6. POV accidents continue to be the number one killer of Army soldiers. FY01 had an eleven percent reduction in POV fatalities. For FY92 to FY01, POV accidents accounted for approximately 60-65 percent of the total Army accident fatalities. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY01.



7. We continue to make progress in reducing workplace injuries and illnesses involving The Army's civilian workforce. In FY 93, over 28 of every 1,000 workers lost time from the job as a result of working conditions. In FY 01, this number had dropped to approximately 18 of every 1,000 workers. The graph below depicts year-end lost workday cases and the rate or cases per 100,000 employees from FY92 to FY01.



snowflake

October 30, 2002 7:07 AM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Smallpox

Attached is a memo from my doctor in Chicago about a possible smallpox product you might want to look into.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/29/02 Oyer ltr to SecDef re: Smallpox Therapy

DHR:dh
103002-1

Please respond by 11/22/02

To Dr. Tomberg –
Plo. provide response for me.
You should communicate w/ others in FHP-MR, and Dr. Johnson-Winegar's office if a more technical assessment of this possible product will yield a more complete response to Sec Def –
Plo. respond by 11/15 Thanks Bill

790

30OCT02

Associates In Internal Medicine
211 East Chicago Avenue, Suite 1050
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(b)(6),(b)(7)(F)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 30 2002

Joseph H. Skom, M.D.
Joan C. Mullan, M.D.
Eric W. Terman, M.D.
Michael D. Zielinski, M.D.
Sean D. O'Connor, M.D.

Cardiovascular Disease
Neil J. Stone, M.D.

Endocrinology/Diabetes
David S. Oyer, M.D.
Richard S. Crawford, M.D.

October 29, 2002

Re: Smallpox therapy

Dear Donald,

I apologize for bothering you with your busy schedule. Through a bizarre act of circumstances, I have learned of a company out west that claims to have a lotion that can be applied to the skin and kills the small pox virus. They were looking for a treatment for herpes and supposedly had access to small pox and discovered that in nude mice the lotion prevented death from small pox. They will be in NYC Wed through Friday this week, and want to link with a major pharmaceutical firm to pursue research and production.

I heard about this through my good friend Craig Goldberg in NYC, an ex-investment banker now advising the secret service, Secretary of the Treasury and the White House on white-collar crime and securities abuse. Because I was just at a meeting with a director of research at Merck about a diabetes drug, Craig gave my name to Mike Guidry (?), a government operative who was approached by the small company. Supposedly, Mike Guidry presented the information to the military, which expressed interest, and to Orin Hatch, but no connection with a drug company was made. Claiming only patriotic motivation, Mike is looking for a name at a drug company. The companies mentioned as good candidates were Pfizer and Johnson and Johnson. The company should be American.

The infectious disease friend I spoke to thinks it unlikely a lotion could work, especially for inhalation small pox. So I apologize if the small company is making false claims. But it seems that even a long shot is worth pursing.

Do you have any drug company names that you would want me to give Mike? If not, I will cold call people at Pfizer and Johnson and Johnson.

Regards,

David Oyer MD

David Oyer, MD

cc: LD

snowflake

January 21, 2002 12:30 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

SUBJECT: Detainees

I am ready to send those Brits back to Britain, and if we have any Canadians, send them back to Canada. Please look into it and see if there is any good reason not to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012102-28

Please respond by 01/25/02

DSD

21 Jan 02

January 29, 2002 11:43 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Port Availability

Do we have a good study going of port availability around the world—ports we might need to use for sealift in the event the way ahead involves some other countries?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-16

560

Please respond by _____

29 Jan 02

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

2002 FEB -6 PM 1:26

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-158-02
6 February 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Port Availability

- Mr. Secretary, you asked "Do we have a good study going of port availability around the world—ports we might need to use for sealift in the event the way ahead involves some other countries." (TAB)
- My staff, the geographic combatant commands and USTRANSCOM maintain worldwide airfield and seaport characteristics and imagery. We continually update and review data collection activities to ensure the most current assessments are available to meet future operations. We have identified and are reviewing the regional ports that might be needed to support future sealift operations.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM G.S. Holder, USN; Director for Logistics; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6511 U02148 /02

TAB

January 29, 2002 11:43 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Port Availability

Do we have a good study going of port availability around the world—ports we might need to use for sealift in the event the way ahead involves some other countries?

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DHR:dh
012902-16

Please respond by _____

snowflake

12/18 1330

10/21

September 27, 2002 2:58 PM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Definitions

Please do me a favor and ask Tom Shanker what distinction he was referring to in terms of preemption, preventative self-defense and anticipatory self-defense.

Jim, I got asked this question. Is there some legal answer to it that I ought to be aware of?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092702-11

Please respond by 10/11/02

U02166 /03

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2002, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Legal Distinction Between Preemption, Preventive Self-Defense, and Anticipatory Self-Defense

- You wrote me a note asking whether there is any significant difference between these terms.

- In ordinary usage, "pre-emptive" and "preventive" convey slightly different meanings.

  - William Safire's recent column ("Rope-A-Dope," NYT Mag., October 13, 2002) explained that the terms connote a difference in the imminence of threat. A "pre-emptive" action responds to a more imminent threat than does "preventive" action. (See ~~Tab B~~ RED TAB.)

  - The DoD Dictionary of Military Terms recognizes this distinction. It defines a "preemptive attack" as one "initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent." It defines a "preventive war" as one "initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk."

- International law recognizes no difference between "preemption," "preventive self-defense," and "anticipatory self-defense." These terms all refer to the right to use force based on the existence of an imminent threat but prior to an armed attack.

  - "Anticipatory self-defense" is the classic term for the right under customary international law to use force in the face of an imminent threat. The 1837 "*Caroline* Case" established the right of anticipatory self-defense. (For a more detailed discussion of anticipatory self-defense and the *Caroline* case, see the Info Memo at ~~Tab A~~ GREEN TAB.)

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381

16 OCT 02

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  - NSS emphasizes, however, that the concept of "imminent threat" must be adapted to "the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries" (*i.e.*, the threat need not be as imminent if there is an increased risk of occurrence and an increased magnitude of harm).

COORDINATION: None

The New York Times
nytimes.com

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October 13, 2002

Rope-a-Dope

By WILLIAM SAFIRE

In casting a heavy aspersion on Saddam Hussein's word, the presidential press secretary, Ari Fleischer, said, "He has a history of playing *rope-a-dope* with the world, while all the time developing a more powerful punch."

That must have been a head-scratcher in Baghdad. *rope-a-dope* is the latest boxing phrase to enter politics, following in the grand tradition of man in the arena, throw in the towel and Theodore Roosevelt's "My hat's in the ring. The fight is on and I'm stripped to the buff."

A week before the White House usage, Harold Brown, who was Jimmy Carter's defense secretary, predicted to his interviewer Jim Lehrer that Saddam "is going to try a *rope-a-dope* strategy of the kind he did during 1998, finally throwing the inspectors out."

The coiner of *rope-a-dope*, and the fighter who became the pugilistic technique's best-known practitioner, is Muhammad Ali. The first report using the phrase was from the New York Times sportswriter Dave Anderson, who put it in his lead from Las Vegas on May 15, 1975: "With a warning about using '*rope-a-dope*' strategy, Muhammad Ali will defend his world heavyweight title tomorrow night." He quoted the fighter: "I'm just gonna go out and take his best shots. I might just put the *rope-a-dope* on him."

Anderson, whose classic prose places him in the heavyweight class of Red Smith, vividly remembers the coinage scene: "Ali had been working out. He was wearing trunks and sweating and recalled the strategy he had used the year before in Zaire, when he took the throne from George Foreman." (That was the "rumble in the jungle," not to be confused with the subsequent Ali-Joe Frazier "thrilla in Manila.")

"In the Zaire fight," Anderson recalls, "Ali leaned back on the ropes absorbing punches, letting Foreman wear himself out pummeling Ali's arms and ribs. By the eighth round, Foreman was exhausted, and Ali knocked him out." The phrase was not a meaningless rhyming reduplication: "The ropes were his allies, and his opponent was the dope."

In its current metaphoric extension, diplomatic or military *rope-a-dope* means "a defense that frustrates and ultimately exhausts an offense until it is so weakened as to become vulnerable." The Bush press secretary, though redundant in his use of *while* with *all the time*, adroitly fixed the phrase in a boxing context to those unfamiliar with it in his conclusion of "developing a more powerful punch."

PREVENTING PRE-EMPTION

We often hear of *pre-emptive strikes* and *preventive war*; we rarely hear of *preventive strikes* or *pre-emptive war*. Why? What is the difference between the adjectives *pre-emptive* and *preventive*?

(Before we get to that, what difference is there between *preventive* and *preventative*? They are used interchangeably as both adjective and noun, but to establish a useful distinction, I suggest *preventive* as the adjective and the one with the extra syllable as the noun. Thus: "In *preventive* medicine, doctors often suggest aspirin as a *preventative*.")

In military and diplomatic usage, the difference between *pre-emptive* (most often modifying the noun *strike* or *attack*) and *preventive* (most often modifying *war*) has to do with the imminence of the threat: how soon would the danger become intolerable?

In the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, the latest edition published in December 2001 by the Department of Defense, a *pre-emptive attack* is defined as "an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent." The Pentagon's lexicon defines *preventive war* as "a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk."

In the 1999 edition of his book "Intervention: The Use of American Military in the Post-Cold War World," Richard Haass (now the State Department's director of policy planning) writes: "*Preventive* uses of force are those that seek either to stop another state or party from developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter."

How is that different from a *pre-emptive* action? "The difference is one of timing and context," Haass writes. "*Pre-emptive* uses of force come against a backdrop of tactical intelligence or warning indicating imminent military action by an adversary."

Imminence is central. That word usually signals danger ahead, with its adjectival synonyms "approaching, impending, looming, menacing." Thus, in defining *pre-emptive*, Defense and State are reading from the same lexical hymn book. But there may be a shade of difference about *preventive*: Defense's dictionary focuses on dealing with an inevitable conflict while Haass focuses on stopping the potential "military capability" of another state.

In current use, *pre-emptive strike* has the more positive connotation, recalling the 1981 Israeli precision air attack that destroyed a nuclear reactor about to come on stream in Iraq. *Preventive war* has a pejorative ring, having been associated with generals parodied in the 1964 movie "Dr. Strangelove." Aware of this, those advocating a forced "regime change" in Iraq are likely to mix the two and use *preventive attack* or *pre-emptive war*.

Pre-empt is hyphenated to split the double vowel, much as *co-operate* once was. With frequent use of the word, the hyphen usually disappears. The *empt* comes from the Latin *emere*, "to buy," and our *pre-emption*, from which the verb *pre-empt* was back-formed, is rooted in the act or right to purchase before others.

In England, Sir William Blackstone, in his 1769 "Commentaries," defined *pre-emption* as "a right enjoyed by the crown of buying up provisions . . . by the intervention of the king's purveyors . . . even without consent of the owner." From the start, *intervention was the key*.

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GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

August 2, 2002, 10:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Anticipatory Self-Defense

- Self-defense has been a fundamental right recognized in the customs and practices of nations. These practices are sometimes called the "law of nations" or "customary international law." The UN Charter—the most important codification of those customs and practices—did not create the right, nor does it limit it.

- The 1837 "*Caroline* Case" is generally cited as establishing the right of "anticipatory self-defense" under customary international law.

  - The steamer *Caroline* had been supplying armed insurgents against British rule in Canada with reinforcements of men and materiel from the United States. In response to the threat of more activity of this sort, a British force from Canada entered U.S. territory at night, seized the *Caroline*, set the ship on fire, and sent it over Niagara Falls, killing two U.S. citizens in the process.

  - The British claimed they were acting in self-defense. In an exchange of diplomatic notes, Secretary of State Daniel Webster called upon the British to show that the "necessity of self-defense [was] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation . . . ."

  - Webster's articulation of the justification needed for use of force in that circumstance supports the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense.

  - The *Caroline* case has been distilled into two principal requirements for using force in anticipatory self-defense:

    - The use of force must be necessary because of both the imminent nature of the threat and the absence of peaceful alternatives, and,

    - The response to the threat must be proportionate.

11-L-0559 SD/6518

- Recent U.S. practice can be seen to demonstrate that the custom among nations (i.e., customary international law) is in accord:
    - Cuban Missile Crisis – nuclear missile bases in Cuba labeled an "immediate threat" and imposition of a blockade a justifiable act of self-defense.
    - 1986 air strikes on Libya justified in large part as anticipatory self-defense.
    - 1989 military action in Panama – President Bush explained the action was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger.
    - 1993 attack on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in response to compelling evidence Iraq had attempted to assassinate President Bush justified as self-defense.
    - 1998 cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan in response to U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania justified as "a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of future terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities."
- With the advent of nuclear and other sophisticated weapons and the potential for terrorists to obtain such weapons, the degree of imminence required to justify using force in anticipatory self-defense arguably should be seen differently: the threat need not be as demonstrably imminent if there is an increased risk of occurrence and an increased magnitude of harm.
- Taking those changed circumstances and the practice among nations into account, the appropriate analysis might be stated as follows:
    - Anticipatory self-defense is justified if a state:
        - Reasonably believes that it will be the subject of attack by WMD or terrorism;
        - Pursues nonmilitary remedies to no avail;
        - Waits until further delay would unreasonably increase the chances of significant harm ; and
        - Uses force proportional to the threat.

COORDINATION: None

cc: CJCS
USD(P)

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2002, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Legal Distinction Between Preemption, Preventive Self-Defense, and Anticipatory Self-Defense

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COORDINATION: None

The New York Times
nytimes.com

SPONSORED BY STARBUCKS.COM

October 13, 2002

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By WILLIAM SAFIRE

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GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

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FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

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11-L-055[redacted]SD/6524

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COORDINATION: None

cc: CJCS
USD(P)

snowflake

September 27, 2002 2:58 PM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Definitions

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Jim, I got asked this question. Is there some legal answer to it that I ought to be aware of?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092702-11

Please respond by 10/11/02

12/9 snowflake
0800

(202) 685-4570

December 5, 2002 10:41 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Costs

Please find out how much we spend on this Pentagon Research Team in the Army Center of Military History.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120502-14

314.7

Please respond by ~~1/3/03~~ ?

2/10

Col Farrell -
Please let's discuss.
DiRita

Larry Di Rita
2/10

5 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6527

U02231 /03

snowflake

January 28, 2002 6:17 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Agreements in Advance

What do you think about going around the world now to get a number of agreements—SOFA , access, acquisition and cross-servicing—where we may not need them now, but may need sometime in the future?

If we are going to have a major worldwide effort, we know we will need them.

Another way to do it would be to take a look at the 6, 7 or 8 possible target areas and approach their adjacent countries as our top priorities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012802-31

Please respond by 02/04/02

092,2

28 Jan 02

U02332 /02

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 20 2002

091.4

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter expressing interest in the training and utilization of linguists in the Armed Forces. I agree that sound management of foreign language assets is important to Defense performance, and this topic is being addressed as part of our human resource strategic planning.

In the meantime, we are working to provide a virtual work-learning environment that will permit sharing of language processing (translation and interpretation) workloads across organizational lines; this potentially will include agencies external to the Department. This type of innovative effort has a direct bearing on the concerns you identify, and the Department is committed to seizing these efficiencies.

Thank you for your sustained interest in, and support of, Defense programs such as this.

Sincerely,

20 FEB 02

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

ACTION MEMO

January 9, 2001, 4:53 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSecDef Action_____

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R) David S. C. Chu 8 Feb 02
(Signature and Date)

SUBJECT: Assignment of Armed Forces Translators

- Senator Byrd suggests that the Department review the assignment of linguists to determine if they are properly trained and assigned to meet "missions essential to our national security." (Tab B)

- A constituent had reported that a "significant number" of Army linguists were assigned to tactical intelligence units with low workloads, and that these Soldiers could have been better utilized by translating materials that have a direct bearing on national security.

- Army policy stipulates that "language training will be given priority equal or higher than common soldier skills." However, the direct use of linguist skills in tactical units is generally less than that of strategic units that support national intelligence programs.

- Your response to Senator Byrd reports that the management of foreign language assets is an important component of the Human Resource Strategic Plan now being prepared to shape the next issuance of Defense Planning Guidance. The response also describes recent innovations responsive to the Senator's concerns.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the reply to Senator Byrd, at Tab A.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo (b)(6)

Larry Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI
MA BUCCI
EXECSEC WHITMORE

U02313 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/6530

Attachment

SUBJECT: Assignment of Armed Forces Translators

COORDINATION: (Sign & Date)

General Counsel	Mr. Dell'Orto; 11/30/01
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)	Mr. Hefti; 11/07/01
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)	Mr. Stenbit; 11/07/01
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)	Mr. Duehring; 11/08/01
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)	12/10/01
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Mil Pers Policy)	12 Jan 02 01
Director of the Joint Staff	Maj Gen Hawkins; 11/15/01

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo (b)(6)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 OCT 12 PM 3:33

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
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TERRENCE E. SAUVAIN, STAFF DIRECTOR
STEVEN J. CORTESE, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6025
www.senate.gov/~appropriations

October 1, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I write to you to share my concern about the training and use of linguists in the Armed Forces.

I have been contacted by one of my constituents who believes that, in the months leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a significant number of Army linguists had been assigned to tactical intelligence missions with a low workload. My constituent believes that these personnel may have been put to more productive use by assisting in the translation of materials that might have a more direct bearing on our national security.

Given the recent statements by FBI Director Robert Mueller as to the urgent need for translators with skills in Middle Eastern languages, I ask that you review the assignment of linguists in the Armed Services to see that they are appropriately trained and tasked to meet the missions essential to our national security.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Byrd

Robert C. Byrd

RCB:ekr

11-L-0559/OSD/6532 U17194/01

February 8, 2002 12:10 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: MoD Ivanov

Russia

I spoke with Sergei Ivanov today. We will be sending out a memorandum of the conversation.

However, I did want to let you know that he does want to see each of you when he comes to town. He is going to be in Washington sometime between the period of March 11, 12, 13 or 14—probably for two or three days, depending on how long it takes him to get his work done.

I just wanted you to be aware we will be trying to connect with each of you at some point.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020802-14

8 Feb 02

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

GENERAL COUNSEL

January 24, 2002, 7:30 AM

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Photos of Detainees

- You asked about the precise rules with respect to photos of detainees and directed establishment of a policy for places where detainees are being held.

- The rule in regard to photographs of detainees is based on Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949: "[P]risoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity."

- While this rule does not explicitly forbid the taking of pictures and publication of photographs of prisoners of war, the U.S. Government has interpreted it to mean that photographing prisoners of war or detainees and publishing the photographs in newspapers or journals would be holding them up to public curiosity and therefore forbidden. Tab A contains a written explanation we provided to interested DoD officials on January 10.

- Still, we have worked with OSD/PA to accommodate press interests to the extent possible. As a result, the approved guidance of January 11 provides: "Group or wide area photo/video coverage of detainees in and about detainee facilities may be permitted by the camp commander, subject to security requirements and the following restrictions," including that "[n]ews media coverage, including photo/video coverage, will not identify individual detainees, by name (s) or by image." I believe this guidance strikes the right balance. Tab B.

- I concur that when photos are posted, they should be fully explained. We understand from OSD/PA that the photo that caused so much discussion carried some sort of explanation about detainees arriving.

COORDINATION: None

11-L-0559/OSD/6534

U02511 /02

January 10, 2001, 16:00
J. Burger, OGC, IA

Policy on Photos of Battlefield Detainees
Prepared by the DoD General Counsel

While Operation Enduring Freedom battlefield detainees have not been determined to be prisoners of war, the policy on forbidding photography is in accord with treating them consistent with the protections provided under the Third Geneva Convention. This is not a change in policy. It is in conformity with long-standing U.S. procedures and practice.

We realize that some photography of detainees has been seen in the world's media during the past several weeks. Some of this has been inadvertent or unavoidable. Some of this has resulted from the Department's long-standing policy not being clearly understood or uniformly applied. The Department's underlying policy has not changed.

The policy of prohibiting the release for publication of photography of prisoners of war is based upon Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. That Article states: "[P]risoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity."

While this rule does not explicitly forbid the taking of pictures and publication of photographs of prisoners of war, the United States Government has always interpreted it to mean that taking pictures of prisoners of war and publishing them in newspapers or journals would be holding the prisoners up to public curiosity and is therefore forbidden.

The United States has historically forbidden the release of photographs of prisoners of war, and has objected when hostile powers have published photographs of, or held press briefings showing detained U.S. military personnel.

The theory behind the rule is that the detaining authority might use the publication of pictures for its own ends, for example, to show that it was treating the prisoners humanely while in truth it was not. There have been instances when detaining powers have used photographs and press briefings for propaganda purposes.

The Department's regulation on prisoners of war and other detained persons states that: "Photography, filming and video taping of individual EPW (enemy prisoners of war), CI (civilian internees) and RP (retained persons) for other than internal Internment Facility administration or intelligence/counterintelligence purposes is strictly prohibited. No group, wide area or aerial photographs of EPW, CI and RP or facilities will be taken unless approved by senior Military Police officer in the Internment Facility's chain of command." (Reference: paragraph 1-5d of AR 190-8, OPNAVIST 3461.6, AFI 31-304, MCO 3461.1)

As we proceed, we will review applicable policies, including this one, as appropriate.

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RAAUZYUW RUEKJCS9221 0121711-UUUU--RUEKCHP.
ZNR UUUUU
R 111124Z JAN 02
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA//
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENTAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON DETAINEES.
REFERENCES: A. SECDEF MESSAGE 072300Z JAN 02, PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA IN
SUPPORT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). B. SECDEF MESSAGE 072020 DEC 01, CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.
1. PURPOSE: TO CLARIFY AND SUPERCEDE PAG ON COVERAGE OF DETAINEES AND DETAINEE FACILITIES.
2. EXTERNAL NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DETAINEES:
2.A. GROUP OR WIDE AREA PHOTO/VIDEO COVERAGE OF DETAINEES IN AND ABOUT DETAINEE FACILITIES MAY BE PERMITTED BY THE CAMP COMMANDER, SUBJECT TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS. INSERT THESE RESTRICTIONS IN NEWS MEDIA GROUND RULES.
2.A.1. NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE, INCLUDING PHOTO/VIDEO COVERAGE, WILL NOT IDENTIFY INDIVIDUAL DETAINEES, BY NAME(S) OR BY IMAGE (I.E., CLOSE-UP

PAGE 04 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS
IMAGES OF IND1VIDUAL FACE(S) THAT WOULD ALLOW INDIVIDUALS TO BE IDENTIFIED WILL NOT BE PERMITTED.)
2.A.2. COVERAGE MAY SHOW GROUPS OF DETAINEES, BUT ONLY IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESTRICTION IN PARA. 2.A.1.
2.A.3. COVERAGE OF DETAINEES IN TRANSIT IS NOT PERMITTED, INCLUDING GROUND AND AIR MOVEMENT BETWEEN DETENTION FACILITIES, OR MOVEMENT BETWEEN DETENTION FACILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION (BUSES, FERRIES, PLANES, ETC.).
2.B. COVERAGE OF DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS OR INTERVIEWS IS NOT PERMITTED. NEWS MEDIA INTERVIEWS WITH DETAINEES ARE NOT PERMITTED.
2.C. INTERVIEWS WITH SENIOR COMMANDERS, SUPPORT STAFF, AND DETENTION CAMP PERSONNEL ARE PERMITTED, CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE IN PARA. 6. OF REF A.
3. INTERNAL NEWS, COMBAT CAMERA COVERAGE: INTERNAL NEWS COVERAGE OF DETAINEE ACTIVITIES IS PERMITTED, SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS IN PARAS. 2.A. THROUGH 2.C. OF THIS PAG. PARAS. 2.A. THROUGH 2.C. OF THIS PAG DO NOT APPLY TO COMBAT CAMERA. ANY COMBAT CAMERA OR INTERNAL NEWS IMAGERY, OR INTERNAL NEWS STORIES, MUST BE CLEARED THROUGH OASD-PA TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH PARAS 2.A. THROUGH 2.C. BEFORE PUBLIC RELEASE.

PAGE 05 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS
4. ACCESS BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: CONSISTENT WITH THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 AND WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS/RED CRESCENT PERSONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT AND OBSERVE DETAINEES. ONLY ICRC PERSONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT/OBSERVE DETAINEES.
5. CHANGES TO PREVIOUS PAG:
5.A. PARAGRAPH 5.E. OF REF. A IS DELETED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUPERCEDED BY THIS PAG.
5.B. PARAGRAPH 8, 8.A., 8.C. AND 8.D. OF REF. A IS DELETED AND SUPERCEDED BY PARA. 3 OF THIS PAG. NEWS AND IMAGERY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE REGIONAL CINC'S PA OFFICE THROUGH US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND BEFORE FORWARDING TO OASD-PA FOR RELEASE APPROVAL.
5.C. QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 8 OF REF. A. IS DELETED AND SUPERCEDED BY THE FOLLOWING:
Q8. WILL THE DETAINEES HAVE ACCESS TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS?
A8. CONSISTENT WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS/RED CRESCENT PERSONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT AND OBSERVE DETAINEES. ONLY

PAGE 06 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS
ICRC PERSONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT/OBSERVE DETAINEES.
6. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR USE AS APPROPRIATE:
6.A. BASED ON THE DEPARTMENT'S EXISTING GUIDANCE, DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO WILL BE TREATED AS THEY WERE TREATED UPON COMING UNDER U.S. CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN: HUMANELY AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED UNDER THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949. WITHIN THIS GUIDANCE, THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AT GUANTANAMO MAY BE AFFECTED BY SECURITY NEEDS AND THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF THE AVAILABLE FACILITIES AT GUANTANAMO.
6.B. EVEN THOUGH DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, THEY ARE ENEMY PERSONS CAPTURED DURING THE ONGOING COALITION CONFLICT AGAINST TERRORISM.
6.C. NO PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE DETAINEES WILL BE ALLOWED. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH LONGSTANDING U.S. PRACTICE, INCLUDING OPERATION DESERT STORM, AND CONSISTENT WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, WHICH PROHIBIT DETAINED PERSONS FROM BEING SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC CURIOSITY OR HUMILIATING TREATMENT.
6.D. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) HAS HAD ACCESS TO DETAINEES WHILE THEY WERE IN THE CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF

PAGE 07 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS
OPERATIONS. THIS, TOO, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTION PROVISIONS. AT GUANTANAMO, WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, ICRC REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT THE DETAINEES.
6.E. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) WILL NOT HAVE ACCESS TO DETAINEES. THIS, TOO, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, WHICH RECOGNIZE THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE ICRC FOR PURPOSES OF ENSURING HUMANE TREATMENT AND MONITORING CONDITIONS OF DETAINEES.
6.F. DETAINED PERSONS HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE TREATED HUMANELY. HUMANE TREATMENT MEANS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THEY WILL BE GIVEN ADEQUATE FOOD, WATER, SHELTER, CLOTHING AND MEDICAL TREATMENT. WITHIN THIS GUIDANCE, THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AT GUANTANAMO MAY BE AFFECTED BY SECURITY NEEDS AND THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF THE AVAILABLE FACILITIES AT GUANTANAMO.
6.G. THE POLICY ON LIMITING PHOTOGRAPHY IS IN ACCORD WITH TREATING DETAINEES CONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED UNDER THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION. THIS IS NOT A CHANGE IN POLICY. IT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH LONG-STANDING U.S. PROCEDURES AND PRACTICE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6.H. THE POLICY OF LIMITING THE RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHY OF DETAINEES IS CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 13 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949. THAT ARTICLE STATES: '[P]RISONERS OF WAR

PAGE 08 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS
MUST AT ALL TIMES BE PROTECTED, PARTICULARLY AGAINST ACTS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION AND AGAINST INSULTS AND PUBLIC CURIOSITY.' WHILE THIS RULE DOES NOT EXPLICITLY FORBID THE TAKING OF PICTURES AND PUBLICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS INTERPRETED IT TO MEAN THAT TAKING PICTURES OF INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS OF WAR OR DETAINEES AND PUBLISHING THEM IN NEWSPAPERS OR JOURNALS WOULD BE HOLDING THEM UP TO PUBLIC CURIOSITY AND IS THEREFORE FORBIDDEN.
6.I. THE UNITED STATES HAS HISTORICALLY FORBIDDEN THE RELEASE OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS OF WAR, AND HAS OBJECTED WHEN HOSTILE POWERS HAVE PUBLISHED PHOTOGRAPHS OF, OR HELD PRESS BRIEFINGS SHOWING DETAINED U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.
6.J. AS WE PROCEED, WE WILL REVIEW APPLICABLE POLICIES, INCLUDING THIS ONE, AS APPROPRIATE.
7. OASD (PA) CONTACT IS THE DOD PRESS OFFICE, DSN 227-5131, COMM (b)(6) E-MAIL NEWSDESK@OSD.MIL.
BT
#9221

NNNN
<[^^^]> 01/12/2002 1223 <[^^^]>

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/6538

snowflake

January 23, 2002 7:16 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Photos of Detainees

383.6

Please tell me precisely what the rules are with respect to photographs of detainees, and let's look at it and get a policy established for Guantanamo, Bagram, Torie Clarke and everyone else who is releasing these things.

In addition, it seems to me that anytime we release a photo, we ought to have an explanation of what in the world it is, so people know. That clearly would have saved all these problems the last four days, if we had explained what that one picture was. I hope it has been taken off the web site.

We need some precise rules as to how we are going to handle the prisoners and the photos.

Thanks.

GC

Larry Di Rita 1/24

DHR:dh
012302-1

Please respond by 01/25/02

Jim — The Burger memo suggests that we will not permit photos, period. Clearly, we're not following it.

23 Jan 01

If we're changed the policy through press guidance then what's the point?

11-L-0559/OSD/6539
U01406 /02

snowflake

February 5, 2002 8:12 AM

3836

TO: Jim Haynes
GEN. MYERS

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Screening Procedures

Please give me the screening procedures, so I can decide how close they are to what the Geneva Convention ~~title 9~~ Article 5 requires for tribunals.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020502-9

Please respond by 02/8/02

5 Feb 02

snowflake

2/12/02

February 11, 2002 11:20 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Lengthening Tours

What has happened to my interest in lengthening tours and years of service? Please give me the status.

I want to get going on both of them—I think they are important.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021102-20

Please respond by 02/22/02

2 days

11 Feb 02

snowflake

January 29, 2002 2:40 PM

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Tour Length

I have to know what is happening about lengthening tours. I am convinced it is the right thing to do. There must be a way to do it.

One way to do it is incrementally, and lengthen the tours every year by a quarter of a year. Over a four-year term, we would have lengthened them by at least a year without causing any major changes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-27

Please respond by 02/11/02

200.4

29 Jan 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6542

U02629 /02

2/4
1345

Snowflake

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 FEB 12 PM 5:53

8:26 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: February 11, 2002

SUBJECT: **Ukraine**

There is a Ukraine delegation coming to the United States. There's a fellow by the name Harbolin. He's an expert on missile defense, and he knows counter measures. He worked on them in the old Soviet Union. We might want to have him meet with Wynn and Sega and Kadish and try to avoid the "not invented here" syndrome. He is apparently a candidate for Parliament in Ukraine and a fairly good person. He took over a bad party and cleaned it out, I'm told.

Thank you.

UKRAINE

DHR/azn
021102.15

Please respond by: 2/15/02 2/11

→ To: ASD(ISP) Crouch - 11 Feb 02

Please advise.

D. Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/6543
U02645 /02

Larry Di Rita

Snowflake

SEC... 2002 FEB 13 AM 9:30

February 11, 2002 12:20 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Tracking Coalition Humanitarian Assistance

Should there be a daily one-page sheet on all that the coalition is doing from a humanitarian standpoint in Afghanistan and who is doing it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021102-37

Please respond by 02/22/02

11 Feb 02

U02654 /02

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (FEB.12.2002 5:19PM) * * *

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	TTI PERS. NAME	FILE
FEB.12.	5:18PM	COMPATIBLE	G-TS	1'33"	P. 2	OK		056

Received by OSI Myers

\# : BATCH
M : MEMORY
S : STANDARD
A-: ASYNC MODE
C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
1-: MIL_STD MODE
$: TRANSFER
@ : FORWARDING
F : FINE
G-: RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE
P : POLLING
E : ECM
> : REDUCTION

Secretary of Defense Cover Sheet

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FILE	

FROM: OSD CABLES

OFFICE/DESK: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PHONE NO.: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Tracking Coalition Humanitarian Assistance

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES: 2
(Including Coversheet)

____ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

XX IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
CENTCOM	GEN FRANKS				

REMARKS: SUSPENSE: 22 Feb 02.

PLEASE INSURE THE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL RECEIVE THIS DOCUMENT FROM THE SECDEF

Please call Secretary of Defense Cable Division to report transmission problems (b)(6)

snowflake

February 11, 2002 2:19 PM

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Safety Records

Would you please take a look at these and tell me how I can change the format and improve the performance?

Thanks. Regards.

Attach.
01/28/02 SecNAV memo to SecDef re: Safety Records

DHR:dh
021102-54

929

11 Feb 02

SECRETARY
2002 JAN 28 PM 12:44

January 28, 2002

TO: Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: Safety Records

SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 11 2002

This is to provide our first quarterly safety report per your request (attached).

Safety is one of my top priorities. My first act was to establish myself as Chief of Safety for the Department of the Navy and to place responsibility for safety directly with me. We immediately established a Deputy Assistant Secretary position devoted solely to Safety. Weekly, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I monitor accident trends. Attached are the metrics I will submit to you quarterly.

My focus areas are:

(1) Unify the safety effort in the Department.
(2) Use state-of-the-art technologies to improve safety and occupational health.
(3) Embed strong safety and risk management characteristics in our Naval culture.
(4) Integrate best private and public sector safety practices.

You will start seeing improvements.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/30
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	1/31
MA BUCCI	1/31
EXECSEC WHITMORE	1/28

Navy and Marine Corps
Total Class A Operational Mishap Ra
As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A m
mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or r
personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of $1 million

Navy and Marine Corps
Class A Flight Mishap Rates
As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of $1 million or more.

Navy Afloat
Class A Mishap Rates
As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100 ships per year. A Class A mishap is
involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-milit
destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of $1 million or more.

11-L-0559/OSD/6551

Navy and Marine Corps
Class A Ashore Mishap Rates
As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A n
mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or n
personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of $1 million

11-L-0559/OSD/6552

Navy and Marine Corps
PMV Fatality Rates
As of 31 Dec 01

PERSONAL MOTOR VEHICLES



Rates reflect military fatalities per 100,000 personnel per year.

Navy and Marine Corps
Federal Civilian
Lost Time Case Rates
As of 31 Oct 01



Civilian lost time case rates = total number of worker's compensation cases involving lost time injuries per 100 workers per year.

2/2
1230
snowflake

February 11, 2002 2:14 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Senator Leahy

Sometime I would like to have Pat Leahy down to talk about the Leahy Amendment. I would also like to have, if possible, Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace, Paul Wolfowitz and maybe Colin Powell.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021102-55

2/13

Please respond by 02/28/02

ASD(LA)

Powell Moore -
Let's discuss
D. Rita

Larry Di Rita

11 Feb 02

000.71 SD

U02772-02

11-L-0559/OSD/6555

Snowflake

February 14, 2002 8:18 AM

Greece

TO: Ambassador Tom Miller

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Your Cable

Tom, I read your cable, Athens 000408 (O 110928Z FEB 02). Good for you!

You are on the mark, my friend.

Regards,

DHR:dh
021402-4

14 Feb 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 14 2002

OTTUZELX RUEHTHA0408 0420928-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110928Z FEB 02 ZEL TAGS AND PARAGRAPH MARKINGS CITE 0240W
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 1012
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0787
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7177
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES

To SecDef
Sir,
Amb Miller is taking on a big target here
Cec B
2/12
7:30pm

UNCLAS ATHENS 000408

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ASEC, PINS, PROP, PTER, SCUL, SOCI, GR

SUBJECT: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE: LESSENING BUT STILL APPARENT

G 2/12

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: ANTI-AMERICANISM IS DEEP-SEATED IN SMALL SEGMENTS OF GREEK SOCIETY AND HAS COMPLICATED OTHERWISE FRIENDLY U.S.-GREECE RELATIONS FOR DECADES. PREVIOUS GREEK GOVERNMENTS AND GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE BEAR CONSIDERABLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROBLEM AND MUST BE PART OF THE SOLUTION. OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL MISSION-WIDE MEETINGS AIMED AT IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE MEASURES FOR COMBATING ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE. AFTER A SERIOUS ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, WE HAVE MAPPED OUT ACTION PLANS WITH DESIGNATED ACTION OFFICERS TO RESEARCH AND IMPLEMENT NEW SHORT- AND LONG-TERM INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO TACKLE THIS PROBLEM. OUR AIM IS TO HELP BRING THE GREEKS MORE IN LINE WITH EURO-ATLANTIC ATTITUDES. EMBASSY ATHENS'S MPP WILL REFLECT OUR COMMITMENT TO IMPROVING GREECE'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE US AND HELP BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN GREECE AND OUR OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES. END SUMMARY

2. (U) WHEN PRESIDENT CLINTON VISITED GREECE IN 1999, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY ALL OVER THE CENTER OF ATHENS WAS LOOTED AND BURNED AND A MOCK TRIAL CONDEMNED THE PRESIDENT FOR OUR KOSOVO POLICY IN THE MIDDLE OF CONSTITUTION SQUARE (IN FRONT OF THE GREEK PARLIAMENT). AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, WHILE MANY

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: X DEPSEC: 1 SPL ASST: 1 EXECSEC: 1 SR MA: ____
C&D: 1 CCD: 1 CABLE CH: ____ FILE: ____

USDP: 1 DIA: ____ OTHER: ____
MILPER: ____ PER SEC: ____ COMM: ____

GREEKS AND THE GOVERNMENT WERE QUITE SYMPATHETIC AND SUPPORTIVE, THERE WERE SOME WHO CELEBRATED AND MANY THAT FELT "WE HAD THIS COMING." A DISTURBING NUMBER OF GREEKS CHEERED AT A SPORTING EVENT WHEN FANATICS BURNED A U.S. FLAG. REPORTERS IN THE NEWSROOM OF A MODERATE NEWSPAPER, "KATHIMERINI," CHEERED AT THE NEWS OF THE ATTACKS. AND IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING THE ATTACKS, THOUSANDS OF DEMONSTRATORS LINED THE STREETS AROUND THE EMBASSY. IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, COMMUNIST PROTESTERS, LABELING THE AMBASSADOR AN IMPERIALIST AND CHANTING, "KILLERS GO HOME," PREVENTED HIM FROM VISITING A GREEK GRADE SCHOOL WHERE HE WAS PLANNING TO TALK WITH 6TH GRADE STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBE (ENVIRONMENTAL/SCIENCE EDUCATION) PROGRAM. WHILE ANTI-AMERICANISM IS BUT A FRAGMENT OF WHAT IT WAS UNDER THE RAPIDLY ANTI-AMERICAN PAPANDROU YEARS IN THE 1980S, EVEN TODAY INSTANCES OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT ARE NEITHER RARE, NOR SURPRISING.

3. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICANISM IS A STAPLE OF MODERN GREEK LIFE. IT IS BORN OUT OF A MISREADING OF HISTORY, DISTRUST OF POWER AND A SENSE OF VICTIMIZATION. IT IS BUILT ON MANY THINGS, INCLUDING THE PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. FAVORS TURKEY; THE IDEA WE COULD SOLVE CYPRUS IF WE WANTED, RESENTMENT OF OUR SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA, AND THE MYTHOLOGY THAT OUR POLICIES IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO WERE DESIGNED TO THWART ORTHODOXY. IT BREEDS ON A SERIOUSLY FLAWED UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES. IT ALSO TAPS INTO DEEP UNEASE OVER GLOBALIZATION AND THE ECLIPSE OF GREEK TRADITIONAL PATTERNS OF LIFE. AND IT THRIVES ON THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT'S UNWILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE POLITICALLY COURAGEOUS BUT RISKY STEPS NEEDED TO PREVENT A FEW FASCIST-MANNERED FANATICS FROM IMPOSING THEIR ANARCHY ON THE MANY.

4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICANISM IS A TOOL FOR POLITICIANS AND MEDIA MAGNATES TRYING TO ATTRACT VOTES OR VIEWERS. (IN MANY INSTANCES, IT IS NOT SIMPLY A MATTER OF "GIVE THEM THE FACTS AND THEY'LL GET IT." MANY OF THESE PEOPLE AREN'T INTERESTED IN "THE FACTS" IF THEY DO NOT FIT THEIR OWN PRECONCEIVED VIEW OF THE WORLD) IT REINFORCES SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND OFFERS A SOOTHING, EASY PARADIGM FOR "UNDERSTANDING" THE WORLD, AND NEATLY ABSOLVES GREECE FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS OWN DESTINY. IN THIS ZERO-SUM CULTURE, PERSONAL AND NATIONAL PRESTIGE IS ENHANCED WHEN THE U.S. IS CRITICIZED.

5. (SBU) WHAT DOES IT COST? IT COSTS BOTH SIDES A LOT. AS GREECE'S FLAG BURNING AND ANTI-AMERICANISM HAS BECOME MORE INTERNATIONALLY NOTED, THE NATION'S "REPUTATION" HAS BEEN TARNISHED, NOT ONLY IN THE U.S., BUT THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE EU AS WELL. GREECE DOES NOT ATTRACT THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IT MIGHT; ITS NEGATIVE POLLS SHOW IT TO BE OFF THE GRID OF EUROPEAN OPINION REGARDING THE U.S.; AND THE COUNTRY IS NOT SEEN AS A FIRST-TIER ALLY BY THE EURO-ATLANTIC LEADERSHIP. MANY IN THE MORE ASTUTE GREEK ELITE

REALIZE THIS PERCEPTION IS AFFECTING THE CONFIDENCE OF ALLIES AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. THAT IS WHY SOME OF THEM ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH US ON THIS.

6. (U) FROM OUR SIDE, ANTI-AMERICANISM COMPLICATES OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH AN ALLY. IT GOADS THE GREEK PRESS INTO CREATING ARTIFICIAL CONTROVERSIES OVER INVENTED GRIEVANCES. THE AIR-TIME, PRINT SPACE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL SPENT ON MANAGING THESE CONTROVERSIES, AS WE RECENTLY SAW FROM SIMITIS' TRIP TO THE U.S., IS STOLEN FROM SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. AND DESPITE THE BIG-PICTURE REALITY OF GREECE AS A VALUED FRIEND TO THE U.S., WE GET IRRITATED OVER THE SHRILL AND SOMETIMES PERSONAL ATTACKS FROM GREEK POLITICAL AND MEDIA ELITE.

7. (U) ALL OF THAT SAID, THIS GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN COOPERATIVE IN RECENT YEARS; AND THE USG-GOG RELATIONSHIP IS AS STRONG AS IT HAS EVER BEEN. THE SIMITIS ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM; HOWEVER THEY HAVE DONE LITTLE TO SWAY PUBLIC OPINION FOR FEAR OF ALIENATING SMALL BUT VOCAL BITS OF THE ELECTORATE (INCLUDING SOME OF THEIR TRADITIONAL CORE SUPPORT). WITH THE ONGOING AND INCREASING EUROPEANIZATION OF GREECE, TIME AND INTEGRATION WILL HOPEFULLY CONTINUE THE PROCESS WE'VE ALREADY SEEN STARTED BY TRANSFORMING THE GREEK MINDSET INTO A MORE SECURE IDENTITY. IN THE MEANTIME, THERE ARE THINGS THAT THIS MISSION WILL DO TO CREATE BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES.

8. (SBU) WE HAVE COMPOSED A LIST OF SHORT AND LONG TERM INITIATIVES. OUR LIST OF SHORT TERM STRATEGIES INCLUDE: (1) USING AND ENGAGING THE MEDIA ON OUR TERMS AND ON OUR TURF; (2) A PA STRATEGY THAT IS MORE STRONGLY CENTERED ON AMERICAN VALUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND PROCESSES; (3) A TARGETED COUNTERATTACK ON POLICY ISSUES THAT RESONATE IN GREECE; (4) BROADENING OUR PRESENCE TO REGIONS OUTSIDE OF THE URBAN AREAS; (5) ILLUMINATING VISIBLE US-GREECE COOPERATION ON KEY ISSUES FOR GREECE; (6) STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES WITH AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS IN GREECE, LIKE THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND THE AMERICAN SCHOOLS, TO COMBAT ANTI-AMERICANISM; (7) AND PROMOTING AMERICAN EMBASSY VOLUNTEERS IN LOCAL COMMUNITY PROJECTS--SHOWING OUR HUMAN SIDE.

9. (SBU) OUR LIST OF LONG TERM STRATEGIES INCLUDE: (1) A BROADER MORE TARGETED FULBRIGHT PROGRAM; (2) MORE EMPHASIS ON AMERICAN STUDIES IN GREECE AND FOR GREEK SCHOLARS; (3) ENCOURAGING SECONDARY SCHOOL YOUTH EXCHANGES AND TEACHER TRAINING IN AMERICAN STUDIES; (4) TARGETING YOUTH POPULATIONS, BOTH POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; (5) TARGETING YOUNG JOURNALISTS WHO ARE NOT YET PART OF GREECE'S POLITICIZED ETHICS-VOID MEDIA SYSTEM TO RECTIFY MYTHS ABOUT THE U.S. THAT PLAGUE GREEK PUBLICATIONS; (6) ENHANCING AND RE-PRIORITIZING POST (AND PARTICULARLY PD) RESOURCES TOWARDS COMBATING THE PROBLEM.

10. (SBU) WE WILL NOT BORE WASHINGTON WITH OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF EACH OF THESE INITIATIVES, BUT RATHER, CITE THE ABOVE STRATEGIES FOR TWO REASONS: (A) SOME OF THEM WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES; AND (B) TO LET WASHINGTON KNOW THAT WE'RE WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM. IN THIS RESPECT, WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN WITH US FOR THE PAST 50 YEARS. NEW INITIATIVES, HOWEVER WELL CONCEIVED, WILL NOT "FIX" IT OVERNIGHT. RATHER, WORKING TO REDUCE ANTI-AMERICANISM IS MORE OF A PROCESS THAN A DISCRETE ISSUE THAT ONE CAN "SOLVE" OVER A SHORT TIME PERIOD.

11. (SBU) MANY THE INITIATIVES MENTIONED REQUIRE THAT THE EMBASSY REALLOCATE RESOURCES (OR SEEK ADDITIONAL RESOURCES) AND BE COMMITTED TO A CHANGE IN THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS. OUR MPP WILL REFLECT THESE STRATEGIES AND CHANGES. WE HAVE NO ILLUSION THAT WE WILL RE-CREATE THE GREEKS' PERCEPTION OF US IN A DAY. BUT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WITH SOME PRO-ACTIVE STRATEGIES ON OUR PART AND GREECE'S GREATER INTEGRATION INTO THE EU, OVER TIME ATTITUDES IN GREECE CAN IMPROVE.
MILLER

**** CORRECTED COPY ****

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SECDEF V2                                                          2
ACTION                                              (U,6,7,F)
INFO   NMCC:CWO(*) CMAS(*) CMAS(1) CHAIRS(*)
       CHAIRS TESTBED(*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*)
       USDAT:STS(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*) DIR:PAE-RAM(*)
       USDAT-STS(*) ESC-SMTP(*)
      +USDP:ESC
                                        TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED      2
#0408

NNNN
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:

8 Aug 02

AUG 13 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps

SUBJECT: Concept of Operations - INFO MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you yesterday. I believe that the discussions were very useful and informative.

I would like to emphasize the importance of the Concept of Operations discussion by offering the following points:

1. I believe it is very important to do this (write a "ConOps").
2. It serves as a forcing function that will sort out many issues that have no way of being resolved by any other means presently.
3. The Joint Chiefs should be tasked to do this under the guiding hand of the Chairman and Vice Chairman.
4. Combatant commanders ought to have representation in the effort.
5. Joint Forces Command will play a major role.
6. This should be done in a relatively short period of time.
7. Doing a "ConOps" based on the Defense Planning Guidance makes sense.
8. This strikes me as a good way to get at the "service stovepipes."

Very respectfully,

Jim Jones

JAMES L. JONES

snowflake

August 12, 2002 12:43 PM

TO: Gen. Jones

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Concept of Operations

Thanks for your note on con ops. I agree.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/08/02 CMC info memo to SecDef re: "Concept of Operations"

DHR:dh
081202-27

Please respond by _____

12 Aug 02

U02894 /03

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:

8 Aug 02

AUG 13 2002

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Very respectfully,

Jim Jones

JAMES L. JONES

snowflake

February 8, 2002 8:41 AM

381

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Skelton Paper

Please bump this Ike Skelton paper around to various people. It has some good thoughts in it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated Ike Skelton paper, "Lessons from Yesterday's Frontier Wars for Tomorrow's Asymmetric Conflicts"

DHR:dh
020802-7

Please respond by 02/22/02 2/11

Sharon - Please do memo from me to
- CJCS
- VCJCS
- Service Secs
- Service Chiefs
- Unders

"Attached is a piece by Congressman Skelton on asymmetric conflict. The Secretary thought you would appreciate seeing it." Thks

8 Feb 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6564

U02937 /02

snowflake

February 12, 2002 12:22 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Non-lethal Agents

We need to go ahead and think about getting the executive order or the law changed with respect to the use of non-lethal agents.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021202-16

Please respond by 03/01/02

Snowflake

NEF01838

7:45 AM

Snow flake

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: February 11, 2002

SUBJECT: **European Union Rapid Reaction Force**

NATO 322

I notice here it says the EU rapid reaction force won't be ready for 10 years. Do we have any data that suggests that is the case? I thought it was going to be much sooner.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021102.07
Attach: Early Bird Article

Please respond by: 2/18/02

11 Feb 02

stance, the Bush Administration might fail to adequately consult its allies on the controversial issue of how best to pursue the next phase in the war on terror.

"Clearly this hope and expectation on the part of many European officials that the Bush Administration would somehow 'find religion' on this issue of multilateralism as a result of September 11 were wrong, and there was surprise and disappointment in Europe over the ABM decision," said Dana Allin, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think tank. "More broadly, however, I think that the September 11 attacks improved trans-Atlantic relations, because many of these contentious but secondary issues, such as the ABM Treaty, have been subordinated to the primary threat of terror and the conduct of the war on international terrorism."

A Strong Foundation

Privately, NATO officials concede that the war on terrorism has provoked what one European NATO ambassador referred to as a period of great "self-doubt" within the alliance. Not since the early 1990s, when NATO struggled simultaneously to redefine its mission after the Cold War and to cope with civil war in the Balkans, has the alliance gone through such a wrenching self-examination.

Although U.S. officials defend the invocation of Article 5 after September 11, in retrospect some acknowledge that they should have reacted more quickly to the offers of military assistance from European allies. In the end, they note, the United States fought in Afghanistan in a coalition of six allies. For its part, NATO granted blanket U.S. requests for overflight rights across member countries, as well as access to ports and airfields. It also deployed a standing NATO naval force to the Eastern Mediterranean and—in another first—deployed NATO Airborne Warning and Control System planes to guard America's skies, and thus free American AWACS for operations over Afghanistan.

"Part of the problem was that no one had ever done this before, and all of us had an image from our schoolboy days that after Article 5 was invoked, the collective armies of the United States and Europe would march off together to slay a common foe," said a senior NATO official. "But this conflict is so unconventional that it didn't fit any of those stereotypes of what NATO was all about. Because everyone was anticipating a longer campaign in Afghanistan, there was also a belief that we had more time to develop a military coalition than proved the case."

Despite some strains since September 11, most NATO officials argue that the alliance is still the sole bridge that allows the United States to exercise adequate influence and power in Europe. Only the United States, with its large nuclear arsenal, can provide a strategic umbrella over Europe, and the roughly 100,000 U.S. active-duty troops stationed on the Continent form the bulwark of NATO's conventional capability. During the 1990s, NATO also proved to be the only institution with the collective will and capability to tame the fires of ethnic strife and civil war in the Balkans.

"I don't find serious these arguments that NATO is no longer relevant, because it continues to prove its relevance in a host of areas," Ambassador Nicholas Burns, the U.S. permanent representative to NATO, told National Journal. "The more pertinent question posed by September 11 is whether NATO can continue to transform itself so that it is capable of responding to new threats, such as terror groups possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction." To do so, he argues, the alliance's European members will have to do more to close their military-technology gap with the United States: They will have to live up to their commitments to get better at projecting power at great distances and to make better use of high technology.

"That technology gap is one of the most serious problems facing NATO today, because if you trace the continuum of conflict through the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, what you see is that, with the notable exception of Britain, the European allies don't have sufficient capability in areas such as strategic lift, precision-guided weapons, secure communications, and special forces," Burns said. "So whether the Europeans want to fulfill their commitments to NATO, or employ the European Union's rapid reaction force for crisis management or peacekeeping, they must address significant weaknesses in these areas."

But few analysts believe that European countries have the political will to increase defense spending for additional capabilities. Most of Europe is now governed by center-left administrations trying to stave off recession, and they're not anxious to spend more on defense. Germany, for instance, as the largest European economy, still spends only 1.6 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, far less, proportionately, than the United States' 3.1 percent. Further straining budgets, the European nations that have adopted the euro as their common currency have pledged not to run deficits higher than 3 percent of GDP. According to recent press reports, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office has found that because of critical shortfalls in funding for strategic lift, cruise missiles, surveillance and intelligence equipment, and mobile infantry, the European Union's rapid reaction force will not be ready to undertake combat operations for at least 10 years.

"Afghanistan has shown once again that the Europeans have failed to deliver on their promises to significantly enhance their defense capabilities," said Steven Everts, a senior research fellow for the Center for European Reform based in London. "So the question is no longer about whether a trans-Atlantic division of labor is evolving in security operations, but rather how to manage it, so we don't degenerate into a lot of finger-pointing and point-scoring on the issue. Rationally, you can argue that there is nothing wrong with the United States focusing on high-end war fighting and the Europeans on crisis management and peacekeeping. What worries me is that that approach is likely to lead to divergent strategies and threat perceptions across the Atlantic, with the United States increasingly finding NATO unhelpful in the kinds of crises it confronts around the world, and the Europeans finding the Americans unwilling to engage in necessary peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Europe. That's a prescription for NATO irrelevance."

How Big a NATO?

Even before September 11, the United States was viewed as championing a major enlargement of NATO. Formal invitations to as many as seven Eastern European countries could be issued at the Prague summit. In a June 15, 2001, speech in Warsaw, for instance, President Bush not only asserted that "all of Europe's new democracies" from the Baltics to the Black Sea should have an equal chance to join Western institutions such as NATO, but also warned that failure to let them do so would be the moral equivalent of "Yalta," or "Munich," referring respectively to the 1945 alliance conference that surrendered Eastern Europe to Joseph Stalin, and the 1938 talks that surrendered Czechoslovakia to Hitler. With the United States now focused on broad coalition-building in the wake of the September 11 attacks, it is widely presumed within NATO that Washington will push for the broadest possible enlargement, perhaps to include all three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) in the north, and even Bulgaria and Romania in the south.

"I think the United States is going to make a big push for new NATO members at Prague, possibly to the point of lowering the threshold of what new member states must bring to the table in terms of military capability and democratic reforms," said one NATO permanent representative. "The new approach seems to be that first we'll grant them member-

11-L-0559/OSD/6567

snowflak
snowflake

February 15, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Service Secretaries
Under Secretaries
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
Ken Krieg
Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Change

Here is an interesting article Andy Marshall sent me that I thought you would benefit from seeing.

Thanks.

Attach.
Across the Board, Nov/Dec 2000, "Meeting of the Minds"

DHR:dh
021502-1

Please respond by _____

310.1

15 Feb 02

4:14
1 30

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE 14 Feb 2002

MEMO FOR Sec Def

From: Andy Marshall

Since we are not meeting today I am sending you the attached article, which I found very interesting. I have marked a few paragraphs of special interest. Direct application to DOD may not be possible, but the line of thought is on the mark, I think.

Andy

Meeting of the Minds

Peter Drucker and Peter Senge discuss the future and why companies must learn how to walk away from a good thing.

ONE OF THEM HAS COME TO BE KNOWN as the father of modern management, the other as the father of organizational learning. For years, Peter F. Drucker and Peter M. Senge have been two of the biggest names in management thinking. Drucker is the author of 31 books (including the recently published *Management Challenges for the 21st Century*), honorary chairman of the Drucker Foundation, and Clarke Professor of Social Sciences at the Claremont Graduate University. Senge is a senior lecturer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, chairman of the Society of Organizational Learning, and author of, most famously, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*. The two men met at Drucker's home to discuss one of their favorite topics: change. The following is adapted from their three-hour meeting of minds.

The Drucker-Senge conversation, "Leading in a Time of Change," will be available on video in January, with an accompanying viewer's guide. For more information on this co-production of the Drucker Foundation and Jossey-Bass, see www.josseybass.com/druckersenge.

11-L-0559/OSD/6570
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SENGE: If you had to pick two developments in the near future that will be radically different from today, what would they be?

DRUCKER: First, a very large proportion—probably the great majority—of executives will not stay with their present employer or in their present line of work until traditional retirement age. They will leave much earlier, and maybe officially take earlier retirement. And then they will keep on working more or less full-time into their late 70s. Second, as long as they will keep on working, which is probably going to be pretty much the rest of their lives, they will go back to school one way or another—at least every three years. And I don't mean just read a book, and I don't mean just go to a seminar—I mean *go back to school*. I think those changes are predictable and certain, and very few of the executives I know, whether in business or in nonprofits, are prepared for them.

SENGE: I would agree. I've seen a lot of people in the last few years start their second careers way before they ever expected, and in ways they never expected. And in many ways, I think a lot of people have found the work they do as an independent agent is much more interesting, in some ways, than their main career, their first career.

DRUCKER: Forty years ago, when I would say that, everybody talked about how the organization and the personnel department would take care of your career. The Japanese still believe that, by the way. One of the things people will have to learn is that they will have to take charge of their own career. They will have to know where to place themselves; they will have to know when it's time to quit.

SENGE: Will the changes we're living through accelerate in the future?

DRUCKER: Most people think the last few years have been years of very great change. Actually, this is only because the preceding 30 years were so continuous. We are at the point where the transition turns over. We have been through two big transitions in the last 500 years in the West: one starting with Gutenberg, and one starting with the steam engine. After 40 or 50 years, there's a total change, and we're just at that point.

One implication is that every organization will have to become a change leader. You cannot manage change—you can only be ahead of it. Also, the information revolution is just beginning to have an impact. E-commerce is a fundamental change, and—let me say—nobody predicted it, which is very typical. Above all, e-commerce will make the multinational obsolete as we know it today. And at the same time, we can say with certainty—or 90 percent probability—that the new industries that are about to be born will have nothing to do with information.

Biotechnology, for example. I am going to stick my neck out and say the most important new industry of the next 30 years is going to be fish farming. We are moving from being hunters and gatherers on the oceans to being aquaculturalists. And there are a few other industries testing their wings that have nothing to do with information, technologically, but a lot to do with the new mindset.

Lastly, I don't think it's a certainty, but in all probability, the single dominant factor in all developed and emerging countries will be population changes. Only in the English-speaking world do we still have a birthrate barely adequate to maintain the population, and only because of high rates of immigration. In the rest of the developed world, there are no young people. In Italy, the birthrate's down to about one-third of the reproduction rate; in Japan, it's half the reproduction rate. And in all countries except the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia, the number of people under 15 is past its peak. That's unprecedented. Nobody has any experience with it; we don't know what it means. Does it mean that young people will become more precious and more powerful? Or will the pendulum swing to a much older, over-60 age group?

I think that within 10 years, except in the English-speaking countries, the youth market is over. So we may move away from the extreme youth culture of the last 40 years that was based on demographics. It's an old rule that the population group that is both the biggest and growing the fastest determines the mindset and the mood. Since 1950, in all developed countries, these have been people between 15 and 30, or 12 and 25. Now, the fastest-growing age group is 55-plus. And by all historical analogies, they will set the mood and the mindset. Nobody quite knows yet what that's going to be.

SENGE: In an interesting way, we tend to project what the needs of this over-55 age group are going to be by thinking of them as if they were once youths, but no more. In other words, the youth culture has so dominated the way we think that we tend to think of older people as people who have lost their youth rather than people who are actually entering some really fundamental new stage. In China, there's an old saying that the human mind only becomes interesting past the age of 50.

DRUCKER: Yes, but also those people over 55 are very different people—physically and mentally—from those of the past. When I was

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

born, 90-plus percent of the workforce in every country did hard manual labor to make a living. That's down to 20 percent in this country, and the labor isn't that hard anymore. Just a personal story: My great-grandfather, who was minister of labor in Austria, gave a gold medal in 1910 to the steel mill that had killed the fewest people in one year. They killed only 11 per thousand, and they got the gold medal for that year. The only occupational hazard for most people today is hemorrhoids, and those we know how to cure.

Older people today have horizons. They are ready to travel, they jog, they play tennis. For my father, who was in very good shape and lived to be 91, the idea of playing tennis after age 55 was inconceivable—you played tennis until you were 40. So this is a very untraditional older group physically and mentally, and we don't yet really understand them. No one's experienced them before. And we still—not only in the United States, but particularly in Japan and even in France—expect those people to behave like the senile, declining old people of 150 years ago. They don't. And I think this is something nobody's quite prepared for yet.

SENGE: If this is the landscape of the future as you envision it, how do an organization and its leaders deal with a world of such unprecedented changes?

DRUCKER: I'd say two things to the question of how an organization should deal with rapid change. The first is to accept that you have to deal with it, and not believe that this is something you do on Friday afternoon after 3 p.m. The second is to create receptivity to change, and there's only one way to do it: by building organized abandonment into your system. A great sage of 18th-century Britain said that there's nothing that so concentrates a man's mind as to know that he will be hanged in the morning. There's nothing that so concentrates a manager's mind as to know that the present product is going to be abandoned in two years. Otherwise, he won't innovate. Otherwise, he'll postpone.

Innovation is very hard work; you put in five years before you see any output. And in the meantime, you're being compensated on this year's results, and you're going to put more money and human resources into making the old product, the old service.

Every three years, every organization, not just businesses, should sit down and look at every product and every service and every policy, and say, "If we didn't do this already, knowing what we now do, would we go into it?" And if the answer is no, don't make another study.

SENGE: It raises a kind of obvious question, which is *Why is this so hard for us?* Logically, it makes a lot of sense—you just can't keep adding in new things. After a while, the weight of everything that's there kind of holds you back. I think a lot of people in the creative arts have a very good feeling for this, because in the arts you create something and you move on, you create something and you move on, you create something and you move on.

But once we get into organizations and institutions, somehow the dynamics change completely. And it becomes extraordinarily difficult for us to even talk about abandonment. As you said, it's one thing to say that business is dead and we're losing money like mad. But oftentimes, the right time to abandon is much earlier than that—

DRUCKER: Oh, much earlier.

SENGE: —because of the way it's soaking up your creative possibilities by trying to maintain it.

DRUCKER: Once you've started and gotten over the first couple of years, it becomes self-supporting. But to start is very difficult. Let's look at a fellow who, when he was 22, invented a pen and made his career on it. Now he's at the top, and some young whippersnapper comes and designs something that makes it obsolete. The fellow has spent much more time with this pen than he spent with his wife and his children.

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This is his child; this is his life. There is emotional attachment.

SENGE: It's his identity.

DRUCKER: I have seen so many people who have no personality except in their product. And that is a problem. But abandoning gets easier once you start doing it, and once you accept that the time to get rid of a product is not when it no longer produces but when somebody says it still has five good years.

SENGE: I remember years ago, I had a good friend who was the CEO of a very successful computer company. And they had an engineering technical genius who helped found the company. This man, every summer, would build a new sailing boat. They lived in Minnesota, so during the winter it was cold, and this inventor-engineer would work in his shop in his leisure time to build a sailboat. And then the summer would come, and of course Minneapolis doesn't have a very long summer, so he would have his sailboat in the water by mid-June or late-June, and would sail for two months.

Then every year in October, he had a party, and he invited everybody over to his house. And you know what he did at his party? He burned the sailboat. He said, "Unless I burn that sailboat, there's a part of me that will always be trying to fix it. And I have to burn it, I have to get rid of it, so that part of me is available to create something new."

DRUCKER: I have done a lot of work with music and musicians. And there's a letter from Beethoven to the young Schubert in which he said to the very brilliant youngster, "Don't ever spend any time finishing something if it comes hard. Start something new. Two years later, the old thing will finish itself."

SENGE: It seems to me, Peter, that we're on to something really quite fundamental, and I found myself thinking a lot about it as I was reading your book *Management Challenges for the 21st Century*. There really is a difference between an orientation toward creating and an orientation toward problem-solving. And I think our enterprises are dominated by an ethic of problem-solving.

DRUCKER: It's in part the fault of the business schools—and don't underrate their influence in the last 50 years. Problem-solving you can teach. In part it's because the same companies that were there in 1939 still dominated in 1979. So for 40 years, the job was maintenance, and that's problem-solving: If the roof leaks, you have to put some shingles in—you don't build a new house.

SENGE: I think your pointing to the business schools is very appropriate, because it also seems to me that to a high degree, the roots of this are in our whole educational system. As you point out, it's a lot easier to teach right answers and wrong answers. So children grow up thinking life's about solving the problem and getting the correct answer.

DRUCKER: I am a little unhappy with all the talk about creativity. To some extent, it's a cop-out to cover up our *problem* focus. There is no lack of creativity. But we're doing our level best in most organizations to squelch it. There are quite a few exceptions, but by and large, most organizations are not willing to experiment.

The worst, of course, is the government. Two great weaknesses of the government are, first, that everything has to be immediately national. And second, governments simply cannot abandon. They find it very hard. That is a real weakness of government as a performer.

But even small businesses find it very hard to experiment. I say to my clients, "Don't make a study; *go out and try it*. Find a market in which you are strong and which is sufficiently remote—like Salem, Ore.—and go ahead and try it out. And in three weeks you'll know 10 times as much as you'll know from any study, at a fraction of the cost." They are very reluctant to do this. They love the beautiful three-volume study with as much computer graphics as you can get. But all you have to do is go out to the nearest supermarket and try to sell it to find out that nobody buys it.

SENGE: Clearly, there needs to be a willingness to take risks and to try things out. What else does it take to lead change?

DRUCKER: You have to infuse your entire organization with the mindset that change is an opportunity and not a threat. That takes hard work. And then you systematically look at changes. You start out with unexpected success, because that is usually the first indication of an opportunity. And then you look at

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changes that have happened. I tried in a book I wrote 15 years ago to outline the areas in which you look: Demographics is always one and technology is always one, but the others are different for different businesses—with the question *Would this be an opportunity for us?* And then, if it looks like one, you put one or two good people to work on it. It's worth it.

At the same time, you have to be receptive to what comes in over the transom. I don't know how many people had even heard that IBM existed in 1934 or '35 when the lawyers had already drawn up a bankruptcy petition for the company. IBM was going bankrupt because of the first accounting machine—old man Watson had designed it for banks, but in 1934 no American bank bought anything. He had not sold a single one. Then at a dinner he found himself sitting next to a middle-aged lady who said, "What are you doing?" She'd never heard of it, and he described it. And she said, "We need three

tomorrow." And he looked at her, a middle-aged lady, and said, "Why?" And she said, "I'm the chief librarian of the New York Public Library, and we cannot keep inventory of our books." And he sold her five the next day, and that saved IBM. That's a true story. You have to be ready for this.

And that is an attitude at the top, from somebody who enjoys the unexpected. The most important thing I have to tell my people at the top of organizations is that they're not being paid for being clever. They're being paid for being right.

SENGE: There's an element that you're talking about that is completely disregarded in formal management education. We're supposed to figure things out. We're supposed to make the machine work and correct problems when they come up. But, in fact, in creating something, a lot of the most important developments are what you didn't expect. And it's how you recognize and deal with surprise. It's a very different mindset. You kind of appreciate the unexpected.

DRUCKER: And in the next 20 years, that will become absolutely crucial, because there will be a great many surprises. And if every surprise is a threat, we won't be around very long. I'm not saying that every surprise is an opportunity, but every surprise is something to be taken seriously.

SENGE: The problem that happens in a lot of corporations is that people immediately disregard most of the surprises as being not relevant.

DRUCKER: The entire reporting system kind of encourages the neglect of opportunities and surprises, but also it's fairly easy to change. Fifty years ago, a friend and mentor of mine invented a system used in a big company that's become very successful as a result. Every manager, down to the first-line supervisor, sat down every month and wrote a letter with one subject: the unexpected. Not what went right or what went wrong, but the unexpected. And then they had a meeting and looked at these things with the question: *Does this tell us something?* Now, the great majority don't, the great majority are just anecdotes, but there would be three or four that were relevant. And out of this, this company—a pharmaceutical company—has grown from a fairly unimportant commodity producer to one of the world leaders. And it's come out of surprises, clinical surprises, like when a physician uses a medication for what it was not developed for and has amazing results.

You have to focus on success, especially unexpected success, and run with it. Most problems cannot be solved—most problems can only be survived. And one survives problems by making them irrelevant because of success.

This is a matter, above all, of placing people. What I have learned to do is to take a sheet and list our opportunities and the risks. And then I make a list of a few priorities—one cannot do too much. Then I take a list of the best-performing, ablest people in the organization and try to match those two.

SENGE: I think that's one of the most simple and basic lessons for leaders: to find where the energy wants to go, and work with it. I think sometimes there's a part of us that wants to correct the people that are wrong, rather than build something that wants to occur.

I don't know if you've ever noticed this, Peter, but I remember years ago, when I first started teaching, I noticed I had a habit when I was in front of a group of people. There would be 25 people who were attentive and one person with his arms crossed and his head down. And who did I put all my attention on? The one person who was not attentive.

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11-L-0559/OSD/6574

DRUCKER: We all had to learn that.

SENGE: And you have to realize—you let that person be there, and you work with the people who are really engaged. It's one of the most simple and basic lessons of all leadership in any setting: Where is the energy trying to flow, and how do you work with that?

DRUCKER: There's a human law that says that the gap between the one at the top and the average is a constant. And it's terribly hard to work on that huge average. You work on the few at the top, and you raise them, and the rest will follow, even the ones who are sitting with their arms crossed and their heads down.

I have done a fair amount of work with the schools that work, which are largely parochial Christian charter schools. The difference is a very simple one. In our public schools today, we focus on the problems. The parochial schools focus on the kids who want to learn. That's really all the difference. And they make it possible for those kids to learn. They push and push and push them. The rest follow. I'm not saying that's easy, but it works.

I have also worked with some conductors, including the late Georg Solti, who raised the Chicago Symphony Orchestra in five years from a kind of comfortable mediocrity to being world-class. And I asked him, "How do you achieve it?" He said, "I looked at the 128 members in that orchestra, found the 20 who were top-flight and wanted to excel, and worked with them. Sure, I had to fire a second oboe, but for most of the others, suddenly, the standards, the vision had changed."

SENGE: You know, it connects back to something you mentioned earlier, when you said there's no shortage of creativity in organizations. The question is: Are we paying attention to the creativity that's there, trying to come out? Or are we busy trying to move the whole thing in some kind of a lock-step fashion?

DRUCKER: My way of describing it is that a substantial majority of executives in all organizations spend most of their time worrying whether we need a fourth carbon copy and very little on what we use the report for. Organizations have a gravity, the weight is constantly being pushed into being problem-focused and mediocrity-focused, and one has to fight it all the time.

Also, not very many organizations are good at what I call "exploitation of success." Look at what is today the world's largest consumer-electronics entertainment company: Sony. Basically, all Sony has ever done is run with the tape recorder and build on one exploitation. And if you build that into the organization and demand it from everybody, then you create a receptivity for being opportunity-focused rather than problem-focused.

And above all, you create an enjoyment. I know this is not the academically respectable thing to say, but performing organizations enjoy what they're doing. I'm always asked how I know what kind of an organization to accept as a client. When you walk through the door, you know in two minutes whether they enjoy it. And if they don't enjoy it, then I'd rather not work for them. But if they like it and they feel that tomorrow is going to be better—that creates a totally different climate.

SENGE: Remember we talked once before about what distinguishes volunteer organizations? We tend to think that in a traditional organization people are producing results because management wants results, but the essence of a volunteer organization is people producing results because *they want the results*.

And I think what you said before is so true. It's puzzling why we find it so hard to understand that if people are really enjoying their work, they'll innovate, they'll take risks, they'll have trust with one another because they really are committed to what they're doing. And it's fun. Deming used to talk about the right to joy in work. And Americans all thought this sounded very naïve and romantic. It's always puzzled me why people think that's so strange.

DRUCKER: No, that's anything but romantic—that's pure realism. But one reason for our attitude is the legacy that work is a curse. It is amazing how quickly people go down in retirement; most of them deteriorate. Work is one of the two dimensions of the human being. The other one is love and family. And those who perform love what they're doing.

I'm not saying they like everything they do. That's something quite different. Everybody has to do a lot of routine; there's an enormous amount of routine. Every great pianist has to do three hours of playing scales each day. And nobody will tell you that they love it. You have to do it. It's not fun, but you enjoy it because—I've talked to pianists about it—because even after 40 years you still feel the fingers improving. Pianists have a wonderful expression I heard many years ago: "I practice until I have my life in my fingers." And, sure, it's a dull routine, but you enjoy it.

The same is true of people I've seen in business who enjoy the work. Their routine is: *It's got to be done, and I enjoy it because I enjoy the work.* And that is the difference, I believe, not between mediocrity and performing, but between what you call a "learning organization"—one where the whole organization grows and then the process changes—and an organization that maybe does very well but nobody misses it after 5 o'clock. ■

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11-L-0559/OSD/6575

snowflake

305

Done 11/6

October 1, 2002 7:16 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Laser Designators

Are we currently arranged so that every unit will have some laser designator and that we could even provide some for allies, with some trained operators? I don't have any idea what the optimum number is, so that all U.S. elements and all allied elements have them. Someone probably ought to talk to Gen. Jumper.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-6

Please respond by 10/25/02

10/1/02

Snowflake

OCT - 2 2002

EF2988
021614557

October 1, 2002 7:39 AM

ISA

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

Larry Di Rita
10/30

Please have someone check what the Iraqi opposition's views are of Nizar Hamdoon and what has happened to him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-12

Please respond by 10/25/02

~~ISA lead~~
~~Suspense 10/22~~

Response Attached

Snowflake

307

Done - See attached

October 2, 2002 11:26 AM

TO: Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: List for Special Operations Command

Please don't forget to give me the list of the things we have asked Gen. Holland to do at Special Operations Command—what date he delivered on them, things still underway we've asked for, and the due date.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100202-3

Please respond by 10/18/02

SOCOM

2 Octo2

11-L-0559/OSD/6578

1103227 /03

Snowflake

#310

October 7, 2002 3:34 PM

Korea

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: South Korea

Larry Di Rita 10/12

We ought to be looking into this anti-American sentiment in South Korea. Here is a cable on it. Please get back to me with your assessment.

Thanks.

Attach.
02633Z CIA 499225

DHR:dh
100702-62

70CT02

11-L-0559/OSD/6579

U03262 /03

snowflake

September 9, 2002 4:16 PM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: World Military Powers

I'd like to have a piece of paper that shows me the top military powers in the world, the top ten or fifteen. I would like to see land, air, and sea power separately ranked, and then overall military capability, with some rough numbers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090902-40

Please respond by 09/27/02

snowflake

318

Done

October 15, 2002 3:29 PM

350.09

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: HUMINT Authorities

F

Please take a look at this memo from Jim Haynes and see if you agree that we ought to have some sort of a prior understanding with George Tenet.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/07/02 GC memo to SecDef re: HUMINT Authorities

DHR:dh
101502-46

Please respond by 11/01/02

15 OCT 02

C 10/10

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2002

INFO MEMO

October 7, 2002, 4:00 P.M.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

FROM: Richard L. Shiffrin, Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: HUMINT Authorities

- Relevant to the discussion this past Saturday, the Department of Defense authority to engage in HUMINT activities derives from several sources:

  - **50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(4), The National Security Act of 1947, § 105(b)(4).** "Consistent with section 103 and 104 of this Act [responsibilities and authorities of the DCI], the Secretary of Defense shall ensure through the Defense Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified system within the Department of Defense for the production of timely, objective military and military-related intelligence, based upon all sources available to the intelligence community, and shall ensure the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence to authorized recipients;"

  - **50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(5), The National Security Act of 1947, § 105(b)(5).** "Consistent with section 103 and 104 of this Act [responsibilities and authorities of the DCI], the Secretary of Defense shall ensure through the Defense Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), effective management of Department of Defense human intelligence activities, including defense attaches;"

  - **50 U.S.C. 403-5(c), The National Security Act of 1947, § 105(c).** "The Secretary of Defense, in carrying out the functions described in this section, may use such elements of the Department of Defense as may be appropriate for the execution of those functions, in addition to, or in lieu of, the elements identified in this section."

- **Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," § 1.11(a) (1981)**
  "The Secretary of Defense shall collect national foreign intelligence and be responsive to collection tasking by the Director of Central Intelligence;"

- **Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," § 1.11(b) (1981)**
  "The Secretary of Defense shall collect, produce and disseminate military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as required for execution of the Secretary's responsibilities;"

- **Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," § 1.11(c) (1981)**
  "The Secretary of Defense shall conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental and tactical foreign intelligence requirements;"

- **Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," § 1.12(a)(1) (1981)**
  "In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in section 1.11, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the … Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include [c]ollection, production, or, through tasking and coordination, provision of military and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies;"

- **Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," § 1.12(a)(2) (1981)**
  "In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in section 1.11, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the … Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include [c]ollection and provision of military intelligence for national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence products;"

- **Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," § 1.12(a)(1) (1981)**
  "In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in section 1.11, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the … Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include [m]anagement of the Defense Attache system;"

- **National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad,"§ 4.a (1972)**
  "Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above [relating to coordination with DCI], other departments and agencies with commands or installations located outside the U.S. and its possessions may conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;

- **National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad," § 8.a (1972)**
  "In active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs [, e]xcept as provided in subparagraph b below [circumstances in which CIA may continue to independently conduct espionage and counterintelligence operations], the entire Central Intelligence Agency organization conducting espionage and clandestine counterintelligence operations in or from a theater shall, as a component force be under the direct command of the U.S. Theater Commander, in accordance with agreements separately reached between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, and shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations."

NOTE TO SECDEF

• suggest you and DCI discuss how you want to arrange the command relationships for Iraq.

W Haynes

- The Department of Defense authority to engage in HUMINT activities is affected by the following legal authorities:

  - **50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2), The National Security Act of 1947, § 105(a)(2).**
    "The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall ensure appropriate implementation of the policies and resource decisions of the Director of Central Intelligence by elements of the Department of Defense within the National Foreign Intelligence Program;"

  - **50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(3), The National Security Act of 1947, § 105(a)(3).**
    "The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall ensure that the tactical intelligence activities of the Department of Defense complement and are compatible with intelligence activities under the National Foreign Intelligence Program;"

11-L-0559/OSD/6584

snowflake

~~TAB A~~

October 11, 2002 9:37 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Special Operations

LTG

How do we get the Special Operations people out of the training function? Maybe we just ought to have an understanding that we won't assign them anymore, so when they finish in Afghanistan and Georgia, it's over unless there is some unusual situation.

I would like to know when Georgia ends and, given the fact that Afghanistan could go on a long time, I would like you to propose who should replace them and what the timetable should be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101102-13

Please respond by 11/01/02

SAA - John, this was discussed w/SD and is in the "kill" pile. Myers 11/4

Response Attached

C 11/2 LTG Craddock

U03270 /03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/6585

Snowflake

TAB A

October 16, 2002 8:59 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Terminology

Let's see if we can come up with better phrases to replace "swiftly defeat" and "win decisively."

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101602-16

Please respond by 11/01/02

11/9

Myers response attached

Tab A

Snowflake

Done 11/8

October 17, 2002 10:18 AM

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: "Marshall Center" in Kuwait

I was told yesterday that Kuwait is ready to help host a Marshall Center type activity in Kuwait. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101702-15

Please respond by 11/01/02

snowflake

February 25, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: David Chu
Gordon England
James Roche
Tom White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Safety

I am attaching some comments Paul O'Neill sent me regarding our safety record tracking. He is commenting on the Navy's format, but his suggestions may apply across-the-board.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/19/02 Secretary O'Neill memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
022202-9

Please respond by 03/04/02

729

25 Feb 02

snowflake

2002-se-001516

February 11, 2002 2:19 PM

2002 FEB 15 A 10:48

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Safety Records

Would you please take a look at these and tell me how I can change the format and improve the performance?

Thanks. Regards.

Attach.
01/28/02 SecNAV memo to SecDef re: Safety Records

DHR:dh
021102-54

11-L-0559/OSD/6589

U02659-02

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

February 19, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL

Before I got this in the mail back to you I received the Navy/Marine report.

If I were doing this for you, I would begin by using the OSHA reporting scheme and definitions for all of DOD (civilian and military). "Lost time case rates per 100 workers per year" has clarity. Second, if the people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours. Third, the civilian only rates in the Marine Corps are at the upper end (bad) range of U.S. work experience. (Looks like 35-40 times higher than the organization I know the best, where the environment is much more challenging than the one experienced by Marine Corps civilians.)

Attachments

FEB-19-2002 18:20 US TREASURY 130688 P.02

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JAN 28 PM 12:44

January 28, 2002

TO: Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: Safety Records

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 11 2002

This is to provide our first quarterly safety report per your request (attached).

Safety is one of my top priorities. My first act was to establish myself as Chief of Safety for the Department of the Navy and to place responsibility for safety directly with me. We immediately established a Deputy Assistant Secretary position devoted solely to Safety. Weekly, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I monitor accident trends. Attached are the metrics I will submit to you quarterly.

My focus areas are:

(1) Unify the safety effort in the Department.
(2) Use state-of-the-art technologies to improve safety and occupational health.
(3) Embed strong safety and risk management characteristics in our Naval culture.
(4) Integrate best private and public sector safety practices.

You will start seeing improvements.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/30
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	1/31
MA BUCCI	2/1/01
EXECSEC WHITMORE	2/1/02

11-L-0559/OSD/6591 U01591 /02

FEB-19-2002 18:20 US TREASURY 130688 P.04

Navy and Marine Corps
Total Class A Operational Mishap Rates
As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of $1 million or more.

FEB-19-2002 18:21 US TREASURY 130608 P.06

Navy and Marine Corps Class A Flight Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. A Class A mishap is
involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-milit
destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of $1 million or more.

Navy Afloat
Class A Mishap Rates
As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100 ships per year. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of $1 million or more.

FEB-19-2002 18:21 US TREASURY 130669 P.08

Navy and Marine Corps
Class A Ashore Mishap Rates
As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A mi
mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or no
personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of $1 million o

Navy and Marine Corps
PMV Fatality Rates
As of 31 Dec 01

PERSONAL MOTOR VEHICLES



Rates reflect military fatalities per 100,000 personnel per year.

FEB-19-2002 18:21 US TREASURY 130699 P.10

Navy and Marine Corps
Federal Civilian
Lost Time Case Rates
As of 31 Oct 01



Civilian lost time case rates = total number of worker's compensation cases involving lost time injuries per 100 workers per year.

Information Only Coversheet

Friday, February 15, 2002

PROFILE #: 2002-SE-001516

DATE CREATED: 02/15/2002

ADDRESSEE: Paul H. O'Neill
Secretary

AUTHOR: Rumsfeld, Donald
Defense

SUBJECT: Safety Records

ABSTRACT: Requests assistance in changing the format and improving the safety performance of the Navy and Marine Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
CHIEF OF STAFF

FEB-19-2002 18:21 US TREASURY 130688 P.11

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

February 15, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL PHO'N

DR: This is such a mish mash of non-comparable data it isn't possible to draw any conclusion. Look at #7 – someone who doesn't understand the difference between rates and # of cases wrote this section!

If you will send someone over who understands the facts I will give you an answer to your question.

From what I see in this report – e.g., the Secretary (of the Army) receives **quarterly** reports -- it is not possible to have a system that learns from itself.

Attachments

Before I got this in the mail back to you I received the Navy/marine report.

If I were doing this for you, I would begin by using the OSHA reporting scheme and definitions for all of DOD (civilian and military) "lost time case rates per 100 workers per year" for clarity. Second, if the people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours. Third the civilian only rates in the marine corps are at the upper end of the U.S. work experience.

11-L-0559/OSD/6599

know the best, where the work environment is much more challenging than the one experienced by Marine Corps civilians.)

FEB-19-2002 18:21 US TREASURY 130588 P.13

snowflake

February 4, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Safety

Here is the quarterly report from the Army on safety. Are they on the right track?

Thanks.

Attach.
01/31/02 SecArmy Info Memo to SecDef re: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

DHR:dh
020402-4

Look at #7 - someone who doesn't understand the difference between rates and # of cases wrote this section!

DR: This is such a mishmash of non-comparable data it isn't possible to draw any conclusion. If you will send someone over who understands the facts I will give you an answer to your question. From what I see in this report -- e.g. the Sec. receives quarterly reports -- it is not possible to have a system that learns from itself.

PO'Neill
2-15-02

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

2002 FEB -1 AM 10:39

SECDEF HAS SEEN

February 1, 2002, 8:33 A.M. FEB 04 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army JAN 31 2002

SUBJECT: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

- Attached provides a current analysis of Safety goals and performance metrics.
- The small increase in fatalities that we experienced during the first quarter, FY 02 is attributable to Operation Enduring Freedom.
- POV accidents continue to be our greatest challenge and the focus of our efforts to reemphasize the efforts of commanders at every level to continue to work this problem hard.
- We have made significant strides in reducing workplace injuries and lost time involving the Army's civilian workforce.
- Safety will remain at the forefront of our efforts to keep the Army ready.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

Prepared By: COL Joseph Schroedel, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Army Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

1. PURPOSE: To provide a quarterly update to the Secretary of Defense on U.S. Army Safety Statistics.

2. The Army has an effective safety program. The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) and I have recently approved a Safety Strategic Campaign plan that is closely tied to The Army Transformation Plan. In October 2000, the CSA established a goal of reducing overall fatalities in The Army by 6 percent per year through FY06. Our current metrics are based on these goals.

3. On a quarterly basis, the CSA and I receive an executive summary and a briefing from the Director of Army Safety on accident rates and trends for all Army categories to include: army motor vehicles, army combat vehicles, personal injury, POV, and aviation. Army-wide initiatives designed to reduce accident rates and stop negative trends are discussed with the senior leaders and attendees.

4. The 6 percent reduction in overall fatalities goal is attainable and consistent with the decreases in accidental fatalities The Army has experienced over the past 10 years. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY02.



5. In this first quarter of FY02, The Army lost 46 soldiers. This represented a 15 percent increase over the same time last year. Leaders and commanders took action and this spike in accidents has since leveled off to where The Army stands at one less fatality than last year at this time. Accidents related to Operation Enduring Freedom account for approximately 10% (5 fatalities) of Army accidental fatalities in the first quarter of FY02.

6. POV accidents continue to be the number one killer of Army soldiers. FY01 had an eleven percent reduction in POV fatalities. For FY92 to FY01, POV accidents accounted for approximately 60-65 percent of the total Army accident fatalities. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY01.



7. We continue to make progress in reducing workplace injuries and illnesses involving The Army's civilian workforce. In FY 93, over 28 of every 1,000 workers lost time from the job as a result of working conditions. In FY 01, this number had dropped to approximately 18 of every 1,000 workers. The graph below depicts year-end lost workday cases and the rate or cases per 100,000 employees from FY92 to FY01.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

2002 MAR 11 PM 12: 57

INFO MEMO

March 7, 2002
DepSecDef _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 3/8/02

SUBJECT: Lost Days Inquiry Response

- This paper responds to Secretary O'Neill's comments on Army, Navy, and Marines safety record tracking at Tab A.

- I concur with Dr. Chu's assessment of Secretary O'Neill's comments at Tab B. Ray DuBois is working closely with P&R and ODUSD(I&E) co-chairs the "Lost Day" Integrated Process Team (IPT). We will continue to support Dr. Chu on the Lost Day Integrated Process Team.

- I would like to emphasize Secretary O'Neill's second point "if people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours." Department leaders need near real time visibility of serious safety & health incidents (deaths, serious accidents and injuries, etc) in addition to close scrutiny of lost time injury and illness. We will work with the Services in conjunction with P&R to identify and implement quick, system-wide data sharing. Our initial focus will be on real time web-based incident reporting.

- The National Safety Council (NSC) completed a peer review in December, 2001 of the DoD's safety and occupational health programs. The NSC assembled a panel of experts from industry, labor, and government and made recommendations including best industry practices to improve our safety and health programs. The NSC Panel has conservatively estimated that the annual cost of injuries and illness for the DoD ranges from $10 billion to over $21 billion. The NSC report is at Tab C. Ray DuBois will continue to work with the Service Assistant Secretaries to review and implement the relevant recommendations of the National Safety Council report.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Curtis Bowling, I&E (SOH) (b)(6) 2088 - 2002 AT

11-L-0559/OSD/6605 1104409 /02

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2002
DepSecDef _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Lost Days Inquiry Response

- This paper responds to Secretary O'Neill's comments on our safety record tracking at Tab A.

- Secretary O'Neill's comments reflect his in-depth understanding of managing lost time due to injuries. His review of the Army and Navy safety information is on target and we are working to address his concerns.

- Our civilian prototype "Lost Day" system calculates the incident (case) rates and days lost due to injuries as Secretary O'Neill suggested. Our system is based on payroll records, not compensation claims, and provides for objective and auditable data. We are also working on a prototype to capture similar information for our military personnel using medical data. This have proven more difficult.

- We are working towards an "objective system" that will provide real time facts regarding the incident that is similar to what Secretary O'Neill suggests. Our "Lost Day" Integrated Process Team (IPT) met mid-February to review progress and set DoD goals to reduce injuries by the end of the year.

- The third point mentioned by Secretary O'Neill is that the Marine Corps civilian case rate is at the high (bad) range of the U.S. work experience. Our data from the payroll and medical records confirms that point and suggests we have room for improvement.

- We will be prepared to brief you on our current efforts and proposed goals for managing lost time due to injuries by early April.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., RP&A, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6606

TAB

C

Department of Defense
Executive Assessment of Safety and Occupational Health Management Systems

Submitted to:

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

Prepared by:

National Safety Council
1121 Spring Lake Drive
Itasca, Illinois 60143-3201

December 6, 2001

11-L-0559/OSD/6608

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT PANEL MEMBERS.....
SUPPORT TEAM.....
PRESENTERS.....

1.0 INTRODUCTION.....
- 1.1. BACKGROUND.....
- 1.2. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES.....
- 1.3. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE.....

2.0 ASSESSMENT OF DOD SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM.....
- 2.1. LEADERSHIP.....
- 2.2. CULTURE.....
- 2.3. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT.....
- 2.4. COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS.....
- 2.5. PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT.....
- 2.6. ACQUISITIONS.....
- 2.7. CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT.....
- 2.8. OFF-THE-JOB SAFETY.....

3.0 CONCLUSION.....

APPENDIX A – LETTER TO HON. DONALD RUMSFELD (May 29, 2001).....
APPENDIX B – LETTER TO NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL (June 26, 2001)...
APPENDIX C – BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF PANEL MEMBERS
APPENDIX D – BEST PRACTICES: DETAILED.....
APPENDIX E – COST METHODOLOGY.....
APPENDIX F – OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, MAJOR COMPONENTS.....

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In May 2001, the National Safety Council (NSC) proposed a partnership with the Department of Defense (DoD) to work together on critical safety and health initiatives. The Secretary of Defense accepted the offer, and the NSC began its work in August by assembling a panel of experts from industry, labor and the government. This expert panel was charged with the task of helping the DoD improve its operational readiness capabilities. The focus of this study was an executive assessment of DoD's safety and occupational health management systems.

Although the Panel's review identified many areas of occupational safety and health excellence, **the major finding of the NSC assessment was the lack of an effective Department-wide safety and occupational health management system.** This deficiency has serious consequences for the Department's mission because preventable injuries and illnesses absorb substantial human and financial resources that are needed for operational readiness. The NSC Panel was unable to precisely determine the full cost impact of these preventable incidents throughout the DoD because aggregate data were not available. The NSC Panel has conservatively estimated that the annual cost of injuries and illnesses for the DoD ranges from $10 billion to over $21 billion.[1]

The DoD does not view occupational injury and illness loss as a key readiness concern that requires Department-level management commitment and leadership. The NSC panel found that, in the DoD, safety and occupational health generally have low visibility. There is no central, corporate management system to ensure coordinated policy, advocacy and oversight. The DoD lacks the data system to collect and analyze fundamental information needed for sound decision-making with respect to occupational injuries and illnesses.

The nation's leading businesses see the prevention of injuries and illnesses as a core business value that reduces human, social, financial and productivity costs and improves the bottom line. DoD also has a bottom line: operational readiness. Like industry, it needs to manage injuries and illnesses and reduce their adverse impact on operational readiness. DoD needs to integrate safety and occupational health into its overall management system. This effort will require senior leadership commitment and the development of new system components to ensure continuous improvement of safety and occupational health performance throughout the Department.

The NSC Panel conducted a high-level review of the management systems used in the DoD for safety and occupational health. Its principal recommendations follow.

[1] Appendix E describes the methodologies and assumptions employed in developing this estimate.

11-L-0559/OSD/6610

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of Defense should take the following actions to demonstrate that safety and occupational health are core values within the DoD:

- Demonstrate a continuing, strong, personal commitment to safety and occupational health within the DoD.

- Establish safety and health as an executive-level business responsibility by assigning overall system oversight to an existing executive-level committee reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Include safety and occupational health as an integral part of both the Defense Planning Guidance and Medical Planning Guidance systems.

- Provide the DoD safety and occupational health office with the authority, personnel and resources to meet its responsibility for the policy, advocacy and oversight of safety and occupational health issues within the Department.

- Establish a uniform performance measurement system within the DoD that provides senior management with the information necessary to ensure continuous improvement of safety and occupational health performance. The system should allow management to determine the human, financial and operational readiness impact of occupational injuries, illnesses and deaths.

11-L-0559/OSD/6611

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The National Safety Council ("NSC"), founded in 1913, is the nation's leading advocate of safety and health in the workplace, on the highways, and in homes and communities. The NSC was chartered by the United States Congress in 1953, by PL-83-259, and is the only safety and health organization chartered by the Federal Government. The NSC is a non-profit, non-governmental public service organization whose mission includes the responsibility

"...to arouse and maintain the interest of the people of the United States in safety and in accident prevention...."

This special report to the Secretary of Defense and the information and insights gained in the course of this review would not have been possible without the knowledge and candor of the officers and civilians within the many staff components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services' headquarters staff, and the men and women at selected commands and installations who make up the vast network of safety and health professionals within the DoD.

In particular, the Services provided staff to supplement the NSC staff working on the project. The efforts of this technical support staff were invaluable.

The members of the NSC Panel volunteered their valuable time and energy to help improve the lives of the military and civilian personnel with the armed Services. Their effort shows dedication both to continuous safety and health improvement and to their country.

The NSC hopes that the information and recommendations contained in this report will enable the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants to expand the already impressive infrastructure supporting the safety and occupational health of uniformed, civilian and contract personnel, reduce the number and severity of injuries and illnesses sustained by these personnel, and provide improvements in the operational readiness of our nation's military.

11-L-0559/OSD/6612

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT PANEL MEMBERS

Gerard (Jerry) Scannell, President Emeritus (Chair)
National Safety Council

Leo Carey, CIH, Director, Government Services (Vice Chair)
National Safety Council

Karl Bossung, Corporate Manager, Health and Safety
Delphi Automotive Systems

Ernest Clayton, Director, Safety, Health and Environmental Affairs
Boeing Companies

Michael N. Ferrara, Manager, SAFE Fleet
Johnson & Johnson

Deborah L. Grubbe, PE, Corporate Director – Safety and Health
DuPont

Jackie Nowell, CIH, MPH, Director, Occupational Safety & Health Office
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union – AFL-CIO

James Lee McAtee, Acting Director, Environment, Safety and Health
Los Alamos National Lab

Charles F. Redinger, CIH, MPA, Ph.D., Principal
Redinger & Associates, Inc.

Knut Ringen, PhD, President
Stoneturn Consultants

Rosemary Sokas, MD, Associate Director for Science
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

James Thornton, CIH, CSP, Director, Environmental Health & Safety
Newport News Shipbuilding

Richard Waxweiler, Ph.D., Director, Division of Acute Care
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC

11-L-0559/OSD/6613

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM

Elizabeth Agnvall, Technical Writer

Patricia S. Bradley, CIH, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, on detail to Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations

Todd Briggs, Government Relations Program Specialist, National Safety Council

Lee Feldstein, Manager, Environmental Programs, National Safety Council

Ken Gladstone, REM, Director, Safety Management Office of Environment and Safety (SEA 00TP), Naval Sea Systems Command United States Navy on detail to the National Safety Council

Captain Philip Goff, BSC, CIH Fellow, Environmental and Occupational Health Division, Air Force Medical Operations Agency, Office of the Surgeon General, United States Air Force

Major Anthony Intrepido, CIH, Program Manager, Industrial Hygiene Field Services Program, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, United States Army

Larry Liberatore, Program Specialist, Office of Government Services, National Safety Council, on detail from the United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Mike Quigley, Occupational Safety and Health Director, Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, MD, United States Navy

11-L-0559/OSD/6614

DoD AND MILITARY SERVICE BRIEFING TEAMS
August 2001

Department of Defense

Mr. Curtis Bowling, Asst. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), Safety and Occupational Health

Mr. Craig Schilder, Asst. for Safety Policy, Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), Safety and Occupational Health

Air Force

Maj. Gen. Timothy Peppe, Chief of Air Force Safety, Safety Center

Col. Brian McCarty, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health)

Col. Forrest Sprester, BSC, RLS, PE, DEE, Chief, Environmental and Occupational Health Division, Office of the Surgeon General

Lt. Col. John Coho, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health)

Mr. John Phillips, Chief, Air Force Safety Policy, Plans & Programs, Safety Center

Mr. J.R. Russell, Chief, Air Force Ground Safety, Safety Center

Maj. Tom DeVenoge, Environmental and Occupational Health Division, Office of the Surgeon General

Army

Mr. Raymond Fatz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Environment, Office of the Secretary of the Army

Brig. Gen. Lester Martinez-Lopez, Commander, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)

Col. Kotu K Phull, Assistant for Occupational Health (outgoing), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Environment, Office of the Secretary of the Army

Col. Paul D. Smith, Occupational/Environmental Medicine Staff Officer, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)

Col. Charles Welliver, Deputy Director, Army Safety Center

Col. Hershall Wolfe, Assistant Chief, Medical Service Corps and Consultant for Environmental Science & Engineering, Office of the Surgeon General

11-L-0559/OSD/6615

DoD AND MILITARY SERVICE BRIEFING TEAMS
August 2001
(continued)

Army (continued)

Mr. Gary Abriz, Assistant for Safety, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Environment, Office of the Secretary of the Army

Ms. Donna Doganiero, Director, Occupational Health Sciences, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)

Lt. Col. Steven P. Jones, Assistant for Occupational Health (incoming), of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Environment, Office of the Secretary of the Army

Lt. Col. Mary Lopez, Ergonomics Program Manager, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)

Lt. Col. Paul Smith, Occupational/Environmental Medicine Staff Officer, Office of the Surgeon General

Navy

Mr. Dan Reinhard, Director, Safety, Occupational Health & Fire Policy, Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Navy, (Safety)

Ms. Joy Erdman, Head, Safety and Occupational Health, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Capt. Bill Stover, Branch Head, Occupational Health and Safety, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Surgeon General's Office

Capt. Kurt Garbow, Liaison to the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Safety Center

Marine Corps

Mr. Albert Lillibridge, Deputy Director, Safety Division, HQ USMC

Ms. Anna Marie Pratt, Program Manager, Off Duty & Recreational Programs, HQ USMC

Ms. Freya Arroyo, Safety Engineer, HQ USMC

Lt. Col. James Grace, Head, Military Operations/Training Branch, HQ USMC

Capt. Leonard Martin, Aviation Safety Officer, HQ USMC

11-L-0559/OSD/6616

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Paul H. O'Neill, who was chairman and CEO for Alcoa before taking the U.S. Treasury Secretary post, said the nation's employers should set dramatic goals for reducing injury rates.

"The only legitimate goal is zero," O'Neill said in his address to the April 2001 Workplace Safety Summit held at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

Alcoa was able to make dramatic gains in its severity injury rate – reducing it from 1.86 in 1987 to a current rate of 0.14 per 100 – not only by setting hard-to-reach goals but also by taking some unusual steps to ensure that management and workers "bought" into the effort.

"One of the things you have to do is say to everyone in the organization, that if something has to be done" it will be, he said. "I went to managers and said, there are no excuses anymore."

"You start to think you can't afford to get better" because the resources required provide diminishing returns, he said. "But you have to say, safety is not a value. Safety is a precondition" for a company to operate, he said.

"Most of what we need to do to get to zero [employee injuries] is not about huge investments, it's mostly about process and commitment – and constant learning," he said.

Remarks by U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill
at the April 2001 Workplace Safety Summit,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

With approximately 3.5 million men and women civilians and uniformed personnel (the active military, the National Guard and Reserves) the United States Department of Defense is the largest employer in the country. In addition to its size, the U.S. military is unlike any other employer. It confronts virtually all of the safety and health challenges facing corporate America, ranging from those in the manufacturing and service industries to those in research and development and office administration. At the same time, it must retain a constant state of operational readiness to meet the nation's national security and emergency preparedness needs.

As the U.S. Armed Forces deploy in the war against terrorism and continue to protect Americans at home, all civilian and uniformed personnel are critical components of overall force readiness. In addition, every dollar spent as a result of occupational injuries and illnesses is a dollar that could be spent on military priorities.

11-L-0559/OSD/6617

Historically, the U.S. military has lost more lives to disease and non-battle injuries than as a direct result of combat.[2] Tragically, the first casualty in the war against terrorism was an airman killed in an accident while engaged in a forklift operation.

What is the financial cost of DoD occupational injuries and illnesses? Currently, the DoD has no ready way to obtain an accurate accounting of this cost. Although injury and illness data abound among the Services, no standard measures are used to describe costs, nor is there a comprehensive DoD-wide data collection and analysis system. Further, the DoD does not use performance measures to link these costs with their overall impact on operational readiness. Nevertheless, we conservatively estimate the total cost of DoD-wide occupational injuries, illnesses and death ranges somewhere from $10 billion to more than $21 billion annually.

Although financial costs are certainly important, readiness is the military's true bottom line. Occupational injuries and illnesses may impact operational readiness in a number of ways: losses in skilled manpower which require the recruitment and training of replacements; losses in efficiency and productivity caused by degradation, damage and loss of equipment; and loss of senior managers' focus on readiness as attention is diverted to dealing with injury and illness issues.

It would be inappropriate, however, to measure occupational injuries and illnesses only in terms of monetary cost. Each of the 400 plus fatalities and thousands of injuries and illnesses military and civilian personnel reported in 2000 has far-reaching human costs as well.

The NSC Panel believes that the DoD and the Services can greatly reduce both the human and monetary costs associated with preventable occupational injuries and illnesses and set an example for others by instituting a world-class safety and occupational health management system.

[2] "Disease and non-battle injuries historically have accounted for three-quarters or more of battlefield admissions (69 percent in Vietnam, over 95 percent in World War II and Somalia.)" Force Health Protection, Healthy and Fit Force, Casualty Prevention, Casualty Care and Management; pg. 17

11-L-0559/OSD/6618

1.1. BACKGROUND

In May 2001 Alan McMillan, President & CEO of the National Safety Council, sent a letter to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, suggesting a partnership between the National Safety Council and the DoD. The purpose of this proposed partnership was to work together on critical safety and health initiatives. Mr. McMillan proposed that an expert panel composed of private sector safety and health experts conduct an analysis of the DoD's safety and occupational health management system with the goal of improving the DoD's operational readiness capabilities.

On behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld, Mr. Raymond DuBois, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations & Environment, accepted the NSC proposal to conduct a high-level review of the DoD safety and occupational health management systems.

The National Safety Council convened an expert panel composed of industry safety and health executives, government experts, and labor representatives. Staff members of the National Safety Council and military and civilian support personnel with the safety and health community on loan from the Services to the National Safety Council augmented the team.

The purpose of this NSC initiative was to conduct an assessment of the DoD safety and occupational health management systems, identify strengths and weaknesses and make recommendations for improvements. The expert panel's framework is based on best practices within industry and on national and international standards and guidelines.

The analysis seeks to highlight areas where the DoD and the Services currently conform to the best practices for safety and occupational health management systems and to identify priority areas where improvements would ultimately reduce occupational injuries, illnesses and fatalities. The results of this analysis provide the basis for developing specific recommendations and implementation plans for a comprehensive safety and occupational health management system.

11-L-0559/OSD/6619

1.3 METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE

During the week of August 6, 2001, representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps presented summaries of their safety and occupational health management systems to the NSC Panel. The Service representatives provided details on their safety and occupational health policies, implementation, accountability, goals, objectives, performance, auditing and data collection. The NSC Panel and support team then conducted interviews with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and each of the Services to examine the details of their systems.

The Panel conducted brainstorming sessions on DoD's programs, identified best practices, and focused on a number of key functional areas. The NSC Panel and the project support team examined each of these subject areas. In addition to attending the briefings, the combined team reviewed briefing materials, military policy, directives and instructions, and conducted personal interviews with civilian and military staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General's Office, and each of the Services.

As part of the review, the Panel Chair offered the line leadership of the Services (Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries) the opportunity to provide direct input to the Panel. Also, NSC staff apprised the staff of the Congressional committees responsible for DoD oversight of the project.

The NSC did not review the implementation of specific programs or conduct systematic site visits. The Panel focused its attention on the safety and occupational health management systems affecting DoD's uniformed, civilian, and contractor personnel. In addition, we looked at the issue of off-the-job injuries and illnesses. We did not analyze the organization and interrelationships between DoD and other components of the total force concept, such as the National Guard and the Reserves; limitations of time and resources necessitated this reduction in scope. The Panel's recommendations to improve DoD safety and occupational health management systems may, however, also be applicable to these other components. Nor did the NSC Panel examine external factors that might influence DoD safety and occupational health performance. For example, a number of people who commented felt that occupational safety and health performance in DoD would improve if the Occupational Safety and Health Act, including sanctions, were applied to DoD. Such a recommendation was outside the scope of this document.

11-L-0559/OSD/6620

2.0 ASSESSMENT OF DoD's SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Within the last decade or so, management system concepts, theories, and practices have been applied to the well-established recognition, evaluation, and control-based practice of Occupational Safety and Health (OSH). This is evident in OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), the Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible Care program, and numerous International Organization for Standardization (ISO)-based standards around the world. Management system approaches in OSH have matured today to the point where common elements can be found in most, if not all, of the prominent management system approaches.

In the simplest terms, management systems are a way to organize OSH management activities. They contain a body of key activities that have been found to improve OSH performance. They also provide a way to measure OSH performance, particularly when leading indicators are measured. From a systems theory point of view, a system can also be described in terms of four components: inputs, process, outputs, and feedback. It is possible to arrange the components of the major management system approaches in terms of these four system components. Such an arrangement can facilitate an understanding of how the components relate to each other. See Appendix F for definitions of some key components of major management system approaches.

Organizations throughout the world have begun to use these management system concepts in their efforts to improve OSH performance. They have found, as have many of the Panel member's organizations, that these arrangements do lead to improved OSH performance and provide a way to measure improvement.

Based on a synthesis of several of the management system approaches, industry best practices, and findings from the Panel's deliberations with DoD, the following eight areas were assessed:

Leadership	Personnel Involvement
Culture	Acquisitions
Performance Measurement Systems	Contractor Management
Communication Systems	Off-the-Job Safety

11-L-0559/OSD/6621

2.1 LEADERSHIP

Companies with successful safety and health programs have active senior management participation. Without this active involvement, mid-level managers and front-line supervisors tend to ignore safety and health as an issue.

National Safety Council, "14 Elements of a Successful Safety & Health Program"

Management commitment to occupational health and safety may be operationally defined as: 1) the allocation of sufficient resources for the proper functioning of an OHS program or management system; 2) the establishment of organizational structures whereby managers and employees are supported in their OHS duties; and, 3) a senior management representative, who is responsible for overseeing the proper functioning of the OHSMS, is designated.

Occupational Health and Safety Management System Performance Measurement,
Drs. Charles Redinger & Steven Levine.

DISCUSSION

Organizations that are successful in occupational safety and health have three things in common: top leadership commitment exemplified by regular review of safety and health performance by senior managers; a common and integrated system of collecting loss control data with continuous evaluation of those data; and involvement of employees in the development of continuous improvements in safety and health practices.

Of all the categories considered for review, leadership is perhaps the most important subject area. The term "leadership" embraces all the other focus areas. Leadership promotes the effective use of communication, conveys a set of cultural values, elicits and values employee involvement and makes necessary adjustments based on feedback mechanisms such as performance measures. Leaders demonstrate their commitment by being personally involved and by providing the organizational structure and resources necessary to ensure that goals are met.

It is the collective experience of the NSC Panel that in the best organizations in the private sector, safety and occupational health are integrated programs, and managers have direct access to senior management. In addition, leaders are ultimately held responsible for the occupational safety and health of their personnel.

FINDINGS

Senior leaders within the DoD and the Services have expressed support for safety and occupational health through statements, policies, directives and memos. However, senior leadership in DoD has not taken specific actions that signal personal commitment to safety and occupational health and demonstrate the value placed on safety and occupational health within the organization. As a result, safety and occupational health performance often suffers.

11-L-0559/OSD/6622

The DoD has not established a rigorous system of accountability for safety and occupational health that is sufficiently tied to performance within the lines of authority at all levels of command, including the individual and unit level. The NSC Panel found little evidence that there is a clear link between safety and health performance and how senior leaders are held accountable. At the same time, responsibility for safety and occupational health is fragmented throughout the DoD and the Services and appears in many cases to be a staff and not a line responsibility.

Safety and occupational health have not been effectively integrated into the overall management system of the DoD. Currently, safety and occupational health follow separate paths and lines of authority within the chains of command. The DoD has also not instituted a system to ensure the continuous improvement of safety and occupational health systems. DoD needs an integrated, cohesive, and comprehensive approach to safety and occupational health that encompasses all units of the DoD.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the office that has responsibility for safety and occupational health lacks appropriate resources, access to senior management and the visibility to fulfill its mission of safety and health oversight, advocacy and policy development. One byproduct of this is that the Army, Navy and Air Force Designated Safety and Health Officials (DSHOs) have been primarily involved with environmental projects at the expense of safety and occupational health initiatives.

Nevertheless, the NSC Panel recognizes a number of activities that demonstrate leadership in the safety and health area in each Service. Some examples:

Army

- The Chief of Staff, Army Staff principals and selected Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and the DSHO, are briefed quarterly on the status of the Army Safety Program, including a review of safety performance. The Chief of Staff directs specific actions to improve Army safety performance at these briefings.

Navy

- The Navy has recently established and filled a new position for a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety.
- The newly appointed Secretary of the Navy has issued a strong statement emphasizing his personal commitment to safety and occupational health.

11-L-0559/OSD/6623

Air Force

- The Air Force Chief of Staff and Secretary are briefed on all fatality investigations and review performance measures during weekly staff meetings with other senior staff.

Marines

- The Commandant of the Marine Corps established a Marine Corps Executive Safety Board consisting of commanding generals from operations commands, major bases and supporting organizations. The Board's mission is to provide safety policy and guidance for the Marine Corps.
  - The Marine Corps Safety Office reports directly to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) and is an integrated office, staffed with several safety and occupational health professionals. The ACMC is directly briefed on and actively involved with the accident prevention program.
  - The Marine Corps includes a statement in every Executive Officer's fitness report on safety and occupational health performance within their unit. This integrates accountability for this function into line management.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of Defense should take actions to demonstrate that safety and occupational health are core values within the DoD, including:

- Demonstrate a continuing, strong, personal commitment to safety and occupational health within the DoD. As a first step, the Secretary should issue a statement establishing safety and occupational health as core values within the DoD;
- Establish safety and health as an executive-level business responsibility by assigning safety and occupational health management system oversight to an existing committee reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Include safety and occupational health as an integral part of both the Defense Planning Guidance and Medical Planning Guidance systems;
- Ensure that safety and occupational health issues are addressed at the highest levels of the Department and Services and are viewed as an integral component of operational readiness;
- Establish safety and occupational health goals for the DoD and provide a system of accountability for meeting them to line managers throughout the DoD; and
- Ensure that OSD provide oversight and advocacy for safety and occupational health to ensure that Service safety and occupational health program funding is allocated effectively and that programs are effectively implemented.

11-L-0559/OSD/6624

- Incorporate into DoD's existing individual accountability systems a component for safety and occupational health that is equal in importance to the other components used to evaluate the performance of senior managers of the Department and the Services.

- Provide the OSD safety and occupational health unit with the authority, personnel and resources to meet its responsibility for the policy, advocacy and oversight of safety and occupational health issues within the Department.
  - Ensure that this unit is placed at a level within the Department that allows it to raise safety and occupational health issues to the top levels of the Department management.
  - Structure the Services' safety and occupational health organizations so that they have access to the top levels of the Service.
- Improve management system capability to include comprehensive financial data that provide corporate budget visibility so DoD leadership can advocate for safety and health requirements at all levels.

- Functionally integrate DoD safety and occupational health components so they can better communicate and coordinate their activities. One way to achieve this is to implement the data integration recommended elsewhere in this report.

- Establish a forum that allows for ongoing communication and exchange of lessons-learned and best practices between top-level experts in industry and the DoD.

BEST PRACTICES

DuPont: Leadership with Full Accountability

- The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) sees himself as ultimately accountable for the safety and health of employees.
  - He often reiterates safety and health as a core value.
  - He begins every meeting with a safety message.
  - He sees safety as a competitive advantage in attracting new talent and in differentiating DuPont from its competitors in the markets it serves.
  - He sees investment in safety and health as good business. It is estimated that DuPont saves $4 - $5 for every dollar invested in safety.
- DuPont has a decentralized safety and health management system.
  - The corporate core safety and health group consists of six people who have direct access to the CEO.
  - A safety excellence center of 25 people supports the line organization by managing the safety standards approval process, proposing common safety

11-L-0559/OSD/6625

solutions for the business units, and compiling statistics and managing the incident tracking system.

- The majority of the safety work occurs at every facility, where:
  - Each plant manager is responsible for the safety and health of the employees at the facility.
  - Each plant manager has a safety and health professional who assists him/her on a tactical level in an internal consulting role.
  - Managers are held accountable for the safety and health performance of their units.
  - Managers with poor safety records are removed from their positions.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Integration of Safety and Health Costs

- An Executive Safety and Health Steering Committee has been formed to raise the visibility of occupational safety and health issues and to review progress toward goals.
  - The Committee is comprised of the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Vice President of Operations, Vice President of Human Resources, Director of Environmental Health and Safety and several operations managers.
  - The Committee meets at least every six weeks solely to discuss employee safety and health issues.
- Safety performance is linked to productivity.
  - The cost of injuries is charged back to the project where they occurred.
  - A department with a high number of occupational injuries does not generally meet its financial goals.
- Line managers are accountable for the occupational safety and health of employees.
  - Managers' performance agreements include financial, quality, productivity and safety goals.
  - Failure to meet safety and health goals adversely affects promotions, bonuses and raises.

Johnson & Johnson: Safety Leadership from the Top

- Safety and health are corporate values embodied in the Johnson & Johnson culture. They are transformed into workplace reality at every Johnson & Johnson company throughout the world.
- The Safety Vision Statement created by Johnson & Johnson Chief Executive Officer, Ralph Larsen, reads: "We are committed to making Johnson & Johnson the world leader in health and safety by creating an injury-free workplace." To attain and hold this leadership position the company affirms that:

11-L-0559/OSD/6626

- We hold safety and health as our highest values
- All accidents and injuries are preventable
- We operate on the basis of continuous improvement
- Safety is everyone's responsibility
- Job training and positive feedback are essential
- Safety is a key indicator of organizational excellence.
- We consider safety in every task we perform and in every decision we make

- Executive Committee members champion specific safety processes (i.e. Machine Safety, SAFE Fleet).
- Executive Committee and/or CEO reviews serious injuries/illnesses and incidents with operating company president and worldwide vice president of safety & industrial hygiene.

For more detailed best practices from panel member companies in each of the subject areas, see Appendix D.

11-L-0559/OSD/6627

2.2 CULTURE

Implementing a systematic approach to workplace safety [and health] will require a cultural change in many organizations, among regulators and within the safety profession. All organizations need to nurture a "safety culture." Company policy and workstation practice must dictate that safety never takes a back seat to other interests. No one should be asked – and no one should tolerate – a potentially disabling or life-threatening risk in the name of cost-cutting, productivity or any other priority.

Safety Agenda for the Nation, National Safety Council

DISCUSSION

Core values of an organization stand the test of time, are not compromised and do not compete with other priorities or need to show a return on investment. Occupational safety and health should be core values consistent with an organization's mission. Leaders instill occupational safety and health as core values by setting specific measurable goals in occupational safety and health, providing the necessary resources, and holding themselves and each organizational level responsible and accountable for achieving results.

FINDINGS

Safety and occupational health are not fully integrated into the cultural value system of the DoD. There is no sense of urgency to improve safety and health performance by reducing existing injury and illness rates. (In fact, rates have essentially reached a plateau over the last few years.) Neither the DoD nor any Service has truly adopted a zero-injury workplace culture. The Services have been unsuccessful in making safety and occupational health a core value within their operational units.

Because the Services do not link safety and occupational health to operational readiness, safety and occupational health are not seen as key parts of the military's primary business. For example, the generally accepted definitions of readiness do not include a safety and health component. The clear link between injury and illness and operational readiness has not been made within the DoD and the Services.

Within the DoD and the Services, safety and occupational health is approached differently for uniformed personnel, civilians and contractors. Although the same standards of care exist on paper for uniformed and civilian personnel, these standards are implemented differently in practice. The DoD expects its contractors to comply with federal regulations but accepts only limited responsibility for the safety and health performance of its contractors. This contrasts with the best practices of leading private sector organizations, which clearly see contractor oversight as the responsibility of the organization hiring the contractor.

11-L-0559/OSD/6628

Within DoD, the occupational health program operates within a culture that emphasizes treatment rather than prevention. The preventive-medicine community has made great strides in prevention programs aimed at behavior modification (e.g., smoking, alcohol and drug cessation), but more emphasis is needed on prevention when dealing with traditional safety and occupational health concerns. This focus on treatment rather than prevention is apparent in the allocation and distribution of resources, including both personnel and funds.

Cultural change is evident, however, in several areas:

- The Marine Corps safety and occupational health philosophy is consistent with a Corps' slogan: *Marines take care of their own.*[3] "Nothing is so critical as to place the life of a Marine at risk in a training situation." – United States Marine Corps Safety Campaign Plan, August 2000
- Some service training centers are leaders in integrating preventive concepts and preventive medicine into their operations. A few examples are:
  - At Parris Island, occupational physicians developed ways to reduce heat stroke in Marines by using temperature/humidity assessments that govern when training can occur.
  - Preventive medicine review found that placing people according to height during drills dramatically reduced pelvic stress fractures that had caused a number of female recruits to fail basic training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The DoD should develop a strategy to clearly communicate that safety and occupational health are core values and are integrated into the primary business practices of the organization. Leadership at all levels of the DoD and the Services should demonstrate by personal action that safety and health is a core value of the organization.

- The Secretary of Defense should adopt a DoD-wide goal of zero injuries and illnesses.

- Senior leadership should incorporate safety and occupational health into the definition of readiness and recognize that the safety and health of military, civilian and contract personnel is an important component of operational readiness.

- The strategy for instituting safety and health as a core value within the DoD and Services should span military personnel, civilians and contractors. Although different

[3] Safety Update to the 32ns Commandants Guidance, Ref (A); General J.L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; October 2000.

11-L-0559/OSD/6629

rules and regulations govern each of these groups, the institution of a core value goes far beyond solely following regulations.

- The safety and occupational health and medical communities should use their collective expertise to improve prevention programs to reduce occupational injuries and illnesses.

BEST PRACTICES

DuPont: "The Goal is Zero"

- In 1994 DuPont commissioned a Discovery Team to research why the numbers of safety and occupational injuries and illnesses were rising.
- The team, consisting of senior leaders, line managers and safety and support personnel, created a new level of safety and health expectation within DuPont, "The Goal is Zero."
- Even with some initial management resistance, the company soon began to see a drop in the numbers of injuries and illnesses.
- Culture change was initiated by the team, and worked with the CEO, who drove it from the top. Team members explained the new goal to their peers.
- Through leadership commitment, intensive training, employee involvement and recognition and reward, the zero-injury culture has permeated throughout global DuPont.
- A zero-injury culture is considered a world-class benchmark.

Delphi Automotive Systems: A Culture Shift

- In 1994 the General Motors board of directors commissioned a team to visit Allied Signal, DuPont, Boeing, Alcoa and other best-in-class companies to investigate their safety and health management systems.
- The team found that these companies had several things in common, including:
  - A plant safety and health review board (or the equivalent)
  - Detailed safe operating practices
  - Thorough incident investigation
- The team developed a new safety and health management system and rolled out the process over the next several years.
- Plant safety review board:
  - Is comprised of top union and management leadership, including the plant manager.

11-L-0559/OSD/6630

- Holds high-level, safety-only meetings once a month. If plant manager can't attend, meeting is rescheduled.
- Oversees development of detailed safe operating procedures.
- Commissioned every department to create a team that would train employees, implement and enforce procedures.

Johnson & Johnson: Creating a Safety Culture in the Field Sales and Service

- In 1995 Johnson Executive Committee decided to design a program to create cultural change within the sales/service force to reduce driving accidents and injuries.
- Each operating company vice-president of sales/service champions a SAFE Fleet team that implements the six-step SAFE Fleet process.
- SAFE Fleet performance is a factor in merit and bonus increases.
- Formal behind-the-wheel training is provided to each sales/service representative every three years
- Formal motivation and recognition programs were created for safe driving performance.

11-L-0559/OSD/6631

4.23 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS

The ability to measure Occupational Safety and Health performance over time is essential to eliminating occupational injuries and illness, and to verify continuous improvement. To achieve this, the organization should develop performance measures that are consistent with the variables expressed in the Occupational Safety and Health policy and goals and objectives, and measure both preventive ("upstream") and trailing performance indicators.

Occupational Health and Safety Management System Performance Measurement,
Drs. Charles Redinger & Steven Levine.

DISCUSSION

Organizations should collect and analyze data that allow for an assessment of the overall performance of safety and occupational health management systems. Injury and illness data are commonly used in industry to form the basis of performance measures. The best programs use a combination of leading and trailing indicators. Trailing indicators include measures that describe injuries, illnesses, near-misses, or other mishaps that have occurred, while leading indicators measure safety and health activities that the organization is undertaking to prevent injuries and illnesses from occurring.

Organizations should collect data that are beneficial and meaningful to their continuous improvement efforts. The measures selected by the organization should be useful and meaningful to personnel, management and the overall organization, as well as to interested outside parties. Many organizations rely on audits or self-assessments to provide feedback on their occupational safety and health performance.

FINDINGS

The NSC Panel found little evidence of a uniform set of occupational safety and health measures within the DoD. Instead, many measurement systems for safety and occupational health data exist within the Services. For example, definitions for the same measure may vary by Service. Most of the measures used are trailing indicators, such as the number of fatalities, lost-time cases, personal vehicle accidents, on- and off- duty accidents. The NSC Panel found little evidence that any service uses leading indicators as part of their safety and health measurement system. In addition, little or no data are collected on contractor safety and health performance.

Some Services have instituted audit programs that have the potential to raise safety and health performance. However, there is no consistency across the Services or Department in the use of audits or self-assessments and no common understanding of the importance of auditing and the auditing process. Many programs also lack an evaluation system and thus lose the opportunity to identify and correct deficiencies and design more effective interventions.

11-L-0559/OSD/6632

The Services collect an extensive amount of medical data on active-duty military personnel. The NSC Panel found that medical surveillance data on injuries are not integrated into the safety and occupational health measurement system. Consequently, the DoD lacks the information needed to fully understand the nature of injuries, develop prevention strategies, assess performance against policy goals and improve performance.

The Army Medical Surveillance Activity's (AMSA) Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) operates a comprehensive disease, injury and medical event database and analytical capability for all of the Services. The AMSA identifies and evaluates obstacles to readiness by linking various databases that communicate information that has the potential to affect soldiers' health. The DMSS tracks hospitalizations, ambulatory visits, reportable diseases, HIV tests and results, acute respiratory diseases, health risk appraisals, and longitudinal data on personnel and deployments. The DMSS's primary functions are to analyze, interpret, and disseminate information on the status, trends, and determinants of the health and fitness of America's Army and to identify and evaluate obstacles to readiness.

The NSC Panel believes that the DMSS offers the potential for filling the void on uniformed personnel injury and illness costs. It has the data collection and analytical foundation to prepare executive-level management reports for the DoD. The AMSA collects much hospitalization cost data for uniformed personnel. However, it is neither tasked nor funded to prepare high-level management reviews and is underutilized by the DoD.

Some efforts are underway to improve DoD's safety and occupational health measurement systems:

- The OSD is developing a Web-based reporting system for civilian lost-workday cases for all of the Services.

- The Navy is testing a set of performance measures (leading indicators) for use by all levels of command.

- The Air Force Safety Center has a Web-based reporting system for accidents that could be used as a model for Web-based indicators.

- The Air Force's Environmental Safety Occupational Health Compliance Assessment and Management Program (ESOH CAMP) is an example of an effective audit system that provides wing commanders with reports on the wing's safety and occupational health compliance status.

- The Army Reserve Command's Internet systems use the web to record incidents and conduct analysis.

- The Army's definition of readiness, which includes "deployability," could be used to link safety and occupational health to operational readiness.

11-L-0559/OSD/6633

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Improve the performance measurement system used by DoD and the Services so that it is uniform, effective, and includes both leading and trailing indicators and allows for goal-setting and tracking. It should also be capable of showing how the injuries, illnesses and fatalities of military, civilian and contractor personnel are linked to levels of operational readiness and mission accomplishment.

- Integrate medical, personnel, financial, safety and health, and mishap data into DoD-wide safety and occupational health data systems.

- Analyze the data to evaluate progress against policy goals and to design intervention programs. Continually benchmark these policies, programs and performance with those of industry leaders.

- Determine the full costs of injury and occupational illness by conducting research to establish the ratio between direct and indirect costs for injury and illness for each Service.

- Task and fund a DoD-wide data center (like the Army Medical Surveillance Activity) to collect and analyze uniform, civilian and contractor injury and illness incident and cost data to support senior management decision making

BEST PRACTICES

Dupont: Leading and Lagging Indicators

- Lagging indicators include lost time cases, OSHA recordable injuries, and process incidents and environmental releases.
  - Incidents are investigated, categorized and recorded.
  - Information enters a corporate data collection system within a specified time frame.
  - The Safety Health Environmental Center creates periodic reports for managers and business leaders.
  - Measures are kept simple to allow easy comparison within DuPont and with other industries.

- Leading indicators are before-the-fact measures, which help managers and leaders understand if there is a higher risk or chance of a future injury or incident.
- Managed at the site level (weekly or monthly) by line managers and safety professionals, four factors are reviewed:
  - Performance of key safety tasks, e.g. number of completed audits, completion of job cycle checks, percentage of audit items closed, etc.

11-L-0559/OSD/6634

- Index trends based on prior safety injury and incident performance.
- Work force morale -- high, medium, low.
- Level of distraction – e.g. holiday period or weekend, percentage of people in new jobs, community distraction, etc.

- These factors are rated, averaged and used within the site to drive special management actions, or to alert the workforce to be extra cautious.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Built-in Financial Accountability

- Newport News uses a combination of leading and trailing indicators.
- The trailing indicators are:
  - Number of recordable cases
  - Number of lost-time cases
  - Reports submitted by medical clinics that are trained to report numbers
- The leading indicators are:
  - Number of health and safety training hours delivered
  - Quality of accident reports
- The cost of each injury is charged back to the department. Costs include:
  - Wage replacement
  - Medical costs
- High injury costs adversely affect department profitability.

Johnson & Johnson: Leading and Trailing SAFE Fleet indicators

- Series of leading and trailing indicators.

- Key metrics: accidents per million miles driven, percent of fleet in accidents, percent of high-risk drivers

- High-risk drivers within existing field sales and service receive special training and focused coaching by management.

- All drivers receive two commentary (coaching) drives per year conducted and rated by their manager. Used as a leading indicator to prevent accidents in areas where sales representatives need additional training (i.e. following too closely, speeding).

- The following leading indicators are used to identify and eliminate the hiring of high-risk drivers:

11-L-0559/OSD/6635

- Vehicle condition and maintenance treated as leading indicator: dents and scratches, poor maintenance indicates potential problems.
- SAFE Fleet team assessment scores
- Percent of drivers trained and successful completion of training

- Results – significant reduction in high-risk drivers; over five years fleet grew by 88 percent and the accident rate has been reduced by 39 percent.

11-L-0559/OSD/6636

24 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Arrangements and procedures should be established and maintained for:

a) receiving, documenting and responding appropriately to internal and external communications related to occupational safety and health

b) ensuring the internal communication of occupational safety and health information between relevant levels and functions of the organization; and

c) *ensuring that the concerns, ideas and inputs of workers and their representatives on OSH matters are received, considered and responded to.*

Guidelines on Occupational Safety and Health Management Systems,
International Labour Office

DISCUSSION

A well-functioning communication system with defined feedback channels is essential to a successful occupational safety and health management system. For the system to survive and potentially grow, there must be mechanisms that allow system components to receive feedback from each other and from the external environment. In its most basic form a communication system should be able to transmit information to those responsible for the proper functioning of the safety and occupational health management system.

FINDINGS

The DoD and the Services lack a fully integrated safety and occupational health system for receiving, analyzing and transmitting information on safety and occupational health. The Services have procedures, activities and written policies for communicating safety and occupational health information, but this information is poorly communicated up and down the chain of command within and across the Services. The presence of such communication networks is critical to continual improvement. Safety and occupational health functions are separate units in each of the Services, and professionals from the two disciplines rarely collaborate on program performance.

Success stories, lessons-learned in investigations, and service injury and illness data are not shared DoD-wide. The Services could improve the sharing of safety and occupational health information and training from the various centers of expertise. For example, the Navy has a Crane Safety Center in Philadelphia that conducts crane safety training, data collection and root-cause analysis of crane accidents, but the other Services do not use the Center's expertise in their crane work.

Within the OSD, the Prevention Safety Health Promotion Council could be used to share information within the DoD, but this group's focus should be expanded to include safety and occupational health.

11-L-0559/OSD/6637

There are obstacles to the sharing of successful techniques and lessons-learned among health and safety peers both among and within the Services and with the private sector. For example, there is no DoD-wide safety and occupational health conference, and professionals from the DoD do not regularly meet with their private sector counterparts to benchmark practices and processes.

Although all of the compensation and disability cases administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) consist of injured, ill, or disabled veterans transferred from the Services, the DoD and the VA have not established an effective channel of communication on safety and occupational health data between the two agencies. Such a channel could provide the DoD with valuable information on the costs, origin, prevention and treatment of occupational injury and disease.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Establish and maintain a communications management and oversight capability within the designated DoD safety and health units that links the separate service communication networks to each other and across the DoD.
- Establish a clearinghouse to collect and disseminate safety and occupational health information among all the Services. Information to and from the clearinghouse should flow from all levels of the organization, e.g., the service safety centers, hospitals, installations, commands, etc. The clearinghouse, in turn, would share lessons-learned across the DoD and with industry.
- Develop an installation-level award program similar to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Voluntary Protection Program, to help communicate the steps necessary to achieve safety and occupational health excellence throughout the Services.
- Establish effective interactions between health and safety professionals across DoD and the Services through regular joint activities. For example, establish a joint annual service safety and health symposium or conference.
- Establish and maintain open lines of communication for the exchange of pertinent safety and health and cost information with the VA and other federal agencies, such as the Department of Transportation.

BEST PRACTICES

Boeing: Communication Up, Down, Across System

- Boeing uses regular meetings – both Web-based and in person – to ensure effective communications both with the company's safety and health professionals and with all Boeing personnel.
- Every Tuesday, the corporate director of safety, health and environment meets with the Process Council, which:

11-L-0559/OSD/6638

- Is comprised of the heads of safety, health and environment within each Boeing business unit;
- Makes safety and health policy decisions; and
- Communicates policies/plans/goals throughout the organization

- Executive safety councils on each site run safety and health systems.
  - These councils include the site operations director and all of his/her staff; meetings are run by the site director.
  - The councils:
    - Analyze measurement charts
    - Determine whether policies are being executed
    - Search for system improvements
- Crew safety meetings mimic executive safety council meetings.
  - These consist of small working groups, e.g., a group that puts together a wing.
- Web-based communications system regularly sends safety messages to all employees.
- Safety professionals have cross-sectional safety teams that:
  - Encourage interaction/sharing between business units
  - Have subcommittees (e.g., ergonomics, industrial hygiene, physical safety)
  - Make recommendations to Corporate safety office
- Once a year all Boeing safety and health managers meet for a three or four day conference.

Redinger & Associates, Inc.: Communication System Best Practices

- Several communication system trends observed in our management system assessment work follow.
  - The communication system is defined. That is, the organization has given thought to what OSH information needs to be communicated, and how.
  - Examples of information that is communicated: properties of hazardous materials, physical hazards in the workplace (e.g. noise, radiation), audit findings, accident reports, exposure assessment findings, corrective actions, emergency response information, facility evacuation information and contractor-related safety and health information
  - Ways that information is communicated: training programs, signs, labels, electronic mail, bulletin board postings, formal and informal meetings (e.g. daily "tailgate" meetings vs. more formal monthly meetings), Job Hazard Analysis, closed-circuit T.V. systems, informal communication from supervisors to workers.

11-L-0559/OSD/6639

- Organizations with robust communication systems can demonstrate that senior managers receive, evaluate, and take appropriate actions on OSH matters. Examples include the review of:
  - Information relating to fatalities and serious accidents
  - Audit findings
  - Agency citations
  - Emergency response simulation drill performance
- Organizations find ways to solicit input and participation from employees regarding the communication system. Examples include:
  - Employee input on the development of communication system procedures
  - Employee involvement in training delivery
  - Employee participation in accident investigations

Johnson & Johnson: SAFE Fleet Communications

- SAFE Fleet uses Web-based communications and e-based technology to communicate with drivers every month.
- Formal newsletters and executive communications are distributed every quarter.
- Every six weeks the SAFE Fleet Task Force (the steering group for the program in North America) meets and holds an open conference call for one hour with sales management and representatives company-wide.
- Annually, each SAFE Fleet Team meets at a Champions Conference to share best practices and launch new programs.

11-L-0559/OSD/6640

2.5 PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) requires that employees have at least three active and meaningful ways to participate in safety and health problem identification and resolution. This must be in addition to the process enabling employees to notify management of hazardous conditions and practices and to have issues addressed.

Occupational Safety and Health Voluntary Protection Program Directive

Worker Participation

1. Worker participation is an essential element of the OSH management system in the organization.

2. The employer should ensure that workers and their safety and health representatives are consulted, informed and trained on all aspects of OSH, including emergency arrangements, associated with their work.

3. The employer should make arrangements for workers and their safety and health representatives to have the time and resources to actively participate in the processes of organizing, planning and implementation, evaluation and action for improvement of the OSH management system.

4. The employer should ensure, as appropriate, the establishment and efficient functioning of a safety and health committee and the recognition of workers' safety and health representatives, in accordance with national laws and practice.

Guidelines on Occupational Safety and Health Management Systems
International Labour Organization

DISCUSSION

Companies that are recognized as leaders in occupational safety and health view worker involvement as essential to the success of any safety and occupational health management system performance. Involvement by every person at all levels of the organization is the hallmark of successful private sector safety and health programs. For such programs to be successful, however, management must demonstrate its commitment to safety and health and to personnel involvement. Safety and health performance is improved when the contributions of everyone are integrated throughout the safety and health management system. When all personnel are involved in such systems from their developmental stage through implementation and ongoing program evaluation, they feel a positive sense of ownership in the system and therefore have a greater investment in the success of the program. Programs that do not emphasize and encourage full personnel involvement risk being ineffective.

11-L-0559/OSD/6641

FINDINGS

The blend of DoD's workforce of uniformed, civilian and contractor personnel magnifies the challenge of stimulating personnel involvement in safety and health. Within the Services, senior leaders view participation primarily as a top-down activity – orders are expected to be obeyed. Personnel involvement in the military occurs primarily in the context of training and the communication of instructions/orders.

The military culture of following orders runs contrary to an environment in which subordinate personnel speak up when they identify an unsafe work practice or are asked to perform an unsafe act. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Jones, addressed this concern in a letter to the Corps: "It takes a bold individual to recommend to the commander that we cancel or halt an evolution. Yet, this aggressive and thoughtful spirit is just the sort of attitude that we expect from Marines in combat."[4]

Many military installations and activities have established safety and health committees or councils that meet regularly to discuss safety and health issues and facilitate the exchange of information between senior management/commanding officer and work units/work centers. Each of the Services has established suggestion programs and award recognition programs for individuals, groups and installations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Establish safety and health committees at all levels that involve a cross section of personnel. These committees would serve as the focal point to stimulate new and innovative ways to involve personnel in safety and health programs and to consider such industry practices as:
  - establishing *ad hoc* safety and health problem-solving groups
  - having shop level/work center enlisted personnel participate in audits and worksite inspections
  - having shop level/work center enlisted personnel participate in accident and incident investigations
  - developing and/or participating in improvement suggestion programs
  - training other personnel in safety and health
  - analyzing job/process hazards
  - serving on safety and health committees beyond the activity/installation level

[4] United States Marine Corps Safety Campaign Plan; General J.L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Letter from the Commandant; August 2000.

11-L-0559/OSD/6642

- Increase the visibility of personnel and activity safety and health award/reward recognition systems, consistent with the level of recognition/reward given for operational readiness, battlefield performance, production goals and performance.

- Encourage personnel at all levels of management to make full use of existing systems to identify safety and health problems.

- Establish a mechanism to continually benchmark personnel involvement within the safety and occupational health management system with the best personnel involvement practices in industry.

BEST PRACTICES

Delphi Automotive Systems: Personnel Involvement an Intricate Part of the Process

- Employee involvement is a cornerstone of Delphi Automotive System's safety and health culture change; employee representatives are involved in design process
- Joint union safety and health representatives report to plant managers
- Safety and health programs have as many union as management representatives
- Safety and health trainers (in ergonomics, lock-out, hazardous materials, etc.) are hourly employees that Delphi trained to be trainers

Newport News Shipbuilding: Health and Safety Teams Give Return on Investment

- Labor/management health and safety task teams work to improve health and safety performance
  - Forty health and safety task teams cover entire shipyard
  - Each team has hourly and salaried employees, including union representatives and a manager
  - Each team elects leaders: the leader is often not a manager
  - Teams work toward process improvement
  - Teams conduct root-cause analysis accident investigations
  - Teams conduct weekly inspections, noting improvements needed in equipment, compliance, etc.
- Measured by both leading and trailing indicators, safety and health task teams have produced the greatest return on investment of any aspect of the Newport News health and safety system

11-L-0559/OSD/6643

Johnson & Johnson: SAFE Fleet – A Team Approach

- Each sales/service organization has a cross-functional SAFE Fleet team.
- Membership includes Vice Presidents of Sales, Directors, Managers and Sales representatives, Safety Professionals, Health & Wellness Professionals and Human Resources representatives.
- Large fleets have regional field safety coordinators (similar to a plant safety rep), representatives that have volunteered to provide additional focus and support to their peers out in the field regarding SAFE Fleet.
- Team implements formal six-step process and is awarded for their process design (using scoring system) and accident/injury reduction.

11-L-0559/OSD/6644

2.6 ACQUISITIONS

Recognizing the extensiveness of the culture change needed to successfully implement a newly adopted safety through design concept and the hazard analysis and risk assessment procedures integral in the design process, some companies issue policy and procedure statements....that hazards must be identified and addressed early in the design process, and as an integral part of the concurrent engineering program.

...it is necessary for personnel having design responsibilities to consider hazards during the early concept stages when developing new products, manufacturing processes, technology, and facilities that may impact on occupational safety and health...

Safety Through Design, NSC, 1999, National Safety Council, 1999

DISCUSSION

Leading companies incorporate a safety and occupational health review of major acquisitions, starting with initial design, then following through development and implementation. Occupational safety and health is built into the entire life cycle of acquisitions. Occupational safety and health management brings a unique perspective to the acquisition process. The acquisition process requires cooperation with other players in the process to ensure that risks and hazards are identified and managed before design, manufacture or customer use.

Significant results have been achieved in industry by integrating the disciplines of occupational safety and health (OSH) into the acquisition process. An effective strategy for successful integration of OSH into acquisition systems is top-management oversight throughout the process. Investment in safety is most effective early in the design phase.

FINDINGS

The DoD acquisition system is unique. There is no other organization in the world that acquires the same range and complexity of weapons systems, products, and services. The DoD spends billions of dollars annually to replace aging systems.

The DoD has developed an interwoven system to ensure that the Services acquire quality products. The process is driven by the interaction of three basic program management systems: (1) the Requirements Generation System, (2) the Acquisition Management System, and (3) the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Each of these three management systems incorporates a management process that defines mission needs, operational requirements and performance capabilities.

Unfortunately, safety and occupational health needs and requirements are often not fully integrated into these management systems, nor is the safety and occupational health perspective adequately represented at major programmatic and milestone reviews. The

11-L-0559/OSD/6645

DoD and Service program managers who are directly involved with decision making in the acquisition process are often not versed in safety and occupational health concerns. At the same time, the input of the safety and occupational health community is not consistently incorporated into the Requirements Generation System. All too often, the senior managers involved with the milestone reviews assume that safety and occupational health needs have been met and have been adequately addressed in the concept and design phase. Problem recognition often surfaces only after there is a system or equipment failure that results from a safety and health omission.

For the most part, safety and occupational health concerns follow separate paths. Since 1996, DoD Inspector General audits have found weaknesses in how program offices performed Programmatic Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Evaluations (PESHEs). Despite the requirement for these evaluations during the acquisition process, these reports noted that there is neither a uniform format or consistent review criteria for these documents. A flag level DoD panel (December 2000) also found a lack of consistent communication of safety requirements and lack of integration of safety and occupational health professionals into the acquisition process as well as deficiencies in the relationship between research and development and design safety.

Some examples of positive DoD acquisitions initiatives:

- The Army Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Program integrates occupational health and system safety considerations throughout a system's entire lifecycle. To achieve this integration, the Army Medical Command's Health Hazard Assessment (HHA) Program and Army Safety Program provide support to acquisition programs and teams. The Army's senior leadership attention to these issues is ensured by having health hazard and system safety assessments, required under Army acquisition and MANPRINT regulations, presented and reviewed at each program milestone.
- The Air Force, as the preparing office for MIL-STD-882D, Standard Practice for System Safety, worked with government and industry representatives to tailor it for risk assessment of system safety and occupational health hazards.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- DoD should implement a Department-wide program (similar to the Army's MANPRINT program) that will support the integration of system safety and occupational health considerations throughout a system's lifecycle.
- DoD should reconsider the Services' recommendations regarding the addition of a separate section on system safety in DoD 5000.2-R and the application of MIL-STD–882D to system safety methodology.
- The DoD and Service program managers should include safety reviews as an integral part of the milestone review process.

11-L-0559/OSD/6646

- Field safety and occupational health professionals should be involved in the acquisition review process, particularly in the Requirements Generation System.
- System safety and occupational health training should be a mandatory part of the Defense Acquisition Management College curriculum for program managers.
- The DoD and Service safety and occupational health professionals should benchmark with industry and exchange information involving safety and occupational health in acquisition processes.

BEST PRACTICES

DuPont: Building Safety and Health into Requirements

- Acquisitions process staff ensures that safety, health and environmental considerations are integrated into specifications or requisitions for purchasing equipment and services.
  - Acquisitions staff is trained always to include safety and occupational health requirements in each contract or purchase order. Accountability is built into the system
  - Line management aids the acquisitions staff with suggestions.
  - Vendors design equipment based on specifications written or reviewed by DuPont.

If a safety flaw is found, steps are immediately taken to rectify the error with a short-term fix combined with a long-term acquisition system or specification improvement.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Using MSDSs to Track Acquisition Hazards

- Safety and health integrated into acquisition process through the hazard communication program.
  - Every product must have a MSDS prior to use (no payment made until company receives it).
  - Information transferred to a Web-based hazard communication system.
    - Users in yard access MSDS information on company Intranet.
  - Destructive and non-destructive testing of materials judges:
    - Flammability
    - Toxicity
    - Other elements
  - Testing information and hazard-communication information passed on to users.

11-L-0559/OSD/6647

2.7 CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT

One way that an owner can carry out this responsibility (to provide a safe work environment to minimize injuries) is to hire contractors who have a record of good safety performance. This requires attention during the processes of qualifying contractors for bidding work and selecting contractors for a contract award.

Both the contractor and the owner will reap cost savings from better safety performance. Owners can take measures to achieve better safety performance, such as:

- *Provide safety and health guidelines that the contractor must follow.*
- *Require the use of permit systems for potentially hazardous activities.*
- *Require the contractor to designate a responsible supervisor to coordinate safety on the site.*
- *Discuss safety at owner-contractor meetings.*
- *Require prompt recording and full investigation of accidents.*

Owners should recognize that the principles of management control commonly applied to costs, schedules, quality, and productivity are equally applicable to safety and that, if used, will improve safety performance. By showing more concern for construction safety, owners can help reduce injuries and loss of life and the billions of dollars needlessly wasted by construction accidents.

The Business Roundtable: Improving Construction Safety Performance
A Construction Industry Cost Effectiveness Report

DISCUSSION

Frequent outsourcing is now standard practice both in industry and the government. Multi-employer worksites, consisting of multiple contractors and personnel of the contracting organization, are also common, with contractors and organizational personnel working side-by-side. Contractors often have key roles within the organization and can be responsible for critical tasks, which can vary in specialization and level of hazard.

Generally, the host employer is in the best position to ensure that communication and coordination of workplace safety and health is taking place. This is because the host employer often controls the means and methods of work and has specific knowledge of workplace hazards. Contract employers also have a significant role in workplace safety and health. The contract employers may also introduce hazards into the workplace that could endanger the host contractor's employees.

The nation's leading companies accept the responsibility of monitoring contractor occupational safety and health. They do it for a variety of reasons – complying with regulations, maintaining a zero-injury worksite, protecting the bottom line, and maintaining the company's image within the community. Contractor safety is more than a legal or contract issue. It affects the productivity, corporate image and morale of the

11-L-0559/OSD/6648

worksite. These companies consider the contractor's safety and health record in the bidding process and include the contractor's health and safety data in their measurement system.

FINDINGS

As in industry, the trend within DoD and the Services has been toward increased outsourcing for a variety of services. The multi-employer worksite is generally the rule. Contractors are hired to perform a variety of tasks, including high-risk services such as hazardous materials and munitions shipping, asbestos/lead paint removal, and shipyard maintenance. Contractors often work side-by-side with civilian and military personnel and are increasingly expected to accompany military personnel during deployment.

The presence of multiple employers on a site introduces additional problems and complexities into the communication and coordination of worker safety and health. There needs to be two-way communication between DoD (the host employer) and contract employers, as well as a reasonable allocation of workplace safety and health responsibilities among these employers that takes account of this added complexity.

Contractors deploy into the field alongside the personnel in the Services and are responsible for conducting specialized and hazardous jobs. Injuries and illnesses among these individuals can have an impact on the operational readiness of the deployed unit. Although the contractor has a contractual obligation to fulfill its contract, injuries to contractor personnel can result in added costs, delays, and inadequate performance, and these costs are, for the most part, passed on to the government.

DoD contracting offices often do not take advantage of individual contractor information (e.g., their compliance history and safety record), even though some of this information is readily available.

Significant improvements in hazard prevention and injury reduction have been achieved by including requirements related to safety and health in contract provisions. Similar reductions in injuries and illnesses have occurred when the DoD exercises safety and health contractor oversight.

Management in DoD and in the Services has, for the most part, taken a "hands-off" approach to contractor safety and occupational health. This attitude is consistent across the Services. These managers argue that increased oversight of contractor occupational safety and health programs could increase the government's exposure to liability risks.

The DoD and the Services are consequently unaware of the full financial and other impacts of contractor injuries and illnesses on DoD. Although contract costs are tracked, the direct and indirect costs of on-the-job illnesses and injuries to contractors, the impact of these injuries on military and civilian personnel, and therefore, on readiness, is unknown.

11-L-0559/OSD/6649

RECOMMENDATIONS

DoD should:

- Take a larger role in rewarding safe contractors and disciplining unsafe contractors. DoD should also take each contractor's occupational safety and health record, performance, and programs into account.
- Develop guidelines for safe contractors and disqualify companies that do not meet these standards.
- Publish guidelines to ensure that contract employees are covered under appropriate military service and activity-level occupational safety and health policies and procedures.
- Strengthen the involvement and clarify the role of DoD safety and occupational health professionals in contractor oversight.
- Include performance measures of contractor accidents in an integrated DoD safety and occupational health information system.
- Include safety and occupational illness performance requirements in all contracts. The DoD and the Services must ensure oversight for these requirements and develop a quality assurance program for contractors' safety and health.
- Continue to benchmark performance with leading companies on a periodic basis. DoD and the Services should establish a mechanism to collect and exchange best practice information among themselves and with industry on a periodic basis.

BEST PRACTICES

Dupont: Holding Contractors To Higher Standards

- Contractors are included in the safety and occupational health management systems.
- Contractors will not make the bidder's list without at least three things:
  - EMR (Experience Modification Rate) of less than one
  - Submitted documentation of the contractor's corporate safety and health program
  - Agreement to obey all applicable laws and regulations, as well as any specialized requirements outlined by DuPont in the contract language and conditions
- Contractor on-the-job lost workday cases are reported to the DuPont CEO and the business Vice President within 24 hours of occurrence (same as is done for DuPont employees).
- Contractor injury and illness metrics are reported monthly to the DuPont Operations Network, a group of senior leaders. These leaders self report, look for trends, and take action if needed. The head of the acquisitions process is a member of this team.
- There are six steps in the DuPont Contractor Safety Process:

11-L-0559/OSD/6650

1. Contractor Selection
2. Contract Preparation
3. Contract Award
4. Orientation and Training
5. Managing the Work
6. Post-Contract Evaluation

- Contractors perform their own audits. DuPont may oversee these and sometimes participate.
- Unsafe acts by contractors may cause DuPont to shut down the job for an indefinite period of time.
- Contractors who regularly have poor outcomes or are regularly seen conducting unsafe acts are removed from the job and/or removed from a list of approved contractors for a period of time.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Contractor Accountability

- Contractors are held accountable for matching Newport News and OSHA VPP safety and health standards and programs
- To be considered for work at NSS contractors must have:
  - Statistics that show their safety and health rates relative to their industry;
  - Written safety and health programs;
  - Hazard-specific programs (lead, asbestos) for specialized contractors;
  - Accident rates below the respective industry average.
- Each contractor has a trained contractor coordinator, who:
  - Ensures that contractors follow company standards
  - Removes contractor workers from the shipyard who are conducting unsafe work
- Newport News removes unsafe contractors from the yard and removes them from the list of approved contractors.
- Newport News requires contractors' lost-time case rates and total case rates to be reported to the shipyard throughout the time the contractor is onsite.

11-L-0559/OSD/6651

28. OFF-THE-JOB SAFETY

America's safety challenge is also Corporate America's challenge. No matter where an injury or tragedy occurs, your employees lose. They might lose their lives, or the life of a loved one. Or they might lose some of their health or mobility. Or the emotional trauma will affect them in some way for a period of time.

Even if the injury is relatively minor, the process of recovery, or the need to help treat a spouse or child, will likely cause your people to be absent from work. Or if they are at work, they will be distracted and not fully productive. When an injury strikes, your employees lose a part of themselves. And you lose part of your employees.

The fact is that a company is affected in many tangible ways when an injury strikes a member of its corporate family – ways that go well beyond the obvious, and enormous, costs of health care.

Remarks by Alan McMillan, President and CEO, National Safety Council
to the Organization Resources Counselors' Occupational Safety and Health Group
Washington, D.C., August 9, 2001

DISCUSSION

The NSC Panel firmly believes that it is important to incorporate off-the-job safety and health elements in occupational safety and health management systems. Accidents that occur off-the-job have large personnel costs, impact corporate productivity, and may adversely impact delivery of customer services. A total "24/7" safety and health systems approach includes a thorough review of off-the-job injuries and illnesses, analyses of root cause, application of findings and results, and evaluation of the effectiveness of preventive measures.

FINDINGS

Off-the-job fatalities impact operational readiness. They take more service member lives than any other cause – 60 percent of DoD fatalities happen while driving, boating, hunting, or during other recreational activities. For example, the Navy estimates that private motor vehicle accidents cost $131 million between fiscal years 1996 and 2000, and traffic and recreation accidents comprised 73 percent of Navy fatalities between FY1996 and 2000.

Because the Services are responsible for uniformed personnel 24 hours a day, seven days a week, they are in a unique position – much stronger than that of industry – to influence off-duty well being. The military can also influence the future behaviors of uniformed personnel and civilian employees once they leave the Services.

11-L-0559/OSD/6652

The Services have the ability to capture data for uniformed personnel and their families. Not only does the military have access to data that industry does not have; it also has the capability to analyze these data and develop prevention and intervention programs to address specific problem areas (e.g., drunk driving). Because of their ability to gather and analyze data and their progress in prevention programs, the Services have the potential to be world leaders in the prevention of off-the-job injuries and fatalities.

Throughout the entire safety and occupational health system, however, the Services could more effectively share and benchmark prevention information from one service to another. The existing off-the-job prevention programs also lack military-wide uniformity and analysis for effectiveness. Finally, just as with occupational injuries within the DoD, there is no system to quantify the impact of off-the-job fatalities, injuries, and illnesses and relate them to operational readiness.

The Services are in a singular position to be able to design programs, determine effectiveness and share lessons-learned about reduction of off-the-job injuries, fatalities and illnesses (including injuries to family members and dependents). The military can serve as a laboratory for developing these injury-prevention programs that have applicability to industry.

A military-wide system to reduce off-the-job injuries, illnesses and fatalities could put the U.S. military in a position to be the world-leader in off-the-job injury and illness prevention. Industry – and, in fact, organizations around the world – would benchmark their programs against the DoD system.

Examples of existing programs:

- The U.S. Marine Corps program consists of the following key elements:
  - The Marine Corps uses Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) accountability techniques to induce personnel to exercise proper safety behavior. Traffic safety is covered by a Marine Corps Order that directs the wearing of seat belts and makes non-use a punishable offense.
  - For both traffic safety and recreational safety – Unit Commanders and MCSC managers are encouraged to use Operational Risk Management in the development of their safety programs.
  - HQMC Safety Office sends staff to the field to personally review status of implementation, encourages force commanders to take active role per Commandant's directive and reminds them of consequences for failure to comply.
  - Marine Corps Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) programs implemented at the unit level have reduced off-duty deaths by 50 percent from FY 2000 to FY 2001.
- The Air Force has developed and administers a number of traffic-related and defensive training courses. In addition, installations develop peer-sponsored Drivers Against Drunk Drivers programs and work with community law enforcement organizations and support groups to target at-risk populations.

11-L-0559/OSD/6653

RECOMMENDATIONS

DoD should:

- Develop and share lessons-learned with off-the-job injury prevention programs among the Services.
- Evaluate the off-the-job injury prevention programs for uniformed personnel and consider ways to extend them to the DoD civilian workforce and military families.
- Quantify the operational readiness impact of off-the-job incidents. As part of existing readiness indicators, include statistics on what percent of the force is not deployable due to off-the-job injuries and illnesses.
- Expand measures to include data collection for off-duty incidents in a consistent fashion for both military and civilian personnel.
- Continue to benchmark performance with leading companies. Establish a mechanism to collect and exchange best practice information about off-the-job injury prevention systems among Services and with industry.
- Increase analysis of medical data on uniformed personnel and their families to develop effective prevention and/or intervention programs to reduce off-the-job injuries, illnesses and fatalities.

BEST PRACTICES

DUPONT: OFF-THE-JOB SAFETY

- DuPont company tracks off-the-job fatalities and lost time injuries that cause employees to miss a day of scheduled work.
  - Categories measured include: slips and falls, sports-related, and motor vehicle related
  - Employee off-the-job fatalities are reported to the CEO and the employee's Vice President and business leader within 24 hours of occurrence
  - Off-the-job lost-time injuries are reported monthly to the corporate operations senior leaders for analysis and potential action. The CEO sees these numbers as part of the same management communication.
- DuPont places significant effort in educating its employee population to "take safety home with you." Examples of education efforts:
  - Home electrical outlet protection
  - Use of personal protective equipment at home
  - Value of healthy diet, exercise and appropriate rest
  - Dangers of falls in the home
  - Seat belt usage and defensive driving techniques

11-L-0559/OSD/6654

Los Alamos National Laboratory: Off-the-Job Safety as a Core Value

- Zero off-the-job injuries has been adopted as a key Laboratory policy.
- Training, education, and safety meetings include home safety subjects.
- Off-the-job education is integrated into the Ergonomics Program. Education examples include:
  - Defensive driving
  - Healthy lifestyles and preventive care
  - Home electrical safety
  - Field safety
- Sharing of lessons-learned from off-the-job accidents and injuries.
- Community involvement to promote off-the-job health and safety. For example, participation in:
  - Health Fairs
  - Waste disposal assistance
  - Seatbelt and child restraint usage
- The Laboratory is initiating a pilot in reporting/tracking off-the-job lost workday cases

11-L-0559/OSD/6655

3.0 CONCLUSION

The goal of this NSC cooperative effort with DoD was to improve the DoD's operational readiness capabilities through reduction in the human and financial costs resulting from non-combat injuries and illnesses. The NSC convened a panel of experts from industry, labor, and government to conduct an assessment of the DoD's Safety and Occupational Health Management Systems.

The NSC review identified many DoD programs and initiatives that have a positive impact on reducing work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses. Despite these pockets of excellence, however, the NSC panel found that the DoD lacks an effective department-wide safety and occupational health management system. No overall system ensures continuing improvement in performance. The performance of the DoD in safety and occupational health is, therefore, less than it should be.

The DoD injury and illness rates are only slightly better than average but more than eight times the rates of the best companies. The occupational fatality rate is unacceptable at 16 times higher than these same industry leaders. The total costs associated with DoD occupational injuries and illnesses are largely unknown but are conservatively estimated at anywhere from $10 billion to more than $21 billion annually. Finally, and perhaps most telling, the DoD has almost no knowledge of the impact of these occupational fatalities, injuries, and illnesses on operational readiness.

Many of the NSC panel members commented that the current DoD situation is not unlike the one that their own companies faced about a decade ago. The NSC's recommendations in this report are consistent with the steps that many of the panel member's companies have taken to become leaders in occupational safety and health.

In order for the DoD to take safety and occupational health to the next level of performance, the NSC panel recommends that the DoD adopt a systems approach to improving performance. Such an approach would be consistent with the one that best-in-class companies have taken. It requires top-level leadership commitment, system integration focused on continuing safety and occupational heath performance improvement, and executive level oversight of overall system improvement. This is the formula many of the NSC panel members' companies followed to improve their safety and occupational health performance.

The NSC panel is confident that the DoD can rise to the level of best-in-class companies if it follows the report's recommendations. The NSC panel also felt that DoD is uniquely positioned to provide leadership in "off-the-job" and "family" safety and occupational health issues.

The Department has done well; it is time to do better.

11-L-0559/OSD/6656

APPENDIX A- LETTER TO HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD

May 29, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense, Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I would like the opportunity to meet with you to discuss how we can work together on critical safety and health initiatives. I believe the Council is uniquely qualified to help improve DoD's operational readiness capabilities.

The National Safety Council, founded in 1913, is the nation's leading advocate of safety and health in the workplace, on the highways, and in homes and communities. NSC was *chartered by the United States Congress* in 1953, by PL 83-259 and is the only safety and health organization chartered by the Federal Government. NSC is a nonprofit, non-governmental public service organization whose mission includes the responsibility "...to arouse and maintain the interest of the people of the United States in safety and in accident prevention..."

We have a network of 50 affiliated chapters, encompassing 37,500 member companies, unions, and associations. These members include the largest, technologically advanced corporations in the Fortune 500. Together, our world-class members and professional staff determine best practices in safety and health. A team of our innovative leaders is available to assist you.

Last year, DoD experienced over 450 deaths to civilians and military personnel. Besides the human tragedies, DoD has experienced loss of operational capability due to injuries and fatalities to your soldiers, sailors, aviators and marines. In addition, the economic impact of civilian injuries alone has exceeded $3 billion in workers' compensation costs over the last five years. The National Safety Council can help you to reduce these human tragedies, loss of operational capability and economic impact.

We would begin with a quick, executive assessment of DoD safety and health programs conducted by our executive team. I look forward to discussing this proposal with you. We

11-L-0559/OSD/6657

could begin in July and brief you in August. Then we could meet with your safety officials at our National Safety Congress in September to discuss the next steps.

I will follow-up with your office in the next few weeks to discuss how the National Safety Council can assist you and the Department of Defense. I look forward to speaking with you then.

Sincerely,



Alan C. McMillan
President & CEO

11-L-0559/OSD/6658

APPENDIX B- LETTER TO NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

ACQUISITION,
TECHNILOGY
AND LOGISTICS

Alan McMillian, President & CEO
National Safety Council
1121 Spring Lake Drive
Itasca, IL 60143-3201

JUN 26 2001

Dear Mr. McMillan:

On behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld, I am responding to your letter of May 29, 2001 offering an executive assessment of the Department of Defense (DoD) safety and health program. The safety and health of our military, civilians and their families as well as our contractors are very important to the Secretary and to the readiness of the Defense Department.

We appreciate the fact the National Safety Council is Congressionally chartered by PL 83-259 as a non-profit service organization for accident prevention with a membership of major corporations, unions, and other associations. Over the years, various DoD installation safety offices have used your expertise. This administration desires to learn from industry successes.

We agree with your proposal to conduct your review in July, outbrief the appropriate individuals in August and meet with our Service Safety Officials in September at the National Safety Congress. We understand this review is to be at no cost to DoD.

The Installations and Environment staff will arrange for an introductory meeting between our key directors and your team. The point of contact is Mr. Curtis Bowling, who can be reached at (b)(6) or by email at Curtis.Bowling@osd.mil.

Sincerely,

Raymond F. Dubois, Jr.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations & Environment)

11-L-0559/OSD/6659

APPENDIX C - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF PANEL MEMBERS

Jerry Scannell
President and Chief Executive Officer (Emeritus)
National Safety Council
Panel Chair

Jerry Scannell joined the National Safety Council as President in 1995 and brings more than 30 years of government and private sector safety and health experience.

During 1992-1994, he served as Vice-President of Worldwide Safety Affairs at Johnson & Johnson in New Brunswick, New Jersey and also served as Director of Corporate Safety, Fire, and Environmental Affairs from 1979 to 1989.

In 1989, Mr. Scannell was nominated by President George Bush to serve as Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

Mr. Scannell graduated from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree and completed postgraduate training in epidemiology and environmental economics at George Washington University.

11-L-0559/OSD/6660

Leo Carey
Director, Government Services
National Safety Council

Mr. Carey received a BS in Chemistry from Allentown College and an MS in Occupational Health from Temple University. He pursued additional graduate studies at the Pennsylvania State University.

As Director of Government Services, Mr. Carey is the central liaison between the National Safety Council (NSC) and the various branches of the U.S. government. In this role, Mr. Carey is responsible for developing policy and business opportunities with the government for the NSC. Mr. Carey is responsible for coordinating the process for the development of NSC policies. He also serves as liaison for the NSC with other safety and health organizations.

Prior to coming to the National Safety Council, Mr. Carey was part of several significant projects on domestic and international occupational safety and health. In 1995 he served as team leader for the team that developed the "New OSHA" document, which became the blueprint for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration under the Clinton Administration. Mr. Carey was appointed by the governing body of the International Labor Organization to serve as Chairman of the Eleventh Session of the Joint ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Health in Geneva, Switzerland, reviewing worldwide occupational health development. He also served on an ANSI International Advisory Committee Task Force on Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems. He currently serves on the ANSI Z10 Accredited Standards Committee on Occupational Health and Safety Systems. For nine years he was OSHA's Director of Field Programs, providing direction to OSHA's regional offices. Mr. Carey is a member of the American Industrial Hygiene Association and the American Conference of Industrial Hygienists and is certified in the comprehensive practice of industrial hygiene by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene.

11-L-0559/OSD/6661

Karl L. Bossung
Corporate Manager, Health and Safety
Delphi Automotive Systems

Karl Bossung began his career with General Motors as a Cooperative Education Student in 1974. After graduating with a Bachelors Degree in Business Administration from General Motors Institute in 1979, he was promoted to Manufacturing Supervisor at the General Motors, Central Foundry Division, Saginaw Malleable Iron Plant in Saginaw, Michigan. Mr. Bossung spent the next 10 years in various manufacturing assignments ranging from skilled trades to production and quality. He was then promoted to Salaried Personnel Administrator in 1987, which included the oversight of all health and safety activities for the foundry.

In 1991, Mr. Bossung was transferred to the UAW-General Motors, Human Resource Center for Health and Safety as a Program Manager and Staff Assistant. In this assignment, Mr. Bossung was responsible for all Health and Safety program development at UAW represented General Motors facilities. In 1992, Mr. Bossung was promoted to Coordinator and Senior Staff Assistant at the Health and Safety Center with the responsibilities of supervising and coordinating the management staff of safety professionals. He held this position for the next three years.

In 1995, Mr. Bossung was promoted and appointed to the newly created position of Manager, Health and Safety, for Delphi Automotive Systems, a division of General Motors. In 1999, when Delphi separated from General Motors, Mr. Bossung was promoted to the new position of Corporate Manager, Health and Safety, Delphi Automotive Systems, the position that he holds today. In this position, Mr. Bossung is responsible for coordinating all safety activities in Delphi locations around the world.

Mr. Bossung is a charter member of the National Safety Council's Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Board and has recently been nominated for a position on its Board of Delegates. Additionally, Mr. Bossung has been elected to a position on the Automotive Industry Action Group's (AIAG) newly created Occupational Health & Safety Steering Committee.

11-L-0559/OSD/6662

Ernie O. Clayton
Director, Safety, Health and Environmental Affairs
The Boeing Company

Ernie Clayton was appointed Director for Safety, Health and Environmental Affairs (SHEA) in August 1998. In this assignment, he is responsible for overall policy and management of The Boeing Company's efforts related to employee safety and health, energy and the protection of the environment.

Before his current assignment, Mr. Clayton served as the SHEA Director for the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG), the company's largest product division.

He joined the Boeing Company in 1980 as Safety Manager for Boeing Engineering and Construction. He was Safety Manager for Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia, PA from 1984 to 1989, and Safety Manager and SHEA Director at the Commercial Airplane plant in Everett, Wash. from 1989 to 1996, when he became SHEA Director for BCAG.

A native of Torrance, CA., Mr. Clayton earned a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry from California State College at Fullerton. He currently serves on the Board of Directors of the Evergreen Safety Council.

11-L-0559/OSD/6663

Michael N. Ferrara Jr.
Manager, SAFE Fleet – North America
Johnson & Johnson

Michael has 13 years of experience in the field of occupational safety and health. He has held positions with the Connecticut State Police in the Public Safety and Transportation Group and the University of Connecticut Health Center in the Radiation Safety Department. Over the last 10 years, he has held positions within Johnson & Johnson in the areas of safety and industrial hygiene and operations.

Over the last five years he has specialized in the area of fleet safety within the sales/service organizations at Johnson & Johnson. In his current position, Mr. Ferrara and his team manage the overall SAFE Fleet program in North America. He has responsibility for 27 Johnson & Johnson operating company SAFE Fleet Teams and over 10,000 field sales/service representatives. He is a member of the Somerset County Business/Education Partnership where he teaches basic management techniques and key job performance skills to students entering the workforce.

A native of Ansonia, CT., Mr. Ferrara holds a B.S. in Safety Engineering and a B.S. in Manufacturing Engineering.

11-L-0559/OSD/6664

Deborah L. Grubbe, P.E.
Corporate Director – Safety and Health
DuPont

Deborah Grubbe is Corporate Director – Safety and Health for DuPont. She is accountable for leading new initiatives in global safety and occupational health for the $27 billion corporation. Ms. Grubbe was formerly the Operations Director for two of DuPont's global businesses, where she was accountable for manufacturing, engineering, safety, environmental and information systems. She has 24 years of experience in five of DuPont's 20 Business Units. Ms. Grubbe is also a past director of DuPont Engineering's 700 person engineering technology organization. Her 15 different assignments range from capital project implementation through manufacturing management and human resources.

Ms. Grubbe currently serves on the National Institute of Standards and Technology Visiting Committee for Advanced Technology. She also serves the National Academy of Sciences as a member of the oversight committee for the Demilitarization of US Chemical Weapons Stockpile. Ms. Grubbe sits on the Board of Directors of the Engineering and Construction Committee of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, and is on the Business Management Advisory Committee of Wilmington College. She is the former co-chair of the Benchmarking and Metrics Committee of the Construction Industry Institute, and currently serves as a member of its Fully Integrated and Automated Project Processes committee. She is currently a member of the Purdue University School of Chemical Engineering New Directions Executive Committee. Ms. Grubbe was the first woman and youngest elected member on the State of Delaware Registration Board for Professional Engineers (1985-1989). During her tenure on the State Board, she was the Chair of the Law Enforcement and Ethics Committee. She is active with the Society of Women Engineers, and is a former board member of the Women in Engineering Program Advocates Network (WEPAN). Ms. Grubbe has been featured in the books "Engineering Your Way to Success" and "Journeys of Women in Science and Engineering – No Universal Constants." She is one of the named supporters of Engineer's Week, 2002, "Introduce a Million Girls to Engineering" initiative.

In 1994, Ms. Grubbe was named an outstanding Chemical Engineering Alumna by the Purdue University School of Chemical Engineering, and is a recipient of the 1986 Trailblazer Award from the Delaware Alliance of Professional Women. She is a recent recipient of the Purdue Engineering Alumni Association Service Award.

Ms. Grubbe was born in suburban Chicago and graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering with Highest Distinction from Purdue University. She received a Winston Churchill Fellowship to attend Cambridge University in England, where she received a Certificate of Post Graduate Study in Chemical Engineering. She is a registered professional engineer in Delaware and is the engineer of record for DuPont. She is married to James B. Porter, Jr., and resides in Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania.

11-L-0559/OSD/6665

J. Lee McAtee
Deputy Director of Environment, Safety & Health
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Lee McAtee has undergraduate degrees in Health Physics and Psychology and a Master of Science degree in Radiology and Radiation Biology from Colorado State University. In the mid-1970s, Mr. McAtee worked as a radiation protection specialist for a variety of companies in the nuclear industry. Since 1980, he has worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, where he served as a staff health physicist and manager of radiation protection. Since 1996, Mr. McAtee has been the Deputy Director of the Environment, Safety, & Health Division. This 800-person organization provides leadership, expertise, and support throughout the Laboratory in all ES&H disciplines, including health physics, industrial hygiene and safety, occupational medicine, nuclear safety, hazmat response, and environmental protection.

In his current role, Mr. McAtee has helped lead the Laboratory's development and implementation of a new integrated safety management system that has resulted in dramatic improvements in ES&H performance, including more than a three-fold reduction in recordable injuries and more than a four-fold improvement in environmental violations during the past few years.

Mr. McAtee is active in the Health Physics Society, where he has served as President and Director of the Rio Grande Chapter and is currently a nominee for Board of Directors of the national society. He has also participated in numerous ES&H reviews throughout the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, holds patents for development of several radiation monitoring techniques, taught health physics at the University of New Mexico, Los Alamos Branch, served as a senior advisor to the DOE Radiological Assistance Program, and participated in or chaired a number of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) committees.

11-L-0559/OSD/6666

Jacqueline (Jackie) Nowell, MPH, CIH
Director, Occupational Safety and Health Office,
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW)

Jacqueline Nowell joined the UFCW in 1990. She is currently Director of the Occupational Safety and Health Office for the Field Services Department.

A Certified Industrial Hygienist, Ms. Nowell earned her Masters in Public Health at the University of California, Los Angeles. She previously served as Assistant Professor, Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences Division, Hunter College, CUNY; and Staff Industrial Hygienist, New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health, a coalition of labor unions that provides technical assistance and training on occupational safety and health to member local unions.

11-L-0559/OSD/6667

Charles F. Redinger, CIH, MPA, Ph.D.
Principal, Redinger & Associates, Inc.

Charles Redinger is a principal with Redinger & Associates, Inc., in San Rafael, California. Since the early 1990s, he has been at the forefront of environmental health and safety management system and performance measurement research and methods development. He works for a wide range of public and private sector organizations in their efforts to improve environmental health and safety performance.

He has a Ph.D. in Industrial Health from the University of Michigan, a Master's Degree in Public Policy from the University of Colorado and a BA in Chemistry from the University of California at Santa Cruz. He is a member of the Public Policy honor society Phi Alpha Alpha, and has been a Kemper Fellow in Public Health and an Erb Fellow in Environmental Management. He is a Certified Industrial Hygienist (CIH) by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene.

He writes and teaches extensively on EHS performance improvement and system implementation. Most recently, he was a co-editor of a performance metrics book and is the author of a management system assessment instrument. His research activities continue with colleagues at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the University of Michigan, and Loma Linda University on management system effectiveness, validation, as well as occupational exposure assessment.

Dr. Redinger has worked for several international organizations on the development of EHS policies and standards. He is a technical advisor to the International Labour Office in their development of an international occupational health and safety management system, as well as the ANSI Z-10 Committee in the development of a similar American standard.

11-L-0559/OSD/6668

Knut Ringen, Dr., P.H., M.H.A., M.P.H.
Principal, Stoneturn Consultants

Dr. Knut Ringen is a principal with Stoneturn Consultants in Seattle, specializing in environment, safety and health risk management, workers' compensation and group health insurance. He also is managing member of The Risk Advisors, LLC in Washington D.C.

He was executive director of the Laborers' Health and Safety Fund of North America 1987-92, and director, The Center to Protect Workers' Rights, 1992-97. He served as Chairman, National Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health from 1993 to 1997.

Among many honors, he is elected to the European Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Collegium Ramazzini. He specializes in the development of research and service programs with an emphasis on workers and other special populations, and has been instrumental in developing many health programs that have achieved national significance. He has lectured extensively throughout North America, Europe, Asia and South America. He is an author or editor of more than 80 scientific publications, including *Occupational Medicine State of the Art Reviews: Construction Safety and Health*, Hanley and Balfus, Philadelphia, 1996 and *Chapter 93: Construction, Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 4th Edition*, International Labor Organization, Geneva, 1997.

He has focused extensively on the use of data to characterize the construction industry, develop industry-wide safety and health objectives and programs, and evaluate the industry's safety and health performance, including the role of compliance inspections.

He received the Doctor of Public Health degree from Johns Hopkins University for his research on the development of health policy. He also holds a Master of Hospital Administration degree from the Medical College of Virginia and a Master of Public Health degree from Johns Hopkins University.

11-L-0559/OSD/6669

Rosemary K. Sokas, MD, MOH
Associate Director for Science
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health

Rosemary Sokas, MD, MOH, is the Associate Director for Science at NIOSH and adjunct professor of medicine at George Washington University. She received her MD from Boston University School of Medicine and her Master's of Occupational Health from the Harvard School of Public Health, and is board certified in internal medicine and in preventive medicine (occupational).

Dr. Sokas previously directed the Office of Occupational Medicine at OSHA. She has served as full-time faculty at the George Washington University, where she directed the Occupational Medicine Residency Program and the Institute for the Environment, and at the University of Pennsylvania, where she coordinated occupational health consultation programs and directed the Philadelphia VA hypertension clinic.

Her research publications include health care worker safety, medical education, lead toxicity, and the effects of occupational exposures on blood pressure. She is the co-team leader for the National Occupational Research Agenda Priority Team focusing on Special Populations at Risk. She has served on an Institute of Medicine committee evaluating the primary care provided to Persian Gulf veterans, and served as a member of the Armed Forces Epidemiology Board from 1996 to 2001.

11-L-0559/OSD/6670

Jim Thornton
Director of Environmental Health and Safety
Newport News Shipbuilding

Jim Thornton is the Director of Environmental Health and Safety at Newport News Shipbuilding. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering from Auburn University and a Master of Science degree in Industrial Hygiene from Texas A&M University. Mr. Thornton began his career with NNS in 1976 as Manager of Industrial Hygiene. In a restructuring move, he next served as Manager, Health Safety & Environmental. His current position of Director, which he has held since 1993, includes responsibility for the Medical Department and Workers' Compensation as well as Environmental, Industrial Hygiene and Safety.

From June 1999 – June 2000, Mr. Thornton served as President of the American Industrial Hygiene Association. The organization is the world's largest association of occupational and environmental health professionals who come from government, labor, industry, universities and private business. AIHA has 12,000 members, an annual budget of $12 million and members' equity of $8 million.

At NNS, Mr. Thornton directed efforts and programs to obtain "STAR" status in the OSHA Voluntary Protection Program. NNS is the largest site and the only shipyard in the program. In addition, the Environmental and Workers' Compensation programs have won awards acknowledging their excellence.

11-L-0559/OSD/6671

Richard J. Waxweiler, Ph.D., M.S.I.E.
Director, Division of Acute Care, Rehabilitation Research, and Disabilities Prevention and
Acting Deputy Director
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Richard Waxweiler received Bachelor's and Master's degrees in engineering from the University of Michigan and a Doctorate in epidemiology from the University of North Carolina. His career at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) began in 1971 as an epidemiologist/industrial hygienist at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), where he led a research staff that focused on the identification and control of occupational carcinogens. Afterwards, he investigated radiation-related health effects while at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and toxic waste site health effects for the National Center for Environmental Health at CDC.

Dr. Waxweiler joined the injury control program at CDC in 1985, where he first directed the Epidemiology Branch. As Special Assistant for Scientific Affairs for the injury program, he led the development of the National Agenda for the 1990s and National Plan for Injury Control. He has directed DACRRDP/NPIPC since its creation in 1993. He has authored/co-authored more than 80 papers in occupational/environmental/injury epidemiology and has been active in the American Public Health Association where he served as Chairman of the Injury Control and Emergency Health Services Section, and in the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine and Brain Injury Association of Georgia as a board member.

11-L-0559/OSD/6672

APPENDIX D – BEST PRACTICES

DuPont: Leadership with Full Accountability

DuPont is a $27 billion company with 90,000 employees. Approximately half of these work outside the United States. The company operates in 70 countries and has 210 manufacturing and processing facilities with 40 research and development and customer service labs in the United States, and more than 35 labs in 11 other countries. DuPont delivers science-based solutions in markets such as food and nutrition, health care, apparel, home and construction, electronics and transportation.

The ultimate responsibility for safety and health at DuPont rests with the chief executive officer. The CEO begins every meeting by reinforcing the safety message and often reiterates that safety is one of the organization's core values.

Everyone in the core corporate safety, health, environment group of six has direct access to the CEO. The bulk of the work for running the world-class safety and health management system is decentralized. A safety excellence center with 25 people compiles statistics and manages the incident tracking system, manages the standards approval process and proposes common safety solutions for the business units. The center is funded and paid for by DuPont's businesses. The businesses use center services to help meet goals.

At a regular operations network meeting of manufacturing and engineering leaders, safety is always the first topic of discussion. The leader of the 25-member group is the Vice President of Operations for DuPont, who reports directly to the CEO.

If a major incident has occurred, the group will often spend a majority of the meeting talking about safety. The team member who is accountable for the site where the incident occurred stands before the group and explains what happened, why it happened, and what actions will be taken to prevent it from occurring in the future. As of the printing of this report, DuPont has not had an employee fatality in more than 3 years.

The leader of each DuPont facility, usually the plant manager, has responsibility for safety and health at the facility level. Each plant manager has a safety and health manager who assists the manager on a tactical level.

Managers are held accountable for safety and health performance. DuPont has found that when safety performance is poor at a plant, production, quality and labor relations are also suffering. Managers with poor safety records are usually removed from their positions, because DuPont leaders consider the poor safety record an indication that the manager is not using management systems appropriately.

11-L-0559/OSD/6673

One of the reasons safety at DuPont has strong management support is that the company considers safety to be a good investment – they save four or five dollars for every dollar they spend on safety. The results: in 1999, DuPont's worker's compensation costs were $9 million for 50,000 employees – one of the lowest in the country per employee.

Another example: DuPont's construction management group, which builds facilities and conducts major maintenance globally, controls 12,000 to 15,000 contractor workers for capital projects. The company pays $12 million for 100 people who manage construction contractors and ensure they are following the DuPont safety and health culture. Partly as a result of this group's work, DuPont's workers' compensation rate for contractors is extremely low – $21 million less than the yearly industry average.

DuPont leadership shows commitment to safety not only by investing money, but also by being willing to stop production at a plant. If two or three OSHA recordable injuries happen within a short period of time, many plants will hold "stop the music" meetings.

The entire production process shuts down and everyone in the plant goes into a safety meeting, where small groups talk about what has happened and work to find solutions that will prevent further incidents. The company philosophy is that the money lost during the production stoppage will be more than recouped in savings from injury prevention.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Injury Costs Integrated Into System

Newport News Shipbuilding is a $2 billion company with 17,000 employees based in Newport News, Virginia. The company constructs and repairs a full complement of naval and sub-surface vessels as well as commercial vessels.

At Newport News Shipbuilding, leaders continually show their commitment to safety in both big and small ways. Leaders make routine safety visits throughout the shipyard, always wearing personal protective equipment. The higher the level of the manager making the visit, the more attention the visit receives. At each level of the company, the managers have responsibility for safety and health.

Three years ago Newport News formed an executive safety steering committee to raise visibility of safety within the company and review progress toward goals on a high-level basis. The company sees the committee as a valuable way to show leadership commitment within the company. The committee, comprised of the COO, Vice President of Operations, Vice President of Human Resources, Director of Environmental Health Safety and several of the operations managers, meets at least every six weeks to discuss safety.

Additional meetings are called on a case-by-case basis – responding to a serious accident or new safety-related legislation, for example.

The group monitors progress against specific company health and safety goals, and determines where program adjustments are needed. If the goals are not being met, the

11-L-0559/OSD/6674

group discusses problems and solutions. Each group member has the power to take actions.

Another way leaders show commitment is through resources commitment. At the corporate level, safety and health has its own budget. This budget pays for the corporate safety and health staff as well as equipment such as sampling pumps and test kits.

Line operators don't have a separate safety and health budget. Ergonomic corrections to machines, for example, come out of general maintenance budgets.

A leadership commitment that safety is equal in priority to productivity ensures that management feels those expenditures are necessary and prudent.

To ensure accountability within the company, each manager has a performance agreement. This agreement includes goals for each manager in financial progress, productivity, quality etc. Each manager's performance agreement includes health and safety goals. If the manager does not meet health and safety goals, promotions, bonuses and raises are adversely affected. The CEO also has a health and safety target for the company for which he is responsible.

Costs of injuries are charged back to the project where they occurred, so the head of a department with high injury rates is held financially accountable for safety performance along with production levels and quality goals. (See Performance Measurement section for more details on the system.)

Dupont: The Zero-Injury Culture

In 1994 DuPont noticed that safety numbers were deteriorating. The DuPont CEO commissioned the Discovery Team, which created a new safety and health process and said the goal of the process would be zero occupational injuries and illnesses for the company.

Although there was some management resistance to the zero-injury goal – a few managers felt the goal would be impractical and impossible – the company saw an immediate drop in safety numbers.

The culture change was initiated by a team and driven from the top. A cross-section team of corporate leadership, plant management and safety leaders began telling their constituents within DuPont about the zero-injury goal. Through leadership commitment, intensive training and employee involvement, the 0-injury culture permeated through every level of the company and is now treated as a benchmark in safety and health by organizations all over the world.
The new culture has dramatically reduced significant incidents at DuPont. From a level of more than 100 significant incidents annually in the early 1990s, the company had only

11-L-0559/OSD/6675

one distribution incident and zero process and environmental incidents in 2000. The businesses are now focused on reducing the less severe incidents to zero.

The zero-injury goal affected other areas of the company as well – people began asking if the company could also set a zero-goal in sexual harassment, off-the-job injuries, ethics violations, environmental releases and transportation.

Delphi Automotive Systems: A Culture Shift

Delphi Automotive Systems is a $29.2 billion mobile electronics and transportation components and systems manufacturer with approximately 200,000 employees working on 196 wholly-owned manufacturing sites, 43 joint ventures, 53 customer centers and 32 techical centers in 43 countries.

In 1994, when Delphi Automotive Systems was still part of General Motors, Paul O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, was on the General Motors board. At the time, Secretary O'Neill was also CEO of Alcoa.

At one of the board meetings a leader profiled GM's safety record. Mr. O'Neill pointed out that the automotive industry had one of the worst records for safety and health of any industry in the country: thus GM was only the best of the worst.

Mr. O'Neill inspired the board members to begin to benchmark against the country's leading companies in safety and health. The General Motors board of directors commissioned a team of 10 people, including senior executives of manufacturing, several union representatives, several safety and health managers and representatives from legal and finance departments, to visit Allied Signal, DuPont, Boeing, Alcoa and others.

After extensive visits and investigation, the team decided the safety and health management systems of best-in-class companies had several things in common including: a plant safety review board (or central safety committee), detailed safe operating practices, thorough incident investigation and safety observation tours. The Delphi and union team took those four elements and created a new joint leadership process.

At each of Delphi's 196 manufacturing sites throughout North America, South America, Asia Pacific and Europe, the company rolled out this leadership process over the next several years.

The plant safety review board acts as the overall safety steering committee for a site. Ad-hoc committees on ergonomics, falls, lock-out, etc...report to that board. The board is comprised of the site's top management and union leadership.

The plant safety review boards are charged to hold stand-alone, high-level meetings at least once per month for one to two hours. If the plant manager can't attend, the meeting is rescheduled.

11-L-0559/OSD/6676

The boards also oversaw the development of detailed safe operating procedures and commissioned every department at each site to create a team, who would train employees, implement procedures and enforce them.

Next, Delphi began conducting a thorough root-cause analysis of every injury. In the past, Delphi's accident investigations had often blamed the employee; thus the investigations did not reach the real root cause. Delphi decided that the real root cause could seldom be employee fault or human error. Within the hierarchy of health and safety controls, the new accident investigations were not permitted to cite warning signs, training or personal protective equipment as the sole correction to a root cause. The solutions should either be elimination or substitution of a hazard.

For example, if an employee cut his hand on a part while not wearing a glove, the root cause of the incident would not be that the employee failed to wear the glove, but that the part had a hazard, a sharp edge or burr. In the past the company would discipline, counsel and reinstruct the employee in wearing the required personal protective equipment. The solution within the new process would be to eliminate the sharp edges on the part the employee handles.

Finally, every month, every level of leadership on a site conducts safety observation tours. Previously, leaders often visited the shop floors but never conducted safety-based tours.

Instead of chastising incorrect behavior, the leaders now praise employees following safe operating procedures. The employees who consistently follow the safe procedures are picked to train new employees in safe behavior.

If the managers observe problems on the tours, they document the problem, find a corrective solution and assign someone to implement the solution and follow-through to check that the solution occurred.

Initially, the safety observation tours met with resistance. Managers felt that the tours were a waste of their valuable time and some employees felt the managers were spying on them. The union expressed concern that the tours would be used to discipline employees. Management agreed that the tours would not be used in the disciplinary process and the unions accepted them. Now the safety observation tours are considered a crucial and valuable part of Delphi's safety and health management system.

The culture change at Delphi is an ongoing process. It began in 1994. In 1995 leaders touted the change throughout the organization. After several months of "waving the flag for safety" they began to implement the change. The company is now in phase 2 of the 3-phase operation.
Even though the safety culture change is not complete, the company has seen definitive results. Since 1993, Delphi has reduced lost-workday cases by 89 percent. Since 1993 Delphi's total OSHA recordables have dropped 86 percent, which means 28,500 fewer recordable injuries each year.

11-L-0559/OSD/6677

The safety and health culture change at Delphi has increased the company's competitive advantage, improved employee loyalty, improved public image, lowered costs, improved quality and improved management relationship.

Johnson & Johnson: Dramatically Reducing Work-Related Driving Accidents

In 1995, the Johnson & Johnson Executive Committee decided to create a culture change within their field sales and service organization to reduce motor vehicle accidents and injuries. The Executive Committee appointed the member responsible for the Pharmaceutical Franchise as program champion. The champion was responsible for creating the culture change, funding programs and making sure the program received high-level visibility and support from senior management.

He formed a corporate SAFE Fleet Task Force, and they developed a comprehensive 16-step process, which recently has been improved and streamlined to six steps. The Task Force set goals for the year, benchmarked against other companies, conducted baseline assessments and instituted systems to collect and report metrics and develop recognition and incentive programs.

Each operating company vice-president of sales sponsors a SAFE Fleet team, and each team follows the six-step process. There are currently 27 SAFE Fleet teams. The process includes senior management involvement, field management involvement, team performance, driver training, motivation and recognition systems, and safety and health. Each team is formally assessed every two years on program progress and accident and injury reduction. Management commitment is one of the main reasons the program works. Senior management views the safe driving program as a core value and provides financial support and leadership.

The SAFE Fleet Task Force reviews the SAFE Fleet performance of each operating company. They then rank the companies based on program metrics (See Performance Measurement section for more details on this system). Since the program began, the Johnson & Johnson fleet has more than doubled in size from 3,000 to 10,000. In that time, the accident rate has dropped by 39 percent.

DuPont: Leading and Lagging Indicators

DuPont uses a combination of leading and lagging indicators. The lagging indicators include lost-time cases and OSHA recordable injuries. The incidents are recorded and incorporated into the corporate data collection system. The safety, health and environment excellence center uses those numbers to create reports that are sent to all the plant managers, as well as the company Vice Presidents and CEO. A simple set of metrics makes injuries and illnesses easily comparable both within DuPont businesses and with the rest of industry.

11-L-0559/OSD/6678

Leading indicators are judged at the site level on four factors: performance of key safety tasks, index trends, "success attitude" displayed and level of distraction.

Performance of key safety tasks includes adherence to employee audit schedule and relief valve/vessel inspections, state of housekeeping, serious incident follow-up, training tasks completed and safety meetings held. The performance is rated either as "dependent" – done with much effort and follow-up, "independent" – understand and execute with minimum follow-up and, the highest rating, "team" – adding scope to work, upgrading approaches and integrating across functions.

Index trends include unsafe acts (measured by management audits), serious defects (observed on individual audits) and serious incidents. The performance is rated as "concern" – high number of defects found routinely, open violation of rules, no knowledge of rules, "normal" – predictable, reasonable number of defects found, organization knowledgeable and defects on improving edges, or "excellent" – defects hard to discover, except by trained professionals.

Success attitude includes spirit of the work force, percentage of the work force involved in safety activities, obvious interest in safety activities, repeat violations of rules/procedures, equipment condition, employee use of repair systems for equipment, participation in safety and health opportunities (i.e. contests). The performance is rated as "dependent" – must urge to comply or participate, "independent" – employees participate in areas of personal interest, or "team" – employees volunteer to participate and plan and conduct safety activities without direction. They also take initiative to make improvements and enlist other employee's help.

Level of distraction includes high job turnover, employment insecurity, union/management problems, high overtime numbers and overhauls within the department. The performance is rated as "high" – employees have their minds on some key issue, "normal" – employees are integrating safety and health tasks with some difficulty or "low" – safety and health activities are normal and repeating, requiring little extra attention and there are no identified external issues.

Each of the above ratings is assigned a numerical score of 5, 3 or 1.

The manufacturing manager, safety professional, maintenance manager and operational unit manager all judge each factor monthly. Results are averaged for a consensus score at the site.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Financial Accountability Built Into Metrics

Newport News uses a combination of leading and trailing indicators in its metric system. Trailing indicators include total number of recordables rate, as defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. If any kind of medical treatment or first-aid is needed, the injury is recordable.

11-L-0559/OSD/6679

Leading indicators include number of health and safety training hours given and quality of accident reports. For example, if an employee falls and incurs a scalp laceration requiring suturing and lost-time, some would say the root cause was that the person wasn't wearing safety equipment. A more mature report would cite instead the equipment or situation that caused the fall.

The medical clinic reports the numbers to the corporate safety and health department. Company nurses are trained in recording procedures and reports are routinely audited.

Monthly reports are distributed throughout management of the company. The level of leadership determines the level of detail of the report. Whereas the CEO receives a one-page report summarizing all company injuries and illnesses for the month, a supervisor of a department with multiple injuries will receive a report with dozens of pages. Each recordable case warrants an extensive report, including a statement from the nurse who handled the injury.

Within the corporate health and safety department, the data is compiled into a database that can analyze numbers in various ways – by type of injury, department, etc.

Costs of each injury, including direct cost (workers' compensation), wage replacement and medical cost are charged back to the department. High injury costs adversely affect department profitability.

Johnson & Johnson's Safe Fleet Program: Leading and Trailing SAFE Fleet Indicators

Johnson & Johnson's SAFE Fleet Program uses a series of leading and lagging indicators to reduce motor vehicle accidents within their fleet. The key metrics for the SAFE Fleet program is accidents per million miles (APMM) driven, percent of fleet vehicles in accidents and percent of high-risk drivers.

The corporate SAFE Fleet team tracks the metrics of each field sales/service organization and reports the metrics to the Vice Presidents of sales/service of each of these organizations monthly.

The company use leading indicators such as high-risk driver screening, commentary drives and vehicle condition/maintenance reports. Johnson & Johnson staff review the driving records of all prospective new hires. High-risk drivers are disqualified from the hiring process. SAFE Fleet offers additional training and coaching to those fleet drivers within Johnson & Johnson who exhibit the high-risk behaviors they have identified.

Managers observe all drivers twice a year by conducting commentary drives. In addition, Johnson & Johnson conducts vehicle inspections and reviews maintenance records as a leading indicator. For example, dents and scratches on the vehicle, lack of routine oil changes or low tire pressure can indicate a potential problem/high-risk driver. Some additional metrics are:

11-L-0559/OSD/6680

- mileage driven
- number of accidents
- types of accidents
- circumstances of accidents
- percentage of vehicles in accidents
- regional and driver demographics related to accidents
- number and types of injuries
- whether certain regions have more accidents than others
- whether time of day is a factor in accidents
- whether those in accidents drive more or less than the average in the company
- percent of accidents caused by the other driver
- percent of accidents caused by high-risk drivers

Boeing: Communication Up, Down, Across System

Every Tuesday, the corporate director of safety, health and environment meets through video conferencing with the Process Council, which includes the heads of safety, health and environment within each Boeing business unit. Site safety and health directors may also tune in if they wish.

Every business unit has executive safety councils for each site. At larger sites, the executive safety councils generally have separate safety meetings; smaller sites often integrate safety into a regular business meeting.

The executive safety councils of 25-40 are comprised of the site operations director and all of their staff. The councils analyze metrics charts provided by the corporate safety and health department, determine whether policy is being properly executed and search for system improvements.

Often the head of safety and health for the site keeps minutes, but sometimes they lead the meeting. Ideally, the heads of safety and health are considered subject matter experts who are knowledgeable about best practices, changes in laws and government policies. The site directors analyze trends and implement improvements.
The executive safety council meetings are mimicked throughout the organization with crew safety meetings. A crew safety meeting might consist of the group who puts wings together and their supervisor.

In addition to the series of meetings, the company has a web-based communications system that delivers daily news to managers and employees. Recently, the corporate safety and health department used this web-based system to send out information about the anthrax threat and company response to all employees.

Safety professionals in the organization also have cross-section teams organized by subject. These teams hold a monthly web-based meeting. They include a safety

11-L-0559/OSD/6681

committee, environmental, medical and materials. Within each of these large subject areas are subcommittees. For example, the safety committee has subcommittees for ergonomics, industrial hygiene and physical safety.

The corporate safety department uses the groups a resource. If a new ergonomics law is passed, the ergonomics group will develop suggestions to ensure that the company is in compliance. The group reports to the Process Council, which takes the input, builds the plan and communicates the plan throughout the organization.

Therefore, changes in the system are not solely top down. The ideas come to the corporate safety and health department from a cross-section of safety professionals within the business units and are then distributed throughout the company.

Once a year all the safety and health managers at Boeing meet for three or four days to discuss best practices and lessons-learned.

Delphi Automotive Systems: Personnel Involvement an Intricate Part of the Process

Employee involvement has been one of the cornerstones of Delphi Automotive System's safety and health culture change. Delphi worked extensively with the union when designing the culture change and every aspect of the system involves employee representation.

Every plant has joint management and union health and safety representatives who report to the plant manager. All of the safety and health programs, such as ergonomics, have as many union representatives as management representatives. All of the safety and health trainers in ergonomics, lockout, hazardous materials, etc., are hourly employees who Delphi trained to be trainers.

Hourly employees are involved in writing safe operating practices because no one knows the job better than the ones performing it. Union representatives work beside management when conducting the safety observation tours and union representatives helped design a new root-cause analysis investigation process that never blames the employee (see Culture Change section).

"We would not be anywhere near the improvement we've had if we had not worked with our unions," says Karl Bossung, manager, health and safety for Delphi.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Health and Safety Teams Give Return on Investment

Newport News Shipbuilding has 40 health and safety task teams that represent the entire shipyard. Each team has both hourly and salaried representatives, including union representatives, as well as a manager. Each team elects its own leaders – often the elected leader is not the supervisor.

11-L-0559/OSD/6682

The teams work toward process improvement. For example, rather than telling employees "you need to wear your hard hat" they work to remove hazards from the process so the hard hat becomes unnecessary. They also conduct root-cause accident investigations of more severe accidents – those that involve property loss, for example. Generally, accident investigations are the responsibility of the foreman.

The health and safety task teams conduct weekly inspections of their area, noting improvements that are needed in compliance, equipment, etc. They compile inspection data and report to management. Task team leaders meet in a quarterly summit to compare data and lessons-learned. At an end of the year task team celebration, a judging panel made up of company management and employee representatives recognizes the best achievers.

It is a sign of management commitment at Newport News that the employees on the task teams spend considerable time away from their regular jobs. Management feels that the time spent is well worth it: Measured by both leading and trailing indicators, the health and safety task teams have produced the greatest return on investment of any aspect of the Newport News Shipbuilding health and safety program.

DuPont: Building Safety and Health into Requirements

DuPont's acquisitions total $11-$12 billion per year, including everything from complex chemicals to cardboard boxes. At DuPont the people who work with the acquisitions process ensure that safety, health and environmental considerations are integrated into specifications or requisitions to buy or lease the equipment.

Because line management is responsible for safety and health, they will often aid the acquisitions staff – the better the engineering on the front end, the less need for controls such as personal protective equipment.

Vendors sometimes build equipment specifically for DuPont and then sell the newly designed equipment to other companies, advertising that DuPont considers it safe.

If a safety flaw is found in a piece of equipment at DuPont, steps are taken immediately to solve the problem. Solutions range from retrofit fixes to scrapping the equipment altogether.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Using MSDSs to Track Acquisition Hazards

Newport News Shipbuilding integrates safety and health into their acquisition requirements process through their hazard communication program. Every product Newport News purchases must be accompanied by a MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet) before payment is made on the product. That material is transferred into a web-based hazard communications system on the company's Intranet, so that anyone in the yard can access the information.

11-L-0559/OSD/6683

Newport News conducts both destructive and non-destructive testing of materials to judge flammability, toxicity and other elements. If a material is judged inadequate it is replaced. Both the testing information and hazard communication (MSDS) information about materials are passed to customers.

DuPont: Holding Contractors to High Standards

DuPont's contractors are integrated into DuPont's safety and health management system. The safety and health record of a contractor is a factor in whether the contractor is chosen for a job. They must have an experience modification rate[5] of less than one and they must show documentation of their corporate safety program.

If those two things are not in place, the contractor will not make the bidding list. The sourcing departments within the line organization make contract decisions.

The sourcing groups within the line organization make the contract decisions with the input of key stakeholders. Contractor on the job lost time injuries and fatalities are reported to the CEO within 24 hours. The statistics are updated monthly for recordkeeping and trend comparison. Contractors have a number of requirements as part of their safety and health programs at DuPont.

Contractors perform their own audits, which DuPont oversees.

DuPont supervisors also watch contractors for any signs of unsafe acts. If a supervisor notices something amiss, DuPont shuts down the job for the day. If safety numbers don't match DuPont standards during a job, a contractor is removed from the list of approved contractors for some period of time.

Newport News Shipbuilding: Contractor Accountability

Every contractor who applies for work within Newport News Shipbuilding must provide the company with a written safety and health program and some statistics that show where the contractor's safety and health rates are relative to industry – total case rate or experience modification rate of one or less, for example. Prospective contractors are also required to disclose any Occupational Safety and Health Administration willful violations within the past three years.

In addition, the companies often must provide industry-specific plans and qualifications. Asbestos contractors need to provide a written asbestos plan, along with certifications. Lead-abatement has its own industry-specific requirements, etc.

[5] Experience modification rate is an insurance measurement that relates a company's health and safety loss performance against their industry average. 1.0 is the average, less than one is better than average, and greater than one is worse than average.

11-L-0559/OSD/6684

Two people on the corporate health and safety staff work exclusively with verifying the qualifications of contractors. If applicants are below industry standards in safety and health, they are rejected as a qualified contractor.

Once a contractor begins a job, each contractor has a company liaison who works to ensure that contractors follow safety and health rules. If a contractor worker commits unsafe acts, he or she is removed from the shipyard. If a contractor as a whole does not live up to safety and health requirements, they are either removed from the job or removed from the list of approved contractors.

Metrics of lost-time case rates and total case rates must be reported to Newport News Shipbuilding throughout the time the contractor is on site.

The company's contractor safety and health program improves safety and health of both Newport News and the contractors.

DuPont: Working to Prevent Off-the-job Injuries

As part of their evolving program, DuPont is working to integrate off-the-job safety into their safety and health management system. Whether an employee is hurt on or off the job, the collective productivity of the company is reduced. While DuPont does not tell employees what they can do with their time off work, they do educate employees so they can make good choices away from the office or factory.
DuPont tracks off-the-job fatalities and injuries that cause employees to miss work. Those injuries and fatalities are reported at the corporate level and to the CEO along with numbers of occupational injuries and fatalities.

The injuries and fatalities are categorized as falls and slips, sports related, driving and other. Just as with an on-the-job fatality, the company CEO receives a report on an on-the-job fatality within 24 hours.

Along with the on-the-job metrics, the corporate safety and health director always has the current off-the-job injury and fatality numbers at her fingertips. As of September, of 90,000 DuPont employees around the world, the company had six fatalities, including four driving fatalities, one motorcycle fatality, zero pedestrian and one other.

Of 360 off-the-job injuries that cause employees to lose time off work through the end of August, 23 percent were from falls and slips, 19 percent from sports, 19 percent driving and 16 percent other.

In order to influence employee behavior outside work, DuPont must walk a fine line between helping employees and invading their privacy. One of the ways to accomplish this is by education at work that benefits DuPont employees away from work.

11-L-0559/OSD/6685

An example: May is electrical safety month at DuPont. The education campaign includes training on how to use good electrical safety practices at work, as well as education on electrical safety at home.

DuPont employees also learn about home electrical outlet protection, use of personal protective equipment at home, value of healthy diet and exercise, dangers of falls in the home, the importance of wearing a seat belt and defensive driving techniques.

11-L-0559/OSD/6686

APPENDIX E - COST METHODOLOGY

DoD Safety and Occupational Health Costs

It is important to state at the outset that the NSC panel was unable to find a way to assess the total OSD and military service cost of injuries and illnesses – direct and indirect – consistent with standard industry practices. Much of the data needed for this analysis was unavailable. NSC could not find the proper data, nor could the OSD (or the Military Services) provide it. The NSC Panel considers this omission a major managerial shortfall because injury and illness loss data is fundamental information needed for sound, executive decision-making.

The lack of data forced the NSC to make many assumptions, and we did so very conservatively. We used two methodologies. Both methodologies are problematic because key data elements are missing. In addition, both methodologies are very conservative. Our estimates for annual OSD and Services injury and illness loss range from $10 billion to $21 billion. The methodologies are described below.

Methodology A: Civilian FECA extrapolation - $10 billion per year.

The FY 2000 FECA cost for DoD's 659,000 civilians is $615,000,000. With 1.4 million uniformed personnel, the civilian to uniformed personnel ratio is 1:2.12. Using the civilian FECA costs as a base, the annual cost for hospitalization, disability and compensation for uniformed personnel is $1.3 billion. This total does not include such cost elements as death and/or termination compensation, sick leave, outpatient medical expenses and long term compensation, which are paid for by the government for uniformed personnel. Data for these costs were not available for the assessment.
Total direct costs are $2 billion per year.

The NSC multiplied direct costs by a factor of 4** to obtain indirect costs, which include such avoidable costs as those to train and compensate a replacement worker, repair or replace damaged property, investigate the accident and implement corrective action, and maintain insurance coverage. Other productivity loss costs include those expenses related to schedule delays, added administrative time, increased insurance premiums, lower morale, increased absenteeism, and poorer customer relations. The NSC felt that a factor of 4 was conservative, especially considering the unique and specialized infrastructure and equipment requirements of the Services.
Total indirect costs are $7.7 billion annually.

Total annual injury and illness costs are $10 billion.

** Only further research will reveal the exact indirect cost ratio. Studies show that the ratio of indirect costs to direct costs varies widely, from a high of 20:1 to a low of 2:1. For the purposes of this assessment, we are using a conservative ratio of 4:1.

Sources: OSHA's webpage: "$afety Pays" Expert System

11-L-0559/OSD/6687

Business Roundtable, Improving Construction Safety Performance: A Construction Industry Cost Effectiveness Project Report, Report A-3, January, 1982

Methodology B: Partial Aggregate Cost Computation - $21 billion per year.

For this approach, the NSC searched for aggregate costs that would be considered an injury or illness expense. Fortunately, the OSD and the services do collect an abundance of information. However, much of it is inconsistent and cannot be consolidated into a cohesive and comprehensive picture of injury and illness cost for uniform and civilian personnel either within a single service, much less across the DoD. The data is derived from multiple databases, each with different data definitions, elements and collection methodologies. Consequently, the NSC had to make many assumptions.

The chart below outlines the NSC's data sources and computations. The methodology, including assumptions, is described in the footnotes.

Type of Cost	Civilian	Military	Total
Direct Costs: 1.Worker Compensation	$ 615 million [1]	$ 888 million [2] $ 432 million [2]	$ 1.93 billion
2. Boarded out to the Veterans Administration	N/A	$ 2.2 billion[3]	$ 2.2 billion
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Indirect Costs: Include training, retraining, replacement, work stoppage and productivity loss. A factor of 4 times the Direct Cost	x 4 [4]	x 4 [4]	x 4 [4]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	$ 3.1 billion	$ 17.6 billion	$ 20.6 billion

About the data. Loss data for DoD civilian employees is derived directly from FECA data (Federal Employees' Compensation Act). This data is equivalent to workers' compensation data in the private sector. Since comparable data is not collected for uniformed personnel, we have partially replicated this cost from discrete sources. Off-duty losses for uniformed personnel have been included in the total cost because these employees need to be available 24 hours a day.

11-L-0559/OSD/6688

[1]**Civilian Workers' Compensation** data is from U.S. Department of Labor (the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs), FECA. Data provides workers' compensation for occupational injury costs charged to Federal employing agencies for FY2001. Total = $614,966,821

[2]**Uniformed personnel workplace compensation.** Uniform workers' compensation costs are based on best available data and are a combination of Class A-C Mishap and hospitalization data.

Of the total, $888 million is from Class A, B and C Mishaps for FY94. (Source: *Atlas of Injuries in the U.S. Armed Forces*, Air Force pp 3-77; Marines pp 3-51; Navy pp 3-23; Army pp 3-21). Class A data consists of fatality or permanent total disability, incidents with a loss of at least $1 million, and/or aircraft, missile or spacecraft destroyed. Class B includes permanent partial disability, or five or more people hospitalized as inpatients and incidents resulting in costs over $200,000 but under $1 million. Class C includes lost time and incidents resulting in cost between $10,000 and $200,000.

Unlike FECA data, however, Class A Mishap data includes equipment losses, which can be significant. Because equipment expenses could not be separated from disability and compensation costs, they were kept as a direct expense, rather than an indirect cost, which may be more appropriate.

$432 million is based on FY 94 uniformed personnel hospitalization rates. (Source: *Atlas of Injuries in the U.S. Armed Forces*, Air Force pp 5-95; pp 5-71 Marines; Navy pp 5-49; Army pp 5-13). We are treating all of the hospitalization as injury and trauma events.

In FY 1994, there were 170,000 hospitalization events, and we are assuming that this is an average annual rate that can be applied to FY 2000. Deduct an all service average of 10 percent for pregnancies. (Source: *Atlas of Injuries in the U.S. Armed Forces).* Deduct another 8 percent for hostile, assault and self-inflicted injuries (Source: Amoroso, Paul, et al. Viewpoint: A comparison of Cause-of-injury coding in U.S. Military and Civilian Hospitals, *Am J Pre Med* 2000;18(3S):169). Multiply the total of 139,230 events by $3,100 - FY 2000 per event average. (Source: Surgeon's General Office, U.S. Navy).

[3]**Veterans Administration.** The life-cycle cost of injuries and illnesses includes costs for long term compensation and medical care for uniformed personnel who have been discharged from the military for their disability. The Veterans Administration is responsible for these cost, which for FY 2000 exceeded $22 billion. Since the VA does not track causes of disability, we conservatively estimated that 10 percent of the population administered by the VA were discharged from the service for an occupational injury or illness.

[4]**Indirect Costs.** Indirect costs are described above. These costs are substantial and have not been researched by the OSD or the Services. We are assuming that their costs will be higher than those in general industry because of DoD's mission, and we are using an indirect cost factor of 4.

11-L-0559/OSD/6689

APPENDIX F – OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS -- MAJOR COMPONENTS

Management Leadership and Commitment: This addresses 1) the establishment of organizational structures where managers and employees are empowered and supported by senior management in the execution of their OSH duties and the designation of a management representative who is responsible for overseeing the proper functioning of OSH arrangements; and 2) the allocation of sufficient resources for the proper functioning of the OSH management system.

Employee Participation: This addresses the way workers at every organizational level are actively involved in the development, implementation and continuous improvement of OSH arrangements. Many OSH professionals believe that management leadership and commitment, and worker participation, are among the most, if not the most, important elements of a sound OSH management system.

Continual Improvement: This addresses the way OSH performance improves. This can be defined and expressed in numerous ways. The basic idea here is that an organization seek ways to achieve ongoing improvement of OSH performance. The primary goal of continual improvement activities is the elimination of worker injury, illness, disease, and death.

Evaluation: Within a systems framework, the evaluation functions can be thought of as part of the feedback loop that allows system elements to find out how they are performing. These functions include an overall performance measurement system, traditional audits, incident investigations, and medical surveillance.

Integration: This addresses the manner in which OSH activities are integrated into the fabric of an organization. These are typically activities that happen as OSH activities and management systems mature. The extent to which OSH activities are integrated on an ongoing basis is one example of a measure of continual improvement. An example within the DoD would be the extent to which OSH issues are integrated with operational readiness functions.

Management Review: Management review is a function that provides an overall assessment of the management system's performance in relation to organizational norms, regulatory expectations, and stakeholder concerns. The general purpose of the management review is to assess the overall OSH management system, to aggregate lessons-learned, improve performance, and modify existing systems in response to changing conditions and activities. It is through this activity that the OSH arrangements, the organization, and the environment external to the organization are linked. This involves evaluating the OSH arrangement's ability to meet the overall needs of the organization, its stakeholders, its employees, and regulating agencies.

11-L-0559/OSD/6690

Snowflake

SENSITIVE

#159

January 28, 2002 2:38 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: National Army Plan for Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Attached is what Fahim Khan gave Colin Powell in Kabul as their plan for a national army. Colin looked at it and said it is just way out of line, that they don't need all that stuff.

Let's get a good scrub going on it fast, and then give me a proposal as to what we can go back to them with.

In terms of spending all that money for arming them, I think that is crazy. We should just stop blowing up the weapons we have been blowing up and give them those weapons.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/23/02 SecState note to SecDef

DHR:dh
012802-18

Please respond by 01/31/02

28 Jan 02

SENSITIVE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

February 4, 2002
DepSecDef _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Lost Days Inquiry Response

- This paper responds to your recent guidance on "Lost Days" at Tab A.

- Members of the P&R and AT&L staff met the Treasury staff who implemented their "Lost Day" system. Treasury worked closely with ALCOA to obtain their proprietary software as Secretary O'Neill was comfortable with the data displays.

- Treasury implemented web-based software to collect compensation claims data and other safety-accident related data such as work processes and property damage. The Treasury system provides a good tool for safety oversight and accident prevention, although it is dependent on self-reporting injuries. Some defense organizations, such as Army Reserve and the Air Force Safety Center, utilize web-based accident reporting systems.

- Even before the Treasury system was implemented, Secretary O'Neill established a Department wide goal to reduce accidents by 50 percent. Preliminary Treasury data since October 2001 indicates the goal appears to have had some effect toward decreasing "Lost Day" rates.

- Our "Lost Day" system is based on payroll records, not compensation claims. Payroll records provide objective and auditable data, but lack detailed accident information. We will explore ways to garner this accident data and set realistic department goals at the next week's "Lost Day" Integrated Process Team (IPT) meeting.

COORDINATION: DUSD(I&E)

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., OUSD-PR/R(RPA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6692

U03373 /02

TAB

A

snowflake

January 21, 2002 11:39 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Lost Days

I read your December 3 paper on "lost days."

Please make sure you find out how the Treasury Department does it, and then we do it using the same calculations. Let's start grading each unit in the Department and see that those numbers get down by the end of the year to something that approximates what Treasury and Alcoa have done.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/03/01 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Lost Days [U19102/01]

DHR:dh
012102-19

Please respond by 02/04/02

snowflake

January 21, 2002 11:39 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Lost Days

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Please make sure you find out how the Treasury Department does it, and then we do it using the same calculations. Let's start grading each unit in the Department and see that those numbers get down by the end of the year to something that approximates what Treasury and Alcoa have done.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/03/01 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Lost Days [U19102/01]

DHR:dh
012102-19

Please respond by 02/04/02

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

February 25, 2002, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Cost of Requirements Submitted by the Commanders in Chief (CINCs)

- You inquired about putting a system in place to tell the CINCs how much the things they request cost the Department. A system currently exists to provide the CINCs the cost of each request.

- My staff chairs a cost team that prices out the requests that come from the CINCs. Team members include Joint Staff (JS) representatives as well as representatives from each Service affected by the CINC request.

  - The CINCs' requests are priced out and compared with alternatives (for instance, cargo transportation by sea vice air) in an effort to determine the most cost-effective means to satisfy the CINCs' requests.

  - These cost estimates are provided to the Services and to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the JS to ensure the original request is being satisfied.

- For current operations, cost estimates for every deployment order are available to the CINCs via multiple sources. First, the CINC Component Commanders' comptroller offices have the ability to determine costs for each request. Second, the Joint Staff or Service budget offices can provide the cost estimate determined by the cost team. The CINC Component Commanders' can provide the CINC with the cost for each request and the OSD cost team data can be made available to the CINCs via the Joint Staff.

COORDINATION: The Joint Staff

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Ron Garant, (b)(6) 0559/OSD/6696

U03393 /02

Coordination Page

Deputy Director, Resources and Requirements (J8)	RADM Szemborski, USN	21 February 2002

snowflake

January 26, 2002 11:54 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Deployments, Use of Assets and Cost

Dov, we had a secure video with the CINCs and Service Chiefs yesterday. During the course of it, it became clear that when the CINCs ask for something, there is no way for them to know what the cost is. Changing the deployment date two days or a week later, or four days earlier, could change the costs advantageously for the taxpayer, but the CINCs have no way of knowing that. There is no connection between cost and what they think they need.

We need to design a system so that, as with any company, individual or family, when they make a decision, they are aware of what it will cost and what it would cost if they did it different ways. At the present time, they don't have that.

Please get back to me with a proposal in 30 days.

Thanks.

DHR:db
012602-13

Please respond by 02/26/02

snowflake

January 26, 2002 11:54 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Deployments, Use of Assets and Cost

Dov, we had a secure video with the CINCs and Service Chiefs yesterday. During the course of it, it became clear that when the CINCs ask for something, there is no way for them to know what the cost is. Changing the deployment date two days or a week later, or four days earlier, could change the costs advantageously for the taxpayer, but the CINCs have no way of knowing that. There is no connection between cost and what they think they need.

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Please get back to me with a proposal in 30 days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012602-13

Please respond by 02/26/02

2002 FEB 25 PM 4:43

INFO MEMO

February 21, 2002, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim FEB 25 2002

SUBJECT: Closing Books

- I completely agree with Secretary O'Neill's response. A common chart of accounts, a system that provides the data we need, and a "human friendly" system are essential to promptly close the books and prepare monthly financial statements.

- As a policy matter, the Department of Defense does have a common chart of accounts--the United States Government Standard General Ledger. Only the Army Corps of Engineers accounting system currently uses this government-wide general ledger. The rest of the Department's accounting systems use unique Service-specific general ledger structures that do not yet comply with our policy.

- We need an integrated financial management system to promptly close the books and provide relevant and reliable information for decisionmakers. Last fall, you kicked off the Financial Management Modernization Program efforts. The Financial Management Modernization Program will integrate and modernize over 674 financial and nonfinancial systems that require over 1,500 "interfaces" to talk to each other, using the government-wide standard general ledger.

- The technical foundation (a blueprint) will be completed by 2nd Quarter 2003. The first prototype will be completed by 2nd Quarter 2005.

Prepared by: Rita Cronley (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6700

U03395 /02

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

2002 JAN 29 AM 10: 41

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

January 28, 2002

NOTE FOR THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL

D.R.: Doing this well requires certain things you probably don't have – (1) a common chart of accounts, (2) a system that is designed to provide what you need, not what has been collected by historical convention, (3) a system that is designed to be "human friendly".

Without real knowledge, my guess is that the referenced "first major phase... of an enterprise architecture that will be completed by March 2003"... will not include these three characteristics and will not produce audited financial statements in three days.

Attachments

2002-se-000602

January 21, 2002 12:33 PM

2002 JAN 22 A 9:41
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Closing Books

Here is a note I sent Dov Zakheim, Pentagon comptroller, and here is the answer I got back. What is your reaction?

Thanks.

Attach.
01/07/02 SecDef memo to USD(C) re: Closing Books
01/16/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
012102-29

D.R.: Doing this well requires certain things you probably don't have -- ① a common chart of accounts ② A system that is designed to provide what you need, not what has been collected by historical convention, ③ A system that is designed to be "human friendly".

Without real knowledge, my guess is that the referenced "first major phase ... of an enterprise architecture that will be completed by March 2003" ... will not include these three characteristics and will not produce audited financial statements in three days.

P O'Neill
1-26-02

21 01170-02

January 7, 2002 2:11 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.

SUBJECT: Closing Books

Dov - Paul O'

Paul O'Neill has gotten the Treasury books so that each month they can be closed in four days. What do we do?

Thanks.

DHR:db
010702-46

Please respond by _____

Response Attached

1/17

Larry Di Rita

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 2 1 2002

INFO MEMO

January 16, 2002, 9:25 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Closing Books

- There are two aspects of closing the books: budget execution and financial statement preparation. The Department of Defense closes the books for budget execution purposes monthly by the 16th workday of the following month and for financial statement purposes annually.

- We cannot provide the financial statements within a week because most of the existing systems cannot collect and maintain the detailed financial data needed to prepare the financial statements in less than the current 4-5 months time frame.

- Closing the books within a week will require major systems upgrades. Those upgrades will be implemented as part of the Department's Financial Management Modernization Program. The program is underway and its first major phase is development of an enterprise architecture that will be completed by March 2003.

Prepared by: Rita Cronley, (b)(6)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 FEB 26 AM 8:54

EF 07505 A

FEB 25 2002

2/26/02

SECDEF SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Approved

FEB 27 2002

1-02/002838

MEMORANDUM FOR CATHY MAINARDI , CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FEB 25 2002

THROUGH: PROTOCOL Honor Cordon · Mess Support · Photo

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (Douglas J. Feith, 697-7200)

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/ISA (Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

25 FEB 2002

Egypt

PURPOSE: Meeting with President Mubarak

DESCRIPTION:

- SecDef is currently scheduled to meet with President Mubarak on 4 March at Blair House. President Mubarak has requested the meeting take place instead at the Pentagon.

5 March @ Pentagon 1000-1030

DATE/TIME: Meeting currently scheduled for ~~1000-1030 on 4~~ March at Blair house, propose the meeting takes place instead at the Pentagon from 0930-1000 4 March, and is followed by President Mubarak laying a wreath at Arlington cemetery for the victims of September 11th.

Cathy M 2/27

Larry Di Rita

OUTLINE OF EVENTS AND LOCATION:

- River Entrance, Honor Cordon required.
- 30 minute meeting, SecDef Office.

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. SecDef, DepSecDef, USDP Feith, DASD Luti; Amb Welch; Country Director McDevitt. Egypt: President Mubarak, Ambassador Fahmy, Defense Attache MG Mahmoud

PREVIOUS MEETINGS:

- President Mubarak last met with SecDef at the Pentagon in April 01 and in Cairo in Oct 01.

25 Feb 02

REMARKS REQUIRED: ISA will provide remarks.

SECDEF DECISION: Hold Open _____ Approve X Decline _____ Other _____
Refer to DepSecDef _____

DASD 2/22/02

PDASD(ISA) cuf

Mary Beth

Prepared by: M.McDevitt, ISA NESA (b)(6)
CC: Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/6705

6978089

X127

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	2/26

003437 /02

Schedule Proposal Checklist

For assistance, contact the OSD Protocol office at (b)(6)

- ☐ Has an executive agent been assigned

  Yes ____ No __X_

- ☐ Is the visit at the request of President, State Department or SecDef

  Yes __X_ No ___

- ☐ Is this the first visit during the current administration

  Yes ___ No __X_

- ☐ Is the visit at the request of the foreign dignitary (attach request)

  Yes _ No ___X_

- ☐ Are honors required

  Yes __X__-Honor cordon No __

- ☐ Will the spouse be accompanying the dignitary

  Yes ____ No _X__

- ☐ Type of meeting: (see Note 2)

  Office call __X__ Plenary ____ Both ____

- ☐ Recommended DoD participants, including U.S. Embassy representation: To be provided.

- ☐ Is lunch or dinner recommended

  Yes ____ (lunch/dinner) No _X__

- ☐ Will there be a gift exchange (See Note 4)

  Yes ____ No _X__

- ☐ OSD Protocol contacted and meeting set up to discuss:

- Requirement for Letter of Welcome (official visit only) – Not necessary
- Translation/interpretation requirements -- None
- Dietary considerations – N/A
- Complete itinerary:..To be provided from NSC.
- Spoke to Protocol:

  Yes __X_ No _

snowflake
snowflake
7/20
1020

February 15, 2002 9:56 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Earmarks

10.01

I notice in today's clips people are talking about things they think Congress is going to give us whether we want them or not. They included C-130s and the like.

I think we ought to get a list of things we don't want Congress to do and why, and get ready to put it out. One of the things we don't want is for them to take the $10 billion contingency and spend it for other things. We need to get a specific paragraph from Dov that shows precisely how little it will last during '03 at the current rate of operations.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021502-12

Please respond by 03/01/02 2/25

Copy BTM done 2/20

To USD(C) - Yours for action. Please advise. DiRita

15 Feb 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6707
003454 02

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2002, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Earmarks

- At the current rate of expenditure, the $10 billion contingency requested to fund the incremental cost of sustaining the war on terrorism during FY 2003 will last approximately 5⅓ months.
- The Department is currently expending approximately $1.8 billion a month on OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE. Therefore, assuming that operations are sustained at approximately the same level as we have seen this year, and excluding the cost of munitions, the additional $10 billion should allow the Department to sustain operations for the first 5⅓ months of FY 2003.
- Without these funds, the Services would be forced to quickly deplete their normal operating resources at the expense of training and maintenance activities, leading to a severe reduction in overall military readiness.
- We will continue to work with the congressional committees to ensure that this position is understood.

COORDINATION: None.

cc: Mr. Larry Di Rita

Prepared By: John P. Roth (b)(6)

10.01

4 MAR 02

[redacted] NEF051

Snowflake

UNCLASSIFIED

February 6, 2002 1:43 PM

Georgia

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Georgia

I want to make sure we start reaching out to Georgia. I think this is important.

They need help, we can help them, and they are friendly. Georgia is an important location. The Russians have tried to assassinate the President.

We need someone assigned to look after them, deal with them and connect with them.

Please read the attached cable.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cable 302355Z JAN 02, TS 8693890, CIA 966477

DHR:dh
020602-11

Please respond by 02/27/02

2/26

Response attached.
J. Rite

6 Feb 02

U03487 /02

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

11-L-0559/OSD/6709

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

February 26, 2002, 10:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov Zakheim FEB 27 2002

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Savings

- Audits and reviews by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office, the DOD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency have all affirmed that BRAC savings are real and substantial after initial investment costs are recouped.

- The Department is reporting net BRAC savings of $15.5 billion over the implementation period from FY 1990 to FY 2001. Annual recurring savings following implementation are about $6.0 billion based on the FY 2003 President's Budget.

- Savings or cost avoidance resulting from BRAC are achieved primarily through (1) overall elimination or reduction of base support costs at specific installations, (2) elimination or reduction of military and civilian personnel costs, and (3) cancellation of military construction and family housing projects at closed or realigned bases.

- Most recently, the General Accounting Office (GAO) report of July 2001 titled "Military Base Closures – DoD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains Substantial" (attached) finds that although imprecise, savings from the four rounds of base closure are substantial.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Henry Sodano, (b)(6)

ATTACHMENT

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Report to the Honorable Vic Snyder
House of Representatives

July 2001

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

DOD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains Substantial

GAO

Accountability * Integrity * Reliability

GAO-01-971

11-L-0559/OSD/6712

GAO
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548

July 31, 2001

The Honorable Vic Snyder
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Snyder:

Through four rounds of base closures and realignments in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the Department of Defense expected to reduce its domestic infrastructure and provide needed dollars for high priority programs such as weapons modernization. Although the Department projects it will realize significant recurring savings from the closure and realignment actions, as noted in your request, many members of Congress continue to raise questions as to how much, if any, money has been saved through the base closure process. This issue takes on increased importance as the Department considers the need for additional base closures.

We have examined costs and savings associated with the base closure process in recent years. In two reports issued in late 1998, we concluded that net savings from the four closure rounds were substantial but that the cost and savings estimates used to calculate the net savings were imprecise.[1] The Department calculated net savings by deducting the reported costs to implement closure actions from reported savings achieved through the elimination or reduction of personnel and base operations and the cancellation of planned military construction projects. Reviewing the Department's data, we found that cost estimates did not include all costs attributable to the closures and that savings estimates were not routinely updated in the Department's records. Since that time, the Department has revised its estimates; and its data indicate that net savings have increased.

As agreed, this report addresses the basis for the Department's recent increase in net savings projected to be realized from the closure process. In addition, we summarized others and our previous observations on the basis for savings from base closure and realignment actions and the precision of the cost and savings estimates. We are continuing to examine

[1] *Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds* (GAO/NSIAD-99-36, Dec. 11, 1998) and *Military Bases Review of DOD's 1998 Report on Base Realignment and Closure* (GAO/NSIAD-99-17, Nov. 13, 1998).

11-L-0559/OSD/6713

cost and savings issues as part of a broader review intended to provide updated information on the status of the four rounds, as closure authority for the last round expires this year. We expect to issue an overall status report in early 2002.

Results in Brief

Department of Defense fiscal year 2001 budget request and documentation[2] show that it now expects net savings of about $15.5 billion through fiscal year 2001 and about $6.1 billion in annual recurring savings thereafter, an increase from the $14.2 billion and about $5.6 billion, respectively, the Department reported in fiscal year 1999.[3] While cost and savings estimates fluctuate over time based on changes within base closure funding (e.g., environmental and military construction), our analysis of the data showed that the net savings increase through fiscal year 2001 was due primarily to an overall reduction of about $723 million in reported costs and an increase of about $610 million in expected savings resulting from the closure actions. Specifically, almost 50 percent, or about $359 million, of the reported cost reduction was attributable to lower environmental restoration costs through fiscal year 2001. Over 86 percent, or about $526 million, of the total reported savings was attributable to increased savings in base operation and maintenance activities. A $101 million increase in the reported post-implementation savings through fiscal year 2001 resulted from using an inflation factor to convert savings into fiscal year 2001 dollars.

Our work has consistently affirmed that the net savings for the four rounds of base closures and realignments are substantial and are related to decreased funding requirements in specific operational areas. In addition to our audits, reviews by the Congressional Budget Office, the Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency have affirmed that net savings are substantial after initial investment costs are recouped. However, those same reviews also showed that the estimates are imprecise and should be viewed as a rough approximation of the likely savings. That perspective applies as well to the Department's updated net savings estimate. At the same time, arguments can be made that net

[2] The fiscal year 2002 budget request was not available at the time we completed this review.

[3] The annual recurring savings estimate excludes an estimated $3.4 billion in environmental costs beyond fiscal year 2001. However, because these costs are spread over many years, they have relatively limited impact on DOD's annual savings estimate.

11-L-0559/OSD/6714

savings could be more or less than reported by the Department. For example, net savings could be viewed as greater than reported by the Department if one considers that the majority of environmental restoration costs attributed to the closures would have occurred, but most likely at a slower pace, even if the bases would have remained open. Further, new facility construction at many receiving bases, while funded by the base closure account, reduced the need for other capital funding investments that would have been needed to address issues of an aging and deteriorating infrastructure. On the other hand, reported costs attributable to the closure rounds do not include federal government expenditures of over $1.2 billion incurred by agencies in assisting communities and employees impacted by the base closure process. While these costs do not significantly reduce overall savings, they are one-time costs that, if reported as closure-related costs, increase the time required for savings to fully offset costs.

Background

In the late 1980s, changes in the national security environment resulted in a Defense infrastructure with more bases than the Department of Defense (DOD) needed. To enable DOD to close unneeded bases and realign others, Congress enacted base closure and realignment (BRAC) legislation that instituted base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds, special BRAC Commissions were established to recommend specific base closures and realignments to the President, who, in turn sent the Commissions' recommendations and his approval to Congress. A special commission was also established for the 1988 round that made recommendations to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives. For the 1988 round, legislation required DOD to complete its closure and realignment actions by September 30, 1995. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds, legislation required DOD to complete all closures and realignments within 6 years from the date the President forwarded the recommended actions to the Congress.[4]

BRAC has afforded DOD the opportunity to reduce its infrastructure and free funds for high priority programs such as weapons modernization and force readiness. As the closure authority for the last round expires in fiscal year 2001, DOD has reported reducing its domestic infrastructure by about

[4] Property disposal and environmental cleanup actions may continue beyond the 6-year period.

11-L-0559/OSD/6715

20 percent and saving billions of dollars that would otherwise have been spent supporting unneeded infrastructure. In essence, reported savings include both distinct savings that actually occur during the budget year or years a BRAC decision is implemented and cost avoidances during future years--costs that DOD would have incurred if BRAC actions had not taken place. Some of the savings are one-time, such as canceled military construction projects. The vast majority of BRAC savings represent a permanent and recurring avoidance of spending that would otherwise occur, such as for personnel. Over time, the value of the recurring savings is the largest and most important portion of overall BRAC savings.

DOD reports its BRAC cost and savings estimates to the Congress on a routine basis as part of its annual budget requests. In preparing the estimates, DOD guidance to the military services and defense agencies states that the estimates are to be based on the best projection of what savings will actually accrue from approved realignments and closures. In this regard, prior year estimated savings are required to be updated to reflect actual savings when available.

The Congress recognized that an up-front investment was necessary to achieve BRAC savings and established two accounts to fund certain implementation costs.[5] These costs included (1) relocating personnel and equipment from closing to gaining bases, (2) constructing new facilities at gaining bases to accommodate organizations transferred from closing bases, and (3) remedying environmental problems on closing bases. DOD, in its annual budget request, provides the Congress with estimated cost data relative to the implementation of each BRAC round. For the most part, these estimated costs are routinely updated as they are recorded on an ongoing basis in DOD's financial accounting systems.

Estimated BRAC Net Savings Have Increased

Since we last reported on this issue in December 1998, DOD has increased its net savings estimate for the four BRAC rounds. DOD now estimates a net savings of about $15.5 billion through fiscal year 2001, an increase of $1.3 billion from the previously reported $14.2 billion. DOD data suggest that cumulative savings began to surpass cumulative costs in fiscal year 1998. The increase in net savings is attributable to a combination of lower estimated costs and greater estimated savings, as reported in DOD's fiscal

[5] There are two BRAC accounts. BRAC I was established to fund base closure in the 1988 round. BRAC II was established to fund base closures in the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds.

11-L-0559/OSD/6716

year 2001 budget request and documentation.[6] Overall, DOD has reduced its cost estimates from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2001 for implementing BRAC by about $723 million and increased its savings estimates by about $610 million, resulting in a net savings increase of $1.3 billion. Table 1 summarizes the cumulative cost and savings estimates through fiscal year 2001 for the four BRAC rounds as reflected in DOD's fiscal years 1999 and 2001 BRAC budget requests and documentation, along with associated changes in the various costs and savings categories. In addition to the estimates shown in table 1, DOD now reports annual estimated recurring savings of $6.1 billion beyond fiscal year 2001, an increase from approximately $5.6 billion that DOD reported in fiscal year 1999.

[6] The fiscal year 2002 budget request was not available at the time we completed this review

11-L-0559/OSD/6717

Table 1: Cumulative Cost and Savings Estimates for the Four BRAC Rounds as Reflected in DOD's Budget Requests and Documentation for Fiscal Years 1999 and 2001

Dollars in millions	FY 1999 budget request	FY 2001 budget request	Total change
Costs through FY 2001			
Military construction	$6,566	$6,667	$100
Family housing	93	93	0
Environmental	7,337	6,978	(359)
Operation and maintenance	7,984	7,741	(243)
Military personnel-permanent change of station	175	132	(43)
Estimated land revenues	(121)	(300)	(180)
Other	847	847	(1)
Sub-total costs (through FY 2001)	**$22,881**	**$22,158**	**($723)**
Savings through implementation period			
Military construction	$965	$965	$0
Family housing-construction	177	177	0
Family housing-operations	658	652	(7)
Operation and maintenance	10,583	11,109	526
Military personnel	5,229	5,229	0
Other	4,601	4,591	(10)
Sub-total savings (through implementation period)	**$22,213**	**$22,722**	**$509**
Post-implementation savings (through FY 2001)[a]	**$14,853**	**$14,953**	**$101**
Sub-total savings (through FY 2001)	**$37,066**	**$37,676**	**$610**
Net cumulative savings (through FY 2001)[b]	**$14,185**	**$15,518**	**$1,333**

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

[a]These savings begin the year after the implementation period for each BRAC round, are cumulative estimates up to fiscal year 2001, and are usually based on estimated savings during the last implementation year for each round.

[b]Net cumulative savings consist of total savings less total costs through fiscal year 2001.

Source. Our analysis of DOD data.

As shown in table 1, the cost estimates for implementing the four BRAC rounds have decreased by about $723 million from $22.9 billion to $22.2 billion with most of the decrease, or about $359 million, attributable to lower reported environmental restoration costs through fiscal year 2001. Our analysis of the data shows that most, or about $313 million, of the environmental cost reduction occurred in the Navy BRAC account. Some of this can be attributed to shifting planned actions to future years.

11-L-0559/OSD/6718

Further, estimated revenues generated from actions—such as land sales, property leases, and other reimbursements—have increased by $180 million to $300 million, thereby increasing the offset to BRAC program cost estimates. According to the Air Force, its increased revenues resulted from the reporting of reimbursements received from the city of Chicago, Illinois, for the cost of moving an Air National Guard unit from O'Hare International Airport to Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and from increased proceeds from land sales and property leases.

In addition to reductions in estimated costs, DOD is reporting over $610 million in additional estimated savings through 2001 in its closure accounts. Our analysis shows that more than half, or $381 million, of the $610 million increase in savings shown in table 1 is attributable to Air Force operation and maintenance. Air Force officials told us that the savings increase was attributable to actions at two bases—McClellan Air Force Base, California, and Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. While the Air Force did not provide an estimate for savings at these two bases in its fiscal year 1999 budget request because of uncertainties regarding the performance of the bases' workloads, it reported a $381 million savings estimate in its fiscal year 2001 budget request. Further, an additional $101 million in increased savings is due primarily to inflationary adjustments in the estimated post-implementation savings for the 1988, 1991, and 1993 rounds through fiscal year 2001. Post-implementation savings for the 1995 round do not begin accruing until fiscal year 2002.

In addition to the revisions made to the cost and savings estimates through fiscal year 2001, DOD has also revised its annual recurring savings estimate for fiscal years 2002 and beyond. DOD is now projecting annual recurring savings of $6.1 billion for the four BRAC rounds, an increase of approximately $500 million from the $5.6 billion DOD reported in fiscal year 1999. Our analysis shows that the increase is attributable equally to an increase in the BRAC 1995 round savings estimate and to a reported increase in prior rounds' recurring savings caused by using an inflation factor to convert them into current year dollars.

Observations on Basis and Precision of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates

Our prior work, along with work by others including the Congressional Budget Office, the DOD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency, has shown that BRAC savings are real and substantial, and are related to cost reductions in key operational areas as a result of BRAC actions. At the same time, limitations have existed in DOD's efforts to track actual costs and savings over time, which limits the precision of its net savings estimate.

11-L-0559/OSD/6719

Basis for BRAC Savings

Audits of BRAC financial records have shown that BRAC has enabled DOD to save billions of dollars, primarily through the (1) overall elimination or reduction of base support costs at specific installations, (2) elimination or reduction of military and civilian personnel costs, and (3) cancellation of military construction and family housing projects at closed or realigned bases.

Our prior work as well as work of others has shown that eliminating or reducing base support costs at closed or realigned bases is a major contributor to generating BRAC savings. Savings are realized through a number of actions, such as terminating physical security, fire protection, utilities, property maintenance, accounting, payroll, and a variety of other services that have associated costs linked specifically to base operations. For example, as stated in an April 1996 report, our analysis of the operation and maintenance costs at eight closing installations from the 1988 and 1991 rounds indicated that base support costs had been reduced and that annual recurring savings would be substantial—about $213 million—after initial costs were recouped.[7] DOD Inspector General and Army Audit Agency reports have also shown base support reductions at closing and realigning facilities as real and substantial, although not precise. The DOD Inspector General, in affirming savings for a sample of bases in the 1993 BRAC round, consistently found that the services had significantly reduced their operating budgets because of the closure process.

The elimination or reduction of military and civilian personnel at closed or realigned bases is also a major contributor to generating savings. In an April 1998 report, DOD estimated that about 39,800 military personnel and about 71,000 civilian positions had been eliminated by BRAC, resulting in an overall recurring savings of about $5.8 billion annually.[8] While we were not able to precisely reconcile these estimated reductions with actual BRAC-related end strength reductions in the services, we reported that the large number of personnel reductions was a significant contributor to the substantial savings achieved through BRAC.[9] DOD Inspector General and

[7] *Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not Easily Quantified* (GAO/NSIAD-96-97, Apr. 8, 1996).

[8] *The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure*, Department of Defense, Apr. 1998.

[9] GAO/NSIAD-99-17, Nov. 13, 1998.

11-L-0559/OSD/6720

Army Audit Agency reports have validated personnel savings at various BRAC locations, although the savings estimates were not well documented in many cases. In other cases, the personnel reductions were greater than estimated. For example, in a review of nine 1995 BRAC bases, the Army Audit Agency found that, in contrast to no savings being identified for the elimination of civilian personnel authorizations at tenant activities providing support to BRAC bases, over $13 million in net recurring savings had accrued.[10]

Additionally, the cancellation of planned military construction of facilities and family housing at closed or realigned bases contributes to the savings generated from BRAC. Prior DOD Inspector General and Army Audit Agency reports have affirmed savings attributable to such cancellations. For example, in a May 1998 report, the DOD Inspector General reported that, after a review of a Navy-reported savings of about $205 million from cancelled military construction projects in the 1993 round, the savings were actually $336 million, or $131 million more than reported.[11]

Finally, as we reported in 1998, DOD, as part of its budgeting process, has subtracted projected BRAC savings from the expected future cost of each service's funding plans in the Future Years Defense Program.[12]

Limitations in Precision of Cost and Savings Estimates

While our work has consistently shown that savings from BRAC actions are expected to be substantial, we have also noted the cost and savings estimates are imprecise. This relates to the development of initial estimates and efforts to track changes in these estimates over time.

While cost estimates are routinely updated and tracked in financial accounting systems, they are based on DOD obligations[13] and not actual outlays, thereby adding a degree of imprecision to the actual costs and the

[10] *Base Realignment and Closure 1995 Savings Estimates*, U S Army Audit Agency, Audit Report AA97-225, July 31, 1997.

[11] *Audit Report: Cost and Savings for 1993 Defense Base Realignments and Closures*, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 98-130, May 6, 1998.

[12] The Future Years Defense Program is an authoritative record of current and projected force structure costs and personnel levels approved by the Secretary of Defense See *Military Bases. Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds* (GAO/NSIAD-99-36, Dec 11, 1998), p. 39

[13] Our prior work indicates that obligational data do not necessarily reflect final costs.

11-L-0559/OSD/6721

basis for savings projections.[14] Also, as we have previously reported, a fundamental limitation in DOD's ability to identify and track savings from BRAC closures and realignments is that DOD's accounting systems, like all accounting systems, are not oriented to identifying and tracking savings.[15] Savings estimates are developed by the services at the time they are developing their initial BRAC implementation budgets and are reported in DOD's BRAC budget justifications. Because the accounting systems do not track savings, updating these estimates would require a separate tracking method or system.

Our prior work has shown that the savings estimates have been infrequently updated and, unlike for estimated costs, no method or system has been established to track savings on a routine basis. Over time, this contributes to imprecision as the execution of closures or realignments may vary from the original plans. Further, because arguments can be made as to what costs or savings can be definitely attributed to BRAC, such as environmental restoration costs, the precision of the estimates comes into question. Nevertheless, we and others have consistently expressed the view that these factors are not significant enough to outweigh the fact that substantial savings are being generated from the closure process.

In reports issued in November and December 1998, we concluded that, while closure and realignment savings for the four BRAC rounds would be substantial after initial costs were recouped, the estimates were imprecise.[16] In particular, we cited that savings estimates were not being routinely updated and that federal economic assistance costs of over $1 billion that had been provided to communities and individuals impacted by BRAC were not included in DOD's reported costs.[17] Those economic assistance costs now exceed $1.2 billion. While the inclusion of these costs

[14] The results of our most recent financial audit at DOD show that the Department does not have the systems and processes in place to capture required cost information. See *DOD Financial Management Integrated Approach, Accountability, and Incentives Are Keys to Effective Reform* (GAO-01-681T, May 8, 2001), p. 5.

[15] *Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds* (GAO/NSIAD-97-11, July 25, 1997)

[16] GAO/NSIAD-99-36, Dec. 11, 1998, and GAO/NSIAD-99-17, Nov. 13, 1998.

[17] A number of federal agencies—DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment, the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration—have provided financial assistance to communities and individuals affected by BRAC actions.

11-L-0559/OSD/6722

as attributable to BRAC has the effect of delaying the point at which savings surpass costs, it does not negate the fact that the savings are substantial.

A July 1998 Congressional Budget Office report also indicated substantial BRAC savings, even though there was imprecision in DOD's cost and savings estimates.[18] In its comments on cost estimates, the Congressional Budget Office cited that not all BRAC-related costs are included in the estimates. As we had also pointed out, the Budget Office cited federal economic assistance costs as not being included in the estimates. Further, the Budget Office pointed out that operating units sometimes had borne unexpected costs when services at DOD facilities were temporarily impacted by BRAC actions. As to savings, the Congressional Budget Office stated its belief that DOD's estimate of $5.6 billion in annual recurring savings at that time was reasonable, given that the Budget Office's estimate was about $5 billion annually.

DOD Inspector General reports also pointed out substantial BRAC savings, despite imprecision in cost and savings estimates. In its May 1998 report of more than 70 closed or realigned bases during the 1993 BRAC round, the Inspector General found that, for the 6-year implementation period for carrying out the BRAC Commission's recommendations, the savings would overtake the costs sooner than expected.[19] While DOD's original budget estimate indicated costs of about $8.3 billion and annual recurring savings of $7.4 billion during the implementation period, the Inspector General concluded that costs potentially could be reduced to $6.8 billion and that savings could reach $9.2 billion, a net savings of $2.4 billion. The Inspector General's report indicated that the greater savings were due to such factors as reduced obligations that were not adjusted to reflect actual disbursements, canceled military construction projects, and a lower increase in overhead costs at bases receiving work from closing bases. On the other hand, an Inspector General's review of 23 bases closed during the 1995 BRAC round noted that savings during the implementation period were overstated by $33.2 million, or 1.4 percent, and costs were overstated by $28.8 million, or 4.5 percent of initial budget estimates.

[18] *Review of the Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure*, Congressional Budget Office, July 1, 1998.

[19] *Audit Report Cost and Savings for 1993 Defense Realignments and Closures*, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 98-130, May 6, 1998.

11-L-0559/OSD/6723

Also, the Army Audit Agency, in a July 1997 report on BRAC costs and savings, concluded that savings would be substantial after full implementation for ten 1995 BRAC round sites it had examined but that estimates were not exact.[20] For example, the Agency reported that annual recurring savings beyond the implementation period, although substantial, were 16 percent less than the major commands' estimates.

The difficulty in precisely identifying savings is further complicated if one considers the specific actions being undertaken under the BRAC process. For example, while environmental restoration costs are a valid BRAC expenditure, DOD reported that the vast majority of its BRAC environmental restoration costs would have been incurred whether or not an installation is impacted by BRAC.[21] DOD acknowledges, however, that environmental costs under the BRAC process may have been accelerated in the shorter term. Others suggest that in some instances BRAC-related environmental cleanup may be done more stringently than would have been the case had the installation remained open. However, the marginal difference is not easily quantified and depends largely on the end use of the closed installation. To the extent that much of the environmental cost is not considered as an additional cost to DOD, this has the effect of increasing net savings, especially considering that DOD estimates $7 billion in BRAC-related environmental costs through fiscal year 2001. DOD also expects to spend $3.4 billion in environmental costs beyond fiscal year 2001.[22] This is a $1 billion increase over the $2.4 billion environmental cost estimate DOD reported in fiscal year 1999. According to DOD officials, this increase is attributable primarily to the inclusion of cleanup costs for unexploded ordnance, the refinement of cleanup requirements and DOD's cost estimates, and the utilization of more stringent cleanup standards due to changes in the end use of closed installations. While the $3.4 billion in environmental costs is not reflected in DOD's $6.1 billion

[20] *Base Realignment and Closure 1995 Savings Estimates*, U.S. Army Audit Agency, Audit Report AA97-225, July 31, 1997.

[21] *The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure*, Department of Defense, Apr. 1998

[22] At the same time, uncertainties exist regarding the full cost of environmental restoration beyond fiscal year 2001 because DOD does not have complete and accurate data needed to estimate cleanup costs of unexploded ordnance, such as bombs and ammunition, and other constituent contamination, such as propellants and explosives, on closed training ranges. See *Environmental Liabilities: DOD Training Range Cleanup Cost Estimates Are Likely Understated* (GAO-01-479, Apr. 11, 2001), pp. 4-6.

11-L-0559/OSD/6724

annual recurring savings estimate, these costs are spread over many years and should have limited impact on cumulative long-term savings.

A similar case can be made for new military construction at receiving bases under the BRAC process. While significant funds have been expended on new military construction (an estimated $6.7 billion through fiscal year 2001), the military did benefit from the improvement in its facilities infrastructure. While this is somewhat difficult to precisely quantify, it appears that some portion of the cost would have been incurred under DOD's facilities capital improvement initiatives. If so considered, this would also have the effect of increasing net BRAC savings.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report on July 25, 2001, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations agreed with our findings. This official also provided technical clarifications, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which cost and savings estimates have changed over time, we compared the data contained in DOD's fiscal year 2001 BRAC budget request and documentation with similar data in the fiscal year 1999 budget request and documentation, which were the latest documents available since we last reported on this issue in December 1998. We noted revisions in the data and identified where major changes had occurred in the various costs and savings categories within the BRAC account. To the extent possible within time constraints, we discussed with officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and military services the rationale for those cases where the changes were significant, but we did not independently verify the validity of DOD's reported cost and savings data. We are continuing to examine the basis for the changes in DOD's cost and savings estimates and will discuss the issue in greater detail in an overall status report on BRAC that we expect to issue in early 2002.

To comment on the validity of the net savings estimates, we relied primarily on our prior BRAC reports and reviewed Congressional Budget Office, DOD, DOD Office of Inspector General, and service agency audit reports. As part of our ongoing broader review of BRAC issues, we are examining the extent to which the military services have updated their cost and savings estimates since we last reported on this issue in December 1998. We will discuss that issue in more detail in the status report that we expect to issue in early 2002. In assessing the accuracy of

11-L-0559/OSD/6725

the cost and savings data, we reviewed the component elements that DOD considered in formulating its overall BRAC savings estimates. Because DOD did not include in its estimates federal expenditures to provide economic assistance to communities and individuals affected by BRAC, we collected these expenditure data from DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment and considered them in our analysis of the estimated BRAC savings.

We conducted our review in June and July 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me on (b)(6) if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were Mark Little, James Reifsnyder, Michael Kennedy, and Tom Mahalek.

Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

11-L-0559/OSD/6726

snowflake

February 8, 2002 9:27 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: BRAC Savings

Please marshal a persuasive presentation as to the savings BRAC actually produces.

I am tired of having people say it is not so. It either is or isn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020802-3

Please respond by 02/22/02

2/12

HENRY –
PLEASE PREPARE THE REQUESTED PAPER. MAKE SURE YOU MAKE THE DEADLINE.

snowflake

SO4C EF678

February 7, 2002 11:01 AM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Russians in GTMO

It is fine with me if the Russians see the five Russians down in GTMO. Let's get an arrangement worked.

I told Paul Wolfowitz he could call Ivanov and tell him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020702-8

Please respond by 02/14/02

383.6

7 Feb 02

FEB 8 02 PM 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6728 U03635 /02

February 13, 2002 9:32 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Coordination

Attached is the transcript of yesterday's press briefing—the marked sections are relevant.

After looking it over, let's talk. We need to get calibrated.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/12/02 Press Conference

DHR:db
021302-9

000759

13Feb02

U03686 /02

United States Department of Defense
NEWS TRANSCRIPT
On the web: http://www.defenselink.mil
Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or +(b)(6)
Public contact: public@defenselink.mil or +

See pages 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Tuesday, Feb. 12, 2002 - 11:31 a.m. EST

DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers

(Also participating was Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

Rumsfeld: Greetings. Good morning. I have a brief comment, and then General Myers has some remarks.

As a country, we've lost thousands of innocent civilians on September 11th, and certainly our country and the people of our country understand what it means to lose fathers and mothers, and sons and daughters, and brothers and sisters.

I think it's useful to remind ourselves that the Taliban and the al Qaeda made a practice of doing harm and repressing the Afghan people. The Afghan people were starved in some measure because the Taliban and al Qaeda stole humanitarian food aid and kept it from them. There was a refugee crisis in the country with internally dislocated people, as well as large camps external to the country. They purposefully used women and children in residential areas to shield their military activities. They deliberately positioned military equipment next to schools and mosques.

Even before September 11th, the United States had been the larger donor of food aid to Afghan people, providing something in excess of 170 million dollars' worth prior to September 11th. In the first days of the war, DOD alone dropped more than a half a million rations of meals into Afghanistan to feed the starving. President Bush has pledged $320 million more, in addition to the military program. And every single day since the war begin, in the midst of the conflict, coalition forces, including American service people, have risked their lives to deliver humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan people.

Today, U.S. and coalition forces are on the ground, digging wells, building schools, supporting other civilian missions to help the Afghan people recover from years of Taliban oppression, and they're doing a fine job at it. And those who perpetrated these crimes against their own people are no longer in power. Hundreds are in detention, and they will have to answer for their crimes.

General Myers?

Myers: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And good morning again.

I'd like to follow up with the status on the Zhawar Kili strike from last week. The material we found around the site is being sent back to the United States for analysis. The search team was able to locate what we think was the exact impact point of the missile. And then the team cleared snow around that site out to 200 yards. There was anywhere from a foot to three to four feet of snow that had to be

cleared.

And I think yesterday Admiral Stufflebeem gave you a list of the type of material that they took from that site, and as I said before, that's currently being sent back to the United States for analysis.

Our team has left that site, but we'll continue to surveil (sic) that particular site and the region for some time to come.

The Hazar Qadam investigation is progressing. At this point in the investigation, I don't believe that any of the detainees -- this was the 27 that were detained -- were subject to beatings or rough treatment after they were taken into custody. All 27 detainees were medically screened upon arrival in Kandahar, and there were no issues of beatings or kickings or anything of that sort. As we've told you before, we continue the full investigation there, and General Franks will make that available once it is complete.

As an addendum here, the total number of detainees now in U.S. control is 474; 220 in Afghanistan, and 254 detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

And with that, we'll take your questions.

Rumsfeld: Questions.

Charlie?

Q: Mr. Secretary, speaking of Admiral Stufflebeem, he lamented yesterday that this war has turned into what he called a "shadow war" and that you're chasing al Qaeda and Taliban and it's difficult to find them.

You're very reluctant to discuss now the secret things that are going on, especially while they're going on -- Special Forces troops, what they're doing. It seems the things that you are announcing, for instance, the attack at Zhawar Kili and the attack north of Kandahar, later to turn out to be mistakes. Are you worried that this is turning into some kind of public relations disaster where the headlines in the newspapers, the preponderance of them, are on mistakes rather than accomplishments?

Rumsfeld: Well, I mean, the first thing one has to say is that any time there is a suggestion that U.S. forces have, as you characterized it, made a mistake, it is something that we take very seriously as a country, and certainly the armed forces and the Pentagon do. When that occurs, we ask the appropriate people to undertake an investigation and to look into the charges or the allegations that have been made. We do that because we care that things be done as well as it's humanly possible to do them.

You say that everything we do is being called a mistake. I don't know that that's the case. Maybe I didn't quote you quite right.

But it seems to me there's a great deal we're doing in the country. We're in the process of assisting them to develop their own national military force. We're providing humanitarian assistance. We're assisting the government with a host of specific things. The forces everywhere they are located are helping the people in those communities.

So there's a great deal of good being done. And the harm that the Taliban was doing is no longer being done. The al Qaeda that had taken -- pretty much taken over the country, in a major sense, are on the

run. And the Taliban have been thrown out. So the repression that existed -- the circumstance of the Afghan people today is vastly better.

Now, does that mean that when there's an operation and someone suggests that it was in one way or another inappropriate that we shouldn't investigate it? No. We do investigate it. And we care about it. And we'll in good time find out actually what took place.

Q: I didn't mean to suggest everything you do was a mistake. You're very reluctant to discuss the positive things that you say you're doing. For instance, details on what attacks you might have foiled, what evidence --

Rumsfeld: I see your point.

Q: -- and perhaps the weight is going in the other direction on bad publicity.

Rumsfeld: Well, you're right. I mean, to some extent, when a -- the forces in the country are doing a variety of things. And among them are some things that are not public; that is to say, they are observing things that are taking place, and trying to make judgments about where people might be located or who might be moving things around in a country in a way that's inappropriate. So we don't announce those things. They're out doing that on a covert basis.

There are other things they do which are not announced until they happen. And those are direct action against a compound, for example, that is believed to be harboring al Qaeda or Taliban, senior Taliban people.

The other thing that's taking place is there's a good deal of discussion going on, and people are, in fact, being discovered; being taken into custody. A lot of intelligence information's being gathered, and that intelligence information has been helpful in preventing other terrorist attacks.

So no one ever likes to see an event where someone charges that it was improper, as we saw with respect to the operation that General Myers commented about. But it happens, and all you can do is go at it, find out what took place, and tell the world what actually happened.

Q: Are you concerned over these two high-profile events and what they might be doing to the campaign, in the eyes of the world?

Rumsfeld: I'm always concerned when there is an allegation made that suggests that some innocent person was -- that an attack was inappropriate or that some innocent person was killed or injured. Obviously, anyone would be concerned about that.

Myers: Can I add a little something -- just something to that?

Rumsfeld: Sure.

Myers: You know, I think the secretary and I would -- we are anxious to share some of these successes with you. The problem is that once you do that, then the tactics and the techniques and the procedures that are being used in this very difficult mission of locating leadership and other pockets of al Qaeda or Taliban, once we tell you how successful we've been, then we reveal those tactics, techniques and procedures, and sometimes they're easy to thwart. So that's why we have to be very careful. This is an

ongoing operation, if you will, and we've just got to be very, very careful.

The second thing I'd say, that no matter how these investigations turn out, as some of you know because you've been in the field with our forces, they are the most professional and disciplined forces there are. They make life and death decisions when they come upon this group -- these two compounds, where we had the 27 detainees and the 15 that were killed. Some of those detainees could have easily been killed. They were armed. The rules of engagement permit you to shoot back. And the fact that they were detained and not killed I think is an indication of just how professional and disciplined and dedicated our folks are. Now, if there were mistakes made, we're going to find that out when General Franks finishes his investigation. But I think the American people need to know that we have the best forces in the world, the best-trained forces, who are making these decisions and 99.9 percent of the time make them exactly right.

Rumsfeld: Let me -- let me elaborate, Charlie, on your question, because when you ask the question, "Are you concerned?", there's always a risk, if one says they're not concerned, that the headline will be that the Pentagon is not concerned. And it happened to me when I was asked in a lengthy interview by BBC about the detainees and how they were being treated. And I described how they were being treated; they were being treated very, very well, and properly, and humanely, and consistent with the Geneva Convention. And we went through all this and I described it.

And then he said something to the effect, "Well, are you concerned about how they're being treated?" And I said something to the effect -- no -- meaning, as I said in the context, because I know how they're being treated and they've been treated very, very properly and humanely. And that has roared around Europe that the Secretary is not concerned about how they're being treated, when the context was that I was not concerned because I know how they're being treated, and they're being treated and handled very, very well.

Now, when you say, "Are you concerned about these?" and if I say, no, I am not concerned about what -- as you cast the question, which is, are you concerned that they are going to be negative and take support away from the campaign of the war against terrorism, if I had answered and said no, I'm not, because I have confidence in the American people and in the people of the world recognizing how much better off the people in Afghanistan are today than they were, and yet I do have a concern when someone makes an allegation, because obviously we don't want people to be improperly handled, and we do not want operations against targets that are not appropriate targets.

So I'm concerned about the specifics. But I did not want to simply answer it in a way that the headline would become inflammatory. I've become very cautious.

Yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, several people now from this podium have said that this target at Zhawar Kili is believed to have been legitimate and appropriate, yet stories persist out of the region that the missile may have killed three innocent civilians who were out collecting scrap metal. Can you provide for us today any additional information besides what this Predator may have seen that led U.S. forces to attack that site? And second of all, what is --

Rumsfeld: You mean the three individuals?

Q: The three. At Zhawar Kili.

11-L-0559/OSD/6733

Rumsfeld: Okay. Let's do that one.

Q: Okay.

Rumsfeld: I don't know that I can add anything to it. It's my understanding that the people who operate the Predator were watching a large number of people -- 15 or -- 10, 15, 20 people -- over a period of time. And out of this group came three people. And they moved in and among various outcroppings of rocks and trees. And the people who have the responsibility for making those judgments made the judgments that, in fact, they were al Qaeda and that they were a proper target. And they make those judgments based on behavior, based on various types of equipment in information that they have developed over a sustained period now of weeks and weeks and weeks.

A decision was made to fire the Hellfire missile. It was fired. It apparently hit three people -- one or more people. There is an investigation underway. Special Forces could not get up there because of the weather. They went up there. They cleared away a large diameter area of snow, anywhere from a foot to two feet of snow, and picked up a great deal of material from the site, and they are in the process of checking into that, and they're also interviewing people in the region.

Now, someone has said that these people were not what the people managing the Predator believed them to be. We'll just have to find out. There's not much more anyone could add, except there's that one version and there's the other version.

Q: Was there any additional intelligence that led to this site to begin with that may have contributed to the perception that these were al Qaeda?

Rumsfeld: These are people who have been doing this now for a good many weeks. And they monitor sites, and they go back to sites where they know al Qaeda have been. And they check things out. And they are honorable, fine people doing the best that's possible to be done. I was not in the control booth. I have not reviewed the -- I have not compared the elements that went into their decisions. I am sure people will do that.

Yes, Ron.

Q: What is your personal confidence that this, in fact, was an appropriate, legitimate target?

Rumsfeld: It's not for me to say. I have great confidence in the people doing it. They're honorable people. They're talented people. They're skillful. They've been doing it for weeks and weeks and weeks now, and they've got a darned good record and I've got a lot of respect for them.

Yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said earlier there's a great deal of good being done in Afghanistan, and you were nodding in particular at the humanitarian effort that's being made daily. But in the hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban leaders on the military front, what has gone right lately?

We've heard nothing but problems lately. What's gone right?

Rumsfeld: Well, we have gathered some intelligence from them that has been beneficial to the United States and other countries and to our deployed forces -- and not just a little, but more than a little.

11-L-0559/OSD/6734

Second, we continue to gather in additional people, senior people, in the Taliban and al Qaeda. It's a fairly steady flow; it's not large numbers at any given time, but we are continuing to bring them in and to interrogate them at Bagram or at Kandahar, and ultimately in Guantanamo Bay. So I feel quite good about the progress.

Q: Senior people -- can you -- how senior? Any names or --

Rumsfeld: As you know, we've got what they say their names are, and we have what we think them to be, and some of their aliases. And we've decided that it's not useful to announce their names because then, for one thing, it could be wrong because they don't always tell the truth, and for a second thing, it can tell everyone else in those organizations who we have and what types of information we conceivably will be hearing from them, in which case it makes it much easier for others to get away.

Yes?

Q: I want to pick up on that point a second. About three weeks ago, from the podium, you said you would think about releasing a list of who was killed in the al Qaeda leadership. About two weeks ago, President Bush told the Washington Post that he keeps a scorecard like a baseball game, and 16 of 22 al Qaeda leaders remain at large. This is about a couple of weeks ago. Can you shed any light on that? Is that roughly the number at large -- six maybe killed and another 16 at large?

Rumsfeld: It changes every day. And there is such a list, and it does indicate whether or not they have been killed for sure, or presumed dead, or in captivity, or at large. And where people fit on that, an individual's status may change from week to week, depending as more information becomes available. And in many cases they're qualified, that is to say it says "presumed" as opposed to certainty. And we have thought about it, and we've decided not to release it.

Q: Was it six -- is that roughly, though, six, roughly, have been killed?

Rumsfeld: I can't say. I haven't -- I have to go back and -- I'm sure when he said it, it was correct. My guess is the numbers have changed since.

Q: General Myers, I have a quick one on the Predator. There's been a lot of attention on this one strike. Roughly how many of these Predator Hellfires have been fired in the campaign by the CIA? Are we talking in the 40 or 50 range, and one or two have been controversial?

Myers: I don't have -- I don't have that at my fingertips. And probably if I did, we wouldn't talk about how many.

But let me just add a little comment to the earlier question on success here. You know, we said early on that one of the ideas -- and the president has said this, and others, that we wanted to disrupt these operations, and part of disruption is getting them to move. And, you know, I think, at least I have said, if they leave Afghanistan, that's not all bad because they're going to be in their second-favorite place, and they're going to be in a place where they're less comfortable, where they have to spend more resources to buy their security, and so forth.

It has turned out that that is -- that's been true. Some of the folks we've gotten our hands on have been actually through other countries, and we've been fairly successful there. And when the time comes, that will all be released. So it's having the kind of effect, I think, that we want to have.

11-L-0559/OSD/6735

Yes?

Q: Two questions about the Predator attack. First of all, yesterday it was described as an appropriate target. Is it still the feeling in this building that it was an appropriate target?

Rumsfeld: As I said, it is from the people I've talked to. The building? I can't speak for the building. But there is no change in opinion on the part of the people who were involved in the process, except for the fact that because people have raised a question about it, that there is an investigation going on, and people, as I say, have gone up there to take a look at it.

Q: Second question. There was a little confusion yesterday. Admiral Stufflebeem said that there was no real-time interaction between the CIA and CENTCOM when this attack was going down, when the CIA was pulling the trigger. And then we saw comments that seemed to contradict that on the wires a little later. Can you bring some clarification to that? How much interaction was there between the DOD and the CIA about this target at the time it was going down?

Rumsfeld: I can't speak to that, except to say that there tends to be a high degree of interaction between CENTCOM and CIA on a whole host of things, and certainly on these matters.

Q: Okay, explain the contradictions we got yesterday --

Myers: I don't know why you got the contradictions because there was close coordination, like there always is. And I don't know why you got the contradiction. I can't explain that.

Q: So General Stufflebeem was incorrect when he said there was no real-time coordination?

Myers: I didn't hear what he said, so I don't know -- I can't say that. And I don't know what he was thinking or the context he said it in. I would just reiterate --

Rumsfeld: He's getting careful too. I like that! (laugbter) Way to go, General!

Myers: (laughs) Thank you, sir!

Q: Well, explain what were the facts, if you could.

Myers: Well, again, without divulging too much of how this all works, there is close coordination between what the CIA is doing and what Central Command is doing.

And it just -- it's virtually continuous. And so I don't know what Admiral Stufflebeem said or told you, but -- and that was the case here. I don't know what else there is to say.

Rumsfeld: Yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, General Myers, both of you talked last week before Congress about developing a joint task force headquarters that would deploy in the event of something like that. If we had had that in place, how could this have helped this operation now? Could the joint task headquarters that the Joint Forces Command is developing right --

Myers: I'll take a stab at it, if I can.

11-L-0559/OSD/6736

Central Command's a little different situation because, in a sense, they are already a joint task force headquarters. So it's a little different for them. A better one to take would be Pacific Command, in doing something in their region, where the unified commander might designate a joint task force.

But let's assume it's Central Command. What we're envisioning there is not only the habitual relationships which CENTCOM does have with all its components -- its Army and its Navy and its Marine and its air components; they have that relationship that we're trying to establish in other unified commands, and maybe more than one. In Central Command, they essentially have this one big joint task force. And one of the issues is what is the suite of equipment that you equip them with when they go in to conduct an operation, whether it's humanitarian or whether it's combat or whatever? And that's the part we need to focus on. Then you take a suite of equipment that plugs everybody in so they all have the relevant pictures of what's happening and so forth. So I think it'd be very relevant in terms of the equipment.

Rumsfeld: Yes.

Q: Can you adapt this to the other --

Myers: Yes. Oh, absolutely. Yes. Have to be adaptable.

Q: This is apparently the most specific information in the last five months about another terrorist attack today. Without divulging anything you don't want to, can you say anything about whether and how DOD's reacting?

Rumsfeld: Well, first let me say that the -- as I understand it, the information that the Department of Justice used to come to the conclusion it came to, that an announcement was appropriate, was information that has been gained in large measure from the interrogations that have been taking place and the other information that has been a result of the efforts of the multi- departmental groups that do the interrogation.

The Department of Defense was pretty much at a level of alert that it didn't require many additional things, although I understand some elements have taken some additional steps which I'd prefer not to discuss.

Q: Can you say anything generally about what you mean by that?

Rumsfeld: About what?

Q: The last thing you said. Can you generally -- what are you referring to?

Rumsfeld: No, because it's --

Q: (off mike) -- at Guantanamo Bay, by the way, or in Afghanistan?

Rumsfeld: I don't know. It could -- we interrogate at Bagram, Kandahar and Guantanamo. So -- and where that particular information came from, I think it was Guantanamo, but I don't know.

Myers: Yes, I think that's right.

11-L-0559/OSD/6737

Rumsfeld: Yes?

Q: Getting back to the Taliban leadership, about three weeks ago, prior to the Special Forces raid north of Kandahar, Afghan officials said that they were in negotiations with three top Taliban officials, including Omar's secretary, to try to bring them in from the cold, and then the attack happened and they lost contact with these three folks.

Were you aware of those negotiations? And if so, do you know what the status is of those today?

Rumsfeld: I can't run a thread back to that particular comment. I do know that at any given time, including this moment, there are discussions taking place about Taliban, and particularly Taliban more than al Qaeda, people who are trying to understand what's going to happen to them if they turn themselves in, or if they decide to give us assistance in finding other people, and that type of thing. So it's a continuous process.

Q: And you're in contact with the Afghan officials, parties to the negotiations with these folks?

Rumsfeld: See, I don't know what you mean by "these folks." But certainly the --

Q: Well, the three top Taliban officials.

Rumsfeld: I can't speak to that. As I said, I know that at any given moment of the day or night, there are discussions going on, and we are certainly in touch with Afghan people who are involved in those kinds of discussions.

Yes?

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said recently, or just actually a couple of moments ago, that the folks firing Predators have a good record. What did you mean when you said that?

Rumsfeld: I mean that they're serious people. They've been doing this now since -- some months, and that I have observed how they handle themselves, and they develop patterns of behavior which give them information. They use human intelligence from the ground. They observe a variety of things from the ground and the air and they connect those things, and then they make judgments. And they have, on a number of occasions, been successful in doing exactly that which they intended to do.

Q: But "record" implies a scorecard. Do you have some sort of scorecard in mind you can share with us?

Rumsfeld: I -- no. It is a series of events that I have observed, and that others have observed, rather than keeping score on it.

Q: Secretary Rumsfeld, on the Predator strike question again, in late November, when people were asking you about the relationship between CIA operations and CENTCOM -- and then it was more about ground operations -- but you said very specifically that General Franks was the man at the steering wheel coordinating or in control of all military operations. Now, with the Predator strikes, you're talking more about an exchange of information, coordination.

So I was wondering if you could clarify the situation of how CIA-military operations are coordinated

11-L-0559/OSD/6738

or in control by CENTCOM.

Rumsfeld: Yeah. That's a good question, and it's hard to answer.

The overwhelming bulk of all activity in Afghanistan since the first U.S. forces went in have been basically under the control of the Central Command. And that's particularly true after the first month. The one exception has been the armed Predators -- I shouldn't say "the one exception." An exception has been the armed Predators, which are CIA-operated.

Q: Why is that -- why is that an exception?

Rumsfeld: It is just a fact. They were operating them before the United States military was involved, and -- the armed Predators -- and doing a good job. And so rather than changing that, we just left it.

Q: Why not plug them into the command and control at CENTCOM? You have three operators at a Predator.

Rumsfeld: It's just a historical fact that they were operating these things over recent years, and they were in Afghanistan prior to the involvement of CENTCOM. And they continued during this period. That's just the way it is.

Yes.

Q: Could I just get the two of you maybe to free associate a little bit more on that subject? We're seeing a --

Rumsfeld: To do what? (laughter)

Q: Free associate. (laughs) It's a sort of touchy-feely '70s term. (laughter)

Myers: I don't believe I can --

Rumsfeld: You got the -- you got the wrong guys! (laughter)

Myers: I don't think I can do that with you. It's illegal. I -- (laughter)

Q: The general subject matter is there is this growing sort of military role for the CIA, and we have you guys up here every day and can ask questions. But the CIA is obviously -- operates in a lot more shadowy way. People are thinking back and remembering some of the excesses of that agency in Latin America 20, 30 years ago, and I think there's -- there tends to be a growing sense of, hmm, what are getting into here? Could you all talk more philosophically about the dealings between the Pentagon and the CIA, and what the parameters are that you're developing or thinking about for how to manage this new world where the CIA now has its own real military capabilities that are not necessarily under the control of the U.S. military, which has transparency with the American public?

Rumsfeld: I can give you a couple of paragraphs on the subject.

Q: All right. That would be the free association.

Rumsfeld: Is that right?

The relationship between the Defense Department and the CIA today is as good as I've ever seen it: that is to say, in the relationships and the interaction and the connectivity.

We have people involved with things they're doing, and in -- for example, in counterterrorism or in intelligence cells, where we're trying to bring all kinds of intelligence information into one place. They have people involved in things that we're doing in a sense of connecting their capabilities and their assets to what we do.

The concern you're expressing, from a decade or two or three ago, I think is not apt simply because people are sensitive to those things and there's all kinds of congressional consultation, there's all kinds of procedures within the executive branch so that things that the agency is planning to do are well vetted in the appropriate ways before they do them.

I think the general relationship on the ground tends to be that if we're not there, the CIA, obviously, has the reporting relationship straight up through the CIA and we're not involved. To the extent they are there, and we then get involved, there's an early period where they're both there and they're doing somewhat different things, needless to say. And then, at a certain point, the defense element is large enough that it becomes -- things tend to chop over to it and the chain of command goes up through the combatant commander, except for, obviously, things that don't fit within our statutory responsibilities.

Q: Secretary Rumsfeld, a number of administration officials have spoke (sic) recently about the need for a regime change in Iraq -- probably the highest-profile being Secretary of State Colin Powell. Do you favor such a regime change sooner rather than later? And how concerned should Saddam Hussein be that the U.S. military may be the force of that regime change?

Rumsfeld: Well, I think that the Congress passed legislation relating to regime change. I've forgotten the name of the statute.

(to General Myers) Do you know?

Myers: I don't remember either.

Rumsfeld: But I --

Q: Aid to the opposition.

Rumsfeld: Well, that was part of it. But I think it was also broader. And I think that's -- I don't know many people who have developed a great deal of admiration for that regime and the way it treats its people and the way it treats its neighbor, and the fact that it's engaging in the development of weapons of mass destruction.

The timing, and whether or not anything is done with respect to any country is something that is for the president and the country to make those judgments.

And it's not for me to express views on that. So I don't.

Q: Has something new come to the attention of the United States with regard to Iraq that has kicked us

into an apparently higher gear for planning and the contemplation of dealing with Iraq? Or is this a continuum that --

Rumsfeld: I think the United States since Desert Storm has always had a various planning with respect to Iraq and what it might do to its neighbors. It's threatened -- it's invaded Kuwait. It's threatened the Shi'a in the south and harmed them. It's harmed the Kurds in the north. It has expressed its view that the regimes of its neighboring countries are illegitimate and ought not to be there. This is -- it is a country that threw out the inspectors, that has an active weapons of mass destruction program. I don't know if anything's changed.

Q: Maybe it is a misperception here. Previous administrations have adopted the policy of trying to contain Saddam Hussein. And it appears from what the president has said and what Colin Powell has said that containment no longer works in the view of this administration, that the threat has somehow changed, increased, that the dynamics are different, and therefore regime change has become a more substantial goal for this administration than previous ones. Is that a -- is that true?

Rumsfeld: Well, if you think about what the president and Secretary Powell have said, what they have said, it seems to me, is pretty much self-evident, that every year that goes by and the inspectors are not there, the development of their weapons of mass destruction proceed apace, bringing them closer to a time when they will have those weapons developed in a form that is more threatening than it had been the year before or the year before that.

The second thing that's occurred is the technologies have advanced. And to the extent that the sanctions -- which historically is the case: sanctions tend to weaken over time, they're relaxed in one way or another. And as those sanctions are relaxed and as dual use capabilities flow into that country, their capability is restored in terms of their ability to impose harm on their neighbors or threaten others.

Third, the September 11th attack, if you think of the president's words and Secretary Powell's position, it reminded the world and the United States that terrorist networks exist, that, in fact, they -- we now know from the intelligence we've gathered that they've had a very active effort underway to get chemical, biological and radiation capabilities -- terrorist networks.

And we know that Iraq has those and does not wish much of -- many of its neighbors well, if any. I don't think it has a neighbor that it wishes well -- maybe.

So it's that combination of things that I would suspect led to the president's comments and to the secretary's comments.

Q: But would it be accurate to say that this building, that the Pentagon is now spending more time considering Iraq than it had previously, in terms of your planning process?

Rumsfeld: This building has always been attentive, for at least more than a decade now, 10, 12 years, to Iraq. We've had Northern no-fly zones and Southern no-fly zones; been flying flights there attempting to contain that country and prevent them from jumping on one of their neighbors.

Yes?

Q: Could I follow up, Mr. Secretary, on what you just said, please? In regard to Iraq weapons of mass destruction and terrorists, is there any evidence to indicate that Iraq has attempted to or is willing to

11-L-0559/OSD/6741

supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction? Because there are reports that there is no evidence of a direct link between Baghdad and some of these terrorist organizations.

Rumsfeld: Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.

And so people who have the omniscience that they can say with high certainty that something has not happened or is not being tried, have capabilities that are -- what was the word you used, Pam, earlier?

Q: Free associate? (laughs)

Rumsfeld: Yeah. They can -- (chuckles) -- they can do things I can't do. (laughter)

Q: Excuse me. But is this an unknown unknown?

Rumsfeld: I'm not --

Q: Because you said several unknowns, and I'm just wondering if this is an unknown unknown.

Rumsfeld: I'm not going to say which it is.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if you believe something --

Rumsfeld: Right here. Right here. Right here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, point of clarification --

Rumsfeld: No, this is a promise.

Q: -- I think under Wright's rules, that a point of clarification -- (laughter)

Q: I just wanted to ask a real bottom line question. And many apologies for taking you back to Zhawar Kili one last time.

But you mentioned here a couple of times that that incident is now under investigation and cited that the team went up there for that reason.

Rumsfeld: This is to the three individuals. Correct.

Q: That's right. But, of course, the team went up there when people from this podium were saying it was definitely what you believed to be senior al Qaeda and you were simply going there to find out which al Qaeda you killed. Not that there -- at that time there were, of course, no at least public allegations that perhaps these people were innocent. So this investigation clearly that you were referring to perhaps has emerged since the team went up there. So what is -- are you --

Rumsfeld: I don't know that.

11-L-0559/OSD/6742

Q: Are you investigating it? Is the CIA investigating it? Or -- you mentioned --

Rumsfeld: No, I'm not. This -- no. This is something that CENTCOM has decided and done, and properly so.

Q: So what is it that CENTCOM is now investigating in regard to the Zhawar Kili attack?

Rumsfeld: I don't know what the right word is. I know that when a -- I know -- you're correct. There was an interest in getting some positive identification, if that were possible. And second, every time an allegation comes up that seems to have some -- that raises questions that ought to be addressed, then CENTCOM on its own decides that they're going to have people go look at that. And whatever that word is -- some call it, an investigation, others call it something else. But that's what's taking place, is they are going up there doing that.

Q: But that's -- they're -- so CENTCOM -- just to make sure I really understand. CENTCOM is investigating these potential allegations that perhaps these were innocent people. Is that what -- and why is CENTCOM investigating that and not the CIA, since it was their missile and their targeting?

Rumsfeld: Well, I don't know that I said that CIA wasn't.

Q: Could you explain that a little more, and --

Rumsfeld: No. I just don't know what they're doing.

Q: But you do know that CENTCOM's looking into it.

Rumsfeld: I do.

Q: And could you just one more time explain something to me? Does the CIA have the ability, the approval to pull the trigger without coming to the military? Does the CIA have that bottom line authority to pull the trigger without coming to the military?

Rumsfeld: I don't know that I am going to start responding to questions for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Q: Well, have you given -- let me try it the reverse way, then. Has the U.S. military -- I don't know what the right verb is -- given the CIA the approval, the authority, the whatever to pull the trigger without coming to Central Command first?

Rumsfeld: I don't know that it's for us to give that authority. If they have capabilities, they do them, what they wish to do.

Q: So they have the legal -- the legal authority to do things without coming to you?

Rumsfeld: I'm not going to answer what the CIA does. But it's not -- it is not the Pentagon that gives other agencies of government authority.

We're going to make the last -- the last question here.

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United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510–6025
www.senate.gov/–appropriations

February 26, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We appreciate your willingness to discuss the proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan. We now better understand your views and your desire to make the changes.

We recognize and support your recommendation to clearly delineate CINC responsibilities for all foreign nations. We believe the understanding between the European Command and the Pacific Command that the Pacific Command will still have principal responsibility for the Russian Far East will provide adequate assurances that this important region is not forgotten.

We were buoyed by your statement that you recognize the importance of the Pacific and that the Administration should not take any action which might be seen by a potential adversary as a sign of weakness or disengagement. With that in mind, we are confident you will share our belief that we should take no actions which diminish the forces assigned to the Pacific Command.

With regard to the Unified Command Plan we believe the following adjustments are necessary and essential:

• ALASKA BASED FORCES: All aspects of Alaska forces and territory, including the National Guard, should remain integral parts of the Pacific Command. Alaska NORAD Region responsibilities should be aligned appropriately to any successor NORAD command, pursuant to existing relationships.

• WEST COAST BASED FORCES: We also believe that all forces that are currently under the jurisdiction of the Pacific Command must remain operationally and administratively tied exclusively to the Pacific Command.

We hope to be able to support your proposal to the President on this matter, and can do so to the extent that we have your assurance that you will not reallocate forces from the Pacific Command pursuant to the Unified Command Plan or in your Forces for Unified Commanders Memorandum later this year. With that assurance you will have our support to establish a Northern Command to better coordinate the homeland defense mission.

We look forward to your response regarding the forces assigned to the Pacific Command.

Sincerely,

Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense

Daniel K Inouye
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense

HC 1530

27 FEB 2002

From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

URGENT

for

Steve Cambone

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 21 2002

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6028

322

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding our proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan.

We share a goal of protecting our important security interests in the Pacific region. The proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan seek both to support that commitment and strengthen our organizational approach to defense in light of our new strategy and the dangerous challenges we face.

With regard to your specific concerns, please be assured of our intention to continue to assign Alaska-based forces to U.S. Pacific Command as well as to associate the Alaska NORAD region to any successor to NORAD.

As we discussed, the assignment of West Coast forces is not specifically addressed in the Unified Command Plan. Thus, we do not intend to delay concluding the Unified Command Plan revision process. We will keep in mind your concerns about these forces as we develop the "Forces For" document later this year.

Again, thank you for your support on these important changes to the Unified Command Plan.

Sincerely,

21 MAR 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6747

U05195 /02

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 21 2002

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6028

Dear Senator Stevens:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding our proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan.

We share a goal of protecting our important security interests in the Pacific region. The proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan seek both to support that commitment and strengthen our organizational approach to defense in light of our new strategy and the dangerous challenges we face.

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Again, thank you for your support on these important changes to the Unified Command Plan.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/6748

U05195 /02

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

INFO MEMO

February 28, 2002, 1700

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSecDef_____

FROM : USD(ATL)

SUBJECT: Rocket (Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile [AARGM])

DISCUSSION:

- At TAB A memo, you stated "Today Duke Cunningham mentioned Argon or Quick Bolt or something, a rocket. I would like someone to explain it to me."

- The items in question are different capabilities of an air-launched anti-radiation missile. The first is the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile or AARGM. The second is called Quick Bolt and is an enhancement to AARGM. Together, they compose the advanced version of the existing High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile or HARM.

- The HARM missile ended production in 1996. Remaining inventory, with improvements is sufficient through 2025. Existing HARM will soon be retrofitted with a GPS/INS for a geo-locating capability that enables lower power targets to be detected. This improvement will be introduced in 2004.

- The AARGM ugrades the HARM with a multi-mode seeker that employs both Anti-Radiation Homing and an active Millimeter wave (MMW) seeker. The seeker enables the missile to find the target in the absence of signals (threat shutdown). Operational capability is expected in 2008. (See attachment.)

- Quick Bolt is a capability that builds on the AARGM accuracy. It enables the missile to have a near real-time intelligence feed that directs the missile to the threat from offboard sensors and provides weapons impact assessment for damage via a classified broadcast system. (See attachment).

Coordination: Verbal from PMA-241, Naval Air Systems Command; CNO N780
Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Richard O. McHarg, USN, OUSD ATL)S&TS Air Warfare (b)(6)

snowflake

February 14, 2002 2:11 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Rocket

Today Duke Cunningham mentioned Argon or Quick Bolt or something, a rocket. I would like someone to please explain it to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021402-12

Please respond by 03/01/02

Spencer / Kent

This is likely a China Lake Skunk Works project for an Air to Air or Air to Ground Missile. Please investigate and provide a response.

Thanks

2/25

AARGM
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile



QUICK BOLT
Concept of Operations



Pre-flight Mission Planning
- Define target and geographic filters

Aircraft captive carry
- Enhanced Situational Awareness (SA)
- Real-time re-routing for threat avoidance

Weapon post-launch
- Autonomous ARH passive ranging in-flight
- MMW radar search

Weapon just prior to fuzing
- Real-time INTEL to support ongoing strike operations and future mission planning

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

2002 MAR -1 AM 9:45

INFO MEMO

February 28, 2002, 4:00 P.M.

FOR: Secretary of Defense

DepSec Action_____

FROM: Mr. E. C. Aldridge

SUBJECT: Missile Defense and European Contractors

- Ambassador Van Galbraith wrote to you from Brussels suggesting you help European defense contractors join the Ballistic Missile Defense National Team that has recently been initiated (Tab A). You asked for my thoughts on the subject.

- Ambassador Galbraith is right. The BMD Program would benefit from participation by European contractors in the National Team, and DoD initiative is appropriate to help facilitate that participation.

- In addressing this matter, we plan to follow two paths in parallel: (1) MDA will open a dialogue with key allied governments that would facilitate foreign contractor participation in the National Team, with a corresponding objective of government-to-government cooperation, and (2) MDA would take the lead with the National Team to promote industry-to-industry contacts with the objective of facilitating the participation.

- This effort will likely take several months. In the government channel, if we press too hard we may provoke negative reactions. In the industry channel, the National Team is just getting organized, so it will take a while for the U.S. prime contractors to engage foreign industry; in any event, the ABM Treaty will limit what we can do with foreign industry until mid June.

- Rather than you taking action now, I plan to talk to Ambassador Galbraith when I am in Europe in April. At that time, our options will be clearer, and the National Team will be further along.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Kent G. Stansberry, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6753 U03751 /02

snowflake

February 11, 2002 2:28 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Defense Contractors

Attached is a memo from Van Galbraith, who works our problems in Europe. Please take a look at it and then see me about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/08/02 Van Galbraith ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
021102-57

Please respond by 02/28/02

1684-2002 TS

SIB
COL B
2/8
2/8

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
REPRESENTATIVE - EUROPE
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 11 2002

8 February 2002

To: The Secretary of Defense,

The four largest defense contractors in Europe (BAE Systems, EADS, Thales, and Finmeccanica) are now seeking to join the National Team created by the Missile Defense Agency to manage our missile defense projects. These European companies could not do this without the approval of their governments - the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Therefore, we should consider these countries estopped from criticizing our missile defense effort.

The bad news is that the U.S. team leaders, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, not surprisingly, appear to be dragging their feet a bit on allocating work shares to the Europeans. A call from you or Pete Aldridge or Ron Kadish to the CEO's of Boeing and Lockheed (and possibly also the other four American companies: Raytheon, TRW, Northrup Grumman, and General Dynamics) would certainly cause some positive movement.

Thanks,

Van

Van Galbraith

cc: Under Secretary Edward C. Aldridge Jr., Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Lt Gen Ronald T. Kadish, Director, Missile Defense Agency

Copies provided to:
- DepSecDef
- USD(AT+L)

snowflake

February 11, 2002 2:28 PM

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02/08/02 Van Galbraith ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
021102-57

Please respond by 02/28/02

373.24

11 Feb 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6756

1684-2002 IT
U03752 /02

SIB
COL B
2/8
2/8

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
REPRESENTATIVE - EUROPE
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 11 2002

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Van

Van Galbraith

cc: Under Secretary Edward C. Aldridge Jr., Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Lt Gen Ronald T. Kadish, Director, Missile Defense Agency

Copies provided to:
- DepSecDef
- USD(AT&L)

snowflake

#191

TAB

February 21, 2002 1:33 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Predator Footage

Torie is interested in releasing the Predator footage—a short piece of it where the three tall people of unknown identity were hit by a Hellfire.

Would you please check to see if we have released any Predator footage in the past. Second, given the thousands of people who see it all the time, whether or not we may at some point in the future want to release some. And third, if we do decide it is appropriate to release some Predator footage, whether or not this piece might make some sense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022102-22

Please respond by 1 Mar

Tab

snowflake

TAB

#180

February 12, 2002 12:19 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Strategic Plan

General Keane mentioned a national military strategic plan—what is that?

Also, what is IRR?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021202-15

Please respond by _____

3861

12 Feb 02

Tab

U03922-02

snowflake

February 11, 2002 3:46 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
Steve Cambone
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Unified Command Plan

1. We want to make absolutely sure that there are no additional staff people brought onboard as a result of the Unified Command Plan. Specifically, that means we have to take out of hide from other headquarters—Europe, Korea, wherever—the people needed to stand up the Northern Command. We will not add a single warm body.

2. Next, the other thing we will not do is to ask for another four-star. We don't need anymore four-stars. We have plenty. We will find a way to take one out of hide.

I would like some suggestions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021102-63

Please respond by 02/28/02

322

11 Feb 02

snowflake

040 CIA

October 1, 2002 11:08 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: CIA Methods

Please find out what this article is about. I have never heard of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Scarborough, Rowan, "U.S. Forces Get OK to Use CIA Methods," *Washington Times*, October 1, 2002.

DHR:dh
100102-44

Please respond by 10/11/02

10CT02

U03935 /03

Washington Times
October 1, 2002
Pg. 1

U.S. Forces Get OK To Use CIA Methods

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

American commandos hunting Taliban and al Qaeda guerrillas in Afghanistan have gained permission to employ new clandestine tactics that typically are confined to the CIA in the shadows of war.

Administration and military sources said that in recent weeks the covert warriors received authority from commanders in the United States to conduct "source operations," a special-operations term for a number of classified war tactics.

Source operations generally refer to recruiting and maintaining spies within the enemy's camp. In Afghanistan, it will mean finding Afghans and Arabs, possibly within the Taliban and al Qaeda network, who would supply intelligence to U.S. special-operations forces.

But source operations also refers to a number of other classified tactics that can be employed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater. The U.S. military estimates there may be 1,000 or more of Osama bin Laden's terrorists still on the loose in the region.

The authorization is part of a much broader plan to toughen the war against terrorists by allowing commandos to do more clandestine missions in more places overseas.

In July, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ordered U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., to accelerate the war against al Qaeda and other terror groups by devising a new war plan. Mr. Rumsfeld, who wants al Qaeda members captured or killed at a faster rate, desires a mechanism for the United States to identify and locate terrorists, then dispatch covert warriors in a matter of hours, not days or weeks.

"They are going to use some special-forces-unique skills to track them down," said a military officer involved in war planning who asked not to be named. "There are certain skills and capabilities that are not publicly associated with special forces."

An administration source said, "There are some initiatives that are very, very sensitive."

Source operations may involve finding spies or using a released detainee to spread disinformation.

A second military officer said in an interview that source operations mean that Army Special Forces soldiers, the Green Berets, will shift from informal contacts with local informants to a more structured relationship that could involve exchanging money for information and regular meeting times and places.

"It's making friends and giving them a tip for a tip," the officer said.

Any significant information would be turned over to the CIA, which has officers and paramilitary people deployed throughout the region.

Commandos in Afghanistan are part of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force that has headquarters near Bagram air base north of Kabul, with camps near Kandahar in the south and Khost in the east.

The task force is a combined force of Army Green Berets, Delta Force and Navy SEALs, including its crack counterterrorism unit, the naval special-warfare development group that used to be known as SEAL Team Six. Foreign nations, including New Zealand and Australia, also assigned some of their best "hunters and killers" to the group.

Some units have complained they are not getting good intelligence on al Qaeda and Taliban locations from either the CIA or the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Sources say the source operations approval is an attempt to improve the intelligence take.

Units are also wary of "walk-ins," locals who provide information but sometimes have an ax to grind with a rival and want the special operators to do their dirty work.

Much of the hunting for senior Taliban and al Qaeda members is being conducted by a unit called Task Force 11, composed mostly of Delta Force soldiers and SEALs.

The warriors are based at Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) which is commanded by Army Maj. Gen. Del Dailey and located at Fort Bragg, N.C., home of the Green Berets and the 82nd Airborne Division.

A 2000 U.S. Special Operations Command posture statement says JSOC is "designed to study special-operations requirements and techniques" and "plan and conduct joint special-operations exercises and training; and develop joint special-operations tactics."

Those benign-sounding words mask the command's role as headquarters for super-secret elite units, such as Delta, that specialize in quick raids and deadly tactics.

Special Operations Command is requesting a big budget increase and 9,000 personnel, in addition to the current 47,000, during the next five years to carry out what Mr. Rumsfeld says will be a long war.

snowflake

October 1, 2002 11:10 AM

020DIA

TO: J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: ADM Jacoby

We probably should have had Jake Jacoby in that meeting this morning.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-45

Please respond by _____

10CT02

U03936 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 11:29 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.

SUBJECT: Accomplishment List

I think you ought to add the Security Cooperation Guidance to the accomplishment list. It seems to me that that is fairly significant.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-47

Please respond by 10/18/02

U03937 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 11:45 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Jointness

Do you think we ought to think about getting the senior classes of the Air Force Academy, Naval Academy and West Point all together sometime to show jointness?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-50

Please respond by 10/11/02

350 Academies

10CT02

U03938 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 12:18 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Senator Biden

Please get Powell Moore to get a letter or something up to Joe Biden in response to his comment.

You can give him the piece of paper, and I will cut off the top section of it. Just tell him flat out that this is precisely what Rumsfeld says, precisely what George Tenet and John McLaughlin of the CIA have released, and exactly what Colin Powell and Condi Rice have said. We're all working off the same piece of paper.

Let me see what you plan to do about him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-51

Please respond by 10/11/02

U03939 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 2:53 PM

334 DSB

TO: William Schneider, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: DSB Projects

Would you please give me a paper that shows the following:

- Every project the Defense Science Board has completed in the last 20 months—the date it started and the date it was finished.

- Every project currently underway, with the date it was started and the date it is scheduled to be completed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-54

Please respond by 10/25/02

10 OCT 02

U03940 /03

Snowflake

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 1, 2002 9:59 AM

IRAQ

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Paper

Where did this paper come from?

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated memo on Iraq/al Qaida Intel for Releasability Consideration

DHR:dh
100102-32

Please respond by 10/11/02

U03941 /03

10CT02

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

Snowflake

October 1, 2002 10:01 AM

IRAQ

TO: Marc Thiessen
Torie Clarke
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Public Grievances in Iraq

Attached is an unclassified paper on what concerns the Iraqi people.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/02/02 Memo on Most Significant Public Grievances in Iraq

DHR:dh
100102-33

Please respond by _____

10CT02

U03942 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 03 2002

2 April 2002

Memorandum

In response to a question about the most significant public grievances in Iraq:

Reporting from Iraq on the public's complaints is almost nonexistent because Saddam and his regime control the news media and punish any perceived opposition with torture, assassination, or arbitrary imprisonment. The people have no safe means of expressing their views on poor economic prospects, corruption, political repression, limited personal freedoms, and their lack of political empowerment. (U)

We receive a wide range of unclassified information on regime repression, but some of the specific claims are difficult to confirm because Iraq refuses to permit visits by human rights monitors or other observers. The available information reflects widespread repression that is consistent with Saddam's past actions:

Executions. Saddam has ordered the assassination of numerous domestic rivals, former colleagues, family members, and dissidents in Iraq and abroad to further his political goals and to consolidate his power. Baghdad in 1997 initiated a murderous cleansing campaign at the large Abu Ghurayb prison that continued into at least 2000.

Torture and ill-treatment. Suspects, including members of the opposition and their collaborators or relatives, are subjected to brutal treatment during questioning by Iraqi security forces and intelligence services. Torture allegedly includes electric shocks, suspension by hands, beatings, rape and sexual abuse of both men and women, threats, and psychological pressure, according to UN reporting.

Counterinsurgency operations. Saddam's obsession with ensuring regime security has led to repeated and devastating attacks on Shias in the region of the southern marshes. Villages have been razed there, and inhabitants have been killed or jailed. According to the international media, nearly 150,000 Arab marsh dwellers who lived near the Tigris and Euphrates rivers had to move when Iraqi forces drained the marshes after the Gulf war.

Ethnic repression and forced relocations. As commander in chief during the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam was responsible for the repression of the Kurds, including the Anfal operation directed by his cousin Ali Hasan al-Majid in 1987-88, which included mass deportations, resettlement, torture, executions, and the use of lethal and nonlethal chemical agents. The international press reports that the Iraqi Government continues to remove Kurdish families from cities and villages in oil-producing regions near the Kurdish-controlled zone and is repopulating these areas with Sunni Arabs to serve as a loyal bulwark. (U)

continued . . .

For further information, contact the Iraq-Saudi Issue Manager at 71729 secure.

11-L-0559/OSD/6771

Human rights groups continue to report on regime abuses against all sectors of the Iraqi population. The UN and Amnesty International since 1991 have documented human rights violations perpetrated by Iraqi military, intelligence, and security personnel against suspected political dissidents using methods that include extrajudicial executions, torture during custody, disappearances, and prolonged incommunicado detention.

— Max Van Der Stoel, the former Special Rapporteur to the UN Human Rights Commission on Iraq, in 1999 said, "Extreme and brutal force is threatened and applied without hesitation and with total impunity to control the population." He frequently has expressed the view that the human rights situation in Iraq is worse than in any country since the end of World War II.

— According to UN Special Rapporteur Mavrommatis's report of August 2000, more than 94,000 individuals have been forced to leave northern Iraq since 1991.

— Amnesty International reports that Iraq is responsible for the disappearance and probable murder of more than 100 Shia clerics since the 1991 uprising. (U)

snowflake

Snowflake

February 7, 2002 11:07 AM

EF-0676

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Tom White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Info on Detainees

383.6

A

Done

You have the job of seeing that there is a proper national databank for all detainees kept, regardless of whether or not they are released. It would have DNA, photos, fingerprints, eye prints if we want to, names, aliases—everything we can figure out about them.

The President wants that done. I bave talked to Tom White about it.

Not Done

You should make sure we have a policy, and that all elements of the government understand it. My guess is the FBI ought to be the one to keep the databank, but they are lousy at databanks, so we ought to decide if we really want that to be the case.

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 23 2002

DHR:dh
020702-9

7 Feb 02

Please respond by 02/21/02

3/1

SECDEF -
A good memo on the Database. No discussion of where it migrates to (which agency) D. Rub

FEB 8 02 08:03

11-L-0559/OSD/6773

U03943 /02

snowflake

October 1, 2002 10:11 AM

020JCS

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Joint Staff

Please take a look at this memo from Gen. Myers and see me.

Thanks.

Attach.
07/15/02 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Joint Staff

DHR:dh
100102-34

Please respond by 10/25/02

10CT02

U03943 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 25 2002

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-402-02
15 July 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Joint Staff

- The following is provided in response to your request ([redacted]) for a list of activities that report to my office. Under current procedures a CJCS-controlled activity must meet the following criteria: (a) is established by the Chairman and reports through a J-directorate, (b) charter approved by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense, (c) has a designated Executive Agent, (d) is a multi-Service activity that performs a joint mission, (e) has an approved joint manpower document, and (f) contains approved joint duty positions.

- Three activities report to the Chairman:
  - National Defense University (NDU). NDU charter was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 1976. The charter placed operations of NDU under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  - Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO). JTAMDO charter was signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in March 1997.
  - US Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board (IABD). The US Delegation, IADB, was placed under the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1990.

- Five activities were transferred from the Chairman to USJFCOM in FY 1998/99 as a result of a Defense Reform Initiative (DRI):
  - Joint Warfighting Center.
  - Joint Communications Support Element.
  - Joint Warfare Analysis Center.
  - Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Battle Center.
  - Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. Subsequently transferred to US Space Command as a result of UCP 99.

- Additionally, the Joint Spectrum Center was transferred from the Chairman to Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in December 1998 as a result of DRI.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

snowflake

TAB

May 17, 2002 7:46 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Joint Staff

Larry Di Rita 7/16

JWAC is assigned to JFCOM (see CJCS response)

We got briefed the other day about the Chairman's Joint Warfighters' Analysis Center. I would like to find out what all the things are that the Chairman has as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so we can look at them and see how they perhaps ought to be regularized.

I am told that one was sent to the Joint Forces Command. But what other things are there like that down in the Joint Staff that I don't know about?

Please give me a complete list of everything they have.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-6

Please respond by 05/31/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

7/16 JUL 25 2002

Gen Myers' response attached
L Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

Tab

7/16

snowflake

October 1, 2002 10:20 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Joint Staff Directives and Publications

Please see me on this memo from Gen. Myers on Join Staff Directives and Publications.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/26/02 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Joint Staff Directives and Joint Publications

DHR:dh
100102-36

Please respond by 10/25/02

300.2

U03944 /03

10 Oct 02

snowflake

303
8/19/03

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: July 23, 2002

SUBJECT:

The other day I took a look at the list of JCS Directives and Joint Publications.

Why don't you take a look at those and tell me what procedures you think we ought to establish, which ones ought to be discontinued, which ones ought to be transferred to some OSD element, which ones ought to be approved by me, etc.

Just take a general review of them and tell me what you think. I found it kind of a strange list.

8/28

CJCS Response Attached

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072302.10

Attach: Action Memo 7/16/02 – CJCS Promulgation of Publications and Instructions

Please respond by: 8/5/02

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-462-02
26 August 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, FOR CJCS

SUBJECT: Joint Staff Directives and Joint Publications

- Per your request[1], I have reviewed the list of JCS instructions and publications.

- In the same way the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan amplifies your Contingency Planning Guidance, these instructions and joint publications facilitate my ability to carry out your directives and those of the President; fulfill statutory functions; and implement Departmental policy, procedures and guidance.

- DOD directives/instructions and CJCS instructions/manuals assign responsibility as follows:

Responsibilities Assigned by Directive/Instruction

Directive/ Instruction/ Manual	OSD Staff	Military Secretaries	Combat Support Agencies	CJCS	Combatant Commands	Joint Staff Directorates	Joint Chiefs
DOD	X	X	X	X	X		
JCS					X	X	X

- As depicted, overlap exists with the combatant commanders; however, DOD direction is strategic in nature while CJCS instructions are written at the joint operational level.

  - CJCS instructions and manuals direct operational and tactical responsibilities. They are reviewed annually for changes/cancellation.

  - With regard to joint doctrine publications, my staff recently began the process of consolidating 115 documents into less than 70. This effort is expected to be completed as a refined doctrinal hierarchy within the next 2 years.

- I will ensure these instructions and manuals do not duplicate your guidance to combatant commanders.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development; (b)(6)

- CJCS 3401B - CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System, 01 Septemb 2000

- JS Guide 5260 - Service Member's Personal Protection Guide: A Self-Help Han to Combat Terrorism While Overseas, 01 April 2000

- CJCSI 1100.01A - Award of Trophies and Similar Devices in Recognition of Accomplishments, 01 September 1999

- CJCSI 1101.01C - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Civilian Awards Prograr January 2000

- CJCSI 1120.01A - Streamers and Distinguishing and Positional Flags for Joint Commands, 01 November 1998

- CJCSI 1210.01B - Joint Training for US Personnel Assigned to NATO Comman the NATO Defense College, 15 December 2001

- CJCSI 1301.01B - Policy and Procedures to Assign Individuals to Meet Combat Command Mission-Related Temporary Duty Requirements, 01 July 2001

- CJCSI 1310.01B - Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge, 08 May 2001

- CJCSI 1320.01B - Assignment of Enlisted Personnel to the Joint Staff, 13 April 2

- CJCSI 1330.01B - Assignment of Officers (0-6 and Below) to the Joint Staff, 4 Ju 2001

- CJCSI 1330.02A - Review of Promotion Selection Board Results by the Chairme the Joint Chiefs Of Staff, 1 May 1997, CH-1, 15 December 1997

- CJCSI 1331.01A - Manpower and Personnel Actions Involving General and Flag Officers, 12 February 1999, CH - 1, 15 March 1999

- CJCSI 1332.01 - Joint Officer Management Policy Provisions Concerning Joint Specialty Officer Selection Boards, 15 June 1997

- CJCSI 1800.01A - Officer Professional Military Education Policy, 01 December 2

- CJCSI 2030.01A - Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance Policy Guidance August 2001

11-L-0559/OSD/6781

- CJCSI 2110.01A - International Transfer of Defense-Related Technology and Munitions, 1 March 2000 Size = 38K

CJCS Guide 3122 - Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) Primer, 01 November 2001

- CJCS Handbook 5260 - Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness, 01 January 1997

- CJCSI 2010.01B - Procedures Relating To The Conduct Of Military Affairs Of The Military Committees, NATO, 15 August 1997

- CJCSI 2310.01A - Implementation Procedures for Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Former Soviet Union, 03 October 2000

- CJCSI 3110.08B - Geospatial Information and Services Supplemental Instruction to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998, 21 June 1999

- CJCSI 3110.16 - Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence Management Operations, 10 November 2000

- CJCSI 3125.01 - Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, 03 August 2001

- CJCSI 3151.01 - Global Command And Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements, 10 June 1997)

- CJCSI 3290.01A - Program for Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Personnel (EPW/Detainee Policy), 15 October 2001,

- CJCSI 3330.01A - Policy for Recommendation of Aliens for Immigration, 15 April 2002

- CJCSI 3341.01 - Guidance On Preparing National Intelligence Estimates, 14 January 1998

- CJCSI 3411.01A - Key Personnel Location Reports to the National Military Command Center, 12 June 2000

- CJCSI 3710.01 - Delegation of Authority for Approving Operational Support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Counterdrug-Related Deployment of DOD Personnel, 28 May 1993

- CJCSI 3901.01A - Requirements for Global Geospatial Information and Services, 26 July 1999

- CJCSI 4110.01A - Uniform Material and Issue Priority System-Force/Activity Designators, 15 February 2000

- CJCSI 5220.01 - Security Classification Policy For Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles and Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles, 1 April 2001

- CJCSI 5221.01A - Delegation Of Authority To Commanders Of Combatant Commands To Disclose Classified Military Information To Foreign Governments And International Organizations, 06 April 1999

- CJCSI 5261.01B - Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund, 1 July 2001

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- CJCSM 3500.03 - Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, 01 June 1996, CH-4, 28 September 1998
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- CJCSM 3500.05 - Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide, 15 April 1997
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- CJCSN 6211 - Cancellation of CJCSI 6211.03, 1 April 2002
- CJCSN 6512 - Cancellation of CJCSI 6630.01A, 15 August 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Joint Publication 1: *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Nov 2000) 1

Joint Publication 0-2: *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Feb 1995) (In Revision) 11

Joint Publication 1-0: *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations* (Nov 1998) 21

Joint Publication 2-0: *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (Mar 2000) 25

Joint Publication 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Sept 2001) 29

Joint Publication 3-07: *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (June 1995) 39

Joint Publication 3-08: *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Oct 1996) 45

Joint Publication 3-16: *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (Apr 2000) 53

Joint Publication 3-33: *Joint Force Capabilities* (Oct 1999) 59

Joint Publication 4-0: *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations* (Apr 2000) 65

Joint Publication 5-0: *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (Apr 1995) 71

Joint Publication 6-0: *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations* (May 1995) (In Revision) 81

The Joint Doctrine Story 91

Appendix A
Joint Force Employment Considerations A-1

11-L-0559/OSD/6786

snowflake

October 1, 2002 10:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Expenses

I want to see the revised format that shows how much I have paid, how much of it that I had to pay, and how much of it could have been paid by the Government had I wished to have them do it.

I want to see it for last year and this year through August, and I would like to get the next month every month by the 15th. We certainly ought to be organized to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-37

Please respond by 10/11/02

U03945 /03

2/19.
1030

February 19, 2002 8:10 a.m.

TO: SECDEF

FROM: TORIE CLARKE

SUBJECT: Q&A

1) We did distribute and blast-fax/email the talking points and Q&A from the White House.

   We also distributed your remarks from the briefing the day after Ari announced the detainee designation decision.

2) Most of the questions are answered by the combined documents.

3) Larry and Jim Haynes think they are acceptable.

   I am waiting to hear from Doug Feith.

snowflake

October 1, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: End Strength

We ought to think about whether we need to do something on end strength. My impression is we don't, but please put some discipline into that question for me and let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-13

Please respond by 10/18/02

330.2

1 of 2

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 4 2002

Mr. Nicholas F. Brady
16 North Washington Street
Easton, MD 21601

Dear Nick,

Thanks for the note about Jim Brandi. I'll mention to the Secretary of the Navy that he has your endorsement.

Sincerely,

231.2

4 May 02

snowflake

February 28, 2002 10:52 AM

TO: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Jim Brandi

Nick Brady sent me his endorsement of Jim Brandi. Nick's letter and Jim Brandi's résumé are attached, as well as my note back to Nick.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/15/02 Brady ltr to SecDef, SecDef reply

DHR:dh
022802-7

Please respond by _____

NICHOLAS F. BRADY
16 NORTH WASHINGTON STREET
P.O. BOX 1410
EASTON, MARYLAND 21601

February 15, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
1000 Defense, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Don:

The quotes you sent me on Mary Robinson are indeed distressing. I checked with friends in Ireland who are even less credible than my friends in the U.S. as they are primarily in the Thoroughbred racehorse business, but they really know their way around (no Irish tax on any kind of horse sales). Their view was, although she did a reasonable job as the President of Ireland, her education was primarily from the socialist side and as they described it: "she was a goer for lost causes." They all felt she ought to come home to Ireland and get off the stage where she is no longer needed.

This is the inside view from the horse world in Ireland. I have no doubt you will find it useful.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Nicholas F. Brady

cc: Larry DiRita

NICHOLAS F. BRADY
16 NORTH WASHINGTON STREET
P.O. BOX 1410
EASTON, MARYLAND 21601

February 15, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
1000 Defense, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Don:

Attached is Jim Brandi's resume. He was one of the outstanding partners in the old Dillon Read before it was merged three times, winding up as part of UBS. At age 53 Jim wants to seek a second career and remembers his service in the Navy as something that meant a lot to him. He has written to Gordon England, the Secretary of the Navy, but I just wanted to add my feeling that you could find no finer person for public service.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Nick

~~Nicholas F. Brady~~

Attachment

2/25

SECT -
"Thanks for the note about Jim Brandi. I'll mention to the Secretary of the Navy that he has your endorsement"
S/

Larry Di Rita

JAMES H. BRANDI

215 East 72nd Street
New York, New York 10021
(b)(6)

BUSINESS EXPERIENCE

1997 – Present — **UBS WARBURG, New York, NY**
Managing Director, Corporate Finance Investment Banking
Currently, Deputy Global Head of Energy and Power Group comprised worldwide of 85 investment banking professionals, 28 equity analysts and support staff. Senior Relationship Banker for several major energy companies as well as a Fortune 100 consumer goods company.

1976 – 1997 — **DILLON, READ & CO. INC., New York, NY**
Managing Director, Corporate Finance Investment Banking
Firm subsequently sold to predecessor of UBS Warburg. Elected as a Managing Director in 1987. Specialized in mergers and acquisitions, participating in over 50 completed transactions as well as numerous debt and equity financings for companies such as Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., Quantum Chemical Corporation, R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., Estée Lauder Companies Inc., Superior Oil Company, Amerada Hess Corporation, Texaco, Inc., The Kansas Power and Light Company and Associated National Gas Corporation. During 1978 and part of 1979, worked on corporate syndication desk.

MILITARY

1970 – 1973 — **U.S. NAVY**
Junior Officer
Graduate of Officers Candidate School. Served on destroyers (DD, DDG and DLG) in communications and operations. Deployed to North Atlantic and twice to Mediterranean. Division Officer for division of 43 enlisted men and qualified as Officer of the Deck. Part of 1972 – 1973 served on staff of ComDesRon 32.

EDUCATION

1973 – 1975 — M.B.A., Harvard Business School
Awarded first-year honors, top 12% of class.

1975 – 1976 — Attended Columbia University Law School. Designated as Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar, top 10% of class. Left to join Dillon Read.

1966 – 1970 — B.A., American History, Yale University
History thesis honors.
Freshman Crew, Captain of Polo Team, 1969 and 1970. Member of team which won U.S. Intercollegiate Championship in 1969 and 1970.
Tutor in French.

PERSONAL

- Married for 31 years to Linda Beard Brandi. Daughter, Katie, is writer-in-residence at St. Albans School, Washington, D.C. Son, Peter, graduated from Kenyon College in 2001.
- Trustee of Kenyon College and member of Budget and Curriculum and Faculty Committees.
- Trustee of Berkshire School. Chairman of Endowment Committee.
- Sponsor participant in Student/Sponsor Partnership, a program for inner-city high school students.
- Member of American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
- Director of the Budd Company and ThyssenKrupp, Inc.
- Skier, book collector, music lover and occasional golfer.

snowflake

October 1, 2002 7:44 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: ADM Jacoby

I think I should see Adm. Jacoby. Are we going to set that up?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-14

Please respond by 10/18/02

OSD 11 SD

1 of 02

U03947 /03

Snowflake

October 1, 2002 8:44 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: D&D

Here is this D&D paper, which I believe is something you are working on.

Thanks.

Attach.
Iraqi Denial and Deception briefing charts

DHR:dh
100102-19

Please respond by _____

Iraq

10/1/02

U03948 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 8:26 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Speech Material

Here's a revision of the guideline paper. These changes should be incorporated in the speech, if any of these guidelines are used.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/01/02 Revision of March 2001 Guidelines Paper

DHR:dh
100102-15

Please respond by 10/04/02

U03950 /03

March 2001

Guidelines to Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

Is the proposed action truly necessary?

- ***A Good Reason***: If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, whatever is to be done must be in the U.S. national interest. If people could be killed, the U.S. must have a darn good reason.

- ***Diplomacy:*** All instruments of national power should be engaged before resorting to force, and they should stay involved once force is employed.

- ***Legal Basis:*** In fashioning a clear statement of the legal underpinning for the action and the political basis for the decision, avoid arguments of convenience. They may be useful at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later.

Is the proposed action achievable?

- ***Achievable***: When the U.S. commits force, the task should be achievable—at acceptable risk. It must be something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to understand our limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the U.S. simply cannot accomplish.

- ***Clear Goals:*** To the extent possible, there should be clear, well considered and well understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we can know when we have achieved our goals and can honestly exit or turn the task over to others.

- ***Command Structure***: The command structure should be clear, not complex and one the U.S. can accept—not a collective command structure where key decisions are made by a committee. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, which it most often will, we should have a clear understanding with coalition partners that they will do whatever might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. We must avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals or jeopardize the command structure. The mission should determine the coalition; the coalition should not determine the mission.

Is it worth it?

- ***Lives at Risk***: If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S. and coalition partners should be willing to put lives at risk.

- ***Resources***: The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. The U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.

- ***Public Support:*** If public support is weak at the outset, U.S. leadership must be willing to invest the political capital to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period of time is required. If there is a risk of casualties, that should be acknowledged at the outset rather than allowing the public to believe the engagement can be done antiseptically, on the cheap, with zero casualties.

- ***Impact Elsewhere:*** Before committing to an engagement, consider the implications of the decision for the U.S. in other parts of the world—if we prevail, if we fail, or if we decide not to act. U.S. actions or inactions in one region are read around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to the deterrent and U.S. influence. We need to think through the kind of precedent a proposed action, or inaction, would establish.

If there is to be action--

- ***Act Early:*** If it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should be willing to make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully, early, during the pre-crisis period, to alter the behavior of others and to try to prevent the conflict. If that fails, be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail.

- ***Unrestricted Options***: In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress or the public to support an action, the National Command Authorities must not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things—not to use ground forces, not to bomb below 20,000 feet, not to risk U.S. lives, not to permit collateral damage, not to bomb during Ramadan, etc. That simplifies the task for the enemy and makes the U.S. task more difficult. Political leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy can simply wait us out.

Finally--

- ***Honesty:*** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners, we must not make the task sound even marginally easier or less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less, or no more, than we can deliver. It is a fact that it is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

Note:

Guidelines, Not Rules: Finally, while these guidelines are worth considering, they should not be considered rules or a simple formula to inhibit the U.S. from acting in our national interest. Rather, they are offered as a checklist to assure that when the U.S. does engage, it does so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, and the opportunities. The future promises to offer a variety of possible engagements. The value of this checklist will depend on the manner in which it is applied.

Decisions on engagement always will be based on less than perfect information, often under extreme pressure of time. These guidelines will be most helpful not in providing answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize available information.

Donald Rumsfeld

Snowflake

October 1, 2002 8:50 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: UN Commission

You might want to look at these two pages on the UN Commission from the Denial and Deception briefing.

Thanks.

Attach.
Denial and Deception page and memo from DepSecDef

DHR:dh
100102-20

Please respond by _____

U03951 /03

C 9/26

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld **DATE: September 25, 2002**

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz PW

SUBJECT: IAEA

Don,

This is another example of what's wrong with the IAEA and why we should be very skeptical of any inspections run by UNMOVIC or the IAEA.

Iraqi Denial and Deception agair
UN Special Commission

Marc T

"Iraq before the war and during the postwar ins
carefully monitored inspection procedures and
its deception activities accordingly."

"During the course of the fourth postwar inspe
Iraqi national safeguard head ..... appeared an
repeatedly bragged that he had applied everyth
had learned from his earlier job as an IAEA saf
inspector to ensure that his former IAEA collea
would not detect the clandestine nuclear progr

Snowflake

October 1, 2002 8:53 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuba

The material from Jim Thomas on the Cuban Missile Crisis is enormously helpful.

Let's use it in a speech.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-21

Please respond by _____

10/8/02

U03952 /03

Snowflake

October 1, 2002 8:54 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iraqi D&D

Here's an unclassified paper on Iraqi Denial and Deception we might want to use sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.
Denial and Deception briefing

DHR:dh
100102-22

Please respond by _____

Iraq

1 Oct 02

U03953 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 8:57 AM

TO: Andy Marshall

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Strategy

Thanks so much for sending along the piece from Gene Durbin. It is excellent. I was fascinated by it.

Keep things coming!

Regards.

DHR:dh
100102-23

Please respond by _____

381

10/1/02

U03954 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 9:08 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Alain Enthoven

If Enthoven comes to town and you are going to meet with him, I would like to meet him as well. Please arrange that.

Thanks for letting me see his letter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-25

Please respond by _____

U03955 103

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305

ALAIN ENTHOVEN
MARRINER S. ECCLES PROFESSOR
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MANAGEMENT

September 10, 2002

Stephen A. Cambone, Ph.D.
Director, Office of Program Analysis & Evaluation
Office of the Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Dr. Cambone:

I read with great interest the article about you in the August 29 Wall Street Journal. Congratulations! I was very happy to see restoration of the idea of an independent civilian analytical team reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. I believe we accomplished a lot back in the 1960s when the office was founded (then "Systems Analysis"), and that the Secretary of Defense can't make good program decisions without such an independent source of advice. (Such advice isn't infallible, but it sure can help in identifying the issues and clarifying the real alternatives.)

I happened to call Robert McNamara that day to inquire about his health, and he was very pleased by the article.

It is inevitable your work that will "put you at odds with the brass." I liked and admired my many friends in the military, some of whom remain good friends to this day. But they are often (not always, but often) constrained by the limitations of experience in one branch, and they are all constrained by intense pressures to support the continuation and expansion of their branch. I saw some pretty brutal career-ending retaliation against officers who managed to take an independent view.

Have you seen *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969,* the book I wrote with K. Wayne Smith in the early 1970s. It describes what we did and why in the Systems Analysis Office. I expect you would find it interesting. We wrote it with people like you in mind, to preserve the message through the coming dark ages. If you can't find it in the Pentagon library, let me know and I will see if I can find one for you. Occasionally, I get requests from the War Colleges to reprint parts of it.

I get to Washington from time to time and would enjoy meeting you if your doubtless extremely busy schedule would allow it.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Alain Enthoven

Alain Enthoven

snowflake

October 1, 2002 9:11 AM

000.3

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Muslim Senior Officers

FYI.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/18/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Muslim Senior Officers [U15183/02]

DHR:dh
100102-26

Please respond by _____

1 Oct 02

U03956 /03

9/19
1600

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 SEP 19 AM 8:04

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECDEF HAS SEEN

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

SEP 30 2002

SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 – 4:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) David S. C. Chu 18 Sep 02

SUBJECT: Muslim Senior Officers

There are six active duty colonels who state they are Muslim in their official records. There are no active duty general or flag officers who state they are Muslim. Attached is a table of active duty members by Service and grade who are recorded as Muslim.

Just under eleven percent (10.8 percent) of the force have no religious preference recorded. Another 20.9 percent state that they have no religious preference.

Attachment: as stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	9/23
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	9/19

RELIGION AFFILIATION MUSLIM - AUGUST 2002

GRADE	ARMY	A.F.	M.C.	NAVY	TOTAL
E01	62	27	18	38	145
E02	99	26	39	61	225
E03	229	115	123	234	701
E04	470	130	93	239	932
E05	417	188	90	245	940
E06	342	101	68	88	599
E07	191	79	22	14	306
E08	30	12	7	3	52
E09	9	6	1	2	18
W01	10	0	0	0	10
W02	15	0	1	0	16
W03	6	0	2	0	8
W04	0	0	2	0	2
O01	19	6	1	0	26
O01E*		5	3	0	8
O02	21	4	9	0	34
O02E*		2	1	0	3
O03	53	19	1	0	73
O03E*		8	4		12
O04	13	11	1	0	25
O05	6	1	0	0	7
O06	3	3	0	0	6
TOTAL	1995	743	486	924	4148

* Indicates prior enlisted experience

snowflake

01/04/2000 00:20 (b)(6) TAOS GUEST HOUSE PAGE 02

6:35 PM

TO: ~~Admiral Giambastiani~~ LTG CRADDOCK

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: August 22, 2002

SUBJECT:

Larry Di Rita 9/23

Please find out how many Muslim senior officers we have, from colonel up.

Do we know that kind of information?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
082202.12

Please respond by: 9/4/02

9/23 – Sec Def Response attached

Larry Di Rita

U14952 /02

snowflake

October 1, 2002 9:13 AM

335 SD

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Paul Nitze

Please keep this material where I spoke about Paul Nitze. I may want to use it. I have been asked to speak at his memorial service. He is still alive, but apparently his wife is just making preparations, because she asked me.

So hold onto that—I may need it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Transcript of 05/03/02 SecDef remarks at Lone Sailor Award Ceremony

DHR:dh
100102-27

Please respond by _____

1 Oct 02

U03957 /03

I even have some Moynihan/Rumsfeld Rules in my Rumsfeld Rules. Are there any congressmen or senators here? [No audible response] Then I can say what's commonly said about Pat Moynihan. [Laughter] I can tell you what's commonly said about -- a former congressman, I can probably get away with it.

The word is that Pat Moynihan has written more books than the other members of the Senate have read. [Laughter] I don't know that it's true and I didn't say it, but I heard someone said it. [Laughter]

I don't think I'd be standing here if it weren't for Pat

Moynihan. He's one of the ones who talked the President into asking me to come out of the Congress and become Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, if my memory serves me correctly. I sure took care of the war on poverty, didn't I? [Laughter]

My friend Paul Nitze's up there, and it's good to see you, sir. You are a long-time friend and I must say that -- [Applause]. I can say for sure Paul's the only one in the room who arrived in Washington before I did. [Laughter]

I arrived in 1957 and Paul I think came in the '40s down from New York. I've been here off and on for 45 years, and Paul's been here off and on for I think 55 years. Besides serving as Secretary of the Navy of course he contributed and helped implement some of our country's most important national security policies.

Interestingly, he was -- When I was asked by President Ford to serve as Secretary of Defense for a variety of reasons, I felt that it was something I wanted to think very carefully about before agreeing to. I had a friend who was serving as Secretary of Defense at the time who I thought very well of, and I said to President Ford, I'd like to call one person and talk to them about this. He said who's that? I said Paul Nitze. And he said fair enough, and I did. I consulted with that gentleman.

Years later I was reading a biography of James Forrestal and in the biography it said that in the 1940s Forrestal was serving in the Roosevelt White House and President Roosevelt asked James Forrestal to go over to the Department of the Navy. And Forestal said he wanted to call somebody and he called his friend from Dillon Reed, Paul Nitze. So you can see that he's been advising Secretaries of Defense from the first to the most recent and I think all in between. [Applause]

The Lone Sailor Award is a particular honor for a broken down ex-Navy pilot and the son of a Navy man to boot. From time to time [inaudible] see some of the planes that I used to fly when I was in the Navy. It's a little embarrassing that they're all in museums. Every single one. [Laughter]

My father was on a carrier on the Pacific during World War II. It was a baby flat top, CD-97, the USS Hollandia. On his return to civilian life after the war he like I suppose any of you here who served in World War II received a letter from Paul Nitze's friend,

11-L-0559/OSD/6821

James Forrestal, who later became of course the first Secretary of Defense. I found the letter to my father folded up in his papers after he died back in 1974. It hangs in my office in the Pentagon today. It was addressed to him, but it was clearly a duplicate that had been sent to literally hundreds of people who served in World War II in tbe Navy.

His letter read, "My dear Mr. George Rumsfeld, I have addressed this letter to reach you after all of the formalities of your separation from active service are completed. I've done so because without formality but as clearly as I know how to say it, I want Navy's pride in you which it is my privilege to express, to reach into your civil life and to remain with you always. You have served in the greatest Navy in the world," as the Admiral just said. "It crushed two enemy fleets at once, receiving their surrenders only four months apart. It brought our land-based air power within bombing range of the enemy and set our ground armies on the beachheads of final victory. No other Navy at any time has done so much. For your part in these achievements you deserve to be proud as long as you live. The nation you served at a time of crisis will remember you with gratitude. Sincerely yours, James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy." Quite a letter.

I remember somewhat later, after my father left the Navy, people would say how in the world could somebody, an old man because he was I think 40, well past draft age, he had a wife and kids, how could an old man 40 years old when he volunteered, with a wife and two children, who had never served in the military, was working in Chicago a long way from the ocean, was managing apartment houses, in effect. And within a matter of months become the Officer of the Deck of an aircraft carrier underway in a war? How in the world does that happen?

My dad's answer very simply was, chief petty officers. [Laughter]

So with all due respect to the admirals here -- [Laughter] -- and the ensigns. [Laughter] The truth is that all of those were needed, admirals and recruits, but it was and often is today the petty officers and the lone sailors who lead the newcomers. They lead down, to be sure, but they also lead up. They lead up in the sense that they led these new officers, the civilians in uniform, men with literally no experience in the military whatsoever, they were called 90 day wonders. They went to Quonset Point, some of them, and came out as naval officers, and good ones.

You all know the story about the captain that got his battle ship and he was so proud and he was steaming around in the ocean and just tickled pink with himself, and saw something up ahead and the man on the bridge said, "What should we do about that?" He said, "Signal that ship to bear starboard." The signalman signaled it to bear starboard. Back came the signal, "Bear starboard yourself." He said this is ridiculous.

He said, signal him again, tell him, "Bear starboard immediately." And of course back came the signal, and the sailor next to him looked at him and he said, "The signal that came back was "Bear starhoard yourself. I am a lighthouse." [Laughter] That was the lone sailor who told him that.

You know in World War II it was mentioned earlier, there were suicide pilots flying their aircraft into our ships. Today a new enemy is seeking global power and has flown our own airliners into our buildings on suicide missions, working to, and they're working today as we know, to gain access to weapons of mass destruction. Not long after Pearl Harbor was attacked in December 1941, the U.S. Navy replied with a stunning bombing raid on Tokyo led by I believe Colonel Jimmy Doolittle off the USS Hornet. Truth be told, I've been around so long I knew Jimmy Doolittle. [Laughter]

But shortly after September 11th the United States Navy launched aircraft off of carriers in the Arabian Sea and with coalition forces have helped to deal a hard blow to the enemy in one of the truly most remote places on earth. It's a landlocked country thousands of miles from here. U.S. ships unleashed missiles that shocked the Taliban and the al Qaeda and marked the beginning of the end for that brutal regime. Today the Navy is on duty all around the world in the global war on terror.

I understand that Herman Wouk was the first recipient of the Lone Sailor Award, or one of the early ones. In his novel, The Winds of War, Wouk wrote of his fictional character that he "found inner strength when walking the ship at night ... The broad, dark ocean, the steaming pure air, the crowded stars arching overhead made him feel what the Bible calls the spirit of God." He felt a cause greater than himself.

And I can recall as a midshipman back in 1950 and '51 and '52 and '53, going forward on a battleship after dinner in the dark and looking at the enormous vessel, three football fields long, plowing through the water and seeing the, I don't know why it happens but the light gets caught in the bow wave and it's quite a sight. And certainly Mr. Wouk had it right.

I also remember back in 1951 when I was a midshipman we'd been in Europe in a battleship and we came back to the United States and we were supposed to make a port call in New York City. And the battleship pulled into the, kind of the Hudson River and moored there, and we all went ashore and we came back and we went to sleep, and sure enough when we got up in the morning it was quite noisy. It turned out that the battleship had pulled mooring and settled on the New Jersey shore. [Laughter]

It was not a proud moment, even for a midshipman. You can imagine how the captain felt. [Laughter]

So I went up on deck and I watched what was going on and here were about 10, 12, 14 of these tugboats were just one at a time bashing into the side of the dadburned ship and bouncing off and nothing happened. It was just stuck solid. One tug after another bounced into it and another one bounced into it. Pretty soon someone came up on deck and they told all those tugs and they stopped them and all snub your nose up against there and all push at once. And sure enough, it was free.

Joyce and I were having dinner with Admiral [Elmo] Zumwalt one night at the Naval Observatory before the Vice President took it away. [Laughter]

I told him that story, and I said you know, I tell people that story because it says a lot. It says that if people work together a great deal can be accomplished, but if you're all tugging in different directions not much can be achieved. I said do you know anything about it? It must be right. He said, "Don, I was aboard that ship." [Laughter] I said really? What was your job? He said I was the navigator. [Laughter].

So I said how in the world did you ever get to be an admiral? [Laughter] Who do you know? I was a young congressman at the time. [Laughter]

He explained that he had protested mooring, repeatedly, told the Navy Department we're not going to do this, this is the wrong thing to do. They said look, you do it, park it right where we told you, so he did and sure enough he was right, they were wrong. I said well is the way I told it roughly right? He said absolutely. There's one thing you didn't know. I said what was that? He said the tide came up. [Laughter]

So it took a little help from the Lord, too. [Laughter]

The great cause of the United States Navy is the cause of freedom. And tonight lone sailors are all across the globe defending our country, defending our families and our freedom. I know that probably an enormous number of the people here, some are today defending it and others have in the past. I thank you and I thank all the men and women all across the globe -- Americans and coalition partners. Lone sailors to be sure. For voluntarily putting their lives at risk.

Thank you very much. [Applause]

- END -

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld at Lone Sailor Award Ceremony (Transcript)

Transcript of Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, at Lone Sailor Award Ceremony at U.S. Navy Memorial Foundation Washington, D.C. May 3, 2002.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. It is good to be with you.

Admiral,[William Crowe] thank you so much for those generous words. Admiral [Hank] McKinney. I thank all the members of the Navy Memorial Foundation.

I do have to confess that when the Vice President [Richard Cheney] was in the process of helping the President [George W. Bush] swear me in he introduced me and said "We're bringing him back hoping he'll get it right this time." [Laughter] So your remarks were right on the mark.

I was interested to hear some of the foundation and congratulate you for it. I think you said that the homecoming version, is that the one with the sea bag beside it?

Voice: No, sir. It's the one with the sailor meeting his wife.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Oh yes, fair enough. I think you said it was Seattle, Norfolk and San Diego?

Voice: Yes, sir.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I've lived in all three of those cities, partly because of my father being in the Navy and partly my duty.

A special good evening to my friend Pat Moynihan. You are a long time friend and a recipient of the award, as I understand it, who served our country as a seaman, I think.

Is that right?

Senator Moynihan: I made it to ensign, sir. [Laughter]

Secretary Rumsfeld: Did you really? [Laughter] My gosh. I thought they had higher standards back in those days. [Laughter] My goodness, gracious. [Laughter and Applause]

Pat served the country in so many ways over so many administrations with great dedication and patriotism, to be sure. But even more with brilliance and courage as well.

snowflake

TOP SECRET // HCS / SI // ORCON

October 1, 2002 9:22 AM

38'36

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Doug Feith
Gen. Franks
Gen. Holland
Andy Marshall

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Interrogation

The attached paper is self-explanatory—it contains interrogations of a detainee. I found it very interesting.

Gen. Myers, please make sure the four people listed on page 8 are on our list.

Thanks.

Attach.
Transcript of 08/13/02 Interrogation

DHR:dh
100102-28

Please respond by 10/25/02

10 Oct 02

Response Attached

U03958 /03

SECDEF CONTROL # X03224 /02

TOP SECRET 6826

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S) DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

snowflake

October 1, 2002 7:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Meet w/Gen. Franks

When Gen. Franks is in town, I want to think about having dinner alone with him—either at the house or at the Pentagon. Let me know when he is next scheduled to be up.

I may also want to alternate it and include some other people, a small group.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-7

Please respond by 10/11/02

OSD 17,000

1 Oct 02

U03959 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 6:32 AM

335 SD

TO: Newt Gingrich

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Your Call

Your call on Saturday was an enormous help. I worked on the materials over Sunday and am getting a good deal of it moving.

Thanks and regards.

DHR:dh
100102-4

1 Oct 02

U03960 /03

October 1, 2002 6:30 AM

Japan

TO: Arlene

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Foreign Meeting

On the September 30, I met with a member of the Japanese Diet, Mr. Nocaga, former head of their national defense. I spent about five or ten minutes talking to him outside the building. He was here visiting Peter Rodman.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-3

Please respond by _____

1 Oct 02

U03961 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 10:33 AM

383.6

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Interview

Please take a look at this interview with one of the detainees.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated interview

DHR:dh
100102-38

Please respond by _____

1 Oct 02

U03962 /03

① 2/02 [redacted]

Q: (A) Who will succeed the principal leadership role within Alqaeda if the "Sheikh" is either killed or dies a natural death?

A: At the present time, Alqaeda is facing what The Egyptian Al-Jihad organization have faced in early 1980s after the assassination of president Sadat, total Confusion, mass arrest, and almost total elimination. During 1980s, Alzawahry ordered the whole organiz[redacted] to go underground, no operations, no activities, Then Alzawahry started the process of the Re-Construction, which took about Seven Years. During the process of the Re-Construction of the leadership, Alzawahry used the so called "The double system leadership", I believe, Alzawahry will use the same successful method again.

What the double system leadership? it Consists of:

(1) The known "publicized" leadership:
The leaders whom names and photos are known to the public and the intelligence services, such as: Alzawahry, Abu [redacted], Seif AlAdl, and Soon.

(2) The unknown "Secret" leadership:
whom are unknown to the public and the intelligence services, such as: Abu waleed, Abd Alkhalek, Abu ubayda Alsagheer, etc---

I believe in case the departure of Ben Laden, Alqaeda leadership will be as follows:

The Known leadership

① Alzawahry
② Seif AlAdl "Assistant [redacted]

↕ clandestine Communication

The Secret leadership

① Abu waleed
② Abd Alkhalek "Assistant

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The structure of the leadership:



Who is Abu waleed: «Secret leadership»

* Egyptian
* About 55-60 Years old
* Height 5-7
* weight about 150-160 pounds
* Black eyes - Black hair «Combed towards the back» [redacted]
* Journalist
* speaks fluent Arabic, English, pushto and persian
* He is the father-in-law of Seif Al-Adel (Seif married his daughter).
* arrived Afghanistan [redacted] after the Soviet invasion.
* never left Afghanistan and Pakistan Since 1979.

UNCLASSIFIED

* he knows every Afghani leader, every leader respects him.
* his appearance, could go exactly as an Afghan.
* He is the smarter guy in the organization. [redacted]
* He is not fanatic.
* if he became a leader, he will not attack civilian targets.
* he is very close to Abu Hafs.
* he does not agree with some issues with Ben Laden, Ben Laden respects him and listens to him, especially in the political affairs.
* he is a very hard worker.
* he stays away from interviews, public activities, etc.--

Abd Alkhalek "secret leadership" [redacted]

* Saudi, his ancestors from China, he looks like chinese.
* About 40-45 years old.
* Hight 5.5
* weight about 140-150 pounds
* Black eyes - black hair on the sides, completely bald on the top.
* in early 1990s, he was senior to Abu Hafs, he was the Amir of Alqaeda training camps.
* I saw him in Sudan for very short time in 1993, [redacted] then he vanished.
* very smart and organized person.
* speaks Arabic, English and pushtu.
* when he was the Amir of Alqaeda training camps, he kicked "Khatab" The Amir in chechnia now, out the camps for insubordination.
* very hard worker.

How the double system leadership works? [redacted]
The known leadership will issue general guideline to the secret leadership, then the secret leadership will handle the details...
Mainly the money and the propaganda will be the responsibility of the known leadership, The operations, training, communication etc will be handled by the secret leadership.

PS: I heard in the news about Abu zubaida....
The seniority is a very important issue inside Al-Qaeda, Abu zubaida has no seniority, I believe he joined Al-Qaeda recently, even if he was an old fighter in Afghanistan, that does not mean he could pass other people, I believe Al-Qaeda assigned him a job to supervise some cells in Jordan, because he is a palestinian.

one important issue, whoever controls the money, controls the organization, The militants usually says "Jihad is money junky"... This is why the money will be in the hands of the known leadership.

Q: (B) will there be a succession plan? what role will the "Doctor" play? will the "Sheikh" son(s) have a prominent role?

A: Yes, there is a succession plan.
it is a religious duty for the Muslim to write his own will, the Quran urged the Muslims to do so.
Every militant has his will already written... This is on the personal level.... For the organization level, in the Islamic history, there was a problem, a succession problem, which the Muslims still suffering of it till this moment, when the prophet Mohamed died, he did not appointed a successor, so the Muslims were divided into two groups, the first group which later was called "Shi'a", called for the appointment of successors from the house of the prophet only, and the other group, which later was called "Sunna", called to elect the successors from among the Mus[redacted]
The succession plan is a normal process among the militants.
I will give an example: when more than two Muslims travel, a go to do a job, away from the organization, they will select an Amir "leader" among themselves, then the successor if the Amir died, then the successor, then the successor...

I have mentioned the role of the "Doctor" in question (A) page 1-4, I want to add the following:
The doctor understands very well that if he [redacted] became the leader of Alqaeda, he will face two prolems:
A- Some of the militants will see it as a took over by Aljihad organization.

because they need Alzawahry to be focusing only on Egypt, not to involve in endless war against USA.
So, I believe Alzawahry will play only a historical role "symbol" in Alqaeda leadership.

About the "Sheik's" Son(s): [redacted]
The eldest son "AbduAllah", he is about 25 years now, I used to tutor him in Sudan, since he left Afghanistan in 1996 to get married in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi authority banned him from leaving the Country.
The others Sons, mainly Mohamed about 17 years old, and Laden about 15 years old. They are kids, I believe they will be symbols only, they will be attraction for the financiers and supporters.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q: (c) Given the apparent military success in Afghanistan will Contacts between elements of the Taliban and Alqaeda Continue?

A: I want to say that Alqaeda never left the Taliban, the question suggests that Alqaeda is operating as an independent force in Afghanistan when us attacked Afghanistan, the Taliban allowed the cities to collapse intentional, then went to the Country side to reorganize, Their re-organization will take several months, then they will appear to fight a non-Conventional war. Alqaeda fighters with the Taliban since day one of the American attack.

Taliban are still active in the local shura "Council" in the villages and town, The Afghans are the only people who Could tell this person was a Taliban or not ... The game did not start yet.

The Taliban will attack the following:

The local leaders who supported the interim government

And the foreign forces "peace keeping Forces"

The American military and the CIA in Afghanistan are operating according to the notion that Alqaeda is operating independently, The following example shows that:

The wide coverage of the attack using the CIA unmanned aircraft which fired rockets against individuals who were wearing "Arabic white robes" and one of them tall guy "Ben Laden" and so on. The CIA believes that Alqaeda is working by itself, inside Afghanistan no-Arabs will wear Arabic dress, never happened since 1979, and will not happen in the future.

one important issue ... usually, the relationship between the Afghans

in return for money, Alqaeda did that before the arrival of Taliban, USA is doing that at this moment... But the T[redacted]ban is a different breed, this is the first time in the history of Afghanistan where the Afghans «Taliban» did not benefit of turning the Arabs to USA. USA must look at this new development in the history of Afghanisten. The Taliban sacrificed their powers, their lives for the Arabs. Alqaeda is moving with the Taliban everywhere. Alqaeda families are staying with the villagers, the Taliban families.
The reason why USA did not arrest Alqaeda leadership, and also did not capture the Taliban leadership, because both leadership are together. [redacted]
The Afghans whom are working with US Forces, misleading US by providing wrong intelligence in order to settle some old disputes and to drag USA in the civil war.

Also, Alqaeda will retreat towards the villages, the villagers will not cooperate directly with foreigners, The Taliban will go to the villages and buy properties, buy loyalty, etc. using Alqaeda money and for Alqaeda. They are working shoulder to shoulder.

(D) what kind of Contingency plans ~~might exist to keep~~ AlQaeda as a viable terrorist organization?

A: AlQaeda used to have Contingency plans, I have assisted AlQaeda in the development of some Contingency plans; such as:

(1) in 1990, in peshawar, Afghanistan, an evacuation plan from pakistan, in Case the government of pakistan decided to Crack down against the Arabs.

(2) in 1994, in Khartum, Sudan, also evacuation plan, in Cas the Islamic government in Sudan lost power to anti Muslim government.

(3) Contingency plan in Sudan 1994, in Case of assassination of Ben Laden

I believe AlQaeda had the following Contingency plan:

1- Succession plan, in Case of the death of Ben Laden.

2- Evacuation plan, in Case of the Collapse of Taliban.

3- Alternative economical plan: in Case AlQaeda faced with problems such as: The stopping of the flow of Cash, freezing its properties, etc--

4- Military Contingency plan, in Case of the assassination of Ben Laden, Capture of leaders, using nuclear weapons against AlQaeda targets, etc--

5- Communication plan, in Case the leadership dispersed, evacuated, or state of Confusion.

6- Hiding places plan, The preparation of hiding places, storing supplies, security, etc--

7- Co-operation plans with other terrorist groups in Case of Crisis.

8- The underground plan, in Case Al-Qaeda decided to go

Q: (E) The "Sheikh" will require some support as he tries to avoid apprehension, give some idea as to how that structure might exist. For example, how is food delivered? Medical attention? Communication links? Computers? E-mail? Hand-held radios? Inmarsat? Satelite phones?

A: [redacted]

I believe Ben Laden in Afghanistan, in order for a foreigner or a group of foreigners to live in Afghanistan or in the tribal area, they have to be sponsored by a warlord with a lot of force. So, if Alqaeda is moving constantly, it might be they are dealing with more than one sponsor.

In East Afghanistan, Alqaeda used to be sponsored by Hekmatyar, Younis Khales, Haqany, and in Kabul and the South by Taliban.

Alqaeda will use pre-prepared locations with sufficient supplies, using the villages by paying money for the villagers to host them.

The following will explain the support system:

Food: The basic food consists of: flour, rice, dates, sugar, this is the main diet, it is available in every village.

In every camp, Alqaeda have sheep, goats, chicken, and some cows. They use the animals as a source of milk and meat.

The delivery of food will be handled by the Afghans, it is normal in Afghanista to see the Afghan are moving by trucks or animals carrying sacks of food, very normal. The firewood everywhere to use it for cooking.

Water: There is no problem, water everywhere. [redacted]

Medical attention: There are a lot of trained doctors among the militants, first aid kits, and various medical supplies for disease and injuries. They could handle operations but the serious one they must evacuate to the hospital.

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Communication:

1- Couriers, no written message, mainly trusted Afghani Couriers.

2- cell phones: The cell phone were bought in pakistan under pakistani names. The cell phone is widely used because the regular phones are not available, using the cell phones as follows:

A- No use of the cell phone directly from inside the location.

B- Using The common language inside Afghanistan, mainly pushtu and persian.

C- For example if Ben Laden wants to send a message to anyplace inside Afghanistan, pakistan, or overseas, the method will be:

(1) A Courier will take the message to another village.

(2) From that village, they will use the cell phone to another relay station "cell phone". [redacted]

(3) Then the relay station in the second village will contact another station in the Tribal area or a pakistani border town

(4) From the pakistani town to a clean Country like Europe or Japan.

(5) From Europe or Japan to the destination

3- E-mail: will be Conducted the same way, using a multiple cell phone to the source who will send E-mail from a public place such as library, Corporate, Cafeteria, etc.

4- Hand-held-Radios: is very Common, and widely used inside Afghanistan, and everybody is listening to everybody, I believe Al-Qaeda will use it as follows:

A- As a listening station to gather information

B- As internal mean for Communication using local language with very Care.

C- As a disinformation method.

The following example will show you how Al-Qaeda is conducting communication during a trouble time:

when I was translating the phone tapes, the [redacted] from the discovery of the trial of the Embassy bombings, I realized the following:

In the early days after the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in 1996, The Taliban confiscated phones, fax machines, and computers from Al-Qaeda, Ben Laden found himself with no means of communication with the outside world, so he dispatched some people to the tribal area where they bought a cell phone and fax machine, they send Ben Laden's instructions which comes to them by a courier and receive messages from outside [redacted] This method of communication worked for a while, till Ben Laden was introduced to the Taliban through the commander Younis Khales.

Also, in Sudan, Alqaeda used the homage pigeon in communication, Al-Qaeda might use it in Afghanistan.

other method of communication to receive package and other message The DHL, FEDEX, EXPRES services, as follows:

There are offices all over pakistan for the above services, the sender will send the package to the mailing address of the office, for example if someone in USA wants to send a package or a letter to peshawar, he will use the mailing address of DHL office in peshawar, [redacted] with the name of the receiver, the receiver will go to the DHL office in peshawar with an ID matches the name on the package, and pick up the package.

Ben Laden will not talk on the phone, if he talks, he speeks

(F) Assume for our discussion that you are [redacted] the field Commander in charge of US Forces in Afghanistan, how would you track down the remaining elements of Al-Qaeda? How do you track down the decision makers within Alqaeda and Taliban?

A: First: There are ~~two~~ Three Commanders "Warlords", very famous, very respectful, whom are helping Alqaeda and Taliban in Eastern Afghanistan, mainly in Khust and Jalal Abad. The two Commanders are:

Younis Khales and Jalal Aldeen Haqani (used to hold a Cabinet member in the Taliban government), and Rahmatu Allah waheed Yar in Gardez.

Second: Alqaeda and Taliban are working together in the following places:

1- Khust
2- Pakhtya
3- Gardez, in Zormat - Shah-e-Khot area
4- Qandahar

Alqaeda and Taliban at the previous locations are paying money to the villagers to host them in the villages.

[redacted]

(1) The remaining elements of Alqaeda are not in the mountains, they are in the villages. How to locate the elements of Alqaeda:

A- The Arab women, usually dressed in black veil, different from the Afghani Burqa, unless the Arab women are trying to hide as Afghanis.

B- The markets, the shop keepers will know the Arabs in the area.

C- The shepherds in the area, where Alqaeda elements usually will buy animals as a source of meat from the shepherds.

D- The people who are exchanging money, the Arabs keep foreign currency (Dollars, Royal Saudi and [redacted] British Pounds)

E- The [illegible]

11-L-0859/OSD/6846

[redacted]

G- The mosques in the area, especially the Dawn prayer and the late prayer "Isha", and Fridays prayer.

H- The Arabs usually wears shoes much better than the Afghan, usually hiking shoes.

I- The Arabs does not smoke, or chew tobacco, the Afghans smokes and chewes.

J. The Arabs drives slower than the Afghans, the Afghans drives very very fast even if there is no road.

[redacted]

(2) The decision makers within Alqaeda and Taliban:

Those guys must live in areas where they are supported by a warlords, They are regrouping, urging people to fight the Americans, So they are moving - A great deal of those individuals are in the local Shura "Councils" in the villages and towns, they are there, telling you they are not Taliban, The Afghans knows who is Taliban, and who is not, to track down the decision makers, you have to deal first with their sponsors, The following:

1- Younis Khales in Khust and Pakhtya.

2- Jalal Aldeen Haqani in Khust.

The remaining of Alqaeda elements are in the villages in Khust, Pakhtya, Gardez and Qandahar.

[redacted]

The Decision makers are regrouping, urging people to fight under the protection

USD1084

(G) In your various training classes did you ever discuss how to handle the role of being a fugitive? How to survive on your own to avoid capture?

Yes, I used to teach survival while on the run as a subject in two different courses:

1- The urban warfare.

2- The guerrilla warfare.

In the urban warfare course, I used to lecture the true stories of fugitives from Al-Jihad organization in Egypt, such as:

(1) Abu Alfaraj Al-Hawy, the deputy of Alzawahry, who was arrested in Baku, Azerbajan with Marzouk, and was sentenced in 1999 to 25 years in Egypt in the trial "The Returnees from Albania". After the assassination of president Sadat, he was on the run in Egypt for three years living in the streets, did contact nobody, then managed to come to Afghanistan.

(2) members of Al-Jihad who crossed the Egyptian desert to libya, then from Libya crossed to Sudan, without any help.

(3) Three prisoners of Al-Jihad whom escaped from Jail in Cairo, and survived around Cairo.

In the guerrilla warfare, practical exercise, how to survive in different environment while the enemy are chasing you.

* Most the militants know a trade, they could use it to survive.
* Most of them speak the local languages.
* Some of them married local women.
* Their kids speak fluent local language, I used to use the

Q: (H) Afghanistan is the size of the state of Texas and the terrain is formidable, and as you have described previously, the Afghan / pakistan border seems a likely place to hide, where else might the "Sheikh" go to? [redacted]

A: The "Sheikh" will go to two type of places:

1) places where he is very familiar with the terrain, where he used to fight, reside, in Camps, such as: "places where he is familiar"

A- Khust: where his headquarters used to be in "Jahad waal" Camp, and the main training Camps, about one hour drive from the tribal area "from Miran shah in the tribal area".
Also in Khust, in the area under the Control of Commander Younis Khales, and Jalal Aldeen Haqani. [redacted]

B- Gardez: where used to be training Camps, especially in "ZORMAT" and SHAHE-KHOT

C- Jawar: where Ben Laden used to fight in the area

D- Jalal Abad: where Alqaeda used to have training Camps and fighting units.

E Ghazni: Training Camps

F- Urgun: fighting units

G- Sarobi: between Jalal Abad and Kabul.

H- Qandahar: where he used to live since 1996 [redacted]

I believe, the "Sheikh" after the American attack, will be in places, not deep inside Afghanistan, but near the tribal area where he could retreat, I believe, he will roam the following places:

A- Khust

B GARDEZ, in ZORMAT

[redacted]

(2) places, where the Taliban will take him:

A- Qandahar, where there is vegetation and irrigation system multiple canals, where covers are [redacted] available.

B- Zabul to the west, where no activity from the American or the interim government.

C- Helmand province, where Hulla omar tribes are located, and very hard mountainous area.

D- Near the border with Iran, where no activities from USA or the interim government.

one impotant thing, the Afghans are very good in tracing things to the source, in fact no secrets in Afghanistan, for example, when an Afghani got killed in a battle, the Afghans will know who killed him, and they will avenge his death, even after the end of the war.

if an Afghani informed us about the location of other Afghans, the Afghans will know and his family will be killed, this is why in Afghanistan despite the reward, the big reward 25 million dollars, nobody asked the reward, I could tell you a lot of stories about how the Afghans trace the source of the information. The Afghans might

Q: (I) Can you give us some insights into how [redacted] "Sheikh" is thinking under extreme stress? How will the "doctor" handle the same situation?

A: I have witnessed the "Sheikh" during some crisis, usually he never yell, or get angry, he takes time to think and decide, consults with other people, the following are some example:

1- in 1991, when we discovered the preparation of the assassination attempt against him, by the saudi government, using the pakistani intelligence individuals, I met with him, [redacted] discussed with him the intelligence report, and our security plan to foil the attempt, he did not show any reaction, or fear, was very relaxed.

2- when I moved him from peshawar, while he was disguising to escape pakistan, he was normal, no fear and was [redacted] joking.

3- In, Khartoum, Sudan, I have arrived just three days after the assassination attempt against him, I walked with him to the guest house where the attack occurred, he was carrying a rifle, he was very quite. [redacted]

4- In Jalal Abad in 1987, the russian invaded Jalal Abad area with an armoured brigade "over 100 Tanks", the militants tried to evacuate him in the beginning of the battle, he refused, and evacuated with the last group.

usually, he keeps people around him very calm, because he is very quite, and talks very low, you have to be close to him to hear his voice. [redacted]

The "doctor" has the same character, does not show emotion, very

difficult time for him when receiving the news from Egypt about arrest or killing of members of Al-Jihad, usually he keeps his cool. There is one thing different between the "sheikh" and the "doctor", the "sheikh" is a forgiven person, the "Doctor" is unforgiven, for example, when Al-Qaeda discovered a spy, Ben Laden does not kill him, just interrogation and let him go, I have witnessed this in the case of a Tunisian who was recruited by the Egyptian "I have mentioned the story during the sessions", and the people from [redacted] Al-Takfeer who stole the safe from the guest house in the tribal area, Ben Laden prisoned them in Afghanistan for three months, then let them go.
Alzawahry executed spies "I have mentioned that during the session", even Alzawahry ordered the execution of some of the government witness in Egypt "I mentioned that in the session".

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q: (J) if you were to promulgate a long term strategic plan to eliminate Al-Qaeda, EIJ, and Alzihad, Gammat, how would you do it?

A: Let's assume that the terrorist organization is a tree, the crack down against the organization will break [redacted] a branch, a some branches, you need to uproot the organization, the only way to uproot the tree is to reach the roots and get rid of it.
You need to get rid of the following roots:

1- Torture---
During my discussion with the militants, I usually ask about their motives to join the organization, Torture was among the main reasons.
if USA is able to stop the torture of the citizens of the Middle Eastern Countries, it will stop thousands of people from joining the terrorist organizations.

2- Unemployment---
When I was conducting some investigation for Al-Jehad, to investigate new members, I have discovered that they were recruited in Iraq, Iraq is the main market for the Egyptian workers, the Egyptians travels to Iraq to work despite the harsh treatment and the killing of Egyptians by the Iraqi, if the Egyptian workers found a job in Egypt, the chances of recruiting them [redacted] Iraq will never happen. unemployment in the Arab world over 30%. The western Countries should not give cash to the corrupted regimes, they should create projects which employs the young people

3- Hollywood Anti Religion movies:
Hollywood movies, people in the Arab world think that these

11-L-0859/OSD/6850

This is the case in their countries, so when Hollywood produces a movie about Jesus or Moses, this is in Islam considered blasphemy. During my discussion with the militants, usually they mention their hostility against USA because the Anti Isl[redacted] campaign in the American Media.

4- The American support of Israel --

The so called double standard of the American foreign policy, The Israeli nuclear program with no opposition from USA, etc. --

5- The existance of the American Forces in Saudi Arabia --

This is a good cause for recruiting, it is so easy to recruit people when you mention that US Force is about 60 miles from the Holly places in Makkah.

[redacted]

In order to eliminate the terrorist organizations, USA needs to go through the following phases:

Phase ①: stop the recruiting process by dealing and eliminating the roots of the problem
"The previous roots"

Phase ②: To neutralize the majority [redacted] militants (the non-fanatic):

Most the militants are not fanatic, they stuck with the fanatic for one reason or another .... I will tell you for sure, if there is a declaration of immunity for who will give himself up, and releasing the non-fanatic from jail (This policy worked in [illegible]) The majority of militants are waiting for something like that, you will be surprised

01-L-0569/OSD/6851

Phase 3: The destruction of the remaining fanatics — Believe me, if you succeeded in implementing phase 1 and 2. By the end of the day, you will be facing between 200-300 fanatics.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q: (K) You have some experience interviewing Mujahedeen and members of Alqaeda. assume for our discussion that you are part of an interview team in either Afghanistan or Cuba, Can you develop a protocol for conducting a successful interview?

[redacted]

[redacted]

2- The translators --

It will be very good, [redacted] if you have an agent who could speak the language "his mother tongue", if you do not have enough agents of that type, so do not use an interpreter from the same nationality as the prisoner, for example, if you used an Egyptian interpreter to interpret an Egyptian prisoner, the prisoner [redacted]ll not cooperate because he will think the interpreter [redacted] pass the information to

[redacted]

will get the same result, also do not use Indian interpreters to interrogate the pakistanis, you will get the same result.

3- The prisoner thinks that USA will exchange information with his Country, so he will not tell the truth. Before asking Questions, the interrogator should make it clear to the prisoner that USA will not give the information to his Country.

4- The prisoner afraid of sending him back to his Country, USA Can not promise him the opposite, The interrogator should make the prisoner Comfortable by asking the prisoner the following Question:
Assume we are going to release you? what Country would you like to go?

5- Not every Arab or foreigner is a member of Alqaeda, a lot of the foreigners in Afghanistan were fighting in the side of the Taliban because they believe Taliban was a pure Islamic government and they have the duty of supporting Taliban.

6- The interrogator needs to create a good relationship with the prisoners, the interrogators Could bring Copies of the Quran, Arabic newspapers or foreign newspapers, dates, milk, Cookies, during the session, and let the inmates keep the Quran and the newspapers, the following are favorable newspapers:
- Al-Quds AlArabi
- AlWasat
- AlHayat
- Alsharq AlAwsat

11-L-0559/OSD/6864

7- The family is the most important thing for the prisoner. The family includes every blood relation, the interrogator should distinguish between the definition of family in USA which include wife, husband and kids, and the family overseas which includes every blood link. The prisoner will be worried about his family more than anything else, The Bay'a "Allegiance" to Alqaeda means [redacted] to him, Comparing to his allegiance to his family.

The prisoner will be reluctant to talk about his family, for fear of arrest or reprisal from the government of his Country, the interrogator should not go there. it is very difficult for the prisoner to mention the names of the females of his family, also the interrogator should not go there.

8- The interrogator, and the interpreter, should [redacted] familiar with some words, such as:

(1) "Akh" "brother"

it means very religious person, fundamentalist, member of an organization. So if the prisoner said, for example "he talked with the Akh Mohamed", that means, he talked with a fundamentalist, or a member. The plural of "Akh" is "Ikhwa".

(2) "Ahl Alketab", The people of the book, it means the Jews and the christians.

(3) "Hakemeya", The ruling according to th[redacted]lamic law.

(4) "Aseer", prisoner, Captured by the enemy.

(5) "Kafer", unbeliever

(6) "Mushrek" The one who associate with God, The idolater

(7) "Allah", The name of God in Arabic, Allah is the same God of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus - The Arab Jews and

11-L-0559/OSD/6855

(8) "Al-Sunna" The traditions of the prophet Mohamed.
(9) "Salat" The praying
(10) "Azan" The Calling for prayer
(11) "Irhab" Terrorism IRHAB [redacted]
(12) "Irhabi" Terrorist IRHABI
(13) "Kaif Halak" How are you?, it is good for the interrogator to use it in the begining of the session.
(14) "Tayeb", good
(15) "Sejn" prison
(16) "Al-Yahud", the Jews
(17) "Al-Nasara", the christians
(18) "Madany", Civilian
(19) "Madaneyeen" plural of Civilian, Civilians [redacted]
(20) "Muqatel", fighter, combtant
(21) "Muaskar", Camp
(22) "Al-Talaba", Taliban
(23) "Kunya", Code name

and so on, words which will help in the Session

[redacted]

The following is a suggestion for the sequence of the questions:

[redacted]

1 personal information:

* The name * The "Kunya" Code name
* The Country / town (Asking the prisoner about his address will be tough on him, remember he is worried about his family, the interrogator could obtain the address by other mean, such his mail).
* Education * profession
* foreign language
* marital status, if his married, the interrogator should not ask him about the wife, her name ---

and so on

2 How did the prisoner become religious?

There are several phases for the prisoner till he became a militant, as follows:

① The "Jaheleya" phase, the Ignorance phase, the period when the prisoner was not doing any religious duty, he was not praying, was drinking, simply, had no religion. The militants called this period "Jaheleya", Ignorance, exactly as the time before the coming of the prophet Mohamed, that period is called "Jaheleya" in the Islamic history.

② The "Iltezam" phase, the Religious discipline" starting from the minute he started doing his religious duties, he became "AKH" brother.

③ The belief in Al Jehad doctrine phase.

[redacted]

militant, so in this group of questions, he [redacted] will talk about two things:
(1) The "Jahaleya" period, the Ignorance period.
(2) How he became "Multazem" means religious man, the interrogator could put a whole group of questions in this section about types of books, mosques, tapes, scholars, etc...

PS: in Egypt during the interrogation of the captured militants, the interrogator well give the prisoner papers and pen, and order him to write how he became a religious in details.

[redacted]

[3] How did the prisoner adopted the Jihad doctrine?
Not every person he became a religious man, adopted the Jihad doctrine. You see at first the prisoner was living in the "Jahaleya" then he became "Multazem" Religious, just religious with no orientation, praying and obeying Allah, then he adopted the Jihad doctrine. The transformation from Religious to Al-Jihad is very important, so the interrogator could ask a group of questions relates to recruitment, political situation, special books and tapes, friends, etc... [redacted]

[4] His recruitment to an organization / or His trip on his own to the battle zone (Afghanistan, Chechnia, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc...)
After he adopted Al Jihad doctrine, he might was recruited to join a militant organization, or Travel on his own to the battle zone to join the Jihad.
The group of questions in this section will cover methods of recruitment propaganda, finance, documents, travel, etc... [redacted]

[5] The war zone "Afghanistan", in this case:
who received him in the airport, what group, guest houses, training camps, courses, indoctrination, join the fighting, etc...
The group of questions is to determine his knowledge about the terrorist activities, his belief about attacking civilian targets, his special training, allegiance, his opinions about 9-11 and other attacks... The interrogator could determine if the prisoner believes in the terrorism, or he was a guy with a good heart who went to the battle zone to help his Muslim brothers.
for example, I believe Mr. walker belongs to that type who went to help what he thought a pure Islamic government.

[6] A group of questions to determine if he is fanatic or not, such as: Taking hostages, hijacking, bombing civilian, assassination, etc...

Q: (M) The kidnaping of Danny pearl, the WSJ reporter, Alqaeda operation? Independent players? Retaliation?

A: I will call this horrible operation "The Returning Favor operation". This is not Alqaeda operation, this is independent group. In 1999, This group hijacked an Indian flight and landed in Qandahar Airport, where the Taliban refused to storm the airplane, and refused permission to the Indian Commandos to storm either. Something was fishy, the hijackers knows in advance their operation will be successful if they just brought the aircraft to Qandahar. The operation ended when the Indian government released the leader of the group "Saeed sheikh" and three others. "Saeed sheikh" after the American attack against Taliban, he conducted the kidnaping to show the Taliban [redacted] gratitude.

[redacted]

Q: (N) what role will the ISI sympathizers play in helping the Sheikh

A: Before 9-11, The ISI was providing the following:

1- Early warning before the American attack [redacted] Afghanistan in 1998 after the embassy bombing.

2- Allowing pakistani nuclear scientists to meet with Ben Laden.

3- Helping militants to obtain pakistani citizenship.

4- Alerting Alqaeda when a security delegation from the Arab Countries comes to pakistan with a list of wanted militants, The ISI will pass the names and photos to Ben Laden.

5- Releasing the militants who were captured in the pakistani jail after the crack down against the Arabs.

6- providing a high ranking officer to be [redacted] contacted at any time in case Alqaeda needs urgent help, Alzawahry was very close friend to that general.

7- Transporting heavy equipment into Afghanistan through the border, The type were used in the construction, which Alqaeda used it to build caves and camps.

8- Receiving the financiers in the airport, and escorting them inside Afghanistan to protect the cash against the bandits.

[redacted]

After 9-11, The ISI, could help Ben Laden as follows:

1- providing documents for some leaders, diplomatic one

2- Transferring money from abroad to Ben Laden

3- providing secure communication links

4- providing safe houses in the major towns in pakistan

5- Transporting leaders of Alqaeda disguising in military or police uniform.

7- Destroying files and photos of Alqaeda members in ISI.

8- ISI, will be a great help, through the [redacted] flow of information during the re-grouping period which I believe the Taliban and Alqaeda are preparing now for a long war in Afghanistan

9. Using their Afghani agents "networks", remember the ISI for decades operates and controls things inside Afghanistan, using the Afghani Agents to work as couriers to exchange messages.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q: (0) Is Somalia still a viable refuge for [redacted] Al-Qaeda?

A: NO,
Al Qaeda had bad and sour experience in Somalia, and I believe Al-Qaeda will not repeat it. please let me tell you the story:
Al-Itehad Al Islami in Somalia consists of two groups:
1- Al-Itehad Al-Islami in Somalia
2- Al Itehad Al-Islami in Ogaden, Ethiopia.
From 1992-1994, Al Qaeda worked with the two groups inside Somalia and Ethiopia. the Sudanese government introduced Al-Itehad Al-Islami to Al Qaeda and pressured Al Qaeda to work with Al-Itehad in the Ogaden, Ethiopia, in order to cause internal trouble to Ethiopia, to keep Ethiopia busy and away from interfering in the civil war in Sudan. I have involved in this operation from the begining, where Al Qaeda prepared two teams to work with each group of Al Itehad ... The idea was we will organize, train, finance, and lead them in the first battle. then when we see that they could depend on the [redacted] we will pull out. But the result was not good:

- The first group, Al Itehad Al Islami in Somalia, was given special training and equipment to rob and terrorize the population and became out of control, and threaten the lives of Al Qaeda operatives who are working with them inside Somalia. Al Qaeda operatives were very upset and asked to be pulled out because the organization became a group of bandits. I have interrogated some of the operatives, I mean interviewing about that problem.
- The second group, Al-Itehad Al [redacted] in Ethiopia. These people are different from those in Somalia. They did not terrorize

11-0559/OSD/6863

operations. Al Qaeda operatives joined them in the early battles, when the operatives found that the group could be dependent, Al-Qaeda pulled the operatives out, but the leaders of the group, kept coming back to Ben Laden in Sudan asking for money and help. Ben Laden refused to keep giving them money, he wants them to capture the enemy supplies and equipment and depend on themselves.

Al-Qaeda operatives have no desire to [redacted] Somalia again.

I tell you the painful truth, I see no color of people but the experience of Al-Qaeda in Africa showed the operatives that Black people are dishonest and thieves, we had this problem in Al-Qaeda in Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, most the members from Africa stole money from Al-Qaeda, we used to trust them as everyone else with big amount of money, but they were not trusted people... Africa is not favorable place to Al-Qaeda members to take refuge with Somali group, [redacted] The Somali will sell Al-Qaeda members to USA for money as well as, the terrain in Somalia is not good for hiding a lot of people, also the color of Al-Qaeda members are lighter than the population.

I am sure Al-Qaeda will never go Somalia again.

The ogaden in Ethiopia is desert, unpopulated, very easy to spot any concentration of people, it will be very easy to US forces to capture Al-Qaeda members, so Al-Qaeda will not use "ogaden" as a refuge. [redacted]

Q: (R) Give some thought to other geographical targets? U.S? Allies!

A: I believe US will not hear seriously from Al-Qaeda for at least five years, Al-Qaeda will go underground for reorganization. After 9-11, Al Qaeda will target the following: Military, and economical targets, such as: [redacted]

① US Air Force:

Because US Air Force is a decisive element in every conflict, it will be targetted, the targets inside the Air Force may includes:

A- Hotels, night clubs, etc-- where the American pilots or Allied pilots frequently used in the host country, such as pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Centeral Asia, Turky.

B- The local contractors whom are providing supplies and services for the Air Force.

C- The Fuel storages, pipelines, dock[redacted]etc--

D- The local Airports or landing zones, which used by the US Air Force or Allies.

E- The Radars, and Communication facilities.

② The FBI liaison offices:

Through information from the local intelligence service in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, pakistan

③ The American Commercial ships: [redacted]

The gulf, Saudi Arabia, Suez Canal, pakistan

④ Exporting contaminated shipment to US or Europe

Ebola, Yellow fever etc.

OSD/6865

⑤ Computer Crimes:
virus, hacking

⑥ Commando attacks against American [redacted]:
If they conducted this type of operation, will be in Africa where the local authorities are very weak.

⑦ The olympic games:
Greece 2002, might using athlete uniform, police or military uniform

⑧ Attacks against American peace Forces: [redacted]
Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania

⑨ Attacks against American oil Companies:
Caspian Sea, Azerabaijan.
To stop the pipeline from the Caspian Sea through Afghanista

⑩ The American Hi-Tech Companies in Asia:
Such as IBM, Seagate, etc-- in Malaysia, Singapore, Tailand, Indonesia. [redacted]

⑪ Targets inside USA: mainly economical targets
A- The water supplies "poison"
B- The agriculture "disease"
C- The live stock "disease"
D- The stock market "[illegible]"
E- The sports activities "disease"

PS: See page 57 for the simultaneous operation

FVL 0589/OSD/6866

Q: (Q) A responsible US official recently stated that in his view There were approximately 100 "sleepers" from Al-Qaeda in the U.S possibly poised for action? Is [redacted] reasonable.

A: NO,

Al Qaeda as you know does not operate like that, Al Qaeda does not keep people in the Country after a big operation, before the execution of the operation, it will pull everyone, except the people who will participate in the operation.

I believe prior to 9-11, the sleepers in US were two groups:

① The Hijackers

② The support group (surveillance, supply)

prior to 9-11, the orders will come for everyone to leave U.S but the hijackers, This is a standard procedure of Al Qaeda operation. The main reason is to avoid Capture du to the crack down after every big operation, and as you see, US waged a huge crack down against Arabs and Muslims.

The Second reason is money wise, US is a very expensive country, to keep and maintain that numbers will be a big burden.

in 1990, Al-Jihad organization started to recruit European Muslims to use them as sleepers in Europe, I was present during the discussion about that issue "I have mentioned that during the sessions" The main problem we were facing was the amount of money which we have to provide every month for the sleepers.

If Al Qaeda has sleepers in USA, will not be more than 3-5 people, the Job of those guys is "Research", their mission is preparing reports about how to hit USA hard, those sleepers will not conduct operation will not recruit, only [illegible] equipment which will be

Remember, Alqaeda is a centeralized [redacted] leadership, even the structure is not centeral structure, but the decision is centeral, the centeral leadership is the part who manage sleepers, not only in U.S, but in other parts of the world, so assume there are five people in the centeral leadership who are dealing with the sleepers as well as other duties, do you believe those five people could handle all these traffics, impossible, time, money, and effort.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q: (R) will there be independent, retaliation from sympathizers?

No,
The kidnaping of Danny pearl, the WSJ reporter, ~~by~~ was conducted by small independent group, if you look at this operation, this is an experienced cell, they kidnaped foreigners in Kashmir before, All what they could do after 9-11 is kidnaping a poor journalist, [redacted] what that tell you, if MR. Danny was very careful, this group will not be able to kidnap him.
pakistan, I believe is the only place where there are a lot of sympathize with Ben Laden and Taliban, and so far, only one operation in MR. Dan
If the sympathizers are serious, they could do a lot of damage in pakistan where anyone could obtain explosives and weapons.
The other reason, because the Taliban and Al Qaeda did not stand and fight against USA, This will stop other independent retaliation
They will ask themselves, why I am going [redacted] retaliate and the Taliban and Al Qaeda disappeared and hide.
The only time, will be retaliation, if Taliban and Al Qaeda, regrouped and succeeded in some operations against US Force in Afghanistan, this will trigger some people to support them by doing some small operation.

[redacted]

Q: (S) will Alqaeda re-emerge under a different name?

A: No,

Because the name "Alqaeda" became historical and symbol all over the world, the name itself will attract recruits, finance, and support. It became a Trade mark [redacted] IBM or Microsoft. After re-emerging from underground, Alqaeda will use bogus names to claim responsibility for the operation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q: (T) what will the Core structure of Alqaeda look like? How will it function? How will operational planning be handled?

A: I have covered this question in page 1 [redacted]

I will add something about the operational planning:
The operational planning is the responsibility of the Secret leadership.
I believe the planning will go through the following steps:

1- The known leadership will issue a guide lines Concerning the goals of Alqaeda, directions, etc...
2- The Secret leadership will break the guide lines into details of Training objective, organizing, intelligence, preparation, etc...
3- The Secret leadership will assign tactical projects to several Amirs, who will work in the field to prepare a blue print plans.
4- The sequence of the planning will be as follows:
   A- Intelligence "gathering info about a group of target"
   B- The selection of targets "Based on several factors: Security, poli
   C- Assignment for the operation
   D- Briefing
   E- preparation and security
   F- Dis-patching [redacted]

Q: (U) what are your views and renditions? if the U.S decided as a matter of policy to render captured subjects to Egypt for further questioning is that a good thing or not? what are the long term ramifications of such a policy? will the bad guys find out about it? if so? what they will do about it?

A: First: USA did a good job by not releasing the names of the captured prisoners in Cuba and Qandahar to the public, Alqaeda now in a state of confusion, no communication, their assessment of damage almost zero, they do not know who died and who captured. The minute US will render the prisoners to Egypt, Alqaeda through its sources inside the Egyptian government will supply Alqaeda with a list of the prisoners names.

Second: Alqaeda now has no idea about what the prisoners said during the interrogation, if they went back to Egypt, Alqaeda will get the details about their interrogation by the Americans.

Third: Rendering the prisoners to Egypt, will be a big credit for the Egyptian authorities that their policy of torture is acceptable by the US government, and eventually the media in the Arab world will praise the torture policy which is supported by U.S.

Fourth: under the torture in Egypt, the prisoners will invent stories, change their stories, and in the end you will not know what is false and what is true.

Fifth: in the future operation, when US [redacted] arrest more prisoners,

US will render them, so why talking with the American [redacted]

Sixth: You will not believe what I will tell you now, when the prisoners will be rendered to Egypt, the Egyptians will charge the prisoners with extra charge, "espionage" because they talked with a foreign intelligence service (The American intelligence), The Egyptian authorities hates people who talk with foreign intelligence services.

Seventh: I believe US should keep the pri[redacted]ers here for sometimes till things becomes clear for two reasons:

(1) To keep them away from the area, the longer they are dealing with the Americans, they will compare the good treatment here with the bad treatment in their countries, believe me, we all human, and people change, at least they will be neutral.

(2) If they go back to Egypt, they will be tortured, then sentenced, most of them does not get life sentence, someday will be released, they will come back after USA who is responsible for their ordeal. [redacted]

[redacted]

Q: (V) Is it likely that captured Mujahedeen are or were privy to operational plans? The "Sheikh" location?

A: No way.
I will tell you about my experience with Ben Laden in that issue. Ben Laden is smart person, and very very careful about his own security. let me give you some examples about how Ben Laden handles information relates to his security:

(1) In peshawar, pakistan, 1991, when Ben Laden decided to exit pakistan because the attempts to kill him. I was sleeping in a house about 15 minutes from Ben Laden house, in the middle of the night, Abu Hafs came to the house, entered my room, and woke me up and told me the "Sheikh" wants to see you now, when we arrived to the "Sheikh" home, he was ready, and told me I want you to secure my trip to Karachi, and we are leaving now, I did not have a minute [redacted] to use the bathroom.

(2) In Sudan, Ben Laden had a big farm in "Damazeen" close to the border with Eritrea, the trips takes about 6 hours, when Ben Laden wishes to go there, for example if he wants to take someone with him, he will call him one minute befor leaving.

(3) Seif Al-Adal in Sudan was in charge of the security of the farm. one time he asked me to assist him to improve the security of the farm "Soba" in Khartoum, he did [redacted] tell me the reason, - The reason was to prepare it for Ben Laden to move to the farm and make it his residence - after several days of studying the security of the farm, I told Seif - The farm is very bad in

Later, I knew the reason, the farm was prepared for Ben Laden.
I Could tell you, around Ben Laden There are four people only who will know about Ben Laden movements in advance.

1. Abu Hafs
2. Seif Al-Adl
3. Reda The Tunisian "Bodyguard" [redacted]
4. Seif The Jordanian, who used to live in Paterson, N.J.

[redacted]

Q: (W) Have you ever heard of a person named Ibn Sheikh al Libi?

A: NO

I believe the name was formed to cause [redacted] confusion

① "Ibn" means the son of, in Egypt they use it, but in countries like Saudi Arabia or Libya they are using "Ben", The same definition, like Ben Laden "The Son of Laden". So the name has the word "Al-Libi" The libian, if the person from LIBIA, The name should be Ben Sheikh Al-Libi not Ibn Sheikh Al-Libi.

② The name "Sheikh" is never used as a code name, it is a family name in Saudi Arabia, very big family "Al-Sheikh", in most the Arab countries the name is used as a family name.

I believe there is some mistake about the name.

[redacted]

Q: (X) Finances, how will the group get its money?

[redacted]

A: The organization gets its finance as follows: mainly from

1- Donation, there is a system all over the Islamic world, around the year, in the mosques, people paying Donation everyday.

2- The wealthy financiers.

3- Economical projects.

4- Trade. "Commerce".

I believe after 9-11, Alqaeda will enter the following fields

[redacted]

1- The oil market

2- The diamond market

3- The Commercial maritime field

4- The pharmaceutical field

5- Computer field

6- The Stock market

7- The Counterfeit money

8- Import-export field

[redacted]

* The business which Alqaeda involves with to make money, must be used to facilitate operations, it is not only the money, but also how to use the business in future operations.

For example, the pharmaceutical field will help to research the Bio-chemical field, and so on.

[redacted]

Q: (4) What role do you see the FBI and the military playing as the war on terrorism continues?

A: The military has no role in the war on terrorism, the military should stay away, the military is not prepared or made for that kind of war, the modern history tells us that the military makes things worse and cannot solve the problem, for example:

1- The Israeli Army failed to eliminate HizbuAllah in South Lebanon since 1980, even HizbuAllah [redacted] the Israelean Army and kicked them out south Lebanon.

2- The British Army failed in Northern Ireland against the IRA

3- The Algerian Army failed since 1990 till now.

4- The Army of phillipines...

and in other parts of the world

The Role of the FBI:

① Infiltration, This is a very long process, it takes years, I could go in details in a special session.

[redacted]

② The FBI must have agents in the visa section in the American embassies in the hot spots, interviewing applicants, it is a very good source of information and recruitment.

③ working undercover in the hot spots (Journalists, Relief organization, students, Import-export, etc...)

[redacted]

④ The FBI should have its own "listening unit" not counting on other agency such as NSA.

11-L-0559/OSD/6878

(5) The FBI should have its military teams, to conduct special tasks overseas, not counting on CIA or the military.

(6) The analysis people should not be on their desks dealing with materials coming from the field which the analysis are not familiar with, They need to taste that field to be able to analyze based on a good vision.

(7) The FBI should have its own interrogation facilities, where the prisoners will go directly there, not to the BoP. You need to keep the prisoners out the system.

home in peshawar, pakistan, there was a conversation about the gulf war and president senior Bush, [redacted] Ben Laden told me why he hates US and president Bush, he told me the following:
Salem Ben Laden, one of Ben Laden relatives who was a close friend of president Bush, he used to have a permenant office in Houston, TX he was managing the money of Ben Laden's family and other money, he was a business associate of president Bush.
In 1980, during the American hostages crisis in Iran, Salem Ben Lad Travelled to paris with president Bush and James Baker to meet with the Iranians in order to urge them [redacted] to release the American hostages in Iran before the American election in order for president Carter not getting the credit, so Carter will loose the election. After the meeting - I do not know the date -, Salem Ben Laden was killed in airplane crash, Ben Laden believes that president Bush has something to do with the death of Salem Ben Laden, in order to silence him.
I believe, Ben Laden conducted 9-11 attack, during Bush time, not during the previous administration, in order to get even with the Bush family. [redacted]

B- Khaled Ben Mahfouz:

He is the brother-in-law of Ben Laden
he inherited salem Ben Laden job in USA
he is a major financier of Ben Laden
I did not heard his name among the people which USA froze their money.

[redacted]

[redacted]

C- Does Al-Qaeda operate in 60 Countries?

[redacted]

NO

I hope this statement did not come out.

I believe some countries in order to get money and assistance from USA, these crook countries claims that they have problem with Alqaeda, very cheap way to get money.

If we assumed, Alqaeda has cells in 60 countries, How many individuals in the leadership of Alqaeda will be assigned to handle the traffics, seif Al-Adl will handle 60 countries, give me a break.

[redacted]

[redacted]

D: 10,000 - 20,000 were trained in Afghanistan

This estimate, even if is correct, does not mean those fighters are members of Alqaeda, or terrorist.
The majority of people who travelled to Afghanistan, they travelled for one main reason, to fulfill a religious duty, The people who trained in Afghanistan were trying to follow a very important of the prophet Mohamed sayings:
The prophet Mohamed said: "whoever died and did not think (did not talk to himself) about fighting in the path of Allah (Jihad), died with some of hypocrisy."

most the fighters does not have any link with such groups, they went only to fulfill the duty of Jihad.

[redacted]

(54)

E: Countries, if I were a militant who wants to hide [illegible]

1- pakistan
2- Bangladish
3- Malaysia
4- Indonesia
5- Turky
6- Tailand
7- Tajikstan
8- Chechnia
9- Kyrgyzstan
10- Cyprus
11- Malta
12- Syria
13- Mauritania
14- Yemen
15- Albania
16- Traq
17- Tanzania
18- Kenya
19- Iran
20- Bulgaria
[redacted]
21- Uganda
22- chad
23- Mali
24- Bukina Faso
25- Zaire
26- Uruguay
27- paraguay
28- Qatar
[redacted] Ethiopia

For political asylum:
1- Finland
2- Denmark
3- Norway

[redacted]

F: The backbone of Alqaeda:

Before 9-11 attacks, nobody among Alqaeda leaders anticipated the horrible magnitude of death, it was a surprise for Al-Qaeda leaders. at that moment, the leaders of Alqaeda executed the evacuation plan, mainly for the Compon[redacted] of Alqaeda backbone which consists of:

1- The instructors ... This is the cream of the crop of Al-Qaeda, each one of them is an encyclopedia in his speciality.

2- The mid-levels, and high levels of leadership, who could run the organization in case the historical leadership, Bin Laden / Zawahry died or captured.

3- The document of the infrastructure, mainly will be in computer disks, Al-Qaeda starting digitizing process in early 1991. I have witnessed the discussion about the [redacted] of keeping the information in a safe place, Al-Qaeda will have three copies of its sensetive information, one copy will be hidden in Afghanistan, one in Europe, and one in Asia.

To break the back of Alqaeda, please, let me honestly say the following:

I made a mistake by helping the terrorists whom brought shame to my religion and my ethics ... The war against this ugly terrorism needs a few dedicated people. prior to 9-11, I wrote some papers to the FBI, The Covert operation, and I have suggested using me in the operation to kill or Capture Ben Laden. please, let me again repeat the same thing, Sentence me, then put me in the custody of the Covert teams, [redacted] prisoners, whom the

If you put me in the street today, after only one week, I will establish physical contact with Ben Laden, and Alzawahry. If you think that I will get killed, that will not happen, and even if I was killed, [redacted] government will not loose anything. Keeping me in Jail during this serious period serves no reason, please let me break their back.

[redacted]

[redacted]

G: The Simultaneous operations:

Al-Qaeda used to Conduct Simultaneous [redacted] as the attack against the American embassies in Africa, and the multiple hijacking in 9-11...

The reason for the Simultaneous attacks is a security one; The Security is the target... As you know, Alqaeda is spending most the time in the intelligence and the planning phases; as soon as Alqaeda intelligence team discovers weakness points in the security of the target, Alqaeda will plan to hit more than one target of that type; for example, I believe Alqaeda surveillance team, discovered a weakness point in the security of American [redacted], and United Air lines, so Alqaeda planners decided to hijack more than one airplane from American and United, they exploit the opportunity because they know, these weakness point will be covered and fixed after the attack.

The best defense against any attack is to foil or to make it very hard for Alqaeda surveillance team to detect the weakness in the target. For example if you have a target as the following:

[redacted]

This target has one security perimeter inside the borders. This is very easy target for the surveillance team to approach to the edges, or will do surveillance from adjacent location



[redacted]

The following example will make it hard on the Surveillance Teams:



The following example will make it impossible for the Surveillance Teams:



Remember if the Surveillance fail, will be no attack against that target.

So, if Alqaeda succeeded in obtaining good information for example about the American force in Afghanistan, they well wage a multiple operation against them. I believe the airports in Afghanistan, especially, Qandahar, Khust, and Jalal Abad are very vulnerable, Alqaeda is very familiar with these airports, because Alqaeda members joined the Afghans during the attacks against these airports, I have witnessed attacks against Khust and Jalal Abad airports.

Afghanistan and pakistan:
Are the only two places, where Alqaeda now could attack American Targets, because they have the equipment (explosives, weapons, etc) and the man power.
I believe if there is operation against USA, it will be conducted inside Afghanistan, the Car bomb is the main method, as the attack against the marines in Lebanon.... The Con[redacted]tion of troops in one area is a tempetation for attack using suicidal person driving a Truck.

Snowflake

October 1, 2002 9:29 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Tribal Areas

Here is a paper on tribal areas, which is interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
September 1997 "Tribal Areas Historic Perspective"

DHR:dh
100102-29

Please respond by _____

1 Oct 02

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HOME & TRIBAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 0 1 2002

Tribal Areas
HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE

By
MANZOOR AHMAD
Consultant

Tribal Research Cell Home Department
September 1997

11-L-0559/OSD/6891

S. No.	TOPICS	P. No.
1.	Historic Perspective	01
2.	Dynastic Era	02
3.	Sikhs Periods	04
4.	British Annexation	05
5.	Emergence of Independence	11
6.	Present Constitutional Status	14
7.	The Treaties	16
8.	Systems	17
9.	Role of Frontier Corps	19
10.	Cost effectiveness of FATA Administration	19
11.	Development of FATA	20
12.	Adult Franchise	20
13.	Economic & commercial bonds with Afghanistan	27
14.	Annex - A	31
15.	Annex - B	33
16.	Annex - C	36
17.	Annex - D	39
18.	Annex - E	40
19.	Annex - F	41

TRIBAL AREAS

HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE.

1 While writing foreword for Captain H.L. Nevill's Account of Campaigns on the North West Frontier (London 1912) one of the most celebrated war veterans of British Empire and hero of the Second Afghan War (1878-81), General Frederick Roberts proceeds to state:

" The history of the North West Frontier of India is one long record of strife with wild and war-like tribes that inhabit the difficult mountainous region which is the Borderland between British India and Afghanistan. From pre-Mutiny days down to the present times the trouble has been there ..... and all the factors which contribute to a fiery fanatical outbreak are still present, and may at any moment compel a fresh expedition to punish an outrage, to enforce restitution, and to restore order."

2. The colonial interest of British Empire was always at play in finding an excuse for frequent military expeditions in tribal territory which were in reality aimed at securing tribal submissions and coercing the tribes in entering into understandings at "Crown's convenience". Time kept changing and history revealing and even during British rule in India, a British historian of eminence Mr.C.F. Andrews, in his critical analysis of British policy in North West Frontier [The Challenges of the North West Frontier, London 1937], laments:-

" We have further to answer with entire honesty the serious question whether by any encroachment the tribes on the North West Frontier have been first goaded on to war, then crushed and last of all been deprived of territory - a method which has been employed by conquering powers in every period of history, but ought no longer to be regarded as legitimate in these post war days".

3. More emphatically, in the present situation when the tribal areas are a federal entity in Pakistan, today's administrator must realize that if military method requires years of arduous discipline, surely the civil administration needs even greater painstaking effort and should always be given precedence over military or strong arm solutions.

4. With this introductory observation, we may now proceed to briefly deal with the evolutionary process of administration in North West Frontier, designated in the present Constitution as, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in its historical perspective. For the convenience of the reader it is divided into four periods:

A. Dynastic Era. (550 B.C. to 1818 A.D.)
B. Sikh period. (1818 - 1849 A.D.)
C. British annexation. (1849 - 1947 A.D.)
D. Emergence of Independence. (1947 onward)

A. DYNASTIC ERA

5. The area now forming Afghanistan and North-West Frontier had seen perhaps more invasions than any other country in Asia, or indeed the world. The Achaemenian dynasty of Iranian origin under its founder Cyrus and later his successor Darius the Great (550-331 BC) was the first in known and established history to invade and set-up its Gadara Satrapy [amongst many others] at Paskaporus (Peshawar) later on known as Parshapur and Peukelaotis (Charsadda) also later on named as Pushkalavati, popularly called Gandhara.

6. The Greek historian Herodotus in his account of Achaemenian dynasty had named the general area of the Satrapy as Paktuike and its people Paktues. He had specially referred to four tribes inhabiting it, the Sattagudia, the Gandarioi, the Dadikai and the Aparutai describing them to be the bravest and more war-like than others. Though wanting in consensus in the case of Sattagudia and Dodikai the later historians and researchers have identified them as under.

1.	The Sattagudia	=	Tribes living south of Peshawar now known as Kohat, Bannu and D.I.Khan. Khattaks and their Shitak cousins Banochis and Daurs according to Sir Olaf Caroe.
2.	The Gandarioi	=	People of Peshawar Valley.
3.	The Dadikai	=	An obscure branch of Kakars or Dard tribe of Chitral/Gilgit.
4.	The Aparutai	=	Apridai or Afridi.

7. The Achaemenians were routed out by Alexander the Great and Seleucus belonging to Macedonian (Hellenic) dynasty and held it under their sway from 327 to 305 BC. Alexander invaded North-West Frontier through the approach

then known as Aspasioi in Afghanistan [Isapzai or Yusafzai Country] and entered Bajaur via Nawa Pass. He finally reached Hund at the confluence of River Kabul and Indus after an arduous march, in rough mountainous country encountering the tribes inhabiting Dir, Malakand, Buner, Sudham and Sama (Mardan).

8. Emperor Asoka Chandragupta, the founder of Mauryan dynasty of Indian origin [323-190 BC] expelled Seleucus from Ghandhara in 305 BC. Mauryan monarchs, Chandragupta and Asoka, reigned for over a century and unlike Alexander and Seleucus left healthy traditions of a benign rule. The stately fabric of the previous Iranian monarchy influenced their imaginations and served as a model for their institutions.

9. After visited by Bactrians (185-97 BC), Sakas (97 BC to 5 AD), Parthians (7-75 AD), Kushans (60-225 AD), Sassanians (230-365 AD) and Kidarites (365-445 AD) all of Iranian origin, White Huns (Turkish) came on the scene from 455-550 AD. Sassanians again appeared followed by Arabs and Saffarids between 568-900 AD. They were replaced by Hindushahiya (Indians) Samanids, Ghaznawids, Ghorids and Khwarezm Shahi from 900 to 1220 AD.

10. The period from 1220 to 1501 AD was perhaps the most tyrannical and horrible in the history of Afghanistan and border land. It was a period of anarchy under Mongol warrior Chingiz and his successors (1220-1365 AD) and the Timurids of Turko-Mongol admixture (1380-1504 AD). The cruel vortex of barbarity and chaos rendered large tracts of human habitation depopulated and irreparably decimated prominent centres of culture and civilization, causing periodical exodus of surviving population towards India. Contemporaneously the Muslim society in the Sub-Continent was passing through evolutionary growth after advent of the Muslim Empire gradually invigorated by the much needed Muslim manpower from Central Asia, Khurasan and Afghanistan against numerically preponderant non-Muslim majority. The Mongol/Timurids misrule of more than two centruies and immense desire for deliverance and restitution found relief in the Islamic way of life and concept of good governance under the Providence' guidance.

1 Finally the Mughal dynasty under Emperor Babur followed by Humayun, Akbar, Jehangir, Shah Jehan and Aurangzeb (1504-1739 AD) brought peace and tranquillity back after a long period of disorder. After Emperor Babur who most of the time remained preoccupied with consolidation of his possessions in

Afghanistan and the Sub-Continent, Akbar's was known as the golden Mughal period.

12. Then came Afshar King Nadir Shah (Turkoman of Persia) who occupied Kabul and obtained cession of trans-Indus territory from Mughals in 1739 AD. His turbulent rule of about ten years (1736-47 AD) was full of turmoil and earned for him the imputation that his saddle was his throne. After his assassination his most trusted General Ahmad Shah Abdali returned to Afghanistan and laid the foundation of Durrani dynasty, as the first Afghan monarchy (1747-1818 AD) which ruled both Afghanistan and Peshawar Valley.

13. Throughout the long history as briefly set out above, hordes of invaders marched through the borderland, but none found a firm foothold. Even at the zenith of their power, the Mughal's hold over it was never sufficiently secure notwithstanding the fact that North-West Frontier and Afghanistan were the main source of their military strength and they considered Afghanistan as "backyard of India". Major H.G. Raverty in this respect writes that "as early as the middle of Emperor Aurangzeb's reign Mughal control was nominal and soonafter almost ceased". It was on this account that Nadir Shah found it so easy to invade the Mughal Empire, the only opposition he faced was from the frontier tribes.

14. So, we find that the North-West Frontier enjoyed its independent character throughout the dynastic era discussed above and the tribes [without any possible aversion or prejudice to the influences of fascinating versatilities of changing dynastic cultures, characteristics and exchange of values as would have been adopted and practised] administered themselves free of any extraneous influence or pressure and cultivated a distinct socio-juridical culture based on the principles of equality, self respect and tort suiting their idiosyncrasies. Though dominated by feelings of ambivalence, some Afghan Rulers, specially Durranis [followed partially by Afghan Barakzai dynasty during the reign of Amir Abdur Rehman, before defining permanent Frontiers] did exercise loose and irregular control over the tribes to secure right of way through local subedars, yet it was always matched with remunerations in the form of subsidies and allowances necessary for maintaining political relationship with the tribes through the hierarchy of tribal chiefs/elders and the khans and Arbabs of adjoining administered areas.

B. SIKHS PERIOD

15. The administration of frontier regions under Sikhs (1818-49) had been of the most spasmodic type. According to Dr.C.C.Devies the sikhs "possessed but little

influence in the tran-Indus tracts, and what influence they had was confined to the plains. Even there they were obeyed only in the immediate vicinity of their forts which studded the country". [The Problem of North West Frontier, 1890-1908 (with a survey of policy since 1849) Cambridge, 1932]

C. BRITISH ANNEXATION.

16. After annexation in 1849 the trans-Indus area of North West Frontier as well as the cis-Indus Hazara district remained part of the Punjab Province, a legacy of Sikh rule. The British Empire followed **"close door policy"** in her relations with the borderland tribes between Afghanistan and the **"British India"**. The main feature of this policy was to guard the border closely with a view to keeping raids and consequent reprisals by military expeditions to the minimum. Non-aggression on tribal territory and non-interference in tribal affairs were the declared objects of this policy. Military Cantonments were set up on bordering districts to restrain tribal raids and punish encroachments.

17. The **close border policy** remained operative for more than quarter of a century and as many as 23 major military operations, designated as expeditions were carried out between the Mutiny of 1857 and the year 1880 to chastise various tribes for depredations on bordering areas in administered districts and other offences against the Empire. However, a radical change was witnessed thereafter, when the concept of `**forward policy**' was pressed into service. It coincided, rather followed in spirit the effective occupation of Baluchistan in about the same year (1880) under Sir Robert Sandeman, Agent to the Governor General. The first thrust of the Forward Policy in North West Frontier resulted in permanent opening of Khyber Pass by Sir Robert Warburton [author of one of the best known books on Frontier i.e. "Eighteen Years in the Khyber" [1879-1898] followed by Gomal Pass and Tochi Valley [1889-90]. The occupation of Samana in 1891 and moving into Kurram Valley the following year were also part of this policy.

18. The permanent annexation of Baluchistan and forward moves made in North-West Frontier, more particularly construction of the railway as far as Chaman on the Baluchistan side and expulsion of Afghan garrison from Biland Khel (near Tall) followed by the occupation of Kurram Valley greatly perturbed Amir Abdur Rehman. He, therefore, felt obliged, in order to put a halt to these advances, to respond to the overtures of defining permanent frontiers between Afghanistan and the **"British India"**. So, the historic Agreement regarding Durand Line [after the name of head of the mission Sir Mortimer Durand] was signed in November,

1893 (Annex-A). Now, the British Empire in India had gained physical control over all the strategic passes over-hanged by lofty heights of Suleman Ranges, Sufaid Koh and Hindu Kush and thus acquired the capability of defending the Empire's possessions in India from "**Russian threat**". It simultaneously provided effective control over tribes to restrain them from raids and depredations on border villages.

19. In this context, so far as the British Empire's fears of Russian expansion beyond Central Asia towards Afghanistan and British India were concerned, one of the English celebrities, Sir Harry Lumsden, Commandant Corps of Guides and Assistant Commissioner, Mardan [before its separation from Peshawar District] described the geographical edge and strategic superiority as under:-

"Providence has blessed us with a strong line of Frontier, covered by rugged and barren hills, through which there are but a limited number of passes by which an army could approach India; and the military art teaches us that the best position for the defence of such ground is on our own side of the passes, just where an army must debouch on the plain with Peshawar, Kohat and Sindh in our possession, and the communications with our Indian Provinces open by rail and steamers on the Indus, and strong force of Europeans located in healthy Cantonments all over the country supported by a well-organised native army, I consider that we should really have the keys of India in our own pockets, be in a position to lock the doors in the face of all enemies, black or white".

20. These developments were soon followed by the epoch making decision of separation of the settled districts and North-West Frontier from the Punjab. Sir Olaf Caroe in his book "The Pathans" while discussing the need for this separation observes :

"Long before Curzon came out as Viceroy in 1899, it had been realized that there existed certain anomalies in the organization of the North West Frontier as part of the Punjab. For the trans-Indus area consisted not out of settled districts, where it could at least be argued that administration by a larger authority had certain advantages, but of tribal territory under a vague executive control where a foot placed wrong might at any time attract the responsibility not only of the central government in India but of London itself. In the earlier days when relations with the tribes were

conducted by district officers and the international frontier had not been defined, the anomaly was not so apparent."

21. Despite strenuous opposition from Sir Mackworth Young, Lieut Governor of Punjab, Lord Curzon's view prevailed with the British Government and North West Frontier Province came into being on 9th November, 1901 with Sir Harold Deane as the first Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. The four trans-Indus districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, with a fifth cis-Indus district of Hazara were separated from the Punjab to form the settled part of the province and adjacent to these were all the five Political Agencies [Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Malakand] together with Frontier Regions managed by Deputy Commissioners, as far as Durand Line.

22. It acquired the status of a Governor's Province in 1932 with Sir Ralph Griffith as the first Governor. The British Colonial rule terminates in 1947 with Sir Olaf Caroe as its last Governor. The heads of the North West Frontier Province from 1901 to 1947 were:-

Chief Commissioners	
Sir Harold Deane	1901-08
Sir George Roos Keppel	1908-19
Sir Hemilton Grant	1919-21
Sir John Maffey	1921-23
Sir Norman Bolton	1923-30
Sir Steuart Pears	1930-31
Governors	
Sir Ralph Griffith	1932-37
Sir George Cunningham	1937-46
Sir Olaf Caroe	1946-47

23. Having Afghanistan been brought under its tutelage after the Second Afghan War, control of strategic passes wrested, permanent frontiers with Amir Abdur Rehman settled and authority over the borderland gradually extended, the British Empire went ahead in enforcing formal state jurisdiction by assigning the status of separate Political Agencies and Frontier Regions (FRs) to various tribal administrative units. These had been previously looked-after by the Deputy Commissioners of adjoining districts or specially appointed Political officers. The following were the first British officers appointed as Political Agents :

AGENCY.	NAME OF OFFICER.	YEAR
1. Khyber.	Major P.L.N Cavagnari	1879
2. Kurram.	Mr.W.R.H.Merck	1892
3. North Wazirstan.	Major G.A.Smith	1910 *
4. South Waziristan	Mr.A.J.Grant	1895
5. Malakand.	Major H.A.Deane	1895

24. The Frontier Regions remained attached to the adjoining districts ever since. Due to the sensitivity of lengthy unmanned border with Afghanistan and long history of incursions of foreign as well as local invaders through its passes, it enjoyed the status of **"centrally administered"** area in respect of which the Home Government at London was always taken into confidence in all policy decisions. Moreover, it had a direct link with the **"British external policy and defence"** of its possessions in the Sub-Continent. Therefore, on the question of North West Frontier in relation to the defence of India, the Simon Commission (1929) pertinently observed that "it is impossible to separate the control of forces which secure the integrity of India's boundaries from all central area which forms the inevitable terrain of military operations in its defence".

25 Initially the main aim of the North West Frontier policy was to ensure law and order in the bordering districts and sought to achieve this end by securing **"pacification and contentment"** of the Frontier tribes. This policy was successfully executed by the use or threat of force, diplomacy and material inducements. It simultaneously had to be reconciled with the maintenance of good relations with the Amir who wielded considerable influence over the tribes. The tribes had also, over the period, assimilated the art of diplomacy of sharing allegiance which was so important for them in order not only to hold on to their traditional way of living but also to make both realize that the **tribal buffer** had a distinct place in the relationship between the British Empire and free Afghanistan. The tribesmen were quite capable of capitalizing on their geo-strategic location bonded in ethnic, cultural and religious affinities across the Durand Line and thus were not to be taken for granted.

Bottom Line on Purp + Reality of what was created

* Afghan influence!

26. The "Policy of Pacification and Contentment' was practised by the British Empire till its last days of rule. While delivering a lecture on 5th August, 1944,

* *Tochi Valley was brought under Political Administration on the request of Darwesh Khel Wazirs and Dawars in 1895. Major G.A. Smith is shown as the first Political Agent in Political Agent's record. He was also the Commandant Tochi Scouts from 1911-1913. Tochi remained under Political Officers for sometime as is proved from the fact that the Maizer outrage against Tochi Field Force Commanded by Lt. Col. A.C. Bunny occurred in 1897 when Mr. H.A.Gee, Political Officer of Tochi led the force to recover fine from Madda Khel wazirs who had murdered the Hindu Munshi of levy post at Sheranni.*

in Delhi on the problem of watch and ward on the North West Frontier, Mr. Dundas CIE., ICS., then Resident in Waziristan, highlighted the following two important positions which according to him had always to be borne in mind in formulating a "Frontier Policy". Those are:-

"(i) That the fewer regular troops are locked up on the minor problem, the better, and

(ii) That if we ever have to defend India against an invasion across the North-West Frontier, it is better to do so with the co-operation, or at least the goodwill of its inhabitants rather than with the added burden of a hostile population, held down by fear and waiting its first opportunity to stab us in the back."

27. While dealing with the **"Close Door Policy"** and the **"Forward Policy"** then followed by the British Empire and discussing their positive and negative aspects, he supports the policy of administering the area through its people instead of sending out columns time and again to punish the tribes for any mischief and then falling back to the Headquarters at a heavy cost. He describes the policy thus followed as under:-

"Sa neither the Close-border policy nor the Forward Policy work out in practice. The present policy is not a compromise between the two, but is a constructive policy on its own. You will remember that the problem is to prevent gangs from the hills raiding into the districts and getting back into the hills in safety with their loot or kidnapped persons, and to prevent offenders from the plains finding a safe refuge in the hills. The Forward Policy aims at doing the job ourselves .. the close border policy at making it unnecessary. The present policy aims at getting the tribes to do it for us, at getting them to accept and fulfil responsibility for controlling their own bad characters. And getting them means helping them, teaching them and finally, if necessary, forcing them. It is a mental process. You do not want to take a column out every time and thing happens. You want to get these types into a state of mind in which finally, these things will not happen, but in the meanwhile, if bad character do break out and raid, the tribe itself will effect restitutian of the property or persons and exact a fine from the offenders. You want to be able to give orders to this effect and to have them obeyed. And how are you going to get your orders obeyed? In the same way that any order is obeyed up and down the world, by a form of discipline based on inducement on the one

side and fear on the other, or as the Pathan says, a lump of gur in one hand and a stone in the other, and these two motives have to be applied in the right mixture by an officer who knows the tribes, knows when to apply kindness, when to apply force, and on whom to apply either just as the commanding officer of a regiment must know how to handle his own particular men in any particular station - only with a very important difference that we can not get rid of any of our men, they are there for good or evil for us to handle, and they are the only people through whom we can work.

Attached to each tribal area or group of allied tribal areas, is a civil officer known as the Political Agent whose duty is to work on this policy of getting the tribes to control themselves until it becomes a matter of discipline and habit. He must have personal knowledge of them from personal contact, and he must have in his hands the two weapons of inducement and fear - he must be able to show the tribes that it pays to be on good terms with Government, and that you get hell if you go against Government, and he must get himself trusted and respected. These are the foundations of discipline, what you are and what you can show."

28. The British officers gained vast experience of dealing with tribes through their elders and formal enlistment of Maliks ensued evolving into the present **"Maliki System"**. Beside those of Khyber, Mohmand and Kurram who were previously in the pay of Afghanistan, fresh registration of tribal elders on the basis of house-hold strength was made in addition to assuring tribes on payment of subsidies/allowances, known as Moajib in the tribal parlance. Our Strategy

29. It was also realized that unlike settled areas, policing and process service could only be carried out by locally recruited men drawn on the basis of tribal **"Nikat"** in the shape of Khasadars to enforce **"protective tribal responsibility"** coupled with the **"collective tribal territorial responsibility"**, the main-stay of tribal administration. Alongside, local para-military out-fits were raised under various names; Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia, Tochi Scouts and South Waziristan Scouts for manning border posts and working as an arm of the Political Agent in maintaining law and order. Similarly, Border Military Police [now known as Frontier Constabulary] was raised to man the pickets and posts along the administrative boundary between settled districts and tribal areas and to assist the district administration in maintaining order and controlling movements of out-laws, etc: along the dividing periphery.

30. With the hold gradually tightening, especially after the Third Afghan War (1919), the Political Agents began to pay more attention on exercising effective control over the **"administered parts"** of the area and started taking cognizance of offences taking place there under the prevalent traditional system of dispensation of justice through jirga. In 1939 the administration of justice was brought under the procedural realm of Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 and the Criminal Procedure Code 1898. Concurrently, the Indian Penal Code 1860 was extended alongwith the Frontier Murderous Outrages Regulation, 1901.

31. The Frontier Crimes Regulation was originally enacted in 1872 by the Punjab Government and was revised in 1887 and 1901. It empowered the Deputy Commissioners to refer civil and judicially weak criminal cases to the Council of Elders. Besides preventive detention, the Regulation provided for the blockade of hostile and unfriendly tribes and placed restrictions on creation of new villages or removal of the existing ones on the administrative borders with Trans-frontier tribes.

D. EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENCE.

32. Throughout the freedom movement from Mutiny of 1857 to 14th August, 1947 the valiant tribes did not show any declivity and waged a continued struggle against colonial subjugation. Although the British Empire enjoyed full sovereignty over the borderland, yet it had to concede complete freedom to tribesmen to administer themselves in accordance with their traditional way of life. Following the tradition of pecuniary favours for services, the Empire accepted the liability of disbursement of subsidies and allowances to the tribes in lieu of maintaining long unmanned frontiers, trouble free movement on strategic roads/passes, vicarious liability for damage to govt property and restraint from outrages and depredations of border villages, under the system of collective tribal territorial responsibility.

33. The unwavering interest of tribesmen in a separate homeland for Muslims could be well assessed from two historic events taking place immediately before Independence. Narrating these incidents in his book "The Savage Frontier", Mr. D.S. Richards states "Until now, tribal leaders had been content to accept Congress funding and political backing against their traditional enemy, the British; but with the ending of the Raj there came a massive increase in support for Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League. So much so that Congress decided that only a visit from an eminent person of Jawaharlal Nehru's standing could arrest the demand for an independent state. In fact, Nehru's visit to Razmak

and Landikotal resulted in a near riot and he was fortunate to escape with a grazed forehead and a damaged car. Another distinguished visitor to experience the fury of the mob was Lord Mountbatten. In April, 1947 he arrived at Peshawar with Lady Mountbatten to be confronted by a huge crowd of Afridis howling for an independent state of Pakistan".

34. Finally, with the resolute and unstinted support of Muslims of Indo-Pak Sub-continent and the tribes of North-West Frontier the fruit of long and arduous struggle was realized under the dynamic leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan emerged on the map of the world, having a distinct place in South East Asia. In the words of Sir Olaf Caroe, "on 15th August, 1947, after a plebiscite, the Frontier Province, with every sign of enthusiasm, became a part of Pakistan. And in November the same year this lead was followed by all the tribes upto the Durand Line and the Chiefs of the four Frontier States of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb, the former signifying their loyalty in open Jirga, the later their allegiance by means of Instruments of Accession".

35. The love of tribesmen is further signified by waging 'Jehad' for the liberation of Kashmir. Within two months of the signing of documents drawn up for the partition of India, motorized Lashkars' took the road east out of Peshawar heading for the valley of Kashmir. This area has from time immemorial been looked upon as Muslim, but after the Sikh wars it had been ceded to the Hindu Raja of Jammu as a reward for loyalty. After partition the Hindu Raja began a systematic persecution of its Muslim subjects, who very rightly turned to their brethren in faith, the frontier tribes, for support. The response was real quick and the liberated part, now known as Azad Kashmir, was saved from Indian subjugation and hundreds of the "Lashkaris" acclaimed martyrdom for a cause so vital for the existence of Pakistan.

36. The tribesmen had always linked their destiny with that of the people of Frontier Province and Muslims of the Sub-continent at large. Their affection with Pakistan is evident from the fact that a historic representative Jirga of all the tribes of North-West Frontier waited upon the Quaid at the Governor's House Peshawar on 17th April, 1948 and pledged their loyalty to Pakistan and unanimously desired that they should be placed "directly under the control of Central Goveroment". The Quaid in his reply noted with approval that the tribesmen had pledged their loyalty to Pakistan and had promised that they would help Pakistan with all their resources and ability and then asked the tribesmen to realize "it is now the duty of every Pakistani, to see that the State which we have established

is strengthened in every department of life and made prosperous and happy for all, specially the poor and needy". Holding his assurance he went on to say "Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your freedom. On the contrary, Pakistan wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our power, self-reliant and self-sufficient and to help your educational, social and economic uplift and not to be left, as you are, dependent on annual doles as has been the practice hitherto". And concluded by again thanking the tribesmen for their "whole-hearted and unstinted declaration of their pledge of loyalty and their assurance to support Pakistan" [PLD 1969 Supreme Court 485-Supdt Land Customs Torkham Vs Zewar Khan and others, 26th August, 1969].

37. An assurance was earlier held out by the Quaid on 31st July, 1947 as the Governor General designate that Pakistan would continue all treaties and agreements and pay allowances until new agreements were negotiated. In this connection the historic Supreme Court Judgement determining the constitutional position of Tribal Areas, authenticating applicability of laws extended to it and declaring the borderland as integral part of Pakistan proceeds to inter alia hold:-

"There is also nothing to show that these treaties were ever denounced either by any authority in the tribal area or by the Dominion of Pakistan. On the contrary it appears that the Government of Pakistan was doing all that it possibly could to preserve the status quo in the tribal areas as the successor to His Majesty's Government in respect of those areas. On the 31st July 1947, the Quaid-i-Azam as the Governor-General designate of Pakistan issued a statement which was published in the Dawn newspaper, appealing "to all the different elements in the Frontier Province and in the tribol areas to forget past disputes and differences and join hands with the Government of Pakistan in setting up a truly democratic Islamic State," and assuring the tribesmen "that Pakistan would like to continue all treaties, agreements and allowances until new arrangements are negotiated."

38. After analysing the historic and legal perspective in exhaustive details the Supreme Court resolved the question of constitutional status of North-West Frontier by holding that:-

"The result, therefore, of the above analysis of various constitutional provisions relating to the tribal areas is that the tribal areas became legally parts of territories of Pakistan - and all laws which applied to

FATA Legal Presedence

those territories before 15th August, 1947 were continued in force until altered or amended".

PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS

39. The present Constitutional status of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is enshrined in Articles 246 and 247 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. It in fact confers continuity of its status as enjoyed during the British rule with legal cover given in the Government of India Act, 1935 and carried over after Independence in the Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973. The only structural change brought about in the Constitution of 1973 is the striping off the previous status of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Malakand with the consent of its people and converting it into a **"Provincially Administered Tribal Area"** instead of the **"Centrally Administered Area"**. Articles 246 and 247 of the Constitution are reproduced below for perusal :-

"Article 246. In the Constitution,-

(a) "Tribal Areas" means the areas in Pakistan which, immediately before the commencing day, were Tribal Areas, and includes-

Definition

(i) the Tribal Areas of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province; and

(ii) the former States of Amb, Chitral, Dir and Swat;

(b) "Provincially Administered Tribal Areas" means-

(i) the districts of Chitral, Dir and Swat (which includes Kalam) (the Tribal Area in Kohistan district,) Malakand Protected Area, the Tribal Area adjoining (Mansehra) district and the former State of Amb; and

(ii) Zhob district, Loralai district (excluding Duki Tehsil), Dalbandin Tehsil of Chagai district and Marri and Bugti tribal territories of Sibi district; and

Definition

(c) "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" includes-

(i) Tribal Areas, adjoining Peshawar district;

(ii) Tribal Areas adjoining Kohat district;

iii) Tribal Areas adjoining Bannu district;

(iv) Tribal Areas adjoining Dera Ismail Khan district;

(v) Bajaur Agency;

(vi) Orakzai Agency;

(vi) Mohmand Agency;

(vii) Khyber Agency;

(viii) Kurram Agency;

(ix) North Waziristan Agency; and

(x) South Waziristan Agency;"

"Article 247.

(1) Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and the executive authority of a Province shall extend to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas therein.

(2) The President may, from time to time, give such directions to the Governor of a Province as he may deem necessary, and the Governor shall, in the exercise of his functions under this Article, comply with such directions.

(3) No Act of (Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the President so directs, and no Act of (Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or a Provincial Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Area, or to any part thereof, unless the Governor of the Province in which the Tribal Area is situate, with the approval of the President, so directs; and in giving such a direction with respect to any law, the President or, as the case may be, the Governor, may direct that the law shall, in its application to a Tribal Area, or to a specific part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the direction.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the constitution, the President may, with respect to any matter within the legislative competence of (Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), and the Governor of a Province, with the prior approval of the President, may, with respect to any matter within the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly make regulations for the peace and good government of a Provincially Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof, situated in the Province.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the President may, with respect to any matter, make regulations for the peace and good government of a Federally Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof.

(6) The President may, at any time, by Order, direct that the whole or any part of a Tribal Area shall cease to be Tribal Area, and such Order may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the president to be necessary and proper:

Provided that before making any Order under this clause, the President shall ascertain, in such manner as he considers appropriate, the views of the people of the Tribal Area concerned, as represented in tribal Jirga.

(7) Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless (Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) by law otherwise provides:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall affect the jurisdiction which the Supreme Court or a High Court exercised in relation to a Tribal Area immediately before the commencing day."

40. Besides special mode of governance of FATAs under tribal customs and traditions through a Political representative of the Government in the form of Political Agent, the Constitution provides :-

a) bar of jurisdiction of superior court;

b) non-interference with its status unless so consented by tribes; and

c) extension of Federal laws with the prior consent of the President of Pakistan on the recommendation of the Governor in his capacity as the Agent to the President."

THE TREATIES

41. The British Empire after annexation gradually extended its rule into the border land by entering into treaties with the tribes. These treaties were negotiated by the Empire immediately after the annexation in 1849 till the Durand Agreement of border delimitation in 1893 and Independence in 1947. Thereafter the Pakistan Government entered into the shoes of the British Empire and went on negotiating and entering into various agreements with regard to the day-to-day administration. Such treaties are as important for us in opening new areas in FATA as those entered in the last quarter of 19th Century for opening Khyber, Tochi and Gomal during the British rule. In order to bring home importance of these treaties, two most important treaties entered into between the Afridi and Shinwari tribes of Khyber in February 1881 and October 1898 are being annexed

with this work as two specimens for facility of reading and understanding the import of these treaties (Annex B & C). These are the binding force of relationship between the tribes and the Government under solemn assurance given by no less a person than the Quaid as quoted in the foregoing discourse.

SYSTEMS

42. This work would be incomplete if we do not briefly deal with the systems under which the tribal areas are administered. These are :

a) Nikat.

Nikat is raison d'etre of the tribal system. It denotes interest profits and losses within the tribe and between the tribes according to ancestral "wesh" (yardstick of distribution of profits and losses). It is no less than a temporal command which is unnegotiable inspite of intervening demographic changes. Any deviation from 'Nikat' invites serious trouble and no Political Administration can venture to enter into this forbidden area. Its rigidity could be imagined from the fact that in some Agencies even the ration and development outlay is based on the dictates of shares contrived under 'Nikat'.

b) Moajib and tribal hierarchy of Maliki/Lungi allowance holders.

The institution of Malaki is synonymous with the system of tribal administration. During the colonial period, British Political officers gained vast experience of dealing with tribes through their elders and started formally enlisting Maliks and it is how the system was evolved. Besides those who were previously in the pay of Afghanistan, fresh registration of tribal elders on the basis of house hold strength was made in addition to assuring tribes on payment of subsidies/allowances known as 'Moajib' in the tribal parlance. Whereas Moajib is paid to the tribes through the hereditary Maliks, Lungi allowance is sanctioned for political services. It terminates on the death of the Lungi holder. As the system involves the family of the allowance holder deeply in rendering services to the State, the Political Agent has the authority to allow the continuation of the allowance in favour of the eldest son of the allowance holder. It provides continuity in the allegiance of the family to the State.

c) Tribal territorial responsibility.

The system of administration in the tribal areas is based on the principal of collective tribal territorial responsibility which is enshrined in the

customs and usages prevailing in the tribal areas. Under this system, which has the approval of the local population, if a crime originates anywhere, the section of the tribe on whose soil the crime is committed is held accountable and answerable to the Government. It is the comer stone of Political administration.

d) Khasadari and protective tribal responsibility.

The institution of Khasadari is as old as the Malaki system itself. It was already there during Durranis' period before annexation of tribal areas in 1849. It ensured good conduct of the tribes for safe passage through their country and thus known as protective tribal responsibility. The British Empire strengthened this system on their ingress into tribal areas under "Forward Policy" after boundary alignment with Afghanistan in 1893. Now this system is all over FATA either in the shape of Khasadaris or the Levies. The main difference between Khasadars and the Levies is that whereas the Khasadari is hereditary and the incumbent supplies his own weapon, the Government provides service rifles to the Levies and they can be replaced by selection. Besides discharging the protective territorial responsibility on behalf of the tribe, the Khasadars/Levies also carry out Police duties in maintaining law and order and process service.

e) Dispensation of justice.

i. The dispensation of justice is made through Jirga system and decisions are based on centuries old customs, traditions and usages. It is a time honoured mode of delivering justice and suits the genius of tribal society. It is the cheapest, quickest and most effective system of administration of justice. In majority of cases the litigations end up in compromises and negotiated settlements. The emphasis is less in punishing the guilty and more on assuaging the injured feelings of victims.

ii. The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) is a procedural vehicle for constituting Council of Elders (Jirga) for adjudication of cases while conviction stems from a violation of an agreement or treaty entered into between tribes or between the Government and the tribes.

iii. The judicial jurisdiction of a Political Agent is exercised in "administered areas" only through a Jirga under FCR whereas the tribes are free to dispense criminal and civil justice in "unadministered areas". The Political Agent takes prompt

cognizance of offences committed against the State in "administered areas" under the relevant sections of Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). In case of violations in "unadministered areas" the principle of collective tribal territorial responsibility comes into play. It equally applies to "administered areas" in addition to penal action under the FCR against individual offenders.

iv. Recently during the interim period, the Caretaker Government amended the FCR allowing Second Appeal in the shape of Revision before a Tribunal consisting of the Home Secretary and the Law Secretary. It has met the long standing demand of the tribesmen.

ROLE OF FRONTIER CORPS

43. The Frontier Corps acts as an arm of the Political Agent in maintaining law and order in tribal areas besides its role of guarding the Frontiers. The Political officers resort to the use of Frontier Corps in serious law and order situations only. It is necessary that the Frontier Corps is always on the beck and call of the Political Agent without seeking prior orders from the Headquarters. The Frontier Corps is governed under the Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959. The role of the Corps in so far as its availability to the Political Agent is concerned is defined under Section 7 of the Ordinance which is reproduced below :-

"Section.7 (1).The superintendence of and command and control over the Frontier Corps shall vest in the Governor NWFP and the Frontier Corps shall be administered, commanded and controlled by the Inspector General and the Commandonts in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance and any rules made thereunder and such orders and instructions as may be made or issued by the Governor NWFP from time to time.

(2) Every Frontier Corps and the Commandant of every Unit of Frontier Corps shall, in time of peace, be subject save in respect of administration, internal economy and training to the directions of the Political Agent or the Deputy Commissioner of the area within the headquarters of the Frontier Corps are located."

COST EFFECTIVENESS OF FATA ADMINISTRATION

44. The FATA Administration under a political representative of the Government is most suited to the genius of the people. Its cost on administrative structure is minimal as compared to settled districts, with one Political Agent, assisted hy a

couple of Assistant Political Agents, a few Tehsildars, a small outfit of Khasadars and Levies. Similarly the strength of Attached Departments is also negligible as compared with settled districts.

45. A random comparison has been drawn between the following four Districts and Agencies as an illustration:-

DISTRICT		AGENCIES	
Swat	11.725	M S.W. Agency	4.920 M
Abbottabad	8.483	M Khyber Agency	3.840 M
Swabi	8.570	M Bajaur Agency	3.789 M
Haripur	5.712	M Orakzai Agency	2.294 M

46. The present cost effectiveness of these agencies is more than half of the expenses incurred on the Administration of the District. This is true of entire FATA when compared with settled districts.

DEVELOPMENT OF FATA

47. Prolonged isolation and traditional abysmal backwardness have acted to keep the tribal areas characteristically backward compared with the national and provincial mainstream. Economic indicators of FATA along with a comparison with NWFP and Pakistan are given at Annex-D.

ADULT FRANCHISE

48. The adult franchise has raised high hopes of bringing about radical changes in FATA in a simplistic manner without taking ground realities into account.

49. After independence the process of integration took off more vigorously with expansion of communication infra-structure opening of closed areas and development out-reach in education, health, irrigation, drinking water, agriculture, animal husbandry and all other social sectors. Quotas in services and professional colleges gave a fillip to this process of amelioration and demand for bringing the tribal population into the mainstream of national polity gained momentum and the care-taker government finally conceded right of universal suffrage to tribesmen.

50. Undoubtedly the introduction of adult franchise has been well received and a lot of enthusiasm was witnessed during February-3 General Elections throughout FATAs. Although a great care was taken to ensure that the prevailing traditional

system of administration is not interfered with adversely nor did it weaken the Malaki system and the concept of tribal territorial responsibility, yet it did generate high hopes to bring about radical changes such as:-

a) abolition of FCR;
b) establishment of Elected Council on the pattern of Northern Areas;
c) introduction of Local Government Reforms;
d) doing away with the concept of tribal territorial responsibility;
e) imposition of individual responsibility; and
f) introduction of civil and criminal justice reforms;

51. Before dealing with these issues it appears pertinent to analyse the outcome of adult franchise and the parliamentary leadership thrown up by the election process.

(1) BAJAUR AGENCY

The Agency is inhabited by two main tribes i.e Tarkanis and Utmankhels. Malik Lal Karim has been returned by a reasonable lead. He comes from a "Muliano" family. He took active part in "Nifaz-e-Shariah" movement in 1994, went out in hiding thereafter and his house was demolished. Later he had to surrender and remained in jail for some time. He also had a narco background and his nomination papers were rejected by the Returning Officer, but later restored by the Appellate Court. He has strong backing of Ulema of the Agency and Darul Ulooms.

(2) MOHMAND AGENCY

The main three tribes of the Agency are Mohmand, Utmankhel and Safi. Malik Haji Baroz, Musa Khel Mohmand has won the election against Malik Abdul Wadood Khwezai . The latter belongs to a highly respected religious family of Khewezai. He is the son of Kutai Moulvi Sahib (late) and widely respected throughout the Agency. He was nearly elected, but for less than 150 votes. He and his brother Senator Abdul Rehman actively supported Afghan Mujahidins during Afghan War against Russian occupation.

(3) KHYBER AGENCY

Afridi, Shinwari, Mulagori and Shilmanis are the four tribes of the Agency. Malik Abdul Latif Advocate, Qambar Khel Afridi has been returned from this constituency. He is a political activist with strong nationalist outlook but had to seek support of Tanzeem-e-ulema (peace committee) of Bara Sub-division during elections. It was banned after scouts action in 1995 for running parallel

administration and having its own jail. The runner up is Sahibzada Nurul Haq Qadri s/o Haji Gul Sahib (late) of Landikotal. The margin of defeat in his case is about 1000. He again hails from a popular religious family and there was every chance of his success.

(4) ORAKZAI AGENCY

Besides Orakzais, the Agency is inhabited by four Hamsaya tribes, namely, Sheikhan, Ali Khel, Malla Khel and Mishti. The latter tribes are more powerful than the original Orakzai tribe due to numerical superiority. Here S. Munir Said, Mian Murid of Kalaya has won the election. He is Shia by faith with progressive thinking inspite of religious background. He is nephew of Gen (R) S.Jamal Said of Gharbina (Kurram).

(5) NORTH WAZIRISTAN

The Wazir and Dawar tribes of the Agency have over whelmingly voted in favour of Maulana Muhammad Dindar, Malizat Daur of Hassu Khel, Tehsil Mirali. He has the support of Ulema and Deeni Madaris of North Waziristan. He leads the Nifaz-e-Shariat Tehreek of FATA. Visited Afghanistan in recent past. Supports Taliban in Afghanistan.

(6) SOUTH WAZIRISTAN

Here again Maulana Nur Muhammad, Ahmadzai Wazir, supported by Ulema and Deeni Madaris mostly from Wazir area, has won the election. He had no support from Mahsud area. The Maulana spearheaded a revolt against the govt in 1976 in Wazir-Mahsud dispute on timber royalty and opening of Gomal Road. He also demands introduction of Shariah in tribal areas and the country at large.

(7) KURRAM AGENCY

The Sunni tribes of Kurram have over-whelmingly voted in favour of Malik Zarin Khan Mangal. He belongs to a loyal influential family of Mangal tribe having strong ties with his kinsmen living across the border in Paktia Province of Afghanistan, under Taliban.

(8) FRONTIER REGIONS

It is a heterogeneously split constituency consisting of six FRs namely, FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Bannu, FR Lakki, FR DIKhan and FR Tank. An arms dealer of FR Kohat Haji Baz Gul, Sharif Khel has won the election by dint of money.

52. It would be observed that we have three MNAs from FATA with strong religious background. Mohmand and Khyber had nearly returned members belonging to religious families, but for small edge by the successful candidates. It shows that candidates having religious links can sweep the elections in FATA and with Taliban in complete control in southern Afghanistan adjoining our borderland, the Shariah Movement can make inroads in tribal areas due to ethnic and religious bonds already existing between the two people.

53 In the back drop of the scenario developing in tribal areas the new political government in Pakistan will have to be very careful in evolving any future tribal policy. Any knee jerk action for introduction of local government reforms, demolition of concept of tribal territorial responsibility, extension of Political Parties Act and radical changes in dispensation of civil and criminal justice or policing of the area will have far reaching effects for the simple reason that no alternative workable system is either there or evolved to replace the existing edifice of governance contrived through a process of evolution spread over a period of almost a century now. A situation worst than PATAs of Dir, Swat and Malakand could emerge with not only foreign policy overtones but boundary disputes with Afghanistan on long porous border alignment. It is even missing in some places like Usmankhel, Khwezai and Baizai areas of Mohmand Agency.

BORDER SENSITIVITY

54. From the climbs of Inkel Sar a lofty feature between Dir and Bajaur to the southern outskirts of South Waziristan in Gul Kach, separating Balochistan from Frontier Province, the long 900 kms unmanned porous border with Afghanistan is inhabited by numerous tribes spreading over an area of 27,000 square kms. It has been divided into administrative units of seven Agencies and six Frontier Regions with a population of about 4 million (estimated 1997).

55 The border alignment between the British India and Afghanistan took place in 1893 and is known as Durand Line. In North West Frontier its length is about 1200 kms from the Pamir heights of Wakhan to Gul Kach in South Waziristan. The physical alignments took place after the Durand Agreement by special Commissions appointed by the British Empire and the Amir. At some places it was marked on the map but not physically aligned. Such areas are shown in broken line as is the case of Mohmand border between Nawa Pass and Salala down to River Kabul near Shalman. This area is lived by the assured Usman Khel, Baizai and Khwezai Mohmand tribe of Pakistan. * Fact

56. The present border arrangement is novel for its being inhabited by the same tribes on both sides. Wazirs, Mangals, Gurbaz, Maqbals, Paras, Shinwaris, Mohmands, Safis, Tarkanis and Mushwanis are note worthy. It is unmanned yet no dispute of the nature of any ingress into one another's area has arisen for more than a century since its alignment in 1893, even during rupture of diplomatic relations in Premier late Sardar Daud's time. Besides Pakistan and every emerging regime in Afghanistan, the tribes living on both sides have respected the border settlement made by the Amir and the British Empire.

57. In some circles ideas like justification for retention of special status of FATAs are coined. Such considerations are very often linked with crimes like smuggling of drugs, arms, foreign goods, etc. These are, no doubt, law and order issues of great importance, but these were there in one form or another throughout the long history of border land, particularly ever since the border alignment of 1893.

58. Here it is relevant to refer to the treaty of peace between British Empire and Afghanistan government, concluded at Rawalpindi on 8th August 1919 and the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 2nd November 1921 (ratified and exchanged on 19th February 1922) (Annex E & F). In Article-5 of the former treaty the Afghan government undertook to abide by the Indo-Afghan frontier as accepted by the late Amir. Under Article II of the later agreement the two High Contracting Parties again mutually recognised the Indo-Afghan frontier as accepted by the Afghan government in the former treaty of 8th August 1919.

59. Article XI of the later agreement is relevant with the subject of this discourse and is reproduced below for ready reference:-

"The two High Contracting Parties having mutually satisfied themselves each regarding the goodwill of the other and especially regarding their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in future of any military operation of major importance which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their respective spheres, before the commencement of such operation".

60. The treaties with Afghanistan and more emphatically those entered with the tribes will have to be respected and due caution exercised while introducing reforms. The existing administrative structure is built on tribal equilibrium based on "Nikat", concept of tribal territorial responsibility and dispensation of justice in

summary

accordance with local traditions and customs. These arrangements are inter-linked with Anglo-Afghan understanding about territories defined under boundary agreements and tribal treaties. So, any tribal policy will be incomplete and unrealistic without a clear border policy. Demolition of one will take the bottom out of the other and the whole edifice of administrative and socio-political set up will crumble without any alternative arrangement in place. There is, therefore, a dire need for strengthening the existing system of governance till a viable alternative is found.

61. While dealing with the epoch making decision of separation of trans-Indus territories of North-West frontier and Cis-Indus area of Hazara from the Punjab in 1901 under Lord Curzon, in his book "The Pathan" Sir Olaf Caroe proceeds to state that in "tribal territory under a vague executive control where a foot placed wrong might at any time attract the responsibility not only of the Central government in India but of London itself". It is still true of FATA administration and its mode of governance. The sensitivities of change need due appreciation before any impetuous leap forward in a carried away state of mind endowed with success achieved in the introduction of universal suffrage which still some students of tribal history regard in gestation stage.

62. Though the existing Political Administration and Border Policy are inseparably interwoven, yet for the sake of arguments if it is conceded that the one can be dealt with in isolation of the other, would it be possible for the Government to ensure its presence with all the military infrastructure along 1200 k.ms long border in North West Frontier and equally long alignment in Balochistan ? Would it be cost effective and what are we going to achieve ? It would only mean kicking up border controversy with Afghanistan, specially when we are not aware of the final outcome of the existing internecine war of self-destruction between various factions having the support of one or another neighbouring country of the region and particularly the spoiler India.

The factional war in Afghanistan before advent of Taliban presented a see-saw scenario. Disappointed by their leaders the people of Afghanistan organized themselves into traditional tribal groups at the district (ulaswali) and Provincial (walayat) levels and started distancing themselves from Kabul. It followed the formation of local "Shuras" and the whole country disintegrated into small semi-independent pockets with or without even a loose linkage with the regime at Kabul. Those "Shuras" who belonged to the opposing factions owed no allegiance what-so-ever to Kabul. This arrangement also fell apart due to differences in rank

and file of local "Shuras" besides other maladies creeping into them like corruption, loot, crime, poor law and order and mismanagement. So, the people became disenchanted and disappointed with these "Shoorai" plunderers and thugs.

64. The Afghan nation in the guest of a 'messiah' has now put its destiny in the hands of student warriors rising out of the blue from a 'madrassa' in Kandahar. Within a period of two years they have occupied 70% of Afghanistan. Except for few provinces and finally Kabul, they were generally welcomed for their unbelievable quality of bringing peace, controlling crime and dispensing justice under Shariah. Their most commendable work everywhere was disarming and building confidence in the people by restoring order and bringing all mal-contents to knees.

65. They are, no doubt, the most powerful entity in Afghanistan, but surely not the lasting phase of the conflict. Besides the warlords of Jumbish-e-Milli, Sura-e-Nazar and Hizb-e-Wahdat, the erstwhile local "Shura" leaders of many Walayats are always prepared to way-lay, ambush and dislodge Taliban for regaining their lost seats of power. Some regional powers are also conspiring against them and providing moral and material support to the forces at war with Taliban. Frequent rebellions raising heads here and there are clear indicators of the extent of opposition against them.

66. There is no denying the fact that Taliban are most important to us for their presence along eastern and southern frontiers of Afghanistan separating our borderland inhabited by people descending from the same human stock with common culture and heritage. Nevertheless, we must have to keep our options open and should not allow ourselves to be carried away by the prevailing power game in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, eventualities consequential to any reversal of Taliban should also be assessed. Every upheaval in Afghanistan has resulted in evacuation of affectees and a fresh refugees exodus. In case of Taliban meeting the fate of their predecessors the problem for Pakistan will be horrendous because of their academic connections with Madrassas and Ulema in FATA, NWFP and Balochistan. Their influence otherwise also in FATAs is a matter of concern for Pakistan. They are now a war hardened lot with extreme religious bias. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that a contingency plan should be worked out to meet any eventuality, specially in FATA due to its peculiar border situation and mode of governance.

67. Another important factor is the inaccessibility of large tracts of tribal country along the Durand Line. About 40% of the tribal area in Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur is politically inaccessible with general aversion to communication linkage with administered areas. 20% of it is still off limits for the Political Administration in North Waziristan. In such a situation which cannot be remedied in the foreseeable future, would it be possible for the Government to open these areas and man the border and if at all done, at what cost on fiscal, political and foreign relations considerations.

68. At present our presence is limited to Zarmelan, Khand Narai, Zilai and Angor Adda in South Waziristan, Saidgi and Ghulam Khan in North Waziristan, Khardand, Laka Tigga, Malikhel, Kharlachi, Burki and Tari Mangal in Kurram Agency, Torkham and Loi Shalman in Khyber Agency and Nawa Pass and Ghakhi in Bajaur Agency and further on at Binshahi in Dir and Arandu and Tura Pass in Chitral District. There are innumerous other unfrequented routes leading into tribal areas plugging of which would be an uphill task if not impossible.

69. In the circumstances we have no option except holding fast to the existing border policy with its inseparable linkage with the existing system of administration in tribal areas. 1997 Pakistan Conclusion

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL BONDS WITH AFGHANISTAN

70. The traditional commercial co-existence between the two people also needs to be recognized and given due weightage in our relations with Afghanistan. After the third Afghan War of 1919 this aspect of relationship found central place in the Rawalpindi Peace Treaty of 1921 between British Empire and Afghanistan. The covenant lays down the border trade and commercial relationship. The relevant Article of the Treaty is reproduced below:

*"**No Customs** duties shall be levied at British Indian ports on goods imported under the provisions of Article-VI on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan, for immediate transport to Afghanistan Provided that a certificate signed by such Afghan authority or representative as may from time to time be determined by the two Government shall be presented at the time of importation to the Chief Custom Officer at the port of import setting forth that the goods in question are the property of the government of Afghanistan and are being sent under its orders to Afghanistan, and showing the description, number and value of the goods in respect of which exemption is claimed; provided, secondly, that the goods are*

required for the public services of Afghanistan and not for the purposes of any State monopoly or State trade; and provided, thirdly, that the goods are, unless of a clearly distinguishable nature transported through India in sealed packages, which shall not be opened or sub-divided before their export from India.

And also the British Government agrees to the grant in respect of all trade goods imported into India at British ports for re-export to Afghanistan and exported to Afghanistan by routes to be agreed upon between the two Governments of a rebate at the time and place of export of the full amount of Customs duty levied upon such goods, provided that such goods shall be transported through India in sealed packages which shall not be opened or sub-divided before their export from India.

And also the British Government declares that it has no present intention of levying Customs duty on goods or livestock of Afghan origin or manufacture, imported by land or by river into India or exported from Afghanistan to other countries of the world through India and the import of which into India is not prohibited by law. In the event, however, of the British Government deciding in the future to levy Customs duties on goods and livestock imported into India by land or by river from neighbouring States, it will, if necessary, levy such duties on imports from Afghanistan; but in that event it agrees that it will not levy higher duties on imports from Afghanistan that those levied on imports from such neighbouring States,. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the levy on imports from Afghanistan of the present Khyber tolls and of octroi in any town of India in which octroi is or may be hereafter levied, provided that there shall be no enhancement aver the present rate of the khyber tolls".

71 Afghanistan had historically been a recognized commercial route between the Sub-Continent and Central Asia on the one hand and through the latter Kashgar and Czar's Russia on the other. The Soviet Union's '**Iron Curtain**' slammed the doors of centuries old trade and commercial interaction between these areas. The British Empire also had her colonial interests in terminating the traditional economic ties between Afghanistan, China and Central Asian States due to the threat of Russian expansion eastward. The Empire's desire to bring Afghanistan into its tutelage and use it as a buffer between the Soviet Union and British India was best served in denying social contacts to the people of these areas through commercial links. Coupled with this geo-political and colonial interests, the

British Empire also wanted to capture the markets of Sub-Continent, Afghanistan and Iran for imperial goods.

72. With the epoch making event of Independence of Sub-Continent in the middle of twentieth century followed by removal of **'Iron Curtain'** on the disintegration of Soviet Union about four decades later, the climate for resumption of broken commercial ties has re-emerged. Now all eyes are focused on the return of peace in Afghanistan to resurrect broken commercial life.

73. The commercial dependence of land-locked Afghanistan on Pakistan brings the two countries and its people more closer. This advantageous position enjoyed by Pakistan is a leverage for establishing strong economic and commercial ties with Afghanistan. The war ravaged country and helpless people need our assistance in every walk of life, education, health, communication and infra-structural reconstruction. Unfortunately, instead of showing compassion and sympathy to the destitute Afghans in the shape of cheap and easy supply of essential commodities, the successive governments made them hostage to **"permit mafia"** and made the supplies more than ten times costlier for them. The bureaucracy hand in gloves with political big-wigs made a hay day of the permit system. The interim government initiated steps to give up the permit system and instead make supplies to the 'Shooras' of the adjoining southern provinces of Afghanistan and Kabul through their nominated representatives in consultation with the Afghan Cell in Foreign Ministry. On the one hand it would make our contacts with all Afghan entities stronger while on the other the people of Afghanistan will be saved from the exploitation of several middlemen. It needs to be pursued. In addition articles like salt, gur, sugar, course cloth, soap, agricultural implements and inputs and all value added goods should be allowed freely without any let or hindrance through normal commercial channels in accordance with Rawalpindi Treaty of 1921 between the British Empire and the Amir. It is a raison d'etre between the two sovereign countries in matters of border alignment and commercial relations. This treaty aims at continued commercial dependence of Afghanistan on Pakistan which is more in our interest. Here rupture of diplomatic relations of early seventies, closure of frontiers and with them commercial ties could be quoted when Afghanistan had to look upon Communist neighbour for its economic and commercial survival. It provided a welcome and highly cherished opportunity to Soviet Union to increase its economic and political influence which culminated in Sour Revolution of 1978 followed by occupation of Afghanistan by Red Army.

74. We have experienced more recently that restrictions on transit trade have not proved fruitful. Iranian ports and Gulf states particularly Dubai have replaced Karachi which is damaging our political interests. Smuggling of foreign goods is going on unabated and our leverage in transit trade has disappeared. So, a well thought out transit trade policy, which is economically sound, creates goodwill, promotes relations with brotherly Muslim country and divests the element of trading goods other than those of Pak-Afghan origin, needs to be evolved. It has to be based on mutual understanding, so that the genuine interests of people of Afghanistan are accommodated.

ANNEX-A

AGREEMENT between HIS Highness AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S.I., AMIR of AFGHANISTAN and its DEPENDENCIES on the one part, and SIR HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., FOREIGN SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, representing THE GOVERNMENT of INDIA on the other part, -1893.

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both HIS HIGHNESS the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:-

(1) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map[1] attached to this agreement.

(2) The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying belong this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

(3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

(4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map[2] attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.

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(1) Not reproduced.

(2) Not reproduced.

(5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:-

From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Pasha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

(7) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India under-take to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.

H. M. DURAND.

AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN

KABUL;
12th November 1893.

ANNEX-B

AGREEMENT entered into by the ZAKHA KHEL, MALIKDIN KHEL, KAMBAR KHEL, KAMRAI KHEL, SIPAH KHEL, and KUKI KHEL, AFRIDIS, and the SHINWARIS of LANDI KOTAL accepting responsibility for the KHYBER PASS, dated February 1881.

We agree as follows:-

1. On the understanding that the British Government maintain political relations with us, while at the same time our independence continues to be fully recognized, we are bound to exclude all other influence, and not to admit the interference of any other power between ourselves and the British Government.
2. In consideration of receiving certain allowances, the amount of which Government has engaged to fix, we hereby undertake the responsibility of preserving order and security of life and property within the Khyber Pass.
3. All matters affecting the pass arrangements, and especially the security of the road, shall be submitted to a combine council of all the Afridi tribes.
   Through this council arrangements will be made such as will provide for the security of the lives and property of all who use the Khyber Road without distinction of class or race, local being entitled to equal protection with foreign traffic; and care will be taken that no inter-tribal or personal feuds are pursued on or near the road or posts.
4. No traders or travellers will be allowed to enter the pass without an order authorising them to proceed, which will be furnished by the persons responsible together with a sufficient guard for protection.
   Should any prospect of danger present itself, owing to the existence or likelihood of any disturbance on or near the road, we will be responsible for closing the pass, giving notice to that effect to the Khan of Lalpura and to the Political Officer at Jamrud, and will further make due provision for the safety of any trade or travellers within the pass.
5. Our responsibility for the security of the road is independent of aid from Government in the form of troops. It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the pass or to withdraw them and to reoccupy at pleasure.
6. We will provide such number of men as Government may direct to carry on the duties of Jezailchis, of whom some force is absolutely necessary, to enable us to render the road secure.

These men, having their headquarters at Jamrud, will be subject to the inspection of the Political Officer, and all arrangements which we make for the distribution of their duties shall be reported to him. Should we wish to employ them on any other duty than that of protecting the road, the permission of the Political Officer must be obtained.

We fully understand that these Jezailchis are not a Government force, and that although maintained at Government expense, they are being allowed merely as an additional means of enabling us to fulfil our engagements.

7. So long as we are in receipt of the Khyber allowances the right of collecting tolls rests with the British Government alone. We cannot claim any payments of traders or travellers.

8. All offences committed on the road shall be dealt with by the united council of all the tribes, whether individuals or sections of tribes are concerned.

The council shall inflict punishment after the manner of our tribal customs and compensation will be awarded to the injured party or parties.

The action taken on the commission of any offence, or in regard to the punishment of the offenders, shall be reported to the Political Officer, through whom any compensation can be enforced by deductions from the allowances made by Government.

9. In consideration of the allowances of which we shall be in receipt, we further bind ourselves not to commit dacoity, highway robbery, or murder in British territory. Any transgression of this condition will make our allowances liable to forfeiture in payment of fine or compensation due on this account.

10. All arrangements that we make in fulfilling our responsibility for the protection of the road shall be reported to the Political Officer.

All convoys wishing to proceed through the pass shall be despatched periodically under a guard, and we are responsible for all trade or travellers admitted within the pass.

11. We will maintain until further orders the standing posts or chaukis which have hitherto been kept up along the road by the tribes, and have been paid for from the allowances. The tribal watchmen who occupy them will be employed either in guarding their assigned localities or in forming part of the escort on the periodical convoys.

12. Of the Government buildings situate in the pass, we consent to take some under our charge, guaranteeing their security; the rest should be dismantled by Government.

We engage to hold the fort of Ali Masjid, understanding that Government will grant an additional company of 100 Jezailchis for this special duty.

13. We undertake to guarantee the safety of the Political Officer, or other official who may have occasion to visit the Khyber Pass, provided that sufficient notice be given us beforehand.

14. It is understood that the boundary fixed by Treaty of Government west of Landi Khana is the limit of our responsibilities. This is liable to subsequent alteration at the discretion of Government.

15. Permanent arrangements will be made by which posts or expresses can be forwarded at any time, night or day.

16. We are prepared to take charge of the Khyber Pass in the manner above indicated from Landi Khana to Ali Masjid, and again from Ali Masjid to Jamrud, at once, or so soon as Government directs the withdrawal of troops from the whole of this road or any part of it. Meanwhile the tribes will preserve their present obligations.

17. We understand that we are exclusively responsible for the future management of Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this responsibility, and this position we accept.

ANNEX-C

AGREEMENT entered into between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and the KHYBER

AFRIDIS, - 1898.

Extract from a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to Brigadier-General C.C.Egerton, A.-D.-C., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Khyber Brigade, dated Simla the 7th October 1898.

1 The Governor-General in Council has decided to associate Mr.F.D.Cunningham, C.I.E., C.S., with you for the purpose of communicating to the full jirga of the Afridi clans, with whom the Khyber Agreement of 17th February 1881 was concluded, the terms upon which the Government of India have decided to renew friendly relations with them and to deal with the Khyber Pass.

2. The jirga has been summoned by you to assemble in Peshawar on the 24th October 1898, and I now am to convey instructions as to the manner in which you and your colleague will announce the Government terms and explain their nature and attention.

3 The announcement to be made is to the following effect;-

First. The Afridis by their own acts ruptured all agreements, forfeited all allowances, and forced the British Government to take and hold the Pass which, as already announced by Sir William Lockhar, will be managed and controlled as the British Government think most desirable.

Second. The Pass will be kept open for trade. The British Government will build a fort at Landi Kotal and posts between that and Jamrud, will keep up a good road or roads and, if they want it, a railway, and will take such measures as they think fit to punish offences and preserve order on road and railway in the fort and posts, and in the neighbourhood where necessary for their purposes.

Third. The Afridis will have no dealings with any power but the British. They will be left to manage their own affairs in their own country; but, in the Khyber Pass, they are responsible to the British Government that they will cooperate to preserve order and security of life and property on roads or railway and within the limits of the Pass.

Fourth. The British Government will give allowances as formerly to the Khyber Afridi clans for discharging this duty, and will maintain a

militia recruited from the Afridi and other tribes and commanded by British officers. The British Government do not undertake to always keep troops at Landi Kotal, but will make arrangements for supporting the militia if circumstances require.

Fifth. Arrangements for trade in the Khyber will be made by the British Government, and the militia will be used for guarding travellers.

Sixth. The allowances granted by the British Government will commence to reckon from the date of the adhesion by the tribe to the terms settled by the Government of India; but they are subject to withdrawal for misbehaviour in the Pass, in British India, or against the friends or allies of Government.

Translation of written statement of acceptance of orders of Government handed in by Maliks, elders and representatives of the Khyber Afridis in full Jirga.

To

Mr.F.D.Cunningham,
Commissioner.

Sir,

We, headmen, representatives, and men[3] of the Afridi clans, Kuki Khel, Malikdin, Sipah, Zakka Khel, Kamrai and Kambar Khel represent that on the day of the Darbar[4] six terms (or conditions) laid down by Government were read out to us, and after that copies of a Pushtu translation were given to us, we have thoroughly understood them; we now declare by this writing that we accept and acquiesce in these six terms which are attached[5] to this paper, and this "jirga" for itself and as representing all the clans concerned agrees to these terms unconditionally.

Dated 26th October 1898.

(Here follow seals and attestations of over 200 Maliks, elders and representative men.)

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(3) Kisharan, literally 'small men.'

(4) i.e., 24th October.

(5) Note.- Attached to the original is one of the lithographed copies of the terms, certified by seals of the principal Maliks.

IL-L-0559/OSD/6930

ANNEX-D

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

S.No	ITEM	PAKISTAN	NWFP	FATA
	Literacy rate (%)	26.17	16.79	6.38
	Male	35.05	25.85	18.09
	Female	15.09	6.48	0.79
2.	Population per Hospital bed	1583.0	1597.0	2354.0
3.	Drinking Water Supply (%)	52.0	58.0	42.9
4.	Rural Sanitation (%)	15.0	2.0	
5.	Roads per sq.km	0.14	0.12	0.14

ANNEX- E

TREATY OF PEACE between the Illustrious BRITISH GOVERNMENT and the Independent AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, concluded at Rawalpindi on the 8th August 1919, corresponding to the 11th Ziqada, 1337 Hijra.

The following Articles for the restoration of peace have been agreed upon by the British Government and the Afghan Government:-

ARTICLE 1

From the date of the signing of this Treaty there shall be peace between the British Government, on the one part, and the Government of Afghanistan on the other.

ARTICLE 2

In view of the circumstances which have brought about the present war between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, the British Government, to mark their displeasure, withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amir's of importing arms, ammunition or warlike munitions through India to Afghanistan.

ARTICLE 3

The arrears of the late Amir's subsidy are furthermore confiscated, and no subsidy is granted to the present Amir.

ARTICLE 4

At the same time, the British Government are desirous of the re-establishment of the old friendship that has so long existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain, provided they have guarantees that the Afghan Government are, on their part, sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The British Government are prepared, therefore, provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts and conduct, to receive another Afghan mission after six months for the discussion and settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis.

ARTICLE 5

The Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation by a British Commission of the undemarcated portion of the line west of the Khyber, where the recent Afghan aggression took place, and to accept such boundary as the British Commission may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their present position until such demarcation has been effected.

ALI AHMAD KHAN,

Commissary for Home Affairs and Chief of the Peace Delegation of the Afghan Government.

A. H. GRANT

Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and Chief of the Peace Delegation of the British Government

ANNEX-F

TREATY between GREAT BRITAIN and AFGHANISTAN establishing Friendly and Commercial Relations. - Kabul, November 22nd. 1921.

(Ratifications exchanged at Kabul, February 6th, 1922.)

The British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, with a view to the establishment of neighbourly relations between them, have agreed to the articles written hereunder whereto the undersigned duly authorised to that effect have set their seals:-

ARTICLE I.

The British Government and the Government of Afghanistan mutually certify and respect each with regard to the other all rights of internal and external independence.

ARTICLE II.

The two High Contracting Parties mutually accept the Indo-Afghan frontier as accepted by the Afghan Government under Article V of the Treaty concluded at Rawalpindi on the 8th August, 1919, corresponding to the 11th Ziqada, 1337 Hijra, and also the boundary west of the Khyber laid down by the British Commission in the months of August and September 1919, pursuant to the said Article, and shown on the map[6] attached to this Treaty by a black chain line; subject only to the re-alignment set forth in Schedule I annexed, which has ben agreed upon in order to include within the boundaries of Afghanistan the place known as Tor Kham, and the whole bed of the Kabul River between Shilman Khwala Banda and Palosai and which is shown on the said map[7] by a red chain line. The British Government agrees that the Afghan authorities shall be permitted to draw water in reasonable quantities through a pipe which shall be provided by the British Government from Landi Khana for the use of Afghan subjects at Tor Kham, and the Government of Afghanistan agrees that British offices and tribesmen living on the British side of the boundary shall be permitted without let or hindrance to use the aforesaid portion of the Kabul River for purposes of navigation and that all existing rights of irrigation from the aforesaid portion of the river shall be continued to British subjects.

ARTICLE III.

The British Government agrees that a Minister from His Majesty the Amir of Afghanistan shall be received at the Royal Court of London like the envoys of all other powers, and to permit the establishment of an Afghan Legation in London, and the Government of Afghanistan likewise agrees to receive in Kabul a Minister from His Britannic Majesty the Emperor of India and to permit the establishment of a British Legation at Kabul.

Each Party shall have the right of appointing a Military Attaché to its Legation

ARTICLE IV.

The Government of Afghanistan agrees to the establishment of British Consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad, and the British Government agrees to the establishment of an Afghan Consul-General at the headquarters of the Government of India and three Afghan Consulates at Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay. In the event of the Afghan Government desiring at any time to appoint Consular officers in any British territories other than India a separate agreement shall be drawn up to provide for such appointments if they are approved by the British Government.

ARTICLE V.

The two High Contracting Parties mutually guarantee the personal safety and honourable treatment each of the representatives of the other, whether Minister, Consul-General or Consuls, within their own boundaries, and they agree that the said representatives shall be subject in the discharge of their duties to the provisions set forth in the Second Schedule annexed to this Treaty. The British Government further agrees that the Minister, Consul-General and Consuls of Afghanistan shall, within the territorial limits within which they are permitted to reside or to exercise their functions. notwithstanding the provisions of the said Schedule, receive and enjoy any rights or privileges which are or may hereafter be granted to or enjoyed by the Minister, Consul-General or Consuls of any other Government in the countries in which the places of residence of the said Minister, Consul-General and Consuls of Afghanistan are fixed; and the Government of Afghanistan likewise agrees that the Minister and Consuls of Great Briton shall, within the territorial limits within which they are permitted to reside or to exercise their functions, notwithstanding the provisions f the said Schedule, receive and enjoy any rights or privilege which are or may hereafter be granted to or enjoyed by the Minister or Consuls of any other Government in the countries in which the places of residence of the said Minister and Consuls of Great Britain are fixed.

ARTICLE VI.

As it is for the benefit of the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan shall be strong and prosperous, the British Government agrees that whatever quantity of material is required for the strength and welfare of Afghanistan, such as all kinds of factory machinery, engine and materials and instruments for telegraph. telephones, etc., which Afghanistan may be able to buy form Britain or the British Dominions or from other countries of the world, shall ordinarily be imported without let or hindrance by Afghanistan into its own territories from the ports of the British Isles and British India. Similarly the Government of Afghanistan agrees that every kind of goods. the export of which is not against the internal law of the Government of Afghanistan and which may in the judgment of the Government of Afghanistan be in excess of the internal needs and requirements of Afghanistan and is required by the British Government can be purchased and exported to Indian with the permission of the Government of Afghanistan. With regard to arms and munitions, the British Government agrees that as long as it is assured that the intentions of the Government of Afghanistan are friendly and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importation in Afghanistan. permission shall be given without let or hindrance for such importation. If, however, the Arms Traffic Convention is hereafter ratified by the Great Powers of the world and comes into force, the right of importation of arms and munitions by the Afghan Government shall be subject to the proviso that the Afghan Government shall first have signed the Arms Traffic Convention, and that such importation shall only be made in

accordance with the provisions of that Convention. Should the Arms Traffic Convention not be ratified or lapse, the Government of Afghanistan, subject to the foregoing assurance, can from time to time import into its own territory the arms and munitions mentioned above through the ports of the British Isles and British India.

ARTICLE VII.

No Customs duties shall be levied at British Indian ports on goods imported under the provisions of Article VI on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan, for immediate transport to Afghanistan, provided that a certificate signed by such Afghan authority or representative as may from time to time be determined by the two Governments shall be presented at the time of importation to the Chief Customs Officer at the port of import setting forth that the goods in question are the property of the Government of Afghanistan and are being sent under its orders to Afghanistan, and showing the description, number and value of the goods in respect of which exemption is claimed; provided, secondly, that the goods are required for the public services of Afghanistan and not for the purposes of any State monopoly or State trade; and provided, thirdly, that the goods are, unless of a clearly distinguishable nature, transported through India in sealed packages, which shall not be opened or sub-divided before their export from India.

And also the British Government agrees to the grant in respect of all trade goods imported into India at British ports for re-export to and exported to Afghanistan by routes to be agreed upon between the two Government of a rebate at the time and place of export of the full amount of Customs duty levied upon such goods, provided that such goods shall be transported through India in sealed packages which shall not be opened or sub-divided before their export from India.

And also the British Government declares that it has no present intention of levying Customs duty on goods or livestock of Afghan origin or manufacture, imported by land or by river into India or exported from Afghanistan to other countries of the world through India and the import of which into India is not prohibited by law. In the event, however, of the British Government deciding in the future of levy Customs duties on goods and livestock imported into India by land or by river from neighbouring States, it will, if necessary, levy such duties on imports from Afghanistan; but in that event it agrees that it will not levy higher duties on imports from Afghanistan than those levied on imports from such neighbouring states. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the levy on imports from Afghanistan of the present Khyber tolls and of octroi in any town of India in which octroi is or may be hereafter levied, provided that there shall be no enhancement over the present rate of the Khyber tolls.

ARTICLE VIII.

The British Government agrees to the establishment of trade agents by the Afghan Government at Peshawar, Quetta and Parachinar, provided that the personnel and the property of the said agencies shall be subject to the operations of all British laws and orders and to the jurisdiction of British Courts; and that they shall not be recognised by the British authorities as having any official or special privileged position.

ARTICLE IX.

The trade goods coming to (imported to) Afghanistan under the provision of Article VII from Europe, etc., can be opened at the railway terminuses at Jamrud, in the Kurram and at Chaman for packing and arranging to suit the capacity of baggage animals

snowflake

October 2, 2002 4:28 PM

370

TO: Jim Haynes
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Deployments Orders

I notice that some of these deployment orders are stuck in your offices for ten days—that sounds long to me. Why don't you try to squeeze them down to a week?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100202-15

Please respond by 10/11/02

2 Oct 02

U03964 /03

snowflake

October 2, 2002 11:59 AM

091412

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Truth

You know how in a small town a liar is known as a liar, but apparently in our world, a country that lies repeatedly is not known as a liar, but is treated as credible.

I wonder if there is a press seminar where that could become the issue, like Bernard Kalb or some television program that could discuss these issues.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100202-7

Please respond by 10/18/02

2 Oct 02

U03965 /03

snowflake

October 2, 2002 12:22 PM

333 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Post-NATO Summit Travel

Please see me about what we do around the NATO summit, afterwards, if I do want to go to the Horn of Africa or to some other countries.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100202-12

Please respond by 10/11/02

2 Oct 02

U03966 /03

snowflake

October 2, 2002 4:45 PM

10.01

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Budget Briefing

I have to find some way to get a grip on what's going on the budget up on the Hill and how it affects the flow of forces for Gen. Franks.

I was in a meeting with Feith, Wolfowitz, Myers and Pace, and the only one who had the vaguest idea what was going on was Pace.

I simply have to get a briefing, and I'd like someone other than Dov—I'd like someone I can understand, who is clear.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100202-20

Please respond by 10/07/02

2 Oct 02

U03967 /03

snowflake

October 2, 2002 4:25 PM

729

TO: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Safety

I have been over this safety record you sent along, and I appreciate the effort you are putting into it.

However, at least on the surface, it looks to me like the record is not good, and the Marines' record is terrible. Have you done any benchmarking?

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/24/02 SecNav memo to SecDef re: 3rd Quarter Safety Report [U15519/02]

DHR:dh
100202-6

Please respond by 10/18/02

2 Oct 02

U03968 /03

snowflake

January 7, 20

ASN ___
EA ___
MA ___

- give to 1/9/02
Mr Johnson

TO: Tom White
Gordon England
James Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Safety Records

Larry DI Rita 9/3

I would appreciate it if you would send me quarterly reports on your safety records—the metrics you are using and showing whether they are getting better or worse.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-45

Please respond by _____

9/ SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 02 2002

Sec Def —
- At each Tab, for that category (e.g., "aviation"), there is a
  - One year (Jun-Jun) Summary
  - Annual (10-year) Summary
  - Delineation of specific incidents in that category over past year.

D. Rita
Larry DI Rita

INFO MEMO

24 September 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 02 2002

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: 3rd Quarter FY02 Safety Report

This quarter we installed a new desktop executive safety summary icon on leaders' desktops. Senior Department of the Navy leadership can now view Class A mishap summaries and trend information updated daily. I am attaching copies of web pages for your review. One module of our new web-based reporting system is on-line, and the second is ready to test with a October 1, 2002 deployment target.

In June I sent a message to all Navy and Marine Corps in which I personally championed our efforts to reduce lost days due to injuries. My message outlined the processes "to step up efforts to reduce lost time due to injuries" at Navy and Marine Corps activities. To address our pervasive and systemic high workers compensation costs a team of Navy and Marine Corps subject matter experts from Human Resources (HR), Injury Compensation Program Administrators (ICPA), Medical Providers, and Safety Professionals recently developed a plan to reduce Navy and Marine Corps' Continuation Of Pay (COP) and Leave Without Pay (LWOP) Rates. We are working diligently to achieve results for both military and civilian personnel. We trained thousands in Operational Risk Management (ORM) these past months and are integrating ORM into our schoolhouses.

I established a safety task force to provide me with recommendations on best Department of the Navy safety structure and effective processes to employ in order to further reduce mishaps and injuries. The task force is comprised of safety expertise from within the military, the private sector, and other Federal Agencies. It builds on the National Safety Council report submitted to you on Department of Defense safety. The Chair, Principal Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment), will provide task force recommendations to me on September 30, 2002.

Attachments:
As stated

TAB 1 - Safety Report
TAB 2 - Snowflake

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	C 9/30
MA BUCCI	SB 9/30
EXECSEC WHITMORE	4 9/26

U15519 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/6942

Naval Safety Center

Last Update: 30 July 2002 08:23 AM

Navy and Marine Corps Executive Safety Summary

Yearly Trends

- Aviation
- Afloat
- Ashore

10-Year Trends

- Total Operational
- Aviation
- Afloat
- Ashore
- PMV Fatalities
- Civilian Lost Time

12-Month Trends

- Total Operational
- Aviation
- Afloat
- Ashore
- PMV Fatalities

FY02 Summaries

- Aviation
- Afloat
- Ashore

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

11-L-0559/OSD/6943

Return to Index | 10-Year Trends

Navy and Marine Corps PMV Fatality Rates

As of 30 Jul 02



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(Jul02=Aug01 through present)

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Return to Index | 12-Month Trends

Navy and Marine Corps PMV Fatality Rates As of 30 Jul 02



Rates reflect military fatalities per 100,000 personnel per year.

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Navy and Marine Corps
Federal Civilian Lost Time Case Rates
As of 30 Jun 02



Civilian lost time case rates = total number of worker's compensation cases involving lost time injuries per 100 workers per year.

ASN(I&E)

Back to Index

Navy and Marine Corps Federal Civilian Lost Time Case Rates As of 30 Jun 02



Civilian lost time case rates = total number of worker's compensation cases involving lost time injuries per 100 workers per year.

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Return to Index | Yearly Trends | 10-Year Trends | Mishap Summaries

Navy and Marine Corps
Class A Flight Mishap Rates
As of 30 Jul 02



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(Jul02-Aug01 through present)

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

DoN Aviation Class A Flight Mishap Rates

(FY2002 as of 30 Jul)

	FY01	FY02
USN	14 / 1.25	18 / 1.82
USMC	5 / 1.40	14 / 4.45



Rate = Class A mishaps per 100,000 flight hours

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Return to Index | Yearly Trends | 12-Month Trends | 10-Year Trends

Aviation Class A Mishaps

FY02 as of 30 July

Class A Flight Mishaps:

- **23 Oct**: F-18C, VFA-105 (Nellis) Engine fire, pilot ejected.
- **15 Nov**: EA-6B, VQ-129 (Washington) Aircraft crashed during training syllabus flight. Crew rescu by helo.
- **21 Nov**: EA-6B, VMAQ-1 (Virginia Capes) Aircraft crashed into water. Aircrew ejected, suffered first-aid injuries.
- **6 Dec**: UH-1N, HMM-365 (Afghanistan) On takeoff, aircraft struck ground, rolled and burned.
- **9 Jan**: KC-130R, VMGR-352 (Pakistan) Aircraft hit mountain near airfield, 7 fatalities.
- **16 Jan:** F-18A, VFA-203 (Georgia) Aircraft nose landing gear collapsed on landing rollout. Aircra departed runway, pilot ejected.
- **20 Jan:** CH-53E, HMM-163 (Afghanistan) Aircraft crashed. Cause unknown. 2 fatalities, 5 injurie
- **7 Feb:** CH-46D, HC-6 (Virginia Capes) During VERTREP, helo entered water and inverted. Aircr lost at sea. No injuries.
- **11 Feb:** KC-130F, VMGR -252 (29 Palms) During departure phase, aircraft crash-landed. Major a first-aid injuries.
- **11 Feb:** UH-1N, HMM-165 (Kenya) Aircraft struck ground, remained upright. Severe aircraft damage.
- **14 Feb:** UH-1N, HMM-166 (California) Aircraft crashed into ground, 2 fatalities, 2 injured.
- **17 Feb:** F-18D, VMFA(AW)-533 (29 Palms) Following landing and subsequent hook-skip, aircraf departed runway; aircrew ejected. 1 fatality.
- **2 Mar:** F-14B, VF-143 (Mediterranean) Aircrew ejected during catapult stroke, aircraft lost at sea. fatality.
- **7 Mar:** AV-8B, VMA-214 (SoCal Op Area) Aircraft crashed into water during routine carrier-qua training. No injuries.
- **8 Mar:** F-14A, VF-211 (Arabian Sea) Aircraft tailhook separated on landing, aircrew ejected, airc crashed into sea. Aircrew rescued.
- **9 Mar:** HH-46D, MCAS Beaufort (U.S. Atlantic Coast) Helo on SAR mission went down in wate fatality, USN corpsman attached to Marine Corps.
- **12 Mar:** SH-60B, HSL-46 (Mediterranean) Deployed aircraft went down while conducting functional check flight. 3 fatalities.
- **15Mar:** F-18A, NAVSTKWARCEN Fallon (Fallon) Pilot ejected during 1v1 ACM. Aircraft crash into ground. Pilot had first aid injury.
- **28Mar:** HH-1N, NWTS China Lake (California) Aircraft crashed in remote location. 2 fatalities.
- **02 Apr:** MH-53E, HM-14 (Bahrain) Aircraft sustained damage during landing after engine failure/fire.
- **20 Apr:** QF-4S, NWTS PT MUGU (Pt Mugu) Aircraft struck ground during 4-plane diamond brea at airshow, 2 fatalities.
- **04 May:** SH-60B, HSL-49 (SoCal Op Area) Aircraft struck water during approach to ship for landing. Aircraft lost, no injuries.
- **08 May:** T-39N, CTW-6; T-39N, VT-86 (Gulf of Mexico) Two Aircraft and 7 aircrew lost at sea after disappearing from ATC radar.
- **06 Jun:** F-18A, NAVSTKWARCEN Fallon (Fallon) Aircraft crashed into terrain. Pilot ejected and was recovered. Injuries TBD.

- **13 Jun:** UH-1N, NAS LEMOORE (Yosemite) Emergency landing during SAR hoist, 1 Civilian fatality, 1 SAR aircrew injured
- **22 Jun:** AV-8B, VMA-231 (VA Capes) Aircraft crashed into water during NVG carrier approach. Pilot ejected.
- **27 Jun:** MH-53E, HC-4 (Sigonella) Aircraft damaged during immediate landing following uncommanded flt control input on takeoff.
- **27 Jun:** AH-1W, HMM-264 (Cherry Point) Aircraft crashed into ground in unpopulated area. 2 aircrew sustained injury.
- **05 Jul:** UH-3H, HC-2 (Persian Gulf) During landing, aircraft lost tail rotor control, crashed on deck/fire/spin and rolled overboard.
- **08 Jul:** F-14B, VF-101 (Virginia Capes) Aircraft crashed at sea. Aircrew ejected and rescued by lo SAR.
- **22 Jul:** AV-8B, VMA-231 (Pamlico Sound) Aircraft on familiarization flight. Pilot ejected. Aircra destroyed.
- **26 Jul:** F-18A, VMFA-312 (Arkansas) Pilot unable to control aircraft for reasons undetermined. Pilot ejected.

Class A Flight Related (FRM) or Aviation Ground Mishaps (AGM):

- **29 Oct**: **AGM**: UH-3H, HC-2 (Norfolk) During rotor engagement, helo spun on deck and came to rest on starboard side.
- **4 Nov**: **AGM**: F-14A, VF-211 (SoCal Op Area) Aircraft under tow struck unmanned F-14 and F-1 during deck roll at night.
- **16 Jul: AGM:** CH-53, CH-53, HMM-166 (Paya Lebar, PI) While taxiing to park, MRB struck parked aircraft's rotor blades. Debris killed civilian.

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Return to Index | Yearly Trends | 10-Year Trends | Mishap Summaries

Navy Afloat
Class A Mishap Rates
As of 30 Jul 02



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(Jul02 - Aug01 through present)

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)
This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Return to Index | 12-Month Trends | 10-Year Trends | Mishap Summaries

DoN Afloat Class A Mishap Rates

(FY2002 as of 30 Jul)

	FY01	FY02
Afloat	8 / 2.37	13 / 4.69



Rate = Class A mishaps per 100 ships per year

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

11-L-0559/OSD/6953

Return to Index | Yearly Trends | 12-Month Trends | 10-Year Trends

DoN Afloat Class A Mishaps

FY02 as of 30 July

Ships and Submarines

- **14 Oct:** USS Nimitz, Weapons launcher lost at sea.
- **19 Oct:** USS Inchon, Ingleside, Sailor died during main space fire.
- **18 Nov:** USS Peterson, Two Sailors lost at sea while maintaining security onboard a diverted vesse
- **27 Nov:** USS Russell, Sailor fell overboard.
- **29 Nov:** USS Kitty Hawk, Sailor died after falling from rack.
- **05 Jan:** USS Buffalo, periscope damaged.
- **16 Jan:** USS Oak Hill, LCAC damaged.
- **27 Jan:** USS Greeneville/USS Ogden, Sub collides with amphibious transport ship.
- **24 Mar:** USS Normandy, Class Alpha fire in the uptakes.
- **05 May:** USS Maryland, Chief suffered fatality while riding exercise bike onboard sub at sea.
- **14 May:** USS Essex, Sailor suffered fatal injuries during LCAC operations.
- **20 May:** USS Thorn, Sailor suffered fatality while running during remedial physical training.
- **21 May:** USS Dolphin, Sub caught fire and partially flooded.

Diving

- NONE

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Return to Index | Yearly Trends | 10-Year Trends | Mishap Summaries

Navy and Marine Corps
Class A Operational Ashore Mishap Rates
As of 30 Jul 02



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(Jul02 - Aug01 through present)

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

11-L-0559/OSD/6955

Return to Index | 12-Month Trends | 10-Year Trends | Mishap Summaries

DoN Operational Shore / MV Class A Mishap Rates

(FY2002 as of 30 Jul)

	FY01	FY02
USN	13 / 3.44	11 / 3.51
USMC	31 / 17.93	18 / 12.53
USN/USMC	44 / 7.99	29 / 6.34



Rate = Class A mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

11-L-0559/OSD/6956

Return to Index | Yearly Trends | 12-Month Trends | 10-Year Trends

Ashore Class A Mishaps

FY02 as of 30 July

Navy - Operational Shore

- **02 Apr:** LCDR died from injuries sustained in mid-air collision.
- **09 Apr:** MA1 suffered cardiac arrest during dept. PT and died shortly thereafter.
- **16 Apr:** SR collapsed and died while performing PRT.
- **21 Apr:** CAPT completed PRT, collapsed in PMV and later died.
- **07 May:** LT fell out during PT and later died.
- **08 May:** Chief collapsed and died during PT.
- **13 Jul:** SKSN collapsed while performing PT and died.
- **17 Jul:** STS1 collapsed while performing mandatory PT.

Navy - Operational Motor Vehicle

- **16 Dec:** CM1 fell out of a moving vehicle and received fatal injuries to head and chest.
- **15 Jan:** OSSN died when he lost control of GMV on black ice and rolled several times.
- **16 May:** PC3 died when the GMV he was driving rear-ended PMV and burned.

Marine Corps - Operational Shore

- **29 Nov:** Employee driving forklift onto a truck. Forklift rolled back down ramp. Employee jumped off, striking his head on truck. Transported to hospital, later died.
- **13 Feb:** Lance corporal suffered fatal injury when a gun section (which was elevating the tube of a M198 howitzer) came out of battery and slid to rear, striking and crushing him.
- **18 Feb:** Sergeant collapsed after 4-mile ability run. CPR administered. Sergeant was revived and transported to hospital. Pronounced dead after arrival.
- **01 Mar:** Corporal fell out of PT formation run and fell to the ground. Died from an aneurysm (cran bleeding).
- **23 Mar**: Recruit collapsed during 1.5 mile run, transferred to hospital where he later died.
- **07 May:** GYSGT was injured while driving forklift, forklift overturned pinning GYSGT beneath, died 10 May.
- **08 Jun:** Lance corporal drowned while swimming to shore after a helo cast. Became unconscious after encountering difficulty outside the surf zone.
- **13 Jul:** SGT died after performing PT. SGT complained of chest pain and collapsed while walking PMV.

Marine Corps - Operational Motor Vehicle

- **24 Jan:** Sergeant in government motor vehicle crossed lane and collided with a school bus. He was fatally injured.
- **22 Feb:** Lance corporal driving government motor vehicle collided with two private motor vehicle while passing, causing one of the PMVs to collide with a third, killing a civilian driver.
- **30 Apr:** Sergeant suffered fatal injuries in a single GMV accident.
- **25 Jun:** LCPL crossed center divider in PMV and collided with 3-Ton GMV, died at scene.

Marine Corps - Operational Tactical Vehicle

- **2 Oct:** Lance corporal driving an LVS failed to negotiate a 90-degree turn and overturned on right side, crushing a lance corporal on the passenger side.
- **19 Oct:** Corporal driving a hardback humvee with 3 passengers, making a left turn on a dirt road, flipped and rolled several times. Corporal totally disabled, three passengers injured.
- **18 Jan:** PFC struck and killed by M813 truck while acting as ground guide.
- **6 Feb:** Corporal and two other Marines suffered fatal injuries when a 5-ton and howitzer rolled ov Four other Marines and one Sailor were injured.
- **15 May:** Corporal sustained fatal injuries when the LAV he was riding in rolled over, trapping him underneath.
- **20 Jul:** LCPL died from injuries sustained when humvee rolled over while making a turn, pinning LCPL beneath vehicle.

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Navy and Marine Corps
Total Class A Operational Mishap Rates
As of 30 Jul 02



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(Jul02-Aug01 through present)

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

Navy and Marine Corps
Total Class A Operational Mishap Rates
As of 30 Jul 02



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year.

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (b)(6)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

snowflake

October 2, 2002 11:33 AM

060 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: October 7 CENTCOM Taping

Gen. Franks tells me I'm supposed to do a tape for CENTCOM for October 7, congratulating them. We ought to get the remarks up pretty soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100202-5

Please respond by 10/04/02

2 Oct 02

U03969 /03

snowflake

October 2, 2002 11:19 AM

OSD 17,000

TO: LTG Craddock
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: ADM Ellis and "Forces For"

By December 1, I want to have met with Ellis, made a firm decision and executed whatever amendments to the "Forces For" document that need to be executed. Please make sure that happens.

Please remind me by November 1, so I can make sure it gets done.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
100202-1

Please respond by 11/1/02

2 Oct 02

U03970 /03

snowflake

October 2, 2002 11:31 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: North Korea Delegation

333

Please find out who from the Pentagon went on the North Korea trip, and let me know what happened in the meetings. I want to know whether any meals were served and whether there were any banquets, social events, and so forth.

In the future, when there is something as important as the North Korea trip, I want to decide who goes for the U.S. delegation. The first thing I know, Mary Tighe is going, and I'm not sure that's who I would have selected—nothing against her, it's just a matter of level and attitude.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100202-4

Please respond by 10/11/02

2 Oct 02

U03971 /03

Snowflake

October 3, 2002 9:09 AM

South America

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: South America

Here is an article on South America. I have to speak at the Defense Ministerial meeting in Chile next month. We ought to think through carefully now what I ought to say and what we ought to propose, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.
Oppenheimer, Andres, "Talk of a South America Military Force Emerges," *Miami Herald*, October 3, 2002.

DHR:db
100302-6

Please respond by 10/25/02

3 Oct 02

U03972 /03

U.S. officials have said illicit drug flights from the Andes to the United States increased following the suspension of the U.S. program.

The American missionary plane was shot down after a CIA surveillance plane spotted what it considered a suspicious aircraft and called in a Peruvian jet to intercept it.

The U.S. crew later realized that the flight was innocent, but was unable to dissuade the Peruvians from firing.

Miami Herald
October 3, 2002

The Oppenheimer Report

41. Talk Of A South American Military Force Emerges

By Andres Oppenheimer

WASHINGTON - The latest debate in Latin American diplomatic circles: whether to step up regional military cooperation -- and perhaps even create a South American military force -- to help defeat Colombia's drug-funded rebel groups and deal with similar internal threats in the future.

Until now, Latin Americans have been happy to allow the United States to pay the financial and political costs of helping Colombia fight the drug cartels, the 17,000-strong leftist guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and rightist paramilitary squads. They didn't want to be dragged into the Colombian conflict, and felt that -- as the world's biggest consumer of Colombian drugs -- the United States should foot the bill of Colombia's war effort.

But things are changing rapidly. Colombia's guerrillas and drug traffickers have been crossing in growing numbers into neighboring Brazil, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. And President Alvaro Uribe's 2-month-old government's military offensive against the guerrillas is likely to push growing numbers of rebels across the country's borders, military analysts say.

In addition, Colombia is for the first time asking for a greater commitment from Latin America to help fight narcoterrorism. In the past, Colombia's military has been leery of requesting formal cooperation from neighboring countries' armed forces, largely for fears that they would use such agreements to set foot on disputed border territories.

Uribe told The Herald two weeks ago that he will ask Latin American countries to update the 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Defense Treaty, also known as the Rio Treaty, so that it can be used to confront internal as well as external threats. As of now, the treaty says an external attack on any member country should be considered an attack against all.

The Colombian president said he wants a security cooperation agreement to share intelligence on guerrilla movements, establish better border controls, and intercept drug flights that abandon Colombian territory. He did not mention creation of a regional military force.

A Hard Sell

But Uribe's military cooperation proposal will be a hard sell anyway. For many countries in the region, military cooperation agreements bring back dark memories from the 1970s, when Latin American military dictatorships cooperated with one another to hunt down leftist guerrillas across their borders, and committed gross human rights abuses -- including the killings of scores of innocent exiles -- in the process.

But growing numbers of Latin American diplomats are concluding that they can't continue pretending that the region's biggest and most violent conflict is not their problem.

Argentina's ambassador to the United States, Diego Guelar, goes even beyond Uribe's proposal for greater intelligence sharing and border controls, and calls for a NATO-style South American military force.

"This is not Argentina's position today, but speaking for myself, I'm convinced that it would be reasonable to start thinking about creation of a joint South American security force, which should emerge from future South American integration agreements," Guelar says.

New Pressure

NATO's post-Kosovo War decision three years ago to guarantee Europe's security from potential threats coming from anywhere in the world, even if far away from Europe, puts new pressure on South America to get its act together, Guelar said.

'For South America, this means that either you organize and join forces to fight against terrorism and drug trafficking, or others will do it for you. What you can't afford to do is not do anything," Guelar said.

Much of South America's decision on whether to sign a new regional security agreement will depend on Brazil, the region's biggest and most powerful country. Brazil has come under growing criticism for wanting to play the role of regional leader, without assuming the responsibility of playing an active role in helping to solve the Colombian conflict.

In a telephone interview Wednesday, Brazil's foreign minister, Celso Lafer, said that Brazil has begun talks with the Uribe government to provide more intelligence from its brand-new $1.4 billion Amazonwide radar system, known as SIVAM.

Brazil is also keeping "an open mind" about updating existing inter-American defense treaties at a hemispheric security conference that Mexico will convene in 2002, he said.

New Security Issues

"We believe that the Rio Treaty still has use and application, as shown last year after the Sept. 11 attacks," Lafer said, referring to the Rio Treaty countries' decision to offer their assistance to the United States. ``Yet we are aware that there are new security issues in today's world, and we will examine with our partners their suggestions."

Uribe's call for regional help may run into new opposition if Brazil's leftist candidate, Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva, wins Sunday's election. Lula and his Workers Party leaders have fresh memories of the military dictatorships' cooperation agreements of the 1970s, and would likely have an instinctive reaction against any such deal.

But, sooner or later, South America will have to deal with the biggest security problem in its neighborhood.

International Herald Tribune
October 3, 2002

42. Journalism And The Rumors Of War

By Simon Freeman

LONDON--In a noisy Italian restaurant here the veteran television correspondent pushed aside his plate and arranged packets of brown and white sugar on the table. "This is Baghdad," he said, pointing to the salt shaker. "TV crews, reporters, photographers will move in from Kuwait, Saudi, northern Iraq. Gulf War One made CNN. CNN has to beat Fox News. CNN has to establish international news supremacy fast in Gulf War Two." He slid the packets toward the salt and smiled.

The correspondent - who was speaking on the condition he not be identified because his contract forbids him talking to the press without permission - added: "This will be the biggest news-gathering operation in the history of television. Money is no object. It will be a real-time war. Everything will be shown."

A second Gulf War will not be an easy conflict to cover, he said. The distances are huge; no one knows where any Western attack would come from; U.S. Special Forces detest publicity. Conventional forces, however, have allowed journalists to accompany them. He said the coverage of war always raised important issues - such as the manipulation of reporters by governments and military. But his biggest problem would be his workload. "I'll be doing five or six spots in an hour. When will I be able to get out to do any reporting?"

The star correspondents want to be based in Baghdad. But he was worried by this: "The Iraqis control you so tightly that there's no room for enterprise reporting." If the war dragged on and American soldiers were being killed, he said, the position of correspondents based in the Iraqi capital would become untenable.

Snowflake

October 3, 2002 7:11 AM

Russia

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Russia Diverting Aid

If the Russians did divert this material and turned our plan into a white elephant, we have to find a way to get reimbursed, or to take the money out of some other program we're doing for them.

Thanks.

Attach.
Scarborough, Rowan, "Russia Diverted U.S. Aid on Arms, Inspector Reports," *Washington Times*, October 3, 2002.

DHR:dh
100302-4

Please respond by 10/18/02

3 Oct 02

U03973 /03

Washington Times
October 3, 2002
Pg. 3

Russia Diverted U.S. Aid On Arms, Inspector Reports

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

The Pentagon spent nearly $100 million to build facilities in Russia to convert liquid rocket propellant for commercial use, only to find out later that Moscow already used the components in its space program, says a government report.

The Pentagon spent $95.5 million as of July to design and build the plants to turn heptyl and amyl — components in rocket fuel for nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles — into consumer products.

But Russia informed the United States in February it had already used the fuel in its space program, according to the 44-page report signed by David K. Steensma, the Defense Department's deputy assistant inspector general for auditing.

"We are left with a big white elephant," said a defense source, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

The inspector general's report states that the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is now spending $1.2 million for maintenance and security while it decides what to do with the buildings.

"As a result, the heptyl and amyl disposition facilities that cost the United States $95.5 million will not be required for their intended purpose," the IG report states.

Mr. Steensma recommends that in the future the DTRA negotiate firm contracts with commitments from Russia on how it plans to dispose of weapons components before investing millions of U.S. taxpayer money into any facilities. The contract needs to "provide adequate transparency rights to Department of Defense, and include remedies," says the report, a copy of which was provided to The Washington Times.

The report also urges the DTRA to exercise more oversight. "The director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency could have more assurance that Russia will provide weapons systems for disposal by performing more complete inspections of equipment provided to Russia and by identifying other potential uses that Russia may have for weapons systems that Russia has agreed to provide for disposal," the IG report said.

A spokesman for the agency declined to comment.

But the report says the agency director did not dispute the IG's findings. The agency has plans for an auditing team that will monitor Russian proceeds from rocket-fuel sales and make sure they fund other threat-reduction programs.

"The planned actions are positive steps in the right direction," the IG report states.

The threat-reduction agency oversees an 11-year-old program in which the United States supplies

billions of dollars to help Russia dispose of chemical, nuclear and other weapons. Congress authorized the program in the 1991 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act. The aim is to consolidate and destroy much of the massive Cold War arsenal left over after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and reduce the chance that such material could fall into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups.

In March, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz asked the Pentagon inspector general, Joseph E. Schmitz, to investigate a Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to convert 30,000 metric tons of liquid rocket fuel from decommissioned ICBMs into a more benign substance. Sen. Pat Roberts, Kansas Republican and Senate Armed Services Committee member, also has pushed for an investigation.

Congress has provided $4.7 billion since 1992 for Russia, as well as the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

snowflake

October 3, 2002 9:05 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

Advance copy given

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

SUBJECT: General Jones

Please set me up to see General Jones on this article and give me the article for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
Maze, Rick, "Top Marine Blasts Joint Chiefs, Spurs Inquiry," *Navy Times*, October 7, 2002.

DHR:dh
100302-5

Please respond by 10/11/02

000171 SD

3 Oct 02

U03974 /03

Navy Times
October 7, 2002
Pg. 10

Top Marine Blasts Joint Chiefs, Spurs Inquiry

By Rick Maze, Times staff writer

Departing Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Jones complained Sept. 27 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff spend too much time managing their individual services and too little time on the larger mission of providing collective advice to the president and defense secretary.

Those comments have launched a Senate Armed Services Committee inquiry that will include current and former members of the Joint Chiefs to see if changes are needed in the military's command structure.

Jones is nominated to become the first Marine to serve as chief of U.S. European Command and NATO's supreme allied commander Europe when he steps down as commandant.

He said the Joint Chiefs of Staff spend most of their time on service-related matters such as the organizing, training and equipping of their forces, duties spelled out in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. But by focusing on internal service issues, the chiefs don't have as much time to discuss larger issues and reach consensus opinions about broader policy matters, Jones said.

"The roles and functions of the Joint Chiefs need to be re-examined and appropriately redefined in order to continue the tradition and expectation of being able to provide the best military advice to the secretary of defense and the president," Jones said.

Things have been better in recent months as the chiefs have reviewed war plans and made recommendations to administration officials, Jones said. But he suggested institutional changes may be needed to make certain the power of the Joint Chiefs is not eroded by other duties.

Jones blamed much of the problem on an unintended consequence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which reorganized the military command structure to give more power to combatant commanders and more clearly define the service chiefs' roles.

But the chiefs themselves also are partly responsible, he said. "It is very personality-dependent. Some of it is us, as service chiefs, who sometimes allow ourselves to be captured by the inner workings of the service," he said.

Jones said he had discussed the topic of balancing service and joint duties with the other chiefs.

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., the committee chairman, said a thorough review of Goldwater-Nichols already was planned to ensure that the 15-year-old law fit into the Bush administration's vision of the defense structure.

But Jones' comments show there could be more fundamental problems, Levin said. He and Sen. John Warner of Virginia, senior Republican on the committee, said they will order a bipartisan staff investigation of Jones' complaint.

11-L-0559/OSD/6970

snowflake

Dave

October 4, 2002 2:17 PM

TO: Rick Kisling

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT:

After you've read this flyer on the protest on October 26 in Taos, let me know what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh
100402-3

Please respond by _____

370.61

4 Oct 02

U03975 /03

4 Oct 2002

C 1014

MEMO FOR SECDEF

SUBJECT: Security (Protest – Taos)

Sir,

I have read the article on the planned protest in Taos. I also spoke with Valerie earlier this afternoon on some other background information pertaining to the flyer.

It would be my desire to send several agents out to "participate" in the rally in a covert manner. I think by doing that, it would give us a better sensing of the future & ultimate intentions of the group, and potentially useful background information. I have run this particular issue through an attorney in the General Counsel's office to ensure that we would not be violating any laws with respect to what could be perceived as collection efforts on U.S. citizens, etc. They are researching the issue and other potential workarounds.

We are currently conducting discreet inquiries into the Action Coalition of Taos and the individuals mentioned by name in the newsletter to determine whether they have any propensity for violent action associated with their organization or demonstrations.

We are also doing some background work with the State Police to determine legal parameters surrounding such a demonstration and "march" to your house (ie, is the demonstration licensed, is there any standoff to property lines, etc). I would also need to know from you whether you would prefer a marked police presence on your property during the timeframe of the demonstration to discourage violation of your property line(s).

I understand that Paul and possibly Valerie may be in Taos during that timeframe. I will have the advance agents touch base with them to address any of their immediate concerns as the demonstration draws closer.

If it appears that your home or your presence in Taos in the future is going to attract future demonstrations and / or disruptive attention, we could consider upgrading & expanding the alarm system which could be monitored both locally and here in the Pentagon, upgrading the window locks, and replacing your current door locks with high security locks.

V/R

Rick Kisling

snowflake

October 4, 2002 2:13 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Remarks for Gen. Myers Event

Attached are some remarks Doug Feith gave about Gen. Myers a couple of nights ago.

They are superb.

I would think you would want to get them around to the press corps down there.

I also think you would want to circulate them among speechwriters, so they get a sense of how you can do something that is very, very, very short but elegant.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/02/02 Remarks for Gen. Myers given by Doug Feith

DHR:dh
100402-1

Please respond by 10/18/02

U03976 /03

Douglas Feith
October 2, 2002

Introduction of General Richard B. Myers
at the
Keeper of the Flame Award Dinner
of the
Center for Security Policy
Washington, D.C.

This dinner represents, as it were, the intersection of two of America's great national security institutions – the Center for Security Policy and the Department of Defense, each headed by its own television star.

Those institutions have much in common philosophically and otherwise, but there are differences:

First, DOD does not do manhunts.

Second, DOD employs precision strike with JDAMs, while the Center opts for carpet bombing with those damn faxes.

A third difference is that the Center is good at strategic influence.

The budgets of both institutions, I'm pleased to note, are rising. Frank Gaffney has championed the increases in both cases, but he is working hard to close the gap.

Frank has assigned to me the delightful duty of saying a few words about General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Myers has served in the Air Force since 1965.

He clocked more than 4000 flying hours, including 600 in combat.

He commanded US Forces Japan,

then US Pacific Air Forces,

then the Air Force Space Command and

after that served as Commander in Chief of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the US Space Command.

When I returned to the Pentagon in the summer of 2001, General Myers was the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

President George W. Bush then appointed him Chairman.

It was a wise appointment. General Myers makes one proud to be an American. He is, if I can put it this way, an American type. His virtues are rare, but classically American:

Intelligence without arrogance.
Patriotism without cant.
Toughness without brutality.
Resolution without rigidity. And
Dignity without vanity.

He is, in sum, a military leader of the finest quality. He speaks plainly, laughs readily and is the most pleasant and professional of colleagues.

As you can tell, I admire him, feel privileged to work with him and am honored to be able to introduce him to you:

General Myers!

snowflake

October 4, 2002 5:21 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Military Salaries

Why do the Service Chiefs make $2,000 (I don't know if it is per month or per year) more than the Combatant Commanders?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100402-5

Please respond by 10/18/02

8/16

10 OCT 02

U03978 /03

snowflake

October 4, 2002 3:37 PM

04OCT02

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: CIA Assistance

Have we told the CIA what we're going to need by way of intelligence to work with our new defense strategy and our new security environment?

If not, we ought to get DIA working on that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100402-8

Please respond by 10/18/02

U03979 /03

snowflake

October 4, 2002 3:47 PM

020410

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: IO Briefing

Let's get that IO full briefing up for me, with Torie in the room.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100402-10

Please respond by 10/18/02

U03980 /03

040702

October 4, 2002 3:50 PM

Centcom

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: RADM Quigley

Gen. Franks wants Quigley assigned, as a military or civilian, to do the PIO for his command for the next six months. How do we do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100402-11

Please respond by 10/11/02

4 OCT 02

U03981 /03

snowflake

October 4, 2002 3:58 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Presidential Decision Memo

Please don't forget to get me the Presidential decision memo from the Ford or Nixon period that Kissinger did when he was National Security Advisor.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100402-13

Please respond by 10/18/02

381

4OCT02

U03982 /03

Snowflake

EF3084

October 5, 2002 3:08 PM

ISRAEL

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Larry Di Rita 10/15

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Ben-Eliezer's Comments

I see where Ben-Eliezer says the U.S. is going to attack in November, and he pretends that he has inside information.

It seems to me we should be careful talking to him. If he asks why, we ought to tell him he talks too much, and we'll deal through a confidential channel, not him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Lazaroff, Tovah and Keinon, Herb, "Ben-Eliezer: US Will Attack Iraq in November," *Jerusalem Post*, October 4, 2002.

DHR:dh
100502-6

Please respond by 10/18/02

10/10/02
→ SD
Will do!
Doug Feith

SOCTO2

U03983 /03

Jerusalem Post
October 4, 2002
Pg. 1

Ben-Eliezer: US Will Attack Iraq In November

By Tovah Lazaroff and Herb Keinon

Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer said last night that he expects an American attack on Iraq by late November. "It's possible it will begin toward the end of November," Ben-Eliezer told Labor Party ministers in Tel Aviv.

Ben-Eliezer stressed that Israel is ready for any eventuality. He spoke after military sources told Israel Radio they now do not expect Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to launch Scud missiles carrying non-conventional warheads at Israel because this would prove to the world that the Americans are right in claiming he has such weapons.

The potential nuclear threat from Iraq is a more serious and immediate danger to Israel than its conflict with the Palestinians, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told the World Jewish Congress biannual meeting in Jerusalem yesterday.

Peres said there are only a few years to react to this threat, after which it will be too late. At the same time, he said, the decision to go to war with Iraq can only be made by the United States. Israel has no role in making this decision, nor should it seek one, he added.

"It's not for us to appear that we are urging war," Peres said. "We should contribute very little by doing so. By being too vocal we should only harm the US position vis-a-vis the Arab world.... I wouldn't want any American mother to think the decision was taken because we urged them to do so.

"What we can do is to pacify the situation here as much as we can and let major decisions have the priority, with all the costs and all the restraints. It's a strategic choice and we have to make it," Peres said.

Iraq's decision to readmit UN arms inspectors is a transparent delaying tactic aimed at giving Saddam Hussein time to sow dissension between the US and Europe, a senior Israeli official said yesterday.

Saddam's tactic is to play for as much time as possible, the official said, adding: "He wants to stall and sow seeds of discontent in the UN Security Council, and in Europe, towards the idea of an American attack." The official said Saddam believes delaying the attack will also increase voices of opposition in the US itself.

Recent comments by Iraqi officials that Iraq has no intention of attacking its neighbors must be seen in the context of Baghdad's not wanting to say anything at this point to give the US a pretext to launch the attack, the official said.

"Iraq is now under a microscope," the official added, "and will say anything that will help create the impression that it does not have weapons of mass destruction. If they would now threaten to use chemical or biological weapons against us, it would confirm the worst that everyone believes, and give the US an excuse to attack."

The official, closely monitoring the situation in Iraq, said Israel is not keen on becoming involved in the impending war, and that Israel will not get involved if it has no overriding interest in doing so. The Americans also understand this, he said, intimating the US would likely cripple Iraq's capability to strike Israel in the early stages of the war, in order to make IDF military involvement unnecessary.

In a related development, diplomatic sources in Jerusalem said a proposed sale of Russian SA-18 anti-aircraft missiles to Syria was high on the agenda of the security-related matters Prime Minister Ariel Sharon discussed with Russian President Vladimir Putin this week during his visit to Moscow.

Israel keenly wants this plan torpedoed, concerned the missiles would be transferred from Syria to the Hizbullah and used against IAF planes in the area.

Another arms deal that came up during the talks in Moscow centered around the sale of Phalcon early-airborne warning systems to India. Discussions have been going on for months regarding the sale of three or four Phalcons to India.

The Phalcon uses a Russian made Ilyushin-76 plane as its platform, and therefore requires Russian approval for sale to third countries. The plane is outfitted with sophisticated Phalcon radar that can detect 60 targets up to 400 kilometers away.

Russian approval of the sale has not yet been secured, Israeli officials said yesterday.

Likewise, the US has also "not exuded unbridled happiness" at the prospect of the sale to India at this time, one official said. US opposition to the Phalcon sale to China ultimately doomed that project during Ehud Barak's tenure as prime minister.

October 5, 2002 2:49 PM

Saudi Arabia

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Letter to Prince Sultan

Let's draft a letter from me to Prince Sultan thanking him for their cooperation on the things they have come around on with respect to the air base and so forth.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100502-8

Please respond by 10/11/02

5 OCT 02

U03984 /03

Snowflake

October 7, 2002 6:12 PM

NATO 471

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: NATO and JDAMs

You probably ought to get word to the people in NATO who are complaining that they cannot get JDAMs, that they are all approved, or most of them are approved, whatever Gen. Myers said. Let's get that problem sorted out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-76

Please respond by 10/25/02

7OCT02

U03985 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 6:21 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Word Count

Please tell people when they prepare remarks for me that they put the number of minutes it is going to take. Here we had the press briefing today, and it didn't have that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-77

Please respond by _____

U03986 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/6986

Snowflake

TOP SECRET

October 7, 2002 1:57 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Hekmatyar

Do we have a full court press trying to get Hekmatyar?

Thanks.

Attach.
10/03/02 Spot Commentary 1935 EDT Spot Comm 2

DHR:dh
100702-46

Please respond by 10/18/02

U03989 /03

10 OCT 02

TOP SECRET

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

snowflake

October 7, 2002 2:25 PM

000.7150

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Senator Shelby

I ought to have Senator Shelby down for lunch sometime with Steve Cambone, where we ought to talk about what we think about intel, and maybe have Rich Haver there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-49

Please respond by 10/25/02

7 OCT 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6988

U03990 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 2:44 PM

000.7750

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: P.F. Bentley

P.F. Bentley is a good guy and a friend of David Kennerly's. He wants to do a profile for "Nightline" on me. According to Kennerly, he'll be calling, and I would like to help him out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-53

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 OCT 02

U03991 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/6989

snowflake

October 7, 2002 2:51 PM

H13351

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: DoD Website

Please tell me what we put on the DoD website. Do we put all my speeches and remarks on? If so, we ought to get a note over to Bill Safire telling him that we do so and how he can get them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-56

Please respond by 10/18/02

done - 11/7

Larry Di Rita

70CT02

U03992 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/6990

snowflake

October 7, 2002 2:58 PM

W37

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Next Staff Meeting

In the next staff meeting I want to ask everybody to come up with ideas on how we can achieve greater jointness. At the present time, it doesn't happen until too late in a career. How can we start it sometime during the first year or two of service?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-58

Please respond by 10/15/02

Done 10/8

Larry Di Rita

7OCT02

U03993 /03

snowflake

October 1, 2002 11:45 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Jointness

Do you think we ought to think about getting the senior classes of the Air Force Academy, Naval Academy and West Point all together sometime to show jointness?

Other idea, let me

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-50

Please respond by 10/11/02

snowflake

October 7, 2002 3:00 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Senator Ensign

I would like to have Senator Ensign down for lunch someday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-59

Please respond by 10/25/02

U03994 /03

Snowflake

October 7, 2002 3:05 PM

Turkey

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Turkey

This *Policywatch* is worth reading.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cagaptay, Soner, "Enhancing the Turkish-American Alliance: The Campaign for Iraq and Other Possibilities," *Policywatch*, October 2, 2002.

DHR:dh
100702-60

Please respond by 10/25/02

10 OCT 02

U03995 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 7 2002

C 10/3

POLICYWATCH

Analysis of Near East Policy from the scholars and associates of THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
Number Six Hundred and Sixty-Five October 2, 2002

ENHANCING THE TURKISH-AMERICAN ALLIANCE: THE CAMPAIGN FOR IRAQ AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES

By Soner Cagaptay

Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Johnson was in Ankara Monday to discuss foreign policy issues including Iraq with her Turkish counterparts. Interestingly, Iraq's vice premier Tariq Aziz visited Ankara yesterday for the same purpose. These trips come at a crucial time as Washington prepares for a confrontation with Saddam Husayn. While prepared to stand with its close NATO ally the United States, Turkey remains uneasy about several issues.

What Could Turkey Contribute? War in Iraq is likely to require heavy air activity. Bases in Turkey's southern Anatolia could support American air operations into northern and central Iraq. Besides the base at Incirlik, which the United States has used for decades for operations such as the vital AWACS flights, other bases including Diyarbakir, Batman, Mus, and Malatya supported activity during the Gulf War. Furthermore, the recent experience of the Turkish armed forces in northern Iraq could provide useful information for the Americans.

Turkey knows northern Iraq very well. Over the last two decades, the Turkish army—especially its elite Special Forces unit—have conducted dozens of operations in northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists. In some especially large operations such as one in 1995 involving up to 30,000 soldiers, Turkish troops proceeded more than fifty miles into Iraqi territory. In fact, Turks have covered almost the entire mountainous strip of terrain in northernmost Iraq, behind which are the flat lands leading to Baghdad. According to various sources, Turkey in fact maintains a force of nearly 5,000 soldiers in northern Iraq. Some of these forces keep a security fence along the Iraqi border. Yet others may be further inland, even at the strategic Serseng (Bamerni) airport, one of the three landing strips in this rugged region that would be especially useful for helicopter flights. So far, Turkish experience in northern Iraq has involved the use of elite troops supported by surgical bombing sorties and tactical helicopter flights. U.S. forces could benefit from Turkish operational experiences it gained in this terrain. Finally, while Turkey is a secular and democratic Muslim country, Ankara's consent for a U.S. attack against Iraq may add legitimacy to the American campaign of pursuing a democratic and secular Baghdad regime after Saddam.

Turkey's Concerns. Ankara's concerns about an American campaign center on several key issues:
PKK Haven. For many Turks, northern Iraq has come to embody PKK terrorism. Following the Gulf War, the allied-enforced oo-fly zone in northern Iraq allowed the creation of a semi-independent Kurdish entity in this area. Nevertheless, fighting in the mid-1990s between the two rival Iraqi Kurdish groups, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led to the bifurcation of the northern Iraqi para-state into feuding cantons. The unsettled political circumstances in an area that has a longstanding tradition of Kurdish nationalism meant that both parties were reluctant to act against the PKK unless pushed. Until its recent demise, the PKK successfully used these circumstances to establish bases in northern Iraq from which it launched many extremely bloody operations into Turkey.

The nature of Iraqi federalism. Ankara is concerned about the fallout effects of a campaign against Iraq. It fears the end of Saddam's regime may lead to a political meltdown in which Kurdish groups would take

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advantage of the chaos to pursue what Turks suspect Kurds truly desire: namely, independence. Since October 2001, Turkish prime minister Bulent Ecevit has continuously warned this scenario would be a *casus belli*, leading to Turkish armed intervention. Furthermore, Ankara is suspicious about what kinds of federalism might arise in a post-Saddam Iraq. On September 25, the two Kurdish factions in northern Iraq proposed a constitution for a "federal Iraq" on terms that Turkey fears could lead to de facto Kurdish independence while ignoring the rights of the region's Turkish-speaking Turkomen minority.

Kirkuk. Among the parts of the KDP-PUK proposed constitution that Ankara objects to is the provision that Kurdistan's capital would be the city of Kirkuk, a major oil area and a bastion of the Turkomens. Over the last year, Turkish defense minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu has repeatedly voiced Ankara's objection to this proposed move. Yet, recent provocative remarks by Iraqi Kurdish leaders have only fueled Turkish apprehensions. For example, on August 21, the KDP representative in Ankara argued, "Kirkuk is a Kurdish city." KDP leader Massoud Barzani was quoted in a German newspaper saying that he would "never allow Turks to take over even a millimeter of our soil," and that if Turkey invaded northern Iraq, his fighters would turn the territory into a "graveyard for Turkish soldiers." In a response on September 25, Turkey declared that it would "react" to an attempt by Iraqi Kurds to take possession of the oil-rich area of northern Iraq.

Allaying Turkish Concerns. These Turkish trepidations, however, do not point at an irreconcilable divergence of Turkish-American interests. There are several ways Washington could encourage more enthusiastic Turkish participation in an Iraq operation:

Communicating to Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds a clear plan on Iraq's future. Clearer communication among the three sides—Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds, and the United States—would create greater confidence in Washington's often-stated commitment to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity after Saddam. It would also help to present clear plans for rebuilding Iraq in a way that guarantees cooperation among its peoples. Meanwhile, on the humanitarian front, the United States might consider collaborating with Ankara to prepare for potential relief efforts in the event of a refugee crisis into Turkey, similar to that in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

Commit to ensuring stability in Mosul and Kirkuk from the very early stages of conflict. Inserting troops into and reserving these cities for a future Iraq would diminish the chances of a Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish confrontation, a possibility that could undermine American war efforts.

On the economic front, Washington might invite Turkish companies to rebuild Iraq. With proven expertise in construction, retail, telecommunications, and automotive industries, Turkish businesses could play a vital role in post-bellum Iraq. Turkish sources are convinced that the Gulf War cost the country approximately $44 billion in the last decade in losses of trade, tourism, and revenue. Now, Turkey fears substantial financial damage exceeding $14 billion during a possible campaign in Iraq. By inviting Turkish businesses to rebuild Iraq, America might address these worries.

EU Membership. Ankara expects help from Washington toward its European Union (EU) membership, which Turks see as their pressing issue during the next few months. Although it is not directly related to the Iraq issue, Turkish-American cooperation on EU matters could deepen the strategic partnership between the two countries, while providing Turkey with further growth and stability that is likely to accompany the country's EU accession schedule. With the recent reform package, Turks may feel that they have satisfied the criteria for becoming a candidate for EU accession, while the EU may not be willing to set a target date for that accession. America could consider lobbying Brussels to offer Ankara a target accession date in its December expansion summit in Copenhagen. On a related matter, America may also offer help towards the resolution of the Cyprus issue, which could become a destabilizing factor in the region if it is not settled while the EU proceeds with its plan to admit Cyprus to the EU.

Handled well, developments of the coming months vis-à-vis Iraq might bring Ankara and Washington even closer. Mutually agreeable policies implemented at a time when the two countries will have many shared interests should pave the way for a deepening of Turkish-American relations.

Soner Cagaptay is a 2002 Soref fellow and head of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

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snowflake

TOP SECRET

October 7, 2002 4:54 PM

4/3.77

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TR

SUBJECT: GPS Jammers

Here is some more information on the GPS jammers.

When I asked about this, you indicated you had looked into it, and that it wasn't a serious problem. I wonder if you could get back to me in writing as to what kind of a problem it is, so I can understand it better.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/02/02 Intel

DHR:dh
100702-66

Please respond by 10/25/02

7 OCT 02

U03996 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/6997

TOP SECRET

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S) DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

Snowflake

October 7, 2002 4:57 PM

Korea (North)

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: North Korea Delegation

Please find out whether or not there were any meals or banquets that were attended by, participated in, or hosted by the delegation that went to North Korea. Were there any social events?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-67

Please respond by 10/11/02

100702

snowflake

October 7, 2002 5:01 PM

310(3&4)

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Time-in-Grade Waivers

On this David Chu memo, my instinct is to go ahead and ask for approval to have the President be able to delegate it to me, and for me to be able to re-delegate it to the Deputy.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/26/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: 3- and 4-Star Time-in-Grade Waivers [U15617/02]

DHR:dh
100702-68

Please respond by 10/25/02

Leg. Package

11/5

Dr Chu -
Please advise Seems like something for our 04 Leg. Package.

D. Rita

Larry Di Rita
11/4

U03998 /03

10CT03

130800

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 SEP 27 AM 10: 40

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 7 2002

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

INFO MEMO

September 26, 2002 – 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)
David S.C. Chu 26 Sep 02

SUBJECT: 3- and 4-Star Time-in-Grade Waivers--SNOWFLAKE

- This responds to your concerns ([redacted]) about having to sign waivers for officers having served fewer than three years in grade.
- About half of the O-9/O-10 population retired with a time-in-grade waiver prior to January 2001.

Down from 50% to 26%

- We are turning around the liberal use of waivers through your continued emphasis on longer tours. This calendar year you have approved only eight waivers, 26% of all O-9/O-10 retirements ([redacted]). In general, the Military Departments indicate that officers will serve three years to retire in grade, and tour lengths are being adjusted to three-years (vice the previous two-year tour). Time-in-grade waivers will be requested only under unusual and hardship circumstances
- Officers must serve three years in grade to retire in that grade, and Congress tacitly endorsed that position when it allowed ***your*** authority to grant time-in-grade waivers to lapse in December 2001. By law, the President must now approve all time-in-grade waivers and his authority may not be delegated. We could, of course, develop legislation to redelegate authority back to you. Only if such authority could be further redelegated would we relieve the paperwork burden on you.

Do it

- We do not notify Congress when a time-in-grade waiver is granted. By law, however, you must certify to the President and Congress that the officer served satisfactorily in grade for retirement in that grade ([redacted]). Last year we proposed legislation that would eliminate your certification requirement, but Congress did not endorse the proposal.
- We have several initiatives working to ascertain the effects of keeping senior officers either longer in careers or longer in particular positions. I will get back to you in the near future with the results of those studies and their recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATIONS: Tab D

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	9/3
SR MA CRADDOCK	C 10/1
MA BUCCI	SPS 10/1
EXECSEC WHITMORE	4 9/23

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: LTC Sally Jo Hall, (b)(6)

snowflake

September 9, 2002 7:14 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: TIG Waivers

If I have to sign so many waivers for having served less than three years in grade, then there is something wrong with the process. Either we are not managing personnel right, the rule is wrong, or who has to decide all these things is wrong. Why do we have to send them to the Congress on something this minor?

Let's try to get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090902-1

Please respond by 09/30/02

9/30
Chu Response Attached
D. Rich

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2002, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Earmarks

- At the current rate of expenditure, the $10 billion contingency requested to fund the incremental cost of sustaining the war on terrorism during FY 2003 will last approximately 5½ months.
- The Department is currently expending approximately $1.8 billion a month on OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE. Therefore, assuming that operations are sustained at approximately the same level as we have seen this year, and excluding the cost of munitions, the additional $10 billion should allow the Department to sustain operations for the first 5½ months of FY 2003.
- Without these funds, the Services would be forced to quickly deplete their normal operating resources at the expense of training and maintenance activities, leading to a severe reduction in overall military readiness.
- We will continue to work with the congressional committees to ensure that this position is understood.

COORDINATION: None.

cc: Mr. Larry Di Rita

Prepared By: John P. Roth (b)(6)

10.01

4/4/02

snowflake

February 15, 2002 9:56 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Earmarks

I notice in today's clips people are talking about things they think Congress is going to give us whether we want them or not. They included C-130s and the like.

I think we ought to get a list of things we don't want Congress to do and why, and get ready to put it out. One of the things we don't want is for them to take the $10 billion contingency and spend it for other things. We need to get a specific paragraph from Dov that shows precisely how little it will last during '03 at the current rate of operations.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021502-12

Please respond by 02/21/02 2/25

Copy BTM done 2/20

To USD(C) - Yours for action. Please advise. DiRita

11-L-0559/OSD/00354 02

02 Feb 18

Snowflake

October 7, 2002 5:11 PM

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings on WMD/Iraq

On this Powell Moore memo, please put some totals down—the number of people who have received the briefing and the number of times people have been invited who haven't seen it in the House and the Senate.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/01/02 ASD(LA) memo re: Attendance at Briefings on WMD/Iraq

DHR:dh
100702-69

Please respond by 10/25/02

7OCT02

U03999 /03

Snowflake

TOP SECRET

October 7, 2002 5:16 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Misleading Information

Attached is a paper that Colin Powell gave me about the problems in Afghanistan.

We probably ought to focus on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated CCJ2 Paper: "Use of Misleading Information or Deliberate Disinformation by Afghans"

DHR:dh
100702-70

Please respond by 10/18/02

U04000 /03

70cT03

TOP SECRET 05

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snowflake

311

Done 11/2/02

October 7, 2002 5:20 PM

W25

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: National Guard and Homeland Security Missions

What do you propose we do with your memo of 12 August? What action ought to be undertaken?

Thanks.

Attach.
08/12/02 CJCS info memo to SecDef re: National Guard Personnel and Homeland Security Missions

DHR:dh
100702-71

Please respond by 10/25/02

70CT02

U04001 /03

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-582-02
1 November 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: National Guard (NG) and Homeland Security (HLS) Missions

- In response to your question (TAB A), the following information is provided. Recommend a Process Action Team (PAT) be established to develop policy and specific criteria to shape the future use of the NG in HLS missions, as outlined in my earlier memorandum (Enclosure to TAB A). The PAT should be led by OSD and include representatives from the US Army, US Air Force, US Northern Command, US Joint Forces Command, US Pacific Command, the National Guard Bureau and my staff.
- The PAT should address, at a minimum, the following issues:
  - NG activation under title 10 versus title 32.
  - Guidance on arming, rules for the use of force, etc.
  - Guidance on detailing the NG to other agencies.
- The PAT should provide policy recommendations and planning criteria within 90 days of being established.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef establish a Process Action Team under OSD leadership.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____ Other_____

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: G. W. Casey, LTG, DJ-5, (b)(6)

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 7 2002

CM-443-02
12 August 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: National Guard (NG) Personnel and Homeland Security Missions

- There have been several opportunities to mobilize NG personnel for homeland security missions: guarding airports in the fall of 2001 and the recent arming of border guards were the most prominent cases. While more work remains, here are a few preliminary observations and comments. My staff will review these instances, look for lessons learned and provide some insight that can be used in the future.

- **National Guard at Airports**. The requirement for NG soldiers to deploy to US airports in the fall of 2001 was unique in that the President went directly to the governors for support--the mission was nationwide and the United States was at war. Since these missions were never federally tasked, normal DOD staffing assessments and orders procedures were bypassed.

- **Title 10 vice Title 32**. Memorandums from the OSD General Counsel on 27 March and 13 May 2002 (TAB) stated that further guidance could have been provided by DOD leadership on whether these soldiers should have been brought on active duty under either state or federal control. I am uncertain if more guidance could have been provided, but further steps must be taken to enhance the ability to authoritatively shape future NG responses. Activating soldiers under title 10 allows you to retain the greatest amount of control, but also subjects missions to the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act. In contrast, activating soldiers under title 32 or in a state active duty status averts the limitations of Posse Comitatus but also negates federal or centralized control over soldiers.

  - Comment: Criteria should be established for determining when missions should be performed under title 10 or title 32. Regardless of which option is chosen, providing some guidelines up front will ensure military advice and civilian oversight occur.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	8/13
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

11-L-0559/OSD/7608 U13309 /02

- **Detailing.** The requirement to support Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service on the borders broke new ground on the issue of detailing soldiers to other federal agencies. While I am generally not comfortable with detailing large numbers of soldiers to other agencies for long periods of time, it may be necessary in the near term as the other agencies reshape themselves to deal with new challenges.

  - Comment: This is another area that will benefit from upfront thinking and criteria. The implications of detailing Service members to the agencies vice activating them under title 10 should be reviewed.

- **Arming Soldiers.** Traditionally, soldiers are activated and deployed with their assigned weapons consistent with their "go-to-war" basic load, mentality and culture. In recent situations, this did not hold true, particularly for initial support to the border security mission.

  - Comment: A policy should be established that requires arming all soldiers supporting civil authorities in a title 10 status. Soldiers must have the ability to protect themselves and to accomplish the mission. Not arming soldiers should be by exception and with only your concurrence. (NOTE: A parallel policy for soldiers activated in a title 32 status should also be considered given the independent ability of state governors to activate their NG assets. Efforts to obtain a general consensus among state Adjutant Generals to support a similar policy might provide the best mechanism to pursue this objective.)

- **Rules of Engagement/Rules for Use of Force (ROE/ RUF).** Soldiers activated in the various titles for Operation NOBLE EAGLE missions were not provided with a common/baseline set of ROE/RUF. Like arming, the determination of ROE/RUF was dependent upon the activation authority. Soldiers that have been recently armed on the borders now have a common set of ROE/RUF; however, the ROE/RUF for soldiers previously deployed in airports varied by state.

  - Comment: Coincident with the arming policy, a common ROE/RUF should be established for activated soldiers in a title 10 status in support of civil authorities. (NOTE: Development of a baseline ROE/RUF, which is acceptable to both DOD and state Adjutant Generals and governors, would also require special attention to ensure standard application across all soldier deployments in support of civil authorities - whether in title 10 or title 32.)

- **Legislative Relief.** Further study may be warranted to seek your consideration regarding some federal control of the NG in a title 32 status. This will be particularly important in situations that are regional or cross state borders.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG George W. Casey, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

TAB

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 10 2002

INFO MEMO

March 27, 2002, 11:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 4/10/02

SUBJECT: Arming National Guard Personnel in Title 32 Status

- You asked whether you have the legal authority to direct the arming and use of force rules for the National Guard personnel performing airport security support. You do not.

- National Guard personnel performing airport security support are doing so under the authority of title 32 of the United States Code. In title 32 status, the governors have "operational control" over the National Guard personnel. ~~DoD~~ US gov't provides funding.

- In addition, state law regarding use of force applies to National Guard personnel when in title 32 status. State laws regarding use of force are not uniform.

- You may, normally through the National Guard Bureau, attempt to influence the governors' decisions regarding arming and use of force rules for title 32 deployments.

- Should a governor refuse to modify arming or use of force rules to your satisfaction, you may refuse to fund that deployment of National Guard personnel in title 32 status.

- The practical problem in the airport security situation is that the President directed the deployment and the title 32 status (governors' control; ~~DoD~~ funds). This makes it difficult for you to refuse to fund, or threaten to refuse to fund, the deployment as leverage to get the governors to modify arming or use of force rules to your satisfaction.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Jim Schwenk; (b)(6)

TAB

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 13, 2002, 4:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel

SUBJECT: Arming National Guard Personnel

- You indicated that the Department made a mistake by not attempting to influence governors' decisions with regard to arming and use of force rules for title 32 deployments for airport security and stated that, in the future, "we have to think through the matter before we just allow people to be deployed." (Tab A)
- In retrospect it would have been helpful to have developed general guidelines pertaining to National Guard "arming" and "rules for the use of force" before undertaking this mission. Although DoD could not mandate that the States adopt such guidelines, such general guidance might have encouraged the development of somewhat similar "arming decisions" and "use of force" rules for each state.
- The Chairman and I will recommend to appropriate DoD officials that DoD examine future requests for National Guard support using the following matrix:
  - Purpose of mission;
  - Funding;
  - Duty status of servicemembers;
  - Exit strategy; and
  - Guidance for developing "arming" and "use of force" rules.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness notes that the original decision to undertake this mission allowed only a few hours to respond to an urgent Presidential question; the alternative was to furnish 25,000 federal troops, who would have lacked proper standing, given that airport security was then a matter of local jurisdiction.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Jim Smyser, (b)(6)

11

194304
snowflake

October 7, 2002 5:23 PM

020DIA

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

Larry Di Rita

SUBJECT: Management Flexibility

Attached are some proposals from DIA for changing and achieving management flexibility. Please take a look at them and let's get them incorporated if they make sense.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/15/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: Policies Inhibiting Management Flexibility

DHR:dh
100702-72

Please respond by 10/25/02

11/04

INTERIM RESPONSE ATTACHED

V/K

11/15

Cc: Ken Krieg

Larry Di Rita

nocto2

U04002 /03

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO
NOV 4 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Management Flexibility at DIA

- Rear Admiral Jacoby identified four policies that he believes inhibit his managerial flexibility. You asked me to examine those policies and incorporate changes that make sense. In this interim reply, I address each policy below.

- Unfilled Military Billets. DIA pays the Services for military billets; the Services do not always fill the billets; DIA thus pays for empty billets. DIA and others have raised this issue in the past with the Comptroller. I am analyzing how best to proceed given this history.

- Ceiling on Number of Intelligence Personnel. The Intelligence Authorization Act limits the number of personnel who can perform intelligence activities. My staff will work with ASD(C3I) to draft and staff appropriate legislation. We will have to coordinate with CIA.

- Personal Services Contracts. DIA seeks relief from the law limiting DoD's ability to use personal services contracts. There are three proposals in DoD seeking relief for other organizations. I am analyzing the best way to combine these proposals while including relief for DIA.

- Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) Experts. ASD(C3I) manages the DoD imposed limit on DISL experts. I am working with ASD(C3I) to determine the best way to review DIA's share of DISL allocations.

- I intend to provide a final reply next week.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk (b)(6)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECDEF HAS SEEN

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

OCT 7 2002

RECOMMENDED FIXES

U-087/DR

15 August 2002 9:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: L.E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBEJCT: Policies Inhibiting Management Flexibility

On July 19, during my office call, you asked me to identify policies which inhibit flexibility. Modifications to four policies listed below would significantly improve management of intelligence activities.

- Unfilled Military Billets. DIA and the unified command intelligence centers are required by DoD policy to budget the salary of military personnel billets. We are required to reimburse the departments for 100% of the authorized billets regardless of actual fill. In recent years, the departments have been decreasing their fill rates. In FY02, military billets were only filled at approximately 85%. Due to budget policy, we lost between $60M and $80M in fiscal guidance. Between FY99 and FY02, the loss was about $340M. This is a windfall for the SERVICES departments and a loss of intelligence funding. We should cost and program for military billets at the average fill rate for the previous three years. With this policy change and the requisite savings, we could hire contractors to cover shortfalls or fund needed new capabilities, such as the expansion in HUMINT capabilities you desire.

- Congressional Ceiling on Intelligence Personnel. The Intelligence Authorization Act imposes a ceiling on the number of personnel that can conduct intelligence and intelligence-related activities. The Defense Appropriations Act mandates that personnel in DoD may not be managed on the basis of end-strength. These laws conflict. The intelligence Act limits intelligence capabilities. By eliminating the ceiling, the size of the work force would be restricted only by the availability of funding for pay. Structure would be driven by mission needs, not limited by an arbitrary ceiling. We need the flexibility to build the work force based on prioritized needs. For example, we need the flexibility to expand our document exploitation activities as we encounter an increasing backlog in captured documents. We also need to increase chemical and biological experts for timely discovery of agents in theaters of operation. There are numerous other examples in areas of foreign weapons exploitation, computer forensics, the attaché service. etc. This problem would be resolved if Congress deleted language in the Intelligence Authorization Act which establishes personnel ceilings.

Say you don't know if you need increased balance by what you don't need to do

- Personal Services Contracts. The Government is normally required to obtain its employees by direct hire under competitive appointment or other procedures required by civil service law. This significantly limits the ability of Defense intelligence to hire

assumes everything is OK 8/16

specific expertise to support short-term or project-specific efforts. Examples include experts on al Qaeda, chemical-biological warfare, Islamic militant personalities, and linguists to support interrogation and document exploitation. CIA has much greater flexibility to address unforeseen requirements for specific expertise because of its authority to use personal service contracts. The situation would be rectified if Congress granted Defense components the same authority to use personal services contracts.

- Defense Intelligence Senior Experts. DoD has established a ceiling on the number of senior civilian technical experts (referred to as Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) positions) authorized for each intelligence agency. These positions are the technical, non-managerial equivalent of Senior Executive Service personnel and offer salaries above the grade of GS-15. DISL opportunities improve retention of superior intelligence expertise. The retention and application of expertise is critical in the current environment. Increasing DISL authorization does not increase appropriated salary. The DoD ceiling on DISLs should be eliminated and organizations should be permitted to manage personnel to their salary limit.

What is the % civ need top level numbers

You also asked me to compare CIA personnel legislation with our own and determine whether or not CIA authorities would improve DoD intelligence effectiveness. Our assessment is ongoing. In addition to the personal services contracting issue noted above, we will report any findings, once we better understand the CIA personnel policies.

COORDINATION: NONE

Enclosures:
1. Unfilled Military Billets
2. Congressional Ceiling on Intelligence Personnel
3. Personal Services Contracts
4. Defense Intelligence Senior Experts

cc:
DEPSECDEF
DIR(PA&E)
ASD C4I
Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence

Unfilled Military Billets

PURPOSE: To request that DoD change its policy regarding military billets being costed and programmed at 100% of authorization.

BACKGROUND: The General Defense Intelligence Program (funding account covering most intelligence analytical capabilities in DIA and the unified commands) lost between $60M and $80M in fiscal guidance in FY 02 (loss of about $340M over the period FY99-02), due to budgeting for unfilled military billets. DoD requires the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) components to budget at 100% for military billets even though the historical actual fill rate falls between 80%-95%. This overstates our military budget and takes away from NFIP fiscal guidance which could be used to fund other critical requirements. The NFIP components should be allowed to program for military billets based on a composite average of filled positions. For example, if the average fill rate for Army military officers is 85% on average for the past three years, the NFIP Defense Component should be able to program resources at 85% of the average military salary vice 100% as currently programmed. The program amount would be modified every year to account for the latest three year average of fill rate. The lost resources could have been used to fund shortfalls in the HUMINT, intelligence production and infrastructure arenas.

RECOMMENDATION: That DoD allow NFIP Components to cost and program for military billets at average fill rate based on the past three year average. The DoD Comptroller is aware of this issue.

Congressional Ceiling on Personnel Contained in the Intelligence Authorization Act

PURPOSE: To request that Congress eliminate requirements for a personnel ceiling.

BACKGROUND: Language in the Intelligence Authorization Act reflects a ceiling on the amount of personnel that can conduct intelligence and intelligence-related activities. Language contained in the Defense Appropriation's Act reflects that civilian personnel of the Department of Defense may not be managed on the basis of any end-strength, and the management of such personnel during the fiscal year shall not be subject to any constraint or limitation (known as an end-strength) on the number of such personnel who may be employed on the last day of such fiscal year. These two laws conflict with each other. The limit on end strength directly affects intelligence capabilities. For example, it is not possible to anticipate and program for increased requirements for interrogators, document exploitation personnel, specialists in chemical and biological warfare supporting forensic efforts on the ground in Afghanistan, intelligence experts in what are traditionally low priority countries such as Yemen, Somalia, and Indonesia. By eliminating the ceiling imposed by the Intelligence Authorization Act, the size of the workforce would be restricted only by the availability of funding to pay for it. Structure would be driven by mission needs, not limited by an inflexible ceiling.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Congress delete language in the Intelligence Authorization Act which establishes personnel ceilings.

Authority to Use Personal Services Contracts

PURPOSE: To request that Congress grant authority for DIA to use personal services contracts.

BACKGROUND: 5 U.S.C. 3109 states that Agencies shall not award personal services contracts unless specifically authorized by statute to do so. A personal services contract is characterized by the employer-employee relationship it creates between the Government and the contractor's personnel. The Government is normally required to obtain its employees by direct hire under competitive appointment or other procedures required by the civil service laws. Obtaining personal services by contract, rather than by direct hire, circumvents those laws unless Congress has specifically authorized acquisition of the services by contract. Without this exception to law, intelligence support to military operations are limited by the number of government assets that are available. It is important to note that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) currently has the authority to use personal services contracts (Sec 8., 50 USC, 403j).

RECOMMENDATION: That Congress grant authority for DIA to use personal services contracts to support analytical and collection activities with short-term or project specific efforts to support crisis requirements. For example, the intelligence analytic staff could be augmented with personnel with specific expertise to support such efforts as the Global War on Terrorism. Examples include experts on al Qaeda, the country of Yemen, chemical and biological warfare, Islamic militant personalities, etc. Another example is the need for additional interrogators or document exploitation personnel with special language proficiencies to interrogate detainees quickly or eliminate a backlog of potentially important captured documents.

Retaining Senior Intelligence Experts

PURPOSE: To request elimination of the OSD established ceiling on Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) authorizations in the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System.

BACKGROUND: DISL personnel are the senior technical experts in specific areas of intelligence (e.g., regional experts (Middle East, South Asia, Latin America) or subject matter experts (e.g., chemical and biological warfare, information operations, computer forensics, counterintelligence, clandestine collection). They are distinct from Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DI SES) managers. 10 U.S.C. 1606 provides a DoD DISES ceiling of 492. OSD policy states DISL totals will approximate 30% of DISES. This ratio applies to the number of DISL authorized within agencies. For protocol purposes DISL personnel are treated like SES personnel. This is important as it gives them entrée' to meetings and forums which sometimes exclude GS-15s and below. The pay level for DISL is equivalent to SES. Agencies pay DISL salary from the total for salary appropriated to the agency. Increasing DISL authorizations does not increase appropriated salary. Agencies must manage to their salary limit. Internal priorities have to be established for the number of senior grade and GG-grade authorizations filled.

As DIA is a people intensive operation and as the nature of its intelligence analysis, production and collection capabilities requires significant expertise, the DISL structure is important. Because of the related salary and benefits, DISL positions are reasonably competitive with similar civil sector jobs. DISL opportunities improve retention of superior technical experts. They ensure the agency has a broad range of world class experts to oversee production, quality control intelligence products, and mentor junior analysts and technical collectors. DIA is currently authorized 25 DISL. This is insufficient to cover the wide range of required expertise.

RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate the OSD-established ceiling on DISL authorizations allowing DIA to manage the number within its annual civilian pay appropriation.

TAB 4

Snowflake

October 7, 2002 5:46 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Fred Starr Proposal

Please draft a memo from me to whoever it should go to posing this Fred Starr proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/08/02 Fred Starr Proposal

DHR:dh
100702-74

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

U04003 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 7 2002

D

MEMO TO: **Secretary Rumsfeld** **DATE:** **August 8, 2002**

FROM: **Paul Wolfowitz** PW

SUBJECT: **Fred Starr's Proposal for a Trade Initiative for Afghanistan and the Region**

Don,

Attached is Fred Starr's brief write-up of his idea for a regional trade initiative. I'm also attaching again his remarkable anecdote about how a $2000 loan converted a thuggish armed mullah in Tajikistan into a prosperous potato farmer who sold his Kalashnikov back to the government and stopped hanging out at the mosque.

Following are the key elements of the initiative – as I understand it from Fred's memo and from the comments he made in our discussion:

- A high-profile international conference, convened by the United States, to focus on reopening the natural trade routes of this region;
- International investment to repair roads and open customs offices;
- Agreement among the participants on measures to remove obstacles to cross-border trade;
- Measures to help provide security for the routes passing through Afghanistan. This could be a function of an expanded ISAF and/or the Afghan National Army.

The U.S. role would be to point the way, coordinate and provide only part of the necessary money. According to Fred Starr, Jim Wolfensohn of the World Bank and Treasury Secretary O'Neill both support this idea.

The essence of the idea is that there is a great deal of trade that historically has moved through Afghanistan connecting various parts of the region. If those routes were reopened, there would be many small-scale entrepreneurs with the assets to own or rent a large truck and begin moving goods between various countries of the region, through Afghanistan. I am giving a version of this memo to Steve Hadley and I will ask Doug Feith to work with Steve to see how we might get some interagency review of this proposal.

Afghanistan/Pakistan/Central Asia: Regional Trade and Regional Security

S.F. Starr
sfstarr@jhu.edu
(b)(6)

No security arrangements in Afghanistan or the broader region will succeed without economic renewal. People must be able to feed themselves and their families. Inability to do so drives men into the arms of warlords and extremists, both of whom pay salaries. Or they turn to the cultivation of opium poppies.

In Tokyo, international donors promised tens of billions of dollars of aid—far more than what will actually be given. Much of that amount will be squandered or diverted to the pockets of local powers. Aid alone will not provide enough development to undergird security.

Due to its unique geographical position and traditions dating back 2,500 years, Afghanistan, the Indus Valley (Pakistan) and the rest of Central Asia have another, potentially far more important source of economic development: international trade. This region is the natural axis of overland trade between the Indian sub-continent, the Middle East, Europe, and China. These routes were largely closed throughout Soviet times and especially in the post 1979 period.

The US should sponsor and lead an international effort to reopen these routes. Leadership and concept are the key missing ingredients, not money. President Bush should give a major speech setting forth this notion, which Secy. O'Neill strongly supports. He should call on all the regional states and their neighbors--India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, etc.—to work together and with the US to coordinate the reopening of regional trade.

In the region, most people see the US as pursuing its own interests, but without a broader vision for the region. This initiative provides such a vision. It is not against any state. All states can support it. The US role should be to point the way, coordinate, and provide only part of the necessary money. This would implement President Bush' VMI speech.

The Afghanistan Redevelopment Act provides funds for opening routes and establishing customs offices. James Wolfensohn of The World Bank strongly supports this effort as well.

snowflake

October 7, 2002 11:26 AM

032

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Feedback on Congressional Meetings

I would appreciate feedback on the meetings I hold with Congressmen and Senators, whether it is at the Pentagon or on the Hill. I never hear a word of feedback from my Congressional relations shop on things that worked and things that didn't work.

What do we do to fix it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-35

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

U04005 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 9:43 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Gen. Jones

I need to see Gen. Jones sometime in the next couple of weeks. I need some talking points, and we ought to give him his marching orders. Specifically, there are some things on the Marine Corps we want him to talk to Hagee about and help us with getting Hagee's head right.

Second, there are some things we want him to do when he gets over to NATO, so he gets off on the right foot.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-25

Please respond by 10/25/02

DS 17,000

7 Oct 02

U04006 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 10:30 AM

337 Cabinet

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Brief Cabinet

I think we ought to get the members of the Cabinet and their deputies, except for State and CIA, over and give them the classified briefing soon. Please see me promptly on a date.

We could have the Cabinet first for lunch and have the deputies come in afterward just for the briefing, or we could have them all over just for a briefing.

Depending on how many people accept and how much room we have, we might want to go down one more tranche and take Walters, Hutchison from DEA, the two domestic deputies at the White House, and Andy Card's two deputies—some of the people who don't get a chance to see that stuff and yet who are part of the Administration and get asked all the time about it.

If we can't do it in one tranche, let's do it in two, but I want to get it done this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-28

7 Oct 02

Please respond by _____

U04007 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 10:36 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Jim Hoagland

Has Jim Hoagland ever asked to see me?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-30

Please respond by 10/18/02

done - 11/7

Larry Di Rita

000.71 SD

7 Oct 02

U04008 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 11:11 AM

322

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Army Corps of Engineers

What do you think about getting an outside study done on the Corps of Engineers? I keep reading about places where they are messing up. I think we ought to go after them and get rid of them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-33

Please respond by 10/25/02

7 Oct 02

U04009 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 11:22 AM

311 Satellites

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Satellites

I would like to get a primer briefing on satellites, the different types, what they look like, how long they stay up, who they serve, what their orbits are, what they cost, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-34

Please respond by 10/25/02

7 Oct 02

U04010 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 10:57 AM

322

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Burns at TRADOC

What do you think about suggesting to Burns that when he arrives at TRADOC, that he make a speech about what he plans to do and how he intends to contribute to jointness.

It seems to me that would be a useful thing for him to do. It would give all of his people the right direction. Someone might want to talk to Keane about it and make sure that the speech is the right one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-19

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

snowflake

October 7, 2002 7:45 AM

0914

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Foreign Friends

Have we ever developed a list of foreigners, like Stevie Davignon, Peter Sutherland, François de Rose and Tadashi Yamamoto, people around the world, who we send my key documents, so that at least some people know what we are doing here?

Please also send my testimony to Tadashi Yamamoto, Peter Sutherland and Stevie Davignon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-9

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

U04013 /03

snowflake

October 7, 2002 7:51 AM

Advance Copy Given to TC

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Sunday Shows

It looks like I am going to have to go on television on Sunday. Since I was just on Schieffer, why don't I try for "Meet the Press" and maybe one other, and double up—perhaps "Meet the Press" and CNN, or "Meet the Press" and Fox.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-11

Please respond by 10/08/02

OSD 27000

7 Oct 02

U04014 /03

Snowflake

12:45 PM

TO: Gen. Tommy Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: February 18, 2002

SUBJECT: ***Washington Times Article***

Take a look at this article from the *Washington Post*. It turns out that the place that our folks seem not to be aware of was in fact a place that the CIA built. I wonder what else we don't know.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021802.15

Attach: **Washington Times *Al Qaeda Tunnels, Arms Cache Totaled* by Steve Vogel 2/15/02**

Please respond by: 2/26

Afghanistan

18Feb02

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Al Qaeda Tunnels, Arms Cache Totaled

Complex Believed Largest Found in War

Not in printed edition

By Steve Vogel
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, February 16, 2002; Page A27

——Special Report——
• Military: Related articles, Web search, online resources.

——Dot.Mil——
• Online Column by William M. Arkin

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The mission was to be a quick, 12-hour operation. A team of U.S. Special Forces troops backed by Marines would fly by helicopter to the al Qaeda camp at Zhawar Kili in eastern Afghanistan, search the tunnels at the facility and get out with daylight to spare.

Instead, stunned by the size of the complex and the amount of weaponry and ammunition it found, the team spent nine days last month overseeing the destruction of what has turned out to be by far the largest -- and perhaps the most important -- al Qaeda compound uncovered in the war.

"We got on the ground and found the cave systems were far more extensive than we thought," said the Navy SEAL officer who commanded the operation. "We started finding tons of stuff. It was the onion thing. The more you peel, the more you find."

The U.S. military commanders who sent the SEALs on their mission should not have been surprised about the size of the Zhawar complex.

Zhawar's immense scope was described in military journals well before the SEAL team was sent. An article detailing its deep, interconnecting tunnels was posted last fall on a Web site operated by the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office. It was built with the help of U.S. money in the mid-1980s by *mujaheddin* forces fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and its importance to al Qaeda was known long before the Afghanistan war began. Zhawar was struck by dozens of U.S. cruise missiles in 1998, when President Bill Clinton ordered an attack on the site in response to the bombings of two U.S. embassies in east Africa.

Even after last month's destruction, U.S. forces remain focused on the site. On Feb. 4, an unmanned drone aircraft operated from afar by the CIA fired a missile at individuals who U.S. defense and intelligence

officials claim were suspected al Qaeda members but who local residents say were innocent civilians collecting scrap metal.

U.S. military planners were not among those who read the article on the Army Web site. Prior to January's attack, Zhawar was hit by warplanes during the campaign only once, in November. "I guess the knowledge was imperfectly shared," said Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, a spokesman for the U.S. Central Command in Tampa. "That knowledge wasn't shared widely enough with the people who needed to know."

Added Quigley: "Had we known in November of the huge size of the place and the amount of stuff in there, we'd have paid more attention to it, I suspect."

When the United States began bombing Zhawar on Jan. 3, senior defense officials said they were acting on intelligence that al Qaeda fighters were using the site to regroup and possibly escape into Pakistan, less than three miles away. Defense officials now say they cannot rule out the possibility that the delay in attacking the site may have enabled al Qaeda members to get away.

Ali Ahmad Jalali, a former colonel in the Afghan army who co-authored the article, called Zhawar "very important for [al Qaeda], politically, strategically and tactically" and said he is surprised that the United States had not zeroed in on it earlier.

"I think many probably escaped from there," Jalali said. "They hit the house but left the door open."

After the collapse of Taliban rule in Afghanistan late last year, a great deal of attention was paid to the siege of Tora Bora in December, the mountain enclave about 70 miles north of Zhawar Kili, where Osama bin Laden and members of the al Qaeda network were once thought to be hiding. But Tora Bora, consisting mostly of natural caves that were not interconnected, is dwarfed by Zhawar, a nine-square-mile complex including tunnels, buildings and a terrorist training camp 30 miles southwest of Khost. Nor was Tora Bora as important to al Qaeda as Zhawar, Jalali said.

The 81-member U.S. team arrived at the site several days after the airstrikes began on Jan. 3. It included San Diego-based SEALs, Air Force commandos, Army chemical and biological weapons experts, FBI agents, forensics experts and a 50-person Marine security force.

Exploring the tunnels with flashlights, they found that many of the more than 70 tunnels were interconnected and stretched hundreds of yards into the side of a steep valley, reinforced by steel I-beams and bricks, the SEAL unit's commander said. Inside they discovered huge arsenals, including tanks, artillery, antiaircraft guns, explosives and ammunition.

"We found tons of ammunition, literally millions of pounds of ammunition," the SEAL officer said. One cache was so large that when it was destroyed, the mountainside kept rumbling with secondary explosions for two full days, he said.

The SEAL, a lieutenant commander, spoke in a telephone interview from Afghanistan on condition that he and his unit not be identified.

The team also found information on al Qaeda, including passports, money and freshly laundered clothes. Some of it was uncovered in apparent al Qaeda safe houses in neighboring villages.

The tunnels were machine-mined, all wired for lighting, though there was no power. "The blackness was absolute," said the SEAL officer. "You turn off your light, and you almost get vertigo." Deep inside, there were anterooms, jail cells, storage rooms and mattresses. "It was eerie," said the SEAL. "It made us more angry than anything. This was a no-kidding terrorist operation."

The team, equipped for only a day's stay, set up camp in a nearby evacuated village and resorted to roasting goats, chickens and a cow for food. Helicopters brought in more supplies and two heavily armed dune buggies that commandos used to get around the sprawling complex.

Armed al Qaeda fighters roamed the area, trying to ambush the Americans, according to the SEAL officer. "We know we were being monitored," he said. "At times we could see signaling in the mountains." The American team called in airstrikes to hit the al Qaeda fighters, he said.

The commandos used demolition charges to blow up the caches of ammunition, igniting an underground fuel depot. "We didn't know that until we hit it one night," said the SEAL officer. "It was quite a show."

Air Force commandos called in airstrikes "night and day" for more than a week to destroy larger equipment, buildings and tunnel openings, he said.

Airstrikes sealed off more than 50 tunnels and destroyed more than 60 aboveground structures. Zhawar is now "98 to 100 percent destroyed," the SEAL officer estimated. Nonetheless, the United States continues to monitor the site to make sure it is not reoccupied, Quigley said.

Inside buildings and in nearby abandoned villages, the commandos found pay ledgers, identification papers and heroin. They also discovered passports, primarily Yemeni and Pakistani, along with money and freshly laundered clothes. "They were obviously safe houses for changing identities," the SEAL officer said.

In al Qaeda classrooms, they found "how-to" literature about ambushes,

bombs and mines, as well as a home-made poster showing bin Laden with a backdrop of a jetliner hitting the World Trade Center.

"It was kind of disturbing," said the SEAL officer. "It was an amazing thing to see the reaction when the guys saw that. . . . It was anger, big-time."

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snowflake

October 7, 2002 7:51 AM

091412

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Countering Disinformation

Please make sure people have copies of Torie's paper for the countering disinformation and declaratory policy meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/16/02 ASD(PA) Memo to SecDef re: Countering Disinformation

DHR:dh
100702-12

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

U04015 /03

C 9/21

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

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OCT 7 2002

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

9/20 Some good thoughts Di Rita

Larry Di Rita 9/20

TO: SecDef

DepSecDef

FROM: Torie Clarke

SUBJECT: Countering Disinformation

DATE: 16 September 2002

ISSUE

How do we do a better job of countering disinformation generally and as it relates to the war on terrorism in particular?

STRATEGY

Increase the volume and gain credibility through 3rd party validation.

1) Be much more aggressive in outreach to select foreign media and audiences.* They'll never say it like we would, but we cannot cede the field completely to negative voices.

2) Identify, activate, and disseminate 3rd party advocates and commentary more credible than ours. Be flexible but focus on British, German and Arab media, European opinion elites and Arab youth.

TACTICS

Global Communication Center** -- An interagency, international communications team that aggressively disseminates U.S./coalition goals and tactics through multiple channels. It also serves as an early warning system and rapid response mechanism. Detect disinformation in its earliest stages and execute appropriate responses. Include Washington, London, Bonn, Pakistan, Kabul, Riyadh, and Cairo, enlist State, DoD, and Combatant Command staff.

* Underway – see attached index of recent foreign media outreach

** Underway now with WH/NSC/DOS.

Global Website* -- Since overseas audiences increasingly turn to the Internet for information (especially the Arab world) use it as a primary vehicle to target select audiences. Content should primarily be 3rd parties with greater credibility than U.S. officials. Ex) Muslim clerics on detainee treatment. Use push/pull technologies targeted at select audiences.

Foreign Media -- Increase senior DoD interaction with foreign media, both in D.C. and abroad. To the extent possible, insist on live electronic interviews and printed transcripts of Q&A to lessen likelihood that comments are taken out of context. On travel, in addition to general media availability, grant one exclusive lengthier interview with an influential media outlet willing to abide by the above ground rules.

Embedded Media -- With strict ground rules in place to protect operational security, embed media with all military operations. Like it or not, media have more creditability in many countries than we do, especially in confusing situations like civilian casualties that result from friendly fire incidents. Ex) If media had been with the troops observing the Oruzgan province prior to the "wedding incident," they would have witnessed first-hand the coalition aircraft being threatened by Triple-A fire.

CONSIDERATIONS

Certain allegations, like civilian casualties, are hard to refute completely because we're constrained by: The truth – real numbers are hard to come by; operational security – not sharing combat camera footage, for example, because doing so might reveal capabilities; and legal issues – lawyers don't want to say anything that might increase the Department's liability

Despite those constraints, we can and should do better by developing a coherent strategy and consistent mechanism for doing so.

* Resources requested in the DPG.

Department of Defense Foreign Press Centers Briefings after Sept 11 2001:

DATE	SUBJECT	SPOKESPERSON
11/13/01	Department of Defense Update for Foreign Media	Rear Adm. Craig Deputy Spokesman Department of Defense
11/02/01	Background Briefing on Taliban Denial and Deception Techniques	Senior Defense Department Official
01/31/02	The War on Terrorism from the Air Force Perspective Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Noble Eagle (Homeland Security)	General John P. Jumper Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force
01/04/02	Department of Defense Update for Foreign Media	Victoria Clarke Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
04/18/02	The New Unified Command Plan	General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
04/11/02	Operation Enduring Freedom	General Tommy Franks Commanding General, U.S. Central Command
05/29/02	International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference on East Asia	Paul Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of Security Defense
06/21/02	The Global War Against Terrorism	Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
09/10/02	Global War Against Terrorism	General Pace Vice Chariman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Media Outreach Office Interviews

Date	Media	Official
07/02/02	Central New Agency Taiwan	ASD (ISA) Rodman
07/03/02	Australian Broadcasting Corp.	Phil Strub
08/08/02	Al Jazeera	SecDef Rumsfeld
08/21/02	Radio Nawa	USD Douglas Feith
08/27/02	Yomiuri Shimbun	ASD Peter Rodman
08/28/02	Ximena Sinay (Argentina)	PDASD Dick McGraw
08/29/02	Kwon Ho Jong (Korea)	ASD Peter Rodman
08/30/02	Hurriyet (Turkey)	DepSec Wolfowitz
09/03/02	La Nacion	LtCol McClellan
09/03/02	Asahi Shimbun	ASD Peter Rodman
09/04/02	Australian Broadcasting	Dr. Mayberry
09/04/02	Dong-A (Korean)	USD (C) Zakheim
09/04/02	Roundtable w/ Indonesian journalists	DepSec Wolfowitz
09/10/02	BBC Radio	ASD (C3I) John Stenbit
09/10/02	NTV Television (Russian)	DASD(EurAsia) Ricardel
09/10/02	London Times	USD Douglas Feith
09/10/02	Channel 2 Jerusalem	USD Dove Zakheim

Foreign Visitors to Press Operations

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Brazil- 9
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Chile-1
Columbia- 1
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El Salvador- 2
Guatemala-1
Honduras- 1
Mexico- 1
Nicaragua- 1
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Spain-1
Australia- 2
Uganda- 1
Georgia- 1
Israel- 1
Malaysia-1
Namibia- 1
Ghana- 2
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Keyna- 1
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Yugoslavia- 2
Egypt- 1
Fiji- 1
Senegal- 1
Trinidad- 1
Cambodia- 1
Zambia- 1
Algeria- 1
Turkey- 1
India- 3
Kuwait- 1
Bolivia- 1
Nigeria- 2

Total- 113 Guests from 46 Countries

snowflake

October 7, 2002 7:51 AM

00071 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Meeting on Building Support

Please schedule a meeting with Torie, Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, you, and me on Torie's 30 August memo.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/30/02 ASD(PA) Memo to SecDef re: Outline for Building Support for the Road Ahead in the War on Terrorism

DHR:dh
100702-13

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

U04016 /03

Clarke

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 7 2002

30 August 2002

Preliminary Outline

Building Support for the Road Ahead in the War on Terrorism

Background:

For a sustained effort in the global war on terrorism to succeed, we need the American people's support and their influence on public policy.

A combination of fear, fatigue and comfort with the long-standing policy of "respond when attacked" make them hesitant to support a shift to preemption. We can get them there, but we're asking people to make a very fundamental shift in their attitudes toward national security. We will need to be honest, persistent and we must "open the aperture" on credible evidence regarding the world threat and Iraq's role. Increase public understanding of the level and nature of the WMD threat and we build the public case and support for preemption.

Strategy:

Engage and Inform.

Engage – Get beyond beltway politics and media-elites. Rather than resisting calls for more information, encourage the interest and interaction. As much as possible, speak directly to the American people and key audiences overseas.

Inform – Have an adult conversation. Inform them with "the facts, the circumstances to the extent they're known before the world and the American people" (SecDef 8/19). Use a credible body of information and evidence to demonstrate the ability and intent of states/terrorists to use WMD against us and allies. Much of it is declassified; more could be.

Benchmark Events:

- POTUS address to nation
- Congressional testimony by SecState/SecDef/CJCS together.
- POTUS address to U.N.

Recommendation:

In addition to building 3rd party support around the events above:

Actively engage the American public and select foreign audiences in an elevated discussion of the WMD threat.

Domestic:

- Senior military and civilian leadership conduct a series of geographically/demographically diverse, town hall-like events across the country. Truly taking our case to the American people, we ask the tough questions, "what do we need to think through as a people? Can we risk waiting for an attack?"

- Continue WMD briefings to Congress and expand outreach to opinion elites and likely talking heads.

- Release a white paper (with some previously undisclosed information) that presents evidence of Al Qaeda connections and intent. Put heavy emphasis on overseas dissemination (consider release by Brits or other ally to enhance document's credibility).

Overseas:

(TBD; need submissions from State/NSC).

- WMD Briefing/conference for defense attachés in Washington, D.C. and CENTCOM liaisons in Tampa.

Surrogate Program:

Identify, inform and activate opinion-elites at home and abroad to serve as surrogates, provide media commentary and write op-eds.

Enlist usual and unusual suspects:

- Former SecDefs and SecStates (include Albright)

- Select Hart-Rudman Commission members

- GEN George Joulwan (Ret), former NATO Supreme Allied Commander

- Bill Bradley

- John Danforth, (more TBD)

Message Themes:

Old security doctrines do not work in the 21st century.

Nexus of terrorist states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorists with intent to use WMD raises the spectre of catastrophic consequences for America and her friends and allies.

Risk of inaction is far greater than the risk of action.

We need to ask the tough questions, debate and discuss what risks we're willing to take.

Consideration:

The best way to influence public policy in Washington is to impact public opinion at home. Get beyond beltway to real people, and we increase the likelihood of success.

Attachment:
Potential Domestic Markets

RECOMMENDED MARKETS

Chicago

Los Angeles

Philadelphia

Detroit

New York

Nashville

Seattle

Raleigh - Durham- Chapel Hill

Pittsburgh

St. Louis

Phoenix

Boston

Denver

San Diego

snowflake

October 7, 2002 10:10 AM

381

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Gingrich Memos

Please call Newt and reference this paper on contingency planning. Suggest to him that if he wants to send things like this, I would prefer he not send them to the world. There is no reason at all that Condi Rice, Scooter Libby, Gen. Jumper, Gen. Keane or whoever "joanad" is ought to be getting all this stuff.

In my view, he ought to focus his missives. If he is sending things to me, he should probably send them separately. I suggest he not send it to so many people, and cut it down to Craddock, Abizaid, Pace, DeLong and me.

What happens is that everyone then starts sending me things asking me about the issues he raises.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/03/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Capabilities Planning

DHR:dh
100702-15

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

copies to Dr. Wolfowitz
Dr. Rita

SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 7 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 8:02 AM
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil
Cc: john.abizaid@js.pentagon.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; john.keane@hqda.army.mil; john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; joanad@odci.gov; delongmike@centcom.mil; lilibby@ovp.eop.gov; crice@nsc.eop.gov
Subject: capabilitiees planning

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 10/3/02
contingencies planning

as we think through possible operations with Iraq we should have contingency plans for three operations:
1. a sudden explosion of missiles from southem Lebanon against Israel (there are apparently 8,000 missiles currently in southern Israel and a number can reach Haifa, I do not know the rate at which this stockpile from Iran and Syria is increasing but it is apparently getting more sophisticated and longer range)

2. an Iranian effort to close the Gulf once we have committed forces in the region (and possibly to attack our logistics footprint in Kuwait and elsewhere)

3. A joint Iranian-Syrian decision that this is their last stand and the United States has to suffer so many casualties it will not try to replace them.

Intentions analysts will argue these are highly improbable. I agree. However planning should be based on CAPABILITIES not INTENTIONS>

In 1967 the Soviets convinced the Syrians Israel was going to attack them and started a cycle of paranoia.

In 1973 Egypt and Syria caught Israel largely by surprise on their holiest day.

In 1979 the Soviets surprised us in Afghanistan.

In 1990 Saddam surprised us by taking Kuwait when we had just concluded the region was quiet.

In 2002 terrorists surprised us on September 11.

It is very dangerous to not have a contingency plan for all three of the capabilities outlined above.

11-L-0559/OSD/7050

October 7, 2002 9:06 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Arlene

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: E-mail to Newt Gingrich

Please send the following to Newt Gingrich:

Newt,

I saw your August 8th e-mail on more effective action in Afghanistan. In it you say that the U.S. has denied expansion of ISAF and refused allies the opportunity to contribute.

Not true. We have been begging countries to contribute and aggressively trying to find first someone to succeed the Brits and then someone to succeed the Turks. That is newspaper nonsense.

I agree with your reconstruction proposal and have moved it around.

Regards,

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-17

Please respond by 10/09/02

7 Oct 02

U04018 /03

Snowflake

October 7, 2002 9:11 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Here's a piece from Newt Gingrich that is interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/08/02 E-mail from Newt Gingrich to SecDef re: More on Effective Action in Afghanistan

DHR:dh
100702-18

Please respond by 10/25/02

7 Oct 03

U04019 /03

From Newt Gingrich
cc: D. Rita
Wolfowitz

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 7 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, August 08, 2002 11:29 AM
To: (b)(6) Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Cc: john.keane@hqda.army.mil; john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: more on effective action in Afghanistan

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt 8/08/02

more on effective action in afghanistan

the following is from someone with recent experience in Afghanistan and reinforces my point from yesterday

Couldn't agree more. But remember that every time we do this in a post conflict situation we have a paralell military security and military/civilian construction effort. The United States has denied expansion of ISAF and refused allies like the Italians (Who have some fabulous road buildign companies) the opportunity to contribute. I can only assume it is because we are not willing to compromise our absolute freedom of military action throughout the rest of the country. The trade off is not worth it in my view.

We should expand ISAF to the entire country and judiciously select the area the united states will occupy with US troops. Turn the current 3 star US HQ into something like SArajevo and invite the allies to take a province for stability ops. The Balkan model would actually work in Afghanistan, where the locals are generally trying to achieve the same thign the administration desires.

The country is such a mess that relatively small improvements have a huge impact. Digging wells in small towns makes them your friend for life. Paving roads will too. We could open the airport in Kandahar to civilian traffic if we wanted to with very little effort. Locals get the message that we don't want their country to improve. we just want to keep chasing bad guys and shooting. They may be right.

Don't count on the international aid folks to do much. They primarily bilk donors to hire themselves at exorbitant salaries. A guy with a bag of money and authority to hire locals to shovel dirt into the holes in the road would be an improvement. Grant authority to the SF teams to dispense money to locals in their AOs and things would improve. There will be some questionable expenditures but small, and there is no progress without errors. Our desire for no errors creates failure.

This works best when military works with local government and NGOs. None can do it alone and someone has to lead for all to work together.

You are right. Lack of progress is disgraceful. But follow the lines of responsibility. Hold the right people accountable. There is a policy failure

snowflake

October 7, 2002 7:41 AM

032

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Testimony

Please make sure we send François de Rose my testimony to the Senate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-8

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

U04020 /03

snowflake

9 42 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: February 16, 2002

SUBJECT: **Former Secretaries of Defense**

One of the former Secretaries of Defense, I think it was Jim Schlesinger, told me the way money is being transferred by the terrorists is by Western Union, and in code where messages are passed to meet people and they pass it in cash. We ought to make sure people are looking into that.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021602.06

Please respond by: 2/27

snowflake

14/8

October 7, 2002 7:32 AM

413.51

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Website Address

Larry Di Rita
10/30

I looked at the website that Safire showed as our website address. That is so long and complicated. Isn't there a way to get a simpler one?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-4

Please respond by 10/18/02

SecDef -

If you type "Defense ~~[illegible]~~ Department" in an internet search program, the first site that comes up is our website. Our problem is not the address, but what the website looks like and the info it provides. Not user friendly is working to get it better.

7 Oct 02

Larry Di Rita
10/30

U04-0259/OSD/7056

TO: SecDef

THROUGH: ASD/PA

FROM: CAPT Tim Taylor USN

DATE: October 22, 2002

SUBJECT: Website Address

Searching for "Defense" or "DefenseLink" will get you to our home page from virtually anywhere on the Internet. Most of our key resources, including transcripts and speeches, are just one or two clicks from the home page. Using a search engine and the home page reduces the need to bother with the annoying "slashes" and "dot coms" that are characteristics of the Internet.

We have already begun a project to overhaul DoD's website: to further simplify its addressing structure, to make it even easier to find things, to modernize its design and content, and to update its antiquated technology.

The universal assessment is that the current site is uninviting, confusing, dated and drab. It represents only fractions of the Department, and it does so inconsistently, unpredictably, and often slowly. We are fixing that.

We want DoD's web site to be the first place to go for the most accurate, complete and timely information available. In the Department's overall scheme of things, this is a relatively small project that carries huge benefits. Internally and externally, DoD will be more current, more responsive, more resilient, more focused, and more professional. The Department will be able to speak quickly and with one voice.

snowflake

EF07569 A

February 25, 2002 9:25 AM

file

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Detainee Outgoing Mail

Please have someone check and see what they are doing about mail, with respect to the detainees. Torie reported that someone called the office, a family member or friend of a family member of one of the detainees, and said they had received mail stamped "POW."

We better make sure the folks down there are not designating or stamping things using "POW," simply because that is the only stamp they have.

Please let me know what actually happened.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022502-1

383.6

25 Feb 02

snowflake

October 7, 2002 5:52 PM

350,09

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Rich Haver

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Intel Reorganization

It seems that Senator Graham, and perhaps Congressman Goss, may be thinking of sponsoring a reorganization of the intel community that could consolidate intel authority under the DCI, possibly along the lines of the Scowcroft report.

I think we need to prepare our thoughts about that idea now, before it becomes a major issue.

My impression is that some folks are tilting in that direction because they seem not to understand the difference between national intelligence and military intelligence. They also seem not to realize that shared responsibility is unavoidable, because intelligence is collected from various assets that cannot be neatly compartmentalized into those two categories.

One argument made by those who think they may want to see greater consolidation is that the DCI does not have all the pieces under him, therefore he can't be held responsible. They say that without appearing to understand that the other side of that argument is equally true, namely that if DoD and the military are to be held responsible for winning wars, then they must have consolidated control over intelligence.

20 Oct 02

U04022 /03

Supporters of consolidation under the DCI also use the argument that there was insufficient sharing of intelligence information before 9/11. That may be true, but it is not an argument for centralizing all intelligence under the DCI. It is a separate issue, and, further, it probably was a problem among CIA, FBI, and other non-Defense intelligence organizations.

I've always believed that in research and development and in intelligence gathering, the last thing one should want is to have a single source of information. There needs to be competition—multiple sources of information, although the information needs to be shared.

Rather than wait for the pressure to build, we should get all of the arguments developed and the people who understand this issue marshaled, so we can stop it from getting a head of steam, rather than having to catch up after it already has a good head of steam.

If you recall, in Condi's draft of the presidential decision memo on intelligence, it stated that the powers of the DCI would be strengthened. I assume it was taken out, but I never went back to check the National Security Strategy. We have a task of managing this problem, and I think it is best to manage it before it gets worse.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100502-1

Please respond by _____

Snowflake

October 7, 2002 4:44 PM

Iraq

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iraq's WMD

Here is the unclassified paper on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.

Perhaps we ought to send it to the ministers of defense of the NATO countries that I briefed, and possibly some other MoDs around the world.

Thanks.

Attach.
October 2002 CIA White Paper: "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs"

DHR:dh
100702-63

Please respond by 10/18/02

7 Oct 02

U04023 /03

October 8, 2002 7:37 AM

020 JCS

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Gen. Abizaid
Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Doctrine/Experimentation/Joint Exercises

12/10

I would like to see what activities are located in the Joint Staff that involve doctrine, experimentation and joint exercises.

We've talked from time to time about the possibility of moving them to Joint Forces Command. It seems to me now may be the time to get it done.

Please get me a briefing on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100802-1

Please respond by 10/25/02

12/9

Response attached

12/10

8 Oct 02

U04024 /03

1249
1400

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-650-02
9 December 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Doctrine/Experimentation/Joint Exercises

- In response to your note (TAB), I have examined the feasibility of transferring doctrine, experimentation and joint exercises from the Joint Staff to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). All three areas fall under the purview of the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, J-7 (DJ-7).
- Have also explored the roles, staffing considerations, legislative requirements and [redacted] associated with the transfer of these responsibilities. Director, J-7, met with CDRUSJFCOM, who agreed with the current division of responsibilities, with the exception of joint doctrine. He wanted to explore how to "bring doctrine to the next level." Requested CDRUSJFCOM provide an analysis of what that means and at what cost. Expect a reply by 31 January 2003.

RECOMMENDATION: Retain all current Joint Staff functions, pending CDRUSJFCOM response on doctrine. Available to brief at your earliest convenience.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____ Other_____

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-651-02
9 December 2002

Ed

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, US JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Subject: Joint Doctrine Policy and Oversight

1. The Secretary of Defense requested I explore the possibility of transferring doctrine, experimentation and joint exercises to US Joint Forces Command. During your discussion with my Director, J-7, understand you agreed to the current division of labor, but wanted to explore the possibility of taking joint doctrine to "the next level." Please provide an analysis of your ideas on a revised joint doctrine process that will bring this to the next level, and at what costs.

2. Look forward to your thoughts and proposals. Appreciate your response by 31 January 2003.

Dick Myers

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

snowflake

October 8, 2002 7:35 AM

381

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Declaratory Policy

The next time we discuss declaratory policy, let's make sure anyone who brings up anything on that subject also has an indication of who is going to convey the message, what the timing is, whether it is covert, overt or both, and what the means of communication will be.

We have to have that as part of the proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100802-2

Please respond by _____

8 Oct 02

U04025 /03

Snowflake

October 8, 2002 7:28 AM

Iraq

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Relationship Between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein

This is the third article that says I have overstated a relationship between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. Please take a look at it.

My instinct is to get a memo that sets out precisely what I have said on the subject, which I believe is only what has been released by the CIA at our request, so that we have it and know we have it in case it keeps coming up.

I don't know whether we ought to send in a letter to the editor or not. Maybe we should. What do you think?

Another way to do it would be to get John McLaughlin to write the letter to the editor. I have been as careful as anyone could be.

Thanks.

Attach.
Strobel, Landay and Walcott, "Officials' private Doubts on Iraq War," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 8, 2002.

DHR:dh
100802-4

Please respond by 10/11/02

8 Oct 02

U04026 /03

Philadelphia Inquirer
October 8, 2002
Pg. 1

Officials' Private Doubts On Iraq War

Some military, intelligence and diplomatic sources say hawks are overstating the danger that Baghdad poses.

By Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott, Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON - While President Bush marshals congressional and international support for invading Iraq, a growing number of military officers, intelligence professionals and diplomats in his own government privately have deep misgivings about the administration's double-time march toward war.

These officials say administration hawks have exaggerated evidence of the threat that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein poses - including distorting his links to the al-Qaeda terrorist network; have overstated the amount of international support for attacking Iraq; and have downplayed the potential repercussions of a new war in the Middle East.

They say that the administration squelches dissenting views and that intelligence analysts are under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's argument that Hussein poses such an immediate threat to the United States that preemptive military action is necessary.

"Analysts at the working level in the intelligence community are feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon to cook the intelligence books," said one official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

A dozen other officials echoed his views in interviews with the Inquirer Washington Bureau. No one who was interviewed disagreed.

They cited recent suggestions by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice that Hussein and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network were working together.

Rumsfeld said Sept. 26 that the U.S. government had bulletproof" confirmation of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda members, including "solid evidence" that members of the terrorist network maintained a presence in Iraq.

The facts are much less conclusive. Officials said Rumsfeld's statement was based in part on intercepted telephone calls in which an al-Qaeda member who apparently was passing through Baghdad was overheard calling friends or relatives, intelligence officials said. The intercepts provide no evidence that the suspected terrorist was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq, they said.

Rumsfeld also suggested that the Iraqi regime had offered safe haven to bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.

While technically true, that, too, is misleading. Intelligence reports said the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, a longtime Iraqi intelligence officer, made the offer during a visit to Afghanistan in late 1998, after the United States attacked al-Qaeda training camps with cruise missiles to retaliate for the bombings of the

U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. But officials said the same intelligence reports said bin Laden rejected the offer because he did not want Hussein to control his group.

In fact, the officials said, there is no ironclad evidence that the Iraqi regime and the terrorist network are working together, or that Hussein has ever contemplated giving chemical or biological weapons to al-Qaeda, with whom he has deep ideological differences.

None of the dissenting officials, who work in a number of different agencies, would agree to speak publicly, out of fear of retribution. Many of them have long experience in the Middle East and South Asia, and all spoke in similar terms about their unease with the way that U.S. political leaders were dealing with Iraq.

All agreed that Hussein was a threat who eventually must be dealt with, and none flatly opposed military action. But, they say, the U.S. government has no dramatic new knowledge about the Iraqi leader that justifies Bush's urgent call to arms.

Some lawmakers have voiced similar concerns after receiving CIA briefings.

Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D., Ill.) said some information he had seen did not support Bush's portrayal of the Iraqi threat.

"It's troubling to have classified information that contradicts statements made by the administration," Durbin said. "There's more they should share with the public."

Several administration and intelligence officials defended CIA Director George Tenet, saying Tenet was not pressuring his analysts but was quietly working to include dissenting opinions in intelligence estimates and congressional briefings.

In one case, a senior administration official said, Tenet made sure that a State Department official told Congress that the Energy and State Departments disagreed with an intelligence assessment that said hundreds of aluminum tubes Iraq tried to purchase were intended for Baghdad's secret nuclear-weapons program. Analysts in both departments concluded that the Iraqis probably wanted the tubes to make conventional artillery pieces.

Other examples of questionable statements include:

Vice President Cheney said in late August that Iraq might have nuclear weapons "fairly soon." A CIA report released Friday said it could take Iraq until the last half of the decade to produce a nuclear weapon, unless it could acquire bomb-grade uranium or plutonium on the black market.

Also in August, Rumsfeld suggested that al-Qaeda operatives fleeing Afghanistan were taking refuge in Iraq with Hussein's assistance. "In a vicious, repressive dictatorship that exercises near-total control over its population, it's very hard to imagine that the government is not aware of what's taking place in the country," he said. Rumsfeld apparently was referring to about 150 members of the militant Islamic group Ansar al Islam ("Supporters of Islam") who have taken refuge in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. However, one of America's would-be Kurdish allies controls that part of the country, not Hussein.

snowflake

October 8, 2002 7:44 AM

5.000

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Alleged Credit Card Fraud

Please get me a report on this Navy alleged credit card fraud—paying for prostitutes and the like.

Thanks.

Attach.
Margasak, Larry, "Navy Abuse of Credit Is Detailed," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 8, 2002.

DHR:dh
100802-5

Please respond by 10/25/02

8 Oct 02

U04027 /03

Philadelphia Inquirer
October 8, 2002

Navy Abuse Of Credit Is Detailed

The use of cards for pro sports and prostitutes went on after news of it surfaced, a report found.

By Larry Margasak, Associated Press

WASHINGTON - Navy personnel used government credit cards to hire prostitutes at brothels, buy jewelry, gamble, and attend New York Yankees and Los Angeles Lakers games in fraudulent purchases exceeding $200,000, congressional investigators have found.

Lower-paid enlisted personnel earning $12,000 to $27,000 were the biggest abusers, but the Navy itself bears responsibility for failure to monitor the travel-card program, the General Accounting Office concluded.

The GAO report was prepared for a House Government Reform subcommittee hearing today and obtained yesterday by the Associated Press.

It shows that the abuses continued months after investigators first publicly reported on problems with the cards. From October 2000 through March 2002, the new survey found 1,180 Navy transactions for personal items totaling $206,700.

The Pentagon has stepped up its efforts to control use of the cards. Money has been deducted from the paychecks of those who abused the cards.

Officials who grant security clearances now are notified when a cardholder comes under investigation. And the military has promised to step up civil and criminal prosecutions.

Last summer, the GAO found that about 200 Army personnel had used the cards to get $38,000 in cash that they spent on lap dances and other forms of entertainment at strip clubs near military bases.

The new Navy study found additional use of the cards to obtain cash at adult clubs - money normally used to tip dancers, waitresses and bartenders. The brothel payments were disguised as restaurant charges.

The Pentagon credit-card program has faced increasing scrutiny since 2001, when auditors disclosed that more than 46,000 Defense Department employees had defaulted on $62 million in official travel expenses charged to the government cards.

The Navy report cited 80 transactions totaling $13,250 at two Nevada brothels; 199 purchases for $20,800 at two jewelry stores; 247 transactions for $28,700 at three adult clubs; 80 gambling transactions for $34,250; 72 cruises for $38,300; and 502 purchases of tickets, worth $71,400, to entertainment events, including The Phantom of the Opera, and Yankees, Braves and Lakers games.

As of March 31, more than 8,400 Navy cardholders had $6 million in delinquent debt, the report said.

snowflake

October 8, 2002 8:45 AM

353

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Funding Joint Experiments/Exercises

How do we arrange so that Joint Forces Command is assigned dollars to conduct joint experiments and exercises, rather than having to scrape it up from others?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100802-9

Please respond by 10/25/02

8 Oct 02

U04028 /03

snowflake

October 8, 2002 8:45 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Cartoon

Would you please get me the original of the cartoon, if you can, from *U.S. News and World Report,* page 4, this week's issue?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100802-11

Please respond by 11/1/02

8 Oct 02

U04029 /03

snowflake

October 8, 2002 1:37 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Accuracy in the Media

The newsmagazine this week said that Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby and I were members of the "B" team during the Ford administration. Actually, I was Secretary of Defense, Scooter Libby was in law school and Wolfowitz was a member—just another example.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100802-16

Please respond by _____

000.7

8 Oct 02

U04030 /03

snowflake

October 9, 2002 5:05 PM

060 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Photos

Here are the photographs from the MIA-POW Ceremony. I signed the top one for Congressman Johnson's staff. If there are others I should sign, please let me know.

Someone ought to look at these, and we ought to sign the ones we want to sign and send them out, but we certainly ought to send them to some of the people like that.

Please tell me what the procedure is—who gets the pictures that are sent into my office that I then put in the out box?

Thanks.

Attach.
Photos

DHR:dh
100902-31

***Please** respond by* 10/18/02 10/17

9 Oct 02

→ Sec Def -
LA has a pretty good system for Congressional related photos, including these. Regarding others, we get them around. For example, all the ones of the Dinner with CINCs and President went out to everyone involved

10/18

U04031 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/7074

snowflake

10:33 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: October 9, 2002

SUBJECT: **Gift Letters**

335 SD

In the future on these letters saying, "I hope you will accept." That sounds like we hope they won't accept it. Instead we should rephrase it to say, "Enclosed is my check which is required so that I may remain consistent with government regulations on gifts."

10/10

Thanks.

Mary Claire Murphy

DHR/azn
10902.02

Larry Di Rita
10/10

Please respond by: _____

9 Oct 02

U04032 /03

snowflake

October 9, 2002 8:41 AM

333

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Prague

Do you think it makes sense to have Mary Claire go on the Prague trip, since she would have to be overseeing the informal NATO Ministerial meetings in the U.S. next year? She might get a sense for the whole thing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-6

Please respond by 10/18/02

10/9

Jeff —
I told her last week she ought to go. With the President & Mrs Bush going, as well as Mrs Rumsfeld, it seems obvious. She's going. D. Rita

9 Oct 02

snowflake

October 9, 2002 8:54 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Mark Mazzetti

Here is Larry Di Rita's response to this. Why don't you get hold of Mark Mazzetti and find out what in the world is going on. That is nonsense.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/30/02 SecDef memo to Di Rita re: Pre-emption, 10/05/02 Di Ri response

DHR:dh
100902-8

Please respond by 10/25/02

000.7

9 Oct 02

U04034 /03

snowflake

C 10/8

September 30, 2002 9:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Pre-emption

I just can't imagine what Mark Mazzetti is talking about here. Please see if you can figure it out.

Thanks.

Attach.
Mazzetti, Mark, "Ready, Aim, Fire First," *U.S. News & World Report*, October 7, 2002.

DHR:dh
093002-3

Please respond by 10/11/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

10/5 OCT 9 2002

SecDef Have spoken with Rodman, who also queried Fargo. No one has a good thought as to what the author was chasing.

Larry

11-L-0559/OSD/7079

Larry Di Rita
10/8

U.S. News & World Report
October 7, 2002

Ready. Aim. Fire First

But is the U.S. military a little gun-shy about starting wars?

By Mark Mazzetti

It was a "what if" scenario–the sort that military planners are paid to imagine–and it was not nearly ready for prime time. Earlier this summer, a top aide to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined for his boss a concept for striking North Korea's weapons of mass destruction–a case study in the application of the Bush administration's new doctrine of pre-emptive military action. The hypothetical scenario envisioned a swift attack, carried out without consulting South Korea, America's ally on the peninsula. When word of the briefing spread, administration heavyweights, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, worked to bury the scheme.

Consider it a clumsy way to ring in the age of pre-emption, which officially debuted with the recent release of the Bush administration's National Security Strategy. In what may be the boldest rethinking of American foreign policy since Harry Truman, the document makes the case that Cold War logic no longer applies in a world where terrorists, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction, strike at civilians without warning. "This kind of enemy will not be deterred or contained the way, perhaps, the Soviet Union might have been," Powell said last week. Breaking from the deep-rooted American instinct to strike only if attacked first, the so-called Bush Doctrine advocates pre-emptive military action against practitioners of terrorism–including overthrowing governments that support them–and it may soon provide the justification for an American attack on Iraq.

U.S. officials insist that the Bush Doctrine is not a one-trick pony meant solely to justify an Iraq invasion. "Any state that has a weapons-of-mass-destruction program and has an irresponsible dictator falls within the president's paradigm shift," says one Bush administration official. "This is a historic moment." But as the dust-up over the Pentagon's North Korea briefing illustrates, laying out a broad strategic vision is one thing; applying it in the real world is quite another. In short: It is not at all clear where, besides Iraq, the Bush Doctrine could really be put into practice.

The military gets to weigh in now; the admirals and generals are putting finishing touches on the National Military Strategy, a practical blueprint for implementing the White House's grand vision. Early indications are that those in uniform are far less enamored of pre-emption than their civilian bosses: A draft of the document, which had not yet made it to Rumsfeld's desk, all but ignored the concept, U.S. News has learned.

The generals aren't dead set against striking first; after all, the notion of pre-empting an enemy attack ("anticipatory self-defense," in the Bush administration lexicon) is as old as warfare. But the White House version is new and different. It advocates taking military action before the adversary even has the capacity to attack. It calls for action, even without ironclad evidence of danger. And it suggests that U.S. power might "dissuade" other nations from trying to match American military might. In the words of one senior officer, "there is a brave new world coming with this new defense policy."

Hit 'em. There is little debate about the appeal of going on the offensive to dismantle terrorist networks before they can strike. The approach gives planners the advantage of tactical surprise and permits them

to strike with a smaller force. "Obviously, taking the offensive under the rules of war is something the military would love to do," says Gen. Gregory Martin, commander of U.S. air forces in Europe. Case in point: The Pentagon is drawing up plans to send special operations forces into states like Yemen that are harboring senior al Qaeda leaders.

Applying the doctrine to rogue states is where the water gets muddied. It has certainly been done before. Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, before it became operational, and many in the military consider the 1989 invasion of Panama another example. But top commanders, including some whose job it has been to devise war plans, are struggling to understand how hitting states first makes military sense. These officers say that even when confront- ing countries the president designated as an "axis of evil"–Iraq, Iran, and North Korea–the containment calculus still works. "Personal survival is what matters to the Kim Jong Ils and Saddam Husseins of this world," says one former four-star officer. "This [pre-emption] absolutely is the right doctrine to deal with enemies that are not organized into states. When it comes to dealing with other countries I'm not so sure."

Even big-think objections to the Bush Doctrine offered by academics have practical consequences that get the military's attention. The doctrine imagines that the United States would not "allow an adversarial military power to rise," as one Bush official put it. That "confirms the notion that America is now embarking on an imperial role," argues James Chace, a specialist in international relations at Bard College. "The great danger of American power nowadays is that it will prompt other powers to combine against us." What that means to the generals is that strategic alliances built up over the years could be ruptured.

Like it or not, the military may have to change the way it goes about its business. At a recent gathering of combatant commanders–the brass in charge of forces deployed outside the United States–Rumsfeld challenged them to adapt to the new terrorism threat. The military will have to reassess where it bases forces, so it will not have to move troops and equipment into a region before a strike–and risk telegraphing its punch. The Pentagon will rely heavily on special operations forces that can deploy in smaller numbers and move without being detected, and on precision bombers that can strike a target from long range. Gathering reliable intelligence will become even more important. "If we are going to be pre-emptive in nature, we better be pretty damn sure we understand their intent," says a senior Air Force official. Satellites in space can't do that very well, putting a premium on spies on the ground who can help predict what an enemy will do.

Do as I say. These are just nuts-and-bolts problems, compared with objections to pre-emption being raised abroad and at home. "We'll be putting ourselves in the position of a rogue nation," says Sen. Robert Byrd, a West Virginia Democrat, who argues that the strategy might inspire copycats. While the Bush National Security Strategy warns that other countries should not "use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression," the new doctrine might give ideas to China in its struggle against Taiwan or to Russia in its fight against Chechen rebels in Georgia. This pattern was clearly on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's mind when he warned India not to mimic the new U.S. policy. "Pakistan is not Iraq, and India is not the United States," he advised his adversary to the south. "They had better not try it." Musharraf may have reason to put down a marker. "India has a history of mirroring the U.S. rhetoric, and even trying to mirror U.S. actions on issues ranging from terrorism to nuclear strategy," says a Senate Democratic official who deals with South Asia policy. "We can't think we are planning our own doctrine in a vacuum."

The White House is billing the Bush Doctrine as the first coherent strategy to confront the dangers of the post-Cold War world. This might be so, but much will depend on how the United States acts upon the doctrine's muscular rhetoric and how the world reacts. "The ripple effects from this are really hard to gauge," says Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. "These

fundamental shifts in our defensive posture don't come around very often."

With Thomas Omestad

snowflake

October 9, 2002 9:06 AM

560.05

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Industrial Base Problem

Can you solve the industrial base problem by building the smaller air-capable ships at that shipyard?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-13

Please respond by 10/25/02

9 Oct 02

U04035 /03

snowflake

October 9, 2002 9:09 AM

451

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Stryker

I am told that the U.S. has something like $1 billion in stockpiled 105mm ammo that we will not be able to use on a Stryker. Apparently it tips the thing over.

I am also told that they can't use the 120mm mortars on the Stryker, because it goes through the floor. The only thing they can use is 81mm, which gives up a lot in capability.

Would you please check that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-14

Please respond by 10/25/02

9 Oct 02

U04036 /03

snowflake

October 9, 2002 9:33 AM

373.24

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Brilliant Pebbles

Should we get Gen. Kadish to take a good hard look at Brilliant Pebbles, the way Lowell Wood and the Defense Science Board asked us to?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-21

Please respond by 10/25/02

9 Oct 02

U04037 /03

Snowflake

October 9, 2002 9:51 AM

Germany

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: German Equipment

Here is an indication that Schroeder will not allow any of the materials in Kuwait apparently to be used for anything other than their current mission. I wonder if we ought to get them out of there.

Please respond.

I really do mean it. I want you to read this and answer me.

Thanks.

Attach.
FBIS reply

DHR:dh
100902-25

Please respond by 10/18/02

9 Oct 02

FBIS

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 9 2002

In response to 5 October request by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for the recent statement by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on the removal of the Fuchs tanks stationed in Kuwait should the US attack Iraq, FBIS has located two items that answer the request.

The first item is a Federal Government report on a 4 September Schroeder press conference on foreign policy issues in which he affirms his negative stance on a possible attack on Iraq. FBIS Austria Bureau was unable to locate the entire press conference.

The second item is a 12 September interview published in Stern, a major independent weekly magazine, where in response to a question on whether the Fuchs tanks would be withdrawn from Kuwait in case of a war with Iraq, Schroeder said, "As soon as these tanks are supposed to play a role in a different mission, I would need a new Bundestag decision, and I would not ask for it."

FBIS

Text

GERMANY: Germany's Schroeder Cites 'Three Points' Against Military Action Against Iraq

EUP20020904000516 Berlin Federal Government WWW-Text in German 1900 GMT 04 Sep 02

[Federal Government report: "Chancellor Schroeder Affirms his Rejection of Intervention in Iraq"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 4 September 2002, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in a press conference on foreign policy issues affirmed his negative stance on a possible attack on Iraq: "Under my leadership, Germany will not participate in an intervention in Iraq," said Schroeder.

The chancellor had already emphasized several times that he would hold to his goal of bringing the UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq. He considers wrong a change of goals in Iraq policy, according to Schroeder. Available information does not suggest a new threat analysis. Hence there is also no reason to correct the present, well-founded policy.

Schroeder listed three points that speak against a military intervention. An intervention in Iraq would upset the international coalition against terrorism. Also, the fight against international terrorism is not yet concluded and the Taliban not yet defeated. Moreover, a conception is lacking for a political restructuring in the Middle East after a possible intervention.

The chancellor rejected accusations of anti-Americanism. The German position is also perceived and supported in Europe. On the basis of common values and assured relations, differences of opinion can also be settled. Everything else would be subordination, Schroeder stressed. In all international deployments after 11 September 2001, Germany as the second-largest supplier of troops has shown very clearly that it is capable of solidarity, and willing. The chancellor recalled, for instance, German participation in deployments in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and also in Enduring Freedom.

On the subject of the German Fuchs reconnaissance tanks presently stationed in Kuwait, the chancellor said that the tanks are deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom. The Bundestag had given its approval for this operation. In case of an attack on Iraq, which would no longer be covered by a Bundestag resolution, the tanks and the 52 German soldiers would have to be withdrawn from Kuwait.

[Description of Source: Berlin Federal Government WWW-Text in German -- official web site of the German Federal Government]

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FBIS

Text

GERMANY: German Chancellor Affirms Opposition to Iraq War, Denies Isolation in Europe

EUP20020912000138 Hamburg Stern in German 12 Sep 02 pp 40-46

[Interview with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder by Tilman Gerwien, Andreas Hoidn-Borchers, and Hans-Ulrich Joerges; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Stern] If you win the election, you will have to settle the crisis that has erupted in German-US relations because of the policy toward Iraq. Meanwhile, there has even been an open confrontation with the US ambassador.

[Schroeder] There are differences regarding the assessment of the question: would there be a military intervention in Iraq? I affirm: Germany will not participate in such an intervention under my leadership. This holds true before the election, and this will remain so after the election. This will not have any negative effects on German-US relations. Nobody has proved as much as I have -- not least by asking for a vote of confidence in the Bundestag -- that he is determined to show solidarity when the friend is attacked and, if necessary, also link his own political existence with this. However, friendship does not mean subordination.

[Stern] Can you really do what the Federal Government has announced, namely withdraw the German detection tanks from Kuwait in case of a war in Iraq?

[Schroeder] We have a Bundestag decision and this legitimates our assistance within the framework of the "Enduring Freedom" antiterror coalition -- and only this. The detection tanks were sent to Kuwait within the framework of "Enduring Freedom" to protect military bases there, which are important for "Enduring Freedom." As soon as these tanks are supposed to play a role in a different mission, I would need a new Bundestag decision, and I would not ask for it.

[Stern] How should Iraq's mass destruction weapons be countered, if not by threatening military force?

[Schroeder] We support the policy of the United Nations and of its Secretary General with the goal of getting the inspectors back into the country. I am not responsible for the change in strategy, which now links this goal with eliminating the system.

[Stern] In an interview with the New York Times you said: "Hands off Iraq." It is clear that this gives rise to the question in the United States with whom the Germans are actually allied.

[Schroeder] I did not use this formulation. There is really not the slightest doubt about Germany's loyalty to the alliance. We have proved this more than once in the struggle against international terrorism. And this remains so.

[Stern] Have you not isolated yourself with your course also in Europe? After all, the EU partners are willing to participate in a war if there is a UN mandate for it. . . .

[Schroeder] There are some governments that have said so. Others have not. Therefore, one cannot speak of isolation at all.

[Stern] Could the United States use its airbases in Germany for a war against Iraq. Would it get overflight rights in Germany for this purpose?

[Schroeder] This question will be decided when it comes up. [passage omitted]

[Description of Source: Hamburg Stern in German -- major independent, illustrated weekly magazine]

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snowflake

October 9, 2002 9:47 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: French Author

I think you have to get something to the author of the book correcting this quote, or some letter or memorandum of record, so it is clear I didn't say the things he said I said.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/01/02 ASD(PA) memo to SecDef re: Transcription

DHR.dh
100902-24

Please respond by 11/01/02

350.001 SD

9 Oct 02

U04039 /03

snowflake

October 10, 2002 7:06 AM

335 50

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Letter to Congressman Stump et. al.

Please draft a very nice letter to Bob Stump. We probably ought to enclose a copy of my remarks at the portrait unveiling with the letter.

Also, please tell me everyone else who is retiring this year from the House and Senate. I want to get letters drafted to the appropriate people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101002-2

Please respond by 10/18/02

10 Oct 02

U04040 /03

snowflake

October 10, 2002 12:24 PM

335 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Senator Ensign

Please make sure we draft a letter to Senator Ensign thanking him for sending my remarks to his Senate colleagues.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101002-7

Please respond by 10/18/02

10 Oct 02

U04041 /03

snowflake

October 11, 2002 6:34 AM

353

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

Advance copy given

SUBJECT: Cable on Training Opposition Forces

Colin Powell called last night and said he moved the cable you wanted on training of opposition forces, so it will go out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101102-1

Please respond by _____

11 Oct 02

U04043 /03

snowflake

October 11, 2002 8:54 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Mention Marine

Advance copy sent

At the next press briefing I may want to mention the Marine who was killed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101102-8

Please respond by 10/18/02

000.7 SD

11 Oct 02

11-L-0559/OSD/7095

U04044 /03

Snowflake

October 11, 2002 8:54 AM

Latin America

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Latin America

With respect to Latin America, I think we need to expand military education and ship visits.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101102-10

Please respond by 10/25/02

11 Oct 02

U04045 /03

snowflake

Due 10/15/02

October 11, 2002 9:02 AM

334

TO: Steve Cambone
John Stenbit
Rich Haver

Advance copy given

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Commission on Intelligence

Here is a note I sent Condi Rice about the possible commission on intelligence. I think we ought to think about who makes sense to be the staff director, chairman and members.

Please get back to me by close of business Monday with any suggestions you have.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/30/02 SecDef memo to Rice, Cheney, Tenet re: "Commission on September 11" [093002-58]

DHR:dh
101102-11

Please respond by 10/14/02

11 Oct 02

U04046 /03

snowflake

September 30, 2002 1:38 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Commission on September 11

This is, as I am sure everyone will agree, enormously important. It can be well done or badly done. The key will be the chairman and the membership.

I think we ought to have a discussion about this, and make certain we are on the same wavelength as to how we think it ought to be handled.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR/dh
093002-58

W01140-02

snowflake

October 11, 2002 1:11 PM

470

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: WMD Protection

Let's make sure we get the schedule for me to get briefed on WMD protection for our troops. We probably would want to do it separately from the WMD briefing that Franks is going to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101102-16

Please respond by 10/25/02

11 Oct 02

U04047 /03

Snowflake

October 11, 2002 1:16 PM

Iraq

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Post-Saddam

Let me know who here in the Pentagon you are proposing to start looking at the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101102-17

Please respond by 10/25/02

11 Oct 02

U04048 /03

snowflake

11:23 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: October 12, 2002

SUBJECT:

005

Let's talk about the United Way. I am not sure we should be giving money.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
101202.07

Please respond by: 10/28

12 Oct 02

U04049 /03

11:31 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: October 12, 2002

SUBJECT: **Nunn-Lugar Plan**

Russia

I would like to have a study done of the Nunn-Lugar Plan and what it does, and what the country's done in Russia and whether it has benefited or not.

I am told they were close to getting a Nobel prize, and my recollection of that program is that it doesn't work, but I just don't know enough about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
101202.10

Please respond by: 10/28

12 Oct 02

U04050 /03

snowflake

October 15, 2002 10:36 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Stryker in C-130

Here is a response from Gen. Handy on the subject of whether the Stryker fits in a C-130.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/11/02 TRANSCOM memo to SecDef re: "C-130 Transport of Stryker"

DHR:dh
101502-15

Please respond by 11/01/02

451

15 Oct 02

U04051 /03

C1911

UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
508 SCOTT DRIVE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5357

11 October 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2002

FROM: TCCC

SUBJECT: C-130 Transport of Stryker

1. In response to your question "Does the Stryker fit on a C-130?" the short answer is yes, but the matter goes beyond "fit" to the issue of transportability. The size and weight of the Stryker creates C-130 specific operational challenges in three areas—aircrew and passenger safety aisle requirements, C-130 ramp/floor axle load limits, and C-130 aircraft performance (in particular payload/range and takeoff capability).

2. The size of Stryker does not allow for the published safety aisle requirements to be maintained. Therefore, we are proactively working with the program manager to ensure that reduced aisle ways will permit acceptable passage under emergency conditions. However, this reduced aisle way does present an increased risk to aircrew and passengers. The current plan is to test each of the 10 Stryker variants before granting any additional safety aisle waivers and to ensure both Air Force and Army personnel have specific emergency evacuation training.

3. Loading the Stryker into the C-130 is another issue under review. The Stryker center of gravity and combat weight, coupled with the C-130 ramp angle, are all critical to ensure the published C-130 ramp/floor load limits are not exceeded. The Infantry Carrier Vehicle version of the Stryker (at 36,250 pounds) proved to be within these limits as demonstrated during Millennium Challenge '02. In an attempt to gain more capability and flexibility, a study funded by the Army through the Air Force's C-130 System Program Office is underway to reexamine C-130 ramp and floor limits.

4. The C-130's payload/range capabilities must be considered prior to transporting the Stryker. There are a number of factors that can reduce the range significantly. Advanced planning will be required to avoid adverse conditions (i.e. high temperature, high altitude, high terrain, and/or short runways) that might otherwise prevent C-130 transport of the Stryker. To promote improved C-130 employment planning, Military Traffic Management Command in coordination with AMC produced a "White Paper" outlining C-130 airlift capabilities impacted by Stryker transport.

5. I assure you that USTRANSCOM continues to aggressively pursue efforts with the Air Force and Army in reaching joint solutions aimed at maintaining the Stryker's maximum combat capability while meeting C-130 airlift parameters.

VR –

John

JOHN W. HANDY
General, USAF
Commander

cc:
CJCS

Printed on recycled paper

11-L-0559/OSD/7105

snowflake

October 15, 2002 11:59 AM

337

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Torie Clarke
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Table of Meetings/Contacts

That Novak article says I haven't been meeting with the military.

Let's do a quick recap again of all the times I have met with the military, Congress and press. We haven't brought that up to date in some time. I would like to see what it looks like and figure out how we might want to use it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-22

Please respond by 10/25/02

15 Oct 02

U04052 /03

snowflake

October 15, 2002 12:02 PM

060

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Video of Saddam's Mistress

I was told there is a video that has been on television of Saddam Hussein's mistress talking about what kind of a person he is. I would like to see it, please.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-23

Please respond by 10/25/02

15 Oct 02

U04053 /03

Snowflake

October 15, 2002 12:21 PM

Saudi Arabia

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

SUBJECT: Saudi Meetings

Let's make sure we do it right with the Saudis—this is important. Let's make sure the people stay the proper length of time, they take the right gifts, and they have the right things to say. I think it is Gen. Myers and Peter Rodman. Let's make sure it is done well.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
101502-24

Please respond by 10/18/02

15 Oct 02

U04054 /03

October 15, 2002 12:22 PM

Saudi Arabia

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Talking Points

I think you are going to get me some talking points, so I can call Sultan and thank him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-25

Please respond by 10/18/02

15 Oct 02

U04055 /03

snowflake

*315

October 15, 2002 12:37 PM

326

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Briefing in Tank on Reserve Call Ups

I came away feeling that it needs a great deal more work and that if there is any push against those numbers, they'll change significantly.

I would like to get a hard set of the assumptions and rework the assumptions myself. Then I would have people go back and push the numbers around the assumptions I select after talking with you, and get another briefing. It ought to include assumptions about the use of coalition forces, all of the so-called "standing requirements" that are 10-15 years old that we may or may not agree with, and places that we could pull other troops from, like Iceland.

I think this is a good opportunity to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-27

Please respond by 11/01/02

15 Oct 02

U04056 /03

snowflake

October 15, 2002 12:39 PM

TO: LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Meeting w/Abizaid

Advance copy sent

OS 17080

I would like an appointment with LTG Abizaid for about 15 minutes sometime early this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-28

Please respond by 10/17/02

15 Oct 02

U04057 /03

Snowflake

October 15, 2002 12:47 PM

Iraq

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Answer for Senator Byrd

We have never gotten an answer for Senator Byrd on what the Pentagon knows about what the U.S. did to help Saddam Hussein with chemical and biological weapons, the way the *Newsweek* story said.

We need to get an answer and I need to see it. How much longer will it take?

Thanks.

Attach.
Novak op-ed: "Stocking Iraq"

DHR:dh
101502-30

Please respond by 10/25/02

15 Oct 02

U04058 /03

Robert D. Novak

Stocking Iraq

Sen. Robert C. Byrd, a master at hectoring executive branch witnesses, asked Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld a provocative question last week: Did the United States help Saddam Hussein produce weapons of biological warfare? Rumsfeld brushed off the Senate's 84-year-old president pro tem as if he were a Pentagon reporter. But a paper trail indicates Rumsfeld should have answered yes.

An eight-year-old Senate report confirms that poisonous and disease-producing materials were exported, under U.S. government license, to Iraq from 1985 to 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war. Furthermore, the report adds, the American-exported materials were identical to microorganisms destroyed by United Nations inspectors after the Persian Gulf War. The shipments were approved despite allegations that Hussein used biological weapons against Kurdish rebels and (according to the current official U.S. position) initiated war with Iran.

This record is no argument for or against waging war against the Iraqi regime, but U.S. officials are not eager to reconstruct the mostly secret relationship between the two countries. While biological warfare exports were approved by the U.S. government, the first President Bush signed a policy directive proposing "normal" relations with Hussein in the interest of Middle East stability. Looking at a little U.S.-Iraqi history might be useful on the eve of a fateful military undertaking.

At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last Thursday, Byrd tried to disinter that history. "Did the United States help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq war?" he asked Rumsfeld. "Certainly not to my knowledge," Rumsfeld replied. When Byrd persisted by reading a current Newsweek article reporting these exports, Rumsfeld said, "I have never heard anything like what you've read, I have no knowledge of it whatsoever, and I doubt it."

That suggests Rumsfeld also has not read the sole surviving copy of a May 25, 1994, Senate Banking Committee report. In 1985 (five years after the Iran-Iraq war started) and succeeding years, said the report, "pathogenic (meaning 'disease producing'), toxigenic (meaning 'poisonous'), and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq, pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. Department of Commerce." It added: "These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction."

The report then details 70 shipments (including anthrax bacteria) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years, concluding, "It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program."

With Baghdad having survived combat against Iran's revolutionary regime with U.S. help, President George H.W. Bush signed National Security Directive 26 on Oct. 2, 1989. Classified "secret" but recently declassified, it said: "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq."

Bush the elder, who said recently that he "hates" Hussein, saw no reason then to oust the dictator. On the contrary, the government's approval of the export of microorganisms to Iraq coincided with the Bush administration's decision to save Hussein from defeat by the Iranian mullahs.

The Newsweek article (by Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas) that so interested Byrd reported on Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad on Dec. 20, 1983, which launched U.S. support for Hussein against Iran. Answering Byrd's questions, Rumsfeld said he did meet with Hussein and then-Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, but he was dismissive about the meeting, saying he assisted "as a private citizen ... only for a period of months." Rumsfeld said he was then interested in curbing terrorism in Lebanon.

Quite a different account was given in a sworn court statement by Howard Teicher on Jan. 31, 1995. Teicher, a National Security Council aide who had accompanied Rumsfeld to Baghdad, said Rumsfeld relayed then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's offer to help Iraq in its war. "Aziz refused even to accept the Israeli's letter to Hussein offering assistance," said Teicher, "because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot."

Such recollections of the recent past make for uncomfortable officials in Washington and Jerusalem today.

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snowflake

October 15, 2002 1:00 PM

HS2R

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Predator

Is there any reason DoD cannot pull the trigger on a Predator?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-32

Please respond by 10/25/02

15OCT02

U04059 /03

October 15, 2002 1:03 PM

Germany

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Forces and Equipment in Germany

Are you having someone pull together the legalities as to what we can and cannot do with U.S. forces and equipment currently in Germany if the Germans don't allow us to do something?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-33

Please respond by 10/25/02

15OCT02

U04060 /03

#317

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-611-02
14 November 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS RBM 11/13

SUBJECT: Forces and Equipment in Germany

- In response to your inquiry concerning what we can and cannot do with US forces and equipment currently in Germany if the Germans do not allow us to do something (TAB), the following is provided.

- There is nothing in the relevant international agreements between Germany and the United States that would permit the Government of Germany (GoG) to dictate how the United States uses its Germany-based forces and equipment. Article 3 of the US-Germany Supplementary Agreement (SA) to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement provides that German authorities ". . . shall accord to a force and its civilian component such treatment as is necessary for the satisfactory fulfillment of their defense responsibilities." Under Article 3, the United States has the ability to deploy forces and equipment out of Germany-based facilities without authorization from the GoG.

- Article 57 of the SA, which provides that the US right to enter Germany or to move within and over Germany in vehicles, vessels and aircraft, is subject to GoG approval and according to GoG law. Thus, if the United States acts according to its rights under Article 3 and deploys German-based forces for a non-NATO military operation, the GoG could attempt to hinder a rapid deployment by restricting the use of the roads, rails, airspace and waterways.

- Because of the significant policy issues involved, I recommend that the US Government (Departments of Defense and State) become actively engaged with the GoG at various levels to ensure Germany does not attempt to impair the ability of US forces and equipment to deploy from Germany in any future operations they may not fully endorse.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment~~s~~:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

snowflake

October 15, 2002 1:55 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Worldwide Plan

We need a worldwide plan on stopping the education of terrorists and somebody in charge of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-36

Please respond by 11/01/02

15 OCT 02

U04061 /03

snowflake

October 15, 2002 1:58 PM

W
W
J

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TR

SUBJECT: Pre-Briefs at Round Table

I don't think we should have any more pre-briefs at the round table. It just doesn't work. It is also frequently the wrong people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-38

Please respond by 10/18/02

10/15

Sec Def—

Got it. We have broken them out as separate meetings as of this week. Calendar reflects it.

D. Rita

15 OCT 02

U04062 /03

Snowflake

France

October 15, 2002 3:15 PM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Briefing on France

I would like to get briefed by whoever needs to brief me on some assistance DoD is providing France – it is a highly classified compartmented program. I want to decide how it is going and whether it should continue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-43

Please respond by 11/01/02

15OCT02

U04063 /03

0/8 0900

R/17

Snowflake

October 15, 2002 5:38 PM

TO: Sec Def
From: Torie
Please see attached document. Result of Jim Thomas, the Deputy and PA work.
TC

IRAQ

TO: Torie Clarke
Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Saddam Hussein Quotes

Here are some remarks by Saddam Hussein that we might want to use at some point.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/20/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Hussein Remarks [U15441/02]

DHR:dh
101502-52

Please respond by 11/01/02

15OCT02

U04064 /03

Saddam Hussein: In His Own Words

Quotes from Saddam and Iraq's regime-controlled media

October 18, 2002

For years, Saddam Hussein and his regime have used state-controlled media in Iraq to spread lies, and threaten his neighbors and the world. Below is a sampling of quotes from Saddam and the Iraqi media -- keyed to significant events -- showing a pattern of threats stretching back more than a decade.

The Gulf War, February 1991

"We will chase [Americans] to every corner at all times. No high tower of steel will protect them against the fire of truth."

Saddam Hussein, Baghdad Radio, February 8, 1991

"[America] will not be excluded from the operations and explosions of the Arab and Muslim mujahidin and all the honest strugglers in the world."

Iraq News Agency, January 30, 1991
(State-controlled)

"What remains for Bush and his accomplices in crime is to understand that they are personally responsible for their crime. The Iraqi people will pursue them for this crime, even if they leave office and disappear into oblivion. There is no doubt they will understand what we mean if they know what revenge means to the Arabs."

Baghdad Radio, February 6, 1991
(State-controlled)

"Every Iraqi child, woman, and old man knows how to take revenge...They will avenge the pure blood that has been shed no matter how long it takes.

Baghdad Domestic Service, February 15, 1991
(State-controlled)

Iraq Masses Troops Against Kuwait, October 1994

"Does [America] realize the meaning of every Iraqi becoming a missile that can cross to countries and cities?"

Saddam Hussein, September 29, 1994

"[W]hen peoples reach the verge of collective death, they will be able to spread death to all..."

Al-Jumhuriyah, October 4, 1994
(State-controlled newspaper)

"[O]ur striking arm will reach [America, Britain and Saudi Arabia] before they know what hit them."

Al-Qadisiyah, October 6, 1994
(State-controlled newspaper)

"One chemical weapon fired in a moment of despair could cause the deaths of hundreds of thousands."

Al-Quds al-Arabi, October 12, 1994
(State-controlled newspaper)

Release of UNSCOM Report, April 10, 1995

"Although Iraq's options are limited, they exist...Iraq's present state is that of a wounded tiger. Its blow could be painful, even if it is the last blow..."

Al-Quds Al-'Arabi, June 9, 1995
(State-controlled newspaper)

Khobar Towers Bombing, June 25, 1996

"[The U.S.] should send more coffins to Saudi Arabia, because no one can guess what the future has in store."

Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Radio, June 27, 1996

Operation Desert Fox, December 1998

"If [other Arab nations] persist on pursuing their wrongful path, then we should -- or rather we must -- place the swords of jihad on their necks..."

Saddam Hussein, January 5, 1999

"Oh sons of Arabs and the Arab Gulf, rebel against the foreigner...Take revenge for your dignity, holy places, security, interests and exalted values."

Saddam Hussein, January 5, 1999

"[Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti] blood will light torches, grow aromatic plants, and water the tree of freedom, resistance and victory."

Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Radio, January 26, 1999

"Whoever continues to be involved in a despicable aggressive war against the people of Iraq as a subservient party must realize that this aggressive act has a dear price."

Saddam Hussein, February 16, 1999

"What is required now is to deal strong blows to U.S. and British interests. These blows should be strong enough to make them feel that their interests are indeed threatened not only by words but also in deeds."

Al-Qadisiyah, February 27, 1999
(State-controlled newspaper)

U.S.S. Cole Bombing, October 12, 2000

"[Iraqis] should intensify struggle and jihad in all fields and by all means..."

Iraq TV, October 22, 2000
(State-controlled)

The Attacks of September 11

"The United States reaps the thorns its rulers have planted in the world."

Saddam Hussein, September 12, 2001

"The real perpetrators [of September 11] are within the collapsed buildings."

Alif-Ba, September 11, 2002
(State-controlled newspaper)

"[September 11 was] God's punishment."

Al-Iktisadi, September 11, 2002
(State-controlled newspaper)

"If the attacks of September 11 cost the lives of 3,000 civilians, how much will the size of losses in 50 states within 100 cities if it were attacked in the same way in which New York and Washington were? What would happen if hundreds of planes attacked American cities?"

Al-Rafidayn, September 11, 2002
(State-controlled newspaper)

"The simple truth [about September 11] is that America burned itself and now tries to burn the world."

Alif-Ba, September 11, 2002
(State-controlled magazine)

"[I]t is possible to turn to biological attack, where a small can, not bigger than the size of a hand, can be used to release viruses that affect everything..."

Babil, September 20, 2001
(State-controlled newspaper)

"The United States must get a taste of its own poison..."

Babil, October 8, 2001

snowflake

October 15, 2002 4:30 PM

020DIA

TO: VADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: DIA Priorities

Thanks so much for sending your two memos on priorities. I find them helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-55

Please respond by _____

15 OCT 02

U04065 /03

Snowflake

October 15, 2002 4:35 PM

Germany

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Policy on Germany

We have to get a policy on Germany. Here is a memo. We need to figure out if we need to get things out of Germany now and/or if we want to get Germany's equipment out of Kuwait.

Why don't you get an inventory done, so we can figure out what we want to do next.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/07/02 EUP20021002000109

DHR:dh
101502-56

Please respond by 11/01/02

15 OCT 02

U04066 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2002

7 October 2002

GERMANY/US/IRAQ

Just FYI: In addition to the Schroeder quotes regarding the German tanks in Kuwait, please see the below interview with FM Fischer--after the German election--suggesting that the tanks might stay longer in Kuwait after a new mandate is discussed, and then how that interview was played in the wire services. Our analysts believe this reflects that FoMin Fischer is taking a softer line, sending the message to the US that there are still ways to work together.

SERIAL: EUP20021002000109

SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 4--CORRECTION -- GERMANY'S FISCHER VIEWS RELATIONS WITH US, STANCE ON IRAQ, ELECTION AFTERMATH

REF: 1. GERMAN GOVERNMENT WANTS TO PROLONG DEPLOYMENT OF DETECTION TANKS IN KUWAIT EUP20021001000202 COLOGNE DEUTSCHLANDFUNK GERMAN 1100 GMT 01 OCT 02

SOURCE: HAMBURG STERN (INTERNET VERSION-WWW) IN GERMAN 2 OCT 02

(CORRECTED VERSION: ADDING URGENT TOPIC TAG, CHANGING INITIAL CAPITALIZATION OF TITLES THROUGHOUT TEXT, REFORMATTING SUBSLUG: INTERVIEW WITH GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER JOSCHKA FISCHER BY TILMAN GERWIEN AND HANS-ULRICH JOERGES; PLACE AND DATE NOT GIVEN: "I AM NOT GOING TO EAT HUMBLE PIE")

(FBIS TRANSLATED TEXT) THE ROW WITH AMERICA, AND THE FRESH START FOR RED-GREEN (SPD - SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY - GREEN PARTY COALITION): JOSCHKA FISCHER DISCUSSES HIS WASHINGTON MISSION, THE COALITION'S REFORM AGENDA, AND THE CHANCELLOR, WHOM HE CALLS HIS BOSS.

(STERN) MR. FISCHER, YOU FACE HAVING TO EAT HUMBLE PIE IN WASHINGTON. HOW LOW ARE YOU GOING TO HAVE TO PROSTRATE YOURSELF THERE, IN ORDER TO ASSUAGE THE AMERICANS' ANGER ABOUT GERMAN POLICY OVER IRAQ?

(FISCHER) NO ONE FACES HAVING TO EAT HUMBLE PIE. HERTA DAEUBLER-GMELIN (FORMER SPD JUSTICE MINISTER) BORE THE POLITICAL BRUNT OF HER ALLEGED COMPARISON WITH HITLER. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT SHE DID SAY, SHE DENIES THE ACCUSATIONS. BUT, IF THE IMPRESSION EVEN AROSE THAT A CONNECTION WAS MADE BETWEEN THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT AND SOMEONE LIKE HITLER WHO PERPETRATED CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, THEN THIS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS TO BE RECTIFIED. THE CHANCELLOR DID THIS WITHOUT DELAY. I MET MY COUNTERPART COLIN POWELL IN NEW YORK, THROUGHOUT THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN WE KEPT IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE, AND I HAD A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH DURING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF EATING HUMBLE PIE.

(STERN) YOU APPEAR TO BE THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT STILL IN CLOSE VERBAL CONTACT WITH HIS AMERICAN PARTNERS. ARE YOU HAVING TO PULL THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE?

(FISCHER) NO. NOR AM I THE ONLY PERSON IN THE GOVERNMENT TALKING TO OUR AMERICAN PARTNERS. HANS EICHEL (SPD FINANCE MINISTER) WENT TO THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK IN WASHINGTON. OTTO SCHILY (SPD INTERIOR MINISTER) DISCUSSED THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI IN BERLIN.

(STERN) BUT THERE IS A CLEARCUT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOUR CONTACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THOSE OF THE CHANCELLOR AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER (PETER STRUCK).

(FISCHER) MY COLLEAGUE PETER STRUCK DOES NOT HAVE A DIRECT PARTNER, AND IS DOING A VERY GOOD JOB.

<snip to take 3 of the interview>

(FISCHER) THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AND I HAVE MADE A CLEAR STATEMENT. GERMANY'S NOT PARTICIPATING IN A WAR AGAINST IRAQ IS A KEY ELECTION PLEDGE. THIS STILL HOLDS TRUE AFTER THE ELECTION. SO WILL THE ELECTION PLEDGE OF GERMANY'S NOT PARTICIPATING IN A WAR, EVEN IF THERE IS A UN MANDATE FOR IT, FOR EXAMPLE FOLLOWING A FAILED WEAPONS INSPECTION, STILL HOLD GOOD? WE HAVE UNEQUIVOCALLY STATED THAT WE WILL NOT TAKE PART IN ANY MILITARY ACTION.

(STERN) MIGHT YOU POSSIBLY TAKE PART IN A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE, FOLLOWING A WAR IN IRAQ?

(FISCHER) WE HAVE SAID: WE WILL NOT PARTICIPATE. THIS IS NOT SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION. THERE IS A CLEARLY-STATED POSITION FROM THE CHANCELLOR AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH AS WHAT I HAVE READ IN THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, IS NOT IN LINE WITH OUR STANCE.

(STERN) THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HAS DECIDED THAT THE GERMAN ARMORED DETECTION VEHICLES WILL REMAIN IN KUWAIT. THEIR BUNDESTAG MANDATE EXPIRES AT THE END OF THIS YEAR. WILL IT BE EXTENDED?

(FISCHER) THIS MANDATE FORMS PART OF THE FIGHT AGAINST AL-QA'IDA'S TERRORISM, UNDER "ENDURING FREEDOM." UNFORTUNATELY, THIS FIGHT HAS NOT YET FINISHED. SO, SPEAKING GENERALLY, THERE WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSION OF EXTENDING THE MANDATE.

DOCUMENT_ID: OW38277901
VENDOR: REUTERS
DOR: **20021001**
TITLE: German **tanks** may stay in **Kuwait** beyond year-end

^BC-GERMANY-**KUWAIT**@
^German **tanks** may stay in **Kuwait** beyond year-end@
BERLIN, Oct 1 (Reuters) - German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said on Tuesday German **tanks** could stay in **Kuwait** beyond the end of this year, despite earlier suggestions they might be pulled out in the event of a U.S.-led attack on **Iraq**.

``This mandate (in **Kuwait**) is part of the fight against the al Qaeda terrorist network. That battle is not yet over, so an extension of the mandate must be discussed," Fischer said in an interview with Stern magazine.

German Defence Minister Peter Struck had said in the past that Germany could withdraw its small contingent of troops and equipment, currently six **tanks** and around 50 soldiers, from **Kuwait** if Washington launched a military strike on Baghdad.

Tensions between the United States and Germany have been strained in recent weeks after Chancellor Gerhard **Schroeder** used strident opposition to a U.S.-led war with **Iraq** as a campaign tactic in the run-up to an election last month.

Fischer, attempting to patch up the differences, said on Friday he would travel to Washington soon and was confident the dispute would be resolved.

He said Germany would do everything possible to get U.N. weapons inspectors back into **Iraq** but reiterated opposition to any military strike aimed at removing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

German troops were moved to **Kuwait** in February at the request of the United States as part of ``Operation Enduring Freedom," the U.S.-led coalition against terror, but the German government has always denied any link between their presence and a possible strike against **Iraq**.

One opposition politician, Free Democrat Juergen Koppelin, said the **tanks** could only serve to support the United States in any action in **Iraq**, adding that the government was duty-bound to remove them after its election campaign promises.

Fischer said in the magazine interview there was no question of Germany changing tack on **Iraq** now the election was over. He also said a dossier on **Iraq** issued by British Prime Minister Tony Blair last Tuesday seemed to offer no significant new evidence.

The dossier said **Iraq** could launch a chemical or biological warhead at 45 minutes' notice and produce nuclear weapons in one to two years if it obtained essential components from abroad. ``At first sight the dossier consists for the most part of facts that are already known," Fischer was quoted as saying. ``It does not answer the question of the **Iraq** threat in any new substantial way."

Reut13:13 10-01-02

snowflake

October 15, 2002 4:39 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: DSB Task Force

On this Defense Science Board Task force on Intelligence in Support of the War Against Terrorism—is there a project underway?

Thanks.

Attach.
06/12/02 DSB TOR for Task Force

DHR:dh
101502-57

Please respond by 10/25/02

U04067 /03

cc: Combone, Haver (Done 10/8 SC)

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

12 JUN 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of reference—Defense Science Board Task Force on Intelligence in Support of the War Against Terrorism

You are requested to establish a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force to identify capabilities, technologies and approaches for strengthening intelligence in support of the war against terrorism. The intelligence capabilities of the United States have been tested by recent attacks on the United States, and we have a unique opportunity to consider developing and deploying new technologies and capabilities. The Task Force should specifically address new capabilities and approaches for achieving early indications and warning of terrorist capabilities and intentions, providing effective operational and tactical intelligence in support of crisis operations against terrorists, and the capability for attribution and location of attackers, should a terrorist event occur. The Task Force should specifically consider promising new capabilities facilitated by recent changes in statutes (e.g., Combating Terrorism Act of 2001).

This Task Force should consider intelligence support for 1) shaping events so that terrorist events are much less likely to occur; 2) new concepts, approaches, systems and technologies that could facilitate the United States in prevailing militarily against terrorists and other transnational actors; and 3) new concepts, approaches, systems and technologies enabling attribution and pinpointing location of attackers, should a terrorist event occur. Explicit attention should be paid to assessing the feasibility of tracking and monitoring people, equipment and materials required by terrorists, even if the same equipment and materials are in use for commercial and military purposes, and developing cueing mechanisms to identify intervention points.

The Task Force should also investigate global, interactive data resources for use in supporting the war on terrorism. Many rich open sources are available with no system to make such data operationally useful. Large databases can contain individually unimportant clues of terrorist activities which, when properly filtered and correlated, can provide useful intelligence on terrorist activities, particularly when augmented by data from specific intelligence sources. Interesting data resources might include proliferated cameras around the country with facial feature recognition and tracking, widely collected biometric data from a variety of sources and data from tracking of vehicles through various means such as from license plate readers and trackers.

The Task Force should begin by identifying actionable recommendations that can be implemented now and provide near term value (the next six months) as well as recommendations that can be implemented now and provide value in six months to three years. The Task Force should provide its initial thoughts on such nearer term recommendations within three months. The final report should include recommendations that require investments from the FY 03-08 Future Year Defense Program and/or National Foreign Intelligence Program.

The study will be sponsored by me as the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence). Dr. Joseph Markowitz and ADM William O. Studeman, USN (Ret.) will serve as the Task Force Co-Chairmen. Mr. R.C. Porter, C3I will serve as the Executive Secretariat. Commander Brian Hughes, United States Navy will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat representative. Reports issued by this Task Force will be submitted to the DCI and the Deputy Director Central Intelligence/ Community Management for a security review and to ensure that findings and proposed actions relating to DCI authorities are fully coordinated.

The Task Force will be operated in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DOD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

E. C. Aldridge, Jr.

snowflake

October 15, 2002 4:42 PM

350.09

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Army Intel Priorities

Please take a look at this paper from the Army's Chief of Intelligence.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/16/02 Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
101502-58

Please respond by 11/01/02

15OCT02

U04068 /03

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1001

C 8/29

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

16 AUG 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 15 2002

Honorable Donald H.Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20201-1000

Mr. Secretary,

Yesterday you asked each of the Intelligence Agency and Service Intelligence Chiefs to submit our three or four priorities. From an Army perspective, the intelligence priorities that fall within the NSPD discussion are:

--Enduring concepts that stand to threaten the United States. Concur that the emergence of China as a potential peer competitor, WMD proliferation, transnational terrorist organizations and foreign intelligence efforts against the nation should remain at the forefront of our collection efforts.

--Opposing forces (designated in existing operation plans, rogue states, unconventional forces). The focus is on capabilities, training, doctrine, weapons systems, and emerging trends. Resultant intelligence is used to influence training, combat development, and system fielding.

--Technology transfer that would give an opposing force overmatch in any of our battlefield functional areas. Maintaining overmatch for the Army is a readiness issue. Included in this priority is protection of our RDT&E programs. We must also focus on those technical or procedural capabilities that threaten our system-of systems (e.g., GPS jammers, denial and deception, etc) or our "way of war."

--Counter-intelligence and force protection. This includes counter-espionage, technology protection, and force protection.

--Asymmetric threats, to include WMD, transnational threats, and threats to our infrastructure and C2 networks. With WMD, we are not only interested in the physical proliferation, but the decision making apparatus relative to employment and potential points of failure in the C2 system we could exploit/attack/defeat if we are unable to get to the weapons ourselves.

As you can see, our intelligence priorities are those that support our Title X function to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders. Regardless of these priorities, however, we must redesign an intelligence community that has the flexibility, agility, and sustainability to meet both the strategic long-range requirements while concurrently satisfying the tactical and operational requirements of our war fighters. The ability to move faster and earlier hinges in no small part on superior, persistent and pervasive intelligence and its attendant C4 network.

I would also offer a few thoughts on transforming the Defense Intelligence Community. In order to provide both "near perfect " situational awareness for our

Printed on Recycled Paper

SD 8/28

operational commanders and the necessary focus on the "enduring challenges", transformational efforts must be synchronized and integrated. To that end, I strongly endorse the effort to create the USD-I. The future of the intelligence community must be characterized by interoperability and interdependence. Services are increasingly dependent on the national agencies for tactical intelligence as well as traditional indications and warning. It is critical that as these agencies transform, they don't inadvertently eliminate capabilities to support military operations as a consequence of independent and uncoordinated efforts to increase their relevance to the national community. Concurrently, the Services must be resourced with meaningful capabilities to meet their tactical and operational requirements.

(Under Secret for Intel)

A major effort must also be made to solve the database problem. We harvest enormous amounts of data daily, yet can't access the germane bits of information without going to multiple databases maintained in multiple "stove pipes". There must be a focused effort to field a true all source database. This would provide enhanced analysis and more focused and efficient collection management. In fact, solving this problem would provide the single most important improvement to our intelligence capability writ large. State of the art information technology exists to make this a reality but we have been unable to drive this to closure. As an aside, I would invite you to visit the Army's Intelligence and Security Command's Information Dominance Center to see some truly transformational work in this area.

The superb capabilities of collection systems are effectively negated if we cannot process, analyze, and disseminate the intelligence to the appropriate decision maker. Content and satisfying decision-maker/commander priority intelligence requirements; not numbers of analyzed intercepts and images, are what counts. Solving the above referenced data base issue, improving analyst training, continuing the emphasis on TPED, identifying new skill sets for our military and civilian work force, and producing true all-source analysis (vice analysis from each agency) for decision makers are just a few examples of initiatives that should be accelerated.

I would also encourage the expansion of our MASINT capabilities. MASINT has long been an intelligence discipline that shows great promise but is not resourced to achieve results. Despite recent initiatives by some Services to operationalize existing national MASINT capabilities for Afghanistan, the Intelligence Community continues to remain focused on significant dollar investments in the traditional intelligence disciplines. With its ability to defeat Denial and Deception techniques, MASINT is becoming a much more relevant capability. It must be nurtured and appropriately resourced.

In the HUMINT business, we (DoD and CIA) continue to be inherently parochial. This attitude has hobbled HUMINT collection and discouraged the meaningful sharing of data. Rice bowls must be shattered, HUMINT collection must be expanded, multi-level security safeguards must be authorized, and senior leaders must be encouraged to accept reasonable risks.

Finally, we must synchronize the intelligence community. Recent efforts to improve intelligence have led to a "Balkanization" of the community. More agencies are being stood up with attendant overhead and bureaucracy. While these efforts may provide short term fixes to specific problems, in the long run they have the potential to waste resources, preclude unity of command and effort, and exacerbate the fragmented, stovepipe construct that currently exists. While an enormous monolithic structure is not the answer, a cultural and management change is required to allow us to achieve our true potential.

v/r

Robert W. Noonan, Jr.
LTG, USA
DCS, G-2

Cf: Mr. Rich Haver
Dr Cambone
Mr Stenbit

Snowflake

October 15, 2002 4:47 PM

ISRAEL

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.

SUBJECT: E-mail to David Kimche

Please send the following e-mail to David Kimche:

Rec'd

David—

Thanks so much for your note. Don't make a special trip, but if you do happen to be in Washington, ~~do~~ let me know. I would enjoy having a chance to catch up with you and hear any thoughts you might have.

Best regards,

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-59

Please respond by 10/18/02

15 OCT 02

U04069 /03

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From David Kimche

From: Gamble, Zeno K, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 7:29 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: David Kimche

Arlene,
Please pass this note to the Secretary.
This letter had gotten lost in the mail for more than 2 months.
Sincerely,
-Zeno.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2002

-----Original Message-----
From: david kimche [mailto:rdk@netvision.net.il]
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 6:38 PM
Subject: Letter of July 18, 2002 — attached

I would be grateful if you could tell the Secretary that I am at his disposal, and if there is anything I can do to help in any way I will naturally be more than willing to do it. I shall be travelling for the next two weeks or so, but as of October 22 I will be vary happy to come to Washington at any time. In the meantime, you can always reach me on my mobile telephone (b)(6)

Thank you.

Sincerely

David Kimche
Israel Council for Foreign Affairs
21 Arlozorov Street
Jerusalem 91042
Israel

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 18 2002

Mr. David Kimche
Israel Council on Foreign Relations
21 Jabotinsky Street
Jerusalem 92142, Israel

Dear David:

Next time you are in the United States, let me know. I would like to have a chance to visit and ask you some questions on a particular matter.

Regards,

Sincerely,

snowflake

October 15, 2002 6:04 PM

322

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Demands on Special Operations Forces

Thanks for your memo of September 26 on reducing demands on Special Operations forces. I will look forward to receiving the inputs from others and coming to some conclusion on this matter. I think it is important.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-62

Please respond by _____

15OCT02

U04070 /03

snowflake

October 15, 2002 6:07 PM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: JFCOM and Joint Con Ops

Should I be doing something else on getting Joint Forces Command working on joint con ops, or is that already taken care of?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-63

Please respond by 10/25/02

15OCT02

U04071 /03

snowflake

October 15, 2002 6:18 PM

381

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Bletchley Park Report

Please send your Bletchley Park report around to some of the people in the Department—Cambone, Feith, Myers, Pace, Franks and some others—over your signature.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-66

Please respond by 10/25/02

15OCT02

snowflake

October 15, 2002 6:18 PM

384

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.R

SUBJECT: Future Planning

I have just reread your October 25, 2001 memo. Why don't you get the SEC working on those projects and come back to me with a report as to who is doing what.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/25/01 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Future Planning

DHR:dh
101502-67

Please respond by 11/01/02

15OCT02

U04073 /03

1.

SPD 10/25

October 25, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Doug Feith

SECDEF HAS SEEN 10/25

OCT 29 2001

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Future Planning

You have asked the question on "what we should have done" to mitigate the effects of a major "event" in the near future. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), who works for me, did some calculations to determine the impact of a variety of events, as provided below"

10 kt nuclear weapon	100,000 fatalities
10 phosgene tank cars	200,000 fatalities
100 kg anthrax from a crop duster	1,000,000 fatalities

What should we do NOW to prepare and mitigate such an event? Obviously, we should be and are working on intelligence and the means to prohibit the introduction of such capabilities within the United States. But, in addition, we should be taking the following steps:

Education of the public on what actions they should take (this needs to be done very carefully).

Assign responsibility for actions, public relations, interagency coordination, etc.

Develop a plan of action, for probable sequence of events and decisions required.

Establish a place for decision making, ensuring that it is a survivable operations center (maybe one in each major city)

Training of local authorities and first responders in an environment that they would be expected to operate.

Have legal processes in place for population control and quarantine measures.

Exercise the government and local authorities in a simulated, but realistic environment.

ACTION: We cannot do all of this after the fact. We need to put someone in charge of pulling these ideas together—or give the task to Tom White.

snowflake

October 15, 2002 9:36 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Guidelines

FYI.

As we discussed.

Attach.
Guidelines

DHR:dh
101502-3

381

15 OCT 02

U04074 /03

March 2001

Guidelines When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

Is a proposed action truly necessary?

- ***A Good Reason*:** If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, whatever is proposed to be done must be in the U.S. national interest. If people could be killed, ours or others, the U.S. must have a darn good reason.

- ***Diplomacy:*** All instruments of national power should be engaged before, during and after any possible use of force. The interaction between effective diplomacy and the potential use or use of force can be a powerful influence.

- ***Basis for the Action:*** In fashioning a clear statement of the underpinning for the action, avoid arguments of convenience. They can be useful at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later. Just as the risks of taking action must be carefully considered, so too the risk of inaction needs to be weighed.

Is the proposed action achievable?

- ***Achievable***: When the U.S. commits force, the task should be achievable—at acceptable risk. It must be something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to understand our limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the U.S. simply cannot accomplish.

- ***Clear Goals:*** To the extent possible, there should be clear, well-considered and well-understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we can know when we have achieved our goals. To those who would change what is falls the responsibility of helping provide something better. It is important to understand that responsibility and accept it.

- ***Command Structure***: The command structure should be clear, not complex—not a collective command structure where a committee makes decisions. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, which it most often will, have a clear understanding with coalition partners that they will do what might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. Avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that it compromises our goals or jeopardizes the command structure. Generally, the mission will determine the coalition.

Is it worth it?

- ***Lives at Risk*:** If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S. and coalition partners should recognize that lives will be put at risk.

- ***Resources***: The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. Even with a broad coalition, the U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.

Public Support: If public support is weak at the outset, U.S. leadership must be willing to invest the political capital to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period of time may be required. If there is a risk of casualties, that fact should be acknowledged at the outset, rather than allowing the public to believe an engagement can be executed antiseptically, on the cheap, with few casualties.

- ***Impact Elsewhere:*** Before committing to an engagement, consider the implications of the decision for the U.S. in other parts of the world—if we prevail, if we fail, or if we decide not to act. U.S. actions or inactions in one region are read around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to the U.S. deterrent and influence. Think through the precedent that a proposed action, or inaction, would establish.

If there is to be action--

- ***Act Early:*** If it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully, early, during the pre-crisis period, to try to alter the behavior of others and to prevent the conflict. If that fails, be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail, plus some.

- ***Unrestricted Options***: In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress, the public, the UN or other countries to support an action, the National Command Authorities should not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things (i.e., not to use ground forces, not to bomb below 15,000 feet, not to risk lives, not to permit collateral damage, etc.). That may simplify the task for the enemy and make the task more difficult. Leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy can simply wait us out.

Finally--

- ***Honesty:*** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners. Do not make the effort sound even marginally easier or less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less, or no more, than we are sure we can deliver. It is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

Note:

Guidelines, Not Rules: While these guidelines are worth considering, they should not be considered rules to inhibit the U.S. from acting in our national interest. Rather, they are offered as a checklist to assure that when the U.S. is considering the use of force, it does so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, and the opportunities. Our future promises to offer a variety of possible engagements. The value of this checklist will depend on the wisdom with which it is applied.

Decisions on military engagement always will be based on less than perfect information, often under extreme pressure of time. These guidelines can be helpful not in providing specific answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize available information.

Donald Rumsfeld
Rev. #3

snowflake

10/19
1130

10/18/02

October 15, 2002 10:03 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Testimony to Krauthammer

Please send Charles Krauthammer a copy of my prepared House/Senate testimony on Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-5

Please respond by 10/18/02

032

15 OCT 02

U04075 /03

snowflake

October 15, 2002 10:06 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.

SUBJECT: Photo

Please find out if the article in the Sunday *Washington Times* is true that says the photo of Mullah Omar the CIA is putting out is not actually Mullah Omar.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-6

Please respond by 10/25/02

000.5

15 OCT 02

U04076 /03

snowflake

10/18/02

October 15, 2002 10:08 AM

Sir:

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Town Hall

Yes, trying to schedule. Larry's looking at next week. T.C

Should we do another town hall inside the Pentagon sometime soon?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-7

Please respond by 10/25/02

10/20

SecDef -

We will get one in. We were thinking maybe you, DepSec, CJCS, and Vice Chairman together.

D. Rich

15 OCT 02

337

U04077 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7149

Snowflake

Bootleg

October 15, 2002 10:30 AM

TO: Bill Luti

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.

Larry Di Rita

1930

SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia and Joint Planning Committee

I think you ought to call Gen. Franks, get the specifics of his comment to us on the phone the other day and then see if we can't do whatever he thinks would be appropriate on Saudi Arabia.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/12/02 Luti memo to SecDef re: U.S. Saudi Joint Planning Committee

DHR:dh
101502-13

Saudi Arabia

Please respond by 10/18/02

SIR:
- ACTION COMPLETE.
- PHONED GEN FRANKS
- WALKED HIM THROUGH JPC PLAN
- HE'S (VERY) SATISFIED.

V/R
BILL LUTI

15 OCT 02

U04079 /03

C 10/12

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2002

12 October, 2002

10:30AM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Luti

Subject: U.S. Saudi Joint Planning Committee (JPC)

Sir, Doug Feith told me General Franks raised a question this morning about Peter Rodman's participation in the U.S.-Saudi mil-to-mil talks later this month.

- As you know, both Rodman and CJCS are heading the U.S. delegation.
- Normally, our bi-lats last for a day and a half. The Saudi JPC will be longer (schedule attached).
- Rodman takes part in all JPC events over three days.
- We've worked with CentCom and the Saudis and believe this fulfills what the Saudis want us to do.

If there's anything more you would like us to do with the Saudis please let me know and we will add it on to the schedule.

V/R,

Bill Luti

OSD/ISA
10/12/02

U.S.-Saudi JPC Schedule of Events

- Sunday, 27 October: U.S. delegation arrives.
- Monday, 28 October (afternoon and evening): U.S. only meeting at U.S. Embassy followed by meetings with MOD Sultan, CP Abdullah, and King Fahd (CJCS and Rodman in attendance).
- Tuesday, 29 October: mil-to-mil talks (JPC) all day (CJCS opens the talks with key note address, then departs; Rodman remains for bi-lats).
- Wednesday 30 October: Rodman continues bi-lats and closes JPC at noon; then visits U.S. facilities.
- Thursday, 31 October: Rodman and delegation depart.

snowflake

October 15, 2002 11:03 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: JDAM

I just looked at these photos of a JDAM kit. It is brilliant!

Do you have folks working to see if there are other things we can do like this, where we have a big supply of something that we can improve relatively simply?

Thanks.

Attach.
JDAM Illustrations

DHR:dh
101502-18

Please respond by 11/01/02

15 OCT 02

U04080 /03

snowflake

TO: Gen. Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: September 24, 2002

SUBJECT:

I need some photographs of a J-Dam kit.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092402.01

Please respond by: 9/26

SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 15 2002

Response attached.
AT&L preparing a briefing for you on JDAM and JSOW.

C 9/30



JDAM Tail Kit

GBU-32 JDAM
Joint Direct Attack Munition



Specifications

Mission	Close air support, interdiction, offensive counterair, suppression of enemy air defense, naval anti-surface warfare, amphibious strike	
Targets	Mobile hard, mobile soft, fixed hard, fixed soft, maritime surface	
Variant	JDAM	JDAM-PIP (PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM)
Service	Air Force and Navy	NAVY
Program status	Development	
First capability	1997	2004
Guidance method	GPS/INS (autonomous)	GPS/INS mid-course with a terminal seeker yet to be selected
Range	Greater than 5 nautical miles, up to 15 miles	
Circular error probable	13 meters using integrated GPS/INS unit 30 meters using INS only	3 meters
Development cost	$683.9M FY 1995 estimate $399.3M FY 1999 estimate	Air Force has programmed about $76.5 million for development through 2001
Production cost	$4,154.4 million	
Total cost	$4,650.6 million	
Acquisition unit cost	$62,846	
Average unit cost (40,000 units)	$18,000 current estimate $42,200 initial estimate	
Quantity	Navy: 12,000 Air Force: 62,000	5,000--kits to be added to basic JDAM
Platforms	B-52, B-1, B-2, F-22, F-16, F-15E, F- 117, F-14 A/B/D, F/A-18C/D, F/A-18E/F, AV-8B, P-3, S-3	

snowflake

October 15, 2002 11:22 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Torie Clarke
Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: National Will

Attached is a chapter from the report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism dated May 15, 1990. It is interesting to read pages 113 through 117. We might want to use this at some point.

Thanks.

Attach.
Chapter 8, "National Will," Report of President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, May 15, 1990.

DHR/dh
101502-20

Please respond by _____

000.5

15 OCT 02

U04081 /03

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM

1825 K Street, N.W., Suite 519
Washington, D.C. 20036
(b)(6)

CHAIRMAN
Ann McLaughlin

MEMBERS
Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ)
Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY)
Rep. James L. Oberstar (D-MN)
Rep. John P. Hammerschmidt (R-AR)
Mr. Edward Hidalgo
Gen. Thomas C. Richards USAF (Ret.)

May 15, 1990

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2002

Dear Mr. President:

I am privileged to present the report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.

Since the Commission began its work in November 1989, we have evaluated the existing aviation security system, options for handling terrorist threats and the treatment of families of victims of terrorist acts. The Commission interpreted your charge as requiring an independent and comprehensive review of these matters using the Pan Am 103 tragedy as a point of reference.

This report presents a series of recommendations designed both to improve aviation security and the ability of the government to respond to a Pan Am 103. The nation must also act to deter and prevent the use of terrorism against civil aviation as a deadly tool of political policy. The Pan Am experience demands nothing less.

The unyielding determination of the families of the victims of Pan Am 103, who sought this inquiry, provided the energy for our work. The sensitive and caring response of the people of Lockerbie, Scotland provided the passion. We trust this report reflects their determination and passion. We are confident that its recommendations can enhance the security of the traveling public. For this is surely our first and highest responsibility.

Sincerely,

Ann McLaughlin

Ann McLaughlin
Chairman

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

11-L-0559/OSD/7159

In compliance with the Executive Order 12686 of August 4, 1989 the undersigned present the report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.

Honorable Ann McLaughlin
Chairman, District of Columbia

Honorable Alfonse M. D'Amato
Member, New York

Honorable John Paul Hammerschmidt
Member, Arkansas

Honorable Edward Hidalgo
Member, Virginia

Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
Member, New Jersey

Honorable James L. Oberstar
Member, Minnesota

General Thomas C. Richards, USAF (Ret.)
Member, Texas

Chapter 8

National Will

The free world has been lurching from terrorist attack to terrorist attack, attempting to agree on how to respond to each event. This approach will not work.

Several facts about terrorism have been dramatically made clear:

—Terrorism is a deadly weapon of the weak and the cowardly. Terrorism leverages violence against innocent victims. As Lenin put it: "The purpose of terrorism is to terrorize."

—Terrorism is cheap, especially in terms of the political results it may achieve. One act of terrorism can cause changes in the policies of major nations.

—Unchecked, terrorism creates a shift in the balance of power toward those nations that sanction terrorism and use it as an instrument of foreign policy.

—Historically, terrorism consisted of isolated acts of individuals or small groups of fanatics. Over recent decades, however, terrorism increasingly is state-sponsored.

—Terrorism is a form of surrogate warfare. Conventional warfare is too difficult, too costly and, indeed, impossible for some nations to conduct. Terrorism offers an alternative.

—Acts of state-sponsored terrorism against a nation's citizens are acts of aggression against that nation. In today's world, the principal targets are the values and interests of democratic nations.

A consensus must be reached among law-abiding nations that terrorism is an act of aggression which can and must be deterred. Those outlaw nations—properly labelled "the league of terror" for harboring and sponsoring terrorism—should be held accountable for their "crime."

The Commission believes strongly that the time is now for the United States to take a more active leadership role in the fight against international terrorism. The American public must be prepared to exercise its national will and support U.S. Government action to increase dramatically the cost to terrorists and their patrons. Elected leaders, in turn, must be prepared to act on this national will as a foundation for taking more aggressive action against both terrorists and their state sponsors.

Once America clearly adopts this consistent, aggressive policy, terrorist groups should quickly get the message that terrorist acts will not be condoned. They must understand that if they pursue terrorist actions against the United States, this country will act to protect its interest to the fullest extent allowed by domestic and international law.

Air travelers are particularly vulnerable to terrorist violence. It is estimated that over one billion passengers used commercial airlines to travel throughout the world in 1989. Yet a handful of terrorist groups, willing to commit their cowardly and despicable crimes, have the capacity to plunge the world's passengers into a hostage-like grip of fear.

Significantly, the wave of hijackings of the 1960s and 1970s stopped when nations refused to give refuge to hijackers. In the 1980s, terrorists turned to bombs to attack passenger air-

In-Flight Explosive Sabotage Incidents

Period	Number of Incidents	Persons Killed	Average Number Killed
1949-1958	8	97	12
1959-1968	11	254	23
1969-1978	18	624	34
1979-1988	12	849	70

Source:
Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation—1988

lines, resulting in 1,030 deaths and 112 injuries in the last five years alone.

The materials necessary to make bombs from plastic explosives like semtex are readily available to terrorists. Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel said recently that his country, under the previous regime, exported to Lihya 1000 tons of semtex, an amount Havel said is sufficient for the world terrorist community to make bombs for 150 years.

Every airport, every departure, every passenger and every suitcase, mail bag or cargo container, presents a possible opportunity for a terrorist to introduce small but deadly amounts of explosives that are effectively invisible to X-ray and other detection equipment currently in use at airports.

The security of U.S. civil aviation has been increased. The Commission believes this security will continue to improve, especially if the recommendations of this Commission are carried out. In reality, however, there will never be 100 per cent security against every terrorist technique.

The more security measures are imposed, the more fundamental freedoms are restricted. Searching bags and screening passengers constitute intrusions upon privacy. Flight delays or cancellations for security reasons limit the freedom of travel. Moreover, the cost of security procedures to the public is incalculable, both in terms of higher fares and time spent in check-in procedures.

Even if aviation security improves dramatically, the terrorist will simply turn to other target areas where people congregate. Securing government targets, like embassies, has had the ironic effect of directing terrorist attacks to more vulnerable and more civilian targets. With an infinite number of civilian targets, it will never be possible to defend against all terrorist attacks. Perhaps most importantly, no state has taken a retaliatory action in response to an aircraft bombing.

While the world aviation system again moves to make this terrorist tactic more difficult, through better detection equipment, tighter screening, improved training practices and better access controls, we must squarely face the reality that even the combination of all of these improvements cannot guarantee civil aviation security.

DEATHS AND INJURIES

Due to Explosives Onboard Aircraft
1977-1989



Year	Deaths	Injuries
1977	0	
1978	8	3
1979	0	4
1980	0	2
1981	2	13
1982	1	15
1983	112	0
1984	0	24
1985	330	0
1986	20	112
1987	115	0
1988	267	0
1989	279	0

* Incidents where the explosion aboard the aircraft occurred during a hijacking are not reflected in these summaries

Source: *Federal Aviation Administration*

There is, however, an alternative: addressing the problem of international terrorism at its source.

The current strategic policy of the United States on counterterrorism consists of four elements:

First, make no concessions of any kind to terrorists. Do not pay ransom,

11-L-0559/OSD/7162

release convicted terrorists, or change policies to accommodate terrorist demands.

Second, make state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their actions. This may entail the use of military force as was used in 1986 in the bombing raids of Libya. It might also include sanctions of a political, economic or diplomatic nature.

Third, work with friends and allies to identify, track and apprehend, prosecute and punish terrorists. This program is designed to bring terrorists to justice, to disrupt their operations, and to destroy their networks.

Fourth, provide training in antiterrorism techniques to law enforcement officials around the world.

The Commission recommends strongly that a policy of "zero tolerance" towards terrorist attacks be adopted through a heightened emphasis on the second element of U.S. counterterrorism policy—to make state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their actions.

Pursuing terrorists and responding swiftly and proportionately to their acts against humanity must become U.S. policy in deed as well as in word. What is required is effective action, not simply strong rhetoric.

To date, the United States has too often treated terrorism only as a law enforcement problem. The Commission recognizes that taking a law enforcement approach to terrorist attacks has many advantages, including: the lawful gathering of evidence; the confrontation of the accusers in an open court of law with all the evidence made public; the assurance of a defense attorney; and the opportunity to present evidence in support of the defense. If successful, a law enforcement approach also results in the punishment of those individuals who were directly responsible for the acts perpetrated.

However, a law enforcement approach is, by its very nature, reactive. It is also an extremely time-consuming process requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It may be hindered by an inability to gather evidence or by difficulties in arresting or extraditing the accused. Most importantly, a law enforcement approach will rarely result in the prosecution of more than a few individual members of any terrorist group, and it is neither designed for, nor can it be effectively used against the state sponsors of terrorism.

While a law enforcement approach must always be a part of our response to terrorism, this Commission finds unacceptable the idea of holding ourselves in all cases to a criminal standard of proof before we act. The United States must be ready to view some terrorist attacks as a matter of national security, and indeed, in some cases should be prepared to treat the act for what it is, as an act of aggression against the United States. It may well be that the perpetrators of a terrorist act may be identified quickly through intelligence operations and techniques.

A swift response could be directed against the terrorist group responsible and/or its state sponsor. In this context, the Commission recommends planning, training and equipping for direct preemptive or retaliatory military actions against known terrorist hideouts in countries that sanction them.

Where such direct strikes are unwise or inappropriate, the Commission recommends use of middle-level options, including covert operations to preempt, disrupt or respond to terrorist actions. The Commission recognizes the many reasons, historical and otherwise, why the United States Government must proceed with caution in the use of covert operations. Certainly such tactics must not be used to circumvent basic democratic values. Terrorists, however, have relied upon the adherence by others to these values to permit them to attack thousands of innocent victims with impunity.

Major steps have been taken in the last few years by the United States and her allies to improve international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Major democratic powers have begun to recognize that an effective counterterrorism policy requires mutual cooperation and support. In 1978 the United States and its fellow members of the Economic Summit (U.K., Canada, Japan, France, Italy, and West Germany) agreed to cut off air service to and from a country that does not extradite or prosecute a terrorist for hijacking. The Venice Annex, agreed upon in June 1987, expanded

upon the Bonn Declaration to include halting air service in cases of sabotage.

Despite this strong rhetoric, countries in the past too often have chosen to act solely in their own self-interest rather than recognizing and acting in support of the combined interests of the international community. However, as terrorism's ugly hand affects more and more countries (citizens of 21 countries were on Pan Am 103), prospects grow for a more unified international response to terrorism.

Recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also present new opportunities to foster wider cooperation on terrorism. Discussions were reportedly held with the Soviets on the issue of terrorism at the Malta Summit in 1989. The Soviets have taken a more constructive approach recently by condemning specific terrorist acts, but there is still much room for improvement. Because terrorism is not only an assault on democratic principles but an act against all humanity, the United States and her allies should continue to urge the Soviet Union to exercise its leadership to ensure that concrete and effective steps are taken to minimize if not to eradicate the threat of terrorism worldwide.

Many of these steps can be taken with the help and support of our U.S. allies. Such a bilateral or multilateral approach should be encouraged. With other like-thinking nations, the United States should work to elevate the acceptable standards of international behavior, and treat as outlaws states sponsoring terrorism. But, the United States itself must stand ready to act.

To continue as a world leader conducting an effective foreign policy and influencing events, the United States must remain engaged. State-sponsored terrorism must be faced and must be deterred—with methods that are consistent with the nature of the threat and the U.S. system and values. Otherwise, terrorism will force a change in the world balance of power fundamentally adverse to U.S. interests.

The United States has vital interests. It needs only the will to defend them against those few states living outside an acceptable standard of international behavior.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1980-1989, BY TYPE OF VICTIM



Source: *Patterns of Global Terrorism—1989*

Recommendations

In the view of this Commission, the United States must:

- First, heighten emphasis on the second element of U.S. counterterrorism policy, that state sponsors should be made to pay a price for their actions.
- Second, refuse to allow terrorist attacks to alter U.S. political and economic policies.
- Third, improve human intelligence-gathering on terrorism, in cooperation with other nations.
- Fourth, work with other nations to treat as outlaws state sponsors of terrorism—isolating them politically, economically, and militarily.
- Fifth, develop through the Congress and the people a clear understanding that state-sponsored terrorism threatens U.S. values and interests, and that active measures are needed, overt and covert, to counter more effectively the terrorist threat.

11-L-0559/OSD/7164

- Sixth, ensure now that all U.S. Government resources are prepared for active measures—preemptive or retaliatory, direct or covert—against a series of targets in countries well-known to have engaged in state-sponsored terrorism.

National will—and the moral courage to use it—is the ultimate means to defeat terrorism.

snowflake

Done 10/29

October 16, 2002 7:50 AM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: POTUS Meeting w/Gen. Franks

The President wants a meeting with Gen. Franks, Gen. Myers and me as soon as the President and Franks can both be here, so Gen. Franks can brief on something. It should probably be "Fortress Baghdad" or IO, one of the two.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101602-6

Please respond by 11/01/02

MTG HELD 29 OCT

HM433

16 OCT 02

U04082 /03

snowflake

October 16, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: WH Strategic Communications Plan

What is the status of this memo on the interagency White House strategic communications plan that you gave me this note on?

Thanks.

Attach.
Clarke note

DHR:db
101602-7

Please respond by 10/25/02

311

16 OCT 02

U04083 /03

T. C.

Do you want me - your Action officer - to do anything particular in this meeting.

Besides serve the cake?

1) Back me up when I encourage CentCom to be more responsive

2) Let them know that we are working hard with the staff,

White House and State to develop a very aggressive strategic communications plan that will be fully integrated with all military operations.

That will require resources, people, commitment and a willingness to do communications very differently than the Persian Gulf war.

snowflake

October 16, 2002 8:46 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Important Accomplishments

Here is an excellent paper that lays out a series of things we have done in the last year that are important. You might want to use them in briefings.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated anonymous paper

DHR:dh
101602-13

Please respond by _____

OSD 020

10/21/02

U04084 /03

1. **Pre-War**

   A. Our emphasis on "surprise," pointing out that Vietnam was not mentioned in McNamara's confirmation hearings, Iraq was not mentioned in Cheney's hearings, and Afghanistan was not mentioned in Rumsfeld's Senate confirmation hearing.

   B. The repeated prediction, including to Members of Congress at 8 a.m. on September 11, that we had to be ready to deal with asymmetric surprises.

   C. Emphasis in DPG and QDR on transformation goals of 1) Homeland Defense, 2) Long-Range Precision Strike through combination of air and ground and 3) Countering anti-access through long range and sea based platforms.

2. **Post September 11: Setting the Stage**

   A. "Broad and sustained" -- all elements of national power will be engaged – economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, over/covert, etc.

   B. "The mission determines the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission."

   C. The war will take a long time.

   D. Linkage of terrorist networks with WMD.

   E. Shifting focus from UBL personally towards Al Quaeda/Taliban Global Terrorist.

   F. The concept that to defend against terrorism requires preemption. One cannot defend every place, at every time, against every technique; the only defense is to take the war to the terrorists.

3. **Building the War Plan**

   A. Refused the "off again on again" proposal with "pauses" – as recommended by CIA and "Islamabad Bob."

   B. Linkage of US military with humanitarian assistance, radio broadcasts, and rewards.

C. Characterization of the US war in Afghanistan and against terrorism as not retaliation, retribution or revenge, but rather self-defense, not against a religion or a people, but against terrorism.

D. **Strike early rather than wait for force build-up.**

E. **Emphasis on military impact on the ground, not just destroying targets.**

F. **Targeting Taliban regime from the beginning.**

G. **PSYOPS should emphasize theme of Taliban repression.**

4. <u>Conduct of War</u>

A. Keep expectation low from day one; under promise and over deliver.

B. Accepting help from any country on their basis, and allowing them to characterize the ways they were helping, rather than our characterizing it.

C. **Pressing to get SF in with NA troops – focus of air strikes and other actions in support of NA.**

D. Refused to stop bombing and fighting during Ramadan as demanded by Muslim countries.

E. **Importance of humanitarian drops. Need to target them to NA areas, not be directed by UN/USAID.**

F. **No pause before Kabul, pressing to take City and use success in North – not delay – to stimulate support from Southern tribes.**

G. **Pressing for more Predators, AC-130's**

H. Decision that the US must have control over dollars that flow into Afghanistan after the war, rather than humanitarian organizations or the UN, so that we can keep leverage the Afghan government and forces to achieve our goals.

5. <u>Rules of Engagement</u>

A. **Delegating to CINC full authority to fight the war without second-guessing.**

B. Franks permitted to hit high CD targets.

C. **Cutting decision time on Predator use.**

D. Decision to authorize Franks to go and get Omar and UBL if the people who have them say they will not give them to us.

E. US declaratory policy on Omar, UBL and the senior al Quaeda and Taliban leaders, that the US expects complete cooperation from anyone who finds them, and if they are not turned over to the US, or relations with whoever has them will go south very fast.

F. Declaring that any flights in or out of Afghanistan best get clearance from CENTCOM to avoid being shot down.

11-L-0559/OSD/7173

snowflake

October 16, 2002 10:36 AM

230

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Civil Service

Please get me the information from the Rudman-Hamilton commission on National Security that talks about today's civil service having become a drag on our national security.

We need to get that section and see if we want to make some changes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101602-29

Please respond by 10/25/02

Legislative Package?

To: Vic Bernson 12/1
OGC - LRS

Are these all in the proposals submitted?

Larry Di Rita
12/2

D. Rita

U04088 /03

16OCT02

11-L-0559/OSD/7174

snowflake

November 1, 2002 2:42 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Amendment on Contractor Personnel

When the Congress comes back, I want to try to get that one-line amendment that allows us to use contractor personnel for force protection. It is just not fair to the Guard and Reserve to be overusing them unnecessarily.

Let's get a good statement prepared, decide who we are going to ask to do it, and make a major push.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110102-18

Please respond by 11/08/02

Leg. Pach

snowflake

November 14, 2002 8:32 AM

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Legislative Authority

One of our legislative changes ought to be military-to-military contacts in Indonesia.

We ought to get a whole list of the micro things that are being done like that, show the whole list and get authority to deal with them ourselves.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111402-6

Please respond by 12/13/02

Leg Pkg

snowflake

October 16, 2002 10:39 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Sue Donahue

Sue Donahue is a good friend of Joyce's and mine from Brussels years back. She is a responsible person. Here is an e-mail from her.

Please find out who she should contact and then contact her and let her know. Please give me a copy of what you tell her, so Joyce and I will know.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/14/02 Donahue e-mail to Mrs. Rumsfeld

DHR:dh
101602-30

Please respond by 11/01/02

U04089 /03

Don please read & give to Larry - Tony or Alison & have them tell me what's going to happen
J.R.

Joyce Rumsfeld

From: <Donohues@aol.com>
To: <jrumsfeld@mindspring.com>
Cc: <NSAASWAG@hotmail.com>
Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 10:23 PM
Subject: Hello and ski uniforms

Hi Joyce,

When we were together last April I mentioned that I am involved with a close friend, Cheryl Jensen, who has taken it upon herself to organize the ski resorts across the country to give their used, but warm and useful, uniforms to, in turn, be given to those in need all over the world. Cheryl was able to have Project SWAG(sending warmth around the globe) recognized and institutionalized by the NSAA (National ski areas association) this past summer.

Basically I wanted to ask you to ask Don about who Cheryl might contact about the Denton Project which falls under the DOD. The goal would be to establish an ongoing relationship and have these items sent to places in need on a regular basis. Because the military has the structure and it is worthy humanitarian aide this seems an ideal fit.

There are no strings here at all--Cheryl discovered the uniforms were being stored for no reason and has worked hard to have them made useful. You may recall that as a result of Cheryl's leadership and effort on the part of many we sent 10,000 pieces to Afganistan in time for Christmas.

Currently there are at least 20 pallets or 5000 pieces ready to go!

Cheryl is working with a man named Kay Hiramine who is with Humanitarian International Services Group. Both of them are willing and able to come to DC in early November to meet with anyone to whom they are referred.

I am able to send more info if you would like---please guide me from here!

Hope all your family including your dear mother are doing fine. Do you get to see your newest grandson very often? Is it Quinton??!! I am in SF right now and will go to take care of Sara's children on the 30th.

Look forward to hearing from you and I hope this is not an imposition but it seems like everyone wins———

Thanks Joyce, Love, Sue

snowflake

October 16, 2002 10:42 AM

335WH

TO: Richard Perle

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Letter to the President

Your letter to the President was excellent. I am glad you sent it along—he understands the situation and the context.

Regards,

DHR:dh
101602-31

16OCT02

U04090 /03

snowflake

October 16, 2002 1:16 PM

1345

LARRY CONVEYED MSG TO MR. POWELL

032

TO: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Brief Senator Warner

Please see that Senator Warner gets offered a briefing on what we are doing in Northern Virginia with respect to the sniper. We should do it today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101602-33

Please respond by 10/16/02

Sir
Senator Warner was briefed on Oct 17.
Dick McGinn

160CT02

U04091 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7180

snowflake

October 16, 2002 2:00 PM

032

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita DR

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressman Andrews

I saw Congressman Andrews at the White House for the resolution signing event. He said, "Call on me if I can ever be helpful." He sure is a good man. Let's look at him carefully.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101602-35

Please respond by 11/01/02

16OCT02

U04092 /03

snowflake

February 11, 2002 2:12 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Airlift

Here is a memo to me from Newt Gingrich. Please take a look at it, get back to me in the next ten days and tell me what you propose to do on this subject.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/20/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Transportation Cost in Airlift"

DHR:dh
021102-53

Please respond by 02/22/02

11 Feb 02

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com (Newt Gingrich)

SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 1 1 2002

Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2002 11:26 AM

To: (b)(6) @osd.pentagon.mil

Cc: Ed.Glambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil; art.cebrowski@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: transportation cost in airlift and the leasing opportunity

for secdef, paul,larry

there should be a thorough study of the logistics of moving and sustaining forces in afghanistan. If we simply analyzed the first few months how many things and people could have been brought in by chartered commercial aircraft at less cost both in current dollars and compounded heavily by out year depreciation of the military airlift. we ought to reserve military airlift to airfields and situations where it is absolutely necessary and wherever possible substitute commercial carriers.
Boeing 747s with hardened floors can handle virtually everything except the heaviest and most outsized equipment. Airfields that are relatively safe should almost automatically switch to leased transportation. where special offloading equipment is needed for 747s it can be brought in in a c-17 and then then the 747s can start flying.
if you were to get an analysis of the total number of miliary airlift flights in 2000 which could have been done by leased cargo planes (including converted passenger planes in downturns when they are in surplus) you would save a significant amount of money, save years of flying life for the relatively scarce and expensive military airlift and allow the military to focus military airlift on critical missions and dangerous areas.
newt

Copied to LD, Dr. Wolfowitz

Snowflake



October 17, 2002 8:55 AM

France

TO: LTG Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: French MoD Prep

I am not being well served for these meetings, like the meeting with the French MoD. I get triple copies of everything, they are different, and my file is a mess. There must be 50 papers in here. I have to go through them and try to sort them and take the duplicates out and throw them away. I have notes on earlier copies.

It is just a mess. I need someone working for me who cares about what I am being given for a meeting and stops the nonsense. Something is fundamentally wrong with the way the whole dad-burn thing is working.

In the future, I would like to have what I need to know on cards, like speech cards, rather than these long pages with 16 subjects on a page. I had to throw out over 34 pages of materials.

Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101702-4

17 OCT 03

Please respond by 10/25/02

10/17

This is unacceptable. We will do better
C 10/21

SecDef - This got past us. We get multiple copies sometim and usually catch it, but did not here. We will shift to cards for [illegible]
DiRita

U04091 /03 11-L-0559/OSD/7185

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 3/5/02

SUBJECT: Secretary of Defense Memberships in External Organizations Under Statute or Executive Order

334

- We have compiled a list of organizations outside the Department on which, by statute or Executive order, the Secretary of Defense is a member (Tab A).

- At your request, we have divided the organizations into the following categories: (1) Continue Personal Participation by SecDef; (2) Retain DoD Membership; Representative of SecDef to Attend; and (3) Seek to Terminate DoD Membership.

- OSD Correspondence and Directives has located three documents that might be characterized as delegations of authority (Tab B). Only one was signed by the Secretary; the other two reflect staff decisions to send a representative to external organizations. To the extent that the Secretary desires to be represented on such groups, I recommend he formally designate DoD officials.

- Although SecDef has not specifically named Secretary White as his representative for the Homeland Security Council, I understand that as Interim DoD Executive Agent for Homeland Security he has been attending Council meetings on the SecDef's behalf.

- I recommend that the attached document be treated as a draft and circulated within the Department for coordination and comment.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Paul S. Koffsky and Kimberly M. Lenzer, (b)(6)

5 Mar 02

TAB

A

Secretary of Defense Memberships in External Organizations Under Statute or Executive Order

Continue Personal Participation by SecDef

1. National Security Council, member

-**Requirement**: 50 U.S.C. §402

-**Established**: Jul. 26, 1947

-**SecDef attends.**

-**Purpose**: The NSC advises the President on domestic, military and foreign policies relating to national security.

-**DoD Interest**: SecDef participation as a statutory member of the National Security Council is critical to U.S. national security decision making. As stated in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 (February 14, 2001), the NSC or NSC Principals Committee "will continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has since 1989." NSC deliberations involve crucial DoD interests and support the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.

2. Export Administrative Review Board, member

-**Requirement**: Exec. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981 (Dec. 5, 1995), continues the Board established by Exec. Order No. 11533 (Jun. 4, 1970) and Exec. Order No. 12002 (Jul. 7, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. 13020 (Oct. 12, 1996), Exec. Order No. 13026 (Nov. 15, 1996) and Exec. Order No. 13118 (Mar. 31, 1999)

-**Established**: June 4, 1970

-**SecDef attends.**

-No alternate Board member shall be designated, but the acting SecDef or Deputy Secretary may serve in lieu of SecDef

-**Purpose**: The Board is responsible for interagency dispute resolution concerning

11-L-0559/OSD/7188

export license applications; Board meets only when necessary to resolve disputes.

-**DoD Interest**: The Board reviews the most sensitive and important policy matters concerning export controls, including resolving (or recommending to the President the most sensitive licensing matters. It provides for an orderly and disciplined process for reviewing of export license applications whereby any of the agencies that review export license applications may escalate to the President for appeal any proposed decision by other agencies.

Retain DoD Membership; Representative of SecDef to Attend

3. President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board

-**Requirement**: Exec. Order No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 202

-**Established**: Oct. 16, 2001

-**SecDef designee**: Mr. John Stenbit, ASD(C3I), secondary is Ms. Carol Haave, DASD(S&IO)

-**Purpose**: The Board recommends policies and coordinates programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support such systems.

-**DoD Interest**: DoD representation on the board allows protection of vitally important critical infrastructure systems.

4. Homeland Security Council, member

-**Requirement**: Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812

-**Established**: Oct. 8, 2001

-**SecDef designee**: Thomas E. White, Sec Army/Interim DoD Executive Agent for Homeland Security

-**Purpose**: The Council advises and assists the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security. It ensures coordination of homeland security-related

11-L-0559/OSD/7189

activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.

-DoD Interest: DoD has lead responsibility for aspects of homeland defense and may be called upon to provide a variety of civil support.

5. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman

-Requirement: 22 U.S.C. §2751
-SecDef may designate a DASD-level or above representative to perform his routine duties

-Established: Oct. 22, 1968

-SecDef designee: Paul Wolfowitz, DepSecDef

-Purpose: The Committee is charged with optimizing funding, development and deployment of highly effective technologies for purposes of detection, monitoring, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating information in support of counterproliferation policy and efforts.

-DoD Interest: DoD uses counterproliferation information to prevent the spread of weapons of mass production.

-Miscellaneous: USD(AT&L) chairs interagency group supporting committee.

6. Invasive Species Council, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183

-Established: Feb. 3, 1999

-SecDef designee: John P. Woodley, ADUSD(E)

-Purpose: The Council prevents the spread of invasive species (species non-native to the ecosystem under consideration and whose introduction is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health) through interagency coordination, creation of a cross-agency budget for rapid response to emerging problems, and reauthorization and expansion of the National Invasive Species Act.

-**DoD Interest**: Invasive plant species--such as kudzu, Japanese barberry, yellow star thistle, and wild parsnip--degrade training lands by making certain lands virtually impenetrable; by threatening both foot and vehicular traffic; and by posing health risks from contact with human skin. Other invasive plant species--such as cheatgrass-- dramatically increase the risk of wildfire, threatening personnel and property, reducing bio-diversity, and rendering training lands unavailable until the lands re-vegetate. Other invasive plant species--such as spotted knapweed, pepperweed, and leafy spurge--crowd out native vegetation, exacerbating DoD's Endangered Species Act management problems and resulting in the imposition of restrictions on critical testing and training. Other invasive plant species--such as salt cedar--choke watersheds, aggravating flooding problems. Invasive animal species promote the spread of leptospirosis, toxoplasmosis, and other threats to human health; and - Invasive animal species--such as the Zebra mussel-- affect both ballast water discharges and ship hulls.

7. U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, member

-**Requirement:** Exec. Order No. 13089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32701,
16 U.S.C. §6401 note

-**Established**: June 11, 1998

-**SecDef designee**: H.T. Johnson, ASN(I&E)

-**Purpose**: The Task Force's mission is to protect and enhance coral reef ecosystems.

-**DoD Interest**: The Task Force addresses high-profile issues surrounding EO 13089 (Coral Reefs) and EO 13158 (Marine Protected Areas), and public scrutiny of Federal agency compliance and implementation. DoD participation encourages adoption of recommendations that are consistent with national security interests. It also affords an opportunity to broadcast our good environmental stewardship.

8. American Heritage Rivers Interagency Committee, member

-**Requirement**: Exec. Order No. 13061, 62 Fed. Reg. 48445
-SecDef or ASD-level designee

-**Established**: Sep. 11, 1997

-**SecDef designee**: Mike Parker, ASA for Civil Works

-**Purpose**: The Committee provides Federal support for community-based initiatives designed to preserve and restore natural and cultural resources along specifically designated American Heritage Rivers. Typically, Federal support is provided in-kind (rather than in cash) in conjunction with projects that concurrently address both agency and community objectives. A provision in the FY00 DoD Appropriations Act (section 8174) prohibited DoD from using FY00 funds to support the American Heritage Rivers Initiative; although no such language has appeared in the Department's Appropriations Acts for FY01 or FY02, DoD's participation in the Initiative since the Fall of 1999 has been limited primarily to the support provided by the USACE in the Civil Works context.

-**DoD Interest**: USACE participation gives it an opportunity to collaborate with local communities on projects of mutual interest without much, if any, additional investment in either time or money.

9. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation, nonvoting ex officio member

-**Requirement**: 15 U.S.C. §657c

-**Established**: Jul. 18, 1958

-**SecDef designee**: Frank Ramos, Dir Small & Disadvantaged Business, OUSD(AT&L)

-**Purpose**: The Corporation created a business model process of establishing business plans that will provide resources to veterans for businesses and cash flow to the corporation.

-**DoD interest**: The Corporation promotes the welfare of those who have served in the military.

-**Miscellaneous**: Meets quarterly.

10. DoD Advisory Council on Dependents' Education, cochairman

-**Requirement**: 20 U.S.C. §929

-**Established**: Nov. 1, 1978

-**SecDef designee**: Charles S. Abell, ASD(FMP)

-**Purpose**: The Council provides advice to the Director, DoDEA regarding curriculum selection, administration, operation of the DoD Dependents Schools (DoDDS) (the Department's overseas school system), national educational best practices and programs that should be considered for inclusion in DoDDS. ACDE members include representatives from DoD and DoEd, teacher union presidents, military general officers, nationally recognized educators external to DoDEA, DoDDS parents, and a DoDDS student.

-**DoD Interest**: ACDE's advice enhances the educational services provided by DoDDS.

11. Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member

-**Requirement**: 22 U.S.C. §4605
-SecDef may designate a DoD PAS official

-**Established**: Oct. 19, 1984

-**SecDef designee**: Mr. Douglas Feith, USD(P)

-**Purpose**: The Board debates on current conflict resolution and policy issues.

-**DoD Interest**: DoD representation at the Board enhances our ability to provide guidance to the U.S. Institute of Peace conflict resolution activities and input to Washington's policy debates.

12. White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member

-**Requirement**: Pub. L. No. 106-579 (36 U.S.C. §116 note)

-**Established**: Dec. 28, 2000

-**SecDef or designee**: No designee currently in place

-**Purpose**: The Commission encourages people and entities at the national, State, and local level to commemorate Memorial Day and to participate in a National Moment of Remembrance in tribute to those individuals who sacrificed their lives

for the United States. The commission provides national coordination for commemorative speeches, publications, exhibits, and events.

-**DoD Interest**: The commission promotes public awareness of Memorial Day and the ultimate sacrifice made by many military personnel in service to the Nation.

13. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member

-**Requirement:** 38 U.S.C. §1974

-**Established**: Sep. 29, 1965

-**SecDef designee**: USD(C)

-**Purpose**: The Council reviews the operations of the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance and advises the Veterans Affairs Secretary on matters of policy relating to the Secretary's activities under this statute.

-**DoD Interest**: The Department is concerned to ensure servicemembers' SGLI premium payments are reasonable.

-**Miscellaneous**: DoDD 1341.3, "Servicemen's Group Life Insurance," assigns the DoD Comptroller responsibility for financial policy and ASD(FMP) responsibility for administrative policy of the SGLI Program.
-Council meets at least once a year or more often at the call of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

14. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member

-**Requirement**: 38 U.S.C. §3689

-**Established**: Nov. 1, 2000

-**SecDef designee**: Ollie Smith, Transition Assistance Program Director, OASD(FMP)

-**Purpose**: The Committee advises the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on requirements of organizations or entities offering licensing and certification tests to individuals on whose behalf the DVA pays for those tests. The Committee

expands the educational opportunities for military personnel who signed up for the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB). As of March 1, 2001, individuals with MGIB benefits possess the option to test on professional certification and licensure examinations. Testing on a DVA-approved professional certification or licensure exam assures eligibility to receive after-the-fact reimbursement.

-**DoD Interest**: The Committee promotes the transition of military personnel to civilian professions requiring some type of license or certificate (e.g., teacher's certificate, aviation mechanic license). Agreements resulting from the committee's efforts allow a servicemember (often free of charge) to test and certify prior to leaving active duty and transition into a new job.

15. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member

-**Requirement**: 38 U.S.C. §4110

-**Established**: Oct. 14, 1982

-**SecDef or designee**: No current representative

-**Purpose**: The Committee's objectives are to: assess the employment and training needs of veterans; determine the extent to which the programs and activities of the Department of Labor are meeting such needs; carry out such other activities as may be appropriate; and make recommendations to the Secretary of Labor with respect to the employment and training needs of veterans at such times and in such manner as the Committee determines appropriate.

-**DoD Interest**: The Committee promotes the welfare of those who have served in the military.

-**Miscellaneous**: The Committee meets quarterly.

16. National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member

-**Requirement**: 40 U.S.C. §71a
-SecDef from time-to-time may designate an alternate to serve in his stead

-**Established**: Dec. 24, 1973

-**SecDef designee**: Jerry Shiplett, Special Assistant to the Director, Real Estate and Facilities, WHS

-**Purpose**: The Commission reviews plans for the construction and renovation of buildings on federal property in the National Capital area.

-**DoD Interest**: The Commission affects the use of DoD property and what we want to do in the National Capital area.

17. Interagency Council on the Homeless

-**Requirement**: 42 U.S.C. §11312

-**Established**: Jul. 22, 1987

-**SecDef designee**: OEA became the DoD representative to the Council in 1994.

-**Purpose**: The Counsel provides an interagency forum for the coordination of federal policy and assistance to support the homeless.

-**DoD Interest**: The Redevelopment Act revolutionized the manner in which property is handled for potential homeless assistance purposes. As Congress was considering changes to the McKinney Act in response to the modest tweaks accomplished by the Pryor amendments, it looked to HUD and other agents for the homeless at the federal level to ascertain the reasonableness of possible legislative changes as they might affect the homeless. Mark Wagner and Josh Gotbaum's other staff (including Rob Hertzfeld) negotiated the new process we have with Marsha Martin (the Executive Director of the Council at that time) along with other GSA/HHS/and HUD components through the Council forum as they oversaw homeless provider opportunities with surplus federal property. We would not have revised the process without their support. Presuming the Council will continue, it would provide an ongoing forum for addressing civilian-based homeless assistance issues that are not normally addressed by the Department for its surplus and enduring properties.

18. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member

-**Requirement**: 42 U.S.C. §12623

-**Established**: Nov. 16, 1990

-**SecDef designee**: Ernie Gonzalez, Director, Civil Military Youth Programs and Innovative Readiness Training, OASD(RA)

-**Purpose**: The Board facilitates the pooling of national, state and local resources.