



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

11-0559/OSD14059
00134-04

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 23, 2003 – 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 24 Dec 03*

SUBJECT: National Security Personnel System (NSPS) Implementation Plan

- We have established the NSPS Program Implementation Office to coordinate implementation throughout the Department. Initial plans will focus on actions and timelines, critical path analysis, and assignment of action officers.
- We will begin implementing immediately certain discretionary provisions that do not require joint action with the Office of Personnel Management, e.g., voluntary early retirement and separation incentive pay authority, and elimination of pay offsets for reemployed annuitants. The Deputy Secretary has the first of these packages for signature, which will help the Navy in phasing out Roosevelt Roads.
- First NSPS implementation is set to begin in the third quarter of FY04. Both the Air Force and the Navy have asked to be included in the first wave. (The statute limits the first wave to 300,000 employees.)
- Components plan to convert approximately 10,000 military billets in each of fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to civilian performance (public or private), in the areas of law enforcement, personnel support, installation management, training range support, communications, logistics, health services, civil works, and homeland defense. The Services have identified offsets of \$136M (FY04) and \$390M (FY05) to pay for the conversions.
- We can brief the Senior Level Review Group early in the New Year.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Brad Bunn, ODUSD(CPP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD14059

OSD 00134-04

10
November 7, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Personnel Legislation

If we get this personnel legislation through, which it looks like we have, I need to see the plan as to how we are going to implement it in the Department.

Clearly, it is going to take some money to implement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110703-20

.....
Please respond by 12/12/03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 JAN 12 11 09 13

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 12, 2003, 1:30PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu From us

SUBJECT: Governor of Connecticut and Family Day Care Licensing - Snowflake

- Following field hearings at Groton, CT, a concern surfaced that spouses who want to provide family day care are waiting an excessive amount of time to be licensed.
- Initial letter was sent in September 2003 to Governor Rowland requesting his assistance in facilitating discussion between the family day care staff at New London Naval Base and the licensing office for Connecticut.
- Connecticut licensing personnel, Director of OSD Office of Children and Youth, and Navy staff met on October 22, 2003. Since that time initiatives have been taken to reduce the length of time for processing background checks and to provide required training earlier in the process.
- Because this process appears to be improving at this time, we have not accepted your offer to help.
- Navy will provide regular updates to OSD reporting on the goal of reducing time for licensing providers from 9 months to 3 months.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

ATTACHMENTS:
None

COORDINATION: None.

PREPARED BY: Jan Witte, Director, Office of Children and Youth, ODUSD(MC&FP), *Jan 12/22*

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD14061

OSD 00411-04

10/23/03

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
DATE: October 22, 2003
SUBJECT: Letter to Governor Rowland

I just read your letter to Governor Rowland of September 9th and his response of September 17th. If you want me to weigh in with him, draft a letter from me to send on top of yours.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
102203.08

Please respond by: _____

10/28

SNOWFLAKE

DR. CHU FOR ACTION _____

ASSIGN ACTION TO MEFP

SUSPENSE DATE BACK TO DR. CHU 29 OCT

SUBJECT: Letter to Governor Rowland

12/24/03 Snowflake



December 27, 2003

330.11

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Writing to the Military

Here is a letter from a woman asking us to reinstate the program of writing to the military. Why don't you have someone look at that, now that the anthrax scare has calmed down—if it has.

Thanks.

Attach.

Christmas card from (b)(6)

DHR:dh
122703-14 (in computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

TO Charlie Abell:
Please respond.

V/R
Jaymie
Durnan
213

27 Dec 03

OSD 01664-04


11-L-0559/OSD14064

Thank you for doing all you do
for our Military. I am very
proud of them and the actions
they do. I started writing to the
"Army Military Member" program in
1990. It was discontinued after
anthrax. I'm still writing some of
the friends I made before the
program was stopped. I hope you
will be able to reinstate the program
in 2004. Have a happy holiday
season.



Best wishes
for a happy holiday season.

(b)(6)



12/24/03 Snowflake

330.11

December 27, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Writing to the Military

Here is a letter from a woman asking us to reinstate the program of writing to the military. Why don't you have someone look at that, now that the anthrax scare has calmed down—if it has.

Thanks.

Attach. Christmas card from (b)(6)

DHR:dm
122703-14 (to computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/16/04

TO Charlie Abell:
Please respond.
V/R
Jaymie
Durnan
43

3 Feb 04 27 Dec 03

INFORMATION RETENTION

December 16, 2003

Japan

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita PAUL WOLFOWITZ
~~Don't know~~

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

I would like to have the two co-chairmen of the US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, Jim Sensenbrenner and Jim McDermott, in for breakfast, lunch or a meeting sometime. I would like to see their background sheets, and then I would like to have that meeting set up.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/4/03 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef
11/24/03 SecDef memo to ASD(LA) [112403.03]

DHR:dh
121603-2

FILE

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

OSD 01687-04

INFORMATION RETEN

11-L-0559/OSD14067

12/18/03
→RS
Call Craddock.
Isn't McDermott
the guy who said
the President could
have caught Saddam
earlier but chose to
wait? If he is, shd
SD meet w/him? DJF

16 Dec 03

12-19-03

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

GENERAL,

SIR, Capt Sayez from Mr. Faith's Office delivered the attached notes from Mr. Faith. It questions whether SecDef should meet w/ Congressmen McDermott in light of comments made regarding the timing of the capture of Saddam.

Tab a is the early bird clipping that documents his comments.

Tab b provides the attachments of earlier snowflakes between Mr. Moore and SecDef on the US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

You may wish to follow up w/ Mr. Dikita or Mr. Faith regarding the concerns Mr. Faith raises. I will be happy to respond to Capt Sayez if you'd like.

V/L

Steve Lind

Seattle Times
December 16, 2003

McDermott Questions Timing Of Arrest

By Alex Fryer, Seattle Times Washington bureau

WASHINGTON — On Seattle radio yesterday, Rep. Jim McDermott questioned the timing of Saddam Hussein's capture, saying, "I'm sure they could have found him a long time ago if they wanted to."

His comments came during an interview on "The Dave Ross Show" on KIRO-FM.

"I've been surprised they waited, but then I thought, well, politically, it probably doesn't make much sense to find him just yet," he said.

"There's too much by happenstance for it to be just a coincidental thing that it happened on this particular day," he continued.

Later yesterday, the Seattle Democrat said he did not know whether the Pentagon had manufactured the arrest of the Iraqi leader. "I think the fact is that the administration has been desperate to find something (positive), and this came up.

"I don't have any knowledge if they knew about it (Saddam's hideout). I think they (Bush administration) got a Christmas present early."

State Republican Party Chairman Chris Vance quickly launched a statement condemning McDermott's earlier statements. "Once again McDermott has embarrassed this state with his irresponsible ranting."

Despite the capture of the Iraqi leader, McDermott said Americans should remain concerned about the welfare of U.S. troops.

"My worry is that problems will be just as bad tomorrow," said McDermott, who has represented the 7th District since 1988.

"... It is not the end of the problem. The fact that he is in captivity does not change things."

McDermott's comment stands in contrast to other members of the state's delegation, who lauded Saddam's capture.

In September 2002, McDermott made news when he traveled to Iraq and told television interviewers that President Bush would mislead the public to justify an invasion.

It's an incident that continues to reverberate on Capitol Hill.

Two months ago, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, R-Texas, wrote McDermott a personal letter after McDermott denounced a comment by a member of DeLay's office. The staffer said McDermott had attacked the U.S. while he visited Iraq.

Instead of an apology, DeLay wrote: "Your words, had they been spoken in the United States, would"

have amounted to mean-spirited but predictable mediocre hackery. That they were uttered in Saddam's Iraq, however, perhaps within shouting distance of a torture chamber or mass grave, elevated (or lowered) those remarks to the sickening embarrassment they were."

Seattle Times staff reporter J. Patrick Coolican contributed to this report.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

December 11, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Legislative Affairs, 697-6210

SUBJECT: Snowflake -U.S. - Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

As a follow-up to your snowflake dated November 24, attached is the list of participants attending this Exchange Program last week.

Attachments:

1. List of U.S.- Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program Participants.
2. Original response to Snowflake.

Prepared By: COL Noreen Holthaus, Director House Affairs, OSD(LA), 695-4132

11-L-0559/OSD14071

The 30th US-Japan Legislative Exchange Program
Tokyo Meeting
December 2nd-4th, 2003

in alphabetical order of countries

Korean Member

Jay Kun Yoo	Member of National Assembly Millennium Democrat Party
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Japanese Members

Otohiko Endo	The House of Representatives New Komei Party Proportional Representative North Kanto Block
Yoshimasa Hayashi	The House of Councillors Liberal Democratic Party Yamaguchi District
Wakako Hironaka	The House of Councillors Democratic Party Chiba District
Banri Kaieda	The House of Representatives Democratic Party Tokyo 1st District
Yoshitake Kimata	The House of Councillors Democratic Party Aichi District
Yutaka Kobayashi	The House of Councillors Liberal Democratic Party Kanagawa District
Yuriko Koike	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Proportional Representative Kinki Block
Kenji Kosaka	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Nagano 1st District

Co-chair	Iwao Matsuda	The House of Councillors Liberal Democratic Party Gifu District
	Asahiko Mihara	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Proportional Representative Kyushu Block
Co-chair	Jin Shinobu Murai	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Proportional Representative Hokuriku-shinetsu Block
Co-chair	Yoshinori Ohno	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Kagawa 3rd District
	Kazuya Shinba	The House of Councillors Democratic Party Shizuoka District
	Yasuhisa Shiozaki	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Ehime 1st District
	Seiken Sugiura	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Aichi 12th District
	Naokazu Takemoto	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Osaka 15th District
	Isamu Ueda	The House of Representatives New Komei Party Kanagawa 6th District
	Hideki Wakabayashi	The House of Councillors Democratic Party Proportional Representative

US Members

Eni Faleomavaega	The House of Representatives Democrat American Samoa
Mike Honda	The House of Representatives Democrat California 15th

Co-chair	Jim McDermott	The House of Representatives Democrat Washington 7th
	Tom Petri	The House of Representatives Republican Wisconsin 6th
Co-chair	F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.	The House of Representatives Republican Wisconsin 5th
	Harald Malmgren	President The Malmgren Group
	Henry R. Nau	Professor The George Washington University
	Sandy Snider-Pugh	Administrative Assistant The George Washington University



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

4 OCT 2003

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (697-6210)

SUBJECT: U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

- Pursuant to your snowflake request of 24 November, I am attaching information on the U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program. House Members participate in the Exchange Program, which is organized by Professor Henry Nau at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. The Senate has chosen not to participate.
- The congressional co-chairmen of the Exchange Program are Jim Sensenbrenner (WI) and Jim McDermott (WA). The American congressional delegation is in Tokyo today for the winter meeting of the Legislative Exchange Program. For the second time, South Korean Parliamentarians were also invited to attend. The spring meeting, which will be held in Washington, has not been scheduled.
- The Exchange Program is congressionally endowed. Meetings are held twice a year.
- As all of the George Washington University (GWU) coordinators are in Tokyo for the winter meeting, I have been unable to get a list of Diet Members. Upon the return of the GWU administrators, I will forward the list to you.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake
2. Agenda for U.S.-Japan-Korea Tri-Lateral Meeting
3. General Information on U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange

Prepared by: Jeanine Esperne, DASD, House Affairs

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14075

9:09 AM

* 2

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT:

See if the US-Japan Parliamentary exchange still exists. If so, who the members are, how often they meet, who funds it and how it works. I would like to know who is on the US side and who is on the Japan side.

Thanks.

DHR:azn
112403 13

Please respond by: 12/1

U223482/03

11-L-0559/OSD14076

- 2

**The 30th U.S.-Japan Legislative Exchange Program
and
The First US-Japan-Korea Tri-Lateral Meeting
December 2-4, 2003**

**Sponsored by the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, under a grant from the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission*

December 2nd, Tuesday

US Members arrive at New Tokyo International Airport, Narita and proceed to ANA Hotel, Tokyo

Accommodations at ANA Hotel, Tokyo

ANA Hotel, Tokyo

12-33, Akasaka 1-chome

Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052

Tel: 81-3-3505-1111

Fax: 81-3-3505-1155

18:00-20:00 Dinner hosted by Japanese Co-Chair at ANA Hotel, Tokyo.

December 3rd, Wednesday

8:00-9:00 Breakfast meeting at ANA Hotel

11-L-0559/OSD14077

09:15 Leave the hotel and proceed to The Parliamentary Museum by coach.

The Parliamentary Museum

1-1, Nagata-cho 1-chome

Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0014

Tel : 03-3581-1651

09:45-12:30 Session 1 - **Political Issue**

12:45-14:00 Luncheon Meeting at the Parliamentary Museum

14:15-16:15 Session 2 - **Security Issue**

December 3rd (continued)

16:15-18:15 Session 3 - **Economic Issue**

18:15 Leave for ANA Hotel by coach

19:00-19:30 Welcoming Cocktails with Korean Parliament Members at ANA Hotel.

19:30-21:00 Tri-Lateral Dinner hosted by Japanese Co-Chair at ANA Hotel.

Accommodations at ANA Hotel

December 4th, Thursday

08:00-09:00 Tri-Lateral Breakfast meeting at ANA Hotel.

09:15 Transfer to the Parliamentary Museum by coach

09:45-12:30 The 1st Tri Lateral Session
Economic and Political Issues of South Korea and
North Korean Issue

12:45-14:00 Tri-Lateral Luncheon Meeting at the Parliamentary Museum.



14:00 Transfer to ANA Hotel by coach.

December 5th, Friday

08:00-09:30 Breakfast with Young Japanese Leaders (optional)
Room in ANA Hotel to be announced

***** End of the 30th Meeting *****

Accommodations at ANA Hotel



11-L-0559/OSD14080

JCIE Political Exchange Program (PEP)

The Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), based in Tokyo, was established in 1970 as an independent, nonprofit, and nonpartisan organization dedicated to strengthening Japan's role in international affairs. JCIE plays an important role in broadening debate on Japan's international responsibilities by engaging Japanese from different sectors in privately sponsored programs of exchange, research, and dialogue with their foreign counterparts.

One of the central elements of JCIE's efforts over the past three decades has been the Political Exchange Program. This program began in the late 1960s, even prior to the formal creation of JCIE, when its precursor, the Japan Council for International Understanding, cosponsored the first full-fledged, nongovernmental policy dialogue between Japan and the United States, the Shimoda Conference. What emerged from that meeting was a growing consciousness that the U.S.-Japan relationship cannot be handled solely by the governments. There is a need for the involvement of leaders from diverse sectors, and particularly from the world of politics. JCIE's subsequent activities—including the continuation of the Shimoda Conference series—have sought to address precisely that need.

As one of very few independent, nonprofit organizations in Japan, JCIE is in a unique position to promote substantive, nonpartisan political exchange between Japan and other countries. JCIE's programs are also enhanced by the presence of its American affiliate, the Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc. (JCIE/USA), which was established in 1975 in New York as a tax-exempt organization. Among its most important functions, JCIE/USA plays a networking role among members of Congress, foundations, and think tanks in the United States and their counterparts abroad. In addition, JCIE/USA serves as an informal information center to JCIE/Japan and other friends by compiling resources and tracking current developments in politics and civil society in North America. This presence in the United States has enabled JCIE to play a critical role in promoting exchange between political, intellectual, and grass-roots leaders from the United States and Japan.

The closing decades of the 20th century witnessed dramatic changes throughout the global community that have changed the way nations are able to govern themselves. Globalization and greater interdependence are making it ever more crucial that policymakers have a thorough grasp of international affairs, even when considering domestic policy choices. In Japan, another significant shift in the mode of governance has been a decline in the role of bureaucrats and a simultaneous and conspicuous rise in the role of politicians in the policymaking process. This has further reinforced the need for substantive exchanges between Japanese policymakers and their counterparts abroad. In comparison to the traditional modes of political exchange that primarily stressed network-building, JCIE has worked to create more issue-oriented exchanges, fostering dialogues between political leaders on topics relevant to them.

Exchanges of Political Leaders

In light of the new requirements of the globalized age, JCIE's exchanges of political leaders seek to promote greater breadth and depth of knowledge on the part of policymakers through the promotion of interaction and dialogue with their counterparts in other countries. These programs also seek to engage a broad range of individuals—the staff of politicians, members of local and state governments, and leaders in the community—all of whom are playing an increasingly important role in relations between countries.

By taking a flexible and responsive approach in its political exchange program, JCIE has enjoyed an exceptional degree of continuity and longevity in its programs. The U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, founded in 1968, is the oldest bilateral exchange of national legislators. In all, JCIE's various exchanges have involved well over one thousand political leaders over the past thirty years, offering them programs that reflect their changing needs and providing substantive learning opportunities as well as opportunities for networking with other policymakers.

U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

Over the past three decades, a total of 24 Congressional delegations and 21 Diet delegations—comprised on aggregate of roughly 200 members of Congress and 160 Diet members—have traveled across the Pacific to meet with their counterparts in the legislature, key government officials, and other experts. As economic and political interdependence has deepened over the past decades, and as the scope and scale of issues requiring policy coordination between the two countries have steadily increased, the program has sought to provide a better and more nuanced grasp of the domestic dynamics in each country. In 1997, the program was expanded to include a Joint Parliamentary Study and Dialogue Project on U.S.-Japan Security Relations in Asia Pacific, conducted in cooperation with the Brookings Institution, and a Study Group for Young Members of the Diet.

U.S. Congressional Delegations to Japan (1968–2000)

Senate

Howard Baker (R-NH)
Max Baucus (D-MT)
Strom Thurmond (R-SC)
Henry Bellmon (R-OK)
Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)
Bill Bradley (D-NJ)
Clifford Case (R-NJ)
Dick Clark (D-IA)
John Chafee (D-RI)
Paul Simon (D-IL)
Tim Wirth (D-CO)

Vance Hartke (D-IN)
James McClure (R-ID)
Lee Metcalf (D-MT)
Robert Morgan (D-NE)
Frank Moss (D-UT)
Frank Murkowski (R-AK)
Edmund Muskie (D-ME)
Sam Nunn (D-GA)
James Pearson (R-KS)
Charles Percy (R-IL)
Javert Rockefeller (D-NY)
William Roth (R-DE)

Paul Sarbanes (D-MD)
Jim Sasser (D-TN)
Hugh Scott (R-PA)
Robert Stafford (R-CT)
Richard Schweiker (R-PA)

House

Thomas Allen (D-ME)
Bill Archer (R-TX)
Les AuCoin (D-OR)
Herbert Bauman (R-VA)
Doug Bereuter (R-NE)

Howard Berman (D-CA)	Sara Geydenson (D-CT)	John Porter (R-WT)
Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY)	Richard Gephardt (D-MO)	Joel Pritchard (R-WA)
Rick Boucher (D-VA)	Sara Gibbons (D-FL)	David Pryor (D-AR)
Jack Brooks (D-TX)	Sam Glickman (D-KS)	Dan Quayle (R-IN)
Coldwell Butler (R-VA)	Sam Gordon (D-TN)	Albert Quie (R-MN)
Tom Cavanaugh (R-CA)	Bill Gradson (R-OR)	Thomas Rainsbeck (R-IL)
William Clay (D-MO)	Judd Gregg (R-NH)	Bill Richardson (D-NM)
William Clinger (R-PA)	Tony Hall (D-OH)	Charlie Rose (D-NC)
Jeffery Cohelan (D-CA)	Lee Hamilton (D-IN)	Donald Rumsfeld (R-IL)
Thomas Coleman (R-MO)	James Hayes (D-LA)	Harold Sawyer (R-MD)
Ronald Coleman (D-TX)	Earl Hilliard (D-AL)	Herman Schneebeli (R-PA)
Michael Collins (R-GA)	James Howard (D-NF)	James Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
James Conman (D-CA)	William Hungate (D-MC)	James Shannon (D-MA)
John Culver (D-IA)	Henry Hyde (R-IL)	Phillip Sharp (D-IN)
Peter DeFazio (D-OR)	Nancy Johnson (R-CT)	Norman Shumway (R-CA)
Diane DeGette (D-CO)	Robert Leggett (D-CA)	David Skaggs (D-CO)
Butler Derrick (D-SC)	Sander Levin (D-MI)	Denny Smith (R-OR)
Lawrence DeNardis (R-CT)	William Mailliard (R-CA)	John Spratt (D-SC)
Norman Dicks (D-WA)	Robert Mathias (R-CA)	William Steiger (R-WI)
Thomas Downey (D-NY)	Robert Matsui (D-CA)	Louis Stokes (D-OH)
Robert Duncan (D-OR)	Spark Matsunaga (D-HI)	Samuel Stratton (D-NY)
Dennis Eckart (D-QH)	Joseph McDade (R-PA)	Gennie Thompson (D-MS)
John Erlenborn (R-IL)	Patsy Mink (D-HI)	Morris Udall (D-AZ)
Alan Enel (D-PA)	Jim McDermott (D-WA)	Jolene Unkei (D-WA)
Frank Evans (D-CO)	Robert McSwen (R-NY)	Pat Williams (D-MT)
Eni Faleomavaega (D-Delegate, American Samoa)	Matthew McHugh (D-NY)	Timothy Wirth (D-CO)
Bob Filner (D-CA)	Thomas McMillen (D-MD)	Robert Wise (D-WV)
Bill Frenzel (R-MN)	Robert Michel (R-IL)	Evan Wolke (D-CA)
Thomas Foley (D-WA)	Bartus Mikulski (D-MD)	Wendell Wyant (R-OR)
Wycle Fowler (D-GA)	John Miller (R-WA)	Andrew Young (D-GA)
Albert Gore (D-TN)	Norman Mineta (D-CA)	
Barney Frank (D-MA)	Howard Nickson (R-UT)	
Donald Fraser (D-MN)	James O'Hara (D-MI)	
Martin Frost (D-TX)	Leon Panetta (D-CA)	
	Thomas Pelt (R-WI)	

(Affiliations given are those at time of participation.)

Japanese Diet Delegations to the United States (1974-2000)

Members of the House of Councilors are marked (*). All others are members of the House of Representatives.

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

Kazuo Aichi
Kenro Aizawa
Kozo Chuma
Seisuke Doi
Takao Fuji
Ken Furuta
Takafumi Hamada
Yoshitaka Hara
Tetsuo Hara
Yoshimasa Hayashi
Yoshio Hayashi

Yukihiko Ikeda
Chiken Kakazu
Koji Kakazuwa
Genryo Kaneko
Kazuyoshi Kaneko
Naomi Kato
Motoo Kumura
Takashi Kosugi
Hiroshi Kumagai
Nobuyuki Machimura
Hiromichi Miyajima
Kiyoshi Mizuno
Ryuzo Mouri
Toshizumi Nakamura
Yoshio Nagano
Ien Nakatsu
Toshitaka Niimi

Takeshi Nozaki
Tetsu Nozawa
Fukushiro Nukaga
Keizo Obuchi
Masumi Ogawa
Shinichi Oishi
Tadamasa Oshima
Shunro Oshiro
Kenichiro Otsubo
Toshio Saito
Kazuo Saito
Otsu Shigenaga
Kobunshi Shimada
Hiroyuki Sonoda
Kunio Suzuki
Shunichi Suzuki
Takumi Takatori

BRIEFING

Elliot School Home & View

Senator
Lieberman Keynotes
Homeland Security
Seminar

Joseph Stiglitz's Brings
Discontent Talk to GWU

Money to Move
Discussion Into Space

Students, Iraq, and a
TV Camera

CISTP Shakes Hands
with South Korea

Developments in the
Works

ESIA Launches New U.S.
Foreign Policy Institute

For Liberty or Security?

The Sigur Center Shines

A Very Public Staff

Japan-U.S. Legislative
Exchange Program Still
Going Strong

Hail to the Chief?


Students on Tour

New Student Policy
Group Tackles Security
Issues

Your Link to a Career

Bartering Over Human
Rights with the Military

Japan-U.S. Legislative Exchange Program Still Going Strong



WHY THE U.S.?

Meeting with China

Paying Attention to Culture in the World

NATO's Kurt Volker Visits with Students

Speaking Out for Children

Everth Continues to Think Ahead

David Rockefeller Chats with Dean Harding

Nau and Mearsheimer Debate Policy

Access Transcripts Online

Want to Find Out What's Happening?

Graduate Students Take Office

Bringing International Education to K-12

Public Diplomacy or Propaganda?

Pelosky Series Hosts Thomas Homer-Dixon

The New Leonard Nadler Scam Honored

Speaking Out for Zimbabwe

Faculty Notes

Faculty Profiles: Kirk Larsen


Brown Bag Series Starts with Afghanistan

Remembering Ambassador John S. Egan: A Tribute

Twice a year members of the U.S. Congress meet with members of the Japanese Diet to talk, chat, debate, and yes, even raise their voices. In the spring they congregate in Washington DC and in the fall they meet in Tokyo for informal conversations on the state of world affairs. By working outside official channels they can develop a more personal relationship and better understanding between the two nations and their policies, says Professor Henry Nau, Director of the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda, the program that hosts this Legislative Exchange Program.

The Legislative Exchange Program began nearly 14 years ago as an offshoot of the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda, which was implemented in 1985. "In the late 80s it was apparent that there was little real dialogue on the issues," says Nau. Gaston Sigur approached Henry Nau with the idea of the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda in order to nurture a better, less business focused relationship with Japan.

Today, the Legislative Exchange Program continues offering further development toward Japan's understanding of U.S. democracy and U.S. understanding of Japan's policies. In its 28th session, Nau remarks that its regular participants have established candid and friendly relations that allow for real talk. In many cases, American senators will spend time with their counterpart's family or a Japanese politician will join an American senator on the campaign trail in the United States.

During their most recent meeting this past October, the Japanese and American officials discussed security issues like U.S. bases in Okinawa, the potential threat of Korean nuclear power, environmental issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol, and a number of other pressing issues. The next scheduled meeting will take place in Washington DC in late April. 

HISTORY OF THE U.S.-JAPAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Introduction

The U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda began in 1985 as a research and public policy activity jointly sponsored by the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. and the Carnegie Council on Ethnic and International Affairs in New York. In 1990, the Agenda became an independent program at the George Washington University, and in 1991, it became associated with the newly created Gaston Sigur Center for Asian Studies, now known as the Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

Over the past seventeen years, the Agenda has conducted a variety of activities. These include public policy seminars and conferences, research projects with various counterpart institutions in Japan (covering a range of topics from energy to agriculture to high technology policy-making), and various publications to include a newsletter, monograph series, two edited books published by New York and Columbia University Presses, and various conference papers and proceedings.

For the first nine years, the GWU Agenda was co-directed by Henry R. Nau, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, and Gaston Sigur, Distinguished Professor of International Relations and Counselor at the Sigur Center in the Elliott School. Professor Sigur, a former Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern and Pacific Affairs in the U.S. Department of State and long-time scholar and commentator on U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Asian affairs, died in Spring 1995. Professor Nau continues as the Agenda Director. He is a former staff member of the National Security Council and author of numerous publications in areas of technology, political economy and U.S. foreign policy. His most recent book, to be published by Cornell University Press in March 2002, is At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy. Other books include The Myth of America's Decline, published in 1990 by Oxford University Press, and Trade and Security, published in 1995 by The American Enterprise Institute Press. Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, is the director of the Sigur Center. He is the holder of the chair in U.S.-Japan relations established in honor of Gaston Sigur.

The Agenda's principal ongoing program is the Legislative Exchange Program (LEP), carried out in cooperation with the Japan Economic Foundation in Tokyo.¹ In

¹ The LEP was referred to in a survey conducted in 1993 by the Japan Center for International Exchange as one of only two "models for bilateral parliamentary exchanges between Japan and the United States" (the other being the Bradley-Shinya U.S.-Japan Legislators' Committee — discontinued in 1996). These models are characterized by academic administration, ongoing dialogue among legislators to develop personal ties (rather than one-shot conferences), and candid, informal discussions on substantive topics of the moment. See JCIE, A Survey and Study Report on Inter-Parliamentary and Political Leaders Exchanges between the United States and Japan, March 21, 1994, p. 1.

2000, the LEP completed its thirteenth year. The LEP brings together on a semi-annual basis the same core group of U.S. Congressional Members and Japanese Diet Members for in-depth and informal discussions of the broad range of political, economic and security issues affecting U.S.-Japan relations. Conducted initially in English, the exchanges have created strong personal and social ties among the members, enabling them to debate controversial political issues without rancor. This type of exchange did not, and still does not, exist elsewhere in U.S.-Japan parliamentary relations. For this reason, in a survey in fall 1997, Congress identified the LEP as the preferred forum for expanding U.S.-Japan parliamentary exchanges, both to include non-English speaking Diet Members and more of the leadership of both parliaments. Accordingly, the LEP's program expanded significantly in 1999. The meetings now include simultaneous translation and higher level parliamentary representation. The new Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, has been a regular member of the LEP since 1995. After becoming speaker, he hosted breakfast meetings for the LEP and has been directly involved in ongoing discussions to include the leadership of Japan's parliament. In December 1999, Taku Yamasaki, then one of the leaders of the LDP and now Secretary General of the LDP under the new Koizumi government, participated in an LEP discussion with simultaneous translation. In 2000, the Speaker of the Japanese Diet attended an LEP dinner. Thus, the current LEP builds on the solid personal and social relationships, which the English-speaking group developed between 1989 and 1998, and now includes expanded meetings with non-English speaking Japanese Members and leaders of both parliaments.

As before, the LEP plans two meetings during Calendar Year 2002. The first meeting takes place in Washington, D.C. in April/May 2002. The second meeting takes place in Tokyo in November/December 2002. At the second meeting, the LEP is exploring a low cost means of linking a parliamentary exchange among U.S., Japanese and South Korean legislators with the bilateral U.S.-Japan LEP meeting. Japanese colleagues would invite friends in the South Korean parliament to attend the last day of the LEP session (usually a morning session and lunch). The topic for discussion would be trilateral security and economic issues. Initially, the South Korean members might cover their own travel costs, and the Japanese the meeting costs. Eventually, the Japanese might work these costs into their regular budget. (The LEP also maintains contact with Congressman Ed Royce (R-CA), who chairs the U.S.-South Korea parliamentary exchange. The possibility of a joint meeting of the two bilateral exchange programs has been suggested.)

Background of the Agenda

In its early years, the GWU U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda conducted a variety of research projects with Japanese counterparts. Initially funded entirely by the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, the Agenda received subsequent support from other sources.

The Pew Charitable Trusts funded the Agenda's high technology policy-making project, carried out in cooperation with the Mitsubishi Research Institute (MRI). The

project featured two conferences on U.S. and Japanese high technology policy-making in the controversial sectors of high-definition television (HDTV) and the FSX fighter aircraft. The conferences developed and published case studies of U.S. and Japanese policy-making processes in these two controversies.

The United States Agency for International Development funded an Agenda project on U.S.-Japan energy and environmental cooperation in third world countries. This project was conducted jointly with the MITI-related institute, Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute (GISPRI). It featured a workshop of 25 participants (10 from Japan) and culminated in the joint preparation of twelve working papers on various aspects of U.S. and Japanese energy and environmental priorities, policy-making and possible cooperation in third countries.

In recent years, the Agenda has confined its activities to the Legislative Exchange Program.

Background of the Legislative Exchange Program (LEP)

The LEP was headed at its inception by Congressman Norman Shumway (R-California) on the American side and Diet Member Iwao Matsuda (LDP-Gifu Prefecture) on the Japanese side. Congress Shumway retired from the U.S. Congress in January 1991, and Congressman Donald Pease (D-Ohio), a key member of the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, became chair. Congressman Pease retired from Congress in January 1993, and Congressmen Amo Houghton (R-NY) and Tom Sawyer (D-OH) served as co-chairs from 1993 to 1998. In 1999, Congressmen James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and David Minge (D-MN) took over leadership of the LEP. In 2000, David Minge left the Congress, and James McDermott (D-WA) became the Democratic Co-Chair. On the Japanese side, Matsuda (originally LDP, then New Frontier Party and independent, now LDP again) was chair until 1996, when he was defeated in lower House elections. Thereafter, Jin Murai (LDP) and Yoshinori Ohno (LDP) assumed the leadership. Mr. Matsuda became the third co-chair when he was reelected to the upper house of the Diet in 1998. Today, the Japanese delegation is led by three co-chairs.

Over the years, participation by U.S. Members in the LEP meetings has steadily increased. At the first meetings, fewer than ten Members participated. At the meeting in May 2001, twenty-one Members participated (i.e. physically showed up, not just indicated they would come). In total, over the past ten years, some eighty-five Members of Congress have attended one or more of the LEP sessions. On the Japanese side, anywhere from six to seventeen Diet members have participated in individual sessions. In May 1999, the Japanese sent their largest delegation to Washington — fifteen Diet Members. In May 2001, seven Japanese Members participated. Altogether, more than thirty-five Diet Members have attended one or more of the meetings. With recent changes in Japanese politics, the participants now represent the range of political parties in Japan.

The participants over the years have expressed frequent and enthusiastic support for the exchanges. The original English format developed a direct and spirited form of exchange, which helped to overcome cultural formalities and build personal ties. Shumway and Pease, when they retired, went out of their way to find successors and ensure that the program continued. A number of the American and Japanese legislators (Sawyer, Houghton, Sensenbrenner, McDermott, Hastert, Murai, Ohno, Matsuda, Yamamoto, Miyamoto) attend the sessions regularly and make up a core group that enjoys personal rapport and attracts a wider circle of participants. In one communication in 1994, Mr. Matsuda suggested how frank and valuable the LEP discussions are. He wrote: "I count the number of times that voices are raised as positive indicators of the intensity and ultimately the value of our exchange programs."

THE CONGRESSIONAL STUDY GROUP ON JAPAN

233 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, S.E., SUITE 200

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-1107

(202) 543-8676

(b)(6)

March 12, 2001

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Dear Colleague:


We would like to invite you and/or a member of your staff to attend a luncheon meeting on Tuesday, March 20, 2001 with a group of seven young policy-oriented Japanese Diet Members who are participating in the 23rd U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program run by the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE). The Diet Members will discuss the current political situation and future outlook in Japan, and are interested in hearing Members' and staff views on the new Congress and future directions for U.S. foreign policy. Please note that staff are particularly welcome to attend this program. The luncheon meeting will be held in Room S-115 (Senate Family Dining Room) in the Capitol, beginning at 12:30 p.m.

The Diet delegation (all members of the House of Representatives) will be led by Mr. Ichiro Aisawa of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Other participants are: Mr. Yukio Edano, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ); Mr. Kazuhiro Haraguchi (DPJ); Mr. Hakubun Shimomura (LDP); Mr. Takuya Tasso (Liberal Party); Mr. Kazuyoshi Akaba (New Komeito Party), and Mr. Tatsuya Ito (LDP). The delegation will be accompanied by Mr. Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE, and Mr. Hiroshi Peter Kamura, Executive Director, JCIE/USA.

We hope that you and/or a member of your staff will join us for a stimulating discussion meeting, which is funded by the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission. Please have your office either return the enclosed form to the Congressional Study Group on Japan (fax: 543-7145), or call 543-8676 to let us know if you will be able to attend.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,



Dianne Feinstein



Steve Horn

Enclosure

The Congressional Study Group on Japan is a project of the U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress in cooperation with the East-West Center and is funded by the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and other interested donors.

11-L-0559/OSD14090

1417
0900

December 16, 2003

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

I would like to have the two co-chairmen of the US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, Jim Sensenbrenner and Jim McDermott, in for breakfast, lunch or a meeting sometime. I would like to see their background sheets, and then I would like to have that meeting set up.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/4/03 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef
11/24/03 SecDef memo to ASD(LA) [112403.03]

DHR:dh
121603-2

.....
Please respond by

1/30/04

Larry -
He wants to meet
w/ McDermott - the guy
who just said we "staged"
the capture of SH for
political effect? ???

- DeLoane

Powell Moore:
Where are we
on this?

Thanks,
Jaymie
Durnan
2/3

OSD 01687-04

11-L-0559/OSD14091



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1511-04
10 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Reporting on Reducing Stress on the Force

- You requested a periodic report on how we are doing in reducing stress on the force (TAB A).
- Program Budget Decision 712 directs the Services to convert 20,070 military billets to civilians and/or contractors in FY 04 and FY 05.
- Services are rebalancing the Active and Reserve Component mix to relieve stress and realigning billets as follows: Army – 100,000, FY 04-09; Navy – 2000, FY 04-05; Air Force – 7000, FY 04-05; Marine Corps – 2029, FY 04-05.
- Defense Agency Manpower Review Process is identifying positions in defense agencies that could be eliminated or civilianized, resulting in military billets returned to the Services: Defense Finance and Accounting Service – 20, FY 05; Defense Contract Management Agency – 24, FY 05; Defense Threat Reduction Agency – 257, FY 03.
- General Defense Intelligence Program converted 305 military billets to civilian and returned those to the Services: Army – 142; Navy – 73; Marine Corps – 8; Air Force – 82.
- Long-term efforts, such as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, force modularity and global force management could provide a significant capability to further reduce stress on the force.
- Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) will provide periodic reports on other stress-related indicators such as impacts on recruiting and retention, family satisfaction, etc.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Brigadier General Maria C. Owens, USAF; Director, J-1;

(b)(6)

0 SD 01976-04

11-L-0559/OSD14092

TAB

A

TAB A

SECRET/NO FORN DISC.

2004 FEB 10 PM 2:58

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu
Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reporting on Reducing Stress on Force

We need to have a periodic report on how we are doing in reducing stress on the force.

For example, Dov Zakheim told me the other day that he has returned to the Services for reassignment 300 military personnel that he doesn't need in the Comptroller's shop.

We need to see where else that is happening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-37 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by

1/31/04

OSD 01976-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD14094

TAB

B

TAB B

OSD(P)	Mr. Richard Davison	January 29, 2004
OSD(P&R)	Mr. Al Gallant	January 29, 2004
OSD(PA&E)	Mr. Greg Wise	January 26, 2004
OSD(RA)	Mr. Dan Kohner	January 26, 2004
USA	COL Randy Wright	January 22, 2004
USN	CAPT D. Thompson	January 27, 2004
USAF	Col Shelby Ball	January 27, 2004
USMC	Col Van Dyke	January 26, 2004
DIA	Ms. Barbara Mays	January 29, 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD14096

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB 10 PM 2:58

December 27, 2003

W
2
2

TO: David Chu
Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reporting on Reducing Stress on Force

We need to have a periodic report on how we are doing in reducing stress on the force.

For example, Dov Zakheim told me the other day that he has returned to the Services for reassignment 300 military personnel that he doesn't need in the Comptroller's shop.

We need to see where else that is happening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-37 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by

1/31/04

OSD 01976-04

Tab A

27 Dec 03

11-L-0559/OSD14097

7 Dec 03

~~12-03~~
2-

Dear Mr. Burnsfield,

My husband and I wish you and your family a very wonderful Christmas. We also want to thank you for keeping us safe and being a man of principle. I feel very disheartened when I hear those who criticize you and can only hope it makes you stronger. There are a lot of us out here who love you and support you. May God continue to

MAY THE GIFTS

THAT ONLY CHRIST CAN GIVE

BE YOURS THIS CHRISTMAS

AND MAY HIS LOVE, JOY, AND PEACE

CONTINUE TO BE ABUNDANTLY YOURS

THROUGHOUT EACH DAY

OF THE NEW YEAR

Bless you and your family

Merry Christmas

(b)(6)

"...THEY SHALL CALL HIS NAME EMMANUEL...
GOD WITH US." MATTHEW 1:23 KJV

02009-04

7 Dec 03

11-L-0559/OSD14098

0

Snowflake

December 27, 2003

33550

→ CSC

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thank You Letter

Someone ought to write a nice letter to (b)(6) thanking them for their card.

Thanks.

Attach.
Christmas card from (b)(6)

DHR:dh
122703-15 (in computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

Done?

— Not unfilled a entered in CRD
according to Bernadette

Thank -
CSC
2/5/04

f
2/3

27 Dec 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 11 2004

33550

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs

(b)(6)

Thank you so much for your holiday card and your words of support. It was kind of you to think of me.

You have my best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

11Feb04

27Dec03

OSD 02009-04

11-L-0559/OSD14100



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your holiday card. It was kind
of you to think of me.

You have my best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

and your
~~kind~~
words
of support

1st +
Sam
Sam
Durnan
2/9

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your holiday card. It was kind of you to think of me.

You have my best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 MAR -3 PM 5:38

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

- Based upon your positive impressions during a visit to Secretary Thompson's Command Center, I visited the facility to determine the potential use of their capability in your new Unified Command Center.
- While the HHS Command Center is limited in scope and size, they have done an impressive job constructing it in 59 days at a cost of \$3.7M. Essentially, they use two large video walls with one wall having four large screen monitors tuned to live news TV stations (domestic and international), and the other wall having ten projector screens in a two-down and five-across matrix as a "knowledge wall."
- On the knowledge wall, each projector can display a single image or multiple images, such as video teleconferencing images, multiple health crises, multiple hospital statuses during an event, etc. This would be similar to you concurrently tracking information and talking to multiple Combatant Commanders, Service Secretaries, other Department Secretaries, the President, etc.
- I have directed my IT team, responsible for developing and implementing your Unified Command Center, to meet with Secretary Thompson's IT staff to better understand how we can utilize the HHS Command Center's capability and their expertise in integrating a "knowledge wall" into the new Unified Command Center, your new office on the Mall Terrace in 2005, and other areas occupied by you.
- If desired, I am available to discuss further at your convenience.

COORDINATION: None


Prepared By: Michael R. Sullivan,

(b)(6)

OSD 03192-04

11-L-0559 SD14103

December 19¹⁹
~~18~~, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

Please go over and take a look at the HHS command center. I am told it was done in 59 days and only cost \$3.5 million. It is amazing.

Please go over, get a full briefing on it and see if you think we ought to do something like that.

Thanks.

DHR:db
121803-11

.....
Please respond by

1/23/04

December 18¹⁹, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

Please go over and take a look at the HHS command center. I am told it was done in 59 days and only cost \$3.5 million. It is amazing.

Please go over, get a full briefing on it and see if you think we ought to do something like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121803-11

.....
Please respond by

1/23/04

OSD 03192-04

11-L-0559/OSD14105

311CCC

19 Dec 03

1 Mar 04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004-03-03 14:53

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

March 3, 2004 - 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu
Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Mandatory Retirement--SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- There are several remedies applicable to Captain (b)(6) and others like him:
 - He can be recalled to active duty. The Secretary of a Military Department may order most retired officers to active duty (10 U.S.C. §688). No more than 25 officers can serve concurrently and they cannot serve more than 12 months in a 24-month period. (During periods of national emergency these restrictions are lifted, which is the current situation.)
 - If selected by a selection board, an officer who would otherwise be required to retire following completion of 30 years service may have retirement deferred and be continued on active duty for up to 5 years or until age 62, whichever is sooner (10 U.S.C. §637).
- The real problem is that officers like Captain (b)(6) may not wish to be retained, because there is little financial incentive to stay. Indeed, it could be argued the current incentive is negative, since delayed retirement may damage second career earnings.
- We are pursuing a set of legislative remedies to this dilemma for flag officers (raising maximum age to 68, and providing for an increased pension if they serve beyond 30 years). Your speaking out in support will help us, since we failed to win their acceptance last year.
- RAND is helping us evaluate alternatives for officers below flag rank. To enable us to try these out without having to justify each in advance, we are seeking military personnel demonstration authority. OMB has not yet cleared this, but I am hopeful they will soon do so. (I will let you know if by the end of next week we have not yet succeeded.)

COORDINATION: TAB B.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Francine Blackmon, ODUSD(MPP/OEPM); (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD14106


0 SD 03235-04

TAB

A

December 11, 2003

12/12/03

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Incentives


Yesterday I met the Executive Assistant to (b)(6) He is a Navy Captain with 30 years of service. He is 51 years old, and he is retiring. He is first-rate.

All the incentives in our system are wrong. Why don't we get them fixed?

Please come back to me with a proposal by January 5.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121103-18



.....
Please respond by 1/5/04

0 SD 03235-04

11-L-0559/OSD14108

TAB

B

11-L-0559/OSD14109

Coordination

General Counsel

[Handwritten signature]
Principal Deputy
1/21/04

Prepared by: Lt Col Francine Blackmon

(b)(6)

12/12/03
2004-11-11 14:55

December 11, 2003

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Incentives

Yesterday I met the Executive Assistant to (b)(6). He is a Navy Captain with 30 years of service. He is 51 years old, and he is retiring. He is first-rate.

All the incentives in our system are wrong. Why don't we get them fixed?

Please come back to me with a proposal by January 5.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121103-18

MRP
Please respond by 1/5/04

OSD 03235-04

11-L-0559/OSD14111

*210 Navy**11 Dec 03*



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1632-04
19 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 14 MAR 13/19

SUBJECT: Congressman Marshall

- **Question.** "Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas about using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week wars and not for much else. He says they like to do it and do it well. He says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth. Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoomaker talk to him and see what he has to say?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, and I are meeting with Congressman Jim Marshall regarding this matter on 23 March.
- **Analysis.** After the meeting, we will report on insights from Congressman Marshall at your earliest opportunity.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Copy to:
CSA

Prepared By: MG Clyde A. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS/NG; (b)(6)

OSD 04082-04

11-L-0559/OSD14112

TAB A

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Marshall

Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas about using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week wars and not for much else. He says they like to do it and do it well. He says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth.

Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoomaker talk to him and see what he has to say. He is an interesting man, very bright. He is the one who wrote such a good op-ed piece after he came back from the Middle East.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-27 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by

1/31/04

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Office of the Chief of Staff, COL Campbell 16 March 2004
US Army

11-L-0559/OSD14114

Tab B

326

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Marshall

Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas about using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week wars and not for much else. He says they like to do it and do it well. He says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth.

Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoomaker talk to him and see what he has to say. He is an interesting man, very bright. He is the one who wrote such a good op-ed piece after he came back from the Middle East.

Thanks.

DHR:ah
122703-27 (to computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

27 Dec 03

OSD 04082-04

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

December 4, 2003

2004 APR -2 PM 2:50

IRELAND

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Collins Film on Irish Insurrection

Attached is a note from Newt. I am going to get the film he refers to.

After I have looked at it, I will let you see it, and we will decide whether we think it is worth Abizaid seeing it.

Thanks.

Attach

12/2/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Irish Insurrection of 1916

DHE:dh
120403-30 (ix computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

0 SD 04811-04

11-L-0559/OSD14116

4 Dec 03

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

cc Di Rita
LTG Craddock

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2003 7:23 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.D.Rita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; Shep3804@aol.com; jack.patterson@osd.mil

Cc: damicorj@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: first copy had editing errors-newt

for secdef depsecdef

from newt

12/02/03

visiting Dublin on the way home from Brussels

you should stop in Dublin on the way home from Brussels and look at the lessons of the Irish war against the British Empire 1916-22.

After six days in Dublin I highly recommend you visit its historic sites and study the lessons of its 1916-1922 war against the British Empire..

The Irish were the first successful insurrection of the 20th century. They forced the British Empire to accept their independence after a six year struggle (1916-1922). The British could not defeat a local insurgency as long as it had local support and was willing to die.

In effect the Irish nationalists were saying "we are willing to die longer than you are willing to kill us and even a few of us can kill enough of you to make your system agree to our independence."

Mao Tse Tung, Tito, Ho Chi Minh and others were all aware of the Irish experience. (Peter Hart, The I.R.A. at War 1916-23 Oxford University Press 2003).

Michael Collins is a pretty good film on this topic and worth the two hours of viewing (an alternative to visiting Dublin).

The key to defeating an insurgency is building up our allies in the local population. Killing the insurgents is necessary but not sufficient. The headline below from the New York Times illustrates how far we are from understanding this war and getting it right.

Using heavy firepower and killing a lot of people is going to end up alienating the local population not intimidating them. We are currently rejecting a century of lessons learned in fighting societal wars (what some would call guerrilla or terrorist

12/3/2003

11-L-0559/OSD14117

3

campaigns but in essence are societies at war with professional military and professional police from another culture).

Dublin Castle in 1921 resembles the CPA fortress in 2003.

It is going to take a profound change of doctrine and strategy to win this war.

Let me repeat because this will be hard for the existing system to accept: it is going to take a profound change of doctrine and strategy to win this war,

NY Times article:

U.S. Sees Lesson for Insurgents in an Iraq Battle

By DEXTER FILKINS and IAN FISHER

Americans vowed that the killing of as many as 54 insurgents would serve as a lesson, but Iraqis disputed the death toll.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

April 7, 2004; 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

David S. C. Chu
8 Apr 04

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Recruiting that Accurately Reflects Deployment

- You recently asked (Tab A) for a sense of how well the Services' recruiting efforts reflect the likelihood of deployments. This responds.
- The topic of deployments is a standard part of training and information provided to recruits during discussions with the recruiter and through Delayed Entry Program activities.
- The Air Force is the most explicit. All Air Force recruits are required to review the Air Force Expeditionary Force Policy prior to accession. Each applicant must indicate with initials or signature that he or she received information on the policy, which clearly states that, although most Air Force personnel are away from their home stations less than 120 days per year, some may be required to exceed this level. Air Force advertising and marketing also depict Airmen in deployed environments.
- Similarly, Navy advertising and marketing prominently feature sailors on sea duty or in a warrior context.
- Army recently shifted its communications strategy away from a focus on tangible benefits, such as money for college and bonuses, to a more balanced approach. Army advertising and marketing reflect all aspects of Army training, including the combat arms, and portray the full rigor of Army service, including mobilizations and deployments.
- We will use our next survey of active personnel to ensure recruits understand these messages accurately.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Capt Angela Giddings, ODUSD(MPP)AP;
Maj Heidi Schwenn, ODUSD(MPP)AP;

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

11-L-0555/OSD14119

OSD 05055-04

TAB

A

MPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Recruiting

We need to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the kinds of deployments we expect.

Do you have a sense of how closely the Services are with respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-32 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

MPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Recruiting

We need to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the kinds of deployments we expect.

Do you have a sense of how closely the Services are with respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-32 (to computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

6:33 PM

C 11/10

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 20, 2003

SUBJECT: Cables

CHIEF OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

20 DEC 12 AM 3:53

Please look at the attached two cables on the French dealing with the Taliban and let me know what you find out the facts are.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
122003 01tscomp

Attach: Unclass 190839Z Dec 03
Unclass 190816Z Dec 03

Sir,
Response attached,
Original attachments
included behind.

vr/cpe
Nixony
1/9

Please respond by: 1/10/04 TO SECDEF

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

s/ste -
help, please -
8K
12/23/03

✓
1/13

France
20 DEC 03

13-2672

11-L-0559/OSD14123

OSD 05210-04

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: FBIS
DOCNO: SAP20031219000011
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
DTG: 190839Z DEC 03
FROM: FM FBIS RESTON VA
CONTROLS
UNCLAS

WARNING: TOPIC: DOMESTIC POLITICAL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL,
LEADER, MEDIA, TERRORISM, URGENT

TEXT
SERIAL: SAP20031219000011
PASS: ATTN WIRE SELECT

COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN, FRANCE, PAKISTAN

SUBJ: PAKISTAN: FRENCH JOURNALISTS REPORTEDLY FAKE FILM ON
MULLAH OMAR, TALIBAN

REF: 1. PAKISTAN ARRESTS FRENCH JOURNALISTS FOR INTERVIEWING
MULLAH OMAR SAP20031218000098 KARACHI UNMAT URDU 18 DEC 03

SOURCE: ISLAMABAD KHAABRAIN IN URDU 18 DEC 03 PP 1, 8

TEXT:

(REPORT BY AZEEM NAZIR: "CONSPIRACY TO DEFAME PAKISTAN; FRENCH
JOURNALISTS PRODUCE FAKE FILM OF TALIBAN'S TRAINING")
(FBIS TRANSLATED TEXT)

LAHORE -- SOME JOURNALISTS FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE ON THE
PAYROLL OF ANTI-PAKISTAN FORCES INCLUDING INDIA AND ISRAEL AND WANT
TO PROVE THAT PAKISTAN IS HELPING THE TALIBAN. ACCORDING TO A
HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL SOURCE, ANTI-PAKISTAN FORCES ARE ALSO
ENCOURAGING SOME PAKISTANI ELEMENTS WHO ARE PROVIDING SHELTER TO
PERSONA NON GRATA ELEMENTS IN TRIBAL AREAS. IN THIS CONNECTION,
TWO FRENCH JOURNALISTS WERE ARRESTED IN KARACHI ON 17 DECEMBER.
BOTH OF THEM ARE ON THE PAYROLL OF ENEMIES OF PAKISTAN WHO HAD
PROVIDED A HUGE AMOUNT TO A MAN IN QUETTA TO GATHER PEOPLE IN A
MOUNTAINOUS AREA ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY. THEY DRESSED THESE
PEOPLE LIKE TALIBAN AND PREPARED A FAKE FILM. IN THIS WAY THEY
WANTED TO PROVE THAT TALIBAN ARE BEING GIVEN TRAINING IN DIFFERENT
AREAS OF BALUCHISTAN. THEY INTENDED TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION THAT
TERRORIST TRAINING CAMPS EXIST IN PAKISTAN.

ACCORDING TO SOURCES, THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT, IN VIEW OF ITS
RELATIONS WITH THE FRIENDLY COUNTRY OF FRANCE, HAS ADOPTED A
LENIENT ATTITUDE TOWARD THE JOURNALISTS, AND BY IGNORING THEIR
DESIGNS HAS REGISTERED A CASE OF VIOLATION OF THE FOREIGN ACT.
HOWEVER, THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT WILL FORMALLY LODGE A PROTEST
WITH FRANCE OVER THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE IT WAS A CONSPIRACY TO
DEFAME PAKISTAN. ACCORDING TO SOURCES, AN IMPRESSION IS BEING
INTENTIONALLY GIVEN THAT THESE JOURNALISTS INTERVIEWED MULLAH OMAR.

S.C.
hook into this
PR

UNCLASSIFIED

WHICH IS A WHITE LIE. IN THIS WAY, AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONCEAL THE REAL DESIGNS.

(DESCRIPTION OF SOURCE: ISLAMABAD KHAIRAIN IN URDU --
SENSATIONALIST DAILY, GENERALLY OPPOSES PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY.
CIRCULATION OF 30,000.)

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(ENDALL)

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: FBIS
DOCNO: SAE20031218000098
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
DTG: 190816Z DEC 03
FROM: FM FBIS RESTON VA
CONTROLS
UNCLAS

WARNING: TOPIC: DOMESTIC POLITICAL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL, MEDIA,
TERRORISM, URGENT

TEXT
SERIAL: SAP20031218000098
PASS: ATTN WIRE SELECT

COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN, FRANCE, PAKISTAN

SUBJ: PAKISTAN ARRESTS FRENCH JOURNALISTS FOR INTERVIEWING
MULLAH OMAR

SOURCE: KARACHI UMMAT IN URDU 18 DEC 03 PP 1, 7

TEXT:

(UMMAT CORRESPONDENT REPORT: "TWO FRENCH JOURNALISTS ARRESTED
FOR INTERVIEWING MULLAH OMAR")

(FBIS TRANSLATED TEXT)

PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES HAVE ARRESTED TWO FRENCH JOURNALISTS WHO
INTERVIEWED TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH MOHAMMAD OMAR. THEY ARE ACCUSED
OF VIOLATING PAKISTANI IMMIGRATION LAWS. THE FIA (FEDERAL
INVESTIGATION AGENCY) HAS REGISTERED A CASE AGAINST THEM FOR
COMMITTING VISA IRREGULARITIES.

ACCORDING TO DETAILS, FIA PASSPORT CELL PERSONNEL RAIDED THE
AVARI TOWER HOTEL ON LATE TUESDAY (16 DECEMBER) NIGHT AND ARRESTED
MARK EPSTEIN AND JEAN PAUL GUILLOTEAU, WHO ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE
FORTNIGHTLY "L EXPRESS." TALKING TO NEWSMEN IN HIS OFFICE,
MOHAMMAD MALIK, FIA PASSPORT CELL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SAID THE FRENCH
JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED FOR VIOLATING THE INSTRUCTION
PRINTED ON THEIR VISAS. HE SAID THE ACCUSED OBTAINED A VISA FROM
THE PAKISTANI EMBASSY IN PARIS IN SEPTEMBER, WHICH WAS VALID UP TO
28 MARCH 2004. THE ACCUSED ARRIVED IN KARACHI ON 7 DECEMBER.
ACCORDING TO VISAS ISSUED TO THE FRENCH JOURNALISTS, THEY COULD
ONLY VISIT KARACHI, LAHORE, AND ISLAMABAD. BUT THE ACCUSED WENT
TO QUETTA ILLEGALLY AND AGAIN STAYED AT AVARI TOWER HOTEL ON THEIR
RETURN TO KARACHI. UPON RECEIVING INFORMATION OF THE BREACH OF
LAW, THEY WERE ARRESTED AND CASE NO. 270/2003 WAS REGISTERED
AGAINST THEM. A LOCAL COURT HAS REMANDED THEM TO FIA CUSTODY
UNTIL 24 DECEMBER.

HOWEVER, IMPORTANT SOURCES SAY THE ACCUSED STAYED IN QUETTA FOR
ONE DAY AND THEN CROSSED THE BORDER INTO AFGHANISTAN, WHERE THEY
RECORDED AN AUDIO AND VIDEO INTERVIEW OF MULLAH MOHAMMAD OMAR.

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTER CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEW, THEY AGAIN REACHED QUETTA. UPON RECEIVING THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN, AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT AGENCY STARTED SEARCHING FOR THE JOURNALISTS. THEY RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE JOURNALISTS HAD LEFT FOR KARACHI BY ROAD, UPON WHICH SECURITY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED AT OTHAL CHECK POINT WERE DIRECTED TO SEIZE THE LUGGAGE AND CAMERAS ETC. FROM THE ACCUSED. THEREFORE, BORDER GUARDS SEIZED THEIR LUGGAGE AND EQUIPMENT. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCES, THE FRENCH CONSULATE GENERAL WROTE LETTER NO. 162/APK TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CAMP OFFICE KARACHI, WHICH SAID THAT THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM THE JOURNALISTS INCLUDED ONE LAPTOP COMPUTER; ONE RED NOTEBOOK; ONE FLOPPY DISC; ONE VIDEOCASSETTE; SIX DIGITAL CAMERAS; IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS; HOTEL RECEIPTS; TICKETS FOR KARACHI, ISLAMABAD, AND QUETTA; AND THE NATIONAL IDENTITY CARD OF ONE KHAWAR MEHDI.

ACCORDING TO SOURCES, THE IMPORTANT AGENCY CHECKED THE ARTICLES CAPTURED FROM THE JOURNALISTS BUT THEY CONTAINED NOTHING ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. LATER, THE AGENCY DIRECTED FIA PASSPORT CELL DEPUTY DIRECTOR MOHAMMAD MALIK TO ARREST THE FRENCH JOURNALISTS FOR VIOLATING THE DIRECTIVES PRINTED ON THEIR VISAS. AFTER THEIR ARREST, A FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICIAL REACHED THE PASSPORT CELL, BUT THE FIA HAD REGISTERED THE CASE BY THEN. OFFICIALS FROM IMPORTANT AGENCIES ARE INVESTIGATING THE MATTER.

MEANWHILE, FIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR MOHAMMAD MALIK HAS DENIED THAT THE ACCUSED WENT TO AFGHANISTAN.

(DESCRIPTION OF SOURCE: KARACHI UMMAT IN URDU -- SENSATIONALIST, PRO-USAMA BIN LADEN URDU DAILY. HARSHLY CRITICAL OF THE US AND OF INDIA. CIRCULATION OF 20,000.)

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(ENDALL)

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

Snowflake

SECRET

2001 100 12 11 9: 03

December 30, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Please read this J.D. Crouch memo on missile defense and see me.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/10/03 Crouch memo to SecDef re: "Missile Defense Way Ahead"

DHR:ds
123003-3 (to computer)

Please respond by

1/16/04

TEN
1/9

OSD 05211-04

11 L 0550/OSD14120

373.24

30 Dec 03

3

11/10
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

DATE 1/9/2004 4:20 PM

MEMO FOR SecDef
I have read J.D.'s memo.

I agree with his approach. We agreed to add \$500M in new money for FY05 and \$1B in FY06 to support the next phase of deploying ground-based missile.

Gen Kadish has found an additional \$336M (FY05 \$177M & FY06 \$159M) within his program to ensure sufficient funds for this next deployment phase.

The challenge before us, if we want to deploy abroad, is to work out agreements with allies.

I agree with J.D. on the need for a fresh look at the missile defense progress. I've discussed such an effort with Gen Kadish, and he agrees one is needed. We should do it before he leaves in June.

Key to continued success with missile defense is the knowledge of and commitment to it by the next ASD/ISP.

As always, I stand ready to help. *gl*

✓
R/S

December 10, 2003

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

DepSec _____

From: J.D. Crouch II

Subject: ~~Missile~~ Defense Way Ahead

I have heard that an effort is underway in the department to "pause" the evolutionary approach to missile defense briefed to the President the last two years in Crawford. I am aware of the arguments in favor of such a pause, but I think it would be a mistake.

The evolutionary approach was deliberately designed not to commit us to a large, costly deployment but slowly to begin fielding modest capability. Its benefits are that for a relatively small investment we can:

- Begin to assure allies and dissuade opponents.
- Gain valuable experience in the organization and operation of global defenses.
- Provide a forcing function to organize, train, and equip for missile defense.
- Demonstrate real capability out of an \$8+ billion dollar budget while continuing an aggressive R&D effort.
- Keep our deployment options open for the future.

The dollars we are talking about for Crawford II are not huge (3-8% of the MDA budget), but sustaining this new approach to fielding systems has broad implications for missile defense, and how the department fields systems more generally.

Pausing now would:

- Be used by opponents of the program as evidence that the President's decision last year was premature and politically motivated.
- Delay the fielding of any new capabilities beyond Crawford I until after the end of the President's second term, thus:
 - Undermining the dissuasive impact of our MD program on key states of interest at a time of critical negotiations.
 - Make it difficult to sustain congressional interest in an \$8+ billion dollar budget in the out-years.
- Instill doubt in allies and friends who have recently come on board or are thinking about doing so, with implications beyond missile defense.
- Be seen inside the military as stepping away from the MD mission at a time when we are just now getting traction with the Combatant Commanders and the uniformed military.
- Cost significant amounts of money to restart production lines.

cc: LD
LTG Craddock

Continuing the program as briefed at Crawford would:

- Demonstrate continued confidence in the cautious, evolutionary approach we briefed to Congress.
 - We need not make a new public announcement of our intention to deploy specific capabilities in FY 06. Internally, budget and schedule planning will need to occur, yet our public rhetoric can simply emphasize our intention to continue to move forward to field additional capabilities, while preserving some flexibility concerning dates and numbers.
- Lock in allied support for the program as it becomes increasingly "real" to them.
 - A European site that provides limited protection for both the U.S. and Europe from longer-range missiles would further demonstrate the President's commitment to the alliance and differentiate the U.S. as an ally of choice in the NATO-EU debate.
 - It would also make it much more difficult to reverse the track toward greater MD capabilities because of the foreign policy and alliance management implications.
- Help force needed trade-offs and belt tightening within the MD program. A pause will be interpreted as a breathing space between hard decisions.
 - There is money to be found in the MDA budget, and Steve Cambone and Dov Zakheim originally reserved an additional funding wedge outside the MDA budget in the FY06-09 timeframe for fielding new capabilities.
 - Three years in, a look at what programs deserve continuing is in order.
 - The tooth to tail ratio also needs examination. There is almost one billion dollars in SETA contract support in the budget!

ACTION: If you agree, I suggest you direct Dov Zakheim to work with Ron Kadish to parse this year's MDA budget and present you with options to sustain the evolutionary approach to missile defense.

SECRET
ZDA 10R 12 01 9: 03

646
December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and CENTCOM

Here is a Vern Clark e-mail on the lines between PACOM and CENTCOM that we ought to think through. Please see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/24/03 CNO e-mail re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts

DHR:dh
122703-79 (is computer)

.....
Please respond by

1/23/04

OK C2/10
Sir,
CJCS met w/ SecDef
on 22 Jan 04 @ 0835.
LTC Snipe

333

27 Dec 03

OSD 05214-04

11-L-0559/OSD14132



SECRET

December 17, 2003

2004 APR 12 AM 9:04

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Philippines

I want to find out what is going on with respect to this fellow from the Philippines who killed one of our soldiers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121703-9

.....
Please respond by 1/5/04

*✓ 1/16**C 1/16**Sir,**Response attached.**VR/CDR Noseny
1/16/03**383.6**17 Dec 03*

OSD 05220-04

11-L-0559/OSD14133

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 19 PM 12:00

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and CENTCOM

Here is a Vern Clark e-mail on the lines between PACOM and CENTCOM that we ought to think through. Please see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach

10/24/03 CNO e-mail re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts

DHR:dh
122703-29 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by

1/23/04

0 SD 05625-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD14134

322

27 DEC 03

C

No Classification in Message Body

Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD

From: Clark, Vern (N00) [Clark.Vern@cno.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, October 24, 2003 6:16 PM
To: 'john.craddock@osd.smil.mil'; 'meyersrb@js.pentagon.smil.mil'
Cc: 'fargotb0@hq.pacom.smil.mil'; 'abizaijp@centcom.smil.mil'
Subject: India/Pakistan trip thoughts

Importance: High
Sensitivity: Personal

(CJCS)

John,

-- Please pass to Secretary Rumsfeld --

Mr. Secretary and Chairman,

You may recall I recently visited India and Pakistan. It was a terrific trip and very fruitful.

Two major issues for me:

- * One: the disconnect in both countries with how the UCP divides sensible relations with these two nations.
- * Our dividing lines are impacting them.
- * India wants to be engaged to the west. They have real national interests in that direction.
- * We are protective to the west because, in CENTCOM, we protect the feelings of Pakistan. (I'm not casting blame; just addressing perceptions)
- * So...India is not as engaged in the Gulf as they would like to be and they told me they sense a lack of connection with CENTCOM. They feel they have no entrance to deal in that AOR, e.g. exercises, liaisons, etc.
- * They don't see themselves as "belonging" to PACOM only.
- * It is less true for Pakistan looking east. As you know, Pak is keeping score of every move we make with India, but in naval stuff, they played in PACOM's submarine rescue event and liked it.

* Recommendation: We need to figure out how to fuzz the lines between these kinds of boundaries.

- * Two: Recovering from sanctions.
- o Lots of frustration. This is familiar to you I know.
- o We need to figure out how to look proactive in a post sanctions window. We don't.
- o Example: Pak already has the HARPOON surface-to-surface missile. During the years of sanction their HARPOON missiles became inoperable ...lack of support, parts, test equipment, etc. They are unable to obtain much needed parts and support equipment for legacy systems like this without starting over through our formal, multiagency approval process.
- * Recommendation: When we lift sanctions, we should consider a fundamental change to our interagency approval process and issue, pre-emptively, a list of items already approved. We should not force the nation to go through the approval process again.

All in all a good trip. I told each of them you had given me, and each of the Chiefs, the direction to get engaged. That message was well received.

VR, Vern

11-L-0559/OSD14135
No Classification in Message Body

October 15, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Pakistan Issues

Could you please get me a report on what the Russians the Indians and the
Iranians are doing in Afghanistan? The Pakistanis raised the question with me, and
I am curious.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-65

.....
Please respond by 11/17/03

Pakistan

15 OCT 03

11-L-0559/OSD14136

OSD 10608-04

Steve / Taylor = Sardon
Moffet
HOT
— S Adverse

August 1, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Corrected Transcripts

I would like to see the transcript we are correcting on the Pryor issue and the Ted Kennedy issue. I need to see what we are submitting, so please dig it out before it goes up there. I have to get it fixed, and I have to see that it is fixed right. This is very important to me.

Further, I need the retouched text of my letter to Ted Kennedy. The time is passing. I have to get that fixed fast, and if you cannot get it out of Jim Jones, please get it out of somebody else. If you need help from me, ask me, but we have to get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080103-1

.....
Please respond by 8/4/03

LA.

- 1) Do you have the Pryor Letter
- 2) How do we have the transcript amended to include the letter
- 3) Kennedy ^{letter} ~~transcript~~ is coming must be same
- 4) Need copy of the transcript

11-L-0559/OSD14137

OSD 10628-04

Questions and Inserts for the Record

- Upon completion of each hearing, it takes about seven to ten days before a “transcript” is made available to the committee. They will call OSD/LA, who dispatches a courier to pick up the Department’s copy.
- OSD Comptroller is responsible for transcripts associated with hearings before the Senate and House Appropriations Committees and ASD (C3I) takes responsibility for the Intelligence Committees. OSD/LA handles all other committees.
- Transcripts are logged in, assigned a control number, receipted for and sent to the appropriate DoD organization. The organizations ensure the transcripts are reviewed for accuracy and questions taken for the record by the witness are assigned to the correct organization to answer.
- There are two types of additions made to the record.
 - o Question for the Record (QFR) – at the end of the hearing the Chairman will announce how long the transcript will be kept open for Members to provide questions to the witness. The staff will collect any questions Members may have and forward them to OSD/LA. LA logs the QFRs in and assigns them to the appropriate organization to answer with a suspense date.
 - o Insert for the Record (IFR) – when the witness tells the Committee he will have to take a question for the record or wishes to correct his testimony, the information is added to the record through an IFR.

Transcript Review

- Transcripts for OSD witnesses (other than Appropriations and Intelligence) are reviewed by the organization in which the witness is associated.
- Transcripts for hearings where the Secretary or Deputy Secretary appeared as a witness are reviewed by the Senate/House Directors in OSD/LA. Additionally, General Craddock is provided with an advance copy of the transcript for review. Any IFRs are answered when identified via correspondence in order to provide a timely response.

Tracking

- Suspense dates for each item is established by the various committees.
- QFRs and IFRs are tracked by OSD/LA (less Appropriations/Intel) for timely submittal.
- As the information is received from the various organizations, it is forwarded via security review to the committee clerks who then insert it into the record.
- Once the information is gathered, the committee will close out the hearing and publish the official transcript.
- The Committee does work with us and tries to get all our information in before closing out the Hearing. If there are questions outstanding when the committee sends the transcript to print, then the phrase "OSD did not respond" is inserted into the record.
- Connie Wachsmuth is the POC in OSD/LA. I will be glad to show you her tracking chart if you are interested.

Weak Points in the Process

- Connie has a pretty good tracking sheet and rapport with the clerks on the Hill. The biggest problem we have is witnesses failing to adhere to the suspense dates assigned by the Committee.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 30 2003

IRAQ

The Honorable Mark Pryor
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Pryor,

During the July 9 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, you posed some questions regarding the reports that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger and asked when I became aware that the reports might be questionable.

After the hearing, I asked the CIA briefer to provide me the background. He said that shortly after Mr. ElBaradei of the IAEA raised questions publicly in a report to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, I had asked my CIA briefer what the facts were. After checking, he tells me that I was advised on March 11 that the CIA believed ElBaradei could be correct in his suspicions regarding the validity of the documents in question.

A question similar to the one you asked me came up on "Meet the Press" on July 13, and I clarified the situation. Attached is the transcript of the relevant portion of that interview. I will correct the transcript of my hearing before your committee now that I know the facts, but I wanted you to be aware of my correction.

With best wishes,

Enclosure

3004103

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RUSSERT: In March.

RUMSFELD: In March, a U.N. IAEA person, and said that he felt that there was a forged document, that the intelligence community then said they agreed with ElBaradei after looking at it, at which time obviously it became clear that that fragmentary evidence may not have been right. Whether it is or not I still don't know. We know that the U.K. still believes it is correct. But -- and I just simply don't know. That's not --

RUSSERT: When Senator Pryor asked you on Wednesday, "When did you know that reports about uranium coming out of Africa coming out of Africa were bogus?" -- you said, "Oh, within recent days."

RUMSFELD: I should have said within recent weeks, when ElBaradei came out.

RUSSERT: Back in March.

RUMSFELD: Right, in March, exactly, because I am told that I was -- that after ElBaradei came out with his statement publicly, I read it, and I am told by the CIA briefer who brief me that I on that next day said, "Who is right on this?" And they said, "We'll check." And it was shortly thereafter that they came out with a piece of paper saying that they thought that ElBaradei was right, and --

RUSSERT: The whole issue of intelligence is so important because --

RUMSFELD: It is.

RUSSERT: There's a theory now put forward that says the administration made the central rationale for the war disarming Saddam Hussein. And then the administration, from the president, yourself on down, said that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear program -- and as evidence from that, uranium from Africa, aluminum tubes, which is also questionable, the purchase of those -- and that because of that threat, that potential nuclear threat, the reconstruction of a nuclear program, that we needed a preemptive war, that we could not wait, and that if we wait for a smoking gun, it could be a mushroom cloud. In hindsight -- in hindsight, do you wish that the administration had been more careful in its presentation? And did you massage or hype intelligence data?

RUMSFELD: I think the answer is no to both questions. The question about the intelligence, it seems to me that it has been a very healthy discussion within the administration, where policymakers have looked at the intel and asked questions, and that's good. You need feedback, that process. But has it been politicized? Certainly not. I mean, every one of the intelligence estimates where there was a disagreement, for example on the aluminum tubes or on the cake, yellow cake, it says it right in it. It says, "This agency thought this," "This agency thought that." No one changed their views for any reasons.

Then you go back to the question -- you cast it as though it were nuclear, and as you'll recall, if you think back, the weapons of mass destruction was always chemical, biological and nuclear. And in no instance did anyone in the administration that I know of suggested that they had a nuclear weapon. We did believe, and do believe, that they had reconstituted their program, and

2 of 5

03-60

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

Printer's Copy
UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON "LESSONS
LEARNED" DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
IN AFGHANISTAN AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM,
AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON ONGOING
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND REGION

Wednesday, July 9, 2003


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to the U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee by:

09-15-03
11-L-0559/OSD14142



UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Sir/Madam:

There will be a meeting of the Committee on

ARMED SERVICES

Room SH-216
Hart Senate Office Building

Wednesday, July 9, 2003 – 9:30 a.m.

OPEN/CLOSED*

To receive testimony on “lessons learned” during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and to receive testimony on ongoing operations in the United States Central Command region.

Witnesses:

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

General Tommy R. Franks, USA
Commander
United States Central Command

***There will be a CLOSED session in SH-219, the hearing room of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, following the OPEN session. Staff attendance at the CLOSED session will be restricted.**

C O N T E N T S

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STATEMENT OF

PAGE

3

HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

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HON. CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

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HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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GENERAL TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED

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STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

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1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON "LESSONS LEARNED"
2 DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN AFGHANISTAN
3 AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, AND TO RECEIVE
4 TESTIMONY ON ONGOING OPERATIONS IN THE
5 UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND REGION
6

7 Wednesday, July 9, 2003
8

9 U.S. Senate

10 Committee on Armed Services

11 Washington, D.C.
12

13 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
14 Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John Warner,
15 chairman of the committee, presiding.

16 Present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts,
17 Allard, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn,
18 Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson,
19 Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.

20 Committee Staff Members Present: Judith A. Ansley, Staff
21 Director; Cindy Pearson, Assistant Chief Clerk and Security
22 Manager; Kenneth Barbee, Security Clerk; Pendred K. Wilson,
23 Receptionist.

24 Majority Staff Members Present: Charles W. Alsup,
25 Professional Staff Member; L. David Cherington, Counsel; Brian

1 R. Green, Professional Staff Member; Ambrose R. Hock,
2 Professional Staff Member; Gregory T. Kiley, Professional
3 Staff Member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, Professional Staff Member;
4 Lynn F. Rusten, Professional Staff Member.

5 Minority Staff Members Present: Richard D. DeBobes,
6 Democratic Staff Director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., Professional
7 Staff Member; Kenneth M. Crosswait, Professional Staff Member;
8 Richard W. Fieldhouse, Professional Staff Member; Jeremy L.
9 Hekhuis, Professional Staff Member; Maren R. Leed,
10 Professional Staff Member.

11 Staff Assistants Present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew Kent,
12 and Sara R. Mareno.

13 Committee Members' Assistants Present: Cord Sterling,
14 Assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, Assistant to Senator
15 McCain; John A. Bonsell, Assistant to Senator Inhofe; James
16 Beauchamp, Assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl,
17 Assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, Assistant to
18 Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., Assistant to Senator
19 Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, Assistant to Senator Ensign; James W.
20 Irwin, Assistant to Senator Chambliss; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
21 Assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, Assistant
22 to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, Assistant to Senator
23 Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman, Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Mieke
24 Y. Eoyang, Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Jarret A. Wright,
25 Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, Assistant to Senator

1 Byrd; Aaron Scholer, Assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth
2 King, Assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, Assistant to
3 Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, Assistant to Senator Bill
4 Nelson; Eric Pierce, Assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; William
5 Todd Houchins, Assistant to Senator Dayton; Mark Phillip
6 Jones, Assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, Assistant
7 to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, Assistant to Senator Clinton;
8 Terri Glaze, Assistant to Senator Pryor.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 VIRGINIA

3 Chairman Warner: The committee meets this morning to
4 receive the testimony from the Secretary of Defense and
5 General Tommy Franks, who has just stepped down as the
6 Commander-in-Chief of the forces that are now CENTCOM. We
7 also step aside from a very sobering and important hearing to
8 congratulate the Secretary on reaching his 71st year. Today
9 is his birthday.

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: You didn't need to do that.

11 Chairman Warner: I know that. And you're joined, I
12 understand, by members of your family this morning, which is
13 wonderful. And General Franks, we hope the opportunity comes
14 for us to meet your wonderful wife.

15 General Franks: Sir, thank you very much.

16 Chairman Warner: The American public, indeed the world,
17 are awaiting this testimony this morning, and consequently,
18 I'm going to put my full statement into the record and make
19 but a very few brief opening remarks out of deference to my
20 colleagues, who are anxiously awaiting to hear the testimony
21 and participate in the questions and indeed the public that
22 are following the hearing.

23 First we open being mindful of the loss of life, loss of
24 limb, and the families who have suffered the consequences as
25 they have throughout the history of this nation and other

1 nations in times of war. They've paid a great price, and
2 those risks continue, as we well know, each day. They showed
3 courage, the men and women of the coalition forces, they
4 showed commitment. Our delegation of nine Senators witnessed
5 that just days ago when we spent time in Basra, Baghdad,
6 Kirkuk. And we thank you, Mr. Secretary, and your staff,
7 Tommy Korologos, Secretary Cambone, and others who made this
8 trip very successful.

9 So we salute all the men and women of the coalition
10 forces and their families. The leadership that has been shown
11 is remarkable -- our President, Secretaries of State and
12 Defense, our military, General Franks, all those in your
13 command. And our hearing this morning covers not only Iraq,
14 but Afghanistan, and indeed the possible military commitment
15 in Liberia, so I hope each of you, that is you, Mr. Secretary
16 on Liberia, touch on that issue.

17 Civilian control of the military has been a part of our
18 history, but I look upon the relationship that you, Mr.
19 Secretary, had with General Franks as really one of
20 partnership. And I guess that's the way it should be. The
21 buck finally stopped on your desks, but having watched the two
22 of you as partners, conducting the operations in Iraq and in
23 Afghanistan is truly remarkable.

24 When Senator Levin and I, on two occasions, visited
25 Afghanistan, and I think to an extent in the Iraqi campaign,

1 we were impressed by the leadership of the non-commissioned
2 officers, and indeed the junior officers, but the non-
3 commissioned officers, how groups of 15, 20, 25, would go in
4 on a mission at night with one officer, and that officer
5 knowing full well that each man, or woman as the case may be,
6 knew exactly what their missions were. A remarkable chapter
7 in history, and also of jointness, joint operations between
8 the Army, the Navy, the Marines, the Air Force.

9 While the major field maneuvers of our troops, division
10 level, regimental level, have stopped, nevertheless the
11 fighting continues at the company level. When we visited the
12 4th ID, the commander went into great detail -- three
13 operations, General Franks, I think one is still continuing,
14 taking to the remaining enemy the battle, not waiting for the
15 enemy to come, but taking it to them. And to meet that
16 challenge, we would like to have your views this morning on
17 the fourth levels, the adequacy, the rotation policy, and how
18 other coalition nations are joining, Mr. Secretary, I
19 personally felt that tremendous efforts have been made from
20 Washington and the other capitals of the world to bring in
21 other troops, not only to augment our existing force
22 structure, but hopefully to provide and facilitate for the
23 rotation of our forces and those of Great Britain back home.

24 The intelligence is a matter of great interest. Your
25 views on the adequacy of that intelligence from a military

1 standpoint -- troop commanders told us when we asked the
2 question they had a high degree of confidence in the
3 intelligence that they received. Nevertheless, Mr. Secretary,
4 the issue of intelligence is of importance, as you well know,
5 and how the intelligence was utilized in the policy-making
6 levels, at your level, and with your subordinates as you
7 address in the American public in open forums, and as you
8 address the Congress, how you utilize that intelligence in
9 such a manner to -- I certainly feel, to remain accurate at
10 all times.

11 The Task Force 20, which is performing, General Franks,
12 the specialized mission of searching out Saddam Hussein, a
13 bounty quite properly now having put on his head, and how they
14 are operating to not only find him and his two sons, but
15 indeed the others that had significant roles in perpetrating
16 the horror throughout Iraq and the threat to the world with
17 their weapons of mass destruction. And on weapons on mass
18 destruction, Mr. Secretary, you've brought in David Kay, a man
19 with impeccable credentials and a long background and history
20 in this subject, working with General Dayton. And you've
21 given them a charter to go out and use every asset that they
22 need to uncover the mystery of these weapons of mass
23 destruction.

24 Lastly, I want to credit Ambassador Bremer. I'd know him
25 through the years, but I think he's doing an extraordinary

1 job, and he laid down the three objectives that he has at this
2 time to try and lessen the risk to our troops and at the same
3 time bring about the fulfillment of our mission to provide
4 freedom for the Iraqi people. First was to take the battle to
5 the enemy and that's being done, to root out the last pockets
6 of resistance.

7 Secondly, to utilize every effort to find Saddam Hussein
8 and the other principals, and thirdly, to form an interim
9 government, composed initially of two parts: one, a governing
10 council of Iraqis who will elect their own chairman of that
11 council to supervise the several ministries, whether it's the
12 creation of a policy force, whether it's education, whether
13 it's the preservation of artifacts, whether it's sewers,
14 whether it's electricity; and secondly, to formulate a group
15 of individuals that will sit down, Iraqis, and write a
16 constitution, because without a constitution, we can not
17 expect elections to be held nationally. There's just no
18 infrastructure on which an election can be established until
19 that constitution is put in place and candidates can address
20 their views with respect to the fulfillment of the provisions
21 of that constitution.

22 Now, while our delegation was there we met in Kirkuk with
23 Iraqis who are assuming local office as mayors, assistant
24 mayors and so forth, and Bremer's to be congratulated in
25 pockets here and there where possible putting together groups

1 of Iraqis who sort of elect themselves and take over the
2 responsibilities of community matters. But the national
3 elections have to await the constitution.

4 So on the whole, speaking for myself, I feel very
5 positive on my return from this inspection trip, and I once
6 again salute those in uniform, the coalition forces, who night
7 and day are taking the risks, and their families at home who
8 are sharing in those risks.

9 Senator Levin?

10 [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

11 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

2 Senator Levin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll also
3 shorten my statement and ask that the entire statement be made
4 part of the record.

5 Chairman Warner: Without objection.

6 Senator Levin: First, General Franks, let me thank you
7 for your life of commitment to this nation. In your public
8 service as a soldier, you've proven yourself time and time
9 again during a unique period in our history. Historians will
10 someday judge the military campaigns that you led in
11 Afghanistan and Iraq that swiftly defeated the Taliban and the
12 forces of Saddam Hussein as brilliantly planned and executed
13 examples of the military art, and as foreshadows of future
14 military tactics. While you would be the first to acknowledge
15 that most of the credit and thanks must go to all who assisted
16 you in that effort, and especially to the fighting men and
17 women of the U.S. Armed Forces, who executed those campaigns,
18 your role as their commander was indispensable.

19 Any inquiry into lessons learned will inevitably tend to
20 emphasize areas of concern, and will tend to spend less time
21 on the innumerable things that were done well. It is
22 essential that that be done, but it must not detract in any
23 way from our appreciation for the superb performance of duty
24 by the men and women of our Armed Forces as they continue to
25 conduct stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and

1 prepare to execute other missions in support of our national
2 military strategy.

3 We must succeed in this endeavor, this post-conflict
4 stability effort of ours, and we need to understand the
5 strategy for ensuring that success. Part of that strategy
6 hopefully will be an attempt to internationalize the security
7 and nation-building efforts. To achieve that end, I hope that
8 we will seek NATO and United Nations support and endorsement.
9 That will facilitate the recruitment of their member nations
10 to our effort in terms of providing troops, resources,
11 expertise, and international legitimacy. The whole world has
12 stake in the stability of Iraq.

13 It is a mystery to me why apparently we have not reached
14 out to NATO and to the United Nations as institutions. Their
15 support could bring significant additional forces, such as
16 German and French forces through NATO, and Indian and Egyptian
17 forces through a U.N. endorsement.

18 We're going to be in Iraq a long time. A large number of
19 troops are going to be needed, as the President acknowledged
20 last week. There are a number of advantages to having a
21 significant number of additional forces from other countries
22 join us in the stability operations in Iraq. First, some U.S.
23 forces, including Reserves, have seen extended combat and
24 other exhausting duty. With U.S. forces stretched thin around
25 the world, increasing the number of non-U.S. forces who can

1 substitute for us in Iraq would reduce the numbers of, and the
2 burden on, U.S. forces. As of now, the number of troops of
3 other countries present on the ground will increase from the
4 present number of 12,000 to a total of only 20,000 by the end
5 of the summer, an increase of a mere 8,000 troops out of about
6 165,000. That is difficult to sustain.

7 Second, I would hope that internationalization would
8 serve to reduce the threat to U.S. forces in more ways than
9 reducing the quantity of our forces on the ground. Up until
10 now, we have been the main target of those Ba'athists who
11 stand to lose most when democracy is established in Iraq
12 because we were the ones who brought down Saddam's regime
13 which provided privileged status to the Ba'athist minority.
14 It would be harder for those Saddam loyalists to sustain
15 attacks on forces wearing NATO or U.N. patches on their
16 shoulders, because it would be dramatized to the people in
17 Iraq that this is not a U.S./British occupation, but is an
18 international effort to bring stability to the nation and to
19 the region.

20 Just as reaching out to the world is necessary, so is
21 reaching in to the Iraqi people to help this effort succeed.
22 As our chairman has indicated, that means turning over the
23 civilian government as quickly as possible to the people of
24 Iraq so that they understand that they are deciding their own
25 future. It also means making better use of our TV capability

1 in Iraq, so that Iraqis can be interviewed about, and talk to
2 their fellow countrymen about the thousands of projects that
3 we are engaged in to help rebuild their nation. We are
4 rebuilding schools, we are bringing back water, we are fixing
5 up neighborhoods, we are supplying food, we are moving
6 garbage, and doing many other tasks needed to reconstruct
7 Iraq. But we have done an inadequate job of getting that
8 information to Iraqis.

9 False propaganda that we blew up a mosque must be
10 countered by Iraqis speaking about our rebuilding efforts in
11 their communities, and assuring Iraqis that we are not there
12 for domination, but to help them rebuild. And Mr. Secretary,
13 we talked to Secretary Cambone about speeding up that
14 television presence and projection to Iraq during our trip,
15 and I know that he's probably by now already discussed that
16 with you. The chairman and I and all the members of the
17 delegation had some strong feelings about the importance of
18 speeding up that effort.

19 The United States has taken upon itself the daunting task
20 of nation building in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The
21 administration and Congress must work together to ensure
22 success in those endeavors. It's essential in that regard for
23 our nation to understand the strategy and the milestones for
24 achieving our objectives, and surely we need to know how we
25 will continue over the foreseeable future to maintain a large

1 American military presence in your former region of command,
2 General. It's been now, what, two days or one day?

3 General Franks: Two days.

4 Senator Levin: I know that the relaxation in your face
5 is palpable. Just kidding. You did that with great glory.
6 You handled it absolutely brilliantly, and never even showed
7 the stress. But we have to let the American people know how
8 we're going to be able to execute other missions of our
9 national military strategy as well as maintaining the large
10 presence in the CENTCOM region.

11 Mr. Secretary, we very much look forward to your
12 testimony as well as that of General Franks. We thank you for
13 your service, your commitment, and I know you're grateful for
14 the presence of your family today.

15 [The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

16 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator Levin. Mr.
2 Secretary?
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1 STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF
2 DEFENSE

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of
4 the committee. I would ask that my complete statement be put
5 in the record.

6 Chairman Warner: Without objection. The statements of
7 both witnesses will be included in the record.

8 Secretary Rumsfeld: And I'd like to make a brief
9 statement. I'll begin by saying a few words about the
10 remarkable man seated next to me, General Tom Franks. On
11 Monday, I was in Tampa to attend the change of command
12 ceremony there. It was an occasion to reflect on General Tom
13 Franks and what the CENTCOM leadership that he put together
14 has accomplished during his tenure as combatant commander.

15 Think back to September 11. It was a dark day for our
16 country, to be sure, but how fortunate our country was to have
17 General Franks and his team in command at CENTCOM. In the
18 period since September 11, consider what's been accomplished.
19 In just weeks, they developed and were executing a war plan
20 for Afghanistan, they'd employed a range of capabilities from
21 the most advanced, such as laser-guided weapons, to antique
22 40-year old B-52s that had been updated with modern
23 electronics, to rudimentary cavalry charges, driving the
24 Taliban and al-Qaeda from power in a matter of months.

25 The plan they developed for Operation Iraqi Freedom was

1 even more innovative and transformational, employing an
2 unprecedented combination of speed, precision, surprise, and
3 flexibility. One of the most interesting aspects of the
4 campaign was mentioned in the opening statements about the
5 lessons learned process. It began before the war ever began.
6 There were something in excess of 50 to 70 people that General
7 Franks installed as a team from Joint Forces Command in his
8 command from the very start. And they did a lot more than
9 take notes to improve our performance for the next war. They
10 actually provided immediate feedback, allowing CENTCOM
11 leadership to apply lessons in real time and improve coalition
12 performance in this war. General Franks has said to me that
13 there wasn't a day that went by that there wasn't value added.
14 I'll leave it to General Franks to describe the lessons he
15 believes are most important. I've listed some in my
16 testimony.

17 We're still in the early stages of studying these
18 lessons, and the conclusions that are drawn will most
19 certainly affect how the Armed Forces of the United States and
20 the services organize, train, and equip for many years to
21 come. This will be one of General Franks' truly enduring
22 legacies. He led the coalition forces that liberated two
23 nations, but how he liberated those two people, the tactics,
24 the strategies that he developed and employed will contribute
25 to the freedom of our country and our people for years to

1 come.

2 So while General Franks may be leaving the service, the
3 Army, his service to our country will live on in the impact of
4 Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom that it
5 will have on our budgets, our procedures, our training, our
6 doctrine, and our joint war fighting. And the people he led,
7 those who served with him in Iraq and Afghanistan will now
8 take those transformational experiences to their next
9 important commands and teach them to the next generation of
10 leaders. So General Franks, I salute you and thank you for
11 your truly remarkable service to our country.

12 Today Iraqis do face the enormous challenge of rebuilding
13 from decades of tyranny. Coalition forces are helping the
14 Iraqi people get on the path to stability and democratic self-
15 government by helping Iraqis reestablish security and
16 commerce, restore power and basic services, reopen schools and
17 hospitals, and establish the rule of law. With each passing
18 week, more services come online. Power and water are restored
19 in more of the country, gas lines disappear, and more Iraqi
20 police are on the streets.

21 But we must not underestimate how difficult the task is
22 before us. Yet despite the difficulties they face, most
23 Iraqis are far better off today than they were 4 months ago.
24 Let there be no doubt about that. The residents of Baghdad
25 may not have power 24 hours a day, but they no longer wake up

1 each morning in fear wondering whether this will be the day
2 that a death squad would come to cut out their tongues, chop
3 off their ears, or take their children away, for questioning,
4 quote, unquote, never to be seen again.

5 It's true there are some Iraqis who are not better off
6 today. For the most part, they comprise a small, elite
7 segment of Iraqi society that benefitted from the Saddam
8 Hussein dictatorship, and they are understandably unhappy now
9 that the regime that favored them, at the expense of the
10 population, has been removed from power. Today some of them
11 are in hiding, others are engaging in acts of sabotage and
12 violence.

13 Let me say a word about the security situation in Iraq.
14 There seems to be a widely held impression that the regime
15 loyalists are operating freely throughout the country,
16 attacking coalition forces at will. That's clearly not the
17 case. Large portions of Iraq are stable. If one looks at
18 this map beside me, while there have been isolated incidents
19 in other parts of the country, most of the recent attacks have
20 been concentrated in Baghdad and in the three corridors that
21 reach to the west, the north, and the east out of the Iraqi
22 capital.

23 At this moment, coalition forces are engaged in
24 operations to deal with the threats in these areas. Indeed, a
25 number of recent incidents in those regions are the result of

1 offensive operations by the coalition, cases where the
2 coalition forces have been seeking out and engaging pockets of
3 enemy fighters. Mr. Chairman, the problem is real, but it's
4 being dealt with in an orderly and forceful fashion by
5 coalition forces.

6 In Iraq, coalition forces drove the country's leaders
7 from power, but unlike traditional adversaries in wars passed
8 that sign a surrender document and hand over their weapons,
9 the remnants of the Ba'ath regime, Fedayeen death squads, and
10 the special Republican forces did not surrender. Some were
11 killed or captured, but many others, particularly in Baghdad
12 and to the north faded into the population, and are now
13 forming pockets of resistance against coalition forces. We're
14 now dealing with those remnants of the regime just as we are
15 dealing with the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban that are
16 hiding in the border areas of Afghanistan.

17 In addition to the remnants of the former regime,
18 coalition forces in Iraq are also dealing with tens of
19 thousands of criminals, some estimate up to 100,000 that were
20 let out of the prisons into the streets prior to the beginning
21 of the war. And they're dealing with foreign terrorists who
22 have crossed into Iraq, in many cases from Syria, looking for
23 an opportunity to harm the coalition and to try to shake our
24 resolve in the war on terror. Well, they'll not succeed.

25 So there are a number of sources of instability, but this

1 much is certain: Iraq has been liberated, the Ba'athist
2 regime has been removed from power and will not be permitted
3 to return. But our war with terrorists, the remnants in Iraq,
4 the remnants in Afghanistan and terrorist networks across the
5 globe continues. It will take time, but we will prevail. As
6 President Bush made clear last week, there will be no return
7 to tyranny in Iraq. Those who threaten the order and
8 stability of that country will face ruin just as surely as the
9 regime they once served.

10 One of the challenges facing the coalition is finding
11 Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as the chairman mentioned.
12 We're still early in that process, so the task before is
13 sizable and complex. Major combat operations ended less than
14 10 weeks ago. The Iraqi regime had 12 years to conceal its
15 programs, to move materials, hide documents, disperse
16 equipment, develop mobile production facilities and sanitize
17 known WMD sites, including 4 years with no U.N. weapons
18 inspectors on the ground. Needless to say, uncovering those
19 programs will take time.

20 The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had
21 discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons
22 of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence
23 in a new light through the prism of our experience on
24 September 11. On that day, we saw thousands of innocent men,
25 women, and children killed by terrorists, and that experience

1 changed our appreciation of our vulnerability, and the risks
2 the U.S. faces from terrorist states and terrorist networks
3 armed with powerful weapons.

4 The United States did not choose war, Saddam Hussein did.
5 For 12 years, he violated 17 U.N. resolutions without cost or
6 consequence. His regime had an international obligation to
7 destroy its weapons of mass destruction and to prove to the
8 world that they had done so. He refused to do so. If he had
9 in fact disarmed, why didn't he take that final opportunity to
10 prove that his programs were ended and his weapons were
11 destroyed? Why did he continue to give up tens of billions of
12 dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions when he could have
13 had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had
14 disarmed? Why did he file what all agreed was a fraudulent
15 declaration of his weapons with the United Nations? Why
16 didn't he cooperate with the international community as
17 Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa did?

18 Had he done so, war would have been avoided. If he had
19 in fact disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to
20 lose by cooperating with the United Nations, yet he did not
21 cooperate. He continued to lie and obstruct U.N. inspectors.
22 The logical conclusion is that he did so because he wanted to
23 keep his weapons, and he believed that he could continue to
24 outwit the international community for another 12 years, just
25 as he had for the past 12.

1 The objective in the global war on terror is to prevent
2 another attack like September 11 or a biological, nuclear, or
3 chemical attack that would be worse before it happens. We can
4 say with confidence that the world is a better place today
5 because the United States led a coalition of forces into
6 action in Iraq and because of General Tom Franks' skilled
7 execution of the President's orders.

8 Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.

9 [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

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1 Chairman Warner: Mr. Secretary, before we hear from the
2 General, I think it's important that you interpret in some
3 detail this important map. While we hear daily the stories of
4 attacks, my understanding of that map, based also on my trip,
5 is the green indicates those sections of Iraq which are
6 relatively secure. The dark center brown is where the most
7 intense number of attacks are coming, and the lighter shade of
8 green are between the two in terms of level of threat. Is
9 that correct?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: That is correct and if you'll
11 recall, when the U.S. and coalition forces moved up from the
12 south, most of the fighting occurred south of Baghdad and in
13 Baghdad, and to a considerable extent, the forces in Baghdad
14 and north, in the Saddam Hussein strongholds, in many cases
15 disappeared into the countryside and still are there. So they
16 still need to be dealt with.

17 Chairman Warner: And those forces did not witness the
18 maneuver of our heavy forces which at one time were
19 anticipated. Had our relations with Turkey been such, we
20 could have inserted heavy forces in the north. Is that not
21 correct?

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: It's true. We did end up, General
23 Franks did, of course, with forces in the north and there was
24 fighting up in that area, but it was not as extensive as it
25 was in the areas to the south.

1 Chairman Warner: Thank you. General Franks.
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1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER,
2 UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

3 General Franks: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And
4 Senator Levin, it's an honor to appear again before the
5 committee. I'd ask that my full statement be entered into the
6 record, Mr. Chairman.

7 Chairman Warner: Without objection.

8 General Franks: Since we last sat in this room, much has
9 taken place in the Central Command area of responsibility. A
10 brutal regime has been removed in Iraq to be sure, and efforts
11 are ongoing to help Iraqis build a new future. Forces have
12 continued to help Afghanistan and those people make strides
13 toward independence and have continued to seek out and destroy
14 terrorists and their networks in that country as well as
15 across the central region as part of the global war on
16 terrorism, and I look forward to discussing these important
17 subject today with the committee.

18 Let me begin by bringing a message to this committee from
19 some 280,000-plus members of our coalition, those that I have
20 been privileged to command. And that message for the
21 committee is very simple, it's thank you. These men and women
22 in uniform very much appreciate the support of this body and
23 the support of this committee and all that you have done on
24 their behalf, Mr. Chairman.

25 As you know, earlier in this week, General John Abizaid

1 took the reins of Central Command, and in fact he is a
2 principled leader as this committee knows, and a soldier who
3 brings a great deal to United States Central Command, and I am
4 proud to relinquish command to him, and to consider him a
5 friend. I'd like to begin today by recognizing coalition
6 nations whose contributions of forces, equipment and economic
7 support have signaled worldwide commitment to the eradication
8 of terrorism.

9 Over the past year, the coalition has been steadfast, and
10 today there are 63 nations represented in Tampa at our
11 headquarters, perhaps the largest coalition we have ever seen.
12 A force has been built in the Central Command area of
13 responsibility to continue to move forward to the complete
14 achievement of all of our objectives in Operation Iraqi
15 Freedom as well as in Operation Enduring Freedom, as the
16 Secretary said, to prevent recurrence of the events we saw on
17 9/11/01, to deny terrorists opportunities to use weapons of
18 mass destruction on our people, to bring terrorists to
19 justice, to dismantle their networks.

20 We've also established a visible and viable presence in
21 the horn of Africa, Mr. Chairman, since we last met in order
22 to continue that work. And work in the central region is
23 underway, but as I'll discuss in a moment, the environment
24 within Central Command's region remains challenging and
25 volatile, as the Secretary said. Securing U.S. interests in

1 the future and ensuring regional stability will continue to
2 involve risks in this region and will continue to require the
3 commitment of our resources.

4 This area encompasses 6.4 million square miles and about
5 a half a billion people, as the committee knows, and it runs
6 from the horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan and
7 South Asia up to Central Asia, as far north as Kazakhstan,
8 including the waters of the Red Sea, the northern Indian
9 Ocean, the Persian Gulf, key maritime chokepoints of Suez, the
10 Bab el-Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz. This is an area that
11 represents all of the world's major religions and at least 18
12 major ethnic groups. National economies in this region
13 produce annual per capita incomes which vary from very little,
14 perhaps a few hundred dollars a year, to tens of thousands of
15 dollars. The area includes dictatorships, absolute
16 monarchies, failed states, democracies, and governments in
17 transition toward democracy.

18 Humanitarian crises, resource depletion and overuse,
19 religious and ethnic conflicts, demographic challenges, and
20 military power imbalances create social, economic, and
21 military volatility. These factors are particularly
22 significant given the geographical and economic importance of
23 the region where national resources provide extraordinary
24 opportunities, but they also give rise to a range of
25 socioeconomic problems.

1 In the past 2 years, Central Command has been at the
2 leading edge of the global war on terrorism and the context I
3 just provided makes it perhaps understandable why the initial
4 focus on the war on terrorism would be in this region. The
5 command is engaged with U.S. and coalition forces today in
6 both Afghanistan and Iraq, and the commitment, as the
7 Secretary said, remains strong as our leaders and our troopers
8 continue to work to bring security across the region.

9 On the ground today in Iraq, our troops are conducting
10 ongoing operations. We're combining civil military work with
11 direct offensive military action which will continue to seek
12 out and bring justice to leaders of the fallen regime and
13 other as mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by yourself as well as
14 Secretary Rumsfeld.

15 Priorities will continue to include forming and training
16 police and security forces as well as the creation of a new
17 Iraqi army. We'll continue to work to improve the
18 infrastructure, working with Iraqis to support the
19 establishment of local governance, providing emergency medical
20 care and other humanitarian assistance. Much dangerous work
21 remains to be done, but millions of Iraqis have freedoms today
22 which 4 months ago were only a dream.

23 Our troops continue to work closely with Ambassador Jerry
24 Bremer and the entirety of his civilian team to provide the
25 tools he needs to be successful. Progress is being made and

1 our country is justifiably proud of what's been accomplished.
2 AS I think about lessons learned, as the Secretary mentioned,
3 I'll talk to just a few. The combat work inside Iraq saw a
4 maturing of joint force operations in a number of ways. Some
5 capabilities we saw reached new levels of performance. From a
6 joint integration perspective, our experience in Operations
7 Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Enduring Freedom in
8 Afghanistan contributed to the jointness and the culture
9 within the headquarters of our area.

10 These operations helped to improve our interoperability,
11 they also helped to improve our command, control,
12 communications, computer and intelligence networking. Our
13 forces were able to achieve operational objectives by the
14 integration of maneuver forces, special operations forces,
15 other government agency assets, precision lethal fires, and
16 non-lethal fires. We saw for the first time integration of
17 forces rather than deconfliction of forces. I believe perhaps
18 most transformational is that particular notion, the business
19 of the integration of forces rather than, as we have seen in
20 the past, simple deconfliction of forces.

21 It seems to me that this integration of the conventional,
22 as you said, Mr. Chairman, air, ground, sea forces to leverage
23 special operations capabilities dealt effectively with
24 asymmetric terrorist-like threats and enabled precision
25 targeting simultaneously in the same battle, in the same

1 battle space. Similarly we have seen in both Afghanistan and
2 Iraq the ability of special operators to use conventional
3 forces in order to set conditions for the success of those
4 forces. Operational fires have been used to spearhead ground
5 maneuver, and our forces have been able to sustain the
6 momentum of the offensive while defeating enemy formations in
7 all kinds of terrain, open desert terrain, complex terrain,
8 and urban terrain.

9 We saw jointness, precision munitions, command and
10 control, the readiness of our equipment, the state of training
11 of our troops, and coalition support as very clear winners
12 during Operation Enduring Freedom. The Secretary said that I
13 would also mention some of the lessons in my remarks and I'll
14 do that briefly now. We also identified a number of areas
15 where we believe we require additional work.

16 Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of
17 standardized combat identification, so fratricide prevention
18 remains work that we're going to have to focus on in the
19 future. Deployment planning and execution were cumbersome and
20 were much more closely akin to those required during the Cold
21 War than to those required for force projection by our country
22 in the 21st century. And coalition information sharing needs
23 to be improved at all levels. When we operate a coalition, we
24 need the ability to reach back and forth, to and with
25 coalition members. Human intelligence and communications

1 bandwidth also represent areas where we're going to be
2 required, Mr. Chairman, to focus effort in the future.

3 A few comments on Iraq and where we stand today. As the
4 Secretary says, security continues to improve. Portions of
5 Iraq are now and will remain for some time however very
6 dangerous. The term stability operations does not infer that
7 combat operations have ended, indeed they have not. Our
8 forces are engaged in offensive work as member of this
9 committee saw during a recent trip all over Iraq today.

10 As we move forward, the composition and size of the
11 forces that we have in that country will change to match the
12 conditions, and it will ever change to match the requirements
13 recognizing that the enemy we see there also has a vote. And
14 so we will size ourselves, as we have in the past, in order to
15 meet the conditions that we see developed in the future.

16 Factors that will influence our force mix inside Iraq
17 will have to do, as Senator Levin said, with coalition
18 contributions. They will have to do with what we see in the
19 way of the enemy threat. They will have to do with what we
20 see in the success of the Iraqi people themselves as they
21 field their security forces, police forces, infrastructure
22 security forces, single site protection capabilities, and as
23 we assist them in fielding a new Iraqi army.

24 Integration of coalition forces is a major near-term
25 effort. The United Kingdom and Poland are committed at this

1 point to leading divisions in southern Iraq and many partner
2 nations have offered forces to fill those units. Deployment
3 of those forces has already begun, Mr. Chairman. We continue
4 discussions today with India and Pakistan. At this moment, 19
5 coalition partners are on the ground in support of operations
6 in Iraq with deployment of an additional 19 countries pending.
7 An additional 11 nations are conducting military-to-military
8 discussions with the Secretary's staff, the joint staff, and
9 my staff in Tampa today.

10 At this point, we see some 35,000 policeman as having
11 been hired, Iraqi policemen. This represents 55, perhaps 60
12 percent of a total requirement, around 60,000 policemen in
13 that country. Until we see the complete standing up of that
14 number of security forces and policemen, we will continue
15 joint patrolling, we'll continue to train with and work with
16 these Iraqi forces as we bring them on.

17 Creation of a new Iraqi army is also moving forward. The
18 plan envisions three divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad,
19 and Basra. They will provide for territorial defense and they
20 will conduct stability operations. Over the next year, our
21 goal is to field approximately nine battalions in order to do
22 that work, and initially those forces will focus on performing
23 security at fixed sites, assisting in the movement of convoys,
24 and providing border control. As it develops, this force will
25 work with coalition forces to contribute to stability and

1 security throughout Iraq.

2 Underlying all security functions is the need to continue
3 humanitarian assistance and the conduct of civil military
4 operations to improve the quality of life for Iraqi people.
5 It is obvious to all that in order to see Iraq move forward
6 into the future, security must in fact come along at a pace
7 that sees the betterment of the conditions of life for the
8 Iraqi people and the establishment of Iraqi governance, the
9 placing of an Iraqi face on the government there. It is in
10 our interest to move these items forward as quickly and
11 thoughtfully as we can, and we'll continue to do that.

12 I can't overstate the value of coalition contribution to
13 success we have seen up to this point. Hospitals, medical
14 supplies, water, food, transportation, expertise in rebuilding
15 is being provided by coalition members. The fact that there
16 has been no humanitarian disaster in Iraq, no widespread
17 outbreak of disease, no hunger, no refugees, or massive
18 problems with displaced persons, or any other predicted
19 consequence of war, all of that is due in large part to the
20 contribution of our allies.

21 The coalition provisional authority, Ambassador Jerry
22 Bremer, and our forces will continue to work in concert with
23 international and nongovernmental agencies to reverse the
24 result of more than three decades of a brutal regime.

25 Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying the global war on

1 terrorism is ongoing. The precision, determination, expertise
2 of our military forces and our coalition partners has brought
3 about the liberation of both Afghanistan and Iraq in lightning
4 speed with minimum bloodshed. However, these two nations have
5 only taken the first steps toward freedom. The United States
6 and our coalition partners must be there to support the whole
7 journey.

8 While we have accomplished a lot, the potential for
9 terrorist acts and other setbacks remains very real.
10 Afghanistan has a new fragile government, a new army, and with
11 coalition support the nation is making strides toward long-
12 term stability. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime was
13 destroyed and regime supporters are being rooted out. Our
14 focus has changed from military destruction of a regime to
15 providing security and humanitarian assistance assisting the
16 Iraqi people to grow a representative form of government.

17 Decisive combat operations have been completed but much
18 work remains to be done. I, as every member of this
19 committee, Mr. Chairman, am very proud of each and every one
20 of the men and women who have continued to serve selflessly
21 and tirelessly in the execution of our mission from Egypt to
22 Kazakhstan, from Suez to Pakistan, regardless of the uniform
23 of service they wear or the nation from which they come.

24 I thank Congress and the American people for the
25 tremendous support you have shown and what you have done for

1 me, Mr. Chairman. I'd be pleased to join the Secretary in
2 answering your questions.

3 [The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]
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1 Chairman Warner: Thank you, General. All of us join the
2 Secretary in his commendation of your distinguished career, 36
3 years I believe, am I not correct? And the contribution of
4 your family.

5 Excellent statement by both witnesses, very balanced,
6 what went right and what we've got to learn to do better in
7 the future, and we'll probe that in these questions. We'll
8 have a 6-minute round, colleagues. We have almost full
9 attendance of the committee and I'll move out quickly.

10 Mr. Secretary, as I departed the one thing that was
11 foremost in my mind is how can we proceed and what steps are
12 being taken to reduce the risk to the individual and groups of
13 our soldiers and civilians, coalition civilians who are in
14 support of this in the face of these repeated daily attacks
15 and losses? The most encouraging information that I received
16 was from Bremer, and that is -- Ambassador Bremer -- that he
17 hopes by this July, within weeks, to have concluded putting in
18 place the initial steps of the interim authority with Iraqis,
19 as I mentioned a council and a constitutional group. Is that
20 on schedule and do you concur in my view that that's perhaps
21 the strongest tool that we have to reduce these attacks, put
22 an Iraqi face, a degree of Iraqi responsibility on this
23 situation as we move towards securing their freedom?

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, I do. I think it's a
25 combination of political progress and, as you suggested,

1 Ambassador Bremer is hopeful that sometime next week or the
2 week thereafter there will be the governing council set up
3 with some 30, 25 to 30-plus members. There are a number of
4 city councils, as you know, that have been stood up in Baghdad
5 and other portions of the country.

6 I think it is, however, a mixture of the political
7 progress, where Iraqis begin to assume responsibility for some
8 of the ministries and some of their activities, economic
9 progress as General Franks said so people see their lives
10 improving, and military security. And I don't think any one
11 can be separated. I think all three are critical and they all
12 have to move forward.

13 Chairman Warner: I agree with that. But as soon as we
14 can begin to hold some Iraqis responsible for these killings
15 and constant attacks all the better, in my judgment. And they
16 can publicly address the need to have them stopped.

17 Mr. Secretary, with respect to questions of augmenting
18 the coalition forces, and specifically as my colleague Mr.
19 Levin said, and as I raised with Ambassador Bremer, the
20 inclusion of elements of NATO. Can you address that?

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'd be happy to. I keep hearing
22 people say things and people write things to the effect that
23 this is the U.S. and the U.K., and it's not. As General
24 Franks said, we've got 19 countries on the ground. We have
25 commitments from another 19 countries. We are in discussions

1 with another 11 countries. That would bring the total up to
2 49 nations. My understanding is that we currently have on the
3 ground some 19,000 coalition forces with commitments for
4 another 11,000, which would bring the total to 30,000. In
5 addition, the work is going forward to develop an Iraqi army,
6 former Under Secretary of Defense Walt Slocum is working hard
7 to achieve that goal and we expect to have thousands of Iraqis
8 back in uniform, functioning in a responsible way as well as
9 the police evolution that you've discussed.

10 Now, what about the U.N. and NATO? The United Nations
11 passed a resolution, they've assigned an individual, Mr. de
12 Mello, who works closely with Ambassador Bremer. I believe,
13 Senator Levin, you indicated that it was a mystery why we
14 hadn't reached out to NATO. We have reached out to NATO.
15 NATO is assisting Poland, which has agreed to take a sector in
16 force generation. In addition, there are discussions that
17 have been taking place in NATO about the possibility of taking
18 on an additional role. At the current time, as you know,
19 they're planning to take over responsibility in Afghanistan
20 this August.

21 So they have a lot on their platter. But we have reached
22 out to just about everybody I can think of asking for
23 assistance of various types and it is coming in. Is it as
24 much as we'd like, as fast as we'd like? No, it isn't. But
25 are we hopeful it will continue to increase? Yes.

1 Chairman Warner: Mr. Secretary, all of us are very
2 mindful of the need to maintain a rotation base of our forces
3 back. We recognize that probably the OPTEMPO of our military
4 forces of all branches are at a very high point at this time,
5 and yet our nation and other nations are faced with a
6 contingency operation in Africa, most notably Liberia. I
7 think the President quite properly is facing this issue, has
8 sent teams out to make an assessment of what needs to be done,
9 he'll evaluate it and then make a presidential decision.

10 Could you share with us this morning some of the options
11 that are being considered and how those options in terms of
12 our forestructure might impact on our troop redeployments out
13 of Iraq or troop redeployments in other areas? In other
14 words, can our military accept in your professional judgment
15 -- I know they will, but what are the consequences of
16 accepting a presidential decision, should it be made, of a
17 deployment force? And we bear in mind that if you deploy, say
18 1,000 individuals, you've got to have 1,000 in transit, 1,000
19 in training, so it's a multiple of the force that actually
20 goes in the country.

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: You're quite right, of course, Mr.
22 Chairman, that when you have 1,000 troops deployed overseas
23 you do need a rotational base, and it ends up like a multiple
24 of three rather than just the 1,000. First let me say that it
25 is critically important that the department manage the forces

1 in a way that we can continue to attract and retain the people
2 we need, that the Reserve who have just done a superb job are
3 not stressed or called up so frequently or kept there so long
4 that it affects their commitment to serve in the Reserves. We
5 need them badly, and we have to be attentive to that, and we
6 intend to be.

7 The rotation out of Iraq is already starting. I don't
8 know what the number is, but I think it's something like
9 140,000 have already been -- 142,000 have already been
10 redeployed. For the most part, there were large numbers of
11 Air Force and Navy. There also have been some Army and
12 Marine.

13 Chairman Warner: Redeployed back home, put in home?

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: Redeployed back home, back to their
15 bases, wherever they were, mostly in the U.S. The 3rd Brigade
16 of the 3rd Infantry Division is now in Kuwait, it's been taken
17 out of Iraq and it should be back home in July. The 2nd
18 Brigade is -- the plan is that they would return in August,
19 having been there something like 10 months, and the 1st
20 Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division is scheduled to return in
21 September and they would have -- they've been in there since
22 about January, so that would be a total of about 9 months.

23 And the services and the Joint Staff have been working
24 with Central Command to develop a rotation plan so that we can
25 in fact see that we treat these terrific young men and young

1 women in a way that's respectful of their lives and their
2 circumstances and they wonderful job they did.

3 With respect to Liberia, the President is considering the
4 appropriate U.S. role. He has indicated to world leaders that
5 he intends that the United States assist in some way with
6 respect to Liberia. He has asked the Department of Defense to
7 dispatch assessment teams in two locations, one in Liberia and
8 it's currently there, several dozen people, and in addition he
9 is sending assessment teams to the so-called ECOWAS nations to
10 determine the readiness of the ECOWAS forces and the extent to
11 which they may or not be ready to deploy and over what period
12 of time, with what type of equipment, having had what type of
13 training.

14 The United States, Great Britain, and several other
15 countries have been in the process for many months now
16 training ECOWAS forces, and some have been used in Sierra
17 Leone, some are currently committed. So until the assessment
18 teams come back, it seems to me that we will not have a good
19 grip on what we would propose to the President.

20 Chairman Warner: Thank you. Your staff briefed this
21 committee yesterday and you'll be briefing yourself the Senate
22 tomorrow, so I commend you on keeping us informed on it.

23 General Franks, lastly, the level of conflict that
24 continues, in your planning did you anticipate this level?
25 You've been very candid with us this morning, and had you put

1 in place the preparations to deal with it, and have you
2 considered perhaps while we're standing up an Iraqi army,
3 between now and the stand up of that army, utilizing some
4 Iraqi soldiers that can be trusted to go along on the patrols
5 with our own, so that we have not only the coalition helmet,
6 but something that the citizens can clearly perceive as one of
7 their own helmets?

8 General Franks: Mr. Chairman, the latter point first.
9 Yes, as we begin to work to build with Walt Slocum, whom the
10 Secretary mentioned a minute ago, the Iraqi army, we will as
11 those forces are brought on position them, work with them in a
12 very operational way because as you said that serves to put an
13 Iraqi face on the security assets that are being used
14 throughout the country. And so, yes sir that is part of the
15 plan. With respect to the level of violence, Mr. Chairman I
16 will tell you, I think in a war and in post-conflict, one
17 never knows how to gauge what may be expected in the aftermath
18 of major combat.

19 Was it anticipated, Mr. Chairman? I would say yes sir,
20 it was. And perhaps the way I'll justify that statement is to
21 say that the footprint that we see in Iraq today is not the
22 same footprint that was in Iraq on the day the President
23 announced the cessation of major combat operations. In fact,
24 the deployment orders, which had been approved by the
25 Secretary prior to the time, I believe it was the 1st of May,

1 when our President said that the major combat operations had
2 ended, the deployment orders which had already been signed, in
3 fact adjusted the footprint for Iraq in terms of military
4 policing, in terms of civil affairs people, in terms of
5 humanitarian assistance type forces, in terms of engineers.

6 The plan called for the removal of forces that are much
7 more inclined to be used during major combat operations than
8 during stability operations, for example, armor formations.
9 And so I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we did anticipate a level
10 of violence and I can't tell you whether we anticipated that
11 it would be at the level that we see right now. You know, Mr.
12 Chairman, I think that when a war begins one can always hope
13 for a very quick transition to peace, to see a nation begin to
14 rebuild itself without a great deal of friction and without a
15 great deal of messiness. But on the operational side, on the
16 military side we must always be prepared to handle whatever
17 level of violence may come along, and Mr. Chairman I believe
18 our forces have been and will continue to be able to handle
19 the levels of violence that we see as this nation tries to
20 bring itself together.

21 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much. Senator Levin.

22 Senator Levin. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary
23 Rumsfeld, going back to the NATO issue just for a minute, back
24 in April you were asked about a possible role for NATO, a
25 formal role for NATO in the post-war effort in Iraq and this

1 is what you said, that you suggested to the Secretary General
2 that I thought that would be a good thing. If NATO wanted to
3 do that, obviously France would be opposed I am told. They
4 are opposed to a lot of things so that shouldn't be a problem
5 because you can do it at 18 instead of at 19 countries, since
6 they're not a member of the Defense Planning Committee.

7 Now, we have apparently not asked NATO to formally decide
8 to raise a force for deployment in Iraq similar to what
9 they've done in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Why have we not made
10 that request of NATO as NATO, not just to support Poland for
11 instance as they've done as an individual country, but why
12 have we not asked NATO to formally decide as NATO to raise
13 that force and to give its endorsement to our action? Is it
14 because we're afraid France might not go along, or what? Or
15 we don't want to ask France.

16 Secretary Rumsfeld: No, first of all, it's not clear to
17 me we haven't. I was told this morning that the discussions
18 taking place in NATO include a discussion about a possible
19 NATO role in Iraq. Now to what extent the Department of State
20 or the United States has or has not issued a formal request I
21 don't know, but I know the discussions are going forward and I
22 know that the assistance that NATO is providing, not
23 individual countries in NATO, but NATO as an institution is
24 providing to Poland, is a NATO institutional action. It is
25 something that has been discussed, approved, and under way.

1 I also know as I said that NATO is preparing to take over
2 responsibilities in Afghanistan so how many things like that
3 they're going to be able to do at one time remains to be open.
4 But I have no problem, as I indicated then and I indicate now
5 some months later, in having NATO involved. Indeed, I think
6 it would be a good thing.

7 Senator Levin: NATO involved as NATO, formally being
8 asked and deciding as an organization to raise and to deploy
9 forces in Iraq? You have no problem with that?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: I have no problem with that.
11 Indeed, I'm very pleased that NATO has been assisting and is
12 currently discussing assisting in additional ways.

13 Senator Levin: But if that request to NATO had been
14 made, wouldn't you know about it?

15 Secretary Rumsfeld: I don't know technically what you're
16 getting at, but whether the Department of State has instructed
17 the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, or Permanent Representative as
18 he's called, to issue some sort of a formal request I don't
19 know. I know NATO has seized the issue, is discussing it, I
20 was told that this morning after Pete Pace, General Pace, had
21 a phone call with the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe,
22 General Jones.

23 Senator Levin: Would you support asking Germany and
24 France to provide forces in Iraq?

25 Secretary Rumsfeld: Our goal is to get large numbers of

1 international forces in from lots of countries, including
2 those two, but we have requests out to a large number of
3 countries.

4 Senator Levin: But you would specifically support
5 requesting Germany and France to provide forces in Iraq?

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: We have made requests to, I don't
7 know what it is, something like the Department of State has
8 issued requests to something like 70 or 80, 90 countries.

9 Senator Levin: Is Germany and France on the list?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'll have to ask. I would suspect
11 they are.

12 Senator Levin: But would you support it?

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: Why certainly.

14 Senator Levin: Good. The troop level, General Franks,
15 you've indicated that that is going to depend upon conditions
16 that exist in the future. General Abizaid at his confirmation
17 hearing recently said that he believes that we would have
18 large number of troops in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Do
19 you agree?

20 General Franks: I do, sir.

21 Senator Levin: And would you -- could you give us just a
22 range of troops, I mean would it be from 100-150,000 for many
23 years, give us some kind of -- I'm not asking for any kind of
24 precise figure, but what's your current best estimate?

25 General Franks: Mr. Chairman, that actually is not as

1 hard to answer as it might seem. We have about 145,000 troops
2 in there right now. As I have talked to commanders at every
3 level inside Iraq one finds that that footprint appears to us
4 on the operational side to be about what that footprint needs
5 to look like. There has been suggestion that perhaps there
6 should be more troops, and in fact I can tell you in the
7 presence of this Secretary that if more troops are necessary,
8 this Secretary is going to say yes. And we have talked about
9 this on a number of occasions and when the tactical commanders
10 on the ground determine that they need to raise force levels,
11 then those forces in fact will be provided. The Secretary may
12 want to comment on that, but what we --

13 Senator Levin: That's reassuring though. In other words
14 the current footprint to your best estimate -- and what that
15 be for the foreseeable future?

16 General Franks: Sir, it is for the foreseeable future.

17 Senator Levin: On the weapons of mass destruction issue,
18 which is back in the press in many ways, in the media this
19 week, Secretary Rumsfeld, as you know, earlier this week the
20 White House acknowledged that, quote, the reference to Iraq's
21 attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been
22 included in the President's State of the Union speech on
23 January 28. On the 29th, you said on CNN something very
24 similar to what the President had said the night before when
25 you said that the Iraqi regime, quote, recently was discovered

1 seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

2 Now Condi Rice just a few weeks ago said the following,
3 that we did not know at the time, no one knew at the time in
4 our circle, maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the
5 agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts
6 and suspicions that this might be a forgery. And I'm just
7 curious as to whether or not you've determined as a policy
8 maker how the facts, the falsity of that claim of uranium sale
9 to Iraq from Africa remained in the bowels of the agency for 9
10 months after you made your statement on the 29th.

11 Did somebody come to you, the intelligence community come
12 to you and say, my gosh, we've got facts that show that that
13 just simply is inaccurate? Have you determined how those
14 accurate facts, in other words, the knowledge in the bowels of
15 the intelligence community that it was wrong that Africa was
16 solicited by Iraq for uranium and that those documents were
17 forged? Have you determined how it happened that that
18 information about the forgery stayed for so long in the,
19 quote, to quote Condi Rice, the bowels of the agency?

20 Secretary Rumsfeld: No, I can't give you a good answer.
21 I can try to get an answer for the record if you'd like. I
22 must say that as someone who reads intelligence every day as
23 you do, I find that corrections are being made fairly
24 continuously, that you review a week's worth of intel, and two
25 months later they come back and say, well we said this on this

1 date, but we have new information that suggests this or that.

2 So the fact that the facts change from time to time with
3 respect to specifics does not surprise me or shock me at all.
4 It's to be expected, it's part of the intelligence world that
5 we live with is uncertainty and less than perfect knowledge.
6 I must say, however, that as we've gone through this period I
7 think the intelligence has been quite good, and I don't think
8 the fact that there is an instance where something was
9 inaccurate ought to in any way paint a broad brush on the
10 intelligence that we get and suggest that that's a pattern or
11 something. It's just not.

12 Senator Levin: Could you find out for this committee for
13 the record? This is a significant piece of intelligence, it
14 was relied on at the highest level, very publicly, very
15 visibly by the President and by you within two days of each,
16 right before the war. A very significant statement about
17 seeking uranium in Africa, it was based on intelligence, at
18 the same time the intelligence community knew in the depths of
19 their agency that this was not true, it seems to me is
20 absolutely startling and I think we would all want to know how
21 it could possibly have stayed there in the basement of the
22 agency while policy makers on the upper floors were making
23 these statements.

24 If you could do that for this committee, I think we'd all
25 appreciate it.

1 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'll try to do that.

2 [The information referred to follows:]

3 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Levin: Thank you.

2 Chairman Warner: Senator Allard.

3 Senator Allard: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'm interested,
4 in light of recent attacks and everything, your assessment as
5 to what's happening with the -- are they more organized than
6 say they were 3 or 4 weeks ago, and if they are becoming more
7 organized, is there any evidence of some -- how central is
8 this organization? Is it be region or is it countrywide? I'd
9 like to hear your assessment on that, General Franks.

10 General Franks: Senator, because we see more of the
11 activity, you know, I ask myself are we seeing more of this
12 violent activity in the areas that are shaded on the map that
13 the Secretary turned around a minute ago? Are we seeing more
14 of this violent activity because some of these Jihadist
15 extremists, Ba'athists, Saddam Fedayeen are coming together or
16 are we seeing more violence there because we are more
17 offensive and because we are placing more patrols in there?

18 And so the answer that I give you I will caveat with that
19 because I suspect that we're seeing increased violence in some
20 of these areas because we are more present. We are out
21 looking for it because that's our charter, that's what our
22 force is going to do. Now in terms of networking among these
23 groups or between these groups, Senator, I'm not comfortable
24 right now saying that I believe that there is operational
25 control between factions operating in Tikrit, Ar Ramadi,

1 Masul, Bayji, I'm not sure. I recognize the same thing you
2 recognize which is that we see increased violence, sir, but
3 I'm not ready yet to tell you that I see evidence that these
4 violent acts are being coordinated. I might tell you that
5 next week, Senator, but I do not yet see evidence of it.

6 Senator Allard: Do you see any outside influences coming
7 into the country, for example, Iran? Is there any coalition
8 forces from any of the neighboring countries that you can pick
9 up or any suggestion that there may be?

10 General Franks: Sir, as you know, since the war started
11 we have seen infiltration of elements through Syria, and we
12 have encountered those on a number of occasions. I believe
13 that there continue to be efforts by Iran, by Teheran, to
14 influence activities inside Iraq. We see evidence in there of
15 the intelligence services, Iranian intelligence services. We
16 see evidence in there of political forces. So, yes, I do see
17 attempts by nations in the region, I named those two, to
18 influence activities that are going on inside Iraq.

19 Senator Allard: Mr. Secretary, I'm aware that Ambassador
20 Bremer is trying to get some members on their Iraqi governing
21 council and get this put together rather quickly, at least in
22 the near future. Do you have any idea what we're thinking
23 about in terms of makeup of the council? Are we going to
24 include Islamic clerics, are we going to have former exiles
25 and Kurdish leaders, and when do you anticipate national

1 elections?

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: I saw the pool of names and it's
3 large and diverse, in answer to your question. It includes
4 folks from all across the spectrum, the Iraqis. And elections
5 are something that it seems to me will have to be determined
6 as we go down the road. The goal in life is not to have one
7 election one time as happened when Adolf Hitler was elected
8 for example. The goal is to have a process and to have true
9 representation and true respect for the various elements,
10 diverse elements in that country.

11 And the steps would be something like this, although I
12 can't even be certain of that: that there will be a governing
13 council, there will be some sort of an interim authority,
14 there will be a constitutional convention to develop a
15 constitution. The constitution and the Iraqis who develop the
16 constitution will make a judgment as to when and at what pace
17 they think their country is ready to have elections in a way
18 that would be reasonable and create a representative system
19 for them.

20 And that's out some way. If you think back to
21 Afghanistan, we still have a provisional government in that
22 country and their elections are expected next year sometime,
23 so it takes some time. It's not an easy transition.

24 Senator Allard: The Kurdish problem in the north I think
25 continues to be a problem and the question I have is, from

1 your assessment, Mr. Secretary, do you think the Kurds in the
2 north are more interested in rebuilding Iraq or are they more
3 interested in forming a separate country at this particular
4 point in time?

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: Oh, I think the former. Everything
6 I've heard is that the individuals from the Kurdish section of
7 Iraq are in fact participating in this process, that they've
8 behaved in a reasonably constructive way and that they're
9 relieved that the regime of Saddam Hussein is gone and that
10 they intend to play a political role in the evolution of a new
11 Iraq.

12 Senator Allard: Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired.
13 Thank you.

14 Chairman Warner: We'll recognize Senator --

15 Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, could I make a
16 response to Senator Levin on this subject that General Franks
17 answered on footprint? He responded, for the foreseeable
18 future about such as it is, as I recall. I would just amend
19 that slightly by saying exactly. We see no reason to think
20 that that footprint isn't the right one for the moment. But
21 the composition of U.S. forces could change and we could end
22 up with different types, as he suggested. And second, the
23 numbers of U.S. forces could change while the footprint stayed
24 the same, in the event that we have greater success in
25 bringing in additional coalition forces, in the event we are

1 able to accelerate the Iraqi army.

2 So the exact number of U.S. forces might change as well
3 as the composition even though the footprint, as General
4 Franks said, would be roughly the same until we see evolution
5 in the political and economic spheres. Thank you.

6 Chairman Warner: Two administrative announcements,
7 colleagues. We have two votes coming circa 11:30. It is the
8 intention of the chair to catch the end of the first vote and
9 remain and do the second, and then return and resume the
10 hearing.

11 Following the open hearing, we will have a closed hearing
12 in 26 -- I mean the Intelligence Committee next door. Thank
13 you very much.

14 Senator Kennedy.

15 Senator Kennedy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary,
16 General. We're all tremendously proud of the troops'
17 effectiveness in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It's a great credit
18 to you, Mr. Secretary and to General Franks. I'm now
19 concerned that we have the world's best trained soldiers
20 serving as policemen in what seems to be a shooting gallery.

21 The President declared an end to major combat operation,
22 but the war's not over for the men and women who are on the
23 ground in Iraq or their families here at home. And the lack
24 of a coherent plan is hindering our efforts at
25 internationalization and aggravating the strain on our troops.

1 Our troops are tired and want to return to their families who
2 are at home coping with the absence and the loss of income.
3 They've been gone close to a year and this truly is a
4 hardship. They and the American people want to know what the
5 strategy is to stabilize Iraq, bring the promise of democracy
6 to the Iraqi people and alleviate the strain on our troops.

7 Now I've heard in response to Senator Levin's questions
8 about the NATO forces, there are 2 million troops in NATO.
9 Clearly not all of them are qualified to go here, but you have
10 the Italian carabinieri and the French gendarmes and the
11 Spanish guardia civil that are superbly trained troops in riot
12 control and dealing with barriers and fire and explosives.
13 Have we made a specific request to try and get some of the
14 best trained police that exist in the NATO countries to come
15 over and provide some relief to these American troops that are
16 in the process of being attacked almost daily?

17 Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, in fact, Italy and Spain have
18 both made commitments.

19 Senator Kennedy: And when will they come, can you tell
20 us --

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: I can't tell you --

22 Senator Kennedy: -- what the expectation is and how many
23 are going to be there?

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: I can't tell you precisely. It's up
25 -- I've always believed that it's up to those countries to

1 make their own announcements.

2 Senator Kennedy: I'm asking about what's been requested.

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: We have requested of them exactly
4 the kinds of forces you've described and they have made
5 commitments to do so. The dates generally for these forces
6 are going to be in the latter portion of this summer and into
7 September and certainly by October. So I'm guessing that some
8 will be coming in next month, and then it will be August,
9 September, and October that they will be flowing in, but I
10 don't want to refer specifically to those countries, because
11 I'm speaking to the 19 countries that have made commitments.

12 Senator Kennedy: Well that's true. But these three
13 certainly, among others, have some of the best trained in
14 terms of the police function.

15 I was troubled just by your earlier response about the
16 knowledge of the request of troops from NATO. It would seem
17 that you would be the person that would be on the phone to
18 NATO to ask these troops to be available and we just want to
19 know, are you on the phone talking to NATO, to General
20 Robertson, to request troops, have you done that? You
21 indicated in an earlier response, we want to reach out to
22 everyone. Is it as much as we would like? No, in terms of
23 response to NATO. It's not clear that we have announced to
24 other countries. I have no problem if they want to provide
25 more help and assistance. I think families want to know what

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1 are we doing? If they have 2 million troops over there, what
2 are we doing to bring a major chunk of those troops through
3 NATO into Iraq. Is that part of our plan now in
4 internationalizing the military phase of it?

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: We have made requests of NATO. I
6 don't know quite what you're asking --

7 Senator Kennedy: I'm asking when have you talked --

8 Secretary Rumsfeld: The 2 million troops, Senator --

9 Senator Kennedy: -- have you picked up the phone?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: The 2 million troops I believe
11 include the United States of America.

12 Senator Kennedy: Well, then you've got, what, 1,700,000
13 over there, out of the 1,700,000 over there?

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: And we have asked, I believe, months
15 ago, the United States through the Department of State made a
16 request to something like 70 or 80 countries for assistance.
17 There have been force generation meetings that have been
18 taking place, one that took place very recently, there's
19 another taking place I believe in New York --

20 Senator Kennedy: But your answer, I gather Secretary, is
21 you're doing everything that you possibly can as a Secretary
22 of Defense --

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: We believe we are.

24 Senator Kennedy -- to make every request of NATO for
25 combat troops as well as for the kind of guard functions, and

1 that you're satisfied you're doing everything you can within
2 NATO and you have made that request yourself, or you're
3 conscious of the administration, or if you don't know that,
4 you're going to find out whether they have made that?

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: We certainly want assistance from
6 NATO and from NATO countries and we have commitments from a
7 good large number of NATO countries already and NATO is
8 already assisting.

9 Senator Kennedy: In the other area of the development of
10 Iraq, as I understand the U.S. Government has talked about the
11 future of Iraq working groups. But I'm told by the people on
12 the ground that there's no formal plan for reconstruction.
13 Can you provide us with the operational plans for
14 reconstruction? Who are the people, the level of resources
15 that are committed, how many Iraqis will be involved in the
16 plan to build, police, justice system, the media, the schools,
17 the other institutions? And are there plans on paper and
18 where are those plans? Or are we shooting from the hip and
19 taking a piecemeal approach when American lives are at stake
20 in terms of the broader security issues?

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: There certainly are plans for the
22 reconstruction of Iraq. I would, however, say that the plans
23 are not for the United States or the coalition to reconstruct
24 Iraq. Iraq's circumstance today is the result of 30 years of
25 repression by the Saddam Hussein regime and a Stalinist type

1 economy and a denial of the people of that country and the
2 infrastructure of that country, the kinds of opportunities and
3 investments that a wealthy country like Iraq is perfectly
4 capable of doing.

5 Today if one goes from the Gulf States, from Kuwait or
6 Qatar or any of those nations into Iraq, it's like going in
7 the old days from Romania into West Germany. It's just stark
8 how damaging that regime has been to that country to say
9 nothing of the mass graves of people that were killed by that
10 regime.

11 The plans do exist, but it will be the Iraqi people that
12 will have to build back their country and reconstruct their
13 country. A reference was made earlier to nation-building. I
14 suppose it's mostly semantics, but I think it's a little heady
15 and arrogant to think that you can build another people's
16 nation. I think the Iraqi people are going to build their own
17 nation back and they're going to build it in a distinctly
18 unique Iraqi way.

19 And our task is to try to create an environment to get
20 rid of that repressive regime and to try to create an
21 environment within which the Iraqi people can put themselves
22 on a political and economic path towards a future and not to
23 think that we're going to go in there and send the American
24 taxpayers' dollars, and billions of them, trying to rebuild a
25 country in a way that fits our image because that's just not

1 going to happen.

2 Senator Kennedy: Well you're not suggesting we're not
3 going to be spending billions of dollars of American taxpayers
4 --

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: Of course we are. Of course we
6 will.

7 Chairman Warner: Senator, the light's on. Thank you
8 very much. I didn't mean to interrupt you Senator, but we
9 have to -- Senator Sessions.

10 Senator Sessions: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
11 Franks, I want to express my congratulations along with the
12 others for your leadership, appreciation for your career, and
13 for the great troops that you led, how they performed under
14 extraordinarily difficult circumstances, they performed so
15 well.

16 You know, when we think about what has occurred, a lot
17 has occurred. We could have as a nation stayed right here and
18 tried to build up defenses at home or we could have gone after
19 the bases of terrorism that were plainly out there in the
20 world. The President made a decision, this Congress supported
21 him overwhelmingly to eliminate those bases, we saw those in
22 Afghanistan. You've liberated that country and we've removed
23 al-Qaeda and the Taliban from authority there. We've now
24 liberated the people of Iraq and our prayer is and our hope is
25 that we can help them establish their own nation. It

1 certainly will be, as the Secretary said, ultimately their
2 challenge to do that.

3 I wanted to ask you a couple of things. One of the
4 concerns I have is how quickly we can bring on the Iraqi
5 indigenous army that will be a servant of the Iraqi army and
6 the Iraqi nation. How difficult is that? Do we need more
7 resources? What can we do to speed along the creation of a
8 healthy, well-trained army that serves the people of Iraq?

9 General Franks: Sir, first thank you for your kind
10 remarks. We do want to bring the Afghan -- pardon me, the
11 Iraqi national army online as quickly as we can. I think the
12 vision is for an order of magnitude of 12,000 or so within the
13 initial 12 months, if my memory serves. We want to have as
14 much Iraqi army as we can, but we want a professional Iraqi
15 army when we build it. And what I mean by that is we want the
16 training of the troopers from the bottom up to be done in a
17 very competent way, and we have reinforced for ourselves in
18 Afghanistan that we know how to do that, that we can do it.

19 But what we also learned in Afghanistan is that we do not
20 want to create an army that has no place to go. We want to be
21 sure that the Iraqis themselves bring along the infrastructure
22 for the positioning of those forces as we bring them online
23 and at the same time we want to be sure that we work from the
24 top down to create a Ministry of Defense and the operational
25 level for an army that can manage them. I would like, Senator

1 Sessions, to see this thing, the Iraqi army come along as fast
2 as we can actually control it and put it to work and I am
3 satisfied with the pace that Walt Slocum intends to work on
4 that project right now, sir.

5 Senator Sessions: General Franks, if you would just
6 briefly share with us the status of our commitment to
7 containing Saddam Hussein before this war started, that
8 resources that we've been committing for over a decade to
9 keeping it in a box, including patrolling the Persian Gulf,
10 air flights and Northern Watch and Southern Watch. You know,
11 we think about the cost of the operation and the effort to
12 help Iraq rebuild, but tell us about the costs we were
13 incurring annually?

14 General Franks: Sir, if you think about Operation
15 Northern Watch, Operation Southern Watch, and the maritime
16 intercept operations that were ongoing between 1992 and 2002,
17 I can't give you with precision the math associated with that.
18 The number that I would give you would probably be -- Northern
19 Watch, Southern Watch, \$1- to \$2 billion a year, depending on
20 the year, and that does not factor what it costs coalition
21 members like the state of Kuwait, for example, who paid in
22 assistance in-kind perhaps another \$200- to \$250 million a
23 year during the course of containment.

24 Sir, I attempt to justify nothing with respect to
25 containment and I make no comment about whether that was good

1 or bad. From an operational perspective, our job was to
2 control the skies over Iraq and to ensure as best we could in
3 doing that the sanctity, if you will, of 786, 787, and
4 security council resolutions, some 17 of them that the
5 Secretary mentioned earlier. That was the policy, that's what
6 our forces worked to do for that period of time. I will offer
7 the operational fact, sir, that at this time, those operations
8 are no longer necessary and in fact there are no longer jets
9 and air defense systems shooting at American men and women and
10 then returning to the sanctity of bases belonging to the
11 regime.

12 Senator Sessions: I think that's an important thing for
13 us to consider, and I always felt that in fact the Gulf War
14 never ended, that there was sort of an agreed-upon peace that
15 was not holding, and to me something had to be done, and I
16 think those actions have been taken. Would you just share --

17 General Franks: Sir, if I could insert one thing in
18 response to a comment Senator Kennedy made a minute ago about
19 troops having been committed a year and in many cases being
20 very tired. I believe, having been there, sir, that troops
21 are tired at two levels. One is a tactical level where one
22 becomes tired, and the other is a level where people do not
23 believe in what they're doing. I believe members of this
24 committee who recently visited our troops on the ground in
25 Iraq found none of the latter and it's my job and our job to

1 be sure that we provide the tactical relief, rest, and quality
2 of life for our troops as best we can. But my comment is that
3 I believe that our young men and women who are deployed in
4 Iraq working in a very dangerous circumstance believe in their
5 responsibilities and are doing them remarkably well. I'm
6 sorry, sir, please.

7 Senator Sessions: Thank you.

8 Chairman Warner: Senator Reed.

9 Senator Reed: Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
10 First, General Franks, let me add my commendation for an
11 extraordinary career in the Army and service to the Nation,
12 and I think you know that we're all sincerely appreciative,
13 but I think you also know that the appreciation of the
14 soldiers that you've served with, their respect is much more,
15 I think, gratifying to you and it should be. Thank you, sir.

16 Mr. Secretary, I had the privilege to go with Chairman
17 Warner and Senator Levin to Iraq and I had a chance to meet
18 lots of soldiers and I would agree with General Franks, they
19 are proud of what they're doing, they will do it as long as we
20 ask them to do it, but they had one question of me I couldn't
21 answer, particularly the troops in my home State, the 115th
22 military police company, the 119th military police company,
23 the 118th military policy battalion -- when are we coming
24 home?

25 The answer to that question relies upon having troops

1 available to replace these troops, because as you've both
2 indicated our footprint in Iraq will be significant. This
3 burden falls particularly with impact upon the Army. Today
4 the Army has 370,000 troops in 120 countries. In Iraq, the
5 footprint has the 3rd ID, the 4th ID, the 1st Armored
6 Division, 101st Airborne, 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 2nd
7 Brigade of the 82nd, the 2nd Light Cavalry Squadron, the 3rd
8 Army Cavalry Squadron, in addition 5 National Guard enhanced
9 battalions in Iraq and 2 in Kuwait. That's a significant
10 footprint.

11 In Afghanistan, shortly we'll have almost two full
12 brigades with the 10th Mountain Division to take the mission.
13 In the Balkans, we have the 34th National Guard Division from
14 Kansas. In Kosovo, we have the 1st Infantry Division which
15 will be replaced by the 28th National Pennsylvania National
16 Guard Division. We have forces in Korea, the 2nd ID, we have
17 contingency forces in the United States and there are other
18 areas in the world that are dangerous.

19 In addition to that, the normal doctrine years ago when I
20 was serving was for every deployed unit you had to have a 3-
21 to-1 ratio. That I think has changed to 5-to-1 now because we
22 also have preparation, exercise phases, training center
23 missions, reintegration and then the actual mission. We are
24 dangerously stretched thin in the Army and other services
25 also.

1 I know the answer to this will be multinational forces
2 will take the place of these troops in Iraq, but so far we've
3 been unsuccessful in arranging those forces. And it seems to
4 me that we have to be prepared to increase our Army, number of
5 brigades in our Army, or to activate National Guard Divisions,
6 and we have to make that decision soon because of the training
7 these troops will need before they're deployed.

8 So Mr. Secretary, are you planning or prepared to
9 increase the size of the Army to meet these commitments?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: First I would say that I talked to
11 General Abizaid this morning and he is sensitive to the
12 importance of troops knowing what the rotation plan will be so
13 they have some degree of certainty in their lives. And he's
14 sensitive to the importance of the quality of their lives,
15 whether they get mail and those types of things, and is
16 determined to continue the fine work that General Franks has
17 done and now that we've completed major combat operation in
18 Iraq, begin to get greater clarity as to exactly how that
19 rotation will take place.

20 It would be incorrect to say that we expect that
21 international forces will replace all of U.S. forces. We
22 don't anticipate that. We're going to have to replace U.S.
23 forces with U.S. forces in large measure, and we understand
24 that. And the Joint Staff and the services have been asked to
25 make a presentation to me -- the request went back many, many

1 weeks, and they have been working in the tank with the
2 services and they expect to bring that forward sometime this
3 month, in which case they'll get clarity as to what people can
4 expect in terms of their circumstances.

5 Then the question comes, do you need to increase force
6 levels, particularly in the Army or Marines, the ground
7 forces, I would add. And that answer -- the question to that
8 is if we believe that's the case, obviously we would come to
9 the Congress and make that request. At the moment we are
10 attempting to bring down our force commitments in a number of
11 countries in the world. We have proposals with respect to
12 what's taking place in Bosnia and Kosovo, which are through
13 NATO, in together and out together, as you're familiar. We
14 have been working to try to reduce our force in the Sinai. We
15 have discussions going on with Korea as to how we can have our
16 footprint there arranged. We have discussions taking place in
17 Europe.

18 We also have, I'm told, by Dr. Chu and I don't know if
19 we've ever gotten the exact list, but something in the
20 neighborhood of 300,000 men and women in uniform doing jobs
21 that aren't for men and women in uniform. They're doing
22 civilian functions, and they shouldn't be doing civilian
23 functions. So we've got to continue to try to manage the
24 department in a way that we make the best use of people who
25 serve in the armed services.

1 If, at some point, it looks as though what you suggest
2 might be the case turns out to be the case, clearly we will
3 come to Congress and ask for an increase, but at the moment we
4 do not see that that's the case.

5 Senator Reed: Let me address the question a different
6 way. Since September 11, 42,000 National Guard troops have
7 been on active duty. That's before Operation Iraqi Freedom.
8 Doesn't that suggest to you that there is a need for a
9 increase in active forces?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: First, I don't have the number at my
11 fingertips and I regret that, but there are a very large
12 number of Guard and Reserve that have been on duty that are
13 volunteers. They are individuals who were not called up,
14 they're not required, but a non-trivial fraction of the total
15 have been individuals who were asked, would you like to come
16 on and serve on an active service for a period and they have
17 said yes.

18 So it is -- you're right, except that within that mix of
19 numbers of Reserve and Guard, a lot of them are there because
20 they want to be, not because they're being forced to be.

21 Senator Reed: Well, you need them Mr. Secretary.

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: You bet we need them.

23 Senator Reed: Then the question goes, if you need that
24 many National Guardsman over an extended period of time,
25 stretching back over a year, doesn't that suggest that the

1 active forces have to be increased?

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, of course, we have increased
3 the active forces. We have a provision the Congress passed
4 and the President has taken advantage of the 2 percent plus,
5 and under an emergency even the 2 percent ceiling is not a
6 requirement for us, and we are in some cases above the 2
7 percent. So the force levels have increased during this
8 period, you're quite right.

9 Senator Reed: Well, Mr. Secretary, my time has expired,
10 but I think this issue of the size of our forces is rapidly
11 approaching a decision point, and from what I've seen from the
12 extended deployment of our Army particularly, and I agree the
13 Marine Corps also, and I would suspect the Navy and the Air
14 Force could make similar cases, is that we're reaching the
15 point where we have to go ahead and bite the bullet and put
16 more forces in our force structure so we can rotate those
17 troops who are doing so well and serving so proudly out of
18 Iraq.

19 Chairman Warner: Thank you Senator. Senator Collins.

20 Senator Collins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
21 Franks, let me begin my remarks by joining my colleagues in
22 thanking you for a truly outstanding career. Our country owes
23 you an enormous debt of gratitude and I join my colleagues in
24 saluting you.

25 Mr. Secretary, I was honored to be part of the Armed

1 Services Committee trip to Iraq recently and like my
2 colleagues, I had the opportunity to talk with many of our
3 troops. I want to echo the impressions that Senator Reed
4 received in his conversations. To a person I found that our
5 troops' morale was very high despite the harsh conditions
6 under which they're serving and despite the dangers to which
7 they are exposed.

8 But I also found a weariness among our troops, and over
9 and over I heard, I'm proud of our mission, I helped free the
10 Iraqi people, but when do I get to go home? So I think it is
11 important that we communicate to the men and women who are
12 serving so that they will have some expectations. One soldier
13 from Maine told me, I can deal with another three months, I
14 can deal with another six months, but I just need to know. So
15 I would encourage you, and I know that General Abizaid is
16 working on this, but to share that information with our men
17 and women in uniform as quickly as it is available so there
18 can be some certainty.

19 I would also ask you, Mr. Secretary, to project for us
20 what you see as the percentage mix of American troops versus
21 troops from other countries as part of the coalition forces by
22 the end of the year. Obviously we can rotate troops home more
23 quickly if we can replace them not just with American troops,
24 but with troops from other countries. Could you give us some
25 rough estimate of what you see as the percentages of American

1 troops versus troops from other countries as part of the
2 coalition forces by the end of the year?

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, as General Franks and I have
4 indicated, we now have about 148,000 troops there. We're
5 hoping to get -- have the non-coalition forces up to something
6 like, at the moment we're looking at 30,000 sometime late
7 summer, early fall. We intend to have the Iraqi army grow as
8 rapidly as we can do so, and there's actually a fourth source
9 of forces and that's contract forces for site protection to
10 the extent that that might make sense. That's roughly what it
11 looks like to me going out toward the end of the year.

12 Senator Collins: You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, in your
13 statement that Iraqis no longer wake up every morning and fear
14 wondering whether this will be the day that the death squads
15 come and indeed all of us feel a great pride in freeing the
16 Iraqi people from the breathtaking brutality of Saddam Hussein
17 and his regime. But nevertheless what I found during the trip
18 is that there still is very much a climate of fear in Iraq.
19 There's the fear that the Americans and the coalition forces
20 will go home too soon and that Saddam Hussein will return to
21 power.

22 I was struck by a conversation that we had with an Iraqi
23 who was running an oil refinery in Basra whom, whenever we
24 asked any question that involved Saddam Hussein would not
25 respond. How important is it that we capture or kill Saddam

1 Hussein and how high a priority is it for the coalition
2 forces?

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: The President has said, and we all
4 agree, that the United States and the coalition forces are
5 committed to stay as long as is necessary and not a day
6 longer. So the idea that we would leave too soon and Saddam
7 Hussein come back is not a realistic concern that anyone ought
8 to have. Saddam Hussein's not coming back.

9 How important is it that he be caught or killed and that
10 closure come to that? It would be helpful, there's no
11 question that this individual has created such fear on the
12 part of the Iraqi people because of his brutality and the
13 numbers of tens of thousands of people he's killed, and the
14 willingness to use chemical weapons on his own people and on
15 his neighbors, that there is a fear not just in Iraq but in
16 the region that we have to be certain that he is not going to
17 be around.

18 I think that that will take some time. People don't get
19 over that fear immediately. But he's not coming back. He's
20 through. That regime is over.

21 Senator Collins: You and I know that, you and I know for
22 certain that Saddam Hussein is not coming back, but I am
23 convinced that the fear that Saddam will come back is impeding
24 our progress in reconstructing Iraq. Prior to this trip, I
25 would have said that as long as he's out of power, that's

1 sufficient. I came back with a very different feeling, a
2 determination that unless we capture or kill Saddam that our
3 progress is going to be far slower.

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: I agree with that and I will say,
5 however, that in answer to your question of what's the
6 priority, the priority is very high, as I'm sure you were
7 briefed.

8 Senator Collins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much Senator. Senator
10 Akaka.

11 Senator Akaka: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
12 want to add my pride of the troops as well as the leadership
13 to the record here, General Franks. What you've done out
14 there with our troops is extraordinary and I want to say thank
15 you and I want to praise you for all of that. I also want to
16 commend Secretary Rumsfeld for all he has done with us as well
17 as with you and the troops out there during this period.

18 I want to continue to pursue the question of when are we
19 coming home because although I didn't make the trip to Iraq,
20 I've heard it at home as well. Secretary, you mentioned in
21 response to Senator Warner's questions that CENTCOM is
22 developing a rotational plan for forces in Iraq and it appears
23 at this point that we don't have detailed answers to that. My
24 question to you is when do you expect that plan to be
25 completed and will it include troop rotations in Afghanistan

1 as well? I would appreciate if you could brief me on that
2 plan when completed as well. As ranking member of the
3 Readiness subcommittee, I am deeply interested in this issue.

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, CENTCOM's responsibility is
5 to communicate the force requirements that they believe they
6 need to do the job that they've been asked to do. The Joint
7 Staff and the services then work with them to determine what
8 kinds of forces and what kinds of rotation schedules make the
9 most sense. That work is currently being done, it's going to
10 be presented to me this week, and I expect to be able to make
11 some decisions.

12 The certainty question is clear to the extent we can get
13 that work done, tell them as we've now told the 3rd Infantry
14 Division what their certainty is, to the extent we can do that
15 with the other forces there. I should add, however, we have
16 redeployed over 140,000 troops already including some Army,
17 including some Marines, some ground forces, as well as Navy
18 and Air Force.

19 Senator Akaka: In regard to this deployment, Mr.
20 Secretary, I recently visited some of our fine marines at Camp
21 Lejeune and our great soldiers at Ft. Bragg. Many of them had
22 just returned from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we
23 spent a lot of time just talking about what they will need to
24 reconstitute their forces after returning home. In past
25 operations it has sometimes taken units up to a year or more

1 to fully regain high levels of readiness. Do you expect these
2 timelines to be about the same after Iraqi Freedom? If not,
3 how do you expect to accelerate them and how much additional
4 funding will this require?

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: We've asked for some funds already
6 for reconstitution and I don't doubt for a minute that we'll
7 have to ask for additional funds for reconstitution and it's
8 important that that be done. It varies from unit to unit how
9 much time it takes and how much the cost is, but that work is
10 all being done by the Joint Staff. And the other thing that
11 happens, however, is that the combatant commanders around the
12 world look at what took place in CENTCOM, in Afghanistan and
13 Iraq and they begin to change their judgments about the
14 numbers of precision weapons they would use, for example,
15 relative to dumb bombs, and how they might conduct their
16 campaigns, and as they involve their contingency plans they
17 then alter their needs and those kinds of things will be
18 coming in in the budget that's being prepared at the present
19 time for presentation next year.

20 Senator Akaka: Mr. Secretary, I'm quite concerned about
21 the problem, and I'm shifting to dirty bombs. The General
22 Accounting Office recently completed a report for me on the
23 availability worldwide of radioactive material that can be
24 used to construct such a weapon. Because of this the looting
25 of the Iraqi nuclear sites has been a matter of great concern.

1 I thank you for letting an International Atomic Energy survey
2 team into Iraq. I would appreciate it if you could provide me
3 an update, either now or for the record, as to whether all the
4 missing radioactive sealed sauces at the sites have been
5 accounted for.

6 General Franks: Sir, would you repeat the last part of
7 the question, just the last phrase sir, I missed the last
8 part.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: It's the percentage of -- materials.

10 Senator Akaka: I would appreciate it if you could update
11 either now or for the record as to whether or not all the
12 missing radioactive sealed sauces at the sites have been
13 accounted for.

14 General Franks: We actually are very pleased with the
15 results of that and having brought the IAEA in to check the
16 work of our troops and some people who had been working that
17 very, very hard. And Senator I will provide for the record
18 the exact math, but the amount of yellowcake specifically is
19 what we're talking about from two different sites that was
20 unaccounted for at the end of bringing all this together
21 actually Senator is infinitesimal. Virtually all of the drums
22 and the substances, the substance yellowcake, was recovered,
23 and I will give you with precision the math on it.

24 [The information referred to follows:]

25 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

1 Senator Akaka: Thank you very much.

2 Chairman Warner: Senator Inhofe.

3 Senator Inhofe: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

4 Again let me, General Franks, echo what Senator Akaka and
5 Senator Collins and all the rest of us have said about the
6 great contribution you've made.

7 In the very beginning of this hearing, Senator Levin
8 mentioned that weapons of mass destruction are now back in the
9 press and I feel compelled to share at least my feelings, and
10 I think some others up here, that they've never been out of
11 the press. It's so obvious that this whole notion that
12 weapons of mass destruction they claim that are not found,
13 therefore we should not have gone in and done what we have
14 done is nothing but an absurd media-driven diversionary tactic
15 and I've never seen the likes of it before. And what these
16 people are saying is that if we didn't find these, therefore
17 we should not have gone in.

18 Well, first of all, I think that could have been, if it
19 hadn't been for the media, would have been put to bed way back
20 in the beginning when they found 11 chemical rockets with the
21 capability -- and I'm recalling this from memory now -- of 140
22 liters of some type of chemical, and as Richard Butler said,
23 140 liters of VX could kill a million people. Now to me, we
24 know there are 15,000 more like that out there but we found
25 those. That should have put it to sleep.

1 General Franks, when you said three decades of bloody
2 regime, that's an understatement and we all know that and I
3 know that Secretary Rumsfeld has tried to articulate how bad
4 that really has been. But what you folks have done is end
5 this monstrous bloody regime. When you stop and think and
6 envision if we hadn't gone in, thinking about the -- in one
7 day, 3,000 women and children tortured to death using nerve
8 gas, and I understand that's one of the most painful ways of
9 dying, to envision 317 kids under 12 years old lined up and
10 executed, and I recall right after 1991 when the war was
11 supposed to have been over, I think 2 days before that we had
12 the first freedom flight into Kuwait. Alexander Haig was on
13 it, there were about six of us on this flight. I recall going
14 to the headquarters that Saddam Hussein had used and walking
15 through the torture chambers and seeing the body parts,
16 running into a little boy that had his ear cut off because he
17 had a picture of an American flag that was in his pocket.

18 This fear, and now when I think about how gratifying it
19 must be to the two of you to know, the two of you more than
20 anyone else and the team that you put together has brought
21 this bloodiest regime since Adolf Hitler to a close. It has
22 to be gratifying that people can now have weddings, women can
23 now walk the streets without worrying about being summarily
24 dragged out and raped and tortured to death, parents can send
25 their kids out without fearing that they'll have their tongues

1 cut out. And so I just would say that, General Franks, as you
2 cap off a career, I don't think you ever in your wildest
3 imagination would have thought that you'd be doing such a
4 liberation the way that you have done.

5 There are a lot of things that we'd like to talk about
6 and you've covered quite a few, but I would say this. Before
7 I came in 1994, I was on the House Armed Services Committee and
8 all I heard all those years was jointness, jointness,
9 jointness, we're going to have to get to jointness and get rid
10 of this mentality of each one out there doing his own thing,
11 and we've come so far. I think that the effort in Iraq is the
12 greatest achievement and I might also say Afghanistan in
13 jointness, and I'd like to have your response, either one of
14 you, to your impression as to where we can go, how much
15 further of this effort of jointness we can go and with the
16 successes that we enjoyed.

17 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, I'll start. You're right.
18 The pattern in the past has been for the services to try to do
19 their own thing and deconflict too in large measure, and what
20 took place in Iraq was the most joint war fighting operation I
21 believe in the history of the world. And I think the team,
22 General McKiernan, General Moseley, Admiral Keating, Dell
23 Daley, and General Franks and his deputies, Mike DeLong and
24 General Abizaid have set a pattern for the future that will
25 dramatically leverage our capabilities for the future.

1 General Franks: Sir, the only thing that I would add to
2 that is I think Afghanistan initially and Iraq later gave us
3 some insight into what joint can be. I think that expansion
4 of that across all our services, all our combatant commands is
5 the future. I think that that would fall under probably what
6 the Secretary would call transformation, I mean, I actually
7 believe that the notion of this level of jointness is
8 transformational. And I think Joint Forces Command, Admiral Ed
9 Giambastiani, my buddy down at Norfolk, will be and has the
10 support of the Secretary to bring this level of jointness all
11 across our uniformed services in the years ahead.

12 Senator Inhofe: I appreciate that very much. Let me get
13 on record as saying I agree with much of what Senator Reed
14 said concerning a concern on end strength and you've heard me
15 say this before and it's something that I hope you'll keep
16 your minds open. And I know your close communications with
17 the Reserve component will convince you as it's convinced me
18 and many of the members of this panel that there's got to be
19 relief and I hope that will continue to stay open.

20 I had occasion to be in Vicenza the other day and talk to
21 some of those in the 173rd, about half of those who were
22 deployed up to northern Iraq. That was a contingency that we
23 didn't know that would be there. We thought we'd be able to
24 come down through Turkey and it wouldn't be necessary, but
25 they are there. One of the minor things that we have learned,

1 and this hearing is supposed to be about lessons we have
2 learned, and since my time is expired I'm going to ask you to
3 give this response in the record.

4 I know that in Vicenza when the 173rd was to deploy they
5 went to Aviano. Fortunately, we had good weather so that the
6 staging area which is out in the open could accommodate them
7 which it would not have if it had been rainy weather. They're
8 now looking at some MilCon projects that are going to ensure
9 that. That's just one of many, many lessons I'm sure we've
10 learned. I'd like to get as many of these examples so that we
11 and this committee, as we look at MilCon in the future and at
12 our activities in the future will be able to isolate these and
13 get your impression on all of these things that now we realize
14 maybe should have been done before but we should address as a
15 result of our experiences.

16 [The information referred to follows:]

17 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Chairman Warner: Senator Byrd.

2 Senator Byrd: What is our situation, Mr. Chairman, with
3 respect to the votes on the floor?

4 Chairman Warner: Yes, the vote has commenced and at the
5 conclusion of your questioning, we will adjourn.

6 Senator Byrd: Would you prefer to go now?

7 Chairman Warner: I think we would like to have you
8 complete yours.

9 Senator Byrd: All right. Mr. Secretary, what is the
10 current monthly spend rate to support our ongoing military
11 operations in Iraq?

12 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'll have to get you that for the
13 record. It's a combination of appropriated funds as you, sir,
14 know better than any plus the expenditures of funds that are
15 taking place from Iraqi frozen assets, from Iraqi seized
16 assets, and from U.N./Iraqi assets under the Oil for Food
17 program, and I can certainly have Dr. Zakheim come up and
18 provide a very precise answer as to what's currently being
19 spent.

20 Senator Byrd: Do you have, do you recall a figure? Can
21 you give us an estimate? I've heard a figure of \$1-1/2
22 billion a month.

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: I would not want to venture a guess
24 and be wrong sir.

25 Senator Byrd: Well somebody ought to know.

1 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well they do know and we'd be happy
2 to brief you on it.

3 Senator Byrd: Well, I'd like to know now.

4 [Laughter.]

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, we'd have to adjourn and I'd
6 have to get on the phone with Dov Zakheim.

7 Senator Byrd: Well, we'll be back won't we Mr. Chairman?

8 Chairman Warner: Yes we will, Senator.

9 Senator Byrd: And along with that, what is the -- how
10 much are we spending a month to support U.S. military forces
11 in Iraq?

12 Secretary Rumsfeld: The expenditures for Iraq are in a
13 variety of categories. You might include the salaries of the
14 people that are serving there. Those salaries would be paid
15 whether they're serving there or they're back in Germany or
16 back in the United States. It might include funds as I
17 indicated that are coming from other sources. It might
18 include funds for reconstitution that are currently being
19 spent but for spending on restocks of bombs, for example, and
20 weapons that were used during the conflict.

21 So it is not a question that can be posed and then
22 answered with a single number. I wish I were able to do that,
23 but it falls into a variety of different baskets under our
24 appropriated funds.

25 Senator Byrd: I understand that, Mr. Chairman, but I've

1 been around here going on 51 years and I'm on the
2 Appropriations Committee and we want to fund our military
3 certainly and meet the needs, but there must be some figure,
4 some amount that we can cite as an amount that we're spending
5 monthly in Afghanistan and the same with respect to Iraq.

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'm sure there is and we'll get it
7 for your.

8 Senator Byrd: Well, that'll be another figure we'll hope
9 to have after when we return, Mr. Chairman, I would hope.

10 Chairman Warner: Well, in that case --

11 Secretary Rumsfeld: Not likely -- that fast?

12 Senator Byrd: Well, you like to have figures fast when
13 it comes to appropriating money.

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: That's for sure.

15 Senator Byrd: I would like to know on behalf of the
16 Appropriations Committee and the Congress how much we're
17 spending.

18 Secretary Rumsfeld: We'll try and get it for you.

19 Senator Byrd: I hear and I read that it's something like
20 \$3- to \$3-1/2 billion a month to support U.S. military forces
21 in Iraq. Now where are these figures coming from that we read
22 about and that we in the Appropriations Committee are told
23 from time to time? Well, anyhow so much for that for the
24 present.

25 Chairman Warner: Mr. Byrd, the warning for 7 minutes has

1 stopped. We'll recess now and when we come back, you'll be
2 immediately recognized to finish those questions.

3 Senator Byrd: Very well. Thank you.

4 Chairman Warner: We're recessed.

5 [Recess.]

6 Chairman Warner: We will continue the hearing. Senator
7 Byrd will be recognized if here following Senator Roberts.

8 Senator Roberts.

9 Senator Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
10 Franks, from a Kansas Aggie to an Oklahoma Aggie, you've done
11 pretty darn well.

12 General Franks: Thank you sir.

13 Senator Roberts: And we truly appreciate your service
14 and I echo all the comments of my colleagues in that regard.

15 Mr. Secretary and General Franks, I want to tell you two
16 accounts from the chairman's CODEL over to Iraq of which I was
17 privileged to be a member, and in which I was trying to
18 determine the intelligence capabilities since I am the
19 chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

20 One is in regards to a massive grave site near Hillah
21 where there is a site about the size of a football field.
22 It's my understanding there are about a hundred of these grave
23 sites around the country and that we have, I think, been
24 involved with this task force justice on the accountability
25 and the forensic job that remains on about 14 and that will go

1 up to about 32, so it's a massive job. And it was with
2 anguish and despair that our delegation stood on a mound of
3 sand and overlooked this pit, half of which has been smoothed
4 over, that contained 15,000 Iraqis. They brought them in by
5 truck, three a day, and in this pit would disgorge these
6 people and they would rape them, they would torture them, they
7 would shoot them. If somebody from the neighboring villages
8 would try to rescue the kids, why they were simply buried
9 alive. Three thousand were excavated when Saddam fell. One
10 thousand were identified and then finally one of the clerics
11 simply declared the whole ground holy ground.

12 I stood there and I wondered about man's inhumanity
13 against man. Saddam Hussein is a Hitler, a Pol Pot, a Stalin,
14 and it gets back to Senator Collins' comment in regards to the
15 palpable fear on the part of Iraqis. I underestimated that.
16 I know that you have made the statement that he is not coming
17 back, we have made the statement he's not coming back, and by
18 damn he's not coming back. But I don't think the Iraqis fully
19 comprehend that or fully grasp it or fully believe it.

20 And that is why I think having been through that and
21 having learned that he basically executed at least 300,000,
22 probably closer to 1,200,000 of his own people and things as
23 graphic as I have described that we must capture or kill him
24 -- must capture or kill him. I know Task Force 20 that you
25 can't really talk about much, if at all, has that duty, has

1 that mission. You say it is a priority. I would urge you sir
2 to say that it is the highest level priority because I don't
3 think that we're going to get the cooperation that we need and
4 the full partnership and have Iraqis enjoy liberty and
5 democracy until we kill or capture Saddam Hussein and his two
6 sons.

7 I'm not asking you to comment on that. You've already
8 responded to it, but I feel very strongly about that. The
9 next account that I'd like to bring to your attention is that
10 there is a Colonel A.J. Kessel who is operating out of the
11 Saddam palace or headquarters there. He is working with the
12 Minister of Culture who is an Italian. And Colonel Kessel got
13 the bright idea that there might be an opportunity to
14 reconstitute the Iraqi symphony of all things, and after 30
15 years there had been no symphony, and was able to do so by
16 relocating and locating people who played in the symphony and
17 obviously some replacements because it's been 30 years. They
18 were in evening dress that was provided. Some of the members
19 of the symphony found their instruments that had been hidden
20 for 30 years, and those that did not have them were provided
21 and they had a symphony. It was a packed house. Tom
22 Korologos was at that performance and Tom did a magnificent
23 job over there in Iraq.

24 The last piece they played, Mr. Secretary, was the Iraqi
25 national anthem, prior to Saddam Hussein. And when they did

1 that, the crowd stood, applauded and cried tears of joy.
2 There is Iraqi nationalism right below the surface that can
3 flourish and there is hope for Iraq. Now I've not asked you a
4 question. Those are just two observations that I would make
5 -- one, anguish and despair on what that man did to brutalize
6 his country and the need to bring him, either killed or
7 captured, and his two sons to justice, so that we can
8 cooperate with Iraqis because they have graffiti, you've heard
9 the tapes, you've heard the pamphlets, anybody that is
10 cooperating lives in fear that he could come back.

11 And then on the other hand, here we have a symphony of
12 all things that is going to be a regular performance, by the
13 way, from now on. And God bless Colonel Kessel, who by the
14 way goes by the name of Buttons. So Buttons did his job, and
15 that is one of the projects -- 1,500 wide that we are
16 conducting in that country that is the untold story because
17 the media doesn't cover it. I wish that symphony had been on
18 CNN, or for that matter any other network. It was very
19 impressive. If you have any comment, I'd be happy to have you
20 comment.

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, Senator Roberts, I agree with
22 you fully on the importance of capturing and bringing to
23 justice Saddam Hussein, his sons, and the senior al-Qaeda --
24 correction the senior Iraqi leadership just as we've been
25 working to try to bring the senior al-Qaeda and Taliban

1 leadership. We will continue to do it. We recognize the
2 problem it poses, and the story you've just recounted on the
3 symphony is an important one and I thank you for doing it.

4 Senator Roberts: One hour and 28 minutes ago, it was
5 announced over Associated Press we have now captured number 23
6 on the U.S. most wanted list and number 29, the high ranking
7 party of the Ba'ath party regional command the former Interior
8 Minister were taken into custody, so the noose draws tighter
9 and that's good news.

10 My time is expired, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman Warner: Yes, Mr. Secretary, you wish to
12 respond?

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, I was asked repeatedly
14 by Senator Levin and others, including members of the press,
15 about whether or not the United States has made an explicit,
16 specific detailed request to NATO for NATO's participation. I
17 did not know the answer as to what precisely had been done.
18 It turns out that my deputy Paul Wolfowitz did travel to
19 Brussels in December of '02 and at least in that one instance
20 he made a specific request to the North Atlantic Council to
21 consider contributions that the Alliance could make to post-
22 war stability in Iraq, and that's the answer to the questions.
23 There may have been other requests, which I suspect there have
24 been through the Department of State.

25 General Franks: And Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a

1 Senator Levin: None since the war?

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: I have no idea. I'll be happy to
3 run around and try to find out the answer to that but I do
4 know there was this one specific one. There may have been
5 some before, there may have been some since.

6 Senator Levin: If we could get a complete list if
7 there's more than one, it'd be helpful.

8 [The information referred to follows:]

9 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Chairman Warner: Senator Byrd.

2 Senator Byrd: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now if we may
3 continue with my questions concerning the amounts of spend out
4 monies that we're expending in Afghanistan and in Iraq
5 monthly, Mr. Secretary.

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator Byrd, I've been given a
7 number by Dov Zakheim that says that in the fiscal year '03
8 supplemental there is, our funds for the United States
9 Government appropriated funds to spend in connection with Iraq
10 -- that between January of '03 and projected through September
11 of '03 will average something in the neighborhood of \$3.9
12 billion spend rate per month.

13 Senator Byrd: In Iraq?

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: In Iraq.

15 Senator Byrd: 3.9

16 Secretary Rumsfeld: Right.

17 Senator Byrd: Okay. Now what has the spend out rate
18 been for Afghanistan?

19 Secretary Rumsfeld: The estimate that I was given is
20 that it's something in the neighborhood of \$700 million per
21 month.

22 Senator Byrd: \$700 million. That doesn't square with
23 the press reports that I read which as I indicated earlier
24 amounted to about \$1.5 billion.

25 Secretary Rumsfeld: The 1.5 number that I've seen is a

1 number that people used 4 or 5 months ago as the projected
2 figure for Operation Enduring Freedom, the non-Iraq portion of
3 the global war on terror. I don't know what you saw in the
4 press, but I have seen that same number in that connection.

5 Senator Byrd: But you say that the amount that you're
6 stating before this committee today is around \$700 million?

7 Secretary Rumsfeld: For Afghanistan.

8 Senator Byrd: For Afghanistan, per month.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, sir. And the numbers that I've
10 been given by Dr. Zakheim of other funds is they anticipate
11 \$1.7 billion from frozen assets to be expended by the end of
12 this fiscal year and \$800 million in seized assets to be
13 expended by the end of this fiscal year. And then there are
14 some additional contributions from various other countries
15 that are going on and the last time I saw that, it was a
16 number of something like \$2.3 billion committed by other
17 nations to assist with the work that's going on in Iraq.

18 Senator Byrd: Well, now it would seem then that we're
19 spending about five times as much per month, a little over
20 five times as much per month in Iraq as we're spending in
21 Afghanistan, \$700 million as against \$3.9 billion, I'd say
22 five-and-a-half times. Yet the numbers there are we have
23 10,000 men, I believe, in Afghanistan, do we not, and
24 something like 150,000 in Iraq, 15 times as many men in Iraq
25 but we're only spending five times as much money.

1 Anyhow, do you believe that the spending rate for Iraq
2 and Afghanistan will continue to remain at the current rate
3 for the next year?

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: I don't know what the administration
5 intends to propose to the Congress by way of funding for that,
6 and that's something that is funded out of a whole host of
7 different portions of your Appropriations Committee, as you
8 know, AID, Department of State, Department of Defense and
9 others. And what OMB and the President will recommend at some
10 point in the future I just don't know, sir.

11 Senator Byrd: All right. I see my time is up but let me
12 ask this follow-up question which my line of questions leads
13 me to. When do you expect to see another supplemental
14 submitted to Congress and how large a supplemental should we
15 expect it to be?

16 Secretary Rumsfeld: I am under the impression that the
17 Office of Management and Budget is looking at a supplemental
18 but I do not know when they would decide to submit it or what
19 the amounts would be either from my department or from other
20 departments because they've not made any recommendations to
21 the President on that to my knowledge.

22 Senator Byrd: But you have some recommendations to make
23 to OMB?

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: At some point we will, yes sir.

25 Senator Byrd: Do you have any idea how much that's going

1 to be.

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: I don't. I'm sure that Dr. Zakheim
3 has some preliminary work that he's done with the services in
4 terms of reconstitution and we can try to provide some of that
5 to you personally if you wish, but I don't have anything at my
6 fingertips.

7 Senator Byrd: Well, I'll be pursuing this as a member of
8 the Appropriations Committee. Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much, Senator Byrd.

10 Senator Dayton.

11 Senator Dayton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I might say,
12 Mr. Secretary, if you need reinforcements, having been on this
13 trip with the chairman and the ranking members, their ages are
14 classified but they are in extraordinary shape and energy and
15 enthusiasm. It was a privilege to be on the trip with you,
16 both of you.

17 Chairman Warner: Glad to have you with us, Senator.
18 Thank you.

19 Senator Dayton: Secretary, General Franks, I salute both
20 of you for your extraordinary success and military victory in
21 Iraq. Mr. Secretary, you were very complimentary of the
22 General and those who worked with him but from the published
23 reports I've read you were integrally involved as well, and I
24 think you should share in that. The strategy that you
25 developed and the success which -- I remember saying

1 beforehand the optimistic but realistic scenario would be to
2 be 3 weeks, but that was very optimistic and I believe it was
3 3 weeks exactly from the day that you crossed the border to
4 the day that you occupied Baghdad, so I think that's an
5 extraordinary success and I salute both of you for it.

6 I'm not qualified to draw lessons, I'm not experienced in
7 military affairs but it would seem to me that at least a
8 similarity in both Afghanistan and Iraq is that the dispersal
9 of opposing forces rather than a surrender. I don't believe
10 in either case there was a formal surrender and as General
11 Sanchez told us in our meeting in Iraq, he said the Iraqi
12 forces dissolved near the end of the advance because of the
13 extraordinary lethality and precision of our firepower and the
14 overwhelming force which suggests to me that the follow-
15 through and the continuation of that after -- there was a risk
16 of prematurely declaring the victory has been won and the
17 hostilities are over when in fact this continuation of the
18 need to track down people, the principals as well as those who
19 have not really in their own minds surrendered but are just
20 running away to fight another day. That in fact leaves our
21 troops even more exposed often than perhaps in the initial
22 stage of combat and that's sort of what seems is occurring
23 now, which is coming as a surprise to the American public who
24 thought that this matter had been declared over and in fact
25 was.

1 And that leads me again, Mr. Secretary, to my concern
2 about the follow-through in terms of winning the country after
3 winning the war. And the progress that you cite, we witnessed
4 some of that with the economic development of the country, the
5 social rehabilitation, which I totally agree with you sir, is
6 not ultimately the responsibility of the American taxpayer or
7 anyone else in the world but the Iraqi citizens themselves.
8 At this point in time it seems that there's a direct
9 correlation between the progress that's being made in the non-
10 military areas of let's call it social and economic
11 rehabilitation and the feelings of the populus toward the
12 American forces and even the number of attacks on them.

13 So I guess in my view, and I don't think this is
14 necessarily the Department of Defense, but there doesn't seem
15 to be, and we were not briefed and obviously we didn't see
16 everything, but I'm not aware of the same magnitude of non-
17 military projects and initiatives being undertaken that are
18 going to make any kind of difference in the standard of living
19 in that society, and I fear without that kind of parallel
20 effort to the military that our forces are going to be in a
21 holding pattern trying to preserve this military victory but
22 not able to be extricated because this unrest is going to
23 continue.

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, Senator I agree completely
25 that it takes progress on all three fronts, the political, the

1 security, and the economic, and no one is likely to get very
2 far out in front of the other. In the last analysis, either
3 people will be willing to vote with their dollars, and I don't
4 mean U.S. dollars but dinars or whatever and invest in that
5 country and people will come back to that country because they
6 have confidence in it and because it has a well-educated
7 population. It has a population that has energy, it has
8 resources in oil, and it's not a poor country like
9 Afghanistan. It has wealth, and there isn't any reason it
10 can't be as prosperous and as successful as its neighbors in
11 the Gulf States.

12 So I think it's going to take some time, it's going to
13 take some effort and that in the end it will happen, it will
14 improve, and we'll see progress.

15 Senator Dayton: I would assert that that question is
16 about when are our troops going to be able to come home, that
17 the speed with which we show some visible signs of improvement
18 across the country, socially and economically, and obviously
19 we're not going to see those through to completion, those will
20 take decades, but to get things started is going to be a major
21 determinant in how quickly our troops are going to be able to
22 come home, and I don't see, and we were not informed in my
23 recollection of a magnitude of effort and initiative, which I
24 think is going to have be U.S.-started anyway, or it's not
25 going to happen in the near term, to get people to start to

1 have faith in the future and also to look at us more
2 favorably.

3 I would commend the report in the New York Times this
4 morning which talks about a city Abu Ghraib, if I'm
5 pronouncing correctly, and it talks about the absence of power
6 there, and the head of the council there that's been elected
7 said conditions have never been worse, we've never been
8 through such a long bad period. And I'm sure from our
9 experience too there are parts of the country where there is
10 more progress being made, there are parts where progress is
11 not being made, but I would just again say that I don't see,
12 didn't see an organized and well-financed non-military
13 initiatives to parallel and build upon the success that was
14 accomplished militarily.

15 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, I believe you said that the
16 war was declared over. No one I know in any position of
17 responsibility declared the war over. What the President said
18 was that major combat operations are completed and now we have
19 to go after the remnants of the regime, and that it will take
20 a good deal of time.

21 Senator Dayton: I stand corrected. That's a better
22 description of what was said.

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: Second, the war started on March 19,
24 major combat was announced as having ended on May 1, and today
25 is July 9. That's less than 4 months. Think what took place

1 in Germany after World War II in 4 years. Think what took
2 place in Japan in years. I mean, I think we have to get some
3 perspective on this and put this in context and think back in
4 history. This is tough stuff. This is hard work. This takes
5 time. As Senator Roberts said, fear is a powerful thing and
6 those people were repressed and fearful. Thirty years of a
7 Stalinist type regime suffocating the creativity and energy
8 and brilliance of so many of those Iraqi people has been a
9 devastating thing on that country. We need to have some
10 patience.

11 Senator Dayton: All right. I would agree with you. And
12 how much patience do the American people whose sons and
13 daughters are over there now -- how much patience do they need
14 to have? Do they need to realistically expect that those
15 forces are going to need to be there for 2 years, 3 years?

16 Chairman Warner: Senator, we have to move on to other
17 Senators. A number are waiting. If you want to make a quick
18 response --

19 Senator Dayton: My time is up, could I have an answer to
20 that question?

21 Chairman Warner: Yes. I was just about to say if you
22 wish to --

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, we responded to that question
24 earlier. The answer is that the people who are over there now
25 will be coming home. They will be rotated home. The ones

1 that are there are not going to stay there for 4 or 5 years.

2 Senator Dayton: The question, sir, was whether American
3 forces have to be there for 2 years or 3 years.

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: And the answer to that question is
5 we don't know. Nobody knows the answer to that question, how
6 long it will take, and it will take some time, and I think we
7 all believe that it's important that it be done, that's it
8 important we get other countries to participate in it, we
9 intend to see it through, and it's going to take some
10 patience. And when it's done, it's going to be darn well
11 worth having done.

12 Senator Dayton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr.
14 Secretary.

15 Senator McCain.

16 Senator McCain: General Franks, I want to add my
17 appreciation for your dedicated service and sacrifice for this
18 nation and your outstanding leadership. I'll reserve any
19 praise for Secretary Rumsfeld until he retires.

20 [Laughter.]

21 Senator McCain: Please accept the thanks of all America
22 on behalf of your outstanding leadership. Mr. Secretary,
23 here's what you're hearing today from the committee. A survey
24 by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press show
25 that 23 percent of respondents think the U.S. military effort

1 in Iraq is going, quote, very well, far fewer than the 61 to
2 66 percent that expressed that view during the conflict. And
3 yet at the same time a large percentage of Americans, in my
4 view very appropriately, think that the decision to go to war
5 was the right thing as you state.

6 The problem here is that Americans are unsure about the
7 future of our involvement in Iraq. So what you need to do, in
8 my view, is give not just this committee but the American
9 people, who hold you in the highest regard and esteem, and
10 have the greatest confidence in the President of the United
11 States and his leadership in this conflict, the concrete plan
12 as much as you can. In other words, how much is it going to
13 cost roughly and how long we expect to be there, even if it's
14 a pessimistic scenario, and how many troops are probably going
15 to be required given that there are certain variables? In
16 other words, this whole issue of how long are they going to be
17 there and the uncertainty of seeing the pictures of the
18 wounded or dead American soldiers are leading to this unease,
19 and I emphasize that's the word -- unease, not disaffection,
20 not anger, but unease on the part of the American people.

21 And I am convinced without a doubt that when Americans
22 are told what the plan is for post-war Iraq, then I think you
23 will receive overwhelming support on the part of the American
24 people. I say in all respect and appreciation for your
25 leadership, everywhere I go Americans want to know that. And

1 so I suggest that you have probably been doing that, but
2 probably not in a fashion that the American people either are
3 hearing or understanding what our future is. But again I want
4 to emphasize an overwhelming majority of American people think
5 we did the right thing. Whether weapons of mass destruction
6 are found or not, the overwhelming majority of Americans
7 support this President and your leadership and that of General
8 Franks.

9 But they need to be told. That's all they need and I
10 think by the tenor of the questions that you've gotten today,
11 the other Senators are reflecting what they're hearing from
12 their constituents. I hope you take that as a constructive
13 comment, which it is intended to be.

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: I do. Thank you.

15 Senator McCain: Now I'd just like to move quickly to
16 Iran. There's reports today that there's a newly found
17 nuclear site. There's accumulating evidence about Iran. I'd
18 like to know your assessment of the threat, the situation,
19 whether there's any North Korean involvement -- I guess I'd
20 like to hear a little more information about how you view this
21 situation in this very bad neighborhood.

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, as the President has
23 indicated, the situation in Iran is roughly as follows, that
24 the U.S. intelligence community has assessed that they do have
25 a nuclear weapon program. The IAEA has had uneven success in

1 dealing with them. The United States, over successive
2 administrations, has had discussions with Russia encouraging
3 them to not participate in a cooperative program with them
4 with respect to anything involving a nuclear power plant.
5 It's estimated that the nuclear facility that they're saying
6 they need for energy would produce less energy than the amount
7 of gas that they burn off on an annual basis.

8 Senator McCain: Have you seen this report this morning?

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: I don't know what report you're
10 referring to.

11 Senator McCain: Iranian exiles describe newly find
12 nuclear site. It was carried in a number of newspapers.

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: I didn't. I have not seen anything
14 in the press this morning, I apologize.

15 Senator McCain: Do you see any other North Korean
16 connection?

17 Secretary Rumsfeld: There has been interaction between
18 North Korea and Iran over a sustained period of time.

19 I would say one other thing. There are recent reports of
20 Iranians moving some of their border posts along about a 25-
21 kilometer stretch several kilometers inside of Iraq, obviously
22 not being respectful of Iraq's sovereignty, and certainly that
23 is behavior that is not acceptable and they should be staying
24 on their own side of the border.

25 Senator McCain: And what action do you think we should

1 be taking, Mr. Secretary?

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: I think that the President and the
3 Department of State have been engaged in a variety of
4 diplomatic efforts to try to persuade countries to not
5 participate with Iran in developing their nuclear
6 capabilities. It takes time to understand the success or lack
7 of success of those efforts.

8 Senator McCain: Well, it seems to me we may have to
9 contemplate significantly more, but I hope not, but it's
10 certainly disturbing news. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank
11 you again, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator McCain.

13 Senator Bill Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General,
14 we're looking forward to having you as a part of our Tampa
15 civilian community and thank you added to all of the accolades
16 here.

17 I would like very briefly to report to both of you what I
18 observed since I just returned from Iraq last night. First of
19 all, I think you have a good appointment in General Sanchez
20 and the Secretary's and your appointment of General Dayton
21 specifically to go after the weapons of mass destruction and
22 trying to find out the fate of Captain Scott Speicher, which
23 was one of the main reasons for my trip there. And I am
24 convinced that in fact he does have him as a priority along
25 with the WMD.

1 I went to the Hakamiyah prison. I can only describe it
2 as a hellhole. I wanted to go there because of the cell that
3 has the initials carved into the wall, MSS, which is the same
4 as Michael Scott Speicher. We have no proof that that was the
5 case. I observed the torture chamber and the refrigerated
6 containers outside where they would put the corpses, and it
7 all the more underscored the brutality of this regime.

8 Happily I noted on the way in this highly protected
9 convoy that went to the prison that economic life was
10 returning on the streets. There were crates of refrigerators
11 and boxes of ovens that you could see along with the fruits
12 and vegetables, the return on the street of economic activity.
13 I was also very heartened to find that new evidence has been
14 produced, which I have just shared at length with Senator
15 Roberts, the two of us have been joined at the hip on this
16 matter of Captain Speicher, new evidence that is classified
17 but that gives me reason to be optimistic for the first time
18 in several weeks that I have been pessimistic.

19 That doesn't say that he's alive, but that says that
20 we're beginning to get evidence that in fact we might be able
21 to find out. So I wanted to give you that report. At the
22 same time, some of the frustration that you have heard here, I
23 don't think that there's any reason for us to shrink from the
24 fact that most of the leadership that briefed me while I was
25 there thinks that we're going to be there for a long time.

1 Clearly I hope we're going to be there for a long time,
2 because we've got to be successful. It is very important in
3 this Senator's opinion that we have economic and political
4 stability, and I think that's going to require us being there
5 with a lot of effort for a lot of time.

6 In addition to Senator Byrd, I had just mentioned to you,
7 maybe we can confirm that in addition to the 150,000 that are
8 there that in the region there are another 80,000 that are
9 basically supporting the 150,000, and I think that we ought to
10 realize that when leadership was telling me that we were
11 likely to be there 5 years, I think it may be longer. Indeed,
12 I can't imagine us being out of Afghanistan just in 5 years,
13 and the experience that we had in Bosnia, now we're in the 8th
14 year.

15 I don't necessarily see that as a negative, but it's, I
16 think, what we ought to get on the table and understand that
17 over the long haul we're committed for that being a successful
18 liberation of those people. Now it gets a lot easier if we
19 find Saddam Hussein, dead or alive, because then a lot of this
20 assassination that's going on right now -- and that's what it
21 is, it's premeditated, it was probably planned before the war,
22 and unfortunately one of the victims was a Florida National
23 Guardsman Sunday night, doing guard duty at the university at
24 which someone slipped up behind him, shot him in the head and
25 then slipped off into the crowd. That has happened five or

1 six times along with what you see, the tactic finding where
2 our convoys are going, putting a mine, having a remote device,
3 detonating it on a Humvee, and that happened and is chronicled
4 in this morning's newspaper again.

5 So I think we just have to screw up our courage, our
6 determination and finally I might say that, Mr. Secretary, you
7 and I have talked about the question of the morale of the
8 troops, the question of the replacement of the troops, I have
9 specifically raised the issue of the National Guard and the
10 reservists and whether or not a policy change ought to be made
11 upping the active duty roster because indeed most every
12 soldier I talk to, and I talk to a lot of them from Florida,
13 both at the noon hour and then later in the evening, they are
14 pretty well under the impression that they've got to stay
15 there for a year. And that's not only the full time Army but
16 that's also the activated National Guard and the reservists.
17 And of course that brings enormous disruption in their lives,
18 in their employers' lives, in their families' lives that they
19 did not necessarily think of that.

20 So I bring this issue up merely as a policy issue that
21 will have to be considered here as well as by you on the
22 question of should we be doing this with these wonderfully
23 trained and specially skilled reservists and National
24 Guardsmen, men and women, or should we not be doing those
25 kinds of tasks that are going to have to be done for the long

1 haul in Iraq as well as Afghanistan with the active duty
2 roster?

3 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator.

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, very briefly, as I
6 indicated earlier, we absolutely have to manage the force in a
7 way that's respectful of what the obligations are and what the
8 expectations are. One of the things that the Department has
9 been working on since the beginning of this conflict is how we
10 can rebalance what we have in the Reserve and the Guard
11 relative to what we have on active duty. We ought to have on
12 active duty the kinds of people that are going to be needed
13 for longer term chores or tasks which are going to frequently
14 come up. We can't keep calling the same people up four, five,
15 six times. It's just not right, and the way the force was
16 organized over the past two decades has been the way it is
17 today, and the way it is today is that we don't have the right
18 people in the active force, enough of the right people in the
19 active force to do those kinds of things.

20 We will be coming forward with proposals in a relatively
21 short period of time to see if we can't get the people
22 proportion of this right.

23 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

24 Senator Clinton.

25 Senator Clinton: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and

1 again General Franks, not only do I want to congratulate you
2 on your long and distinguished career but I believe that your
3 leadership in both Afghanistan and Iraq will likely be studied
4 by military historians for years to come and I thank you for
5 your service to our nation.

6 This is a session on lessons learned and I have two areas
7 in particular that I am interested in. The first goes back to
8 Senator Levin's early questions, Mr. Secretary, about the
9 intelligence, and he focused in particular on the forged
10 documents out of Niger that served as the unfortunate
11 reference in both comments by you and the President as well as
12 the Prime Minister in England and other officials. And
13 Senator Levin's question basically came down to how could it
14 not have been known. In response, and I appreciate your
15 willingness to provide specific details to respond to Senator
16 Levin, you made a statement that the intelligence has been
17 quite good.

18 I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that as part of the lessons
19 learned and the after-action review that I'm sure both the
20 civilian and the military leadership are conducting that you
21 will certainly go deeply into the question of intelligence,
22 because it's not just with the incident concerning the alleged
23 efforts by Iraq to obtain enriched uranium from sources in
24 Africa. During his confirmation hearing, General Abizaid said
25 and I quote, we had indications from intelligence that they

1 were getting ready to distribute chemical weapons to forward
2 Republican Guard artillery units. That's what we thought and
3 so we really targeted those artillery units in particular
4 very, very hard.

5 And then he goes on to say, so the answer to the question
6 is, I am perplexed as to what happened and I can't offer a
7 reasonable explanation with regard to what has happened. Now
8 obviously we're all grateful it didn't happen, and I know the
9 chairman and I on several occasions shared our concerns about
10 what would happen if they were deployed, but the fact is that
11 in this new threat environment in which we find ourselves, we
12 are increasingly reliant on intelligence. We just heard
13 Senator McCain refer to a report from Iranian exiles
14 concerning some potential new nuclear site in Iran.
15 Therefore, I think that of the lessons to be learned, that I
16 hope we have learned, the thorough scrubbing and very careful
17 analysis of intelligence has to be at the top of the list.

18 It may very well be that the American people and
19 certainly the majority in this Congress believe we did the
20 right thing given what we found there and given the end of the
21 Saddam Hussein regime. But I don't think that's the answer to
22 the question about the quality, the accuracy, and the use of
23 intelligence. So I would join in the concerns that Senator
24 Levin and others have expressed that not only in closed
25 meetings, but also in public venues insofar as possible that

1 particularly the Department of Defense but also other agencies
2 within our Government really make it clear what our standards
3 for intelligence are and how we can best understand them
4 because in a democracy that's critical, this flow of
5 information.

6 Now turning to another area of lessons, General Franks,
7 in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom
8 the military we used was fundamentally different than the
9 military that fought and won the first Gulf War. Indeed, we
10 saw the fruits of a decade's worth of investment in our
11 military. The increased use of special forces, precision
12 guided munitions, unmanned reconnaissance and combat air
13 vehicles benefited from the decade's investment.

14 As we look ahead to transforming our military, it seems
15 clear that UAVs, special forces, precision guided munitions
16 that we invested in during the nineties will continue to play
17 an expanded role, yet I think it's also important to look at
18 the legacy systems like the M1 Abrams tank, the A-10 Warthog
19 ground support plane that also played a critical role in this
20 campaign. Now in this committee we've debated which weapons
21 systems are necessary in the 21st century. As a man with
22 enormous expertise and experience in this area, what lessons
23 have you drawn from both the Afghanistan and Iraqi campaigns
24 about the role of legacy weapons like the M1 tank, the A-10
25 Warthog and others in the transformed military that we are

1 going to be building?

2 General Franks: Yes, ma'am. I think that about any
3 point in the history of our country when we take a look we're
4 going to find the need for legacy systems, in this case, ma'am
5 you mentioned two of them, the A-10 Warthog, the M1A2 Abrams
6 tank and there are a number of others. And we will find
7 ourselves being trained and ready at any point in our history
8 to use those legacy systems and whatever we do tomorrow, we
9 have to be prepared good legacy systems to tomorrow.

10 I think the thing that we're seeing now the expectation
11 that I have for the next 2 years, the next 4 years, the next 6
12 years is a tremendous effort in the area of transformation
13 that will seek to maybe skip some steps in there. I think our
14 young people, men and women in uniform have done, Senator, a
15 remarkable job of using very good systems and in Afghanistan
16 and Iraq we also used some systems that came about, as you
17 said, over the past 10 years, unmanned aerial systems, to be
18 sure, precision munitions, very, very powerful.

19 I think the transformation that our armed services is
20 looking -- this is out of my lane but it's my view, it's my
21 opinion -- the transformation that armed services are looking
22 out now seeks to figure out what are we losing by not putting
23 more money into technologies. What are we losing by perhaps
24 overcapitalizing legacy systems at the expense of what we may
25 want in the future? And I think I'm glad that bright people

1 like some subordinates of Secretary Rumsfeld work such things,
2 but I think it'll be a little bit different in the next 3 to
3 10 years than it perhaps has been for us in the past 10 years,
4 if that makes sense to you. Thank you, ma'am.

5 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much.

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, could I make a brief
7 comment?

8 Chairman Warner: Yes, yes, of course.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: Two things. First I want to give a
10 different number than I gave earlier. I'm told now that the
11 \$700 million-a-month burn rate on Afghanistan is low, that
12 it's actually probably 900 to 950. I suppose if we wait
13 another hour we might get a still different number, but that's
14 the trouble with trying to do things in real time.

15 Senator Clinton, I agree completely on the importance of
16 intelligence. I was asked at my confirmation hearing what was
17 the thing that worried me most and I said intelligence
18 information. It's such a big complicated world and there are
19 so many areas that need to be looked at today unlike the Cold
20 War period where you could focus on the Soviet Union and
21 develop a good deal of conviction about it. We're dealing
22 with closed societies, we're dealing with countries that very
23 skillfully used our advanced technologies, where they're
24 trading those technologies, they're indeed trading denial and
25 deception techniques among so-called rogue states.

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1 So it is something that we're focused on, we think is
2 enormously important and I share your concern about it.

3 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

4 Senator Pryor.

5 Senator Pryor: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
6 Rumsfeld, I only have 6 minutes here, so I'm going to try to
7 keep my questions very short and I'd appreciate it if you
8 could try to keep your answers fairly concise if you could.

9 Let me first start with one of Senator Levin's questions
10 earlier in the day where he talked about the breakdown in
11 communications here, maybe between the intelligence community
12 and the Oval Office and exactly how President Bush was allowed
13 to in the State of the Union talk about the uranium statement.
14 I'd love to get an answer from you on that and I hope you will
15 follow up with Senator Levin with the committee, but my
16 question is slightly different from that, and that is, when
17 did you know, Secretary Rumsfeld, when did you know that the
18 reports about uranium coming out of Africa were bogus?

19 Secretary Rumsfeld: Within recent days, since the
20 information started becoming available.

21 Senator Pryor: So in other words, right after the speech
22 you didn't know that or even before the speech, you had no
23 knowledge of that?

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: I've just answered the question.

25 Senator Pryor: Are you trying to say that in no

1 briefing, in no documents that you had or that you were
2 exposed to, that was never communicated to you in any way?

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: I didn't say that. I see hundreds
4 and hundreds of pieces of paper a day and is it conceivable
5 that something was in a document? It's conceivable. Do I
6 recall hearing anything or reading anything like that? The
7 answer is as I've given it, no.

8 Senator Pryor: The next question is on the lessons
9 learned front, we find ourselves in Iraq right now, post-war
10 Iraq, if we can call it that. Based on your experience there
11 and your wide-ranging experience during your career, is there
12 something that we need to do starting now and into the future
13 to provide our troops with more training or different kinds of
14 equipment for circumstances like Iraq, where they come in
15 there and they're an occupying force, hopefully for not very
16 long, but still at this point an occupying force. Do we need
17 to do things differently? Do we need to do things better?

18 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, we think of ourselves as a
19 liberating force, not an occupying force. We think of the
20 role there as not permanent and General Franks, maybe you'd be
21 the best one to respond to the question.

22 General Franks: Sir, I think about the national training
23 center at Ft. Irwin, California. I think about 29 Palms, the
24 Marine training center. I think about Red Flag and Green Flag
25 Air Force training centers. And I think about what has been

1 done during the period of time Senator Clinton mentioned a
2 minute ago, perhaps over the last 10 years, in fact in this
3 case perhaps over the last 15 years, the evolution of things
4 rather than sudden discovery.

5 Senator, I'll give you an answer that is precisely to
6 that same point. For the last 10 to 15 years because of our
7 experiences in other places where we were conducting security
8 and stability operations, tremendous energy has gone into the
9 preparation of the United States Marines, the United States
10 Army troopers, airmen and sailors, especially SEALs, for
11 example, and sailors, to be able to work in an environment of
12 security and stability operations.

13 But Senator, the point that I would make is no amount of
14 training and no amount of preparation is going to make it very
15 likely that within a period of 2 months or 4 months or 8
16 months we're going to move our troops into a population of 25
17 million people who have been abused to the extent that the
18 Iraqis have been abused over more than three decades and cause
19 there to be no fractious behavior and cause these groups that
20 we're having all the difficulties with to go away.

21 And so, sir, if I could I would say again I believe our
22 troops are both trained and ready and very capable, and doing,
23 by the way, an excellent job in this very tough environment.
24 Sorry for the long answer.

25 Senator Pryor: I don't disagree with anything you're

1 saying, in fact I agree with everything. I just hope that as
2 we look at Iraq and understand it and understand our mission
3 there that we continue to improve down the road and that's
4 really my main point.

5 One thing on intelligence, and I don't want to dwell on
6 weapons of mass destruction, but there was a number if I
7 recall, a number of news reports and statements made by the
8 administration and others that Iraq was in possession of
9 several dozen, if I remember the numbers right, Scud missiles
10 before we went into Iraq, and the last I've heard, and you
11 correct me if I'm wrong, Secretary Rumsfeld, but the last I've
12 heard to date there have been zero found.

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: My recollection that I'm sure is
14 imperfect but I recall hearing that there were 10 or 12 Scud
15 missiles that were unaccounted for, up to two dozen.

16 Senator Pryor: Two dozen accounted for, and they've not
17 been found yet then, is that what you mean by that?

18 Secretary Rumsfeld: No, there have been none found.

19 Senator Pryor: Another thing, Secretary Rumsfeld, if I
20 may, in March on ABC News you indicated that you felt like you
21 knew where Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were and you
22 gave a specific general area, if that's a correct phrase, that
23 they're generally around Tikrit and Baghdad and some to the
24 east, south, west, and north. Knowing what you know now, do
25 you think that was an accurate statement at the time?

1 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, of course it was an accurate
2 statement at the time. It's what I believed.

3 Senator Pryor: I understand you believed it at the time,
4 but knowing what you know now, do you think your belief was
5 accurate?

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: I have no reason to believe it's
7 inaccurate. What we said was -- I was asked at a time when
8 our forces were south of Baghdad in the war, in conflict, I
9 was asked why we hadn't found any weapons of mass destruction
10 yet while the war was still going on. And I allowed as how
11 that the area from Baghdad to the north and the west --

12 Senator Pryor: Probably that orange or brown area on
13 that map over there?

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: Probably. Was an area that probably
15 was more likely to have the locations of these so-called
16 suspect WMD sites. How many hundreds were there?

17 General Franks: I think just short of 1,000, Mr.
18 Secretary.

19 Secretary Rumsfeld: And they were all suspect and there
20 was plenty of time for people to know that they were suspect
21 and as I recall a large majority of them are in the area that
22 I've just described, is that right General?

23 General Franks: Sir, that's right, and there's one
24 additional piece to it and that is confirming the negative,
25 whether we're talking about up to two dozen Scuds that the

1 Secretary mentioned a minute ago. If we know that coming out
2 of the 1991 Gulf War, there are up to two dozen of these
3 systems that have not been found and we know that the United
4 Nations' team has spent 11, 12 years looking for them and have
5 not been able to confirm that the Iraqis don't have them then
6 we go look for them just as America would expect us to do, we
7 go look for them. And, sir, that is the case with these
8 nearly 1,000 sites that the Secretary mentioned. We must
9 believe that the problems are there until we confirm the
10 negative that they're not there, and so that's the process
11 that has been ongoing.

12 Senator Pryor: And I understand the difficulty in that,
13 and I'm out of time, but I would like to ask this one last
14 question and that is, there's been some confusion in the press
15 reports, et cetera, about who actually is in charge of
16 searching for the weapons of mass destruction. And Secretary
17 Rumsfeld, I'd like to hear who is in charge of searching for
18 those weapons.

19 Secretary Rumsfeld: There is no confusion about it that
20 I know of. The facts are these. The capabilities on the
21 ground in Iraq essentially are in the Department of Defense,
22 large numbers, helicopters, the ability to move people around
23 and do things. So the Department of Defense was asked to form
24 an Iraqi survey group, which we did. General Dayton is in
25 charge of it.

1 It was pretty clear to me that the Department of Defense
2 did not have the same level of skill that the intelligence
3 community did and the Central Intelligence Agency, so I sat
4 down with George Tenet, the director of CIA and we discussed
5 the importance, not of running around using helicopters and
6 people on the ground to look for weapons of mass destruction,
7 but the importance of gathering intelligence through
8 interrogations, figuring out who might know what, who could we
9 offer amnesty to, who could we offer a reward to, and go
10 through that process that is quite a different thing than
11 looking under every tree for WMD.

12 And so he assigned a man named David Kay to work with
13 General Dayton and the judgment portion of it is being made by
14 David Kay and his cell back in the United States that is a
15 multi-agency cell, and the actual physically doing of things,
16 looking for people, looking for sites is being done under the
17 authority of General Dayton. General Dayton reports to me.
18 George Tenet and I are as close as you can be on this subject.
19 The people on the ground are as close as you can be on this
20 subject and my impression is that the people that have been
21 put in charge are doing a good job and handling it well.

22 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm sure my
23 colleague Senator Levin would join me -- we met with Mr. Kay.
24 He was part of the team Ambassador Bremer assembled to brief
25 us and seated right there was General Dayton and we got

1 clearly the understanding that the chain of command was as you
2 described and therefore there is clarity in my judgment as to
3 that reporting chain through Bremer and Kay up to you with
4 parallel to the Central Intelligence Agency. Thank you for
5 that.

6 Senator Ben Nelson.

7 Senator Ben Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I know,
8 General, you're never going to get tired of the accolades even
9 though they keep getting heaped on, so I want to certainly add
10 mine to those of my colleagues and to extend my appreciation
11 to the Secretary as well for not only taking our questions
12 today but for sticking with this very important task that's
13 before us, and that is, of course, working with the issue
14 about end strength, with rotation, with deployment, and the
15 obvious questions that we're going to be facing in the future
16 dealing with retention as well as recruitment because that's
17 going to be extremely important to the future of our military.

18 And I think you need to do as you are in the whole area
19 of transformation because obviously the force of tomorrow will
20 only maybe slightly resemble the force of today, so this is
21 all before you and I commend you in advance for your work on
22 this.

23 Regarding the post-war planning, earlier this year I
24 discussed with former Army Secretary White the concerns that I
25 had regarding the number of military police and the number of

1 reservists who had been called up to active duty as a result.
2 And while I recognize that this is a liberating force, there's
3 no question but for a period of time that we'll be looked at
4 and probably serve as an occupying force until stability is
5 established.

6 In Iraq I was told by a group of elected officials in
7 Kirkuk, just recently appointed elected group that they
8 thought that the looting had really undercut the effort toward
9 democracy in certain parts of Iraq and that while folks who
10 had not had any experience with democracy were wondering if
11 this was what democracy was going to be about. They don't
12 have outside experiences, no other experience to call upon and
13 so their first taste of democracy may not have been as sweet
14 as we had hoped, ultimately as sweet as we hope that it will
15 be.

16 What I'm leading up to is, as we look toward other
17 efforts in the world today that we may be called upon to
18 restore peace, to establish democracy, are we thinking about
19 the force that will obviously involve immediately upon the end
20 of combat operations the installation of peacekeeping that
21 consists of law and order military police far more than our
22 own military forces? Are we thinking about that in terms of
23 transformation because it appears that with the lack of
24 staffing that we may have had in that area that it may have
25 gotten away from us in Iraq, but we may be faced with that in

1 the next effort that may be just down the road. Are we
2 building toward that and will that be part of transformation?

3 I guess it's unfair to ask you, General Franks, on the
4 way out, but do you have any thoughts of it, and then of
5 course, Secretary Rumsfeld, I'd love to have your thoughts
6 too.

7 General Franks: Sir, your comment about looting I think
8 is right. Unfortunately, looting actually was a tool used by
9 the regime before we ever undertook this so some of these
10 criminal elements, and I'm not sure what the number is, I
11 think the Secretary mentioned a number earlier in the
12 testimony.

13 Senator Ben Nelson: It's 100,000 I've heard.

14 General Franks: Perhaps 100,000 let out of jail and so
15 the looting by those people as well as other disgruntled
16 people for sure affects the taste that the Iraqis have in
17 their mouths.

18 In terms of expectation, sir, I'm not at all sure that I
19 believe that the planning or execution of the post of the
20 initial 60 days or so, and that's how long we've been looking
21 at this, the initial 60 days or so of post-major combat
22 operations -- it can be characterized as well, you weren't
23 quite with it. Actually, what we'll do I suspect, and the
24 Secretary will comment on this, is as the services think
25 through what the structure needs to be for our Armed Forces

1 over the next 10, 20 years, as part of transformation, I
2 believe that sort of study will be undertaken to decide do we
3 have the balance about right. Are we about right in active
4 component, Reserve component? Are we about right in the
5 numbers of armor troopers, in the numbers of military
6 policemen?

7 So, sir, that's the best that I can do.

8 Senator Ben Nelson: Thank you.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: There's nothing I can add. It
10 clearly is important that as soon as possible at the end of a
11 conflict that you have the ability to assert control over an
12 area. It is also impossible to do. You can not go from a
13 war-fighting circumstance in one minute and have a whole lot
14 of forces decide not to fight you, as they did from Baghdad
15 north and blend into the countryside and think that you have
16 the ability in one hour from a powerful war-fighting force
17 into a stabilization force capable of guarding every hospital,
18 every school, every museum, every suspect weapons site in a
19 country the size of California. You can't do it.

20 Senator Ben Nelson: But is there a period of time that
21 in the planning process you could isolate it down to to say
22 that it's something that you should be aiming for within 2
23 weeks, 7 days, or is there a time frame that you can narrow it
24 down to?

25 Secretary Rumsfeld: Absolutely and they did that.

1 General Franks: Sir, the comment that I would make is
2 that when you plan a war or an operation with a mission that
3 says remove a regime, you recognize that, and in fact the
4 Secretary includes in his statement some half-dozen or so
5 things that can go wrong. Well as a planner what one does is
6 take a look at the things that can go wrong and try to put
7 some scope around how long will this operation take because if
8 we can figure out about how long it's going to take and about
9 what size force in terms of the numbers of tanks and aircraft
10 and so forth we need, then we can figure out how long we have
11 in order to get the sort of force, Senator, that you're
12 mentioning loaded and get it on the ground so that it's
13 Johnny-on-the-spot and ready to do some work.

14 Senator Ben Nelson: That's exactly why I was asking
15 Secretary White if he thought we had the skill sets necessary
16 to be able to -- sufficient staffing and support to move and
17 be able to do that in advance of the occurrence.

18 General Franks: And, sir, actually in this case we
19 couldn't do that. And I make no defensive comment about this.
20 We'll let history reflect whatever it chooses to reflect. But
21 I can tell you that there is a direct trade-off between the
22 size force built and the amount of deception and surprise one
23 achieves. And one more day, one more week, one more hour, one
24 more month to build additional forces which we would all
25 applaud now would have resulted in a totally different war

1 than the one we saw.

2 Senator Ben Nelson: The problem with trying to deal with
3 lessons learned is that there's always an element of criticism
4 that's a part of it. When it's not intentional to be
5 critical, if you're not critical, you don't learn the lesson.

6 General Franks: Sir, I agree with that.

7 Senator Ben Nelson: Thank you very much gentlemen.

8 Chairman Warner: Senator, I indicated to the General
9 that as this committee continues to complete its reports on
10 the operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and by no means
11 in my judgment are either operation at that point where we do
12 an after-action report because action is taking place, the
13 General has offered to return in his civilian capacity to take
14 further questions.

15 Yes, Mr. Secretary?

16 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'm going to have to excuse myself.
17 This has gone considerably longer than I had expected.

18 Chairman Warner: I recognize that and what I would like
19 to ask of you if can provide just a brief few minutes in
20 closed session in S-219 next door, we want to have one or two
21 questions on the WMD program, and then you'll be free to go.
22 We thank you. This has almost been a 4-hour public open
23 discussion of all issues relating to these important
24 deployment of our troops.

25 Thank you very much. I'd like to put in today's record

1 at the end a Washington Post article, April 2, '03 by a former
2 Marine Colonel Gary Anderson. I was hoping to address it.
3 Time doesn't permit.

4 [Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

5 [The information referred to follows:]

6 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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12615
11-L-0559/OSD14302

Aug 1
July 30, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Arabic Speakers

I need the details on the information Charlie Abell gave me on Arabic speakers, as I have requested, separated out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073003-16

.....
Please respond by 8/8/03

According to Charlie Abell,
we have 2800

Active/reserve/retired
arabic speakers. Charlie
+ Fred Smith are working
on seeing how many ~~are~~
are available to go, if
we want to send them.

ACTIVE

11-L-0559/OSD14305

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

ARMY

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
		ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0104	WGNTA0
		ARMY	E6	31U	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	WA98AA
		ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0301	WG4MA0
		ARMY	E4	88M	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0302	WAC4T0
		ARMY	O3	35E	ARABIC	3	5	0	9812	WGKEAA
		ARMY	E6	63A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0109	W1L4AY
		ARMY	E5	75H	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	WDEJC1
		ARMY	O3	56A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0106	W2DH1A
		ARMY	E5	35E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	WHXJT0
		ARMY	E8	91Q	ARABIC	2	2	0	0007	W1HJAA
		ARMY	E6	63H	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	WHGBAA
		ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2	2	0210	WH6XA1
		ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0303	W1ECZL
		ARMY	E6	51M	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106	W4UJ21
		ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	W30U1N
		ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W1ECZE
		ARMY	E7	25Z	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	W3E9AA
		ARMY	E4	91W	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0202	WAJKT0
		ARMY	E6	91K	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	W1HHAA
		ARMY	E6	97B	ARABIC	3	3	4	9709	W1E82B
		ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	9808	W00TAA
		ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0210	WDHJD0
		ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WDLB0
		ARMY	O6	12A	ARABIC	3	2	0	9011	WAT4AA
		ARMY	E4	92Y	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	WFQMA1
		ARMY	E4	92A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302	WBB6AA
		ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0202	WGNTA0
		ARMY	O3	55A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0006	W3VZ05
		ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	WDLB0
		ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0207	WH6XD0

11-E-0559/OSD14306

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0011	WH6XD0
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W00112
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0210	W1ECZE
ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0003	W04QAA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0301	WHQLAA
ARMY	O2	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9801	WAC6B1
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0104	WC8SAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	WBVCT0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2	0	0210	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1	0003	W00101
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205	W1E862
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	1	0206	WDSM05
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	9502	W4B2AA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0010	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0206	WDLB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0208	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0208	WGNTAA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0303	W1E844
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0205	WH6XD0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	W1ECZF
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0109	WGNT99
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0207	WH6XD0
ARMY	O4	35G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0205	W0Z1AA
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0202	WA77B0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303	WBVDC0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111	WH6XD0
ARMY	O4	91D	ARABIC	2	2	0	9907	W2HX30
ARMY	O4	74C	ARABIC	2	2	0	9404	W475AA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0206	W0F807
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0105	WH6XD0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0203	W1ECZE

ARMY 1-E70559/09B44308

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0108	WDAMAA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2	0	9908	WG4KAA
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	W4VN10
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	WBVFT0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0101	W1ECA1
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0207	W1ECZ2
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0110	WGNTA0
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0011	W1E82B
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0105	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0210	WDHUHD
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0210	WNDDAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0202	WH72D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0204	WDLB0
ARMY	W2	352C	ARABIC	5	5	0	0205	WDKEB0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0305	W1E846
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0204	WDHUHD
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0103	WH72D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0109	WGNTA0
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9604	W00TAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0105	W1ECZF
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0211	W1ECZE
ARMY	O5	31A	ARABIC	2	3	0	9509	WJHEAA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0205	W1E844
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0101	WDLB0
ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9510	W4VJAA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0304	W1E846

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	WA77B0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0102	WH6XD0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0204	WH6XA1
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	WDGWB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0102	WSHBU2
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0102	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	3	1	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E7	18D	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9812	W1E0AW
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0204	WDLB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	O3	44A	ARABIC	4	4	0	9807	WBGTB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0103	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0201	WH6XD0
ARMY	O4	35G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0110	W37213
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	9606	W1FBAA
ARMY	O4	42B	ARABIC	2	2	0	9812	W3VS24
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0202	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	W1ECZF
ARMY	W3	351E	ARABIC	3+	4+	0	0107	WH6XA1
ARMY	E7	98C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0008	WBVAAA
ARMY	O5	48H	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	W45WAA
ARMY	E7	18E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	W1E0FW
ARMY	O2	88A	ARABIC	4	4	0	9906	WB0MAA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9607	W00TAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0104	WGNT99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0106	WH72D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	W1ECZE
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106	W1E844
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	WDKEA0
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	3	3	0	9903	W30U2L
ARMY	E3	11B	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	WEZKT0
ARMY	E1-E5	0559/O559	ARABIC	2	3	0	0201	WAM0T0

SSN (b)(6)

Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	9811	WH6XD0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0206	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	WGNTAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WDLLB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0302	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0007	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0302	WGNTAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212	W00111
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0209	WDGWBO
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0208	WGNTAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0206	W00121
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	8708	W4FGAA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0206	W1E801
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0206	WH67AA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0201	W37223
ARMY	E6	79S	ARABIC	2	2	2	9908	W00130
ARMY	O6	48J	ARABIC	3	3	0	8611	W2H6AA
ARMY	O3	56A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	W2MJAA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0108	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0303	WH6YD0
ARMY	O5	47G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	W1FBAA
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	WH6XA0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WDSPAA
ARMY	O3	31A	ARABIC	2+	3+	0	9705	W30F01
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0103	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0304	W0F809
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	3	1	0210	WHQLAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	WDGWBO
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0207	WDSPAA

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

(b)(6)

ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0206	WDAMAA
ARMY	O3	66F	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9011	W2L6AA
ARMY	E5	74B	ARABIC	2	3	0	0210	WATLAA
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	W00122
ARMY	O3	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0201	WALX99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	0303	W1E828
ARMY	E5	92Y	ARABIC	3	2	0	0202	WDEFD0
ARMY	E8	75H	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9012	W0ZUAA
ARMY	E4	92Y	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0206	WBHUA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0007	WH72D0
ARMY	E5	92Y	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	WACEHD
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	WG4MA0
ARMY	O5	14E	ARABIC	3	3	0	9003	W1FB50
ARMY	O2	25A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9707	WDWDAA
ARMY	E7	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	W1E841
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	W1	003A	ARABIC	4+	5	0	0305	W3VS1A
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	W4VYAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0208	WC8SAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0010	WH6XA1
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303	W00121
ARMY	E5	73C	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	WENHA0
ARMY	O6	11A	ARABIC	3	2	0	9708	W6AK03
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0303	W1E862
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0209	W3RB35
ARMY	O4	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0301	W4T1AA
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	W1E806
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0305	W1ECZ1
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0210	WHQLAA

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0206	WDSPAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0204	W1ECZE
ARMY	O4	11A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0203	W1V036
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0203	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	WDAMAA
ARMY	O2	14A	ARABIC	3	3+	0	9908	WAWYE0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0204	WDGWB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0106	WH72A0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0212	W1ECA1
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	4	4+	0	0212	W0VPS1
ARMY	O1	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	E4	97B	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	WH8QAA
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0206	WBVFT0
ARMY	E3	92Y	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	WDFJAA
ARMY	E4	77F	ARABIC	2	2	0	0103	WFAJTO
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0209	WDGWB0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0207	W1E801
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0212	WBVDA0
ARMY	E4	71L	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0207	WAZ3T0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	3	2	0205	WDHUD0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0209	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0104	WGNT99
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0304	W1ECZF
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0206	WBVCB0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	W4W6AA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0211	WHQLAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0301	WDHUHD

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	92R	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0202	WELFAA
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	WH8QY5
ARMY	W4	180A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9203	W1E0AA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	WDGWB0
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	9503	W1V069
ARMY	O5	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	9606	WDFKAA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0109	W1E844
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	0206	W372AA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E2	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0109	W00121
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	9901	WH6XA1
ARMY	E4	68X	ARABIC	2	2	0	0105	WDFJAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111	W1ECZE
ARMY	E5	75B	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0108	W4VN02
ARMY	E4	92Y	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	WANVT0
ARMY	E7	97B	ARABIC	3	3	2	0007	W1ECZE
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0304	W00112
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0212	WDKEA0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	O5	35D	ARABIC	4	4	0	0104	W1V077
ARMY	E7	92G	ARABIC	2	3	0	0110	WH9QT0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0303	W1E846
ARMY	O3	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	9208	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0210	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0303	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0201	WDHUT0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	1-47	0559/OSD	ARABIC	14	2	0	9711	WH1DW1

(b)(6)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0106	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	92R	ARABIC	2	3	0	0301	W1E0C1
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WDLB0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0304	WDGWT0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0211	W1E843
ARMY	O5	39C	ARABIC	2	2	0	9403	W0VP8F
ARMY	E5	92Y	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0304	WG4KAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0305	W1E843
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0302	WDAMAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0302	W1E846
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2	3	2	0212	W1E801
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0109	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0304	WDAMAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0212	W1ECZ2
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0212	W00111
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0101	W37213
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0104	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	97B	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0104	WDKVAA
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112	W0F802
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0109	WDSMAA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0012	W40JAA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E3	98K	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0205	WCL8AA
ARMY	1-E4	0323	ARABIC	15	3	0	0208	WAD8T0

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9908	W4VYAA
ARMY	E5	71L	ARABIC	2	3	0	0109	WHGHAA
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0210	WBVBBO
ARMY	O3	91B	ARABIC	5	5	0	9401	WB29AA
ARMY	O5	48D	ARABIC	3	3	0	9512	W4B2AA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0010	WGNT99
ARMY	O3	56A	ARABIC	5	5	0	9904	WAL8T0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303	W00111
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0105	W00111
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	E6	91E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	W3ZS20
ARMY	W3	351E	ARABIC	2	2	0	9802	WDR5B0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0206	WDLLB0
ARMY	E4	91K	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	W03SAA
ARMY	E4	92G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	WAM3T0
ARMY	E5	97B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0305	WH8QAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	2	0210	W1E841
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0108	WH8QHD
ARMY	O2	11A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0104	WH5AC0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0101	WA77A0
ARMY	O6	18A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9403	W37W1A
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0201	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	92R	ARABIC	2	2	2	0204	WDSPAA
ARMY	E8	18Z	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0102	W3QT1A
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0109	WH72A0
ARMY	O2	12A	ARABIC	3	3+	0	0104	WG2CT0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	0	0201	WH6XD0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	WBVFB0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	W00112

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	3	0111	W0F802
ARMY	O3	35D	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0101	W1E870
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	WBVDC0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0209	WDLB0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	W1E801
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0208	WDLB0
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	2	2	2	0005	WH72D0
ARMY	O3	25A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0305	WA77A0
ARMY	E4	91Q	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0302	W0Q153
ARMY	E4	13B	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	WAXMAA
ARMY	O3	25A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9912	WH05T0
ARMY	E3	13B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	WAM0C0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0105	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0109	WGNT99
ARMY	O5	48C	ARABIC	3	3	0	8304	W1V023
ARMY	O3	11A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9310	WH3MT0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0006	W1E02E
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	O3	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9511	W1E02A
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2+	0700	WH62D0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0210	WBVDA0
ARMY	O3	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9908	W1DXAB
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	WGNTAA
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	3	3	3	0204	WH8KA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205	WA77B0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0108	W00112
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0104	W1V021
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0208	WH62D0

SSN (b)(6) Name (last,first,middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0006	W30U2L
ARMY	O1	35D	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	W1E841
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0110	W30U2W
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	W0F8AA
ARMY	E3	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	W1E843
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	9205	W4FGAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0211	WDLLB0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0212	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0105	W1ECZF
ARMY	W1	003A	ARABIC	4+	4+	0	0010	WAYCT0
ARMY	O3	14A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	W475AA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E3	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1ECA1
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0103	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	W1E844
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0209	WGNTA0
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	W0VPS1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0202	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0206	WH62D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106	WGNTA0
ARMY	O2	11A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9904	WALUB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0304	W1ECZE
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	W1ECA1
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0209	WH62D0
ARMY	W2	351B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	WBVHA0
ARMY	E5	97B	ARABIC	2	3	2	0112	WDKEB0
ARMY	O6	21B	ARABIC	3	3	0	8005	WNAG99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0206	WDLLB0
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0304	WBVDC0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0012	WH67D0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1	0110	W1E806
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	W1E801
ARMY	E4	68Y	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207	WG2WA0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	3	2	0109	W001AA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	W37237
ARMY	E4	042B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108	WGLMT0

SSN Name (last first middle)

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Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E5	13F	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0110	WAL3AA
ARMY	O6	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8005	W09ZAA
ARMY	E4	92A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	WAMFB0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0210	WBVDA0
ARMY	E4	82D	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0207	WFBLLA
ARMY	O6	31A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8806	W3KPAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0109	WGNTT0
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	0202	WBU9AA
ARMY	E6	91A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	WHLRB0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	0208	WH62D0
ARMY	O3	88A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0111	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0202	WH62D0
ARMY	W2	180A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	WH04A0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0208	W00114
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0303	W1EC12
ARMY	O1	35D	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0301	WH9TT0
ARMY	O3	11A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9504	W2L58B
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9508	W6AK14
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0301	WDSPAA
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	W372AA
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0203	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0204	WDL1B0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	WCAEB0
ARMY	O5	49A	ARABIC	2	3	0	8104	W1E1AA
ARMY	W2	350B	ARABIC	4	2+	0	9812	WAY6AA
ARMY	O1	25A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9610	WFGNAA
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0209	WH62D0
ARMY	W2	153D	ARABIC	4+	4	0	9903	WAYPA0
ARMY	E4	91X	ARABIC	3	3	2	0205	W3VZ7Q
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0112	WDAMAA
ARMY	O3	25A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9604	W2N3AA
ARMY	E6	18E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0301	WH1AC0
ARMY	O6	01A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8907	W49Q1X
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0011	WBVDA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0210	WDL1B0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0104	WGNT99
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2+	0006	WH67TD

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0209	W1ECA1
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0301	W1ECZ3
ARMY	W2	153D	ARABIC	4	4	0	9812	WEAEEA
ARMY	E3	98C	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W1ECZL
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9508	W6AK03
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0007	WGNT99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0102	WGNTA0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E8E0
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	8711	W1V021
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0206	WDGWBO
ARMY	E3	91E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	WBHBHD
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0105	WGNT99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WH62D0
ARMY	E8	37F	ARABIC	2+	2	2+	0303	W1E01F
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0204	WBVDA0
ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9310	W4T3AA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0303	W1ECZ1
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0110	WGNT99
ARMY	O5	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9607	W1B6AA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0012	WGNT99
ARMY	E9	00Z	ARABIC	3	3	0	9805	WBU4AA
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0206	WATGAA
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	8005	W0Z2AA
ARMY	O3	15A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0206	WDSPAA
ARMY	E7	98G/O3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	W1ECA1
ARMY	E7	98G/O3	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	W1E8E0

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	92A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	WAGKAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0204	W1ECZL
ARMY	E9	98Z	ARABIC	2	2	0	9807	W1D0AA
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0107	W1E874
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0211	WGNTAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0201	WH6XA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0003	WGNT99
ARMY	E6	73C	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	W2DH1E
ARMY	E8	12Z	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	WAHCT0
ARMY	W2	352G	ARABIC	5	4+	0	0303	W1E8E0
ARMY	O3	14E	ARABIC	5	5	0	9909	WHQCT0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2	2	9605	W00111
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	O6	18A	ARABIC	3	2	0	8403	W4RAAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0204	WA77B0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0206	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	73C	ARABIC	3	3	0	0011	WBGJB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0206	WDGWB0
ARMY	E7	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1	9711	W27P26
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0209	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	W4	351E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0204	WBU7AA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0206	WDGWB0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0105	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0204	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	31R	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	WA4RA0
ARMY	E4	92A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0103	WD4PAA
ARMY	E6	68H	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0006	W0U911
ARMY	O4	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0206	W48902
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0009	W1E844
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9809	W00102

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Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPTS DLPT Date UIC

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ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0203	W49QBD
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	O2	11A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0101	W30U2P
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WBVD0T0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0010	W1E806
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0012	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0202	W1ECZE
ARMY	O4	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0105	W4FGAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9710	W0F809
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0700	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0204	WAY8HD
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	W1E801
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0304	W1ECZL
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0111	WDAMAA
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	WBUZ99
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	W0VPS1
ARMY	O6	47G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	W1FBAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	O6	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0000	W6CTAA
ARMY	O4	67B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	W4D7AA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	3+	0208	W1ECA1
ARMY	O3	00E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0210	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0011	W00YAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0104	WGNT99

SSN Name (last first middle)

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Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0204	WH6XD0
ARMY	O5	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8104	W2H602
ARMY	E7	18D	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0211	WHQNB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	9707	W6AK06
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	WDSM05
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0003	WC8SAA
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0004	W00121
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	W6AK09
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E6	91R	ARABIC	3	3	0	0012	W3U43D
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0012	W4VN05
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0111	WH72D0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	9704	WH6XA1
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0112	WGNT99
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0112	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	WDGW80
ARMY	O4	11A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9907	W4VN10
ARMY	W3	351E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9903	W0F8AA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0305	W1E846
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9807	W4FGAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0204	W00111
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	WBVFT0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9812	W1ECZ4
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0206	W1E801
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207	WH6XD0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0208	W1E806
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0107	WGNTA0

SSN (b)(6)

Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E5	92A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	WB30AA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	0109	WG2DT0
ARMY	O7	15A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8606	W1B6AA
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	WH6XA1
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0202	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0204	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0105	W1E82B
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0210	WBVDA0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1	0109	W1E8E0
ARMY	E5	97B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0301	WHQMD0
ARMY	O5	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	W1ECZ1
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	0206	WBVCT0
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	9505	W6AK03
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	4	3	0	9509	W475AA
ARMY	O3	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9106	W1S505
ARMY	E5	75B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	W2L5JA
ARMY	O6	44A	ARABIC	5	5	0	0207	WBF0AA
ARMY	O4	11A	ARABIC	2	3	0	8804	WAKLT0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2	0	0106	W1E806
ARMY	E5	91S	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	W2P1AA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9906	WGNT99
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0205	W00121
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	9403	W1V061
ARMY	O3	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	W1ECA1
ARMY	E6	75H	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0210	WAZ3T0
ARMY	E5	92Y	ARABIC	2	3	0	0109	WCKSAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0007	WH72D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0209	W00114
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0205	WH8Q9C
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0201	WGNTA0
ARMY	E3	35TE	ARABIC	2	2	0	0206	W1E8E0

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

(b)(6)

ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	3	0211	W1EC12
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0210	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WDLLB0
ARMY	E3	12B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	WAC8C0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0110	WGNT99
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W1E846
ARMY	E8	18Z	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0208	W45VAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0206	WH6XD0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	0111	W30U3D
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	WDSLAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0206	WDGWB0
ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	W1FBAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0003	WGNT99
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0212	WDLLB0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	W00111
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0201	W0F802
ARMY	E5	71L	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	W1VCAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0204	WH6XD0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0206	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0011	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	WBVAFD
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0304	W00112
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0202	WH6XT0
ARMY	1-204339/O	351E	3254	3+	0	9605	WHMRB0	

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2+	0208	W00112
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	O1	14A	ARABIC	4	4	0	0208	WAWYC0
ARMY	O5	11A	ARABIC	3	2	0	8504	W0ND24
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0209	W1E862
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0208	WDLB0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0003	WH72A0
ARMY	O3	11A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0206	W372AA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0302	WH62T0
ARMY	E4	75H	ARABIC	3	2	2	0103	WFL6A4
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0105	W1E844
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0205	W1ECZ2
ARMY	E7	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0211	W00111
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	W0VA3D
ARMY	W2	350L	ARABIC	2	2	0	9703	W1V046
ARMY	E6	97B	ARABIC	2	3	1+	9909	WC9S80
ARMY	W2	352G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0106	WBVDC0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0111	WAY8HD
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0303	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	11B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	W1E02C
ARMY	O5	18A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0301	W1U31B
ARMY	E5	62B	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212	WH09D0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	WBVDC0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0009	W1EC12
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0109	W1ECA1
ARMY	E2	77F	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0305	WE8RA0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0111	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	WH62D0

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	O8	13A	ARABIC	3	3	0	8511	W1VWAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0102	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0211	W00111
ARMY	O3	65A	ARABIC	4	4	0	8803	W2NVAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0302	W00111
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WH67TD
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	WJHDA0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0011	W0F809
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	5	5	0	0205	W1V041
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0305	W1E846
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0110	WH67D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0208	WDLLB0
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0101	WGNTA0
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0302	W0VA3D
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1E846
ARMY	W3	351E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0005	WH8QY5
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0206	WDLLB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0208	WH67T0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E3	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E843
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0202	WC1TA0
ARMY	1-05-0559/OS	3272	ARABIC	2	2	0	9408	WAGNT0
ARMY	1-E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	WGNTA0

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2+	0204	WH62T0
ARMY	E8	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	1	0210	W0F802
ARMY	E2	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0204	WGNTA0
ARMY	O3	65D	ARABIC	2	4	0	9303	WE35C0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	W1ECZD
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	1000	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0109	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0012	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	WH6XT0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0209	W1E871
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0211	WAY8HD
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	W37213
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	W1ECZE
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	0203	WH6XD0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0303	W1ECZE
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0212	W1E8E0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WBVFT0
ARMY	O3	12A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9501	W1DXAB
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0202	WDHUD0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2+	0209	W1E844
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	0012	W1V034
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	W00111
ARMY	W2	352C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	WGNT99
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0305	W1E846
ARMY	E5	97B	ARABIC	3	2	2	0302	WH8QAA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9710	W00TAA
ARMY	O5	18A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9903	W6AK06
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	WH67T0
ARMY	E5	71L	ARABIC	2	2	0	0012	WALXAA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0303	W1ECZL

SSN (b)(6)

Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	3	2	0302	WBU8A1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2	3	2	0211	W1ECZE
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0202	W1E844
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0105	WH67D0
ARMY	E4	75H	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	WHP6AA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302	W37223
ARMY	O4	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0006	W0U309
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0205	W1E801
ARMY	O2	11A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0304	WAM3T0
ARMY	O3	60S	ARABIC	5	5	0	0103	W2DH02
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0201	W00121
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0204	WDHUD0
ARMY	O3	67B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	W2H8AA
ARMY	E5	74B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	WDSTAA
ARMY	O6	13A	ARABIC	4	4	0	8406	W1V006
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0002	WGNTA0

11-L-0559/OSD14329

RESERVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARNG	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9808
ARNG	O1	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9612
ARNG	E7	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9102
ARNG	E7	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0211
ARNG	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9707
ARNG	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9406
ARNG	E7	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0008
ARNG	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9512
ARNG	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0202
USAR	O3	SELRES	13A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9609
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	82C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0010
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	92Y	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0005
USAR	E5	SELRES	71L	ARABIC	5	4+	4+	0112
USAR	E5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0109
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0011
USAR	E5	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	3+	3+	3+	0002
USAR	E1	IRR/ING	31U	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9712
USAR	E5	SELRES	62J	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USAR	O4	IRR/ING	88A	ARABIC	4	4	0	9305
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9803
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9903
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9807
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0209
USAR	O5	SELRES	56A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0000
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9808
USAR	O1	SELRES	ZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0207
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9201
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9808
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9903
USAR	E3	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0208
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0012
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0000
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0006

511-ELAN559/09SD1435

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9803
USAR	O5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9703
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0103
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0009
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	3	3	2	9504
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	9802
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0111
USAR	E4	SELRES	62E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9110
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0201
USAR	O5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0202
USAR	O1	SELRES	00D	ARABIC	3	2	1+	9703
USAR	O2	IRR/ING	21B	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9901
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	9802
USAR	O3	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	9609
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9111
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0006
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9402
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0108
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9802
USAR	O4	IRR/ING	11A	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	9310
USAR	E4	SELRES	37F	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9711
USAR	O2	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	9706
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9903
USAR	O5	SELRES	88D	ARABIC	4+	4+	0	9507
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	25A	ARABIC	2	3	0	9704
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0009
USAR	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0102
USAR	E1	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9908
USAR	E4	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0107
USAR	E1	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9802
USAR	E4	SELRES	97B	ARABIC	2	2	2	9903
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0003
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0205
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9805
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0108
USAR	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	9901

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	E5	STAND-BY	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9907
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	9802
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9907
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	9808
USAR	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0106
USAR	O1	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	2	2+	1	9910
USAR	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	9712
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9810
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0012
USAR	E6	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0302
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0104
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212
USAR	O5	SELRES	13A	ARABIC	2	3	0	9603
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	9802
USAR	E5	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0211
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0104
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USAR	O4	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0101
USAR	E4	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211
USAR	E4	SELRES	62H	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0205
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9803
USAR	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	9411
USAR	E4	SELRES	91W	ARABIC	3	3	0	0107
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	0006
USAR	E7	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9605
USAR	E4	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	9808
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9906
USAR	W2	SELRES	352C	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212
USAR	E4	SELRES	37F	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0302
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	31C	ARABIC	2	3	1+	9707
USAR	O2	SELRES	00D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108
USAR	O2	IRR/ING	38A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9305

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SSN (b)(6)

Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	E6	SELRES	96B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USAR	E4	SELRES	37F	ARABIC	2	2	2	0111
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0009
USAR	O3	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9904
USAR	E5	SELRES	97B	ARABIC	2	2	1	9805
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9802
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0003
USAR	E6	IRR/ING	11B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0101
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106
USAR	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0112
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303
USAR	O4	SELRES	72B	ARABIC	5	5	0	9407
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	73C	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0004
USAR	O4	IRR/ING	35G	ARABIC	2	3	2	9510
USAR	O4	IRR/ING	13A	ARABIC	2	3	0	9602
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0106
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9803
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9805
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1	9807
USAR	E7	SELRES	98C	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9105
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	63A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9904
USAR	E6	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	0107
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	3	0102
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0008
USAR	E5	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0012
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0007
USAR	O3	SELRES	13A	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0305

91-L-0559/OSD14337

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS

Language

DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

(b)(6)

USAR	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0206
USAR	O2	IRR/ING	13A	ARABIC	3+	2	0	9712
USAR	O3	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207
USAR	E3	SELRES	09R	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9908
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0105
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9812
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9903
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0103
USAR	E5	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9805
USAR	E3	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0305
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	88M	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9604
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	54B	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0006
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	2	2	1	9811
USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9710
USAR	E5	SELRES	44B	ARABIC	3	2	0	8107
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	9803
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	9606
USAR	W2	SELRES	881A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9511
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	91K	ARABIC	2	2	2	0009
USAR	E1	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0003
USAR	O3	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	9503
USAR	E5	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	9810
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	9909
USAR	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0105
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0203
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9805
USAR	E4	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2	4	9910
USAR	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9807
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9806
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9207
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0109
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	12B	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0108

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SSN (b)(6)

Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	O1	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0209
USAR	O3	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0305
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0010
USAR	E6	SELRES	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0108
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USAR	O4	SELRES	67C	ARABIC	2	4	0	9204
USAR	O5	SELRES	55A	ARABIC	2+	2	2+	9507
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0012
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0105
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0112
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0112
USAR	E6	SELRES	79V	ARABIC	2	3	0	9305
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	11B	ARABIC	3	3	2	0105
USAR	E1	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9908
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9902
USAR	E6	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0103
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0105
USAR	E6	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9602
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807
USAR	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0301
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206
USAR	E6	SELRES	79R	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9710
USAR	E4	SELRES	98X	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0005
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9907
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0201
USAR	O4	IRR/ING	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9606
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0108
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9908
USAR	O1	IRR/ING	ZZZ	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9907
USAR	E5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0012
USAR	W2	SELRES	352G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0205
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9903

14-L-0359/OSD14336

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS

Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

(b)(6)

USAR	E5	IRR/ING	92A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0008
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	92Y	ARABIC	2	2	0	0006
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9811
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9805
USAR	E4	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	3	1+	9803
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	18A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9911
USAR	O1	SELRES	00D	ARABIC	3	3	2	0210
USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	9805
USAR	E6	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0009
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9805
USAR	E4	SELRES	37F	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0305
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9812
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9607
USAR	E4	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0211
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0010
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0211
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	3	3	2	9705
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1	9806
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807
USAR	E3	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9806
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0104
USAR	E8	SELRES	96B	ARABIC	2	2	2	0005
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0009
USAR	E6	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	9904
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0010
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	71L	ARABIC	3	3	0	0104
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0102
USAR	E5	SELRES	98X	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0002
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	2	2	2	9711
USAR	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0211
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9708

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0103
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9809
USAR	E6	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	9907
USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0109
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0011
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0110
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0010
USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9812
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	11B	ARABIC	2	2	0	9406
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0012
USAR	E3	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9810
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	9902
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9706
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	9903
USAR	E5	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0303
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0003
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0103
USAR	E4	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	9809
USAR	E7	SELRES	27D	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9404
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9810
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	9805
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	9812
USAR	O3	SELRES	ZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	0	0202

11-L-0559/OSD14338

RETIRED

11-L-0559/OSD14339

**Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months**

(b)(6)		(b)(6)	
Serv	Grade PMOS	Language	DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S Retirement date
USA	E07 91K4O	ARABIC	2+ 3 0 20010501
USA	E07 54B4H	ARABIC	2 2+ 0 20020901
USA	E07 98G4H	ARABIC	2 2+ 0 20010901
USA	E07 98G4L	ARABIC	2+ 2 1+ 20010901
USA	O06 18A3H	ARABIC	2 2 0 20010601
USA	E08 98Z5P	ARABIC	2 2 2 20021001
USA	O06 48G	ARABIC	3 3 0 20021001
USA	E03 67T1O	ARABIC	2 3 0 20021210
USA	O05 11A3A	ARABIC	2 2 0 20010701
USA	O05 11A5P	ARABIC	2 2+ 0 20020101
USA	E06 98G3L	ARABIC	2+ 2 1+ 20020701
USA	E04 98G1O	ARABIC	2 2 1+ 20011031
USA	E07 98G4L	ARABIC	2 2 1+ 20010301
USA	W02 352G0	ARABIC	2 2+ 0 20010331
USA	O04 56A	ARABIC	3 3 0 20010701
USA	E07 98G4H	ARABIC	2+ 2 0 20010801
USA	O04 42B5P	ARABIC	3 2+ 0 20010601
USA	E07 97E4H	ARABIC	3 2+ 1+ 20011001
USA	E08 98Z5M	ARABIC	2 2+ 2+ 20030101
USA	W02 351E09	ARABIC	2+ 2+ 0 20020601
USA	E08 73Z5L	ARABIC	2 2 0 20020401
USA	W03 920A0	ARABIC	3 3 0 20011101
USA	E08 98Z5LC	ARABIC	2 2+ 0 20021001
USA	E04 97E1P	ARABIC	3 3 2 20010601
USA	E05 45E2O	ARABIC	2 2+ 2 20030124

TAB

D

ACTIVE

11-L-0559/OSD14342

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

USAF

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
(b)(6)		USAF	O3	14N3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFDCT
		USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0206	FF3N2
		USAF	E5	2T354	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	FFDZV
		USAF	E4	2T352B	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0209	FFCVD
		USAF	O4	44M3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	FFNJG
		USAF	E6	2R071	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFPHB
		USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	FF9TZ
		USAF	E5	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0008	FFNK6
		USAF	E5	1A851E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FF2TC
		USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	FFNK6
		USAF	E4	2S051	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0110	FFCS6
		USAF	E5	4Y051	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	FFNJ6
		USAF	O2	62E3E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FF4DS
		USAF	E7	2T271	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	FFJP5
		USAF	O2	36P1	ARABIC	3	3	3	0212	FFRM7
		USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	2	0	0201	FFGGP
		USAF	O2	33S3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFJ0J
		USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FFB45
		USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0212	FFH50
		USAF	E5	K1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0110	FFX1H
		USAF	O5	C14N3	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9110	FFFF9
		USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0210	FFNK6
		USAF	O4	43P3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFB8W
		USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212	FFH50
		USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FF42X
		USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FF1KR
		USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFH50
		USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0302	FFB45
		USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0212	FFR7T
		USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	FFNK6
		USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
		USAF	E7	8D000	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	FFB49
		USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFNK6
		USAF	E5	3C051	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0301	FFFQJ
		USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0009	FFB45
USAF 111-0555	OSD/P4343					3	3	0	0210	FF3N2

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	Q1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0301	FFK3V
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	O1	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFFFK
USAF	O5	T44D3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFM8W
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107	FFL28
USAF	E5	T1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0208	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N355D	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFHGC
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302	FFH50
USAF	O4	14N4	ARABIC	2	2	0	0005	FFNP1
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	3	2	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0206	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207	FFFGX
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E5	1A851E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFX1H
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E6	1N373L	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	O4	C14N3	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0211	FF4FW
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1A831E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	FFX1F
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	FFNK6
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	FFHK3
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFFJJ
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106	FFX1H
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0212	FFNK6

11E1-033570SD14344

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0111	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0211	FFH50
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A811E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108	FFFJJ
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0208	FF88G
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	FFHGC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2	0	0212	FFLLB
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FF13K
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9912	FFB69
USAF	O1	14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FF6VD
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFB45
USAF	O3	14N3	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0110	FF8HW
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FF13K
USAF	E3	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFB45
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFHZP
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FFB45
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E5	Q1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FFX1H
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112	FFLLB
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	2	2	0	0007	FFKLJ
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0109	FFFJJ
USAF	O3	33S3	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0211	FF5V1
USAF	O1	43E3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFNGL
USAF	E4	3P051	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0001	FFBHG
USAF	E1	1N335A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0008	FFFGX
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0012	FF13K
USAF	O4	16F3F	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFLN7
USAF	O5	M44D3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFF6V
USAF	E6	2T370	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	FFNJV
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFNK6

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FF5V1
USAF	E5	1N375P	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FF3N2
USAF	E3	1A831E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0210	FFX1F
USAF	E7	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFHGC
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFK3V
USAF	O3	41A4	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	FFC7R
USAF	E4	1A811E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0112	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFX1F
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0207	FFR7T
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFQGB
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	FFPQH
USAF	E5	7S071	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFKD5
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFX1F
USAF	E4	1N355D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E6	3M071	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0210	FFRXK
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0112	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	6001	FFFJJ
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FFK3V
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0109	FFRM7
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0110	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFRM7
USAF	O4	45S3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	FFR56
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	FFH50
USAF	E7	3M071	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFBSD
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	3	0	0209	FFX1F
USAF	E5	K1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFX1H
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0203	FF88G
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0212	FFB45
USAF	O3	62E3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFB73
USAF	E5	1N355D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFFJJ

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SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

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USAF	E5	1A831E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0206	FFX1H
USAF	O2	T14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	FF8M6
USAF	E7	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0211	FFK3V
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304	FFH50
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9904	FFX1F
USAF	E3	3C031	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0204	FFKG7
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFFJJ
USAF	E7	1A871E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	FF88G
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	O3	T14N3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFPP5
USAF	E6	3E571	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0207	FFNSJ
USAF	E3	2S051	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0201	FFP35
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FF88G
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0206	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	1	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	FFH50
USAF	E4	2A353A	ARABIC	3	2	0	0212	FFG5V
USAF	E4	2S051	ARABIC	2	3	0	0304	FFDYK
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E5	2R031	ARABIC	2	2	0	0011	FFG0G
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	2	2	0	0011	FFF7H
USAF	E4	1A831E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0209	FFB45
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204	FFR1C
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	FF88G

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0301	FFR7T
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0205	FFB45
USAF	O2	T14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	9809	FF8M6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FFRM7
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302	FFH50
USAF	E4	2T354	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0302	FFDYC
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E6	3E571	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFD3W
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFX1F
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FF3N2
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0210	FFRM7
USAF	O6	M44D3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	FF018
USAF	E6	1A171	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFCW3
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0209	FFZ7G
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E4	2T051	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFDZ2
USAF	E7	3S071	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFLC8
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	FFPQW
USAF	O5	K11F3B	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0012	FFM4H
USAF	E5	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFX1H
USAF	E5	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0208	FF88G
USAF	E6	1N373M	ARABIC	2	3	0	0206	FF3N2
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	3	0	0212	FFR18
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207	FFNK6

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SSN
(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	O3	41A4	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	FFHC3
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0201	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375H	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFL31
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0302	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	3M051	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FFZL3
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFHGC
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	FFX1F
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0210	FF88G
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0303	FFH0H
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FF88G
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0112	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0208	FFX1F
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0011	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FF13K
USAF	E8	1A891	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFK3V
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106	FFBJL
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0105	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFC00
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0205	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFZ7G
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	FFNK6

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Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375D	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301	FFH0Y
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0304	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0107	FF3N2
USAF	E2	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106	FFNK6
USAF	O2	21A1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFG69
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFR18
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0103	FFFJJ
USAF	O5	14N4	ARABIC	3	3	2	9205	FFNP1
USAF	E4	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0203	FFX1F
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FF13K
USAF	O3	46N3	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9910	FFNJG
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	4P051	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFNK5
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFX1F
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E6	8D000	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFB8J
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFB45
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	8M000	ARABIC	2	2	0	9005	FF7HB
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304	FFL6N
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFLLB
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0208	FFX1F
USAF	O3	14N3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	FFCJT
USAF	O1	43E1A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0301	FFNFC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	FFH50
USAF	E3	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	FFX1F
USAF	12-L-0359/OSD 14350			3	3	0	0301	FFCNF

SSN (b)(6)

Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFH5J
USAF	E4	1N332A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	FFH50
USAF	E5	1A851E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	FFK4K
USAF	E4	4T051	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0301	FFNLC
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0305	FFG40
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E1	1N315A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0110	FFC99
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212	FFLLB
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	FFS0Q
USAF	O2	14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFQF1
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFFGX
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0212	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	FF13K
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0110	FFFJJ
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0012	FFX1H
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FF88G
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	FFLLB
USAF	E7	T1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0206	FFRM7
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301	FFNK6
USAF	O3	11S3G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0206	FFG1T
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E8	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	FFHGC
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	FFNK6
USAF	O3	14N3	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212	FFBCM
USAF	O4	C71S3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9411	FFX9J
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFH50
USAF	1P1-L-03357/OSD14351	1P1-L-03357/OSD14351	1P1-L-03357/OSD14351	2+	2+	0	0304	FFQGQ

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FF88G
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	FF3N2
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	FFF27
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFX1F
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N373A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFRM7
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	Q1A871	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFGZ6
USAF	E7	7S071	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFJ6J
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFRM7
USAF	E6	1N373M	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0304	FFX1F
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	FFNK6

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RESERVE

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Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ANG	E5	SELRES	2S031	ARABIC	5	5	5	0106
ANG	E4	SELRES	3S051	ARABIC	2	2	2	0208
ANG	E6	SELRES	3M071	ARABIC	2	3	0	9608
ANG	E5	SELRES	2W151	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110
ANG	O4	SELRES	T11F3H	ARABIC	3	3	3	0305
ANG	O1	SELRES	ZZZZZZZZ	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612
ANG	E4	SELRES	2A654	ARABIC	4	4	4	9709
ANG	E8	SELRES	2T291	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
ANG	E9	SELRES	2A300	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
ANG	O5	SELRES	44G3	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0112
ANG	E6	SELRES	1A871E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212
ANG	E6	SELRES	2T370	ARABIC	4	4	4	9701
ANG	E6	SELRES	1N071	ARABIC	2	2	1	8702
ANG	E6	SELRES	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	9611
ANG	E6	SELRES	4R071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9710
ANG	O3	SELRES	33S1	ARABIC	2	2	2	9612
ANG	O4	SELRES	52R1	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
ANG	E8	SELRES	1A891	ARABIC	2+	2	0	8903
ANG	O4	SELRES	W11F3F	ARABIC	4	4	4	9610
ANG	O3	SELRES	C36P3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9606
ANG	E6	SELRES	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9312
ANG	E7	SELRES	4A071	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
ANG	E5	SELRES	2E051	ARABIC	5	5	5	0001
ANG	E5	SELRES	1A851E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202
USAFR	E7	STAND-BY	2A553B	ARABIC	3	3	0	9711
USAFR	E5	SELRES	4P051	ARABIC	4	4	4	0302
USAFR	O4	SELRES	32E3G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108
USAFR	O6	SELRES	43E3A	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2R051	ARABIC	3	3	3	9712
USAFR	E4	SELRES	3P051	ARABIC	4	4	4	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	3M051	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	1P	LS0559/O	SD14354	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305

SSN (b)(6)

Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAFR	E9	SELRES	1N200	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9711
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0007
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	4P051	ARABIC	4	4	4	9708
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	52R3	ARABIC	3	3	0	9411
USAFR	O4	SELRES	14N3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2A754	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	K1A851E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	3C331	ARABIC	4	4	4	0209
USAFR	E3	IRR/ING	2S051	ARABIC	3	3	3	9711
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0112
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	14N3	ARABIC	4	4	4	9610
USAFR	E7	SELRES	2A571	ARABIC	2	2	2	9612
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0008
USAFR	E6	SELRES	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	2+	9108
USAFR	O1	SELRES	12A3C	ARABIC	5	5	5	0104
USAFR	O2	SELRES	51J3	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	95A0	ARABIC	4	4	4	9610
USAFR	E6	SELRES	2A671A	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112
USAFR	O4	STAND-BY	M44F3	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	E7	IRR/ING	7S071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E6	SELRES	3P071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0210
USAFR	E7	SELRES	3S091	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9203
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0112
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9911
USAFR	E6	SELRES	2T271	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2S051	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9812
USAFR	E4	SELRES	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0009
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0102
USAFR	E4	SELRES	X4N051	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	62E3H	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108
USAFR	E5	SELRES	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0012
USAFR	O4	SELRES	35P4	ARABIC	3	3	3	0210
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	43E3A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0010
USAFR	O5	SELRES	16F4	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	K1A851E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112
USAFR	E5	SELRES	2T271	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0111
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	63A1	ARABIC	4	4	4	9611
USAFR	1E4	1N355A	14355A	ARABIC	5	5	5	9705

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	14N1	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204
USAFR	O5	SELRES	11G4	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	K1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	2W051	ARABIC	2	2	0	9910
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0205
USAFR	E5	SELRES	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	47G3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	T11K3C	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E6	SELRES	3P071	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E9	SELRES	1A891	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0112
USAFR	O2	SELRES	14N1	ARABIC	2	3	0	9508
USAFR	O4	SELRES	20C0	ARABIC	5	5	5	9611
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	3E551	ARABIC	5	5	5	0202
USAFR	E7	SELRES	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209
USAFR	E5	SELRES	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9908
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	3E031	ARABIC	3	3	3	0001
USAFR	E5	SELRES	3P071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E8	SELRES	1N091	ARABIC	4	4	4	9611
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211
USAFR	E6	SELRES	1A271	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612
USAFR	O6	SELRES	32E4	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202
USAFR	O3	SELRES	44M3	ARABIC	5	5	5	0010
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9511
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9910
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0110
USAFR	O4	STAND-BY	14N3	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9308
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9809
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212
USAFR	E7	SELRES	4N071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	O5	SELRES	64P3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9612
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0109
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9901
USAFR	O1	SELRES	43T3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9307
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2F051	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0009
USAFR	O4	SELRES	E14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	8003
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	4T051	ARABIC	4	4	4	9802
USAFR	O6	SELRES	M45B3	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612
USAFR	E5	SELRES	2A513A	ARABIC	5	5	5	9705
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205

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SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAFR	O4	SELRES	21R4	ARABIC	3	3	3	0010
USAFR	E4	SELRES	3E052	ARABIC	4	4	4	9709
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	T64P3	ARABIC	2	2	0	9005
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	21A3	ARABIC	2	2	0	9708
USAFR	E3	SELRES	4A011	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303
USAFR	E7	SELRES	2A671A	ARABIC	5	5	5	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1A851E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304
USAFR	E7	SELRES	2A571	ARABIC	5	5	5	9707
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0012
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	9A000	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0010
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207
USAFR	E6	SELRES	7S071	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
USAFR	O3	SELRES	14N3	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9412
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207
USAFR	E7	SELRES	J1W071A	ARABIC	5	5	5	0208
USAFR	O6	SELRES	33S4	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	48G3	ARABIC	3	3	0	9712
USAFR	O4	SELRES	71S3	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	9504
USAFR	E8	SELRES	1N011	ARABIC	4	4	4	9611
USAFR	E3	IRR/ING	1N315A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9909
USAFR	E5	SELRES	2S071	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0111
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	62E3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9205
USAFR	E5	SELRES	1N151	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2	0	0109
USAFR	E9	SELRES	2A600	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0203
USAFR	O3	SELRES	14N4	ARABIC	4	4	4	0204
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2A353A	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9908
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0211
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0110
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	K1A871E	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0208
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	14N3	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E6	SELRES	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9912
USAFR	O4	SELRES	46S3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	O4	SELRES	T14N3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2A553A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0008
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1T151	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0007
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0109

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SSN (b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	2E071	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0110
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9909
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1A851E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0111
USAFR	O4	SELRES	14N3	ARABIC	3	3	3	0303
USAFR	E5	STAND-BY	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0106
USAFR	E7	SELRES	ZZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
USAFR	O6	SELRES	11A3M	ARABIC	5	5	5	0304
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	4E051	ARABIC	2	2	2	9705

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RETIRED

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Last name	First name	Middle name	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	Retirement date
(b)(6)	USAF	O04	14N3	(b)(6)			ARABIC	2	2	0	20020601
	USAF	O04	81T0				ARABIC	2	2	0	20011001
	USAF	E07	1N375A				ARABIC	2	2	0	20021101
	USAF	E07	1N375A				ARABIC	3	3	0	20030301
	USAF	E06	1N373A				ARABIC	3	3	0	20011201
	USAF	E07	X1N375A				ARABIC	2	2	0	20010601
	USAF	E07	X1N375A				ARABIC	2	2+	0	20010501
	USAF	E07	X1N375A				ARABIC	2	2	0	20010901
	USAF	E09	X1N390				ARABIC	3	3	0	20010601
	USAF	O06	44A3				ARABIC	3	3	0	20010401
	USAF	E07	1N375A				ARABIC	3	3	0	20030201
	USAF	E05	1A871E				ARABIC	2	2	0	20030318
	USAF	E06	1N375A				ARABIC	2	2	0	20010901
	USAF	E07	1N375A				ARABIC	3	3	0	20020401

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TAB

E

ACTIVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

USN

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	JIC
		NAVY	E3	AN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0009	N20550
		NAVY	E2	GSM	ARABIC	5	5	5	0203	N21949
		NAVY	E5	YN	ARABIC	3	3	3	9712	N46865
		NAVY	E3	IS	ARABIC	5	5	5	0210	N43494
		NAVY	O4	2300	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0304	N00029
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0103	N41247
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	N41247
		NAVY	E5	EM 4671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0203	N20635
		NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	1	0202	N31188
		NAVY	E3	AN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0009	N09943
		NAVY	E5	AM 8805	ARABIC	5	5	5	9708	N09303
		NAVY	E4	DK 2905	ARABIC	5	5	5	0004	N21979
		NAVY	O3	1115	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N22178
		NAVY	E4	EM	ARABIC	4	4	4	0112	N05832
		NAVY	E4	AM	ARABIC	5	5	5	0006	N09122
		NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0302	N65804
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0109	N39901
		NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	9907	N30570
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106	N41247
		NAVY	E7	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204	N41247
		NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	N31050
		NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	N63987
		NAVY	E7	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0212	N47002
		NAVY	E2	AD 8201	ARABIC	3	3	3	0110	N65554
		NAVY	E1	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	N39901
		NAVY	E5	EM 4671	ARABIC	2	3	0	0201	N46130
		NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N63987
		NAVY	E4	AD 6419	ARABIC	3	2	0	0105	N44326
		NAVY	E6	SK 8012	ARABIC	4	4	0	9904	N09718
		NAVY	E5	GSM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9812	N21450
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1	0209	N39901
		NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	N63987

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SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	N30500
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9707	N30921
NAVY	O3	1615	ARABIC	2	3	0	9604	N31405
NAVY	E5	CTI9204	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	N31050
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0304	N31050
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0109	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	N31050
NAVY	E2	SA	ARABIC	3	3	3	0206	N21560
NAVY	E5	MA	ARABIC	5	5	5	9602	N46262
NAVY	E3	HN 8404	ARABIC	4+	4+	5	0201	N30496
NAVY	E3	SN 9750	ARABIC	5	5	5	0304	N30646
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106	N63987
NAVY	O2	1135	ARABIC	2	2	2	0112	N08973
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0212	N30500
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0105	N48035
NAVY	E7	CTI9204	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9408	N64355
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	N31050
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0305	N31050
NAVY	O5	1630	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9511	N65792
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0106	N41247
NAVY	E5	YN	ARABIC	2	2	2	0110	N63217
NAVY	O1	1645	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	N32842
NAVY	O3	1635	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9504	N47855
NAVY	E5	CTI9204	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	N63987
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0206	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0111	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	N65804
NAVY	E5	CTI8295	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	N63987
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0004	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	N65804
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9909	N41276
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0201	N62443

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Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPTR DLPTS DLPT Date UIC

NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0302	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0207	N3480B
NAVY	O5	1310	ARABIC	3	3	0	8104	N00011
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	N32842
NAVY	O6	1630	ARABIC	2	2	2	0000	N49554
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0105	N65804
NAVY	E3	HN 8404	ARABIC	3	3	0	0107	N40211
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0207	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	2	0205	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	3	0	0202	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	3	0	0103	N46462
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	N63987
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	N41246
NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0206	N32842
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9810	N30922
NAVY	O4	1610	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9702	N47784
NAVY	E5	AD 6418	ARABIC	5	5	5	9812	N09623
NAVY	E4	SK	ARABIC	3	3	3	0110	N21949
NAVY	O2	2305	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	N00183
NAVY	E2	AA	ARABIC	3	3	3	0209	N07195
NAVY	O2	1635	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9812	N39906
NAVY	E4	EN	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	N65918
NAVY	E6	SK 8012	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	N30929
NAVY	E3	FN	ARABIC	3	3	3	0211	N21660
NAVY	E3	HN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0002	N30639
NAVY	E3	FN	ARABIC	2	3	0	0302	N21946
NAVY	E3	FT 1327	ARABIC	4+	4+	4+	9908	N45235
NAVY	E4	AE	ARABIC	5	5	5	0104	N09527
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0210	N39901
NAVY	E3	FN 9760	ARABIC	5	5	5	0204	N21297
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9410	N63987
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	N48002
NAVY	E5	DC	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	N05848
NAVY	E3	BN 9909	ARABIC	5	5	5	0210	N68326

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NAVY	E5	AE 7137	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	N31050
NAVY	O3	1630	ARABIC	4	4	0	0107	N49325
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	N65804
NAVY	E5	SK	ARABIC	5	5	5	9909	N21639
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	N31186
NAVY	O3	1635	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9503	N31405
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	N32842
NAVY	O2	3105	ARABIC	2	2	2	9210	N30449
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0110	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N32842
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9702	N63987
NAVY	E3	SN 9730	ARABIC	5	5	5	0208	N01024
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	N41247
NAVY	E5	AE 8303	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	N52959
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212	N41247
NAVY	E7	CTI8295	ARABIC	2	2	0	0002	N32842
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0006	N45492
NAVY	W2	7441	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205	N44599
NAVY	E3	SK	ARABIC	5	5	5	0204	N53827
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	N39900
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	9509	N31188
NAVY	E2	MM	ARABIC	3	3	3	0209	N20120
NAVY	W3	7151	ARABIC	2	2	2	0112	N39966
NAVY	E6	MS 3538	ARABIC	5	5	5	8811	N07172
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0304	N31050
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N63987
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0302	N65804
NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	N63987
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0108	N41725
NAVY	O1	1645	ARABIC	3	3	0	0202	N41246
NAVY	E4	1659/OS	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	N63987

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NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0303	N65804
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9907	N39899
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0212	N41247
NAVY	E3	DN	ARABIC	3	3	3	9905	N68326
NAVY	O5	1110	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9202	N00011
NAVY	E4	AD	ARABIC	5	5	0	0212	N55600
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0302	N65804
NAVY	O3	1135	ARABIC	2+	2	2	9606	N39592
NAVY	E7	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0003	N64355
NAVY	E3	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	N39900
NAVY	E4	HM 8404	ARABIC	3+	3+	3+	9907	N68096
NAVY	E3	AE	ARABIC	3	3	0	0005	N21853
NAVY	E3	EA	ARABIC	5	5	5	9908	N55101
NAVY	E4	SK	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	N00062
NAVY	E3	SN	ARABIC	2	3	0	0209	N33014
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0203	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0304	N31050
NAVY	E6	EM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9401	N44884
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0203	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212	N31050
NAVY	E4	MS	ARABIC	5	5	5	0008	N09604
NAVY	E3	EM	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0304	N42043
NAVY	E4	AD 8806	ARABIC	5	5	4	0001	N09467
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	N63987
NAVY	O4	2300	ARABIC	3	3	3	0000	N48462
NAVY	O3	1110	ARABIC	3	2	0	8910	N21346
NAVY	E4	GSM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9908	N20836
NAVY	E4	EN	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205	N20603
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	N63987
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0205	N41247
NAVY	E6	HT 7353	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0004	N47898
NAVY	E9	CMD9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	7606	N09372
NAVY	E11	CMD9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0205	N32842

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NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212	N65804
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	2	0201	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9406	N31932
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0105	N39901
NAVY	O3	1615	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9212	N48035
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0207	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0110	N63987
NAVY	E5	PN	ARABIC	3	3	3	9906	N09353
NAVY	O5	1310	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	9505	N00161
NAVY	O5	1440	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N35366
NAVY	O4	5100	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N60169
NAVY	E3	GSE	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	N22996
NAVY	E4	AE 8819	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0204	N09630
NAVY	E3	FN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0109	N21879
NAVY	E1	AR	ARABIC	3	3	3	0305	N30646
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0302	N65804
NAVY	E3	HN 8506	ARABIC	5	5	5	9812	N00183
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9902	N41247
NAVY	O3	2100	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9410	N48456
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	N31050
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0206	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI8296	ARABIC	3	3	0	0107	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0208	N41247
NAVY	O6	1610	ARABIC	3	3	2	0000	N65487
NAVY	E4	MM	ARABIC	2	2	0	0105	N39088
NAVY	E5	CTI8201	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	N32842
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107	N41247
NAVY	E3	FN 9760	ARABIC	3+	3	0+	0211	N03367
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111	N39901
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0107	N39900
NAVY	E4	HM 8494	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0205	N31050

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Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	N41247
NAVY	E4	GSE	ARABIC	5	5	5	9808	N22996
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	N47757
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207	N32842
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0110	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305	N65804
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207	N39900
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0212	N65804
NAVY	E3	FN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0305	N30646
NAVY	O3	1135	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	N08943
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0303	N31050
NAVY	E7	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	N63415
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	3	0	0108	N41247
NAVY	O5	1610	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0000	N41725
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0108	N63987
NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	0	9908	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N41247
NAVY	E5	EN 4382	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0111	N31050
NAVY	E6	CTI9204	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0207	N32842
NAVY	E4	MM	ARABIC	3	3	3	0112	N30896
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1	9705	N41247
NAVY	E4	SK	ARABIC	4	4	4	9910	N09223
NAVY	E2	FA	ARABIC	5	5	5	0203	N22999
NAVY	E4	MS 3527	ARABIC	5	5	5	0007	N21533
NAVY	E3	SN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0011	N21979
NAVY	E3	SK	ARABIC	4+	4+	4+	0301	N30128
NAVY	E5	CTO9302	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9509	N3028A
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0204	N32842
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204	N41247
NAVY	E4	EN 4313	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610	N62813

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Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
NAVY	O4	1610	ARABIC	5	5	0	0110	N46828
NAVY	E6	CTI9204	ARABIC	3	3	0	0102	N63987
NAVY	E6	DT 8732	ARABIC	3	3	0	9807	N62753
NAVY	E3	MS	ARABIC	5	5	5	0102	N21451
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2+	3	2+	9409	N48002
NAVY	E1	AR	ARABIC	3	3	3	0000	N30646
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0206	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	2+	0203	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	N3480B
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	3	1+	9810	N41247
NAVY	E4	YN	ARABIC	5	5	5	9806	N46875
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0111	N41247
NAVY	O5	1320	ARABIC	2	2	1	0000	N69235
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0009	N31050
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	0	9903	N48002
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0106	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0112	N63987
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	N41247
NAVY	E5	HM 8446	ARABIC	5	5	5	9201	N00259
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	3	2+	9409	N39900
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9608	N63987
NAVY	E8	CTI8296	ARABIC	3	2	2	9703	N41246
NAVY	O5	1630	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9409	N4171A
NAVY	O2	1175	ARABIC	3+	3+	4	9611	N30896
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0209	N41247
NAVY	E8	IS 3912	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9205	N31086
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	4	4	2	9511	N41247
NAVY	O5	1630	ARABIC	2	2	1	9702	N44860
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0211	N30669
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303	N31050
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0208	N63987
NAVY	E3	AN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0109	N63922
NAVY	E4	HM 8404	ARABIC	5	5	5	9703	N31948
NAVY	O3	3105	ARABIC	3	3	0	9809	N57007
NAVY	E5	EN	ARABIC	5	5	5	9804	N30811
NAVY	E4	HM 8404	ARABIC	2	2	2	0111	N62995

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
NAVY	E5	HM 8479	ARABIC	5	5	5	9012	N46897
NAVY	E3	SN 9700	ARABIC	3	3	3	0210	N20574
NAVY	E7	CTI8296	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0212	N64355
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	3	0	0212	N39901
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207	N3480B
NAVY	E5	EN	ARABIC	5	5	5	9710	N66588
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0106	N63987
NAVY	O1	1645	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9909	N46828
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	N63987
NAVY	E1	SR	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N30646
NAVY	E5	CTI9208	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212	N66756
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	0	9705	N31743
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	N31050
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0305	N31050
NAVY	W3	7151	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807	N68869
NAVY	O3	1320	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N09665
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9905	N31186
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0202	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9204	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0206	N46462
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2	0	0209	N63987
NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	2	9803	N32842
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2	0	0209	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	N31050
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0208	N41247
NAVY	E1	SR	ARABIC	5	5	5	0304	N30646
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0206	N39900
NAVY	O3	2300	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N35977
NAVY	E5	AM 8347	ARABIC	5	5	5	9712	N09226
NAVY	E6	EN 4324	ARABIC	3	3	3	0110	N0580A
NAVY	E6	CTI8295	ARABIC	2	2	2	9406	N63908
NAVY	E4	EM	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0202	N21351
NAVY	E4	SK	ARABIC	2	4	2	0110	N62995

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RESERVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
(b)(6)		USNR	E4	HM 8416	ARABIC	4	4	4	9602
		USNR	E5	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212
		USNR	E5	AME 8319	ARABIC	5	5	5	9703
		USNR	E4	SH	ARABIC	3	3	3	0206
		USNR	E3	SN 9700	ARABIC	5	5	5	0103
		USNR	E5	CTI 9216	ARABIC	3	2	0	0000
		USNR	E6	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	2+	9511
		USNR	E2	SA	ARABIC	4	4	4	0106
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0003
		USNR	O3	1105	ARABIC	5	5	0	9501
		USNR	E4	EN	ARABIC	2	2	1	0303
		USNR	E4	BM	ARABIC	2	2	1	0304
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0010
		USNR	O6	2105	ARABIC	5	5	5	9712
		USNR	E4	GSE	ARABIC	4	4	4	9905
		USNR	O5	1635	ARABIC	3	3	3	0104
		USNR	O3	1635	ARABIC	3	3	2	0301
		USNR	E4	BM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9707
		USNR	E4	MM	ARABIC	3	3	3	0000
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	3	2	9904
		USNR	E5	SK	ARABIC	5	5	5	0210
		USNR	E5	PN	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9906
		USNR	E3	FN 9760	ARABIC	5	5	5	0110
		USNR	O4	5105	ARABIC	2	2	2	0101
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	3	2	2	0000
		USNR	E5	AD 6418	ARABIC	5	5	5	0211
		USNR	E4	AT	ARABIC	3	4	2	0105
		USNR	E4	EN	ARABIC	5	5	5	9704
		USNR	E5	GSE	ARABIC	5	5	5	9703
		USNR	E4	BM	ARABIC	4	4	4	0304
		USNR	E4	GSE	ARABIC	5	5	5	0205
		USNR	E4	SH	ARABIC	3	3	2	0304
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205
		USNR	E5	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	3	3	3	0000
		USNR	E5	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0000
		USNR	O3	1615	ARABIC	2	3	2	9901
		USNR	E4	MM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9706
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	4	4+	0	0212

41-CT-0359/OASD-14373

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USNR	O5	1125	ARABIC	4	4	3	9710
USNR	O3	2305	ARABIC	5	5	5	0204
USNR	E3	MS	ARABIC	4	4	4	0109
USNR	E5	CTI	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	9609
USNR	O6	2105	ARABIC	2	2	2	9706
USNR	E5	SK	ARABIC	3+	3+	5	9109
USNR	O2	1635	ARABIC	2	2	2	0210
USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0003

RETIRED

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Last name	First name	Middle name	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	Retirement date
(b)(6)	USN	O09	1110	(b)(6)			ARABIC	2	3	0	20010801
	USN	E06	CTI9216				ARABIC	2	2	0	20020331
	USN	E06	OS 0342				ARABIC	3	2	0	20020731
	USN	O04	1630				ARABIC	2	3	2	20020401
	USN	W02	7441				ARABIC	3	3	2	20010901
	USN	E07	AM 8378				ARABIC	2	2	2	20021130
	USN	O06	1630				ARABIC	3	3	0	20030401
	USN	E06	IT 2306				ARABIC	2+	3	0	20030331

11-L-0559/OSD14376

TAB

F

ACTIVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

USMC

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USMC	E4	0121	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	E4	3531	ARABIC	3	3	0	0111
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211
USMC	E3	0121	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209
USMC	E4	6042	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0205
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302
USMC	E5	0656	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0103
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0205
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	3	0	0305
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USMC	O4	0302	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212
USMC	E3	2608	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303

(b)(6)

SSN

Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS

Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date

(b)(6)

USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0304
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0206
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0212
USMC	O5	0302	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0112
USMC	E2	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0109
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0206
USMC	O4	7202	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9812
USMC	E1	0300	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301
USMC	E2	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0212
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0209
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	E1	0100	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304
USMC	O1	9901	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	O3	0302	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303
USMC	O3	7562	ARABIC	2	2	2	9408
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0304
USMC	E5	0231	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0203
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	3	2	0	0203
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0202
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207

11-0559/OSD-380

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304
USMC	W2	2602	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107
USMC	O6	9906	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9411
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0207
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0302
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0303
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0302
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208
USMC	E5	0200	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0202
USMC	E8	3051	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205
USMC	E3	0311	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0206
USMC	E4	2600	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0110
USMC	E2	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0205
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110
USMC	E4	2600	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0206
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211
USMC	E3	3381	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0107
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0305
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0212

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0305
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107
USMC	E4	0151	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0211
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0009
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302
USMC	E4	2600	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205
USMC	O4	4402	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0211
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208
USMC	E8	2691	ARABIC	2	2	0	9709
USMC	O3	7208	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212
USMC	O2	7210	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
USMC	O1	9901	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0001
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	E5	1142	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209
USMC	E5	0151	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0012
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0206
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0303
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0211
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207
USMC	O1	9901	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0001
USMC	E3	3051	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209
USMC	E7	2141	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0211
USMC	E4	0659/OSIBAB382	2	2+	0	0303	

SSN (b)(6)

Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0302
USMC	E5	7372	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0207
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0302
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0107
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0202
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0105
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0202
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USMC	O3	4402	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0302
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0206
USMC	E4	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303
USMC	O3	0402	ARABIC	3	3	0	9503
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	2	0107
USMC	W1	1310	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305

SSN	Name (last first middle)
(b)(6)	

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLF
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	2	(
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	(
USMC	O5	0402	ARABIC	3	3	0	9
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	(
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2	1+	(
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	(
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	3	0	(
USMC	O6	9904	ARABIC	3	2+	0	8

RESERVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	MoMo (last first initial)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
(b)(6)		USMCR	E2	SELRES	9900	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0305
		USMCR	O3	IRR/ING	0602	ARABIC	3	3	0	0012
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	0121	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0104
		USMCR	E4	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0102
		USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0102
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0205
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0105
		USMCR	O4	IRR/ING	1302	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0005
		USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	0311	ARABIC	3	3	0	0201

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USMCR	E5	SELRES	3531	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209
USMCR	E4	STAND-BY	0231	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0111
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0110
USMCR	E3	IRR/ING	2111	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9910
USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
USMCR	O3	IRR/ING	0203	ARABIC	2	2	0	0008
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0208
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	3	0	0106
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
USMCR	O5	IRR/ING	0802	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0109
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	1141	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9809
USMCR	O3	IRR/ING	4302	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	9606
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	0231	ARABIC	3	3	0	0004
USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0105
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0011
USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0103
USMCR	O3	SELRES	0302	ARABIC	2	2	0	9805
USMCR	E3	SELRES	3381	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112
USMCR	E6	SELRES	3381	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9703
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	3	0	0107
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0201

SSN Name (last first middle)
(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLI
USMCR	E6	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	3	3	

11-L-0559/OSD14388

RETIRED

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Last name	First name	Middle name	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT
(b)(6)	USMC	O05	0302	(b)(6)		A	ARABIC	2+	3	0
	USMC	O04	0202			J	ARABIC	2	2	1+
	USMC	E03	3533				ARABIC	3	3	0

11-L-0559/OSD14390

TAB

G



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

MAR 10 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Defense Language Capability


As we continue to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism, the availability of individuals capable of speaking the necessary languages is of increasing concern. Our Defense-wide database of Arabic language speakers, for example, reveals that there are 4500 members of the armed forces (active and selected reserve) identified as Arabic speakers, with almost 2,500 considered proficient at level 2 or higher on the Defense Language Proficiency Test.

To meet our current and emerging language needs it is imperative that we maximize use of all available language speakers. In so doing, we must go beyond a traditional approach of assigning only those with linguist specialties to positions requiring language skills.

Therefore, I ask that you take action to screen all those identified as Arabic, Dari and Pashto speakers, regardless of specialty, to create a base of individuals capable of meeting language requirements. These individuals should be considered eligible for reassignment in support of those language requirements unless the loss of the service member will critically affect the mission capability of the unit to which they are currently assigned. Services shall take positive action to ensure that undertaking these assignments does not adversely effect these individual's advancements and careers. These critical language assignments must be viewed positively in all promotion and selection board processes.

Due to the importance of this skill, it may be necessary to source command requirements without regard to the Service of the individual. We will work with the Joint Staff in reviewing the implementation of this approach.

Please forward a summary of the results of your screening efforts to Mrs. Susan Kelly (Susan.Kelly@osd.mil) (703) 697-1898 of this office by March 21, 2003.


David S. C. Chu

cc: Director, Joint Staff

dispatched 3/10/03



102-0559/OSD14392



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

September 22, 2003, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Legislation on Treatment of Detainees

- In light of the August 13, 2003 Daily Telegraph article entitled "The Guantanamo Solution" you asked whether we have thought about seeking legislation regarding how we should treat the detainees. Tab A.
- The disadvantages of seeking such legislation far outweigh the advantages of seeking such legislation. Nevertheless, more interaction with Congress and the public on this issue could help us and could be achieved through means other than seeking legislation.
- *Reasons to Seek Legislation.*
 - Seeking legislation offers the prospect of additional legitimacy for the continued detention and treatment of the individuals held at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).
 - The President acts at the height of his power when he acts with congressional authorization.
 - Legislation could reduce arbitrariness and the appearance of arbitrariness in the detention and treatment of detainees.
- *Reasons Not to Seek Legislation.*
 - The President has the legal authority to detain those individuals currently being held at GTMO and to determine the course of their treatment without congressional authorization.
 - Determinations about the detention and treatment of enemies detained during an armed conflict are tactical determinations made in prosecuting a war. The Constitution vests in the President *alone* the ability to make such determinations.
 - Executive branch practice is an important factor in judicial determinations regarding the scope of presidential power. If the President seeks legislation

11-L-0559/OSD14393

OSD 19909-04

when he does not need to do so, he may limit his legal authority as well as the legal authority of future Presidents to act in a similar manner absent congressional authorization.

- Moreover, the President is already acting at the height of his authority in the current context.
 - Congress has authorized the President to detain individuals held at GTMO through its authorization of the use of force, permitting him “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those responsible for the September 11 attacks and to prevent future such attacks against the United States. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 Note (2001).
 - Even if Congress had not expressly authorized the President to detain such individuals, it has done so tacitly through similar authorizations and permitting unbroken executive practice of such detention. As a result, the President would still be acting at the height of his authority.
 - Through the Alien Enemies Act of 1789, 10 U.S.C. § 21, which remains in force today, Congress has authorized the detention and removal of enemy aliens.
 - There is an unbroken history of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to detain enemy combatants.
- As a matter of policy, seeking legislation would also bear substantial risks.
 - There is no way to predict the rules that Congress would impose.
 - The legislation potentially could limit the President’s ability to react to new intelligence and his ability to gather intelligence from those detained at GTMO.
 - Seeking legislation from Congress regarding the detention of those at GTMO may also expose the military commission process to legislative efforts to dictate the rules and procedures to be used by the commissions.
- *Alternative to Seeking Legislation.* The reduction of arbitrariness and the appearance of arbitrariness can be accomplished through actions undertaken by the Department.
 - The Department could adopt a plan for the periodic review of the need for continued detention of those individuals detained at GTMO, which could reduce any arbitrariness present in the current system.
 - The appearance of arbitrariness could be reduced through making that plan public, to the maximum practicable.
 - As you may recall, I briefed you a few weeks ago on a concept for such a process. Tab B. We are currently seeking views within the

Department on that concept, which we revised based on comments received in the briefing. Tab C.

- Reaching out to Congress in ways other than seeking legislation may be helpful to us.
 - We need not seek legislation in order to reach out to Congress.
 - There is value in going to the Hill and inviting their informal participation, such as in seeking their comment on any long-term detention plan that we might wish to adopt.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Jennifer L. Koester, DoD OGC, (b)(6)

August 14, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainees

I just read this piece from the *London Daily Telegraph* on Guantanamo. I wonder if we have given any thought to going up and asking for legislation as to how we should treat the detainees, so we get off the hook legally.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The Guantanamo Solution," *London Daily Telegraph*, August 13, 2003

DHR:db
081403-12

.....
Please respond by 9/5/03

11-L-0559/OSD14396

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London Daily Telegraph
August 13, 2003

The Guantanamo Solution

President Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, have been unfairly maligned in this country for their decision to put terrorist suspects on trial in Guantanamo Bay.

Paradoxically, their difficulties stem not so much from their alleged illiberalism as from a desire to maintain some measure of due process in a time of a new and horrific kind of asymmetric warfare.

The Bush Administration has been wrestling with the problem - not dissimilar to that faced by Whitehall during the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland - about whether to treat suspects as prisoners of war or common criminals. His dilemma was understandable. Had he called them PoWs, he would have been obliged by the Geneva Conventions to release them at the end of hostilities.

But when can a war against global terrorism be said to be at an end? With the fall of the Taliban? With the deposition of Saddam? Mr Bush had every reason to believe - he still has - that, if he were to release the prisoners in Camp Delta, a great many of them would return immediately to the war against the West, and plot a new atrocity like the destruction of the Twin Towers. That was something that no responsible leader could countenance.

But if he could not call his captives PoWs, nor could he treat them quite like common criminals. Under the US Constitution, criminal suspects have to be put on trial, and judged according to the rules of evidence. Any competent defence lawyer would make short work of testimony gathered from secret sources or from prisoners held for many months, in harsh conditions, without access to lawyers.

Mr Bush's liberal instincts told him that it was wrong to hold possibly innocent men for long periods without trial. But, equally, he knew that no ordinarily conducted criminal trial could be expected to result in a conviction, no matter how guilty the defendant might be.

So it was that the President hit upon the idea of treating them neither as PoWs nor as criminals, but as something in between. He decided to put them on trial by military tribunal, and instructed his Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to draft special rules of evidence and procedure that would make convictions more likely than in a civilian court. In so doing, he landed himself in the worst of all possible worlds.

Mr Rumsfeld's rules, drafted on March 21, 2002, are not nearly as illiberal as his critics maintain. They include many safeguards of the rights of the defendant. But the fact is that they fall well short of the standards of justice required by civilian courts in both Britain and America.

By being as liberal and fair-minded as he dared, Mr Bush succeeded only in making himself look more authoritarian than he appeared before he suggested trials of any sort. The British Government, which has never wanted responsibility for British prisoners held in Camp Delta, has been forced into the hypocritical position of defending the rights of its citizens against Mr Bush.

Only a fool would dispute that Mr Bush was right to hold and interrogate prisoners while they might still have useful information about planned terrorist atrocities. But the longer their detention goes on, in this limbo between PoW and criminal status, the less justified it seems to many in this country.

The answer, surely, lies not in subjecting the prisoners to military tribunals, but in regularising their status under the law. During the Second World War, many Germans and Italians were humanely interned in Britain, under a form of administrative detention that made no comment on their guilt or innocence of Nazi sympathies. The prisoners in Guantánamo Bay should be treated like that.

January 2, 2003 12:13 PM

TO: ADM Thomas B. Fargo
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
SUBJECT: Priorities

Thanks for sending along your five top priorities. They look good to me.

Happy New Year.

DHR:dh
010203-38

Pac on

2 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD14399

U00135 /03



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO



January 6, 2003, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

Thomas E. White

SUBJECT: Congressman Saxton's Letter

- We have previously addressed all of these issues in numerous fora.
- Prior to receipt of Congressman Saxton's letter, GEN Jack Keane personally briefed him and addressed his concerns with Stryker.
- In December, I extended a written invitation to both Congressmen Saxton and Hunter to examine the Stryker vehicle at Aberdeen Proving Ground or visit the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams at Ft. Lewis, Washington. I will reinforce this invitation by phone later this month.
- We stand ready to re-engage him on any remaining issues.

951

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: Memorandum from Secretary Rumsfeld, December 30, 2002, subj: Stryker

6 Jan 03

December 30, 2002 6:55 PM

TO: Tom White
Gen. Shinseki

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
POWELL MOORE

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Stryker

Attached is a letter I received from Congressman Saxton from the Armed Services Committee on the Stryker. Chairman Duncan Hunter raised it with me. I would be curious to know how you respond to this.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/19/02 Cong. Saxton ltr to SecDef re: Stryker

DHR:dh
123001-18 (its computer) doc

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

U00219-03

11-L-0559/OSD14401



1/6/03 11:13 AM

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

203 JAN -6 PM 5:47

FROM: Steve Cambone *sc*

SUBJECT: Transformation

You asked for a short list of things we might do if we had the funds:

1. Accelerate next generation intelligence capabilities.

- The heart of new capabilities: "universal situational awareness"

- Treat intell databases as if they were databases accessed today through the internet.

- Those internet databases are refreshed without specific demand from the user; the existence of the database, and the rate of refreshment are a function of user interest; but once the level of interest is established, the database is refreshed at a rate sufficient to satisfy the interest.

- How would it work?

- Example Database: Iraq

- All entries from all intell sources converted to digital formats, tagged and entered in database

- Database indexed, with all entries cross referenced

- Each new datum entered as collected

- User demand for a particular datum would go from database to collector which would automatically collect on next available opportunity

- Deconfliction schemes sort priority activity for a given collector

- New datum posted as collected

- Result: User drives collection, not as today, the collector giving the user what the collector can gather and thinks the user should have.

381

6 Jan 03

- Think of the PDB everyday. Except for what is specifically asked for, it is filled with what the collector has make available to the analyst.
- If it were a web-based product, you could enter your preferences and search engines would find what you want.
- As the system became smart about your choices, it would adapt, providing more of what you want.
- The effect on operations could be profound:
 - Planner would have a readily available, time-phased history of his target in all “INTS.”
 - He could adjust his target folders in real time
 - He could the latest data even as his operation unfolds.
- Assumptions:
 - Persistent surveillance with which to build the baseline
 - Internet-based database and database access system
 - Requires complete overhaul of our current system.

2. Improved Computer Network Capabilities

- We added considerable money in FY 04 for computer network defense.
- We created Strategic Command and gave it the global IO—e.g., computer network attack, defense and exploitation—mission.
- However, the DOD is not “manned, trained and equipped” to conduct operations in this emerging mission area.
- It may be that we need to create something for Computer/Information Operations akin to the reforms on space that we implemented last year.
- At a minimum we are looking at investing billions per year.

3. At least 2-3 more UCAV demonstration programs

- The F/A-22, JSF has no real competitor—manned or unmanned
- We understand the limits of manned aircraft; need to learn whether and how UCAVs can make a difference

- On current plans, we do not have enough variety; need to get to situation like the 1960s when multiple airframes were in development.
- Result: more competition, potentially lower cost and increased effectiveness for known missions, might develop new mission capabilities

4. New forms of access to space

- Single stage to orbit still languishes
- New fuels, materials, engines, etc. needed
- New applications need concept development

5. New ship designs

- We continue to build mono-hulled, steel/aluminum ships
- Composite materials, with two or more hulls, with different propulsion designs are possible
- Result: speed, stealth, new ways to do minesweeping, ASW, etc.

6. New weapon designs

- We have few programs that aren't driven either by high explosive (bombs, bullets, artillery) or nuclear energy.
- Alternative energy sources could revolutionize warfare, e.g.,
 - Directed energy
 - Electro-magnetic rail guns
 - Non-lethal weapons
- Would require a joint program office, incorporating DARPA, Service, National Laboratory activity.
- Investment would be needed at a level to permit extensive experimentation and testing.
- Key is to avoid creating the White Elephant or Silver Bullet; what we need are weapons applicable to a wide variety of circumstances.

7. Undersea Operations

- A great deal of investment has gone into beating surface to air missile systems, e.g., F-22, JSF, etc.
- Little has been devoted to undersea activity, to include anti-submarine warfare (ASW), unwarned attack (underwater, surface, land, air), etc.
- The advent of quieter diesel subs, capable of air independent operations, advanced torpedoes, computing to support adversary listening devices, etc., all point to the possibility of “sub-surface anti-access” operations by potential adversaries.
- Current submarine designs—the Virginia class—may not meet our needs in the coming decades. We have nearly abandoned the underwater arrays by which we mapped activity below the surface.
- New investment is needed to characterize the emerging threat and design responses.

8. Bio-mechanical devices

- Should give more support to robotics—even the big robots of today
- Future is in micro systems, including those that are self-constructing and healing; industry has started down this path; not obvious we are exploiting that effort

9. High speed computing

- This is related to Computer operations, above, but goes beyond the operational domain. Moore’s law continues to hold. But we are making progress in sometimes inelegant ways—massive parallel processing, for example.
- Moreover, much of our problem with advanced systems is related to software/hardware integration.
- More attention to what it takes to do high speed computing and integrating hardware and software is key to continued progress in the development of advanced systems.

10. New materials, e.g.,

- Ambient temperature, conducting materials for advanced computer applications;
- Other materials are needed to enable concepts like “adaptive wings”—e.g., aircraft wings that can be reshaped in flight to affect drag, radar signature, etc.
- Armor protection is another area for work. Materials capable of withstanding the impact of projectiles—bullets, tank rounds, shrapnel, etc.—are still desired.
- Lightweight, high strength materials for applications in space, underwater, etc., are of interest.

12:28 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 21, 2002
SUBJECT: **Transformation**

Please give me a list of the things we are not doing that would be transformational that we would be doing if we had a larger budget. Not one hundred things, but 10, 15-20.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
122102.13

Please respond by: _____

1/15/03

U00220-03

11-L-0559/OSD14407



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

SECRET

203 JAN -7 PM 7:54

INFO MEMO

JAN 3 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Update on Maternal and Child Health Care Project in Afghanistan

- On December 16, 2002, you asked the question, "How are we doing on the midwifery program?" (TAB A)
- The Department of Defense (Stability Operations) facilitated a December 6-16, 2002 joint Department of Defense/Health and Human Services trip to Afghanistan to select a site and develop an implementation plan to provide post-graduate Obstetrics/Gynecology teaching clinic for Afghan physicians and mid-level health care providers (e.g. midwives).
- The Afghani Minister of Public Health requested the Rabia Balkhi Hospital in Kabul be selected as the teaching clinic site.
- Health and Human Services and Health Affairs physicians agreed this is an optimal location for the clinic. The hospital is a large women's general hospital, but emphasizes maternal/child health care. The hospital already has a large physician training program to serve as a training base and a potential training staff for the clinic.
- Civil Affairs soldiers have already begun renovation of the hospital. Renovation completion is expected within 90 days. Work is proceeding in two shifts per day.
- The Health and Human Services Team Chief, Dr. Peter Van Dyck, briefed a plan for the clinic to the Health and Human Services Secretary on December 23, 2002, but has not yet filed his written report. Health and Human Services is working to identify funding of this program other than the Department of Defense-funded reconstruction. Health and Human Services expects initial phases of the program to begin within 90 days and has formed three committees to work on details of the proposal.
- Representatives of the Department of Defense and Health and Human Services will meet on January 7th at the Pentagon to discuss the next steps for the project.

COORDINATIONS: TAB B

Prepared by: CAPT Jack Smith, C&PP (b)(6) PCDOCS # 44051,
44403

11-L-0559/OSD14408

U00213 /03

Winkenwerder, William, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ASD(HA)

From: Ritchie, Elspeth, LtCol, OASD(HA)/TMA
Sent: Friday, December 13, 2002 5:46 PM
To: Coates, Marianne, CIV, OASD/HA; Winkenwerder, William, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ASD(HA); Tornberg, David, DASD/C&PP, OASD(HA); Smith, Jack, CAPT, OASD(HA)
Subject: FW: A Country in Need: U.S. Forces Help Restore Afghan Health Care

-----Original Message-----

From: Press Service [mailto:afisnews_sender@DTIC.MIL]
Sent: Friday, December 13, 2002 3:31 PM
To: DEFENSE-PRESS-SERVICE-L@DTIC.MIL
Subject: A Country in Need: U.S. Forces Help Restore Afghan Health Care

By Linda D. Kozaryn
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13, 2002 -- Pictures coming out of Afghanistan show a land seemingly forgotten by time -- and modern medicine. After 20 years of war, medical clinics and hospitals are in ruins and in dire need of basic medical supplies and equipment.

With U.S. and coalition aid, the situation is on the mend.

The United States has been "indispensable" in helping to restore health care in Afghanistan, according to Dr. Abdullah Sherzai, director of planning at the Afghan Health Ministry in Kabul.

"Just the presence of the American military creates the security background within which you can work -- from nutritional work, to health care, to reconstruction," he said. "The Afghan people understand this and we appreciate it."

Sherzai, a neurologist and a U.S. citizen, gave up his research work at the National Institutes of Health in May to go to Afghanistan. This week, he accompanied Health Ministry officials to Washington to meet with U.S. government leaders.

During a Dec. 10 interview at the Pentagon, Sherzai served as spokesman for Afghan Deputy Health Minister Ferozudin Feroz. Expressing the minister's appreciation for America's help, Sherzai said the Afghan people hope the United States intends to create a long-term partnership with Afghanistan.

"The purpose of our visit is to make sure that the world attention, specifically America's attention, is still kept on Afghanistan," Sherzai said. "We are very thankful for all the help, but there is a lot more needed. We're not even close to resolving our problems."

Afghanistan needs help rebuilding, equipping and supplying its medical facilities, according to Sherzai. The first step toward security is health care. It should be everyone's No. 1 priority, he stressed.

"There's nothing more primary and immediate than health care," he said. "Without health, women aren't able to secure the household and, therefore, society is not secure. Without health, men are not able to work and the household situation falls apart and, again, society is insecure."

The people suffering most in Afghanistan are women and children, he reported. Of every 100,000 pregnancies, an estimated 1,600 women die. In one province alone, 7,000 of every

11-L-0559/OSD14409

100,000 pregnancies result in the mother's death.

"We would like your help to change these statistics and help us reverse the calamity that is the health care system for women in Afghanistan," Sherzai said.

The U.S. Defense Department, he pointed out, is helping to rebuild Rabia Balkhi, one of the major women's hospitals in Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime, it was the only women's hospital in operation. The hospital was completely destroyed after the Taliban fell, he said, and now "Americans are the main component reconstructing it."

According to Feroz, about 174 hospitals in Afghanistan need some reconstruction and refurbishing.

Afghanistan's overall health care system right now is "pretty basic," Sherzai said. "We are way below 'zero' at this point. We need a lot of help just to come to an even playing ground.

"There's plenty to be done," he affirmed. "We need a little bit of coordination, and if all our coalition partners and all our friends take one section, we'll be in good shape."

The U.S. military, in particular, Sherzai said, "has been of great help so far -- indispensable help."

U.S. medics are providing basic medical care to Afghan men, women and children. Military veterinarians are treating Afghan farm animals. U.S. forces have helped rehabilitate clinics around Bagram and completely refurbished and reconstructed one hospital. Troops have also dug several hundred wells.

"The American military has multiple campaigns of immunization, treatment and reconstruction going on right now," Sherzai said. Spanish and Jordanian medical officials have set up hospitals. Other coalition partners have focused assistance in different areas.

The Afghan people greatly appreciate these efforts, Sherzai said, and would welcome more U.S. and coalition medical care beyond Bagram and Kabul.

The DoD, Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Agency for International Development are "an incredible force in Afghanistan," Sherzai concluded. "We appreciate the collaborative nature of their help, and (hope) they'll take a part in the reconstruction of a lot of the clinics in Afghanistan.

"We hope the Defense Department and the rest of the team will help in refurbishing those as well, because no matter how many clinics we have, when there are obstructive emergencies, the clinics can't take care of that, so there has to be a referral system that takes these patients from the clinics into the hospitals."

U.S. military officials are now seeking guidance from the Health Ministry on what they can do next. "They want to participate in a collaborative, organized fashion in rehabilitating and reconstructing the health care system," Sherzai said. "That's of utmost importance to us."

Helping the ministry gives legitimacy to the government, which is directly related to security, he said. At present, the Health Ministry is "semi-organized."

The ministry has the capacity to receive help and disperse it. "We don't need to have a middle man, or go through multiple levels," Sherzai said. "Hopefully, within a few months, we will have the financial structure to take the money, have accountability and transparency to show that what you gave was directly transferred into a clinic, directly linked to the health care of this woman and this woman and this woman."

Along with U.S. and coalition military forces, he noted, nongovernment organizations also have been an indispensable help.

As the Afghan government restores health care, Sherzai said, the NGOs and others can help in the interim. "They have to come with the realization that they have to work themselves out of business. They have to give capacity to the Afghan government itself and also to the private sector. But even in the next few years, they'll be indispensable. We need to use their help and their capacity building."

American church groups and private U.S. citizens are also doing what they can to help, according to Sherzai.

"The Memphis-Afghanistan Friendship Council has a relationship with us on a continuing basis. They came to educate people. Other Americans are coming to Afghanistan. There are a lot of American church groups that have come to Afghanistan and helped financially.

"Loma Linda University is directly helping our medical school. Tufts University is directly helping our nutrition department. Georgetown University has relations with Afghanistan. Johns Hopkins University is also helping us directly. National Institutes of Health has sent us equipment through Health and Human Services. Nebraska University is helping us with capacity-building and education."

Sherzai said people who want to help could communicate directly with the Ministry of Health by writing to neurondr@hotmail.com.

200212133a.jpg U.S. Army Capt. (b)(6) of the 82nd Forward Support Battalion examines an Afghan girl from the village of Qadzi Kariz during a humanitarian medical aid visit. The 82nd FSF is an element of the 82nd Airborne Division at Kandahar Army Airfield, Afghanistan. Photo by Spc. (b)(6) USA.

200212133a_hr.jpg High-resolution image available.

200212133b.jpg Afghan women wait in line for U.S. medical care in the village of Deh Baba Ali, Afghanistan. Soldiers of the 339th Combat Support Hospital were on hand to provide medical assistance to Afghan locals as part of a medical assistance mission. Providing aid such as this is part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Photo by Spc. (b)(6) (b)(6) USA.

200212133b_hr.jpg High-resolution image available.

200212133c.jpg Three girls of the Afghanistan village of Qadzi Kariz, sit outside the perimeter of a U.S. medical aid station waiting to receive care from medics of the 102nd Forward Surgical Team, which is attached to the 82nd Airborne Division at Kandahar Army Airfield. U.S. Army photo by Spc. (b)(6) USA.

200212133c_hr.jpg High-resolution image available.


NOTE: This is a plain text version of a web page. If your e-mail program did not properly format this information, you may view the story at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2002/n12132002_200212133.html. Any photos, graphics or other imagery included in the article may also be viewed at this web page.

=====

Visit the Defense Department's Web site for the latest news and information about America's response to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the war against terrorism: "Defend America" at <http://www.DefendAmerica.mil>.

December 16, 2002 6:01 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Midwifery Program

How are we doing on the midwifery program?

Thanks.

DIR dh
12601-43

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

11-L-0559/OSD14412

LL19784-02

MIDWIFERY SNOWFLAKE

COORDINATION

CoS, HA

Ms. Diana Tabler

1/3/03

PDASD, HA

Mr. Wyatt

USD, P&R

Dr. David S. C. Chu

David S. C. Chu
6 Jan 03



January 3, 2003 8:29 AM

TO: LTG Mike Hayden

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Breakthrough

Thanks for your note on the breakthrough. It sounds terrific.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010303-12

.....

Please respond by _____

000.1

3 Jan 03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET

203 JAN -7 PM 5:12

INFO MEMO

January 7, 2003, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim


SUBJECT: Supplemental

- Newt is right, it would be advantageous to align our supplemental request with the congressional schedule to enact the FY 2003 funding for the domestic agencies.
- We have finalized the initial supplemental request for ongoing operations. If the Office of Management and Budget approves the supplemental request in an expeditious manner, Congress will have our request by late January.
- I would add that given the urgency of finding funds for allies such as Turkey, the case for an early supplemental becomes even stronger.
- The supplement request totals \$19.9 billion. This includes \$13 billion for deployment-related costs, \$4 billion for reserve component mobilization, \$1.5 billion for preparatory tasks and \$1.5 billion for other costs, such as reimbursement for host nation support.
- A second supplemental request will address future operations. It is premature to submit this request now because it will raise questions about operational plans that cannot be discussed at this time. The Services have just finalized their cost estimates. As with the first supplemental, my staff will work with the Joint Staff to review the requirements. We should be ready to submit this supplemental request in February.

COORDINATION: None required.

Prepared By: John M. Evans,

(b)(6)



U00251 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14415

110.01

7 Jan 03

December 23, 2002 10:50 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Supplemental

We need to get our supplemental on a bill in January. What do we do to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-21

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

11-L-0559/OSD14416

02 DEC 17/11

December 23, 2002 5:35 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Supplemental

Attached is a useful e-mail from Newt on the supplemental. I agree with his assessment. Let me know what you folks think, and let's get moving.

I talked to the President on Friday about an early supplemental, and he agrees with us. The Vice President and Andy Card were in the room.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Supplemental

DHR:dh
122302-62

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

11-L-0559/OSD14417

January 2, 2003 9:07 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: John Walters

Please check and find out how well we are cooperating with John Walters. Read his Christmas note.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/02 Walters card to SecDef

DHR:dh
010203-12

.....

Please respond by 01/24/03

200404

1/7 SECDEF HAS SENT

SecDef -

We are cooperating in that we scaled back but did not gut his military detainee roster. Otherwise, we have the ongoing counter-drug activities that have a mixed record of support/interest in DoD. I have asked Dr Chui and Marshall Billingslea views as they work the programs of interest. Di Rita

U00256 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14418



December 20, 2002

Dear Don,

At the end of my first year as director of the Drug Office, I want to thank you for your continued support at this time of war. I know this has been difficult in the face of other demands. Thanks for listening to our proposals and allowing us to maintain a smaller number of outstanding professionals from the service. I would ask that you consider adding only the current

Senior Military Advisor position to the new list of detailees because I have found such an officer to be of tremendous value.

We have just seen survey results showing we have drug use by young people heading down again for the first time ~~to~~ in 10 years. Thanks for DOD's help in the national effort.

Happy holidays to you and Joyce and your entire family. Regards, Glen

2003 JAN -8 AM 11:11

January 3, 2003 9:20 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of Documents

Please pull together a list of all of those documents we talked about yesterday that the Joint Staff, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman seemed to think they have to put out on vision, strategies and all that stuff.

We ought to get our arms around them, compare them with what we put out overall and get a single DoD document rather than a Joint Staff document. It is just a lot of people spinning their wheels doing things we probably have to edit and improve.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010303-19

.....
Please respond by 01/24/03

*381**3 Jan 03*

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A948. Suspense Desk: (703) 697-9287 FAX Number: (703) 695-1219 Email: Suspense_Desk@cd.whs.mil

Action Agency

JCS

Suspense Date

01/15/2003

1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

- ☐ a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- ☐ b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO (Justify below)
- ☐ c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO (Justify below)
- ☒ d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- ☐ e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO (Justify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)
- ☐ f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO (Justify below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

After review by the Joint Staff (DJ-5 and DJS level) and previous discussions with the appropriate offices within OSD, believe this has been answered by other means and this action should be closed out.

3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY Joint Staff		e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level) (b)(6)		Date Signed 6/26/2003
b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER <input type="text"/>				
c. TELEPHONE NO. 695-4550	5. ACTION TAKEN (For EXECUTIVE Correspondence Control Division Use Only)			
d. DATE 06/26/2003	a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
	b. CANX	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
	c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
	d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
4. CCD CONTROL # U00271-03	e. OTHER (Specify) <input type="text"/>			
Signature			Date Signed	

SD FORM 391, DEC 2000

11-L-0559/OSD14421

R 400271-03

381

(3 Jan 03)



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-700-03
8 January 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 1/6*

SUBJECT: Report on the Suitability of the Eritrea Range

- In response to your request (TAB A), the following information is provided.
- The Eritrea range offered for US use can replace some aspects of Vieques. It provides a useful training alternative for carrier battle groups (CVBGs) while conducting operations in the vicinity of the Red Sea. Transiting units or deployed units can use Eritrea to their advantage in two primary areas:
 - Naval gunfire proficiency training
 - Amphibious training
- While valuable, the Eritrea range lacks the following key elements inherent in the Vieques range that the Navy considers necessary for training prior to deployment:
 - not close enough to US east coast ports for use in predeployment CVBG certification.
 - location in the Red Sea offers limited air operations maneuver space for the CVBG.
 - no suitable alternate airfields in close proximity to accommodate aircraft that cannot land on the carrier with live ordnance malfunctions. This is vital to carrier safety.
 - existing range infrastructure will not support day and night aircraft operations.


COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF, Director for Operations, (b)(6)

Snowflake

TAB A

December 16, 2002 4:15 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Eritrea

I would like to know why the Eritrea test range we have been offered couldn't replace some aspects of Vieques.

Thanks.

DHR:jh
121002-27

.....
Please respond by _____

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD14423

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USN

CAPT D. D. Thompson

20 December 2002

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD14424

January 8, 2003 7:23 AM

TO: Bill Steiger
Director, International Affairs,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services

CC: Bill Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Midwife Program

I hope the midwife program doesn't migrate up into a major women's hospital. I think the midwife idea was solid and important, and there is always a tendency for things to be elevated up.

What is happening?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010803-8

AFghanis

8 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD14425

U00323 /03

1/7
Snowflake

1/7

January 6, 2003 8:15 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reserve Call-Ups

Let's get me some more headroom for Reserve call-ups. We need to keep track of where I am and of where they are. It looks like we are close to the limit that I set, and it looks like we could go as high as the limit the President set.

W
1/7
1/7

Let's get a projection.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010603-5

.....
Please respond by 01/17/03

1/7
To: Dr Chu -
Would your proposal
to DepSec help with this?
Please advise in either event
J. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

1/7

11-L-0559/OSD14426

U00353 /03

January 8, 2003 3:16 PM

TO: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: House

Is this the house of the ex-Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense?

If so, where is the Secretary of Defense's house?

Happy New Year!

Attach.
CardDHR:dh
010803-25

335 SD



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8 Jan 03



August 20, 2002 5:59 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: ~~Donald Rumsfeld~~ *DR*

SUBJECT: Briefing Senator Hagel

Please get on top of this. I am concerned about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/20/02 SecDef memo to ASD(LA) 082002-17

DHR:dh
082002-18

.....
Please respond by 09/03/02

Done

9/9

337

20 Aug 02

U00587 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14428

August 20, 2002 5:57 PM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing Senator Hagel

I don't feel like I am being kept up to date on how we are briefing Hagel—who is doing it, where it is being done, whether or not I am aware of it before it happens, what the topics are, and who is sitting in.

I need to be on top of that. It is important, and I do not feel like anyone is getting back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082002-17

.....
Please respond by 09/04/02

11-L-0559/OSD14429



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
INFO MEMO

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

2003 JAN 14 AM 8:00

January 13, 2003 – 1:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Reducing Turbulence—SNOWFLAKE

- Tab A identifies a central contributor to today's turbulence: the 1990s drawdown reduced long-tour structure (e.g., Europe) at a pace three times faster than short-tours (e.g., Korea). This hiked turbulence.
- As you see at Tab B, most rotations (59%) are caused by people entering or quitting service, followed by postings overseas or returning from overseas (22%), by intra-theater (including CONUS) "developmental" assignments (13%), and by professional education or training (5%).
- I believe that reductions in forward stationed forces – particularly in Europe – should be a priority, as I argued in our recent meeting. Per your direction, I will work with PA&E to develop a preliminary proposal within 30 days. Meanwhile, there are a number of other steps that can generate quick results:
 - Stabilize Where it Counts Most. This includes the generals or admirals, as well as commanders of all grades – those are key.
 - Managing General and Flag Officers. We are scheduled to brief you on January 28 on new approaches to improve stability. Currently, average time in each job is 23 months.
 - Command Stability. We should establish 24 months as a required minimum now. Most services are meeting or exceeding that on average (Tab C). You (or I) should discuss this with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs. A further goal could be extending the average by six months or possibly longer. The downside, of course, is that fewer officers will have had this experience.
 - Other Tour Lengths: We are looking at other positions and locations where longer minimum tours are appropriate. We will be ready to brief you on this initiative within 30 days.



11-L-0559/OSD14430

U00659 / 03

- Voluntary Incentives: We can make it in the individual's interest to want a longer tour (Tab D).
- New Educational Paradigms. School seats at Staff and War Colleges did not shrink in proportion to the force; thus, opportunity for resident attendance went up. Should we bring that opportunity back to preceding levels? Can we accomplish educational goals in ways that reduce turbulence?
 - Opportunity. The present opportunity is richer than the past by a few percentage points. Had the opportunity held constant, about 600 fewer officers, grade O4-O6, would be moving each year to meet professional education demands.
 - Length of Residency. I have tasked the Services to evaluate their PME curriculum and recommend modules for distance learning, as a means of reducing PCS moves and associated turbulence in jobs. Their first reports are due March 5th.
- There are other steps specific to the circumstances of the individual Services. I will begin developing these for action. A first important one involves the Army: The separation of its schoolhouse system (e.g., the Armor School at Fort Knox) from its maneuver units (e.g., Fort Hood) induces geographic turbulence as individuals move from troop positions to instructor positions and back. I will include this issue in Ray DuBois' BRAC effort.

RECOMMENDATION: Info only

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

A

11-L-0559/OSD14432

Changes in OCONUS Strengths and Rotational Moves (All figures in thousands)			
	FY 87	FY 97	% Change
Long-Tour structure	247.7	89.4	-64
Short-Tour structure	42.2	33.4	-21
Total OCONUS Structure	289.9	122.8	-58
Rotational Moves	151.7	73.0	-52

PCS Moves per 1,000 End Strength, FY97		
	Officer	Enlisted
Accession and separation	162	436
Rotational	97	158
Other (training, operational, unit)	150	52
Total	409	646

B


11-L-0559/OSD14434

PCS Environment

Types of PCS Travel

Accession	Transfer of personnel from one station to another station of the same grade and pay level.
Rotational	Between CONUS and overseas (if transoceanic travel is involved)
Operational	Within CONUS and between stations overseas
Training	CONUS moves to or from training of 20 weeks or more (excludes accessions)
Unit	In connection with relocation /establishment /disestablishment of an organized unit

Number of Moves (FY01)



* MustMove

C

Average Time in Command	
Army	MONTHS
GO (Line Cmd)	23
Field Grade	24
Navy	
FO (Line Cmd)	30
Senior Grade	28
USMC	
GO (Line Cmd)	24
Field Grade	24
Air Force	
GO (Line Cmd)	25
Field Grade	24
Average Time in Command: 25	

D

11-L-0559/OSD14438

Stabilization Incentives

The following authorities support the goal of reducing personnel turbulence by increasing retention and stability. Special and incentive pays work in concert with robust compensation and enhanced quality of life factors to affect an individual's retention decision. A decision to stay means one less person needs to be replaced, trained and relocated to a new duty station--the retention of a trained and ready individual ultimately impacts job tenure. Other authorities specifically target "voluntary" overseas tours. Together these authorities work to increase personnel stability.

FY 2003 NDAA –Issues

- **Pay Raises** – The January 1, 2003 pay raise was targeted as per the Department's proposal and the President's budget. All members received a minimum raise of 4.1% (ECI+1/2%), with additional raises targeted to mid-grade officers and NCOs. The average raise was 4.7%.
- **BAH – Reduction in Out-of-Pocket Expenses** – The President's budget continued the Secretary of Defense plan to lower out-of-pocket housing costs from 11.3 percent in 2002 to 7.5 percent in 2003 and to eliminate average out-of-pocket costs altogether by 2005.
- **Assignment Incentive Pay** – Provided authority for monthly incentive pay to a member while in a 'hard-to-fill' assignment designated by the Service Secretary. Payable up to \$1,500 per month in addition to any other pay and allowance to which entitled.
- **Increased Maximum Amounts Payable for Medical Officers** – Increased maximum multiyear retention bonus from \$14,000 to \$50,000 and special pay from \$36,000 to \$50,000.
- **Increased Maximum Amounts Payable for Other Health Care Professionals** – Increased maximum rates per year for dental officers, nurses, optometrists and pharmacy officers.
- **Retention Incentives for Health Care Providers Qualified in a Critical Skill** – Provided exceptions to 'maximum bonus amount' and 'years of service limitation.'
- **Extension of Leave Travel Deferral Period for Members on Consecutive Overseas Tours of Duty** – Allowed leave travel anytime before consecutive tour and up to 1 additional year if travel precluded by duty in conjunction with a Contingency Operation.

- **Expansion of Vehicle Storage Authority** – Authorized storage of privately owned vehicles in CONUS when assigned to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, N. Mariana's, or any US Possession.
- **Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Program** - Modified leave incentive to allow members flexibility in where they take the additional leave.

FY 2002 NDAA – Issues

- **Pay Raises** – The January 1, 2002 pay raise was targeted as per the President's budget. Officers received a minimum of 5%; enlisted received a minimum of 6%. Raises of up to 10% were targeted to mid-grade officers and NCOs. The average raise was 6.9%. This represented the President's promised additional \$1B (above the by law raise of ECI + ½% (4.6%).
- **Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) – Reduction in Out-of-Pocket Expenses** – The President's budget continued the Department's plan to lower out-of-pocket housing costs from 15% in 2001 to 11.3% in 2002 and to eliminate out-of-pocket costs altogether by 2005.
- **Extension of BAH During PCS for All E-4s and Below** – Eliminated the requirement to be "E-4 (4 or more years of service) and above" for receipt of BAH during PCS.
- **Certain Career Continuation Bonuses for Early Commitment to Remain on Active Duty** – Authorized aviation officers and surface warfare officers the eligibility for career continuation bonuses to remain on active duty by initiating a continuation agreement during the last year of completing current service commitment.

Others

- **Critical Skills Retention Bonus**- authorized in FY 2001 NDAA for FY 2002 implementation. Provisions are flexible enough to implement a policy that would allow for payment of CSRB for individuals in certain skills at certain locations to be eligible for the bonus provided they remain in the job for a designated period of time.
- **Non-Monetary Incentives Review** – currently contracted study which examines non-monetary incentives that can not only enhance retention, but also encourage personnel to extend in their current tour.

1/7/03

January 6, 2003 12:26 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Turbulence

I am at the end of my string. We have a global war on terrorism going on, and we are business as usual in terms of people moving from assignment to assignment to assignment every 15 or 18 months. It is irrational.

Please screw your head into it, and get back to me within 5 working days and tell me precisely what you think I can do to create greater stability and less turbulence. There is no question, absolutely no question, but that by reducing turbulence, unless it is conscious and intentional to get rid of somebody, that we will increase military capability and warfighting capability.

Please respond with a program that is short, simple and will be effective.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010603-26

.....
Please respond by 01/13/03

11-L-0559/OSD14442



1/7/03

January 6, 2003 12:26 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Turbulence

I am at the end of my string. We have a global war on terrorism going on, and we are business as usual in terms of people moving from assignment to assignment to assignment every 15 or 18 months. It is irrational.

Please screw your head into it, and get back to me within 5 working days and tell me precisely what you think I can do to create greater stability and less turbulence. There is no question, absolutely no question, but that by reducing turbulence, unless it is conscious and intentional to get rid of somebody, that we will increase military capability and warfighting capability.

Please respond with a program that is short, simple and will be effective.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010603-26

.....
Please respond by 01/13/03

322

6 Jan 03

U00660 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14443

CENTRAL FILE
SECRET (0111:32 AM) VOL

203 JAN 15 AM 10:56

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 13, 2003
SUBJECT: **House/Senate**

Give me a piece of paper so we can call the top people in the House and the Senate Authorization and Appropriation at least once a month. Give me a check off list and each week I will call one of them over every week, and we just keep working through it.

Thanks.

1/14
→ Farrell Moore
As discussed

DHR/azn
011303.21

Larry Di Rita

1/14

Please respond by:

1/25/03

[Signature]

032

13 JAN 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-719-03

15 January 2003

SECRET

2003 JAN 15 11 03 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers 1/15*

SUBJECT: Comments on US-Russia Military-to-Military Way Ahead

- In response to your memorandum (TAB), the position outlined by the Russian DATT on 18 December 2000 is correct. The positive shift in US-Russian relations may have already resulted in increasing Russian political desire to normalize military contacts. At the July 2002 Joint Staff Talks in Moscow, the Russian General Staff indicated it had been instructed to "get the relationship right." The initial success in operational and intelligence cooperation (much of it Russian-instigated) in the Global War on Terrorism suggests potential new venues.
- Despite protests over the Unified Command Plan change, the Russian Ground Forces have rapidly developed a very active relationship with USAREUR. In addition, USAFE, USPACOM and USSTRATCOM continue to plan events with their counterparts. While much of this circumvents Ministry of Defense and General Staff apparatus, it is evident that the lack of a signed plan is currently not impacting ongoing contacts.
- The overall goal remains to "normalize" the military-to-military relationship. Therefore, it is important to support USEUCOM as the lead for military contacts with Russia (as with all other nations in that AOR) and allow time for the relationship with the Russian General Staff to develop.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG G. W. Casey, USA; Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (b)(6)

RUSSIA

15 Jan 03

U00807.../03

11-L-0559/OSD14445

#360

December 30, 2002 11:59 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Russia

Please take a look at this paper on Russia. My instinct is to stick with EUCOM as the contact.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/18/02 DATT Moscow paper: "A Way Ahead on US-Russian Military Contact Plan"

DHR:dh
123001-6 (to computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 01/17/03

03 JAN

11-L-0559/OSD14446

A Way Ahead on US-Russian Military Contact Plan

Situation. During the December visit of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, to Russian Chief of General Staff, General Kvashnin, Kvashnin verbalized what the US side has been hearing in whispers since about November. The Russian Chief of the General Staff does not like the shift of responsibilities from Joint Staff to European Command Staff for coordinating our mutual contact plan. Saying that he "does not accept the change," Kvashnin said he had directed his First Deputy, General Baluyevskiy, to work with whomever General Myers nominated to work out the details of how to resolve the disconnect. Both the Chairman and Kvashnin left the subject for further discussion by their deputies. The question now is how to proceed with 2003 contacts.

The position taken by General Kvashnin actually places the General Staff and Russian military services in a tough spot. It is the Russian side, which needs an agreed contact plan more than the American side. The Russian General Staff first and foremost wants to exercise central control over the coordination and planning process, a requirement that a single overarching contact plan helps satisfy. Secondly, the Services need an agreed contact plan, because the document becomes the justification for allocation of funding from the General Staff to the Services for contacts, trips, and activities with the US military. Without the plan, the Services must fund their own activities from their operating budget or rely on US funding. Finally, the plan provides justification for Service Chiefs who work for Kvashnin to request permission for themselves and their subordinates to participate in joint activities and travel abroad. Kvashnin personally approves all requests by general officers to travel abroad, and he has been known to cancel their travel days before an event.

Kvashnin's announcement that he does not accept the new US conditions for coordinating and planning contacts, comes at an awkward time for both sides, but especially for the Russian side. The US side has already planned for its expenses by and large and in many cases has penciled activities into the operational and training calendars. The Russian side, which starts its operational year on 1 January, is behind the power curve. Proposals by the Russian Services for events should have been submitted to the General Staff in November and incorporated into the 2003 plan already. USDAO Moscow knows that the General Staff is already working on the 2003 plan, because the Staff has

~~For Official Use Only~~

translated the EUCOM draft plan for discussion within MoD and has distributed it to the Services. In fact, the Ground Forces have already provided the General Staff their response for 2003 and given a copy to DAO Moscow. Some joint activities are already being worked between US and Russian organizations. For example, the Ground Forces have accepted several events including participation in two MREs and a visit by Chief of Ground Forces to the Chief of the US Army. The Russian Air Force CINC has accepted a visit to USAFE Commander sometime in the spring. The lack of an agreed plan is not completely halting coordination, but it will undoubtedly slow development of new contacts.

Next Steps. The US side can proceed in several ways toward contacts in 2003. USDAO Moscow suggests that the first step should be a good faith effort to attend any meeting with General Baluyevskiy that the Russian side proposes. Since the proposal for this meeting comes from General Kvashnin, there is no imperative on the US side to call for or arrange the meeting, but the Chairman did give his verbal consent to sending a representative to such a meeting. A good choice to represent the Chairman would be General Wald, new Deputy Commander of EUCOM. That would reinforce a relationship established already by General Fulford and would support the goal of promoting EUCOM as the main point of contact for military contacts. This meeting will afford the US side another opportunity to minimize the role of an overarching plan and to push for a more flexible and normalized coordination process. A process that gives EUCOM the freedom and authority to coordinate all the requirements for military contact with Russia (PACOM, CENTCOM, STRATCOM, Services, etc.). While Joint Staff waits for a Russia proposal for a Baluyevskiy-level meeting, EUCOM can proceed with its various proposals (coordinated among the various US organizations that have military contacts with Russia) that have been already been passing directly to Services and Military Districts since this past summer. These initiatives include letters from component commanders offering exchanges and training as well as recommendations for operational combined activities and programs such as IMET. USDAO Moscow can continue passing and following up on these activities. The top-down pressure from Putin and MinDef on the Russian military to maintain good relations will continue to work in our favor. USDAO Moscow believes that, if US commands can allow the Russian side some time to work through its position, the US will get a more flexible process than previously existed.

~~For Official Use Only~~



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

702 17 17 7:13

INFO MEMO

January 16, 2003 – 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

Dr. David S. C. Chu 16 Jan 03

SUBJECT: Coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs—
SNOWFLAKE (TAB A)

- I believe we've established an excellent relationship with the VA:
 - Together we've helped shape a very constructive interim report by the Presidential Task Force to Improve Health Care Delivery for our Nation's Veterans. Its final report is due in March, and we expect it to call for institutionalizing the rejuvenated DoD-VA relationship.
 - Central to that relationship is the Joint Executive Council that we established with the VA Deputy Secretary, to oversee the existing Health Executive Council, and a newly established Benefits Executive Council. Together these have:
 - Concluded an agreement establishing a single discounted rate for the provision of medical services by VA to DoD and vice versa. We believe it will encourage the efficient sharing of resources.
 - Initiated a system for the transfer of protected electronic health information (so we can send veterans' service health records to the VA electronically)
 - Facilitated procurement sharing arrangements under which we either buy together, or one uses the preferential procurement arrangements of the other (for example, we will be using the VA's access to better drug prices)



11-L-0559/OSD14449

U00861 /03

- Provided a forum for deciding the administration of “Purple Heart Plus,” the program Congress enacted in lieu of concurrent receipt. We hope this forum can be used to revamp the overall disability program in a way that focuses funds on those injured by military service. (Congress’ recent direction focused on conditions associated with the aging process, including a bill this year that will make hearing loss presumptively a service connected disability for many)
- DoD and VA are collaborating on future facilities planning, through a Strategic Planning Executive Steering Committee we have created, and through a coordinated approach to our BRAC process and the VA’s analogous process “Capital Asset Realignment for Enhancement of Services (CARES).
- We are also collaborating on deployment health issues—i.e., anticipating the concerns raised after the last Persian Gulf War that became known as “Gulf War Illness.”

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Dr. William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

TAB

A

December 23, 2002 4:10 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Coordination with VA

The President wants a progress report on how we are doing with the Veterans Administration and Toni Principi on coordinating and cooperating our activities. Please give me a report by January 8.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-49

.....
Please respond by 01/08/03



January 7, 2003 12:16 PM

TO: Dr. Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Amphetamines

Have you looked into the issue of giving amphetamines to pilots? What are your thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR dh
010703-13

.....
Please respond by

11/24/03

440

7 Jan 03

U00887-03

11-L-0559/OSD14453



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1200 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

OCT 16 2002

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM. William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT. Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Pilots

- You asked, "Why don't you get some folks to think about it a little bit?" in reference to operational use of dextroamphetamine by pilots. (TAB A) My staff called a meeting of Army, Navy, and Air Force medical specialists to review this practice
- Fatigue is linked to an average of ten Air Force class A aviation mishaps and several fatalities each year
- The remedy for fatigue is adequate sleep. However, sleep is not always possible. For example, two-man B-2 bomber missions from Whiteman AFB to Central Asia require in excess of 48 hours of continuous flight
- When fatigue countermeasures, such as adjusting sleep patterns, in-flight naps and exercise, fail, pharmaceuticals can aid the pilot in completing the critical mission. Dextroamphetamine is the most effective of the drugs available and is safe when properly used. The use of these medications is closely supervised by medics and the line, and supported by experience, research and mission requirements. No aviation mishaps have been attributed to use of fatigue management medications.
- The Army, Navy and Air Force have strict policies on use of stimulant medications to maintain performance during long or frequent operational flights. Each allows use of stimulants only as a last resort.
- Pilots also undergo extensive ground-testing to preclude inadvertent complications before they are "cleared" to use controlled stimulant medications. Unused doses are returned and accounted for to preclude non-operational diversion of the medications
- Based on this review, my medical opinion is that the practice is limited, acceptable in support of certain military missions, and is well controlled.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments.
As stated

Prepared by COL James M. Bengt, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS# 41751,
41518

11-L-0559/OSD14454

September 30, 2002 9:32 AM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dextroamphetamine

I just can't believe using these pills is a good idea. Why don't you get some folks to think about it a little bit? I admit I've got kind of a bias against putting things into your body unless you absolutely have to, but please take a look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.

09/06/02 ASD (Health Affairs) memo to SecDef re: Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Aviators [U14912-02]

OHR:dh
093002-4

.....
Please respond by 10/2/02

Dr. T -

10/2

Thoughts? Any possibility we could (should?) develop Policy with tighter guidelines for use of these pills? I tend to agree w/ Sec Def
Pls. respond w/in 5 business days.

BW

11-L-0559/OSD14455



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D C 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

SEP 6 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr. MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Aviators

- You directed that we "look into this business about pilots using amphetamines." (TAB A)
- Dextroamphetamine, known as "go pills," has been used by military aviators since World War II to counter the effects of fatigue during combat operations. It is only used if alternatives such as adjusting sleep patterns, in-flight naps or exercise are either unsuccessful or not an option. There have been no reported safety incidents involving aircrew members' use of "go pills."
- The wing commander, or deployed commander equivalent, in consultation with the senior flight surgeon, determines if the use of Dextroamphetamine is medically warranted. The authorization for its use is time and/or mission specific.
- Countering pilot fatigue is an "off label" use of Dextroamphetamine; informed consent is necessary from the crew member. Commanders may not order its use. There is no penalty, punishment, loss of benefits, or adverse action of any kind for those who decline the use of stimulants. Ground testing prior to combat use and rigorous accountability measures must also be in place.
- Military medical research laboratories are currently studying alternative drugs to effectively combat pilot fatigue, including Modafinil, a Food and Drug Administration approved medication used to treat narcolepsy.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared by: COL John Powers, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS# 40336, 40197

11-L-0559/OSD14456

Snowflake

8:29 AM

Kevin
Aug 8

David Chu

Donald Rumsfeld

August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Please look into this business about pilots using amphetamines. I don't think that is a good idea. What's going on?

Thanks.

DHR/asa
080902.02

Please respond by:

8/25/02

U14910-02

11-L-0559/OSD14457



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

ACTION MEMO



U-2791/DO-5

January 16, 2003, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché Paris

- The U.S. Air Force (USAF) plans to move the defense attaché (DATT) Paris, Brigadier General Felix Dupre, USAF, in February, prior to his promotion to Major General.
- The options for replacing General Dupre are to send another O-7 to Paris or to designate one of the O-6 service attaches assigned in Paris as acting DATT.
- The USAF does not have a language-qualified O-7 available to complete the remainder of General Dupre's assignment as DATT.
- If a flag officer entered attaché training in early January 2003, he/she would graduate in late April 2003 and would require an additional 6 months of language training.
- The proposed legislative change as drafted by the OSD General Counsel to remove the Title 10 requirement that the DATT Paris be an O-7 is attached at TAB A.
- The DATT Paris was an Army general officer from 1965 to 1989 and an Army O-6 from 1992 to 2000.

RECOMMEND THAT YOU APPROVE:

- Naming the Army attaché, Colonel Ralph Steinke, as acting DATT upon General Dupre's departure, until legislative resolution of the Title 10 O-7 requirement. JAN 18 2003
- As a contingency, pending a change in the Title 10 requirement, Army identify an O-7 to assume the DATT position no earlier than summer 2004. JAN 18 2003
- Revert the DATT Paris position to an O-6 billet filled by Army foreign area officers, if the Title 10 O-7 requirement is lifted. JAN 18 2003

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Ms. Beth Wald, Office of Plans, Programs, and Policy, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14458

000935 / 03

France

16 Jan 03

1) Draft Legislative Language:

SEC. ____ . REPEAL OF REQUIRED GRADE FOR DEFENSE ATTACHE IN FRANCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 714 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 41 of that title is amended by striking the item relating to section 714.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Repeal of this provision will eliminate the requirement that only one-star military officers or those selected for promotion to that grade may be selected as defense attache to the United States embassy in France. Following this repeal, the Secretary of Defense may assign an officer to the position of defense attache to the United States embassy in France in the grade that the Secretary determines to be most appropriate. This repeal will permit the Secretary to dedicate scarce general/flag officer assets in ways that he determines are most beneficial to the Department of Defense.

C 11/17

August 20, 2002 7:17 AM

VCJES chop on this
action are marginal notes,
left side of the paper

TO: General Myers
CC: RADM Jacoby
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

I would like to stop the assignment of Dupré to Paris. I don't think a two-star is appropriate.

I think we ought to assign an O-6 so we don't end up with a two-star there if he gets promoted.

I will ask the General Counsel to prepare a proposal to change the law, so we can go back to an O-6, as in other countries.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/19/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: Flag Defense Attachés

DHR:dh
081902-45

.....
Please respond by 09/06/02

- Response Attached

(Related memo as rear
of packet)

U13717 /02

August 15, 2002 4:15 PM

Snowflake

TO: RADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Defense Attachés

I understand we have a two-star defense attaché in Paris. What is normal in a country like France—an O-6? Do we have two-stars anywhere else, or are there one-stars in China and Russia?

Please advise. I want to talk to Senator Warner about this soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061502-23

.....
Please respond by 08/20/02

11-L-0559/OSD14461

#286



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *RP 8/22*

August 22, 2002
GFO 289/74-02

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché - France

- You asked Gen Myers to stop the assignment of Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, as the Defense Attaché (DATT) - France (TAB) in order to avoid having a two star fill this position. Brig Gen Dupre is projected to be promoted to Major General in June 2003.
- I certainly agree that the DATT-France position should be downgraded to a Colonel and fully support your legislative proposal to change the law that currently requires the grade to be an O-7. However, in the interim, recommend Brig Gen Dupre continue with his scheduled assignment based on the timing of your request.
- Brig Gen Dupre is already in France. He has relocated his family and received his household goods. He is currently scheduled to assume the position on 4 September. In addition, Brig Gen and Mrs. Dupre both just completed four months of extensive preparation and training at the Defense Intelligence Agency. The incumbent, RADM Larry Poe, has also shipped his household goods and is preparing to retire.
- In light of these circumstances, recommend Brig Gen Dupre be allowed to serve as DATT-France until his promotion to Major General. This solution avoids a two-star in the position and alleviates undue personal hardship for General Dupre and his family, while affording the department sufficient time to amend the legislation and adequately prepare his replacement.
- The Air Force concurs with curtailing his assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve the assignment of Brig Gen Dupre to be Defense Attaché - France until the month prior to his effective promotion date to Major General (currently projected as May 2003).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Julia K. Sennewald, USA, Spec Asst for G/FO Matters, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION SEP 3 2002

U13869 02

JP Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

11-L-0559/OSD14462

11/3869 02



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2002 AUG 23 PM 12:10

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *MP e/22*

August 22, 2002
GFO 289/74-02

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché - France

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- The Air Force concurs with curtailing his assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve the assignment of Brig Gen Dupre to be Defense Attaché - France until the month prior to his effective promotion date to Major General (currently projected as May 2003).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Julia K. Sennewald, USA, Spec Asst for G/FO Matters

(b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

_____ Other

11-L-0559/OSD14463

1113869 / 02

522
8/19
48/19
SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

AUG 19 2002

U-090/DR

August 19, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency *Z. Jacoby*

SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

Sir, you noted that we have a two-star defense attaché (DATT) in Paris and asked what rank DATT would normally be assigned to a country like France, whether two-stars are assigned to any other country, and if one-stars are assigned in China and Russia.

- Amge Law*
- Public Law 105-85 of Nov 1997 specified the DATT in France hold (or be on the promotion list for promotion to) the grade of one-star. The law was the result of Sen Warner's promise to Amb Harriman in France to enact this change.
 - Sen Warner pressed the Department to fill with a one-star. Eventually RADM Larry Poe, a Reserve two-star assigned to ASD(C3I) as a civilian, was activated and assigned as DATT. He arrived in Jul 2000 and is scheduled to depart in Sep 2002.
 - The previous DATT was an Army O-6. At various times in the past there were Flag/General officers assigned to France.
 - Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, is scheduled to replace RADM Poe. Brig Gen Dupre is a two-star select. He was assigned as Military Assistant to SACEUR, GEN Ralston, from Apr 2000 to Mar 2002. Dupre is fluent in French.
 - The other one-star DATT positions are in Russia and China. Both are filled with one-stars. France is the only country with a two-star.
 - DATT assignments equivalent to France (U.K., Germany, Italy, Australia, Japan for example) are O-6's.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: RADM L.E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

11-L-0559/OSD14464

U13868 / 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-728-03
22 January 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Staff Reductions

- In response to your request (TAB) for opinions on initiating an outside review of the OSD and Joint Staff, concur in the idea for an independent study to gain efficiencies, reduce duplication and potentially free assets to meet future challenges. In addition, Larry Welch is, without a doubt, the right person to take a look at this issue.
- It would be beneficial to have full Joint Staff participation in this effort to include the development of the terms of reference, the selection of team members, and the review and implementation of any study recommendations. Regardless of our challenges while prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism, please be assured of our support for this study initiative.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria I. Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14465

U01030 /03

January 2, 2003 1:05 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
CC: PAUL WOLFWITZ
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Staff Reductions

I am inclined to get someone outside to take a look at OSD and Joint Staff reductions. We have now have Ken Krieg's and Arnold Punaro's ideas. My instinct is to get Larry Welch to put together a small group of folks who have worked on the Joint Staff and in OSD and help us figure out a way how we can cut down the size of this place and stop duplicating everything.

Please let me know what you think. I would like to get on with it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010203-31

.....
Please respond by 1/10/03

January 2, 2003 1:05 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
CC: PAUL WOLFWITZ
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Staff Reductions

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Please let me know what you think. I would like to get on with it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010203-31

.....
Please respond by 1/10/03

200510

2 Jan 03

03 JAN 3

11-L-0559/OSD14467

U01032 /03



January 22, 2003 9:38 AM

TO: Honorable Anthony J. Principi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statement

I am sure you have seen the flap. Here is the statement I issued. I hope you can give me a hand by calling some of your friends in the veterans' organizations.

The most active ones on this issue apparently are the Vietnam Veterans of America and the national office of the American Legion.

Thanks so much for any help you can provide.

Regards,

Attach.

01/21/03 SecDef statement, DoD Press Release No. 029-03

DHR:dh
012203-5

327

1254103



United States Department of Defense

News Release

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil>Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: public@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 428-0711**IMMEDIATE RELEASE**No. 029-0.
January 21, 2003

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE STATEMENT ON THE DRAFT

During a recent press briefing at the Pentagon, a reporter asked my views on the old military draft system. Although not eloquently stated, I responded to the question in part as follows:

"If you think back to when we had the draft, people were brought in, they were paid some fraction of what they could make in the civilian manpower market, because they were without choices. Big categories [of people] were exempted-people that were in college, people that were teaching, people that were married. . . . And what was left [those who were not exempted] were sucked into the intake, trained for a period of months and then went out, adding no value, no advantage really, to the United States Armed Services over any sustained period of time, because (of) the churning that took place - it took an enormous amount of effort in terms of training and then they were gone."

Again, my statement was not eloquent. A few columnists and others, though, have suggested that those words were intended to mean that draftees added no value to the military. That is not true. I did not say they added no value while they were serving. They added great value. I was commenting on the loss of that value when they left the service. I certainly had no intention of saying what has been reported, or of leaving that impression. Hundreds of thousands of military draftees served over years with great distinction and valor - many being wounded and still others killed.

The last thing I would want to do would be to disparage the service of those draftees. I always have had the highest respect for their service, and I offer my full apology to any veteran who misinterpreted my remarks when I said them, or who may have read any of the articles or columns that have attempted to take my words and suggest they were disparaging.

The intent of my comments was to reflect a view I have held for some time: that we should lengthen tours of duty and careers for our all-volunteer forces, so that these highly trained men and women in uniform can serve in specific assignments longer, and also not be forced to leave the service when they are at the peak of their skills and knowledge.

It is painful for anyone, and certainly a public servant whose words are carried far and wide, to have a comment so unfortunately misinterpreted.

It is particularly troubling for me that there are truly outstanding men and women in uniform or their families -- past and present -- who may believe that the Secretary of Defense would say or mean what some have written. I did not. I would not.


I hope this deeply felt statement reaches those who have served those who are serving, and their families.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/b01212003_bt029-03.html

Snowflake

January 21, 2003 2:03 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: UAVs

Are we focusing the right amount of collection assets on UAVs?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012103-10

452 R

21 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD14471

U01057 /03

JUN 24 AM 7:42

January 21, 2003 7:02 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Combat Support Agency Review Team

Here is a memo and summary of a study the Joint Staff did on the DLA. Why don't you look it over and suggest how we should proceed?

Thanks.

Attach.

11/13/02 CJCS memo to SecDef re: CSART [U00063/03]

DHR:dh
012103-1

.....
Please respond by 02/21/03

020 JCH

21 JAN 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-607-02

13 November 2002

SECRET

JAN 21 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RBM/11/9*

SUBJECT: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

- Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires a biennial assessment of the combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security. The CSART recently completed its assessment of DLA.
- DLA is ready to execute its mission to support the operating forces as specified in current operations and concept plans, and is responsive to the current requirements of DOD combatant commands. Of particular note, DLA received high marks for bulk fuel and provisioning support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
- However, combatant commands are not confident that the current in-transit visibility (ITV) system is capable of providing logistic visibility from the depot to the field unit during a contingency. Although there are a number of plans addressing asset visibility and ITV, there is no comprehensive DOD strategy to improve and integrate ITV across the Department of Defense. Recommend the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics develop a long-term strategy for improving asset visibility for the joint warfighter.
- I have forwarded the report to the relevant parties for information, and have already directed the implementation of those report recommendations within my authority (TAB A). Attached for your information is a copy of the DLA executive summary (TAB B).

RECOMMENDATION: ~~Request your signature on the enclosed proposed memorandum (TAB C) forwarding the summary of findings for implementation.~~ *1/6*

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8;

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECUTIVE WHITMORE	

11-L-0559/OSD14473

U000063 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-609-02

13 November 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander, US Northern Command
Commander, US Transportation Command
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Information Systems
Agency

Subject: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

1. Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires a biennial assessment of the combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security. The CSART recently completed its assessment of DLA.

2. DLA is ready to execute its mission to support the operating forces as specified in current operations and concept plans, and is responsive to the current requirement of DOD combatant commands. Of note, DLA received high marks for bulk fuel and provisioning support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. A summary of the findings and the executive summary of the report have been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

3. The enclosed specific recommendations to improve DLA's readiness have my support for implementation. The Joint Staff has initiated actions as a result of the assessment. A copy of the final report is enclosed for your information; a formal tasker from the Office of the Secretary of Defense will be provided later.

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD14474

A

Copy to:

Commander, USCENTCOM
Commander, USEUCOM
Commander, USJFCOM
Commander, USPACOM
Commander, USSOUTHCOM
Commander, USSOCOM
Commander, USSTRATCOM
Army Operations Deputy
Navy Operations Deputy
Air Force Operations Deputy
Marine Corps Operations Deputy
Director for Logistics, Joint Staff
Director for Operational Plans
and Joint Force Development,
Joint Staff

TAB B

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCY REVIEW TEAM
2002 REPORT
ON THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

1. Overall. The Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) assessed the readiness and responsiveness of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to support the operating forces in accordance with title 10, United States Code, section 193. The CSART found DLA to be ready and responsive to provide logistic supply support to all CONPLANs and OPLANs with minor discrepancies. DLA also participates satisfactorily in joint exercises. DLA is to be commended for significant improvements in customer support, supply support, bulk fuel management, and provisioning support to operating forces. Detailed findings and recommendations are contained in the enclosure to TAB C.

2. Combat Support Readiness. DLA's combat support strength lies in its supply chain management processes. DLA supports contingency operation logistic requirements with a mix of depot stocks, commercial industry, and host-nation support using both military and commercial transportation to deliver supplies. The primary DLA risk to readiness is the constraint imposed on both military and commercial transportation networks into a theater of war.

a. DLA has several major opportunities for increasing its contribution to the support of the warfighter. It can improve command confidence in the commercial capabilities of the supply chain management process by developing and exercising contingency plans in the event of a computer network attack against the DLA commercial industrial base and exercising medical prime vendors' ability to surge for a large contingency. Achieving the DOD 85 percent availability goal for aviation repair parts is the major contribution DLA can make to assist the commands and Services in increasing the readiness rates of their aircraft.

b. The economic pressures on DLA to downsize and consolidate inventories, while still meeting a high state of logistic readiness, are the greatest threats to readiness. This is a result of DOD budget constraints and expectations for DLA to mirror commercial business operations. Balancing these demands with readiness is the greatest challenge facing the Director, DLA. Applying commercial concepts such as the Army's Velocity Management and the Air Force's Lean Logistics offer the opportunity for increased readiness. The Department of Defense can support DLA efforts to move commercial business operations while balancing readiness by reestablishing an overarching actionable DOD strategic plan for asset visibility. However, implementing these concepts must be assessed against the risk incurred in regions where austere environments and inadequate commercial hubs limit delivery modes and commercial suppliers.

Tab B

3. Assessment Criteria. The CSART evaluated DLA in the seven assessment areas summarized below.

a. Contingency Operations. Based upon its support to on-going and recent contingencies, DLA is ready to support similar level contingency operations. However, no recent contingency has fully challenged DLA's supply chain management capability as might be expected in the execution of multiple major conflicts as envisioned in the future.

b. Deliberate and Crisis Planning Support. DLA is assigned tasks in the all-regional combatant command OPLANs and CONPLANs. DLA is an active participant in the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) and has active headquarters and field-level planning elements. Its participation in the JPEC, review of combatant command plans for supportability, and development of internal plans are indicators that DLA properly plans for success. However, there are areas where DLA, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands can improve the planning process.

c. Exercise and Training Support. Recent involvement in CJCS and combatant command exercises indicates DLA is poised to provide responsive and effective support to the major OPLANs and CONPLANs. However, combatant commands are requesting DLA to assume a greater role in educating and training their staffs.

d. Security Cooperation Support. The combatant commands have assigned DLA no security cooperation missions in their theater engagement plans, although DLA is an active participant in theater engagement planning conferences.

e. Supply Support. Combatant commands believe DLA is ready to provide Class II (clothing, individual equipment, tents, tool sets, and administrative and housekeeping items); Class IV (construction materials); Class VI (personal demand items); Class VIII (medical supplies); and Class IX (consumable repair parts and components for equipment maintenance) supplies. However, there is room for DLA to improve the support for Class IX consumable aviation repair parts, Class VIII medical prime vendor support, and for the Department of Defense to improve in transit visibility (ITV) for all deliveries.

f. Bulk Fuel Support. DLA is responsive regarding fuel support and has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to meet all Class III requirements. The combatant commands, particularly the USCENTCOM/J-4, praised DLA and its field level activity, the Defense Energy Support Center, for its fuel support.

g. Provisioning Support. DLA is responsive in providing provisioning support (Class I). In particular, USCENTCOM cited DLA for excellent provisioning support during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.



THE SECRETARY OF D
1000 DEFENSE PENTA
WASHINGTON, DC 2030

Ex-1 *3/1*
Not under review
3/14
CMH

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
UNDER SECRETARY OF I
TECHNOLOGY, AND I
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INT
AGENCY
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

SUBJECT: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a biennial assessment of combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security.

The CSART conducted the DLA assessment in calendar year 2002 which contains specific recommendations for improving DLA readiness and has my support for implementation. A summary of findings and recommendations is attached.

I commend the Director, DLA, for exceptional bulk fuel and provisioning support during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. I particularly agree with the findings on in-transit visibility (ITV) and aviation repair parts. DOD efforts to establish ITV are critical to US warfighting capability. Request the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics develop a long-term strategy for improving asset visibility for the joint warfighter within the Department of Defense. Addresses should provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an update on recommendations within three months and a complete status prior to the next scheduled CSART assessment of DLA in January 2004.

Attachment:
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD14478

Copy to:

CSA

CNO

CSAF

CMC

Commander, USCENTCOM

Commander, USEUCOM

Commander, USJFCOM

Commander, USNORTHCOM

Commander, USPACOM

Commander, USSOUTHCOM

Commander, USSOCOM

Commander, USSTRATCOM

Commander, USTRANSCOM

CJCS, ATTN: Director for Logistics,
Joint Staff

CJCS, ATTN: Director for
Operational Plans and Joint Force
Development, Joint Staff

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
1.	DLA Liaison Officers (LNOs). Increased combatant command operational tempo and DLA responsibilities have placed additional requirements that often exceed the capability of the current DLA LNOs.	Establish, train and exercise a cadre of LNOs that are available to immediately augment the current LNO support at a combatant command in the event of a crisis.	Director, DLA
2.	DLA Secure Communications. Limited DLA secure communications risk operational security and hinder the combatant commands' ability to communicate with DLA.	<p>a. In coordination with DLA and DISA, develop and implement a DLA secure communications plan to reduce the secure communications shortfalls and risks.</p> <p>b. Submit a by-exception JMRR identifying DLA's secure communications shortfalls.</p>	<p>Joint Staff/J-6</p> <p>Director, DLA</p>
3.	Commercial Delivery Concept. Commercial delivery concepts increase logistic risk in theaters with undeveloped commercial transportation hubs.	<p>a. Develop and implement a mitigation strategy that minimizes the risks of velocity management in an undeveloped theater and incorporate said concepts in the next revision of CJCSI 3110.03A, "Logistic Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan."</p> <p>b. In coordination with HQ USTRANSCOM, identify areas where undeveloped infrastructure would restrict commercial deliveries.</p> <p>c. In coordination with HQ USTRANSCOM, develop a concept of logistic support for areas where undeveloped infrastructure would restrict commercial deliveries and, upon execution, incorporate concept into the logistic support plan.</p> <p>d. In coordinate with the Services and Defense agencies, develop a strategy for the CONUS entry of contractor logistics support (CLS) into the DOD distribution pipeline. Implementation will be a Service/agency responsibility as program managers of programs and projects that utilize CLS.</p>	<p>Joint Staff/J-4</p> <p>Director, DLA</p> <p>Director, DLA</p> <p>Director, DLA</p>

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
4.	<u>Commercial Defensive Information Operations.</u> Commercial vendor computer systems are prone to computer network attack (CNA), which may impact DLA's procurement and distribution processes.	a. In coordination with Joint Staff/J-3 and J-6, USSPACECOM and DISA, conduct an information operations risk assessment of DLA's commercial vendor Director, DLA base to determine DOD's vulnerability and develop requisite mitigation strategies. b. Incorporate training guidance in the next update of CJCSI 3500.02, "Joint Master Training Plan for the Armed Forces of the United States," to test the logistic community's response to a CNA on the commercial and unclassified networks.	Director, DLA Joint Staff/J-7
5.	<u>Supply Support.</u> Outdated logistic guidance for units deploying in contingency operations results in unclear timelines for when DLA sustainment	a. Review joint logistic guidelines for contingency operations to clearly define the supplies that units should deploy with in support of an operation and the expected timelines that DLA is expected to begin sustainment of supplies. b. In coordination with Joint Staff/J-4 and J-7, develop an exercise and training strategy for DLA and the combatant commands to implement the logistical doctrine for contingency operations.	Joint Staff/J-4 Director, DLA
6.	<u>Training Support.</u> Continuous DLA education is needed at the combatant commands due to personnel turnover rates.	a. Develop and execute a yearly DLA training program at each combatant command with the purpose of training staff members on DLA missions, function, roles, products, services, and capabilities. b. Establish and develop curriculum on DLA capability to be taught in Service and joint schools and courses.	Director, DLA Joint Staff/J-7
7.	<u>Aviation Repair Parts.</u> DLA meets the DOD's 85 percent aircraft repair parts supply availability goal for all Services, except for Air Force (Air Force should meet the goal by end FY 2003). DLA improved its aggregate availability percentage to 87.6 percent which is a 2.6 percentage increase from the last CSART. However, DLA is facing funding challenges and must	a. Joint Staff/J-4 assess the FY 2004-2009 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to determine if sufficient resources are allocated DLA to meet and sustain the DOD 85 percent supply availability goal for aviation repair parts. Report any deficiencies to the Joint Readiness Oversight Council. b. Ensure the strategy and implementation plan continually improves stocking policies, forecasting models, and contractor delivery performance for aviation	Joint Staff/J-4 Director, DLA

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
7. Co n't	continually improve its management techniques in order to maintain performance at or above the goal.	<p>repair parts to increase DLA's supply availability to meet DOD 85 percent goal.</p> <p>c. Submit a by-exception Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) identifying DLA-managed aviation repair part availability shortfalls if the 85 percent goal is not going to be met.</p>	Director, DLA
8.	<u>Medical Material Readiness</u> . Exclusive reliance upon medical prime vendor suppliers increases the risks of not meeting surge requirements for a large-scale contingency.	<p>a. Ensures the implementation of the Joint Warfighter Capability Assessment Commercially Based Medical Materiel Readiness study recommendation to develop broad scope medical prime vendor contracts.</p> <p>b. Develop and execute realistic medical exercises to test and assess medical prime vendor surge capability with the goal of increasing the warfighter's confidence in the medical prime vendor's ability to surge.</p> <p>c. Submit a by-exception JMRR identifying medical prime vendor risks.</p>	<p>Director, DLA</p> <p>Director, DLA</p> <p>Director, DLA</p>
9.	<u>In Transit Visibility</u> . Incomplete implementation of ITV hinders the combatant commander's ability to obtain a complete logistic supply picture.	<p>a. Publish (in coordination with DLA, Joint Staff/J-4, Services, DLA, and the combatant commands) a long-term strategy for improving asset visibility for the joint warfighter within DOD.</p> <p>b. In coordination with USD(AT&L), DLA, Joint Staff J-4, Services and the combatant commands, revise the Defense ITV Integration Plan to align with the long-term strategy in Recommendation 9a above.</p> <p>c. In coordination with the combatant commands, develop and execute a strategy to incorporate intra-theater visibility into the Global Transportation Network system.</p> <p>d. Develop and implement a confirmation process that validates the accuracy of the information entered into the GTN system against actual supply data being requisitioned and feeder systems uploading data.</p>	<p>USD(AT&L)</p> <p>HQ USTRANSCOM</p> <p>HQ USTRANSCOM</p> <p>HQ USTRANSCOM</p>

TAB D
COORDINATION PAGE

USD(AT&L)	Hon. E. Aldridge	20 September 2002
HQ DLA	VADM K. Lippert	Briefed 4 September 2002
USA	Colonel S. Loving	14 August 2002
USN	Captain V. Andrews	14 August 2002
USAF	Colonel D. Estep	21 August 2002
USMC	Colonel A. Van Dyke	13 August 2002
USEUCOM	Colonel E. Kramer	25 August 2002
USCENTCOM	Colonel R. Radin	12 August 2002
USPACOM	Colonel K. Andrews	17 August 2002
USSOCOM	Colonel J. Hampton	20 August 2002
USJFCOM	Mr. K. Speights	14 August 2002
USSTRATCOM	Captain T. Purcell	16 August 2002
USSPACECOM	Colonel K. Selva	21 August 2002
USTRANSCOM	Maj Gen W. Welser	22 August 2002
USSOUTHCOM	Lieutenant Colonel R. Diaz	29 July 2002
Joint Staff/J-1	Colonel C. Bowker	24 July 2002
Joint Staff/J-2	Mr. T. McNeil	24 July 2002
Joint Staff/J-3	Colonel R. Jassey	31 July 2002
Joint Staff/J-4	Colonel M. Stine	12 August 2002
Joint Staff/J-5	Captain D. McClain	2 August 2002
Joint Staff/J-6	Colonel R. Kenney	1 August 2002
Joint Staff/J-7	Colonel D. Laine	5 August 2002

Tab D

11-L-0559/OSD14483



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

March 6, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS)
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

SUBJECT: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

Title 10, United States Code, Section 193, requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a biennial assessment of combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security.

The CSART conducted the DLA assessment in calendar year 2002. The assessment contains specific recommendations for improving DLA readiness and has my support for implementation. A summary of findings and recommendations is enclosed.

I commend the Director, DLA, for exceptional bulk fuel and provisioning support during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. With regard to the finding on in-transit visibility (ITV), the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) will continue to work with the combatant commands, the Military Departments and DLA on implementing the Future Logistics Enterprise (FLE). The FLE is transforming the underlying deployment and sustainment business processes of the combatant commands and the Military Services, as well as DLA, and is significantly improving the overall logistics support provided to the warfighter. Enhanced visibility is a by-product of these improvements.

Further, DLA shall have the recommended Readiness Improvement Initiatives identified in the enclosed Summary of Findings completed by September 2003.

Addressees should provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an update on the completion of recommendations no later than May 15, 2003.

Enclosure:
As stated

U02257-03

11-L-0559/USD14484

020 DLA

6/11/03

Copy to:

CSA

CNO

CSAF

CMC

Commander, US Central Command

Commander, US European Command

Commander, US Joint Forces Command

Commander, US Northern Command

Commander, US Pacific Command

Commander, US Southern Command

Commander, US Special Operations Command

Commander, US STRATCOM

Commander, US Transportation Command

CJCS, Director for Logistics, Joint Staff

**CJCS, Director for Operational Plans and
Joint Force Development, Joint Staff**

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

CSART Assessment of DLA

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
1.	<u>DLA Liaison Officers (LNOs)</u> . Increased combatant command operational tempo and DLA responsibilities have placed additional requirements that often exceed the capability of the current DLA LNOs.	Establish, train and exercise a cadre of LNOs that are available to immediately augment the current LNO support at a combatant command in the event of a crisis.	Director, DLA
2.	<u>DLA Secure Communications</u> . Limited DLA secure communications risk operational security and hinder the combatant commands' ability to communicate with DLA.	<p>a. In coordination with DLA and DISA, develop and implement a DLA secure communications plan to reduce the secure communications shortfalls and risks.</p> <p>b. Submit a by-exception JMRR identifying DLA's secure communications shortfalls.</p>	<p>Joint Staff/J-6</p> <p>Director, DLA</p>
3.	<u>Commercial Delivery Concept</u> . Commercial delivery concepts increase logistic risk in theaters with undeveloped commercial transportation hubs.	<p>a. Develop and implement a mitigation strategy that minimizes the risks of velocity management in an undeveloped theater and incorporate said concepts in the next revision of CJCSI 3110.03A, "Logistic Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan."</p> <p>b. In coordination with HQ USTRANSCOM, identify areas where undeveloped infrastructure would restrict commercial deliveries.</p> <p>c. In coordination with HQ USTRANSCOM, develop a concept of logistic support for areas where undeveloped infrastructure would restrict commercial deliveries and, upon execution, incorporate concept into the logistic support plan.</p> <p>d. In coordination with the Services and Defense agencies, develop a strategy for the CONUS entry of contractor logistics support (CLS) into the DOD distribution pipeline. Implementation will be a Service/agency responsibility as program managers of programs and projects that utilize CLS.</p>	<p>Joint Staff/J-4</p> <p>Director, DLA</p> <p>Director, DLA</p> <p>Director, DLA</p>

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
4.	<u>Commercial Defensive Information Operations.</u> Commercial vendor computer systems are prone to computer network attack (CNA), which may impact DLA's procurement and distribution processes.	<p>a. In coordination with Joint Staff/J-3 and J-6, USSPACECOM and DISA, conduct an information operations risk assessment of DLA's commercial vendor Director, DLA base to determine DOD's vulnerability and develop requisite mitigation strategies.</p> <p>b. Incorporate training guidance in the next update of CJCSI 3500.02, "Joint Master Training Plan for the Armed Forces of the United States," to test the logistic community's response to a CNA on the commercial and unclassified networks.</p>	<p>Director, DLA</p> <p>Joint Staff/J-7</p>
5.	<u>Supply Support.</u> Outdated logistic guidance for units deploying in contingency operations results in unclear timelines for when DLA sustainment	<p>a. Review joint logistic guidelines for contingency operations to clearly define the supplies that units should deploy with in support of an operation and the expected timelines that DLA is expected to begin sustainment of supplies.</p> <p>b. In coordination with Joint Staff/J-4 and J-7, develop an exercise and training strategy for DLA and the combatant commands to implement the logistical doctrine for contingency operations.</p>	<p>Joint Staff/J-4</p> <p>Director, DLA</p>
6.	<u>Training Support.</u> Continuous DLA education is needed at the combatant commands due to personnel turnover rates.	<p>a. Develop and execute a yearly DLA training program at each combatant command with the purpose of training staff members on DLA missions, function, roles, products, services, and capabilities.</p> <p>b. Establish and develop curriculum on DLA capability to be taught in Service and joint schools and courses.</p>	<p>Director, DLA</p> <p>Joint Staff/J-7</p>
7.	<u>Aviation Repair Parts.</u> DLA meets the DOD's 85 percent aircraft repair parts supply availability goal for all Services, except for Air Force (Air Force should meet the goal by end FY 2003). DLA improved its aggregate availability percentage to 87.6 percent which is a 2.6 percentage increase from the last CSART. However, DLA is facing funding challenges and must	<p>a. Joint Staff/J-4 assess the FY 2004-2009 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to determine if sufficient resources are allocated DLA to meet and sustain the DOD 85 percent supply availability goal for aviation repair parts. Report any deficiencies to the Joint Readiness Oversight Council.</p> <p>b. Ensure the strategy and implementation plan continually improves stocking policies, forecasting models, and contractor delivery performance for aviation</p>	<p>Joint Staff/J-4</p> <p>Director, DLA</p>

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
7. Co n't	continually improve its management techniques in order to maintain performance at or above the goal.	repair parts to increase DLA's supply availability to meet DOD 85 percent goal. c. Submit a by-exception Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) identifying DLA-managed aviation repair part availability shortfalls if the 85 percent goal is not going to be met.	Director, DLA
8.	<u>Medical Material Readiness</u> . Exclusive reliance upon medical prime vendor suppliers increases the risks of not meeting surge requirements for a large-scale contingency.	a. Ensures the implementation of the Joint Warfighter Capability Assessment Commercially Based Medical Materiel Readiness study recommendation to develop broad scope medical prime vendor contracts. b. Develop and execute realistic medical exercises to test and assess medical prime vendor surge capability with the goal of increasing the warfighter's confidence in the medical prime vendor's ability to surge. c. Submit a by-exception JMRR identifying medical prime vendor risks.	Director, DLA Director, DLA Director, DLA
9.	<u>In Transit Visibility</u> . Incomplete implementation of ITV hinders the combatant commander's ability to obtain a complete logistic supply picture.	a. Publish (in coordination with DLA, Joint Staff/J-4, Services, DLA, and the combatant commands) a long-term strategy for improving asset visibility for the joint warfighter within DOD. b. In coordination with USD(AT&L), DLA, Joint Staff J-4, Services and the combatant commands, revise the Defense ITV Integration Plan to align with the long-term strategy in Recommendation 9a above. c. In coordination with the combatant commands, develop and execute a strategy to incorporate intra-theater visibility into the Global Transportation Network system. d. Develop and implement a confirmation process that validates the accuracy of the information entered into the GTN system against actual supply data being requisitioned and feeder systems uploading data.	USD(AT&L) HQ USTRANSCOM HQ USTRANSCOM HQ USTRANSCOM



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2003 JAN 24 AM 9:24



January 21, 2003, 9:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army *Tom White* JAN 24 2003

SUBJECT: Report on Tank Operation

- This responds to your request to see a report after steps had been taken with respect to the Lima Tank operation, based on observations by former Secretary of the Treasury, Honorable Paul O'Neill, during a visit to Lima Army Tank Plant regarding underutilized capacity, plant management, and safety issues (Tab A).
- Lima Army Tank Plant is a Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated facility operated by General Dynamics Land Systems with oversight provided by the United States Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, and the in-plant Defense Contract Management Agency Office. This facility has diversified by applying its manufacturing capabilities to products beyond tanks. In addition to the Abrams tank produced for the Army and Egypt, they currently fabricate upper hull structures for the Stryker, complete structures for the Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, as well as gun turrets for Navy Cruisers. The facility is also used to assemble the Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge and test the Stryker Anti-Tank Guided Missile variant.
- General Dynamics Land Systems currently employs 610 personnel at Lima Army Tank Plant, of which 90% operate on the first shift. Remaining personnel on other shifts are primarily dedicated to equipment and facility maintenance.
- Observations made by former Treasury Secretary O'Neill:
 - Observation 1: Lima Army Tank Plant was disorganized.

Response: The recent reductions in Abrams tank production requirements and the termination of the Crusader program have resulted in pockets of underutilized manufacturing space within the plant, leaving the facility not as efficient as it could be, and creating some facility maintenance issues. The pockets of manufacturing may have caused the perception of disorganization. However, it is important to note that within the current production operations

U01101 / 03

SUBJECT: Report on Tank Operation

dedicated to the existing Abrams, Stryker, and other service programs, efficient operations are being used.

To address Lima Army Tank Plant's efficiency shortcomings and facility maintenance issues, a Contractor and Government team has been formed to review the methods by which we contract for management of facility operations. The objective of the team will be to introduce more efficient methods for operating the installation, to establish clearly understood standards for non-production related functions, and to gain better visibility over the installation operation costs. We invite your representatives to visit Lima Army Tank Plant in the June 2003 timeframe to see the results of these efforts.

The future of Lima Army Tank Plant beyond the current known projected workload is dependent on the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Lima Army Tank Plant is no longer exclusively dedicated to Heavy Combat Vehicle manufacturing. The facility is also being used for Medium/Light Vehicle manufacturing (i.e. Stryker and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle component/structure fabrication) as outlined in the FCS Acquisition Strategy. Discussions with General Dynamics Land Systems indicates that they are considering using Lima Army Tank Plant for their Manned Ground System proposal to the Lead System Integrator for FCS. The Army has made a significant investment in Lima Army Tank Plant that can be used to offset FCS facilitization costs. The current planned workload can provide a bridge for Lima Army Tank Plant to be utilized in support of the FCS Program. In the event Lima Army Tank Plant is on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list, the Army must be prepared to make a significant investment in relocating Lima's capability. Non-Army customers would be forced to establish their own capability or support the Army relocation. FCS would lose the advantage of any facilitization cost savings associated with using Lima Army Tank Plant.

- Observation 2: The plant appears to be an unsafe environment.

Response: General Dynamics Land Systems has an excellent safety record utilizing Lima Army Tank Plant. The appearance of an unsafe environment may have been attributed to: (1) retention of inactive equipment in place, (2) pockets of manufacturing activity, and (3) outstanding facility maintenance issues. Again, these problems are being worked by a Government/Contractor team.

SUBJECT: Report on Tank Operation

- Observation 3: People seemed to be standing around at the end of the shift.

Response: General Dynamics Land Systems' policy for hourly workers provides five minutes for wash up at lunchtime and five minutes at shift change. During Honorable O'Neill's visit, workers had cleaned up their workstations, and in some cases had moved to the checkout points, in accordance with their established labor standing operating procedures.

- Observation 4: The production capacity was low.

- Response: Reduction in Abrams requirements has adversely affected the use of Lima Army Tank Plant capacity. Lima Army Tank Plant was designed to meet a surge rate requirement of 120 tanks per month on a 3/8/5 shift basis. However, today the plant is only funded to produce 10 per month on a 1/8/5 shift basis. General Dynamics Land Systems will utilize 45% of available Industrial Plant Equipment capacity/capability to meet FY03 requirements.

- Ongoing efforts to workload Lima Army Tank Plant:

- General Dynamics Land Systems is incentivized to increase facility utilization through the use of a "Rent-Free Use" contract clause. This clause allows General Dynamics Land Systems to produce products for other DoD customers without an equipment usage charge.
- Foreign Military Sales tank requirements are being pursued by General Dynamics Land Systems that could potentially increase the plant's utilization. Possible customers are Taiwan and Turkey.
- The Army is exploring options to allow for introduction of non-DoD work into the plant as a means of further reducing overhead costs.
- Lima Army Tank Plant's future is being evaluated as part of the upcoming BRAC and the Army's Transformation requirements, especially as it relates to FCS workload.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: Memorandum from Secretary Rumsfeld, November 23, 2002, subj: Report on Tank Operation

Prepared By: Mr. Prince Young, Jr., (b)(6)

November 23, 2002 3:35 PM

TO: Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Report on Tank Operation

I want to see a report after you have taken your steps with respect to the Lima tank operation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112302.12

.....
Please respond by

12 / 20 / 02

01 / 09 / 03 (EXT. APPROVED BY OSD)

01 / 22 / 03 (EXT. APPROVED BY OSD)



January 24, 2003 11:27 AM

TO: John McLaughlin

CC: Honorable George Tenet

MA

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

It was enormously helpful having you at that Senate presentation yesterday with Colin and me. Thanks for doing it.

DHR:dh
012403-13

335 SD

24 Jan 03



January 22, 2003 10:38 AM

TO: LTG Hayden

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

SUBJECT: Update

Thanks for the update on the Giesler project. I appreciate it.

DIR:dh
012203-12

.....

Please respond by _____

33550

22 Jan 03

January 22, 2003 10:25 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Funds

We need to think about "tin cupping" the world for the situation if we do end up using force in Iraq. Someone ought to be putting together a plan as to how we do it, so we can implement it near immediately.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012203-11

Iraq

22 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD14495

U01172 /03



January 21, 2003 7:08 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invitation and Response

Please see me on that invitation to speak to the McDonald's board. I am inclined not to do it, but I have to answer.

Also, I have to answer Penn James, who wrote me about J.J. Quinn.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012103-2

.....
Please respond by 01/24/03

001.150

21 Jan 03



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

JAN 24 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Response to Secretary of Defense about an Alignment between Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences

- In the enclosed letter from Dr. Bernie Wagner, he suggests that "an alignment between the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for the Department of Defense." (TAB A)
- We agree with Dr. Wagner that there are potential educational advantages and economies to be gained from closer links between the two Department of Defense organizations. Indeed, in our recent response to the Program Analysis and Evaluation's study on the Program Decision Memorandum on the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, we recommended that the Institute should increase formalized collaborations with or realign to become part of the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences.
- We are taking steps to explore opportunities for improved collaboration this year with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Board of Governors and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences Board of Regents.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC E.C. Ritchie, C&PP, HA, (b)(6) PCDOCS
#44679,44556

U01258-03

11-L-0559/OSD14497

December 20, 2002 8:04 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: AFIP and USUHS

Please take a look at this letter from my friend, Dr. Bernie Wagner, and get back to me with an indication of what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/21/02 Wagner ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
122002-4

.....
Please respond by 01/17/03

*Stacy,
check w/ Asst. Heltzer and see if Winters needs
has the action and please keep me informed.
See also my noted questions.
220 12.23.02*

U01256-03

11-L-0559/OSD14498

Bernard M. Wagner, M.D.
Emeritus Research Professor of Pathology
New York University Medical Center

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 20 2002

November 21, 2002

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Suite 405
400 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Dear Don:

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), plays a vital role in our country's military preparedness. Virtually all of its programs are directly related to military readiness. Furthermore, many of these programs are unique in their specificity to the needs of DoD. For example, many cities, counties and states have forensic pathology programs. However, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System is specifically designed to address the unique circumstances attendant to deaths among the military. As we have discussed in the past, the AFIP has the strongest group of pathologists in the world. Their expertise is focused not only upon the appropriate diagnosis and treatment of disease among military personnel but also the support of DoD in research of specific importance to the Armed Forces and the education of health professionals throughout the military health care system.

This education component of the AFIP's mission has prompted the recommendation that it be united with the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). Careful examination of these two organizations reveals an amazing degree of possible synergy should they be combined. Such a combination would not only provide benefits to DoD and our country but could result in major cost savings.

In summary, the AFIP is vital to the mission of DoD in terms of military readiness, Force Health Protection and homeland security. The value of USUHS to DoD is well known and respected. An alignment between the AFIP and USUHS would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for DoD. I served for 15 years as a member of the Committee on Toxicology, National Academy of Sciences. During this time, the DoD was our major sponsor of studies. Repeatedly, we used the AFIP as a consultant to our committee.

Here's wishing you and your family a happy Holiday Season and I hope to see you soon. With very best personal regards,

Bernie

who & what's behind this?

11-L-0559/OSD14499

JAMES M. DENNY

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

November 25, 2002


(b)(6)

Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense-Pentagon
Room 3E-880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

(b)(6)

Attached is a letter that Bernie Wagner asked me to pass on to Don. Bernie was a member of the Scientific Advisory Board at Searle when Don was CEO and has been a member of the Scientific Advisory Board at Gilead for some time

Kindest Regards,



James M. Denny
JMD/kdm

D:\Kali\2002\denon\112502-Name1

cc: Larry D. Rite - ~~Done~~

11-L-0559/OSD14500



Colonel Stacey K. Hirata

*Military Deputy
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Installations and Environment*

23 Dec 2002

CAPT Steve Wellock
P&R

Steve,

Can you tell me who within P&R will be responding to the attached SecDef snowflake?

Request they keep us informed of the reply to the SecDef.

Further request they attempt to answer Mr DuBois' handwritten questions (on the snowflake).

Thanks.

11-L-0559/OSD14501

RESPONSE TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ABOUT AN ALIGNMENT BETWEEN AFIP
AND USUHS

COORDINATION


DASD, HB&FP

1/17/03

CoS, HA

PDASD, HA

USD, P&R

 28 Jan 03



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

ACTION MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

January 10, 2003; 6:00 PM

FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

FROM: David Tornberg, DASD, C&PP, Health Affairs *sent 1/17/03*

SUBJECT: Response to Secretary of Defense about an Alignment between Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

- The enclosed memorandum is in response to a letter from Dr. Bernie Wagner to Secretary Rumsfeld.
- Dr. Wagner suggests that "an alignment between the AFIP and USUHS would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for DoD." (TAB B)
- We agree with Dr. Wagner that there are potential educational advantages and economies to be gained from closer links between the two DoD organizations. Indeed, in our recent response to the Program Analysis and Evaluation's study on the Program Decision Memorandum on the AFIP, we recommended that the Institute should increase formalized collaborations with or realign to become part of the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences.

RECOMMENDATION: That the ASD (HA) forward INFO Memo (TAB A) to SECDEF.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: LTC E.C Ritchie, C&PP, HA,

(b)(6)

PCDOCS #44679



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

JAN 24 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Research Regarding Pain Relieving Drugs and Vaccines

- You asked, "What do you know about the following: 1) a drug Fort Detrick is working on that eliminates pain for a period, just by a whiff of something, and 2) a synthetic vaccination that covers all or most particular risks." (TAB A)
- Fort Detrick is coordinating research on a formulation of ketamine for self-administration by intranasal spray. Ketamine may provide an alternative treatment for acute, moderate to severe pain associated with burns, bullet wounds, blunt trauma, and other war-related injuries. In addition to the benefits of being non-invasive (no needle involved) and having a wide margin of safety, this formulation of ketamine does not decrease blood pressure and pulse like morphine which is the current standard for tactical field pain relief. The product does not appear to have any significant mental effects at the dosage tested and can provide immediate pain relief while the victim is conscious, unlike morphine which produces drowsiness and even loss of consciousness depending upon the dose.
- The ketamine research is at an intermediate stage. Successful completion of ongoing studies may support filing an investigational new drug application with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
- Fort Detrick is also working on a vaccine that can deliver multiple vaccine antigens simultaneously. The delivery system would incorporate vaccine antigens being developed as individual products, such as anthrax, botulism and Marburg virus. While the system is being designed to deliver multiple vaccine antigens, it is technically not a "synthetic" vaccine. The payoffs for the delivery system include improved readiness, improved ease of administration and potentially reduced manufacturing costs. Research is in the early stage.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared by: Lt Col Roger Gibson, C&PP, (b)(6)

U01266-03

11-L-0559/OSD14504

December 23, 2002 4:52 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information

What do you know about the following:

1. A drug Fort Detrick is working on that eliminates pain for a period, just by a whiff of something.
2. A synthetic vaccination that covers all or most particular risks.

Apparently the Surgeon General of the Army has been looking at this, or Fort Detrick. Al Haig mentioned them to me. Is there any prospect to them?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-56

.....
Please respond by 01/24/03

U01265-03

11-L-0559/OSD14505

RESEARCH REGARDING PAIN RELIEVING DRUGS AND VACCINES

COORDINATION

USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu

11-L-0559/OSD14506

RESEARCH REGARDING PAIN RELIEVING DRUGS AND VACCINES

COORDINATION

DASD, C&PP	Dr. Tornberg	1/17/03
COS (HA)	Ms. Tabler	_____
PDASD (HA)	Mr. Wyatt	_____



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

ACTION MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

January 15, 2003, 2:00 PM

FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

FROM: David N. Tornberg, DASD(C&PP) *mn* 1/17/03

SUBJECT: Research Regarding Pain Relieving Drugs and Vaccines

- ASD(HA) should forward the subject memorandum at TAB A to SECDEF
- The SECDEF asked ASD(HA) at TAB B, "What do you know about the following: 1) A drug Fort Detrick is working on that eliminates pain for a period, just a whiff of something, 2) A synthetic vaccination that covers all or most particular risks.
- We have coordinated with the Fort Detrick on these issues and obtained information on both. Research on an intranasal formulation of ketamine is ongoing. Currents tests show the product provides rapid, non-invasive analgesia without the cardiovascular and mental depressive effects seen with morphine, the current standard for field situations. Research is at an intermediate stage leading to an investigational new drug submission to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
- Fort Detrick is also working on a multi-agent vaccine delivery system. While not a "synthetic vaccine" per se, the delivery system allows for simultaneous administration of multiple antigens (currently anthrax, botulism and Marburg virus) and can potentially save vaccine production costs, ease administration and improve readiness.

RECOMMENDATION: That the ASD(HA) forward the report (TAB A) to the SECDEF.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Prepared by: Lt Col Roger Gibson, C&PP,

(b)(6)

PCDOCS #44851

11-L-0559/OSD14508



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-736-03

28 January 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMM 1/28

SUBJECT: Activating the Guard and Reserve

- In response to your request (TAB A) the following information is provided.
- The Joint Staff will form a General and Flag Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) representing the combatant commands and Services, with a mandate to offer specific recommendations and provide a framework for operation by 28 February 2003.
- GOSC will evaluate three alternatives to consolidate responsibility for activating Reserve Components (RCs) into one location:
 - Establish a manpower allocation task force similar in doctrine and procedures to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources Task Force whenever the activation of RC personnel is contemplated.
 - Create a Joint Manpower Priorities and Allocation Board analogous to the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board to administer the activation program.
 - Charge US Joint Forces Command, in its force provider role, to make force allocation decisions for both Active and Reserve Components.
- Each of these alternatives offers considerable change to organization, doctrine and business processes for the Services, combatant commanders and Joint Staff. GOSC will complete its report by the above stated due date.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM G.S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14509

U01270 / 03

TAB A

35

9:06 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Admiral Giambastiani
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 21, 2002

SUBJECT:

I think we are going to have to find a way to take all of the responsibility for activating the guard and the reserve from the services, the joint forces command and the combatant commanders and put them in one place so that the flow of forces, whether it is active duty or reserves, is all in one location. We can't do anything skillfully the way it is currently ~~disbursed~~.

dispersed Arrayed

Please come back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

DHR:azn
122102 GS

Please respond by: _____

1/2/03

Tab A

114L-0559/OSD14510

420034-02

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USJFCOM	CAPT Burdon	17 January 2003
USA	COL Chappell	16 January 2003
USN	CAPT Thompson	16 January 2003
USAF	Col Estep	16 January 2003
USMC	Col Bultemeier	16 January 2003

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD14511

January 22, 2003 11:40 AM

Received 1/27
10:00am

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Djibouti

Could we pay Djibouti for the use of that bombing range?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012203-24

.....
Please respond by 01/31/03

Dave / Tosh

Singapore 1/29

Djibouti

22 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD14512

U01286 / 03

03 Jan 03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100


OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JAN 28 PM 4:14

INFO MEMO

January 28, 2003, 1:57 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Payment for bombing range in Djibouti

- You asked whether we could pay Djibouti for the use of a bombing range. The answer is "yes."
- The United States has a current lease with Djibouti for the use of Camp LeMonier for \$4.75 million per year. The Office of the General Counsel has determined that we can renegotiate the current leasing agreement to include additional facilities, space, and other land, the cost of which reflects the special use of the land (e.g. using bombing ranges to train for the global war on terrorism).
- USCENTCOM currently has an assessment team in Djibouti to evaluate the facilities, space and ranges, and will report back next week.
- USCENTCOM advises that the United States currently does not pay for the use of bombing ranges in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Any such agreement that provides payment for the use of bombing ranges would be precedent setting.
- My office and Policy are also pressing U.S. Embassy, Djibouti to provide an itemized list of the costs that Djibouti has incurred supporting U.S. military operations in connection with the global war on terrorism. Once we obtain the itemized list, we can proceed with making a payment using FY 2002 Emergency Supplemental funds. My staff believes that the payment should be approximately \$3 million.

COORDINATION: Attached

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Josh Boehm, (b)(6)

U01288 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14513

Djibouti

28 Jan 03

**U.S. Government Support to Djibouti
FY03**

Humanitarian
Civil Work

DOD: 6.05M

- Humanitarian Assistance -- \$1M → OK - ODAHCA
- Airport Landing/Parking Fees -- \$300K (\$25K per month)
- Renewal of Lease of Camp Lemonnier -- \$4.75M

\$1 for demining & humanitarian assistance

(Camp will have to renew by Sept for 9/03-9/04)

Center is paying monthly \$2.5M

SECURITY ASSISTANCE: \$2.185K

- Foreign Military Financing -- \$2M
- International Military Education and Training (IMET) -- \$185K

STATE DEPARTMENT: \$10.25M

- Economic Support Funds (ESF) -- \$5M
- USAID Development Assistance -- \$2M
- Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism Demining and Relating Programs (NADR)- Humanitarian Demining -- \$250K
- USAID Food for Peace -- \$3M

GRAND TOTAL \$18.5M

IN PROCESS:

- Reimbursement for Djibouti services provided in support of OEF -- (Djibouti has submitted \$4,000,939 in expenses which are under review) ± 3 mil.
- Additional FMF for military to military support (including coastal security support)
- Additional ESF and USAID funding for economic/education/medical support
- Continued IMET (FY04 and beyond)

COORDINATION

OGC (Fiscal)	Scott Castle	January 28, 2003
USD(P)/ISA/Africa	Theresa Whelen	January 28, 2003



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JAN 28 PM 4:14

INFO MEMO

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COORDINATION: Attached

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Josh Boehm

(b)(6)

U01288 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14516

DJIBOUTI

28 JAN 03

U.S. Government Support to Djibouti
FY03

Humanitarian
Civil Work

DOD: 6.05M

- Humanitarian Assistance -- \$1M → OK - ODAHCA
- Airport Landing/Parking Fees -- \$300K (\$25K per month)
- Renewal of Lease of Camp Lemonier -- \$4.75M

for demining & humanitarian assistance -

(Center will have to review by Sept for 9/03-9/04)

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7-5

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- Continued IMET (FY04 and beyond)

COORDINATION

OGC (Fiscal)	Scott Castle	January 28, 2003
USD(P)/ISA/Africa	Theresa Whelen	January 28, 2003

January 22, 2003 11:40 AM

Received 1/27
10:00am

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Djibouti

Could we pay Djibouti for the use of that bombing range?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012203-24

.....
Please respond by 01/31/03

Dave / Tosh
Suzanne 1/29



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-742-03

29 January 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/24*

SUBJECT: Alerts and Mobilization

- In response to your question (TAB A), the following is provided. All Services have similar processes for alerting and mobilizing forces.
- An Alert memorandum is generated from you to the respective Secretary of the Military Department, who then notifies the command structure via standard message traffic. An automated retransmission is then sent to the affected units. Individual notification of Service members is by the unit commanding officers via telephone (phone tree is activated).
- The process for alerting forces and the process for mobilizing forces are the same, except mobilization requires that orders be generated for the individual.
- Service inputs indicate that the period between a signed SecDef memorandum and notification of the individual varies from 24 to 96 hours.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachment:
As stated


Prepared By: Gordon S. Holder, VADM, USN; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14520

U01379- /03

January 21, 2003 7:17 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Alerts and Mobilization

Please tell me how we alert people and how we notify them that they are being mobilized. Is it done by phone, mail or e-mail? Is it uniform among the Services? How long does it take?

The reason I ask is that it is my recollection that in World War II when Norway decided to mobilize their reserves they did it by mail, and the letters went out and arrived after they had already surrendered.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012103-3

.....

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD14521

TAB B

COORDINATION

USN	Captain Thompson	23 January 2003
USA	Colonel Wright	23 January 2003
USAF	Colonel Murphy	23 January 2003
USMC	Colonel(S) McCarron	23 January 2003

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD14522

TAB A

#373

January 21, 2003 7:17 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Alerts and Mobilization

Please tell me how we alert people and how we notify them that they are being mobilized. Is it done by phone, mail or e-mail? Is it uniform among the Services? How long does it take?

The reason I ask is that it is my recollection that in World War II when Norway decided to mobilize their reserves they did it by mail, and the letters went out and arrived after they had already surrendered.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012103-3

.....

326

21 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD14523

U01380 /03

Tab A

1/5
0928
Snowflake

2:47 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: January 10, 2003

SUBJECT: MFO-Sinai

Draft a memo on the subject of the MFO-Sinai Reconfiguration for me to send to the President. Short and sweet.

Thanks.

→ To Sec Def
Larry Di Rite
1/29

DHR/azn
011003.11

Please respond by: _____

1/15
MEMO ATTACHED

✓/R

→ [Signature]
(Fres) [Signature] 1/23

01-13-03 15:42 IN

11-L-0559/OSD14524

U01510 /03

10 JAN 03



January 30, 2003 1:26 PM

TO: Rich Haver

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
VADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

334

You will need to pull together a team within the Department to start planning our interaction with the 9/11 Commission.

Please come back to me with your thoughts fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
013003-13

.....

Please respond by 02/07/03

30 Jan 03



February 3, 2003 4:01 PM

Centcom

TO: Gen. Franks
 CC: Gen. Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
 SUBJECT: Dr. Schlesinger

Jim Schlesinger is going to be out at your command in Tampa on Wednesday.

I would appreciate it if you would pull him aside for an hour, just you or a small group. He is a very smart guy and has some very interesting ideas. He wants to be helpful. I think you would find it was a good investment of time. I hate to add to your burden, but I would appreciate it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 020303-23

Please respond by _____

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	
SPLASST	
EXECSEC	
DEPSECDEF	
C&D	X
CCD	
USDP	
CABLECH	
FILE	

3 Feb 03

U01564 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14526

January 6, 2003 9:07 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Joint Con Ops/Capstone

I don't think we ought to change the name of the Joint Con Ops to Capstone. I think it is a big mistake. It means nothing and it confuses the issue.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010603-15

.....
Please respond by 01/17/03

ACTION MEMO

ATTACHED

2/4
v/r
6 Jan 03

4:05 PM

TO: Bill Schneider
Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: January 13, 2003

SUBJECT:

Lou Branscomb, formerly of IBM is a very smart guy. You ought to see if you think he ought to be on any of our scientific advisory boards. Please report back to me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
011303.31

Please respond by:

1/28/03

ALDRIDGE RESPONSE
ATTACHED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-752-03
5 February 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM/5*

SUBJECT: Governors and Modernizing the National Guard

- In response to your question (TAB A), the following is provided. Engaging the governors in tabletop exercises and integrating their input into ongoing discussions concerning the evolving role of DOD in Homeland Security will be beneficial.
- These exercises could detect gaps in individual state planning, define the National Guard's role in homeland security, provide USNORTHCOM additional insight into the dynamics involved with different states and their consequence management efforts, and pinpoint interagency shortfalls in supporting the states.
- Assisting governors in identifying specific National Guard capabilities and requirements will also be useful. However, the Department of Defense should be wary about potentially getting governors involved in force structure deliberations--this should remain a separate DOD responsibility.
- Currently, the Army and National Guard Bureau are converting 18 Army National Guard combat brigades to combat support and combat service support units to meet the strategic guidance developed in response to the Quadrennial Defense Reviews of 1997 and 2001, as well as the events of 11 September.
- Will continue to work with the Service Chiefs; Commander, USNORTHCOM; and the President of the National Defense University.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Maj Gen Michael M. Dunn, USAF; Acting Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14529

U01699-103

TAB A

December 30, 2002 11:56 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Governors and Modernizing the National Guard

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. This might be something we want to do. Do you want to fashion something for me to send to Gaffney and Eberhart? Is it something that Giambastiani should be involved in?

Let's talk.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/15/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: National Guard

DHR:dh
123001-5 (to computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

03 JAN 3 1

11-L-0559/OSD14530

Tab A

From Newt Gingrich
cc: D. Rita
Wolfsberg

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, December 15, 2002 11:01 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DIRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil
Cc: jaymie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: Governors and modernizing the National Guard

for secdef.depsecdef
 from newt 12/14/02
 Getting the Governors to help modernize the National Guard

The fiscal pressure combined with the new realities of terrorist threats give you a real opportunity to modernize the National Guard. A series of war games in which every Governor and their civil defense staff dealt with two or three consequence management problems would then lead the Governors to see that they needed a lot more healthcare, engineering and military police capability in their National Guard. If you had the Governors helping make the case you would have a lot easier time getting the changes through Congress.

Gaffney and Eberhart ought to be able to collaborate to develop a game that could educate each state as it is played. A small team should travel to each capital to play it on site so it is easy for the Governor's staff to fully participate. After each game the local team should work with the DOD-Homeland Security team to develop a set of recommendations.
 the NY times reference follows

Deficits Looming, Governors Worry About Antiterror Costs

Government and business officials who met in Las Vegas to discuss national security issues said the U.S. may have too many vulnerable targets and not enough money.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/07/national/07WEST.html?todaysh headlines>

TAB B

COORDINATION

NDU	ADM Gaffney	24 January 2003
OSD(HLS)	Mr. Verga	23 January 2003
OSD(RA)	Mr. Hall	24 January 2003
USA	COL Chappell	24 January 2003
USAF	Col Richburg	27 January 2003
USN	CAPT Leenhouts	27 January 2003
USMC	Col Van Dyke	24 January 2003
USNORTHCOM	COL Aylward	27 January 2003
NGB	COL Mathis	28 January 2003

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD14532



February 5, 2003 1:28 PM

381

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Plans

I absolutely must have the rack up that shows the date that all of the contingency plans and excursions will be brought to me at their various iterative states. I cannot see any reason in the world why that is so difficult to produce.

I am now getting asked by the President what the dates are, and I have still not seen the rack up. I need to see it soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020503-9

.....

Please respond by 02/14/03

5 Feb 03

TAB A

8:29 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: January 15, 2003

SUBJECT:

I think we need to get your group working on the idea of harmonizing levels of threat so that "one" is always high, and anything lower is always lower. I agree with Ed Eberhart.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
011503.09

Please respond by: _____

Tab A

384

15 Jan 03



#

7:06 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
DATE: January 17, 2003
SUBJECT:

Don't forget you owe me a report back as to how we can wire this building so that any alerts that take place are fed through this office, my office, and coordinated with Homeland Security and the White House rather than being done individually by NORTHCOM. That includes any alerts out of this building and any alerts with respect to the services.

384

Thanks.

DHR:azn
011703.04

Please respond by: _____

A-2

Tab A

17 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD14535

U01838 / 03



February 6, 2003 8:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senate Hearings

Here is my testimony from the HASC hearing. It should be fixed and edited for the Senate. Here also is my notebook, which I think should probably be updated for the Senate.

Thanks.

Attach.
Testimony
Budget book

DHR:dh
020603-18

.....
Please respond by 02/11/03

UAB

2/10

- > Control snowflake
- > by 3 pgs of index to attach
- > SecDef will testify this thing

H

*eser for folder
index for ~~speech~~ binder*

*Larry Di Rita
2/10*

110.01 HNGS

6 74603

DoD FY 2004 BUDGET

**Secretary
of
Defense**

PREP BOOK

FY 2004 Defense Budget Q&As

War on Terrorism/Near-Term Requirements

A. War on Terrorism

1. Cost of the War
2. FY02 Supplemental Appropriations
3. FY03 Supplemental Appropriations
4. Allied Support
5. Foreign Assistance to Other Countries
6. Counterterrorist Train and Equip
7. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense
8. Guantanamo Detainees
9. Homeland Defense
10. Small Pox Immunizations

B. Other International Issues

1. National Security Strategy: Preemptive vs Deterrence
2. Nuclear Posture Review
3. Iraq
4. US presence in S. Korea
5. Afghanistan Reconstruction

C. Intelligence

1. Intelligence for the War on Terrorism
2. Information Assurance
3. Command and Control
4. Shared Intelligence among Federal Agencies
5. Total Information Awareness

Quality People and Forces

D. Readiness and Force Structure

1. PERSTEMPO
2. Spares
3. UCP
4. Vieques
5. Guard/Reserve Mobilization
6. Assistance to Customs
7. Range Preservation: Relief From Environmental Limitations
8. Special Operations Forces
9. Military Construction Recapitalization

E. People/Quality of Life

1. Pay Raise
2. Recruitment and Retention
3. Health Care
4. Military Housing
5. Domestic Violence
6. US Forces in Korea Quality of Life
7. National Security Personnel System

Transformation

F. Transforming Military Capabilities

1. Transformation
2. Missile Defense
3. PAC-3
4. Stryker
5. Future Combat Systems
6. Comanche
7. Army Systems - Terminations and Realignments
8. Shipbuilding Plan
9. Ship Force Structure
10. CVN-21
11. SSGN Conversions
12. DD (X)
13. Tactical Aircraft Programs
14. F-22
15. JSF
16. C-17
17. Tanker Retirement and Leasing
18. UAVs
19. C4ISR
20. Science and Technology

G. Transforming the Business of Defense

1. Performance-based Budgeting
2. Financial Management Modernization Program Progress
3. Defense Agency Streamlining
4. Security Clearance Process
5. BRAC 05
6. Proposed Legislative Package

H. Other

1. Percent of GDP and Federal Spending
2. DoD Topline
3. Budget Slides



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 10 2003

Dr. Bernard M. Wagner
Emeritus Research Professor of Pathology
New York University Medical Center

(b)(6)

Dear Bernie,

I asked our folks about your idea of uniting the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. The experts here think the idea has merit and are pursuing it farther.

Thanks so much for the suggestion. Keep them coming!

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

352

10Feb03

U01862 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14541

December 20, 2002 8:04 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: AFIP and USUHS

Please take a look at this letter from my friend, Dr. Bernie Wagner, and get back to me with an indication of what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/21/02 Wagner ltr to SecDef

DNR:dh
122002-4

.....
Please respond by 01/17/03

Stacy,

*check w/ Dept. Hall for any info w/ respect to
the letter and please keep me informed.
See also my initial question.*

220 12.23.02

2/4
Response attached

U01256-03

11-L-0559/OSD14542



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

JAN 24 2003

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Response to Secretary of Defense about an Alignment between Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences

- In the enclosed letter from Dr. Bernie Wagner, he suggests that "an alignment between the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for the Department of Defense." *WAGNER*
- We agree with Dr. Wagner that there are potential educational advantages and economies to be gained from closer links between the two Department of Defense organizations. Indeed, in our recent response to the Program Analysis and Evaluation's study on the Program Decision Memorandum on the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, we recommended that the Institute should increase formalized collaborations with or realign to become part of the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences.
- We are taking steps to explore opportunities for improved collaboration this year with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Board of Governors and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences Board of Regents.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: LTC E.C. Ritchie, C&PP, HA,
#44679,44556

(b)(6)

PCDOCS

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSFC WHITMORE	<i>1/26</i>

U01258-03

11-L-0559/OSD14543

11/20/2002 00:10 AM
Bernard M. Wagner, M.D.
Emeritus Research Professor of Pathology
New York University Medical Center

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 20 2002

November 21, 2002

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Suite 405
400 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Dear Don:

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) plays a vital role in our country's military preparedness. Virtually all of its programs are directly related to military readiness. Furthermore, many of these programs are unique in their specificity to the needs of DoD. For example, many cities, counties and states have forensic pathology programs. However, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System is specifically designed to address the unique circumstances attendant to deaths among the military. As we have discussed in the past, the AFIP has the strongest group of pathologists in the world. Their expertise is focused not only upon the appropriate diagnosis and treatment of disease among military personnel but also the support of DoD in research of specific importance to the Armed Forces and the education of health professionals throughout the military health care system.

This education component of the AFIP's mission has prompted the recommendation that it be united with the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). *by whom?* Careful examination of these two organizations reveals an amazing degree of possible synergy should they be combined. Such a combination would not only provide benefits to DoD and our country but could result in major cost savings.

In summary, the AFIP is vital to the mission of DoD in terms of military readiness, Force Health Protection and homeland security. The value of USUHS to DoD is well known and respected. An alignment between the AFIP and USUHS would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for DoD. *indicate* I served for 15 years as a member of the Committee on Toxicology, National Academy of Sciences. During this time, the DoD was our major sponsor of studies. Repeatedly, we used the AFIP as a consultant to our committee.

Here's wishing you and your family a happy Holiday Season and I hope to see you soon. With very best personal regards,

Bernie

who & what's behind this?

11-L-0559/OSD14544

JAMES M. DENNY

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

November 25, 2002

(b)(6)

Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense-Pentagon
Room 3E-880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

(b)(6)

Attached is a letter that Bernie Wagner asked me to pass on to Don. Bernie was a member of the Scientific Advisory Board at Searle when Don was CEO and has been a member of the Scientific Advisory Board at Gilead for some time

Kindest Regards,



James M. Denny
JMD/tdm

D:\Cell\2002\docs\112502-Name\

cc: Larry D. Rife - ~~LD~~

11-L-0559/OSD14545

February 10, 2003 10:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invitation to Norway

Here is an invitation from Kristin Devold. She gave it to me at Munich. Why don't we try to do it when I have to go over there for the June meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
5 February 2003 MoD Norway note to SecDef

DHR:dh
021003-18

.....
Please respond by 12/28/03

11-L-0559/OSD14546

U01922 /03

Norway

16 Feb 03

FEB 10 2003

Oslo, 5. February 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The United States of America

In these challenging times frank discussions and constructive consultations across the Atlantic are needed more than ever. I always value our discussions and I am pleased to hear that our staffs seem to cooperate very well.


I enjoyed my visit to Norfolk last month. The Open Road seminar was very interesting. As you know, I believe the task of linking U.S. and European transformational efforts is central to ensuring a viable future for NATO.

I am pleased with the fact that U.S. and Norwegian forces already enjoy a relatively high degree of interoperability, but I am working to ensure that this is improved continuously and that new allies also will benefit from our experiences. This is one reason why I am a firm believer in a strong Norwegian presence in the transformational side of the new allied command structure.

I know a U.S. – Norwegian dialogue on many of the challenges facing the international community and NATO would be mutually beneficial. I would therefore like to invite you to visit me in Norway this year. We should let our staffs work out the details, but my initial suggestion is a visit to Norway in conjunction with the NATO-ministerials in June.

I look forward to seeing you in Munich this weekend and hopefully in Oslo this Summer.

Yours sincerely



Kristin Krohn Devold

February 11, 2003 7:32 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Russians in Bosnia

Here is the answer Ivanov gave me as to that dust up with the Russians in Bosnia.
Please take a look at it, and let's see if we have different facts. If we do, I will
send them to him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated Russian Military Contingent paper

DHR:dh
021103-5

.....
Please respond by _____

RUSSIA

11Feb03

11-L-0559/OSD14548

U01924 /03

**SUBJECT: ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF A US TEAM
IN THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE RUSSIAN MILITARY CONTINGENT
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE
TOWN OF BIELINA**

According to the data received from independent sources at the end of 2002, there is a group of foreign nationals deployed and conducting intelligence in the town of Bielina, 7 Milesevska street, falling into the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the Russian Military Contingent (RMC) stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those unidentified persons are armed and wear plainclothes. It was indicated that the building housed concealed antennas and other radio equipment.

The provision of the group with potable water, fuel for a diesel generator, and food supplies, was effected via vehicles bearing US Armed Forces license plates.

On January 29, 2003, the RMC Commander's office put a number of questions to the US side, as pertaining to the point in issue, with a request filed to reply within three days.

On February 2, 2003, after an elapse of the deadline, with no reply coming back from Colonel Beck, multinational brigade (MNBgd (N)) Deputy Commander, the RMC Commander decided on checking out on the location by a 6-strong patrol from a recon platoon, reinforced with three policemen from the Ministry of the Interior Security Center of the town of Bielina, as well as a group of RMC officers.

The inspection established that the building was rented by the US Contingent for a long period of time by then. The US servicemen residing in the building are armed with pistols, rifles, and pump guns, which constitutes a gross violation of the international law. The arms were loaded and ready for use. It was purely by chance that Russian and US servicemen did not sustain any injuries.

Apart from that, the transponder mounted on the said facility is not designated on the relevant MNBgd (N) maps.

This unit is unaccounted for in the SFOR-10, SFOR-11, SFOR-12 listings of the US servicemen deployments.

The presence of the unit is not stipulated by the bilateral agreements and provisions laid down in the current Standing Operations Procedure for the NATO Allied Forces in Europe.

Attempted concealment of the true objectives pursued by that group and the transponder housed in the building bring about a breach of evolving mutual understanding and trust between the members of the Russian and US Armed Forces.

February 10, 2003 12:05 PM

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Gen. Jones

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Italy and the Balkans

Minister of Defense Martino of Italy told me Italy would be willing to backfill some of our forces in the Balkans. If we have to have those forces for Iraq, we might want to think about paring down some, but not reducing to zero.

Please have someone look into it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021003-17

.....

Please respond by 02/21/03

11-L-0559/OSD14550

U01925 /03


ITALY

/0Feb03

• Snowflake

February 10, 2003 11:36 AM

TO: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Thanks for your note. It was quite a time!

DHR:dh
021003-23

33550

10 Feb 03

11-L-0559/OSD14551

U01926 /03

From Admiral G

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Giambastiani, Edmund P ADM J00 [giambastiani@jcom.mil]
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2003 8:38 AM
To: (b)(6) (E-mail)
Subject: Munich

SECDEF--

Great job in Munich this weekend. It was another tour de force.
Glad to be on the team. V/r Ed

January 21, 2003 2:01 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Opinion

Could I write General McInerney a note and tell him I thought his column in the *Wall Street Journal* was excellent?

Thanks.

Attach.

McInerney, Thomas. "Friendly Fire: From Tragedy to Justice," *Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 2003.

DHR:dh
012103-9

.....
Please respond by

01/24/03

11-L-0559/OSD14553

U02040 /03

*Affirmation**21 Jan 03*

*Gen. Thomas
McInerney*

Friendly Fire: From Tragedy to Justice

McInerney

... 2002, around 12:52 a.m., an Air and Control Aircraft (Awacs) Controlled two F-16 pilots of Coffee 51 Flight. Need more details on Safire," the surface-to-air fire that one of the it was tracking the other's aircraft. s, in the sky near Kandahar, Afghanistan what is termed an "on call" mission, circling the area to respond to ground units needing their cover after the Awacs order to hold fire, an—Coffee 52—rolled in on a target "I got some men on a road and it looks like they are firing at us. I am rolling in in use."

American Rules of Engagement (ROE) authorize a response in self-defense. Coffee 52 dropped a 500-pound laser-guided bomb scored a direct hit on Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, which was engaged in night live-fire training at Tarnak Farms Range. Four Canadian soldiers were killed, and eight wounded.

A few minutes elapsed from the time Coffee 52 initially saw the firing on the ground to the time it released the laser-guided bomb. Eight seconds after impact, Awacs called out "friendlylies."

Answered Questions

People make mistakes in the heat of combat. Is this one that we should accept as a tragic error and write off as an honest mistake? Many mistakes were made during Desert Storm, when we had about 30% of our casualties attributed to friendly fire. Why hadn't this live-fire exercise been briefed to the pilots, Maj. William Umbach and Maj. Harry Schmidt, two very well-qualified pilots from the Illinois Air National Guard? What was the urgency of this target that it had to be attacked after Awacs had already told Coffee 52 "Hold fire" when he initially requested to fire on the location with his 20mm cannon? We all know that they would not deliberately fire on friendly forces. What went wrong that night?

The military has a process to answer these questions, and it is under way. Earlier, a Coalition Investigation Board (CIB) found the cause of this friendly-fire incident to be the failure of the two pilots to exercise appropriate flight discipline.

This resulted in a violation of the ROE and inappropriate use of lethal force. Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, approved the CIB findings and returned the report to the Air Force for action.

Last week, an Article 32 hearing (the military equivalent of a grand jury) started at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. Prior to the start of the Article 32, the case had been well-publicized in the media by the pilots' attorneys

Four brave Canadian soldiers were killed—a full and fair accounting is in order.

and supporters. Unfortunately, virtually all those who have appeared on television are not fighter pilots and have not experienced surface-to-air fire at night. In addition, none were in the chain of command as a General Court Martial Authority. Because I have served in both of those capacities, I want to explain the facts to the public as I understand them.

We have an extraordinary amount of recorded audio and video to reconstruct this case and most of it is in the public domain. I have personally reviewed the audio and video tapes from both cockpits plus talked to Air Force members who have appeared at the Article 32 hearing.

The issue is whether Coffee 52, Maj. Schmidt, was acting in self-defense when he dropped the laser-guided bomb on friendly forces. The initial evidence does not support this contention for several reasons. First, he had been told to "Stand by" and "Hold fire" by the Awacs controller. Second, surface-to-air fire—for those who have experienced it at night—is very easy to distinguish from ground-to-ground fire, and Maj. Schmidt apparently mistook ground fire for fire aimed at his flight leader.

Coffee 51 Flight was at 18,000 feet or higher and surface-to-air fire is not very effective at that altitude—which is why they were there. Third, if the surface-to-air fire was tracking them, they took no evasive action nor discussed it when it happened. There was never any urgency expressed on the audio recordings. Fourth, from the time he locked his Forward Looking Infra Red Pod on the target there was no enemy fire coming at either plane according

to both their cockpit video recorders. After bomb impact, and only when asked by Awacs, Coffee 52's audio recording did say "it seemed like it [Safire] was tracking around us and trying to lead us, with some sort of continuous fire with tops around 10,000 ft." Fifth, the daily Air Space Control Order had stipulated that Tarnak Farms was a Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) with small arms firing up to 11,000 feet 24/7. Unfortunately, the pilots had not seen this nor had their squadron intelligence briefed them about this continuous ROZ.

These facts compel me to say that there is sufficient reason for the CIB to have acted, and for the ongoing Article 32 investigation to proceed. We have an important obligation to protect the integrity of our Command and Control System and our support of Coalition Ground Forces. People make mistakes in combat and we accept that, but when it appears that there is a violation of the ROE we must investigate and take appropriate action. This was not a split-second life-or-death decision. This was done during a very slow night of no combat activity by two very skilled pilots.

That said—and this cannot be stressed enough—there is absolutely no evidence to support the ongoing, spurious claims made in the media that "go pills," faulty night-vision goggles, or, most incredibly, U.S.-Canada relations had anything to do with why the ROE were violated that night above Afghanistan.

Close Scrutiny

As Coffee 52 was exiting the area after being told by Awacs that there were "friendlylies" in the area, he said, "I hope that was the right thing to do," and his leader, Coffee 51, responded, "Me too." Both men knew they would be scrutinized closely for their actions that night. What counts most now is that the process of military justice be fair, as I have every expectation it will be. The Air Force must continue to do the right thing, as must Majors Schmidt and Umbach. A tragic mistake was made and four brave Canadian soldiers were killed and eight injured. We—and they—are entitled to a full and fair accounting by our military authorities. Trying this case in the media would be a great injustice to both men, and to the service to which they belong.

Gen. McInerney, a retired three-star Air Force lieutenant general and former assistant vice chief of staff, is now a Fox News military analyst.

February 22, 2003 9:57 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: (b)(1),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i),(b)
(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507

I agree completely that the DCI ought to have a

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i),(b)(3):50
U.S.C. § 3507

I will even go further—

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507

Good for you!

DHR:dh
022103-10

NATO 230

22 FEB 03

11-L-0559/OSD14556

U02350-03



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

FEB 12 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Update on Afghanistan Maternal and Child Health Joint Project with Health and Human Services

- This is updated information in response to your January 8 memo querying of Mr. Bill Steiger, "What is happening?" (TAB A)
- Health and Human Services publicly announced last week that they have secured \$5 million in the upcoming Fiscal Year 04 federal budget for healthcare in Afghanistan. The Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital program in Kabul will serve as a base of operations for four satellite teaching clinics to be established in outlying rural areas in 2004.
- Rabia Balkhi was chosen as the first site for perinatal specialty training to initially focus on physician refresher and residency training because:
 - The Department of Defense sponsored renovation of the hospital had already been scheduled (completion and a ribbon-cutting ceremony are scheduled for March 8, with training to begin in April).
 - Obstetrical physicians in Kabul have had no refresher training for more than 20 years.
 - Non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan are already engaged in training of midwives and traditional birth attendants.
 - Physician focused training at Rabia Balkhi is consistent with the wishes of the Ministry of Health, will complement existing non-governmental organization sponsored programs, and will serve as a training model which can be rapidly expanded to rural areas, once established.
- We plan to continue oversight of this program to recommend, once the physician training is completed, rural clinics with midwifery services are established.

COORDINATIONS: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Jack Smith, Director, C&PP Integration,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14557

U02111 /03


TAB

A

January 8, 2003 7:23 AM

TO: Bill Steiger
Director, International Affairs,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services

CC: Bill Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Midwife Program

I hope the midwife program doesn't migrate up into a major women's hospital I think the midwife idea was solid and important, and there is always a tendency for things to be elevated up.

What is happening?

Thanks.

DHR dh
010603-8

11-L-0559/OSD14559

U00323-03

TAB

B

ACTION MEMO

FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

FROM: Dr. David Tomberg, DASD, Clinical & Program Policy *out 4/03*

SUBJECT: Update on Afghanistan Maternal and Child Health Joint Project with Health and Human Services

- In response to your memo of January 13, a coordination meeting between DoD and HHS representatives for the Afghan Maternal and Child Health Project was held in the Stability Operations office at the Pentagon on January 31. We were informed that Secretary Rumsfeld's January 8 memo to Bill Steiger (TAB B-1) had been answered informally.
- Dr. Van Dyck updated the group on the three committees (equipment, curriculum, and request for proposal (RFP)/logistics) working on detailed plans for the Rabia Balkhi Hospital Training Program, which will serve as a center for refresher and post-graduate medical education training for Afghan Obstetricians and Midwives. Dr. Van Dyck's full report to Secretary Thompson is at TAB B-2.
- HHS publicly announced last week that they have secured \$5 million in the upcoming Fiscal Year 04 federal budget for healthcare in Afghanistan. The Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital program in Kabul will serve as a base of operations for four satellite teaching clinics to be established in outlying rural areas in 2004 (TAB B-3).
- DoD plans to establish eight Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in rural areas of Afghanistan in the months ahead. HHS has expressed interest in a partnership with PRTs to establish the rural training clinics.
- Rabia Balkhi was chosen as the first site for perinatal specialty training because
 - DoD sponsored renovation of the hospital had already been scheduled (completion and a ribbon-cutting ceremony are scheduled for March 8)
 - Obstetrical physicians in Kabul have had no refresher training for more than 20 years

- Non-governmental organizations (NGO) in Afghanistan are already engaged in training of midwives and traditional birth attendants
- Physician focused training at Rabia Balkhi is consistent with the wishes of the Ministry of Health, will compliment existing NGO sponsored programs, and will serve as a training model which can be rapidly expanded to rural areas, once established
- Next steps
 - The three committees will complete their initial recommendations by Feb 7
 - HHS will send Dr. Linda Brown to Kabul on Feb 13 to work with Rabia Balkhi staff, further refine program requirements and to serve as local resource coordinator.
 - A joint DoD/HHS team (Dr. Bill Haffner to represent DoD) will join Dr. Brown in Kabul the first week in March, and will be present for the ribbon-cutting on March 8
 - Rabia Balkhi training program start-up is scheduled for April 03

RECOMMENDATION: That the ASD forward the Info Memo at TAB A

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Jack Smith, Director, C&PP Integration,
PCDOCS # 45481

(b)(6)

Update of Afghanistan Maternal and Child Health Joint Project
with Health and Human Services

COORDINATION

CoS (HA) Ms. Diana Tabler _____

PDASD (HA) Mr. Ed Wyatt _____

USD (P&R) Dr. David S. C. Chu _____

David S. C. Chu 14 Feb 03



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECURITY AFFAIRS

2003 FEB 14 PM 3:41

FEB 12 2003

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Potential use of Viroxyn/Orthopoxyn

- You directed that we may wish to "look into a possible smallpox product" (TAB A).
- Viroxyn/Orthopoxyn was developed by Quadrex Pharmaceuticals. Four studies with male immuno-suppressed hairless mice showed improved results versus placebo for mice inoculated with smallpox vaccine.
- The projected market for this product is as an alternative to Vaccinia Immuno-Globulin or Cidofovir for those individuals experiencing adverse events from smallpox immunization. Quadrex Pharmaceuticals suggests there is also potential for treatment of smallpox lesions from a bio-terrorist attack for those individuals who have not received vaccine or have developed lesions despite vaccine.
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease is familiar with this product which is characterized by a very low therapeutic index (concentration necessary to inhibit smallpox replication is close to the toxic concentration). Moreover, recent primate studies have demonstrated that smallpox disease is characterized by high viral concentrations in body tissues; topically applied medication has no efficacy in such situations. They recommend against further investment in this drug for treatment of orthopox infections. (TAB B)
- I strongly favor increased investment in research and development of new treatments and vaccines and am committed to working with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology & Logistics) to improve our medical defensive posture against biological weapons such as smallpox.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: COL John Powers, C&PP, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14564

U02112 /03

TAB

A

October 30, 2002 7:07 AM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Smallpox

Attached is a memo from my doctor in Chicago about a possible smallpox product you might want to look into.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/29/02 (b)(6) tr to SecDef re: Smallpox Therapy

DIIR:dh
103002-1

.....
Please respond by 11/12/02

To Dr. Tomberg -

Plo. provide response for me.
You should commicte w/ others in
FHP-MR, and Dr. Johnson-Winegar's
office if a more technical assessment
of this possible product will yield a
more complete response to Sec Def -
Plo. respond by 11/15 Thanks Ben

11-L-0559/OSD14566

100323-03

Associates In Internal Medicine
211 East Chicago Avenue, Suite 1050
Chicago, Illinois 60611

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 30 2002

(b)(6)

Joseph H. Skom, M.D.
Joan C. Mullan, M.D.
Eric W. Terman, M.D.
Michael D. Ziellinski, M.D.
Sean D. O'Connor, M.D.

Cardiovascular Disease
Neil J. Stone, M.D.

Endocrinology/Diabetes
David S. Oyer, M.D.
Richard S. Crawford, M.D.

October 29, 2002

Re: Smallpox therapy

Dear Donald,

I apologize for bothering you with your busy schedule. Through a bizarre set of circumstances, I have learned of a company out west that claims to have a lotion that can be applied to the skin and kills the small pox virus. They were looking for a treatment for herpes and supposedly had access to small pox and discovered that in nude mice the lotion prevented death from small pox. They will be in NYC Wed through Friday this week, and want to link with a major pharmaceutical firm to pursue research and production.

I heard about this through my good friend Craig Goldberg in NYC, an ex-investment banker now advising the secret service, Secretary of the Treasury and the White House on white-collar crime and securities abuse. Because I was just at a meeting with a director of research at Merck about a diabetes drug, Craig gave my name to Mike Guldry (?), a government operative who was approached by the small company. Supposedly, Mike Guldry presented the information to the military, which expressed interest, and to Orin Hatch, but no connection with a drug company was made. Claiming only patriotic motivation, Mike is looking for a name at a drug company. The companies mentioned as good candidates were Pfizer and Johnson and Johnson. The company should be American.

The infectious disease friend I spoke to thinks it unlikely a lotion could work, especially for inhalation small pox. So

I apologize if the small company is making false claims. But it seems that even a long shot is worth pursuing.

Do you have any drug company names that you would want me to give Mike? If not, I will cold call people at Pfizer and Johnson and Johnson.

Regards,

(b)(6)

cc: LD

11-L-0559/OSD14567

TAB

B

Powers, John , COL, OASD(HA)/TMA

From: Jahrling, Peter B Dr USAMRIID [Peter.Jahrling@us.army.mil]
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2003 7:42 PM
To: John Powers (John.Powers@ha.osd.mil)
Cc: Boudreau, Ellen F Dr USAMRIID
Subject: Viroxyn
Importance: High

Col Powers,

Dr. Boudreau passed along your inquiry regarding Viroxyn. This product is known to us, and our NIAID collaborators have tested it for its ability to inhibit orthopoxvirus replication in vitro, and to treat vaccinia infections in scid mice.

My understanding is that Viroxyn is characterized by a very low therapeutic index in cell culture. The concentration necessary to inhibit orthopoxvirus replication is close to the toxic concentration for cells. Also, the compound showed little to no therapeutic efficacy when tested in scid mice with disseminated vaccinia. Although the compound may have some marginally beneficial effects in amelioration of the vesicular skin lesions, topical application does not reduce the viral burden in visceral tissues, where the infectious virus concentrations can exceed 10^6 virions/gram.

From our recent primate studies using infectious smallpox virus, we now know that systemic infection with exceedingly high viral burdens in visceral tissues characterizes the smallpox disease. Thus, topical application of this compound would not be expected to have beneficial effects in treatment of smallpox. While Viroxyn may have some beneficial effects on vesicular lesions associated with Herpes, the restricted distribution of Herpes virus to sharply localized sites, accessible to topically applied drugs, is a very different situation from the overwhelming systemic infection (with associated cytokine storm and septic shock syndrome) which characterizes smallpox infection. For these reasons, I would recommend against further investment in this drug for treatment of orthopoxvirus infections.

Peter Jahrling
Senior Research Scientist,
USAMRIID


11-L-0559/OSD14569

TAB

C

Potential use of Orthopoxyn

COORDINATION

DASD (C&PP)	David N. Tornberg	Concurred 11/21/02 (see attached)
CoS, HA	Ms. Diana Tabler	_____
PDASD, HA	Mr. Ed Wyatt	_____
USD (P&R)	Dr. David S. C. Chu	 14 Nov 02

TAB A

#376

January 28, 2003 4:40 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld P.
SUBJECT: Reserve Combat Deployments

I would like to visit with you about this issue.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/29/02 Mark Kirk e-mail for SecDef re: Reserve Combat Deployments; SecDef reply

DIR:dh
012803-16

.....
Please respond by _____

366

28 Jan 03

Carozza, Mary Beth, CIV, OSD-LA

From: Mark Kirk [(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, December 29, 2002 4:18 PM
To: MaryBeth.Carozza@osd.mil
Subject: Reserve Opportunities

Dear Mary Beth:

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year. I spoke with Powell on the issue below (and attached). I wonder if you could run it by the Secretary. Just a note and some thoughts to make our lives easier selling the Reserve program to Congress in a post-Iraq environment.

Give me a call [(b)(6)] if you have any questions.

Mark

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: U.S. Rep. Mark Kirk
RE: Reserve Combat Deployments
DATE: December 29, 2002

Kimberly and I loved dinner at your place. Joyce is a great hostess and Joyce's book shows you are a "not-so-covert" romantic.

I wanted to raise one issue:

Problem

Reserve units offer higher levels of capability in key specialties (e.g. doctors or air tanking pilots) for lower cost than active duty alternatives (roughly a 60% savings). Key units are needed on day one of any U.S. conflict.

Our current plan for Iraq (1003V) involves a substantial reserve contribution. Everyone agrees that a large reserve contribution is essential.

Tactical aircrews will be the key combat veterans in the coming campaign. Given our experience in *Allied Force* and *Enduring Freedom*, the performance of precision-guided munitions indicates that tactical aircrew's role will likely

11-L-0559/OSD14573

Tab A

increase, with fewer other combat specialties actually involved in fighting.

The majority of combat tactical air will be flown by Air Force and Navy aircraft. With regard to the Navy, I understand the service limited the number of wings to participate. The Navy owns one reserve wing of eight squadrons -- this wing has not been asked to prepare for deployment.

Out of eight Navy combat tactical aircraft squadrons, only one has been planned (fragged) for the operation. Seven remaining squadrons are making no preparations.

We depend on the reserves for a large amount of the coming mission. While reservists overwhelmingly perform essential, non-combat duties, the reservists who participated in prior combat operations performed well. The combat veterans sold the entire reserve program.

Using the combat performance of previous reserve units, we effectively outlined the nation's need and congressional budget for the reserve program. In Desert Storm, all National Guard units were left at home. No one from this program was enabled to return home to explain their mission, role, budget or importance for America's defense using examples of their combat performance. In Allied Force, only 40 naval reserve aviators saw combat and became the "rock stars" and salesmen of the entire navy reserve program.

If no changes to the current plan are made, "Desert Storm II" will involve only 40 naval air crew reservists in combat -- all attached to VFA 201, based out of Dallas (The reservists of VFA 201 just scored highest in the Atlantic fleet on their carrier qualifications). **If we limit reserve combat tactical air to just one squadron, it will limit our ability to explain the reserve mission, justify the DoD's budget and tell the story of the military. It will limit our message to only one major U.S. city in one major state and will create precious few role models for the entire reserve program upon which our defense does depend.**

Solution

Ask the planners writing 1003V to include other Air Force and Navy tactical air squadrons in the planning for the MODEP. I know of at least two other Navy squadrons that could be deployed in expeditionary roles to support future Air Tasking Orders.

This would increase our ability to highlight the role of reserves, tell their story in other states and highlight their importance in Congress.

Just a thought.

You are doing great and we are 100% proud of you in Winnetka!



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 FEB 12 09:19:31

CH-778-03
18 February 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Reserve Combat Deployments

- In response to your request (TAB A), the following information is provided regarding Reserve combat deployments.
- Currently Tasked Forces:
 - Carrier Air Wing 20 and its assigned squadrons are slated for mobilization and employment to provide surge capability for the Navy in case of a protracted conflict.
 - VFA (Fixed Wing Fighter/Attack) 201 (F/A-18A+) mobilized and deployed aboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT in place of an active squadron undergoing transition to F/A-18F. (F/A-18A+ are low-fatigue life F/A-18A aircraft modified to provide enhanced weapons capability comparable with F/A-18C.)
 - Naval Air Reserve support aircraft squadrons are currently deployed, or will be deployed shortly (C-40A, C-9B, C-130, C-20).
 - Lack of a more robust Naval Air Reserve presence in 1003V is due to a number of operational or maintenance factors unrelated to 1003V:
 - 1 F/A -18A squadron is slated for disestablishment (POM 04).
 - 1 F/A-18A squadron is undergoing upgrade to F/A-18+ and not available until 4th quarter FY03.
 - 1 E-2C squadron is scheduled to begin upgrade in 4th quarter FY03.
 - 1 EA-6B squadron returned from an Operation NORTHERN WATCH expeditionary deployment in September 2002.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14576

U02180 / 03

326

18 FEB 03

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

ORGANIZATION	NAME	DATE
USN	CAPT Thompson	7 Feb 03
Director, Naval Reserve	CDR Cutcheon	7 Feb 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

CM-778-03
18 February 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM 2/15*

SUBJECT: Reserve Combat Deployments

- In response to your request (TAB A), the following information is provided regarding Reserve combat deployments.
- Currently Tasked Forces:
 - Carrier Air Wing 20 and its assigned squadrons are slated for mobilization and employment to provide surge capability for the Navy in case of a protracted conflict.
 - VFA (Fixed Wing Fighter/Attack) 201 (F/A-18A+) mobilized and deployed aboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT in place of an active squadron undergoing transition to F/A-18F. (F/A-18A+ are low-fatigue life F/A-18A aircraft modified to provide enhanced weapons capability comparable with F/A-18C.)
 - Naval Air Reserve support aircraft squadrons are currently deployed, or will be deployed shortly (C-40A, C-9B, C-130, C-20).
- Lack of a more robust Naval Air Reserve presence in 1003V is due to a number of operational or maintenance factors unrelated to 1003V:
 - 1 F/A-18A squadron is slated for disestablishment (POM 04).
 - 1 F/A-18A squadron is undergoing upgrade to F/A-18+ and not available until 4th quarter FY03.
 - 1 E-2C squadron is scheduled to begin upgrade in 4th quarter FY03.
 - 1 EA-6B squadron returned from an Operation NORTHERN WATCH expeditionary deployment in September 2002.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

U02180 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14578

TAB

A

TAB A

#376

January 28, 2003 4:40 PM

Snowflake

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld P.S.
SUBJECT: Reserve Combat Deployments

I would like to visit with you about this issue.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/29/02 Mark Kirk e-mail for SecDef re: Reserve Combat Deployments; SecDef reply

DHR:dh
012803-16

.....

Please respond by _____

402176-03

11-L-0559/OSD14580

TAB A

Carozza, Mary Beth, CIV, OSD-LA

From: Mark Kirk (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, December 29, 2002 4:18 PM
To: MaryBeth.Carozza@osd.mil
Subject: Reserve Opportunities

Dear Mary Beth:

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year. I spoke with Powell on the issue below (and attached). I wonder if you could run it by the Secretary. Just a note and some thoughts to make our lives easier selling the Reserve program to Congress in a post-Iraq environment.

Give me a call (b)(6) if you have any questions.

Mark

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: U.S. Rep. Mark Kirk
RE: Reserve Combat Deployments
DATE: December 29, 2002

Kimberly and I loved dinner at your place. Joyce is a great hostess and Joyce's book shows you are a "not-so-covert" romantic.

I wanted to raise one issue:

Problem

Reserve units offer higher levels of capability in key specialties (e.g. doctors or air tanking pilots) for lower cost than active duty alternatives (roughly a 60% savings). Key units are needed on day one of any U.S. conflict.

Our current plan for Iraq (1003V) involves a substantial reserve contribution. Everyone agrees that a large reserve contribution is essential.

Tactical aircrews will be the key combat veterans in the coming campaign. Given our experience in *Allied Force* and *Enduring Freedom*, the performance of precision-guided munitions indicates that tactical aircrew's role will likely

11-L-0559/OSD14581

Tab A

increase, with fewer other combat specialties actually involved in fighting.

The majority of combat tactical air will be flown by Air Force and Navy aircraft. With regard to the Navy, I understand the service limited the number of wings to participate. The Navy owns one reserve wing of eight squadrons -- this wing has not been asked to prepare for deployment.

Out of eight Navy combat tactical aircraft squadrons, only one has been planned (fragged) for the operation. Seven remaining squadrons are making no preparations.

We depend on the reserves for a large amount of the coming mission. While reservists overwhelmingly perform essential, non-combat duties, the reservists who participated in prior combat operations performed well. The combat veterans sold the entire reserve program.

Using the combat performance of previous reserve units, we effectively outlined the nation's need and congressional budget for the reserve program. In Desert Storm, all National Guard units were left at home. No one from this program was enabled to return home to explain their mission, role, budget or importance for America's defense using examples of their combat performance. In Allied Force, only 40 naval reserve aviators saw combat and became the "rock stars" and salesmen of the entire navy reserve program.

If no changes to the current plan are made, "Desert Storm II" will involve only 40 naval air crew reservists in combat -- all attached to VFA 201, based out of Dallas (The reservists of VFA 201 just scored highest in the Atlantic fleet on their carrier qualifications). **If we limit reserve combat tactical air to just one squadron, it will limit our ability to explain the reserve mission, justify the DoD's budget and tell the story of the military. It will limit our message to only one major U.S. city in one major state and will create precious few role models for the entire reserve program upon which our defense does depend.**

Solution

Ask the planners writing 1003V to include other Air Force and Navy tactical air squadrons in the planning for the MODEP. I know of at least two other Navy squadrons that could be deployed in expeditionary roles to support future Air Tasking Orders.

This would increase our ability to highlight the role of reserves, tell their story in other states and highlight their importance in Congress.

Just a thought.

You are doing great and we are 100% proud of you in Winnetka!

TAB

B

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

ORGANIZATION	NAME	DATE
USN	CAPT Thompson	7 Feb 03
Director, Naval Reserve	CDR Cutcheon	7 Feb 03

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD14585



February 13, 2003 9:35 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Supplemental

Attached is a note from Mitch Daniels on the supplemental. Let's get our heads together and figure it out fast, by tomorrow, so I can get back to him.

We will go over it at tomorrow's Round Table, and Dov will need to attend.

Thanks.

Attach.

02/11/03 Director, OMB ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
021303-12

.....
Please respond by 02/14/03

U02189 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14586

110.01

13 FEB 03



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SECRET

2003 11 13 11 11 11

THE DIRECTOR

February 11, 2003

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Director Daniels *mtld*

I think the time is right for a discussion with the President about our approach to a supplemental in the event of hostilities in Iraq, and have requested time in the next few days. The objective would not be to settle on specific amounts, but rather to secure the President's guidance on an overall approach. I would array the choices this way:

- 1.) Make a request for the kind of conflict ("six days to six weeks") and early occupation the public has come to expect.
- 2.) Make a request for a worst case conflict and aftermath.
- 3.) Make a request for the "expected" conflict, but also ask for some kind of reserve fund accessible by notification to the Congress, without another full round of legislating.

There may be other permutations, but I think those ideas bracket the range. I believe duty requires us to be ready with a well-thought out request almost instantaneously with a Presidential decision, so now is the time to determine our general plan and prepare a request to have at the ready.

2/b cc: Dr. Rita
Zakheim
Wolfowitz

U02008 /03

TOTAL P.02

11-L-0559/OSD14587



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-6000
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 FEB 20 PM 12:29



INFO MEMO

February 12, 2003, 1:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army *Tom White* FEB 19 2003

SUBJECT: Costs of the U.S. Army Center of Military History's (CMH) Pentagon Research Team

- Memo responds to your question on subject (Tab A).
- Costs of maintaining CMH's Pentagon Research Team are salaries and communications.
 - Salaries are for one GS-13/9 (\$86,494) and one GS-12/6 (\$66,992).
 - Communications costs are \$400 annually.
 - Total is \$153,886 annually.
- Office serves Headquarters, Department of Army, other Army and DoD entities, Congressional offices, on call (Tab B).
- Office performs liaison and outreach for CMH, steers research, provides accurate and official historical data and publications, provides information on CMH services and resources, prepares information papers and essays, provides historical quality control on uses and interpretations of historical data, covers and collects information on Army Transformation and operations (Tab B).
 - CMH would have to perform these functions in any event, whether from Pentagon or elsewhere.
 - Pentagon office saves travel costs and time, facilitates face-to-face coordination and understanding of customer needs.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: James L. Yarrison,

(b)(6)

314.7

12 Feb 03

TAB

A

December 5, 2002 10:41 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Costs

Please find out how much we spend on this Pentagon Research Team in the Army Center of Military History.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120502-14

.....
Please respond by 1/3/03 [?]

2/10
→ Col Farrell.
Please let's
discuss.
D.R.H.
Larry Di Rita
2/10

TAB

B

Constituencies Served by the U.S. Army Center of Military History's (CMH) Pentagon Research Team

The Pentagon Research Team serves all of Headquarters, Department of Army, and other Army entities. It supports DoD offices, and various Congressional offices, on call on Army-related issues. The office provides particular support to drafters of speeches and articles and to high-level officials in the agencies described who have historically-related questions for which they need accurate, official information. During the past year, for example, the office has assisted the OSD, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, several Senators' and Representatives' offices, in addition to offices and commands throughout the Army. Serving these constituencies requires that the office be manned with seasoned historians who are extremely knowledgeable of the Army and its history and closely tied into current Army issues and operations.

Pentagon Research Team Functions

The Pentagon Research Team performs several functions for CMH and the Army. It acts as the Chief of Military History's liaison element within the Pentagon, gathering information and facilitating CMH's support to the offices and officials requiring it and providing information on CMH services and resources. The office assists action officers within its various constituencies in planning and conducting historical research and assists them in the proper use and interpretation of the historical data that they collect. In response to queries from constituents, it conducts research and provides, where possible, official and accurate oral or written responses and finished publications, as appropriate, and, on request, prepares timely and focused information papers and essays for those requesters. The office also serves as the repository for information that it collects on the ongoing Army Transformation and other Army initiatives and operations.



February 22, 2003 5:09 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (1/1/03)

SUBJECT: German Defense Minister Struck's Comments

I am considering sending this memo to MoD Peter Struck. A copy of the article in question is attached. What do you think? My view is that we should get something out promptly.

Thanks.

Attach.

02/22/03 Draft memo to MoD Struck

02/21/03 Paris AFP story, FBIS EUP20030221000118[100]

DHR:dh
022203-12

Handwritten signature: Cheney

Handwritten date: 22 Feb 03

11-L-0559/OSD14593

U02330 /03

DRAFT

February 22, 2003 5:14 PM

TO: Minister of Defense Peter Struck

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Mr. Minister—

I have just been shown news reports with the headline, “Germany Threatens to Withdraw Peacekeepers from Afghanistan in the Event of Iraq War.” It quotes you as saying that Germany would “first evacuate civilian colleagues by planes within a week and then the soldiers.”

As someone who understands the hype that headline writers can add to comments taken in the wrong context, I still am concerned about the signal your statement is sending: All terrorists have to do is put some pressure on the Germany-led ISAF and Germany will withdraw. That, of course, could well incite terrorists to engage in terrorist acts against ISAF, in that they would feel they now know what the result will be—Germany will withdraw, which is their goal.

If the sentiment of your comments as reported is not accurate, I believe the impression should be promptly corrected. If the sentiment is accurate, it seems to me that you should have talked to the United States and your ISAF partners before publicly committing to such a course of action. Discussing such a unilateral action without consulting with one’s coalition partners is surprising.

If what is being carried in the press is the policy of the German government, it would be best if you made prompt arrangements to move German forces out of ISAF as soon as possible. The United States is willing to work with the remaining ISAF countries to fill that gap. To wait until after a terrorist attack and then to

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD14594

DRAFT

withdraw your forces would signal to terrorists that terrorism works. This would be unfortunate.

German troops on the ground in Kabul have been performing well. I have heard from General McNeill that the German forces on the scene believe that the way to prevent terrorist attacks is to be seen out aggressively patrolling. I agree.

If you find that you cannot promptly correct the record, then I suggest we immediately discuss withdrawing German troops now, rather than withdrawing them precipitously after a terrorist attack.

Sincerely,

DHR:dh
022203-11

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD14595

February 22, 2003 5:09 PM

2

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *(initials)*

SUBJECT: German Defense Minister Struck's Comments

I am considering sending this memo to MoD Peter Struck. A copy of the article in question is attached. What do you think? My view is that we should get something out promptly.

Thanks.

Attach.

02/22/03 Draft memo to MoD Struck

02/21/03 Paris AFP story, FBIS EUP20030221000118[100]

ONR 03
012703-17

Don,
Struck's comments are outrageous, if accurate. Dan Coats
AC sends him a clarification. IF
in to get back off
they don't you both go
denounce, should our counterparts. IF
sat night Berlin.
OK?
GP
SUN AM
100yo.

Germany

22 Feb 03

11-L-0559/OSD14598

U02331 /03

February 22, 2003 5:14 PM

3

TO: Minister of Defense Peter Struck

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Mr. Minister—

I have just been shown news reports with the headline, "Germany Threatens to Withdraw Peacekeepers from Afghanistan in the Event of Iraq War." It quotes you as saying that Germany would "first evacuate civilian colleagues by planes within a week and then the soldiers."

As someone who understands the hype that headline writers can add to comments taken in the wrong context, I still am concerned about the signal your statement is sending: All terrorists have to do is put some pressure on the Germany-led ISAF and Germany will withdraw. That, of course, could well incite terrorists to engage in terrorist acts against ISAF, in that they would feel they now know what the result will be—Germany will withdraw, which is their goal.

If the sentiment of your comments as reported is not accurate, I believe the impression should be promptly corrected. If the sentiment is accurate, it seems to me that you should have talked to the United States and your ISAF partners before publicly committing to such a course of action. Discussing such a unilateral action without consulting with one's coalition partners is surprising.

If what is being carried in the press is the policy of the German government, it would be best if you made prompt arrangements to move German forces out of ISAF as soon as possible. The United States is willing to work with the remaining ISAF countries to fill that gap. To wait until after a terrorist attack and then to

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD14599

withdraw your forces would signal to terrorists that terrorism works. This would be unfortunate. 4

German troops on the ground in Kabul have been performing well. I have heard from General McNeill that the German forces on the scene believe that the way to prevent terrorist attacks is to be seen out aggressively patrolling. I agree.

If you find that you cannot promptly correct the record, then I suggest we immediately discuss withdrawing German troops now, rather than withdrawing them precipitously after a terrorist attack.

Sincerely,

DIR:ah
072201-11

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD14600

February 22, 2003 9:57 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: (b)(1),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i),(b)(3):50
U.S.C. § 3507

I agree completely that the DCI ought to have a (b)(1),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507

I will even go further—

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507

Good for you!

DHR:dh
022103-10

NATO 230

22 FEB 03

11-L-0559/OSD14603

U02350-03

2/13
802 Snowflake

16

EF494LA

2/21

January 30, 2003 7:52 AM

BOSNIA

TO: J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Paddy Ashdown

Larry Di Rita
2/21

Thanks for your memo on Paddy Ashdown. Do you think we ought to have a meeting with him every six months to see how he is doing, get him to report and force him to make progress?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
013003-12

Please respond by 02/11/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 21 2003

FEB 13 2003

SecDef:

Yes. We will meet with him every six months to keep the pressure on. And we will report to you every 60 days or so on progress. Do you want to meet with him regularly?

J.D.

FEB 13 2003/1540

if he is here
do it every 6 mo

11-L-0559/

JUN 31 10 07

0024563 / 03

11-L-0559

JAN 31 2003/1055

30 JAN 03

J.D. Crouch

Larry Di Rita
2/21



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704
INFO MEMO

pm 3:10

February 25, 2003, 11:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Response to February 13, 2003, Snowflake Subject "Award of A-76 Contract" and A-76 Status Update

- The short answer to your question, "How often . . . [have our audits] determined that the Government contractor underbid the private contractor," is that the subject Defense Financing and Accounting Service (DFAS) A-76 competition was the first.
- My office has conducted an independent review on a total of five A-76 competitions; in all but the most recent DFAS competition, there was either no contractor proposal or the contractor proposal was determined not technically responsive.
- According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, OUSD(AT&L), the results of 314 A-76 competitions from FY97 through FY01 show that the government competitor won 187 (60%) of the competitive awards. It is not clear how many of these instances were a result of "the Government contractor underbid[ding] the private contractor." I have tasked my staff to clarify this detail, and will supplement this response upon receipt and review of the responsive data from the OUSD(AT&L).
- As I mentioned in my February 11, 2003, Info Memo on this subject, I had requested the GSA Inspector General independently to review the events surrounding the DFAS A-76 error. In his February 20, 2003, report (attached), the GSA IG concluded, "the [DoD Office of Inspector General] audit work materially departed from the audit plan and was performed in a manner that does not meet several generally accepted government auditing standards [and] these shortcomings substantially lessened the likelihood that the OIG DoD's audit work would detect the error(s) made by management or its contractor in preparing the actual cost study."
- I am working with my senior leadership both to implement prudent measures to avoid even the appearance of either a departure from any OIG audit plan or performance by any of our auditors "in a manner that does not meet . . . generally accepted government auditing standards," and I have tasked my Audit leadership to prepare a proactive plan of action, based on the findings and the record of the GSA Peer Evaluation, for: (a) issuing any accolades; and (b) determining whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable for any omission, commission, or failure to meet professional standards.

Attachment: As stated

cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
11-L-0559/OSD14606

U02639 /03

GSA REPORT

11-L-0559/OSD14607



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

FEB 20 2003

The Honorable Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
Department of Defense

Dear Mr. Schmitz: *Joe*

Enclosed is our Office of Auditing's final report of its peer evaluation of the audit work performed by the Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense under its engagement entitled, "Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Function," Report Number D-2001-167, dated August 2, 2001. The purpose of the evaluation was to express an opinion regarding whether the audit work on this project was conducted in a manner consistent with generally accepted government auditing standards.

In our opinion, the work performed relative to the subject audit materially departed from the audit plan and does not meet several generally accepted government auditing standards. These shortcomings in practice substantially lessened the likelihood that the audit work would detect the error(s) made by agency management in preparing the actual cost study.

We undertook this review at your request. Accordingly, we consider your office to be the owner of the final report. We will not release the report to other parties. Any inquiries requesting the report will be referred to your office for your consideration.

Thank you for the courtesies extended to our staff during the review. We would be pleased to respond to any questions or provide additional assistance if needed.

Sincerely,

Dan
Daniel R. Levinson,
Inspector General

Enclosure



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

February 20, 2003

The Honorable Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Mr. Schmitz:

The U.S. General Services Administration's Office of Inspector General has completed a peer evaluation of audit work performed by the Office of Inspector General Department of Defense (OIG DoD) related to its engagement entitled, *Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions*, Report Number D-2001-167, dated August 2, 2001. The purpose of the evaluation was to express an opinion regarding whether the OIG DoD's work on this project was conducted in a manner consistent with generally accepted government auditing standards, commonly referred to as the Yellowbook standards. We undertook this engagement at the request of the OIG DoD and performed it in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We did not evaluate the OIG DoD's system of internal controls and accordingly, we did not include an assessment statement of their internal control structure. The fieldwork was performed at the OIG DoD offices in Arlington, Virginia during January and February 2003.

To accomplish our objective, we:

1. reviewed the working paper files associated with Report Number D-2001-167, *Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions (R&A audit)*;
2. reviewed the working paper files associated with Report Number D-2001-173, *Independent Review of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Cost Comparison Study of Civilian Pay Function*;
3. reviewed the working papers compiled by the OIG DoD's Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audit Policy and Oversight (APO) during their independent review of the R&A audit's audit plan and procedures;
4. reviewed other documents maintained by the lead auditor on the R&A review that were not incorporated into the official working papers;
5. reviewed the draft report and associated working papers for Project Number D2002CH-0074, *Report on the Public/Private Competition for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions*; and
6. interviewed appropriate OIG DoD audit staff.

Results in Brief

Based on our review of the R&A audit report and supporting documentation, it is our opinion that the audit work materially departed from the audit plan and was performed in a manner that does not meet several generally accepted government auditing standards. The audit documentation does not demonstrate that due professional care was exercised during the course of the audit. Moreover, the audit work did not meet several fieldwork standards, specifically: gathering sufficient audit evidence to support conclusions; preparing adequate audit documentation; and providing appropriate supervision to ensure audit objectives were being achieved. All of these shortcomings substantially lessened the likelihood that the OIG DoD's audit work would detect the error(s) made by management or its contractor in preparing the actual cost study.

Background

All federal agencies under the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-76 are required to perform selective cost comparison competitions to determine whether commercial type work performed currently by federal employees could be performed by private sector firms at lower overall costs. The government organization is given the opportunity to prepare its cost bid based upon what it believes is its Most Efficient Organization (MEO), provided that the MEO is prepared consistent with the standards and formulas established in the A-76 guidance. An independent review official (IRO) is provided for by the circular. It is their responsibility to ensure the validity of the data used in crafting the MEO and ensuring that the A-76 guidelines were followed in its development.

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) subjected its Military Retired and Annuitant (R&A) Pay Functions to an A-76 cost comparison study. DFAS engaged MEVATEC Corporation to assist them in this effort. On November 8, 2000, DFAS established the cost of their MEO with the issuance of an In-House Cost Estimate (IHCE) totaling \$347,173,983.

The OIG DoD served as the IRO, charged with auditing the DFAS's R&A study and certifying as to the reasonableness and appropriateness of the estimated costs. After DFAS adopted some adjustments recommended by the OIG DoD, the OIG DoD certified the MEO's amounts. Subsequently, the bid process determined that a private contractor could perform the work for lower costs than proposed in the MEO. After a union appeal and a review, the contractor was still found to have submitted the lowest bid for the work and was awarded the contract. The DFAS R&A activity was disbanded affecting the employment of over 500 federal employees.

A subsequent inquiry from a Member of Congress caused the OIG DoD to further reexamine the work it performed in connection with the R&A audit. In the course of this review (headed by a different supervisory team), an OIG DoD staff member found that a material error in salary computations went undetected in the original IRO audit. The analysis of the audit established that the original DFAS MEO costs were overstated by \$31.8 million. More significantly, had the correct amounts been used in the cost competition, the government activity would have retained

February 13, 2003 12:59 PM

TO: Joseph Schmitz
CC: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Award of A-76 Contract

Thank you for the report on the A-76 error.

If I understand it correctly, your audit determined that the Government contractor underbid the private contractor. How often does that happen?

Thanks.

Attach.

02/11/03 IG memo to SecDef re: "Error Results in Award of A-76 Contract with Potential Value of \$346 Million to Higher Bidder" [U01946/03]

DHR dh
021303-21

.....
Please respond by 02/11/03

11-L-0559/OSD14611

U02640 /03

160

137603


↑

EF4279

Now in Jushro
Henry file
ISP

February 20, 2003 10:01 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: NATO and ISAF

Lord Robertson wants NATO to do the ISAF. I told him that was fine with me.

Where do we stand?

Thanks.

DHR:db
022003-10

.....

Please respond by 02/28/03

NATO 092

USDP-
I asked ISP to
do a quick note on Snowden
2/21
✓/R UA

U02648 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14612

FEB 21 2003/1340

20 1603



February 28, 2003 7:20 AM

TO: Joe Schmitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Article

Thanks for your note and the journal with your article.

DHR:dh
022803-1

.....

Please respond by _____

000.7

28 Feb 03

U02708 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14613



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

2003 MAR 04 PM 1:52

INFO MEMO

CH-804-03
3 March 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: United Kingdom Provincial Reconstruction Team

- In response to your concern (TAB A) regarding the United Kingdom (UK) leading one of the provincial teams in Afghanistan, the following information is provided. The UK, through its Senior National Representative at HQ CENTCOM, began discussions in December 2002 to take leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.
- The UK Ministry of Defence has initiated formal staffing to obtain approval to deploy forces in April to assume leadership of the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT in May and has top-down direction from Prime Minister Blair to take on this mission.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael M. Dunn, USAF; Acting Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14614

U02774 /03

February 13, 2003 10:51 AM

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Myers

CC: Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: UK Provincial Team

Yesterday Geoff Hoon, the UK MoD, said the UK wants to lead one of the provincial teams in Afghanistan.

Please have someone get in touch with them and get that moving.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021303-16

.....

Please respond by 03/07/03

11-L-0559/OSD14615

03 FEB 2003

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD(P)

Marc Cheek

February 21, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD14616

February 13, 2003 10:51 AM

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Myers

CC: Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: UK Provincial Team

Yesterday Geoff Hoon, the UK MoD, said the UK wants to lead one of the provincial teams in Afghanistan.

Please have someone get in touch with them and get that moving.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021303-16

.....

Please respond by

03/07/03

03 FEB 11

11-L-0559/OSD14617

Tab A

U02775 /03

*UK**13 Feb 03*

January 7, 2003 12:11 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to South Korean MoD

I think we have to get a letter from me to the South Korean MoD proposing a plan to go forward, so we get this project underway.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010703-11

.....
Please respond by 01/14/03

Korea

75 Jan 03

U02805E/03

11-L-0559/OSD14618

EX 3955 UA

January 7, 2003 12:08 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: South Korea

I have talked to Condi Rice, Colin Powell, the President and the Vice President—everyone agrees we should proceed with the discussions with South Korea.

Please come back to me with a proposal telling me how you think we ought to initiate the dialog as to how we rearrange our forces in a way that fits the current military and political situation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010703-9

.....
Please respond by 01/14/03

U028067/03

01-08-03 12:37 IN

11-L-0559/OSD14619

Korea

7 Jan 03



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

2003 MAR -5 12 4:52



INFO MEMO

March 03, 2003, 3:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action_____

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army *Tom White* MAR 4 2003

SUBJECT: Annual Budget for the Center of Military History (CMH)

- Memo responds to a follow-on question to the SecDef's request (Tab A).
- The CMH is responsible for the execution of the Army Historical Program that preserves, critically interprets, disseminates and teaches military history; provides historical advice; and stimulates historical mindedness within the Army, Department of Defense, and throughout the nation and world.
- The CMH FY03 budget is \$14.044 million including:
 - \$8.452M for center operations and civilian pay
 - \$3.092M for mission requirements
 - \$2.5M for the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA)
- The CMH functions include: supervising 124 museums (active, reserve and national guard); the preservation and stewardship of over one million artifacts, valued at over \$1 billion; providing technical oversight for over 120 MACOM and field historians, and 25 military history detachments (active, reserve and national guard); maintaining the Army's organizational history, lineage and honors; writing, editing and publishing the Army's official history.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTC Steven C. Larson

(b)(6)



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 FEB 20 PM 12:29



INFO MEMO

February 12, 2003, 1:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

FEB 19 2003

SUBJECT: Costs of the U.S. Army Center of Military History's (CMH) Pentagon Research Team

- Memo responds to your question on subject (Tab A).
- Costs of maintaining CMH's Pentagon Research Team are salaries and communications.
 - Salaries are for one GS-13/9 (\$86,494) and one GS-12/6 (\$66,992).
 - Communications costs are \$400 annually.
 - Total is \$153,886 annually.
- Office serves Headquarters, Department of Army, other Army and DoD entities. Congressional offices, on call (Tab B).
- Office performs liaison and outreach for CMH, steers research, provides accurate and official historical data and publications, provides information on CMH services and resources, prepares information papers and essays, provides historical quality control on uses and interpretations of historical data, covers and collects information on Army Transformation and operations (Tab B).
 - CMH would have to perform these functions in any event, whether from Pentagon or elsewhere.
 - Pentagon office saves travel costs and time, facilitates face-to-face coordination and understanding of customer needs.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: James L. Yarrison,

(b)(6)

Bob Ferrell
what is CMH's annual budget?

CPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MR CRADDOCK	
MR. GUGGI	
EXECUTED WENTMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>

Dh

129
0800
Snowflake

December 5, 2002 10:41 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Costs

Please find out how much we spend on this Pentagon Research Team in the Army Center of Military History.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120502-14

.....
Please respond by 1/3/03 [?]

2/10
→ Col Farrell
Please let
discuss
D, R, L
Larry Di Rita
4/10



March 4, 2003 9:21 AM

TO: Tom White Gen. Shinseki
H. T. Johnson ADM Clark
James Roche Gen. Jumper
David Chu Gen. Hagee

CC: Gen. Myers Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Waivers from Joint Service

Given the many years that have passed since Goldwater-Nichols became law, I wonder if we ought to simply end the policy of waivers for the absence of joint service to officers being selected for promotion to General and Flag rank.

I also wonder if we might want to review what positions give joint service credit. As I have talked to people I interview, I have the impression that some of the positions they say give them joint service credit tend not to really be very joint.

Therefore, I would like you to review the list of assignments that qualify for joint service. My impression is that the list very likely has grown so that more people are enabled to punch that ticket, and it may very well be that we want to tighten it up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030303-27

.....
Please respond by 3/28/03

U02871 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14623

210 (384)

4 mar 03



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

703 117-5 21 2:53

USDP *for Rodman* *3 Mar*

I-002295/03
EF4278

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351) *MR* 28 FEB 2003

SUBJECT: Oversight of the Regional Centers

In reply to your question as to who in my office oversees the Regional Centers, the breakdown is as follows:

- Peter W. Rodman oversees the following Centers:
 - Asia-Pacific (PACOM)
 - Africa (NDU)
 - Near East and South Asia (NDU)
 - Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (Latin and Central America) (NDU).
- J.D. Crouch oversees the Marshall Center (EUCOM).
- The respective Deputy Assistant Secretaries provide the policy guidance for each of the regional centers.
- ISA's office of International Negotiations and Regional Affairs, supervised by Peter Rodman, coordinates cross-cutting administrative and policy matters, such as funding, policy guidance, and hiring of new directors.

Prepared by Dan Haendel, Principal Director, International Negotiations and Regional Affairs, (b)(6) *DN 4/1/03*

02-28-03 09:23 11

11-L-0559/OSD14624

U02875 /03

INRA
L-002295/03

EF4278

WORMDISPRO

PD
ISA
ISP

February 20, 2003 1:43 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Centers

Who in your office oversees these centers we have around the world? such as The
Marshall Center, Asia-Pacific Center, et so forth.
Thanks.

DHR:dh
022003-21

.....
Please respond by 02/28/03

USDP -

2/21

This is Rodman
except for Marshall
which goes to JD.

✓ IR UA

11-L-0559/OSD14625

FEB 21 2003/1346

COORDINATION

PD ASD/ISP DA

PDASD Flory CS

11 EA
I-002295/03

EF4278

Normalismo

PD
ISA
ISP

February 20, 2003 1:43 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Centers

Who in your office oversees these centers we have around the world? such as The
Marshall Center, Asia-Pacific Center, en so forth.
Thanks.

DHR:dh
022003-21

Please respond by 02/28/03

USDP -

2/21

This is Rodman
except for Marshall
which goes to JD.

✓ IR UA

U02876 /03

FEB 21 2003/1346

11-L-0559/OSD14627

080

20 Feb 03

March 3, 2003 3:47 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Concepts of Operations

381

Here is an interesting letter from Barry Blechman about Joint Concepts of Operations. What do you think about his suggestion?

Thanks.

Attach.
2/14/02 Blechman ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
030303-26

.....
Please respond by 02/21/03

3 Mar 03

U02891 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14628



DEF INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman
CEO and President

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR - 4 2003

February 14, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

Thanks very much for taking the time to talk with me on Tuesday, and for providing the proverbial free lunch! It was a pleasure to see you and have the chance to better understand your priorities in transforming the Department, as well as to discuss key foreign policy issues.

Our discussion of your efforts to lead the Services into Joint Concepts of Operations brought to mind the frustrations that we experienced when assisting the Air Force's Directorate of Plans (XP) in attempts to engage the other Services in a discussion of joint concepts for expeditionary operations. Official channels for communication proved to be ineffective and ad hoc initiatives equally fruitless. Without a forcing function, XP's efforts to develop a Joint CONOP that could be tested, exercised, and, ultimately, implemented have so far come to naught.

The priority that you now ascribe to progress in this area provides a new opportunity to encourage the Services to come to the table. JFCOM is the logical "honest broker" to manage a series of all-Service workshops to develop Joint CONOPS. In order to generate a constructive discussion, participants should be handpicked and include representatives from the Unified Commands, Joint Staff, and OSD. A board of retired "gray beards" charged with thinking across Service lines on this issue might additionally aid the process.

The process might also include informal, off-line meetings under private auspices, as well as more structured, top-level sessions, to maximize creativity while driving towards specific, actionable agreements. More than just an opportunity to compare slides and share jargon, these activities should be structured toward tangible results - a focused set of CONOPS that could be tested in the field in 2004.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this concept further with Admiral Giambastiani's team. DFI's work for the Services and OSD has made clear that encouraging the Services to work together outside of existing stovepipes is a vital step toward transforming our military capabilities.

Thanks again for lunch. I look forward to seeing you at the Defense Policy Board meeting later this month.

Sincerely,


Barry Blechman



March 5, 2003 4:08 PM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Myers
ADM Fargo

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*

SUBJECT: Philippines

We ought to get somebody going pretty fast on trying to work out some arrangement with the Philippines.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030303-23

.....
Please respond by 03/14/03

Philippines

5 Mar 03

002908-03

11-L-0559/OSD14631



March 5, 2003 1:38 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Director of TTIC

John Brennan sounds terrific. We're delighted. Charge ahead, my friend.

DHR:dh
030503-10

040 C1A

5 Mar 03



1102921-03

March 3, 2003 1:21 PM

TO: Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Gen. Jones

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CENTCOM Is the Supported Command

CENTCOM

This memo is to underscore the arrangements I have made whereby CENTCOM will be the supported command. All other commands will be supporting commands.

I hope there is no doubt in anyone's mind, at any level, as to how this will work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030303-22

.....

Please respond by _____

3 Mar 03

11-L-0559/OSD14633



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

SECRET
2003 MAR 11 11 09 25

March 7, 2003, 1630 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Further Response to February 12, 2003, Snowflake Subject "Award of A-76 Contract" and A-76 Status Update

- As mentioned in my February 25, 2003, Info Memo on this subject (attached) the results of 314 A-76 competitions from FY97 through FY01 show that the government competitor won 187 (60%) of the competitive awards. The Government competitor underbid the private contractor in 118 competitions.
- According to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, independent of who wins, the cost to perform that function decreases by 25 to 30 percent. When the Government employees win they are 25 to 30 percent below prior costs and lower than the private contractor.
- A future review will address the quality of data on A-76 competitions in a new automated DoD system. The review will help the Department validate data used for measuring performance of A-76 competitions and ensure that accurate and timely data is available for management decisions.

Attachment: As stated

cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD14634

U03185 / 03



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704
INFO MEMO

February 25, 2003, 11:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Response to February 13, 2003, Snowflake Subject "Award of A-76 Contract" and A-76 Status Update

- The short answer to your question, "How often . . . [have our audits] determined that the Government contractor underbid the private contractor," is that the subject Defense Financing and Accounting Service (DFAS) A-76 competition was the first.
- My office has conducted an independent review on a total of five A-76 competitions; in all but the most recent DFAS competition, there was either no contractor proposal or the contractor proposal was determined not technically responsive.
- According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, OUSD(AT&L), the results of 314 A-76 competitions from FY97 through FY01 show that the government competitor won 187 (60%) of the competitive awards. It is not clear how many of these instances were a result of "the Government contractor underbid[ding] the private contractor." I have tasked my staff to clarify this detail, and will supplement this response upon receipt and review of the responsive data from the OUSD(AT&L).
- As I mentioned in my February 11, 2003, Info Memo on this subject, I had requested the GSA Inspector General independently to review the events surrounding the DFAS A-76 error. In his February 20, 2003, report (attached), the GSA IG concluded, "the [DoD Office of Inspector General] audit work materially departed from the audit plan and was performed in a manner that does not meet several generally accepted government auditing standards [and] these shortcomings substantially lessened the likelihood that the OIG DoD's audit work would detect the error(s) made by management or its contractor in preparing the actual cost study."
- I am working with my senior leadership both to implement prudent measures to avoid even the appearance of either a departure from any OIG audit plan or performance by any of our auditors "in a manner that does not meet . . . generally accepted government auditing standards," and I have tasked my Audit leadership to prepare a proactive plan of action, based on the findings and the record of the GSA Peer Evaluation, for: (a) issuing any accolades; and (b) determining whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable for any omission, commission, or failure to meet professional standards.

Attachment: As stated

cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

402639-03



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

FEB 20 2003

The Honorable Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
Department of Defense

Dear Mr. Schmitz: *Joe*

Enclosed is our Office of Auditing's final report of its peer evaluation of the audit work performed by the Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense under its engagement entitled, "Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Function," Report Number D-2001-167, dated August 2, 2001. The purpose of the evaluation was to express an opinion regarding whether the audit work on this project was conducted in a manner consistent with generally accepted government auditing standards.

In our opinion, the work performed relative to the subject audit materially departed from the audit plan and does not meet several generally accepted government auditing standards. These shortcomings in practice substantially lessened the likelihood that the audit work would detect the error(s) made by agency management in preparing the actual cost study.

We undertook this review at your request. Accordingly, we consider your office to be the owner of the final report. We will not release the report to other parties. Any inquiries requesting the report will be referred to your office for your consideration.

Thank you for the courtesies extended to our staff during the review. We would be pleased to respond to any questions or provide additional assistance if needed.

Sincerely,

Dan
Daniel R. Levinson,
Inspector General

Enclosure



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

February 20, 2003

The Honorable Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Mr. Schmitz:

The U.S. General Services Administration's Office of Inspector General has completed a peer evaluation of audit work performed by the Office of Inspector General Department of Defense (OIG DoD) related to its engagement entitled, *Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions*, Report Number D-2001-167, dated August 2, 2001. The purpose of the evaluation was to express an opinion regarding whether the OIG DoD's work on this project was conducted in a manner consistent with generally accepted government auditing standards, commonly referred to as the Yellowbook standards. We undertook this engagement at the request of the OIG DoD and performed it in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We did not evaluate the OIG DoD's system of internal controls and accordingly, we did not include an assessment statement of their internal control structure. The fieldwork was performed at the OIG DoD offices in Arlington, Virginia during January and February 2003.

To accomplish our objective, we:

1. reviewed the working paper files associated with Report Number D-2001-167, *Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions (R&A audit)*;
2. reviewed the working paper files associated with Report Number D-2001-173, *Independent Review of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Cost Comparison Study of Civilian Pay Function*;
3. reviewed the working papers compiled by the OIG DoD's Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audit Policy and Oversight (APO) during their independent review of the R&A audit's audit plan and procedures;
4. reviewed other documents maintained by the lead auditor on the R&A review that were not incorporated into the official working papers;
5. reviewed the draft report and associated working papers for Project Number D2002CH-0074, *Report on the Public/Private Competition for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions*; and
6. interviewed appropriate OIG DoD audit staff.



Results in Brief

Based on our review of the R&A audit report and supporting documentation, it is our opinion that the audit work materially departed from the audit plan and was performed in a manner that does not meet several generally accepted government auditing standards. The audit documentation does not demonstrate that due professional care was exercised during the course of the audit. Moreover, the audit work did not meet several fieldwork standards, specifically: gathering sufficient audit evidence to support conclusions; preparing adequate audit documentation; and providing appropriate supervision to ensure audit objectives were being achieved. All of these shortcomings substantially lessened the likelihood that the OIG DoD's audit work would detect the error(s) made by management or its contractor in preparing the actual cost study.

Background

All federal agencies under the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-76 are required to perform selective cost comparison competitions to determine whether commercial type work performed currently by federal employees could be performed by private sector firms at lower overall costs. The government organization is given the opportunity to prepare its cost bid based upon what it believes is its Most Efficient Organization (MEO), provided that the MEO is prepared consistent with the standards and formulas established in the A-76 guidance. An independent review official (IRO) is provided for by the circular. It is their responsibility to ensure the validity of the data used in crafting the MEO and ensuring that the A-76 guidelines were followed in its development.

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) subjected its Military Retired and Annuitant (R&A) Pay Functions to an A-76 cost comparison study. DFAS engaged MEVATEC Corporation to assist them in this effort. On November 8, 2000, DFAS established the cost of their MEO with the issuance of an In-House Cost Estimate (IHCE) totaling \$347,173,983.

The OIG DoD served as the IRO, charged with auditing the DFAS's R&A study and certifying as to the reasonableness and appropriateness of the estimated costs. After DFAS adopted some adjustments recommended by the OIG DoD, the OIG DoD certified the MEO's amounts. Subsequently, the bid process determined that a private contractor could perform the work for lower costs than proposed in the MEO. After a union appeal and a review, the contractor was still found to have submitted the lowest bid for the work and was awarded the contract. The DFAS R&A activity was disbanded affecting the employment of over 500 federal employees.

A subsequent inquiry from a Member of Congress caused the OIG DoD to further reexamine the work it performed in connection with the R&A audit. In the course of this review (headed by a different supervisory team), an OIG DoD staff member found that a material error in salary computations went undetected in the original IRO audit. The analysis of the audit established that the original DFAS MEO costs were overstated by \$31.8 million. More significantly, had the correct amounts been used in the cost competition, the government activity would have retained

the work in-house at a cost to the government well below the contractor's price. (Please refer to the appendix for a timeline of significant events in the IRO review process.)

The internal reviews performed by the OIG DoD also concluded that the audit team that performed the original IRO audit did not perform the work in conformance with Yellowbook auditing standards. The OIG DoD requested that our office conduct an independent evaluation of the R&A audit for the purpose of expressing an opinion regarding whether applicable auditing standards were followed during the course of the audit. Our work confirmed that the original audit was not performed in a manner consistent with several major auditing standards.

Background – Management's Error

MEVATEC Corporation provided DFAS technical and analytical support from June 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. Among MEVATEC's tasks was to input data into COMPARE, a software package specifically developed to facilitate A-76 cost comparison studies. After all appropriate data is input, COMPARE generates an IHCE that is compliant with OMB's A-76 provisions.

Personnel costs comprised the largest line item in the R&A study's IHCE. A key determination to be made was whether the personnel contemplated in the MEO were subject to the Service Contract Act. A-76 guidelines stipulate that because positions covered by the Service Contract Act are subject to an Economic Price Adjustment (EPA), the wages associated with these positions **are not to be inflated** beyond the first year. Conversely, for positions not covered by the Service Contract Act, and not subject to an EPA, **costs are to be annually inflated for each year of the study**. DFAS had advised MEVATEC that 502 of 503 positions were subject to an EPA. However, MEVATEC erred while inputting data into COMPARE and reversed the EPA determination – they mistakenly coded 502 positions as non-EPA and 1 position as EPA. This data input error resulted in a **\$42.7 million overstatement** of the MEO's cost estimate. Actually, the OIG DoD's re-audits of the entire IRO process concluded that DFAS' guidance (i.e., 502 positions subject to EPA) was not "fully correct." The additional OIG DoD analysis determined that only 426 positions should have been subject to EPA, reducing the error to **\$31.8 million**.

Findings

Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions Did Not Meet Government Audit Standards

Our review of the OIG DoD's *Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions* (R&A Audit) concluded that the audit work was performed in a manner that does not meet several generally accepted government auditing standards. The audit documentation does not demonstrate that due professional care was exercised during the course of the audit. We believe that the error made by management could have been detected by the auditors, had some fundamental testing been performed. Moreover, the audit work did not meet several fieldwork standards, specifically: gathering sufficient audit evidence to support conclusions; preparing adequate audit documentation; and providing appropriate supervision to

ensure audit objectives were being achieved. All of these shortcomings substantially lessened the likelihood that the OIG DoD's audit work would detect the error made by management or its consultant in preparing the actual cost study.

Auditors Did Not Exercise Due Professional Care

The auditors on the A-76 R&A audit did not exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit. Government auditing standards provide for the following:

"Due professional care should be used in conducting the audit and in preparing related reports.

This standard requires auditors to work with due professional care. Due care imposes a responsibility upon each auditor within the audit organization to observe generally accepted government auditing standards.

Exercising due professional care means using sound judgment in establishing the scope, selecting the methodology, and choosing tests and procedures for the audit. The same sound judgment should be applied in conducting the tests and procedures and in evaluating and reporting the audit results."¹

Our review found the following examples where due professional care was not exercised:

- Based on our review of all available documentation, including DFAS documents that had not been incorporated into the official working paper file by the lead auditor, we believe that the error made by management could have been detected by the auditors, had some additional testing been done. As a matter of fact, during another A-76 IRO audit of DFAS' Civilian Pay study (which commenced about two months after the initial IG certification of the R&A study), the auditor detected an identical data input error made by a different consultant. The lead auditor on the Civilian Pay audit found this error by simply tracing EPA input data (i.e., Y or N) back to source documents instead of merely accepting management's representations. *This basic level of audit testing to source documents was not evident on the R&A review.*
- Although the R&A and Civilian Pay reviews had the same Program Director, Project Manager and three audit staff members common to both jobs, the connection was never made between the error found on the Civilian Pay review and the R&A review. The Civilian Pay error was found on or about March 22, 2001, two months after the first R&A certification but two months before the second R&A certification (June 8, 2001). Additionally, an updated A-76 audit guide was issued on June 6, 2001, two days prior to the second R&A certification. This audit guide, authored by the R&A/ Civilian Pay Project Manager, incorporated additional steps related to reviewing the EPA determination. Finally, the second R&A certification on June 8, 2001 dealt with inflation factors and cost of capital, the same inflation factors that came into play by virtue of the EPA error. *Therefore, while it remains unclear why no one involved in these parallel*

¹ Electronic Codification of Government Auditing Standards as of July 1999 (through Amendment 2), §3.26, §3.27 & §3.28

reviews made the connection between the two identical errors, it is apparent that ample opportunity existed for such a connection to be made.

- The audit guide was given to DFAS to fill in. The filled in version became the working paper. However, there is no evidence that the auditors tested any of DFAS' responses to the audit steps.
- The COMPARE software program was run by a junior GS-9 auditor with no prior experience because "he had the only computer that was capable of running the software". He was not trained in COMPARE, but was given a COMPARE manual that he reviewed on his own. We were told that this auditor was not given a copy of the audit guide at the time and the degree to which he was supervised is not determinable.

Working Papers Did Not Meet Government Auditing Standards

The working papers in evidence in the official audit file did not meet the following minimal government auditing standards:

"Evidence should be sufficient, competent, and relevant. Evidence is *sufficient* if there is enough of it to support the auditors' findings. In determining the sufficiency of evidence it may be helpful to ask such questions as: Is there enough evidence to persuade a reasonable person of the validity of the findings? When appropriate, statistical methods may be used to establish sufficiency. Evidence used to support a finding is *relevant* if it has a logical, sensible relationship to that finding. Evidence is *competent* to the extent that it is consistent with fact (that is, evidence is competent if it is valid)."²

As of January 22, 2001, insufficient evidence existed in the working papers to support the OIG DoD's IRO certification that the MEO cost data was valid and prepared consistent with A-76 guidelines. The only working papers prepared as of the certification date support adjustments that resulted in a \$25.5 million increase to the IHCE. The major issue, regarding a reclassification of subcontract costs, had been raised by a reassigned Project Manager in an informal meeting with the assigned lead auditor, before the R&A audit started.

The majority of the working papers were prepared in the June/July 2001 timeframe – approximately five months after the OIG DoD issued its original certification. It appears, however, that all substantive audit work was done prior to the first certification (January 22, 2001) – all later work constituted mathematical/mechanical checks for updated rates using COMPARE software. Apparently, there was a belief among the staff that workpapers did not have to be finalized prior to certification. The Project Manager told us that that was the way it was done on previous A-76 audits. Additionally, the lead auditor told us that after certification, he started working on another A-76 review and, consequently, set aside his R&A working papers to be completed at a later date.

² Electronic Codification of *Government Auditing Standards* as of July 1999 (through Amendment 2), §6.53

Government auditing standards also stipulate the following regarding the quality of working papers:

"Working papers serve three purposes. They provide the principal support for the auditors' report, aid the auditors in conducting and supervising the audit, and allow others to review the audit's quality. This third purpose is important because audits done in accordance with GAGAS often are subject to review by other auditors and by oversight officials. Working papers allow for the review of audit quality by providing the reviewer written documentation of the evidence supporting the auditors' significant conclusions and judgments.

Working papers should contain

- a. the objectives, scope, and methodology, including any sampling criteria used;
- b. documentation of the work performed to support significant conclusions and judgments;
- and
- c. evidence of supervisory review of the work performed."³

We found that many of the working papers do not lend themselves to a credible review of the quality and extent of the audit effort. Specifically, we noted:

- For many working papers, it was impossible to identify the source of information presented, who answered questions or provided information or ran reports. Only summary working papers indicated a source and a date – supporting papers did not contain this information.
- There was no indication on any of the COMPARE printouts labeled "IG-generated" as to what source data was used. This was especially confusing when cost comparisons were re-run by the auditors; there was absolutely no way for a reviewer to ascertain what source data was changed to arrive at the revised numbers.
- R&A audit team briefings to the Certifying Official were given verbally. These briefings were not formally documented and were apparently limited to the adjustments that resulted in the \$25.5 million increase to the IHCE.

Supervisory Oversight Did Not Meet Government Auditing Standards

Overall, supervisory oversight on the R&A review did not meet the following auditing standards for supervision:

"Staff are to be properly supervised.

Supervision involves directing the efforts of auditors and others who are involved in the audit to determine whether the audit objectives are being accomplished. Elements of supervision include instructing staff members, keeping informed of significant problems encountered, reviewing the work performed, and providing effective on-the-job training.

³ Electronic Codification of *Government Auditing Standards* as of July 1999 (through Amendment 2), §6.63 & §6.64

Supervisors should satisfy themselves that staff members clearly understand what work they are to do, why the work is to be conducted, and what it is expected to accomplish. With experienced staff, supervisors may outline the scope of the work and leave details to assistants. With a less experienced staff, supervisors may have to specify not only techniques for analyzing data but also how to gather it."⁴

Specifically, the following shortcomings were noted:

- None of the working papers were signed by a supervisor (sign-off indicates supervisory review and acceptance of the working paper) prior to the first certification on January 22, 2001; the first supervisory sign-off did not appear until June 2001.
- Both the Program Director and Project Manager were absent during critical time periods during the audit and prior to the initial certification: the Program Director attended extended out-of-town training starting January 8, 2001 and the Project Manager was on annual leave from December 15, 2000 through January 3, 2001.
- The Project Manager had no prior A-76 experience. The R&A audit was initially staffed with two GS-12's and one GS-9: One GS-12 had worked on five previous A-76 jobs while the other GS-12 and the GS-9 had no prior A-76 experience.
- Although there were copies of e-mails that evidenced the Project Manager's involvement in the audit prior to the initial certification, the fact is that he did not charge any time to this assignment.
- There was no evidence of any supervision given to the GS-9 prior to certification. The GS-9 told us that he was not given a copy of the audit guide but was given verbal instructions.

Comments on Staffing

In the interest of presenting a complete picture, it is important to point out there was another, higher profile A-76 review at the time that required staffing allocations that impacted the availability of staff for the R&A and Civilian Pay assignments. On December 22, 2000, the AIGA at the time sent an e-mail emphasizing the importance of the upcoming Lackland Air Force Base A-76 review. "This is CM's (Contract Management) highest priority audit and you should resource it accordingly. The work papers must be impeccable because they are liable to be subpoenaed some day and the senior auditors could be called as expert witnesses in a legal proceeding, if it comes to that."

In response, the Director of Contract Management (CM) informed all Program Directors and Project Managers to be prepared to contribute "your best staff or, in other words, the ones I want,

⁴ Electronic Codification of *Government Auditing Standards* as of July 1999 (through Amendment 2), §6.22, §6.23 & §6.24

not the ones you necessarily want to give up.” As a result, the “best staff” was assigned to Lackland while remaining staff was assigned to other jobs.

The Program Director is ultimately responsible for staff assignments made in his own division. In the case of the R&A review, the lead auditor had been a GS-12 for over ten years but the Director of Contract Management had expressed concern about this particular GS-12’s ability to handle this assignment. However, both the original Project Manager (who was reassigned to Lackland) and Program Director believed he was capable.

Comments on Time Charges

During the course of our review, it became apparent that the OIG DoD’s internal time reporting system lacks credibility due to careless input by the audit staff. The following examples illustrate this problem:

- The audit file documents that the GS-9 staff auditor prepared working papers prior to the initial certification date of January 22, 2001. However, he did not charge any time to this project until June 2001. A review of his timesheets showed that around the time the auditor was working on the R&A project, he was charging his time to the Lackland A-76 assignment and a project to evaluate the redesign of the COMPARE Software.
- As we previously stated, although there were copies of e-mails that evidenced the Project Manager’s involvement in the R&A audit prior to the initial certification, he never charged any time to this assignment. A review of his timesheets showed that leading up to the initial certification date, the Project Manager charged his time to another competitive sourcing assignment and the COMPARE Software Redesign job.

Time charging is an important management tool for evaluating level of effort and assessing the audit process on a post issuance basis.

OIG DoD’s Internal Review Process

We examined the OIG DoD’s internal inquiry that assessed the R&A audit and found the effort to be a thorough and objective review of the project.

In response to a Congressional inquiry, including questions about an EPA clause in the contract document, a separate OIG DoD review was started on January 17, 2002. This review, which was essentially a re-audit of the entire Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Function A-76 process, found the EPA-related mistake that resulted in a \$31.8 million overstatement. As a result of this review, the original R&A audit report was retracted.

In addition, the OIG DoD’s Audit Policy and Oversight (APO) group performed two reviews of this situation at the request of the Acting Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, concluding

that audit standards were not met. Specifically, APO determined that the R&A review suffered from a lack of supervision, inadequate working papers and a lack of due diligence.

Based on our review of the above work products, it is clear that the OIG DoD's post-review process was thorough and credible.

This review was performed at the request of the OIG DoD and contains proprietary Department of Defense information. Accordingly, our office will not release the report to outside parties. We will refer any such requests to your office for consideration and appropriate action.

We wish to thank you and your staff for the assistance and courtesies extended to our staff during this review. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 501-0374.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Eugene Waszily". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Eugene Waszily
Assistant Inspector General for Auditing
General Services Administration

Appendix

TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE IRO REVIEW PROCESS

Date	IHCE	Event
11/08/00	\$347,173,983	DFAS established the cost of their Most Efficient Organization (MEO)
11/08/00		DFAS submitted their cost estimate to the OIG DoD for an independent review
11/27/00		R&A project start date
	\$372,695,229	The OIG DoD recommended changes to the IHCE, resulting in an upward adjustment
01/22/01	\$372,695,229	The OIG DoD certifies the amount as the Independent Review Official (IRO)
06/08/01	\$382,921,642	Estimate adjusted for updated inflation and cost of capital factors; <i>IG Recertification</i>
06/15/01		Decision to award contract to ACS Government Services Inc. based on low bid of \$364.7 million
07/06/01		Union appeals the DFAS decision to contract out
08/06/01	\$366,622,226	After review, estimate was adjusted (mainly due to transition costs); <i>IG Recertification</i>
08/14/01		Letter from Congress alleging circumvention of A-76 process
09/05/01		Contract awarded to ACS for \$364.7 million
11/14/01		OIG DoD responds to Congress, finding no fault with competition
12/07/01		Additional questions from Congress, including the issue of the Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) clause in ACS' contract
03/21/02		Re-audit of process reveals an EPA related error made in IHCE was not detected in the original audit
04/30/02		Internal review by Audit Policy and Oversight (APO) confirms that error was made and not detected
11/27/02	\$334,789,625	OIG DoD draft report quantifies error to be a \$31.8 million overstatement of the IHCE



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704
INFO MEMO

February 25, 2003, 11:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Response to February 13, 2003, Snowflake Subject "Award of A-76 Contract" and A-76 Status Update

- The short answer to your question, "How often . . . [have our audits] determined that the Government contractor underbid the private contractor," is that the subject Defense Financing and Accounting Service (DFAS) A-76 competition was the first.
- My office has conducted an independent review on a total of five A-76 competitions; in all but the most recent DFAS competition, there was either no contractor proposal or the contractor proposal was determined not technically responsive.
- According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, OUSD(AT&L), the results of 314 A-76 competitions from FY97 through FY01 show that the government competitor won 187 (60%) of the competitive awards. It is not clear how many of these instances were a result of "the Government contractor underbid[ding] the private contractor." I have tasked my staff to clarify this detail, and will supplement this response upon receipt and review of the responsive data from the OUSD(AT&L).
- As I mentioned in my February 11, 2003, Info Memo on this subject, I had requested the GSA Inspector General independently to review the events surrounding the DFAS A-76 error. In his February 20, 2003, report (attached), the GSA IG concluded, "the [DoD Office of Inspector General] audit work materially departed from the audit plan and was performed in a manner that does not meet several generally accepted government auditing standards [and] these shortcomings substantially lessened the likelihood that the OIG DoD's audit work would detect the error(s) made by management or its contractor in preparing the actual cost study."
- I am working with my senior leadership both to implement prudent measures to avoid even the appearance of either a departure from any OIG audit plan or performance by any of our auditors "in a manner that does not meet . . . generally accepted government auditing standards," and I have tasked my Audit leadership to prepare a proactive plan of action, based on the findings and the record of the GSA Peer Evaluation, for: (a) issuing any accolades; and (b) determining whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable for any omission, commission, or failure to meet professional standards.

Attachment: As stated

cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)

100-005597080-14647



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704
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Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)

FDL 0569408514648



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704
INFO MEMO

February 25, 2003, 11:30 a.m.

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Attachment: As stated

cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
19L-0559/OSD 14849

February 13, 2003 12:59 PM

TO: Joseph Schmitz
CC: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Award of A-76 Contract

Thank you for the report on the A-76 error.

If I understand it correctly, your audit determined that the Government contractor underbid the private contractor. How often does that happen?

Thanks.

Attach.

02/11/03 IG memo to SecDef re: "Error Results in Award of A-76 Contract with Potential Value of \$346 Million to Higher Bidder" [U01946/03]

DHR:dh
021303-21

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD14650



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

February 11, 2003, 9:15 a.m. **SECDEF HAS SEEN**

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Error Results in Award of A-76 Contract with Potential Value of \$346 Million to Higher Bidder

- I will issue an audit report during the week of February 24, documenting a DFAS consultant's error in a public/private competition that resulted in the award of an A-76 contract with potential 10 year value of \$346 million to the contractor rather than to the lower in-house bid. Congressman Kucinich, in particular, supported the in-house bidder who should have won the A-76 contract. In order to avoid any unnecessary adverse media, I will offer to brief Congressman Kucinich, Senator Grassley, and the Counsels of the SASC.
- The Audit component of my office acted as the independent review officer of the public/private competition for the DFAS Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions. My Audit component should have detected, but did not detect, an error that inflated the in-house cost estimate by \$31.8 million. The inflated in-house cost estimate was \$1.9 million greater than the contractor estimate.
- The good news is that our audit report recognizes opportunities for systemic improvements to A-76 competitions. As a result of the audit, I have also requested OMB to revise overhead cost factors and to use net present value in competitions that exceed 3 years. The correction of these issues by the Department and OMB should provide better competitions in the future.
- I have also requested the GSA Inspector General independently to review the events surrounding the \$31.8 million error. In the meantime, my office has implemented new procedures to preclude any recurrence of our oversight error.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: John R. Crane, (b)(6)

cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD14651

1101946 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 11 2003

Mr. Richard P. Libretti
Principal
Sandler O'Neill & Partners
919 Third Avenue
6th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Libretti:

Thank you so much for taking time to visit with me at the Statesmanship Awards dinner in Washington. It was good meeting you.

I am delighted to have the metal cross you presented me. It is a profound memento of the World Trade Center and the human toll behind the important purpose to which our nation has committed itself.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

U03195 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14652

33550

11MAR03

Mr. Richard P. Libretti
Principal
Sandler O'Neill & Partners
919 Third Avenue
6th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Lenny Di Rita

3/7

Dear Mr. Libretti:

Thank you so much for taking time to visit with me at the Statesmanship Awards dinner in Washington. It was good meeting you.

I am delighted to have the metal cross you presented me. It is a profound memento of the World Trade Center and will serve to always remind me of those who lost their lives that tragic day. *The important*

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

*The human toll
behind the important
purpose to which our
nation has
committed itself.*

March 5, 2003

*Hono -
Once more
with feeling.
D. Libretti
Larry Di Rita
3/5*

Memorandum To: Larry Di Rita
From: Mary Claire *Mem*
Re: Thank you note for World Trade Center Metal Cross

At last night's Awards dinner at the Willard, Mr. Libretti, from NY, came up to the SecDef and presented him with a framed metal cross, made out of metal from the World Trade Center --

It is my understanding that he was presenting it on behalf of his boss, who had a friend whose daughter died at the Trade Center, and knew Mr. Libretti was going to see the SecDef, etc.

Evidently, Former Congressman LaRocca (sp) knows this gentleman ---

(b)(6)

*said SecDef
Wanted a nice Thank
You done — (There is
a
Mc Snowflake
on
this)*

11-L-0559/OSD14654

March 5, 2003 8:21 AM

TO: Protocol
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Gift

When you get the box that has a cross in it, it was a gift from Richard Libretti—his card is attached. The cross was made from metal from the World Trade Center, from Tower 2, I believe.

We need to send him a very nice thank you note and register the gift. It is something I will want to keep.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business card

DRB dh
030503a

.....
Please respond by 03/14/03



Richard P. Libretti
Principal

(b)(6)

Sandler O'Neill
& Partners, L.P.
919 Third Avenue
6th Floor
New York, NY 10022
www.sandleroneill.com



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Attach.
Business card

DIRR dh
030503-6

.....

Please respond by 03/14/03



Richard P. Libretti
Principal

(b)(6)

Sandler O'Neill
& Partners, L.P.
919 Third Avenue
6th Floor
New York, NY 10022
www.sandleroneill.com

11-L-0559/OSD14656

U03215 /03

335 30

S Mar 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 11 2003

Mr. Richard P. Libretti
Principal
Sandler O'Neill & Partners
919 Third Avenue
6th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Libretti:

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I am delighted to have the metal cross you presented me. It is a profound memento of the World Trade Center and the human toll behind the important purpose to which our nation has committed itself.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

U03195 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14657

33550

11MAR03



March 8, 2003 1:43 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
LTG Garner (Ret.)

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Humanitarian Effort

The President is determined that there be a great humanitarian effort. In addition, he is determined that it be effectively communicated.

I would like to have some sort of a briefing—neither of you need do it personally—but have the people who are doing this for you set up a time for Torie Clarke, and Gen. Pace and me to hear this briefing, so we can develop conviction that the things the President needs to have happen are happening and that we have figured out ways to see that they are properly communicated. I would sure appreciate it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030803-23

.....
Please respond by

3/14/03

042

8 Mar 03

11-L-0559/OSD14658

U03229 /03

March 8, 2003 10:41 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
Torie Clarke
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Undefended Places

Attached is a letter from Ed Koch, the former mayor of New York, whom I served with in Congress.

He has an interesting idea here—let's talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/25/03 Koch ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
030803-1

.....
Please respond by 03/11/03

TPH

8 Mar 03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR - 8 2003

Edward I. Koch

1290 Avenue of the Americas
30th Floor
New York, New York 10104

February 25, 2003

(b)(6)

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don:

I support President Bush's position on Iraq and the need to have a regime change. I hope that short of Iraq's complying with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, which is highly unlikely, we will use the armed forces of the United States with those nations willing to join us to bring Iraq to the full defeat that should have occurred in 1991. We are lucky to have President George W. Bush and his superb fearless leadership, as we are lucky to have you in your position.

The President has gathered an extraordinary team around him including Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell and National Security Advisor Rice. Each of you could be running the country, and I am not blowing smoke.

Almost all of the critics raise the issue of huge casualties that would result from an attack on Baghdad with house-to-house fighting. I have a suggestion. There are a number of protocols either signed by the U.S. or, if not signed, recognized by the U.S. affording the rights thereunder which refer to "undefended places" sometimes called "non-defended zones or localities." Designating an area as such a locality requires that it be emptied of all combatants, mobile weapons and that its fixed weapons be restricted with no hostile acts by its population in which case it would not be subject to bombing. Why not demand of Saddam Hussein that he give Baghdad such status by observing all of the requirements which would make Baghdad an "undefended place?" If he refuses to do so, as he probably will, then the U.S. Air Force should drop leaflets on the city advising its inhabitants that they have 48 hours to evacuate the city before it will be attacked from the air and effectively destroyed. Citizens should be informed that their government has deprived them of safety having been given the opportunity to protect them by turning the city into an "undefended place."

The provisions of various treaties, protocols and other articles on the subject of undefended places are: The Hague Regs of 1907, Article 25; Article 4 of the Geneva Convention; Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1977 [we have not signed it for other reasons, but afford rights thereunder] and The Army Field Manual, Section 39.

LD- Not copied to SD
2/26/03

11-L-0559/OSD14660

All the best.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Ed' or 'EJ', written in a cursive style.

Edward J. Koch

(b)(6)

March 8, 2003 12:04 PM

TO: Jim Schlesinger
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your Memo on Iraq

Thanks so much for your note on the plans for post-military Iraq. It is helpful, and I will get it moved around.

DHR:dh
030803-14

Iraq

8 Mar 03

11-L-0559/OSD14662

1103253 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN
MAR - 8 2003

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Donald Rumsfeld
FROM: Jim Schlesinger
DATE: 5 March 2003
SUBJ: Timely Implementation of Plans for Post-military Iraq

Don:

Your mentioning last Friday that the DoD still seeks authorization from OMB for spending money on post-attack clean-up and reconstruction efforts in Iraq causes ever-growing concern.

Assuming that the United States goes in, you may immediately be faced with Saddam's use of chemical or biological use of agents in country. You will want to start clean-up operations as quickly as possible. If such agents are not disbursed, we will nonetheless be faced with de-mil-ing the WMD that we will assuredly uncover. We will want to do this expeditiously, recognizing that there will be capacity limits, and that an early start means an earlier finish.

These are time-consuming processes. To move a rotary kiln from the interior of this country to an appropriate spot near Baghdad—and set it up—will require many months. Such a kiln is 40 feet long and, I think, 16 feet wide. Conceivably, it might fit into a C5A, but I doubt that you would want to devote airlift to such a purpose, while military operations are being prepared or executed. Therefore, such equipment should now be in the process of being barged over to Kuwait.

Two or three months ago I mentioned to Bill Luti that we should start getting contractors aboard. Private contractors will not undertake such expenditures without certainty of compensation. We have already lost some months. We need to start identifying appropriate contractors for the reconstruction effort in Iraq now. Needless to say, we also need to authorize them to get the needed logistical effort underway.

Phil Merrill has indicated that he is prepared to underwrite reconstruction efforts (with the usual Ex-Im criteria). That could help. If there is anything that I can do at NSC, OMB, etc. to help get the requisite authorization, please let me know.

3/5/03

Sent via Email from
Dr. Schlesinger

CC: L. Di Rita
C & D

11-L-0559/OSD14663

40 28 203

* * * COMMUNICATION RESULT REPORT (MAR.11.2003 12:43PM) * * *

TTI EXECSEC SPECIAL PROJECTS OFC

FILE MODE	OPTION	ADDRESS (GROUP)	RESULT	PAGE
569	MEMORY TX	(b)(6)	OK	P. 1/1

REASON FOR ERROR

E-1) HANG UP OR LINE FAIL
E-3) NO ANSWERE-2) BUSY
E-4) NO FACSIMILE CONNECTION

(b)(6)

March 8, 2003 12:04 PM

TO: Jim Schlesinger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Your Memo on Iraq

Thanks so much for your note on the plans for post-military Iraq. It is helpful, and I will get it moved around.

DHR:dh
030803-14

11-L-0559/OSD14664



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET
2003 MAR 11 09 40 03

INFO MEMO

March 11, 2003 - 1100

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 11 Mar 03

SUBJECT: Average Mobilization of Guard/Reserve--SNOWFLAKE

- You suggested (Tab A) it would be helpful to have a good metric reflecting the average usage of Reserve component (RC) members, especially for mobilizations – and that we should determine the average pre-notification time to RC members before they are mobilized/deployed.
- Development of a well-populated metric for the second issue will require additional time (our next survey of reserve personnel (May) will cover this issue).
- However, use of available data (Tab B) does provide the following for the first issue.
- An average RC member had the following probabilities of being mobilized:
 - Serving from 1991 to 1992 - .24 for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
 - Serving from 1993 to 2000 - .06 for Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia.
 - Serving from 2001 to 2003 - .33 thus far for NOBLE EAGLE/ENDURING FREEDOM, Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia.
- An average RC member serving from 1991 to 2003 had a .65 probability of being mobilized for 1 contingency; a .04 probability of being mobilized for 2 contingencies; and less than .01 probability of being mobilized for 3 or more contingencies.
- This includes only data on involuntary mobilizations, not voluntary support for operational missions.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P)

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD14665

U03268 /03

TAB

A

2 113103

Snowflake

February 11, 2003 6:30 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Mover
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Average Mobilization of Guard/Reserve

It would be helpful to have some metric to consider the average number of times the average reservist has been called to active duty in the past 2, 4, 6, or 10 years, or whatever time period would provide useful information.

We probably should try to get some data on how much time, on average, reservists got between the time they were notified they may be mobilized, activated, and/or deployed and the time they actually were mobilized, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dj
021103-1

.....
Please respond by 02/14/03

11-L-0559/OSD14667

TAB

B

Number Mobilized 1991 - 2003 (Feb)
(NEEF, SWA, KOSOVO, HAITI, BOSNIA, DSDS)

	2003*	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991
# Mobilized	117,998	94,715	29,240	9,374	9,243	4,704	8,296	3,618	2,300	-	11,000	225,242
Strength	971,343	974,326	898,534	855,242	870,917	902,216	920,371	945,852	998,330	1,057,676	1,114,905	1,164,570
Tro Pipeline	52,487	55,144	67,989	80,922	59,566	61,812	57,833	52,377	48,848	57,419	68,552	67,104
AGR/TARs	67,384	67,204	65,285	55,438	65,041	64,772	65,608	64,874	67,598	70,516	73,028	74,516
2.9% non-deployable	20,471	20,480	20,014	19,611	20,284	21,010	21,563	22,337	23,737	25,006	26,159	27,187
Total non-deployable	140,342	142,828	153,282	155,871	144,891	147,594	145,004	139,588	140,183	152,941	167,739	168,807
Deployable Strength	731,001	731,499	715,252	699,372	726,026	754,622	775,367	806,264	858,147	904,735	947,166	995,763

% of deployable force mobilized

15.06%	12.95%	3.95%	1.34%	1.27%	0.64%	1.13%	1.07%	0.45%	0.27%	0.00%	1.16%	22.85%
--------	--------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	--------

725,917	average deployable strength	01.03	782,708	average deployable strength	00.93	956,455	average deployable strength	92.91
240,351	mobilized		46,054	mobilized		235,242	mobilized	
33.11%	Probability of mobilization		6.88%	Probability of mobilization		24.44%	Probability of mobilization	

Probability of Mobilization Over a career spanning 1991 - 2003

# of Mobilizations	# in K	Probability
1	517.3	64.84%
2	28.5	3.57%
3	2.9	0.36%
4	0.4	0.05%
5	0.03	0.00%

11-L-0559/OSD14669

February 11, 2003 6:30 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Average Mobilization of Guard Reserve

It would be helpful to have some metric to consider the average number of times the average reservist has been called to active duty in the past 2, 4, 6, or 10 years, or whatever time period would provide useful information.

We probably should try to get some data on how much time, on average, reservists got between the time they were notified they may be mobilized, activated, and or deployed and the time they actually were mobilized, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dj
021105-1

.....
Please respond by 03/14/03

326

11Feb03



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET
703 MAR 12 11 7:55

INFO MEMO

March 3, 2003 - 1600

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu 11 Mar 03

SUBJECT: Senator Clinton's Inquiry on Reservists—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- You said that Senator Clinton wants to see you on two subjects – the military callup of Reservists who are first responders, and issues relating to the Gulf War syndrome.
- Regarding the callup of first responders, we have a well-established process, initiated in 1979, to screen individuals out of the Ready Reserve who are in critical civilian positions effecting national security and the safety of the American population.
- Though we can only proactively screen the 2.7 million federal employees, the program is available to state/local government agencies as well as the private sector.
- Recognizing the unique situation created by the events of September 11, 2001, we immediately established another program recognizing that certain individuals, who may not have been screened out of the Ready Reserve because of their civilian jobs, may occupy civilian positions now regarded as critical to national security and safety.
- This new program processes requests for delay/exemption from mobilization for Ready Reserve members based on the critical nature of their civilian employment.
- The first case we processed was a request from the New York City Office of Emergency Management, in which we accommodated the request not to mobilize 17 of their first responders for 90 days.
- Since that time we have received requests on over 1,000 individuals. Through coordination with requesting agencies, we reduced the number of those being processed to 211 - granting 53 exemptions, 88 delays, and denying 51 requests, with 19 pending final adjudication.
- We have recently overcome Privacy Act concerns and are now preparing to mandate collection of civilian employer information that will facilitate better identification and management of first responders.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD14671

U03288 /03

February 13, 2003 1:56 PM

TO: Powell Moore
William Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Clinton

*Vague task to
some input*

Hillary Clinton wants to see me down here on two subjects—one is the problem of first responders in the state and local government in the Reserves getting called up, and second is a medical problem from the Gulf War syndrome. She said the same thing has hit the people who were involved in Ground Zero in New York. Have we found anything like that from the Pentagon problem?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021303-23

.....
Please respond by 02/28/03

11-L-0559/OSD14672



February 13, 2003 1:56 PM

TO: Powell Moore
William Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Clinton

*Vague task to
some input*

Hillary Clinton wants to see me down here on two subjects—one is the problem of first responders in the state and local government in the Reserves getting called up, and second is a medical problem from the Gulf War syndrome. She said the same thing has hit the people who were involved in Ground Zero in New York. Have we found anything like that from the Pentagon problem?

326

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021303-23

.....

Please respond by 02/28/03

13Feb03



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 13 2003

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Senator Clinton "Snowflake"

- In your February 13, 2003, memo (TAB A), you asked whether medical problems observed in people in the September 11, 2001, Pentagon attack might be similar to those reported by first responders to the World Trade Center attack or those reported as "Gulf War Syndrome." There are few similarities among those involved in those different situations.
- Medically, there is no Gulf War "syndrome." No single medical syndrome has been found among Gulf War veterans. About 20% of the ailing Gulf War veterans have medically unexplained symptoms that cannot be attributed to traditional diagnoses.
- Many of the illnesses experienced by World Trade Center workers are respiratory in nature and likely due to heavy exposures to numerous airborne contaminants. Other symptoms appear to be due to psychological trauma. Such psychological health effects have been observed consistently among the survivors of disasters and warfare.
- In comparison to the World Trade Center, the attack on the Pentagon was much smaller in scale and duration. Extensive indoor air quality and other environmental sampling data do not indicate any medically significant exposures to Pentagon personnel on or after September 12th.
- Medical surveillance of Department of Defense clinics in the Washington DC area has shown no net increase in overall visits for patients having depression, anxiety, acute and post-traumatic stress disorder, substance use disorders, or other behavioral health problems.
- Several special follow-up programs have been initiated for Pentagon workers and rescue and cleanup personnel.
- TAB B provides more details on the medical problems reported by World Trade Center workers and on programs to assist Pentagon workers.

COORDINATION: TAB C

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Jeff Prather, DHS, (b)(6) PCDOCS #46029/R46225

11-L-0559/OSD14674

U03662 03

326

13 MAR 03

Information Paper

Comparisons between the Medical Problems Associated with the World Trade Center, Gulf War Syndrome, and the Pentagon Disaster

Background: Following the September 11th World Trade Center attack, many personnel who worked at Ground Zero in New York experienced persistent health problems. Senator Clinton (D-NY) likened these problems to those experienced by Gulf War veterans (labeled by the media as "Gulf War Syndrome"). Senator Clinton asked whether similar symptoms are occurring in Pentagon personnel.

Facts:

- The media uses the term "Gulf War Syndrome" as a way of broadly referring to the occurrence of health problems among Gulf War veterans. The term wrongly applies the traditional medical use of the word "syndrome," which refers to a combination of symptoms, signs, and diagnostic tests unique in a way that their combination represents a single disease process that can be distinguished from other diseases. No single such syndrome has been found among Gulf War veterans. About 20 percent of the ailing Gulf War veterans have had medically unexplained physical symptoms that cannot be attributed clearly to traditional diagnoses. This is not an unexpected phenomenon, since the US has seen similar symptoms in veterans after every war since the Civil War.
- Many of the illnesses experienced by World Trade Center workers are respiratory in nature and likely due to heavy exposures to numerous airborne contaminants (glass, smoke, asbestos, heavy metals, and fibrous materials). Other symptoms appear to be due to the psychological trauma that was experienced. Such psychological health effects have been observed consistently among the survivors of disasters and warfare.
- The DoD began steps immediately after the attack to assess the physical and behavioral health of Pentagon occupants and to implement programs to support the health and welfare of Pentagon personnel including:
 - In early Oct 2001, a comprehensive "Pentagon Post-Disaster Health Assessment Survey" designed to document injuries, exposures, and illnesses sustained by Pentagon personnel was administered between 4 and 12 weeks post attack. Of the 19,450 Pentagon personnel, 4,751 participated in the survey. Eighty-six percent of those reported some type of exposure to smoke/dust/odors. Smoke exposure was generally of light intensity with a median duration of less than 15 minutes, in stark contrast to longer-term exposures at the World Trade Center where great amounts of smoke and dust were generated for days afterwards. Among the respondents who were at or near the Pentagon during the attack, 186 (5 percent) indicated they were injured during the initial blast and/or the evacuation. A total of 1,700 (35 percent) of the respondents reported a worsening of prior-health problems or new health problems, the majority of which were stress related (54 percent).
 - Operation Solace began on September 11th to reduce the severity and/or chronicity of reactions to stress and grief, of other psychiatric illness, and of medically unexplained physical symptoms among active duty and civilian Pentagon personnel. Contact was

made with anyone who indicated the desire for it on the Pentagon Post-Disaster Health Assessment Survey. Over 75,000 contacts have been made to date through various means. Approximately 800 Pentagon personnel continue to be seen/contacted periodically by the Operation Solace team. Ten clinicians continue to go office-to-office and desk-to-desk either providing care on the spot or discreetly arranging for a follow-up meeting. Informal sessions are held in the location of the worker's choosing. In addition, support groups are run; classes are offered; presentations at staff meetings are made to address stress, grief and other topics; and referrals to higher levels of care are arranged where desired. Operation Solace also provides clinical behavioral health care for those active duty desiring it (~75 active cases).

- Medical surveillance of DoD's clinics in the National Capitol Region has shown no net increase in visits for patients having depression, anxiety, acute and posttraumatic stress disorder, substance use disorders or other behavioral health problems. In addition, there were no increases in behavioral medicine clinic visits but there were significant changes in the number of diagnoses for anxiety disorders and acute stress reactions in children, and adjustment reactions in adults. Monitoring for increased numbers of patients having "medically unexplained symptoms" has shown no increases, although variability in coding at the practitioner level make confidence in the comprehensiveness of these data less certain.
- Review of the worker's compensation data for DoD civilians working in the Pentagon shows no significant increase in the number of claims.

The DoD Deployment Health Clinical Center at Walter Reed Army Medical Center reports that, of the patients clinically evaluated between April and December 2002 as a result of the Pentagon attack, approximately 40 patients were identified with a high level of unmet mental health needs and self-described unexplained physical symptoms. Although the clinical data may be misleading because it may not capture all civilians who sought help (civilians are more likely to go to private doctors than DoD clinics), the clinical data coupled with the outreach surveys, counseling sessions, and review of workers compensation claims give a fairly complete picture (definitely better than New York City) of the impact of the attack on Pentagon employees.

TAB A

3

February 14, 2003 2:02 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: Forces Worldwide

We have to start looking at forces worldwide and make sure that the people sending in their plans are not feeling restricted to use only the forces allocated to them or vice versa—not feeling obliged to use all the forces allocated to them.

We also have to make sure they start putting assumptions up, like I told Admiral Fargo. We have to make sure they start including a State Department element, an information operations element and an intelligence element.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021403-13

.....
Please respond by

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD14677

U03392 /03

14 Feb 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-831-03
13 March 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

- In response to your note (TAB), the following information is provided:
- As forces prepare for operations in Iraq, my staff, the combatant commands and the Services have redoubled efforts to capture, analyze and distribute lessons learned. We're looking at good ideas emanating from the Global War on Terrorism, Homeland Security, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and all other operations.
- In addition to the continuing efforts in the Services and energized efforts at Joint Forces Command's Lessons Learned Center, we have also supplemented USJFCOM with resources from the Institute for Defense Analyses' Joint Advanced Warfighting Program. USJFCOM will provide immediate feedback on joint operational and interoperability observations from the planning and execution of operations.
- Currently, there are no formal procedures for meeting with you and your staff to ensure your ideas, concerns and recommendations are included in the process. If you have no objections, my J7 is prepared to conduct interviews with your staff on a recurring basis, to include your Senior MA and you as desired.
- The results will be periodically compiled and forwarded for your review.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Copy to:
DepSecDef
USD(P)
USD(AT&L)

Prepared By: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7

(b)(6)

*Mr Secretary,
I've also asked Joint Force
Command to deconflict their
efforts with the Defense Science
Board lessons learned effort.*

*VR
Doeh*

11-L-0559/OSD14678

U03393th/03

February 18, 2003 9:42 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
LTG Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

When the lessons learned from the Iraq effort gets underway, and I assume that is soon, I want to make sure all of us keep good notes, so we can feed into that process.

The previous times there were lessons learned, nobody checked with me. I don't know if they checked with Paul, General Myers or General Pace, but we sure want to get our ideas, concerns and corrections into the process.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021803-8

.....
Please respond by 02/28/03

11-L-0559/OSD14679

03 FEB 2003 09:59



385

February 18, 2003 9:42 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
LTG Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Iraq

When the lessons learned from the Iraq effort gets underway, and I assume that is soon, I want to make sure all of us keep good notes, so we can feed into that process.

The previous times there were lessons learned, nobody checked with me. I don't know if they checked with Paul, General Myers or General Pace, but we sure want to get our ideas, concerns and corrections into the process.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021803-8

.....

Please respond by 02/28/03

18 Feb 03

11-L-0559/OSD14680

03 FEB 24 10 39 1

U03394" /03

4:17 PM

TO: Gen. Richard Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 1, 2003

SUBJECT:

We need to pull up all the authorities that Ed Eberhart has as Commander of Northern Command and have a piece-by-piece review. We should not have the same authorities for the Northern Command that we do for the other areas of responsibility. There is an enormous difference.

I would like a review of how this space shuttle accident was handled precisely. Then I want to have lessons learned and a recommendation as to how we need to rearrange the authorities so that we have the proper lines in the chain of command.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030103.11

Please respond by: _____

*2/15/03**Northern Command**1 Feb 03*

March 18, 2003 5:32 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
Michael Wynne

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Defense Contract Management Agency

Here is an analysis of the Defense Contract Management Agency the Joint Staff has completed. I have not read it.

Please review it and let the Chairman and me know if there is any particular action required.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/14/03 CJCS Action memo re: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART)
Assessment of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) [U03535/03]

DHR:dh
031803-9

.....

Please respond by 4/18/03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CH-838-03

14 March 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

- Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires a biennial assessment of the combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security.
- DCMA became a combat support agency on 27 March 2000. This is the first ever CSART of DCMA. The CSART determined that DCMA is ready to execute its mission to support the operating forces and is responsive to the current requirements of our combatant commands with minor shortfalls.
- I have forwarded the report to the relevant parties for information and have already directed the implementation of those report recommendations within my authority (TAB B). Attached for your information is a copy of the DCMA executive summary (TAB C).

RECOMMENDATION: Request your signature on the enclosed proposed memorandum (TAB A) forwarding the summary of findings for implementation.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8;

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

11-L-0559/OSD14683

U03535 /03

A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
AGENCY

SUBJECT: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a biennial assessment of combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security.

The CSART conducted the DCMA assessment in calendar year 2002 that contains specific recommendations for improving DCMA readiness, and has my support for implementation. A summary of findings and recommendations is enclosed.

I commend the Director, DCMA, for the contingency contract administration support during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, which is a combat multiplier, releasing military members to perform critical battlefield functions. Addressees should provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an update on all recommendations within 3 months and a complete status prior to the next scheduled CSART assessment of DCMA in June 2004.

Attachments
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD14685

Copy to:

USD(P&R)

CJCS

CSA

CNO

CSAF

CMC

Commander, USCENTCOM

Commander, USEUCOM

Commander, USJFCOM

Commander, USNORTHCOM

Commander, USPACOM

Commander, USSOUTHCOM

Commander, USSOCOM

Commander, USSTRATCOM

Commander, USTRANSCOM

Director for Operations, Joint Staff

Director for Logistics, Joint Staff

Director for Operational Plans and

Joint Force Development, Joint

Staff

ENCLOSURE

DCMA SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
1.	Lack of full integration of DCMA functions at the combatant commands impedes DCMA's ability to execute its combat support mission.	<p>a. Educate the combatant and the component commands on DCMA's service offering and capabilities for contingency contract administration.</p> <p>b. Assign a representative to liaise with each combatant command to ensure DCMA is part of all planning and deployments.</p> <p>c. Increase liaison officer (LNO) engagement of component command staffs to coordinate issues germane to the combatant commander.</p> <p>d. Coordinate with Joint Staff, J3, to monitor timely receipt of deployment orders.</p> <p>e. Place DCMA as an addressee on all future planning orders for coordination or information.</p>	<p>Director, DCMA</p> <p>Director, DCMA</p> <p>Director, DCMA</p> <p>Director, DCMA</p> <p>Joint Staff, J3</p>
2.	DCMA's fill rate for military manpower is 75 percent of authorization.	<p>a. Coordinate with the Office of the USD(P&R) and the Services to assess the number of military authorizations necessary to achieve DCMA mission accomplishment using the Defense Agency Manpower Review Process. This review should include existing Service component contingency contracting capability, already committed to the combatant commander's OPLAN, to perform the Contingency Contract Administrative Support (CCAS) mission.</p> <p>b. Assess the impact of military fill rate on DCMA's ability to perform its CCAS missions and submit as a readiness deficiency, as appropriate.</p>	<p>USD(AT&L)</p> <p>Director, DCMA</p>
3.	Insufficient joint doctrine and policy concerning contractor support on the battlefield hampers the combatant commander's ability to efficiently employ and manage contractor assets in the area of responsibility.	<p>a. In coordination with Joint Staff, J4, develop joint doctrine and procedures for contractor utilization on the battlefield and contingency contracting support, standardizing the terms of reference, definitions of responsibilities and employment.</p>	<p>Joint Staff, J7</p>

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
3.	Continued	b. In coordination with Joint Staff, J4, develop joint doctrine and procedures that outline the roles and responsibilities for joint task force or theater special operations command when they are designated the operational lead.	Joint Staff, J7
4.	Lack of a process at the combatant command level impacts management of contractor and associated personnel information in the area of responsibility.	a. In coordination with principal contracting officers for the theater executive agent for contracting, predesignate the appropriate contract administration agent; DCMA or Service component for theater contracts in their OPLANs and CONPLANS. b. In coordination with the Joint Staff, J4, develop guidance for the CCAS teams to advise the joint commander within the AOR on contractor issues, visibility of contractors, and integration of contractor capability.	Combatant commanders Director, DCMA
5.	DCMA lacks an approved Agency Mission Essential Task List (AMETL) and associated metrics to objectively assess agency readiness to support contingency contracting missions and focus agency training.	Develop, approve and submit to the Joint Staff, J7, the AMETL and the metrics required to validate the missions.	Director, DCMA
6.	DCMA has not identified and trained sufficient personnel to meet DCMA's anticipated requirement for deployment of CCAS Teams.	a. Enforce an emergency essential clause as a condition of employment for employees in skills that are necessary for initial response team (IRT) and CCAS deployments. b. Review manning and equipment requirements for future IRT and CCAS missions (to include an assessment as to whether some CCAS missions can be accomplished using existing Service component contracting assets as a mean of mitigating possible manning and equipment shortfalls) and prepare to support them or identify the shortfall as a Joint Quarterly Readiness Report deficiency. c. Define unit type codes for the initial response and contingency contract administration support teams for utilization in the Global Status of Resources and Training database.	Director, DCMA Director, DCMA Director, DCMA

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
7.	DCMA CCAS teams require additional training on the Balkan Support Contract (BSC) before deployment to the AOR.	<p>a. Review the length of the BSC training program and revise it as required to ensure administrative contract officers are fully trained on the BSC before deployment.</p> <p>b. Develop rotation policy that maximizes productive time that continues to be consistent with USEUCOM deployment policies for the AOR.</p>	<p>Director, DCMA</p> <p>Director, DCMA</p>

B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-839-03

14 March 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List

Subject: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

1. Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires a biennial assessment of the combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security. The CSART recently completed its assessment of DCMA.
2. DCMA is ready to execute its mission to support the operating forces as specified in current operations and concept plans, and is responsive to the current requirement of our combatant commands. A summary of the findings and the executive summary of the report have been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. Under CJCSI 3401.01C, 1 October 2002, combatant commanders should utilize the results of this assessment to support the assessment of DCMA's readiness to support respective commands.
3. The enclosed specific recommendations to improve DCMA's readiness have my full support for implementation. The Joint Staff has initiated actions as a result of the assessment. A copy of the final report is enclosed for your information; formal tasking from the Office of the Secretary of Defense will be provided later.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Richard B. Myers", is positioned above the printed name.

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff


Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD14691

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Commander, USTRANSCOM	1
Operations Deputy, US Army	1
Operations Deputy, US Navy	1
Operations Deputy, US Air Force.....	1
Operations Deputy, US Marine Corps.....	1
Director, Defense Contract Management Agency.....	1
Director for Operations, Joint Staff.....	1
Director for Logistics, Joint Staff	1
Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff	1



COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCY REVIEW TEAM
ASSESSMENT OF THE



DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCY REVIEW TEAM (CSART) 2002 REPORT ON THE DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA)

Combat Support Agency Review. The CSART assessed the readiness and responsiveness of the DCMA to support the operating forces under the authority granted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, section 193. DCMA is one of the seven designated combat support agencies that can be tasked to directly support a combatant commander. In the role of a combat support agency, DCMA provides in-theater contingency contract administration services to several ongoing operations. While contractor support on the battlefield allows uniformed personnel to concentrate on core military responsibilities, doctrine has not been fully developed. Contract administration provides the oversight necessary to assure that contractor support is performed to specification, and in a timely and agile manner. DCMA is the quality-control link between the combatant command and the contractor. One should note that combat support constitutes only about 5 percent of DCMA's mission; the agency's primary work is in support of the Defense acquisition community, an area of study beyond the purview of CSART.

Combat Readiness. DCMA is ready and responsive to provide contingency contracting with minor shortfalls. These include a lack of knowledge within the combatant commands about the services and capabilities offered by DCMA; insufficient doctrine and policy concerning the management of contracts and contractors on the battlefield; DCMA liaison; and contingency contract administration support (CCAS) team manning, equipping and training.

Combatant commands are generally unaware of DCMA's services and capabilities because they delegate contingency contract administration to a component command designated as an executive agent within the AOR. Additionally, at the component command level, only a small number of staff personnel are familiar with the services and support capabilities DCMA offers. DCMA needs a comprehensive plan for educating combatant and component commands about what support it brings to the battlefield.¹

Contingency Contract Support. DCMA provides direct support to combatant commands by administering external theater support contracts like the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and the Balkan Support Contract (BSC). DCMA administers these contracts upon the principal contract officer (PCO) delegating authority to DCMA. In coordination with the PCO, DCMA deploys tailored CCAS teams to an AOR. These teams rely heavily on the use of both military and civilian personnel assigned to other billets at

¹ *Defense Contract Management Agency CSART Internal Operation Assessment (IOA) Status Briefing, 13 May 2002.*

DCMA. However, the fill rate of military billets at DCMA is 75 percent, and the continuing demands of global operations stress the organization. The Defense Agency Manpower Review Process should be used to assess the level of fill necessary to accomplish the DCMA mission.

Conclusions. To improve its readiness and responsiveness, DCMA needs to improve combatant command knowledge of the services and capabilities offered by increasing the liaison between DCMA and the combatant and component commands. An aggressive education of customers about what contracts DCMA supports, what should be expected when DCMA supports a contract, and the development of a metrics system to measure the effect DCMA has on theater readiness will improve customer support. DCMA should also continue its progress in resolving the employment, manning, training, composition and equipping issues surrounding CCAS teams. Finally, there is a recognized need for joint doctrine to guide future operations.

CHAPTER I
CSART PURPOSE AND ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
PART 1 - CSART Purpose and Authority

Authority. CSART assessed the readiness and responsiveness of the DCMA to support the operating forces in accordance with title 10, United States Code, section 193. This law mandates three focus areas:

CSART Objective:
Make a determination with respect to the ***responsiveness and readiness*** of each agency to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security.

a. Combat Readiness. Paragraph 193(a) requires that "Periodically (and not less often than every two years) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on the combat support agencies." Each report shall include "a determination with respect to the responsiveness and readiness of each agency to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security;" and "any recommendations that the Chairman considers appropriate."¹ The law requires a review of "the plans of each such agency with respect to its support of operating forces in the event of a war or threat to national security..." and grants the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the authority to "take steps to provide for any revision of those plans that the Chairman considers appropriate."²

b. Participation in Joint Exercises. Paragraph 193(b) requires the Chairman to "provide for the participation of the combat support agencies in joint training exercises to the extent necessary to ensure that those agencies are capable of performing their support missions," and to "assess the performance in joint training exercises of each such agency," and to "take steps to provide for any change that the Chairman considers appropriate to improve that performance."³

c. Readiness Reporting System. Paragraph 193(c) requires the Chairman to "develop ... a uniform system for reporting to the Secretary of Defense, the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, and the Secretaries of the military departments concerning the readiness of each such agency to perform with respect to a war or threat to national security."⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.01C, 1 October 2002, "Chairman's Readiness System," directs combat support agencies to submit a Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR).

¹ Title 10, United States Code, Section 193, (a) (1).

² Ibid. (a) (2).

³ Ibid. (b)

⁴ Ibid. (c).

PART 2 – Assessment Methodology

Assessment Methodology. The CSART conducted its assessment in accordance with the procedures in CJCSI 3460.01, 14 January 2002, “Combat Support Agency Review Team Assessments.” Detailed findings and recommendations are contained in Chapter 3. The CSART visited selected combatant commands and the component commands tasked to be the executive agent for contingency contracting in the AOR. The combatant commands provided the over-arching view of operations in the AOR, while the component commands gave the corresponding contract sustainment and logistics perspective. The CSART also visited the PMs for the LOGCAP, AFCAP, and the BSC. These three contracts are the primary vehicles for logistics, infrastructure and sustainment support during contingency operations.

Assessment Areas. To arrive at an overall conclusion concerning DCMA readiness and responsiveness, the CSART assessed DCMA support of military operations of the combatant commanders in the following five assessment areas.

a. Contingency Operations Support. The CSART assessed DCMA support to ongoing or recent contingency operations as a primary indicator of the readiness of the agency to support similar operations. The CSART assessed DCMA support of Kosovo Force (KFOR), Sustainment Force (SFOR) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The CSART also evaluated the direct effect DCMA contract management had on the readiness of the combatant commands during contingency operations.

b. Deliberate and Crisis Planning Support. The CSART assessed DCMA support to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and combatant command planning, supporting plans and internal contingency plans and planning capability on the presumption that such an agency capability enhances their readiness to execute assigned missions.

c. Exercise and Training Support. The CSART assessed DCMA participation and performance in major exercises as an indicator of DCMA readiness to accomplish its mission in major combat operations. This included support and participation in combatant command, CJCS and internal exercises and training programs.

d. Security Cooperation Support. The CSART identified no security cooperation issues germane to DCMA's mission.

e. Contingency Contracting Support. The CSART assessed the readiness and responsiveness of DCMA to support combatant command readiness in contingency contracting support, DCMA's primary combat support mission.

CHAPTER II

DCMA PROFILE

DCMA Background. On 27 March 2000, DCMA was designated a combat support agency by the Secretary of Defense in DOD Directive 5105.64, 27 September 2000, "Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)." Prior to that time, DCMA was a subordinate command of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).¹ The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) provides oversight, supervision, direction, authority and control of DCMA.

a. The DCMA manages contracts awarded by the military Services, Defense agencies, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, other federal agencies and foreign governments that are delegated to the agency for administration. In its role as a combat support agency, DCMA provides CCAS to the combatant commands and their component commands across the full continuum of warfare, from humanitarian aid to major combat operations and from pre-contract award through the contract execution and closeout phases. Although DCMA is a combat support agency, roughly 5 percent of its mission is in direct support of the combatant commanders through CCAS and 95 percent of its mission support is to the defense acquisition community PEO and PMs. The agency's purpose is to minimize risks to customers associated with both internal and external factors that affect on-time delivery of conforming products and services within cost according to contractual requirements. DCMA manages over 320,000 prime contracts with current work valued at over \$850 billion.²

DCMA Mission Statement

"Provide Customer Focused Acquisition Support and Contract Management Services to Ensure Warfighter Readiness, 24/7, Worldwide."

b. DCMA was authorized 11,747 civilians full time equivalents (FTEs) and 625 military positions in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002. DCMA currently employs 10,823 civilians representing 92 percent of its FTE authorization and 471 military members, or 75 percent of its military authorization.³ The DCMA budget is approximately 90 percent appropriated funding and 10 percent reimbursable funding through foreign military sales (FMS) and other non-DOD customer support. The FY 2002 budget appropriation was \$927M and the FY 2003 budget request is for \$983M. Of the FY 2003 budget request, \$809M (82 percent) is dedicated to personnel funding. The DOD reimbursed DCMA

¹ Under Secretary of Defense memorandum, 1 October 2001, "Fiscal Year (FY) 2003-2007 Defense Contract Agency (DCMA) Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimates Submission (BES)"

² Defense Contract Management Agency Transformation Roadmap, undated, page 2.

³ Agency In-Brief for DCMA CSART, chart 8 (Manning), dated 11 June 2002.

\$1.2M to fund Operation ENDURING FREEDOM CCAS requirements during FY 2002. In October 2002, DCMA identified FY 2003 funding requirements of \$4.92M, including \$3.3M for CCAS support and \$1.6M for counterterrorism. The agency laid out the continuing requirement below for FY 2004-2009 due to an increase of requirements for deployed CCAS teams to support Counterterrorism and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM requirements:

FY	FY 2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009
TOTAL	\$4.3M	\$5.7M	\$7.2M	\$8.6M	\$9M	\$9.4M

Mission. DCMA ensures that the contract logistics and sustainment support of the operating forces are provided through contract administration. Contract administration is a mechanism for combatant commanders to leverage the full capability of contractor support to assist in completing a major portion of the logistical mission of a contingency operation. Due to military downsizing and complex technical military weapon systems, the combatant and component commanders rely on contractor support to perform many logistical functions on the battlefield. Leveraging contractors allows military personnel to concentrate on core military responsibilities. Contract administration provides the oversight necessary to assure the contractor support on the battlefield is performed to specification, in a timely manner, and provides the agility to negotiate supplemental changes to respond to unforeseen situations. DCMA is the link between the command and the contractor that ensures contractor responsiveness to the needs of the command. In support of the warfighter, DCMA's draft Mission Essential Task list includes:

a. Contract Management Services. DCMA contract management offices provide readiness information to buying agencies throughout the life of the contract. During the presolicitation phase of an acquisition, DCMA provides planning advice to help construct effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select capable contractors and write contracts that are easy to manage. After contract award, DCMA assesses contractors' systems to ensure they are controlling products, costs and schedules in compliance with the contract.⁴

b. Readiness and Delivery. DCMA supports the readiness of the combatant forces by using its in-plant presence in industry to assure on-time, accelerated and expedited delivery of mission-essential equipment to the warfighter.⁵ Through this supply chain linkage, DCMA enables warfighter readiness.

c. Providing Industrial Analysis. At the direction of the USD(AT&L), DCMA can provide the combatant commander information about the industrial base capability to support a contingency, planned or in execution. Based upon analysis results, logistics and operations can be linked to ensure supportability through contract accelerations or constraint imposition.

⁴ *Defense Contract Management Agency Transformation Roadmap, undated, page2.*

⁵ *Ibid, page 15.*

d. CCAS. DCMA's mission of administering select contingency contracts for logistics and sustainment directly supports the warfighter and constitutes its primary combat support mission. The combatant commanders, through OPLANs and CONPLANs, assign this mission to DCMA. DCMA executes its CCAS mission through review and update of deliberate plans as a member of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC), and through deployment of CCAS teams in response to a crisis.

(1) DCMA reviews OPLANs, CONPLANs and exercise plans to ensure resources (personnel and equipment) are available to meet the mission requirement. DCMA uses this information to evaluate training and deployment requirements for the personnel selected as CCAS team members. CCAS team members must be trained in contract administration as well as Basic Contingency Operations Training (BCOT) prior to deployment and they must be designated Emergency Essential (EE) DOD employees.⁶ The composition of the team is tailored to meet the requirements outlined by the combatant or component command when it is requested. DCMA has determined that the requirement for CCAS team support involves the fielding of teams to meet a scenario involving one major combat operation (MCO), two lesser regional conflicts, and three immediate response teams for two 6-month rotations.⁷

(2) Since 1993, DCMA (or the Defense Contract Management Command, DCMC, as they were designated while under DLA) has deployed more than 400 people in support of contingency operations.⁸ Currently, DCMA has 31 personnel deployed in support of ongoing contingency operations.⁹ Eighteen DCMA personnel are administering contracts worth \$442M to sustain Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in this FY alone.

<u>Currently Deployed</u>	
<u>Country</u>	<u># Deployed</u>
Bosnia	6
Kosovo	7
Kuwait	4
Qatar	1
Uzbekistan	3
Philippines	1
Afghanistan	6
Republic of Georgia	2
Djibouti	1
TOTAL	31
As of 25 October 2002	

(3) DCMA provides combatant and their component commands with contingency contracting support only to one of the three elements of contingency contracting: External theater support contracts. External theater support contracts are those in which the supporting headquarters is outside of the mission area (e.g., LOGCAP, AFCAP, emergency construction capabilities contract, Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the BSC, and War Reserve contracts).¹⁰

⁶ *Defense Contract Management Agency Directive 1 (The One Book), Chapter 13.1 (Draft), Readiness Reporting, June 2002.*

⁷ *Ibid*

⁸ *Agency In Brief, Support to Contingency Operations, 11 June 2002*

⁹ *Agency provided information, 25 October 2002.*

¹⁰ *Joint Publication 4.0, Joint Logistics, Chapter V, Contractors on the Battlefield, 6 April 2000.*

DCMA does not provide direct support to combatant commands for theater support¹¹ or in-theater systems support contracting.¹²

(4) Over the course of the SFOR, KFOR, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM contingencies, DCMA has administered logistics and sustainment contracts in support of combatant commands. The chart below provides information showing the depth of DCMA support to recent and ongoing operations.¹³

Organization. HQ DCMA is comprised of the following directorates: Contract Management Operations; Program Integration, Financial and Business Operations; Human Resources; Information Technology; Aircraft Operations; and the Special Staff. DCMA has three contract management districts: Defense Contract Management District East, Defense Contract Management District West, and Defense Contract Management District International. Each district office is responsible for contracts in their respective area.

DCMA SUPPORT TO ONGOING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS					
LOCATION	SCOPE OF WORK				
Contingency Operation Name of contract Supported combatant command	Contract start date	Contract total \$ value	# people (customers) served	Contractors	CCAS team size
SFOR Balkan Support Contract* USEUCOM	Nov-95	2.5B	3,124/day 8,260/day	6,127 10,939	6
KFOR Balkan Support Contract* USEUCOM	Nov-95	-	5,136/day	4,812	7
Operation Enduring Freedom LOGCAP USCENTCOM	Apr-02	19M	1,850	295	6
Operation Enduring Freedom LOGCAP USPACOM	Jan-02	20M	~1,300	391	1
Operation Enduring Freedom AFCAP USCENTCOM	Feb-02	403M	14	1	1

* Balkan Support Contract supports both Bosnia and Kosovo

a. The districts oversee 65 subordinate Contract Management Offices (CMOs) that are responsible for the work performed at over 900 operating locations worldwide. The CMOs manage contracts within specific geographic areas and within contractor's plants. Their management duties include daily, on-site surveillance of contractor processes, systems and program specific concerns that cannot be viewed by off-site agencies.¹⁴ The employees at the district offices provide readiness information to military buying agencies during the acquisition cycle and throughout the life of the contract.

¹¹ Theater Support Contracting refers to support given to the combatant commands from sources within the mission area or through pre-arranged host-nation support contracts with regional businesses or vendors (e.g. trash removal, fresh produce delivery, fuels, utilities, etc.).

¹² In-Theater Systems Support Contracting refers to contractors that support deployed forces with pre-arranged contracts awarded by Service Program Managers to meet specific system needs (e.g. Abrams Tank or Apache Helicopter contractor support, communications, or C2 infrastructure, etc.). In-Theater System Support Contracting is usually an arrangement made among a Program Manager, a manufacturer or maintenance provider, and a unit. The relationship is often habitual and DCMA does not administer these contracts.

¹³ Agency provided information.

¹⁴ Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 12 April 2002, "Defense Agency Performance Plans"