

b. CCAS teams are the smallest elements within DCMA that provide a direct service as an entity to the combatant commands. Depending upon the scope of the operation, a CCAS team is tailored and may be as large as 33 people or as small as a single representative.¹⁵

¹⁵ DCMA Directive 1 (*The One Book*), Chapter 13.4.1, *Readiness Reporting*, Chart 1, dated June 2002 (Draft)

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART 1 - General

This chapter provides findings and recommendations concerning DCMA's readiness and responsiveness to the operating forces. The intent is to improve the readiness and responsiveness of DCMA to the warfighter. Combatant and/or supporting command contracting staffs and DCMA share responsibility to advise combatant commanders on the best means of managing all required contractor support in the AOR within their limited resources. Findings and recommendations in this assessment are based upon the review in each of the key functional areas identified in the assessment process.

PART II – Findings and Recommendations

The CSART finds that DCMA is ready and responsive to provide contingency contracting as required by combatant command OPLANs and CONPLANs with minor shortfalls. Chief among these shortfalls are: a lack of knowledge within the combatant commands with regard to the services and capabilities offered by DCMA; insufficient doctrine and policy concerning contractors on the battlefield and contract management; DCMA liaison with combatant commands; and CCAS team manning, equipping and training. Although these shortfalls do not create significant impediments to the support DCMA currently provides to the combatant commands, implementation of the recommendations associated with each finding should improve DCMA's level of support and visibility to the operating forces.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The CSART evaluated DCMA support to recent and on-going contingencies as an indicator of future performance and readiness. Based upon its findings, DCMA appears fully capable of supporting similar contingency operations. However, none of the recent or ongoing contingencies stressed DCMA capabilities as might be expected in the execution of a major combat operation based on current OPLANs. DCMA's impact on the readiness of the operating forces through its in-plant presence is not evident to combatant or component commands.

Finding Number 1: Lack of full integration of DCMA functions at the combatant commands impedes DCMA's ability to execute its combat support mission.

a. With the exception of a small group of staff officers, combatant and component command staffs are generally unaware of DCMA services and capabilities.¹ DCMA liaison with the combatant commands may take three forms: assignment of a liaison officer (LNO) at the headquarters; visits from the headquarters to combatant commands; or communication from the combatant command to DCMA headquarters or DCMA field office. At the component level, knowledge of DCMA capabilities resides principally in the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC), who holds the expertise to address issues related to contractors on the battlefield.

b. DCMA's rationale about which contracts will be administered is not well understood by the combatant or component commands. DCMA's combat support agency mission focuses on contingency contract administration of external theater contracts within the AOR such as LOGCAP, AFCAP and the BSC. Service components remain responsible for administration of contracts supporting permanent installations and construction contracts. Confusion results when a combatant or a component command requests DCMA assistance, but is denied because the command has requested assistance for something that is outside of DCMA's combat support agency mission. The commands do not understand the criteria DCMA applies to accepting or rejecting contract management taskings.

c. DCMA is not on routine distribution or invitation as a supporting agency on planning orders issued from the Joint Staff, J-3. As a result, DCMA representatives are not alerted to participate in and influence execution planning. For example, a DCMA representative was not present in preparation for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES. USPACOM and USARPAC believe this contributed to a 30-day delay in contract administration, risking contract cost overrun, quality control problems or contract default. The USPACOM order for joint task force (JTF) 510 directed the use of a LOGCAP contract for the operation, but the PCO for LOGCAP did not delegate the contract to DCMA until the contractor was already setting up in the Philippines. Although DCMA had an Initial Response Team (IRT) in the AOR when delegation was made, had a DCMA representative been present for planning, a faster delegation of contract authority could have been accomplished.

d. DCMA has not achieved efficient employment of LNOs across the Joint Staff and combatant commands to meet operational requirements. DCMA has established liaison officer positions at four of the five geographic combatant commands and at the Joint Staff. USSOUTHCOM currently has no LNO authorized, but has recently requested one be established. The LNOs do not routinely engage the PARCs, who are critical to DCMA success,

¹ Multiple interviews at geographic combatant and component command headquarters, August-October 2002.

as outlined in DCMA guidance to the LNOs.² LNOs at the combatant command provide their greatest value to the PARCs in the close and regular coordination of actions across the components. Additionally, USJFCOM has requested DCMA participation, in addition to the LNO already assigned there, to help shape the future of logistics as USJFCOM plots the course for the Defense Department Transformation in concert with Joint Vision 2020.

e. Recommendations

(1) Director, DCMA

(a) Educate the combatant and the component commands on DCMA's service offering and capabilities for contingency contract administration.

(b) Assign a representative to liaise with each combatant command to ensure DCMA is part of all planning and deployments.

(c) Increase LNO engagement of component command staffs to coordinate issues germane to the combatant commander.

(d) Coordinate with Joint Staff, J-3, to monitor timely receipt of deployment orders.

(2) The Joint Staff, J-3, place DCMA as an addressee on all future planning orders for coordination or information.

Finding Number 2: DCMA's fill rate for military manpower is 75 percent of authorization.

a. For combat support agencies to be ready and responsive to combatant commands, they must be provided adequate personnel resources. DCMA relies heavily upon its military members to take on leadership roles in a combatant command AOR and to be prepared to deploy with little or no notice. In the

event a civilian volunteer is unable to meet deployment timelines, whether for medical or professional reasons, military manpower is used to fill the gap. DCMA's military fill rate as of 16 June 2002 was 75 percent.³

Fill Rates by Service			
Service	Authorized	Assigned	%
Army	126	112	89
Navy	118	86	73
Marine Corps	15	13	87
Air Force	374	258	69
TOTAL	633	469	75

² DCMA Liaison Officer Guidebook, undated.

³ Agency provided information.

b. A review of the authorizations in the above table indicates that DCMA is authorized 633 military manpower authorizations (Army, 19.91 percent; Navy, 18.64 percent; Air Force, 59.08 percent and Marine Corps, 2.37 percent). Air Force has the largest percentage and fills all DCMA commander authorizations at 100 percent and fills the remainder of the DCMA authorizations at the same level as operational major commands.

c. The Defense Agency Manpower Review Process should be utilized to assess the number of military authorizations necessary for DCMA mission accomplishment. A marginal increase in Service component capability could, in some cases, provide comparable service at less cost and with fewer military resources. Services should have the opportunity to participate in this process.

d. Recommendations

(1) USD(AT&L) coordinate with the Services and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to assess the number of military authorizations necessary to achieve DCMA mission accomplishment using the Defense Agency Manpower Review Process. This review should include existing Service component contingency contracting capability, already committed to the combatant commander's OPLAN, to perform the CCAS mission.

(2) Director, DCMA, assess the impact of military fill rate on DCMA's ability to perform its CCAS missions and submit as a readiness deficiency, as appropriate.

DELIBERATE AND CRISIS PLANNING SUPPORT

Deliberate and crisis planning is a core competency of all combat support agencies. DCMA is specifically assigned tasks in USPACOM OPLANs only. Some missions from the combatant commands have evolved to DCMA from DLA with the reorganization and the OPLANs or CONPLANs are in the process of being updated to reflect DCMA appropriately. DCMA does not have a comprehensive plan for educating combatant and component commands regarding the services and capabilities the agency brings to the warfighter.

While DCMA believes that its industrial base analysis capability is of great use to the combatant commands, the combatant commands do not utilize this capability and do not acknowledge its requirement. The industrial base analysis capability supports the title 10 responsibilities of the Services and the Department of Defense, indirectly supporting the combatant commands.

Finding Number 3: Insufficient joint doctrine and policy concerning contractor support on the battlefield hinders the combatant commanders' ability to efficiently employ and manage contractor assets in the AOR.

a. Joint Publication 4.0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, Chapter V, "Contractors on the Battlefield," provides the combatant commander and the Services with doctrinal materiel relevant to contingency contracting, but it does not provide a framework under which the combatant commands and Services should model contracting doctrine, policies and planning. This inefficiency does not allow for full synchronization of all assets available to the combatant commander within the AOR. Furthermore, doctrine is yet to be defined for the role of contractors in support of Homeland Defense.

b. There is insufficient doctrine delineating responsibilities and procedures in an AOR when Special Operations Forces are tasked by the combatant commander to be the operational lead with one of the Services as the executive agent for support.⁴ Future operations will increasingly require USSOCOM to perform a lead role in the war on terrorism. When operating in such a role, USSOCOM requires ready access to LOGCAP and AFCAP contract tools. For example, USPACOM recently placed its Special Operations component in the lead for the operation, but tasked USARPAC to provide support. JTF 510 was operating without support doctrine and passed requirements directly to the contractor that had not been vetted by USARPAC. Without joint doctrine to lay out responsibilities for support and requirement validation, the JTF places requirements on the supporting Service component command to resource.

c. Recommendations. Joint Staff, J-7, in coordination with the Joint Staff, J-4:

(1) Develop joint doctrine and procedures for contractor utilization on the battlefield and contingency contracting support, standardizing the terms of reference, definitions of responsibilities and employment.

(2) Develop joint doctrine and procedures that outline the roles and responsibilities for JTF or theater special operation command when they are designated the operational lead.

Finding Number 4: Lack of a process at the combatant command level impacts management of contractor and associated personnel information in the area of responsibility.

⁴ Interviews, USPACOM and US Army Pacific, October 2002.

a. The lack of overall visibility of contracts or contractors operating in the AOR creates force protection and other support risks for the combatant commander.⁵ For example, contractors often arrive at military installations in the AOR utilizing the support (e.g., dining or medical) facilities without prior coordination with the combatant commander. With no visibility of the contractors authorized to use these facilities, commanders risk expending their resources to serve contractors who may not be authorized support or who may be in the AOR without proper authority. Combatant commanders assume responsibility for the protection of all US civilians. Such support and protection requirements increase mission requirements and ultimately, force structure requirements. In addition, casualties to contractor personnel can cause political repercussions on mission accomplishment. With no means to identify what contractors are in the AOR, commanders cannot adequately provide the necessary force protection.

b. Poor visibility of contracts or contractors at the combatant command staff level leads to inefficient use of resources in the AOR.⁶ Contractors in the AOR bring capabilities and capacities that could be cross-leveled between areas of need if these qualities are cataloged. Because the combatant command staff does not have centralized visibility of the contracts or contractors employed by the Service component commands, contractors in the AOR may be providing redundant services and capabilities, or they could be in competition with each other for limited resources. Government-furnished equipment or equipment procured by the contractor at government expense is not visible to the combatant commander either. Because there is limited oversight of the equipment, finding the excess equipment capabilities in the AOR for redistribution is a time-consuming task requiring each component command to make its own assessment and provide the information to the combatant command staff.

c. The lack of combatant or component command PCO decisions to pre-designate either DCMA or an appropriate component contract management capability within the AOR, contributes to the lack of command visibility and hinders both DCMA and the component's readiness to respond.

d. Recommendations

(1) Combatant commanders, in coordination with PCOs for the theater executive agent for contracting, pre-designate the appropriate contract administration agent; DCMA or Service component for theater contracts in their OPLANs and CONPLANs.

⁵ Multiple interviews at geographic combatant and component command headquarters, August-October 2002.

⁶ Interviews, USEUCOM, 24 September 2002.

(2) Director, DCMA, in coordination with the Joint Staff, J4, develop guidance for the CCAS teams to advise the joint commander within the AOR on contractor issues, visibility of contractors, and integration of contractor capability.

EXERCISE AND TRAINING SUPPORT

DCMA's internal training must fully support its assigned wartime and contingency missions. The CSART evaluated DCMA's participation in CJCS and combatant command exercises to determine the degree to which the agency's participation supports the wartime mission and to gain insights into the agency's ability to perform its mission. DCMA participates in these exercises by providing advisors to Service contracting officers, responding to queries from combatant commands, or by deploying with Service personnel to administer contracts.

Finding Number 5: DCMA lacks an approved Agency Mission Essential Task List (AMETL) and associated metrics to objectively assess agency readiness to support contingency contracting missions and focus agency training.

a. DCMA does not have an approved AMETL or metrics to measure its ability to perform the combat support mission. CJCSI 3500.01B, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, requires all combat support agencies (CSAs) develop an AMETL and supporting metrics. While the AMETL is in draft, DCMA cannot validate its stage of internal readiness to respond to combatant command requirements based on quantifiable standards for contingency contracting.

b. Recommendation. Director, DCMA, develop, approve, and submit to the Joint Staff, J-7, the AMETL and metrics required to validate its missions.

SECURITY COOPERATION SUPPORT

The CSART views the security cooperation support missions assigned in concert with the combatant command's regional security cooperation strategy as a core assessment area in the agency's combat support mission. However, the combatant commands assigned DCMA no missions in their theater engagement plans. The CSART did not identify any findings in this area.

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT

The CSART assessed the ability of DCMA to administer large and complex contracts in support of combatant commander requirements as directed in OPLANs and CONPLANs. Because combatant commanders task component

commands as executive agents for contract support in an AOR, the CSART visited component commands that are responsible for logistics and sustainment contract support, in addition to combatant commands. DCMA's primary contingency contract support is in the LOGCAP, AFCAP and BSC administration. DCMA has deployed, on an average, 45-50 personnel annually since 1993 on CCAS missions. Even at higher rates and with appropriate management and training, DCMA should be able to meet anticipated requirements within current manpower levels.

Finding Number 6: DCMA has not identified and trained sufficient personnel to meet DCMA's anticipated requirement for deployment of CCAS teams.

a. While DCMA can meet current and imminent requirements, the possibility remains that the continuing demand of world-wide operations could exceed the number of qualified personnel available for deployment as CCAS team members. More emergency essential clause personnel need to be identified and made available in order to ensure adequate support to combatant commands in the future. DCMA's reliance on volunteers to fill CCAS teams poses a threat to DCMA's readiness to support combatant commands. In accordance with DCMA Directive 1 ("The One Book") policy, civilian personnel must sign an Emergency Essential (EE) agreement to be members of a CCAS team.⁷ DCMA does not enforce this policy, as there are no EE personnel currently on the roster. Because of this, at any stage of the deployment process, the CCAS volunteers can change their mind and decide to pull themselves from the deployment. Fortunately, to date, DCMA has not failed to respond to any command mission requirement. However, the DCMA estimates that the worst-case deployment scenario will require a pool of at least 150 personnel prepared to deploy at any time.⁸ This is approximately 1 percent of the DCMA current authorized (FTE) strength. DCMA further estimates that it has only 100 volunteers on standby.⁹ As Operation ENDURING FREEDOM expands, the number of potential external theater support contracts is also expanding to a point where DCMA's current pool 100 of volunteers is likely to be insufficient. If DCMA were called upon by the combatant commands to deploy all of the CCAS teams that are being proposed for the war on terrorism, the agency would not be able to continue manning existing contingencies or respond to new contingencies without a concerted effort to solicit and train additional personnel from within DCMA manpower.

b. DCMA lacks the equipment required to sustain CCAS teams when deployed, placing the burden on combatant and component commands. Current documentation authorizing individual equipment does not exist to

⁷ DCMA Directive 1 (*The One Book*), Chapter 13.5.1, *Deployment Process*, June 2002 (Draft)

⁸ DCMA Directive 1 (*The One Book*), Chapter 13.1.4, *Readiness Reporting Chart 1*, June 2002 (Draft)

⁹ Agency interview, 16 October 2002.

support these teams. DCMA does not maintain a central issue facility to outfit deploying uniformed or civilian personnel with individual equipment required for deployment to an AOR. DCMA requests equipment through the component command responsible for contracting in the AOR, resulting in unplanned tasks on subordinate units. DCMA also lacks organic vehicles, generators, and unit equipment necessary for deployment and life sustainment.

c. DCMA has not submitted any Unit Type Codes (UTCs) in either the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) or time-phased force deployment data listings for any DCMA elements. This shortfall deprives the warfighter of critical readiness and planning information. It is incumbent upon DCMA to define the organization, structure, capability, and equipment of the CCAS teams beyond that which may be specified in OPLANs and CONPLANs and to prepare the appropriate UTCs and desired operational capability (DOC) documents for its initial response and CCAS teams.

d. Recommendations. Director, DCMA:

(1) Enforce an EE clause as a condition of employment for employees in skills that are necessary for IRT and CCAS deployment.

(2) Review manning and equipment requirements for future IRT and CCAS missions (to include an assessment as to whether some CCAS missions can be accomplished using existing Service component contracting assets as a mean of mitigating possible manning and equipment shortfalls) and prepare to support them or identify the shortfall as a Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR) deficiency.

(3) Define UTCs for the initial response and contingency contract administration support teams for utilization in the GSORTs database.

Finding Number 7: DCMA CCAS teams require additional training on the BSC before deployment to the AOR.

a. The level of training for first-time deploying contract administrators of the BSC is insufficient and results in a 2-month on-the-job learning phase. The USAREUR philosophy regarding the BSC is to minimize disruption of services by maintaining Brown and Root, Inc., and the Army Corps of Engineers as the prime contractor and PCO, respectively. The BSC has been in place since 1995 and has been modified and expanded to the point where it is voluminous and complex.¹⁰

¹⁰ Interview, Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Program Center, Winchester, Virginia, 17 September 2002.

b. A 2000 GAO study found training of contract administration personnel to be insufficient and recommended increased training, specifically on the BSC, for deploying units and for Administrative Contracting Officers.¹¹ CCAS team member deployment training is 21 days long, of which only 4 days are dedicated to the BSC contract.¹² The PCO and the USAREUR staff find that during the initial phase of the deployment, contract oversight is not as stringent as it was when an experienced CCAS team is in place because new people lack familiarity with the BSC.

c. The deployment duration of CCAS teams results in frequent replacement of trained team members with first-time deploying contract administrators. DCMA CCAS teams are activated for 179-day tours. The approximately 21 days of training and deployment processing to in-process and out-process the teams from the AOR are counted against the tour length, leaving approximately 158 days in theater. Following a 2000 GAO study recommendation, DCMA has offset deployment cycles to help stabilize the level of support in the Balkans.¹³ However, the rotations every 2 to 3 months create noticeable changes in contract administration depending on the experience level of the deployed team members.¹⁴ At the discretion of USEUCOM, an individual deploying to the AOR can be placed in a temporarily change of station status for a period of up to 3 years.

d. Recommendations. Director, DCMA:

(1) Review the length of the BSC training program and revise it as required to ensure administrative contract officers are fully trained on the BSC before deployment.

(2) Develop rotation policy that maximizes productive time that continues to be consistent with USEUCOM deployment policies for the AOR.

¹¹ *United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Report #GAO/NSIAD-00-225, "Contingency Operations, Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans", page 26, dated September, 2000.*

¹² *Agency interview, 16 October 2002.*

¹³ *United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Report #GAO/NSIAD-00-225, "Contingency Operations, Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans", page 26, dated September, 2000.*

¹⁴ *Interviews at US Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Program Center, Winchester, Virginia, 17 September 2002; and US Army Europe, 25 September 2002.*

C

TAB B

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCY REVIEW TEAM (CSART) 2002 REPORT ON THE DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA)

Combat Support Agency Review. The CSART assessed the readiness and responsiveness of the DCMA to support the operating forces under the authority granted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, section 193. DCMA is one of the seven designated combat support agencies that can be tasked to directly support a combatant commander. In the role of a combat support agency, DCMA provides in-theater contingency contract administration services to several ongoing operations. While contractor support on the battlefield allows uniformed personnel to concentrate on core military responsibilities, doctrine has not been fully developed. Contract administration provides the oversight necessary to assure that contractor support is performed to specification, and in a timely and agile manner. DCMA is the quality-control link between the combatant command and the contractor. One should note that combat support constitutes only about 5 percent of DCMA's mission; the agency's primary work is in support of the Defense acquisition community, an area of study beyond the purview of CSART.

Combat Readiness. DCMA is ready and responsive to provide contingency contracting with minor shortfalls. These include a lack of knowledge within the combatant commands about the services and capabilities offered by DCMA; insufficient doctrine and policy concerning the management of contracts and contractors on the battlefield; DCMA liaison; and contingency contract administration support (CCAS) team manning, equipping and training.

Combatant commands are generally unaware of DCMA's services and capabilities because they delegate contingency contract administration to a component command designated as an executive agent within the AOR. Additionally, at the component command level, only a small number of staff personnel are familiar with the services and support capabilities DCMA offers. DCMA needs a comprehensive plan for educating combatant and component commands about what support it brings to the battlefield.¹

Contingency Contract Support. DCMA provides direct support to combatant commands by administering external theater support contracts like the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and the Balkan Support Contract (BSC). DCMA administers these contracts upon the principal contract officer (PCO) delegating authority to DCMA. In coordination with the PCO,

¹ *Defense Contract Management Agency CSART Internal Operation Assessment (IOA) Status Briefing, 13 May 2002.*

DCMA deploys tailored CCAS teams to an AOR. These teams rely heavily on the use of both military and civilian personnel assigned to other billets at DCMA. However, the fill rate of military billets at DCMA is 75 percent, and the continuing demands of global operations stress the organization. The Defense Agency Manpower Review Process should be used to assess the level of fill necessary to accomplish the DCMA mission.

Conclusions. To improve its readiness and responsiveness, DCMA needs to improve combatant command knowledge of the services and capabilities offered by increasing the liaison between DCMA and the combatant and component commands. An aggressive education of customers about what contracts DCMA supports, what should be expected when DCMA supports a contract, and the development of a metrics system to measure the effect DCMA has on theater readiness will improve customer support. DCMA should also continue its progress in resolving the employment, manning, training, composition and equipping issues surrounding CCAS teams. Finally, there is a recognized need for joint doctrine to guide future operations.

D

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

USD(AT&L)	Hon M. Wynne	Briefed on 10 Jan 03
HQ DCMA	BG E. Harrington	Briefed on 13 Dec 02
USA	COL R. Wright, (b)(6)	6 Dec 02
USN	CAPT D. Thompson, (b)(6)	10 Dec 02
USAF	COL R. Richburg, (b)(6)	24 Jan 03
USMC	COL M. Bultemeier, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
USEUCOM	CAPT R. Parker, (b)(6)	9 Dec 02
USCENTCOM	COL B. Perry, (b)(6)	6 Dec 02
USPACOM	COL K. Andrews, (b)(6)	6 Dec 02
USSOCOM	COL T. Blume, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
USJFCOM	CAPT D. Deets, (b)(6)	10 Dec 02
USSTRATCOM	COL J. Curtis, (b)(6)	26 Nov 02
USNORTHCOM	RADM D. Stone, (b)(6)	5 Dec 02
USTRANSCOM	Ms. G. Jorgenson, GS14, (b)(6)	3 Dec 02
USSOUTHCOM	COL R. Diaz, (b)(6)	3 Dec 02
Joint Staff, J-1	COL J. Mulvenna, (b)(6)	21 Nov 02
Joint Staff, J-2	Mr. T. McNeil, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
Joint Staff, J-3	COL W. Davis, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
Joint Staff, J-4	COL M. Stine, (b)(6)	2 Dec 02
Joint Staff, J-5	CAPT D. McClain, (b)(6)	22 Nov 02
Joint Staff, J-6	Mr. C. Franz, GS15, (b)(6)	26 Nov 02
Joint Staff, J-7	COL B. Russell, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
CJCS Legal Counsel	COL K. Wheaton, (b)(6)	3 Dec 02

Tab D



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

2003 APR 28 PM 4:00

2003 APR 28 PM 3:38

INFO MEMO

April 17, 2003, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L) *[Signature]* 4/17/03

SUBJECT: Snowflake – JCS Analysis of Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

- You asked that I review the Joint Staff's analysis of DCMA and let the Chairman and you know if there is any particular action required (attached).
- There are several OUSD(AT&L) actions identified. My lead, BG Harrington (Director, DCMA), is working those to closure with Brig Gen Goldfein (J-8) - who led the Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) review.
- The review resulted in DCMA providing Joint Staff daily Situation Reports (SITREPs) of weapon systems production in plant and critical readiness spares status, including expediting transportation, for DLA and Service buying commands. The Joint Staff used SITREPs to resolve weapon system or readiness spares problems during Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.

ACTION: No further action required.

Prepared by: Col Lyndi Balven, OUSD(AT&L)/DPAP, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD14719

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020 CMM

17 APR 03



March 17, 2003 12:16 PM

TO: Tom White Gen. Shinseki
H. T. Johnson ADM Clark
Jim Roche Gen. Hagee
Gen. Jumper

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Assignments

We need to figure out how to get the best officers into joint assignments and into combatant commands, so they have the right kind of experience to be Service Chiefs or Vice Chiefs at some point.

Thanks.

DIR dh
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.....
Please respond by 4/18/03

U03659 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14720

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THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 13 2003

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Senator Clinton "Snowflake"

- In your February 13, 2003, memo (TAB A), you asked whether medical problems observed in people in the September 11, 2001, Pentagon attack might be similar to those reported by first responders to the World Trade Center attack or those reported as "Gulf War Syndrome." There are few similarities among those involved in those different situations.
- Medically, there is no Gulf War "syndrome." No single medical syndrome has been found among Gulf War veterans. About 20% of the ailing Gulf War veterans have medically unexplained symptoms that cannot be attributed to traditional diagnoses.
- Many of the illnesses experienced by World Trade Center workers are respiratory in nature and likely due to heavy exposures to numerous airborne contaminants. Other symptoms appear to be due to psychological trauma. Such psychological health effects have been observed consistently among the survivors of disasters and warfare.
- In comparison to the World Trade Center, the attack on the Pentagon was much smaller in scale and duration. Extensive indoor air quality and other environmental sampling data do not indicate any medically significant exposures to Pentagon personnel on or after September 12th.
- Medical surveillance of Department of Defense clinics in the Washington DC area has shown no net increase in overall visits for patients having depression, anxiety, acute and post-traumatic stress disorder, substance use disorders, or other behavioral health problems.
- Several special follow-up programs have been initiated for Pentagon workers and rescue and cleanup personnel.
- TAB B provides more details on the medical problems reported by World Trade Center workers and on programs to assist Pentagon workers.

COORDINATION: TAB C

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Jeff Prather, DHS, (b)(6) PCDOCS #46029/R46225

11-L-0559/OSD14721

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13 MAR 03

Information Paper

Comparisons between the Medical Problems Associated with the World Trade Center, Gulf War Syndrome, and the Pentagon Disaster

Background: Following the September 11th World Trade Center attack, many personnel who worked at Ground Zero in New York experienced persistent health problems. Senator Clinton (D-NY) likened these problems to those experienced by Gulf War veterans (labeled by the media as "Gulf War Syndrome"). Senator Clinton asked whether similar symptoms are occurring in Pentagon personnel.

Facts:

- The media uses the term "Gulf War Syndrome" as a way of broadly referring to the occurrence of health problems among Gulf War veterans. The term wrongly applies the traditional medical use of the word "syndrome," which refers to a combination of symptoms, signs, and diagnostic tests unique in a way that their combination represents a single disease process that can be distinguished from other diseases. No single such syndrome has been found among Gulf War veterans. About 20 percent of the ailing Gulf War veterans have had medically unexplained physical symptoms that cannot be attributed clearly to traditional diagnoses. This is not an unexpected phenomenon, since the US has seen similar symptoms in veterans after every war since the Civil War.
- Many of the illnesses experienced by World Trade Center workers are respiratory in nature and likely due to heavy exposures to numerous airborne contaminants (glass, smoke, asbestos, heavy metals, and fibrous materials). Other symptoms appear to be due to the psychological trauma that was experienced. Such psychological health effects have been observed consistently among the survivors of disasters and warfare.
- The DoD began steps immediately after the attack to assess the physical and behavioral health of Pentagon occupants and to implement programs to support the health and welfare of Pentagon personnel including:
 - In early Oct 2001, a comprehensive "Pentagon Post-Disaster Health Assessment Survey" designed to document injuries, exposures, and illnesses sustained by Pentagon personnel was administered between 4 and 12 weeks post attack. Of the 19,450 Pentagon personnel, 4,751 participated in the survey. Eighty-six percent of those reported some type of exposure to smoke/dust/odors. Smoke exposure was generally of light intensity with a median duration of less than 15 minutes, in stark contrast to longer-term exposures at the World Trade Center where great amounts of smoke and dust were generated for days afterwards. Among the respondents who were at or near the Pentagon during the attack, 186 (5 percent) indicated they were injured during the initial blast and/or the evacuation. A total of 1,700 (35 percent) of the respondents reported a worsening of prior-health problems or new health problems, the majority of which were stress related (54 percent).
 - Operation Solace began on September 11th to reduce the severity and/or chronicity of reactions to stress and grief, of other psychiatric illness, and of medically unexplained physical symptoms among active duty and civilian Pentagon personnel. Contact was


made with anyone who indicated the desire for it on the Pentagon Post-Disaster Health Assessment Survey. Over 75,000 contacts have been made to date through various means. Approximately 800 Pentagon personnel continue to be seen/contacted periodically by the Operation Solace team. Ten clinicians continue to go office-to-office and desk-to-desk either providing care on the spot or discreetly arranging for a follow-up meeting. Informal sessions are held in the location of the worker's choosing. In addition, support groups are run; classes are offered; presentations at staff meetings are made to address stress, grief and other topics; and referrals to higher levels of care are arranged where desired. Operation Solace also provides clinical behavioral health care for those active duty desiring it (~75 active cases).

- Medical surveillance of DoD's clinics in the National Capitol Region has shown no net increase in visits for patients having depression, anxiety, acute and posttraumatic stress disorder, substance use disorders or other behavioral health problems. In addition, there were no increases in behavioral medicine clinic visits but there were significant changes in the number of diagnoses for anxiety disorders and acute stress reactions in children, and adjustment reactions in adults. Monitoring for increased numbers of patients having "medically unexplained symptoms" has shown no increases, although variability in coding at the practitioner level make confidence in the comprehensiveness of these data less certain.
- Review of the worker's compensation data for DoD civilians working in the Pentagon shows no significant increase in the number of claims.

The DoD Deployment Health Clinical Center at Walter Reed Army Medical Center reports that, of the patients clinically evaluated between April and December 2002 as a result of the Pentagon attack, approximately 40 patients were identified with a high level of unmet mental health needs and self-described unexplained physical symptoms. Although the clinical data may be misleading because it may not capture all civilians who sought help (civilians are more likely to go to private doctors than DoD clinics), the clinical data coupled with the outreach surveys, counseling sessions, and review of workers compensation claims give a fairly complete picture (definitely better than New York City) of the impact of the attack on Pentagon employees.

SUBJECT: Senator Clinton "Snowflake"


COORDINATIONS

PM, OHS	COL Sulka	Concur 2/24/03
Dep Dir, DHSD	Dr. Kilpatrick	Concur 2/24/03
DASD, FHP&R	Ms. Embrey	Concur 2/24/03
	(Colonel Rauch for)	
CoS (HA)	Ms. Diana Tabler	_____
PDASD (HA)	Mr. Ed Wyatt	_____
USD (P&R)	Dr. David S. C. Chu	 18 Mar 03

11-L-0559/OSD14724

SUBJECT: Senator Clinton "Snowflake"

COORDINATIONS

PM, OHS	COL Sulka	Concur 2/24/03
Dep Dir, DHSD	Dr. Kilpatrick	Concur 2/24/03
DASD, FHP&R	Ms. Embrey	Concur 2/24/03
	(Colonel Rauch for)	
CoS (HA)	Ms. Diana Tabler	_____
PDASD (HA)	Mr. Ed Wyatt	_____
USD (P&R)	Dr. David S. C. Chu	 18 Apr 03

February 24, 2003 9:49 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Assistance

Please give me a report every two weeks as to what countries are doing what with respect to:

- Afghanistan
- Iraq
- Global War on Terrorism

We need to keep track of those and then start giving them credit at the press briefings.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022403-10

.....
Please respond by

02/07/03
14

11-L-0559/OSD14726

U03760 /03

000.5

24 Feb 03



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 703 MAR 20 PM 5:16

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-854-03
20 March 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Joint Concepts of Operations

*DM 3/10 Mr. Secretary, Short answer
is that we are doing what
Mr. Blechman is suggesting.
VB
Back*

- In response to your memorandum (TAB) concerning the concept development suggestions made by Mr. Barry Blechman, President and CEO of DFI International. I agree in the points made by Mr. Blechman; similar determinations were made by US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) during the 2003 mission analysis that restructured the concept development and experimentation program.
- Based on current capabilities-based methodology and joint concept development events, I believe that the Armed Forces are already moving in the direction discussed in Mr. Blechman's letter. USJFCOM's restructured iterative experimentation methodology is focused on smaller, more frequent sets of experiments that are designed to provide actionable recommendations regarding future force investment.
- A collaborative effort among the Services, Joint Staff, OSD and USJFCOM is under way. USJFCOM is hosting a series of planning sessions and workshops that will lead to the Pinnacle Impact 03 May event, examining the joint operations concepts and using key joint issues and comparative concepts in multiple scenarios. This effort will serve to further refine the development of the joint operating concepts such as major combat operations.
- The Joint Staff will continue to work closely with USJFCOM, US Northern Command and US Strategic Command as they develop the initial set of joint concepts. These organizations appreciate and will continue to consider the potentially significant contributions that DFI and similar companies contribute to this effort.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8;

(b)(6)

U03832-03

11-L-0559/OSD14727

TAB A

March 3, 2003 3:47 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Concepts of Operations

Here is an interesting letter from Barry Blechman about Joint Concepts of Operations. What do you think about his suggestion?

Thanks.

Attach.
2/14/02 Blechman ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
030303-26

.....
Please respond by 03/21/03

Tab A

03 MAR 7 8:15

11-L-0559/OSD14728



DFI INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman
CEO and President

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR - 4 2003

February 14, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

Thanks very much for taking the time to talk with me on Tuesday, and for providing the proverbial free lunch! It was a pleasure to see you and have the chance to better understand your priorities in transforming the Department, as well as to discuss key foreign policy issues.

Our discussion of your efforts to lead the Services into Joint Concepts of Operations brought to mind the frustrations that we experienced when assisting the Air Force's Directorate of Plans (XP) in attempts to engage the other Services in a discussion of joint concepts for expeditionary operations. Official channels for communication proved to be ineffective and ad hoc initiatives equally fruitless. Without a forcing function, XP's efforts to develop a Joint CONOP that could be tested, exercised, and, ultimately, implemented have so far come to naught.


The priority that you now ascribe to progress in this area provides a new opportunity to encourage the Services to come to the table. JFCOM is the logical "honest broker" to manage a series of all-Service workshops to develop Joint CONOPS. In order to generate a constructive discussion, participants should be handpicked and include representatives from the Unified Commands, Joint Staff, and OSD. A board of retired "gray beards" charged with thinking across Service lines on this issue might additionally aid the process.

The process might also include informal, off-line meetings under private auspices, as well as more structured, top-level sessions, to maximize creativity while driving towards specific, actionable agreements. More than just an opportunity to compare slides and share jargon, these activities should be structured toward tangible results – a focused set of CONOPS that could be tested in the field in 2004.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this concept further with Admiral Giambastiani's team. DFT's work for the Services and OSD has made clear that encouraging the Services to work together outside of existing stovepipes is a vital step toward transforming our military capabilities.

Thanks again for lunch. I look forward to seeing you at the Defense Policy Board meeting later this month.

Sincerely,


Barry Blechman



March 20, 2003 1:01 PM

TO: The Right Honourable Geoff Hoon MP
Secretary of State for Defence

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Geoff--

I read your draft statement. It was excellent. Congratulations!

UK

DHR:dh
032003-6

20 Mar 03

U03849 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14731

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

MOD HOON STATEMENT

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE DEFENCE SECRETARY: 20 MARCH 2003TO HOUSE OF
COMMONSIRAQ: OVERNIGHT EVENTS

Mr Speaker, with permission I would like to make a statement about military operations to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein expired at 1 o'clock this morning. Just as Saddam failed to take his final opportunity to disarm by peaceful means, so he has now failed to take his final opportunity to depart in peace and avoid the need for coalition military action. I draw the House's attention to Hans Blix's comments in New York yesterday, that he was disappointed that three and a half months of inspection work had not brought clear assurances from the Iraqis of the absence of weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush announced at 3.15 this morning on behalf of the coalition that operations had begun with attacks on selected targets of military importance. These attacks were carried out by Coalition aircraft and cruise missiles on more than one target in the vicinity of Baghdad, following information relating to the whereabouts of very senior members of the Iraqi leadership. Those leaders are at the very heart of Iraq's command and control system, responsible for directing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein's regime is the chief obstacle to the disarmament of Iraq. The military plan is therefore crafted around his removal from power.

We will be placing a copy of the Government's Military Campaign Objectives in the Library of the House later today.

In addition to these attacks, coalition forces yesterday carried out certain preliminary operations against Iraqi artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, and air defence systems within the Southern No Fly Zone. These were prudent preparatory steps, using coalition air capabilities previously used in the No Fly Zones, designed to reduce the threat to coalition forces in Kuwait. The protection of our Servicemen and women will remain a matter of paramount importance.

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

11-L-0559/OSD14732

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

The House will be aware of reports of Iraqi missile attacks against Kuwait. These incidents are being investigated by personnel with appropriate skills and the necessary protection. There are no reported casualties so far. But I am afraid there is nothing more I can confirm to the House at this stage.

I would like to draw the attention of the House to two particular points. First, that coalition forces will take every possible care to minimise civilian casualties or damage to civilian infrastructure. And whilst the Coalition will use modern weapons which are more accurate than ever, we can never unfortunately exclude the possibility of civilian casualties, tragic though these always are. However, people should treat with caution Iraq's claims of civilian casualties. The Iraqi people are not our enemies, and we are determined to do all we can to help them build the better future they deserve.

Second, I would caution the House against suggestions that this campaign will be over in a very short time. We all certainly hope that offensive operations will be over quickly. But we should not underestimate the risks and difficulties that we may face against a regime that is the embodiment of absolute ruthlessness with an utter disregard for human life.

Turning now to the United Kingdom's Armed Forces, I have set out in successive statements the forces we have prepared for this purpose. We have deployed a substantial naval force of 29 Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, including the aircraft carrier, HMS ARK ROYAL, and the helicopter carrier, HMS OCEAN; a land force led by Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division and including 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, 16 Air Assault Brigade, 7th Armoured Brigade and 102 Logistics Brigade; and an air force comprising around 100 fixed-wing aircraft and 27 helicopters. In all, about 45,000 Servicemen and women have been assigned to the campaign to disarm Iraq. Our forces will make a major contribution to the military action to disarm Iraq which we will pursue at a time and on a schedule of our own choosing. They are trained, equipped and ready for the tasks they may now need to undertake. British forces are already engaged in some military operations, although the House will understand why I cannot give further details at this stage.

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Mr Speaker, events over the coming days will dominate the 24 hour media. The House will recognise that we must all be wary of jumping to conclusions on the basis of "breaking news" before there has been time to conduct a proper investigation. Similarly, the House will understand – and I hope the media will too – that if we respond to media pressure for instant operational detail, we could risk the security and safety of our forces. We cannot therefore offer a running commentary on media reports. I will, however, ensure that the House is kept fully informed of significant developments. That is why I am making this statement today. In addition to statements as and when necessary, I will arrange for a short summary to be placed in the Library of the House, and copies made available to members in the Vote Office, as warranted by the day's events.

My RHF the Prime Minister will be travelling to the European Council this afternoon. Once military action has begun, and UK forces are substantially engaged, the Prime Minister will ask to make a broadcast to the nation.

Once again we are placing an enormous weight of responsibility on the shoulders of our Armed Forces. We have not taken the decision to do so lightly. The commitment to military action of Service personnel is always the gravest step any Government can take. I know that the thoughts and prayers of this House and our country are with them, and their families, as they embark on their mission. We hope for their safe and swift return.

February 13, 2003 8:08 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Comparison Metrics

There is an article in today's *Wall Street Journal* in the first column on the first page about how armies of Europe are spending almost all their money on personnel. (attached)

Why don't we get five or six metrics and look at them—compare the US and NATO countries on these key issues. Show me the metrics before we get the data, and then I think sometime when we are at NATO we ought to raise it.

Thanks.

DIIR dh
021303-1

.....
Please respond by 03/07/03

11-L-0559/OSD14735

U03921 /03

NATO 300 L

13 Feb 03



March 20, 2003 6:28 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz Tom White Gen. Shinseki
Gen. Myers Jim Roche ADM Clark
Gen. Pace H. T. Johnson Gen. Jumper
Dov Zakheim Gen. Hagee

CC: PETE ALDRIDGE
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: DoD Management Issues

Attached is a memo from Gordon England. I agree with each of his points.

I would like each of you to take a look at this and then get back to Pete Aldridge with suggestions as to how we can proceed.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/17/03 England memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
032003-14

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

310.1

20 Mar 03

U03923 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14736

January 17, 2003


SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 20 2003

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England

Mr. Secretary,



Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Department of Defense and all of our Sailors, Marines and civilians in the Department of the Navy. For me, this has been a memorable experience.

The following are five suggestions you may find useful as you continue to lead the DoD.

1. Follow through on your recent decision to make the POM process a biennial event. That is important because otherwise the bureaucracy will revert to past practices.

Discussion

A detailed disassembly and reassembly of service programs each year is astonishingly ineffective and inefficient. It is necessary only to make essential mid-course corrections in the off year of the POM. Rather, have the management team concentrate on future strategic issues.

2. Align fiscal and planning guidance and involve the services in the strategic objectives of the department.

Discussion

While there are a lot of senior management meetings, there is not a clear unambiguous statement of OSD priorities, objectives and constraints. As early as possible in the budget cycle, SECDEF should clearly articulate his financial and program objectives for the year so the entire department can be working toward common objectives.

3. Align and publish authorities and responsibilities for all operating departments in the Pentagon and especially between service secretaries and OSD staff.

Discussion

The Goldwater-Nichols Act clarified the chain of command from the President to the SECDEF to the combatant commanders; however, it left the relationship between SECDEF and the Service Secretaries somewhat vague.

11-L-0559/OSD14737

Title 10 specifies that Service Secretaries have the “responsibility and authority” to carry out their obligations, but it also specifies that the SECDEF ultimately controls all activities of DoD.

Accordingly, the SECDEF needs to clarify these roles and responsibilities to avoid friction as OSD normally assumes the authority (but not the responsibility) to regulate the activities of the service departments.

4. Implement an investment strategy more in line with industrial companies.

Discussion

The present budget does not discriminate between a capital expenditure account and an operational account. That is the crux of the problem regarding split funding of hugely expensive capital assets such as nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines. Full funding of capital assets with 30 – 50 years' service is inconsistent with prevailing business practices.

Differentiating capital investments from other expenses, such as operations and personnel costs, would be a dramatic improvement to our budget process. The resources freed by such a policy change could be used to fund surge demands on operations and personnel accounts to support recapitalization or to accelerate the pace of transformational capabilities.

5. Uniformity of systems across DoD is desirable but not essential to achieve effectiveness and efficiency.

Discussion

The Navy has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on four Enterprise Resource program pilots, two of which are operational and the other two close to being operational. This effort will dramatically improve the Navy's supply chain, reduce costs and improve combat capability. It can also be modified to feed into any financial system eventually developed at the OSD level for the entire department. It is important to incentivize military departments to initiate bottom-up programs of this type while OSD is developing a longer term top-level approach.

Lastly, I do congratulate you on your very significant progress in managing the department. I expect that more substantive progress has been made in the past two years than in any prior four-year administration. It has been a privilege to be a small part of that effort. Thanks.

March 20, 2003 5:54 PM

TO: Jay Garner
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Deputy for Policy and DART Teams

Besides using the Deputy for Policy for the ministries and governance generally and the link back here, I would also have that person help with public affairs—particularly since Larry Di Rita will be there the first month with Ryan Henry and Ryan will be onsite thereafter. I used the model you and I discussed on the phone and talked to Larry and Ryan about it. They are cocked and ready to do it. We are going to miss them here, but I think they will be a big help there.

I also talked to Colin Powell today about the DART teams. I told him I had read in the paper that Natsios said that they all report straight back to him. I told Colin the MOU needs to be fixed that was signed before the Garner operation was set up, because the President made the decision that it all goes through DoD. I told him if Natsios or the State Department had a problem with that, the way to solve it would be to do what I am asking—have it go through Garner for direction, instructions and prioritization. To the extent Garner and Natsios disagree, they will elevate it to Rumsfeld and Powell and we'll solve it. But the assumption has to be that Garner sets priorities and gives instructions. Powell said he would take a look into it. He didn't seem to resist strongly, although I suppose when he gets back to the Department he might find folks who feel differently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032003-11

.....
Please respond by 3/28/03

1103925 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14739



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

February 25, 2003 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake - Question from Hearing: Arabic Speakers in DoD

- You received a question from a member of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on February 13 about the number of Arabic language speakers in the military and in the entire Department of Defense (Tab A).
- We have a total of 4240 active duty military, of which 2193 are considered proficient. ("Proficient" means level 2 or higher on the Defense Language Proficiency Test.) When the selected reserve and civilian populations are added we have a total of 5395, of which 2543 are considered proficient.
- Additional detail is attached at Tab B.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Edward Christie, DMDC-West, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD14740

U04174 / 03

February 13, 2003 10:49 AM

TO: ~~Powell Moore~~ David Chu
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Question from Hearing

Someone at the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee today—I think it was Congressman Moran— asked me how many Arabic language speakers there are in the military and how many in the entire Department of Defense, if we know.

Thanks.

DIIR:dh
021303-15

.....
Please respond by 03/01/03

Arabic Language Speakers in the Department of Defense *
as of December 2002

	Enlisted				Officer				Civilian *	
	Active Duty		Selected Reserves		Active Duty		Selected Reserves		#	Considered Proficient **
	#	Considered Proficient **	#	Considered Proficient **	#	Considered Proficient **	#	Considered Proficient **		
ARABIC	118	79	59	27	68	26	34	20	126	29
ARABIC-CLASSICAL	8	3	5	1	2	1	5	2	21	14
ARABIC-EGYPTIAN	40	21	61	8	109	29	32	5	41	6
ARABIC-GULF	5	2	11	2	3	1	3	1	15	5
ARABIC-LIBYAN	7	6	.	.	1	1
ARABIC-MAGHREBI	3	2	2	0	1	1	9	0	2	0
ARABIC-MODERN STANDARD	2,967	1,662	346	142	814	308	147	47	162	19
ARABIC-MOROCCAN	14	12	.	.	1	1
ARABIC-PENINSULA	6	2	10	7	4	0	10	1	8	3
ARABIC-SYRIAN	26	15	18	5	39	18	16	4	12	2
ARABIC-YEMENI	3	2	.	.	1	1
TOTAL	3,197	1,806	512	192	1,043	387	256	80	387	78

* Civilian totals do not include employees of DoD intelligence agencies. Language data reporting by other DoD civilian employees is voluntary.

** Defense Language Proficiency Test reported at level 2 or higher.

February 13, 2003 10:49 AM

TO: ~~Powell Moore~~ David Chu
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Question from Hearing

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DHR:dh
021303-15

.....
Please respond by 03/01/03

09114


13 Feb 03

U04176 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14743

March 24, 2003 12:14 PM

TO: Jay Garner

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Ministries

I have asked the OSD staff to push faster on your request to identify people to supervise some of the Iraqi ministries. As Doug Feith explained on the SVTC earlier today, the goal is to find good people who will bring real expertise, whether in or out of government.

We are also identifying senior DoD civilian managers who can be assigned to you to help with the ministries.

For key ministries, like Defense, I think it is important to have very senior people, at least for part of the time. Accordingly, we are considering some individuals of international stature who might be willing to help with this task for a limited period. I have in mind people like Rudy de Leon (former Deputy Secretary), Walt Slocombe (former Under Secretary) and Jim Woolsey (former Under Secretary of the Navy and CIA Director).

Slocombe and Woolsey have already indicated a willingness to help. With people of that caliber volunteering, we hope to get other outstanding individuals.

As far as the press operation is concerned, I understand you have some good technical people. What you may need is a good strategic communicator who can help you shape the public's perception of your work and its importance in helping create conditions for the transition to Iraqi governance and, ultimately, U.S. and coalition troop withdrawal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032403-10

.....
Please respond by 3/28/03

U04309 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14744

Tr
69

21 Mar 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 25 2003

Dr. Barry M. Blechman
CEO and President
DFI International
1717 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Suite 1300
Washington, DC 20006

381

Dear Barry,

Enclosed is a note I got back from Dick Myers in response to my inquiry to him about the letter you sent me. He seems to feel we're proceeding in that general direction.

Thanks.

Regards,

Enclosure

25 Mar 03

U04419 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14745

3/21 11:30

ES



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 203 MAR 20 PM 5:16
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-854-03
20 March 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 24 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Joint Concepts of Operations

From 3/10 Mr. Secretary, short answer is that we are doing what Mr. Blechman is suggesting.
Boek

- In response to your memorandum (TAB) concerning the concept development suggestions made by Mr. Barry Blechman, President and CEO of DFI International. I agree in the points made by Mr. Blechman; similar determinations were made by US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) during the 2003 mission analysis that restructured the concept development and experimentation program.
- Based on current capabilities-based methodology and joint concept development events, I believe that the Armed Forces are already moving in the direction discussed in Mr. Blechman's letter. USJFCOM's restructured iterative experimentation methodology is focused on smaller, more frequent sets of experiments that are designed to provide actionable recommendations regarding future force investment.
- A collaborative effort among the Services, Joint Staff, OSD and USJFCOM is under way. USJFCOM is hosting a series of planning sessions and workshops that will lead to the Pinnacle Impact 03 May event, examining the joint operations concepts and using key joint issues and comparative concepts in multiple scenarios. This effort will serve to further refine the development of the joint operating concepts such as major combat operations.
- The Joint Staff will continue to work closely with USJFCOM, US Northern Command and US Strategic Command as they develop the initial set of joint concepts. These organizations appreciate and will continue to consider the potentially significant contributions that DFI and similar companies contribute to this effort.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/21
SR MA CRADDOCK	3/24
MA BUCCI	3/24
EXECSEC WHITMORE	3/21

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

U03832-03

11-L-0559/OSD14746

TAB A

March 3, 2003 3:47 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Concepts of Operations

Here is an interesting letter from Barry Blechman about Joint Concepts of Operations. What do you think about his suggestion?

Thanks.

Attach.
2/14/02 Blechman ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
030303-26

.....
Please respond by 03/21/03

Tab A

03 MAR 7 8:33

11-L-0559/OSD14747



DFI INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman
CEO and President

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR - 4 2003

February 14, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

Thanks very much for taking the time to talk with me on Tuesday, and for providing the proverbial free lunch! It was a pleasure to see you and have the chance to better understand your priorities in transforming the Department, as well as to discuss key foreign policy issues.

Our discussion of your efforts to lead the Services into Joint Concepts of Operations brought to mind the frustrations that we experienced when assisting the Air Force's Directorate of Plans (XP) in attempts to engage the other Services in a discussion of joint concepts for expeditionary operations. Official channels for communication proved to be ineffective and ad hoc initiatives equally fruitless. Without a forcing function, XP's efforts to develop a Joint CONOP that could be tested, exercised, and, ultimately, implemented have so far come to naught.


The priority that you now ascribe to progress in this area provides a new opportunity to encourage the Services to come to the table. JFCOM is the logical "honest broker" to manage a series of all-Service workshops to develop Joint CONOPS. In order to generate a constructive discussion, participants should be handpicked and include representatives from the Unified Commands, Joint Staff, and OSD. A board of retired "gray beards" charged with thinking across Service lines on this issue might additionally aid the process.

The process might also include informal, off-line meetings under private auspices, as well as more structured, top-level sessions, to maximize creativity while driving towards specific, actionable agreements. More than just an opportunity to compare slides and share jargon, these activities should be structured toward tangible results – a focused set of CONOPS that could be tested in the field in 2004.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this concept further with Admiral Giambastiani's team. DFI's work for the Services and OSD has made clear that encouraging the Services to work together outside of existing stovepipes is a vital step toward transforming our military capabilities.

Thanks again for lunch. I look forward to seeing you at the Defense Policy Board meeting later this month.

Sincerely,


Barry Blechman

March 24, 2003 1:57 PM

TO: The Honorable Mel Martinez
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Charlie Shaw

Mel—

Charlie Shaw, the person I mentioned to you as having been active in the home builders, was not active in the home builders, but he was active in what I think was called the Urban Land Institute. He is a terrific person with great energy. He would be interested in the project you mentioned in Lake County, Florida.

Attached is a copy of my letter to him and his contact information if you decide you would like to get in touch with him.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/24/03 SecDef ltr to C. Shaw
Contact info for Charlie Shaw

DHR:dh
032403-3

080

24 Mar 03

U04438 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14750

Donald H. Rumsfeld

March 24, 2003

Mr. Charles H. Shaw

(b)(6)


Dear Charlie,

The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Mel Martinez, may be giving you a call. I told him a bit about you the other day. He knows of an interesting project in Florida for the families of the deployed troops that I thought might be of interest to you.

I hope things are going well.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'D. Rumsfeld', written over the word 'Sincerely,'.

11-L-0559/OSD14751

Mr. Charles H. Shaw
Chairman
The Shaw Company
233 South Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606

Office: (b)(6)
Home: (b)(6)

Home Address:

(b)(6)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

07:11:00 PM
107 MAR 26 PM 3:31

Dear Don,

March 26, 2003

In response to the question you asked me about the relationship between USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and DOD's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), there is a sensible way forward.

Close coordination between the DART teams and ORHA is critical to ensure the prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance to Iraqi populations most in need of lifesaving assistance. DART is committed to complete transparency and cooperation with ORHA and other entities engaged in humanitarian assistance operations in Iraq.

The DART leader reports to the Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, who reports to USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios and, through him, to me. The ORHA Director reports to you.

Since DART is committed to coordination and transparency, I doubt there will be any issues, but if operational disagreements arise between the DART and ORHA and cannot be resolved on the ground, USAID Administrator Natsios and General Garner will address the issue. If this fails, the final resolution of the matter will come to us.

Sincerely,



Colin L. Powell


The Honorable
Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense.

11-L-0559/OSD14753

U04481 /03

April 2, 2003, 2:00 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Subject: Disaster Assistance Response Team and the Garner Group

I read your memorandum of 26 March and subsequently learned that the Deputies Committee has discussed the relationship between the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA, or the Garner Group) and the Agency for International Development's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).

Here is how I recommend that we solve this problem:

- Let's make the DART's leader, Michael Marx, a deputy to Garner's Humanitarian Assistance coordinator, Ambassador George Ward.
- The DART will then receive prioritization of its planning and activities from Jay Garner.
- If necessary, the DART will then submit Garner's guidance to AID for concurrence.
- If there is a dispute, Andrew Natsios and Jay Garner will resolve it.
- If that fails, you and I will get involved.

This solution will give us unity of effort in the field and allow for input from the parent agency. If you agree to this commonsense approach, our involvement in subsequent disputes will be kept to a minimum.

I look forward to hearing from you soon on this subject.

U04892 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14754

1840

2 APR 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

April 18, 2003

Pandeli Majko
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense (Ministria e Mbrojtjes)
Boulevard Deshmoret e Kombit
Tirana, Albania

Dear Minister Majko:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Albania's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

Afghanistan

18 Apr 03



11-L-0559/OSD14755

U04540-03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Nikolai Svinarov
Minister of National Defense
Ministry of National Defense
#3 Vasil Levski Street
1000 Sofia, Bulgaria

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Bulgaria's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14756



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

John McCallum
Minister of National Defense
Department of National Defense
101 Colonel Drive
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2

Dear Minister McCallum:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Canada's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14757



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Svend Aage Jensby
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Holmens Kanal 42
DK-1060 Copenhagen, Denmark

Dear Minister Jensby:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Denmark's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the "Sincerely," text.



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14758



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Cairo, Egypt

Dear Minister Tantawi:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Egypt's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Pakika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14759



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Yiannis Papandoniou
Minister of Defense
Hellenic Republic
Camp Papgou Holargos 15501
Athens, Greece

Dear Minister Papandoniou:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Greece's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14760



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Ferenc Juhasz
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Balaton u. 7/11 P.O. Box 25
H-1885, Budapest, Hungary

Dear Minister Juhasz:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Hungary's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14761



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Halldor Asgrimsson
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Raudararstig 25
150 Reykjavik, Iceland

Dear Minister Asgrimsson:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Iceland's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the "Sincerely," text.



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14762



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Cho Young-kil
Minister of National Defense
Ministry of National Defense
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Dear Minister Young-kil:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for the Republic of Korea's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14763



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Ioan Mircea Pascu
Minister of National Defense
Ministry of National Defense
Strada Izvor #13-15, Sector 5
Bucharest, Romania

Dear Minister Pascu:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Romania's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14764



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Dr. Anton Grizbold
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Kardeljeva, Ploščad 25
1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia

Dear Minister Grizbold:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Slovenia's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14765



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Fedrico Trillo
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Spain
Madrid, Spain

Dear Minister Trillo:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Spain's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the "Sincerely," text.



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14766



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Samuel Schmid
Chief of the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports
VBS
Bundeshaus Ost
3003 Bern, Switzerland

Dear Chief Schmid:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Switzerland's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14767



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

General Volodymyr Shkidchenko
Minister of Defense
Ukraine
Kiev, Ukraine

Dear Minister Shkidchenko:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Ukraine's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14768



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

General Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum
Minister of Defence
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Your Highness:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for the United Arab Emirates's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to Donald Rumsfeld, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14769



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

April 18, 2003

Geoffrey Hoon
Secretary of State for Defense
Ministry of Defense
Main Building, Room 6147, Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB, United Kingdom

Dear Minister Hoon:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for the United Kingdom's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the "Sincerely," text.

U04540-03



11-L-0559/OSD14770



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

April 18, 2003

Zeljka Antunovic
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Trg kralja P. Kresimira IV br. 1
10000 Zagreb, Croatia

Dear Minister Antunovic:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Croatia's offer of assistance. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, equipment, and specialty training.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14771



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

April 18, 2003

President Pervez Musharraf
President Secretariat
Islamabad, Pakistan

President Pervez Musharraf:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Pakistan's contribution. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, and equipment.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. Rumsfeld", is written below the word "Sincerely,".



U04540-03

11-L-0559/OSD14772



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

April 18, 2003

His Excellency Shri George Fernandes
Minister of Defense
South Block
New Delhi, India 110 001

Your Excellency:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for India's offer of assistance. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, and equipment.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



11-L-0559/OSD14773

U04540-03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

April 18, 2003

General Mukhtar Altynbayev
Minister of Defense
Republic of Kazakhstan

General Mukhtar Altynbayev:

I wanted to give you an update on the Afghan National Army training program and thank you for Kazakhstan's offer of assistance. To date, there are seven battalions, with an eighth in training. Our immediate objective is for the Afghan National Army to assume responsibility for many functions now being performed by coalition forces. We will also assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Support Command.

Newly trained Afghan soldiers from the 3rd battalion have performed well during recent deployments to Orgun-E, Paktika province. Other Afghan National Army units will deploy in conjunction with the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

International assistance is critical to the success of this program, and we continue to welcome contributions of funding, infrastructure, and equipment.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense, is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

U04540-03



11-L-0559/OSD14774

4/15
1330
4/16

1550
4/16
EDW

USDP SEE NEXT
PINDER

ACTION MEMO

I-03/001789-SO

EF-4489

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action RW 4/17/03

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict SEE NEXT PINDER

SUBJECT: Afghan National Army Thank You Letters

- You requested thank you letters be sent to international donors to the Afghan National Army (ANA). Attached are three versions:
- The first version (TAB A) is for countries with completed donations (except France)—Albania, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.
- The second version (TAB B) is for Croatia, whose donation is still pending.
- The third version (TAB C) is for countries neighboring Afghanistan—Pakistan, India, and Kazakhstan. President Karzai has requested that neighboring countries provide equipment and infrastructure but not training, so this version of the letter does not request training assistance.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign attached letters (TAB A, B, and C).

COORDINATION: Attached at TAB D.

Attachment:

As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DURMAN	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WENTWORTH COX	4 4/15

Prepared by: Laura Cooper (b)(6) and Heather Panitz (b)(6) SO/LIC Stability
Operations

11-L-0559/OSD14775

U. 04540/03

COORDINATION

ANA Thank You Letters

USD(Comptroller)	Dov Zakheim	9 April 03
General Counsel	William J. Haynes II	8 April 03
ISP (Eurasian Affairs)	Alan Van Egmond, Director	11 Feb 03
ISA (Asian and Pacific Affairs)	Mary Tighe, Principle Director	14 Feb 03
ISP (European Policy)	James Townsend, Acting DASD	20 Mar 03
Comment: Confirmed letter should be sent to Germany.		
ISA (Near East and South Asian Affairs)	Paul Hulley, Director	14 Feb 03

7128
1270

EF-4489

USDP *has been
+ documented
5/5/03*

ACTION MEMO

MAR 27 2003

I-03/001789-SO

EF-4489

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSecDef Action _____

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict *has seen*

SUBJECT: Afghan National Army Thank You Letters

- You requested thank you letters be sent to international donors to the Afghan National Army (ANA). Attached are three versions:
- The first version (TAB A) is for countries with completed donations (except France)—Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.
- The second version (TAB B) is for countries with pending donations—Canada, Croatia, Egypt, and Poland.
- The third version (TAB C) is for neighboring countries with pending donations—Pakistan, India, and Kazakhstan. President Karzai has requested that neighboring countries provide equipment and infrastructure but not training, so this version of the letter does not request training assistance.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign attached letters (TAB A, B, and C).

COORDINATION: Attached at TAB D.

Attachment:
As stated

*3/27
fix on all
Comptroller/Ge coord.
LARRY DI RITA
3/28*

BPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>4/3/03</i>

U04540 /03

Prepared by: Laura Cooper (b)(6) and Heather Panitz (b)(6) SO/LIC Stability
Operations

11-L-0559/OSD14777

03-25-03 16:38 IN

3/26
1500

12



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-860-03

26 March 2003

210 (3&4)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

PHU 3/26

SUBJECT: Waivers from Joint Service

- In response to your inquiry concerning ending joint service waivers for officers selected for promotion to general or flag officers (G/FO) and request to review the positions qualifying for joint service credit (TAB), the following is provided.
- The Congressionally directed independent Joint Officer Management/ Joint Professional Military Education study was completed 17 March 2003. The assessment recommended legislative and policy changes to Goldwater-Nichols. In addition, the positions that qualify for joint service credit were evaluated. However, a detailed analysis to determine whether each billet should provide joint credit was not conducted.
- Upon appraisal of the study's conclusions, I will recommend a G/FO joint service waiver policy to you not later than 1 April 2003. To evaluate the 9102 joint positions, a panel of subject-matter experts from the Services and unified commands will be convened to review each position and determine the joint experience provided. This will be completed not later than 30 September 2003. *We will also evaluate positions that are currently not getting joint credit but should.*

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Brigadier General Maria Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1;

(b)(6)

*3/27
General Cribbs -
Who did the
study and
has anyone seen the
recommended changes?
D. White
Larry Di Rita
3/28*

abmaros

U04581 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14778


TAB

March 4, 2003 9:21 AM

TO: Tom White Gen. Shinseki
H. T. Johnson ADM Clark
James Roche Gen. Jumper
David Chu Gen. Hagee

CC: Gen. Myers Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Waivers from Joint Service

Given the many years that have passed since Goldwater-Nichols became law, I wonder if we ought to simply end the policy of waivers for the absence of joint service to officers being selected for promotion to General and Flag rank.

I also wonder if we might want to review what positions give joint service credit. As I have talked to people I interview, I have the impression that some of the positions they say give them joint service credit tend not to really be very joint.

Therefore, I would like you to review the list of assignments that qualify for joint service. My impression is that the list very likely has grown so that more people are enabled to punch that ticket, and it may very well be that we want to tighten it up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030303-27

.....
Please respond by 3/28/03

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD14779

U02871 /03



TAB A

January 2, 2003 7:50 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Afghanistan ROE

Afghanistan

We need to finish the ROE for Afghanistan—both ground and air—and hot pursuit.

Thanks.

DHR dh
010203-1

.....
Please respond by _____

2 Jan 03

03 JAN 03

11-L-0559/OSD14780

U04596 / 03
Tab A



365

TAB A

January 3, 2003 8:52 AM

040 Transportation

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Doug Feith
ADM Clark
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Role of the Coast Guard

Today I was advised that we need to activate Coast Guard Reserves to bring them to the Central Command, so they can perform functions the US Navy is not capable of performing.

It seems to me that the time for that kind of an arrangement is over. Specifically, were there to be a couple of events in the United States and a need for those same Coast Guard Reservists for homeland security activities, you can be sure we would not be able to get them to go over to the Middle East.

Therefore, it seems to me we need to get US Navy capabilities that can substitute for the Coast Guard capabilities and stop using the Coast Guard for things that don't have anything to do with homeland security.

Please come to me with a proposal as to how that could be accomplished and any comments that anyone may have on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010303-15

.....
Please respond by 01/24/03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD14781

03 JAN 8 01

U04608 /03

3 Jan 03

March 31, 2003 3:07 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Ministry Liaison Positions in Iraq

I appreciate your helpful responses to Jay Garner's requests for people and know these individuals have certain expectations.

As our thinking about Jay's operation has evolved, our folks thought it would be helpful to seek additional individuals, in and out of government, who have particular skills and who may be willing to join the operation. There is going to be plenty of work to go around, and the people you have identified at Jay's request have obvious expertise that can contribute across the range of needs he will have. It would be best, though, to develop as broad and deep a pool of talent as we can, and we are seeking to do that.

We've put together a pool of names to serve as senior ministry advisors, and the State nominees are in that pool. We'll be in touch about who fills which position.

I understand Steve Hadley, Marc Grossman and Doug Feith are meeting regularly to work through these issues, and to discuss other important post-conflict matters.

We also have added a Policy and Governance group to Jay's operation. A State Deputy Assistant Secretary, Scott Carpenter, could be instrumental in that activity.

I hope you will consider making Scott available to begin working here at the Pentagon. The many governance issues need a steady focus, and I understand he is good and ready to help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032803-7

11-L-0559/OSD14782

U04733 /03

Iraq

31 Mar 03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

April 2, 2003 10:14 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)
David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Rep. Frost Inquiry (D TX 24th) on Consolidation of Three Military Exchanges
SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The Armed Services operate three independent exchange systems: the Army & Air Force Exchange System (AAFES), the Navy Exchange Service Command, and the Marine Corps Exchange.
- You cited the exchanges as an example of duplication in the "Battlefield to Bureaucracy" speech of September 10, 2001. Past studies recommended consolidation of the exchange systems. Department of Navy has strongly opposed.
- We are staffing a memo with the Secretaries of the Military Departments that announces the decision to consolidate the three Armed Services Exchanges into a single organization. The Army and Air Force concur. The memo leaked from the Department of the Navy.
- The Department and exchange patrons would be best served by consolidation. Some may suggest that the consolidation, like other transformation initiatives, be placed on hold. We strongly recommend that consolidation should proceed.
- The Army and Air Force have a combined exchange that has operated well since the late 1940s. AAFES is headquartered in Dallas (Rep. Frost's district). The AAFES Commander is MG Kathryn Frost, USA, who is married to Rep. Frost.
- Rep. Frost is questioning the integrity of retired Maj Gen C.J. Wax, USAF, who will lead the transition effort. C.J. Wax is the former Commander, AAFES. News articles may be circulating concerning accounting irregularities discovered at AAFES last year. After an internal audit uncovered irregularities, Maj Gen Wax directed an internal investigation in Jun 2002. This led to an Office of Special Investigations (OSI) review. OSI found that Maj Gen Wax exercised proper oversight and took appropriate action.
- Mr. Geren and Mr. Abell spoke with Rep. Frost after his call to the Secretary. Mr. Abell also spoke with Rep. John McHugh, Chairman, and several members of the HASC Total Force Subcommittee. Early reactions are generally supportive. Rep. Schrock (R VA 2nd), who has the Navy exchange headquarters in his district, may be an opponent. Mr. Abell meets with Rep. Schrock on April 2.



11-L-0559/OSD14783

U04824 /03

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: N/A

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: John Molino, DUSD(MC&FP),

(b)(6)

3/27/03

MR. Abell

Snowflake

March 27, 2003 7:57 AM

TO: ~~Powell Moore~~ David Chu
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressman Frost

Congressman Martin Frost wants to talk to you about the exchange merger that someone is apparently proposing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032703-2

.....
Please respond by

4/11/03

11-L-0559/OSD14785

3/27/03

MR. Abell

March 27, 2003 7:57 AM

TO: ~~Powell Moore~~ David Chu
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressman Frost

Congressman Martin Frost wants to talk to you about the exchange merger that someone is apparently proposing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032703-2

.....
Please respond by 4/11/03

11-L-0559/OSD14786 U04825 /03



April 1, 2003 11:21 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing to POTUS

The President said he would like to have a briefing from you every week, so please look ahead to next week and figure out a day you think you would like to do it. Then we will do that from week to week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040103-9

.....
Please respond by 4/4/03

337 W04

11 Apr 03

U04832 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14787



April 5, 2003 11:34 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
LTG *CRAMER*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gen. McNeill

337 WH

The President would like to have Gen. McNeill on the portion of the Wednesday briefing that will be about Afghanistan, if you are comfortable with that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040503-4

.....
Please respond by

4/1/03

5 Apr 03

11-L-0559/OSD14788

U05027 / 03



398

TAB

April 2, 2003 7:39 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Estimated Iraqi Strength in Numbers of People

On the Hill yesterday, Gen. Myers and I didn't know the answers to questions Senator Levin asked about how many overall did we estimate (in terms of numbers of people) were in the following:

1. Iraq's regular army.
2. Republican Guard.
3. Special Republican Guard.
4. Fedayeen Saddam.
5. Any other elements in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040203-2

.....
Please respond by 4/9/03

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD14789

U05193 /03

03 APR 2 3:27 PM

*TRH**2 APR 03*



April 7, 2003 7:59 AM

TO: Gen. T. Michael "Buzz" Moseley

CC: Gen. Franks
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld)))

SUBJECT: Congratulations

I saw a quote from you about a cow peeing on a flat rock. It is perfect.
Congratulations.

You are doing a great job!

Regards,

DHR dh
040703-7

.....
Please respond by _____

335
SD

7 Apr 03



April 7, 2003 11:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Awards

Please stop these awards until I have a chance to look at them, and stop Paul Wolfowitz or anyone else's authority to issue them until I have a chance to get my head around them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040703-27

.....

Please respond by 4/11/03

200.6

APR 10 2003

RAY Dubois -
need list of awardees since
we came in & not approved
(OSD-level)

Thanks

Samuel

74003

11-L-0559/OSD14791

U05376 /03

April 7, 2003 10:21 AM

TO: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: ORHA Paper

The format Jay Garner used in the attached paper, "ORHA Plan for Disposition," does not work and needs to be changed. They should use larger font type, separate info from action items, and clearly indicate what needs action.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/5/03 "ORHA Plan for Disposition of Frozen Iraqi Assets"

DHR:dh
040703-19

.....
Please respond by _____

Ryan Henry

The paper you reviewed was actually written by Treasury. I have made Jay aware of your preference for short, precise, bulletized memos, drafted in 13 pitch, and provided him the attached templates. I also asked that Jay pre-coordinate memos to you with Policy so we can lead-turn actions and assist with quality control.

11-L-0559/OSD14792

U05423 /03

INFORMATION MEMO

I-03/(Insert I-Number)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Name, Position, Organization, phone #

SUBJECT: Enter a Brief Subject

- Size 13 font
- One page, bullet list with white space

COORDINATION: TAB ___ (or NONE)

Attachment (s):

As stated or TAB A:

TAB B:

Prepared by: Name/Organization/Telephone #/Date

11-L-0559/OSD14793

CLASSIFICATION

ACTION MEMO

I-03/(Insert I-Number)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Name, Position, Organization, phone #

SUBJECT: Enter a Brief Subject ()

- () Size 13 font
- () One page, bullet list with white space

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve/sign....(TAB A) ()

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other: _____

COORDINATION: TAB __ (or NONE)

Attachment (s):

As stated or TAB A:

TAB B:

Prepared by: Name/Organization/Telephone #/Date

Classified By: or Derived From:

Reason:

Declassify On:

11-L-0559/QSD14794

CLASSIFICATION

READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD/DR. WOLFOWITZ:

(TOPIC)

From: Principal's Name, Title, Organization, & Telephone Number

Date, Time, Location

Host, Lead, or Briefer: Organization

Attendees: List key attendees and their titles; list additional attendees in an attachment.

Issue: Short but clear statement of major issue or point. (Answer the questions; Why are you telling this to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary? What should he know and discuss? What is the objective of the meeting?)

- Succinct, bullet statement format, one page, stand-alone document
- Background:
 - No more than 2 sub-bullets.
- Desired Outcome:
 - No more than 2 sub-bullets.
- Talking Points:
 - No more than 5 sub-bullets.

Prepared by: Name/Organization/Telephone Number/Date




April 9, 2003 5:52 PM

000.5

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Rewards

I would appreciate learning what rewards the Department of State has given out to reward activities that occurred after September 11, 2001. Specifically, I would like to know:

- The amount of the rewards.
- The dates of the grants.
- The dates the information was provided.
- The reason for the grant—what the value was that merited the rewards.
- The names and nationalities of the recipients.

I am convinced that rewards can be important in achieving our goals in Iraq, but my impression is that our rewards programs still aren't working at their potential.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040803-18

94PR03

11-L-0559/OSD14796

U05429 /03



COMPTROLLER


UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO



April 11, 2003 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Weekly Report 04/11/03

- **FY 2003 Supplemental:** The conferees are meeting today to address the FY 2003 Supplemental appropriations bill. We expect that the bill will pass by the end of the day. Our current information is that the defense number will be \$62.6 billion with \$15.7 billion appropriated into a transfer fund and the remainder into specific appropriations. There are really only about \$3 billion worth of "strings" attached to the DERF, which means that we have more flexibility than originally was in either the House or Senate bills. We consider that this DERF should be executable. We will get the money appropriated into the specific appropriations to the Services as soon as the bill is enacted and OMB makes the money available to us. This should relieve the current pressures on the operating accounts. We will work with the Services to manage the transfer account to deal with events as they unfold the remainder of the fiscal year.
- **Iraq "Tin Cup:"** On Wednesday I hosted the Senior Coalition Contributions Group for Iraq to discuss next steps in our strategy for the "tin cup" effort for Iraq. We have arranged a face-to-face meeting with other key country representatives in Washington April 14 concomitant with a Treasury-hosted Finance Ministers meeting. Japan, Spain, the UK, and Australia have all agreed to attend, mostly at the Deputy Minister or Under Secretary level.
- **Transportation of Iraqi Vested Property into Theater.** This week we have coordinated the procedure to move \$20 million in small denominations into theater. The specific plan and procedures to be followed were sent to you in a separate memo. This procedure was coordinated with NSC, OMB, Treasury, GAO, the Joint staff, DFAS and various organizations with the Department. The first shipment should arrive at Andrews AFB today. Nothing can be disbursed prior to ORHA providing a more detailed plan for approval.
- **Djibouti Lease Signing Ceremony:** This afternoon I signed a leasing agreement for Camp LeMonier with Djibouti's Ambassador to the United States. This agreement will allow the United States to provide substantial financial support to Djibouti. I am sending a separate memo to you on this matter.



11-L-0559/OSD14797

U05485 03

020 USC

11 April 03

- **Leasing Issue:** Pete Aldridge and I are preparing a memorandum for your signature approving the Air Force entry into a lease for 100 KC-767 tankers. The lease will be contingent on securing a waiver from funding termination liability and approval from the Office of Management and Budget. We are working with Mike Wynne to draft negotiating guidelines that provide an acceptable negotiating range for the price of the aircraft. This will entail deleting unnecessary content from the aircraft and achieving additional price reductions from Boeing. We are also working with AT&L and PA&E to flatten the funding profile outside the FYDP.
- **Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP):** I chaired the FMMP Executive Committee meeting on Tuesday with AT&L, C3I, and the Service FM's in attendance. We intend to complete the review and analysis of the DoD Financial Management Enterprise Architecture and the transition plan on April 30, 2003. The Architecture will be completed by then, on time and under budget. I am also renaming the program from the Financial Management Modernization Program to the Business Management Modernization Program, and renaming the Financial Management Enterprise Architecture as the Business Enterprise Architecture. I will be scheduling a ceremony to recognize the delivery of the architecture in mid - late May 2003. I have attached a chart providing additional detail.
- **DCAA:** Bill Reed, Director of DCAA, reports that:
 - DCAA received notice last week that GAO has terminated a review of the Effects of Personnel Reductions and the Changing Acquisition Environment on DCAA's Oversight Responsibilities. The Comptroller General initiated the review based on concerns regarding adequacy of staffing for oversight organizations like DCAA. DCAA representatives told the lead GAO analyst at the start of the review, that DCAA was adequately staffed to perform its mission under the current acquisition environment. The GAO's preliminary analysis supported DCAA's position. No report will be issued for the GAO project.
 - As previously reported, contractor pension cost forecasts, resulting from declining pension investment portfolios, continue to grow and will likely impact future DoD buying power. Lockheed Martin's most recent corporate rate proposal forecast, received on March 31, 2003, tripled from October 2002. Ninety-seven percent of this cost growth (\$1.014 billion for 2004 – 2007) relates to pension cost estimate increases.

COORDINATION: NONE

ATTACHMENT:

As stated



Status of Architecture and Transition Plan

- Team IBM on track to deliver the enterprise architecture and Transition Plan April 30, 2003
- Proposed Name Change Beginning May 1, 2003
 - Financial Management Modernization Program (FMMP) to Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)
 - Financial Management Enterprise Architecture (FMEA) to Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA)
- Architecture Implementation
 - Start using Best Practices through Pilots Across Domains/Services (12 - 18 Months in Duration)
 - Select Pilots in Accordance With Developed Criteria with Domain Owners (April - June 2003)
 - Domain/Services Nominate Pilots/Quick Wins - April 2003
 - Validate, Maintain and Extend the architecture




COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

April 11, 2003, 5:03 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Providing Support to Djibouti

- On January 22, 2003, you asked that I work to get some money to Djibouti (Tab A). We have made considerable progress on this matter.
- We concluded that the best vehicle for helping Djibouti and improving our own access at the same time would be to re-negotiate the lease for Camp LeMonier.
- My staff worked with Peter Rodman's team and the Office of the General Counsel staff to re-negotiate the lease. I signed the new lease with the Djiboutian Ambassador today.
 - Under this new leasing agreement, USCENTCOM will have greatly expanded access to facilities, ranges, and other property in Djibouti.
 - The DoD will make an additional \$10.25 million cash payment to Djibouti for the use of Camp LeMonier and other facilities for the remainder of FY 2003.
 - The DoD will pay Djibouti \$15 million for the use of Camp LeMonier and other facilities in FY 2004. Three \$5 million payments will be made.
- My staff has also received a detailed listing of the costs that Djibouti has incurred supporting U.S. military operations in connection with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). We can reimburse Djibouti for the costs using FY 2002 Emergency Supplemental funds.
 - Our preliminary analysis suggests that we can reimburse Djibouti between \$3.0 - \$5.8 million using FY 2002 funds.
 - I will report back to you once USCENTCOM and analysts on my staff verify specifically how much we can pay Djibouti.

11-L-0559/OSD14800

- In FY 2003, DoD will provide between \$19.3 – \$22.1 million in total support to Djibouti. This includes support provided through the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program, and DoD Fellowship Programs. This will account for approximately two-thirds of the \$30 million that the NSC wanted to provide to Djibouti when President Guelleh visited Washington in January 2003.
- I am sending a separate memo to Stephen Hadley at the NSC on this matter.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachment:
As stated

Cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Prepared By: Josh Boehm, (b)(6)

January 22, 2003 10:19 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Djibouti

Please work with Doug Feith and figure out some ways we can get some money to Djibouti. They are doing everything in the world for us, and we are doing next to nothing for them. They need some help.

Please get back to me soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012203-9

.....
Please respond by 01/31/03

11-L-0559/OSD14802

COORDINATION

USD(P)/ISA/Africa

Theresa Whelen

April 11, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD14803

⬆
TAB A

March 6, 2003 4:23 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*
SUBJECT: Bases in the Middle East

We need some thought as to what bases in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East we might consider reducing after a conflict with Iraq, if there is one. If we have to open new bases, we will need to close some down.

Please see me on this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030603-12

.....
Please respond by 03/28/03

Middle East

6 Mar 03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD14804

U05626 /03

April 14, 2003 10:02 AM

TO: ADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

I hope you have Gen. Handy engaged in this lessons learned process. He needs to be involved.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
041403-15

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

Tag

14 Apr 03

APR. 15. 2003 10:36AM

NO. 081 P. 2

April 14, 2003 10:02 AM

TO: ADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

I hope you have Gen. Handy engaged in this lessons learned process. He needs to be involved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041403-15

SECDEF HAS OPEN

Please respond by 4/25/03

APR 16 2003

4/15/03

SECDEF—

HE IS ENGAGED. AS A MATTER OF FACT, I DISCUSSED LESSONS LEARNED WITH HIM EARLIER TODAY.

WE ALSO HAD TWO LESSONS LEARNED TEAM MEMBERS AT TRANSCOM FROM 24-28 MARCH. THESE "TWO MEMBERS REMAIN "PLUGGED IN" WITH TRANSCOM. MORE TO FOLLOW.

cc: CTCS

V/R *[Signature]*

P. 2

11-L-0559/OSD 4806

USJFCM

11-655-03

4/16

24/16

Ir-09



April 14, 2003 3:57 PM

TO: Gen. Jones
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PIFWC

I just read about the PIFWC. Congratulations to you and your folks. It looks like it was a fine operation.

Regards,

DIR,dh
041403-Ja

.....

Please respond by _____

France

14 Apr 03

U05654 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14807

April 14, 2003 10:13 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Franks
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Symbolism

Attached is an interesting idea from Newt. I think he is right. When that happens, it ought to be a big event and seen all over the world.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/11/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: A Ceremony for a New Iraqi Government

DHR:dh
041403-16

.....
Please respond by 5/16/03

Iraq

14 Apr 03

U05655 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14808

From Newt Gingrich
cc Wolfowitz
Craddock
Di Rita

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com**Sent:** Friday, April 11, 2003 9:23 AM**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil;
jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil**Cc:** Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; wilkinjr@centcom.mil**Subject:** a ceremony for a new Iraqi government

for secdef depsecdef

from newt 4/11/03

symbolically turning over power to the Iraqi people

the following note from Mike Shields makes a powerful point about a big day six months or a year from now, we should plan it as a worldwide ceremony

By the way; I realize it is a long way away, but I hope that we have a distinctive ceremony handing over power once it happens from the military stewardship to the new government. It should be a big, bold ceremony with a "handshake" or "salute" culminating an inauguration as we peacefully hand power over to the Iraqi people. The symbolism is so important in the Arab world. We take it for granted here as we peacefully transfer power on inauguration day. It should be a very clear ceremony and the date should be celebrated as an Iraqi/American day.

4/11/2003

11-L-0559/OSD14809

073 APR 15 01 4 19

**THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON**

April 15, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DART Team

After discussing the issue over the weekend with Jay Garner and Andrew Natsios, I propose we apply a disciplined solution to the problem.

I need to keep command/ownership of the DART Team under USAID and me for a variety of reasons dealing mostly with relations with the NGO and humanitarian communities. However, I have told Andrew to instruct Mike Marx, the DART Team Leader, that I consider him under the operational control of Jay Garner. Mike is to respond to Jay's directions and taskings and report to him constantly. In the event of a major disagreement, or an instruction inconsistent with his USAID responsibilities, Mike is to come back to us for resolution. Otherwise, respond to Garner and keep us informed.



Colin L. Powell

U05660 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14810

April 16, 2003 7:47 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DART Team

16 APR 03

Thanks for your note of April 15 on the DART team. It sounds right to me. I will pass it along to Jay.

Thanks.

Regards,

DHR:dh
041603-4

16 APR 03

11-L-0559/OSD14811

U05825 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 18 2003

Tony Brenton
Minister & Deputy Head of Mission
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20008-3600

UK

Dear Tony,

Here is a deck of the cards with the pictures of the Iraqis from the wanted list. I thought you would enjoy having them.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Enclosure

18 APR 03

U05821 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14812

J
O
K
E
R



Iraqi Military Ranks —

General of the Army	Muhib
General	Fariq Awwal
Lt. General	Fariq
Major General	Liwa'
Brigadier General	'Amid
Colonel	'Aqid
Lt. Colonel	Muqaddam
Major	Ra'id
Captain	Naqib
1st LT.	Mulazim Awwal
2nd LT.	Mulazim
Sergeant	Arif
Corporal	Naib
Private 1st class	Jundi Awwal
Private	Jundi Awwal
Basic Private	Jundi

"Rukn"- staff officer
 "Tayar"-Air force
 "Bahri"-Naval



R
E
K
O
f

U05821 /03

April 14, 2003 8:12 AM

TO: *Col Buca*
~~Steve Cambone~~

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: "Wanted" Cards

Please get me about six decks of the cards with the pictures of the Iraqis on the wanted list on them. I want to take one to the President, one to the Vice President and send one to Tony Brenton, compliments of me when we get them in. Here is his card.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business card

DHR:dh
041403-7

*Ypt here
CARD
D if*


.....

Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD14814

April 16, 2003 7:47 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: DART Team

16 APR 03

Thanks for your note of April 15 on the DART team. It sounds right to me. I will pass it along to Jay.

Thanks.

Regards,

DHR:dh
041603-4

16 APR 03

11-L-0559/OSD14815

U05825 /03

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2003 APR 15 PM 6:19


April 15, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DART Team

After discussing the issue over the weekend with Jay Garner and Andrew Natsios, I propose we apply a disciplined solution to the problem.

I need to keep command/ownership of the DART Team under USAID and me for a variety of reasons dealing mostly with relations with the NGO and humanitarian communities. However, I have told Andrew to instruct Mike Marx, the DART Team Leader, that I consider him under the operational control of Jay Garner. Mike is to respond to Jay's directions and taskings and report to him constantly. In the event of a major disagreement, or an instruction inconsistent with his USAID responsibilities, Mike is to come back to us for resolution. Otherwise, respond to Garner and keep us informed.



Colin L. Powell

1:15 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: April 12, 2003

SUBJECT:

Let's think about having some of the folks who did such a good job as talking heads in after this thing is over.

Who else would there be besides Grange, Jacobs, McInerney, Allard? There were three or four others that stood out. There was a major, Bevellequa, and several others.

Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041203.11

Please respond by: 4/21/03

cc: DSD

Jaymie Duman
4/11-L-0559/OSD14817

U05839 / 03

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Major Robert S. Bevelacqua (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman (USA, Retired)

President and Executive Director

Kimsey Foundation

1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 850

Washington, DC 20006

(b)(6)

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Brigadier General David Grange (USA, Retired)

Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer

McCormick Tribune Foundation

435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite Number 770

Chicago, Illinois 60611

(b)(6)

Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

General William F. "Buck" Kernan (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)

Visiting Tom Slick Professor of World Peace

Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs

University of Texas, Austin

Post Office Box Y

Austin, Texas 78713-8925

(b)(6)

General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)
Principal
The Cohen Group
600 13th Street, NW, Suite Number 400
Washington, DC 20036

(b)(6)

A rectangular black box used to redact information, likely a signature or contact details.

Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

A rectangular black box used to redact information, likely a signature or contact details.

Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

A rectangular black box used to redact information, likely a signature or contact details.

Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

A rectangular black box used to redact information, likely a signature or contact details.



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

203 APR 10 PM 4:21



INFO MEMO

April 11, 2003, 10:04 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since Start of Operation Iraqi Freedom

- SECDEF requested information on the status of recruiting and retention since the beginning of the war in Iraq. (Tab B)
- **Active duty recruiting** remains strong through March, with all Services slightly above accession quantity goals. The quality of new active duty recruits is also strong, with all exceeding benchmarks for percent high school graduates and percent scoring in the upper half on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. (Tab A)
- **Reserve recruiting** is experiencing some difficulty, although this challenge is not insurmountable. The Reserves rely heavily on prior service recruits, so Stop Loss programs adversely affect the ability of the Reserves to meet their recruiting goals. Non-prior service recruits also seem more hesitant to join the Reserves right now. Army Reserve and Army National Guard account for 70% of Reserve Component recruiting, and both missed their March accession goals.
- **Retention** remains high. The Services have met or exceeded their goals through second quarter of FY03 (and report they are on target to meet FY03 retention goals). However, part of their success is attributed to current Service Stop Loss policies, as well as residual effects from the previous year's programs. The Department will have a better understanding of the impact of current operations on retention once Stop Loss is lifted by all Services, which we expect to happen soon.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Capt Angela Giddings, USAF

(b)(6)

U05855-03

11-L-0559/OSD14821

	Quantity			Quality	
	Accessions	Goal	% of Goal	% High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG)	% Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
Recruiting FY03 Through March					
Army	34,222	33,960	101%	95%	71%
Navy	16,482	16,334	101%	95%	65%
Marine Corps	13,300	13,196	101%	97%	70%
Air Force	18,761	18,006	104%	99%	79%
Active Duty Total	82,765	81,496	102%	96%	71%
Army National Guard	17,150	19,809	87%	85%	62%
Army Reserve	13,581	13,749	99%	93%	69%
Naval Reserve	4,336	4,157	104%	87%	69%
Marine Corps Reserve	3,648	2,995	122%	97%	76%
Air National Guard	2,171	1,903	114%	Not available	Not available
Air Force Reserve	2,549	2,298	111%	92%	71%
Reserve Total	43,435	44,911	97%		
HSDG benchmark = 90% AFQT benchmark = 60%					

** Air National Guard data through December 2002*

April 2, 2003 7:45 AM

TO:

~~LTC Craddock~~

Dr CNU

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention

Please check and find out if recruiting is up or down since the beginning of the war in Iraq. Also, check and see what has happened to retention.

I know it is soon, but it would be interesting to know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040203-4


.....
Please respond by 4 / 11 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14823

April 16, 2003 2:20 PM

TO: Service Secretaries
OSD Under Secretaries
Torie Clarke

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Writing in Plain English

Attached is a memo from Dov Zakheim on writing in plain English. It is worth thinking about.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/11/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Writing Course—Plain English [U054080 03]

DHR:dh
041603-19

.....

Please respond by _____

U05875 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14824

350

16 Apr 03

4/11/03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO



April 11, 2003 11:00 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 16 2003

Jaymie Duman
4/11

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Writing Course--Plain English

- The purpose of this memorandum is to tell you about a highly successful writing course I organized for my staff. Others in the Pentagon could benefit from it. Last year it became evident to me that members of my staff needed a refresher course to improve their writing skills. This week we concluded the last of a very successful series of writing classes that trained the majority of our personnel, to include both senior executive and GS level personnel.
- Some details about the course:
 - The writing course was highly practical. It emphasized writing clearly and getting the main point up front.
 - The instructor, Dr. Ed Bailey, is a professor at Marymount University. He has written 8 books in the field. More importantly, he understands our writing situation and knows how one should write for busy people.
 - Due to our heavy workload and long workdays, we scheduled all classes in the Pentagon, during normal working hours. The course was efficient. It consisted of three 2-hour sessions and one on-line session. The course extensively evaluated our actual writing.
 - I made the first course mandatory for our SES personnel. Their initial reluctance was followed by very positive endorsements of both the course and instructor. Course critiques have been overwhelmingly positive.
 - The results of the course have been evident in an improving quality of work. Analysts have provided better papers, and supervisors have taken a greater interest in the clarity and brevity of correspondence.

COORDINATION: NONE

SPL ASSISTANT : DUMAN	4/11
SR MA CRADDOCK	4/11/6
MA BUCCI	5/23/14
EXECSEC	4/4/14



U05480 03

11-L-0559/OSD14825

203 APR 03 11 00 01

USDPCopy provided 4/21/03

INFO MEMO

I-03/005252

APR 18 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

SUBJECT: Humanitarian Demining Operations

You asked about US involvement in humanitarian demining. The USG is a recognized world leader in humanitarian demining, but we are not shouldering the entire burden.

SD —
DoD does not
do any humanitarian
mine clearance
We do military
mine clearance,
but when it
comes to human
ops, we train
and equip others
to do it.

Worldwide Humanitarian Demining

- US humanitarian demining expenditures (for all agencies) have totaled over \$600M since Fiscal Year 1993.
- Norway (\$107M) and United Kingdom (\$79M) are leading foreign government contributors. Denmark, Australia and Canada are also significant contributors. The European Union has provided an additional \$151M.
- Other key actors include the United Nations and Organization of American States, NGOs (Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, HALO Trust, etc.) and commercial firms (e.g., Royal Dutch /Shell Group of Companies recently donated \$100,000 to provide mine dogs for Thailand). These actors either assist countries in developing an indigenous demining capability or clear mines for them.

MB

The State Department Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships strengthens internal mechanisms for mine action, coordinates the development of public-private partnerships and advances promising demining technologies.

DoD Participation

- DoD participates in the USG Humanitarian Mine Action program to provide unique training, readiness and access benefits for US forces, and to advance the Combatant Commanders' security cooperation strategies.
- DoD participation also deflects criticism of US landmine policy by directly supporting efforts to eliminate the risks to civilian populations posed by the indiscriminate use of landmines.

Attached is a paper on plans for humanitarian demining in Iraq.

Prepared by: COL Richard Thresher, (b)(6) and Marc Cheek, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14826

01-21-03 16:12:18 U06064 /03

Iraq Humanitarian Demining Efforts

The US plans to provide immediate humanitarian demining services and to establish an Iraqi-led humanitarian demining program. The pursuit of these parallel efforts will demonstrate to the Iraqi people that the new government is concerned about their needs.

- The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs is establishing an Emergency Mine Action Team to act as a Mine Action Coordination Cell, coordinating humanitarian demining efforts until the indigenous Iraqi program is able to take over.
- DoD humanitarian demining support for Iraq is based on requirements forwarded through CENTCOM.
- Coalition forces are also conducting countermine operations. However, these efforts are focused on supporting military operations rather than humanitarian needs, and the forces conducting them are not trained to conduct humanitarian demining missions.

The Department of State developed a four component mine action plan for Iraq.

- Provide Mine Risk Education – Develop mine risk education teams to educate Iraqi civilians on the hazards from landmines and the explosive remnants of war.
- Deploy a Quick Reaction Demining Force – Four teams, consisting of ten persons plus two dogs each, to provide demining in response to immediate humanitarian needs.
- Expand NGO operations – Support the existing NGO demining capacity in Northern Iraq and establish demining teams to enable movement of displaced persons, access for humanitarian service providers, and humanitarian infrastructure in Central and Southern Iraq.
- Develop long-term capacity – Using a train-the-trainer technique establish indigenous demining infrastructure for the Iraqi government's future program.

The UN is also providing contributions to support the Iraqi national mine action center.

Prepared by: COL Richard Thresher, (b)(6) and Marc Cheek, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14827



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

2003 APR 28 PM 4:02

2003 APR 28 PM 3:38

INFO MEMO

April 17, 2003, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L) *[Signature]* 4/17/03

SUBJECT: Snowflake - JCS Analysis of Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

- You asked that I review the Joint Staff's analysis of DCMA and let the Chairman and you know if there is any particular action required (attached).
- There are several OUSD(AT&L) actions identified. My lead, BG Harrington (Director, DCMA), is working those to closure with Brig Gen Goldfein (J-8) - who led the Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) review.
- The review resulted in DCMA providing Joint Staff daily Situation Reports (SITREPs) of weapon systems production in plant and critical readiness spares status, including expediting transportation, for DLA and Service buying commands. The Joint Staff used SITREPs to resolve weapon system or readiness spares problems during Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.

ACTION: No further action required.

Prepared by: Col Lyndi Balven, OUSD(AT&L)/DPAP, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD14828

U06331 /03

020 CMH

17 APR 03

417
1730

11-L-0559/OSD14829

11-L-0559/OSD14829

March 18, 2003 5:32 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
Michael Wynne

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Defense Contract Management Agency

Jaymie Durnan

4/28

Here is an analysis of the Defense Contract Management Agency the Joint Staff has completed. I have not read it.

Please review it and let the Chairman and me know if there is any particular action required.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/14/03 CJCS Action memo re: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART)
Assessment of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) [U03535/03]

DHR:dh
031803-9

.....
Please respond by 4/18/03

11-L-0559/OSD14829

U03535A / 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0999

ACTION MEMO

CN-838-03

14 March 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBH 3/14*

SUBJECT: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

- Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires a biennial assessment of the combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security.
- DCMA became a combat support agency on 27 March 2000. This is the first ever CSART of DCMA. The CSART determined that DCMA is ready to execute its mission to support the operating forces and is responsive to the current requirements of our combatant commands with minor shortfalls.
- I have forwarded the report to the relevant parties for information and have already directed the implementation of those report recommendations within my authority (TAB B). Attached for your information is a copy of the DCMA executive summary (TAB C).

RECOMMENDATION: Request your signature on the enclosed proposed memorandum (TAB A) forwarding the summary of findings for implementation.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8;

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DURRAN	4/20
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	6/3/17

11-L-0559/OSD14830

U03535 /03

A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
AGENCY

SUBJECT: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a biennial assessment of combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security.

The CSART conducted the DCMA assessment in calendar year 2002 that contains specific recommendations for improving DCMA readiness, and has my support for implementation. A summary of findings and recommendations is enclosed.

I commend the Director, DCMA, for the contingency contract administration support during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, which is a combat multiplier, releasing military members to perform critical battlefield functions. Addressees should provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an update on all recommendations within 3 months and a complete status prior to the next scheduled CSART assessment of DCMA in June 2004.

Attachments
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD14832

Copy to:

USD(P&R)

CJCS

CSA

CNO

CSAF

CMC

Commander, USCENTCOM

Commander, USEUCOM

Commander, USJFCOM

Commander, USNORTHCOM

Commander, USPACOM

Commander, USSOUTHCOM

Commander, USSOCOM

Commander, USSTRATCOM

Commander, USTRANSCOM

Director for Operations, Joint Staff

Director for Logistics, Joint Staff

Director for Operational Plans and
Joint Force Development, Joint
Staff

ENCLOSURE

DCMA SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
1.	Lack of full integration of DCMA functions at the combatant commands impedes DCMA's ability to execute its combat support mission.	<p>a. Educate the combatant and the component commands on DCMA's service offering and capabilities for contingency contract administration.</p> <p>b. Assign a representative to liaise with each combatant command to ensure DCMA is part of all planning and deployments.</p> <p>c. Increase liaison officer (LNO) engagement of component command staffs to coordinate issues germane to the combatant commander.</p> <p>d. Coordinate with Joint Staff, J3, to monitor timely receipt of deployment orders.</p> <p>e. Place DCMA as an addressee on all future planning orders for coordination or information.</p>	<p>Director, DCMA</p> <p>Director, DCMA</p> <p>Director, DCMA</p> <p>Director, DCMA Joint Staff, J3</p>
2.	DCMA's fill rate for military manpower is 75 percent of authorization.	<p>a. Coordinate with the Office of the USD(P&R) and the Services to assess the number of military authorizations necessary to achieve DCMA mission accomplishment using the Defense Agency Manpower Review Process. This review should include existing Service component contingency contracting capability, already committed to the combatant commander's OPLAN, to perform the Contingency Contract Administrative Support (CCAS) mission.</p> <p>b. Assess the impact of military fill rate on DCMA's ability to perform its CCAS missions and submit as a readiness deficiency, as appropriate.</p>	<p>USD(AT&L)</p> <p>Director, DCMA</p>
3.	Insufficient joint doctrine and policy concerning contractor support on the battlefield hampers the combatant commander's ability to efficiently employ and manage contractor assets in the area of responsibility.	a. In coordination with Joint Staff, J4, develop joint doctrine and procedures for contractor utilization on the battlefield and contingency contracting support, standardizing the terms of reference, definitions of responsibilities and employment.	Joint Staff, J7

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
3.	Continued	b. In coordination with Joint Staff, J4, develop joint doctrine and procedures that outline the roles and responsibilities for joint task force or theater special operations command when they are designated the operational lead.	Joint Staff, J7
4.	Lack of a process at the combatant command level impacts management of contractor and associated personnel information in the area of responsibility.	a. In coordination with principal contracting officers for the theater executive agent for contracting, predesignate the appropriate contract administration agent; DCMA or Service component for theater contracts in their OPLANs and CONPLANs. b. In coordination with the Joint Staff, J4, develop guidance for the CCAS teams to advise the joint commander within the AOR on contractor issues, visibility of contractors, and integration of contractor capability.	Combatant commanders Director, DCMA
5.	DCMA lacks an approved Agency Mission Essential Task List (AMETL) and associated metrics to objectively assess agency readiness to support contingency contracting missions and focus agency training.	Develop, approve and submit to the Joint Staff, J7, the AMETL and the metrics required to validate the missions.	Director, DCMA
6.	DCMA has not identified and trained sufficient personnel to meet DCMA's anticipated requirement for deployment of CCAS Teams.	a. Enforce an emergency essential clause as a condition of employment for employees in skills that are necessary for initial response team (IRT) and CCAS deployment. b. Review manning and equipment requirements for future IRT and CCAS missions (to include an assessment as to whether some CCAS missions can be accomplished using existing Service component contracting assets as a mean of mitigating possible manning and equipment shortfalls) and prepare to support them or identify the shortfall as a Joint Quarterly Readiness Report deficiency. c. Define unit type codes for the initial response and contingency contract administration support teams for utilization in the Global Status of Resources and Training database.	Director, DCMA Director, DCMA Director, DCMA

#	FINDING	RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY	LEAD ACTION
7.	DCMA CCAS teams require additional training on the Balkan Support Contract (BSC) before deployment to the AOR.	a. Review the length of the BSC training program and revise it as required to ensure administrative contract officers are fully trained on the BSC before deployment. b. Develop rotation policy that maximizes productive time that continues to be consistent with USEUCOM deployment policies for the AOR.	Director, DCMA Director, DCMA

B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-839-03
14 March 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List

Subject: 2002 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) Assessment of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

1. Title 10, United States Code, section 193, requires a biennial assessment of the combat support agencies' responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security. The CSART recently completed its assessment of DCMA.
2. DCMA is ready to execute its mission to support the operating forces as specified in current operations and concept plans, and is responsive to the current requirement of our combatant commands. A summary of the findings and the executive summary of the report have been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. Under CJCSI 3401.01C, 1 October 2002, combatant commanders should utilize the results of this assessment to support the assessment of DCMA's readiness to support respective commands.
3. The enclosed specific recommendations to improve DCMA's readiness have my full support for implementation. The Joint Staff has initiated actions as a result of the assessment. A copy of the final report is enclosed for your information; formal tasking from the Office of the Secretary of Defense will be provided later.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard B. Myers", is positioned above the printed name.

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD14838

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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Operations Deputy, US Air Force.....	1
Operations Deputy, US Marine Corps.....	1
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Director for Operations, Joint Staff.....	1
Director for Logistics, Joint Staff	1
Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff	1



COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCY REVIEW TEAM
ASSESSMENT OF THE



DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY

(20 Pages)

March – October 2002

Information Cutoff Date: 18 October 2002

11-L-0559/OSD14840

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	CHAPTER TITLE	PAGE
	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ii
I	CSART PURPOSE AND ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY	I-1
	PART 1 -- CSART Purpose and Authority	I-1
	PART 2 -- Assessment Methodology	I-2
II	DCMA PROFILE	II-1
III	FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	III-1
	PART 1 -- General	III-1
	PART 2 -- Findings and Recommendations	III-1
	CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS	III-1
	DELIBERATE AND CRISIS PLANNING SUPPORT	III-4
	EXERCISE AND TRAINING SUPPORT	III-7
	SECURITY COOPERATION SUPPORT	III-7
	CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT	III-7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCY REVIEW TEAM (CSART) 2002 REPORT ON THE DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA)

Combat Support Agency Review. The CSART assessed the readiness and responsiveness of the DCMA to support the operating forces under the authority granted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, section 193. DCMA is one of the seven designated combat support agencies that can be tasked to directly support a combatant commander. In the role of a combat support agency, DCMA provides in-theater contingency contract administration services to several ongoing operations. While contractor support on the battlefield allows uniformed personnel to concentrate on core military responsibilities, doctrine has not been fully developed. Contract administration provides the oversight necessary to assure that contractor support is performed to specification, and in a timely and agile manner. DCMA is the quality-control link between the combatant command and the contractor. One should note that combat support constitutes only about 5 percent of DCMA's mission; the agency's primary work is in support of the Defense acquisition community, an area of study beyond the purview of CSART.

Combat Readiness. DCMA is ready and responsive to provide contingency contracting with minor shortfalls. These include a lack of knowledge within the combatant commands about the services and capabilities offered by DCMA; insufficient doctrine and policy concerning the management of contracts and contractors on the battlefield; DCMA liaison; and contingency contract administration support (CCAS) team manning, equipping and training.

Combatant commands are generally unaware of DCMA's services and capabilities because they delegate contingency contract administration to a component command designated as an executive agent within the AOR. Additionally, at the component command level, only a small number of staff personnel are familiar with the services and support capabilities DMCA offers. DCMA needs a comprehensive plan for educating combatant and component commands about what support it brings to the battlefield.¹

Contingency Contract Support. DCMA provides direct support to combatant commands by administering external theater support contracts like the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and the Balkan Support Contract (BSC). DCMA administers these contracts upon the principal contract officer (PCO) delegating authority to DCMA. In coordination with the PCO, DCMA deploys tailored CCAS teams to an AOR. These teams rely heavily on the use of both military and civilian personnel assigned to other billets at

¹ *Defense Contract Management Agency CSART Internal Operation Assessment (IOA) Status Briefing, 13 May 2002.*

DCMA. However, the fill rate of military billets at DCMA is 75 percent, and the continuing demands of global operations stress the organization. The Defense Agency Manpower Review Process should be used to assess the level of fill necessary to accomplish the DCMA mission.

Conclusions. To improve its readiness and responsiveness, DCMA needs to improve combatant command knowledge of the services and capabilities offered by increasing the liaison between DCMA and the combatant and component commands. An aggressive education of customers about what contracts DCMA supports, what should be expected when DCMA supports a contract, and the development of a metrics system to measure the effect DCMA has on theater readiness will improve customer support. DCMA should also continue its progress in resolving the employment, manning, training, composition and equipping issues surrounding CCAS teams. Finally, there is a recognized need for joint doctrine to guide future operations.

CHAPTER I
CSART PURPOSE AND ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
PART 1 – CSART Purpose and Authority

Authority. CSART assessed the readiness and responsiveness of the DCMA to support the operating forces in accordance with title 10, United States Code, section 193. This law mandates three focus areas:

CSART Objective:
Make a determination with respect to the ***responsiveness and readiness*** of each agency to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security.

a. Combat Readiness. Paragraph 193(a) requires that "Periodically (and not less often than every two years) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on the combat support agencies." Each report shall include "a determination with respect to the responsiveness and readiness of each agency to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security;" and "any recommendations that the Chairman considers appropriate."¹ The law requires a review of "the plans of each such agency with respect to its support of operating forces in the event of a war or threat to national security..." and grants the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the authority to "take steps to provide for any revision of those plans that the Chairman considers appropriate."²

b. Participation in Joint Exercises. Paragraph 193(b) requires the Chairman to "provide for the participation of the combat support agencies in joint training exercises to the extent necessary to ensure that those agencies are capable of performing their support missions," and to "assess the performance in joint training exercises of each such agency," and to "take steps to provide for any change that the Chairman considers appropriate to improve that performance."³

c. Readiness Reporting System. Paragraph 193(c) requires the Chairman to "develop ... a uniform system for reporting to the Secretary of Defense, the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, and the Secretaries of the military departments concerning the readiness of each such agency to perform with respect to a war or threat to national security."⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.01C, 1 October 2002, "Chairman's Readiness System," directs combat support agencies to submit a Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR).

¹ Title 10, United States Code, Section 193, (a) (1).

² Ibid. (a) (2).

³ Ibid. (b)

⁴ Ibid. (c).

PART 2 – Assessment Methodology

Assessment Methodology. The CSART conducted its assessment in accordance with the procedures in CJCSI 3460.01, 14 January 2002, “Combat Support Agency Review Team Assessments.” Detailed findings and recommendations are contained in Chapter 3. The CSART visited selected combatant commands and the component commands tasked to be the executive agent for contingency contracting in the AOR. The combatant commands provided the over-arching view of operations in the AOR, while the component commands gave the corresponding contract sustainment and logistics perspective. The CSART also visited the PMs for the LOGCAP, AFCAP, and the BSC. These three contracts are the primary vehicles for logistics, infrastructure and sustainment support during contingency operations.

Assessment Areas. To arrive at an overall conclusion concerning DCMA readiness and responsiveness, the CSART assessed DCMA support of military operations of the combatant commanders in the following five assessment areas.

a. Contingency Operations Support. The CSART assessed DCMA support to ongoing or recent contingency operations as a primary indicator of the readiness of the agency to support similar operations. The CSART assessed DCMA support of Kosovo Force (KFOR), Sustainment Force (SFOR) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The CSART also evaluated the direct effect DCMA contract management had on the readiness of the combatant commands during contingency operations.

b. Deliberate and Crisis Planning Support. The CSART assessed DCMA support to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and combatant command planning, supporting plans and internal contingency plans and planning capability on the presumption that such an agency capability enhances their readiness to execute assigned missions.

c. Exercise and Training Support. The CSART assessed DCMA participation and performance in major exercises as an indicator of DCMA readiness to accomplish its mission in major combat operations. This included support and participation in combatant command, CJCS and internal exercises and training programs.

d. Security Cooperation Support. The CSART identified no security cooperation issues germane to DCMA’s mission.

e. Contingency Contracting Support. The CSART assessed the readiness and responsiveness of DCMA to support combatant command readiness in contingency contracting support, DCMA’s primary combat support mission.

CHAPTER II

DCMA PROFILE

DCMA Background. On 27 March 2000, DCMA was designated a combat support agency by the Secretary of Defense in DOD Directive 5105.64, 27 September 2000, "Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)." Prior to that time, DCMA was a subordinate command of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).¹ The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) provides oversight, supervision, direction, authority and control of DCMA.

a. The DCMA manages contracts awarded by the military Services, Defense agencies, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, other federal agencies and foreign governments that are delegated to the agency for administration. In its role as a combat support agency, DCMA provides CCAS to the combatant commands and their component commands across the full continuum of warfare, from humanitarian aid to major combat operations and from pre-contract award through the contract execution and closeout phases. Although DCMA is a combat support agency, roughly 5 percent of its mission is in direct support of the combatant commanders through CCAS and 95 percent of its mission support is to the defense acquisition community PEO and PMs. The agency's purpose is to minimize risks to customers associated with both internal and external factors that affect on-time delivery of conforming products and services within cost according to contractual requirements. DCMA manages over 320,000 prime contracts with current work valued at over \$850 billion.²

DCMA Mission Statement

"Provide Customer Focused Acquisition Support and Contract Management Services to Ensure Warfighter Readiness, 24/7, Worldwide."

b. DCMA was authorized 11,747 civilians full time equivalents (FTEs) and 625 military positions in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002. DCMA currently employs 10,823 civilians representing 92 percent of its FTE authorization and 471 military members, or 75 percent of its military authorization.³ The DCMA budget is approximately 90 percent appropriated funding and 10 percent reimbursable funding through foreign military sales (FMS) and other non-DOD customer support. The FY 2002 budget appropriation was \$927M and the FY 2003 budget request is for \$983M. Of the FY 2003 budget request, \$809M (82 percent) is dedicated to personnel funding. The DOD reimbursed DCMA

¹ Under Secretary of Defense memorandum, 1 October 2001, "Fiscal Year (FY) 2003-2007 Defense Contract Agency (DCMA) Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimates Submission (BES)"

² Defense Contract Management Agency Transformation Roadmap, undated, page 2.

³ Agency In-Brief for DCMA CSART, chart 8 (Manning), dated 11 June 2002.

\$1.2M to fund Operation ENDURING FREEDOM CCAS requirements during FY 2002. In October 2002, DCMA identified FY 2003 funding requirements of \$4.92M, including \$3.3M for CCAS support and \$1.6M for counterterrorism. The agency laid out the continuing requirement below for FY 2004-2009 due to an increase of requirements for deployed CCAS teams to support Counterterrorism and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM requirements:

FY	FY 2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009
TOTAL	\$4.3M	\$5.7M	\$7.2M	\$8.6M	\$9M	\$9.4M

Mission. DCMA ensures that the contract logistics and sustainment support of the operating forces are provided through contract administration. Contract administration is a mechanism for combatant commanders to leverage the full capability of contractor support to assist in completing a major portion of the logistical mission of a contingency operation. Due to military downsizing and complex technical military weapon systems, the combatant and component commanders rely on contractor support to perform many logistical functions on the battlefield. Leveraging contractors allows military personnel to concentrate on core military responsibilities. Contract administration provides the oversight necessary to assure the contractor support on the battlefield is performed to specification, in a timely manner, and provides the agility to negotiate supplemental changes to respond to unforeseen situations. DCMA is the link between the command and the contractor that ensures contractor responsiveness to the needs of the command. In support of the warfighter, DCMA's draft Mission Essential Task list includes:

a. **Contract Management Services.** DCMA contract management offices provide readiness information to buying agencies throughout the life of the contract. During the presolicitation phase of an acquisition, DCMA provides planning advice to help construct effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select capable contractors and write contracts that are easy to manage. After contract award, DCMA assesses contractors' systems to ensure they are controlling products, costs and schedules in compliance with the contract.⁴

b. **Readiness and Delivery.** DCMA supports the readiness of the combatant forces by using its in-plant presence in industry to assure on-time, accelerated and expedited delivery of mission-essential equipment to the warfighter.⁵ Through this supply chain linkage, DCMA enables warfighter readiness.

c. **Providing Industrial Analysis.** At the direction of the USD(AT&L), DCMA can provide the combatant commander information about the industrial base capability to support a contingency, planned or in execution. Based upon analysis results, logistics and operations can be linked to ensure supportability through contract accelerations or constraint imposition.

⁴ Defense Contract Management Agency Transformation Roadmap, undated, page2.

⁵ Ibid, page 15.

d. **CCAS.** DCMA's mission of administering select contingency contracts for logistics and sustainment directly supports the warfighter and constitutes its primary combat support mission. The combatant commanders, through OPLANs and CONPLANs, assign this mission to DCMA. DCMA executes its CCAS mission through review and update of deliberate plans as a member of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC), and through deployment of CCAS teams in response to a crisis.

(1) DCMA reviews OPLANs, CONPLANs and exercise plans to ensure resources (personnel and equipment) are available to meet the mission requirement. DCMA uses this information to evaluate training and deployment requirements for the personnel selected as CCAS team members. CCAS team members must be trained in contract administration as well as Basic Contingency Operations Training (BCOT) prior to deployment and they must be designated Emergency Essential (EE) DOD employees.⁶ The composition of the team is tailored to meet the requirements outlined by the combatant or component command when it is requested. DCMA has determined that the requirement for CCAS team support involves the fielding of teams to meet a scenario involving one major combat operation (MCO), two lesser regional conflicts, and three immediate response teams for two 6-month rotations.⁷

(2) Since 1993, DCMA (or the Defense Contract Management Command, DCMC, as they were designated while under DLA) has deployed more than 400 people in support of contingency operations.⁸ Currently, DCMA has 31 personnel deployed in support of ongoing contingency operations.⁹ Eighteen DCMA personnel are administering contracts worth \$442M to sustain Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in this FY alone.

<u>Currently Deployed</u>	
<u>Country</u>	<u># Deployed</u>
Bosnia	6
Kosovo	7
Kuwait	4
Qatar	1
Uzbekistan	3
Philippines	1
Afghanistan	6
Republic of Georgia	2
Djibouti	1
TOTAL	31
As of 25 October 2002	

(3) DCMA provides combatant and their component commands with contingency contracting support only to one of the three elements of contingency contracting: External theater support contracts. External theater support contracts are those in which the supporting headquarters is outside of the mission area (e.g., LOGCAP, AFCAP, emergency construction capabilities contract, Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the BSC, and War Reserve contracts).¹⁰

⁶ *Defense Contract Management Agency Directive 1 (The One Book), Chapter 13.1 (Draft), Readiness Reporting, June 2002.*

⁷ *Ibid*

⁸ *Agency In Brief, Support to Contingency Operations, 11 June 2002*

⁹ *Agency provided information, 25 October 2002.*

¹⁰ *Joint Publication 4.0, Joint Logistics, Chapter V, Contractors on the Battlefield, 6 April 2000.*

DCMA does not provide direct support to combatant commands for theater support¹¹ or in-theater systems support contracting.¹²

(4) Over the course of the SFOR, KFOR, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM contingencies, DCMA has administered logistics and sustainment contracts in support of combatant commands. The chart below provides information showing the depth of DCMA support to recent and ongoing operations.¹³

Organization. HQ DCMA is comprised of the following directorates: Contract Management Operations; Program Integration, Financial and Business Operations; Human Resources; Information Technology; Aircraft Operations; and the Special Staff. DCMA has three contract management districts: Defense Contract Management District East, Defense Contract Management District West, and Defense Contract Management District International. Each district office is responsible for contracts in their respective area.

DCMA SUPPORT TO ONGOING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS					
LOCATION	SCOPE OF WORK				
Contingency Operation Name of contract Supported combatant command	Contract start date	Contract total \$ value	# people (customers) served	Contractors	CCAS team size
SFOR Balkan Support Contract* USEUCOM	Nov-95	2.5B	3,124/day 8,260/day	6,127 10,939	6
KFOR Balkan Support Contract* USEUCOM	Nov-95	-	5,138/day	4,812	7
Operation Enduring Freedom LOGCAP USCENTCOM	Apr-02	19M	1,850	295	6
Operation Enduring Freedom LOGCAP USPACOM	Jan-02	20M	~1,300	381	1
Operation Enduring Freedom AFCAP USCENTCOM	Feb-02	403M	14	1	1

* Balkan Support Contract supports both Bosnia and Kosovo

a. The districts oversee 65 subordinate Contract Management Offices (CMOs) that are responsible for the work performed at over 900 operating locations worldwide. The CMOs manage contracts within specific geographic areas and within contractor's plants. Their management duties include daily, on-site surveillance of contractor processes, systems and program specific concerns that cannot be viewed by off-site agencies.¹⁴ The employees at the district offices provide readiness information to military buying agencies during the acquisition cycle and throughout the life of the contract.

¹¹ Theater Support Contracting refers to support given to the combatant commands from sources within the mission area or through pre-arranged host-nation support contracts with regional businesses or vendors (e.g. trash removal, fresh produce delivery, fuels, utilities, etc.).

¹² In-Theater Systems Support Contracting refers to contractors that support deployed forces with pre-arranged contracts awarded by Service Program Managers to meet specific system needs (e.g. Abrams Tank or Apache Helicopter contractor support, communications, or C2 infrastructure, etc.). In-Theater System Support Contracting is usually an arrangement made among a Program Manager, a manufacturer or maintenance provider, and a unit. The relationship is often habitual and DCMA does not administer these contracts.

¹³ Agency provided information.

¹⁴ Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 12 April 2002, "Defense Agency Performance Plans"

b. CCAS teams are the smallest elements within DCMA that provide a direct service as an entity to the combatant commands. Depending upon the scope of the operation, a CCAS team is tailored and may be as large as 33 people or as small as a single representative.¹⁵

¹⁵ DCMA Directive 1 (*The One Book*), Chapter 13.4.1, *Readiness Reporting, Chart 1*, dated June 2002 (Draft)

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART 1 - General

This chapter provides findings and recommendations concerning DCMA's readiness and responsiveness to the operating forces. The intent is to improve the readiness and responsiveness of DCMA to the warfighter. Combatant and/or supporting command contracting staffs and DCMA share responsibility to advise combatant commanders on the best means of managing all required contractor support in the AOR within their limited resources. Findings and recommendations in this assessment are based upon the review in each of the key functional areas identified in the assessment process.

PART II – Findings and Recommendations

The CSART finds that DCMA is ready and responsive to provide contingency contracting as required by combatant command OPLANs and CONPLANs with minor shortfalls. Chief among these shortfalls are: a lack of knowledge within the combatant commands with regard to the services and capabilities offered by DCMA; insufficient doctrine and policy concerning contractors on the battlefield and contract management; DCMA liaison with combatant commands; and CCAS team manning, equipping and training. Although these shortfalls do not create significant impediments to the support DCMA currently provides to the combatant commands, implementation of the recommendations associated with each finding should improve DCMA's level of support and visibility to the operating forces.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The CSART evaluated DCMA support to recent and on-going contingencies as an indicator of future performance and readiness. Based upon its findings, DCMA appears fully capable of supporting similar contingency operations. However, none of the recent or ongoing contingencies stressed DCMA capabilities as might be expected in the execution of a major combat operation based on current OPLANs. DCMA's impact on the readiness of the operating forces through its in-plant presence is not evident to combatant or component commands.

Finding Number 1: Lack of full integration of DCMA functions at the combatant commands impedes DCMA's ability to execute its combat support mission.

a. With the exception of a small group of staff officers, combatant and component command staffs are generally unaware of DCMA services and capabilities.¹ DCMA liaison with the combatant commands may take three forms: assignment of a liaison officer (LNO) at the headquarters; visits from the headquarters to combatant commands; or communication from the combatant command to DCMA headquarters or DCMA field office. At the component level, knowledge of DCMA capabilities resides principally in the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC), who holds the expertise to address issues related to contractors on the battlefield.

b. DCMA's rationale about which contracts will be administered is not well understood by the combatant or component commands. DCMA's combat support agency mission focuses on contingency contract administration of external theater contracts within the AOR such as LOGCAP, AFCAP and the BSC. Service components remain responsible for administration of contracts supporting permanent installations and construction contracts. Confusion results when a combatant or a component command requests DCMA assistance, but is denied because the command has requested assistance for something that is outside of DCMA's combat support agency mission. The commands do not understand the criteria DCMA applies to accepting or rejecting contract management taskings.

c. DCMA is not on routine distribution or invitation as a supporting agency on planning orders issued from the Joint Staff, J-3. As a result, DCMA representatives are not alerted to participate in and influence execution planning. For example, a DCMA representative was not present in preparation for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES. USPACOM and USARPAC believe this contributed to a 30-day delay in contract administration, risking contract cost overrun, quality control problems or contract default. The USPACOM order for joint task force (JTF) 510 directed the use of a LOGCAP contract for the operation, but the PCO for LOGCAP did not delegate the contract to DCMA until the contractor was already setting up in the Philippines. Although DCMA had an Initial Response Team (IRT) in the AOR when delegation was made, had a DCMA representative been present for planning, a faster delegation of contract authority could have been accomplished.

d. DCMA has not achieved efficient employment of LNOs across the Joint Staff and combatant commands to meet operational requirements. DCMA has established liaison officer positions at four of the five geographic combatant commands and at the Joint Staff. USSOUTHCOM currently has no LNO authorized, but has recently requested one be established. The LNOs do not routinely engage the PARCs, who are critical to DCMA success,

¹ Multiple interviews at geographic combatant and component command headquarters, August-October 2002.

as outlined in DCMA guidance to the LNOs.² LNOs at the combatant command provide their greatest value to the PARCs in the close and regular coordination of actions across the components. Additionally, USJFCOM has requested DCMA participation, in addition to the LNO already assigned there, to help shape the future of logistics as USJFCOM plots the course for the Defense Department Transformation in concert with Joint Vision 2020.

e. Recommendations

(1) Director, DCMA

(a) Educate the combatant and the component commands on DCMA's service offering and capabilities for contingency contract administration.

(b) Assign a representative to liaise with each combatant command to ensure DCMA is part of all planning and deployments.

(c) Increase LNO engagement of component command staffs to coordinate issues germane to the combatant commander.

(d) Coordinate with Joint Staff, J-3, to monitor timely receipt of deployment orders.

(2) The Joint Staff, J-3, place DCMA as an addressee on all future planning orders for coordination or information.

Finding Number 2: DCMA's fill rate for military manpower is 75 percent of authorization.

a. For combat support agencies to be ready and responsive to combatant commands, they must be provided adequate personnel resources. DCMA relies heavily upon its military members to take on leadership roles in a combatant command AOR and to be prepared to deploy with little or no notice. In the

event a civilian volunteer is unable to meet deployment timelines, whether for medical or professional reasons, military manpower is used to fill the gap. DCMA's military fill rate as of 16 June 2002 was 75 percent.³

Fill Rates by Service			
Service	Authorized	Assigned	%
Army	126	112	89
Navy	118	86	73
Marine Corps	15	13	87
Air Force	374	258	69
TOTAL	633	469	75

² DCMA Liaison Officer Guidebook, undated.

³ Agency provided information.

b. A review of the authorizations in the above table indicates that DCMA is authorized 633 military manpower authorizations (Army, 19.91 percent; Navy, 18.64 percent; Air Force, 59.08 percent and Marine Corps, 2.37 percent). Air Force has the largest percentage and fills all DCMA commander authorizations at 100 percent and fills the remainder of the DCMA authorizations at the same level as operational major commands.

c. The Defense Agency Manpower Review Process should be utilized to assess the number of military authorizations necessary for DCMA mission accomplishment. A marginal increase in Service component capability could, in some cases, provide comparable service at less cost and with fewer military resources. Services should have the opportunity to participate in this process.

d. Recommendations

(1) USD(AT&L) coordinate with the Services and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to assess the number of military authorizations necessary to achieve DCMA mission accomplishment using the Defense Agency Manpower Review Process. This review should include existing Service component contingency contracting capability, already committed to the combatant commander's OPLAN, to perform the CCAS mission.

(2) Director, DCMA, assess the impact of military fill rate on DCMA's ability to perform its CCAS missions and submit as a readiness deficiency, as appropriate.

DELIBERATE AND CRISIS PLANNING SUPPORT

Deliberate and crisis planning is a core competency of all combat support agencies. DCMA is specifically assigned tasks in USPACOM OPLANs only. Some missions from the combatant commands have evolved to DCMA from DLA with the reorganization and the OPLANs or CONPLANs are in the process of being updated to reflect DCMA appropriately. DCMA does not have a comprehensive plan for educating combatant and component commands regarding the services and capabilities the agency brings to the warfighter.

While DCMA believes that its industrial base analysis capability is of great use to the combatant commands, the combatant commands do not utilize this capability and do not acknowledge its requirement. The industrial base analysis capability supports the title 10 responsibilities of the Services and the Department of Defense, indirectly supporting the combatant commands.

Finding Number 3: Insufficient joint doctrine and policy concerning contractor support on the battlefield hinders the combatant commanders' ability to efficiently employ and manage contractor assets in the AOR.

a. Joint Publication 4.0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, Chapter V, "Contractors on the Battlefield," provides the combatant commander and the Services with doctrinal materiel relevant to contingency contracting, but it does not provide a framework under which the combatant commands and Services should model contracting doctrine, policies and planning. This inefficiency does not allow for full synchronization of all assets available to the combatant commander within the AOR. Furthermore, doctrine is yet to be defined for the role of contractors in support of Homeland Defense.

b. There is insufficient doctrine delineating responsibilities and procedures in an AOR when Special Operations Forces are tasked by the combatant commander to be the operational lead with one of the Services as the executive agent for support.⁴ Future operations will increasingly require USSOCOM to perform a lead role in the war on terrorism. When operating in such a role, USSOCOM requires ready access to LOGCAP and AFCAP contract tools. For example, USPACOM recently placed its Special Operations component in the lead for the operation, but tasked USARPAC to provide support. JTF 510 was operating without support doctrine and passed requirements directly to the contractor that had not been vetted by USARPAC. Without joint doctrine to lay out responsibilities for support and requirement validation, the JTF places requirements on the supporting Service component command to resource.

c. Recommendations. Joint Staff, J-7, in coordination with the Joint Staff, J-4:

(1) Develop joint doctrine and procedures for contractor utilization on the battlefield and contingency contracting support, standardizing the terms of reference, definitions of responsibilities and employment.

(2) Develop joint doctrine and procedures that outline the roles and responsibilities for JTF or theater special operation command when they are designated the operational lead.

Finding Number 4: Lack of a process at the combatant command level impacts management of contractor and associated personnel information in the area of responsibility.

⁴ Interviews, USPACOM and US Army Pacific, October 2002.

a. The lack of overall visibility of contracts or contractors operating in the AOR creates force protection and other support risks for the combatant commander.⁵ For example, contractors often arrive at military installations in the AOR utilizing the support (e.g., dining or medical) facilities without prior coordination with the combatant commander. With no visibility of the contractors authorized to use these facilities, commanders risk expending their resources to serve contractors who may not be authorized support or who may be in the AOR without proper authority. Combatant commanders assume responsibility for the protection of all US civilians. Such support and protection requirements increase mission requirements and ultimately, force structure requirements. In addition, casualties to contractor personnel can cause political repercussions on mission accomplishment. With no means to identify what contractors are in the AOR, commanders cannot adequately provide the necessary force protection.

b. Poor visibility of contracts or contractors at the combatant command staff level leads to inefficient use of resources in the AOR.⁶ Contractors in the AOR bring capabilities and capacities that could be cross-leveled between areas of need if these qualities are cataloged. Because the combatant command staff does not have centralized visibility of the contracts or contractors employed by the Service component commands, contractors in the AOR may be providing redundant services and capabilities, or they could be in competition with each other for limited resources. Government-furnished equipment or equipment procured by the contractor at government expense is not visible to the combatant commander either. Because there is limited oversight of the equipment, finding the excess equipment capabilities in the AOR for redistribution is a time-consuming task requiring each component command to make its own assessment and provide the information to the combatant command staff.

c. The lack of combatant or component command PCO decisions to pre-designate either DCMA or an appropriate component contract management capability within the AOR, contributes to the lack of command visibility and hinders both DCMA and the component's readiness to respond.

d. Recommendations

(1) Combatant commanders, in coordination with PCOs for the theater executive agent for contracting, pre-designate the appropriate contract administration agent; DCMA or Service component for theater contracts in their OPLANs and CONPLANs.

⁵ Multiple interviews at geographic combatant and component command headquarters, August-October 2002.

⁶ Interviews, USEUCOM, 24 September 2002.

(2) Director, DCMA, in coordination with the Joint Staff, J4, develop guidance for the CCAS teams to advise the joint commander within the AOR on contractor issues, visibility of contractors, and integration of contractor capability.

EXERCISE AND TRAINING SUPPORT

DCMA's internal training must fully support its assigned wartime and contingency missions. The CSART evaluated DCMA's participation in CJCS and combatant command exercises to determine the degree to which the agency's participation supports the wartime mission and to gain insights into the agency's ability to perform its mission. DCMA participates in these exercises by providing advisors to Service contracting officers, responding to queries from combatant commands, or by deploying with Service personnel to administer contracts.

Finding Number 5: DCMA lacks an approved Agency Mission Essential Task List (AMETL) and associated metrics to objectively assess agency readiness to support contingency contracting missions and focus agency training.

a. DCMA does not have an approved AMETL or metrics to measure its ability to perform the combat support mission. CJCSI 3500.01B, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, requires all combat support agencies (CSAs) develop an AMETL and supporting metrics. While the AMETL is in draft, DCMA cannot validate its stage of internal readiness to respond to combatant command requirements based on quantifiable standards for contingency contracting.

b. Recommendation. Director, DCMA, develop, approve, and submit to the Joint Staff, J-7, the AMETL and metrics required to validate its missions.

SECURITY COOPERATION SUPPORT

The CSART views the security cooperation support missions assigned in concert with the combatant command's regional security cooperation strategy as a core assessment area in the agency's combat support mission. However, the combatant commands assigned DCMA no missions in their theater engagement plans. The CSART did not identify any findings in this area.

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT

The CSART assessed the ability of DCMA to administer large and complex contracts in support of combatant commander requirements as directed in OPLANs and CONPLANs. Because combatant commanders task component

commands as executive agents for contract support in an AOR, the CSART visited component commands that are responsible for logistics and sustainment contract support, in addition to combatant commands. DCMA's primary contingency contract support is in the LOGCAP, AFCAP and BSC administration. DCMA has deployed, on an average, 45-50 personnel annually since 1993 on CCAS missions. Even at higher rates and with appropriate management and training, DCMA should be able to meet anticipated requirements within current manpower levels.

Finding Number 6: DCMA has not identified and trained sufficient personnel to meet DCMA's anticipated requirement for deployment of CCAS teams.

a. While DCMA can meet current and imminent requirements, the possibility remains that the continuing demand of world-wide operations could exceed the number of qualified personnel available for deployment as CCAS team members. More emergency essential clause personnel need to be identified and made available in order to ensure adequate support to combatant commands in the future. DCMA's reliance on volunteers to fill CCAS teams poses a threat to DCMA's readiness to support combatant commands. In accordance with DCMA Directive 1 ("The One Book") policy, civilian personnel must sign an Emergency Essential (EE) agreement to be members of a CCAS team.⁷ DCMA does not enforce this policy, as there are no EE personnel currently on the roster. Because of this, at any stage of the deployment process, the CCAS volunteers can change their mind and decide to pull themselves from the deployment. Fortunately, to date, DCMA has not failed to respond to any command mission requirement. However, the DCMA estimates that the worst-case deployment scenario will require a pool of at least 150 personnel prepared to deploy at any time.⁸ This is approximately 1 percent of the DCMA current authorized (FTE) strength. DCMA further estimates that it has only 100 volunteers on standby.⁹ As Operation ENDURING FREEDOM expands, the number of potential external theater support contracts is also expanding to a point where DCMA's current pool 100 of volunteers is likely to be insufficient. If DCMA were called upon by the combatant commands to deploy all of the CCAS teams that are being proposed for the war on terrorism, the agency would not be able to continue manning existing contingencies or respond to new contingencies without a concerted effort to solicit and train additional personnel from within DCMA manpower.

b. DCMA lacks the equipment required to sustain CCAS teams when deployed, placing the burden on combatant and component commands. Current documentation authorizing individual equipment does not exist to

⁷ DCMA Directive 1 (*The One Book*), Chapter 13.5.1, *Deployment Process*, June 2002 (Draft)

⁸ DCMA Directive 1 (*The One Book*), Chapter 13.1.4, *Readiness Reporting Chart 1*, June 2002 (Draft)

⁹ Agency interview, 16 October 2002.

support these teams. DCMA does not maintain a central issue facility to outfit deploying uniformed or civilian personnel with individual equipment required for deployment to an AOR. DCMA requests equipment through the component command responsible for contracting in the AOR, resulting in unplanned tasks on subordinate units. DCMA also lacks organic vehicles, generators, and unit equipment necessary for deployment and life sustainment.

c. DCMA has not submitted any Unit Type Codes (UTCs) in either the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) or time-phased force deployment data listings for any DCMA elements. This shortfall deprives the warfighter of critical readiness and planning information. It is incumbent upon DCMA to define the organization, structure, capability, and equipment of the CCAS teams beyond that which may be specified in OPLANs and CONPLANs and to prepare the appropriate UTCs and desired operational capability (DOC) documents for its initial response and CCAS teams.

d. Recommendations. Director, DCMA:

(1) Enforce an EE clause as a condition of employment for employees in skills that are necessary for IRT and CCAS deployment.

(2) Review manning and equipment requirements for future IRT and CCAS missions (to include an assessment as to whether some CCAS missions can be accomplished using existing Service component contracting assets as a mean of mitigating possible manning and equipment shortfalls) and prepare to support them or identify the shortfall as a Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR) deficiency.

(3) Define UTCs for the initial response and contingency contract administration support teams for utilization in the GSORTs database.

Finding Number 7: DCMA CCAS teams require additional training on the BSC before deployment to the AOR.

a. The level of training for first-time deploying contract administrators of the BSC is insufficient and results in a 2-month on-the-job learning phase. The USAREUR philosophy regarding the BSC is to minimize disruption of services by maintaining Brown and Root, Inc., and the Army Corps of Engineers as the prime contractor and PCO, respectively. The BSC has been in place since 1995 and has been modified and expanded to the point where it is voluminous and complex.¹⁰

¹⁰ Interview, Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Program Center, Winchester, Virginia, 17 September 2002.

b. A 2000 GAO study found training of contract administration personnel to be insufficient and recommended increased training, specifically on the BSC, for deploying units and for Administrative Contracting Officers.¹¹ CCAS team member deployment training is 21 days long, of which only 4 days are dedicated to the BSC contract.¹² The PCO and the USAREUR staff find that during the initial phase of the deployment, contract oversight is not as stringent as it was when an experienced CCAS team is in place because new people lack familiarity with the BSC.

c. The deployment duration of CCAS teams results in frequent replacement of trained team members with first-time deploying contract administrators. DCMA CCAS teams are activated for 179-day tours. The approximately 21 days of training and deployment processing to in-process and out-process the teams from the AOR are counted against the tour length, leaving approximately 158 days in theater. Following a 2000 GAO study recommendation, DCMA has offset deployment cycles to help stabilize the level of support in the Balkans.¹³ However, the rotations every 2 to 3 months create noticeable changes in contract administration depending on the experience level of the deployed team members.¹⁴ At the discretion of USEUCOM, an individual deploying to the AOR can be placed in a temporarily change of station status for a period of up to 3 years.

d. Recommendations. Director, DCMA:

- (1) Review the length of the BSC training program and revise it as required to ensure administrative contract officers are fully trained on the BSC before deployment.
- (2) Develop rotation policy that maximizes productive time that continues to be consistent with USEUCOM deployment policies for the AOR.

¹¹ *United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Report #GAO/NSIAD-00-225, "Contingency Operations, Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans", page 26, dated September, 2000.*

¹² *Agency interview, 16 October 2002.*

¹³ *United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Report #GAO/NSIAD-00-225, "Contingency Operations, Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans", page 26, dated September, 2000.*

¹⁴ *Interviews at US Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Program Center, Winchester, Virginia, 17 September 2002; and US Army Europe, 25 September 2002.*

C

TAB B

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCY REVIEW TEAM (CSART) 2002 REPORT ON THE DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA)

Combat Support Agency Review. The CSART assessed the readiness and responsiveness of the DCMA to support the operating forces under the authority granted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, section 193. DCMA is one of the seven designated combat support agencies that can be tasked to directly support a combatant commander. In the role of a combat support agency, DCMA provides in-theater contingency contract administration services to several ongoing operations. While contractor support on the battlefield allows uniformed personnel to concentrate on core military responsibilities, doctrine has not been fully developed. Contract administration provides the oversight necessary to assure that contractor support is performed to specification, and in a timely and agile manner. DCMA is the quality-control link between the combatant command and the contractor. One should note that combat support constitutes only about 5 percent of DCMA's mission; the agency's primary work is in support of the Defense acquisition community, an area of study beyond the purview of CSART.

Combat Readiness. DCMA is ready and responsive to provide contingency contracting with minor shortfalls. These include a lack of knowledge within the combatant commands about the services and capabilities offered by DCMA; insufficient doctrine and policy concerning the management of contracts and contractors on the battlefield; DCMA liaison; and contingency contract administration support (CCAS) team manning, equipping and training.

Combatant commands are generally unaware of DCMA's services and capabilities because they delegate contingency contract administration to a component command designated as an executive agent within the AOR. Additionally, at the component command level, only a small number of staff personnel are familiar with the services and support capabilities DMCA offers. DCMA needs a comprehensive plan for educating combatant and component commands about what support it brings to the battlefield.¹

Contingency Contract Support. DCMA provides direct support to combatant commands by administering external theater support contracts like the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and the Balkan Support Contract (BSC). DCMA administers these contracts upon the principal contract officer (PCO) delegating authority to DCMA. In coordination with the PCO,

¹ *Defense Contract Management Agency CSART Internal Operation Assessment (IOA) Status Briefing, 13 May 2002.*

DCMA deploys tailored CCAS teams to an AOR. These teams rely heavily on the use of both military and civilian personnel assigned to other billets at DCMA. However, the fill rate of military billets at DCMA is 75 percent, and the continuing demands of global operations stress the organization. The Defense Agency Manpower Review Process should be used to assess the level of fill necessary to accomplish the DCMA mission.

Conclusions. To improve its readiness and responsiveness, DCMA needs to improve combatant command knowledge of the services and capabilities offered by increasing the liaison between DCMA and the combatant and component commands. An aggressive education of customers about what contracts DCMA supports, what should be expected when DCMA supports a contract, and the development of a metrics system to measure the effect DCMA has on theater readiness will improve customer support. DCMA should also continue its progress in resolving the employment, manning, training, composition and equipping issues surrounding CCAS teams. Finally, there is a recognized need for joint doctrine to guide future operations.

D

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

USD(AT&L)	Hon M. Wynne	Briefed on 10 Jan 03
HQ DCMA	BG E. Harrington	Briefed on 13 Dec 02
USA	COL R. Wright, (b)(6)	6 Dec 02
USN	CAPT D. Thompson, (b)(6)	10 Dec 02
USAF	COL R. Richburg, (b)(6)	24 Jan 03
USMC	COL M. Bultemeier, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
USEUCOM	CAPT R. Parker, (b)(6)	9 Dec 02
USCENTCOM	COL B. Perry, (b)(6)	6 Dec 02
USPACOM	COL K. Andrews, (b)(6)	6 Dec 02
USSOCOM	COL T. Blume, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
USJFCOM	CAPT D. Deets, (b)(6)	10 Dec 02
USSTRATCOM	COL J. Curtis, (b)(6)	26 Nov 02
USNORTHCOM	RADM D. Stone, (b)(6)	5 Dec 02
USTRANSCOM	Ms. G. Jorgenson, GS14, (b)(6)	3 Dec 02
USSOUTHCOM	COL R. Diaz, (b)(6)	3 Dec 02
Joint Staff, J-1	COL J. Mulvenna, (b)(6)	21 Nov 02
Joint Staff, J-2	Mr. T. McNeil, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
Joint Staff, J-3	COL W. Davis, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
Joint Staff, J-4	COL M. Stine, (b)(6)	2 Dec 02
Joint Staff, J-5	CAPT D. McClain, (b)(6)	22 Nov 02
Joint Staff, J-6	Mr. C. Franz, GS15, (b)(6)	26 Nov 02
Joint Staff, J-7	COL B. Russell, (b)(6)	4 Dec 02
CJCS Legal Counsel	COL K. Wheaton, (b)(6)	3 Dec 02

Tab D

263
18320 Snowflake

LE

LT-4873

April 11, 2003 3:01 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Recruiting Arabic Speakers

Have we thought about using Arabic-speaking retired American police officers and military for security service in Iraq?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041103-17

.....
Please respond by 4/18/03

RESPONSE ATTACHED 4/23

✓12

Sharon:

CC: DSD- 4/25/03

cc: Dr. Chu

Jaymie Duman

11-L-0559/CSD 14866

U06405-103

0914

11 Apr 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 30 2003

The Honorable Jaroslav Tvrdik
Minister of Defence
Czech Republic

Dear Minister Tvrdik:

I received your letter of March 21. I want to thank you for your leadership, and tell you that we appreciate the strong support of the Czech Republic and your troops in the Middle East.

Paul Wolfowitz recently met with Foreign Minister Svoboda. They have some good ideas on how we might work together for the reconstitution of Iraq.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

U06523 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14867

CZECH REPUBLIC

30 APR 03

S A R A H D I S K E T T E T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
R E L E A S I N G D O C U M E N T

CREATION DATE: 090403
CREATION TIME: 08090000
SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03
MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME: DONALD H. RUMSFELD
ORG: OUSDP/EUR/ISP OFFICE: OSD PHONE: 695-7100
TOC FILE CRC: 19216

FILENAME	MSG TYPE	PREC CLASS	ACTION GROUP	DATE/TIME	FILETIME SSN	TOT/ TOR	SPECAT CIC	CRC
PRAGUE	DD173	RR	UU	REDY	300809ZAPR03		ZYUW N	11509

OUSDP/EUR/ISP OSD 695-7100
ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER


DONALD H. RUMSFELD

APR 30 2003

U06523 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14868

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 300809Z APR 03

PAGE 01 of 02

Drafter's Name : DORIS M. JACKSON, ADMIN ASST
Office/Phone : EUR/POL/, 697-6538

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. RUMS, SECDE, OSD, -7100

Action Prec : ROUTINE
Info Prec : ROUTINE
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
To: USDAO PRAGUE//
Info: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//
USDAO PRAGUE//
SECDEF WASHINGTON//USDP//ADMIN//
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//EUR/ISP//

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE TVRDIK. REQUEST THAT
USDAO FORWARD TEXT OF LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JAROSLAV TVRDIK.
ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER TO FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE JAROSLAV TVRDIK
MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

DEAR MINISTER TVRDIK:

(PARA) I RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF MARCH 21. I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR
YOUR LEADERSHIP, AND TELL YOU THAT WE APPRECIATE THE STRONG SUPPORT
OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND YOUR TROOPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

(PARA) PAUL WOLFOWITZ RECENTLY MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SVOBODA.
THEY HAVE SOME GOOD IDEAS ON HOW WE MIGHT WORK TOGETHER FOR THE
RECONSTITUTION OF IRAQ.

(PARA) WITH BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,
(SIGNED) DONALD H. RUMSFELD

3. END TEXT

4. POC FOR THIS CABLE IS STEPHEN WENTWORTH EUR POLICY/ISP, COMM: 703
697-9258,

UNCLASSIFIED

U06523 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14869

UNCLASSIFIED


DTG: 300809Z APR 03

PAGE 02 of 02

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD14870

April 16, 2003 6:42 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
 SUBJECT: Letter to Czech MoD

Please look at this letter. It is poorly positioned on the page. It is not terribly elegant, and I don't have the vaguest idea what "lustrating" means, nor do I think "democratizing post-Saddam Iraq" is the way to phrase it.

Why don't we rewrite it and properly position it on the paper.


Thanks.

Attach.

3/28/03 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef re: Letter of Support from Czech MoD Tvrdik

DHR dh
 041603-2

.....
 Please respond by 4/28/03





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Jaroslav Tvrdik
Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic

Dear Minister Tvrdik:

Thank you for your letter. The political and military support of the Czech Republic has been helpful as we undertake operations to disarm Saddam and liberate Iraq.

Paul Wolfowitz had a good conversation with Foreign Minister Svoboda recently regarding lustrating and democratizing post-Saddam Iraq. I hope you'll give some thought to how the Czech Republic might help with this.

Sincerely,

Recurite



11-L-0559/OSD14872



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 2003 MAY -5 PM 9:03
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO



April 29, 2003, 8:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

SUBJECT: Snowflake - Hiring Iraqi Translators

- You asked that we provide a copy of the letter that the Director of OPM signed providing instructions on what actions must be completed before we could hire Iraqi translators. A copy of the OPM letter is attached at Tab A. Your snowflake is at Tab B.
- You asked that we confirm that it took OPM two-weeks to respond to our request. We have verified that OPM was initially contacted for assistance on February 12. The OPM Director signed the response back to the Department on February 25.

RECOMMENDATION: None. This is for information only.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Ginger Groeber, DUSD(CPP)

(b)(6)



U06691-03

11-L-0559/OSD14873

091.4

2 May 03

TAB

A



UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20416-1000

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

FEB 25 2003

The Honorable David S.C. Chu
Under Secretary of Defense
For Personnel and Readiness
4000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-4000

Dear Dr. Chu:

The employment of non-citizens is an important policy issue for the Nation. In recognition of the related national defense issues, I am approving a request submitted by your Deputy Under Secretary for Civilian Personnel Policy. This approval will allow you to appoint non-citizen, Arabic linguists when qualified U.S. citizens are not available.

This letter amends your Interagency Delegated Examining agreement and provides the authority for the Department of Defense (DoD) to approve the hiring of non-citizens under Schedule A 213.3102(bb). This authority can assist DoD in its efforts to recruit Arabic-speaking individuals needed for linguistic support.

In order to use the Schedule A 213.3102(bb) authority, you must first use competitive examining procedures (including public notice). If you find no qualified citizens available to fill the competitive service position, and if the individual meets the requirements of Immigration Law (i.e., authorized to live and work in the United States), you may hire the non-citizen under 5 CFR 213.3102 (bb). When filling a position in this manner, you must withdraw it from the competitive service for the period it is filled by the non-citizen. The excepted appointment does not give the employee eligibility for any other job. He or she may not be promoted or reassigned to a position in the competitive service, except in situations where a qualified citizen is not available and another Schedule A appointment is used. In these situations, you must apply competitive procedures again.

When granting approval under the Schedule A 213.3102(bb) authority, you must ensure that the search of all likely recruitment sources for qualified U.S. citizens was both diligent and thorough. In practical terms, this means looking beyond just the vacancy announcement and length of time it was posted. You should also give consideration to whether the agency or component conducted any targeted recruitment efforts (e.g., in trade journals, among the faculty of colleges and universities, in communities, etc.).

11-L-0559/OSD14875

Dr. David S.C. Chu

2

In addition to the Schedule A 213.3102(bb) authority, you have several options for hiring individuals with Arab language and culture skills. Options for hiring U.S. citizens with these skills include:


1. Competitive examining;
2. The Federal Career Intern Program;
3. The Student Career Experience Program;
4. 213.3102(r), which allows you to hire individuals in fellowship and intern programs such as the National Security Education Program (NSEP). This program awards fellowships to graduate students to study less commonly studied foreign areas, languages, and other international fields critical to U.S. national security. NSEP fellows are required to work for the Federal government or in the field of higher education--in an area related to the study funded by NSEP; or
5. Contracting with private firms for these services.

In your search for individuals with the required language skills, I strongly encourage you to first consider all available sources of Arabic-speaking U.S. citizens. In the event you do not find any Arabic-speaking U.S. citizens, additional options for hiring non-citizens with language skills include:

1. 213.3102(o), which allows you to appoint bona fide faculty members for up to 130 working days per year to scientific, professional, or analytical positions;
2. Hiring these individuals as experts under 5 CFR 304; or
3. 213.3102(i)(2), which allows you to make 30 day appointments when a critical need exists, pending completion of competitive examining, clearances, etc. Agencies may extend these appointments for an additional 30 days.

The Office of Personnel Management is pleased to assist DoD in its efforts to partner with the Arab-American community as a way to combat terrorism. If you have any questions, please have your staff contact Ms. Ellen E. Tunstall at 202-606-8097.

Sincerely,



Kay Coles James
Director

**U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT****OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR**

1900 E STREET, ROOM 5A09

WASHINGTON, DC 20415

TELEPHONE: (202) 606-1000

(b)(6)

TO: DAVID CHU DATE: 2-25-03FAX #: (b)(6) PAGES: 3 INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET.
2/26FROM: ☒ Director Kay Coles James
☐ Jackie Cunningham, Secretary
☐ Dawn Hively, Deputy Chief of Staff
☐ Janet Schmautz, Scheduler
☐ Robert Beals, Special Assistant

SUBJECT: _____

COMMENTS:

TAB

B

April 4, 2003 3:57 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Programmatic Differences

Please make sure you get a copy of that letter and tell me for sure if it was two weeks and a two-page letter, as this memo says.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/3/03 "Examples of Programmatic Differences Between DoD and OPM"

DHR:dh
040403-14

.....

Please respond by 4/15/03

:

U06700-03

11-L-0559/OSD14879

Examples of Programmatic Differences Between DoD and OPM

DoD Linguists. Faced with a need to hire foreign national linguists in preparation for the rebuilding of Iraq, DoD went to OPM for approval. After two weeks DoD received a two page letter outlining the things the Department couldn't do and what level of proof needed to be met before it could apply the new authority. Consequently, DoD has used a contractor to hire the necessary linguists rather than using the OPM authority.

Additional One Percent Pay Increase to 2003 Civilian Pay. The 2003 Treasury Appropriations Act contained an additional one percent pay increase for civilian employees that the Administration did not request. DoD believed that the additional pay increase should be in the form of base pay rather than locality pay to increase the amount we can pay local national employees in foreign areas where DoD is prohibited by the Defense Appropriations Act from paying them more than US employees receive. This is an issue that is a substantial irritant in relations with Portugal and Spain. OPM and OMB decided to put the increase in the form of locality pay reflecting the preferences of other agencies. (Additionally, OPM used the dollar value of the entire civilian employee population for the increase, (i.e. including those overseas) so employees in civilian agencies received well over one percent in many locality areas!)

OCONUS Locality Pay. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) told the Department in 2001, that it was going to support changes to overseas pay that would require payment of locality pay to employees overseas. This was brought on by State Department (DOS) indications that it could not recruit senior DOS employees to serve overseas due to the cut in pay they would take by not having locality pay. Implementation of locality pay overseas would increase payroll cost for DoD by about \$50M per year. DoD did not need this change, but OPM nonetheless indicated its intent to proceed.

See for k
Change 0

April 3, 2003



April 4, 2003 3:57 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Programmatic Differences

Please make sure you get a copy of that letter and tell me for sure if it was two weeks and a two-page letter, as this memo says.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/3/03 "Examples of Programmatic Differences Between DoD and OPM"

DHR:dh
040403-14

.....

Please respond by 4/15/03

091.7

4 Apr 03

U06700-03

11-L-0559/OSD14881

Examples of Programmatic Differences Between DoD and OPM

DoD Linguists. Faced with a need to hire foreign national linguists in preparation for the rebuilding of Iraq, DoD went to OPM for approval. After two weeks DoD received a two page letter outlining the things the Department couldn't do and what level of proof needed to be met before it could apply the new authority. Consequently, DoD has used a contractor to hire the necessary linguists rather than using the OPM authority.

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Get back to
Change 0

April 3, 2003

April 21, 2003 9:00 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Patriot Missile Batteries

Should we be leaving some of the Patriot missile batteries in the Middle East as pre-positioned rather than pulling them all out?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042103-14

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

471.98

21APR03

03 APR 11
11-L-055970 OSD14883

U06725 /03
Tab A

TAB A

April 15, 2003 12:27 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Doug Feith
Andy Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CENTCOM AOR

Let's think about adding to CENTCOM the following countries: Syria, Israel, Lebanon, India, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041503-18

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD14884

U06738 /03

03 APR 10 31


CENTCOM

15 APR 03



May 1, 2003 3:37 PM

TO: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Ideas

What do we do to fix the National Training Center? It is so Europe-oriented.

What do we do to fix the schools in the Army, Navy and Air Force so they get joint at an earlier stage?

Any thoughts?

If you want some ideas, you might want to talk to Jay Garner. He is a fountain of ideas.

Thanks

DHR dlh
050103-27

.....
Please respond by _____

352

May 03

May 1, 2003 3:37 PM

TO: ADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Ideas

What do we do to fix the National Training Center? It is so Europe-oriented.

What do we do to fix the schools in the Army, Navy and Air Force so they get joint at an earlier stage?

Any thoughts?

If you want some ideas, you might want to talk to Jay Garner. He is a fountain of ideas.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2498

IN REPLY REFER TO:
6 August 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Ideas

1. The fix for the National Training Center (NTC) is to embed it in the Joint National Training Capability, which we are doing as quickly as we can. This will allow it to transcend its European Air-Land Battle heritage as we combine it with virtual, simulated and life training venues and audiences to tackle the new warfighting challenges we face. Joint Forces Command, partnering with the Services and David Chu and Paul Mayberry are all over this. We originally had our first event at the National Training Center scheduled for May, but have rescheduled it for later this year due to ongoing operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and lack of forces.
2. As for getting more jointness earlier in Service schools, a possible solution is to embed Phase II Joint Professional Military Education in all of the junior and senior Service school curricula. The Chairman and I have talked about just such a possibility. I am pursuing options with him.
3. I'm scheduled to see Jay Garner and Wayne Downing on 18 August.

Very respectfully,

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U.S. Navy

11-L-0559/OSD14886 R- 006792-03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

May 19, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

360.33

SUBJECT: Reducing Preventable Accidents

World-class organizations do not tolerate preventable accidents. Our accident rates have increased recently, and we need to turn this situation around. I challenge all of you to reduce the number of mishaps and accident rates by at least 50% in the next two years. These goals are achievable, and will directly increase our operational readiness. We owe no less to the men and women who defend our Nation.

I have asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to lead a department-wide effort to focus our accident reduction effort. I intend to be updated on our progress routinely. The USD(P&R) will provide detailed instructions in separate correspondence.

19 May 03



U06916-03

11-L-0559/OSD14887



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

5/7
Jaymie Duman

May 6, 2003

DepSec Action

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S.C. Chu, USD(P&R)

Dr. Chu's letter - 6 May 03
SUBJECT: Aviation Accident Rate—SNOWFLAKE (TAB B)

- We met with Paul O'Neill on accident metrics. He recommended we refocus our proposals. Metrics should focus on injuries and loss of life vice the current practice that focuses on value of damages. The goal should be a zero loss culture.
- Mr. O'Neill also recommended a "top-down" push. To address this issue, we intend to use our Defense Safety Oversight Council as the senior-level safety forum. Could you kick-off our first meeting? Mr. O'Neill agreed to address a session.
- You ask for instances where aircraft safety systems have been cut. A recent example is the elimination of the Auto Ground Collision Avoidance System in the F-22 (\$64 million). Pete Aldridge has agreed to relook at this. Likewise, we did not fund a modern commercial safety system, Flight Operational Quality Assurance, for high accident aircraft types. The system captures aircraft flight instrument data to improve aircrew training, maintenance, and reduce human error(\$14.7M).
- The memorandum at Tab A sets reduction goals for the Department and adds your personal support for these initiatives.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum at TAB A.

COORDINATION: USD (C), DUSD (I&E) at Tab C.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr. (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT	<i>AP/RAAN 5/7</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>C5116</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>5/7 5/16</i>
EXECSEC V	<i>COX 5/16</i>

11-L-0559/OSD14888

U06916 / 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD HELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Reducing Preventable Accidents

World-class organizations do not tolerate preventable accidents. Our accident rates have increased recently, and we need to turn this situation around. I challenge all of you to reduce the number of mishaps and accident rates by at least 50% in the next two years. These goals are achievable, and will directly increase our operational readiness. We owe no less to the men and women who defend our Nation.

I have asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to lead a department-wide effort to focus our accident reduction effort. I intend to be updated on our progress routinely. The USD(P&R) will provide detailed instructions in separate correspondence.



11-L-0559/OSD14889



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
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11-L-0559/OSD14890



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

February 25, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Dr. David S.C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Aviation Accident Rate—SNOWFLAKE (TAB B)

- I had a good session with Paul O'Neill on accident metrics and our proposals to reduce accidents in the Department. Paul suggested that we must change the culture to significantly reduce accidents, for example, accidents should not be considered as a "cost of doing business" and that world-class organizations do not tolerate accidents.
- We intend to use our Defense Safety Oversight Council to provide the "top-down" push and focus our corporate efforts. We would be most pleased if you would kick-off our first meeting. Paul O'Neill also offered to address the Council.
- In terms of metrics, we plan to recast our accident measures to focus on personnel, vice equipment losses, and provide actionable and real-time accident data to effect change.
- Paul O'Neill stated that he reduced lost time due to injuries by 50% during his tenure at Treasury. We need to press for these reductions for DoD. This will not be easy, but we need to set unambiguous and challenging goals to stimulate needed changes.
- Finally, you ask for instances where aircraft safety systems have been cut or re-prioritized in our acquisition process. A recent example is the elimination of the Auto Ground Collision Avoidance System in the F-22. By removing this system, some estimate the Air Force is now accepting the risk of losing two or more aircraft per year. Likewise, our request for a modest effort to equip high accident aircraft types with a modern, commercial safety system called the Flight Operational Quality Assurance, or "FOQA" was not funded. These systems capture aircraft flight instrument data to improve aircrew training, maintenance, and reduce human error. We submitted a request to pilot test the FOQA on F-16s, selected helicopters, and the primary aircraft trainer for supplemental funding, but were "cut" from the DoD supplemental list. We believe both of these decisions should be revisited.
- The memorandum at Tab A sets reduction goals for the Department, and adds your personal support for these initiatives.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum at TAB A.

COORDINATION: USD (C) QJ ^{MAR 3 2003} DUSD (I&E) _____

Attachments: As stated

Dov S. Zakheim

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr. (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD14891



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

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DepSec Action _____

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- The memorandum at Tab A sets reduction goals for the Department, and adds your personal support for these initiatives.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum at TAB A.

COORDINATION: USD (C) _____ DUSD (I&E) *[Signature]*
2.28.03

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., (b)(6)

11-L-05597 OSD14892

November 23, 2002 3:33 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Aviation Accident Rate

I read your response to my snowflake on the aviation accident rate. I have these thoughts on what I would like you to do:

1. Revise your proposal so it includes metrics. In my view, metrics and tracking change behavior. I suggest you see that they are the right ones and are sufficiently simple and obvious that they are embarrassing and notable for those who don't do well. I need to see them when you have them fashioned.
2. Tell me what flight safety systems were downgraded or eliminated by whom and when, and to save what amount of money. That sounds crazy.
3. Run your proposal by Paul O'Neill for me and see what he thinks of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/05/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Aviation Accident Rate

DHR:dh
112302.11

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

11-L-0559/OSD14893

406918-03


SENSITIVE

May 8, 2003 10:17 AM

Iraq

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Policy Guidelines—Iraq

Attached is a draft of the policy guidelines for Iraq I am preparing to work through the Principals. I will give you a final draft after I work it through the NSC or PC, so you can do an implementation plan. If you have suggestions or omissions, let me know.

A related classified (code word) paper is being sent to you under separate cover.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/8/03 "Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines"

DHR:dh
050803-3

8 May 03

11-L-~~SECRET~~ 1894

SENSITIVE

U06980 /03

**SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER**

DRAFT #8

May 8, 2003 11:59 AM

Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines

1. **Global significance.** The importance of Coalition success in Iraq cannot be overstated. If Iraq, with its size, capabilities and resources, is able to get on a path toward representative democracy, the impact in the region and the world could be historic—with effects on Iran, Syria, the Palestinians, and elsewhere. Iraq could become a model—an example that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremists that is taking place in the Muslim world.
2. **Supporting President Bush's vision for a free Iraq.** Iraqis desiring to participate in the future of Iraq will be sought out, encouraged and empowered to the extent they are supportive of President Bush's vision of a free Iraq. Those who are not supportive will be opposed. Iraq will:
 - Be a single country;
 - Not have weapons of mass destruction;
 - Not be a terrorist state and will not harbor terrorists;
 - Not be a threat to its neighbors or to diverse elements within the country;
 - Have a market economy and an independent judiciary; and
 - Have respect for the rule of law, for ethnic and religious minorities, for the rights of women, and will be on a path to representative democratic government.
3. **Assert authority, provide security.** The Coalition Provisional Authority will assert authority over the country—a country that has been a dictatorship for decades. It will not accept being defied—it will tolerate no self-appointed Mayors of Baghdad. It will work to ensure the security of the Iraqi people. The Coalition will be ready and willing to use force to impose order as required. Without security for the Iraqi people, none of our other goals for the Iraqi people will be achievable.

**DRAFT WORKING PAPER
SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL**

11-L-0559/OSD14895

SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

4. **Commitment to stay; commitment to leave.** The Coalition will maintain as many security forces in Iraq as necessary, for as long as necessary, to accomplish our goals, and no longer.
5. **Unity of leadership.** There will be clarity that the Coalition is in charge, with no conflicting signals to the Iraqi people, Coalition partners or neighbors. The Coalition will have unambiguous unity of leadership and effort.
6. **Iraqi foreign missions.** The Coalition will gain control over Iraqi foreign embassies and, to the extent possible, Iraqi seats in international fora.
7. **Improve conditions; involve Iraqis.** The Coalition will contribute to the improvement of the circumstances of the Iraqi people, month-to-month. It will work to achieve visible accomplishments in vital public services, and create an environment that encourages the involvement of the Iraqi people, since it will be their responsibility to improve their country.
8. **Promote Iraqis who share coalition's goals.** In staffing ministries and positioning Iraqis in ways that will increase their influence, the Coalition will work to have acceptable Iraqis involved as early as possible, so Iraqi faces can explain the Coalition's goals and direction to the Iraqi people. Only if Iraqis are seen as being engaged in, responsible for, and explaining and leading their fellow citizens will the broad public support be achieved that is essential for security. We accept the reality that, regardless of what the Coalition does, it will be assumed that the Coalition set up the Iraqi Interim Authority. Its fingerprints will be on it. Therefore, we should accept that fact, not worry about that, and get on with the task and make sure it succeeds.
9. **Hands-on political reconstruction.** As the political process proceeds, the Coalition will consistently steer the process in ways that achieve stated U.S. objectives. The Coalition will not "let a thousand flowers bloom."
10. **De-Baathification.** The Coalition will work with forward-looking Iraqis and will actively oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers—the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, etc. We will make clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime.
11. **Justice for bad actors.** Those who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity on behalf of the regime will be tracked down and brought to justice. Mechanisms will be established to detain and screen out members of organizations that carried out Saddam Hussein's repression and to bring them

SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

to justice. De-Baathification may cause inefficiencies, but that is acceptable and indeed necessary to remove pervasive fear from Iraqi society.

12. **Repairing social fabric.** Iraq will need to find ways to heal the wounds that the Baathists inflicted on the society. The experiences of Eastern Europe, South Africa and elsewhere could inform that process.
13. **Property claims.** Mechanisms will be established to adjudicate property claims peacefully.
14. **Favor market economy.** Economic decisions will favor market systems, not Stalinist command systems, and activities that will diversify the Iraqi economy beyond oil. We will move as quickly as possible to privatize the economy.
15. **Pay smart.** We must avoid allowing the Coalition or the international community to distort the economy with floods of highly paid workers.
16. **Oil.** Iraqi oil will be used for the Iraqi people. The Coalition Provisional Authority, based on a study of best practices around the world, will develop a plan for the Iraqi oil industry that is based on transparency and private ownership. The plan should be designed to benefit the Iraqi people.
17. **Contracts—promoting Iraq's recovery.** Contracts for work in Iraq will go first to those who utilize Iraqi workers, and to countries that were supportive in liberating the Iraqi people, especially key neighbors such as Jordan and the Gulf states, because it will contribute to greater regional economic activity and accelerate Iraq's economic recovery.
18. **Third-states and international organizations.** Other countries and international organizations, including the UN, will be encouraged to assist in Iraq, but not if their presence is designed to further complicate an already difficult task.
19. **Outsiders—assistance, but not interference.** Assistance from neighbors will be welcomed. Conversely, interference in Iraq by its neighbors or others in the international community will not be accepted. Iraqis who are complicit or, for example, serve as agents of Iranian or Syrian influence will be dealt with.

**SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER**

20. **Monitoring NGOs.** We welcome NGO assistance, but activities of NGOs will be closely monitored and regulated. Those with extremist ties will be excluded.
21. **Priority sources of funds.** The U.S. will be the funder of last resort, not first. In order of preferred expenditure: Iraqi funds located in Iraq, Iraqi funds at the UN, seized frozen Iraqi assets in the U.S. and in other countries, donors from other nations, and finally U.S. appropriated funds. Once the U.S. starts funding an activity, it will be difficult to get others to take over that responsibility. It is best for the U.S. not to start funding in the first place, and instead to use the urgency of the problem to serve as leverage to get access to Iraqi funds or to raise money from others.
22. **Trial and error.** Democracies in transition are inherently untidy. Trial and error and experimentation will be part of the process. Perfection will not. Course corrections will be necessary.
23. **New matters.** Additional issues will be addressed as they surface (the role of the UN, debt relief, etc.).
24. **Patience and respect for Iraq's singular character.** The transition from despotism to a democracy will not happen fast or easily. It cannot be rushed. It will evolve over years. Rushing elections could lead to tyranny of the majority. Further, the ultimate outcome must be for Iraq and be decided by Iraqis, within the broad principles laid out by President Bush. One ought not expect the Iraqi outcome to replicate any other system. For example, there may well be a larger role for religion than in many other countries, and that is acceptable. Elections will likely best be held only after the mechanisms of a civil society are in place.

DHR:dh
Iraq/Principles for Iraq

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***
***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 1 of 2

PTTUZYUW RUMIAAA7229 1281359-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 081318Z MAY 03
FM CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//DEPUTY/DASD-CN//
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
VCJCS WASHINGTON DC
CDR USNORTHCOM
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCCC//

203 MAY - 03 09:51

UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR

SUBJ:JIATF-S AND JSSROC MERGER

GENERAL JAMES T. HILL, COMMANDER, USSOUTHCOM, SENDS PERSONAL FOR HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; INFO HONORABLE TOM RIDGE, SECHLS; HONORABLE JOHN WALTERS, DIR ONDCP; HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOVITZ, DEPSECDEF; MR. ANDRE HOLLIS, DASD-CN; GENERAL MYERS, CJCS; GENERAL PACE, VCJCS; GENERAL EBERHART, CDR USNORTHCOM; GENERAL SHINSEKI, CSA; ADMIRAL CLARK, CNO; ADMIRAL COLLINS, CMDT COGARD; MR. WILLIAM SIMPKINS, ACTING DEA ADMINISTRATOR

RMKS/1. MR. SECRETARY, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MERGE THE JOINT SOUTHERN SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS CENTER (JSSROC) INTO JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH (JIATF-S) TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTER NARCO-TERRORISM (CNT) AND COUNTER-ILLCIT TRAFFICKING OPERATIONS (CITO) IN MY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR).

2. CURRENTLY, JSSROC DEVELOPS OUR COMMON OPERATING PICTURE (COP) AND CONDUCTS DETECTION AND MONITORING (D&M) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) IN SUPPORT OF CNT, CITO, INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE, AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. JIATF-S CONDUCTS D&M AND INTERDICTION OPERATIONS USING THE COP DEVELOPED FROM SOURCES ACROSS THE AOR. APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF JSSROC'S MISSION DIRECTLY SUPPORTS JIATF-S. THE OTHER 30 PERCENT SUPPORTS PURE DOD MISSIONS, INCLUDING AIR DEFENSE OF GUANTANAMO, TACTICAL CONTROL OF SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS, AND PASSING AIR TRACKS OF INTEREST TO THE SOUTH-EAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR IN RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA. ALL OF THESE MISSIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A CONSOLIDATED ORGANIZATION.

3. AS THE LEAD AGENCY IN THE PROGRAM TO RESTART AIR BRIDGE DENIAL (ABD) IN COLOMBIA AND EVENTUALLY PERU, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

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USDP: <u>/</u>	DIA: <u>/</u>	OTHER: <u>/</u>	
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U07009-03

11-L-0559/OSD14899

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***
***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 2 of 2

REQUIRES A MORE ROBUST C2 STRUCTURE AT JIATF-S. NEAR-TERM EFFICIENCIES IN COMBINED MANPOWER WILL BE APPLIED TO JIATF-S EXECUTION OF ABD. I HAVE ALREADY TAKEN INITIAL STEPS TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL FROM JSSROC FOR PROGRAM START-UP. ADDITIONAL MANPOWER EFFICIENCIES ARE EXPECTED, BUT I INTEND TO RUN THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR BEFORE DIRECTING A U.S. ARMY MANPOWER ANALYSIS AGENCY (USAMAA) STUDY TO DOCUMENT THOSE EFFICIENCIES.

4. EXISTING RESOURCES FROM DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS (DASD-CN) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WILL SUPPORT THE COST OF THIS MERGER. OUT-YEAR DASD-CN FUNDING SAVINGS MAY ALSO BE REALIZED.

5. WE WILL DOCUMENT THIS MERGER AND THE RESULTING COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS IN OUR INPUTS TO THE DRAFT UPDATE TO THE NATIONAL INTERDICTION COMMAND AND CONTROL PLAN.

6. VERY RESPECTFULLY, TOM HILL.//

+++PERSONAL FOR+++
SPECIAL HANDLING \$\$\$REQUIRED \$\$\$
 \$\$\$ \$\$\$COPY NUMBER----- \$\$\$

JOINT STAFF V1 1
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ACTION (M)
INFO SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED(*)
 SECDEF-C(*)

 TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2

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NNNN

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11-L-0559/OSD14900

TAB

May 13, 2003 11:02 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SOUTHCOM Cable

What do you think about this cable from Hill?

Thanks.

Attach.

CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL Cable P R 081318Z MAY 03

DRR:dh
051303-6

.....
Please respond by

03 MAY 15 PM 4:36

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD14901

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***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 2 of 2

SECRET

2003 MAY -7 11 09:51

PTTUZYUW RUMIAAA7229 1281359-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 081318Z MAY 03
FM CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//DEPUTY/DASD-CN//
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
VCJCS WASHINGTON DC
CDR USNORTHCOM
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCCC//

UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR

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U07009-103

11-L-0559/OSD14902

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Page 2 of 2

REQUIRES A MORE ROBUST C2 STRUCTURE AT JIATF-S. NEAR-TERM EFFICIENCIES IN COMBINED MANPOWER WILL BE APPLIED TO JIATF-S EXECUTION OF ABD. I HAVE ALREADY TAKEN INITIAL STEPS TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL FROM JSSROC FOR PROGRAM START-UP. ADDITIONAL MANPOWER EFFICIENCIES ARE EXPECTED, BUT I INTEND TO RUN THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR BEFORE DIRECTING A U.S. ARMY MANPOWER ANALYSIS AGENCY (USAMAA) STUDY TO DOCUMENT THOSE EFFICIENCIES.

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6. VERY RESPECTFULLY, TOM HILL.//

+++PERSONAL FOR+++
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ACTION (M)
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Tab

11-L-0559/OSD14903



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-974-03
3 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *PHM 4/2*

SUBJECT: Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) and Joint Southern Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC) Merger

- In response to your inquiry (TAB), I support the proposal to merge JIATF-S and JSSROC.
- The merger will require disestablishing the JSSROC, a USSOUTHCOM component, and moving the personnel and systems to JIATF-S, an interagency organization under USSOUTHCOM's OPCON. This will improve mission effectiveness and efficiency, as well as supporting air bridge denial efforts.
- PDASD(SOLIC) requested the Director, Joint Staff, concurrence in the Department's proposed response. The reply, which endorses this initiative, has been forwarded via separate correspondence.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Copy to:
PDASD(SOLIC)

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

*No Secretary —
The JIATF-S and JSSROC
are already in the same
building. "Moving" as used
in 2nd Pt of this memo means
writing diagram changes.*

VRDich

11-L-0559/OSD14904

U085311/03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 MAY 12 04:10:54

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

May 7, 2003, 4:10PM

FOR: Secretary of Defense

DepSecDef Action _____

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel and Readiness)

David S. C. Chu 8 May 03

SUBJECT: Citizenship for Military Personnel

- You asked for background on how military personnel become U. S. citizens.
- Current policy is contained in a DoD Directive that implements Federal law.
 - Requires three years of military service to apply; service under honorable conditions; induction, enlistment or re-enlistment in the United States or its possessions; and must be in the United States for required interviews, oaths, and ceremonies.
- DoD has worked with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to expedite the processing of requests of active duty Service members based on the requirements of the law.
- Through a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2000, DoD and INS have reduced *processing* time for requests (after application) from 2 years to 6 months.
- During periods of military conflict, the President has the authority, by Executive Order, to exempt active duty Service members from needing three years of service to apply.
- On July 3, 2002, President Bush signed an Executive Order exempting active duty Service members from the usual requirement for naturalization (outlined above), retroactive to September 11, 2001, during the period of the war on terrorism.
- There have been nine bills introduced in the House and Senate which seek to make the process easier for Service members, as well as for their families for posthumous requests, to apply for naturalization (Tab 1).
- The Department of Homeland Security heads an interagency group exploring all options. Thus far, we have been supportive of every effort to ease citizenship.

014.33

7 May 03



11-L-0559/OSD14905

U07094 / 03

RECOMMENDATION: None. For Information only.

COORDINATION: N/A

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: Colonel Marcus Beauregard, MWR Policy, ODUSD(MC&FP),
(b)(6)

John
5/8/03

COORDINATION

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CSA 5/8/03

11-L-0559/OSD14907

TAB

1

Legislation Being Considered in the House and Senate for Naturalization of Service Members

Provisions:	H.R. 1275	H.R. 1714	H.R. 1806	H.R. 1814/ S.922	S.789	S.897	H.R. 1685	H.R. 1799	S.783
Reduce active duty service to 2 years.	X			X	X	X			
Reduce active duty service to 1 year.			X						
Allow any individual who serves in the military (who is otherwise eligible except for time in service).		X							
Prohibit fees (except State fees).	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Provide naturalization services overseas.	X		X	X	X	X			
Revocation of citizenship based solely on separation from the military service under other than honorable conditions.		X							
Require DHS and DoD to expedite verification of application.			X						
Requires DoD to prescribe a policy that facilitates the opportunity for members to finalize naturalization.						X			
Add members of the Selected Reserve to the list of military who are eligible through active duty service.				X					
Allow up to 2 years for a spouse, children and parents of citizen or permanent resident who dies during honorable service to apply for an adjustment of status after death.				X					
Allow spouse and children of active duty member granted posthumous citizenship during period of military hostilities to be eligible for immigration status.							X		
Eliminate any need for an affidavit to allow the spouse and children a service member granted posthumous citizenship to self-petition for benefits based on their relationship.							X		
Eliminate 2 year marriage requirement to allow an individual who has been married "for any period" to a citizen who dies to be eligible for naturalization.								X	
Authorize SecDef or DHS designee to request posthumous citizenship during periods of military hostilities.									X
Make posthumous provisions retroactive to 9/11/2001							X	X	X

TAB

2

5/6/03

May 5, 2003 11:22 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
cc: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Citizenship

What is the rule on giving citizenship to illegal immigrants who serve honorably in the military?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-19

.....
Please respond by 5/14/03

Jim:
Please bring up @
roundtable on 5/15.
J/R
J



5/6/03

May 5, 2003 11:22 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
cc: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Citizenship

What is the rule on giving citizenship to illegal immigrants who serve honorably in the military?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-19

Please respond by

5/14/03

Jim:

Please bring up @
roundtable on 5/15.

J/R

014.33

5 May 03

U07099 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14912

May 9, 2003 8:00 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UK Envoy to Iraq

Geoff Hoon, the MoD of the UK, tells me that Prime Minister Blair has dispatched an envoy to Iraq named John Sawyers, who speaks fluent Arabic. It sounds to me like he could be a help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050903-9

.....
Please respond by _____

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	
DEPSECDEF	
SPL ASST	
EXCSEC	
USDP	
USDI	
C&D	X
CCD	
GC	
RB	
LTC (OK)	/
CABLE CH	
FILE	

U07160 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14913

SECRET

2003 MAY 13 11 12 12

Jim R -
Maybe you should
brief Duncan
Hunter

SECDEF RUMSFELD NOTE:

"Jim R —
Maybe you should brief Duncan Hunter."

May 13, 2003

U07168 / 03


11-L-0559/OSD14914

CS/12

March 25, 2003 4:46 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
Jim Roche

CC: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Cruise Missiles

Attached is some material from Duncan Hunter. He says the following:

1. This cheap cruise missile is all off the shelf and would just be a fabulous thing. He says we could get it going for \$50 million.
2. We did not put enough purchases for Tomahawks in the Supplemental—we are going to run out.

Please take a look at both points and get back to me

Thanks.

Attach.

Inside the Navy, February 3, 2003, p. 1.

Draft RADM Jay Cohen ltr to Duncan Hunter

"Titan Corporation Affordable Weapon Overview" March 2003 (*Company Proprietary Information*)

DHR:dh
032503-11

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

5/12
ROCHE RESPONSE
AT RED TAB.
v/r



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

TO SD
Jaymie Durnan
7/12

MAY 6 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Affordable Weapon Concept

1. I have reviewed the information you sent me on the Affordable Weapon (AW) concept and, based on the multiple roles of AW, loiter time, and cost, am directing our operators to review capability shortfalls for which AW might be a solution.
2. There are a few concerns with this potential capability if it is to be used as a cruise missile (CM) supplement or replacement. The primary mission of CMs is to strike targets at long, standoff distances, mainly because enemy threats keep US air assets at a distance. AW's survivability (no stealth), speed (150-180 knots), and lethality (200 lb warhead) may not be adequate, if the true purpose of CMs is to be achieved.
3. While AW may not be a viable cruise missile replacement or supplement for the Air Force, I see the potential capabilities as worth exploring. Most appealing is the multiple role feature of AW, coupled with its ability to stay airborne for long periods of time. AW has the potential to be a technical solution to the AF's capability shortfall for future standoff/loiter munitions and could be considered as an option.
4. The AW is an interesting and appealing concept, which I feel is worth further consideration. Thank you for taking the time to bring this important capability to my attention.

Don,

We are concentrating on the JASSM (about \$500K a line) for its

ROCHE NOTE →
TYPED ON NEXT
PAGE

stealth (very good), range (about 275 mi) and payload (1000 lbs) for our B-1 fleet (will carry 24). The AW sounds interesting, but unlike a surface shot, we would have to see what it would cost to be compatible with bomb bays, and whether COTS electronics could handle the vibration and temperatures of captive flight. I have been to this "picture show" before with a cheap missile that had nothing but problems. 11-0559/OSD14946 integrate it. n/a Jim

Don,

We are concentrating on the JASSM (about \$500K or less) for its stealth (very good), range (about 275 nmi) and payload (1000lbs) for our B-1 fleet (will carry 24). The AW sounds interesting, but unlike a surface shot, we would have to see what it would cost to be compatible with bomb bays, and whether COTS electronics could handle the vibration and temperature of captive flight. I have been to this "picture show" before with a cheap missile that had nothing but problems when we tried to integrate it. v/r Jim

Donna Hulse

YOM
ONR
J. L. Hulse
Reggie
5 go in to get out there

R-

Inside The Navy February 3, 2003 Pg. 1
Navy's New 'Affordable Weapon' Seen As Potential 'Tomahawk-Lite' As questions mount about the affordability of the Tactical Tomahawk missile, the Office of Naval Research is ready to begin prototype production of a "cruise-like" missile that could pack a significant punch for 10 times less the price. The new missile, aptly called the Affordable Weapon, is not considered a possible replacement to the Tactical Tomahawk, but it could be used as an economical alternative in missions that do not require as great a range or striking power, according to ONR.
The Navy will have 100 of the new missiles in its arsenal by September, as well as 80 warheads, and their shipping containers.
The object of the Affordable Weapon program is to give the Navy "a tool to lower our cost when prosecuting war," according to Capt. Steve Hancock, the director of the Naval Expeditionary Warfare Science and Technology Department. While Tactical Tomahawks cost at least \$569,000 apiece -- with some estimates reaching over \$1 million per copy -- the Affordable Weapon is expected to cost about \$40,000, said Hancock.
Raytheon makes Tactical Tomahawk, or Block IV, which is due to reach the fleet in 2004. Though its name is familiar, Tactical Tomahawk is based on a new design.
The Affordable Weapon is not a Tomahawk variant, but it has some similar capabilities. "Somebody asked me one time if this is another Tomahawk missile, and my answer was 'It's kind of like a Tomahawk-lite,'" Hancock told Inside the Navy during a Jan. 23 interview.
The Affordable Weapon earned its name by employing less-expensive commercial off-the-shelf technology. Although it works like a Tomahawk, it is not intended to have equivalent range, speed or payload capacity, Hancock emphasized. For example, the Affordable Weapon, which is launched from its shipping container by a small rocket booster and powered by a small turbojet engine, is designed to carry a warhead to a target several hundred miles away. Tomahawk missiles, on the other hand, can travel about 1,000 miles bearing a heavier payload.
An easy way to understand the role of the Affordable Weapon, said Hancock, is to imagine ONR building a VW Bug as opposed to a Corvette. Both will get you from point A to point B -- and while the Corvette may get you there

faster, the VW Bug will cost a lot less.

He later added, "Does everything you go after require truly a fully milspec, ultra precise, ultra perfection solution? And the answer is not everything does. So does it make sense to spend millions of dollars when you don't need to spend millions of dollars? You can spend thousands of dollars for the solution."

Like the Tactical Tomahawk, the Affordable Weapon can fly directly to its target guided by the Global Positioning System, or it can fly to an area and loiter until a forward observer directs it to a target. Or the "cruise-like" missile can be retargeted in flight -- an observer can direct it to switch to a target different from the one the weapon was originally sent to attack. Modification to the prototype's airframe will allow it to carry a larger payload, such as an existing warhead. The planned modifications will also add about 200 miles to the Affordable Weapon's range. Titan, a military contractor in San Diego, is developing the prototypes with ONR.

Hancock specified the Affordable Weapon should not be considered a replacement to the Tactical Tomahawk, but rather a complement to it. He pointed out that for missions where a missile with a shorter range and smaller warhead could effectively neutralize a target then "why spend one point whatever million dollars on a Tomahawk missile if you can do it for \$40,000?"

With the prospect of multiple wars on the horizon and an ailing economy at home, Navy observers have said the service needs to look more closely at whether it can afford to fill its stockpile with Tactical Tomahawks. Ron O'Rourke, a naval analyst with the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, discussed the importance of a more affordable alternative to the Tactical Tomahawk Jan. 15 before an audience at a Surface Navy Association conference in Arlington, VA.

"Tactical Tomahawk is only going to be about half as expensive as the original version -- that's certainly a big improvement -- but Tactical Tomahawk at \$500,000 a copy is still 25 times expensive as [Joint Direct Attack Munitions]." he said. "As long as you have a ratio between the cost between the weapons like that, I think it's going to put an upper bounds on the ability of Navy and [Office of Secretary of Defense] policy makers to think about just how expansive the role of the surface community can be in the overall [Defense Department] effort."

Although he never referred to ONR's effort specifically, O'Rourke tasked the Navy with finding "some way to get that cost ratio down by developing a new . . . affordable weapon." And while he never named an optimum price, he said, "right now you have a 25-to-1 ratio. If you can get that down to a 10-to-1 or a 5-to-1, then I think you could have significant impact on how people might view the surface community's future contribution to national security and therefore the role of the surface community in the Navy and DOD as a whole."

Retired Rear Adm. Eugene Carroll, vice president emeritus of the Center for Defense Information, was more direct, calling the price of the Tactical Tomahawk "prohibitive" during an interview with ITN. Simply put, he said the Navy could not afford the number of Tactical Tomahawks needed to be definitive in warfare. That does not rule out selective application of the missiles, but in general, the Tactical Tomahawk's high expense prevents it from being stockpiled in adequate numbers, he said.

But during an interview with ITN, a Navy official argued against comparing the Affordable Weapon to the Tactical Tomahawk at all. He said comparing the Tactical Tomahawk and the Affordable Weapon is like comparing "apples and oranges" or a "155 mm Howitzer to a hand grenade." For that reason, a dollar-to-dollar comparison is misleading given that the two weapons have very different capabilities and because this is not an "either/or" situation where the Navy needs to select only one weapon for its arsenal, he said.

Rising Costs

The actual cost of the Tactical Tomahawk has been the subject of much debate. Under the initial agreement with Raytheon signed in 1999, the Navy would pay \$569,000 per missile for the production of 1,353 missiles. But the program has since experienced cost overruns during its development stage, leading many industry and Navy observers to speculate the unit cost has spiked. Some industry sources pin the current price of the Tactical Tomahawk over \$1 million.

The selected acquisition reports the Pentagon released in November cite the

cost of the Tactical Tomahawk program at \$2 billion in base-year fiscal year 1999 dollars and \$2.2 billion in then-year dollars for 1,725 missiles. The major cost driver was the change in engine manufacturers from Teledyne to Williams International, Raytheon spokeswoman Jennifer Allen told ITN in December. Raytheon ordered Teledyne Continental Motors to halt development of its J402-CA-402 engine planned for use in Tactical Tomahawk in December 1999 because the engine failed to meet performance specifications, officials said at the time.

Another factor, according to Allen, was the "upgrading of the Inertial Measurement Unit to meet navigation accuracy in a jamming environment and address anomalies discovered during system level qualification testing." An industry source indicated that the Global Positioning System anti-jamming specification arose in the middle of Tactical Tomahawk's development, adding unexpected cost to the program.

A combination of both the engine troubles and the IMU upgrade slid the schedule to the right and added cost, the source added.

A price hike would also account for inflation since 1999. Additionally, Tactical Tomahawk Program Manager Capt. Bob Novak noted during an interview in December the Navy has upped its order by over 300 missiles. However, Novak would not comment on the price of the weapon, saying that any discussion of cost was premature since the Navy has not yet signed a production contract with Raytheon.

"We are on a strong path to push forward," Novak told ITN. According to his schedule, the program will start technical evaluation of the missile this spring, followed by an operational evaluation to be completed by November 2003. He expects to reach initial operational capability in spring of 2004 and then sign a contract for full-rate multiyear production that June. Last week, Raytheon announced that it had won a \$224.5 million modification to a previously awarded low-rate initial production contract with the Navy for the Tactical Tomahawks. Work is scheduled to be complete by August 2005, according to a company statement.

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman House Armed Services Committee
The U. S. Congress
Washington DC

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Hunter,

As you requested, I am providing you the status of the Office Naval Research (ONR) Affordable Weapon (AW) Initiative. As you are aware we are developing a 600 mile range, 150-180-knots, "loitering," missile that carries a 200 pound payload using Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technology. The missile has both line of sight and satellite data links for interaction with ground stations and forward observers. AW is reprogrammable in flight with unlimited way points. This initiative has demonstrated that the COTS approach can reduce costs by an order of magnitude from traditional cruise missiles. The current missile cost in production is estimated to be \$45,000. The payload will be additional. The current MK125 warhead is estimated to be about \$15,000.

The AW initiative started in FY99 and has continuing development. There have been ten consecutive successful flights of the missile in the last 15 months. Much has been learned about COTS to advance military applications.

In view of the rapid progress that AW has demonstrated and current world events ONR has funded five missiles which are being readied for possible deployment overseas as air sensor vehicles and the manufacturing line is being readied for production. One is ready for shipment now. We expect to build two per week at the start and increase the rate as money is available. Our current limitation is funding.

This missile can be a weapon, but it can also be used as a surveillance platform, a communications relay, a SIGINT platform or any other use that has a payload less than 200 pounds.

The payoff of this development is a low cost reliable air platform that can perform many missions at about one tenth the cost of existing systems. In addition it offers the feature of loitering to defeat moving targets. The missile is planned to be launched from CONEX type containers holding between six and twenty missiles. These boxes can be carried on land, sea or air platforms.

Respectfully

RADM Jay Cohen



TITAN

National Security Solutions

Titan Corporation Affordable Weapon Overview

March 2003

Company Proprietary Information

11-L-0559/OSD14922



TITAN

National Security Solutions

System Overview

① COTS

- R&D vehicle cost = production cost
- USN production costs = independent of quantity
- Lowest production cost

② Vehicle Recovery



- Greatly reduced R&D cost
- Lower cost/kill
- Significantly reduce logistics burden

③ Multi-Mission (Weapon + Surv./Targeting)



Affordable organic asset with no additional R&D cost


④ Modular/Multiple OTS Warheads



- Heavy Armor/Area Targets
- Operational flexibility
 - Multiple kills/weapon (> 3) (cost/kill, kill rate)
 - Cost/kill (w/o vehicle recovery)
 - < \$20 k (heavy armor)
 - < \$10 k (area targets)

① COTS

Seeker	Avionics	Propulsion	Controls	DataLink	Control Station



Cost/Kill

- ≥ factor of 3-5 reduction in cost/kill for all targets

Range

- ≥ factor of 6 increase

Mission Flexibility

- Wide-area surveillance of 1,200 sq. n.mil. by simply removing warhead

Real-time BDA

⑧ Man-in-Loop on Multiple Platforms



⑧ Real-Time BDA



- Efficient surveillance/weapon resource application

⑦ Shoot-Look-Shoot




- Factor of 2 increase in kills/weapon

⑨ Minimize Collateral Damage



- Politically acceptable

⑤ Long Duration Loiter



Realistic (real C³I time delays) attack of mobile targets

⑩ Indirect Fire




- USN personnel survivability



TITAN

National Security Solutions

Future Spiral



Blk I Affordable Weapon

- Range 1,000 n.mi
- Loiter 8 hrs.
- Warhead 175 lbs. (MK128)
- Guidance GPS/D-GPS
- Data Links LOS/NLOS
- GTOW 820 lbs.
- Dia. ~ 13.5"

Hyperspectral
Seeker



Ducted Fan
Propulsion

Blk II Affordable Weapon

- Range > 5,000 n.mi
- Loiter 48 hrs./72 hr. UAV
- Warhead(s) MK128/SFW's
- Guidance GPS/D-GPS + Hyperspectral Seeker
- Data Links LOS/NLOS
- BDA Camera
- GTOW 150 lbs. - 820 lbs. (Function of Range, Loiter, Warhead)
- Dia 7" (Helo) - 13.5"




TITAN

National Security Solutions

Future Spiral

Air-Air Refueling Provides "Unlimited Endurance"



Bianco, Pat, TSgt, WHS/CCD

From: Stanback, Roddy, Ctr., HAF/ES
Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2003 07:47
To: Bianco, Pat, TSgt, WHS/CCD
Subject: FW: HOT TASK, U07168-03: MAYBE YOU SHOULD BRIEF DUNCAN HUNTER ON CRUISE MISSILES: Suspense Date: 5/20/2003 - SAF

Importance: Low

Pat,

Close per Lt Col Cox 4/15

See email traffic below. The Air Force will treat this suspense as a snowflake from SECDEF and answer directly. Can we just close--Lt Cox, Exec Sec is aware.

v/r

RODDY L. STANBACK

Chief, Information Workflow Management

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Wells, Suzanne, LtCol, SAF/OS
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 1:05 PM
To: HAF/ES Workflow
Cc: Stanback, Roddy, Ctr., HAF/ES
Subject: FW: HOT TASK, U07168-03: MAYBE YOU SHOULD BRIEF DUNCAN HUNTER ON CRUISE MISSILES: Suspense Date: 5/20/2003 - SAF

Please see Lt Col Cox's response below...and close the loop as appropriate with OSD to close this tasker from their system.

Thank you,

Lt Col Suzie Wells

Mil Asst to Secretary of Air Force

(b)(6) m 4E874

-----Original Message-----

From: Cox, Sam, LtCol, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 12:52 PM
To: Wells, Suzanne, LtCol, SAF/OS
Subject: RE: HOT TASK, U07168-03: MAYBE YOU SHOULD BRIEF DUNCAN HUNTER ON CRUISE MISSILES: Suspense Date: 5/20/2003 - SAF

Suzie,

You have it right. I think Secretary Roche can interpret the note as he sees fit (my guess is he will get with Congressman Hunter).....obviously, that is his call.

Sam

-----Original Message-----

From: Wells, Suzanne, LtCol, SAF/OS
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 11:49 AM
To: HAF/ES Workflow
Cc: Stanback, Roddy, Ctr., HAF/ES; Cox, Sam, LtCol, OSD
Subject: RE: HOT TASK, U07168-03: MAYBE YOU SHOULD BRIEF DUNCAN HUNTER ON CRUISE MISSILES: Suspense Date: 5/20/2003 - SAF

I have a call in to Lt Col Sam Cox about this one. I don't think this should have been sent electronically because it contains SECDEF snowflake information. Earlier this morning Lt Col Cox hand-delivered the original to me and said

47194

(13 MAY 03)

May 12, 2003 2:02 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
LTG Craddock
DSD

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DK

SUBJECT: Shia Holy Sites

You both heard the President today in the NSC meeting discuss the importance of the Shia holy sites and the dynamics of what may be taking place in Iran. I think we should get more information.

We should see what we think, and then develop a plan.

Doug, you should have a group of people start working this problem. You heard what the President said.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050903-26

Doug Feith:
Please brief DSD
on Shia issue.

Please respond by 5/30/03

Iran

12 May 03

U07198 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14927



May 12, 2003 2:20 PM

TO: ADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Unified Quest 2003

Your May 7 memo on Unified Quest 2003 sounds terrific. Pour it on!

Regards,

DHR:dh
051203-7

.....

Please respond by _____

353

12 May 03

U07199 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14928



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 14 2003

The Honorable John Stenbit
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence
6000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-6000

Dear John,

I received your letter. I did not like it. I don't think
you should leave, and if you insist, you should leave as late as
possible.

We need your help, my friend.

Regards,

0220 C3I

14 May 03

U07265 /03

Ag
1700 Snowflake

C5112

May 7, 2003 5:04 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan

Jaymie Durnan
5/9

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld M

SUBJECT: John Stenbit

Please ask Bill Schneider if it makes sense to put John Stenbit on the Defense Science Board. I would like to do that.

Thanks.

Bill said ok
5/9

DHR:dh
050703-13

.....
Please respond by 5/20/03

Jaymie Durnan
5/9



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

3-10-03

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I will resign from my position, at your convenience, but no later than 7-15-03.

I was very reluctant to rejoin government service, but your challenge to integrate the information systems and flows in the department was irresistible.

Dividing the job of integration is, however, resistable.

As was the case when we were here before, we have initiated a revolution in how information is used in the department. We will be proud of the results when we look back in ten years or so.

High on your list of choices for my replacement should be Priscilla Guthrie, my deputy CIO.

Thank you for all of your support and good luck. Sincerely,  John Stenbit

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable John Stenbit
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence
6000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-6000

Dear John,

I received your note announcing your resignation. I am disappointed. You have done a terrific job for the country, and we will miss you a great deal.

I hope we can stay in touch. One way to do that might be for you to join the Defense Science Board. If that makes sense for you, do let me know, as I would very much enjoy having your fine thinking machine contribute in the weeks, months and years ahead.

You are a star, my friend!

T. W. Schuer
regard,

THE SECRET
W.

TO SD
Det Sec. B1
Jaymie Duman
4/4

The Honorable John Stenbit
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Control, Communications
6000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-6000

Dear John,

I got your note announcing your resignation. You have done terrific work, and we will miss you ~~terribly~~. I will certainly be in touch with you.

You are a star, my friend.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD14933



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET
700 MAY 16 PM 2:13

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

April 23, 2003, 2:05 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: In-State Tuition for Service Members and their Families

- I asked the Army to take the lead some months ago. Since February 28th, the Army has worked with the states to shape tuition-related benefits for soldiers and family members so that they offer:
 - In-state tuition within the state of legal residence,
 - In-state tuition for soldiers and family members in state of assignment,
 - Continuity of in-state tuition once established.
- Presently 44 states meet two of these targets; 15 meet all three (Tab 1).
- I asked the other Services to appoint a senior level representative to work with the Army.
- We will be writing each Governor of the 35 states who do not meet all three criteria. Based on their responses, I will recommend those with whom you or the Deputy might speak when the occasion permits, noting that this is a contributor to our Quality of Life assessment in the BRAC process.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENT(S):

As stated

PREPARED BY: John Molino, DUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)

jm
5/13/03

292

23 Apr 03



11-L-0559/OSD14934


U07377 / 03

COORDINATION

In-State Tuition for Service Members and their Families

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles Abell

A handwritten signature, likely of Charles Abell, written in dark ink. The signature is stylized, with a long horizontal stroke at the end and a diagonal stroke crossing it.



11-L-0559/OSD14936

In-State Tuition
Status of Coverage by State

State	available in state of legal residence	available in state of assignment	retention of benefit upon reassignment of member
Alabama	x	x	
Alaska	x	x	
Arizona	x	x	x
Arkansas	x	x	
California	x	x	
Colorado	x	x	
Connecticut	x	x	x
Delaware	x	x	
Distr of Columbia	x	x	
Florida	x	x	x
Georgia	x	x	
Hawaii	x	x	
Idaho	x	x	x
Illinois			
Indiana			
Iowa	x	x	x
Kansas	x	x	x
Kentucky	x	x	x
Louisiana	x	x	x
Maine	x	x	
Maryland	x	x	
Massachusetts	x	x	
Michigan	x	x	
Minnesota	x	x	
Mississippi	x	x	

In-State Tuition
Status of Coverage by State

State	available in state of legal residence	available in state of assignment	retention of benefit upon reassignment of member
Missouri	x	x	
Montana	x	x	
Nebraska	x	x	
Nevada	x	x	x
New Hampshire	x	x	
New Jersey	x	x	
New Mexico	x	x	x
New York	x	x	
North Carolina	x	x	
North Dakota	x	x	
Ohio	x	x	x
Oklahoma	x	x	x
Oregon	x	x	x
Pennsylvania	x	x	
Rhode Island	x	x	
South Carolina	x	x	
South Dakota	x		
Tennessee	x	x	x
Texas		x	
Utah	x	x	x
Vermont			
Virginia	x		
Washington	x	x	
West Virginia	x	x	?
Wisconsin	x	x	
Wyoming	x	x	?

incoming

m dulle's cy *del*

4/8/03

April 7, 2003 8:31 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: In-State Tuition

Please take a look at this article, "War Renews Focus on States' Tuition Rules for Military." I think we ought to get going on that, get John Warner working and get people around the country working. That is terrible.

Please get back to me with a report.

Thanks.

Attach.

Mathews, Jay. "War Renews Focus on States' Tuition Rules for Military," *Washington Post*, page B01, April 5, 2003.

DHR:dh
040703-12

.....

Please respond by 5/9/03

washingtonpost.com

War Renews Focus on States' Tuition Rules for Military

By Jay Mathews
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 5, 2003; Page B01

When Army Capt. Terry Crank was transferred to Fort Monroe in Hampton, Va., in 2001, his wife, Melissa, decided to get her elementary school teaching credential at nearby Christopher Newport University.

She filed for in-state tuition status after living in Virginia for a year, assuming she could cut her fees in half. Instead, she got an unpleasant surprise.

Despite her Virginia-registered car, her Virginia driver's license, her Virginia property tax bill and many other emblems of her residence status, the university said no. Because she was studying full time and raising two small children, she had no time to work and lacked the required \$10,300 of taxable income. Her husband's income did not count because his official residence was in Texas, which does not have a state income tax.

"It is not our doing that we are living in Virginia," Melissa Crank said. That is where the Army sent them, but as happens with many military dependents, such rules make it difficult to ever feel totally at home.

In-state tuition rules in many states stymie military dependents who want to pursue their educations. For a long time, politicians and military leaders shrugged it off, but with the country depending on volunteer forces to win a war, they say it has become vital to keep morale high and persuade the most experienced troops to stay in the service. That has led the Army to launch a campaign for a better quality of life for dependents, including the nettlesome issue of tuition fees.

Educational opportunity is particularly important to the spouses and children of active-duty soldiers, said Patty Shinseki, wife of Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army's chief of staff. More generous in-state tuition policies, she said, "will really level the playing field for those who would otherwise not be able to afford this."

For the state officials who manage university budgets, the effort on behalf of military dependents could not come at a worse time. Many states, including Maryland and Virginia, face budget deficits, and easing in-state tuition rules will only make the financial picture worse.

According to a September 2002 survey, military personnel based in the United States have 548,385 dependents who are spouses or college-age children. In Maryland there are 15,962 such dependents, the survey found, while in the District there are 9,402. Those numbers don't come close to Virginia's 80,487.

The large military presence makes for a political and social culture in Virginia that is very friendly toward people in uniform, but it also means any easing of the in-state tuition rules will

be particularly hard on the state's budget. "The General Assembly has had several opportunities to change the rules, but the cost would be prohibitive, about \$10 million," said Belle S. Wheelan, Virginia's secretary of education.

"We want to say yes, but we are constrained by state law and the limits of state funding," said Christopher Newport University President Paul. S. Tribble Jr., a former U.S. senator.

Members of the military and their dependents say it's only fair that the state absorb this cost, given what they sacrifice for their communities. They say the rules are also inconsistent. In Crank's case, for example, Thomas Nelson Community College in Hampton charged her the in-state rate for some courses.

Maryland has resolved many of the issues that frustrate military personnel stationed in Virginia. Several years ago, for instance, the University of Maryland changed its policy, and active-duty troops must show only that they have been stationed to live and work in the state and they will receive in-state tuition rates.

On Thursday, delegates passed an amendment that would extend the in-state tuition privileges to active-duty members and honorably discharged veterans and their families. The Senate passed a narrower provision. The amendments were tacked on to a highly charged bill to extend in-state tuition to undocumented immigrants. The military measures, which some lawmakers decry as attempts to gut the immigrant bill, are scheduled for a final vote this weekend.

Since Shinseki became the Army's top general in 1999, he and his wife have made military family life a priority. Patty Shinseki said the couple remembers the difficulty of moving from Germany to Virginia in the middle of their daughter Loris's senior year of high school. They have tried to ease that pain for other families, sponsoring conferences and studies to improve communication and reduce the harm of moves that affect education. The campaign for better tuition rules is another stage in that effort, Army officials say.

Marian Bogen Ledford, whose husband, an Army major, is based at the Pentagon, temporarily moved back to her home state Mississippi to finish college because, she said, she could not afford Virginia's out-of-state tuition. But the University of Mississippi at first "would not give me in-state tuition because my husband is not assigned to a duty station [in that state]," she said.

Patsy Brumfield, associate director of media and public relations for the University of Mississippi, said what university officials in most states say: They are bound by rules set by the state legislature.

Army Command Sgt. Maj. William Hoffer, based at Fort Belvoir, said he could not even get in-state tuition at Northern Virginia Community College for his son, who recently graduated from Mount Vernon High School in Fairfax County. Like many active-duty service personnel, Hoffer long ago established a permanent legal state of residence -- in his case, Pennsylvania.

Some states, however, do very well by dependents. Army Col. Fred Pickens said his two children had no trouble getting in-state tuition at Louisiana State University while he was stationed in Louisiana from 1995 to 2001. The state had clear rules offering the cheaper rate to the child of any active-duty personnel stationed there. "This was a superb policy for us," he said. "Otherwise

we were faced with sending them to live with grandparents and go to college in Tennessee. . . .
Paying the out-of-state tuition would have doubled our college expense."

Staff writer Brigid Schulte contributed to this report.

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-94 19 May 2003
19 May 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Vaught Letter

- In response to your inquiry (TAB), the following information is provided.
- While Lieutenant General (Ret) Vaught's wealth of experience has allowed him to provide many thought-provoking ideas, his lack of involvement with the planning for the transformation of the forces in Korea leaves him unaware of the broader spectrum of missions envisioned for those transformed forces. Consequently, he misses the mark on some key points.
- The Future of the Alliance initiative is a phased effort, in part because of the assessment that the South Korean military is not currently able to defend the peninsula on its own. I therefore disagree with General Vaught's bottom line that US Forces should immediately draw down to a 7,000-person force, large enough only to assist South Korea in case North Korea launches an attack. He does not consider the strategic advantage of the proposed hub structure, which will provide peninsular and regional defense capability.
- The United States must have an active role in resolving the North Korean issues – any push, as General Vaught suggests, to have only "resident Asian powers" solve the issues without US involvement misses the point that this is a global, international issue.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

U07481 03

TAB

#427

May 6, 2003

~~April 26, 2003~~ 4:52 PM

(dove on trip)

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Vaught Letter

What do you think of this letter from General Vaught?

Thanks.

Attach.

1/5/03 Vaught ltr to Cody

DHR:dh
042603-30

.....
Please respond by _____

Tab

2

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
(U.S. ARMY RETIRED)

(b)(6)

January 5, 2003

FAX LETTER for LTG "Dick" Cody
G-3, U.S. Army

Dear Dick,

Happy New Year! This year can be the best or the worst, for the world, since the end of WWII. Referring to the Korea paper left with you on December 9th, 2002, what follows may be useful to you while the Korea issue is now on one of the two front burners. Listed below are some additional thoughts for your consideration.

1. Please see enclosed letter to Dr. Kim who has a very influential conduit to China.
2. Since we owe China nearly \$100 billion in trade deficit, China is unlikely to run the risk of aggravating its U.S. trade relationship by backing a loser called North Korea.
3. China has a larger, growing and more beneficial trade relationship with South Korea than it does with North Korea.
4. Russia badly needs our economic help and access to our oil market. The last thing Mr. Putin needs is a lessened economic and political relationship with the U.S.
5. Japan will stand back in fear of North Korea and wait things out. Many Koreans North and South still do not trust Japan who occupied, enslaved, and exploited all Korea from 1910 to 1945.

-2-

③

6. The resident Asian powers – China Japan, and Russia should resolve this issue. As a first step, they and we should demand that the president of North Korea come to the UN and explain why his country is violating its pledge to conform to the UN charter.
7. The UN command in South Korea should request all eighteen countries that fought there during the Korean War 1950-53 to send liaison teams back to Seoul to display UN solidarity against any invasion or attack by North Korea.
8. The modern South Korean Joint Armed Force are fully capable of defending South Korea against any evasion by the larger obsolete mass ground forces of North Korea. (Have the intel community do a net capability analysis of North and South Korea)
9. Some self appointed "Korea experts" are making some bad suggestions which are alarming the public around the world. It may be time for a reality check in the form of a "white facts paper".
10. An example of a bad idea is the suggestion that the 2nd ID be repositioned south of Seoul. Were this foolish idea implemented millions of South Koreans who now live north of the Han River would quickly conclude that the U.S. is not telling them that the north is about to attack. Residents north of the Han would pack up quickly and head south.
11. Finally – yes, we should withdraw our combat ground forces from Korea for two reasons
 1. They are not needed.
 2. Our withdrawal will stop all claims that we intend to invade North Korea. Withdraw one Brigade equivalent NLT than the end of February and remainder NLT 30 June 2003. Withdraw troops only by air through Inchon, the world's most modern International airport. Between now and June 30th, tailor and position, primarily at Osan, a 7000 person joint strategic stay behind force to assist South Korea in case the North launches an attack.


-3-

④

12. Remember - all three resident Asian powers may not really want Korca to become one nation, which could quickly become a strong competition.

Please pass any and all of the above to others that you believe may find it useful

Warm Regards,



Jim Vaught

PS. Copies have been sent to LT 63
Abuzick, Casey and Craddock.

7

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
(UNITED STATES ARMY RETIRED)

(b)(6)

COVER SHEET: November, 2002


The enclosed paper was prepared a few days after the author returned from a trip around the world during the period September 28 to October 26, 2002. Major cities visited were: Helsinki, St. Petersburg, Moscow, an eight day stint on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, to Vladivostok, Seoul and Seattle.

The author has served three military tours in Korea since June 1950, and visited Korea dozens of times since his retirement from the Army in 1983. He is a founding Member of the Council on U.S. Korean Security Studies which completed its 17th annual meeting on October 15th 2002, in Seoul. CAUTION: Readers should anticipate that a majority of the conventional minded Admirals, Ambassadors and Generals who claim to be experts on Korea will quickly say the proposal is ridiculous. These are the same kind of conventional last war thinkers who said Jim Vaught was crazy when he led the Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt in 1980, and then insisted that the Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC) be organized, prepared, and made available to National Command Authorities as our nations first response to terrorism. He was also the person who organized and trained the Strategic 75th Rangers and the 160th Special Operation Aviation Regiment, "Night Stalkers" in 1979-80. After his retirement from the Army in 1983, as Commander of the ROK-US combined Field Army in Korea, he continued to work at all levels of the Armed Forces to create the unified Special Operation Command now known as SOCOM and its three service components: AFSOC, ARSOC and NAVSOC.

2

(8)

Since most of the 47 million persons now living in South Korea were less than 10 year old or born since the truce was signed and the DMZ was established in mid 1953, it is understandable that they believe their 22 million North Korean relatives will not initiate a war against their modernized peace loving country. For fifty years South Koreans have relied upon and still expect the United States to defend them. It's time to ask them to defend themselves. The best way to send that message is to withdraw 30,000 of the 37,000 Americans now stationed in South Korea.



Jim Vaught

(9)

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
(UNITED STATES ARMY RETIRED)

(b)(6)

12 November 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of The National Security Council
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONCEPTUAL STRATEGY FOR FUTURE U.S. SUPPORT OF SOUTH KOREA

I. FACTS:

- A. North Korea (NK) has admitted that it has violated the 1994 nuclear accords and now possesses weapons grade plutonium.
- B. Unchecked NK can blackmail its neighbor South Korea (SK) into another period of prolonged negotiations while it perfects and produces biological, chemical and nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD's) along with State of the Art delivery systems which will enable it to continue to threaten South Korea, China, Japan, Russian and US interest in the Region
- C. Certain SK political elements are still trying to justify and sustain the "Sunshine Policy"(appeasement by another name) which is the very policy that provided cover and enabled the NK's to violate the 1994 agreement.
- D. While the SK economy is currently functioning below capacity. It is nonetheless at

(10)

least 10 or more times stronger than the net capability of NK. It has strong and growing ties with China, Japan, Russia and several other East Asian Economic partners.

- E. North Korea with a population of 22 million has an active military force of more than 1.2 million with an equal or greater number of quick deployable reserves. South Korea with a population of 47 million has an active armed force of 620 Thousand plus 400,000 ready reserves. In sum there are nearly 4 million persons in the combined armed forces of NK and SK. Clearly the assets used to support these large single purpose forces could better be used to build a unified Korean nation at peace.
- F. The US, as the continuing UN agent in SK, maintains a 37,000 person force in Korea with other forces ready to reinforce if the 50 year old truce is violated. US forces in the event of renewed combat would fight along with SK as part of the SK lead Combined Forces Command (CFC).
- G. I was in SK during October, 2002, when the announcement was made that NK had admitted it had violated the 1994 accords. Immediately, well placed influential SK's began asking me how will the US defend us now. They never suggested they should defend themselves.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

- A. An all out attack by NK from the vicinity of the so called DMZ which is in fact a heavily militarized zone (HMZ) would result in heavy damaged to the greater Seoul area which now has a population of more than 18 million.

(11)

- B. Properly led the SK combined forces command could begin a Conventional Counterattack within 10 days or less with an objective of moving north and destroying the NK armed forces.
- C. Scenarios A and B above would result in 3-5 million civilian casualties and 200-300 thousand military casualties and several billion dollars worth of lost or damaged infrastructure.
- D. The NK's are using the oil, food and other assets provided by the US per the 1994 accords to sustain approximately 3 million persons, primarily government workers, and their nearly 2 million person armed forces. The remaining 17 million NK's are virtually starving. While the US and several smaller outsiders provided food programs have helped the people in the countryside to survive conditions get worse with each passing day. There are now an estimated one-half million undernourished mothers with dry breast trying to give milk to their newly born babies. Well intended US policy has enabled these terrible circumstances.
- E. Unless the US adopts a drastically revised strategy the SK's will continue to rely on the US to defend them while they try to talk the NK's into some new worthless agreement to buy more time and put off doing what is necessary IE: (devising a political economic and military policy they can execute with United Nations backing that will force an end to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and enable the beneficial use of the several billion dollars of assets which are now being wasted each year on the maintenance of the 4 plus million persons armed forces now resident on the Korean peninsula.

(12)

- F. China, Japan and Russia may see a unified Korea as an unwelcome competitor. Hence, a request that they join or support this initiative may receive a lukewarm or negative reply..

III. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE:

- A. Announce that the US intends to withdraw approximately 30,000 of its forces from SK during the next six months (approximately 7,000 persons would be left in SK to support the combined forces command). Most of the stay^{behind} force would be stationed at ^{Osan,} ~~Osan~~.
- B. The US would continue to provide C4-I and other critical unique US enabling power to the CFC
- C. Most of the US equipment and supplies now in SK would be turned over to the CFC (Note: A few items which are badly needed elsewhere in the US Armed Forces would be withdrawn.)
- D. The SK armed forces should be asked to provide a 10,000 person cadre and fillers to add to the existing 5,000 KATUSA's, who are already serving in US units and are familiar with US equipment, to form another SK division to reinforce the CFC Counterattack Force.
- E. Encourage the CFC to withdraw its forward deployed divisions which are stationed along the HMZ to positions out of range of the DPRK's fixed bunked artillery now deployed along the HMZ. This action would enable several beneficial advantages to the CFC such as:
1. Preclude more than 1/2 of SK's best front line divisions from being

(13)

devastated by the DRP's dug in forward deployed artillery in an initial attack.

2. Provide a 10 thousand meter wide killing zone where an attacking NK ground force could be devastated by CFC's combined air and Ground counter-fires.
3. Enable a largely intact CFC counterattack force to move against the attacking DPRK force on familiar ground while being supported by heavy volumes of CFC air and ground firepower.
4. Enable the CFC to take the fight to the enemy and move into NK territory in less than 10 days after any NK attack.
5. The CFC could use superior US C4-I to preclude the DPRK's surprise use of weapons of mass destruction (NOTE: the US should provide an early warning to the DPRK that in effect says, "Should you the DPRK prepare to use or actually use any weapon of mass destruction, Biological, Chemical or Nuclear, the US will attack and destroy all such weapons without further warning." (China, Japan and Russia would be made aware of this reality).
6. The DPRK would be informed of our ability to implement the above policy and encouraged to withdraw its armed forces from the HMZ and immediately begin demobilizing. They could be told that their demobilization would be monitored by UN observers and that SK's CFC would also demobilize on a *quid pro quo* basis until both armed

(14)

forces are reduced to below a combined total of no more than 100,000.

The resources saved by the above actions would enable the emergence of a new unified Korean Nation which would become a political economic and military democracy at peace and in full compliance with and in support of the UN charter.

7. The withdrawn 30,000 US Troops could be used to reinforce Special operations structure (For example: activate 4 new Ranger battalions, 2 more Special Forces Groups and reinforce Other Special Operations elements). Other spaces would be used to speed up transformation.

IV RECOMMENDATIONS:

- A. Form an Economic-Political-Military study group to examine the above concept and provide a preliminary report within 30 days or less.
- B. Devise a phased implementation plan to be announced as soon as we know the Iraq issue is resolved.
- C. Revise the (ROK-US) bilateral treaty as needed
- D. Since the US has been the UN's agent in Korea since 1950 timely and appropriately notification needs to be made to that body.
- E. Use the removed 30,000 US Military manpower and recouped funds to:
 1. Strengthen Special Operations forces
 2. Facilitate transformation and modernization
 3. Improve the overall US capability to conduct broad spectrum 21st


(15)

Century Military Operations

- F. Use the funds saved and recouped for higher priority missions and to reduce the national debt.

V. COMMENT:


In Sum, the above Concept would enable Koreans to resolve the expensive 50 year old wasteful "jostling" contest and liberate 15 million + oppressed starving North Koreans from the yoke of an untrustworthy rogue dictatorship, namely Kim il Sung and his 5 million plus fellow travelers. A unified Korean Democracy would put a smile on the face of God.



Jim Vaught

8:07 AM

TO: Gen. Larry Welch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: May 19, 2003

SUBJECT: **FCS Briefing**

Thank you so much for coming in Saturday to provide the briefing on your team's work on the Future Combat System. I appreciate it a great deal.

Please extend my thanks to the members of the team. It is clear they put in a lot of time and did an excellent job, and we do appreciate it over here.

Thanks so much.

DHR/azn
051703.07

U07502 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14958

470

19 May 03



May 5, 2003 1:37 PM

Australia

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Thank the Aussies

Your shop ought to draft a thank you note from me to the Aussies for their help in Iraq, since they are now taking their SOF out I believe.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-40

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

AN
T 5/20
Where is it
Get it

5/19

Sir - Attached is letter already sent to Australian MOD, and a letter for your signature to the Prime Minister - v/r.

an

11-L-0559/OSD14959

007515 / 03

5 MAY 03



SECRET

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

2003 MAY 20 11 14 03

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-943-03

20 May 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RAM 5/19

SUBJECT: Seeking Brevity in Secretary of Defense Approved Orders

- The following is provided in response to your inquiry (TAB) concerning the thoughts of Mr. Jim Haynes, the Department of Defense General Counsel, who expressed concerns with the "turgid, overly detailed" orders forwarded to you for approval.
- Mr. Haynes's concerns are valid. Many of our orders include pages of detailed "boiler plate" language that do not require SecDef approval. My staff is reviewing the orders process to determine what changes are required. Results of that review and recommended changes will be provided for your approval.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

*Mr Secretary -
We can do a better job of
this and we will.*

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

VR Dick

11-L-0559/OSD14960

U07552 /03

TAB

March 19, 2003 7:25 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 71

SUBJECT: Execute Orders

Attached is an interesting paper on execute orders.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/12/02 GC memo to SecDef re: Execute Orders [U13307/02]

DHR:dh
031803-17

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/QSD14961

03 MAR 2003

Tab



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

August 12, 2002, 7:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes II*

SUBJECT: Execute Orders

- *Compare* the orders you routinely sign to the attached:
 - February 12, 1944 order to Eisenhower in anticipation of D-Day. (Two pages, including organization chart.)
 - September 9, 1862 orders from Robert E. Lee to his principal subordinates regarding his first invasion of Maryland. This one to two page order is one of Lee's most complicated orders. It is the one found by McClellan's army, resulting in the battle at Antietam.
- *Problem* – Our system produces very turgid, overly detailed orders for you to issue. To be sure, this war on terrorism is extraordinary, presenting many unique issues. Nevertheless, there must be a way to write clearer, shorter orders faster.
- *Objective* – That we should be able to get closer to the old style of orders.
 - Perhaps we can rely more on training and general guidance to the combatant commanders, rather than regurgitating detailed ROE.
- *Recommend* you suggest General Myers retrieve sample SECDEF orders from previous conflicts in, say, the last twenty or thirty years. Then, using those samples, a small multi-disciplinary team can track the changes, identify the reasons, and provide you a reasoned proposal to improve the system. I would expect this exercise could yield savings in time and resources.

DECISION: ____ Yes ____ No ____ See me

Tab

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

CC: CJCS, USD(P)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>8/13</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>8/13</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>8/13</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>8/13</i>

11-L-0559/USD14962

U13307 / 02

DIRECTIVE

TO SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

(Issued 12 February 1944)

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

2. *Task.* You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.

4. *Command.* You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix [reproduced on opposite page]. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support.

5. *Logistics.* In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command.

6. *Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies.* In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces, agencies of sabotage, subversion, and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities, are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.


11-L-0559/OSD14963

Tab

7. *Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas.* Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the U. S. S. R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.

8. *Relationship with Allied Governments—the re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories.* Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.

CHAIN OF COMMAND



11-L-0559/OSD14964

Tab

While I should feel the greatest satisfaction in having an interview with you, and consulting upon all subjects of interest, I cannot but feel great uneasiness for your safety should you undertake to reach me. You will not only encounter the hardships and fatigues of a very disagreeable journey, but also run the risk of capture by the enemy. I send my aide-de-camp, Major [W. H.] Taylor, back to explain to you the difficulties and dangers of the journey, which I cannot recommend you to undertake.

I am endeavoring to break up the line through Leesburg, which is no longer safe, and turn everything off from Culpeper Court-House toward Winchester. I shall move in the direction I originally intended, toward Hagerstown and Chambersburg, for the purpose of opening our line of communication through the valley, in order to procure sufficient supplies of flour. I shall not move until to-morrow, or, perhaps, next day, but when I do move the line of communication in this direction will be entirely broken up. I must, therefore, advise that you do not make an attempt that I cannot but regard as hazardous.

I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
No. 191. } *September 9, 1862.*

I. The citizens of Fredericktown being unwilling, while overrun by members of this army, to open their stores, in order to give them confidence, and to secure to officers and men purchasing supplies for benefit of this command, all officers and men of this army are strictly prohibited from visiting Fredericktown except on business, in which case they will bear evidence of this in writing from division commanders. The provost-marshal in Fredericktown will see that his guard rigidly enforces this order.

II. Major Taylor will proceed to Leesburg, Va., and arrange for transportation of the sick and those unable to walk to Winchester, securing the transportation of the country for this purpose. The route between this and Culpeper Court-House east of the mountains being unsafe will no longer be traveled. Those on the way to this army already across the river will move up promptly; all others will proceed to Winchester collectively and under command of officers, at which point, being the general depot of this army, its movements will be known and instructions given by commanding officer regulating further movements.

III. The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry.

IV. General Longstreet's command will pursue the main road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

V. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

Tab

VI. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, practicable, by Friday morning, Keys' Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with Generals McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.

VII. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.

VIII. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

IX. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

X. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood, &c.

By command of General R. E. Lee:

R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
September 10, 1862.

Brigadier-General BRANCH,
Commanding Division:

GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs me to say that, instead of moving at dawn, as hitherto ordered, you will follow General Lawton when he comes up, he being ordered to move at dawn.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. F. PAXTON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
September 11, 1862.

General BRANCH:

The major-general commanding directs me to say that Major-General Hill, having been released from arrest, will assume command of his division, and you will turn over to him all instructions received relative to it.

Respectfully,

E. F. PAXTON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Hagerstown, Md., September 12, 1862.

His Excellency President DAVIS:

Mr. PRESIDENT: Before crossing the Potomac I considered the advantages of entering Maryland east or west of the river. The other

Tab



TAB

March 19, 2003 7:25 AM

381

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 71

SUBJECT: Execute Orders

Attached is an interesting paper on execute orders.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/12/02 GC memo to SecDef re: Execute Orders [U13307/02]

DHR:dh
031803-17

.....
Please respond by _____

19 Mar 03

U07553 /03

11-L-0559/OSD14967

Tab

03 MAR 2003



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SEP 30 2002 10:22
SECDEF HAS SEEN

ACTION MEMO

SEP 30 2002

August 12, 2002, 7:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Execute Orders

- *Compare* the orders you routinely sign to the attached:
 - February 12, 1944 order to Eisenhower in anticipation of D-Day. (Two pages, including organization chart.)
 - September 9, 1862 orders from Robert E. Lee to his principal subordinates regarding his first invasion of Maryland. This one to two page order is one of Lee's most complicated orders. It is the one found by McClellan's army, resulting in the battle at Antietam.
- *Problem* – Our system produces very turgid, overly detailed orders for you to issue. To be sure, this war on terrorism is extraordinary, presenting many unique issues. Nevertheless, there must be a way to write clearer, shorter orders faster.
- *Objective* – That we should be able to get closer to the old style of orders.
 - Perhaps we can rely more on training and general guidance to the combatant commanders, rather than regurgitating detailed ROE.
- *Recommend* you suggest General Myers retrieve sample SECDEF orders from previous conflicts in, say, the last twenty or thirty years. Then, using those samples, a small multi-disciplinary team can track the changes, identify the reasons, and provide you a reasoned proposal to improve the system. I would expect this exercise could yield savings in time and resources.

DECISION: ____ Yes ____ No ____ See me

Tab

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

CC: CJCS, USD(P)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	8/13
MA BUCCI	8/12
EXECSEC WHITMORE	8/12

11-L-0559/OSD14968

U13307 / 02

TAB

421

May 2, 2003 8:13 AM

TH/26 received 6/1

TO: Gen. Pace
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bagram

Afghanistan

Please check and see what base security is like at Bagram and how the aircraft are placed. Do they have revetments, or are they just lined up looking for a problem?

Also, please check where base hospital is and how close it is to where they arm the aircraft.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
050103-69

.....
Please respond by

2 May 03

Tab

03 MAY 7 AM 7:53


11-L-0559/OSD14969

U07581 /03



May 19, 2003 11:46 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Europe

You might want to think of having the President give a speech in Europe at some early date.

It seems to me it is not a good thing to allow the movement towards a set of rival political or strategic partnerships evolve in Europe. In my view, the proper set of issues is counter-proliferation and trade. They are both in our interests, economically and from a security standpoint.

We have some common values in the rule of law and democracy that ought to help prevent the split.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-25

Europe

19 May 03

↑

May 19, 2003 3:17 PM

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Franks
Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Foreign Forces

I agree. We have to have a full court State and Defense press on getting additional forces into the country from other countries, with or without the UN resolution. They should be cocked and ready to go.

Are you putting enough pressure on that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-47

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

19MAY03

007696 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14971

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) (MAY. 20. 2003 3:47PM) * * *

FAX HEADER:

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
MAY. 20.	3:45PM	COMPATIBLE	3-S	1'23"	P. 2	OK		782

: BATCH
M : MEMORY TX
S : STANDARD
* : PC
2-: ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
+ : ROUTING
1-: MIL_STD MODE

S : TRANSFER
@ : FORWARDING
F : FINE
O : RECEPT. NOTICE REQ.
3-: RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
> : REDUCTION
A : RECEPT. NOTICE

VERbal CONFIRMATION by Service Chief ALSO
@ 1545L.

5/13/0 Snowflake



May 9, 2003 1:42 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Hill Relations

I have heard a lot of good reports on your work on these personnel matters with the Hill. Thanks so much.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050903-28

.....

Please respond by

032

9 May 03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET
702 MAY 23 11 25 03

INFO MEMO

May 23, 2003, 11:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *dy*

SUBJECT: Iceland

- In response to your request regarding the annual costs to maintain U.S. forces in Iceland, the Department spends about \$225 million annually (\$59 million by the Air Force and \$166 million by the Navy) for Iceland support: \$121 million for base support, facility maintenance, and radar operation; \$12 million for family housing; and \$92 million for military personnel costs.
- The Department maintains 2,464 military and civilian personnel (642 Air Force and 1,822 Navy personnel) at the Naval Air Station Keflavik in Iceland, along with HH-60G search and rescue helicopters, a detachment of 4 deployed P-3s (rotating every 6 months), and an Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance operation.
 - The Navy P-3s are a rotational detachment from a deployed squadron, split between U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command. The P-3 deployment cycle maintains a rotation base of three squadrons (one deployed, two in interdeployment training cycle).
 - Under the Aerospace Expeditionary Force construct, the Air Force rotates four F-15s, one KC-135, and one HC-130 and crews to Iceland every 3 months.
- The mission of Naval Air Station Keflavik is to maintain and operate facilities, and provide services and materials to support aviation activities and Navy's operating forces. Iceland also provides the primary divert airfield for the North Atlantic.
- The Air Force uses the Navy's facilities and reimburses the Navy for the support provided. The Air Force operates the radars (\$17 million) for air control and defense. The radars feed the Icelandic air traffic control system.

11-L-0559/OSD14974

U07840 / 03

- Beginning in FY 2004, the annual cost for forces deployed to Iceland declines to \$160 million per year because the Air Force has not budgeted for Iceland support after FY 2003. The Air Force wanted to remove its forces from Iceland starting in FY 2002 but was directed to continue funding Icelandic support through FY 2003. The Navy has budgeted about \$160 million each year from FY 2004 and beyond for Icelandic operations.
- The Air Force believes that it can provide for Icelandic defense through force projection. Ending Icelandic support would save \$27 million annually (base support and radar costs) and would relieve pressure on the low density/high demand search and rescue crews and aircraft.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: John M. Evans

(b)(6)

May 6, 2003 7:49 AM

*received 5/6
6:30pm.*

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iceland

Please find out what it costs us per year to maintain U.S. forces in Iceland—the F15s and the search and rescue, etc.

If we have to maintain them over there, that means we have to maintain a rotation base for them of two, three or four times as many, I assume.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050603-6

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03



May 6, 2003 7:49 AM

received 5/6
6:30pm.

Iceland

TO: Döv Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iceland

Please find out what it costs us per year to maintain U.S. forces in Iceland—the F15s and the search and rescue, etc.

If we have to maintain them over there, that means we have to maintain a rotation base for them of two, three or four times as many, I assume.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050603-6

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

6 MAY 03

U07841 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14977

TAB A

May 1, 2003 1:56 PM

#4

390

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Baseline Force Presence and Changes

I would like to see a paper showing what forces we had deployed around the world when the President arrived on January 20, 2001, and then what the pluses and minuses, the puts and takes, have been since then by country, by AOR and then the total.

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-2

.....
Please respond by 5/12

Tab A

1 MAY 03

11-L-0559/OSD14978

U07984 /03

May 22, 2003 7:28 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Jay Garner
Larry Di Rita
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

Attached is a memo I dictated after a visit with Alan Greenspan. I think you will find it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/21/03 SecDef memo to USD(P) re: Oil and Democracy [052003-19]

DHR:dh
052203-2

.....

Please respond by _____


IRAQ

22 MAY 03

U08003 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14979

May 21, 2003 9:45 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

Alan Greenspan came by to see me. The subject was oil and democracy.

Our discussion was along these lines:

We must keep the revenues from oil away from government. Throughout the world, underdeveloped countries with oil have wasted the revenues. They have been stolen, misused and used to suppress the population.

In the old days, the people of a country could swarm over a small minority that was robbing them or repressing them. Not so today. Small minorities—bullies—can use technology to successfully repress majorities. Repression works because of modern technologies.

The goal in Iraq from the outset should be to get the oil revenues into the hands of the Iraqi people. One approach might be to establish four or five mutual funds and put the revenues from oil and gas into them. They would be owned by the Iraqi people. The plan would be to take a small portion of the revenues of the funds, and pay them to the owners of the funds, all adult Iraqi citizens. There are issues as the definition of an Iraqi citizen (for example, are the people who just returned Iraqi citizens) but those issues could be dealt with.

Fortunately, the average income in the country is so low that it could make a significant difference and substantially affect the annual income of the Iraqi people by giving them a relatively small amount of money. Each of the funds would pay exactly the same monthly dividends, regardless of their varying successes.

The rest of the funds' income could be for:

1. Strengthening the oil infrastructure, improving liftings, building pipelines, and finding more efficient ways to do things.

2. Other infrastructure in the country that will benefit the Iraqi people and contribute towards increasing private sector economic activity and the economic well-being of the country.
3. Loans for small businesses. If the fund made loans for small businesses, it could help to develop a middle class, an entrepreneurial class, people who would develop material values, which could then begin to create in the Iraqi people a sense of progress. This could weaken the pull of Islamic fundamentalism.

Democracy

Democracy is linked to this idea. Democracy can be dangerous in the sense that if you have a group of people who have spiritual values but not material values and have not practiced the art of compromise, if they go too fast to an election by majority rule, it could end up with a permanent mistake—one vote, one time—and another Iran-like theocracy.

In short, we need to lay a foundation for self-government. The way to get a non-theocratic system is to go slowly. People have to begin to see what is in it for them.

That suggests we should not rush to have elections. We can have votes on things like city councils with a limited mandate—to help get sewers fixed, help get the garbage picked up, help get policemen out. Otherwise, the fundamentalists will very likely sweep, in a way that is disadvantageous to the people in terms of their long-term future and benefit.

Democracy involves choosing between things. If the people don't have things to choose between and there are strong, dominant theocratic forces, the outcome may be an unhappy one.

In short, the management of the oil revenues could conceivably help to begin to lay the foundation for movement towards democracy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-19

.....

Please respond by _____

~~SENSITIVE~~

May 8, 2003 10:17 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Policy Guidelines—Iraq

Attached is a draft of the policy guidelines for Iraq I am preparing to work through the Principals. I will give you a final draft after I work it through the NSC or PC, so you can do an implementation plan. If you have suggestions or omissions, let me know.

A related classified (code word) paper is being sent to you under separate cover.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/8/03 "Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines"

DIIR:dh
050803-J

U08009 / 03

11-L-05590080-4982
~~SENSITIVE~~

THO

May 03

May 8, 2003 11:59 AM

Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines

1. **Global significance.** The importance of Coalition success in Iraq cannot be overstated. If Iraq, with its size, capabilities and resources, is able to get on a path toward representative democracy, the impact in the region and the world could be historic—with effects on Iran, Syria, the Palestinians, and elsewhere. Iraq could become a model—an example that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremists that is taking place in the Muslim world.
2. **Supporting President Bush's vision for a free Iraq.** Iraqis desiring to participate in the future of Iraq will be sought out, encouraged and empowered to the extent they are supportive of President Bush's vision of a free Iraq. Those who are not supportive will be opposed. Iraq will:
 - Be a single country;
 - Not have weapons of mass destruction;
 - Not be a terrorist state and will not harbor terrorists;
 - Not be a threat to its neighbors or to diverse elements within the country;
 - Have a market economy and an independent judiciary; and
 - Have respect for the rule of law, for ethnic and religious minorities, for the rights of women, and will be on a path to representative democratic government.
3. **Assert authority, provide security.** The Coalition Provisional Authority will assert authority over the country—a country that has been a dictatorship for decades. It will not accept being defied—it will tolerate no self-appointed Mayors of Baghdad. It will work to ensure the security of the Iraqi people. The Coalition will be ready and willing to use force to impose order as required. Without security for the Iraqi people, none of our other goals for the Iraqi people will be achievable.

~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

4. **Commitment to stay; commitment to leave.** The Coalition will maintain as many security forces in Iraq as necessary, for as long as necessary, to accomplish our goals, and no longer.
5. **Unity of leadership.** There will be clarity that the Coalition is in charge, with no conflicting signals to the Iraqi people, Coalition partners or neighbors. The Coalition will have unambiguous unity of leadership and effort.
6. **Iraqi foreign missions.** The Coalition will gain control over Iraqi foreign embassies and, to the extent possible, Iraqi seats in international fora.
7. **Improve conditions; involve Iraqis.** The Coalition will contribute to the improvement of the circumstances of the Iraqi people, month-to-month. It will work to achieve visible accomplishments in vital public services, and create an environment that encourages the involvement of the Iraqi people, since it will be their responsibility to improve their country.
8. **Promote Iraqis who share coalition's goals.** In staffing ministries and positioning Iraqis in ways that will increase their influence, the Coalition will work to have acceptable Iraqis involved as early as possible, so Iraqi faces can explain the Coalition's goals and direction to the Iraqi people. Only if Iraqis are seen as being engaged in, responsible for, and explaining and leading their fellow citizens will the broad public support be achieved that is essential for security. We accept the reality that, regardless of what the Coalition does, it will be assumed that the Coalition set up the Iraqi Interim Authority. Its fingerprints will be on it. Therefore, we should accept that fact, not worry about that, and get on with the task and make sure it succeeds.
9. **Hands-on political reconstruction.** As the political process proceeds, the Coalition will consistently steer the process in ways that achieve stated U.S. objectives. The Coalition will not "let a thousand flowers bloom."
10. **De-Baathification.** The Coalition will work with forward-looking Iraqis and will actively oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers—the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, etc. We will make clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime.
11. **Justice for bad actors.** Those who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity on behalf of the regime will be tracked down and brought to justice. Mechanisms will be established to detain and screen out members of organizations that carried out Saddam Hussein's repression and to bring them

~~SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL~~
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

to justice. De-Baathification may cause inefficiencies, but that is acceptable and indeed necessary to remove pervasive fear from Iraqi society.

12. **Repairing social fabric.** Iraq will need to find ways to heal the wounds that the Baathists inflicted on the society. The experiences of Eastern Europe, South Africa and elsewhere could inform that process.
13. **Property claims.** Mechanisms will be established to adjudicate property claims peacefully.
14. **Favor market economy.** Economic decisions will favor market systems, not Stalinist command systems, and activities that will diversify the Iraqi economy beyond oil. We will move as quickly as possible to privatize the economy.
15. **Pay smart.** We must avoid allowing the Coalition or the international community to distort the economy with floods of highly paid workers.
16. **Oil.** Iraqi oil will be used for the Iraqi people. The Coalition Provisional Authority, based on a study of best practices around the world, will develop a plan for the Iraqi oil industry that is based on transparency and private ownership. The plan should be designed to benefit the Iraqi people.
17. **Contracts—promoting Iraq's recovery.** Contracts for work in Iraq will go first to those who utilize Iraqi workers, and to countries that were supportive in liberating the Iraqi people, especially key neighbors such as Jordan and the Gulf states, because it will contribute to greater regional economic activity and accelerate Iraq's economic recovery.
18. **Third-states and international organizations.** Other countries and international organizations, including the UN, will be encouraged to assist in Iraq, but not if their presence is designed to further complicate an already difficult task.
19. **Outsiders—assistance, but not interference.** Assistance from neighbors will be welcomed. Conversely, interference in Iraq by its neighbors or others in the international community will not be accepted. Iraqis who are complicit or, for example, serve as agents of Iranian or Syrian influence will be dealt with.

~~SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL~~
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD14985

~~SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL~~
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

20. **Monitoring NGOs.** We welcome NGO assistance, but activities of NGOs will be closely monitored and regulated. Those with extremist ties will be excluded.
21. **Priority sources of funds.** The U.S. will be the funder of last resort, not first. In order of preferred expenditure: Iraqi funds located in Iraq, Iraqi funds at the UN, seized frozen Iraqi assets in the U.S. and in other countries, donors from other nations, and finally U.S. appropriated funds. Once the U.S. starts funding an activity, it will be difficult to get others to take over that responsibility. It is best for the U.S. not to start funding in the first place, and instead to use the urgency of the problem to serve as leverage to get access to Iraqi funds or to raise money from others.
22. **Trial and error.** Democracies in transition are inherently untidy. Trial and error and experimentation will be part of the process. Perfection will not. Course corrections will be necessary.
23. **New matters.** Additional issues will be addressed as they surface (the role of the UN, debt relief, etc.).
24. **Patience and respect for Iraq's singular character.** The transition from despotism to a democracy will not happen fast or easily. It cannot be rushed. It will evolve over years. Rushing elections could lead to tyranny of the majority. Further, the ultimate outcome must be for Iraq and be decided by Iraqis, within the broad principles laid out by President Bush. One ought not expect the Iraqi outcome to replicate any other system. For example, there may well be a larger role for religion than in many other countries, and that is acceptable. Elections will likely best be held only after the mechanisms of a civil society are in place.

DHR:dh
Iraq/Principles for Iraq

~~DRAFT WORKING PAPER~~
~~SENSITIVE—PRE-DECISIONAL~~

11-L-0559/OSD14986

May 12, 2003 2:02 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
LTG Craddock
DSB

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DK*

SUBJECT: Shia Holy Sites

You both heard the President today in the NSC meeting discuss the importance of the Shia holy sites and the dynamics of what may be taking place in Iran. I think we should get more information.

We should see what we think, and then develop a plan.

Doug, you should have a group of people start working this problem. You heard what the President said.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050903-26

*Doug Feith:
Please brief DSD
on Shia issue*

Please respond by 5/30/03

U08011 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14987

DSB

12 May 03



May 9, 2003 8:00 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UK Envoy to Iraq

Geoff Hoon, the MoD of the UK, tells me that Prime Minister Blair has dispatched an envoy to Iraq named John Sawyers, who speaks fluent Arabic. It sounds to me like he could be a help.

Thanks.

DHR dh
050903-9

.....

Please respond by _____

DR

9 May 03


U08012 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14988



May 14, 2003 2:35 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Thanks

Thanks so much for your update. I appreciate it. It is helpful and encouraging. I am sure you are doing a great job. Best to all.

DHR:dh
051403-13

.....
Please respond by _____ 

3355D

U08013 / 03


14 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD14989



May 12, 2003 4:57 PM

TO: Amb. Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Guidelines

Jerry—

I received your edits on the policy guidelines and incorporated them. Thanks.

I hope things are going well.

DHR:dh
051203-15

.....

Please respond by —



12 May 03

U08014 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14990



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 13 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY TO IRAQ

SUBJECT: Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority

Pursuant to the President's letter of May 9, 2003, appointing you as Presidential Envoy to Iraq, and my authority under applicable law, I hereby designate you as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, with the title of Administrator. You shall be responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq, and shall oversee, direct and coordinate all executive, legislative and judicial functions necessary to carry out this responsibility, including humanitarian relief and reconstruction and assisting in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority.

As the Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander of U.S. Central Command shall directly support the Coalition Provisional Authority by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out U.S. policy generally.

cc:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commander of U.S. Central Command




11-L-0559/OSD14991



May 13, 2003 7:53 AM

TO: The Rt. Honourable Geoff Hoon

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Precedent

I have thought about our phone conversation a good deal. I wonder if it is really a good idea to have a practice that a person should not serve as a Secretary General of NATO unless they come from an EU nation. If you think about it, from Ismay through Spaak, Stikker, Brosio, Luns, Carrington, Worner, Claes, Solana and Robertson, it is a clean sweep.

I suspect that that precedent will not prove to be helpful to the alliance or the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Why don't you think a bit about that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051203-11


NATO 230

13 May 03

U08015 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14992

May 12, 2003 5:16 PM

TO: The Rt. Honourable Geoff Hoon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Guidelines

Thanks so much for your notes on the policy guidelines for Iraq. When the final draft of this policy paper comes out, I think you will find that I tweaked paragraph 7 (now paragraph 8) to incorporate your points on "rapid and visible benefits for ordinary Iraqis," and we tweaked paragraph 18 (now paragraph 19) on "encouraging non-governmental organizations."

Once we get closure on this, I will see that you get a copy.

Thanks so much.

Regards,

DHR:dh
051203-14

TRH

12 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD14993

U08016 / 03



May 12, 2003 2:20 PM

TO: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Unified Quest 2003

Your May 7 memo on Unified Quest 2003 sounds terrific. Pour it on!

Regards,

DHR:dlh
USI 203-7

.....
Please respond by _____

353

12 MAY 03

U08017 / 03

May 22, 2003 10:39 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Crime Statistics

Attached are some crime statistics we pulled together and then adjusted for the population of Baghdad. Do you have any idea what the average number per month is of murders in Baghdad or the number of robberies, larcenies and thefts?

In any event, it strikes me that this puts the thing in a little context that might be useful.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/22/03 "2002 Crime Statistics"

DHR:dh
052203-28

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

Iraq

22 May 03

U08018 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD14995

2002 CRIME STATISTICS

<u>CITY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>AVERAGE # OF MURDERS PER MONTH</u>	<u>AVERAGE # OF ROBBERY / LARCENY / THEFT PER MONTH</u>	<u># OF MURDERS PER MONTH (ADJUSTED TO POPULATION OF BAGHDAD)*</u>	<u># OF R/L/T PER MONTH (ADJUSTED TO POPULATION OF BAGHDAD)*</u>
Baghdad, Iraq	5,600,000				
Albuquerque, N.M	448,607	4	2,680	50	33,455
Los Angeles, CA	3,694,820	54	12,995	82	19,696
New York, NY	8,008,278	49	10,863	34	7,596
Washington, DC	572,000	22	3,247	215	31,793
Paris, France	2,110,000	35	13,620	93	36,148
Moscow, Russia	9,000,000	106	5,027	66	3,128

*These numbers project a local crime rate to adjust for a population size to match Baghdad (5,600,000)

<u>City</u>	<u>Crime Statistic Source</u>
Albuquerque, N.M.	Albuquerque Police Dept
Los Angeles, CA	Los Angeles Police Dept
New York, N.Y.	New York City Police Dept
Washington, D.C.	Washington D.C. Metro Police
Paris, France	Vocal, U.S. Embassy, Paris.
Moscow, Russia	U.S. Embassy Moscow, Russia

Prepared 5/22/2003 8:49 AM
11-L-0559/OSD14996

May 22, 2003 8:51 AM

TO: LTG Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Post-Saddam

Iraq

Attached is an interesting article that is worth thinking about.

Regards.

Attach.

Anderson, Gary. "Saddam's Greater Game," *Washington Post*, April 2, 2003, p. A17.

DHR:dh
052203-18

.....

Please respond by _____

SD:

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Colonel. He is @ SAIC. A very smart guy!

22 May 03

Jayme

11-L-0559/OSD14997 008019 / 03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Source: [News & Business](#) > [News](#) > News Group File, All (1)

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MAY 22 2003

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The Washington Post, April 02, 2003

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The Washington Post

April 02, 2003, Wednesday, Final Edition

SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. A17

LENGTH: 879 words

HEADLINE: Saddam's Greater Game

BYLINE: Gary Anderson

BODY:

Many observers of the war with Iraq are focused on the looming battle for Baghdad in anticipation that it will be the culminating event of the conflict, and it may in the end be so from an American perspective. But in the view of the Iraqi leadership, it may be only the end of a first stage in a greater Iraqi plan.

George Patton said that the only way to truly get to know an enemy is to fight him. We have been fighting for nearly two weeks now, and some patterns have been emerging that indicate the Iraqi game plan may differ from the American worldview. A conflict with Iraq has been war-gamed countless time, in many venues in the past 12 years. The potential Iraqi use of asymmetric "dirty tricks" has been a feature of virtually every game I have been associated with. These tactical actions should have come as no surprise to anyone. The question is how to turn asymmetric tactics into a coherent strategy. The assumption that Saddam Hussein is looking at the Battle of Baghdad as a glorious last stand is totally inconsistent with his character. There is likely a greater game afoot, and it is becoming clearer.

Let's look at what we know. Hussein is an admirer of Ho Chi Minh. He has also studied the American debacles in Lebanon and Somalia. He and his staff have had 12 years to think about how to fight. What follows is how I think he has thought about it.

Begin with a desired strategic end state. I believe that he views the war as an opportunity not only to defeat the Americans but also to hijack leadership of the anti-Western wing of the Arab and Muslim world from Islamic fundamentalists such as Osama bin Laden. To do that against overwhelming American and British conventional military superiority, Hussein must develop a three-pronged strategic approach.

Phase I assumes eventual defeat in a conventional war. If defeat is inevitable, he must make the most of it. Anwar Sadat of Egypt reclaimed a measure of Arab pride in 1973 in a war that, while lost tactically and operationally, was fought with enough skill to regain an Arab sense of honor and pride lost in 1967. The next precept is to make the conventional phase last as long as possible and be as bloody as possible for the American-British coalition. The

11-L-0559/OSD14998

5/13/2003

final sub-phase will be to attempt to turn Baghdad into an Arab Alamo and make "Remember Baghdad" a battle cry, not just for future generations but also for the rest of this war. At this point Hussein would go into hiding or exile, portraying himself as having led a glorious struggle against imperialism and vowing to continue. If he uses chemical weapons, I am wrong. There will be no sanctuary.

The second phase would be a protracted guerrilla war against the "occupation," which the American-British coalition bills as liberation. It is now obvious that the Baath Party has seeded the urban and semi-urban population centers of the country with cadres designed to lead such a guerrilla movement; this is not a last-minute act of desperation or an afterthought. Americans have overrun facilities that have been in place for some time. The war would be waged as an attritional struggle against the occupying forces and any Iraqi interim government. Attempts at free elections would be subverted and portrayed as a sham. The strategic objective of this phase would be to have the Americans and British tire of the effort and turn it over to the United Nations.

Phase III would then be to amass enough semi-conventional power to overwhelm the U.N. and interim government mechanisms. In other words, the concept would be to stage a combination of "Black Hawk Down" and the 1975 North Vietnamese offensive that crushed South Vietnam. A success here would transform Hussein from a regional pariah into a darling of the Arab world. This is a high-risk strategy, but Saddam Hussein is a high-risk kind of guy.

My reason for writing this is not to postulate a gloom-and-doom scenario but to suggest that we be prepared to react to an enemy game plan that may be different from our own. This plan is not devoid of significant dangers from an Iraqi perspective. First, it would be hard for Baath Party operatives to make the transition from the role of Sheriff of Nottingham to that of Robin Hood. But it would not be impossible.

Such a transition is not unprecedented. Vlad the Impaler, a noted tyrant, became a Romanian folk hero in the face of a Turkish invasion. If Dracula could make the transition, it's not inconceivable that Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party leadership could do the same. But that transition is not yet complete. The Baath cadres can be rooted out and hunted down early if we make doing so a priority. We know how to fight a guerrilla war, but we need to act quickly before these cadres become indigenous to the local terrain. We need to ship copies of the old Marine Corps Small Wars Manual to the battlefield if we have not already done so.

In Iraq we are fighting an adaptive and asymmetric foe. To paraphrase actor George Hamilton in one of his most memorable roles (in "Zorro, the Gay Blade"), "There is no shame in fighting an asymmetric war; the only shame is fighting one badly."

The writer is a retired Marine Corps colonel who served in Somalia and Lebanon.

LOAD-DATE: April 02, 2003

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5/12/03
1420

May 9, 2003 11:11 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
DAVID CH
CC: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve

As we discussed and the President requested, I need to see a proposal as to how we can ease up the pressure on the Guard and the Reserve.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050903-25

.....
Please respond by 5/16/03

326

9 May 03



May 28, 2003 8:03 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (deliver by hand)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Australian, Russian Ministerials, etc.

For those meetings where both you and I are supposed to meet with both ministers, why don't we make a proposal to change them, so that one of us travels when it is out of the U.S. on alternate years and meets with both their foreign and defense ministers, and vice versa, so just one of them would have to come to the U.S. to meet with both of us.

I think it is crazy for us to be doing this with Russia, Australia and other countries. It is overkill.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052703-33

337

28 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD15001

U08075 /03

May 21, 2003 9:45 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

Alan Greenspan came by to see me. The subject was oil and democracy.

Our discussion was along these lines:

We must keep the revenues from oil away from government. Throughout the world, underdeveloped countries with oil have wasted the revenues. They have been stolen, misused and used to suppress the population.

In the old days, the people of a country could swarm over a small minority that was robbing them or repressing them. Not so today. Small minorities—bullies—can use technology to successfully repress majorities. Repression works because of modern technologies.

The goal in Iraq from the outset should be to get the oil revenues into the hands of the Iraqi people. One approach might be to establish four or five mutual funds and put the revenues from oil and gas into them. They would be owned by the Iraqi people. The plan would be to take a small portion of the revenues of the funds, and pay them to the owners of the funds, all adult Iraqi citizens. There are issues as the definition of an Iraqi citizen (for example, are the people who just returned Iraqi citizens) but those issues could be dealt with.

Fortunately, the average income in the country is so low that it could make a significant difference and substantially affect the annual income of the Iraqi people by giving them a relatively small amount of money. Each of the funds would pay exactly the same monthly dividends, regardless of their varying successes.

The rest of the funds' income could be for:

1. Strengthening the oil infrastructure, improving liftings, building pipelines, and finding more efficient ways to do things.

11-L-0559/OSD15002

U08076 /03

IRAQ

21MAY03

2. Other infrastructure in the country that will benefit the Iraqi people and contribute towards increasing private sector economic activity and the economic well-being of the country.
3. Loans for small businesses. If the fund made loans for small businesses, it could help to develop a middle class, an entrepreneurial class, people who would develop material values, which could then begin to create in the Iraqi people a sense of progress. This could weaken the pull of Islamic fundamentalism.

Democracy

Democracy is linked to this idea. Democracy can be dangerous in the sense that if you have a group of people who have spiritual values but not material values and have not practiced the art of compromise, if they go too fast to an election by majority rule, it could end up with a permanent mistake—one vote, one time—and another Iran-like theocracy.

In short, we need to lay a foundation for self-government. The way to get a non-theocratic system is to go slowly. People have to begin to see what is in it for them.

That suggests we should not rush to have elections. We can have votes on things like city councils with a limited mandate—to help get sewers fixed, help get the garbage picked up, help get policemen out. Otherwise, the fundamentalists will very likely sweep, in a way that is disadvantageous to the people in terms of their long-term future and benefit.

Democracy involves choosing between things. If the people don't have things to choose between and there are strong, dominant theocratic forces, the outcome may be an unhappy one.

In short, the management of the oil revenues could conceivably help to begin to lay the foundation for movement towards democracy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-19

.....

Please respond by _____

May 22, 2003 7:32 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

Attached is a memo I dictated after a visit with Alan Greenspan that you might find of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/21/03 SecDef memo to USD(P) re: Oil and Democracy [052003-19]

DHR:dh
052203-3

11-L-0559/OSD15004

W00611-03

May 22, 2003 7:28 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Jay Garner
Larry Di Rita
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

Attached is a memo I dictated after a visit with Alan Greenspan. I think you will find it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/21/03 SecDef memo to USD(P) re: Oil and Democracy [052003-19]

DHR:dh
052203-2

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD15005

U08003-03

9:51 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
cc: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 24, 2003

SUBJECT:

Someone ought to take a look at the Iraqi military equipment that the Kurds have grabbed. There's a lot of intel on it. It looks worrisome to me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052403.08

Please respond by: 6/10/03

Iraq

24 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD15006

U08132 /03

SENT 5/29 07:00

May 27, 2003 11:46 AM

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Constitutional Democracy

Attached is some material from a very thoughtful constitutional scholar, Dr. Robert Goldwin. I think it will be helpful in the process we are embarked on.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/29/03 Goldwin ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
052703-17

Please respond by _____

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29 MAY 03

11-L-0559/OSD15007

U08141 /03


Robert A. Goldwin

(b)(6)

Post-it Fax Note	7671	Date	Apr. 29, 2003	# of pages	7
To	Sec. Rumsfeld	From	Bob Goldwin		
Co./Dept	DDO	Co.			
Phone #			(b)(6)		
Fax #	(b)(6)				

April 29, 2003

D. Bremer

To: Secretary Rumsfeld
From: Bob Goldwin *CRG*
Subject: A Checklist of Questions for Constitution Writers

A few decades ago you gave me a medal for the usefulness of my questions; the attached article contains a superabundance of my questions, which I trust you will also find useful.

I wrote this article thirteen years ago [The American Enterprise, Vol. 1, No. 3, May/June 1990] as advice to the constitution writers then getting to work in several of the newly liberated Soviet republics. Rereading it now for its relevance to Iraq, I don't think anything would have to be revised.

The checklist of questions, beginning on page 3, should be the most useful part of it for you, General Garner, and the Iraqis who will be engaged in making the new Iraqi constitution. These questions were compiled in the course of my work in editing two volumes of essays by over thirty living authors of the constitutions of their own country from more than a dozen different countries.

I offer one additional unasked-for bit of advice, if I may. The rhetorical emphasis should be on "constitutional democracy," not just "democracy" alone. Democracy alone is unstructured and there are no clear steps to take to establish it. When you advocate democracy alone you get stupid questions like, "What if they vote democratically for an Iranian-style theocracy or another dictator like Saddam Hussein?". But *constitutional* democracy implies clear assignments of power and limits on those powers, barriers to dictatorial rule, rule by laws not men, and—most important—explicit protection of the fundamental rights of individuals. And adding a constitution to the process makes it clear what the first and subsequent steps must be, right to the end result.

cc: J. Duman

WE THE PEOPLES: A CHECKLIST FOR NEW CONSTITUTION WRITERS

BY ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

Robert A. Goldwin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He was director of AEI Constitution Project. This article draws on the introductions of two of his books: Constitution Makers on Constitution Making and Forging Unity Out of Diversity.

Americans are accustomed to thinking of constitution writing as something done hundreds of years ago by bewigged gentlemen wearing frock coats, knee breeches, and white stockings, but for the rest of the world, constitution writing is very much an activity of the present day. The Constitution of the United States is now more than 200 years old, but a majority of the other constitutions in the world are less than 15 years old. That is, of the 160 or so written national constitutions, more than 80 have been adopted since 1975. This means that in the last few decades, on average, more than five new national constitutions have come into effect every year.

Some of these new constitutions are, of course, for new nations, but the surprising fact is that most were written for very old nations, such as Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. And now, in the old nations of Eastern Europe and possibly also in the Soviet Union or newly independent parts of it, new constitutions are about to be written to replace outdated, one-party constitutions.

Those who are responsible for writing these new constitutions know they need assistance. As Professor Albert Blaustein of Rutgers University Law School recently reported, many East European legal experts "haven't seen a constitutional law book for 45 years." They need not proceed without advice, though, because there are so many still-active, experienced constitution writers in scores of nations around the world that have recently adopted new constitutions. There are also experts in international constitutional law in the United States and in many other nations who would be only too glad to offer their services.

Nonetheless, except perhaps for narrow technical matters, outsiders, however expert, are limited in the help they can provide. A successful constitution must be deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the nation and its people, and its writers need a clear sense of what is central to the way the nation is constituted. For millennia, East European nations have been battlegrounds for innumerable invasions, conquests, and consequent migrations. As a result, there is a great mixing of peoples who cannot be sorted out even by computer-guided drawing of borders. These peoples, who have no choice but to live side by side, are not necessarily able to love their neighbors. It seems as though everyone's grandfather was murdered by someone else's grandfather. As a result, most of these nations have diverse populations characterized by passionate hostilities. The constitutional task to make "one people"-to strengthen a sense of national unity by constitutional provisions-is a much greater concern for these nations.

Destructive Diversity

That all human beings are fundamentally equal is a central tenet of modern constitutionalism that is essential to all systems of political liberty. To assert that we are all equal means, necessarily, that we are all equally human, sharing one and the same human nature. This view is widely held and advanced, sometimes as fact, sometimes as aspiration, and denied or disputed for the most part by those who are thought to be benighted, or bigoted, or both. The universality of human nature, the oneness of humankind, is a vital element of modern democratic thought.

(2)

And yet, wherever we look in the world, we see mankind divided into tightly bound groups, set apart by racial, religious, language, or national differences. The bonds of loyalty these differences engender often override all other considerations, including even the obligations of national citizenship. Whether or not we are "all brothers and sisters under the skin," two indisputable, and indisputably linked, facts are evident everywhere: first, there is a natural, powerful fraternal bond among persons who share the same religion, or race, or language, or nationality; second, the same inclusive bond commonly has the effect of excluding those who are different, engendering hostility toward "outsiders."

In almost all countries with diverse populations and almost all countries around the world do have significant diversity—we see, not the "domestic tranquility" spoken of in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, but domestic hostility between fellow citizens of the same nation-states: Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Muslims and Christians in Lebanon, Jews and Muslims in Israel, blacks and whites in the United States, Flemish and French speakers in Belgium, Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union, Serbs and Albanians in Yugoslavia, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, Hausas and Ibos in Nigeria—and this list does not come close to being exhaustive. Given historic animosities in many countries of Eastern Europe, diversity presents a problem for their constitution makers.

Citizens who are members of groups significantly different from others of the population can reasonably have grave concerns: fear for their safety, concern that they will not be allowed to participate in the political, social, and economic life of the nation, and fear that they will be restricted in the practices that are characteristic of their special way of life. To address these fears, many constitutions have special provisions, usually addressed directly to groups by name, assuring them of participation in the national life and guaranteeing freedom of religion or use of language, or promising preferences in education or employment on the basis of nationality or race. The dilemma such provisions pose, however, is that they raise the differences within the population to a constitutional status and tend thereby to identify, emphasize, and perpetuate the divisions within society. Our own constitution is silent in this regard, aiming for unity by assimilation.

No Universal Formula

Years of study of constitutions confirm what common sense would suggest: that there is no universal formula for a successful constitution. A sound constitution for any nation has to be something of a reflection, although more than that, of the essence of a particular nation, and this is inescapably influenced by the character of each nation's people, or peoples, and their history.

Constitution writers may wish to make a break with their past, to make a completely fresh start, but they never have the luxury of a clean slate. They start with a population having certain characteristics (for example, homogeneous or diverse), an economy tied to its geographic characteristics (a maritime nation or landlocked), neighboring nations (peaceful or warlike) that cannot be moved or ignored, and a history that has shaped their understanding of themselves and their national aspirations. The constitution must reflect all of these elements of the nation, and the more it is in accord with these national characteristics, the better the constitution will be.

One day in Athens some years ago, while talking to a Greek judge who is also a constitutional scholar, I referred to the newness of the Greek constitution. He asked me what date I put on it, and I, somewhat surprised, said, "1975, of course." "Yes, I understand," he said, "but you could also say 1863." "But," I replied, "Greece has had nearly a dozen constitutions since then." "Yes," he said, "that's right, but they are always the same." He was exaggerating, of course, but not much. When Greece adopted its latest constitution, two issues were foremost, the roles of the armed forces and of the monarchy. However much Greek constitutions and regimes changed through the decades, these questions remained constant. There was not much leeway, not much discretion on many of the most important points. The same will be true for the nations of Eastern Europe.

(3)

Although there can be no universal formula for successful constitution writing-no canned answers that can be applied to any country in search of a new constitutional order-there are standard, universal questions that must be asked. A comprehensive list will include some questions that at first glance seem archaic or unnecessary to consider. Turkey or Portugal, for instance, did not have to dwell on the question of the role of the monarchy as Greece and Spain did, but considering how many modern nations are constitutional monarchies, it is not impossible that one or another East European nation might consider some form of constitutional monarchy before the turmoil is over.

Therefore, in the conviction that it is possible to develop a substantial, if not complete, list of the questions constitution writers must ask themselves in writing the constitution of any country, I offer this enumeration for guidance:

QUESTIONS FOR CONSTITUTION WRITERS

The Preliminaries

- How will delegates to the constitutional committee or constituent assembly be chosen? Will the new constitution be drafted by the legislative body or by a body chosen specifically for the purpose? If there is controversy about the method of selection, how and by whom will it be resolved?
- What will be the rules and procedures of the constitution-making body, once chosen, and how and by whom will controversies on this question be resolved?

Powers and Power Relationships

- What are the different branches of government, and what is their constitutional relationship? Are the executive and legislative branches separated or combined?
- Is there a single chief executive, or an executive cabinet, or some form of executive council? What are the executive powers, and how are they limited? Does the executive have some share in the legislative process: for instance, do laws require his signature; does he have veto power, the right to propose legislation? Does the executive have treaty-making powers, the power to declare war, command of the armed forces, law-enforcement powers, some degree of responsibility to appoint judges, power of executive pardon or clemency? Are police powers national, or is there some form of local authority? How are the executive departments established, and how and by whom are the department heads appointed and fired? How are executive salaries determined? How is the chief executive chosen, and what is the term of office?
- Is the head of state separate from the head of government, and if so, what is the role of the head of state? How is the head of state chosen? What is the term of office? If a monarch, what is the role of the crown? Does the head of state act to dissolve the legislature, call for new elections, name a new prime minister?
- Is the legislature unicameral or bicameral? What is the principle of representation, or is there more than one principle (for example, some legislators chosen on the basis of population, some by states or provinces)? What is the length of term for members? Under what conditions and by whom are new elections called? How are salaries of members determined and varied? Does the legislature have the

4

power of the purse, taxing power, oversight powers, a role in executive and judicial appointments, budget-making powers, power over the monetary system, power to regulate domestic trade, foreign trade, a role in war making and treaty making, power to investigate and compel testimony, power to impeach executive and judicial officers? Do legislators have immunity from arrest? What are the conditions for dissolution of the legislature? What is the system of justice and law enforcement? What is the structure of the judicial system, and how and by whom is it established? In what ways, if any, are judges subject to legislative and executive controls? How independent are judges from executive and legislative control? How are judges appointed or elected and for what terms? Are judicial salaries protected? Do the courts of law have powers of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions, or is there a separate constitutional court?

- To whom are the powers assigned for the conduct of foreign policy? To what extent are they shared, and on the basis of what principle? Where is the power assigned to declare war and to make and ratify treaties?
- Are there powers to suspend the constitution in emergencies? If so, by whom and under what conditions? Are there protections against abuse of emergency powers? Are all public officials required to take an oath of office to uphold this constitution?
- To what extent are the executive, legislative, and judicial powers separated, and by what provisions are the separations maintained?
- Is the national government unitary or federal, and if the latter, what form of federalism? Whether unitary or federal, is it centralized or decentralized, or some combination?
- What are the limits of the powers of the government and of the various branches and officers, and by what means are the limits sustained?

Elections and Political Parties

- By what methods are the various offices filled: direct popular election by universal suffrage or some indirect method; winner-take-all or some form of proportional representation? Which offices, if any, are not elective, and what is the method of appointment? Are there different methods of election or selection for different offices?
- What is the constitutional status of political parties, or is that left undetermined?

Nonpolitical Institutions

- What is the structure of the education system, and how is it supervised? Is the school system centralized, regional, local, or some combination? Are there provisions for ethnic, religious, or language schools? Are private schools allowed, and if so, what controls are imposed on them? Is the freedom of inquiry in university teaching and re-search protected?
- What are the provisions for the media? Are there government-owned, political party-owned, or privately owned newspapers, television channels, and radio stations? Are the media regulated or licensed? What protections are there for freedom of the press, and how are abuses prevented?
- What is the constitutional status of the military? Who is the commander in chief of the armed forces? How much and what form of civilian control is there?

5

- What is the role of religion? Is there an established church, and one or more official religions? Are there church subsidies from public funds, and if so, are they on a basis of equality or are they preferential? Is there separation of church and state? Is freedom of religion protected and by what means?

Rights

- Is there a bill of rights? What protections are there for the rights of individuals: speech, press, religion, peace-able assembly, habeas corpus, public trial, and so on? Is there equality of all persons, or are there constitutional preferences based on race, religion, sex, nationality, or different levels of citizenship? Are the rights primarily political and legal, or are social and economic rights included? Are the rights provisions stated negatively or affirmatively? Is there a list of duties of citizens listed, and if so, are the duties linked to rights? Are there protections of rights of aliens? What are the provisions for immigration and emigration? What is the status under the constitution of international declarations of rights? Are only the rights of individuals acknowledged, or are there also protections for the rights of religious, ethnic, racial, or regional groups?
- Are there different levels or kinds of citizenship; that is, are there qualifications or restrictions of voting rights, property rights, representation, access to education, or eligibility for public office based on race, sex, religion, language, or national origin? Do naturalized citizens have the same rights, privileges, and immunities as natural-born citizens? What are the naturalization provisions?
- Does the constitution specify any national or official languages? Are there provisions for schools, courts, government offices, churches, and other institutions to conduct their activities in languages other than the national or official ones?

The Economic System

- Does the constitution specify what kind of economic system shall prevail (for instance, that this nation is a socialist democracy or that the means of production shall be owned privately)? Are there provisions for managing the economy, or is a market economy of private enterprise assumed? What is the status of private property? What is the status of banks, corporations, farms, other enterprises? What are the regulatory and licensing powers? Are there government monopolies and, if so, what kind? What are the copyright and patent provisions? Is there protection against impairing the obligation of contracts?
- What is the status of inter-national law and international organizations in relation to national laws and institutions? What is the legal status of treaties and other international obligations?

Final Questions

- What is the amendment process? Is it designed to make amending the constitution easy or difficult? Does the amending process include the people as a whole, or is it limited to the legislature and other officials?
- What is the process for ratifying the constitution?

A Rare Activity

(6)

The frequency of constitution writing tells us two things. First, constitutions are very important, and great investments of time and effort are needed to write them; and second, it is very difficult, and rare, to write a constitution that lasts-which is why there have been so many of them.

A complete list-and this one surely has omissions-gives no assurance of finding the right answers in writing a constitution. But an enumeration such as this provides reassurance that major issues will not be overlooked. It also reminds us what an extraordinary accomplishment our own 200-year-old Constitution is.

Making a constitution is a special political activity. It is possible only at certain extraordinary moment in a nation's history, and its success or failure can have profound and lasting consequences for a nation and its people. That is the challenge facing the constitution makers and the peoples of Eastern Europe.

May 29, 2003 8:38 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (deliver by hand)
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cost of Iceland

Attached is a memo on the cost of Iceland. It is too much. We have to get it fixed.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/23/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Iceland [U07840/03]

DHR:dh
052903-13

Iceland

29 May 03

U08164 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15015

5/23
1820



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

703 MAY 23 PM 2:33

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 29 2003

May 23, 2003, 11:30 AM

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *by*

SUBJECT: Iceland

- In response to your request regarding the annual costs to maintain U.S. forces in Iceland, the Department spends about \$225 million annually (\$59 million by the Air Force and \$166 million by the Navy) for Iceland support: \$121 million for base support, facility maintenance, and radar operation; \$12 million for family housing; and \$92 million for military personnel costs.
- The Department maintains 2,464 military and civilian personnel (642 Air Force and 1,822 Navy personnel) at the Naval Air Station Keflavik in Iceland, along with HH-60G search and rescue helicopters, a detachment of 4 deployed P-3s (rotating every 6 months), and an Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance operation.
 - The Navy P-3s are a rotational detachment from a deployed squadron, split between U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command. The P-3 deployment cycle maintains a rotation base of three squadrons (one deployed, two in interdeployment training cycle).
 - Under the Aerospace Expeditionary Force construct, the Air Force rotates four F-15s, one KC-135, and one HC-130 and crews to Iceland every 3 months.
- The mission of Naval Air Station Keflavik is to maintain and operate facilities, and provide services and materials to support aviation activities and Navy's operating forces. Iceland also provides the primary divert airfield for the North Atlantic.
- The Air Force uses the Navy's facilities and reimburses the Navy for the support provided. The Air Force operates the radars (\$17 million) for air control and defense. The radars feed the Icelandic air traffic control system.

SPL ASSISTANT	Dushman
SEC BR	CRADDOCK
APR 2003	
EXCISE	COX

11-L-0559/OSD15016

5/23

U07840 /03

- Beginning in FY 2004, the annual cost for forces deployed to Iceland declines to \$160 million per year because the Air Force has not budgeted for Iceland support after FY 2003. The Air Force wanted to remove its forces from Iceland starting in FY 2002 but was directed to continue funding Icelandic support through FY 2003. The Navy has budgeted about \$160 million each year from FY 2004 and beyond for Icelandic operations.
- The Air Force believes that it can provide for Icelandic defense through force projection. Ending Icelandic support would save \$27 million annually (base support and radar costs) and would relieve pressure on the low density/high demand search and rescue crews and aircraft.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: John M. Evans

(b)(6)

May 28, 2003 11:30 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Articles by Hormats

Here are a couple of papers by Bob Hormats on Iraq that are worth reading.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hormats, Robert. "Post-War Germany's Lessons for Post-War Iraq," *CEO Confidential*, Issue 2003/06, April 2003, p. 1-2.

Hormats, Robert D. "Draw from Past in Postwar Iraq," *Baltimore Sun*, March 23, 2003.

DHR:dh
052803-7

Please respond by _____

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Iraq

28 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD15018

U08165 /03

Inside:

Reaching Deeper Into the Monetary Policy Tool Kit	3
Better—But Not Bright— Prospects for Tech Spending	4
Market Snapshot	5
The World in a Nutshell	6
After the War: Parallels With September 11	8

Post-War Germany's Lessons for Post-War Iraq

The personal views of Robert Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs (International)

Presenting his vision of post-war Iraq, President Bush compared reconstruction in Iraq to that of Germany and Japan after World War II. The comparison is apt. In particular, the allies' experience in Germany offers valuable lessons for today's planners.

Then-Secretary of State James Byrnes described the allies' aims: 'to win the German people . . . it was a battle between us and the Russians over minds.' This time, the battle over minds will be with Islamic radicalism. The coalition's success or failure in Iraq will have a crucial impact on that battle throughout the Middle East and around the world.

The war has also forced the US and the UK to grapple with the right balance between 'winning the war' and 'winning friends.' US, British and Australian forces have fought the war with tactics designed to minimize civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure—while still destroying strategic targets and undermining the military structure of the Saddam regime. This is a difficult challenge; achieving the right balance will be critical to the future of Iraq and the region.

Differences between post-war Germany and post-war Iraq are as instructive as the similarities. Unlike Iraq, Germany had a modern economy and democratic institutions before the rise of the Nazis. Germany also was far more homogeneous ethnically and culturally than Iraq. The country already had close commercial and diplomatic links to many western nations and long-standing ties of immigration, culture and trade with the US. Not so Iraq, a culture and society that few westerners on either side of the Atlantic are very familiar with. This will make post-war reform cooperation between coalition countries and Iraqis a lot more difficult.

Allied forces entered Germany as occupiers. This time the coalition wants its forces to be received by Iraqis and seen by others as liberators. Therefore, US and coalition authorities may be less willing than 50 years ago to press for wholesale political and social reengineering. Enlisting UN and multilateral support could sustain the pressure for reform and increase the perception of legitimacy in

the eyes of the Iraqi people and others in the Islamic world. Also, US forces in the 1940s were largely draftees; many had expertise in civilian governance and economic management. In today's armed forces, such skills are largely among reserves, increasing the need for help from private and UN agencies.

Despite obvious differences, many of the post-war challenges are similar. In 1945, Germany suffered wretched hunger, sickness and poverty. Millions roamed in search of shelter, food and jobs. In Iraq, millions already face shortages of food and medicine. War could make these worse, especially by disrupting the oil-for-food distribution system on which 16 million Iraqis depend for subsistence. If Iraq's fragile electric power infrastructure is damaged, hospitals, sewage systems and water treatment plants will fail. Wars with Iran and Kuwait, and Saddam's own brutality, have created many displaced persons and refugees. This war, plus score settling and retribution, could add more.

Germany had to be de-Nazified, demilitarized and purged of war criminals. Iraq will have to be de-Baathified, its military thinned and war criminals punished. But disqualifying too many civilian officials could be counterproductive. Allied authorities needed skilled and experienced Germans to help run the country; one of the chief reasons for the German economic and political recovery was the abundance of skilful and experienced Germans to set the country on a new course. The current coalition must find and support a similar group of Iraqis.

The allies pressed the Germans to create a new government structure that would prevent authoritarian power from re-emerging, yet be strong enough to avoid disintegration. In Iraq, the coalition will want to see authority diffused, but not so much that Baghdad cannot maintain Iraq's territorial integrity. A security architecture was built to provide Germany a place in Europe that did not threaten its neighbors. The same will be needed in the Gulf region. Cooperation with other regional powers, especially Turkey, will be needed to ensure a stable post-war regional environment.

Continued on page 2

Goldman Sachs
133 Fleet Street
London EC4A 3BB
England

Sandra Lawson
Senior Global Economist
Roopa Purushothaman
Research Assistant

<http://www.gs.com/ceoconfidential>

(b)(6)

Post-War Germany's Lessons for Post-War Iraq

Continued from page 1

What Can Be Learned From the Occupation of Germany That Will Help in Iraq?

The allies were unprepared for the widespread hunger, disease and malnutrition that staggered Germany after the war. Much of Europe and Asia experienced similar conditions, so Germans got little sympathy. Today, the coalition will be judged harshly if a comparable humanitarian disaster befalls Iraqis. Immediate and massive assistance for the malnourished, wounded and uprooted will be required.

Fortunately, a great deal of planning and propositioning of food and medicine has taken place, and supplies are already entering southern Iraq. Relief will likely be required for a long time. That will require cooperation among the coalition, the UN and private relief agencies. Non-coalition countries have an interest in joining this effort to build a prosperous and free Iraq. Indeed, cooperation in the rebuilding effort provides an opportunity to heal many of the deep rifts that developed in the pre-war period.

According to noted US diplomat and historian George F. Kennan, US forces embittered Germans by 'camping in luxury amid the ruins . . . inhabiting the same sequestered villas that the Gestapo and SS had just abandoned, and enjoying the same privileges.' As coalition forces establish a presence in Iraq, they must remember and not repeat that experience.

Important Nazi leaders escaped prosecution, while needed German teachers, doctors and health workers were dismissed. The perceived arbitrariness and

length (five years) of de-Nazification left some Germans asking whether allied justice shared some of the ousted government's characteristics. Swift, fair and transparent prosecution—with international legitimacy—can avoid that charge in Iraq.

Even with Germany's skilled and democratically experienced population, a new government structure had to be constructed from the bottom up. First, elections were held in the states (Länder). Then governors (minister presidents) in the western occupation zones met to fashion broader administrative institutions. A German Economic Council was elected to oversee reconstruction. Four years after the war, state delegations met to draft a West German constitution (Basic Law). Only then did parliamentary elections take place. The US, the UK and France worked closely together to support German reformers during this lengthy process.

A similar approach could lead to the creation of an Iraqi federal government representing geographic rather than ethnic or communal interests. In the absence of democratic experience, this should start with discussions about the responsibilities of voters and elected officials. Electing an Iraqi Economic Council representing the various regions of the country, to work with the coalition partners and international agencies on reconstruction and oil matters, would help dispel the idea that the war was fought to control oil.

Secretary Byrnes insisted that 'large armies of foreign soldiers or alien bureaucrats . . . are in the long run not the most reliable guardians of another country's democracy.' Even as they maintained responsibility for maintaining order and stability, allied authorities gave able and trusted Germans 'primary responsibility for running their own internal affairs.' The US commander, General Lucius Clay, supported the decision of Ludwig Erhard, top German economic official in the western zones, to eliminate price controls and introduce a stable currency. Hoarding stopped, and food appeared on shop shelves.

Economic change in Iraq will require coalition support for similarly bold moves and ambitious reformers. Just as the success of the occupation of Germany depended on the will and capability of many highly skilled and dedicated Germans—so will the success of the rebuilding and reform of Iraq depend on a similar group of Iraqis. The potential for finding them is considerable; Iraq is one of the most secular countries in the region, with a strong tradition of education and a skilled middle class.

Exports of factories and equipment as reparations jeopardized German reconstruction, so General Clay ordered them to be cut back. Massive reparations and debt repayments could cripple recovery in Iraq. Large-scale rescheduling or forgiveness will be needed. The US, other coalition nations, the World Bank and the IMF should lay the groundwork now.

Oil revenues should be used for key priorities, such as humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. There is a tendency to overestimate the size of oil revenues (which have been about \$15 billion annually) and the ability to quickly increase oil exports. Using oil revenues to support coalition forces or pay war costs would undermine reconstruction and public good will—as did German reparations.

If the peacekeeping and reconstruction are done well, and a moderate, progressive government takes root, Iraq will be a far better place—as Germany is today. And a successful, prosperous and peaceful Iraq will be of considerable benefit to its neighbors, just as a successful, prosperous and peaceful Germany has been to Europe and the rest of the world. Failure, on the other hand, would undermine American and British credibility and influence in much of the world—as it would have in Germany 50 years ago. ■

Further information on the topics in this report is available on the GS Financial Workbench™. For access, please go to www.gs.com/ceoconfidential

Contributors: Ben Broadbent, Bill Dudley, Robert Hormats, Fiona Lake, Binit Patel, Dominic Wilson

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Draw from past in postwar Iraq

By Robert D. Hormats
Originally published March 23, 2003

PRESIDENT BUSH has compared postwar reconstruction in Iraq to that of Germany and Japan after World War II. The comparison is apt. In particular, America's experience in Germany offers valuable lessons for today's planners.

Then-Secretary of State James F. Byrnes described America's aims: "to win the German people ... it was a battle between us and the Russians over minds."

This time, the battle over minds will be with Islamic radicalism. America's success or failure in Iraq will have a crucial impact on that battle throughout the Middle East and worldwide.

Differences between postwar Germany and postwar Iraq are as instructive as the similarities.

Unlike Iraq, Germany had democratic institutions before the takeover of the Nazis, and a modern economy. Germany had longstanding ties of immigration, culture and trade with the United States. Many Americans spoke German; many had visited there.

U.S. forces entered Germany as an army of occupation. This time, the United States wants its forces to be received by Iraqis and seen by others as liberators. Therefore, U.S. authorities may be less willing than in Germany to demand wholesale political and social re-engineering. Enlisting U.N. and multilateral support for reform could reduce the need for unilateral pressure.

Despite obvious differences, many of the postwar challenges are similar.

In 1945, Germans suffered wretched hunger, sickness and poverty. Millions roamed in search of shelter, food and jobs. In Iraq, millions already face shortages of food and medicine. War could make these worse, especially by disrupting the oil-for-food distribution system on which 16 million Iraqis depend for subsistence.

If Iraq's fragile power infrastructure is damaged, hospitals, sewage

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systems and water treatment plants will fail. Wars with Iran and Kuwait and Saddam Hussein's brutality have created many refugees. A new war, plus score-settling and retribution, will add many more.

Germany had to be de-Nazified, demilitarized and purged of war criminals. Iraq will have to be de-Baathified, its military thinned and war criminals punished. But disqualifying too many civilian officials could be counterproductive. U.S. authorities needed skilled and untarnished Germans to help run the country. They must find a similar group of Iraqis. And they must support Iraqi reformers, just as they did German reformers such as Ludwig Erhard, who created the postwar German market economy.

The United States pressed Germany to create a new government structure that would prevent authoritarian power from re-emerging yet be strong enough to avoid disintegration. In Iraq, it will want to see authority diffused, but not so much that Baghdad loses the ability to maintain the country's territorial integrity. A security architecture was built to provide Germany a place in Europe that did not threaten its neighbors. The same will be needed in the Persian Gulf.

What can be learned from the occupation of Germany that will help in Iraq?

The United States and its allies were unprepared for the widespread hunger, disease and malnutrition that staggered Germany after the war. Much of Europe and Asia experienced similar conditions, so Germans got little sympathy.

Today, the United States will be judged harshly if a comparable humanitarian disaster befalls Iraqis. Immediate and massive assistance for the malnourished, wounded and uprooted will be required. U.S., U.N. and private relief agencies should be preparing a major effort.

Even with Germany's skilled and democratically experienced population, a new government structure had to be constructed from the bottom up.

First, elections were held in the states. Then governors in the western occupation zones met to fashion broader administrative institutions. Representatives to a German economic council were elected by the states to oversee reconstruction. Four years after the war, state delegations met to draft a West German constitution. Only then were parliamentary elections held.

A similar bottom-up approach could lead to the creation of an Iraqi federal government that represents geographic rather than ethnic or communal interests. In the absence of democratic experience, this should start with discussions about responsibilities of voters and

elected officials. Electing an economic council to oversee reconstruction and oil matters would help dispel the myth that the war was fought to control oil.

Reparations and debt repayments could cripple a recovery in Iraq. Rescheduling or forgiveness will be needed. The United States, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should lay the groundwork now. Oil revenues should be used for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. Using them to support U.S. forces or pay war costs would undermine reconstruction, as did German reparations.

If American peacekeeping and reconstruction is conducted well, and a moderate, progressive government takes root, Iraq and the entire Middle East will be far better places - as Germany and Europe are today.

Failure would undermine U.S. credibility and influence in much of the world, as it would have in Germany more than 50 years ago.

Robert D. Hormats, a Baltimore native and vice chairman of Goldman Sachs (International), was a senior economic official in the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations.

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SECRET

282 MAY 28 11 28 29

29 MAY 2003

MEMO FOR: SECDEF

FROM: LTG CRADDOCK

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO 27 MAY SNOWFLAKE, SUBJ: BDA

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION - WHAT TO DO WITH BDA MEMO FROM CHRISTIE ? - I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:

- SUBMIT THE MEMO TO JFCOM FOR INCLUSION IN THEIR ONGOING OIF "LESSONS LEARNED" EFFORTS. AS HIS MEMO PURPORTS ENHANCEMENTS IN 4 AREAS, THESE SPECIFICS WOULD PROVIDE JFCOM WITH BETTER GRANULARITY FOR A CLOSER LOOK AT BDA EFFICACY.
- CONCURRENTLY, SEND THE MEMO TO CENTCOM FOR THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE ENHANCEMENTS. GENE RENUART AND HIS TARGETING TEAM SHOULD BE ABLE TO "SHED LIGHT" ON THIS.
- CRAFT A NOTE BACK TO CHRISTIE THANKING HIM AND TELLING HIM WE WILL BE LOOKING AT BDA IN THE OIF LESSONS LEARNED ARENA.

IF YOU CONCUR IN THIS APPROACH I WILL GET IT STARTED.

M

OK
Do
it

May 27, 2003 3:41 PM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: BDA

What do you propose I do with this memo from Christie on the problem of battle damage? It was as bad or worse in Iraq.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/16/03 Dir, OT&E memo to SecDef re: Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and Evaluation contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom [U07374/03]

DHR:dh
052703-31

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

Response attached
5/29

11-L-0559/OSD15025

5/17
1804



OPERATIONAL TEST
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1700 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1700

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

2003 MAY 16 PM 2:06

May 16, 2003, 12:00 p.m.

MAY 27 2003

Jaymie Durnan
S/A

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas P. Christie, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

Thomas Christie

SUBJECT: Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E)
contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom

JBDA conducted contingency testing with United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) during current operations (TAB A). Four main enhancements evolved from this testing (more details at TAB B):

- JBDA assisted USCENTCOM in developing a database to accurately track Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) status of maneuver and fixed targets in a timely manner.
- Installed system capability with near-real-time intelligence and operational data that increased situational awareness.
- Modified the concept of operations for support from the federated partners in coordination with the Joint Staff and the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, resulting in smoother execution of the federated BDA process.
- Introduced BDA training and computer-based training modules to provide reservists with BDA training prior to deployment.

Additional information on JT&E tests and their contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom is forthcoming.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Michael Crisp, Deputy Director, Systems & Test Resources,

(b)(6)

OPR ASSISTANT	Durnan	5/17/03
OPR MA GRADINGS		5/16
MA BUGGY		5/16
EXECSEC	CRX	5/16

11-L-055 SD15026

U07374 / 03



**JOINT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION**

7025 Harbour View Blvd., Suite 105
Suffolk, Virginia 23435-2761



FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E)

PURPOSE: The JBDA JT&E was chartered to investigate, evaluate, and improve battle damage assessment (BDA) in support of the joint force commander (JFC) to facilitate operational decision-making.

PROBLEM STATEMENT: Study of the joint targeting process indicates that, while enhancements have been implemented, BDA needs improvement to provide effective and timely assessments of fixed and mobile targets.

CONCEPT: JBDA will establish a baseline case by evaluating and documenting BDA procedures in realistic operational scenarios. Deficiencies will be identified and verified; potential improvements will be determined, installed, and tested; and collected data will be analyzed for effectiveness and suitability. Legacy products will be developed for the joint staff, Unified Combatant Commands, other joint organizations, and the Services.

BACKGROUND:

1. At the conclusion of DESERT STORM, the Department of Defense (DOD) stated in its final report to Congress, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992*, "The BDA process was difficult, especially for re-strike decisions. The number one DOD finding concerning BDA was that it was slow and inadequate."
2. In response to a recommendation by the Senior Advisory Council (SAC), the Deputy Director, Developmental Test and Evaluation, under the Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), directed a JBDA joint feasibility study (JFS) in June 1999.
3. The JBDA JFS team presented briefings to the joint staff, combatant commands, the Services, and test and evaluation agencies to solicit guidance and support, ensure all involved that the JBDA effort was on track, provide a venue for the team to heighten awareness of BDA processes, and identify problems.
4. The SAC recommended JBDA for charter, and, on 17 August 2000, OSD chartered the JBDA JT&E to "Employ multi-Service and other Department of Defense (DOD) agency support, personnel, and equipment to investigate, evaluate, and improve BDA support to the joint force commander in order to facilitate operational decision-making."
5. JBDA observed Korea's Combined Forces Command annual exercise Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) 01 and used UFL 02 as its baseline test. JBDA also completed contingency tests with the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) to study real-world BDA processes during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

JOINT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ROADMAP:

1. JBDA Program Test Plan approved Jun 02.
2. Held second annual Senior Mentor BDA Seminar in Oct 02.
3. Conducted OEF contingency test. Collected, analyzed, and documented data; report dated Dec 02.
4. Conducted initial General Officer Steering Group in Feb 02; next meeting scheduled for Mar 03.
5. Hosted second annual BDA Symposium 13-14 Jun 02; next symposium planned for 25-26 Jun 03.
6. Completed UFL 02 baseline test in Aug 02; enhancements now being laid in for testing in UFL 03.
7. Conducted OIF contingency test with USCENTCOM, 15 Mar-17 Apr 03.
8. Will create legacy products, write final report and briefing, and shut down the JT&E by Dec 04.

The JBDA team is located at the JT&E facility in Suffolk, VA (b)(6)
<http://www.jbda.jte.osd.mil>

As of 6 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD15027

TAB A

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM TEST REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ES.1 BACKGROUND

*"A core combat assessment analysis problem of Operation DESERT STORM centered on tactical battlefield damage assessment (BDA) Thus, a more accurate counting methodology is a requirement. BDA is now neither art nor science."*¹ To address this shortfall in warfighting capability, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation (D,TSE&E)², authorized the Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA) program to conduct a joint feasibility study (JFS) to establish a thorough problem characterization of the BDA processes occurring within the joint force.

ES.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

A joint working group (JWG), composed of 20 combatant command and national agency subject matter experts (SMEs), reached a consensus that, while advancements have been made in BDA since Operation DESERT STORM, there still remains room for improvement. Specifically the JWG identified the main problem areas as lack of a process for conducting maneuver-force BDA, lack of training, and lack of adequate BDA command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems interoperability. The problem statement follows:

Study of the joint targeting process in support of the joint force commander indicates that, while enhancements have been implemented, BDA still needs improvement to provide effective and timely assessment of fixed and mobile targets.

ES.3 JOINT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT CHARTER

JBDA demonstrated its feasibility to the Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) Technical Advisory Board (TAB). Upon the recommendation of the JT&E Senior Advisory Council (SAC), JBDA was formerly chartered as a JT&E in August 2000 to meet the following objectives:

a. establish a baseline case by evaluating and documenting current BDA procedures in realistic operational scenarios.

¹ From Intelligence Supplement to DESERT STORM Report, House Armed Services Committee (HASC)

² Now the Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems (D,S&TS)

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Determine deficiencies and opportunities for improvements in the BDA process within the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLP-F) framework.

c. Test and evaluate potential improvements in environments as closely aligned with baseline measurements as possible.

d. Analyze collected data to evaluate their effectiveness and suitability. Based on the outcome of these evaluations, determine the validity of these beneficial hypotheses.

ES.4 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The JBDA JT&E program will test JBDA planning, collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination processes; collect data that provides the means to measure baseline performance; identify potential areas for improvement; test and evaluate those improvements; and develop legacy products, based on test results, that can improve joint BDA capabilities.

ES.5 TEST ISSUES AND MISSION LEVEL MEASURES

In coordination with the JWG, the JBDA JFS developed the following test issues, which are used as starting points for the structural analysis (dendritic) decomposition:

a. How much will changes in the *mobile target* BDA process improve support to the joint force commander (JFC)?

b. How much will changes in the *fixed target* BDA process improve support to the JFC?

Sub-issues for mobile and fixed targets include BDA planning, collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination. The issues address the performance and impact of changes between the baseline and enhanced cases of the BDA process; the following two mission level measures (MLMs) address the overall outputs of the BDA process and the capability of BDA reporting (by target category and report type) to provide actionable information required to support specific decision points (DPs):

a. Percentage of BDA reports that provide actionable (timely, accurate, and complete) information on the status of targets and target systems

b. Percentage of BDA-related DPs supported by BDA reporting

ES.6 CONTINGENCY TEST EXECUTION

Contingency tests are real-world operations in which BDA processes occur and provide the most realistic data for analysis of actual BDA processes. Enhancements have the potential to significantly improve the fidelity, validity, and legitimacy of JBDA's findings for potential legacy customers. JS J2T and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) extended to JBDA the opportunity to observe real-world BDA activities as a result of US military contingency operations during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).

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During the first six months of OEF, the Joint Test force observed the BDA process in place at the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and the USCENTCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). JBDA collected data at USCENTCOM from 10 October–21 November 2001 and from the NMJIC from 7 October–8 November 2001. Two JBDA personnel traveled to the federated partners, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 29–30 October 2001, and to US Pacific Command (USPACOM) 2 November 2001 to collect data related to the federated BDA process and command-specific methodologies. Focus areas at these locations concentrated on organization, training, prioritization, information flow, and the concerns of the federated BDA partners.

A mixture of automated and manual data collection methods was employed in conjunction with demographic surveys and interviews conducted with theater and federated partner operational personnel and senior leadership.

ES.7 OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

JBDA categorized observations, conclusions, and subsequent enhancement recommendations based on the DOTMLP-F paradigm prescribed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in *Joint Vision 2020*.

ES.7.1 DOCTRINE (TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES)

a. Overall, the mobile target BDA process and subsequent order of battle (OB) updating differed substantially from the fixed target process. In general, the process was less defined, and less supported by automated data processing (ADP) capabilities than the observed fixed target BDA process.

b. The BDA-collections interface can be improved. The target approval process (both planned and immediate) should be utilized to stimulate BDA planning and collection requests.

c. Collection Management Mission Applications (CMMMA) and Joint Targeting Toolbox (JTT) were not responsive to the demands of dynamic tasking/re-tasking of assets for immediate targets. Broad sharing of information, improved coordination of new desired mean points of impact (DMPs) and emerging targets among target development (TD), BDA, collections, and OB cells would all aid in this process.

d. The current Target System Assessment must be reviewed, particularly the use of TD and combat assessment (CA) in support of effects-based operations.

e. Standardization of reporting and reporting architectures is necessary. This is especially true of tactical (strike) reporting and collections to the JFC level.

f. Mobile Target BDA tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) require substantive work. This includes establishing mobile target battle damage indicators (BDIs), improved methods for correlation and deconfliction of strike (phase I) reporting and assessments, and OB updating.

g. Command generated operations security (OPSEC) constraints must be evaluated for their effect on information flow.

ES.7.2 ORGANIZATION

a. Reserve BDA unit(s), either centralized or command-specific, should be relied upon for BDA cell crisis augmentation. During the first six months of OEF, JBDA observed that the majority of individuals performing BDA were augmentees assigned without specialized training.

ES.7.3 TRAINING

a. Improved individual, cell, and command level BDA training is needed.

b. Individual training requirements, such as those documented by the USCENTCOM BDA cell, should be incorporated into a combination of Service Intelligence Schools, the Joint Targeting School (JTS), and other BDA courses (for example, courses at the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] and the Joint Intelligence Training Activity, Pacific [JITAP]). Proficiency levels should be established.

c. TTP and working relationships between BDA, OB, collections, and TD need to be exercised on a regular basis. Improved command-level training at major exercises, such as ULCHI FOCUS LENS (UFL) and Internal Look, with real-world reporting and simulation should be instituted.

d. Mission report (MISREP) training at the unit level is needed. The need for this would be mitigated by proliferation of JTT or MISREP generation capability to the unit level.

ES.7.4 MATERIEL

a. The deployment of JTT v2.0, the CMMA tool, and the Modernized Intelligence Database (MIDB) replication concept of operations (CONOPS) produced by USCENTCOM encompass and render complete most of the materiel enhancements identified during early analysis.

b. A US Message Text Format (USMTF) report generation tool, which validates field formatting, for MISREPs and BDA reports would significantly improve phase I (MISREP) reporting.

c. Use of a near real-time (NRT) common operational picture (COP) display combined with collaboration tools, would significantly improve operations within BDA cells.

ES.7.5 LEADERSHIP

a. Standards for the development and promulgation of command BDA guidance need to be developed.

ES.7.6 PERSONNEL

a. Better tracking of trained BDA personnel is needed. JBDA observed that the combatant commands and joint forces drew augmentees from a greater manpower pool; the augmentees often lacked specialized BDA training.

ES.7.7 FACILITIES

a. Collocation of the TD, collections (management and exploitation sites, particularly imagery), OB, and BDA cells proved mutually beneficial to each functional process.

ES.8 ENHANCEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

JBDA test observations and conclusions were the source for most of the JBDA enhancement recommendations. The following recommendations were also developed within DOTMLP-F framework.

ES.8.1 DOCTRINE (TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES)

The JBDA Joint Test force developed the following recommendations to improve TTPs:

a. Develop a federated BDA CONOPS that addresses the transition between federated and non-federated operations and the impact of the JTT.

b. JBDA facilitate the development/update of a mobile target BDA TTP that incorporates command CONOPS and includes updates to JP 2-01.1 and DIA handbooks.

c. Improve target development-collections joint interface between components during the target nomination, approval, and dynamic retasking process.

d. Standardized MISREPs and other reporting formats to improve timeliness and completeness of MISREP reporting.

ES.8.2 ORGANIZATION

a. Identify Reserve units that upon initiation of crisis action planning are available to fill BDA positions, as required. JBDA forwarded, to various parties, several options to establishing a reserve BDA unit.

b. One central "BDA Headquarters (HQ)" for theater augmentation, or a dedicated federated unit that would work in direct support to the supported command. Individuals should be assigned to specific sections.

c. Minimize stovepiping of BDA information between commands within OPSEC constraints (i.e., Fusion Cell or US Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] reporting) to increase information flow into the BDA cell and accuracy of BDA reporting by the supported command. This is another area where the JTT database may help.

d. Physically reposition and collate OB, TD, and BDA cells to reduce time lag discrepancies between OB and BDA assessments.

UNCLASSIFIED

ES.8.3 TRAINING

JBDA identified the need to enhance both individual training and collective (command BDA cells) training.

- a. Conduct collective training on MISREP generation.
- b. Develop crisis action training plan to conduct on-demand training to previously unidentified BDA personnel (including permanently assigned, reserve, and augmentee personnel).
- c. Institutionalize a joint force/federated agency training program providing BDA cells collective training in the federated CONOPS and the JTT.
- d. Facilitate development of Joint Force mobile target BDA .
- e. Improve joint BDA training events including tying training objectives to BDA joint mission essential tasks (JMETs).

ES.8.4 MATERIEL

Materiel support for BDA was enhanced significantly, when USCENTCOM deployed the JTT v2.0; the CMMA tool; and the MIDB. Several areas need enhancement:

- a. Adequate ADP for (dynamic/automated) updating of the OB/combat effectiveness (CE) model.
- b. An NRT COP available to the BDA cell.
- c. Standardize MISREP generation capability to eliminate multiple reporting formats and increase the speed and accuracy of MISREP auto parsing.
- d. Develop enhancement that facilitates BDA cell accessing the JTT from a CMMA.
- e. Recommend standardized formats for quality deficiency reports and pre-planned quality product improvements.

ES.8.5 LEADERSHIP

- a. Establish consistent standards for the development and promulgation of command BDA guidance and promulgate them into Capstone courses.
- b. Inform the course content review boards at the Service schools conducting BDA training of the new joint training requirements including subtasks contained in Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3500.4C (draft), *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)* v5.0; and USCENTCOM-established joint training requirements.

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ES.8.6 PERSONNEL

a. Establish reserve BDA units that upon initiation of crisis action planning are available to fill BDA positions, as required. JBDA forwarded several options to establishing a reserve BDA unit.

ES.8.7 FACILITIES

a. Facilitate physically positioning the OB, TD, BDA, and Collections Cells to collate TD, Collections Management (CM), Collections Exploitation, Imagery, OB, and BDA cell functions.

ES.9 FUTURE ACTION

JBDA will develop and field enhancements for evaluation in Exercise UFL 2003 and actual operations.

UNCLASSIFIED

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May 27, 2003 3:41 PM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: BDA

What do you propose I do with this memo from Christie on the problem of battle damage? It was as bad or worse in Iraq.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/16/03 Dir, OT&E memo to SecDef re: Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and Evaluation contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom [U07374/03]

DHR:dh
052703-31

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

Response attached

5/29

27 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD15036

U08180 /03

SECRET 5/31 0945

~~May 29, 2003 1:48 PM~~

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
Jerry Bremer
Sarah Hagelmann
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missing Persons

Attached is a copy of a letter I received. My understanding is that these folks have some very good technology and can be helpful.

You have the responsibility for this activity. Please consider taking advantage of this offer.

Regards.

Attach.
5/19/03 Kimsey ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
052903-21

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

Ir 59

29 may 03

11-L-0559/OSD15037

U08249 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 29 2003

JAMES V. KIMSEY
1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE NW
SUITE 900
WASHINGTON, DC 20006

May 19, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In light of recent events in Iraq, I would like to contribute the services & technology of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) to support the Department of Defense in dealing with the mass graves found and the families of the victims of forced disappearance under the regime of Saddam Hussein.

I assumed Chairmanship of the ICMP at the request of Secretary of State Colin Powell more than two years ago. As you may know, the ICMP was established in 1996 to address the issue of the missing in the regions of the former Yugoslavia. The successes of our projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate the magnitude of the contribution we might make in Iraq.

I would like to take a team from the ICMP with our equipment to Iraq to search for and identify human remains. I am asking for your support in this endeavor. Your support would put the ICMP in a position to seek additional funds to complete its work in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the possible extension of its operations into Iraq.

In light of the criticism that has been leveled toward post-conflict activities in Iraq, it seems obvious that there could be some immediate benefit in taking advantage of the proven capacity of the ICMP.

I will be traveling to Bosnia-Herzegovina and then hopefully into Iraq in mid-June to further assess ICMP's potential involvement in the identification of the missing there. I need your assistance to make this happen.

Peter Kirsch, my Chief of Staff, will be in touch with your office immediately.

Sincerely,

James V. Kimsey
James V. Kimsey, Chairman
International Commission on Missing Persons

I need your help on this

(b)(6)

PHONE: 202/785-0400 • FACSIMILE

11-L-0559/OSD15038

Don, Jim has waited both you and me. The ICMP does great work. I think they can help with this.

29/5

SEC 5/31 0945

~~May 29, 2003 1:48 PM~~

TO: ~~Gen. Franks~~
CC: Gen. Myers
 ~~Jerry Bremer~~
 Sarah Nagelmann
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missing Persons

Attached is a copy of a letter I received. My understanding is that these folks have some very good technology and can be helpful.

You have the responsibility for this activity. Please consider taking advantage of this offer.

Regards.

Attach.

5/19/03 Kimsey ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
052903-21

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

11-L-0559/OSD15039

ATT18041

Reporting-MTA: dns; exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil

Final-Recipient: RFC822; bremerp@orha.centcom.smil.mil

Action: delivered

Status: 2.1.5

X-Display-Name: Bremer, Paul

Final-Recipient: RFC822; norwoods@orha.centcom.smil.mil

Action: delivered

Status: 2.1.5

X-Display-Name: Norwood, Scott



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 JUN -2 11:11:55

INFO MEMO

May 29, 2003, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake – Army Personnel and Pay Systems

- Newt Gingrich is correct in his assessment that poorly aligned personnel and pay systems hinder the Department in providing timely and accurate pay and entitlements to Service members. Multiple and poorly aligned personnel and pay systems plague the entire Department. We have taken steps to address these and other problems caused by our legacy personnel and pay systems.
- In 1995/96, I participated in a Defense Science Board Task Force that recommended a single, fully integrated personnel and pay system for all Services and components. The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) was established in 1998 to respond to the recommendation. When I arrived in OSD in 2001, I found that DIMHRS was under funded and needed aggressive top-level leadership. We corrected the problems and in April of this year DIMHRS formally received approval to proceed into development.
- DIMHRS will enable DoD to: track members in deployments; integrate personnel and pay operations; access information on competencies to ensure efficient use of skills; provide cross-Service support; streamline business processes and adopt best industry practices; and improve interfaces with Veterans Affairs and other agencies.
- The HASC has proposed a cut to DIMHRS in 2004 on the basis of its earlier history (acquisition delays). We have appealed.
- An information paper is attached. We are available to brief you or provide additional information.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Norma St. Claire, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration Office,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15041

U08307 /03

May 2003

Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS)

Problems with legacy personnel and pay systems:

- Legacy personnel systems do not track personnel in deployments or on temporary duty assignments. Service members do not have complete records of Service and Joint Commanders do not have reliable information on their resources in theater. PERSTEMPO information is inaccurate.
- Legacy personnel and pay systems are not fully integrated (except for Marine Corps) and therefore even when working perfectly require extensive manual adjudication. Service members do not receive timely or accurate pay and benefits.
- Legacy active, reserve and guard systems and data bases are not integrated (except for Marine Corps) and Service members are lost when they transfer back and forth. DoD lacks personnel accountability and records of service for military personnel are inaccurate.
- Legacy personnel systems do not adequately capture full record of service and after members leave the military (discharge or retirement) there are often delays in access to benefits from other agencies (especially Veterans Affairs).
- Legacy personnel systems capture different data using different business rules and different interpretations of the law. As a result, OSD and Joint commanders have difficulty in doing cross-Service analysis.
- Differences in legacy systems and processes prohibit cross-Service support, so Joint Commanders must have four sets of staff to support personnel functions.
- Differences in accuracy, timeliness and content of legacy systems data hinder Joint Commanders from the most effective use of resources.

DIMHRS is being built using the PeopleSoft Human Resources product. Strong OUSD(P&R) control of requirements ensures minimal modification to the COTS product. Strong Service participation at all levels ensures buy-in. The Services have demonstrated willingness to adopt best practices.

All of the problems listed above will be resolved with this fully integrated single personnel and pay management system for all military personnel. DIMHRS will also provide an opportunity for consolidation of personnel and pay management functions. One stop customer service, single entry of data, common processes, and best practices will all be implemented with DIMHRS.

DIMHRS Initial Operating Capability is projected for fourth quarter 2005. The Army will be the first Service using the product.

Prepared By: Norma St. Claire, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration Office, ODUSD(PI), OUSD(P&R)

May 19, 2003 11:30 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Personnel Systems

Please take a look at this e-mail on the Army personnel systems Newt Gingrich sent to a number of people, and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/18/03 Gingrich memo to SecDef re: "An Opportunity for Consolidation and Savings"

DHR:dh
051903-22

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

11-L-0559/OSD15043

From Newt Gingrich
cc Wolfowitz
Craddock
Durnan

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, May 18, 2003 9:19 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil
Cc: ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: an opportunity for consolidation and savings
for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 5/18/03

three army pay systems

There are three army pay systems and they are so badly aligned it can take up to three months to coordinate shifting back and forth between the systems (a personal story someone told me recently).

Surely as part of overhauling the entire Army personnel system (a sine qua non of a mobilizable, agile force) the Army could be instructed to merge the three systems into one integrated system.

This should save money, time and headaches.

5/19/2003

11-L-0559/OSD15044

5/20/03

SNOWFLAKE

DR. CHU FOR ACTION _____

ASSIGN ACTION TO PL _____

SUSPENSE DATE BACK TO DR. CHU 6/10 _____

SUBJECT: Army Personnel Systems _____

May 19, 2003 11:30 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Personnel Systems

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Attach.

5/18/03 Gingrich memo to SecDef re: "An Opportunity for Consolidation and Savings"

DHR:dh
051903-22

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

240

19 May 03

U08308 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15046

From Newt Gingrich
cc Wolfowitz
Craddock
Durnan

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, May 18, 2003 9:19 PM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil

Cc: ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: an opportunity for consolidation and savings
for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 5/18/03

three army pay systems

There are three army pay systems and they are so badly aligned it can take up to three months to coordinate shifting back and forth between the systems (a personal story someone told me recently).

Surely as part of overhauling the entire Army personnel system (a sine qua non of a mobilizable, agile force) the Army could be instructed to merge the three systems into one integrated system.

This should save money, time and headaches.

5/19/2003

11-L-0559/OSD15047

6:35 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jerry Bremer
Gen. Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 30, 2003
SUBJECT: **Iraq**

Attached is a very good memo from Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia. It is filled with things that are important for us to register and ideas that we should carefully consider doing.

I would like Doug to get Jerry's thoughts and, to the extent we can be helpful in implementing any of these, we should do so.

I am also by this copy sending a copy to Gen. Franks with the same request.

I am very much in agreement that a visit by some of the members of the Bipartisan Commission could be helpful. I also agree with his point that it is important to have members of Congress visit Iraq and see what is actually going on, which is why I have asked that the Congressional delegation restrictions be loosened, even if it takes additional resources for the Department.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
053003.01

Attach: Report from Rep. Frank R. Wolf 5/29/03 Re: Iraq

Please respond by: 6/10/03

U083367/03

11-L-0559/OSD15048

Iraq

30 May 03

I just returned from spending two days in southern Iraq. I was there Sunday, May 25, and Monday, May 26.

I crossed over the border from Kuwait. I visited the towns of Nasiriyah, where some of the heaviest fighting took place during the war, Al Kut and Al Amarah.

I spent the night in Nasiriyah then traveled northeast to Al Kut Monday morning. I then headed south to Al Amarah, driving through the outskirts of Basara on the way back to the Iraqi border.

I felt it was important to go Iraq to assess the humanitarian situation and to get a first hand look at the reconstruction efforts that are under way.

While there I talked with several Iraqi's, visited two hospitals, including the one from which Pvt. Jessica Lynch was rescued, met with military officials and representatives from several non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

I also saw one of Saddam Hussein's infamous torture chambers.

I also spent a day in Kuwait – Tuesday, May 27 – meeting Kuwaiti officials, military officials and State Department officials, including officials from USAID.

Life in southern Iraq is tough. Saddam Hussein did everything in his power over the last decade to make life in towns like Nasiriyah as miserable as possible because of the uprisings following the first Gulf war. Thousands of men literally disappeared following the uprisings and have never been heard from since; they are presumed dead.

Poverty is widespread in southern Iraq. Many of the trees have been cut down for firewood because propane was so scarce. The water is putrid. The conditions in the two hospitals I visited – while dramatically improved over the last month – are pitiful.

At what was once the Saddam Hussein General Hospital in Nasiriyah – it is now just called the General Hospital – there are no screens on the doors so anytime a door is opened bugs – particularly flies – come streaming in. Flies were swarming over two of the empty beds in the emergency room.

There is no monitoring equipment for the beds in the emergency room – in fact, I saw very little monitoring equipment anywhere in the hospital. Imagine walking into your local hospital and not seeing something to monitor your pulse or take your blood pressure. Medicine is in short supply.

It was depressing.

cc: Jaymie Durnan
5/29/03 4:05 pm

11-L-0559/OSD15049

Before I go on, I want to praise the efforts of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and members of the Coast Guard who served or are continuing to serve in Operation Iraqi Freedom. They are the best of the best.

I cannot emphasize enough how good a job they have done and continue to do. They all have made tremendous sacrifices. Their families also have made tremendous sacrifices.

I was particularly impressed with the soldiers and Marines I talked with who were called to active duty from the reserves. Many left good jobs and/or school to serve. Their professionalism and attitude was exceptional.

I want to express my heartfelt sympathy to all the families who lost loved ones during the war. Those individuals made the ultimate sacrifice.

All the soldiers and Marines I met with in Iraq are doing an incredible job under some extremely difficult circumstances.

The heat in Iraq and Kuwait is oppressive and will only get worse as summer approaches. It was over 100 degrees both days I was in Iraq. I was told that the temperature can sometimes reach 140 degrees in July and August. Moreover, while the war may be over, Iraq is far from being safe. Lives are still being lost.

Security in Iraq remains a real concern, not only for coalition forces but for the general public. No matter whether you talked to military officials, NGOs or Iraqis, the issue of security was the topic of conversation.

Looting is still a problem in some parts of the country and I heard several stories about robberies and car jackings. I was told MPs in Nasiriyah successfully stopped a car jacking Sunday night.

Many Iraqis are afraid to go back to work for fear their home may be looted or they may be robbed. Several people told me that hearing random gun fire after sundown was commonplace.

NGOs that I talked with said that it was not unusual for their vehicles to be pelted with rocks in some parts of the country. No one travels after sunset.

In order for the United States to win the peace in Iraq it is imperative that we restore law and order. We need to redouble our efforts to ensure that Iraq is safe.

In "Play to Win," the final report of the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, security is one of the four "pillars" of post-conflict reconstruction. The other

three are: justice and reconciliation; economic and social well being; and governance and participation.

This comprehensive report published in January by the Association of the United States Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies should serve as the blueprint for the reconstruction efforts in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

Members of the commission include retired general officers, representatives from the NGO community and international organizations, former high-ranking executive branch officials, and Members of Congress with expertise in foreign affairs.

Among those on the commission: Dr. John Hamre, former deputy secretary of defense; Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations; Gen. Gordon Sullivan, former chief of staff of the U.S. Army, Senator Pat Roberts and Rep. Doug Bereuter. (I, too, was a member of the commission, although did not have a leading role.)

The report makes 17 recommendations "on what the United States will have to do to enable itself to help countries successfully rebuild themselves following conflict."

I have asked the commission to provide me with 535 copies of the report so I can to share them my colleagues. It can be found online at <http://www.pcrproject.org>

Below is an excerpt from the report on the issue of security:

"Security is the sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction. Though every case is different, there is one constant – if security needs are not met, both the peace in the given country and the intervention needed to promote it are doomed to fail. Unless comprehensive security needs are addressed upfront, spoilers will find the weak areas and retain leverage to affect the political outcomes, vitiating the peace. While peace is essential, it never will be one hundred percent guaranteed and the perfect must not become the enemy of the good. In order to achieve acceptable levels of security, "coalitions of the willing" and the UN peacekeeping operations need coherent military leadership and core troops from a lead nation that provide the backbone of the operation. The international community must also enhance its ability to deploy civilian police to address temporary needs. In addition, efforts to design and reconstruct local security institutions, including both military and police, must begin early in the process."

I believe the Administration would be well served to have five or six members of the commission visit Iraq to measure how the reconstruction efforts underway measure up to the recommendations in the report.

Dr. Hamre and Gen. Sullivan, who served as the co-chairman of the commission, could be charged with selecting which members are chosen to visit Iraq and Afghanistan. There should be no objection to this recommendation. Each of the commission members has a distinguished

and extensive background. Their insight and observations could prove to be invaluable.

In addition to members of the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction visiting Iraq, Members of Congress should visit. In my opinion, it would make sense for the chairman and ranking Democrat – or their designees – of the following committees to travel to Iraq:

- House and Senate Armed Services committees
- House International Affairs committee
- Senate Foreign Relations committee
- House and Senate Appropriations committees

In addition to meeting with military commanders, these members or their designees should meet with Paul Bremer and other officials from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance – now called the Coalition Provisional Authority – US AID officials, and representatives from the NGO community and other international organizations.

Meetings with Iraqi citizens also should be set up.

Members should spend time in all parts of Iraq. Yes, safety and security are issues, but the trips could be made in small groups without publicity. The only way to get a feel for what is happening is to visit the towns and cities and talk to the people living there.

Congress needs to be involved in – and kept up-to-date on – the reconstruction of Iraq. Clearly, there is a great deal at stake for the United States in Iraq. Reconstruction in Iraq is going to be long and arduous. No one is naive enough to believe it has going to happen overnight. Nor is anyone naive enough to think that it is not going to come without problems and challenges.

Yet, if Congress is not involved, the Bush Administration is going to be left without a partner in rebuilding these two countries.

The Congress is the Bush Administration's greatest ally. There should be nothing to hide – and after my trip I believe there is much to tell, and much of it is positive.

I now want to take a few minutes to go over some recommendations I have since spending time in Iraq. Each of you should have a copy, plus a copy of "Play to Win."

RECOMMENDATIONS

* Security is priority one. While the forces have made great strides in trying to improve security in recent weeks, there is still a long way to go. Security is the linchpin to winning the peace in Iraq. That means security for coalition forces. Security for the NGOs. Security for the contractors. And security for the Iraqi people so they can go about their life. The gun turn-back program recently announced by Ambassador Bremer is a positive step but many are concerned that people may turn in only one gun and keep two. In addition to concerns about personal safety, looting remains a problem. I was told that looters continue to target electrical substations in southern Iraq, stealing the copper wire to sell on the black market. These substations provide much of the power for Baghdad. Coalition forces should provide security until it can be provided by the Iraqis.

* Justice is another major issue. Re-establishing a fair and just judicial system in a timely fashion is critical. Figuring out what to do with locals who break the law – such as looters – but are not a threat to U.S. security must be addressed as soon as possible. The laws need to be clear and must be enforced. Before the war started, Saddam Hussein opened the prisons, releasing both political prisoners and criminals. Getting these criminals back behind bars is imperative restoring order.

* “Play to Win,” the final report of the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, should be used as the blueprint for rebuilding Iraq. The report, released in January, was produced jointly by the Association of the United States Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Its 17 recommendations provide an excellent model to follow. The commission is made up of 27 distinguished individuals with extensive experience in government, the military, non-governmental organizations and international aid groups. It met throughout 2002 to “consider recommendations that surfaced over two years of research, expert working groups, and vetting with current policy-makers and practitioners.” The report can be found online at <http://www.pcrproject.org>

* A select group of the commission – appointed by the panel’s co-chairmen, Dr. John Hamre, former deputy secretary of defense, and Gen. Gordon Sullivan, former chief of staff of the U.S. Army – should travel to Iraq to assess how the reconstruction efforts are going. Their assessment – a second opinion, if you will – would be impartial and could prove to be invaluable. They should travel in a small group with a military escort to ensure their safety.

* Members of Congress – in small groups without publicity to ensure their safety and the safety of those who would be providing protection – should visit Iraq to learn more about what is happening in the country and what it is going to take to rebuild the country. The chairmen and ranking members – or their designees – of the House and Senate Armed Services committees, Appropriations committees and International Relations/Foreign Affairs committees should consider going. In addition to meeting with military commanders, the members should meet with Ambassador Bremer and other officials in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), USAID officials, representatives from the NGO community and other international organizations, and Iraqi citizens.

* Every effort must be made to involve the Iraqi people in rebuilding their country, from governance to security to rebuilding the country's infrastructure. The Iraqi people must be an equal partner in the process.

From "Play to Win": "...every effort must be taken to build (or rebuild) indigenous capacity and governance structures as soon as possible. Leadership roles in the reconstruction effort must be given to host country nationals at the earliest possible stage of the process. Even if capacity is limited, host country representatives should chair or co-chair pledging conferences, priority-setting meetings, joint assessment of needs, and all other relevant processes."

* Along these lines, American companies awarded contracts to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure should hire locals whenever possible. There are many skilled and educated people in Iraq and they should be tapped to help rebuild their country.

* The sooner the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance – now the called Coalition Provisional Authority – is running at full speed the better. Every effort should be made to ensure that Ambassador Bremer and his staff have the necessary tools and resources to successfully complete the job.

* The military's Civil Affairs detachments in Iraq have worked diligently to help restore order and are making more and more progress every day. Consideration should be given to providing the officer in charge of each of the 18 provinces in Iraq with access to a ready cash account – perhaps up to \$500,000 – so they can more quickly hire translators, laborers and other locals to assist in their efforts in putting together a government without having to get every expenditures signed off by headquarters or Washington. The money also could be used to purchase goods and services in-country, such as generators, pumps or even a trash truck, on a more timely basis rather than waiting for it to be brought in by coalition forces. Government on any level needs money to operate. Clearly, this money must be accounted for, but it would greatly assist in the efforts to rebuild the country.

* Consideration also should be given to helping augment the work of the Civil Affairs detachments by bringing in civilians with expertise in local government, such as county administrators and city managers, as well as experts in agriculture and public works. In each of the 18 provinces, the head of each military Civil Affairs detachment acts like a governor. They need experts – much like a cabinet – at their disposal who can advise them on issues like banking, education, public works and health care. For example, the National Association of County Administrators could assist in rotating in civilian administrators to work with the military and local Iraqis in setting up local governments. There could be one for each of the 18 provinces. Some of the leading agriculture companies in the country could lend their expertise on irrigation and production. The head of the public works department in any large county or city in the country would bring an inordinate amount of experience to the table. There also is a great deal of expertise in federal government which can be tapped. Again, these individuals would work hand-in-hand with the military and the locals.

* The military has to begin thinking about training more of its soldiers for a post-combat environment to help fill any void until the necessary Civil Affairs and Military Police units can

be put in place. I realize this is asking our war fighters to take on a new mission, but in this new world environment, I believe this skill is necessary.

* Communications and communication systems remain a problem for both the military and the aid organizations working in Iraq. I was told that not all of the Civil Affairs detachments are readily able to communicate with each other or with the Humanitarian Assistance Center in Kuwait, which is coordinating all the civil affairs and humanitarian assistance in Iraq. I was told part of the problem is that most Civil Affairs detachments are made up of reserve units and do not have the same communications equipment. This needs to be addressed. It is imperative that all 18 provinces be linked with each other and headquarters. Congress should provide DOD with the necessary funding to ensure that these detachments have radios, computers and other communications equipment that can talk with each other. Aid organizations also are encountering problems communicating with their staff in southern Iraq because telephone and other data transmission lines have yet to be repaired. This presents a problem, especially for sharing data and supplying information.

* The issue of Iraqi currency must be dealt with immediately. Many people in Iraq will not accept payment with the old regime's currency. The World Bank should provide its expertise in helping get Iraq's banking system back up and running.

* The State Department working with the National Endowment for Democracy and other groups with similar expertise should develop a program on democracy and how a democratic government works. I was told that Iraqis watch a great deal of TV. Perhaps whatever program is developed should be put on videotapes and tailored to specific age groups so that all Iraqis can understand the process. This program must be made available to the Civil Affairs units in each of the 18 provinces. I understand money already has been appropriated and some contracts have been let. This program must be put into place as soon as possible.

* A pro-democracy newspaper also should begin to be published on a daily basis in Iraq.

* Finding and removing unexploded ordnance needs to be a priority. Sadly, many Iraqi children have been seriously hurt by exploding weapons while playing outdoors. When I visited the General Hospital in Nasiriyah, a young boy had just been brought into the emergency room after a mine or some sort of ordnance blew up near him. He was severely burned and there was a piece of shrapnel in his right eye. Clearing this ordnance will be a long and arduous process.

* While great progress has been made to improve health care in southern Iraq since the war ended, there is still a long way to go. While the major hospitals in southern Iraq used to bear Saddam Hussein's name – and are all identically constructed – there was little or no medicine and the conditions inside are deplorable. I was told that more than 2 tons of donated medicine has been distributed to hospitals and clinics in southern Iraq. There is concern, however, that diseases like malaria and visceral leishmaniasis – also called Dum Dum Fever or Black Fever – will ravage the region this summer because no spraying was done this spring to kill the mosquito larvae or sand flea larvae. Bites from sand fleas are the cause of visceral leishmaniasis, which is 80 percent fatal for young children unless treated with a 21-day shot routine. The disease attacks internal organs. Cholera is another concern. Area hospitals and American drug companies

ATT20734

Reporting-MTA: dns; exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil

Final-Recipient: RFC822; norwoods@orha.centcom.smil.mil

Action: delivered

Status: 2.1.5

X-Display-Name: Norwood, Scott

ATT20734

Reporting-MTA: dns: exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil

Final-Recipient: RFC822; norwoods@orha.centcom.smil.mil

Action: delivered

Status: 2.1.5

X-Display-Name: Norwood, Scott



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

773 JUN -3 PM 3:01



INFO MEMO

May 23, 2003, 2:01 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef action _____

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S.C. Chu 2 June 03

SUBJECT: Pay Differential for Reserve/Guard

- You asked if there are Reserve and Guard who are on active duty getting substantially less than active duty personnel? A 'Delta Force' pilot in Iraq raised the issue.
- This is not the case for Reserve/Guard members serving on active duty in Iraq. A Reserve/Guard member who is serving on active duty in support of a contingency operation (e.g. Iraqi Freedom) is entitled to the same pay and allowances as a Regular Component member.
- There are circumstances, however, when a Reserve/Guard member serving on active duty may be compensated differently from a Regular component member with the same grade and years of service. Neither of these situations would apply to Reservists serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.
 - A Reserve/Guard member serving on active duty, for less than 140 days and not in support of a contingency operation, would most likely receive less Basic Allowance for Housing.
 - Reserve/Guard members serving short periods (less than one month) of active duty or inactive duty for training receive 1/30th of the monthly amount of pay and various Special and Incentive pays per day or training period. Some pilots raise this issue with respect to aviation career incentive pay, citing they must maintain the same qualifications as active duty pilots, who receive a full month's incentive pay.
 - Some Reserve/Guard members receive extra compensation from their civil employers.
- These are long-standing provisions of Reserve compensation policy, but both are under review as part of a study of Reserve compensation and benefits directed by the Senate in its FY 2003 NDAA report language. We anticipate completing the report this summer. The attached paper further explains and provides examples of the above issues.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: C. Witschonke,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15058

U08369 /03

TAB

A

Differences in Reserve Component and Active Duty Pay

A Reserve Component or National Guard member who is serving on active duty in support of a contingency operation is entitled to the same pay and allowances as a Regular Component member. There are some instances, however, when a Reserve Component or National Guard member serving on active duty would receive less than a Regular component member with the same grade and years of service.

Basic Allowance for Housing: A Reserve Component or National Guard member serving on active duty, for less than 140 days *and not in support of a contingency operation*, would receive Basic Allowance for Housing, Type II (Reserve Component housing allowance) vice Basic Allowance for Housing (which is generally larger than the Type II allowance). This usually, but not always, results in a lesser housing allowance for a Reserve member.

EXAMPLE 1 - The monthly Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rate for a member serving on active duty, grade E-6 and with dependents, for example, ranges from \$565 at Minot AFB, ND to \$2366 at Santa Clara County, CA. The rate for a Reserve Component member serving on active duty, not in support of a contingency operation, for less than 140 days is a flat \$645.90.

This provision dates to the 1980's when Congress first authorized a variable rather than a flat-rate housing allowance. As a cost saving measure, Reservists were not allowed to receive the variable addition to the allowance unless they were on active duty for 140 days. The cost of lowering the 140-day threshold to even 30 days is \$100 million per year.

Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP): An active duty and a Reserve pilot assigned to and operating out of a base in the Persian Gulf would be entitled to the same pays and allowances. The active duty member may also be receiving a bonus for the commitment to serve a specific number of years on active duty beyond his or her initial obligation (8 –10 years). The Reserve pilot has made no such a commitment to serve on active duty.

But, Reserve Component and National Guard members serving short periods (less than one month) of active duty or inactive duty for training receive 1/30th of the monthly amount of pay and various Special and Incentive pays per day or training period. Some pilots raise this issue with respect to aviation career incentive pay (ACIP), citing they must maintain the same qualifications as active duty pilots, who receive a full month's incentive pay. Their flying duty may be inactive duty for training (IDT or drills) or active duty.

The member in a drill status receives drill pay (1/30th active duty basic pay for each drill performed, usually 2 drills per day). A Reserve pilot in flight status performing drill would also receive Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) at the rate of 1/30th per drill or 2/30th per day. If they serve in an active duty status, they would receive one day of basic pay and allowances plus 1/30th ACIP for each day.

EXAMPLE 2 - A commercial airline pilot who is a member of the Reserve or National Guard may fly for the military during their time off or vacation time. The chart below shows the pay for 3 Air Force Majors (O-4), one active duty and two Air Force Guard or Reserve, flying C-17s for 4 days in one month:

Officer grade O-4 with 16 years service for pay & 14 years aviation service flying C-17s out of Dover, DE for 4 days of the month					
	Basic Pay (4 day's)	Basic Allowance for Housing	Basic Allowance for Subsistence	Aviation Career Incentive Pay	Total Compensation (for 4 days)
Active Duty	\$729.48	\$148.27	\$22.29	\$112.00	\$1012.04
Active Duty for Training	\$729.48	\$128.12 TYPE II	\$22.29	\$112.00	\$991.89
Inactive Duty (Drill)	\$1458.96	N/A	N/A	\$224.00	\$1682.96

So in the case of short duration duty, not only are the active and reserve members paid differently, two reserve members can be paid differently. And, the drilling reservist may be paid the most of anyone on a daily basis.

There is a Reserve Component Working Group studying Reserve compensation and benefits. The Senate in its FY 2003 NDAA report language directed the study. The working group is reviewing, among numerous issues, the 140-day housing allowance threshold, the 1/30th rule for special and incentive pays, and the relevance of drill pay in facilitating a seamless transition from reserve to active duty service. We anticipate completing the report this summer.

TAB

B

Snowflake

May 1, 2003 2:51 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pay Differential for Reserve/Guard?

Some people raised the issue of the Reserve and Guard who are on active duty getting substantially less than active duty personnel. It may be because the active duty people are getting bonuses for agreeing to stay in for longer periods of time. If that is all it is, that is fair. If there is some other differential, it might be useful to look into it.

It was particularly raised by a Delta Force pilot when I was in Iraq.

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-13

.....

Please respond by _____

TAB

C

COORDINATION PAGE

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (RA)

Mr. Duehring May 22, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD15065

Snowflake

May 1, 2003 2:51 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pay Differential for Reserve/Guard?

Some people raised the issue of the Reserve and Guard who are on active duty getting substantially less than active duty personnel. It may be because the active duty people are getting bonuses for agreeing to stay in for longer periods of time. If that is all it is, that is fair. If there is some other differential, it might be useful to look into it.

It was particularly raised by a Delta Force pilot when I was in Iraq.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030103-13

.....
Please respond by _____

U08370 /03


11-L-0559/OSD15066

TOTAL P 04



June 2, 2003 11:30 AM

IRAN

TO: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Memo on Counter Moves

I read your memo on "Moves to Counter Pro-Iranian and Ba'ath Elements." I agree with it, and I am talking with Gen. Myers and Gen. Franks about it.

Regards,

DHR:dh
060203-35

.....

Please respond by _____

27Jun03

↑

SENT 6/3
~~May 31, 2003 3:04 PM~~

Iraq

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Franks
Jerry Bremer
Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Documents

I am told somebody found a cache of documents in the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Secret Police in Baghdad. The report indicates the documents are under water, and that some portion of them relate to the history of the Jewish community in Iraq.

I am told that Hebrew University has offered to take possession of them, restore them and make them available in some appropriate way.

Could you please have someone look into that and get back to me about what the situation is and what we are doing about it, if anything.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053103-20

.....
Please respond by 6/08/03

31 May 03

U08497 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15068

June 2, 2003 7:19 AM

TO: Doug Feith
cc: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Info on Democracy for Schools

Frank Wolfe said that they need some material on democracy to put in the schools, that there is a vacuum. They need information. Let's get on that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-5

.....
Please respond by 6/25/03

cc: Terry Bremer

U08498 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15069

Iraq

2 Jun 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 3 2003

General James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.)

(b)(6)

Dear Jim,

Attached is a letter I just sent to our mutual friend, Bill Schneider. I do want you to know how much I appreciate the superb work you and your team have done. It is enormously helpful and will certainly benefit the security of our country significantly.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Enclosure


334058

35000

U08500 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15070

June 2, 2003 9:53 AM

TO: Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: DSB Reports

I have just finished reading the Phase II reports on "Own the Night," "Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration" and "Streamlining the Deployment Order Process" and the Phase III report on "Organizational Lessons Learned."

They are excellent pieces of work, and I do appreciate it a great deal. I will begin the process of getting our folks to make sure that they agree with the recommendations, and then we will get on it.

Thanks so much.

Regards,

DHR:dh
060203-23

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD15071



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUN -3 AM 3:01

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-971-03
3 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Communications Support for the Coalition Provisional Authority

- In response to your request (TAB), the following is provided.
- Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) assets (video teleconference (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System), secure telephone, SIPRNET, NIPRNET and DMS) were available in theater to provide the required capability. JCSE is totally self-contained for all equipment (has organic power and vehicles). These assets were relocated in accordance with your timeline and fully operational by 26 May.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Keith Kellogg, USA; Director J-6;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15072

U08514 /03

TAB

May 19, 2003 1:48 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Communications Support

You have to find a way to get the military to support the necessary communications packages for Garner and Bremer. I have never once had a SVTC or a phone call with them that works right. They can't talk to us. They can't talk to each other. How do the military and the State Department manage to have good comms?

We ought to be capable of putting in a comm. package there, including e-mail, in the next 72 hours, even if we have to take it away from somebody else. Please help to get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-32

.....
Please respond by 5/22/03

TAB

May 19, 2003 1:48 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Communications Support

You have to find a way to get the military to support the necessary communications packages for Garner and Bremer. I have never once had a SVTC or a phone call with them that works right. They can't talk to us. They can't talk to each other. How do the military and the State Department manage to have good comms?

We ought to be capable of putting in a comm. package there, including e-mail, in the next 72 hours, even if we have to take it away from somebody else. Please help to get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:db
051903-32

.....
Please respond by 5/22/03

U08515 /03

Tab


11-L-0559/OSD15074

311

19 May 03



June 2, 2003 9:53 AM

TO: Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: DSB Reports

I have just finished reading the Phase II reports on "Own the Night," "Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration" and "Streamlining the Deployment Order Process" and the Phase III report on "Organizational Lessons Learned."

They are excellent pieces of work, and I do appreciate it a great deal. I will begin the process of getting our folks to make sure that they agree with the recommendations, and then we will get on it.

Thanks so much.

Regards,

DHR:dh
060203-23

.....
Please respond by _____

334058

25 Jun 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-974-03
3 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBH 4/2*

SUBJECT: Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) and Joint Southern
Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC) Merger

- In response to your inquiry (TAB), I support the proposal to merge JIATF-S and JSSROC.
- The merger will require disestablishing the JSSROC, a USSOUTHCOM component, and moving the personnel and systems to JIATF-S, an interagency organization under USSOUTHCOM's OPCON. This will improve mission effectiveness and efficiency, as well as supporting air bridge denial efforts.
- PDASD(SOLIC) requested the Director, Joint Staff, concurrence in the Department's proposed response. The reply, which endorses this initiative, has been forwarded via separate correspondence.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Copy to:
PDASD(SOLIC)


Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5 (b)(6)

*Mr Secretary —
The JIATF-S and JSSROC
are already in the same
building. "Moving" as used
in 2nd pt of this memo means
writing diagram changes.*

VRDich

TAB

May 13, 2003 11:02 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: SOUTHCOM Cable

What do you think about this cable from Hill?

Thanks.

Attach.

CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL Cable P R 081318Z MAY 03

DHR:dh
051301-6

.....
Please respond by

03 MAY 15 PM 4:36

11-L-0559/OSD15077

Tab

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***
***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 1 of 2

SECRET

2003 MAY -2 PM 9:51

PTTUZYUW RUMIAAA7229 1281359-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 081318Z MAY 03
FM CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//DEPUTY/DASD-CN//
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
VCJCS WASHINGTON DC
CDR USNORTHCOM
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCCC//

UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR

SUBJ:JIATF-S AND JSSROC MERGER

GENERAL JAMES T. HILL, COMMANDER, USSOUTHCOM, SENDS PERSONAL FOR HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; INFO HONORABLE TOM RIDGE, SECDEF; HONORABLE JOHN WALTERS, DIR ONDCP; HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DESECDEF; MR. ANDRE HOLLIS, DASD-CN; GENERAL MYERS, CJCS; GENERAL PACE, VCJCS; GENERAL EBERHART, CDR USNORTHCOM; GENERAL SHINSEKI, CSA; ADMIRAL CLARK, CNO; ADMIRAL COLLINS, CMDT COGARD; MR. WILLIAM SIMPKINS, ACTING DEA ADMINISTRATOR

RMKS/1. MR. SECRETARY, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MERGE THE JOINT SOUTHERN SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS CENTER (JSSROC) INTO JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH (JIATF-S) TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTER NARCO-TERRORISM (CNT) AND COUNTER-ILLCIT TRAFFICKING OPERATIONS (CITO) IN MY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR).

2. CURRENTLY, JSSROC DEVELOPS OUR COMMON OPERATING PICTURE (COP) AND CONDUCTS DETECTION AND MONITORING (D&M) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) IN SUPPORT OF CNT, CITO, INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE, AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. JIATF-S CONDUCTS D&M AND INTERDICTION OPERATIONS USING THE COP DEVELOPED FROM SOURCES ACROSS THE AOR. APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF JSSROC'S MISSION DIRECTLY SUPPORTS JIATF-S. THE OTHER 30 PERCENT SUPPORTS PURE DOD MISSIONS, INCLUDING AIR DEFENSE OF GUANTANAMO, TACTICAL CONTROL OF SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS, AND PASSING AIR TRACKS OF INTEREST TO THE SOUTH-EAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR IN RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA. ALL OF THESE MISSIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A CONSOLIDATED ORGANIZATION.

3. AS THE LEAD AGENCY IN THE PROGRAM TO RESTART AIR BRIDGE DENIAL (ABD) IN COLOMBIA AND EVENTUALLY PERU, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: <u>/</u>	DEPSEC: <u>/</u>	SPL ASST: <u>/</u>	EXECSEC: <u>/</u>
C&D: <u>/</u>	CCD: <u>/</u>	CABLE CH: <u>/</u>	FILE: <u>/</u>
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U07009-103

11-L-0559/OSD15078

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Page 2 of 2

REQUIRES A MORE ROBUST C2 STRUCTURE AT JIATF-S. NEAR-TERM EFFICIENCIES IN COMBINED MANPOWER WILL BE APPLIED TO JIATF-S EXECUTION OF ABD. I HAVE ALREADY TAKEN INITIAL STEPS TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL FROM JSSROC FOR PROGRAM START-UP. ADDITIONAL MANPOWER EFFICIENCIES ARE EXPECTED, BUT I INTEND TO RUN THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR BEFORE DIRECTING A U.S. ARMY MANPOWER ANALYSIS AGENCY (USAMAA) STUDY TO DOCUMENT THOSE EFFICIENCIES.

4. EXISTING RESOURCES FROM DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS (DASD-CN) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WILL SUPPORT THE COST OF THIS MERGER. OUT-YEAR DASD-CN FUNDING SAVINGS MAY ALSO BE REALIZED.

5. WE WILL DOCUMENT THIS MERGER AND THE RESULTING COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS IN OUR INPUTS TO THE DRAFT UPDATE TO THE NATIONAL INTERDICTION COMMAND AND CONTROL PLAN.

6. VERY RESPECTFULLY, TOM HILL.//

+++PERSONAL FOR+++
SPECIAL HANDLING \$\$\$REQUIRED \$\$\$
\$\$\$ \$\$\$COPY NUMBER----- \$\$\$

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Tab

11-L-0559/OSD15079

TAB

May 13, 2003 11:02 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SOUTHCOM Cable

What do you think about this cable from Hill?

Thanks.

Attach.
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL Cable P R 081318Z MAY 03

DHR:dh
051303-6

.....
Please respond by _____

Southcom

13 May 03

03 MAY 15 PM 4:36

11-L-0559/OSD15080

Tab
U08532 /03

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***
***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 1 of 2

SECRET

2003 MAY -01 10 09:51

PTTUZYUW RUMIAAA7229 1281359-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 081318Z MAY 03
FM CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//DEPUTY/DASD-CN//
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
VCJCS WASHINGTON DC
CDR USNORTHCOM
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCCC//

UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR

SUBJ:JIATF-S AND JSSROC MERGER

GENERAL JAMES T. HILL, COMMANDER, USSOUTHCOM, SENDS PERSONAL FOR HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; INFO HONORABLE TOM RIDGE, SECHS; HONORABLE JOHN WALTERS, DIR ONDCP; HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPSECDEF; MR. ANDRE HOLLIS, DASD-CN; GENERAL MYERS, CJCS; GENERAL PACE, VCJCS; GENERAL EBERHART, CDR USNORTHCOM; GENERAL SHINSEKI, CSA; ADMIRAL CLARK, CNO; ADMIRAL COLLINS, CMDT COGARD; MR. WILLIAM SIMPKINS, ACTING DEA ADMINISTRATOR

RMKS/1. MR. SECRETARY, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MERGE THE JOINT SOUTHERN SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS CENTER (JSSROC) INTO JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH (JIATF-S) TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTER NARCO-TERRORISM (CNT) AND COUNTER-ILLCIT TRAFFICKING OPERATIONS (CITO) IN MY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR).

2. CURRENTLY, JSSROC DEVELOPS OUR COMMON OPERATING PICTURE (COP) AND CONDUCTS DETECTION AND MONITORING (D&M) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) IN SUPPORT OF CNT, CITO, INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE, AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. JIATF-S CONDUCTS D&M AND INTERDICTION OPERATIONS USING THE COP DEVELOPED FROM SOURCES ACROSS THE AOR. APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF JSSROC'S MISSION DIRECTLY SUPPORTS JIATF-S. THE OTHER 30 PERCENT SUPPORTS PURE DOD MISSIONS, INCLUDING AIR DEFENSE OF GUANTANAMO, TACTICAL CONTROL OF SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS, AND PASSING AIR TRACKS OF INTEREST TO THE SOUTH-EAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR IN RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA. ALL OF THESE MISSIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A CONSOLIDATED ORGANIZATION.

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U07009-103

11-L-0559/OSD15081

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Page 2 of 2

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ACTION (M)
INFO SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED(*)
SECDEF-C(*)

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Tab

11-L-0559/OSD15082

May 30, 2003, 10:15 AM

The Secretary of Defense

FROM: Marc Thiessen

SUBJECT: Ruth Wedgewood Column

In case you missed it, thought you would want to see this piece Ruth Wedgewood had in the *Wall Street Journal* on the legality of interdicting North Korean arms shipments.

Korea(north)

30 May 03

U08537 1/03

11-L-0559/OSD15083

Rule of Law/By Ruth Wedgwood

Self-Defense, Pirates and Contraband

In a muttered aside at recent Chinese-hosted talks, North Korean negotiators boasted that they may "transfer" reprocessed plutonium fuel rods and nuclear devices to willing bidders abroad. Undeterred by growing international censure, Kim Jong Il's actions threaten to leave North Korean nuclear footprints across the globe.

The plutonium auction is only the latest misadventure in Pyongyang's deadly black-market bazaar. North Korea has recently been pioneering "take out" Scuds, some of which were discovered in December on a flagless North Korean ship by a Spanish patrol boat in the Arabian Sea. At the time, the U.S. interceded to release the goods to President Saleh of Yemen. It's time for Washington to rethink this logic.

Arms-control treaties traditionally assume best-case scenarios—with trust in the honorable intentions of the signers and the binding gaze of the world community. The treaties are light on remedies for noncompliance or withdrawal, other than the tender attentions of the U.N. Security Council. But in these days of difficult Security Council relationships, there is greater cause for concern. The prospect of action by the council may not be a credible deterrent.

The challenge, then, is how to restrict Kim Jong Il's ability to move dangerous items into the hands of other rogue regimes and private bidders. Having caught one illicit cargo vessel, there can be little doubt that others have slipped through.

* * *

All countries enjoy the right to navigate freely on the high seas and the right of "innocent passage" for lawful commerce, even when sailing through another state's close-to-shore territorial waters. But that doesn't extend to internationally forbidden cargo, not to mention the kind of cargo that poses a security threat. Coastline countries can police their own 12-mile territorial waters—plus a 12-mile contiguous zone beyond—and that does offer some protection.

Still, there are distinct limits to "just in time" policing. Even a satellite-rich intelligence system is challenged in tracking a tramp steamer's midnight dashes into port. Maintaining a maritime embargo off the North Korean coast—Nampo and Haeju in the west, and Chongjin and Wonsan in the east—is the only effective way to monitor North Korean shipping. Call it the mariner's version of "launch-phase" interception.

Forty years ago, it was a "defensive quarantine" that did the trick for John F. Kennedy in fending off Khrushchev's recklessness in the Cuban missile crisis. JFK announced that U.S. patrols would stop any Soviet vessels carrying intermediate-range missiles into Cuba. He drew a line in the Atlantic sand, and made clear that orders to stand by for inspection would be enforced once ships passed the demarcation. As it happened, Khrushchev turned the ships around.

Kennedy did the right thing: A Soviet launch pad 90 miles from Miami would have destabilized the hemisphere, shortened the time for strategic decisions, and imperiled millions. North Korea's challenge is not dissimilar. Pyongyang does not merely threaten Japan or South Korea: Its cash-and-carry sales could result in the distribution of plutonium to terrorist networks that attack without warning, including in the U.S.

It is lawful to interdict North Korea's arms shipments.

Kennedy's quarantine was not done under a Security Council resolution—a Russian veto would have barred the door. He stopped Soviet ships not because any Russian war plan was unspooling, but to prevent an adversary from multiplying its capability. This was a real life version of pre-emptive force. The same should apply to the North Korean nuclear pawn shop and the known objectives of its customers. It would be a mistake to wait for the attack.

U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte has already presented the Security Council with proof of Pyongyang's defiant disregard and rapid escalatory steps—the expulsion of nuclear inspectors, the broken seals on thousands of fuel rods, and the restarting of the Yongbyon reactor. North Korea denounced the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and has been flouting Security Council Resolution 1373, signed on Sept. 28, 2001, which binds states to prevent aid or assistance to terrorist networks. Any abetting act, whether providing intelligence, asylum, or war materiel, is forbidden. North Korea's behavior is at best profligate, at worst premeditated.

The U.S. now has a few distinct options for how to proceed with North Korea. We could (France willing) seek a new Security Council resolution imposing an inspection regime on all North Korean shipping. China could abstain in

the vote, yet still cooperatively sideline North Korean rail traffic for "routine" customs inspections when ghost trains cross over the northern boundary. Joint Chinese-American maritime and air patrols in the Yellow Sea could give new Chinese leader Hu Jintao a chance to boast how major powers may act together.

Yet if council action should prove unavailable, there are other options for the U.S. In the short term, allies may be willing to delegate some targeted powers of inspection in their territorial waters and adjoining customs enforcement zones, or to conduct joint patrols with the world's largest blue-water navy. The International Maritime Organization can be asked to crack down on "flag laundering." Cash-hungry countries should not be permitted to lease their flags to notorious customers. A ship that flies a false flag, or no flag at all, may qualify for piratical status. Any false cargo manifest also warrants seizure of the cargo, at least until its status is adjudicated.

The idea of "contraband" has power here. The antique term refers to war supplies bound for belligerents, including non-state actors, such as ammunition, guns, and in an older time, ships' timbers. The right of states at war to "visit and search" for contraband applied even to the search of neutral ships, sailing on the open seas. It may be worth adapting the idea of contraband to the circumstances—permitting visit and search even on the high seas where there is reasonable suspicion. Weapons of mass destruction are certainly war materiel.

* * *

This is a case where diplomacy and self-interest may carry the day. As President Bush's recent meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made clear, North Korea's neighbors have plenty of interest in protecting themselves against Kim Jong Il. China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea all should be willing to help contain North Korea's threat.

But America's interest is, ultimately, broader. We must keep North Korea from providing one-stop-shopping for global spoilers, especially non-state networks. The Kennedy-Bush doctrine of preventive and proportionate force may need to be adapted to a new world of dangerous cargoes.

Ms. Wedgwood, a professor of international law and diplomacy at Johns Hopkins, is a member of the Defense Policy Board.

TAB A

May 14, 2003 2:13 PM

TO: Gen. Pace
CC: LTG Craddock
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SPAWAR

What was the SPAWAR matter Senator Hollings was talking about? What do they do? He said there is no government money in it. It would surprise me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051403-11

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U08573 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15085

Tab A

322

14 MAY 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-979-03

4 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *from 6/4*

SUBJECT: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)

- In response to your questions (TAB A), the following is provided. SPAWAR is one of three naval acquisition systems commands; the other two being Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston (SSCC), SC, was formally established in 1994 as the result of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC '93) consolidation of the Navy's East Coast C4ISR Engineering Field Activities. SSCC reports to SPAWAR headquarters which is located in San Diego, CA. Today, SSCC is a leading Joint C4ISR Systems Engineering Center developing and supporting systems for all DOD services, major combatant commands and many federal agencies.
- As a working capital fund organization, SSCC does not receive direct annual appropriations, but instead supports operations by charging customer activities for work performed. The command's performance is measured by cost effectiveness and by delivering high-quality integrated and tested products and services to the warfighter in a rapid fashion.
- There is no truth to the rumor that SPAWAR is moving. In a recent periodic meeting of the senior SPAWAR leadership, the topic of "alignment," (pertaining to mission, services and facilities) was addressed in view of how to better support the joint warfighter and achieve efficiencies. During the discussions, alignment options were brainstormed and information was requested, including costs, if any SPAWAR System Centers were to be realigned or moved. No formal studies were initiated. SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston is a new, state-of-the-art, growing, vibrant, world-class facility providing leading-edge joint C4ISR solutions to DOD and federal agencies. Funds available for execution in FY02 were in excess of \$2B.
- Pertinent excerpts from Senator Hollings' testimony comments are enclosed (TAB B).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Joseph K. Kellogg, USA; DJ-6 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15086

U08696 /03

TAB

A

TAB A

May 14, 2003 2:13 PM

TO: Gen. Pace
CC: LTG Craddock
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SPAWAR

What was the SPAWAR matter Senator Hollings was talking about? What do they do? He said there is no government money in it. It would surprise me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051403-11

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

TAB

B

FDCH TRANSCRIPTS
Congressional Hearings
May 14, 2003

Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Holds Hearing on FY2004 Appropriations

===== text removed =====

STEVENS:
Senator Hollings?

HOLLINGS:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I have supported you before you became popular.
(LAUGHTER)
And the jointness that I have in what we call SPAWAR down in Charleston, South Carolina. I want you to see that. That's a Rumsfeld operation and I want you to come and visit it.

===== text removed =====

STEVENS:
Thank you very much.
Senator Byrd?
Senator Hollings?

HOLLINGS:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

HOLLINGS:
Mr. Secretary, that's an outstanding statement, and I congratulate you on bringing Defense into the new century.
What happens -- and the reason I take the committee's time here to ask about this little installation down in Charleston, back in '92 at the base realignment and closure, there was one thing that both George Bush Sr. Clinton could agree on, and that was we are not going to close the Portsmouth navy yard. I mean, we got the run up there in that primary.
So they closed Charleston [Naval Base] which had won all the navalies (ph) and everything else.
But at the time, I had debated and argued to have Navalex (ph) that you would remember as a former secretary back in the '70s, and Navalex (ph) was combined into SPAWAR. They combined for Pawtucket, Maryland, Nebraska Avenue, where Secretary Ridge is right now, on Nebraska Avenue, Norfolk, and Charleston.
And the reason for the question, of course, a comment is an admiral now has asked for a study to find what the cost of moving it. I hope we get that study, because Bruce Allen

(ph) [Booze Allen (Hamilton)], [for] the secretary of the Navy, has just completed [a] cost-efficiency study of 15 navy engineering centers and have found that the SPAWAR facility down in Charleston was ranked number one in overall efficiencies, so it's a jointness.

We don't receive appropriated funds. What we do is we design, build, test, and support computer command and control systems. And a bunch of little small contractors, and since the big Navy yard has closed, the rent is cheap, they love it down there.

HOLLINGS:

And they've got room to move and expand, and they serve Army, Navy, Air, and Marines, but they serve the White House, the Secret Service, the FAA and everything else. It's all contract. It's the jointness that Secretary Rumsfeld is insisting on.

And if you could come visit us down there, you'll see it, and I think you can use that as an example of succeeding in this jointness effort.

===== text removed =====

List of Speakers

U.S. SENATOR TED STEVENS (R-AK) SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR THAD COCHRAN (R-MS)
U.S. SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER (R-PA)
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U.S. SENATOR TOM HARKIN (D-IA)
U.S. SENATOR BYRON DORGAN (D-ND)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD DURBIN (D-IL)
U.S. SENATOR HARRY REID (D-NV)
U.S. SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA)

WITNESSES:

DEFENSE SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF VICE CHAIRMAN GEN. PETER PACE
DOV ZAKHEIM, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND COMPTROLLER

TAB

C

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

CAPT Mark Compton	EA, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command	22 May 03
CAPT Nancy Deitch	C.O., SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston	22 May 03



TAB A

May 19, 2003 7:14 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cruise Missile Errors

I would like a report as to why those cruise missiles landed in Turkey and how often that happens. We have to keep that in mind if we are going to be firing over friendly countries.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-2

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

471.94

19 May 03

03 MAY 20 AM 7:41

U08737 /03
Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD15094



SENT 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Pete Geren
Under Secretaries
Service Secretaries

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Help from Congress

When I was with Congressman Tom DeLay last week, the Majority Leader of the Congress, he indicated that Members of Congress are eager to help us. They want to do things for us. We need to give them materials and talking points or ways they can be helpful. They can be our echo chamber.

He said if we send things to him, he can help disburse them to the right people, so they better understand what we are doing, why we are doing it and how we are doing it, and can answer knowledgeably when asked.

Please get back to me, and tell me how you propose we fill that need.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060603-32

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

U08903 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15095

032

9 JUN 03



June 6, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Media

Iraq

Attached is some material on what is taking place with respect to our media effort in Iraq.

Attach.
6/6/03 "Talking Points on Iraqi Media"

DHR:dh
060603-30

6 Jun 03

11-L-0559/OSD15096

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 6 2003

6 JUNE 2003

8:10 AM

(DUE D LUTTI AIRR)


Talking Points on Iraqi Media

- We must do better in countering the growing disenchantment among the Iraqi people with Coalition efforts to reestablish order. Iranian influence efforts through television and radio broadcasting must also be neutralized if we are to succeed.
- There is a perception by some that the Coalition provisional authority (CPA) does not have the means to carry its message to the Iraqi people, but content is the greater need.
- These are the facts:
 - Seven TV ground stations are up, covering its two largest cities and 40% of Iraq.
 - There is almost complete coverage by radio; short wave is countrywide; AM covers most of the country; FM is currently limited because of range and power.
 - Three Coalition newspapers are on the streets, and are sold out on a daily basis.
 - DoD has hired 300 Iraqis to work on radio and TV projects. Bureaus have been set up in Baghdad, Basra, and Irbil (in the North). Two to five hours a day of TV programming is being generated.
 - Satellite links are being installed in nine locations throughout the country. Programming can be generated from inside Iraq, from the US, or from other sources.
 - General Franks' people and DoD contractors are distributing 50,000 AM/FM short wave radios to rural areas and 20,000 direct broadcast satellite radios countrywide.
- We are putting the necessary infrastructure in place, and we are making steady progress, but we need to accelerate our efforts.
- The Deputies Committee is looking at four areas:
 - Redoubling efforts to ensure that our contractors have electrical power, and physical and site protection as they go about extending quality radio and TV coverage throughout the country.
 - Providing more high quality TV and radio programming through US domestic sourcing and purchase of existing Arabic language programming.
 - Adequate funding to allow an acceleration of these efforts.
 - A replacement for Margaret Tutwiler—Jerry Bremer has enough to do.
- We can fiddle around the edges by jamming terrestrial Iranian broadcasts and not licensing hostile groups, but in the end we have to have superior programming—tailored to each region, and ultimately created by Iraqis for Iraqis.

/ of /



SENT 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Rich Haver
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Beverly Deane Shaver

Here is a note from Beverly Shaver. Would you please take a look at it and tell me what you think I ought to do. Then we'll get going on it again.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/2/03 Shaver ltr and materials to SecDef

DHR:dh
060603-28

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

China

9 Jun 03

U08905 /03

RECEIVED

JUN - 2 2003

(b)(6)

May 29, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
C/o (b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUN - 6 2003

Dear Rummy:

Since before 9/11, I have been planning to write you, but naively have been waiting until things cooled down a bit in your schedule. It is obvious that that isn't going to happen. I am hoping that, along with the many other demands for your attention, you can give this some serious consideration.

I know you are aware that I am less than satisfied with the USG's efforts to determine that fate of Jim Deane. I have received sympathy, but little substantive cooperation from the DPMO in several areas I have brought to their attention. I have been so grateful for your generous help in the past, but I now seem to have no other recourse than to ask for your help again.

I certainly am not in a position to have all the answers, but I can identify at least three things that the USG could and should do to resolve Jim's case. In each of these areas, I have sought help on the agency level without success. These areas are:

1. Colonel Xu Junping, director of the U.S. liaison office in the Foreign Affairs Office of the Chinese Ministry of Defense, who defected to the U.S. in March 2001, *has not, to my knowledge, been questioned regarding Jim Deane*. Five months previous to this defection, his direct superior, General Zhan Maohai, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office in the Defense Ministry, received Ambassador Prueher's request for information on the Deane case (enclosed) and promised a response. Surely, Xu, as the US liaison head would have involved in preparing such a response, and should have knowledge of what information the Chinese are holding .

I asked DASD Jerry Jennings at the DPMO last summer to have Xu interrogated, but he denied having any knowledge whatsoever of this defector. I don't believe it is too much to ask that Xu be interrogated on this matter, with copies of the original intelligence reports to jog his memory. He could have not only some of the answers regarding Jim, but possibly all of the answers. Is there any way you can make this happen?

- 2 .The DPMO and/or other agencies have failed to follow-up on the considerable new information I brought them after my two trips to China in 1999 and 2000 (see attached letter to DASD Bob Jones). After I supplied names and contact information

11-L-0559/OSD15099

of those who identified the Chinese pilot and confirmed that two prisoners were indeed taken from the P4M, there was absolutely no action taken by the USG on any of it. Is there any reason why the intelligence resources of the USG can't be used to follow-up?

While I support the DPMO's excavation efforts to repatriate remains, I fail to understand it virtually ignoring what needs to be done in a "last known alive" case, a case that conceivably could result in a live prisoner.

3. The CIA should go back to its pre-computer age files and come up with its information on this case. I know that they did a search at your and James Woolsey's request in the early 1990's. Nevertheless their fingerprints are all over it in the copies of the intelligence reports they received and in the comments of Samuel Klaus (memos enclosed). Almost every former intelligence person I interviewed in the last 10 years believes that the CIA, more than ONI, would have been responsible for monitoring what became of the two prisoners. The CIA has so far come up with absolutely nothing. They should be asked to look again.

Knowing that you probably do not have in your present office any of the documents I have sent in the past, I am enclosing a few pertinent ones, marked for your convenience. Please let me know if you need anything else.

I could not help but react with some bitterness by the use of the word "closure" in some of the televised Memorial Day speeches. There is no lack of closure more terrible than not even knowing whether someone is alive or dead. Jim Deane just deserved better than this.

I am desperately hoping that sometime during your tenancy in the Pentagon, that I can have that closure. Can you help?

Regards to all the Rumsfelds.



Beverly Deane Shaver

Encl..

Contact info:

Until July 21:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

After July 21:

(b)(6)

c/o

(b)(6)

SYNOPSIS

P4M Shootdown Incident of August 22/23, 1956

Lt jg. James Brayton Deane, Jr., USN (#536882/1310) was the co-pilot of a P4M Martin Mercator electronic countermeasure plane shot down off the coast of Shanghai August 22 (23 Far East time), 1956. The plane was deployed from VQ-1 (ECMRON ONE) squadron based in Iwakuni, Japan, carried a crew of 16, and had a Navy bureau number of 124362.

While flying a course to the south, the plane reported at 00:19 August 23, 1956 local Far East time, an emergency message that it was "under attack by aircraft". Newspaper reports noted the shootdown involved one Mig 15 and two Mig 17s, and that "life rafts" were seen jettisoning from the tail of the plane as it flew off in a southeasterly direction.

On August 24, 1956 search and rescue by the US 7th fleet recovered debris from the plane and one body. A second body was found several days later. Subsequent investigation concluded that the plane had crashed into the sea in the vicinity of latitude 30-23 North, longitude 122-53 with great impact.

The People's Republic of China announced attacking over Huang tse Island a plane, presumed to be Chinese Nationalist, which had intruded over Ma-an Island. Both islands are part of the Choushan archipelago about 30 miles off the coast of Shanghai. The Chinese reported that the plane flew off in a southeasterly direction. A week or so later, the Chinese recovered two additional bodies, those of AT1 William F. Haskins and AT3 Jack A. Curtis, off the shore of Choushan T'ao Island and returned them to the U.S. via the British Charge d' Affaires in Beijing. The remaining twelve crew members, including Lt. jg Deane, were held in a missing status for one year, and were presumed deceased August 31, 1957.

A Naval Court of Inquiry concluded that the plane was probably off course to the west due to a navigational error unavoidable because of weather conditions, topography of the local coast, and limitations on the plane's navigational capabilities imposed by the nature of the mission.

In 1992, the newly discovered and declassified files of Samuel Klaus, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, brought to light many documents concerning similar incidents during the Korean and Cold Wars. Among these documents were a series of intelligence reports indicating that:

1. Three survivors of the P4M were picked up by a Chinese patrol boat Number 4 of the Chang-tu Island detachment of the Choushan Islands garrison and taken to a local hospital at Cheng-hai. One died, one was severely injured, and the other slightly injured. The rescue occurred approximately 35 minutes after the shootdown. The remains of three other bodies recovered were cremated on Chang-tu Shan Island, and believed sent to Chen-hai.

2. Subsequently on September 15 (or 1st?), 1956 the two remaining survivors were admitted to Paoting (Baoding) Army Hospital's third ward (NR). Both were recovering. The one most severely injured was the taller of the two. Both had been questioned to a limited extent. Their presence at the hospital was a closely guarded secret, and the identities were not known. They were discharged November 26th, 1956 and transferred to Wan Ping where they were under surveillance of the Inspector General (Toku Satsucho).

3. The two prisoners were housed in the quarters of Tsai Mao, Chief of Public

Information, Ministry of Social Welfare at WanPing prison, 40 kilometers south of Beijing. The taller one, described as the "crew leader" was identified by U.S. intelligence from the physical description (tall, not hairy, raised cheekbones, letter "J" on notebook, doesn't speak much, well-built, brown hair), as Lt. jg Deane. The shorter one was identified as either AO2 Warren Edgar Caron or AT2 Leonard Strykowski.

4. On April 10, 1957 Lt.jg Deane was moved to the quarters of Ch'eng Lung, Assistant Chief of the Public Security Department in Peking (Beijing). A military hearing was held in mid-April. Lt. jg Deane was reported in this last location as late as December 1957. The other prisoner remained at the quarters of Tsai Mao, and later was "employed" at the Sheng-Lung Corporation in Shanghai.

5. Although Klaus' file contain no later reports, his conversation memos as late as April 1958 indicate that he was still receiving reports of survivors of the P4M.

.....
In April 1999 during a visit to the PRC, Lt.jg Deane's widow, Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver, learned that:

a) the name of the PRC pilot who shot down the P4M was Zhang Wen-yi. He is now retired in Guangzhou.

b) A retired senior military officer of Chinese Air Defense in 1956 recalled hearing of the arrest of two of the plane's "pilots" or crewmen after the incident.. He does not, however, know the disposition of the two prisoners.

B. SHAVET MD

(b)(6)



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT NR	SDO NR
DATE 25 SEPTEMBER 1956	TON 2319Z/25	ROUTED BY PRUITT	CHECKED BY PC Pruitt

6360 240632Z SEP 56
(DATE/TIME GROUP (ZCT))

FROM: CINCFE
TO: CINCPAC

ROUTING CHANGE
DESTROY ALL OTHER COPIES

PRECEDENCE	
(ACT)	(INFO)
<input type="checkbox"/> FLASH	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> DEFERENTIAL	<input type="checkbox"/>

INFO: D A//CINCAL//CG AFPE/ARMY EIGHT/REAR//COMFEAF//COMNAVFE//CHMAAG TOKYO

READDRESSED AS ROUTINE 251845Z SEP 56:
FM: ADMINO CINCPAC
INFO: C N O

This document contains information the disclosure of which could be injurious to the national defense within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, U.S.C. sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

"NOFORN - SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS."

FE 802654.

REF MY FE 802500 DTG 060151Z.

1. FOLLOWING INFO, WHICH MODIFIES AND AMPLIFIES THE ORIGINAL REPORT, RECEIVED THIS HQ, PERTAINING SURVIVORS US NAVY P4M RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN 23 AUG OFF EAST CHINA COAST:

A. ACCORDING TO INFO OBTAINED FROM CREW MEMBER OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PATROL BOAT IN AREA, 3 SURVIVORS FROM DOWNED AMERICAN AIRCRAFT RESCUED.

922Y....COG PER 33 9/26/56/MT.... "PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES"

922F...COG

922..92..921..00..09..06..03..61..SECNAV..UNSECNAV..N..H..Y..CR..9281..

92M..33..60..NAVAIDE..CNO/OCU

ADD: OSD/ISA PER H3 9/26/56/MT
ADD STATE..CIA..NIC..
PER H3 9/26/56/DK

SECRET
(When filled in)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 937302
By CTR NARS, Date 5/4/93

OPNAV FORM-2100-AL (REV. 8/1/55)
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240632Z SEP 56
RTO

AC

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11-L-0559/OSD15104

DECLASSIFIED
 By *MMW 93708*
 NARS, Date *5/14/13*

INFO - SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS."

1 SLIGHTLY INJURED, 1 SERIOUSLY INJURED, 1 DIED SEVERAL HOURS LATER. BOTH SURVIVORS RECOVERING FAVORABLY, TRANSFERRED TO ARMY HOSPITAL PAO-TING (38-52 N/115-27E) 1 SEP.

B. BODIES OF 3 MORE CREW MEMBERS PICKED UP; AFTER BEING CREMATED CHANG-TU SHAN ISLAND REMAINS BELIEVED SENT CHEN-HAI (29-57N/121-42E).

C. ALL PERSONNEL WHO PARTICIPATED IN THIS INCIDENT TRANSFERRED TO MANCHURIA. SOVIET AIR FORCE SERGEANT WHO PILOTED ATTACKING AIRCRAFT TRANSFERRED TO CHI-LIN (43-51N/126-33E) 2 SEP.

2. ABOVE INFO RECEIVED BY FEAF THRU CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT FROM SHANGHAI AGENT. INFORMANT CONSIDERED RELIABLE. RELIABILITY OF SHANGHAI SOURCE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

AC

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "G" encryption-physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification. No unclassified reference if the date-group is quoted.

ORIGINATOR, CINCFC 240632Z SEP 56 PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DTG

OPNAV FORM 2110-ACI (REV. 8/1/55)
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 (When filled in)

8-1704

NAVAL MESSAGE		SECRET		NAVY DEPARTMENT	
RELEASED BY	DATE	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.	COPY NO.	
	20 OCT 56	0834Z/20	PRUITT		
1316		200430Z OCT 56			
			PRECEDENCE		
			(ACT)	(INFO)	
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			<input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY	<input type="checkbox"/>	
			<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	
			<input type="checkbox"/> IMMEDIATE	<input type="checkbox"/>	
			<input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE	<input type="checkbox"/>	
			<input type="checkbox"/> DEFERRED	<input type="checkbox"/>	
FROM: COMNAVFE					
TO: CNO					
INFO: CINCPACFLT					

FOLLOWING FROM G2 US EIGHTH ARMY (REAR) UNEVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

OBTAINED FROM NURSE AT PAOTING ARMY HOSPITAL. AFTERNOON OF
 15 SEPT 1956 2 AMERICANS FROM NAVY PLANE WHO WERE RESCUED OFF CHOU SAN
 ISLAND, WERE ADMITTED TO THIRD WARD PAOTING ARMY HOSPITAL. CONDITION
 OF BOTH VERY SATISFACTORY. ONE (THE SHORTER OF THE 2) HAS ALREADY
 RECOVERED AND IN GOOD HEALTH. OTHER (TALLER OF 2) EXPECTED FULLY
 RECOVER BY END OCT. AFTER FULL RECOVERY BOTH PROBABLY WILL BE TRANS-
 FERRED TO PEIPING. BOTH HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED TO LIMITED EXTENT BUT
 NOT YET EXTENSIVELY. FACT THEY ARE RECEIVING MEDICAL CARE AT PAOTING
 ARMY HOSPITAL CLOSELY GUARDED SECRET. NAMES OF MEN NOT KNOWN. THEY
 ARE REFERRED TO AS A1 AND A2.

92...ACT

CR..00..09.06..03..61..SECNAV..UNSECNAV..CNO/00D...

ADD:: STATE...CIA...JCS...ARMY...AF...PER OP-922H3//10/20/56/GLH

SECRET

(When Filled In)

200430Z OCT 56

OPNAV FORM-2110-1 (REV. 8/1/55)
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A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically
 remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

8-55270

11-L-0559/OSD15106

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

(MARCH 4, 1957) SUPPLEMENT TO AF FORM 112

ORIGINATING AGENCY

6004th Air Intel Sv Sq

REPORT NO.

IR 1176-57

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

MOVEMENT OF SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS OF THE DOWNED US NAVAL AIRCRAFT

SOURCE:

1. Information was received through
in mid-Feb 57.

Sp

TEXT:

2. Since 27 Nov 56, two surviving crew members of the downed US naval aircraft have been moved to the residence of TSAI, Mao, Chief of Public Information, Ministry of Social Welfare, at WAN-PING (3951N/11613E). They are permitted freedom of movement but are not allowed to meet anyone other than the authorities concerned.

3. Physical descriptions of the two Americans are as follows:

a. Well-built, lean and taller than average. Oval-faced, slightly raised cheekbones and thin lips. Doesn't speak much. The letter "J" was on his memo-book.

b. Relatively round-faced with a ruddy complexion. Height was not tall and was rather stout-looking. Dark bearded and light freckles on both sides of the nose. Has a cheerful disposition.

COMMENTS OF THE PREPARING OFFICER:

4. The downed US Naval aircraft mentioned in paragraph 2 is the US Navy P4M-1Q downed off the Communist Chinese coast on 23 Aug 56.

5. Based on identifying data and photos of missing crew members of the downed P4M-1Q, the survivor described under paragraph 3-a appears to fit the description of Lieutenant (junior grade) James Braxton DEANE, Jr., and that described under paragraph 3-b fits the description of either AOG Warren Edgar CARON or AT2 Leonard (n) STRYKOWSKY.

6. Information given in this report may also be forwarded through CMI, COMNAVFE.

Henry D. Chiu
FOR HENRY D. CHIU CAPT
Captain, USAF
OIC, Liaison Section

MARCH 25, 1957

SUPPLEMENT TO AF FORM 112

ORIGINATING AGENCY

REPORT NO.

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

6004th Air Intel Sv Sq

IR 1900-57

INFORMATION ON SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS OF THE DOWNED US NAVAL AIRCRAFT

SOURCE:

1. Information was received from a

TEXT:

2. According to information dated 7 Mar 57 and obtained from the so
at the residence of (TSAI MAO), one of the two prisoners
has brown hair. He is not hairy and he is of average build. He is said to be
the crew leader. Both prisoners have been examined by a doctor twice a month
and have received favorable treatment. The said crew leader has not yet under-
gone formal investigation but he has been submitting personal notes weekly to the
military sub-committee. It appears that the hearing by the military sub-commit-
tee will begin in mid-April. It is believed that the hearing will not be a
formal investigation but one to obtain his statements. It is said that the
alleged crew leader, probably under persuasion by TSAI Mao, has stated to TSAI
that he will reside permanently in Communist China if given livelihood guaran-
tees.


JBD.

3. According to information dated 16 Mar 57, the alleged crew leader is
believed to be about 38 or 39 years old. The other prisoner seems five or six
years younger than the alleged crew leader. On about 10 April, the alleged
crew leader is expected to move to the residence of CHEN Lung, located in the
outskirts of PEI-PING (3956N/11624E), because of the hearing by the military
sub-committee. As for the other prisoner, it appears that he will remain at the
residence of TSAI Mao for some time.

COMMENTS OF THE PREPARING OFFICER:

4. Information on reportedly surviving members of the downed US Naval
F4U-10 aircraft has been reported in previous 6004th AIFS IR 1176-57.
5. Information in this report has been forwarded through OMI, COMAFCE.
6. This report satisfies FFAF SRI 10-6-6-H.
7. Coordinates were provided by the Preparing Officer.

Henry D. Chiu
HENRY D. CHIU, 1/12, USAF
Captain, USAF
OIC, Liaison Section



SAMPLE OF
CONVERSATION MEMOS
OF SAMUEL KLAUS,
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL
ADVISOR, DEPT OF
STATE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

August 8, 1957

SUBJECT: Navy Mercator Case.


PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Klaus
Lt. James C. Doyle, Navy JAG

Pursuant to the request by Lt. Doyle, he came to see me this afternoon to discuss the Mercator Case. I told him that I had not yet finished reading the affidavits which the Navy had submitted and which had been collected by Commander Rood. However, he agreed with me that the evidence was entirely circumstantial and that it was clear that the plane was off course. The reconstruction of the flight was, therefore, a matter for which we had to rely on circumstantial evidence. I explained that since we were looking forward to a possible suit in the ICJ, we should be sure that our circumstantial evidence was as detailed and positive as it could be. I therefore raised the question first of possible survivors and second of the use of Navy Hydrographic Office personnel.

He said the first subject was one on which he wished to speak to me especially. He showed me a letter which he said was typical of those sent out by the Bureau of Personnel of the Navy to the next of kin of the crew. He said the letter had not cleared his office and that he was sorry it had been sent. The letter explained that under the statute after a year of absence a board is set up to determine whether to declare the missing person to be presumably dead. He had inclined to the idea that we should say nothing on this subject until after the diplomatic correspondence was finished. I told him that we had had experience in this field, particularly in the B-50 case (and also in the B-29 case), and we had taken the position

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11-L-0559/OSD15109

CONFIDENTIAL


-2-

in the note that we demanded of the Soviet Government a clear statement whether any survivors were being held or bodies found and, at the same time, we claimed damages for the loss of such personnel. I pointed out that in that case I was counting on the testimony of the hydrographers as to currents in the harbor at Vladivostok. In the present case the conclusions of the witnesses who examined the debris and bodies of the dead were that the crash was so great that no one could survive it. On the other hand, I said, we had been receiving intelligence reports continuously to the effect that three crew members were being held captive by the Chinese Communists. Moreover, we had not demanded a return of any living personnel so far as I could recall and operated on the assumption that all were dead.

Lt. Doyle said that he thought that Intelligence did not credit these reports. However, he said he would have a new evaluation instituted. He pointed out that ONI, which worked with CIA, was not very free in giving its information. I told him that in a case like this we would need to be buttressed by the clearest kind of contact and evaluation of the informers. He agreed he would look into this matter further and let me know.

We also agreed that the diplomatic claim and the finding of death were not necessarily related. I told him that there might be complications if people were found alive after their wives had re-married but that this was a constant risk in the military services and I recalled that in the Senate hearings on our note to the Soviets, Senator Knowland had taken the same position and that all the other Senators apparently concurred with him. The statutory finding of death was merely a means of stopping the payment of salary, straightening out the budget and presumably permitting re-marriage (as well as other insurance

11-L-0559/OSD15110



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

payments etc.). However, any note that we wrote to the Chinese through the British would make clear that we expected a definite reply from the Chinese; and I stressed that we should be as particular in assertions of fact as we could be. I furthermore pointed out that while there were rumors that three crew members were alive, we did not know which of the crew these might be and we could not hold up a finding as to all the crew in the absence of specific identification of those suspected of being alive.

On the second point, he said that he certainly concurred that we should, if possible, go to the Hydrographic Service. He said that the destroyers on the scene which picked up the bodies and the debris made some tests but, as I would see, they were not as elaborate as the studies that could possibly be made by the Hydrographic Service.

Later he came back and said that he had additional copies of the affidavits of which he had sent me only the original. I told him I would be pleased if he would keep the copies since we might need them for other purposes.

Subsequently, I informed Mr. Aylward of FE of the foregoing in substance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11-L-0559/OSD15111

Memos of Samuel Klaus,
Office of The Legal Advisor
✓ Dept. of State.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

September 7, 1956.

Re: Navy Mercator Case.

At the suggestion of Mr. McCaughy and Mr. Clough of CA, I called Admiral Beakley this morning and told him of my interest in the case. He said that Admiral Riley, who had taken Admiral Smedberg's place, was the one to deal with. I, therefore, called Admiral Riley and left a message for him to call me. Later I received a telephone call from Commander Markham (Code 131-74294), who said that Admiral Riley had asked him to call me.

I explained to Commander Markham that we would have to prepare the case as we had the others on the basis of possible litigation in the ICJ. I said that there were two parts to the case. One, was the damages question, and the other, retracing the flight of the aircraft in the incident. On the former, I said, we would have to continue the practice established in the prior cases of getting figures for the cost of the airplane (replacement cost, if any, or else actual cost) and replacement of the crew, plus search and rescue and other damages to the United States. On the incident itself, since there were apparently no survivors, we would have to reconstruct the flight as best as we could with a flight plan, position reports, the objects found and the sea currents found. I mentioned that in prior cases we had had the help of Hydrographic Service on the currents. I also said that I was not concerned with the purpose of the mission, although our right to be in the general area of Okinawa, et cetera, might be important.

11-L-0559/OSD15112

He said that he would need to get help elsewhere, on which I concurred.

He said that he would keep in touch with me.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

September 10, 1956.

Re: Navy Mercator Case.

I received a telephone call from Commander George H. Rood (131-79161) of the International Law Division of Navy JAG. He said that Commander Markham of OP 61 of Admiral Riley's office had turned over to him this morning the matter of working with the Department of State in the preparation of the claim in the Mercator Case. He said that the International Law Division Chief was now in Newport Rhode Island but that a Captain Powers, who is slated to assume the position of Assistant JAG, had talked to him, Rood, and told him to ask me for a memorandum setting forth what we wanted the Navy to do.

Commander Rood said that he himself knew nothing more about the case than what he had seen in the New York Times but he said that a Court of Inquiry was actually going on. I said that I was concerned that the Court of Inquiry should follow the rules of evidence and that we should have documents complying with the rules of evidence on which we could base assertions of fact provable ~~for~~ⁱⁿ an international forum, barring classification questions. He said that a lawyer would certainly be present at the Court of Inquiry but that he thought that a good deal of the record would be highly classified and that the case might be, to that extent, considerably different from the two other cases which I had handled with the Navy.

We agreed that I would address the memorandum to Admiral Chester Ward,

11-L-0559/OSD15114

- 2 -

JAG Navy, Attention International Law Division. He said that he would send a copy to the Court of Inquiry. When the record is received from the Court of Inquiry, he said he would consider taking up with me the examination of classified material.

11-L-0559/OSD15115

Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

September 19, 1956.

Re: Navy Mercator Case.

I called Commander Rood (131 79161) this morning and asked him whether he had received my memorandum. He said he had and asked me to wait as he wanted to put someone else on the phone and then introduced Captain Hearn (?) who, he said, was head of the section. Captain Hearn said he had read the memorandum and found it extremely detailed. He said there was a great deal of the information that was classified and he had tried to get in touch with Admiral Riley to determine how much information could be given to me. Admiral Riley, he said, would not be available until tomorrow morning.

I told Captain Hearn that, of course, I expected some of the information to be classified but that as a lawyer I would have to know the worst as well as the best to avoid pitfalls, et cetera, and that we would certainly respect security classification. He said he noted that in my memorandum. I told him that ordinarily I would be happy to go out myself to make sure that the facts that came in were adequate and that the documents would not need to be returned. He said that there were enough JAG officers in the Philippines and elsewhere to do the job. I assured him that we needed to have complete affidavits containing all the facts not just conclusions, and that we would respect all classifications. He said he appreciated my point very well. He asked me whether he should just go ahead or get in touch with me after talking to

11-L-0559/OSD15116

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~MEMORANDUM

July 30, 1959

Subject: ~~Navy Mercator Case~~
Navy Korea Case

Captain Hearn called. He asked me what had happened to the Navy case in 1956 that had been prepared for me. At the moment I could not recall what he was talking about. I said I would call him back. I then found the Navy Mercator file, the last entry of which showed that Lieutenant Doyle of Captain Hearn's office was going to prepare a report as to what he thought the facts showed in the way of a case. I recalled that Mr. Hensleigh of the Department of Defense, Mr. Aylward and I had discussed the case and that I noticed from the file that Hensleigh had undertaken to tell Doyle to make some sort of report, but none had been received.

Accordingly I called Captain Hearn back and told him the foregoing. He expressed resentment that the State Department had caused the Navy to spend so much money preparing the case (his figures jumped from \$50,000 to \$100,000 in the course of the conversation) and then taken no action. I told him that we had not considered that a case was made with the evidence submitted and that Doyle had never presented a case, although he had promised to do so. Captain Hearn then said that the essence of the case seemed to be whether we would be recognizing Communist China if we sued. I said that point had been settled; that suing Communist China or making demands through the British did not mean recognition, but before we undertook any such action we must have a very strong case. No such case was presented by the Navy in this situation. He expressed resentment that the State Department asked the Navy to prepare a case but wouldn't take it after it was prepared. I said we could not proceed unless a case was good and the case was not strong enough to prove any violation of international law by the Chinese.

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11-L-0559/OSD15117

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-2-

official

He then said that the real purpose was with respect to the Navy Korea case. I told him I had not been given the Navy Korea case as one to be prepared for the ICJ. It was my understanding that this case was being handled at Panmunjom. The problem of suing North Korea was therefore not involved. I did not assume that Panmunjom was a court. He said he agreed that it was not a court. I said I assumed therefore that the case did not fall in my jurisdiction. He then said that he would assume from what I said that until the State Department asked him he would not make any attempt to prepare a case.

I then called Mr. Manhardt of the Korean desk. Manhardt said that he could not understand the Navy's operations in this regard. He would call Mr. Sandri of ISA in the Department of Defense who was more aware of what was going on and attempt to get an explanation for the Navy's inquiry. He said that the Commander in Chief in Korea had expressed dissatisfaction with the handling of this case both by the Navy and by the State Department, particularly in respect to the issuance of press releases. As a result, we had not even obtained a copy of the last telegram. Manhardt agreed that our policy was not to bring suit and he would have Sandri explain that. He said he would keep me informed.

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L:L/K:SKlaus:js 7/31/59

11-L-0559/OSD15118

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~NAVY DEPARTMENT ²

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HM/ *Ch...*

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PRECEDENCE

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FROM: CTF 77

COMSEVENTHFLT

CTF 72//ECMRON ONE//COMTAWANDEFCON/US//USS DENNIS J BUCKLEY//
CINCPACFLTREADDRESSD EMERGENCY 240838Z FM CINCPACFLT INFO CNO
READDRESSD OPERATIONAL 240824Z FM COMSEVENTHFLT INFO CNO COMNAVFE
PER NCC 6846 8/24/56/EC/

BUCKLEY RECOVERED BODY ALBERT P MATTIN USN. LIFE SAVING GEAR NOT
INFLATED. EXAMINATION WRECKAGE SHOWS WHEEL AND FUEL TANKS DAMAGED BY
FIRE. EXAMINATION RAFTS SHOW EQUIPMENT STOWAGE FLAPS WERE OPENED AND
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SURVIVORS AT ANY TIME

33.....COG

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JCS ARMY AF OSD UNSECNAV ASTSECNAVAIR ASTSECNAVMAST ASTSECNAVF1
ASTSECNAVPERS STATE CNO/ODD~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(When filled in)

240658Z AUG 56

DTG

OPNAV FORM 2110-4
(REV. 8/1/55)
DEPT. USE ONLY

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically
remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

DECLASSIFIED BY CINCPACFLT (N2) ON 6 JUN 94.

B28379

11-L-0559/OSD15119

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~NAVY DEPARTMENT ²

RELEASED BY

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DATE

24 AUG 56

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6812/6846

240658Z AUG 56

PRECEDENCE

(ACT)

☐ FLASH

(INFO)

☐ IMMEDIATE☐ PRIORITY☐ ROUTINE☐ DEFERRED

FROM CTF 77

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO CTF 72//ECMRON ONE//COMTAIWANDEFCON/US//USS DENNIS J BUCKLEY//
CINCPACFLT

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 READDRESSD OPERATIONAL 240824Z FM COMSEVENTHFLT INFO CNO COMNAVFE
 PER NCC 6846 8/24/56/EC/

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240658Z AUG 56

DTG

OPNAV FORM-2110-4
 (REV. 8/1/55)
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11-L-0559/OSD15120

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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NO 5187	300414Z OCT 56 (DATE/TIME GROUP (OCT))	PRECEDENCE (ACT) (INFO) <input type="checkbox"/> FLASH <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE <input type="checkbox"/> PPP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY PPP <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> DEFERRED <input type="checkbox"/>
FROM: COMSEVENTHFLT		
TO: C N O		
INFO: CTF 72 // CINCPAC // CINCPACFLT // COMNAVFE		

CINCPACFLT *260006Z YOUR 242335Z.

A. FOLLOWING ARE SIGNIFICANT OPINIONS OF COURT OF INQUIRY WHICH CONVENED ON 4 SEPT 1956 TO INQUIRE INTO LOSS OF P4M: ALL MEMBERS WERE KILLED EITHER BY GUNFIRE OR WHEN PLANE CRASHED INTO SEA AFTER BEING SHOT DOWN. 1 BODY AND PORTION OF CLOTHING, WHEEL AND 2 OF THE GAS TANKS SHOWED DAMAGE BY FIRE. SINCE ONLY THESE ITEMS SO DAMAGED, AIRCRAFT PROBABLY DID NOT BURN BEFORE CRASH. AIRCRAFT STRUCK WATER SO VIOLENTLY THAT IT BROKE UP RELEASING STRUCTURAL PARTS AND EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RELEASED OTHERWISE. THERE WAS FIRE ON THE SURFACE OF WATER AFTER CRASH. 2 BODIES RECOVERED BORE EVIDENCE OF SUCH SEVERE INJURIES RESULTING FROM IMPACT THAT EXISTENCE OF SURVIVORS CONSIDERED IMPROBABLE. AIRCRAFT STRUCK BY AT LEAST 2 PROJECTILES.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

92.....ACT

JAG...57...56...05...008...50...55...33...BUAER...SPEC CNO/DC

SECNAV...UNSECNAV...ASTSECNAVAIR...CNO/OD

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300414Z OCT 56

OPNAV FORM-2110-1 (REV. 8/1/55)
DEPT. USE ONLY

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physical: remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification

B. PRELIMINARY AUTOPSY AT IWAKUNI OF BODY OF MATTIN INDICATED DEATH BY MULTIPLE EXTREME INJURIES INCLUDING BROKEN CERVICAL VERTEBRA. LEGS PUNCTURED. METAL FRAGMENTS WHICH APPEARED TO BE STEEL FROM EXPLODED PROJECTILE RECOVERED FROM LEG WOUNDS.

C. REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY DOES NOT INDICATE SHRAPNEL FOUND IN BODY OF PONSFORD BUT THAT DEATH CAUSED BY MULTIPLE EXTREME INJURIES INCLUDING LOSS OF UPPER PART OF HEAD.

D. NO INFO HERE RE CONDITIONS 2 BODIES RECOVERED BY CH+COMS.

E. ORIG CONCURS CRASH WAS RESULT OF ENEMY GUNFIRE AND UNCONTROLLED IMPACT WITH WATER. CONCUR CTF 72 290804Z. 29 0840Z
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AVAILABLE ORIG TO COMPLETELY RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF BAILOUTS PRIOR CRASH.

** REF NOT HELD OPNAV COMMO 040640R.

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR COMSEVENTHFLT 300414Z OCT 56 PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

OPNAV FORM 2110-1A (REV. 8/1/55)
DEPT. USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~

B-1700

11-L-0559/OSD15122

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEIJING, CHINA

November 21, 2000

THE AMBASSADOR

Major General Zhan Maohai
Director, Foreign Affairs Office
Ministry of National Defense
Beijing, People's Republic of China

Dear Major General Zhan:

Thank you for your offer of assistance in resolving the case of Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) James Brayton Deane, which you conveyed to Ambassador John Holdridge in a recent meeting. LTJG Deane was a naval aviator whose P4M Martin Mercator disappeared off the coast of Shanghai in 1956.

LTJG Deane's widow, Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver, has been in touch with me on several occasions concerning her seven-year effort to determine her former husband's fate. The information she has accumulated suggests that her husband might have survived the crash of his aircraft and might have been captured by the Chinese military at a time when our two nations did not have diplomatic relations. Recently, the unofficial assistance she had been given by retired People's Liberation Army personnel came to a halt.

I would greatly appreciate any assistance you might be able to provide in this case. In the course of her research, Dr. Shaver has accumulated various documents that might assist you in your efforts. I am enclosing copies of the documents that she obtained along with a copy of her most recent letter to me and a copy of a letter she has drafted but not yet sent to President Jiang Zemin.

The Embassy is ready to forward to Dr. Shaver any information you might be able to provide concerning this case. Alternatively, we would be happy to facilitate any direct contact you or other People's Liberation Army personnel might wish to have with her.

My best,

Joe
Joseph W. Prueher

Enclosures

11-L-0559/OSD15123

(b)(6)

Mr. Robert Jones, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense
DPMO Suite #800
1745 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Jones:

I have been asked by the U.S. Ambassador to China, Joseph W. Prueher, to send you a report of my own research in China on the case of my former husband, Lt. jg James Brayton Deane, Jr., USN. Lt. jg Deane was imprisoned in China after the 1956 shootdown of his P4M electronic reconnaissance plane off the coast of Shanghai.

Other than the original intelligence reports which came out of the Klaus file in 1992, most of the material in Lt. jg Deane's file at your office came either from me, or from U.S. agencies which had found responsive documents pursuant to my numerous FOIAs. In general, I have shared any information I've obtained with a number of your analysts.

Last year, however, I became very discouraged with the lack of progress with, and low priority given to, Lt. jg Deane's case. It seemed that by far the vast majority of your resources were devoted to either the Cold War Russian cases, the Korean War cases, or the Vietnam cases. Lt. jg Deane fit into none of these groups, and was obviously slipping through the cracks. Although I brought my concerns to the attention of at least two of your predecessors, there was never any follow-up action or response to my letters or verbal requests. In addition, despite what I considered very strong evidence of validity (see attachment to letter to James Wold), I was told that some of your analysts considered the 1956-8 intelligence reports had at least a 50% chance of being fabrications.

With the above situation in mind, I decided to approach the Chinese directly as a private citizen, asking for release of information on this event purely for humanitarian considerations. I was anxious to keep this request entirely private so that it would not be politicized into a Chinese-U.S. quid pro quo. My approach was two-fold:

1. In March 1999 I had lunch in Beijing with Madame Li Xiaolin, Vice-Chairman (American Affairs) of the Chinese Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, who agreed to forward my request for information to the PRC government. Mme. Li seemed anxious to help, and suggested my request would carry more weight if I could obtain support letters from U.S. government officials. Subsequently President Gerald R. Ford, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Senator John McCain, Senator Jon Kyl, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Congressman John Shadegg all wrote letters on my behalf.

11-L-0559/OSD15124

2. Before leaving Beijing in April 1999, I met with He Di, Vice-Chairman at Warburg Dillon Read. He Di's former colleague at the Institute of American Studies of CASS(Beijing), Nui Jun, is the son-in-law of Yin Qianchen, the retired head of Chinese Air Defense in 1956. Yin reported to He and Nui that he remembered the August 1956 shootdown very well...i.e the location, details of the surrounding circumstances, etc., and especially the fact that "two of the American pilots were arrested". Although there was great celebration in the higher echelons of the Air Force, the capture of the pilots was kept in great secrecy. He did not know what became of the "two pilots" because that was not his department. Yin also confirmed that the pilot credited with the shootdown was Zhang Wen yi, now retired in Guangzhou. Zhang was highly decorated for this shootdown and later in his military career became Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Zhang's brother is Zhang Wen-pu, a mid-level foreign ministry officer in 1956, but was later Ambassador to Canada and held other foreign ministry positions.

Sometime during the summer of 1999, Yin was interviewed again by He and Nui at my request for further details. During this interview he telephoned another retired senior military officer, and upon returning from the telephone said he was now "not sure" about survivors. His family does not want him interviewed again unless he is in the presence of the Friendship Association or other Chinese functionaries. Zhang Wen-pu has refused to put me or He Di in contact with his brother, and denies there were any survivors of the shootdown. It was obvious that 1) those involved felt this was still classified and 2) that Yin had inadvertently spilled some sensitive information.

I returned to Beijing in March of this year to meet again at lunch with Madame Li of the Friendship Association. I had written her previously asking for her Association to facilitate my interviewing Yin and the pilot Zhang. Contrary to her rather encouraging letters during the months prior to this second meeting, she told me that I must "stop my investigation." She stated that, despite the support letters I had provided, information regarding my husband's fate was "highly classified", "top secret," and involved "the national security of China". My letters and documents had been forwarded to the Foreign Ministry, which said it was a military matter. I am not clear whether it was the Foreign Ministry or the military which actually denied the request. I also asked her to deliver to President Jiang Zemin a letter I had drafted asking him to have the information about my husband declassified. She refused, saying it would do no good anyway as President Jiang would not (?or could not) countermand the military. I told her the only way I could see that this 44 year old incident would still be classified was if the PRC were still holding him in prison. Her answer was "I just don't know". Three weeks later, she declined to reiterate by letter what she had told me in Beijing.

The following day I hired an interpreter and spent a day in the environs of Wan Ping, a town on the outskirts of southwest Beijing. Wan Ping was the site of one of the prisons where my husband was held (see IRs # 1176-57, 1900-57, and 6795-57). We visited five or six prisons, none of which were in existence in 1956, and talked with a number of elderly villagers, as well as historians at the Sino-Japanese war museum, all without

learning anything significant. We did however, interview a Public Security officer who had worked in the area in the late 50's. He stated that a foreigner being held for political (i.e. non-criminal) reasons would have been in a military facility completely off-limits to other citizens, who would not even have known it contained any kind of prison. It therefore seemed fruitless to spend any more time in Wan Ping.

I hope this additional information will once and for all put to rest any further speculation by the DPMO that the 1956-1958 intelligence report were fabrications, and that Lt.jg Deane's case will have the "last known alive" priority that it has deserved and not received for the past seven years. I have contact numbers for the individuals above, but because of the sensitive nature of the material, do not feel they should be contacted without consulting me first.

I do not plan to give up until I have learned what happened to my husband, and I hope I will have the support of the DPMO in this endeavor. Lt.jg Deane certainly deserved no less.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Beverly Deane Shaver". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Beverly" being the most prominent.

Beverly Deane Shaver, M.D.

(b)(6)

Enclosures.

Cc: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Senator John McCain
Senator Jon Kyl
Ambassador Joseph W. Prueher
Congressman John Shadegg

**Points Supporting the Validity of the Intelligence Reports
in the Shootdown of the P4M August 22/23/1956**

1. The reports have multiple sources. To my knowledge, the *only* person who has read the *unredacted* reports was an analyst from Task Force Russia, who reported to me that there appeared to be probably *four separate sources*, and he did not feel it was possible for one fabricator to simulate this. In addition, there were *three separate intelligence gathering groups* involved, viz.: a) a Japanese business man with Shanghai connections reporting to ?, b) a nurse in Paoting reporting to G-2 8th Army Korea, and c) two sources in Peiping/WanPing reporting to the 6004th AF Air Intelligence Service Squadron in Tokyo/Atsugi. It is inconceivable to me that there could be four separate fabricators who, just by chance, happened to fabricate a series of reports that agree for the most part in content and sequence.

2. The physical description of Lt jg. Deane is unique. His general description of build, facial appearance, demeanor, etc. fit him well, but they could apply to others, and at least some of the description could have been gleaned from a photograph (sent to many Asian naval attaches by ONI OP 922H (Collection and Dissemination) in 1956-7. But, the comment in IR 1900-57 (see enclosure # 1) that "he is not hairy" could *not* have come from the photograph or the physical descriptions sent to the Far East. It had to have come from someone who saw him, probably with no, or few, clothes. Lt. jg Deane had less body hair than probably 0.1% of caucasian men. He was exceedingly smooth-skinned without hair on his chest, abdomen, arms, or legs. In a word, his body hair distribution was that of an Asian, and it must have been striking to the Asian observer reporting.

3. Most ONI intelligence analysts from the 1956-57 period feel these IRs are, more likely than not, valid. While no one can draw a firm conclusion on this point, and the opinions were not unanimous, those with analytic experience who agreed to read these reports (many listed on enclosure # 5), made comments such as "I see nothing suggesting a fabrication", "certainly looks like worthwhile pursuing", etc., etc. Only two people I interviewed, and who read the IRS, felt they were fabrications; one because he did not feel the US government would abandon its men, and the other because he felt that everything that came out of the 6004th was a fabrication. Both these points have been refuted by many.

4. It is quite apparent that Samuel Klaus believed there were survivors. His conversation memos all through 1957 and even into 1958, persistently raises the issue of the continuous reports of survivors that he is receiving, even after the Navy had declared the missing crew dead. (See marked passages of enclosure # 3) It is also obvious that we do not have today all the reports that were available to Klaus.

5. The IRs cite appropriate names and places. I have been able to establish that WanPing was a *real* prison and that Ch'eng (or chen) Lung was a *real* person. According to Harry Wu, author of "Laogai, the Chinese Gulag", Wan Ping was a very small, highly

secure, secret military prison, and exactly the type of prison which would have been used if the Chinese had wanted to keep the prisoners secret. Its function would have been known to very few people. It was closed in 1958, and Wu does not know where its prisoners would have been transferred.

I also interviewed Sidney Rittenberg, author of "The Man Who Stayed Behind" and professor of Chinese History at Uof NC, who lived in the PRC about 30 years, many of those years in prison. Rittenberg identified Ch'eng Lung as the Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Public Security, who in 1956 was in charge of all local police, the PRC's equivalent of the "FBI" and "CIA". He was not in charge of the usual Chinese prisons, and was actually part of the military. Rittenberg felt that the detainees living at the "residence" of Ch'eng Lung was not believable, but felt the "residence" was probably a translation inaccuracy for "jurisdiction".

I do not think your analysts are aware of the above two points on this case, but they should be. I had not been able to get through to them by telephone prior to the Los Angeles meeting.

6. *The Bail-out Factor.* The families of the crew were told that the wreckage and four bodies recovered indicated the plane experienced an unsurvivable impact, the main reason for changing the status from "missing" to "deceased." The autopsy reports in the Klaus file do support this conclusion, but those in the search and rescue concluded that there was nothing which precluded some of the crew bailing out. (see enclosure # 2)

7. *Are the flaws in the IRs truly significant?* Admittedly this was probably not a Russian pilot flying the plane which shot the P4M down, but this is an understandable mistake. There were certainly enough Russians around then. The use of phrases unlike those used by Chinese...i.e. "medium build", residence of Ch'eng Lung " may be only translation problems. The rather vague IR 264-58 seems to have no connection whatsoever to the P4M case, and one wonders why it was even included in this file. Some of the inconsistencies such as Lt. Deane being "well-built and lean" in February 1957 (IR1176-57) and later in March 1957 (IR 1900-57) being of "average build" could either be due to two different observers, or the effects of a prison diet over a month's time.

Written 5/29/03

8. The existence of two survivors from the P4M captured and imprisoned in China was confirmed in 1999 by the 1956 head of Chinese Air Defense. (See 7/25/00 letter to DASD Bob Jones).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
11-L-0559/OSD15128

(b)(6)

May 10, 2002

Mr. Jerry D. Jennings, Director
Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office
OASD/ISA
2400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2400

Dear Mr. Jennings:

I am sure you have by now received my May 3rd letter, faxed to you on May 6th, wherein I requested that the Chinese defector Colonel Xu Junping be interrogated on the case of my missing former husband, Lt. jg James Brayton Deane, Jr, USN. Lt. jg Deane was the copilot of a P4M elint plane shot down by the PRC August 22/23, 1956, and was subsequently imprisoned in China. This letter should be considered a postscript to that request.

I do believe that this debriefing of Xu is so critical to DPMO's efforts, not only on my case, but also on all Chinese POW/MIA cases, that you will find a way to have it done. It has occurred to me that Colonel Xu might be vague on this case due to the passage of time, etc., if he were asked for information in a general way. I am writing now to request again that this debriefing be done, and that it be done by someone very familiar with Lt. jg Deane's case who is armed with certain critical documents I have sent you.

To wit, Xu should be shown and asked for comments on at least the following:

1. November 21, 2000 letter from Ambassador Prueher to General Zhan Maohai. How far did this request go, and what was learned?
2. My July 25, 2000 letter to Bob Jones wherein individuals with critical information (Yin Qianchen, Zhang Wen yi, etc.) were named. As my access to them was cut off, perhaps Xu will have other suggestions on how to reach them.
3. The original intelligence reports of 1956-8 (especially IR# 1176-57, 1099-57, 6795-57) reporting my husband and one other crew member alive. Can he identify my husband's last known location, described in the IRs and in the Synopsis, i.e. "quarters of Ch'eng Lung, Assistant Chief of the Public Security Department in Peking"? Does he have knowledge of, or an opinion, as to where he would have next been sent, whether he would have been executed, or if alive, where he would be held today.?
4. Does Xu have any opinion as to what it would take for the PLA to declassify all this information and "come clean" on these POW issues?

I must seem both naïve and presumptuous to spell out to professionals how I think this debriefing should be carried out, but after spending the past ten years working on this, it is quite possible that I do know more about some aspects of this case than anyone else. You may also sense that what I'd really like is to talk with Xu myself. Of course I would, but I'm not so naïve as to ask that of the USG.

11-L-0559/OSD15129

You should have copies of all the documents to which I referred above. If not, please let me know if you need them resent, or if you need any other information I might have.

Thank you for all your help.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Beverly Deane Shaver".

Beverly Deane Shaver, M.D.

(b)(6)



**EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Beijing, China**

September 11, 2002

AMBASSADOR

Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver

(b)(6)

Dear Dr. Shaver,

I very much welcome and appreciate your efforts to resolve the fate of your former husband, Lieutenant Junior Grade James Brayton Deane.

In May of this year, a team from the United States Department of Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (DPMO) sent a delegation to Beijing to negotiate two investigations and recoveries of WWII and Cold War MIA cases in China. During those negotiations, the DPMO once again asked for access to the archives of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA representative at the meeting stated emphatically that the archives would not be opened because they are still considered classified. We expect another high-level delegation from DPMO to visit China in October. One of the priority discussion points for the upcoming delegation will be the opening of the PLA archives. The PLA archives are essential in resolving your husband's and numerous other MIA cases.

We are hopeful that the current initiatives to resolve WWII and Cold War MIA cases will lead to further cooperation between the United States and China on this issue. Although the Chinese Government has been reluctant to grant us access to their archives, you have my personal assurance that we will continue to do all that we can to assist DPMO in resolving all of our outstanding cases.

With kind regards, I am

Very truly yours,

Clark T. Randt, Jr.

11-L-0559/OSD15131

Embassy of the People's Republic of China

2300 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008

YANG JIECHI

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Telephone: (202) 745-6764

Fax: (b)(6)

December 24, 2002

Ms. Beverly Deane Shaver

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Shaver:

I acknowledge the receipt of your faxes on October 21, 2002. Your letter to President Jiang Zemin and other materials included have all been duly forwarded to the President's office.


We attach great importance to the cases involving American missing pilots in China in the 1950's, and we always handle them in a humanitarian and cooperative spirit. At the request of the United States, China made two investigations into the missing of your former husband, Lt. jg. James Brayton Deane, Jr., USN in 1993 and in 2000 respectively. We found the remains of two crew members of the P4M Martin Mercator electronic reconnaissance plane, and later handed them over to the U.S. side. However, we do not have any information on the whereabouts of the other crew members on the P4M. Last year, the U.S. side once again requested China's assistance regarding the case. Accordingly, we made another detailed investigation. But still we have not had any new discoveries.

Due to the then limited salvaging capacity of China, the Chinese side retrieved only two corpses and small wreckages such as the fuel tanks floating on the sea. We do not have in possession any belongings of Lt. jg. Deane. Should there be further discoveries in the future, we will inform you as soon as possible.

The Chinese people hold friendly sentiments toward the American people, and we are determined to deepen the mutual understanding and friendship between China and the United States for the fundamental interests of our two peoples and the whole world at large.

Wish you a Happy New Year.

Sincerely,



Yang Jiechi

Ambassador

Cc: Mr. Erik Kirzinger

11-L-0559/OSD15132

April 29, 2003 12:30 PM

W.J. HAYNES II
HAS SEEN

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: War Crimes Charges

I notice from an article by Jeffrey Kuhner in the April 28 issue of the *Washington Times* that some outfit in Belgium is filing international war crimes charges against Gen. Franks.

If that is the case, ~~it is not clear to me that we ought to go to NATO meetings in Belgium.~~ What do you think?

Thanks

DHR:dh
042903-4Please respond by 5/5

Should we consider whether or not we should be attending meetings (including NATO) in Belgium?

CC: DSD

11-L-0559/OSD15133

U08918 /03

383

29 Apr 03

May 19, 2003 2:05 PM

TO: Richard Lawless
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Philippines

The problem in the Philippines is maintenance. I think we need to put a major press on that and make sure we require them to do the job they ought to be doing on that. They have no C-130s that fly, and they only have about 9 of 30 helicopters that fly.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-35

.....
Please respond by 6/12/03

Philippines

19 May 03

11-L-0559/QSD15134

U08971 / 03



SENT 6/9

~~June 2, 2003~~ 2:09 PM

TO: Jay Garner
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Acknowledgements

Please let me know which folks who helped you should receive letters from me thanking them. If you think any of them merit a specific Department of Defense award, let me know that as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-40

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

335 SD

9 Jun 03

U08985 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15135



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

SECRET
11 11 03
10 4 20



INFO MEMO

June 6, 2003 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Summary of Financial Management in Iraq

A great deal of progress has been made in the last few weeks to make sure that we have procedures in place to ensure the greatest degree of transparency and accountability possible regarding the various funding sources in Iraq. In many cases we are setting brand new precedents because of the unique circumstances surrounding Iraq.

- We expect there to be strong interest from Iraqis, from the international community, and from Congress and others in the U.S. in how the United States Government (USG) manages and utilizes vested and seized (i.e., found) valuables in Iraq. We need to be prepared to answer questions on these resources and publicize how the funds are being used to maximize transparency.
- My plan is to send you these updates on a periodic basis to keep you informed. This memo focuses on assets available to Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

1. Major Funding Sources for Activities in Iraq

- **Vested Iraqi Property.** The President has vested in the Treasury Department \$1.7 billion in formerly blocked and confiscated Iraqi State assets in the U.S. to be used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

To date we have shipped \$199 million in vested Iraqi property (mainly for salaries) to Iraq for use by the CPA. We currently are shipping an additional \$358 million in cash, bringing the total to \$557 million, that is expected to arrive in theater on June 7, 2003.

- **Seized Iraqi Property -- Cash.** As of May 28, 2003, \$798.1 million U.S. dollars have been seized by the U.S. military in Iraq. Given the significant amount of currency involved and the large denominations, it is essential that the authenticity of the currency be established so that it may be used effectively. The DoD will lease three BPS200 currency authentication systems from G&D America. These systems are capable of authenticating currency at a minimum confidence level of 95 percent and are recommended by the Federal Reserve. We expect the authentication team to arrive within the next 2 weeks and to complete the



11-L-0559/OSD15136

U09017 /03

validation process by the end of June. In the interim, the Administrator of the CPA is using \$4 million of these assets for the Brigade Commanders' Fund to accomplish small humanitarian and reconstruction efforts on the ground.

- **Seized Iraqi Property – Yellow Ingots.** As of USCENTCOM's June 2, 2003 seized assets inventory update, 2,176 ingots are being stored in a vault at Camp Arifjan. They may or may not be gold. One ingot was assayed yesterday by the Under Secretary of Commerce for Precious Metals in Kuwait City and found to be principally copper (68%) and zinc (31%). Thirty-two randomly selected ingots will also be assayed this week. Additionally, OUSD(C) is coordinating with the U.S. Mint to send assayers out to collect core samples and bring them back to the U.S. (West Point) for chemical analysis. Once the ingots' true value is determined, they will be deposited with the Iraqi Central Bank per Ambassador Bremer's direction. No funds have been obligated from this source pending authentication.
 - **Development Fund for Iraq.** The UNSCR 1483 calls for certain monies to be placed in the "Development Fund for Iraq" (hereafter called "Fund") administered by the CPA. The Fund is to be used for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, for continued disarmament of Iraq, for the costs of Iraq civilian administration, and other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq. The United Nations has already transferred \$1 billion from the Oil For Food escrow account into the Fund. Oil sales revenues also will be deposited into the Fund along with some vested Iraqi assets and frozen assets held by other governments. No funds so far have been obligated from this source.
 - **Appropriated Funds.** In the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, Congress appropriated \$2.475 billion for the President's Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, which is the primary source of U.S government appropriated funding for Iraqi relief and reconstruction activities. Congress also made \$489 million of the Iraqi Freedom Fund appropriation available to be used if needed to repair damage to Iraqi oil facilities and to preserve a petroleum distribution capability. Through May, the Army has used \$175 million of the \$489 million. Through June, the estimated obligations are expected to be \$252.2 million.
2. **Currency Update.** On June 2, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority began printing 250 Dinar notes using the one surviving Iraqi facility (the other was damaged heavily). Printing will take place over the next 2 weeks. Sometime in the next few weeks, the CPA will announce procedures for exchanging old, higher value (10,000 Dinar) notes for the newly printed notes. Representatives from the U.S Department of Treasury advise that the 10,000 Dinar notes are continuing to devalue

and exchange rates vary considerably within Iraq, due in large part to poor communication/transportation.

Ambassador Bremer has been briefed on medium-term options for printing new currency (headless Saddam Dinars, Swiss Dinars, etc.). We await Ambassador Bremer's recommendation regarding these options.

3. **Pentagon - CPA Management Liaison Cell.** We created a management team with personnel in Baghdad and back here in Washington that includes representatives from OMB, USAID, GAO, the DoD IG, the Joint Staff, Defense Contract Management Agency, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Finance and Accounting Services, and USD(Comptroller). This management cell will assist Ambassador Bremer and the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority in reviewing all financial transactions to ensure transparency and accountability.

May 22, 2003 10:32 AM

Received 5/28

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Financial Management in Iraq

Please keep me posted from time to time on your assessment of the financial management in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-26

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

11-L-0559/OSD15139



May 22, 2003 10:32 AM

Received 5/28

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Financial Management in Iraq

Iraq

Please keep me posted from time to time on your assessment of the financial management in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-26

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03


22 May 03



SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Reductions

When will the numbers in Jordan and Saudi Arabia go down faster? We still have 3,600 in those two countries total. Do you have a projection that you can give me?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060703-6

.....

Please respond by 6/12/03

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reductions Over Three Months

I would like a projection on how you think you are going to be pulling down Kuwait and the remaining Gulf states over the next three months. We still have 80,600 in Kuwait and another 15,800 in the remaining Gulf states. I would think that at this point you might be able to give me a fix as to what your projection is between now and October 1.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060703.7

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS
TO:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

JUN 13 2003

EP-5362

DepSecDef

USD(P)

I-03/006963-ISA

INFO MEMO

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) 5 JUN 2003

SUBJECT: Interim Response to Snowflake on the Philippines: U.S. Navy Recruitment Program for Philippine Citizens

- You asked us to resolve the issue of whether or not to restart the U.S. Navy recruitment program for Philippine citizens that ended in 1992.
- The program started in 1947 with the signing of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA), and it ended per the Philippine Government's request (coinciding with its termination of the MBA).
- The program, unique to the Philippines, allowed 2000 male Philippine citizens per year to enlist voluntarily in the U.S. Navy for periods of 4-6 years.
- The program was extended to the U.S. Coast Guard in 1954, allowing 400 male Philippine citizens to enlist per year.
- Participation in the program did not guarantee eventual U.S. citizenship.
- This program highlighted the special relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines resulting from the Philippines status as the sole former U.S. colony.
- Resuming the program would demonstrate close bilateral ties but could also generate unrealistic hopes on the part of the Philippine Government that we will re-establish a "special relationship."
- Resuming it could also open the door for similar requests, especially from Compact of Free Association nations.
- We have asked Personnel and Readiness (P&R) to assess the advantages and disadvantages of resuming the program. Once we receive this assessment, we will send you a recommendation.

Attachments:

Tab A: SecDef question

Tab B: Coordination

U09116 /03

EF-5362

I-006963

May 19, 2003 11:53 AM

15 E

TO: Richard Lawless
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Philippines

We have to resolve the issue of whether or not we want to have the Philippines again have the chance to join the US military.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-27

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

USDP- 5/20/03
Lawless For action -
Suspense 5/22/03.

U(R L B)

11-L-0559/OSD15144

COORDINATION

PDASD/ISA, Peter Flory

WS

DASD/AP, Richard Lawless

Res for 4/3

PDIR/AP, Mary Tighe

Res 4/3

Personnel & Readiness - ~~Bon Clarke~~

info copy

Joint Staff (J-5), Howie Tran

info copy

Navy/Personnel (CDR Chris Erant)

info copy



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUN 12 AM 10:01

INFO MEMO

June 11, 2003, 8:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Telling our Story on Stewardship of Taxpayer Money

- This is in reply to your recent memoranda (Tab A) on saving money and getting our story out about being good stewards of taxpayer money. Attached are examples of DoD actions supporting good stewardship. I will continue to develop these and related materials to help us get this story out.
- Telling our story on stewardship of taxpayer money is not only money savings initiatives, but also our management initiatives.
- We have had some success on specific issues with both the Hill and the press, e.g., transformation legislation, 2-year budgeting, management initiatives, and Personnel Security Investigations transferred to OPM.
- The appropriations bills are currently going through mark-up, and the authorization bills through conference. It is important that we continue to demonstrate our commitment to management improvements.
- I have already been working the Hill on our business architecture by using briefings and lunches to keep key staffers informed.
- I will work with Powell, Ken, and Torie to develop a more detailed plan of action.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Robert Shue, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15146

U09131 /03

DoD Stewardship of Taxpayer Money

1. Adopt and support the right strategy

- 2001 QDR blueprint to transform U.S. defense to reflect 21st century realities.
- NPR recommended New Triad geared to realities of post-Cold War.
- Missile defense: new direction and way of budgeting (consolidate various \$ pots)
- Near-term requirements balanced with long-term transformation.

2. Acquire the right military capabilities

- Over \$80 billion shifted from old to new plans for FY 2004-09 – for early termination of acquisition programs and other efficiencies.
- Increased investments in transformation goals, Science & Technology.
- New ways to fulfill military missions, e.g. unmanned vehicles.
- Better focus on new threats: SSGN conversion, increased SOF.
- Skip ahead to better technologies/systems: CVN-21, DD-21 to DDX.

3. Change how U.S. military fights

- Joint operational concepts: interoperability, info superiority, intelligence, precision, speed, range, mobility, survivability, lighter logistics burden.
- New Unified Command Plan, greater roles for SOCOM and JFCOM.

4. Put people first

- Military compensation: Both added dollars and better distribution of funds through targeted pay raises for people who are hardest to retain.
- Privatization leverages budgets to yield quality housing faster: over 92,000 units.

5. Achieve passage of Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act

- National Security Personnel System; better military personnel management.
- Transformed acquisition process, range preservation initiative.
- DoD reorganization, greater flexibility for appropriated funding, fewer reports.

6. Improve defense acquisition

- Spiral development and other initiatives speed fielding of new systems.
- Realistic funding: FY 2002-03 requests added \$8 billion to key programs.
- Rationalizing long-term program, most notably tactical aircraft.

7. Streamline and upgrade DoD facilities

- President's and Congress's support for new 2005 BRAC round remains critical to achieve more streamlined, cost-effective facilities infrastructure.
- Once fully implemented. BRAC 2005 will save about \$8 billion per year.
- Facilities recapitalization: FY 2002-03 PB added about \$2 billion per year.

8. Overhaul internal DoD programming/budgeting

- Balanced scorecard and performance metrics to guide budget decisions and improve programs.
- New process: combined program/budget review, 2-year cycle, execution review.

9. Modernize business management systems

- The Department's 2,000 business systems are being transformed by eliminating some of them and overhauling the rest. The Business Enterprise Architecture is guiding the transformation. It will standardize and integrate systems, enabling them to generate timely and accurate business information for DoD leaders.

10. Advance other management improvements

- Senior leadership is in charge through Senior Executive Council, Business Initiative Council (BIC), and Defense Business Board, and use of the Management Initiative Decision (MID) process. Below are highlights of MIDs.
- Competitive Sourcing (MID 907): Directs studies of 226,000 DoD positions to determine which public or private organization can best provide the functions of those positions. Once the results of the studies are implemented, savings for FY 2006-2009 would likely exceed \$300 million.
- Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) (MID 908): DoD is seeking statutory authority to transfer the PSI function to the Office of Personnel Management, which would make it the central provider of these services for the federal government. This would eliminate redundancy and other inefficiencies, and is projected to save \$160 million.
- Defense Agencies (MID 909): Examples of proposals include:
 - For the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA): Divest its Document Automation and Production Service, finance various logistics studies from within available resources, and demolish obsolete fuel facilities.
 - For Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA): Conduct pilot test for outsourcing its audit workload.
- BIC Initiatives (MID 902): Examples include:
 - Cell phone economies: Achieve savings by pooling and bundling unused cell phone minutes by organization, installation, or regional level. This initiative now has been broadened to encourage users to obtain flexible cell phone plans that are tailored to their needs and most cost effective.
 - Alternatives for outsourcing. This advances the use of several efficient means for outsourcing non-core DoD functions to the private sector. Such means include direct service contracts and the commercial cost comparison option permitted by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. One example: One DoD organization outsourced its desktop computer services by defining them as a new requirement, then negotiating with the private sector for the efficient providing of those services.
 - Web-based processing. For DoD contracts, convert from paper-based to web-enabled process. This would speed up processing, make payments more timely and thus reduce penalties against DoD, and save operating costs.

SENT 5/31 0945

May 30, 2003 11:54 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Savings

Where are the lists that show we are saving money in different things around here and that we are respectful of the taxpayers' dollars?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-7

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

May 22, 2003 8:01 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

CC: Torie Clarke
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Getting the Story Out

Congressman Nussle of the Budget Committee said yesterday that he thought we were being attentive to taxpayers' money, but he really thought there ought to be a way we could show the taxpayers that we were being attentive.

Should we begin to think of how we can say we have saved money on different things and what we are trying to do? I think that is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-11

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

SENT 5/31 0945

May 30, 2003 11:54 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Savings

Where are the lists that show we are saving money in different things around here and that we are respectful of the taxpayers' dollars?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-7

.....
Please respond by

6/6/03

10,01

31 May 03

May 22, 2003 8:01 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Torie Clarke
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Getting the Story Out

Congressman Nussle of the Budget Committee said yesterday that he thought we were being attentive to taxpayers' money, but he really thought there ought to be a way we could show the taxpayers that we were being attentive.

Should we begin to think of how we can say we have saved money on different things and what we are trying to do? I think that is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR:db
052203-11

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUN 16 AM 8:23

INFO MEMO

JUN 12 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Department of Health and Human Services Offer of Assistance to Improve Health Care in Iraq

- On May 30, you informed Ambassador Bremer that Secretary Thompson, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, had contacted you with an offer of assistance to improve health care in Iraq. (TAB A)
- On June 6, Mr. James K. Haveman arrived in Baghdad as the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Health. My office arranged contacts for Mr. Haveman with officials in the Department of Health and Human Services prior to his departure.
- Mr. Haveman is now preparing a health care service plan for Ambassador Bremer in conjunction with my office and the Iraqi Ministry of Health which will identify and prioritize health care system needs in Iraq. This plan will assist us in prioritizing the many offers of assistance that are coming forward from both governmental and non-governmental sources. I am also assembling an interagency senior health care steering committee to coordinate our support to Ambassador Bremer and his staff. I will ensure that the Department of Health and Human Services' proposals are included in this review and receive the highest attention.
- At this time, discussions are ongoing to identify Department of Health and Human Services personnel that can be added to the ministerial team, particularly in the critically needed area of support to medical laboratories and medical surveillance.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Diana Tabler, CoS, OASD (HA) (b)(6), PCDOCS 51081, 51083

U09246 03

11-L-0559/OSD15153

TAB

A

12:43 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer
Cc: Bill Winkewich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 30, 2003

SUBJECT:

Secretary Thompson, the Secretary of HHS called and said he wants to be helpful in Iraq on healthcare. He has heard about their problems. He is available to send a team in to assist you or do anything you want.

It is conceivable that they have some money and capabilities that could be useful. Just let us know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
053003.06

Please respond by:

6 | 10 | 03

51081

11-L-0559/OSD15155

TAB

B

HHS Offer of Assistance to Improve Health Care in Iraq

COORDINATION

CoS (HA)	Ms. Diana Tabler	<u>has seen 6/12/03</u>
PDASD (HA)	Mr. Ed Wyatt	<u></u>
USD (P&R)	Dr. David S. C. Chu	<u>David S. C. Chu 10 Jan 03</u>



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO



June 13, 2003, 1100

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Guard, Reserve Short on Recruits, June 10 USA Today Article

- Regarding the article, you asked "Is it true? What are the facts?" (TAB A) The message of the article was that heavy use of the Reserve components (RC) may be starting to affect recruiting. Article is at Tab B.
- The article is partially true. The facts are as follows:
- All RCs achieved recruiting and end strength goals in FY 02. In addition, quality of recruits, based on education and mental category criteria, were higher than for FY 01.
- Recruiting goals for FY 03 are higher than for FY 02 in four of the six RCs. RCs have achieved 97% of that goal. We expect RC recruiting to increase with the ending of AC Stop Loss programs and the upcoming strong Summer recruiting months.
- Of the six RCs, only the Army National Guard is experiencing a significant recruiting shortfall compared to their FY 03 goal (30,834 achieved vs goal of 35,503). Data at Tab C. However, their strength is at 346,290 (98.9% of the authorized 350,000).
- The Army Reserve is at 97% for the same period and actually showed improvement in the month of April and is well above its programmed strength.
- The Department sees no indications that recruiting is having any serious impact on the RC ability to prosecute the homeland security mission or the war on terrorism.
- Patriotism is high and several of the RCs are experiencing an extremely strong recruiting performance. It is simply too early to predict the short- or long-term impacts of the current mobilization on future strength achievement.
- The Army is taking a number of steps to assist the Army National Guard in achieving their end strength objective through both recruiting and retention initiatives.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD15158

U09267 /03

TAB

A

Snowflake

6/12/03

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 10, 2003

SUBJECT:

See this item that I've circled on the Guard and the Reserve. Is that true? What are the facts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061003.01.A

Attach: Early Bird Cover Sheet; 6/10/03 Item 6

Please respond by: _____

6/23/03

TAB

B

CURRENT NEWS

EARLY BIRD

June 10, 2003

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Story numbers indicate order of appearance only.

TOP STORIES

1. **In A Massive Shift, U.S. Plans To Reduce Troops In Germany**
(Wall Street Journal)...Greg Jaffe
The Pentagon plans to significantly shrink the U.S. force of 70,000 troops in Germany, a military stronghold for half a century, and put far more American forces in Africa and the Caucasus region.
2. **War In Iraq Was 'Right Decision,' Bush Says**
(Washington Post)...Dana Milbank
President Bush yesterday defended the accusations leveled by his administration about Saddam Hussein's illegal weapons capability, saying history will record that the United States made the "absolute right decision" in attacking Iraq three months ago.
3. **U.S. Soldiers Face Persistent Resistance**
(Washington Post)...William Booth and Daniel Williams
Attacks on American troops are growing in frequency and sophistication across central Iraq, a crescent of discontent and hostility where many Iraqis remain opposed to the U.S. occupation of their country.
4. **U.S. Policies Lead To Dire Straits For Some In Iraq**
(Los Angeles Times)...Michael Slackman and John Denizewski
From the Americans' perspective, recent decisions to disband the defeated Iraqi army and bar full members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party from state posts seemed like no-brainers. But both decrees from the head of the U.S.-led occupation have angered Iraqis and created new problems for American and British authorities trying to run the country.
5. **Iran Accuses Iraq Hid Arms**
(Washington Times)...Stewart Stogel
An Iranian government official with ties to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Tehran sides with the Americans on one big issue — Saddam Hussein's weapons.
6. **Guard Reserve Short On Recruits**
(USA Today)...Dave Moniz
The Pentagon's heavy use of part-time military units in the war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq may be starting to exact a price: The nation's largest auxiliary forces — the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve — are beginning to have trouble meeting their recruiting targets.

RUMSFELD TRIP

7. **With 'New NATO' In Mind, Rumsfeld Starts Europe Trip**
(Los Angeles Times)...Esther Schrader
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld began a four-day European swing Monday in which he will meet with NATO defense ministers in Brussels to discuss the future of the alliance and with German leaders in Munich who

USA Today
June 10, 2003
Pg. 1

Guard, Reserve Short On Recruits

Heavy use takes toll on Army part-timers

By Dave Moniz, USA Today

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon's heavy use of part-time military units in the war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq may be starting to exact a price: The nation's largest auxiliary forces — the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve — are beginning to have trouble meeting their recruiting targets.

As of April 30, the Guard was nearly 6,000 recruits short of where it needed to be on that date to meet its Sept. 30 target of enlisting 62,000 soldiers, Pentagon statistics show. If the Guard can't reverse the shortfall, it will mark the first time since 1998 that it has failed to fill its ranks.

The Army Reserve is also lagging behind and was more than 700 soldiers short of where it needed to be in April to meet its Sept. 30 goal of 42,000.

Defense officials and civilian analysts say the numbers demonstrate that the unusually intense use of part-time soldiers over the past year and a half is beginning to seriously affect the Guard and Reserve. Units have been called up for numerous missions that include guarding bases around the world, fixing war-torn towns in Afghanistan and flying refueling jets over Iraq. Two months after the fall of Baghdad, there are still 215,000 Guard and Reserve troops on active duty around the world, many in Iraq.

"I think it is reasonable to conclude that people are looking at the last 19 to 20 months of mobilization and they are voting with their feet," says Tom White, a former secretary of the Army. "I think we're seeing the leading edge of a problem."

Recruiters aren't helped by the apparent transformation of part-time soldiering into full-time jobs. For much of the decade before the Sept. 11 attacks, men and women who joined the Guard and Reserve knew that in most cases, they would train one weekend a month and perform two weeks of summer drills. Most were unlikely to be called for active duty.

A recruiting drought could have serious implications for homeland security and the war on terrorism because Guard and Reserve troops are shouldering much of the burden of guarding U.S. airports and performing other domestic security missions.

The demands on National Guard and Reserve troops, most of whom have full-time civilian jobs, have been unrelenting. Some units, including military police and nation-building soldiers known as civil affairs specialists, have been on active duty almost constantly since the Sept. 11 attacks. Last year, the Pentagon extended about 15,000 Reservists for a second consecutive year of active duty, the first time that has happened since the Vietnam War.

For now, the recruiting trouble seems to be confined to the Army's part-time units. The active-duty forces are on target to meet recruiting goals, as are the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve — though those part-time units are smaller than the

Army's and usually have an easier time meeting their goals.

TAB

C

Service Recruiting Performance

RECRUITING QUANTITY		FY 2003 through March		
Active Component	FY 2003 Objective	Objective through March	Achieved	Percent achieved YTD
Army	73,800	31,895	32,193	100.9%
Navy	41,656	15,513	16,124	103.9%
Marine Corps	32,751	13,196	13,059	99.0%
Air Force	37,000	18,006	18,063	100.3%
Total	185,207	78,610	79,439	101.1%
		FY 2003 through April		
Reserve Component	FY 2003 Objective	Objective through April	Achieved	Percent achieved YTD
Army National Guard	62,000	35,503	30,834	86.8%
Army Reserve	42,400	25,489	24,677	96.8%
Navy Reserve	12,000	7,082	7,341	103.7%
Marine Corps Reserve	8,617	5,418	6,017	111.1%
Air National Guard	5,708	3,330	4,742	142.4%
Air Force Reserve	7,512	3,952	4,334	109.7%
Total	138,237	80,774	77,945	96.5%

Snowflake

6/12/03

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 10, 2003

326

SUBJECT:

See this item that I've circled on the Guard and the Reserve. Is that true? What are the facts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061003.01.A

Attach: Early Bird Cover Sheet; 6/10/03 Item 6

Please respond by: _____

6/23/03

10 Jun 03

11-L-0559/OSD15167

U09268 /03

CURRENT NEWS

EARLY BIRD

June 10, 2003

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Story numbers indicate order of appearance only.

TOP STORIES

1. **In A Massive Shift, U.S. Plans To Reduce Troops In Germany**
(Wall Street Journal)...Greg Jaffe
The Pentagon plans to significantly shrink the U.S. force of 70,000 troops in Germany, a military stronghold for half a century, and put far more American forces in Africa and the Caucasus region.
2. **War In Iraq Was 'Right Decision,' Bush Says**
(Washington Post)...Dana Milbank
President Bush yesterday defended the accusations leveled by his administration about Saddam Hussein's illegal weapons capability, saying history will record that the United States made the "absolute right decision" in attacking Iraq three months ago.
3. **U.S. Soldiers Face Persistent Resistance**
(Washington Post)...William Booth and Daniel Williams
Attacks on American troops are growing in frequency and sophistication across central Iraq, a crescent of discontent and hostility where many Iraqis remain opposed to the U.S. occupation of their country.
4. **U.S. Policies Lead To Dire Straits For Some In Iraq**
(Los Angeles Times)...Michael Slackman and John Demiszewski
From the Americans' perspective, recent decisions to disband the defeated Iraqi army and bar full members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party from state posts seemed like no-brainers. But both decrees from the head of the U.S.-led occupation have angered Iraqis and created new problems for American and British authorities trying to run the country.
5. **Iran Agrees Iraq Hid Arms**
(Washington Times)...Stewart Stogel
An Iranian government official with ties to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Tehran sides with the Americans on one big issue — Saddam Hussein's weapons.
6. **Guard Reserve Short On Recruits**
(USA Today)...Dave Moniz
The Pentagon's heavy use of part-time military units in the war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq may be starting to exact a price: The nation's largest auxiliary forces — the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve — are beginning to have trouble meeting their recruiting targets.

RUMSFELD TRIP

7. **With 'New NATO' In Mind, Rumsfeld Starts Europe Trip**
(Los Angeles Times)...Esther Schrader
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld began a four-day European swing Monday in which he will meet with NATO defense ministers in Brussels to discuss the future of the alliance and with German leaders in Munich who

USA Today
June 10, 2003
Pg. 1

Guard, Reserve Short On Recruits

Heavy use takes toll on Army part-timers

By Dave Moniz, USA Today

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon's heavy use of part-time military units in the war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq may be starting to exact a price: The nation's largest auxiliary forces — the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve — are beginning to have trouble meeting their recruiting targets.

As of April 30, the Guard was nearly 6,000 recruits short of where it needed to be on that date to meet its Sept. 30 target of enlisting 62,000 soldiers, Pentagon statistics show. If the Guard can't reverse the shortfall, it will mark the first time since 1998 that it has failed to fill its ranks.

The Army Reserve is also lagging behind and was more than 700 soldiers short of where it needed to be in April to meet its Sept. 30 goal of 42,000.

Defense officials and civilian analysts say the numbers demonstrate that the unusually intense use of part-time soldiers over the past year and a half is beginning to seriously affect the Guard and Reserve. Units have been called up for numerous missions that include guarding bases around the world, fixing war-torn towns in Afghanistan and flying refueling jets over Iraq. Two months after the fall of Baghdad, there are still 215,000 Guard and Reserve troops on active duty around the world, many in Iraq.

"I think it is reasonable to conclude that people are looking at the last 19 to 20 months of mobilization and they are voting with their feet," says Tom White, a former secretary of the Army. "I think we're seeing the leading edge of a problem."

Recruiters aren't helped by the apparent transformation of part-time soldiering into full-time jobs. For much of the decade before the Sept. 11 attacks, men and women who joined the Guard and Reserve knew that in most cases, they would train one weekend a month and perform two weeks of summer drills. Most were unlikely to be called for active duty.

A recruiting drought could have serious implications for homeland security and the war on terrorism because Guard and Reserve troops are shouldering much of the burden of guarding U.S. airports and performing other domestic security missions.

The demands on National Guard and Reserve troops, most of whom have full-time civilian jobs, have been unrelenting. Some units, including military police and nation-building soldiers known as civil affairs specialists, have been on active duty almost constantly since the Sept. 11 attacks. Last year, the Pentagon extended about 15,000 Reservists for a second consecutive year of active duty, the first time that has happened since the Vietnam War.

For now, the recruiting trouble seems to be confined to the Army's part-time units. The active-duty forces are on target to meet recruiting goals, as are the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve — though those part-time units are smaller than the

- Guard, Reserve Short On Recruits

Page 2 of 2

- Army's and usually have an easier time meeting their goals.



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2003 JUN 16 PM 2:53

INFO MEMO

June 13, 2003, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David W. Chu 13 June 03


SUBJECT: TRICARE for Reserves

- You requested that I answer a question concerning TRICARE benefits for Reserves (TAB B).
- The prepared answer is at TAB A.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Gina Marchi, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD15171

U09298^{7:2}/03

TAB

A

Senate Appropriations Committee
Defense Subcommittee
Hearing Date: May 14, 2003
Subject: FY 2004 Defense Budget Request
Senator: Senator Leahy
Witness: Secretary Rumsfeld
Question #2

Question. Does DoD support legislation which would make reservists eligible for TRICARE benefits?

Answer: The Department has over the past two years used existing legislative authority to ensure equality of benefits under TRICARE for the activated Reserve and active duty force and their families.

TRICARE implemented its demonstration authority and provided immediate relief to activated Reserve family members post 11 September 2001 by waiving the requirement that they obtain a non-availability statement from a Military Treatment Facility; by waiving the requirement that they meet their statutory deductible under TRICARE Standard; and by paying up to the legal liability limit to non-participating providers, thereby relieving them of the need to pay anything above their normal cost share.

Recently, the Department changed its policy to allow the activated Reservist's family member residing in the catchment area of Military Treatment Facilities to be eligible for TRICARE Prime after the Reservist has been activated for thirty days, as opposed to the previous 180 days.

Congress last session provided the TRICARE Prime Remote for Active Duty Family Member (TPRADFM) benefit to reserve family members, but only if they "reside with" the reserve member. The Department is interpreting this language liberally to allow the family members to be eligible for TPRADFM as long as they reside with the Reservist at the time orders are received, rather than requiring the family to continuously reside with the member.

The Department, however, does not support legislation that would make Reservists or their family members eligible for TRICARE when not on active duty. The GAO has estimated the cost of providing the TRICARE benefit for Reservists who are not on active duty at approximately \$2 billion per year.

TAB

B

MAY -22' 03 (THU) 14:06

FMO

TEL: (b)(6)

P. 001

MAY-16-2003 11:48

OSD LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

703 697 8299 P. 02/05

May 14, 2003 2:08 PM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *VA*
SUBJECT: Tricare for Reserves

Please work with David Chu to get an answer I can see first for Senator Leahy's question about Tricare for Reserves.

Thanks.

DNR:m
031403-0

Please respond

Anita -

*Please forward to
Cyndi Spight - need
to do direct coordination
w/ Lt on the response
& be sure Dr. w/ one
Dr. Chu get a chop on the
final draft -
UTC S. -*

Received May-16-03 00.

Page 002

11-L-0559/OSD15175

COCHRAN:

On another subject, I know that both the Navy and the Army have been experimenting with leased vessels to define the requirements of the littoral combat ship in case of the Navy, and the theater support vessel that the Army considers important for its purposes. I understand, too, the Army is considering leasing a lot more of these vessels.

COCHRAN:

They're catamaran-type vessels, high-speed vessels. We have shipbuilding firms on the Mississippi gulf coast that are very capable of building cost-effective ships for our military, and I wonder whether you'll look at this leasing plan and see whether or not it might be more appropriate to build these ships rather than to lease foreign vessels for experimentation and analysis.

RUMSFELD:

Let me have Dov answer that.

ZAKHEIM:

Well, one of the reasons, Senator, that these leases are being looked at is because they're still trying to define exactly what kind of platforms they have in mind. The littoral combat ship's a good example. I know down in Mississippi you have a tremendous composite facility which would come up with a completely new type of composite ship.

The issue really is defining requirements. And until they've got that nailed down -- and as you know, the Navy's been working on that, for its part, and the Army for theirs -- in order to just get a sense of what requirements might be needed, they are leasing. I don't believe that that is the long-term intention.

COCHRAN:

Thank you very much.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

STEVENS:

Senator Leahy?

LEAHY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Interesting in listening to this, and interesting how much we have improved in the high-tech area of our military, Mr. Secretary -- Mr. Secretary, you and I have talked before about such things as using drones and all, and I think we're in absolute agreement on -- in fact, especially for surveillance and everything else, it's a lot easier to stick something up there, and if it does get shot down you've lost a drone, you haven't lost a person. They can stay longer and you have more flexibility.

MAY-15-2003 11:48

OASD LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

703 697 8299

P. 04/05

We also might note, this committee funded an advanced data link that allowed targeting information to go to our aircraft quickly. That was an initiative that I had worked on.

ZAKHEIM:

This committee had funded it. I hear that our pilots over there at the gateway made a real difference, and I want to compliment those who used it.

In Iraq, we confirmed the total force concept. We had the guard reserves, active force fighting side by side. The commander was telling me they were an integral part of our military victory.

I'm concerned, however, that our benefits by our central Reservists haven't changed. Example, about 20 percent of the Reserves don't currently possess adequate health insurance. I'm told this undermines readiness, undermines recruitment and so on, retention.

We do support legislation to make Reservers eligible for tri-care (ph) on a cost-share basis.

RUMSFELD:

Senator...

LEAHY:

And I must say, I'm the co-chair of the Guard Caucus, and we have a lot of -- it's a bipartisan, we have a lot of members who are interested.

RUMSFELD:

I've discovered that I'd best not answer questions like that until I look at the numbers and the cost and see what one has to give up to have something like that.

LEAHY:

You'll do that and submit it to me?

RUMSFELD:

We will be happy to take a look at it and see what the costs are. I would add this, that you're quite right, however, in the -- total force concept works. It has worked in the conflict, it is working today.

But one of the delays in calling people up was that, you're right, their teeth needed to be fixed and various other things that they hadn't paid attention to. And it may very well be at some point that there will be some advantage in having certain elements of the Guard and Reserves more ready, that is to say having had their teeth checked and having had those kinds of physical checks, so that there is not a delay and a big paperwork rush when you're trying to get people on active duty.

MAY -22' 03 (THU) 14:07 FMO

TEL: (b)(6)

P. 004

MAY-16-2003 11:48

OSD LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

703 697 8299 P.05/05

LEAHY:

I'm also concerned about the health insurance. There is a long hiatus they may be without it.

LEAHY:

And I'd be glad to work with your staff on this, but this is a growing concern. Those of us in the caucus and both parties are concerned about -- we hear from our home states and all -- I think it is something -- we're pushing for legislation on this. I think it is something that could be done. I think ultimately it'd be a very cost-effective thing.

I realize this is not a question where you'd have the answers on the top of your head, but would you direct your staff to work with mine so that we can share this information with the whole guided caucus?

RUMSFELD:

We'll be happy to dig into it. Thank you.

Received May-16-03 00:38pm

From-703 697 8299

To-Office Assistant Sec Page 005

TOTAL P.05

11-L-0559/OSD15178

TAB

C

Coordination Page

Assistant Secretary of Defense (LA)

Mr. Moore June 11, 2003

MAY -22' 03 (THU) 14:06

PMO

MAY-16-2003 11:48

Snowflake

OSD LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

TEL (b)(6)

P. 001

(b)(6)

P. 02/05

May 14, 2003 2:08 PM

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CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PT*
SUBJECT: Tricare for Reserves

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Thanks.

DNR-06
831403-9

Please respond

Alvin -

*Please forward to
Lyndi Spigot - need
to do direct coordination
w/ Lt on the response
& be sure Dr. w/ one
Dr. Chu get a chop on the
final draft -
UTC S.*

Received May-16-03 08.

Page 002

11-L-0559/OSD15181

U09300 /03

701

14 May 03

COCHRAN:

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MAY -22' 03 (THU) 14:07 FMO

TEL:

(b)(6)

P. 004

MAY-15-2003 11:48

OSD LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

(b)(6)

P. 05/05

LEAHY:

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I realize this is not a question where you'd have the answers on the top of your head, but would you direct your staff to work with mine so that we can share this information with the whole guided caucus?

RUMSFELD:

We'll be happy to dig into it. Thank you.

Received May-18-03 08:58pm

From-703 687 8200

To-Office Assistant Sec

Page 005

TOTAL P.05

11-L-0559/OSD15184



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64
JUN 17 11 10 10

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

June 13, 2003, 11:00am

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces--SNOWFLAKE

- In your June 9, 2003, memorandum, you asked "to see a list of each of the Services' proposals as to how they are going to rebalance their active duty forces versus Guard and Reserve."
- As detailed in the "*Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*," there are multiple solutions to address your concerns about Active/Reserve force mix. These include:
 - Move AC/RC capabilities within/between war plans and theaters of operation.
 - Enhance volunteerism to provide trained, ready individual reservists, and units, who can be used without involuntary mobilizations.
 - Expand the use of reachback to reduce the need for deployed forces.
 - Streamline the mobilization process to improve responsiveness.
 - Rebalance capabilities between and within the AC and RC.
- The issue has been at the forefront of our ongoing discussions with the Services and is the topic of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) on June 19, 2003. Attached are the last two slides from that brief, constituting the proposed action items that will be the basis for discussion on the way ahead. The list you requested would be compiled from the Program Change Proposals due August 1st.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Captain Alan LaBeouf (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD15185

U09352 /03

6/9/03
1306Sent 6/9
June 5, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

I want to see a list of each of the Services' proposals as to how they are going to rebalance their active duty forces versus Guard and Reserve.

The goal would be to make sure we have people who can do every needed skill on active duty, so that every time we want to do anything we don't have to activate Reserves.

We also need to look at the total number of people in each skill, so that we don't have to activate people so frequently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-10

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

AC/RC Force Mix Considerations

OSD/RA Brief to SROC
25 June, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD15187

SECDEF Concerns About the RC

Availability

“...I think we also ought to look into that subject that came up about the Guard and Reserve, and whether we even want Guard and Reserve available only after 120 or 180 days.” *4/1/02 Memo to USD (I) re: Availability of Reserves*

Responsiveness

“...I think we need to make sure we have all the people we could conceivably need in specific skills as part of the active force rather than some of them in the reserves, as is currently arranged...” *4/15/02 Memo to USD (P&R) re: No Subject*

Agility

“...It is very clear that there are some distinctive tasks only found in the Reserves that are not found on active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate reservists.” *11/01/02 Memo to USD (C) re: Tasks-Reserve v. Active Duty*

Flexibility

“...I have trouble seeing why we have to have a reserve call-up anytime we want to engage in conflict. It simply tips off the fact that that is what we are going to do months before we are able to do it.” *12/30/02 Memo to USD (P&R) re: RC v. AC Tasks*


Transformation

“...We can't do anything skillfully the way it (activating the guard and reserve) is currently arrayed.” *12/21/02 Memo to CJCS re: No Subject*

SECDEF: “The Mix is Something that Needs to be Looked At.”

March 27, 2003 HAC Hearing

- Requirements for Reserve forces span a large variety of functions.
- Recent mobilizations highlight shortages in some capabilities that stress the RC.
 - Of the 284,000 RC mobilized for GWOT since 9/11/01; 28,000 were involuntarily mobilized for a second year.
 - Almost 1/2 of RC special forces are on duty today.
 - Multiple call-ups for intelligence, military and security police, special operations and others.
 - Demand for Biological Integrated Detection Systems (BIDS) exceeds availability.
 - Few of the individuals in Major HQs are sourced based on validated requirements.
- End strength is not the issue - SELRES mobilized involuntarily: USNR 18%; ARNG 22%; USAR 30%; ANG 31%; USAFR 31%; USMCR 43%; USCGR 82%



Facts and Assumptions: GWOT Lessons Learned

- All Services have AC/RC mix issues.
 - LD/HD stresses both AC and RC - some rebalancing is being addressed in the FY 04 budget, but more needs to be done.
 - Actions to set the force must reduce repeated, frequent mobilization of RC individuals and units.
- Some reasons for embedding capabilities in the RC are changing in the post 9/11 world; others remain valid.
- Immediate response and rapid response CONUS based forces are best filled with units maintained at the highest readiness levels.
 - RC forces projected for early use must be capable of sustaining high levels of readiness in peacetime.
 - RC volunteerism (units and individuals) can work well.
 - Current method for training of reserves reduces responsiveness and agility of the force.

Multiple Solutions for AC/RC Force Mix

- **Move** Active and Reserve capabilities within warplans to achieve operational requirements in all phases.
- Introduce innovative management techniques.
 - Enhance **volunteerism** to provide trained, ready individual reservists and units who can respond immediately without requiring mobilization (e.g. aircrews, transportation support, PSYOPs, IMAs).
 - Expand the use of **reachback** to reduce the footprint in theater through virtual connectivity to CONUS locations (IO, intelligence, finance).
 - **Streamline** the mobilization process to improve responsiveness.
- **Rebalance** capabilities between and within the Active and Reserve Components to reduce stress on highly leveraged assets.

Provide **resources** necessary to enhance the readiness of RC needed first.

Multiple Solutions for AC/RC Force Mix - Examples

Capability	Move	Volunteerism	Reachback	Streamline	Rebalance
Electronic Warfare		√		√	
Intelligence		√	√		√
Major HQ Augment		√	√	√	√
Military/Security Police	√	√			√
Special Operations		√	√		√

Provide *resources* necessary to enhance the readiness of RC needed first.

THE WAY AHEAD

- Reduce dependence on involuntary mobilization of reservists needed early in an operation by replacing early deploying RC with later deploying AC where appropriate.
- Expand the use of volunteer RC units and individuals through application of concepts such as the Variable Pool of Reserves.
- Program for RC use in support of CONUS-based operations intended to provide reachback capabilities for forward forces, thereby reducing footprint in theater.
- Program RC capabilities to meet predictable, long lead-time missions such as rotational overseas presence and experimentation.

THE WAY AHEAD (Cont.)

- Implement innovative management techniques such as those discussed in the *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*. Include new management programs and auxiliaries for special units that are difficult to access, train and retain, and designing and testing new affiliation programs.
- Determine the role and contribution of the RC to Homeland Defense and Assistance to Civil Authorities.
- Conduct a review of the most recent mobilization lessons learned and recommend an improved mobilization system. Identify legislative, policy, or procedural changes needed to enable the new system.
- Reprogram force imbalances that result in repeated, frequent mobilization of RC individuals and units by changing force structure and/or mix, using contractors, or mitigating shortfalls through technology.

REFER TO THE HANDOUT PROVIDED FOR ASSIGNMENTS AND DISCUSSION

↑

6/9/03
1306
Snowflake

sent 6/9
June 5, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

320.2

I want to see a list of each of the Services' proposals as to how they are going to rebalance their active duty forces versus Guard and Reserve.

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We also need to look at the total number of people in each skill, so that we don't have to activate people so frequently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-10

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

5 Jun 03



June 16, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PR*
SUBJECT: Press

Attached is a USAID press office release. It doesn't mention you or the Coalition Provisional Authority.

I am told there was another one that said USAID was launching an economic governance program for Iraq, and it also made no mention of you or the CPA.

My impression is that this type of AID promotion would weaken your position, confuse people on the ground and suggest that we may not have a clear plan.

Do you have any suggestions as to what I could do to be helpful? Do you want to take care of it? Please let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/29/03 USAID Press release: "USAID Unveils Democracy Transition Projects in Umm Qasr, Iraq"

DHR:dh
061603-15

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

Iraq

16 Jun 03

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The United States Agency for International Development

USAID Unveils Democracy Transition Projects in Umm Qasr, Iraq

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PRESS RELEASE

WASHINGTON, DC 20523
PRESS OFFICE
<http://www.usaid.gov/>
(202) 712-4320

2003-047

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 29, 2003

Contact: USAID Press Office

UMM QASR, IRAQ - The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) yesterday held a ribbon-cutting ceremony in Umm Qasr, Iraq to mark the formal hand-over to the town's Transitional Town Council of three democracy projects funded by the U.S. government. The total cost of the projects is \$76,000. These projects mark the first time there has been public access to the Internet in Umm Qasr, and the first time in decades that there have been administrative offices for a locally-selected government.

The ceremony included representatives of the Town Council, USAID, implementing partner Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), and U.S. military Civil Affairs leadership. The three USAID grants, selected based on a list of priorities developed by community residents, were for a new town council building (\$41,000), for a new Community Communication Center (\$30,000), and for youth sports facilities and equipment (\$5,000). The Town Council grant has provided a new pre-fabricated administration building with air conditioning, electricity, and plumbing; computers and other office equipment including furniture; and training and technical assistance in community leadership for the currently appointed and the future elected Council members. The Community Communications Center project has supplied new computers with broadband internet access and international phone call capabilities, furniture, and training and technical assistance. The youth sports project includes a new cement basketball/volleyball court, restoration of a soccer field, and balls and nets for soccer, volleyball, and basketball.

At the ribbon-cutting ceremony for the new Town Council office, Umm Qasr Town Council member Abdul Jabbar Al-Fayyad said, "I would like to express our appreciation, first of all, for the liberation of the Iraqi people from the tyrant. Second of all, for the serious reconstruction in Iraq. And we are grateful that you are now paying attention to our other problems. Now we have a place to meet, and now the people can come to us and say whatever they want - and we thank you, we thank you very much."

Each of the projects responds to a request received from the community. They are designed to

support education and local government, and provide a safe place for young people to meet and play together.

"By providing greater access to information and an environment for working together, USAID is supporting the transition to self-governance in Iraq," said Michael Marx, Team Leader for USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team, "These grants will help Umm Qasr's residents as they work, learn and rebuild their community."

The DART is an inter-agency U.S. humanitarian response team deployed by USAID in cooperation with other U.S. agencies including the Department of State and Health and Human Services.

For more information on USAID's relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, visit www.usaid.gov/iraq/.

The U.S. Agency for International Development has provided economic and humanitarian assistance worldwide for more than 40 years.

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Visit our [contact page](#) to find the appropriate resource.

16

June 16, 2003

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lessons of the War

Here is an article on the lessons of the war I thought you might like to see in case you missed it.

Regards,

Attach.

Hanson, Victor Davis. "Lessons of the War," *Commentary*, June 2003.

DIIR:dh
061603-1

.....

Please respond by _____

16 Jun 03

16 Jun 03

Commentary

June 2003

Lessons of the War

Victor Davis Hanson

The New Gloomayers

Joshua Muravchik

Countrymen—A Story

David Aizman

The Scandal of "Diversity"

Jonathan Kay

Castro's Gambit

Mark Falcoff

Bringing Up Parents

Kay S. Hymowitz

The Shy Master

Terry Teachout

Books in Review

*James Q. Wilson • David Pryce-Jones • Dan Seligman
Sam Munson • Barton Aronson • Chester E. Finn, Jr.*



Lessons of the War

Victor Davis Hanson

THE GENERAL facts about the recent war are not in much dispute. In a span of about three weeks, the United States military overran a country the size of California. It utterly obliterated Saddam Hussein's military hardware—tanks, heavy artillery, transport—and tore apart his armies. Of the approximately 110 American deaths in the course of the hostilities, fully a fourth occurred as a result of accidents, friendly fire, or peacekeeping mishaps rather than at the hands of enemy soldiers. The extraordinarily low ratio of total American casualties per number of U.S. soldiers deployed, or of American fatalities per Iraqi soldiers killed, is almost unmatched in modern military history—and an unimaginably long way from the specter of Armageddon offered up by a variety of self-proclaimed experts before the war and during its early days.

The phenomenal and rapid success of Operation Iraqi Freedom should not, however, lead us to think that it was a foregone conclusion, or blind us to the age-old obstacles to conducting military operations in the distant Middle East and surrounding environs—difficulties amply attested by the disastrous Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya and past British and French debacles from Gallipoli to Algeria. Brute force does not al-

ways translate into battlefield victory, especially, as has often been the case, when logistics are strained, civilians are indistinguishable from soldiers, political considerations bridle the use of firepower, and an antagonist's defeat is not measurable by the enormous numbers falling to Western arms. No less daunting in the present instance was the surrounding geopolitical landscape: overt enemies of the United States like Syria and Iran, duplicitous friends such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and the suddenly fickle ally Turkey.

Critics of American action, drawing on memories of the first Gulf war in 1990-91, cited other prospective perils as well: burning oil fields, fouled waters, and missiles launched into Israel and Kuwait. Concerns about chemical weapons, blown bridges, exploding dams, suicide bombers, and mass executions were adduced to remind us that conquering this fully functioning criminal state would be much more hazardous than our prior experience of expelling its predatory legions from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's military knew where we were, where we were going, and approximately when we would begin. In the operation's early days, the narrow front at Kuwait was especially vulnerable as thousands of vehicles and troops were crowded into a confined launching area. Moreover, this single point of entry lay some 400 miles distant from Iraq's northern Kurdish cities—a longer distance than the one confronting the Allied armies in World War II who left the Normandy beaches for

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON is the author of two new books, *Mexifornia (Encounter)* and *Ripples of Battle (Doubleday)*. Among his contributions to COMMENTARY are "I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas" (December 2002) and "Goodbye to Europe?" (October 2002).

the Siegfried line. Although retired generals and others harped on the alleged paucity of troops on the ground, it would have been no less risky to expose to missile or chemical attack a larger force—the suggested figure was 500,000 soldiers, or over half of America's aggregate front-line combat strength—concentrated in a few thousand acres.

Still another uncertainty was the disposition and likely reaction of the "Iraqi people." They were not quite enemies, like the Germans in World War II, but neither were they friendlies like the once-liberated West Europeans of that era. Saddam's subjects were, perhaps, more like the Italians *circa* 1943: people who sort of wished to be freed from a dictator—but depending on how quickly, painlessly, and profitably it could be done. In the event, they turned out to be a mixture of all three and something else altogether: on one day sullen if not exactly reluctant supporters of Saddam Hussein, on the next a mass of blameless individuals happy to have been extricated from the grip of their despotic overlords, and on the next looters and destroyers of their native heritage and infrastructure, blaming the Americans for their own license and demanding our immediate exit.

HOW, THEN, did we pull it off? In lieu of overwhelming numbers and strategic flexibility, the key was speed and tactical surprise. By forgoing a long bombing campaign but starting the land invasion in tandem with precision strikes on the regime's grandees, we caught the Baathists off guard, killing a fair number, and thereby accomplished a number of critical pre-battle goals. Motorized columns raced to Baghdad, bypassing resistance and overwhelming Iraqi command-and-control before shocked Iraqi generals could react and reorganize. If one thinks of the densely populated Mesopotamian corridor as prey that had long been in the grip of a kind of snake, the idea was to decapitate the beast in Baghdad and thus loosen its grasp far more quickly than could be accomplished by hacking away at its multifarious 300-mile-long coils. There were also political considerations behind the decision not to soften up Iraq by air for weeks on end as we had done in the earlier Gulf war, or later in the cases of Serbia and Afghanistan; despite the greater peril to our forces in the field, we felt we could not ruin the heavy infrastructure of the country, suffer through weeks of televised images of collateral damage caused by us, allow Saddam to devour the resources of his own people, or endure endless criticism of our alleged timidity about putting "boots on the ground."

The Secretary of Defense and his generals were castigated for a purported "pause" during the first week of operations due to adverse weather and the need to resupply. Their alleged sins included not only insufficient troops or armor in place but also a failure to produce spontaneous local uprisings as advertised. But these criticisms missed the vast revolution in arms that had transpired in the twelve years since the first Gulf war (not to mention the logical point that an imprisoned and brutally subjugated people might need a little time to display its enthusiasm openly). As our troops fought fatigue and sandstorms, 3,000 air sorties a day were nevertheless methodically whittling down the Republican Guard to individual tanks and batteries. When occasionally directing their classical massed formations against the outnumbered American columns, the Iraqis only provided better targets for our jets, flying far above the oil-fired smoke, whirlwinds, and clouds. Alternatively, by breaking up their armored divisions to avoid our bombs, or by taking refuge in mosques, hospitals, and schools, they forfeited any chance to concentrate their fire, made ad-hoc desertions more likely, and diluted their strength, huddling in weak pockets that could be isolated and picked off.

It is easy to exaggerate the effect of airpower in replacing the punch of armored divisions, but it is considerable. How many tanks were 1,000 American planes worth as they dropped their smart bombs on individual Baathist houses and small groups of the Republican Guard? Tacticians still have not done the calibrations. In any case, and notwithstanding charges that Donald Rumsfeld has emasculated the Army, what was proved by our deployment of 10,000 Special Forces to organize the entire northern front, by the flexible use of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, and by the race of the 3rd Mechanized Division to Baghdad was the versatility of the new infantry itself, which can no longer be caricatured as slow, immobile, or one-dimensional. Victory could have unfolded even more quickly had our geopolitics been as inspired as our military operations: a northern front headed by the 20,000-man 4th Infantry Division, strengthened by 60,000 Kurdish irregulars, and covered by 300 bombers flying freely out of Turkey would have ensured the encirclement of Baghdad in five or six days.

Rumsfeld was also slurred for remarking on the superiority of professional troops over draftees. But his point remained valid. The new American military proved lethal beyond its numbers, as near-adolescents without combat experience showed them-

selves to be more adept at street fighting than the so-called Saddam *fedayeen*. What has become clear from the war is that, from year to year, the American military has increased its lethality geometrically, not incrementally. What has also become undeniable is the moral character of our forces. Neither bloodthirsty nor triumphalist, American soldiers came across on our television screens as idealists eager to liberate the unfree and return home, content that they had defeated killers and saved innocents. One will long remember the sight of Marines in ray-ban glasses, their radios blaring rock music and their tanks emblazoned with slogans like "Anger Management": this really was something new in history, a strange marriage between contemporary American mass culture and 19th-century concepts of heroism, patriotism, and humanitarianism.

IF THESE are some of the factors accounting for our victory, a somewhat different question is what accounted for the Iraqi defeat. After all, the war did not necessarily have to be so quick. Even setting aside the hysterical predictions of disaster and the early cries of "quagmire," we would do well to bear in mind the plenitude of intrinsic advantages on the Iraqi side: ample weapons and munitions, large armies, an array of homeland defenses, trained assassination squads, stealthy political support from other Arab nations, guaranteed sanctuary and supply in Syria, and the presence of new-found allies in Europe who could broker an armistice should the Americans begin to tire or take excessive casualties. Had the highway and the surrounding desert from Kuwait to Baghdad been laced with thousands of land mines, or showered with shells from subterranean artillery, our enormous gamble to send and supply serpentine columns on such a narrow path could have met with near disaster. Perhaps Iraq's greatest edge lay in the inhibitions placed on American military conduct, in contrast to the freedom enjoyed by Saddam Hussein in parking his military assets in schools and mosques and sending out a powerful stream of televised disinformation.

Why then did the Iraqis fold so abruptly? The answer is at least partly generic—that is, having something to do with the Arab way of war in general. In an impressive and underappreciated study, *Arabs at War*, Kenneth M. Pollack has outlined the main problems besetting Middle Eastern armies during the last half-century.* Better known as the author of last year's *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*, Pollack here applies the same

dispassionate mode of analysis to the wider military culture that has brought defeat after defeat to modern Arab armies.

There is, to begin with, very little status accorded to conscript soldiers, who are poorly paid, housed, and trained. Tribalism, not merit, is more likely to govern the promotion of officers. In an age of mechanized warfare and combined land-and-air operations, most commanders have little knowledge of flexible tactical doctrine. Instead, outdated Soviet ideas from the 1970's—like stacking armor in successive rings for massive, set-piece assaults—still infect the thinking of the few generals who have studied military theory. When such rote practices prove suicidal in the face of a sophisticated opponent with mastery of the air, there is no mechanism for ad-hoc adjustment.

There are other deficiencies as well. Weapons, almost exclusively imported rather than manufactured at home, are often poorly maintained and are thrust into the hands of soldiers lacking either education or much experience with high technology. As American soldiers would remark in the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi artillery was inaccurate and slow-firing, small-arms fire was poorly directed, and armored vehicles and tanks were in obviously inferior condition.

All this is symptomatic of larger problems: the absence within Arab militaries of free discussion about operational choices, and a system that rewards obsequiousness and punishes initiative. Only in this wider context can the Baathists' otherwise bewildering tactics in the most recent conflict be understood. Here was a military clique that went to war over the possession of chemical and biological weapons that were so hidden away they could not be readily used for the very purpose for which they had been acquired; that would send an armored column into the open under the cloak of a sand-storm that provided no cloak at all against satellite-guided bombs; that would order men to swarm out of fortifications and dwellings at the sight of approaching American troops ("quail hunters"), only to see them obliterated by waiting planes; that would hurl men clad in pajamas against soldiers arrayed in ceramic body armor; that would stockpile arms and munitions in public sanctuaries that proved indefensible points of resistance.

As Pollack documents, moreover, while defeat on the battlefield can exact a bitter price for a professional Arab soldier, excellence can be no less dangerous, earning him the envy and suspicion of

* Nebraska, 698 pp., \$49.95. The subtitle of this book is *Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991*.

Indeed, rather than providing Saeb Erekat with his own "Baghdad Bob"-like web page, where his untruths could have been held up to deserved scorn, the Western media, led in this case by the British, canonized them. On April 17, 2002, the *Guardian* called the supposed massacre at Jenin "every bit as repellent as Osama bin Laden's attack on New York." The *Evening Standard* trumpeted the term "genocide," and its columnist A.N. Wilson further accused Israel of "poisoning the water supply" to ensure its "cover of genocide." Not to be outdone, the London *Times's* Janine di Giovanni snapped that not even Bosnia or Chechnya rivaled "such deliberate destruction, such disrespect for human life."^{*}

From this perspective, the Arab inebriation with falsehood and the propaganda of the lie begins to look not so irrational after all. However injurious such habits of delusion may turn out to be when tested in actual clashes of arms, politically they have proved, at least until now, rather useful—and quite in step with the deductive predispositions of influential sectors of opinion in the West. This is especially so where the subject of Israel and the Palestinians is concerned, but it applies elsewhere as well. European efforts over the years to sell arms to Saddam Hussein's regime, machinations to hamper American military action, and the postwar European support for Syria to resist the extradition of Iraqi Baathists—these are some of the fruits of a tacit acquiescence in the idea of Arab victimhood. So are the large percentages of Frenchmen and other Europeans favoring Palestinian terror over Israeli democracy. Whatever the particular motive involved, it has been generally the case that Arab adversaries of Israel or of the United States have been able to win politically and diplomatically what they have been unable to achieve through arms on the battlefield.

THE REAL question remains whether, in the wake of Iraq, any of the normal ways of doing business are going to change. As far as the United States is concerned, one might hope that our face-to-face confrontation with and utter defeat of the Baathists—coupled with the evidence of their barbaric rule, documentation of which keeps turning up as we sift through abandoned Iraqi government offices and torture chambers—will lead to a renewed appreciation of what Israel has been up against in its own struggle with an enemy that adopts similar strategies and displays a similar mentality. If nothing else, the trouncing, removal, and humiliation of Saddam Hussein should remind us that wars of self-defense and national survival need

to be pursued to their logical conclusions in military defeat of the aggressors and change of regime. Rarely if ever do interrupted conflicts end by means of imposed peace processes, road maps, or UN-brokered armistices—all of which perpetuate and reward the illusion that defeated aggressors can recoup politically what they lost militarily—but rather by the elimination and replacement of the conditions that prompted the conflicts in the first place.

Certainly the geopolitical calculus in the Middle East has visibly improved, including for Israel. We have 100,000 soldiers positioned on the border with Iran—a country now surrounded by reform governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and one whose restive population is itself reportedly eager for liberalization. Already the United States has turned renewed attention toward the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and the sanctuaries enjoyed by the terrorist cadres of Hamas and Hizbullah; Syria itself may soon be confronted with democracies to the north, south, and east. There are thus grounds for thinking that, combined with other initiatives, our efforts in Iraq might end by so changing realities in the Middle East as to bring about the emergence of more than one new consensual government in the region.

Lending support to the possibility of political progress is the fact that, even before we landed in Iraq, some Arabs seemed at last to be acknowledging that their problems were self-induced—and that these liabilities have been threatening the very survival of their societies. The unusually candid *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, issued by leading Arab intellectuals under the auspices of the UN, was one such symptom. Among the particulars listed in its damning indictment (framed, needless to say, by a ritual denunciation of Israel) are the struggle between the area's exploding population—75 percent under the age of eighteen—and its ever scarcer resources; the abysmal economic performance of the 22 undemocratic Arab countries, whose combined gross national product of \$531 billion dollars amounts to \$60 billion less than Spain's alone; the rapacity of the Saudi royal family, which has sequestered \$450 billion outside the country, a figure representing not much less than all the goods and services produced by 300 million Arabs each year; and the expressed desire of perhaps half the youth in most Arab countries to emigrate, most often to either Europe or the United States.

The problems of the Middle East are gargantuan,

^{*} For further documentation of this episode, see "Jenin: What the British Media Said" by Tom Gross (*National Review Online*, May 13, 2002).

but we have at last taken a lever to this part of the world and given it a shove in the right direction. Still, there are at least two reasons for caution. First, Americans have traditionally been disinclined to seek further confrontations in the wake of victory—or, for that matter, in the wake of defeat. Our material and psychic exhaustion in 1945 meant that we had no stomach for the messy effort to ensure the cause of freedom in Eastern Europe—the very cause that had attended the start of World War II—against our former ally the Soviet Union. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, Americans simply walked away from the unfolding genocide in Cambodia. Victory in the first Gulf war precluded any desire for the further bother of actually removing Saddam Hussein—even though thousands upon thousands of Shiites and Kurds were butchered while American soldiers were ordered to stand down. How probable, or perhaps even prudent, is it that an American President will resort to military action against, say, Syria so quickly after the recent war—even if high-ranking Baathists and Iraqi weapons are found ensconced in Damascus? As for the American public, it may be more inclined to turn away in disgust from scenes of free Iraqis angrily demonstrating against their liberators, or from the inevitably messy and protracted business of reconstruction, than to clamor for more of the same in Syria.


ANOTHER CONSIDERATION has to do specifically with Israel. Although our intervention in Iraq neatly gave the lie to the conventional wisdom that the Israel-Arab dispute is at the “heart” of the Middle East problem, it is habitual by now for any American success in the region to be followed by efforts at resolving that dispute. Pressuring Israel to “take risks for peace” has long been seen by our State Department as a means of assuaging Arab humiliation after military defeat—almost as if the amazing military prowess of Western armies required some kind of psychological compensation in the form of political concessions. Thus, in the aftermath of the first Gulf war, the rapid convening of the Madrid conference set the stage for the disastrous Oslo accords—and hence the current “road map.”

But the Palestinians have their own Saddam Husseins, and their own kindred thugocracy—and their own murderous delusions. From all of these material and ideological shackles they need to be liberated before there can be a glimpse of a beginning of concord between them and the Israelis. That difficult truth, too, is a lesson of the recent war, no less than is the gleaming hope borne aloft by the downfall of one especially brutal tyranny through the brilliance of American arms and the perseverance of American vision.



June 16, 2003

IRAA

TO: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Funding for CPA

FYI.

Attach.
6/16/03 USD(C) info memo to SecDef re: Process and Average Time to Approve Funding Requests

DHR:dh
061603-41

.....

Please respond by _____

16 Jun 03

U09420 03

11-L-0559/OSD15206



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
INFO MEMO

11-0559/OSD15207
JUN 18 2003

June 16, 2003, 7:56 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Process and Average Time for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to Approve Funding Requests from the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA)

- There are two sources of funds that require OMB approval for funding:
 - President's Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) (\$2.475 billion from the Supplemental) and
 - Iraq vested assets (U.S. blocked Iraq assets that are invested in the U.S. Treasury).
- The process for handling OCPA funding requests for the two sources is as follows:
 - The various OCPA ministries determine a requirement.
 - The requirement is vetted through the Program Review Board, which forwards recommended requirements to Ambassador Bremer for his approval.
 - If the Ambassador Bremer approves and the source of funding is the IRRF, the requirement is supposed to be forwarded onto the OMB with a copy provided to my staff. Thus far, that the OCPA chooses to send the requirement to my staff and not directly to the OMB. If the requirement is for vested assets, then they are to be forwarded directly to my staff for processing.
 - My staff reviews the requirement, coordinates the requirement with applicable DoD staff elements (must respond within 48 hours), and prepares a memorandum to the OMB that includes a recommended funding source/strategy.
 - Following executive review and approval, my staff transmits the requirement to the OMB.
- Our records indicate that, of three projects submitted to the OMB to date, one is not answered and the remaining two project's average approval time is 9.5 days. A listing is attached.
- Ambassador Bremer has the authority to approve spending of seized Iraqi assets; he notifies OMB and us after the funds have been dispersed.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: John Evans (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15207

16 JUNE '02
8 AM

OMB's Average Approval Times for OCPA Projects

<u>Project</u>	<u>Date Sent to the OMB</u>		<u>Date OMB Answered</u>
New Iraqi Army	6-Jun	6 days	12-Jun
Humanitarian Demining	10-Jun		No Answer
Interim Nationwide Communications	22-May	13 days	4-Jun

Average approval
time of 9.5 days

June 16, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Oil

Iraq

If you are still thinking about the possibility that the Iraqi people should share in some portion of oil revenues, getting that idea announced as a thought—not as a firm policy, since it will ultimately be up to the Iraqis, and not as a specific program—might be a way to help stop the sabotage of oil wells and the oil production system.

Apparently the intel suggests that is what is taking place—is that true, that there is a good deal of sabotage?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-39

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

16 Jun 03

U09421 03

11-L-0559/OSD15209



June 16, 2003

TO: John McLaughlin
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

IRAQ

Whenever you want to set up the meeting on lessons learned with other people at the Agency, you might want to do it at a time that George could be there. I think it would be good for him to see it as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-37

*← He's at
CIA
DDCI*

009422 03

16 Jun 03

11-L-0559/OSD15210



June 19, 2003

TO: ADM Giambastiani

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Jay Garner

I think you ought to get connected to Jay Garner. He has some very good ideas on transformation. He used to help Buck Kernan. I think he is first-rate.

Thanks.

DHR:dlh
061903-16

.....

Please respond by 6/24/03

381


195603

U09646 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15211



June 19, 2003

TO: ADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Wayne Downing

You also might want to include Wayne Downing in your efforts on transformation. He is a pretty smart fellow.

Thanks.

DHR:dlh
061903-17

.....

Please respond by 6/21/03

381


19 Jun 03

U09647 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15212



June 19, 2003

TO: General Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Box

I gave the President your wooden gift box. He was appreciative.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-21

.....

Please respond by _____

335 WH

19 JUN 03

U09648 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15213



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET

2003 JUN 23 10 14 17

INFO MEMO

June 17, 2003, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Accounting for Supplemental

- Representative Nussle mentioned to you that since 9/11 the Department has not been able to account for some of the supplemental funds. His remark was based on erroneous information he received from the news media. We are able to account for all DoD funding received, including supplemental funds. We have done so because we have implemented several procedures to enhance our ability to accurately track and report the status of these funds.
- Of the \$31.2 billion we received in supplemental funding in FY 2002, \$30.4 billion is now obligated. I anticipate that most of what is left will obligate in the next 2 months.
- We have completed the data collection for the FY 2003 midyear execution review. My final report will be ready before the end of the month. Preliminary analysis indicates that we have sufficient funding to cover our operating requirements for the remainder of the fiscal year. Reserve demobilization and the number of forces deployed in the CENTCOM area of operations remain a funding concern.
- We are still working the numbers for the reconstitution of forces. As part of the post-war assessment process, the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Services are working to prioritize these requirements within the guidelines briefed to you at the Senior Level Review Group.
- We owe to the Congress an FY 2003 spending plan on July 1, 2003, including the status of funds provided in the supplemental. I will use this report to highlight our execution review findings and update the Components' spending plans for the remainder of the fiscal year.

COORDINATION: None required.

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

U09680 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15214

110.01

17 Jun 03

May 22, 2003 8:02 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Accounting for Supplemental

Congressman Nussle mentioned to me in a meeting with the leadership yesterday that since 9/11 we have not been able to account for some of the money in the Supplemental. What is that about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-12

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

11-L-0559/OSD15215

3/28
10:50 Snowflake

February 3, 2003 8:13 AM

C3/31
A-4971.51

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Weapon Reduction

I need to see how we plan to reduce down to 1700 to 2200 weapons by a decade.
Do we have a plan laid out and are the costs to do it budgeted?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020303-9

.....
Please respond by 02/28/03

3/28
RESPONSE ATTACHED

3/29

VLR

Sec Def - The attachment
says we have a plan, and
costs are budgeted beginning
this year.

Dispute

3 Feb 03

11-L-0559/OSD 15216

U09707 / 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUN 24 PM 1:26

INFO MEMO

CH-1014-03
24 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: POMCUS

- In response to your questions regarding POMCUS in Norway (TAB A), the following comments are provided.
- The Army and Marine Corps both maintain pre-positioned equipment in Norway. The Army is carefully assessing worldwide requirements and has decided to pull back Norway stocks. A formal notification is currently being staffed to the Norwegian Ministry of Defense (in accordance with treaty agreements) stating that the United States will remove all Army stored supplies and equipment no later than 30 December 2003.
- The Marine Corps currently has an Expeditionary Brigade set in Norway and supports maintaining this for operational reasons. The flexibility provided by the Norwegian location, coupled with the high quality of maintenance of the pre-positioned equipment, make this set particularly valuable for rapid deployment in support of contingency operations. Elements of this equipment were used in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) with great success.
- Pre-positioned stocks are not considered to be leftovers, as POMCUS has been built upon, relocated and reconfigured on an ongoing basis to meet the strategic threat. Determinations continue to be made on stocks to be pulled back from around the world. Each Service is developing detailed plans for the constitution of these assets post-OIF. The individual Service plans are in the initial stages of execution and will result in the pre-positioned force becoming lighter and more flexible while maintaining its lethality.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

*Mr Secretary,
We will brief you
on these plans in
the next few weeks.*

*VR
Dretz*

11-L-0559/OSD15217

U09772 103

TAB

A

TAB A

#44
—

May 29, 2003 8:31 AM

✓4

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld y

SUBJECT: POMCUS

We have to talk about POMCUS in Norway and around the world. Is it something we should be pulling back? Is it just a leftover?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012903-11

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD15219

TAB

B

TAB B
COORDINATION

USA	COL Chappell	19 June 2003
USMC	Col Bultemeier	13 June 2003



TAB A

#44
1

May 29, 2003 8:31 AM

(√4)

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *y*

SUBJECT: POMCUS

We have to talk about POMCUS in Norway and around the world. Is it something we should be pulling back? Is it just a leftover?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052903-11

.....

Please respond by 6/12/03

Norway

29 May 03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD15222

U09773 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CH-1017-03
24 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM 6/24*

SUBJECT: Kosovo Training School

- In response to your request (TAB), the following is provided. The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) operates the Kosovo Law Center, and has trained over 5,000 Kosovar policemen. The police course in Kosovo consists of 12 weeks of classroom instruction followed by 15 weeks of field training. This mission is scheduled to be completed in 2004.
- The OSCE has successfully operated several police training academies in the Balkans. The OSCE does not have a mandate or the expertise to train peacekeepers, but could use its experience in the Balkans to train policemen for Iraq and Afghanistan to assist in providing security.
- Iraq is not a member of the OSCE or a partner, but Afghanistan was recently granted partnership status. Currently, the OSCE does not conduct operations outside of member states. However, this does not preclude the OSCE from considering police training in Iraq and Afghanistan if asked. Under the Bonn agreement, Germany is the lead nation for police training in Afghanistan.
- If the OSCE agrees to conduct the training, it will likely require funding from the Coalition Partners and the United States. Initial indications are that a request to train policemen in Iraq could be favorably considered. This request should be routed through the Department of State to Ambassador Minikies, the US Ambassador to the OSCE.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef request SecState approach OSCE about training policemen for Iraq and Afghanistan.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ OTHER _____

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG W. L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15223

U09774 /03

TAB

May 20, 2003 2:41 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kosovo Training School

Why don't you look at the training school in Kosovo, and see if we ought to get some of those folks training policeman and peacekeepers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:jh
052003-15

.....
Please respond by _____



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

CM-1017-03

24 June 2003 JUN 30 2003

442
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RMH 6/24*

SUBJECT: Kosovo Training School

- In response to your request the following is provided. The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) operates the Kosovo Law Center, and has trained over 5,000 Kosovar policemen. The police course in Kosovo consists of 12 weeks of classroom instruction followed by 15 weeks of field training. This mission is scheduled to be completed in 2004.
- The OSCE has successfully operated several police training academies in the Balkans. The OSCE does not have a mandate or the expertise to train peacekeepers, but could use its experience in the Balkans to train policemen for Iraq and Afghanistan to assist in providing security.
- Iraq is not a member of the OSCE or a partner, but Afghanistan was recently granted partnership status. Currently, the OSCE does not conduct operations outside of member states. However, this does not preclude the OSCE from considering police training in Iraq and Afghanistan if asked. Under the Bonn agreement, Germany is the lead nation for police training in Afghanistan.
- If the OSCE agrees to conduct the training, it will likely require funding from the Coalition Partners and the United States. Initial indications are that a request to train policemen in Iraq could be favorably considered. This request should be routed through the Department of State to Ambassador Minikies, the US Ambassador to the OSCE.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef request SecState approach OSCE about training policemen for Iraq and Afghanistan.

APPROVE *RMH*

JUN 30 2003

DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG W. L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15225

RU09774-03

TAB

May 20, 2003 2:41 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kosovo Training School

Why don't you look at the training school in Kosovo, and see if we ought to get some of those folks training policeman and peacekeepers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003 15

.....
Please respond by _____

Kosovo

05/20/03

U09775 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15226

Tab

February 11, 2003 7:26 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *SR*

SUBJECT: Botulism

Please give me an answer on botulism, the force production line and the monoclonal antibodies sometime this week. I have to get back to Cheney.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021103-4Please respond by 02/14/03

1. no adv. dev. for BOTX monoclonal Ab's
2. R+D

SECDEF HAS SFEN

MAR 11 10

ALDRIDGE

RESPONSE ATTACHED

V/R

U09779 /03

CLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD15227

3/3

Larry Di Rie

3/3

ADVANCE COPY
SENT

720

2/27

11 Feb 03

January 9, 2003 10:29 AM

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita
LTG CraddockFROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Help for Changes in Authorities

Why don't you think about how we can get the military to help lead the charge on the changes in authorities. We could have both the military and the civilian leadership of the Department work on it.

If they have these legislative people all through the Services and in the Joint Staff and they are always up there, why don't we get them doing our work?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010903-14Please respond by 1/17/03*1/23*
RESPONSE ATTACHED*1/2*

11-L-0559/OSD15228

U09822 /03

9 JAN 03



1/8/03

January 7, 2003 1:52 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Minority Representation

I know Larry Di Rita talked to you about the data on minority representation in combat and combat support roles. Please get the material to me within five working days.

Thanks.

DHR dh
010703-17

.....
Please respond by

1/14/03
10

320.2

7 Jan 03

January 8, 2003 7:50 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Minority Representation

*Advance
Copy Sent*

Please get the exact data from David Chu about minorities—as to whether they were underrepresented or over represented in Vietnam, and how they are represented today.

Thanks

DHR dh
010803-13

.....
Please respond by

01/27/03

1/10
With at 10/1

2/1/03
1300

January 8, 2003 3:35 PM

C3/3

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Larry D. 3/3
SUBJECT: Spain

Spain

What is this problem we have with the Spanish in NATO? I am told it involves the Spanish military representative.

Please explain.

Thanks.

DFIR:dh
010803-30

.....

Please respond by 21/1/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAF JET 3/3
RESPONSE ATTACHED

8 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD15231

U09827 /03



February 13, 2003 2:53 PM

TO: Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Provincial Reconstruction Teams

I need a one-pager about provincial reconstruction teams that tells me precisely:

- what one is,
- how I should talk about it,
- how many we think we will have,
- whether or not foreigners are involved,
- what the size of them is,
- what their assignment is, and
- how many countries are lined up to do them.

Please let me know whatever you think I ought to know about them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021303-24

Please respond by

02/21/03

*Call &
Get +
me today*

U09835 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15232

Afghanistan

25 Jun 03

3/12 Snowflake
153

15

3/1/9

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

February 24, 2003 3:47 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: MANPADS

Thanks for your note on MANPADS. I am also worried about them against civilian aircraft in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022403-15

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Please respond by _____

MAR 20 2003

3/1/1

J. Myers following attached

373.24

24Feb03

Tab A

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/QSD15233

U09840 / 03

2/4/03

2/4

2/10

January 24, 2003 9:55 AM

IRAQ

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Funds for Iraq

2/1

2/10

Thanks for the weekly report—I appreciate it. Keep at it!

Please start thinking through how we can “tin cup” the world on Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012403-10

.....
Please respond by 02/07/03

2/4

RESPONSE
ATTACHED

2/12

→ Copy To Doug Lick
Done 2/10
2/10

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 11 2003

Larry Di Rita
2/10

Good
2/10

2450003

11-L-0559/OSD15234

U09897 /03



January 22, 2003 9:45 AM

AUSTRALIA

TO: ADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Allied Transformation

I read your memo of January 16, and I am delighted you are including the Australians. What about the Japanese? I think we need to start linking them much more tightly.

Regards,

DHR:dh
012203-7

Please respond by 02/07/03

3/5
Done

Larry Di Rita

22 Jan 03

U09899 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15235

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

Done - Copy
Provided to OSD on 2/24/03
7:33 AM
3

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: January 15, 2003

SUBJECT:

I am still concerned about military aircraft defenses against stingers and the like,
MANPADS. I would like a report on where we stand.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
011503.01

Please respond by: _____

_____ 2/26
Response attached

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab A

15 Jan 03

11-L-0559/OSD15236

U09922 /03



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2003 JUN 25 10 52 AM

INFO MEMO

June 25, 2003 – 8:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Vaccinations – SNOWFLAKE

- You asked if we are re-examining our vaccination policy. Snowflake is attached.
- Short answer: We are, and we are scheduled to brief you on June 30th.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock – (b)(6)

720

25 Jun 03



11-L-0559/OSD15237

U09935 / 03

6/20/03
1355

Snowflake

June 19, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Vaccinations

Are you thinking through the question as to whether or not we ought to continue with the smallpox and/or anthrax vaccinations?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-26

.....

Please respond by 07/11/03


11-L-0559/OSD15238

6/20/03
1355
Snowflake



June 19, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Vaccinations

Are you thinking through the question as to whether or not we ought to continue with the smallpox and/or anthrax vaccinations?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-26

.....

Please respond by 07/11/03

720

19 Jun 03

May 19, 2003 12:07 PM

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: North Korea

Attached is a paper on North Korea done for the Democratic leadership. Please take a look at it and see if there are thoughts in there we ought to be considering.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/5/03 National Security Advisory Group memo to Senate Democratic Leadership re: "The Loose Nukes Crisis in North Korea"

DHR:dh
051903-30

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

02 MAY 20 10:12

U09945 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15240



June 24, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Peacekeeping

Attached is a memo I dictated after my meeting with Paddy Ashdown, for what it is worth.

Regards,

Attach.
6/17/03 SecDef MFR "Peacekeeping"

DHR:dh
062403-5

.....
Please respond by _____

Tracy

24 Jun 03

U09947 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15241

June 17, 2003

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping

There are three important lessons from peacekeeping:

1. Start tough. You can always relax later. Use military force.
2. The rule of law comes first. If not, the dollars flow to the criminals, and it is tough to get the corruption out.
3. Plan on a decade, not months or years.
4. Get the externals right. In the case of Iraq, the externals involve Iran, Syria and the Middle East peace process.

DHR:dh
061703-13

11-L-0559/OSD15242



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUN 26 PM 12: 54

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1028-03

26 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/25*

SUBJECT: End Strength

- In response to your question (TAB A) concerning possible end strength increases and your request to expedite demobilization and reduce stop-loss, the following is provided. Subsequent to the 5 June briefing to you, the Services are finalizing plans for meeting authorized end strength levels (TAB B). Also, we are executing the demobilization efforts I outlined for you on 9 June.
- The Services will continue to reduce end strength and expedite demobilization.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Maria I. Cribbs, Brig Gen, USAF; Director J-1;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15243

U10011 /03

TAB A

TAB A

June 2, 2003 2:50 PM

Snowflake

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: End Strength

If we are going to get the demobilization moving along and reduce the stop losses, we are going to have to review what is happening in the various commands. We need to see that we don't have end strength creep and that the demobilization goes forward. There is pressure for end strength increases, and it could get out of hand unless we review each command.

Please tell me how we are going to avoid that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-38

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

'03 JUN 4 AM 7:49

Tab A


11-L-0559/OSD15245

TAB B


UNCLASSIFIED

FY03/04/05 Personnel Strength

Marine Corps



FY03/04/05 Personnel Strength Navy




11-L-0559/OSD15248



TAB B

UNCLASSIFIED

ARMY PERSONNEL STRENGTH (Projected DEMOB)



UNCLASSIFIED

Data as of 1 June 2003

This chart unclassified when separated from the briefing.


11-L-0559/OSD15249

Tab B



U.S. AIR FORCE

Active Duty End Streng



6/25/03

11-L-0559/OSD15250

TAB A

June 2, 2003 2:50 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: End Strength

If we are going to get the demobilization moving along and reduce the stop losses, we are going to have to review what is happening in the various commands. We need to see that we don't have end strength creep and that the demobilization goes forward. There is pressure for end strength increases, and it could get out of hand unless we review each command.

Please tell me how we are going to avoid that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-38

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

03 JUN 4 AM 7:49

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD15251


U10012 /03

320.2

2 Jun 03



June 25, 2003

TO: Ambassador Nick Burns
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: André de Staercke

Thanks so much for your thoughtfulness in sending along the material on André de Staercke. I do appreciate it a great deal.

Regards,

DHR:dh
062503-10

050.7

25 June 03

11-L-0559/OSD15252

U10062-03



UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

R. Nicholas Burns
Ambassador

June 25, 2003

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am sending you a copy of an article that appeared in the Brussels daily *Le Soir* on the posthumous publication of André de Staercke's memoirs. I thought you might find this interesting given that you knew de Staercke quite well.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Nick".

R. Nicholas Burns

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC

11-L-0559/OSD15253

U10128 /03

000.7

23 Jun 03



**U.S. MISSION TO NATO
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM**

TEL: (b)(6)

#
Attach not attached

UNCLASSIFIED FAX		OPERATORS USE		Date Sent:	Time sent	Initials
To:	NAME:	ORGANIZATION:	UNCLASSIFIED FAX NUMBER			
	Hon. Donald W. Rumsfeld	Secretary of Defense	(b)(6)			
From:	NAME:	OFFICE/EXTENSION	USNATO UNCLASS FAX NUMBER			
	Amb. R. Nicholas Burns	(b)(6)	(b)(6)			
Precedence: Routine Priority Immediate ⇒			Receive Deadline	Date:	Time:	
Date	June 25, 2003	Total Number of Pages (including Cover):	10	Approval:	XO:	ODAXO:
SPECIAL NOTES AND INSTRUCTIONS						

Please note that the enclosure to the attached letter is a two-part article from a French-language newspaper, with English translation provided. Thank you.

C&D SENT SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE
4 111067-02

cc: C&D
D. Ritz




UNCLASSIFIED TEXT ONLY

➔ ATTACH UNCLASSIFIED ONLY ➔

11-L-0559/OSD15254

June 25, 2003

TO: Ambassador Nick Burns
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: André de Staercke

Thanks so much for your thoughtfulness in sending along the material on André de Staercke. I do appreciate it a great deal.

Regards,

DHR:dh
062503-10

050.7

25 June 03

11-L-0559/OSD15255

U10062-03



10:40 AM

TO: ADM Fargo
GEN Laporte

CC: GEN Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 28, 2003

SUBJECT: **North Korea**

Korea(North)

In our June 25 meeting, you committed to provide a final product on your North Korea planning by July 14. It seems to me it would be a good idea if your effort over the next two weeks is closely coordinated with Doug Feith and his policy team. You may also want to confirm that Doug's team is coordinating the policy angle with Leon Laporte on the South Korea-North Korea side.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
062803.02

28Jun03

11-L-0559/OSD15256

U10138 /03

June 27, 2003

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statements on Iran's Nuclear Program

You asked what I might have said about Iran's nuclear weapon program. Here is the only thing we can find. It looks accurate and innocuous to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

Transcripts of interviews, news clippings

DHR:dh
062703-2

IRAP

27Jun03

11-L-0559/OSD15257

U10142 /03

①

**Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with WCBS-TV
Tuesday, May 27, 2003**

Q: What about Iran's nuclear weapons program or nuclear program? It seems to be some evidence they may be doing something that could be a concern the U.S. and to the entire region of the world?

Rumsfeld: There's no question in my mind but that they have an active nuclear weapon program.

✓

②

**Infinity Radio Town Hall with Secretary Rumsfeld
Thursday, May 29, 2003**

Rumsfeld: In terms of causing additional proliferation, I think that's really not the case at all. There are nuclear weapons being -- we haven't made new nuclear weapons for some time. The nuclear weapons are being made all the time in Russia. Any number of countries currently have nuclear programs that are underway -- Iran does, North Korea does, and other nations as well -- China. So I think that any suggestion that it would contribute to proliferation, which is at the present time -- I would almost have to describe it as pervasive, the proliferation situation doesn't need any further encouragement from anybody to be going and doing what's being done.

Kroft: We have a caller, John, from KDKA in Pittsburgh.
John, are you there?

Q: Yes. Secretary, it's a pleasure and honor to speak to you. Prior to the war, there was talk of the nuclear power plant that the Iranians are building. I was wondering how close to completion and being operational would that be?

Rumsfeld: Well, there's a -- that falls on my -- the answer to the last question. We don't know of certain knowledge how close the Iranians are. **The U.S. intelligence community, and other intelligence communities in the world, John, do assess that the Iranians have a nuclear weapon program.** We also know that there are -- that they have an active ballistic missile program.

✓

How close they are to having a weapon -- certainly, they're intelligent people. There's a great deal of information about how to do these things that is available in the public these days. There are also a number of technicians who used to do it in other countries who hire themselves out to assist people in how to do it. So, one reasonably has to believe that if you have seriousness of purpose, you have money, you have intelligent people and you have networks of people around the world that are available to help you with the more difficult aspects of it, that it's going to happen. And the -- **I think reasonable people assume that sometime in this decade, the Iranians, if they continue to pursue this, which is unfortunate, that they will, in fact, have nuclear weapons.** Some would estimate earlier, some would estimate later.

✓

⑤

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BRADENTON HERALD

Found on Bradenton.com

The Bradenton Herald

May 23, 2003 Friday EST EDITION

SECTION: FRONT; Pg. 3

LENGTH: 675 words

HEADLINE: White House considers trying to destabilize Iran

BYLINE: WARREN P. STROBEL; Knight Ridder Newspapers

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Prompted by evidence that Iran is harboring top al Qaida operatives linked to last week's suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia and fears that Tehran may be closer to building a nuclear weapon than previously believed, the Bush administration has begun debating whether to take action to destabilize the Islamic republic, U.S. officials said Thursday.

Officials in Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's office are using both issues to press their view that the United States should adopt both overt and covert measures to undermine the Islamic regime in Tehran, said the officials, who are involved in the debate. Other officials argue that such a campaign would backfire by discrediting the moderate Iranians who are demanding political reforms.

Although one senior official engaged in the debate said "the military option is never off the table," others said no one was suggesting an invasion of Iran, although some officials think the United States should launch a limited airstrike on Iran's nuclear weapons facilities if Iran appears on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon. By some estimates, **Iran could have a nuclear weapon** within two years.

Some Pentagon officials suggested using the remnants of an Iranian opposition group once backed by Saddam Hussein, the Mujahedeen Khalq (MEK), to instigate armed opposition to the Iranian government. U.S. military forces in Iraq have disarmed the roughly 6,000-strong MEK, which is on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist groups. But the group's weapons are in storage and it hasn't disbanded.

However, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and other top officials rejected the idea, saying that while some might consider the MEK freedom fighters, "a terrorist is a terrorist is a terrorist," according to officials involved in the debate.

Bush has designated Iran a member of an "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea. But until now, he's pursued a middle course with Iran, approving talks on issues of common concern such as Afghanistan, while not attempting to re-establish diplomatic ties.

A formal statement of U.S. policy toward Iran, called a National Security Presidential Directive, has been on hold about a year because of internal administration debates and the war in Iraq, American officials said. The document is being resurrected, they said.

Bush's senior foreign-policy advisers were to have met at the White House on Thursday to discuss Iran policy, said a knowledgeable administration official, but the meeting was postponed until next week to give Iran several more days to meet U.S. demands that it turn over the suspected al Qaida terrorists. If it doesn't, Washington is likely to react with harsher measures, the official said.

11-L-0559/OSD15259

Copyright 2003 National Post, All Rights Reserved
National Post (Canada)

May 29, 2003 Thursday National Edition

SECTION: World; Analysis; Pg. A12

LENGTH: 638 words

HEADLINE: U.S. steps softly as it deals with Iranian threat

SOURCE: The Associated Press

BYLINE: George Gedda

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

WASHINGTON - In its links with terrorism and in its weapons programs, Iran is more of a menace than Iraq was. Despite that, Bush administration officials are talking as though a military strike is the last thing on their minds.

Iran is closer to having a nuclear weapons capability than Iraq was under Saddam Hussein and the administration believes al-Qaeda operatives working out of Iran were behind the devastating terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia on May 12.

The ties officials were able to establish between Saddam and al-Qaeda seemed less compelling.

But the administration is not ready to do battle with the Iranians. A turning point in its preferred approach, diplomacy, could come next month when the International Atomic Energy Agency visits Iran to inspect its nuclear facilities. An IAEA finding that the country is in violation of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments could put the issue before the UN Security Council.

Whatever the Council decides, the U.S. administration may opt for restraint. Iran is flanked on either side by Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which feature expensive -- and somewhat messy -- U.S.-led reconstruction efforts.

The political climate does not favour a pugnacious approach. Unlike Iraq, there is no UN Security Council resolution demanding Iran dispose of weapons of mass destruction. The administration was able to use a dozen years of council weapons resolutions as a lever to justify force against Iraq.

Nonetheless, Iran is even more a U.S. irritant now than when George W. Bush, the U.S. President, designated it a member of the "axis of evil" 16 months ago. Its supposed ties to al-Qaeda are causing anxiety, as are disclosures Iran is producing highly enriched uranium and perhaps plutonium.

The opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) has been tracking Iran's nuclear development activities though its sources inside the country.

The administration confirmed an NCRI report last August of a uranium enrichment facility and is now examining a new NCRI claim of two additional enrichment facilities 65 kilometres west of Tehran. An NCRI spokeswoman said **Iran could have a nuclear weapon** by 2005.

The Central Intelligence Agency says Iran is seeking chemical and biological weapons and is in the late stages of perfecting a medium-range missile. Analysts wonder if the time will come when Mr. Bush will apply to Iran his policy statement on terrorism of last September, as he did to Iraq.

"Our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale," Mr. Bush said at the time.

11-I-0559/OSD15260

Regime change is not the official policy for Iran, but that certainly is the goal of a large number of Iranians, now weary of the conservative mullahs who have run the country, albeit with some democratic trappings, for 24 years.

Perhaps the most sensitive issue in U.S. relations with both China and Russia is the degree to which both have contributed to Iran's military buildup. The U.S. State Department used exceptionally strong language last week in denouncing China's alleged acquiescence to the sale by a Chinese company of materials designed to aid in Iran's missile development.

Russia, meanwhile, may be having second thoughts about assisting with an Iranian nuclear reactor under construction at Bushehr.

Russia's second-ranking diplomat expressed concern this week about the existence of "serious unresolved questions in connection with Iran's nuclear research."



Moscow had been maintaining the Bushehr project was unrelated to nuclear weapons development, which is consistent with Iran's own explanation.

Mr. Bush is certain to sound out Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, on the issue when they meet this weekend in Russia.

LOAD-DATE: May 29, 2003

◀ [prev](#) Document 41 of 62 [next](#) ▶

May 28, 2003 11:05 AM

TO: 
Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Roosevelt Letter

Please take a look at this letter from Mrs. Roosevelt. It is a distinguished group of folks who are members of the Gibraltar - American Council that she chairs.

Please draft an answer for me to look at.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/20/03 Roosevelt ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
052803-5

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

6/27
Exec Sec -
To USD(P) for
(ISP)
Response. Tight suspense.



Larry Di Rita

6/20
U1021503

11-L-0559/OSD15262



Gibraltar - American Council

1156 15th Street NW • Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone 202/452-1108 • Fax 202/452-1109 • gibraltargov@msn.com

Chairperson
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.

Vice-Chairperson
Joanne Bickel, CFP®

Past Chairmen
Thomas N. McCarter III
Nicholas Ludington

Patron
Hon. Peter Caruana

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 28 2003

Dean Mr. Secretary,

Of course one cannot write to you at this time without first congratulating you upon the extraordinary accomplishment of our armed forces.

And it is on the subject of our defenses that I am now writing to you. Gibraltar is so small -- and historic -- that we are apt to overlook its present importance. But our fleet continues to depend upon its exceptional shiprepair facilities, and your British counterpart, Geoffrey Hoon, has stated that Gibraltar is indispensable for British defenses. It is generally agreed that with a volatile situation in North Africa, the strategic significance of this tiny country's base grows ever greater.

Sadly, however, Gibraltar and its Anglo-American defense role is being threatened by Gibraltar's neighbor, Spain. Despite the tiny country's forthcoming celebration of three centuries as an independent nation, Spain is doing what it can to remake Gibraltar into a Spanish colony. And, most distressing, Tony Blair, has announced that he will grant joint sovereignty over Gibraltar to Spain. Leading British journalists attribute this action by Mr. Blair as a way of gaining full Spanish support for his own personal ambitions in Europe. Certainly the British pollsters find that an overwhelming majority of the British people and most members of Parliament are strongly opposed to surrendering Gibraltar as a British country. Last November Gibraltar held a referendum in which ninety-eight point seven percent of the people voted against Spanish sovereignty.

International experts are in accord that joint sovereignty has no chance of success, and especially not when the Rock is on the Spanish border.

Mrs. Stewart Alsop • George F. Baker III • Mrs. Alexander Bancroft • John C. Bennison • Hon. Daniel Boorstin • Daniel B. Brewster, Jr. • Thomas W. Bruce • Paul W. Bucha • Hon. Butler C. Derrick, Jr. • Stephen W. Dizard • Mrs. Anne Eisenhower-Flottl • Dennis Frelinghuysen • Aiden Freyne • Richard Fursland • John B. Hattendorf • Hon. Marife Hernandez • John C. Herndon • Leigh W. Hoagland • James R. Hocking • William Humes • David H. E. Keiser • George L. Knox III • Hon. Jerome Kurtz • John W. Lampl • Hon. James Lilley • Thomas H. Lipscomb • Frank B. McKown Jr. • Ajata Medratta • Paul L. Miles, Jr. • Hon. Jay Peter Moffat • Chester Nosal • R. Lanse Offen III • John A. Pancetti • Blaise Pasztor • Herman R. Pirchner • Richard Peterson • Robert L. Porell • Donald Reed • Alfred S. Regnery • Stephen Schlesinger • Mrs. Jean Way Schoonover • Thomas Spencer • J. Andrew Spindler • Robert Steinhilber • Perry Stieglitz • Edward M. Strauss III • Tunku Varadarajan • John S. Veatch, Jr. • Aidan St. P. Walsh • Miner H. Warner • J. Riney Westmoreland • Bruce Zanaris • Nicholas Zoullas

Allow me to site two instances that demonstrate the danger of Gibraltar's base falling into Spanish hands.

A few years ago when then House of Representatives Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Floyd Spence went with other members of the committee in their own plane to visit Mediterranean defenses, they spent a few hours at Rota. As they prepared to leave the base, they were asked by the Spanish commander where their next call was. They replied, "Gibraltar." The commander told them they were not allowed to fly from Spain into Gibraltar. They therefore flew to Lisbon, touched down on the tarmac, and then on to Gibraltar. Spain, as part of its harassment of Gibraltar, does not permit planes to fly there. In addition, Spain frequently blocks Gibraltar's only land frontier for many hours at a time to make life more difficult for the Gibraltarians.

Last year when the British nuclear submarine, the HMS Tireless, sailed into Gibraltar for emergency repairs, the Spanish Government strenuously attempted to forbid the use of the Gibraltar shipyards for the repair of nuclear ships.

Gibraltar, a staunch friend of America, is being threatened by a not very democratic Spain. If you were to indicate your agreement with Minister Geoffrey Hoon on this subject, you would be helping American defenses in the Mediterranean and a most worthy three-hundred-year-old democracy.

Mr. Secretary, I do hope you will act on this matter.

Sincerely yours,
Tobie Roosevelt
(Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.)

May 20, 2003



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

AUG 1 2003

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chairperson
Gibraltar – American Council
1156 15th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20005

SPAIN

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

Thank you for your letter on Gibraltar. The strategic importance of Gibraltar is indisputable and we watch closely developments relative to this entity.

The United Kingdom and Spain are both close allies and friends of the United States, as well as of each other. We have every confidence that these two great democracies will address any differences that may exist between them.

Thank you again for raising this issue with me.

Sincerely,

1 AUG 03



11-L-0559/OSD15265

U12682 /03



June 30, 2003

TO: Senior Level Review Group
CC: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Portfolio Approaches to Defense Strategy

Attached is a memo from Andy Marshall about the Summer Study Report. I found it very interesting and thought it might be helpful if the SLRG discussed it at a future date.

381

I was struck by Andy's cover memo pointing out how resistant people are to looking at strategy in a different way and pursuing advantages, rather than focusing on reacting to threats.

Attach.
1/30/03 Marshall memo re: Summer Study Report

DHR:dh
063003-61

.....

Please respond by _____

30 Jun 03

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11-L-0559/OSD15266



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

January 30, 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 30 2003

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andrew W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: Summer Study Report

Attached is a paper on the possible use of portfolio approaches to Defense strategy. One of my 2002 Summer Studies dealt with this topic; something of major interest to me. The original strategy paper I wrote for you in early 2001 proposed a portfolio of advantages strategy as a way of exploiting our strengths and coping with the uncertainties of the future.

I have highlighted the first five pages of the paper. This will give you a good idea of major messages that come out of the study. The most striking thing to me was how resistant the people in the study group (mostly drawn from DoD) were to looking at strategy as (1) constructing a portfolio (especially that top-level managers approach to strategy might in any way be different than at lower levels), and (2) pursuing advantage rather than focusing entirely on reacting to threats. We are the biggest player in the game; our strategy ought to reflect this. There is a reluctance to act on this and thus to remain focused on threats.

The plan is to organize a few seminars to discuss the use of portfolio approaches, using this paper as a read-ahead.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>1/30</i>

11-L-0550SD15267

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Portfolio Approaches to Defense Strategy¹
(OSD Net Assessment Report: Newport Study Group July 2002)

Introduction

Annually OSD (Net Assessment) has sponsored short studies of complex strategic issues at the Naval War College. In the summer of this year one of those subjects was the potential applicability of a private sector strategic thinking process called portfolio analysis to the development of defense strategy. Addressing that subject meant examining three major topics:

- Developing examples of portfolios for the DoD that might reflect a different view of strategy.
- Analyzing how a portfolio approach to defense strategy might be incorporated into the existing defense planning process.
- Recommending a program to implement such an innovation, if the decision was made to adopt it as a vehicle for defense planning.

This paper provides an overview of the portfolio method, the results of the Newport discussions, and examples of types of portfolios that might be applicable in defense strategy (the first topic). The objective of the paper is to provide a background for individuals in the DoD to discuss the portfolio method and address the second and third topics: integrating the method into the existing strategy and planning processes, and developing a program to implement the use of portfolio analysis.

Overview ---- Current Strategic Setting

At present the United States holds a pre-eminent position in military power that may last for several decades. It should be able, therefore, to use this period to develop and implement strategies that exploit and extend that advantage. This could include reshaping military capabilities in a manner that helps shape peacetime relations and emerging competitions with other nations, that deters or puts opponents at a disadvantage prior to conflict, and that leads to U.S. forces dominating such opponents in the event of conflict. Perhaps no nation has ever had such reach and capability, and strategies should focus on extending that advantage for the long term.

However, greater uncertainty exists today than during the Cold War about the next generation of major competitors and the manner in which they will challenge U.S. national security. Broad geopolitical trends can be identified (e.g., the growing importance of Asia and the PacRim), but many specifics of confrontation and conflict cannot (e.g., which nations will challenge the U.S. and when). Technologies may also lead to the appearance of new types of warfare (e.g., space warfare, non-lethal combat, and information warfare), or to substantial changes in the manner in which certain types

¹ This paper was prepared by George "Chip" Pickett, chairman of the OSD(NA) working group studying the application of the portfolio method. Comments and questions can be directed to him at 410-765-6571 (email: GPickett@northropgrumman.com).

of fighting occur (e.g., the increased use of precision fires). The pace of the emergence of these new forms of war, however, is similarly unclear.

A major counterbalance to this uncertainty is that this existing substantial U.S. leadership provides opportunities for strategic behavior that might not otherwise exist. Because the U.S. is not in a close worldwide military competition with another country (or set of countries), it has the current advantage of very large gaps between it and potential competitors. That presents it with strategic flexibility that it would not have if it were locked in a neck and neck competition. For example, it can use the current period to develop new approaches to conflict, to test new force capabilities on a broader scale, and to accept near term risks in order to develop future capabilities.

Today's strategic position, therefore, may require a different strategic thought process than in the past several decades, a strategic thought process that focuses on using that advantage to increase the gap between the U.S. and other nations and position it for the future. This is a strategy of "seeking advantage", not of "countering threats". This in turn raises the question of whether there are new ways to think strategically about the future, ways that are more pertinent to strategy setting than the methods used in the period of the Cold War.

Description of the Portfolio Method

One approach to strategy in this situation may be to apply a framework drawn from the portfolio method found in private industry. This strategic thought process originated in 1950s as a method to manage stock portfolios, and has been applied since the 1960s to the management of very large, diversified multi-business enterprises. Its value lies in two major attributes: (a) an ability to focus the power of the entire institution while subelements optimize their individual strategies, and (b) an ability to balance risks and opportunities at a broad level.

In large diversified enterprises, the portfolio method enables managers to look at individual businesses (or sub-organizations) from a different perspective. Top managers can set aside delving into the intricate and complex strategies of individual businesses and focus on the mix of those businesses and changes in that mix. For example, by thinking of these businesses in the aggregate, top managers can examine, establish strategy and manage such factors as:

- Positioning the firm, for its collective power, and applying that collective power to influence competitors, allies and customers.
- Determining the overall goals for the enterprise that may then lead to creating new units, or altering the role of existing ones.
- Identifying common needs (e.g., in skilled personnel, technologies, and facilities) and using the overall firm's scale to meet those more effectively.
- Picking high risk and high payoff opportunities that would be beyond the resources and strategic interests of individual units.

- Identifying units that eventually will become more or less critical to long term success (e.g., because of changes in competitive environments, or underlying technologies), and then guiding the strategic direction of those units.
- Identifying and developing subtle cross linkages between units to enhance their power.
- Managing overall risk among businesses so that, for example, a technology risk that undermines one unit does not similarly undermine another, and resources from one unit can be applied to assist another in such situations.
- Allocating overall corporate resources (technology investment, key skilled personnel, facilities, etc.) across businesses for strategic purposes.

At the level of the individual business unit (or sub-organization) managers continue to develop, implement and manage strategy tailored to the unique demands of their individual businesses. One of the advantages of the portfolio method is that it recognizes that fundamental differences can exist between various business units in a large organization (e.g., in the rates of change in underlying technology, the characteristics of products, the underlying investment requirements, the practices of competitors, and the rates of growth.) While manager at the unit level focus on the demands of their businesses (e.g., "how will this business succeed in its market against the products of companies X, Y and Z?"), managers at the top of the corporation can focus on the overall long term business of the company (e.g., "how will this mix of businesses affect the future of the firm?")

Potential Applicability of the Portfolio Method to Defense Strategy

DoD is a large diversified organization with a complex mix of operations, many having both strong independent roles and requirements while being part of an interdependent set of relationships. The combination of individual and collective strengths provides the overall national security impact of the Department. In that context, the portfolio method could provide a method of assessment and strategy setting that would assist the top levels of the Department. For example:

- It could provide top management with a way to think about the activities of the Department at an aggregate level. DoD top leadership could have a different perspective on military power from (for example) the military services. While the individual services and joint commands develop specific capabilities, top management might select specific areas to pursue for the long term that might not be routinely selected in their current strategy activities, and which could substantially reshape the overall military capability of the U.S. This could be at a broad level (e.g., new missions such as missile defense), or at a more specific level of technologies, systems or forces (e.g., robotics).
- It could enable top management to focus on existing and emerging capabilities from a different strategic viewpoint and make appropriate strategic decisions about the pace and direction of those capabilities. For example, some force capabilities are well within the competence of DoD and their future potential value is predictable (e.g.,

DoD has decades of experience in long range strike and undersea warfare). Other capabilities are not as well developed or their future value is far more uncertain (e.g., DoD may just be entering a period of extensive and ever changing uses of information warfare.) A portfolio approach can enable top managers to balance current competencies and new competencies, and make appropriate resource commitments for the future without surrendering the past.

- It could assist top management in selecting a set of specific and narrowly focused investments, the success of just a few would greatly enhance U.S. political military leadership. By focusing on broad long term goals, the portfolio method could enable top management to make high level "bets" on the future sources of success and to free up resources to make those bets. DoD top management could pursue several such investments in parallel, realizing that some will succeed and others will fail, but that the collective impact will be major leaps forward in defense capabilities.

In general, the portfolio approach provides a means for DoD top management to use a different framework for strategic thinking from that used lower down in the department. Top DoD management can focus on an activity from a different perspective (e.g., are combat divisions important entities to perceptions of power?), while lower levels of the department focus on the specifics (e.g., what is the right number of divisions? How should a division be organized? What are the operational concepts that they should employ or support?) Even now the results of the DoD's current strategy and planning activities is to create a portfolio of capabilities; the difference is that this is now a by-product of the analysis and not one of its major goals.

Summary of Results of Newport Study of Portfolio Methods

At Newport, government representatives, commercial management consultants, and members of private defense analysis groups attempted to define the portfolio method as it might be applied in DoD, and attempted to create example of such portfolios. From this experience and from post-Newport assessments of the effort, the following are key findings:

- Developing sample portfolios proved far more difficult analytically than envisioned, even after identification of the attributes or criteria for portfolios. There are both problems in understanding the underlying concepts of a portfolio, and problems in creating ideas for what should be included in a portfolio. This is not a problem of bureaucratic resistance, but one of understanding the concept itself.
- Within DoD, frameworks for strategic analysis appear to be oriented almost entirely on threats and on forecasts of possible military conflicts. This focus is so strong as to impede the use of other strategic frameworks, such as those focused on establishing peacetime competitive advantages. Such other frameworks are applied in the DoD on an isolated basis, but the dominance of frameworks, processes and measures based on threats and conflicts tend to exclude the use of such strategic approaches more broadly.

- Consequently, DoD strategy as currently developed may be fundamentally defensive and reactive in nature. The strategy setting process starts almost from the beginning with a forecasted threat (or set of threats). In doing so it sets a theme of responding to opponents. If this is the case, its potential implication is that progress in U.S. capability is subtly tied to opponents who are already far behind. This constrains consideration of powerful strategic options. It also may create situations in which the participants in setting strategy do not focus on important strategic questions (e.g., what initiatives could be taken to alter the setting in which the U.S. and other nations compete or to place other nations in inferior long term positions?")
- DoD strategy setting processes appear to create the situation in which the strategic frameworks used by senior leadership is expected to be nearly identical to that used by lower levels. For example, if war planning were to use a framework of "threat to strategy to task" at the joint or individual unit level, then "threat to strategy to task" should, in the DoD process, be used by the SecDef for creating strategy for the entire department. By contrast, as the portfolio method suggests, top level leaders often use strategic frameworks very different from their subordinate organizations. DoD personnel also appear on occasion to view strategy as very tightly integrated (i.e., any change in one part has a direct impact on another part). This is not found in companies and is probably over emphasized.
- In the long term, to develop the application of portfolios broadly in DoD will take several years. Research will be required (a) to develop the taxonomy and method of analysis; (b) to determine how to insert it within current strategy and planning processes; (c) to educate managers and staffs in how to use the method; and, (d) to accomplish insertion. This will require a range of efforts, including demonstration projects, conceptual thinking by the DoD's school system, and tapping non-DoD experts in the methodology.
- In the near term, if top level DoD management wants to develop portfolios, it will require an independent effort. The intellectual and process obstacles are too significant for rapid and widespread introduction of the method. A small effort under OSD sponsorship would be needed to develop portfolios for the SecDef, if this framework is to be applied even in a limited manner in the near term.

As a result of these observations from Newport, this paper was prepared in order to engage additional participants in the department in the discussion of the portfolio method and its potential application.

Examples of Portfolios

The following are examples of approaches to portfolios that are drawn from discussions and recommendations at the Newport session and from other sources. Three classes of portfolios are discussed:

- Portfolios of general advantage
- Portfolios of specific advantage
- Portfolios of revolutionary change and risk management

Portfolios of General Advantage

Portfolios of general advantage contain actions that would enable the U.S., on a broad basis, to sustain dominance in military capabilities and defense strategy over opponents. These portfolios build upon current U.S. leadership, and expand already existing gaps by actions across the entire department. In addition to improved warfighting, their objective is to increase, in opponents, their sense of uncertainty and lack of control in the military competition with the U.S. That is accomplished both by making major advances in specific areas and by presenting opponents with a complex military force under constant rates of change, so that the exact type of U.S. force that would be encountered is always unpredictable.

Portfolios of general advantage can take several forms:

- They can focus on the “front end” of defense capability, those forces seen as the most visible aspect of U.S. military capability. Various portfolios could be constructed around, for example, missions (e.g., precision strike), areas of dominance (e.g., space capabilities), trends in warfare (e.g., urban combat), or top level national security goals (e.g., peacekeeping). The objectives of such portfolios could be to limit, for the very long term, the capacity of any nation to initiate hostilities far from its own borders, to restrict such nations to local aggression, and thus to create opportunities for U.S. led alliances to muster worldwide counters.
- They can focus on the “back end” of defense capability, the underlying infrastructure of practices and processes that lead to strong military capabilities. For example, the U.S. leadership in undersea warfare, long range strike, etc. is underpinned by such defense wide strengths as the selection and training of personnel, the ability to develop new operational concepts of warfare, the capacity to develop very complex weapon systems and networks, and the ability to conduct realistic training in global operations. These are the subtler and less visible bases for long term military leadership.

Examples of such a portfolio include:

Portfolio of general advantage: Limit Strategic Behavior of Potential Opponents

- | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retain blue water worldwide naval dominance to discourage others from attempting to match U.S. seapower capabilities or project power by sea and keep, for the long term, major crises away from U.S. shores. |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

- Establish missile defense to lower the risk that nations, restricted from long range strike by other means, can consider missile attack as a method.
- Sustain dominance in long range aviation and local air superiority to undermine "distance" from U.S. forces as a perceived advantage by other nations.
- Sustain leadership in long range delivery, application and sustainment of multi-divisional land forces in order to make potential opponents see that the U.S. can take the ground war to them.
- Invest in space to sustain capabilities that are too costly for others to replicate and yet are seen as essential to successful major aggression.
- Link the above areas to each other in order to create interrelated capabilities that opponents cannot match without first developing each individual area.

Portfolio of general advantage: Shape Warfighting Practices for Enduring Leadership

- Master first engagement competence.
- Establish effects based warfighting.
- Achieve instantaneous massing of dispersed forces.
- Achieve precision effects.
- Sustain large forces at a distance with minimum logistics tail.
- Provide rapid power projection from a distance into denied areas.
- Develop very fast counter-strike capabilities.
- Provide fast "speed to kill" at the individual weapon and force levels.

Portfolio of general advantage: Sustain Excellence in Underlying DoD Practices

- Focus on development and training of skills in joint and combined operations of large units.
- Develop new concepts of military operations.
- Expand experimentation.
- Emphasize simulation for training realism from individual soldier to large unit operations.

Portfolio of general advantage: Develop National Sources of Competitive Advantage

- Develop capability to access industrial skills and capabilities in non-defense industries.
- Develop the engineering disciplines in special areas of

- lasting advantage, such as system engineering.
- Preserve competition in key future warfighting technologies and systems.
- Identify key technologies and skills to be restricted from foreign access.
- Pursue substitution of capital for labor.
- Develop strategies for outsourcing industrial capabilities to long term allies and friends.

Portfolios of Specific Advantage

Portfolios of specific advantage do not deal with the full range of the department's activities but focus on a subset of capabilities in which the U.S. wants to preferentially invest. Defense resources may not be sufficient for increasing the gap of leadership broadly across the DoD. The objective of these portfolios is to pick specific areas in which the U.S. can achieve unambiguous and expanding leadership, and in which that leadership would have a substantial impact on potential opponents.

Such portfolios might be of the following forms:

- They might consist of a narrow set of activities in which the U.S. could clearly dominate the military environment and perceptions of military power. This could involve specific areas such as space warfare, control of the seas, and long range power projection; investments in new concepts of military operations; or, investments in a class of technologies or systems.
- They might consist of a set of activities that are specifically targeted against general classes of potential opponents. This could include emerging major powers, regional powers, opponents in the PacRim, or terrorists. Such types of portfolios could present opponents with significant new U.S. advantages that would discourage them from entering into a peacetime military competition, or influence their own investments in military forces over the long term.

Examples of activities that might be included in portfolios of this type are:

Portfolio of specific advantage: Sustain Sea Power Dominance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop technology and operational concepts for sea operations at great depths. • Develop capabilities to operate covertly within opponents territorial waters prior to official opening of hostilities. • Develop forces able to track, trail and target any ship in any location in peacetime. • Integrate sensors, C2 and operational forces for long range strike from the sea. • Invest in deep underwater technologies for surveillance, inspection, destruction, disarming, and retrieving.

Portfolio of specific advantage: Establish Dominance in Networked Forces

- | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Develop increased joint force capabilities, including joint operations at the level of squads, individual aircraft and individual ships.• Develop combined operations doctrine and competence (through exercises).• Develop systems and system implementation strategies to network foreign military forces into U.S. C4ISR processes in peacetime, crisis and conflict. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Portfolios of Revolutionary Change and Risk Management

Revolutionary and risk management portfolios are even more narrowly focused than the preceding ones. These may be formulated because defense resources are too limited for a broader approach, or because the Secretary wants to focus the department on a very select set of activities. Two types can be identified:

- Portfolios could be designed to invest in a series of high risk/high payoff initiatives, anyone of which would have major impact on U.S. military capabilities. Several initiatives would be pursued in parallel because some will succeed and others will fail. Because probabilities of success are low, the payoff from each initiative should be very high. Moreover, the initiatives should be diversified so that, should one not succeed, the factors leading to its failure will not similarly affect other initiatives.
- Portfolios can be constructed that are more defensive in nature and create hedges against long term trends in military conflict. In this application the portfolio resembles insurance, a set of activities that protect against major long term trends in the nature of combat and confrontation between the U.S. and opponents. This portfolio approach, more than any other, comes closest to a threat form of analysis.

Examples of such portfolios are:

Portfolio of High Risk/High Payoffs in Shaping Combat Environments

- | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Creation of "keep out zones" in air, space and sea, where other forces cannot operate.• Control cities and large populations with small units.• Passive large scale shutdown of opposing forces in conflict at long range.• Creation of the ability to fight precisely in cluttered environments. |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

- Development of capabilities to target and disable under ground targets.

Portfolio of High Risk/High Payoffs in Technologies

- Broad programs in robotics for military applications.
- Establish multi-sensor networks using bi-statics, time sharing, etc among sensors to create 24/7 coverage.
- Pursuit of developments in nano-technology.
- Development of technologies that enable "plug and play" integration among disparate systems.
- Development of technologies for operating at great depths in the ocean.

Portfolio of Hedges

- Develop counters to opponents employing "anti-access" strategies and forces.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Defenses against chemical and biological weapons.
- Establishment of domestic security capabilities to detect, identify and counter threats within U.S. borders.

Conclusions and Questions for Consideration

The portfolio method appears to offer a different way to think about strategy formulation for the DoD in this period of both great uncertainty and great advantage. The initial work accomplished at the Naval War College provides some ideas, as well as raising questions about the form of such a portfolio and about how such a method could be employed within the current DoD strategy and planning processes.

To further develop work on this potential method of thinking, it is intended that various individuals within the Department would read and consider the issues raised in the preceding pages. These individuals would then meet in several working groups to discuss the issues, and to address the following questions:

In general:

- To what extent does the U.S. current leadership position require a different framework of thinking, such as the portfolio method?

- To what extent should top level DoD managers apply strategic frameworks of thought different from those used by the military services and joint commands?

As to types of portfolios:

- What types of portfolios would be of the most use to the Secretary of Defense in the near term?
- What portfolios would be particularly given the long term trends in U.S. national security environment (e.g., such as the forecasted rise in importance of Asia, or the increased presence of terrorism)?
- What might be portfolios that would create leap-ahead capabilities in periods of resource constraints (i.e., portfolios of revolutionary change)?

As to implementing portfolios:

- What types of projects should be initiated within the DoD to further develop the portfolio method and test its applicability to defense planning? For example, what tasks might be assigned to the military services and joint commands to develop ideas for portfolio planning?
- What types of research activities could be established to investigate the concept, to develop the terminology, and to develop methods and measures to evaluate portfolios? For example, should there be a long term research program within various think tanks?
- How might portfolio thinking be incorporated into the DoD's existing PPB and related strategy setting activities?
- What steps should be taken to build support for implementing this form of strategic thinking? What steps could be taken to gain acceptance for the method within the department?



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 1 2003

The Honorable Jim Nussle
U.S. House of Representatives
303 Cannon Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-1502

Dear Congressman Nussle:

You mentioned in a meeting last month that the Department of Defense has been unable to account for some of the money in supplemental funds appropriated since September 11, 2001.

As you know, the accounting systems in the Department have long needed consolidation and modernization. With respect to supplemental appropriations, though, we have initiated several procedures to account for all funding received. Our FY 2003 spending plan to Congress will highlight the accounting of these funds. Dr. Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), is available to brief you and your staff in greater detail.

Sincerely,

U10315-03

11-L-0559/OSD15279

110.01

1 JUL 03

ZSW:

SEE NOTE BELOW. THANKS

1
M



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET

2003 JUN 22 11 18 AM

INFO MEMO

June 17, 2003, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Accounting for Supplemental

- Representative Nussle mentioned to you that since 9/11 the Department has not been able to account for some of the supplemental funds. His remark was based on erroneous information he received from the news media. We are able to account for all DoD funding received, including supplemental funds. We have done so because we have implemented several procedures to enhance our ability to accurately track and report the status of these funds.
- Of the \$31.2 billion we received in supplemental funding in FY 2002, \$30.4 billion is now obligated. I anticipate that most of what is left will obligate in the next 2 months.
- We have completed the data collection for the FY 2003 midyear execution review. My final report will be ready before the end of the month. Preliminary analysis indicates that we have sufficient funding to cover our operating requirements for the remainder of the fiscal year. Reserve demobilization and the number of forces deployed in the CENTCOM area of operations remain a funding concern.
- We are still working the numbers for the reconstitution of forces. As part of the post-war assessment process, the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Services are working to prioritize these requirements within the guidelines briefed to you at the Senior Level Review Group.
- We owe to the Congress an FY 2003 spending plan on July 1, 2003, including the status of funds provided in the supplemental. I will use this report to highlight our execution review findings and update the Components' spending plans for the remainder of the fiscal year.

COORDINATION: None required.

Prepared By: John M. Evans,

(b)(6)

6/24 P.L. Draft letter to Mr. Nussle J.M.E.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRAADOCK	
MA ZUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	6/24

Harry Di Rita

6/25

U09680 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD15281

May 22, 2003 8:02 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Accounting for Supplemental

Congressman Nussle mentioned to me in a meeting with the leadership yesterday that since 9/11 we have not been able to account for some of the money in the Supplemental. What is that about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
~~052203-12~~

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

TAB A

SENT 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prisoners of War

At the lunch we had today with the retired military commentators, one of them said that on an Al Jazeera tape of American prisoners of war in Iraq, the U.S. prisoners gave a lot more information than their name, rank and serial number. He said it kind of reflected poor training and didn't reflect well.

Please have someone take a look at that Al Jazeera tape to see what he is talking about, and then tell me what the Pentagon is doing in that regard.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060603-29

.....
Please respond by

6/26/03

03 JUN 10 09:23

11-L-0559/OSD15283

U10323 /03
Tab A

June 2, 2003 9:27 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Program Stability

Do you have any thoughts on how we can improve the stability in our program management? There is not much we can do about Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but we ought to be able to figure out something for the rest of them.

One thought would be to simply mandate longer tours.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
3/19/03 Aldridge Memo re: Program Stability

DHR:dh
060203-18

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

03 JUN 4 AM 7:49

-L-0559/OSD15284

U10326 /03

100.54

25 Jun 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

SECRET

2003 JUL -2 11:13:56
CM-1047-03
2 July 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Force Provider

*Mr Secretary -
We're attacking the issue
you raised on several fronts.
We're working closely with
the OSD staff and I
recommend continuing on
this multi-path effort - VR
Dick*

- In response to your request (TAB), the following is provided. There are several ongoing efforts directly addressing this issue which are providing insights on the best course of action to address your concerns.
- Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Joint Lessons Learned. Analysis and integration of lessons learned are ongoing--including the lessons USJFCOM has collected at the operational-theater level and those we have seen at the strategic-national level. USJFCOM's roles and responsibilities as "Joint Deployment Process Owner for DoD" and Joint Force Provider are specifically being examined as part of this effort.
- Operational Availability (OA) Study. Outbrief III, held on 23 June, addressed analytical findings and recommendations on the issues of Active/Reserve Component mix and force management.
- In the Total Force Assessment follow-on study, which will begin in July, J-8 will refine the OA work and conduct additional Win Decisive/Swiftly Defeat analyses.
- Unified Command Plan (UCP) Review. I have asked J-5 to examine, in coordination with the combatant commanders and Services, ways to best address the Joint Force Provider mission assigned to USJFCOM in the UCP.
- The UCP Review will be informed by USJFCOM's lessons learned from OIF, particularly with regard to USJFCOM's responsibilities as the Joint Force Deployment Process Owner.
- An In-Progress Report of the UCP Review will be presented during the July Combatant Commanders' Conference.
- Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum (Forces For) Review. In coordination with the UCP Review, I have asked J-8 to conduct a Forces For review and forward recommendations on how to realign current force assignment

11-L-0559/OSD15285

U10327 /03

to streamline the force management process and facilitate USJFCOM's Force Provider responsibilities.

- Planning Process Revision. J-7 is leading an effort to revise our planning process to make it more flexible and responsive, while also refining/streamlining the transition from deliberate planning to crisis action execution.
- This effort is in parallel with and supports the DASD (Resources and Plans) adaptive planning initiative.
- Our staffs are working in close coordination on all of these actions. I propose continuing the ongoing efforts and integrate the results with recent lessons learned in order to provide a comprehensive proposal for improving the force provider and deployment processes.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7 (b)(6)

TAB

Sent 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Force Provider

I am coming to the conclusion that we need to have a better process to provide forces to the Combatant Commanders, to include active forces, Guard and Reserve. That may be a single force provider—or something else.

If we learned anything during the recent mobilization and deployment flow of forces, it is that having the Services handle the Reserve Components and non-apportioned forces, the AORs handle their assigned forces, and Joint Forces Command handle other forces just doesn't work without extraordinary efforts at our level.

It is not clear to me why we cannot do it relatively easily.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how this could be accomplished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-14

.....
Please respond by

6/20/03

JUN 10 PM 2:23

11-L-0559/OSD15287

Tab

TAB

SENT 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Force Provider

I am coming to the conclusion that we need to have a better process to provide forces to the Combatant Commanders, to include active forces, Guard and Reserve. That may be a single force provider—or something else.

If we learned anything during the recent mobilization and deployment flow of forces, it is that having the Services handle the Reserve Components and non-apportioned forces, the AORs handle their assigned forces, and Joint Forces Command handle other forces just doesn't work without extraordinary efforts at our level.

It is not clear to me why we cannot do it relatively easily.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how this could be accomplished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-14

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

JUN 10 PM 2:23

11-L-0559/OSD15288

U10328 /03

Tab

320.2

6 Jun 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-4000

ACTION MEMO

CR-1046-03
2 July 2003

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

203 JUL -2 AM 11:12

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 7/1*SUBJECT: Defense Science Board (DSB) Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)
Reports

- In response to your request the following information is provided.
- The DSB lessons learned task force was the only organized effort that looked at joint operational and strategic issues from OEF. Learning from that, the Joint Staff postured itself to better capture lessons emanating from operations against Iraq through the efforts of US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Joint Staff, Services and the DSB.
- A number of the lessons from OEF were adopted and implemented in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).
- The DSB OEF report recommendations should be consolidated with the emerging OIF recommendations and addressed as a group; otherwise, we run the risk of confusing the DSB OEF lessons with USJFCOM, DSB and Joint Staff OIF recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION: Joint Staff formally staff DSB OEF report recommendations through USJFCOM and Services for comment and incorporate results into OIF lessons learned recommendations.

Approve *JA* Disapprove _____ Other _____
JUL 4 2003

COORDINATION: NONE

Copy to:
DepSecDef
USD(P)
USD(AT&L)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	7/3
MA BUCCI	7/3
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	7/3

Prepared By: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

U10329 /03

ASD-3

11-L-0550/OSD15280

334 DSB

SIGN
HERE
2 JUL 03

July 4, 2003

TO: LTG CRADDOCK

FROM: DELONNIE

PLEASE PASS THE ATTACHED TO LTG CRADDOCK.

LTG CRADDOCK—

PLEASE NOTE SECDEF APPROVED CJCS RECOMMENDATION ON THE
ATTACHED. [U10329/03]

D

PAGE 1 OF 3

11-L-0559/OSD15290

Snowflake

June 2, 2003 10:07 AM

TO: Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DSB Reports

Here are these four reports. I have been over them. They each have recommendations. What do you propose we do to move the recommendations forward?

Some possibilities include:

- Accepting the recommendations as they have been presented.
- Putting together a small group on the Joint Staff and OSD to review them and come back to me with recommendations.
- Ask McCarthy to come in and brief on all four of the reports.
- Other.

What do you recommend?

CTCS RESPONSE
ATTACHED

Thanks.

Attach.

2/25/03 DSB Report: "Own the Night"

1/29/03 DSB Report: "Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration"

1/29/03 DSB Report: "Streamlining the Deployment Order Process"

December 2002 DSB Report: "Organizational Lessons Learned Review"

DFR:ah
060203-24

.....
Please respond by 17 JUL

Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab *A50-2*

XXXXXX *X01814 /03*

11-L-0559/OSD15291



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 JUL -2 01 41 26

INFO MEMO

June 26, 2003, 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 2 July 03

SUBJECT: National Park Foundation (NPF) and Free Parks Passes

- My staff is working closely with the President of the National Park Foundation (NPF), Mr. Jim Maddy, to facilitate this initiative.
- The proposal appears to be most easily implemented were the National Parks simply to admit for free individuals with military identification cards; however, NPF is considering printing special passes. We will assist in the control and distribution of these passes if that is the route the Foundation takes.
- There are no significant obstacles within the Department to bringing this to fruition. As of July 1, the Foundation has advised that their internal coordination process precludes a July 4 announcement. We will do all we can to facilitate its implementation when the Foundation is ready to proceed.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: Tab B

ATTACHMENTS: As stated.

PREPARED BY: William F. Gleason, ~~Morale, Welfare and Recreation Policy,~~
ODUSD (MC&FP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD15292

U10367 /03

June 4, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: National Park Foundation and Free Parks Passes

The Vice Chair and the President of the National Park Foundation, David Rockefeller and Jim Maddy, were in yesterday, and they said they thought it might be good for everybody if they figured out a way to provide free National Park passes for some category of military people—people who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, people on active duty, people in the Reserve or Guard who served on active duty, etc. They charge about \$50 per pass, but it costs the National Park Foundation only about \$1 to print one up. We would have to distribute them. They would get good publicity out of it.

Any thoughts? Attached is a memo from them on the subject. Please take a look at it, and then get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/3/03 NPF (Rockefeller and Maddy) ltr to SecDef re: National Parks Pass

DHR:dh
060403-3

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

6/17
Dr Chu -
Also advise

Larry Di Rita

6/20

11-L-0559/OSD15293



11 Dupont Circle NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036-1224

202-238-4200 main

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS REVIEWED

JUN 4 2003

MEMORANDUM

DATE: JUNE 3, 2003
TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: DAVID ROCKEFELLER, JR., VICE CHAIR, NPF
JIM MADDY, PRESIDENT, NPF
RE: NATIONAL PARKS PASS

At the most recent meeting of the Board of the National Park Foundation in San Antonio, Texas, Dayton Duncan proposed a concept to Secretary Norton and Director Mainella that was received with great enthusiasm. The proposal was to explore ways to give a National Parks Pass every American military family. While we recognize that many organizations are providing much-deserved support to the troops and their families, we strongly feel that access to National Parks, which capture the essence of the history and natural beauty of this country and honor the sacrifice of America's military in its history of world conflicts, is a special tribute to the men and women who serve, and their families who support them.

The National Park Foundation continues to manage the National Parks Pass program in partnership with the National Park Service. We would propose to structure this gift to America's troops as follows:

1. Building on its track record of corporate partnerships, the NPF would secure the commitment from a corporation to underwrite the costs to the NPS of providing a National Parks Pass to military families.
2. DOD would sponsor the distribution of the National Parks Pass and work with NPF on organizing a national press announcement.

We would propose announcing this campaign on July 4th 2003. Once again, the National Park Foundation, through a corporate partner, AT&T, will be underwriting the cost of the July 4 fireworks on the National Mall. NPF would organize a press event to include Secretary Norton, Director Mainella, yourself and members of the Board of the National Park Foundation to make the announcement to the American Public. We would seek your counsel, and that of Secretary Norton, as to whether this was an opportunity for participation by President and/or Mrs. Bush.

Please advise us about whether this concept is feasible and who to work with on your staff to implement. Thank you for your thoughts and consideration.

B

COORDINATION

DoD OGC

Stephen Epstein

June 24, 2003

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CSA 7-1-03

Ellison, Lisa, CIV, OSD-PB

From: Epstein, Stephen, Mr, DoD OGC
Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2003 2:22 PM
To: Gleason, William F., CIV, OSD-P&R; Sprance, William, Mr, DoD OGC; Beaubien, Kris, , OUSDC
Cc: Jones, Freeman E., COL, OSD-P&R; Beauregard, Marcus J., COL, OSD-P&R
Subject: RE: SECDEF SNOWFLAKE - National Parks Foundation and Free Parks Passes

Bill:

I received your fax. This is a piece of cake. We have done this many times for other organizations such as theme parks, etc. I'm not as familiar with the details as Bill Sprance or George Schaeffer are, but I believe we consider these gifts to the individual servicemembers that are distributed by the Military Services. The Standards of Conduct permit acceptance of such gifts by Government personnel because they are offered to all milpers, even if restricted on basis of geographic considerations. In this case, assuming they are available to all milpers who have served in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, the passes could be accepted. If this authority to accept the gifts does not work, there are others that may apply as well.

Bottom line: there is no legal or ethical issue here.

Regarding logistics, I'm not the expert, but in the past we had the Military Services (including their MWR facilities) distribute such passes.

Steve (I'm at 717-878-2579 today.)

-----Original Message-----

From: Gleason, William F., CIV, OSD-P&R
Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2003 1:36 PM
To: Sprance, William, Mr, DoD OGC; Beaubien, Kris, , OUSDC; Epstein, Stephen, Mr, DoD OGC
Cc: Jones, Freeman E., COL, OSD-P&R; Beauregard, Marcus J., COL, OSD-P&R
Subject: SECDEF SNOWFLAKE - National Parks Foundation and Free Parks Passes
Importance: High

Steve/Bill/Kris

I have FAXed the SECDEF SNOWFLAKE to you (Bill 693-7616; Kris 602-0777). Hope these are still good FAX numbers. Steve, I do not have a FAX Number for you.

It would appear that the Services would be distributing the passes to their service members.

Suggest the following be address back to the Foundation:

1). The Foundation's proposal would like to make passes available to "...some category of military people...."
a). Perhaps the process could be simplified to make National Parks available to all Services members. The service member could show their ID card for access rather than go through the expense of making special passes.

2). It would appear that the start date is July 4, 2003. What is the termination date?

3). The Foundation will need to know the quantity required for each Service. How would these passes be distributed?

If you have not seen my fax, please call me with your proper fax number.

Bill Gleason
(703) 602-5012

SNOWFLAKE

HOT

DR. CHU FOR ACTION _____

ASSIGN ACTION TO McFB

SUSPENSE DATE BACK TO DR. CHU

~~6/20/03~~

ASAP

RECEIVED 24 JUNE

SUBJECT: National Park Foundation and Free Parks Passes

Must coord w/
GC + Camp
- contribution

June 4, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Park Foundation and Free Parks Passes

080

The Vice Chair and the President of the National Park Foundation, David Rockefeller and Jim Maddy, were in yesterday, and they said they thought it might be good for everybody if they figured out a way to provide free National Park passes for some category of military people—people who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, people on active duty, people in the Reserve or Guard who served on active duty, etc. They charge about \$50 per pass, but it costs the National Park Foundation only about \$1 to print one up. We would have to distribute them. They would get good publicity out of it.

Any thoughts? Attached is a memo from them on the subject. Please take a look at it, and then get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/3/03 NPF (Rockefeller and Maddy) ltr to SecDef re: National Parks Pass

DHR:dh
060403-3

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

6/19

*Dr Chen -**Pls advise*

Larry Di Rita

6/20

11-L-0559/OSD15299

U10422 /03

4 Jun 03



11 Dupont Circle NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036-1224

202-238-4200 main
(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 4 2003

MEMORANDUM

DATE: JUNE 3, 2003
TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: DAVID ROCKEFELLER, JR., VICE CHAIR, NPF
JIM MADDY, PRESIDENT, NPF
RE: NATIONAL PARKS PASS

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We would propose announcing this campaign on July 4th 2003. Once again, the National Park Foundation, through a corporate partner, AT&T, will be underwriting the cost of the July 4 fireworks on the National Mall. NPF would organize a press event to include Secretary Norton, Director Mainella, yourself and members of the Board of the National Park Foundation to make the announcement to the American Public. We would seek your counsel, and that of Secretary Norton, as to whether this was an opportunity for participation by President and/or Mrs. Bush.

Please advise us about whether this concept is feasible and who to work with on your staff to implement. Thank you for your thoughts and consideration.



June 30, 2003

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Priorities

Here is a note from Newt Gingrich on the subject you are working on.

Regards,

Attach.
8/7/02 Gingrich note to SecDef

DHR:dh
063003-59

.....

Please respond by _____

020 040

30 Jul 03

✓
for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 8/07/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 30 2003

Taking the Cost out versus setting priorities in program: the missing revolution in Pentagon affairs

Everyone talks about and focuses on transformation as it relates to war fighting capabilities. Everyone talks about a revolution in military affairs.

Almost no one focuses systematically on forcing a revolution in Pentagon affairs (the management and servicing of the defense apparatus). Almost no one focuses on transformation of comparable power in the non-combat aspects of DOD.

Yet there are far more opportunities to save money by rethinking the processes of non-combat defense than there is by setting priorities and cutting weapons systems. f)

If things proceed as usual there will be enormous energy spent on fighting over weapons systems, arguing about priorities, and trying to save money by retiring old systems, cutting or deferring the purchase of new systems, etc.

If the same level of senior management time and energy went into forcing changes in the non-combat aspects of defense we would actually save more money and could procure BOTH the transformational systems of the future and the transition systems of the present.

There is a JFCOM to force experimentation and change in joint combat systems, doctrine, and training. There is significant attention to the next generation of weapons and doctrine. However there is no equivalent to JFCOM in forcing profound change in the administration of all non-combat aspects of DOD.

If the lessons of logistics requirements of the last decade were applied the system could save billions in the smaller requirements and lower inventory.

If the number of headquarters were compressed to fit the new collaborative environment and joint standing task force headquarters model the savings could be thousands of slots returned to combat assignments.

If best practices were applied to management, logistics, and acquisition more money could be saved and applied to procurement than will be involved in all the upcoming fights over procurement.

Secdef should set some very hard metrics for forcing a revolution in Pentagon affairs and on a quarterly basis should insist on reports on every metric which could save over \$200 million a year (\$1 billion over a 5 year cycle).

The entire system of PPBS and Poms should be replaced by a far more simple and flexible process of hands on management.

Base closing for 2005 should be implemented as a transformational top down process rather than a legacy-based service up process. The goal for savings should be very high.

The general principle should be that the burden of proof should be on the old management, old personnel, old procurement, and old logistics systems. When in doubt new benchmarked systems should be established if they have reasonable promise of being less expensive while meeting combat requirements and if they have benchmarked private sector systems which already are proven in practice.

Every service and CINC should be recruited to help with this aggressive implementation system with the promise that money saved will be reinvested in weapons systems and combat force structure. OMB has to be signed on to keeping that commitment.

At least \$35 billion a year should be liberated in this process (\$175 billion for procurement and force structure over a five year period).

This will only turn from potential to reality if some very senior people are given the authority to prepare tough decisions for secdef, if tough metrics are assigned and if best practices are imported from outside DOD on a very substantial basis.

Taking the waste out and forcing a revolution in Pentagon affairs is a much more productive way to spend the next two years than fighting over weapons systems with the services. It simply requires structure, commitment, attention and determination.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 9 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

The balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components today is not the best for the future. We need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process.

To that end there are three principal objectives that I want to achieve. They are:

- Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation). Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every 6 years.
- Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and which validates requests for forces in time to provide timely notice of mobilization.
- Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When Reservists are used, ensure that they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.

I consider this a matter of the utmost urgency. I expect each of you to tailor the actions in the attachment to your specific organization and report back to USD (P&R) by memo on your assessment and plan for implementation NLT July 31, 2003. Follow up actions may be reviewed at a future SROC as necessary.

Attachment:
As stated

cc: Combatant Commanders

U10510-03

11-L-0559/USD15304

Actions for Force Rebalancing

Rebalance Forces:

- **Rebalance AC/RC Forces.** Services submit Program Change Proposals to correct imbalances that result in lengthy, repeated, or frequent mobilization of RC individuals and units by changing force structure and/or mix, using contractors or civilians, or mitigating shortfalls through technology. Specifically address capabilities that reside exclusively or predominantly in the RC and are in high demand because of on-going operations and the Global War on Terror, capabilities that are required for homeland defense missions, and capabilities critical to post hostilities operations. (August 03)
- **Reduce Early Dependence on Involuntarily Mobilized RC.** Services submit Program Change Proposals or undertake policy changes in order to reduce dependence on involuntary mobilization of reservists needed early in an operation. (August 03)
- **Revise Requirements Review Process.** CJCS, in coordination with USD (P), USD (P&R), USD (C) and the Services will revise the requirements review procedure to ensure appropriate force structure is available and validate Combatant Commanders' request for forces. (August 03)
- **Determine RC Role in Homeland Defense.** ASD (HD), in coordination with NORTHCOM, PACOM, USD (P&R), the Services and Joint Staff, determine Total Force requirements for Homeland Defense and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (September 03). Based upon the established DoD requirements, ASD (RA) prepare a report on Reserve Component Contributions to Homeland Defense and Civil Support that will recommend the appropriate roles, force mix, priorities, command relationships, and resources required for conducting these missions. (December 03)

Encourage Increased Volunteerism

- **Establish Prototype Programs.** Services submit Program Change Proposals or undertake policy changes to establish prototype programs that expand the use of RC volunteerism at both the individual and unit levels, through techniques that allow for varying amounts of Reserve participation. (August 03)
- **Resources.** Services ensure that sufficient military pay is programmed to support the utilization of volunteer RC units and individuals.

Attachment

Actions for Force Rebalancing (continued)

Innovative Management

- **Establish Prototype Programs.** Services submit Program Change Proposals (August 03) to implement innovative management techniques such as those described in the *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense* to include the design and test of innovative RC affiliation programs for individuals with specialized skills, for military retirees, and for civilian volunteers. (December 03)
- **Use RC for Rotational Overseas Presence.** Services submit Program Change Proposals to allow RC capabilities to meet predictable, long lead-time missions such as rotational overseas presence and experimentation. (August 03)
- **Increase the Use of Reachback.** USD (P&R), in conjunction with USD (I) and ASD (NII) develop CPG language regarding the importance of Combatant Commanders' utilization of reachback and chair a reachback GOSC to determine the road ahead (July 03). Services submit Program Change Proposals to enhance RC use in support of CONUS-based operations intended to provide reachback capabilities for forward forces, thereby reducing footprint in theater. (August 03)
- **Improve the Mobilization Process.** Working within the JFCOM effort on mobilization process improvements, the USD (P&R), in coordination with JFCOM, the Joint Staff, the Services and other OSD offices as appropriate, undertake "Quick Win" opportunities to improve policy or process changes that can be implemented within the next three months, to improve the mobilization process. Issue guidance as appropriate. (September 03).



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

2003 JUL -3 11 5:13

July 3, 2003

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: SROC Decision Memorandum

- Attached at Tab A is a proposed memorandum summarizing the taskings you discussed with the Senior Readiness Oversight Council members at the most recent meeting. It includes changes to the tasking based on the meeting's discussion.
- The memorandum will provide us the "action plan" the Secretary requested in his June 23rd "Snowflake" (Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION: Sign Tab A

COORDINATION: Tab C

ATTACHMENTS: As stated


PREPARED BY: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, OUSD(P&R), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD15307

U10510-03

June 23, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

I have read your memo of June 13 on rebalancing forces. I like most of it.

Please coordinate that with Dick Myers, the Services and anyone else who is appropriate, and then develop an action plan and get back to me.

I consider this a matter of the utmost urgency.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/13/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Rebalancing Forces [U09353/03]

DHR:dh
062303-12

.....
Please respond by 8/1/03

UNCLASSIFIED

COORDINATION

<u>Office</u>	<u>POC</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Action</u>
Secretary of the Navy	Mr. Navas	July 3, 2003	Concur
Secretary of the Army	BG Ralston	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur
Secretary of the Air Force	Mr. Dominguez	July 3, 2003	Expect Nonconcur
Joint Staff	VADM Holder	July 3, 2003	Expect Nonconcur
	LGEN Cartwright	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur
General Counsel	Mr. Dell'orto	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur
USD (P)	Ms. Haber	July 3, 2003	Unknown
USD (C)	Dr. Zakheim	July 3, 2003	Nonconcur(wait to 2006)
USD (AT&L)	Mr. Wynne	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur
USD (I)	Ms. Long	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 9 2003



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

The balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components today is not the best for the future. We need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process.

To that end there are three principal objectives that I want to achieve. They are:

- Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminates the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation). Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every 6 years.
- Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and which validates requests for forces in time to provide timely notice of mobilization.
- Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When Reservists are used, ensure that they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.

I consider this a matter of the utmost urgency. I expect each of you to tailor the actions in the attachment to your specific organization and report back to USD (P&R) by memo on your assessment and plan for implementation NLT July 31, 2003. Follow up actions may be reviewed at a future SROC as necessary.

Attachment:
As stated

cc: Combatant Commanders



11-L-0559/OSD15310

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

sent 6/9
June 5, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CPA and CENTCOM Reports

I am not finding the reports from Bremer and Franks very useful for my current purposes.

They have small print, block paragraphs and many acronyms. There is a mixture of the important and the unimportant. There are no metrics we can track.

Dick Myers, please have your folks develop a format for a CENTCOM report for the AOR, Afghanistan and Iraq, and then let me approve the format.

Doug Feith, please work with Jerry Bremer and develop a format that he finds useful that I can use, and people back here can use to inform the President and the Congress.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-1

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

03 JUN 10 AM 8:17

11-L-060503-1

U10512-03
Tab A

Iraq

5 Jun 03

12



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

July 30, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Your initial steps to instill a greater joint focus into the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff are on the mark. The fact that we will be prosecuting a war against terrorism (WOT) requires us to examine how we currently do business and make adjustments so that our Armed Forces, Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC), remain relevant. As you continue your efforts, there are a few areas into which I would like you to look.

First, in light of the fact that Congress has chartered NGB as a Bureau jointly administered under the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, I want you to develop proposals to forge a new relationship among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff and the NGB that are more relevant to the current environment. Improving the Department's access to National Guard (NG) capabilities should be your principal focus. Develop, for my review, recommendations on how the NGB should interact with OSD and the Joint Staff. Identify any regulatory or statutory changes that might be required to facilitate this new relationship.

Second, the NGB should be the focal point for Guard matters at the strategic level. Title 10 clearly outlines NGB's role as the channel of communications between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the states and territories. As you reorganize the Bureau, strengthen that statutory link with the Army and Air Force and intensify your efforts to ensure the NG remains an effective participant in our joint forces. All US forces and leaders must be trained and ready to operate in the joint environment to meet today's challenges.

Third, strive to adapt the NGB to better support the WOT, homeland defense and homeland security (HLS). Seek ways to strengthen NGB's relationship with the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and the OSD - Homeland Defense. My intent is to enhance our ability to employ forces to meet the Nation's homeland defense needs.

Fourth, I would like you to work with USJFCOM as it develops proposals to change and modernize the mobilization and demobilization process. Make recommendations to enhance the availability and accessibility of our NG forces.



U10516-03

11-L-0559/OSD15312

325

30 JUL 03

Finally, work with the Services as they develop proposals to adjust their AC/RC mix. You must be a full player in these efforts if we are to take full advantage of our NG forces.

Nothing the military has been asked to do since World War II is as important as the task we face today -- fighting and winning the war on terrorism. You and the Nation's citizen-soldiers are key to winning that war, at home and abroad.

Work with the Army and Air Force, and get back to me in the next 30 days with a proposal on how to proceed.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal line extending from the end.

Copy to:
SecArmy
SecAF
CJCS

7/7
1800



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CH-1057-03
3 July 2003

773 JUL -7 AM 7:30

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM 7/3*

SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

- You requested proposed guidance for Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), to aid him in pulling together the Guard and Reserve and military and civilian elements in the Department of Defense as he transforms the NGB

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the letter to CNGB at TAB B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Major General John A. Bradley, USAF; ACJCS-RM

(b)(6)

*Mr. Bentley —
Chief, National Guard Bureau
agrees with the findings. I
think this is a good letter and
that you should sign it. ASD
Hall concurs as well. Dick
(OSD Reserve Affairs)*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/9
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	5/23/9
EXECSEC MARIOTT	4 7/7

11-L-0559/OSD15314

U10516 / 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Your initial steps to instill a greater joint focus into the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff are on the mark. The fact that we will be prosecuting a war against terrorism (WOT) requires us to examine how we currently do business and make adjustments so that our Armed Forces, Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC), remain relevant. As you continue your efforts, there are a few areas into which I would like you to look.

First, in light of the fact that Congress has chartered NGB as a ~~joint~~ ^{jointly administered} Bureau under the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, ^{I want you to} develop proposals to forge a new relationship among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff and the NGB that are more relevant to the current environment. Improving the Department's access to National Guard (NG) capabilities should be your principal focus. Develop, for my review, recommendations on how the NGB should interact with OSD and the Joint Staff. Identify any regulatory or statutory changes that might be required to facilitate this new relationship.

Second, the NGB should be the focal point for Guard matters at the strategic level. Title 10 clearly outlines NGB's role as the channel of communications between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the ~~several~~ states and territories. As you reorganize the Bureau, strengthen that statutory link with the Army and Air Force and intensify your efforts to ensure the NG remains an effective participant in our joint forces. All US forces and leaders must be trained and ready to operate in the joint environment to meet today's challenges.

Third, strive to adapt the NGB to better support the WOT, homeland defense and homeland security (HLS). Seek ways to strengthen NGB's relationship with the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and the OSD - Homeland Defense. My intent is to enhance our ability to employ forces to meet the Nation's ~~HLS~~ ^{homeland security} needs.

Fourth, I would like you to work with USJFCOM as it develops proposals to change and modernize the mobilization ^{and demobilization} process. Make recommendations to enhance the availability and accessibility of our NG forces.

Finally, work with the Services as they develop proposals to adjust their AC/RC mix. You must be a full player in these efforts if we are to take full advantage of our NG forces.



11-L-0559/OSD15315

Nothing the military has been asked to do since World War II is as important as the task we face today -- fighting and winning the war on terrorism. You and the Nation's citizen-soldiers are key to winning that war, at home and abroad.

Work with the Army and Air Force, and get back to me with ~~your thoughts~~ in the next 30 days *with a proposal in how to proceed.*

Copy to:
SecArmy
SecAF
CJCS

July 14, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

Have David Chu and you taken a look at this response from Gen. Myers on pulling things together?

Thanks.

Attach.

7/3/03 CJCS action memo re: Pulling Together Elements [U10516/03]

DHR:dh
071403-16

.....
Please respond by 7/25/03

7/29

SecDef -

Dr Chu's and my edits to the
CJCS memo are at the YELLOW TAB
(highlighted)

- The CJCS original memo is at the
RED TAB

- If you concur we will forward
to LTG Blum - it is good guidance

11-L-0559/OSD15317

G.L.
Chw

May 31, 2003 1:53 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: David Chw
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

7/9
As I understand it, you are going to come back to me with some proposals as to how we pull together all the Guard, Reserve, military and civilian elements in DoD and some proposed guidance for General Blum.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053103-18

.....
Please respond by 6/16/03

7/9
Response
Attached

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Your initial steps to instill a greater joint focus into the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff are on the mark. The fact that we will be prosecuting a war against terrorism (WOT) requires us to examine how we currently do business and make adjustments so that our Armed Forces, Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC), remain relevant. As you continue your efforts, there are a few areas into which I would like you to look.

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Third, strive to adapt the NGB to better support the WOT, homeland defense and homeland security (HLS). Seek ways to strengthen NGB's relationship with the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and the OSD - Homeland Defense. My intent is to enhance our ability to employ forces to meet the Nation's homeland defense needs.

Fourth, I would like you to work with USJFCOM as it develops proposals to change and modernize the mobilization and demobilization process. Make recommendations to enhance the availability and accessibility of our NG forces.

Finally, work with the Services as they develop proposals to adjust their AC/RC mix. You must be a full player in these efforts if we are to take full advantage of our NG forces.

Nothing the military has been asked to do since World War II is as important as the task we face today -- fighting and winning the war on terrorism. You and the Nation's citizen-soldiers are key to winning that war, at home and abroad.

Work with the Army and Air Force, and get back to me in the next 30 days with a proposal on how to proceed.

Copy to:
SecArmy
SecAF
CJCS



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

173 JUL -7 PM 5:15

INFO MEMO

July 7, 2003 – 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 7 July 03*

SUBJECT: Moskos to Iraq? – SNOWFLAKE

- You asked my recommendation on Professor Moskos request he be invited to interview troops in Iraq.
- I would recommend against issuing such an invitation, for reasons I would be happy to explain in detail at your convenience.

Iraq

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

7 Jul 03



11-L-0559/OSD15321

U10570 / 03

6/3/03

June 2, 2003 11:24 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Charlie Moskos

Newt Minow sent me the attached e-mail that he received from Charlie Moskos.

Do you think there would be any value in that?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/28/03 Moskos e-mail to Newt Minow

DHR:dh
060203-33

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

11-L-0559/OSD15322

Minow, Newton N.

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, April 28, 2003 3:25 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: (No subject)

10:02 2 2003

Dad
TTP
slee

Newt, have been in DC area for past three months and about to go to Europe for some lectures.

It may be an imposition. but if you thought it worthwhile, could you contact Rumsfeld and say it would be a good idea for Charlie Moskos to visit Iraq and talk to the soldiers? This to get an "out of the box" appraisal of the soldiers' attitudes and morale. Nothing elaborate, just some focus groups, a small survey, and lots of schmoozing. No funds required.

If this pushing the envelope too much, I fully understand. But, after all, what are Cook County residents supposed to do except use old friends.

Regards,


Charlie



6/13/03

June 2, 2003 11:24 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Charlie Moskos

Newt Minow sent me the attached e-mail that he received from Charlie Moskos.

Do you think there would be any value in that?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/28/03 Moskos e-mail to Newt Minow

DHR:dh
060203-33

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

ITag

25 Jun 03

11-L-0559/OSD15324

U10572 / 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 7 2003

The Honorable Paulo Sacadura Cabral Portas
Minister of State and Defense
Ministry of National Defense
Avenida Ilha da Madeira
1400-204 Lisboa
Portugal

Dear Paulo,

Thank you for your hospitality during my visit to Lisbon.
Thanks also for the book about Fort São Julião – I look forward
to reading more of your fascinating history.

I appreciate your strong public support on the global war
on terrorism, including Portugal's intent to deploy 120
gendarmes to Iraq. I look forward to continuing the strong
U.S.-Portugal relationship.

Thanks for all your help. I do appreciate it, my friend.

Sincerely,

U10655 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15325

333 SD

7 Jul 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Paulo Sacadura Cabral Portas
Minister of State and Defense
Ministry of National Defense
Avenida Ilha da Madeira
1400-204 Lisboa
Portugal

Dear ~~Minister Portas~~, *Paulo*
Yours sincerely

Thank you for ~~meeting with me~~ during my visit to
Lisbon. Thanks also for the book about Fort São Julião – I look
forward to reading more of your fascinating history.

I appreciate your strong public support on the global war
on terrorism, including Portugal's intent to deploy 120
gendarmes to Iraq. I look forward to continuing the strong
U.S.-Portugal relationship.

Thank ~~you~~ for all your help. I do appreciate it, my friend.

Sincerely,

Snowflake

7:12 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 10, 2003

SUBJECT:

I want to see the thank you to Portas for the book before it goes out.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061003.10

Please respond by: _____

6/20/03*Letter attached
6/14**fed*

11-L-0559/OSD15327



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

702 JUL -2 PM 4:22

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

July 3, 2003, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 7 July 03
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since Start of Iraqi Freedom

- You asked about recruiting and retention since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and I responded (Tab B). You requested trend data (Tab A). This responds.
- Retention is strong with overall retention the highest in six years. Even amidst Stop Loss, troops may reenlist — and they are doing so in numbers sufficient to meet retention goals of the Services. Pocket skill shortages continue, but are not as severe as over the past six years. Table 1 shows the percentage of the enlisted force retained over the fiscal year, as a fraction of those who started the year.

	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03*
Total Continue	82%	85%	85%	85%	85%	85%	86%	87%

* FY 2003 to Date

Table 1 - Retention - DoD Components (Active)

- Recruiting news also is good. Annual goals were missed in FY 1999-2000, but were met in FY 2001-02, and have been exceeded for FY 2003 to date. See Table 2.

	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03*
Recruit HS Grad	96%	90%	91%	93%	94%	94%	96%	96%
Top Half Aptitude	71%	66%	66%	66%	63%	69%	69%	71%
Recruiting Goal Met	102%	100%	100%	96%	97%	100%	100%	102%

* FY 2003 to Date

Table 2 - Recruiting - DoD Components (Active)

- The proportion of high school graduates among recruits matches its high point over the past six years, and the representation of top-half aptitude recruits (math and verbal aptitude, which correlates strongly to job performance) is at its highest level in six years.
- The numbers look good, but factors today operate in our favor: unemployment levels conducive to recruiting and retention; strong patriotism; and atypically strong compensation for many (e.g., tax free income in combat zones). As these change, solid pay raises will help guard against any quick downward shifts.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: LtCol Gina Grosso, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD15328

U10703 / 03

5/1/03

→ MPP

Snowflake

April 29, 2003 1:59 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since the Start of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Your report of April 11 [U06866-03] doesn't say compared to what. I need to see trends or comparisons.

Thanks

DHR:dh
042903-3

.....

Please respond by 5/5

cc: DSD

Recruiting FY03 Through March	Quantity			Quality	
	Accessions	Goal	% of Goal	% High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG)	% Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
Army	34,222	33,960	101%	95%	71%
Navy	16,482	16,334	101%	95%	65%
Marine Corps	13,300	13,196	101%	97%	70%
Air Force	18,761	18,006	104%	99%	79%
Active Duty Total	82,765	81,496	102%	96%	71%
Army National Guard	17,150	19,809	87%	85%	62%
Army Reserve	13,581	13,749	99%	93%	69%
Naval Reserve	4,336	4,157	104%	87%	69%
Marine Corps Reserve	3,648	2,995	122%	97%	76%
Air National Guard	2,171	1,903	114%	Not available	Not available
Air Force Reserve	2,549	2,298	111%	92%	71%
Reserve Total	43,435	44,911	97%		
HSDG benchmark = 90% AFQT benchmark = 60%					

** Air National Guard data through December 2002*

12

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

9 July 2003 - 0800 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DAVID CHU, USD / P&R

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention since Start of Iraqi Freedom


Sir:

This is a very useful and informative memo.

Could we please see the same sort of information for the Officer corps, especially in relation to the O-1 to O-4 ranks?

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
OSD U10703/03

Suspense: Friday, 11 July 2003

U10703A/03

340

9 Jul 03



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

DSD Copy

114

SECRET

203 JUL -6 PM 6:27

INFO MEMO

July 3, 2003, 12:30 PM

ORIGINALS TO GO TO SD

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 7 July 03
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since Start of Iraqi Freedom

- You asked about recruiting and retention since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and I responded (Tab B). You requested trend data (Tab A). This responds.
- Retention is strong with overall retention the highest in six years. Even amidst Stop Loss, troops may reenlist — and they are doing so in numbers sufficient to meet retention goals of the Services. Pocket skill shortages continue, but are not as severe as over the past six years. Table 1 shows the percentage of the enlisted force retained over the fiscal year, as a fraction of those who started the year.

	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03*
Total Continue	82%	85%	85%	85%	85%	85%	86%	87%

* FY 2003 to Date

Table 1 - Retention - DoD Components (Active)

- Recruiting news also is good. Annual goals were missed in FY 1999-2000, but were met in FY 2001-02, and have been exceeded for FY 2003 to date. See Table 2.

	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03*
Recruit HS Grad	96%	90%	91%	93%	94%	94%	96%	96%
Top Half Aptitude	71%	66%	66%	66%	63%	69%	69%	71%
Recruiting Goal Met	102%	100%	100%	96%	97%	100%	100%	102%

* FY 2003 to Date

Table 2 - Recruiting - DoD Components (Active)

- The proportion of high school graduates among recruits matches its high point over the past six years, and the representation of top-half aptitude recruits (math and verbal aptitude, which correlates strongly to job performance) is at its highest level in six years.
- The numbers look good, but factors today operate in our favor: unemployment levels conducive to recruiting and retention; strong patriotism; and atypically strong compensation for many (e.g., tax free income in combat zones). As these change, solid pay raises will help guard against any quick downward shifts.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LtCol Gina Grosso, (b)(6)

U10703 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15332

DSD

5/1/03

→ MPP

April 29, 2003 1:59 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since the Start of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Your report of April 11 [U06866-03] doesn't say compared to what. I need to see trends or comparisons.

Thanks

DHR:dh
042903-3

.....

Please respond by 5/5

cc: DSD

11-L-0559/OSD15333

INFO MEMO

April 11, 2003, 10:04 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since Start of Operation Iraqi Freedom

- SECDEF requested information on the status of recruiting and retention since the beginning of the war in Iraq. (Tab B)
- **Active duty recruiting** remains strong through March, with all Services slightly above accession quantity goals. The quality of new active duty recruits is also strong, with all exceeding benchmarks for percent high school graduates and percent scoring in the upper half on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. (Tab A)
- **Reserve recruiting** is experiencing some difficulty, although this challenge is not insurmountable. The Reserves rely heavily on prior service recruits, so Stop Loss programs adversely affect the ability of the Reserves to meet their recruiting goals. Non-prior service recruits also seem more hesitant to join the Reserves right now. Army Reserve and Army National Guard account for 70% of Reserve Component recruiting, and both missed their March accession goals.
- **Retention** remains high. The Services have met or exceeded their goals through second quarter of FY03 (and report they are on target to meet FY03 retention goals). However, part of their success is attributed to current Service Stop Loss policies, as well as residual effects from the previous year's programs. The Department will have a better understanding of the impact of current operations on retention once Stop Loss is lifted by all Services.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Capt Angela Giddings, USAF (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD15334

	Quantity			Quality	
Recruiting FY03 Through March	Accessions	Goal	% of Goal	% High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG)	% Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
Army	34,222	33,960	101%	95%	71%
Navy	16,482	16,334	101%	95%	65%
Marine Corps	13,300	13,196	101%	97%	70%
Air Force	18,761	18,006	104%	99%	79%
Active Duty Total	82,765	81,496	102%	96%	71%
Army National Guard	17,150	19,809	87%	85%	62%
Army Reserve	13,581	13,749	99%	93%	69%
Naval Reserve	4,336	4,157	104%	87%	69%
Marine Corps Reserve	3,648	2,995	122%	97%	76%
Air National Guard	2,171	1,903	114%	Not available	Not available
Air Force Reserve	2,549	2,298	111%	92%	71%
Reserve Total	43,435	44,911	97%		
HSDG benchmark = 90% AFQT benchmark = 60%					

** Air National Guard data through December 2002*

TAB

#4/6/03

June 21, 2003

cc. Power Moore

TO: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Weldon Report

Here is a report on Congressman Weldon's trip to North and South Korea. Please go through it, and see that we are in contact with him if we would like to discuss it further.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/5/03 Navy (OLA) memo to ASD(LA) re: CODEL Weldon 28 May - 3 Jun 2003

DHR:dh
060903-39

.....
Please respond by July 1, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD15336

U10710 / 03 Tab

JUN 24 PM 1:45



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

DECISION MEMO

06 June 2003, 4:30 p.m.

RECEIVED
JUN 21 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs 697-6210

SUBJECT: Meeting offer from Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA)

- Congressman Curt Weldon has just completed a CODEL to North Korea and has offered to meet with you to debrief you on his trip. Congressman Weldon was escorted to North Korea by the Navy and accompanied by Congressman Silvestre Reyes (D-TX), Congressman Solomon Ortiz (D-TX), Congressman Joe Wilson (R-SC), Congressman Jeff Miller (R-FL) and Congressman Elliott Engle (D-NY).
- A copy of the Weldon trip report and itinerary are attached for your information.
- The Point of Contact in the Congressman's office is Michael Conallen at (202) 225-2011.
- **Recommend you or someone from Policy meet with Congressman Weldon.**

DECISION:

Accept _____

Decline _____

Comment _____

11-L-0559/OSD15337

Tab



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
1300 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1300

IN REPLY REFER TO
June 5, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

FROM: RADM Gary Roughead
Chief of Legislative Affairs

SUBJ: CODEL WELDON 28 MAY - 3 JUN 2003

DISCUSSION: A bipartisan congressional delegation visited Pyongyang, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 30 May - 1 June, and Seoul, South Korea from 1-2 June 2003. (Detailed itinerary enclosed in Attachment 1). The delegation included:

Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA)
Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY)
Rep. Jeff Miller (R-FL)*

Rep. Solomon Ortiz (D-TX)
Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)
Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC)*

Mr. Doug Roach (Professional Staff, House Armed Services Committee)
Mr. Bob Lautrup (Professional Staff, House Armed Services Committee)
Mr. Tong Kim (State Department Interpreter)
CDR Lorin Selby, USN (Lead Escort)

* Were accompanied by their spouses, however spouses did not travel to the DPRK.

The delegation attended three meetings in the DPRK; the first with the Vice Foreign Minister, Gye Gwan Kim, the second with the Vice Foreign Minister, Nam Sun Paek, and the third with the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, Tae Bok Chai. Informal discussions were held with officials from the Bureau of U.S. Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following meeting summaries are derived solely from escort officer notes.

At the first meeting, Vice Minister Gye Gwan Kim expressed his desire for change in the current state of relations with the U.S. Rep. Weldon raised the nuclear issue, including fear that DPRK's insistence on developing nuclear weapons would encourage others in the region to start programs of their own to counter the threat from DPRK, and the delegation's shared concern over the current state of relations. The Vice Minister indicated the nuclear issue was an offspring of U.S. pressure, based on the "Axis of Evil" speech and belief that the US is seeking a DPRK regime change. He added that any sanctions imposed on the DPRK would be regarded as a "proclamation of war." He stated the DPRK wants a non-aggression pact, normalization of relations with the U.S., and a U.S. commitment not to interfere with relations between DPRK, China and Japan. In exchange, DPRK would dismantle its nuclear weapons program. When asked by Rep. Ortiz whether DPRK had nuclear weapons, the Vice Minister said he could "neither confirm nor deny" but did make a point of saying 8,000 spent fuel rods had been reprocessed and the 5 MW reactor was operational with new spent fuel rods coming out now. During dinner later that evening, the Vice Minister blurted out, "We have nukes, now what are you going to do about that?"

In the second meeting, Foreign Minister Nam Sun indicated they "want to live peacefully and on an equal footing with the U.S." He blamed the deterioration in relations on the current Administration, and that their insistence on the DPRK giving up all weapons first was an attempt to disarm the DPRK. The Foreign Minister said the DPRK thinks the U.S. has been unfaithful in implementation of the 1994 agreements, while the DPRK has been "committed in full." He said the DPRK made a

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
11-L-0559/OSD15338

Tab

"new bold proposal in April in Beijing" and expressed frustration that they had not heard a U.S. response to their proposals. He hoped the delegation would advise the Administration of the DPRK's concerns, and that "production of our weapons depends on U.S. side." He further said the DPRK was willing to discuss nuclear issues in bi-lateral talks, was willing to follow these with multi-lateral talks, and also wanted discussions about the non-hostile intent of the U.S. The Foreign Minister relayed DPRK's desire for the U.S. to back away from demands for them to abandon all nuclear weapons first. If the U.S. refuses, and also refuses bi-lateral talks, then "we can only assume" that the U.S. does not want peaceful coexistence, "but war." He stated our "national dignity and national sovereignty must be protected" and they had learned a serious lesson from the U.S. war with Iraq. Rep. Weldon said "no American wants conflict with your country," "no one is calling for regime change in the DPRK," and the goal of the delegation was to change the nature of the dialogue between the countries.

In the third meeting, Chairman Chai said he appreciated the delegation's efforts to "normalize" relations, that the "hostile policy of current U.S. Administration against DPRK" was to blame for the current situation, and the nuclear issue was "artificial." He mentioned the April Beijing talks included bold initiatives by DPRK to solve the nuclear issue and expressed disappointment in the lack of a U.S. response. He said the DPRK was willing to "clear the hostile relationship" and start new relations with the U.S. on an "equal footing" if the U.S. stopped its hostile policy towards the DPRK.

While in DPRK, the CODEL was accompanied by a North Korean escort from the Bureau of US Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at all times and followed a tightly controlled itinerary. The hotel accommodations were located within the city center. No one was allowed to leave the premises without an escort. Rooms were similar to a US three-star hotel. The CODEL toured several sites in Pyongyang including: the monument to Kim Il Song, Kim Il Song's birthplace, a middle school (similar to our charter schools), an art studio, and a film studio (a source of propaganda films). On Sunday morning, the CODEL attended Christian church services in Pyongyang. The delegation requested visits to a military installation and the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Requests were denied due to "insufficient time." Rep. Weldon kept pressing and was told at the end of the visit that he had a standing invitation to return to the DPRK for another visit, to include being taken to Yongbyon and a military base.

During the brief stay in South Korea, the delegation paid official calls on President Roh Moo-hyun and Foreign Minister Yoon, attended a dinner with several Members of the National Assembly, and debriefed their DPRK visit with U.S. Ambassador Hubbard and General LaPorte (USFK).

Outbound, while refueling at Hickam AFB, the delegation received a DPRK intel brief from RADM Sullivan, PACOM (J5). On the return, at the Asia Pacific Center, the delegation debriefed their trip to LTGEN Dierker, PACOM Deputy Commander.

Force protection of the CODEL's aircraft was the responsibility of Commander, Seventh Fleet (C7F). Six. CONUS based, Raven-trained Marines were assigned to the aircraft. In accordance with the C7F force protection plan, the Marines did not enter the DPRK.

Attachments:

I. CODEL Weldon Itinerary

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD15339

Tab

CODEL Weldon Itinerary (all times local)

Wednesday, 28 May 2003

1730 Depart Andrews AFB for Atsugi, Japan
Refueling stops at Travis and Hickam AFBs

Thursday, 29 May 2003 – Lost when crossing International Date Line

Refueling stop at Wake Island.

Friday 30, May 2003

0600 Arrive Atsugi, Japan
0730 Depart Atsugi for Pyongyang, DPRK (spouses remain in Japan)
1000 Arrive Sunan Airport, DPRK
1100 Transported to Hotel/Check-in (Potonggang Hotel)
1230 Coordination Meeting/Schedule
1315 Depart Hotel for tour of Monument to Kim Il Song
1515 Meeting w/ Vice Foreign Minister
1830 Depart for Hotel
1930 Dinner Hosted by Vice Foreign Minister
2200 Transported to Hotel

Saturday, 31 May 2003

0900 Depart Hotel for tour of Kim Il Song's birthplace
1000 Visit Middle School (Kim Il Song School)
1100 Meeting w/ Foreign Minister
1130 CODEL spouses arrive Seoul, Korea from Tokyo, Japan
1230 Visit Art Studio/Shopping
1330 Lunch at Hotel
1515 Meeting w/ Chairman, Supreme People's Assembly
1630 Tour Film Studio
1900 Return to Hotel
1930 Delegation Hosted Dinner for Vice Foreign Minister at Hotel Restaurant

Sunday, 1 June 2003

1200 Depart the DPRK for Seoul, South Korea
1330 Arrive Osan Air Base, ROK
1400 Depart Osan
1430 Arrive Seoul, Korea
1500 Check-in Westin Chosun Hotel, Seoul (spouses rejoin CODEL)
1530 Shopping
1715 Meeting w/ Ambassador Hubbard and General LaPorte in Hotel
1830 Dinner w/ National Assembly Members, hosted by Rep. Yoo Jay-kun



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

100-1067-03
700 J... 9-22

CM-1067-03
9 July 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{F.O.R.}
VRP 8 JUL 03

SUBJECT: Weldon Report

- In response in your request (TAB), we have reviewed Congressman Weldon's North Korea trip report and determined that further Joint Staff discussions with the Congressman concerning his trip to North Korea are unnecessary.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5;

(b)(6)

U10711 /03

11-L-0559/OSD15341

June 21, 2003

cc. Power Moore

TO: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Weldon Report

Here is a report on Congressman Weldon's trip to North and South Korea. Please go through it, and see that we are in contact with him if we would like to discuss it further.

Thanks,

Attach.

6/5/03 Navy (OLA) memo to ASD(LA) re: CODEL Weldon 28 May - 3 Jun 2003

DHR:dh
060903-39

.....
Please respond by 1 July 2003

11-L-0559/OSD15342

03 JUN 24 PM 1:45
Tab



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

DECISION MEMO

06 June 2003, 4:30 p.m.

DATE MADE
JUN 21 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs 697-6210

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- A copy of the Weldon trip report and itinerary are attached for your information.
- The Point of Contact in the Congressman's office is Michael Conallen at (202) 225-2011.
- **Recommend you or someone from Policy meet with Congressman Weldon.**

DECISION:

Accept _____

Decline _____

Comment _____

11-L-0559/OSD15343

Tab



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
1300 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1300

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
11-L-0559/OSD15344

Tab

"new bold proposal in April in Beijing" and expressed frustration that they had not heard a U.S. response to their proposals. He hoped the delegation would advise the Administration of the DPRK's concerns, and that "production of our weapons depends on U.S. side." He further said the DPRK was willing to discuss nuclear issues in bi-lateral talks, was willing to follow these with multi-lateral talks, and also wanted discussions about the non-hostile intent of the U.S. The Foreign Minister relayed DPRK's desire for the U.S. to back away from demands for them to abandon all nuclear weapons first. If the U.S. refuses, and also refuses bi-lateral talks, then "we can only assume" that the U.S. does not want peaceful coexistence, "but war." He stated our "national dignity and national sovereignty must be protected" and they had learned a serious lesson from the U.S. war with Iraq. Rep. Weldon said "no American wants conflict with your country," "no one is calling for regime change in the DPRK," and the goal of the delegation was to change the nature of the dialogue between the countries.

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Force protection of the CODEL's aircraft was the responsibility of Commander, Seventh Fleet (C7F). Six, CONUS based, Raven-trained Marines were assigned to the aircraft. In accordance with the C7F force protection plan, the Marines did not enter the DPRK.

Attachments:

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD15345

Tab

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Refueling stop at Wake Island.

Friday 30, May 2003

0600 Arrive Atsugi, Japan
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1400 Depart Osan
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1530 Shopping
1715 Meeting w/ Ambassador Hubbard and General LaPorte in Hotel
1830 Dinner w/ National Assembly Members. hosted by Rep. Yoo Jay-kun

~~SECRET~~ UNTIL RELEASED

16 April 2003

FREEDOM MESSAGE TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE

DECLASSIFIED

Peace be upon you.

Coalition Forces in Iraq have come as liberators, not as conquerors. We have come to eliminate an oppressive and aggressive regime that refused to comply with UN Security Council resolutions requiring the destruction of weapons of mass destruction.

The Coalition is committed to helping the people of Iraq heal their wounds, build their own representative government, become a free and independent people and regain a respected place in the world. We will ensure that Iraq's oil is protected as a national asset of and for the Iraqi people. Iraq and its property belong to the Iraqi people and the Coalition makes no claim of ownership by force of arms.

Coalition forces respect the Iraqi people, their religious practices, history and culture, and will safeguard Iraq's unity and territorial integrity.

We are working with the international community to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to promote law and order so that Iraqis can live in security, free from fear. We are establishing the stability that will allow early progress toward political freedom and economic prosperity.

Our stay in Iraq will be temporary, no longer than it takes to eliminate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, and to establish stability and help Iraqis form a functioning government that respects the rule of law and reflects the will, interests, and rights of the people of Iraq.

Meanwhile, it is essential that Iraq have an authority to protect lives and property, and expedite the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those who need it. Therefore, I am creating the Coalition Provisional Authority to exercise powers of government temporarily, and as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. To facilitate these objectives, I proclaim the following:

Members of the armed forces and security organizations shall lay down their arms, stay away from their weapons, and remain in place. They shall obey the orders of the nearest Coalition military commander.

All other Iraqis should continue their normal daily activities; officials should report to their places of work until told otherwise. All those engaged in the delivery of essential services should return to their jobs.

The Arab Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq (Hizb al-Ba'th al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki al-Iraqi) is hereby disestablished. Property of the Ba'th Party should be turned over to the Coalition Provisional Authority. The records of the Ba'th Party are an important part of the records of the

~~SECRET~~ UNTIL RELEASED

11-L-0559/OSD 15347

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~

Government of Iraq and should be preserved. All those with custody of the records of the Ba'th Party or the Government of Iraq should preserve and protect those records, and turn them over to the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Saddam Hussein's intelligence and security apparatus, the Al-Mukhabarat al-Iraqiyya, is hereby deprived of all powers and authority. All Iraqis are now free to express their views without fear of retribution. At an appropriate time, free elections will make Iraqis self-governing in local, regional, and soon, national affairs.

All parties and political groups may participate in Iraq's political life, except those who advocate or practice violence.

Iraqis must not seek revenge. There will be a just legal process that will safeguard the honor and dignity of the Iraqi people.

The Coalition Provisional Authority will seek a fair and prompt solution to the problem of displaced persons and refugees. There will be a legal, organized process to address restitution of homes that have been seized by the former regime. The Coalition will work with Iraqis to set up a commission to deal with such claims.

I call upon Iraqis to inform Coalition Forces regarding the location of weapons of mass destruction or related materials, facilities where such weapons are made, and individuals connected to weapons of mass destruction. All records concerning these activities should be preserved. Iraqis should not pass weapons of mass destruction to terrorists or terrorist organizations.

I call upon Iraqis to inform Coalition Forces regarding the location of: foreign fighters and terrorists; members of the regime's security apparatus; and individuals who have perpetrated crimes against humanity or war crimes. All records concerning these activities should be preserved. Rewards may be provided for especially important information on these matters.

All barriers to free movement of people and goods, including illegal roadblocks and checkpoints, must come down.

We will work with regional leaders, entities, and governments that are committed to peace and democracy to integrate them into the Coalition's activities..

Coalition Forces are here to ensure safety and security, and to help the people of Iraq create a better future for their country. We pledge our support to all Iraqis who seek Iraq's freedom and prosperity, and the blessings of peace and security.

General Tommy R. Franks
Commander of Coalition Forces

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~

11-L-0559/OSD 15348

DECLASSIFIED