

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

AT THE TIME, THIS TWO WAR STRATEGY SEEMED TO BE A USEFUL WAY TO SIMPLIFY OUR MILITARY PLANNING IN THE COMPLICATED, UNCERTAIN, FRACTURING POST-COLD WAR WORLD. IT HELPED US TO DECIDE THE SIZE OF OUR FORCES, AND FIGURE OUT WHERE THEY SHOULD GO, HOW THEY SHOULD BE ORGANIZED, HOW THEY SHOULD BE EQUIPPED.

BUT A FUNNY THING HAPPENED, AS WE LEFT THE COLD WAR WORLD, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE EMERGING WORLD DID NOT EVEN BEGIN TO RESEMBLE THE WORLD WE EXPECTED – AND AROUND WHICH AMERICA HAD DESIGNED THIS TWO WAR STRATEGY.

RATHER THAN MOTIVATING US TO TRANSFORM OUR FORCES FOR THE NEW CHALLENGES OF THE NEW CENTURY, THE TWO-WAR STRATEGY BECAME AN EXCUSE FOR MAINTAINING OUR COLD WAR LEGACY FORCES.

RATHER THAN ENCOURAGING A NEW CULTURE OF BOLD THINKING, IT ENCOURAGED A CULTURE OF CAUTION. IT ALLOWED MILITARY PLANNERS TO KEEP FOCUSING ON FAMILIAR THREATS – AND NOT

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GIVING ADEQUATE ATTENTION TO THE UNEXPECTED AND INCREASINGLY LIKELY THREATS OF THE FUTURE. IT BECAME AN EXCUSE FOR NOT TRANSFORMING TO MEET THOSE THREATS.

WE PREPARED OUR FORCES FOR TWO BIG WARS WITH IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA – AND THEN WE DEPLOYED THEM FOR MISSIONS TO HAITI, SOMALIA, BOSNIA AND KOSOVO, AND TO POLICE THE SKIES OVER NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN IRAQ.

THE RESULT WAS A DECLINE IN THE READINESS OF OUR REMAINING FORCES, WITH SOME UNITS REPORTING “UNFIT FOR COMBAT” FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS.

THAT’S WHY, AS WE ENTER THE 21ST CENTURY, WE NEED TO BE PREPARED TO DO MORE THAN DEFEND OUR ALLIES AGAINST IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA.

WE NEED TO BE READY TO:

- DEFEND NOT JUST SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN, BUT ~~ALL~~ U.S. FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ASIA.

Defend and if necessary defend

flexible enough to

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- MEET OUR COMMITMENTS TO NATO, AND PARTICIPATE IN EXISTING – AND FUTURE – COALITION OPERATIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

- DEFEND OUR TERRITORY – AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES – FROM AGRESSION AND COERSION.

- ORGANIZE OUR FORCES INTO SMALLER, “MODULAR” UNITS, WHICH CAN FIGHT EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR TOGETHER.

- BALANCE OUR INVESTMENTS TO LOWER THE RISK FROM THE MOST OBVIOUS THREATS, BUT ALSO TO MITIGATE THE LIKELY RISK THAT WE WILL BE SURPRISED BY AN UNEXPECTED ADVERSARY WIELDING AN UNANTICIPATED CAPABILITY AND STRIKING AT AN UNTHOUGHT OF AND UNPROTECTED VULNERABILITY.

IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD, WE NEED A MILITARY FORCE THAT IS ABLE TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH A WIDER RANGE OF OPTIONS -NOT ONLY FOR MAJOR WAR, BUT FOR DEALING WITH

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TREATS IN THE PRE-CRISIS PERIOD AND CONTINGENCIES SHORT OF MAJOR WAR.

begin to same author
 WE SHOULD ~~SHIFT THE WEIGHT~~ OF OUR EFFORTS FROM MASSIVE, HEAVY FORCE PACKAGES ~~WHOSE~~ *the* PURPOSE ~~IS~~ *of which are* TO DEFEAT AND OCCUPY TWO ADVERSARIES, AND BUILD NEW CAPABILITIES THAT ENHANCE DISSUASION IN THE PRE-CRISIS PERIOD, REPEL ATTACKS EARLIER AND WITH FAR GREATER EFFECT, AND ENSURE OUR OPTIONS TO MORE SWIFTLY DEFEAT ON OUR TERMS A WIDER RANGE OF ADVERSARIES.

WE SHOULD SHIFT FROM A STRATEGY THAT EMPHASIZES MASSIVE DEPLOYMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TOWARD A CONCEPT OF IMMEDIATE DEFENSE FORWARD AND THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF NECESSARY REINFORCING FORCES TO AREAS OF CONCERN AROUND THE WORLD, CAPABLE OF RAPID DOMINANCE,

THERE ARE MANY APPROACHES WE COULD TAKE TO ORGANIZING OUR FORCES FOR THIS STRATEGY. ABSOLUTELY FUNDAMENTAL, HOWEVER, IS THE REQUIREMENT THAT OUR FORCES TRAIN

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TOGETHER AND OPERATE TOGETHER IN PEACETIME – SO THAT
THEY ARE READY TO FIGHT TOGETHER IN WAR TIME.

begin by *in* *that the concept that*
AWI WE SHOULD ESTABLISH STANDING JOINT TASK FORCES TO
1 ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF OUR FORCES TO OPERATE TOGETHER. *in war-*

THESE STANDING JOINT TASK FORCES SHOULD BE ABLE TO
CONDUCT TOGETHER A WIDER RANGE OF MISSIONS THAN TODAY.

THEY ALSO SHOULD ALSO BE MORE MODULAR AND TASK
ORGANIZED. A JOINT TASK FORCE FOR A CONTINGENCY LIKE
KOSOVO WILL REQUIRE A VERY DIFFERENT FORCE THAN ONE
DESIGNED FOR A WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, OR DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES.

STATE OF THE MILITARY

I have prepared
MR. CHAIRMAN, ~~WE HAVE~~ A VISION OF THE FUTURE FORCE ~~WE~~
We ~~NEED,~~ AND KNOW WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO BUILD IT. THE
QUESTION IS: HOW DO WE GET THERE FROM HERE?

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THE ANSWER, RIGHT NOW, IS THAT WE CAN'T. SO LONG AS OUR ARMED FORCES ARE STRUGGLING TO MEET NEAR-TERM THREATS AND EXISTING COMMITMENTS, THEY CAN'T TRANSFORM FOR THE FUTURE.

mention of temp

MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR ARMED FORCES ^{are} ~~is~~ IN BAD SHAPE. OVER THE PAST DECADE, DEFENSE SPENDING WAS SLASHED IN A ~~MISGUIDED~~ SEARCH FOR A "PEACE DIVIDEND," WHILE AT THE SAME TIME OUR MEN AND WOMEN IN UNIFORM HAVE ASKED TO DO MORE AND MORE -- AND TO DO IT WITH LESS AND LESS. *(chart?)*

WE ARE NOW PAYING THE PRICE FOR THAT APPROACH. LET ME TELL YOU IN STARK TERMS WHERE WE ARE:

- THE DEDICATED MEN AND WOMEN OF OUR ARMED FORCES ARE CONDUCTING EVER INCREASING DEPLOYMENTS AROUND THE WORLD -- AND DOING SO WITH WORN OUT EQUIPMENT,
- MANY LIVE IN INADEQUATE HOUSING AND RECEIVE PAY AND BENEFITS THAT LAG FAR BEHIND THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR,

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- . THEY APPROACH THE END OF EACH FISCAL YEAR UNCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THEIR SERVICE WILL RUN OUT OF MONEY.
- THEY WATCH MANY OF THE BEST OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL LEAVE THE SERVICE.
- NOT SURPRISINGLY, WE ARE HAVING TROUBLE RECRUITING AND RETAINING ^{the needed} ~~GOOD~~ PEOPLE IN THE ARMED FORCES.
- THE ^{Service} ~~DEPARTMENT~~ HAS ALSO FAILED TO PROCURE EQUIPMENT AT SUFFICIENT LEVELS TO SUSTAIN THE FORCE – RESULTING IN AN AGING FORCE THAT DRIVES UP MAINTENANCE AND SUSTAINMENT COSTS AND REDUCES FUNDING AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFORMATION.
- OUR FACILITIES HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED, I'VE BEEN TOLD THAT ON AVERAGE IT WOULD TAKE 150 YEARS TO RECAPITALIZE OUR BUILDINGS !

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- AND OUR SCIENCE AND TECH-NOLOGY BASE CONTINUES TO SHRINK BECAUSE IT IS POORLY FUNDED.

MR. CHAIRMAN, A DECADE OF SLASHED BUDGETS, PROLIFERATING DEPLOYMENTS AND AGING EQUIPMENT HAS RESULTED IN THE EROSION OF MORALE AND READINESS IN THE FORCE.

THIS HAS PUT AN ENORMOUS STRAIN ON OUR ABILITY TO MEET CURRENT THREATS, MUCH LESS PREPARE FOR THE THREATS OF THE FUTURE.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? WE HAVE THREE CHOICES:

- FIRST, WE CAN CONTINUE DOWN THE CURRENT PATH, DO *too little, leaving the car down the road still a few more years* NOTHING, AND ALLOW THIS DETERIORATION CONTINUE;
- SECOND, WE CAN TRY THE "BAND AID" APPROACH, PATCHING UP OUR CURRENT FORCES AS BEST WE CAN, AND HOPING THAT NEW AND UNEXPECTED THREATS DO NOT JUMP OUT TO SURPRISE US;

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- OR, THIRD, WE CAN MAKE THE INVESTMENTS NECESSARY BOTH TO STOP THE ^{defeat in} ~~HEMMORAGING~~ AND TO BEGIN TRANSFORMING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.

~~MR. CHAIRMAN, YOU KNOW WHERE I STAND.~~ I WANT TO WORK

~~TOGETHER~~ WITH YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE TO

TRANSFORM THE UNITED STATES MILITARY TO MEET THE SECURITY

CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY. *That is why I am here.*

That is what Paulini Pull has asked -

BUT AS YOU HAVE OFTEN SAID, MR. CHAIRMAN, "A PRESIDENT PROPOSES, BUT CONGRESS DISPOSES." IN THE END, THE CHOICE IS YOURS, THAT IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS.

OUR TASK IS URGENT. A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IS OPEN TO US.

BUT THE WORLD IS CHANGING RAPIDLY, AND UNLESS WE CHANGE

WITH IT, WE ^{will} ~~MAY~~ FIND OURSELVES FACING NEW AND DAUNTING

THREATS WE DID NOT EXPECT AND ~~ARE NOT~~ ^{we} PREPARED TO MEET.

DURING THE CIVIL WAR, A UNION GENERAL NAMED JOHN

SEDGEWICK STOOD SURVEYING HIS CONFEDERATE ADVERSARY

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ACROSS THE BATTLEFIELD. CONFIDENT OF HIS SUPERIOR POSITION,
HE TURNED TO AN AIDE AND SAID "THEY COULDN'T HIT AN
ELEPHAND AT THIS DISTANCE."

A MOMENT LATER, A SHARPSHOOTER'S BULLET STRUCK HIM
UNDER HIS LEFT EYE, KILLING HIM INSTANTLY.

MR. CHAIRMAN, COMPLACENCY KILLS. LET'S NOT ~~END UP LIKE~~
of GENERAL SEDGEWICK. *let Amens to the the date*

THANK YOU *[Signature]* VERY MUCH.

##

CLOSE HOLD

May 4, 2001 7:34 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
 Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Procedure for Presidential Talking Points

As I mentioned to you, I was hopeful that, after completing the training for the first two Nigerian battalions and the Ghana and Senegal battalions for Sierra Leone, we could avoid having to do three more battalions in Nigeria.

As I began the process to try to get us out of that arrangement established in the prior Administration, I ran into the fact that someone had prepared talking points for the President's conversation with the president of Nigeria, wherein he, in effect, made a commitment to fulfill the prior Administration's arrangement to train three more battalions.

When things involve the Defense establishment, it could be helpful to have the talking points run by DoD before being given to the President, so that once we get our people onboard we can offer our views with respect to them before the boss makes commitments.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 050401-39

350.001 WH

4 May 0

CLOSE HOLD

U08842 / 01

11-L-0559/OSD/3689

snowflake

May 7, 2001 2:15 PM

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: Ambassador Tom Miller
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Invitation to Visit - Bosnia

I am afraid I am not going to be able to get to Bosnia on this stop, but thanks for the thought.

Regards.

DHR:dh
050701-26

U08869 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/3690

FAX COVER

B 5/7/01

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR
AMERICAN EMBASSY
ALIPASINA 43

SARAJEVO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

FAX: (b)(6) / TEL: (b)(6)

TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD

FAX No.: (b)(6)

FROM: Ambassador Thomas J. Miller

DATE: **May 7, 2001**

REF: DOD Cable DTG 011550ZA01

Dean Don:

I see from a recent cable that you're planning a trip through Greece, Turkey, and other European points from June 3-9. I wonder if you could stop by here during that trip. Even a half-day would be useful for a quick meeting with the Bosnian leadership and SFOR.

If this is possible, we'll do whatever is necessary to accommodate your ochedulr and timing.

Thanks again for the lunch you gave me. It was great arming you.

All the best --

Tom

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*2/7
6/15/01*

snowflake

May 14, 2001 11:32 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Testimony

Here is a piece of paper that might be useful for some structure for the testimony.

Attach.
"Briefing Organization"

DHR:dh
051401-35

381

14 May 01

BRIEFING ORGANIZATION

Characterization of the 21st century security environment

- Unpredictable threats no longer permit optimization of defense posture against a specific threat. Adversaries may emerge rapidly able to field advanced capabilities with little or no warning.
 - Liberalization of trade **and universal** access to advanced technology – the enablers of advanced military capability – makes it possible for adversaries as well as allies to obtain highly effective and lethal military capabilities.
 - Economic growth ~~will~~ will fuel a fleet of the security environment (the PRE will become more precise).
- The US cannot engage the 21st century security environment with Cold War legacy systems alone.
- Legacy systems, the infrastructure that supports them, and the personnel who operate them are in far worse condition than previously thought during the campaign.
 - US armed forces – strategic and general purpose forces – must be transformed to engage 21st century threats. - faster etc.

To engage 21st century threats, new capabilities are needed.

- Strategic forces, offense and defense must be able to dissuade potential adversaries from seeking to threaten US interest in crucial areas, especially **WMD/long-range** delivery.
- High-tech general purpose forces able to engage an **adversary** quickly and decisively.
- Because we cannot forecast what threats will emerge, or when they will do so, we need new intelligence capabilities well beyond those required during the Cold War when the adversary was well-understood and predictable.

Resources

- Resources need to reflect the fact that threats to US interests are likely to be an escalating characteristic of the first quarter of the 21st century. N.K. are here
- Defense investment is measured against an ability to dissuade **potential** adversaries from posing types of threats that pose a mortal danger to the US and its interests abroad – WMD/long range delivery and high-tech general purpose forces.
- Other types of threats are inevitable, but are more likely to yield to other measures, e.g. counter terrorism. (All bills the Carter term budget, they low demand)

awaken
more
relevant.
of low
and power
legacy.

snowflake

May 14, 2001 10:35 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Central Support Management

Here is the Central Support Management briefing from Arnold Punaro. Do you think you and the Service Secretaries ought to get briefed on that by him? He does a good job.

Attach.
12/24/97 Brief, "Streamlining Central Support Management"

DHR:dh
051401-24

310.1

14 MAY 01

PRELIMINARY DRAFT/PRE-DECISIONAL


Streamlining Central Support Management

PRELIMINARY DRAFT/PRE-DECISIONAL

11-L-0559/OSD/9895

Key Steps Already Taken in Defense Reform Initiative

- Consolidation of three agencies/activities in the Threat Reduction and Treaty Compliance Agency
- Commitment to negotiate performance contracts with defense agency heads
- Establishment of Defense Management Council to serve as the board of directors for defense agencies
- Identification of commercial functions to be competed under the A-76 process
- Consolidation, restructuring, and regionalizing of many support agencies



TF recommends building on this momentum: This briefing presents some ideas for the DMC to use in moving ahead

Outline

Part I. Defense Agencies:

1. Scope of the challenge
2. Defense agencies are big businesses...and should be managed that way
3. Restructuring and reengineering are long term efforts...must begin now
4. Consolidation into fewer, leaner organizations would facilitate the DMC's task
5. Focus on core competencies
6. Reengineering the Defense Working Capital Fund

Part II. Other Ideas:

- Ideas for future DMC development
- Promoting the revolution in business affairs

(1) Scope of the Challenge


If DoD infrastructure were a separate country, it would rank 39th in GDP

But it is run, not
forces, b
bureaucrati

RANK	COUNTRY	GDP (\$, B)
	Sweden	163
	Switzerland	148
	Austria	139
	DoD Infrastructure	115
	Portugal	107
	Denmark	103


- PPBS & FYDP
- Acquisition DABs
- DoD Instructions
- Audits/Investigation Oversight

1995 National Data



(1) Scope of the Challenge

Infrastructure Consumes Half of DoD's Resources



But many of these forces are support forces, not combat forces, so tooth-to-tail ratio is even lower. Further, large elements of combat support agencies are now in force category.

Recommendation: To better control support costs, DoD should

review the allocation between infrastructure and forces to ensure that the forces category includes only activities that are truly forces split the forces category between combat and support

9 Division-Equivalents Worth of Medical Personnel

EXAMPLES

Division of Doctors	13,12
Division of Nurses	13,89
2 Regiments of Dentists	6,80
3 Regiments of Bio-medical Tech's	9,08
Regiment of Administrators	4,63
3 Battalions of Veternarians	2,42

NOTE: 1 division-equivalent ~15,000 personnel; 1 regiment-equivalent ~3
1 battalion-equivalent ~800

Plus 5+ more division-equivalents of other medical personnel


32 Division-Equivalents* of Support Personnel

Area	Personnel	Division Equivalents
Auditors, Inspectors, Investigators	16,000	1
Medical	130,000	9
Logistics and Supply	200,000	13
Transportation	80,000	5
Intelligence	70,000	4

* 1 division-equivalent ~15,000 personnet.

(1) Scope of the Challenge

Most infrastructure (77%) is in the military departments



Recommendation: An effective infrastructure reduction effort must include the military departments

(1) Scope of the Challenge

Fundamental Problem: DAs/FAs are not being managed as efficient businesses or recognized as overhead

Causes:

- Limited application of best business practices
 - ⇒ business-related defense agencies/field activities are not perceived as businesses
 - ⇒ few meaningful performance management systems
 - ⇒ continued operation of non-core-competency activities
- Passive OSD supervision combined with ownership behavior
 - ⇒ Failure to recognize as fiscal drag on warfighting readiness
 - ⇒ low-priority of supervisory duty: USD's and ASD's often too busy
 - ⇒ strong advocacy/protection of subordinates
- DWCF accounting rules inhibit rational business decisionmaking
 - ⇒ inclusion of mobilization costs in rates for goods and services
 - ⇒ services feel unfairly overcharged

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(2) Defense Agencies are Big Business

Defense Agencies Compared with Top Defense Contractors

Rank	Contractors (Rank)/Defense Agencies	DoD Con Bud
1	DLA	
2	Lockheed Martin Corp. (1)	
3	McDonnell Douglas Corp. (2)	
4	Defense Health *	
5	DeCA	
6	DISA	
7	BMDO	
8		
9	Northrop Grumman Corp. (3)	
10	Raytheon Co. (4)	

1997 Data; agency budgets include DWCF funds.

*DHP programmed portion service medical funding the

Six of the 10 top defense contractors are defense agencies

(2) Defense Agencies are Big Businesses...So Treat them as Businesses...and as Overhead

Present System

- DAs treated as "free good" to services
- Military leadership of largely business entities
- Many narrowly focused agencies
- Little emphasis on achieving performance goals
- Conflicted OSD supervision



New System

- Shift burden of proof onto DAs to justify diverting resources from warfighting forces
- Professional business managers of largely business entities with military deputies
- Infusion of best business practices
- Fewer, broadly functional groupings turned into major DoD subsidiaries
- Ambitious goals for systemic changes, outsourcing, customer orientation, and performance mgmt
- Coherent, high-level oversight by Deputy Secretary

(2) Defense Agencies are Big Businesses...What is Retained Needs a Steady Infusion of Best Business Practices

Recommendation:

- Create a Defense Business Board


Purpose of Board:

- To support Defense Management Council by (1) providing insights on world-class business practices, and (2) acting as a “sounding board” for management initiatives



Membership of Board

- Board membership should.. .
 - have extensive business expertise and experience, especially in reducing overhead
 - be recruited from non-defense sector

(3) Restructuring and Reengineering are Long-term Efforts




(3) Restructuring and Reengineering: Illustrative Business Timelines




(4) Consolidation into Fewer, Leaner Orga

*The number of defense agencies and field act
has outstripped current management arranger*



*Includes DHP
and DoDIG

(4) Consolidation: Necessary for Moving to the Next Level of Efficiency



(4) Consolidation: Use Existing Agencies as Base

Advantages

- Allows opportunity to reengineer across wider of activity
- Provides closer oversight of previously independent fragmented activities
- Provides faster, less costly implementation
- Less disruptive of ongoing services and will not create a new bureaucracy
- Candidates exist to serve as core of new DoD subsidiaries


(4) Consolidation: Illustrative Functional Groupings

	Defense Acquisition	Health Agency/ Command	Intelligence Agency	Personnel Agency	Threat Reduction Agency
Base	DLA	TRICARE	DIA	WHS	DSWA
Incorporated Defense Agencies and Field Activities	BMDO*	OCHAMPUS	NSA	DoDEA	OSIA
	DCAA	DMPA	NIMA	HRFA	DTSA
	DISA		DIS		
	DSAA				
Other Incorporated Activities	DTIC	USUHS	NRO	DEOMI	
	DMEA		DARO		
	JLSC		Defense Suppor. Project Office		
	DAU				
	DSMC				
	4 others				

*If not devolved to ARPA and Services

(4) Consolidation: Illustrative Transformation Action - DLA into Defense Acquisition Support Agency (DASA)

(End FY97 Personnel Levels)



Personnel numbers are illustrative.

(5) Focus on Core Competencies

Privatize (Get DoD out of hands-on management)

DeCA
DoDEA > Develop plans now to privatize these activities

AFIS - Non-policy support

[DPS], [DRMS] - Privatize

[DTIC] - Privatize/move to NTIC (DOE)

Outsource

DFAS - Retired pay

DISA - Commercial activities

DLA - Commercial activities

Devolve to Others

BMDO - NMD to ARPA, TMD to Services

DPMO - to Army

Merge to OSD


DLSA - to General Counsel

OEA - to USD(A&T)

AFIS policy support - to ASD(PA)

Elimination - 13	
<u>Thru Privatization (3)</u>	
DeCA	[DRMS]
DoDEA	[DTIC]
AFIS	[DPS]
<u>Thru Consolidation (6)</u>	
OCHAMPUS(?)	OSIA
DMPA	DSWA
HRFA(?)	DTSA
<u>Return/Devolve (4)</u>	
BMDO	
DLSA	
OEA	
DPMO	

(5) Consolidation: New Supervisory Assignments



(6) Reengineering DWCF: Conflicting Objectives

DWCF has multiple, conflicting objectives

	Objective	Purpose	Pricing Implication
1	Cost visibility	Show decisionmakers all costs	Full costs, including sunk and fixed
2	Efficient market	Encourage competition between DWCF and commercial sources	Marginal costs only
3	Stabilize defense program	Prevent program instability	Constant prices
4	Indirect financing	Finance other defense costs when Congress is reluctant	Some "profit" required

These conflicts undercut DWCF effectiveness

TF Recommendation: DWCF should concentrate on objectives (1) and (2)

Illustrative Benefits: Business Experience


From consolidation



Allied Signal - \$21M from consolidating 14 Data Centers into 1

Lockheed and Martin Marietta - merged two equivalent-sized company HQs; saved 45%

From privatization/outourcing



20% savings and allows a focus on core competencies

Boeing -reduced unit costs by 25%
-reduced cycle time by 50%

From Reengineering



Allied Signal -operational savings of \$17M per year

Lockheed-Martin - saved \$2.6 billion; eliminated 5600 positions

Mercedes-Benz -reduced product design-to-market time by 2 years.

Unfinished Business

- Reengineer audit function
- Restructure criminal investigative organization
- Merge cables operations -- OSD and JS
- **Examine further reductions to management H**
 - Merge service secretariats and military headquarters
- Reengineer business processes, especially P
- Improve interagency planning and coordination
- Revise retired pay accrual calculation
- Explore establishment of a medical command


Reengineering the Audit Function: Overview

Size and Composition of DoD Audit Function

	FY 89	FY97	FY 03
DoD IG (Auditors only)	540	654	498
DCAA	6,515	4,090	3,571
Army Audit Agency	832	666	569
Army Internal Review	958	494	457
Air Force Audit Agency	993	925	806
Naval Audit Service	566	521	463
Total	10,404	7,350	6,364

Number of auditors dropping consistent with overall personnel reductions...but large number still remains

Size of DoD IG Office



DoD IG projected to have 24% reduction...but will still retain much of 1980's growth

The 1979 size is an estimate of the constituent parts of the IG as DOD first began considering creation of an IG office after passage of the 1978 IG Act. The DOD IG was officially established as such in 1984.

Reengineering the Audit Function: Obse


- No outside review of audit requirements-- especially mandatory vs. discretionary
- Many audits, particularly “self-initiated” audits out of sync with DoD decision processes (resulting in little real impact)
- Still many complaints of “I got you” mentality IG trying to change this
- Increasing Congressional requirements for (e.g., BRAC CFO functions)
- Many claimed audit savings are unverified

Reengineering the Audit Function: Op

1. Contract out audit functions as feasible
2. Eliminate DCAA as a separate defense agency through consolidation with DoD IG or DCMC
3. Consolidate service audit agencies into DoD
4. Combine Army's internal review function into Army Audit Agency
5. Reduce DoD IG audit function greater than 20% projected reduction
6. Finance some IG and audit activities through recovered by contract fraud investigation (See IG briefing for details).

Restructure Criminal Investigations: Overview

- Four stovepipe organization: DCIS, NCIS, CID, and OSI
- Civilian and military personnel/FTEs



- Civilian workforces percentage:

Navy NCIS	96%
Air Force OSI	24%
Army CID	33%
DOD IG DCIS	100%

Restructure Criminal Investigative Organizations: Consolidation Options

1. Create a Defense Bureau of Investigation
 - One headquarters reporting directly to General Counsel
 - DCIS can be in or out
 - Results in management savings by eliminating duplicative staff and support functions

Options for Consolidating Support Functions

2. Close separate basic training programs
 - Consolidate basic training at FLETC
3. Designate Army as the executive agent for forensic labs
 - Close 2 Navy labs
 - Rely on state and local labs for special cases
 - Explore privatization possibilities
4. Designate Air Force as executive agent for computer crime labs
 - Rely on the Air Force for all research, development, and training

Restructure Criminal Investigative Organizations: Restructuring Options

1. Move to a civilian cadre of investigators
 - Reduces inefficiency arising from military PCS rotations
 - Reduces training required by military turnover
2. Outsource specialized/advanced training
 - Criminal investigation training not a DoD core function
3. Transfer protective service function from CID to Military Police
 - Currently Army CID provides all DoD bodyguards

Merge OSD and JCS Cable Operations: The Problem

- Three separate organizations provide communications and crisis management support to SECDEF and CJCS
 - WHS: SECDEF Cables Division
 - USD(P): OSD Executive Support Center
 - JCS: National Military Command Center (NMCC)
- Inadequate responsiveness to the Secretary of Defense
- insufficient integration of military and civilian crisis management personnel
- Apparent duplication/overlap in services and operations

Merge Cables Operations: Consolidate into Leaner Organizations

- Affirm that NMCC reports to SECDEF through CJCS
 - Respond to SECDEF requirements directly or through SECDEF designated staff member
- Consolidate OSD Executive Support Center into NMCC
 - Single crisis management center and process
 - Merges civilian and military staffs
- Consolidate part of SECDEF Cables into NMCC
 - Place communications, cables, message capability, and telephone support NMCC
 - Continue administrative support (e.g., travel, logistics, transportation, and courier services) through WHS

**Impact: Increase responsiveness to SECDEF,
Save 11-14 FTEs**

Promoting the Revolution in Business Affairs

- Develop a communications plan (to supplement *Defense Strategic Communication Plan*)
- Exploit the potential of the DoD Internet homepage
- Devote an issue of *Joint force Quarterly*
- Organize a symposium at the National Defense University
- Arrange for a visit/lecture series by business leaders and scholars
- Create a business affairs center at the Pentagon Library
- Initiate writing competitions on the Revolution in Business Affairs
- Select key leadership and management readings for senior leaders
- Prepare a series of articles by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
- Arrange an offsite retreat of senior leaders
- Expand SECREF Strategic Studies Group.

Concluding Thoughts

Reform Initiative has made a great beginning--real
real savings, real innovation

TF believes that the SECDEF can build on this moment

- better analysis of tooth-to-tail
- further consolidation, privatization, devolution of def agencies
- treating business-type activities as businesses
- ruthlessly squeezing overhead

TF recommends starting implementation now:


- Set firm timetables for decisions
- Ensure objective analysis of alternatives (don't let organizations analyze)
- Focus on a few, important initiatives--don't dissipate effort
- Be ready to spend near-term political capital for long-term gain
- Ensure that agency performance measures are derivative of fundame

Backup Slides

Glossary

Defense Agencies		Field Activities		Other Abbreviations	
DLA	Defense Logistics Agencies	AFIS	American Forces Information Service	PSA	Principal Staff Advisor
DeCA	Defense Commissary Agency	DMPA	Defense Medical Programs Activity	DMR	Defense Management Review
DFAS	Defense Finance & Accounting Service	DPMO	Defense POW/MIA Office	SOCOM	Special Operations Command
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency	DTSA	Defense Technology Security Administration	DCMC	Defense Contract Mgmt Command
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency	DoDEA	DoD Education Activity	DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency	HRFA	Human Resources Field Activity	DMEA	Defense Microelectronics Activity
DLSA	Defense Legal Services Agency	OEA	Office of Economic Adjustment	JLSC	Joint Logistics System Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency	TSO	TRICARE Support Office	DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DISA	Defense Investigative Service	WI-IS	Washington Headquarters Services	DSMC	Defense Systems Mgmt College
DARPA	Defense Adv. Research Projects Agency			USUHS	Uniformed Services University for Health Sciences
DSWA	Defense Special Weapons Agency			NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
BMDO	Ballistic Missile Defense Organization			DARO	Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
OSIA	Onsite Inspection Agency			DEOMI	Defense Equal Opportunity Mgmt Institute
NSA	National Security Agency			BPRC	Business Process Reengineering Center
NIMA	National Imagery & Mapping Agency			LCIIO	Life-Cycle Information Integration Office
DMC	Defense Management Council				

Personnel Trend Comparison (Changes Relative to 1989 Base)



SOURCE: DA&M data; Annual Report; post-QDR POM, Post-Reform Initiative

Merge Cables Operations: Explanation of Savings

Staffing

- SECDEF Cables Division 19 (all civ)
 - OSD Executive Support Center 14 (3 civ + 11 mil)
 - NMCC 44 (all mil)
- Total Staffing 77

Reductions Due to Consolidation

- SECDEF Cables Division -5 to 7
 - OSD Executive Support Center -6 to 7
- Total Reduction -11 to 14 or 14-18%

Agency/Management Action Matrix

		Consolidate							Comments	
Defense Agencies & Field Activities		Merge	Privatize	Devolve	Def Acq Cluster	Health Agency Cmd	Intel Cluster	Personnel Cluster		Threat Reduction Agency
Defense Agencies	ARPA									
	BMDO*			X						If not devolved include in Acq Cluster
	DCAA				X					
	DeCA*		X							Privatize CONUS activities
	DFAS*		X							Outsource as possible--beginning w/retired pay
	DIA						X			
	DIS						X			Possibly incorporate w/a Def Investigative org., if one is created
	DISA		X		X					Outsource commercial activities, consolidate remainder
	DLA		X		X					Privatize elements
	DLSA*	X								Merge into OSD
	DSAA				X					
	DSWA								X	
	NIMA						X			
	NSA						X			
OSIA								X		
Field Activities	AFIS*		X							Policy elements to OSD(PA)
	DPMO*			X						Devolve to Army as EA
	DTSA								X	
	DMPA					X				
	DoDEA*		X					X		Privatize CONUS ops, then consolidate remainder
	HRO							X		
	OEA*	X								Merge into OSD
	OCHAMPUS					X				
	TRICARE					X				
	WHS							X		

* Eliminated in whole or in substantial part, excluding effects consolidations.

(6) Reengineering DWCF: Distortions from DWCF Rates

- Distortions--some examples:
 - Forklift services--Marine Supply Warehouse, Albany, GA
 - DWCF rate: \$67/hour
 - Local economy: \$14/hour
 - Produce contracting--DLA for DeCA
 - DWCF cost: \$12.9 million
 - Non-government alternative: \$2.0 million
- Remove mobilization cost from rates for goods and services
 - Give visibility to mobilization cost
 - End overcharging distortions
- Fund mobilization costs through direct appropriations

Recommendation: (1) Clarify DWCF priorities and adjust pricing accordingly
(2) Authorize a pilot project to allow local commanders to purchase locally and not through DWCF

Task Force Research and Outreach



Data as of Task force completion
on November 25, 1997

Task Force has cast its net widely.

snowflake

May 14, 2001 11:37 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen
CC: Steve Herbits
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Charts for Testimony

322

I do think we need some charts for the testimony. Here are some that offer suggestions and possible constructs:

- Summary
- State of the Military Briefing
- 21st Century Security Environment
- Risk of Short-Funding Defense
- FY 01 and FY 02-07 Budget Issues

Attach.
See list above

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11-L-0559/OSD/3736

14MAY01

Summary

- ❑ The global scope, frequency, duration and broad range of military operations represent a serious organizational and resources challenge.
- ❑ The military is less ready today than 10 years ago and is struggling today to reach their established readiness goals or at least to maintain recent readiness levels.
- ❑ U.S. installations are decaying at an alarming rate that left unchecked will further reduce mission readiness, QOL and personnel retention. This also made limit the effectiveness of the transformed force.
- ❑ Procurement rates do not sustain the current force. The resulting procurement backlog is large and must eventually be eliminated, or a *de facto* force reduction of 13-24% already has occurred.
- ❑ Procurement holiday in the 90s left an old force that costs more to maintain and sustain every year, which in turn reduces the dollars available for military transformation.
- ❑ S&T base continues to shrink and is underfunded, affecting the opportunities, breadth and speed of military transformation.

~~For Official Use Only~~

P. know & has said - Cap. devel. down his P. defect
Encl left with cap. funded by his predecessor.

State of The Military

April 2001

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/3738


Briefing Outline

- Military Deployments**
- Defense Procurement**
- Equipment Aging**
- Military Readiness**
- S&T Base**
- Installation Condition**
- DOD Budget Context**

Military Forces Were Deployed Often In The '90s To Conduct A Wide Range Of Missions

Average Monthly Number Of Ongoing Military Operations

Number



*White Force back down by 1/3 -
+ Very little present so eq. would have*





Note: Percent shown is change since FY 1991.

Number And Average Duration By Type Of Military Operation




Type of Operation	10-Year Total	Average Duration (Months)
Counterterrorism Operations	6	8.8
Counterdrug Operations	6	.3
Counterproliferation Operations	15	n/a
Humanitarian Evacuation Operations	27	1.2
Peacekeeping Operations	28	n/a
Off-Fly Zone Enforcement	6	n/a
Maritime Interdiction Operations	19	11.0
Humanitarian Assistance (Foreign)	90	4.5
Support to Domestic Authorities	87	3.2
Total DOD	284	

n/a - more than one operation ongoing of a long duration.
No average length of operation can be computed.

Military Forces Did More With Less, Tiring Out People and Wearing Out Equipment



DOD Purchases Fell Below Levels Needed To Sustain The Existing Force, Leaving A Procurement Backlog . e*



Deferred Purchases

	1980-89	1990-92	1993-05	Projected Force Losses
Aircraft	2,041	1,228	3,163	-24%
Shipbuilding	28	11	39	-13%
Tanks/IFVs	2,743	59	2,802	-21%

De Facto Force Reduction, If Purchases Are Not Made

Shipbuilding: 1980-89 28, 1990-92 11, 1993-05 39, Projected Force Losses -13%


.... And Creating An Old Force

Dixmike

<u>Weapon Category</u>	<u>Desired Average Age</u> (Years)	<u>Average Age In</u>		
		<u>FY 1991</u> (Years)	<u>FY 2000</u> (Years)	<u>FY 201.0</u> (Years)
Attack Helicopters	15	4	12 <i>OK</i>	22 ✓
Attack Submarines	12-15	15	14 <i>OK</i>	20 ✓
Attack Fighters (DON)	10-15	9	11 <i>OK</i>	14
Attack/Fighters (USAF)	10-15	9	18 —	20 ✓
Strategic Airlift	20	22,	(24) —	22 ✓
Strategic Bombers	15-30	22	25 .	33 ✓
Surface Combatants	17-20	15	1 4	17
Tankers	30	29	38 ↘	48 ✓


.m.a That Costs More To Maintain And Sustain.

Aircraft Examples





High OPTEMPO And An Aging Force Led To A Major Drop In Overall Unit Readiness

Percent of Units in Top 2 Categories




Data includes all combat, combat support and combat service support forces

-a And A Serious Decline In Equipment Readiness.



In no. no change
So 2/3 of Eq. ded in readiness
in the 5%.




■ Readiness fell by no more than 5 % below FY 1991 levels.
 □ Readiness fell by more than 5 % below FY 1991 levels.

Note a: Army ground equipment includes Army M1, M2, M3, M60A3, and M113A2/A3 ground combat vehicles.

Note b: Aviation excludes surveillance and reconnaissance, observation, utility aircraft and trainers.





Note c: Major naval combatants includes aircraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious assault ships, and attack submarines.

DOD Basic Research Spending Fell Sharply, Affecting Our Ability To Transform In The Mid - and Far- Term.



Transformations and Revolutions Begin With Basic Research

The Decline In Basic Research Spending Led To A Major Brain Drain At DOD Labs and Universities.




Note (a): Percent shown equals change from FY 1992 budget to last budget shown.
 Note (b): Includes research assistants, teaching assistants and other support.

M. Ash + ...

The Overall Condition Of DOD Installations Is Bad Today, Affecting Quality of Life, Morale and Retention, As Well As Mission Readiness and Capability.

Facilities Maintenance Budget




Compare FY 1992

Percent of Installations Rated In FY 2000 As

** / **

Category	Good or Limited Problems (C-1/C-2)	Some Failures/Major Problems (C-3/C-4)
----------	------------------------------------	--



...attributed to the current condition in which 69 % of DOD facilities are rated as having "some failures" or "major problems."


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Services Project Major Facility Problems At Many Bases This Decade Given Current Budgets.

January 2001 Budget Projection


Percent of Categories

Army




Percent of Categories

Air Force




Percent of Categories

Marine Corps



Percent of categories




Navy



Note: Army budget plan increases spending significantly to improve facility conditions (expand yellow and green areas). Risk shown represents Army budget plan adjusted to reflect past migration rate of facility spending being used to pay for unplanned O&S bills in other areas. This problem is not as large for other services.

Reductions Left An Older Workforce, About Ready To Retire And In Need Of Renewal

Official Use Only




Service Active-Duty Trends
(Percent of Total Active Force In FY 90 And FY 00)


	SMC	USN	USAF
	90/00	90/00	90/00
22 - 25	17/17	19/17	9/12
26 - 35	30/29	31/28	26/25
> 36	16/19	15/22	21/28

DOD Is At "War" For People, Which Demands More Resources


Advertising Budget




Production Recruiters



Incentives



Recruiting Support Budget




Percent shown reflects increase in annual amount since FY 1990.

DOD Acquisition Challenge Is How To Balance Demand And Supply Of Money

Demand for Money

Steady-State Procurement Budget Demands


(Services' Estimates Of Steady State Costs In billions of FY 2001 dollars)



Supply of Money

FY 2001 Procurement Budget

(In billions of FY 2001 dollars)



Army

Navy

Air Force

21st Century Security Environment

- Threats are likely to be numerous, difficult to predict, and may emerge with little warning.
- Post-Cold War liberalization of trade and technology transfer has created a universal technology base that is available to allies and adversaries alike,
- The critical *enabling* features of advanced military capabilities are derived from this dual-use universal technology base.
- Nuclear/chemical/bio weapons, long-range delivery systems, and sophisticated conventional weapons are available to any nation seeking them.
- 21st Century military capabilities can no longer be *effectively* designed against specific threats since such threats cannot be reliably predicted.
- We must focus on creating capabilities that can dissuade a potential adversary from investing in capabilities that are most devastating to American interests – WMD/long range missiles and high tech conventional-forces.
- US forces must be able to be reconfigured to adapt to the 21st Century environment based on exquisite intelligence *because the threats can change rather rapidly*
Without good intel flexibility is even more important

The Risk of Short-Funding Defense

- Truman kept defense spending very low from 1947-1950; average budget about \$12B
- FY 1951 Defense budget request: (early 1950) \$13.3B
- “Of course the results will not show up until we get in serious trouble. We are repeating our own history of decades--we just don't believe we will ever get into a real jam.”--Eisenhower, to his diary, 1949
- In speech, Secretary of State fails to include S. Korea in list of countries US will defend
- After North Korea invades South Korea, FY 51 DoD budget quadruples, in three supplementals:
 - \$11.7B July 1950
 - \$16.8B November 1950
 - \$6.4B May 1951
- Total FY 51 DoD appropriation: \$48.2B
- FY 52 DoD BA: \$60.2B

B. file

TALKINGPOINTS

FY 01 AND FY 02-07 BUDGET ISSUES

- National Security Policy Issues – Post Cold War Threats

1. The collapse of the Soviet empire has produced centrifugal forces in the world that have created new regional powers, Several of these are intensely hostile to the United States and are arming to deter us from bringing our conventional or nuclear power to bear in a regional crisis.

2. The post-Cold War liberalization of trade in **advanced technology** goods and services has **made** it possible for the poorest nations on earth to rapidly acquire the most destructive military technology ever devised including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. We cannot prevent them from doing so.

3. The civil sector, not the defense sector now creates the enabling technologies for advanced military capabilities. These universally available technologies can be used to create “asymmetric” responses by small or medium sized states to our conventional military power that cannot defeat our forces, but can deny access to critical areas in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Conventional submarines, advanced air defense, attacks on our C4ISR infrastructure and similar “asymmetric” approaches can limit our ability to apply military power.

4. China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and others are investing in these capabilities that exploit provocative lapses in US capabilities. Liberalized international trade will propagate these capabilities to others.

5. These threats can emerge very rapidly and with little or no warning. NOTE: Observations of FMR SECDEF Bill Cohen – missile threat to the US could emerge in one year).

CONCLUSION: The risk to US and alliance security is increasing as the US fails to respond effectively and decisively to asymmetric threats likely to characterize the first quarter of the 21st century.

• *Some budget realities*

1. To achieve ZERO real growth in the defense budget over the FY 02-07 period, \$113 billion must be added to the January '01 Clinton budget (F Y D P) .

2. If the last Bush I FYDP (FY 92-97) was extended at zero real growth through the FY 02-07 FYDP, \$183.4 billion must be added to the January '01 Clinton budget for FY '02-'07.

3. If the last Bush budget (FY 92-97) was extended through FY 00,

- \$119 billion more would have been spent for DoD than under Clinton.
- \$32 billion more would have been spent for the Intelligence Community than under Clinton.

Conclusion: Using the Bush I baseline for FY 92-97 and extending it through FY 07, additional expenditure of \$334 billion would be required (\$151 billion in FY 92-01+ \$183 billion in FY 02-07) to sustain the force at the Bush I level. These additional dollars, however, do not include the costs for transformation, or Bush II initiatives such as National Missile Defense, pay increases, et cetera.

4. The need for substantial increases in defense expenditure (FY 02-07) is widely recognized by non-government specialists – left and right.

- Congressional Budget Office: + \$255 billion
- Former SECDEFs James Schlesinger/Harold Brown: + \$450 billion
- CSIS: + \$842 billion

5. Clinton FY 02-07 FYDP = 2.5% of GDP; the lowest **since 1940**.

Additional BA to achieve 3.0% of GDP (FY 02-07) = \$370 billion

Additional BA to achieve 3.5% of GDP (FY 02-07) = \$754 billion

- **What happened to national defense since we last had a Bush in the White House?**

1. At the end of the Cold War, the Bush I administration cut the armed forces down to the "Base Force" (1991) which was reduced further by two Clinton administration reviews, the Bottom Up Review (1993) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (1997). The force structure was cut 35% and the DoD budget by 23%.

2. However, the forces and equipment that survived were worked much harder. Military personnel suffered the extreme demands of back-to-back overseas deployments, while equipment was subjected to overuse that accelerated aging.

- The number of naval vessels declined from 430 to 317, but no change was made in the number deployed on station abroad (-100-1 10 ships at any given time).
- Almost -all categories of equipment are now at or beyond their service half-life, producing rapid increases in operating cost. Inadequate budgets for maintenance and spare parts have produced steep declines in their capability to perform their assigned mission (Mission capable rates have declined from 83% to 74% since 1991). Vast shortages of spare parts have led to an unprecedented rate of cannibalization of equipment (- 12%).
- To use examples from just one service, the Air Force, major combat units' readiness is down 25% since 1996 (91% to 66%). Air Combat Command active unit readiness is down 37% from 1996 (86% to 49%). The House Armed Services Committee recently found that 99% of B-1B bombers were flying with parts cannibalized from other aircraft.
- The Clinton administration has taken a "procurement holiday" since 1995. To maintain the existing force structure, it is procuring less than half the number of ships and aircraft required. To maintain the force structure from 2001-2005, 1,228 additional aircraft 11 ships will have to be procured beyond those planned in the projected budget.

- The procurement holiday has created a potentially catastrophic circumstance for the US intelligence community. Over% of our intelligence satellites (___ of ___) are operating beyond their design life. Crucial gaps in coverage are inevitable, and an extremely dangerous inability to monitor developments abroad is possible.
 - Under funding of the nuclear weapons program will significantly increase the risk that the President will be forced to resume nuclear testing. This is so because the program to certify nuclear weapons (new designs and the existing stockpile) – the Stockpile Stewardship Program – will not be completed until years after specialized design personnel with testing experience will have retired.
3. The military “quality of life” has deteriorated rapidly adversely affecting recruitment, retention, and readiness. New obligations of the DoD for military medical care, energy costs, and immediate needs to maintain Navy and Air Force flying hours, and similar costs require \$4.4 billion supplemental funding in FY 01 simply to avoid further force structure and readiness reductions.

- **What are we trying to achieve?**

1. We need to sustain our ability to deter the use of WMD and long-range missiles against the US, its forces abroad and allies by adapting our military posture to 21st century threats.
2. To do so, we must support the ability of the existing force structure to dissuade nations abroad from challenging our interests while we transform our military capabilities to 21st century conditions. If we do not, we must accept increased risk to our security interests. Hostile powers will find this condition provocative, and are likely to intensify challenges to our interests when they believe we are unable to respond effectively.
3. We need to both transform our armed forces to meet 21st century threats and maintain our ability to respond to current threats. A failure to do so will expose the US to unacceptable risk in either the short or long term.

4. We should take advantage of favorable political and macroeconomic circumstances to put a program to transform US defense capabilities promptly starting in FY 01. This can be accomplished by a defense burden that is ~ one-third of that we sustained when I came to the Congress in the early 1960s.

snowflake

May 14, 2001 10:12 AM

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Force Size

Please take a look at this piece by Ron Fogleman, then give me a call on the phone and let's talk about it.

Attach.
3/24/01 Fogleman memo to SecDef re: Force Size

DHR:dh
051401-21

320.2

14MAY01

Durango Aerospace, Inc.

FAX

Date: 24 March 2001

To: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Company: Office of the Secretary Of defense

-Phone:

Fax: (b)(6)

From: General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, (Ret)
Company: Durango Aerospace, Inc.

Phone: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)


Subject: 2 March 01, Luncheon Follow-up

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I want to thank you for your leadership of the Space Commission and the follow on luncheon you hosted at the Pentagon on Friday, 2 March. The purpose of this correspondence is to respond to your invitation to get engaged in the ongoing review process in OSD. In particular I want address the issue of force size and structure from a historical perspective with the intent of proposing a way to generate meaningful savings to be redistributed within the Department.

I know you have many talented individuals working on your quick look initiatives and what I have to offer may already be under consideration, but I wanted to give you the perspective of a senior informed official who served as a CinC and a service chief during the 1990s.

Respectfully,


Ron Fogleman

This fax contains four pages including the cover sheet.

Rear Mr. Secretary:

As you indicated in your luncheon remarks the total costs associated with manpower (recruiting, pay, benefits, health care, quality of life and retirement) are consuming an ever-larger part of the defense budget. This is happening at a time when we need to re-capitalize the forces with more modern and capable equipment.

In my view we have lost our way because we have forgotten the fundamental principles upon which this nation founded its military establishment. Our forefathers, based on their view of the dangers and costs of such a force, deliberately decided to eschew a large standing military establishment. Throughout most of our history we have followed the militia model. Under this model we maintained a cadre of a professional military around which we mobilized our militia in times of crises. This model served the nation imperfectly, but well, up through the first half of the 20th Century.

With the advent of the Cold War the militia model was discarded, primarily as a result of the tyranny of timelines imposed by a large standing threat to the peace of Europe, the Soviet led Warsaw Pact, and the specter of global Communism. Those of us who served during that period remember the requirement to be able to deploy 10 divisions to Europe in 10 days to augment the large forward deployed force in blunting an anticipated attack by the Warsaw Pact. This requirement dictated the size and composition of the active force and resulted in a large standing military establishment with heavy land forces comprising much the force. When the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, as a nation we missed the opportunity to review our true defense needs at the grand strategy level. The previous Bush administration was starting that process when Saddam triggered the gulf War, Coming out of the Gulf War we had another opportunity to do a top to bottom review of national security needs. However, the change in administration, to one led by a President and civilian defense team tainted by a lack of military experience, resulted in a missed opportunity over the next eight years.

The Clinton defense team chose not to challenge the uniformed leadership throughout a series of reviews (Bottom Up Review, Roles and Missions Review, QDR). For a variety of reasons, (natural conservatism, service parochialism, fear of the unknown) the senior military leadership insisted on perpetuating the planning assumptions and timelines of the Cold War force. This was done by having the civilian leadership accept the concept of determining the size and readiness of the force on the need to be prepared to fight two major conflicts quickly and nearly simultaneously. Two major theater wars (TMWs) became the unshakable underpinning for perpetuating a large standing military force. The result was a salami slicing approach to force structure reduction but no real effort to take advantage of the lack of a real threat and capabilities coming out of the revolution in military affairs (RMA). At the same time the administration decided that if a sizable

military force existed it would **be** used to police the world. The senior uniformed leadership became willing accomplices in **these** misadventures.

If the new Bush Administration is to break out of the pattern of the last **eight** years it **must** start by articulating a new national **security strategy based on** different timelines **and force** requirements. **The** centerpiece of such a strategy would be the idea that we can **have** a smaller active **force**, particularly land **forces**, if we return to our **militia roots**. Such a strategy would allow reductions in **all the services**. The **money** saved **can re-capitalize the** force and support a robust ability to project force from the **CONUS**, a **few forward bases** and from **the** sea. The tools emerging **from the RMA** that allowed us to **prevail** in Serbia and Kosovo and keep Saddam in **the** box in the Middle East, along with a combined, robust space **based** and **air breathing reconnaissance**, surveillance and **intelligence** capability will **allow** us to detect and deter trouble **before** it becomes conflict. If **deterrence** fails the response will be long-range strike assets followed by mobilization. **Inherent** in such a strategy is the idea **that** if the threat cannot be **defeated** by the initial **responses** it will be **contained** until land **forces can** be mobilized and fall in on equipment. The **necessary** mobility assets (tankers and sea and air transports) will **receive** priority in the **modernization** program. Timelines might be more on the **WWII** model, but **with far** more capable and credible **early responders and modern** equipment **available** for the **forces** being mobilized.

Concurrent with new national security strategy it would be **helpful** if the administration adopted new policies to neutralize **the underpinnings** of the two **MTW strategy**. Clearly **the current Iraqi** policy sanctions and continual force deployments to **police** the no fly **zones** are **failing**. A policy shift that modifies **the** approach to sanctions and withdraws US forces from parts of the region would send a strong **signal** to the countries **of the** region. **In essence** we would **make** Saddam an **Arab problem** not an American problem. **Before** withdrawing **our** forces from **the region** we should **make** it clear to his neighbors **that they must deal** with him and if they **can** not or do not wish to take him on **when** **challenged** then they must be willing to admit the **first** responders from, the U.S.

In the case of North Korea it **appears** that the way to **neutralize** that threat is to support South Korea's efforts to bring the North out of it's isolation. **Any** U.S. hard-line policy helps **perpetuate** the **regime** in **the** North **and** generates a **threat**, which justifies keeping U.S. active force structure for that **single** scenario. A policy of active US **engagement** combined with South Korea's "Sunshine Policy" allows us to monitor the situation and determine **capabilities** and intent. That in **turn will** allow us to properly size our forces.

A business **as usual** approach that **depends** on savings from **BRAC**, process changes and more minor force structure **adjustments** will be inadequate generate the **resources needed** to modernize **and** shape **the forces for now** and **the future**. **Significant** savings can **only come from** manpower reductions that make sense within a new National Security Strategy. Putting on my old programmer hat I can see **BRAC** potentially **generating** savings of **\$1- \$3** billion dollars per year, undefined **process** changes perhaps \$5 billion and another salami slice of force **structure** **\$2- \$5** billion. On the other hand, a **reduction**

of 350,000 soldiers, sailors, marines and airman, assuming a 1 to 4 officer to enlisted ratio, would generate approximately \$22 billion/yr. and provide the **opportunity** to gain additional **BRAC** and force **structure** savings. 11

I recognize this is an **over** simplification of **the** challenges faced by the administration in **general** and the **Defense** Department in particular. However, until **the** civilian **leadership** takes the **lead** in articulating a bold new National **Security** Strategy that breaks the tyranny of outdated **response** timelines **the** **uniformed** **leadership** and their political allies will **resist** **any** meaningful **transformation** efforts. A strategy that is **based** on one of **the** fundamental founding **principles** of the United States, the militia concept, should appeal to a wide **range** of constituents.

TO: Steve Cambone
Paul Gebhard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: March 26, 2001

SUBJECT: **Manpower**

Attached is a memo I received on the subject of manpower. Take a look at it and tell me if you think one of our task forces is looking at that, and then return it to me.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
032601.67
Attach.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

5/14/01

To: CTO

PLEASE control + distribute
today.

Thanks - MIC

- 1) Casual Support Mgt
- 2) STREAM LINDY JOINT STAFF
- 3) CARDS for Testimony
- 4) Meeting w/ MARK THISSER
- 5) FILE SIZE
- 6) SUPPLEMENTAL
- 7) TESTIMONY INPUT
- 8) 9 JUNE RESINER

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

10) MAKE ORG INPUT

snowflake

May 14, 2001 10:15 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Supplemental

Here is some material on the '01 supplemental. When do I meet on the '02 budget with some folks?

Attach.
5/11/01FY 2001 Supplemental

DHR:dh
051401-22

U09167-01

11-L-0559/OSD/3768

110.01

14MAY01

**FY 2001 Supplemental
(\$, in millions)**

Category	DoD	OMB
1 Urgent Funding	5,290	4,514
2 Essential/Prudent Investments	1,865	836
3 Now More Efficient	1,617	73
4 Enhancements to Operations	299	265
5 Transformational Capabilities	2,438	254
6 Missile Defense	826	826
7 Other National Security Related	561	232
Total	12,896	7,000
Proposed Rescissions	-	-500
Net Total	12,896	6,500

*2002
5/11/01*

5/11/01

**FY 2001 DoD Supplemental
(\$, Millions)**

FY 2001 Requirement	DoD Request	OMB Staff
Category 1: Urgent Funding (Failure to fund stops ongoing operations)		
Defense Health Program (all) -- The costs have been incurred and medical facilities face closure if additional funding is not forthcoming.	1,500	1,427
Legislated Pay (all) -- There was no opportunity to anticipate additional compensation to military personnel.	116	116
Housing Survey Results -- Essential to quality of life initiatives, the survey created an unavoidable increase.	204	204
Utilities (all) -- Unforeseen increases in utility costs	734	764
Flying Hours (Navy/AF/SOCOM) -- Failure to fund will result in aircraft stand-downs in fourth quarter.	1,120	970
Focus Relief -- Unanticipated costs essential to achieve U.S. national security goals in Sierra Leone.	54	36
USS Cole Repairs -- Congress has appropriated \$150 million based on preliminary damage assessment. -- \$100 million completes necessary repairs	100	44
EHIME MARU Salvage/Claims -- Unexpected event.	40	36
Classified Program -- Critical to maintain schedule and prevent intelligence gathering gap.	27	27
C-17 Merger Cost (Air Force) -- Must pay bill to preserve the multiyear contract with Boeing.	49	49

5/11/01

11-L-0559/OSD/3770

FY 2001 Requirement (Category 1 continued)	DoD Request	OMB Staff
National Foreign Intelligence Program Requirements -- On-going programs that would halt if funding is not forthcoming.	287	94
Base Operations (Army) -- Finances critical must-pay bills, avoids negative impacts to soldier's quality of life and protects Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) funding. Army Chief of Staffs number one priority.	435	237
Ship Cost Growth (Navy) -- Unavoidable prior year contractual commitments	222	222
Airborne Laser Underfunding (Air Force) -- Ensure program stays on schedule to address current missile defense vulnerabilities. Potential contractor work stoppage.	98	98
Oman Runway -- Required by international agreement; permits continued use of a runway CENTCOM deems of vital importance to U.S. operations.	18	18
Second Destination Transportation (Army) -- An unavoidable bill to ensure supplies are delivered in a timely manner in order to achieve readiness goals.	62	62
Launch Vehicle Demonstration -- Maintain contractual commitment to execute the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle acquisition.	48	48
Army Reserve Funding Needs -- Funds training, full-time support, housing survey and civilian personnel	87	6
Reprice Pay (Navy) -- Officer pay table reform implemented in July 2000	28	28
Air Force BRAC -- Fund the new and emerging requirements, particularly at McClellan AFB.	42	9
Telecommunications	19	19
<i>Total Category 1, Emergency Funding</i>	5,290	4,514

classified

5/11/01

11-L-0559/OSD/3771

FY 2001 Requirement	DoD Request	OMB Staff
Category 2: Essential/Prudent Investments		
USS Cole Lessons Learned (Navy) -- Implement force protection findings. Consequences of not funding leaves administration open to question for not acting immediately to reduce risks.	127	22
Anti-terrorism Force Protection -- Accelerate implementation of force protection measures to ensure safety of at-risk personnel. Waiting increases operational risks.	178	11
Recruiting and Retention -- To improve Air Force military personnel underexecution of accession goals. Funding needed to address real-time problem.	41	-
Aircraft Maintenance -- Increased cost of Navy/Air Force aircraft maintenance	263	276
Fund Security Investigation Backlog -- Protect the security of our defense contractors.	25	
Army Range Improvements -- Modernize combat training centers	261	
Ship Depot Maintenance -- Achieve the CNO goal of 100% of the requirement.	375	290
Real Property Maintenance (Army) -- Improve quality of existing facilities by increasing the funding from 71% to 80% of the requirement.	345	126
Real Property Maintenance (AF) -- Improve quality of existing facilities by increasing funding from 70% to 76% of the requirement	130	16
Air Force Contractor Logistics Support -- Improve the maintenance of Air Force aircraft in order to meet mission capability goals.	74	63

FY 2001 Requirement (Category 2 continued)	DoD Request	OMB Staff
National Foreign Intelligence Program Requirements -- On-going programs that would halt if not funded.		32
B-2 Initial Spares -- Covers a prior year contractual liability.	46	
<i>Total Category 2, Essential/Prudent Investments</i>	1,865	836
<i>Cumulative Total</i>	7,155	5,350

Category 3: Opportunity to Do Now is More Efficient		
Terminate Peacekeeper Program -- Begin the process of Peacekeeper retirement in order to accelerate pace of strategic arms reductions.	19	
Facility Demolition -- Accelerate the demolition and disposal of obsolete facilities.	50	
Crusader Close Down -- Begin the process of terminating the Crusader program.	20	-
Completion of Prior Year Shipbuilding -- Maintain shipbuilding schedules by fully funding shortfalls in the Virginia submarine, DDG-51 destroyer, aircraft carrier and LPD-17 amphibious transport dock ship programs.	1,178	
Air Force Training Munitions -- Failure to fund will require decertification of pilots for use of certain munitions.	83	73
Training Munitions (all) -- Fully fund all Services' requirements.	267	-
<i>Total Category 3, Now More Efficient</i>	1,617	73
<i>Cumulative Total</i>	8,772	5,423

FY 2001 Requirement	DoD Request	OMB Staff
Category 4: Enhancements to Operations		
Base Operations -- Must pay bills, avoid negative impacts to soldier's quality of life and protects operating tempo. Army Chief of Staffs top priority.		80
Increased Cost of Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Moves -- Improved military quality-of-life through zero-defect moves.	58	58
Real Property Maintenance (Navy) -- Improve quality of existing facilities by funding the industry standard	151	44
Joint Exercises -- Fund at Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed level	18	9
Army Reserve Funding needs -- Funds requirements for training, full-time support, housing survey, and civilian personnel.		42
Army reserves Contingency operations -- Greater than anticipated use of Reserves in contingency ops.	72	32
<i>Total Category 4, Enhancements</i>	299	265
<i>Cumulative Total</i>	9,071	5,688

Category 5: Earlier Introduction of Transformational Capabilities		
Global Hawk -- Acceleration of Global Hawk fielding.	50	25
Information Warfare/Joint Command & Control -- Accelerate development and implementation of information warfare capabilities to meet expanding threat.	150	50
Global Positioning System (GPS) Navigation Warfare -- Accelerate effort to address jamming vulnerabilities and protect friendly use of GPS across the warfighting spectrum.	158	-
Miniature Munitions Capability -- Increase payload capabilities for combat aircraft by accelerating development of the 250-pound munition.	20	20
Space Based Radar -- Augment existing space based radar efforts in order to make this technology available earlier.	25	-

5/11/01

11-L-0559/OSD/3774

FY 2001 Requirement	DoD Request	OMB Staff
Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile Conversion -- CALCM is the only smart munition in its range	168	
Joint Experimentation -- Expand joint experimentation efforts through the use of additional simulations and investment in database capabilities.	15	15
Accelerate AWACS Radar Improvement -- Provide additional funding for the Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) in order to field this capability earlier.	40	
National Foreign Intelligence Program Requirements . -- Need to be funded, could wait until FY 02. Some efforts are transformational in nature.	1,812	144
<i>Total Category 5, Transformational Capabilities</i>	<i>2,438</i>	<i>254</i>
<i>Cumulative Total</i>	<i>11,509</i>	<i>5,942</i>
Category 6: Acceleration of Missile Defense		
Accelerate development to close current vulnerabilities at the earliest possible time and to meet congressional mandate. Funding would reside in transfer account to be allocated at a future date.	826	826
<i>Total Category 6, Missile Defense</i>	<i>826</i>	<i>826</i>
<i>Cumulative Total</i>	<i>12,335</i>	<i>6,768</i>
Category 7: Other National Security Related		
Coast Guard -- TRICARE, pay and housing	78	72
Coast Guard -- Aviation spare parts	30	20
Department of Energy -- Infrastructure deficiencies at labs, test site readiness, warhead maintenance, plutonium pit certification and physical security	453	140
<i>Total Category 7, Other</i>	<i>561</i>	<i>232</i>
<i>Grand Total</i>	<i>12,896</i>	<i>7,000</i>

Proposed Rescissions	DoD Request	OMB Staff
V-22 Tiltrotor Aircraft		-395
B-52 Modifications		-30
Military Construction projects		-75
<i>Total Rescissions</i>	-	-500
<i>Net Grand Total</i>	12,896	6,500

snowflake

May 14, 2001 9:41 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Testimony Input

On page 10 and 12, there are some things that might be quoted in the testimony. They are from a national commission, a study group.

381

Attach.
Executive Summary on Homeland Security

DHR:dh
051401-18

14 May 01

U09168 /01



Executive Summary

After our examination of the new strategic environment of the next quarter century (Phase I) and of a strategy to address it (Phase II), this Commission concludes that *significant changes must be made in the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus.* Our institutional base is in decline and must be rebuilt. Otherwise, the United States risks losing its global influence and critical leadership role.

We offer recommendations for organizational change in five key areas:

- *ensuring* the security of the American homeland,
- *recapitalizing* America's strengths in science and education;
- redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch,
- *overhauling* the U.S. government personnel system; and
- *reorganizing* Congress for national security affairs.

We have taken a broad view of national security. In the new era, sharp distinctions between "foreign" and "domestic" no longer apply. We do not equate national security with "defense." We do believe in the centrality of strategy, and of seizing opportunities as well as confronting dangers. If the structures and processes of the U.S. government stand still amid a world of change, the United States will lose its capacity to shape history, and will instead be shaped by it.

Homeland Security

The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism portends the end of the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American citizens on *American soil* is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures.

*We therefore recommend the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for **planning, coordinating, and integrating the various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.*** NHSA would be built upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with the three organizations currently on the front line of border security—the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border **Patrol**—transferred to it. **NHSA** would not only protect American lives, but also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, including its information technology aspect.

NHSA would have Cabinet status and its Director would be a statutory advisory to the National Security Council. The legal foundation **for the** National Homeland Security Agency would rest firmly within the array of Constitutional guarantees for civil liberties. The observance of these guarantees in the event of an acute national security emergency would be safeguarded by **NHSA's** interagency coordinating **activities**—which would include the Department of Justice—as well as by its conduct of advance exercises.

Pre-decision draft: Do not quote, cite or attribute.

The potentially catastrophic nature of homeland **attacks** necessitates our being prepared to use the tremendous resources of the Department of Defense. The Department needs to pay far more attention to this mission in *the future*. *We recommend that a new Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security be created to oversee the DoD various activities and ensure that the necessary resources are made available.*

New priorities also need to be set for our armed forces in light of the **threat** to the homeland. *We urge, in particular, that the National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission, as the US Constitution itself ordains.* The National Guard should be reorganized, trained, and equipped to undertake that mission.

Finally, *we recommend that Congress reorganize itself to accommodate this Executive Branch realignment, and that it form a special Select Committee for homeland security to provide Congressional support and oversight.*

Recapitalizing American Strengths

Americans are living off the economic and security benefits of the last three generations' investment in science and education, but we are now consuming capital. Our systems of basic scientific research and education are in serious crisis, while other countries are redoubling their efforts. In the next quarter century, we will likely see ourselves surpassed, and in relative decline, unless we make a conscious national commitment to maintain our edge.

We also face unprecedented opportunity. The world is entering an era of dramatic progress in bioscience and materials science as well as information technology and scientific instrumentation. Brought together and accelerated by nanoscience, these rapidly developing research fields will transform our understanding of the world and our capacity to manipulate it. **The United States can remain the world's technological leader—if it makes the commitment to do so.**

The US. government has seriously underfunded basic scientific research in recent years. The quality of the U.S. education system, too, has fallen well behind **those** of scores of other nations. This has occurred at a time when vastly more Americans will have to understand and work competently with science and math on a daily basis. In this Commission's view, the inadequacies of our systems of research and education pose a greater threat to U.S. national security over the next quarter century **than** any potential conventional war that we might imagine.

American national leadership must understand these deficiencies as threats to national security. If we do not invest heavily and wisely in rebuilding these two core strengths, American will be incapable of maintaining its global position long into the **21st** century.

We therefore recommend doubling the federal research and development budget over the next seven to eight years, and instituting a more competitive environment for the allotment of those funds.

We recommend further that the role of the President's Science Advisor be elevated to oversee these and other critical tasks, such as the resuscitation of the national laboratory system and the institution of better inventory stewardship over the nation's science and technology assets.

CITE in Technology (C)

We also recommend a new National Science and Technology Education Act to fund a comprehensive program to produce the needed numbers of science and engineering professional as well as qualified teachers in science and math. This Act should provide loan forgiveness incentives as well as scholarships in order to attract those who have graduated as well as those still in school to go into K-12 teaching in science and math.

Institutional Redesign

The dramatic changes in the world have not been accompanied by any major institutional changes in the Executive Branch of the US **government**. Serious deficiencies exist that only a significant organizational redesign can remedy. Most troublesome is the lack of an overarching strategic framework guiding U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. Clear goals and priorities are rarely set. Budgets are prepared and appropriated as they were during the Cold War.

The Department of State, in particular, is a crippled institution that is starved for resources by Congress because of its inadequacies and is thereby weakened further by the lack of resources. The political reality is that only if the State Department's internal weaknesses are cured will it become an effective leader in the making and implementation of the nation's foreign policy. Only **then** can it credibly seek significant increases in funds from Congress. The Department suffers in particular from an ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not **serve** integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.

For this and other reasons, the power to determine national security policy has steadily migrated toward the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The staff now assumes policymaking roles that many observers have warned against. Yet the NSC staff's role as policy coordinator is more urgently needed than ever, given the imperative of integrating the many diverse strands of policymaking.

Meanwhile, the U.S. intelligence community is adjusting only slowly to the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War era. While the economic and political components of statecraft have assumed greater prominence, military imperatives still largely drive the analysis and collection of intelligence. Neither has **America's** overseas presence been properly adapted to the new economic, social, political, and security realities of the 21st century.

Finally, the Department of Defense needs to be overhauled. The growth in staff and staff activities has created mounting confusion and delay. The failure to outsource or privatize many defense support activities wastes huge sums of money. The programming and budgeting process is not guided by effective strategic planning. The weapons acquisition process is so hobbled by excessive laws, regulations, and oversight strictures that it can neither recognize nor seize opportunities for major innovation, and it stifles a defense industry that is already in a state of financial crisis.

In light of such serious and interwoven deficiencies, the Commission's initial recommendation is that *strategy should once again drive the design and implementation of U.S. national security policies.* That means that *the President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and that process should be linked to the allocation of resources*

Pre-decision draft: Do not quote, cite or attribute.

throughout the government. When submitting his budgets for the various national security departments, the President should also present an overall national security budget, focused on the nation's most critical strategic goals. Homeland security, counter-terrorism, and science and technology are potential candidates for this budget.

We recommend further that the President's National Security Advisor and NSC staff return to their traditional role of coordinating national security activities and resist the temptation to become policymakers or operators. The NSC Advisor should also keep a low public profile. Legislative, press communications, and speech-writing functions should reside in the White House staff; not separately in the NSC staff as they do today. The higher the profile of the National Security Advisor, the greater will be the pressures from Congress to compel testimony and force Senate **confirmation** of the position.

To reflect how central economics has become in U.S. national security policy, we *recommend additionally that the Secretary of Treasury be named a statutory member of the National Security Council.* Responsibility for international economic policy should return to the National Security Council, *The President should abolish the National Economic Council, distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the Domestic Policy Council.*

Critical to the future success of our national security policies will be a fundamental restructuring of the State Department. Reform must ensure that responsibility and accountability are clearly established, regional and functional activities closely integrated, and strategic planning emphasized and linked to the allocation of resources.

We recommend that this be accomplished through the creation of five Under Secretaries with responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and a redefinition of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. They would each be accountable to the President and the Congress for all political, economic and security activities in their areas of responsibility. Someone would actually be in charge.

We further recommend that the activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development be fully integrated into this new State Department organization, and that a new Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget office be established. Rather than multiple Congressional appropriations, the State Department should also be funded in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget, which would include all foreign assistance programs and activities as well as the expenses for all related personnel and operations. All U.S. Ambassadors, including the Ambassador to the United Nations, should report directly to the Secretary of State, and a major effort needs to be undertaken to "right-size" the U.S. overseas presence.

The Commission believes that the resulting improvements in the effectiveness and competency of the State Department and its overseas activities would provide the basis for the significant increase in resources necessary to carry out the nation's foreign policy in the 21st century.

As for the Department of Defense, *we urge first and foremost that the new Secretary of Defense reduce by 10-15 percent the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Services, and the regional commands.* This would not only save money but also achieve the decision speed and decentralization necessary to survive in the 21st century.

Pre-decision **draft**: Do not quote, cite or attribute.

Just as critical, *the Secretary of Defense should establish a 10-year goal of reducing infrastructure costs by 20-25 percent through steps to consolidate, restructure, outsource, and privatize as many DoD support agencies and activities as possible.* Only through savings in infrastructure costs, which now take up nearly half of DoD's budget, will the Department **find** the funds necessary for modernization and personnel.

The processes by which the Defense Department develops its programs and budgets as well as acquires its weapons also need fundamental reform. The most critical first step is for the Secretary of Defense to produce defense policy and planning guidance that defines specific goals and establishes relative priorities.

Together with the Congress, the Secretary should *move the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the second year of a Presidential term.* The current requirement, that it be done in an administration's **first** year, spites the purpose of the activity. Such a deadline does not allow the time or the means for an incoming administration to influence the QDR outcome, and therefore for it to gain a stake in its conclusions.

We recommend a second change in the QDR, as well, namely that the Secretary of Defense introduce a new process that requires the Services and Defense Agencies to compete for the allocation of some resources within the overall Defense budget. This, we believe, would give the Secretary a vehicle to identify, stretch, or terminate low priority programs and begin the process of reallocating funds to more promising areas during subsequent budget cycles.

As for acquisition reform, the Commission is deeply concerned with the downward spiral that has emerged in recent decades in relations between the Pentagon as customer and the defense industrial base as supplier of the nation's major weapons systems. Many innovative high-tech firms are simply unable or unwilling to work with the Defense Department under the weight of its auditing, contracting, profitability, investment, and inspection regulations. These regulations also impair the Defense Department's ability to function with the speed it needs if it is to keep abreast of today's rapid pace of technological innovation. Weapons development cycles average nine years in an environment where technology now changes every twelve to eighteen months in Silicon Valley-and the trend lines continue to diverge.

In place of a specialized "defense industrial base," we believe that the nation needs a national industrial base for defense, which would be composed of a broad cross-section of commercial firms as well as the more traditional defense firms. "New economy" sectors must be attracted to work with the government on sound business and professional grounds; the more traditional defense suppliers, which fill important needs unavailable in the commercial sector, must be given incentives to innovate and operate efficiently. We therefore recommend these major steps:

- *Establish and employ a two-track acquisition system, one for major acquisitions and a "fast track" for a modest number of potential breakthrough systems, especially those in the area of command and control.*
- *Return to the pattern of increased prototyping and testing of selected weapons and support systems to foster innovation. We should use testing procedures to gain knowledge and not to demonstrate a program's ability to survive budgetary scrutiny.*

Pre-decision draft: Do not quote, cite or attribute.

- *Implement two-year defense budgeting solely for the modernization element (R&D/procurement) of the Defense budget because of its long-term character, and expand the use of multi-year procurement.*
- *Modernize auditing and oversight requirements (by rewriting relevant sections of U.S. Code, Title 10, and the Federal Acquisition Regulations) with a goal of reducing the numbers of auditors and inspectors in the acquisition system to be commensurate with the budget they produce.*

There is no more critical dimension of defense policy than to guarantee U.S. commercial and military access to outer space. The U.S. economy and military are vitally dependent on communications that rely on space. The clear imperative for the new era is a comprehensive national policy toward space and a coherent governmental machinery to carry it out. We *recommend the establishment of an Interagency Working Group on Space (IWGS).*

The members of this interagency working group would include not only the relevant parts of the intelligence community and the State and Defense Departments (including the National Space Command), but also the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Commerce, and other Executive Branch agencies as necessary (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Communications Commission, National Science Foundation, Department of Transportation.)

Meanwhile, the global presence and responsibilities of the United States have brought new requirements for protecting U.S. space and communications infrastructures, but no comprehensive national space architecture has been developed. *We recommend that such responsibility be given to the new interagency space working group and that the existing National Security Space Architect be transferred from the Defense Department to the NSC staff to take the lead in this effort.*

The Commission has concluded that the basic structure of the intelligence community does not require change. Our focus here is on those steps that will enable the full implementation of recommendations found elsewhere within this report.

First in this regard, we *recommend that the President should set national intelligence priorities through National Security Council guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence.*

Second, *the intelligence community should emphasize the recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of the intelligence community's highest priorities, and ensure that existing operational guidelines support this policy.*

Third, *the community should place new emphasis on collection and analysis of economic and science/technology security concerns, and incorporate more open source intelligence into its analytical products.* To facilitate this effort, Congress should increase significantly the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for collection and analysis.

Building Human Capital: Personnel

Our governmental personnel system is in crisis. Government regulations and personnel systems—the way we hire, promote, and retire—have increased the disincentives to

Pre-decision draft: Do not **quote**, cite or attribute.

serve. Indeed, these disincentives have grown even as the demand for quality in the ranks of public servants has increased. If we allow the lines of these trends to cross, *none of the reforms proposed by this or any other national security commission will produce their intended results.*

We recommend, first of all, Presidential commitment to a broad program of renewing the national commitment to service to the nation. Nothing will be more important than the Presidential use of the bully pulpit to stress the importance and nobility of public service. While skepticism of government's abilities is healthy, cynicism is not. Since so many national political figures have contributed over the years to the transmutation of skepticism into cynicism, it is the duty of political leaders throughout the government first and foremost to repair the damage in a high-profile and fully bipartisan manner.

Beyond that, *this Commission recommends the most urgent and possible streamlining of the process by which we attract our senior government officials.* The confirmation process is characterized by vast amounts of paper work and many delays. Conflict of interest and financial disclosure requirements have become a prohibitive obstacle to the recruitment of honest men and women to public service. Post-employment restrictions confront potential new recruits with the prospect of their having to forsake not only income but work itself in the very fields in which they have demonstrated talent and found success. Meanwhile, a pervasive atmosphere of distrust and cynicism about government service is reinforced by the encrustation of complex rules based on the assumption that all officials, and especially those with experience in or contact with the private, sector, are criminals waiting to be unmasked.

We therefore recommend the following:

- *Bring together the President and Congressional leaders and have them instruct their top aides to report within 90 days of January 20, 2001, on specific steps to revise government ethics laws and regulations.*
- *Revise the Presidential appointee process to eliminate the impediments to high-level public service by reducing the number of non-career positions by 25 percent, shortening the appointment process, and moderating draconian ethics regulations.* This should entail reducing and standardizing paperwork requirements, reducing the number of nominees subject to full FBI background checks, and confirming the national security team first.
- *Make blind trusts, discretionary waivers, and recusals more easily available as alternatives to complete divestiture of financial and business holdings of concern.*

Beyond the appointments process, there are problems with government personnel systems specific to the Foreign Service, the Civil Service, and to the military services, But for all three, there is one step we urge: *Expand the National Security Education Act of 1991.*

This Act, which provides college loan forgiveness and other benefits for government service, should be broadened to cover areas of study specifically applicable to the needs of the Foreign Service, such as economics and foreign language expertise. It should be applied as well to those who would join the Civil Service in their fields of relevance. And it should be expanded and funded to aid the recruitment and retention of high quality military personnel.

Pre-decision draft: Do not quote, cite or attribute.

With respect to the Foreign Service, *we recommend that the Foreign Service system be improved by making leadership a core value of the State Department, revamping the examination process, and dramatically improving the level of on-going professional education.*

With respect to the Civil Service, Congress should both ease recruitment procedures and fully fund professional education and retention programs. More important, however, we *recommend the establishment of a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths and to provide a corps of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the Executive Branch.*

The specific objectives of the NSSC, a new group of senior-level executives drawn **from** the existing Civil Service, would be to broaden the experience base of senior departmental managers; to develop leaders who seek integrative solutions to national security policy problems; and to produce better policy planning and execution. Participating departments would include Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, and Energy--the **departments** essential to interagency policy-making on key national security issues.

With respect to the military personnel system, reform is needed in the recruitment, promotion, and retirement systems. Otherwise, the military will continue to lose its most talented personnel, and the armed services will be **left** with a cadre unable to handle the technological and managerial tasks necessary for a world-class 21st century force.

Beyond the further expansion of the National Security Education Act, *we recommend, the enhancement of the Montgomery GI Bill and Title 38 (VA Benefits Authority).* GI Bill entitlements should equal at the very least the median tuition costs of four-year U.S. colleges and should be indexed to keep pace with increases in those costs. Title 38, Chapter 37 should be modified specifically to improve medical, dental, and VA homeownership benefits for career and retired service members.

Taken together, such changes can help persuade **military** personnel in all Services to serve longer to **secure** these greater benefits. *We also recommend modifying all four of the governing parts of military personnel legislation--those dictating the terms of enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation--in order to give the Services more flexibility to recruit and retain high-quality personnel.*

The Role of Congress

While Congress has mandated many changes to a host of Executive departments and agencies over the years, it has not reformed itself one iota since 1949. At present, for example, every major defense program must be voted upon no fewer than eighteen times each year by an array of committees and subcommittees. This represents a very poor use of time for busy Executive and Legislative Branch staff.

No one designed the current Congressional committee system as a whole; it evolved piecemeal over many years. It cannot be effectively reformed piecemeal, however. Rather, a new consolidated design must be conceived analogous to a restructuring in the private sector. Congress should play a major role in reforming the Executive Branch's role in national security and, clearly, few of the major reforms this Commission recommends can be implemented

Pre-decision draft: Do not quote, cite or attribute.

efficiently, or at all, without Congressional concurrence and assistance. At the same time, Congress sorely needs to tend to its own houses.

We recommend, therefore, that Congress strengthen its role in national security affairs by facilitating the Executive Branch reforms recommended by this Commission, and by rationalizing its own committee structure accordingly.

In addition, Congress needs to reduce the demands it makes on Executive Branch personnel through duplicative and non-substantive hearings and reporting demands. It needs to institute **ways** to educate its members in national security and foreign affairs areas, and it needs to develop ways to better educate itself and its staffs through more systematic liaison with public policy experts outside of government.

The Commission notes, in conclusion, that some of its recommendations will save money, while others call for more expenditure. We have not tried to “balance the books” among our recommendations, nor have we held financial implications foremost in mind during our work. We consider any money that may be saved a second-order benefit. We consider the provision of additional resources to national security, where necessary, to be investments, not costs, **in first-order** national priorities.

Finally, while we would not bind the hands of the new President in the choice of a method to implement this Commission’s recommendations, we **strongly urge the new President and Congressional leadership to establish some mechanism to track, assist, and oversee the implementation of the recommendations pro&red here**. It would be unfortunate, indeed, to have chartered, supported, and funded an independent, bipartisan Commission on organizational and process efficiency only to squander its work upon receipt by an absence of organizational and process efficiency.

snowflake

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 14, 2001

SUBJECT: NATO

Are you going to have a meeting on NATO enlargement some time before Colin goes? Seems to me we ought to talk about NATO enlargement, European Defense Initiative and Missile Defense with the Allies since those will be the focus of attention at both his ministerial meetings and mine.

DHR/azn
051401.32

NATO 320.2

14 MAY 01

snowflake

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 14, 2001

SUBJECT: Chinese & Russian Planes

*FAKES
BY CAOL
5/15*

Attached are some examples of instances where a Chinese plane and Russian planes have landed in Alaska and Thule in emergency situations. As you will note, in each case we treated the people very, very well. They were given gas, food, heaters, etc.

I think it would be worth going back another time to the PRC and making sure they understand, so that they see how we handled them on previous occasions.

Thanks.

360.33

DHR/azn
051401.17
Attach.

cc: Gen Botiste

14 May 01

SEVERAL EXAMPLES

- **27 February 1974 – Soviet AN-24 weather reconnaissance aircraft, low on fuel, emergency landing at Gambell Airfield, Alaska**
 - **Crew remained on aircraft overnight (we provided space heaters and food). Refueled next day and departed.**
- **6 April 1993 – Chinese civilian airliner declared *inflight* emergency and landed at Shemya in Alaska**
 - **Dozens of injured passengers treated/medevac'd; two deaths; . aircraft was repaired and departed**
- **26 March 1994 – Russian military aircraft monitoring a NATO ASW exercise; low of fuel; emergency landing at Thule Air Base in Greenland**
 - **On the ground 6 hours; crew fed and aircraft refueled, then departed. No charge for the fuel.**

UNCLASSIFIED

11 April 2001

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: RUSSIAN IL- 18 AIRCRAFT LANDS AT THULE AFB (GREENLAND) IN 1994

1. (U) Purpose. Provide information to VDJS on the subject incident.
2. (U) Key Points.
 - (U) On 26 Mar 94 a Russian IL- 18 aircraft was loitering in the area of a NATO ASW exercise involving 10 NATO aircraft (from Holland, Canada, and the US).
 - (U) The aircraft declared an emergency due to low fuel and unexpectedly landed at Thule Air Base after having been denied permission by Canada to land in Canada.
 - (U) The IL- 18 was an intelligence' gathering aircraft traditionally used for electronic espionage that had Aeroflot markings and declared it was on a meteorological mission.
 - (U) The aircraft was taken to a hanger where the 22 crew and passengers were fed. The aircraft was refueled and took off after approximately 6 hours on the ground.
 - (U) US forces did not enter the aircraft, which was guarded by US MPs while it was on the ground. The US did not present Russia with a bill for the fuel.

Prepared by: (b)(6) USMC
(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/3796

To: _____

April 6, 2001

A Russian radar airplane landed on Thule Air Base in Greenland

Sources: Cable from the Danish news agency on March 26, 1994, and reports in Jyllands-Posten on Sunday, March 27, 1994.

Text of cable:

Shortage of fuel forced a Russian airplane, full of radar equipment, to land on Thule Air Base at 32 degrees centigrade below zero. The airplane had been denied landing permit in Canada and therefore landed unexpectedly on the base. It happened in the middle of a NATO exercise and resulted in hectic activity, according to Jyllands-Posten's Sunday newspaper. The crew was guarded closely in a hangar for six hours before the airplane left the base again with full fuel tanks. The airplane was of the Iljusjin IL-18 type which is traditionally used for espionage, according to the newspaper. It is the first time ever that a Russian airplane has visited Thule Air Base. The airplane was officially on a meteorological mission in the area.

Text of report on the front page of Jyllands-Posten:

At a temperature of 32 degrees centigrade below zero, a Russian airplane – full of radar equipment – wrote world history last Friday when it unexpectedly landed on Thule Air Base in Greenland in the middle of a NATO exercise. Lack of fuel had forced the airplane down on the American base, as the Canadian authorities had refused to give the airplane permission to land, Lt. Cd. Erik Kester told from Station Grønnedal.

The airplane was officially on a meteorological mission, and the forced landing resulted in hectic activity on the base. The Americans blocked all telephone lines to the United States for civilian calls. Security police surrounded the airplane and the hangar where the crew members stayed for almost six hours.

It has never happened before that a Russian airplane has landed on Thule Air Base.

The radar airplane was of the Iljusjin IL-18 type which is a version that traditionally is used for electronic espionage.

--Now we are also going to pay for their espionage, said an American officer, according to a Dane who was on the base when the Russians took off with full fuel tanks.

Text of report by Erik Thomle on page 5 in Jyllands-Posten:

The news about the Russian airplane was spreading faster than the fragrance of a stewardess would have done among the 1000 men on Thule Air Base in Northern Greenland.

A radar airplane with the name "Aeroflot" painted with Russian letters on its side was parked on the runway. A Russian airplane had never before landed on the three-kilometer-long runway which has been vital for the most northern NATO defense for decades.

But last Friday at 17:00 Greenland time -- i.e. 22:00 Danish time -- the special-built Ilyushin IL-18 was parked at the arrival hangar and resulted immediately in an increase of the level of preparedness.

Employees kept sway

In the middle of a NATO exercise where about ten airplanes from Canada, the Netherlands and the United States were training submarine surveillance, the Russians had landed to refuel, it was explained.

The security police of the American forces prevented both Danish and American employees from getting close to the Russian airplane and its crew without special permission, and American officers were speaking openly about the possibility that the airplane must have been on an espionage mission.

Flight schedule had been sent

The uninvited Russian visit made not any deep impression officially (in Denmark). The Danish Air Tactical Command in Karup was of the opinion that it was "probably merely Tuzla in Bosnia that had been spelt Thule by a mistake." But Lt. Col. Køster at Station Grønnedal in Greenland confirmed the incident. He added that the Russians had sent their flight schedule in advance as they should. It was just not intended that they were to land in Thule.

Diplomats in the airplane

"Several of the 22 people in the airplane were travelling as diplomats, and their visa to Canada was OK," a source at Thule Air Base told Jyllands-Posten. But the Canadians would not allow the airplane to land. Sondrestrom Air Base a

little longer to the south in Greenland was closed because of bad weather, so the Russians had to go down in Thule when they were running out of fuel."

The official mission for the airplane was meteorological observations in the altitude of eight kilometers, and the people on board had visa, so that they could travel into Canada via Resolute Bay. But the airplane itself had not been approved for that. When it was on its way from Iceland, the Russian captain was ordered to keep away.

With monitoring equipment

Ilyushin 18 is used by the Russian airline company Aeroflot as a passenger airplane. But it exists in fact in many reconstructed versions with different kinds of military monitoring equipment.

On the airplane which landed in Thule, was an extra bulge on its back, giving space for additional electronic equipment, and several antennas were seen sticking out of the airplane.

The Russians themselves did not make any secret of the fact that the airplane was a special version, but they maintained that the electronic equipment merely was for scientific purposes.

About ten NATO surveillance airplanes were parked on Thule Air Base when the Russian radar airplane in bright sunshine, but at a temperature of 32 degrees centigrade below zero, landed with almost empty fuel tanks.

It was dragged to the arrival hangar where the 22 crew members and passengers got something to eat and drink, while there was carried out a hectic communication between the base and the military authorities in the United States. All telephone lines were in fact blocked for civilian calls, and additional staff was called up to talk in the military telephones.

After about three hours, the threads of the problem were unraveled so much that the airplane could be refueled, and shortly before 23:00, the Russians could take off, heading back to Iceland.

(6q-DAO)

(b)(6)

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

(b)(6)
Friday, April 06, 2007 10:13 AM
(b)(6)
Artikel

Russisk radarfly nedlandet på Thule-basen (12)
(Ritzaus Bureau 26. marts 1994 kl. 2233)

Qaanaaq, lørdag. RB

Brændstofmangel tvang fredag aften et russisk fly, spækket med radarudstyr, til at lande på Thulebasen i 32 graders kulde. Flyet var blevet nægtet landingstilladelse i Canada og landede derfor uventet på basen. Det skete midt i en NATO-øvelse og førte til hektisk aktivitet, skriver Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten søndag. Besætningen blev skarpt bevogtet i en hangar i seks timer, før flyet forlod basen med fyldte tanker. Flyet, et Ilyusjin IL-18, var af en type, der traditionelt bruges til elektronisk spionage, skriver bladet. Det var første gang nogensinde, Thule-basen havde besøg af et russisk fly. Det var officielt på meteorologiske opgaver.
SLUT PÅ ARTIKEL

19
67

Russisk fly landede i NATO-øvr

AF ERIK THOMLE

Nyheden om det russiske fly spredtes hurtigt, og end daften af en stewardesse blandt de 1000 mænd på Thule-basen i Nordgrønland.

Et radarfly med "Aerofoil" notation med russiske bogstaver på siden holdt på landingsbanen. Aldrig tidligere er et russisk fly landet på den tre kilometer lange bane, der i årtier var livsvæven i det nordligste NATO-forsvar.

Men fredag aften kl. 17.00 grønlandsk - kl. 23 dansk tid - holdt den specialbyggede Iljusjin 18-IL-18 - ved ankomsthængaren og udsatte omgængende og et beredskab.

Attentat på afstart

Midt i en NATO-ovelse, hvor en halv snes fly fra Canada, Holland og USA lærte u-båds overvågning, var russerne landet for at tanke brændstof, led forklaringen.

De amerikanske flyeters sikkerhedsprotokoll forhindrede både danske og amerikanske ansatte uden særlig tilladelse i at komme i nærheden af fly og besætning, og amerikanske officerer lalte åbent om, at flyet måtte være på splinteragtigt

Flyveplanen sendt

Officielt gjorde det uopfordrede russiske besøg ved NATO-øvrissen ikke ret dybt indtryk. Flyvertaktisk Kommando i Karup mente i går, at "der nok er tale om en forveksling mellem Thule og Tuzla" i Bosnien. Men oberstløjtnant Erik Koster på station Grennadal i Grønland bekræfter episoden. Han tilføjer, at russerne på forhånd havde sendt flyveplanen, som de skulle. Det var blot ikke meningen, at de skulle lande i Thule.

Diplomater på rejse

Fleere af de 21 i flyet rejste som diplomater, og de, der viste til Canada var i orden, siger en kilde på Thule-basen til Jyllandsposten. Men canadierne ville ikke inde flyet lande. Søn-

dre Strechford-baser landede mod syd var lukket på grund af dårligt vejr, så russerne blev nødt til at gå ned i Thule, da brændstoffet var ved at løbe op.

Flyets officielle opgaver er meteorologiske observationer i otte kilometers højde, og de ombordværende havde vist til at rejse ind i Canada via Resolute Bay. Men selve flyet var ikke godkendt. På vej fra Island fik den russiske kaptein ordre til at holde sig væk.

Med flytøjledstyr

Iljusjin 18 bruges af det civile russiske luftfartsselskab Aerofoil som passager-fly. Men det findes i talrige ombyggede versioner med forskellige former for overvågningsudstyr til militært brug. På maskinen, der landede i Thule, gaven bilde på ryggen plads til ekstra elektronik, og flere antenner stak ud fra maskinen. Russerne lagde heller ikke skjul, at maskinen er en specialudgave, men fastholdt, at elektronikken kun tjente videnskabelige formål.

Omgivning en halv snes NATO-overvågningsfly holdt på Thule-basen, da det russiske radarfly i klar sol og 32 graders frost lagde an til landing med næsten tomme tankke. Det blev trukket hen til ankomsthængaren, hvor de 22 besætningsmedlemmer og passagerer fik noget at drikke og spise, mens der foregik en hektisk kommunikation mellem basen og de militære myndigheder i USA. Alle telefonlinier til USA blev spærret for civile samtaler, og der blev indholdt ekstramandskab til at passe de militære telefoner.

Efter godt tre timer var sådant vedt så meget ud, at flyet blev løst op, og kort før kl. 23.00 lattede russerne med kurs tilbage mod Island.



Det russiske forsvar bruger ofte ombyggede civile flyninger. Under en international ballistikkonference i deltagerne af fotografere disse to Iljusjin 18-18 på Puskin flyveplads ved Leningrad. Flyene, der bygges via Aerofoil firmaet, havde fået nummeret og beholdt toppe af luftretning

Protester mod publikums-

Kvaliteten er

Russisk fly landede i NATO-ø

De amerikanske styrkers sikkerhedspolitik forhindrede både danske og amerikanske ansatte uden særlig tilladelse i at komme i nærheden af fly og besætning, og amerikanske officerer lakte åbenlyst om, at flyet måtte være på spionagetagt.

Flueplanen sendt

Officielt gjorde det uoplydte russiske besøg ved NATO-øvelsen ikke ret dybt indtryk. Flyveraktisk Kommandant i Karup mente i går, at 'der nok er tale om en forveksling mellem Thule og Tuzla' i Bosnien. Hens oberstløjtnant Erik Knister på station Gronaadal i Grønland bekræfter episoden. Han tilføjer, at russerne på forhånd havde sendt flyverplanen, som de skulle. Det var helt ikke meningen, at de skulle lande i Thule.

Diplomater på vej

Fire af de 22 i flyet rejste som diplomater, og de var vist til Canada tur i weekenden, siger en kable på Thule-basen til Jyllands-Posten. Men russisk vilkårlig lande flyet. For

dre Birsmørd basen længere mod syd var lukket på grund af dårligt vejr, så russerne blev nødt til at gå ned i Thule, da brændstoffet var ved at slippe op.

Flyets officielle opgaver er meteorologiske observationer i otte kilometers højde, og de ombordværende havde vist til et rejse land i Canada via Resolute Bay. Men selve flyet var ikke kendt. På vej fra Island fik den russiske kaptein ordre til at holde sig væk.

Med flyteudstyr

Uzunin 18 bruges af det civile russiske luftforsknings- og transportfly. Men det findes i talrige ombyggede versioner med forskellige former for overvågningsudstyr til militært brug. På maskinen, der landede i Thule, gav en bølge på ryggen plads til ekstra elektronik, og flere antenner stak ud fra maskinen. Russerne tog ikke hulter til skud, at maskinen var en specialudgave, men fastholdt, at elektronikken kun havde videnskabelige formål.

Omkring en halv time senere holdt på Thule-basen, da det russiske redarfly i klar sol og 32 graders frost lagde an til landing med rammen forreste tanker. Det blev trukket hen til ankomsthavnen, hvor de 22 besætningsmedlemmer og passagerer fik noget at drikke og spise, mens der foregik en hektisk kommunikation mellem basen og de militære myndigheder i USA. Alle telefonlinier til USA blev spærret for civile samtaler, og der blev indkaldt ekstra mandskab til at passe de militære telefoner.

Efter godt tre timer var fradens redet så meget ud, at flyet blev tanket op, og kort før kl. 23.00 lettede russerne med huss tilbage mod Island.



Det russiske forsvær bruger ofte ombyggede civile fly. Under en international luftkonkurrence stillegerne af jagerflyene til Uzunin 11-18 på Parken flyveplads ved Leningrad. Flyene, der bygges af Aeroflot's fabrik, havde fået monteret en indbygget type af hullerret.

ter mod
ums-
TOTAL P. 08

Kvaliteten er

11-L-0559/OSD/3803

John

----- Forwarded by John Ruble/EP/EUR/ISA/OUSSDP on 04/06/0107:00 PM --

This Message:

diwatmg@notes.dawn
.dia.smil.mil
04/06/01 07:52 AM

To: dicarjw@notes.dawn.dia.smil.mil, disanpj@notes.dawn.dia.smil.mil,
John Ruble/EP/EUR/ISA/OUSSDP@nts.policy.osd.pentagon.smil.mil, "Portelli,
LTC" <portella@eucom.smil.mil>, "Swanson, Efdon C G5-13 (CNE N521)"
<cneN521@navetur.navy.smil.mil>, org DIO for Europe
<dio.europe@pentagon.smil.mil>
cc: (bcc: archive/USDP/OUSSDP@OUSSDP)
Subject: China situation - Thule semi-precedent worth mentioning

Based on a barely &membered incident from a member of the embassy, we found a copy of a Danish newspaper article from March 27, 1994, giving details of of the emergency landing of a Russian XL-18 (Intel a/c w/ Aeroflot markings) at Thule Air base. The Russian declared an emergency due to low fuel and landed at Thule (after being refused landing permission by the Canadians). It had been loitering in the area of a NATO exercise (10 a/c from Canada, Holland, and USA were on an ASW exercise), Th c had Aeroflot markings, declared it was on a meteorological mission (making observations at 8000 meters) and was low on fuel. After being refused landing clearance for Canada, the other potential runway was Sondre Stromfjord (Middle Greenland), which was closed due to weather. It came in from Iceland OPAREA. It was on the ground for 6 hours. The crew and passengers (22) were watered, fed, the aircraft was refueled, and departed for the Iceland OPAREA and home. The base MPs guarded the aircraft. No one went aboard. Fuel bill was not presented to the Russians.

IL-18

would anyone like copies of the translation of the article?

I'm not planning to do anything more 'with this.

(b)(6)

Captain, USN
USDAO Copenhagen

(45) (b)(6)

fax: diwatmg@notes.dawn..dia.smil.mil

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages - 1

To	RADM QUIGLEY	From	MR FRED SULLIVAN
DEPT/AGENCY	ASATPA	Phone	(b)(6)
	(b)(6)	Fax #	

NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5009-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

OPTIONAL FORM 39 (7-80)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages = 3

To	RAEON QUIGLEY	From	MR. PAED SMITH
Dept./Agency	FA	Phone #	(b)(6)
Fax #	(b)(6)	Fax #	

To: _____

NSN 7540-01-217-7000 5095-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

April 6, 200X

A Russian radar airplane landed -on Thule Air Base in Greenland

Sources: Cable from the Danish news agency on March 26, 1994, and reports in Jyllands-Posten on Sunday, March 27, 1994.

Text of cable:

Shortage of fuel forced a Russian airplane, full of radar equipment, to land on Thule Air Base at 32 degrees centigrade below zero. The airplane had been denied landing permit in Canada and therefore landed unexpectedly on the base. It happened in the middle of a NATO exercise and resulted in hectic activity, according to Jyllands-Posten's Sunday newspaper. The crew was guarded closely in a hangar for six hours before the airplane left the base again with full fuel tanks. The airplane was of the Iljusjin IL-18 type which is traditionally used for espionage, according to the newspaper. It is the first time ever that a Russian airplane has visited Thule Air Base. The airplane was officially on a meteorological mission in the area.

Text of report on the front page of Jyllands-Posten:

At a temperature of 32 degrees centigrade below zero, a Russian airplane — full of radar equipment — wrote world history last Friday when it unexpectedly landed on Thule Air Base in Greenland in the middle of a NATO exercise. Lack of fuel had forced the airplane down on the American base, as the Canadian authorities had refused to give the airplane permission to land, Lt. Col. Erik Kaster told from Station Grønneal.

The airplane was officially on a meteorological mission, and the forced landing resulted in hectic activity on the base. The Americans blocked all telephone lines to the United States for civilian calls. Security police surrounded the airplane and the hangar where the crew members stayed for almost six hours.

It has never happened before that a Russian airplane has landed on Thule Air Base.

The radar airplane was of the Iljusjin I8-IL-18 type which is a version that traditionally is used for electronic espionage.

--Now we are also going to pay for their espionage, said an American officer, according to a Dane who was on the base when the Russians took off with full fuel tanks.

Text of report by Erik Thomsen on page 5 in Jyllands-Posten:

The news about the Russian airplane was spreading faster than the fragrance of a stewardess would have done among the 1000 men on Thule Air Base in Northern Greenland.

A radar airplane with the name "Aeroflot" painted with Russian letters on its side was parked on the runway. A Russian airplane had never before landed on the three-kilometer-long runway which has been vital for the most northern NATO defense for decades.

But last Friday at 17:00 Greenland time -- i.e. 22:00 Danish time -- the special-built Iljusin 18-IL-18 was parked at the arrival hangar and resulted immediately in an increase of the level of preparedness.

Employees kept away

In the middle of a NATO exercise where about ten airplanes from Canada, the Netherlands and the United States were training submarine surveillance, the Russians had landed to refuel, it was explained.

The security police of the American forces prevented both Danish and American employees from getting close to the Russian airplane and its crew without special permission, and American officers were speaking openly about the possibility that the airplane must have been on an espionage mission.

Flight schedule had been sent

The uninvited Russian visit made not any deep impression officially (in Denmark). The Danish Air Tactical Command in Karup was of the opinion that it was "probably merely Tuzla in Bosnia that had been spelt Thule by a mistake." But Lt. Col. Kester at Station Grennedal in Greenland confirmed the incident. He added that the Russians had sent their flight schedule in advance as they should. It was just not intended that they were to land in Thule.

Diplomats in the airplane

"Several of the 22 people in the airplane were travelling as diplomats, and their visa to Canada was OK," a source at Thule Air Base told Jyllands-Posten. But the Canadians would not allow the airplane to land. Sonderstrom Air Base a

little longer to the south in Greenland was closed because of bad weather, so the Russians had to go down in Thule when they were running out of fuel."

The official mission for the airplane was meteorological observations in the altitude of eight kilometers, and the people on board had visa, so that they could travel into Canada via Resolute Bay. But the airplane itself had not been approved for that. When it was on its way from Iceland, the Russian captain was ordered to keep away.

With monitoring equipment

Ilyushin 18 is used by the Russian airline company Aeroflot as a passenger airplane. But it exists in fact in many reconstructed versions with different kinds of military monitoring equipment.

On the airplane which landed in Thule, was an extra bulge on its back, giving space for additional electronic equipment, and several antennas were seen sticking out of the airplane.

The Russians themselves did not make any secret of the fact that the airplane was a special version, but they maintained that the electronic equipment merely was for scientific purposes.

About ten NATO surveillance airplanes were parked on Thule Air Base when the Russian radar airplane in bright sunshine, but at a temperature of 32 degrees centigrade below zero, landed with almost empty fuel tanks.

It was dragged to the arrival hangar where the 22 crew members and passengers got something to eat and drink, while there was carried out a hectic communication between the base and the military authorities in the United States. All telephone lines were in fact blocked for civilian calls, and additional staff was called up to talk in the military telephones.

After about three hours, the threads of the problem were unraveled so much that the airplane could be refueled, and shortly before 23:00, the Russians could tie off, heading back to Iceland.

(6q.DAO)

Information Paper
on

SUBJECT: Chinese Eastern Airlines MD-11 Emergency Landing at Eareckson Air Force Base, Alaska, 6 April 1993

1. Attached is a narrative summary of briefing given by the U.S. Alaskan Air Commander chronologically describing the story of the Chinese Eastern Airlines MD-11 emergency landing at Eareckson AFB on 6 April 1993. Eareckson AFB is located near the end of the Aleutian Island Chain, approximately 1500 miles from Anchorage, Alaska.

a. The airliner declared an in-flight emergency and reported 30 injured with one seriously injured passenger. The isolated island community rapidly moved into action following their disaster preparedness procedures. Within 30 minutes the entire base was mobilized and the medical staff setup a small medical aid station equipped to handle the 30 reported injuries.

b. The interior of the aircraft was a disaster area. Instead of 30 injuries, there were, serious injuries to 156 of the 255 passengers and crew members on board and ultimately two **fatalities**.

c. An aircraft hangar was prepared for **triaging** and passenger comfort. Personnel treated injured passengers and assisted 96 less seriously injured passengers with chairs, food, drinks, and emotional support.

d. A Navy P-3 (not an EP-3) and an Air Force RC-135 were both converted to handle patients on litters, and the medical evacuation to Elmendorf AFB. Other aircraft and air crews participated in this were: a Navy C-130, Coast Guard C-130, and C-141.

e. At Elmendorf, federal and municipal agencies and local hospitals were available to provide emergency assistance.

2. From the initial notification, some passengers departed Alaska as early as 30 hours later with some of the more severely injured departing a few days later.

3. The damaged MD-11 departed Eareckson AFB after repairs were completed.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only
MGen Garry Trexler/ Joint Staff/ 11 April 2001/224-5223

EVENT: Federal Executive Board Meeting, 1 Jun 93

SPEAKER: Lt Gen Ralston

Synopsis: The Commander of Alaskan Command and Eleventh Air Force tells the chronological story of the Chinese Eastern Airlines MD-11 emergency landing at Shemya AFB on 6 Apr 93 and the medical evacuation of 156 seriously injured passengers and crew members to Elmendorf AFB and Anchorage. Lt Gen Ralston highlights the professional response of the men and women on Shemya and the tremendous teamwork and cooperation displayed between military, federal, and civil agencies in Anchorage.

SLIDE #1 (ALCOM, II AF, ANR LOGOS)

(Introductory Greetings)

Today, I'll review the recent MD-11 China Eastern Airlines emergency landing at Shemya AFB, now Eareckson AFS, and the subsequent medical evacuation to Elmendorf and Anchorage. I think it's important to review the incident while it's still fresh in our minds, so we can capture the lessons learned and prepare for the next emergency we may face together.

SLIDE #2 (ALEUTIAN CHAIN SHOWING SHEMYA)

EARECKSON

To set the scene, ~~Shemya~~ Air Force Base is located near the end of the Aleutian Island Chain, approximately 1500 miles from Anchorage.

OPTIONAL FORM 90 (7-90)

As it turned out, the notification and quick mobilization proved critical, because the emergency was far worse than reported, or what you- would expect after seeing the exterior of the plane.

SLIDE #6 (INTERIOR VIEW OF MD-11)

The interior was a disaster area! Instead of 30 injuries, there were serious injuries to 156 of the 255 passengers and crew members on board and ultimately two fatalities. Injuries included debilitating head and neck injuries, broken bones, lacerations, and extreme shock., Adding to the confusion and communications problems, only 11 of the people on board understood or spoke any English.

SLIDE #7 (DAMAGED SEATS-SIDE VIEW)

The following pictures will give you a good idea of the forces involved in causing this much damage and injuries<

SLIDE #8 (DAMAGED AISLE SEAT)

Imagine the force involved to cause this much damage to the seat, let alone the person sitting there.

SLIDE #9 (CLOSE-UP OF SAME SEAT)

Here is a close-up of the same seat...

SLIDE #15 (GALLEY)

And finally, the galley. As you can imagine, it was a shock for our people to see the inside of the aircraft loaded with injured people. Captain Laura Towne our-sole doctor at Shemya, started immediate triage and had those with minor injuries removed from the plane, so there was more room to work on the seriously injured. The overall evacuation of passengers took three hours due to the severe destruction of the cabin area, closeness of seating, and the seriousness of the injuries.

SLIDE #16 (INSIDE HANGAR #6)

Nearby, a hangar was quickly prepared for further triaging and passenger comfort. Volunteers removed mattresses from an adjacent dormitory building and set-up beds in the emergency clinic. Still others assisted the 96 less seriously injured passengers with chairs, food, drinks, and most importantly, emotional support during this trying experience.

SLIDE #17 (MORE VOLUNTEERS)

Still others cut backboards out of plywood, and improvised I.V. holders out of lamp stands.

SLIDE #21 (LITTERS READY FOR FIRST EVACUEES)

The spirit of cooperation was magnificent throughout the medical evacuation. Ambulances and medical teams were standing by waiting for the evacuees when the first aircraft arrived at Elmendorf.

SLIDE #22 (UNLOADING P-3 ORION)

Our Aerial Port Squadron had the right equipment ready for immediate and careful off-load of the patients.

SLIDE #23 (MEDICAL TECHNICIANS)

Our medical technicians worked hand-in-hand with their civilian counterparts to properly treat and evacuate the seriously injured patients.

SLIDE #24 (MAP OF: ANCHORAGE HOSPITALS))

The City- Health Department worked with our 3rd Medical Center and the three hospitals in Anchorage to determine the best destination for each injured passenger. This slide depicts the location and number of patients each hospital received.

SLIDE #29 (AMBULATORY PATIENTS ARRIVE)

Finally, the ambulatory patients arrived on C-130's and were assisted by military, civilians, and Chinese translators from the Anchorage community. Without the Chinese Translators, communication with the passengers would have been nearly impossible.

SLIDE #30 (MORE AMBULATORY PATIENTS)

The humanitarian care continued as the final injured passengers arrived at Elmendorf and were evacuated to local hospitals for evaluation and treatment.

SLIDE #31 (2ND MD-11 AT SHEMA)

From the initial notification, until the last group of passengers departed for Anchorage on a second China Eastern Airlines MD-11, the total ordeal lasted over 30 hours for the folks on ^{EARECKSON} ~~Shemya~~. It continued a few days longer here in the, Elmendorf and Anchorage hospitals and for other civil and federal agencies taking care of the passengers' and arranging transportation to their final destinations.

snowflake

May 16, 2001 5:52 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Indonesia Mil-to-Mil

Where do we stand on military-to-military for Indonesia? Have we found out whether it is DoD or the Congress that has to make some changes?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051601-5

Indonesia

16 May 01

U09396 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/3814

snowflake

May 17, 2001 6:58 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Dan Gallington
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Sinai

At the NSC meeting, I told the President and Colin and Condi that I was going to move the issue of reducing our forces in the Sinai into the interagency process and that they would be seeing it come to them.

DHR:dh
051701-6

37002

MAY 0

U09397 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/3815

snowflake

May 17, 2001 6:54 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Belize

Please get back to me when you figure out whether or not Belize is a place we could do the bombing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051701-4

Belize

MAYO

U09399 /01

May 17, 2001 6:56 AM

TO: General Shelton
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3
SUBJECT: Nigeria

Please have someone tell me what we are training the Nigerians to do-what kind of lesson programs are there? Are we teaching them how to use equipment, or are we teaching them democracy and things like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051701-5

May 18, 2001 11:06 AM

TO: Marc Theissen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gingrich Comments

I read Newt Gingrich's language. I like the ideas. I think there is a lot there we can use. I think we ought to feel free to edit it, but I think it is a useful thing.

What do you think?

Attach.

5/17/01 Thiessen memo to SecDef re: Gingrich Comments

DHR:dh
051801-17

381

18 May 01

U09528 /01

May 17, 2001, 10:30 AM

~~TO:~~ The Secretary of Defense,

FROM: Marc Thiessen

SUBJECT: Gingrich Comments

M. Thiessen
MAY 17 2001

Speaker Gingrich sent us some suggested language this morning for possible inclusion in the testimony. I have attached it for your review. If you indicate ideas here you like, I can work them into the next draft.

Attach.

Gingrich comments, 5/17/01

5/17
2:00

NEWT GINGRICH COMMENTS

Thank you for allowing me to testify on behalf of the President and the Department of Defense. I come here today with a deep sense of shared responsibility and shared concern, The Founding Fathers wisely decided that the legislative and executive branches would share the burden of defending America. They realized that the cause of freedom could only survive if the power of the purse remained in the legislative branch while the daily conduct of foreign and defense policies had to be implemented by a single executive. They recognized that the laws which would regulate the raising of the army and the maintaining of the navy had to originate in the legislative branch and be signed by the President. Yet they also knew from long years of experience in the revolutionary War that there had to be one single Commander in Chief.

It was no accident that our first commander in chief as President had also been the Commanding General of the Continental Army and the President of the Constitutional Convention. President George Washington and his colleagues knew full well the process of politics, the art of government making, and the bitter, painful lessons of combat.

We meet 212 years later to sustain their great achievement. We must work together to continue to develop the defenses of the United States. I must report to you on behalf of the President, the men and women of the Defense Department and in light of my sworn obligation to help defend the United States. Similarly each of you has sworn an oath to defend the Constitution and we share this hallowed obligation,

It is especially appropriate for us to work together because your constituents are the young men and women whose interests I seek to represent. Your citizens live in the cities and towns we seek to protect. Your friends back home become the travelers overseas we work to keep safe, In this spirit of joint undertaking allow me to share for a moment my understanding of the realities which press upon us and of the strategic goals and the strategic needs of our country and the principles that will make it possible for us to achieve those goals and meet those needs. I think it is vital that we reach a mutual agreement about basic strategies and key principles before we seek to work out specific programs or adopt specific reforms. If we can agree on the larger realities and the larger goals and principles we can work together to find mutually acceptable solutions on the specific details.

Let me begin with a brief review of the realities which force us to remain strong. The world is dangerous. While it is true that there is no peer competitor on a global basis and there is no Soviet Union directly threatening us, it is equally true that weapons of mass destruction continue to proliferate and the risk of one of them being used continues to grow.

In the next two decades there is every reason to believe one or more rogue states will acquire weapons capable of inflicting significant damage and horrible casualties directly on the United States. Furthermore many of these states will have new horror weapons capable of harming our young men and women if we had to field another expeditionary force like Desert Shield.

The dangers of weapons of mass destruction are compounded by the possibility that terrorist organizations with global reach will acquire them and use them aggressively.

Our challenge is compounded because our interests continue to become more and more global. We are a nation with relatives in every country in the world. Wherever there is the threat of genocide there are Americans with family ties. Wherever there is the threat of violence and conquest there are Americans with family ties.

Our deepest values --"we hold these truths to be self evident"; our economic interests, our concerns for humanitarian decency and human rights, our interests in the environment--all carry us into places far beyond our national borders.

Our interests are compounded by our alliances. Ever since Pearl Harbor woke America 60 years ago we have been determined to keep war from our land by allying ourselves with nations across the planet. We won the Cold War by building the most comprehensive and durable **alliance** in human history. We help sustain countries throughout the world. We can not turn our back on them and abandon them to the savage, the ruthless, and the violent. We proved that in 1990 when Kuwait was invaded. We stand alert for our 48th year in Korea to continue deterring aggression against our ally.

We can take enormous pride in the increased prosperity, increased freedom, and increased safety which have grown from those alliances, We can also take pride in the commitments our allies have made in sustaining their portion of the alliance. The 28 other nations who joined us in Desert Storm made that operation far more successful and far safer for young Americans than it would have been if we had gone by ourselves.

Thus the reality of today is that the world is dangerous, that we have obligations across the globe to work with our friends and deter or if necessary defeat our opponents and that this is a burden we must work on together,

There are some key strategies which have evolved to cope with this complex dangerous reality since December 7, 1941. With the exception of the first year after World War II and the six years immediately after the Vietnam War there has been a remarkably consistent bipartisan and bicameral commitment to these strategic principles. Both Republican and Democratic Presidents and

Republican and Democratic Congresses have concluded that these principles are unavoidable and indeed are the basic foundation of American safety in a dangerous world.

These strategic principles began in the Second World War and were renewed when the Republican 80th Congress and the Democratic Presidency of Harry Truman came together to forge new institutions, create new laws, and provide new resources unprecedented for peacetime America. They have been part of our ongoing heritage for the last 60 years.

First, the United States will remain so prepared in peacetime that no rational adversary would try to defeat us.

Second, the United States will seek alliances and project power so that danger will always be as far from America as possible. When faced with an enemy or a rogue state we want to be on their border, we do not want them to be on our border.

Third, this requires the United States to undertake alliances, to keep our word, to be reliable, and to have the strength and the persistence to win if one of our allies is threatened.

Fourth, the United States is committed to using the most advanced science and technology and the best engineering to provide the greatest possible advantage over our potential opponents. We want our cities to be safe even if theirs are not. We want our young men and women to have the best chance to survive and win in combat. We have a moral obligation to develop the best science, create the best weapons, field the best equipped and best trained force. To do less would be to immorally betray those who risk their lives for America.

Fifth, the United States will be frugal in peacetime but we will never allow our forces to become so small or so undertrained that we suffer again the painful losses of the 1941-1942 campaign or the tragedy of Task Force Smith in Korea in 1950. Our forces will be large enough, robust enough, and trained enough to win the first battle. It is the only way to both save American lives and save American allies.

These five strategic principles have been the foundation of 60 years of remarkable leadership by the United States. But the time has come to add three additional principles which I would like to propose but which can only occur with the full support and help of the Congress.

Sixth, the world of science and technology is now changing so rapidly that we must develop a new ability to innovate and implement in a time comparable to

the modern commercial world rather than to the slow, ponderous bureaucracies which have grown over the last half century.

Seventh, the American military and the American taxpayer both deserve a Defense Department which equals the best of modern American management in leanness, quality orientation, agility and flatness of hierarchy. For a generation the gap has widened between the General Electrics, the Federal Expresses and the Wal-Marts on the one hand and the expensive burden in time, money and misfocus of people in the Defense Department. We cannot produce a 21st century defense with a mid-20th century model of bureauracy. That can only change with the help of the Congress.

Eighth, and finally, we can only create a worthy 21st century Defense Department if we can rebuild the trust between the legislative and executive branches. From Vietnam to the present there has been a steady erosion of trust. It has been replaced with micromanagement by the Congress and cynical manipulation by the Executive branch. We cannot truly create a modern system within that atmosphere, I pledge to you that I will listen to you, work with you, answer every question, meet every inquiry and with your help build a system of communications and teamwork which will allow you to believe that together we can build a system of sustainable trust, Trust cannot be given it has to be earned. With your help we will build it together and it will become the foundation from which together we can build the system which will met the other seven strategic goals.

I urge you to consider these eight strategic principles because they are the basis of everything else I will be proposing. If we agree on them we can eventually work everything else out. If we profoundly disagree on them we need to stop and work through that because we will have no mutual basis for helping defend our country.

For the moment, allow me to hope you will agree and move on to some more detailed examples of how I hope we can move forward.

##

snowflake

May 18, 2001 11:02 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUB SECT: Landmines

Here is a memo from Dov Zakheim on landmines. I find it confusing.

Would you please look it over and tell me where you think we are and what we ought to do?

Thanks.

Attach.

5/16/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef re: Costs for Landmines

DHR:dh
051801-16

4716

18 May 01

U09529 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/3824

INFO MEMO

②
Paul W

May 16, 2001 15:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

MAY 17 2001

SUBJECT: Costs for Landmines

- Dick Garwin and Bob Sherman were nice enough to come by and brief their solution to the **landmine** problem as it relates to the Ottawa treaty. The basis of their solution addresses U.S. policy regarding persistent landmines (anti-personnel/anti-vehicle). They firmly believe we should not sign the Ottawa treaty, and should maintain **only** short duration landmines of any type. Currently, 85 percent of our landmines are short duration, so their proposal effects only 15 percent of our **landmine** inventory that are persistent landmines. The Ottawa treaty only addresses anti-personnel mines and does not address anti-vehicle mines of any type. Both believe the U.S. could become the moral leader in this area by adopting such a policy.
- U.S. policy has supported not signing the Ottawa treaty until suitable alternatives are available. The U.S. has signed the Amended Mines Protocol (AMP) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which the U.S. ratified in May 1999. The AMP imposes significant restrictions on the use of landmines in order to curb the risk to noncombatants.
- In 1997, the Department of Defense began developing alternatives to anti-personnel landmines (APL). The major reasons for seeking alternatives to current APLs are humanitarian concerns and compliance with the Ottawa treaty, which was signed by 122 countries in 1997 and entered into force in March 1999.
- Track I, led by the U.S. Army, combines two efforts. The first, termed Remote Area-Denial Munitions (**RADAM**), combines the existing artillery-delivered anti-personnel and anti-tank mine programs. The second, Non-Self-Destructing Alternatives (NSD-A) is a **man-in-the-loop** alternative to the use of "dumb" anti-personnel landmines in Korea. RADAM is ready to enter production; NSD-A is ready to enter Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD).

5/17
1250

- Track II involves a DARPA program oriented towards longer-term solutions. DARPA is investigating two systems. One is the self-healing minefield, which can fill gaps as the minefield is being breached. The second system, as yet unnamed, is based on a concept where dismounted enemy soldiers are tagged with burr-like radio-frequency transmitters that can guide indirect or direct fires. This track is not funded beyond FY 02.
- Track III, managed by the Army, overlaps both Track I and Track II. This program's purpose is to find existing and new technologies and develop operational concepts that can provide a capability that is equivalent to our existing landmine capabilities. The Garwin proposal was given to the Joint Staff for evaluation and could be easily incorporated as one of the alternatives in Track III.
- It is not certain if any of our current efforts will meet the requirements of the Ottawa Convention or meet the milestones set by the previous Administration. Reducing Track I and II funding and enhancing Track III development could lead to savings of as much as \$600 million over 6 years.
- This program will be subject to the upcoming program and budget reviews.
- Current BES funding:

Program (M)	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08
KAJAM							
RDTE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Procurement	48.2	48.4	48.4	12.1	0.0	0.0	157.1
Total	48.2	48.4	48.4	12.1	0.0	0.0	157.1
NSD-A							
RDTE	21.2	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	24.2
Procurement	0.0	64.1	123.0	127.6	118.0	0.0	432.7
Total	21.2	67.1	123.0	127.6	118.0	0.0	456.9
Track III							
RDTE	26.3	26.4	43.9	50.3	0.0	0.0	146.9
Procurement	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	20.0
Total	26.3	26.4	43.9	70.3	0.0	0.0	186.9
TOTAL	95.7	141.9	215.3	210.0	118.0	0.0	780.9

COORDINATION: OSD PA&E

Prepared By: Larry Lanzillotta, (b)(6)

snowflake

May 3, 2001 4:45 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Costs for Landmines

Please take a look at this and see what you can find.

Thank you.

Attach.

5/3/01 SecDef memo to DepSec re: "Landmines" [050301-29]

DHR: dh
050301-30

11-L-0559/OSD/3827

01 may 023

snowflake

May 3, 2001 4:43 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Landmines

On the subject of landmines, if you are not knowledgeable about what Dick Garwin's views are, you probably ought to talk to him. I think what he told me was we shouldn't sign Ottawa.

He also said that 85% of our mines are already okay, that what we need are self-deactivating or self-destructive minefields, or minefields on demand.

He said with a small amount of dollars you could stick a little tube in them and achieve that.

We certainly ought to take a quick look at the budget and see how we can save some of that billion dollars I am told is in there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050301-29

11-L-0559/OSD/3828

May 3, 2001 4:43 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Landmines

471.6

On the subject of landmines, if you are not knowledgeable about what Dick Garwin's views are, you probably ought to talk to him. I think what he told me was we shouldn't sign Ottawa.

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
050301-29

3 May 01

May 3, 2001 4:45 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3
SUBJECT: Costs for Landmines

Please take a look at this and see what you can find.

Thank you.

Attach.

5/3/01 SecDef memo to DepSec re: "Landmines" [050301-29]

DHR:db
050301-30

May 19, 2001 8:12 AM

SUBJECT: Phone Call from Benjamin Netanyahu 5/18/01

He called to talk about missile defense. He said he has been reading broadside attacks against our ballistic missile defense proposals and had two thoughts:

1. He said the argument that rogues will be deterred anyway and ballistic missile defense is not needed is nonsense. Saddam Hussein was not deterred from going into Kuwait and won't be in the future. Imagine the extent to which he would be deterred if he had nuclear capability and had his finger on the button
2. He pointed out that never in history have there been nuclear weapons in the hands of individuals who have no structure around them to serve as buffers to decision-making. Most nuclear powers are democracies. Even the Soviet Union, though certainly a dictatorship and not a democracy, had a structure that would keep a single individual from using those weapons irresponsibly.

DHR:dh
051901-2

May 18, 2001 1:33 PM

TO: Honorable Mitch Daniels
 Director, OMB

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Caps on Defense

1/10/01

Ted Stevens says he would oppose caps on defense. He also seemed to be in disagreement with what you indicated had to be done with respect to the caps.

Also, he recommended reprogramming instead of rescissions.

You might want to have *someone sort that* out.

DHR:dh
051801-14

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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<i>Cambridge</i>	/
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FILE	

18 May 01

FAXED TO OMB VIA
WH SIT ROOM

snowflake

TO: Larry DiRita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: May 22, 2001
SUBJECT: **DoD Defense Legislative Activity Workload**

032

Here's a piece of paper that I found in my files dating back to 1977. I wonder if there is some way to update this and put in new numbers, easily.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052101.59
Attach.

22 MAY 01

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY WORKLOAD

NUMBER OF WITNESSES	HOURS OF TESTIMONY	NUMBER OF COMMITTEES HEARING DOD TESTIMONY																		
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="border: none;">1964</td> <td style="border: none;">1976</td> <td style="border: none;">% INCREASE</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">630</td> <td style="border: none;">1,721</td> <td style="border: none;">173</td> </tr> </table>	1964	1976	% INCREASE	630	1,721	173	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="border: none;">1964</td> <td style="border: none;">1976</td> <td style="border: none;">% INCREASE</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">650</td> <td style="border: none;">1,425</td> <td style="border: none;">119</td> </tr> </table>	1964	1976	% INCREASE	650	1,425	119	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="border: none;">1964</td> <td style="border: none;">1976</td> <td style="border: none;">% INCREASE</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">24</td> <td style="border: none;">75</td> <td style="border: none;">213</td> </tr> </table>	1964	1976	% INCREASE	24	75	213
1964	1976	% INCREASE																		
630	1,721	173																		
1964	1976	% INCREASE																		
650	1,425	119																		
1964	1976	% INCREASE																		
24	75	213																		
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS ON BUDGET SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	PAGES IN CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION BOOKS	WRITTEN INQUIRIES (ESTIMATE)																		
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="border: none;">FY 1964</td> <td style="border: none;">FY 1977</td> <td style="border: none;">% INCREASE</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">293</td> <td style="border: none;">585</td> <td style="border: none;">100</td> </tr> </table>	FY 1964	FY 1977	% INCREASE	293	585	100	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="border: none;">FY 1964</td> <td style="border: none;">FY 1977</td> <td style="border: none;">% INCREASE</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">7,189</td> <td style="border: none;">11,927</td> <td style="border: none;">66</td> </tr> </table>	FY 1964	FY 1977	% INCREASE	7,189	11,927	66	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="border: none;">1964</td> <td style="border: none;">1976</td> <td style="border: none;">% INCREASE</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">98,000</td> <td style="border: none;">127,000</td> <td style="border: none;">30</td> </tr> </table>	1964	1976	% INCREASE	98,000	127,000	30
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1964	1976	% INCREASE																		
98,000	127,000	30																		

TELEPHONE INQUIRIES (ESTIMATE)		
1964	1976	% INCREASE
568,000	650,000	14

1-L-0559/OSD/3835

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEGISLATIVE ACT

NUMBER OF WITNESSES			HOURS OF TESTIMONY		
1964	1975	% INCREASE	1964	1975	% INCREASE
630	1,165	85	650	3,538	444

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS ON BUDGET SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE			PAGES IN CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION BOOKS		
FY 1975	FY 1976	% INCREASE	FY 1970	FY 1976	% INCREASE
293	745	154	7,189	12,627	74

TELEPHONE INQUIRIES (ESTIMATE)		
1964	1975	% INCREASE
568,000	900,000	58

- These trends indicate that the Congress is significantly increasing its demands on the Dept. at for information, testimony, and other assistance. We are not arguing that the Congress should not be concerned with Defense management. The issue is cost, and the impact of such demands upon Defense staffing.
- Appearing before Congress, answering written questions, and processing thousands of Congressional requests -- all subject to deadlines -- generate a tremendous workload and demand the time and attention of many people. A few statistics, some of which are ballpark estimates, illustrate this workload.
- Growth in budget line items and Congressional Report action items indicates growth in Congressional demand for budget detail and in special requirements reflected in specific legislation. Similarly, the growth in reprogramming requirements imposes additional administrative workload on DOD -- all of which increase staffing requirements. The growth in witnesses and manhours also increases workloads as well as DoD costs.
- DoD also last year responded to over 3 million separate written or telephonic inquiries, an increase of 50 percent over 1964.
- Unless there is a significant curtailment or restraint on the part of the Congress, we foresee a continuing increase in the percentage of the Defense dollar and work force devoted to the Congressional workload.
- NOTES ON CHART:

1/ Totals are obtained by counting items in appropriate reports.

2/ Requires Congressional approval for reprogramming.

3/ Reprogramming restrictions did not exist officially until, FY 1972. Figures for FY 1968 are line item reductions.

TO: Lisa Bronson
cc: Mark Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 22, 2001
SUBJECT: **NATO**

I don't know how many members there are in NATO now. I guess it is 19. I found this old piece of paper from years ago after Spain went in, I think. I was trying to figure out how many simultaneous bi-laterals occurred in front of everyone else and I got up to something like 120. I think one important point about NATO is it does permit all of these countries, including us, to talk to each other and accomplish a great deal. Imagine trying to replicate that many bi-laterals; the amount of energy and effort and time.


However, it would not accomplish the same thing. Even if you did take the time, energy, money and effort to do that many bi-laterals, indeed the unique advantage of NATO is that these bi-laterals take place in front of each other. They are not bi-laterals, they are multi-laterals. It is particularly important because the larger countries talk in front of the smaller countries, as Andre De Staercke once said. Everyone has a chance to hear and comment and consider.

Why don't you calculate what the current total number is. I may want to say something about that at NATO.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052101.74
Attach. (NATO doc.)

TO: Secretary of Defense
FROM: Lisa Bronson
DATE: May 23, 2001



Sir: The current total number would be 171, based on 19 allies.

$(n-1) + (n-2) + (n-3) \dots + 1$

when "n" = the number of nations

snowflake

TO: Pete Aldridge
Dov Zakheim
Barry Watts

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RA*

DATE: May 22, 2001

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is a letter from Jay Garner that I found helpful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052101.58
Attach.

470

22 May 01

U09707 /01

Jay Garner
 President,
SY Technology, Inc
 1745 Jeff Davis Hwy
 Crystal Sq #4 Suite 1000
 Arlington VA 22202
 Ph: (b)(6)
 Fax: (b)(6)

facsimile transmittal

To: SECRETARY RUMSFELD Fax: (b)(6)

From: LTG (R) JAY GARNER Rate; MAY 16, 2001

Re: Pages: 3 + COVER

- Urgent For Review Please Comment Please Reply Please Recycle
-

5/16
 2:45 PM

May 16, 2001

Mr. Secretary,

Thax for the kind note. I did not sit on a panel involving CRUSADER. I think **what you** saw was a **story** in either the New York Times and/or the Wall Street Journal stating that in 1996-97 as the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, responsible for the Army's QDR effort, I attempted to kill CRUSADER but was prevented **from** doing so by the Senior Army leadership. Let me briefly explain the background: The roots of the requirement for CRUSADER arc found in the Cold War. The Russians **are** great believers in artillery and it is the biggest killer on the battlefield; they refer to artillery as the "God of War". When Stalin began his final push to destroy the German Sixth **Army** at Stalingrad, **he** began with the planning of Soviet Artillery genius General Nokolai Voronov, who used seven thousand pieces of heavy **artillery** along a seven mile front to destroy the German perimeter. German resistance at Stalingrad (which had lasted for about 5 mos.) ended less than a month later. This is just one example of the Soviet use of massive artillery, there **are** many others, Consequently, the Soviets and their surrogates have always fielded large formations of artillery. We could never compete with them; in **terms** of quantity, so we choose to challenge them with quality; to us, this meant significant technological improvements in mobility, range and rate of fire. From this grew the requirement for AFAS (Advanced Field Artillery System, now known as CRUSADER). AFAS was to be a liquid propellant gun which would have revolutionary improvements over the current system PALADIN, Rare of fire would be improved by a **factor** of 4 to 5, range would be doubled, and **cross-county** speed and dash speed to cover would be equal to the Abrams and Bradley family. However, by 1996 we realized that we were pushing liquid propellant technology beyond what was possible and the decision was made to revert the program to conventional (but vastly improved) Cannon Artillery Tube and Armament Technology while retaining the revolutionary features of AFAS (auto loader, crew cockpit, mobility, lighter armor, etc). It was at **this time that I** advocated killing the program. My thought was to take a portion of the money and to plus-up the tech base and to continue to develop liquid propellant technology; with **the** remaining dollars I wanted to pursue two developments: First, to extend the range of

11-L-0559/OSD/3848

ATACMS to over **400km** (this has important underpinnings that we should discuss at a **later** date) and to also **extend** the range of MLRS rockets to 50-60 km with increased precision. Second, would be to up-gun the power train and the engine of the PALADIN so it could approach keeping up with the **Abrams/Bradley** force (it doesn't come close to this now, in fact there were several times during the Gulf War that the Maneuver Force had to slow down or halt in order for the artillery to catch up.) The validity of my argument isn't important, it simply provides the rationale for my position to terminate CRUSADER in 1997.

Now it's four years later and that brings us to today's dilemma... to kill it or keep it. I think that I know all of the arguments being made to terminate the CRUSADER program and I think that some have merit. However, I believe that there are a few mitigating issues, which may not have been expressed to you, that may favor production at some **level**...let me discuss three areas: technology, force structure and the industrial base.

Technology: CRUSADER is the carrier that provides the **technological** path to the Army's Objective Force and for the Future Combat System (**FCS**). Because of this, the technical and schedule risk for the FCS and its variants will be significantly increased without the technology maturation process they will experience in the CRUSADER program (this also has Joint implications. The DD-21 Advanced Gun System is depending upon the maturation of Gun technologies in CRUSADER.). CRUSADER is also the carrier for two important future combat vehicle **technologies**. One is the Automatic Loader Capability, which allows us to reduce manning and increase the rate of fire; the other is the light survivable armor technology that will greatly reduce **the** weight while vastly improving the **survivability** of all future combat vehicles.

Force Structure: **Until** the Objective Force is fully fielded (my guess is that this will not be until 2025 or later) **our** Nation's sustained Ground War-winning capability will be in a single US **Army** Mechanized Corps consisting of 3 divisions. **In** anticipation of the rapid long-range precision fires that CRUSADER **brings** to **this** force, the **Army** has reduced the force structure of each of the Mechanized Divisions by 70 **Abrams**, 56 Bradleys, 18

Paladins and approximately 2000 combat soldiers (a battery of 6 **CRUSADERS** produces the same firepower as an 18 gun battalion of **PALADINS**). Thus, due to these structure reductions, the combat power of these divisions is about 25% less, Without **CRUSADER**, they are today far less potent than they were during the Desert War.

Industrial Base: **UDLP**, the Prime for **CRUSADER**, is one of two combat vehicle suppliers in the U.S. (the other is **GD**), **UDLP** is one of the world's preeminent Artillery Armament System designers; the others are European. Termination will rapidly eliminate those skill sets in both the Government and the private sector. The U.S. production of future indirect fire systems will be jeopardized. Finally, termination will leave the U.S. with only **GD** as an important combat vehicle producer. To me, **GD** without a competent U.S. combat vehicle competitor is not a desirable scenario for future **DoD**.

Let me sum this up by saying that I do see merit in some of the arguments for **termination**. But, having said that, I think the prudent decision at this point in time would be to procure a limited number of **CRUSADERS...enough** for the Mechanized Corps, somewhere around 250 systems plus or minus a few. As previously stated, this would to allow us to mature important technologies without having to **restart** them elsewhere; make important capability improvements to a Legacy Corps that is already aging and will be with us for another 25 years; and, preserves an important element of the U.S. industrial base while keeping **GD** and the Europeans honest.

Thax for the opportunity to correspond.

Jay

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

22 MAY 01

TO: CBI - DR WELLS

REF: Brubaker Article, Federal
Computer Week (22 May snafu)

Sir

1. THE SECRETARY WONDERS IF
SOMEONE IS PROPOSING THAT
WE COMBINE THE CONTROLLER + CIO
JOBS?
2. HIS INSTRUCTION IS NOT TO COMBINE
3. PLEASE ADVISE HIM

Respectfully
Maier

U09717 /01

02
COM

22 MAY

fers the latest in a growing body of evidence to suggest that Mr. Kim is at once a tactical genius and a strategic fool, qualities that may be a major obstacle to progress in both South Korean and U.S. relations with North Korea. In an effort aimed at regaining the spotlight, putting pressure on the Bush administration, and reassuring Kim Dae-jung on North-South, Mr. Kim met with a senior EU delegation.

All three elements of Mr. Kim's tactics were revealed in the EU discussions as was Mr. Kim's pleasure in placing himself on the world stage. Mr. Kim pledged to continue his moratorium on missile testing until 2003 (not coincidentally, the year when the two LWRs under the Agreed Framework are supposed to be completed). Yet at the same time, he told the EU envoys that Pyongyang would continue exporting missiles and missile technology, principally, because he "needs the money." Finally, he sent the EU delegation off to Seoul with a private letter for Kim Dae-jung reassuring the ROK that the North-South reconciliation process and perhaps his promise of a second Kim-Kim summit are not dead.

Kim Jong-il's use of the EU visit as (to use a billiard term) a political "bank shot" to the U.S. was particularly impressive. By reinforcing the North Korean missile test moratorium while at the same time emphasizing North Korea would continue its destabilizing missile exports Mr. Kim was sending a clear "carrot and stick" message to Washington as it nears the final stages of its Korea policy review. Kim Jong-il's commitment to the missile moratorium was a signal that Pyongyang remains eager to pursue missile talks with the U.S.; Mr. Kim's proclamation that North Korea would continue exporting missiles was his "stick" designed to bring a sense of urgency to restarting U.S.-North Korean talks.

Mr. Kim's performance is fascinating, and interestingly suggests that many critics of the Bush "go slow" approach to North Korea were dead wrong. Recall, it was argued that there was a narrow "win-

dow of opportunity" for a mis-sile deal and that President Bush must immediately start in "muddling through," for his where President Clinton left regime, but the price has been off. Not true. Pyongyang has at great cost hundreds of thousands elsewhere else to go.

In fact, the "time out" for death, widespread deprivation, North Korea called by the and 22 million Koreans with Bush administration has al- little hope for a decent life.

ready yielded some important benefits. Instead of the U.S. strategy beyond immediate and South Korean constantly survival by living off of global begging Pyongyang to come to handouts? His choices range the table, it is Kim Jong-il who from bad to worse. The North is now the one eager to resume Korean economic system has talks. This reverses the un- failed and tinkering with it healthy diplomatic patterns fers little respite from falling created by the Clinton admini- stration, always begging and bribing Pyongyang just to at- tend meetings, Now Mr. Bush has been described as the is setting the terms of diplo- macy rather than reacting to Pyongyang's games. This is an important prerequisite for a China and Vietnam suggest re- new policy.

Indeed, Kim Jong-il's be- havior suggests that Mr. Bush's assessment of the situa- tion and of U.S.-South Korean- Japanese leverage is correct.

Faced with a perpetual food shortage nearly 2 million tons this year and a still moribund economy, North Korea's des- peration is growing. At the same time, the very success of its "feed me or I'll kill you" extortion tactics over the past six years is constraining Py- ongyang's behavior even as it keeps North Korea on life sup- port. Instead of missile to launches, or provocations in the Demilitarized Zone, Py- ongyang's reaction to Mr. Bush's skepticism and rethink- ing of Korea policy has been merely therapeutic spewing abusive rhetoric at Washington and Seoul. The fact is that the massive amounts of food, fer- tilizer and other international aid that have poured into North Korea from the U.S., South Korea and the international community since 1995 have given Mr. Kim Jong-il some- thing to lose. This suggests new boundaries for North Ko- rean behavior and increased leverage for U.S.-South Ko- rean-Japanese trilateral diplo- macy.

Unfortunately for the fu- ture of Korea, Kim Jong-il's sense of strategy is as flawed as his tactics are clever. His tactics, of course, are designed to ensure regime survival at the lowest possible cost and lowest risk. This has so far succeeded where President Clinton left regime, but the price has been off. Not true. Pyongyang has at great cost hundreds of thousands elsewhere else to go.

In fact, the "time out" for death, widespread deprivation, North Korea called by the and 22 million Koreans with Bush administration has al- little hope for a decent life.

same mistake with Kim Dae- jung that he made with Mr. Clinton. His mistake with the United States has meant Py- ongyang now has to deal with a much tougher administration in Washington.

Kim Dae-jung has provided Pyongyang every reasonable opportunity to move forward on genuine North- south reconciliation. But unless there is rapid progress during the remainder of this year, Kim Dae-jung will be- come a lame duck as the South Korean presidential election campaign begins early next year. It is unlikely that Kim Jong-il find a more patient, generous and magnanimous partner to deal with in Seoul than Kim Dae-jung in the fore- seeable future. Thus, yet an- other opportunity may be missed.

There was a classic epi- sode in the old comic strip "Pogo," where Pogo says sagely, "We have met the enemy and he is us." In the end, for all his tactical genius, Kim Jong-il will remain a strategic fool in charge of a deco- ring state and society unless he makes the difficult choices needed to move toward a soft landing and peaceful coexist- ence. Even the best-conceived and executed U.S. and South Korean policies can do little to fix such a "Pogo problem."

Robert A. Manning is senior fellow and director of Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Federal Computer Week
May 14, 2001
27. Keep CIO, Comptroller Apart

By Paul Brubaker
The Defense Department is considering a much-needed reorganization of the chief information officer duties. The leading scenario, and the source of much recent speculation, involves placing the CIO within the comptroller's office. That would be a colossal mistake. The CIO organization must work with the comptrol- ler's office not under it. The legislative intent in creating a CIO was for that person to be independent of any other organization within a department

or agency so that information resources management could be the CIO's primary duty. It was also envisioned that the CIO would have a seat at the management table alongside the chief financial officer (i.e., the comptroller) and the chief operating officer.

The CIO is also tasked under the Clinger-Cohen Act with leading process change. Under the comptroller's wing, the CIO would lose the independence to perform that function — a serious problem, because process change is something the comptroller's office desperately needs but has failed to achieve.

Controlling the purse strings gives the comptroller's office great power and authority. For example, an attempt by Congress and the DOD CIO office to stop an accounting system that was high-risk, over-budget and behind schedule was overturned because "that's what the comptroller wanted." Clearly, any CIO under the comptroller could not effectively oversee any financial systems, let alone successfully advocate reforming DOD's antiquated financial systems.

A third reason to keep the CIO independent is that the comptroller's civilian leadership is loath to reform. Two anecdotes support that contention. Several months ago, while serving as the deputy CIO within DOD, I had just completed a high-level briefing on the need for transforming the existing major management processes at the Pentagon. The highest-ranking civilian in the comptroller's shop stopped me and said, "That [transformation] stuff may work in the private sector, but that's not how we do business in the Pentagon."

Just a few weeks later, another senior official in the office said, "The current budget planning system has served the department well for the last 40 years." The comptroller has also constantly rejected budget requests required to implement Clinger-Cohen at DOD.

The comptroller's shop has a history of hostility toward innovation. Had the CIO shop been, housed inside the comptroller's shop during con-

sideration of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet project, neither it nor any other innovation would have occurred.

One of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's major priorities is to change the antiquated processes at the department. So it is possible that new leadership may be able to overcome the resisters of change throughout the organization. But this will take a dogged tenacity and commitment from the top.

Most importantly, it will take an independent CIO organization working with the comptroller rather than under it.

Brubaker is president of e-government solutions at Commerce One Inc., a former deputy chief information officer at the Defense Department and an architect of the Clinger-Cohen Act.

San Antonio Express-News
May 15, 2001

28. Defense Picks Worrisome

Once again, Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., is standing up against business as usual in Washington and pointing out obvious conflicts of interest.

And once again, McCain's position pits him against his former presidential primary foe, George W. Bush.

The issue: Bush's appointment of defense industry honchos to key Pentagon posts.

Bush chose Gordon England of General Dynamics to be secretary of the Navy and James G. Roche, corporate vice president of Northrop Grumman Corp., to be Air Force secretary.

General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman are major defense contractors.

McCain raised the issue of conflicts of interest in a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing last week.

The nominees told senators they would recuse themselves from decisions involving their corporate connections, the Associated Press reported.

But it is discomfoting to have former high-ranking defense industry executives in-

volved in or close to decisions impacting their previous employers.

Plenty of potential nominees who do not have ties to the defense industry are available, and Bush is showing a lack of sensitivity to conflicts with these choices.

Boston Globe

May 14, 2001

Pg. 10

29. Spacey Rumsfeld

If the prospect of militarizing space were not such a serious matter, there would be something as zany as Stanley Kubrick's "Dr. Strangelove" in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's announcement Tuesday that he is shuffling the Pentagon's organizational chart in order to have a four-star Air Force general in charge of an Air Force Space Command.

Although Rumsfeld denied that his rearranging of chairs in the Pentagon has anything to do with the development of weapons for space, this new bureaucratic alignment - viewed alongside a commission on space he chaired five years ago and the clamor from some Republicans for space weapons - looks like part of a deliberate campaign to increase funding for the develop of antisatellite and anti-missile space weapons.

What is truly zany about the move to militarize space is that it resembles a perfectly designed boomerang that will come whistling back at the country that launched it.

"We are the only serious military presence in space at present," says Joseph Cirincione, &rector of the Carnegie Endowment's Non-Proliferation Project. "The Soviet Union was also there, but now Russian satellites are falling out of the sky. Today nobody else is even close to us, and it is very much in our interest to keep it that way. We should be trying to keep other countries out of space."

If the Bush administration pursues the development of space weapons, it will not war with Iraq and North Korea merely be diverting and wasting finite resources. It will also be making a strategic error.

In large part, the United States owes its military domi-

nance to a virtual monopoly on space satellites. Two years ago, when NATO planes were bombing Serb targets in the Kosovo war, satellites were used to target bridges and depots and to guide bombs to their targets.

"Kosovo was a space war," says John Pike, a prominent specialist on space weapons who is director of GlobalSecurity.org. To deter other countries from seeking to knock out American satellites, Pike says, the United States can rely on the overwhelming force it already possesses. The most effective way of preventing the American advantage in space is to codify and enforce a norm that defines any attack on a space satellite as justifying what Pike calls "grievous retaliation."

Without wasting enormous sums on the pursuit of laser weapons in space, American satellites can be better protected by launching more of them, placing them in higher orbits, having aircraft capable of providing backup, and making their ground stations much less vulnerable than they are today.

If Rumsfeld is permitted to pursue a space weapons boondoggle, the result will be to endanger America's unrivaled advantage in space satellites, squander money that should be spent on real needs, and possibly frighten allies and possible rivals who fear an American lust for global domination.

Chicago Tribune

May 14, 2001

30. Beyond The Two-War Scenario

Since the Cold War ended a decade ago, the Pentagon has built its force structure around the notion that the U.S. must be able to fight and win two major regional wars almost simultaneously to meet its global national security obligations.

The double-header of dangers most often depicted in Iraq and North Korea is nearing the end of a

Now the Bush administration is nearing the end of a Pentagon review amid reports that Defense Secretary Donald



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000



2001 JUN 11 AM 10:56

INFO MEMO

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

June 8, 2001, 10:00AM

DepSec Action: _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: LINTON WELLS II, ACTING ASD(C3I) *[Signature]* *6/11/01*

SUBJECT: Brubaker article in Federal Computer Week "Keep CIO, Comptroller Apart"

- In a snowflake dated May 22, 2001 (TAB B), you asked if someone is proposing that OSD combine the Comptroller and the CIO.
- The attached issue paper (TAB A), addresses this question and provides rationale for keeping the CIO functions aligned with the ASD(C3I).
- The assertion in the Federal Computer Week article that such a consolidation is "the source of much recent speculation," is correct. The proposal has been mentioned as one of several reorganization options in the context of increased management oversight and control of financial system IT resources.

COORDINATION: USD(C)

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Keith Dean, (b)(6)

020 COM

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June 1, 2001

ISSUE: Should the DoD CIO be combined with the Comptroller?

BACKGROUND:

- Discussions about the location of the CIO have considered four main alternatives: (1) stand up an independent CIO, (2) combine the CIO function with AT&L, (3) combine the CIO function with the Comptroller, (4) keep the CIO function with ASD(C3I).
- The Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) states that the CIO shall have "information resources management (IRM) duties as that official's primary duty." The CIO is responsible for providing information and advice regarding IRM and information technology (IT) to the agency head, and for ensuring that the acquisition, management and use of IT is consistent with the CCA principles.
- Based on successful private sector practices, the intent of CCA was to have a single individual who would focus on the role and function of IT within the agency. While the legislative history makes it clear that the CIO function was not to be combined with other major functions, this has become a common practice among federal agencies. Combining C3I and the CIO function is a logical choice since C3I's responsibilities for communications and intelligence complement CIO functions. The span of control is broad, but at least the both functions are founded on information.
- The CIO is the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) and advisor to the Secretary for IRM and IT. Thus, while the CIO has PSA responsibilities (i.e., DoD-wide policy development, planning, resources management, and oversight and evaluation), the CIO's responsibilities for IRM and IT span all functional areas. This means that the CIO has oversight of IRM and IT activities relevant to both joint mission areas and functional areas -- including, but not limited to, finance, logistics, C3ISR, etc.
- If the CIO is subordinate to the Comptroller or the USD(AT&L), IT decisions can easily take a back seat to other pressing issues. In his article, Mr. Brubaker argued against combining the CIO and Comptroller positions primarily on the grounds that the CIO would lose the independence needed to conduct oversight of information system investments, promote process change across functional boundaries, break down stovepipes, and make strategic IT investment decisions in the best interests of the enterprise. A CIO-CFO partnership is critical, but the functions must be separate and balanced.

RECOMMENDATION: Keep CIO functions with ASD(C3I).

POINT OF CONTACT: Acting DoD Deputy CIO, Margaret Myers,

(b)(6)

COORDINATION

USD(C) Dov Zacheim June 7, 2001

May 21, 2001 7:35 PM

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Ambassador Thomas Miller
Ambassador to Bosnia

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

SUBJECT: Remarks on Bosnia

BOSNIA

There have been some press reports on my remarks on Bosnia. Here is the actual text.

I am sorry if the incomplete coverage caused you any difficulties.

Best regards,

Attach.
USA Today transcript

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You talk about turbulence, and of course you bring people in, you move them a lot with their families which is not easy. It can be difficult for morale. It has an expense. It has an expense in dollars. It also has an expense in the capability a person develops in a given position. If you're there 12, 13, 14 months, you can imagine -- Think of you. If you did defense for 12 months and then went to something totally different; another 12 months, something totally different; you'd just be getting up to speed...

Stone: Right. So people are leaving just as they're sort of getting up to speed.

Rumsfeld: There is that question in my mind. So those are things I'm going to be looking at.

You asked about morale and quality of life.

Stone: Yes.

Rumsfeld: Some other things. Optempo is something that we have -- General Shelton and the Joint Staff and I and the policy shop, when we get someone there, are engaged in a look at where are we around the world, how are we arranged, and what are the things that are the most beneficial, and what are the things that are the least beneficial.

Stone: What sort of things --

Rumsfeld: How can we improve morale and the quality of life for the men and women in the armed services by possibly finding places we can reduce the commitment so that the tempo of their lives gets back to something they can live with. Less hectic.

Stone: You mentioned Bosnia as a place that we've finished our mission. Can you --

Rumsfeld: There's another instance that I'd like to amplify on.

Stone: Yes.

Rumsfeld: The United States went into Bosnia with a military role. I'm told that that military role was completed several years ago. I think there is general agreement.

It is not appropriate for our forces to come out at the present time -- not because the military role is not completed, but because they have not as yet developed the civil structure and the civil capability so that when the military forces are

removed there will continue to be a relatively stable situation. That work should have been going forward over the last period of years. It needs to go forward. I intend to encourage it to go forward. Because until it goes forward one would not want to abruptly pull any troops out of Bosnia.

Second, we went in with other countries, we will go out with other countries, and any implication to the contrary is probably not appropriate.

Stone: Do you have a timeframe in mind?

Rumsfeld: You can't. You can't have a timeframe. I have a timeframe that's very different from what the behavior pattern in the past has been. The behavior pattern in the past has been to leave them in there because there is nothing in its place, but not to put a lot of effort and energy to put something in their place on the civil side. I think that's what needs to be done.

Stone: So you're saying in the last few years, three or four years, it's been static, not a lot of effort to go forward?

Rumsfeld: Let me state what I know and not what I don't know.

What I know is that the military -- I'm told the military task was finished several years ago. They are still there. The reason they are still there is because the civil side has not been sufficiently fashioned so that when the military comes out there will be a stable situation.

How much effort was put into trying to do that over the past several years, I don't know. Were there efforts that failed, I don't know. Was it possible there was very little effort at all? That's possible. But I don't know that. **All I** know is that it isn't there.

Of course once U.S. troops or any troops get into a place, they tend to be so-called, so to speak, free. They don't cost the country anything to speak of. They cost the American taxpayer, so they're not free at all. But it is comforting to have them there. And it's understandable that people would want them to continue.

But I don't think military forces that are really for military purposes ought to stay in places where there isn't a military function and where they're in effect doing civil functions. That is exactly what's happening in Bosnia.

We went into the Sinai 20 years ago -- not with the theory

that it would become permanent. And I have raised that issue as well. Indeed, we're looking all across the globe.

Stone: How about Kosovo?

Rumsfeld: I have not -- that's a subject for the National Security Council to address, and we haven't talked about it. I don't have any particular defined opinions like I'm developing with respect to Bosnia and the Sinai.

Stone: Is there anything else you would put on that list with Bosnia, Sinai --

Rumsfeld: We're looking across the globe at how we're doing. I mean I've been involved in U.S. forces in Nigeria training Nigerians to assist in Sierra Leone; Haiti. There's these types of things going on in many, many places in the world and so --

Stone: What's your thought on training troops in Nigeria?

Rumsfeld: I beg your pardon?

Stone: What's your thought on training troops...

Rumsfeld: The President decided that he felt that was a good thing to do and we're doing it.

Stone: So you're going to continue that.

Rumsfeld: I didn't say that.

Stone: Okay.

Rumsfeld: I said we're going to do what we agreed to do. That was a fairly explicit number of battalions as I recall. Two and then three to follow, maybe. A total of five?

Quigley: A total of five, yes, sir.

Stone: Total of five training battalions?

Rumsfeld: Well, don't quote me. He can give the --

Quigley: We'll check that. A total of five Nigerian battalions have been or will be trained.

Rumsfeld: My recollection is that we've done a couple and that there is a -- we may currently be doing some in Senegal and Ghana. Then we have an understanding that we'll go ahead and do

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 22, 2001
SUBJECT: **American Patriotism Article**

Here's a letter I received from John Howard, and also a copy of *Officer Review* and the paper that will be appearing in it.

You might want to think about moving that around in some way. I wouldn't know how to do it, but you might know.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
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Attachs. (1 -Officer *Review* Magazine
2-"American Patriotism" by Dr. Howard)

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American Patriotism
By Dr. **John A. Howard**, Senior Fellow
The Howard Center on **Family**, Religion and Society
Rockford, Illinois

The date is September **20**, 1945: **The setting** is **Chungking**, China, where General A. C. Wedemeyer is hosting a dinner for eleven American soldiers just released **from** a Japanese prison camp. Years later, General Wedemeyer reported what happened that evening after he had offered a toast, to his honored guests.

General "Skinny Wainwright, tall and **gaunt**, arose unsteadily to respond in **behalf** of his comrades. He **pulled** from his shirt pocket a wrinkled, piece of paper. There was silence. Clearing his throat, the old general read slowly. "**Not** for **fame** or reward, not for place or for rank, not goaded by necessity, nor lured by ambition, my **men** suffered all, **sacrificed** all, dared all, and many died. A glorious victory **was won**, and we thank God and you for **our** freedom tonight.

From a 4/28/83 speech to the
China, Burma, India Veterans
Association

This sense of patriotic duty, so powerfully phrased by the general, was shared by most of America's troops in World War **II**. That generation **grew up in** a time when the school day began with the pledge of allegiance and often a patriotic song, and all **the children studied the history** of the United States and learned about the lives **and judgments** of **the remarkable** men who forged the American government.

James Russell Lowell, the American poet and diplomat, was once asked by the French historian, **Francois Guizot**, how long the American Republic would endure? "As long", said Lowell, "**as** the ideas of the men who founded it remain dominant."

During the half century since World War **II**, the ideas of the Founders have lost their prominence in the schooling process and receive scant attention by the nation's authors, poets and playwrights and political leaders. The Fourth of **July**, our country's patriotic holiday, offers the **occasion to revisit some** of the ideas of the Founders.

In most **other** nations, the-people's devotion to the homeland is- inspired by a rich mix of cultural **features** uniquely their own-distinctive language, -cuisine, beverages and clothing, folk heroes; literary, artistic and-musical **giants from** centuries past, and architectural wonders **known to every** child-a mosaic of national treasures. American patriotism is altogether different. Consider for instance; the fairly recent admission to the Union of **Hawaii** and Alaska:. These two territories, culturally, were remarkably. **different** from each other **and** from the forty-eight states, and yet both were **instantly accepted** as full and equal **partners**. This welcoming embrace of peoples of a dissimilar heritage is an extraordinary occurrence, and reflects the particular **nature of** our national origin.

The **American Revolution** was fought for a single purpose, to achieve freedom from British tyranny; The Declaration of Independence **cited twenty-**seven kinds of **oppressive action**, and reported the-prolonged and futile efforts the **colonists had** made to **bring an end to these** injustices. The anger and-frustration reached the point that Patrick, Henry burst out; "**Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?"**

The price Americans paid **for their freedom was** eight long years of war and, hardship and sacrifice. When liberty was finally achieved, its protection was the primary concern in designing the constitution **and in** adding nine amendments that specified rights of the citizens which could not be diminished or negated by the government.

The creation of The United States of America shattered existing concepts of political institutions. In a speech at Colonial Williamsburg, the British author, Barbara Ward, said, "The men who legislated here nearly two centuries ago.. **.with** breath-taking audacity stood up in this little-room and dared **to** legislate for mankind. For-make no mistake-that is what they **were** doing. They do not say, '**we** Virginians', they do not say, '**we Americans,**' they say 'all men:' 'All men are **free** and independent,' 'all have certain rights,' 'government ought to be constituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people.' " Although she was referring to the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted in June 1776, these concepts were principles **enshrined** in The Declaration of Independence a month later.

The Founding Fathers not only knew from-their own experience how precious liberty is to the human being, but they also knew that it was at least **as difficult** to sustain liberty as it was to achieve it.

In his Inaugural Address, George Washington dwelt primarily on what he believed to be of the greatest importance- to-the **new government**, the character of the people and of their elected officials. "Rectitude and patriotism'? he saw as the

surest guarantees that conflicting interests would not destroy the fledgling republic. The **foundation of national policy**," he said, **must** be "the pure and immutable principles of private **morality**."

Washington stressed standards, of **the highest** character throughout his career in the army and the government: **In this emphasis**, he was transmitting the wisdom of the French political **philosopher**, Charles de Montesquieu, whose major work, The Spirit of the Laws (1748), set forth a number of principles woven into the U.S. Constitution. Montesquieu **explained that a republic** could only **survive** as long as its people were virtuous.

In every society there must be **some** means for bringing about the cooperation of **the** participants so that, together, they can accomplish the purposes of **the** group. Each individual faces the **conflict** between what he may want to do at a given moment and what the **group** may **need to** have him do. This **push-pull** occurs in all organized activities, a **baseball team, a family**, or a business enterprise. It is especially difficult to **achieve the necessary** degree of cooperation for a nation of **free** citizens.

Most governments decide **what they require** of the people, and issue decrees to be enforced by police, **and by punishments**, which in some nations are brutal and inhumane. In a smoothly **operating free society**, the cooperation of the citizens is primarily **achieved, not by laws, but by the** willingness of the people to abide by innumerable, **informal standards of conduct**. These include, lawfulness, **truthfulness**, civility, **manners, morals**, kindness, **respect** for the other, **person's** rights and sensitivities, **sportsmanship, loyalty, marital fidelity**, integrity, earning ones own way, and many **more, above all, a willingness** to use social pressures to encourage other people **to abide by the informal rules**.

As long as such civilized **codes** of behavior are generally **observed**, the people can live together amicably **and productively**. When the informal rules break down, trouble follows. **When large numbers of citizens** revert to the savage inclinations to cheat and lie **and steal and vandalize, and in** other ways take advantage of their neighbors, **then the government is called** on to pass more and more **laws**, and hire more police, **and build more prisons**, and the free society, no longer **virtuous**, turns **itself into** a new **tyranny as the** laws and penalties keep multiplying.

The Founding Fathers' recognition **that the well** being of the free nation depends on the character of the people was still **of the** highest concern to American statesmen when the seventh president, Andrew Jackson gave **his** Farewell Address in 1837.

"Knowing that the path of freedom is continually beset by enemies **who** often assume the guise of friends; **I have devoted the last** hours of my public life to warn you **of the dangers**. The progress of the United States **under our free and happy institutions** surpassed the **most sanguine hopes of the founders** of the Republic. . . **You have no longer any** cause to fear danger from **abroad. . . it is from within**, among yourselves-from **cupidity, from corruption, from disappointed ambition and mordinate thirst** for power-that factions **will be formed and liberty** endangered.

. . . **You have the highest of human trusts** committed to your care. **Providence has showered** on this **favored land blessing without number and has** chosen you as guardians of **freedom, to preserve** it for the human race.

The ideas of **the Founder** that James Russell Lowell believed **to** be the essential foundation of our free society have not been kept alive in the **public** consciousness over the last **half-century**. **General Wainwright's** troops clearly understood the obligations **which free citizens must accept, and** the sacrifices which **free** citizens must make. Somehow, **in the years** since that time, America has failed to introduce new generations to their **cultural** heritage. **The task** now is to help all Americans understand why honorable **conduct** in all aspects of life and **sacrificing** for the general well-being are **the marks** of a true American patriot, and are the best **guarantees** of their liberty.

JOHN A. HOWARD
Senior Fellow in Educational Philosophy
THE HOWARD CENTER FOR FAMILY, RELIGION & SOCIETY
934 North Main Street
Rockford, IL 61103
(b)(6)

PERSONAL DATA

Born: Evanston, IL (b)(6)

Married: (b)(6)

Children:

POSITIONS HELD

Palos Verdes College: Instructor 1947-49, Dean of Students 1949-51,
President 1951-55

President Eisenhower's Committee on Government Contracts: Executive Vice
Chairman 1956-57

Northwestern University: Instructor and Graduate Student 1957-59

Rockford College: President 1960-77

Rockford College Institute: Director 1976-80

The Rockford Institute: President 1980-86, Counselor 1986-1997

Ingersoll Foundation: President 1982--

The Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society: Senior Fellow in
Educational Philosophy 1997--

EDUCATION

Princeton University 1939-42

*Northwestern University 1946-47, 1957-60 B.S., M.A., Ph.D.

MILITARY SERVICE

745th Tank Bn, First Infantry Division 1942-45

Battlefield Commission, 2 Purple Hearts, 2 Silver Stars

HONORARY DEGREES

Grove City College, LLD 1972; Brigham Young University, LLD 1976;
Rockford College, LHD 1980

GOVERNMENT SERVICE

White House Task Force on Priorities in Higher Education 1969-70

Chairman, Consultants to Presidential Counselor Robert H. Finch 1970

National Commission- on Marijuana and Drug Abuse 1971-73


ORGANIZATIONS

Phi Beta Kappa; Rockford Rotary Club; Young President's Organization 1962-
71; Chief Executives Forum 1971-75; American Association of Presidents of
Independent Colleges and Universities 1966-77; President of the Association
1969-72; The Philadelphia Society 1968--; President of the Society
1979-80; Bohemian Club 1971-88; Mont Pelerin Society 1974-84; Council of the
Farmington Trust in Oxford, England 1974-81.

BOOKS

Contributing Author: WHO SHOULD RUN THE UNIVERSITY? American Enterprise
Institute, 1969; CAPITALISM AND CULTURE, Rockford College Institute 1977;
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE VIABILITY OF CAPITALISM IN AN ERA OF MILITANT
DEMANDS, Rockford College Institute 1978; DILEMMAS FACING THE NATION, Harper
and Row 1979; THE FAMILY: AMERICA'S HOPE, Rockford College Institute 1979;
ON FREEDOM, Devin Adair 1984; CHURCHES ON THE WRONG ROAD, Regnery Gateway
1986.

11-L-0559/OSD/3866



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00878 SN 00001
676 JOHN A HOWARD
02 BIRCHWOOD LN
CKE FORD IL 61107-1878

CINC Comments

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

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SENIOR VICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

Lt. Don Allen

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COL Brion V. Chabot

Col. Watt G. Hill, Jr.

COL Bert Rice

CAPT R. M. "Rollie" Stevens

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JUDGE ADVOCATE

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Col. Jerry Wheaton

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HISTORIAN GENERAL:

Maj. Silas W. Bass

GENERAL STAFF-AT-LARGE:

Elected

Maj. Gen. Carl Black

CW4 Robert R. "Bob" Ozier

LTC J.C. Strauss II

LTC Dave Titus

Lt. Col. Frank Zander

Appointed

CAPT Samuel L. Collins

COL D. Michael Duggan

COL Raul A. Garibay

LTC William Sellen

CPT Francis R. "Bus" Spaniola

As your CINC, I asked that each chapter set objectives for the year and develop a plan to achieve them. As we pass three quarters through our fiscal year, it's time to evaluate our progress against these objectives. Every successful organization has a plan to provide direction and act as a measuring tool to determine its status.

Some questions being asked are: Is the Order making progress? What are the Order's weaknesses? What must the Order do to be successful? What actions have been initiated by you or your chapter to achieve these objectives? What are the results of these actions? What do you still have to do to achieve your chapter's annual goals? It may be time to have a "state of the chapter" meeting to review your chapter's achievements, discuss actions to meet your chapter's goals, and assign responsibilities for future chapter projects.

As an individual Companion, are you receiving the satisfaction of your membership that you expect? Do you feel like a contributing member or simply a roster number? In either case, take the initiative to set aside some time to help the Order. Anything worthwhile takes some work and commitment, and your Order asks a lot from its Companions. It's a lot harder on active Companions to carry the load when too many Companions sit on the sidelines and don't carry their fair share.

The Order is becoming much more active and is expanding many critical programs. More and more Companions need to participate. I have written about this in the past, and as I travel among the chapters, I find the common need for most chapters is "participation by all."

With all the emphasis on recruiting, I do not see a serious effective effort by some chapters. It's like they're sitting in the doorway waiting for someone to pass. Personally, I seem to find people all over the country not only eligible, but interested. Typically, I'm asked, "What's that lapel pin for?" Or, if I'm wearing it, "the neck ribbon?" After I explain, the prospective new Companion says something like, "I'm an officer and I'd like to know more about what you do." I'm led to believe that some chapters and Companions are not making the aggressive effort necessary to successfully recruit new members. Please prove me wrong.

In closing, Memorial Day is this month, and I know many chapters and Companions will be out paying their respects to our fallen service members. I am very proud of the work our Order does to honor Memorial Day.

MOWW is doing many good things. Spring is here, everything is growing, including your Order. Now, let's go have some fun. Let's all meet in Columbia, South Carolina, for the National Convention!

COVER: A lone bugler plays the solemn notes of "Taps" during the National Memorial Day Concert, held in Washington, D.C. each year. Details on this year's concert are on page 14.



1LT A. Earl Luetge


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TAKE TIME TO SERVE YOUR COUNTRY

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By LT Cedric Philipp | | |
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By COL Raul Garibay | | |



Editorial Offices: 435 North Lee Street, Alexandria, VA 22314. Subscriptions: For members of the Military Order of the World Wars, the subscription is \$15.00 annually (deducted from annual dues). Nonmember subscription is \$15.00 per year. Single copies \$2.50. No responsibility is assumed for unsolicited manuscripts or other material submitted for publication. Deadline for submission of material for publication is the first of the month preceding the month of issue. Articles appearing in Officer Review do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the officers of the MOWW or its editors. The editor or publisher reserves the right to decline or discontinue any advertisement. The Military Order of the World Wars is composed of federally recognized commissioned officers and warrant officers who are citizens of the United States of good moral character and repute who are serving or have served honorably on active duty or in the Reserve Components of the armed forces of the United States of America, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the United States Public Health Service (USPHS), including descendants and spouses of these officers. Membership eligibility also includes Reserve Component active duty for training. Eligible individuals may join one of the Order's chapters located throughout the United States. Dues in chapters vary. For further membership information, contact MOWW National Headquarters, 435 North Lee Street, Alexandria, VA 22314, or phone (703) 683-4911.



THE HISTORY OF MEMORIAL DAY

Memorial Day began more than 100 years ago at the end of the Civil War, when "families of the soldiers killed in battle decorated the graves of their fallen relatives with flowers. On May 5, 1868, General John Logan issued General Order No. 11 to proclaim this day a national holiday, which was called Decoration Day. It was first observed on May 30, 1868. The northern and southern states held different celebrations on different days of the year until after World War I. Over time, this special day became one of remembrance for all who had given their life in battle, not only in the Civil War, but in any war.

In 1882, the name "Decoration Day" was changed to Memorial Day, and was later declared to be held every year on the last Monday of May.

Today, Memorial Day is a time when people assemble to pay tribute to their close friends or relatives who have died in service to their country. Memorial Day is still very much about honoring America's fallen service members—people gather every year at national cemeteries such as Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia, to visit the tomb of the unknown soldiers, which represents all who laid down their lives for our country and are unaccounted for.

In addition, each year on Memorial Day, people honor our ancestors who are responsible for creating the world we live in today and paving the way into the future so the next generation can enjoy this freedom. It is a day to remember and give thanks to all those who made the ultimate sacrifice to give us the freedom we now have.



Taps

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lakes, From the hills, From the sky, All is well, safely rest. God is nigh.

Fading light, Dims the sight, And a star, Gems the sky, Gleaning bright, From afar, Drawing nigh, Falls the night.

Thanks and praise, For our days, Neath the sun, Neath the stars, Neath the sky, As we go, This we know, God is nigh.



Thinking about World War II as Memorial Day approaches, I can't help but remember its three theaters of action. Yes, there were three: the European Theater of Operations, the South Pacific, and the China-Burma-India (CBI) campaign. The first two were, and still are, readily recognized, but the third became known—among Americans, anyway—as the “forgotten theater..”

That moniker never bothered those of us who served there; it never occurred to us to agitate for parades and acclaim. It had simply been our lot to perform a necessary task, and when it was satisfactorily accomplished, we were thrilled just to come home,

In April of this year, a group of American veterans representing the Flying Tigers, Merrill's Marauders, the Hump Pilots Association, and the CBI VA were invited to China where we were royally received by both Taiwanese and communist Chinese, all of whom assured us repeatedly that no one in all of China will ever forget us because of what we did for them. Even awestruck school children applauded us.

An entirely different reaction awaited me at my first MOWW chapter meeting after I arrived home. I was startled by the comments of two members: one said, “I never could figure out what the hell we were doing in Calcutta,” and another introduced me as “the nurse who took part in the China airlift.” Granted, these comments were made by men who were still wearing short pants during World War II, but wherever did they go to school? Or wasn't the blood, sweat, and tears expended in the vicious jungle and aerial combat that prevented the Japanese from conquering all of Asia worth mentioning in the history books?

I doubt that any of the pilots of those B-24s, B-25s, B-29s, P-41s, P-47s and P-38s would appreciate hearing their incredible feats referred to as an airlift. It is true that many planes (the C-46s, C-47s and modified bombers) hauled cargo—some of these delivered supplies to the CBI war zones and then ferried back the wounded—but the missions they flew were equally as dangerous as those engaged in active combat all had to cope with the

uniquely difficult conditions prevalent there—the brutal weather, the uncharted, alien monster Himalayas with their white peaks obscured by clouds and a visibility that was frequently nil! Those mountains were as much an enemy as the Japanese!

Crossing that mountain range meant flying at very high altitudes, which required all aboard to cope with oxygen masks, a very uncomfortable nuisance, especially when exhaled breath froze in dribbles of ice. These conditions also held true for the medical evacuation planes, which meant that transporting a full load of frightened patients, especially r&mined psychotics, was a difficult day's work, sometimes extending well beyond 12 hours. It was a long haul from Kunming, China, to Calcutta, India, and none of it could be classified as a milk-run!

The skies that constituted this battleground were full of enemy fighters, ice storms, and jet stream winds. There were no light beacons and only the crudest of airports. Also crude by today's standards were the instruments, or lack of them, in these unpressurized aircraft. Radios were often out of range and dysfunctional.

Planes that were shot down ended up in desolate ravine or dense jungle, and their crews—those who were capable—spent many days, and sometimes weeks, fighting their way back to any semblance of civilization. Even when coming upon other human creatures (as opposed to jungle denizens), it was difficult to recognize friend from foe. Receiving help or sustenance from any of the natives was always an “iffy” proposition in spite of the phrases emblazoned on flight jackets or cards in the emergency kits that read, “I am an American; please take me to the Chinese; my country will pay you for help.”

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer stated that “flying the hump” was the foremost and by far the most dangerous, difficult, and historic achievement of the entire war. He could have specified “any war” since, obviously, it had never been done before nor will it ever again.

And then there were the ground troops engaged in fierce fighting through dense jungle while being tortured by debilitating heat, and the highest humidity, plus all manner of wildlife, ranging from ticks to tigers, and the

terrible monsoons. They suffered miserably with a variety of tropical diseases and untreatable skin ailments including of all things, prickly heat, along with the usual battle field traumas.


By the time American forces (such as the Mars Task Force, which was comprised of the 475th Infantry Regiment and the 124th Cavalry) got into the act, the Japanese had taken practically all Chinese seaports and were well advanced into Burma. The enemy occupied Rangoon, Mandalay, Myitkyina, and all surrounding territory. All that stood in the way of complete Japanese domination of Asia was India, protected by the British, and although bombed repeatedly, Calcutta was the vanguard.

The building of the Burma Road (also known as the Stillwell Road) was an incredible engineering feat. Carving a route through rugged mountainous terrain in

brutal heat that reached 130 degrees in the shade and was accompanied by 100 percent humidity was no walk in the park. The Motor Corps drove the trucks over that treacherous route to deliver supplies—everything from bombs to toothpaste.

A little known fact is that a component of our naval fleet had been docked at a Chinese port and been captured, its crew incarcerated by the Japanese as early as 1939. When we brought those men out of the concentration camps in August 1945, they had little knowledge of world events that had occurred in the six years they'd been imprisoned. One of the most interesting comments made was when I asked a fellow where he had been captured, he said, "A place you never heard of, lieutenant—Iwo Jima."

So there! Does that give you youngsters a hint of what we were doing in Calcutta in World War II?



The dedication ceremony will begin promptly at 10:00 a.m. and will last approximately two hours. The event will be open to the public at no charge on a first-come, first-served basis. Please be aware that due to the high volume of visitors expected to arrive for the ceremony, there is not a guarantee of on-site access for everyone.

Parking for the June 6 event will be entirely off-site, with shuttles running continually from each of five satellite parking areas beginning at 7:00 a.m. Each lot will open at 6:15 a.m. and buses will begin loading soon after. There will be one off-site handicapped parking area equipped with handicapped buses, and one off-site parking area reserved for motorcoaches.

Please arrive as early as possible in order to avoid both road blockage closer to the time of the ceremony, and to ensure, as much as is possible, that you will be able to access the site.

All visitors must be in a remote parking area by 9:00 a.m. in order to be admitted to the site. No visitors will be allowed onto the site between 9:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m.

A videotape of the dedication ceremony will be available for sale through the Foundation in limited quantities. The on-site gift tent will take reservations and payments for the videotapes June 6-10. The cost is yet to be determined.

There will be an on-site hospitality area selling food and drinks, as well as an area to purchase gifts and memorabilia.

Umbrellas, coolers and lawn chairs will not be permitted. Individuals or groups may not display flags or banners other than on their buses or vehicles.

After the ceremony, the site will be open until 4:00 p.m. Beginning June 7, the National D-Day Memorial will be open regularly 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., Tuesday through Sunday. The Memorial will be closed to the public on Mondays.

The National D-Day Memorial Foundation is a non-profit educational foundation established to maintain a memorial complex for the nation's remembrance of D-Day. The Foundation exists to memorialize the valor, fidelity, and sacrifice of the Allied Armed Forces on D-Day, June 6, 1944, and is located in Bedford, VA, the community that lost the most men per capita of any United States municipality on D-Day.

The Education Center, an integral part of the memorial complex, will go under construction in coming months and will be completed by 2004. The center will serve as the crux of the complex, providing programs, projects, and exhibits that preserve, interpret, and illuminate the history and lessons of D-Day.

The Memorial site, which is currently under construction, will be closed to the public until the June 6 event. The closing is for safety reasons related to construction and weather.

All preceding information is subject to change and is not all-inclusive. More specific information will be provided to local newspapers and will be posted on the Foundation website in the near future. If you have additional questions, please contact the Foundation by email at dclay@dclay.org or phone (540-586-DDAY or 800-351-DDAY).



Sites of Pacific Battle

By LTC Lawrence H. Harris, Savannah Chapter

Memorial Day helps us remember a recent holiday vacation trip I took. During the 2000-2001 season, my wife Thelma and our two grown children accompanied us to the Philippines. Along the way, we visited three sites hal- lowed by American World War II heroes: Pearl Harbor, Corregidor in Manila Bay, and the American Pacific Cemetery near Fort Bonifacio, Manila, Philippines.

As we boarded the crowded motorcraft near Honolulu, we could see the crescent-shaped white encasement that enfolds the remaining superstructure of the battleship *Arizona*. There is little to remind the American and foreign visitors, including many Japanese tourists, that December 7, 1941, changed the mechanics of naval warfare, after Japanese navy planes sank the *Arizona* and the *Oklahoma*, under Vice Admiral Nagumo, and severely damaged six other battleships. More than 3,226 Marine and Army personnel were killed and hundreds wounded. Still entombed in the *Arizona* are the bodies of more than 1,000 sailors gripped in their great ship, from which still rises, like tears, a trail of Oil.

General Douglas MacArthur did not have his finest hour in the Philippines; that would come at **Inchon** during the Korean War. If the Japanese attacked, he could not decide whether he would defend on the beaches of **Luzon** or pull back to the jungles of Bataan. The Japanese air force destroyed the American planes lined up in neat rows, even with an alert that war was imminent. Then the unprepared American and Filipino defense forces fell

back on Bataan on January 3, 1942, fought savagely, but succumbed to disease, wounds, and starvation. MacArthur had neglected to stock his Bataan Gibraltar with adequate food or ammunition. The bright spot in all of this is that the only Southeast Asians to stick loyally to their colonial authorities were the brave Filipinos.

There remained two small island forts, and they would become Philippine **almos**: Fort Drum and Corregidor. Fort Drum had a few artillery pieces that were **14-inchers**, but the outpost was small. Corregidor was hilly, had been prepared for a major siege, and contained an elaborate tunnel, Malinta, that was first excavated around 1922. Malinta, with its complex side tunnels protected a hospital, the Philippine government, and the military staff. We saw the formidable features of Corregidor that inflicted



LTC Harris stands in front of a 12-inch Howitzer pitted from enemy fire in Corregidor.

4,000 casualties on the Japanese during their final assault. In one outpost on Corregidor, we viewed three **12-inch** Howitzers that fired on captured Bataan at the rate of one **1,000-pound** shell per minute. We were told by our guide that one of the guns killed 2,000 Japanese and fired until the mechanism froze.

As I viewed the dark, empty, and stark Malinta tunnel, I thought of poor General Jonathan Wainwright, who was left behind to surrender, not only Corregidor and its 11,500 men, but all the forces remaining in the Philippines. General MacArthur was ordered to depart the Philippines on March 11, 1942, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Australia, to take command of the forces in the South

Pacific. When he left, his enlisted men did not understand, but they stood by their 155s and fought General Homma's forces until they could fight no more.

Rising above the site of old Fort Bonifacio in glistening white and immaculate grass of the brightest green and trees that sing with color, is the gorgeous American Pacific Cemetery. As we viewed it, we saw the crosses and stars of David of thousands of men and women who had laid their lives down for the United States, and some also for their country of birth, the Philippines.

The only warrior to share a story with me, who had fought on the Siegfried Line and the Battle of the Bulge, was a Filipino. He was younger than I, and he showed me his leg wound from a firefight with the Moros. Then, as an American consul, I had seen a monument (dated 1902) posted by the 2nd U.S. Cavalry after a fight with the Moros. The Philippines had been the training ground of Generals "Black Jack" Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall, Ike Eisenhower, and other aspiring officers.


When I served in the Philippines from 1937 to 1940, I perceived a sense of hurt by the Filipinos. Yet,

they fought with distinction under MacArthur, and continued the war against the Japanese in guerrilla bands. They also learned to love America, even in the abstract. On the island of Bohol, I visited a little beaten-up cemetery, and saw the stone of a school teacher who honored America and refused to kiss the Mikado's flag. That act of loyalty caused him to be beheaded by the Japanese. The Filipinos feel that we conquered them, trained them in American-style schools, taught them the terminology of democracy, and then quickly forgot them.

On the walls of the enclosure, there are the names of thousands of combatants who died in places like Biak, New Guinea, Okinawa, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Corregidor, Manila, Midway, and Leyte. Those memorialized were mostly young Filipino and American men, but there were also nurses and guerrillas who fought in rags. I stood in silence beside one of the monuments, which depicted two soldiers—one Filipino, and one wounded American—helping each other along. And I surmised that in combat, there is a brotherhood that is only exceeded by a mother's love for her child: This Memorial Day, we will all remember this brotherhood.

A Manual-Guidelines for Patriotic Education

LTC Peter Straub, Chairman, Patriotic Education Committee, has revised Sections C and E of this publication. Distribution has been made to the PEC Committee, PEC Conference Directors, and Chapter Commanders. All other holders of this book may request a copy of the revision from National Headquarters,



Preamble: To cherish the memories and associations of the World Wars waged for humanity; To inculcate and stimulate love of our country and flag; To promote and further patriotic education in our nation; Ever to maintain law and order, and to defend the honor, integrity, and supremacy of our national government and the Constitution of the United States; To foster fraternal relations among all branches of the armed forces; To promote the cultivation of military, naval, and air science and the adoption of a consistent and suitable policy of national security for the United States of America; To preserve records of individual services; To encourage and assist in the holding of commemorations and the establishment of memorials of the World Wars; And to transmit all these ideals to posterity and for our country, we unite to establish the Military Order of the World Wars.

Officer Review May 2001



Pearl Harbor in the Spotlight

By 1Lt. Charles A. Bennett, Ventura County Chapter

Everybody is talking about Pearl Harbor these days, especially around Memorial Day. It has been in the daily news since the unfortunate collision of a Pearl Harbor-based U.S. submarine and a Japanese fishing boat. Coverage of the inquiry has given us almost daily interviews from the Pearl Harbor naval base and occasional glimpses of the USS *Arizona* Memorial, where Pearl Harbor was first seared into America's consciousness on December 7,

and genuine emotion. From emotion may perhaps arise a real interest in what happened, why, and how America and her armed forces responded. I got a head start on raising interest in Pearl Harbor a year and a half ago. I was asked to develop some fundraising materials for the "Pearl Harbor Commemorative 1941-2001" and the new USS *Arizona* Memorial Fund. Lots of discussions and research opened a new world of fascinating factoids and great stories about this memorial, which, I

admit, I first imagined was in Arizona. Wrong!

Actually, the USS *Arizona* Memorial in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, is one of the most recognized and most moving of all memorials in America and the world. Since 1962, nearly 40 million people have set foot on the memorial, an emotional and thought-provoking experience



awareness and heights. In the our national credible attack the terrible ny generation

ence by all accounts.

They still come, up to 4,500 per day, to see Pearl Harbor firsthand and to pay their respects. Universally, the USS *Arizona* Memorial represents Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and America's entry into World War II. At the turn of the millennium, journalists rated Pearl Harbor the #3 "Most Important News Story of the Century" behind the man on the moon (#2) and the atomic bomb (#1).

It is, first of all, America's memorial to the sailors and Marines who died on the battleship USS *Arizona*, with most of whom are entombed in their ship. The Remembrance Exhibit at the Memorial visitor Center also honors the fallen from other ships, airfields, and barracks attacked that day, a day President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said would "live in infamy."

For many Americans and international visitors (30 percent of the total, two-thirds of whom are from

I'm not so sure that the younger generation knows much about Pearl Harbor, so it's a good thing that the average age of movie audiences is 16-26 years old and that the film stars the hugely popular, Ben Affleck. Whatever the cinematic or historic merit or shortcomings of the film, it will give everyone at least an outline of the sequence of events and some special effects or computer-enhanced images of the USS *Arizona* exploding or the USS *Oklahoma* capsizing.

From this virtual imagery may emerge some gen-

Japan), it commemorates all casualties and combatants of World War II in the Pacific. People travel here from all nations and come together in a spirit of remembrance, reconciliation, and resolve for continued peace in the Pacific.

The USS *Arizona* Memorial welcomes 1.5 million visitors per year, more than double what anyone anticipated when the Memorial Museum and Visitor Center was dedicated in 1980. It is consistently the #1 visitor destination on Oahu. Many visitors to the USS *Arizona* Memorial are veterans of World War II and relatives of veterans. Many are active-duty servicemen and women or relatives of active-duty personnel. The Memorial Fund provides everyone an opportunity to enroll names of loved ones in the Memorial Registry of the Fund.

In the busiest seasons, long lines and long waits can occur due to the number of visitors viewing the powerful National Park Service interpretive film and because boarding the Navy launch to the memorial must be limited,

Visitors' time is well spent in the museum, which features personal belongings of officers and crew, a smashed, but unexploded, torpedo, military art by Tom Freeman, and incredibly detailed ship models like the carrier *Akagi*, with tiny pilots and sailors waving their caps so realistically you can almost hear them yell, "Banzai!"

Excellent as the small museum is, there are still far more artifacts in storage at the base than the present museum can currently preserve and exhibit.

Then there is the collection of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, which is now being preserved and restored at a National Park Service archaeological site in Tucson, Arizona. As soon as possible, these artifacts should be returned to their proper

Preservation is another. The Memorial Visitor Center is appropriate for Hawaii, that temperature and

humidity controls can better preserve the documents, photographs, and personal memorabilia of the Pearl Harbor attack.

To solve these problems, a \$10 million capital fundraising campaign will approximately double the size of the Memorial Museum and expand the Visitor Center. This expansion is not to increase the number of visitors, but to provide a better experience of the memorial and to tell more stories of Pearl Harbor and World War II in the Pacific.

The beginning, middle, and end of World War II in the Pacific are memorialized at Pearl Harbor today. The USS *Arizona* Memorial, the Bowfin Submarine Museum, and the USS *Missouri* have


been working together to create a "Day at Pearl Harbor" experience for visitors. Part of the USS *Arizona* Memorial expansion plan is to improve visitor parking lots, walkways, landscaping, and signage to

facilitate movement from one site to another.

Honorary co-chairmen of the USS *Arizona* Memorial are Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Senator John McCain (R-Arizona). A prominent spokesman and Fund Trustee is H. Delano Roosevelt, grandson of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whose father James was a Marine in the Pacific.

There is every indication that the USS *Arizona* Memorial Museum and Visitor Center will continue as the focal point of the true Pearl Harbor story for future generations. Memorial Day is a day to remember Pearl Harbor, but with this Museum and Visitor Center, you can visit it all year.

December 7, 2001, will be the 60th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor and the last planned reunion of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association. A "Pearl Harbor Symposium" will take place in Honolulu the first week of December. Tom Brokaw, NBC News anchor and author of *The Greatest Generation*, will be the keynote speaker. For information on the USS *Arizona* Memorial Fund, visit <http://www.PearlHarborMemorial.com>.



The USS *Arizona* Memorial in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii



A Tale of Two Wars

By Col. Ken Clark, Middle Georgia Chapter

While we remember on Memorial Day events of the Korean War 50 years ago, we can also pause for the 10-year anniversary of the Gulf War, in which the enemy capitulated after 38 days of air war and 100 hours of air-ground war. When our chapter met on January 25, 2001, it was the 10th anniversary of the 10th day of Coalition strikes against the forces of Saddam Hussein. During these air strikes the coalition gained mastery of the air and knocked out Iraq's air defense system; Saddam's command, control, and communication network; and a good percentage of Iraqi electrical power generation and distribution. The United States also started to work on deployed ground forces and their logistic support. It was a textbook application of **airpower** that warmed the hearts of Companions and brought cheers to our lips, as we watched the war unfold on the evening news.

Contrasts are sharp in looking at both the Korean and Gulf conflicts from a historic perspective. In the opening days of the Korean War, South Korea was being overrun in a surprise attack for which U.S. forces were ill-prepared. We rushed the forces we had into the breach, mostly **airpower** left over from World War II. They slowed the advance and threw the North Koreans off their timetable, as we deployed the ground forces we could muster from occupation duty in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

By contrast, in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein gave two weeks notice of his intent to invade Kuwait, while he still conferred with Middle Eastern leaders on a conciliatory note. During that two weeks, the United States was developing contingency plans for the defense of Saudi Arabia by a coalition of concerned nations. No attempt was made to defend the tiny country of Kuwait directly when it was invaded, but the aggression brought an immediate response from the United States and its allies. Naval carrier battle groups steamed to the

Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the north Arabian Sea. Saudi Arabia agreed to the stationing of coalition forces in the kingdom. F-15s deployed over the next 5 1/2 months. Coalition forces steadily built land, sea, and air power in the region. While diplomatic efforts to get Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait continued, President George Bush obtained the backing of coalition leaders and his own Congress to use force if necessary. Plans were drawn and refined for the best employment of the incredible hammer of coalition military power, poised to strike.

In the Gulf conflict, the coalition held the initiative as to when, where, and how a strike would take place. The objectives were clear-cut and agreed to beforehand: to defend Saudi Arabia against attack, to bring about the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, to reinstall Kuwait's legitimate government, to stabilize the region, and ensure the continued flow of oil to the world's consumers.

In Korea, though, U.S. policy was hazy. We had excluded Korea from America's line of defense in the Pacific in January 1950, an open invitation to the Russians or Chinese to take it over. When the Russian puppet regime in North Korea accepted the invitation, it was the United Nations that felt attacked, not the United States. President Truman's initial response was to protect the lives of American citizens in South Korea, not the South Korean government.

Many other differences exist **between** the two conflicts, but the final, major difference is that in the Gulf, when the Iraqis got out of Kuwait and the legitimate government was reinstated, the United States called a halt to the ground war. It was tempting to expand the war to eliminate Saddam, but we stuck to our original goals. We failed to do that in Korea, and paid a high price for our adventurism. We are still in both theaters "stabilizing" the situation, but at much less cost in the Gulf.

Goodbye to a Vietnam Veteran



By Lt. Col. Paula Haley
San Antonio Chapter

I was driving to North Carolina with three other soldiers from the Vietnam War. I was a donut dolly who had spent one year in Vietnam. Our mission was to go to North Carolina to take Tommy Wieber, a fellow veteran, to his final resting place at Arlington National Cemetery. He had suddenly died, and I figured we were the most qualified to accomplish this job. After all, he was our friend and fellow Vietnam veteran. His widow, Sharon, was with us, and we traveled with heavy hearts.

When Sharon and I approached the casket, my eyes filled with tears upon seeing Tommy's face. I quickly turned away and walked to a corner like a child to hide my tears and fears. I quickly gained my composure and walked back to the casket to help Sharon place his ribbons on his mess dress.

We stood over Tommy's casket, fixing the ribbons on his mess dress for the funeral. Vietnam veterans were now standing next to us. We placed the coffin in a beautiful POW/MIA truck because he had rescued many soldiers in Vietnam, and the POW issue was his passion. The men from Tommy's work were there, and as we stood around the truck, one of the men passed around a bottle. We each took a drink and passed it to the next person to have a drink in honor of Tommy.

As we drove, we had our CB radios on, and the truckers asked what the occasion was. We responded that we were taking our friend to his final resting place at Arlington Cemetery. They replied, "God Bless America."

It was a glorious send off, complete with a 21-gun salute, as family, friends, veterans, and Red Cross donut dollies looked on. As generations pass, we must never forget those who served our country with pride. Survivors of all wars have a special responsibility to carry on the memory of our fallen comrades. On Memorial Day, our nation does that.

A CALL FOR ARTICLES

The MOWW magazine is very important to all Companions. As your editor, my goal is to keep your magazine interesting and personal.

What MOWW needs from all Companions is your stories. Handwritten or typed is OK! Vignettes, short stories, or in-depth accounts of your experiences are all welcomed. Mail or email them to MOWW national headquarters. If you're mailing them, please include a disk copy whenever possible. Please do not fax your articles.

We need your funny, serious, or sad stories of your experiences in the military. Leader, follower, or just one of the group; fighter, flyer, cook, doctor, or nurse; in the air, on the land, or in the seas, your fellow Companions need to hear your stories. Send them to us now.

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A Close Cdl

By Lt. Col. Edward c. Craft, Jr.
Philadelphia Chapter

It was Vietnam 1967, and we were on our way to the first target of the day. Our flight of six, C-123 spray planes was headed for an Agent Orange target in II corps,

I was the backup lead navigator in the fourth plane. In the cockpit on my right was the instructor pilot, and on my left was a pilot in training. I sat on a bullet-proof box between the two pilots.

The target was "hot," meaning, we expected a lot of enemy fire. It also meant we would come in high and drop down fast just prior to the spray-on point. We approached the target 4,000 feet above the ground. The lead pilot in plane #1 gave the command to "take 'em down cowboys!" At that instant, our pilot in training pulled back on the throttles and nosed over a maximum-rate descent of 4,000 feet per minute. Normally, it would take a minute to descend to a point 1 kilometer from the start of the spray-on

point.

All planes would stay in formation during the descent, but for some reason something did not sound right, and we were now passing the third plane. Soon, we passed the first and second, as well. I noticed a tree on the ground when we started, and it kept getting bigger and bigger. We were below 1,000 feet when suddenly, the instructor pilot took over the plane and pulled us out of the descent just above the tree. We maneuvered back into formation and completed the mission with no problems.

During the debriefing, we learned that the pilot in training, a man with long arms, had pulled the throttles back as far as he could. He was struggling to get into idle. But it was not enough since his long arms hit the back of his seat, so to get the engines into idle, he lifted his arm for more room and inadvertently, at the same time, pulled up on the throttles, which put both engines in reverse, while we were descending.

I guess I am one of the few people who can say they were in a descending aircraft exceeding its maximum rate of descent, within 1,000 feet of the ground, with both engines in reverse and live to write about it.



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The Vietnam Wall that Heals

2001 Schedule

May 4-7	Lexington, MA
10-13	Middletown, RI
17-20	Chicago, IL
25-28	Putnam, CT
31-June 3	Lewiston, ME
June 7-10	Dover, NH
14-17	Peabody, MA
July 4-8	McPherson, KS
12-15	Royal Center, IN
18-22	Sullivan, MO
25-29	Bradley, IL

August 2-5	Scribner, NE
9-12	Merrillville, IN
16-19	Kalamazoo, MI
24-26	Omaha, NE
September 6-9	Longmont, CO
13-16	Salt Lake City, UT
27-30	Plainview, TX
October 11-14	Walla Walla, WA
25-28	Schulenberg, TX
November 1-4	Austin, Texas
9-11	Truth or Consequences, NM
15-18	Yuma, AZ

DOD Honors Korean War Veterans

In 1951, the Republic of Korea offered the Republic of Korean War Service Medal to United Nations forces serving in Korea and adjacent waters. At the time, however, U.S. law prohibited U.S. military personnel from wearing medals issued by foreign governments. Congress changed that ruling in 1954, but by then most U.S. service members eligible for the medal had returned home.

In 1998, to coincide with the upcoming 50th Anniversary of the Korean War, the Republic of Korea reiterated its original offer of the Republic of Korean War Service Medal to U.S. military personnel. On August 20, 1999, the Department of Defense approved the acceptance and wear of the medal. Approximately 1.8 million U.S. Korean War Veterans are eligible to receive it.

For more information about this ceremony or the Department of Defense 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration, call toll free (866) KOREA50, or visit the web site at <http://korea50.army.mil/>.

Information on how to apply for or request the medal can be found by calling the Air Force Personnel Center, Monday-Friday, 7:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m. (CST) at (800) 558-1404, or the Awards and Decorations Section (210) 565-2432/2520/2516, fax (210) 565-3118. The web site is found at <http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/awards/>.

National Memorial Day Concert

Raise the flag and salute our nation's valiant veterans! This year's National Memorial Day Concert, PBS's all-star tribute to the brave Americans who served the cause of freedom, commemorates the 60th anniversary of Pearl Harbor and the 10th anniversary of Desert Storm. The holiday event also honors former POWs of the Korean War and Vietnam veterans.

Broadcast live from the West Lawn of the U.S. Capitol on Sunday, May 27, 2001, from 8:00-9:30 p.m. ET (check local listings), the program features eminent journalist Walter Cronkite, decorated veteran Charles Durning, Broadway's Tom Wopat, and other distinguished guest artists in performance with the National Symphony Orchestra under the direction of premier pops conductor Erich Kunzel.

A unique blend of musical performance, archival footage, and dramatic readings, the National Memorial Day Concert is broadcast overseas by the Armed Forces radio and television network.



Army Civil War Medal: Awarded to Union Army veterans who served from 1861-1865. Confederate veterans were awarded the Confederate Cross of Honor.



China Commemorative Medal World War II: Authorized by Nationalist China to all U.S. personnel who served in the China-Burma-India Theatre during World War II.



Vietnam Service Medal: For service in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand during 1965-1973.



World War I Victory Medal: To all members of the Armed Forces who served at least one day active federal service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918.



Asiatic Pacific Campaign Medal World War II: For service in the Asiatic-Pacific theater for 30 days or receipt of any combat decoration.



The SW Asia Service Medal 1991-Present Given for active participation in or in support of Operation Desert Shield and/or Operation Desert Storm.



World War II Victory Medal: Awarded for service in the U.S. Armed Forces between 1941-1946.



Korean War Service Medal: For participation in military operations within the Korean area during 1950-1954.



Armed Forces Services Medal—Bosnia: For participation in military operations not covered by specific war medal or Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.



Humane Action-Berlin Airlift: Given for 120 consecutive days of service participating in the Berlin Airlift or in support thereof. The medal was also awarded posthumously.



ROK Republic of Korea Medal: For all military personnel who served 30 consecutive days or 60 nonconsecutive days in Korea or in its territorial waters, or for aircrew personnel who flew combat or support missions over or to Korea.



The new Kosovo Campaign medal.

51st Annual National Convention

Tuesday, July 24, 2001

0900-1800 Registration
 1300-1500 Budget Committee Meeting
 1500-1800 YDF, Inc., Board of Directors Meeting
 1500-1800 PEF, Inc., Board of Trustees Meeting
 1600-1700 National Security Committee Meeting

Wednesday Pulp 25, 2001

0800-1800 Registration
 0800-1200 I&-Convention Executive Committee Meeting
 0900-1200 Constitution and By-Laws Committee Meeting
 0900-1200 Resolutions Committee Meeting
 0900-1200 National Convention Committee Meeting
 0900-1515 Spouses Tour and Luncheon
 1200-1330 Region Commanders Awards Luncheon
 1330-1600 Pre-Convention General Staff Meeting
 1600-1800 Patriotic Education Committee Meeting
 1600-1800 Policy Planning Committee Meeting
 1830-2130 Welcome Reception

Thursday Pulp 26, 2001

0745-0845 New Officers Orientation
 0745-1500 Spouses Tour and Luncheon
 0900-1800 Registration
 0900-0915 Opening Ceremonies
 0915-1200 First Convention Session
 1200-1300 Lunch on Your Own
 1200-1330 Hann-Buswell Chapter Meeting and Luncheon
 1330-1530 Council of Past CINC's Meeting

1330-1530 Chapter Commanders Orientation
 1330-1530 Legislative Committee Meeting
 1530-1630 National Security Seminar
 1630-1730 Membership Seminar
 1830-2000 Hann-Buswell Reception and Banquet
 1900-2100 Nominating Committee Meeting

Friday July 27, 2001

0800-0900 Patriotic Education Seminar (YLCs)
 0900-1800 Registration
 0900-1000 Chapter Activities Seminar
 1000-1100 ROTC Seminar
 1130-1330 Commanders Awards Luncheon
 1400-1700 Second Convention Session
 1700-2030 Boat Cruise and Dinner on Lake Murray

Saturday July 28, 2001

0800-0900 Memorial Service
 0845-1615 Spouses Tour and Luncheon
 0900-1800 Registration
 0915-1200 Third Convention Session
 1200-1400 Lunch on Your Own
 1400-1700 Post-Convention General Staff Meeting
 1700-1800 Church Services
 1830-1930 Formal Reception
 1930-2300 Banquet and Installation of Officers

Sunday July 29, 2001

0900-1100 Post-Convention Executive Committee Meeting
 0900-1100 Executive Committee Spouses Breakfast

Convention Registration Form

Name _____ Spouse/Guest Name _____

Rank _____ Service _____ Component _____ Status _____

Address _____ City _____ State _____ ZIP _____

Phone _____ Chapter Affiliation _____ Current Office _____

Special Dietary/Physical Handicap Needs _____

Mode of Transportation _____ Estimated Date/Time of Arrival _____

Airline _____ Flight # _____

Registration Fees	Before June 1, 2001	After June 1, 2001	Number	Total Fee
Commander	\$170	\$180	_____	_____
Colonel/General	\$155	\$160	_____	_____
Major	\$30	\$33	_____	_____
Captain	\$25	\$28	_____	_____
1st Lt	\$15	\$18	_____	_____
2nd Lt	\$10	\$12	_____	_____
Staff Sergeant	\$5	\$6	_____	_____

For more information, call MAJ F. F. Price, Jr., at 803-787-9695, or Lt. Col. Prank Zander at 803-787-3132. Or email zander@mind-
 committee chairman must notify MAJ F. F. Price, Jr., no later than May 15, 2001, to schedule a meeting and specify
 special requirements and audio/visual equipment needs.

TOURS

Wednesday, July 25, 2001

Tour 1-State Capital and Art Museum

Depart the hotel at 9:15 a.m. for a visit to the art museum. Afterward, board the bus for a tour of Trinity Cathedral. Participants can enjoy a glorious bus-ride view of the city while they eat, then tour the state capital, and return to the hotel at 3:00 p.m. Total cost: \$30.

Thursday, July 26, 2001

Tour 2-Historical Columbia

Board the bus at 9:30 a.m. for a guided tour to learn about the history of Columbia, South Carolina. First, visit the University of South Carolina, followed by lunch at Hennessey's restaurant. Afterward, tour the Governor's Mansion and other historical homes, and return to the hotel at 3:45. Total cost: \$35.

Tour 3—Fort Jackson

Leave at 8:00 a.m. to attend a graduation ceremony at Fort Jackson. Afterward, enjoy a tour of the museum and dine on the base. After lunch, tour the Fort before returning to the hotel at 3:00 p.m. Total cost: \$15.

Friday, July 27, 2001

Tour 4—Lake Murray

Depart the hotel at 5:00 p.m. to board a boat for a dinner cruise on Lake Murray. Arrive back at the hotel at 8:30. Total cost: \$50.

Saturday, July 28, 2001

Tour 5-Columbia Zoo, Botanical Gardens, and State Museum

Leave at 8:30 a.m. for a fun morning at the zoo and botanical gardens. After dining at New Orleans for lunch, visit the state museum. Arrive back at the hotel at 4:00 p.m. Total cost: \$40.

Adam's Mark Hotel Reservation Form

Name _____ Address _____

City _____ State _____ ZIP _____

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Arrival Date _____ Departure Date _____ No. of Rooms _____

Number of people _____ Sharing _____ ETA at hotel _____

Adams Mark Hotel 1200 Hampton Street Columbia, SC 29201 (b)(6) (Hotel) (b)(6) (Reservations) (b)(6) (Fax)	Method of Payment: <input type="checkbox"/> Check or money order enclosed: Amount \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> American Express <input type="checkbox"/> Diners Club <input type="checkbox"/> VISA <input type="checkbox"/> Carte Blanche <input type="checkbox"/> Mastercard <input type="checkbox"/> Discover
--	--

Credit Card Number _____ Expiration Date _____

Signature _____

Reservations received after the cutoff date (June 1) are subject to availability. Rooms may still be available after the cutoff date, but not necessarily at the rates listed. Please apply 7 percent sales/occupancy tax and 3 percent tourism fee to the rates.	Rates: 1 person-\$85 + tax + fee 2 people-\$85 + tax + fee 3 people--\$95 + tax + fee 4 people--\$95 + tax + fee Smoking <input type="checkbox"/> Nonsmoking <input type="checkbox"/>	Special Room Requests: 2 Double Beds 1 King Bed Balcony King Balcony Double _____ Accessible King _____
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We Need New YLCs!

By Lt. Col. Pete Straub, Fort Walton Beach Chapter

I have endeavored to keep all single- and multi-day conference directors informed, to assist them, through a publication called the *PEC Huddle*. But I am sure they would agree with my efforts to address the rest of the MOWW membership regarding the largest, most rewarding program of the Order. Our youth leadership conferences (YLCs) produce the greatest product our Order could ever bestow on the people of our nation. For we are teaching the youth, our future leaders, leadership, patriotism, love of country and flag, and the free enterprise system—subjects not being taught in our schools today.

Those of you who have helped staff, directed, or attended one of the 60 or more conferences we hold throughout the nation, know exactly what I am talking about. Those of you who have not attended, simply don't know what you are missing. To see the pride the graduating students display with their new knowledge and understanding, will make your buttons pop. I guarantee it!

Through the generosity of dedicated philanthropists like Ross Perot, the Palmer family, and several others, we now have the funds to double or triple the number of YLC programs we have been operating. At this point, money is not the problem—what we need is the help of each chapter commander in expanding the YLC programs.

In 1997, the Patriotic Education Committee (PEC) published a manual, which includes all the steps necessary to start a new conference. It's my understanding that every chapter was sent a copy. Although the organizational structure of the PEC has changed and parts of the manual are being updated, the details on how to plan and execute a conference have not changed. For those who can't find their manual; they are readily available on the World Wide Web at the MOWW website.


Senior Vice CINC Lt. Don Allen is MOWW's webmaster and continually updates the information on the web site referencing all facets of the PEC. To

get to the site, simply type in <http://www.militaryorder.org>. Click on Patriotic Education along the left side of the home page and you will be moved to a summary of the program. Scan to the bottom of the page, where you will find directions on how to access the manual. Be advised that the manual is 137 pages, so downloading and printing a copy takes time. But, once you reach the manual, you can scan and read Section B on how to start a new conference. Many of the details such as MOWW recognition and certification are there. The part you should look over, however, is on getting a YLC started.

Last year, we went from the 30s to 61 multi- and single-day conferences, with multi-day YLCs jumping from 17 to 24. This year, new multi-day conferences for Fort Knox, Kentucky, and Portland, Oregon, plus several others are in the development stages. The new people involved with the YLCs met, selected their directors, and assembled a speaker's list following the guidelines in the manual regarding percentages for subject matter. They also negotiated a venue, arranged transportation, and requested funding. The PEC is willing to make every effort to assist in helping get your conference off the ground.

The Huntsville Chapter had no idea where to start. Last fall, the PEC met with the staff and discussed in detail what it would take to get a conference started. As a result, the chapter is sending students and some chapter staff members to observe the conference at Florida State University this year with the idea of starting a conference in 2002. That's what the PEC volunteer staff is designed to do—help directors keep their programs going as smoothly as possible and assist in creating new conferences to expand the MOWW YLC program.

Today, many of the young officers you approach ask, "What can your organization do for me?" You have an answer—the MOWW Patriotic Education Program. Get them involved! Everyone will be rewarded, especially you and the kids.



IMPROVING REALITY

This question has been asked about our teenagers by every generation. Many of us are concerned that young people today are growing up without values and a clear understanding of the price veterans have paid for the freedom we enjoy today.

Some of us remember Will Rogers saying, "All I know is what I read in the papers." Today, the media leads us to believe that many of our youth are in trouble and have no respect for life. But many of us have worked with young people in our youth leadership programs and know there are a many neat young people in this country.

They know about the successes of Desert Storm and the Balkans; however, they know very little about World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. They want to hear from us the "what, why, and how" of those times in history. What is tragic is that the history of these events is not being taught in our schools today. These young people are intelligent, hard working, and eager to learn about the history of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. They want to know about the contributions and sacrifices made by veterans for their country during this period in time.

To give some young people an opportunity to learn about these periods in history, Major Farrel Dockstetter recently arranged for a few veterans to be interviewed by students at Lawton High School (Lawton, Oklahoma), two of whom were officers from our chapter. The other soldier interviewed was a senior NCO. The students, acting as newspaper reporters, interviewed each veteran and made a written report to their teacher, Col. Terry M. Freeman, PhD, the lead teacher at Lawton High School.

At our monthly chapter meeting, Col. Freeman read these reports to our membership, stating, "I believe the experience broadened the students' knowledge of military service and greatly increased their appreciation of the sacrifices of veterans. It was

certainly time well spent." Col. Freeman has asked us to return next year. We will continue our efforts to visit the other high schools in our area during the coming year. Our chapter considers this a worthwhile and productive project.

Do our young people care about what our veterans have sacrificed and given for our country? You bet they do! They want to talk to us. I encourage each chapter that reads this article to consider presenting such a program to the young people in your area. Note, I said, "your area" not only your city or town. Consider the surrounding small communities also.

For information on how to conduct a veteran interview, you may contact me via e-mail, jjori@sirinet.net or Dr. Peter B. Riesz from the Victoria, Texas, Crossroads Chapter at pbriesz@icsi.net.

Student Comments from the Veterans Interview Program

"Through these gentlemen's amazing stories, I now have a deeper appreciation for those serving our country during war."

"These men opened the eyes of many students and told them things they would have never had the opportunity to hear if it were not for the willingness of these veterans."

"In preparing for this interview, I merely expected to gather insignificant facts that would bring me to tears of boredom. I was wrong! Three very courageous men brought before me useful knowledge concerning life and confidence."

"This event helped to bridge the gap between a student's views and a veteran's."

"These gentlemen's friendliness and interaction with the youth was fascinating."

Philadelphia Chapter Presents National Law & Order Award

By LT Cedric Philipp
Philadelphia Chapter

Philadelphia's Police Commissioner John F. Timoney received MOWW's National Law & Order Award, signed by Commander-in-Chief LT A. Earl Luetge, from Philadelphia Chapter Commander LT Cedric Philipp, on Thursday, January 4, at the Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, Joint Reserve Base.

The ceremony opened with the crisp advance of the colors by four JROTC cadets in Civil War uniforms and bearing muskets from Philadelphia's Abraham Lincoln High School. Commissioner Timoney himself then pronounced the invocation. Afterward, Henry Jansen, retired Police Superintendent from Radnor, Pennsylvania, led the Pledge of Allegiance. Accompanying Mr. Jansen were current Radnor Police Superintendent Jerry Gregory and retired Radnor Police Chief Maurice Hennessy.

Also attending were police chiefs, detectives, and officers from Upper Merion, Lower Merion, West Goshen, Whiteland, and Tredyffrin, Pennsylvania, and from Collingswood, New Jersey. The commander of the Willow Grove Base, CPT J. Cameron Blake, and 43 Companions and guests of the Philadelphia Chapter also attended.

Introducing Mr. Timoney, BG Richard Merion of West Chester spoke of the commissioner's strong leadership and national reputation as one

of the nation's top police executives. Praised in particular was how well Commissioner Timoney maintained law and order during the Republican National Convention.

In presenting the award for outstanding performance, Philipp noted that the plaque cited outstanding leadership to advance the cause of law and order in the birthplace of American independence.

Mr. Timoney shared his thoughts on "noble professions" where service to the public is paramount and pay is poor. He cited nursing, teaching,


and the military in this connection and added that hours in police work are erratic as well as accompanied by danger. Referring to the Republican National Convention, Timoney said that many of his police officers sustained injuries, and one was knocked unconscious, but none of the demonstrators were hurt.

Timoney arrived in the United States

from Ireland at the age of 12. "I couldn't afford to go to college, so I joined the New York Police Department right out of high school," he said. Attending college at night, he later got his bachelor's degree from John Jay College and master's degrees from Hunter College and Fordham University.

But Timoney said he would not choose another profession. He saluted the other police officers around him who obviously shared the same view. Timoney received a standing ovation.

Prominent in news coverage were Action News, Philadelphia's Channel 6 and the *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Channel 6, aired the story several times during the evening hours of January 4. The *Inquirer* gave it big space in its city edition and three columns in the suburban editions.



Vice Commander BG Richard D. Merion (center) reads the national citation to Philadelphia Police Commissioner John F. Timoney, standing to his right as Commander LT Cedric Philipp looks on.

El Paso Youth Leadership Conference

By COL Raul Garibay
El Paso Chapter

The recently concluded El Paso Youth Leadership Conference was a highly significant event in our chapter's programming. This was a multi-day activity spanning two weekends at Fort Bliss and a Saturday at the Ysleta Independent School District Cultural Arts Center. It was well attended by students from the various high schools around the city. The timing of the conference was especially noteworthy, coming as it did in the midst of a traditionally busy season of the year involving



Rita Caribay (right) feeds the "troops" at the El Paso Youth Leadership Conference.

pre-holiday activities, and for many of the students, semester final examinations,

We were particularly pleased that Vice Commander-in-Chief CAPT Rollie Stevens participated in a portion of the conference and then spoke

at the chapter luncheon, which was also attended by participating students and staff. His inspiring remarks were well received. Also contributing to the success of the conference was LTC Del Lewis, co-director of the Arizona Sunbelt Youth Leadership Conference.

We applaud the efforts of Companion LTC Rafael Garcia who was responsible for the planning, coordination, and direction of this most successful event. Presenters at the conference came from an outstanding cross section of institutions from the city and region areas.

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Many Companions who are members of the Disabled American Veterans (DAV) and the DAV auxiliary are disappointed that our Order has not seen fit to support legislation removing prohibitions against concurrent receipt of military retired pay and veterans' disability compensation. Congress caused the problem; Congress must fix it. To get them to fix it is a task our Order must endorse.

Moreover, our Order has not joined with other service organizations of The Military Coalition (TMC) in supporting the need for enactment of concurrent legal receipt legislation as a law, a vital public issue with Congress and the Bush administration. I urge you to put this matter before the Order's General Staff and senior commanders to adopt this positive stance and encourage all Companions to send members of Congress their appropriate petitions for redress of this egregious injustice.

How can we, as an Order, representing an honorable nation, not keep our promises, in the words of Lincoln, "to him who has borne the battle, his widow, and his orphan," as well as our disabled veteran heroes, their spouses, and families. Veterans deserve their retired pay in full; likewise, we must compensate them in full, with no offsets, for all disabilities they incurred, and often still endure today, in their active military duty, reserve, and guard services to our nation.

As I have mentioned before, in my opinion, we will have to make such patriotic behavior not the exception, but the norm, in order to sponsor and establish the highest levels of good citizenship and sound stewardship in our Order. Leadership depends on precept and example. Leaders, to lead well, must lead from the front.

To have equality for all under law is not just a motto. We will make Congress measure up, all the way, in fulfilling 100 percent on its responsibilities to completely eliminate all injustices in legislation affecting those citizen-soldier veterans who elected them. I ask you to make this matter right, to join with the associations of the Military Coalition in this good fight for concurrent receipt law. Congress has seen fit to remove the dual compensation liability.

ity. They must do the same for all veterans.

I ask you to lead our Order in an honorable support of concurrent receipt legislation and its enactment in the 107th Congress, To do so will show we act upon the precepts and examples contained in our Order's Preamble.

—Maj. Leonard W. Seagren
General Leigh Wade - DC Chapter

"The Navy cadets fired the traditional 21-gun salute in three volleys of seven." ("Mail Call," March 2001)

It's one of my minor life pursuits to try to educate the local (Dallas) newspaper and TV media-folk that a "21-gun salute!" and the "traditional three volleys" are two different things. The author of that "Mail Call" piece, a colonel, should have known better!

The 21-gun salute is fired by guns (actually, Howitzers in most cases). The most recent example of a true 21-gun salute was that given by Army cannoners at the inauguration of President George W. Bush. As I recall, the 21-gun salute was originally a naval salute, given by ships passing each other at sea. There is (or was in 1959) an Army "Table of Salutes" specifying the number of guns dignitaries are entitled to — with the President/Sovereign of a nation receiving 21, the U.S. Vice President receiving 19, four-star generals and admirals receiving 17, and so forth.

According to my now-ancient *The Officer's Guide*, (Stackpole, 24th ed., 1959), "A cannon salute consists of firing a prescribed number of rounds, normally at three-second intervals, as a salute on Memorial Day and Independence Day, to a high dignitary, and as a salute to foreign ships of war. They are fired only between reveille and retreat or, by or between ships of war, between sunrise and sunset. (See AR 600-25, 1956)."

A few pages after *The Officer's Guide* discussed the cannon salutes, it discussed military funerals:

"The military funeral ceremony that has been developed to demonstrate the nation's recognition of the debt it owes to the services and sacrifices of soldiers is based on a few simple customs and traditions....At the cemetery, the casket is placed over the grave and the body bearers hold the flag-pall

waist high over the casket. After the committal service is read by the chaplain, a firing party fires three volleys. A bugler stationed at the head of the grave sounds Taps over the casket, and the military funeral is completed."

A few pages later, *The Officer's Guide* has a chapter on "Customs of the Service," and one of the paragraphs discusses "The Three Volleys Over Graves." It says, with respect to the three volleys described previously, "The use of this custom by military people is said by students to have been in use during the 17th century. In concept, it traces to the Romans who honored their dead by casting earth three times upon the grave, calling the name of the dead, and saying 'Farewell' three times. It is also likened to the intent of saying an honorable farewell by the Three Cheers as used during the Crusades..."

In *The Army Wife* (Shea, 3d ed., 1954, Harper & Brothers), there is a section devoted to military funerals, which contains the following passage in a section entitled "Origin of Certain Customs at

Military Funerals":

"Firing Three Volleys at Military Funerals: In the funeral rites of the Romans, the casting of the earth three times upon the coffin constituted the burial. It was also customary among the Romans to call the dead three times by name, which ended the funeral ceremony, after which the friends and relatives pronounced the word 'Vale' (farewell) three times as they departed from the tomb. Today, when a squad of soldiers fires three volleys over a grave, they are, in accordance with this old Roman custom, bidding their dead comrade 'Farewell, Three Times.'"

OK, so much for the lecture! Considering the number of times these two forms of military honors are confused, it might be worth an article in *Officer Review*. I've given you some places to start.

Now, please don't call the nation's highest honor "The 'Congressional' Medal of Honor" — I might have to hurt somebody

-COL Charles A. Thompson
Dallas Chapter



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New Members

APACHE TRAIL: COL Emmett C. Aepli (A), Mindi Kugler (E), CDR Joseph R. Mitchell (N) * AUGUSTA: COL John W. Geiger (A) * BATON ROUGE: Lt Col Robert L. Buckley (AF), COL Ronald R. Thompson (A) * BATAAN MEMORIAL: COL George B. Faulhaber (A) * CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA: Eva D. Adams (E) * DALLAS: LTC Guillermo Cisneros (A), Maj Louis E. Miller (AF) * EL PASO: Elizabeth M. Fink (E), Capt Ronald A. Holman (MC), Capt Jeanne B. Thompson (AF) * GEN HOLLAND: Sara W. Fontaine (E), LtCol Vernon L. Sylvester (MC) * GEN VANDENBERG: CW03 William J. Gaudet (A), Maj Dave A. Harris, Jr., CDR Don M. Morris (N) * GEN WESTMORELAND: LTjg John R. Shields (N) * HEADQUARTERS: Lt Col Ron Tottingham (AF), Col Paul A. Wilcox (AF) * HILL COUNTRY 1LT Bill O. Bull (A), CPT Robert L. Weinberg (A) * HOUSTON: LTC Edward F. Brodie (A) * HUNTSVILLE AL: Lt Col David L. Dunlap (AF) * JACKSON: LTjg Robert A. Murphy, Jr. (N) * LOUISVILLE: LTC Sammy T. Cox (A), Ina O. King (E) * LTG John M. Wright, Jr: LCDR Robert H. Ehm (N), MAJ Paulette B. Provost (A), MAJ Jonathan S. Provost (A) * NORTHERN NEW JERSEY: Helene Z. Hill (E) * OKLAHOMA CITY: COL Lee A. Henderson (A), Lt Col Mary W. Johnson (AF), 1Lt Duard T. Leslie (AF), CW4 Thomas D. Yates (A) * PORTLAND: COL Herbert L. Hirst (A), MAJ Frank W. McIntosh (A) * SAN DIEGO: CW03 Tim Hughey (A), CW03 Ron James (A), LTC Stanley A. Metzger (A), LTC Irwin Periola (A), Maj Thomas R. Standifer (AF), CAPT Carmine Tortora (N) * SAN FRANCISCO: CW4 Patrick L. Clark (A) * SANTA FE: Capt Donald F. Sterner (AF) * SAVANNAH: Dr Robert A. Burnett (A) * THE PUGET SOUND: LTC David F. Bassett (A)

New Perpetual Members

ATLANTA: Lt Col Bonnie G. Rowe, Jr. (AF) * BRADENTON-SARASOTA: MAJ Dale Keen (A) * CAPITOL HILL: COL Lesley B. Shelburne, Jr. (A) * DETROIT: COL Irving R. Wendt (A) * EAST TEXAS: LTjg Daniel E. Gannaway (N) * FORT

WORTH: LTG Ronald R. Blanck (A) * GAYLORD DILLINGHAM MEMORIAL: Edna K. S. Loo (H), Ann G. Morano (H) * HEADQUARTERS: CPT David M. Egan (A), LTC Edward B. Williams (A) * JOSEPH H. PENDLETON: Louise S. McIntyre (H) * LOUISVILLE: CW2 Don Helton (A) * MAJ CYRILL PFOHL: LtCol Robert L. Padgett (MC) * ORO VALLEY: Dolores M. Cataldo (H) * PHILADELPHIA: LCDR John W. Gaul (N) * RGN 8 HQS: Maj Lois L. Tilley (AF) * SAN FERNANDO VALLEY: COL Fred W. Darley (A) * SANTA BARBARA: BG Frederick R. Lopez (MC) * SOUTHWEST FLORIDA: LTC Samuel E. Roakes, Jr. (A) * THE PUGET SOUND: COL James L. Saunders (A)

Deceased Members

CENTRAL ARKANSAS: Lt Col William F. 'Howard (AF), COL William B. Swafford (A) * CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA: Col William F. Etchberger (AF) * CHARLOTTE: COL Ralph C. Clontz, Jr (A) * CHICAGO: LT Shirley W. Bryan (N) * CLEARWATER: COL Edward L. Wolff (A) * COLUMBIA: COL Richard F. Ropp (A) * CORPUS CHRISTI: CDR Henry D. Stence (N) * DALLAS: LT James B. Newman (N) * GAYLORD DILLINGHAM MEMORIAL: Col James T. Pettus (AF) * GEN GEORGE G. MEADE: COL Carl G. Witte (A) * GEN RIDGWAY-PFG PA: CAPT Raul B. Perez (N) * GEN WESTMORELAND: 1LT Harry G. Goode, Jr. (A) * GREATER BOSTON: CPT John G. Coving (A) * GREATER KANSAS CITY: CAPT Paul J. Ericson (N) * HEADQUARTERS: Maj Gen Daniel C. Doubleday (AF), LCDR Lawrence E. Hess, Jr (N), COL Joseph W. Batch (A) * INDIANAPOLIS: COL Kenneth E. Marlin (A) * LOUISVILLE: MAJ Robert L. McGeachin (A), LTC Robert W. Whyte (A) * NEW YORK: CAPT Benjamin I? Field (N) * ORO VALLEY: Gloria M. Kerwin (H) * PHILADELPHIA: 1LT Chandler Gillespie (A) * PHOENIX: LT Daniel M. Madden (N) * SAN FRANCISCO: LTC Kenneth L. Leimbach (A) * SPOKANE: Lt Col Leo G. Rasmussen (AF) * ST AUGUSTINE: LTC William H. Dodge (A), LTC Danny I? Fraser (A), Lt Col Charles C. Hortenstine (AF) * ST PETERSBURG: Martha Balke (H) * SUN CITIES: LTC Vernon E. Harvey (A) * THE PUGET SOUND: CAPT Raul B. Perez (N)



It's Your Order...

What Do You Think About It?

The issue of the Military Order of the World Wars, Inc., (MOWW, Inc.) name has been discussed for almost 50 years. As far as the records in national headquarters indicate, the discussion started after the return of the World War II veterans.

Everybody under-

MILITARY ORDER OF THE WORLD WARS

There have been many discussions about changing the Order's name for many years. The Order is now taking a survey. Please complete and return this card.

Do you favor changing the Order's name? (Circle one) YES NO
(If NO, put your name and Chapter on the card and return it.)

If YES, rank the following 3 names (1 through 3) recommended by a committee of Companions, tasked by the Order to look at this issue.

- The Order of Military Officers
- The Military Order of Officers
- The Military Order of American Officers

After ranking the 3 names above, if you wish to add a name please PRINT your recommendation:

Thank you for taking the time to complete and return this survey card. To save the Order funds, we request that you affix the postage (at least 22 cents). The results of this survey will be reported at the July 24-29, 2001 National Convention in South Carolina and in *Officer Review* in September 2001.

(Please print your name)

(Chapter)

Kosovo (1999-present), plus veterans from many other conflicts throughout the world since World War II (such as the Berlin Airlift, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, etc.). Today, the question being asked of the Order is, "Should the name be changed?"

Your Commander-in-Chief LT A. Earl Luetge, with the endorsement of MOWW's Executive Committee has directed that a survey of all Companions be conducted, by postcard, distributed in the May issue of *Officer Review*

MOWW will be renewing its congressional charter in 2002, and it is important that the Order have a clear position on what changes it might want to make (if any) to the current MOWW charter. If the Companions decide to change the name of the Order, this change would have to be included in this renewal application.

Again, this is very important! Please remove the enclosed survey postcard, complete the questions, and mail it to MOWW headquarters as soon as possible. MOWW is counting on you to answer this survey.

magazine.
This is very important! Please remove the enclosed survey postcard, complete the questions, and mail them. If there is more than one Companion in your household, and you are receiving only one copy of the Officer Review magazine, please make the appropriate copies of the survey postcard, put them in an envelope, and mail your survey postcards to MOWW national headquarters. MOWW headquarters will tabulate the results of all survey postcards received and report the results to the Order at the national convention in July 2001, in South Carolina.

The leadership of MOWW is very important to gather the input of all Companions. It is important to have this very important information this summer.

Officers Call

ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE CHAPTER: A joint meeting was held with the Prince George's County Chapter in February. Professors of naval, military, and aerospace science from three local universities addressed JROTC cadets who are planning to attend their ROTC programs next year. The professors covered their freshman programs and discussed problems and challenges the potential officer candidates may encounter.

AUGUSTA CHAPTER: The February meeting was dedicated to the theme of patriotism. Guest speaker was Phil Turner, who read some of his patriotic poetry and provided additional thoughts on patriotism. Companions **MAJ Bud Dent** and **COL Jim Keagle** organized the February youth leadership conference.

BATON ROUGE-GEN. TROY H. MIDDLETON CHAPTER: At the February meeting, Companion **COL Phil St. Amant** gave an inspiring talk on "Foreign Policy Directions for the United States in a New Century."

COLORADO SPRINGS CHAPTER: Representatives from several ROTC units attended the annual JROTC/ROTC meeting. Medal of Honor recipient Peter Lemon spoke about establishing, setting, and adhering to rules and standards.

COLUMBIA CHAPTER: Forty Companions and guests were present at the February meeting to hear Companion and state Senator Warren Giese deliver an interesting talk on the inner workings of, and the problems facing, the South Carolina State Legislature in their present session.

DAYTONA BEACH CHAPTER: The February meeting featured representatives from the Volusia Sea Turtle Society. Speakers **Joyce Stires** and **Suzanne Blandi** presented a slide show and set up an impressive display of information about turtles, shells, and photos.

EAST TEXAS CHAPTER: Speaker for the February meeting was Companion **COL Emery Crane**, whose presentation dealt with his four-month tour of duty in Vietnam. He was assigned to a C-123 Tactical Airlift Wmg, commanding a flight of seven aircraft and ten crews, spraying Agent Blue, an undiluted liquid fertilizer. The idea was to burn the Viet

Cong crops by overfertilization.

EL PASO CHAPTER: VCINC CAPT Rollie Stevens was the honored guest at the December meeting, which also featured students from the El Paso-Sunbelt Youth Leadership Conference. Awards were presented to the top three YLC students. The January meeting, attended by 47 Companions and guests, honored past chapter commanders, four of whom were in attendance. Guest speaker was Companion **MAJ George Ernst**, who spoke about the forthcoming visit of former British Prime Minister **Lady Margaret Thatcher** for the "Share the Vision of World Peace" event.

FRESNO CHAPTER: Companion **LT John Castle**, a Coast Guard veteran and television show host, spoke at the February meeting about the United Nations, often expressing reserves about its value and function in the world today.

GEN. GEORGE G. MEADE CHAPTER: February was designated Law and Order month. The speaker for the meeting was **Pamela L. North**, judge of the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court. She said that mandatory sentencing laws arbitrarily take away the court's discretion in many instances where circumstances appear to call for a combination of rehabilitation and punishment versus mandatory incarceration only. An update was given by **COL Bert Rice** who directed a YLC at the **Herman L. Toulson** Correctional Boot Camp in Jessup, Maryland, a facility that emphasizes physical fitness, education, training and counseling to help rehabilitate inmates.

GEN. MATHEW B. RIDGWAY CHAPTER: Ray Rounds gave an excellent presentation at the January meeting on the Pittsburgh VA Health System. He handed out a picturesque folder of Pittsburgh for all, which contained a wealth of information.

GREATER BOSTON CHAPTER: At the February meeting, Companion **Capt. Al Mundo** gave attendees insight into the events surrounding the downing of TWA Flight 800 through a one-hour video presentation.

HILL COUNTRY CHAPTER: At the February meeting, **Nick Villanueva**, the assistant volunteer services officer at the local VA hospital, spoke about the history of the hospital, the veteran residents, and volunteering at the hospital.

JOSEPH H. PENDLETON CHAPTER: Forty-eight Companions and guests attended the January

meeting. The speaker was **Joseph F. Little** who served during the Battle of the Bulge. He was wounded in combat, captured by the Germans, and remained a prisoner of the Germans for the remainder of World War II. Because the Germans believed that he was Jewish, he suffered greatly as their prisoner.

MIDDLE GEORGIA CHAPTER: The January program featured Brig. Gen. **Dave Sibley** speaking on the 1990s aerospace involvement in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East—its successes, lessons learned, and value of planning for possible future involvement around the world.

NEW LONDON CHAPTER: The Tricare Program was discussed at the February meeting. In addition, Companions **LTC Waldron T. Higgins** and **MAJ Henry M. Hansen** have been selected to present the awards at the awards ceremony for the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in May.

NEW ORLEANS CHAPTER: **CAPT Giles Norrington** spoke at the January meeting about his experiences as a POW for nearly five years in North Vietnam.

PHILADELPHIA CHAPTER: The January meeting honored the U.S. Air Force. ROTC units from five area colleges, JROTC cadets from six high schools, and 91 Companions and guests packed the meeting to hear **BG James Skiff** speak about his mission in South East Asia and in the National Guard. Also in attendance was **COL Randall Lanning**, commander of the ROTC and JROTC Air Force units throughout New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. General Skiff also provided a history of the National Guard and Air National Guard.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY CHAPTER: **Ann Beckman** of the Wellness Center at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center gave an informative talk, at the January meeting, on nutrition, stress management, living well, and how to stay healthy. She also distributed a folder containing information on the Wellness Center.

PUGET SOUND CHAPTER: The February dinner meeting was attended by 50 Companions and guests. Speakers were Traffic **SGT John Solheim** and community service officer **Katherine Gallant** who spoke on a new device being placed in **Lakewood**—the "Photo Cop"—that will photograph drivers who run red traffic lights. Chief of Police **COL Larry**

Saunders and **LTC Donald Wilson** were inducted into membership. The Police Officer of the Year plaque was presented to Deputy Sheriff **Travis A. Hoffman**.

SANTA BARBARA CHAPTER: An enthusiastic audience of 76 were present to hear **Capt. Sandy Evens** talk about events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. He said that documents support the fact that the United States was not yet in position to challenge the Japanese operations in the Pacific and on the Asian mainland.

SAVANNAH CHAPTER: The new chief of police, **Dann Flynn**, spoke at the January meeting about how to reduce crime in the community, and about his experiences as a veteran police officer. Companion **Julia Folkner** read memorials for Past Commander-in-Chief **CDR Bruce L. Slawson** and **Christian Carreras**, son of Companion **Luis Carreras**.

SPACE COAST-INDIAN RIVER CHAPTER: **Master Gunnery Sergeant David R. Beers**, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, is this year's recipient of the **MOWW Citizen-Soldier of the Year Award**. This award is given by the chapter each year. Selection criteria, which is derived from the statement in the Preamble "to foster fraternal relations among all branches of the Armed Forces," includes the individual's leadership in the community with the military.

ST. LOUIS CHAPTER: **COL Thomas J. Kitz**, deputy assistant commandant of the U.S. Army Chemical School provided the latest information at the February meeting about the Army's chemical programs.

TOPEKA CHAPTER: The February speaker was **LTC Jim Ruth**, executive officer of the 130th Field Artillery Brigade. He briefed attendees on the newest armament and vehicles the Army uses today.

We Know You're Out There

Please remember to send your monthly newsletters to national headquarters. The "Officer's Call" column is compiled from the information you provide us through your newsletters. Currently, we receive about 25 newsletters per month. We know there are more of you out there, so tell us about your chapter activities, and we'll reserve a space for you in "Officer's Call"!



Surgeon's Office

You Hurt! What Pain Reliever Should You Choose?

By COL Jerrold Wheaton
Surgeon General

Selecting an over-the-counter medication used to be a simple choice of either Aspirin or Tylenol. Now there are dozens of pain relievers on a drug store shelf. How are you to select the right one?

Let's look at the active ingredients and start from there. The three basic ingredients are aspirin, acetaminophen, and a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory (NSAID). The next question is what does each one do?

Aspirin contains salicylic acid as the active ingredient that partially blocks the hormone-like prostaglandin production that contributes to inflammation and pain. It also blocks platelet function that increases blood-clotting time and may increase bleeding. Some aspirin preparations contain caffeine, and if taken regularly, can cause the headache of caffeine withdrawal if the medication is discontinued abruptly.

Acetaminophen probably acts directly on nerve endings to decrease pain, but no one is absolutely sure how it works. Some pain-relief products with acetaminophen also contain other medications such as diuretics or antihistamines. Read the label! Males do not need to, take the one with a diuretic, and need to be careful of combining acetaminophen products with antihistamines if they have an enlarged prostate. These preparations are apt to make it more difficult to urinate. They also have a sedating effect that can be dangerous when driving or operating machinery.

NSAID's such as ibuprofen (motrin) and naprosyn (naproxen) suppress pain by inhibiting prostaglandin production. This hormone-like secretion acts in inflammation and pain production. They are more effective in this regard than aspirin, but can be just as irritating to the stomach, causing ulceration and bleeding, particularly as people age.

Buffered pain relievers are preparations that are coated with an outside layer designed to allow them to pass through the stomach before dissolving in the small intestine. The buffering is done to reduce the incidence of stomach lining ulceration and bleeding. The disadvantage is that the buffering delays the action of the active ingredients. They are also more expensive. Regular aspirin or NSAID's can be "buffered" without additional cost by taking them with food.

With any of these medications, start with the lowest suggested dosage and always stay within the maximum daily dosage. To exceed the maximum daily dosage is to invite ulceration, bleeding, or liver damage.

Give the medicine time to work. Don't expect relieve in 5, 10, or even 15 minutes. These medications are designed to produce some effect at about 30 minutes and usually last for about 2 hours. Take all of them with food to reduce the chance of ulceration and bleeding, and never take them with alcohol!

Decrease the dose with age. Medication is not eliminated in an older person's system as rapidly as it is in a younger person. In addition, those on a daily dose of aspirin to reduce coronary occlusion should count this dosage when they calculate the maximum allowable daily dosage!

Remember to read the label carefully for many over-the-counter preparations contain acetaminophen or aspirin or another NSAID in addition to the primary ingredient. This is especially true of cold, sinus, and flu remedies. The active NSAID ingredients in these medications should also be counted to stay within the allowable daily dose.

Those taking over-the-counter medications should be careful about combining them with herbal remedies. A doctor or pharmacist should be consulted before adding any drug or herbal remedy to other medications. The Council on Family Health has recognized this problem, and in cooperation with the Food and Drug Administration and the National Consumers League, has issued a free consumer guide, "Drug Interactions: What You Should Know." To get a copy, send a request for item #600G to the Federal Consumer Information Center, Pueblo, CO, 81009.

“When it
comes to my investments, I call the shots.”



Brokerage Services. If you do the research and decision making when it comes to your investments, use USAA Brokerage Services as your discount broker. We have a variety of accounts to meet your needs. And USAA Brokerage Services offers access to stock, bond and options trading at commissions as low as \$14.95. Plus, you can select from over 6,000 mutual funds from many of America's most prominent fund families through the USAA Fund Marketplace? There are three

flexible ways to invest: you can invest online at usaa.com; call one of our registered investment representatives; or use USAA TouchLine Trade? our automated telephone service. If you're a take-charge kind of investor, use USAA Brokerage Services to help you meet the goals in your investment strategy.

Call us at (b)(6)
or visit us at usaa.com




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
Names and Faces



GREATER KANSAS CITY CHAPTER: Region XI Commander **COL James M. Snyder** presents a trophy to the cadet commander of a winning Air Force drill unit at a competition. All trophies presented at the event were donated by the chapter.



SPACE COAST-INDIAN RIVER CHAPTER: The chapter pays tribute to the Tuskegee Airmen. Left to right are chapter Commander **COL John Hilliard**, original Tuskegee Airmen **Don Williams** and **Hiram Mann**, and **Lt. Gen. Roger DeKok**, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command in Colorado.



AUSTIN CHAPTER: COL Andrew McVeigh (left) presented the outstanding participant award to **Paul Trujillo** at the 2000 Youth Leadership Conference. On the right are past chapter commander **Lt. Col. Tom Anderson** and current Commander **Maj. Lois Tilley**.




GEN GEORGE G. MEADE CHAPTER: The chapter exhibited the Korean War commemoration flag and posters at the Mid-Winter General Staff Meeting. Visiting the exhibit were (left to right): **LTC Pete Straub**, Fort Walton Beach Chapter; **VCINC CAPT Rollie Stevens**; **VCINC LT Don Allen**; **LT Dorothy Davis**; **CPT Bus Spaniola** Mid-Michigan Chapter; and **JAG COL John Murphy**.



SAN DIEGO CHAPTER: Department of Southern California Commander **COL Filomena Manor** speaks at the Region XIV Midwinter Conference. Looking on are (left to right) **Lt. Jack Blake**, region historian, **Col. Jerry Webb**, commander of the San Diego Chapter, and **CDR James Studnicke** of the Bradley Chapter in the foreground.


CLEARWATER CHAPTER: Pictured from left to right is **MG Edward Heywood**, past chapter and Region VI commander **Col. Elliott Taylor Kathrnian**, and current chapter commander **Lt. Col. David C. Berry**. Col. Kathrnian was given honorary perpetual membership at a ceremony held at his assisted living facility in **Palm Harbor, Florida**.




DALLAS CHAPTER: Two Companions recently presented a check for \$2,023 to the Plano Ind. School District as a contribution from the Dallas Military Ball Corporation Fund. Pictured from left to right are Past **CINC COL Homer C. Schmidt**; **LTC James Coughlin**, professor of military science at Plano East High School; **Ira McAfee**, school principal; and **COL John D. Sefcik**, chapter senior vice commander.



ROANOKE CHAPTER: At a recent dinner meeting, new members and sponsors pose after the induction ceremony (from left): **Col. Norman Elmore**, **Capt. Harold Haley**, **LCDR David Sullivan**, and **Lt. Robert Paine**. Col. Elmore sponsored Capt. Haley and LCDR Sullivan sponsored Lt. Paine.




EL PASO CHAPTER: **Garibay** presents a membership to **M. Aimore** for her continued Preamble-focused activities.



JOSEPH H. PENDLETON CHAPTER: Manning a booth at the 6th annual retiree fair are (from left to right) **Lt. Col. Richard Hull**, senior vice commander; **Maj. Raymond Schmidt**, director of YLCs; **Jenny McCoy**, junior vice commander; and **James Baird**, commander.






courtesy of the

World War I



courtesy of the World War II Memorial Foundation

World War II



and History Association

Vietnam War,

snowflake

May 22, 2001 10:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boats v. Ships

MAY 23 2001
SECRET HAS BEEN

560

On this unnumbered page, the President talks about putting an airplane on a boat. You ought to let them know that submarines are called boats, and small vessels are often called boats, like a tugboat. But ships that are big enough to have an airplane on them are called ships.

Attach.
5/18/01 Naval Academy Commencement Draft

DHR:dh
05220 1-6

Sec Def Done
J 423

U09818 /01

22 MAY 01

Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense
From: Dov S. Zakheim
Subject: Clinton-Gore Book
Date: March 14, 2001

24/5

To Paul W
for [unclear]
DR

1400
14 MAR 01

Duncan Hunter's book (ref. your note to me of 9 March) is quite good, but I believe that we have marshaled the arguments he makes. Moreover, his statistics tend to be from 1999, and some improvements were realized last year, with more anticipated for this year.

A marginal note: Hunter cites Lane Pierrot's testimony in making his case about modernization shortfalls (first tab in book). Lane worked for me years ago at DoD and I have suggested we hire her as a special assistant in the Comptroller's front office.

110.01

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MAY 14 2001

14 MAR 01

March 9, 2001 5:51 PM


snowflake

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Clinton-Gore Book


Is there anything in this Clinton-Gore book that Duncan Hunter put together that could be useful to us in our dealings with OMB and the White House on the budget?

Attach.

DHR:dh
030901-23

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "DHR:dh", written over a horizontal line.

THE CLINTON-GORE
ADMINISTRATION'S
NEGLECT OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES



By Rep. Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Subcommittee
on Research & Development

March 1, 2001

THE DEFENSE PROBLEM: IT'S GETTING WORSE

“The inescapable fact is that, in terms of maintaining and sustaining the military capabilities of the QDR force-the desired force for FY 1997 – 201 5–DoD is facing budget shortfalls of at least \$100 billion per year...” [*Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium* by Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney, November 1999]

“CBO estimates that DoD would need to spend about \$90 billion a year to maintain steady rate procurement funding for today’s force structure.” [*Lane Pierrot, CBO analyst, before House Subcommittee on Military Procurement, February 24, 1999*]

“The pigeons will come home to roost in a period from 2010 to 2015. We cannot maintain the present force structure and reequip the forces on the present budget levels or the prospective budget levels.” [*James M. Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, February 8, 2000*]

In testimony before the House Military Procurement Subcommittee on February 29, 2000, Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn stated that the current U.S. Navy force structure of ships is inadequate “to do all of the things that we could and, in my view, should to do support the national security strategy.” Admiral McGinn went on to endorse a fleet level of 350 ships.

JUST THE FACTS:

Under the Clinton Administration, U.S. military force structure has been drastically reduced since Desert Storm.

	<u>1990</u>	<u>NOW</u>
Army divisions:	18	10
Fighter Wings:	24	13
Navy Ships:	546	316

Readiness of our forces are declining

- ✓ The Army is \$3.3 billion short in basic ammunition.
- ✓ The Marines have a shortfall in ammunition of over \$220 million.
- ✓ 5,100 military families are forced to accept food stamps because of low pay rates.
- ✓ The average U.S. Navy aircraft age has increased to 17 years and approximately 66% of the inventory is older than 15 years.
- ✓ The average Marine tanker is 25 years old and the average Marine transport helicopter is 24 years old.
- ✓ The average U.S. Air Force bomber is 23 years old and the average helicopter is nearly 19 years old.
- ✓ The average U.S. Army transport vehicle is between 15 and 30 years old.
- ✓ Since 1998, there have been 95 military aircraft crashes, leading to 118 fatalities.



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- ☞ The Defense Problem: It's Getting Worse
- ☞ Modernization Spending Inadequate
- ☞ Aging Equipment
- ☞ Army Ammunition Shortages
- ☞ Precision Guided Munitions Shortages
- ☞ Air Force Readiness
- ☞ Army Readiness: 2 Divisions Report "not ready."
- ☞ Mission Capable Rates Declining
- ☞ Naval Fleet Size Inadequate
- ☞ Military Personnel Shortages

MODERNIZATION SPENDING INADEQUATE

STATEMENT: *The Clinton-Gore Administration has consistently underfunded the modernization requirements of the military services.*

FACTS: Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee revealed that the Clinton-Gore Administration has neglected the modernization needs of our military services and that future Administrations will need to provide significant resources to modernize our military forces.

According to the Lane Pierrot of the bipartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO), "DoD would need to spend about \$90 billion a year to maintain a steady rate procurement funding for today's force structure."

Former Defense Secretary, Dr. James Schlesinger, supported CBO's assessment in a hearing before the Armed Services Committee in February 2000, but placed the number that defense was underfunded by as much as \$100 billion per year.

The Clinton-Gore Administration's own former Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry admitted that the FY01 procurement budget of \$60 billion was inadequate. Instead he stated, "My own judgement is it probably needs to be perhaps \$70 to \$80 billion" to modernize our defense systems.

CBO
TESTIMONY

Statement of
Lane Pierrot
Senior Analyst
National Security Division
Congressional Budget Office

on
Aging Military Equipment

before the
Subcommittee on Military Procurement
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives

February 24, 1999

NOTICE

This statement is not available for public release until it is delivered at 2:00 p.m. (EST), Wednesday, February 24, 1999.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the aging of military equipment. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified before the House Armed Services Committee last month, they expressed concerns about the effects of low levels of procurement on their equipment inventories, arguing that the average age of weapons will soon be unacceptably high.

The Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) analysis suggests that stocks of many kinds of military equipment are already at a higher average age than they have been in the past. Even if the Department of Defense (DoD) increases purchases as its current plans project, that trend will continue. Those added purchases are scheduled to occur in the years beyond 2000, when the Administration projects large real increases in aggregate defense spending, including higher funding for procurement.

The Administration's budget plan, however, depends on savings in other areas of the federal budget that may be difficult to realize. Most of the added funding is premised on the Administration's assumption that Social Security reform will free up significant budgetary resources. But the Administration and the Congress have yet to agree to changes in the Social Security system, much less to reforms that would generate the large savings the Administration's plan banks on. The remainder of the spending increase for defense comes from revisions to the Balanced Budget Act that have not yet been negotiated.

DoD took what some of its leaders termed a procurement holiday in the 1990s and is finding it

TABLE 1.
AVERAGE AGES OF SELECTED EQUIPMENT (In years)

Type of Mission	Weapon Systems	Service	Half of the Past or Planned Service Life of Systems ^a	Average Age	
				In 1999	In 2007
Missions Without Replacement Plans					
Tanks	M1 Abrams	Army	15	12	20
Shore-Based Maritime Patrol Aircraft	P-3c	Navy	15-20	23	31
Support Aircraft	E-2, EA-6B, S-3B	Navy	10-18	18	24
Bombers	B-52, B-1, B-2	Air Force	25-35	23	30
Tankers	KC-135, KC-10	Air Force	25-33	39	47
Missions With Replacement Plans					
Light Attack and Scout Helicopters	OH-58 Kiowa, Comanche	Army	10-18	21	28
Surface Combatants	DDG-51, DD-2 1, CG-47, others	Navy	15-20	12	15
Multirole Fighters, Close Air Support	F-14, F/A-18, AV-8B, Joint Strike Fighter	Navy	10-15	13	16
	F-16, A-10, Joint Strike Fighter	Air Force	10-15	12	19
Air Superiority Fighters	F-15A-D, F-22	Air Force	10-15	18	23

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense

a. The midpoint of the systems' average service life. In an inventory that has systems evenly distributed between those newly delivered and those nearing retirement, the average age will equal half of the system's service life.

Over the current planning period (2000 to 2005), DoD plans to purchase replacements for some types of equipment but not for others. As shown in Table 1, the fleets that age the most over that period are those for which DoD has absolutely no purchases planned. Some of those fleets contain equipment that is already very old, on average. The Air Force's tanker fleet, for which the service plans no replacement purchases at least through the next decade, averages 39 years today and will be 47 years old by 2007. DoD also plans no replacement purchases for Army tanks, Navy maritime patrol aircraft, and Air Force bombers according to its 2000-2005 plan.

Even when DoD plans to purchase new systems--including light attack and scout helicopters in the Army, surface combatants in the Navy, and tactical fighter fleets in the Air Force and Navy--fleets will grow older during that planning period because purchases of replacement systems are too few or begin too late to halt aging completely. Air Force and Navy fighter fleets

are in the best shape: planned purchases of F-22s and F/A-18E/Fs will slow increases in the average ages of those fleets.

If the equipment in the fleet is relatively young and has many years of service life remaining, then aging may be of little concern. Table 1 also shows a range of average ages that represent roughly half of the retirement age (or service life) of the weapons in the various mission categories. If weapon systems of a particular type are bought at steady rates and are thus evenly distributed between systems that have just entered the fleet and those nearing retirement, the average age of the fleet will be half of the retirement age. The range of estimates shown in Table 1 show two projections of how long systems will last. The optimistic estimates generally assume that equipment will last longer, and in some cases much longer, than it has in the past.

Comparing the values that reflect half of the planned service lives with the average ages projected for the fleets suggests that DoD could confront problems with aging inventories relatively soon. The average age of the equipment in several mission categories already exceeds half of the shorter service life (in two cases it also exceeds half of the longer, more optimistic service life); by 2007, all but one of the systems shown will exceed half of even the more optimistic service lives. Such patterns might not be a problem if DoD planned to make further force cuts. But today's forces roughly equal the levels the Administration has said it wishes to preserve. It also might not be a near-term problem if equipment in DoD's inventories was bought in a block. Using that approach, those fleets could have average ages that were greater than half their service lives but few systems near retirement. CBO's analysis suggests that although the equipment in DoD's fleets may have been bought unevenly, many platforms are or will soon be older than the ages at which similar equipment would have been retired in the past.

REDUCED PURCHASES

The fleets are elderly because DoD bought relatively small quantities of most types of major equipment during its procurement holiday in the 1990s. The Administration argued that a procurement holiday would be acceptable since large cuts in forces had created a surplus of equipment. Purchasing large numbers of weapons seemed unnecessary while the services were retiring equipment that had not yet reached the end of its service life. But DoD cut purchases of many types of equipment by a much larger percentage than it cut forces. And even after the Administration decided to end the holiday, it found it difficult to greatly increase procurement. The Administration's planned purchases for the six years of its current plan, though an increase above recent procurement, are still not sufficient to halt the aging of DoD's fleets.

A comparison of historical, planned, and steady-state purchases of selected equipment shows that in most cases, average annual purchases of systems over the 20-year period between 1974 and 1993 were much greater than those over the past six years (see Table 2). They also exceed purchases planned during the six-year period of the current plan. The Army purchased more than 1,400 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery systems per year on average over the 1974- 1993 period. Average yearly purchases of the same types of systems equaled only 24 over

the past six years and are scheduled to rise to only 28 over the next six years (and no tanks or infantry fighting vehicles have been bought since 1992, though the Army has an ongoing program to upgrade its tanks). Over the same 20-year period, the Navy purchased 105 fighter and attack aircraft per year, compared with average annual purchases of about 36 over the past six years and about 46 planned over the next six years. That pattern also applies to most of DoD's major systems. Indeed, the only mission areas in which recent or planned purchases would equal or exceed historical purchases are tactical and strategic airlift aircraft for the Air Force (see Table 2).


TABLE 2.
COMPARISON OF PAST, PLANNED, AND STEADY-STATE PURCHASES OF SELECTED EQUIPMENT

	Average Annual Purchases			Annual Purchases to Sustain Today's Forces	
	1974-1993	1994-1999	2000-2005	More Optimistic Case ^a	Less Optimistic Case ^b
Tanks, Artillery, and Other Armored Vehicles	1,485	24	28	623	872
Scout and Attack Helicopters	58	2	4	90	152
Utility Helicopters	66	42	26	65	111
ships	17	7	8	8	10
Fighter and Attack Aircraft					
Navy	105	36	46	70	93
Air Force	203	8	26	104	139
Electronic Warfare Aircraft	6	0	0	6	8
Support Aircraft	13	3	3	6	8
Tactical and Strategic Airlift Aircraft	10	7	14	20	27
Tankers	3	0	0	10	12
Bombers	6	0	0	3	4

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

spent in 2005 is worth less than today's dollar because of the inflation that will occur between now and 2005.)

FIGURE 1.
PAST, PLANNED, AND STEADY-STATE PROCUREMENT FUNDING



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office estimates based on data from the Department of Defense.

Spending on defense procurement not only fell in absolute terms but also shrank below its historical average. Over the 1974- 1993 period, procurement appropriations averaged almost \$90 billion a year, and for a short period in the 1980s, they may have equaled the funding required to sustain the larger forces of the Cold War era. But procurement spending over the past six years (1994 to 1999) averaged only about \$47 billion annually, which is much less than DoD might need to sustain forces at today's levels.

Even before procurement funding reached its nadir in 1997, DoD's leaders recognized their problem. In 1995, General John Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that DoD needed to increase its spending for procurement to at least \$60 billion a year by 1998 (that would be about \$62 billion in 2000 dollars). And at least since 1995, a hallmark of the department's Future Year's Defense Programs is that they have included that \$60 billion goal, usually at the end of the proposed planning period.

A second hallmark is that each plan projects sizable increases in procurement funding in the years beyond the budget year, and those crests have shifted outward in bow-wave fashion from one plan to the next (see Figure 2). DoD's procurement funding has yet to reach General Shalikashvili's target. Actual funding was \$16 billion below his goal in 1998 and \$13 billion below it in 1999, and DoD's request for fiscal year 2000 is still about \$10 billion short. The department's inability to reach its procurement goals has resulted, at least in part, from the difficulty it has had wresting savings from the operating side of its budget.

DoD may be able to allow some weapons to age indefinitely, although it may need to spend more on modifications or overhauls to do so. In many cases, modifying systems is cheaper than buying new ones, and in some cases it is much cheaper. And overhauls--which simply replace worn-out parts--are likely to be even less expensive than modifications.

The military services, however, have argued against permitting large portions of their inventories to age beyond the estimated service lives. Their concerns include the possibility that enemies will develop weapons that make older U.S. weapons obsolete; that maintenance and modification costs will increase as the fleet ages; and that older weapons will develop unexpected defects that could render them unavailable for conflicts until major, and perhaps time-consuming, modifications or overhauls were completed.

The first concern--obsolescence in the face of an increasing threat--may be less of an issue today, at least in comparison with the Cold War years. No current enemy comes close to matching the efforts of the former Soviet Union to develop and buy sophisticated weapons. Of course, DoD is assuming that it will retain weapons some 30 years or more into the future. Ensuring that obsolescence will not be an issue for 30 years or more is much harder.

The two other concerns that the services have raised in the past may have received support from recent research. Until recently, DoD was unable to document an empirical relationship between the age of its fleets and increased costs to operate them, largely because the services had few platforms in the fleet that greatly exceeded the expected retirement ages. Several recent studies, including one to be discussed in this hearing by Dr. Raynond Pyles from RAND, have begun to document some effects of aging on both costs and the time during which systems are down while awaiting repair. If problems are magnified as systems are kept beyond their retirement ages, a very large portion of DoD's fleets could deliver some costly surprises in the not too distant future.

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2000

TESTIMONY BY DR. SCHLESINGER

(H.A.S.C. No. 106-46)

TESTIMONY ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 8 2000

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

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One Hundred Sixth Congress

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helpful to us this year. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr Skelton can be found in the Appendix.]

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you. Without objection, the prepared statements of all the witnesses along with any accompanying material will be inserted in the record.

I would note at this point that Dr Schlesinger has graciously rearranged his schedule to be with us today but he will have to depart by 2:00 p.m. Accordingly, it is my intention to recognize Dr. **Schlesinger** for his remarks and then turn to as many members' questions as possible until two o'clock, at which time Dr. **Schlesinger** has to depart. And Mr. Ranney and Dr. **Gouré** will formally present the CSIS Study with members' question to follow.

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Dr. Schlesinger, the floor is yours.

STATEMENTS OF THE HON. JAMES R. **SCHLESINGER**, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND **MEMBER**, CSIS BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Dr. **SCHLESINGER**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Skelton, it is a pleasure to be back here today. You may not know it, gentlemen, but a quarter of a century ago, the Chairman and I were participating in parachute jumps down in Fort Bragg and, of course, Congressman Skelton at that time was a youngster on this Committee. So time has passed.

a It is my responsibility today to present what is a definitive study about the shortfall, where we are heading in terms of budget projections.

Some of you may know the story that Lyndon Johnson used to tell about this dim-witted boy down in Texas who decided that he wanted to work on the railroad. He went down to the station in town, and the stationmaster said to him, suppose there is a train coming down from San Antonio and another train coming up from McAllen, and it was a single track, what would you do? The boy looked at the stationmaster and said, I would run and get my brother. And the stationmaster looks puzzled and said, you would run and get your brother? Why is that? The boy says, because my brother's never seen a train wreck.

Well, we are likely to see a train wreck. The simple reality, gentlemen, is that we cannot sustain the QDR forces on the prospective defense spending. Those QDR forces have been described by the Administration, described by Bill Perry when he was Secretary of Defense, as the minimum necessary to sustain our international position.

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The simple reality is that we cannot sustain those forces. That is not a matter of opinion. That is a matter of simple arithmetic which is spelled out in this study.

We are, at this time, living on our capital. We are also overstretching the existing forces. At the moment, we are spending about three percent of the GDP on defense. In 1941, fiscal year 1941.

prior to Pearl Harbor we were spending 4.1 percent of the GDP. We are projecting to go down to about 2.3-4 percent of the GDP spent on defense.

Gentlemen, we like to imagine that we will forever be the sole superpower. We pride ourselves on being the sole superpower. Secretary of State has described the United States as the indispensable Nation, but let me assure you that we will not, over the decade, remain the sole superpower or the indispensable Nation on 2.8 percent of the GDP spent on defense.

Why is this? I mentioned that we are living off our capital. We have been on an extended procurement holiday since the Cold War. That holiday is spelled out in this study. Right now, the depreciation on a straight-line basis of the equipment of the Armed Forces of the United States is over \$1 billion a year. We have been spending roughly \$45 billion, \$50 billion, as the Chairman mentioned. The Administration is requesting \$60 billion. In order to replace the equipment of the QDR designated force, we will have to spend approximately \$100 billion a year.

We have to spend considerably more than 2.8 percent of the GDP if we wish to sustain the position of the United States in the world. This is laid out in meticulous detail in the study by Dr. Gouré and Mr. Ranney.

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The existing forces are already under considerable strain. We have a high operations tempo driven by the willingness of the United States to intervene in various parts of the world with now substantially-reduced force.

We are maintaining that high operations tempo partly by underfunding procurement and partly by underfunding readiness, both short-run and long-run readiness.

The long-run readiness means that we do not have enough spares. We do not have enough war reserves. We do not have enough in terms of depot maintenance and the like. Our nominal objective, our nominal strategy is to be able to fight two Multiple regional contingencies (MRCs) more or less simultaneously. The simple reality today is that we cannot fight two MRCs more or less simultaneously. It is difficult for us to have a major regional conflict, as was reflected during the Kosovo War when we drew down our war reserves substantially and forced us to suspend some of our operations over Iraq.

We have many ways of rationalizing the shortfall. For years, we have discussed the possibility of base closings as a way of obtaining the resources to fund the shortfall in procurement. Quite simply, even if we were able to obtain the closure of bases, we would not obtain sufficient funds to fund the required procurement.

But as you know quite well, we are not closing bases. And when we do close a few bases from past decisions of the Congress, the gains are slow in coming. We are also told annually about unspecified efficiencies that will be obtained by Department of Defense in the future. Those efficiencies are laid out in the abstract at the beginning of the fiscal year. By the end of the fiscal year they do not materialize.

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The pigeons will come home to roost in that period from 2010-2015. We cannot maintain the present force structure and reequip the forces on the present budget levels or the prospective budget levels.

We face, in the period after 2010, a substantial growth in the entitlements program. As a result, we will be faced then with a squeeze on the budget, which is likely to inhibit any reallocation towards defense.

Mr. **Chairman**, let me turn from these simple numbers and our present condition to a few **observations with regard** to the **policy implications**. The **United States** has fallen into the **habit** of expanding its commitments at the same time it is shrinking its forces. We **will** not be able to meet **all** those commitments. So that leaves us, as the years roll by, with the **following** alternatives: we can shed commitments. Indeed, we can wait until the **commitments fall** due and **welch** on them. Second, we can **live** with a higher level of risk, which means that we have less deterrent **capacity** and that we have less capability to fight wars, or, **third**, we can begin to spend the money necessary to sustain forces more or less akin to the QDR level, forces sufficiently large to match the **commitments** into which we have entered and into which we continue to enter.

Undoubtedly, we will have a combination of these various alternatives. The study does not make recommendations. The study simply points out the arithmetical gap that exists with regard to defense spending and what the Administration has specified as defense requirements.

Gentlemen, we need to face the problem. We need to make the hard choices I have laid out the alternatives. Sooner or later we will have to face up to them, and right now it is probably incumbent upon us to stop kidding ourselves about what we will have in the long run. Thank you, Mr. **Chairman**.

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The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you, Doctor. As I indicated earlier, we will go down the list and have some questions starting with Mr. Skelton.

Mr. **SKELTON**. Thank you, Dr. **Schlesinger**. We take what you say with a great deal of understanding of your background and the work that you have done, which you have done so much for our country, and we thank you for being with us today.

I look forward to seeing what the Budget **Committee** will do in light of your testimony today. So my only question today is not of you. My only question today is of the Budget **Committee**. What will it reflect? What will it say? What figure will it come up with when in budget authority the **Administration** has sent over a \$15 billion figure for us to work with.

So the bottom line cannot be answered by anyone on this panel. And, of course, the Budget **Committee Chairman** comes from this Committee. So I ask the question of the Budget Committee, what will thou say? Thank you.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Mr. Hunter.

Dr. **SCHLESINGER**. Mr. Congressman, may I just make one observation? It is essential that we

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2000

TESTIMONY BY DR. WILLIAM PERRY

[H.A.S.C. No. 106-46]

TESTIMONY ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

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mainstream never covers this area. I would do a study on how this President personally, and in my opinion, that is exactly what it was, deliberately gunned down the American people so they could get away with increasing domestic spending and criticize us publicly for putting 345 billion more of additional defense spending because we supposedly didn't need it and got away with that. Now has the audacity to come in and say we are about \$15 billion short. Because, to me, that IS the greatest disservice that a commander in chief and a leader of our country could ever do to the American people and perhaps more significantly to the men and women who wear the uniform.

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Thank you.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you.

Well, gentlemen, we have come to the end of the row up here; and it looks like the bells are ringing, too. We appreciate your contribution to the Committee; and your work, obviously, from what you have heard, is well appreciated by all of us. And we have been, as you indicated, talking about these things a good while. You make our case for it I think a lot better. So we appreciate what you have done, your work and continuing work in this field, and we will be calling on you later.

The **CHAIRMAN**. We are going to go on now to the next panel, Secretary William Perry.

Thank you again, gentlemen.

Dr. Perry, you can proceed as you would like. And I announced earlier, if you have any prepared statement, it can be submitted for the record; and you can proceed as you like.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have some informal remarks I would like to make.

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I would like to begin with a brief reference to the book that was written by the previous witnesses. I believe that it makes several very good and very important points—that the U.S. is the strongest military force in the world today; that in the years ahead the United States will face security crises which require us to maintain that capability; and, most importantly, the point they make in the book is there are forces at work eroding the quality of our military; and, in particular, our modernization is falling behind. So I agree with all of those points in the book.

I do not agree with the remedial actions described in the book and especially do not agree that the defense budget needs to be increased by \$100 billion or more to solve those problems. I will remind you that the defense budget has decreased in real terms about \$100 billion since the ending of the Cold War, and so this prescription essentially eliminates that peace dividend that we got from the ending of the Cold War. To make my point as straightforward and as precise as possible, I believe that an increase of this magnitude is neither necessary nor desirable.

It is not desirable because this peace dividend has brought very real benefits to our country. It has been an important factor in balancing the Federal budget, as you well know but it has also been a contributing factor to the long sustained economic boom that we have had this past decade, and this economic boom is not only good for the people of the country but it strengthens the business and industrial base on which our Defense Department depends.

So those are, in summary, the reasons for not believing it is desirable to go back to Cold War spending, but I also believe it is not necessary, and it is in that point I would specifically disagree with the authors of the book.

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Now, the approach that they take in the book I think is entirely reasonable, of looking at individual systems in lifetimes and estimating replacement costs. Nevertheless, the answer does not seem reasonable to me. I do not have either the staff or the time for making a detailed program-by-program analysis of the points made in the book. So, instead, I have done a top-down analysis to try to determine what I would consider a reason for why I find these conclusions not compelling.

We had, at the end of the Cold War, more than 300,000 troops in Europe. Since then, we have pulled out 200,000—those troops were there waiting for an attack, deterring an attack from Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact forces. Since then, in the absence of that threat, we have pulled out more than 200,000 troops, leaving just about 100,000 today which I believe is an appropriate level to leave in Europe.

In addition to that, we have made a major reduction in our weapons of mass destruction. For example, we reduced the deployment of strategic and theater nuclear forces almost two-thirds. We stopped altogether the production on the MX, the ALCM, the Trident submarine, the Trident missile, the B-1 bomber, the B-2 bomber. Those changes in military operations and requirements and others, have allowed for 30 percent reduction approximately in force levels and there just have to be significant savings associated with that 30 percent reduction.

The budget we have today relative to the—at the end of the Cold War is about 25 percent less in real terms. So it is approximately equal to that 30 percent reduction in force. And so the question is, why do we still have a problem? Why indeed has modernization fallen behind, which I agree with the witnesses that it is falling behind. So I want to go through a very simple analysis to give you my answer to that question and also some recommendations as to what can be done about it.

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If we take a look at the budget proposed to you today, the 2001 defense budget, and compare it to the defense budget in 1989, just at the time the Berlin Wall fell, what I will take arbitrarily to be the ending of the Cold War, if we look at the components of those budgets, the personnel account is 30 percent less in 2001, 30 percent less. Our force reduction is about 30 percent less. So that is a perfectly reasonable and appropriate reduction.

R&D is about 20 percent less. It is harder to gauge that because I don't like R&D into the issue of the forces. My own judgment, the 20 percent reduction is quite reasonable and indeed even at that level, it is substantially more than the R&D level was during the late 1970s, the time I was the Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering and during the period we were actually developing, during the R&D, on the systems which were later used in the Gulf War. So we have a baseline of saying that should be an adequate R&D program.

But the procurement account is 40 percent less than it was in 1989. Worse than that, the procurement account during the last six years has been 50 to 60 percent less, and so we have accumulated during that period what might be called a procurement deficit. Since the budget was only down 25 percent, why did we have a procurement down 60 percent? And the answer was because the O&M account is only down ten percent from the 1989 budget.

Some of this is a result of having more emphasis and priority on training and quality of life, and I supported those, as you well know, when I was the Secretary of Defense. But a good bit of that disproportionate emphasis on O&M comes because of inefficient business practices, inefficient buying and because of an inappropriately large base TOO many bases, to put it bluntly.

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Finally, we have used that O&M account for funding unscheduled operations, and that has typically come at the expense of the training or the quality of life features.

Now, my bottom line then on procurement is that we do have a procurement problem, and in that I agree with the previous witnesses. The first thing I have looked at is how much is necessary to fix that procurement problem, and in that respect I do not agree with the previous witnesses.

Procurement proposed to you in this budget is \$60 billion in round figures. My own judgment is it probably needs to be perhaps \$70 to \$80 billion, and I will give you a very crude top-down rationale for how I arrive at those figures.

If we look at the procurement budget at the end of the Cold War, 1989, in today's dollars it was \$98 billion. Today, we have a force that is 30 percent less than the force we had then, and therefore, it would be reasonable to believe that we would have to spend 30 percent less in order to reply and sustain that force. And taking 30 percent off that figure gets you a number more like \$70 billion, and that would argue that we have perhaps a deficit of about \$70 billion if you believe, as I do, that the budget we had in 1989 was reasonable for the force we had then.

Now, another way of looking at it is that this force modernization is already at a deficit level, and, therefore, we need a buildup. It isn't just the one-time effect here, and so I have looked historically for comparison purposes to Reagan buildup. Because when we went into the Reagan era, it was argued, and I think correctly, that we had a deficit in acquisition and force equipment then. And so if you look at the 8 years of the Reagan buildup, look at procurement during those 8 years, the average spent for procurement in those years was \$113 billion. Now, if you take that 113 and say that was a reasonable amount of money for building up that force, this force is 30 percent less than that, so, therefore, we would take 30 percent off that, and that takes

you down to \$80 billion.

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So by this top-down analysis, comparing with historical data I would get a number more like \$70 to \$80 billion needed for procurement for the size force which we have today.

I hasten to tell you that I have not done the detailed analysis the previous witnesses have **done**. I am only **using this top-down analysis**. I do think that a **historical analysis** is reasonable because we have been through this problem before, and the **experience** we had is **relevant**, and the **data** we have bears on today's problem.

Now, if you accept that, then the question is how you get to a **\$70 to \$80 billion procurement budget**. One very **obvious** way is to add \$10 to \$20 billion to the top line of the defense budget, **and** I would leave it to your assessment as to whether that is **politically feasible**. I am not representing the **Administration**. I am not representing the **Congress**. I am just presenting facts for you to consider.

I would suggest to you, however, that before you come to that conclusion you do look at some other **alternatives** of **ways of dealing with this deficit**, \$13 to \$20 billion deficit, whatever it is, and the **first** of those is to look back to the O&M budget and see if we can shift over time, not **immediately** in 1 year, but shift over time. In my judgment, perhaps \$10 billion could be shifted from O&M to procurement, to get O&M and procurement more in line with the historical experience we have had there.

If you are going to do that, the Department and the Congress would have to join together the **two things**.

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First of all it would have to reduce the overhead we have, the infrastructure we have. That is there would have to be further reduction of bases. I know this is a recommendation which the Congress does not want to hear. I **will** make it anyway. I think there needs to be some further reduction of our overhead, and that does **require another base closing round**.

Second, and **this is something** that the Department needs to do, but the Congress can **encourage** it to do, is get more **efficient buying practices** in the O&M account. And there is no doubt in my mind that there is perhaps \$5 to \$10 billion of savings that could be made by **introducing modern buying practices**. This is not, in my judgment, a theory. It is being done every day in business and every day in industry. It involves buying supplies through e-commerce, and partly through that means and partly through other means is making major reductions in inventory. Every successful company today is doing that and every successful company is realizing very substantial reductions in overhead.

I will give you just one example, which is a company that I am on the **board** of and **so I know** the numbers very well, in my head in fact. That is United Technology, **which** for the last 5 years **has had** revenue increases of about 5 percent since stable markets, **fairly flat revenue increases**, but has had property increases of about 20 percent. The **difference** between that 5

percent and 20 percent was productivity improvement, and I have detailed to you the techniques that they have used to get that productivity improvement. Those techniques are available to the Defense Department as well. Some of them are being used but not nearly to the extent they could be.

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The second change that can be made and that could have a very major effect on this outcome is if you are spending \$70 billion for procurement, it is to get more leverage from the money you are spending, get more bang for the buck, get more unit per dollar spent. This involves two different techniques, both of which are well-known, both of which have been demonstrated in many cases. First of all, buying more commercial components. This is what we called—what I called, as Secretary of Defense, acquisition reform in which this Committee, as a matter of fact, passed legislation which helped introduce those. Again, this is not a theory that will work.

Let me give you one example from it. This Committee authorized us to establish five pilot programs back five years ago. One of those was the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), which is now a mature program, and we have detailed results from that. And the savings introduced by using commercial components and giving the program manager the authority to waive the Military Specifications (MILSPECS) requirements was not 5 percent or 10 percent but approximately 50 percent or, to put it another way, for a given number of dollars, we can buy twice as many JDAMs by using these reform acquisition techniques.

The second technique, which is more recently being considered in the Defense Department, is the introduction of continuous process improvement during the manufacture, during the production of old defense equipment.

During the 1990s, early 1990s, American companies had fallen badly behind Japanese companies in competition in world markets because of their productivity inefficiencies. Many of the best companies then went to school to learn what the Japanese are doing. They learned in detail about how the Japanese were applying this continuous process improvement and they brought it back and applied it to their own companies. Now, many U.S. companies are world leaders in the field and are outcompeting their Japanese counterparts by the introduction of these techniques.

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So this is not a theory either, nor is it a theory that it only can apply—that it can apply to defense companies.

I would like to call your attention to the C-17 program which back in the 1994 time period was a troubled program, very close to cancellation. At that time, with the encouragement of the Defense Department, McDonnell Douglas introduced continuous process improvement techniques. I visited the production line of the C-17 just a few months ago and was pleased to learn that they have a learning curve that is steeper than on any commercial airplane today. It is an amazing success story, and it can be applied to many more programs in defense.

All of this simply says, one way of getting more equipment is putting more dollars in the budget. Another way is getting more unit equipment for every dollar spent, and we need to be

doing both.

Final point to make and I will entertain your questions then is that it is important, I believe, not to erode the O&M budget by funding unplanned deployments out of it. I believe that if the Administration plans to undertake an unscheduled operation, it should come to the Congress, request the additional funds for the specific operation, and not take that money out of training, not take it out of quality of life.

Well, in sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe we do have a modernization or procurement problem. I do not think the solution requires another \$100 billion a year in the defense budget. It may require \$10 to \$20 billion a year, which is no small matter, but with good management and with good cooperation between the Department and Congress, a good bit of that \$10 to \$20 billion may be gained by improved efficiency of operation and improved productivity.

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I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Dr. Perry.

The CHAIRMAN: Those of us who have been in this place for a while appreciate your service over the years, and I remember some of the things you were talking about we have been through together. C-17 was most recently I remember here in the Committee one day we came down to just about the place where it was scratch time and decided to go ahead with it as you indicated, and it is a real success story now.

One of the things that I think has disturbed some of us on this Committee for a long time and we have been wrestling with it with the Department of Defense is this question of whether or not we have the size force and the capability of carrying out the national strategy of fighting two major theater wars at the same time. And over a period of time it has developed into questioning our leaders of our military, it started off them saying, well, yeah, you know, we can do this. It might entail some risk, but we can do it. We can swing things here and there in two situations, like maybe the Persian Gulf area and Korean Peninsula.

And then you get on down into detail and you ask, well, what kind of risk are we talking about? And they would say, well, moderate risk. And you start asking why, and they say, well, you know, we have to swing these things back and forth and hold over here and try to do something over here, and in the meantime it is going to take a long time, but we will finally prevail.

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And I would always come back and say, well, what kind of risk in terms of casualties, American lives lost of our military? And we would start talking about hundreds of thousands of lives, and we would go on and on.

And, finally, the most recent assessment has gone from moderate to high, high risk now.

And so my question is, why are we in that situation? Have we reduced our force too much, capabilities not there? What is it that leaves us in this place? What can we do?

AGING EQUIPMENT

STATEMENT:

The Clinton-Gore Administration has deferred modernization of military equipment to the extent that our critical military weapons system are overworked and aging.

FACTS:

In 1996, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, stated that there was a requirement for \$60 billion annually in procurement spending and urged that this amount be attained by Fiscal Year 1998.

The Clinton Administration ignored this advice in FY98, FY99 and FY00 by proposing funding well below \$60 billion for the procurement needs of the military. In Fiscal Year 2001, the Clinton-Gore Administration claimed "victory" by providing \$60.3 billion in procurement funding. Accounting for inflation, this FY01 procurement should have been \$63 billion.

This "Clinton Administration procurement holiday" has led to serious modernization problems. In 1999, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak stated before the House Armed Services Committee that, "We are transporting Marines and equipment in CH-53Ds that we had expected would leave our inventory seven years ago; and, at current replacement rates, we will be flying them for another 10 years. Our fleet of KC-130F tankers is approaching 40 years of age, almost twice its planned service life."

Under the Clinton Administration the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft, which has aged from 14 years in 1992 to 17.2 years in 1999, will be on average 21 years old by 2007. In 2003, approximately 2/3rds of the Navy inventory of aircraft will be greater than 15 years old.

The average age of the Air Force's bomber fleet is 23.4 years old with our B-52's averaging 38.2 years.

STR STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format

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The Washington Post

November 11, 1995, Saturday, Final Edition

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A12

LENGTH: 1089 words

HEADLINE: Pentagon Leaders Urge Accelerated 50% Boost in Procurement

BYLINE: Bradley Graham, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

The uniformed leaders of the **armed forces**, worried about **aging weapons** and equipment after a decade of declining procurement, have recommended a roughly 50 percent jump in spending on purchases over the next two years.

Clinton administration plans call for spreading the same sum over **four years**. But top military officers are skeptical about ever seeing all the money, noting that past projections have rarely been realized.

So to highlight what they see as an urgent problem, the **military chiefs** have asked that the Defense Department meet a goal of **boosting** annual defense procurement from about \$ 40 billion at present to \$ 60 billion by fiscal 1998, not 2000 as the administration had proposed. "We now **don't** expect it to go up like the projection shows it **will**. It **never** has before. I **don't** expect it to now," said Adm. William A. Owens, **vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**. "And secondly, 2000 is too late.

"So our view is, you have to get to \$ 60 billion as soon as you can, and 1998 would be a good year:

The **recommendation** was included in a budget assessment submitted last month by Gen. John Shalikashvili, **chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**, to **Defense Secretary William J. Perry**. It reflected heightened concern about a **potential erosion of military capabilities** unless purchases are accelerated. It marked a shift in focus from last year, when the Pentagon, intent on shoring up the current **readiness of military units**, reduced procurement to cover **higher-than-expected** operational and maintenance costs. Procurement spending has **fallen to its lowest level** since 1950, forcing the **military services** to defer buys of jet fighters, helicopters, ships, trucks and other **assets** to replace earlier models entering, in some cases, **their fourth or even fifth decade of use**.

"We are significantly underfunded in **the procurement** line," Owens said. "Our thrust is to say we must do something, we've got to fix it:

He said the **military chiefs** are concerned not just about **low procurement** but

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a rising "bow wave" -- the piling up of postponed programs

At the same time, Owens indicated the message from the chiefs was not intended to be confrontational or divisive with the Pentagon's civilian leadership, and may have been aimed less at Perry than at the military services themselves. By committing all the chiefs to an ambitious new procurement goal, the memorandum is especially useful to Shalikashvili and Owens in their nascent effort to exercise more central discipline over individual service plans.

The memo, which represents the consensus view of the chiefs and vice chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps as well as regional commanders in chief, is said by Pentagon officials to be short on details about just how to bolster procurement and on what to spend the extra funds. "It's a broad statement, expressing a broad sense of concern," said a senior defense official. "But the details get a little thin."

Shalikashvili makes clear the chiefs do not expect the added funds for modernization to come from higher overall defense spending but rather through cuts in some programs under development and other savings. Even with a Republican-controlled Congress committed to boosting the defense budget, the military leaders are assuming little if any growth in military spending.

Nor are the chiefs suggesting reversing the priority given last year to readiness over procurement -- that is, draining funds from the operational and maintenance accounts that support current readiness to pay for more modernization. Rather, the biggest adjustments proposed in the Shalikashvili memo would involve cutting back on competing service programs in such development areas as theater missile defense and unmanned aerial vehicles and reducing modeling and simulation activities.

Even so, these recommended savings would not come close to providing the roughly \$ 20 billion increase in annual procurement the chiefs would like to see between now and 1998. "We acknowledge the answers are not all there," Owens said.

But he expressed confidence that substantially more funds for procurement can be found by eliminating redundant systems, embracing economic high-tech innovations and realizing Pentagon plans to farm out more defense activities to the private sector. Significantly, the chiefs have decided not to look for more savings by shrinking troop levels below the 1.45 million active duty service members called for in the administration's plan.

In its 1996 budget proposal to Congress, the administration provided for \$ 39 billion in military procurement, a drop of 71 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars from the 1985 peak. House and Senate defense appropriation committees have tentatively agreed to raise procurement to \$ 43 billion, but their conference report has yet to win floor approval.

The administration's five-year budget plan envisions a 47 percent increase in modernization spending between 1996 and 2001. But much of that is not projected to materialize until the turn of the century -- and assumes still uncertain savings from military base closings and reforms in Pentagon buying procedures. Responding to Shalikashvili in an Oct. 24 memo, Perry agreed that \$ 50 billion in annual procurement "is an appropriate goal" and offered "to work closely with

The Washington Post, November 11, 1995

you to accelerate' reaching it.

But Shalikashvili's initiative, known formally as the chairman's program assessment, has come late in the 1997 budget cycle. A final defense budget proposal is due at the White House next month. Perry suggested major adjustments in Pentagon plans would have to wait until next year and depend largely on what more the services have to offer. "I will be particularly interested in seeing your specific program recommendations for achieving efficiencies and funding reductions in programs of lower priority from a warfighting perspective," the secretary wrote. For the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to be weighing into the Pentagon budget debate with his assessment is indicative of an increasingly prominent Joint Chiefs' role in coordinating individual service plans and a consensus view of military requirements. The Shalikashvili memo emerged from the deliberations of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, a panel headed by Owens and including the services' vice chiefs. Over the past year and a half, Owens has strengthened the panel's role in formulating common investment objectives and reducing overlap among service programs.

GRAPHIC: Photo, ADM. WILLIAM A. OWENS GEN. JOHN SHALIKASHVILI

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: November 11, 1995

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11-L-0559/OSD/3931



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

10 JUL 2003

HQ USAF/XP
1070 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1070

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0552

Dear **Mr.** Hunter

As you requested through the subcommittee **staff**, we are providing **information on the average** ages of the following categories of Air Force aircraft:

Fighter/Attack: 12.2

Bomber: 23.4

Tanker: 36.6

Airlift: 22.0

Trainer: 27.6

C2ISR: 23.4

Helicopter: 19.0

Thank you for your continuing interest in our aircraft readiness and **modernization** programs.

Attachment:
Aircraft Categories


JOSEPH H. WEHRLE, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
DCS/Plans and Programs



11 August 2000

**The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
United States House of Representatives
Washington DC 20515**

Dear Mr. Hunter

Attached is the information you requested in regards to our aircraft mission capable rates from FY91 thru the present and the average age of our aircraft. Don't hesitate to call me if you need additional data or have questions.

Thanks for your great support of America's airmen!

Very Respectfully,

**T. MICHAEL MOSELEY
Major General, USAF
Director, Legislative Liaison**

cc: Mr. Steve Thompson

MISSION CAPABLE (MC) RATES
FY91 - FY00 (through May 00)

MDS	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	Average Age (as of 29 Feb 00)
A-10	88	87.8	84.2	84.5	83.3	82.7	79.8	74.7	72.5	69.7	18.7
AC-130	72.7	79.8	W.6	79.8	44.6	58.3	72.2	78.5	78.4	85.8	17
B-1	58.8	58.3	59	87.1	65.3	66.6	82.5	52.3	55.2	88.1	12.7
B-2*				2s.1	18.9	22.9	a.4	33.7	42.2	46.6	5.8
B-82	76.7	61.3	632	61.2	80.9	80.1	78.8	78.2	74.1	78.2	38.2
C-130	622	60.6	80.5	80.2	77	77	78.9	74.2	72.1	72.8	22.1
C-141	81.8	82.4	78.5	75.2	72.2	72.4	74.7	73.2	72.3	66.4	33.4
C-17*			81.8	44.6	74.0	86.5	87.8	88.2	85	82.2	3.8
C-8	86.2	a6	88.8	64.4	a.3	84.8	82.7	80.5	80.7	88.8	22
E-3	81.8	81.2	6s	86.3	88.1	82.8	78.2	71.9	73.5	74.4	20.2
E-4**	73.1	78.1	826	71.1	77.8	88.8	72.8	81.8	78.1	78.3	25.7
E-4*							49.7	88.3	R.4	88.8	3.8
EC-130	76.6	11.4	a.4	78.4	78.2	78.8	74.8	72.8	70.2	89.1	31.8
EC-135**	77.9	84.4	76.7	73.3	77.2	81.1	84.4	79.5	78.8	73.1	38.8
F-117	64	642	81.7	88.7	78	U.6	64	78.8	83.1	78.7	8.9
F-18	62.6	614	80.8	78.2	78.1	77.8	n	74.1	73.5	73.6	16
F-15E	88	88.8	82.8	82.9	81.8	80.8	76.6	78.8	78.1	78	8.8
F-18	84.4	82.8	83	79.3	79.3	78.0	762	74.4	74.3	75.3	11.1
H-80***		87.5	72.8	70.3	73.3	72.2	87.8	71.3	86.6	88.8	9.8
MC-130	66.4	712	73.3	70.8	73.3	67.7	82	61	82	88.9	27.2
KC-10	82.8	83	83.3	90.1	78.9	88.5	85.7	w.7	84.5	88.8	15.1
KC-136	86.4	85.5	83.8	80	80.1	79.7	78.9	78.7	77.2	87.7	38
MC-130	72.4	86.1	81	66.2	67.7	87.6	70	78.8	75.6	79.3	25.3
MH-83	76.9	85.4	80.4	67.3	82.4	57	60.0	85.8	88.8	73.8	27.2
RC-135**	64.7	66.2	73	75.5	76.3	78.1	74	73.9	85	87.2	38.5
T-37****	86.7	68.5	88.8	68.0	82.9	18.7	81.3	79.7	80.1	79.1	38.8
T-38****	81.4	85.4	86.6	6a.7	88.4	88.8	86	60.3	80.4	78.2	32.8
U-2**	77.6	83.4	84.2	88.5	88.8	66.7	w.3	82.8	80.2	77.2	16.4
WC-130	88.7	84	63	85.8	85.8	70.7	88.7	723	73.7	66.5	24.4

* B-2 entered the inventory in FY94; C-17 entered the inventory in FY93; E-8 entered the inventory in FY97
 ** Dab for FY91-FY98 provided by ACC (RC-135 FY91-97)
 *** H-80 aggregatenumber not available for FY91
 **** T-37 and T-38 data for FY91 provided by AETC

MC Rates as of 31 May 00
 Source: MERLIN (AFALBY)
 Avg Age as of 29 Feb 00
 Source: Program Data System (PDS)

08/09/2000



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350 2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
13100
Ser N8/OU638155
12 Jul 00

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Hunter:

Per your request, average ages of naval aircraft as of FY99
(by major aircraft category) are listed as follows:

<u>Aircraft Category</u>	<u>Average Age</u>
Fighter-Attack	12.3
Tanker	24
Maritime Patrol	23
Trainer	18
T-2C	27
T-45A	5
T-45C	1
Helicopter	18.1
CH-46D	33
CH-46E	31
CH-53D	30
CH-53E	12
SH-60B	11
MH-53E	9
SH-60F	8
HH-60H	7
Electronic Attack	17

Allow us to answer any additional questions you may have.


C. C. LAUTENBACHER JR.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
Resources, Warfare Requirements
And Assessments

Enclosure 1. Average Age Charts

11-L-0559/OSD/3935

NAW MC/FMC RATES
(%)


YYMM	MC	FMC
Oct-93	703	81
Nov-93	70.4	81
Dec-93	71.9	63.1
Jan-94	72	63.7
Feb-94	71.9	(12.2)
Mar-94	70.1	61.5
Apr-94	71.3	62.6
May-94	71.3	62.5
Jun-94	73.3	64.8
Jul-94	71.1	63.1
Aug-94	69.5	61.3
Sep-94	68.7	61.3
Oct-94	69.2	61.1
NW-94	71.6	63.4
Dec-94	68.8	61.4
Jan-95	69.6	61.9
Feb-95	66.9	60.4
Mar-95	70.2	61.3
Apr-95	72.4	64.2
May-95	70.6	62.2
Jun-95	70	61.3
Jul-95	70.3	62
Aug-95	69.7	61.6
Sep-95	70.5	62.7
Oct-95	69	59.9
Nov-95	69.7	61.2
Dec-95	68.9	59.2
Jan-96	68.5	59.9
Feb-96	70.9	62.5
Mar-96	70.5	62.1
Apr-96	69.3	60.4
May-96	70	59.6
Jun-96	69.5	59
Jul-96	67.6	57.7
Aug-96	67.3	56.4
Sep-96	65.4	54.5
Oct-96	64.7	53.9
NW-96	67.7	58.7
Dec-96	65.1	56.2
Jan-97	65.3	55.2
Feb-97	64.7	53.7
Mar-97	63.4	52.5
Apr-97	66.3	55.1
May-97	63.7	51.9
Jun-97	64.1	54
Jul-97	63.7	53.5

YYMM	MC	FMC
Aug-97	64.2	51.4
Sep-97	64.6	51.5
Oct-97	64.6	51
Nov-97	67.8	54.2
Dec-97	64.9	50.1
Jan-98	67	52.8
Feb-98	67.7	53.8
Mar-98	64.4	52.8
Apr-98	65.5	51.5
May-98	67.2	52.2
Jun-98	66.5	50.4
Jul-98	67.5	54.3
Aug-98	66.5	55.3
Sep-98	65.4	51
Oct-98	66.1	51.8
NW-98	70.1	55.6
Dec-98	67.2	53.8
Jan-99	66.1	52.6
Feb-99	66.5	52.9
Mar-99	85.5	51.7
Apr-99	67.6	52.3
May-99	69.05	56.8
Jun-99	68.27	55.17
Jul-99	68.16	52.35
Aug-99	69.5	56.3
Sep-99	69.1	56.2
Oct-99	67.3	56.1
Nov-99	60.2	58.2
Dec-99	68.7	56
Jan-00	68.8	56.1
Feb-00	68.9	56.2
Mar-00	69.3	56.1

Average age of Navy Aircraft in 1992 is as follows:	
	Years
Helos	18.9
Fixed Wing	13.8
Combined	14.0

AIRCRAFT AVERAGE AGE

With Updated Calculations



Aircraft	Class	TMS	Average Age
Anti Sub		S-3A	24
Anti Sub		S-36	24
Attack		EA-3B	40
Attack		RA-3B	40
Attack		ERA-38	40
Attack		NRA-38	41
Attack		EA-6B	17
Attack		A-6E	24
Attack		N A-6E	28
Attack		AV-8B	8
Attack		NAV-8B	10
Drone		DC-130A	21
Drone		QF-4N	34
Drone		QF-4S	31
Fighter		YF-4J	35
Fighter		F-4S	31
Fighter		F-5E	14
fighter		F-SF	19
Fighter		F-14A	20
Fighter		N F-14A	17
Fighter		F-148	14
Fighter		N F-14B	10
Fighter		F-140	13
fighter		N F-140	9
Fighter		FA-18A	14
Fighter		N FA-18A	15
Fighter		FA-188	15
Fighter		FA-18C	8
Fighter		N FA-18C	11
Fighter		FA-180	7
Fighter		N FA-18D	10
Fighter		FA-18E	1
Fighter		FA-18F	1
In Flight Refuel		KC-130F	38
In Flight Refuel		KC-130R	23
In Flight Refuel		KC-130T	10
Patrol		P-38	31
Patrol		P-3C	22
Patrol		N P-3C	29
Patrol		N P-30	34
Rotary Wing		UH-1Y	22
Rotary Wing		AH-1Z	12
Rotary Wing		HH-1N	27
Rotary Wing		UH-1N	25
Rotary Wing		AH-1W	10
Rotary Wing		SH-2G	12
Rotary Wing		VH-3A	38

RotaryWing	NVH-3A	37
Rotary Wmg	VH-3D	24
RotaryWing	SH-3H	34
Rotary Wing	UH-3H	36
Rotary Wing	TH-6B	8
Rotary Wing	CH-46D	33
Rotary Wing	HH-46D	34
Rotary Wing	UH-46D	34
Rotary Wing	CH-46E	31
Rotary Wing	CH-53D	30
Rotary Wing	CH-53E	12
Rotary Wing	MH-53E	9
Rotary Wing	TH-57B	15
Rotary Wing	TH-57C	16
Rotary Wing	OH-58C	2
Rotary Wing	YCH-60	3
Rotary Wing	UH-60A	15
Rotary Wing	SH-60B	11
Rotary Wing	NSH-60B	13
RotaryWing	SH-60F	8
Rotary Wmg	YSH-60F	12
Rotary Wmg	HH-60H	7
RotaryWing	VH-60N	11
Rotary Wmg	SH-60R	15
Training	T-39G	26
Training	TA-3B	40
Training	NTA-3B	39
Training	TA-4J	30
Training	TC-18F	4
Training	TC-130G	36
Training	TE-2C	11
Training	TP-3A	35
Training	T-2C	27
Training	T-34C	18
Training	N T-34C	23
Training	T-38A	12
Training	T-390	35
Training	T-39N	2
Training	T-44A	21
Training	T-45A	5
Training	T-45C	.
Training	TAV-8B	10
Training	X-26A	19
Training	X-31A	9
Transport	C-12C	0
Transport	UC-35C	0
Transport	N C-130H	1
Transport	C-2A	12
Transport	DC-9	13

a

Transport	C-96	24
Transport	C-200	12
Transport	c-20G	5
Transport	C-260	1
Transport	C-130T	6
Transport	VP-3A	37
Transport	US-3A	27
Transport	CT-39G	24
Utility	TC-12B	19
Utility	UC-128	19
Utility	RC-12F	13
Utility	UC-12F	13
Utility	RC-12M	10
Utility	UC-12M	12
Utility	UP-3A	37
Utility	UP-36	32
utility	N U-16	43
Utility	U-6A	24
Warning	EC-24A	12
Wamtng	E-2C	10
Warning	E-6A	8
Warning	E-68	10
Warning	EP-3E	30
Warning	EP-3J	34
Wamtng	ES-3A	25



10 July 2000

Dear Congressman Hunter

Per your request, the average age of Marine Corps aircraft, as of fiscal year 1999, are as follows by major aircraft category:

<u>Fighter/Attack</u>		<u>Tanker</u>	
F/A-18A	13 years	KC-130F	37 years
F/A-18B	13 years	KC-130R	22 years
F/A-18C	07 years	KC-130T	13 years
F/A-18D	06 years		
AV-8B 07 years (28 Of 117 are remanufactured acft)			

<u>Transport Helicopters</u>		<u>Attack/Utility Helicopters</u>	
CH-46E	31 years	JH-1N	25 years
CH-53C	29 years	AH-1W	09 years (43 of 188 are conversion acft)
CH-53E	11 years		
JH-60N	11 years	<u>Electronic Attack</u>	
JH-3D	24 years	EA-6B	07 years

The above data includes both active and reserve forces. Aircraft that have been remanufactured converted, i.e. AV-8B & AH-1W return to service as new aircraft with zero time on the airframe.

Thank you for your support of Marine Aviation

Very respectfully,

F. MCCORZLE

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Aviation

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0552

<u>Fighter/Attack</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>AVG AGE</u>
F/A-18A	201	13 = 2,613	
F/A-18B	14	13 = 182	
F/A-18C	45	17 = 765	
F/A-18D	96	16 = 1,536	
AV-8B	107	17 = 1,819	
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>463</u>	<u>5,915</u>	<u>= 8.1</u>

<u>Tanker</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>AGE</u>	
KC-130F	35	37 = 1,295	
KC-130R	14	22 = 338	
KC-130T	28	10 = 280	
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>1,913</u>	<u>= 24.5</u>

<u>Transport Helicopters</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>AGE</u>	
CH-46E	231	31 = 7,161	
CH-53D	44	23 = 1,276	
CH-53E	149	11 = 1,639	
UH-60N	28	11 = 308	
UH-60D	11	24 = 264	
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>463</u>	<u>10,428</u>	<u>= 23.5</u>

<u>Attack/Utility</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>AGE</u>	
OV-10	35	25 = 875	
AO-1W	133	19 = 2,527	
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>3,402</u>	<u>= 14.5</u>

<u>Electronic Attack</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>AGE</u>	
EA-6B	20	20 = 400	<u>= 20.0</u>



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1776

IN REPLY REFER TO

5000
APP
August 17, 2000

Mr. Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Procurement
2265 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Hunter:

SUBJECT: AVERAGE AGE OF AIRCRAFT AND READINESS RATES

Per your request, the average age of Marine Corps aircraft in fiscal year 1993 and the Mission Capable/Full Mission Capable Readiness Rates are provided. Enclosure (1) contains the average age of Marine Corps aircraft in fiscal year 1993 and includes active and reserve assets. Enclosure (2) contains the Mission Capable/Full Mission Capable Readiness Rates by aircraft category from fiscal year 1993 to June 2000 and includes an overview of the rates of rotary and fixed wing aircraft during that period.

Thank you for your support of Marine Aviation.

Very respectfully,

F. MCCORKLE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Aviation

Enclosures: 1. Average age of Marine Corps aircraft in FY93
2. Mission Capable/Full Mission Capable Readiness Rates

AVERAGE AGE OF AIRCRAFT FY93

FIGHTER / ATTACK

F/A-18A	6.75							
F/A-18B	6.75							
F/A-18C	2.87							
F/A-18D	1.85							
AV-8B	5.8							
EA-6B	14.95							

TANKER

KC-130F	30							
KC-130R	18							
KC-130T	4							

TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS

CH-46E	25							
CH-53D	23							
CH-53E	3.4							
VH-60N	5							
VH-3D	18							

ATTACK / UTILITY

AH-1W	3.5							
UH-1N	19							

Enclosure (1)

ARMY AMMUNITION SHORTAGES

STATEMENT: *The Clinton-Gore Administration has a significant shortfall in necessary ammunition for the U.S. Army.*

FACTS: According to the U.S. Army, they “have a significant shortfall in preferred munitions.” The Fiscal Year 2001 shortfall with substitutions is approximately \$3.3 billion.

:139 Mr. Hunter. Thank you, General.

:140 General Shinseki. I have got your document reflecting
:141 your shortages in ammunition. You reflect a \$14 billion
:142 overall shortage, but \$3.3 billion of what you call a
1143 critical munition shortage. Now, that **was** sent to me in
:144 September, first of this month; it is now the last of the
:145 month. Was that **an accurate** document that you sent to me,
:146 a \$3.3 billion critical ammunition shortage?

1147 General Shinseki. That is correct, as I recall, the
:148 number is. I think it **also** said, though, that we had put
:149 into the program money to reduce that by about half. But,
:150 I mean, that is money in program to purchase ammunition.

:151 Mr. Hunter. That is money that is to be spent in the
:152 next five years or so, right?

:153 General Shinseki. That is correct.

1154 Mr. Hunter. But right now we have a **\$3.3** billion
:155 shortage, right?

1156 General Shinseki. That is correct.

**** :157 Mr. Hunter. Earlier, in **fact, in November of 1999**, we
:158 had two **Army** divisions, the 1st Infantry Division, the 10th
:159 Mountain Division, **whose** division commanders reported that

1160 they were not ready. They reported a low state of

1161 readiness to deploy and go to war, did they not?

1162 General Shinseki. That is correct.

1163 Mr. Hunter. Those were good commanders, weren't they,

1164 those division commanders?

1165 General Shinseki. Superb.

1166 Mr. Hunter. And they were the ones that made the

1167 report to the division commanders, the generals. It wasn't

1168 a politician who made that report, right?

1169 General Shinseki. That is correct.

1170 Mr. Hunter. That was in November of 1999. In

1171 December of 1999, the Army declared that those divisions

1172 were ready, did they not?

1173 General Shinseki. Those commanders submitted their

1174 reports in 1999 and said that their readiness condition,

1175 which had to do with their deployability, had improved.

1176 Mr. Hunter. And the reason that they were now ready

1177 in December of 1999 and they weren't ready a month earlier

1178 is because, for a division to announce that it is ready, it

1179 has to be able to be trained, equipped and be able to

1180 deploy to its area of operation in a given amount of time-

1181 it is a classified amount of time-but in a given amount of
1182 time. Is that not correct?

1183 General Shinseki. That is correct.

1184 Mr. Hunter. And because these units had **to** retrieve
1185 some of their units from other places like Bosnia and bring
1186 them back, lift them back, retrain them and redeploy them,
1187 the commanders didn't feel they could do that in that **given**
1188 amount of time, did they?

1189 General Shinseki. That is correct.

1190 Mr. Hunter. So they were given more time, weren't
1191 they?

1192 General Shinseki. I adjusted their **flow, time** lines.
1193 That is correct.

1194 Mr. Hunter. So they were **given** more time.

1195 So the difference between November of 1999, when the
1196 commander said they weren't ready, and December of 1999,
1197 when the **commander** said they **were** ready, was the fact that
1198 they had been given more time to deploy. Is that right?

1199 General Shinseki. That is correct.

1200 Mr. Hunter. Okay.

1201 Admiral Clark, Admiral **McKinnon**, commander of 3rd
1202 Fleet, says in the testimony that he **gave** to our

ARMY INFORMATION PAPER

SARD-ZCA
1 September 2000

SUBJECT: Congressional Questions On Shortfalls of Preferred Munitions and Critical Training Ammunition Requirements

1. Purpose. To update answers to questions asked by Professional Staff Members of the House Armed Services Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, House Appropriations Committee and Senate Appropriations Committee during preparation for Hearings and Committee Markups.

2. Facts.

a. Question: **What are your shortfalls in preferred munitions and critical training munitions that are not satisfied in the Fiscal Year 2001 President's Budget?**

Answer: The **Army** can execute its training strategy for Fiscal Year **2001**, although the Army has a shortfall of training munitions totaling approximately **\$47.5** million. This shortfall is principally in the training pipeline, which affects the distribution of training munitions. These pipeline shortages may have some readiness impact by delaying training events. Approximately \$18 million of war reserve munitions required for the Two Major Theater Wars will be consumed to support training in the Fiscal Year **2001** funded delivery period. A portion of this additional draw-down will occur in support of fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Team forces.

The **Army** does have a significant shortfall in preferred munitions but can execute two major theater wars with moderate risk by relying on substitutes. Currently, we estimate the shortfall at **\$14.5** billion, up from last year's \$12.5 billion. The main driver in this change was mid-term adjustments to War Reserve Requirements for Fiscal Year **2005**. **Approximately \$11 billion of the** shortfall can be supported with **acceptable substitute** munitions, and \$300 million is in the Fiscal Year **2001** President's Budget, leaving a critical shortfall of \$3.3 billion. The **Army's** Future Year Defense Program satisfies about \$1.7 billion of that critical shortfall.

b. Question: **What** Portion of the shortfall could **be** satisfied in the **FY00** budget if additional resources were **available?**

Answer: The Army would be **able to** address approximately 5122 million of this shortfall if all preferred munitions and critical training munitions with shortfalls were funded in Fiscal

Year 2001 at the minimum executable level. At the maximum executable level, the Army could execute approximately \$576 million. See Attachment A for details.


c. Question: what munitions have you drawn out of stockpile which need replacement? Is this problem recurring?

Answer: The Army has used approximately \$87.5 million in stockpiled war reserve munitions in support of training in prior program years, either when funding shortfalls existed or when there were production interruptions. A list of these munitions is at Attachment B. At current funding levels, approximately \$18 million of training standard munitions will be drawn out of stockpile to support training in Fiscal Year 2001.

COL Naughton/617-8001

COORD:					
DAMO-FDL	SAFM-BUI	SAFM-BUL	SALL-P	DACS-DPA	DAMO-TR
Mr. Lanyi	Ms Raines	LTC Sheridan	LTC Eberle	MAJ Hoglund	LTC Vosberg

Approved by:


LTC Kern

Security: SARD-ZCA reviewed this paper IAW applicable security regulations and determined the information enclosed therein is unclassified.

Security Authority: _____ Date: 1 September 2000
James T. Naughton, COL, GS

ATTACHMENT A

Following information represents the current status of preferred conventional ammunition and critical training munitions for the **Fiscal Year 2001 President's** budget.

Information displayed includes the current budgeted amount in **Fiscal Year 2001**, the shortfall without consideration of **acceptable substitutes**, the shortfall if acceptable substitutes are considered, and the executable funding in **FY2001**.

In total, the information shows that the Army is short \$14.5 billion. **\$47.5** million of this amount is in training **ammunition**, principally representing pipeline shortages. Of the remaining shortfall, approximately \$11 billion is offset by acceptable substitutes, thus presenting minimal near term risk. Between \$122 million and \$576 million can **be** executed in Fiscal Year 2001 if additional funds were available.

Munitions with Shortfalls in FY01
Dollars are in Thousands

NOMENCLATURE	FY01 FUNDING	FY01 SHTFAL W/O SUBS	FY01 SHTFAL W/SUBS	FY01 EXECUTABLE RANGE	
				MINIMUM EXECUTABLE	MAXIMUM EXECUTABLE
120MM TANK					
M829A2 APDSFS-T	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
M830A1 MPAT	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$4,000	\$25,887
XM908 HEAT-CP	\$0	\$41,087	\$41,087	\$4,000	\$7,700
25MM BRADLEY					
M919 APFSOS	\$23,800	\$341,348	\$0	\$23,800	\$35,000
60MM MORTAR					
M720A1 HE-MO	\$0	992,376	\$0	\$20,500	\$30,000
M722A1 WP	\$0	\$7,840	\$0	\$2,200	\$6,000
M721/M767 ILLUM	\$5,800	\$0	\$0	\$5,800	\$8,120
81MM MORTAR					
M821 HE-MO	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
M375A1 WP	\$0	\$4,902	\$4,902	\$4,902	\$4,902
M853/XM816 ILLUM	\$0	315,000	\$0	\$10,000	\$15,000
120MM MORTAR					
M934A1 HE-MO	\$45,310	\$215,064	\$0	\$36,983	\$50,000
M929 WP	\$25,125	\$53,000	\$53,000	\$25,000	\$57,400
M930 ILLUM	\$0	\$60,200	\$42,200	\$6,000	\$15,000
XM983 IR-ILLUM	\$0	576,000	\$76,000	\$6,000	\$15,000
HYDRA 70					
M264 MPSM upgrade motors	\$0	\$11,400	\$11,400	\$2,000	\$4,000
M264 Addl MPSM Production	\$0	5243,000	\$243,000	\$10,000	\$40,000
MI51 HE Rockets	\$36,194	\$36,000	\$0	\$10,000	\$40,000
M274 Signature Practice	\$85,861	\$95,500	\$95,500	\$85,861	\$107,326
SMALL ARMS					
M995 5.56MM AP	\$1,345	\$24,939	\$0	\$1,345	\$4,000
M993 7.62MM AI	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
M903 .50 CAL SLAP	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2,000	\$6,000
M8211 .50 CAL HEI	\$0	\$26,605	\$26,605	\$1,500	\$3,000
M8 .50 CAL Ball 4/1	\$10,712	\$15,141	\$15,141	\$10,712	\$25,853
VARIOUS 7.62MM AI Types	\$9,046	\$3,900	\$3,900	\$9,046	\$13,569
VARIOUS 5.56MM An Types	\$98,366	\$9,000	\$9,000	\$98,366	\$107,366
30MM ALL TYPES					
30MM HEI/MP1	\$0	\$10,000	\$10,000	\$6,800	\$20,000
40MM ALL TYPES					
M430 HEDP for MK19	\$0	\$62,620	\$62,620	\$6,000	\$15,440
M918 TP for MK19	\$50,900	\$36,309	\$36,309	\$50,900	\$78,350

Key:

FY00 Funding = President's budget

FY00 Shortfall w/o subs = Shortfall in current round, assuming no substitution was possible

FY00 Shortfall w/subs = Shortfall remaining if available substitutes are applied

FY00 Minimum Executable Program = Sustaining rate

FY00 Maximum Executable Program = Economic buy quantity given current program status

Includes Funding contained in FY00 funding column

a

Munitions with Shortfalls in FY01

Dollars are in Thousands

NOMENCLATURE	FY01	FY01	FY01	Shortfall W/SUBS	FY01 EXECUTABLE RANGE	
	FUNDING	SHORTFALL W/O subs	SHORTFALL W/O subs		MINIMUM EXECUTABLE FY00 PROGRAM	MAXIMUM EXECUTABLE FY00 PROGRAM
Non-Lethal Munitions						
MLM Stocks	\$8,102	\$21,847		\$16,847	\$8,102	\$24,949
155MM HOWITZER						
M79SE1 HE-ER w/Basebleed	SO	\$336,182		\$159,854	\$10,000	\$20,000
M825A1 WP SMOKE	\$14,773	\$22,222		\$0	\$10,000	\$20,000
M107 HE	\$42,602	\$8,280		\$8,280	\$35,397	\$50,882
M741A2 RADAM-SD	\$35,758	\$143,872		SO	\$33,583	\$38,702
M731A1 RADAM-LD	\$11,919	US.021		\$0	\$11,188	\$12,234
105MM HOWITZER						
M913/M927 HERA	SO	SO		\$0	SO	0
M314 SERIES 105MM ILLUM	\$0	\$10,400		\$10,400	\$6,000	\$10,400
FUZE						
M767/M767 Electronic Time Fuzes	\$21,505	\$136,500		\$0	\$21,505	\$29,032
Multioption Fuze Arty	\$45,917	\$1,052,100		\$0	\$45,917	87,396
PROPELUNG CHARGES						
Modular Artillery Chg	\$27,602	\$568,148		\$10,000	\$27,602	m2,444
DEMOLITIONS						
SLAM	SO	5104000		\$89,500	\$7,000	\$10,000
DETCORD	SO	\$2,858		\$1,683	\$2,858	\$4,541
Fighting Position Excavator	SO	11,859		\$1,859	\$1,500	\$4,000
MICLIC	SO	\$87,500		SO	\$10,000	\$15,000
C4	\$0	\$80,000		\$0	\$15,000	\$20,000
M221 Demo Charge	31,594	\$5,145		\$5,145	\$1,616	\$2,000
GRENADES						
XM90 Smoke for LVOS	\$4,216	\$5,550		\$5,550	\$4,216	\$7,216
VARIOUS Grenade All Types -Frag	32,216	\$17,340		\$17,340	\$6,016	\$10,000

Key:

FY00 Funding = President's budget

FY00 Shortfall w/o subs = Shortfall in current round, assuming no substitution was possible

FY00 Shortfall w/subs = Shortfall remaining if available substitutes are applied

FY00 Minimum Executable Program = Sustaining rate

FY00 Maximum Executable Program = Economic buy quantity given current program status

Includes Funding contained the FY00 Funding column.

Munitions with Shortfalls In FY01
Dollars are In Thousands

WAR RESERVE AMMUNITION PROGRAMS LONG-TERM/MODERNIZATION NOMENCLATURE	FY01	FY01	FY01	FY01 EXECUTABLE RANGE	
	FUNDING	SHTFAL W/O SUBS	SHTFAL W/SUBS	MINIMUM EXECUTABLE FY01 PROGRAM	MAXIMUM EXECUTABLE FY01 PROGRAM
ARTILLERY					
M998A1 SADARM P3I	\$0	\$3,467,640	50	50	50
XM982 DPICM-ER	\$0	\$4,325,000	\$100,000	\$0	\$0
M915/XM915 DPICM	\$0	\$403,500	\$403,500	\$15,000	\$20,000
MINE WARFARE					
VOLCANO	50	\$1,185,132	\$922,077	\$15,000	\$30,000
WAM	\$10,367	\$736,301	\$736,301	\$10,367	\$20,935
APOBS	\$5,668	\$253,940	50	\$5,668	\$6,500
SIGNAL/SALUTE/CEREMONIAL AMMUNITION					
Signals, ALL MPES	\$13,135	\$3,000	\$3,000	\$13,000	\$16,500
.30 Cal ALL TYPES	\$570	\$972	3972	\$905	\$2,000

FY01 Funding = President's budget

FY01 Shortfall w/o subs = Shortfall in current round, assuming no substitution was possible

FY01 Shortfall w/subs = Shortfall remaining if available substitutes are applied

FY01 Minimum Executable Program = S Includes Funding contained the FY01 Funding column.

FY01 Maximum Executable Program = Economic buy given current program stabs.

Includes Funding contained the FY01 Funding column.

	FY01	FY01	FY01 SHTFAL	FY01 EXECUTABLE RANGE	
	FUNDING	SHTFAL W/O SUBS \$ in 000	W/SUBS \$ in 000	MINIMUM EXECUTABLE FY00 PROGRAM	MAXIMUM EXECUTABLE MOO PROGRAM
	636420	14503517	\$3,222,751	\$760,954	\$1215,424
EXECUTABLE SHORTFALLS				\$122,534	\$577,004

ATTACHMENT B

The following is the total funding required for replacement of war **reserve** munitions consumed in Fiscal Year 1996-97 that drew **stockage** levels below that **required** by the Fiscal Year 2005 War Reserve Requirements Process.

40MM All Types \$7.0M
HYDRA 70 Rockets HE M151 \$38.5M
FUZES ET M762 \$12.0M
GRENADES All Types \$5.0M
SIGNALS All Types \$6.0M
60MM Mortar HE M720A1 \$8.0M
Demolitions All Types \$5.0M
81MM Mortar WPM370 \$6M

The following additional items will be drawn down to support training at current Fiscal Year 2001 funding levels:

5.56MM Ball Linked 4/1 for Squad Automatic Weagon \$1.0M
.50 cal All Types \$8.0M
105MM Howitzer Illumination M314 series \$6.0M
Grenade HE Frag M67 series \$2.5M

PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS SHORTAGES

STATEMENT: *The Clinton-Gore Administration has failed to provide enough precision munitions in critical categories to meet the Military's Two Major Theater War (MTW) Combat Requirements.*

FACTS: Precision munitions proved extremely effective during the Gulf War in 1991 and, as a result, have become a major part of the U.S. weapons inventory.


Precision munitions were critical to NATO's success during Operation Allied Force. Over 25,000 bombs were dropped and of those, 8,500 were precision-guided munitions.

In spite of this increasing reliance on precision-guided munitions, the Clinton-Gore Administration has failed to provide enough resources to fund the military's 2 MTW requirement for many of these critical munitions.

For example, in April 1999 the Navy had only 55% of its 2 MTW requirement of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and the Air Force had less than 10% of its 2 MTW requirement of Conventionally Air Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCM).

In the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Supplemental Appropriations, the Administration requested funds to increase the inventory of these munitions by converting 322 ALCM's to the CALCM configuration and 624 TLAM conversions. However, even these Administration requested increases still leave the military well short of its own CALCM and TLAM 2 MTW inventory requirements.

MUNITIONS STATUS (Through 4/20/99)



Precision Guided Weapon	Common Name	2 MTW Combat Requirement		Current Weapons Inventory	Production Line Status
Standoff Theater Defense					
AGM-86	CALCM	1000		✓ 70	Conversion Only
RGM-109/UGM-109	TLAM	4000		✓ 2204	Conversion Only
TOTAL		5000		2274	
Standoff Area Defense					
AGM-65 D/G	MAVERICK	15000		13361	Conversion Only
AGM-84	SLAM	500		514	In production
AGM-88	HARM	14000		14180	Conversion Only
AGM-130		300		154	Production until Dec
AGM-154	JSOW	15000		141	In production
TOTAL		44800		28350	
Standoff Point Defense					
GBU-10		2000		10030	Out of production
GBU-12		8000		19514	Out of production
GBU-16		4000		3203	Out of production
GBU-24		15000		10115	In production
GBU-27		2000		1805	In production
GBU-31	JDAM	100000		✓ 609	In production
TOTAL		131000		45276	
Unguided					
CBU-87	CEM	50000		121459	Out of production
CBU-99	ROCKEYE	25000		91575	Out of production
MK-82		175000		399875	Out of production
MK-83		80000		75587	Out of production
TOTAL		330000		688496	

Legend:



Inventory addressed in Emergency Supplemental

11-L-0559/OSD/3957

Chart provided by Congressman Duncan Hunter

Navy Chiefs Paint Stark Picture of Stockpiles

U.S. Navy Running Short of Munitions, Equipment, Say Service Leaders

By ROBERT HOLZER
Defense News Staff Writer

SAN DEIGO — The six aircraft carriers of the U.S. Pacific Fleet are bristling with about 275 tactical aircraft, such as the advanced F/A-18 fighter, that can fire precision-guided munitions (PGMs) like the Joint Standoff Weapon.

But the fleet can arm only about 110 of these combat aircraft with sophisticated munitions because its inventories of such weapons are at precipitously low levels.

After the PGMs run out, "we're back to dumb bombs," said Adm. Tom Fargo, fleet commander.

Similar munition shortages abound throughout the fleet.

A helicopter squadron of 42 is allowed to fire only one Hellfire air-to-surface missile each year for training, far less than is required to maintain their proficiency, Fargo said. The total inventory of Tomahawk cruise missiles is classified, but the Navy's inventory is estimated at around 2,000. The Navy's stocks are low because it fired more than 400 Tomahawks in Operation Desert Fox against Iraq in December 1998 and in the Kosovo air campaign in 1999.

These and other examples comprise what Navy leaders say is a critical shortfall of PGMs. The Navy needs \$1 billion to bring its PGM arsenal to acceptable levels, officials said.

Aircraft carrier battle groups at sea have adequate stocks of munitions, Fargo said. But units in training status and ships preparing to deploy have few munitions with which to train. Lack of training can diminish the fleet's readiness, or combat prowess.


"Ordnance is simply too low,"

Precision-Guided Munitions Shortfall

U.S. Navy leaders say the service has a critical shortage of precision-guided munitions. The Navy requires at least \$1 billion more to buy enough munitions for training, which will ensure the fleet is ready to meet all combat missions.


NUMBER OF SYSTEMS BY BUDGET YEAR (\$ appropriated in millions)

Tomahawk
Long-range cruise missile




Source: U.S. Navy


Standard
Surface-to-air missile



SLAM-ER
Stand-Off Land Attack Missile



JSOW
Joint Standoff Weapon



DEFENSE NEWS/Nathaniel Levine

Fargo said in a Jan. 25 speech to a conference here sponsored by the Armed Force Communications and Electronics Association and the U.S. Naval Institute.

In the past decade he said, the Navy has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to buy more planes capable of firing advanced missiles. But the service has not purchased sufficient numbers of the munitions they were designed to fire.

"We have four to five times the strike aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions (PGMs) than we had 10 years ago. But the fact is, I have only about two air wings worth of PGM stocks to give them," he said. There are, on average, about 72 aircraft in a Navy air wing, of which about 50 or so are classified as strike or attack planes.

The Navy is buying new precision-guided munitions such as the Joint Standoff Weapon, the Land Attack Standard Missile and the Tactical Tomahawk. But some still are in the development stage. Others are being bought at such low annual volumes that it will take years to

"We have four to five times the strike aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions (PGMs) than we had 10 years ago. But the fact is, I have only about two air wings worth of PGM stocks to give them."

Adm. Tim Fargo
U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander

close the Navy's current weapons gap also are shortages of related equipment.

The Navy will receive the first improved versions of the Tactical Tomahawk in 2003 and 2004, but they will be purchased in very small numbers.

As a result, service leaders say they will have to adopt a host of stopgap measures to ensure the fleet is prepared should combat missions be required today.

Among the problems:

- Pilots fire few, if any, PGMs in training prior to deployment overseas.

- Targets to test or hone skills in the use of PGMs or missiles are in short supply.

- Ships are hoarding 5-inch gun and small-arms ammunition.

In addition to PGMs, there

for the Pearl Harbor, Hawaii-based Pacific Fleet.

"The ammunition and weapons procurement accounts are way below" what the Navy needs, said Ronald O'Rourke, a naval analyst with the Congressional Research Service. "There are a lot of nicks and corners that you can choose not to fund, and one of these areas the Navy has decided to nix is in the systems that support developed platforms."

Fargo said the lack of funding in recent years, while operation levels hovered near Cold War levels, forced the service to add more funds every year to maintain the status of deployed forces, while letting the health of other areas like munitions decline.

As a result, the Navy's procurement path today will result in a future fleet of 225 ships, Fargo said, far below the 315-ship fleet that is mandated to meet today's overall defense strategy.

"In my view, we have two choices: We either change the strategy or pay the bill," Fargo said.

"Cross-decking equipment and ordnance doubles the work for our sailors and brings into question our ability to surge the force at home for larger conflict," Fargo said. "We need to attack this problem." Cross-decking is the practice of moving munitions or equipment from ship to ship as they return and embark on overseas deployments, service officials said.

"We don't have enough ammunition, we don't have enough targets, and we need improved precision-guided munitions," said Vice Adm. Ed Moore, head of U.S. surface forces for the Pacific Fleet.

**AIR FORCE READINESS AT LOWEST STATE IN
YEARS AND MISSION CAPABLE RATES DECLINING
FOR AIR FORCE FRONT- LINE FIGHTERS**

STATEMENT: *The Clinton-Gore Administration's increased pace of deployments and lack of adequate funding has lead to declining mission capable rates for Air Force front-line fighters.*

FACTS: In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General Michael Ryan, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force admitted that "Air Force readiness is now at the lowest state we have been in years." He further confirmed that Air Combat Command's operational readiness has fallen 50% since 1996.

In addition, General Ryan confirmed that mission capable rates for Air Force front-line fighters has declined significantly. Since 1992, the mission capable rate for the F- 15E has dropped from 86% to 78%; the F-15 from 81% to 73%; and the F-16 from 82% to 75%.

TESTIMONY HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SEPTEMBER 17 2009
AIR FORCE MISSION CAPABLE RATES

1118 Mr. Hunter. I have got another statement here that
1119 you made in June, and I quote you, General. "Air-force
1120 readiness is now at the lowest state we have seen in years,
1121 and we are the ones who are demanded to be first in line
1122 when a crisis erupts." Did you make that statement?

1123 General Ryan. Yes, sir.

1124 Mr. Hunter. And you believe it to be true?

1125 General Ryan. Yes, sir.

1126 Mr. Hunter. I want to read back to you what your shop
1127 sent over to us in terms of degradation of your front-line
1128 fighters: F-15E has dropped, since 1992 to today, to a
1129 mission capability rate which used to be 56 percent in 1992
1130 to 3 state, today, of 79 percent. And I have got your
1131 document, if you need to take a look at it. I have got
1132 your F-15 dropping from a mission capability rate of 3;
1133 percent to 73 percent. And I have got your F-16 dropping
1134 from 82 percent to 75 percent, between 1992 and today. And
1135 I have got your statement-or your chart on those readiness
1136 rates if you would like to have that. Does that sound
1137 accurate?

1138 General Ryan. That sounds about right.

07 The Chairman. Thank you, General Jones.

08 I am going to yield my time to Mr. Hunter.

09 Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 And, gentlemen, thanks for being with us today.

101 And, General Ryan, let me start with you. I am going
102 to put up a statement that you made earlier.

103 If staff could put the poster up there. Turn that
104 over. The other one has got all the military casualties
105 there.

106 I am going to quote your statement, General Ryan.
107 'Since 1996, we have experienced an overall 14 percent
108 degradation in our operational readiness of our major
109 operational units. This is especially true of stateside
110 units, which are prioritized lower than the overseas and
111 engaged units. For instance, in Air Combat Command, their
112 operational readiness has fallen 50 percent since 1996:
113 General Mike Ryan, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force,
114 20 January, 1999.

115 Was that statement true at that time when you said
116 that?

117 General Ryan. Absolutely.

READINESS OF 2 DIVISIONS IMPROVED BY ALLOWING
ADDITIONAL TIME TO DEPLOY

STATEMENT: *The Army admits it did not devote additional resources to improve the readiness ratings of its two Army divisions that were declared 'not ready' in November 1999. Giving these divisions additional time to deploy was the only reason they were declared ready in December 1999.*

FACTS: In November 1999, the Commander of the 1st Infantry Division and the Commander of the 10th Infantry Division reported a very low state of readiness to deploy and go to war. The next month, December, the Army reported these divisions were ready.

In questioning before the House Armed Services Committee, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, admitted that additional time to deploy and train was the reason these divisions could declare themselves ready.

Testimony from House Armed Services Committee. September 27, 2000

Mr. Hunter. So they were given more time. So the difference between November of 1999, when the Commander said they weren't ready, and December of 1999, when the commander said they were ready, was the fact that they had been given more time to deploy. Is that right?

General Shinseki. That is correct.

READINESS RATINGS

1225 Admiral Clark. That is my view.

1226 Mr. Hunter. That means we are going to have to
1227 increase the defense top-line.

1228 Admiral Clark. That is my view.

1229 Mr. Hunter. Okay. Thank you.

1230 General Shelton, when the discussion erupted about the
1231 1st and the 10th Infantry Divisions not being ready, you
1232 came forth and said that they were ready and that it was
1233 nonsense for anyone to imply that they weren't. Sir, that
1234 was a yes and severe statement, was it not?

1235 General Shelton. Not exactly. Let me state for the
1236 record and clear the record.

1237 First of all, my response to that allegation, that
1238 they were not ready, was at Los Angeles at a forum that I
1239 had been scheduled to speak at for about eight months. It
1240 was a coincidence that Governor Bush had said the day
1241 before that they were not ready. Of course, that is what
1242 had been reported at an earlier time. But, in essence,
1243 what they reported not being ready is, they were not
1244 available because there was not a plan that they knew
1245 about-two great division commanders, as General Shinseki
1246 said-they did not know what the plan was that would allow

1247 them to redeploy in time to meet their wartime mission.

1248 And as they very correctly said, for that reason: We would

1249 not be ready to meet our wartime mission.

1250 But in terms of their training, their personnel and

1251 their equipment status, they were in good shape. So, in

1252 fact, when I was asked, "Are they unready?" at that **time**,

1253 the answer is, no, they are not unready. And I told the

1254 truth, **as you** would or anyone else would. They, in fact,

1255 were ready, but they couldn't meet the time line-

1256 Mr. Hunter. Okay. But, now, General, you just told

1257 us it is important for generals to tell the unvarnished

1258 truth, right? And the whole truth?

1259 General Shelton. Exactly. And that is what I **am**

1260 doing-

1261 Mr. Hunter. Now General Shinseki just said they were

1262 given more time. And that-giving them more time, and the

1263 document that **came** down that gave them more time, a piece

1264 of paper, turned two infantry divisions from unready to

1265 ready the instant that piece of paper hit the desk, did it

1266 not?

1267 General Shelton. It allowed them to meet their

1268 wartime requirements. There is a difference.

1269 Mr. Hunter. Well, and they then submitted reports
1270 that said C-1, meaning they are ready to go to war, right?
1271 Did they not?

1272 General Shelton. Well, we won't go into C ratings
1273 because they are classified. But they reported they were
1274 ready.

1275 Mr. Hunter. Okay.

1276 So my question is, General, you didn't then tell-and
1277 you spoke to the Nation, you talked to a lot of people when
1278 you talked about this. You never said-and if you did,
1279 correct me-but you never told anyone, the public or anyone
1280 else, that the reason they were now ready was because they
1281 had been given more time, did you?

1282 General Shelton. What I said was is that the reason
1283 they reported that they were not ready at the time was not
1284 the readiness status reporting that normally makes you
1285 unready; it was because they had determined they were
1286 unavailable to meet the wartime requirement.

1287 Mr. Hunter. Okay.

1288 So my question again is, you didn't tell the public
1289 that they had been given more time, did you?

1290 General Shelton. I wasn't asked if they had been

1291 given more time, because I said-

1292 Mr. Hunter. Then your answer is no, isn't it?

1293 General Shelton: -they were ready then, and they are

1294 ready now. They were ready then, but they could not get

1295 there in time.

1296 Mr. Hunter. so you did not tell the public that they

1297 had been given more time?

1298 General Shelton. I responded to the question I was

1299 asked on that date. I wasn't asked later if they were given

1300 more time .

1301 Mr. Hunter. Okay. Thank you, General.

1302 General Shelton. But I would have been happy to tell

1303 them that they were given time, because the Army, in fact,

1304 had come up with a plan that would allow those divisions to

1305 meet their wartime requirements. And that is what makes

1306 the difference.

1307 Mr. Hunter. Okay. Thank you for your response. I

1308 appreciate that, General.

1309 General Jones, your requirements officers testified to

1310 us this last week that the Marine Corps was \$320 million

1311 short of basic ammunition. Is that an accurate statistic?

MISSION CAPABLE RATES DECLINING

STATEMENT: *The Clinton-Gore Administration's increased pace of deployments and lack of adequate funding has lead to declining mission capable rates for the military services.*

FACTS: Between 1982- 1990 the Army and Marine Corps participated in 17 deployments. Since 1990 the Army and Marine Corps have participated in 149 deployments.

This rapid pace of deployments, coupled with a lack of funding and decline in personnel levels, has resulted in decreasing mission capable rates.

Over the last 10 years the average mission capable rate for Air Force aircraft has declined from 78% to 72%. Critical fighter aircraft such as the F-16 have seen their mission capable rate decline from 84.4% in FY91 to 75.3% in FY00. The F-15E's mission capable rate has dropped 10% from 88% to 78%.

The Navy has experienced a similar decline in its mission capable rates from 71% in 1993 to 68% in 1999. The Navy's fully mission capable rate – which rates whether the aircraft can perform every mission it was designed to do – has declined from 62% to 54.5% over the same time period.

The Marine Corps has experienced a drop in mission capable rates in fixed wing aircraft from 79% in FY93 to 73% in FY99.

(b)(6)



11 August 2000

**The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
United States House of Representatives
Washington DC 20515**

Dear Mr. Hunter

Attached is the information you requested in regards to our aircraft mission capable rates from FY91 thru the present and the average age of our aircraft. Don't hesitate to call me if you need additional data or have questions.

Thanks for your great support of America's airmen!

Very Respectfully,

**T. MICHAEL MOSLEY
Major General, USAF
Director, Legislative Liaison**

cc: Mr. Steve Thompson

MISSION CAPABLE (MC) RATES
FY91 - FY00 (through May 00)

MDS	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	AVERAGE AGE (as of 29 Feb 00)
A-10	88	87.8	84.2	84.5	83.3	82.7	79.8	74.7	72.5	69.7	18.7
AC-134	72.7	79.8	80.6	79.9	44.1	98.3	72.2	79.5	76.4	15.3	17
B-1	58.6	58.3	59	87.1	86.3	88.6	82.5	82.3	55.2	56.1	127
B-2*				25.1	18.9	23.9	32.4	33.7	42.2	43.6	5.5
B-62	78.7	81.3	83.2	81.2	80.9	80.1	76.8	78.2	74.1	70.2	38.2
c-130	62.2	WA	80.5	80.2	78	n	75.9	74.2	721	72.8	22.1
C-141	81.9	a 4	78.9	n 2	72.2	724	74.7	73.2	72.3	69.4	33.4
C-17**			81.6	44.8	74.8	M b	87.5	86.2	85	82.2	3.8
C-8	66.2	68	68.8	64.4	83.3	84.8	82.7	60.5	ss.7	58.8	22
E-3	01.8	91.2	85	86.3	16.1	82.5	79.2	71.9	73.5	74.4	20.2
E-4***	73.1	78.1	82.6	71.1	77.6	86.9	72.9	81.6	79.f	79.3	25.7
E-4*							49.7	68.3	72.4	68.8	2.9
EC-130	78.8	81.4	80.4	78.4	78.2	76.8	74.8	72.8	10.2	69.1	31.8
EC-135***	77.9	84.4	78.7	73.3	n.2	81.1	84.4	79.5	78.9	73.1	38.6
F-117	84	8 4 2	81.7	m.7	78	WA	84	78.9	83.1	76.7	8.9
F-18	82.6	81.8	80.8	78.2	78.1	77.8	77	78.1	73.8	73.8	18
F-15E	80	82.8	82.8	82.9	81.8	80.6	78.6	78.9	78.1	78	8.8
F-16	84.4	829	83	78.3	79.3	78.8	78.2	74.4	74.3	75.3	11.1
H-60****		87.5	72.8	70.3	73.3	722	87.8	71.3	68.6	68.6	9.8
HC-130	88.4	71.2	73.3	70.9	73.3	s7.7	82	81	82	83.3	27.2
KC-10	82.9	83	83.3	80.1	18.9	88.5	86.7	88.7	84.5	83.2	15.1
KC-136	88.4	86.5	83.9	80	80.1	79.7	78.9	78.7	n.2	67.7	39
MC-130	72.4	86.1	81	86.2	67.7	87.6	70	76.6	75.6	79.3	25.3
MH-63	75.9	85.4	80.4	67.3	32.4	67	80.9	85.8	68.8	73.8	272
RC-135**	64.7	66.2	73	75.5	78.3	78.1	74	73.9	85	57.2	38.5
T-37****	06.7	88.5	88.9	m.9	92.9	88.7	81.3	79.7	80.1	79.1	36.6
T-38****	61.4	115.4	88.6	88.7	89.4	88.9	88	00.3	80.4	71.2	32.9
U-2**	77.8	83.4	64.2	88.6	88.8	86.7	86.3	82.6	80.2	n.2	16.4
WC-130	88.7	84	83	85.9	85.9	70.7	88.7	72.3	73.7	68.5	24.4

* B-2 entered the inventory in FY94; C-17 entered the inventory in FY93; E-8 entered the inventory in FY97
 ** Data for FY91-FY98 provided by ACC (RC-135 cw1-97)
 *** H-60 aggregate number not available for FY91
 **** T-37 and T-38 data for FY91 provided by AETC

MC Rates as of 31 May 00
 Source: MERLIN (AFALBY)
 Avg Age as of 29 Feb 00
 Source: Program Data System (PDS)

08/03/2000

NAVY MC/FMC RATES
 (%)

YYMM	MC	FMC
Oct-83	70.3	61
Nov-83	70.4	61
Dec-83	71.9	63.1
Jan-84	72	63.7
Feb-84	71.6	62.2
Mar-84	70.1	61.5
Apr-84	71.3	62.6
May-84	71.3	62.5
Jun-84	73.3	64.6
Jul-84	71.1	63.1
Aug-84	69.5	61.3
Sep-84	66.7	61.3
Oct-84	69.2	61.1
Nov-84	71.8	63.4
Dec-84	69.8	61.4
Jan-85	69.8	61.9
Feb-85	68.9	60.4
Mar-85	70.2	61.3
Apr-85	72.4	64.2
May-85	70.6	62.2
Jun-85	70	61.3
Jul-85	70.3	62
Aug-85	69.7	61.6
Sep-85	70.5	62.7
Oct-85	69	59.9
Nov-85	69.7	61.2
Dec-85	68.9	59.2
Jan-86	68.5	59.9
Feb-86	70.9	62.5
Mar-86	70.5	62.1
Apr-86	69.3	60.4
May-86	70	59.6
Jun-86	69.5	59
Jul-86	67.6	57.7
Aug-86	67.3	56.4
Sep-86	65.4	54.5
Oct-86	64.7	53.9
Nov-86	67.7	56.7
Dec-86	65.1	56.2
Jan-87	65.3	55.2
Feb-87	64.7	53.7
Mar-87	63.4	52.5
Apr-87	66.3	55.1
May-87	63.7	51.9
Jun-87	64.1	54
Jul-87	63.7	53.5

YYMM	MC	FMC
Aug-87	64.2	51.4
Sep-87	64.8	51.5
Oct-87	64.6	51
Nov-87	67.6	54.2
Dec-87	64.9	50.1
Jan-88	87	52.8
Feb-88	67.7	9.6
Mar-88	66.4	52.6
Apr-88	65.5	51.5
May-88	67.2	52.2
Jun-88	66.5	50.4
Jul-88	67.5	54.3
Aug-88	68.5	55.3
Sep-88	65.4	51
Oct-88	66.1	51.8
Nov-88	70.1	55.8
Dec-88	67.2	53.8
Jan-89	66.1	52.6
Feb-89	66.5	52.9
Mar-89	65.5	51.7
Apr-89	67.6	52.3
May-89	69.05	56.8
Jun-89	66.27	55.17
Jul-89	66.16	52.35
Aug-89	69.1	56.3
Sep-89	69.1	56.2
Oct-89	67.3	56.1
Nov-89	66.2	56.2
Dec-89	66.7	56
Jan-90	66.8	56.1
Feb-90	66.9	56.2
Mar-90	69.3	56.1

Average age of Navy Aircraft in 1992 is as follows:

	Years
Helo's	18.8
Fixed Wing	13.8
Combined	14.0



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO

5000
APP
August 17, 2000

Mr. Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Procurement
2262 Rayburn building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Hunter:

SUBJECT: **AVERAGE AGE OF AIRCRAFT AND READINESS RATES**

Per your request, the average age of **Marine Corps** aircraft in fiscal year 1993 and the **Mission Capable/Full Mission Capable Readiness Rates** are provided. Enclosure (1) contains the **average age of Marine Corps** aircraft in fiscal year 1993 and includes active and reserve **assets**. Enclosure (2) contains the **Mission Capable/Full Mission Capable Readiness Rates** by aircraft category from fiscal year 1993 to June 2000 and includes an **overview** of the rates of rotary and **fixed wing** aircraft during that period.

Thank you for your support of **Marine Aviation**.

Very respectfully,

F. MCCORKLE
Lieutenant General, **U.S. Marine Corps**
Deputy **Commandant** for Aviation

Enclosures: 1. Average age of **Marine Corps** aircraft in **FY93**
2. **Mission Capable/Full Mission Capable Readiness Rates**

ACTIVE DUTY AIRCRAFT MISSION CAPABLE/FULL MISSION CAPABLE RATES FY93-CFY

EA-6B	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	78.7	76	81.9	78.2	76	68.8	74.6	64
FMC	73.8	72.11	77.8	71.7	69	58.5	63.2	55.9

AV-8B	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	74.2	77.2	76.1	77	71.3	60.8	60.7	62.2
FMC	60.7	74	73.5	74.7	64.9	53.3	50.8	50

TAV-8B	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	81.4	70.3	68.6	73.3	72.4	63.1	61.6	60.4
FMC	60.1	66.2	67	71.2	71.3	60.7	60.4	59.7

FA-18A	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	82.8	85.3	84.9	83.3	83.7	79	79.1	80.8
FMC	78.6	83	82.1	80	81.6	74.4	71.3	75.2

FA-18B	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	74.1	85.2	85.2	82.7	67.2	54.2	62.8	47.1
FMC	72.4	83	83.8	82.1	65	50	57.8	44.9

FA-18C	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	81.7	86.7	83.3	83.1	81.7	80.2	78.5	81.9
FMC	78.7	83.4	79.6	79.1	77.6	75.5	71.7	76.8

FA-18D	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	82	86	83.2	82.8	79.4	72.7	81.4	84.8
FMC	76.9	83	80.7	80.4	78.1	67.6	76.3	79.8

KC-130F	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	78	81	78.7	78.1	70.5	71.1	71.4	63.8
FMC	52.5	69.2	64.6	65.8	56.4	53.4	55.5	43

KC-130R	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	N/A	80	79.8	80.7	73.8	71	73.4	66.7
FMC	N/A	72.3	69.8	73.8	60.8	57.6	53.1	43.6

UH-1N	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	75.6	78.6	78.7	78.6	80.7	79.7	77.8	79.8
FMC	66.4	71.1	72.8	73.1	73	68.9	63.8	71.5

AH-1W	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	71.5	70.8	76	76.3	78.2	78.6	73.8	76.5
FMC	55.9	62.3	68.8	70.9	70.2	66.4	61.1	67.8

CH-46E	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	80.2	81.4	79.3	77.3	78.1	77.2	78	76.9
FMC	76.8	76.9	76.3	73.6	70.8	70.8	70.8	71.5

Enclosure (2)

ACTIVE DUTY AIRCRAFT MISSION CAPABLE/FULL MISSION CAPABLE RATES CONTINUED

CH-53D	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	68	78.1	73.4	70.7	72.8	71.4	81.8	82.4
FMC	61.3	70.3	66.7	62.7	63.8	63.5	76.4	78.1

CH-53E	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	78.9	57.5	63.1	68.4	70	71.4	72.1	69.8
FMC	71.2	50.2	53.2	58.9	58.9	63.5	58.7	62

OVERALL ACTIVE DUTY AIRCRAFT READINESS RATES FY93-CFY

FW ACFT	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	78.7	81.3	79.9	80.1	76.2	69.8	73	71.8
FMC	70.4	77.8	76.2	76.4	70.8	62.9	62.8	60.7

RW ACFT	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	75.3	77.3	77.8	72.4	73.8	75	75.2	76.2
FMC	66.8	70.8	72.4	66.8	66.2	66.1	64.3	66.9

RESERVE AIRCRAFT MISSION CAPABLE/FULL MISSION CAPABLE RATES

FA-18A	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	72.7	64.6	64.7	68.7	69	72.7	75	80.1
FMC	69.7	61.9	60.7	63.3	65.5	66.6	70.1	75.8

KC-130T	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	77.6	76.3	74.4	71.3	70.3	74.2	78.7	82.2
FMC	65.7	66.1	58.1	52.8	41.9	63.8	63.5	73.8

UH-1N	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	69.3	75.4	73	72.8	74.7	74.8	74.5	74.4
FMC	63.8	69.6	66.1	68	69.1	59.1	63.8	66

AH-1W	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	74.7	66.3	66.7	73	73.8	75.5	78	80.3
FMC	60.5	56.9	58.9	66.5	66.4	67.8	67.8	73.4

CH-46E	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	61.4	61.8	78.4	80.3	86.3	86.7	84.4	72.5
FMC	78.5	77.4	75.7	77.7	84.6	85.4	82.7	65.4

CH-53E	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	58.1	63.8	58.5	58.8
FMC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	39.8	48.7	44	37.8

Enclosure (2)

OVERALL RESERVE AIRCRAFT READINESS RATES FY93-CFY

FW ACFT	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	70.1	71.1	70.4	89	76.3	74.5	76.8	71.1
FMC	65.7	66.2	84)	61.7	59.2	67.91	66.8	74.8

FW ACFT	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	CFY
MC	70.1	70.5	68.1	71.8	75.3	78.3	73.8	71.5
FMC	61.2	61.6	59.9	64.1	69.7	67.2	64.5	60.7

NOTE: CFY DATA IS CURRENT THRU JUNE 2000. ONLY

Enclosure (2)

NAVAL FLEET SIZE INADEQUATE

STATEMENT: *The Clinton-Gore Administration's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) level of 305 Naval Vessels is inadequate to meet Navy requirements.*

FACTS: In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Naval Admirals admitted that the Naval fleet needed to be increased from the Clinton-Gore QDR level.

In response to the question - *Is the navalforce structure, as defined in the QDR, sufficient?* Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn, Commander, Third Fleet stated, **"It is not adequate to meet the requirements, as they are stated by the geographical CINCs."**

In response to to the question - *I-low many naval vessels are required?* Admiral McGinn responded, **"I would say that the number would approach 350."**

Vice Admiral Charles Moore, Commander, Fifth Fleet, testifying at the same hearing agreed with Admiral McGinn's assessment, **"I agree completely with Admiral McGinn. I would just add that I think that, when the QDR was developed, we couldn't see into the future. And if you look at our practical experience, day in and day out, we're being tasked at a level beyond what was envisioned at that point."**

999 | *Mr.* TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

1000 | Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Evans.

1001 | Lane, you didn't have any questions? Okay, thanks.

1002 | Admiral McGinn and Admiral **Moore**, you obviously have a

1003 | firsthand look at the stretching effect *of* this relatively

1004 | low number **of naval** ● **hipr, on your operational requirements.**

1005 | We're talking about ship numbers today. In your estimation,

1006 | Admiral McGinn, do we have enough ships in the U.S. Navy?

1007 | Admiral MCGINN. To do all of the things that we could

1006 | and, in my view, should **do** to support the national security

1009 | **strategy, no.**

1010 | *Mr.* HUNTER. What do we need? From your personal

1011 | perspective, where do you place the number?

1012 | Admiral MCGINN. In the big picture, I would refer back to

1013 | Admiral Moore's comments about numbers of battle groups and

1014 | numbers of Amphibious Readiness Groups. If we were to meet

1015 | the requirements of the three major geographical **CINCs**, we

1016 | need 15 carrier battle groups and 14 Amphibious Readiness

1017 | Groups. The QDR number, as Admiral **Lautenbacher** said, was 12

1018 | of **each of** those essential elements of **naval war** fighting

1019 | power.

1020 | So **if you --**

1021 | Mr. HUNTER. So you don't think the QDR is accurate? Is

1022 | sufficient?

1023 | Admiral MCGINN. It is not **adequate to** meet the

1024 requirements, as they are stated by the geographical **CINCS**,
1025 no, sir.

1026 **Mr. HUNTER.** Okay. What numbers are you looking at, if **you**
1027 translate those **battle** groups into numbers?

1028 Admiral **HCGINN.** **I** would **say** that the number would
1029 approach 350.

1030 **Mr. HUNTER.** Okay. Admiral Moore, What do **you** think? **Do**
1031 we have enough ships? And, if not, where do you think we
1032 should be? I need **a** picture of your personal observation.

1033 Admiral **MOORE.** I agree completely with Admiral **McGinn.** I
1034 would just add that I think that, you know, when the QDR was
1035 developed, we couldn't see into the future. And if you look
1036 at our practical experience, day in and day out, we're being
1037 tasked at a level beyond what was envisioned at that point.
1038 And in our theater, we see this happen day in and day out.
1039 I've already cited the example of the aircraft carrier battle
1040 groups and our Amphibious Groups.

1041 **For** instance, I have a requirement for an Amphibious
1042 Readiness Group **365** days a year. **I am** provided one 180 days a
1043 year. When we have, for instance, right now, as we speak, we
1044 have a war going on in Eritrea and Ethiopia where we have
1045 Americans in our embassies. We have Americans there in both
1046 those nations and we're struggling to figure out how we would
1047 conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation without the
1048 presence of an Amphibious Readiness Group. That's just one

1049 | example.

1050 | Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Would you, if you were trying to peg a
1051 | number, big picture, do you agree with Admiral **McGinn's** 350
1052 | number?

1053 | Admiral **MCGINN**. I agree with **15** aircraft carrier battle
1054 | groups, **14** Amphibious Readiness **Groups**. And I think **that'll**
1055 | come out around, if you do all of the support ships, I think
1056 | that'll come out about 350.

1057 | Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Attack submarines, gentlemen. Where
1058 | should we be?

1059 | Admiral MCGINN. We're really, as we are in other classes
1060 | of ships, Mr. Chairman, stretched on attack submarines. We
1061 | have a requirement to work up the Amphibious Readiness Groups
1062 | and carrier battle groups. And we do that by using opposing
1063 | forces, or simulated opposing forces, some of these in the
1064 | area of critical naval mission **area** of anti-submarine
1065 | warfare. We use our **SSNs** to do-that. We find, of late, over
1066 | the past couple of years, that we're really having to stretch
1067 | to get **the kind** of exposure we **need to** get to the level of
1068 | ASW proficiency because of the high demands made on our
1069 | attack submarines, so I would describe our situation in terms
1070 | of SSN force rationale as very tight and, if we continue to
1071 | decommission our Los Angeles class submarines, to get even
1072 | tighter in the future.

1073 | Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Well, the **QDR's** down to **50**. There have

1074 | been a number of studies, as you know, over the years, some
1075 | classified, some not, but ranging upwards of 70, in recent
1076 | years close to 70 and **abouts**. What do you think?

1077 | Admiral **MCGINN**. I would, not being familiar with all of
1078 | the studies, classified and unclassified --

1079 | Mr. HUNTER. But **just** looking at it from your own
1080 | perspective.

1081 | Admiral MCGIWN. From my own perspective, I would say **that**
1082 | it would **be** in the **area** of 60 submarines that I would put **as**
1083 | **a** floor.

1084 | Mr. HUNTER. A floor of 60. Admiral Moore.

1085 | Admiral MOORE. Well, with the number of submarines we
1086 | have today, the system only allocates me one in my region.
1087 | And I **can** tell that, day in and day out, I need at least two.
1088 | I think we **make** a strong case for four. The submarine is **an**
1089 | excellent platform, stealthy platform, to fire Tomahawk
1090 | missiles from. We use the submarines extensively for
1091 | indications and warning and intelligence gathering. And, of
1092 | course, we see the threat developing in our region. The
1093 | submarine threat is developing significantly in the region.

1094 | So I believe we need more submarines. I don't know what
1095 | the top-line number is. We need enough to give me more than
1096 | one in my region, I guess would be the way I would put it.

1097 | Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Admiral **Lautenbacher**, you've listened
1098 | to the gentlemen that are using the equipment that place the

1099 | number of ships around 350, which I think is a reasonable
1100 | number. **I** think that's been--**a** number **of** experts in this **area**
1101 | have come in with the same number. And attack boats, Admiral
1102 | **McGinn says 60.**

1103 | What does that require in terms of **annual** shipbuilding,
1104 | if we were going to put **350** as **a** number?

1105 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. You would have to --

1106 | **Mr. HUNTER.** A 16 fleet number.

1107 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. You would have to increase the **SCN**
1108 | budget to about \$16 billion to \$18 billion a year to do that.

1109 | **Mr. HUNTER.** Okay. And what would that, in terms of ships
1110 | per year, what would we have to build?

1111 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. You would have to have about **14**
1112 | ships a year, something like that. It would depend. Because
1113 | you would have to build up to that. You know, again, it
1114 | depends on the spikes and *ups* and downs, but you would have
1115 | to have significant numbers more than we have now. **It's**
1116 | certainly not 8 to 10. It's 12 to 14, something like that.

1117 | **Mr. HUNTER.** Okay. **When you say 12 to 14 boats: attack**
1118 | **boats.**

1119 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. No, I'm talking overall, the
1120 | ships.

1121 | **Mr. HUNTER.** I understand.

112; | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Okay.

1121 | **Mr. HUNTER.** Drop down to the subset of attack

1124 **submarines.** What do you think, production per year?

1125 Admiral **LAUTENBACHER.** I **support** the studies that have
1126 come out and, obviously, if you want to go **back** up to
1127 something like 68 or 70, you have to have about 3 per year to
1128 do that.

1129 **Mr. HUNTER.** Okay. **How about** to **maintain 60?**

1130 Admiral **LAUTENBACHER.** Well, between two **to** three, if you
1131 want --

1132 **Mr. HUNTER.** **So, basically, we've** got, we've blueprinted
1133 one per year.

1134 Admiral **LAUTENBACHER.** We have one per year, yes, sir.
1135 That's what we've got.

1136 **Mr. HUNTER.** Okay.

1137 Admiral **LAUTENBACHER.** And we'll have to increase it **to 2**
1138 **just to** maintain the 50 and maybe to 3 for at least several
1139 years to keep that up.

1140 **Mr. BUNTER.** Okay. Admiral Lautenbacher, then would **it be**
1141 **fair to say** that this shipbuilding budget is inadequate **to**
1142 **maintain the required naval forces?**

1143 **Admiral LAUTENBACHER.** I'd like to **caveat** my answer just a
1144 little bit. The Fiscal **Year** 2001 budget that we're supporting
1145 today is adequate for today. We are going to need **a** lot more
1146 **as we go into the outyears.** In other words, we have eight
1147 ships in today's budget --

1148 **Mr. HUNTER.** But if we want a steady-state, maintain **a**

1149 | 350--**build** to and maintain a 350-~~ship~~ Navy?

1150 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Then it's inadequate.

1151 | Mr. HUNTER. Then it's inadequate.

1152 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. For a 350-~~ship~~ Navy.

1153 | Mr. HUNTER. Do you agree that a 350-~~ship~~ Navy is
1154 | required?

1155 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I have testified for the past **two**
1156 | years and **I'll** testify again that **15** carrier battle groups
1157 | and 14 **ARGs** meets the requirement and that the size of the
1158 | Navy that balances that is about 360 ships.

1159 | Mr. HUNTER. Then this budget fails to maintain the
1160 | steady-state requirement in building to a 350-~~ship~~ Navy. Is
1161 | that accurate?

1162 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. It does not build to that
1163 | requirement. It builds to the QDR requirement of
1164 | approximately 300.

1165 | Mr. HUNTER. Now, do you **think** it even builds to the **300?**
1166 | 39 ships over **5** years?

1167 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. In Fiscal *Year* 2001, it is okay. In
1168 | the outyears, it needs *to* be increased.

1165 | Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Have you made recommendations to
117c | increase this budget to your superiors?

1171 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir.

117; | Mr. HUNTER. **What's** the answer?

1173 | Admiral LAUTENBACHER. The answer is there's only so much

MILITARY PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

STATEMENT: *A variety of Clinton-Gore Administration military personnel policies including: increased operation tempo, insufficient pay, sub-par housing and poor retirement health care options, have led to the services' continued struggle to recruit and retain qualified personnel.*

FACTS: At a September 27, 2000 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, each of the Service Chiefs testified that while recruiting programs have been more successful this year than in the past several years, they still do not have sufficient personnel to meet all their obligations.

General Shinseki, U.S. Army: "The Army's requirement for an increase in end-strength was valid then." (In January 1995, General Ted Stropf testified that the Army end-strength should be 520,000.) "At that point, we were headed to Bosnia. We thought we were going to be there for a specified period of time. We are still there and Kosovo since. The requirement for end-strength increase in the Army is validated yet again today."

Admiral Clark, U.S. Navy: "If you look at our trends, you find, today, I am 14,000 people short: almost 8,000 at sea, and 6,000 ashore."

General Ryan, U.S. Air Force: "We are currently about 5,000 short of the number we ought to be at, at budgeted level. And that is probably 5,000 under what is required. So a total of 10,000 short right now."

General Jones, U.S. Marine Corp: "The effect of the last QDR was to, essentially, cut into some of our muscle. What we lost was the shock absorber that allows some recovery time between an accelerated pace of operations. My prediction would be that I would come in with a request of about 4,000 to 5,000 to restore that shock absorber that was taken out."

70 General Shelton. Unquestionably, yes, sir.

71 Mr. Skelton. Much of this is due to our capability of
72 what we call force multipliers, such as command and control
73 and intelligence, reconnaissance. Is that correct?

74 General Shelton. Yes, sir, it is.

75 Mr. Skelton. Since our Goldwater-Nichols reform of
76 1986, we have embraced a greater jointness capability. Am
77 I correct?

78 General Shelton. I would submit that we lead the
79 world, without a doubt, in that arena, Congressman Skelton.

80 Mr. Skelton. That is my next question: Unlike other
81 armies, navies, et cetera, is that correct?

82 General Shelton. Yes, sir.

83 Mr. Skelton. General Shinseki, you spoke of troop
84 numbers. In January of 1995, Lieutenant General Ted Strop
85 sat exactly where you are and testified that the Army
86 should be at 520,000 end-strength. It was that week, my
87 recollection is, that the Army entered Bosnia for the first
88 time, and we all, of course, know the history since then.
89 I am convinced that, in order to pay other bills, the Army
90 end-strength recommendation came forward-this is, of
91 course, before your watch-at lesser figures.

Are you convinced that there was merit to what General
ted Strop testified to in January of 1995?

General Shinseki. I can't sign up for the exact
number now. I have work underway to come up with a number.
But yes, the essence of his statement is correct. The
Army's requirement for an increase in end-strength was
valid then. At that point, we were headed to Bosnia. We
thought we were going to be there for a specified period of
time. We are still there and Kosovo since. The
requirement for end-strength increase in the Army is
validated yet again today.

Mr. Skelton. The end-strength question, Admiral
Clark, do you have a comment on the Navy?

Admiral Clark. I do. I believe that you know our
end-strength is established by the QDR. And if you look at
our trends, you find, today, I am 14,000 people short:
almost 8,000 at sea, and 6,000 ashore. That has to be
redressed. We are working on that number.

I believe that you get to end-strength by dealing with
how long people are in the pipeline, accessions rate, and
also retention can help because it reduces the number of

people in training and so forth. So it is a balance of all;
of these factors.

so I am not certain of the exact number. We are
working on that right now. I am convinced that-

Mr. Skelton. Will you come forth with a
recommendation?

Admiral Clark. It is my intent to do so in the next
budget submission.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you.

General Ryan?

General Ryan. We are currently about 5,000 short of
the number that we ought to be at, at budgeted level. And
that is probably 5,000 under what is required. So a total
of 10,000 short right now.

Mr. Skelton. General Jones, there was a
recommendation to take you down to 159,000 and we kept that
number up, if you will remember.

General Jones. I do recall those conversations.

Mr. Skelton. Yes, we do, too. How about the end-
strength for the Marines today?

General Jones. Well, sir, as you know, our en-
strength right now is set at 172,500 for the active and

roughly 39,000 for the Reserves. The effect of the last QDR was to, essentially, cut into some of our muscle. What we lost was the shock absorber that allows some recovery time between an accelerated pace of operations. We have been pursuing internal efficiencies in the Marine Corps. We have been able to return 2,100 Marines to the operating forces just from the internal structure of the Corps.

I will be prepared, during the next budget submission, to make a more concrete recommendation. We have been studying this issue now for my full year in office. My prediction would be that I would come in with a request of about 4,000 to 5,000 to restore that shock absorber that was taken out.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you.

It is my hope that when the five of you gentlemen come to testify in January or early February, you will have researched your needs for the future and, as the commandant says, the future readiness of our force is what we are concerned about, and after, hopefully, having a heart-to-heart talk with whoever the chief executive may be in making his recommendations and giving us that same set of recommendations.

We thank you for your testimony and your candor.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Hansen?

Mr. Hansen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think this has been a very interesting hearing. And I enjoyed, last night, going through the testimony of the Joint Chiefs, reading it. I am encouraged from what they say, because they all say they have got a problem. And that is probably half the thing: If you have got a problem, how do we face it?

General Shelton made an interesting statement. He said, "Ready for what?" And that is a pretty good question, really, and we could have a lot of fun discussing that one.

I would add to that, compared to what? Are we comparing it to what we had **eight** years ago? Are we comparing it to what the adversary may be?

I remember of all my years on the Intelligence Committee, we had-1 still remember Jim Woolsey, director of CIA, used to say the old Soviet Union was a great dragon in the jungle, and it split apart and now we have got all these slithering snakes. And so now you folks have to

Regiano

106TH CONGRESS
1st Session

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REPORT
106-301

**NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000**

CONFERENCE REPORT

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 1059



ALBANY 6 (legislative day, AUGUST 21, 1999.—Ordered to be printed

- Sec. 413. End strengths for military technicians (dual status).
 Sec. 414. Increase in numbers of members in certain grades authorized to be on active duty in support of the Reserves.
 Sec. 415. Selected Reserve end strength flexibility.

Subtitle C—Authorization of Appropriations

- Sec. 421. Authorization of appropriations for military personnel.

Subtitle A—Active Forces

SEC. 401. END STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE FORCES.

The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of September 30, 2000, as follows:

- (1) The Army, 460,000.
- (2) The Navy, 372,037.
- (3) The Marine Corps, 172,518.
- (4) The Air Force, 360,877.

SEC. 403. REVISION IN PERMANENT END STRENGTH MINIMUM LEVELS.

(a) **REVISED END STRENGTH FLOORS.**—Section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking "372,636" and inserting "371,781";
- (2) in paragraph (3), by striking "172,200" and inserting "172,148"; and
- (3) in paragraph (4), by striking "370,803" and inserting "360,877".

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on October 1, 1999.

Subtitle B—Reserve Forces

SEC. 411. END STRENGTHS FOR SELECTED RESERVE.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for Selected Reserve personnel of the reserve components as of September 30, 2000, as follows:

- (1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 350,000.
- (2) The Army Reserve, 205,000.
- (3) The Naval Reserve, 90,288.
- (4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 39,624.
- (5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 106,678.
- (6) The Air Force Reserve, 73,708.
- (7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 8,000.

(b) **ADJUSTMENTS.**—The end strengths prescribed by subsection (a) for the Selected Reserve of any reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by—

(1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at the end of the fiscal year, and

(2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for un-

satisfactory participation in training) without their consent at the end of the fiscal year.

Whenever such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the end strength prescribed for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strengths of such units and by the total number of such individual members.

SEC. 412. END STRENGTHS FOR RESERVES ON ACTIVE DUTY IN SUPPORT OF THE RESERVES.

Within the end strengths prescribed in section 411(a), the reserve components of the Armed Forces are authorized, as of September 30, 2000, the following number of Reserves to be serving on full-time active duty or full-time duty, in the case of members of the National Guard, for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components:

- (1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 22,430.
- (2) The Army Reserve, 12,804.
- (3) The Naval Reserve, 16,010.
- (4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 2,272.
- (5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 12,287.
- (6) The Air Force Reserve, 1,134.

SEC. 413. END STRENGTHS FOR MILITARY TECHNICIANS (DUAL STATUS).

The minimum number of military technicians (dual status) as of the last day of fiscal year 2000 for the reserve components of the Army and the Air Force (notwithstanding section 129 of title 10, United States Code) shall be the following:

- (1) For the Army Reserve, 6,474.
- (2) For the Army National Guard of the United States, 23,125.
- (3) For the Air Force Reserve, 2,785.
- (4) For the Air National Guard of the United States, 22,267.

SEC. 414. INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF MEMBERS IN CERTAIN GRADES AUTHORIZED TO BE ON ACTIVE DUTY IN SUPPORT OF THE RESERVES.

(a) **OFFICERS.**—The table in section 12011(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

Grade	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps
Major or Lieutenant Commander	3,297	1,071	689	160
Lieutenant Colonel or Commander	1,011	626	777	99
Colonel or Navy Captain	471	188	297	39

(b) **SENIOR ENLISTED MEMBERS.**—The table in section 12012(a) of such title is amended to read as follows:

Grade	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps
E-9	648	203	688	86
E-8	2,000	626	1,641	94

Cost of Pay Raise to Eliminate Pay Gap
And Keep Pace with Civilian Pay Increases
In the Out Years

FY	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Pay Raise Percent	15.0%	4.6%	4.3%	4.0%	3.7%	
BA	\$6.9B	\$11.7B	\$14.9B	\$18.0B	\$21.0B	\$72.5B
OL	\$6.7B	\$11.5B	\$14.8B	\$17.9B	\$20.9B	\$71.7B

Prepared by staff of House Committee on Armed Services

snowflake

TO: Lisa Bronson
CC: Larry DiRita (for D. Feith)
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 21, 2001
SUBJECT: **NATO Expansion**

I am leaning quite strongly towards the big bang on NATO; expansion.

I think we probably ought to go minimum of five and maybe seven added to NATO in the next round.

I am less worried about the military effectiveness and more of the opinion that if we do that, we will cause Russia to lean West rather than East. We want their interest to be to connect with the West rather than with the PRC and they have to be worried about the PRC and the Moslem world.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052101.09

11-L-0559/OSD/3992

U09919 /01

NATO 320.2

21MAY01

snowflake

May 23, 2001 4:16 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
 Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bosnia

BOSNIA

Attached is the actual transcript of my remarks on Bosnia. I think you will find they are exactly what we have all been saying.

Attach.
USA Today transcript

DHR:db
052301-14

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23MAY0

You talk about turbulence, and of course you bring people in, -you move them a lot with their families which is not easy. It can be difficult for morale. It has an expense. It has an expense in dollars. It also has an expense **in the** capability a person develops in a given position. If you're there 12, 13, 14 months, you can imagine -- Think of you. If you did defense for 12 months and then went to something totally different; another 12 months, something totally different; you'd just be getting up to speed...

Stone: Right. So people are leaving just as they're sort of getting up to speed.

Rumsfeld: There is that question in my mind. So those are things I'm going to be looking at.

You asked about morale and quality of life.

Stone: Yes.

Rumsfeld: Some other things. Optempo is something that we have -- General Shelton and the Joint Staff and I and the policy **shop**, when we get someone there, are engaged in a look at where are we around, the **world**, how are we arranged, and what are the **things** that **are** the most beneficial, and what are the things that are the least beneficial,

Stone: What sort of things --

Rumsfeld: How can we improve morale and the quality of life for the men and women in the armed services by possibly finding places we can reduce the commitment so that the tempo of their lives gets back to something they can live with. Less hectic.

Stone: You mentioned Bosnia as a place that we've finished our mission. Can you --

Rumsfeld: There's another instance that I'd like to amplify on.

Stone: Yes.

Rumsfeld: The United States went into Bosnia with a military role. I'm told that that military role was completed several years ago. I think there is general agreement.

It is not appropriate for our forces to come out at the present time -- not because the military role is not completed, but because they have not as yet developed the civil structure and the civil capability so that when the military forces are

removed there will continue to be a relatively stable situation. That work should have been going forward over the last period of years. It needs to go forward. I intend to encourage it to go forward. Because until it goes forward one would not want to abruptly pull any troops out of Bosnia.

Second, we went in with other countries, we will go out with other countries, and any implication to the contrary is probably not appropriate.

Stone: Do you have a timeframe in mind?

Rumsfeld: You can't. You can't have a timeframe. I have a timeframe that's very different from what the behavior pattern in the past has been. The behavior pattern in the past has been to leave them in there because there is nothing in its place, but not to put a lot of effort and energy to put something in their place on the civil side. I think that's what needs to be done.

Stone: So you're saying in the last few years, three or four years, it's been static, not a lot of effort to go forward?

Rumsfeld: Let me state what I know and not what I don't know.

What I know is that the military -- I'm told the military task was finished several years ago. They are still there. The reason they are still there is because the civil side has not been sufficiently fashioned so that when the military comes out there will be a stable situation.

How much effort was put into trying to do that over the past several years, I don't know. Were there efforts that failed, I don't know. Was it possible there was very little effort at all? That's possible. But I don't know that. All I know is that it isn't there.

Of course once U.S. troops or any troops get into a place, they tend to be so-called, so to speak, free. They don't cost the country anything to speak of. They cost the American taxpayer, so they're not free at all. But it is comforting to have them there. And it's understandable that people would want them to continue.

But I don't think military forces that are really for military purposes ought to stay in places where there isn't a military function and where they're in effect doing civil functions. That is exactly what's happening in Bosnia.

We went into the Sinai 20 years ago -- not with the theory

that it would become permanent. And I have raised that issue as well. Indeed, we're looking all across the globe.

Stone: How about Kosovo?

Rumsfeld: I have not -- that's a subject for the National Security Council to address, and we haven't talked about it. I don't have any particular defined opinions like I'm developing with respect to Bosnia and the Sinai.

Stone: Is there anything else you would put on that list with Bosnia, Sinai --

Rumsfeld: We're looking across the globe at how we're doing. I mean **I've** been involved in **U.S.** forces in Nigeria, training Nigerians to assist in Sierra Leone; Haiti. There's these types of things going on in many, many places in the world and so --

Stone: What's your thought on training troops in Nigeria?

Rumsfeld: I beg your pardon?

Stone: What's your thought on training troops, ..

Rumsfeld: The President decided that he felt that was a good thing to do and we're doing it.

Stone: So you're going to continue that.

Rumsfeld: I didn't say that.

Stone: Okay.

Rumsfeld: I said we're going to do what we agreed to do. That **was** a fairly explicit number of battalions as I recall. Two and **then** three to follow, maybe. A total of five?

Quigley: A total of five, yes, sir.

Stone: Total of five training battalions?

Rumsfeld: Well, don't quote me. He can give the --

Quigley: We'll check that. A total of five Nigerian **battalions** have been **or** will be trained.

Rumsfeld: My recollection is that **we've** done a couple and that **there** is a -- we may currently be doing some in Senegal and Ghana. Then we have an understanding that we'll go ahead and do

snowflake

Task at Staff Mtg

TO: Larry DiRita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 14, 2001
SUBJECT: **Foreign Military Training**

Attached is a paper on foreign military training.

They have answered a question I did not ask. I am not interested in having the U.S. pay all foreign military training.

I am interested in knowing what foreign military training we currently do? For what countries and at what cost?

The second thing I am interested in knowing is are there countries that can't afford to pay the full price for military training in the U.S.? If so, what provisions do we currently have that we could use that would assist them in covering some or all of the costs for selected countries that (a) can't afford to pay for it and (b) that we want to have their people trained in the U.S.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051401.01

Attach. (SecDef Inquiry on Training for Foreign Officers)

350.2

14 May 01

snowflake

TO: Larry DiRita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: May 14, 2001

SUBJECT: We ought to be able to get somebody working on this, who can do it right, rather than waiting for Doug Feith to be confirmed.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051401.01
Attach.

11-L-0559/OSD/3998

May 29, 2001 12:44 PM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction to Space Commission Response

Attached is a memo from Steve Cambone that suggests some additional briefings and close contact may be needed on Capitol Hill with respect to the space program.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/22/01 Berkowitz memo re: Congressional Reaction

DHR:dh
052901-18

491.96

29 May 01

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Sir-
ATTACHED IS A MEMO
FROM MARC BERKOWITZ ON
HILL REACTION TO OUR
RESPONSE TO THE SPACE
COMMISSION REPORT.

SK

MAY 24 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

FROM: MARC BERKOWITZ *MyB 5/22/01*

SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction to the Department's Space Commission Response

There has been wide ranging interest in Congress regarding the Department's response to the Space Commission report. We thought it would be useful to provide you a summary of the early feedback.

Defense Authorization Committees. On May 16, 2001, the House Armed Services Committee's Procurement and the Research and Development Subcommittees held a breakfast hosted by Congressman (CM) Duncan Hunter (R-CA) to discuss Space Commission related issues. CM Hunter, CM Floyd Spence (R-SC), CM Ike Skelton (D-MO), CM Martin Meehan (D-MA), and numerous staff were present. In addition to myself, the invited guests were Maj Gen (S) Mike Hamel from the Air Staff, and Commissioners Tom Moorman, Bob Davis, and Doug Necessary.

- The Congressmen wanted to understand our dependence on space as well as our vulnerabilities and shortfalls. CM Hunter quickly grasped the concept of needing a new management and organizational approach to assign clear responsibility and accountability for our space program. Much of his interest centered on regulatory and export control issues and the need for a senior official to manage competing national security and commercial interests.
- The Congressmen were interested and indicated they might want to get together again. They pressed the Commissioners for any insight they could provide on the funding increases that would be needed in space. The Commissioners demurred on that point, but they were surprisingly vocal in their dissatisfaction with certain aspects of how the Department responded to the Commission's report. Bob Davis had a list of items he thought the Congress would need to legislate, including: creation of the Under Secretary for Space, Information, and Intelligence; Title 10 authority for the Air Force, and the creation of a true Major Force Program budgeting category for space. In each case, we explained that

the Department's response was geared to meet the Commission's intent and no options had been foreclosed.

- The House Armed Services Committee, led by CM Mac Thornberry (R-TX), will likely sponsor legislation on this topic. Bob Davis, Doug Necessary, and others probably are agitating for legislation to force the Department to implement all of the Commission's recommendations in a manner they deem satisfactory.

In addition, the Senate Armed Services Committee's Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Chaired by Sen Allard (R-CO), is planning to hold a Space Commission hearing in June. By then, the results of the Defense Strategy Review and the FY 01 Supplemental will have been rolled out, so our witness (either Mr. Aldridge or, if confirmed, yourself) will have more detail to provide on programmatic. Discussions with the committee's staff indicates they have specific interest in the following areas:

- How OSD will be organized for space, information, and intelligence;
- How OSD will provide oversight of the Air Force space organization and ensure protection of the other Services' equities;
- How DoD will ensure appropriate trade-offs are made between air and space programs;
- How DoD will provide oversight of intelligence activities; and
- Whether DoD intends to weaponize space as part of the management and organization changes.

Defense Appropriations Committees. The Appropriators have not yet expressed any significant interest in this topic. They will likely remain quiet until they see the President's budget.

Intelligence Committees. Staffers from both the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees are locked onto two issues. First, whether any changes will affect the DCI's equities. Second, whether the Department is committed to creating the Office of Space Reconnaissance. Our most recent information from the House intelligence committee staff is that they have decided not to hold a hearing on the Space Commission in the near future. Their concerns about an imminent Air Force take over of the NRO evidently were assuaged.

We suggest that a strategy be developed for sustaining our messages regarding the Space Commission on the Hill. The response to the Space Commission report was an excellent start, but the posturing over legislation and other methods to force certain implementation outcomes has now started. If you and Secretary concur, we will work with Legislative Affairs to develop the strategy. A forward leaning posture with key Members and staff will help to influence likely legislation in a manner beneficial to the Department.

snowflake

May 29, 2001 12:55 PM

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: India

Here are some notes from that meeting with Brzezinski.

You might want to put into the classified paper the risk that India could have difficulty with stability the more it becomes literate and the more the **internet** takes over.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/9/01SecDef MFR

DHR:dh
052901-19

DR

29 May 01

MEETING WITH ZBIGNEW BRZEZINSKI
4/9/01

India could fall apart when it is literate and TV and the Internet allow political activism to focus on religion and ethnicity.

Take steps so that Russia doesn't make moves on Ukraine and Central Asia.

All of Central Asia is volatile. The five former Soviet republics plus Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, The non-Arab Moslem world.

Once stabilizing forces are gone, such as Tito or the Soviet central government, the centrifugal force pulls things apart.

That could be India in 20 years.

DHR/azn
052101.06

snowflake

May 29, 2001 2:14 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
cc: Larry Di Rita *(to set up meeting)*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mission Creep Briefing

The Joint Staff has a briefing on mission creep and the counter-drug mission since its tasking in 1989. Paul Wolfowitz has seen it.

Please get me the briefing in a 20-minute version, and then let's ask QDR how we return back to the original tasking and what it would mean in terms of activity, optempo, and money.

Maybe it should be part of the meeting we are having with the Chiefs, Steve—
what do you think?

Attach.

4/3/01 de Leon memo to SecDef re: Counter-Drug Mission

DHR:dh
052901-29

0300.5

29 May 01

April 3, 2001



Gen. Vretha

To: Secretary Rumsfeld
From: Rudy de Leon *R*
CC: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
Re: Counter-Drug Mission

You asked "is it conceivable that we could figure out a way to reduce our involvement in the counter-drug mission" raising optempo concerns, etc.

Based on your earlier inquiries on op-tempo, the Director of the Joint Staff prepared a briefing that showed the "mission creep" in the counter-drug mission since the original tasking back in 1989. ✓

In fact, over time the regional CINC South has steadily increased mission tasking and presence in the region.

The Director of the Joint Staff has presented this briefing to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. In turn, Dr. Wolfowitz has directed that policy options be prepared for further consideration.

snowflake

March 26, 2001 6:47 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Counter-Drug Mission

Do you think it is conceivable that we could figure out a way to reduce our involvement in the counter-drug mission? I don't know enough of the background to know how it all got started and where the pressure points are.

It certainly seems to contribute adversely to optempo.

Please let me know what you think.

DHR:dh
032601-17

May 29, 2001 2:18 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Andy Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Bases

Dov Zakheim's memo on joint bases is something that ought to be brought up in the QDR process, and possibly with the Chiefs, in the guidance.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/16/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef re: Joint Bases

DHR:dh
052901-31

323.3

29 May 01

INFO MEMO



May 16, 2001 15:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)



MAY 18 2001

SUBJECT: Joint Bases

- The OSD staff supports the idea of joint bases, because such bases eliminate duplication in facilities, particularly general use support facilities, and result in cost savings. The Services have consistently opposed joint facilities and bases, however.
- The congressional oversight committees have addressed this issue as well. The FY 2001 Military Construction appropriation report asks for a certification that a construction project is not suitable for joint use. Prior to OSD approval of a construction project, DoD regulations direct Service Assistant Secretaries to certify that a given project is suitable for joint use, and if not, to provide a reason why not.
- The OSD staff has tried to identify projects that appear to be compatible with joint use. For instance, OSD recommended eliminating funding for a gym at McGuire AFB because a gym existed at Fort Dix (which is contiguous to McGuire). The Air Force opposed the recommendation and prevailed. OSD unsuccessfully recommended consolidating the Army and Air Force into one SPACECOM building at Peterson AFB.
- The National Guard and Reserve support base consolidation. The Reserve Affairs office is proposing to set up a pot of money that the Services compete for on joint use projects.
- We should press ahead with this effort and, if possible, revisit decisions such as the McGuire gym.

COORDINATION: USD AT&L

Prepared By: (b)(6)

5/18
2:35pm

snowflake

May 3, 2001 4:32 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Joint Bases

We have to look at joint bases, where Services share a base rather than own them completely.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050301-26

11-L-0559/OSD/4011

01 May 021

May 29, 2001 8:41 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraq

Here is a piece that came from Richard Perle. Why don't you send it to whoever ought to get it. Until I get through this QDR process, I am going to have to leave Iraq to you.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/14/01 Feith Memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
052901-7

Iraq

29 May 01

May 14, 2001

2001 MAY 14 PM 1:23

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

From: Douglas J. Feith 

Richard Perle asked me to pass the attached piece to you. It is an excerpt from a lengthy essay (also attached) on Iraq by Reuel Marc Gerech from the May 14, 2001 *Weekly Standard*.

SIR -

My summary: Several pages of overheated rhetoric with a vaguely defined proposal for 2 U.S. divisions to occupy southern Iraq (at Tab.)

Very Resp'y -

Jerry

U09155*/01

Liberate Iraq

Is the Bush administration serious about toppling Saddam Hussein?

BY REUEL MARC GERECHT*

Excerpt:

The "Arab street" has turned against the United States because Saddam Hussein once again has the look of a winner. Always popular with influential writers and intellectuals in the Arab world for his fire-breathing rhetoric against the age-old Western enemy, Saddam has restored his hayba [i.e., power to intimidate] by surviving and increasing his strength. By contrast, he casts Muslim Arab rulers who too closely associate with America as quislings, not statesmen wisely dealing with an indomitable, foreign power.

Saddam, like other Arab dictators, has benefited enormously from the Muslim world's unhappy collision with the modern West. Triumphant for a thousand years, Muslims have now witnessed three-hundred years of unrelenting defeat. Unfortunately, the Arab Middle East easily takes solace in a ruthless despot who can intimidate America. The hundreds of thousands who have died because of Saddam's unceasing aggression vanish silently in the collective indignation of an embittered civilization. "There has been an implosion, a moral collapse in the Arab world," writes Kanan Makiya, the most eloquent of Iraqi dissidents. "The consequences of this collapse are going to remain with us for generations to come, no matter what happens in Iraq...and irrespective of whether or not the holy grail of an Arab-Israeli settlement is finally grasped."

The State Department's Near East Bureau and the Office of Policy Planning under the energetic "realist" Richard Haass do Secretary Powell a disservice when they generate analyses of the Middle East depicting

the United States forever on the seesaw of the Arab street. The "moral collapse" of which Makiya speaks can only be made worse by U.S. officials so solicitous of "Arab opinion." The United States must not try to win a popularity contest in the Arab world-the very act of doing so will make us appear weak. We will not grow stronger merely by reinvigorating sanctions; nor will Saddam grow weaker. If we are to protect ourselves and our friends in the Middle East, who are many, we have to rebuild the awe which we have lost through nearly a decade of retreat.

Sooner rather than later, we have to answer one question: Is Saddam Hussein a serious enough threat to the United States that he must be countered, if necessary with force of arms? If we believe that George Bush senior was right in 1990-that Saddam is a Middle Eastern Hitler destined to slaughter and wreak havoc in his region and beyond-then the answer is "yes," and we must be prepared to give battle. If the new Republican administration answers "yes," but then stutters-essentially the Clinton approach-it may make an even bigger mess in the Middle East than its predecessor.

The Clintonites tied themselves in knots trying to spin away from the undeniable facts about Saddam Hussein: that he is on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons, that he is a catastrophe waiting to happen, and that they lacked the will to stop him. "Ignore it" was their small-power policy, though the Clintonites tried to camouflage their indifference and weakness in a loud internationalism characterized by half-hearted military action. Whenever an opposing force had even so much firepower as the Haitian army, the administration dodged the fight-or bombed from 15,000 feet. Former Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott, the most intellectually serious Clintonite, felicitously described his administration's ever-cautious reflex as learning to live "with reality."

Now, if President Bush tries to find a middle ground between Clintonism and a fight, "reality" will quickly get the better of him. If he is tempted by what might be called "the French approach"- ease sanctions while publicly averring readiness to massively whack Saddam

the first moment the brute misbehaves - then the administration will truly put itself on a slippery slope. The Butcher of Baghdad will endlessly test our resolve, as he energetically advances his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Such a policy will be read (correctly) throughout the Middle East as another American retreat.

*Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former case officer in the CIA's clandestine service, is the director of the Middle East Initiative at the Project for The New American Century. He is the author, under the pseudonym Edward Shirley, of *Know thine Enemy: A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran*.

Liberate Iraq

Is the Bush administration serious about toppling Saddam Hussein?

BY REUEL MARC GERECHT

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, President Bush often compared Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler. In sophisticated American and European foreign policy circles, the allusion seemed overwrought—a historical malapropism from a president trying hard to rally his people.

After all, U.S. diplomats and spooks, not to mention businessmen and farmers, had established a certain rapport with Saddam's regime. His eight-year, half-a-trillion-dollar *guerre à outrance* with Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini had ended in 1988. Victorious but chastened, the ruler of Baghdad obviously wanted stable times to rebuild his country, or so these Americans asserted. He wanted to work with, not against, the United States, which had provided inestimable aid in satellite intelligence during the most critical war years. American oilmen were clogging every first-class Baghdad hotel, eager to show how they'd tap Iraq's immense, undeveloped energy resources. American "realists" were thus certain they'd found an Arab strongman with whom they could deal.

A decade after Desert Storm, those Republican "realists" have gone to ground, pretending, as did so many Clintonites about the Cold War, that they'd known all along the evil before them. President Bush's Hitlerian allusions—which, given Bush *père's* World War II past, were no doubt uttered sincerely—now seem apposite. America's one-hundred-hour Middle East war no longer appears so grand precisely because its end—conditional Iraqi surrender—betrayed the president's words, leaving in place an aggressive, vengeful, totalitarian ruler.

In the wake of two Gulf Wars, Saddam has devoured his country. The machine-gunning, bombing, and gassing of Kurds in the north; the obliteration of the Marsh Arabs in the south; the slaughter of other Shi'ites in the countrywide rebellion of March 1991; the intentionally random arrest, interrogation, torture, and murder of countless apolitical citizens; the routine, systematic rape of thousands of women of all classes, creeds, and tribes (turning shame into the ultimate political weapon against independence of body and mind)—all of these sins and more, against his own people and his neighbors, define Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath political party that formed him as accomplished, modern totalitarians.

Twice since 1980, Saddam has tried to dominate the Middle East by waging wars against neighbors that could have given him control of the region's oil wealth and the identity of the Arab world. He has unceasingly sought weapons of mass destruction, and will in all likelihood have a nuclear bomb within a few years. Who would like to bet that Saddam Hussein has spent hundreds of millions,

if not billions, of dollars on biological and chemical weapons *since* the Iran-Iraq War only to slaughter Kurds?

In 1990, the United States very nearly did not go to war because of Washington's fear of American casualties, which led many on the left and the right to find no irreconcilable conflict between U.S. national interests and Saddam's hunger for *Lebensraum*. Contrary to the common depiction of him as a mad hatter, Saddam acted in a perfectly rational manner when he ridiculed the resolve of Uncle Sam in 1990. Anyone who thinks this besmirches the old man should read the *Congressional Record* of that year. George Bush senior's greatest accomplishment as president was his success at pushing Congress and the equally queasy bureaucrats and soldiers of Washington, D.C., to back his fight in Mesopotamia. Once Saddam has his nuke—as he inevitably will if he stays in power—will Washington gird its loins again, even if Saddam has not lately invaded any neighbors?

Think smaller: If Baghdad's ruler finally downs one of our pilots who constantly fly over Iraq to enforce the no-fly zones, will the United States appease Baghdad to secure the pilot's release? American and British pilots have experienced a fivefold increase in the intensity of Iraqi anti-aircraft fire in the last four months. Saddam Hussein obviously thinks a captured pilot will redound to his advantage. Should he get one, a media circus would likely unfold, with CNN mixing features on the pilot's life with gripping stories about ordinary Iraqis' suffering under U.S. sanctions. Weeks of this coverage could easily distort policy planning deliberations in Washington, as hostage crises have done before. An excellent question inevitably comes to the fore: To what end are allied pilots risking their lives?

More broadly: Is the United States to hinge its Iraq policy on hope and luck—Saddam somehow dies an early death, and his regime, which has shredded the terms of its 1991 conditional surrender, is succeeded by a “realistic” one? Is active intervention—even preemptive military action—unthinkable for the United States, given the political establishment's fear and firm belief that the American people, not to mention the political elites themselves, no longer believe in a Pax Americana? In other words, were the Clintonites right?

In recent years, Republicans often attacked the Clinton administration's foreign policy for its ineptitude, weakness, and lack of vision. Saddam Hussein tried to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait in 1993; President Clinton in reprisal fired cruise missiles at an empty Iraqi building. Yet such superpower frivolousness was the product of a purposeful, consistent, and quite serious intellectual choice by President Clinton and his closest advisers: Above all, the United States would not again risk going to war in the Persian Gulf.

Once that decision had been made, everything else—the slow-motion evisceration of United Nations weapons inspections; the abandonment of the U.S.-supported opposition group the Iraqi National Congress; Washington's embrace of the lame coup attempt by the opposition group Iraqi National Accord; the collapse of the sanctions regime; the revival of anti-Americanism in the "Arab street"; the resurrection of Saddam Hussein as the great defender of the Muslim Middle East; the mantra, repeated ever more emphatically by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, that Saddam was trapped "in a box" (which, of course, any oil analyst or Jordanian taxi driver could have told her was nonsense); and the increasingly pro-Iraqi attitudes of Paris, Moscow, and Beijing—all this became inevitable.

Totalitarians have a sixth sense for democratic weakness. A carnivore, Saddam Hussein probably knew early on (a good guess would be June 1993, when President Clinton cruise-missiled the empty intelligence headquarters) that Washington had no will to fight. By August 1996, when the United States failed to use its airpower to defend the Iraqi National Congress's lightly armed forces against Baghdad's mechanized brigades, there was no doubt.

America's *hayba-its* ability to inspire awe, the critical factor in the Middle East's ruthless power politics—had vanished. And once *h a y b a* is lost, only a demonstration of indomitable force restores it. A U.S. election, followed by President George W. Bush's slightly bigger bombing run over Iraq on February 16, doesn't cut it after years of pointless raids accompanied by American braggadocio.

President Bush's choice for secretary of state, Colin Powell, further complicates the situation. The Iraqis know well that General Powell fought hard against President Bush's decision to go to war in 1990. Once engaged, he famously promised to "kill" the Iraqi Republican Guards—Saddam's praetorians—and then didn't. As secretary of state, he quickly voyaged to the Middle East to solicit very publicly the opinion of former Arab "partners" in the Gulf War coalition, telling all that Washington was after "smarter" (read fewer) sanctions. He made appeals for renewed U.N. weapons inspections without making ironclad military threats to reinforce America's determination to search Iraqi installations.

In other words, the general sent a signal that the Bush administration was retreating. With one trip, Powell unintentionally dissipated the tougher-than-Clinton aura of George Bush II in the dynastically minded Middle East. He provoked memories of Warren Christopher.

Intellectually honest, Secretary Powell knows that the principal reason he was in favor of sanctions in 1990 was that he feared war more than he feared Saddam Hussein. But does anyone today doubt that the war needed to be fought? Does anyone seriously believe that sanctions would have rolled Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait a decade ago? Does anyone really believe that sanctions today, no matter how much you increase their IQ, will prevent Saddam from acting for a third time

on his dreams of a new Babylonian empire? Can anyone seriously contend, in an age of rapid proliferation, that Saddam Hussein's megalomania and quest for vengeance will not send shock waves well beyond Tel Aviv?

Nonetheless, one can easily appreciate the State Department's distaste for the sanctions regime. Sanctions don't weaken the merciless hold Saddam Hussein has over his people. They make daily diplomacy—delivering *démarches*, which are increasingly derided and ignored—unpleasant and embarrassing. But lightening and (in theory) tightening sanctions doesn't, of course, reverse their effects. Saddam Hussein isn't strong because his people are poor. He was strong when they were rich. As Adolf Hitler knew well, totalitarians need not fear affluence.

And Saddam can, if he wants, alleviate the suffering of his people. He has more than enough oil money to do so. The sanctions are debilitating to the common man primarily because Saddam wishes it so. Arab leaders have moved away from the United States not because their hearts and souls bleed for the Iraqi people, nor because they truly fear "popular opinion" or riots in sympathy with the "America-oppressed" Iraqis. The denizens of Cairo may riot over the price of bread; if they riot over Iraq, it is because their leaders have told them to do so.

The "Arab street" has turned against the United States because Saddam Hussein once again has the look of a winner. Always popular with influential writers and intellectuals in the Arab world for his fire-breathing rhetoric against the age-old Western enemy, Saddam has restored his *hayba* by surviving and increasing his strength. By contrast, he casts Muslim Arab rulers who too closely associate with America as quislings, not statesmen wisely dealing with an indomitable, foreign power.

Saddam, like other Arab dictators, has benefited enormously from the Muslim world's unhappy collision with the modern West. Triumphant for a thousand years, Muslims have now witnessed three-hundred years of unrelenting defeat. Unfortunately, the Arab Middle East easily takes solace in a ruthless despot who can intimidate America. The hundreds of thousands who have died because of Saddam's unceasing aggression vanish silently in the collective indignation of an embittered civilization. "There has been an implosion, a moral collapse in the Arab world," writes Kanan Makiya, the most eloquent of Iraqi dissidents. "The consequences of this collapse are going to remain with us for generations to come, no matter what happens in Iraq...and irrespective of whether or not the holy grail of an Arab-Israeli settlement is finally grasped."

The State Department's Near East Bureau and the Office of Policy Planning under the energetic "realist" Richard Haass do Secretary Powell a disservice when they generate analyses of the Middle East depicting the United States forever on the seesaw of the Arab street. The "moral collapse" of which Makiya speaks can only be made worse by U.S. officials so solicitous of "Arab opinion." The United States must not try to win a popularity contest in the Arab world—the very act of doing

so will make us appear weak. We will not grow stronger merely by reinvigorating sanctions; nor will Saddam grow weaker. If we are to protect ourselves and our friends in the Middle East, who are many, we have to rebuild the awe which we have lost through nearly a decade of retreat.

Sooner rather than later, we have to answer one question: Is Saddam Hussein a serious enough threat to the United States that he must be countered, if necessary with force of arms? If we believe that George Bush senior was right in 1990—that Saddam is a Middle Eastern Hitler destined to slaughter and wreak havoc in his region and beyond—then the answer is “yes,” and we must be prepared to give battle. If the new Republican administration answers “yes,” but then stutters—essentially the Clinton approach—it may make an even bigger mess in the Middle East than its predecessor.

The Clintonites tied themselves in knots trying to spin away from the undeniable facts about Saddam Hussein: that he is on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons, that he is a catastrophe waiting to happen, and that they lacked the will to stop him. “Ignore it” was their small-power policy, though the Clintonites tried to camouflage their indifference and weakness in a loud internationalism characterized by half-hearted military action. Whenever an opposing force had even so much firepower as the Haitian army, the administration dodged the fight—or bombed from 15,000 feet. Former Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott, the most intellectually serious Clintonite, felicitously described his administration’s ever-cautious reflex as learning to live “with reality.”

Now, if President Bush tries to find a middle ground between Clintonism and a fight, “reality” will quickly get the better of him. If he is tempted by what might be called “the French approach”—ease sanctions while publicly averring readiness to massively whack Saddam the first moment the brute misbehaves—then the administration will truly put itself on a slippery slope. The Butcher of Baghdad will endlessly test our resolve, as he energetically advances his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Such a policy will be read (correctly) throughout the Middle East as another American retreat.

But it is also possible that President Bush will make up his mind to fight. If he does, the tactical questions will become clearer. We will see first and foremost the indispensable and primary role of a U.S.-supported Iraqi opposition. We will also be thankful that Ahmad Chalabi, the chief voice of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), hasn’t given up and retired to a life of ease in London.

We need to be frank, however, about one thing right from the beginning: A U.S.-armed Iraqi opposition cannot relieve the United States of the cost and responsibility once again of fielding its own troops in Iraq. Critics of the INC like to point out that supporting the Iraqi opposition is no free lunch. They are right to do so. Chalabi may be forgiven for suggesting that Iraq can be liberated at little cost to the American taxpayer, but it is unwise for his Western supporters to gloss

over the unavoidable costs of deposing Saddam. Republicans who think that America can be tough, cheap, and out of harm's way delude themselves.

One of those costs would be the deployment of U.S. soldiers. To refuse to send large numbers of them would clearly signal that the United States still wasn't serious. For the opposition to have legitimacy and *hayba* in Iraqi eyes, U.S. ground forces would have to be deployed in the south to seize and protect zones under U.S.-opposition control. That alone would quickly transform Iraq's political landscape. We must shatter the bonds of fear that are the primary glue holding Saddam's totalitarian society together. U.S. ground troops are the key to instigating insurrection against the Ba'ath party.

And ground troops would also be a military necessity. Combined U.S.-opposition military operations would be inevitable. American helicopter gunships—essential for neutralizing Baghdad's armor—don't go anywhere without mechanized foot soldiers to back them up. American foot-soldiers don't go anywhere in significant numbers without tanks in front of them. At minimum, two divisions—roughly 50,000 troops—would probably be needed in the beginning. Given the U.S. military's doctrine of overwhelming force—more Field Marshal Montgomery than General Patton—the Army would likely press for far more, even though Saddam would be wary of concentrating an equivalent force given U.S. tactical airpower and the desert terrain.

Saddam Hussein would, however, go after any INC-U.S. forces in the south of the country immediately and tenaciously. Southern Iraq, unlike Kurdistan in the north, is the heartland, which is where the United States and the INC would have to strike. Saddam could not allow his enemies to shear off this part of the country, which is rich in oil. And we would want Saddam to throw heavily armed troops into the battle as quickly as possible. American soldiers would have to be there in sufficient numbers to ensure that the first and most important confrontation sent a shock wave through Baghdad. And when U.S. and INC forces found weakness, or strength, in the Iraqi lines, U.S. ground forces would have to move forward with the opposition. To do otherwise would immediately signal that American support was tentative and reversible. As Saddam brilliantly demonstrated in his squashing of the nationwide rebellion in 1991, he knows the psychology of his country. He would assiduously exploit any ebbing of our effort.

Yet unlike Ayatollah Khomeini and other great chiliastic leaders in Islamic history, Saddam Hussein doesn't inspire death-wish believers. Fear is the principal undergirding of his tyranny. When it vanishes, as it did so explosively throughout the country when Saddam retreated from Kuwait, the Ba'ath police-state overnight becomes a house of cards. Far fewer Iraqis and Americans would die in a U.S.-opposition campaign if the United States engaged as forcefully and as quickly as possible. We wouldn't want to allow Saddam a chance to regain his balance once his regime started to totter. Unlike in 1991, Washington would need to aid vigorously Iraqis who chose to rebel, anywhere in the country.

Contrary to many critics' claims, the opposition's forces would likely have significant military and intelligence value; indeed, they would probably demonstrate quite quickly that they could rout superior forces when backed up by U.S. airpower and an evident American determination to annihilate Saddam. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers would likely answer the opposition's call to change sides and fight. Yet it is impossible now to design realistic battle plans for opposition forces since Washington hasn't decided on the nature of its own involvement. After the debacle of August 1996, when the Clinton administration failed to provide air support to the INC, Iraqis will be loath to put the cart before the horse. For the opposition, manpower and tactics are inextricably tied to America's willingness to commit.

Whatever the military role of the opposition, however, its most critical function would be spiritually to gut Iraq's totalitarian system by creating a pool of men, an organization, and a cooperative ethic to fill the void as the regime fell. Like the forces of the Free French and the *R&stance* in World War II, the Iraqi opposition would carry the burden of the country's honor. The people of Iraq have been woefully compromised by decades of totalitarian rule. The blood of the Iraqi opposition could give the whole country a much-needed moral reference point.

Even so, Iraq's fissiparous inclinations might well come to the fore. Apart from Israel, and maybe Egypt and Iran, the Middle East has no real nation-state. Once freed of Saddam, Iraq will need an institution, untouched by the Ba'ath, through which its diverse people can begin to restore communal ties and reconstruct a national identity. Given the savage police-state they have endured, reestablishing even minimal trust among communities will be extraordinarily difficult. Yet Saddam's and the Ba'ath's indescribable brutality has given all Iraqis a common denominator. We may hope that their experience with barbarism has sharpened their desire to find compromises short of killing.

In January 1999, *Foreign Affairs* published a high-profile attack on the INC, "Can Saddam Be Toppled?" by Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Gideon Rose. It left the impression that Ahmad Chalabi is definitely not the man to lead the opposition, let alone the nation, out of the totalitarian abyss, portraying him as an ineffectual leader, devoid of the eminence necessary to draw disparate Iraqis together. Yet Chalabi may be ideal for the task, for the very reasons that often cause critics to trash him. He is rich, upper class (in the old-world sense), well educated, highly Westernized, an expatriate, and, last but not least, a Shi'ite Arab.

Sunni Arabs are very much an Iraqi minority. They represent no more than 30 percent of the population, probably closer to 20 percent. Shi'ite Arabs are at least 60 percent of the people, perhaps even 70 percent. (Sunni Kurds are the majority of what is left.) The Iraqi army, too, is majority Shi'ite. The officer corps probably isn't; the elite units certainly are not.

Yet this perspective is relevant only if one is trying to instigate a coup within Saddam's inner circle. But a coup against Saddam is an addle-headed idea, as the men involved in the CIA-engineered Iraqi National Accord coup attempt could testify, if they were still alive. Coups against totalitarian regimes can't work. Even if Saddam were to fall to an assassin's bullet or a praetorian insurrection, he would only be succeeded by a Ba'athi Himmler or Göring.

If Iraq is ever to escape its vicious past, its politics must start to reflect the mosaic of its people. Continued Sunni Arab dominance of government is a recipe for Lebanese-style disaster. The Sunni Arab community needs to know that the Shi'ites are not going to massacre them for their privileges within the Ba'athi system—this is an article of faith with Chalabi, who has a profound understanding of Iraq's messy history—but they must also know that the Sunni Arab power structure, as it exists under Saddam Hussein, will end.

This might not be as convulsive as it sounds. Sunni Arabs have suffered horribly under Saddam's reign of terror. For years, their women too have been raped. Chalabi, because he is an outsider and a member of an old, prominent family that reaches back before Iraq descended into its Ba'athi nightmare, can appeal to the nostalgia one senses throughout the Arab world for a time when civilized men did not slaughter each other.

Sunni-Shi'ite problems are no doubt in Iraq's future, but the possibility of Iraqi democracy must not be jettisoned for the illusion that there is any cheap, quick, Sunni-officer-delivered escape from the need to extirpate the Ba'ath. We must not deny the democratic chance for fear of an Iraqi-Iranian Shi'ite collusion upsetting the balance of power in the Middle East. This kind of fraternity between Iraqi and Iranian Shi'ites simply does not exist—except in the minds of Republican "realists" who tragically used this argument a decade ago.

We don't know for sure how good a national leader Chalabi would be. An observant Muslim, he has the old patrician Arab ability to speak across perhaps the most important socio-religious dividing line—between traditionalists and moderns. But we can't finally assess Chalabi's gravitas until the White House backs him on the battlefield, in Congress, and before Washington's foreign-affairs, defense, and intelligence bureaucracies.

Anyone who has met him knows that Chalabi has presence, but the critical factor for his leadership would be America's support. Once Chalabi was chosen by us, everyone else—the Kurds, the Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs, the Turks, Iranians, Kuwaitis, and Saudis—would view him in an entirely new light. It is astonishing that Byman, Pollack, and Rose, and those who echo their views in the U.S. government, favor trolling for new leadership among the many factions of the Iraqi opposition—in effect, turning the principle of divide and conquer against us. Their assertion that Chalabi has been a feckless leader of the opposition is bizarre given the Clinton administration's unflagging efforts to undermine him. Ever

since August 1996, when national security adviser Anthony Lake surreally declared Saddam Hussein's rout of the U.S.-supported INC to be irrelevant to America's position in the Middle East, besmirching Chalabi, who refused to go quietly, has been a logical necessity.

Chalabi's perseverance in the face of so much executive-branch flak ought to incline us strongly in his favor. And he has already shown that he can be an adequate leader. Under very adverse circumstances, and with considerable resistance from Washington, Chalabi organized successful military operations in northern Iraq in 1995 and 1996. These weren't major battles against Republican Guard shock troops, but that Chalabi was able to move the INC into combat at all, with only haphazard assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency, is impressive.

Chalabi also established his own intelligence service, which dwarfed the reach and understanding of the CIA's clandestine service. One of the principal reasons the clandestine service's Near East Division loathes Chalabi is that he tried to warn Langley that its coup d'état plans with the Iraqi National Accord—an opposition group that supposedly had cells within elite units of the Iraqi Army—had been thoroughly penetrated by Saddam. The INC, which wasn't supposed to be privy to the existence of the coup attempt, detailed quite accurately the trap Saddam was springing. The notorious "Bob," an intrepid, talented CIA case officer stationed in northern Iraq, believed the INC's information and tried to warn headquarters to begin immediately testing its INA assets for doubles. Langley refused. When Saddam tore the INA scheme apart, Chalabi became one of Langley's least favorite people.

Chalabi's acute grasp of the American scene—he went to MIT and the University of Chicago and has many influential friends in the worlds of finance, politics, and the press—also has not endeared him to bureaucratic Washington, which naturally prefers dependent foreigners ignorant of the real corridors of power. When the going gets tough in Iraq, as it surely will if there is war, we will be thankful that Chalabi can discuss in nuanced English the complexities of the situation on the ground. If we had to depend on the CIA's intelligence resources, our understanding would be thinner, our approach much more likely to be wrong.

And Chalabi is unquestionably pro-American, in a deep, philosophical sense, which is rare among Middle Easterners, particularly expatriates. There appears to be little rancor in the man, which there certainly could be given the number of his people who died in the summer of 1996 owing to American tergiversation.

Anonymous U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers have repeatedly labeled Chalabi via the press as corrupt, suggesting that he cares more about personal profit than anything else. A banker in Jordan in the 1970s, Chalabi is rumored to have stolen millions from his Petra bank. The rumors are probably unfounded, the product of Chalabi's being on the losing side in Hashemite-Jordanian-Palestinian

financial squabbles. He made enemies among influential Jordanians closely tied to Palestinian banking circles, which have a near monopoly over Jordan's commerce.

But even if the rumors are true, so what? Chalabi hasn't been trying for the last eight years to become the CEO of KPMG. He hasn't watched friends die because money is the center of his life. If Chalabi weren't rich, he couldn't devote so much time and money to the fight against Saddam Hussein. One would think that George Tenet's CIA, which has probably been at the root of most of the attacks on Chalabi, would know well that good, even noble, men can take money. In the Middle East, there are much deadlier sins than greed.

The pettiness of so much of the Washington discussion about the INC is not really a reflection of the personal dynamics between Chalabi and this State Department aide or that intelligence official; it's just the trickle-down effect of the Clinton administration's decision not to fight in Iraq. The constancy of bureaucracy has now produced careless bad-mouthing from the Bush administration.

President Bush will soon have to answer for himself the primary question about Saddam Hussein. If he answers that Saddam must go, a firestorm of criticism surely awaits him. The pummeling that Ronald Reagan took for fielding the contras may well seem like a walk through a spring rain compared with the barrage that will come at Bush from the timid Left and the "realist" Right. The State Department, CIA, and Pentagon will likely resist, as they resisted in 1990, doing anything that might upset the status quo, which is to say they will favor doing nothing. Most of our allies overseas will surely scream that the *hyper-puissance* has run amok.

And if President Bush doesn't answer with an unqualified "Saddam must go," then it would be a good time for the Republicans to apologize to the Clintonites. They won't, of course.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former case officer in the CIA's clandestine service, is the director of the Middle East Initiative at the Project for The New American Century. He is the author, under the pseudonym Edward Shirley, of Know thine Enemy: A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran,

TO: Mark Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

Here are some thoughts. I don't know if you want to put all of this in the testimony, but it sure is how I feel.

DHR/azn
052901.35
Attach. (Memo - 5/22/01)

381

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MEMORANDUM

5/22/01

We have an armed force that is the finest in the world.

But in all honesty, we must confess that it is characterized by:

Pay and benefits not competitive with the private sector;

Housing and working facilities that have been neglected into serious states of disrepair;

An aging aircraft fleet;

A funding system dependent on **supplementals** that causes uncertainties and shortages during much of each year;

An operations tempo that causes demands beyond capabilities;

A readiness system that announces to the men and women in the armed services that the process is sufficiently antiquated that it can't be fashioned to assure that they are properly trained, equipped and ready for the assignments they will be asked to undertake;

A process that attracts people in, then moves them from assignment to assignment, disrupting their lives and moving at a pace that is harmful to development and capability;

A personnel process that pushes people out while they are still in the prime of their careers;

A pay and compensation system that is so rigid that it can't offer a range of options for the men and women in the armed services as is the case in most successful enterprises;

A ship building pacing that all can see will reduce the US. Navy to 275 and lower in the years ahead unless it is properly funded.

A set of restrictions and prohibitions that results in an the acquisition system that produces weapons systems with technologies one or two generations old;

A financial reporting system that can't track or provide the financial information necessary for managers to manage.

Security clearance process with a backlog of some 100-200,000 clearances.

I mention all of this with the hope that we can at least agree with the **first** principle. The first principle being that **DoD** is at the minimum imperfect and more accurately, it is in many respects, wrapped around its anchor chain. There isn't any reason why **DoD** can't be fixed. It can be. But it can only be fixed if there is agreement that it needs to be fixed and there is a partnership between Congress and the Executive branch in setting about to fix it.

Everyone who has asked me what's the biggest difference between today and 25 years ago, The answer is distrust between the Congress and the Department.

Why else would there be 2,000 to 2,500 contacts between the Department and the Congress every week?

Why else would there be requirements for 950 some reports from the Department to the Congress every year?

Why else would the Defense authorization bill have grown from 50+ pages to 900+ pages in the past period of years?

Why else would the Department be required to have some 24,000 auditors and inspector generals to monitor its work, which amounts to roughly the same number of shooters the U.S. Army could field at any given time.

I mention these things not to be critical of anyone but simply to state facts. It is my conviction after several months on the job that the DoD has very serious problems in managing and functioning. The system is harmful to the men and women in the armed forces who voluntarily risk their lives for their country, It is difficult to explain to young men and young women who come in to serve their country, not for fame, not for reward, not for place, not because they were conscripted, but simply because they want to serve and are willing to accept the risks and the hardships.

If we can at least agree, and I have heard a number of the members on this Committee and on its corresponding committee in the other body, express similar concerns. Then we can get about the business of figuring together what we can do about it.

If on the other hand there are members who believe that things are OK, that the Defense Department is not wrapped around its anchor chain, and that the way we are doing business is OK, then before we go on we need to resolve that issue.

DHR/azn
052101.66

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Adm. Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT: **Wood Paper**

Take a look at this paper from Lowell Wood, but don't circulate it around.

There may be some pieces of it that should be extracted and given to some people. Why don't you see what you think you would do to it and how you would **parce** it out, and then let me see it before you do it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.25

Attach. (Wood ~ Great 1st 100 days)

020 SD

29 May 01

U10136 /01

c Lonell West

GREAT FIRST 100 DAYS. You've done just about everything nearly perfectly in your first 100 days – as the screams-&-howlings from the forces of reaction make abundantly clear. All citizens who wish the Republic well are already greatly in your debt, simply because you're trying to **fix** (rather than blink away) deeply embedded – but eventually exceedingly costly – problems arising from America's "too many victories, over too many years" syndrome.

However, the easier first-half of your **first** 'modern' budget cycle is now drawing to a close – ~~Swiftly~~ Smart Money's betting that you're about to get "chopped finer than cat-food", as you present your overarching plans, your '01 supplemental and your '02 budget amendment on the Hill. They're ready-and-waiting for you, and moreover are **exceedingly** experienced in what they're about to do. [Also, they've got 10 **loyal-and-primed-for-action** staffers for every one that you *actually* have.] You're doomed to not only lose, but be publicly humiliated in the process . . . unless you decide very soon that you're going to do what it takes to win.,

[It's not that they hate you – many sound to me in private like they really respect you, though entirely in the abstract, for what you're trying to do. It's just that you threaten to significantly modify a highly intricate, extensively arranged/negotiated and **fiercely**-defended \$300 B/year network of cash-flows, so that there's literally millions of folks – and thousands of lobbyists – who feel deeply uneasy (at best) about *whatever* major changes that you may cause to occur. "The sorrow and the pity" of this whole business is that, if someone of your protean capabilities fails, moreover in the present rather halcyon circumstances, no SecDef will try again to do any significant fraction of what you're attempting for another quarter-century, until the institutional memory of your catastrophe has died away,]

WINNING ON THE HILL. As I already related, the key to a SecDef winning on the Hill in these benighted times is for him to obtain, hold & wield a credible threat of (any number required of) Presidential vetoes of Congressional Defense bills – primarily Authorization Acts, but (as may be necessary) Appropriations ones, as well.

The Congress **must** fund the payroll and day-to-day operations of the Armed Forces, and they must do so by the end of the second week of October (in order to meet the biweekly payroll for all of the enlisted men, many of the civilian DoD work-force, etc.). In order to do this, they must have the President's signature on a Defense Appropriations Act (or a Continuing Resolution respecting DOD's budget), In order to get this – as a practical matter, in a Congress whose House has 224 Republicans facing voters 17 months hence with their Party's leader sitting as President **and** not facing the electorate with them – they've got to send Acts to the President that he's willing to sign into law (or to allow to become law, by 10 legislative days elapsing without his returning the Act in question to them with his objections – Constitutionese for "veto").

Now, ancient tradition permits a President to demand "clean" Appropriations Acts from the Congress – simple, spartan specifications of funds made available from the Treasury

to a particular Cabinet Secretary, for a particular basic USG function – uncluttered by essentially any conditions, with the exception of an Act-initializing “**Subject to authorization**” clause, which authorization however must be the subject of a separate-&-distinct Defense Authorization Act. The President’s legislative liaison and OMB people – if they are properly instructed – will simply tell the Defense Appropriations Conference that the President demands a “clean” Appropriations Act, or he’ll keep returning it too them until they provide such, thundering each time from his bully pulpit that he must have such ‘cleanliness’ from the (then-increasingly desperate) Congress. He’ll win *swiftly* and inexorably in any such confrontation -- which is thus highly unlikely to occur. [Indeed, the Congress has passed such ‘clean’ Defense Appropriations Acts twice in the past 6 years, with no accompanying Authorization Act yet in place to direct how the funds so appropriated are to be spent(!)]

The Congress then has to pass a Defense Authorization Act – to constrain a SecDef who already has the money-in-hand. [Any money which you can spend between Presidential signatures on an Appropriation that precedes the corresponding Authorization is entirely unconstrained by this Authorization!] Needless to say, the President and his SecDef hold all the trumps in the negotiations regarding the terms-and-conditions of this belated Authorization Act -- as Bill Clinton and his people taught *the Congress repeatedly* during the past 6 years. Moreover, the President-&-SecDef hold nearly as commanding position when negotiating the Defense Authorization Act’s contents before an Appropriations Act is passed (as the Authorization Conference’s senior Members recognize that the Appropriators assuredly will act in a timely manner in order to get the required **funds-in-place** before early October, at which point the Authorization Conference’s **timewise-dwindling** negotiating leverage with the President-&-SecDef evaporates completely).

All that you need to do to guarantee your winning, then, is to secure a binding commitment from the President to “object” to any-&-all Defense Acts coming his way, unless they have your “recommendation that he sign them” If YOU have this, victory in the upcoming monumental head-butting will assuredly be yours: if you don’t, you will defznitively fail. [Furthermore, the sooner you get this, the more peaceful the year of the budget cycle will be for *everyone* concerned – as minimal ‘face’ will be lost by anyone.]

You, Don, are presently in a near-perfect position to elicit such a decisive commitment from your Boss. The President has yet to feel any real pressure re your initiatives, as he’s not been required to start paying the political prices of your boldness. Much more crucially (and my apologies-in-advance for wandering into your personal affairs), you are about to make (or so it seems, from press accounts) a huge personal financial sacrifice in order to meet your already once-deferred confirmation commitments to the Senate re your somehow liquidating highly illiquid long-term personal investments. Thus, you’re now in a splendid position to speak privately to a President who also is personally wealthy through his own efforts, saying words to the effect of, “*Sir, I’m about to drop a third of my personal worth in order to continue to serve you as SecDef, and I’ve now got my head stuck into a loaded cannon in this capacity – simply for carrying out your policies, just as we’ve agreed. I know that you ‘ll agree that it’s completely unreasonable for me to **take first** a huge financial beating and soon thereafter a **definitive***

*political one. If you can't assure me that you'll stand by me with as many vetoes as may be required as I carry out your policy guidance and implement the Bush Defense Reforms and the Bush National Security Policy, then it's now time for me to bow out gracefully, while my fortune and honor are still intact. Thus, if you want me to keep working for you, you need to let everyone know – and know quite soon and very clearly -- that you'll surely veto any-&-all Congressional Acts respecting national security for as long as I'm SecDef, unless I explicitly and formally recommend approval to you on each occasion. I need your decision and your commitment on this fundamental issue now, as our plans and budgets are about to go to the Hill **and** I'm about to throw away a third of what I've worked a lifetime to earn in order to **fight for you.**”*

Moreover, it's said that “It takes a crisis to get anything done in this town,” and the impending reorganization of the Senate to give you Carl Levin as your Authorizing Committee Chairman, Joe **Biden** at Foreign Affairs and Tom Daschle as Majority Leader is surely ample crisis to enable you to speak this candidly to a President whose **post-**inauguration honeymoon now is abruptly over.

If you get this commitment from the President, your Secretaryship will assuredly be a historic one. If you don't, you'll likely be compromised – early **and** often – into unceasing frustration and eventual insignificance. [It's not easy to find words to readily convey how tough, experienced, tenacious and sharp is Carl Levin in pursuing his agenda – which **assuredly** isn't yours-&-mine.]

DOING MISSILE DEFENSE. Fixing BMDO. I'm sorry that we don't yet agree on the issue of how well the current structure, staff and management of BMDO is likely to serve your purposes. **BMDO** is a modest part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense – but it's a crucial one, as missile defense is a ‘signature item’ of your Secretaryship, as well as of the entire Bush II Administration.

It's not just that General Kadish is already overlong in his position, **or** that he's ill-suited for **this** post in **this** Administration (though an outstanding choice for it in the **Clinton-Gore** Administration – the Building's System **always** serves up 3-stars exactly to political specifications, in my 35 years of observation), **or** that BMDO is almost completely staffed with time-servers who can't get jobs elsewhere, **or** that its basic structure and organizational habits/culture are profoundly maladapted to your present plans and **near-**term goals, **or** that this entire operation aged gracelessly after heavy feeding in **Reagan-Bush** followed by programmatic starvation in the Clinton **interregnum**, **or** that everyone in DC knows how a **SecDef** signals his personal interest in a matter and that you're giving **all** the contrary signals in this matter – it's all of these taken together, **and** much more.

[For the record, I've had **precisely** zero interaction personally with the Kadish BMDO, except for 75 minutes I spent with Kadish and his deputy, upon Steve's motion, several weeks ago. What I know about him-&-his comes from silent-but-close observation of the operations of BMDO and its prime contractors, and unsolicited information from BMDO

and cognizant OSD staff-in-place. I have no axe to grind here, except in the National interest.]

One of your successors-&-predecessors, Les **Aspin**, didn't hesitate to signal unequivocally his Administration's new policies re missile defense by completely re-doing **SDIO** -- even to the point of changing its name -- including re-staffing its upper levels nearly entirely and canceling outright or downscoping by at least **5-fold all** of its major programs except for the low-capability theater ones. Moreover, he did it all personally, in an *ad hoc* press conference held in early May 1993. Your missile **defense**-related organizational actions, by comparison with Les's, are tentative, timorous, diminutive and delayed. This lack-of-message from the new **SecDef** to **the Building** is a resounding message to everyone.

The single most fundamental critique of your present stance re **BMDO** is summarized in the Scriptural admonition, "***Only a fool puts new wine into old wineskins.***" [No disrespect intended.]

Missile Defense Organizational Options. I suggest that you have three basic options re missile defense, organizationally. You can do a top-to-bottom make-over of **BMDO** (the Les **Aspin** approach, re killing Bush I **GPALS**), you can give it to the Army to continue to do **THAAD** and **Patriot** (and **MEADS**?) and simultaneously start up a brand-new operation to execute your Administration's new missile defense policies (the Cap Weinberger approach re **SDI**), or you can "go black" and do it all covertly-&-quickly (the Harold Brown approach, re **stealth**). All of these options are available to you immediately -- you need no enabling approvals from anyone.

The 'black' option comes in two, highly distinctive flavors. The first is a standard Special Access Program (**SAP**), the entire collection of which is overseen by a standing OSD committee now chaired by Paul. This is the way **stealth** was done, with quite restricted but still strikingly comprehensive Congressional oversight, annual appropriations for many years into the 'black' annex of **DoD's** budget, etc. The second is an intelligence-directed effort, usually of somewhat shorter duration and more modest total budget, which is far more cloistered in all respects; one of the most famous examples was the **CIA's** raising of the sunken Soviet attack sub off of Hawaii in the '70s (**Project Jennifer**).

An 'Utter Black' Space Operations Program -- With An Emergency Missile Defense Adjunct. It's presently feasible to create, in a black program of this second type, a set (50-500) of small spacecraft directed to providing most, though possibly not all, of the national security functions sketched in the Rumsfeld II Commission Report, including just about all of the near-term intelligence ones. If appropriately designed, these could be transformed in seconds (moreover, reversibly) into a highly-effective, world-wide missile defense system in time of emergency, by simply uploading new software. [This option was sketched in a little detail in the thinner of the two January 2001 briefing documents that I gave you as we parted.]

You would be eminently justified in spending *a few percent* of the ~\$30 B of Intelligence funds appropriated to you each year for the creation of such a system, simply because of the large set of space-type intelligence functions that it would perform capably. The missile defense capabilities would be essentially free – a ‘bonus’ for *intelligently* creating general-purpose space surveillance-&-monitoring capabilities. [The cost of the software to confer and test-exercise the missile defense adjunct capabilities would be negligible – of the order of \$10 M.]

This route would permit you to bring missile defenses of high-capacity and world-wide scope into being – and, if you wished, even to *exercise* such defensive capabilities covertly. [Bear in mind that hit-to-kill missile defense, especially in boost phase, looks from a distance just like a severe rocket-booster malfunction – and military **missile-launch** systems never carry telemetry to enable *anyone* to question such a diagnosis.] If substantial importance, this program’s covert nature, remarkably low cost and advanced technological character would forestall essentially all complications from the Hill – only **very** few Congressional folks would have to know of its existence during the brief (2-3 year) duration of the primary program, and no *one would need to know of its adjunct capabilities.*

Shared Missile Defenses. The just-now altered character of the Hill may motivate a basic shift in the political calculus with respect to bringing ‘everyone else’ on-board re deployment of missile defenses. It may be deemed overall cost-effective, e.g., at the level of Principals of the National Security Council, to offer to share ownership/operation of globally-effective (i.e., space-based), limited-scale missile defenses with every nation meeting certain minimal political requirements, along the lines of the brief discussion about this particular matter which you led a year ago in your loft-office. [After all, *our supreme National interests currently lie not in being able to execute a limited ballistic missile strike on anyone, but in being able to prevent anyone from being able to do so on us. Any way in which we can attain to this state-of-affairs should be seriously considered.*]

An amusing aspect of such shared ownership would be the exceedingly low dollar cost-to-the-U.S. of such a system. Indeed, Gen. John Piotrowski, the USCINCSpace during most of the Bush I Administration and a highly-experienced soldier-diplomat, remarked to me that he was completely confident that he could “pass the hat” **among** the Allies and raise the entire \$11 B life-cycle cost of the Global Defense portion of the Bush I GPALS system, simply because of the defense that would thereby be afforded to the NATO and ANZUS nations that he would solicit. [This general topic of shared operation and/or ownership of a globally-effective missile defense system is explored in the oldest of the three briefing documents which I handed you.]

Indeed, *our basic National military strategy must be to devalue as swiftly as completely as ever possible that weaponry in which potential adversaries can compete with us, and to emphasize that weaponry on which we can maintain a ‘proprietary lock.’* [You, as a senior magnate of the pharmaceutical sector, obviously appreciate keenly the importance of gently-but-firmly guiding the market to forsake those corporate products coming off-

patent in favor of those for which one's company enjoys an enduring monopoly. Simply put, we now want everyone to throw away those soon-to-be-impotent-&-obsolete old ballistic missiles whose ownership has recently come into the reach of far too many nations and to commence to engage precision-target weaponry that moreover is **sourced-and-directed** from afar. Global-scope missile defense with which everyone is **more-or-less** happy moves **precisely** in this direction: **the force d'frappe** and the British Tridents, but our European friends get the Chinese CSS-4s that are **boresight-targeted** on most of their capitals negated in this Grand Bargain – along with all the coming-soon 'traffic' from the Third World thugs to the south and east of them.]

KUDOS RE POLICY STAFFING. You're doing a truly fabulous job in staffing your Policy shop, an item that I'm afraid I may have not noted sufficiently when we spoke.

A top-notch Policy operation is essential for any Defense Secretariat to engage effectively the rest of the Government, to say nothing of the rest of the planet – and you're now most of the way to having just this. Great work!

Unfortunately, however, "Faith without works is dead," and the great minds in Policy must be close-coupled to great arms-and-hands in Acquisition to create and supply modern weaponry in a timely and cost-efficient manner to the Services, which brings us to the next topic.. .

REFORMING ACQUISITION. I'd like to be comparably enthusiastic about what's happening in Acquisition – but, for now, "the sound of one hand clapping" is the best I can muster. I've seen too many well-omened 'Acquisition reform' efforts come to naught over the past third-century – and the present one isn't even all that well-omened. As with so many other seeming governmental failures, Defense Acquisition, has been carefully designed and meticulously created-&-re-created over the past third-century to diffuse management responsibility well below threshold and to thereby *reliably* defeat any accountability for the inevitable sub-standard results – while eliciting and encouraging all of the worst behavioral patterns on the part of the Congress. Failure to appreciate this lovingly *engineered* (and actively maintained) character of the Acquisition situation explains most of the plethora of previous failures to impact it at all substantially.

Pete Aldridge did a crucial, likely-underappreciated job for the Nation's military capabilities in space in saving our National expendable launch vehicle capabilities from being prematurely scrapped in the "Shuttle Mania" of the early '80s – but for most of the past decade, he's presided over the Air Force's debacle in advanced space systems (e.g., SBIRS-High and -Low), as the head of Aerospace Corp., the brain trust of the USAF's Acquisition arm. His undisputed record of utter failure in reviving this one-time 'crown jewel' of American national security technology accurately forecasts, I fear, just what he'll [not] do for you in the Acquisition & Technology post. He epitomizes – perhaps more so than any other single person – the "old school" of Defense Acquisition, which I

understood you intended to reform-and-replace. He's Ron Kadish in civilian clothes – **while** also being substantially older and much wiser.

An early “litmus test” that you can apply to determine who of us sees this situation more clearly would be to ask Pete & Co., as a top-priority matter, to design-in-detail a **general-purpose** “silver bullet” Acquisition process for top-priority programs so designated by the SecDef (or the NSC Principals, or whatever) – initiatives which must be implemented as force-in-being every bit as swiftly as the U.S. technology community is capable of. *After* you've duly taken note of how (remarkably) long it takes for him-and-his to get back to you and Paul with the draft DoD Instruction which is to institute this new Acquisition process, examine carefully the overall time-scales, decision-procedures, etc. of what is presented to you as an archetypal effort in this new as-fast-as-ever-possible Acquisition process – all the time recalling that the brand-new Manhattan Engineering District had Colonel(!) Leslie Groves installed as its first head in September '42 and thereupon proceeded to detonate the first atom bomb 34 months later, and that it took a shade under 4 years for RADM 'Red' Raborn & Co. to design, prototype, test, build-&-launch the first Polaris missile-launching submarine during the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition “*By their fruits shall they be known unto you,*” we are reminded.

I certainly hope – for your sake and the Nation's – that I'm thoroughly wrong on this score,

REVITALIZING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Your statement that Rich Haver will soon be joining you as your Intelligence *czar* is really fine news, as I remarked.

After nearly five years of dispensing ‘technical and strategic advice’ to the Senate Intelligence Committee re their IC oversight responsibilities – as one of the few technically-trained members of its ‘Technical Advisory Group’ – I'm more keenly aware than most of how sorely the U.S. needs a fundamental re-building and re-chattering of its intelligence operations. I've also become far more appreciative of the enormously important roles that the “cutting edges” of the IC play in the active preservation of international peace and national security – and of the even more telling performance that they could deliver, if old structures, linkages, modes-of-thought, cultures, missions, etc., were to be replaced with ones more appropriate to 21st Century challenges.

Rich is one of the best possible people to aid with you with this ‘cleaning of the Augean Stables’ task. [There's a large majority of a third of a million unusually-bright folks – many of their leaders chosen for their career-long professional skills in dissembling, subverting and purchasing loyalties – who are resolutely committed to failure of *any* deep-cutting IC reforms, Not even Hercules ever faced odds of this scale!]

Congratulations on luring Rich back into Government service – and the very best of good luck!

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT: **Memorandum from Adm. Bill Owens**

You might want to show this oil platform material to Gen. Kadish. It is from Bill Owens, and it is quite encouraging.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.14
Attach. 5/25/01 Memorandum from Adm. Owens

463

29 May 01



Broadband Center
1445 120th Avenue NE, Bellevue, WA 98005
Phone: +1.425.602.0000 Fax: +1 .425.602.0001

TO: Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld
FROM: Janis Dolacky Jacobs for Admiral William A. Owens
DATE: May 25, 2001
FAX #: (b)(6)
OF PAGES: 28 (including cover)

Please deliver the following fax from Admiral Owens directly to Secretary Rumsfeld.

If I may be of further assistance, please contact me directly at (b)(6)

Respectfully,

Janis Dolacky Jacobs
Assistant to Admiral William A. Owens
Co-Chief Executive Officer and
Vice Chairman of the Board, Teledesic LLC &
Vice Chairman, ICO-Teledesic Global Limited

Phone: (b)(6)
Fax: (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)

5/24/01

For The Secretary of Defense

Don,

Thanks for your note on the floating oil platform sinking off the coast of Brazil. I've been following this because of a long term interest in these platforms for Natl. security. It's my belief that the loss of this one was not because of inherent flaws but because of personnel fouleups, piping^{1/2} valve lineups, etc. If you are interested I've attached a copy of the commission report on the loss of the platform (P-36) (it might be a good "staff read")

I also enclose a couple of " excerpts from "Lifting the Fog--- concerning Standing Joint Forces, a topic I know you have some interest in.

Very best wishes
Bill Owens

BR

MINIMINARY

INQUIRY COMMISSION

PLATAFORM P-35

Rio, April 23 2001

SCOPE OF THE WORK:

- To determine the causes of the accident
- To determine contributing factors to the platform's loss of stability
- To recommend measures to eliminate/control these causes and factors

■ COMMISSION GUARANTEED TOTAL AUTONOMY AND AUTHORITY**RESULTS:**


- Hypotheses that are being investigated and evaluated
- Initial results and recommendations
- Proposal for the continuation of the work and forecasted conclusion

- **REGULAR**

- Petrobras : 38 people
- Contracted companies : 42 people

- **TEMPORARY**

- Petrobras : 7
- Contracted companies : 88

METHODOLOGY (INTERNATIONALLY USED)

Stage I – Gathering of Information

Stage II – Analysis of the Evidence

Stage III – Preliminary Report

Stage IV – Analysis of the Causes

Stage V – Drafting Corrective Actions

Stage VI – Complete the Accident Inquiry Report


Stage VII – Feedback on Proposed Corrective Actions

This preliminary report focuses on the identification of the loss and the description and analysis of the incident. Corresponding to stages I and II described above.




- **PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION (P-36) WAS**
- **61 INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED**
- **DOCUMENTATION/MATERIAL RETRIEVED FROM P-**
 - **Records of Ballast Operations**
 - **Operational Situation Bulletin (SITOP)**
 - **Daily Production Bulletins**
 - **Treatment of Irregularities Report (RTA)**
 - **Magnetic Files with Records of Fire&Gas and Shutdown Systems**
(from 08h00min on March 14 to 04h00min on March 15 2001)
- **PLATFORM PROJECT DOCUMENTS**
- **VIDEO TAPES AND PHOTOGRAPHS**
- **ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THE MEDIA**

RECONCILIATION OF PLATFORM INFORMATION
ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE DATA AND DOCUMENTS
INTERVIEWING PROCESS STANDARDIZED AND DOCUMENTED
ESTABLISHING CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (TIME
PREPARATION AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT HYPOTHESIS
ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL RISKS (HAZOP)
ANALYSIS AND MODELING OF THE EXPLOSIONS
STUDIES INTO STABILITY, FLOODING AND LOSS OF P-36
ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE HYPOTHESES FOR THE
SECOND EVENTS






PLATFORM D



11-L-0559/OSD/4049

BR


COLUMN DE



11-L-0559/OSD/4050

BR

PONTOON DETAILS



SEAWATER PUMP

PONTOON


BR

DETAILS OF 4TH DECK OF COLUMN

05/23/2001 09:15 FAX 4256020002

TELEDESIC

2013



11-L-0559/OSD/4052

BR


COLUMN DE



11-L-0559/OSD/4053

COLUMN DETAILS

BR



HYPOTHESES FOR THE 1st AND 2nd EXPLOSIONS THAT ARE BEING INVESTIGATED AND EVALUATED

SINCE NO OBVIOUS CAUSES WERE DISCOVERED,
VARIOUS SCENARIOS WERE ANALYSED:

1. **EMERGENCY DRAIN STORAGE TANK:** the leakage of hydrocarbon into the emergency drain storage tank, gas leakage, ignition
2. **WASTE OIL TANK:** the entry of gas into the waste oil tank, gas leakage, ignition
3. **GAS COMPRESSION SYSTEM / VENTILATION OF THE COLUMN PONTOON AND STARBOARD AFT AREAS/ROOMS:** a gas leak in turbo-compressor C drawn in through the column ventilation systems, pontoon and starboard aft areas; formation of explosive mixture; ignition

HYPOTHESES FOR THE 1st AND 2nd EXPLOSIONS THAT ARE BEING INVESTIGATED AND EVALUATED

4. **MISALIGNED PIPING:** a gas leak from flanges and/or piping rupture due to misalignment, ignition
5. **PONTOON BILGE SYSTEM:** leakage of hydrocarbons into the pontoon bilge system through a reverse flow of gas from the tank separator, leakage, ignition
6. **ATMOSPHERIC VENT SYSTEM:** a build-up of gas pressure in the vent system, reverse flow, leakage, ignition
7. **DIESEL OIL SYSTEM:** leakage of diesel, generation of diesel vapor, ignition

HYPOTHESES THAT ARE CONSIDERED IMPROBABLE FOR THE 1ST AND 2ND EXPLOSIONS

- **EXPLOSION CAUSED BY BLOCKAGE**
- **SABOTAGE**
- **MAINTENANCE SERVICE**
- **COLLISION**
- **CARGO HANDLING**
- **FAULT IN RISERS/CONNECTIONS ON THE SPIDER DECK**

EXPLOSION AT 00:22h

Flooding begins due to rupturing of water cooling pipe

Continuation of flooding through the seawater inlet valve which remained open (Fail-Set valves)

Various compartments were flooded

Ways of flooding between compartments:

- Rupture of internal structure**
- Through the ventilation shafts**
- Bulkheads or access doors open**
- Rupture of pipes**


FLOODING AND LOSS

Results of the analysis of the stability:

Following the explosions, the flooding of the inter-connecting compartments caused the platform to sink in the water with a 16 degree list at about 7:45h on March 15 2001. This was sufficient to submerge the openings of the chain lockers by 54 cm, a situation in excess of the platform's projected critical point for maximum damage.

This began the progressive process of flooding that resulted in the eventual loss of the platform.

FLOODING AND LO



Opening of the chain loc

INITIAL RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

	RESULTS	REGOMMENDATIONS
1	<p>There was an initial explosion probably on the fourth level of the starboard aft column at 00:22h on March 15, 2001 and the incident is being analyzed according to the various hypotheses. This explosion was the event leading to the initial flooding of the platform.</p>	<p>To continue studies to determine what could have caused the initial explosion.</p>
2	<p>There was a second explosion at 00:39 on March 15, 2001, caused by the ignition of hydrocarbons, in the starboard aft area at a location still to be precisely identified. It also being analyzed against the various hypotheses. (This explosion caused the deaths of 11 fire fighters.)</p>	<p>To continue studies to determine what could have been the most likely location and the causes of the second explosion.</p>

BR**INITIAL RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

	RESULTS	RECOMMENDATIONS
3	<p>The explosions did not cause the rupture of the pontoon's hull and/or the column. The flooding was caused by the rupture of the piping and shafts inside the starboard aft column.</p> <p>Actions taken to control the flooding were unsuccessful.</p>	<p>To widen the investigations into the causes of the flooding and the control of the stability during the emergency.</p>

INITIAL RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

	RESULTS	RECOMMENDATIONS
4	At the present time, the analysis of the platform' design documentation has not been completed.	To continue and broaden the analysis of the project.
5	The presence of tanks connected to the processing activities inside the column is a relevant aspect that requires reconsideration of the operational risks involved.	In spite of the practice being acceptable to the oil industry, the Commission recommends that a management decision be taken in future projects not to use tanks or receptacles inside columns or pontoons that are connected to processing activities. In the case of existing platforms that have receptacles and tanks inside the columns or pontoons and are connected to the processing activities, we recommend that the Company reanalyze the projects in the light of the operational risk.

	RESULTS	RECOMMENDATIONS
6	The explosions were not caused by or originated from a collision of any type.	
7	The hypothesis of a build-up of pressure in the atmospheric vent system is, at this point, an unlikely cause of the accident.	Broaden the investigation into the causes of the build up of pressure in the atmospheric vent system accident.
8	The solution adopted to resolve the blockage in the atmospheric vent in the flare tower by creating an alternative bypass vent is, at this point, considered to be an unlikely cause of the accident.	

- MAINTAIN THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY IN BEING
- PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL TERMS OF SIX WEEKS TO CONCLUDE THE INVESTIGATION AND TWO WEEKS FOR PREPARATION OF THE FINAL REPORT, A WEB SITE RELEASE TO THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND TECHNICAL ORGANS.
- MAINTAIN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS BY DNV.

snowflake
snowflake

TO: Mark Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

You might want to take a look at this memo of February 12. You may **find** some **useful** material.

Thanks!

DHR/azn
052901.09
Attach.

U10141 / 01

11-L-0559/OSD/4066

February 12, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO **DR. SCHNEIDER**

FROM: **JEFFREY M. RANNEY**
DAN GOURE
BERNIE VICTORY

SUBJECT: **ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES TO THE DOD FY 2002 - 2007 BUDGETS DERIVED FROM EISENHOWER - KENNEDY PERIOD AND REAGAN BUILDUP PERIOD**

There are two periods in the post-1945 history of U.S. defense planning and budgeting that can provide useful budget strategies for the FY 2002 - 2007 period. In both periods defense spending increased over a period of years. Both periods also saw significant changes in force structure and weapons technologies. The first period was from **FY 1954 to FY 1965 (referred to in this brief as the Eisenhower New Look even though the Kennedy years are included)**. The second is the period from **FY 1981 to 1992 (the Reagan Buildup)**. The Truman buildup for the Korean Conflict is not included since, unlike the other two, it represents not an increase in funding and a reshaping of the force, but a complete remobilization.

The period from **FY 1954 to FY 1965, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations**, was one period in which the U.S. military was truly transformed. This period saw the introduction of advanced new technologies and weapon systems, to include the intercontinental strategic bomber, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers, jet-powered aircraft, rotary aircraft, guided munitions, and early-warning, detection, and surveillance satellites. Chart 1 shows annual defense **spending**, measured in FY 2001 total obligation **authority (TOA)** dollars, for the **FY 1954 - 1965 period**, and major technological advances. It is very instructive for the current **FY 1902 - 2007 period** as the overall size of the Armed Forces also was reduced even as it was transformed.

Somewhat surprisingly, the Reagan buildup was less transformational when compared to the **FY 1954 - 1965 period**, and represents more a modernization cycle. The overall size of the force was increased along with the introduction of new technologies. Significant technological advances in this period included **stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, precision guided munitions, global positioning system satellites, real-time and multi-spectral imaging sensors, and digital electronics**. Chart 2 shows annual defense spending in a similar manner for the **FY 1981 - 1992 period**.

Comparing the two periods, annual defense budget increases exceeded 5 percent on nine separate occasions. Chart 3 shows the annual real growth rate for both periods. Both periods began with a nearly 20 percent increase: (Eisenhower (19 %) and Reagan (22 %)). They also took at least twelve years to unfold. We are fully aware that all programs do not start or end within the two periods. Nevertheless, from a national policy-making perspective, they capture the policy changes and long timeframes that are often required to develop and acquire military capabilities.

Chart 4 displays the projection of defense spending for the **FY 2002 – 2007** period using the annual growth rates observed from the two previous periods. As shown, projections of defense spending based on either the “Eisenhower New Look” or “Reagan Buildup” periods would require annual defense budgets greater than 3 percent of U.S. gross domestic product. To achieve an “Eisenhower New Look”-like defense budget would require \$ 564 billion additional dollars over the amount proposed in PB 02. To achieve a “Reagan Build-Up”-like defense budget would require \$754. billion additional dollars than proposed in PB 02.

The current budget team **projection**, which builds upon the military services’ unfunded requirements and new initiatives, is provided in Chart 5. As discussed last Friday, as the new initiatives become better understood in terms of their funding requirements, they will compete for funding with recovery programs. This will force the retirement of additional equipment, the closure of additional military installations, and further reductions in military personnel levels. The annual nominal growth rate is also shown.

Four conclusions emerge from this work:


- Both cycles began with a significant jump in annual defense spending: Eisenhower (19 % in FY 55) and Reagan (22 % in FY 81);
- Both cycles required more than the 6 years of a FYDP to complete.
- If similar annual growth rates were applied to the current period, annual DOD budgets would equal somewhat more than 3 percent of GDP.
- When drawing parallels to today, the Eisenhower period would seem to be the preferred one insofar as it demonstrates an approach to both transformation and overall force reductions that left the military better off in the end. It is also preferable because it provided for a continuous, steady-state approach to force modernization as opposed to the “boom-bust” attributes of the Reagan buildup.

We have additional charts and work, and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this issue more fully if your time permits.

Chart 1

FY 1954 - 1965 Transformation Period DOD Purchases Spending

In billions of FY 2001 TOA Dollars




Major Technological Advances

- Intercontinental strategic bomber
- Intercontinental ballistic missiles (land and sea-based)
- Jet-powered, long-range supersonic fighters
- Large, jet-power inter-theater transport aircraft
- Nuclear-powered submarines
- Large, nuclear powered aircraft carriers
- Rotary wing aircraft
- Guided munitions
- Early-warning, detection, surveillance and communication satellites

Chart 2

FY 1981 - 1992 Period DOD Purchases Spending

In billions of FY 2001 TOA Dollars



'Major Technological Advances


- Stealth aircraft
- Cruise Missiles
- Precision guided munitions
- Large, quiet submarines (Trident, Seawolf)
- Gas-turbine surface combatants
- Digital electronics
- Airborne early warning and ground surveillance
- Global positioning system satellites
- Real-time and multi-spectral imaging

Chart 3

Annual Defense Spending Comparison DOD Purchases Spending


1954 – 1965 Period

Annual Percent
Real Change



1981 – 1992 Period

Annual Percent
Real Change




Note: Defense spending in FY 1954 was 49 percent lower than previous year because of the end of the Korean Conflict.

Chart 4

Alternative DOD Purchases Projections

In billions of Current BA Dollars



**FY 02 – 07
Total**

\$2,685 B

[+ 190 B]

\$2,495 B

[+ 564 B]


\$1,931 B

— DOD spending pegged to a constant share of GDP.

Note: Eisenhower New Look and Reagan Buildup reflect annual real growth rates experienced during FY 1984 – 1985 and FY 1981 – 1992, respectively.

Chart 5 Current Budget Team Projection

In billions of Current BA Dollars



**FY 02 - 07
Total**

\$200 B

\$487 B

\$1,937 B

\$2,624 B

— DOD spending pegged to a constant share of GDP.

snowflake

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

Here is a paper that should be held close but it has some very good ideas for the Defense Strategy paper, then specific recommendations.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.50
Attach.

381

29 May 01

U10146 /01

APPENDIX 1

The Recommendations

This appendix lists all of the Phase III Report's major recommendations in order of their presentation. The recommendations are numbered sequentially and grouped by Section. The page on which the recommendation appears in the report is noted in the box. Those recommendations in red type indicate recommendations on which Congressional action is required for implementation. Those in blue type can be implemented by Executive Order. Those in green type can be implemented by the head of an Executive Branch department or agency, or by the Congressional leadership, as appropriate.

Securing the National Homeland

1: The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail. (p. 11)

2: The President should propose, and Congress should agree, to create a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. They should use the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a key building block in this effort. (p. 15)

3: The President should propose to Congress the transfer of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to the National Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct entities. (p. 15)

4: The President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and produce National Intelligence Estimates on these threats. (p. 23)

5: The President should propose to Congress the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary. (p. 23)

6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be reorganized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission. (p. 25)

7: Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland security issues, as has been done with intelligence oversight, Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations, This body should also include members of all relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-officio members from the leadership of both Houses of Congress, (p. 28)

Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education

8: The President should propose, and the *Congress* should support, doubling the U.S. government's investment in science and technology R&D by 2010. (p. 32) 1

9: The President should empower his Science Advisor to establish non-military R&D objectives that meet changing national needs, and to be responsible for coordinating budget development within the relevant departments and agencies. (p. 34) 1

10: The President should propose, and the Congress should fund, the reorganization of the national laboratories, providing individual laboratories with new mission goals that minimize overlap. (p. 37) 1

11: The President should propose, and Congress should pass, a National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) with four sections: reduced-interest loans and scholarships for students to pursue degrees in science, mathematics, and engineering; loan forgiveness and scholarships for those in these fields entering government or military service; a National Security Teaching Program to foster science and math teaching at the K-12 level; and increased funding for professional development for science and math teachers. (p. 41)

12: The President should direct the Department of Education to work with the states to devise a comprehensive plan to avert a looming shortage of quality teachers. This plan should emphasize raising teacher compensation, improving infrastructure support, reforming the certification process, and expanding existing programs targeted at districts with especially acute problems. (p. 43)

13: The President and Congress should devise a targeted program to strengthen the historically black colleges and universities in our country, and should particularly support those that emphasize science, mathematics, and engineering. (p. 45) 1

Institutional Redesign

14: The President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and delegate authority to the National Security Advisor to coordinate that process. (p. 48)

15: The President should prepare and present to the Congress an overall national security budget to serve the critical goals that emerge from the NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the President should continue to submit budgets for individual national security departments and agencies for Congressional review and appropriation. (p. 49)

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

16: The National Security Council (NSC) should be responsible for advising the President and for coordinating the multiplicity of national security activities, broadly defined to include economic and domestic law enforcement activities as well as the traditional national security agenda. The NSC Advisor and staff should resist the temptation to assume a central policymaking and operational role. (p. 50)

17: The President should propose to the Congress that the Secretary of Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security Council. (p. 51)

18: The President should abolish the National Economic Council, distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the Domestic Policy Council and its international economic responsibilities to the National Security Council. (p. 52)

19: The President should propose to the Congress a plan to reorganize the State Department, creating five Under Secretaries, with responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would operate in conjunction with the existing Under Secretary for Management. (p. 54)

20: The President should propose to the Congress that the U.S. Agency for International Development be consolidated into the State Department. (p. 55)

21: The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis to strategic planning in the State Department and link it directly to the allocation of resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office. (p. 56)

22: The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to the State Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget, which would include all foreign assistance programs and activities as well as all expenses for personnel and operations. (p. 58)

23: The President should ensure that Ambassadors have the requisite area knowledge as well as leadership and management skills to function effectively. He should therefore appoint an independent, bipartisan advisory panel to the Secretary of State to vet ambassadorial appointees, career and non-career alike. (p. 62)

24: The Secretary of Defense should propose to Congress a restructuring plan for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which would abolish the office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and create a new office of an Assistant Secretary dedicated to Strategy and Planning (S/P). (p. 64)

25: Based on a review of the core roles and responsibilities of the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the CINCs, the Secretary of Defense should reorganize and reduce those staffs by ten to fifteen percent. (p. 65)

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

26: The Secretary of Defense should establish a ten-year goal of reducing infrastructure costs by 20 to 25 percent through outsourcing and privatizing as many DoD support agencies as possible. (p. 66)

27: The Congress and the Secretary of Defense should move the Quadrennial Defense Review to the second year of a Presidential term. (p. 68)

28: The Secretary of Defense should introduce a new process that would require the Services and defense agencies to compete for the allocation of some resources within the overall Defense budget. (p. 69)

29: The Secretary of Defense should establish and employ a two-track acquisition system, one for major acquisitions and a second, "fast track" for a limited number of potential breakthrough systems, especially those in the area of command and control. (p. 71)

30: The Secretary of Defense should foster innovation by directing a return to the pattern of increased prototyping and testing of selected weapons and support systems. (p. 72)

31: Congress should implement two-year defense budgeting *solely* for the modernization element of the DoD budget (R&D/procurement) because of its long-term character, and it should expand the use of multivear procurement. (p. 73)

32: Congress should modernize Defense Department auditing and oversight requirements by rewriting relevant sections of U.S. Code, Title 10, and the Federal Acquisition Regulations. (p. 75)

33: The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD to shift from the threat-based 2MTW force sizing process to one which measures requirements against recent operational activity trends, actual intelligence estimates of potential adversaries' capabilities, and national security objectives as defined in the new administration's national security strategy—once formulated. (p. 76)

34: The Defense Department should devote its highest priority to improving and furthering expeditionary capabilities. (p. 78)

35: The President should establish an Interagency Working Group on Space (IWGS) at the National Security Council to coordinate all aspects of the nation's space policy, and place on the NSC staff those with the necessary expertise in this area. (p. 80)

36: The President should order the setting of national intelligence priorities through National Security Council guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence. (p. 83)

37: The Director of Central Intelligence should emphasize the recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of the intelligence community's highest priorities, and ensure that operational guidelines are balanced between security needs and respect for American values and principles. (p. 84)

38: The intelligence community should place new emphasis on collection and analysis of economic and science/technology security concerns, and incorporate more open source intelligence into analytical products. Congress should support this new emphasis by increasing significantly the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for collection and analysis. (p. 84)

The Human Requirements for National Security

39: Congress should significantly expand the National Security Education Act (NSEA) to include broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign languages in exchange for military and civilian service to the nation. (p. 89)

40: The Executive and Legislative Branches should cooperate to revise the current Presidential appointee process by reducing the impediments that have made high-level public service undesirable to many distinguished Americans. Specifically, they should reduce the number of Senate confirmed and non-career Senior Executive Service (SES) positions by 25 percent; shorten the appointment process; and revise draconian ethics regulations. (p. 92)

41: The President should order the overhauling of the Foreign Service system by revamping the examination process, dramatically improving the level of on-going professional education, and making leadership a core value of the State Department. (p. 95)

42: The President should order the elimination of recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier hiring process, and see to it that strengthened professional education and retention programs are worthy of full funding by Congress. (p. 98)

43: The Executive Branch should establish a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide a corps of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the Executive Branch. CD. 101)

44: Congress should significantly enhance the Montgomery GI Bill, as well as strengthen recently passed and pending legislation supporting benefits-including transition, medical, and homeownership-for qualified veterans. (p. 106)

45: Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate to decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation (p. 107)

The Role of Congress

46: The Congressional leadership should conduct a thorough bicameral, bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch relationship to national security and foreign policy. (p. 110)

47: Congressional and Executive Branch leaders must build programs to encourage individual members to acquire knowledge and experience in both national security and foreign policy. (p. 111)

48: Congress should rationalize its current committee structure so that it best serves U.S. national security objectives; specifically, it should merge the current authorizing committees with the relevant appropriations subcommittees. (p. 112)

49: The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus on foreign policy and national security consultation with Congress and devote resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation a higher priority and form a permanent consultative group of Congressional leaders as part of this effort. (p. 113)

50: The President should create an implementing mechanism to ensure that the major recommendations of this Commission result in the critical reforms necessary to ensure American national security and global leadership over the next quarter century. (p. 111)

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT: Attachment

Do you want to take this Zal Khalilzad paper and structure a series of questions to make sure they get brought into the meetings we are having this week?

I think there are some good points, particularly on the last page.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
05290 1.49
Attach,

381

29 May 01

U10147 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4081

April 10, 2001 6:23 AM

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Khalilzad's Comments

Here are some interesting thoughts from Zal Khalilzad that you might want to think about in the context of the paper.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/2/01 Khalilzad Memo: "National Security Strategy Review"

DHR:dh
041001-12

To: Secretary Rumsfeld
 FROM: Zal Khalilzad
 Date: January 2, 2001
 Subject: National Security Strategy Review

[Handwritten initials and signatures]
 SC
 RJA
 2/4

The Bush Administration is taking office at a unique and critical moment for our national role in the world and our national security. Today, American power and position, while unrivaled, will not automatically be sustained, but will be deeply affected both by what we do and do not do and by how others respond.

We face many challenges. While the Soviet Union is gone, Russia has not been anchored in the West. **Other** countries, notably China and India, are seeking to enhance their status as great powers. Several important regional powers such as Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia are in a state of flux. What happens within these countries will be critical if not decisive in determining what they do abroad. Hostile states are challenging international norms in several regions. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, threats to our critical economic and military infrastructure including our **space**-based systems and international terrorism are creating new challenges which will have significant impact on America's interests and those of our **friends** and allies.

At the same time, advances in technology are causing one of history's more profound revolutions. Globalization is transforming the nature of international life – not only in finance and economics but, increasingly, in politics and security. Particular social, political, and religious forces are having a growing impact on global life. Global politics is increasingly being shaped by non-governmental organizations and by private sector and financial entities that transcend traditional state borders. For most countries, sovereignty is eroding – in some places, like the European Union, by design, elsewhere as an unintended consequence of the digital age. Resentment of globalization is on the rise and has produced increased anti-Americanism, as Washington is perceived as its architect and primary beneficiary. This trend hampers efforts at building new global trading and financial institutions that are necessary to expand and spread prosperity around the world,

Newer concerns, like cross-border crime and illegal narcotics **trafficking**, the challenge of mass migration, the rise of religious extremism, humanitarian disasters, failed states and warlordism, environmental degradation and the spread of disease are all part of the new international agenda. There is no national consensus on how we should balance the pursuit of our own traditional interests and these newer international concerns. Our inability to ignore these issues and the weakness or the poor use of non-military instruments has resulted in the overuse of our military to deal with some of these problems,

American power and will cannot **suffice** to meet and master the entire array of global demands that challenge U.S. interests and values and those of our **friends** and allies. How do we prioritize among these challenges? Selective global leadership by the

United States, coupled with strengthened and revitalized alliances is the best **long-term** vision.

In my judgment, America should seek to preclude the rise of a global rival or a hostile global alliance, while at the same time transforming its democratic alliances by focusing them on new threats, challenges, and opportunities. Together with democratic allies, we will have unparalleled ability to respond to tomorrow's demands. Therefore, maintaining, strengthening and extending these alliances is essential to America's future and should be the bedrock of U.S. engagement abroad. The national security review should focus on three key priorities:

- Fashioning ways to shift more of the burden of maintaining international stability to our allies. ✓
- Developing a new architecture for our alliances and posture in Asia to ensure long term stability. More than any other critical region, Asia appears to have the potential for a wide range of basic changes, ✓
- Reducing the demand on our military. Our military is over-used. It needs to be transformed. ✓

In addition, the review should deal with a number of other questions including:

- How do we integrate Russia, China and India into the current international system?
- How do we encourage the transition of the major states in flux to responsible members of the international community?
- What policies should we follow towards regional troublemakers such as Iraq?
- How can we be more selective in use of US military force? ↗
- How do we limit and mitigate the backlash against globalization? ↖
- How do we build political support – both with Congress and the American people for the new strategy? ↘

snowflake

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

Attached is a memo on my discussion with Admiral Blair. Why don't you get NSC working on this, or should it be DoD Doug Feith? If we ever get anyone in the policy shop.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
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Tapan

29 May 01

U10148 /01

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-
snowflake

May 21, 2001 9:50 AM

SUBJECT: Meeting with Admiral Blair 3/27/01

We need a plan for Japan-what we want, what our position should be and the way ahead:

- Update the joint declaration of 1996. Go further.
- Third country issues-North Korea, PRC.
- Okinawa. Move U.S. presence on the island from populated areas to less populated areas-south to north. Clear up 70% of south bases, Air Force has done well with a good neighbor policy. First step is underway. Japanese pay \$4 billion for the move north. Bundle it all in a blueprint for the way forward.
- We need an interagency group to fashion an approach, get the President's blessing, and do it over the next four to five months.

DHR:dh
052101-4

11-L-0559/OSD/4086

snowflake

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT: **Landmines**

Attached are some materials that Ann McLaughlin Korologos brought in on the subject of landmines.

You better get an expert, because it's going to be an **important** issue for us.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.45

Attach.

471.6

29 May 01

U10153 / 01

LANDMINES: AN AMERICAN STORY



*Faces of American
Landmine Survivors*

LANDMINES: AN AMERICAN STORY

The Department of Defense estimates that 100,000 Americans have been killed or injured in **landmine** incidents.

Roughly sixty million landmines are buried in over sixty countries around the world.

One-third of American military casualties during the Vietnam and Gulf conflicts were caused by landmines.

But you don't have to be wearing a uniform to be blown up by a landmine. You could be an overseas relief worker or a college student studying abroad. You could be on your honeymoon.

You could be a tourist,
or a business person,
or an archaeologist,
or an art collector,
or a writer,
or an exchange student...

Most Americans are not at risk in their day-to-day lives. But like millions worldwide, Americans cannot be protected when the leftover litter of war hidden deep in the earth explodes with one wrong step.

Fortunately, most American landmine survivors have access to some of the best medical care in the world. Sadly, this is not true for 90% of hundreds of thousands of landmine survivors worldwide.

WORLD WAR II

Landmine survivors from the Greatest Generation have known this scourge for over half a century. They want their grandchildren to walk in safety.

DUANE A. ROBEY

The patrol left Hoven, Germany at 23:00 hours on December 30, 1944. We moved along the road through our own extensive mine field to the bridge. The German outpost was just one mile after the river. Our mission was to capture German soldiers, or, if not possible, to bring back as much information as we could.


We were wearing white camouflage suits over our normal gear and helmets. The ground was covered in snow. It was now 00:30 hours on December 31, 1944 and we had crossed the river and were making our way toward the outpost. We advanced steadily through the enemy's minefield. We planned that all seven of us were going to leap into the German position and overpower them before they could react. Time: 01:30 hours. I moved forward to get into final position and wait for the signal, I was bent low looking at the ground. I saw a slight rise in the snow and although the other six had gone

over this spot my subconscious screamed, "Don't step there!" Too late. WHOOMP!

My left leg was jammed upward, a heavy hammer came down upon my head, my left arm was thrown upward and my rifle and helmet sailed away into the darkness. I catapulted forward; my face plowed into the snow-covered ground. Dazed, I rolled over on my back. There was

no feeling in my left leg. I sat up and saw my mangled foot against my shin. The boot was gone and my foot felt sticky and wet.

Four of the men came to my side and we placed a tourniquet above the ankle and wrapped the foot. First Lieutenant Pruitt said, "The mission is



Duane Robey with wife, **Ledores**.

aborted. Pick Robey up and we will head for our lines." We were about 40 feet from the enemy outpost. I said, "For God's sake don't anyone step on a mine." WHOOMP! I was bent upwards with sharp pains in my back. I heard Private Gaines scream, Private Glick's hands were badly burned, First Lieutenant Pruitt put me down to pull the men together.

I pushed myself up into a sitting position. The explosion blew away my clothes from the waist down and I had no feeling from the waist down. I knew that I soon would be dead. "God help me!", I cried out. The words were no more out of my mouth when I rolled over and was able to crawl on my hands and knees toward the river. We all started moving toward the river. Private Gaines was crawling too, although he had lost two fingers on his left hand.

Then, there was a third explosion behind me. I turned around to see Sergeant Lynde disappear in a cloud of white smoke. His right foot was gone and there was a 6-inch steel fragment in his side. Pruitt shouted, "Robey keep crawling!" I could have crawled over a mine. But I began to have a feeling of great well-being that no more harm



Young Duane Robey

would come. We reddened the snow with our open wounds as we crawled towards the river. German soldiers were coming towards us, and Pruitt was shot in the arm. We fired back. I threw my four grenades and watched them explode among the Germans.

We kept retreating back towards our lines. By sheer willpower, I climbed the pier of the bridge. Germans were firing all around us and Pruitt, Sergeant Major, and Corporal Clark emptied their weapons and became engaged in hand to hand combat.


From the top of the pier I jumped down the other side into the river. Half-way across, my left foot caught on a broken branch. I yanked hard and left part of my torn foot on the branch. I had no pain. The cold air was causing our wounds to clot and freeze. On my way to the hospital, Pruitt asked Major about me, and Major replied, "He will not see the Regiment." "Like so much!" I said to myself "I am going to make it all the way!"

Duane Robey lives in Bismarck, ND. They have three children and two grandchildren. Mr. Robey has a Masters degree in Science-Teaching and enjoys lapidary work and is active in a church and the Masonic Lodge.

JACK WACK

Born in 1922 in Ohio, I joined the US army in 1943 and trained at Fort Belvoir, Virginia as a combat engineer. In 1944, I went to Italy as part of the 39th Combat Engineering Regiment to fight in World War II.

It was a beautiful Tuscan morning on September 11, 1944. I stood looking at Florence in the distance thinking of its beautiful, historic buildings that I would be soon be visiting. Six combat engineers, including me, climbed into the back of a 6x6 truck headed for Florence. We



Jack Wack and his grandchildren, Michael and Sarah.

crossed over the Arno on a Bailey bridge and continued through Florence about five miles until we reached a small creek flowing through a wooded valley. A small bridge had been blown up and our mission was to place a large metal corrugated tube into the creek and cover it over with debris.

My buddy and I were picked to clear the minefield around the blown bridge, an area about 100' x 200'. A dozer and driver had been blown up the day before so our dozer operator, from rural Virginia, was very nervous. He said he needed another 50 feet cleared at one end to provide more dirt to fill around the tube.

So I took the detector and began to clear the area. My buddy from Fredericksburg, Texas was about ten feet behind me. I was extremely careful because the dozer operator had already set off a mine in the dirt he had scraped up to fill in the creek. That meant that we had missed at least one mine during our sweeping. Did we miss any others?

Boom! I flew up in the air and landed on my head. I lay staring at wisps of smoke rising from the bottom of the hole blown in the ground. My first thought was that I was alive and was reasonably all together. Next came the realization that I had lost a leg and the thought that it was probably both legs. But then it occurred to me that I wouldn't be sweeping for mines anymore, that this was the last sweep I had to make. And to show how the mind seeks out the positive side of things,




Young Jack Wack

my next thought was that I would get to fly home and nor suffer the violent sea sickness that I had coming to Europe.

While those thoughts were flashing through my mind, the dozer operator ran into the minefield and ripped open my fatigues. He looked down and said, "You are OK" My buddy was thrown backwards and lost a finger but was otherwise fine. They carried me from the minefield and eventually an ambulance carried me to a British field hospital where they cleaned the stumps of my legs and bound them in air-tight bandages. I then went to an American evacuation hospital, a general hospital in Rome, another general hospital in Naples, a hospital in Oran, another in Casablanca, a stop in Miami, Florida, and then to England General Hospital in Atlantic City, NJ. I stayed there until my discharge in the MI of 1946.

Jack taught engineering at Howard University before working for the Naval Ordnance Laboratory where he received several performance awards. He and his wife Judith have eight children and eleven grandchildren. They currently live in Bethesda, MD.



Sarah Wack 11-15-00
My Grandpa I call Grandpa Jack is thoughtful and kind and gives me and my brother candy when we come to his house! He is smart and he knows lots of things! He is tidy and keeps his things neat. He is funny and makes me and my brother laugh! He is brave and he was in world war 2! He is always happy when I go to his house.

Sarah **Wack** is seven years old. She lives with her parents, Robert and Lisa, and her two younger brothers, Michael, age 5, and Jeffrey, age 7 months. Sarah attends the first grade.

— SARAH WACK (JACK WACK'S GRANDDAUGHTER)



THE KOREAN WAR

Irv Axelrod stepped on a mine made with US components. Some US businesses still make landmine components.

IRVIN AXELROD

It was late October, 1950. I was in my third year of college at the University of Chicago when I was recalled to active military duty. Following several weeks of combat readiness training, I was shipped to Korea. Our ship landed at Incheon on Christmas Eve of 1950.

In mid February, as the UN forces were about to recapture Seoul, I was given the assignment to deliver secret orders for a new offensive called "Operation Killer" to the front lines. My shotgun guard and I had to cross a frozen rice paddy around which there was a lot of machine gun fire. I had my destination, the 29th British Infantry Brigade com-

mand post, in sight. As I was walking along an elevated dike on the terraced rice paddy, I stepped on a snow-covered enemy planted landmine. I was blown into the air and thrown down onto the next lower level of the terraced rice paddy. Despite how loud the explosion was, I thought perhaps I had been machine gunned through my foot. My buddy, who was only blown down and not injured by the blast, saw the mud thrown over the icy surface and knew that I had detonated a landmine. He immediately ran to get me medical assistance. My right foot was severely mangled and my right leg was bent at right angles midway between the knee and my ankle. My first thoughts were that



Young Irvin Axelrod

God was punishing me for my participation in this horrid war. British medics soon carried me on a stretcher to an emergency medical tent on the front lines where they operated on me. Within the next ten days, I had four additional surgeries, one at a U.S. 8055th M.A.S.H Unit and three others on the USS *Repose* hospital ship in Pusan harbor. Over the next four and a half years, I had seventeen more

operations trying to save my leg. Eventually, it had to be amputated.

The suffering and pain that I have gone through for the past 50 years has made me a much stronger person and I have no regrets about my life experiences. I have traveled to 32 countries around the world. I know how fortunate I am to have been brought up in the United States. In 1953, Helen Keller visited me at my bedside. It was a life-altering event. To this day I carry her message in my heart: concentrate on what you have, not on what you have lost.

I do indeed feel extremely fortunate that my country has given me all the care I needed to recover from my **landmine** injury. I estimate that the U.S. government has spent almost two million dollars on my rehabilitation and care over the past **fifty** years. Few **landmine** victims around the world have this type of support, yet it has been absolutely necessary for me to get on with my life. I am proud to be an American and want the US to do whatever it can to help rehabilitate **landmine** victims around the world.

Irvin Axelrod worked for the US government for 36 years. Upon retirement, he became amputee patient coordinator at the National Rehabilitation Hospital. He currently is president of the Washington Amputee Association, Inc. Mr. Axelrod and his wife Aida live in Centreville, VA. They have three daughters.



THE VIETNAM WAR

^{cc} **D**uring his second tour of duty in Vietnam more than 30 years ago, Colin L. Powell came to the aid of a soldier — “just a kid,” he later recalled — who had stepped on a mine and whose face showed a mixture of astonishment, fear, curiosity and, most of all, incomprehension. He died in Powell’s arms and left behind, in Powell’s mind, the unanswered question of why American soldiers were in Vietnam.” — WASHINGTON POST, DECEMBER 16, 2000

J E F F R E Y F R E D R I C K

I was born in 1949. My father was a Naval aviator during World War II. When the Vietnam War rolled in, I, like many of my compatriots, believed this to be the crusade of our generation — much

like what our fathers had been through “defending democracy” in Europe and Asia. Sadly, the ethics of the cause was not to be.

It was July, 1968. I was in the rice paddies, near Cu Chi, on a search and destroy mission (hunting



Jeffrey Frederick and a N. Vietnamese **amputee**.

for Viet Cong to kill). I stepped on a **landmine** and it was like walking though a great, glass shield — one life path exchanged for another.

The next thing I remember I am lying in a tent, burning from heat and fever, and experiencing the most intense pain I ever felt. Two cots down from me was a Viet Cong prisoner, handcuffed to the cot rail. He was also a new amputee.

At the foot of his bed sat an MP guard with an M-16. I remember wishing at the time the MP would be kind to this prisoner. The search for mercy now replaced the search for destruction. I also remember wishing whoever planted the **landmine** well and hoping

they could avoid such discomfort. My life as a soldier had changed.

Mr. Fredrick has a Masters Degree in Special Education and is a certified prosthetist. He is a Branch Manager for Rehabilitation Engineering, Inc. Mr. Fredrick founded a medical and rehabilitation program in Haiti and started a clinic in Vietnam with Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. He lives in Tallahassee, Florida with his wife and two daughters.



Vietnamese amputee working in the field.

JEFFREY FREDRICK

OTHER AMERICANS

An aid worker in Zaire, another in Somalia, and a student in the Holy Lands report their findings about landmines.

M A R I A N N E H O L T Z

It was a lovely day in eastern Zaire, one of the most beautiful places on earth. I had been back in Zaire just seven weeks working as nurse-coordinator for American Refugee Committee in Mugunga Camp for **Rwandan** refugees near **Goma**. A co-worker and I decided to drive out of town to spend a few hours in the countryside before scarring a Sunday afternoon of work in our medical supply storeroom in **Goma**. It was October 29, 1995. We were in a small truck. When we passed Kibumba Camp where I had worked six months previously, I remember thinking about the remarkable changes that had taken place there since the refugees first arrived in July, 1994. Then, in one moment, a moment that I recall only with blackness, my life was changed forever. Our truck hit a landmine.

Later, there was a voice in the darkness asking my blood type. But then nothing more for four more days. I awakened slowly. I hurt so very badly. I saw white tiles on the ceiling and realized I was in a bed. I figured that I had to be in a hospital but I did not know where. Voices were speaking Swahili. I realized I must be in Nairobi Hospital but I didn't know why I was there or what was wrong with me. I couldn't imagine why I hurt so much. Plastic tubes were going in and out of my body almost everywhere. I couldn't speak (my jaws were wired shut), couldn't hear well, my vision was blurred, and I couldn't move. When I looked down the bed, I saw that something was even more dreadfully wrong. There was no rise in the bedcovers where my feet should have been.



Marianne Holtz

Later, friends and co-workers filled me in on what happened after the blast destroyed our truck and threw it 30 feet off the road. David Lillie, my co-worker who was driving was dazed but had only minor injuries. Realizing I was seriously hurt, he tried to call for help on his handheld radio set but got no response.

Fortunately, a Red Cross nurse happened along within minutes and gave first-aid and directed some passersby to remove me from the wreckage. She took me to the International Federation of the Red Cross hospital in Kibumba Camp where surgeons amputated what was left of my legs below the knees and performed other emergency surgery to save my life.

UNHCR medical director, Claire Bourgeois, organized blood donations and arranged to have me flown to Nairobi by helicopter. If I had been a refugee or one of the local residents I would have remained at the local hospital. The extensive medical treatment that I needed was not available locally.

When I arrived at Nairobi Hospital casualty room, I was so near death the doctors did not expect to admit me to the hospital. Fortunately, with excellent medical care, many prayers, and my own tough constitution I did survive and was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit. It was three and one-half weeks before I was able to transfer to a hospital in my own country and reunite with my family at home. During those painful weeks I was not allowed a mirror to look at the terrible damage that had been done to my face, nor was I allowed to sit or even turn myself in bed as my back was broken in three places. But, worst of all, I required a ventilator to help me breathe when my lungs failed to function because of shock. Thinking

about those weeks can still give me nightmares.

I have had many months of physical rehabilitation, a number of surgeries and can now walk again for short distances with two prosthetic legs and a cane. Like other **landmine** survivors, I will never be **completely** free from pain and will have **difficulty** managing even the ordinary daily routines of life. In some ways, I am luckier than other **landmine** survivors. I am a citizen of a country which has excellent medical resources and I will be provided for sufficiently to have a reasonable standard of living. **Landmine** survivors in many countries do not fare so well.

Marianne Holtz currently writes and speaks on landmines. She has represented LSN at international conferences on landmines in Turkmenistan, Canada, the former Soviet Union, Mexico, and the United States.

K E N R U T H E R F O R D

In December 1993, I was working as a training officer for the International Rescue Committee in Somalia, where my job was to help Somalis apply for loans so they could rebuild their country. My project was funded by U.S.A.I.D. On December 16, as I was inspecting a program site near the border with Ethiopia, my car hit a landmine. I suddenly became something rare for an American — a **landmine** victim. It was to change my life forever.

After the explosion, I first remember seeing a foot lying on the floorboard of the car. I remember thinking: "Is it mine?" **It was.** It was my right foot. I remember that I kept trying to put it back on, but it kept falling off. Then I looked at my **left** foot. The top part was ripped off and I could see bones going to my toes, one of which was missing.

I dragged myself out of the car and called for help on my radio. It seemed like a lifetime before help arrived. While I was waiting, I prayed to God. I was also spitting up blood, so I thought that I might have internal injuries that could be **fatal.** I asked God that if I lived, I would like to marry Kim, my fiancée of two months, and raise a family.



Ken Rutherford and son, Hayden.

In the evacuation plane from Somalia to Nairobi, a Belgian doctor and an American nurse gave me blood from their bodies to mine.

I am here today because of the resources I had at my disposal. I had a radio to call for help and airplanes to evacuate me. Most **landmine** victims are not so lucky. The U.N. estimates that the average lifetime care of a **landmine** victim costs from \$5,000 to \$7,000. My medical costs have already exceeded a quarter of a million dollars.

Ken Rutherford is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Southwest Missouri State University, where he teaches international relations, international organization and American Citizenship and Democracy. Dr. Rutherford has testified before congress and published articles on the landmine issue in numerous academic and policy journals, including World Politics, Journal of International Politics, Nonproliferation Review, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, and the United Nations Landmines Journal. He is also a co-founder of LSN.

JERRY WHITE

I was only four years old when Syrian soldiers, retreating during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, laid Soviet-supplied mines in the Golan Heights. The soldiers no doubt hoped the mines would maim or kill Israeli troops. Instead, my mine waited silently in the ground for nearly seventeen years until it exploded under my foot and blew off my right leg.

I was twenty years old. I had taken time from my university studies in the United States to explore the Middle East. I wasn't a soldier. I was armed with only a backpack and an Arabic and Hebrew dictionary. Two friends and I had decided to explore northern Israel on a hiking trip. We were looking for a place to camp and had no idea that we had entered a minefield. There was no fence and no sign to keep us out. The next morning, on a beautiful spring day, I stepped on a mine. I can still remember the deafening blast and the smell of blood, burnt flesh and metal. Only when my friends rolled me over did they see the extent of my wounds. The explosion had ripped off my right foot, shrapnel had lacerated my skin, and my left leg was open and raw--with a bone sticking out of my calf. We screamed for help but it seemed that no one but God could hear. Either I would bleed to death, or my friends would have to carry



Jerry White and family.

me out of the minefield. Luckily we made it out without further loss.

All the talk about fencing and marking minefields is a distraction from the real challenge: to stop the proliferation of landmines. I was injured in a country that takes pride in how well it has fenced and marked its minefields. But even in a small, security-conscious state like Israel, fences break down, signs

fade, fall, or are stolen, and mines shift with changes in weather and soil erosion.

Jerry White is Co-founder and Executive Director of Landmine Survivors Network. Through editorials, public speaking, and news interviews, Mr. White has helped build public support for stopping the use of landmines. He has testified before Congress and published articles in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Christian Science Monitor and International Herald Tribune.

February 22, 2001

Dear Mr. President,

Your number one priority should be weapons, landmines in particular. You should sign the Landmine Ban Treaty. This definitely should have already been done!! I especially know what these deadly weapons can do. My dad stepped on one in Israel and is now missing part of his leg! President Bush, if you signed the treaty, the effect would be amazing! If you don't already know this, someone steps on one of these deadly machines every 22 minutes, either causing death or severe injuries. Imagine if you lived near mine. You would live with the fear of stepping on a landmine, yet try to go about a normal life! People live with this fear, this chance. Will you let them? You shouldn't, Mr. Bush, just because we are lucky enough not to have landmines doesn't mean you shouldn't sign. Please sign the Landmine Ban Treaty.

Sincerely,

Kate White

Kate White is ten years old. She lives in Silver Spring, Maryland with her parents and three younger siblings. She attends the fifth grade and she is crazy about horses.

VOICES NEVER HEARD

The following article is reprinted from the Minneapolis Star Tribune, June 29, 1995.

State Woman, Husband Killed During Honeymoon in Egypt

BY MARY LYNN SMITH: STAFF WRITER

U.S. Army Maj. Patricia Kopp-Horvath told her family that she knew Egypt could be a dangerous place to visit, but the adventurous Washington County native and her new husband and fellow soldier, Maj. Brian Horvath, decided to spend their honeymoon along the Red Sea anyway.

On Monday, nine days after the couple was married in Kopp's hometown of Lake St. Croix Beach, their families learned that the couple had been killed. They apparently hit a land mine while traveling with a guide and driver in an off-road vehicle along the southeast coast of the Sinai Peninsula. The guide and driver were hospitalized.

The newlyweds were on a tour of the desert territory where Israeli and Egyptian soldiers fought between 1948 and 1967. Army officials would not release details about the accident until the bodies are positively identified.

An official at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo said the area where the explosion occurred - just north of the Sinai's southern tip - was visited frequently by tourists.

The Egyptian Ministry of the Interior said the area had been mined during 40 years of recurring hostilities, but that efforts had been made to clear the mines when Israel returned the area to Egypt. U.S. officials in Egypt considered the incident an accident, the U.S. Embassy official said.

Sue Kopp Casillas, Kopp-Horvath's sister, said the families know very little about the accident. "We've heard so many stories, we don't want to comment on anything unless we see it in black and white," Casillas

said Wednesday. The Horvath family in Sayville, N.Y., also declined to comment.

A tourism official from a Red Sea resort at Sharm elSheikh said, "It is a terrible accident. I don't want to speak about it." The couple, guide and driver drove 30 kilometers north of Sharm el-Sheikh to snorkel at the coral reefs at Ras Nasrani, said the tourism official, who declined to give his name. Afterward, they apparently traveled another 15 kilometers to visit the mangroves, which grow in salt water.

"It's an area where there are a lot of mines that we don't know anything about," the tourism official said. "Thousands of people have traveled that area. . . . The driver made that trip at least 500 times. This is the first time something like this happened." He speculated that flooding last fall may have shifted some of the mines.

The bodies of Kopp-Horvath and Horvath were flown to the Army medical center in Landstuhl, Germany, where Horvath worked as a cardiologist and Kopp-Horvath worked as a nurse-anesthetist. Casillas said she's heard that her sister and husband had been traveling in a restricted area. "I don't think that could be true," she said. "She wouldn't do things like that. She's not foolhardy. It would be out of character for her."

Kopp-Horvath, 38, was the third of six children. She had been stationed for the past three years in Germany, where she met her husband. "She loved adventure. She loved to travel," Casillas said. Kopp-Horvath had traveled extensively through Europe and "had a strong desire to go to Egypt," her sister said. Wire services contributed to this report.

December 31, 1944

The I&R platoon, 415th Infantry,
was on patrol behind enemy lines.
— Hugh Daly, Park Hills, Kentucky

There was an explosion. I saw my foot
was no longer attached to my leg.
We were in a minefield.
— Duane Robey, Bismarck, North Dakota

I attempted to lift Robey
I was standing on a mine.
The whole world exploded.
— Al Gaines, Cartersville, Georgia

Sergeant Charles R. Lynde stepped on a mine.
Three of the six carried the wounded back across
the mined bridge while the Lieutenant fired a flare
for artillery support to divert the enemy.
— John Deane, G2 Officer, South Carolina

Somehow the wounded
were carried to safety.
All lost legs, but all survived.
— James Hutchinson, Peru, New York

This week American heroes like Duane Robey
are coming to Washington to stand with
other survivors in the battle *against landmines*.

Honor their courage under fire.
Ban landmines.
Help all victims reclaim their lives.



YOU can help. Please go to www.landminesurvivors.org

— WASHINGTON POST ADVERTISEMENT, MARCH 6, 2001

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:



1420 K Street, NW . # 650 . Washington, DC 20005 . USA
phone: (b)(6) . fax: (b)(6)
www.landminesurvivors.org

11-L-0559/OSD/4099

Her Majesty Queen Noor
National Press Club
Washington, DC
March 8, 2001

Last spring, three young girls were playing in a field on the outskirts of Sarajevo. A **landmine** exploded. Two of the girls died instantly; one remained alive, severely injured. But no one dared to enter the minefield. The deminers couldn't clear a path fast enough. Neighbors and NATO peacekeepers watched in helpless frustration as the girl clung to life for two desperate hours, pleading in pain and terror to be rescued. And then, silence. The deminers and frightened onlookers could do nothing but weep and look away.

This story is tragic enough, but what is worse is- that it is not unique — not even unusual. The human suffering and economic devastation landmines cause is an insidious day-to-day threat to the lives of millions around the world. Just last month in the Lebanon a 13 year old girl, Nahla **Basha**, was playing with her sister near where her father was tilling a field. Nahla left her sister to go inside for a moment. And then she heard a loud bang. She ran outside and stepped on a mine, seriously injuring her eye – her **arm** and leg were severed. Her sister, however, was killed instantly.

Over the past 25 years, reading news reports, driving past Jordan valley **minefields** fenced off by barbed wire, or visiting victims, I have grieved for children and adults in Jordan and the Middle East – which some consider the **landmine** heartland of the world – routinely maimed or killed by this menace. About 10% of Jordan's population lives in areas now rendered desolate, even deadly, by landmines. And because landmines are small, and ravage lives one by one, their horrific effects have long gone as unnoticed as the murderous weapons themselves.

Landmines murder or maim another man, woman or child roughly every 20 minutes. Somewhere in the world, in the brief time we are here together today, 5 landmines will explode and 5 individuals, at least 4 of them civilians, possibly children – who are 1/3 of all anti-personnel landmines – will be maimed for life, or killed. 70 today, 500 this week, more than 2,000 this month and more than 26,000 this year. It is a killer that takes only minutes to deploy,

yet can survive 10, 20, 50 years or even more – long enough to slaughter the grandchild of whoever originally laid it.

President Ryan, members of the National Press Club, on behalf the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, I thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about these weapons of mass destruction in slow motion.

The 80 million or so landmines that lie hidden today in the fields, forests and roads of approximately 80 countries, and the 250 million stockpiled around the world waiting to be deployed, amount to a **landmine** for every twelve children on earth. They comprise one of the greatest public health hazards of our time – a modern, man-made epidemic.

Landmines are indiscriminate killers, unable to distinguish between a soldier's heavy boot and a toddler's bare foot. Indeed, some mines are designed in shapes that attract the innocent eyes and hands of children. Because they are cheap and easily obtained, they are frequently used by informal militias and **guerillas** in local conflicts – groups that are more likely to turn mines against civilians, and less likely to keep records of where they were planted. They are **often** placed in rural areas explicitly to shatter the morale and integrity of the family, clan, tribe and village. And, cruelest of all, even in long hoped-for peace, these insidious left-overs are a bitter reminder of past conflict and a threat to future progress.

In my work as advisor to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, and with the **Landmine** Survivors Network, the first international organization created by and for **landmine** survivors, I have personally witnessed the heartbreaking consequences for those striving to overcome the devastation wrought on their bodies, their lives and their families in rural Jordan, in Lebanon, in the former Yugoslavia, and in Southeast Asia, another of the most mine-infested regions of the world.

When I visited that region with LSN in October 1999, 30 years after my own student activism to contribute to the efforts to persuade the US Government to end what we believed was an inhumane, illegal and immoral war in Vietnam, I came face to face with the lingering human and economic toll of that war which is hard to fathom, even today. In Vietnam and Cambodia, one out of every 236 people has lost at least one limb, and the carnage continues; between 1200

and 2000 people are maimed or killed each year. In Vietnam, some 3.5 million mines remain in the ground and there are an estimated 180 **landmine** casualties per month. There are over 36,000 **landmine** survivors in Cambodia alone, where there are over a million mines. Nearly one in 300 has been injured by landmines or unexploded ordinance, and less than 10% of these survivors have access to medical care or rehabilitation.

It is meeting these survivors that brings home the humanitarian costs of this curse: above and beyond the \$3 or \$300 to manufacture a mine, or even the \$1,000 to get rid of it, or even the \$1,000 to \$12,000 it takes to fit a prosthetic limb.

The greatest toll can't be quantified: the initial numb sensation giving way to acute pain and shock; the heart-stopping anguish of watching your rescuers risk their lives to save yours; the multiple surgeries to salvage what remains of an arm or a leg; **the** trips a young child must make to the hospital to fit a new prosthesis, only to grow out of it every six months, and need another, and another, and another; and the psychological scars and shattered dreams of knowing your body will never be whole again.

Often those disabled by conflict face humiliation, neglect and discrimination. They can't **find** jobs. They become dependent on others. Their futures are stolen, their hopes are destroyed, without provocation or purpose. These survivors want and deserve the means to help themselves and support their families, earning not only income but also self-respect and the respect of their communities. Victim assistance has remained the poor relation of the global movement to ban landmines – the least publicized tragedy of landmines' hidden menace.

But even those who never set foot on a mine can be held hostage by these weapons for many years. Imagine a family returning to a village where mines have been sown. Their precious farmland, perhaps handed down through generations, now infested by this evil crop, is useless. They dare not graze livestock, search for firewood, let their children run and play. Even the mere perception of a mine threat is enough to destroy a village's livelihood. In Cambodia, where there are millions of mines still in the ground, 85% of the population are farmers, but have little safe land to farm. And war-torn societies can never be rebuilt if people continue to fear for their lives with every step they take. Peace will forever remain on fragile footing and conflict recovery quite impossible while these deadly reminders of war remain.

The good news is that we have witnessed the extraordinary compassion and commitment among survivors whether American, Arab, European or Asian who are trying to help other survivors recover and resume their roles in society, I have seen the courage of children who refuse to lose their smile along with a limb.....of disabled mothers who still work incessantly to care for their familiesof amputees learning new job skills, strong in spite of their suffering. We owe it to them to do all we can to make their lives whole in a way their broken bodies never will be.

Those who make, sell and deploy landmines claim they are a necessity of war. But these weapons, even if originally designed for a specific battlefield objective, have proliferated into a source of random terror that respects neither time nor territory.

In 1995, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent commissioned a military study of the fundamental effectiveness of landmines. The Committee had been alerted by their surgeons in the field that a quarter of their patients, in places like Angola, Cambodia and Afghanistan, were **landmine** victims, Examining 26 conflicts since 1940, the study found that anti-personnel landmines played no significant role in the outcome of any of them.

More than 50 high ranking military figures from 20 countries endorsed the study's conclusion: that the appalling suffering and waste caused by landmines far outweighs their questionable military utility.

Landmines have never been militarily decisive. And if ever they were useful at all, they are now obsolete. More than fifteen retired U.S. Generals including General Norman **Schwartzkopf**, General David Jones, General John Galvin, Lt. General Robert Gard and others tell us that anti-personnel mines have outlived their military usefulness. The generals also say that the effectiveness of US forces will not be compromised by banning landmines.

In fact, quite the opposite, U.S. and allied forces have far more reason to fear landmines than feel protected by them. Since WWII, over 100,000 Americans alone were injured or killed by landmines. The first American soldiers to die in Vietnam and, later, in Bosnia, were killed by anti-personnel mines, and mines were responsible for a third of the U.S. casualties in Vietnam

and in the Persian Gulf War. The tragic irony is that 90% of the landmines in these conflicts were largely of U.S. manufacture or of components of U.S. manufacture.

What is more, in today's highly mobile battlefields, landmines can rapidly become subterranean terror – “friendly fire” underground – posing a substantial hazard to the troops themselves who planted them. My two sons currently serve in the Jordanian Army. I wouldn't be here if I thought banning mines would endanger them in any way – they are among the millions we are fighting to protect.

That fight inspired a new kind of coalition activism, which brought the Ottawa Landmine Ban Treaty into force in record time – the first international arms treaty to encompass humanitarian obligations to the weapons' victims. This remarkable treaty evolved from a unique coalition: for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross; Lloyd Axworthy, former Foreign Minister of Canada; leading governments such as Norway, Austria, and Canada; activists from organizations such as Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation; Physicians for Human Rights; Handicap International; Human Rights Watch; Mines Advisory Group; and landmine survivors themselves, like ICBL's Cambodian Ambassador Tun Channereth, and Jerry White and Ken Rutherford, founders of LSN.

Working together in unprecedented networks, they have united in a pledge to win back blighted land, to fulfill our humanitarian duties to the survivors and to eradicate these obstacles to recovery and peace. The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the use and trade of landmines, demands global demining, orders governments to destroy their stockpiles, and calls for a range of assistance to mine victims. 139 nations – two-thirds of our world – have signed and already around 20 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed from global stockpiles.

Jordan was one of the first Middle Eastern states to join the international Mine Ban Treaty in 1998, My husband, who despised this scourge, in 1993 set a goal of the year 2000 for a landmine-free Jordan valley, and vowed to make our beloved country free of landmines forever.

It was a bold move in a region long distinguished by the highest per capita military spending in the world, and a deplorable stockpile of weapons of all kinds including around half

of the world's stock of landmines. In fighting this wasteful militarism, King Hussein envisaged Jordan as a model for the rest of our region and elsewhere. Currently, we are in full compliance with all the terms of, and the timetable set by, the Ottawa Treaty.

Since 1993, we have cleared the Jordan Valley of over 300,000 mines, to allow those who had tilled the earth many years ago, to cultivate it again, and others to unearth once more our region's precious history. Now, although the task is not fully complete, our most holy ground is no longer desecrated by mines, and pilgrims who wish to walk in the paths of the prophets can do so in safety near the Baptism site of Jesus and other landscapes sacred to the World's major religions. It is my hope that one day we will have a holy land entirely free of landmines and conflict.

Yet, much more remains to be done to rid the world of landmines. Without the support of regional powers like Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and especially the United States, the treaty will never achieve its aims. Everyone who cares about this issue is deeply concerned that the United States has not joined the Ban.

Retired Lt. General James Hollingsworth, a former commander of U.S. forces in Korea, has stated that "the world's civilians as much as American soldiers do not deserve to be tragically disfigured, horribly maimed or blown apart by a weapon emplaced in yesterday's battlefields where children now play."

I believe it is a geopolitical reality that U.S. leadership is essential to transform aspirations into action. We need your influence to stigmatize landmine-abusing nations. We need your example and energy to rally the resources for the task. As long as some of the world's major producers and users continue to flout the global consensus, we will never fully root out this menace from our earth. It is therefore a moral imperative for the United States to lend your full authority to this issue, as soon as possible.

People living in the United States do not live with landmines day to day. Children in schools across this country, whatever other threats they may tragically face, do not have to fear **landmines** in their playgrounds. Many say that "Main Street USA" has little concern about what happens to the farmer in Cambodia, the new mother in Eritrea, the small child in Afghanistan, or

the grandmothers in Kosovo and El Salvador.

I am told again and again that the United States has a national aversion to international treaties. Perhaps this is so, but I cannot imagine that any American I have ever **known** could ignore the screams of that dying child in the field outside Sarajevo.. .or that young girl in Lebanon.

My confidence that the American people will support this Ban was reaffirmed yesterday when I met two inspiring gentlemen, highly decorated veterans of World War II. Jack **Wack**, from Bethesda, Maryland, was a deminer. He lost a leg in the Italian Campaign. Duane Robey, a former teacher from North Dakota, was injured on an intelligence and reconnaissance mission on New Year's Eve, 1944.

These two American heroes are with us today because they will not turn away, but, instead, are determined they will see the United States join the **Landmine** Ban in their lifetimes. I cannot imagine a more noble commitment and dream.

Mr. **Wack** and Mr. Robey have committed themselves to the Ban, as have numerous retired military personnel. We all must work to educate the American people about this terrible weapon and do everything possible to build the needed political will.

The Treaty, and 1997 Nobel Prize for Peace, awarded to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, did not signal the end of the **landmine** epidemic. The mass human suffering inflicted by landmines is still with us. The **landmine** story, like the landmines themselves, is not dead. Let's not bury it again.

The media still have a key role to play in these crucial efforts. The campaign never could have come so far without the press highlighting the issue, and for that you deserve heartfelt thanks. But the battle has not yet been won. You, more than anyone, have the power to educate the public about the **landmine** problem, to bring it into our homes where it cannot be ignored, and to catalyze the will to resolve it. You can expose **landmine** abusers, and commend governments and **NGOs** and manufacturers who are promoting positive change, You can put human faces on the harrowing statistics of **landmine** victims and survivors. And you can

remind us every day that this weapon of war still kills, even when the wars are over. I challenge all of you here today to take editorial positions that will make it impossible for politicians to look away from the suffering inflicted by mines, to make it impossible for them to ignore the ban.

I encourage concerned individuals, organizations, and courageous political leaders like Senators Patrick Leahy, Chuck Hagel, Arlen Specter and Representatives Jack Quinn, Jim McGovern, and Lane Evans to continue to voice their concerns and build the political alliances needed to persuade the United States to ban landmines.

Someday, I hope we will understand the contradictions in US landmine policy. The United States leads the world in support for demining efforts and provides significant humanitarian relief to survivors worldwide. In fact yesterday I testified before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. Congressmen Tom Lantos and Henry Hyde are introducing meaningful and far-reaching legislation to provide care and rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration for hundreds of thousands of landmine survivors worldwide. But this generous and peace-loving nation cannot bring itself to destroy its own stockpile of over 10 million mines? The world's remaining superpower, with the most advanced arsenal on the planet, finds it difficult to give up this marginally useful and obsolete weapon.

The Clinton Administration deferred the question until 2006. The stated concern was that US troops might be at risk at the border between North and South Korea. Some maintain landmines might, perhaps, buy a few minutes of time in the event of an infantry war on the Korean Peninsula -but is that worth the cost of deploying something that continues killing long after armies surrender, treaties are signed and peace is declared? The relationship between North and South Korea is changing dramatically, god willing. Meanwhile, if landmine casualties continue at current rates, 150,000 more victims will be claimed while we wait around for 2006.

The new administration has recently announced a comprehensive review of U.S. defense policy. It is my hope that in this process, analysts will determine that landmines and security are not inextricably linked.. ..quite the contrary.

The United States is one of the “holdout” nations with respect to the **landmine** ban, keeping company with China, Pakistan, India, Syria, Iran, Iraq and many others. The United States and Cuba are now the only countries in this hemisphere that have not joined the Ban. The United States and Turkey are the only members of the NATO alliance that have not joined the Ban. HOW can the United States participate with allied nations like England, France, Germany, and even Jordan, in security agreements when these nations are legally bound by the **landmine** ban? In the near future, the United States may find itself isolated when attempting to pursue multilateral military operations with NATO allies who refuse to take part in the transfer or use of antipersonnel mines.

There is a saying in the Koran: “the removal of harmful objects from **the** path is a good deed.”

I pray, God willing, **that** President Bush will lead the United States to remove harmful objects, landmines from the path walked by so many in the global community. By every measure, moral, practical, and even (except when viewed in most narrow terms) political, it is a very good deed – indeed it is the right thing to do. The fight against landmines is an integral part of the fight for peace worldwide,

I can think of no greater gift to the future than to make a giant step towards peace by rendering safe the steps of everyone on our planet. Now is the time to end the curse of landmines, forever.

Thank you,



March 2001
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary McCain,

You were a most **gracious** and charming host for the wonderful lunch we **shared** with our mutual **friends** Ann McLaughlin, Tom **Korologos**, Jane **Olson**, and Jerry **White**. On **behalf** of **Landmine Survivors** Network, I thank you for taking the time to **discuss** the **humanitarian tragedy** of **landmines**.

Since we spoke, another 500 men., **women** and **children** have **stepped** on **landmines**, losing lives and limbs. Fewer **than 10** percent **will** have **access** to **proper medical** or rehabilitative **care**, **let alone social and** economic support. This **is the** urgent humanitarian **challenge** we **face**.

To solve **the landmine** problem, U.S. leadership is **absolutely** essential. Your **leadership** in **particular** will help **move** this **issue forward**. We are **hopeful** the **new Administration** will succeed in **accelerating the timeline** for **the United States to ban forever** the use of **antipersonnel mines**.

Thank you for your **counsel** on engaging the support of **other** prominent **Americans** and your kind **offer** to **set** up a future meeting with **General Jones**. This dialogue: is very important as we **seek** to establish a broad discussion **throughout the** U.S. government and **among respected military** analysts, veterans **and** civil society.

I so enjoyed hearing your perspective on **landmines and other** issues. I look **forward** to working **together toward** our **common humanitarian** goals, and hope **that** you will support **new** legislation this year to **help mine victims** worldwide **recover, heal and** reclaim **their** lives.


With very high esteem and
warm wishes,

Chuck Hagel
Nebraska

United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

March 9, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear M. Secretary: 

I am writing to request that you include the issue of landmines in your policy, force structure and hardware review.

For some time, the Pentagon has implemented a balanced landmine policy that recognizes both the tragic unintended consequences that come from anti-personnel landmines around the world and the responsibility for the safety of our servicemen and women. The Pentagon is continuing to develop new alternatives to landmines as required by law and is spending millions to develop new, innovative and simple de-mining equipment. I support and applaud these efforts.

The U.S. leads the world in the landmine crusade but this fact is often dismissed by the world community because of the U.S. decision to retain mines. A review of landmine use and an aggressive movement to replace landmines with a safer, suitable protector would once again place the United States in the forefront of international landmine policy. The current top-to-bottom Defense Department review seems to me to be an appropriate time for a concentrated appraisal of our progress and policy on landmines.

I look forward to hearing the results of your review and to working with you to ensure the safety of our troops. Thank you.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/4110



MEMORANDUM

Honorary Chair
and Patron
Her Majesty Queen
Noor of Jordan

Chairman
Board of Directors
Jane Olson

Directors
Armand Assante
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Kenneth Rutherford
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Gerard White

Co-Founders
Ken Rutherford
Gerard White

Executive Director
Gerard White

**To: Her Majesty Queen Noor
LSN Board of Directors**

**Fr: Jerry White, Executive Director
David Hawk, Consultant**

**Re: U.S. LANDMINE POLICY AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION**

Date: March 5, 2001

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Current US **landmine** policy does not reflect forward thinking about the best interests of US security. Landmines do not support an **efficient** and highly mobile military and are unnecessarily dangerous to US forces in combat. The previous Administration was unable to coordinate an approach that would permit the US to participate and in fact assume the benefits of a global leadership role.

US leadership in a global **landmine** ban has both political and humanitarian benefits that have not been adequately explored. The Bush Administration has an opportunity to approach **landmine** policy questions and resolve them in a way that benefits and coordinates US defense, foreign policy and humanitarian concerns.

Five **landmine** policy matters will come to the new Administration for consideration, including two policy decisions (1-2) deferred by President Clinton on his last full day in office:

- 1) Whether or not to produce an “alternative” to the present stockpile of old-fashioned mines in Korea;
- 2) Whether or not to combine into the same projectile existing anti-vehicle mines and existing anti-personnel sub-munitions;
- 3) Whether or not the present search for alternatives to existing anti-vehicle mines ~~will produce a “suitable alternative”~~
- 4) How to resolve complications result&g from our NATO partners adherence to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty; and,
- 5) Whether or not to support legislation taking shape in Congress to seek a more comprehensive, integrated and augmented approach to humanitarian mine action.

A world in which anti-personnel mines were effectively banned or shunned, as presently is the case for chemical and biological weapons, would serve US security and humanitarian interests, and the US **will** certainly want to work toward that end. The starting place should be improved government interagency coordination and a large increase in support for mine awareness and **landmine** victim assistance programs,

Anti-personnel mines remain viewed as “force protectors”, even though many military commanders recognize the dangers that **APLs** – even self-detonating ones – pose to our own forces. Thus, it will continue to remain in the interest of the US military to quickly deploy safer, less risky, “**force** protectors.” Further, prominent and respected military commanders hold that “the US Army already has tactics and technology that serve the same purpose of AP mines, blocking the movement of infantry units.”

¹ As former Lt. Gens. James Hollingworth and Henry Emerson put it in a recent op ed piece in the Washington Times (February 25, 2001).

The larger context for the review of APL policy is the modernization and transformation of US military: a force structure for the 21st Century equipped and prepared to deter or else to win the wars of the 21st Century. As those processes get underway, the US **landmine policy** of the early to mid-1990s – the desire to maintain a stockpile of WWII-era mines in Korea – will become increasingly redundant and obsolete. The decreasing marginal utility of these weapons will be outweighed by benefits of joining the treaty regime that seeks to ban these indiscriminate weapons. This will allow the United States to assert leadership within the Mine Ban Treaty regime as well as other arms control forums such as the rather more lethargic consultations on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Such leadership would enhance US prestige and accelerate progress toward **landmine** eradication and victim assistance.

2. THE POLICY BACKGROUND: WHERE CLINTON LEFT OFF

In his September 1994 appeal at the UN General Assembly for an eventual ban on anti-personnel mines, President Clinton performed a great service to **landmine** victims around the world. The original US diplomatic instinct – to negotiate technological **fixes** and limits on the use of landmines primarily with other great powers in UN conventional weapons arms control forums – was not unreasonable as a first step toward an eventual ban. However, those negotiations did not succeed. When several NATO allies (Canada and Norway, initially) and other American friends (Austria, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland, primarily) set off in an attempt to negotiate an outright ban on anti-personnel weapons among “like-minded states,” US diplomacy lost its focus and fell behind the policy curve that Clinton had himself originally set in motion.

Maladroit diplomacy **left** the US as a non-participant in key early negotiating sessions to **draft** a ban treaty. Subsequently, a fierce internal debate about whether the US would even attend the conclusive Oslo negotiations on the **final** text of the Mine Ban Treaty **left** the US in an ungraciously awkward and inopportune position when it was finally decided to participate. Even late night, last minute personal phone calls by President Clinton to **friendly** heads of state could not untangle the knots tied by US **propositions** at Oslo which compounded previous absence with present heavy-handedness.² The result was a landmark Convention banning anti-personnel landmines that the Clinton Administration deemed it could not **sign**.³

Throughout this period, US policy was driven primarily by “the Korea problem” – the desire to retain a stockpile of **WWII-era** anti-personnel **mines** on the Korean peninsula to deter a **1950-style** North Korean invasion across the **DMZ** and protect US forces in **the** event of a North Korea invasion and US counter-attack. (In fairness, it should be recalled that these

² At the Oslo negotiations, the US presented a “package” of four, virtually non-negotiable, demands – some of which even close US allies reluctantly viewed as tantamount to “treaty-busters.”

³ A perverse result of the maladroit US diplomacy during the drafting of the Mine Ban Convention is “definitional” provisions that, as conventionally interpreted, allow the anti-tank mines of our NATO allies. But the same provisions, as conventionally interpreted, are seemingly deemed to disallow US anti-tank mines, even though the US anti-vehicle mine systems indisputably pose considerably less danger to innocent civilians following the end of hostilities than the anti-vehicle mines of our NATO allies.

landmine policy deliberations followed shortly after a virtual “war-scare” level of tension between the US and North Korea over North Korea’s capacity to develop nuclear warheads.)

In fact, however, many US military leaders were and are keenly aware of the danger that our own anti-personnel mines pose to our own troops--given the US war-fighting doctrine of immediate and relentless counter-attack. And the Joint Chiefs were reportedly very close to concluding that the old-fashioned anti-personnel mines (**APLs**) stockpiled in Korea were redundant and obsolete. However, the US Commander **in** Korea wanted to retain the stockpiles. For internal Pentagon reasons, the Joint Chiefs did not want to overrule their **man-**on-the-scene. And President Clinton was not inclined to override the Joint Chiefs.

Instead, the United States initiated a search for alternatives to landmines and stipulated that, if “suitable alternatives” were found, the US would stop using **free-standing APLs** outside of Korea by 2003 and any **free-standing APLs** anywhere by 2006. And, at that point, on those conditions, the US would be able to join the Mine Ban Treaty.

3. LANDMINE POLICY AND THE LANDMINE BAN

The **Landmine** Ban Treaty is one of the most successful humanitarian “treaty regimes” ever. It acquired signatories, ratifications and accessions, and “entered into force” with astonishing speed.⁴ The Mine Ban and the international public campaign that brought the Convention into being have resulted in an extraordinary destruction of existing stockpiles, a huge increase in de-mining efforts, and a (still lagging) impetus for assistance to **landmine** victims. Whatever its purported faults and liabilities, the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty is on its way to creating an “international norm” that stigmatizes anti-personnel mines to the extent that presently extends to chemical and biological weapons.’

The National Interest

A universalized ban on the use of anti-personnel **landmines** would serve US security interests, Pentagon-commissioned strategic studies have long held – primarily because of the United States military’s considerable array of alternative weapons and fire-power.

Ironically, the present primary impediment to the globalization or universalization of a ban on anti-personnel mines is the non-participation of the United States in the 1997 Mine Ban Convention. Russia and China will never forgo anti-personnel mines if the US does not also. The other militarily powers (with long borders and adversarial neighbors) that have not banned anti-personnel landmines – India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Vietnam, etc. – may, like Russia and **China**, not ban **APLs**, even if the US does. But they will not if the Americans do not.

⁴ Following its promulgation in late 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty has acquired, as of February 2001, 139 Signatories and 110 States Parties.

⁵ Almost all non-signatories to the 1997 Ottawa Convention nonetheless pay homage to its goals and say, like the US, that they will join it as soon as their various, particular security concerns are met.

US Policy and the Human Interest

Unfortunately, for all it has already accomplished, the promise of global **landmine** ban will remain severely diminished without US participation. While the U.S. reviews its decision regarding the Ban Treaty, there are a number of policy decisions pending that would put the United States further away from retention and/or use of **APLs** in practice, if not also in law. The US can continue to make **significant** contributions to humanitarian mine action (de-mining and victim assistance). Indeed, the first **landmine** matter likely to come before the Bush Administration is whether to support the **landmine** victim assistance and mine awareness legislation currently taking shape in Congress.

The US and International Treaty Regimes

Republican foreign policy makers tend to come more **from** the 'realpolitik' approach to international **affairs** than some their 'liberal internationalist' Democratic counterparts. This entails less devotion to and more skepticism about international law, in and of itself.

On the other hand, Republican Administrations do support treaty regimes when they are held to serve US interests and are compatible with US policy. Nixon and Bush Senior pursued and supported arms control treaties. And it was President Reagan who obtained Senate consent to **ratify** the human rights conventions signed by President's Truman and Carter. If the **landmine** policy considerations discussed below come to fruition, there should be no intrinsic reason that the George W. Bush Administration could not consider joining the Mine Ban Convention.

US treaty ratification, of course, requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee usually has power to prevent a treaty **from** being 'heard' or coming to the floor of the Senate for a vote. The present Chair, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina is the Mine Ban Convention's most vigorous opponent in the U.S. Senate. Senator Helms (along with Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina) are the last representatives of the segregationist-isolationist bloc in the US Senate that since World War II has frequently viewed international conventions as hostile to US sovereignty, US unilateral initiative, or what used to be called "states rights."

However, should Senator Helms decide to retire or not seek re-election in 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will acquire a much more mainstream composition and Senate consideration of the Mine Ban will no longer be out of the question.

4. HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION

In the meantime, while the United States is a leader in global de-mining **efforts**,⁶ programs for **victim assistance**—like those of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties as well—have lagged

⁶ Through a program known as the "De-mining 2010 Initiative".

considerably as a percentage of humanitarian mine **action**.⁷ Specifically, the Mine Ban Treaty challenges – some would say obligates – states “in a position to do so” to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims, and for mine-awareness programs (multilaterally or bilaterally).

During the course of President Clinton’s two terms, victim assistance programs were run primarily through the USAID Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund. But presently victim assistance programs remain inadequately funded and coordinated. Forthcoming legislation currently under review as the new Congress organizes itself seeks a more comprehensive and integrated approach, coordinated by the Department of State, with participation of HHS, DoD and Veterans Administration. (The legislation would mirror internationally what President Bush has called for domestically in his “Freedom Initiative” to offer support for persons with disabilities.) It seems probable that the management style of the Bush Administration would favor such a planned and systematic approach.

Mine victim assistance usually starts with emergency and primary medical care, followed by physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics. Rehabilitation programs have lagged, and essential social-economic re-integration programs remain rudimentary, indeed virtually unchartered. In developing **mine-affected** countries, isolation for the mine-injured is the norm. Many women mine victims rarely leave their homes. At present, most male mine victims think they have little future other than begging. Indeed, limb-less beggars are often the visible tip of the **landmine** iceberg in mine-affected countries. Outside of Europe and the US, **landmine** victims remain among the very poorest of the world’s poor. It seems reasonable that the compassion approach highlighted by candidate and now President Bush will not turn away from these collaterally-damaged survivors of last century’s wars.

5. THE CONTEXT FOR LANDMINE POLICY I: OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA?

One of the **landmine** policy decisions Clinton deferred to the Bush Administration was whether or not to proceed with production of the work product of the Pentagon’s search for alternatives to the million-odd WWII era anti-personnel mines (**APLs**) stockpiled in South Korea for use in the event of a North Korean invasion. This search for “suitable alternatives,” known as “**Track I**,” yielded a very muddled outcome in which old-fashioned, i.e. “non-self-detonating, non-self-deactivating,” victim-detonated **APLs** would be replaced by a **command-detonation** system dubbed the “**Man-in-the-Loop**” (**MITL**), in which a **human** soldier with a lap-top computer would have to detonate the minefield when the enemy soldiers were observed or sensed crossing into it. But, as currently designed, **MITL** has a “**Battlefield-Override System**” (**BOS**), which, when activated, would reconvert **MITL** to an old-fashioned, victim-activated minefield. Congress previously appropriated set-aside funding for Ottawa Convention-compliant alternatives to **APLs**. But Congressional appropriators would not likely allow these funds to be used to produce and deploy non-Ottawa compliant substitutes such **BOS**-equipped **MITL** weapons.

⁷ Currently, victim assistance is only roughly 10% of overall humanitarian mine action.

However, on its own merits the “man-in-the loop” anti-personnel weapon system without the “battlefield-override system” generates little enthusiasm. (The amount of deadly US and South Korean firepower that would be unleashed upon invading North Korean **infantry** is so awesome, would US military leaders really want to put their own men or women ‘in-the-loop’, close enough to the battlefield to “command-detonate” the minefield?) It is not clear that, given other priorities and hard choices, the Department of Defense will want to spend other Pentagon **funds** on new, improved high-tech anti-personnel mines that are not really all that much better than the existing, cheap, low-tech, old-fashioned ones.

Further, producing the new APL weapon system would end the existing de facto moratorium on **landmine** production in the United States. This risks a negative response in some quarters of the Congress and US public, and even perhaps among US allies -- in order to manufacture new anti-personnel landmines of dubious military utility and significance.

Even more importantly, it is obvious that the threat **from** North Korea is its potential to combine nuclear warheads with intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles, not a Kim Jong II-regime-suicidal Kim II Song-style invasion of South Korea. As of the North Korean Vice Marshal’s and the US Secretary of State exchange of visits to Washington and Pyongyang last year, and the recent North Korea-South Korea summit talks, it appears that the North Koreans are willing to negotiate away their missile development program in exchange for economic assistance, and a regime-survival enhancing political normalization with the US. The outline of such a deal was very close to being on the table at the end of the Clinton Administration. It is possible that, sooner or later, the Bush Administration will attempt to negotiate the **verification** protocols that the Clinton Administration did not have time enough to conclude.

The deal that was almost on the table reportedly includes North Korean willingness to engage in conventional arms “confidence-building” measures – such as diverting North Korean troops immediately above the DMZ to (South Korea-financed) development and construction projects closer to Pyongyang. That potential deal, according to South Korean President Kim Dae Jung without denial or refutation by North Korea, also includes acceptance of a continued US military presence in Korea – re-conjured as a “peace-keeping” force.’

There is already a very strong case that the US stockpiles of old-fashioned **APLs** in Korea are of only marginal utility, **if they** are not already redundant and obsolete. And that, **if used** in war, pose at least as much danger to counter-attacking US forces as they would to the invading North Koreans. In principle, the utility of this stockpile can be considered apart from overall policy and relationships on the Korean peninsula. However, should the above larger policy developments come to pass – and ending the North Korean missile program certainly has its own compelling logic – and particularly if there is a North Korean pull back **from** the DMZ, the US stockpile of WWII era anti-personnel mines will become even more obsolete and redundant than they already are.

^a Leftist radicals and a few other groups in South Korea and Japan, and some isolationists here at home, may favor US military withdrawal from the eastern Pacific. China and Russia may not be entirely adverse to this either. But there is a countervailing Asian-Pacific sentiment that the forward US military presence is stabilizing, and that US withdrawal would lead to an accelerated arms race in Northeast and Southeast Asia. President Kim says that Dear Leader Kim shares this countervailing sentiment.

Relations with North Korea will remain fitful and rocky and North Korea is prone to talk and act roguishly. But it is quite possible that the “Korea problem” in US **landmine** policy will **be** overtaken by events as part of the larger developments in relations between the two **Koreas** and North Korea and the United States’.

6. POTENTIAL POLICY DETERMINATES II: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AND MODERNIZATION

RADAM

The second decision Clinton deferred to the Bush Administration was whether to proceed with the production of RADAM, a new mixed-mine system that would combine in the same projectile seven RAAM (Remote Anti-Armor Mine) mines with five ADAM (the Area Denial Anti-personnel Munition) **mines**.¹⁰ (Presently the anti-tank mines are either air-dropped or shot via artillery, and then the anti-personnel mines are dropped or **fired** on top and along side the anti-tank mines as “anti-handling devices” to prevent enemy soldiers **from** removing or tampering with the anti-tank mines.) This weapon system also encounters opposition by mine ban proponents while, like MITL above, engendering not all that much enthusiasm on its own merit.¹¹

The “NATO Complication ”

All NATO Members except for Turkey and the United States have joined the Mine **Ban** Treaty regime which prohibits the use, stockpiling, or transfer of anti-personnel mines. The Mine Ban Convention also requires “**implementing** legislation” to make the non-use and destruction of anti-personnel mines a matter of national domestic law as well as international treaty law. Presently, on the basis of pre-existing arrangements, the US stockpiles **APLs** in several NATO **countries**.¹² Presumably, the use and modalities of US APL stockpiles in NATO countries are governed by various Status of Forces agreements or Memoranda of Understanding. But as the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation legislation in NATO countries comes on line, it will cause complications for joint war plans, joint training exercises, and possibly the US APL stockpiles themselves.

⁹ Should this come to pass, there would be some inducement for the US and the major State-Parties to the Ottawa Convention (all US allies) to take another look at the prevailing, conventional interpretation of the definition of permissible anti-tank anti-handling devices in the Mine Ban Treaty.

¹⁰ (If used only as anti-handling devices for anti-tank mines, the Pentagon would like to re-classify ADAM as “submunitions” rather than free standing APLs.)

¹¹ It should be noted that ADAM “smart” mines comprise more than 3/4ths of the roughly 12 million mines in the US stockpile of anti-personnel mines (APLs). Conversion to RADAM would facilitate the destruction some 5-6 million of these APLs that are not needed for inclusion within the RADAM projectile.

¹² And some non-NATO States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty as well.

The extent and details of these complications are not yet clear. But they are complicating factors that US **landmine** policy makers will have to take into account. Given the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe (the original **raison d'être** for NATO), as most of the former Warsaw Pact members line up to join NATO, and given the range of alternative weaponry available to core members of the NATO alliance, it should be clear to US policy makers that these particular APL stockpiles are not worth the complications they bring to America's most fundamental alliance.

The Search for Alternatives: Track III

RADAM's purpose, above, is related to the Clinton-commissioned "Track III" search for "suitable alternatives" to current US anti-vehicle mines, usually termed "mixed-mine systems." Anti-vehicle mines have been used up to now, primarily, to re-direct, slow down or immobilize tanks so they can be more easily "**killed**" usually from alongside or **above** with armor piercing projectiles. Or to "shape the battlefield," i.e. as barriers, primarily to prevent one's own forces **from** being outflanked by enemy armored columns (a combination of tanks and highly mobile infantry, often transported in trucks or armored personnel carriers).

But since anti-vehicle mines require the weight, or metallic content, or "engine signature" of a large vehicle to detonate, anti-vehicle mines are almost always equipped with "**anti-handling devices**" to prevent enemy foot soldiers from disabling, destroying or stealing the anti-vehicle mines for their own use. Most countries use mechanical devices or simplistic fuses as "**anti-handling devices**." Uniquely, given its military research budget, the US developed "**self-detonating-self-deactivating**" (so-called "**smart**") anti-personnel mines as anti-handling devices for its anti-vehicle mines. Most of these "smart" mines are timed to blow themselves up **after** four hours, and even those that fail to blow up immediately will de-activate in 30 days when the battery in the battery-operated timer expires. (Nonetheless, they were previously categorized as anti-personnel mines, and some elements within the military hanker to use them as free-standing APLs, not just as anti-handling devices for anti-vehicle **mines**.¹³)

Near the end of Clinton's second term, with Congressional encouragement, the Pentagon commissioned a half-dozen studies by high-powered defense contractors on alternative weapons concepts to the current "mixed-mine" systems. The mandates and parameters of these Pentagon contracts remain "proprietary," i.e. essentially classified. But from their public titles, it appears that these alternative studies have to do mostly with "tank-killing" weapons so fast, powerful and precise, it doesn't matter whether the tank is going 10 miles per hour or 60. Or, for other kinds of barrier mechanisms or devices to deter potential outflanking by enemy armored columns.

The result of these Pentagon-contracted studies should become available within the next six to twelve months. And when they do, they will present the occasion for a review of **landmine** policy, and production/deployment or retirement decisions, by the Bush Administration.

¹³ Reportedly there was considerable concern about the risk that US forces in the Gulf war might run head-long into their own "smart" minefields, because the weaponry is such that modern day battles can turn even more quickly than four hours.

As noted above, during the recent Presidential campaign, candidate Bush spoke enthusiastically about the transformation of the US military – the need for armed forces equipped for the 21st century ready to fight the wars of the 21st Century. The search for alternatives to landmines fits very well indeed with military modernization and transformation. If the military transformation heralded by President Bush is underway there will be a new, and better, context for the particular policy decisions yet to be made on largely obsolete and redundant anti-personnel landmines.

7. CONCLUSION: RENEWED US LEADERSHIP AND PRESTIGE

It has long been recognized that a universalized global ban on anti-personnel mines – that puts **APLs** in the same category as chemical and biological weapons – would serve US security interests. But, as noted above, it is **ironically** the US non-ban position that is the primary **immediate** obstacle to the universalization of a global ban on **APLs**.

The time has come to address and clarify U.S. **landmine** policy—the two policy decisions deferred by the Clinton Administration (whether or not to proceed with production of **RADAM**, and **MITL-BOS**); the coming on line of the Pentagon’s “Track III” and the independent searches for alternatives to existing **APLs**; the *growing* complications with NATO allies; and the need for comprehensive integrated mine action as proposed in legislation taking shape in Congress. Each issue must be reviewed and reconsidered by the Bush Administration. And, as noted above, such reviews potentially will take place in the larger contexts of **overall** relations on the Korean peninsula and military modernization. There is the possibility that the **specific** APL policy decisions made in these larger contexts will obviate the perceived need for stockpiles of US **APLs** around the world, and move the USA closer to the global **landmine** ban.

It is not expected that the Republican Administration would decide **first** to ratify the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty for its own sake and then adjust its **landmine** policy accordingly. However, if US **landmine** policy moves in the direction of the Ban, as expected, the Bush Administration might well see joining the Mine Ban Treaty regime as an opportunity to serve US interests and augment US prestige and leadership in world affairs – all of which would accrue with accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of the world’s nations would applaud this outcome and welcome renewed US leadership on this issue.



LANDMINE
SURVIVORS
NETWORK

**1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty)**

As of 01 February 2001, 139 signatories/accessions and 111 ratifications

COUNTRY	DATE SIGNED	DATE RATIFIED
Albania	Sept. 8, 1998	Feb. 29, 2000
Algeria	Dec. 3, 1997	
Andorra	Dec. 3, 1997	June 29, 1998
Angola	Dec. 4, 1997	
Antigua and Barbuda	Dec. 3, 1997	May 3, 1999
Argentina	Dec. 4, 1997	Sept. 14, 1999
Australia	Dec. 3, 1997	Jan. 14, 1999
Austria	Dec. 3, 1997	June 29, 1998
Bahamas	Dec. 3, 1997	July 31, 1998
Bangladesh	May 7, 1998	Sept. 6, 2000
Barbados	Dec. 3, 1997	Jan. 26, 1999
Belgium	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 4, 1998
Belize	Feb 27, 1998	April 23, 1998
Benin	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 25, 1998
Bolivia	Dec. 3, 1997	June 9, 1998
Bosnia Herzegovina	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 8, 1998
Botswana	Dec. 3, 1997	March 1, 2000
Brazil	Dec. 3, 1997	April 30, 1999
Brunei Darussalam	Dec. 4, 1997	
Bulgaria	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 4, 1998
Burkina Faso	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept 16, 1998
Burundi	Dec. 3, 1997	
Cambodia	Dec. 3, 1997	July 28, 1999
Cameroon	Dec. 3, 1997	
Canada	Dec. 3, 1997	Dec. 3, 1997
Cape Verde	Dec. 4, 1997	
Chad	July 6, 1998	May 6, 1999
Chile	Dec. 3, 1997	
Colombia	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 6, 2000
Cook Islands	Dec. 3, 1997	
Costa Rica	Dec. 3, 1997	March 17, 1999
Cote d'Ivoire	Dec. 3, 1997	June 30, 2000
Croatia	Dec. 4, 1997	May 20, 1998
Cyprus	Dec. 4, 1997	
Czech Republic	Dec. 3, 1997	Oct. 26, 1999

Denmark	Dec. 4, 1997	June 8, 1998
Djibouti	Dec. 3, 1997	May 18, 1998
Dominica	Dec. 3, 1997	March 26, 1999
Dominican Republic	Dec. 3, 1997	June 30, 2000
Ecuador	Dec. 4, 1997	April 29, 1999
El Salvador	Dec. 4, 1997	Jan. 27, 1999
Equatorial Guinea	Sept. 16, 1998	Sept. 16, 1998
Ethiopia	Dec. 3, 1997	
Fiji	Dec. 3, 1997	June 10, 1998
France	Dec. 3, 1997	July 23, 1998
Gabon	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 8, 2000
Gambia	Dec. 4, 1997	
Germany	Dec. 3, 1997	July 23, 1998
Ghana	Dec. 4, 1997	June 30, 2000
Greece	Dec. 3, 1997	
Grenada	Dec. 3, 1997	Aug. 19, 1998
Guatemala	Dec. 3, 1997	March 26, 1999
Guinea	Dec. 4, 1997	Oct. 8, 1998
Guinea-Bissau	Dec. 3, 1997	
Guyana	Dec. 4, 1997	
Haiti	Dec. 3, 1997	
Holy See	Dec. 4, 1997	Feb. 17, 1998
Honduras	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 24, 1998
Hungary	Dec. 3, 1997	April 6, 1998
Iceland	Dec. 4, 1997	May 5, 1999
Indonesia	Dec. 4, 1997	
Ireland	Dec. 3, 1997	Dec. 3, 1997
Italy	Dec. 3, 1997	April 23, 1999
Jamaica	Dec. 3, 1997	July 17, 1998
Japan	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 30, 1998
Jordan	Aug. 11, 1998	Nov. 13, 1998
Kenya	Dec. 5, 1997	Jan. 23, 2001
Kiribati	Sept. 7, 2000	Sept. 7, 2000
Lesotho	Dec. 4, 1997	Dec. 2, 1998
Liberia	Dec. 23, 1999	Dec. 23, 1999
Liechtenstein	Dec. 3, 1997	Oct. 5, 1999
Lithuania	Feb. 26, 1999	
Luxembourg	Dec. 4, 1997	June 14, 1999
Macedonia	Sept. 9, 1998	Sept. 9, 1998
Madagascar	Dec. 4, 1997	Sept. 16, 1999
Malawi	Dec. 4, 1997	Aug. 13, 1998
Malaysia	Dec. 3, 1997	April 22, 1999
Maldives	Oct. 1, 1998	Sept. 7, 2000
Mali	Dec. 3, 1997	June 2, 1998
Malta	Dec. 4, 1997	
Marshall Islands	Dec. 4, 1997	
Mauritania	Dec. 3, 1997	July 26, 2000
Mauritius	Dec. 3, 1997	Dec. 3, 1997
Mexico	Dec. 3, 1997	June 9, 1998
Moldova, Republic of	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 8, 2000
Monaco	Dec. 4, 1997	Nov. 17, 1998
Mozambique	Dec. 3, 1997	Aug. 25, 1998

Namihia	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 21, 1998
Nauru	Aug. 7, 2000	Aug. 7, 2000
Netherlands	Dec. 3, 1997	April 12, 1999
New Zealand	Dec. 3, 1997	Jan. 27, 1999
Nicaragua	Dec. 4, 1997	Nov. 30, 1998
Niger	Dec. 4, 1997	March 23, 1999
Niue	Dec. 3, 1997	April 15, 1998
Norway	Dec. 3, 1997	July 9, 1998
Panama	Dec. 4, 1997	Oct. 7, 1998
Paraguay	Dec. 3, 1997	Nov. 13, 1998
Peru	Dec. 3, 1997	June 17, 1998
Philippines	Dec. 3, 1997	Jan. 10, 2000
Poland	Dec. 4, 1997	
Portugal	Dec. 3, 1997	Feb. 19, 1999
Qatar	Dec. 4, 1997	Oct. 13, 1998
Romania	Dec. 3, 1997	Nov. 30, 2000
Rwanda	Dec. 3, 1997	June 8, 2000
Saint Kitts & Nevis	Dec. 3, 1997	Dec. 2, 1998
Saint Lucia	Dec. 3, 1997	April 13, 1999
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	Dec. 3, 1997	
Samoa	Dec. 3, 1997	July 23, 1998
San Marino	Dec. 3, 1997	March 18, 1998
Soa Tome et Principe	April 30, 1998	
Senegal	Dec. 3, 1997	Sept. 24, 1998
Seychelles	Dec. 4, 1997	June 2, 2000
Sierra Leone	July 19, 1998	
Slovakia	Dec. 3, 1997	Feb. 25, 1999
Slovenia	Dec. 3, 1997	Oct. 27, 1998
Solomon Islands	Dec. 4, 1997	Jan. 26, 1998
South Africa	Dec. 3, 1997	June 26, 1998
Spain	Dec. 3, 1997	Jan. 19, 1999
Sudan	Dec. 4, 1997	
Suriname	Dec. 4, 1997	
Swaziland	Dec. 4, 1997	Dec. 23, 1998
Sweden	Dec. 4, 1997	Nov. 30, 1998
Switzerland	Dec. 3, 1997	March 24, 1998
Tajikistan	Oct. 12, 1999	Oct. 12, 1999
Tanzania, United Republic of	Dec. 3, 1997	Nov. 13, 2000
Thailand	Dec. 3, 1997	Nov. 27, 1998
Togo	Dec. 4, 1997	March 9, 2000
Trinidad & Tobago	Dec. 4, 1997	April 27, 1998
Tunisia	Dec. 4, 1997	July 9, 1999
Turkmenistan	Dec. 3, 1997	Jan. 19, 1998
Uganda	Dec. 3, 1997	Feb. 25, 1999
Ukraine	Feh. 24, 1999	
United Kingdom	Dec. 3, 1997	July 31, 1998
Uruguay	Dec. 3, 1997	
Vanuatu	Dec. 4, 1997	
Venezuela	Dec. 3, 1997	April 14, 1999
Yemen	Dec. 4, 1997	Sept. 1, 1998
Zambia	Dec. 12, 1997	Feb. 23, 2001
Zimbahwe	Dec. 3, 1997	June 18, 1998



1997 Mine Ban Treaty – NON SIGNATORIES

As of 4 December 2000

1. Afghanistan
2. Armenia
3. Azerbaijan
4. Bahrain
5. Belarus
6. Bhutan
7. Central African Republic
8. China
9. Comoros
10. Congo (Brazzaville)
11. Cuba
12. D.R. Congo
13. Egypt
14. Eritrea
15. Estonia
16. Finland
17. Georgia
18. India
19. Iran
20. Iraq
21. Israel
22. Kazakhstan
23. Korea, North
24. Korea, South
25. Kuwait
26. Kyrgyzstan
27. Laos
28. Latvia
29. Lebanon
30. Libya
31. Micronesia
32. Mongolia
33. Morocco
34. Myanmar (Burma)
35. Nepal
36. Nigeria
37. Oman
38. Pakistan
39. Palau
40. Papua New Guinea
41. Russia
42. Saudi Arabia
43. Singapore
44. Somalia
45. Sri Lanka
46. Syria
47. **Togo**
48. Turkey
49. Tuvalu
50. United Arab Emirates
51. United States of America
52. Uzbekistan
53. Vietnam
54. Yugoslavia



MISSION

Created by and for survivors, Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) links victims in mine-affected countries to a range of rehabilitative services, provides peer counseling and direct assistance, and promotes social and economic reintegration. LSN strives to protect future generations from the scourge of landmines.

BACKGROUND

LSN is the first international organization created by **landmine** survivors for survivors. The Network's goal is to facilitate among mine victims the comprehensive rehabilitation they need to become accepted and productive members of their communities. LSN was founded in 1995 by two American **landmine** survivors, Jerry White and Ken Rutherford, to help hundreds of thousands of mine victims who live in more than 60 countries now infested with millions of mines. Based in Washington, DC, and registered as a nonprofit international charitable organization in 1997, LSN works to help mine victims and their families recover through an integrated program of peer counseling, sports, and social and economic reintegration into their communities. Someone steps on a **landmine** somewhere in the world every twenty-two minutes. In many countries where landmines are prevalent, victims lose more than a leg or arm; they often lose their place as valued and respected members of their society. Though LSN cannot give back their hands, feet or eyes, LSN works with survivors to support their efforts to reclaim their lives.

PHILOSOPHY

LSN adheres to the "International Guidelines for Survivor Assistance" drafted by the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Working Group on Victim Assistance.

1. LSN promotes comprehensive rehabilitative care as expressed in the global Mine Ban Treaty, which calls for the "care and rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims."
2. LSN seeks to invest in local resources and infrastructure and does not support removing **landmine** survivors and other war victims from their country to provide basic services.
3. LSN recommends that fitting of prosthetic limbs must include proper physical therapy, gait training and timely follow-up for adjustments and repair as needed.
4. LSN stresses the importance of engaging persons with disabilities and involving local staff at all levels of programming and in project development and management.

ACTIONS

LSN is directly involved in two main actions to support victims of landmines – overseas project development and advocacy work for the ban on anti-personnel landmines. Project development focuses on empowering **landmine** survivors and other persons with limb loss to establish support networks that address psychological issues, need for information and assistance with reintegration into the community. LSN's advocacy role emphasizes the need to engage survivors at all levels of programming and encourages countries to sign and implement the Mine Ban Treaty.

LSN PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

LSN believes that effective assistance must include an integrated program that takes into account the whole person and their community. Replacing a missing limb with an artificial one is important but, by itself, a prosthesis is not a cure-all. Follow-on care is needed to ensure recovery. Currently, LSN has peer support Networks launched or under development in Bosnia, El Salvador, Jordan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Mozambique.

Core Elements of LSN Project Activities Include:

1. *Peer Support for All Amputees:* LSN conducts hospital and home visits to assess needs, offer psychological and social support, and educate families about the effects of limb loss.
2. *Survivor Interviews:* Following a standard format, interviews are conducted by trained staff (in areas targeted for LSN action) to assess living conditions and needs for the rehabilitation and integration of survivors. Providing the opportunity for survivors to recount their trauma to an empathetic listener can have therapeutic and other health benefits.
3. *Rehabilitation Directory:* LSN identifies government and non-government support services available in local communities and nationally. Each Network will produce an up-to-date directory of organizational contacts used in networking to link victims to rehabilitative services.
4. *Referrals:* LSN performs a "social work role" in mine-affected communities, linking individual survivors and their families to existing services.
5. *Direct Assistance:* When no help or services are available, LSN follows specific "guidelines for giving" adapted for each country to offer the direct help or material support needed for recovery.
6. *Resource Library:* Educational materials are developed and available to survivors and their families to address a range of issues related to landmines, limb loss and rehabilitation including an electronic database on the needs of mine victims and services available to help them.
7. *Advocacy:* - LSN works closely with local and international organizations to protect the human rights of all persons with disabilities and to promote equal access to community activities, education, employment opportunities, physical recreation and sports.

Personnel:

1. LSN employs local **landmine** survivors as outreach workers trained to educate and help others who have experienced limb loss and to raise awareness of the dangers posed by landmines.
2. **LSN's** international headquarters in Washington, DC, provides guidance, training and educational materials for each country Network. Depending on the qualifications and need of each Network, LSN may employ an "Advisor" to assist in the Network set-up. An expatriate or local consultant with international experience can fill this role.

GLOBAL ADVOCACY WORK

Since 1995, LSN has played a lead role in the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines, urging governments to eradicate mines and provide for the rehabilitation of hundreds of thousands of mine victims worldwide. At conferences around the world, the firsthand accounts of survivors have proved indispensable in forcing governments to confront the human suffering inflicted by mines. LSN's founders and associates have appeared regularly in the media to draw attention to the needs of mine victims and their families. LSN serves on the Coordinating Committee of the ICBL, and is the Chair of the first Global Taskforce on Victim Assistance.

Her Majesty Queen Noor of Jordan is Patron of Landmine Survivors Network.



LANDMINE
SURVIVORS
NETWORK

LANDMINE FACT SHEET

Landmine Survivors Network

Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) is the **first** international organization created by **landmine survivors for landmine survivors**. The Network's goal is to **facilitate** among mine victims the comprehensive rehabilitation they need to become accepted and productive members of their communities. LSN was founded by two American **landmine survivors**, Ken Rutherford and Jerry White, in order to help the thousands of victims of landmines who live in more than 60 countries now infested with millions of mines. Based in Washington DC and established as a nonprofit international organization in 1997, LSN works to help mine victims and their **families** recover through an integrated program of peer counseling, sports, and social and economic reintegration- LSN strives to protect future generations **from** the scourge of landmines.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

LSN is one of 15 organizations serving on the Steering Committee of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The ICBL works toward an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and sale, transfer, or export of antipersonnel landmines; the signing, ratification, implementation, and monitoring of the mine bane treaty; increased resources for humanitarian demining, mine awareness programs, and survivor assistance. The ICBL represents over 1,100 human rights, demining, humanitarian, children's, veterans', medical, development, arms control, **religious**, environmental, and women's groups in over 60 countries, who work locally, nationally, regionally and internationally to ban antipersonnel landmines. In 1997, the TCBL and its coordinator, Jody Williams, received the Nobel Prize.

The Mine Ban Treaty

The Mine Ban Treaty is formally referred to as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and On Their Destruction. The Treaty is also known as the Ottawa Convention after being signed by over 100 countries in Ottawa, Canada in December 1997. The Treaty was ratified in September 1997 after the required 40 ratifications were reached, faster than any treaty in history. On March 1, 1999 the Treaty became binding international law for the first 40 ratifiers. Entry in force will occur for other countries six months after their individual dates of ratification. The Treaty requires destruction of stockpiled mines in four years, and destruction of mines already in the ground within ten years. The Treaty's provisions for providing assistance to **landmine** victims and increasing mine awareness also take effect. As of September 8,200, there are 139 signatories to the treaty and 107 ratifications.

Landmines

There are two categories of landmines: antipersonnel (AP) and antitank or anti-vehicle (AT): **An anti-personnel (AP) mine** is "A mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons." (**Mine Ban Treaty definition**) **An anti-tank (AT) landmine** is a device designed to detonate under more than 100 kilograms of pressure. AT mines cannot distinguish between a tank and tractor.

There are different types of **AP** mines according to the types of injuries they inflict: **Blast mines** are usually hand-laid or under the ground or scattered from the air. The explosive force of the mine causes foot, leg, and groin injuries and secondary infections usually result in amputation. **Fragmentation mines** are usually laid on or under the ground and are activated by **tripwire** or **other** means. When detonated the explosion projects hundreds of fragments at ballistic speed of up to 50 meters resulting in fragmentation **wounds**. Some fragmentation mines **lift** above the ground (**about 1 to 1.5 meters**) before detonating, resulting in upper body injuries or even decapitation.

Number of Mines

Over 400 million landmines have been deployed since the beginning of World War **Two** – of which 65 million have been laid in the past 15 years. Between 80-19 million lie in wait in approximately 70 countries and a further 100 million are stockpiled ready for use. **Each** year between 5 and 10 million new mines are produced. The average cost per **landmine** is between **US\$ 3.00 and \$30.00**.

Mine Clearance

Humanitarian **deminers** use a toolbox of devices to clear mines: a sensitive metal detector to detect mines with metallic content, vegetation cutters to clear the terrain, a metal prodder to hand probe the ground every square inch, and sometimes dogs to locate the scent of the mines explosive. It is dangerous, time-consuming and costly work. Sometimes heavy equipment, **such** as flails and rollers are used to limited success. Demining technology has not caught up with the advances in mine manufacturing technology but a number of processes are now being developed, including the use of ground penetrating radar and passive infrared detection. Such methods may still be many years away **from** reliable application in the rice paddies of Cambodia, mountains of Afghanistan and dense vegetation of Mozambique, The main question is whether high-tech solutions will ultimately be cheap and accessible to help those who truly need it: the rural poor of the world's developing countries,

Mine Victims

There are over 300,000 **landmine** survivors world-wide. Every 22 minutes, someone is killed or maimed by a landmine. Landmines continue to claim over 500 victims a week, 26,000 people a year. Three-dollar antipersonnel landmines have killed more people than all the Cold War weapons of mass destruction combined. In Cambodia alone, some 40,000 people, or one person in 250, have lost limbs to mines. Landmines killed no fewer than 85 peacekeepers in **Bosnia**. There were 33 US **landmine** casualties in the Gulf War, and 64,000 US **landmine** casualties during the Vietnam and Korean wars.



TO WALK WITHOUT

LANDMINES

The Global Movement
to Ban Landmines

Edited by Maxwell A. Cameron,
Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin

CHAPTER 7

THE ROLE OF THE LANDMINE SURVIVORS NETWORK

Jerry White and Ken Rutherford

When the Ottawa Convention was signed in December 1997, it included a clause to provide humanitarian relief for the hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children who have been maimed by landmines. It was an unprecedented achievement that came about through the efforts of many people. But, most importantly, landmine survivors themselves played a central role in ensuring that the people most wounded by these inhumane devices would not be forgotten in the first treaty to ban their use. Landmine victim statistics are well known to many people, but after a while the numbers become mind-numbing. It is easy to forget that there is a face and a name behind each landmine casualty. Also less well understood is the personal horror that each victim experiences in the moments after an explosion. Landmines tear off limbs and shoot shrapnel and dirt into the body. Even one's own bones become projectiles. If the eyes are not blinded during an explosion, a victim can see his own body torn, mangled, and bleeding. Without nearby help, the unfortunate victim usually dies alone.

The voices of landmine survivors were first heard at the international level at the Vienna conference in September 1995. In an unusual development, representatives of NGOs working directly with landmines and landmine victims were invited to speak to the delegate assembly. It was not just another diplomatic discussion with government officials stating the same stale points of view. Instead, people who were experiencing the tragedy firsthand were helping to set the tone of the discussions. During their speeches, persons injured by landmines from Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the United States provided powerful evidence for urging the ban on these weapons.

THE VOICES

Ken Rutherford (United States): "In December of 1993, I was working in Somalia with the International Rescue Committee. I was inspecting a program site near the border with Ethiopia when my car hit a landmine. After the explosion, I saw my foot lying on the floorboard of the car. I thought, 'Is it mine?' I kept trying to put it back on. I dragged myself out of the car and called for help on my radio. I am here today because of the resources I had at my disposal. I had a radio, airplanes evacuated me to a hospital, and

I returned to the United States to receive, to date, over \$300,000 in medical care. Needless to say, most mine victims are not so lucky.'

Jerry White (United States): 'I was only four years old when Syrian soldiers, retreating during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, laid Soviet-supplied mines in the Golan Heights. My mine waited silently in the ground for 17 years before it exploded under my right foot while I was hiking in an unmarked minefield. I wasn't a soldier. I was a student taking a break from studies to explore the Middle East. There were no fences and no signs to keep me out. I was lucky I had friends with me and a farmer nearby who heard the blast. All the talk about fencing and marking minefields is a distraction from the real problem: how to stop the proliferation of landmines. Even in a small, security-conscious state like Israel, fences break down, signs fade, fall, or are stolen, and mines shift.'

Abdul Rahman Sahak (Afghanistan): 'Can you think for a moment what a human being would suffer in this situation? Imagine the extent of the injuries and pain while struggling between life and death with blood all around. I am proud to be a spokesman for my country. I would like to join the voices of my disabled' brothers and sisters . . . to call for a total ban on production of all types of mines.'

As the UN landmine conference unfolded, however, the disabled participants felt they were being relegated to the conference sidelines. While most conference attendees were respectful, there was a sense that no one quite knew what to do about the needs of the survivors. As landmine survivors themselves, the authors saw a need to increase the volume and to become more a part of the process. The authors discussed the need for more representation for landmine survivors both within the ICBL and at conferences. If this debate was about landmines, then who was more suited than survivors to provide evidence of the indiscriminate nature of the weapon?

GENEVA: THE UN CCW CONFERENCE

In April 1996, at the follow-up conference in Geneva, the issue causing the most disappointment was that the needs of the victims, mostly civilians injured through *no* fault of their own, were not being discussed. Our landmine-disabled friends had travelled a great distance to Geneva, only to discover apathy concerning their needs. Did no one really care, or had the needs of survivors not been properly communicated? One of the slogans of the international campaign had been 'to speak for those who cannot speak for themselves'. Perhaps the time had come for landmine survivors to start speaking on their own behalf+

At that time, in Switzerland, the authors decided to create a new international organization, the Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), to become a powerful advocate for those disabled by mines and to offer practical assistance to one of the most vulnerable populations in the world. It was a radical concept in some ways: a new NGO staffed by landmine survivors to empower and offer peer support to other survivors. The authors recognized that in the fellowship of suffering that survivors share, there is also empowerment and strong motivation to do whatever it takes to end the suffering. A strong bond began to form among mine victims, along with a strong desire to work together towards a global ban and to find help for the wounded.

Together, the survivors decided to increase the pressure on governments and international organizations. First, Ken Rutherford and Tun Channareth, a Cambodian landmine survivor, introduced the 'Wall of Remembrance', a photographic collection of mine victims in Batrambang Province, Cambodia. The victims were injured between the closing of the Vienna CCW conference in October 1995 and the opening of the Geneva CCW conference in April 1996. During this brief period there were more than 230 mine accidents in a province of fewer than 250,000 Cambodians. Behind the Wall of Remembrance display, the ICBL had set up an electronic counter that clicked every 22 minutes to signal another mine victim injured somewhere in the world. Like the Wall of Remembrance display, the scoreboard only counted victims since the end of the UN ccw landmine conference in Vienna. By the end of the Geneva conference the haunting clicker had registered nearly 15,000 new victims.

Tun Channareth, known as Reth by his friends worldwide, has been an inspiring leader in the global movement to rid the world of anti-personnel mines. Reth lost both his legs to a landmine in 1982 near the Thai-Cambodian border. His friend had to carry him nearly 30 kilometres to a medical post for emergency care. Reth has travelled the world and met with scores of world leaders and various groups to discuss the impact of mines on countries such as Cambodia and call for much-needed assistance for mine-contaminated communities. At the conference Reth told the delegates that 'if it were their children being blown up' they would have already banned landmines. He then asked, 'How can so many clever people sit together for two weeks and fail to do what ordinary people back home are asking them to do?'

The second way that landmine survivors amplified their voices at the Geneva ccw was at a press conference organized by Jerry White and a team of budding LSN 'associates' working under the umbrella of the ICBL. In the main lobby of the United Nations conference centre, survivors read a

statement, 'We Are Outraged', Survivors from Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, England, Bosnia, and the United States voiced their anger and frustration with the world's diplomats and politicians. **One** by one, the survivors removed their prosthetic limbs, describing their personal encounters with mines and calling on the world's diplomats to ban these weapons. In their statement, the mine-injured asked, 'Why do you covet weapons that primarily kill civilians and do not discriminate between soldiers, women, and children? Most of the delegates here have never seen a mine-field or experienced firsthand the horror caused by landmines. One short visit to a mine-infected country would do wonders to cure the indifference of the world's politicians and diplomats.' The press conference included testimonies from the authors, Tun Channareth, and other persons with disabilities who had travelled on crutches and in wheelchairs to speak out.

MORE VOICES

A young Cambodian boy, Khern Man So, recounted: 'I was blown up in Cambodia . . . in January. I was going to school with two friends when they picked up a **landmine** and were killed. We didn't know it was a mine. I am 14 years old and now have only one leg. Why did they just make it easier to make new mines?'

A brave Bosnian survivor, Pero Jakic, recalled: 'I was injured by a mine while visiting my burnt-out house in Sarajevo. Mines will prevent families from returning to their villages. My closest neighbour and her 17-year-old son were killed by a **landmine** when they went back to visit their former home. I came here to describe what people are suffering in Sarajevo and other parts of the world. I would like the whole world to know that producers of mines must stop now so that people don't die and so that there are no more handicapped.'

Mozambique's leading disability rights advocate, Farida Gulamo, said: 'For years, I have witnessed the human suffering and economic devastation caused by landmines in my country. Mozambique's richness is in its agriculture, but landmines have devastated the rural areas where farmers can no longer safely grow crops. It saddens me to watch these diplomats discuss ways to improve mines. Don't they see the humanitarian crisis?'

Usman Fitrat, 25 years old and from Afghanistan, shared his own poignant story: 'I was 11 years old when my mother and cousin were mercilessly killed by landmines on the way home from a local health clinic. Ten days later, I lost both my hands and my left eye in a mine explosion. My own grandmother saw it and thought I was dead. Let me ask one question: What was my fault and that of several hundred thousands of innocent

people who have been killed or maimed by mines in Afghanistan? I condemn the use of mines and can't believe that this conference has agreed to their continued use.'

British mine-clearance expert Chris Moon also spoke forcefully: 'I accept the loss of my right lower leg and hand with good grace because I chose to run humanitarian mine-clearance teams. For this reason, I do not consider myself a victim but want to point out that people in mined areas have no choice. Blown up by a mine in Mozambique in March 1995, I have sympathy for mine victims. In fact, I ran in the London Marathon a year after my accident to assist those less fortunate because I believe actions speak louder than words.' True to his word, Chris continues to raise money for **landmine** survivors through actions. In 1997, he also ran marathons in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Australia and ran 150 miles in the Sahara Desert to raise over \$150,000 to make artificial limbs for amputees in Vietnam. Chris also raised awareness of the **Landmine** Survivors Network when he carried the Olympic torch during the opening ceremony of the 1998 Winter Olympics at Nagano, Japan.

In Geneva, **landmine** survivors met in small groups and targeted their messages one-by-one to intransigent government delegations. In sum, survivors said they came to Geneva 'to put a human face on the mass suffering caused by landmines. We have travelled a long distance with crutches, artificial limbs, and wheelchairs to tell our personal stories in the hope that the world's diplomats would listen to our plea to ban anti-personnel **land**-mines from the earth. But this conference has turned a deaf ear to our cries. We have no choice but to denounce the CCW's shameful agreement.' The statement concluded: 'We were warned that this conference would not address our desire for an immediate and total ban. But we had no idea that the conference would settle for such a reprehensible agreement. Therefore, we cannot support it and we must express our outrage.'

DEFINING VICTIM ASSISTANCE

What, exactly, is meant by victim assistance? What kind of structure is needed to co-ordinate assistance? Which categories of humanitarian relief should be included? The LSN began to define survivor assistance to include the 'care and rehabilitation provided for the immediate and long-term needs of mine victims, their family members and/or dependants, and mine-affected communities. Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, emergency and medical care; access to prosthetics, wheelchairs and other assistive devices; social and economical reintegration; psychological and peer support; accident prevention programs; and legal and advisory

services.' The definition of 'victim assistance' was derived from discussions with other NGOs active in the ICBL as well as from informal discussions with government and UN representatives.

Looking into the needs of the victims, especially in developing countries, the LSN was nearly overwhelmed by the desperation of thousands of survivors with no access to affordable care. Aside from the emergency and acute medical care required immediately following a mine blast, the production and training for the use of assistive devices, including prosthetics, wheelchairs, crutches, and specially designed transportation, are of urgent necessity. There is also a need for psychosocial support programs, data collection of mine-affected populations, mine awareness programs, social reintegration, employment opportunities, and legal services. It was obvious that, to offer this range of services, landmine survivors would need to enlist the help of all governments and NGOs pushing for a ban treaty. Today, an enormous gap exists between rehabilitative care available in affluent countries and what most mine victims receive in developing countries recovering from years of war. For example, the American authors of this chapter have received care approaching a combined cost of \$800,000.¹ This is in contrast to the United Nations estimate that the average lifetime care of a landmine victim is between \$5,000 and \$7,000.

Another question was how to define landmine victims. In consultation with other NGOs, the LSN proposed a broad definition: 'human beings impaired due to physical, psychological, social or economic harm or injury caused by the explosion of landmines; family members and/or dependants of the mine-disabled or mine fatalities; all human beings affected by the existence of mines who, due to the threat of mines, could not or cannot pursue their normal activities.'

In late 1995, very few people in the campaign were pushing for victim assistance. Several organizations such as Veterans International, Handicap International, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were, of course, providing prosthetics and other assistance in the field, but NGOs were not lobbying for such assistance to be part of the talking points for solving the landmine problem. The pursuit of a global ban was the central, unrelenting focus of the ICBL. On the surface, at least, it seemed logical that wealthier states would resist the inclusion of landmine victim assistance in the treaty, as many of them do not have landmine-disabled populations. Any mine victim assistance provided by these states would necessarily go to foreign populations. And poorer countries, those most affected by landmines, have limited means and infrastructure to support the growing number of survivors. Victim assistance seemed a no-win situation for garnering political support.

Meanwhile, the United Nations was still talking about legitimizing new types of landmines, and a global ban seemed years, if not decades, away. Some members of the campaign, though reluctant to say so publicly, believed that insisting on victim assistance measures would just muddy the waters and potentially give governments another excuse for not committing to a ban of any sort. Landmine survivors respectfully disagreed. As the debate continued over the next few months, much was made of 'the poor victims'. One of the biggest challenges was to convince other campaigns that survivors were more than just 'poster children' for the ban movement. Strangely, it was as if amputees had to demonstrate that though landmines had blown off limbs and left horrible scars, survivors' minds, dreams, and humanity were still intact.

The Landmine Survivors Network, now an official NGO, decided to take its concerns regarding the need for victim assistance directly to policy makers. Not willing to wait until other campaigners understood the centrality of victim assistance to the larger issue of banning landmines, the LSN charged ahead by setting up independent meetings with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the American Red Cross, and the US National Security Council, Department of Defense, State Department, and Agency for International Development (USAID). We hammered away at the same message--of course, a global ban was imperative, but a 'paper' treaty that did not take into account the urgent need to help rehabilitate hundreds of thousands of survivors would be a tragically missed opportunity. To our thinking, victim assistance had to be a part of any meaningful discussion on how to stop the mass suffering caused by mines. Solving the landmine problem would require an integrated approach that took into account the need for accelerated mine clearance and survivor assistance.

In a May 1996 letter, Jerry White, Ken Rutherford, and Marianne Holtz, an American nurse who lost both legs to a landmine in Zaire in 1995, strongly urged US President Clinton to remember that 'most mine victims are civilians, including women and children. Many have trouble supporting their families and many are ostracized and denied proper medical attention or rehabilitation.' The President's response communicated his desire to secure a special exemption for mines in Korea and that he had instructed the Secretary of Defense to look into improving demining technology. No mention was made about victim assistance. In his defence of US policy, the President seemed blind to the humanitarian need for urgent action to protect civilian populations.

In October of 1996, the LSN demonstrated a prototype of the first database designed to track the needs of mine victims worldwide and the limited resources to help them. As word of the LSN's new information strategy

started to reach mine victims in all regions, it began to serve as a small clearinghouse of information and resources. By 1998, the database contained profiles of scores of landmine survivors and their families in Mozambique, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. It also contains detailed information on over 1,000 organizations and has been used by media and NGOs alike as a source of information about the world's mine-affected people and communities. But, while a database is useful to keep track of needs, it cannot meet those needs. Only by engaging the international community in a global effort would the LSN succeed in its efforts to respond to the pleas of landmine survivors.

OTTAWA CONFERENCE, 1996

At the October 1996 landmine conference in Ottawa, the LSN called for an integrated approach to mine action, including a ban, accelerated mine clearance, and increased assistance for survivors. At the time, the call for a global ban was receiving the greatest attention. The ICBL was still calling for legalizing some mines and for increasing the metallic content of older mines so that they would be easier to detect. The ICBL and its members, including the LSN, were calling for nothing less than an immediate and comprehensive ban without loopholes. Victim assistance and demining were secondary goals of the ICBL, however. The LSN approached the ICBL co-ordinator to determine whether its leadership would object to the LSN's efforts to promote effective victim assistance in Ottawa. There was no response, so the LSN took matters into its own hands and prepared to fight for the rights of survivors. As the victims who had stared out from silent photographs for too long, the Landmine Survivors Network believed it was time to be heard.

The LSN found an ally in Jill Sinclair, an official in Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Sinclair understood Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy's sympathy for mine victims, and her office helped arrange for the LSN to make a presentation to the plenary meeting of the Ottawa conference. Speaking on the final day of the conference, Jerry White made a statement that was intended as a wake-up call:

Despite all the talk about the human suffering of mine victims, it seems that we still have trouble putting our money where our mouth is. What is really being done to help these victims? Very little, I'm afraid. I do not doubt that every person in this audience is horrified and personally moved by the stories of landmine victims—you'd need a heart of stone not to be.

I am also convinced that individuals, NGOs, and governments all want to help. But why is it that victim assistance has not moved beyond the rhetorical level? Survivors tend to be awfully strong and motivated people. They want a chance to be productive again, not to become dependent on charity.

White ended his statement by encouraging the Canadian government to honour its own survivors--the brave peacekeepers now threatened by landmines spread throughout the former Yugoslavia. He reminded the Canadians of Mark Isfeld, 'one of Canada's finest military sons, who was killed removing mines in Croatia in 1994 on his third peacekeeping duty'. Mark's father, Brian Isfeld, was sitting among the governmental and NGO delegates as White went on to describe how 'Mark cared deeply about stopping landmines from killing children. He would take candy and little dolls knit by his mother, Carol, to hand out to the children where he served.' Brian and Carol Isfeld are landmine survivors. They, like hundreds of thousands of families worldwide, know what it means to have your life suddenly and forever changed by losing a loved one to these cruel and unpredictable weapons.

By the end of the Ottawa conference, victim assistance had received rhetorical support as something that should be included in the treaty. The American and Irish delegations seemed keenly interested in pursuing the issue, and Canada appeared ready to take a leadership role. Without their early interest, victim assistance might very well have stayed on the shelf. But now, there was a glimmer of hope that mine victims would get the support they needed to help each other on the road to recovery.

The LSN privately urged the ICBL members to help landmine survivors get proper care instead of just flying them around the world to speak at international landmine conferences. Usman Fitrat, for example, was given a false eye during his trip to the Ottawa, thanks to the *pro bono* assistance provided by Canadian eye specialists, Thomas Dean and Dr A.G. Watson, who enthusiastically heeded the call by the LSN to help mine victims, and the Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights pitched in to make sure Usman made it to all his eye appointments between media interviews and panel discussions.

MOZAMBIQUE NGO LANDMINE CONFERENCE

In February of 1997, the Fourth International NGO Landmine Conference was held in Mapuro, Mozambique—an appropriate venue as Africa is the most mined-contaminated continent in the world, with Angola alone

having tens of thousands of amputees from **landmine** explosions. Once again, the LSN was asked to identify and invite survivors to participate in the conference. We came with high hopes, even arranging for Bosnian **landmine** survivors to join us in Maputo. While eager to embrace the survivors, conference participants appeared unsure of how best to include their disabled guests in the dialogue on the treaty and the role of victim assistance. This was something that required focus through the eyes of survivors themselves. 'The challenge was to communicate effectively survivors' needs without offending the incredibly committed and hard-working conference planners.

LSN organized a dinner for the disabled gathered in Maputo. It was a wonderful opportunity for survivors from across the world to relax and talk openly. How should survivors play an active role? What were our own goals? It came out during the dinner that there was a frustration with the portrayals of victims in the international campaign. Survivors were shown almost exclusively as 'victims', many photographed only in their worst moments of pain and anguish. By showing the horrible effects, the media had assigned to mine victims an aura of tragedy and helplessness. Yet most of the survivors didn't see their own lives as over after a **landmine** explosion. Most felt lucky to have survived. It was clear at that special dinner in Maputo that the survivors who gathered to eat and talk were some of the strongest and most motivated people we had ever met. It was in Maputo that survivors started to address more pointedly the campaign language that often depicted the disabled as helpless victims. LSN was determined to add images of strength, empowerment, and survival. Extraordinary strength is required to overcome disfiguring injury and sometimes ostracism. Somehow, that message needed to come out, as well as a realistic portrayal of the human suffering. We would now work toward empowerment.

RAISING THE PROFILE OF SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE IN THE ICBL

Throughout 1996-7, the ICBL issued periodic statements on the status of the campaign, dealing primarily with the platforms it currently supported. Survivors **began** to push for stronger language on the need for **effective** victim assistance. At the very least, we argued, the issue deserved its own bullet, instead of being lumped in as an inconspicuous clause together with the issue of demining efforts. During strategy sessions the response was usually supportive, but there still was no initiative by the ICBL as a whole to advocate for the rights of the victims. Instead, most members were overwhelmingly concerned with the ban and with building support for that. Some in the campaign leadership felt that the LSN was being counter-

productive to the overriding goal of the campaign, which was, of course, a total ban on landmines.

OAU Conference in Johannesburg

In May of 1997, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) hosted a conference on landmines. As with previous conferences, not enough survivors were invited, and again, we had a small voice. The LSN had pushed consultants and conference organizers to include victims and disability support issues in panel discussions, and urged that disabled persons and rehabilitation specialists be invited to speak, including Farida Gulamo from Mozambique and Abraham Gebreyesus from Eritrea. During the conference, Ken Rutherford arranged a small press conference with Gebreyesus and Mozambican survivor Luis Wamuce, who posed the question to the government participants: 'What are you doing to help the victims?'

African delegates quoted statistics on landmines and the casualties, but there was little indication that they understood or had much contact with the real people behind the numbers. To put a face on the issue, Rutherford, Wamuce, and Gebreyesus told their stories and pushed for social and economic support of mine victims and their families. Wamuce, a secretary for the Association for Disabled People of Mozambique (ADEMO), urged the OAU 'to adopt and implement victim assistance policies so that landmine survivors can be more easily reintegrated back into society.' The LSN succeeded in having mine victim assistance included in the OAU final declaration and action agenda. In addition, the LSN called for co-ordination of data collection and development of a comprehensive database on assistance for survivors. These recommendations were incorporated in the final OAU conference proceedings. One of the wonderful benefits of arranging for Abraham Gebreyesus to attend the OAU conference was that he was introduced to Lieutenant General D.P. Knobel, who assured him that South Africa could arrange a corneal transplant operation that Abraham had been waiting for since he was 11 years old when a landmine accident caused blindness and the loss of his right hand.²

Diana, Princess of Wales

Perhaps the greatest contribution to the issue of victim assistance came from Diana, Princess of Wales. In January 1997, Diana had visited Angola as a guest of the British Red Cross and HALO Trust, a British NGO working to clear landmines. Photographic images of her walking through minefields and meeting with landmine-disabled persons were beamed around the world. During her visit, she called on her own country to ban landmines.

At the time, the British position was similar to that of the United States—unwilling to give up these weapons and wishing to develop new types of mines. Diana's remarks in the minefields of Angola put her at odds with Britain's Tory government. Many back home criticized her 'political' statements, while most of the world applauded her courage and honesty. Without a doubt, the Princess of Wales, more than any other individual, caused global awareness of the devastation caused by landmines to skyrocket. Her willingness to use her celebrity as a lightning rod for the issue was an invaluable service to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Wherever she went, cameras followed, sending pictures of the Princess in minefields to living rooms throughout the world.

In an effort to encourage the Princess's work on landmines, the LSN and the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a demining organization, co-hosted a seminar at the Royal Geographical Society in London, entitled 'Responding to Landmines'. Rae McGrath, MAG's founder, had invited the Princess to deliver the keynote address. Kensington Palace agreed, with the understanding that the seminar was geared to address the practical needs of those working or living in minefields, including demining and victim assistance. It was at the Royal Geographical Society on 12 June that the Princess delivered her first major speech on landmines, describing with emotion her reaction to what she saw firsthand in Angola: 'I am not a political figure. I'd like to reiterate now, my intentions are humanitarian. That is why I felt drawn to this human tragedy.'

With the Princess's involvement, the media was hooked, Landmines and the human suffering they caused were now in the headlines. Diana understood her contribution to the cause. She realized better than anyone that the media would closely follow any move she made. Why not take them to mine-infested countries! Thus, by the summer of 1997, it seemed that landmine survivors had found a compassionate spokesperson for their cause and an ally to help alleviate their suffering.

Bad Honnef Conference

Also in June 1997, members of the German Campaign to Ban Landmines arranged a workshop in Bad Honnef, Germany, to develop guidelines for integrated mine action programs from a development point of view. Again, the focus of Medico International, Jesuit Refugee Service, Misericordia, the LSN, and other international organizations was to draft a set of guidelines for people seeking to help mine-affected communities and the growing number of victims. The Bad Honnef guidelines emphasized community and development. Among them were:

- The needs and aspirations of people affected by mines are the starting point for mine action programs.

- Mine action programs support the reconstruction and development of the community and aim at rebuilding the socio-economic and cultural infrastructure.
- Empowerment and training of the community to carry out all aspects of mine action programs are the ultimate goal.
- Mine-affected people have a right to participate in political and economic decision-making, to shape their own lives, and to have their dignity restored.

Brussels Conference

Later that same month, a conference in Brussels, Belgium, reviewed the draft treaty and lined up those countries willing to be counted as ban supporters. Just before the opening of the conference, the LSN and other sympathetic NGOs, such as Medico International, Jesuit Refugee Service, and Handicap International, discovered that there was not one word on victim assistance in the first draft of the treaty. It was a devastating discovery. Time was getting short, and a serious push was needed to lobby the government delegates. There were only a dozen survivors present in Brussels, and all 12 prepared a joint statement emphasizing the need to include language on victim assistance: 'We ask you to re-read the current draft of the treaty and consider how it appears to us **landmine** survivors. There is virtually nothing in it to urge governments to take responsibility for the victims. Yet people are bleeding and dying even as we speak. To this day, the real needs of mine-affected communities are not being addressed. Survivors remain an afterthought. Their numbers grow each day, but without your help they have little hope of ever receiving proper medical attention or rehabilitation.' The reaction from delegates and the International Committee of the Red Cross was positive. Several governments, particularly South Africa, responded by indicating they would not support a treaty without provisions for the survivors.

Although most campaigners were enthusiastic, one of the ICBL steering committee members expressed dismay that the LSN had 'surprised' him with its statement and suggested that, in the future, the LSN would be better advised to consult first with the treaty committee, which had been working for months on the draft. Others in the campaign were also not supportive of adding victim assistance to the mix. The LSN had to identify its allies in the campaign and determine what chance victim assistance had to be included in the treaty. It did not look promising, since the priority for most organizations was simply to achieve a global ban as soon as possible. At the eleventh hour, victim assistance would complicate the negotiations. Furthermore, wealthier 'donor' countries would be wary of any language that would oblige them to put their money in the 'tin cup' of poorer mine-affected countries.

The LSN decided to turn international law to its advantage by enlisting the services of the Washington-based law firm of Arnold & Porter, who agreed to work *pro bono* to research legal precedents and draw up a memo regarding mine victim assistance proposals that could be included in the treaty. The LSN discussed its initiative with the Canadians, and Axworthy's office offered support by faxing a list of core group contact information so the LSN could approach other countries directly. Again, this independent initiative was not well received by some in the campaign leadership. The LSN was accused of pursuing its own agenda rather than that of the campaign. Nevertheless, we persisted, and throughout the summer, Arnold & Porter's attorneys, led by Anthony O'Donnell, searched for precedents and *ways* to legitimize the inclusion of victim assistance language in the treaty.

A VISIT TO BOSNIA

Meanwhile, the LSN was busy planning a secret trip to Bosnia with Diana, Princess of Wales. In late July 1997, the LSN's co-founders visited Kensington Palace to brief the Princess on its mission to survey the rehabilitative needs of Bosnia's landmine victims. Diana had repeatedly offered her help to the LSN and immediately picked up on the idea of survivors helping survivors. She wanted to join us in Bosnia. That summer afternoon, drinking tea in Diana's plush living-room, we started to brainstorm her three-day visit to Bosnia. The Princess's overriding interest was to meet privately with the survivors and their families. She did not want to discuss policy, meet government officials, or detonate another mine, as she had done in Angola. She insisted on direct contact with those who had suffered.

In Bosnia, her impact on the survivors was spectacular. She listened attentively to their gut-wrenching stories, holding their hands and stroking their scarred limbs. She resolved to do more for them in the future. It was to be her last public act of charity. When Diana lost her life in a car accident in Paris on 31 August landmine survivors lost a true and irreplaceable friend and ally.

OSLO CONFERENCE

Only days after Princess Diana's death, the Oslo conference commenced to negotiate the final treaty draft to be signed in Ottawa in December. The conference chair, Ambassador Jacob Selebi, from South Africa, was seen as a potential ally. He had, however, set a disciplined agenda within the first three days of the conference. With each passing day, it would be increasingly difficult to add new items or proposed language to the table. In Oslo,

Susan Walker of Handicap International was working to build pressure on governments to get victim assistance into the treaty. She took the lead to ensure that the ICBL platform included some of our proposed draft language on victim assistance. The ICRC was also very supportive. Language worked its way into the draft and was ready for debate, though the LSN was not allowed to sit in on any negotiating sessions. Instead, survivors had to lobby the delegates individually between sessions and after hours. We met with the Germans, the Norwegians, the Americans, the Austrians, the ICRC, the ICBL—in fact, with anyone who had time and was willing to speak with us about victim assistance.

Thankfully, Ambassador Selebi was sympathetic to the inclusion of victim assistance on the agenda. With the encouragement of Canadian Foreign Affairs officials Jill Sinclair and Bob Lawson, the LSN had circulated its memo by Arnold & Porter to the core group of countries working on treaty proposals. Even though the draft treaty did not impose on states direct obligations to assist civilian victims, it did require states to ban and destroy landmines because they were recognized as endangering civilian populations. The LSN hoped the inclusion of mine victim assistance language 'would require states to accept certain affirmative duties toward individuals.'

The LSN argued there were substantial reasons to include humanitarian relief in the ban treaty. First, the primary purpose of the treaty is to protect individuals from the type of excessive and unnecessary injury landmines inflict. The inclusion of language relating to victim assistance furthers the purpose of the treaty by protecting individuals from the long-term injuries that landmines cause. In other words, *landmine* victim assistance programs were necessary to prevent mine victims' permanent inability to function, work, or otherwise participate as productive members of society. Thus, the inclusion of mine victim assistance was necessary for the Convention to provide a complete response by the international community to the dangers posed by landmines.

Second, the inclusion of victim assistance provisions within the Convention is consistent with international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions constitute the framework within which humanitarian law pertaining to the protection of civilians, combatants, and prisoners of war has developed. Although these provisions primarily restrict what states can do within the context of war, they also require states to accept certain affirmative obligations towards individuals.

Finally, many international instruments refer to assistance or *compensation* to victims as a humanitarian duty of states. More significantly, a strong argument can be made that states are legally obligated to assist or

compensate mine victims. The use of mines violates two basic principles of international humanitarian law. Landmines scattered over large areas likely to be used by civilians during or after a conflict do not distinguish between military and civilian targets. This violates the principle of discrimination, which holds that weapons must be able to discriminate between civilian and military targets. Landmine injuries also inflict much more severe injuries than other conventional weapons and often result in excessive injury or suffering to civilians. This violates the principle that prohibits attacks that produce 'unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury'. Violations of humanitarian law trigger a duty to compensate or assist victims of those violations. Therefore, the unlawful use of landmines generates a legal obligation to assist mine victims.

In the end, victim assistance made it into the landmine treaty due to the efforts of many people, but full credit must be given to the landmine survivors around the world. In the keynote address at the opening plenary for the Mine Action Forum at the Ottawa conference, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, stated that one of the lessons to be learned from the Ottawa Process was that international public opinion will not tolerate 'weapons that cause massive civilian casualties'. In other words, the large and growing number of landmine victims caused the ban dream to become reality.

The Ottawa Convention is the first international arms control agreement that addresses the humanitarian needs of the victims of a particular weapon system. On victim assistance, it states in the Preamble that signatory states wish 'to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims'. Article 6 of the treaty elaborates on this issue:

3: Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organization, or on a bilateral basis.

7: States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, *inter alia*: . . . assistance to mine victims . . .

By the time of the signing ceremony in Ottawa, there had been a significant change in the role victim assistance played in the campaign. The catch-phrase 'victim assistance' had become one of the three main pillars of the campaign. In Ottawa, there were several panels on the issue, including 'Addressing Psycho-Social Reintegration for Mine Victims'. Mine-disabled persons were now an official and welcome part of the discussion.

Landmine survivors believe they have won a battle, but the war is not over. It's time to give the treaty legs, so to speak. Though the treaty only 'urges' victim assistance, we believe justice demands that more be done for the survivors and their families. New battles on the horizon include how to raise significant funding to support rehabilitation programs and how best to spend money on community-based programs to help survivors heal and recover from trauma.

There are still mixed signals coming from various signatory governments. For example, more than 100 foreign ministries failed to respond to a letter the LSN distributed asking governments to describe their intentions to promote victim assistance. The letter, signed by more than 20 organizations, urged governments 'to commit significant resources to help rehabilitate the growing numbers of mine victims worldwide'. To this end, the LSN issued a challenge to governments: 'For every three dollars pledged for demining, at least one additional dollar should be directed toward rehabilitation and assistance for landmine victims.'

As of mid-1998, fewer than 10 governments had responded to the LSN query on victim assistance programs. Though Canada immediately pledged \$100 million to support mine action, including support for mine victims, there are questions about how the money will be spent and how much will end up helping mine victims. Norway pledged \$100 million over five years to support mine clearance and victim assistance, but some fear that victim assistance could be reduced to a simple donation to the Red Cross and will not address the range of survivors' needs for rehabilitation and social and economic integration. The British government also pledged to give money towards victim assistance and mine clearance. When asked, government officials could not say when or where the support would be given. Though the treaty calls for reporting and tracking progress on mine clearance, there was no mention of creating a similar mechanism for tracking rehabilitation services. The LSN will continue to monitor governments and ask for concrete victim assistance. We plan on developing a report card to evaluate each signatory's true commitment to comprehensive survivor assistance.

ICBL GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING

The ICBL held a meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, in February 1998 to restructure the Nobel Prize-winning coalition and chart out future strategy and actions. The Landmine Survivors Network and other organizations were added to the steering committee. At the meeting, the LSN pushed for the creation of the first global task force on survivor assistance. Survivors are now heading up this new effort on behalf of the ICBL.

In preparation for the Frankfurt meeting, the LSN drafted a short list of 'victim assistance goals' and solicited feedback from a selection of NGOs interested in working on victim assistance. The key organizations to offer input included Handicap International, Jesuit Refugee Service-Cambodia, Physicians for Human Rights, and the Kenyan Campaign to Ban Landmines. The LSN redrafted its goals and proposed them to the conference. The following goals were adopted by the ICBL:

1. The ICBL will press governments to commit \$3 billion over the next 10 years to support victim assistance, including social and economic reintegration.
2. The ICBL will press governments to support a whole range of landmine victim assistance activities: acute care, supply of prosthetics and wheelchairs, physical therapy, psychosocial support, data-gathering, landmine awareness, social reintegration, land tenure, and legal and employment services,
3. The ICBL and national campaigns will promote sharing of landmine victim information and assistance strategies among members and other groups to effect the best possible rehabilitation outcomes for mine victims.
4. The ICBL will promote and involve landmine victims and landmine-infested communities in the planning and implementation of mine assistance programs.

Victim assistance is now an established pillar of the ICBL. The treaty language, coupled with the goals established by the ICBL in Frankfurt, mean we have much work to do to ensure that survivors and their families receive the attention, care, and compassion they deserve.

CONCLUSION

Landmine survivors worldwide commend Canada for its leadership to make our dream for a treaty become reality. We also commend our allies in the ICBL and Red Cross who have helped to move this issue so far and fast. Unlike most organizations, the LSN does not want its constituency to grow

in size. To the contrary, we long for the day when there are no more landmine casualties and no man, woman, or child will experience that terrible pain of losing a limb, eyesight, or life to this inhumane weapon. For the present, we want to see increased resources dedicated to rehabilitate the thousands of innocent and often impoverished mine victims around the world. It won't be easy, as the world's attention focuses elsewhere and the media spotlight turns to new issues.

The challenges for effective victim assistance include: lack of reliable data, and information-gathering exercises that leave most survivors empty-handed; limited information-sharing and collaboration among service providers and local disability groups; and too much attention focused on 'limbs only' (prosthetics) relative to the attention paid to the psychosocial impact of landmine injury and the survivors' needs for social and economic integration.

For the hundreds of thousands of landmine disabled, healing will begin when the weapon that disfigured our bodies and took away the innocence of daily life is banned and proper rehabilitation services become available worldwide. Our scars bear witness to the cruelty and inhumanity of anti-personnel mines. But survivors worldwide believe this weapon can be stopped and that it is within the international community's grasp to help turn victims into survivors who rightfully take their place as valued members of their communities. No one can make the journey alone. We are joining together to demand action and drawing strength from each other, and from humanitarian organizations, and from the states committed to implementing all aspects of the Ottawa Convention. Survivors worldwide will monitor the progress closely.

NOTES

1. Ken Rutherford's rehabilitation has cost nearly \$400,000 in less than four years; Jerry White's rehabilitation costs come to roughly \$400,000 in the 14 years since his accident.
2. Abraham was examined by a specialist and in August 1997 returned to Johannesburg to undergo surgery. He has regained sight in his right eye and was fitted with a prosthesis on his right arm. The LSN wants to recognize the combined efforts that accomplished this act of healing: the South African Surgeon General, Christian Outreach (a British organization), and the fund-raising efforts (swim- and bike-a-thons) of Rae McGrath (founder of the UK-based Mines Advisory Group) to raise money for the operation. When Abraham arrived in Oslo, Norway, for the September 1997 ban treaty negotiations, the LSN nominated him to receive the 1997 Reebok Human Rights Prize, which he was awarded at a ceremony in New York City in March 1998.

snowflake

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT: Landmines

2 *D 5/31*
13/6

Attached are some materials that Ann McLaughlin Korologos brought in on the subject of landmines.

You better get an expert, because it's going to be an important issue for us.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.45

Attach.

13 JUN 2001
USD/P —

471.6

29 May 01

U10153A/01

snowflake

May 29, 2001 6:34 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Russia Paper

Attached is a paper Fred Iklé prepared with respect to Russia.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/25/01 MFR: Framework for a New Strategic Relationship with Russia

DHR:dh
052901-77

RUSSIA

29 May 01

U10155 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4150

Memorandum for the Record

May 252001

The Framework for a New Strategic Relationship with Russia

It Is Not Only About Missile Defense

The President's statements made it clear that he seeks a fundamental transformation of the nuclear relationship with Russia, "a clear break" from "the adversarial legacy of the Cold War;" and that missile defense is merely one of several innovations that are needed to this larger end. But the reactions from the Russians, the Allies, and critics at home focus almost exclusively on MD and the ABM Treaty. This distortion is partly a misunderstanding, partly deliberate. Some of the critics would rather preserve the Cold War nuclear strategy than give up Cold War arms control treaties. And the Russians see in the ABM Treaty a symbol of their strategic equality, as well as a legal obstacle that keeps the US from acquiring what they can't afford.

Initially, it was prudent for the Administration to present its goals with broad brush strokes, as an invitation to open-minded consultations. But over time, this open-minded stance becomes an invitation to attacks. We have to get ready, step by step, to articulate a richer, more complete design.

The Essence of the New Framework

To put it simply, the goal is to convince Russia, through a process of inducements and pressures:

- to abandon the idea that it must maintain the world's second largest nuclear offensive forces ceaselessly ready, for years to come, utterly to destroy the United States,
- because it allegedly needs to deter the United States from suddenly launching a nuclear attack to disarm and destroy Russia.

To translate the Framework into a program of US initiatives and policies, it will be essential to address many contingencies and complex issues. Here are just a few:

- How should we bring China into all this?
- How much weight should we give to the possibility that Russia wants to maintain or enhance its capability suddenly to destroy the United States, not to deter a US surprise attack, but to deter us from defending Poland or the **Baltics**?
- Can we induce (or pressure) Russia to abandon MAD against the United States without hobbling too much the US nuclear deterrent and counter-force capability for third country contingencies?

As we work our way through these important issues, we must guard against sliding back into the Cold War **mindset**. For half a century, thousands of excellent minds -- elected leaders, technical experts, think tanks strategists -- have debated and shaped the role of our nuclear forces in "detering" the powerful Soviet Union from launching a major nuclear or conventional attack. With this awesome theology lodged in **our** minds, it will take a conscious, sustained effort to adjust our concepts and vocabulary to the task ahead. If we cannot execute this sea change, those will prevail who believe that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of arms control and that Cold War arms control must be perpetuated.

What's In It For the United States?

(1) The worst, most terminal contingency for the United States would be if a large part (or all) of the still functioning Russian ICBMs and SLBMs were launched against US targets, because of insubordination, false warning of US attack, or for whatever reason. Even though we cannot assign a meaningful probability to such an event and want to believe that its is "very low," we have an obligation to lower this risk.

(2) Should the United States remain locked into MAD with Russia, it will not be long until China, by its rhetoric and by building up its offensive forces, creates the **mindset** among Americans (Congress, the military, you and me) that MAD is also the cornerstone of our strategic relationship with Beijing. One can already see the beginning of this. But a trilateral MAD is considerably madder than a bilateral one; for example, we could one day face a Sino-Soviet nuclear alliance (short-lived to be sure -- but a calamity like the Hitler-Stalin pact). A trilateral **MAD** leads to a polygon of multilateral MAD relations, which would mean a vast increase in nuclear instability, worse than the

entanglement of mobilization plans before August 1914.

Third, if we did remain locked into MAD with Russia (and later also with China, etc.), we would have less freedom of action to cope with an actual or threatened WMD use by a rogue. And this would hold true even if we had fairly effective theater MD. A North Korean contingency illustrates this: North Korea delivers CW by cruise missiles into South Korea and our quickest way to stop this would be low yield nuclear missile strikes; at that point how much time would elapse to make sure China or Russia would not misread our response as an attack on their nuclear deterrent?

How to Overcome the Opposition

If we cannot induce Russia to move in the desired direction, the benefits of the Framework cannot be realized. If we succeed in bringing Russia along, the Allied concerns about MD can be overcome and the domestic US opposition to MD will collapse (except for budgetary concerns).

The heart of the matter, therefore, is how, and indeed whether, we can convince the Russian government. This is a major project that must be worked out in much greater detail than is appropriate for this memo. The project must be informed by intelligence inputs regarding the Russian reaction and resistance to previous proposals for reducing the nuclear confrontation (September 1991, various US attempts to achieve better transparency, the Russian rebuffs to our questions about the new underground facility in the Urals, our assessments of Russian missile launch procedures, etc.). We need to develop inducements and pressures for both Russia's political and military leadership. To wield these carrots and sticks, we can accentuate both sides of several aspects:

- Prestige: If Russia joins us in the new Framework, it can become and remain a nuclear power "co-equal" with the US (symbolically rather than in reality). But if Russia clings to MAD it will fall further behind because of our MD, space superiority, etc.; and it will become trapped in a China-US-Russia triangle as the increasingly weaker third party.
- Economic: we can talk debt relief up as Russia moves in the right direction, but stress the difficulty of supporting loans (IMF, Exim, etc) for a country that insists on preserving and refurbishing expensive systems kept ready to destroy our country.

- Technology: we can work with and help the Russian military and their space agency on projects not harmful to us; or conversely we can partially restore the technology transfer controls we had in the 1980s.

The Tasks Ahead

The changes envisaged by this Framework cannot be implemented quickly. Nuclear systems take a long time to build and deploy, and also to dismantle. Even if agreement in principle with Russia and the Allies could be obtained within one year, it might take ten years safely to establish the new strategic dispensation. In the meantime it will be necessary to make it through various crises, government changes in China or Russia, and the under-brush of compliance problems.

Several aspects of the Framework will require ~~a~~ careful and constructive analyses by DoD.

For instance, adjustments in **alert measures** that could reduce the risk of an accidental or impulsive Russian nuclear attack. Recall Yeltsin's **swaggering** with the (allegedly connected) nuclear codes! To induce Russia to make adjustments beneficial to us might require some changes in the US alert posture that would also have to be evaluated. A prudent approach to this problem demands broad judgmental input since one cannot rely on meaningful statistics on the risk of accidental launch (or conversely, the risk of inviting a deliberate attack because the deterrent forces appear to be unready).

The so-called "**codes**" for nuclear release present intricate and delicate problems. Occasional unexpected failures have been experienced in the past and a comprehensive overview of the system is very difficult to achieve. In the Soviet period, the Politburo relied on politically separate, parallel control systems. In the United States that approach was abandoned in the Truman administration and until the late 1950s US nuclear weapons were deployed without two-man control and without **PALs**. Put simply, there are many variations possible.

The requirement -- real or imagined -- for great **secrecy** further complicates innovation of systems that are already somewhat inscrutable. The realization of the new Framework is likely to be slowed down by the ingrained Russian tradition of secrecy. For this reason, we should think of some way-stations that could be beneficial.

snowflake

April 10, 2001 7:51 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Rudy de Leon
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Ideas from General Pace, SOUTHCOM

381

Please sort through this memo that I sent out and that Chris Williams responded to and see what you think and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/5/01SecDef Memo and 4/2/01 Ltr from CINC Southcom

DHR:dh
041001-11

10 APR 01

Clare Hill

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
General, Shelton
General Myers
Steve Cambone
Chris Williams
Paul Gebhard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 5, 2001

SUBJECT: Attached

Take a look at this letter from General Pace. Why don't you visit among yourselves and then come back to me with a recommendation as to whether or not any of that is something that we ought to consider.

It's interesting and probably a good idea, but I wonder if we have the time.

Sir:

I think General Pace may be on to something. Buying more time for a QDR is appealing, although it would delay the implementation of your Defense Strategy and Transformation "vision" by a year — The idea of some "offsites" to facilitate intensive work on translating your Defense Strategy into a National Military Strategy and associated force structure options/decisions is a good idea. Focused and sustained attention to these issues by senior officials is surely time well spent. *VR* —
Chris Williams

DHR/azn
040501.05
Attach.

no. Purchase

11-L-0559/OSD/4156

4/11

snowflake

TO: Dan Dell 'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 2, 2001
SUBJECT:

Here is a letter from a very nice man in (b)(6)
(b)(6). I don't know him very well, but he is a
responsible businessman and a decent person.

Do you have any suggestions of what I do with this letter?
Thanks.

DHR/azn
060102.08
Attach.

3837

2 Jun 01

U10316 /01

Don - well
worth reading
Think of how
many people
are bamboozled
by our govt.

(b)(6)

Mrs. Joyce Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. Rumsfeld,

My name is (b)(6) and I must apologize for imposing on your time and good nature. Yet, as the famous line goes, "desperate times call for desperate measures!"

Now the purpose for which I set this pen to parchment... In 1998 I married a woman who is **an** illegal immigrant **from** Mexico, living in Taos. She has a daughter who is four years old. They originally came here to join with the father of her child, who ended up abandoning them before the child was even born and has **no** interest in helping to raise her. Anyway, I **married** (b)(6) and became a father to young (b)(6). The only father she has ever known. Neither (b)(6) ever "sponged off the system" nor have they ever run afoul of the law--- not even a parking ticket,

In 1998, **after** our marriage, we **began** the lengthy and complex process of applying to the National Visa Center for her residency papers which would give (b)(6) a Social Security number, the ability to have a Drivers License, a work permit, and ingress/egress to the United States. Three years to the date of our original application, (the NVC lost our original application and we had to pay the same lawyer to re-do the paperwork and resubmit) the **NVC** informed us that our paperwork was ready to begin **final** processing at the American Consulate in Juarez, Mexico. The date set was April **6th, 2001**. I called INS and asked to transfer the location of the interview to Albuquerque, NM instead of Juarez, Mexico and was **deliberately** lied to by an INS officer in Texas. I feel she lied in order to get us into Mexico in order to deny my wife re-entry **after** completing our paperwork on April 6th at the American Consulate in Juarez.

Yes, they lied to me outright. I had no idea they were going to deny my wife re-entry for a period of eight to twelve months while I, as her husband, apply for a "pardon" or waiver for her being here in the US illegally. If they had told us the truth, we would have planned for this. My wife and daughter had only two days worth of clothing and I was forced to leave them behind in Mexico, sending them on a bus to Southwest Mexico where (b)(6) family lives. I traveled back home with the prospect of not being with my family for possibly a year (b)(6) has since missed her pre-school graduation.

I placed and paid for a pardon (waiver) which the American Consulate Staffer said would take 8-12 months, during which my wife is banned from re-entering the U.S. under penalty of loosing her application privilege for a period of at least ten years. I was told that I could write INS if there are any hardships, but they rarely back down and let an applicant re-enter during the waiver process period. I explained that I have a Twenty-five year old daughter named (b)(6) who is severely disabled. She requires the round-the-clock care of my former wife, (b)(6) and myself. During the time (b)(6) is with us, my wife (b)(6) helps me to no end with her care, including bathing, feeding, dressing, and on bad days getting (b)(6) in her wheelchair. Without (b)(6) and her loving help, I must care for (b)(6) alone and get her to the caregiver during the day so that I may run my **30-year** old business.

I have written to Hon. Jeff **Bingamann**, Hon. Heather Wilson, Hon. Pete **Domenici**, and the American Consulate. I have asked that they may consider paroling (b)(6) so that she and (b)(6) may return to Taos in the period that her waiver is being processed. I don't think that this is unheard of, considering how many **criminals** and no-goods were pardoned by our ex-president. My wife (b)(6) is a gentle, law-abiding person who poses no threat to the health or well being of any citizen of our country. In fact, she is invaluable to myself, family and **friends**.

I pray that you, or Mr. Rumsfeld, may have the ability to find the right person who could expedite or grant (b)(6) a parole. Again, I apologize for asking, but "**nothing** ventured, nothing gained!"

I have enclosed all pertinent documents.

Thank you for your time and attention. I wish you well.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)


4-18-01

To Whom it May Concern,

(b)(6)

Letter from (b)(6) pre-school.

(b)(6)



*Thank you and
God Bless you,*

(b)(6)

Noah's Ark Preschool

**NOAH'S ARK PRESCHOOL
BOX 6007
TAOS, NM 87571**

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL - **VISA** SECTION
LOPEZ MATEOS 924 N. P.O. BOX 1.0545
CD. JUAREZ, CHIH, MEX. EL PASO, TX 79995

Doc 2 -

IMMIGRANT VISA INFORMATION NUMBERS:

FROM U.S.A.: (b)(6) (8:00AM-4:30PM, MOUNTAIN TIME)
CHARGED TO THE CALLER AT US\$1.00 PER MINUTE
FROM MEXICO: (b)(6) (8:00AM-4:30PM, MOUNTAIN TIME)
CHARGED TO THE CALLER AT MEX\$10.00 (PESOS) PER MINUTE

Date: 17 Jan 2001

(b)(6)

USA

Dear (b)(6)

This office is ready to begin final processing of the immigrant visa applicant(s) named below in this case. We have scheduled an appointment for a visa interview in the Immigrant Visa section on the date printed below. This letter must be presented upon your arrival at this office on the appointment date.

Please see the enclosed information for further instruction about the medical examination required for all intending -immigrants. Be sure to read all of the enclosed information and follow the instructions very carefully. When communicating with this office either by telephone or letter, please provide your name and case number exactly as shown in this letter.

Sincerely,

chief, Immigrant Visa Branch

Visa' Appointment
Date *****a***** Time
06-Apr-2001 10:00

Medical Appointment
Date ***** Time

Case -Number: CDJ1999603067
Name (P) : MARTINEZ, DORA ARMIDA MADRID DE

Traveling Applicants:
(b)(6)

Preference Category: CR1 - MEX

Encl: Packet 4

*Appointment Date
and Date Re-entry
19-Sep-1969 Was Denied
See Doc 3*

Doc 3

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIUDAD JUAREZ, CHIHUAHUA



DATE: 4/6/01

CASE NUMBER: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

VISA CATEGORY: (b)(6)

DEAR VISA APPLICANT:

This office regrets to inform you that it is unable to issue a visa to you because you have been found ineligible to receive a visa under the following section(s) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(I) which prohibits the issuance to any alien who was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than one year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to section 244(e)) prior to commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240, and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal.

X Section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) which prohibits the issuance to any alien who has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States.

X You are ELIGIBLE TO APPLY for a waiver of the grounds of ineligibility above under section 212(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as the spouse, son or daughter or child of a United States Citizen or Legal Permanent Resident,

You are NOT ELIGIBLE TO APPLY for a waiver of the grounds of ineligibility above as you do not have the required relationship of spouse, son or daughter or child of a United States Citizen or Legal Permanent Resident.

Section 212(a)(9)(C)(I) which prohibits the issuance to any alien who has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than one year. NO WAIVER AVAILABLE

Section 212(a)(9)(C)(II) which prohibits the issuance to any alien who has been ordered removed under 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible. NO WAIVER AVAILABLE

OTHER: You must remain in Mexico until your waiver is approved

AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER

AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER

United States Senate

May 22, 2001

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Enclosed is a copy of the response I recently received in reply to the inquiry I submitted on your behalf. It is sent for your information and is **self-explanatory**.

Please be assured of my continued interest in your case and that I will keep you apprised of any further **communication** I receive.

Thank you for this opportunity to be of **service** to you, and kindest regards.

Sincerely,



Jeff Bingaman
United States Senator

JB/scm

This is the reply from Hon. Jeff Bingaman and American Consulate. The Only One to Reply or try & help.

625 SILVER AVE., SW, SUITE 130
ALBUQUERQUE, NM 87102

148 LORETTO TOWNE CENTRE
605 SOUTH MAIN
SARASOTA, FL 34231

P.O. BOX 1877
118 BRIDGE STREET, SUITE 3
LAS VEGAS, NV 89101

105 WEST THIRD, SUITE 409
ROSWELL, NM 88201
(505) 622-7113

179 E. MARCY,
SANTA FE, NM
(505) 988-8647

**U.S. Consulate
General
Ciudad Juarez
Mexico**



To: Office of Senator Jeff Bingaman (b)(6) **From:** Miguel De La Hoya
Attn: (b)(6) **Consular Officer**
Fax: (b)(6) **Phone:** Fax (011-52-16) 16-90-27
Phone: (b)(6) **Pages:** 1
Re: (b)(6) **Date:** 05/18/01

I am replying to your letter regarding the immigrant visa case of (b)(6)

(b)(6) was refused a visa on April 6, 2001 under *Immigration and Nationality Act section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), Unlawful Presence in the United States*. Under this section of the INA, any alien who resided legally in the U.S. for more than 360 days after April 1, 1997 is barred from re-entering the U.S. for 10 years unless he/she is granted a waiver of ineligibility by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Her waiver application was sent to the INS office in Ciudad Juarez on April 10, 2001. Due to the volume of applications received by the INS the processing time is approximately 8-10 months. The INS is currently working on applications received in August 2000. We will schedule (b)(6) for a return appointment as soon as we receive INS' decision on her application.

Your inquiry with its accompanying letter has been referred to the INS office for their consideration. You may contact them at (011-52-16) 11-04-75; fax 11-52-84.



COMANDANCIA DE POLICIA
CD. GUERRERO, CHIH.

DEPENDENCIA <u>Comandancia</u>
OFICIO NO. _____
EXPEDIENTE <u>IX</u> <u>Jx</u> <u>99</u>

ASUNTO: No antecedentes

A quien corresponda:

El suscrito **C. Jaime Ruíz Delgado**, Director de Seguridad Pública del Municipio de Guerrero, Chih., por medio de la presente hace constar:

Que **revisando** los **archivos** de la **policia** municipal de Guerrero, Chih., no se **encontró** antecedentes por faltas al **Bando** de Gobierno **o por** problemas administrativos a nombre de la C. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Se extiende la **presente para** los fines y **usos** a que **haya lugar**, en la **Ciudad** de Guerrero, Chih., a **los diez días** del mes de **Septiembre** de mil **novecientos** noventa y **nueve**.



ATENTAMENTE
EL DIRECTOR DE SEGURIDAD PUBLICA
[Signature]
C. JAIME RUIZ DELGADO

Document from police in her home town-state attesting she is not or never been a criminal

April 27, 2001

Mr. Luis Garcia
District Manager
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Dear Mr. Garcia:

This letter is a plea that you may consider through your abilities, granting an advance parole to my wife of three (3) years, (b)(6) whose status is presently "Illegal Alien", residing in Guerro, **Chihuahua**.

On April 6, 2001 we were advised of our **final** processing in **Ciudad Juarez** for her category CRV of the National Visa Center which would allow her residency status in the U.S.A.

On this date she was denied reentry into **the** U.S. under Section **212(a)(9)(B)(II)**. I, as her spouse, applied under 212(v) for a waiver pardon.

I ask that you may, for the following reasons, help expedite a parole in the time we await our waiver pardon, so our family may be reunited.

A. Our 4 year old daughter's graduation from pre-school scheduled for May 25, 2001.

B. My wife's immeasurable help with my 26 year old disabled daughter, help that includes bathing, feeding, dressing, etc., help which also allows me time to run my business of 30 years.

Respectfully ,

(b)(6)

This Mr Garcia is the one I presume who can expedite or grant parole, waiver etc...

11-L-0569/OSD/4167

Seguro Social 649-09-8691

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT AUTHENTIC UNLESS PRODUCED ON SAFETY PAPER

CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH
CERTIFICADO DE NACIMIENTO

STATE OF
NEW MEXICO

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION
BUREAU OF VITAL RECORDS
AND HEALTH STATISTICS



ESTADO DE
NUEVO MEXICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE SALUD
DIVISION DE SALUD PUBLICA
OFICINA DE REGISTROS VITALES
Y ESTADISTICAS DE SALUD

I certify that the following birth is registered in the Bureau of Vital Records and Health Statistics
Cerifico que en la Seccion del Registro de Nacimientos a mi cargo aparece la siguiente inscripcion

File No. <i>Numero de Archivo</i>	Request No. <i>Numero de Solicitud</i>	County of Birth <i>Condado de Nacimiento</i>
(b)(6)	(b)(6)	TAOS
Date of Birth <i>Fecha de Nacimiento</i>	Date of Registration <i>Fecha de Inscripcion</i>	
(b)(6)	(b)(6)	
Name of Person Registered <i>Nombre del escrito</i>	Sex <i>Sexo</i>	
(b)(6)	FEMALE	
Name of Father or Parent One <i>Nombre del Padre</i>	Birth Name of Mother or Parent Two <i>Nombre de Soltera de la Madre</i>	
(b)(6)	(b)(6)	

(b)(6)

my step-daughter B-Cert.



Celina Sanchez
SIGNATURE OF STATE REGISTRAR
FIRMA DEL REGISTRADOR DEL ESTADO

DO NOT DUPLICATE BY ANY MEANS

AD/En: VCA. Es ilegal alterar, copiar o falsificar este certificado

snowflake

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 1, 2001

SUBJECT:

My impression is we made a mistake taking the money for missile defense out of the '01 supplemental. Most of the money we took out, I am told, was not for the national or long range missile defense, but for the **theatre** missile defense, which we need in there and which the Congress would not have contested.

If that did happen, we need to be more careful and think through what we are doing and check with other people before acting.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
060101.13

373.24

15 Jun 01

U10318 /01

5/30
10
snowflake

May 29, 2001 6:31 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Dollar Cost

Will someone please get me the dollar cost by area where our forces are deployed using the AORs?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052901-76

snowflake

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
Doug Feith

cc: Mark Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 9, 2001

RE: **Strategic Surprises**

Attached is a memo on some potential strategic surprises. It is worth reading and thinking about. Let's talk about it.

DHR/azn
06090 1.05
Attach. (Cambone Strategic Surprise paper)

381

950051

U10607 /01

Strategic Surprises

Executive Summary:

- This paper briefly describes several “strategic surprises” U.S. would not want to see, and therefore might enhance planning/resource emphasis upon preventing them. The following list does not include a number of possibilities that would be also be “surprises,” yet have been somewhat considered in planning (e.g., sudden aggression by China against Taiwan, SOH closure by Iran, China/India conflict).
- Top 5 “surprises” include illustrative options to mitigate their occurrence, as well as general “courses of actions” to consider if “surprise” does occur despite best effort. These are followed by list of 7 additional undesired “surprises” for your consideration (also at Tab A is a list of 28 other strategic surprises -- demonstrating that while of utility, taking this approach too far could begin to stretch available planning time/resources, particularly in view of known threats),

Discussion:

- Top 5 strategic surprises:
 1. U.S. military expelled from Japan; U.S. friends/allies throughout the region increasingly concerned about resurgent Japanese militarism.
 - Options to mitigate:
 - Increase inter-agency coordination to desensitize U.S. presence in Japan;
 - e.g., Increase use of non-Japanese ranges for training
 - 3 Increase diplomatic efforts to emphasize common security concerns (e.g., North Korean ballistic missiles);
 - 3 Develop new rationale for continued U.S. presence (e.g., China)
 - If surprise occurs, possible follow-on courses of action:
 - 3 U.S. forces expelled from Japan “fall back” to Guam;
 - U.S. increases naval deployments in theater to reassure friends/allies about US. commitment to regional security.
 2. Middle East war involving use of WMD; Suez Canal permanently closed to U.S. warship transits; OPEC imposes oil embargo against those who support Israel.
 - Options to mitigate:
 - Increase non-proliferation efforts;
 - 3 Emphasize to regional actors common security concerns with U.S. (e.g., Iranian subversion/coercion).
 - Deploy TBM assets to/near Israel and regional allies as deterrence;
 - If surprise occurs, possible follow-on courses of action:
 - Rotational crewing considerations to mitigate “lost presence time” due to longer LANT-PG transit
 3. Government of Saudi Arabia replaced by fundamentalist regime; U.S. forces expelled from country; U.S. forced to continue “containing” Iraq without benefit of Saudi bases, with greater challenges to mitigating Iranian regional influence.
 - Options to mitigate:
 - 3 De-emphasize U.S. land-based presence in Saudi Arabia;
 - Initiate diplomatic efforts within region to obtain basing rights at alternative sites to enhance “rapid deployments” capabilities if needed.
 - If surprise occurs, possible follow-on courses of action:
 - Increase naval deployments to offset loss of land-based access

... communication occurs peacefully; **leads** to emergence Of Korean-Japanese tensions; both sides seek U.S. commitment in case of aggression from other side; other states fear open conflict between Korea and Japan if U.S. withdraws or is forced from region.

- Options to mitigate:

- Emphasize shared security concerns (e.g., China);
- 3 Initiate closer coordination/exercises between U.S., Japanese, and Korean forces;

- If surprise occurs, possible follow-on courses of action:

- 3 "equal" U.S. presence in both nations

5. Turkey suffers complete economic and political collapse; Islamic fundamentalist takeover of government and accept support from other Islamic states in Middle East and former Soviet Union; Turkey leaves NATO and concern over Greece-Turkey conflict rises.

- Options to mitigate:

- 3 Enhance military engagement by both NATO and EU
- 3 Coordinate economic assistance with EU to head-off collapse of Turkish economy.

- If surprise occurs, possible follow-on courses of action:

- 3 Work with NATO allies to prevent isolation of new Turkish regime;
- 3 Provide technological and economic assistance to make Greece more militarily self-sufficient, lessening perception that its security depends on others.

• Additional "strategic surprises":

6. Present Russian-Belarus union emboldens new Federation to move into Baltic States using as pretense the "protection of Kaliningrad enclave"

7. Nuclear exchange anywhere (e.g., India/Pakistan, North Korea ballistic missile launch on Japan);

8. China domestic collapse, resulting in division of mainland into two or more countries;

9. France dominates EU military alliance; instigates collapse of NATO; U.S. forces deemed not necessary and removed from Continent.

10. Cyberspace "Pearl Harbor" attack on U.S., significantly damaging IO systems from banking to defense networks.

11. India aligns with Iran to deny US. access to Southwest Asia (overcoming traditional Hindu/Muslim animosities).

12. China develops and commences its own naval forward deployments throughout Pacific -- and even to Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf -- as result of its increasing reliance upon trade/oil coming via sea lines of communications (e.g., China presently imports very little oil, but expected to import 75% of available Persian Gulf oil by 2015).

Tab A

Additional Strategic Surprises We **Would Not** Want to See

- A. Political / Military
1. China – India conflict
 2. China – Russia conflict
 3. African continent erupts in widespread cross-border, inter-state conflict (vice civil conflicts)
 4. China begins campaign to dominate Asia with assist from weapons/technology bought or leased from Russia; starts with aggression against Taiwan, then Korea, Spratley Island, and Viet Nam.
 5. Potential adversary (e.g., China) builds base in Western Hemisphere (Cuba, Mexico, etc.) **PAWMA**
 6. Cascading major natural disasters stretches U.S. military's ability to support humanitarian responses while meeting ongoing commitments.
 7. Realignment of key allies in Asia (e.g., Singapore) with China into formal anti-US coalition
 8. Emergence of nationalist Russia unfriendly to US/Europe
 9. Governments of Peru and Columbia collapse as a result of corruption and drug trade; lawlessness and urban warfare expected to spread to Brazil and Bolivia because of severe economic problems in those countries; United States asked to provide military assistance to restore order peace and massive economic aid
 10. Russia forcibly annexes Kazakstan; Muslim nations plead for US intervention
 11. ~~Disintegration~~ Disintegration results in increased piracy and blockage of key straits; rogue elements charge 'tolls' for safe passage of ships,
 12. Castro dies, Cuba suffers internal collapse, civil war; regional conflict ensues, engulfing U.S. southeast coast (esp. Florida).
 13. Panama Canal blocked/damaged by rogue elements. Trade slows, product availability diminished, severe price hikes result.
 14. Nuclear power plant accident in Western Europe; millions flee, thousands die.
 15. Thailand/Myanmar (Burma) border war fueled by drug cartels; possible spillover of violence into neighbors.
 16. Access denied to Hong Kong harbor to US naval vessels and merchant ships bound for U.S.
 17. Alienation of East European countries compels them back into arms of an ultra-nationalist Russia.
 18. A breakthrough in technology disadvantageous to U.S. military supremacy -- oceans becoming "transparent" by new sensor capability, meaning U.S. advantage in reliance upon submerged platforms is greatly negated.

- B. Economic
 - 1. Collapse of the Euro (hyperinflation/economic chaos in Europe).
 - 2. Significant oil reserves discovered in Antarctica; many nations vie to claim and exploit;
 - 3. Closure of one or more of the world's 16 "superports" by Information Operations (e.g., Singapore, where 1/3 of world's maritime transshipments are made daily; the estimated cost to world prices is rise of 20%);

- C. US-specific
 - 1. US Stock Market crash
 - 2. LA-like riots leads to national unrest and widespread civil disorder; exploited by terrorist elements (domestic and foreign).
 - 3. Chemical and/or biological terrorist/rogue nation attack on US city.
 - 4. Severe electrical power crisis on the eastern seaboard; suspected terrorist sabotage.

- D. Directly Affecting US Military
 - 1. China attacks Taiwan
 - 2. Iran attempts to close Strait of Hormuz
 - 3. North Korea invades South Korea with support of China.

snowflake

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 9, 2001
RE: **X00785/01**

I just read the memo. It is unclear to me exactly how the tour could be advertised as safe by the U.S. Embassy if they have insisted they be accompanied by armed guards.

Please explain.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060901.11

Philippines

9 June 01

U10608 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4176

snowflake

TO: Jeff Starr
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: June 9, 2001
RE:

We need to follow up on that Uzbekistan meeting.

I would like to visit there some day, I think we ought to look again at surplus equipment, make sure we beef up their education opportunities I am also in favor of the special forces training.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
06090 1.04

UZBEKISTAN

9 June 01

U10611 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4177

snowflak

TO: Gen. Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DL

DATE: June 9, 2001

SUBJECT:

Do you think we ought to get a U-2 or Predator to assist the operation Northern Watch folks? They sure seem to feel they need it.

Let me know what you think.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
060901.01

I RAO

9 Jun 01

U10613 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4178



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000



2001 JUN 11 AM 10:56

INFO MEMO

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

June 8, 2001, 10:00AM

DepSec Action: _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: LINTON WELLS II, ACTING ASD(C3I) *[Signature]* 6/8/01

SUBJECT: Brubaker article in Federal Computer Week "Keep CIO, Comptroller Apart"

- In a snowflake dated May 22, 2001 (TAB B), you asked if someone is proposing that OSD combine the Comptroller and the CIO.
- The attached issue paper (TAB A), addresses this question and provides rationale for keeping the CIO functions aligned with the ASD(C3I).
- The assertion in the Federal Computer Week article that such a consolidation is "the source of much recent speculation," is correct. The proposal has been mentioned as one of several reorganization options in the context of increased management oversight and control of financial system IT resources.

COORDINATION: USD(C)

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Keith Dean, (b)(6)

020 COM

89001



June 1, 2001

ISSUE: Should the DoD CIO be combined with the Comptroller?

BACKGROUND:

- Discussions about the location of the CIO have considered four main alternatives: (1) stand up an independent CIO, (2) combine the CIO function with AT&L, (3) combine the CIO function with the Comptroller, (4) keep the CIO function with ASD(C3I).
- The Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) states that the CIO shall have “information resources management (IRM) duties as that official’s primary duty.” The CIO is responsible for providing information and advice regarding IRM and information technology (IT) to the agency head, and for ensuring that the acquisition, management and use of IT is consistent with the CCA principles.
- Based on successful private sector practices, the intent of CCA was to have a single individual who would focus on the role and function of IT within the agency. While the legislative history makes it clear that the CIO function was not to be combined with other major functions, this has become a common practice among federal agencies. Combining C3I and the CIO function is a logical choice since C3I’s responsibilities for communications and intelligence complement CIO functions. The span of control is broad, but at least the both functions are founded on information.
- The CIO is the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) and advisor to the Secretary for IRM and IT. Thus, while the CIO has PSA responsibilities (i.e., DoD-wide policy development, planning, resources management, and oversight and evaluation), the CIO’s responsibilities for IRM and IT span all functional areas. This means that the CIO has oversight of IRM and IT activities relevant to both joint mission areas and functional areas -- including, but not limited to, finance, logistics, C3ISR, etc.
- If the CIO is subordinate to the Comptroller or the USD(AT&L), IT decisions can easily take a back seat to other pressing issues. In his article, Mr. **Brubaker** argued against combining the CIO and Comptroller positions primarily on the grounds that the CIO would lose the independence needed to conduct oversight of information system investments, promote process change across functional boundaries, break down stovepipes, and make strategic IT investment decisions in the best interests of the enterprise. A CIO-CFO partnership is critical, but the functions must be separate and balanced.

RECOMMENDATION: Keep CIO functions with ASD(C3I).

POINT OF CONTACT: Acting DoD Deputy CIO, Margaret Myers, (b)(6)

COORDINATION

USD(C) Dov Zacheim June 7, 2001

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

22 MAY 01

TO: C3I - DR WELLS

REF: Brewster Article, Federal
Computer Week (22 May 2001)

Sir

1. THE SECRETARY wonders if
someone is proposing that
we combine the Controller + CIO
jobs?
2. HIS INSTRUCT IS NOT TO COMBINE
3. PLEASE ADVISE HIM

Respectfully
Maui

U09717 / 01

Rec'd 23 MAY
6-43-31 MAY

Chris - CC Controlling
Sec.

Ardy Johnson

fers the latest in a growing body of evidence to suggest that Mr. Kim is at once a tactical genius and a strategic fool, qualities that may be a major obstacle to progress in both South Korean and U.S. relations with North Korea. In an effort aimed at regaining the spotlight, putting pressure on the Bush administration, and reassuring Kim Dae-jung on North-South, Mr. Kim met with a senior EU delegation.

All three elements of Mr. Kim's tactics were revealed in the EU discussions as was Mr. Kim's pleasure in placing himself on the world stage. Mr. Kim pledged to continue his moratorium on missile testing until 2003 (not coincidentally, the year when the two LWRs under the Agreed Framework are supposed to be completed). Yet at the same time, he told the EU envoys that Pyongyang would continue exporting missiles and missile technology, principally, because he "needs the money." Finally, he sent the EU delegation off to Seoul with a private letter for Kim Dae-jung reassuring the ROK that the North-South reconciliation process and perhaps his promise of a second Kim-Kim summit are not dead.

Kim Jong-il's use of the EU visit as (to use a billiard term) a political "bank shot" to the U.S. was particularly impressive. By reinforcing the North Korean missile test moratorium while at the same time emphasizing North Korea would continue its destabilizing missile exports Mr. Kim was sending a clear "carrot and stick" message to Washington as it nears the final stages of its Korea policy review. Kim Jong-il's commitment to the missile moratorium was a signal that Pyongyang remains eager to pursue missile talks with the U.S.; Mr. Kim's proclamation that North Korea would continue exporting missiles was his "stick" designed to bring a sense of urgency to restarting U.S.-North Korean talks.

Mr. Kim's performance is fascinating, and interestingly suggests that many critics of the Bush "go slow" approach to North Korea were dead wrong. Recall, it was argued that there was a narrow "win-

dow of opportunity" for a missile deal and that President Bush must immediately start in "muddling through." for his where President Clinton left regime, but the price has been off. Not true. Pyongyang has at great cost hundreds of thousands starving to nowhere else to go.

In fact, the "time out" for death, widespread deprivation, North Korea called by the Bush administration has a little hope for a decent life.

What is Kim Jong-il's strategy beyond immediate and South Korean constantly begging Pyongyang to come to the table, it is Kim Jong-il who is now the one eager to resume Korean economic system has talks. This reverses the unhealthy diplomatic patterns created by the Clinton administration, always begging and bribing Pyongyang just to attend meetings. Now Mr. Bush has been described as the one setting the terms of diplomacy rather than reacting to Pyongyang's games. This is an important prerequisite for a new policy.

Indeed, Kim Jong-il's behavior suggests that Mr. Bush's assessment of the situation and of U.S.-South Korean Japanese leverage is correct.

Faced with a perpetual food shortage nearly 2 million tons this year and a still moribund economy, North Korea's desperation is growing. At the same time, the very success of its "feed me or I'll kill you" extortion tactics over the past six years is constraining Pyongyang's behavior even as it keeps North Korea on life support. Instead of missile launches, or provocations in the Demilitarized Zone, Pyongyang's reaction to Mr. Bush's skepticism and rethinking of Korea policy has been merely therapeutic abusive rhetoric at Washington and Seoul. The fact is that the massive amounts of food, fertilizer and other international aid that have poured into North Korea from the U.S., South Korea and the international community since 1995 have given Mr. Kim Jong-il something to lose. This suggests new boundaries for North Korean behavior and increased leverage for U.S.-South Korean-Japanese trilateral diplomacy.

Unfortunately for the future of Korea, Kim Jong-il's sense of strategy is as flawed as his tactics are clever. His tactics, of course, are designed to ensure regime survival at the lowest possible cost and lowest risk. This has so far succeeded in "muddling through." for his regime, but the price has been at great cost hundreds of thousands starving to nowhere else to go.

What is Kim Jong-il's strategy beyond immediate and South Korean constantly begging Pyongyang to come to the table, it is Kim Jong-il who is now the one eager to resume Korean economic system has talks. This reverses the unhealthy diplomatic patterns created by the Clinton administration, always begging and bribing Pyongyang just to attend meetings. Now Mr. Bush has been described as the one setting the terms of diplomacy rather than reacting to Pyongyang's games. This is an important prerequisite for a new policy.

same mistake with Kim Dae-jung that he made with Mr. Clinton. His mistake with the United States has meant Pyongyang now has to deal with a much tougher administration in Washington.

Kim Dae-jung has provided Pyongyang every reasonable opportunity to move forward on genuine North-South reconciliation. But unless there is rapid progress during the remainder of this year, Kim Dae-jung will become a lame duck as the South Korean presidential election campaign begins early next year. It is unlikely that Kim Jong-il find a more patient, generous and magnanimous partner to deal with in Seoul than Kim Dae-jung in the foreseeable future. Thus, yet another opportunity may be missed.

There was a classic episode in the old comic strip "Pogo," where Pogo says sagely, "We have met the enemy and he is us." In the end, for all his tactical genius, Kim Jong-il will remain a strategic fool in charge of a decomposing state and society unless he makes the difficult choices needed to move toward a soft landing and peaceful coexistence. Even the best-conceived and executed U.S. and South Korean policies can do little to fix such a "Pogo problem."

Robert A. Manning is senior fellow and director of Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Federal Computer Week
May 14, 2001

27. Keep CIO, Comptroller
Apart
By Paul Brubaker

The Defense Department is considering a much-needed reorganization of the chief information officer duties. The leading scenario, and the source of much recent speculation, involves placing the CIO within the comptroller's office. That would be a colossal mistake. The CIO organization must work with the comptroller's office, not under it. The legislative intent in creating a CIO was for that person to be independent of any other organization within a department

or agency so that information resources management could be the CIO's primary duty. It was also envisioned that the CIO would have a seat at the management table alongside the chief financial officer (i.e., the comptroller) and the chief operating officer.

The CIO is also tasked under the Clinger-Cohen Act with leading process change. Under the comptroller's wing, the CIO would lose the independence to perform that function — a serious problem, because process change is something the comptroller's office desperately needs but has failed to achieve.

Controlling the purse strings gives the comptroller's office great power and authority. For example, an attempt by Congress and the DOD CIO office to stop an accounting system that was high-risk, over-budget and behind schedule was overturned because "that's what the comptroller wanted." Clearly, any CIO under the comptroller could not effectively oversee any financial systems, let alone successfully advocate reforming DOD's antiquated financial systems.

A third reason to keep the CIO independent is that the comptroller's civilian leadership is loath to reform. Two anecdotes support that contention. Several months ago, while serving as the deputy CIO within DOD, I had just completed a high-level briefing on the need for transforming the existing major management processes at the Pentagon. The highest-ranking civilian in the comptroller's shop stopped me and said "That [transformation] stuff may work in the private sector, but that's not how we do business in the Pentagon."

Just a few weeks later, another senior official in the office said, "The current budget planning system has served the department well for the last 40 years." The comptroller has also constantly rejected budget requests required to implement Clinger-Cohen at DOD.

The comptroller's shop has a history of hostility toward innovation. Had the CIO shop been housed inside the comptroller's shop during con-

sideration of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet project, neither it nor any other innovation would have occurred.

One of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's major priorities is to change the antiquated processes at the department. So it is possible that new leadership may be able to overcome the resisters of change throughout the organization. But this will take a dogged tenacity and commitment from the top.

Most importantly, it will take an independent CIO organization working with the comptroller rather than under it.

Brubaker is president of e-government solutions at Commerce One Inc., a former deputy chief information officer at the Defense Department and an architect of the Clinger-Cohen Act.

San Antonio Express-News
May 15, 2001

28. Defense Picks Worrisome

Once again, Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., is standing up against business as usual in Washington and pointing out obvious conflicts of interest.

And once again, McCain's Position pits him against his former presidential primary foe, George W. Bush.

The issue: Bush's appointment of defense industry honchos to key Pentagon posts.

Bush chose Gordon Eng-land of General Dynamics to be secretary of the Navy and me James G. Roche, corporate vice president of Northrop Grumman Corp., to be Air Force secretary.

General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman are major defense contractors.

McCain raised the issue of conflicts of interest in a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing last week.

The nominees told senators they would recuse themselves from decisions involving their corporate connections, the Associated Press reported.

But it is discomfoting to have former high-ranking defense industry executives in-

involved in or close to decisions impacting their previous employers.

Plenty of potential nominees who do not have ties to the defense industry are available, and Bush is showing a lack of sensitivity to conflicts with these choices.

Boston Globe
May 14, 2001

Pg. 10

29. Spacey Rumsfeld

If the prospect of militarizing space were not such a serious matter, there would be something as zany as Stanley Kubrick's "Dr. Strangelove" in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's announcement Tuesday that he is shuffling the Pentagon's organizational chart in order to have a four-star Air Force general in charge of an Air Force Space Command.

Although Rumsfeld denied that his rearranging of chairs in the Pentagon has anything to do with the development of weapons for space, this new bureaucratic alignment - viewed alongside a commission on space he chaired five years ago and the clamor from some Republicans to pursue space weapons - looks like part of a deliberate campaign to increase funding for the development of antisatellite and anti-missile space weapons.

What is truly zany about the move to militarize space is that it resembles a perfectly designed boomerang that will come whistling back at the country that launched it.

"We are the only serious military presence in space at present," says Joseph Cirincione, director of the Carnegie Endowment's Non-Proliferation Project. "The Soviet Union was also there, but now Russian satellites are falling out of the sky. Today nobody else is even close to us, and it is very much in our interest to keep it that way. We should be trying to keep other countries out of space."

If the Bush administration & sues the development of space weapons, it will not war with Iraq and North Korea merely be diverting and wasting finite resources. It will also be making a strategic error.

In large part, the United States owes its military domi-

nance to a virtual monopoly space satellites. Two years ago, when NATO planes were bombing Serb targets in the Kosovo war, satellites were used to target bridges and depots and to guide bombs to their targets.

"Kosovo was a space war," says John Pike, a prominent specialist on space weapons who is director of Global Security.org. To deter other countries from seeking to knock out American satellites, Pike says, the United States can rely on the overwhelming deterrence it already possesses.

The most effective way of preserving the American advantage in space is to codify and enforce a norm that defines any attack on a space satellite as justifying what Pike calls "grievous retaliation."

Without wasting enormous sums on the pursuit of laser weapons in space, American satellites can be better protected by launching more of them, placing them in higher orbits, having aircraft capable of providing backup, and making their ground stations much less vulnerable than they are today.

If Rumsfeld is permitted to pursue a space weapons boondoggle, the result will be to endanger America's unrivaled advantage in space satellites, squander money that should be spent on real needs, and validate the complaints of allies and possible rivals who fear an American lust for global domination.

Chicago Tribune
May 14, 2001

30. Beyond The Two-War Scenario

Since the Cold War ended a decade ago, the Pentagon has built its force structure around the notion that the U.S. must be able to fight and win two major regional wars almost simultaneously to meet its global national security obligations.

The double-header of most often depicted is Iraq and North Korea.

Now the Bush administration is nearing the end of a Pentagon review amid reports that Defense Secretary Donald

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
Adm. G
Cathy Mainardi
Corn. Mewhome

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 9, 2001

SUBJECT: **Dinner in Brussels**

I asked to go to a restaurant. I ended up at a private business house, where they would not allow me to pay for dinner. As a result, Davignon paid for dinner, which is against the rules.

I don't know what I have to do. There is no way I can make all the arrangements. I have told people what I want to do. I do not want to be put in a position where I can't pay for dinner, if I say I need to pay for dinner. I said I needed to pay for the dinner. I said I wanted it in a restaurant.

Now I am going to have to go back and unravel it. It is a waste of my time, and a potential embarrassment.

Please start helping me. Don't put me in awkward positions.

DHR/azn
060901.25.3

333 SD

9 Jan 01

snowflake

May 21, 2001 12:05 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Disqualifying on AIDS

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUN 10 2001

Please see what the status is on this AIDS memo I drafted. My instinct is that we ought to send it out to the changed addressees above. It appears I proposed it to Dell'Orto, but nothing ever happened except he said it is okay.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/25/01 Dell'Orto memo to SecDef re: AIDS

DHR:dh
052101-30

~~6/5~~ 6/5

SIR -

After consultation with Jim Haynes /GC, I distributed the copy signed on 4/23 (attached). I also, again at his advice, copied him and Admiral Giambastiani. This satisfies the need to inform all who need to know, and makes it effective when you actually signed

990


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21 May 01
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11-L-0559/OSD/A187

6/2/01 Larry

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Steve Cambone
Adm. JJ Quinn
Larry DiRita
Dan Dell'Orto
D.O. Cooke
Executive Secretariat

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: April 23, 2001

SUBJECT: AIDS

By this memorandum I am recusing myself from any Department of Defense involvement on the subject of AIDS until further advised.

Until shortly before coming to the DoD, I served as the Chairman of the Board of Gilead Sciences, Inc., **and continue to hold stock options in Gilead.** Gilead currently has a drug on the market for AIDS related retinitis. In addition, it has a drug for AIDS in clinical testing.


In that AIDS is starting to be discussed in interagency meetings, I am recusing myself.

The Deputy Secretary will handle all matters relating to AIDS for the Department.

Thank you.

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

cc: Steve Cambone
Adm. JJ Quinn
Larry DiRita
Dan Dell'Orto
D.O. Cooke
Executive Secretariat

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: April 23, 2001

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The Deputy Secretary will handle all matters relating to AIDS for the Department

Thank you.

720

23 Apr 01

snowflake

June 13, 2001 8:14 AM

TO: Honorable Cohn Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: IMET

Please put enough money in for IMET in your budget. I have talked to Mitch Daniels about it. I have talked to the President about it. It is important, I will constantly mention it on the Hill.

If there are any instances where you are having trouble, I would be delighted to go up there and talk to them, as would Paul Wolfowitz.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061301-7

110.01

13 June 01

snowflake

June 13, 2001 5:27 PM

TO: Jim Haynes, General Counsel
CC: *POWELL MOORE*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Independent Legal Counsel

Please look into the idea of having a separate legal counsel, independent of your office, to handle the IG.

I am told that is the way it is done at HHS. Senator Grassley is interested in whether or not we would be willing to do something like that and whether or not it makes sense.

We do that kind of thing on a temporary basis in corporations, of course, where we allow an audit committee to have an outside counsel, but it is not permanent generally.

What do you think?

DHR:dh
061301-37

0206C

3 Jun 0

U10878 /01

June 13, 2001 5:29 PM

TO: Inspector General
cc: General Counsel *DM*
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Response to Senator Grassley

I met with Senator Grassley today. He tells me his office had a meeting with you within the last month and you have not responded to the meeting. He said you then told him you needed a letter from the Chairman of the Committee to respond.

Please advise me as to what the status is.

DHR:dh
061301-38

032

135000



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000



2001 JUN 14 PM 4:55

INFO MEMO

FORCE MANAGEMENT
POLICY

June 14, 2001, 3:15 p.m.

FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: Charles S. Abell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (EMP)

Charles S. Abell
6-14-01

SUBJECT: DoD Personnel Assigned to Non-DoD Positions

- This is an interim response to let you know I am still working your tasking to assemble a list of all detailees to include associated costs and other information. I requested my staff to include numbers from the Legislative Fellow program, as well.
- I reviewed the prepared package yesterday and returned it for more information. The data across the Services is inconsistent and needs verification. I know what you want and will submit a complete package to you as soon as possible.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
None

Prepared by:



2001 JUN 15 11 08 43

June 15, 2001, 3:52 p.m.

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DJ*

SUBJECT: Fast Track

Jim Haynes and I discussed this matter today. We agreed that facilities consolidation should be part of a larger approach that asks Congress to create a fast track mechanism for DoD on a number of issues. Jim has prepared a memo to that effect.

COORDINATION: NONE

snowflake

June 13, 2001 4:22 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Fast Track

I think we ought to go with a fast track idea like Jim Miller had today. Who is the right person in this building to get it going?

DHR:dh
061301-35

11-L-0559/OSD/4195

snowflake

June 18, 2001 4:18 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
Pete Aldridge
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Bill Owens

Attached is a memo from Bill Owens I would like you to take a look at.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/12/01 Owens memo to SecDef re: Budget and Transformation

DHR:dh
061801-38

381

18 Jun 01

U11078 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4196

(b)(6)

②

March 21, 2001

Personal Memo for the Secretary of Defense

Don,

I'll take advantage of your offer to provide a few thoughts. I know how profoundly complex and demanding the challenges you face are, and I'll keep this brief.

I BELIEVE THAT:

-TRANSFORMATION IS THE ONLY PATH. There is simply **too much risk in not proceeding.** Risk of not finding the money for **recapitalization of platforms** and systems, risk of potential enemies "skipping the present day generation of **legacy systems**" and being able to gain disproportionate advantage, risk of missing the potential of the "RMA", and the risk of losing the **budget savings** and efficiencies of reducing the redundancy of the services. You may be the only **person** who has the **stature**, perseverance, and work ethic to **make** it happen, but I believe it will be a lonely journey **as there are many who oppose real transformation.**

-THE BUDGET IS THE CORE OF TRANSFORMATION. Culture will follow. Everyone in the Pentagon ultimately responds to the budget process and allocation. **The BUDGET BECOMES THE POLICY. POLICY RARELY TRANSFORMS ITSELF INTO A CLEAR BUDGET.** Your involvement in the **macro allocations** and **some of the particularly relevant details** of the budget will deliver the strongest message of "transformation". NO one understands the "**requirements** process across the department, no general or admiral and no civilian (although **many** will profess to understand). The system will not do justice to real change and will invent ways to **avoid** real change in the budget (**leaving the policy articulation** to you and the service **secretaries...hence "they"** win and will be able to "**outwait** the transformation artists".

-There are measures which can be used to monitor "budget and hence, policy transformation".

-A FEW MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF TRANSFORMATION.

- (1) **Balance the accounts, Establish the right percentages (of the total budget) for various elements of the budget, and then measure where we are and where we need to be to get the right balance,** e.g. R&D, Procurement, O&M, Personnel, etc. The last **8** years of budgets **have** been dramatically **UNBALANCED**, and if not balanced the budget will simply result in one problem (for example current readiness) being replaced by another as time passes. The budget is unbalanced today **in the following ways (for example):** procurement is not sized for the current force structure, **there** is too much money going to **tacsair** (and not enough for bombers), the replacement **rate** for physical inventory (buildings, etc) is sadly low, the personnel budget is for a force of **60%** of our **actual** numbers of people, there is no measure of the

C4ISR budget that is manageable (and it is dramatically underfunded). Nate: You and Colin might want to have a look at the **balance** of funding between State and Defense, also.

- (2) **C4ISR/RMA**. "If America can **see** the battlefield 24 hours a day, real time, all weather and deliver the information to our troops and **the** enemy can't, we win!" (a) Get a true measure of **the** platforms which perform this-uniquely critical function and monitor it for the duration of your tenure. For **example** numbers, ages, and replacements for Guardrail aircraft, AWACS, JSTARS, E-2Cs, S-35, Rivet Joint aircraft, U2s, P3s, various imaging satellites, aigint satellites, **comms. Satellites, UAVs**, etc. (All of these are underfunded, aged, and programs for followons are starved). Ensure that there is enough money to provide replacements in each cnteeory (b) Have a close look at the data links (link 16, SCDL, CEC, LOCE, etc) and demand that the **services BUY ENOUGH OF THEM** and make them **INTEROPERABLE**. (you might have a look at link 16 for an **interesting case study**) (c) have a **serious** look at how commercial **TCP/IP/XML** internet protocols and **C++** and **Java/Jimi** software could revolutionize this area (d)Increase the funding for the C4ISR area by 100% and make it transparent.
- (3) 'hew **measures of readiness**' With your (VERY IMPORTANT) strategic **review** define these measures (including personnel factors) to achieve the goals you've set. This **will** be a revolution in itself, and it **translates** into **BILLIONS**. Monitor the funding and results and ensure that "just enough" money goes to these accounts.
- (4) **Business Measures**. The supporting elements of **LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND MEDICAL** are VERY redundant and often not interoperable across the services. In **each of** the four **areas** dramatic consolidation and focused outsourcing should be considered. **I** believe there is **\$10B** in savings **here**. You might monitor the budget in each of these areas and set goals (perhaps 20-25%) for reductions over 2 years. These four **areas are** full of possibilities for reorganization.
- (5) **Procurement**. Pick a top 10 list of areas where you believe there are big redundancies **and/or** savings (and little impact on our capability), and personally monitor the decisions to reduce expenditures (possible areas are: racair, submarines, strike systems, **helicopters**).

Don, I'm sure you are besieged with advice. I'm sure mine is no better than many others. If I can help, I'm here for you, and regardless, I'll be cheering for you! I have sent you a copy of a book I published last May, "Lifting the Fog of War". It has a number of other suggestions, and it may be worth having one of your staff review it for possible (more controversial) ideas.

Very best wishes,

Bill Owens

(b)(6)

bill@teledesic.com

snowflake

June 18, 2001 3:34 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Nuclear Security

Please take a look at this material from the Eisenhower Institute and Andy Goodpaster on the subject of **nucs** and let me know if you think there is anything there we haven't thought of or that I ought to read carefully

Thanks.

Attach.
Spring 2001 Eisenhower Institute re: Nuclear Security

DHR:dh
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PREFACE

The Eisenhower Institute, a living memorial to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, has a strong, enduring interest in issues of nuclear security and the shaping of America's nuclear future. Such is quite fitting: nuclear dangers, and the promises of "Atoms for Peace," his historic message of hope, stood high among the responsibilities and the aims to which he dedicated himself throughout his presidency.

General Andrew Goodpaster, the author of this paper, worked closely with him in these efforts, as well as in his own subsequent high military posts. In the years of his retirement he has continued with groundbreaking proposals aimed at tighter limits and further reins on nuclear arms, notably including major reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals in response to the opportunities to strengthen stable security and peace afforded by the end of the Cold War.

This has been – and in his view remains – a work in progress. Its development has been greatly aided by a distinguished group – civilian and military – of experienced individuals of deep understanding and insight of these matters in the context of U.S. security and international affairs who have been willing to read and comment on some of its earlier drafts. The text as it now appears is of course a matter for which he himself takes full responsibilities, joined with the hope that through widening consideration and debate, early and continuing action will result to achieve strengthened assurance of nuclear peace.

Susan Eisenhower
President

FOREWORD

This paper responds to a growing belief that the time is **opportune** for a renewed look at the means of assuring and advancing our nuclear security. It takes as the appropriate starting point an examination of just what security needs and purposes our country's nuclear weapons forces and nuclear weapons establishment should serve, acting as they do in conjunction with "associated measures" such as verification, non-proliferation and missile defense, all joined in nuclear security efforts as part of our overall framework of security strategies and policies in the world's "geopolitical" environment now and foreseen.

It considers, as a priority, our security needs and purposes with regard to relations with Russia, China and "rogue states," as well as the need for "hedging" against future uncertainties. It then proceeds to examine the essential tasks that will be involved in reshaping and realigning U.S. nuclear posture in accord with the needs and purposes as thus redefined.

These tasks include resizing, reconfiguring and reorienting our nuclear forces, reshaping the nuclear establishment, safely dismantling and disposing of the weapons and warheads that will be rendered excess, and taking action on the "associated measures" that will serve in company to safeguard and strengthen our nuclear security. Finally, the paper reviews the tasks, challenges and issues that must be dealt with to bring us from where we are to where we ought to be, in summary as follows:

U.S. Nuclear Posture – Key Tasks and Challenges in Realigning and Reshaping

- Defining the needs and purposes that U.S. nuclear weapons and associated measures should serve – focusing on Russia, China, rogue states and terrorists, and "hedging"

- Resizing the U.S. Nuclear Force

Is complete elimination infeasible? Is **Putin's 1500** (or lower if he so moves) appropriate to U.S. needs and purposes?

- New composition of the U.S. force

Retain the "Triad"? What weapon systems retained?

- Reorienting the force

Changed target doctrine? Changed alert system?

- Reshaping the nuclear establishment

What remanufacturing capability? How (and where) built? How provide needed tritium ? What “ramp-up” capacity? What plant and laboratory structure?

- Safe dismantling and disposition of excess nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials and components. How safeguard and carry out accountability? How deal with plutonium?
- Verification procedures. What system to put into effect? How to build and implement U.S.-Russian agreed provisions?
- Non-proliferation – non-military components: what initiatives to strengthen international efforts and observance? How (and how soon) achieve ratification of CTBT?
- Military deterrence and defense activities. Are present weapons types sufficient?
- Direct defense. How resolve the intense NMD impasse? What defense of forces, theater, regions?

This is an impressive list of action requirements for the U.S. government. It involves, in addition to actions that the United States can take alone, many that involve interactions with other countries, Russia especially. None look to be infeasible. All require intensified, well-focused, sustained top-level leadership.

U.S. Nuclear Posture – Time to Reshape and Realign

The comprehensive U.S. nuclear posture review now underway with a December 2001 due-date offers an important new opportunity. It is time for a thoroughgoing fresh assessment of the security needs and purposes that our country's nuclear complex – nuclear forces and nuclear establishment – should serve in the years ahead. These needs and purposes are centered on the protection of America's security against nuclear danger from abroad in all its dimensions. Our nuclear capability is joined in that purpose with an expanding battery of associated measures, ranging from anti-proliferation efforts and safeguards against "loose nukes" to various levels of ballistic missile defense. And all this should be viewed in conjunction with our overall strategic policies regarding especially our alliances, Russia and China,

The key outcome of the posture review can and should be a major reorienting, reshaping and resizing of the U.S. nuclear complex, aligned to the future, shifting away from the outdated elements of the Cold War nuclear legacy that still, to too great an extent, form the core of our nuclear capability. In assessing the security needs and purposes to be served in the future, those of primary importance pertain to Russia, to China, to possible proliferators ("rogue" states and terrorists) and to a prudent "hedge" against the possibility – however remote it may now appear to be – of a serious worsening, or even breakdown of the now relatively benign world security environment. These should shape our future nuclear posture and capability.

The Principal Needs and Purposes

Russia, with its still massive but aging nuclear arsenal, continues as the primary influence on the size, composition, posture and doctrine of our nuclear forces. President **Putin's** recently announced decision to reduce the Russian strategic nuclear weapons arsenal to a total of 1500 weapons, and perhaps much less, gives a timely lead to the United States to consider a comparable move. His decision, clearly addressed to his own country's nuclear needs and purposes -just as our own decisions should be addressed to ours, and our allies' – shows that he senses (as he should) no threat of nuclear attack by the United States, just as we sense no nuclear threat to ourselves from Russia on the course it has clearly chosen. The overall security of both countries stands to gain by large-scale weapons reductions of the kind he intends to make. They will greatly lower the massive destructive nuclear potential that has long existed on both sides, constituting in President Eisenhower's words "**the** only thing that could destroy the United States of America" (and, as we may add, many other countries including Russia as well).

There are, however, lesser dangers that exist in the Russian nuclear establishment – as distinguished from threats of attack – which remain serious grounds for concern: the continuing potential for launch by accident, by miscalculation or without authorization, together with the constant possibility of

theft or diversion of weapons or weapons-grade materials to possible nuclear proliferators. Dangers such as these have now risen to the fore, causing a shift of the U.S. needs and interests regarding the Russian nuclear stockpile – most notably to the weapons and materials that will be rendered excess by President Putin's decision. The United States should continue its cooperation with Russia, working together to safeguard against "loose nukes" as a common goal. But by far the most important means of responding to our needs and purposes is to give added emphasis to building a firm foundation of productive relations with Russia as a means to strengthen mutual nuclear security.

~~China presents a different~~ China presents a different ~~and~~ and ~~the~~ the ~~future~~ future ~~security~~ security relationship with China can and will in fact be achieved is by no means clear. The question is complicated, in particular, by the unresolved issues over the future of Taiwan. It is aggravated as well by the dispute over the U.S. limited national missile defense program. As matters stand today, the relationship remains troubled by Chinese intimations of the possibility of a military clash. The recent provocative reference, for example, by a senior Chinese military officer to the possibility of a nuclear strike against Los Angeles cannot be summarily dismissed as rhetorical excess. A degree of uncertainty will endure for some time as to the future course of the relationship between our two countries, but at least no reversion to Cold War attitudes has occurred or is in sight. The U.S. nuclear arsenal simply by its existence serves to discourage any resort to force that could threaten to unleash a nuclear exchange. It should be seen as part of a wider effort, productive in nature, to lessen confrontational tendencies, even while we keep a watchful eye on possible Chinese moves to attain a full-scale offensive capability.

The "rogue states" so-called (Iraq and Iran, perhaps Libya and now ~~less-~~certainly North Korea) plus transnational terrorist groups such as Osama bin Laden's must be recognized as potential nuclear proliferants inimical to the United States. These are the next source of concern, ranking in fact as the most likely active and compelling source of future nuclear threat or attack on us or our allies. The worldwide non-proliferation program, of which the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are major components, has as its primary aim the blocking and preventing – preferably by non-military means – of the spread of nuclear weapons to their hands – through early detection of suspicious activities, denial of access to weapons and weapons-grade materials components and production equipment and diplomatic efforts to dissuade potential proliferators from seeking to produce or otherwise obtain them.

But if, nevertheless, they do develop or acquire them, our nuclear weapons, together with our ballistic and other defenses against the delivery of such enemy weapons, provide an essential backup – deterring their use for nuclear threat or actual attack, and providing the capability for swift defeat and destruction if such are ever required.

Finally, "hedging" is required – consideration must be given to the possibility that the favorable world security environment now existing among the

major powers might somehow cease to exist, and that in an extreme case overt or clandestine action might be taken by one or more nations to build increased nuclear forces. The contingency that future relations of the United States with Russia **and/or** with China could take an adverse turn has also to be taken into account. Such a "worst case" possibility should not be exaggerated or made **self-fulfilling**, but should instead be carefully noted in the development of our policies and future programs. Unlikely as such a contingency may seem, there remains a necessity to maintain a readiness to respond, if necessary, with a halt in reductions, or even with an actual expansion of stockpile and forces. A capability to "ramp up" again if needed should be maintained, but need not, on present expectations, go beyond something very tightly limited in magnitude.

These four sets of needs and purposes provide a solid basis for the reorienting of our guiding policies and priorities and for planning and executing the challenging program of reform now needed. They should guide the realigning and reshaping – resizing, reconfiguring and reorienting our nuclear forces and establishment – as well as the reappraisal and redirection of concurrent associated protective measures such as ratification of the CTBT, the development of ballistic missile defenses and counter-terrorist measures and the strengthening of positive, productive relationships with Russia and China.

Realigning U.S. Nuclear Posture

In resizing the force to conform to this assessment of U.S. security needs and purposes, there is good reason for moving to a new, much reduced level as a next working objective, to match the level – 1500 – President **Putin** recently set for Russian strategic weapons. A question needing early clarification in this regard is whether the Russians – and the U.S. – will see fit to eliminate **all** nuclear weapons in excess of 1500, specifically including those now categorized as tactical, non-strategic, or non-deployed. Such action would constitute a valuable and reassuring step in reducing the total nuclear danger, carrying forward the initiatives of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War. The level of 1500 total weapons meets our identifiable needs: it maintains a stable, confidence-supporting balance with Russia; it takes adequate account of the uncertainties regarding future relations with China. It provides an ultimate nuclear backup to non-proliferation efforts dealing with rogue states and terrorists if ever required. And it provides at least a limited basis for "ramp-up" should that ever be needed.

In reconfiguring the force, an immediate question turns on retention of the "Triad." The three forces we now maintain offer distinctive operational features – the lesser vulnerability of the submarine-based missiles, the quicker reaction of the land-based version, the added flexibility of the bomber mode of delivery. For the present at least, planning on the basis of retaining all three, subject to continuing reconsideration as the years go on, holds obvious attractions, even though the reduction of costs in money and personnel would thereby be delayed. Particular weapons types now in the stockpile would be selected for retention.

About the only further need – having the assured capability to counter possible proliferation by rogue states – would be a deep-earth penetrator, for which an adaptation of an existing tested and proven warhead might be deemed satisfactory. If such should prove to be needed, it should be recognized that an issue might be created that would require national and international resolution. Such would certainly be the case if a new design were to be created and tested.

In reorienting the force, the chief issues will be targeting doctrine and alert provisions. As regards Russia, both of these issues can and should reflect the shift of need and purpose from the deterrence that characterized the past to the new concept of mutual assurance. China's nuclear capabilities do not at this time require active deterrence on a standing high-alert basis. Future decisions in this area will remain dependent on the Chinese nuclear program and on the success achieved in building (and rebuilding) a productive China-U.S. security relationship. Only in the case of proliferation by rogue states or terrorist groups would active deterrence and high alert status be required – and that of limited numbers – and then only when and if the proliferation were to reach the status of active threat of attack. Meanwhile, primary reliance can be placed on the general deterrent effort of the weapons, and on the ability to raise the alert levels quickly if and when increased threats should arise.

The reshaping of the U.S. nuclear establishment is already considerably advanced. Much of the past materials-producing infrastructure is by now out of action, and the main task for those facilities is to deal safely with the vast, dangerous residues that remain. The halt in nuclear testing – an essential element in non-proliferation – has to date been successfully accommodated, while maintaining the ability, through science-based stockpile stewardship, to certify the safety and reliability (i.e., the assured performance if ever required) of the legacy weapons retained. Serious questions remain open – notably the scale of needed remanufacture, and the means of providing it, the provision of tritium for replenishment, the essentials for possible “ramp-up” if ever called for, and the assured capability to perform the needed surveillance and maintenance as retained weapons age through the years. Attracting and holding the talents and capabilities in the laboratories and other elements of the nuclear complex, and in the supporting industries, and meeting the costs, will be a basic continuing concern. Our nuclear security, as changes proceed, will still rest on retained, reshaped and reoriented nuclear capabilities at lower levels – the continuing activities and responsibility of the U.S. nuclear military forces and the U.S. civilian nuclear production complex.

Safe dismantling and disposition remains a high priority. The physical processes involved in the actual reduction of the nuclear stockpiles pose stringent requirements of their own, on which **Russian-U.S.** cooperation will be of special value. Here the **Nunn-Lugar** Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is of outstanding importance. The removal, storage and turnover for dismantlement of excess weapons, and for safe disposition of their materials (the most critical need of potential weapons proliferators) must be safeguarded with utmost rigor and

accountability at every stage. Exposure to possible loss will be a vital concern; there will be enduring risk of diversion into the proliferation efforts of rogue states and of transnational terrorists.

A good start has been made in laying out the necessary controls. START II, which contemplated reductions of strategic weapons to 3000-3500 in both Russia and the United States, aimed at achieving these levels by the end of 2007, taking into account the five-year extension of time agreed at Helsinki in 1999. As also agreed, the warheads to be reduced were to be removed from their delivery systems well before that date. It is not known what **timeline** President **Putin** has in mind for the reduction to 1500, nor is it completely clear that the 1500 is to cover **all** weapons, including the so-called non-strategic. **In** fact, many questions remain to be answered, and it is to be hoped that a stepped-up program of information exchange will be established.

The 1500 level could be reached in a further year or two beyond 2007 – i.e., by 2008 or 2009 – at an assumed rate of safe and efficient dismantling of weapons and their warheads, much of the groundwork having been thought through in the work on START II. The added time that would be needed for non-strategic, non-deployed or “reserve” weapons dismantlement is less clear, but could be of the order of two to three more years, perhaps a bit more. For the added increment of strategic weapons made excess in each country by the reduction below the START II levels to the 1500 level, it should be possible without undue difficulty to adapt the processes already laid out in START II and to carry out in that manner their orderly verified removal and turnover for safeguarded dismantlement.

A special problem must be dealt with regarding disposition of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium. There are first of all sharply contentious views (largely relating to proliferation concerns) that must be resolved in favor of concerted, safeguarded disposition and utilization policies. Then comes a challenging task of establishing and conducting safeguard-monitoring operations that will give assurance that controls are in fact effective. And safety provisions for the transportation, storage and handling of these environmentally dangerous materials must be instituted as well. The congruence of Russian and U.S. security/safety issues suggests that with sustained high-priority attention to these issues throughout their respective national complexes, these problems can be mastered.

Action on the “Associated Measures”

Along with decisions and actions on the reshaping of our nuclear forces and establishment, concurrent decisions and actions must be taken on the “associated measures” earlier referred to (verification, non-proliferation and anti-missile defenses in particular). Though not addressed in detail herein, these have a role parallel in importance to that of the nuclear capability itself. The feasibility of many of the reforms identified herein for the U.S. nuclear complex will in fact

be heavily dependent on the strength and effectiveness of these associated measures.

The first is the whole area of verification. This has been well thought through in connection with the START II negotiations. Its actual conduct will require extremely careful monitoring and continuing assessment. For the U.S. agencies involved, full and timely funding will be a critical requirement.

The second is nuclear proliferation. As suggested earlier, the essential tasks involved in preventing and responding to proliferation have been clearly **defined**. The major problem lies in their execution, especially where cooperation of other countries is required. The handicaps are numerous and difficult; in some cases (Iraq in particular) actions by other countries, including our allies, have fallen short. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that in other cases the tools of diplomacy, discussion and negotiation have brought successes of great importance. Non-proliferation, for which our nuclear capability continues to serve as the ultimate safeguard, constitutes an essential avenue toward nuclear stability and nuclear security.

The third associated measure, direct defense, is the focus of the current political division, disagreement and contention over the planned U.S. limited national Missile Defense (NMD) and risks delaying nuclear objectives over "linked" ABM issues. It is also the area in which there is a need thus far not fulfilled, of developing defense capabilities for forces in the field and at sea, and for theater and regional defense if needed. In addition, the demands within the U.S. for national missile defense of some scope, together with other means of protection against all forms of possible rogue and terrorist weapons attack, generate a requirement for thoroughgoing reconsideration and comprehensive restudy of this whole issue, from policies to programs (including "boost phase" alternatives), aimed at providing security against all methods of hostile weapons delivery or emplacement. Consultation and cooperation with other nations sharing a common interest will be very much in order.

A final consideration: If it were possible to eliminate all the world's nuclear weapons with certainty, such could well be the proper working goal. But so long as the possibilities of clandestine possession or undetected preparations for breakout continue to exist, or a turn for the worse in the international security environment remains a possibility that must be safeguarded against, full elimination would require a degree of verification that goes well beyond present capabilities. No country, the United States and Russia included, is ready for the intrusive measures that would be required (measures that have not yet been designed), nor for the degree of transparency that would be necessary. It is possible, however, to pursue more limited goals: the reduction of nuclear armaments to the lowest verifiable level consistent with stable security, and the shift from deterrence at high states of alert to shared doctrines of mutual reassurance. Safe reduction to 1500 seems surely attainable. Beyond that, given safeguards and verification procedures that already appear feasible, and

depending upon a continued improving nuclear security environment and actions by the other nuclear-armed countries, further reductions to levels numbered in the low hundreds seem realistically possible once the 1500 levels are in fact reached.

Implementing the Reassessment and Realignment

To achieve the changes of the scale and importance envisioned herein, it will be necessary to confront an extensive range of tasks, challenges and key issues, which, in summary, include:

- Defining the needs and purposes that US. nuclear weapons and associated measures should serve – focusing on Russia, China, rogue states and terrorists, and “hedging”
- Resizing the U.S. Nuclear Force
 - Is complete elimination infeasible? Is **Putin’s** 1500 (or lower if he so moves) appropriate to U.S. needs and purposes?
- New composition of the U.S. force
 - Retain the “Triad”? What weapon systems retained?
- Reorienting the force
 - Changed target doctrine? Changed alert system?
- Reshaping the nuclear establishment
 - What remanufacturing capability? How (and where) built? How provide needed tritium? What “ramp-up” capacity? What plant and laboratory structure?
- Safe dismantling and disposition of excess nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials and components. How safeguard and carry out accountability? How deal with plutonium?
- Verification procedures. What system to be put into effect? How to build and implement U.S.-Russian agreed provisions?
- Non-proliferation – non-military components: what initiatives to strengthen international efforts and observance? How (and how soon) achieve ratification of CTBT?
- Military deterrence and defense activities. Are present weapons types sufficient?

- Direct defense. How resolve the intense NMD impasse? What defense of forces, theater, regions?

Conclusion

All this forms an impressive list of action requirements for the U.S. government.

It involves, in addition to actions that the United States can take alone, **many** that involve interactions with other countries, Russia especially. None look to be infeasible. All require intensified, well-focused, sustained top-level leadership.

Because the many changes in store are of such importance (and benefit) to American security, it is vital that they be understood and supported by our people and our Congress. They involve “new thinking” and breaking away from **long-**established concepts and from the organizational structures and practices that go with them. These departures – responding to the new assessment of security needs and opportunities – will inevitably encounter many organizational and special interests resistant to the needed changes along the way. Well-informed and determined leadership, both in the United States and abroad, will be required to overcome the many obstacles. Breaking free from the past will not be easy, for past habits of thought die especially hard in the nuclear domain. The remnants of Cold War deterrence based on nuclear weapons in a high state of readiness must give way, most notably with Russia, to the new concept of mutual reassurance. The targeting now needed should be directed primarily against rogue states hostile to the United States as part of the integrated total non-proliferation effort.

Despite the difficulties, one may be optimistic because the highest guiding interest will surely be recognized as reducing, to the practical minimum, the dangers posed both by the existence and by the potential development of nuclear weapons around the world. The major moves in that direction by Russia and the United States now in prospect, following President **Putin’s** initiative, will make enduring contributions of vast importance to the security of the United States and to a peaceful future.

snowflake

June 18, 2001 3:32 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Skipping a Generation

Here is some material on skipping a generation, which could conceivably be useful in testimony or in Q&As.

Attach.

6/16/01 DepSecDef memo to SecDef re: Skipping a Generation

DHR:dh
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11-L-0559/OSD/4211

U11081 /01

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: June 16, 2001

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SECDEFHASSEEN

SUBJECT: Skipping a Generation

JUN 18 2001

Don,

Attached are three different items that may stimulate your thought on the subject of "skipping a generation:"

(1) Some thoughts Andy Krepinevich provided me about two ways in which one might undertake to "skip a generation" in a major way, by (a) reducing the JSF buy and perhaps canceling the Air Force version; and (b) canceling the DD-2 1 and beginning early procurement instead of smaller, stealthier, more numerous and hence more distributed platforms;

(2) A think piece from Dov Zakheim;

(3) Some pages from the 1997 National Defense Panel report. The Panel did not use the term "skipping a generation," but it made some comments about technology that are germane. (Joe Collins notes, in a more general way, that "this visionary document is full of commonsense recommendations that make it an important document against which it would be wise to bounce the QDR's findings.")

I think the term "skipping" is unfortunate. We should be talking instead about "leapfrogging." The idea is not to take some kind of procurement holiday because the threat is low, but rather to accelerate the introduction of new advanced technologies. (It should be possible, however, to replace some old equipment with current generation equipment because in the near term the capability of the threats we face in Iraq and North Korea is not changing qualitatively.)

The bottom line on this, as I see it, is that several strands begin to converge in a significant way as you come to the end of the QDR:

(a) You should start to have a better idea of total force size and hence total numbers of things you should procure;

(b) Also a better idea of how much of that total should have transformational capability and how much can be merely replacement level;

(c) By then also we should have a better idea of the cost trade-offs among these major programs.


All of this means that it isn't really possible to make intelligent decisions about individual major weapons programs until one has a clear idea of the strategy, but conversely it should be possible to make strategy-based decisions on major programs in the Fall as the QDR results become clear.

At that point, also, we will need to figure out how to make good on the President's promise in the Citadel speech that he would direct the Secretary of Defense to devote 20% of the procurement budget to technologies that "propel America generations ahead."

MEMO

TO: Deputy Secretary of Defense

c c : Director, Net Assessment

FROM: Andrew Krepinevich 

DATE: June 14, 2001

SUBJECT: Skipping a Generation

Issue: *Under what conditions does it make sense to “skip a generation” with respect to modernization in favor of adopting a “leap-ahead” approach?*

Skipping a generation makes sense when the following three conditions obtain:

- First, when the near-term risks to our security are relatively low, reducing the need to procure large numbers of incrementally improved systems;
- Second, when incremental modernization yields an “improved” system that, because of coming changes in the threat environment, will actually see its effectiveness decline, perhaps precipitously (e.g., as a consequence of the emerging anti-access threat); and
- Third, when it is anticipated that rapidly advancing technology offers the opportunity to field substantially different-and much more effective and relevant-military capabilities than incremental improvements of existing system types.

N.B. Skipping a generation does *not* imply a “procurement holiday.” The principal reason for skipping a generation is to achieve a higher level of military effectiveness, not budget economies. The options discussed below, if pursued, would almost certainly cost more to implement than would the existing modernization options.

Issue: *What programs might be candidates for “skipping a generation”?*

1. Joint Strike Fighter (especially the CTOL, or Air Force, version)

The JSF represents a significant improvement over existing tactical aircraft. However, the JSF buy **assumes** the U.S. military will continue to enjoy unimpeded access to forward air bases for the indefinite future, when such access is already problematic, and will likely worsen over time. There are three reasons for this.

- First, the new era of “coalitions of the willing” has led to our being denied base access by friends/allies (e.g., during Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force).
- Second, we will not always be operating in regions where a large sophisticated basing structure exists. A future crisis in South Asia between India and Pakistan, or a showdown over the Spratlys or Taiwan, would find our forces bereft of bases.
- Third, and *most important*, the continued diffusion of ballistic and cruise missile technologies will increasingly enable enemies to hold large, fixed forward bases at high risk of destruction.

Skip a Generation Objective: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). Extended-range (Air Force) UCAVs, mobile-based (Navy) UCAVs, and distributed land-based “tactical” UCAVs (Army) could help address the anti-access threat while reducing substantially manpower requirements and O&S costs.

Major Unknown Planning Factor: How many manned aircraft missions can be assumed by UCAVs, and how soon?

Hedge: The JSF is viewed primarily as an efficient deliverer of precision munitions. But this is not 1950. We have many options for delivering ordnance on targets over great distances. We can avoid locking in to a large JSF buy while also hedging against a slower-than-anticipated development of UCAVs with the following capabilities:

- a Continuing “bridge” production of F/A-1 8E/Fs (Navy) and F-1 6 Block 60s (Air Force) to remain within acceptable tac air age limits;
- Increasing substantially the number of PGMs carried on our B-2s through accelerating programs focused on small, smart munitions;
- Converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs, each carrying over 150 TLAMs; and
- Accelerating Army deep-strike capabilities (e.g., Comanche, ATACMS Block IIA, in addition to a tactical UCAV).

II. DD-21

The DD-21 represents the Navy’s effort to enhance its capabilities to support the battle ashore. With the Soviet Navy gone and its ability to strike deep inland increasing, the Navy has rightly shifted its emphasis from open-ocean blue waters to littoral “green” waters. As it does, the Navy will encounter a very different threat environment.

- The fleet will come within range of an increasing number of enemy anti-maritime forces (e.g., coastal submarines; small, high-speed, stealthy surface combatants; mines; shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles; and land-based air and missile forces), resulting in large surface combatants being placed at increased risk;

- The enemy's scouting problem will be reduced substantially, further increasing the fleet's risk; and
- The fleet's warning time of attack will decrease dramatically

In this environment, the DD-21s, whose size approaches that of the first modern battleship (*HMS Dreadnought*), might be so few in number and so costly to replace that we will be reluctant to deploy them into the littoral until friendly sea control has been established.

Skip a Generation Objective: The Streetfighter Concept employing Network Centric Warfare. The concept asserts that advanced information technologies are an asymmetric US advantage that can enable highly integrated, yet highly distributed maritime operations. Rather than buy a relatively small number of DD-21s (32 are planned), an effort should be made to explore the potential of squadrons of much smaller, faster, stealthier and less expensive "Sea Lance" combatants. These combatants could be more effective in supporting the campaign to seize control of the littoral and strike targets ashore. Owing to their substantially greater numbers and low cost relative to the DD-21, Sea Lances could be employed early in the littoral at far lower risk.

Major Unknown Planning Factor: Is it possible for information technologies to create a "distributed" capital ship, and how soon?

Hedge: As with the JSF, the DD-21 is principally a strike platform. As noted, we have many different ways to conduct strike operations. Two readily available near-term maritime force hedges for delaying, canceling, or reducing the buy of the DD-21 are:

- Converting the four SSBNs coming out of the nuclear deterrent force to SSGNs; and
- Increasing the quantity and variety of PGMs for existing surface combatants.

Other hedges that should be pursued include those mentioned with respect to the JSF (i.e., Army deep strike assets; maritime UCAVs, increasing the B-2 PGM payload, etc.):

Bottom Line:

- As the President envisioned, the opportunity to skip a generation can be seized;
- Options can be created for dealing with an uncertain future-and the risk of putting too many eggs in the tac air and large surface combatants baskets can be avoided;
- The Defense Industry can be an overall "winner" in terms of level of investment and increased opportunities to bid on new programs; and
- President's call to shift 20 percent of the procurement budget toward leap-ahead capabilities can be realized.

SKIPPING A GENERATION

0 We can “skip a generation” by

- bringing new capabilities into the force sooner than has been anticipated.
 - We can accelerate developmental programs.
 - We can also field forces more quickly, as we did with the operational introduction of the JSTARS technology demonstrator during the Gulf War
- . Avoiding large scale costly modifications of many of our legacy systems
- . Introducing new systems heretofore either in the earliest stages of development or heretofore not considered for inclusion in the force

0 Accelerating the operational introduction of capabilities already in the later stages of our current program. Potential candidates include:

- Battlefield reconnaissance drones
- . Over-the-horizon anti-tank missiles
- Mine countermeasures programs
- . Adding to the payload and targeting potential of our long range bomber force
- Airborne laser program
- Global Hawk

0 While we must maintain many of our legacy forces for years to come, we should limit investment in upgrades that provide only marginal capability improvements. We might:

- . Make modifications and upgrades only on selected portions of our forces (e.g., units that would be the earliest to deploy in likely contingencies)
- . Scale back the extent of modifications to ensure that increases in marginal capability are greater than or equal to increases in marginal cost

0 Systems currently in early stages of development that are candidates for accelerated introduction into the force include:

- . Robotic armor
- . UCAVs incorporating warheads on unmanned aerial vehicles
- “Arsenal ships” combining the latest C4I advances, stealth capabilities and large missile payloads on either surface units or submarines
- New sea and space based missile defense capabilities
- High speed sealift
- Lighter than air cargo airlifters

0 Three additional points are worth reiterating:

- “Skipping a generation” does not mean a “procurement holiday,” The modernization needs of the current force are too great and the defense industrial base wouldn’t survive it.
- Skipping a generation does not render our current forces obsolete; 80% of our current force will remain part of our posture for at least another decade and must therefore be maintained and sustained. This means that older equipment will have to be replaced, although it may be desirable to replace it with current generation equipment if the immediate next generation is not a sufficient advance to justify its increased cost.

Near-Term Implications

Applying the above principles and in view of the services' future visions and concepts, the Panel does not follow the logic of several of the services' procurements.

- With regard to land forces, the Panel questions continuing the upgrade of the M1 A1 tank and the continuing evolution of the main battle tank beyond its current capabilities, as well as the projected numbers of Crusader and Comanche. Although the Panel recognizes the potential capabilities of these systems and the valuable results of the Force XXI and Advanced **Warfighting** Experiment initiatives, it believes that future requirements would best be met if the Army consolidates and limits their applications. These capabilities should be deployed to III Corps and the forward-based forces as a risk mitigation capability while transitioning the balance of the Army (force structure and programs) to the *Army After Next* concept. These actions and others will require a redesign of the Army's force structure and concomitant acquisition programs, which may result in end strength savings,
- In regard to the Navy, the Panel disagrees with the decision to terminate the arsenal ship test bed. The value of a test bed to support a major **warfighting** transition was clear in the use of the NORTON SOUND to support the Navy's **introduction** of surface-to-air missiles. Given the characteristics the Panel believes necessary for future forces, a new hull form should be built for testing and to serve as a platform for a number of topside antenna configurations and weapons systems. The Panel also believes that the Navy should look closely at accelerating the transformation to the CVX class of carriers in lieu of procuring additional Nimitz class **CVNs** and converting one or more of the four Trident **SSBNs** coming out of strategic service to alternative missions.
- On the issue of tactical air, the Panel notes the cost over the lifetime of all three current programs and questions the total number of planned aircraft buys and the appropriate mix of systems in 2010-2020. With respect to the **F/A-18E/Fs** and Joint Strike Fighter, the Panel supports Secretary Cohen's plan to continue to evaluate the ultimate numbers and mix of **F/A-18E/Fs** procured dependent upon the ultimate capability, cost, and schedule successes of the Joint Strike Fighter. The Panel further believes that the services must demonstrate how these two systems, and the F-22, can operate effectively in the 2010-2020 environment, which will be characterized by new challenges to our power projection capability.
- The Panel remains concerned about the near-term ground surveillance capabilities and recent programmatic decisions (i.e., reducing the JSTARS buy).

is through the synergistic concentration of effects, not **by the** assembling of force packages in one locale, that we must dominate our enemies.

If these characteristics comprise a template for our future forces' success, the question remains whether we currently are developing the right systems, operational platforms, and organizational structures to dominate and prove victorious in the future. The Panel suggests that the specific examples below represent the kind of actions we should take to transform our military to meet the challenges of the future.

All Forces

- Shift funds from upgrade of legacy systems to new systems focused on meeting the challenges of 2010-2020;
- Place more emphasis on directed energy, electromagnetic energy, and cyber-weapons;
- Enable greater speed, and penetration capability for Special Operations Forces to preempt or resolve terrorist activity or WMD threat;
- Provide more near-zero miss, long-range, stealthy cruise missiles, brilliant munitions, and submunitions in lieu of dumb weapons;
- Integrate ballistic and cruise missile defense to protect forces (both point and area targets), theaters, and regions; harmonize land- and sea-based missile defenses (i.e., ballistic and air breathers) in an effort to eliminate duplicative systems;
- Establish a distributed user-friendly global information system that includes a broadcast architecture;
- Create a "distributed," in-theater logistics structure in lieu of "iron mountains" (large stockpiles);
- Provide the ability to project significant power from **forward** deployed areas, as well as the United States, within hours or days rather than months;
- Explore new air and **sealift** concepts emerging in the commercial world;
- Accelerate network-centric operations linking sensors and weapons;
- Replace individual service component-unique systems with integrated, joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems;
- Structure less manpower-intensive forces;
- Create highly networked forces able to see the battlespace in near real time and to dynamically task and control forces.

Land Forces

- Become more expeditionary: fast, shock-exploiting forces, with greater urban operations capability;
- Reduce systems that are difficult to move and support; shift to lighter, more agile automated systems;
- Evolve to lighter, greater range, more lethal fire-support systems;
- Develop the twenty-first century tank to be a unique vehicle relying on speed, agility, and hyper-velocity gun technology for operational effectiveness (the Panel's view is that 30-35 tons is the appropriate weight range);
- Move beyond Force XXI to incorporate the concepts embodied in *Army After Next*;
- Restructure above-the-line units, which evolve to smaller operational elements with equivalent (or greater) lethality;
- Move toward advanced vertical lift systems versus service-life extensions of current rotary-wing aircraft.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Consolidate gains from Force XXI and move directly to Army After Next (AAN)

Sea Forces

- Move toward small-signature ships capable of providing sustained long-range, precision firepower;
- Design ship production to allow rapid incorporation of latest technology;
- Provide greater quantities of small unmanned underwater vehicles to augment and extend the reach of submarines;
- Construct follow-on carriers to capitalize on short take-off, vertical landing; unmanned aerial vehicle; and unmanned combat aerial vehicle aircraft characteristics with attendant reduction in size and personnel;
- Consider sea-based mobile off-shore bases to provide access in situations where forward bases are unavailable or at risk to prepositioned forces;
- Provide insertion vehicles incorporating the latest technologies to extend the reach of the maneuver component of the naval power projection forces.

Aerospace Forces

- Ensure a proper mix of short- and long-range aerospace forces to enable optimal strike operations;
 - Move toward fewer numbers of short-range aircraft providing increased delivery capacity with smaller, but more accurate weapons;

Explore new approaches to **long-range**, precision delivery vehicles;

- More distributed satellite systems to provide redundancy and survivability of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
- Short-take-off-vertical-landing aircraft on wide array of airfields, ships, and sea-based platforms;
- Increase ground surveillance capability.

snowflake

June 11, 2001 1:09 PM

TO: General Hugh Shelton
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
Rich Haver
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: SRO

I would like to have the appropriate person take a look at the capability we have to destroy anything that is classified on all SRO subs, ships and aircraft.

My impression was that what we had on the EP-3 wasn't good enough.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061101-20

3800

1 Jun 01

2001 JUN 13 AM 9:22

11-L-0559/OSD/4223

U11173 /01

111
1230

CLOSE HOLD-SENSITIVE

snowflake

June 18, 2001 3:49 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

Task to DUSD/Installation

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico

Let's find out what we have in Puerto Rico-how many people, what different locations for what different purposes, how long they have been there and how much money we are spending with respect to them.

The next step would be to find out how we could save some money by co-locating whatever is in Puerto Rico with something that is somewhere else.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061801-40

18 Jun 01

CLOSE HOLD-SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/4224

U11184 /01

CLOSE HOLD - SENSITIVE

2001 JUN -5 AM 8:42

DEFENSE

June 26, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense

cc: Larry Di Rita

From: Pete Aldridge



Subject: Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico

Aside from the range at Vieques, we have five facilities in Puerto Rico, two Navy, two Army, and one National Guard. We have just under 8,900 people there and our recurring annual costs appear to be about \$160 million. These facilities have been in Puerto Rico for over 50 years.

The primary Navy mission is range management. There are two large firing ranges, an underwater tracking range, and the small range at Vieques, all in close proximity to Puerto Rico. A secondary Navy mission is communications, weather tracking, and surveillance at a Naval Security Group located on the north side of the Island.

The primary Army mission is support of Southern Command with command and control of U.S. Army forces in an area of responsibility that includes 32 countries in Latin and South America. The Air National Guard mission is also to support Southern Command.

Our nearest facilities for relocation of these activities are in Florida, over 800 miles away. This may complicate the range management function and may degrade the communications and surveillance, but otherwise would be feasible.

There are about 3,500 people assigned to headquarters, base operations, medical, commissary and exchange positions. These appear to be overhead positions that could be eliminated if the missions were relocated to existing facilities elsewhere. Assuming a linear cost distribution this would equate to recurring savings of about \$63 million per year.

(18 JUN 2001)

August 17, 2001 5:30 p.m.

SECRET HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

(Handwritten initials)

8/22/01

2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *(Handwritten signature)*

SUBJECT: Reserves

I have been able to identify the following "reserves":

- **Foreign Currency Fluctuation Fund account:** The account stood at \$981 million in January 2001, and the current balance is \$535 million.
- **Defense Stockpile:** There is a current balance of \$700 million of monies that have not yet been expended for stockpiling rare minerals and the like. Congress has fenced this money, but we could apply for legislative relief, which in the past we have obtained.
- **Working Capital Fund Cash:** existing cash can be used to provide budgetary relief, especially in the O&M account. Currently, only the Navy is in surplus.
- **Defense-Wide O&M:** There was about \$20 million available for transfer at the beginning of FY 01. Currently, only \$5 million remains. I am told only \$5 million will be available in FY 02.
- These reserves should not be confused with the various reserves we have set aside for the FY 03 program. Those reserves are:

• DoD Mandated Reserves

• Military Pay increment to ECI+1/2%	224.0
• Reserve from OMB "rebate" on accrual funds	2000.0
Total Mandated Reserves	2224.0

• DOD-Initiated Reserves (FY03--assuming baseline plus inflation)

• Overseas Contingency Operations	2700.0
• Full funding of Major Defense Programs for which funds were added in FY02	857.9
• Defense Wide Milcon Planning and Design	105.2
• Military housing program	2.0
Total	3665.1

110 01

*8/22/01
112
D14*

- DOD-Initiated Reserves if Additional \$10B are available
 - Reserve for Enlisted and Office Pay Enhancement (70th percentile) 538.0
 - Acquisition Stability Reserve, to fund fully Major Defense Programs for which funds were not added in FY 02 1261 .0
 - Total 1779.0

COORDINATION: NONE

August 9, 2001 8:33 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Reserves

Any reserves or any money we have tucked away, I want to personally know about, and I don't want the Comptroller's office or anyone else to be dispensing it without my being involved.

Please give me a tabulation of what we have and where it is located, so that I have a very clear sense of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080901-2

snowflake

TO: Secretary Colin Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: June 23, 2001
SUBJECT: *Washington Times Article*

You've got a new best friend!

DHR/azn
062301.01
Attach:

Washington Times, 6/22/01, "Biden vs. Rumsfeld" by Gary Pierce

™
®

000.95D

23JUN01

Biden vs. Rumsfeld

Sen. Joseph R. **Biden** Jr., the Delaware Democrat who is now chairman of the **Foreign** Relations Committee, told contributors to his 2002 re-election campaign that he will do what he can to hinder Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld while promoting the views of Secretary of State Cohn

Washington Times

L. Powell, whom Mr. **Biden** described as a sort of honorary **Democrat**.

Speaking to donors in Boston last Friday, **Mr. Biden** "offered a tutorial on the philosophic divisions within the Bush administration," Boston Globe columnist **Joan Vennochi** writes.

"In a nutshell, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell is the good guy and, according to **Biden**, 'the only man in America who doesn't understand he's a Democrat'; and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is the 'movement conservative' who stands for **everything** liberal Democrats abhor!"

Mr. Biden, describing the defense secretary as a **unilateralist** and the secretary of state as a multilateralist, said he would give the latter "cover." If President Bush sides with Mr. Rumsfeld over Mr. **Powell**, "we're in deep trouble," Mr. **Biden** said.

snowflake

June 25, 2001 9:24 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
~~DOUG FEITH~~

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Preparation for Meetings

I arrived at the Macedonia Principals' Committee meeting on Sunday afternoon at 2 p.m. Everyone there was reading something called "The Op Plan" that SACEUR was going to present to NATO the next day. I did not have a copy. It was apparently attached to the back of something that I had received, which I gave to Paul Wolfowitz to read and then he put in his safe,

We have to find a way to ensure that I am properly prepared for meetings. What do we do about it?

Dick Myers tells me DoD has a Balkans task force in OSD in the Policy shop. I have no idea what they do. They certainly don't do me any good. Why don't we abolish them if they are not doing us any good, or else figure out a way for Paul to give them direction and leadership and then connect them to me so I get some benefit.

DHR:dh
062501-4

337

AS TUN D

U11483 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4231



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECRET
2001 JUN 28 11:20

INFO MEMO

June 28, 2001, 7:00AM

FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJHaynes 6/28/01*

SUBJECT: Why We Need New Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) Authority

- Yes, there is a law on the books governing base closure, but it does not work. Enacted in 1977, it is in fact a series of *restrictions* on the Secretary of Defense's previously relatively unfettered ability to manage military installations.
- At least since the end of the Indian wars in the late 19th century, Congress has chafed at Executive Branch closures and realignments. Periodically, Congress attempted specific restrictions, but all were vetoed until 1977.
- The 1977 legislation requires study, notification, and waiting provisions before any irrevocable action to effect or implement a decision to close. Reportedly, no proposed closure under this authority has succeeded.
- Existing base realignment or closure authority does not work because:
 - The process invites installation-by-installation review of each recommendation, making any recommendation susceptible to a single-member veto.
 - Without the "insulation" provided by an independent commission, the Department is susceptible to criticism that inappropriate politics drive realignment or closure decisions.
 - The 1977 authority lacks the many BRAC innovations designed to facilitate the closure, disposal, and economic redevelopment of installation properties.
 - Any recommendation to realign or close an installation under this authority must be supported by an environmental impact analysis, which takes an average of two years to prepare, is costly, and often results in litigation.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: James Van Ness, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/4232

U11590 / 01

snowflake

A77 (10/31/01) 1740

October 31, 2001 9:53 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Leaflets

Afghanistan

Let's get some leaflets that tell the local Afghan people to get the Taliban out of the mosques and out of the residential areas, or we will have to start attacking those areas.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103101-16

.....
Please respond by _____

31 OCT 01

D #73 10/30
0943

snowflake

October 29, 2001 3:45 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Status on PACOM Proposals

I hope we have charged ahead on the PACOM Combating Terrorism proposals and recommendations on p. 15 of their packet.

Please let me know what the dimensions of that island in the Philippines are-how many miles across, north to south and east to west. 11/6

Philippines


Thanks.

DHR:dh
102901-32




Please respond by 10/30

29 OCT 01




BASILAN

L.A. Zamboanga Times
Library (c) 2001



Malaysia



24 NM

37 NM

11-L-0559 D/4237

stow/late

June 29, 2001 7:50 AM

2001 JUL -2 PM 3: 51

TO: ~~VADM Giambastiani~~ DiRita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Tropical Storm Allison

Please find out on this tropical storm Allison what it cost, how long we were involved in it and who paid.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/27/01 SecArmy memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
062901-11

000.92

29 JUN 01



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON **SECDEF HAS SEEN**

INFO MEMO

JUN 29 2001

June 27, 2001, 9:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Tom White

FROM: ~~Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army~~

W. White
JUN 27 2001

SUBJECT: Military Support to Flood Relief Operations – Gulf Coast (Close Out)

- This memorandum serves as a close out to the Department of Defense (DoD) support provided for Tropical Depression Allison in Houston, Texas.
- On June 25th, the U.S. Public Health Service released the Department of Defense medical unit, the 591st Expeditionary Medical Systems. The Defense Coordinating Officer and Defense Coordinating Element remain on site and will be released shortly.
- The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the lead for the Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Function #3 (Public Works and Engineering), currently have thirty on-site quality assurance personnel providing debris-monitoring support for the City of Houston
- At its peak, 487 DoD personnel were involved in support of Tropical Storm Allison. Three were Active Duty Army, 93 Active Duty Air Force, 390 Army National Guard, and one DoD civilian.
- Tropical Depression Allison was the first event where DoD has provided support in this year's severe weather season.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: (b)(6) (b)(6)

6

CF:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

*06/27
0635*

2001 JUL 11 AM 10:14

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

→ ABC 10 Jul 01

pls close out
based on:

- (1) LTC DE VRIES
email next week
- (2) copy of Aogo Paper
from SA dated
9 Jul that
answered the
question

Thank

C

000 92

(29 Jul 01)

Glassner. Craia. CIV. WHS/CCD

From: DeVries, David L, LTC, OSD
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2001 4:09 PM
To: Glassner, Craig, CIV, WHS/CCD; Horner, Larry, CIV, WHS\CCD; Mirelson, Pam, CIV, WHS \C&D; Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS\CCD
Subject: Close out tasker



SecArmy Memo RFI
TS Allison_5



secdef06.PDF



SA Info Paper
010709 pdf

Please close out this tasker. The word document on the left was signed by SECARMY, delivered to me and I carried into Mr. DiRita. The SA pdf file is the scanned copy of the original that went into Mr. DiRita. I forgot that the original had a tasking number on it.

I have no idea what the tasked control number was.

Thanks

Dave

LTC Dave De Vries
Military Assistant, Executive Secretariat
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(6) DSN: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: LaNeve, Christopher C MAJ ECC
[mailto:Christopher.LaNeve@hqda.army.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2001 2:35 PM
To: 'david.devries@osd.pentagon.mil'
Cc: 'suspense_desk@osd.pentagon.mil'
Subject: FW: SECDEF Suspense

Sir,
Can you please close this tasker with TSG Bianco

VR
MAJ LaNeve
DDECC-OPS

> -----Original Message-----

> **From:** Taylor, Andrea V Ms USA
> **Sent:** Thursday, July 05, 2001 14:20
> **To:** LaNeve, Christopher C MAJ ECC
> **Subject:** FW: SECDEF Suspense

>

>

> Sir,

>

> LTC David DeVries (OSD Exec Sec) talked with COL Marksteiner (this
> office) who is working the action. The Suspense has been extended to
> Monday July 9.

>

> Andrea Taylor
> Staff Action Specialist
> SASA-MS

> -----Original Message-----

> **From:** Marksteiner, Paul COL USA
> **Sent:** Thursday, July 05, 2001 2:10 PM
> **To:** Robinson, Joseph P COL
> **Cc:** 'De Vries, David L, LTC, OSD'; Taylor, Andrea V Ms USA; Condon,
> Kathryn A Ms USA; Schroedel, Joseph COL SEC Army; Castle, Edwin S Mr OGC;
> Rice, James LTC ODCSOPS
> **Subject:** SECDEF Suspense

>

> Joe:
>
> OSDEXECSEC extended suspense on this action to Monday. Cut this down
> some. *Pls review for accuracy and provide best guess at disengagement
> date. Thanks.
>
> Paul
>
> <<SecArmy Memo RFI TS Allison_ 5 July 2001.doc>> <<secdef06.PDF>>



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

July 9, 2001, 7:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Tom White*
Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army JUL 9 2001

SUBJECT: Secretary of Defense Inquiry Regarding Military Support in Response to Tropical Depression Allison

- This memorandum responds to a Secretary of Defense inquiry concerning the costs associated with Department of Defense (DoD) relief operations for Tropical Depression Allison. The cost estimate is as of July 6, 2001.
- DoD has spent approximately \$3,825,000 in disaster relief support. Of this amount, \$3,270,000 was funded by a direct transfer of relief dollars from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). An additional \$555,000, the incremental cost of other associated DoD support, is pending reimbursement from FEMA.
- DoD has been involved in relief support since June 10, 2001. USACE continues to provide Civil Works support to the city of Houston and will be engaged in relief efforts until the latter part of August 2001. All USACE relief efforts are fully funded by FEMA.

COORDINATION: SAAC

Prepared By:

(b)(6)

CI
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Printed on  Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/4243

INFO MEMO

July 9, 2001, 7:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Estimated Costs for Military Support in Response to Tropical Depression Allison

- This memorandum responds to a Secretary of Defense inquiry concerning the costs associated with Department of Defense (DoD) relief operations for Tropical Depression Allison. The cost estimate is as of July 6, 2001.
- DoD has spent approximately \$3,825,000 in disaster relief support. Of this amount, \$3,270,000 was funded by a direct transfer of relief dollars from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). An additional \$555,000, the incremental cost of other associated DoD support, is pending reimbursement from FEMA.
- DoD has been involved in relief support since June 10, 2001. USACE continues to provide Civil Works support to the city of Houston. USACE support is scheduled to be completed _____

COORDINATION: SAGC

Prepared By: (b)(6)

CF:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

snowflake

July 5, 2001 2:30 PM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing thoughts

One of the things I noticed about the briefing that we got out there with Buckles I think, is that he said, "It's a **collegial** effort," Everyone gets involved in the process. He mentioned CIA, JCS, Space, CINCs, and the one thing he left out was OSD.

DHR:cd
070501-21

337

5 Jul 01

U12002 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4245

snowflake

December 29, 2001 11:25 AM

129
ACTION
01/02
1625

Done
MTB A/10?

TO: Gen. Pace
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JROC Issues

334

My recollection is that the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the Chairman of the JROC. My further impression is that there are some important decisions that are going to have to be made as we go along here. Any tough decision that gets made is going to be time-consuming, and the Chairman of JROC is the one who has to invest the time and work the matter through with people so that it gets done and gets done well, without major explosions.

I have no idea what the important issues might be that will be coming up, but I would be curious to have you give me a sense of that sometime when we are visiting in a morning Round Table.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122901-3

29 Dec 01

U12004 /02

0

snowflake

July 5, 2001 3:15 PM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: De-layering Commands

We've talked about Standing Joint Task Forces – what we have not talked about is de-layering commands. That ought to be part of the QDR.

I specifically remember when the EP-3 was doing things with SRO flights that Blair said he was going to abbreviate the chain of command. If it's worth abbreviating when there is a problem why isn't worth abbreviating all the time?

DHR:cd
070501-31

381

5 Jul 01

U12004 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4247

snowflake

December 21, 2001 7:08 AM

#126
Action
12/27
1811

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: VADM Giambastiani *DA*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Replacement for CINCPAC

Done
0.1/03
15/15

PACOM

I met with Admiral Blair on December 20. He advised me that his date of departure is March 3, 2002.

He asked me where we stood, and I told him I had not gotten the nominations yet. He said it would be helpful for his planning purposes if we had some sense of what he should do. I told him to plan on staying until April 1 for sure, and asked when he needed to know a firm date if it happens to have to go to May 1, which I doubt.

He said if I let him know in the first two weeks of January the difference between April 1 or May 1, that would allow him to do his plans. I told him it was a deal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122101-2

Please respond by _____

21 Dec 01

U12005 /02

snowflake

July 5, 2001 3:25 PM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Booklets on National Security

There are some interesting thoughts in these two booklets on National Security. You might want to take a look at them.

DHR:cd
070501-32

381


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SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY

A CONCERT FOR
PRESERVING SECURITY AND
PROMOTING FREEDOM



THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY

11-L-0559/OSD/4250

SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY:


A CONCERT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND PROMOTING FREEDOM

**The Phase II Report on a
U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century**

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

April 15, 2000

U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21st CENTURY



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Co-Chair




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
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
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
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
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James Schlesinger
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Harry D. Train
Con-missioner



Andrew Young
Commissioner

Introduction

“We must disenthral ourselves,” said Abraham Lincoln, at a time of much greater peril to the Republic than we face today. As the times are new, said Lincoln, “so we must think anew.” At the dawn of this new century, the nation faces a similar necessity. No concern of American society is more in need of creative thinking than the future security of this country, but in no domain is such thinking more resistant to change. The very term “security” suggests caution and guardedness, not innovation. We know that major countries rarely engage in serious rethinking and reform absent a major defeat, but this is a path the United States cannot take. Americans are less secure than they believe themselves to be. The time for reexamination is now, before the American people find themselves shocked by events they never anticipated.

During the last half century, the national security strategy of the United States was derived largely from, focused on, and committed to the containment of Soviet Communism. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the dramatic transformation of world politics resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later, our leaders have been searching for a unifying theme to provide a strategic framework appropriate to current and future circumstances. That search has not been easy.

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century has been tasked with thinking anew about America’s national security for the next 25 years.¹ In this report, we suggest the strategic precepts that should guide the formulation of U.S. strategy, and then take a fresh look at U.S. national interests and priority objectives. On that basis, we propose the framework of a new national security strategy.² This report is intended to contribute to a new consensus on national security strategy to carry the United States forward into a challenging future.³

Thinking about Strategy

This Commission’s Phase I report pointed to two contradictory trends ahead: a tide of economic, technological, and intellectual forces that is integrating a global community, amid powerful forces of social and political fragmentation.⁴ While no one knows what the mix of these trends will produce, the new world coming will be dramatically different in significant respects. Governments are under pressure from below, by forces of ethnic separatism and violence, and from above, by economic, technological, and cultural forces beyond any government’s full control. We are witnessing a transformation of human society on the magnitude of that between the agricultural and industrial epochs—and in a far more compressed period of time.

Such circumstances put a special premium on strategic wisdom, particularly for a country of the size and character of the United States. In this Commission’s view, the essence of American strategy must compose a

¹ This Commission, established to examine comprehensively how this nation will ensure its security in the next 25 years, has a threefold task. Phase I, completed on September 15, 1999, described the transformations emerging over the next quarter-century in the global and domestic U.S. security environment. Phase II, concerning U.S. interests, objectives, and strategy, is contained in this document. Phase III, which will examine the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus for 21st century relevancy, will be delivered on or before February 15, 2001.

² In the interest of brevity, this Commission has compressed considerable discussion and detail into this document. Further discussion of the implications of several main themes in this report will be presented in the Commission’s Phase III findings.

³ This report is built upon a consensus involving all members of the Commission, but not every Commissioner subscribes with equal enthusiasm to every statement contained herein.

⁴ See *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 15, 1999).

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balance between two key aims. The first is to *reap the benefits of a more integrated world in order to expand freedom, security, and prosperity for Americans and for others*. But, second, American strategy must also strive to *dampen the forces of global instability so that those benefits can endure*. Freedom is the quintessential American value, but without security, and the relative stability that results therefrom, it can be evanescent. American strategy should seek both security and freedom, and it must seek them increasingly in concert with others. Hence our title: *A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom*.

Our assessment of the new world emerging, and the core interests and values of the American people, lead us to offer the following precepts as a guide to the formulation of national strategy:

Strategy and policy must be grounded in the national interest. The national interest has many strands—political, economic, security, and humanitarian. National interests are nevertheless the most durable basis for assuring policy consistency. Gaining and sustaining public support for U.S. policy is best achieved, too, when American principles are coupled with clearly visible national interests. Moreover, a strategy based on national interest, properly conceived, engenders respect for the interests of others.

The maintenance of America's strength is a long-term commitment and cannot be assured without conscious, dedicated effort. If America does not make wise investments in preserving its own strength, well within 25 years it will find its power reduced, its interests challenged even more than they are today, and its influence eroded. Many nations already seek to balance America's relative power, and the sinews of

American strength—social, military, economic, and technological—will not sustain themselves without conscious national commitment. Assuring American prosperity is particularly critical; without it, the United States will be hobbled in all its efforts to play a leading role internationally.

The United States faces unprecedented opportunities as well as dangers in the new era. American strategy must rise to positive challenges as well as to negative ones. Working toward constructive relations among the major powers, preserving the dynamism of the new global economy and spreading its benefits, sharing responsibility with others in grappling with new transnational problems—this is a diplomatic agenda that tests American statesmanship and creativity. As in the late 1940s, the United States should help build a new international system in which other nations, freely pursuing their own interests, find it advantageous to do so in ways that coincide with American interests.

Since it cannot bear every burden, **the United States must find new ways to join with other capable and like-minded nations.** Where America would not act itself, it retains a responsibility as the leading power to help build effective *systems* of international collaboration. America must therefore overcome its ambivalence about international institutions and about the strength of its partners, questioning them less and encouraging them more.

This nation must set priorities and apply them consistently. To sustain public support and to discipline policy, America must not exhaust itself by limitless commitments. Especially with respect to military intervention abroad, a finer calculus of

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benefits and burdens must govern. Resisting the "CNN effect" may be one of the most important requirements of U.S. policymaking in the coming period.

Finally, **America must never forget that it stands for certain principles, most importantly freedom under the rule of law.** Freedom is today a powerful tide in the affairs of mankind, and, while the means chosen to serve it must be tempered by a realistic appreciation of limits, it is not "realism" to ignore its power. At the same time, if America is to retain its leadership role, it must live up to its principles consistently, in its own conduct and in its relations with other nations.

The National Interest in a New Century

The first of these precepts is the most crucial of all: American national security strategy must find its anchor in U.S. national interests, interests that must be both protected *and advanced* for the fundamental well being of American society. We define these interests at three levels: **survival** interests, without which America would cease to exist as we know it; **critical** interests, which are causally one step removed from survival interests; and **significant** interests, which importantly affect the global environment in which the United States must act. There are, of course, other national interests, though of lesser importance than those in the above three categories.

U.S. **survival** interests include America's safety from direct attack, especially involving weapons of mass destruction, by either states or terrorists. Of the same order of importance is the preservation of America's Constitutional order and of those core strengths—educational,

industrial, scientific-technological—that underlie America's political, economic, and military position in the world.

Critical U.S. national interests include the continuity and security of those key international *systems*—energy, economic, communications, transportation, and public health (including food and water supplies)—on which the lives and well being of Americans have come to depend. It is a critical national interest of the United States that no hostile power establish itself on U.S. borders, or in control of critical land, air, and sea lines of communication, or—in today's new world—in control of access to outer space or cyberspace. It is a critical national interest of the United States that no hostile hegemon arise in any of the globe's major regions, nor a hostile global peer rival or a hostile coalition comparable to a peer rival. The security of allies and friends is a critical national interest of the United States, as is the ability to avert, or check, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of actors hostile or potentially hostile to the United States.

Significant U.S. national interests include the deepening and institutionalization abroad of constitutional democracy under the rule of law, market-based economics, and universal recognition of basic human rights. The United States also has a significant interest in the responsible expansion of an international order based on agreed rules among major powers to manage common global problems, not least those involving the physical environment. It is a significant national interest of the United States that there be economic growth abroad, to raise the living standards of the poorest and to mitigate economic and political conflict. It is a significant national interest of the United States that international terrorism and criminality (including illicit drug trade) be minimized, but without jeopardizing the openness of international eco-

conomic and cultural exchanges. It is a significant national interest of the United States that neither mass murder nor gross violations of human rights be acceptable in the world's political life. It is a significant national interest of the United States that immigration across American boundaries not be uncontrolled. Finally, the free and safe movement of American citizens abroad is a significant national interest of the United States.

Key Objectives

The United States seeks to assure its own freedom under law, its safety, and its prosperity. But Americans recognize that these goals are best assured in a world where others achieve them, too. American strategy, therefore, must engage in new ways—and in concert with others—to consolidate and advance the peace, prosperity, democracy, and cooperative order of a world now happily free from global totalitarian threats. At the same time, however—also in concert with others—American strategy must strive to stabilize those parts of the world still beset by acute political conflict. To fulfill these strategic goals in a new age, America's priority objectives—and key policy aims—must be these:

FIRST, TO DEFEND THE UNITED STATES AND ENSURE THAT IT IS SAFE FROM THE DANGERS OF A NEW ERA.

In light of the new dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, the United States must focus anew on how to maintain a robust and powerful deterrent to all forms of attack on its territory and its critical assets. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of the highest priority in U.S. national security policy in the next quarter century. A higher priority, too, should be given to preventing, through diplomatic and other means, unconventional

attacks on all states. But should prevention and deterrence fail, the United States must have means of active defense against both mortal danger and blackmail. U.S. military, law enforcement, intelligence, economic, financial, and diplomatic means must be effectively integrated for this purpose.

The United States should seek enhanced international cooperation to combat the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This should include an effective and enforceable international ban on the creation, transfer, trade, and weaponization of biological pathogens, whether by states or non-state actors. Also, when available and implemented with rigor, cooperative programs to deal with existing stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are cost-effective and politically attractive ways to reduce the dangers of weapons and weapons matériel proliferation.

The United States should also strive to deepen the international normative consensus against terrorism and state support of terrorism. It should work with others to strengthen cooperation among law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and military forces to foil terrorist plots and deny sanctuary to terrorists by attacking their financial and logistical centers.

The United States should build comprehensive theater missile defense capabilities. It should also build national defenses against a limited ballistic missile attack to the extent technically feasible, fiscally prudent, and politically sustainable. As cruise missile and other sophisticated atmospheric technologies spread, the United States must address the problem of devising defenses against such capabilities. The United States must also develop methods to defend against other, covert means of attacking the United States with weapons of mass destruction and disruption.

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The United States must also have specialized forces capable of combating threats and blackmail from those possessing weapons of mass destruction and from terrorism. The magnitude of the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction compels this nation, as well, to consider carefully the means and circumstances of preemption.

The protection of U.S. and international access to outer space and cyberspace must become a high priority of U.S. security planning. Outer space and cyberspace are the main arteries of the world's evolving information and economic systems, and the ability to move ideas and information through them freely is a prerequisite for expanding global freedom and prosperity. Secure access to outer space and cyberspace is also now the *sine qua non* of the U.S. military's ability to function effectively. Through both technological and diplomatic means, the United States needs to guard against the possibility of "breakout" capabilities in space or cyberspace that would endanger U.S. survival or critical interests.

Despite the, political obstacles, the United States should redouble its efforts to deal multilaterally with the diffusion of dangerous dual-use technologies. It must improve its capability to track the destinations and final uses of its own high-technology exports, and it must be prepared to aid allies in similar efforts.

To deal medically and psychologically with potentially large losses of American lives in attacks against the American homeland, U.S. public health capabilities need to be augmented. In addition, programs to ensure the continuity of Constitutional government should be bolstered.

SECOND, TO MAINTAIN AMERICA'S SOCIAL COHESION, ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, TECHNOLOGICAL INGENUITY, AND MILITARY STRENGTH.

TO ensure the vitality of all its core institutions, the United States must make it a priority of national policy to improve the quality of primary and secondary education, particularly in mathematics and the sciences. Moreover, in an era when private-research and development efforts far outstrip those of government, the United States must create more advanced and effective forms of public/private partnerships to promote public benefit from scientific-technological innovation.

The United States must strive to reduce its dependence on foreign sources of fossil fuel energy that leaves this country and its allies vulnerable to economic pressures and political blackmail. Steady development of alternative sources of energy production, and greater efficiencies in energy transmission and conservation, are thus national security as well as economic and environmental necessities.

The United States must strengthen the bonds between the American people and those of its members who serve in the armed forces. It must also strengthen government (civil and military) personnel systems in order to improve recruitment, retention and effectiveness at all levels. Executive-Legislative relations regarding national security policy need to foster effective collaboration.

THIRD, TO ASSIST THE INTEGRATION OF KEY MAJOR POWERS, ESPECIALLY CHINA, RUSSIA, AND INDIA, INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

The United States should engage China constructively and with a positive attitude, politically and economically. But it must recognize that the potential for competition between the United States and China may increase as China grows stronger. China's increasing adherence to global economic, legal,

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and cultural institutions and norms will be a positive factor, and the United States should encourage and assist this process of integration. At the same time, the United States should maintain its deterrent strength and its alliance system in the Asia/Pacific region. It should remain committed to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, consistent with the terms of the three Sino-American Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.

The United States should support Russian economic reform and democratic political development on a realistic basis, recognizing that these goals are first and foremost for Russians themselves to accomplish. It is also in the U.S. interest to assist Russian integration into global economic institutions, no less than is the case with China.

Clearly, too, relations with Russia should be appropriate to its importance as a major power. It does not benefit the United States to pursue policies that weaken or humiliate Moscow. Still, the United States must assert its own interests when they are affected adversely by Russian policies—as they are, for example, by policies that encourage or allow the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United States and its allies should also support the continued political independence and territorial integrity of the newly independent former Soviet states.

In addition, arms control remains an important facet of U.S. national security policy. But the United States needs a new calculus for developing future strategic nuclear arms control strategy beyond START II. Such a calculus must include analysis of the implications of the increase in the number and prospective capabilities of nuclear weapons powers in the world. It must take account of new Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons capabilities. It must also take into account both the potential U.S. need to

respond to chemical and biological threats with nuclear weapons and the U.S. commitment to protect non-nuclear states from blackmail and attack by nuclear weapons states.

India is the world's largest democracy and soon will be the world's most populous country. Therefore, India is and must be dealt with as a major power. Pakistan, too, remains a pivotal country in its own right, and good U.S. relations with Pakistan are in the U.S. national interest. The United States should also encourage India and Pakistan to settle their differences short of violence, and should make its good offices available to that end.

It is unlikely that American policy can persuade any Indian or Pakistani government to abandon its nuclear capacity. But the United States, together with other major powers, can play a more active role in discouraging future testing and the further production of fissile materials not under safeguards. The United States should also encourage mutual adoption of measures to ensure the safety and security of both countries' nuclear capabilities.

Beyond its efforts to bring these three major states into the mainstream of a new cooperative international order, the United States has a strong interest in limiting the further proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons around the world. It should therefore seek support for a multilateral approach to devising limitations on such proliferation first with its closest allies and friends, and thereafter with Russia, China, India, and other significant arms producing countries.

FOURTH, TO PROMOTE, WITH OTHERS, THE DYNAMISM OF THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

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The United States, in concert with the G-7, must strive to manage the elements of turbulence that accompany economic globalization in order to spread its benefits, while minimizing social and political dislocations and the system's vulnerability to financial crisis. This must include building political legitimacy as well as an economic architecture.

Continuing trade liberalization remains a key to global economic advance, particularly for those regions, countries, and selected economic sectors in advanced countries—including the United States—whose trade remains shackled by protectionist policies. Bilateral and regional approaches (in addition to the global system represented by the WTO) should be encouraged. Environmental concerns and labor rights must be addressed, although not in a manner that blocks or reverses trade liberalization.

Similarly, economic sanctions should not unduly inhibit trade. But, while this Commission is skeptical of the efficacy of broad and especially unilateral U.S. economic sanctions, specifically targeted financial sanctions, particularly when employed multilaterally, have a better chance of working. As the United States and its closest allies erect a new financial architecture, the capability to impose financial sanctions should be built into the system.

The United States, in cooperation with others, must continue to ensure that the price and supply of Persian Gulf and other major energy supplies are not wielded as political weapons directed against the United States or its allies and friends.

Because this Commission believes that public diplomacy is an important part of American diplomacy, the United States should help spread information technology worldwide, to bring the benefits of globalization and democracy to those

parts of the world now cut off from them. The United States should also employ new technologies creatively to improve its public diplomacy in the new Information Age.

The United States should continue to promote strong international efforts against state corruption and transnational criminality, and should help the international community respond more effectively to humanitarian relief crises. To do this will require not only working in new ways with other governments but also with the burgeoning community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly in areas where U.S. official representation is sparse.

The United States should, as it has traditionally, support the growth of international law and remain willing to subscribe to international agreements where they promote overall U.S. interests. But the United States must always reserve the right to define its own interests, even if it requires withdrawing from—but not violating—selected treaty obligations. U.S. policy coherence and democratic accountability under the Constitution must be preserved.

The United States has a strong stake in a reformed and more effective United Nations system, and should engage constructively to that end. The UN, when properly supported, can be an effective instrument for the enhancement of international stability and humanitarian ends. In addition, the United States must be willing to lead in assembling ad hoc coalitions outside UN auspices if necessary.

FIFTH, TO ADAPT U.S. ALLIANCES AND OTHER REGIONAL MECHANISMS TO A NEW ERA IN WHICH AMERICA'S PARTNERS SEEK GREATER AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY.

The cornerstone of America's regional policies must be the maintenance and

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enhancement of existing U.S. alliances and friendships. By strengthening relations with allies and friends, the United States extends both its influence and the zone of peace and stability.

In Europe, the United States should be prepared to support the evolution of an independent European Union defense policy in a manner consistent with the unity of the Atlantic Alliance. Forward-stationed forces, as the embodiment of overall U.S. capabilities and commitments in Europe, should remain an essential ingredient in that regional security alliance. The United States should also promote the concept of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), as well as encourage the integration of East and Central European democracies into Atlantic and European economic institutions based on free trade,

The United States should expand the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to all the democracies of the Western Hemisphere. It should deepen its ties within this hemisphere and seek to strengthen the Organization of American States (OAS). Whatever the merits of "exporting" democracy, there can be little doubt that helping to bolster democracies where they have come to exist of their own exertions should be high on the list of U.S. priorities. Nowhere is such an effort more important than in the Western Hemisphere.

In the Asia/Pacific area, the U.S.-Japan alliance should remain the keystone of U.S. policy. The United States should seek a more equal strategic partnership and a free trade agreement with Japan. In a region where old rivalries persist and reconciliation and integration have not advanced as far as they have in Europe, U.S. alliance and security ties with Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and others remain critical. Such ties

compose a regional security community resting solidly on the assurance provided by U.S. engagement and power. The United States should also support the growth of multilateral institutions for regional security and prosperity, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (MEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

The United States should plan now for the possibility of Korean reunification. Some American troops should remain in a unified Korea as a factor of reassurance and stability in the region, including for the purpose of ensuring that a unified Korea remains without nuclear weapons.

The United States has a continuing critical interest in keeping the Persian Gulf secure, and must accept its share of the burden for so doing. In that light, it must be a high priority to prevent either Iraq or Iran from deploying deliverable weapons of mass destruction. The United States should also support the emerging collaboration of friendly states---notably Israel, Turkey, and Jordan---and seek to broaden such a collaboration to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others. Assisting the diplomatic settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute will advance that prospect.

In collaboration with other OECD countries, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and international development institutions, the United States should assist sub-Saharan Africa to build stronger economies and strengthen institutional cohesion and democratic ideals. In the economic field, emphasis should be put on promoting private investment, helping to develop West Africa's offshore energy resources, and providing debt relief and humanitarian aid (including resources to combat the AIDS epidemic). The United States should promote the professionalization of African militaries within

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a framework of democratic values, and encourage African governments to engage their militaries in constructive tasks of infrastructure building. Major emerging democracies such as South Africa and Nigeria will be key players as partners with the United States and its allies.

SIXTH, TO HELP THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TAME THE DISINTEGRATIVE FORCES SPAWNED BY AN ERA OF CHANGE.

The disruptive new forces of globalization are subjecting many governments to extraordinary pressures. In many states, what used to be governmental monopolies on the use of force, on law making, and over the supply of money are now "privatized" in various ways. Even the spread of the idea of freedom, while positive in the long run, is often accompanied by destabilization. The disruption of the political and territorial status quo in much of the world will be one of the distinctive features of international affairs over the next quarter century.

To address these spreading phenomena of weak and failed states, ethnic separatism and violence, and the crises they breed, the United States needs first to establish priorities. Not every such problem must be primarily a U.S. responsibility, particularly in a world where other powers are amassing significant wealth and human resources. There are countries whose domestic stability is, for differing reasons, of major importance to U.S. interests (such as Mexico, Colombia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia). Without prejudging the likelihood of domestic upheaval, these countries should be a priority focus of U.S. planning in a manner appropriate to the respective cases.

For cases of lesser priority, the United States should help the international community develop innovative mechanisms to manage the

problem of failed states. One such mechanism should include standing procedures to facilitate organizing peacekeeping operations and UN "conservatorships."

In all cases, the United States should resort first to preventive diplomacy: acting with political and economic tools, and in concert with others, to head off conflict *before* it reaches the threshold of mass violence.

Preventive diplomacy will not always work, however, and the United States should be prepared to act militarily in conjunction with other nations in situations characterized by the following criteria:

- when U.S. allies or friends are imperiled;
- when the prospect of weapons of mass destruction portends significant harm to civilian populations;
- when access to resources critical to the global economic system is imperiled;
- when a regime has demonstrated intent to do serious harm to U.S. interests;
- when genocide is occurring.

If all or most of these conditions are present, the case for multilateral military action is strong. If *any one* of these criteria is serious enough, however, the case for military action may also be strong.

Implications for National Security

The strategy outlined here bears important implications for the political, economic, and military components of U.S. national security policy. From the political perspective, American diplomacy must recognize that the increasingly integrated nature of global exchanges will render traditional analytical divisions of the world *obsolete*. While important relations will continue to take place on a

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bilateral basis, many more international phenomena will be increasingly regional in nature and more will be fully global. The proliferation of non-state actors will also strain the traditional categories within which American diplomacy is organized.

As this Commission emphasized in its Phase I report, the economic dimensions of statecraft are also becoming more important. Among the democracies in what is known as the "zone of democratic peace," economic issues can rival the importance of military ones. But economic issues are also of critical importance to the prospect that other emerging or developing states will succeed or fail with fundamental political and social reform. American strategy must also recognize the importance of technology as the basic underpinning of economic health and military prowess the world over.

All this means that the integrating function of U.S. policymaking processes will be challenged as never before. Traditional national security agencies (State, Defense, CIA, NSC staff) will need to work together in new ways, and economic agencies (Treasury, Commerce, U.S. Trade Representative) will need to work more closely with the traditional national security community. In addition, other players—especially Justice and Transportation—will need to be integrated more fully into national security processes. Merely improving the inter-agency process around present structures may not suffice.

Moreover, the U.S. government must learn to build more effective partnerships with state and local governments, and government as a whole must develop new partnerships with non-governmental organizations—though without sacrificing its ultimate responsibility and accountability for determining national policy.

As to military implications, the world we see emerging, and the strategy appropriate to that environment suggest that the United States needs five kinds of military capabilities:

- *nuclear* capabilities to deter and protect the United States and its allies from attack;
- *homeland security* capabilities;
- *conventional* capabilities necessary to win major wars;
- rapidly employable *expeditionary/intervention* capabilities; and
- *humanitarian relief and constabulary* capabilities.

Fundamental to U.S. national security strategy is the need to project U.S. power globally with forces stationed in the United States, and those stationed abroad and afloat in the forward presence role. Owing to the proliferation of new defense technologies in the hands of other states, effective power projection will become more difficult for the U.S. armed forces in the 21st century. U.S. forces must therefore possess greater flexibility to operate in a range of environments, including those in which the enemy has the capability to employ weapons of mass destruction. U.S. forces must be characterized by stealth, speed, range, accuracy, lethality, agility, sustainability, reliability—and be supported by superior intelligence—in order to deal effectively with the spectrum of symmetrical and asymmetrical threats we anticipate over the next quarter century.

This Commission believes that the "two major theater wars" yardstick for sizing U.S. forces is not producing the capabilities needed for the varied and complex contingencies now occurring and likely to increase in the years ahead. These contingencies, often calling for expeditionary interventions or stability opera-

tions, require forces different from those designed for major theater war. We believe these contingencies will occur in the future with sufficient regularity and simultaneity as to oblige the United States to adapt portions of its force structure to meet these needs. The overall force would then have the ability to engage effectively in contingencies ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peace and expeditionary combat operations, to large-scale, high-intensity conventional warfare. Finally, we recommend that the force structure designed to address these needs be developed on the basis of real-world intelligence assessments rather than illustrative scenarios.

In short, the capabilities mandated by these requirements will result in forces able to deploy rapidly, be employed immediately, and prevail decisively in expeditionary roles, prolonged stability operations, and major theater wars; a force to **deter** wars, to **preclude** crises from evolving into major conflicts, and to **win** wars rapidly and decisively should it become necessary.

America must also enhance the civil (that is, non-military) aspects of homeland security. These functions must be adequately funded and organized along appropriate lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability. The National Guard—successor to the militia, and acknowledged in the Second Amendment as the historic defender of the Republic—must be trained and equipped to assume, among its other responsibilities, a significant role in defending the homeland in the 21st century.

It is imperative, too, that the United States develop and fund these five kinds of capabilities *consistent with the level of need* created by changing political and security realities. Given the demands now placed upon this nation's military, or those anticipated in the next quarter century, it is evident that modern forces equal

to **these** demands cannot be sustained by current levels of spending.

To Phase III—Building for Peace

The strategy articulated here requires that the United States *lead in the construction of a world balanced between the expansion of freedom, and the maintenance of underlying stability.* To do so it must concert its efforts with others and, to the extent possible, in a way consistent with the interests of others.

Having become a global power, the United States now holds a responsibility it will not abandon, both for the safeguarding of American interests and the broader interests of global peace and security. The United States is the first nation with fully global leadership responsibilities, but there are more and less effective ways to lead. Tone matters. Leadership is not the same as dominance; everyone else's business need not also be America's. Just as riches without integrity are unavailing, so power without wisdom is unworthy. As Shakespeare put it:

O, it is excellent
To have a giant's strength; but it **is**
tyrannous
To use it like a giant.⁵

The strategy outlined here for U.S. national security differs from the strategic habits of the past half-century. It puts new emphasis on the economic and other non-military components of national security; it focuses on opportunities as much as on threats; and it reminds us of the domestic foundations of U.S. international strength. It attempts to clarify U.S. strategy and purposes, and to match them to a prudent sense of limits. It is

⁵ Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene 2.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

not clear to us that the U.S. government is now organized in such a way that it can execute this strategy, or any other strategic concept that departs significantly from past practices. The world is changing fast, and if the U.S. government does not change with it, it may find itself forced into one bewildered reaction after another. If the United States loses the capacity to respond to dynamic change, the day will come when we will regret it dearly.

In Phase III of its work, therefore, this Commission will **examine** current structures and processes to determine their relevance to the 21st century. We will apply the following criteria:

First, the U.S. government needs to be adept at anticipating national security challenges. This requires the best possible system of intelligence, from collection to analysis to dissemination to policy review.

Second, the U.S. government needs the ability to calculate the longer-term implications of intervention abroad. It is not enough to be selective; we must be wisely selective, which requires a better matching of the instruments of national power to the problems at hand.

Third, the U.S. government needs to integrate effectively all non-traditional elements of national security policy with traditional ones.

Fourth, the U.S. government needs the agility to adapt rapidly to changes in the global environment.

Fifth, the U.S. government needs new organizational mechanisms to manage the increased blurring of lines among military, police, and legal jurisdictions, and among new forms of warfare.

Sixth, the U.S. government needs effective means to assess critically its **own** performance, draw lessons from its experience, and adjust resources, as appropriate.

Seventh, the U.S. government needs coherence between domestic policies with core national security implications and national security policies directed outside U.S. borders.

Phase III of this Commission's work will offer recommendations for enhancing the U.S. government's ability to function effectively in a rapidly changing political and technological environment. As with any kind of travel, clarity with respect to destination and route will prove unavailing if one's vehicle is not up to the journey. It is to that vehicle—the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus---that this Commission now turns its attention.

PHASE I: NEW WORLD COMING
AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
SEPTEMBER 15, 1999

PHASE II: SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY
A CONCERT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY
AND PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT
APRIL 15, 2000

PHASE III: BUILDING FOR PEACE
MARCH 15, 2001

THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY

NEW WORLD COMING:

AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

MAJOR THEMES &
IMPLICATIONS



THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY

**NEW WORLD COMING:
AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

MAJOR THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS

The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment
for the First Quarter of the 21st Century


The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

September 15, 1999

Preface

In 1947, President Harry Truman signed into law the National Security Act, the landmark U.S. national security legislation of the latter half of the 20th century. The 1947 legislation has served us well. It has undergirded our diplomatic efforts, provided the basis to establish our military capabilities, and focused our intelligence assets.

But the world has changed dramatically in the last fifty years, and particularly in the last decade. Institutions designed in another age may or may not be appropriate for the future. It is the mandate of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century to examine precisely that question. It has undertaken to do so in three phases: the first to describe the world emerging in the first quarter of the next century, the second to design a national security strategy appropriate to that world, and the third to propose necessary changes to the national security structure in order to implement that strategy effectively. This paper, together with its supporting research and analysis, fulfills the first of these phases. As co-chairs of the Commission, we are pleased to present it to the American people.




Gary Hart




Warren B. Rudman


U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21st CENTURY




Gary Hart
Co-Chair




Warren B. Rudman
Co-Chair



Anne Armstrong
Commissioner




Norman R. Augustine
Commissioner




John Dancy
Commissioner



John R. Galvin
Commissioner



Leslie H. Gelb
Commissioner



Newt Gingrich
Commissioner




Lee H. Hamilton
Commissioner




Lionel H. Olmer
Commissioner




Donald B. Rice
Commissioner



James Schlesinger
Commissioner



Harry D. Train
Commissioner



Andrew Young
Commissioner

This paper consists of four parts: a contextual introduction; an articulation of twelve basic assumptions and observations; fourteen key conclusions about the global environment of the next quarter century; and a statement of their essential meaning for American national security strategy in the 21st century. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century will build upon this foundation to recommend a new strategy for the advancement of American interests and values. It will then propose, as necessary, new structures and processes for U.S. foreign and security policies in order to implement that strategy.

Introduction

In the next century, the spread of knowledge, the development of new technologies, and an increasing recognition of common global problems will present vast opportunities for economic growth, regional integration, and global political cooperation. The size of the world's middle class may increase many times over, lifting literally tens of millions of people from the depredations of poverty and disease. Authoritarian regimes will increasingly founder as they try to insulate their populations from a world brimming with free-flowing information, new economic opportunities, and spreading political freedoms. We may thus see the rise of many new democracies and the strengthening of several older ones. However fragile this process may be, it holds the hope of less conflict in the world than exists today.

Realizing these possibilities, however, will require concerted action on the part of the United States and other mature democracies around the world. Active American engagement cannot prevent all problems, but wise policies can mitigate many of them. The United States and governments of kindred spirit must

work harder to prevent conflicts as well as respond to them after the fact. Otherwise, the promise of the next century may never be realized, for greater global connectedness can lead to an increased possibility of misfortune as well as benefit.

The future is one of rising stakes. While humanity has an unprecedented opportunity to succor its poor, heal its sick, compose its disagreements, and find new purpose in common global goals, failure at these tasks could produce calamity on a worldwide scale. Thanks to the continuing integration of global financial networks, economic downturns that were once normally episodic and local may become more systemic and fully global in their harmful effects. Isolated epidemics could metastasize into global pandemics. The explosion in scientific discoveries now under way bears the potential of near miraculous benefit for humanity; misused, in the hands of despots, the new science could become a tool of genocide on an unprecedented scale. During the next 25 years, dilemmas arising from advances in biotechnology increasingly will force some cultures to reexamine the very foundations of their ethical structures. As society changes, our concept of national security will expand and our political values will be tested. In every sphere, our moral imaginations will be exercised anew.

For all that will be novel in the next century, some things will not change. Historical principles will still apply. There will still be great powers, and their interaction in pursuit of their own self-interests will still matter. As ever, much will depend on the sagacity and good character of leadership. Misunderstandings, misjudgments, and mistakes will still occur, but so will acts of bravery borne on the insight of exceptional men and women.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

Today, and in the world we see emerging, American leadership will be of paramount importance. The American moment in world history will not last forever; nothing wrought by man does. But for the time being, a heavy responsibility rests on both its power and its values. It is a rare moment and a special opportunity in history when the acknowledged dominant global power seeks neither territory nor political empire. Every effort must be made to ensure that this responsibility is discharged wisely. It is to this end that our study is ultimately directed.

Our View of the Future

As we look to the future, we believe that:

1. An economically strong United States is likely to remain a primary political, military, and cultural force through 2025, and will thus have a significant role in shaping the international environment.
2. The stability and direction of American society and politics will help shape U.S. foreign policy goals and capacities, and hence the way the United States may affect the global future,
3. Science and technology will continue to advance and become more widely available and utilized around the world, but their benefits will be less evenly distributed.
4. World energy supplies will remain largely based on fossil fuels.
5. While much of the world will experience economic growth, disparities in income will increase and widespread poverty will persist.
6. The international aspects of business and commerce (trade, transportation, telecommunications, investment and finance, manufacturing, and professional services) will continue to expand.
7. Non-governmental organizations (refugee aid organizations, religious and ethnic advocacy groups, environmental and other single-issue lobbies, international professional associations, and others) will continue to grow in importance, numbers, and in their international role.
8. Though it will raise important issues of sovereignty, the United States will find it in its national interest to work with and strengthen a variety of international organizations.
9. The United States will remain *the* principal military power in the world.
10. Weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) and weapons of mass disruption (information warfare) will continue to proliferate to a wider range of state and non-state actors. Maintenance of a robust nuclear deterrent therefore remains essential as well as investment in new forms of defense against these threats.
11. We should expect conflicts in which adversaries, because of cultural affinities different from our own, will resort to forms and levels of violence shocking to our sensibilities.
12. As the United States confronts a variety of complex threats, it will often be dependent on allies; but it will find reliable alliances more difficult to establish and sustain.

Conclusions

On the basis of the foregoing beliefs, and our understanding of the broad context of the international security environment that will emerge over the next quarter century, we conclude that:

- 1. America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us.***

The United States will be both absolutely and relatively stronger than any other state or combination of states. Although a global competitor to the United States is unlikely to arise over the next 25 years, emerging powers--either singly or in coalition--will increasingly constrain U.S. options regionally and limit its strategic influence. As a result, we will remain limited in our ability to impose our will, and we will be vulnerable to an increasing range of threats against American forces and citizens overseas as well as at home. American influence will increasingly be both embraced and resented abroad, as U.S. cultural, economic, and political power persists and perhaps spreads. States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.

- 2. Rapid advances in information and biotechnologies will create new vulnerabilities for U.S. security.***

Governments or groups hostile to the United States and its interests will gain access to advanced technologies. They will seek to counter U.S. military advantages through the possession of these technologies and their actual use in non-traditional attacks. Moreover, as our society becomes increasingly dependent

on knowledge-based technology for producing goods and providing services, new vulnerabilities to such attacks will arise.

- 3. New technologies will divide the world as well as draw it together.***

In the next century people around the world in both developed and developing countries will be able to communicate with each other almost instantaneously. New technologies will increase productivity and create a transnational cyberclass of people. We will see much greater mobility and emigration among educated elites from less to more developed societies. We will be increasingly deluged by information, and have less time to process and interpret it. We will learn to cure illnesses, prolong and enrich life, and routinely clone it, but at the same time, advances in bio-technology will create moral dilemmas. An anti-technology backlash is possible, and even likely, as the adoption of emerging technologies creates new moral, cultural, and economic divisions.

- 4. The national security of all advanced states will be increasingly affected by the vulnerabilities of the evolving global economic infrastructure.***

The economic future will be more difficult to predict and to manage. The emergence or strengthening of significant global economic actors will cause realignments of economic power. Global changes in the next quarter-century will produce opportunities and vulnerabilities. Overall global economic growth will continue, albeit unevenly. At the same time, economic integration and fragmentation will co-exist. Serious and unexpected economic downturns, major disparities of wealth, volatile capital flows, increasing vulnerabilities in global electronic infrastructures, labor and social disruptions, and pressures for

increased protectionism will also occur. Many countries will be simultaneously more wealthy and more insecure. Some societies will find it difficult to develop the human capital and social cohesion necessary to employ new technologies productively. Their frustrations will be endemic and sometimes dangerous. For most advanced states, major threats to national security will broaden beyond the purely military.

5. Energy will continue to have major strategic significance.

Although energy distribution and consumption patterns will shift, we are unlikely to see dramatic changes in energy technology on a world scale in the next quarter century. Demand for fossil fuel will increase as major developing economies grow, increasing most rapidly in Asia. American dependence on foreign sources of energy will also grow over the next two decades. In the absence of events that alter significantly the price of oil, the stability of the world oil market will continue to depend on an uninterrupted supply of oil from the Persian Gulf, and the location of all key fossil fuel deposits will retain geopolitical significance.

6. All borders will be more porous; some will bend and some will break.

New technologies will continue to stretch and strain all existing borders-physical and social. Citizens will communicate with and form allegiances to individuals or movements anywhere in the world. Traditional bonds between states and their citizens can no longer be taken for granted, even in the United States. Many countries will have difficulties keeping dangers out of their territories, but their governments will still be committed to upholding the integrity of their borders. Global connectivity will allow

“big ideas” to spread quickly around the globe. Some ideas may be religious in nature, some populist, some devoted to democracy and human rights. Whatever their content, the stage will be set for mass action to have social impact beyond the borders and control of existing political structures.

7. The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but will endure.

The international system will wrestle constantly over the next quarter century to establish the proper balance between fealty to the state on the one hand, and the impetus to build effective transnational institutions on the other. This struggle will be played out in the debate over international institutions to regulate financial markets, international policing and peace-making agencies, as well as several other shared global problems. Nevertheless, global forces, especially economic ones, will continue to batter the concept of national sovereignty. The state, as we know it, will also face challenges to its sovereignty under the mandate of evolving international law and by disaffected groups, including terrorists and criminals. Nonetheless, the principle of national sovereignty will endure, albeit in changed forms.

8. Fragmentation or failure of states will occur, with destabilizing effects on neighboring states.

Global and regional dynamics will normally bind states together, but events in major countries will still drive whether the world is peaceful or violent. States will differ in their ability to seize technological and economic opportunities, establish the social and political infrastructure necessary for economic growth, build political institutions responsive to the aspirations of their citizens, and find the leadership necessary to guide them through an era

of uncertainty and risk. Some important states may not be able to manage these challenges and could fragment or fail. The result will be an increase in the rise of suppressed nationalisms, ethnic or religious violence, humanitarian disasters, major catalytic regional crises, and the spread of dangerous weapons.

9. Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations.

Interstate wars will occur over the next 25 years, but most violence will erupt from conflicts internal to current territorial states. As the desire for self-determination spreads, and many governments fail to adapt to new economic and social realities, minorities will be less likely to tolerate bad or prejudicial government. In consequence, the number of new states: international protectorates, and zones of autonomy will increase, and many will be born in violence. The major powers will struggle to devise an accountable and effective institutional response to such crises.

10. Space will become a critical and competitive military environment.

The U.S. use of space for military purposes will expand, but other countries will also learn to exploit space for both commercial and military purposes. Many other countries will learn to launch satellites to communicate and spy. Weapons will likely be put in space. Space will also become permanently manned.

11. The essence of war will not change.

Despite the proliferation of highly sophisticated and remote means of attack, the essence of war will remain the same. There will be casualties, carnage, and death; it will not be like a

video game. What will change will be the kinds of actors and the weapons available to them. While some societies will attempt to limit violence and damage, others will seek to maximize them, particularly against those societies with a lower tolerance for casualties.

12. U.S. intelligence will face more challenging adversaries, and even excellent intelligence will not prevent all surprises.

Micro-sensors and electronic communications will continue to expand intelligence collection capabilities around the world. As a result of the proliferation of other technologies, however, many countries and disaffected groups will develop techniques of denial and deception in an attempt to thwart U.S. intelligence efforts—despite U.S. technological superiority. In any event, the United States will continue to confront strategic shocks, as intelligence analysis and human judgments will fail to detect all dangers in an ever-changing world.

13. The United States will be called upon frequently to intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances and with the prospect of fewer forward-deployed forces.

Political changes abroad, economic considerations, and the increased vulnerability of U.S. bases around the world will increase pressures on the United States to reduce substantially its forward military presence in Europe and Asia. In dealing with security crises, the 21st century will be characterized more by episodic “posses of the willing” than the traditional World War II-style alliance systems. The United States will increasingly find itself wishing to form coalitions but increasingly unable to find partners willing and able to carry out combined military operations.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

14. The emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different military and other national capabilities.

The United States must act together with its allies to shape the future of the international environment, using all the instruments of American diplomatic, economic, and military power. The type of conflict in which this country will generally engage in the first quarter of the 21st century will require sustainable military capabilities characterized by stealth, speed, range, unprecedented

accuracy, lethality, strategic mobility, superior intelligence, and the overall will and ability to prevail. It is essential to maintain U.S. technological superiority, despite the unavoidable tension between acquisition of advanced capabilities and the maintenance of current capabilities. The mix and effectiveness of overall American capabilities need to be rethought and adjusted, and substantial changes in non-military national capabilities will also be needed. Discriminating and hard choices will be required.

Seeking an American National Security Strategy

In many respects, the world ahead seems amenable to basic American interests and values. A world pried open by the information revolution is a world less hospitable to tyranny and more friendly to human liberty. A more prosperous world is, on balance, a world more conducive to democracy and less tolerant of fatalism and the dour dogmas that often attend it. A less socially rigid, freer, and self-regulating world also accords with our deepest political beliefs and our central political metaphors—the checks and balances of our Constitution, the “invisible hand” of the market, our social creed of *E Pluribus Unum*, and the concept of federalism itself.

Nevertheless, a world amenable to our interests and values will not come into being by itself. Much of the world will resent and oppose us, if not for the simple fact of our preeminence, then for the fact that others often perceive the United States as exercising its power with arrogance and self-absorption. There will also be much apprehension and confusion as the world changes. National leaderships will have their hands full, and some will make mistakes.

As a result, for many years to come Americans will become increasingly less secure: and *much less secure than they now believe themselves to be*. That is because many of the threats emerging in our future will differ significantly from those of the past, not only in their physical but also in their psychological effects. While conventional conflicts will still be possible, the most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks on American cities by sub-national groups using genetically engineered pathogens. Another may

be a well-planned cyber-attack on the air traffic control system on the East Coast of the United States, as some 200 commercial aircraft are trying to land safely in a morning’s rain and fog. Other threats may inhere in assaults against an increasingly integrated and complex, but highly vulnerable, international economic infrastructure whose operation lies beyond the control of any single body. Threats may also loom from an unraveling of the fabric of national identity itself, and the consequent failure or collapse of several major countries.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that threats to American security will be more diffuse: harder to anticipate, and more difficult to neutralize than ever before. Deterrence will not work as it once did; in many cases it may not work at all. There will be a blurring of boundaries: between homeland defense and foreign policy; between sovereign states and a plethora of protectorates and autonomous zones; between the pull of national loyalties on individual citizens and the pull of loyalties both more local and more global in nature.

While the likelihood of major conflicts between powerful states will decrease, conflict itself will likely increase. The world that lies in store for us over the next 25 years will surely challenge our received wisdom about how to protect American interests and advance American values. In such an environment the United States needs a sure understanding of its objectives, and a coherent strategy to deal with both the dangers and the opportunities ahead. It is from the Phase I Report—both this document and the research and analytical study from which it is drawn—that this Commission will seek to develop that understanding, and build that strategy, in Phase II. We will unveil that strategy in April 2000.

PHASE II: SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY
APRIL 15, 2000

PHASE III: BUILDING FOR PEACE
MARCH 15, 2001

THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON

snowflake

December 3, 2001 12:31 PM

115

Action
12/4
1819

TASSED
B-1

000.7

TO: VADM Giambastiani
cc: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PA and Military Leadership

Closed 12/11

Why don't you tell somebody to draft up the right memo from me that would implement what you and Torie think ought to be done? Then wash it by Larry.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated memo from ASD(PA) to SecDef re: Military Leadership and Public Affairs

DHR:dh
120301-34

Please respond by _____

12/5
1153

DJS AND SMA DISCUSSED TODAY

BOTH AGREED THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA (TO INCLUDE PA TRAINING IN COMBONE COURSE)

DJS TOLD SMA THAT HE WOULD DRAFT A MEMO ~~FOR~~ SECDEF TO SEND TO CJCS DIRECTING IMPLEMENTATION.

V.R. Qu

3 Dec 01

U12007 /02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Military Leadership and Public Affairs

1. I understand that each of the Services provides some public affairs/media relations training to their newly selected General and Flag Officers. It was suggested we do more to prepare our senior leaders to effectively deal with the media. This needs to include more than just press conference work. It should also encompass an opportunity for dialog with senior media folks, such as Brookings or the JFK School.

2. I want you to consider introducing supplemental public affairs/media training at the CAPSTONE course, or at another appropriate forum, for our senior leaders. Please provide me your thoughts on how we can accomplish this.

Larry Di Rita 11/30 12/11

VIA VADM G 11/30

TO: SECDEF

FROM: *Torie Clarke*

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Military Leadership and Public Affairs

DEC 03 2001

CC: Di Rita

As you and I have discussed, we need to do a better job of convincing military leadership of the importance of public affairs in their work.

Communicating what we're doing and how we're doing it is critical to building and maintaining the public support necessary for a strong and capable defense. Despite that, too many see public affairs as an "extra," seldom a priority.

Recommendation

To underscore public affair's relevance, make the study of it a significant element of the Capstone program.

Have Brookings, the JFK School or a similar organization facilitate an intensive series of discussions, debates and exercises between Capstone participants and select media. The experience would be enlightening for both sides, thus strengthening the relationship between the military and the media.

More importantly, the sessions would be highly educational for the future military leaders, who--like it or not--will be dealing with the media and the public throughout their careers.

CJCS RUNS THE COURSE AT NAT'L DEFENSE UNIVERSITY.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

A VERY GOOD IDEA- I'D
SUGGEST THAT EACH
SERVICE HAS THEIR
OWN PAs + SHOULD DO
THIS AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO CAPSTONE. LIKE
THE BUDGET, SOME-
THING MUST BE CUT
TO ACCOMODATE A
NEW REQUIREMENT.

snowflake

Amirah 11/14
1114

November 13, 2001 10:37 AM

(Too trivial to put on tracking report)

CENTCOM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Schedule for Gen. Franks

I take it you are going to communicate the fact that Tommy can go with the tank on Wednesday, the PC on Thursday and the President early on Friday morning.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111301-11

.....

Please respond by _____

13 NOV 01

U12009 /02

STOW/FAKES

Acc # Q # 101

November 13, 2001 10:14 AM

11/14
11/15

350.09

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Scowcroft Proposal

Why don't you have the Chiefs take a look at Scowcroft's proposal, and let's get some view as to what they think of it. I assume they will think it is as bad as I do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111301-6

Please respond by _____

*DRS sent letter on 12/5 of
4 to Chiefs from
Sec Int / Issue site*

13 NOV 01

U12010 /02

JWP
11/14
0759

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3
DATE: November 12, 2001
SUBJECT:

I told George Tenet about Terry Cook and said they would be connecting in the appropriate way.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
01001.04

Please respond by _____

090 CIA

12 Nov 01

U12012 /02

snowflake

November 9, 2001 2:46 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
 Dov Zakheim

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Weapons

FYI, attached is a memo in response to my memo of October 30.

Thanks.

Attach.
 1 1/08/01 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef, "Gunship-Like Weapons"

DHR:dh
 110901-13

.....

Please respond by _____

452C

9 Nov 01

U12013 /02

5833
SECDEF HAS SEEN 11/8

NOV - 9 2001

November 8, 2001

9/1/8

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge *PA*

Subject: Gunship-Like Weapons

You sent me a note stating "we need more weapon systems like the AC-130, where the ordnance can be directed in a more precise way" I agree, and this memo will describe what we are doing.

Two general points. First, the use of the **gunship** requires air superiority, and some self defense capability from ground fire. The **gunships** have been used infrequently, and one could suspect that their proficiency has eroded over time. Second, the **gunship's** advantage is that it couples target identification, man-in-the-loop decision making and organic firepower in a single platform. The older Air Force A-10s possess similar capabilities. This leads me to suggest the following:

--maximum the use of **gunship** crew training to enhance current effectiveness:

--upgrade the current **gunship** fleet with additional capabilities, such as small UAVs and air-to-surface missiles, to augment their guns and cannons (we have been in contact with the SOF at Hulbert AFB to start such a program);

--augment the **gunships** with UCAVs, but this will take some time to get the UCAVs of sufficient size even to achieve a fraction of the kill capability of the AC-130 (we are currently working on 3000 pound payload UCAVs);

--refine the target kill chain-target ID, decision and rapid target destruction-to "mimic" the **gunship** in its operation, requiring an integrated approach sensors, decision making and lethality (we have a Time Sensitive Target Study underway to do this).

For Information Only.

snowflake

October 30, 2001 3:09 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Weapon Systems

We need more weapon systems that are like the AC-1 30, where the ordnance can be directed in a more precise way than can some of our other platforms and weapons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103001-56

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/4288

snowflake

#89 11/13
7146

November 2, 2001 9:25 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld₃
SUBJECT: Blair Memos for Gen. Franks

Tommy Franks tells me that he does not have copies of the Blair memos. We should make sure he gets them.

CK

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110201-11

.....
Please respond by _____

VADM G:

11/2/01
1207

- This was faxed to General Franks yesterday — CENTCOM acknowledged receipt @ 1201, 1 Nov 01 (see attached)
- Recommend we call this COMPLETE, unless you know something else.

2 Nov 01

V.R. 

U12016 /02

snoflake

#87 11/2
0700

11/2 0720

~~October 31, 2001 3:10 PM~~

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and Treasury

M 11/2

000.5

Please let Denny Blair know that I have talked to the Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neill. He said if Denny or you contact Ken Dam, the number two man at Treasury and explain what you need by way of Treasury involvement in the Pacific Command's cell for intelligence on terrorism, Ken Dam will work with you on it.

Thanks.

Sent to ADM Blair via email 11/2

DHR:dh
103101-32

.....
Please respond by 11/11

2 Nov 01

U12017 /02

snowflake

#88 D ACTION
11/1
0807

November 1, 2001 4:27 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Version for Franks

Alan G.
Done on 11/1
M 11/2

Please make sure you send Tommy Franks the version we actually used with Condi, Colin and George Tenet, so he sees how we fixed the first two paragraphs on the first page.

000.5

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110101-26

.....
Please respond by _____

1 Nov 01

U12018 /02

snowflake

#85 11/14/01

October 30, 2001 1:22 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and Treasury

Admiral Blair says he still doesn't have a Treasury representative to share information in the war on terrorism. You might want to figure out how we work with the Treasury Department on that.

000.5

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103001-43

.....*
Please respond by 11/4

30 OCT 01

U12019 /02

snowflake

#71

10/20
0912

October 29, 2001 3:38 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Status

What is the status of Avenging Eagle?,

I have not heard a word back and I am anxious to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102901-30

.....
Please respond by

10/31

*General Holland met w/
SD on 11/9 to discuss. Also
Gen Holland briefed this (update)
to Ho TenK on 11/9. DR*

353

29 OCT 01

U12021 /02

UNCLASSIFIED

AVENGING EAGLE

Briefing to the Secretary of Defense
26 September 2001

9/26/01 10:01

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
10559/OSD/4294

#73

snowflake

October 29, 2001 3:45 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Status on PACOM Proposals

HAS BEEN
[unclear]

I hope we have charged ahead on the PACOM Combating Terrorism proposals and recommendations on p. 15 of their packet.

RESPONSE
IN
WORK

000.5

Please let me know what the dimensions of that island in the Philippines are-how many miles across, north to south and east to west.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102901-32

Please respond by 10/30

U12022 /02

8/11/6 11/6
14/15

RESPONSE TO SEC DEF MEMO

RE: BASILAN ISLAND DIMENSIONS

~~from VCJCS~~
CORRECTION SIR-FROM
CJCS

29 OCT 01

U12022 /02



snowflake

10/30 1700 #72
October 29, 2001 3:42 PM
D 10/30
0943

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Status on EUCOM

What is the status of "Defeating Terrorism in USEUCOM AOR," the package given to me by Joe Ralston?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102901-31

.....
Please respond by

10/30

see
OCT 30 2001
1720

JS 807

000.5

2902701

U12023 /02

snowflake

#55

October 25, 2001 6:53 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
 CC: VADM Giambastiani
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
 SUBJECT: Strategic Influence Campaign

I want to be briefed on the strategic influence campaign. VADM Giambastiani, please set this up this week. This just drags on and on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 102501-3

09112

.....

Please respond by 10/26

~~SECRET~~

STRATEGIC INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN BRIEF TO YOU BY OSD(POLICY) AND JCS(J39) IS SCHEDULED FOR SATURDAY 10/27 1245-1330.

~~SECRET~~

V/R
 Ed 10/25
 Ok
 251070

U12025 /02

snowflake

*Info 10/25
0917*

October 22, 2001 6:09 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Prep for Wednesday

You might want to make sure that the CINC and the Chiefs are aware of the points I made to the President, both orally and in the memo, so they are prepared to discuss those points if they want to.

It is their call, but I have told the President that I think those are the issues that the Chiefs and the CINC have an interest in. If I am wrong, and there are other things I have neglected, you or they should tell me between now and Wednesday, so I can elevate them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102201-50

322

22 OCT 01

U12028 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4300

snowflake

#37

ACW 10/5 1023 ✓

October 8, 2001 7:46 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Trip Materials

On the flight to the Middle East I looked at the Joint Staff materials that had been prepared for Admiral Doran.

I am just dumbfounded. They repeat exactly what the Policy shop is trying to do for me. It is nuts!

We have to find some way to get them together. I couldn't believe the material they prepared for Doran-it was about four times as much as the material that was prepared for me, and Doran never said a word. What is going on? How do we fix this?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100801-2

33250

8 OCT 01

U12030 /02

#31

*PA Howard
1/14*

snowflake

October 2, 2001 6:09 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Canada

The Minister of Defense of Canada, Mr. Eggleton, called me at 5:30 p.m. on 10/02/01. He said Canada has people and capabilities, they want to help, they share the continent and they are interested in mutual security.

Canada

Today President Bush told the Canadian prime minister that other countries may be involved that are even smaller than Canada, specifically Australia. They would like to be involved as well.

I suggested that their CHOD contact you and think about a liaison with Tommy Franks in Tampa.

He said they have a frigate that could be part of a carrier task group and that that might be a way to participate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100201-21

OCTO 1

U12031 /02

snowflake

#29

*PAren
blz
0820*

October 1, 2001 11:15 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Philippines

Please tell Denny Blair that I have authorized him to proceed with the assessment team with respect to the Philippines.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100101-13

Philippines

1 OCT 01

U12033 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4303

#26

Acc'd
11/18

snowflake

September 29, 2001 8:52 AM

TO: General Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Canada

I liked that idea we heard over at the White House the other day in the Roosevelt Room about getting Canada to help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092901-6

Canada

29 Sept

U12034 /02

#25

stowflake

Auth [Signature] 1108

September 28, 2001 4:09 PM

TO: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld [Signature]

SUBJECT: Joint Staff

Please advise the Joint Staff that they should no longer use the phrase "Joint Staff" for approvals or notifications, but they should use specific people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092801-8

Alfred [Signature]

020 JCS

28 Sep 01

U12035 /02

#6

snowflake

Amoral

D9/20

0752

September 19, 2001 4:47 PM

* Copy provided to CJCS by
Bob Berri

TO: General Hugh Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo for CINCs

*Complete for
CJCS EA
9/24
0921*

I sent you a Top Secret memo concerning some **targeting** suggestions. I sure hope that gets to the Tommy Franks, Charlie Holland, **possibly** the other CINCs and also down to the Dahlgren people in some form. I don't care how you send it to them.

I think those thoughts and any thoughts **you** want to add might be useful for those folks.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Affgrenman

DHR:dh
091901-14

19 Sept 01

U12036 /02

#5

snowflake

Acad 9/20
1151

August 16, 2001 11:24 AM

TO: General Hugh Shelton
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Counter-Drug Detection and Monitoring

Completed
Per PJCS EA
9/24/01
0918

I note that there are 1,375 people in counter-drug detection and monitoring at JIATF East. Please have someone take a look at that and see if there is some way to reduce that number.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081601-17

0005

16 Aug 01

U12037 /02

#3

snowflake

August 16, 2001 11:49 AM

TO: General Shelton
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Arabian Gulf

8010

I would like to have someone brief me on the Arabian Gulf Maritime Interception Operations, where we have 1,546 personnel deployed.

Thanks.

DEF - get a brief

DHR:dh
08160122

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

GIVEN TO UCJCS

I have the answers in my safe

COL Bucci

BRIEF

16 Aug 01

U12038 /02

U12038 /02

snowflake

July 9, 2001 8:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Shipbuilding

Please get this memo from Bruce Dauer redone—I have made some edits—and explain what “young” is, so Powell Moore can send something like it to all of the people who asked about shipbuilding up there.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/7/01 Dauer memo to SecDef: “Shipbuilding Constraints”

DHR:dh
07090 1-4

*To Bruce Dauer for
C'DR Zeiser.
DR*

11-L-0559/OSD/4309

U12069 /01

① Feb 2
Sent 1/2/01

INFO MEMO

July 7, 2001, 11:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Bruce A. Dauer 

SUBJECT: Shipbuilding Constraints

- Attached is the information on shipbuilding constraints that you requested this morning.

Shipbuilding Budget Constraints

A. BACKGROUND

- The current standard based on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review is to maintain a 310-ship Navy.
- Over the long term, the Navy needs to buy approximately 8.7 ships per year to maintain this force level based on an average ship-life of 35 years.

B. BUDGET STATUS

- The FY 2002 budget recommends procurement of 6 ships. Continued procurement at ~~this~~ ^{the current} rate will reduce the Navy to 230 ships by 2030.

C. ISSUES

DoD intends to increase future shipbuilding budgets to sustaining rates, but ~~this is~~ ^{was} difficult [↓] in FY 2002 because of the following shipbuilding constraints:

- CVN Aircraft Carrier (none in the FY 2002 budget): Carriers are purchased at a rate of one every five to six years. With one purchased in FY 2001, there is no need for another carrier procurement until 2006.
- Virginia Class Submarine (one in the FY 2002 budget): Requires advance procurement of nuclear components and other long lead equipment two years in advance of construction. Advance procurement to support construction of two submarines in FY 2004 was considered as part of the FY 2002 budget amendment but fell out when the amendment shrunk to \$18.4 billion.
- DDG-51 (three in the FY 2002 budget): Surface combatants are young and are currently being inactivated as the newer, more capable DDG-51 ships are delivered. Increasing the current rate of three ships per year would result in yet additional ships having to be retired. Additionally, three is the maximum quantity under the current multiyear contract. Additional DDG-51s could be added to the contract, but this would disrupt the stable workforce and material planning advantages of the multiyear contract.
- LPD-17 Transport Dock Ship (none in the FY 2002 budget): The lead LPD-17 ship is 2 years behind schedule and LPD-18, 19, and 20 are similarly behind schedule. At Navy's recommendation, DoD decided to defer a FY 2002 LPD procurement while design and construction problems are resolved on the earlier ships.

(b)(6)

Comptroller Directorate: Inv

(b)(6)

07/07/01 11:20 AM

1 of 2

11-L-0559/OSD/4311

SECRET
This was the point you were being pressed on the members of Congress want you to add more DDG's more than anything. Larry

- T-AKE Auxiliary Cargo and Ammunition Ship (one in the FY 2002 budget): Neither the FY 2000 nor the FY 2001 T-AKE ship is under contract. At Navy's recommendation, DoD limited the FY 2002 request to one ship. This will allow construction experience to mature the ship design before increasing construction quantities to two or more per year.
- LHD-8 Amphibious Assault Ship (one in the FY 2002 budget): This ship was originally budgeted in FY 2005 but accelerated by Congress. LHA(R), the next large deck amphibious assault ship, is not required to replace a retiring ship until 2011.

(b)(6)

Comptroller Directorate: Inv

(b)(6)

07/07/01 11:20 AM

2 of 2

11-L-0559/OSD/4312

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

9 Jun

ANDY
~~ESR~~

PVE PASS to COL
ZIEGLER FOR CORRECTIONS
AND ANSWER to SECDEF'S
QUESTION.

THX,
WAT

560.05

9 Jul 01

snowflake

July 5, 2001 10:30 AM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld a /
SUBJECT: DepSecDef Note on General Schwartz

Asia

Attached is a note from Paul on General Schwartz. Do you know what he's talking about? Is the QDR looking at that?

Cc: Paul Wolfowitz

DHR:cd
070501-7

5/5/01

U12101 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4314

28 June 2001

MEMO FOR SecDef

FROM DepSecDef *FW*

INFO Steve Cambone

SUBJECT: Office Call with General Schwartz

I met with Tom Schwartz in your place yesterday evening because you were engaged in the testimony prep. The two main points that you should be aware of are:

- ?*
1. General Schwartz is aggressively pursuing the Northeast Asia Command concept that you discussed with him earlier this month. He thinks it is a great idea--a forcing function to bring Korea and Japan together. He expects to be able to present this concept to you towards the end of July following the appropriate coordination and prebriefs.
 2. General Schwartz is concerned about QDR-generated rumors of a mission change in his theater. His current mission is to deter war, and if deterrence fails, destroy North Korean armed forces. A change of the mission from destroy to defeat, halt, or hold would have a significant impact on the combined ROK-US aspects of both planning and force structure. At the end of the day, deterrence may require more than just the capacity to defeat, halt, and hold. The ability to destroy the enemy could be the most important aspect of deterrence. In any case, this is an issue that needs to be addressed jointly with the ROK.
- Draw*

Draw

On a separate but related question, I raised with him the notion of inviting some of our key allies to send teams to consult on the QDR. He said the Koreans would jump at the chance.

TO: SECDEF

7.5/1600
1800

snowflake

July 2, 2001 8:06 AM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Systems

Please read the attached. Is there anything we can get the QDR to do to look at this issue of systems in a way that would be useful?

381

→ Sir -

We are still struggling to define what the force is today!
The standing joint task force is a "system."
We'll keep working the problem.

CC: Service Secretaries

DHR:cd
07020 1-4

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SC

JUL 07 2001

JUL 5 2001

[Signature] 7/9

256101

MEMORANDUM

4/19/01

Innovation between the two world wars was more a matter of systems than weapons thought up from the field level.

For example, if one asked what would defeat the German subs, it was not a new weapon, it was a combination of various radars, sonars, long-range aircraft, B-24s dropping bombs (land planes), blimps, signals intelligence to pick up German signals, command and control, hunter killer teams, convoys and the like. In short, it was not a weapon, but rather a system in the broadest sense, and it came not from the ground up, but from the top down. Somebody asked what would it take to defeat German submarine packs.

That's the kind of thinking that's needed, That is unlikely to be done from the bottom up.

In that connection, there is a critical link that needs to be made between science and the military. In the old days when the country was smaller, and everyone who was anybody was related to each other, an admiral could have a cousin named **Vannaver** Bush and could pick up the phone and say that there needs to be a connection between science and the government. They ended with Bush who had a link with brilliant scientists who had an every day connection the people who were developing the capabilities for the war.

DHR/azn
041901.9

July 5, 2001, 3:58 p.m.

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ* JUL 5 2001

SUBJECT: Curt Weldon

- You may recall that during the hearing Curt said that he wanted to work with us on Davis-Bacon, not that he was opposed to our idea. I've got a phone call in to him.
- Incidentally, I'm working up an estimate of the present value of 2000 dollars in 1931, when D-B was enacted.

COORDINATION: NONE

7/6
SECDEF

*Let's try -
This paper legislation on*

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 17 2001
[Signature] 7/9

Amplifying info: The \$2000 refers to the size of the contracts above which Davis-Bacon "prevailing wage rate" law applies. We want to raise the exemption to \$1 million, as very few DoD contracts are valued at \$2000 or below.

Weldon in the hearing said he thought labor would support something well above \$2000, if not as high as \$1 million. He'll work with us.

Jerry

160

5 JUL 10 2001

July 2, 2001 9:32 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Article Regarding Phony Savings

Look at this article in the Defense Daily that says, "You've got phony savings in there." Curt Weldon is a good guy – someone ought to go up and talk to him.

DHR:cd
0702014

01 Jul 01

26 asking him to explain how he will pay for the defense budget amendment in light of dwindling budget surpluses.

-- Marc Selinger

Defense Daily
June 27, 2001

Pg. 1

27. Weldon Says Rush Budget Contains 'Phony' Savings Estimates

By Kerry Gildea

The Bush administration has included \$1 billion in savings assumptions in its FY '02 budget plan based on "phony numbers," according to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee panel on readiness.

"We have a responsibility to expose those phony numbers," Weldon yesterday told the vice chiefs of staff from the military services testifying before the panel. "They were phony when Bill Clinton offered them and they are phony when George Bush offers them. And, I say that as a Republican."

The vice chiefs declined to comment on the budget submission or the savings estimates outlined.

"We can't touch that...I am not playing games...we don't have that information," Army Gen. John Keane, Army vice chief of staff, told Weldon.

Weldon said the savings are misleading, particularly one that banks on Davis-Bacon reforms through the Congress, which Weldon said simply will not happen.

Any poor assumption in the defense budget could further set back the military's readiness, according to Weldon, who said he also is concerned about what the services do with the funds Congress authorizes and appropriates.

The General Accounting Office reported last year that over a five-year period, 1994-98, DoD changed funding in various operations and maintenance accounts by almost \$43 billion compared with the amounts the Congress originally designated for them, Weldon noted.

"I understand that operational needs of the military require the movement of funds during the year of execution, but movements of this magnitude, outside of the normal legislative process and without a timely notification to Congress are unacceptable," Weldon said.

The services vice chiefs told the panel they are prepared to send another reprogramming request to Capitol Hill that will include: a \$100 million reprogramming for the Army; \$180 million for Navy; \$400 million for Air Force; and \$27 million for the Marine corps.

The vice chiefs did not provide specifics on any procurement programs that would be effected by the reprogramming.

The vice chiefs also expressed concerns if the Congress does not finish work by the end of July with the \$6.5 billion supplemental package under consideration.

While individual soldiers will not feel the effect of that funding shortfall immediately, later in the summer there will be increased problems, Keane said.

In documents provided to Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), the Pentagon said if it does not get the money by the end of July it will have to shift millions out of procurement accounts to avoid personnel and readiness problems (Defense Daily, June 26).

Washington Post

June 27, 2001

Pg. 23

In The Loop

28. Senators Have A Cambone To Pick

By Al Kamen

Won't be around for the July 4 fireworks? You might be able to catch a preview today at the Senate Armed Services Committee. Word is Chairman Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) & Co. are preparing some to cuff about nominee Stephen A. Cambone, who's up for a job as principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

If Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's relations with the Senate are less than warm and fuzzy, Cambone's Sept. 27.

are even cooler, sources say, with both sides of the aisle. Something about the august lawmakers and staff feeling Cambone does not treat them with the respect they require.

Cambone briefed Hill aides May 31 on the Pentagon's plans and its defense strategy review. But after 90 minutes of charts and lecture, Cambone only had time for a few questions before he had to go. Some aides were displeased.

Then Cambone raised sensitive Senate eyebrows when he briefed foreign officials on the ballistic missile defense plan during Rumsfeld's recent trip to Europe. The Senate

doesn't like nominees to presume confirmation by doing things such as occupying anticipated offices or briefing allies.

On the other hand, the Senate guidelines are flexible and Cambone, also a special assistant to Rumsfeld, could brief if he were wearing that

assistant's hat. Cambone will get harrumphed at, sources say, but should make it through fine.

On the other hand, two other nominees, assistant secretary-designate for international security matters Jack D. Crouch II and undersecretary-designate for policy Douglas J. Feith still face tough battles.

New York Times

June 27, 2001

29. Retired Army Employee Is Found Guilty Of Spying

By Christopher Marquis

WASHINGTON, June 26 — A federal court jury in Florida today convicted a retired civilian employee of the Army of spying for the Soviet Union and then Russia over at least 25 years.

The Army employee, George Trofimoff, 74, was found guilty of providing highly classified documents to Moscow from a NATO interrogation center in Nuremberg, Germany, from 1969 to 1994.

Mr. Trofimoff, a naturalized American whose parents

were Russian emigres, could be sentenced to life in prison. Sentencing is scheduled for

As the verdict was read in a Tampa courtroom, Mr. Trofimoff, a balding, slightly overweight man with a military bearing, silently glanced at his weeping wife and shrugged, a prosecutor said.

His lawyer, Daniel Hernandez, said he would appeal.

Law enforcement officials said it would be difficult to assess the damage Mr. Trofimoff did to American and allied intelligence. He is believed to have furnished Moscow with the testimony of East bloc defectors interviewed at the center, which is administered jointly by German, British, French and American officials.

In addition, he is suspected of passing along classified materials that included Soviet and Warsaw Pact Order of Battle documents, which

would have divulged American knowledge of the military structure and capabilities of the Soviet Union and its allies, the officials said.

One indication of Mr. Trofimoff's value to Soviet officials arose in the monthlong trial when Oleg Kalugin, a

former K.G.B. general, testified that Mr. Trofimoff had been listed in the 1970's at the top of the K.G.B.'s list of American assets. Mr. Trofimoff was even invited to a resort for Soviet military officers as a reward for his labors, Mr. Kalugin said.

"You can gauge the significance of that information by how the K.G.B. ranked him as their No. 1 spy in terms of giving them information," said Mac Cauley, the United States attorney for the Middle District of Florida. "It was pretty vital information."

Mr. Cauley called the verdict "a great victory for our office," the product of an eight-year investigation that involved the F.B.I. and Army intelligence.

Until his arrest last June, Mr. Trofimoff had been leading a seemingly quiet retirement in a military community in Melbourne, Fla. He worked bagging groceries at a super-

July 7, 2001, 7:55am

07A

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

(DARPA)

I want you to see me **after** you have had a chance to think about the idea of putting some R&D money behind capabilities of the United States does not have to rescue hostages, deal with urban warfare, and or function in areas that are not being governed.

Thanks.

7/9/01

TO: Sec Def

*Don -
OK. I have asked DARPA
to work on this and have
asked for a status report.
I'll give you a report on
progress.*

Pete

110.01

15010

cam

U12138 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4321

INFO MEMO

July 10, 2001, 2:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim  JUL 10 2001

SUBJECT: Additional Information Requested on the FY 2002 Amended Budget

- Attached are additional papers that expand on the operation and maintenance budget categories that we discussed last Saturday.

COORDINATOR: None.

Prepared By: (b)(6)

Military Personnel

(\$ Billions)



Overview:

	<u>FY 01</u>	<u>FY 02</u>
• Army	28.3	30.1
• Navy/Marine Corps	26.5	29.1
• Air Force	<u>20.6</u>	<u>23.1</u>
Total	75.4	82.3

- Extends benefits legislated in FY 01 Authorization Act
- Funds FY 02 military pay raise of 4.6% (3.7% budgeted last year)
- Includes \$1 .0 billion for targeted pay increase (5% to 10%)
- Eliminates poor and dangerous neighborhoods from housing allowance calculation
- Reduces member out of pocket costs from 15% in 2001 to 11.3 % in 2002 on the way to 0% in 2005

Military Pay

A. BACKGROUND

The Military Personnel title funds the basic pay, special and incentive pay, non-taxable allowances, relocation costs (individual and unit moves), accrual payments for future retired pay, and other ancillary costs of supporting nearly 1.4 million active duty men and women in uniform and an additional 865,000 members in Guard and Reserve units. For the Guard and Reserve, funding in the budget pays for their attendance at weekend drills as well as their 2-week annual training requirement and it pays for special training necessary to ensure qualification in their military specialties. The budget also funds the pay-related costs of using Reserve personnel to augment the Active Forces when appropriate.

- Much of the budget is determined by legal requirements. Titles 10 and 37 of the United States Code specify amounts for various special and incentive pays and allowances and the circumstances under which they can or must be paid.
- The DoD Board of Actuaries indirectly determines the amount for retired pay accrual. They meet annually to review actuarial assumptions and specify a normal cost percentage (NCP) which, when multiplied by basic pay, forms the basis of the budget estimate for the accrual payment for future retirements.

B. BUDGET STATUS

The FY 2002 budget request of \$82.3 billion for the Military Personnel title is \$6.9 billion above the FY 2001 funding level of \$75.4 billion (9.1 percent).

Funding Summary:

<u>Category</u>	<u>(BA, Dollars in Millions)</u>		
	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Basic Pay*	34,182.6	+2,658.1	36,840.8
Retired Pay Accrual*	10,113.7	+1,044.5	11,158.3
Housing Allowances*	6,431.1	+980.8	7,412.0
Clothing, Overseas, and Other Allowances*	1,772.8	+145.3	1,918.1
Special and Incentive Pays*	2,841.0	+352.3	3,193.3
Enlisted Food Subsistence*	3,259.5	+198.4	3,457.9
Relocation (individual and unit moves) *	2,879.2	+85.5	2,964.7
Guard & Reserve Training	6,252.0	+271.9	6,523.9
Guard & Reserve Full-Time Support And Administration	4,254.9	+366.7	4,621.5
Other**	<u>3,448.5</u>	<u>+768.5</u>	<u>4,216.8</u>
Total	75,435.3	+6,872.0	82,307.3

*Full-time regular active duty only

**Other includes social security, separation payments, and miscellaneous support costs.

POC: (b)(6)

Comptroller Directorate: Ops

Phone: (b)(6)

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Preliminary

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Operation & Maintenance

(\$ in Billions)



Overview:

	<u>FY 01</u>	<u>FY 02</u>
• Army	23.6	26.7
• Navy/Marine Corps	28.0	31.0
• Air Force	27.5	31.9
• Defense Wide	<u>28.8</u>	<u>36.0</u>
Total	107.9	125.7

Significant Programs:

• Aircraft operations	7.6	9.4
• Army OPTEMPO	2.7	2.7
• Ship operations	2.7	2.9
• Depot maintenance	6.6	7.9
• Training	8.5	9.3
• Reserve Components	11.2	12.5
• Facility Sustainment/Base support	17.9	20.7
• Defense Health Program	12.1	17.9
• Drug Interdiction	0.9	0.8
• Environmental restoration	1.3	1.2
• Contingency operations	2.9	2.8
• Cooperative Threat Reduction	0.4	0.4

Aircraft Operations - Active Forces

A. BACKGROUND

- The Air Operations program funds aircraft operations costs to train pilots to achieve and to maintain flying proficiency in support of the national military strategy. Air Operations costs consist of depot level repairables, consumable spare parts, and fuel.
- Air Operations are commonly referred to as the “flying hour program.” Based on training syllabuses, each Service estimates the number of training hours needed to meet and to maintain aircrew skill levels. Each Service uses models to calculate air operations funding requirements. These costs are a function of previous years’ actual cost per hour and of the training hours dictated by the training curriculum.
- However, over the past several years, actual air operations costs are substantially greater than those modeled. The increasing costs are driven by increased depot level repairables costs, likely due to aging aircraft, to equipment wear, and to inexperienced maintenance mechanics.

B. BUDGET STATUS

FY 2002 Amended Budget. The FY 2002 Amended Budget funds fully the training hours required for pilot proficiencies.

- To prevent a flying hour funding shortfall in FY 2002 and to ensure a ready force, the FY 2002 Amended President’s Budget adds \$1.9 billion. The Navy and the Air Force reflect realistic cost assumptions by including a factor to support aging aircraft.

Funding Summary:

	(TOA, Dollars in Millions)			
<u>Active Forces</u>	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Army	600	720	-10	710
Navy	3,176	2,932	+604	3,536
Air Force	3,206	3,445	+1,244	4,689
USSOCOM	445	453	+54	507
Total	7,427	7,550	+1,892	9,442

C. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

- Average age of Navy and Air Force aircraft has increased by about 5.3 years (+32 percent) between FY 1989 and FY 2002.
- There is no evidence that the growth in air operations costs will subside.

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Active Forces Air Operations

- Air operations includes the following funding elements:
- **Army**
 - Land Forces Operations and Flight Training
 - Includes flying costs for rotary wing aircraft such as AH-64D Apache and OH-58D Kiowa
- **Navy**
 - Flight Operations and Fleet Air Training
 - Includes flying hour costs for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft such as the F/A-18, F-14, EA-6B, S-3B, P-3C, E-2C, training aircraft, and rotary wing aircraft.
- **Air Force**
 - Air Operations
 - Primary Combat Forces
 - Front-line fighter and bombers
 - B-52, B-1, B-2, F-15, F-16, F-22, A-10
 - Primary Combat Weapons
 - Rotary aircraft providing Peacekeeper and Minuteman security
 - Combat Enhancement Forces
 - Electronic warfare: EC-130 Compass Call
 - Air Operations Training
 - Training aircraft and Aggressor Aircraft (F-16)
 - Combat Communications
 - Airborne Command and Control
 - E-3 Sentry, E-8C Joint Stars, RC-135 Rivet Joint, U-2
 - Rescue and Recovery: Rotary wing aircraft
 - Mobility
 - Airlift Operations
 - c-5, c-17, c-135, c-141
 - Medical and Theater Support
 - C-9 Nightingale
 - c-12, c-21
 - Other Support Aircraft
 - VC-25 Air Force One
 - C-137, C-20, C-32, C-37 VIP Transport

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Phone: (b)(6)

Army OPTEMPO

A. BACKGROUND

- The Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) budget provides for Army's training requirements and, consequently, its level of combat readiness.
 - The Army's ground OPTEMPO training levels are expressed in terms of annual miles per tank driven at home stations (including Close Combat Tactical Trainer) and National Training Center for the ground forces.
- Historically, the Army has requested funds to fund fully its ground OPTEMPO requirements. However, in the last decade, with the exception of FY 1991 to support Desert Storm/Desert Shield operations, the Army has not executed fully its ground OPTEMPO goals.
 - On average, the Army only executed 79.7 percent of its ground OPTEMPO goal since FY 1990 (excluding FY 1991).
- According to the Army, the primary reason for historical underexecution was the flexibility exercised by the field commanders in order to fund critical fact-of-life bills (such as base operations support) that emerge during execution.
- Due to continued migration of funds out of mission readiness accounts (i.e., OPTEMPO) to other readiness support accounts, the Congress criticized the Army for not accurately reflecting the required training. In response, the Army contracted with RAND Corporation to conduct a comprehensive review of the Army's OPTEMPO program. The Army is expecting an interim report by the second quarter of FY 2002.

B. BUDGET STATUS

- In the FY 2002 Amended Budget, the Army reduced the FY 2002 OPTEMPO funding to an "acceptable" readiness risk level in order to invest in other critical requirements (e.g., stabilize deterioration of aging facilities). The Army believes that this reduction in OPTEMPO will allow the Army to achieve a balanced and executable programs.

Summary:

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Ground OPTEMPO (\$ in Millions)	\$2,721	-	\$2,697
Home Station and Simulator Tank Miles	800	-70	730
National Training Center Tank Miles	<u>97</u>		<u>97</u>
Total Ground OPTEMPO – Tank Miles	897	-70	827

Army OPTEMPO

- The Army's OPTEMPO program includes the following funding elements:
- **Divisions** - Finances training and operations of the active Army's 10 fighting divisions plus all organic forces (brigades, battalions, companies, and other subordinate units).
- **Corps Combat Forces** - Finances the training operations of all non-divisional combat units plus all organic assets associated with these forces. Includes corps level aviation, field artillery, and air defense units plus all separate combat units.
- **Corps Support Forces** - Finances the training and operations of corps support assets in order to support operations required to establish and sustain a corps' war-fighting capability. The supporting units include engineer, medical, signal, finance, personnel, military police, military intelligence, and corps support command units.
- **Echelon Above Corps Support Forces** - Finances the operations of Echelon Above Corps (EAC) Forces, separate from divisional and corps units, that directly support operations within the specified theater. The funding for EAC forces supports aviation, engineer, medical and signal theater assets.
- **Land Forces Operations Support:** Provides funding to conduct force related training at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs): the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

Ship Operations - Active Navy

A. BACKGROUND

Navy ship operations ensure that combat ready warships and military forces are continuously deployed to support the National Military Strategy in terms of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready group requirements. Ship operations costs are comprised largely of ship fuel, organizational level repairs, supplies and equipage, utility costs, and ship charter costs through the Military Sealift Command (MSC).

B. BUDGET STATUS

- The FY 2002 budget provides \$2,861 million for Active ship operations in FY 2002, an increase of \$122 million above the enacted FY 2001 budget of \$2,739 million.
- The increase includes program growth resulting from the transfer of Southwest Asia ship operations from the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund to the Navy ship operations accounts, the transfer of two underway replenishment ships to the MSC, and from increased nuclear fuel core processing requirements.

Funding Summary:

<u>Category</u>	<u>(TOA, Dollars in Millions)</u>			
	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Mission and Other Ship Operations	1,946.0	2,213.2	+102.0	2,315.2
Operational Support and Training	<u>540.5</u>	<u>528.8</u>	<u>+19.5</u>	<u>545.3</u>
Total	2,486.5	2,739.0	+121.5	2,860.5

C. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

- The FY 2002 budget provides funding to support and sustain the 310 ship Navy.
- Active Battle Force Ships (257 Active Navy ships and 42 MSC charter/support ships) in FY 2002, which is a decrease of two ships from the FY 2001 level of 301 ships. (The total number of ships planned for the Navy in FY 2002 is 314.)
- The FY 2002 budget supports the Chief of Naval Operation's goal of 50.5 underway steaming days/quarter for the deployed fleet in FY 2002 and 28 underway days/quarter for the nondeployed fleet.
- For the past 3 decades, the deployed fleet goal has been 50.5 underway days/quarter. The Navy reviews the ship operations goal annually in coordination with issuance of the Chief of Naval Operation's Baseline Assessment Memorandum.

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Phone: (b)(6)

Active Navy Ship Operations

Includes the following funding elements:

- Mission and Other Ship Operations - Funds all aspects of ship operations required to continuously deploy combat ready warships and supporting forces in support of national objectives. Includes the cost of-operating ships (to include distillate fuel); fleet and unit training; specialized skills training; operational support such as command and control, pier side support and port services; organizational maintenance; utilities costs; nuclear propulsion fuel consumption and processing; and Military Sealift Command charters.
- Ship Operational Support and Training - Funds detailed preplanning, engineering, and range operations necessary to train operating force ships and nuclear attack submarines and their crews and ensure high readiness levels. Includes the Submarine Operations and Safety Program; the Deep-Sea Submarine Program; the AEGIS Program; and the Receipt, Segregation, Storage, and Inventory Program (movement, handling, storage, and disposal of ordnance).

Depot Maintenance - Active Forces

A. BACKGROUND

- Depot Maintenance programs fund the overhaul, repair, and scheduled upkeep of DoD weapons systems and equipment (e.g., aircraft, missiles, ships, submarines, combat vehicles, and communication and electronic equipment) at both DoD depots (public) and contractor (private) facilities.
- Funding to maintain defense systems and equipment has been inadequate in past years. In FY 1992, only 6.5 percent of stated requirements were unfunded; in FY 2000, the percent of requirements left unfunded nearly doubled to 12.0 percent. The growing maintenance backlog is attributed to increased requirements associated with aging equipment and increased OPTEMPO levels.

B. BUDGET STATUS

- The Bush Budget arrests the growth of the maintenance backlog and moves the Services closer to achieving optimal depot maintenance funding by adding \$1.3 billion above the FY 2001 enacted level.
- Although the Bush Budget leaves almost 13 percent of the total stated requirement unfunded in FY 2002, the optimal level of unfunded requirements is estimated to be 8.5 percent. The Bush Budget would need to be increased by another \$790 million in FY 2002 to achieve optimal funding levels.

Funding Summary:

Category	(TOA, Dollars in Millions)			FY 2002
	FY 2000	FY 2001	Change	
Army Land Forces	679.9	707.4	+103.2	810.6
Navy Aircraft	837.6	688.9	+219.6	908.5
Navy Ship*	3,784.8	3,436.0	+812.3	4,248.3
Air Force	1,554.4	1,669.6	+200.0	1,869.6
Marine Corps	123.6	119.2	-11.4	107.8
Total	6,980.3	6,621.1	+1,323.7	7,944.8

* Excludes FY 2001 appropriation for USS COLE repair (\$150 million).

C. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

- The amended budget funds 70 percent of the Army's land forces maintenance requirements, 100 percent of the Navy's deployed airframe requirements, 90 percent of the Navy's nondeployed aircraft and ship maintenance requirements, 89 percent of the Air Force's depot maintenance workload, and 78 percent of the Marine Corps maintenance requirements.

- In FY 2002, the Bush Budget achieves optimal levels for Navy aircraft maintenance only. Additional funding increases beginning in FY 2003 will be required to sustain these levels and to reduce remaining backlogs to the optimal levels.

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Phone: (b)(6)

Depot Maintenance - Active Forces

Includes the following funding elements:

- Army Land Forces Depot Maintenance - Funds overhaul, rebuild, and manufacture of weapon and/or support systems, general equipment, and commodity group equipment; and recapitalization (maintenance and systematic upgrade of currently fielded systems) for 13 Army systems.
- Navy Aircraft Depot Maintenance - Funds inspection, repair, modification, and overhaul of aircraft airframes and engines, and support the depot level repair of aeronautical components for aircraft systems and equipment under Contractor Logistics support (CLS).
- Navy Aircraft Depot Operations Support - Provides unscheduled maintenance services to the fleet by correcting unplanned maintenance problems in support of depot maintenance operations. Also funds the Naval Aviation Pacific Repair Activity in Atsugi, Japan.
- Navy Ship Depot Maintenance - Supports maintenance ranging from overhauls to restricted technical availabilities performed at Naval shipyards (public) or private shipyards to restore ships, correct deficiencies, and perform emergent repairs. Includes dry docking costs, battery renewals, and various miscellaneous type repairs.
- Navy Ship Depot Operations Support - Funds a variety of depot maintenance programs such as: planning and technical support; Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIPs); Fleet Modernization Program; Berthing and Messing program; and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility. The SUPSHIPs are the Navy's designated contractors administrators and on-site technical and business agents for ship contracts at assigned shipyards.
- Marine Corps Depot Maintenance - Funds major repair and rebuild of ground equipment on a scheduled basis to maintain the materiel readiness of equipment inventory for the Fleet Marine Forces.
- Air Force Air Operations Depot Maintenance - Funds organic, contract, and interservice depot level maintenance requirements for the Air Force's front line operating weapons systems in eight commodities (aircraft, engine, missiles, other major end items, software, nonworking capital fund exchangeables, area and base support, and storage).
- Air Force Mobility Operations Depot Maintenance - Funds organic, contract, and interservice depot level maintenance requirements for the Air Force's mobilization, deployment, airlift, and air refueling forces in eight commodities (aircraft, engine,

missiles, other major end items, software, nonworking capital fund exchangeables, area and base support, and storage).

- Air Force Basic Skills and Advanced Training Depot Maintenance - Funds organic, contract, and interservice depot level maintenance requirements for the Air Force's training and recruitment activities in eight commodities (aircraft, engine, missiles, other major end items, software, nonworking capital fund exchangeables, area and base support, and storage).
- Air Force Logistics Depot Maintenance - Funds organic, contract, and interservice depot level maintenance requirements for the Air Force's combat rescue and recovery activities in eight commodities (aircraft, engine, missiles, other major end items, software, nonworking capital fund exchangeables, area and base support, and storage).

Training

A. BACKGROUND

The training budget for military and civilian personnel operates a wide range of training centers, Service schools and colleges, Service academies, and other institutions. Funding is also included to purchase training from non-DoD sources. Additionally, this budget supports recruiting efforts of the Services and includes the costs of basic recruit training.

- Accession Training includes officer basic training, military basic indoctrination training for enlisted (i.e., boot camp), and Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs.
- Basic Skill/Advanced Training includes specialized skill training, flight training, professional development education, training support, and depot maintenance.
- Recruiting/Other training includes recruiting and advertising, examining, off-duty and voluntary education, civilian education and training, and Junior ROTC programs.
- Base Operations Support costs are those day-to-day costs of operating an installation.
- Facility Sustainment funding ensures that the infrastructure is adequately maintained.

B. BUDGET STATUS

- The FY 2002 budget request of \$9.3 billion for Training and Recruiting is \$.8 billion above the FY 2001 funding level of \$8.5 billion (9.4 percent).
- The budget supports significant increases for training and recruiting programs.
- The budget includes increases for ROTC programs, and for dynamic advertising 'campaigns to ensure that the Services continue to meet their accession missions.
- Funding for base operations and facility sustainment increase substantially over the FY 2001 enacted level (increase by 17 percent), reflecting the President's decision to fund the realistic costs of these operations.

Funding Summary:

<u>Category</u>	<u>(BA, Dollars in Millions)</u>		
	<u>FY 2001'</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Accession Training	574.7	+57.3	632.0
Basic Skill/Advanced Training	3,234.7	-167.7	3,402.4
Recruiting/Other Training	1,589.6	+176.6	1,766.2
Base Operations	2,006.7	+350.0	2,356.7
Facilities Sustainment	783.2	+134.2	917.4
Other	261.5	+12.2	273.7
Total	8,450.4	+898.0	9,348.4

POC: (b)(6)
Comptroller Directorate: Ops
Phone: (b)(6)

Reserve Components' Operation & Maintenance

A. BACKGROUND

The Reserve Components' Operation and Maintenance appropriations provide funding to operate and to maintain their assigned equipment in a readiness state which will permit rapid deployment in the event of full or partial mobilization. Reserve Component personnel maintain adequate skill levels in highly technical specialties through training during weekend drills and active duty training. Concurrently, the Reserve Components contribute significant support to a variety of Active mission areas.

- Army National Guard and Army Reserve units provide essential combat, combat support, and combat service support to the Army.
- The Naval Reserve augments active duty Navy units by supporting the fleet in day-to-day operations, while simultaneously promoting a flexible crisis-response capability.
- The Marine Corps Reserve augments and reinforces the active duty Marine Corps with qualified units and individuals in time of war or other national emergencies.
- The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units perform a broad range of combat and combat support missions, including CONUS air defense, drug interdiction, close air support, strategic and tactical airlift, aerial refueling, space operations, aeromedical evacuation, aerospace rescue and recovery, and special operations.

B. BUDGET STATUS

The Reserve Components' Operation and Maintenance budgets are summarized below in the following categories:

- **Aircraft Operations** programs funds aircraft operations costs to train pilots to achieve and to maintain flying proficiency in support of the national military strategy. Air Operations costs consist of depot level repairables, consumable spare parts, and fuel.
- **Army OPTEMPO** measures the training level and, consequently, its level of combat readiness. The Army's ground OPTEMPO training levels are expressed in terms of annual miles per tank driven at home stations (including Close Combat Tactical Trainer) and National Training Center for the ground forces. The Army's air OPTEMPO training levels are maintained in terms of flying hours per crew per month.
- **Navy Ship Operations** ensure that combat ready warships and military forces are continuously deployed to support the National Military Strategy in terms of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready group requirements. Ship operations costs are comprised largely of ship fuel, organizational level repairs, supplies and equipage, utility costs, and ship charter costs through the Military Sealift Command (MSC).

- **Depot Maintenance** programs fund the overhaul, repair, and scheduled upkeep of DoD weapons systems and equipment (e.g., aircraft, missiles, ships, submarines, combat vehicles, and communication and electronic equipment) at both DoD depots (public) and contractor (private) facilities.
- The **Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM)** program, previously referred to as Real Property Maintenance program, funds maintenance, repair, restoration, and modernization of buildings, structures, warehouses, roadways, runways, railway tracks, utility plants, and distribution systems.
- The **Base Operations Support (BOS)** program provides the resources to operate the military facilities that directly affect the lives of soldiers and their families located worldwide. A few of the base services include child care, fitness centers services, child and youth development services, utility operations, security guard services, and fire protection.
- **Other** programs include Marine Corps operating forces, personnel administration, recruiting and advertising, communications, transportation, etc.

The FY 2002 budget request of \$12.5 billion for the Reserve Forces is \$1.3 billion above the FY 2001 funding level of \$11.2 billion (11.6 percent). These increases will improve the readiness and training of the Reserve Components. The \$7 million reduction in ship operations is due to the unplanned loss of the USS La Moure County and a decrease in phased replacement material and spares and intermediate maintenance for surface ships.

Funding Summary:

<u>Category</u>	<u>(BA, Dollars in Millions)</u>		
	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Aircraft Operations	4,093.0	+525.8	4,618.8
Army OPTEMPO	2,615.7	+268.0	2,883.7
Ship Operations	63.9	-7.0	56.9
Depot Maintenance	1,140.5	+151.0	1,291.5
Facility Sustainment/Base Support	2,159.0	+292.8	2,451.8
Other	<u>1,129.8</u>	<u>+77.0</u>	<u>1,206.8</u>
Total	11,201.9	+1,307.6	12,509.5

POC: (b)(6)
 Comptroller Directorate: Ops
 Phone: (b)(6)

Facilities Sustainment and Base Operations Support

A. BACKGROUND

- The Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) program, formerly known as the Real Property Maintenance (RPM) program, funds day-to-day maintenance of aging facilities; restoration of facilities that have been damaged by fire, accident, or natural disasters; and alteration of facilities in order to implement new or higher standards to accommodate new functions or missions.
- The Base Operations Support (BOS) program provides the resources to operate the military facilities that directly affect the lives of soldiers and their families located worldwide. A few of the base services include child care, fitness centers services, child/youth development services, utility operations, security guard services, and fire protection.
- In the past several years, emerging requirements with compelling readiness implications caused the Services to realign funds from Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) and other readiness programs to SRM and BOS programs.

B. BUDGET STATUS

- The Department's FY 2002 Amended Budget proposes an increase of \$2,799 million for the active forces in FY 2002 above the FY 2001 enacted level. This increase should preclude the need for future supplemental funding requests and reduce the risk of funding migration from OPTEMPO and other readiness programs to fund critical "must pay" facility repair bills. The amended budget includes the following changes in FY 2002 for SRM and BOS:
 - An increase of \$487 million in SRM - Increases the funded percentage of requirements from 77 percent in FY 2001 to 89 percent in FY 2002.
 - An increase of \$2,312 million in BOS - Funds the projected increase in base level utilities; energy savings initiative to reduce DoD's peak energy demand; emergent antiterrorism requirements in order to mitigate recently recognized force protection vulnerabilities; and other critical base operations support costs.

Funding Summary:

(TOA, Dollars in Millions)

	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Army	605	1,531	+401	1,932
Navy	871	1,159	+159	1,318
Marine Corps	429	478	-60	418
Air Force	<u>1,475</u>	<u>1,548</u>	<u>- 1 3</u>	<u>1,535</u>
Total SRM	3,380	4,716	+487	+5,203
Army	4,857	4,706	+903	5,609
Navy	2,778	2,630	+510	3,140
Marine Corps	922	899	+99	998
Air Force	<u>4,569</u>	<u>4,900</u>	<u>+800</u>	<u>5,700</u>
Total BOS	13,126	13,135	2,312	15,447
Grand Total SRM and BOS	16,506	17,851	2,799	20,650

Facilities Sustainment and Base Operations Support

- The Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) program, formerly known as the Real Property Maintenance program, includes the following funding elements:
 - Maintenance - Funds day-to-day maintenance of aging facilities
 - Restoration – Funds restoration of facilities that have been damaged by fire, accident, or natural disasters or needed due to excessive age.
 - Modernization – Funds alteration of facilities in order to implement new or higher standards to accommodate new functions or missions.
- The Base Operations Support (BOS) program provides the resources to operate the military facilities that directly affect the lives of soldiers and their families located worldwide. A few of the base services include the following:
 - Logistics Services – Includes transportation services, food services, laundry and dry cleaning.
 - Engineering Services – Includes utility operations, leased spaces, environmental oversight and compliance with national and local laws.
 - Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Services – Includes gyms, libraries, craft shops.
 - Family Services – Includes child and youth development services for both military and civilian workforce.
 - Base Communications – Includes operation and maintenance of all nontactical base equipment systems communications for each installation.

Defense Health Program (DHP)

A. BACKGROUND

The DHP provides health services to military and their families, retirees and their families, and others entitled to DoD medical care. Beneficiaries receive healthcare through:

- 577 Military Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs)
- 5 private sector care (PSC) contractors administered thru 7 DoD service regions
- Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)
- 10 designated provider programs (these are managed care health plan providers established in 1981 to serve uniformed service members, retirees, and their families -- formerly known as Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities)

B. BUDGET STATUS

<u>Funding Summary:</u>	<u>(BA, Dollars in Millions)</u>			
	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<u>DHP</u>	<u>12,540.3</u>	<u>12,072.9</u>	<u>+5,826.1</u>	<u>17,899.0</u>
Operation and Maintenance	11,894.8	11,371.0	+6,194.8	17,565.8
Procurement	350.7	289.4	-21.5	267.9
Research & Development (R&D)	294.8	412.5	-347.2	65.3

The FY 2002 Amended Budget includes \$17.9 billion for DHP to provide for realistic healthcare cost estimates for the first time in recent years. Specifically, it includes:

- \$3.9 billion growth for expanded benefits for Medicare-eligible military retirees and their dependents and other benefits associated with the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act.
- \$0.3 billion increase for expected 15 percent growth in MTF pharmacy requirement.
- \$2.0 billion increase to eliminate program/funding imbalance in:
 - Managed care support contracts (12% growth),
 - Initiatives to recapture workload in MTFs, and
 - National Mail Order Pharmacy and contracted care for active duty personnel (outside the MTFs) growth.
- \$0.3 billion reduction for savings related to proposed legislation requiring the Department to pay prospective payment rates to providers for skilled nursing and hospital outpatient care.
- \$0.4 billion reduction for programs added by Congress in FY 2001 that are not funded in FY 2002, primarily R&D.

POC: (b)(6)

Comptroller Dir. Ops

Phone: (b)(6)

Drug Interdiction

A. BACKGROUND

- The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to pursue a wide range of activities in support of the counterdrug objective directed in the President's *National Security Strategy of the United States*.
- The counterdrug (CD) plans and programs of the DoD support the U.S. Government's international and multi-agency approach to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combating international traffickers, and reducing demand at home.
- The National Drug Control Strategy outlines the following five major goals:
 - Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse;
 - Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence;
 - Reduce the health and social costs of illegal drug use;
 - Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and
 - Break foreign and domestic sources of supply.
- The CD Program is funded through the Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities, Defense appropriation, which is a central transfer account (CTA) that funds all associated CD resources except for the Active Components' military personnel, military construction, and Service operating tempo (OPTEMPO). The OPTEMPO portion of the CD program is budgeted in the Services' O&M accounts but supports the President's National Counterdrug Strategy. The CTA provides inherent flexibility for the Department to respond effectively to CD threats.

B. BUDGET STATUS

<u>Categories</u>	(BA, Dollars in Millions)			
	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<u>Drug Interdiction CTA</u>	<u>997.6</u>	<u>867.1</u>	<u>-46.6</u>	<u>820.4</u>
Educate America's Youth	27.4	28.5	-3.2	25.3
Increase Safety of Citizens	113.6	114.8	-36.3	78.5
Reduce Health & Social Costs	74.2	74.2	+3.5	77.7
Shield America's Frontiers	343.4	358.5	-24.0	334.5
Break Drug Sources of Supply	439.0	291.1	+13.4	304.5
Military Construction - Forward Operating Locations (FOLs)	117.0	0	+12.5	12.5
Counterdrug OPTEMPO Costs (Service Funded)	129.0	179.9	-13.1	166.8
Airborne Reconnaissance Low (FY 2000 Sup)	30.0	-	-	-
Total	1,273.6	1,047.0	-47.2	999.7

- The FY 2002 Amended Budget:
 - Sustains Plan Colombia support at \$22.5 million, down \$91.7 million from the \$114.2 million level in FY 2001.
 - Funds \$21.1 million of additional requirements at FOLs, including \$12.5 million MILCON for the El Salvador FOL.
 - Does not continue to fund \$32.7 million of programs added by the Congress in FY 2001.

POC: (b)(6)
Comptroller Directorate: Ops
Phone: (b)(6)

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM

A. BACKGROUND

- The Environmental Restoration program reduces risks to human health and the environment at active installations and Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS).
- Ensures that DoD environmental cleanup policy conforms to existing laws and regulations.
- Funds the identification, investigation, and cleanup of past **contamination** from hazardous substances and wastes; correction of environmental damage; detection of unexploded ordnance; and demolition of unsafe buildings and structures.
- In FY 1996, DoD began a relative risk approach to environmental cleanup, enabling the prioritization of cleanup activities that pose the greatest danger to public health and safety and to the environment in the context of regulatory agreements.
- The relative risk process is now one of the key tools used by the Department in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of the cleanup program.

B. BUDGET STATUS

Funding Summary:

<u>Category</u>	<u>(TOA, Dollars in Millions)</u>			
	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Environmental Restoration (Clean-Up)	1,297	1,310	-64	1,246
Army	376	389	+1	390
Navy	283	294	-36	258
Air Force	375	375	+10	385
Defense-Wide	25	21	+2	23
Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS)	238	231	-41	190

- In FY 2001, the Congress added \$45 million to accelerate the reduction of the backlog of projects in the Formerly Used Defense Sites program.
- The decrease between FY 2001 and 2002 reflects primarily: (1) a decision to not continue accelerating reduction in the Formerly Used Defense Sites program backlog, and (2) a 2-year deferral of some lower priority Navy restoration projects.

POC: (b)(6)

Comptroller Directorate: Ops

Phone: (b)(6)

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

A. BACKGROUND

Since FY 1997, the Department has requested, and the Congress has enacted, funds for contingency operations in the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF). The OCOTF overcomes many difficulties in normal appropriations process and provides flexibility.

Examples of contingency operations are peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, enforcement of no-fly zone over Iraq, and Kosovo air campaign.

- The FY 2002 Amended Budget fully funds all ongoing contingency operations based on the level of operations in FY 2001.
- Increasing the level of operations or deployment to new contingency operations would require supplemental funding -- preferably emergency **non-DoD** offset supplemental funding.

B. BUDGET STATUS

Beginning in FY 2002, funds to finance the incremental cost of contingency operations in Southwest Asia are included in Services' accounts (\$1.2 billion, 18,000 troops) vice the OCOTF since Southwest Asia operations have become more stable and predictable.

Troop levels continue to be reduced as in-theater situations allow, with attendant cost reductions.

- Bosnia troop levels are down to approximately 3,300 from a high of 6,900 in-country.
- Kosovo troop levels are down to approximately 5,600 from the initial level of 6,200 in-country.

C. SUMMARY OF FUNDING AND TROOP LEVELS

	<u>(TOA)</u>			
	<u>(Dollars in Millions)</u>			
<u>Contingency Requirements</u>	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Bosnia	1,483.1	1,348.5	-32.9	1,315.6
Kosovo	1,803.1	1,743.7	-215.1	1,528.6
Southwest Asia	1,138.9	1,277.3	-1,277.3	
East Timor	56.8			
Total Program Requirements	4,481.9	4,369.5	-1,525.3	2,844.2
 <u>Available Financing</u>				
Appropriation Enacted/Requested		2,932.3		2,844.2
FY 2000 Carry-Forward		337.2		
FY 2000 Reappropriation by Congress		1,100.0		
Funding Available		4,369.5		

<u>Contingency Operations</u>	<u>(TROOP LEVELS)</u>			
	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Bosnia	4,600	4,000	-750	3,250
Kosovo	5,600	5,600		5,600
Southwest Asia	18,000	18,000	-18,000	
East Timor	5 0 0			
T o t a l	28,700	27,600	-18,750	8,850

POC: (b)(6)
 Comptroller Directorate: Ops
 Phone: (b)(6)

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

- The Congress enacted the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 and the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 to reduce the threat posed by the inventory of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remaining in the territory of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The legislation also designated DoD as the executive agent for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The CTR program provides funding for the destruction of nuclear; chemical weapons; biological materials; infrastructure; and prevention of the proliferation of WMD components.
- The program to date has destroyed 740 missile launchers; 87 strategic bombers, and 665 strategic missiles; and deactivated 5,586 nuclear warheads.

B. BUDGET STATUS

Funding decreases by \$39.4 million in FY 2002 below the FY 2001 level, primarily due to the cancellation of the Fissile Material Processing & Packaging program and completion of the **Mayak** Fissile Material Storage facility.

Funding Summary:

<u>Category</u>	<u>(TOA, Dollars in Millions)</u>			
	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Nuclear Weapons and Infrastructure	218.8	213.7	-16.8	196.9
Nuclear Weapon Storage, Security, Transport	161.3	160.1	-94.6	65.5
Plutonium Production Facility Elimination	37.0	32.1	+9.6	41.7
Chemical and Biological Weapon Elimination	34.0	14.5	+52.5	67.0
Other CTR Programs and Projects	<u>7 . 0</u>	22 0	<u>+9.9</u>	<u>31.9</u>
Total	458.1	442.4	-39.4	403.0

- Nuclear Weapons and Infrastructure: Includes the destruction or dismantlement of the Russian strategic capabilities to include: 90 SS-18 Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) silos and 39 road/256 rail mobile launchers; 366 **SS-17/18/19** ICBM missiles; 581 submarine launched ballistic missiles (**SLBMs**); and 612 SLBM launchers and the associated 41 strategic submarines (**SSBNs**). Also to be destroyed is associated equipment and infrastructure systems and components.
- Nuclear Weapon Storage, Security, Transport: Includes enhancements to the nuclear weapons inventory control and management system that is to be used to track the locations of weapons; improvements to security at both strategic and tactical nuclear storage sites; improvements for safety of weapons while in transit between operational sites and the destruction or dismantlement facilities.
- Plutonium Production Facility Elimination: Demolish the three existing plutonium production reactors located at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. This project also includes funding to refurbish the two existing fossil fuel facilities at Seversk and

to construct a new power station or refurbish the facility at Zheleznogorsk to provide heat and electrical energy for the region.

- Chemical and Biological Weapon Elimination: Includes the design and construction of a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuchye to eliminate nerve agent filled munitions; improvements to the site security at Russian chemical weapons nerve agent storage facilities; and continued demilitarization of former chemical weapons production facilities
- Other CTR programs and projects: Includes funding for program management; audits and examinations; defense and military contacts and other related activities.

POC: (b)(6)

Comptroller Directorate: Ops

Phone: (b)(6)

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

CC: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Macedonia

The equipment that Macedonia is buying from Ukraine is certainly not appropriate for the kind of military problem they have in their country.

Are our people weighing in with the governments of Macedonia and Ukraine to try to get them to stop?

It says that on July 8 they offloaded 18 T-55 tanks, 22 BTR-70 armored personnel carriers; have requested 30 T-55 tanks, 30 armored personnel carriers; and have already received 7 attack helicopters, 4 SU-25 fighter-bombers and 4 transport helos.

DHR:dh
071001-14

Mr. Secretary -
There was no piece of
paper associated with
this dictation. Is any
of this classified?
v/r
DeBorne
7/11 file to mtr.
Di Rita has seen
7/10

11-001-14

11-001-14

~~snowflake~~

July 5, 2001 11:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Frequent Flier Miles

248.7

What's this about frequent flier miles? Please let me know.

DHR:cd
070501-10

59201

AIDS in African armed forces, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, which brings regional military and civilian leaders together.

In Guinea, the United States has supplied more than 51 million of communications equipment, spare parts and meals to its army. A multimillion-dollar aid package is under consideration, Pentagon officials said.

Many African armed forces, faced with sharp budget cutbacks and the end of Cold War largesse, welcome the us, training and the equipment that often goes with it.

Ghana, participating in both Focus Relief and ACRI, is one of the most enthusiastic countries about the new military ties. In an interview, Defense Minister Kwame Addo-Kufuor said his troops received advanced equipment and "an extension toward democratic traditions and a better appreciation of the democratic way of life."

About 300 of the 800 soldiers being trained here come from the 64th Battalion, known for its loyalty to former president Jerry Rawlings, who led two coups, governed the country for 20 years and is widely accused of using the unit to suppress dissent and violate human rights. Rawlings left office in January.

None of the units trained in either Focus Relief or ACRI has been accused of human rights abuses. But human rights groups argue that training armies that have histories of brutality must include effective vetting of participants and have a strong focus on human rights and humanitarian law.

Janet Fleischman, Africa director of Human Rights Watch, said human rights training and vetting are the "weakest link" in the Focus Relief program "If done right, with strong human rights vetting, humanitarian law instruction and a clear mechanism for monitoring and accountability, this could be a new model," she said. "But we haven't seen if they are going to give sufficient emphasis to these fields to make it work."

Lt. Col. Glover said troops be trains receive seven hours Of human rights instruction,

with additional training incorporated into other exercises.

A senior Pentagon official said "all participating individuals are vetted for human rights violations." But in the cases of Nigeria and Ghana, where until recently the united states has scant military contact, vetting is limited to checking the names of training candidates against lists of suspected rights abusers kept by the State Department, Defense Department OK intelligence agencies.

"We don't really know who these guys are or where they come from," acknowledged a U.S. official in the region. "We have very little to match the names against because we haven't worked with this army for decades."

InsideDefense.com
Jul 3, 2001

6. Bush Administration Proposal Would Let Service Members Keep Frequent Flier Miles

The Bush administration will send to Congress this week proposed legislation that allows service members to keep certain promotional items they receive from private companies when traveling on official business, such as airline frequent flier miles.

The proposed legislation would lift existing restrictions on the use of items such as "frequent travel programs, upgrades, and access to carrier clubs or facilities" offered by major airlines. "Such items must be obtained under the same terms as provided the general Public and must be at no additional cost," according to the legislation, a copy of which was obtained by Inside the Pentagon.

"Normally, items of value received by military members pursuant to official duty belong to the government," states a "sectional analysis" of the bill approved by the administration. "Where the transportation has been obtained for the military member by the government, the ability to obtain private gain through the use of one's official position is extremely limited. Normally, promotional items are of little intrinsic value and the overall

costs to the government from tracking, accounting for, and processing such items exceeds all benefits received."

In addition to those affecting military personnel, the proposed legislation would lift restrictions on the use of such promotional items by civilian federal government employees and Foreign Service members.

The bill repeals a section of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 dealing with General Services Administration guidelines that encourage "the use of frequent traveler programs to realize cost Savings for Official travel," the analysis states.

The administration views its proposal as a way to ease restrictions on official government travel and make federal employment more attractive by letting officials keep frequent flier miles, airline miles and other promotional benefits they accrue while on government-paid travel. The measure allows government entities to adopt a practice often employed by private industry to reward those whose jobs that require extensive travel, some proponents of the legislation say.

"The administrative expense and labor-intensive burden of accounting for unsolicited items of little intrinsic value is inconsistent with efforts by the federal government to adapt to commercial practices where possible," according to the sectional analysis.

Contracts negotiated by the General Services Administration and travel arranged by U.S. Transportation Command "represent the lowest cost fares for the government . . . [and] despite repeated requests, transportation providers will not make the nominal costs of promotional items directly transferable to the government nor will they reduce the cost of transportation by such amounts," it adds. Moreover, the federal government to date has been unable to find a way "to effectively utilize" frequent flier miles benefits.

The legislative proposal would have no impact on the use of the Government Travel Card and would not increase the government's budgetary

requirements, the analysis states.

- Keith J. Costa

European Stars and Stripes July 3, 2001 Pg. 3

7. Military Wants Funds To Beef Up Security State-side

By Pauline Jelinek, The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — In April, someone stole machines used to make military identification cards from an Army building in Washington. In May, a was plastic explosives and land mines from a Navy base in California.

While American military posts overseas get the lion's share of the attention and money to fight off possible terrorist attacks, officials are taking a closer look at how secure stateside bases are as well. Commanders from coast to coast say they need more people and money to protect troops and their families from what some believe is an inevitable attack on U.S. soil.

"In the battle for anti-terrorism dollars, it is difficult for stateside bases to compete," said Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Kane of the 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base in California.

"We can't afford to sit on our hands and wait to see if one of our domestic bases is attacked, and then face the issue," said Rep. Jim Turner, D-Texas, a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

"Numerous potential vulnerabilities" at U.S. bases have been found in a General Accounting Office study commissioned by the committee's Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism and due to be completed this summer, lawmakers said. At a recent closed-door session, GAO researchers reportedly told panel members preliminarily that most of the problems could be fixed without more money, but rather with changes in how troops operate.

The study was requested after October's bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, an attack that killed 17 sailors and nearly sunk the warship. The GAO,



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

3-1-01
2001 AUG 23 AM 11:07

INFO MEMO

August 14, 2001, 11:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes* 8/15/01
SUBJECT: Frequent Flier Legislation

248.7

- This replies to your request for information regarding the InsideDefense.com article "Bush Administration Proposal Would Let Service Members Keep Frequent Flier Miles" at Tab A.
- The article accurately summarizes the proposed legislation (Tab B). If enacted, the federal government would adopt the commercial business practice of allowing travelers to retain for their personal use frequent flier programs, seat upgrades, travel club access and similar promotional benefits accrued during official travel.
- If enacted, the proposal would affect all military personnel, civilian employees and members of the Foreign Service. It has wide support throughout the Executive Branch.
- The U.S. Transportation Command proposed this legislative item. OMB has the legislation on hold for possible inclusion in an Executive Branch-wide Freedom to Manage legislative proposal. The proposal has not been submitted to Congress.
- The House of Representatives has passed a similar bill (H.R. 2456). However, the House bill includes only civilian employees; it does not include either military personnel or members of the foreign service, H.R. 2456 is pending before the Senate.

COORDINATION: NONE


Prepared By: (b)(6)

14A06-01



July 11, 2001 2:17 PM

TO: Secretary Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iceland

As we have discussed, we are trying to reduce our military presence in Iceland. We have F-16s, search and rescue, and support personnel.

DoD has been trying for several years to reduce our presence. However, we get resistance from Iceland, and then we get that resistance reflected back from the State Department.

I would appreciate it if you would engage the subject for me and get the State Department helping us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071101-15

Iceland

115010

snowflake

July 11, 2001 7:23 AM

TO: Secretary of the Army
Chief of Staff, Army
CNO
Chief of Staff, Air Force

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Language Training at the Service Academies

091.4

You might want to take a look at the foreign languages offered at the Service Academies, It might be interesting to see the number of people who are taking each of the languages offered. Our strategic review has emphasized the importance of language training.

If one looks at the world and the numbers of people who speak various languages, it strikes me that some of the languages that have been popular for previous generations may be of less relevance going into the 21st century.

You might want to see if any shift in emphasis there might be appropriate and, if so, think about how that might be accomplished,

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071101-2

115010

U12285 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4354

11/11/42

snowflake

July 12, 2001 8:20 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bruce Blair Article

RUSSIA

Please find out if this article by Bruce Blair is accurate. If it is, it merits expressing appreciation to the Russians when we meet with them.

Thanks.

Attach.

Washington Post op-ed by Bruce Blair: "Nukes: A Lesson from Russia"

DHR:dh
071201-1

7/12

Copy BTM

Col W.

P2 Task to ASD/~~ASD~~
S&T

to provide response for
Sec Def.

D. Rita

12 Jul 01

Bruce G. Blair

Nukes: A Lesson From Russia

Although the United States spends nearly \$1 billion every year to help Russia protect its vast storehouse of nuclear weapons materials from theft or sale on the black market, few Americans know how this aid helps strengthen America's own nuclear safeguards.

Russian experts at the Kurchatov Institute, the renowned nuclear research center in Moscow, recently found what appears to be a critical deficiency in the internal U.S. system for keeping track of all bomb-grade nuclear materials held by the Energy Department—enough material for tens of thousands of nuclear bombs.

Kurchatov scientists discovered a fatal flaw in the Microsoft software donated to them by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This same software has been the backbone of America's nuclear materials control system for years. The Russians found that over time, as the computer program is used, some files become invisible and inaccessible to the nuclear accountants using the system, even though the data still exist in netherworld of the database. Any insider who understood the software could exploit this flaw by tracking the "disappeared" files and then physically diverting, for a profit, the materials themselves.

After investigating the problem for many months, the Russians came to believe that it posed a grave danger and suspended further use of the software in Russia's accounting system. By their calculations, an enormous amount of Russia's nuclear material—the

equivalent of many thousands of nuclear bombs—would disappear from their accounting records if Russia were to use the flawed U.S. software program for 10 years.

Then, in early 2000, they did something they didn't have to do: They warned the United States, believing that an analogous risk must exist in the U.S. system. Although neither Los Alamos nor the U.S. Department of Energy has publicly acknowledged the possibility that innumerable files on American nuclear materials might have disappeared, the Russian warning caused shock waves at the highest levels of the Energy Department.

Unlike the Russians, who did not throw away their manual records of their nuclear stockpile—the infamous shoe box and hand-receipt system that U.S. assistance was intended to supersede—the United States has long since discarded its old written records. To reconstruct a reliably accurate accounting record, the Energy Department may need to inspect all of America's nuclear materials—a huge task that could cost more than \$1 billion and still might not detect the diversion of some material, should it have occurred.

The importance of the goodwill and trust that had grown up between American and Russian nuclear experts over years of working together in this area is clear. When the Russian scientists first discovered the computer flaw, the initial reaction in some high-level Moscow circles was to suspect an American Trojan horse, a bug planted deliberately to un-

dermine Russian security. After complaints by their Russian counterparts, scientists at Los Alamos suggested that the Russian scientists instead use a later version of the same program. Kurchatov then discovered the upgraded program not only contained the same bug (though much less virulent) but also had a critical security flaw that would allow easy access to the sensitive nuclear database by hackers or unauthorized personnel.

But trust overrode suspicion. The Russians concluded that the glitches were innocent errors, not devious traps. Thus, they feared the U.S. database, unbeknown to Americans, was not only prone to lose track of nuclear materials but was also accessible to unauthorized users. Russia reported both problems to Los Alamos, which subsequently verified the defects, as did Microsoft. Though a fix remains elusive, Kurchatov scientists also have shared a partial repair they developed.

This Russian feedback may be causing American embarrassment—U.S. officials apparently have tried to muzzle the Russians and censor their scientific papers on the fiasco—but it surely represents a high return on the American investment in Russian nuclear security. The lesson is that nuclear cooperation is a two-way street, is paying off and deserves continuing support.

The writer, a former Minuteman missile launch officer, is president of the Center for Defense Information.

There's another \$28 billion gone. I eliminated \$184 billion of the \$200 surplus, the "on budget" surplus can't be trusted as a mere \$16 billion. If a slowing only erases this margin, then we will have an on-budget deficit.

This almost-Orwellian process (standable only by "accountants or other specialists") converts actual budget surplus to the appearance of deficits. Of course, politics heavily motivates the arithmetic. With these numbers, Sen. Kent Conrad, North Dakota, the new chairman of the Budget Committee, accuses the Bush administration of driving the country into a "ditch." Worse, he says, the White House is about to "raid" the Medicare and Social

John Podesta and Beth

Federal Judges

The Senate is in the midst of examining a role that ideology should play in a presidential nomination to advise and consent to the presidential nominees. What must not be lost in that debate is the equally important question about what role ideology should play in the president's selection of judicial nominees.

As two people intimately involved in the judicial selection process in the Clinton White House, we were often criticized by our friends for not being ideological enough in selecting judges. Some of our friends believe the way to achieve balance on the federal courts was to appoint individuals who were far to the left as the conservative judges that President Reagan were to the right.

President Clinton did not march down that path. He believed, and we concur, that federal judges should not be used as the point

snowflake

July 12, 2001 11:10 AM

TO: Lisa Bronson
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Letter—Macedonia

Please get a letter *drafted* from me to the Minister of Defense of Macedonia expressing concern about all the tanks and armored personnel carriers they are buying when those are not the kinds of equipment that are likely to be useful with respect to the specific problems they have.

It makes the countries that are helping concerned that the resources are going in the wrong direction.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071201-19

Macedonia

1250101

U12401 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4357

snowflake

June 25, 2001 1:03 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lost Day Rate

Let's require that every one of our units give us a "lost day" rate like Paul O'Neill suggested, and let's think of starting to put it on some sort of a web so everyone can see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062501-21

200.1

25 Jun 01

snowflake

July 13, 2001 5:34 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: LT(jg) James Deane, Jr.

Here is a letter from Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver about her husband. Her husband, Jim, was a classmate of mine in Naval flight training and a very close friend. I hope that you will raise this issue on your trip to China.

Regards.

Attach.

7/12/01 Shaver ltr to Asst. Sec State Jim Kelly

DHR:dh
071301-19

China

1352101

NANCY PARDO
ROBBINS & ASSOCIATES, LLC
SUITE 830
333 WEST WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, IL 60606
TEL. 312-609-1195 FAX 312-609-1175
E-MAIL: NPARDO@RUMSFELD.COM

Date: July 13, 2001
To: Arlene Nestel
Company: OSD
Fax #: 703-693-0100
From: Nancy Pardo
Total # of Pages: 3

For SecDef from Dr. Shaver. This came by fax, so there are no enclosures included with the copy.

Tks,
NP

Sin,

Copies provided to Larry Di Rita
Adm. Giambastiani

Arlene

11/3
11/00

1-d

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/4360

Pardo

Jul 13 01 08:04a



FBI

8 10 1 North 53rd Place
Paradise Valley, AZ 85253-25 13
July 12, 2001

The Honorable **Jim Kelly**
Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. **Department** of State
2201 c **Street**, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Kelly:

I **have** been given your **address** by Ann Mills **Griffiths** and some **POW/MIA** family membm. **This** letter is a plea for your help.

I am the "widow" of Lt. jg **James Brayton Deane, Jr., USN**, the copilot of a **P4M** Martin **Mercator** electronic countermeasure plane shot down off the coast of Shanghai August 23 (22nd U.S. time), 1956. **Although** he was **declared deceased** by the Navy in 1957, intelligence reports of that **era**, declassified only in 1992-1993, **reported** that my **husband** and one other **crewman** were rescued and imprisoned in China. The reports of his whereabouts **continued** for two years.

In 1990 the 1956 head of Chinese Air **Defense** **confirmed** to a **Chinese** friend of mine that the PRC had indeed captured two "pilots" from the **P4M** plane. In **March, 2000**, I was told by **Mme Li Xiaolin**, head of the **American** sector in the **Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries**, that they could not help me, as all the information about my husband was still "highly classified" and "vital to the **national** security of China".

Lt. jg **Deane** was a member of **VQ-1**, the same squadron which flew the **EP3** to **Hainan**. **Unlike** the crew of that plane, he was not so fortunate. Dead or dive, he is still in China.

I am asking that, as you assist **Secretary Powell** to prepare for his **imminent** trip to China, you **urge** him to **raise** the issue of my husband's case with **President Jiang**, and to also **deliver** my 1999 letter to **Jiang**. I also ask that this case be raised again during **President Bush's** visit in **October**.

I do believe that there is, at **least**, a small but **reasonable** chance that my husband **Could** still be alive, and that his case should be given the maximum **weight** and **attention** from the **government** he so valiantly **served**.

-2-

I am enclosing some background for further details, Ann Mills Griffiths and Secretary Rumsfeld, an old friend of my husband, are both familiar with Lt. jg Deane's case, and I of course, will provide any information or assistance. I will be very grateful for your help.

Sincerely,

Beverly Deane Shaver, M.D.
formerly Mrs. James Brayton Deane, Jr.

tel: (b)(6) fax: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Enclosures.

CC: Ms. Ann Mills Griffiths
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
Mr. Alan Liotta, Defense POW/MIA Office

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

2001 JUL 24 AM 11: 07

WASHINGTON

July 20, 2001

Dear Don:

Thank you for your July 13 note forwarding Beverly Deane Shaver's letter regarding your classmate and friend, Lt. jg James Deane, Jr., JSN. When I go to China, I will raise both his case and the overall issue of POW/MIA cooperation. I will urge the Chinese to work with your Office of POW/Missing Personnel which I understand will have representatives in China in August.

Sincerely,



Colin L. Powell

The Honorable
Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

U12812 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4363

069
0960

snowflake

June 29, 2001 7:17 AM

TO: Lawrence Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3
SUBJECT: Assistance from Senator McCain

SECDEFHASSEEN

JUL 06 2001

Please make sure we get McCain's help on depot maintenance and base closings. He offered it in the hearing yesterday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
06290 I-2

~~Stedler~~
July 5 4:00 p.m.
We will. He'll also be of help on Freedom to Manage because such reform issues are his focus.

Larry

→ Copy To: Powell Moore ASD/LR
Tim Haynes GC

635

29 Jun 01

U12498 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/4364

October 25, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Doug Feith

SECRET HAS BEEN

OCT 29 2001

SAS
10/25
9/10/25

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Future Planning

384

You have asked the question on "what we should have done" to mitigate the effects of a major "event" in the near future. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), who works for me, did some calculations to determine the impact of a variety of events, as provided below"

10 kt nuclear weapon	100,000 fatalities
10 phosgene tank cars	200,000 fatalities
100 kg anthrax from a crop duster	1,000,000 fatalities

What should we do NOW to prepare and mitigate such an event? Obviously, we should be and are working on intelligence and the means to prohibit the introduction of such capabilities within the United States. But, in addition, we should be taking the following steps:

Education of the public on what actions they should take (this needs to be done very carefully).

Assign responsibility for actions, public relations, interagency coordination, etc.

Develop a plan of action, for probable sequence of events and decisions required.

Establish a place for decision making, ensuring that it is a survivable operations center (maybe one in each major city)

Training of local authorities and first responders in an environment that they would be expected to operate.

Have legal processes in place for population control and quarantine measures.

Exercise the government and local authorities in a simulated, but realistic environment.

ACTION: We cannot do all of this after the fact. We need to put someone in charge of pulling these ideas together-or give the task to Tom White.

290CT01

October 30, 2001 7:43 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Future Planning

384

You may have misunderstood my request. My request was two-fold. First, assume there is to be a major WMD event, killing not thousands but tens or hundreds of thousands in the next 6-12 months.

My two questions were as follows:

1. First, what are you doing in your areas of responsibility to be prepared for that? To deter it, to defend against it, to deal with it if it were to occur and to mitigate the impact.
2. The second portion of my question is thinking outside of your area of responsibility, what do you think others ought to be doing.

Here is your memo back. Please respond along that line for me.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/25/01 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Future Planning

DHR:dh
103001-7



Please respond by _____

300CT01

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 2, 2001
SUBJECT:

Take a look at this memo I received from a friend about missile defense. Do you think we ought to be doing some of these things he recommends? Let's discuss it at the next meeting.

Steve, make sure it's on the agenda.

DHR/azn
040201.26
Attach.

373.24

2 Apr 02

U12581 /02

March 28, 2001

Mr. Secretary,

I wrote you a paper on 9 March which discussed accelerating the National Missile Defense Systems into a family of systems providing a Global Missile Defense. That paper recommended that if you expanded the current NMD concept into a Global Missile Defense capability, it should be done along the lines of a Manhattan Project-like approach incorporating a streamlined acquisition process. Since the original paper, I've given this more thought and would like to briefly share some of these ideas with you:

- 3 Oversight: Establish a small oversight office headed by a three star or a three star equivalent that reports directly to SECDEF or DEPSECDEF. This will eliminate the layers and the incessant drills initiated by the various OSD staff elements.

The staff for the oversight office should be kept small so that it does not become a bureaucratic layer between the Three Star and the subordinate Program Manager-s (i.e., keep only the necessities: Public Affairs, Congressional liaison, legal, etc.).

- 3 Separate Program Offices: Establish Program Management offices that represent four major critical functions of missile defense i.e., Sensors, Boost-Phase Engagement, Mid-course/Terminal Engagement and Battle Management. Each program manager would be a two-star or equivalent reporting directly to the three-star. The program offices would be organized as follows:

- The Sensor Program Manager would be responsible for SBIR development, UEWR/IFIC's improvements and new missile defense sensor developments to include space-based.

- The Boost-Phase Engagement Program Management Office would include the current Navy theater-wide program (including SPY radar upgrades, internal BMC4I and communications); the airborne laser program and future space-based missile defense weapons.
 - Establish a third program office that combines the functions of Mid-course and Terminal Engagements. This office would essentially be the current NMD JPO (the Ground-Based Interceptor, Ground-Based X-Band Radar, internal BMC4I and Communications) and the current THAAD Program office.
 - The fourth program management office would be responsible for Battle Management which consists of the overarching BMC4I functions necessary to establish the integration, standards and interoperability required for a Global Missile Defense.
- First Order Imperatives (or rules): Establish the rules that will create an environment for good management and initiative (using your guidance, I'll keep the rules under ten).
- First, allow room for test failures, if my memory still serves me, I remember that Nike Zeus had 40 failures in 160 flight tests and that the Sprint/Spartan intercept tests had 5 failures out of 55 firings (this was accomplished after 111 developmental firings).
 - The Oversight and the Program Management Offices must be unencumbered from non-programmatic issues such as treaty, policy, etc.

In other words, they must be protected from the politics that surround Global Missile Defense. Give these problems to someone else.

- Third, establish a measurement system for periodic SECDEF IPR's; this should consist of a set of metrics for schedule and cost variance, technical progress, and risk mitigation activities.
 - Return the lower tier systems (e.g. PAC-3, MEADS, Navy area-wide, etc.) to the Services and fence the dollars for these systems to prevent the Services from using them as bill-payers.
 - Fifth, streamline the acquisition process: Bring the testers into the programs up front (make them part of the solution rather than the problem); stabilize the program funding (eliminate the internal funding cuts, across the board taxes, and the resulting re-baselining); and stabilize the people (select the best of class and keep them, as a minimum, through major milestone decisions).
 - Finally, there must be close management of the requirements creep and the changes associated with the user community. For this program, I think we should walk away from the current CRD, ORD, world-wide staffing and JROC process, make the requirements process responsive to your guidance and to program stability.
- Those are my thoughts hope they are useful.. . again, I thank you for the opportunity to correspond.

snowflake

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rugsfeld
DATE: April 2, 2001
SUBJECT:

Please explain to me what this memo on General and Flag Officers holding multiple positions is about.

DHR/azn
040201.27
Attach.

2106344

2 April 01

U12582 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4371

In accordance with the reporting requirements outlined in § 721(d)(2), the following table reports the number of general and flag officers who have simultaneously held both a position external to that officer's armed force and another position not external to that officer's armed force.

Commander in Chief, United States Space Command
 Commander, Air Force Space Command
 Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
 Commander, Air Mobility Command
 Director, Command Control Systems, J-6, United States Space Command
 Director, Communications and Information, Air Force Space Command
 Deputy Commander, Canadian NORAD Region
 Commander, 722 Support Squadron, Air Combat Command
 Assistant Chief of Staff, CJI-5, United Nations Command/Combined Forces
 Commander, Marine Forces Korea
 Command/United States Forces Korea
 Chief of Staff, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe
 Deputy Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Europe
 Commander, United States Defense Forces, Iceland, United States Atlantic Command
 Commander, Fleet Air, Keflevik

Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Commander, Air North
 Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe
 Commander, United States Forces Japan
 Commander, 5th Air Force
 Deputy Commander in Chief, United Nations Command Korea/ Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea
 Commander, 7th Air Force
 Commander, Air South
 Commander, 16th Air Force
 Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command
 Commander, 11th Air Force
 Director, Joint Information Operations, USSPACECOM
 Commander, Air Intelligence Agency
 Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Commandant of the Marine Corps
 Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces United States Forces Korea
 Commanding General, 8th Army
 Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Naval Operations
 Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
 Commander, United States Naval Forces Europe
 Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern
 Commander, SIXTH Fleet
 Commander, Striking Fleet, Atlantic
 Commander, SECOND Fleet
 Commander, Submarine, Allied Command, Atlantic
 Commander, Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet
 Commander, United States Naval Forces and Middle East Force/ United States Central Command
 Commander, FIFTH Fleet
 Commander, Maritime Air Forces, Mediterranean
 Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean
 United States Pacific Command Representative, Guam
 Commander, United States Naval Base Guam
 Commander, Allied Submarine Force Mediterranean
 Commander, Submarine Group EIGHT
 Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command, South Center, Larissa, Greece
 Deputy Commander, U.S. Marine Forces, Europe


Status of General and Flag Officers




11-L-0559/OSD/4373





Change in AC End Strength versus G/FO Authorizations



Combined Strength per G/FO




Joint Change in Authorizations



Joint numbers are pure in that they are reduced by 22 dual hat billets



Joint Impact: Combined per G/FO





Study Observations and Recommendations

- Since 1980 G/FO population has been reduced by **22%** from **1141** to **889**.
- Since 1985, Joint G/FO population has been reduced by **18%** from **290** to **237**.
- Joint G/FO requirements reduces Service **G/FO** population by another **27 %** from **889** to **674**.
- Ratio of **G/FO** to Service End Strength in **2001** is statistically the same as it was in **1980**.
- This leaves Services **401 G/FO's** below their requirements.

snowfiak

TO: Steve Cambone
Adm. JJ Quinn

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 9, 2001

SUBJECT: **China**

I want to make sure no U.S. military ship or airplane goes into the People's Republic of China for the next 30 days **without** my knowing about it beforehand and having an opportunity to stop it. That includes port calls or CODELs or whatever.

DHR/azn
040901.05

China

9 Apr 01

U12585 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4379

April 10, 2001 8:34 AM

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3
SUBJECT: Zakheim Memo

Please take a look at this memo from Dov Zakheim, dated back in early January, and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
1 //O 1 Zakheim Memo: "Organization"

DHR:dh
041001-32

020 D&D

10 Apr 01

U12584 /02

ORGANIZATION

- There are three *major* organizational **issues**—the **two** we discussed this morning and one other,
 - **The possibility of two DepSecs**
 - Two new positions **most** frequently discussed at DOD:
 - Assistant **Secretary** (Space)
 - Assistant **Secretary** (Transformation)
 - Space Force
- Regarding the **DepSecs**, you could simply rename the USD (Acquisition and Technology) which is a Level II position, **like DepSecDef**.
 - **One** Deputy could manage **Research**, Programs and Resources
 - One Deputy could oversee Policy, Personnel and Public Affairs
- Regarding the **Assistant Secretaries**, unless you go to Congress, **you** would have to eliminate a **current Presidential-level** appointment **for** each new Assistant Secretary you wish to create.
- Your **best** bet for finding slots is to reorganize the policy office, where **there are four presidential** appointees below the Under Secretary—three **ASD's** and the Principal Deputy **Under** Secretary (Policy). A brief **overview**:
 - Principal **Deputy** USDP

Currently held by Jim Bodner, who doubles as Bill Cohen's special assistant. The PDUSD works special project?; and troubleshoots. Paul **Wolfowitz** created the job for Scooter Libby by upgrading my old job (Deputy Under Secretary for Planning and Resources), which managed the link between policy, **programs** and acquisition, produced the Defense Guidance, and was **a troubleshooter** for **USDP**. Paul also gave Scooter the additional responsibility for the former CIS states and Eastern Europe when the Cold **War** ended. Walt Slocombe then reassigned much **of** what Libby was doing to. . .

- Assistant Secretary (**Strategy** and **Threat** Reduction)-Ted Warner

Walt Slocombe also gave **Warner** the part of the old **ISP** that was responsible for nuclear forces and proliferation/counter-proliferation. **Warner** also manages the Defense Policy Board.

ISA is not what you knew it as when you ran **DoD** last time.

DSZ/3 Jan/01/17:30

-- Assistant Secretary (ISA)--Frank **Kramer**

This now includes **all** the regions except **Latin America**, which **was transferred** to the Assistant Secretary for Special Ops and Low **Intensity Conflict (SOLIC)**.

-- Assistant Secretary (**SOLIC**)—**Brian Sheridan**

Only ASD **to** have control of own budget line, Latin Americans are **annoyed** that they are viewed only **through** the prism of the drug war. This shop also **has control over** peacekeeping and **humanitarian** affairs issues.

A possible fix is to provide for a senior space **person** and a senior “**transformation**” person:

Space involves real **programs**—both r&d and acquisition--and budgets. “**Transformation**” is a policy. Therefore, there should be an ASD (space) in the office of **the Under Secretary** for Acquisition and Technology (A&T, former the Research and Engineering **Office**) and a Deputy Under **Secretary** (Plans, **Strategy and Transformation**) in **the** Office of the Under Secretary for Policy.

To free up an **ASD** slot for the new ASD (Space), I recommend that you eliminate the presidential level PDUSDP—as you know. **I** am rather sour on principal deputies anyway—and simply have the **USDP's deputy** be a **DUSD** (Policy).

As for transformation, it simply would be a waste **of** a valuable ASD **slot**. As a policy focus, **transformation** could be **just** as effectively supported by a DUSD reporting directly to USDP. So as **to ensure** that transformation permeates departmental planning, this DUSD could also be assigned **the** contingency planning guidance, and the national defense strategy—both mandated by law, as well as the **strategy and** planning portions **of** the Defense Planning **Guidance**.

The ASD for Strategy and Threat reduction previously responsible for the latter tasks, would continue to oversee policy **relating** to Russia and the **CIS**; Missile Defense and Nuclear Weapons policy; Threat Reduction and Non-Proliferation, including arms control. That is a large **enough** menu for any ASD,

- Finally, as **we** discussed, the Space Force should be created as an **adjunct** of USAF, much as the Army Air Corps **originated**

snowflake

April 10, 2001 6:23 AM

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Khalilzad's Comments

Here are some interesting thoughts from Zal Khalilzad that you might want to think about in the context of the paper.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/2/01 Khalilzad Memo: "National Security Strategy Review"

DHR:dh
041001-12

381

10 Apr 02

U12585 /02

Handwritten notes:
~~SECRET~~
SC
RSD
2/4

To: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Zai Khalilzad
Date: January 2, 2001
Subject: National Security Strategy Review

The Bush Administration is taking office at a unique and critical moment for our national role in the world and our national security. Today, American power and position, while unrivaled, will not automatically be sustained, but will be deeply affected both by what we do and do not do and by how others respond.

We face many challenges. While the Soviet Union is gone, Russia has not **been** anchored in the West. Other countries, notably China and India, are seeking to enhance their status as great powers. Several important regional powers such as Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia are in a state of flux. What happens *within* these countries will be critical if not decisive in determining what they do abroad. Hostile states are challenging international norms in several regions. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, threats to our critical economic and military **infrastructure** including our **space-**based systems and international terrorism are creating new challenges which will have significant impact on America's interests and those of our friends and allies.

At the same time, advances in technology are causing one of history's more profound revolutions. Globalization is transforming the nature of international life – not only in finance and economics but, increasingly, in politics and security. Particular social, political, and religious forces are having a growing impact on global life. Global politics is increasingly being shaped by non-governmental organizations and by private sector and financial entities that transcend traditional state borders. For most countries, sovereignty is eroding – in some places, like the European Union, by design elsewhere as an unintended consequence of the digital age. Resentment of globalization is on the rise and has produced increased anti-Americanism, as Washington is perceived as its architect and primary beneficiary. This trend hampers efforts at building new global trading and financial institutions that are necessary to expand and spread prosperity around the world,

Newer concerns, like cross-border crime and illegal narcotics trafficking, the challenge of mass migration, the rise of religious extremism, humanitarian disasters, failed states and **warlordism**, environmental degradation and the spread of disease are all part of the new international agenda. There is no national consensus on how we should balance the pursuit of our own traditional interests and these newer international concerns. Our inability to ignore these issues and the weakness or the poor use of non-military instruments has resulted in the overuse of our military to deal with some of these problems,

American power and will cannot suffice to meet and master the entire array of global demands that challenge U.S. interests and values and those of our friends and allies. How do we prioritize among these challenges? Selective global leadership by the

United States, coupled with strengthened and revitalized alliances is the best long-term vision.

In my judgment, America should seek to preclude the rise of a global rival or a hostile global alliance, while at the same time transforming its democratic alliances by focusing them on new threats, challenges, and opportunities. Together with democratic allies, we will have unparalleled ability to respond to tomorrow's demands. Therefore, maintaining, strengthening and extending these alliances is essential to America's future and should be the bedrock of U.S. engagement abroad. The national security review should focus on three key priorities:

- Fashioning ways to shift more of the burden of maintaining international stability to our allies. ✓
- Developing a new architecture for our alliances and posture in Asia to ensure long term stability. More than any other critical region, Asia appears to have the potential for a wide range of basic changes. ✓
- Reducing the demand on our military. Our military is over-used. It needs to be transformed. ✓

In addition, the review should deal with a number of other questions including:

- How do we integrate Russia, China and India into the current international system?
- How do we encourage the transition of the major states in flux to responsible members of the international community?
- What policies should we follow towards regional troublemakers such as Iraq?
- How can we be more selective in use of US military force? ✓
- How do we limit and mitigate the backlash against globalization? ✓
- How do we build political support – both with Congress and the American people for the new strategy? ✓

snowflake

April 10, 2001 7:54 AM

T O : Rudy de Leon
CC: *PAMC WOLFOWITZ*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Savings

Would you please take a look at this memo from Dov and tell me which ones you think we ought to send to the appropriate people to get done and get started, or at least get investigated.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/8/01 Memo from Zakheim: "Point Paper on Savings"

DHR:dh
041001-22

110.01

10 APR 02

U12587 /02

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 
SUBJECT: Point Paper on Savings
DATE: 8 March 2001
c c : The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Steve Cambone told me that you were seeking my advice/suggestions regarding savings. I attach a point paper that lays out

- several ideas for achieving economies/efficiencies
- a timetable for implementing these ideas
- an assessment of their viability
- an indication of metrics or measures for evaluating their success

I have drawn upon the materials generated by

- Bill Cohen's Task Force on Defense Reform, on which I served, and regarding which you were briefed by Arnold Punaro;
- materials sent to me by Phil Odeen; Bob Hale (former CBO colleague and Air Force ASD/FM); and Arnold Punaro
- materials generated by Rich Hearney and his BENS (Business Executives for National Security);

and other ideas that I have picked up along the way, including a few of my own.

Nevertheless, please note that since I've not been confirmed, I am a staff of one, so that any errors of commission or omission (and I know what follows is far from complete) are mine alone.

A BLUEPRINT FOR ACHIEVING ECONOMIES AND EFFICIENCIES IN DOD, FY 2001-07

STREAMLINING THE STAFF

One of the most important points that the Defense Reform Task Force emphasized to Bill Cohen was that he needed to get his own house in order (i.e. OSD, JCS, and Defense Agencies) in order to be really credible with respect to other reforms. That advice remains pertinent. The following paragraphs outline streamlining that you could initiate and support.

OSD and JCS Structure and Activities

- Set a timetable to **eliminate two OSD layers by end of FY 02**
 - Candidate layers for elimination: offices with term “principal” in them: Principal Deputy Assistant and Under Secretaries (unless Congressionally mandated) and Principal Directors
 - Exception: “Principals” who are dual-hatted with another job, in which case, only the staff support for “principal” activity would be eliminated. For example, PDASD/ISA is also DASD (African affairs). The PDASD would retain his/her dual hat, but would be supported only by the African affairs staff.
- Refocus OSD/JCS activities with goal of **reducing OSD and JCS staffs each by 15% by end FY02**
 - Task Comptroller/PA&E, with J-8 supporting, to identify duplicative OSD/JCS tasks by end FY 01; work to be done during summer review (example of duplicative tasks: J-5 country desk officers and Policy country desk officers; JCS legislative liaison and OSD legislative liaison)
 - Announce that DepSecDef will adjudicate disagreements between Comptroller/PA&E and J-8 in order to meet 15% reduction requirement
 - **To facilitate the above effort**, have Comptroller working with J-1 or J-8
 - a) establish actual costs of operating OSD—to report back in time for summer program review
 - b) publish numbers of all individuals conducting staff work—to report back in time for summer program review

Feasibility Assessment: The OSD changes can be more easily implemented, since they take place in your own office, but the JCS changes should not be too difficult to implement either.

MANAGING DEFENSE AGENCIES

- Create a Defense Business Board
 - Board would act as sounding board for management initiatives
 - Board would provide inputs from corporate and financial world
 - All members recruited from outside USG

Outsourcing Services

This has become a motherhood idea. In practice, such efforts have been fraught with difficulties:

- a cumbersome A-76 process (the A076 system nominally competes the government against outside bidders for a particular contract). Critics argue that A-76 process is so slow that many competitions are cancelled before they are completed. In addition, many critics say the process is rigged in favor of government bids.
- civil service union opposition-the unions oppose contracting out for obvious reasons. Political pressure has at times reversed A-76 decisions in favor of private contractors.

DoD cannot revise the A-76 process on its own. It appears, however that DoD can contract out entire functions, without resorting to A-76 competition. Examples include the Army's Logistics Modernization Contract and the Navy's/USMC Intranet Service Contract for the entire information technology support function.

Candidates for similar major contracts include:

- the entire payroll system for each of the Services (no contractor will take on the entire DoD payroll system);
- payroll for each of the Defense Agencies (we need to examine whether all DoD Agencies could be serviced by one contract);
- housing: military housing should be replaced by private housing, rather than be endlessly upgraded. Moreover, those who live in DoD housing have no incentive to cut back on energy and other utility costs. DoD should expand the current plan for the services to enter into partnerships with private contractors to build,

maintain and operate housing projects for military personnel. Services should report progress on a half-yearly basis. Progress can be measured in the number of family units that have moved from military to private housing.

- 9 Defense communications: other than for secure communications, all others should be contracted out.
- 9 Travel: DoD has only begun to re-engineer its travel system. The entire travel support system should be outsourced to several contractors who would bid on portions of the overall system (e.g. for each of the Services and for Defense Agencies etc.)
- 9 DoD Commissaries.
 - Outsourcing the entire commissary system at once is probably too hard to do
 - There will be opposition on the Hill
 - It might be best to outsource commissary support on a regional basis
 - **To that end, initiate a pilot program for the National Capitol Region to take effect by end FY02; begin contracting out process immediately**
 - **At same time accept USMC offer to conduct their own pilot program with one of their commissaries**
 - Have OSD/Comptroller evaluate results in time for a decision on how to move forward in FY03
- 9 Logistics: DLA is among the largest and most unwieldy defense agencies. Moreover, many logistics related activities, whether carried out within or outside DLA, are better and more efficiently implemented by commercial firms. Activities that could be outsourced include:
 - repairs. Contractor logistics support could be expanded to fielded systems, as was the case with MSE radios and the KC-10.
 - reduce inventories by shifting to prime vendor support for all commodities. DLA has tested and proved this concept, which will reduce carrying costs and increase cash for the revolving industrial funds.
 - rely more heavily on commercial carriers for airlift.
 - replace CRAF (civil reserve air fleet) concept with leasing schemes, especially for new wide bodied aircraft.