) the support or acquiescence of key countries needed for implementation of the military plan.

A military operation against Saddam Hussein cannot be long and drawn out. If it is, the battle may turn into a struggle of Islam against the West. It would also enable Hussein to try to involve Israel by launching attacks on it -- perhaps using chemical and biological weapons -- in the process sowing confusion within the Muslim world. A long war extending to six months and beyond would also make it more difficult to keep allies and countries such as Russia and China from dissociating formally from what they are unlikely to join but even more unlikely to oppose.

Before proceeding to confrontation with Iraq, the Bush administration will therefore wish to examine with great care the military strategy implied. Forces of the magnitude of the Gulf War of a decade ago are unlikely to be needed. At the same time, it would be dangerous to rely on a combination of U.S. air power and indigenous opposition forces alone. To be sure, the contemporary precision weaponry was not available in the existing quantities during the Gulf War. And the no-fly zones will make Iraqi reinforcements difficult. They could be strengthened by being turned into no-movement zones proscribing the movement of particular categories of weapons.

Still, we cannot stake American national security entirely, or even largely, on local opposition forces that do not yet exist and whose combat capabilities are untested. Perhaps Iraqi forces would collapse at the first confrontation, as some argue. But the likelihood of this happening is greatly increased if it is clear American military power stands in overwhelming force immediately behind the local forces.

A second prerequisite for a military campaign against Iraq is to define the political outcome. Local opposition would in all likelihood be sustained by the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shiite minority in the south. But if we are to enlist the Sunni majority, which now dominates Iraq, in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, we need to make clear that Iraq's disintegration is not the goal of American policy. This is all the more important because a military operation in Iraq would require the support of Turkey and the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia. Neither is likely to cooperate if they foresee an independent Kurdish state in the north and a Shiite republic in the south as the probable outcome. A Kurdish state would inflame the Kurdish minority in Turkey and a Shiite state in the south would threaten the Dhahran region in Saudi Arabia, and might give Iran a new base to seek to dominate the gulf region. A federal structure for a unified Iraq would be a way to deal with this issue.

Creating an appropriate coalition for such an effort and finding bases for the necessary American deployment will be difficult. Phase II is likely to separate those members of the coalition that joined so as to have veto over American actions from those that are willing to pursue an implacable strategy. Nevertheless, the skillful diplomacy that shaped the first phase of the anti-terrorism campaign would have much to build on. Saddam Hussein has no friends in the gulf region. Britain will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based on its special relationship with the United States, that it has earned for itself in the evolution of the crisis. Nor will Germany move into active opposition to the United States -- especially in an election year. The same is true of Russia, China and Japan. A determined American policy thus has more latitude than is generally assumed.

But it will be far more difficult than Phase I. Local resistance -- especially in Iraq -- will be more determined and ruthless. Domestic opposition will mount in many countries. American public opinion will be crucial in sustaining such a course. It will need to be shaped by the same kind of decisive and subtle leadership by which President Bush unified the country for the first phase of the crisis.

*The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.*

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**WASHFAX  
Secretary of Defense  
Cover Sheet  
12/N**



**FROM:** Secretary Rumsfeld

**OFFICE/DESK:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

PHONE NO.: (b)(6)

**SUBJECT:** Kissinger's Piece

**PAGES:** 6 (Including Coversheet)

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WH	President George W. Bush				
WH	Vice President Richard B. Cheney				
WH	Honorable Condoleezza Rice				

**REMARKS:** Please deliver immediately. Thank you!

Please call Secretary of Defense Cable Division at (b)(6) and confirm receipt.

**CLASSIFICATION:**

11-L-0559/OSD/13707

January 19, 2002 8:41 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Decisions

The other day I was preparing for an interview with the *Washington Post* on the early days of the conflict. To tickle my memory, I wrote down some of the important concepts that have significantly affected the conduct of the conflict in Afghanistan. They were major directional decisions you made from September 11 on, most of which were made in the very early days and weeks of the campaign.

It struck me that you might like to see them on a single page.

Very respectfully,

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
The Honorable George Tenet  
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice

Attach.

01/18/02 Major Directional Decisions 9/11 et seq.

DHR:dh  
011802-5

000.5

19 Jan 02  
2002

11-L-0559/OSD/13708

January 19, 2002 11:44 AM

SUBJECT: Major Directional Decisions—9/11/01 et seq.

- Despite the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks or attacks that may occur in the future, the U.S. will not pull back or withdraw - the U.S. will stay engaged in the world.
- When attacked, the U.S. will be “leaning forward, not back.” When the U.S. is seen as faint-hearted or risk-averse, the deterrent is weakened.
- Terrorism: it is not possible to defend against terrorism in every place, at every time, against every conceivable technique. Self-defense against terrorism requires preemption - taking the battle to the terrorists wherever they are and to those who harbor terrorists.
- The war against terrorism will be “broad-based, applying pressure and using all elements of national power—economic, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and military, both overt and covert.”
- The campaign against terrorism will be “long, hard and difficult.” Terrorists do not have armies, navies or air forces to attack, so we must go after them where they are and root them out.
- The U.S. will not rule out anything—including the use of ground forces. This will not be an antiseptic, “cruise missile war.” The U.S. is ready and willing to put boots on the ground when and where appropriate.
- Coalitions: “The mission must determine the coalition; coalitions must not determine missions”; missions must not be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator by coalition pressure.
- The U.S. wants help from all countries, in every way they consider appropriate; we recognize that to get maximum support, it is best for each country, rather than the U.S., to characterize how and in what ways they are assisting the overall effort.
- Declaratory policy: the U.S. is against global terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists—“you are either with us or against us.”
- The U.S. recognizes it must be willing to accept risks. There are causes so important that they require putting lives at risk - fighting terrorism is one.
- Avoid personalizing the war against terrorism by focusing excessively on UBL or Omar. The task is bigger and broader than any one individual. We must root out the terrorist networks.
- Because Afghanistan is “anti-foreigner,” the U.S. emphasized the truth, that the U.S. is not there to stay; rather, we are there to help fight terrorism, liberate the Afghan people from the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, assure that it does not harbor terrorists in the future and assist with humanitarian assistance.
- The link between global terrorist networks and the nations on the terrorist list that have active WMD capabilities is real, and poses a serious threat to the world; it points up the urgency of the effort against terrorism.
- September 11th resulted in a major shift in the world, offering opportunities to establish new relationships and to reorder institutions in ways that will contribute to our goals of peace and stability for decades to come.

Donald Rumsfeld

DHR:dh  
SD Memos/Current MFRs/Major Decisions

11-L-0559/OSD/13709

January 21, 2002 6:02 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*  
SUBJECT: Visit to Fort Bragg

Here is a memo I sent you back in November. I still think it is a good idea. You might want to crank it into the schedule.

Regards,

Attach.

11/29/01 SecDef memo to Hon. Card

DHR:dh  
012102-44

333WT

21 Jan 02

W00094 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13710

SNOWFLAKE

**November 29, 2001 10:45 AM**

**TO:** Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *Dh*  
**SUBJECT:** Fort Bragg

I promised the folks down at Fort Bragg that the President would visit there in the year 2002. He will absolutely love the trip! These folks are doing a great job for the country.

You really ought to think about getting that on your calendar for the first quarter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112901-5

11-L-0559/OSD/13711

10:55 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 19, 2002  
SUBJECT: Rewards and Bounties

We really do need to get the inter-agency functioning to sort out the mess that exists with respect to rewards and bounties. It needs to move, not just for Afghanistan, but we need to think it through for the whole world.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
011902.05

19 Jan 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13712

W00099 /02

000.5

January 22, 2002 4:31 PM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Visit to FDR Memorial

Mr. President,

I would be delighted to join you for a quick visit to the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial almost any evening. It would take about 30 minutes. I think you would find it memorable.

Very respectfully,

DHR:dh  
012102-47

2001/00  
OSD

22 Jan 02

W00101 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13713

January 22, 2002 3:15 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Your Impact

I had lunch last week with the five senior enlisted personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces.

They said that in their military careers, which span 20 to 30 years each, they have never seen the time when there was as close a link and relationship between the men and women in the Armed Services and their national leadership.

There is no question but that the fact that we are in a conflict is part of it, but equally important, I know from their comments, are the many visits you have made to military installations, the personal effort you have put into assuring that the pay raise was achieved, and the many photos and news clips they have seen showing you with the troops. Also, they remarked on the thoughtful leadership you have provided with well-chosen words. Words are powerful, and they are listening.

Very respectfully,

DHR:dh  
012102-51

33550  
DR

22 Jan 02

W00102 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13714

January 22, 2002 3:07 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: India—China

I met with the Minister of Defense of India, George Fernandes, on Thursday, January 17. He told me that as a labor leader, in 1959, he led a demonstration in India against the People's Republic of China for their treatment of Nepal or Tibet. Madame Ghandi, the Prime Minister of India at that time, received a communication from Chou Enlai of the PRC, saying that "Fernandes had insulted Mao Tse-tung," and the incident "will never be forgiven or forgotten."

Fernandes told me that immediately after my visit to India last November, the PRC Ambassador called on him and, on behalf of the PRC, invited him to visit China. Over the next several weeks he received an invitation from the senior military leader in China to visit also, and then last week the PRC Ambassador again invited him to visit China.

He was greatly amused by the fact that all it took for him to be forgiven by the PRC for his "insult" was a visit by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the clear warming of the relationship between the United States and India.

It shows the significance of a visit, a phone call, or a letter at the right time and done in the right way. Given the number of phone calls you make and the leaders you see, it struck me that this incident points up the impact of the many calls and contacts you make. They are well worth the effort.

Very respectfully,

DHR:dh  
011802-10

INDIA

DRAFTED

W00103 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13715

January 29, 2002 2:59 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *in*  
SUBJECT: EEOB

I am told that the Old Executive Office Building next to the West Wing of the White House was renamed the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, but there was never a ceremony dedicating it.

It might be a nice event. Why don't you think about that? There are a lot of members of the Eisenhower family still alive, there are some members of his Cabinet still alive and he is well thought of.

We did it for Robert Kennedy—it might be nice to do it for Dwight Eisenhower.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012902-31

600

29 Jan 02

WOO1341/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13716

February 7, 2002 1:39 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: National Security Strategy

381

In both the House and the Senate, I am starting to get questions about why we have not done the National Security Strategy required by Congress.

I get the sense the Democrats are going to begin to use that against us.

Where do we stand?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020602-26

7 Feb 02

W00169 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13717

February 12, 2002 7:53 AM

2002 FEB 12 07 53 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[initials]*  
SUBJECT: Scowcroft Report

I understand that Bill Schneider has attached his additional dissenting views to the Scowcroft Report. I have read Bill's dissenting views and agree with them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
021102-8

350.09

12 Feb 02

WOO182 102

11-L-0559/OSD/13718

February 20, 2002 9:11 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Upcoming Trip

It might make sense for Bill Luti, who used to be on your staff and is now working with Doug Feith in the Pentagon, to go along on your trip if you are comfortable with that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
021502-5

333 WH

20 Feb 02

W00208■/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13719

February 20, 2002 9:11 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *(initials)*  
SUBJECT: Meetings w/President

I would like to get back to having a regular weekly meeting with the President, where I can meet with him separately.

I always cancel if I don't need it, but I find I always have odds and ends that are probably better to bring up with him there than they are in the NSC meetings, which is about the only time I see the President.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
021502-4

333 W  
H M USE

20 Feb 02

W00209 1/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13720

SNOWFLAKE

February 27, 2002 5:30 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Unified Commanders and Service Chiefs on Thursday, February 28, 2002

W27WF

The ten unified commanders, five service chiefs, Generals Myers and Pace, Paul Wolfowitz and I are scheduled to meet with you Thursday for an hour and a quarter, starting at 5:00 p.m.

Fifteen minutes prior, at 4:45 p.m., Generals Myers and Franks will join me to brief you on a future operation we're planning in Operation Enduring Freedom.

When the larger group joins us, I propose that the preponderance of the time be dedicated to hearing from the ten unified commanders, whom you see less often than you do the service chiefs.

Each of the unified commanders will be prepared to give you a short overview of issues important to his function or region, focusing on their activities in the war on terrorism.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh  
022702-19

27 Feb 02

WCO254 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13721

11:15 AM

TO: Vice President Richard Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
DATE: March 4, 2002  
SUBJECT: **RON JAMES**

Ron James was in the other day, and he would be in a position to do something in government some time later this year, probably the fall. Attached is his background sheet. We had lunch the other day. He is certainly a good man. I send it along with the thought that you might want to keep your eye open for something.

*3/4/02  
2/2*

I asked him about political contributions. He said that his law firm gave to many candidates. He is registered as a Republican.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030402.05

Attach: Resume of Ron James

*W00269 102*

11-L-0559/OSD/13722

## **Ronald J. James**

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**Partner**  
**Labor and Employment Practice Area**

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### ***Personal Practice Summary***

Ronald J. James is a partner in the Labor and Employment practice area, resident in the firm's Cleveland office. Ron concentrates on counselling and advocacy for private and public sector employers in labor and employment matters and particularly emphasizes wage & hour law.

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### ***Significant Recent Experience***

The former Administrator of the Wage & Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor during the Ford Administration, Ron concentrates his practice on representing management in a wide variety of wage & hour matters in addition to the full range of other employment and labor law matters including discrimination, affirmative action, Railway Labor Act, anti-trust, drug testing, ERISA, NLRA, OSHA, labor arbitration, restrictive covenants, employment-at-will and disability law. Ron's practice engages him in employment-related litigation before federal and state courts, administrative agencies and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

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### ***Professional Associations and Activities***

Ohio State Bar Association  
Iowa Bar Association  
American Bar Association  
National Bar Association  
Defense Research Institute  
National School Boards Association

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### ***Community Activities***

Cleveland International Program  
Hiram College Visiting Committee  
ASPA Legal Advisory Committee  
Hawken School Board General Counsel and Executive Committee Member

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### ***Publications and Speeches***

Lecturer, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1980-1982)  
Member of Faculty, National Employment Law Institute  
Various seminars for organizations such as Society for Human Resource Management, NSBA, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Employers'

**Ronald J. James**

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Resource Council, Midwest Labor Law Conference, Cleveland State University, Ohio CLE Institute and the American Bar Association

**Professional Employment**

Partner, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio (1977-Present)  
Administrator, Wage & Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor (1975-1977)  
Assistant General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1972-1975)  
Trial Attorney, Office of the Secretary of Transportation (1970-1971)  
Special Assistant to Donald Rumsfeld, Counsellor to the President – White House (1969-1970)

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**Education**

J.D., American University School of Law, 1966  
M.A., Southern Illinois University, 1972  
B.A., University of Missouri, 1959

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**Nationality**

United States of America

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6:57 AM

TO: Clay Johnson  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 7, 2002  
SUBJECT: Naval Academy Board of Overseers

I just read the *Washington Post* that reported that the President had named four to the Naval Academy Board of Overseers. I was not aware of that. Was there any discussion with DoD on that?

352 USAF

As you will recall, my understanding with the President was that I would not recommend anyone he was not comfortable with, and he would not name anyone that I was not comfortable with. Since I don't believe DoD has asked about this, I am wondering what is going on in the personnel operation that we have changed the rules.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030702.02

Mar 02

WOO2860/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13725

10:48 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 8, 2002  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Trip

I talked to Tom Franks about the women's visit to Afghanistan. He says right now it's fine. He is going to wait until within five days and at that time he will make a call. People should keep leaning forward. For now, it looks good.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030802.31

*8 March*

**Woo2870/02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13726

March 12, 2002 3:24 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. Myers  
J. D. Crouch  
*HONORABLE CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE*  
CC: J. D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Russian MoD Ivanov, March 11, 2002

I took MoD Ivanov to the Wizards' basketball game on March 11.

We didn't talk much business, but the following items might be worth noting:

1. He said the Olympics played very badly in Russia. It stirred up a lot of anti-American feeling.
2. I told him that the "chicken" decision was not going to be helpful with Jackson-Vanik. He said he has been briefed on that, and there is no question but that when the chicken arrived from the U.S., stamped "approved," they found salmonella in 5 or 6 or 7 cases. He believes it. He mused that it is hard to see the connection between chickens and Jewish immigration.
3. He said the steel decision hurts in Russia. I said Russia and several other places.
4. I told him we might want to spend the first part of the first meeting talking about what we want to do, what we want to cover in which meeting. He said fine. He said he brought along some experts—one in proliferation. They know more than he does, and he said we ought to give them a chance to speak.
5. I asked him if Berezofsky was bouncing him around a little bit. He said he is after all of Putin's people in the press, but nothing notable.
6. He is still limping noticeably, claims that in a month or two it will all be well.
7. He is still smoking.

DHR:dh  
031202-3

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/13727

W00307 /02

March 14, 2002 7:22 AM

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper by Newt Minow

262

Attached is a lecture by Newt Minow. It will be given at Loyola University on March 19.

Newt was President John F. Kennedy's Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.

I recommended that he be nominated for the Democratic opening on the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

I think you will find the lecture worth reading. He points up the importance of communicating our message.

Respectfully,

**Attach.**

03/19/02 Newton N. Minow, "The Whisper of America," Morris I. Leibman Lecture, Loyola University

DHR:dh  
031102-28

20 Mar 11

WOO3080/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13728

March 14, 2002 7:22 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Paper by Newt Minow

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Regards.

Attach.

03/19/02 Newton N. Minow, "The Whisper of America," Morris I. Leibman Lecture, Loyola University

DHR:dh  
031102-24

WOODS 080/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13729

March 14, 2002 7:22 AM

TO: Honorable Karl Rove  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Paper by Newt Minow

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Regards.

Attach.

03/19/02 Newton N. Minow, "The Whisper of America," Morris I. Leibman Lecture, Loyola University

DHR:dh  
03J102-22

WOO3080/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13730

**March 14, 2002 7:22 AM**

**TO:** Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld  
**SUBJECT:** Paper by Newt Minow

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Regards,

Attach.

03/19/02 Newton N. Minow, "The Whisper of America," Morris I. Leibman Lecture, Loyola University

DHR:dh  
031102-23

WOO3086/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13731

March 14, 2002 7:22 AM

TO: Honorable Clay Johnson  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Paper by Newt Minow

Attached is a lecture by Newt Minow. It will be given at Loyola University on March 19.

Newt was President John F. Kennedy's Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.

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Regards.

**Attach.**

03/19/02 Newton N. Minow, "The Whisper of America," Morris I. Leibman Lecture, Loyola University

DHR:dh  
031102-27

WOO3080/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13732

Morris I. Leibman Lecture – Loyola University—March 19, 2002

**The Whisper of America**

By Newton N. Minow

In World War II, when the survival of freedom was still far from certain, the United States created a new international radio service, the Voice of America. On February 24, 1942, William Harlan Hale opened the German-language program with these words: “Here speaks a voice from America. Every day at this time we will bring you the news of the war. The news may be good. The news may be bad. We will tell you the truth.”

My old boss, William Benton, came up with the idea of the Voice of America. He was then Assistant Secretary of State and would later become Senator from Connecticut. He was immensely proud of the Voice of America. One day he described the new VOA to RCA Chairman David Sarnoff, the tough-minded and passionate pioneer of American broadcasting. Sarnoff noticed how little electronic power and transmitter scope the VOA had via short-wave radio, then said, “Benton, all you’ve got here is the whisper of America.”

Although The Voice of America, and later other international radio services, have made valuable contributions, our international broadcasting services suffer from miserly funding. In many areas of the world, they have seldom been more than a whisper. Today, when we most need to communicate our story, especially in the Middle East, our

broadcasts are not even a whisper. People in every country know our music, our movies, our clothes, and our sports. But they do not know our freedom or our values or our democracy.

I want to talk with you about how and why this happened, and what we must do about it.

First, some history:

At first, the Voice of America was part of the Office of War Information. When the war ended, the VOA was transferred to the Department of State. With the beginning of the Cold War, officials within the government began to debate the core mission of the VOA: Was it to be a professional, impartial news service serving as an example of press freedom to the world? Or was it an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, a strategic weapon to be employed against those we fight? What is the line between news and propaganda? Should our broadcasts advocate America's values—or should they provide neutral, objective journalism?

That debate has never been resolved, only recast for each succeeding generation. In August 1953, for example, our government concluded that whatever the VOA was or would be, it should not be part of the State Department. So we established the United States Information Agency, and the VOA became its single largest operation.

A few years ago, Congress decided that all our international broadcasts were to be governed by a bi-partisan board appointed by the President, with the Secretary of State as an ex-officio member.

This includes other U.S. international broadcast services which were born in the Cold War, the so-called "Freedom Radios." The first was Radio Free Europe, established in 1949 as a non-profit, non-governmental private corporation to broadcast news and information to East Europeans behind the Iron Curtain. The second was Radio Liberty, created in 1951 to broadcast similar programming to the citizens of Russia and the Soviet republics. Both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were secretly funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, a fact not known to the American public until 1967, when the *New York Times* first reported the connection. The immediate result of the story was a huge controversy, because the radios had for years solicited donations from the public through an advertising campaign known as the Crusade for Freedom. Such secrecy, critics argued, undermined the very message of democratic openness the stations were intended to convey in their broadcasts to the closed, totalitarian regimes of the East.

In 1971, Congress terminated CIA funding for the stations and provided for their continued existence by open appropriations. The stations survived and contributed to American strategy in the Cold War. That strategy was simple: to persuade and convince the leaders and people of the communist bloc that freedom was better than dictatorship, that free enterprise was better than central planning, and that no country could survive if it did not respect human rights and the rule of law. Broadcasting into regimes where

travel was severely restricted, where all incoming mail was censored, and all internal media were tools of state propaganda, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty communicated two messages that conventional weapons never could – doubt about the present and hope for the future.

They did so against repeated efforts by Soviet and East European secret police to sabotage their broadcast facilities, to create friction between the stations and their host governments, and even to murder the stations' personnel. In 1962, I personally witnessed an effort by Soviet delegates to an international communications conference in Geneva to eliminate our broadcasts to Eastern Europe. Because I was then Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, the Soviets assumed I was in charge of these broadcasts. I explained that although this was not my department, I thought we should double the broadcasts.

Listening to the radios' evening broadcasts became a standard ritual throughout Russia and Eastern Europe. Moscow, no matter how hard it tried, could not successfully jam the transmissions. As a result, communism had to face a public that every year knew more about its lies. In his 1970 Nobel Prize speech, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn said of Radio Liberty, "If we learn anything about events in our own country, it's from there." When the Berlin Wall fell, and soon after the Soviet Union crumbled, Lech Walesa was asked about the significance of Radio Free Europe to the Polish democracy movement. He replied, "Where would the Earth be without the sun?"

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty continue to broadcast, from headquarters in downtown Prague, at the invitation of Vaclav Havel. The studios are now guarded by tanks in the street to protect against terrorists.

With very little money, Congress authorized several new services: Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Iraq, Radio Free Iran, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Democracy Africa, and Worldnet, a television service that broadcasts a daily block of American news. After 9/11, Congress approved funding for a new Radio Free Afghanistan. What most people don't know is that this service is not new – Congress authorized funds for Radio Free Afghanistan first in 1985, when the country was under Soviet domination. Even then the service was minimal – one half-hour a day of news in the Dari and Pashto languages. When the Soviets withdrew, we mistakenly thought the service was no longer needed. We dismantled it as the country plunged into chaos. We are finally beginning to correct our mistakes with a smart new service in the Middle East called "The New Station for the New Generation."

Indeed, as the Cold War wound down, we forgot its most potent lesson: that totalitarianism was defeated not with missiles, tanks and carriers, but with ideas – and that words can be weapons. Even though the Voice of America had earned the trust and respect of listeners for its accuracy and fairness, our government starved our international broadcasts. Many of the resources that had once been given to public diplomacy – to explaining ourselves and our values to the world – were eliminated. In the Middle East, particularly, American broadcasting is not even a whisper. An Arab-language radio

service is operated by Voice of America, but its budget is tiny and its audience tinier -- only about 1 to 2 percent of Arabs ever listen to it. Among those under the age of 30 - 60 percent of the population in the region -- virtually no one listens.

As we fell mute in the Cold War's aftermath, other voices grew in influence.

### **Al Jazeera**

In the past few months, Westerners began to learn about Al Jazeera as a source of anti-American tirades by Muslim extremists and as the favored news outlet of both Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. The service had its beginnings in 1995, when the BBC withdrew from a joint venture with Saudi-owned Orbit Communications that had provided news on a Middle East channel. The BBC and the Saudi government clashed over editorial judgments, and the business relationship fell apart. Into the breach stepped a big fan of CNN, Qatar's Emir, Sheikh Hamed bin Khalifa Al Thani. He admired CNN's satellite technology and decided to bankroll a Middle East satellite network with a small budget. He hired most of the BBC's anchors, editors and technicians, and Al Jazeera was born.

Al Jazeera means "the peninsula" in Arabic, and the name is fitting. Just as Qatar is a peninsula, the station's programming protrudes conspicuously into the world of state-controlled broadcasting in the Middle East. Several commentators, including many Arabs, have sharply criticized the service for being unprofessional and biased. CNN and Al Jazeera had a dispute this year and terminated their cooperative relationship.

Well before September 11, Al Jazeera had managed to anger most of the governments in its own region. Libya withdrew its ambassador from Qatar when Al Jazeera broadcast an interview with a critic of the Libyan government. Tunisia's ambassador complained to the Qatari foreign ministry about a program accusing Tunisia of violating human rights. Kuwait complained after a program criticized Kuwait's relations with Iraq. In Saudi Arabia, officials called for a "political fatwa" prohibiting Saudis from appearing on any Al Jazeera programming. In March 2001, Yasser Arafat closed Al Jazeera's West Bank news bureau, complaining of an offensive depiction of Arafat in a documentary. Algeria shut off electricity to prevent its citizens from watching Al Jazeera's programs. Other countries deny Al Jazeera's reporters entry visas.

And of course, our own country has plenty to complain about Al Jazeera.

Al Jazeera came to our notice first because a 1998 interview with Osama bin Laden called upon Muslims to "target all Americans." Al Jazeera broadcast the tape many times. As the only network with an office in Afghanistan, Al Jazeera was the only one the Taliban allowed to broadcast from the country. On October 7, 2001, the network's Kabul office received a videotape message from Osama bin Laden, which it transmitted around the world. Hiding in caves, Osama could still speak to the world in a voice louder than ours because we allowed our story to be told by our enemies.

Forty years ago, I accompanied President Kennedy on a tour of our space program facilities. He asked me why it was so important to launch a communications satellite. I

said, "Mr. President, unlike other rocket launches, this one will not send a man into space, but it will send ideas. And ideas last longer than people do." I never dreamed that the ideas millions of people receive every day would come from Al Jazeera.

### **The Global Media Marketplace**

Whatever one thinks of Al Jazeera, it teaches an important lesson: The global marketplace of news and information is no longer dominated by the United States. Our own government, because it has no outlet of its own in the area, is looking into buying commercial time on Al Jazeera to get America's anti-terrorism message out. And because of privatization and deregulation in the international satellite business, a huge number of Americans now have direct access to Al Jazeera through the EchoStar satellite service.

The point is simply this: Whether the message is one of hate or peace, in the globalized communications environment it is impossible either to silence those who send the message, or stop those who want to receive it. Satellites have no respect for national borders. Satellites surmount walls. Like Joshua's Trumpet, satellites blow walls down.

That was the last lesson of the Cold War. In Beijing, the Chinese government would not begin its brutal sweep through Tianamen Square until it thought the world's video cameras were out of range. In Manila, Warsaw and Bucharest, dissenters first captured the television station – the Electronic Bastille of modern revolutions. In Prague, a classic urban rebellion became a revolution through television. The Romanian revolution was not won until television showed pictures of the Ceaușescus' corpses and scenes of rebels

controlling the square in Bucharest. In the final days of the Soviet Union, the August 1991 coup against President Mikhail Gorbachev failed when video of the supposedly ill president was broadcast by satellite around the world. Those satellites, Gorbachev later said, "prevented the triumph of dictatorship." Now, we have the newer technologies of the internet and e-mail – technologies the Voice of America and the Freedom Radios use with enthusiasm without adequate support.

What we have failed to realize is that the last lesson of the Cold War is also the first lesson of the new global information age. We live now in a world where we are the lone superpower, and the target of envy and resentment not just in the Middle East but elsewhere. Terror is now the weapon of choice.

But if you believe we are only in a war against terrorism, you are only half-right. Nation-states can sponsor terrorism and provide cover to terrorists, but the war against terrorism is asymmetric. This is my friend Don Rumsfeld's favorite word – asymmetric. This means that war is not waged by a state against another state *per se*, but against an ideology. Think of the campaign of the past few months. The enemy has been a band of religious zealots and the Al Qaeda terrorists they harbor, not the people of Afghanistan. President Bush has been emphatic and effective on this point, as have Prime Minister Tony Blair and other world leaders.

Asymmetry also refers to the strategies and tactics used by those who cannot compete in a conventional war. In an asymmetric war, it is not enough to have Air Forces to

command the skies, Navies to roam the seas, or Armies to control mountain passes.

Although the Cold War led to staggering advances in military technology to win the battles, there is not a corresponding change in our government's use of communications technology to win the peace.

Asymmetry, in other words, is not limited to what happens on the battlefield. While U.S. Special Operations forces in Afghanistan use laptops and satellites and sophisticated wireless telecommunications to guide pilots flying bombing missions from aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea, we still use obsolete, clumsy and primitive methods, such as short-wave radio, to communicate to the people.

Here is another incongruity: American marketing talent is successfully selling Madonna's music, Pepsi Cola and Coca Cola, Michael Jordan's shoes and McDonald's hamburgers around the world. Our film, television and computer software industries dominate their markets worldwide. Yet, the United States government has tried to get its message of freedom and democracy out to the 1 billion Muslims in the world and can't seem to do it. How is it that America, a nation founded on ideas – not religion or race or ethnicity or clan – cannot explain itself to the world?

In the months since September 11, Americans have been surprised to learn of the deep and bitter resentment that much of the Muslim world feels toward us. Our situation is not just a public relations problem. Anyone who has traveled the world knows that much anti-American sentiment springs from disagreements with some of our economic and

foreign policies. Our support of authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world has not endeared us to the people who live there. And there is no more poisonous imagery than that of Palestinians and Israelis locked in mortal and what seems to be never-ending combat.

Still, the United States has an important story to tell, the story of human striving for freedom, democracy and opportunity. Since the end of the Cold War, we have failed to tell that story to a world waiting to hear it on the radio and see it on television. We have failed to use the power of ideas.

Within days of the Taliban's flight from Kabul, television was back on the air in the country. The Taliban had not only banned television broadcasts, but confiscated and destroyed thousands of TV sets. They hung the smashed husks of TV sets on light poles, along with videocassettes and musical instruments, as a warning to anyone who might try to break the regime's reign of ignorance. And yet no sooner were the Taliban driven from the city than hundreds of TV sets appeared from nowhere. Even in the midst of a totalitarian, theocratic regime, there had been a thriving underground market for news and information. Television antennas were quickly hung outside of windows and on rooftops. The antennas are like periscopes, enabling those inside to see what is happening outside.

Where were we when those people needed us? Where were we when Al Jazeera went on the air? It was as if we put on our own self-created burka and disappeared from sight. The voices of America, the voices of freedom, were not even a whisper.

### **The New Challenge**

I believe the United States must re-commit itself to public diplomacy -- to explaining and advocating our values to the world. As Tom Friedman put it in his *New York Times* column not long ago: "It is no easy trick to lose a PR war to two mass murderers -- (Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein) but we've been doing just that lately. It is not enough for the White House to label them 'evildoers.' We have to take the PR war right to them, just like the real one."

There are two leaders of both parties who need our support in this fight for aggressive, vigorous public diplomacy. Illinois Republican Congressman Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, wants to strengthen the Voice of America and the many Freedom Radio services that broadcast from Cuba to Afghanistan.

Democratic Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is on the same page. He has developed legislation known as "Initiative 911" to give special emphasis to more programming for the entire Muslim world, from Nigeria to Indonesia.

In November, Congress finally set aside \$30 million to launch a new Middle East radio network. The AM and FM broadcasts (not short wave) will offer pop music -- American

and Arabic – along with a mix of current events and talk shows. The proposal to fund Radio Free Afghanistan is for \$27.5 million this year and next, and will allow about 12 hours a day of broadcasting into the country. The goal is to make our ideas clear not just to leaders in the Muslim world, but to those in the street, and particularly the young, many of whom are uneducated and desperately poor, and among whom hostility toward the United States is very high.

These efforts are late and, in my view, too timid. They are tactical, not strategic. They are smart, not visionary. The cost of putting Radio Free Afghanistan on the air and underwriting its annual budget, for example, is less than even one Commanche helicopter. We have many hundreds of helicopters which we need to destroy tyranny, but they are insufficient to secure freedom. In an asymmetric war, we must also fight on the idea front.

Bob Shieffer put the issue well not long ago on CBS' "Face the Nation":

"The real enemy is not Osama, it is the ignorance that breeds the hatred that fuels his cause. This is what we have to change. I realized what an enormous job that was going to be the other day when I heard a young Pakistani student tell an interviewer that everyone in his school knew that Israel was behind the attacks on the Twin Towers and everyone in his school knew all the Jews who worked there had stayed home that day.

"What we have all come to realize now is that a large part of the world not only misunderstands us but is teaching its children to hate us."

Steve Forbes, who once headed the Broadcasting Board of Governors, put the issue even more bluntly: "Washington should cease its petty, penny-minded approach to our

international radios and give them the resources and capable personnel to do the job that so badly needs to be done right.... What are we waiting for?"

### **The proposal**

What are we waiting for? I suggest three simple proposals. First, define a clear strategic mission and vision for U.S. international broadcasting. Second, provide the financial resources to get the job done. Third, use the unique talent that the United States has – all of it – to communicate that vision to the world.

First, and above all, U.S. international broadcasting should be unapologetically proud to advocate freedom and democracy in the world. There is no inconsistency in reporting the news accurately while also advocating America's values. The real issue is whether we will carry the debate on the meaning of freedom to places on the globe, where open debate is unknown and freedom has no seed. Does anyone seriously believe that the twin goals of providing solid journalism and undermining tyranny are incompatible? As a people, Americans have always been committed to the proposition that these goals go hand in hand. As the leader of the free world, it is time for us to do what's right – to speak of idealism, sacrifice and the nurturing of values essential to human freedom – and to speak in a bold, clear voice.

Second, if we are to do that, we will need to put our money where our mouths are not. We now spend more than a billion dollars each day for the Department of Defense. Results in the war on terrorism demonstrate that this is money well invested in our national security.

Whatever Don Rumsfeld says he needs should be provided by the Congress with pride in the extraordinary service his imaginative leadership is giving our country. As President Bush has proposed, we will need to increase the defense budget. When we do, let's compare what we need to spend on the Voice of America and the Freedom Radio services with what we need to spend on defense. Our international broadcasting efforts amount to less than two-tenths of one percent of Defense expenditures. Al Jazeera was started with an initial budget of less than \$30 million a year. Now Al Jazeera reaches some 40 million men, women and children every day, at a cost of pennies per viewer every month.

Congress should hold hearings now to decide what we should spend to get our message of freedom, democracy and peace into the non-democratic and authoritarian regions of the world. One suggestion is to consider a relationship between what we spend on defense with what we spend on communication. For example, should we spend 10 percent of what we spend on defense for communication? That would be \$33 billion a year. Too much. Should we spend 1 percent? That would be \$3.3 billion, and that seems about right to me -- one dollar to launch ideas for every \$100 we invest to launch bombs. This would be about six times more than we invest now in international communications. We must establish a ratio sufficient to our need to inform and persuade others of the values of freedom and democracy. More importantly, we should seek a ratio sufficient to lessen our need for bombs.

Third, throwing money alone at the problem will not do the job. We need to use all of the communications talent we have at our disposal. This job is not only for journalists. As important as balanced news and public affairs programming are to our public diplomacy mission, the fact is that we are now in a global information marketplace. An American news source, even a highly professional one like the VOA, is not necessarily persuasive in a market of shouting, often deceitful and hateful voices. Telling the truth in a persuasive, convincing way is not propaganda. Churchill's and Roosevelt's words – "never was so much owed by so many to so few" – "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself" – were as powerful as a thousand guns.

When Colin Powell chose advertising executive Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy and public affairs, some journalists sneered. You cannot peddle freedom as you would cars and shampoo, went the refrain. That is undoubtedly so, and Beers has several times said as much herself. But you can't peddle freedom if no one is listening, and Charlotte Beers is a master at getting people to listen – and to communicate in terms people understand.

So was another visionary in this business, Bill Benton. Before he served as Assistant Secretary of State, Benton had been a founding partner in one of the country's largest and most successful advertising firms, Benton and Bowles. To win the information war, we will need the Bentons and Beers of this world every bit as much as we will need the journalists. We have the smartest, most talented, and most creative people in the world in our communications industries – in radio, television, film, newspapers, magazines,

advertising, publishing, public relations, marketing. These men and women want to help their country, and will volunteer eagerly to help get our message across. One of the first people we should enlist is a West Point graduate named Bill Roedy, who is President of MTV Networks International. His enterprise reaches one billion people in 18 languages in 164 countries. Eight out of ten MTV viewers live outside the United States. He can teach us a lot about how to tell our story.

### **Conclusion**

In 1945, a few years after the VOA first went on the air, the newly founded United Nations had 51 members. Today it has 189. In the last decade alone, more than 20 countries have been added to the globe, many of them former Soviet republics, but not all. Some of these new countries, as with the Balkan example, have been cut bloodily from the fabric of ethnic and religious hatred. Some of these countries are nominally democratic, but many – especially in Central Asia – are authoritarian regimes. Some are also deeply unstable, and thus pose a threat not only to their neighbors, but to the free world. Afghanistan, we discovered too late, is a concern not only to its region, but to all of us.

In virtually every case, those whose rule is based on an ideology of hate have understood better than we have the power of ideas and the power of communicating ideas. The bloodshed in the Balkans began with hate radio blaring from Zagreb and Belgrade, and hate radio is still common in the region today. The murder of 2 million Hutus and Tutsis

in central Africa could not have happened but for the urging of madmen with broadcast towers at their disposal. The same has been true of ethnic violence in India and Pakistan.

I saw this first hand in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. President Kennedy asked me to organize eight American commercial radio stations to carry the Voice of America to Cuba because the VOA was shut out by Soviet jamming. We succeeded, and President Kennedy's speeches were heard in Spanish in Cuba at the height of the crisis. As we kept the destroyers and missiles out of Cuba, we got the Voice of America in because we had enough power to surmount the jamming. On that occasion, our American broadcasts were more than a whisper.

Last spring – well before the events of September 11 – Illinois Congressman Henry Hyde put the need eloquently. I quote him:

During the last several years it has been argued that our broadcasting services have done their job so well that they are no longer needed. This argument assumes that the great battle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the long struggle for the soul of the world, is over: that the forces of freedom and democracy have won. But the argument is terribly shortsighted. It ignores the people of China and Cuba, of Vietnam and Burma, of Iraq and Iran and Sudan and North Korea and now Russia. It ignores the fragility of freedom and the difficulty of building and keeping democracy. And it ignores the resilience of evil.

Fifty-eight years ago, Albert Einstein returned from a day of sailing to find a group of reporters waiting for him at the shore. The reporters told him that the United States had dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, wiping out the city. Einstein shook his head and said, "Everything in the world has changed except the way we think."

On September 11 everything changed except the way we think. It is hard to change the way we think. But we know that ideas last longer than people do, and that two important ideas of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are now in direct competition: the ideas of mass communication and mass destruction. The great question of our time is whether we will be wise enough to use one to avoid the other.

March 14, 2002 7:06 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Combating Terrorism Coin

335  
SG

The enclosed coin was commissioned before September 11, 2001, and the die was destroyed in the attack on the Pentagon. The manufacturer made a new strike.

Mr. Thomas Kuster of the staff here provided me the first numbered coins and wanted you to have coin number one.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
Coin Number One

DHR:dh  
031302-2

14 MAR 02

WOO309•/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13752

March 14, 2002 7:12 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Combating Terrorism Coin

The enclosed coin was commissioned before September 11, 2001, and the die was destroyed in the attack on the Pentagon. The manufacturer made a new strike.

Mr. Thomas Kuster of the staff here provided me the first numbered coins and wanted you to have coin number two.

Regards,

Attach.  
Coin Number Two

DHR:dh  
031302-3

WOO309 • /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13753

March 14, 2002 7:12 AM

TO: Honorable John Ashcroft  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Combating Terrorism Coin

The enclosed coin was commissioned before September 11, 2001, and the die was destroyed in the attack on the Pentagon. The manufacturer made a new strike.

Mr. Thomas Kuster of the staff here provided me the first numbered coins and wanted you to have coin number four.

Regards,

Attach.  
Coin Number Four

DHR:db  
031302-4

WOO309\*/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13754

March 14, 2002 7:12 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Combating Terrorism Coin

The enclosed coin was commissioned before September 11, 2001, and the die was destroyed in the attack on the Pentagon. The manufacturer made a new strike.

Mr. Thomas Kuster of the staff here provided me the first numbered coins and wanted you to have coin number five.

Regards,

Attach.  
Coin Number Five

DHR:dh  
031302-5

WOO309<sup>8</sup>/02

11-L-0559/OSD/13755



11-L-0559/OSD/13756



11-L-0559/OSD/13757

March 18, 2002 12:50 PM

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Don Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Comparison of Military to Civilian Pay

Mr. President,

Sometime back you indicated you were interested to know how military pay compared to civilian pay, with the pay raises proposed in the '03 budget.

Attached is a response Under Secretary David Chu prepared, which I believe responds to your question.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

01/31/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Military Compensation [U01978/02]

DHR:dh  
031802-41

18 Mar 02

C&D  
Please contact  
and send.

11-L-0559/OSD/13758

W00324 /02


## How Does Military Compensation Compare to Civilian Wages?

- Military pay<sup>1</sup> for troops with 10 to 20 years of military service tracks with average earnings of full-time, male workers in the private sector who have some college education (see attached graph).
- During the first and the third decades of military service, pay exceeds the 70<sup>th</sup> percentile of civilian earnings, but during the second decade of service, pay has remained below the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile. The President's FY 2002 \$1 billion targeted pay raise, coupled with a 10-percent increase in housing allowances, has moved mid-career enlisted and officers above the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile.
- The proposed FY 2003 targeted raise will elevate those mid-careerists even closer to the 70<sup>th</sup> percentile. That higher percentile is appropriate because more than 50 percent of sergeants (top five enlisted grades) have completed one year of college, with more than 20 percent of the top two enlisted grades holding college degrees. Thus, the "some college" pay line is the appropriate point of comparison.
- For officers, the comparable civilian point of reference is male *college graduates* who work in managerial and professional jobs, yet the pay of officers with between 9 and 15 years of service also remains below the appropriate benchmark (70<sup>th</sup> percentile of civilian wages).
- The above comparisons do not include extra pays or bonuses paid for special skills, the value of retired pay, or medical benefits, each of which helps mitigate effects of deployments, family separations, spousal income losses resulting from frequent moves, and other conditions of military service—the most important being the risk to life and limb.

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<sup>1</sup> In this paper, "military pay" refers to Regular Military Compensation (RMC), which is the counterpart to gross wages and salaries in the private sector. RMC is composed of basic pay, housing and subsistence allowances (or their in-kind equivalents) and the tax advantage attributable to the non-taxability of the allowances.

## **Enlisted Pay Compared with Earnings of Those In Private Sector with Some College**



11-L-0559/OSD/13760



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECDEF HAS SEE

MAR 18 2002

ACTION MEMO

January 31, 2002, 10:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to POTUS Regarding Military Compensation

- You asked me (Tab B) to provide a response to POTUS question:

*"The President is curious to know how comparable military pay will be to civilian pay with the pay raise proposed in the '03 budget. If that is not the right question, then answer that, but also give me the answer to what the right question is."*

- The question you posed is correct. My proposed response is attached (Tab A) and discusses how both enlisted and officer pay compare to the civilian sector.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the response at Tab A.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATIONS: N/A

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: CAPT Chris Kopang, OASD(FMP)(MPP)/Comp.

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI
MA BUCCI
EXECSEC WHITMORE

523

24

11-L-0559/OSD/13761



U01978 /02

snwhk  
1/26/02

January 25, 2002 12:23 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Military Pay

The President is curious to know how comparable military pay will be to civilian pay with the pay raise proposed in the '03 budget.

If that is not the right question, then answer that, but also give me the answer to what the right question is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012502-8

.....

Please respond by 02/01/02

y/7

Response attached

11-L-0559/OSD/13762

March 18, 2002 12:53 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Galileo and Possible Impact on GPS Military Signals

This is clearly an interagency problem.

Would you please give me some sense of what you think we might do to deal with it? It is very serious.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/08/02 Schlesinger memo to SecDef re: Galileo and Possible Impact on GPS Military Signals

DHR:dh  
031802-42

4/3/02

18 Mar 02

W00326 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13763

2

cc: Gwen to DeRita

## MEMORANDUM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FOR: Donald Rumsfeld

MAR 18 2002

FROM: Jim Schlesinger

DATE: 8 Marcy 2002

SUBJ: Galileo and Possible Impact on GPS Military Signals

Don:

You may recall that last winter I gave you spectrum charts indicating how we had failed to protect ourselves at the WOC-2000 (World Radiocommunications Conference). What the charts indicated was that we had agreed that (basically acquiescing in the French position) the Europeans could use for their prospective Galileo system the same frequency bands that we use for our own GPS system. I fear that the chickens may now be coming home to roost.

Last week (see attachment) Germany, which had been resisting going ahead with the Galileo system, switched positions. As of now, the likelihood that Galileo will proceed is quite high. The EU apparently does not intend to use the central frequency that we employ for the C/A code (the coarse acquisition signal), but apparently intends to use the side bands where our military signals lie—and thus could interfere with reception in some geographical site.

Two points!

1. It is regrettable that we did not use our time effectively—especially in the Clinton years when we had the best opportunity—to persuade the Europeans not to proceed with Galileo. It was my judgement and recommendation at the time that we establish a National Program Office and establish an advisory body within the Executive Office that would give the Europeans a feeling that at least they were being listened to. Otherwise, they would run along with their tendentious line that they could not trust the U.S. Department of Defense over the long term. It is possible that we still might recover the situation by renewing efforts along this line of approach.
2. If the Europeans do proceed with Galileo, we must persuade them to use GPS standards. That would allow us to avoid expensive augmentation and retrofits to deal with (different) Galileo signals. Indeed, if they use our signal structure, it could strengthen the GPS system. In the absence of interoperability, however, we would have to have receivers equipped to receive both signals—which could be confusing as well as expensive.

Memo to Donald Rumsfeld

-2-

8 March 2002

The Japanese plan to put several satellites in geosynchronous orbit—and to make use of GPS standards. We must press the Europeans to do the same, if indeed they go ahead with Galileo.

P. S. I have pressed these concerns with Frank Miller at the NSC. The charts showing the messy results at WOC-2000 are available.

**SPACENEWS****Business Report**

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Fri, Mar 1, 2002

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**German Approval Paves Way For Galileo**By PETER B. de SELDING

Space News Staff Writer

posted: 05:20 pm ET, 28 February 2002

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KOUROU, French Guiana — The German government's approval of Europe's proposed Galileo satellite navigation system all but ensures that European Union transport ministers will vote to proceed with the project at a March 26 meeting, according to European government and industry officials.

The upcoming vote is the final hurdle to the release of 1.1 billion euros (\$1 billion) to begin full-scale development of the system.

The German decision was announced Feb. 27 by German Transportation Minister Kurt Bodewig following the approval of the German government's cabinet, led by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. In a statement issued after the announcement, the transport ministry said Galileo would improve the efficiency and safety of Europe's air, land and maritime transportation.

Germany is one of a half-dozen European Union (EU) governments that had been undecided about Galileo, a 30-satellite constellation that is designed to provide services similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System.

These governments, also including Britain, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, had voiced concerns during a December EU transport ministers meeting that Galileo, estimated to cost around 3.4 billion euros, would not attract enough private investors to help ease the burden on European taxpayers.

Some European government officials had said Germany, Britain and the other dissenters also were under pressure from the U.S. government to scuttle Galileo. U.S. government officials have denied that they are against the program, but have raised concerns that its backers — European research and transport ministers — have not paid sufficient attention to the system's security implications.

With Germany among them, the dissenting governments wielded enough power to block the program. With Germany's approval, however, the scales have tipped in favor of the pro-Galileo camp.

Felix Stenschke, a spokesman for the German Transport Ministry, said Feb. 28 that Germany's hesitation in December was due only to the fact that the EU Commission had not given member governments enough time to review a report on Galileo's financial and commercial aspects.

The report, by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, was generally favorable to Galileo and said it would generate four times its capital cost in economic activity in the EU. The report also said it could be difficult to win private-sector support for Galileo, at least at the project's early stage, because making a profit would take years.

the  
info in  
images.

German Approval Paves Way For Galileo

[http://www.space.com/spacedewi/europe/Galileo\\_022802.html](http://www.space.com/spacedewi/europe/Galileo_022802.html)

"We asked for time to review that report, and we have reviewed it and we approve the funding proposed by the European Commission," Stenschke said. "We have made our decision and it has been approved by the cabinet."

Stenschke said Germany's position is that Galileo must be funded by resources already at the disposal of an EU program called Trans-European Networks, and must not depend on supplemental funding by EU governments. "Even if the program suffers cost overruns, these added costs must be covered by the EU budgets and not national budgets," he said.

European Commission officials have said their entire Galileo development budget of 550 million euros has been set aside and will require no supplemental funding from EU governments. The European Space Agency also has approved 550 million euros in Galileo development.

Jean-Pol Poncelet, the European Space Agency's director of strategy, said in a Feb. 28 interview that the German government's decision was "a quantum leap for Galileo.

"I imagine that the German decision will be followed by a strong consensus on the program when the transport ministers meet March 26," Poncelet said. "The British government, for example, informed us that, while it does not support Galileo, it would not want to be excluded from the program if it went forward."

The remaining funding of 2.3 billion euros needed to complete the Galileo system has not yet been secured. A combination of private and government funding is foreseen, with the exact proportion yet to be decided. The Galileo constellation is scheduled to be operational by 2008.

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**FUTURE SPACE**  
**First major discovery at Mars by Odyssey,**  
**coming by 4 p.m. EST today on SPACE.com.**

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March 21, 2002 11:56 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *YK*

SUBJECT: Exit Strategies

Attached is an article with an interesting thought about "exit strategies."

Very respectfully,

cc: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

Attach.

03/15/02 Debra Saunders, "Bush Wants Victory, Not an Exit," *Sarasota Herald Tribune*

DHR:dh  
032102-6

38-1

20 Mar 2002

W00353-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13768

DOUBTERS IN THE SENATE

Sarasota Herald Tribune

3/15/02

# Bush wants victory, not an exit

There's a predictable pattern to how this sort of story plays out. First, U.S. Sen. Robert Byrd, D-W.Va., complains during a congressional hearing that the Bush administration has no "exit strategy" and that there is "no end in sight in our mission in Afghanistan." Next, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle questions President Bush's likely "continued success" in the war.

Then, the Republican senators overplay their hand. They bash Daschle for dissing Bush while American troops are fighting abroad.

This invites the left to get all huffy about anyone criticizing Democrats for criticizing the White House. Daschle acts as if he weren't criticizing Bush, but just asking questions because "we have a constitutional obligation to ask these questions." Editorial pages agree that senators should ask questions. Democrats conclude that they are patriots when they ask questions, while their critics are anti-American for questioning their questions.

Sic transit media.

Puh-lease: Daschle was thinking about his obligation to his presidential aspirations. He didn't pose questions because he might, say, oppose defense spending based on a principled disagreement on U.S.-Afghan policy. He was posing questions because he didn't have

DEBRA  
SAUNDERS



the brass to take on Bush directly, not when Bush policies are riding high in the opinion polls.

Daschle asked questions because he knew that if he told reporters that he had doubts now, and the Bush effort stumbles later, he can use his vaguely expressed doubts against Bush in the 2004 presidential race.

Byrd is harder to figure. He's a student of history, ignoring recent history. He should be aware of Osama bin Laden's infamous Time magazine interview, in which bin Laden stated that the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia made him and his followers realize "more than before that the American soldier was a paper tiger and after a few blows ran in defeat." I won't question Byrd's patriotism, but I do question his judgment.

There's also Byrd's odd use of the term "exit strategy." A week into the squabble, the Democratic National Committee defended Byrd by releasing a transcript of a 2000 presidential debate between Bush and Veep Al Gore. Bush said that U.S. military missions need "to be clear and the exit strategy ob-

vious." Not that the DNC folks noticed, but Bush was arguing that America should have an exit strategy when U.S. troops are fighting someone else's war — not an army that has attacked U.S. civilians.

"Exit strategy," after all, is a euphemism for defeat. It's D.C.-speak for when a superpower decides it has had enough and wants to pick up its marbles and go home. You don't have an exit strategy when you are defending your own country. In that case, there are only two exits: victory or defeat.

As Cliff May of the anti-terrorism think tank, Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, noted, "When the battleground is New York City, you don't think of an 'exit strategy' unless you're thinking of leaving New York behind." May added, "In 1941, if anybody had said to Franklin Roosevelt, 'Hey, you're going into Europe, North Africa and Asia — what's your exit strategy?' he would have tossed them out of the room. He would have said: 'I don't have an exit strategy. I have a victory strategy. I'm going to do what it takes, as long as it takes, to defeat our enemies.'" Alas, when Bush talks like that, sophisticates dismiss him as a simpleton.

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April 2, 2002 6:25 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Narcotics in Afghanistan

We need to get the NSC working on the subject of what role we want to play on narcotics in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040102-51

Afghanistan

2 Apr 02

W00388 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13770

2

April 2, 2002 7:05 AM

A-471.61

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D u A - H*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons

Attached is an interesting article on nuclear weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I thought you might like to read it.

Regards.

Attach.

06/27/00 Stephen M. Younger, "Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," Los Alamos National Laboratory, LAUR-00-2850

DHR:dh  
040202-11

2 Apr 02

W00389 / 02  
11-L-0559/OSD/13771



INDEX

*Director - Defense Threat Reduction Agency*

APR 13 2001

# Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century

Stephen M. Younger

Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Weapons  
Los Alamos National Laboratory

LAUR-00-2850

June 27, 2000

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The time is right for a fundamental rethinking of the role of nuclear weapons in national defense and of the composition of our nuclear forces. The Cold War is over, but it has been replaced by new threats to our national security. Technology, here and abroad, is inexorably advancing, creating both dangers and opportunities for the United States. This paper analyzes the future role of nuclear weapons in national security, describes the roles and limitations of advanced conventional weapons in meeting strategic needs, and suggests several alternate scenarios for future U.S. nuclear forces.

The principal role of nuclear weapons is to deter potential adversaries from an attack on the United States, our allies, or our vital interests. Russia maintains very large strategic and tactical nuclear forces. China is actively modernizing its nuclear arsenal. India and Pakistan have dramatically demonstrated the ability of midlevel technology states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. There are grave concerns about the future proliferation of nuclear weapons among such countries as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. The nuclear age is far from over.

Advances in conventional weapons technology suggest that by 2020 precision long-range conventional weapons may be capable of performing some of the missions currently assigned to nuclear weapons. Today, uncertainty in the location of road mobile missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction might require a nuclear weapon for assured destruction. Future real-time imagery and battle management, combined with precision strike long-range missiles, may mean that a conventional weapon could effectively destroy such targets.

Some targets require the energy of a nuclear weapon for their destruction. However, precision targeting can greatly reduce the nuclear yield required to destroy such targets. Only a relatively few targets require high nuclear yields. Advantages of lower yields include reduced collateral damage, arms control advantages to the United States, and the possibility that such weapons could be maintained with higher confidence and at lower cost than our current nuclear arsenal.

Now is the time to reexamine the role and composition of our future nuclear forces. New technologies take at least a decade to move from the concept stage to the point where we can rely on them for our nation's defense. And, advance planning is already under way for the replacements of our nuclear capable missiles, aircraft, and sub-marines. Prudent thought given to this crucial subject will reap great dividends for the United States and for peace in the world.

## INTRODUCTION

Nuclear weapons played a pivotal role in international security during the latter half of the twentieth century. Despite rapid increases in communications, transportation, and weapons technology, there has been no large-scale strategic conflict since the Second World War. Nuclear weapons, as the most destructive instruments ever invented, had a stabilizing effect on superpower relations by making any conflict unacceptably costly. However, geopolitical change and the evolution of military technology suggest that the composition of our nuclear forces and our strategy for their employment may be different in the twenty-first century. The time is right for a fundamental rethinking of our expectations and requirements for these unique weapons.

Nuclear weapons are one component of an integrated defense strategy that includes diplomacy and conventional forces. The principal role of nuclear weapons was and continues to be that of deterring any potential adversaries from an attack on America or our vital interests. This role is expected to continue for as long as nuclear weapons hold the appellation of "supreme" instruments of military force. However, this does not mean that their role in military planning will not change at all. Changes in the geopolitical environment and the inexorable advance of military technology here and abroad suggest that the position of nuclear weapons in national security policy will evolve with time. Given the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons, it is essential that this evolution be planned, to the extent possible, with due consideration of the integration of strategic nuclear forces into a consistent and comprehensive policy for national security.

Even with the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world during the past decade, nuclear warplanning today is similar in many respects to what it was during the Cold War. The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is focused on a massive counterattack strategy that aims to eliminate the ability of an adversary to inflict further damage to American interests. Nuclear weapons provide an assured retaliatory capability to convince any adversary that aggression or coercion would be met with a response that would be certain, overwhelming, and devastating. It is often, but not universally, thought that nuclear weapons would be used only in extremis, when the nation is in the gravest danger. While there has been some discussion of "single weapon" strikes against isolated targets, such as sites of weapons of mass destruction, most of the attention in nuclear strategy has been and is directed toward large-scale engagements. This may not be true in the future.

The advance of conventional weapons technology may result in the ability of conventional weapons to perform some of the missions currently assigned to nuclear weapons. For example, take the case of a road mobile ballistic missile. If one knows the location of such a target and if one can place a conventional weapon on that target with meter-scale accuracy, then it can be destroyed without a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, if one does not know the location of the target to within many kilometers then even a nuclear weapon may not destroy it. The key parameters required for target destruction are intelligence and precision delivery, not the explosive force of the weapon. However, even if a weapon is precisely delivered to the correct target point, countermeasures as simple as steel netting, boulder fields, or decoys complicate reliance on conventional weapons with limited radii of destruction.

The role of nuclear weaponry as the ultimate deterrent to aggression and the ultimate destructive force in combat will likely lead to the retention of at least some nuclear forces for decades to come. However, the composition of our nuclear arsenal may undergo significant modification to respond to changing conditions, changing military needs, and changes in our confidence in our ability to maintain credible nuclear forces without nuclear testing or large-scale weapons production. Options for precision delivery of nuclear weapons may reduce the requirement for high yield. Lower yield weapons could be produced as modifications of existing weapons designs, or they could employ more rugged

and simpler designs that might be developed and maintained with high confidence without nuclear testing and with a smaller nuclear weapons complex than we envision is required to maintain our current nuclear forces.

This paper attempts to look forward to the role that nuclear weapons might play in the twenty-first century, starting about 2020. A twenty-year horizon was chosen because over this time scale it is possible to make reasonable projections of technology and some assumptions about the probable threat situation. It takes about twenty years for substantially new weapons technologies to be developed and fielded into dependable military systems. Since this is true for other countries as well as the United States, one can project the development of potential adversarial capabilities to some degree. Of course, changes in governments could occur quickly compared to this time scale, but the technology that would be employed against the United States would proceed more slowly. This paper focuses on state-to-state defense and does not explicitly consider terrorism or the rapid evolution of entirely new state threats. It is unlikely that an emergent power would be able to develop the technology necessary to confront the United States on a time scale faster than two decades without some obvious indicators that would enable our technological or diplomatic response.

Why is this an important issue now? Current plans call for the deployment of the "next generation" of strategic forces in about 2020, including replacements for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, and perhaps even the venerable B52 bomber. This strategic modernization will be expensive, and it is not too soon to begin the debate over what kinds of strategic forces are needed to meet future needs.

It takes at least a decade to deploy a new technology, and if research and development are required, additional time may be needed. For such a key component of national defense, it is not sufficient to merely demonstrate that new systems work. There must be sufficient time to shake out the inevitable problems associated with new systems so as to make them dependable beyond reasonable doubt of our own government and the governments of potential adversaries. Time must also be allowed for the negotiation of treaties or other international agreements that support the new force structure and that preclude the marginalization of our forces by either a massive breakout or any other action that would reduce the effectiveness of our forces. Finally, the twentieth century repeatedly demonstrated that sweeping geopolitical changes occur on a short time scale compared to our ability to respond with new technologies or doctrines. It is imperative to consider the widest range of potential options before a crisis develops and to maintain a sufficiently robust research and development base to enable a response at that time.

The development of naval air power during the 1930s is a prime example of the need to evaluate the role of new technologies well before any anticipated engagement. The development of radar and ballistic missiles during the 1940s is an example of technologies developed during a conflict using preexisting foundations of research and technology. Some investment in thinking about future strategic forces now could reap significant dividends in the future.

Planning for future strategic defense is a highly complex affair that requires the consideration of many possible contingencies. This paper is not intended to be a complete analysis of such a complex topic. Rather, its purpose is to stimulate thinking about changes in the international environment and technology that might be expected to influence the makeup of our strategic warfighting capability.

In order to set the stage, I first present a brief overview of the geopolitical situation that might reasonably be expected to influence defense strategy in 2020. This is followed by a discussion of what weapons technology might be available to the United States and other countries. Next, a discussion is given of some force structures, including weapons and supporting infrastructure, that might satisfy future defense needs. The paper concludes with

a summary and suggestions for further work.

## THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Before one can rationally discuss future defense needs, it is necessary to know what one is defending against. The past decade has demonstrated the difficulty and danger of predicting the geopolitical future, but there are some forecasts that can be made with reasonable confidence and which can be used to guide further discussion.

### Strategic Threats to U.S. National Security in the Twenty-First Century

Future national security threats to the United States might be divided into three major categories: major power conflicts, especially those involving Russia and China; regional conflicts, including potential nuclear states such as Iran, Iraq, or North Korea; and conflicts involving terrorist groups and other nonstate organizations. Only the first two major categories will be considered here, since it is arguable whether there is any role for strategic nuclear forces in dealing with terrorism and substate threats. However, strategic conflicts can be sparked by terrorist acts, as was the case in the First World War and other conflicts.

**Russia** — During the past 200 years European Russia has sustained a series of catastrophes including the invasion of Napoleon, the Crimean War, the First World War, the Revolution, the Second World War, and now the transition from a communist state to something else. In each case the country recovered within a generation. Even after the Second World War, when the country was essentially in ruins, it came back to launch Sputnik within twelve years. While one cannot predict what will happen in a country so volatile as Russia, it is not unreasonable to assume that it will endeavor to return to a conventional military power while continuing to rely on a significant nuclear capability. It is clear from Russia's investment in conventional military technology that it wishes to reassert its status in this area and to continue a lucrative business in the international arms trade.

**China** — China's international aims are in development, but their long stated intention to "reunify" Taiwan into the mainland and their territorial moves in the South China Sea indicate that they plan to play a broader role on the international stage. China has a small nuclear arsenal but one capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on American territory and interests. It is unclear at present what, if any, impact alleged Chinese nuclear espionage will have on the modernization of its nuclear arsenal. However, it is worth noting that China has several nuclear weapons systems in the advanced development stage including a new cruise missile, which presumably can carry a nuclear warhead, and new land-launched and sea-launched ballistic missiles. Road mobile nuclear capable missiles add a degree of survivability to China's limited nuclear arsenal. The desire to develop an operational ballistic missile submarine is another suggestion that China is concerned about the survivability of its nuclear forces and perhaps is a comment on its future goals of power projection outside of the immediate Pacific area.

**Other Countries** — The nuclear tests of India and Pakistan again demonstrate that countries will act in their own perceived national interests, sometimes in direct opposition to the wishes of the United States or to previous treaty commitments or arrangements. Continued tensions in South Asia, including Sino-Indian tensions, bear close monitoring, but they may not directly involve the United States. The Middle East will continue to be a problem area due to the misalignment of ethnic, cultural, and national borders. The prospects for Arab or Islamic unification do not appear imminent at present, but historically this unification has relied on a charismatic leader, whose advent is difficult to predict. Continued problems in the Balkans and elsewhere in the world may tax American and allied conventional capabilities, but such conflicts are not expected to assume a nuclear dimension in the foreseeable future. North Korea is presumed to have at least some nuclear capability and has demonstrated remarkable progress in ballistic missile technology, despite its perilous economic condition. Japan and South Korea look upon North Korea's nuclear ambitions

with concern and could pursue their own nuclear programs if they felt uncertainty in the American nuclear umbrella. Similar concerns could apply to Taiwan in light of recent statements made by the People's Republic of China.

Nuclear engagement scenarios are not necessarily binary. Third countries may feel compelled to intervene in disputes between nuclear states or in conflicts involving weapons of mass destruction that could spill over into their territory or interests. For example, China may feel a need to act in a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. Similarly, Israel may feel a need to act in a major conflict of its neighbors that involved weapons of mass destruction.

## FOREIGN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Trends evident today suggest that by 2020 many countries in the world will have access to several important technologies.

- Weapons of mass destruction: India and Pakistan graphically demonstrated the ability of midlevel technology states to construct or obtain nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are assumed to be within the reach of many countries today.
- Long-range ballistic missile technology: It is apparent that countries like North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan, and other countries have or will soon have the capability to project force at intercontinental distances. The developing international marketplace in these technologies may make long-range missiles available to almost any country that has the money and the basic technical capability to acquire and use them. Although such missiles may lack the precision of current U.S. weapons, they might be entirely adequate for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction.
- Space imaging: Commercial services already provide high-resolution images from space. The technical capability to provide these images in real time to customers around the world should be expected to develop. Whether international agreements will be enacted to prevent collection against sensitive sites remains to be seen. At some point, Third World countries will have the capability to launch their own intelligence satellites or will pay others to launch them, thus bypassing the need for commercial services.
- Russian weapons technology: Despite its economic troubles, Russia is committing significant resources to the research and development of advanced conventional weapons. Part of the reason for this is certainly to provide a credible defense of Russia and its vital interests. However, Russia also sees a lucrative international arms market that appreciates the low cost and operational simplicity of its weapons. One might expect more countries to have access to "last generation" but quite capable Russian military technology including missiles, air defenses, submarines, tanks, and other systems.
- Advanced communications and computer technology: The spread of communications and computer technology will serve as a force multiplier for a growing number of countries. The ability to effectively employ a small number of electronic weapons against a technologically and/or numerically superior enemy is a cost-effective force-leveling tactic.

The United States will enjoy superiority in conventional and nuclear weapons as long as adequate investments are made in research and development and in the deployment of the resulting weapons systems. However, we should expect other countries to employ many of our ideas in their own defense strategy including the simple copying of our technology and doctrines, or the use of our technology to develop weapons systems of their own. They may also attempt to exploit weaknesses in our advanced technology through means such as

electromagnetic weapons, chemical and/or biological weapons, and other "asymmetric means."

## **U.S. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

### **Conventional Military Technology**

Advances in military technology have been much discussed in the literature and are said to be leading toward a revolution in military affairs. Relevant to the present discussion, there are several advances in conventional weapons technology that deserve mention.

- Advanced precision munitions: It is already possible for cruise missiles to deliver payloads to targets hundreds of miles from their launch point with few meter accuracy. High precision for intercontinental missiles, either land- or sea-launched, is also possible. Given that ballistic missile reentry vehicles arrive on target with velocities of thousands of meters per second, it is not necessary to have explosive payloads to destroy some classes of targets.
- Advanced real-time imagery and data fusion: Data collection from satellites and from unmanned forward platforms will enable real-time remote battle management, including the direction of precision munitions to distant, even mobile, targets.
- Antiballistic missile technology will mature if the appropriate investment is made, enabling some defense against limited missile attacks. Analogous defenses could be developed against cruise missiles and aircraft, although these threats are in many ways a tougher problem due to the greater number of potential entry points and the availability of stealth technology.
- Information warfare may develop in such a fashion to enable the United States to interdict enemy command, control, and communications.

There has been much discussion of other advanced conventional technologies including unmanned aircraft, sensor technology, beam weapons, and so on. In this paper we will focus on those technologies that could have a strategic impact and that are related to the changing role of nuclear weapons. The importance of considering future defense against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft cannot be overestimated. The inexorable advance of technology will eventually make such defenses feasible and will put them within the grasp of any country that wishes to have them. Such is the case now with reasonably sophisticated air defenses. Long range strategic planners must at least consider the return of a traditional "armor /antiarmor" competition even for strategic forces. Stealth technologies, advanced countermeasures, and new technologies will affect these trades but will not change the fundamental ability of defense technologies to influence strategic thinking.

### **Nuclear Weapons-Related Technology**

Nuclear weapons pack incredible destructive force into a small, deliverable package. In addition to their psychological deterrent value, they are the only current means of holding at risk several classes of targets.

- Mobile targets, such as road mobile and rail mobile missiles
- Fixed moderately hard targets, such as missile silos
- Distributed targets, such as airfields or naval bases
- Hard targets, such as deeply buried command structures

- Superhard targets, such as facilities located beneath mountains

Conventional weapons might be able to address some of the missions currently assigned to nuclear weapons, but not all of them. Some targets, like missile silos and command and control structures, are sufficiently hard that no conventional weapon will have the energy to defeat them. Other targets, such as airfields and naval bases, are sufficiently dispersed that a massive amount of conventional explosives would be required for their destruction. Even though conventional weapons could damage or destroy such targets, they could do so today only over an extended time frame and with the use of limited resources that may be required in other theaters of operation. Future conventional weapons designs may change this, but there are still limits on the amount of damage that can be caused with a given quantity of high explosive. For these and other reasons, nuclear weapons are expected to continue to play a role in strategic doctrine, independent of their role as a psychological deterrent to aggression.

The United States employs a counterforce strategy that targets military assets that could inflict damage to our national interests. We do not threaten cities or populations as in a countervalue policy, although there is an implicit threat of doing so that is a potent element of the deterrent calculus. American nuclear weapons systems are designed to hold specific classes of targets at risk, using the minimum explosive forces necessary to accomplish the mission. However, a sizable factor governing the explosive force required to defeat a target of given hardness is the precision with which weapons can be delivered. The evolution of accurate delivery systems could change engagement strategies for nuclear weapons, in some cases reducing the required yield or even eliminating the need for an explosion at all. Once again, the use of conventional weapons presumes a level of detailed information on the location and characteristics of the target that has so far eluded military planners. A reliance on precision conventional munitions for some strategic missions presumes a major investment in intelligence collection and analysis tools, including accurate means of assessing target damage following an attack. This is particularly important for strategic targets such as mobile missiles or weapons of mass destruction that could, if they survive, inflict significant damage.

Advances in military technology may change the makeup and use of our strategic forces in several ways.

- Some important classes of targets, such as mobile missiles, might be effectively dealt with by long-range precision conventional weapons. One can envision submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), loaded with such precision weapons, which could be directed by real-time intelligence to targets anywhere on the planet within 30 minutes. Maneuvering reentry vehicles could enable these weapons to follow and destroy moving targets.
- A 5-kiloton (kt) nuclear explosive detonated on a 30-foot-thick missile silo door will vaporize that door, destroying the missile inside. With precision delivery many hard targets might be able to be defeated with nuclear explosives having lower yield than we might currently employ. Such lower-yield weapons could use simpler and/or more robust designs than we have in our current arsenal. Simpler, more robust designs, in turn, might allow the nuclear arsenal to be maintained with a smaller maintenance and production complex than is required to support the sophisticated, highly optimized weapons in our stockpile. As in the case of advanced conventional weapons, the use of lower-yield nuclear weapons against hardened targets could be made problematic through the use of relatively simple countermeasures. In the example of a silo door, shielding could be used to separate the blast from the door area, reducing the effectiveness of the weapon.
- Widely dispersed targets require energy (yield) for assured destruction. Several dispersed lower-yield weapons will produce the same effect as a single higher-yield

weapon. Using multiple weapons on a single target assumes that fratricide effects can be dealt with in planning multiple nuclear bursts in a single target area. Such an approach also requires a larger number of weapons, a factor that would be more challenging if deep cuts in weapons numbers are negotiated. A benefit of lower-yield weapons is that the collateral damage sustained by the near-target area may be reduced, an important factor in attacks near urban areas.

- Some very hard targets require high yield to destroy them. No application of conventional explosives or even lower-yield nuclear explosives will destroy such targets, which might include hardened structures buried beneath hundreds of feet of earth or rock. For such purposes it might be desirable to retain a small number of higher-yield nuclear weapons in the arsenal as deterrents against enemy confidence in the survival of such targets.
- Superhard targets, such as those found under certain Russian mountains, may not be able to be defeated reliably by even high-yield nuclear weapons. In this case, one might use a different strategy such as "functional defeat" in which power, communications, or other vital functions are eliminated or denied without the physical destruction of the main target. Alternately, one might use negotiations to eliminate a target, bargaining away a limited set of special targets for concessions on our part.

These proposals are a departure from conventional thinking on nuclear issues. For example, our ability to negotiate away superhard targets would be very difficult at best. Others, such as the ability of precision advanced conventional munitions to hold at risk mobile and other soft-point targets, are more realistic and require only projections of current technology. In the latter case, a challenge may come from arms control concerns of other countries that see their own nuclear forces made marginal. Also, potential adversaries may use "asymmetric means" to counter our advanced technology.

An important consideration in thinking about lower-yield nuclear forces for most of our strategic nuclear requirements is that such weapons could be much simpler than our current highly optimized nuclear designs. Given sufficient throw-weight on our missiles, we could use gun-assembled or other simple, rugged designs that might be maintained with high confidence without nuclear testing. Such designs would require a significantly smaller industrial plant for their maintenance than our current forces. If based on uranium weapons designs, a much smaller plutonium infrastructure would be required. Other technologies specific to high-yield nuclear weapons could be placed in a standby mode rather than a production mode. Finally, simpler weapons might be maintained with higher confidence for longer periods by a weapons staff that has little or no direct experience with nuclear testing. However, should the country elect to follow such a path it will still be necessary to retain expertise in more sophisticated nuclear designs as a hedge against changing conditions in the future.

There is an additional, nontechnical, consideration that will influence future nuclear policy. Given current and projected scientific capabilities, it is difficult or impossible to confidently field a new, highly optimized, nuclear warhead design without nuclear testing. For this and other reasons, the United States intends to maintain its existing nuclear designs into the indefinite future. This is a fundamental change in how we maintain our arsenal. Recent concerns about espionage in the weapons program raise questions about our ability to keep weapons designs secret over many decades. Some in the intelligence community contend that a fixed target, such as our nuclear designs, will be compromised by a determined adversary given sufficient time. Information about our designs could provide important guidance to countries that wish to improve their own nuclear arsenals. Such information would also be advantageous to countries attempting to optimize some future ballistic missile defense system of their own for use against our systems. Finally, it could assist potential adversaries in deploying their strategic forces in a manner designed to make it difficult for

us to assure their destruction.

Planners need to consider what we will do when, and not if, the details of our nuclear forces become known by a potential adversary. There are several paths that could be employed here, including disinformation, counterintelligence, etc. One path that has been proven to work has been to change our forces on a regular basis in response to evolving military requirements and technology options. The certification of substantially new nuclear weapons designs is difficult or impossible to do with high confidence without underground nuclear testing. However, the United States has a large archive of previously tested designs that might be fielded with reasonable confidence to meet evolving military needs. In addition, the current stockpile has significant flexibility for modification for new requirements. Such flexibility was most recently evidenced by the modification of the B61 bomb to provide earth-penetrating capability. A move toward a mixed force of long-range conventional and lower-yield nuclear weapons with improved accuracy would be another means of meeting this need. Such decisions need not be exclusive. It may be wisest to employ multiple technologies, both nuclear and nonnuclear, to create a robust future strategic posture.

## STRATEGIC FORCES TO MEET FUTURE DEFENSE NEEDS

Planning strategic forces is a highly complicated affair that must include technical, geopolitical, and military considerations. A full analysis is not attempted here. The purpose of this section is to suggest some broad options that can be used as starting points for more detailed treatment. Although this section concentrates on strategic forces, it is worth noting that several countries possess potent "nonstrategic" nuclear forces that are designed for tactical engagements. Nonstrategic forces include nuclear artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions, short-range missiles, and air-delivered bombs. While such weapons are typically lower in yield than most strategic bombs and warheads, they are still nuclear explosives with destructive power vastly greater than conventional weapons. One might expect the division between "tactical" and "strategic" weapons to blur in the future, especially if significant reductions in strategic arsenals occur.

### Scenario 1: Status Quo

Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate defense of the nation, a deterrent against any and all potential adversaries. Combined with diplomacy and conventional military capabilities, nuclear weapons have helped to avoid a large-scale conflict between leading world powers for over fifty years. This is an astonishing achievement given the acceleration in communications and transportation that took place during this time. When the Cold War ended, the U.S. nuclear stockpile consisted of a set of highly optimized warheads and bombs on highly reliable missiles and aircraft. These weapons systems were designed primarily to counter the massive Soviet threat. They were and are the most advanced of their kind in the world. Current plans call for them to be retained essentially indefinitely. There are several good reasons for this.

- These weapons are safe, reliable, and meet performance requirements.
- We have nuclear test data that support our understanding of their operation.
- New warheads of comparable capability are difficult or impossible to field without nuclear testing.
- They can be modified in many ways to respond to changing military requirements, as was done when the B61 bomb was modified to give it an earth-penetrating capability.

This scenario maintains a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. More than one type of weapon is maintained in each leg of the triad to provide backup capability should one

weapon type encounter a problem. This strategy served us well during the Cold War. Given the rapidity with which the geopolitical situation can change, there is merit in following a prudent and conservative path for future nuclear forces.

There are several potential disadvantages to maintaining the existing stockpile indefinitely. Over time such highly optimized systems may be less well suited to military requirements. Refurbishment and other changes will be made to aging warheads and bombs, changes that might be difficult to certify without nuclear testing. Also, the cost of maintaining these weapons is high for both DoD and DOE. In the case of DOE, an extensive infrastructure of laboratories and plants is required for the Stockpile Stewardship program, including a new manufacturing capability for plutonium pits. Finally, the current stockpile may not be credible against some set of potential adversaries. For example, if a national emergency were to develop that involved the imminent use of weapons of mass destruction against American interests, would an adversary consider our threat of a multiwarhead attack by the Peacekeeper ICBM or a Trident SLBM as overkill and hence not a realistic threat? Such a reliance on high-yield strategic weapons could lead to "self-deterrence," a limitation on strategic options, and consequently a lessening of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons.

### **Scenario 2: Reduced Stockpile of Existing Designs**

This scenario assumes that arms control initiatives have made it advantageous to the United States to greatly reduce our stockpile of existing nuclear weapons. It is similar to Scenario 1 with lower force levels. One can debate the merit of eliminating one arm of the strategic triad or the nonstrategic (i.e. tactical) nuclear forces under such circumstances, depending on the depth of the reductions. Cost savings associated with reduced numbers are not directly proportional to the number of weapons since a significant infrastructure is required to support any type of modern nuclear design. The cost advantage would be in the size of the required production plant and not in the diversity of technical capabilities that are required.

At very low stockpile numbers it may be useful to explicitly consider a "flexible stockpile" strategy that takes advantage of the flexibility inherent in current nuclear weapon designs. The United States could have a mixed force of weapons based upon current types suitably modified to meet evolving military needs. Special consideration might be given to maneuvering reentry vehicles that can deal effectively with enemy defenses. One could consider tailored output weapons for special applications such as those that produce an enhanced electromagnetic pulse for the disabling of electronics or those that produce enhanced radiation for the destruction of chemical or biological weapons with minimum collateral damage. (There is serious doubt in the nuclear weapons community as to whether such systems could be introduced into the stockpile without additional nuclear testing.) Careful consideration must be given to single-point failure in a reduced stockpile. For example, the use of a common missile or a common warhead for ICBMs and SLBMs would save money but would introduce a potential single-point failure in the majority of strategic forces.

In selecting weapons that would be maintained in a smaller force structure, consideration might be given to those that are the most rugged, the easiest and cheapest to maintain, and the most flexible. Highly optimized weapons may be more efficient, but efficiency can come at the cost of complexity of maintenance. Without nuclear testing, small changes caused by natural aging or required component replacements will introduce some uncertainty into the stockpile, uncertainty that must be figured into military strategy. Understanding such uncertainty is especially important if the number of weapons types is reduced, admitting the possibility of single-point failure of a large part of the force. It may be advisable to view ruggedness and ease of maintenance as principal criteria for the selection of the types and distribution of weapons within a reduced stockpile. Given the uncertainty of future military needs, the ability of a weapon to be maintained, modified, and/or certified without nuclear testing may also be an important element in the decision

process.

### Scenario 3: Mixed Conventional and Nuclear Strategic Forces

Reasonable assumptions about the development of advanced conventional munitions leads to a scenario where the strategic workload is carried by a combination of nuclear and nonnuclear forces. It is possible to envision nonnuclear components to each of the arms of the strategic triad. Using conventional ICBMs and SLBMs, or their projected replacements, one could design reentry warheads to achieve high accuracy. These warheads would contain "smart" guidance systems that would receive intelligence handoffs from satellites or other sources before and/or during flight. Such systems would know that a target exists in a general area, be aware of its potential movement and signatures, and be able to home in on it. Given the kinetic energy of a reentering warhead, it might not be necessary for the system to contain high explosives. Hitting the target might be sufficient to destroy it. Similar warheads could be developed for cruise missiles that could be launched from bombers, submarines, or surface warships. In the case of cruise missiles, the lower velocity of delivery would require a high-explosive warhead.

A nonnuclear long-range weapon would be especially useful against limited numbers of time-urgent weapons of mass destruction targets such as biological weapons warheads that were in preparation for use against U.S. forces. Long-range nonnuclear weapons would enable such targets to be destroyed without causing the United States to be the first to employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. The use of nonnuclear strategic weapons against Russia, China, or other nuclear states would require care, since the appearance of such a weapon on long-range sensors might be indistinguishable from a nuclear attack by the United States.

A word of caution is needed on the use of precision munitions for high-value strategic targeting: The Kosovo conflict demonstrated very clearly that just the ability to place a weapon on the designated aim point is not enough to ensure mission success. Inaccurate target coordinates provided to pilots sometimes resulted in weapons being delivered very precisely to the wrong spot. Effective utilization of precision munitions demand that a premium be placed on the collection and the analysis of target information. This includes postattack damage assessments that determine the need for follow-on attacks and the ability of the adversary to use its weapons for offense or defense.

The nuclear component in this scenario could take one of several forms. First, one could employ a small number of existing weapons designs to retain a traditional counterforce deterrent strategy. Second, one could modify existing designs to reduce their yield, relying on precision delivery to help achieve military objectives. In this case one could use existing reentry warheads or develop new ones with the precision guidance necessary to destroy moderately-hard-point targets with low yield. Third, one could design and deploy a new set of nuclear weapons that do not require nuclear testing to be certified. Such weapons might be, but do not need to be, based on simple gun-assembled uranium designs that do not require a plutonium infrastructure and that do not require the same sophistication in nuclear weapons science and engineering as our current stockpile. However, nothing comes for free, and one must recognize that such simple weapons have important, perhaps fatal, tactical limitations that would preclude their use in some engagement scenarios. Also, such simple devices would be based on a very limited nuclear test database and would require extensive and expensive flight testing to assure that they could be delivered with the required precision. Fourth, one could consider a combination of new or modified low-yield warheads and some existing higher-yield designs to be retained against the possibility of unexpected developments in adversaries' defenses or of the need to hold very hard targets at risk. In this case one would need to retain much of the infrastructure of the current stockpile to ensure the continued performance of these highly optimized weapons. Savings could be achieved in the size of the plant complex required to remanufacture components and complete weapons.

#### Scenario 4: Prospects for Wholly Nonnuclear Strategic Forces

It is almost impossible to conceive of technological and political developments that would enable the United States to meet its defense needs in 2020 without nuclear weapons. There are several reasons for this. First, nuclear weapons continue to play a vital role in deterring other countries from launching significant military strikes against America, our allies, or our vital interests. The real threat of not just military defeat but national annihilation is a potent deterrent now and should be expected to remain so for at least the next few decades. Second, it does not appear possible with current or projected technology to assure ourselves that there are no—and never will be any—nuclear weapons in the hands of potential adversaries. Given the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons, an asymmetry of this kind should be unacceptable to American military planners. Third, the development of antiballistic missile defense is encouraging, but the assumption that a leak-proof shield can be fielded by 2020 is debatable. Fourth, some targets will not be able to be held at risk by any type of conventional weapon because of their extreme hardness. Fifth, the ability of an adversary to deliver a nuclear weapon by aircraft, cruise missile, naval vessel, or by clandestine insertion into this country are additional concerns beyond the long-range ballistic missile threat. Lacking the ability to deter such threats and to respond in kind would open up the country to blackmail.

It is critical in any discussion of strategic forces to consider the overall stability provided by technology and policy. Such calculations have become considerably more complex in the multipolar world that is expected to persist at least over the time scale addressed in this paper.

The future is unpredictable, but we can count on it to be dynamic. Strategic thinking must be flexible and must consider the evolution of several possible futures, each of which has branches that are contingent on the geopolitical situation and technological capabilities here and abroad. Countries will respond to technology and policy developments in the United States and elsewhere. We must be careful that any changes to our strategic position make the overall situation better and not worse.

Russia has already promised that it will use "asymmetric means" to counter advanced U.S. technology. Official Chinese publications indicate that China will likely follow a similar strategy. The capabilities of their own research and development complex should not be underestimated. While Russia cannot yet match the United States in the most sophisticated technology, it has shown a remarkable ability to achieve military objectives through cleverness and sometimes through brute force. Finally, the development of advanced conventional strategic weapons could push the Russians to an even greater reliance on high-yield nuclear weapons. Rather than an evolution toward some fixed strategy, strategic thinking should be done along a flexible time line that recognizes changes in the world and in military technology. What may work at one time may not work at another time when the situation has substantially changed.

One "asymmetric" counter to advanced technology is cyber-warfare, including non-explosive weapons that could disable or render ineffective advanced conventional or even nuclear munitions. Precision kill requires sophisticated electronics, and electronics can be affected by various means such as radio frequency or microwave weapons. Russia's electromagnetic weapons program is perhaps the most advanced in the world, and at least some of this technology has been shared with China. Given the uncertainty in future advanced weapons technology, the United States may wish to retain some higher-yield nuclear weapons as hedges against the development of potent point or area defenses. The development of antisatellite weapons would create a similar complication to the United States if we were to rely on advanced conventional weapons that require precise targeting information to be effective.

Arms control initiatives will play an important role in the planning of future strategic forces. Proposed deep reductions in nuclear stockpiles may be a motivation for using conventional weapons as part of the strategic weapons mix. Such a decision will strongly depend on whether warheads or launchers are the counted quantity. If nuclear warheads and not delivery vehicles are the counted quantity, then existing or new launchers can be equipped with advanced conventional warheads. If missiles and aircraft are the counted quantity, we will need to be careful about treaties that allow only one warhead, nuclear or conventional, on a missile. Maintaining an effective deterrent requires a minimum number of nuclear weapons, and the dilution of our forces with conventional weapons could drive us from a counterforce strategy (military targets) to a countervalue strategy (cities) with attendant ethical and perhaps legal problems.

Arms control agreements can assist in strategic planning by restricting certain classes of weapons or targets. If, in some scenario, our weapons are particularly susceptible to nuclear interceptors, then we may wish to negotiate the elimination of nuclear interceptors in return for some other concession. If we are unable to destroy one or more targets by any weapon in our arsenal, we may want to attempt to negotiate away the target in return for assurances that we will not construct similarly hard targets in the United States. Such negotiations are by nature complex because they involve giving up different commodities on each side. However, the advantages of reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, with their large radii of destruction, might be an incentive. Also, the development of new conventional strategic weapons, the use of which might be incorporated into nonnuclear war planning and that will not necessarily lead to national destruction, should be considered with care.

One of the features of nuclear weapons is that they are so destructive that their use is reserved for only the most extreme cases. Making strategic weapons more "usable" could start the United States on a path of escalation that could exacerbate and not reduce the potential for war. Conversely, lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons in response to a strategic situation could raise the level of care with which countries interact. This points to the need for a detailed stability analysis to be performed as a prelude to any arms control negotiations. Such an analysis must explicitly include the balance of nuclear forces, the state and projected future of ballistic missile defenses, and the ability of advanced conventional weapons to perform missions formerly assigned to nuclear weapons. The weapons research and development programs of potential adversaries will provide input to this analysis by providing pointers to future defense capabilities. And, of course, any analysis of future strategic weapons needs must necessarily consider the possible geopolitical situation that will be present at the time of their deployment. Finally, the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons will fade for small stockpiles. Both types of weapons must be included in negotiations for overall stability to be maintained.

Another important consideration in planning future strategic forces is cost. Nuclear weapons systems are sometimes considered expensive to maintain due to their complexity, their unique characteristics, and the lack of private industry support of some components of their infrastructure. In fact, nuclear weapons are cheaper to develop and to maintain than very large conventional force structures. This was the reason why NATO chose to rely on nuclear weapons as a principal part of its defense against the massive Soviet conventional threat in Europe. Nuclear weapons are considered expensive today because they are primarily strategic in nature and we are in the midst of a "strategic pause" that has lessened the perceived need for strategic weapons.

For the DoD, costs include operations, maintenance, and the development of next generation capabilities that will replace current systems upon their obsolescence. For the DOE, costs include the operation of the weapons laboratories and production plants and the material costs associated with weapons refurbishment. To first order, the cost of maintaining the DOE nuclear weapons complex is independent of the number of weapons in the stockpile. Some capability in uranium, plutonium, and other special materials is required. Scientific capabilities must be maintained, especially in those classified areas unique to

nuclear weapons, to enable informed decisions to be made on weapons aging, component replacements, and future modifications. Tritium has some variable cost, as it must be produced to support some fixed number of weapons. Plutonium pit production can be maintained at a small rate at Los Alamos, but any stockpile above about one thousand weapons will require the construction of a new large production plant to replace the Rocky Flats facility, which ceased production in 1989. Should the country go to a precision low-yield nuclear force that is based on uranium rather than plutonium, the cost of the large pit-production facility could be avoided, and the remaining high-yield weapons that did employ plutonium pits could be supported by a modified Los Alamos plutonium facility.

## SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War, the evolution of new regional threats to international security, and the stated desire of many countries to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals suggest that the time is right for a fundamental rethinking of the role of nuclear weapons in national security. Nuclear weapons, as the most destructive instruments yet invented, must be considered as part of a coordinated national security program that employs diplomacy, arms control initiatives, and conventional forces to optimize stability and peace in the world.

Technology assessments suggest that advanced conventional weapons delivered by ballistic or cruise missiles could defeat many targets that are presently targeted by nuclear weapons. Precision delivery of nuclear weapons would enable some classes of hard targets to be defeated with much lower yields than are currently employed. Some number of current nuclear weapons designs might be retained in order to address very hard targets or for traditional deterrent roles. Simple, rugged nuclear weapons designs that might be maintained at relatively low cost and without the need for nuclear testing might be a part of such a strategy.

Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented. Nor can we assume that their role in strategic deterrence will never change. Prudent thought given to the role of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century will reap handsome dividends for the national security of the United States and for the stability of the whole world.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Hans Mark for suggesting the theme of this paper and for his helpful comments on its content. I would also like to recognize the contributions of many colleagues, especially John Browne, C. Paul Robinson, Richard Wagner, Carolyn Mangeng, Thomas Scheber, and Gary Stradling. The accuracy and content of this paper are the responsibility of the author and do not represent the positions of the Department of Energy or the United States Government.

April 1, 2002 6:53 PM

000.5

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M. A. J.*

SUBJECT: Phrase

From time to time, we have used the phrase "bring the perpetrators to justice or bring justice to the offenders." A professor friend of mine sent me the attached on the subject, which quotes from John Locke's second treatise on government.

I thought you might find it of interest.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

03/26/02 Goldwin fax to SecDef

DHR:dh  
040102-55

1 Apr 02

W00390 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13786

2

*cc-to D. Rita*

March 26, 2002

Post-it Fax Note	7671	Date 3/26/02	5 pages
To Sec. Rumsfeld		From Bob Goldwin	
Fax Num	DOD	Co	
Phone #		Phone #	(b)(6)
Fax #	(b)(6)	Fax #	(b)(6)

**TO: Secretary Rumsfeld****FROM: Bob Goldwin**

APR 3 2002

**SUBJECT: Source of "to do justice on an offender"**

**Here is the passage you asked me to send to you, a phrase to use in speaking about the President's determination that "justice will be done," when the circumstances are such that the justice ought not be done in a regular court of law: "We will find an appropriate way to do justice on these offenders."**

The phrase "to do justice on an offender" occurs in John Locke's **Second Treatise of Government** (Ch. 2, sec. 8): "Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, liberty, health, limb or goods of another."

SNOWFLAKE

April 2, 2002 7:48 AM

A-47161

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. R. [initials]*  
SUBJECT: Nuclear Policy

Attached is a piece by Barry Blechman, who served in the Carter Administration at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is a thoughtful person and points out that the argument by critics that the new U.S. nuclear policy would lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is simply wrong.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

03/18/02 Barry Blechman, "New Nuclear Policy Makes for a Safer World," *Los Angeles Times*

DHR:dh  
040102-47

2 APR 02

W00391 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13788

2

# Los Angeles Times

## COMMENTARY

### New Nuclear Policy Makes for a Safer World

By BARRY M. BLECHMAN

Barry M. Blechman was assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 to 1980.

March 18 2002

The Bush administration's new nuclear policy has received a great deal of criticism over its suggestion that U.S. nuclear weapons play a role in deterring hostile nations that don't possess nuclear weapons but are armed with other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

The criticism--that the new policy lowers the bar for use of nuclear weapons--is misplaced. In fact, by linking U.S. nuclear and conventional precision strike capabilities, the policy narrows the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy, reduces the circumstances in which they might be used and sets the stage for even deeper cuts in nuclear forces.

The planned reduction in nuclear warheads deployed with operational submarines, bombers and land-based missiles--from about 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200--is quite an accomplishment. It will decrease the cumulative risk of technical mishaps and unauthorized or inadvertent launches, and it should reassure the Russians politically by moving the U.S. to a force level that Russia appears to be seeking itself. Critics of the new policy have complained that many of the warheads coming off U.S. forces will be placed in reserve rather than dismantled

immediately. Getting 4,000 warheads off alert is very important in its own right. It would take time to put the weapons back on missiles or into active bomber inventories. Given the international furor that would accompany such a move, no president would take it without very serious reason.

Meanwhile, having the option to beef up U.S. forces is only sensible given the uncertainties of world events. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said, when it comes to international threats "the only surprise is that we're surprised when we're surprised."

Weapon and stockpile requirements are reviewed periodically. If international developments continue favorably, either further reductions in operational weapons or the destruction of stockpiled weapons would certainly be possible.

The new policy recognizes that Russia is no longer our enemy, and there is no longer a need to plan for massive attacks against that nation. It would move the U.S. away from a single, integrated operational plan for nuclear attacks to "capabilities-based targeting." Instead of massive, society-destroying nuclear strikes, the U.S. would plan to have capabilities to conduct limited nuclear

strikes aimed at specific objectives. In its classified form, the policy mentioned nations for which planners need to prepare such options, causing a furor. The only thing new here from previous administrations is that the names of the nations leaked out.

In its most important development, the new defense policy pairs U.S. nuclear forces with precise, conventional strike capabilities. In this formulation, the new policy greatly circumscribes the potential role of nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the immense capabilities of modern aircraft and missiles armed with conventional weapons, the new policy implies that for the first time in 50 years the U.S. may not have to respond to nuclear threats in kind. We may be able to defeat such threats by attacking enemies with conventional weapons, relying on missile defenses to stop any threatening forces that survive. This is a huge change in thinking, allowing for even more nuclear-force reductions as conventional strike and missile defense capabilities advance.

Administration officials have a way to go before the new policy is fulfilled. They have to work closely with the U.S. Strategic Command to ensure that the planned changes in targeting are implemented properly. The nuclear departures of more than one previous administration have been thwarted in their implementation phase. And the administration will have to move expeditiously to set in place the transparency measures and other arrangements to reassure the Russians and others that the shift from negotiated arms control agreements to unilateral reductions in forces is not a subterfuge.

These steps notwithstanding, the new policy is a major accomplishment and an important advance toward ending nuclear dangers.

snowflake  
5

March 29, 2002 2:06 PM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Third World Demographics

Attached is an interesting piece on demographics that you might enjoy reading.

Very respectfully,

260

Attach.

"The United States and the Third World Century: How Much Will Demographics Stress Geopolitics?"

DHR:dh  
032902-6

29 March 2002

W00396 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13791

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**MAR 29 2002**

## **The United States and the Third World Century: How Much Will Demographics Stress Geopolitics?**

### **Executive Summary**

### **The United States and the Third World Century**

The world the United States confronts over the next several decades is likely to be one in which the US Government will have a much harder time achieving its foreign policy objectives with traditional levels of involvement overseas, according to participants at the Strategic Assessments Group's third annual conference:

- Several participants thought the United States would have to become much more involved in the affairs of the world's poorest and most poorly governed countries in order to manage the threats to US national and global security that emerging economic and political trends in these countries could generate.
- Many governments and nonstate actors, however, also are likely to more strongly resist US involvement overseas, especially if they view it as a continuation of the status quo in which the United States remains the dominant global player.
- Participants thought that over the next several decades these competing pressures would push the United States into a tight spot, forcing it increasingly to decide between pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy agenda or rallying international consensus and support.

Many participants thought that the present suite of world institutions would not be adequate to deal with these challenges and that the United States and other Western countries would confront strong pressure from the developing world to create new institutions that are more responsive to their needs.

### **Factors That Will Most Strongly Influence the US Role Internationally**

While a number of factors will be key in shaping the global environment over the next several decades, the group thought that a few—including unprecedented demographic trends, income inequalities, and poor governance—would have the greatest influence on the role the US plays internationally.

*Demographically*, the world the United States confronts over the next several decades will be one that is older in the developed world and younger

and more crowded in the developing world. These and other unprecedented demographic trends could create new demands for US economic resources and challenge the philosophy of traditional US foreign policies:

- By 2015, the United States will be the only developed country that will be among the top 10 most populous nations in the world, a stark contrast from several decades ago when six developed countries were on the top 10 list. This would significantly increase the international political clout of developing nations. Many conference participants thought that these countries' national, societal, and economic challenges and objectives would differ sharply from those in the developed world.
- The national priorities of developed and developing countries are likely increasingly to diverge as many of the former face unprecedented aging crises and many of the latter confront large youth populations. During the first part of this century, the number of people 65 and over will be 16.3 percent of the total world population versus only 6.9 percent today. Italy, Japan, Germany, and China will be among the many countries that may face fiscal crises as they attempt to support their aging populations with declining revenues.
- Several developing countries will confront severe social strains if they are unable to create jobs for their growing youth populations. Most of the growth in the world's youth population over the next decade—which the International Labor Organization estimates will reach 1 billion—will be in the developing world.

These and other demographic pressures will contribute to the proliferation of overcrowded cities as jobs and resources become increasingly concentrated in urban areas. By 2015, for the first time in human history, a majority of the world's population will live in cities.

*Economically*, there is a substantial risk that income gaps between the United States and most countries in the developing world will widen, creating new global demands on US economic, security, and humanitarian resources. CIA estimates suggest that many developing countries will need decades or centuries to achieve per capita incomes equal to those in the United States, creating a world of "poor young billions versus rich young millions." Countries can shorten this time only by significantly boosting GDP growth rates above historical averages:

- Continued increases in income gaps will be due largely to the fact that the developing countries where per capita incomes already diverge most from

those in the United States are the same nations with the least potential to improve them. Countries such as Syria, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan need to make significant policy adjustments to attract the foreign and domestic private investment that are key contributors to growth and improved living standards.

- China will be one of only a few countries whose per capita income is likely to converge with that of the United States. Continued economic reform and a more open economy will enable China to more effectively exploit the potential growth gains from globalization and technological advances.

*Politically*, a number of participants thought that the United States would have to operate in a world with more failed states as countries in Latin America, East Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, the former Soviet Union, and Africa fail to implement the institutional and political reforms necessary to create viable economies and stable political institutions. Most conference participants stressed that poor governance and income inequality would generate some of the greatest global challenges.

#### **Additional Shaping Factors**

In addition to these three key “shapers,” participants discussed a number of other future developments that are likely to help mold the global environment but put less pressure on US foreign policy:

- There is a good chance that the development and spread of technology will be highly uneven, with the United States—which has the institutions and economic conditions that foster innovation—maintaining its current leadership role and the world’s poorest and often most poorly governed countries falling farther behind.
- Numerous participants suggested that, unlike many other countries in the developing world, China and possibly India could emerge with much stronger and more influential economies over the next several decades, potentially increasing their geopolitical influence both globally and regionally and boosting their demand for oil, especially from the Middle East.

April 2, 2002 6:18 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Strategy

Possibly the NSC ought to be thinking through a plan for how we deal with each of the warlords and the upcoming Loya Jirga. We all need to have the same strategy—know what we want to do, who we want to be helpful to and who should be doing what.

This may be happening, but I need clarity.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040202-23

W 81

2 APR 02

W00397 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13795

Snowflake

April 3, 2002 11:43 AM

TO: Gen. Franks  
Gen. Myers  
Doug Feith  
Zal Khalilzad

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iran and the Afghan Media

Attached is an article indicating Iran seems to feel they are making headway with the Afghan media.

Let's get our head wrapped around this and come up with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/01/02 FBIS-FMA 04-047, "Iran-Afghanistan: Tehran Sees Aid to Afghan Media as Boosting Its Influence"

DHR:dh  
040302-13

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*Please respond by* 04/19/02

W00398 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13796

April 3, 2002 9:06 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D u M - fm*

SUBJECT: Sheikh Mohammed

Attached is a note I received from a good friend, Chuck Horner.

I don't know where President Bush may have met with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, but he has been a good friend of the United States. If the President does happen to know him and would like to meet with him, needless to say, I am sure the Sheikh would be delighted to do so, and we could bring him over.

Do let me know.

Regards,

Attach.

04/02/02 Horner memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
040302-3

000.71CD

3/10/02

W00394 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13799

Note for Secretary Rumsfeld from Chuck Horner April 2, 2002

My friends in the United Arab Emirates tell me that their boss, His Highness Lt. Gen. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Chief of Staff UAE Armed Forces, will be visiting the United States in the near future.

I am sure he will be meeting with the Secretary of Defense and want to provide some insights concerning Sheikh Mohammed.

**Sheikh Mohammed played a key role during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991**

He was the first, and initially the only, leader in the Gulf to recognize the Iraqi threats of July 1990 were serious and asked for KC-135 tankers to be deployed for training exercises with the UAE Air Force. This also provided the capability to maintain combat air patrols over the off shore oil fields for his short-range French fighter aircraft.

He proved to be our biggest supporter in working the bed down of our deploying forces during the hectic days of August-September 1990. Whenever I had a problem finding ramp space, feeding and housing our troops, or moving equipment through customs, he was the one I could turn to and get problems solved immediately.

He selected his top officers, Colonels Khalid and Faris to come to Riyadh and work on our Combined forces air staff that planned the war to liberate Kuwait. Khalid is now the commander of the UAEAF and Faris I believe is the Director of Operations.

He made sure the UAEAF was able to participate in the air war by accelerating the training of the new Mirage 2000 squadron. He also selected to lead the squadron, Colonel Abdullah who is a first rate officer in every aspect, a graduate of the USAF Command and Staff and now the point of contact on the F-16 Block 60 sale.

Sheikh Mohammed is soft-spoken, very polite and listens carefully. He is a true patriot and selflessly seeks what is best for the UAE security interests. Others are not so selfless nor have his capacity to envisage what is best for his nation and its people.

I believe he has met with then Governor Bush, and should do so again when in Washington this time. While third or fourth in the UAE leadership, he will likely head the UAE some day. Both are approximately the same age and have much in common and the relationship between President Bush and Sheikh Mohammed could be of critical importance during future activities with Gulf nations to include Iraq.

After the Gulf War Sheikh Mohammed told me "I am embarrassed, because while I knew we needed the US forces I was afraid of the problems your people would cause due to abuse of alcohol and harassment of our women. To my surprise they behaved themselves perfectly while in our country, something I cannot say for the Arab refugees in our hotels. Please thank them for me."

April 5, 2002 9:53 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. R. / A. H.*

SUBJECT: Russian Reaction

Attached are some remarks by the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, on our progress towards an agreement. I am struck by how closely it parallels the memo I sent you the other day, giving my assessment.

It looks like we are making progress.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

FBIS CEP2002040500022 Moscow Interfax, "Russian Defense Minister Says 'No Differences' with US Over New Strategic Arms Agreement"

DHR:dh  
040502-8

Russia

61  
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02

W00413-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13804



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 17 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Joint Strike Fighter International Participation

Since you speak with foreign leaders regularly it might be helpful to you to have some information on those countries that have entered or are considering entering into cooperative agreements to produce the Joint Strike Fighter.

The United Kingdom and Canada have already joined us as cooperative development partners, and several other countries are nearing completion of their decision process to join.

The enclosed fact sheet summarizes the current status, and provides some points you may wish to use in your discussions with foreign heads of state.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

Enclosure:

As stated

cc:

Vice President

20 Jun 2002

W00415-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13806

~~For Official Use Only~~

### **Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Participation**

The Department of Defense (DoD), in consultation with State, Commerce, and the Congress, has been working since summer 1999 to bring foreign partners onboard to participate in JSF development. The JSF is a DoD program that is designed to address Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and Allied requirements to replace their aging F-16, F-18, and AV-8B aircraft beginning in 2010. Allied participation in the \$30B JSF development effort benefits the United States by bringing foreign investment into the program, enhancing future coalition warfare capabilities, and strengthening U.S. government and industrial ties. Current status:

**United Kingdom**—On board for \$2 billion since January 2001.

**Canada**—On board for \$150 million since February 2002.

**Denmark**— On board for \$125 million since May 28, 2002.

**Netherlands**—Dutch Government approved participation at \$800 million on June 4, 2002. Memorandum of Understanding document signature process will be completed by June 7.

**Italy**—Italian Government approved participation at \$1 billion on June 4, 2002. Memorandum of Understanding document signature will take place in the near future.

**Turkey**—Announced its intention to join on March 18, 2002 at \$175 million. Final Government approval and Memorandum of Understanding document signature expected in June 2002.

**Norway**—Norwegian Cabinet approved participation at \$125 million on June 3, with final Norwegian Parliament approval and Memorandum of Understanding document signature expected before the end of June 2002.

**Australia**—Still considering a \$150 million participation arrangement.

**Singapore, Israel, Greece, and Poland**—Each of these countries is considering some type of participation (possibly through Foreign Military Sales).

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/13807



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SECDEF HAS BEEN

072 MAY 31 ST 3:28

05/17/2002  
ACTION MEMO

CSD  
WHITE HOUSE SECTION

May 30, 2002, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr., USD (AT&L) *5/30/02*

SUBJECT: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Participation Update

- 6/10 Lem Di Rita*
- In response to your recent request (REB), I revised the Memorandum for the President that describes our activities on JSF and provides a 'Fact Sheet' for his use (REB).
  - In addition to incorporating your revisions, I have updated the "Fact Sheet" to reflect current status. If this Memorandum generates any additional interest, we would certainly be happy to provide future updates to the White House and/or NSC staff.

COORDINATION: PD(GC), PDUSD(P) (at TAB C)

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend you sign the Memorandum at TAB A

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Frank Kenlon, AT&L/IC/P&A/ (b)(6)

✓ 14

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	6/8
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	SP3 6/9
EXECSEC WHITMORE	6/3

W00415-02

11-L-0559 OSD/13808

May 31, 2002 11:58 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
CC: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Strike Fighter

The President would like a one-pager on the Joint Strike Fighter (one and a half at the most).

Please get it to me in English, so he can understand it and will know what countries are participating and to what extent.

Ed Giambastiani, please be in charge of getting this accomplished for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
053102-38

.....

*Please respond by 06/28/02*

*6/4*

*Aldridge response attached.*

*V/R  
Ed*

11-L-0559/OSD/13809

April 22, 2002 3:10 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[initials]*

SUBJECT: Kissinger Piece

Attached is a piece by Henry Kissinger on the subject of the International Criminal Court. It is worth reading.

Thanks.

Attach.

Henry Kissinger, "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction" *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2001,  
Volume 80, Number 4

DHR:dh  
042202-40

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22 Mar 02

W00488 /02

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The Pitf  
Universal Ju

*Henry A. K*

**FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

11-L-0559/OSD/13811

# The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction

*Henry A. Kissinger*

## RISKING JUDICIAL TYRANNY

IN LESS THAN a decade, an unprecedented movement has emerged to submit international politics to judicial procedures. It has spread with extraordinary speed and has not been subjected to systematic debate, partly because of the intimidating passion of its advocates. To be sure, human rights violations, war crimes, genocide, and torture have so disgraced the modern age and in such a variety of places that the effort to interpose legal norms to prevent or punish such outrages does credit to its advocates. The danger lies in pushing the effort to extremes that risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of governments; historically, the dictatorship of the virtuous has often led to inquisitions and even witch-hunts.

The doctrine of universal jurisdiction asserts that some crimes are so heinous that their perpetrators should not escape justice by invoking doctrines of sovereign immunity or the sacrosanct nature of national frontiers. Two specific approaches to achieve this goal have emerged recently. The first seeks to apply the procedures of domestic criminal justice to violations of universal standards, some of which are embodied in United Nations conventions, by authorizing national prosecutors to bring offenders into their jurisdictions through extradition from third countries. The second approach is the International Criminal

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HENRY A. KISSINGER, Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., is a former Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. This essay is adapted from his latest book, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*.

Court (icc), the founding treaty for which was created by a conference in Rome in July 1998 and signed by 95 states, including most European countries. It has already been ratified by 30 nations and will go into effect when the total reaches 60. On December 31, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the ICC treaty with only hours to spare before the cutoff date. But he indicated that he would neither submit it for Senate approval nor recommend that his successor do so while the treaty remains in its present form.

The very concept of universal jurisdiction is of recent vintage. The sixth edition of *Black's Law Dictionary*, published in 1990, does not contain even an entry for the term. The closest analogous concept listed is *boscos humani generis* ("enemies of the human race"). Until recently, the latter term has been applied to pirates, hijackers, and similar outlaws whose crimes were typically committed outside the territory of any state. The notion that heads of state and senior public officials should have the same standing as outlaws before the bar of justice is quite new.

In the aftermath of the Holocaust and the many atrocities committed since, major efforts have been made to find a judicial standard to deal with such catastrophes: the Nuremberg trials of 1945–46, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the genocide convention of 1948, and the antitorture convention of 1988. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki in 1975 by President Gerald Ford on behalf of the United States, obligated the 35 signatory nations to observe certain stated human rights, subjecting violators to the pressures by which foreign policy commitments are generally sustained. In the hands of courageous groups in Eastern Europe, the Final Act became one of several weapons by which communist rule was delegitimized and eventually undermined. In the 1990s, international tribunals to punish crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, established ad hoc by the U.N. Security Council, have sought to provide a system of accountability for specific regions ravaged by arbitrary violence.

But none of these steps was conceived at the time as instituting a "universal jurisdiction." It is unlikely that any of the signatories of either the U.N. conventions or the Helsinki Final Act thought it

*Henry A. Kissinger*

possible that national judges would use them as a basis for extradition requests regarding alleged crimes committed outside their jurisdictions. The drafters almost certainly believed that they were stating general principles, not laws that would be enforced by national courts. For example, Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, referred to it as a "common standard." As one of the negotiators of the Final Act of the Helsinki conference, I can affirm that the administration I represented considered it primarily a diplomatic weapon to use to thwart the communists' attempts to pressure the Soviet and captive peoples. Even with respect to binding undertakings such as the genocide convention, it was never thought that they would subject past and future leaders of one nation to prosecution by the national magistrates of another state where the violations had not occurred. Nor, until recently, was it argued that the various U.N. declarations subjected past and future leaders to the possibility of prosecution by national magistrates of third countries without either due process safeguards or institutional restraints.

Yet this is in essence the precedent that was set by the 1998 British detention of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet as the result of an extradition request by a Spanish judge seeking to try Pinochet for crimes committed against Spaniards on Chilean soil. For advocates of universal jurisdiction, that detention—lasting more than 16 months—was a landmark establishing a just principle. But any universal system should contain procedures not only to punish the wicked but also to constrain the righteous. It must not allow legal principles to be used as weapons to settle political scores. Questions such as these must therefore be answered: What legal norms are being applied? What are the rules of evidence? What safeguards exist for the defendant? And how will prosecutions affect other fundamental foreign policy objectives and interests?

#### A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

IT IS decidedly unfashionable to express any degree of skepticism about the way the Pinochet case was handled. For almost all the parties of the European left, Augusto Pinochet is the incarnation of a right-wing assault on democracy because he led a coup d'état against an elected leader. At the time, others, including the leaders



CORBIS-BETTMANN

Trial or error?  
General Augusto Pinochet, Santiago, Chile, May 24, 2000

of Chile's democratic parties, viewed Salvador Allende as a radical Marxist ideologue bent on imposing a Castro-style dictatorship with the aid of Cuban-trained militias and Cuban weapons. This was why the leaders of Chile's democratic parties publicly welcomed—yes, welcomed—Allende's overthrow. (They changed their attitude only after the junta brutally maintained its autocratic rule far longer than was warranted by the invocation of an emergency.)

Disapproval of the Allende regime does not exonerate those who perpetrated systematic human rights abuses after it was overthrown. But neither should the applicability of universal jurisdiction as a policy be determined by one's view of the political history of Chile.

11-L-0559/OSD/13813

*Henry A. Kissinger*

The appropriate solution was arrived at in August 2000 when the Chilean Supreme Court withdrew Pinochet's senatorial immunity, making it possible to deal with the charges against him in the courts of the country most competent to judge this history and to relate its decisions to the stability and vitality of its democratic institutions.

On November 25, 1998, the judiciary committee of the British House of Lords (the United Kingdom's supreme court) concluded that "international law has made it plain that certain types of conduct ... are

---

The world must respect Chile's own attempt to come to terms with its brutal past.

not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone." But that principle did not oblige the lords to endow a Spanish magistrate—and presumably other magistrates elsewhere in the world—with the authority to enforce it in a country where the accused had committed no crime, and then to cause the restraint of the accused for 16 months in yet another

country in which he was equally a stranger. It could have held that Chile, or an international tribunal specifically established for crimes committed in Chile on the model of the courts set up for heinous crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, was the appropriate forum.

The unprecedented and sweeping interpretation of international law in *Ex parte Pinochet* would arm any magistrate anywhere in the world with the power to demand extradition, substituting the magistrate's own judgment for the reconciliation procedures of even uncontestedly democratic societies where alleged violations of human rights may have occurred. It would also subject the accused to the criminal procedures of the magistrate's country, with a legal system that may be unfamiliar to the defendant and that would force the defendant to bring evidence and witnesses from long distances. Such a system goes far beyond the explicit and limited mandates established by the U.N. Security Council for the tribunals covering war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the one being negotiated for Cambodia.

Perhaps the most important issue is the relationship of universal jurisdiction to national reconciliation procedures set up by new democratic governments to deal with their countries' questionable pasts. One would have thought that a Spanish magistrate would have

*The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction*

been sensitive to the incongruity of a request by Spain, itself haunted by transgressions committed during the Spanish Civil War and the regime of General Francisco Franco, to try in Spanish courts alleged crimes against humanity committed elsewhere.

The decision of post-Franco Spain to avoid wholesale criminal trials for the human rights violations of the recent past was designed explicitly to foster a process of national reconciliation that undoubtedly contributed much to the present vigor of Spanish democracy. Why should Chile's attempt at national reconciliation not have been given the same opportunity? Should any outside group dissatisfied with the reconciliation procedures of, say, South Africa be free to challenge them in their own national courts or those of third countries?

It is an important principle that those who commit war crimes or systematically violate human rights should be held accountable. But the consolidation of law, domestic peace, and representative government in a nation struggling to come to terms with a brutal past has a claim as well. The instinct to punish must be related, as in every constitutional democratic political structure, to a system of checks and balances that includes other elements critical to the survival and expansion of democracy.

Another grave issue is the use in such cases of extradition procedures designed for ordinary criminals. If the Pinochet case becomes a precedent, magistrates anywhere will be in a position to put forward an extradition request without warning to the accused and regardless of the policies the accused's country might already have in place for dealing with the charges. The country from which extradition is requested then faces a seemingly technical legal decision that, in fact, amounts to the exercise of political discretion—whether to entertain the claim or not.

Once extradition procedures are in train, they develop a momentum of their own. The accused is not allowed to challenge the substantive merit of the case and instead is confined to procedural issues: that there was, say, some technical flaw in the extradition request, that the judicial system of the requesting country is incapable of providing a fair hearing, or that the crime for which the extradition is sought is not treated as a crime in the country from which extradition has been requested—thereby conceding much of the merit of the charge. Meanwhile, while these claims are being considered by the judicial

*Henry A. Kissinger*

system of the country from which extradition is sought, the accused remains in some form of detention, possibly for years. Such procedures provide an opportunity for political harassment long before the accused is in a position to present any defense. It would be ironic if a doctrine designed to transcend the political process turns into a means to pursue political enemies rather than universal justice.

The Pinochet precedent, if literally applied, would permit the two sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or those in any other passionate international controversy, to project their battles into the various national courts by pursuing adversaries with extradition requests. When discretion on what crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction and whom to prosecute is left to national prosecutors, the scope for arbitrariness is wide indeed. So far, universal jurisdiction has involved the prosecution of one fashionably reviled man of the right while scores of East European communist leaders—not to speak of Caribbean, Middle Eastern, or African leaders who inflicted their own full measures of torture and suffering—have not had to face similar prosecutions.

Some will argue that a double standard does not excuse violations of international law and that it is better to bring one malefactor to justice than to grant immunity to all. This is not an argument permitted in the domestic jurisdictions of many democracies—in Canada, for example, a charge can be thrown out of court merely by showing that a prosecution has been selective enough to amount to an abuse of process. In any case, a universal standard of justice should not be based on the proposition that a just end warrants unjust means, or that political fashion trumps fair judicial procedures.

**AN INDISCRIMINATE COURT**

THE IDEOLOGICAL supporters of universal jurisdiction also provide much of the intellectual compass for the emerging International Criminal Court. Their goal is to criminalize certain types of military and political actions and thereby bring about a more humane conduct of international relations. To the extent that the ICC replaces the claim of national judges to universal jurisdiction, it greatly improves the state of international law. And, in time, it may be possible to negotiate

*The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction*

modifications of the present statute to make the ICC more compatible with U.S. constitutional practice. But in its present form of assigning the ultimate dilemmas of international politics to unelected jurists—and to an international judiciary at that—it represents such a fundamental change in U.S. constitutional practice that a full national debate and the full participation of Congress are imperative. Such a momentous revolution should not come about by tacit acquiescence in the decision of the House of Lords or by dealing with the ICC issue through a strategy of improving specific clauses rather than as a fundamental issue of principle.

The doctrine of universal jurisdiction is based on the proposition that the individuals or cases subject to it have been clearly identified. In some instances, especially those based on Nuremberg precedents, the definition of who can be prosecuted in an international court and in what circumstances is self-evident. But many issues are much more vague and depend on an understanding of the historical and political context. It is this fuzziness that risks arbitrariness on the part of prosecutors and judges years after the event and that became apparent with respect to existing tribunals.

For example, can any leader of the United States or of another country be hauled before international tribunals established for other purposes? This is precisely what Amnesty International implied when, in the summer of 1999, it supported a "complaint" by a group of European and Canadian law professors to Louise Arbour, then the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The complaint alleged that crimes against humanity had been committed during the NATO air campaign in Kosovo. Arbour ordered an internal staff review, thereby implying that she did have jurisdiction if such violations could, in fact, be demonstrated. Her successor, Carla Del Ponte, in the end declined to indict any NATO official because of a general inability "to pinpoint individual responsibilities," thereby implying anew that the court had jurisdiction over NATO and American leaders in the Balkans and would have issued an indictment had it been able to identify the particular leaders allegedly involved.

At any future time, U.S. officials involved in the NATO air campaign in Kosovo could face international prosecution

*Henry A. Kissinger*

Most Americans would be amazed to learn that the ICTY, created at U.S. behest in 1993 to deal with Balkan war criminals, had asserted a right to investigate U.S. political and military leaders for allegedly criminal conduct—and for the indefinite future, since no statute of limitations applies. Though the ICTY prosecutor chose not to pursue the charge—on the ambiguous ground of an inability to collect evidence—some national prosecutor may wish later to take up the matter as a valid subject for universal jurisdiction.

The pressures to achieve the widest scope for the doctrine of universal jurisdiction were demonstrated as well by a suit before the European Court of Human Rights in June 2000 by families of Argentine sailors who died in the sinking of the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* during the Falklands War. The concept of universal jurisdiction has moved from judging alleged political crimes against humanity to second-guessing, 18 years after the event, military operations in which neither civilians nor civilian targets were involved.

Distrusting national governments, many of the advocates of universal jurisdiction seek to place politicians under the supervision of magistrates and the judicial system. But prosecutorial discretion without accountability is precisely one of the flaws of the International Criminal Court. Definitions of the relevant crimes are vague and highly susceptible to politicized application. Defendants will not enjoy due process as understood in the United States. Any signatory state has the right to trigger an investigation. As the U.S. experience with the special prosecutors investigating the executive branch shows, such a procedure is likely to develop its own momentum without time limits and can turn into an instrument of political warfare. And the extraordinary attempt of the ICC to assert jurisdiction over Americans even in the absence of U.S. accession to the treaty has already triggered legislation in Congress to resist it.

The independent prosecutor of the ICC has the power to issue indictments, subject to review only by a panel of three judges. According to the Rome statute, the Security Council has the right to quash any indictment. But since revoking an indictment is subject to the veto of any permanent Security Council member, and since the

*The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction*

prosecutor is unlikely to issue an indictment without the backing of at least one permanent member of the Security Council, he or she has virtually unlimited discretion in practice. Another provision permits the country whose citizen is accused to take over the investigation and trial. But the ICC retains the ultimate authority on whether that function has been adequately exercised and, if it finds it has not, the ICC can reassert jurisdiction. While these procedures are taking place, which may take years, the accused will be under some restraint and certainly under grave public shadow.

The advocates of universal jurisdiction argue that the state is the basic cause of war and cannot be trusted to deliver justice. If law replaced politics, peace and justice would prevail. But even a cursory examination of history shows that there is no evidence to support such a theory. The role of the statesman is to choose the best option when seeking to advance peace and justice, realizing that there is frequently a tension between the two and that any reconciliation is likely to be partial. The choice, however, is not simply between universal and national jurisdictions.

**MODEST PROPOSALS**

THE PRECEDENTS SET by international tribunals established to deal with situations where the enormity of the crime is evident and the local judicial system is clearly incapable of administering justice, as in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have shown that it is possible to punish without removing from the process all political judgment and experience. In time, it may be possible to renegotiate the ICC statute to avoid its shortcomings and dangers. Until then, the United States should go no further toward a more formal system than one containing the following three provisions. First, the U.N. Security Council would create a Human Rights Commission or a special subcommittee to report whenever systematic human rights violations seem to warrant judicial action. Second, when the government under which the alleged crime occurred is not authentically representative, or where the domestic judicial system is incapable of sitting in judgment on the crime, the Security Council would set up an ad hoc international tribunal on the model of those

11-L-0559/OSD/13816

*Henry A. Kissinger*

of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. And third, the procedures for these international tribunals as well as the scope of the prosecution should be precisely defined by the Security Council, and the accused should be entitled to the due process safeguards accorded in common jurisdictions.

In this manner, internationally agreed procedures to deal with war crimes, genocide, or other crimes against humanity could become institutionalized. Furthermore, the one-sidedness of the current pursuit of universal jurisdiction would be avoided. This pursuit could threaten the very purpose for which the concept has been developed. In the end, an excessive reliance on universal jurisdiction may undermine the political will to sustain the humane norms of international behavior so necessary to temper the violent times in which we live.②

April 22, 2002 2:20 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
CC: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Paul O'Neill  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Areas Not Being Governed

260

Paul O'Neill recently spoke to the World Economic Forum and talked a bit about this problem—from Afghanistan, to Somalia, to Indonesia, to Colombia.

It is pretty clear there has to be a new entrepreneurial model of nation building. A model has to be fashioned, and then all the various national and international aid structures probably need to be thought through and undoubtedly reorganized and reoriented to try to achieve it.

Our interest in a more stable and peaceful world suggests that it needs order, safety, prosperity, the rule of law, private property and freedom. That, needless to say, is a much bigger order than simply being against terrorism, which we must also be.

It strikes me that it would be useful to get some folks thinking about this. Newt Gingrich has some good ideas on this subject, as does Hernando de Soto, who has been working some in the Arab world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042202-28

22 Apr 02

W00539 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13818

April 23, 2002 5:52 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Ron James

Mr. Vice President,

Attached is a recent letter from Ron James and also a copy of his background sheet.

I will go ahead and send a copy over to Clay Johnson, but I hope you will weigh in and keep your eyes open as well. Is there a vacancy on the Ex-Im Bank?

Best regards,

Attach.

Ronald James letter and background sheet

DHR:dh  
042302-17

23 Apr 02  
W00541 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/13819

*Ronald J. James*

(b)(6)



April 22, 2002

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
The Secretary of the Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:


I know your time has to be your most precious currency so I truly appreciate the time we spent together.

I have been unable to get a handle on specific positions currently available within the Administration, therefore, I have simply listed some generalized preferences:

1. Board member of an independent administrative regulatory agency e.g.:
  - Consumer Product Safety Commission;
  - Export-Import Bank;
  - Federal Communications Commission;
  - Or one of the Department of Transportation Regulatory Boards.
2. Management or legal position with international responsibilities, e.g.:
  - Agency for International Development
  - Department of State
  - Agency for African Development
  - An Ambassador post.

As I am sure you are aware, if there was some position that would assist you and the President in our current war effort, I would gladly set aside my personal desires.

Very truly yours,



Ronald J. James

11-L-0559/OSD/13820

**RONALD J. JAMES**

(b)(6)

Home: (b)(6)  
Office:**CAREER SUMMARY**

Attorney with extensive legal expertise and management experience in the governmental regulatory process. Tested creative problem solver and legal counselor for national and international companies on a broad variety of business, labor and employment matters.

**EXPERIENCE AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

**Partner, Squire Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio 44114** (1977 - Present)  
International Law Firm with 28 offices World-Wide.

- Practice focus on counseling and representation of national and international clients in regulatory, labor and employment matters.
- Primary clients have been:
  - Transportation companies, e.g. UPS, Chessie, ConRail
  - Foreign Air Carriers, e.g., Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico
  - Communication corporations, e.g., MCI, Penton Media, Clear Channel

**Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor** (1975 – 1977)

- Managed the enforcement activities, procedures and standards of 300 offices nationwide and a staff of 1,500.
- Recommended policy and legislative initiatives to the Secretary of Labor (John Dunlap or William Usury) e.g., the Fair Labor Standards Act, child labor, age discrimination and equal pay.

**Assistant General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago, Illinois** (1972 – 1975)

- Structured and developed the Regional Litigation Center covering a ten-state area.
- Directed and managed the litigation activities of thirty-two attorneys.
- Negotiated major settlements with national and international corporations and argued several precedent setting Title VII cases.

**Trial Attorney, Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.** (1971 – 1972)

- Litigated cases involving transportation policies and mergers before regulatory agencies and federal courts.

**Special Assistant to Donald Rumsfeld, Counselor to the President** (1970 – 1971)

**Special Assistant to Director Donald Rumsfeld, Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C.**

- Provided legal, legislative, administrative and policy support.

**Legislative Associate to John Gardner, President, Urban Coalition Action Council, Washington, D.C.** (1970)

- Developed and advocated Coalition's position on labor-management legislation.

**Assistant County Prosecutor – Criminal, Black Hawk County, Iowa** (1967 – 1969)

11-L-0559/OSD/13821

**Director, Commission on Human Rights , City of Waterloo, Iowa,** (1966 – 1967)

- Formulated and implemented the administrative process for investigation and enforcement of discrimination complaints.

**Analyst, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C.** (1965 – 1966)

**Staff , Congressman Donald Rumsfeld (R-Illinois) U.S. Congress** (Summer 1964)

**Legislative Aide to Congressman James Bromwell (R-Iowa), Member, U.S. Congress,  
House Judiciary Committee** (1963 – 1964)

#### MILITARY

**Lieutenant, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division Artillery, U.S. Army, Fort Campbell, Kentucky** (1961 – 1963)

#### EDUCATION

**American University Law School, Washington, D.C. Juris Doctor**

**Southern Illinois University, Washington, D.C. Extension, Master of Arts (Economics and Political Science)**

**University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, Bachelor of Arts (Political Science)**

#### CURRENT COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

**Cleveland International Program: Board member/Volunteer** 1989 – Present

Organization dedicated to providing promising professionals from around the world with work internships in the public and private sector

- Assisted in securing internships for a number of participants doctors, lawyers, teachers, social workers.
- Hosted thirteen professionals and one student in own home for periods ranging from three weeks to eight months from various European, African, Central and South American countries.

**The Church of Covenant: Trustee, Executive Committee, Elder, Personnel and Finance Committee**

- Active in Presbytery of the Western Reserve, e.g., CLEV-SA (Cleveland to South Africa Exchange Program) and "Joining Hands Against Hunger," (pilot project on U.S. and South Africa hunger issues).

1982 - Present

**East Cleveland Metro Kicks: Co-Founder,**

- Fundraiser, Coach, for a 501(c)(3) Recreational Soccer Program in Ohio's poorest city

1997 - Present

**Hawken School, Gates Mills, Ohio: Trustee, Chair Personnel and Member Executive Committee** 1989 – Present

#### PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

**Teaching Assistant , Economics and History, University of Northern Iowa 1967-69**

**Lecturer , Case Western Reserve University School of Law 1980's**

**Faculty, NELI Member (National Employment Law Institute) 1989 to present**

**Speaker-Trainer, Society for Human Resources Management, National School Board Association, Cleveland Clinic, Employers Resource Council, Midwest Labor Law Seminar, Cleveland State University, American Bar Association**

**Member, Administrative Conference of United States (1982-92)**

April 23, 2002 6:01 PM

TO: Honorable Clay Johnson  
CC: VICE PRESIDENT RICHARD B. CHENEY  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Ron James

Clay,

Attached is a background sheet on Mr. Ron James. He is a Republican African-American who worked with me back in the 1960s and 1970s. As a matter of fact, he was a special assistant to me when I was the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, at the same time Vice President Cheney was a special assistant, so the Vice President knows him well.

In addition to his background sheet, I have included his letter. I asked him to think through the things that might be of interest to him since he is anxious to serve in the Administration. He of course does not know all of the jobs available in the government and, as a result, he simply set out some that might be possibilities from his standpoint.

I know him well and think the world of him. I would very much appreciate it if you would have your folks take a look at him for appropriate assignments. Thanks so much.

Regards,

Attach.

Ronald James letter and background sheet

DHR:dh  
042302-18

230.02

23 Apr 02

W00543 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13823

**Ronald J. James**

(b)(6)

April 22, 2002

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
The Secretary of the Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I know your time has to be your most precious currency so I truly appreciate the time we spent together.

I have been unable to get a handle on specific positions currently available within the Administration, therefore, I have simply listed some generalized preferences:

1. Board member of an independent administrative regulatory agency e.g.:


- Consumer Product Safety Commission;
- Export-Import Bank;
- Federal Communications Commission;
- Or one of the Department of Transportation Regulatory Boards.

2. Management or legal position with international responsibilities, e.g.:

- Agency for International Development
- Department of State
- Agency for African Development
- An Ambassador post.

As I am sure you are aware, if there was some position that would assist you and the President in our current war effort, I would gladly set aside my personal desires.

Very truly yours,



Ronald J. James

11-L-0559/OSD/13824

**RONALD J. JAMES**

(b)(6)

Home:  
Office:

(b)(6)

**CAREER SUMMARY**

Attorney with extensive legal expertise and management experience in the governmental regulatory process. Tested creative problem solver and legal counselor for national and international companies on a broad variety of business, labor and employment matters.

**EXPERIENCE AND ACHIEVEMENTS****Partner, Squire Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio 44114**  
International Law Firm with 28 offices World-Wide.

(1977 - Present)

- Practice focus on counseling and representation of national and international clients in regulatory, labor and employment matters.
- Primary clients have been:
  - Transportation companies, e.g. UPS, Chessie, ConRail
  - Foreign Air Carriers, e.g., Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico
  - Communication corporations, e.g., MCI, Penton Media, Clear Channel.

**Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor**

(1975 - 1977)

- Managed the enforcement activities, procedures and standards of 300 offices nationwide and a staff of 1,500.
- Recommended policy and legislative initiatives to the Secretary of Labor (John Dunlap or William Usery) e.g., the Fair Labor Standards Act, child labor, age discrimination and equal pay.

**Assistant General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago, Illinois**

(1972 - 1975)

- Structured and developed the Regional Litigation Center covering a ten-state area.
- Directed and managed the litigation activities of thirty-two attorneys.
- Negotiated major settlements with national and international corporations and argued several precedent setting Title VII cases.

**Trial Attorney, Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.**

(1971 - 1972)

- Litigated cases involving transportation policies and mergers before regulatory agencies and federal courts.

**Special Assistant to Donald Rumsfeld, Counselor to the President**

(1970 - 1971)

**Special Assistant to Director Donald Rumsfeld, Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C.**

- Provided legal, legislative, administrative and policy support.

**Legislative Associate to John Gardner, President, Urban Coalition Action Council, Washington, D.C.**

(1970)

- Developed and advocated Coalition's position on labor-management legislation.

**Assistant County Prosecutor - Criminal, Black Hawk County, Iowa**

(1967 - 1969)

11-L-0559/OSD/13825

**Director, Commission on Human Rights , City of Waterloo, Iowa,** (1966 – 1967)

- Formulated and implemented the administrative process for investigation and enforcement of discrimination complaints.

**Analyst, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C.** (1965 – 1966)

**Staff , Congressman Donald Rumsfeld (R-Illinois) U.S. Congress** (Summer 1964)

**Legislative Aide to Congressman James Bromwell (R-Iowa), Member, U.S. Congress,  
House Judiciary Committee** (1963 – 1964)

#### MILITARY

**Lieutenant, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division Artillery, U.S. Army, Fort Campbell, Kentucky** (1961 – 1963)

#### EDUCATION

**American University Law School, Washington, D.C. Juris Doctor**

**Southern Illinois University, Washington, D.C. Extension, Master of Arts (Economics and Political Science)**

**University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, Bachelor of Arts (Political Science)**

#### CURRENT COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

**Cleveland International Program: Board member/Volunteer** 1989 – Present

Organization dedicated to providing promising professionals from around the world with work internships in the public and private sector

- Assisted in securing internships for a number of participants doctors, lawyers, teachers, social workers.
- Hosted thirteen professionals and one student in own home for periods ranging from three weeks to eight months from various European, African, Central and South American countries.

**The Church of Covenant: Trustee, Executive Committee, Elder, Personnel and Finance Committee**

- Active in Presbytery of the Western Reserve, e.g., CLEV-SA (Cleveland to South Africa Exchange Program) and "Joining Hands Against Hunger," (pilot project on U.S. and South Africa hunger issues).

1982 - Present

**East Cleveland Metro Kicks: Co-Founder,**

- Fundraiser, Coach, for a 501(c)(3) Recreational Soccer Program in Ohio's poorest city

1997 - Present

**Hawken School, Gates Mills, Ohio: Trustee, Chair Personnel and Member Executive Committee** 1989 – Present

#### PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

**Teaching Assistant , Economics and History, University of Northern Iowa 1967-69**

**Lecturer , Case Western Reserve University School of Law 1980's**

**Faculty, NELI Member (National Employment Law Institute) 1989 to present**

**Speaker-Trainer, Society for Human Resources Management, National School Board Association, Cleveland Clinic, Employers Resource Council, Midwest Labor Law Seminar, Cleveland State University, American Bar Association**

**Member, Administrative Conference of United States (1982-92)**

SNOWFLAKE

7:23 AM

TO: Vice President Richard Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*  
DATE: April 15, 2002  
SUBJECT: Ridge Testimony

I see articles about Congress wanting Tom Ridge to testify. I think you are right to not allow it, since it would increase pressure on the National Security Council, the Counsel to the President, and other White House advisors to testify.

I am no expert, but most things Tom Ridge appears to be involved in seem to have a statutory rooting in one of the statutory departments. That being the case, why not have the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, the Department Health and Human Services, etc. testify before Congress on the issues they have responsibility for that involve homeland security. If the Administration offers up the cabinet officers who have statutory jurisdiction over the subject matter that a particular committee is interested in, it should solve the problem. Since Ridge has no statutory responsibility, he shouldn't be testifying in the areas of responsibility of the statutory departments anyway.

h8  
h8C

One problem is that, instead of characterizing Ridge as an "advisor" like Condi Rice is, he has been characterized as a "director" of an operational activity, which he is not.

Also, I noticed that Mitch Daniels is quoted as considering the possibility of a new statutory department for homeland security. I don't know what would be pulled out of the other departments to make up a new Department of Homeland Security. I do know it would not be possible to bifurcate DoD assets between worldwide defense of America and homeland defense of America. It would be dangerous and unwise to try to divide up military capabilities that way. The same thing is probably true of trying to bifurcate the Department of Justice by separating international law enforcement and law enforcement for homeland security. I hope we can steer that idea off.

My impression is that the reason some are considering a Homeland Security Department is because of the pressure for Ridge to testify. I'm afraid that if we did it, we'd be jumping out of one frying pan into another that could be much worse.

One idea might be a revised Department of Justice with FEMA operating as an agency within the Department of Justice much as the FBI does today. If the orientation were that direction, there would be a cabinet department that could then testify on many of the domestic aspects and the Pentagon could testify on the military matters.

20-Apr-02  
51

Just some thoughts.

DHR/szn  
041202.26

W00545 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13827

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


April 30, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Unified Command Plan 2002

Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve and direct implementation of the revised Unified Command Plan.

You are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf, as required by title 10, United States Code, section 161(b)(2).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George W. Bush".

W00549-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13828

May 21, 2002 3:42 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[initials]*  
SUBJECT: Jim Woolsey's Piece

500.5

The attached op-ed by Jim Woolsey is excellent.

Regards,

Attach.

R. James Woolsey, "Foiling the Next Attack," *New York Times*, 05/21/02

DHR:dh  
052102-9

21 MAY 02

W00650-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13829

Wall Street Journal  
May 21, 2002

## Foiling The Next Attack

By R. James Woolsey

It might be useful to call a truce, step back from the finger-pointing about who in the government made what mistakes before Sept. 11, and look for a moment at who was doing things right.

Based on what is now publicly known it looks as if a handful of people were demonstrably prescient before Sept. 11 about terrorists being trained as pilots and crashing aircraft into major buildings in the U.S.:

- The late Rick Rescorla, the remarkable chief of security for Morgan Stanley in the World Trade Center, who foresaw the magnitude of the attack and died a hero's death while saving over 3,000 people.
- Two FBI agents, Kenneth Williams in Phoenix and another agent in Minneapolis, each of whom separately shared his specific concerns about terrorist pilots with colleagues inside the FBI.
- Rex Hudson, an analyst at the Library of Congress, who was asked to assess the psychology of terrorists by the National Intelligence Council in 1999 and whose analysis of suicide pilots was published well before Sept. 11.
- Stephen Gale, a terrorism expert at the University of Pennsylvania, who, together with two colleagues, gave the Federal Aviation Administration in 1998 an analysis of how suicide pilots would operate, and was met with a shrug.
- And Tom Clancy, who published a novel ("Debt of Honor") in 1994 centered on the concept of a rogue pilot flying a 747 into the U.S. Capitol.

Much of the information upon which these men reached their conclusions was available to the rest of us. Why weren't we as perceptive as Rick Rescorla et al.?

### Spy Games

It is probably in part because in order to make decisions about what we need to do to thwart terrorist attacks in this country we've been relying too much upon the prospect of obtaining foreign intelligence. For a number of reasons this source of information -- stealing secrets abroad by, principally, recruiting spies and intercepting communications -- will only rarely be able to give us advance warning about terrorist attacks. If we are smart and lucky we may conceivably strike gold -- recruit a member of al Qaeda's inner circle or tap into their communications -- but during the years, perhaps decades, of war that lie ahead this will occur at best only rarely. It would be extremely difficult for a CIA case officer to recruit and run an agent who stays in place in al Qaeda and gives us a continuing stream of information. To find one who has access to the organization's advance plans would be more difficult still.

Intercepted communications could be a more promising source of intelligence if it weren't for our national tendency to logorrhea about the subject. U.S. intelligence figured out in the late 1990s how to intercept bin Laden's satellite telephone conversations and then someone talked to the press about it; the source of course dried up. Recently there have been periodic press reports about how we have been able

to intercept al Qaeda e-mail and other communications. (Hint to the blabbermouths in the government who have access to intercepts of terrorist communications: Members of al Qaeda read newspapers.)

The most useful thing the president could do to avoid intelligence failures in the war against terrorism would be to order the government to treat intercepted communications the way we treated the fruits of U.S. and British code-breaking in World War II: Cut back the number of people with access to intercepts by about 99.9% and threaten the few who retain access with severe punishment if they even think of talking about intercepts outside authorized channels.

In part because of these problems there apparently was no foreign intelligence (in the sense of secrets stolen abroad) that was available before Sept. 11 and that would have reasonably led the government to expect that terrorists would fly airliners into buildings, on that date or any other time. The intelligence warning given the president by the CIA last Aug. 6 about possible al Qaeda hijackings was, as is often the case, vague and general; it did not deal with suicide pilots at all. As long as the White House was relying on the foreign intelligence it was given, it is hard to see how the president could reasonably have done more than he did -- alert law enforcement agencies and the airlines.

Each of the half dozen or so individuals who did take some action before Sept. 11 to get us to focus on the threat of suicide pilots attacking buildings did so based not on foreign intelligence but on his own judgment, sparked by other sources of information. The two FBI agents were acting on hunches developed during law enforcement investigations inside the U.S. Mr. Hudson, the Library of Congress analyst, had read that after his capture Abdul Hakim Murad, Ramzi Yousef's colleague in the 1995 plot to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners, had reportedly spoken of the possibility of a suicide pilot attack against CIA headquarters. The University of Pennsylvania researchers were insightful for similar reasons. Mr. Clancy presumably decided on the plot of his novel based on his own fertile imagination, combined with his extensive research. The extraordinary Rescorla, who had also foreseen the earlier truck bomb attack against the World Trade Center, was just one of those rare individuals -- as he had shown in his distinguished military career -- who have an invaluable sixth sense of being able to think like their enemies and the intellectual courage to act on their judgments. The question is how to replicate such insights across the spectrum of government.

We will pick up a good deal of information about possible terrorist attacks in the future from a number of different sources: by interrogating prisoners captured abroad, by our armed forces capturing terrorists' computers in Afghanistan, by law enforcement investigations here in the U.S., by tips from friendly intelligence and law enforcement organizations in other countries, and to some extent through our spies and our collection of electronic intelligence. Military actions abroad may be quite fruitful, but foreign intelligence that we ourselves collect -- the secrets we steal abroad -- may be a relatively small share of the important information in the government's hands.

One major reason is that much of the terrorists' plotting may be done here in the U.S., as terrorist expert Steven Emerson has been saying for years. Much of the hijackers' planning for Sept. 11 apparently took place in the U.S. and in Germany. Neither the FBI nor its German counterpart have a hunting license to spy domestically on whatever interests them. Both investigate specific crimes, past and potential. The terrorists knew exactly what they were doing -- they worked out of two countries where civil liberties are strongly protected and, as long as they obeyed the law, they knew they would probably not even be watched, much less interfered with.

Some of the pre-Sept. 11 barriers to communication about terrorism within and between the intelligence and law enforcement communities have been removed in the last eight months. The CIA has reportedly now suspended, at least in matters relating to terrorism, the highly dysfunctional guidelines it issued in late 1995 that deter case officers from recruiting spies who might have some propensity to violence --

obviously a major obstacle to penetrating terrorist groups. The USA Patriot Act made it legal last fall (it was illegal before) for the FBI to provide material to the CIA obtained pursuant to grand jury subpoenas in domestic terrorism investigations. FBI Director Robert Mueller, who inherited from his predecessor an extremely decentralized organization that was not well-focused on dealing with terrorism, has recently consolidated counter-terrorist work; this should help ensure in the future that FBI agents in Phoenix and Minneapolis who have suspicions about a terrorist threat will not work in ignorance of one another's efforts.

What is needed, urgently, is a way for the potpourri of information available to the government -- including assessments of our infrastructure's vulnerabilities, foreign intelligence, law enforcement material, and the hunches of FBI agents and academic analysts -- to be pulled together in one place and assessed by people with the sixth sense of a Rick Rescorla. The only institution which both the law enforcement and intelligence communities recognize as their superior is the presidency, so this task, it would seem, must be done in the White House. The most obvious place to focus it would be in Tom Ridge's Homeland Security office.

But Mr. Ridge needs more resources than civil servants on loan from other parts of the government. And to get the job done properly his charter needs to let him move well beyond coordinating the efforts of various government departments. Among other tasks, he needs to take charge of both assessing and correcting the vulnerabilities in all of our national networks -- the electricity grid, the Internet, food production and distribution, oil and gas pipelines, and so on. Each of these networks has different vulnerabilities, and it is necessary for those who understand the networks and those who can put themselves in the shoes of the enemy to work side-by-side.

### Talent Search

During World War II the most talented people in the country were brought to Washington and many worked for a dollar a year to handle the myriad new tasks needed to win the war. Something like that spirit and commitment are needed now. President Bush and Mr. Ridge should ask the best people that the country can provide to help assess, network by network, our vulnerabilities and especially those (such as flimsy airliner cockpit doors before Sept. 11) that invite terrorist attack and exploitation. Congress should then be asked to give the executive branch whatever authority it needs to get those vulnerabilities fixed promptly.

The White House could start with the collection of Nobel Prize winners and top industry experts now involved in the National Academies' (Science, Engineering, Medicine) forthcoming report on using technology to protect us from terrorism; divide them up into different working groups for each network; add the nation's best experts on the Mideast such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami; season with FBI agents and others who have demonstrated prescience about terrorists' tactics; add Tom Clancy for a dash of spice; give them full access to all terrorist-related information; put a picture of Rick Rescorla on the wall as their guiding spirit, and tell them to get busy.

We must now concentrate on finding, and getting judgments made by, the people who are likely to be right. Put off the recriminations and televised hearings. There's work to do.

*Mr. Woolsey, director of Central Intelligence from 1993 to 1995, practices law in Washington.*

June 17, 2002 11:29 AM

TO: Honorable Alberto Gonzales  
CC: Honorable David Addington  
Honorable Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RH*  
SUBJECT: Asymmetric Warfare

Please take a look at this article by Ruth Wedgwood. Do you think we ought to do something along one of the lines she mentions?

Thanks.

Attach.

Wedgwood, Ruth, "The Enemy Within," *Wall Street Journal*, June 14, 2002.

DH:R:dh  
061702-16

6/18

council

W00737-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13833

leading American envoy, Mr. Khalilzad, then called a press conference to announce that the king would not accept appointment, thereby tainting the new government as a creation of foreign powers and causing delegates to lose face. Each would now return home without having had meaningful input into the crucial question facing the nation.

Finally, Mr. Brahimi gave the feared National Security Directorate, also controlled by the Panjshiris, free access to the loya jirga.

Together, these actions convinced many that the loya jirga is a puppet of Panjshiris and foreigners, and that the Bush administration is not willing to let Afghans engage in any democratic debate that might contradict American views. The administration's close relationship to the Panjshiris began when the Pentagon deputized the Northern Alliance in the war against the Taliban. They are the people the Bush administration has grown accustomed to and whom it refuses to face down in the present crisis.

Over the past six months the thing preventing Pashtuns, Hazaras and other groups from resisting the Kabul government has been the hope that the loya jirga would take corrective action against Panjshiri power. Dashing that hope could let loose the frustrations of those who feel excluded, a category that may include a majority of Afghans. If they cannot view the Kabul government as their own, they will embrace warlords who champion their cause -- bearing in mind that the Panjshiris and some of the politicians with whom they may make common cause, like the Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, are themselves basically warlords. In short, the new Kabul government as it appears to be taking shape may elevate another set of foreign-backed warlords for other Afghans to rebel against. This time, they would also be rebelling against the United States and, in some sense, the United Nations. Lest it be further blamed, America should instantly indicate it will respect the decisions of the loya jirga on all matters, including re-

moval of Panjshiris from key ministries. Beyond the loya jirga, a secondary problem of gross imbalance remains: ministry staffs are now dominated by Northern Alliance or former Communist personnel.

At this point it is up to Mr. Karzai to replace these appointees with ethnically diverse and professional personnel, particularly in the key ministries and the National Security Directorate. As he considers this step, he should know that the United States will provide strong support for his new staff -- and that longer-term development assistance will depend on his readiness to face this challenge.

*S. Frederick Starr is chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University. Marin J. Sirmecki writes frequently about Afghanistan and is vice president of the Smith Richardson Foundation.*

Wall Street Journal  
June 14, 2002

### 53. The Enemy Within

By Ruth Wedgwood

Al Qaeda has championed asymmetric warfare. Donning civilian garb permits its suicide bombers to travel across borders in pursuit of soft targets. Ever inventive, it is now attempting to gain an advantage from the most sacred symbol of the American union -- the Constitution.

The leadership of al Qaeda has realized that the easiest way to avoid American watch lists and visa precautions is to recruit U.S. citizens for the jihad. The added strategic benefit is the special protections that Americans enjoy in a liberal democracy.

Our obvious dilemma is how to reconcile the values of the Constitution and the safety of the Republic. The matter has been put before us by the activities of an American citizen named Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member who converted to Islam, went to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and conferred there with al Qaeda super-operative Abu Zubaydah about exploding a

radiological "dirty bomb" in the U.S. In May, Padilla was snared at O'Hare Airport, on his return. Federal authorities sought Padilla's testimony as a material witness before a grand jury in Manhattan. He refused to cooperate and, last Sunday, was transferred to a military brig in South Carolina.

Padilla was not charged criminally in New York because of restrictive rules of evidence that govern what a trial jury can hear. Much of the information about him comes from his co-conspirator Abu Zubaydah, now in custody abroad. But Zubaydah is a hostile interlocutor, and the details of the "dirty bomb" scheme have been gleaned obliquely, in the course of extended interrogations. There is little chance, at present, that he would act as a government witness in a criminal prosecution against Padilla.

Thus the conundrum of reconciling safety and law. There is, of course, an important difference between corroborated intelligence and admissible trial evidence. The purpose of criminal justice is to punish as well as prevent further crime. So its rules are particularly restrictive.

So far, Congress has not acted to adapt any of the rules of evidence in federal district courts to the threats of catastrophic harm posed by al Qaeda. Going to trial also means opening the sources of sensitive information to inspection -- a particular problem when a defendant chooses to represent himself, as the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui is making clear. Thus, the U.S. chose to detain Padilla as a combatant, rather than as a defendant, arguing that under the laws of war he is, in every real sense, an "enemy combatant."

In 1942, the Supreme Court ruled that the same designation -- "enemy combatant" -- applied to Nazi saboteurs who landed by submarine on American shores to blow up industrial plants. The eight men were tried before a military commission. One of them had a plausible claim of American citizenship. The Supreme Court ruled this to be irrelevant, for "citizens who associate themselves with the

military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts" qualify as "enemy belligerents."

In thinking through the new hybrid form of war waged by al Qaeda, few of us wanted to anticipate the problem of American recruits. But a president determined to prevent future attacks has to solve the problem, even if provisionally. The international law of armed conflict permits the victim of aggression to detain enemy combatants until hostilities are over. The purpose of the detention is not punitive, but rather to keep the enemy's operatives from returning to the fight.

Libertarians must ask what would restrain runaway use of such power. Habeas corpus remains available in our courts, even in this unorthodox war. Congress has not taken the extraordinary step of suspending it, and the president has not asked them to. Habeas corpus allows a court to inquire into the authority by which any American citizen is detained, even an al Qaeda recruit. The courts will have occasion to confirm whether the president enjoys a constitutional power to detain American combatants in this new kind of war waged by nonstate actors.

To be sure, the need to forestall attacks against innocent Americans with weapons of mass destruction may seem self-evident, even when criminal trial witnesses are not available. Most judges will appropriately decline to second-guess a military decision of the commander-in-chief based on reliable intelligence, especially when the stakes are so high. No writ or injunction will deter al Qaeda from carrying out acts of mass violence.

But to bolster its case, and to allay concern about error, the president might consider several options. First, the certification of a combatant should give a statement of reasons. Even if the underlying information cannot be made public in the near term, this will give a court additional reason to credit the basis of the decision.

Second, the president may wish to empower the recently

created military commissions to take on the task of reviewing the basis for a "combatant" designation. The commissions' procedures admit a broad range of evidence, yet guarantee combatants the right to challenge the government's account. A battlefield judgment of combatancy has never required the criminal standard of "beyond reasonable doubt," but the case of American citizens in this unusual war makes it appropriate to think hard about an apt standard of proof.

Third, and in the alternative, the president could give the "second look" to a panel such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court. This is a panel of judges who have gained experience in protecting intelligence, and have come to understand that the foreign affairs power deals with problems different from domestic criminal justice. In the context of wiretap applications, the FISA court has had to look at whether there is probable cause to believe that someone is acting as the agent of a foreign power. This option would probably require the consent of Congress.

Employing a structured basis for the designation of al Qaeda recruits will strengthen the confidence of the courts and the public that this awesome power will be appropriately employed in the fight against al Qaeda's terrorism. We have a government of laws, not of men. But as Justice Robert H. Jackson remarked, the Constitution is not a suicide pact. It should be possible to reconcile the problems of prevention with the careful processes of liberal government.

*Ms. Wedgwood, a former federal prosecutor, is a professor of law at Yale and Johns Hopkins.*

to military quarters, where he can be held indefinitely, incommunicado and without legal representation, has triggered a chorus of cries from civil libertarians and editorial boards.

Most of these reflexive criticisms are largely unfounded, however, if the allegations against Padilla have a substantial factual basis. Pursuant to the Geneva conventions and ample precedent in U.S. law, the Bush administration is well within its rights to detain those properly determined to be lawful or unlawful combatants until the conclusion of the armed conflict, and only then to try them in a properly constituted military tribunal, a military court or in civilian courts. The apparent supervision of Padilla by a federal judge since his detention as a material witness and the availability of federal habeas petitions, should help check against arbitrary or pretextual determinations about his combatant status.

Until the commencement of such proceedings, the Bush administration has no obligation to provide counsel. Because Padilla may with sufficient evidence properly be classified as an unlawful combatant, interrogators have the advantage of less restrictive rules for questioning than if he were in the civilian courts or classified as a prisoner of war. The inclination toward a military forum seems driven, at least in part, by the relaxed evidentiary rules that permit the use of information obtained by interviews abroad with detained al Qaeda leaders.

So far, so good. But where the administration is vulnerable to legal pitfalls is in its steadfast refusal to work with Congress to eliminate potential roadblocks that alleged terrorists will take full advantage of in the courts.

First, the military tribunals as now constituted through executive fiat stand on shaky legal grounds for lack of congressional authorization. In upholding convictions in military tribunals of German terrorists who landed on U.S. shores in 1942 -- including an American citizen acting on behalf of the German Reich -- the

U.S. Supreme Court validated the tribunals, noting that by "the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases." (The terrorists were convicted of attempting to blow up domestic war facilities.)

When addressing itself to whether such tribunals would have legitimacy without such congressional authorization, the court said it was "unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions."

What that means in legal terms is that the military tribunals, as currently constituted, are in a state of legal limbo over the question of whether a president can unilaterally suspend the civilian court system if he merely asserts that terrorism is at hand. That unresolved legal issue only gives accused terrorists new unnecessary avenues to delay and obstruct prosecutions -- a problem that could be easily solved with congressional action. And such action would surely be forthcoming if the Bush administration were simply to ask for it.

Accused al Qaeda defendants are also likely to raise legal challenges to the selective use of the tribunals, because accused terrorists who, unlike Padilla, are not citizens -- such as Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid -- are getting the full benefits of civilian courts. Here, Congress too could help the administration avoid unnecessarily distracting litigation by spelling out criteria for using the tribunals, and by granting broad discretion to the administration to make such choices depending on factual circumstances. There is no reason, as the Supreme Court noted in 1942, that Congress could not extend the jurisdiction of tribunals to U.S. citizens accused of taking up arms against the United States.

The same act of Congress could also codify minimal due process rights for the tribunals consistent with international norms, such as the opportunity for independent civilian review, as exists now in military courts-martial. Such a provision would cost little in terms of prosecutorial muscle and would gain much praise in the international human rights community.

Congress should also give the Bush administration additional tools for civilian courts: a relaxation of evidentiary rules in terrorism cases to allow hearsay evidence gleaned from interrogations abroad, and a revision of the secrecy laws to deny accused terrorists who represent themselves -- like Zacarias Moussaoui -- potential rights to see some classified materials.

In times of war, the president has considerable inherent powers as commander in chief, but he is not omnipotent. His inherent powers are considerably bolstered with congressional backing. The present Congress, in a bipartisan manner, has given the administration virtually every legal tool it has asked for to prosecute the terror war. And, as it did by embracing Congress in the elevation of a homeland security agency, it should stop acting as if it's scared of its congressional shadow, and embrace the Hill for the legal battles ahead. If it does, the terrorists will be a lot worse off for it.

*The writer is the former Democratic chief counsel to the House Judiciary Committee.*

Washington Post  
June 14, 2002

Pg. 31

#### 54. Why Not Work With Congress On Military Tribunals?

By Julian Epstein

The announcement that Jose Padilla, a.k.a. Abdullah al Muhajir, was being transferred

Washington Times  
June 14, 2002  
Pg. 23

#### 55. No Right Without Might

By Jed Babbin

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said recently that diplomacy is unlikely to be effective without the power of military force behind it. That sounds much like the memorable scene from "The Untouchables," when Robert de Niro, in the character of Al Capone, said something like, "In my neighborhood you can get farther with a smile and a gun

June 17, 2002 1:56 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: FBI

Attached is a memo I received from our friend Newt. I think he is right on the mark. Is it too late to do it right?

Thanks.

Attach.  
06/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef, "Splitting the FBI"

DJR:dh  
061702-34

DOJ/JUSTICE

DOJ/INTL/DOJ

**W00744-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13836

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From Newt Gingrich

~~SECDEF HAS SIGHTED~~

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 05, 2002 8:48 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) @osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;  
**Cc:** Herbits1@aol.com  
**Subject:** splitting the FBI  
for secdef, depsecdef  
from Newt June 05, 2002

JUN 17 2002

**splitting the FBI**

I know this topic is not in your immediate zone but it is in your area of conversation on national security.

The more I watch our efforts to shift the FBI the more convinced I am that this is a profound mistake.

We have a Federal Bureau of Investigation because we have a wide range of crimes that require a federal response. On September 10 the overwhelming bulk of that agency was focused on drugs, kidnapping, bank robbery, organized crime, etc. It had a long and serious history of pursuing domestic criminals and was to some extent become more international as CRIME became more international.

The rythm of crime fighting is radically different from the rythm of stopping terrorist. Investigative agents within the American constitution scrupulously protect the innocent, observe procedural rules designed to preserve freedom, and are essentially reactive rather than proactive.

Stopping terrorism is going to require a different mindset and a different focus. Every scrap of gossip is important to an anti-terrorist and inadmissible to a criminal investigator.

If we succeed in converting the FBI over the next five to ten years (and changing a culture will take that long) into an anti-terrorist organization then we will have to invent a crime fighting organization.

We would be better off to take a deep breath, realize how big and permanent a problem anti-terrorism is and invent a new National Anti-Terrorist Agency with pieces from the FBI and elsewhere. This Agency ought to report to the Homeland Security Director and work very closely with the Director of Central Intelligence (in a way we would not like if applied to domestic crime).

It is psychologically impossible for the Director of the FBI to be both our leading anti-terrorist domestic enforcer and our leading anti-domestic crime fighter. One or the other will dominate probably based on the issues which dominate in that period. We will swing back and forth beating up the schizophrenic FBI on each cycle (why

weren't you looking after drug bosses? why didn't you allocate people to bank robberies? how could you have failed to focus on terrorism? will be the routine scapegoating questions of the future if we give the FBI both assignments

June 17, 2002 2:26 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
CC: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
Honorable Alberto Gonzales  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Designation of Al Qaeda Recruits

Attached is a copy of a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed by Ruth Wedgwood. I found it most interesting. I think she is someone we ought to think about using more.

Thanks.

Attach.

Wedgwood, Ruth. "The Enemy Within," *Wall Street Journal*, June 14, 2002.

DHR:dh  
061702-42

10 Jun 02

W00745-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13839

Wall Street Journal  
June 14, 2002

## The Enemy Within

By Ruth Wedgwood

Al Qaeda has championed asymmetric warfare. Donning civilian garb permits its suicide bombers to travel across borders in pursuit of soft targets. Ever inventive, it is now attempting to gain an advantage from the most sacred symbol of the American union -- the Constitution.

The leadership of al Qaeda has realized that the easiest way to avoid American watch lists and visa precautions is to recruit U.S. citizens for the jihad. The added strategic benefit is the special protections that Americans enjoy in a liberal democracy.

Our obvious dilemma is how to reconcile the values of the Constitution and the safety of the Republic. The matter has been put before us by the activities of an American citizen named Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member who converted to Islam, went to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and conferred there with al Qaeda super-operative Abu Zubaydah about exploding a radiological "dirty bomb" in the U.S. In May, Padilla was snared at O'Hare Airport, on his return. Federal authorities sought Padilla's testimony as a material witness before a grand jury in Manhattan. He refused to cooperate and, last Sunday, was transferred to a military brig in South Carolina.

Padilla was not charged criminally in New York because of restrictive rules of evidence that govern what a trial jury can hear. Much of the information about him comes from his co-conspirator Abu Zubaydah, now in custody abroad. But Zubaydah is a hostile interlocutor, and the details of the "dirty bomb" scheme have been gleaned obliquely, in the course of extended interrogations. There is little chance, at present, that he would act as a government witness in a criminal prosecution against Padilla.

Thus the conundrum of reconciling safety and law. There is, of course, an important difference between corroborated intelligence and admissible trial evidence. The purpose of criminal justice is to punish, as well as prevent further crime. So its rules are particularly restrictive.

So far, Congress has not acted to adapt any of the rules of evidence in federal district courts to the threats of catastrophic harm posed by al Qaeda. Going to trial also means opening the sources of sensitive information to inspection -- a particular problem when a defendant chooses to represent himself, as the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui is making clear. Thus, the U.S. chose to detain Padilla as a combatant, rather than as a defendant, arguing that under the laws of war he is, in every real sense, an "enemy combatant."

In 1942, the Supreme Court ruled that the same designation -- "enemy combatant" -- applied to Nazi saboteurs who landed by submarine on American shores to blow up industrial plants. The eight men were tried before a military commission. One of them had a plausible claim of American citizenship. The Supreme Court ruled this to be irrelevant, for "citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts" qualify as "enemy belligerents."

In thinking through the new hybrid form of war waged by al Qaeda, few of us wanted to anticipate the problem of American recruits. But a president determined to prevent future attacks has to solve the problem, even if provisionally. The international law of armed conflict permits the victim of aggression

to detain enemy combatants until hostilities are over. The purpose of the detention is not punitive, but rather to keep the enemy's operatives from returning to the fight.

Libertarians must ask what would restrain runaway use of such power. Habeas corpus remains available in our courts, even in this unorthodox war. Congress has not taken the extraordinary step of suspending it, and the president has not asked them to. Habeas corpus allows a court to inquire into the authority by which any American citizen is detained, even an al Qaeda recruit. The courts will have occasion to confirm whether the president enjoys a constitutional power to detain American combatants in this new kind of war waged by nonstate actors.

To be sure, the need to forestall attacks against innocent Americans with weapons of mass destruction may seem self-evident, even when criminal trial witnesses are not available. Most judges will appropriately decline to second-guess a military decision of the commander-in-chief based on reliable intelligence, especially when the stakes are so high. No writ or injunction will deter al Qaeda from carrying out acts of mass violence.

But to bolster its case, and to allay concern about error, the president might consider several options. First, the certification of a combatant should give a statement of reasons. Even if the underlying information cannot be made public in the near term, this will give a court additional reason to credit the basis of the decision.

Second, the president may wish to empower the recently created military commissions to take on the task of reviewing the basis for a "combatant" designation. The commissions' procedures admit a broad range of evidence, yet guarantee combatants the right to challenge the government's account. A battlefield judgment of combatancy has never required the criminal standard of "beyond reasonable doubt," but the case of American citizens in this unusual war makes it appropriate to think hard about an apt standard of proof.

Third, and in the alternative, the president could give the "second look" to a panel such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court. This is a panel of judges who have gained experience in protecting intelligence, and have come to understand that the foreign affairs power deals with problems different from domestic criminal justice. In the context of wiretap applications, the FISA court has had to look at whether there is probable cause to believe that someone is acting as the agent of a foreign power. This option would probably require the consent of Congress.

Employing a structured basis for the designation of al Qaeda recruits will strengthen the confidence of the courts and the public that this awesome power will be appropriately employed in the fight against al Qaeda's terrorism. We have a government of laws, not of men. But as Justice Robert H. Jackson remarked, the Constitution is not a suicide pact. It should be possible to reconcile the problems of prevention with the careful processes of liberal government.

*Ms. Wedgwood, a former federal prosecutor, is a professor of law at Yale and Johns Hopkins.*

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2007 JUN 18 04:41:19



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**FROM: Secretary of Defense****PHONE NUMBER:** (b)(6)**SUBJECT: Designation of Al Qaeda Recruits****DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:**

**PAGES: 4**  
**(Including Coversheet)**

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 11-L-0559/OSD/13842

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**FROM:** Secretary of Defense

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**SUBJECT:** Designation of Al Qaeda Recruits

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11-L-0559/OSD/13843

June 18, 2002 3:44 PM

TO: Zal Khalilzad

CC: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: ISAF

REF: KABUL O 170824Z JUN 02,  
"Increasing Security Problems in North Lead to Call for Expanded ISAF"

I certainly have no problem with expanding the ISAF, and I don't know anyone here who does. It is simply a matter of priorities. If there are folks who want to do it, I agree with you, let them do it. We need to keep our focus where it is.

The one thing I question is the assessment of the security situation. It certainly differs from what I am hearing. My sense is that, for Afghanistan, the situation is not bad. What are the facts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061802-5

W00755-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13844

June 19, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: Honorable Josh Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: DoD Schools

Attached is a memo I sent out to David Chu on DoD schools and his response.

It struck me that you might want to be aware of that, given your policy role. You might want to move it around to Rod Paige, Lynne Cheney, or people who are involved in that subject. I find it interesting.

Regards.

Attach.

05/24/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Quality of DoD Schools [U08853/02]

DHR:dh  
061902-6

35  
Dep't of Defense  
19 Jun 02

19 Jun 02

**W00756-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13845

Re: snowflake

APR-24-2002 07:54  
4/23/02

ODASD MCFP

703 614 9323 P.04

April 22, 2002 3:17 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: DoD Schools

*4/23/02 DR*  
*Sixty Minutes* had a program on DoD schools education programs and how they seem to be color blind and income blind, yet produce better students than the private schools.

Has there been a decent study on that, so we really know what is going on? They compared DoD schools with public schools.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042202-41

Please respond by 05/17/02

*Chu response attached*

Larry Di Rita

4/4

*-This is an issue topic worth pursuing in the public policy area.*

TOTAL P.04

*V/R  
Ed*

11-L-0559/OSD/13846



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

STAFF OF THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON, MAY 24 PM 4:20  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

SECRET

May 24, 2002, 4:00 PM

18 19 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
  
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu - May 24, 2002*  
  
SUBJECT: Quality of DoD Schools: Has there been a decent study? –  
SNOWFLAKE

- Yes: The National Education Goals Panel commissioned a Vanderbilt University report on why minority student achievement on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) was so high in DoD schools. Results published September 2001.
- DoD domestic and overseas schools scored at or near the top of all states in reading and writing on the 1998 NAEP, often referred to as the Nation's Report Card. The same is true for the results from the 2000 NAEP that focused on math and science (not included in the study).
- Caucasians, African-Americans, and Hispanics each scored well compared to their civilian public school counterparts. The white-minority performance gap was narrower than in the civilian sector.
- If DoD were a state system, it would rank number one in the nation in terms of its minority student scores. The rankings were sustained even after controlling for parental education. \*
- The authors noted several factors influencing these results:
  - DoD has a strong accountability system that continually measures student achievement and drives curricular improvement.
  - Parents are encouraged to participate.
  - DoD schools are relatively small, facilitating communication and cooperation.
- The report also notes that sufficient resources are key. DoD schools appear to be adequately but not lavishly financed. DoD, in 1999, spent approximately

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SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	65/2611-L-0559/OSD/13847



U08853 /02

\$8,900 per pupil, \$1,600 more than the national average. (Note: national figures often exclude other federal and state funds for which DoD is not eligible.) DoD's per pupil expenditure is less than what typically is spent in large U.S. school systems with comparable portions of minority students.

- We are investigating a process to measure the added value of DoD schools, i.e., controlling for family and community characteristics.

RECOMMENDATION: None

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Dr. Joseph D. Tafoya, Director, DoDEA, (b)(6)

snowlake  
snowflake

June 24, 2002 11:07 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Rumsfeld* *1* *ju*

SUBJECT: Looking at the Moslem World

Attached is a memo I received from Andy Marshall that is interesting.

Regards.

Attach.

12/19/01 Net Assessment memo to SecDef re: Thinking Strategically about the Moslem World  
(a la Safire) [U19649/01]

DHR:dh  
062402-17

Middle East

24 Jun 02

W00777-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13849



DIRECTOR OF  
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2950

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Copy to:

USDP (P) Feith (one<sup>2nd</sup>)  
ASD(C3I) Stenbit

JUN 24 2001

19 December 2001

W.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM ANDY MARSHALL *Aecm*

SUBJECT: Thinking Strategically about the Moslem World (à la Safire)

A couple of weeks ago we met to discuss the Safire article in which he puts forward Nixon's view of what we ought to do. At the end of our discussion you requested that I put down some ideas of my own. What follows are my first thoughts.

① Bolster Turkey  
As I mentioned at our meeting, I believe we should look at alternative ways in which the Moslem world might evolve over the next couple of decades, decide which of these worlds we like, and then work toward those futures. Attachment A develops three alternative worlds, the first of which is, I think, by far the preferred one. This is a world in which Turkey and Iran are the major Moslem powers and the Arab nations are relegated to a much-reduced position. What could we do to move in this direction? First, we ought to build up our relationship with Turkey, making Turkey a strategic ally in a much fuller sense than we have here-to-fore. We should help Turkey further develop in the direction it is already going: a democratic state and that is increasingly successful economically. We want Turkey to develop and have an expanded role because it could have a significant influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia and indeed in controlling Iraq and perhaps other parts of the Middle East. Second, accelerate what seems to be the move toward a change of regime in Iran. Bernard Lewis thinks that we could do this by making it clear that there will be future consequences to any continuation of terrorism supported by Iran. We could also expand radio and television broadcasts into Iran. Some Iranians in Los Angeles already are sending programs into Iran; this could be supported and augmented by the US government. We could also design and produce TV antennas that would be less visible and so less subject to state control. An antenna that could lie flat on a roof or perhaps be built into other features of a house is an example. A third aspect of a strategy would be to put less reliance than we have on the Saudis and Egypt. We could hedge our bet on these corrupt and possibly fragile regimes by seeking better, closer relations with the other Gulf States. In any case, the other Gulf States have historically sought alliances with the dominant Western power; since the Saudis have claims against parts of their territory and this is a way of keeping them at bay. We should also explore long-term investment strategies in alternative energy sources and accelerate the transition to a more hydrogen-based energy regime. There are also some extraordinarily interesting developments in solid state physics that provide materials that produce electricity from heat. Such devices could increase the energy efficiency of

② Regime Change in Iran

③ De-emphasize Saudi, Egypt

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4-12/20

6-119L-0559 SD/13850

U19649 /01

automobiles and many other energy consuming processes. The objective would be to increase our flexibility through less dependence on the Saudis and also to keep a downward pressure on oil prices. We should limit the funds available to the Saudi's for supporting and spreading the Wahhabi version of the Moslem faith, which without their support would be a minor radical heresy.

In summary, we should shift our attention to and build up the non-Arab parts of the Moslem world. Turkey and Iran are the two most obvious cases where this might seem possible. It is interesting that within the Moslem world after the first couple of centuries it was the Turks and the Persians who largely dominated that world. Both are ancient peoples with a long history as centers of empires and a sense of community that is lacking in Saudi Arabia, which was put together only in the 1920's. Within the Arab world we ought to shift our attention and reliance away from Egypt and Saudi Arabia to other Arab countries such as the smaller Gulf States and, should we be able to replace Saddam Hussein, increase the role of Iraq. Iraq among the Arab states has been the most successful in producing a technically educated cadre capable of something like modern western standards of performance.

Attached for further reading:

Attachment A, Three alternative Moslem world,

Attachment B, notes from a meeting on the longer term strategic consequences of the current war on terrorism.

July 3, 2002 12:45 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*,  
SUBJECT: Personnel in Bosnia

Here is what the Joint Staff lawyer says about the extent to which people are covered by the Dayton Peace Accords. As I recall in the NSC meeting, you just said, "Oh, they are already covered."

Bosnia

It appears to me that:

1. It is waivable by the Secretary General—we don't know if it is NATO or the UN.
2. It says they are immune only for acts done in the course of their official duties. Of course, that is debatable what that is. Certainly bombing civilians is not in the course of your official duties.

My impression is that the coverage you implied is probably not the case, although I am not a lawyer.

Thanks.

Attach.

07/03/02 JAGC note re: Privileges and Immunities Under Dayton Peace Accords for US Personnel in Bosnia

DHR:dh  
070302-8

3 July 2002

**W00820-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13852

Date: 3 July 2002

## PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS FOR US PERSONNEL IN BOSNIA

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

00.03.2002

### • BACKGROUND

- Article VI of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) provides that IFOR and its personnel shall have the privileges and immunities set forth in the accompanying appendix.
- These privileges and immunities are also accorded to any military elements from states assisting in implementing the DPA, whether officially attached to IFOR or remaining under national command and control.
- The appendix consists of three agreements - between NATO and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

is yet to be determined.

Prepared by: Jane G. Dalton, CAPT, JAGC, USN  
OCJCS/LC 697-1137

### • PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS

- Military personnel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements, under "all circumstances and at all times."
  - Military personnel are immune from personal arrest or detention.
  - Civilian personnel are accorded "experts on mission" status, which means they are immune from legal procedures for any acts done in the course of their official duties.
    - Civilian personnel are immune from personal arrest or detention.
    - The Secretary General (not clear whether of NATO or the UN) has the "right and duty" to waive these immunities when such immunity would "impede the course of justice."

### • NOTE

- The Dayton Peace Accords were not prepared or signed with the ICC in mind. How these provisions would be applied in the context of an ICC investigation or prosecution

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**FROM Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld**

**PHONE NUMBER:** (b)(6)

**SUBJECT: Personnel in Bosnia**

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**Secretary of Defense  
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12/N

**FROM Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld**

**PHONE NUMBER:** (b)(6)

**SUBJECT: Personnel in Bosnia**

## **DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:**

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NSC	<b>Hon Condoleezza Rice</b>			



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**Secretary of Defense  
Cover Sheet**



**FROM Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld**

**PHONE NUMBER:** (b)(6)

**SURJECT: Personnel in Bosnia**

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:**

**PAGES: 2**  
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1-L-0559/OSD/13856



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0999

ACTION MEMO

100-000000000000000000

CM-403-02  
15 July 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *100-000000000000000000*

SUBJECT: Recommended Change to Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002

- Recommend you approve the change to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) merging US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and US Space Command (USSPACECOM) (TAB A).
- Title 10, United States Code, section 161, requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the missions, responsibilities and force structure of each combatant command and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any necessary changes.
- With the forwarding of the most recent UCP to you in February, I suggested that more study was required before potentially merging USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM into one command. My staff, with the strong support of your staff, the Services, USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM, recently completed this study and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant merging the two commands.
- The recommended changes to the UCP have been coordinated with the Service Chiefs, OSD, and affected combatant commanders. The following revised paragraphs include changes that accomplish the following:
  - Revised paragraph 21 disestablishes USSPACECOM on 1 October, and revised paragraph 22 provides notification that all missions currently assigned to USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM will be assigned to USSTRATCOM, effective 1 October 2002.
  - New paragraph 23 establishes a new combatant command, retaining the name "US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)" with headquarters at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska (with elements at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado), effective 1 October 2002. This new command will be assigned the missions and responsibilities of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM.

W00833-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13857

- This change to the UCP does not affect any other paragraph except the paragraph for US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), which will be renumbered.
- As you know, the merged command will be assigned the current missions of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM at initial operational capability (IOC). We are currently conducting in-depth studies of other potential missions (global strike; integrated missile defense; information operations; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)) to determine the feasibility and desirability of assigning these missions to the merged command. Three studies will be completed in early August (global strike, information operations and C4ISR). The integrated missile defense study will be completed in September. I anticipate forwarding the study recommendations for your approval over the next several months. We will then roll any mission changes into Change 2 to UCP 2002 before the end of the year.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Sign the proposed memorandum to the President (TAB B) approving the UCP changes.

**COORDINATION:** TAB C

**Attachments:**

As stated

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, USA; Director, J-5;mnb (b)(6)

## **CHANGE-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002**

The following changes apply to the Unified Command Plan dated 30 April 2002:

**Page 16, paragraph 21. Insert subparagraph o to read:**

“o. On 1 October 2002, USSPACECOM will be disestablished, and all USSPACECOM missions and responsibilities will be assigned to US Strategic Command as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17, paragraph 22. Insert subparagraph d to read:**

“d. On 1 October 2002, all missions currently assigned to US Strategic Command and US Space Command will be assigned to US Strategic Command, as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17. Insert new paragraph 23 to read:**

“23. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). On 1 October 2002, the Commander, USSTRATCOM, headquartered at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska (with elements at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado), will be established as the commander of a combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander’s missions. USSTRATCOM has no geographic AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. When USSTRATCOM’s forces are deployed in a geographic combatant commander’s AOR, they will remain assigned to and under the control of USSTRATCOM unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities will include:

- a. Maintaining primary responsibility among the combatant commanders for strategic nuclear forces to support the national objective of strategic deterrence.
- b. Employing assigned and attached forces, as directed.

- c. Providing support to other combatant commanders, as directed.
- d. Developing requirements, advocating, planning and conducting space operations (force enhancement, space control and space support, including spacelist and on-orbit operations, and force application), to include:
  - (1) Providing warning and assessment of space attack.
  - (2) Supporting NORAD by providing the missile warning and space surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement.
  - (3) Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational matters, except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (4) In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders, providing military representation to US national agencies, commercial, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (5) In coordination with appropriate geographic combatant commanders' security assistance activities, planning and implementing security assistance relating to military space operations and providing military assessments as required. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, these activities shall not supersede the responsibilities of other combatant commanders to coordinate security assistance matters and provide advice and assistance to chiefs of US diplomatic missions.
  - (6) Coordinating and conducting space-campaign planning.
  - (7) Providing the military point of contact for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in space in support of nonproliferation policies, activities and taskings.
  - (8) Serving as the DOD manager for manned space flight support operations.

e. Planning for and developing requirements for missile defense and space-based support for missile defense to include:

- (1) Providing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment of missile and air attacks on CONUS and Alaska, should NORAD be unable to accomplish the assessment mission.
- (2) Providing warning of missile attack to other combatant commanders.
- (3) Advocating missile warning requirements of all combatant commanders.

f. Tasking and coordinating C4ISR capabilities in support of strategic force employment as directed.

g. Serving as the military lead for computer network defense (CND) and computer network attack (CNA), to include advocating the CND and CNA requirements of all combatant commanders, conducting CND and CNA operations, planning and developing national requirements for CND and CNA, and supporting other combatant commanders for CND and CNA, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders.

**Page 17, renumber old paragraph 23 as paragraph 24.**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to Unified Command Plan 2002

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the command structure and areas of responsibility (geographic and functional) for the Nation's combatant commanders.

During our review of the most recent UCP, General Myers and I contemplated a merger of US Strategic Command and US Space Command to benefit from the synergy between strategic capabilities and the space domain, but chose to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change. We recently completed this assessment and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant merging the two commands. We therefore recommend that US Strategic Command and US Space Command be merged, retaining the name "US Strategic Command," effective 1 October 2002. This combatant command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two commands in the near-term, while being poised to accept evolving missions (Global Strike; Integrated Missile Defense; Information Operations; and, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) in the future.

Subject to your approval of these changes to the UCP, we will quickly formalize an implementation team to finalize details and to nominate for your approval a commander and deputy commander for US Strategic Command.

Pursuant to your authority as Commander in Chief and under title 10, United States Code, Section 161, I recommend that you approve the proposed revisions to the UCP by signing the attached memorandum. This memorandum also directs me to notify Congress of revisions to the UCP on your behalf pursuant to title 10, United States Code, Section 161(b)(2).

Attachments:

1. Change-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002
2. Proposed Presidential Memorandum



11-L-0559/OSD/13862

**TAB C**

<b>US Strategic Command</b>	<b>RADM Byrd</b>	<b>June 18, 2002</b>
<b>US Space Command</b>	<b>CAPT Parker</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy)</b>	<b>Mr. Hoehn</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>US Army</b>	<b>BG Eikenberry</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>US Navy</b>	<b>RADM Wachendorf</b>	<b>June 17, 2002</b>
<b>US Air Force</b>	<b>Maj Gen Schmidt</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>US Marine Corps</b>	<b>MajGen Kuklok</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (LC)</b>	<b>Col Carey</b>	<b>June 14, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-1)</b>	<b>Col Murray</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-2)</b>	<b>RADM Jacoby</b>	<b>June 18, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-4)</b>	<b>VADM Holder</b>	<b>June 20, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-5)</b>	<b>LTC Casey</b>	<b>July 09, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-6)</b>	<b>Col Henney</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-7)</b>	<b>MajGen Osman</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-8)</b>	<b>Brig Gen Lewis</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>

## **Attachment 1**

**11-L-0559/OSD/13864**

## **CHANGE-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002**

The following changes apply to the Unified Command Plan dated 30 April 2002:

**Page 16, paragraph 21. Insert subparagraph o to read:**

“o. On 1 October 2002, USSPACECOM will be disestablished, and all USSPACECOM missions and responsibilities will be assigned to US Strategic Command as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17, paragraph 22. Insert subparagraph d to read:**

“d. On 1 October 2002, all missions currently assigned to US Strategic Command and US Space Command will be assigned to US Strategic Command, as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17. Insert new paragraph 23 to read:**

“23. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). On 1 October 2002, the Commander, USSTRATCOM, headquartered at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska (with elements at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado), will be established as the commander of a combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander’s missions. USSTRATCOM has no geographic AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. When USSTRATCOM’s forces are deployed in a geographic combatant commander’s AOR, they will remain assigned to and under the control of USSTRATCOM unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities will include:

- a. Maintaining primary responsibility among the combatant commanders for strategic nuclear forces to support the national objective of strategic deterrence.
- b. Employing assigned and attached forces, as directed.

- c. Providing support to other combatant commanders, as directed.
- d. Developing requirements, advocating, planning and conducting space operations (force enhancement, space control and space support, including spacelift and on-orbit operations, and force application), to include:
  - (1) Providing warning and assessment of space attack.
  - (2) Supporting NORAD by providing the missile warning and space surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement.
  - (3) Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational matters, except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (4) In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders, providing military representation to US national agencies, commercial, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (5) In coordination with appropriate geographic combatant commanders' security assistance activities, planning and implementing security assistance relating to military space operations and providing military assessments as required. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, these activities shall not supersede the responsibilities of other combatant commanders to coordinate security assistance matters and provide advice and assistance to chiefs of US diplomatic missions.
  - (6) Coordinating and conducting space-campaign planning.
  - (7) Providing the military point of contact for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in space in support of nonproliferation policies, activities and taskings.
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- (2) Providing warning of missile attack to other combatant commanders.
- (3) Advocating missile warning requirements of all combatant commanders.

f. Tasking and coordinating C4ISR capabilities in support of strategic force employment as directed.

g. Serving as the military lead for computer network defense (CND) and computer network attack (CNA), to include advocating the CND and CNA requirements of all combatant commanders, conducting CND and CNA operations, planning and developing national requirements for CND and CNA, and supporting other combatant commanders for CND and CNA, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders.

**Page 17, renumber old paragraph 23 as paragraph 24.**

## Attachment 2

11-L-0559/OSD/13868

**The White House  
Washington**

**MMMM DD, 2002**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**SUBJECT: Change to Unified Command Plan 2002**

**Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve and direct a merger of US Strategic Command and US Space Command, effective 1 October 2002.**

**You are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf as required by title 10, United States Code, section 161(b)(2), as a result of implementing the revised UCP.**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1000

JUL 20 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to Unified Command Plan 2002

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the command structure and areas of responsibility (geographic and functional) for the Nation's combatant commanders.

During our review of the most recent UCP, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop some synergy from the capabilities resident at the Space Command and the Strategic Command. We chose to defer that decision in order to assess more fully the implications of such a change.

We recently completed this assessment and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant the creation of a new command. We therefore recommend that U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command be disestablished and that a new "U.S. Strategic Command," be established effective October 1, 2002. This combatant command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two commands in the near-term, while being poised to accept evolving missions (Global Strike; Integrated Missile Defense; Information Operations; and, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) in the future.

Subject to your approval of these changes to the UCP, we will quickly formalize an implementation team to finalize details and to nominate for your approval a commander and deputy commander for US Strategic Command.

Pursuant to your authority as Commander in Chief and under title 10, United States Code, Section 161, I recommend that you approve the proposed revisions to the UCP by signing the attached memorandum. This memorandum also directs me to notify Congress on your behalf of revisions to the UCP pursuant to title 10, United States Code, Section 161(b)(2).

322

20 JUL 02

Attachments:

1. Proposed Presidential Memorandum
2. Change-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002



W00845-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13870

**The White House**  
Washington

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**SUBJECT:** Change to Unified Command Plan 2002

Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve Change-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002, and direct the creation of a new combatant command named U.S. Strategic Command, effective October 1, 2002. The Space Command and the present U.S. Strategic Command will be disestablished on that same date.

You are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf consistent with title 10, United States Code, section 161(b)(2), of this action.

## **CHANGE-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002**

The following changes apply to the Unified Command Plan dated 30 April 2002:

**Page 16, paragraph 21. Insert subparagraph o to read:**

“o. On 1 October 2002, USSPACECOM will be disestablished and all USSPACECOM missions and responsibilities will be assigned to US Strategic Command as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17, paragraph 22. Insert subparagraph d to read:**

“d. On 1 October 2002, USSTRATCOM will be disestablished and all missions currently assigned to US Strategic Command and US Space Command will be assigned to a new combatant command, US Strategic Command, as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17. Insert new paragraph 23 to read:**

“23. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). On 1 October 2002, the Commander, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska (with elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado), will be established as the commander of a combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander’s missions. USSTRATCOM has no geographic AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. When USSTRATCOM’s forces are deployed in a geographic combatant commander’s AOR, they will remain assigned to and under the control of USSTRATCOM, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities will include:

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- b. Employing assigned and attached forces, as directed.
- c. Providing support to other combatant commanders, as directed.
- d. Developing requirements, advocating, planning, and conducting space operations (force enhancement, space control, and space support, including spacelift and on-orbit operations, and force application), to include:
  - (1) Providing warning and assessment of space attack.
  - (2) Supporting NORAD by providing the missile warning and space surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement.
  - (3) Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational matters, except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (4) In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders, providing military representation to US national agencies, commercial, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (5) In coordination with appropriate geographic combatant commanders' security assistance activities, planning and implementing security assistance relating to military space operations and providing military assessments as required. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, these activities shall not supersede the responsibilities of other combatant commanders to coordinate security assistance matters and provide advice and assistance to chiefs of US diplomatic missions.
  - (6) Coordinating and conducting space campaign planning.
  - (7) Providing the military point of contact for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in space in support of nonproliferation policies, activities, and taskings.
  - (8) Serving as the DoD Manager for Manned Space Flight Support

Operations.

e. Planning for and developing requirements for missile defense and space-based support for missile defense, including:

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- (2) Providing warning of missile attack to other combatant commanders.
- (3) Advocating missile warning requirements of all combatant commanders.

f. Task and coordinate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities in support of strategic force employment, as directed.

g. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders, serving as the military lead for computer network defense (CND) and computer network attack (CNA), including advocating the CND and CNA requirements of all combatant commanders, conducting CND and CNA operations, planning and developing national requirements for CND and CNA, and supporting other combatant commanders for CND and CNA.

**Page 17, renumber old paragraph 23 as paragraph 24.**

July 15, 2002 12:22 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RM*  
SUBJECT: Broder Article

I would like to visit with you about this article sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.

David Broder, "Wobbly Words," *The Washington Post*, 07/14/02

DHR:dh  
071502-36

000.1

15 July 02

**W00834-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13875

*David S. Broder*

# Wobbly Words

The confidence crisis that has overtaken the Bush administration has many dimensions, but at bottom, it comes down to a single question: Can you take this president's words seriously?

For most of his presidency and, indeed, his political career, George Bush has enjoyed the reputation of saying what he means and meaning what he says. But now uncertainty is infecting both foreign policy and domestic issues and stretching from the Middle East to Wall Street. While his personal approval scores remain very high in the polls, he is building a catalogue of policy contradictions and retreats that threaten to undermine his leadership.

Presumably, at some point the stock market will recover, but the first returns on Bush's efforts to restore confidence in Wall Street were anything but encouraging. In the first two days after Bush journeyed to the heart of the financial world on a self-assigned mission to banish the world's worries about the integrity of corporate America, the Dow Jones industrial average fell more than 400 points and the Nasdaq market index hit its lowest mark since 1997.

This was not what Bush had in mind when he opened his Tuesday morning address on Wall Street with five successive paragraphs setting forth all the reasons that confidence in the American free enterprise system "is well-placed."

"We can be confident," he declared, not only because of "the amazing achievements of American workers and entrepreneurs" but because "America is taking every necessary step to fight and win the war on terror" and because "last year, we passed the biggest tax cut in a generation" to spur economic growth.

Whether this was just rhetoric or was meant to be taken seriously, Bush's words clearly linked confidence in him and his policies with trust in financial markets and the corporate culture from

which he sprang.

But a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll released soon after Bush spoke showed only two out of five Americans think the United States and its allies are winning the war on terrorism, fewer than those who think it a stalemate.

And Friday, the president's budget office announced that instead of running a small surplus this year, the government is headed for a deficit of as much as \$165 billion, a warning signal about the economic future.

Bush's personal performance has added to the wobble in confidence. The last-minute news conference in which he returned to the public stage from his Independence Day holiday was the weakest, most inarticulate showing he has made since the early months of his presidency. Asked repeatedly about his sale of stock in Harken Energy Corp., where he was a director, shortly before it had to revise upward its reported losses for the year, he responded eight times with variations on the words, "It has been looked at by the SEC," the Securities and Exchange Commission, which found no reason to challenge the legality of his action.

When Bush is feeling defensive, he seems to think that reiteration is as effective as explanation or persuasion. It is not, but it is better than outright contradiction. And it turns out that, as a Harken director, Bush received two low-interest loans from the corporation to finance his purchase of company stock—the very kind of transaction that he condemned in his Wall Street speech.

The problem is deeper. It involves policy reversals as well as personal contradictions. Nine months ago, Bush said he wanted Osama bin Laden "dead or



REUTERS

alive." When asked about the elusive terrorist last week, Bush pretended he hardly matters, answering a question on bin Laden with the remark that "the war on terrorism is a lot bigger than one person."

Three months ago, Bush issued an ultimatum to Ariel Sharon to withdraw Israeli forces from Palestinian territories in the West Bank "without delay." Last week, with the Israelis still there, he said, he will "call upon the Israelis, as security improves, to allow for more freedom of movement by the Palestinian people." That's quite a difference.

In the real world, where presidents must operate, friends and foes are constantly testing and assessing how seriously they must take the words of any leader. We do not know how Sharon or Yasser Arafat (who's been told by Bush to take a hike) or Saddam Hussein or bin Laden gauge this American president.

But last week, America's allies in the United Nations defied a Bush administration threat to end U.S. participation in the Bosnia peacekeeping operation unless our troops were given blanket immunity from possible prosecution by the new International Criminal Court. Instead, the United States will seek a temporary exemption, leading one unnamed diplomat to tell *The Post*, "the Americans blinked."

Too many back-downs in too short a time.

July 18, 2002 6:58 AM

TO: Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: SASC Issues

Attached is your 26 June letter to Chairman Levin and Senator Warner of the Senate Armed Services Committee. This was apparently sent without OMB clearing it with anyone at the Department of Defense.

We had been working hard with the Congress on these matters. I had had discussions with the President about what he would veto and what he wouldn't veto.

I think it is out of line to have the Office of Management and Budget send a letter to the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee on an important piece of legislation without even consulting me or any senior official of the Department of Defense.

In something as important as this, you really should check with me first.

Thanks.

Attach.  
06/26/02 OMB ltr to Levin and Warner

DHR:dh  
070202-4

W00841-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13877

06/26/2002 14:16 FAX

(b)(6)

JUN. 26. 2002: 3:21PM

VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

NO. 0720

002/002

P. 1/1  
P. 02/02

OMB/DIRECTOR OFFICE



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

THE DIRECTOR

June 26, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 02 2002

Dear Chairman Levin and Senator Warner:

It is the understanding of the Office of Management and Budget, based on the Levin-Warner colloquy, that if the Levin 2<sup>nd</sup> degree amendment is adopted, the funds provided in the underlying Warner amendment, if appropriated, could be expended on missile defense and other activities determined by the President.

Sincerely,

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.

11-L-0559/OSD/13878



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1000

JUL 20 2002

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT:** Recommended Changes to Unified Command Plan 2002

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the command structure and areas of responsibility (geographic and functional) for the Nation's combatant commanders.

During our review of the most recent UCP, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop some synergy from the capabilities resident at the Space Command and the Strategic Command. We chose to defer that decision in order to assess more fully the implications of such a change.

We recently completed this assessment and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant the creation of a new command. We therefore recommend that U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command be disestablished and that a new "U.S. Strategic Command," be established effective October 1, 2002. This combatant command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two commands in the near-term, while being poised to accept evolving missions (Global Strike; Integrated Missile Defense; Information Operations; and, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) in the future.

Subject to your approval of these changes to the UCP, we will quickly formalize an implementation team to finalize details and to nominate for your approval a commander and deputy commander for US Strategic Command.

Pursuant to your authority as Commander in Chief and under title 10, United States Code, Section 161, I recommend that you approve the proposed revisions to the UCP by signing the attached memorandum. This memorandum also directs me to notify Congress on your behalf of revisions to the UCP pursuant to title 10, United States Code, Section 161(b)(2).

322

20 JUL 02

Attachments:

1. Proposed Presidential Memorandum
2. Change-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002



W00845-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13879

**The White House**  
Washington

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**SUBJECT:** Change to Unified Command Plan 2002

Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve Change-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002, and direct the creation of a new combatant command named U.S. Strategic Command, effective October 1, 2002. The Space Command and the present U.S. Strategic Command will be disestablished on that same date.

You are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf consistent with title 10, United States Code, section 161(b)(2), of this action.

11-L-0559/OSD/13880

## **CHANGE-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002**

The following changes apply to the Unified Command Plan dated 30 April 2002:

**Page 16, paragraph 21. Insert subparagraph o to read:**

“o. On 1 October 2002, USSPACECOM will be disestablished and all USSPACECOM missions and responsibilities will be assigned to US Strategic Command as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17, paragraph 22. Insert subparagraph d to read:**

“d. On 1 October 2002, USSTRATCOM will be disestablished and all missions currently assigned to US Strategic Command and US Space Command will be assigned to a new combatant command, US Strategic Command, as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17. Insert new paragraph 23 to read:**

“23. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). On 1 October 2002, the Commander, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska (with elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado), will be established as the commander of a combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander’s missions. USSTRATCOM has no geographic AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. When USSTRATCOM’s forces are deployed in a geographic combatant commander’s AOR, they will remain assigned to and under the control of USSTRATCOM, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities will include:

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  - (2) Supporting NORAD by providing the missile warning and space surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement.
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  - (5) In coordination with appropriate geographic combatant commanders' security assistance activities, planning and implementing security assistance relating to military space operations and providing military assessments as required. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, these activities shall not supersede the responsibilities of other combatant commanders to coordinate security assistance matters and provide advice and assistance to chiefs of US diplomatic missions.
  - (6) Coordinating and conducting space campaign planning.
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**Page 17, renumber old paragraph 23 as paragraph 24.**



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

FF2216

ACTION  
INFORMATION MEMO

I-02/010420-STRAT

OSD Control #: W00833-02

July 16, 2002; 4:00 P.M.

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY - *CONFIDENTIAL AT TAB B*

FROM: Barry Pavel, Principal Director for Strategy *BP*

SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002

- Package from the Chairman to the Secretary recommends that he sign a memorandum to the President requesting the approval of changes to the 2002 UCP. These entail:
  - disestablishment of U.S. Space Command on 1 October
  - merger of the current missions associated with U.S. Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command, and
  - assignment of those missions to U.S. Strategic Command
- In short, the memorandum that the Secretary is asked to forward to the President would codify, through the legal instrument of the UCP, the merger that was approved by the President and announced by the Secretary and the Chairman on June 26
- Strategy has reviewed the proposed memorandum from the Secretary to the President and found no problems or issues
- RECOMMENDATION: Secretary sign the proposed memo to the President *at tab A.*

Tab A: SecDef Memo to POTUS  
Tab B: Proposed Presidential Memo to SecDef  
Tab C: CJCS Memo with Proposed Changes  
Tab D: Coordinations

7/16 Approved

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/16
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	7/16

Prepared by: Burgess Laird, OUSD(P)/Strategy, (b)(6)

Sec Sec. also please review -  
is embossed the revision of the  
Tab I we used last time  
11-L-0559/OSD/13884

07-16-02 16:11 IN

7/16

**TAB C**

<b>US Strategic Command</b>	<b>RADM Byrd</b>	<b>June 18, 2002</b>
<b>US Space Command</b>	<b>CAPT Parker</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy)</b>	<b>Mr. Hoehn</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>US Army</b>	<b>BG Eikenberry</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>US Navy</b>	<b>RADM Wachendorf</b>	<b>June 17, 2002</b>
<b>US Air Force</b>	<b>Maj Gen Schmidt</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>US Marine Corps</b>	<b>MajGen Kuklok</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (LC)</b>	<b>Col Carey</b>	<b>June 14, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-1)</b>	<b>Col Murray</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-2)</b>	<b>RADM Jacoby</b>	<b>June 18, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-4)</b>	<b>VADM Holder</b>	<b>June 20, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-5)</b>	<b>LTC Casey</b>	<b>July 09, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-6)</b>	<b>Col Henney</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-7)</b>	<b>MajGen Osman</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>
<b>Joint Staff (J-8)</b>	<b>Brig Gen Lewis</b>	<b>June 19, 2002</b>



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-403-02  
15 July 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *100-115*

SUBJECT: Recommended Change to Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002

- Recommend you approve the change to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) merging US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and US Space Command (USSPACECOM) (TAB A).
- Title 10, United States Code, section 161, requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the missions, responsibilities and force structure of each combatant command and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any necessary changes.
- With the forwarding of the most recent UCP to you in February, I suggested that more study was required before potentially merging USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM into one command. My staff, with the strong support of your staff, the Services, USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM, recently completed this study and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant merging the two commands.
- The recommended changes to the UCP have been coordinated with the Service Chiefs, OSD, and affected combatant commanders. The following revised paragraphs include changes that accomplish the following:
  - Revised paragraph 21 disestablishes USSPACECOM on 1 October, and revised paragraph 22 provides notification that all missions currently assigned to USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM will be assigned to USSTRATCOM, effective 1 October 2002.
  - New paragraph 23 establishes a new combatant command, retaining the name "US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)" with headquarters at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska (with elements at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado), effective 1 October 2002. This new command will be assigned the missions and responsibilities of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM.

W00833-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13886

- This change to the UCP does not affect any other paragraph except the paragraph for US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), which will be renumbered.
- As you know, the merged command will be assigned the current missions of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM at initial operational capability (IOC). We are currently conducting in-depth studies of other potential missions (global strike; integrated missile defense; information operations; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)) to determine the feasibility and desirability of assigning these missions to the merged command. Three studies will be completed in early August (global strike, information operations and C4ISR). The integrated missile defense study will be completed in September. I anticipate forwarding the study recommendations for your approval over the next several months. We will then roll any mission changes into Change 2 to UCP 2002 before the end of the year.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Sign the proposed memorandum to the President (TAB B) approving the UCP changes.

**COORDINATION:** TAB C

**Attachments:**

As stated

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, USA; Director, J-5; mn<sup>(b)(6)</sup>

## **CHANGE-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002**

The following changes apply to the Unified Command Plan dated 30 April 2002:

**Page 16, paragraph 21. Insert subparagraph o to read:**

“o. On 1 October 2002, USSPACECOM will be disestablished, and all USSPACECOM missions and responsibilities will be assigned to US Strategic Command as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17, paragraph 22. Insert subparagraph d to read:**

“d. On 1 October 2002, all missions currently assigned to US Strategic Command and US Space Command will be assigned to US Strategic Command, as set forth in paragraph 23.”

**Page 17. Insert new paragraph 23 to read:**

“23. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). On 1 October 2002, the Commander, USSTRATCOM, headquartered at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska (with elements at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado), will be established as the commander of a combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander’s missions. USSTRATCOM has no geographic AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. When USSTRATCOM’s forces are deployed in a geographic combatant commander’s AOR, they will remain assigned to and under the control of USSTRATCOM unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities will include:

- a. Maintaining primary responsibility among the combatant commanders for strategic nuclear forces to support the national objective of strategic deterrence.
- b. Employing assigned and attached forces, as directed.

- c. Providing support to other combatant commanders, as directed.
- d. Developing requirements, advocating, planning and conducting space operations (force enhancement, space control and space support, including spacelist and on-orbit operations, and force application), to include:
  - (1) Providing warning and assessment of space attack.
  - (2) Supporting NORAD by providing the missile warning and space surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement.
  - (3) Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational matters, except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (4) In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders, providing military representation to US national agencies, commercial, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (5) In coordination with appropriate geographic combatant commanders' security assistance activities, planning and implementing security assistance relating to military space operations and providing military assessments as required. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, these activities shall not supersede the responsibilities of other combatant commanders to coordinate security assistance matters and provide advice and assistance to chiefs of US diplomatic missions.
  - (6) Coordinating and conducting space-campaign planning.
  - (7) Providing the military point of contact for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in space in support of nonproliferation policies, activities and taskings.
  - (8) Serving as the DOD manager for manned space flight support operations.

e. Planning for and developing requirements for missile defense and space-based support for missile defense to include:

- (1) Providing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment of missile and air attacks on CONUS and Alaska, should NORAD be unable to accomplish the assessment mission.
- (2) Providing warning of missile attack to other combatant commanders.
- (3) Advocating missile warning requirements of all combatant commanders.

f. Tasking and coordinating C4ISR capabilities in support of strategic force employment as directed.

g. Serving as the military lead for computer network defense (CND) and computer network attack (CNA), to include advocating the CND and CNA requirements of all combatant commanders, conducting CND and CNA operations, planning and developing national requirements for CND and CNA, and supporting other combatant commanders for CND and CNA, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders.

**Page 17, renumber old paragraph 23 as paragraph 24.**

July 29, 2002 4:25 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Crusader Program

Sir—

I am delighted to report that, as of last Friday afternoon, we have directed the Army to terminate the Crusader program. It seems that nothing ever ends in Washington, D.C., but I think this one may be over.

Thank you for your assistance, and that of the Vice President and the White House staff.

Respectfully,

CC:

Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

DHR:dh  
072602-15

OLB

29JUL02

W00883-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13891

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


July 30, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Change to Unified Command Plan 2002

Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve Change-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002, and direct the creation of a new combatant command named U.S. Strategic Command, effective October 1, 2002. The Space Command and the present U.S. Strategic Command will be disestablished on that same date.

You are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf consistent with title 10, United States Code, section 161(b) (2), of this action.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George W. Bush".

W00886-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13892



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Richard B. Cheney  
President of the Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to assess more fully the implications of such a change.

We recently completed this assessment and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant the creation of a new command. On July 30, the President approved our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command be disestablished and that a new "U.S. Strategic Command" be established effective October 1, 2002. With headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, and elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the new U.S. Strategic Command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two combatant commands in the near-term, and will be poised to accept additional missions in the future.

Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

322

20 SEP 02

U14779-02



11-L-0559/OSD/13893



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable J. Dennis Hastert  
Speaker of the House  
2369 Rayburn House Office Building  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to assess more fully the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

U14779-02



11-L-0559/OSD/13894



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Carl Levin  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

cc:

Honorable John Warner

U14779-02



11-L-0559/OSD/13895



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Robert Byrd  
Chairman  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to assess more fully the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

cc:

Honorable Ted Stevens

U14779-02



11-L-0559/OSD/13896



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Defense  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6028

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

cc: Honorable Ted Stevens

U14779-02



11-L-0559/OSD/13897



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Bob Stump  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

cc:

Honorable Ike Skelton

U14779-02



11-L-0559/OSD/13898



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable C.W. Bill Young  
Chairman  
Committee on Appropriations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-6015

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

cc:

Honorable David Obey

U14779-02



11-L-0559/OSD/13899



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Jerry Lewis  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Defense  
Committee on Appropriations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-6018

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

cc:

Honorable John P. Murtha

U14779-02



11-L-0559/OSD/13900

August 2, 2002 7:36 AM

040 ENERGY

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *dh*  
SUBJECT: Replacement for John Gordon at the  
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

I don't know where you stand in the process, but I would like to suggest that the following individuals be considered carefully:

- Johnnie Foster, former Director, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
- Admiral Richard Mies, USN (Ret), former Commander, STRATCOM
- Paul Robinson, President, Sandia Laboratory

Regards,

cc:  
Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Clay Johnson

DHR:dh  
080202-6

2 Aug 02

W00894-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13901

7:34 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 6, 2002  
SUBJECT: Requested Material

Attached is the material you asked me to get from CENTCOM on Tora Bora, Anaconda and the timeline.

Afghanistan

DHR/azn  
080602.07

*Attach: Fact Sheets on Tora Bora, Anaconda and USCENTCOM OEF Chronology*

baugoe

W00901-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13902

TO RA BORA

1. Purpose. To provide information on the use of Afghan forces in the Tora Bora fight in eastern Afghanistan, 1 - 17 December 2001.

2. Talking Points.

- In early December 2001, the U.S. had 1,300 Americans in Afghanistan in seventeen different locations. Southern Afghanistan was still not under Coalition Forces control. In eastern Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was consolidating its forces in the rugged, high mountain terrain of the Tora Bora region.
- Several factors influenced the concept of operations adopted for Tora Bora. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan, entailing over 10 years and the introduction of more than 620,000 troops into Afghanistan, was a prominent planning factor. More than 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed and 55,000 wounded during their occupation. Mindful of the Soviet experience, planning was also shaped by the strategic setting that Afghanistan ultimately belonged to the Afghans.
- Fahim Khan, the premier Afghan leader in the area at the time, communicated a strong desire to have the Afghan forces attack in the Tora Bora area. Afghan forces were acclimated to the harsh climate and to operating at the high elevations found in eastern Afghanistan.
- The U.S. relationship with these particular Afghan forces was relatively immature since the focus up to this time had been western, central and northern regions of Afghanistan. The decision was made not to stop the Afghan commanders who wanted to move into the Tora Bora area where we had already done a great deal of kinetic work. Associated with these Afghan forces were 100 Special Operations Forces.
- Pakistan had up to 100,000 troops along the border, concentrated along the exfiltration points from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
- The plan called for an approach up two parallel valleys with blocking forces at the ends of these valleys. As the Afghan forces (with U.S. Special Forces soldiers supporting) moved to contact, they encountered AQ/TB elements.

- Various assessments have been made of the number of Al-Qaeda/Taliban forces in the Tora Bora area, ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand forces. In actuality, the total size of the enemy force in the area is unknown. Pakistani border guards captured 247 Al-Qaeda/Taliban fighters, providing clear evidence that some enemy forces retreated into Pakistan as a result of the Tora Bora offensive.
- Consolidation operations between 17 December 2001 and 8 January 2002 revealed many fleeing Al-Qaeda were trapped and frozen as they fled across mountain passes at elevations of 13,000 to 14,000 feet.
- SOF with Hazrat Ali were told their plan included:
  - Two blocking forces
  - Two maneuvering units
  - However, no blocking forces ever showed, which allowed some enemy forces to escape.
- The operation took place under extreme winter conditions at high elevations.
  - Battlespace ranged from 5,000 feet to 13,000 feet elevation.
  - Weather: frequently overcast, snowy precipitation, snowpacked ground, temperatures in the single digits at night.
  - Not a proper battlefield for heavy forces - this was an Infantryman's war.

## ANACONDA

1. Purpose. To provide information regarding the decision not to employ conventional artillery during Operation ANACONDA on 2 - 18 March 2002.

2. Talking Points.

- Conventional artillery was not employed during Operation ANACONDA. Prior to the operation, mission analysis dictated the need for mortars to provide organic fire support vice conventional artillery. Operating at high altitude, at the limit for most rotary wing operations, the conditions dictated the need for light, responsive forces, such as mortars for fire support.
- The decision not to deploy artillery to Afghanistan and to employ the specific force identified for Operation ANACONDA, was a decision made at the tactical level by the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander. As a commander develops his mission analysis for each operation, he decides how many forces, what type and how they should be equipped at each particular point of the operation.
- Mortars are considered ideal for use by light infantry in mountainous terrain and are more practical than artillery due to their mobility, responsiveness and rates of fire.
- Operation ANACONDA was completely dependent on airlifting combat forces in an operations area varying from 8,000 to 12,000 feet in altitude.
- A total of 18 helicopters were available in Afghanistan for Operation ANACONDA. Although helicopters were required to support the operation because of terrain, any airlift of artillery would have been at the expense of the Infantrymen on the battlefield. Moving a single howitzer system by helicopter would have precluded moving two platoons of soldiers.
- Mortars weigh between 47 pounds (60mm) and 715 pounds (120mm).
- The smallest artillery piece weighs over 4,500 pounds.

- Four 120mm mortar systems and a pallet of ammunition can be transported by one CH-47 helicopter. The same number of 105mm howitzer tubes requires four CH-47 helos.
- Fire Support from mortars is extremely responsive at ranges from 300M up to 7200M.
- The maximum rate of fire for the 120mm mortar is up to three times faster in the first minute (15 rounds per minute for the first minute) than that of the M119 Howitzer.
- The maximum ordinate for 120mm mortar fire is only 4000M as compared to the maximum ordinate for the M119 Howitzer's 8000M. This allows supporting aircraft to fly lower when flying Close Air Support (CAS) missions.
- A total of 26 mortars, of the 34 available in Afghanistan, were used during Operation ANACONDA: eighteen 60mm mortars; four 81mm mortars; and four 120mm mortars.
- During the first twelve hours of the operation a total of six 60mm mortars, two 81mm mortars, and four 120mm mortars were inserted and used.
- On the second day of the operation twelve 60mm mortars and four 81mm mortars were inserted.

**CHRONOLOGY**

- 12 Sep Directed to begin planning
- 21 Sep POTUS briefed on concept and mission
- 02 Oct POTUS approval
- 07 Oct Strike Ops and air-delivery of humanitarian rations begins
- 19 Oct Raid on Mullah Omar's residence, RHINO-base established
- 20 Oct First special forces link-up with Northern Alliance
- 22-31 Oct CINC visits United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan
- 05 Nov Anti-Taliban forces launch offensive
- 09 Nov Mazar-E Sharif falls
- 11 Nov Taloqan falls
- 12 Nov Herat falls
- 12 Nov Shindand falls
- 13 Nov Kabul falls
- 14 Nov Jalalabad falls
- 15 Nov 8 "Shelter Now" detainees rescued, Gardez falls
- 18-25 Nov CINC visits Uzbekistan, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Afghanistan
- 1-18 Dec Operations IVO Tora Bora
- 14 Dec USMC secures Qandahar airport
- 19-27 Dec CINC visits Oman, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
- 22 Dec Inauguration
- 08 Jan Jordanian hospital operational
- 10 Jan Transfer of prisoners to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba begins
- 20-28 Jan CINC visits Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan
- 8 Feb Spanish hospital begins operations
- 8-13 Feb CINC visits Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and Spain
- 28 Feb U.N. begins humanitarian flights into AFG
- 02 Mar Operation ANACONDA begins
- ISAF begins training 1st Battalion, ANG
- 16 Mar Korean hospital established at Manas
- 17 Mar Operation ANACONDA ends
- 12-22 Mar CINC visits Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia
- 22 Mar Operation MOUNTAIN LION begins
- 30 Mar CJTF AFG established
- 04 Apr 600 AFG soldiers (1 BANG) graduated after ISAF training
- 17 Apr 4 Canadian KIA, 8 WIA by friendly-fire incident
- 19-26 Apr CINC visits Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Kingdom
- 01 May ANA training begins
- 9-17 May CINC visits Qatar, Oman, Afghanistan, and Crete
- 24 May The Czech Republic hospital operational in Kabul
- 31 May CJTF 180 stood up, LTG McNeill Cdr
- 11 Jun Loya Jirga process opened without violence or incident
- 13 Jun Hamid Karzai elected as head of Afghan Transitional Gov.
- 19 Jun Loya Jirga concluded; government officials selected
- 20 Jun ISAF change of command; Turkey assumes command
- 20-28 Jun CINC visits United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Jordan, and Germany
- 30 Jun Operation FULL THROTTLE
- 19-27 Jul CINC visit to Bahrain, Kenya, and Greece

**RESULTS SO FAR/PROGRESS**

- Destroyed Taliban; ATA in place
- Eliminated AFG as base of operation
- Senior leadership in disarray
- Disrupted command and control
- Forced ad hoc mode of operation
- Disrupted access to financial resources
- Eliminated permanent training facilities
- Major reduction in weapons
- Regional perceptions affected by strong global response
- State sponsors wary of association
- Stable environment created
- Over 300 caches exploited, 196 identified by locals

**FACTS**

- Forces in AOR: Over 66,000
  - Over 9,000 Coalition
- In AFG
  - Over 8,000 US
  - Over 6,500 Coalition (4,000 + for ISAF)
- Over 120 sensitive sites exploited
- Combat sorties: over 14,000
- Bombs dropped: over 20,000 (50% PGM)
- Mine cleared area: 1.7M square meters
- Airlift: over 19,000 sorties
  - Strategic inter-theater flights: over 3,000
  - Intra-theater sorties: over 16,000
- Air refueling missions: over 7,000
- People moved: 150,000+
- Cargo moved: 228,500 tons
- Bases/ports departed: 267
- Nations over-flown: 46

**37 COUNTRIES IN TAMPA \***

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Djibouti, Czech Rep., Denmark, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan

\* Yemen ETA 10 Aug 02 (total will be 38)

**FIRSTS**

- First ANA Bn trained (23 Jul)
- Longest combat fighter mission
- Longest airborne surveillance mission
- Music to AFG people for first time in 6 Years
- First CFLCC since WWII
- Unified CINC at war with all four Components
- Over half of PGMs dropped were GPS-guided JDAMS

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS**

- OHDACA for OEF in AFG: \$10,000,000
- OHDACA committed as of 8 July 02: \$4,044,589
- O&M projects: \$434,826
- Approved OHDACA projects: 89
- OHDACA projects completed: 43
- O&M projects: 4
- Projects transferred to NGOs and USAID: 11
- Schools under construction: 49
- Medical Centers/Hospitals under construction: 15
- Drinking water wells under repair/construction: 12
- Road and bridge reconstruction.

**SOVIET CASUALTIES**

- 118 jets, 333 helo's, 147 tanks, 433 artillery pieces
- 1,138 vehicles, 620,000 troops served
  - 14,453 KIA, 54,000 WIA

**OEF CASUALTIES**

- 23 KIA (19 US/5 Coal.), 110 WIA (99 US/11 Coal.)
- Non-hostile: 22 killed, 90 injured

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11-L-0559/OSD/13907

# RONOLOGY AND FACTS

UNCLASSIFIED

## STATUS OF INVESTIGATIONS

### 16/26 Oct 01 Air Strikes on ICRC Facilities

- Forwarded to Chief of Staff of USAF for action.

### 11 Nov 01 UN Convoy Damage

- Investigation completed. Status is closed

### 29 Nov 01 FOB Rhino Near Friendly Fire Incident

- Investigation complete. Gunner aboard helicopter mistook friendly strobe for enemy fire. Corrective actions instituted. Status is closed.

### 23 Jan 02 Hazar Qadam Direct Action Mission

- Investigation complete. No systemic errors in target planning, mission planning, or execution. Status is closed.

### 12 Feb 02 Allegation of Detainee Mistreatment While in DOD Custody at Qandahar

- Investigation complete. Status is closed.

### 27 Feb 02 Allegation that 27 Detainees Taken at Hazar Qadam Were Beaten While at Qandahar Detention Facility

- Investigation complete. While at facility detainees treated well. Injuries consistent with what might be expected from the application of force reasonably necessary to secure them during the mission. Status is closed.

### 17 Apr 02 Tarnak Farms Friendly Fire

- F-16 engaged Canadian ground forces (4 killed; 8 injured)

### • CFACC investigation:

- Completed late June (Joint board)
- Findings: Cause - aircrew did not exercise flight discipline; Contributing - failings within immediate command structure

### • CINCCENT approved on 21 June

- Directed implementation of board recommendations

- Services now determining disciplinary/administrative actions

### 6 Apr 02 Suspect Leadership Target, Blue Pickup Truck IVO Shkin

- Investigation complete. Sufficient intelligence existed to support the engagement. Status is closed.

### 30 Jun 02 Civilian Casualties During Operation Full Throttle

- Oruzgan Province, AFG; allegations of Afghan civilians killed.

- Status: investigation in progress

## COALITION CONTRIBUTIONS

### AOR wide: 38 countries supporting

Total nations in AFG: 24, including ISAF

**Ground Operations (non-ISAF) :** 15 countries: over 1,600 deployed in AFG (AUS, CAN, EST, FRA, DEU, ESP, GBR, ITA, JOR, KOR, NOR, NZL, POL, ROM, TUR)

**ISAF: 18 countries deploying over 4,000 personnel:**

### • Contributing countries:

Austria	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Denmark
Finland	France	Germany	Greece
Ireland	Italy	Netherlands	New Zealand
Norway	Romania	Spain	Sweden
Turkey		United Kingdom	

### Special Operations Forces: 9 countries

**Coalition Air Missions:** 11 countries (AUS, BEL, CAN, DEU, FRA, ESP, GBR, ITA, DBN, NLD, NOR); over 5,000 sorties (over 1,600-airlift for 21.0 mil pounds cargo + over 7,500 personnel; over 1,100-tanker; 900-ISR; 200-C2; 1,100-fighter; 1,000-helicopter sorties)

**Naval Operations:** 10 countries (AUS, CAN, FRA, DEU, ESP, GBR, GRC, ITA, JPN, NLD), with an average of 25 ships, and approx. 5,000 personnel.

**Humanitarian Assistance Highlights:** 7 countries (BEL, CZE, DEU, ESP, GBR, GRC, JOR).

- Mazar-e-Sharif: Jordanian hospital has treated over 89,000 civilians.
- Bagram: Spanish hospital has treated over 10,000 civilians.
- Qandahar: Jordanian mine clearing.
- Dushanbe: French HA airlift.
- Karachi: Belgium, UK and Greek airlift support for ISAF

### Coalition De-mining Support

- Norway 2 de-mining vehicles
- Jordan 2 de-mining vehicles
- UK 2 de-mining vehicles
- Poland 2 Sappers (Engineers)

## LESSONS

• Flexible Coalition structure is achieving results. "Mission defines Coalition, Coalition does not define mission."

• Joint and Combined training paid dividends

• DOD and other government agencies work well together

• Synergy of conventional and special forces maximized combat effectiveness.

• Peacetime engagement facilitated deployment from 267 bases, staging of operations from 30 locations, and over-flight of 46 nations.

• Unmanned aerial vehicles provided time-critical intelligence and were force multipliers.

• HUMINT is valuable and decisive.

• Strategic lift and aerial refueling aircraft are high demand assets.

- Tankers are key to meeting force protection requirements

- Additional lift is needed (C-17's and aircrews)

• Precision guided munitions are force multipliers, reduced the number of sorties required to destroy a target, and resulted in an unprecedented low level of collateral damage.

• Advanced technology permitted command and control from 7,000 miles away in Tampa, FL

## AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)

16 Mar SECDEF approves Quick Start program

01 May US begins training 1<sup>st</sup> BANA (approx. 500 recruits)

01 Jun 1<sup>st</sup> BANA paid -- first official ANA payday

08 Jun French begin training 2<sup>nd</sup> BANA (approx. 350 recruits)

15 July US begins training 3<sup>rd</sup> BANA (approx. 300 recruits)

23 Jul First graduation of an ANA battalion (1<sup>st</sup> BANA)

### ANA Trained

• 30 Dec 02: Plan: 3,600 (600 man BN-6 BANA).

- At present recruitment levels, will graduate 1,950

• 1 Jul 03: Plan: 7,800 (600 man BN-12 BANA + 2 Border force (300 man BN))

• 30 Dec 03: Plan: 12,600 (600 man BN-18 BANA + 6 Border force (300 man BN))

### Money Needed to Support

• 30 Dec 02: \$80M total

• 1 Jul 03: \$190M total (additional \$110 mil)

• 30 Dec 03: \$300M (additional \$110 mil)

August 5, 2002 4:35 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cable

The cable you should read is Kabul 001489.

Colin was wrong. General McNeil was not in the meeting. There was a brigadier in there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-45

Afghanistan

5 Aug 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13909

W00905-02

\*\*\*\*\*  
**TRANSMISSION REPORT**  
\*\*\*\*\*

(WED) AUG 7 2002 7:39  
OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CTR

DOCUMENT #	TIME STORED	TIME SENT	DURATION	PAGE (S)	MODE	RESULT
3760665-401	8. 7 7:39	8. 7 7:39	6"	2	G4	OK

DESTINATION	DST. TEL #
8 WHSR	(b)(6)

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**Secretary of Defense  
Cover Sheet**

**FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: DONALD RUMSFELD**

**PHONE NUMBER:** (b)(6)

**SUBJECT: CABLE  
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:**

**PAGES: 2**  
**(Including Coversheet)**

— HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

x IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

## **DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS**

# COMPLETED



**CLASSIFICATION:**

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**Secretary of Defense  
Cover Sheet**

**FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: DONALD RUMSFELD**

**PHONE NUMBER:** (b)(6)

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HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

X IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

PAGES: 2

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11-L-0559/OSD/13911

August 12, 2002 10:30 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Persian Gulf

I was struck by this speech by President Clinton, apparently given at the Pentagon February 17, 1998. I have marked a couple of passages of interest.

Respectfully,

Attach.

02/17/98 "Remarks by the President on Iraq to Pentagon Personnel"

DHR dh  
081202-20

PERSIAN GULF

12 AUG 02

W00925-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13912

[THE WHITE HOUSE](#)

## President Clinton Explains American Position in Persian Gulf

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### THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary

For  
Immediate  
Release

February 17,  
1998

#### REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON IRAQ TO PENTAGON PERSONNEL

The Pentagon

12:37 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President, for your remarks and your leadership. Thank you, Secretary Cohen, for the superb job you have done here at the Pentagon and on this most recent, very difficult problem. Thank you, General Shelton, for being the right person at the right time. Thank you, General Ralston, and the members of the Joint Chiefs, General Zinni, Secretary Albright, Secretary Slater, DCI Tenet, Mr. Bowles, Mr. Berger. Senator Robb, thank you for being here; and Congressman Skelton, thank you very much, and for your years of service to America and your passionate patriotism, both of you; and to the members of our Armed Forces and others who work here to protect our national security.

I have just received a very fine briefing from our military leadership on the status of our forces in the Persian Gulf. Before I left the Pentagon I wanted to

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talk to you, and all those whom you represent -- the men and women of our military. You, your friends and your colleagues are on the front lines of this crisis in Iraq. I want to you and I want the American people to hear directly from me what is at stake for America and the Persian Gulf; what we are doing to protect the peace, the security, the freedom we cherish; why we have taken the position we have taken.

I was thinking as I sat up here on the platform of the slogan that the First Lady gave me for her project on the millennium, which was: Remembering the past and imagining the future. Now, for that project, that means preserving the Star-Spangled Banner and the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and it means making an unprecedented commitment to medical research and to get the best of the new technology. But that's not a bad slogan for us when we deal with more sober, more difficult, more dangerous matters.

Those who have questioned the United States in this moment, I would argue, are living only in the moment. They have neither remembered the past, nor imagined the future. So, first, let's just take a step back and consider why meeting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is important to our security in the new era we are entering.

This is a time of tremendous promise for America. The superpower confrontation has ended on every continent; democracy is securing for more and more people the basic freedoms we Americans have come to take for granted. Bit by bit, the Information Age is chipping away at the barriers -- economic, political and social -- that once kept people locked in and freedom and prosperity locked out.

Prime Minister  
Tony Blair

American  
Association for the  
Advancement of  
Science

First Balanced  
Budget in 30 Years

Commitment to  
Child Care

Ford's Theater Gala

Los Alamos  
National  
Laboratories

Dialogue on Social  
Security Reform

"High Hopes"  
Education  
Partnerships

National Prayer  
Breakfast

American Position  
in Persian Gulf

But for all our promise, all our opportunity, people in this room know very well that this is not a time free from peril -- especially as a result of reckless acts of outlaw nations and an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers and organized international criminals. We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century. They feed on the free flow of information and technology. They actually take advantage of the freer movement of people, information, and ideas. And they will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen.

There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region, and the security of all the rest of us.

I want the American people to understand, first, the past: How did this crisis come about. And I want them to understand what we must do to protect the national interest and, indeed, the interest of all freedom-loving people in the world.

Remember, as a condition of the cease-fire after the Gulf War, the United Nations demanded -- not the United States, the United Nations demanded -- and Saddam Hussein agreed to declare within 15 days -- this is way back in 1991 -- within 15 days his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them; to make a total declaration. That's what he promised to do.

The United Nations set up a special commission of highly trained international experts, called UNSCOM,

to make sure that Iraq made good on that commitment. We had every good reason to insist that Iraq disarm. Saddam had built up a terrible arsenal and he had used it -- not once, but many times, in a decade-long war with Iran, he used chemical weapons -- against combatants, against civilians, against a foreign adversary, and even against his own people. And during the Gulf War, Saddam launched Scuds against Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Bahrain.

Now, instead of playing by the very rules he agreed to at the end of the Gulf War, Saddam has spent the better part of the past decade trying to cheat on this solemn commitment. Consider just some of the facts. Iraq repeatedly made false declarations about the weapons that it had left in its possession after the Gulf War. When UNSCOM would then uncover evidence that gave lie to those declarations, Iraq would simply amend the reports. For example, Iraq revised its nuclear declarations four times within just 14 months, and it has submitted six different biological warfare declarations, each of which has been rejected by UNSCOM.

In 1995, Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law and the chief organizer of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, defected to Jordan. He revealed that Iraq was continuing to conceal weapons and missiles and the capacity to build many more. Then, and only then, did Iraq admit to developing numbers of weapons in significant quantities, and weapon stocks. Previously it had vehemently denied the very thing it just simply admitted once Saddam Hussein's son-in-law defected to Jordan and told the truth.

Now, listen to this. What did it admit? It admitted, among other things, an offensive biological warfare capability,

notably 5,000 gallons of botulinum, which causes botulism; 2,000 gallons of anthrax; 25 biological-filled Scud warheads; and 157 aerial bombs. And I might say, UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq has actually greatly understated its production. As if we needed further confirmation, you all know what happened to its son-in-law when he made the untimely decision to go back to Iraq.

Next, throughout this entire process, Iraqi agents have undermined and undercut UNSCOM. They've harassed the inspectors, lied to them, disabled monitoring cameras, literally spirited evidence out of the back doors of suspect facilities as inspectors walked through the front door -- and our people were there observing it and have the pictures to prove it.

Despite Iraq's deceptions UNSCOM has, nevertheless, done a remarkable job. Its inspectors, the eyes and ears of the civilized world, have uncovered and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction capacity than was destroyed during the Gulf War. This includes nearly 40,000 chemical weapons, more than 100,000 gallons of chemical weapons agents, 48 operational missiles, 30 warheads specifically fitted for chemical and biological weapons, and a massive biological weapons facility at Al-Hakim, equipped to produce anthrax and other deadly agents.

Over the past few months, as they have come closer and closer to rooting out Iraq's remaining nuclear capacity, Saddam has undertaken yet another gambit to thwart their ambition by imposing debilitating conditions on the inspectors and declaring key sites which have still not been inspected off limits -- including, I might add, one palace in

Baghdad more than 2600 acres large.

By comparison, when you hear all this business about presidential sites reflect our sovereignty, why do you want to come into a residence, the White House complex is 18 acres, so you'll have some feel for this. One of these presidential sites is about the size of Washington, D.C. That's about -- how many acres did you tell me it was -- 40,000 acres. We're not talking about a few rooms here with delicate personal matters involved.

It is obvious that there is an attempt here, based on the whole history of this operation, since 1991, to protect whatever remains of his capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, the missiles to deliver them, and the feedstocks necessary to produce them. The UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, a small force of Scud-type missiles, and the capacity to restart quickly its production program and build many, many more weapons.

Now, against that background, let us remember the past, here. It is against that background that we have repeatedly and unambiguously made clear our preference for a diplomatic solution. The inspection system works. The inspection system has worked in the face of lies, stonewalling, obstacle after obstacle after obstacle. The people who have done that work deserve the thanks of civilized people throughout the world. It has worked.

That is all we want. And if we can find a diplomatic way to do what has to be done, to do what he promised to do at the end of the Gulf War, to do what should have been done within 15 days -- within 15 days of the agreement at the end of the Gulf War -- if we can find a

diplomatic way to do that, that is by far our preference. But to be a genuine solution, and not simply one that glosses over the remaining problem, a diplomatic solution must include or meet a clear, immutable, reasonable, simple standard: Iraq must agree, and soon, to free, full, unfettered access to these sites, anywhere in the country. There can be no delusion or diminishment of the integrity of the inspection system that UNSCOM has put in place. Now, those terms are nothing more or less than the essence of what he agreed to at the end of the Gulf War.

The Security Council many times since has reiterated this standard. If he accepts them, force will not be necessary. If he refuses or continues to evade his obligation through more tactics of delay and deception, he, and he alone, will be to blame for the consequences.

I ask all of you to remember the record here: what he promised to do within 15 days of the end of the Gulf War, what he repeatedly refused to do, what we found out in '95, what the inspectors have done against all odds.

We have no business agreeing to any resolution of this that does not include free, unfettered access to the remaining sites by people who have integrity and proven competence in the inspection business. That should be our standard. That's what UNSCOM has done, and that's why I have been fighting for it so hard. That's why the United States should insist upon it.

Now, let's imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press

for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal. And I think every one of you who has really worked on this for any length of time believes that, too.

Now, we have spent several weeks building up our forces in the Gulf, and building a coalition of like-minded nations. Our force posture would not be possible without the support of Saudi Arabia, of Kuwait, Bahrain, the GCC states and Turkey. Other friends and allies have agreed to provide forces, bases or logistical support, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands, Hungary and Poland and the Czech Republic, Argentina, Iceland, Australia, New Zealand and our friends and neighbors in Canada. That list is growing -- not because anyone wants military action, but because there are people in this world who believe the United Nations resolution should mean something, because they understand what UNSCOM has achieved, because they remember the past and because they can imagine what the future will be depending on what we do now.

If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear: We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. We want to seriously reduce his capacity to threaten his neighbors. I am quite confident from the briefing I have just received from our military leaders that we can achieve the objectives and secure our vital strategic interests.

Let me be clear: A military operation cannot destroy all the weapons of mass destruction capacity. But it can, and will, leave him significantly worse off than he is now in terms of the ability to threaten the world with these weapons, or to attack his neighbors. And he will know that the international community continues to have the will to act if and when he threatens again.

Following any strike, we will carefully monitor Iraq's activities with all the means at our disposal. If he seeks to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction we will be prepared to strike him again. The economic sanctions will remain in place until Saddam complies fully with all U.N. resolutions.

Consider this: Already these sanctions have denied him \$110 billion. Imagine how much stronger his armed forces would be today, how many more weapons of mass destruction operations he would have hidden around the country if he had been able to spend even a small fraction of that amount for a military rebuilding.

We will continue to enforce a no-fly zone from the southern suburbs of Baghdad to the Kuwait border, and in Northern Iraq, making it more difficult for Iraq to walk over Kuwait again or threaten the Kurds in the North.

Now, let me say to all of you here, as all of you know, the weightiest decision any President ever has to make is to send our troops into harm's way. And force can never be the first answer. But sometimes it's the only answer.

You are the best-prepared, best-equipped, best-trained fighting force in the world. And should it prove necessary for me to exercise the option

of force, your commanders will do everything they can to protect the safety of all the men and women under their command. No military action, however, is risk free. I know that the people we may call upon in uniform are ready. The American people have to be ready as well.

Dealing with Saddam Hussein requires constant vigilance. We have seen that constant vigilance pays off, but it requires constant vigilance. Since the Gulf War we have pushed back every time Saddam has posed a threat. When Baghdad plotted to assassinate former President Bush, we struck hard at Iraq's intelligence headquarters. When Saddam threatened another invasion by massing his troops in Kuwait, along the Kuwaiti border in 1994, we immediately deployed our troops, our ships, our planes, and Saddam backed down. When Saddam forcefully occupied Irbil in Northern Iraq, we broadened our control over Iraq's skies by extending the no-fly zone.

But there is no better example, again I say, than the U.N. weapons inspections system itself. Yes, he has tried to thwart it in every conceivable way. But the discipline, determination, the year-in-year out effort of these weapon inspectors is doing the job. And we seek to finish the job.

Let there be no doubt, we are prepared to act. But Saddam Hussein could end this crisis tomorrow, simply by letting the weapons inspectors complete their mission. He made a solemn commitment to the international community to do that and to give up his weapons of mass destruction a long time ago, now. One way or the other, we are determined to see that he makes good on his own promise.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq reminds us of what we learned in the 20th century and warns us of what we must know about the 21st. In this century we learned through harsh experience that the only answer to aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination, and, when necessary, action.

In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity -- even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.

But if we act as one, we can safeguard our interests and send a clear message to every would-be tyrant and terrorist that the international community does have the wisdom and the will and the way to protect peace and security in a new era.

That is the future I ask you all to imagine. That is the future I ask our allies to imagine. If we look at the past and imagine that future, we will act as one together. And we still have, God willing, a chance to find a diplomatic resolution to this, and if not, God willing, the chance to do the right thing for our children and grandchildren.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

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Snowflake

August 13, 2002 2:35 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Girls' School

You will recall the girls' school in Mazar-E-Sharif that was badly damaged during a pitched battle with Al Qaeda as the city was being taken over by the Northern Alliance.

I have kept my eye on it since, and I think you'll be pleased to see that good progress has been made to rebuild the school and to provide education for young women in temporary facilities in the meantime.

Respectfully,

Attach.

MeS Sultan Rasia Girls' School Update—August 12, 2002

DHR:dh  
081302-14

AFGHANISTAN

13 Aug 02

W00932-02


11-L-0559/OSD/13925

## **MeS Sultan Rasia Girls' School Update -- August 12, 2002**


The Sultan Rasia Girl's School in Mazar-E-Sharif is a two-phase project, with Phase I being 100% completed. Phase I consisted of repairs to the out-buildings and acquisition of modular classrooms (Enclosure 1) to support the conduct of classes at the beginning of the school year. These areas are in full use.

Phase II is divided into two sections, A & B. As seen in the attached photographs, (Enclosure 2) section A is close to completion with final work (windows and plaster) being accomplished. Section B entails major structural work on the roof and other parts of the building. Engineers estimate the roof section will be completed by 25 August 02. Upon completion of both sections later this fall, they will be joined as one building. Once completed, the school will support approximately 3000 female students.

**Sultan Rasia Girls School Reconstruction Project  
Mazar-e-Sharif**




**Set-up almost complete for modular classroom**



**Student in new modular classroom**



**Sultan Rasia Outbuilding #1**







**Sultan Rasia Outbuilding #2**

**Encl (1)**

**11-L-0559/OSD/13927**

**Sultan Rasia Girls School Reconstruction Project  
Mazar-e-Sharif**



**Encl (2)**

**11-L-0559/OSD/13928**

August 15, 2002 4:30 PM

350.09

TO: Honorable I. Lewis Libby, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence

Please take a look at this memo to me from Jim Haynes. I asked CIA to give us a note about the extent to which other English-speaking countries have domestic intelligence-gathering activities. You might want to ask them, and take a look at it.

Please let me know if you have any thoughts on this subject. I don't.

Thanks.

Attach.

07/03/02 GC memo to SecDef re: Domestic Intelligence-Gathering Agency

DHR:dh  
081502-27

15 Aug 02

W00938-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13929



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

July 3, 2002, 10:00 AM

AUG 15 2002

INFO MEMO

✓f

?

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel *7/1/02*  
SUBJECT: Your Question About a Domestic Intelligence-Gathering Agency

- You asked about a "domestic intelligence-gathering" agency. An agency modeled after the British Security Service (MI5) may help accomplish President Bush's twin aims of preventing terrorist attacks and reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism.
- The FBI has the primary role in conducting foreign counterintelligence, which includes counter-terrorism. Military departments, the Defense Intelligence Agency and civilian law enforcement agencies also engage in intelligence gathering, generally related to their specific missions. No agency is responsible for oversight of all domestic counterintelligence operations.
- The Homeland Security Department (HSD), in part, has been proposed to close the gap in intelligence coordination and accountability. The White House proposal makes the HSD a "customer" of the CIA and FBI and leaves the FBI and CIA relatively untouched. The proposal requires the FBI and CIA to provide processed intelligence to the HSD, but allows all three agencies to prepare their own competing analyses of threats. The Administration's proposal has been criticized for potentially promoting greater turf wars and failing to address adequately the lack of communication among the existing agencies.
- Two recent newspaper articles alternatively have suggested modeling the HSD after the MI5. The HSD would take over the FBI's counterintelligence and counter-terrorism missions and the counterintelligence functions of the various agencies brought within the HSD. It would be responsible for collecting and disseminating counterintelligence, investigating and assessing threats, advising other government departments and offices on protective security measures and providing support for law enforcement agencies. The HSD would have no policing powers. The British model could ensure greater communication and intelligence sharing and more efficient operation. Under this scheme, the HSD would have more control over the process of collecting, reporting and integrating intelligence information. The CIA's mission would remain unchanged and mirror that of MI6.

COORDINATION: None



11-L-0559/OSD/13930

**Snowflake**

**August 16, 2002 11:15 AM**

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PA*  
SUBJECT: Iraq

Attached is an interesting article on the subject we discussed this morning at the NSC meeting.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Dionne, E.J. Jr. "In Search of a War Rationale," *Washington Post*, August 16, 2002

DHR:db  
081602-7

*Iraq*

*16 Aug 02*

**W00943-02**

**11-L-0559/OSD/13931**

Washington Post  
August 16, 2002  
Pg. 25

## In Search Of A War Rationale

By E. J. Dionne Jr.

Supporters of going to war against Iraq offer two very different rationales for American action. Before the shooting starts, we had better be clear about which war we're fighting.

One Iraq war would be preemptive but, in principle, defensive in character. The argument for it is that Saddam Hussein is building weapons of mass destruction that he will someday use or pass on to others. In this view, Hussein will always manage to foil the outside inspections he agreed to after his defeat in 1991. We need to take him out because that is the only way we can be sure of taking out his weapons.

The second Iraq war would be a much bolder enterprise. Its goal is to revolutionize the entire Middle East. If Hussein is driven from power, the idea goes, Iraqis will then build a thriving democracy. A free Iraq will become a model for Arab and Muslim nations. The Arab-Israeli dispute will become less intractable and moderation will become contagious.

The staunchest advocates of military action embrace both arguments. Their assumption is that once we get involved in a war for defensive purposes, we will have no choice but to move to the next step of occupying and rebuilding Iraq under benign leadership.

But it would be a great mistake to sell the Iraq war as a defensive action when its real purpose is much broader. Here is a recipe for disillusionment that could undermine the operation's long-term success.

Already, this has looked too much like a war in search of a justification. Advocates of taking on Hussein keep trying, almost desperately, to link him to the attacks of Sept. 11. Their case hangs almost entirely on two alleged meetings in Prague between Mohamed Atta, the leader of the hijackers, and an Iraqi agent. Because there is great dispute about whether these meetings even took place, they provide a thin rationale for full-scale war.

Supporters of war know this. That's why they have shifted to arguments about the more general threat that Hussein poses. But the shifting rationales for war create a credibility problem. It raises the burden on the war's supporters to offer more convincing evidence than they have that Hussein really is on the verge of breakthroughs in the production of dangerous weapons -- or that he is prepared to use what he has sooner than we once thought.

As recently as July 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell was arguing that "smart sanctions" could contain Hussein's threat. At the same time, Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser, was endorsing "a sanctions regime that actually works." The goal, she said, would be to make sure that Hussein "couldn't rebuild his military power" and "that he would have great difficulty in acquiring weapons of mass destruction." The administration needs to be very clear -- beyond generalized talk about Sept. 11 changing everything -- on why what was true a year ago is no longer true now.

If the real purpose of this exercise is the larger one -- to make the Middle East safe for democracy -- the administration has to make a long-term commitment upfront to rebuilding Iraq and supporting a new regime. As our experience in Afghanistan shows, this will be no piece of cake.

Gary Schmitt, an Iraq hawk who is executive director of the Project for the New American Century, has been entirely candid in saying that this war could entail at least a five-year commitment of American troops to Iraq. There's been a lot of leaking of conflicting military plans. What really needs public airing is the postwar strategy -- how to make sure we don't squander a victory.

There's a reason why President Bush has not run into much domestic opposition to his Iraq plans, and it's not because most Democrats are too timid to take Bush on. There is broad agreement that the status quo in Iraq is dangerous for the long haul. The question is: What's the most effective way to change it?

If the issue is Hussein's weaponry, one last try with tough, intrusive and uncompromising inspections would have one of two effects. The inspections could succeed and rid us of the threat. Or Hussein would obstruct them and, in the process, force our reluctant allies to the view that there is no alternative to war.

But if the war with Iraq is really about a grander strategy to remake the Middle East, Americans need to know what we're getting into. A more democratic Middle East would do much practical good. It will also be hellishly hard for an outside power, even the world's only superpower, to create.

August 19, 2002 3:21 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Marking October 7

October 7, 2002 is the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the bombing and active military campaign in Afghanistan.

General Franks would like to invite the President to Tampa on October 7, as a way of marking that anniversary. Why don't you give some thought to that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-13

Afghanistan

2001

W00951-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13934

August 19, 2002 7:25 AM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iran and North Korea

I believe the situations in Iran and North Korea are sufficiently interesting and unsettled that fashioning a major U.S. Government effort, for the most part confidential, to undermine the current regimes and encourage regime change from within is worth consideration.

Doing this would require a great deal of skill and deftness. It could accomplish enormous good for the world.

I would be glad to discuss this at your convenience.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh  
071502-7

W00965-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13935

19Aug02

August 19, 2002 7:06 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
Honorable Clay Johnson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: Ambassador to Afghanistan

I request that I have an opportunity to interview any person who is proposed for Ambassador to Afghanistan, before the selection gets made and before the President is involved.

This post is very important for the Department of Defense and I would like to have a good sense of who it might be and why.

When the decision was made on the current Ambassador to Afghanistan, I was not aware of it until it had been decided.

I think criteria for the post should be agreed on before any names start being considered, so we can all be sure we are focusing on the right skills.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-41

Afghanistan  
2002

19 Aug 02

**W00967-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13936

September 3, 2002 2:55 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Decisions

Attached is the paper I pulled together on threads, with respect to the war on terrorism. It is quite a different approach from the interview with Woodward I just read.

000.5

Attach.  
05/10/02 Major Directional Decisions—9/11/02 et seq.

DHR:dh  
090302-31

3 Sep 02

W01013-02  
11-L-0559/OSD/13937

2

May 10, 2002 11:42 AM

SUBJECT: Major Directional Decisions—9/11/01 et seq.

1. Despite the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks or attacks that may occur in the future, the U.S. will not pull back or withdraw - the U.S. will stay engaged in the world.
2. When attacked, the U.S. will be “leaning forward, not back.” When the U.S. is seen as faint-hearted or risk-averse, the deterrent is weakened.
3. Terrorism: it is not possible to defend against terrorism in every place, at every time, against every conceivable technique. Self-defense against terrorism requires preemption - taking the battle to the terrorists wherever they are and to those who harbor terrorists.
4. The war against terrorism will be “broad-based, applying pressure and using all elements of national power—economic, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and military, both overt and covert.”
5. The campaign against terrorism will be “long, hard and difficult.” Terrorists do not have armies, navies or air forces to attack, so we must go after them where they are and root them out.
6. The U.S. will not rule out anything—including the use of ground forces. This will not be an antiseptic, “cruise missile war.” The U.S. is ready and willing to put boots on the ground when and where appropriate.
7. Coalitions: “The mission must determine the coalition; coalitions must not determine missions”; missions must not be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator by coalition pressure.
8. The U.S. wants help from all countries, in every way they consider appropriate; we recognize that to get maximum support, it is best for each country, rather than the U.S., to characterize how and in what ways they are assisting the overall effort.
9. Declaratory policy: the U.S. is against global terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists—“you are either with us or against us.”
10. The U.S. recognizes it must be willing to accept risks. There are causes so important that they require putting lives at risk - fighting terrorism is one.
11. Avoid personalizing the war against terrorism by focusing excessively on UBL or Omar. The task is bigger and broader than any one individual. We must root out the terrorist networks.
12. Because Afghanistan is “anti-foreigner,” the U.S. emphasized the truth, that the U.S. is not there to stay; rather, we are there to help fight terrorism, liberate the Afghan people from the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, assure that it does not harbor terrorists in the future, assist with humanitarian assistance and help establish the conditions to ensure the new Afghan government has the opportunity to succeed.
13. The link between global terrorist networks and the nations on the terrorist list that have active WMD capabilities is real, and poses a serious threat to the world; it points up the urgency of the effort against terrorism.

11-L-0559/OSD/13938

14. September 11th resulted in a major shift in the world, offering opportunities to establish new relationships and to reorder institutions in ways that will contribute to our goals of peace and stability for decades to come.
15. Victory on the ground was crucial to the success of the information campaign—because strength is respected throughout the world, and particularly in the Arab world, but also because liberation of the Afghan people has been one of the most powerful stories on our side.
16. The U.S. can be effective when we leverage the capabilities of others.
17. Perhaps most important of all, we leveraged the Achilles heel of our opponents, which was the fact that the Taliban regime and the terrorists were so widely hated by the people they oppressed. More generally, every government that supports terrorism also rules by terror, and the people they terrorize are our potential allies.
18. Momentum is crucial, and it was important to pursue the campaign relentlessly—no pauses to negotiate, no pauses for Ramadan, no pauses outside Kabul.
19. The campaign had to include humanitarian operations (and information operations) from the very beginning. Moreover, humanitarian operations had to be viewed in a strategic way, focused on helping those people who were on our side.
20. Military force can have political effect only if it is militarily effective or threatens to be militarily effective. Merely blowing things up, without affecting events on the ground, becomes a symbol of impotence.
21. Finally, success required recognizing that defeating the Taliban regime had to be a goal, rather than preserving it to avoid chaos in Afghanistan or separating “good” Taliban from bad ones. Afghan reconstruction (and rehabilitation of “good” Taliban) could only come after the defeat of the Taliban regime.
22. Unified commanders are expected to develop military options void of preconceived political constraints. First determine what is possible, then let folks in Washington worry about what can be achieved. (CINC can certainly voice his opinion about the advisability of options.)
23. Setting the bar higher—we should list our expectations of countries based on what we want them to do rather than what we think they are willing to do.
24. Special reconnaissance operations (SRO)—focus changed to a proactive mode that places value on our adversaries knowing we are doing it. Some will remain unseen, others will be coercive.
25. Even though we are engaged in a large conflict, we must continue to transform in order to emerge from this current operation with the quality of our force intact and ready to meet the many challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Donald Rumsfeld

September 10, 2002 11:49 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

CC: Honorable Steve Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Combatant Commanders

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I would appreciate it if invitations to combatant commanders come through my office personally, rather than being directed to the combatant commander. Unless the President specifically requests something, I would prefer that General Myers and I be the ones to decide which interagency meetings combatant commanders attend.

It is not possible for the NSC staff to know what I have asked the combatant commanders to do or what their other tasks are. The NSC calls meetings on short notice. A combatant commander feels he has to respond to an NSC invitation, then I have to help them determine what their priority ought to be, but I can't do it if I don't know they've been invited.

Needless to say, if the President of the United States decides he wants a combatant commander at a meeting, I should be told that and I will see that that happens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
090902-43

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JG  
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W01040-02  
11-L-0559/OSD/13940

September 12, 2002 2:23 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Reconstruction

Where do we stand on Eikenberry and Dov Zakheim?

Is the State Department is opposed? I thought there was a big urgency to getting money and help to Afghanistan for security. The Principals Committee said that. The President said that. So I went ahead and tried to move on Zakheim and Eikenberry, but there seem to be roadblocks.

What's happening? Are you against it?

DHR:dh  
091202-25

12 Sep 02

Afghanistan

W01047-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13941

September 13, 2002 2:39 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Testimony on Iraq

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I am scheduled to testify next week for the Administration on the subject of Iraq before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

I am told that my testimony is supposed to be in support of a resolution the Administration is asking the Congress to pass and/or a resolution we are asking the UN to pass, or both.

I have not seen either resolution. If I could be provided those resolutions, I would be in a position to testify. At present I am not.

Has a decision been made about what the role of the various Administration officials ought to be with respect to their testimony?

My assumption is that George Tenet and the intelligence community would testify on the intelligence situation, and that Colin Powell would make the case we are presenting on the President's policy.

The Defense role, on the other hand, doesn't come into play until and unless the President makes a decision to do something in Iraq from a military standpoint. Having DoD discuss that subject before a Presidential decision would not be very helpful.

Therefore, my testimony should track the presentations of Tenet and Powell, but I don't have their testimony to review.

ZP/ASCI

It seems to me that the Administration should decide what it wants and when it wants to have it, for example: We desire a Congressional Resolution that says "XXX," and we want it passed not later than October 11.

W01052-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13942

Having made that determination, we should then back off from that date to the present and start scoping out the various activities and objectives we should undertake. For example:

- What should be the objective of DoD testimony next week before the House and Senate?
- What should be the objective of Colin's testimony the following week?
- What briefs should we undertake for Members of Congress?
- What is the case we are trying to make? Support the U.N. resolution?
- Should the President address a joint session of Congress, and if so, when?

I feel that we have put the cart before the horse by offering several intelligence briefings to the Hill before we are certain as to the policy objectives. Ultimately, there is no single piece of intelligence that will make a case for war, should the President decide war is required. Rather, it will be a systematic policy framework that is supported by what intelligence we have, but that goes beyond any 'smoking guns' and puts Iraq into the proper context.

Any thoughts?

DHR:dh  
091302-7

September 26, 2002 7:46 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Gordon England

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I don't know what you folks will decide on Gordon England, but in the event a decision is made to go forward, you need to make that decision knowing that we can't let him go until we have a replacement or have finished the budget in December. In other words, once the decision is made, he can't just leave here suddenly. He needs to stay here to finish our budget process, which is critical for the President. We'll need to find a replacement, get him cleared and processed through the White House and FBI, and up to the Senate for confirmation. That will take time. He's been here barely a year.

I hope you won't let anyone get the idea that Gordon can just drop everything and leave. We'll need him through early December for sure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092102-9

26 Sep 02

W01118-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13944

7:26 AM

TO: Vice President Richard Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 27, 2002  
SUBJECT: State Department

11-L-0559/OSD  
WHITEHOUSE SECTION  
CSD

Attached is a piece that Larry Silberman did in 1979. It's worth reading. You also might want to get a copy to Clay Johnson, Andy Card and possibly the President, if you think it is worthwhile.

Thanks.

092

DHR/azn  
092702.05

Attach: "Toward Presidential Control of the State Department," Laurence H. Silberman, Spring 1979

27 Sep 02

W01129-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13945

*Laurence H. Silberman*

**TOWARD PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL  
OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT**

*Reprinted From*

**FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS**

*AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW*



**SPRING 1979**

11-L-0559/OSD/13946

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*Laurence H. Silberman*

## TOWARD PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

**T**

his article challenges the notion that it is appropriate for Foreign Service officers to routinely occupy senior policymaking positions in the State Department. As a recent "political" ambassador who has also served at a senior level in domestic departments of our government, I confess that I ended my ambassadorial stint with less than friendly feelings toward the Foreign Service as a whole. Since then, reflecting as dispassionately as possible on my own observations and looking with some care into past history, I have concluded that the frictions that have arisen almost continuously between the Service and successive Presidents (and their political appointees) have their roots deep in the system of appointments itself—and that they lend themselves to constructive remedies.

The practice of having Foreign Service officers in senior State Department positions goes back a long way; in the minds of many it has attained the status of an accepted convention. I believe it is time to reject that convention, not only because it is fundamentally inconsistent with American democratic theory, but also because—perhaps more directly relevant to those interested in the substance of foreign policy—for the last 50 years the Foreign Service's quite natural desire to preserve and expand these job opportunities has caused or exacerbated unfortunate clashes with presidential authority over the conduct of foreign policy. As Professor James Q. Wilson of Harvard has recently observed, indispensable to a full understanding of any government department's policy-formulating process is an appreciation of that department's formal and informal incentive system.<sup>1</sup> So long as the Foreign Service sees itself in competition with political appointees for senior positions,

<sup>1</sup> James Q. Wilson, *The Investigators*, New York: Basic Books, 1978, *passim*.

---

Laurence H. Silberman currently practices law in Washington and is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1975 to 1977, and prior to that served as Deputy Attorney General in 1974-75, as Under Secretary of Labor in 1970-73, and as Solicitor of the Labor Department in 1969-70. The author acknowledges research assistance by two Dartmouth undergraduates, Robert and Katherine Silberman.

## PRESIDENTS AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT 873

it will instinctively resist presidential direction of the substance of foreign policy. In resisting the legitimacy of political appointments essential to presidential control, it inevitably rejects as well the legitimacy of political direction.

Indisputably, the Foreign Service has much to offer in the fashioning and implementation of foreign policy, but the troublesome friction to which I refer has often led Presidents and their appointees to reject the Service's views out of hand. It is time, I submit, to call a halt to this long struggle. Accordingly, in my conclusion I suggest a legislative modus vivendi, one which takes account of the need to maintain, indeed improve, the Foreign Service's morale.

### II

Perhaps it is because Foreign Service officers (and many of their journalistic champions) have relatively little experience with the American government as a whole that they are unaware of how anomalous is their claim to policymaking positions.

Senior political posts in the executive branch of the U.S. government, those presumed to carry policymaking functions, are almost invariably presidential appointments requiring Senate confirmation. For the most part, they are designated as executive appointments at levels from one through four: level one is reserved to the Cabinet (and the Special Trade Representative); level two is typically a deputy secretary (but also includes the Directors of the CIA and FBI); level three embraces the under secretaries and level four the assistant secretaries. Men and women who fill these jobs are normally thought of as part of the President's team; indeed, they are extensions of the presidency.

Among the world democracies, the United States uniquely functions with so many political appointments at senior levels of government. But the United States' tripartite governmental structure is also unique. The parliamentary democracies fuse legislative and executive powers; the civil service in those countries, therefore, looks only to one political authority. By contrast, in the United States both a presidential sun and a congressional moon exert a gravitational pull on the Civil Service. Since our chief executive must compete with legislative authority for the allegiance, or even the attention, of the Civil Service, it follows that he needs a considerable number of senior executives in the departments who are closely tied to his political fortunes. Even these ties do not guarantee him bureaucratic support, but they ensure an irreducible minimum of influence.

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In all the executive departments save State, these executive-level appointments almost invariably go to supporters of the President—persons who share his political goals, or at least are drawn from the President's political party. To be sure, occasionally a civil servant will be selected for political appointment but, in that event, he or she is assumed to have abandoned the neutrality of the career service and does not return to career status when the administration leaves office.

The State Department is structured like other executive departments with a secretary, deputy secretary, four under secretaries, and over a dozen assistant-secretary-level positions. In addition, however, there are more than 150 ambassadorships, all presidential appointments requiring Senate confirmation and carrying an executive-level ranking—depending on the importance and size of the embassy—from two through five. The more important ambassadorships, then, have equivalent rank to the deputy or under secretary posts since an ambassador, in theory, personally represents the President of the United States in his assigned country. According to strict protocol, the American ambassador outranks even the Secretary of State at his embassy (a protocol nicety that few ambassadors have dared assert). As a direct representative of the President, an ambassador is not restricted to communications with the State Department. Some have even advanced personal views or positions espoused by other departments that ran counter to State's wishes—unless instructed otherwise by the President. It is not unknown, for that matter, for Presidents to direct ambassadors on certain sensitive matters without even informing the State Department.

Over the years, however, the majority of these embassies and a goodly proportion of the senior posts in Washington have been occupied by career Foreign Service officers who maintain their career status while in these positions. Accepted Washington wisdom, as disseminated by the diplomatic press corps, holds that these appointments should normally go to Foreign Service officers. Career status has, in the State Department, been deemed synonymous with merit. Political appointments are implicitly regarded as non-meritorious. During the presidential campaign of 1976, for example, C. L. Sulzberger, the venerable if predictably conventional foreign correspondent of *The New York Times*, paused in a little town outside of Plains, Georgia to write a column in which he described the importance of a presidential candidate committing himself to appoint Foreign Service officers to ambassadorships. After his subsequent meeting with Jimmy Carter, he breath-

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lessly reported that, sure enough, the Democratic candidate was determined to make "merit" appointments to foreign policy positions. After the election, as we all saw, Jimmy Carter did not completely accept the congruence of career status and merit. He did appoint fewer political ambassadors but, in contrast to the Ford-Kissinger Administration, President Carter took more care to ensure that his assistant and under secretaries were drawn from political circles that shared the President's foreign policy philosophy.

### III

The Foreign Service has persistently argued for a congressionally imposed limit on the number or percentage of non-career appointments to ambassadorships and has grumbled at what it regards as excessive appointments of non-careerists to comparable positions in Washington. A necessary corollary to the Service's position has been its explicit assumption that foreign policy—unlike all other responsibilities of government—is not appropriately a subject for political difference. As Fred Iklé recently put it, the Foreign Service has a direct career interest in defending the cliché that "politics stops at the water's edge."<sup>2</sup>

George Kennan, perhaps the leading apostle of foreign policy careerism (some say elitism), argues that our political parties play no important role in the long-term formulation of foreign policy because in the United States, unlike Europe, they are not ideological. He sees them as purely pragmatic groupings of various constituencies without ideological content. When politicians challenge the Foreign Service's conduct of policy, they are, according to Kennan, responding merely to "highly organized lobbies and interest groups."<sup>3</sup>

The ultra-careerist must thus denigrate the impact of politics on foreign policy, for if it were to be conceded that our political parties do represent alternative philosophies of foreign policy, it would also have to be conceded, consistent with democratic theory, that the successful party is entitled to place its adherents in senior State Department positions to carry out its philosophy.

Kennan and his supporters, I submit, fundamentally misunderstand our political system. American political parties can indeed be seen as competitive constituency groupings, but these have always been bound together in significant degree by an ideological

<sup>2</sup> "Beyond the Water's Edge: Responsible Partisanship in Foreign Policy," *Common Sense*, Summer 1978.

<sup>3</sup> "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," *Wilson Quarterly*, Winter 1977, pp. 148-57

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glue of varying viscosity—using “ideology” simply to mean a reasonably coherent set of ideas about the relationship between government and its citizens. Our great geographical and cultural diversity, as virtually every first-year college student is taught, has caused a certain degree of ideological overlapping. Still, for almost 50 years the Republican Party, or at least its central core, has differed with the Democrats over the fundamental issue of the desirability, equity, even morality of coercive redistribution of wealth and income, and the corollary question of the growth of governmental power.

Moreover—and this point is crucial—domestic ideological differences have always been, in part, reflected in the differing foreign policy approaches of the Democratic and Republican Parties. Surely the restrained enthusiasm with which conservative Republicans view delegations of authority to the United Nations is ideologically connected to Republican distrust of domestic governmental growth, and the greater receptiveness with which most liberal Democrats examine the developing nations’ demand for a New International Economic Order is related to their espousal of domestic economic redistribution. For most liberal Democrats, “narrowing the gap” in world income by direct transfers of wealth follows ineluctably from their domestic political objective of similarly “narrowing the income gap” among Americans. Domestic liberals—and most are Democrats—are almost as prone to believe that world order can be achieved through supranational planning as they are to believe that we should move toward greater governmental planning domestically. Conservatives, by contrast, in both domestic and foreign policy, tend to distrust rationalistic schemes and give greater deference to the natural growth of domestic and international structures. These differences, between liberal and conservative, go back to Rousseau and Burke.

True, domestic ethnic, religious and racial lobbies have always exerted political influence on American foreign policy. In recent years U.S. policy toward disputes in the Aegean, the Middle East and southern Africa has been so shaped. Still, these issues are not without ideological content. Most American blacks, for instance, are aligned with the Democratic Party, which party, particularly President Carter’s wing, has seemed much less troubled by black African nationalism with a Marxist flavor than have Republicans. This, in turn, is clearly related to the present Administration’s overall effort to reduce the anti-communist character of American foreign policy.

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Although both parties share a strong distaste for totalitarianism, Republicans are naturally, on the whole, more distrustful and fearful of totalitarianism on the Left and Democrats more apprehensive of its rightist counterpart. That is surely why Roosevelt's foreign policy in the 1930s was more aggressively anti-fascist than many Republicans thought prudent. And why Republican views for years have been, on the whole, more aggressively anti-communist.

Admittedly, there are important foreign policy differences within both parties. The 1976 Reagan challenge to President Ford was most successfully rooted in foreign policy disagreements centered on the Ford-Kissinger policy of détente. In that respect there are similarities between conservative Republicans and the Jackson-Moynihan-Nunn wing of the Democratic Party. That these kinds of issues are often disputed intra-party as well as inter-party does not at all detract from the proposition that our political process properly accommodates foreign policy debates or that they normally have an ideological content. Senator Jackson, like Governor Reagan, lost his primary fight for nomination and, therefore, as much as some of us might regret it, President Carter was certainly on sound democratic (note the small "d") grounds in rigorously excluding Jackson Democrats, as well as orthodox Republicans, from significant foreign policy positions. They manifestly would not fit.

I do not mean to suggest that American foreign policy will or should shift 180 degrees as administrations change. In the first place, the great strength of American democracy is the relatively narrow degree of ideological differences between our political parties with respect to either domestic or foreign issues. What we virtually all agree upon—our shared premises—is greater than that which divides us. Therefore, philosophic changes in foreign policy orientations, while significant, will not be fundamental—not sea changes.

Second, the United States does have relatively permanent economic and strategic interests that no administration, regardless of ideology, can ignore. To be sure, which of those interests are vital is very much a political question because vital interests are those a nation is willing to take substantial risks to preserve or advance. Thus, different administrations may well be willing to assume greater political, economic and even military costs, on the margin, to protect different objectives. Put another way, the political process sets priorities on national interests; Vietnam was in that manner continually downgraded from vital to borderline to irrele-

event. No computer or group of wise men can objectively divine the outer boundaries of vital interests, because in a democracy the people as a whole must determine the acceptable cost-benefit ratio of actions that preserve or advance foreign policy goals. Still, the central core of our policy, or any nation's policy, will always be shaped by objective factors. Not surprisingly, then, as time passes, we see that at least certain of President Carter's policies have begun to conform to those of the preceding Administration. Take, for example, the abandonment of the Turkish arms embargo or the President's "Camp David" change in Middle East policy.

Some scholars argue that ideology should play little or no role in the conduct of foreign policy, but it is hard to take that position seriously. Can one imagine American policy in this century uninfluenced by antipathy to or a healthy fear of fascism and communism? Nonetheless, how much weight ideology should be given when fashioning policy toward other nations is surely questionable. As Bayless Manning put it, since the beginning of the Republic pragmatism and ideology, held in uneasy balance, have been twin themes of our foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> Sometimes an administration has emphasized ideological factors over pragmatic ones, for example, Woodrow Wilson's self-determination, John Foster Dulles' anti-communism, and Jimmy Carter's human rights. At other times, as most recently with Kissinger's Realpolitik, pragmatism seems to dominate.

I suggest that a long-term aim of our policy is to keep these considerations, ideology and pragmatism, in appropriate balance. No magic formula, however, will permanently achieve that equation. The best means to keep these factors in balance, and the one most appropriate to our system of government, is partisan public debate. Inevitably, the administration in power will emphasize one or the other factor and the party out of power will duly criticize the administration for overemphasis—just as the Democrats attacked Dulles for excessive moralizing and Kissinger for too little attention to moral concerns. The political process ensures that the balance can never be tipped too far in one direction.

In that fashion, I would argue, partisan political debate over foreign policy serves long-run stability rather than instability. The democratic process is often thought to jeopardize professionally devised foreign policy continuity; in fact, it ensures a deeper continuity which eludes totalitarian states. The key theoretical

<sup>4</sup> Bayless Manning, "Goals, Ideology and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 271-284.

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proposition, then, of the careerists' argument for their own dominance of senior foreign policy positions—that domestic politics is the appropriate process for the resolution of domestic economic and social issues, but *not* for foreign policy questions—is plainly and demonstrably wrong.

### IV

Still, political theory aside, the question of expertise remains. Foreign Service spokesmen maintain that the conduct (and fashioning) of foreign policy is inherently subtler and more sophisticated than other facets of governmental responsibility. The stakes, moreover, are much higher—particularly in a thermonuclear world. American democracy, it is argued, has no practical choice but to delegate to its Foreign Service greater responsibility than is granted to the domestic Civil Service. George Kennan assumes this delegation when he describes the Foreign Service officer as an anomaly not belonging to “that great body of *lower-level* servicing personnel known as the civil service” but rather somewhere between the ordinary civil servant and the political appointee.<sup>5</sup>

The grade, rank and pay of Foreign Service officers, however, is comparable to that of Civil Service officers—except when the former are serving in those executive-level presidential appointments described earlier—so Congress has not explicitly made the delegation Kennan assumes.<sup>6</sup> In fact, the Foreign Service was created through executive orders of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft and the Rogers Act of 1924 to bring our diplomatic personnel up to the professional standards of the Civil Service.

But should the Foreign Service be regarded as superior to the Civil Service? Is the substance of foreign policy so uniquely challenging as to compel acceptance of a Foreign Service policy-making role?

To answer No, to reject this claim, it is not necessary to denigrate the complexities of foreign affairs. It is only necessary to observe that other aspects of governmental responsibilities are no less complex. I would go further, however. The average American has a sounder instinctive grasp of the basic dynamics of foreign policy

<sup>5</sup> Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 151 (emphasis added). Surely, this unwarranted assumption of the superiority of the Foreign Service over the Civil Service owes much to the “aristocratic” social origins of Foreign Service officers of the 1920s and 1930s (and the pretensions of some others whose backgrounds were more modest). See Martin Weil, *A Pretty Good Club*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1978. That is not to say that today's Foreign Service is drawn primarily from the same social circles, but the sense of superiority remains—in search of a justifying rationale.

<sup>6</sup> The last step of an FSO-1's pay schedule is equivalent to a GS-18. There is a handful of career ministers who carry the grade of executive level five; there are also, however, a number of executive level five positions in the domestic departments filled by civil servants.

than he does of domestic macroeconomics (the management of which is, after all, the most important domestic responsibility of the government). Common sense—the sum of personal experiences—will take one farther in the realm of foreign policy than in macroeconomics. Even children playing together begin to learn lessons about the balance of power—to prevent one from dominating others—but they manifestly do not learn the way people behave economically in the aggregate. As George Will laments, much of domestic democratic government consists of futile efforts to reverse economic laws—laws, I would add, that are rooted in human nature.

The Foreign Service contends that the actual conduct of day-to-day relations between countries—as opposed to the administration of domestic departments—requires of those who do this business special expertise that *only* professionals with a lifetime of training gain; expertise both in the process of diplomacy itself and in profound knowledge of the nature of other societies. The military is a favorite analogy used to buttress this argument. We do not appoint politicians to senior military commands because we recognize the need for that special expertise which only the careerist can provide; the same reasoning, it is argued, should govern appointments to the senior foreign policy commands. On close examination, this analogy disintegrates. Civilian or political control of the military is well established in the United States. Consequently, the Assistant Secretaries of the Defense Department and of the services are invariably drawn from the ranks of civilians, and the military are almost never given political authority (the exception would be temporary wartime or postwar occupation of enemy territory).<sup>7</sup>

To be sure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff report directly to the President in his role as Commander in Chief. This is obviously of more practical significance in war than in peace. But war and planning for war are a good deal more specialized and outside the experience of most politicians than the conduct of diplomacy. (For that matter, it is equally outside the experience of the Foreign Service, which surely is one of the reasons why, when George Kennan recently called for a special conclave of experts to redefine Soviet capabilities and intentions, he excluded any consideration of the Soviet military buildup.)

Drawing once again upon James Q. Wilson, if one wishes to

<sup>7</sup> Ironically, the State Department argues, usually successfully, that military serving in foreign countries should be subordinate to ambassadors, for the latter carry political authority as the direct representatives of the President.

determine whether political appointees bring any desired attitudes or skills to the conduct of foreign policy, one should look carefully at the actual tasks performed both abroad and at home. What is it that diplomats actually do? Are there comparative advantages and disadvantages as between typical careerists and non-careerists with respect to requisite skills and experiences?

The Foreign Service is divided into four categories or "cones": political, economic, consular, and administrative. Political officers—from whose ranks the lion's share of ambassadors is drawn—are responsible, when abroad, for analyzing and reporting political trends and events in their assigned country. Economic officers, similarly, report on economic affairs, but when serving as commercial attachés or when supervising them, they are also responsible for searching out business opportunities for American firms, then helping these firms take advantage of those opportunities. Consular officers are charged with aiding Americans who run afoul of host country laws and also are responsible for the often vexing administration abroad of U.S. immigration laws. Administrative officers provide support services for the embassy, much as do administrative officers in the Civil Service.

All four groups must also represent American interests to the host country in their respective spheres. The job of an embassy, then, including the various attachés who work for other governmental departments (agricultural, military, legal, etc.) is partly to report to our own government on events in that country and partly to represent the American government and American interests there.

To do this job, officers need background and knowledge of the host country—including usually the host country's language as well as broad training in political theory, economics and history. They also, however, need an even more profound understanding of our own country, its governmental and political processes, and the nature of national objectives and interests. One who represents the United States obviously must understand it but in addition—and this is insufficiently appreciated—to report well on events in an assigned country, one must have an analytical framework which assigns relevance, and relevance depends on American interests. That assuredly does not mean that reporting should be filtered through an ideological prism which would distort the truth, but it does mean that there are all sorts of truths, and some are of more compelling interest than others.

The Foreign Service ambassador will often (but by no means always) have a deeper knowledge of the country to which he or

she is assigned than a non-careerist, but the non-careerist often has a comparative advantage in understanding the United States, particularly if he or she comes to a post with a broad background in government, economics or scholarship.

Career officers typically complain that politicians and political appointees do not sufficiently appreciate "the world as it is." In a sense that is true. The Foreign Service will more accurately reflect trends and values prevailing outside the United States than the non-careerists. But, I believe, the converse is also true: the Service will less accurately reflect counterpart trends and values dominant within the United States. The Foreign Service in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s was significantly more sympathetic to dominant trends in Western Europe during that time, including what we have come to see as misguided ideas of accommodation with fascism, than was the Roosevelt Administration.<sup>8</sup> Today, I would argue that the Foreign Service is more willing to accommodate Marxist trends around the world than are many politicians or the American people as a whole. Essentially that is why Daniel Patrick Moynihan as U.N. Ambassador was so popular with the American public but so repugnant to our professionals.

To some extent the world, to the Foreign Service, is divided up into the sum total of ambassadorial posts. The resulting distortion is analogous to the political distortion at the United Nations (one dictator/one vote). Thus, Foreign Service partiality to the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli dispute over the last 30 years does not have its roots (as some critics have suggested) in undue deference to Arab oil power, nearly so much as in the fact that there are over a score of Arab capitals—which means there are that many embassies and that many ambassadorial slots in Arab nations.

Foreign Service officers necessarily tend to specialize in certain areas of the world; the burdens of language training alone ensure this. For self-advancement, an officer must be hospitably received in the country or countries in which he specializes. Moreover, once posted in a country, good reporting requires sources of information, particularly among influential or governing elites. Inevitably, therefore, a Foreign Service officer has a tendency toward what is referred to in the State Department as "clientism," a term which suggests overemphasizing the interests of a foreign country (as defined by the governing elite) vis-à-vis the broader interests of the United States. "Good relations" between the host country and the United States (often at our expense) become an

<sup>8</sup> See Weil, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 94-102 and 119-28.

end in themselves without sufficient regard to U.S. geopolitical and geostrategic interests.<sup>9</sup> Some political appointees, admittedly, are subject to the same tendency, but since political appointees have other career options they are likely to be less susceptible to the germ.

The Foreign Service officer has a natural tendency toward caution; one advances in the Foreign Service by not making mistakes. It follows, then, that risk is to be avoided. One kind of avoidable risk involves too sharp a presentation of options. Just as a diplomat must often seek to paper over disputes between his own country and his assigned country, he learns to blur American foreign policy options for presentation to policymakers. Thus the State Department's nickname, "the Fudge Factory."

The other kind of risk typically eschewed by career officers is too vigorous a defense of American interests because such behavior can lead to relative unpopularity with the nation or group of nations in which the officer specializes—particularly if that group of nations shares a common ideology. For instance, two political appointees of Roosevelt in the 1930s, Claude G. Bowers to Spain and William E. Dodd to Germany, were far more outspoken in defending American values and ideology in the face of fascist attacks than the prevailing views within the career service or, in the case of Dodd, his career-service successor.<sup>10</sup>

At bottom, a good diplomat, like a good politician, domestic bureaucrat, businessman, lawyer or administrator, is one who exercises good judgment. The Foreign Service does attract, on the whole, the ablest men and women who enter government. But I would contend that it is relatively rare for Foreign Service officers in their first ten or 15 years to exercise responsibility equivalent to that available to a talented young person in the domestic Civil Service or, even more pronouncedly, outside government. Good judgment comes from the opportunity to exercise responsibility—even the opportunity to make mistakes. The Foreign Service is one of America's most rigidly hierarchical organizations. The most insignificant question must be passed up through the apparatus, layer after layer. This is particularly so in Washington but true also in most embassies. Such an operational climate does not

<sup>9</sup> See "Clientitis, Corpulence and Cloning at State—The Symptomatology of a Sick Department," John Krizay, *Policy Review*, Spring 1978, pp. 39-55.

<sup>10</sup> Both Dodd and Bowers are discussed in the anecdotal but useful gallery of ambassadorial portraits by E. Wilder Spaulding, *Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary*, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961, pp. 170-77. For a more considered comparison of Dodd and his successor, Hugh Wilson, see Arnold A. Offner, *American Appeasement*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 206-16. How much of Hitler's well-known view of the weakness of Western democracies arose from his perception of Western professional diplomats?

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produce sufficient opportunities for junior officers to assume responsibility and, therefore, to develop seasoned judgment.

All of these considerations lead me to believe we would have a far better Foreign Service if we could provide incentives for Foreign Service officers to spend significant periods in domestic agencies where real responsibility can be offered earlier. The present personnel practice of the State Department discourages this. One-year stints on the Hill or with domestic agencies are not uncommon. But three or four years at the Treasury Department or Interior will actually injure the Foreign Service officer's career chances. By comparison, great newspapers will often assign journalists, whose function closely parallels certain tasks of the diplomat, alternately to domestic and foreign assignments. Indeed, the best foreign correspondents and columnists are those whose interests and experience include domestic affairs.

West European countries, in the main, rigorously segregate their foreign services from their domestic departments—and from political appointees as well. That should hardly be a persuasive precedent, however, since many of those countries are still burdened with an ancient tradition that demands aristocratic pedigrees (or reasonable contemporary facsimiles in the form of university degrees) from career diplomats. The communist states and many developing countries, on the other hand, often transfer diplomats back to responsible jobs in domestic affairs. This practice ensures that ambassadors are more well rounded and, not incidentally in my view, more aggressive in pursuit of national interests when serving abroad. That Japan, for instance, draws heavily upon its economic ministries for diplomats may be related to its persistent and successful pursuit of foreign markets.

It is sometimes observed—Harold Nicolson, the British counterpart to George Kennan, said it patronizingly—that career diplomats are trained to patience, whereas amateurs often blunder by seeking to accomplish too much during their relatively short tenure. There is a good deal of truth to that, but the other side of the coin is that the Foreign Service officer is often slow to see the importance of change, and “the essence of good foreign policy is constant re-examination.”<sup>11</sup> For this reason, I believe we need both careerists and non-careerists among our diplomats.

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What, it may be asked, does all of this have to do with the stuff of foreign policy? Does it really make much difference whether

<sup>11</sup> David Halberstam, *The Best and The Brightest*, New York: Random House, 1972, p. 121.

our ambassadors and assistant secretaries are drawn from the career Foreign Service or from outside those ranks—and in what proportion? Is this just an unseemly squabble between two classes of jobseekers without relevance to the broad compelling issues of foreign policy? On the contrary, in my view the tension between political authority and careerists has had, and continues to have, an unfortunate impact on the shaping and articulation of these issues.

Consider the recurring frustration American Presidents express concerning their relative inability to control and direct the State Department. One need not agree with Daniel Yergin's revisionist theory of the cold war set forth in his recent *A Shattered Peace* to recognize that he chronicles a sad story of guerrilla warfare between the professional Foreign Service and the Roosevelt Administration. The story is amplified by Martin Weil's more recent *A Pretty Good Club*. Since the 1920s, the constant theme of the Foreign Service has been resistance to political appointees and that, in turn, has led to presidential hostility and various techniques to circumvent the Foreign Service. President Nixon's use of the National Security Council to fashion and implement his Soviet and China initiatives—because he distrusted the Foreign Service—parallels Roosevelt's efforts to conduct foreign policy, as Weil and Yergin recount, using various confidants outside the State Department. The Foreign Service did its best to sabotage Roosevelt's efforts to negotiate terms for diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933; thereafter, he wisely did not trust his State Department.<sup>12</sup> Nixon, it seems, distrusted State even more than the domestic bureaucracies. Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all, at one point or another, expressed the same exasperation with the State Department and sought to circumvent its institutional hostility.<sup>13</sup>

Now, of course, Presidents have been known to complain about unresponsiveness in other executive branch bureaucracies as well, but the State Department has been in a class by itself. If one thinks hard about this, it seems extraordinary. Other bureaucracies present difficulties for presidential direction because of their symbiotic relationship with domestic constituencies and congres-

<sup>12</sup> Weil, *op.cit.*, pp. 69-71.

<sup>13</sup> Dulles seems to have largely ignored the great bulk of the Foreign Service during Eisenhower's presidency, without too great a resistance since the Service was still terrorized by its searing experience with McCarthyism. See Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, Boston and Toronto: Atlantic Little, Brown, 1973, *passim*. By President Kennedy's time, the Service seems to have regained its urge to resist. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978, pp. 451-61.

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sional committees and staffs—often referred to as “iron triangles.” But as the Foreign Service so often complains, it has no supporting domestic constituency and, therefore, less of an institutional ally within the Congress. One would expect that the State Department would be the department most responsive to presidential will rather than the least. The answer to this paradox lies, I believe, in the resentment, unique in our government, that Foreign Service officers feel for political appointees in the State Department. This resentment inevitably leads Foreign Service officers toward resistance to any political direction of foreign policy—even presidential.

Of course, disputes between the Foreign Service and political authority are always couched in policy terms, but the root cause, I believe, is often found in the Foreign Service’s natural fear of diminishing job opportunities and a concomitant wish to expand these. It is impossible to exaggerate the fierce attention career officers pay to the number of political appointments (like the unemployment rate, the absolute number is less “politically” significant than the rate and direction of change), or the resistance new political appointees encounter. I dare say this is less a reflection on the Foreign Service than it is an observation on human nature; any group of people would surely behave the same. One should keep in mind that promotion in the Foreign Service is more difficult than in the Civil Service; the personnel structure is more like a pyramid. So long as every political appointment is seen as a direct threat to the Foreign Service officer’s career advancement, his or her attitude vis-à-vis both the appointee and the authority represented is inevitably negatively affected.

The most troublesome aspect of this phenomenon is that the bureaucratic struggle it causes takes on a life of its own. Since the career Foreign Service officer rejects the *legitimacy* of politically appointed ambassadors or assistant secretaries, it necessarily tends to reject whatever new ideas or perspectives those men or women bring to their posts. For instance, the previously mentioned Ambassadors Dodd and Bowers saw the dangers of European Fascism and Nazism with a good deal more clarity than the professional Foreign Service. But the views of both men were rejected and both were criticized for their efforts to defend American values under fascist attack. In turn, the President’s appointees, if they are not beaten into submission by the obdurate hostility of the Foreign Service, tend to reject its expertise. A whole administration can thereby turn a deaf ear to legitimate concerns of conscientious Foreign Service officers.

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Patrick Hurley's experience is, in this respect, instructive. As our Ambassador to China during the crucial period of the Chinese civil war, he is often accused of ignoring—indeed, of persecuting—the old China hands, that corps of excellent Foreign Service China experts who consistently warned U.S. policymakers of the likely communist triumph in China. But what is not often noted is that Hurley, by the time he arrived in China as Special Envoy in 1944, had experienced several years of Foreign Service coolness or even hostility. He had undertaken several wartime missions for President Roosevelt and, in particular, after a sojourn in Iran as Roosevelt's Special Envoy, his recommendations for postwar U.S. policy toward that country—of which Roosevelt approved—had been buried by the State Department's hierarchy. To be sure, Hurley was a man of severe limitations, but the persistent hostility of the Foreign Service surely contributed to his inability to draw upon its expertise.<sup>14</sup>

Perhaps no one in recent years has more directly confronted the Foreign Service than Daniel Patrick Moynihan, whose views expressed both in his famous *Commentary* article "The United States In Opposition" and during his term as Ambassador to the United Nations so fundamentally challenged conventional wisdom as to the appropriate tactics the United States should employ vis-à-vis the Third World (as well as the "socialist" bloc). The implacable hostility he aroused in our own Foreign Service against a "politician" obscured the validity of Moynihan's analysis even for some officers who privately conceded much of his thesis. Andrew Young's more recent performance has generated similar if more muted disdain among the professionals. Moynihan and Young represent virtually polar philosophic extremes with respect to most foreign policy issues facing the United States; both have been, concerning the appropriate strategy and tactics the United States should employ vis-à-vis dictatorial Marxism, marginally further to their end of the pole than the administrations they have served. But both were appointed Ambassadors to the United Nations because of their views and not despite them, by administrations that wished these articulate men to help fashion the indispensable ideological component to foreign policy. Both, therefore, were entitled to the Foreign Service's full support rather

<sup>14</sup> For a dispassionate view of Hurley's encounters with the Foreign Service concerning Iran and later in China, see Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973, pp. 124-33, and Chapters VI-XI. A sharply critical view of Hurley in China will be found in Theodore H. White, *In Search of History*, New York: Harper & Row, 1978, pp. 197-205.

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than the back-alley muggings which have characterized their respective tenures.<sup>15</sup>

Ostensibly it is their style to which the Foreign Service has most objected; neither man was sufficiently discreet to satisfy the requirements of career diplomacy (admittedly both made gaffes)—but the truth of the matter is that both sharply articulated fundamental policy issues so that the American people could see them. That is terribly threatening to the Foreign Service officer because it allows for political resolution of these issues.

The career Foreign Service officer will, and indeed should, exercise a cautious drag on political swings in foreign policy direction. Any government bureaucracy will do the same, since it has an intellectual and psychological investment in past policy. Particularly is this important in foreign affairs, since other nations, too, have investments in these policies. Capricious turns of the foreign policy wheel will inevitably undermine U.S. credibility. But the Foreign Service's challenge to the *legitimacy* of senior political appointees in the State Department does not serve a policy interest because it does not actually focus on policy. More, it extends beyond advice regarding fashioning of policy to constitute obstruction of the implementation of policy. And this, in a vicious circle, tends to generate within political authority a disposition to disregard completely whatever the Foreign Service has to contribute.

No one seems to have understood the difficulties in dealing with the Foreign Service better than Henry Kissinger. As National Security Adviser he deftly outmaneuvered the whole State Department including the senior political appointees, and as Secretary of State he exercised astonishingly successful control over most issues of foreign policy. He did so not by "managing" the State Department; middle- and lower level officials often were blissfully uninformed concerning Kissinger's strategy and tactics even in their areas of substantive responsibility. And when informed or partially informed, they were frequently shockingly open in their opposition, particularly in the early stages of his tenure as Secretary.<sup>16</sup> But Kissinger so centralized decision-making and personally so dominated the important cable traffic as to ensure his own direction of key policy movements. Naturally some

<sup>15</sup> For Moynihan's story see *A Dangerous Place*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978. His *Commentary* article appeared in March 1975, pp. 31-44.

<sup>16</sup> Foreign Service morale at any point seems always to be worse than it was in the past but, as is true of any department, a strong Secretary with a coherent strategic view improves career morale in due course even when there is widespread disagreement with that Secretary's views. This appears to have been true in Mr. Kissinger's case.

## PRESIDENTS AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT 889

matters, like the Cyprus crisis of 1974, fell between the cracks, but Kissinger's energy and range were absolutely astonishing. To aid him—for not even Kissinger could do everything alone—he promoted into senior presidential appointments relatively young and capable Foreign Service officers who because of their junior status would be unusually loyal to the Secretary.

Most of these young men, however, had little attachment or loyalty to the Republican Administration or to the President. In fact, the majority were at least nominal Democrats, which of course accentuated their calculated dependence on Kissinger personally. As a result, the foreign policy of the United States appeared—and indeed was—the child of the Secretary of State without structural links to the Administration or the Republican Party. When, as was inevitable, foreign policy came under attack in the presidential campaign of 1976, both Reagan first, and Carter second, effectively denigrated President Ford's leadership by pointing to Henry Kissinger's dominant role. The senior appointees in the State Department were not then conspicuous, even in private, in their defense of the President. They may, as some have noted, have been busy with transition plans, but even if they had been willing to respond vigorously to the political attacks, as careerists they would not have been credible or effective.<sup>17</sup>

So even though Kissinger dominated the State Department's product to a degree not seen before, and probably not to be seen again, his technique did not lead to political—that is to say, presidential—control over foreign policy. Unless a President can command the political loyalty of all of his senior department appointees, political control is impossible.

### VI

Three competing interests, then, are involved here. First, democratic control of foreign policy requires political presidential appointments in the State Department just as is the case with all other government departments. Second, the debilitating friction between administrations and the Foreign Service must be reduced. Third, spokesmen for the Foreign Service are right to concern us all with maintaining the morale of the Service. If a career officer cannot look forward to the day he or she is appointed an ambassador, we will not continue to attract top-grade talent into the Foreign Service. That consideration has led Service spokesmen to urge Congress to limit by statute the number or percentage of

<sup>17</sup> The tradition precluding State, Defense and Justice appointees from political campaigning does not and should not prevent their response to political criticism directed at policies or activities of their departments.

## 890 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

non-career ambassadorial appointments. The Constitution, in my view, however, will not tolerate such legislative limitations on the presidential appointment power.<sup>18</sup>

These three conflicting policy interests—to encourage political control, to reduce competitive friction and to ensure a fixed percentage of ambassadorships for Foreign Service officers—can be accommodated. I propose a law that would convert all but a set number of ambassadorships, say 15 or 20, into appointments of the Secretary of State.<sup>19</sup> Incumbents would be limited to career officers and would carry their Foreign Service grade (normally at the top or close to it), but *not* an executive-level rank commensurate with senior presidential appointments. Of course, this would change the ostensible nature of these ambassadorships; they would no longer be seen as policymaking positions. But the truth of the matter is that few ambassadorships today are in practice real policymaking positions. As has been remarked too often, advances in transportation and communications have erased much discretion that ambassadors were once called upon to exercise. For the same reason, it is more a fiction than fact to describe most ambassadors as personal representatives of the President—they usually take directions drafted by an assistant secretary or below. No purpose is served in perpetuating the fiction.

<sup>18</sup> Congress has, over the years, sought to fashion legislative limits on the President's appointive discretion by specifying characteristics of those to be appointed to particular posts. When applied to executive branch appointments, this practice is constitutionally dubious; the more discretion is restricted, the more dubious the practice. Cf. *Meyers v. U.S.*, 272 US 52: "We see no conflict between [congressional power to prescribe qualifications for office] and [presidential power] of appointment and removal provided, of course, that the qualifications do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation." The Senate could, as has been suggested, resolve or otherwise declare that it would not confirm more than a fixed number or percentage of political ambassadors. That approach strikes me as an unseemly circumvention of the Constitution.

<sup>19</sup> Under the Foreign Service Act of 1945, *all* Foreign Service officers like military officers are presidentially appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate—to a class or grade, rather than to a specific post (22 USC 906). The Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 specifies that "ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States" shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. It also provides, however, that "Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments." "Inferior officers," as used here, is not a pejorative, but simply means officers who can be appointed by constitutionally recognized officers. Although the issue has never been squarely decided, and occasionally courts have referred to inferior officers as those not specifically mentioned in that clause (see *U.S. v. Germaine*, 99 US 508, 510) it seems more likely that ambassadors, public ministers and consuls would be regarded as inferior to the Secretary of State if appointed by the Secretary. Attorney General Cushing implied just that in an opinion (7 OP AG 186, at p. 217). He pointed out that "the term ambassadors and other public ministers comprehends all officers having diplomatic functions whatever their title or designation" (page 211). It is therefore quite unlikely that the Constitution intended that no diplomatic officer could be considered an "inferior officer." In any event, because Foreign Service officers are presidentially appointed and confirmed for all promotions, it is clearly not constitutionally required that they be nominated and confirmed to each ambassadorial job assignment, as is statutorily required today (22 USC 901).

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To be sure, some ambassadorships to countries whose relationships with the United States are of overriding importance are of a different order. Usually in those cases, a web of political, cultural, economic and military connections makes appropriate an American envoy who actually is the personal representative of the President rather than merely of the State Department. Fifteen or 20 ambassadorships would, therefore, be reserved for presidential appointments confirmed by the Senate, and could be used by the President as he wishes for those countries he and the Secretary regard as falling within that category. These need not be assigned to the largest nations; one can visualize a particularly sensitive negotiation, like that over the Panama Canal, which could require an ambassador-at-large or an ambassador to a small country drawn from this pool.

Some may contend that those nations to which a political appointment is not sent will object to an implied downgrading of their importance. The United States and all other nations, it will be recalled, were, for similar reasons, driven to convert all legations into embassies (ministers to ambassadors). But my proposal treats all titles the same; it is only grades and political status that vary among embassies. Grades already vary among ambassadors today, depending on the size and importance of embassies, and as to political status, the Foreign Service claims that most nations prefer a career officer (which is not necessarily true) so the issue cannot be argued both ways.

A careful examination of presidential appointments in the Department should also be made with an eye to converting any that should not be regarded as truly policy-level positions into career appointments of the Secretary. The rest, particularly assistant secretaries and above, like the small group of political ambassadors, will be the President's men and women.<sup>20</sup> This doesn't mean that Foreign Service officers would be ineligible for appointment to these positions; that, too, might be an unconstitutional abridgement of the President's appointment power. But—and it is a very big but—the law should require any Foreign Service officer who accepts such an appointment immediately to resign from the Service with no right of return. On those rare occasions in the past when a civil servant accepted a presidential appoint-

<sup>20</sup> A limited number of political appointments below the rank of presidential appointment would be necessary as immediate staff to presidential appointees, corresponding to the "Schedule C" or NEA appointments in other departments. These are now generally treated as Foreign Service Reserve appointments, but I would suggest a separate category to avoid needless friction. Perhaps one top administrative post could be reserved for a careerist who would then be recognized as the senior serving Foreign Service officer, but I do not see this post as carrying a line policy role like the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

ment, that has been the practice in other departments<sup>21</sup> and it should be the rule in the State Department. Once having accepted a presidential appointment, a career officer should have committed his or her fortunes and loyalty to that President's administration. If the appointee has the right to return subsequently to the Service, either that commitment and the resulting presidential confidence will be undermined, or else subsequent administrations would be disadvantaged.

Some will certainly argue that it will be too difficult for either party to recruit able non-careerists for all senior posts—particularly toward the end of an administration. For that matter it is never easy to attract the very best political appointees into government in any department, but it can be done with sufficient effort. Surely the talent pool of those interested and experienced in foreign affairs throughout the nation is no smaller than that from which presidential appointees are drawn for other departments. It may not always be possible to find appointees with actual diplomatic experience any more than those coming into other departments have experience in the actual tasks performed by those departments. But it is not undesirable, in my view, that some political appointees bring different perspectives formed through varying experiences.

Others will contend that the conditions I would impose on Foreign Service officers who wish to accept a presidential appointment are draconian and will therefore effectively prevent careerists from serving in such positions. Admittedly, I do not mean to make it easy for ex-careerists to dominate policymaking positions; I would rather see the pool of other experienced political appointees in both parties expand. Nonetheless, a careerist who accepts a presidential appointment and is thereby forced to resign from the Foreign Service will hardly be unemployable when the appointing administration leaves office. We are, after all, discussing very senior appointments and the private market for such people is strong and will get even stronger. Moreover, depending on one's age, there is no reason to believe that such a person's diplomatic career would be finished upon the expiration of the appointing administration. Some, like the late David Bruce, might be ap-

<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, effective this July, provides otherwise. Mr. Campbell of the Civil Service Commission believes, contrary to the thrust of this article, that civil servants should have the opportunity to serve in political appointments and still maintain Civil Service reemployment rights. I strongly doubt, however, given the tradition in the domestic departments, that many civil servants will be offered presidential appointments (other than such posts as Assistant Secretary for Administration), or that after receiving them, they would invoke the new right to return to Civil Service status. If they do, succeeding administrations would surely bury them.

## PRESIDENTS AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT 893

pointed in successive administrations; others would surely reappear when their party returned to office. In any event, it is probably advisable to consider some modification of the Foreign Service retirement scheme to ensure a greater measure of financial security for persons in this category.

If this proposal were made law, what benefits would flow from its implementation? Foreign policy formulation would thereafter be generally recognized as the responsibility of political authority and, at least conceptually, would be distinguished from foreign policy execution. The latter responsibility, clearly subordinated to the former, would be the task of the careerist. A clear line of demarcation between political appointments and career jobs would, both at home and abroad, substantially lessen that institutional friction between the Foreign Service and the presidency which has negatively affected the conduct of American foreign policy.

The Foreign Service would have gained a great deal, however: a fixed number or percentage of ambassadorships—the vast majority, at that—would be reserved to the careerist. What is crucial here is not so much the particular number, but that there be a fixed number. Certainty as to the number of political appointments would substantially relieve the quite natural career anxieties of Foreign Service officers; future political appointments would not thereafter be seen as the institutional threat they presently constitute. Furthermore, with only a relatively few ambassadorships to appoint—at senior levels—any President would be a good deal less likely to give those appointments to men and women whose primary qualification is financial campaign contributions.

Most important, as Presidents gained greater confidence in their ability to control the Foreign Service, they would have less incentive to circumvent the State Department. The undoubted expertise in that Department, therefore, would be more effectively employed.

Snowflake

September 30, 2002 10:11 AM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Post-Saddam

Attached is an interesting article by Robert Kaplan.

Thanks.

Attach.

Kaplan, Robert D., "A Post-Saddam Scenario," *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 2002.

DH/R.dh  
093002-13

IRAQ

30Sep02

**W01139-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13970



**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
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This is a special preview of material from our November 2002 issue,  
available for sale at newsstands October 15.

The Atlantic Monthly | November 2002

## **A Post-Saddam Scenario**

*Iraq could become America's primary staging ground in the Middle East. And the greatest beneficial effect could come next door, in Iran*

BY ROBERT D. KAPLAN

• • • •

The constellation of overseas bases with which the United States sustained its strategic posture throughout the Cold War was a matter not of design but of where Allied troops just happened to be when World War II and its aftershocks—the Greek Civil War and the Korean War—finally ended. The United States found itself with basing rights in western Germany, Japan, Korea, the eastern Mediterranean, and elsewhere. In particular, our former archenemy, Germany, precisely because America had played a large role in dismantling its Nazi regime, became the chief basing platform for U.S. troops in Eurasia—to such a degree that two generations of American soldiers became intimately familiar with Germany, learning its language and in many cases marrying its nationals. If the U.S. Army has any localitis, it is for Germany.

A vaguely similar scenario could follow an invasion of Iraq, which is the most logical place to relocate Middle Eastern U.S. bases in the twenty-first century. This conclusion stems not from any imperialist triumphalism but from its opposite: the realization that not only do our current bases in Saudi Arabia have a bleak future, but the Middle East in general is on the brink of an epochal passage that will weaken U.S. influence there in many places. Indeed, the relocation of our bases to Iraq would constitute an acceptance of dynamic change rather than a perpetuation of the status quo.

Two features of the current reality are particularly untenable: the presence of "unclean" infidel troops in the very Saudi kingdom charged with protecting the Muslim holy places, and the domination by Israeli overlords of three million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Neither will stand indefinitely. President Bush's refusal to force the Israelis out of the West Bank has heartened neoconservatives, but it is a temporary phenomenon—merely a matter of sequencing.

Only after we have achieved something more decisive in our war against al Qaeda, or have removed the Iraqi leadership, or both, can we pressure the Israelis into a staged withdrawal from the occupied territories. We would then be doing so from a position of newfound strength and would not appear to be giving in to the blackmail of those September 11-category criminals, the Palestinian suicide bombers. But after the Israelis have reduced the frequency of suicide bombings (through whatever tactics are necessary), and after, say, the right-wing Israeli leader Ariel Sharon has passed from the scene, Bush, if he achieves a second term and thus faces no future elections, will act.

But first the immediate issue: Iraq. The level of repression in Iraq equals that in Romania under the Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu or in the Soviet Union under Stalin; thus public opinion there is unknowable. Nevertheless, two historical cultural tendencies stand out in Iraq: urban secularism and a grim subservience. Whenever I visited Baghdad in the past, the office workers at their computer keyboards had the expressions that one imagines on slaves carrying buckets of mud up the steps of ancient ziggurats. These office workers labored incessantly; a cliché among Middle East specialists is that the Iraqis are the Germans of the Arab world (and the Egyptians are the Italians). Iraq was the most fiercely modernizing of Arab societies in the mid twentieth century, and all coups there since the toppling of the Hashemite dynasty, in 1958, have been avowedly secular.

Given the long climate of repression, the next regime change in Iraq might even resurrect the reputation not of any religious figure but of the brilliant, pro-Western, secular Prime Minister Nuri Said, who did more than any other Iraqi to build his country in the 1940s and 1950s. As in Romania, where the downfall of Ceausescu resurrected the memory of Ion Antonescu, the pro-Hitler nationalist executed in 1946 by the new Communist government, the downfall of Iraq's similarly suffocating autocracy could return the memory of the last great local politician murdered in the coup that set the country on the path to Saddam Hussein's tyranny.

Iraq has a one-man thugocracy, so the removal of Saddam would threaten to disintegrate the entire ethnically riven country if we weren't to act fast and pragmatically install people who could actually govern. Therefore we should forswear any evangelical lust to implement democracy overnight in a country with no tradition of it.

Our goal in Iraq should be a transitional secular dictatorship that unites the merchant classes across sectarian lines and may in time, after the rebuilding of institutions and the economy, lead to a democratic alternative. In particular, a deliberately ambiguous relationship between the new Iraqi regime and the Kurds must be negotiated in advance of our invasion, so that the Kurds can claim real autonomy while the central government in Baghdad can also claim that the Kurdish areas are under its control. A transitional regime, not incidentally, would grant us the right to use local bases other than those in the northern, Kurdish-dominated free zone.

Keep in mind that the Middle East is a laboratory of pure power politics. For example, nothing impressed the Iranians so much as our accidental shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner in 1988, which they believed was not an accident. Iran's subsequent cease-fire with Iraq was partly the result of that belief. Our dismantling the Iraqi regime would concentrate the minds of Iran's leaders as little else could.

Iran, with its 66 million people, is the Middle East's universal joint. Its internal politics are so complex that at times the country appears to have three competing governments: the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei and the goons in the security service; President Mohammad Khatami and his Western-tending elected government; and the former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose *bazaar* power base has made him a mediator between the other two. Sometimes Iranian policy is the result of subtle arrangements among these three forces; other times it is the result of competition. The regimes of Iraq and Iran are fundamentally different, and so, therefore, are our challenges in the two countries.

Vastly more developed politically than Iraq, Iran has a system rather than a mere regime, however labyrinthine and inconvenient to our purposes that system may be. Nineteenth-century court diplomacy of the kind that Henry Kissinger successfully employed in China with Mao Zedong and

Zhou Enlai will not work in Iran, simply because it has too many important political players. Indeed, because so many major issues are matters of internal bargaining, the Iranian system is the very opposite of dynamic. Iran's foreign policy will change only when its collective leadership believes there is no other choice.

Iranian leaders were disappointed not to see an American diplomatic initiative in 1991, after the United States bombed Baghdad—which, like the shooting down of the civilian jet, had greatly impressed them. Also likely to have been impressive to them was President George W. Bush's "axis of evil" speech (Iran's orchestrated denunciations notwithstanding). Overtures to the moderates in Iran's elected government, as the White House has already admitted, have not helped us—we will have to deal directly with the radicals, and that can be done only through a decisive military shock that affects their balance-of-power calculations.

The Iranian population is the most pro-American in the region, owing to the disastrous economic consequences of the Islamic revolution. A sea change in its leadership is a matter of when, not if. But a soft landing in Iran—rather than a violent counter-revolution, with the besieged clergy resorting to terrorism abroad—might be possible only if general amnesty is promised for those officials guilty of even the gravest human-rights violations.

Achieving an altered Iranian foreign policy would be vindication enough for dismantling the regime in Iraq. This would undermine the Iranian-supported Hezbollah, in Lebanon, on Israel's northern border; would remove a strategic missile threat to Israel; and would prod Syria toward moderation. And it would allow for the creation of an informal, non-Arab alliance of the Near Eastern periphery, to include Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Eritrea. The Turks already have a military alliance with Israel. The Eritreans, whose long war with the formerly Marxist Ethiopia has inculcated in them a spirit of monastic isolation from their immediate neighbors, have also been developing strong ties to Israel. Eritrea has a secularized population and offers a strategic location with good port facilities near the Bab el Mandeb Strait. All of this would help to provide a supportive context for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. A problem with the peace plan envisioned by President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, in the summer of 2000, was that coming so soon after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, it was perceived by many Arabs as an act of weakness rather than of strength. That is why Israel must be seen to improve its strategic position before it can again offer such a pullback.

Of course, many Palestinians will be unsatisfied until all of Israel is conquered. But in time, when no Israeli soldiers are to be seen in their towns, the seething frustration, particularly among youths, will turn inward toward the Palestinians' own Westernized and Christianized elites, in Ramallah and similar places, and also eastward toward Amman.

In regards to Jordan and our other allies, U.S. administrations, whether Republican or Democratic, are simply going to have to adapt to sustained turbulence in the years to come. They will get no sympathy from the media, or from an academic community that subscribes to the fallacy of good outcomes, according to which there should always be a better alternative to dictators such as Hosni Mubarak, in Egypt; the Saudi royal family; and Pervez Musharraf, in Pakistan. Often there isn't. Indeed, the weakening of the brutal regime of Islam Karimov, in Uzbekistan, will not necessarily lead to a more enlightened alternative. It could just as likely ignite a civil war between Uzbeks and the ethnic Tajiks who dominate the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara. Because Uzbekistan is demographically and politically the fulcrum of post-Soviet Central Asia, those advocating "nation-building" in Afghanistan should realize that in the coming years there could be quite a few more nations to rebuild in the region. For this reason some in the Pentagon are intrigued by a basing

strategy that gives us options throughout Central Asia, even if some countries collapse and we have to deal with ethnic khanates.

Our success in the war on terrorism will be defined by our ability to keep Afghanistan and other places free of anti-American terrorists. And in many parts of the world that task will be carried out more efficiently by warlords of long standing, who have made their bones in previous conflicts, than by feeble central governments aping Western models. Of course we need to eliminate anti-American radicals (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a case in point) who are trying to topple Hamid Karzai's pro-Western regime. But that doesn't mean we should see Karzai's government as the only sovereign force in the country. Given that the apex of Afghan national cohesion, in the mid twentieth century, saw the Kabul-based regime of King Zahir Shah controlling little more than the major cities and towns and the ring road connecting them, the prospects for full-fledged nation-building in Afghanistan are not only dim but also peripheral to the war on terrorism. We forget that the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not spark the *mujahideen* uprising. The spark came in April of 1978, in the form of the Kabul regime's attempt to extend the power of the central government to the villages. However brutal and incompetent the methods were, one must keep in mind that Afghans have less of a tradition of a modern state than do Arabs or Persians.

In any case, the changes that may be about to unfold in the Middle East will clear Afghanistan from the front pages. In the late nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire, despite its weakness, tottered on. Its collapse had to wait for the cataclysm of World War I. Likewise, the Middle East is characterized by many weak regimes that will totter on until the next cataclysm—which the U.S. invasion of Iraq might well constitute. The real question is not whether the American military can topple Saddam's regime but whether the American public has the stomach for imperial involvement of a kind we have not known since the United States occupied Germany and Japan.

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
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September 30, 2002 1:38 PM

000.5

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Commission on September 11

This is, as I am sure everyone will agree, enormously important. It can be well done or badly done. The key will be the chairman and the membership.

I think we ought to have a discussion about this, and make certain we are on the same wavelength as to how we think it ought to be handled.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
093002-58

30sep02

**W01140-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13975

October 1, 2002 9:04 AM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. L. H. [initials]*  
SUBJECT: Strategy

000,5

From time to time, Andy Marshall sends along pieces he has read and finds interesting. Because I found this one particularly interesting, I am sending it along for your possible interest.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

09/20/02 Marshall memo to SecDef: "Thoughts on a Strategy for the War on Terrorism"

DHR:dh  
100102-24

10CT02

**W01141-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13976



## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2950

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

DIRECTOR OF  
NET ASSESSMENT

September 20, 2002

(2)

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Andrew W. Marshall *Agree*  
SUBJECT: Thoughts on a strategy for the War on Terrorism

Larry Di Rite  
8/23

You like thinking broadly and strategically, therefore you might find the attached piece by my friend Gene Durbin, who was once my deputy, of interest. He may be a little too pessimistic about a few things, but his general picture of our situation seems right and the three alternative general strategies he proposes are interesting.

He plans to dig deeper and develop these strategies and the details of their implementation over the next two months.

*See highlights in  
appendix.  
with*

Larry Di Rite

11-L-0559 ASD/13977

**What's the Problem? Why do we Need a Strategy?**

The United States is now the focus and target of attacks emanating from the Muslim world. The attack on U.S. soil on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 could not be ignored as had been the previous attacks (WTC 1993, Khobar Towers 1996, U.S. embassies in Africa 1998). For two hundred years the U.S. could comfort itself with the belief that oceans and national strength would protect it. The attack on September 11, 2001 shattered that belief. Without a serious effort to protect ourselves now, it is highly likely that further attacks on the U.S. will occur.

It's important to distinguish between hostility and danger, and also to identify the time scale over which portions of a strategy should act. We need a strategy that protects us from danger. We need it in the near term. Over the long term, although we're unlikely to alter Muslim hostility, we should clearly convey to many Muslim populations that it is not permissible to attack us. We should provide incentives for Muslim governments to control their own extremists, and we should encourage and assist countries that practice a more tolerant and accommodating version of Islam.

It's also important to note the role of China in the development of the current danger to the United States. China is emerging as a long term strategic competitor. China provides technology, weapons, and training to states that are unfriendly to us, and through such states, to extremist groups. China's goal is to weaken the U.S. and to reduce U.S. influence and presence in the Middle East and Asia. China itself needs Middle Eastern oil and gas just as we do, and the Muslim world will therefore continue to be a theater of competition as both nations vie for influence and access.

**Why is the problem worse now than in the past?**

September 11, 2001 demonstrated a new type of weapon, a commercial airliner guided by Muslims willing to commit suicide while attacking us. This willingness to commit suicide, coupled with the increased likelihood that terrorist groups will be able to obtain nuclear and biological weapons, creates the specter that a very few people will be able to inflict a great deal of damage.

This willingness to mount a mass suicidal attack in 2001 came about partly because of the emergence of the militant and violent Wahhabi sect. Present in Arabia for hundreds of years, significant spread of the Wahhabi sect began only in the 1970's after Saudi financial support increased markedly. This allowed the Wahhabi imams to propound their hatred of the U.S. and Israel, to seed their Madrassas all over the world like a metastasizing cancer, and to create a pool of fanatical young males ready to destroy the infidel. Wahhabi schools and teachers now exist even in the United States. All who do not adhere to their strict beliefs are infidels, even moderate Sunni Muslims and Shiites, and of course, members of any other religion.

The ability of a terrorist organization to carry out an attack on the scale of "September 11<sup>th</sup>" depended on assistance from at least one government, that of Afghanistan. State resources are vital to terrorists. The Afghan-Soviet War produced cadres of trained and dedicated Muslim fighters willing to serve the Wahhabi cause. Since that war governments of various Muslim states have made money, weapons, bases, and cover available to extremist groups. Some of these states see terrorism as a relatively safe way to oppose the U.S., some to attack Israel or Russia. Terrorist actions have been safe since prior to 2001 the U.S. has not retaliated strongly against terrorists or their supporting states, nor did it move to curtail the economic resources available to such states.

There are more general factors which are relevant in a longer term strategy to confront and alter the Muslim world, but they are not as important to focus on in dealing with the present danger as are suicidal terrorists with WMD and U.S. vulnerabilities.

The Muslim world has seen itself as superior to the West for almost fourteen hundred years. Muslims are taught that their Islamic religion is a "perfected" version of Christianity and Judaism, that the Koran dictates how society is to be governed, and that Islam cannot be modified to accommodate Western cultural norms. From about 700 to about 1600 the Muslim world was in fact more powerful in almost every dimension than was the Western world and the Muslims viewed Western Civilization with contempt. The combination of religion and history has made it difficult for Muslims to accept the changes in relative power that have occurred over the past 400 years, and, given this long history, Muslim beliefs will not likely change soon, nor without consistent Western pressure.

Even when they were far more powerful than the West, Muslims (Turks, Arabs, Persians) had as their first priority keeping the Western infidels out of their lives. Muslim rulers did not want the West to infect their youth with alien ideas. They did not want Western intervention in their politics and their modes of governance. Most recently they have been particularly incensed by the Western emancipation of females. The first impulse of Muslim rulers has been to submerge differences and band together to oppose Western intrusion. Even the average Muslim male has preferred a Muslim autocrat (i.e. the Turkish Sultan) to a Christian imposed and influenced democracy.

Over the past 50 years the U.S. has become the predominant Western power in the Muslim world. It has gradually become the personification of everything negative about the West, and it is held responsible for the continued existence of the state of Israel in the midst of the Muslim world.

As petroleum emerged as the basis of the world's energy over the past century, so did a handful of autocratic regimes across the Muslim world. Iran is the only true theocracy. In the other problem countries autocrats (Khaddafi, Hussein, the House of Saud, Assad) govern simply to enrich themselves and their families. They resist Western intrusion and influence because they want to retain power. For a variety of reasons, these autocratic regimes also support or sponsor fundamentalist groups and terrorists. Pakistan presents a particular and special danger because of its hostility to India, its possession of nuclear weapons, the existence of fundamentalist movements with large numbers of fanatical young males, the support of terrorists by elements of the Pakistani government, and the existence of large, ungoverned areas of the country.

Most of these factors simply describe a hostility to the United States, but not a danger. It is the existence of weapons of mass destruction and the willingness of terrorists to die while attacking us that create the new dangers. These dangers are exacerbated because of the vulnerabilities of the U.S. society itself.

**United States Vulnerabilities:** The United States values freedom, openness, and the perfectibility of peoples and societies. In its pursuance

of national policies guided by these principles, the United States has made itself vulnerable, and arguably, weaker.

1. Entry policies: Immigration, open borders, education of foreign students, commercial priorities over security considerations.
2. Economic policies: Emphasis on broad free trade policies deprives us of the tool of bilateral trade agreements, which we could use to motivate cooperation. Free trade and globalization have resulted in the loss of high paying jobs and industries, while U.S. corporations relocate overseas, use cheap labor and then ship products back into the U.S. This hollowing out of the American economy and diminution of our export base certainly makes questionable how we will be able to maintain our standard of living while supporting a worldwide confrontation with Islam, let alone China.
3. Energy policies: We have made little effort to develop alternatives to imported oil, no real attempt to stabilize the Middle East except to humor the Saudis, and almost no effort to develop complete alternatives to hydrocarbons.
4. Sclerotic U.S. agencies: The FBI, CIA, DoD, State, NSC policy apparatus all bask in the successes of WWII and the Cold War, or are captured by the rosy glow of idealism, or have been captured by subcultures unable or unwilling to adapt.
5. Americans are by and large unconscious about our own national characteristics (rather than arrogant) but by this cultural hubris we make our security and foreign policy task much more difficult.

We are ignorant about this large (1.2 billion Muslim people) swath of the globe. We have few speakers of the various languages and little knowledge of the separate cultures. This makes for fragile intelligence capability, poor national policies, and excessive weight given to the few entities that purport to have expertise (State Department Arabists, CIA analysts, foreign born academics.)

Most of the Muslim world would probably grant that we have a right not to be attacked. But they would question why we provide unconditional support for the state of Israel in their midst and expect them to abide by our decision.

Because we value the interplay of ideas we believe our ideas should have a right to penetrate the Muslim world. We don't comprehend how this may threaten the basis of their civilization.

Our own culture has become more coarse, more crass, more amoral, even leading to criticism and reaction within this country. Yet our pervasive media assault the Muslim world with examples of our entertainment and our behavior. Worse, a large proportion of their populations, especially their youth, are attracted by our freedoms and our infidel ways.

**Prognosis:** Without focused effort, there is little on the horizon to make the situation better.

The Muslim birthrate is high, literacy is low, teaching by religious extremists is widespread, regimes do almost nothing to improve this. Hostile governments have sufficient money to buy weapons and expertise, to build laboratories, to create security forces to maintain their power, and to provide support to terrorist groups.

The United States is struggling to reconcile its civil liberties and its idealistic visions with the needs of its own security. There is no evidence we have a strategy to shut down the Madrassas and counter the Wahhabi incitement, even in the United States. We are not yet undertaking large language programs, and we have not begun significant efforts to communicate with either the Muslim world or the American public.

### **Why isn't anybody else in the world worried about terrorist attacks?**

China is engaged in a complex juggling act. It is worried about Muslim extremism, about notions of ethnic autonomy, and about the infiltration of Western freedoms. It has a long history of adding countries to its empire and keeping them there by force. While China has a much more homogenous society than does the United States, that society is under tight security control. China is actively engaged in strategies to weaken the U.S., one of which is undoubtedly to encourage and arm Muslim states and through them, extremist groups. China probably believes that at this time it can deflect Muslim ferment away from itself and that it can adequately protect itself against extremism. It does not want to create a hostile U.S.

just now. China is still weak compared to us, its companies are exporting into our markets as fast as they can, and China is becoming the world's low cost producer of goods, even high-end technological goods. They are educating large numbers of their students at our universities. As the Chinese economy grows they will need more Middle Eastern oil, and they obviously are concerned about the security and stability of those oil supplies.

Russia is economically and militarily weak. It is trying quietly to regroup, to regenerate its strength via cooperation with the U.S. and Europe, and to obtain foreign currency by trade with whomever it can. Russia has always been concerned about Muslim activities along its southern border and has a serious active problem in Chechnya. Russia has a long memory, a long planning horizon, excellent intelligence and security services, and a history of no-holds-barred war against terrorists and hostile neighbors.

Europe resents U.S. military and economic power, U.S. predominance in the Middle East, and U.S. cultural primacy. Europe is relatively fragile economically because of their extensive welfare policies and their aging populations. They have difficulty in agreeing on any foreign policy that requires resource use or sacrifice, a tradition of appeasement that goes back at least a century, and an long-standing anti-semitism. As long as Europe is not the target of Muslim attacks, their remaining energy will be directed at economic and diplomatic competition with the U.S. and attempts to limit Russian growth and influence.

## THE BROAD APPROACHES

**First**, the United States could back out of confrontation with the Muslim world, limit its involvement in Muslim regions, seriously defend its homeland and some narrowly defined vital overseas interests, and only very selectively militarily confront Muslim states or groups if it were clear that great danger was emerging.

a.) This approach could include negotiations to remove our irritants from the Muslim world, as well as efforts to curtail the expansion of Saudi-funded Madrassas, to counter their teachings, and via media efforts to deter state sponsorship and support of terrorism against us.

b.) We could initiate a serious effort (of the scope of the Manhattan or Apollo projects) to develop viable alternatives to oil.

c.) We could begin to withdraw support for an Israeli state in the Middle East, offering to relocate and protect the Israeli population elsewhere, even in the United States. If Israel rejected this, they would have to fend for themselves.

d.) Graduate education is a weapon. We could encourage U.S. students to study science and engineering in U.S. graduate schools by providing U.S. government subsidies, while at the same time making it harder for foreigners to train here in these subjects and then return home where the knowledge gained might be used against us. (This probably affects China more than the Muslim world.) Subsidies and encouragement to U.S. students might make the universities more agreeable to the prospect of losing their foreign students and their revenue. We could also start significant programs in foreign languages and the various Muslim cultures and countries.

**Second**, at the other extreme, we could accept that the present situation is a flare-up in a 1400 year old conflict between Islam and the West; it is not likely to end in the foreseeable future, and nothing we do is likely to change the fundamental Islamic view ("us versus the infidel".) Nevertheless, we would seek over time to reach a modus vivendi regarding acceptable behavior in the modern world. Most important, we would take steps to reduce the power of unfriendly states and groups to hurt us.

Various commentators (e.g. Ralph Peters) have pointed out that the Muslim world is not monolithic. Its susceptibility to change varies even by age group and certainly by country. Around the edges of the Muslim world (from Morocco in the West to Indonesia and the Philippines in the East and to the Turkic states in Central Asia) Islam is more plastic, more amenable to change than are the more rigid Arab and Persian states of the center. Our national policies must take account of the differences exhibited in the Islamic religion between countries.

Such a broad national effort could include:

a.) Defense of the U.S. homeland, including notable changes in entry and population surveillance policies, and control of extremist Islamic teaching within the United States.

b.) Development of a U.S. intelligence apparatus able to function without dependence on foreign countries to monitor developments in the Muslim world and produce high quality information, creation of security agreements between us and cooperative Muslim countries, and formation of U.S. military and counter-terrorist forces able to intervene directly, rapidly, and forcefully against extremist groups, or against dangerous developments such as the fall of a government such as Pakistan.

c.) Modification of trade policies to place security considerations over commercial priorities (speed of transit, convenience, profit.)

d.) Review of globalization and free trade philosophies with the objects of maintaining American economic strength rather than simply lifting the world's economic level, and of providing tools to deal with other governments.

e.) A continuing and major communications effort using many modes of media to convey:

- impermissible behavior
- the ultimate futility of attacks against the West
- alternatives to theocratic and autocratic governmental modes
- examples of more moderate and flexible Islamic practices

(Indonesia, U.S., India.)

f.) Educational programs to develop U.S. expertise in languages and Muslim cultures, and to maintain native strength in science and engineering, while restricting such education to students from unfriendly nations,

g.) Actions and programs to limit economic resources of those countries that house and support terrorist movements, (blockade oil tanker routes, freeze accounts, destroy loading facilities and pipelines.) Support of terrorist groups and activities is not a very expensive undertaking. Therefore while economic warfare sounds attractive, in itself it will not stop state support of terrorism. It may be able to reduce the resources available

for military infrastructure development, but the main importance of economic warfare will probably be as a motivator.

h.) In the final analysis, it may become necessary to alter national boundaries in the Muslim world in order to create long-term stability and to reduce danger. (Examples would be backing Hashemite legitimacy as against the Saudis, Turkey against Syria, Russia over portions of Iran, Jordan and Turkey over portions of Iraq, India over portions of Pakistan.) Such efforts would most likely depend on the cooperation of large powers such as India and Russia.

Third, an intermediate strategy focused on our own defense. Within such a strategy we would also develop the intelligence and counter-terrorist structures to disrupt terrorists, and we would carry out the planning needed to progress to a more major confrontation.

While serious, the terrorist threat to us is not now mortal. The United States is reluctant even to see the current threat as enduring, or to accept that it could grow in scope and virulence if unchecked. Our policies will undoubtedly continue to provide major irritants on which Muslim extremists will focus. We are unlikely to withdraw support for Israel. We are too powerful to be pushed out of the Muslim world. Our commercial interests will not readily move away from cheap oil and even less readily from oil itself. We certainly do not see ourselves as sufficiently threatened or as sufficiently strong to single-handedly re-draw the map of the Muslim world. Repeated attacks, especially with WMD, could quickly change our attitudes.

We are therefore in a position similar to that of the United States prior to World War Two. We probably will be attacked again, but there is not yet enough support for us to engage in a major activities to remake the Muslim world. We will have to wait.

In an intermediate strategy we would stratify the dangers apparent in the Muslim world and craft an appropriate set of activities for each subset.

Terrorist groups that we know of that would attack us if they had the means and opportunity.

Dangerous and unstable states whose governments are friendly to us (Pakistan, Egypt.)

Rich states on which we are dependent and whose policies damage us (Arabia.)

Rich, dangerous, and hostile states whose populations are divided (Iran) and who therefore are themselves unstable.

States which house terrorists without even knowing the extent of their infestation (Yemen, Balkans, Somalia, Philippines.)

Kleptocracies (Iraq, Libya, Syria, even some states of Central Asia.)

The elements of this strategy would include:

- a. media efforts
  - to educate the U.S. public,
  - to confront the Madrassas worldwide,
  - to depict for many different Muslim populations the alternatives to theocracy and autocracy
  - to show alternative forms of Islam,
  - to describe what we will consider impermissible behavior,
- b. increased effort to develop alternative oil supplies and alternatives to oil, ✓
- c. increased security priorities in entry policies, educational policies, and surveillance policies, ✓
- d. expansion of language and area programs, and evaluation of our science and engineering education policies, ✓
- e. analysis of the balance between commercial practices and security needs, and evaluation of the future effect of free trade and globalization on the strength of the U.S. economy, ✓
- f. construction of a worldwide intelligence structure focused on the Muslim world and predominantly independent of foreign assistance and separate from our existing organizations, ✓

- g. creation of military and counter-terrorist forces suitable for use against Islamic extremists and their supporting governments,
- h. analysis of the economic vulnerabilities of each of the countries that support terrorism, together with planning for actions to curtail the economic resources available to each of those countries, and
- i. development of relationships and programs so that governments in the Islamic world themselves have the incentive to control their own extremist movements.

September 30, 2002 2:46 PM

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Paul Wolfowitz

Here is an interesting transcript of Pete Pace talking with a *New York Times Magazine* reporter about our mutual friend, Paul Wolfowitz.

It struck me that you might want to read it, because he talks a bit about the military-civilian relationship.

There is no question but that Paul is doing a terrific job for the Department of Defense and the country.

Thanks.

Attach.

Keller, Bill. General Peter Pace Interview, 11 September 2002.

DHR:dh  
093002-67

000.7 D55

308p02

W01164-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13989

GENERAL PETER PACE  
VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Interview with Bill Keller, Reporter  
NY Times Magazine

SEP 30 2002

11 September 2002

~~NY Times:~~ I'm in the home stretch of finishing up this piece on Paul Wolfowitz for the Times Magazine and his staff suggested last week you might be a good person to add to the pretty long list of people I talked to and I won't say no to that. I won't take a lot of your time because I know you've got a full plate.

~~General Pace:~~ Well he gave me 50 bucks last night, so I'm ready. [Laughter]

~~NY Times:~~ That's what generals go for these days? [Laughter] Whatever happened to semper fi.

~~General Pace:~~ Are you a Marine?

~~NY Times:~~ I'm not, but I know you are.

~~Let me start by asking whether you'd encountered Wolfowitz before your current assignment. Where have you run into him? Where did your careers cross?~~

~~General Pace:~~ I certainly have been aware of him before because in his previous incarnations here in the building, I heard his name very often. But in truth, my personal association with him began last year, full time on 1 October when I became the Vice Chairman, and before that when he started to interview me for the various positions that were coming open up here, so it's really been the last year that I've known him best.

~~NY Times:~~ What's his operating style, and particularly his operating style when he's dealing with the uniformed?

~~General Pace:~~ He's really good. He listens and he absorbs and he asks penetrating questions, but he does it in a way that doesn't put anybody on the defensive. He's just really good at getting to the heart of the matter in a way that makes folks comfortable to share what they're thinking and doesn't put anybody on the defensive.

~~NY Times:~~ One of the reasons I was interested in doing this piece, there's kind of a caricature of him out in the general public, a lot of it has to do with Iraq, of course, but the notion that he's kind of an ideologue, and I know he's a more complicated guy than that.

I'm curious whether you came to the job with a sort of impression of him before you worked with him?

~~General Pace:~~ I heard some of the same stuff you're talking

11-L-0559/OSD/13990

about but I didn't come with any pre-judgment. And I can tell you, all my dealings with him -- first of all, he's really humble. Here's a guy who's an Ambassador, he doesn't want to be called Ambassador; he's earned a doctorate, he doesn't want to be called doctor; he's a Deputy Secretary of Defense, he doesn't want to be called Mr. Secretary; he wants to be called Paul. He's smart, and he's brilliant, and he does his homework, I mean, he really does his homework. He works late and he does a lot of reading.

He's open to ideas. Now he's not swayed from his position easily, but he will change his mind when the intellectual argument is of the kind that he in fact should change his mind, and he's very open to doing that. So I find him to be anything other than narrowly focused as he's portrayed sometimes.

**NY Times:** One thing you hear from outside, is that there's been some friction between the civilians in the Pentagon and the uniformed side, particularly on the business of Iraq. A concern among people in uniform that civilians are either over-optimistic about how easy it would be to do, or inclined to do it on the cheap, or not fully cognizant of just how complicated something like that could be. I thought it might be valuable to ask someone who's been pretty hands-on on the war on terrorism, whether there's anything to that.

**General Pace:** Bill, I appreciate the opportunity to talk to that because I really have had a hard time understanding where that particular characterization of the environment here comes from. I can tell you at least, at least 30 minutes per day, normally one, two, three, four hours per day Dick Myers, Pete Pace, Secretary Rumsfeld and DepSecDef Wolfowitz are together talking about issues. If there's anything that we're thinking about, it's encouraged that we speak up and expected that we speak up. The same thing with the Joint Chiefs.

What does happen, and I this is, as I tried to think the things through in my own mind, how the things get twisted in the reporting. It's kind of like the telephone thing where one guy says one thing and they keep passing it down the line and by the time the 20th person repeats it, it's something totally different. It is definitely true that when we sit around in these meetings and we sit around in the Tank there are varying views of how best to accomplish something. And each of the Joint Chiefs has his own views on how things could be done based on their own background and experience, and those are all put on the table very openly and very honestly and in a collegial, not a contentious way. Then we are expected, and I would tell you we are obliged by position to speak our minds to the Secretary of Defense and the President when we have differing opinions. So I am very comfortable that we have an environment inside of which we can speak, that we're expected to speak, and if any of us has

any concerns, and if we have not spoken our minds to the President or the Secretary of Defense it's our fault, not theirs.

**NY Times:** In the early days after September 11th I'm aware of at least two generals who were uneasy that Iraq was being pushed forward too quickly and too eagerly. One of them is now Secretary of State and the other one is General Shelton. Is that now not a concern? Have those differences such as they were been ironed out? I guess the question is, are the civilians and the uniforms pretty much on the same wave length, without saying what may or may not be decided, but in terms of how to proceed?

**General Pace:** Let me try to answer that for you and if I don't get to your point come back at it again because it's really an important question.

The military guys are looking at the military options around the world to include Iraq and our responsibility is to bring forward to the President and the Secretary when they ask for it plans that do whatever the mission is as efficiently and as effectively as we possibly can with minimum loss of life on the U.S. slash coalition side. So I am very comfortable that we have the opportunity, the authority, the responsibility to do just that.

On the policy side, the discussions amongst the various members of the President's Cabinet, that's really not for me to depict other than just like there are varying views inside the Tank about how specifically to go about obtaining a particular objective, I'm sure that same thing happens with the President's National Security Council.

There's a difference I think between portraying varying people's views of honest opinions of how to do something differently than to cast it as Camp A versus Camp B. Because what I've seen, it's not like that.

**NY Times:** I think that's about as close to an answer as I can honestly expect.

How has the whole transformation business set with the services -- that might be easier to answer as a Marine than it would be if you were Army, because I know there has been some angst in the Army, but Wolfowitz has been pretty closely identified with, among other things, killing the Crusader, but and with the general enthusiasm for transformation?

**General Pace:** I think the enthusiasm for transformation is great. I think everybody understands the need to change the way we do business. Then within that, first of all the major thing to

do is a mindset change because we can do, with the current equipment that we have, we can do things vastly differently than we have in the past. Take Afghanistan as an example. So, you don't have to have new toys to have transformation.

Now longer term, you do need to get lighter and more lethal and those kinds of things if you're going to be able to save the country money and move to battlefields more quickly, and have the same level of military impact with fewer troops. So that part very much is part of the future.

And then, the honest dialogue is: does one particular weapon system get you the kind of transformation you're talking about or not. That's again, honest dialogue between the guys who have either started down that path and they think they ought to stay on it, or the others who might have a new idea that they think should replace the old idea. So there's a lot of room in there for open discussion and dialogue, but I think we're very much at the front end of transformation. We are still, in my opinion, we are still very much in understanding what transformation is all about and how to go about setting up our processes to facilitate and encourage transformation. As we get that piece in our head, and there's been a lot of dialogue -- I've spent hours with the Secretary and the DepSecDef and the Service Chiefs and the Service Secretaries just sitting around in the room talking about what do we mean when we say transformation and how do we encourage it and how do we change the way we do business to get there. So I think there's plenty of room for honest dialogue about particular weapon systems, but the major point right now is to get people thinking alike. And I think we are. I think we really do understand there's tremendous opportunity out there for military efficiency and effectiveness and also saving big bucks for the taxpayer.

~~NY Times: Do you think he could have handled the Crusader thing a little more smoothly?~~

~~General Pace: I think in retrospect -- Well, the short answer is yes. [Laughter]~~

~~By virtue of the fact that the Crusader was an issue when it came out, in retrospect you say whoops, sure.~~

~~NY Times: I guess the Army probably could have handled it a little better too though, huh? Going to the Hill is not always the best way to ingratiate yourself with your bosses.~~

~~General Pace: I wasn't privy to who did what to whom on that, but obviously when there's angst created, whether it's on this side of the river or the other side of the river, that means~~

collectively we all could have done better.

NY Times: I'm really grateful for your time.

General Pace: Can I tell you one more thing Bill?

NY Times: Sure.

General Pace: We started out about Paul Wolfowitz and I would really be doing him a disservice if I didn't say this, because I truly believe it.

One of the greatest strengths of Paul Wolfowitz is his moral courage when he's sitting in a room of very senior people who are all discussing a particular issue one way, and his view is a little bit different or his approach is a little bit different. He always has the courage to voice his opinion, regardless of how far down the road the particular issue has already gotten. I really admire him because when you're in a room of senior policymakers and the folks in that room are who they normally are when we're sitting around like that, it takes a great deal of personal and moral courage to go counter-tide, so to speak. He does that very very effectively and very well.

NY Times: Any examples come to mind?

General Pace: Yeah, but I can't give them to you. [Laughter] Only because that would be breaking trust with the folks who we sit around with.

NY Times: You're talking about people who out-rank him?

General Pace: Yes. It doesn't take much moral courage to disagree with your subordinates.

NY Times: No. I wanted to be clear on that.

General Pace: Either his peers or above. And I think any time you're in with a peer group or folks senior to you that when the conversation is going one way, you've got to pause and make sure your thoughts are right, and then speak them. He does each of those very well.

NY Times: You raise the matter of moral courage. I guess, let me ask you one other quick question. Do you think it makes any difference to the people in uniform that he hasn't seen combat?

General Pace: No. Absolutely not.

**NY Times:** But you do sometimes hear from, not about him in particular, but you hear from guys who have some combat a bit of resentment that the people who are contemplating sending them off to war don't really know what it's like first-hand.

**General Pace:** The reason I am so quick to say no is because I know the man and I know that he listens. Many many of the leaders in our government have no military experience at all, yet they continue to listen and to absorb data and to weigh their own experiences against that military experience that we bring to the table and make decisions. So you don't need to have military experience yourself to be a thoughtful person who listens. And as I mentioned up front I think, Paul does his homework. He reads, he listens, he gets the whole cloth before he makes a decision. So there's no reason for anybody who has a uniform on to be concerned about the fact that this gentleman did not wear a uniform.

**NY Times:** That moral courage you referred to earlier, that willingness to speak your mind even when the whole tide is going against you, is that unusual in the circles you travel in?

**General Pace:** No, it's not. It's not unusual in the circles we travel in here, thank God. But it still is a fact that when you're sitting in a room like that and the tide's going in one direction, it takes courage to try to convince people that the tide ought to go in the other direction, and it should not be overlooked that we have folks like Paul Wolfowitz who are willing to do that on a daily basis.

**NY Times:** That's great. I hope I get a chance to talk to you again on something else.

**General Pace:** Bill, great. Thanks so much.

(END)

October 1, 2002 6:49 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Speech

I feel increasingly strongly that the President should do a speech to a Joint Session of Congress. It need not be in connection with Congress passing a resolution. It could wait until after the UN acts and he makes a decision.

The more I think about it and the more I travel around, I think there are questions in the public's mind. There has been a lot of misinformation floated around by Europeans and opponents. That being the case, if we may need to call up Reserve and Guard members, we will need the support of the public.

If you want to visit about it, give me a call.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
093002-85

AM 100-350

10/01

W01165-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13996

October 1, 2002 2:51 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Support

I don't know what the timing is on the UN resolution, and I don't know what the timing is on the Congressional resolution, since they are being handled out of the White House and the State Department. However, it seems to me that you are going to want to give some thought to getting the former Secretaries of Defense, former National Security Advisers, and former Secretaries of State (the ones who will do it) to sign a letter supporting the President's position, either before a vote in the Congress or before a UN action.

The Defense Department would be happy to help, except I don't have any guidance, and I don't know how to help. I wouldn't know how to draft the letter, because I don't know what it is we are trying to get support for.

I think it could be useful. You may want to get your folks thinking about it, and I think this is particularly true on the UN resolution.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100102-53

W01166-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13997

October 7, 2002 11:05 AM

020

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Honorable Mitchell Daniels

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*

SUBJECT: DoD Under Secretary for Intelligence and Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense

There is a way we can get both of these posts approved this year. It is extremely important that we do.

It currently looks like we can achieve it in the authorization process, if there is an authorization bill, but there may not be an authorization bill.

We believe we can manage it up on the Hill in the appropriations or continuing resolution process, but I'm told we're getting push back from OMB. I suspect they don't want to make their task more complex, which is understandable from their standpoint.

Please let's get everyone in line.

We have to have these two positions. They are important to the Department. I am requesting that everyone there get on the same wavelength, and that we all push and get this accomplished. If we do it in the next week, we can get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100702-24

W01167 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13998

October 15, 2002 10:20 AM

334NSC

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
CC: Honorable Steven Hadley  
Honorable Paul Wolfowitz  
Honorable Doug Feith  
~~Honorable Andrew Card~~  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Interagency Responsibilities

I would really appreciate it if your staff would put down "DoD" instead of "OSD" or "Joint Staff" when they prepare materials from the NSC and the interagency process. They put "Department of State" and "Department of Treasury," but for whatever reason, your folks seem to think that it is their job to decide who in DoD should do what. My view is that DoD ought to decide what the responsibilities ought to be for the interagency process.

Thank you.

DHR:dh  
101502-10

15 OCT 02

**W01200-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/13999

October 17, 2002 1:23 PM

C94  
2

TO: Honorable Clay Johnson  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PL*  
SUBJECT: Ambassador to World Radio Conference

There is a position open for U.S. Ambassador to the World Radio Conference.

The U.S. has a critical interest in sending someone who understands the technical details of this highly complex matter. The issues to be considered will affect virtually all government and private sector radio-frequency spectrum users, and several of the issues have profound national security implications.

We have asked for Ms. Janice Obuchowski to be considered. I am told she is extremely well qualified and that Michael Powell at the FCC supports her, too. Her resume is attached.

This is very important to the United States.

Thanks,

Attach.  
Resume

DHR:dh  
101502-21

**W01202-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/14000

2

## **BIOGRAPHY FOR JANICE OBUCHOWSKI**

Janice Obuchowski was the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration under President George H.W. Bush and is President of Freedom Technologies, Inc., a Washington-based telecommunications consulting and research firm.

Ms. Obuchowski has a range of experience that uniquely qualifies her to head this delegation to the WRC. She has served as a member and chair of the ITU's Telecom Board from 1993 to 2000, maintaining continued personal and professional relationships with many of the top ITU staff and political leadership. Over the last decade, she has represented primarily private sector interests as a participant at WRC 95 and WRC 92.

As Administrator for NTIA, she oversaw all federal spectrum management and development of federal government positions at WRC conferences. She also led U.S. delegations to international bilateral communications conferences. Prior to that, from 1987 to 1989 Ms. Obuchowski managed the NYNEX (now Verizon) worldwide government affairs program. Here again, she had extensive international responsibilities not only for interfacing with all U.S. government international telecommunications policymakers, but also for working on behalf of NYNEX at the ITU.

Further, during her seven years at the FCC during the Reagan Administration, Ms. Obuchowski advised the FCC Chairman on all telecommunications policy matters. She coordinated all FCC ITU activities, including preparations for WARC Mob-87, WARC HFBC-87, and WARC Orb-85. Specifically, she worked closely with WARC Orb-85 Ambassador Dean Burch in negotiating with the then-Soviet Union on satellite issues. She was the first female International Division Chief at the FCC, from 1982 to 1983.

During much of her career, she has been involved with the private sector. However, both because she interfaced with the Department of Defense during her tenure at NTIA and because she has worked with DoD on some recent issues, many of which are classified, involving the telecommunications network aspects of military transformation, she enjoys the confidence both of the private sector and of DoD.

October 15, 2002 5:25 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

CC: Honorable Albert Gonzales  
Honorable David Addington  
Honorable William J. Haynes, Jr.  
Honorable Peter Rodman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: International Courts

Attached is a paper on the difficulties Dr. Henry Kissinger is facing.

The U.S. Government ought to do a better job of helping a person in that position. For his service to our country, he is being harassed. The U.S. Government ought to pay legal fees for those problems, and the departments of the government and the White House ought to be interested and cooperative in assisting him with what he needs to protect himself.

What do you propose be done?

Thanks.

Attach.

August 20, 2002 paper

DHR:dh  
101502-50

W01203-02

2

11-L-0559/OSD/14002

In the last several years, judicial investigators in France, Chile, Spain, and Argentina have attempted to question Dr. Henry Kissinger about events taking place in Latin America while Dr. Kissinger was U.S. Secretary of State (1973-76). The questions, propounded in the form of "subpoenas" or "writs," principally seek information relating to alleged U.S. involvement in "Operation Condor," a network of Latin American countries (including Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil) created in the 1970s that is suspected of conspiring to persecute and assassinate thousands of political opponents.

The French court issued its subpoena containing twelve detailed questions relating to Operation Condor over a year ago. The Chilean court recently issued a similar set of eighteen questions seeking information about Operation Condor, as well as other alleged atrocities committed during the Pinochet regime, including the disappearance and death of Charles Horman, a journalist and U.S. Citizen. In April 2002, the Spanish Judge Garzon -- the same judge who sought the extradition of Augusto Pinochet in 1998 -- asked British officials to detain Dr. Kissinger for a deposition on similar issues while Kissinger was giving a speech in London. Fortunately, British officials rejected the request.

These repeated and ongoing efforts by foreign magistrates to question Dr. Kissinger present foreign policy concerns of the highest order. These concerns stem not only from the repeated harassment, and very real threat of judicial process, that Dr. Kissinger faces when traveling abroad. By purporting to question Dr. Kissinger about his official acts while serving as Secretary of State, these foreign courts are necessarily delving into matters implicating highly sensitive questions of U.S. foreign policy -- as a brief review of the questions propounded thus far reveals.

Such questions not only threaten to reveal highly sensitive, potentially classified, foreign policy decisions of the United States from nearly thirty years ago. They threaten to create a precedent under which a single foreign magistrate, without any apparent authorization from the government on whose behalf he claims to act, would have the power to use the judicial process to subject former high-ranking U.S. officials to questioning about any matter of U.S. foreign policy. While these questions thus far have been propounded only as to Dr. Kissinger, this precedent poses even greater mischief if applied to former sub-Cabinet rank officials who were more actively involved in implementing U.S. policies. And by permitting unimpeded informational access to former Secretaries of State such as Dr. Kissinger, we risk inviting similar attempts to seek information from *current* U.S. officials as well. Quite obviously, no government could function if its Secretaries or Foreign Ministers were constantly subject to judicial inquiries during their terms of office. Thus, in order to safeguard vital national interests -- both past and present -- the informational demands placed upon Dr. Kissinger clearly call for a coordinated, strategic response from the United States Government.

To date, the State Department's approach has been to prepare responses to some of the informational requests. (It is respectfully suggested that such responses, although deemed necessary to forestall efforts to seek extradition, should aggressively defend the propriety of U.S. policy and should present a self-contained, stand-alone, affirmative, contextual description of the relevant actions taken to implement that policy.)

Thus far, the U.S. Government has not taken coordinated steps to discourage these overzealous magistrates' direct intrusion into U.S. foreign affairs, or even to re-examine the threshold question whether it serves the national interests for the U.S. Government to answer these informational requests at all.

The authority of magistrates of one country to subject high-ranking foreign officials to judicial process directly implicates one of the most contentious issues of contemporary international law: so-called "universal jurisdiction." Promoted vigorously by human rights activists, this doctrine has been invoked to defend the power of any court in the world to impose sanctions, including criminal sanctions, against perpetrators of war crimes and other similarly egregious atrocities – regardless of the citizenship of the defendant, the citizenship of the victim, the place of the alleged crime, or well-established immunity doctrines protecting high-ranking governmental officials from liability for official duties. The decision by the British House of Lords denying Pinochet's claim of immunity from prosecution by a Spanish magistrate went a long way (at least in the minds of many human rights activists) towards establishing this principle as a doctrine of customary international law. A more recent decision by the International Court of Justice in *Congo v. Belgium* (February 2002) – recognizing a claim of immunity of a current Congolese minister subjected to an arrest warrant by the Belgian government for alleged war crimes occurring outside of Belgium – may well provide the beginning of much needed limits on this sweeping legal principle.

Of course, the Administration has been appropriately concerned with the expansive notion of universal jurisdiction in other contexts – most notably, in its recent decision not to join the Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. A similar concern, and coordinated strategic response, is necessary here to protect similar national interests. Foreign governments, let alone single magistrates purporting to exercise the judicial power of those governments, should not be permitted to second-guess the United States' foreign policy judgments by means of extra-diplomatic, informational requests directed at high-ranking former U.S. officials.

Whether the solution comes in the way of international agreements regulating this kind of international "discovery," or a firm unilateral declaration from the United States that it will not permit such international fishing expeditions in the name of "universal jurisdiction," it is clear that some action is necessary. Again, such action is necessary not only to protect Dr. Kissinger's interests and the interests of other former high-ranking officials. What is at stake is the very ability of U.S. Government effectively to conduct the nation's foreign policy unencumbered by the intrusion of the international subpoena.

August 20, 2002

DCI-523458.2

October 18, 2002 9:20 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Washington Airspace

Have any decisions been made with respect to the airspace over Washington and how we should handle it?

Can I be helpful in pushing it along?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101802-4

**W01223-02**

**11-L-0559/OSD/14005**

**Snowflake**

**October 17, 2002 8:40 AM**

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC Mil-to-Mil

You have expressed an interest in the U.S.-PRC military-to-military contacts. As you may recall, one of the aspects of the relationship is that we arranged for the head of the National Defense University, Vice Admiral Paul Gaffney, to visit the People's Republic of China earlier this month.

For your interest, prior to your meeting with Jiang Zemin, I am attaching a report from Admiral Gaffney's visit, which I think you will find of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/15/02 President NDU memo to CJCS re: Mil-to-Mil Contact with PRC - October 2002

DHR dh  
101702-J

**W01224-02**

**11-L-0559/OSD/14006**



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-5066

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 17 2002

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

15 October 2002

PERSONAL FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subj: MIL-TO-MIL CONTACT WITH PRC – OCTOBER 2002

1. As approved, I led a small delegation to the PRC from 8-14 October; after one-day working stops in Tokyo and Seoul. DATT Beijing and Air Attaché accompanied me. Everyone positively highlighted (including Chinese press) that this was the first substantive military-to-military contact since the EP-3 incident. Summary:

- a. Hospitality: 100%+. Could only be duplicated in the U.S. by POTUS.
- b. Transparency: 75%, but 110%+ of what was expected when trip started. Recommend my trip be considered a new baseline. Admiral Fargo's trip should "inch up" the transparency. I judge that the PRC is ripe for a step increase in transparency as long as they have the [bureaucratic] time to react.

2. Highlights:

a. 30-minute call with MOD (General Chi Haotien) stretched to 60 minutes. ALCON reported this was unusually positive, my schedule started being "beefed up" immediately thereafter.

b. Several events added: Naval Research Institute (NRI), Xian [Military/Civilian] aircraft factory, ad hoc PLA-AF A-5 tactical ground attack aircraft demo and fly off. Discussions at each visit were unusually open; ample time for substantive questions and answers allowed at: PLA NDU, NRI, Academy of Military Sciences, Shanghai Naval Headquarters, 28<sup>th</sup> Air Division, and Fudan University's "American Institute."

c. Requests for books and course materials – including at less-open AMS and NRI – were honored, and then some. I returned with a trunk full of publications.

d. Everyone we spoke with –in Japan and Korea too – mentioned concerns with what they called "the new doctrine" of preemption announced in the President's National Security Strategy. We tried to set that element of the strategy in context. We need to do more.

3. Sociology:

a. We had hundreds of miles of police escorted convoys. Most Chinese either ignored or [sometimes] challenged policy authority. At one point Police/PLA argued for 20 minutes about whether to pay a toll on an expressway. Transportation Police held their ground...PLA paid out of their pockets! An interesting indication to me of public independence and division of bureaucratic labor among PRC agencies.

2007  
5

11-L-0559/OSD/14007

Subj: MIL-TO-MIL CONTACT WITH PRC – OCTOBER 2002

b. I was impressed by the large number of Chinese cadets at the Air Engineering College studying English exclusively. I would judge 40-50% were women.

c. Most people we met socially or in business settings were very friendly and seemed to treat us as celebrities. Especially so, NDU students to whom I lectured, 18-20 year old English language students (women (one sought an autograph!)), and A-5 pilots.

d. The PLA officers from O-3 to O-8 had a remarkably consistent party line:

- We want dialogue with the U.S. military

- We are not strong militarily and our first priority is economic development.

When one sees Shanghai after Beijing and Xian one sees the obvious benefit that the Chinese see in economic development. Shanghai even after Xian and Beijing, is "mind-boggling."


e. PLA is not very joint.

f. PLA-NDU is organized like US-NDU. Yet, it was obvious in Q&A's that the principles of academic freedom/non-attribution, while appealing to many head-nodding students, was not typical in PLA-NDU.

4. I invited PLA CAPSTONE to visit the U.S. (early December). They are very pleased with DoD flexibility on dates. Also invited PLA-NDU President to visit the U.S. I expect this will be in CY03 as the present PLA-NDU President (General Xing Shizhong) told me he would probably not visit and would retire before the end of CY02. Keeping in mind a strategy of ratcheting up transparency, I recommend the US DOD exercise bureaucratic flexibility...because we should be better at this than PRC and because they tried to demonstrate last minute flexibility.

5. Worthwhile trip. Admiral Fargo will need to go a long way to beat me! Detailed trip report to be compiled by delegation and provided by separate cover.

Very respectfully,



PAUL G. GAFFNEY II  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Copy to:  
DJS  
J-5  
OSD (Col Hooper)

11-L-0559/OSD/14008

CLASSIFICATION:  
UNCLASSIFIED



Secretary of Defense  
CABLES  
Cover Sheet  
12/N



FROM: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

FROM THE OFFICE/DESK OF: Office of the Secretary of Defense

PHONE NUMBER: (b)(6)

8  
10/10/02 15:14

SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC Mil-to-Mil

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES: 4  
(Including Coversheet)

HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	FAX NO.
WHSR	President George W. Bush		WASHFAX
WHSR	Hon. Andrew H. Card, Jr		WASHFAX

REMARKS: Please Provide Receipt Confirmation As Soon As Possible to OSD CABLES

Courtesy Copy forwarded to Hon. Andrew H. Card, Jr

CLASSIFICATION:  
UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/14009

CLASSIFICATION:  
UNCLASSIFIED



**Secretary of Defense  
CABLES  
Cover Sheet  
12/N**



**FROM: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld**

**FROM THE OFFICE/DESK OF: Office of the Secretary of Defense**

**PHONE NUMBER:** (b)(6)

**SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC Mil-to-Mil**

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:**

**PAGES: 4  
(Including Coversheet)**

**HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS**

**IMMEDIATE DELIVERY**

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS**

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	FAX NO.
WHSR	President George W. Bush		WASHFAX
WHSR	Hon. Andrew H. Card, Jr		WASHFAX

**REMARKS: Please Provide Receipt Confirmation As Soon As Possible to OSD CABLES**

Courtesy Copy forwarded to Hon. Andrew H. Card, Jr

CLASSIFICATION:  
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11-L-0559/OSD/14010

~~SECRET~~

May 22, 2002 8:13 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter of Arrangement with UK

Attached is the agreement I have approved with the UK on their counternarcotics operation in Afghanistan. As I recall, you asked about it. It is done at my level; now they will sign it at the Peter Rodman level.

Thanks.

Attach.  
US-UK Letter of Arrangement

DHR:dh  
052202-6

22 Apr 02

~~SECRET~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/14011

W01236-02  
UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

October 24, 2002 7:37 PM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
Honorable George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: *New York Times* Story on So-Called Pentagon "Intelligence Unit"

At today's press briefing, I tried to tamp down the issue raised in the *New York Times* story this morning.

For your information, I am attaching the relevant excerpts from the transcript of the press briefing.

Very respectfully,

Attach.  
[October 24 DoD Press Briefing Excerpts](#)

W01244-02  
11-L-0559/OSD/14012

Thursday, Oct. 24, 2002 - 1:44 p.m. EDT

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Excerpts from DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers

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Q: Speaking about The New York Times and their article today, they have this article about a Defense Department team sifting through intelligence information separate from, obviously, the CIA and the DIA. Can you talk about that team, what it does and why it's created?

Rumsfeld: I asked about that this morning after skimming that article, and I'm told that after September 11th, a small group -- I think two, to start with, and maybe four now, or some number close to less than a handful of people in the policy shop were asked to begin poring over this mountain of information that we were receiving on intelligence-type things, and that they have been doing that. It is not -- any suggestion that it's an intelligence-gathering activity or an intelligence unit of some sort, I think, would be a misunderstanding of it.

Q: The suggestion in the article is that you're unhappy with the intelligence that you're getting about the link between al Qaeda and Iraq.

Rumsfeld: Why would I be unhappy? The intelligence is what intelligence is. It says their best estimates.

If you go back in history, I was on the -- chairman of the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, and at the end of that, we had been asked by the Congress and by George Tenet to take a look at the intelligence community and make an assessment of our best judgment as to what the

strengths and weaknesses are, where the gaps were, were too many things stovepiped and that type of thing. We did, and we prepared, this group of -- with one exception, namely me -- of really very thoughtful people, Larry Welch and a whole host of excellent talents who were users of intelligence over the decades -- came out with an intelligence side letter, which we then got unclassified. And it's around someplace, and it's worth reading. It's very good.

One of the things in there I can remember we put in was the importance of having well-informed users of intelligence in Iraq with the suppliers of intelligence, with the analysts. And to the extent there's no feedback coming from a reader, a user of a piece intelligence, then one ought not to expect that the level of competence and -- not competence so much as currency on the part of people supplying that intelligence will be as good as it would as if there's an effective interaction.

And there is a very effective interaction going on. I don't get briefed today by anyone other than the CIA. I get briefed every morning by them. And it is an excellent relationship between the Department of Defense and the intelligence community, in this sense: they're really well knitted together at the CENTCOM level in Afghanistan and all of that activity. George Tenet and I couldn't have a closer relationship. We meet together for lunch, I think, almost once a week. We are able to sort through issues, and we get them dealt with.

There are always are going to be people who have different intelligence views within the agency, and there's no question but that on some of these important terrorism issues, you're seeing differences of opinions out of the intelligence community and the Central Intelligence Agency.

There also are going to be people who will ask a lot of questions, and there's no question but that the people in the Department of Defense, General Myers or Rumsfeld and others, ask a lot of the questions of the intelligence community, and then they get -- they come back with responses.

But I'm not unhappy at all about intelligence. Indeed, I have found my briefer to be very effective and to -- responsive in terms of testing -- pinging the system to see -- to get the best answers that they can on subjects that I find of interest. (To the general.) Don't you?

Myers: Absolutely.

Rumsfeld: Yeah. It's been a good relationship.

Q: But of course there are people at the CIA whose job it is to do just what you say, to go over this mountain of information and to draw up analysis. So why, again, is it necessary to have people here doing exactly what intelligence analysts at the CIA are supposed to be doing?

Rumsfeld: People are doing that all over town. They do it at the State Department. They do it in my office. I do it. I take this information and read it and think about it and sort and ask questions and talk to other people about it. We discuss it in our morning meeting with General Myers and General Pace. It is what one ought to do.

Q: If you think about it, what comes out of intelligence is not fixed, firm conclusions. What comes out are a speculation, an analysis, probabilities, possibilities, estimates --

Rumsfeld: -- assessments, if you will. And then you take those -- if you think that -- if that comes from the intelligence side, then it goes to the policy people. That's what our job is. Our job is to take that information, look at it, think about it, and then make judgments off of it.

You don't -- it doesn't come out saying, okay, Mr. Policymaker, turn right, turn left, do this, do that. It comes out, well, on the one hand this, and on the one hand that. And then the policymakers have to function off of -- almost always -- a great deal less than perfect knowledge -- perfect information. It's going to be 10 percent, or 20 percent, or 30 percent of what's knowable you might know. And so it's happening everywhere that people do that. The president does it. All of us do. And it's hard work -- and it's not easy; it's difficult.

Yes?

Q: You started by saying you read this article this morning and asked about it --

Rumsfeld: I think I said I skimmed it --

Q: And nonetheless, you did say that you asked about this effort this morning --

Rumsfeld: I did.

Q: -- after seeing it in the newspaper.

Rumsfeld: Yeah.

Q: So, were you -- you did not order this organization to be established? You didn't know about it until you saw it in the newspaper this morning?

Rumsfeld: It's interesting. I read my name in headlines, and everything --

Q: It certainly seems Dr. Wolfowitz --

Rumsfeld: -- as though -- as though I'd been some sort of a creator or sponsor of this.

Q: Well it certainly seems Dr. Wolfowitz knew about it -- he was --

Rumsfeld: He did, he did. And I asked him, and I asked Doug Feith, and I asked General Myers, and somebody else -- I can't remember -- and it came back to me that -- roughly what I said; that after September 11th, a couple of people were asked to start going over this. After that, the group of the size -- the size of the group was enlarged to, I think, four, or something. I don't know what it is today. And that they have been looking at terrorist networks, al Qaeda relationships with terrorist states, and that type of thing.

I was told, in answer to a question, that at one moment somebody recommend that I receive a briefing. And that -- that one, or possibly two of the people who do this for Doug Feith, did in fact brief me on something. And that was the sum total -- I knew they worked for Doug, I didn't happen to know that they were in -- what else they did, but I was briefed by them. And then I was so interested in it, I said, gee, why don't you go over and brief George Tenet? So they did. They went over and briefed the CIA. So there's no -- there's no mystery about all this.

Q: What I'm not understanding, so -- was it Dr. Wolfowitz or Doug Feith that ordered this up? And my other --

Rumsfeld: I think it's Doug Feith. It's his shop. The people work for him. I don't know, I didn't ask them that question.

Q: Well, I guess the other question is, when it really gets back to it, how satisfied are you with the intelligence you have seen on the connections between Iraq and al Qaeda? And have you had reason to send some of that intelligence back through the system and ask for harder and harder links to be established between Iraq and al Qaeda? Or are you satisfied with what you got originally?

Rumsfeld: You don't know what you don't know. And so in comes the briefer and she walks through the daily brief, and I ask questions. I couldn't send anything back, as such. What I could do is say, "Gee, what about this? Or what about that? Has somebody thought of this? Could you get me all your sevens or eights" -- or whatever else seems not to be there, what's missing -- those kinds of questions. But I do that every day. Everyone who gets briefed -- (to General Myers) -- You do that.

Myers: Same thing.

Rumsfeld: Yeah. The president, the vice president, everybody does that. They -- then back comes a memo saying, "In response to a question by Secretary Rumsfeld" -- or Secretary Powell or somebody else -- and there's the answer to the question.

Q: So what is the current state of knowledge, I guess, you know, not hypothetically, but realistically, about the links between Iraq and al Qaeda, based on everything you've seen since you talked about it several weeks ago? Do you believe --

Rumsfeld: I -- at least I don't think I know anything more than I did when I read this two or three weeks ago.

Q: If I can be the cynical one again, the problem, I think, that this story raises in the minds of especially those who might be skeptical of the administration is that the intelligence community, professional intelligence analysts -- who, presumably, don't have any political loyalties -- are just calling it as they see it; but when you have an office that's staffed by political appointees, are they maybe looking for facts to support preconceived conclusions about what's going on? I think that's what's giving folks pause.

Rumsfeld: First of all, I don't know that they're political appointees, the people in the office.

Q: Well, it's headed by a political appointee.

Rumsfeld: I don't know that, either.

Q: Well, the office is headed by a political appointee.

Rumsfeld: The overall office, but not this group of people.

Q: Got it. Okay.

Rumsfeld: Above all, precision, Pam.

Q: (Laughs.) Yes, sir!

Rumsfeld: We want precision.

Q: But can we just address the appearance here? And maybe you can --

Rumsfeld: You know, I don't know how to answer that. It is -- is it possible that there are people on the face of the Earth who believe something and they ask enough questions trying to validate something? I suppose that's true.

Q: But nothing here.

Rumsfeld: But I would think a good analyst would hypothesize that something might be true and then ask the same questions down that track, and then hypothesize that something else might be true and ask the same questions down that track. If I were an analyst, a professional analyst instead of an amateur analyst, I would do that. I would put myself in the shoes of people who might want to do something a different way, and end up down that different track, and then say, "Well, how do I feel about all that?" and weigh them against each other and then make an assessment.

Q: Is the problem --

Rumsfeld: So you're asking me is there anyone in that office who might have done that? Well, I guess I hope so.

Q: Is the issue here --

Rumsfeld: Do I think that's bad or evil or wrong? No.

Q: -- that the intelligence analysts haven't looked at all the hypotheses, and then this group has come up with some others that they're now seeking --

Rumsfeld: That I don't know. That I don't know.

October 25, 2002 7:25 AM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: France and Iraq

Here is an interesting short article on the relationship between France and Iraq.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Gurfinkel, Michel, "A Beautiful Friendship? What France Sees in Iraq," *The Weekly Standard*, October 28, 2002.

DHR:dh  
102502-4

France

25 OCT 2002

W01257-02

11-L-0559/OSD/14021

# A Beautiful Friendship?

*What France sees in Iraq*

BY MICHEL GURFINKIEL

**M**odern France's love affair with Iraq was fleetingly foreshadowed in the year 803, when Harun ar-Rashid, legendary Abbasid caliph of Baghdad, sent an embassy to the equally famous emperor Charlemagne, ruler of the Franks. It seemed a promising beginning: The caliph's gifts to the emperor included unbreakable Damascene swords, a clepsydra, and an elephant. Nevertheless, many centuries would pass before the two countries came into regular contact. In the meantime, the Mongol invaders of the 13th century would burn Iraq's ancient cities, ruin the irrigation system along the Tigris and Euphrates, and put 90 percent of its people to the sword. Even in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the French were active in many Arab lands—the Maghreb, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon—they stayed out of Iraq, an Ottoman province and preserve of the Germans until 1917, when it fell into the hands of the British as a nominally independent Hashemite monarchy. Only after the Iraqi republican revolution of 1958, the most brutal and bloody coup ever carried out in an Arab country, did the relationship change. The Soviet Union replaced Britain as the most influential foreign power in Baghdad, and France came close behind it.

Two men saw to this. The first was President Charles de Gaulle. Leader of the Resistance during World War II, General de Gaulle had made a political comeback in 1958 and set up the Fifth Republic, dedicated to the rebirth of France as a great power. That entailed modernizing the economy at home and challenging the postwar division of

the world between the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union—in particular, challenging the United States as the paramount Western power.

One way to advance both goals was to support Third World nationalism. In less than four years, de Gaulle transformed the old colonial empire in Africa into a loose constellation of client-states, making possible new links with other countries, notably in the Arab world. To a Conservative member of the National Assembly who lamented the transfer of the oil-rich Sahara to independent Algeria in 1962, de Gaulle retorted: "Don't you see we have traded

Grandpa's empire for the much broader empire of the future, and the limited oil of the Sahara for the much more plentiful oil of Arabia?"

There was some logic to this, except that the richest Arab or Islamic oil countries—from Libya to Saudi Arabia to Iran, monarchies all—remained very much under Anglo-Saxon influence. Iraq, however, seemed to present an opportunity.

The revolutionary regime had started to expropriate the assets of the former colonial oil company, the largely Anglo-American Iraq Petroleum Company. Could Iraq be brought into the French orbit? De Gaulle was confident that even the Americans would not object, eager as they were to prevent a Soviet takeover. But then, who was in charge in Baghdad? The new regime was ridden with coups and intrigues. Kassem, the first republican leader, was overthrown and put to death in 1963. There was a succession of further nationalist rulers, either followers of Nasser or supporters of the more dogmatic Baath party—hardly the strong and stable leadership that France would need to deal with.

**T**he man who came to de Gaulle's aid at this juncture was the historian and military expert Jacques Benoist-Méchin. A most unlikely go-between,

*The author of several books on world affairs, Michel Gurfinkiel is the editor in chief of Valeurs Actuelles, a Paris-based journal.*

Benoist-Méchin was ostensibly de Gaulle's very opposite. During World War II, he had not merely sided with Marshall Philippe Pétain's Vichy régime over de Gaulle's Free French, but had explicitly supported Hitler's New Order in Europe. He would even report in his *Mémoirs* that he had warned Hitler, in the course of an interview in Berlin in 1942, about some of his strategic decisions; and commented that the Führer had "unfortunately" not heeded his advice. De Gaulle, however, was not one to classify people by conventional criteria. Above all, he admired Benoist-Méchin's great *History of the German Army Since the Armistice*, first published in 1938, which explained how the *Reichswehr*, the Weimar Republic's rump-army, had been turned into an elite corps paving the way for Hitler's *Wehrmacht*. In fact, de Gaulle's first order, upon taking over the Ministry of War as head of the National Liberation Government of France in 1944, had been to have the book reissued and distributed to the officers of the resurrected French army. As for its author, de Gaulle could not spare him some measure of punishment, but made sure he would survive. Benoist-Méchin was sentenced to death for treason by France's High Court of Justice in June 1947, only to be reprieved almost at once and sent back to his studies.

Benoist-Méchin became as strong a supporter of de Gaulle's anti-Anglo-Saxon policies as he had been of Pétain's. And he knew the Middle East almost as well as he knew Germany. He had written the first—and to this day, the best—biographies of Mustafa Kemal and Ibn Saud ever published in French, and was a confidant of most Arab leaders, from King Hassan II of Morocco to Nasser. But his ties with Iraq were even stronger. In September 1941, while serving as a senior assistant to the vice president of the Vichy government, he had engineered a bilateral agreement allowing Germany to transfer weapons through the then French-controlled territory of Syria to Rashid Ali, the pro-Axis Iraqi leader who had just toppled the pro-British regent, Abdullilah, and his prime minister, Nuri Said. The German weapons transfer did not materialize, as a month later, the Free French wrested Syria from the Vichy French, and the British restored the regent in Iraq. But Rashid Ali's people never forgot how helpful Benoist-Méchin had been prepared to be. Many of them were sacked, but those who managed to stay in the Iraqi armed forces were active in the 1958 revolution. They soon got in touch with their old friend, who in turn introduced them to the appropriate people at the Quai d'Orsay, the French Foreign Office. It was then that de Gaulle summoned Benoist-Méchin himself to the Elysée Palace. "Iraq really is the key to your Arab policy," the former Vichy official would recall telling the president. "Its oil reserves are second

only to Saudi Arabia's. And the most reliable people in Iraq are the Baathists."

**D**e Gaulle resigned in 1969, not long after Saddam Hussein, the cleverest and most ruthless of all the Baathists, came to power. Saddam was to bring his country stability, albeit by totalitarian means. And he had a soft spot for France. His uncle and surrogate father, Khairallah Tulfah, had been involved in the Rashid Ali coup. The contacts initiated by Benoist-Méchin eventually led to full-fledged accords negotiated under de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou. It fell to Jacques Chirac—one of Pompidou's most trusted assistants and ministers until 1974; then, under Pompidou's successor, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, prime minister of France from 1974 to 1976—to formalize these agreements in treaties and contracts.

Of course, it would be absurd to claim that Gaullist France had deliberately armed Iraq, much less provided it with weapons of mass destruction. France was simply advancing its national interests. Once the Iraqis promised not to build nuclear weapons, it wasn't up to Paris to determine whether or not they were secretly taking steps to turn the Osirak civilian nuclear reactor into a military facility. Earlier French governments had not been fussy about how the Israelis were using their French-built reactor at Dimona, in the Negev desert. And the same Gaullist or post-Gaullist governments that negotiated with Saddam Hussein's Iraq were engaged in parallel talks and accords, even over nuclear facilities, with the shah's Iran, Iraq's rival for hegemony in the Persian Gulf. As for Chirac himself, he was not responsible for the most consequential step taken by France regarding Iraq in nuclear matters: the decision to provide Iraq enriched plutonium. That decision was made by his successor as prime minister, Raymond Barre. In the end, only one of the six planned shipments was carried out.

In 1981, the Israelis felt sufficiently threatened by Iraq to destroy the Osirak reactor in one of the most daring airborne raids in history. By then, the shah had been replaced by the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic of Iran, and Saddam Hussein had invaded this new neighbor. The French, who had just elected a Socialist president, François Mitterrand, for the first time in 27 years, wondered whether they should continue the relationship with Iraq. One reason not to was that Saddam was an unreliable customer. Most French companies involved with Iraq were actually getting paid by Coface, the French government agency that backs export contracts. Still, there was the prospect that Iraq might win the war with Iran and, with its enormous oil resources, become the dominant



AP/Wide World

*Nonproliferation, Israeli style: ruins of Iraq's French-built Osirak nuclear plant*

power in the Middle East. Moreover, solidarity with Baghdad, cemented by the high-profile cooperation and commercial contracts of the 1970s, had become quite popular with the French public. Gaullists saw it as part of France's sacrosanct "Arab policy," a legacy from the general, as well as a personal achievement of Chirac. The Communists, still a significant political force in the 1980s, were supportive of the generally pro-Soviet Iraqi regime. The anti-American left, a rising force within the Socialist party, saw Saddam as an "anti-imperialist leader" and even as a "secularist bulwark" against Shiite fundamentalism. The Catholic church had contacts of its own with Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein's Christian foreign minister. Anti-Semites and anti-Zionists of all stripes, including latter-day Vichy loyalists, were enthusiastic, too. Mitterrand eventually agreed to resume and even upgrade French cooperation with Iraq, both supplying weapons and entering into industrial partnerships. By 1989, when Saddam Hussein finally defeated Khomeini, about \$10 billion worth of French arms had been delivered to Iraq, of which less than \$5 billion had been paid for. And Iraq-related orders accounted for about half of all French arms production.

Saddam's invasion of Kuwait a year later only rekindled the debate. Was Iraq to be fought—or supported? A significant part of French opinion, from the hard left to the far right, stood by Iraq. Its champion, the Socialist

defense minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, resigned from the cabinet rather than condone military intervention. An even larger share of the public was inclined to neutrality. Mitterrand, however, joined the American-led international coalition for the liberation of Kuwait (not without engaging in last-minute negotiations with Baghdad), as well as the smaller coalition that later forced Iraqi air forces out of Kurdistan and southern Iraq. He did this out of sheer realpolitik. It was obvious to him that Iraq was no match for the United States and that the old Gaullist strategy made no sense now that the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union was disintegrating. It no longer served the national interest of France to challenge America, but to be among the winners and so have a say in the final settlement, whatever it might be.

**N**early a dozen years later, little has changed in this regard. For all its anti-American rhetoric, France actively supported U.S. military endeavors all around the globe throughout the 1990s, be it in Bosnia, in Kosovo, or in Afghanistan. The rationale is still to be seen as a peer of the one and only superpower—and incidentally to keep in touch with the superpower's ever-improving military technology and training. Regarding Iraq, France now confronts an ironic situation: Iraq was crushed in 1991, as Mitterrand foresaw it would be, but George Bush and then Bill Clinton allowed Saddam to survive. The only sensible response for the French was to keep their distance. Now that a new American president, George W. Bush, seems serious about getting rid of the Baathist dictatorship, things may change again. France, too, has a new president—the very Jacques Chirac who helped Pompidou and Giscard cement the Iraqi-French relationship in the 1970s. French public opinion is arguably more pro-Iraq or neutralist than ever, if only because of France's growing Islamic population. But Chirac's own position is more subtle. In recent months, he has repeatedly expressed concern about a "preventive war" against Iraq not "authorized" by the United Nations or the world community. Still, unlike the neutralist German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, he has not ruled out war as such. That would be to step onto the sidelines, and France must be a great power at any cost. \*

You deserve a factual look at...

47B

## Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank") Can Israel survive without it?

Many people believe that the "conflict" between Israel and the Palestinians could be resolved if Israel were to consent to the creation of Palestinian state in Gaza and in all or most of Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank"). Even our president has advocated this outcome, contingent on the "good behavior" of the Palestinians. But would the creation of such a state be a solution to the conflict or, just as the Oslo Accord, another illusion that would exacerbate the conflict, rather than terminate it?

### What are the facts?

**The Root of the conflict.** The conflict between Israel and the Arabs is not about borders and not about the Palestinians. The conflict is not about the size of Israel. It is about Israel's very existence. Israel, of whatever size and within whatever boundaries, is unacceptable to the Arabs. In surrendering strategic territory, Israel is gambling with its very life. The PLO still adheres to its infamous "phased plan." It calls for first creating a Palestinian state on any territory vacated by Israel and then using that state to foment a final allied Arab assault against the truncated Jewish state.

**The Importance of territory.** Many believe that in this age of missiles, territory is of little importance and that Israel should therefore not hesitate to relinquish "land for peace." But

that is not the case. The Arab states have acquired over \$50 billion of the most advanced armaments since the end of the Gulf War. And those are not just "conventional" weapons—enormous quantities of tanks, aircraft of all kinds, and much more. The Arab state possess large arsenals of chemical and biological weapons, and all of them work feverishly on the development of their nuclear potential. All of those weapons have only one single purpose: the destruction of the state of Israel. And that goal is not being cancelled for any agreements that Israel may make with the Palestinians. For both "conventional" war and for war of mass destruction, territory and topography are critical for self-defense and deterrence. The mountainous territory of Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank") is an indispensable line of defense, especially for a country as small as Israel. It totally controls access to Israel's heartland from the east. Israel needs this high ground for defense,

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"Without Judea/Samaria (the 'West Bank') Israel would be totally indefensible; therefore, neither the purposes of Israel nor those of the United States would be served by Israel's relinquishing control of the 'West Bank'."

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to be able to peer deeply into the enemy's territory and to get early warning of any attack. The high ground allows Israel to detect missiles while they are still in the launch stage and to destroy them, with the Arrow or other sophisticated anti-missile systems. Unlike the U.S., Israel cannot maintain a fleet of nuclear submarines for "second strike" deterrence. But it can maintain dozens of mobile missile launchers safe in underground tunnels hewn into the rock of the Judean mountains.

**Would the "West Bank" be demilitarized?** Even those who want Israel to retreat to its pre-1967 borders are agreed that the evacuated areas must be demilitarized. But that would be useless. Because the Palestinians will have thousands of trained soldiers, camouflaged as their police force. In

case of war against Israel, these troops could be heliographed in minutes to their positions, with armored forces reaching them within the same night. In any case, it is highly doubtful that the

surrounding hostile Arab nations would allow such a military vacuum to exist. And finally, there is the matter of terrorism. There are over fifteen Palestinian terror organizations that neither Yassir Arafat nor any other Palestinian authority can control. There would be a constant rain of Katyusha rockets launched into the Tel Aviv area and into the entire coastal plain, which is only nine miles wide at its waist. It contains 80% of Israel's population and of its industrial and military potential. Ben Gurion airport, every incoming and outgoing flight, would be subject to mortar fire or shoulder-held Stinger attack. Does anybody doubt that the Arabs would not exploit that irresistible opportunity?

Without the "West Bank" Israel would be totally indefensible. That is the professional opinion of over 100 U.S. generals and admirals. Israel's strong defensive posture makes it most inadvisable for Israel's enemies to attack her. But once this defensive strength is removed, a coordinated war against Israel can only be a matter of time. The example and fate of Czechoslovakia, which preparatory to the Second World War was dismantled and shorn of its defensive capacity, insistently comes to mind. What does all this mean to the United States? In a part of the world in which our country has the most far-reaching geopolitical stakes, Israel is the only democracy, the only country that is unquestioningly aligned with us. It is the guarantor of American interests in the area. With Israel in a position of weakness, the role of the United States in the area would collapse and radical states such as Syria, Iraq and Iran would dominate. That is why, despite the heady prospect of "peace in our time," neither the purposes of Israel nor those of the United States would be served by Israel's relinquishing control over the "West Bank."

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Facts and Logic About the Middle East  
P.O. Box 590359 ■ San Francisco, CA 94159  
Gerardo Joffe, President

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11-L-0559/OSD/14025

October 30, 2002 8:02 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld : *2A*  
SUBJECT: Commission on 9/11

One thought for the chairman of a commission on 9/11 is Larry Silberman. He has unimpeachable credentials and is tough-minded.

We also need to give a lot of thought to the staff director. I understand an official at Justice, Patrick Murray, may be a good candidate.

DHR:dh  
103002-5

**W01273-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/14026

November 1, 2002 2:29 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
CC: Honorable Clay Johnson  
Honorable Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Personnel

I am told that the Homeland Security and personnel people are looking at more DoD employees, beyond Gordon England, and that several have already been contacted, without talking to me first.

We spent months and months selecting and recruiting people from the outside. We spent many more months getting their security clearances and getting them through the White House and Senate process. Only I have been here more than a year and a half.

The way to staff the Homeland Security Department is not to go into the Pentagon and rob us of the people that we spent all that time recruiting. The Administration should be adding people from the outside—finding new people. We shouldn't simply keep moving people around from one Department to another. It causes damaging turbulence and harm to our national security.

Please stop all White House and Homeland Security contacts with DoD unless somebody first comes to me to discuss it. We're robbing Peter to pay Paul. DoD is facing serious national security problems and issues. We don't need the added distraction of further attrition and increased turbulence.

Help!

DHR:dh  
110102-7

**W01283-02**

**11-L-0559/OSD/14027**

November 13, 2002 7:15 AM

111202-11 7:10

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Iran

I would like copies of the cables or messages that went out and the report that came back on the Iran issue that we have been discussing. I need to read them completely.


Thanks.

DHR.dh  
111202-71

House /  
111202

W01319-02  
11-L-0559/OSD/14028

November 18, 2002 5:45 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Taiwan

I am concerned about Taiwan. It would be most unfortunate if the leadership of Taiwan inadvertently or intentionally said or did things that we did not agree with, that then created an unnecessarily negative reaction by the PRC.

Our unnatural relationship with Taiwan restricts normal contact, with an unintended result that our communications are not what they are with most of our interlocutors.

I have no personal connections with Taiwan, and I am unclear what linkage you have. Are you comfortable that our linkages are strong enough that Taiwan won't make a mistake? If so, I will relax. If not, possibly we should discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111702.11

W01335-02

11-L-0559/OSD/14030

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~



**WASHFAX  
Secretary of Defense  
Cover Sheet  
12/N**



FROM: Office of the Secretary of Defense  
OFFICE/DESK: Secretary of Defense  
SUBJECT:  
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:  
 HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS  
 IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

SECDEF CABLES	
DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	
SPLASST	
EXBCSBC	
DEPSECDEF	PHONE NUMBER:
C&D	
ODD	
USDP	
	PAGES: <u>2</u>
CABLECH	(including Coversheet)
FILE	

(b)(6)

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS**

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
OVP	VP Cheney				
NSC	Dr. Rice				
COS	Andrew Card				

**REMARKS**

Colonel Whitmore: I faxed this to Andy Card  
per your previous guidance. The swing watch had already sent this  
memo/fax to SecState.

PLEASE PASS TO THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT TO THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS *Coat T.*

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/14031

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: The Secretary of Defense *R. A. J.*

Date: November 19, 2002

Subject: Visit to Chile—Defense Ministerial of the Americas

*WWWD*

I have just attended the 5<sup>th</sup> Defense Ministerial of the Americas, involving all the countries of the hemisphere except Cuba. I held bilateral meetings with Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Brazil.

- **DEFENSE MINISTERIAL OF THE AMERICAS.** In many ways, the issues being debated in this hemisphere are similar to those being discussed at NATO this week—how to take institutions built during the Cold War, adapt them, and make them relevant to 21<sup>st</sup> century threats and challenges.

Some countries, like Mexico, argue that institutions of the Inter-American System that arose during the Cold War have outlived their usefulness. Mexico has withdrawn from the Rio Treaty, and wants countries of the region to focus more on bilateral cooperation and “soft” security issues. This is clearly a minority view.

I made the case that the need for our nations to work together has not diminished; it has grown. Instead of dismantling old institutions, we need to adapt them and forge new areas of concrete cooperation.

In that spirit, we offered two initiatives for discussion, which were well received:

- First, an initiative to facilitate naval cooperation among the nations of the hemisphere, to help guard the Caribbean and East Pacific against arms trafficking and other threats;
- Second, an initiative to strengthen peacekeeping cooperation by taking specialized capabilities of individual nations, and integrating them to create regional capabilities.

We also discussed the problem of “ungoverned areas,” where terrorists, hostage takers, and drug- and arms-traffickers operate—and need for democratic nations to exercise “effective sovereignty” in their territories.

*190000*

W01345-02 1

11-L-0559/OSD/14032

- **CHILE.** Our host, Chile, was extremely supportive of our initiatives. Their views parallel ours in terms of preserving and adapting Inter-American institutions. I met with President Lagos and Defense Minister Michelle Bachelet, and was once slated to be Socialist President Salvador Allende's ambassador to the Soviet Union, before Allende was overthrown in the 1973 coup. Like Prime Minister Blair, he seems to a man of the left who is trying to govern as a centrist. He is friendly and supportive—a good sign since Chile will rotate onto the UN Security Council in January.
- **ARGENTINA.** Argentina is the only country designated as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” in the hemisphere. They have an impressive number of peacekeeping deployments around the globe, and also offered forces for Afghanistan, including peacekeepers and a field hospital. The financial crisis there is a limiting factor in their ability to do more, but they are right-thinking and extremely supportive.
- **COLOMBIA.** I had a good meeting with the Colombian Minister of Defense. She said that it means a lot to the Colombian people that they have such a firm ally in the U.S., and in you personally. President Uribe has taken a courageous and bold approach to Colombia’s predicament. The time to help him is now, early in his Administration, while he has momentum. If we wait, and he gets bogged down, the effort will be much more difficult. Congress has given us expanded authority to help—by permitting counter-drug funds to be used for counter-terrorism—but only for a year.
- **BRAZIL.** The outgoing Brazilian Defense Minister said that the leftist President-elect “Lula” seemed to have undergone a “process of maturing.” It remains to be seen whether, like Chilean President Lagos, he will govern to the center, or whether he will follow the Castro/Chavez model.

When I was SecDef in 1975, only 14 nations in the Western hemisphere could be considered democracies. Today, with the exception of Cuba, almost the entire hemisphere has embraced representative government.

The democratic transformation of the Americas has opened up avenues for expanded cooperation, and there seems to be growing consensus on the need to adapt Inter-American institutions to deal with the new transnational threats.

Respectfully,

Cc: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The National Security Advisor

November 10, 2002 3:25 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: White House decision to brief Bob Woodward or others looking for the "inside story"

When I was told about Woodward's intention to write a book, I declined to be interviewed. Later I was told by the White House that I should agree to be interviewed. I did so, for 30 minutes, against my better judgment, with the understanding that it would be on the record and that we would publish the transcript, which we did.

Subsequently, I heard that people in the White House and the Administration spent many, many hours with Woodward.

My concern was and remains that these stories inevitably create dissension and differences within an administration. Further, when some do it, it creates a requirement that other people do it, to defend themselves. How, in the middle of a war, people can spend that much time in such a self-serving way is beyond me.

I hope in the future the Administration policy will be to not engage in that kind of an exercise.

Respectfully,

DHR dh  
111802.10

000.050

10NOV02

W01346-02

11-L-0559/OSD/14034

December 2, 2002 7:22 AM

TO: Honorable Clay Johnson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *(initials)*

SUBJECT: Nancy Reynolds

Colin tells me there are some openings for ambassadors. Last year I sent over some information on Nancy Reynolds, as I believe others did. I continue to think she would make a very good ambassador in Africa.

Thanks.

Attach.

Nancy Reynolds background sheet

DHR:dh  
120202-2

Africa

2  
Dec  
2002

W01376-02

11-L-0559/OSD/14035

**VITAE****NANCY CLARK REYNOLDS**

October 1998                   Chair, Board of Trustees  
to present                   Crow Canyon Archaeological Center, Cortez, Colorado

June 1992                   Senior Consultant  
to present                   The Wexler Group, Washington, DC, and Santa Fe, New Mexico

August 1990                   Vice Chair  
to June 1992               The Wexler Group, Washington, DC

January 1983                   Vice Chair  
to August 1990             Wexler, Reynolds, Fuller, Harrison and Schule, Washington, DC

1977 to                   Vice President, Government Affairs  
December 1986               The Bendix Corporation, Washington, DC

1976 to 1977               Associate Director, National Affairs  
                             Boise Cascade Corporation, Washington, DC

1974 to 1976               Account Executive  
                             Deaver and Hannaford, Public Relations, Los Angeles, California

1968 to 1974               Special Assistant to Governor Ronald Reagan

1966 to 1968               Assistant Press Secretary to Governor Ronald Reagan

1960 to 1966               News Anchor and Political Reporter: KPIX-TV (CBS San Francisco)

**BOARDS OF DIRECTORS:**

1989 to 1999               Norrell Corporation, Atlanta, Georgia

1993 to 1997               Allstate Corporation, Chicago, Illinois

1982 to 1997               Sears, Roebuck & Company, Chicago, Illinois  
                             Chair, Public Issues Committee

1986 to                   The Wackenhut Corporation, West Palm Beach, Florida  
Present                   Chair, Equal Opportunity Employment Committee

Nancy Clark Reynolds

**RESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS:**

- March 1994              International Observer of Uganda's elections
- May to                    Head of U.S. Delegation to CSCE Symposium on Cultural Heritage  
June 1991                Krakow, Poland
- October 1988             Head of U.S. Delegation to Nyayo Anniversary, Nairobi, Kenya
- August/                  Vice Chair, U.S. Delegation to U.N. Conference on Women  
September 1985           Nairobi, Kenya
- October 1985            Member  
to 1987                President's Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations
- January 1981            U.S. Representative to U.N. Commission on the Status of Women  
to August 1985
- January 1981            Member  
to 1983                President's Commission on White House Fellowships

**PUBLIC SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS:**

- 1990 to present        Director  
                          National Park Foundation
- 1991 to 1997            Trustee, Active Alumna  
                          L.S.B. Leakey Foundation
- 1990 to 1997            Trustee  
                          The Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian
- 1986 to 1991            Founding Member and Vice President  
                          Economic Club of Washington
- 1982 to 1983            President, Business-Government Relations Council, Washington, DC

**EDUCATION:**

- 1985                    Honorary Doctor of Laws, Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington
- August 1980            Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro, North Carolina
- July to                Harvard University Business School  
August 1978            for Senior Managers in Government
- 1949                    B.A. in English, Goucher College, Towson, Maryland

Nancy Clark Reynolds

**POLITICAL ACTIVITIES:**

November 1984      Director, Congressional Relations  
to January 1985      Reagan/Bush Inaugural Committee

September 1980      Reagan/Bush Campaign  
to February 1981      Director, East Wing White House Transition Team

December 2, 2002 7:22 AM

TO: Honorable Clay Johnson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>1A</sup>

SUBJECT: Pat Ryan

Attached is a background sheet on Pat Ryan, who would make a superb ambassador.

Regards.

Attach.

Pat Ryan background sheet

DHR:dh  
120202-1

230.02

2 Dec 02

**W01377-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/14039

**PATRICK W. RYAN****OBJECTIVE**

To serve in a position where my broad background in foreign affairs, especially in the Middle East, and my extensive experience in defense and intelligence can contribute to the development and execution of international and national security policies and programs.

**EXPERIENCE**

1999-2000 Ryan & Associates Springfield, VA President / Senior Associate Established information services enterprise.n Provided editorial and web based services to international clients.n Managing Editor of 'GulfWire' newsletter and 'ArabiaLink.com.'

1999 National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations Washington, DC Vice President / Chief Operating Officer. Managed all aspects of a not for profit educational organization focused on helping Americans understand the Arab world and U.S. interests there.1998-1999 Autometric, Inc. a Division of Boeing Springfield, VA Program Manager Managed all aspects of sensitive programs in support of the U.S. Government involving integration and deployment of cutting edge technical systems and techniques.1972-1998 U.S. Navy 1997-1998 U.S. Central Command

Tampa, FL Research Fellow, Director Central Intelligence Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Programn Research, analysis and writing on Arabian Peninsula political-military developments. Fellowship in Saudi Arabia.1996-1997 U.S. Central Command Tampa, FL Executive Assistant to Director of Intelligence Principal assistant and confidant; manager of directorate operations and requirements. Representational travels to Middle East.

(b)(6)

**EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)**

1995-1996 U.S. Central Command Tampa, FL Chief, 'Transnational' Issues Branchn Managed an intelligence team responsible for research, analysis, writing and briefing on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction/advanced weapons proliferation, energy issues, counterdrugs and civil maritime issues.

1993-1995 Center for Naval Analysis Alexandria, VA Senior Intelligence Officer Managed intelligence support to Navy's 'think-tank.'

1991-1991 Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate The Pentagon Senior Producer, Defense Intelligence Networkn Managed intelligence television production team.1990-1991 Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate The Pentagon All-Source Analyst - Central American Branchn Research, analysis, writing and briefing all aspects of crisis and current intelligence concerning Nicaragua, Honduras and related areas. National Military Joint Intelligence Center watchstander.1988-1990 USS CONSTELLATION The Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Directed watch center providing 'all-source' warning and tactical intelligence support to forward deployed Carrier Battle Group.

**EDUCATION**

1986 Georgetown University Washington, DC Courses completed in the National Security Studies Graduate Program1980-1981 University of South Carolina Columbia, SCBA, International Studies1977-1980 University of Maryland, European Division Naples, Italy Courses completed toward degree

**SECURITY**

Top Secret/SCI/ISSA/Poly active with Autometric, Inc.

• 11/26/02 TUE 11:08 FAX

(b)(6)

WH PPO

4002

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/14041



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 11 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommended Change-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the command structure and areas of responsibility (geographic and functional) for the Nation's combatant commanders.

The most recent change to the UCP created a "new" combatant command, retaining the name "U.S. Strategic Command," effective 1 October 2002. When General Myers and I recommended this change, we also stated that USSTRATCOM would assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM in the near-term, while being poised to accept evolving missions (Global Strike; Integrated Missile Defense; Information Operations; and, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)) in the future. Our staffs have conducted an in-depth study of these evolving missions and recommend that they be assigned to USSTRATCOM immediately. Given the complexity of these responsibilities, we expect USSTRATCOM to be able to fully accomplish these missions no later than 1 January 2004.

322

Pursuant to your authority as Commander in Chief and under title 10, United States Code, Section 161, I recommend that you approve the proposed revisions to the UCP by signing the attached memorandum. This memorandum directs the Commander, USSTRATCOM to notify you no later than 1 January 2004, through the Chairman and me, when USSTRATCOM reaches Full Operational Capability for its new missions. This memorandum also directs me to notify Congress of revisions to the UCP on your behalf pursuant to title 10, United States Code, Section 161(b)(2).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Rumsfeld".

Attachments:

1. Proposed Presidential Memorandum
  2. Change-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002
- 11 Dec 02

W01408-02

11-L-0559/OSD/14042

The White House  
Washington

MMM DD, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Change-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002

Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve and direct the assignment of Global Strike, Integrated Missile Defense, DoD Information Operations, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) missions to US Strategic Command. On or before 1 January 2004, the Commander, US Strategic Command, will provide me, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, an assessment of his command's ability to perform these newly assigned missions, and, if Full Operational Capability has not been achieved, will identify the additional capabilities needed to achieve Full Operational Capability.

You are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf as required by title 10, United States Code, section 161(b)(2), as a result of implementing this revision to the UCP.

## **CHANGE-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002**

The following changes apply to the Unified Command Plan dated 30 April 2002, with Change 1 dated 30 July 2002 inserted:

**Pages 14-16. Delete paragraph 21.**

**Page 17. Delete paragraph 22.**

**Page 17-19. Delete paragraph 23.**

**Page 14. Insert new paragraph 21 to read:**

"21. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The Commander, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska (with elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado), is the commander of a combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander's missions. USSTRATCOM has no geographic AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. When USSTRATCOM's forces are deployed in a geographic combatant commander's AOR, they will remain assigned to and under the control of USSTRATCOM, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. USSTRATCOM's responsibilities will include:

- a. Maintaining primary responsibility among the combatant commanders for strategic nuclear forces to support the national objective of strategic deterrence.
- b. Employing assigned and attached forces, as directed.
- c. Providing integrated global strike planning and command and control support to deliver rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and information operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives.

- d. Providing support to other combatant commanders, as directed.
- e. Exercising command and control of selected global strike missions if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
- f. Developing desired characteristics and capabilities, advocating, planning, and conducting space operations (force enhancement, space control, and space support, including spacelift and on-orbit operations, and force application), including:
  - (1) Providing warning and assessment of space attack.
  - (2) Supporting NORAD by providing the missile warning and space surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement.
  - (3) Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational matters, except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
  - (4) Providing military representation to US national agencies, commercial, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations, as directed by the Secretary of Defense and in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate combatant commanders.
  - (5) In coordination with appropriate geographic combatant commanders' security assistance activities, planning and implementing security assistance relating to military space operations and providing military assessments as required. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, these activities shall not supersede the responsibilities of other combatant commanders to coordinate security assistance matters and provide advice and assistance to chiefs of US diplomatic missions.
  - (6) Coordinating and conducting space campaign planning.
  - (7) Providing the military point of contact for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in space in support of nonproliferation policies, activities, and taskings.

(8) Serving as the DoD Manager for Manned Space Flight Support Operations.

g. Planning, integrating and coordinating global missile defense operations and support (sea, land, air, and space-based) for missile defense; and, developing desired characteristics and capabilities for global missile defense operations and support for missile defense, including:

(1) Providing warning of missile attack to other combatant commanders.

(2) Providing assessment of missile attack should NORAD or the appropriate combatant commander be unable to accomplish the assessment mission.

(3) Advocating desired global missile defense and missile warning characteristics and capabilities of all combatant commanders, including the battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence system (BMC3I) and architecture.

(4) Developing the missile defense concept of operations (CONOPS).

h. Planning, integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in support of strategic and global operations, as directed.

i. Tasking and coordinating command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities in support of strategic force employment, to include global strike, missile defense, and associated planning, as directed.

j. Integrating and coordinating DoD information operations (IO) (currently consisting of the core IO capabilities of computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC), military psychological operations (PSYOP), and military deception (MILDEC)) that cross geographic areas of responsibility or across the core IO capabilities, including:

(1) Supporting other combatant commanders for planning.

- (2) Planning and coordinating capabilities that have trans-regional effects or that directly support national objectives.
- (3) Exercising command and control of selected missions, if directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense.
- (4) Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities for DoD-wide CND, planning for DoD-wide CND, and directing DoD-wide CND.
- (5) Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities for CNA, conducting CNA in support of assigned missions, and integrating CNA capabilities in support of other combatant commanders, as directed.
- (6) Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities for joint electronic warfare and planning for and conducting electronic warfare in support of assigned missions.
- (7) Supporting other combatant commanders for the planning and integration of joint OPSEC and military deception.

**Page 17, renumber old paragraph 24 as paragraph 22.**



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-648-02

7 December 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *12/1/02*

SUBJECT: Recommended Change 2 to Unified Command Plan 2002

- Request you approve the change to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigning the following missions to USSTRATCOM: global strike, integrated missile defense, information operations and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) (TAB A).
- The new USSTRATCOM was assigned the missions of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM through Change 1 to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), effective 1 October. When Change 1 was forwarded, I stated that we would conduct in-depth studies of other potential missions (global strike, integrated missile defense, information operations and C4ISR) before the end of the year.
- My staff, along with your support, the Services and the combatant commanders recently completed these studies and concluded that it is feasible and desirable to assign these missions to USSTRATCOM. USSTRATCOM is prepared to begin work on these missions, and will have an initial operational capability (IOC) when assigned by the President. Given the complexity of these responsibilities, USSTRATCOM will reach full operational capability by 1 January 2004. To that end our staffs, with the support of the Services and the affected combatant commands, are developing a terms of reference that will serve to delineate the boundaries of responsibility among USSTRATCOM, other combatant commands, defense agencies and the Joint Staff for their complementary responsibilities (e.g., USJFCOM and USSTRATCOM for battle management command and control, USSOCOM and USSTRATCOM for psychological operations (PSYOP), and USSTRATCOM, Missile Defense Agency, and Joint Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) for global missile defense).
- The recommended changes to the UCP have been coordinated with the Service Chiefs, your staff and the combatant commanders. The revised paragraphs include changes that accomplish the following:

- Defines and assigns global strike responsibilities to USSTRATCOM as either a supporting or supported commander, providing increased options to you and the President.
- Assigns responsibilities of developing desired characteristics and capabilities, planning, integrating and coordinating missile defense to USSTRATCOM.
- Expands USSTRATCOM's role in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of strategic, global missions.
- Assigns increased responsibility for strategic information operations (computer network defense, computer network attack, electronic warfare, psychological operations, operations security and military deception that have transregional effects or national strategic consequences) to USSTRATCOM.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Approve and sign the proposed memorandum to the President (TAB B) approving the UCP changes.

**COORDINATION:** TAB C

**Attachments:**

As stated

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT:** Recommended Change-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the command structure and areas of responsibility (geographic and functional) for the Nation's combatant commanders.

The most recent change to the UCP created a "new" combatant command, retaining the name "U.S. Strategic Command," effective 1 October 2002. When General Myers and I recommended this change, we also stated that USSTRATCOM would assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM in the near-term, while being poised to accept evolving missions (Global Strike; Integrated Missile Defense; Information Operations; and, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)) in the future. Our staffs have conducted an in-depth study of these evolving missions and recommend that they be assigned to USSTRATCOM immediately. Given the complexity of these responsibilities, we expect USSTRATCOM to be able to fully accomplish these missions no later than 1 January 2004.

Pursuant to your authority as Commander in Chief and under title 10, United States Code, Section 161, I recommend that you approve the proposed revisions to the UCP by signing the attached memorandum. This memorandum directs the Commander, USSTRATCOM to notify you no later than 1 January 2004, through the Chairman and me, when USSTRATCOM reaches Full Operational Capability for its new missions. This memorandum also directs me to notify Congress of revisions to the UCP on your behalf pursuant to title 10, United States Code, Section 161(b)(2).

**Attachments:**

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2. Change-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002

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**Page 17, renumber old paragraph 24 as paragraph 22.**

**TAB C**

**COORDINATION PAGE**

US Army	MG Huntoon	20 August 2002
US Navy	RADM Krol	21 August 2002
US Air Force	Maj Gen Gould	22 August 2002
US Marine Corps	LtGen Bedard	26 August 2002
US Strategic Command	ADM Ellis	05 December 2002

snowflake

December 23, 2002 9:15 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D, A  
SUBJECT: Nature of the Struggle

Attached is an interesting set of notes from Newt on David Trimble of Northern Ireland. He makes some good points.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: On the Nature of the Struggle

DHR:dh  
122302-14

000,5

23 Dec 02

**W01462-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/14056

From Newt Gingrich

Page 1 of 2

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

cc D. Rita  
Wolowitz

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
Sent: Saturday, December 07, 2002 1:35 PM  
To: (b)(6) @osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil  
Cc: stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil  
Subject: for secdef depsecdef  
for secdef.depsecdef  
from newt 12/07/02  
on the nature of the struggle

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
DEC 23 2002

The following represents my intuition which is that this is a much harder war with many greater difficulties than we have even begun to think about. Newt

this memo from bill sanders, the navy fellow at AEI, has some useful points about David Trimble's viewpoint in Northern Ireland as it relates to fighting terror

Yesterday's discussion at AEI with David Trimble, first minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly and recipient of the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize was quite interesting on "Fighting Terror and Winning."

Summarizing Trimble's points, to defeat terrorism one must:

- Maintain firm public opinion,
- Ensure amelioration of genuine grievances,
- Suppress and penetrate terrorist organizations,
- And aid the decline of the terrorist's ideology.

He freely admitted no Middle East expertise but offered the following observations:

- "The Al-Qaeda and its extreme Islam views pose huge problems, not resolved easily."
- "Improving the sophistication of the armed forces alone won't do it."
- "This will be a 'long time, high cost' conflict."
- "Our relationship with Turkey and other Muslim states will be key."

He provided an interesting view when posed the question "Should the US adopt a law enforcement model similar to the British MI-5 that would split the FBI into two separate agencies?" He acknowledged the common pitfall that another agency structure would lead to more "hoarding of info" but said there may be an advantage over the traditional crime-driven model in the intelligence-driven model.

While the "public may prefer the crime-driven, law enforcement model" of the FBI, "an intelligence-driven model that identifies key players and organizational ties provides a better model in pre-empting terrorist actions." This idea was in your Nov. 13th agenda with VP Cheney and I believe is one of the keys to strong Homeland Security.

Best regards, Bill