



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 12 2002

The Honorable Kim Dong Shin
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea

Minister Kim:

Thank you for your letter regarding the selection of the F-15K as the next generation fighter aircraft for the Republic of Korea.

Your desire to maintain interoperability between ROK and U.S. forces, even as we seek to transform these forces to better address the security environment of the coming years, will help strengthen our capabilities.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/8830

U08656 02

KOREA

12 Jun 02

S A R A H D I S K E T T E T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
RELEASING DOCUMENT

CREATION DATE: 210502

CREATION TIME: 13350000

SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03

MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU

HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU

DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME:

ORG:

OFFICE:

PHONE:

TOC FILE CRC: 26146

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ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER

David R. Jhal

11-L-0559/OSD/8831

UNCLASSIFIED
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DTG: 031800Z JUN 02

PAGE 01 of 02

Drafter's Name : J. KESSINGER COUNTRY DIRE
Office/Phone : ISA/AP, (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECDEF

Action Prec : ROUTINE
Info Prec : ROUTINE
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
To: AMEMBASSY KOREA
Info: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR
USDAO SEOUL KO//DATT//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE KIM

1. REQUEST AMEMBASSY FORWARD THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO MINISTER KIM
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ORIGINAL LETTER WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE KIM DONG SHIN
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

MINISTER KIM:

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER REGARDING THE SELECTION OF THE
F-15K AS THE NEXT GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA.

□

(PARA) YOUR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN ROK AND U.S.
FORCES, EVEN AS WE SEEK TO TRANSFORM THESE FORCES TO BETTER ADDRESS
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMING YEARS, WILL HELP SUSTAIN OUR
CAPABILITIES.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD

3. END OF TEXT.

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/8832

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DTG: 031800Z JUN 02

PAGE 02 of 02

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11-L-0559/OSD/8833



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

ACTION MEMO

I-02/007441

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Response letter to Minister of Defense Kim Regarding the Republic of Korea's
Selection of the F-15K

- Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Kim Dong-Shin, sent a letter informing you of the selection of Boeing's F-15K for the ROK's next generation fighter (F-X) program.
- The Ministry of National Defense announced the selection on April 18 and is expected to sign the final contract (40 planes for \$4.29 billion) in June.
- The selection followed a contentious and charged competition between the F-15K and the French Rafale.
- DOD maintained a low profile during the selection to avoid the semblance of pressuring the ROK government.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign response letter at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A: Response Letter

Tab B: Letter from Minister of Defense Kim

Tab C: Coordination Page

Prepared by: Thomas Sisk, Asst. Country Director for Korea, (b)(6)

| |
|-------------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DIR |
| SR MA GIAMBASIANI |
| MA BUCCI |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE |

11-L-0559/OSD/8834

U08656 /02

COORDINATION PAGE

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Mr. Douglas J. Feith)

Principal Deputy ASD/ISA (Mr. Peter C.W. Flory)

DASD/AP

DSCA

11/13/01
af MAY 16
PTB

by email 5/16
(A. Smoote)



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ACTION MEMO

1-02/007441

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Response letter to Minister of Defense Kim Regarding the Republic of Korea's Selection of the F-15K

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| SPL ASSISTANT DIR | |
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| EXECSEC WHITMORE | |

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TO ESR 6 JUN
REVISED BY

ATTN: L-0559/OSD/8836

05-17-02 11:33 IN

U08656 /02

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
MILITARY SUPPORT REQUEST
DISPATCH FORM**

TO: C&D

DATE: _____

- Action on the attached request is complete.
- Copies were dispatched to:

| | | |
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CHECK ONE:

- _____ - Distribution made, please control and file.
- _____ - Please distribute to offices as listed on the attached memorandum, control and file.
- _____ - Copy back to me.

COMMENTS:

*Please return to
ISA Rodman for Files
per DiReta note.
Thanks*

Military Assistant



Attachment:
As stated



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Kim Dong Shin
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea

Minister Kim:

Thank you for your letter regarding the selection of the F-15K as the next generation fighter aircraft for the Republic of Korea.

Your desire
~~Our efforts~~ to maintain interoperability between ROK and U.S. forces, even as we seek to transform these forces to better address the security environment of the coming years, ~~is an important element in ensuring~~ the enduring nature of our defense relationship. *will help sustain*



11-L-0559/OSD/8838



**EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
MILITARY SUPPORT REQUEST
DISPATCH FORM**

INTERN
SEC
AFF

TO: C&D

DATE: 31 May

1690 - 7/11
22 MAY 9:54

I-02/007441

- Action on the attached request is complete.

- Copies were dispatched to:

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ffairs
17 MAY 2002

Republic of Korea's

CHECK ONE:

- _____ - Distribution made, please control and file.
- _____ - Please distribute to offices as listed on the attached memorandum, control and file.
- _____ - Copy back to me.

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generation fighter

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COMMENTS:

*Please return to ISA
(Rodman) per Di Rita note.*

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[Signature]
Military Assistant

REC

Attachment:
As stated

Atta

Tab A: Response Letter

Tab B: Letter from Minister of Defense Kim

Tab C: Coordination Page

U08656

[Signature] 5/23
[Signature] 5/23

Prepared by: Thomas Sisk, Asst. Country Director for Korea (b)(6)

[Signature] 5/31
LARRY DI RITA

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | <i>[Signature]</i> 5/22 RE 5/23 |



11-L-0559/OSD/8839

05-17-02 11:38 IN

U08656 /02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Kim Dong Shin
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea

Minister Kim:

Thank you for your letter regarding the selection of the F-15K as the next generation fighter aircraft for the Republic of Korea.

Your decision will provide the Republic of Korea with the ~~next generation~~ fighter that it needs to maintain its qualitative edge in air power.

Our efforts to transform ROK and U.S. forces, while maintaining interoperability, is an important element in ensuring the enduring nature of our defense security relationship. I look forward to future discussions on this subject.

D. [Signature]

Maintain interoperability between, even as we seek to transform these forces to better address the security environment of the next coming years.



11-L-0559/OSD/8840

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

5/23

From: Col Seiwel

To: C+D

Please return to ISH Rahman
for fixes per D:Rata note.

Thanks

KAS

F DEFENSE

ON
2400

16 MAY 2002

888

5/17

2002 MAY 22 11:38 54

I-02/007441

al Security Affairs

17 MAY 2002

Regarding the Republic of Korea's

Kim Dong-Shin, sent a letter
the ROK's next generation fighter

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ATTACHMENTS:

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Tab B: Letter from Minister of Defense Kim

Tab C: Coordination Page

Prepared by: Thomas Sisk, Asst. Country Director for Korea, (b)(6)

U 08656-02



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|-------------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DIR |
| SR MA GIAMBAS |
| MA BUCCI |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE |

5/23
RE 5/23



11-L-0559/OSD/8841

05-12-02 11:38 IN

U 08656-02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Kim Dong Shin
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea

Minister Kim:

Thank you for your letter regarding the selection of the F-15K as the next generation fighter aircraft for the Republic of Korea. *Your decision*

~~The Department of Defense is confident that the F-15K will provide the Republic of Korea with the next generation fighter that it needs to maintain its qualitative edge in air power and the interoperability to support the combined readiness of our forces.~~

Our efforts to transform ROK and U.S. forces, while maintaining interoperability, ~~illustrates~~ the enduring nature of our security ~~alliance~~. I look forward to future discussions on this subject. *relationship*

is an important element in answering
Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/8842

OFFICE OF MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SEOUL

2002 MAY -8 PM 3: 25

April 22, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

Your Excellency:


It is my great pleasure to inform you that Boeing's F-15K has been selected as the next fighter aircraft for the F-X project of the Republic of Korea. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for your Government's active support and cooperation for Korea's force improvement efforts.

The selection of the F-15K is the result of careful evaluation of all aspects on the basis of a fair and transparent selection process. I hope this decision will serve to further strengthen ROK-US security ties and cooperation to ensure the success of the F-X project.

Once again, I would like to thank you for your special interest and support for this project as well as other issues of mutual interest regarding our combined defense. Moreover, I hope our shared trust lays the groundwork for further promoting close cooperation between our two Governments.

I extend my warm wishes for your Government's continued prosperity and your personal success.


Sincerely yours,


Kim, Dong Shin
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea

I-00744/-02
U08039102

11-L-0559/OSD/8843

September 27, 2002 4:14 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Status Report on Leaks

380.015

Please get me a status report on the leaking of the war plan. I've never heard from anybody what happened.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092702-13

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

27 Sep 02

U08656 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8844

12:01 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 28, 2002

SUBJECT:

See me about the possibility of going with Marshall Billingslea.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092802.03

Please respond by: 10/4

U08657 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8845

020506

28 Sep 02

1:20 PM

TO: Gen. Mike DeLong
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 28, 2002
SUBJECT: **SecDef Update**

Afghanistan

On your form that you send up every day, you might want to show the ISAF levels of personnel.

I also think you might want to start showing the progress on the Afghan National Army, the border patrol and the police. These are issues that are important to everybody.

In addition, instead of (on page 2) showing "total, killed, captured and at-large," you might want to say, "at large and unknown" for a fifth category. The point being that some people you know are at large, because you do have any identification of them being at large. In other cases, there are people you don't know whether or not they are at large or dead and I would say "unknown" in that category.

I would also like you to send up the videotape you mentioned on page 4 of the paper for September 27th.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092802.07

Please respond by: 10/7

28 Sep 02

U08658 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8846

September 30, 2002 9:25 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Truth

000.7

At some press briefing, I think we ought to talk about Iraq and Al Qaeda and go back to the subject matter of the Reuters story, although not referencing it again.

Specifically, if you think about it, in civilized society, if a person tells a lie, they become known as a liar. When they say things, people don't believe them. They get a reputation for lying, they are weakened and damaged by virtue of that reputation, and they pay a penalty for it. On the one hand, they gain an advantage because they can trick some people, but on the other hand, they pay a penalty. The problem we have is that the media is looking for news and for conflict, and, for whatever reason, they seem to be frequently looking for things that are anti-U.S. Certainly that's true in Europe, and to a certain extent it's true in the U.S.

Shouldn't the media begin keeping track of who is lying? The U.S. does not lie. We may make mistakes, we may make poor decisions, but we don't lie. Saddam Hussein's policy is to lie and deceive, to purposely do things to cause the reputation of the U.S. and others to be damaged by virtue of the falsification of things. Isn't it the responsibility of the media to allow that reputation to be known? If they feel they have to report something that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime says or the Al Qaeda say, they ought to simultaneously be required to say that this is a known, repeated liar. Anyone in the media who has the slightest interest in the truth can validate what I've just said.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-2

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

30 Sep 02

U08659 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8847

September 30, 2002 10:37 AM

091.412

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Info Ops

Larry Di Rita is going to set up a meeting so we can talk about info ops. It is a camel. We need to straighten it out and get it operational.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-19

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

30 Sep 02

U08660 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8848

September 30, 2002 1:28 PM

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: RR

Please check and see if it says in the "Rumsfeld's Rules" "The mission must determine the coalition; the coalition should not determine the coalition." See if that is under the national security section. If it isn't, let's put it in. Let me see it, and I'll edit it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-57

.....
Please respond by 10/01/02

U08662 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8849

020 SD

30 Sep 02

2:35 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 28, 2002
SUBJECT:

032

I would like someone get a report to me on how the Kissinger panel and the Shelly Kashveli panels went up on the Hill. I read when I was out of town that they testified and I would like to see what happened.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092802.11

Please respond by: _____

*11/5**28 Sep 02*

U08664 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8850

2:51 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 28, 2002
SUBJECT:

Iraq

Gi-Gi Geyer wrote a column today in *The Washington Times* which is worrisome. She indicated that we didn't offer for NATO to do anything. We did. You ought to make sure she reads the whole transcript of my press conference there, and realizes that we engage them on lots of things. She is just factually wrong. We didn't ask them to invade Iraq, because the President hasn't decided to do it.

We need to get her head right.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092802.16

Please respond by: _____

28 Sep 02

U08665 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8851

September 30, 2002 9:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pre-emption

I just can't imagine what Mark Mazzetti is talking about here. Please see if you can figure it out.

Thanks.

Attach.

Mazzetti, Mark, "Ready, Aim, Fire First," *U.S. News & World Report*, October 7, 2002.

DHR:dh
093002-3

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

(D)

10/5

*← Sec Def - Have spoken with
Rodman, who also queried
Fargo. No one has a
good thought as to what
the author was chasing.*

Jerry

U08667 103

Larry Di Rita

10/8

11-L-0559/OSD/8852

381

30 Sep 02

U.S. News & World Report
October 7, 2002

Ready. Aim. Fire First

But is the U.S. military a little gun-shy about starting wars?

By Mark Mazzetti

It was a "what if" scenario—the sort that military planners are paid to imagine—and it was not nearly ready for prime time. Earlier this summer, a top aide to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined for his boss a concept for striking North Korea's weapons of mass destruction—a case study in the application of the Bush administration's new doctrine of pre-emptive military action. The hypothetical scenario envisioned a swift attack, carried out without consulting South Korea, America's ally on the peninsula. When word of the briefing spread, administration heavyweights, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, worked to bury the scheme.

Consider it a clumsy way to ring in the age of pre-emption, which officially debuted with the recent release of the Bush administration's National Security Strategy. In what may be the boldest rethinking of American foreign policy since Harry Truman, the document makes the case that Cold War logic no longer applies in a world where terrorists, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction, strike at civilians without warning. "This kind of enemy will not be deterred or contained the way, perhaps, the Soviet Union might have been," Powell said last week. Breaking from the deep-rooted American instinct to strike only if attacked first, the so-called Bush Doctrine advocates pre-emptive military action against practitioners of terrorism—including overthrowing governments that support them—and it may soon provide the justification for an American attack on Iraq.

U.S. officials insist that the Bush Doctrine is not a one-trick pony meant solely to justify an Iraq invasion. "Any state that has a weapons-of-mass-destruction program and has an irresponsible dictator falls within the president's paradigm shift," says one Bush administration official. "This is a historic moment." But as the dust-up over the Pentagon's North Korea briefing illustrates, laying out a broad strategic vision is one thing; applying it in the real world is quite another. In short: It is not at all clear where, besides Iraq, the Bush Doctrine could really be put into practice.

The military gets to weigh in now; the admirals and generals are putting finishing touches on the National Military Strategy, a practical blueprint for implementing the White House's grand vision. Early indications are that those in uniform are far less enamored of pre-emption than their civilian bosses: A draft of the document, which had not yet made it to Rumsfeld's desk, all but ignored the concept, U.S. News has learned.

The generals aren't dead set against striking first; after all, the notion of pre-empting an enemy attack ("anticipatory self-defense," in the Bush administration lexicon) is as old as warfare. But the White House version is new and different. It advocates taking military action before the adversary even has the capacity to attack. It calls for action, even without ironclad evidence of danger. And it suggests that U.S. power might "dissuade" other nations from trying to match American military might. In the words of one senior officer, "there is a brave new world coming with this new defense policy."

Hit 'em. There is little debate about the appeal of going on the offensive to dismantle terrorist networks before they can strike. The approach gives planners the advantage of tactical surprise and permits them

- • to strike with a smaller force. "Obviously, taking the offensive under the rules of war is something the military would love to do," says Gen. Gregory Martin, commander of U.S. air forces in Europe. Case in point: The Pentagon is drawing up plans to send special operations forces into states like Yemen that are harboring senior al Qaeda leaders.

Applying the doctrine to rogue states is where the water gets muddied. It has certainly been done before. Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, before it became operational, and many in the military consider the 1989 invasion of Panama another example. But top commanders, including some whose job it has been to devise war plans, are struggling to understand how hitting states first makes military sense. These officers say that even when confronting countries the president designated as an "axis of evil"—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—the containment calculus still works. "Personal survival is what matters to the Kim Jong Ils and Saddam Husseins of this world," says one former four-star officer. "This [pre-emption] absolutely is the right doctrine to deal with enemies that are not organized into states. When it comes to dealing with other countries I'm not so sure."

Even big-think objections to the Bush Doctrine offered by academics have practical consequences that get the military's attention. The doctrine imagines that the United States would not "allow an adversarial military power to rise," as one Bush official put it. That "confirms the notion that America is now embarking on an imperial role," argues James Chace, a specialist in international relations at Bard College. "The great danger of American power nowadays is that it will prompt other powers to combine against us." What that means to the generals is that strategic alliances built up over the years could be ruptured.

Like it or not, the military may have to change the way it goes about its business. At a recent gathering of combatant commanders—the brass in charge of forces deployed outside the United States—Rumsfeld challenged them to adapt to the new terrorism threat. The military will have to reassess where it bases forces, so it will not have to move troops and equipment into a region before a strike—and risk telegraphing its punch. The Pentagon will rely heavily on special operations forces that can deploy in smaller numbers and move without being detected, and on precision bombers that can strike a target from long range. Gathering reliable intelligence will become even more important. "If we are going to be pre-emptive in nature, we better be pretty damn sure we understand their intent," says a senior Air Force official. Satellites in space can't do that very well, putting a premium on spies on the ground who can help predict what an enemy will do.

Do as I say. These are just nuts-and-bolts problems, compared with objections to pre-emption being raised abroad and at home. "We'll be putting ourselves in the position of a rogue nation," says Sen. Robert Byrd, a West Virginia Democrat, who argues that the strategy might inspire copycats. While the Bush National Security Strategy warns that other countries should not "use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression," the new doctrine might give ideas to China in its struggle against Taiwan or to Russia in its fight against Chechen rebels in Georgia. This pattern was clearly on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's mind when he warned India not to mimic the new U.S. policy. "Pakistan is not Iraq, and India is not the United States," he advised his adversary to the south. "They had better not try it." Musharraf may have reason to put down a marker. "India has a history of mirroring the U.S. rhetoric, and even trying to mirror U.S. actions on issues ranging from terrorism to nuclear strategy," says a Senate Democratic official who deals with South Asia policy. "We can't think we are planning our own doctrine in a vacuum."

The White House is billing the Bush Doctrine as the first coherent strategy to confront the dangers of the post-Cold War world. This might be so, but much will depend on how the United States acts upon the doctrine's muscular rhetoric and how the world reacts. "The ripple effects from this are really hard to gauge," says Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. "These

- ' fundamental shifts in our defensive posture don't come around very often."

With Thomas Omestad

September 30, 2002 9:32 AM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dextroamphetamine

I just can't believe using these pills is a good idea. Why don't you get some folks to think about it a little bit? I admit I've got kind of a bias against putting things into your body unless you absolutely have to, but please take a look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.

09/06/02 ASD (Health Affairs) memo to SecDef re: Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Aviators [U14912-02]

DHR:dh
093002-4

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

U08668 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8856

440

30 Sep 02



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

SEP 26 2002 1:51

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr. MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Aviators

- You directed that we "look into this business about pilots using amphetamines." (PW/BW)
- Dextroamphetamine, known as "go pills," has been used by military aviators since World War II to counter the effects of fatigue during combat operations. It is only used if alternatives such as adjusting sleep patterns, in-flight naps or exercise are either unsuccessful or not an option. There have been no reported safety incidents involving aircrew members' use of "go pills."
- The wing commander, or deployed commander equivalent, in consultation with the senior flight surgeon, determines if the use of Dextroamphetamine is medically warranted. The authorization for its use is time and/or mission specific.
- Countering pilot fatigue is an "off label" use of Dextroamphetamine; informed consent is necessary from the crew member. Commanders may not order its use. There is no penalty, punishment, loss of benefits, or adverse action of any kind for those who decline the use of stimulants. Ground testing prior to combat use and rigorous accountability measures must also be in place.
- Military medical research laboratories are currently studying alternative drugs to effectively combat pilot fatigue, including Modafinil, a Food and Drug Administration approved medication used to treat narcolepsy.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared by: COL John Powers, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS# 40336, 40197

| | |
|-----------------------|--------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | |
| SR MA CRADDOCK | C 9/30 |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 201/17 |

U14912-02

11-L-0559/OSD/8857

8:29 AM

Rec'd 27 Aug 02

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Please look into this business about pilots using amphetamines. I don't think that is a good idea. What's going on?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
080902.02

Please respond by:

8/25/02

U14910-02

11-L-0559/OSD/8858

Larry Di Rita
9/27

Snowflake

EF2950

02 / 014370

September 30, 2002 9:43 AM

Larry Di Rita
10/1/02

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Questions

ADVANCE
COPY
GIVEN TO POLICY

Long

Please have someone get an answer to these questions in this William Raspberry column, put them down and get them to me by Wednesday, please.

Thanks.

Attach.

Raspberry, William, "Unasked Questions," *Washington Post*, 09/30/02.

DHR:dh
093002-6

.....
Please respond by 10/02/02

U08669 103

30 Sep 02

9/30 1300

11-L-0559/OSD/8859



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

OCT 01 2002

USDP Colly 10/1/02

EF-2950 OCT - 1 01
I-02/014370

MEMO FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodmar (b)(6)) 01 OCT 2002

SUBJ: Replies to questions in William Raspberry column

- You asked for answers to the questions in William Raspberry's column for 30 September (next under).
- Suggested answers at TAB A.

DASD NESA W. Rodmar

| | |
|-----------------------|-------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | <u>10/5</u> |
| SR MA CRADDOCK | |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | <u>10/3</u> |

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/USD/8860

- *What is the actual threat to the U.S. – the purpose of war?*
 - Biological agents – which might be disseminated by a terrorist group – could cause large casualties. If one were trying to cause civilian casualties, they could be used quite effectively, despite what Colonel Williams says.
 - Iraq has had experience using chemical weapons – Iraq found them quite useful in the war with Iran, not to speak of massacres of its own citizens.
 - At Halabjah alone, Iraq massacred 5,000 people. This is one of several dozen cases chemical weapons were used effectively against civilians.
 - An Iraqi nuclear weapon would transform the Middle East. It would be used politically as a weapon of regional blackmail, intimidating all of Iraq's neighbors in the Gulf and the Middle East. Saddam could threaten Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, or other neighbors via conventional aggression and hope that the U.S. would be deterred or impeded from intervening.
- *How many American lives will we expend to punish Saddam Hussein?*
 - None. If American lives are put at risk, it will be for the purpose of defending our country and its vital interests.
 - After the Gulf War, the population of Iraq rose in rebellion against Saddam. Half of Baghdad's population is Shi'a. Why would they want to fight for Saddam?
 - In fact, since Saddam took power, almost one in five Iraqis have fled their country. Almost every Iraqi has someone in his family who fled or died because of Saddam.
 - Saddam rules by intimidation and bribery, not ideology. Few Iraqis want to die for Saddam. There is precedent of unrest among even the Tikritis and Special Republican Guard.
- *How long will public support last when hundreds, possibly thousands, of body bags start arriving home?*
 - It is not productive to speculate about levels of casualties. High estimates have been significantly wrong in the past.
 - Thousands of Americans have already died because the U.S. turned a blind eye to those who harbor terrorists.

- In Vietnam, support for the war remained high even as we started taking casualties in large numbers. Majority public support lasted into 1968, by which time about 30,000 American servicemen and women had died.
- *How, militarily, do you plan to fight this war?*
 - Coalition air power is much more capable now than it was in the Gulf War. Iraq's Air Force is not capable of engaging a Coalition Air Force both in equipment and pilot capabilities.
 - On the ground, we are much stronger and more agile than we were in the Gulf War, while the Iraqi army, even if it fights, is poorly equipped and one-third the size it was in 1990.
 - The scenario that we will have to "conquer cities" by house-to-house fighting is speculative.
- *How many Iraqi citizens do you plan to kill in order to bestow democracy?*
 - We do not target civilians. In fact, we do everything humanly possible to limit civilian casualties as demonstrated during Desert Storm, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
 - The Iraqi regime intentionally uses civilians as human shields by hiding military forces in mosques, schools, and hospitals.
 - While we can't guarantee that no civilians will be harmed, it is probable that we will kill orders of magnitude fewer civilians than Saddam Hussein has killed to maintain his tyranny.
 - We will not "level cities by bombing." We didn't in the Gulf War, we didn't in the Kosovo conflict, we didn't in Afghanistan, and we won't now.
- *How will you govern a defeated Iraq?*
 - As the people of Iraq showed after the Gulf War, they are more likely to regard themselves as liberated than as defeated.
 - Iraqi opposition groups are discussing a broad-based, representative government to replace Saddam's tyranny.
 - Why do we assume that the Iraqi people are unable to provide themselves with a decent government?

- *How does the war against Iraq contribute to winning the war against terrorism?*
 - Iraq is a supporter of terrorist groups, including al Qaida, the Arab Liberation Front, and Hamas.
 - Iraq actively undermines Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy and pays \$25,000 per suicide bombing.
 - The overthrow of the current Iraqi regime would deprive international terrorist groups of safehaven in Iraq.
 - The Iraqi regime's overthrow would end the threat that Iraq will be a source of biological agents, or other weapons of mass destruction, to terrorists.
 - The reaction in the Arab world will likely be short-lived, just as it was to the liberation of Afghanistan – demonstrations at first, until the television screens begin to show the celebrations of the population.
 - Iraqis celebrating their liberation would send a message to other Arabs that freedom and a desire for peace trump extreme nationalism, radicalism, and war.

Unasked Questions

By William Raspberry

Larry Williams, a retired Marine colonel now teaching at George Washington University, has a few questions he'd like to ask his commander in chief. They aren't smart-aleck questions -- this is a serious military man, whose service included stints in Vietnam and Lebanon.

And though his questions may seem obvious, I think you'll be struck by how few of them the president has answered -- perhaps, as Williams says, even for himself. Here they are, abridged from his recent open letter to President Bush and elaborated in an interview:

What is the actual threat to the United States -- the purpose of war?

Chemical and biological weapons, Williams argues, are not weapons of mass destruction. "They are very inefficient and unpredictable and hard to use effectively. Casualty-producing, yes, but not on a large scale."

Says Williams: "Even if the Iraqis make a nuclear device -- which also concerns me -- what would they do with it? The Mideast region is not alarmed. Why are we -- thousands of miles away -- alarmed to the degree of war?"

How many American lives will we expend to punish Saddam Hussein?

Baghdad has nearly 5 million residents. It is reasonable to expect that many would see America not as a liberator but as an invader -- and that many of these would see our military as at least as great a threat as Hussein. "If," says the professor, "one million of them resist an American invasion in street-to-street resistance -- under a local threat of chemical and/or biological weapons -- how many Americans will die?"

How long will public support last when hundreds, possibly thousands, of body bags start arriving home?

"Desert Storm and Afghanistan make war look so easy, with so few casualties. When support at home wanes, how will you turn back the clock?"

How, militarily, do you plan to fight this war?

The Army is too "heavy" to get there short of a Desert Storm-style buildup. Air power and advanced technology get you little in the fight to conquer cities.

How many Iraqi citizens do you plan to kill in order to bestow democracy?

"You can't level cities by bombing, as in World War II. When newspapers and TV broadcasts around the world start to show pictures of Iraqi mothers carrying babies dead from U.S. bombs -- pictures real or

staged, it doesn't matter -- the world will be inflamed in anti-American sentiment, and U.S. public support will dissolve."

How will you govern a defeated Iraq?

"Of course, a military victory is as assured as it was at the outset of Desert Storm. But then, how will you govern a country probably still resisting through guerrilla activity and in which we do not speak the language? Will your military forces be confined to cantonments at night because they do not control the streets of Baghdad?"

How does the war against Iraq contribute to winning the war against terrorism?

"The origin of the attacks of 9/11 and the preceding chain of attacks against the embassy in Beirut and the Marine barracks in 1983 and other embassies thereafter were in the Arab/Muslim world. Victory in the war against terrorism must necessarily be found in that worldwide presence. How does alienating every facet of that world contribute to victory in the current war on terrorism?"

Williams, a career Marine who insists that his thoughts are his and not to be linked to George Washington University, says he learned in Beirut and South Vietnam that his government didn't always have better information than he had -- not because officials lied but because critical details were filtered out as communiques made their way up the chain of command. "That experience," he said, "convinced me that the most senior leadership does not always have the best counsel."

He then offers Bush his own bit of counsel: "As president and commander in chief, you clearly have it in your power to move a reluctant nation toward war. But if war is too important to be left to generals, it is also too fraught with unforeseeable catastrophe to be left to the personal whim of one man. Please, sir, ask yourself my questions -- and make certain you have the answers right."

September 30, 2002 10:47 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JSF as Tank-Killer

Someone said we ought to think about the Joint Strike Fighter as a tank killer and make it organic to the Army, ending the rule about Army not having fixed wing aircraft. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-24

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

U08670 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8866

452 F

305402

Snowflake

September 30, 2002 11:05 AM

Middle East

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Middle East/Arafat

Here are some thoughts on the Middle East and a post-Arafat world from Newt Gingrich that he sent back in March.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/30/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
093002-25

.....
Please respond by _____

30SEP02

U08671 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8867

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Saturday, March 30, 2002 10:56 AM

To: (b)(6) pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Subject: PLANNING FOR A POST ARAFAT PEACE PROCESS

For secdef ,depsecdef
 from Newt 3/30/02
 planning for a post arafat world

Our strategy in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is profoundly weakened by a reliance on Arafat as the center of gravity among the Palestinian people. Arafat and the tradition of terrorism and dishonesty which he personifies is the problem. Trying to build a solution with him at the center is like trying to solve the German problem with Adolph Hitler as Chancellor.

No peace will come while Arafat is in charge. No peace can come while the terrorist organizations are funded, recruited, and organized. The terrorist organizations will not disband peacefully. The terrorist organizations have no interest in a ceasefire. The terrorist organizations have a vested interest in ensuring that General Zinni's mission fails. Uprooting the terrorist organizations would put Arafat in conflict with Syria and Iran. There is no reason to believe he will crush the ability of Hamas, Hezbollah and others to wage terror. Suppressing terror will mean imprisoning many of Arafat's own followers in organizations that pledge loyalty to him. This would be war between an older and younger generation. There is no reason to believe he is capable of that or even desires such an outcome.

Arafat's behavior since Oslo has been consistent. Preach hatred in Arabic, print textbooks that do not even show Israel on a map, promise Palestinians that the right of return will never be given up (this is return to Tel Aviv and Haifa not to the West Bank and would mean the end of Israel), permit terrorist organizations to propagandize and organize with impunity, publicly lavish praise on "martyrs" (suicide bombers and terrorists) and then call on the United States to intervene and make whatever tactical promise is necessary in English.

If Arafat had been leading a polity next to the United States we would have replaced his government, tried him for war crimes, and rooted out the terrorist organizations at all cost. We would have established a moderate regime and sanctioned the hunting down and killing or imprisoning of anyone who tried to overthrow that regime. We would then have thrown money at the Palestinian people to rebuild their economy while fundamentally overhauling their schools to teach civil society, democracy and living peacefully with their neighbors. This is in large part what we did with Germany, Italy, and Japan, implemented over time with South Korea and are now in part doing in Afghanistan.

Voting against Israel in the United Nations yesterday was a fundamental break with

President Bush's position on terrorism. If defending your civilians in a week when incident after incident has killed people (the equivalent of a thousand dead Americans if you take into account the 47 to 1 difference in population) is not legitimate then what are we doing in Afghanistan, the Philippines, etc?

Focusing on a truce is not a strategy it is a tactic. We cannot build a strategy because we keep trying to stop the violence in a series of deals with a dishonest manipulator who has a consistent track record of saying one thing in Arabic and another in English. We cannot stop the violence without a wrenching change in Palestinian society in which the violent, the haters and the terrorists are defeated and that change will never be led by Arafat.

If our focus remains on stopping the violence we will preside over the continuing downward spiral of the region as Israeli society is more and more hardened by the killings and reacts with more and more brutality which then legitimizes more and more suicide bombers and more and more fanaticism among the Palestinians.

We need a new vision of peace in the region in which a Palestinian State committed to peace has accepted that the right of return has been turned into an equity right to be paid for over a twenty year period (in which the Palestinian people would receive more aid per capita than Europe did during the Marshall plan) and with an insistence on democracy, transparency and a real opportunity to create prosperity and enforce peace. In this future preaching hatred would be as outlawed as Nazism is in modern Germany and for the same reason. If hatred can be preached violence will occur. If violence occurs the peaceful, prosperous, safe Palestine is impossible. If a peaceful prosperous safe Palestine is impossible then no truce will last because the haters will use the time to prepare new atrocities.

It is time to create a new vision of a better future for the Palestinian and Israeli people and that future can only come when Arafat is no longer a factor.

A small working group should begin now to think through a post-Arafat future, to plan for the support necessary for a moderate Palestinian regime to survive, and to think through the transition process by which the United States could replace Arafat and his system of corruption and dishonesty with a younger generation of leaders willing to fight the terrorists and willing to build their future on prosperity and dignity rather than terrorism and propaganda. This will be a difficult challenge but it is more likely to succeed than any effort to have a truce with the terrorists still in place. This new approach would require the Israelis to agree to a Palestinian state (with some limits on the ability to import weapons), to agree to a system of prosperity for the Palestinian people, to agree to be part of compensating the Palestinian people economically, and to agree to withdraw the most destructive and indefensible of the settlements. Yet in this circumstance those concessions would be empowering and strengthening a new Palestinian regime committed to living in peace and prepared to suppress and imprison would be terrorists and to outlaw hateful propaganda. The

- United States could successfully broker an agreement of that kind with the Israelis and that would reinforce the authority of the new generation of Palestinian leaders. As each succeeding truce effort fails just remember, Arafat is the problem and cannot be part of the solution. Every American strategy which fails to take that into account will find itself undone by the violence of events.

September 30, 2002 11:07 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Attached is an e-mail from Newt Gingrich on Afghanistan that is well worth reading. If you have any thoughts, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Action in Afghanistan

DHR:dh
093002-26

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

U08672 /03

30Sep02

11-L-0559/OSD/8871

From Newt Gingrich

Page 1 of 2

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

cc to D. Rita
Wolowitz

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2002 10:47 PM

To: (b)(6) mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil

Cc: jaymie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil; john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; john.keane@hqda.army.mil;
kernan@jfc.com.mil; ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil;
rodmanp@mail.policy.osd.mil; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil; bluti@mail.policy.osd.mil

Subject: action in afghanistan

For secdef, depsecdef
from newt 8/07/02
Action in Afghanistan

Today's Washington Post story on the absolute failure of road building in Afghanistan is a disgrace and an invitation to a failure.

This slow, laborious bureaucratic red tape ridden pace is typical of the self-serving, self-destructive habits of the modern international aid community. The defensive explanations in the story ("Afghans simply have to learn how slow and cumbersome our processes are" "people should not have unrealistic expectations") are the antithesis of the American pragmatic, entrepreneurial, can do spirit. US AID is as bad as its overseas counterparts.

We should have a retired combat engineer from the Army or Marines or a retired Seabee from a Naval Construction background and they should have \$50 million to spend directly on their say so. We should ask for volunteers from national Guard construction units (as we did in Honduras in the 1980s) and they should spend three to six months building roads next spring and summer. We should insist on the Churchill phrase "Action this day."

Leaders all around the third world are watching to see if the United States can be a useful ally. They know we can be a frightening enemy. They have less proof that we can be a helpful constructive ally. They are watching Afghanistan to see whether our coming in helps or hurts their lives.

If we were prepared to pay a number of countries (Poland, Romania to name two) would almost certainly send construction units to serve for six months to a year).

All we want to do is build paved roads, get water running for irrigation and drinking, get electricity poles up, and repair major buildings. The greatest power in the world should be able to do this fast, decisively and with common sense.

Today we and the rest of the industrial world look trapped in our own red tape, hypocritical in our rhetoric, and pathetically unable to get the simplest things done to help our Afghan allies back on their feet.

8/8/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/8872

Appoint a construction czar, cut through the red tape, get things moving.

NOW.

September 30, 2002 11:09 AM

IRAAQ

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Declaratory Policy

Here is a note from Newt Gingrich on WMD and war crimes. Has this been fed into your declaratory policy?

Thanks.

Attach.

08/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Regime Replacement: Weapons of Mass Destruction and War Crimes

DHR:dh
093002-27

.....
Please respond by 10 / 11 / 02

U08674 /03

30Sep02

11-L-0559/OSD/8874

✓
'for secdef, depsecdef
from Newt 8/07/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 30 2002

Regime Replacement: Weapons of Mass destruction and War Crimes

It is vital that we announce early, clearly, and emphatically that any Iraqi in the chain of command who implements an order to use weapons of mass destruction will be treated as a war criminal and will face the death sentence.

We need to make clear that the certainty of American punishment will be great enough that only Saddam's closest henchmen will even consider implementing an order for biological, chemical or nuclear action.

This should be one of the highest priorities in preparing for a regime replacement action against Saddam and should be a component of any future preemptive strike.

The need to establish certainty of punishment for WMD is so great that the Administration should consider asking Congress for a special law on WMD use and personal sanctions against anyone involved.

This is a debate we will win with the American people and it will help set the stage for future action against regimes and groups using or threatening to use WMD.

September 30, 2002 11:13 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
LTG Craddock
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Stryker

Attached is a note on the Stryker from Newt Gingrich that is interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/21/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Stryker

DHR:dh
093002-28

.....
Please respond by —

451

30 Sep 02

U08675 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8876

(b)(6), CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2002 5:29 AM

SEP 30 2002

To: (b)(6).pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: Stryker

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 8/21/02
stryker

there are two ways to approach stryker. One would be to kill it. That would be right but would probably maximize hostility and conflict between the old army and the civilian appointees.

The other route is simply to let the light of day determine its fate (we might in the end be wrong although I doubt it).

the following outline assumes depsecdef is the action agent but it could be secdef.

If we ran a simple project that

first allowed the world to know of its millenium challenge performance

second had depsecdef initiate an outside look at the millenium challenge performance and the promises against which it should be measured

third, had depsecdef ask for a review of all the programs the army has cut to shovel money into this system

fourth had depsecdef request a simulated battle (outside Army maybe at JFCOM) of the same dollar value Stryker versus AGS (Armored Gun System, Tracer, MX upgrade of M-113) and then matched c-130 equivalent forces (if you flew 100 c-130s into theater and one version held stryker and the other version held the alternative force which gave you more power and survivability?)

had depsecdef freeze this years POM investment in Stryker (\$4.9 Billion I think) and instead invested it in secondary Army programs with only enough left over for Stryker to survive (say \$300 million) while being studied

if at the same time the Army was getting A-10s and looking at JSF it would be pretty hard to argue secdef and depsecdef were anti-Army.

Our mantra should be "people will die in combat if we make the wrong decision

8/22/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/8877

and our commitment is to the soldier who is going to war in these vehicles. We are determined to get the best combat capability to save American lives." That puts the argument on a moral plane that is pretty hard to argue with.

September 30, 2002 11:24 AM

381

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Execute Orders

Please take a look at this note from Jim Haynes and then see me.

Larry, please schedule a meeting for us to talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/12/02 GC Action Memo to SecDef re: Execute Orders [U13307/02]

DHR:dh
093002-31

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

30 Sep 02

U08676 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8879



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN
2002 AUG 12 AM 10:22

SEP 30 2002

August 12, 2002, 7:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes II*

SUBJECT: Execute Orders

- *Compare* the orders you routinely sign to the attached:
 - February 12, 1944 order to Eisenhower in anticipation of D-Day. (Two pages, including organization chart.)
 - September 9, 1862 orders from Robert E. Lee to his principal subordinates regarding his first invasion of Maryland. This one to two page order is one of Lee's most complicated orders. It is the one found by McClellan's army, resulting in the battle at Antietam.
- *Problem* – Our system produces very turgid, overly detailed orders for you to issue. To be sure, this war on terrorism is extraordinary, presenting many unique issues. Nevertheless, there must be a way to write clearer, shorter orders faster.
- *Objective* – That we should be able to get closer to the old style of orders.
 - Perhaps we can rely more on training and general guidance to the combatant commanders, rather than regurgitating detailed ROE.
- *Recommend* you suggest General Myers retrieve sample SECDEF orders from previous conflicts in, say, the last twenty or thirty years. Then, using those samples, a small multi-disciplinary team can track the changes, identify the reasons, and provide you a reasoned proposal to improve the system. I would expect this exercise could yield savings in time and resources.

DECISION: ____ Yes ____ No ____ See me

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

CC: CJCS, USD(P)

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | 8/13 |
| MA BUCCI | 8/12 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 8/12 |



U13307 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8880

DIRECTIVE

TO SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

(Issued 12 February 1944)

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

2. *Task.* You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.

4. *Command.* You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix [reproduced on opposite page]. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support.

5. *Logistics.* In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command.


6. *Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies.* In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces, agencies of sabotage, subversion, and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities, are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.

11-L-0559/OSD/8881

7. *Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas.* Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the U. S. S. R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.

8. *Relationship with Allied Governments—the re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories.* Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.

CHAIN OF COMMAND



11-L-0559/OSD/8882

----- Liaison

While I should feel the greatest satisfaction in having an interview with you, and consulting upon all subjects of interest, I cannot but feel great uneasiness for your safety should you undertake to reach me. You will not only encounter the hardships and fatigues of a very disagreeable journey, but also run the risk of capture by the enemy. I send my aide-de-camp, Major [W. H.] Taylor, back to explain to you the difficulties and dangers of the journey, which I cannot recommend you to undertake.

I am endeavoring to break up the line through Leesburg, which is no longer safe, and turn everything off from Culpeper Court-House toward Winchester. I shall move in the direction I originally intended, toward Hagerstown and Chambersburg, for the purpose of opening our line of communication through the valley, in order to procure sufficient supplies of flour. I shall not move until to-morrow, or, perhaps, next day, but when I do move the line of communication in this direction will be entirely broken up. I must, therefore, advise that you do not make an attempt that I cannot but regard as hazardous.

I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
No. 191. } *September 9, 1862.*

I. The citizens of Fredericktown being unwilling, while overrun by members of this army, to open their stores, in order to give them confidence, and to secure to officers and men purchasing supplies for benefit of this command, all officers and men of this army are strictly prohibited from visiting Fredericktown except on business, in which case they will bear evidence of this in writing from division commanders. The provost-marshal in Fredericktown will see that his guard rigidly enforces this order.

II. Major Taylor will proceed to Leesburg, Va., and arrange for transportation of the sick and those unable to walk to Winchester, securing the transportation of the country for this purpose. The route between this and Culpeper Court-House east of the mountains being unsafe will no longer be traveled. Those on the way to this army already across the river will move up promptly; all others will proceed to Winchester collectively and under command of officers, at which point, being the general depot of this army, its movements will be known and instructions given by commanding officer regulating further movements.

III. The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry.

IV. General Longstreet's command will pursue the main road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

V. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

VI. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Keys' Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with Generals McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.

VII. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.

VIII. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

IX. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

X. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood, &c.

By command of General R. E. Lee:

R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
September 10, 1862.

Brigadier-General BRANCH,
Commanding Division:

GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs me to say that, instead of moving at dawn, as hitherto ordered, you will follow General Lawton when he comes up, he being ordered to move at dawn.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. F. PAXTON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
September 11, 1862.

General BRANCH:

The major-general commanding directs me to say that Major-General Hill, having been released from arrest, will assume command of his division, and you will turn over to him all instructions received relative to it.

Respectfully,

E. F. PAXTON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Hagerstown, Md., September 12, 1862.

His Excellency President DAVIS:

Mr. PRESIDENT: Before crossing the Potomac I considered the advantages of entering Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge. In either

Snowflake

September 30, 2002 11:39 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: IO Plan

Afghanistan

I want to get briefed on the IO plan we are currently executing in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-36

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

30 Sep 02

U08677 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8885

September 30, 2002 11:45 AM

300

Done
10/28/02

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

When are we going to have a plan as to what we think ought to be done on
Afghanistan's security forces?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-38

.....
Please respond by 10/12/02

30 Sep 02

U08678 /03

September 30, 2002 11:55 AM

#301
Done 10/1/02
Per DJB/SMA

326

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reserves

I need to get fully briefed on all this big reserve call up of 300,000 or 280,000 or 260,000 or 250,000, whichever it is—I keep hearing different numbers. I need to have it disaggregated as to what portion is for Iraq and what portion is for U.S. force protection.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-44

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

30 Sep 02

U08679 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8887

September 30, 2002 1:57 PM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JROC and Stryker

451

Is JROC the proper place to take a look at this article on the Stryker and see what the truth is—whether or not it is C-130 deployable?

I keep hearing that it isn't. But every once in a while, someone pops up and says it is. I think we need to know precisely whether it is or isn't. If it is, how difficult is it, how many things break, how long does it take to do it and all of those extra little facts that seem to get lost in a heated debate.

If you're not the right one, please tell me who is.

Thanks.

Attach.

Inside the Army, "Gingrich Tells Top DoD Officials Army's Stryker Shouldn't be Fielded"
September 30, 2002.

DHR:dh
093002-61

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

30 Sep 02

U08680 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8888

Inside The Army
September 30, 2002
Pg. 1

Gingrich Tells Top DOD Officials Army's Stryker Shouldn't Be Fielded

A prominent retired congressman has advised Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputies that the Army's Stryker vehicle should not be fielded, sources said last week.

Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) earlier this month counseled Rumsfeld that Stryker "should either be canceled or limited to one test brigade that will never be air-transported but that could be used" to evaluate new electronics.

Gingrich writes in a message to Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz that Stryker "simply fails to meet" the Army's self-imposed requirement of deployment via C-130. C-130 compatibility is critical for two reasons, he contends. "There is no other airplane available with the total lift and mobility of the C-130," he states in the message. Furthermore, approximately 1,730 C-130s -- including 810 within the U.S. Defense Department and Coast Guard -- are owned by 68 countries across the globe; should the United States need assistance, "our allies can really help with theater mobility if it fits into a C-130," Gingrich says.

The C-130 requirement must be "non-negotiable" and, given that Stryker is not C-130 deployable, he states, the program should be terminated. If the department were to let the current contract run its course, it could outfit about one brigade and use it for testing purposes, Gingrich suggests.

"It is impossible for this system to be funded in the next budget at levels requested. It has failed in ways which are not, repeat NOT, correctable," he concludes.

Gingrich, through a spokesman, declined to comment on any military matters or contacts with Rumsfeld. Sources did not know whether his opinion on Stryker was sought or unsolicited advice. He is reported to have close relationships with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.

Gingrich's letter was circulated to several top defense officials including Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace, Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. John Keane and Stephen Cambone, head of the DOD program analysis and evaluation directorate.

The Army is flying Stryker in C-130s under a temporary waiver issued by the Air Force. The waiver was necessary because the vehicle is too wide to accommodate the 14-inch safety aisle around all sides that is required by the Air Force for the loadmaster. Additionally, only a portion of its crew may fly in the same aircraft.

Yet, the Army disputes claims that Stryker -- the centerpiece of its new Brigade Combat Teams -- is not transportable via C-130.

Gen. William Keman, chief of Joint Forces Command, recently acknowledged, however, that "there's some more work that needs to be done" regarding C-130 deployability. He drew his conclusions from the August Millennium Challenge '02 exercise during which five Strykers were flown on C-130s from southern California to the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin.

An Army summary of Stryker performance during Millennium Challenge noted that the Infantry Carrier Vehicle variant required multiple alterations to fit into a C-130: The crew removed two smoke grenade launchers, all antennas, a left rear bracket that blocked egress over the top of the vehicle, the Remote Weapons System and the third-row wheel's bump-stop. Reassembly upon landing took as long as 17 minutes, the memo stated (Inside the Army, Sept. 23, p1).

Rumors that some members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would like to cut Stryker procurement significantly have floated through the defense establishment during the past few months. The Army wants to field six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, formerly known as Interim Brigade Combat Teams. Sources have suggested that OSD wants no more than three SBCTs -- if that many.

Stryker is currently participating in a side-by-side comparison against recapitalized M113A3s already in the Army's inventory. The test was mandated by congressional authorizers to determine whether acquisition of a new medium armored vehicle is truly necessary.

Congress appears at least to support the concept of the Brigade Combat Teams. It has directed that one IBCT be fielded to Europe by fiscal year 2007.

Additionally, four members of the Washington state congressional delegation recently sent their Capitol Hill colleagues a letter touting the system. The Sept. 16 document, signed by Reps. Norm Dicks (D), George Nethercutt (R), Adam Smith (D) and Rick Larsen (D), emphasizes that the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams "rapidly deployed by C-130" during the Millennium Challenge exercise, and "brought a new way of fighting to the Opposing Force."

"All six SBCTs the Army intends to field represent a transformation in warfighting capability that will ensure our battlefield commanders have the tools they need to immediately respond to the War on Terrorism and other conflicts," the legislators state.

-- Erin Q. Winograd

September 30, 2002 2:02 PM

322

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: IBCTs

If the number of IBCTs goes down, we sure better figure out where the ones we do have go, because the pressure will be fierce.

Let's get that decided in anticipation, just in case that's the decision.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-62

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

30 Sep 02

U08681 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8891

September 30, 2002 3:48 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Larry Di Rita
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Continuing Resolution

Do we know what we get from a continuing resolution if we don't get an appropriation, how bad it is and what we ought to do about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-73

.....
Please respond by 10/24/02

110.01

30 Sep 02

U08682 /03

Snowflake

September 30, 2002 4:32 PM

ADDED TO
#297

OBE 10/10

Germany

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Germany and ISAF

We've got to decide what we want to do about Germany and ISAF.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-76

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

U08684 /03

30 Sep 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8893

September 30, 2002 6:05 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

You might want to talk to Newt Gingrich about the idea that we should put a report to the American people and our coalition allies on the achievements and lessons learned in Afghanistan. It could be a booklet or a briefing. Newt thinks it could have a foreword from President Bush or President Karzai and possibly some coalition leaders and an introduction. The book could be from Gen. Franks or somebody and designed as lessons learned for the Congress, the interagency participants, the military outside CENTCOM and the like.

He'd be happy to help, and he thinks it could get done by late October and have a huge impact. It could remind the world that we've done some things that worked, accept the direction we're going and it could have an effect in IO.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-87.....
Please respond by 10/04/02

U08685 /03

30 Sep 02

October 1, 2002 7:03 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Doug Feith
J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO

NATO Infra

The editorial in the *Washington Post* from Sunday called "Progress at NATO" is unfortunate. They claim that my comment that "it hadn't crossed my mind to engage NATO" was disingenuous. It wasn't. We were briefing NATO because we're working the NATO countries in the UN to get their support. We were working with NATO countries because I was at a Defense Ministerial meeting of 19 nations, all of which are in the UN, where we are working to get a resolution of support for the President's position. The President has not made a decision to go into Iraq, therefore, we were not there recruiting nations to recruit NATO to go into Iraq.

Then it goes on to say, "NATO's support would be vital to a U.S.-led campaign either through individual countries in the military phase or collectively in post-war peacekeeping." That, of course, is true. We're already talking to individual countries to participate in the event that a decision is made. There's no question but that there would be either a UN or an international coalition helping in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

It goes on to say, "The alliance has never operated outside Europe." That is not true. The AWACs were flying over the U.S. for almost a year. They were NATO. There's a NATO-led effort in Kosovo and Bosnia.

1 Oct 02

U08686 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8895

It ends by saying there are some opportunities for “positive transformation of NATO—one that the Bush administration should not fail to exploit.” That is insulting. It is the Bush administration that is creating the opportunities for transformation. We’re the ones leading the transformation. We’re the ones pressing for command and base structure reform. We’re the ones who thought up and posed the NATO response force. It is inexcusably uninformed and negative.

Maybe what we ought to do is have J.D. Crouch or Doug Feith write a letter to the editor of the *Washington Post* that really cracks them for that editorial’s lack of understanding and knowledge.


Thanks.

Attach.

“Progress at NATO,” *Washington Post*, September 29, 2002; Page B06.

DHR:dh
093002-70

.....
Please respond by _____

TO: SECDEF
FROM:  Torie Clarke
DATE: 2 October 2002
SUBJECT: Speechwriters

Larry Di Rita
10/14

I met with all the speechwriters and Tony Dolan on September 30 to review all appropriate procedures for your speeches and remarks.

I also underscored the critical importance of taking every measure to prevent any plagiarism or inadvertent plagiarism.

I will continue to meet with the speechwriters individually and as a group to get the job done well.

350.001 SD

2 Oct 02

U08687 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/8898

September 30, 2002 1:08 PM

TO: Toric Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Speech Length

I have asked, and asked, and asked that every draft of a speech tells me how many minutes it is.

It ought not to be hard for the speech shop to do that every single time.

I insist that it get done. I am tired of having to guess, and then at the very end have to cut half of it out.

Please get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-51

.....

Please respond by 10/04/02

September 30, 2002 1:10 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pronunciation

I think you ought to be able to persuade people in the speech shop to start putting in the phonetic pronunciation of names that are obviously difficult. Please see if you can get it accomplished.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
093002-52

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02

11-L-0559/OSD/8900

September 30, 2002 1:12 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Draft Speech Font Size

In the future, please tell the speechwriters when they're sending me drafts to please use a decent size font and not the tiny stuff that they're using with respect to the West Point speech. Please get all of these instructions and guidance communicated to all the speechwriters and let's get it all fixed at once.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-53

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02

11-L-0559/OSD/8901

September 30, 2002 1:13 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: West Point Speech

In the future, please have the name of the speechwriter on the speech, so I know who's doing the work.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
093002-54

.....

Please respond by 10/04/02

September 30, 2002 1:20 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Draft Speech Process

In the future, please see that my edits are shown to the speechwriter, so that they understand what I'm trying to accomplish.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-55

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02

11-L-0559/OSD/8903

September 30, 2002 2:11 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Speech Drafts

These speech drafts continue to come in without any idea of how long they are. It has to stop. Please see what you can do with Torie or Thiessen—or somebody down there—to get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093002-64

.....
Please respond by 10/02/02

11-L-0559/OSD/8904

May 20, 2002 4:41 PM

461

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Surprise and Warning

Attached is a foreword from Roberta Wohlstetter's book that talks about surprise and warning. I think it is worth reading.

Attach.

Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, 1962).

DHR:dh
052002-47

20 MAY 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8905

008710 /02

FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States; assuming the decision on war, the attack hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake—one we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it *is* the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather dreadfully familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found us, it can only remind us how likely it is that we are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

FROM OFFICE OF VETS

(WED) 5.22.02 14:19 ST. 14:18 NO. (b)(6) P. 2
SECRET

SECRETARY OF LABOR
WASHINGTON

2002 MAY 23 AM 9:50

MAY - 1 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20302-1000

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

It is with pleasure that I hereby appoint you to serve as an ex-officio member of the Advisory Committee on Veterans' Employment and Training. Your appointment is effective as of today's date.

It is the duty of the Advisory Committee to advise the Secretary with respect to carrying out her functions, including assessing the employment and training needs of veterans and determining the extent to which the programs and activities of the Department of Labor are meeting such needs (as provided in Section 4110 of Title 38) and to submit recommendations with respect thereto. I solicit your advice so that this law may be effectively administered.

I appreciate your willingness to give us your time and the benefit of your experience to help us better serve veterans. Please advise Mr. Frederico Juarbe Jr., Assistant Secretary for Veterans' Employment and Training, by May 8, 2002, of your intention to serve in this capacity. His telephone number is (b)(6)

Sincerely,



Elaine L. Chao

11-L-0559/OSD/8908

U08717 /02

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division

(CCD) WHS Room 3A948. Suspense Desk (b)(6) FAX Number: (b)(6)
 Email: Suspense_Desk@cd.whs.mil

Action Agency **UPR**

Suspense Date **5/31/02**

1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

- ☒ a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- ☐ b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO _____ (Justify below)
- ☐ c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO _____ (Justify below)
- ☐ d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- ☐ e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO _____ (Justify below Include POC Name & Phone Number)
- ☐ f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO _____ (Justify below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

Telephoned the Department of Labor and informed them that Mr. John Molino, DASD for MC&FP, has been designated as Secretary Rumsfeld's representative on the Advisory Committee on Veterans' Employment and Training.

DoL's POC is Mr. John Mucklebarrow at (b)(6)

3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY

UPR

e. APPROVING AUTHORITY

(Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level)

b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER

LTC Dannemiller

Signature

Dannemiller, Robert.0609008535

Date Signed

05/29/2002

c. TELEPHONE NO.

(b)(6)

5. ACTION TAKEN

(For EXSIC/Correspondence Control Division Use Only)

- | | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| a. EXT | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| b. CANX | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| c. DWNGRD | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| d. TRANSFER | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |

4. CCD CONTROL

U08717-02

e. OTHER (Specify)

Signature

Date Signed

SD FORM 391, DEC 2000

11-L-0559/OSD/8909

R U08717-02

334

(147702)

2002 MAY 23 PM 4:03

May 2, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Singapore

Please be sure I send a personal note thanking the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Singapore for the \$10 million contribution toward U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

I want to see the draft.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050202-8Please respond by 05/10/02*SWT?**Di Rita*
Lam. 17:00:00
*5/20**Larry let me see letter we sent! DR**SINGAPORE**2 May 02*



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

2002 APR 17 PM 5:21

MAY 02 2002

INFO MEMO

April 16, 2002, 2:21 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Singapore

- You may recall that at this morning's staff meeting I mentioned that Singapore had agreed to contribute \$10 million in assistance-in-kind to the Global War on Terrorism. I attach a self-explanatory letter from Defense Minister Tony Tan.

Attachments:

As stated

COORDINATION: NONE

Sec Def-

*May want to
hold for Lee Kuan Yew*

meeting.

L. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

9/1

| | |
|-----------------------|-------------|
| SFC ASSISTANT DI RITA | <i>4/30</i> |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | <i>4/30</i> |
| MA BUCCI | <i>4/30</i> |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | <i>4/30</i> |

11-L-0559/OSD/8911

U06896 /02



AMBASSADOR
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
3501 INTERNATIONAL PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20008

(b)(6)

April 16, 2002

Dr Dov Zakheim
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
Fax: (703) 693-0582

Dear *Under Secretary Zakheim,*

Could you please forward the attached faxed letter from Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Tony Tan, who is also Singapore's Minister of Defence to US Secretary of Defence, The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld. Singapore has pledged US\$10 million in kind towards US operations in Afghanistan.

The original letter will be sent to you once we receive it.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Chan Heng Chee'.

CHAN HENG CHEE

11-L-0559/OSD/8912



DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE
SINGAPORE

11 April 2002

The Honourable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
United States of America

Dear *Secretary Rumsfeld*.

I am pleased to inform you that the Government of Singapore has considered the request of the United States Government for assistance-in-kind, and will pledge US\$10 million in kind towards the US operations in Afghanistan.

Singapore stands firm in our support for the international fight against terrorism, and this contribution underscores our commitment to support this effort. We regard the fight against terrorism as an endeavour of the highest importance. The civilised world must and will succeed in this endeavour.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Tonytan'.

DR TONY TAN KENG YAM



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 17 2002

His Excellency Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Defence
Republic of Singapore

Dear Dr. Tan:

I wanted to express my gratitude for your nation's
pledge of assistance-in-kind towards U.S. operations in
Afghanistan.

Your pledge of \$10 million demonstrates
Singapore's serious commitment to the fight against
terrorism. The United States is pleased to be joined by
Singapore in this critical endeavor.

Your support means a great deal.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

U09886 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/8914

SINGAPORE

17 Jun 02

May 23, 2002 8:00 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Tom White
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Gen. Shinseki
Pete Aldridge
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Garwin Op-Ed

Here is an op-ed piece by Richard Garwin, which should be moved around. He is a member of the Jasons and is a brilliant person,

Thanks.

Attach.

Richard Garwin, 05/20/02 e-mail to Op-Ed Editor, *Washington Post*

DHR:dh
052302-8

.....

Please respond by _____

U08830 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8915

470

23 MAY 02

Work: (b)(6)
Home:
FAX:
INTERN:

SECDEF HAS S
MAY 20 2002

May 20, 2002
(Via Email to oped at washpost.com)

Op-Ed Editor
The Washington Post

1150 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20071

Dear Op-Ed Editor:

Crusader and Beyond.

On May 16, the entire Defense Department leadership-- Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Under Secretary Pete Aldridge-- faced a skeptical Armed Services Committee in presenting their decision to cancel the Army Crusader artillery system.

Crusader is an advance over Paladin-- the current self-propelled howitzer. The Crusader system consists of a sophisticated self-propelled gun with advanced control system, and a supply vehicle capable of transferring fuel and 48 rounds of ammunition to the howitzer in less than 12 minutes. The overall program would have had a \$9 B development and procurement cost.

I concur with Secretary Rumsfeld's judgment that the Crusader program has been overtaken by other technology, and that the Army will benefit far more from applying these resources to a guided multiple-launch rocket system.

I noted also the Secretary's testimony that the military in the past has often been shortsighted in rejecting the cruise missile, GPS, and the joint direct attack munition-- JDAM-- the GPS-guided bomb first used in 1999, in the conflict in Kosovo.

I toiled over the decades to gain acceptance for all three of those programs, and several others. In my judgment, the GPS-guided rocket system surpasses Crusader in every

aspect-- firepower, precision of attack, minimal staffing requirement, and flexibility, as well. It is also less vulnerable than is Crusader.

Why?

Howitzers such as Crusader are limited to a range of 30-40 km, although rocket-propelled rounds can extend this range. The Army indicates that the probable error in range for Crusader would be 0.5%, so about 0.15 km at 30-km range. The probable error for the GPS-guided rocket likely to be in the 5-m range, accounting for the statement that for attack on a point target, one guided projectile is worth about 50 of the unguided.

A single Crusader is to put eight rounds simultaneously "on target" (within the 150-m by 30-m footprint), by firing them in quick succession at different elevation angles. It is a simple matter to launch eight rockets from a range of 100 km or so-- even from different locations-- with the same requirement for simultaneous arrival.

That capability is demonstrated in modern fireworks displays, which are computer programmed and fired.

Guided rockets, with ranges from 60 km to 200 km or so, can mass fires much more readily onto a particular target than can multiple guns, or even a single Crusader. Furthermore, the same mechanism (movable fins or canards-- which allows the navigation system to guide the weapon to the target) can also be used to provide maneuvering, so that targets can be attacked not only directly, but from the side or from the back. Such capabilities already exist with JDAM.

Furthermore, Crusader is a large system. Development is tightly integrated, whereas for the guided rocket, there is only loose coupling between the rocket in its various versions, and the launcher and command system. So one can anticipate much more rapid evolution of the rocket system, which can be placed into effective use, while adding features later which might prove desirable and affordable.

I advocated such weapons throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the cruise missile came into the inventory because then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. "Bud" Zumwalt had been the liaison between my Naval Warfare Panel and the Pentagon before he was sent to Vietnam to head the brown-water Navy there. On assuming the position of CNO,

Admiral Zumwalt wrote me, "I am up and running on CAPTOR mines and cruise missiles." And indeed he did bring the Tomahawk cruise missile into the inventory, which was also the origin of the air launched cruise missile, developed by Boeing.

Those interested in the effectiveness of our military in general, and our army in particular, should get behind the precision guided rocket system and transfer as expeditiously and economically as possible funds from the Crusader program to this quicker and more effective approach.

One problem continually bothers the army; it is that a weapon of longer range is attached at a higher level in the army structure, so that those in combat regard such longer range weapons as less responsive and less available than weapons which support only their local combat area. In principle, weapons of longer range can do everything that the shorter range weapons can do; if necessary, the longer range weapons can be firmly assigned to support specific units.

Sincerely yours,

Richard L. Garwin
Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology
Council on Foreign Relations

RLGF:jah:2140OEW:052002OEW

For discussion with colleagues only



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 2002 MAY 24 PM 4:20
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

May 24, 2002, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 24 May 02*

SUBJECT: Quality of DoD Schools: Has there been a decent study? --
SNOWFLAKE

- Yes: The National Education Goals Panel commissioned a Vanderbilt University report on why minority student achievement on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) was so high in DoD schools. Results published September 2001.
- DoD domestic and overseas schools scored at or near the top of all states in reading and writing on the 1998 NAEP, often referred to as the Nation's Report Card. The same is true for the results from the 2000 NAEP that focused on math and science (not included in the study).
- Caucasians, African-Americans, and Hispanics each scored well compared to their civilian public school counterparts. The white-minority performance gap was narrower than in the civilian sector.
- If DoD were a state system, it would rank number one in the nation in terms of its minority student scores. The rankings were sustained even after controlling for parental education.
- The authors noted several factors influencing these results:
 - DoD has a strong accountability system that continually measures student achievement and drives curricular improvement.
 - Parents are encouraged to participate.
 - DoD schools are relatively small, facilitating communication and cooperation.
- The report also notes that sufficient resources are key. DoD schools appear to be adequately but not lavishly financed. DoD, in 1999, spent approximately



11-L-0559/OSD/8919

U08853 /02

\$8,900 per pupil, \$1,600 more than the national average. (Note: national figures often exclude other federal and state funds for which DoD is not eligible.) DoD's per pupil expenditure is less than what typically is spent in large U.S. school systems with comparable portions of minority students.

- We are investigating a process to measure the added value of DoD schools, i.e., controlling for family and community characteristics.

RECOMMENDATION: None

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Dr. Joseph D. Tafoya, Director, DoDEA, (b)(6)

APR-24-2002 07:54

DDASD MCFP

(b)(6)

P.04

April 22, 2002 3:17 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DoD Schools

Sixty Minutes had a program on DoD schools education programs and how they seem to be color blind and income blind, yet produce better students than the private schools.

Has there been a decent study on that, so we really know what is going on? They compared DoD schools with public schools.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042202-41.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

TOTAL P.04

11-L-0559/OSD/8921

April 22, 2002 3:17 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DoD Schools

Sixty Minutes had a program on DoD schools education programs and how they seem to be color blind and income blind, yet produce better students than the private schools.

Has there been a decent study on that, so we really know what is going on? They compared DoD schools with public schools.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
042202-41

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

352 Dep Schools

22APR02

TOTAL P.04

11-L-0559/OSD/8922

U08854 /02

May 24, 2002 2:43 PM

Personal

TO: Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III
Director, FBI


FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Steve McMillan

Bob, one additional thought for your finance post is Steve McMillan. He used to be the legislative director for Phill Gramm, when he was Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee. I understand he is either just going to OMB or thinking about it. You might want to look at him.

As you can see, I gave it a little additional "consideration."

Go get 'em, my friend. You can do it! — But stay away from DoD. We've got our hands full here.



Regards,

D11R dh
052402-9

*CRD
Juchin C.*

24 May 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8923

U08860 /02

May 7, 2002 9:08 AM

383.6

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: John Walker Lindh

921 *FILE*

We have to get that John Walker Lindh issue solved promptly. Please tell me what needs to be done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050702-7

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

5/20
Update attached
D.R.H.

Larry D. ...

721 *45/23*

7 MAY 02



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600
INFO MEMO



May 20, 2002; 9:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 5/20/02*

SUBJECT: Status of United States v. John Walker Lindh

- You have asked for a brief status report on where matters now stand in the Walker prosecution.
- On Tuesday, May 14, the Department of Justice (DOJ) responded to the court's order to propose a method by which Walker's defense counsel could pose questions to detainees. Under the proposal, defense counsel questions would be screened and worked into routine interrogations. Answers would be transcribed and screened, then provided to defense counsel. A redacted videotape of interrogation would also be given to defense counsel.
- The court scheduled a hearing on this issue for May 28, 2002.
- JTF 170 and the 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion are continuing to collect reports of interviews and similar documents to be screened for exculpatory evidence. We may be required to turn such evidence over to the defense. Screening will require a review of over 10,000 documents.
- DoJ has requested access to the relevant databases in order to conduct these document reviews. We will continue to limit DOJ access until we see how the court handles the detainee access issue.
- The court's action in resolving the detainee access issue may restrict our options in moving this case forward. We are developing a contingency plan for your consideration should the court dismiss the case.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Major Patrick J. Murphy, USMC, DoD OGC, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/8925

snowhare

April 25, 2002 10:09 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
 CC: Doug Feith
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
 SUBJECT: Amnesty International

Please take a look at this Amnesty International ^{paper}, particularly the conclusions and recommendations, and tell me what we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/15/02 Amnesty International Report ^{PAPER} CAN BE FOUND AT www.amnesty.org

USA: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN AND

DHR:dh
042502-R

GUANTANAMO BAY UNDERMINES HUMAN RIGHTS - AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
MEMORANDUM TO US GOVERNMENT

Please respond by 05/17/02

AI INDEX

AMR 51/054/2002

AMR 51/053/2002

65 pages - will bring hard copy after trip

web address of memorandum:

<http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/AMR510532002>

Haynes Response Attached.
 Summary: No action
 Required.

11-L-0559/088/2826/02

7/21 Jilt

383.6

25APR02

EF 1615 WA
02/00 7515-USDP
May 15, 2002 6:46 AM

PAKISTAN

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Pakistan

5/21
12/20/02
The Air Marshall for Pakistan was in, and they have the same problem—we are not paying them money. What is going on?

Thanks.

DHR dh
051502-2

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

ISMAYOV

Response
attached
5/21/02

MAY 15 02 14:57

05-15-02 14:57 1X

11-L-0559/QSD/8927

U08878 /02



POLICY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100

INFORMATION MEMO



1-02/007515

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *5/10/02*

MAY 18 2002

FROM: Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Pakistan Reimbursements

- You raised questions about reimbursing Pakistan for war-related expenses.
- We have reimbursed Pakistan for expenses through December 2001. Expenses claimed totaled \$472 million. DoD made payments totaling \$80 million from the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) using authority provided in section 304 of the Emergency Supplemental Act, 2002. In addition, the State Department, using its authorities, made payments totaling \$220 million.
- Pakistan has submitted expenses for January-March 2002 of approximately \$80 million per month; we expect to receive April expenses shortly. We have not yet reimbursed Pakistan for 2002 claims because the authority provided to DoD for this purpose is exhausted and the authority we requested in the pending emergency supplemental is not yet enacted.
- We requested \$420 million in the *pending* emergency supplemental for reimbursements to Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations based on estimated requirements of \$45 million per month for Pakistan and \$15 million through the end of the year for Jordan.
- OUSD(C) is preparing to move quickly to make additional payments to Pakistan once the supplemental appropriation act is enacted. It is anticipated that reimbursements will be for less than the expenses submitted due to both vetting requirements and availability of funding.

~~COORDINATION: F2A~~


Prepared by: Mary Tighe (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/8928

05-20-02 11:25 IN

May 23, 2002 1:10 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Outside DoD Assignments

I got your memo on outside DoD assignments dated May 20.

My Special Assistant, Larry Di Rita, is working with your Executive Secretariat to sort through those issues, and my impression is that it is coming along fine.

Regards,

DHR:dh
052302-25

040 STATE

23 MAY 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8929

U08914 / 02

S/ES 20021222B

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSETHE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2002 MAY 21 AM 9:56

May 20, 2002


MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Colin L. Powell

SUBJECT: Outside DOD Assignments

As we discussed last week, there is value in having military officers assigned to the Department of State and Foreign Service officers serving in the Department of Defense. The exchanges have been on a non-reimbursable basis. Both Departments benefit from the exchange. The military officers serving at State are for the most part working on issues of importance to DOD.

As a result of your March 13th directive to not approve any additional assignments outside of the Department, Doc Cooke has refused all requests for replacements for officers finishing their tour at the Department of State. I think it would be unfortunate if this successful and long-standing program came to an end.

We are prepared to provide a justification for each position to show the benefit accrued to DOD. I ask for your reconsideration of the new policy.


Colin L. Powell

U08590 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8930



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2002 MAY 29 AM 6:36

INFO MEMO

May 28, 2002 – 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu copy on*

SUBJECT: Gender Integrated Training – SNOWFLAKE

- Charlie Abell and I are personally reviewing gender-integrated training by:
 - Visiting each of the basic training facilities
 - Interviewing our major operational commanders about their view of the competence of the personnel they receive from the training establishment (i.e., does a change in policy have military merit?)
- We anticipate completing this survey by fall and would propose to report to you on its results at that time.

RECOMMENDATION: None required.

COORDINATION: None required.

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/8931

U08941 / 02

2:48 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: May 4, 2002

SUBJECT:

How are we doing on these Presidential statements that he made during the Campaign?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
050402.14

Attach: Campaign Statements snowflake dated 9/7/01


Please respond by: _____

5/13/02

11-L-0559/OSD/8932

TO: Secretary White
Secretary England
Secretary Roche

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: September 7, 2001

SUBJECT: Campaign Statements

Attached are some materials that refer to statements made by the President on the subject of training in the military. You might want to be aware of them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
090701.20

11-L-0559/OSD/8933

Memorandum

TO: JOSHUA BOLTEN
FROM: JOEL KAPLAN
DATE: 09/06/2001

SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS ON GENDER INTEGRATED
TRAINING

In response to your request, please find attached quotes that I believe represent the entirety of the President's and Dr. Rice's public comments during the campaign on the issue of gender-integrated training in the Armed Services.

As you'll see, the President spoke to this issue directly on two occasions. First, in response to a question about "gender-integrated training" generally, the President stated in a December 1999 interview with the *National Review* that he "[docs not] believe in gender-integrated training," and that he "think[s] they ought to be separated." Second, the President gave a narrower response to a narrower question in a campaign-stop interview published the following month in *American Legion Magazine*. In that interview, the President answered a question on gender-integrated *basic* training by stating that "the [e]xperts . . . tell me that we ought to have separate basic training facilities." Dr. Rice, a member of the Kassebaum-Baker commission and the one expert to whom the President explicitly referred in his *American Legion* interview, had previously described the President's views in a press teleconference in September 1999. She explained in that interview that while the President's "view is that gender-integrated training above the basic training level is a very good thing, . . . we ought to look hard at the basic training and see if it might not be a good thing to have . . . separate gender training at the basic level, at least in the first several weeks."

President Bush Quotes From Campaign

National Review
December 31, 1999

NR: What about gender-integrated training?

GWB: I don't believe in gender-integrated training. I think they ought to be separated.

The Washington Post
December 14, 1999
POLITICS; Bush Rules Out 'Co-Presidency'

In a wide-ranging interview with the conservative journal National Review, Texas Gov. George W. Bush held forth on women, the media, his New Year's plans and smoking in the White House...Should men and women train together in the military? "I don't believe in gender-integrated training. I think they ought to be separated. The training facilities ought to be separated."

American Legion Magazine
January 2000

The American Legion Magazine Editor John Raughter interviewed Bush at a campaign rally in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

Candidate Q & A

Q: What are your views on gender-integrated basic training.

A: The experts tell me, such as Condoleezza Rice (policy adviser to former President Bush), that we ought to have separate basic training facilities. I think women in the military have an important and good role, but the people who study the issue tell me that the most effective training would be to have the genders separated.

Dr. Rice Quote From Campaign

Press Teleconference
September 23, 1999, Thursday
HEADLINE: FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE DICK CHENEY HOLDS
TELECONFERENCE WITH HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER AND FORMER U.S.
AMBASSADOR RICHARD ARMITAGE TO DISCUSS GOVERNOR GEORGE W. BUSH'S

SPEECH ON DEFENSE POLICY AT THE CITADEL IN CHARLESTON, S.C.

QUESTION: What about gender-integrated training in boot camp?

RICE: Yes, his view is that gender-integrated training above the basic training level is a very good thing, once they're into military operational specialties, but that we ought to look hard at the basic training and see if it might not be a good thing to have gender -- to have separate gender training at the basic level, at least in the first several weeks.

If you remember, this was a recommendation of a bipartisan panel, the Kassebaum-Baker panel. It was a very, very broadly gauged panel -- civil rights lawyers, a Title 9 lawyer -- and everybody on that panel unanimously recommended that basic training -- that they look hard at basic training.

QUESTION: My understanding, though -- when you said he's going to listen to his military commanders, it's my recollection that the majority of senior commanders oppose that recommendation.

RICE: I think that there -- as I said, we'd look hard -- he'd look hard at it. I didn't say he would always decide exactly what his military commanders said. I said he would listen hard to them.

QUESTION: So can we then say that he hasn't taken a position on it?

RICE: Yes. Are you through (ph)?



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 MAY 29 AM 6:51



INFO MEMO

May 28, 2002 – 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 28 May 02

SUBJECT: Federal Recognition for National Guard Generals – SNOWFLAKE

- In keeping with your direction (Tab A), the Department has been setting a high standard for federal recognition of flag rank for general officers in the National Guard. (They may be promoted by their states, but federal recognition allows them to serve in that grade when called to federal service, and is seen as an important validation of state actions.)
- Two cases in the Mississippi National Guard have recently arisen that are of interest to Senator Lott, and I therefore wanted you to be informed of the background to the Deputy Secretary's decisions regarding their federal recognition, should Senator Lott speak to you about them.
- In one case (Brigadier General Roberts), the Deputy Secretary has deferred action on federal recognition, pending a DoD IG review of Army practices regarding membership in supporting organizations. (The IG had earlier substantiated adverse information that General Roberts improperly pressured soldiers to join the National Guard Association of Mississippi.)
- In the other (Colonel Woods), the Deputy Secretary decided to deny recognition, based on the adverse information substantiated by the IG that Colonel Woods signed an Officer Evaluation Report knowing it contained false information.
- I will be conveying these conclusions to Senator Lott shortly.

RECOMMENDATION: None required

COORDINATION: None required



11-L-0559/OSD/8937

U08943 / 02

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock, (b)(6)

Attachment: As stated

cc: Mr. DiRita

11-L-0559/OSD/8938

TAB

A

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

4/17

2007 APR 18 PM 3:53

Dr Chu -

Please advise.

P. Rita

Larry Di Rita

4/18

U06957 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/8940

April 4, 2002 10:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: National Guard

What is the situation on the National Guard? I keep reading these articles. This may be a time to release all of that, let it out and make the changes we want to make in the Guard.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/04/02 Dave Moniz and Jim Drinkard, "4 More Guard Leaders Probed," *USA Today*

DHR:dh
040402-2

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

U06957 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/8941

Among those arrested was Wahidullah Zahabaun, the former finance minister for the Northern Alliance and a former member of Mr. Hekmatyar's Islamic Party, which was known for its extreme religious doctrines and its virulently anti-Western views. A government official said that Mr. Zahabaun had been released but that his whereabouts were unknown.

A spokesman for the American Embassy said tonight that the staff did not know about the arrests.

Mr. Karzai's government, cobbled together during a meeting in Germany while the fighting was still raging in Afghanistan, has been plagued by infighting since it took office.

In February, Abdul Rahman, the civil aviation minister, was killed by a mob, and three members of Mr. Karzai's government, including the deputy intelligence minister, were arrested. Mr. Karzai charged that Mr. Rahman had been assassinated as part of a conspiracy. The three men are awaiting trial.

Last month, Zahir abruptly postponed his scheduled return to the country amid concerns about his security. A Western diplomat said the former king faced the threat of assassination.

His trip is meant to rally support for the government.

The alleged conspiracy comes two months before the convening of the loya jirga, a planned gathering of the nation's political and religious leaders to choose a new government.

The maneuvering for that convention has already begun, with persistent reports that an alliance of Islamic fundamentalists, including Mr. Hekmatyar and others, would try to unseat Mr. Karzai and form a more strictly Islamist government.

Mr. Karzai could not be reached for comment today, but a senior adviser suggested that he might have had little to do with the arrests, and that the arrests might have been carried out without his approval.

Mr. Karzai's critics see him as a compromise choice, and little more than a puppet of the Tajiks who control the For-

eign Affairs, Interior and Defense Ministries.

"This is a deeply divided government," said the Karzai adviser, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "I am not sure that he signed off" on the arrests.

The arrests follow the decision by the Bush administration last month to oppose the expansion of the 4,500-man international security force now patrolling the streets of Kabul.

Mr. Karzai had urged Western governments to expand the force to other Afghan cities, saying that without a national army, his government was powerless to fight remnants of the Taliban or quash restless warlords.

The administration argued that the nations now supplying troops, like Britain and France, had military commitments elsewhere and were not willing to contribute any more. The Bush administration is cautious about the force, for one reason because it has said it does not want to be put in the position of having to evacuate it should fighting make that necessary.

At a ceremony in Kabul today, the Afghan government marked the graduation of the first 600 members of the national army, a force intended to bring Afghanistan's many ethnic groups together under a unified command.

"We will not allow groups of armed men call themselves armies," Mr. Karzai said.

Also today, the new American ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert P. Finn, presented his credentials to Mr. Karzai at Gulkhana Palace. Mr. Finn is the first American ambassador to serve here since Adolph Dubs was kidnapped and murdered by leftist extremists here in 1979.

While Kabul appears relatively calm under the watchful eyes of the international force, the scene outside of capital is markedly different. The most serious threats have come in the north, where the private armies of Gen. Ostad Atta Muhammad and Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, the deputy defense minister, have clashed repeatedly in recent weeks.

Although he has pledged his loyalty to the Karzai government, General Dostum may

be preparing to challenge it. A United Nations official and members of the interim government say General Dostum is receiving guns and money from Iran. Gen. Dostum recently invited two former associates of Mr. Hekmatyar to set up operations in the large areas of northern Afghanistan where the general exerts nominal control.

Mr. Hekmatyar rose to prominence in the 1980's as a leader in the American-backed effort to oust the invading forces of the Soviet Union. Despite his extremist views, he received more American money than any other warlord.

After the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 and civil war engulfed the country, Mr. Hekmatyar's fortunes declined. Despite continued backing from Pakistan, his army stalled outside Kabul, and his forces began a series of rocket attacks on the city that lasted through the mid-1990's. As many as 50,000 civilians were estimated to have been killed.

Mr. Hekmatyar met his match in the Taliban, whose forces defeated him on the battlefield. Mr. Hekmatyar went into exile, but many of his followers joined the Taliban.

USA Today
April 4, 2002
Pg. 1

5. 4 More Guard Leaders Probed

Pentagon disclosures point to misconduct by brass in 13 states

By Dave Moniz and Jim Drinkard, USA Today

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has acknowledged four more cases of misconduct by top National Guard commanders, which brings to at least 13 the number of states where the highest-ranking Guard official violated military rules or state or federal laws over the past decade.

The disclosures came in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by USA TODAY. The military refused to identify the generals involved or their states and refused to say whether any additional state commanders have committed misconduct.

All four were Army Guard generals, known as adjutants general, who ran the National Guard in their states. The Army provided summaries of the internal investigations, but it says releasing identities would violate privacy rights. It's not known whether the generals received punishments.

The disclosures amplify questions about the quality and character of some of the top leaders of the 470,000-member Guard, which is being counted on to play a major role in homeland defense and is in line for a boost in federal funding.

The extent of misconduct among top Guard generals is unknown because the Pentagon refuses to release complete records. The four new cases came in response to a request for records involving Oregon, Idaho, West Virginia, Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina and the District of Columbia.

Among the findings:

*A March 2001 Army probe determined that an adjutant general had a five-year sexual relationship with an enlisted woman in his state while he was married. The military prohibits adultery, which for generals is typically a career-ending offense.

*An August 1996 Army investigation determined that an adjutant general had "coerced, harassed and threatened" officers who did not join the National Guard Association, a powerful lobbying group.

*A March 1997 investigation found that an adjutant general improperly used money intended for soldiers to purchase gifts for officers in his command. Guard officers in other states and active duty military officers. The report also said the adjutant general ignored purchasing rules to furnish his office.

In a series of articles in December, USA TODAY outlined chronic misconduct among adjutants general across the United States. Over the past decade, these state-appointed National Guard commanders committed offenses that include embezzlement, perjury and misuse of government property.

TO: Gen. Tom Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 28, 2002

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

I am told that water is a real problem in Afghanistan.

Do you think that it would make any sense for us to send some Corp of Engineer people over there to try to figure out where the water table is and what might be done?

Former Secretary of the Army Marty Hoffmann has an interest in this and raised the question with me. After you think about it, let me know your thoughts and if we think it is worth doing, Marty could be helpful to the Corp as to where to go and how to do it. Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052802.01

Please respond by:

6/3/02

Afghanistan

28 MAY 02
①

snowflake

5/7/02

2:48 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

DATE: May 4, 2002

SUBJECT:

How are we doing on these Presidential statements that he made during the Campaign?

Thanks.

353

DHR/azn
050402.14

Attach: Campaign Statements snowflake dated 9/7/01

Please respond by:

5/13/02


8 May 02

U08974 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8944

TO: Secretary White
Secretary England
Secretary Roche

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: September 7, 2001

SUBJECT: Campaign Statements

Attached are some materials that refer to statements made by the President on the subject of training in the military. You might want to be aware of them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
090701.20

11-L-0559/OSD/8945



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 24 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE FIELD ACTIVITIES

322

SUBJECT: The Title "Commander in Chief"

Effective immediately, the title "Commander in Chief" shall be used to connote or indicate the President of the United States of America. Further, this memorandum discontinues use of the acronym "CINC" (meaning "Commander in Chief") for military officers. Attached is a list of new titles to be used.

Utilization of current material (signs, stationery, etc) for military officers that indicates the title "Commander in Chief" is permitted until supplies are exhausted, or until the next regular maintenance period during which signage may be changed without any undue additional cost to the taxpayers.

240902

Attachment:
As stated



U09052 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8946

New titles of former military "Commanders-in-Chief"

Unified Combatant Commands

Commander, U.S. Northern Command

Commander, U.S. Southern Command

Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Commander, U.S. European Command

Commander, U.S. Central Command

Commander, U.S. Transportation Command

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Other Commands

Commander, United Nations Command

Commander, Combined Forces Command

Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9000

202 MAY 30 PM 12:55

ACTION MEMO

CH-351-02
30 MAY 2002

SECRET

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RM/US 124*

SUBJECT: The Title "Commander in Chief"

- I have drafted the attached memorandum for your approval and signature (TAB) to restrict the use of the title "Commander in Chief" to the President.
- In addition, this memorandum discontinues use of the acronym "CINC" (meaning "commander in chief") to preclude confusion inasmuch as this acronym has normally connoted or indicated commanders of combatant commands and, in some instances, commanders in the Military Services.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the attached memorandum disseminating the correct usage of the term "Commander in Chief."

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: MajGen H. P. Osman, USMC; Director, J-7 (b)(6)

| | | |
|-----------------------|-------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 6/3 | 7/12 |
| SF MAORIMBASTIANI | 4/6/4 | 7/17 |
| MA' SIBICI | 5/3/6 | |
| EXE SIBICI WHITMORE | 1/31 | |

11-L-0559/OSD/8948

U09052 /02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE FIELD ACTIVITIES


SUBJECT: The Title "Commander in Chief"

Effective as of the date of this memorandum, the title "Commander in Chief" shall only be used to connote or indicate the President of the United States of America. Further, this memorandum discontinues use of the acronym "CINC" (meaning "commander in chief") to preclude confusion inasmuch as this acronym has normally connoted or indicated the commanders of the combatant commands and, in some instances, commanders in the Military Services.

Commanders of combatant commands shall be called combatant commanders, per the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (short title: Joint Pub 1-02), which defines the terms "combatant command" and "combatant commander." Henceforth only the President will be called the Commander in Chief in accordance with the United States Constitution, which refers to the President as "Commander in Chief" of the United States Armed Forces.



11-L-0559/OSD/8949





GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OCT 16 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P & R)

SUBJECT: Redesignation of the Title "Commander in Chief"

This replies to your request for coordination on a proposal to have the President formally redesignate certain positions of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code (section 601). The redesignation would replace the title of "Commander in Chief" with the title "Commander." Your proposal is based upon the view that such formal redesignation may be necessary before the Secretary may direct that "Commander" be used in place of "Commander in Chief" when referring to those officers.

I have determined that, as a matter of law, the Secretary may issue this guidance now, on his own authority. The positions in question are commanders and deputy commanders of combatant commands, and commanders of three international commands. Of course, in keeping with the substantial authority vested in these commanders, they may perform many responsibilities, including serving in some cases both as commanders of United States combatant commands and as commanders of international commands. The legal analysis with regard to titles for commanders of combatant commands differs somewhat from the analysis for commanders of international commands.

1. Commanders of Combatant Commands. The primary governing statute for commanders of combatant commands is section 164 of title 10, United States Code (section 164). Nothing in this statute mandates the designation "Commander in Chief." To the contrary, section 164 uses the titles "commander of a unified or specified combatant command" and "commander of a combatant command." Section 164 thus suggests that the "in chief" language is merely honorific.

This view is consistent with the President's recent actions. In his current Unified Command Plan (UCP), the President used the title "commander" rather than "commander in chief" to refer to the combatant commanders. In addition, in all of the President's recent nomination packages submitted to the Senate for combatant commanders and deputy commanders, the President changed the titles for those positions to use the term "commander" in place of "commander in chief."



11-L-0559/OSD/8950

Moreover, the Secretary's authority, direction and control over the Department of Defense under 10 U.S.C. § 113 includes the power to determine methods of addressing subordinate officials within the Department, including combatant commanders and their deputies. Establishing such conventions and customs within the Department is an inherent part of the Secretary's command authority.

I have carefully considered – and rejected – the argument that the title of a position of importance and responsibility under section 601, by itself, is so central to the designation of that position that only the President may direct this name change. The President's duty under section 601 is to designate positions, not bestow titles (though of course he may do so if he chooses). Titles merely identify the designated positions. A change in title would not alter the position. It would create no uncertainty regarding which positions are designated under section 601, and thus would not implicate the President's section 601 responsibilities. And in any event, the President's recent actions regarding the UCP and combatant commander nominations, described above, evidence his intent to change the title of the combatant commanders from "commander in chief" to "commander."

In sum, directing the Department to use "commander" is consistent with sections 164 and 601, with the President's recent actions, and with the Secretary's statutory and inherent authority.

2. Commanders of International Commands. The positions of Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; and Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command raise additional issues. These international commands are created by international agreement rather than by section 164. And unlike section 164, these agreements specifically refer to "commander in chief." Nonetheless, these agreements do not preclude redesignation. Nothing in the agreements requires that the commanders be designated "commander in chief," and a redesignation as "commander" would affect nothing of substance in the treaty.

I should note, however, that the United States cannot bind another nation to changes in an international treaty unless that nation consents to the change. Because redesignation might have diplomatic implications, the Secretary should consider, as a matter of comity, informing our treaty partners of this change and perhaps seeking modifications to relevant international agreements to reflect this change. In addition, perhaps for an interim period, the Secretary may wish to authorize these commanders to use the title "commander in chief" in the international context when doing so is in the interest of the United States. This multiplicity of titles depending on function is nothing new for these commanders –

they are familiar with the concept of wearing several “hats,” including those of multinational commands.

The President’s most recent UCP, referred to above, contains a reference to the title “Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command.” Accordingly, that title may be used in the bi-national U.S.-Canadian context. The UCP also embraces the title “Commander, US Northern Command” – the same official. In light of the Secretary’s statutory and inherent authority to determine the methods of addressing subordinate officials, I do not believe that the President’s UCP reference affects the conclusions above.

I am aware that consistent DoD practice has been to request the President to modify formally the titles of the positions designated under section 601 before directing any change in the Department. Under the specific circumstances presented here, however, I find no legal requirement that the President take action as proposed in the attached package prior to the Secretary’s issuing his direction.

I have advised the Counsel to the President and the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, of my conclusions.



William C. Haynes II

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

GC -

Mr. Haynes -

Please let
discuss -

O. White

Larry Di Rita

(U 07052-02)

6/26



CDR Greg Wittman
Navy Military Assistant
OSD Executive Secretariat

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

TO: TSA

6/25

SUBJ: CINC MEMO

Sir,

Coords obtained at Tab A
as indicated.

Based on info that OGC
indicated ~~_____~~ Mr. Haynes
would brief you on personally,
recommend we cancel this memo
and let OGC/PR work with
White House.

Clear w/ 407052-2 U/R Stim
Myself

Toric

Don
Pondell Mason
& Fetum + me

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Date: June 17, 2002

Suspense: 1600 19 June, 2002

SUBJECT: CINC memo.

The Secretary of Defense has asked for coordination by the individuals listed below on the attached memo regarding use of the title "Commander in Chief".

Please indicate below concurrence or nonconcurrence, signature and date, and any remarks. Feel free to annotate the attached draft memo.

| <u>COORD</u> | <u>CONCUR/ NONCONCUR</u> | <u>SIGNATURE/ DATE</u> | <u>REMARKS</u> |
|--------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|
|--------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|

CJCS (Myers)

VCJCS (Pace)

USD(C)
(Zakheim)

DoD GC
(Haynes)

NONCONCUR - input to be provided by
Mr Haynes to Mr. D. Rita

ASD (PA)
(Clarke)

ASD (LA)
(Moore)

Completed coordination package should go to CDR Wittman in OSD Executive Secretariat, Room 3D853, by suspense. Please deliver or call for pickup, (b)(6)



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

2002 MAY 31 AM 10:47

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

May 15, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Info Memo Force Protection

29 MAY 2002

Snowflake at TAB A.

The staffs of USD(AT&L), USD(P&R) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), are working this snowflake. We are currently working together to scope the extent of this challenge and then to propose technology options for fielding and implementation. CJCS has prepared the compendium of technology projects at TAB B, as potential considerations. DDR&E has examined the Joint Staff compendium and DDR&E reports that it is a good first list of near term technology opportunities, but it may not include all the technology opportunities that could emerge from the DoD Component's current/approved S&T programs.

In addition, as a follow-up to a meeting of the Military Manpower Senior Level Review Group, Dr. Chu requested that DDR&E engage in an evaluation of technology opportunities for manpower transformation at TAB C. We are working closely with USD(P&R) to define the technologies that may produce opportunities for force protection manpower reductions.

AT&L's expected analysis of technology products have been shared with USD(P&R), and the Defense Science and Technology Advisory Group (DSTAG) (i.e., Service Component S&T Execs + Joint Staff) with a positive response. The DSTAG is working this initiative through a tasked working group, with report and recommendations due to the full DSTAG in early June, 2002. AT&L plans to have an interim assessment of technology programs by June 14, 2002.

Also, we are working with the Assistant Director of Operations, Force Protection (J-34) to vet a subset of the technology opportunities with the military operations communities by using the JROC's Joint Warfighting Capability Analysis (JWCA) process. We anticipate that the JWCA metrics and methodology could be used for the full portfolio of technology opportunities. We will continue to keep you informed of our progress.

Attachments: TAB A: SECDEF Snowflake

TAB B: CJCS Compendium of Technology Projects

TAB C: Evaluation of Technology Opportunities for Manpower Transformation

Prepared by: Dr. Robert Foster, Director, Bio Systems, ODUSO(S&T), (b)(6)


UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/8957

TAB

A

March 20, 2002 7:58 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Force Protection

I would like to know what we are doing in R&D and technology development to get technological ways to handle force protection that makes it less manpower intensive.

Steve: we should make sure the DPG includes this.

Thanks.

DHR:ch
032002-5

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

11-L-0559/OSD/8959

TAB

B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-0000

INFO MEMO

CM-181-02

22 February 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 2/22*

SUBJECT: Homeland Security (HLS) and Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)

- For your information, the following is in response to your question (TAB) regarding projects to make homeland security and force protection less manpower intensive.
- **Specific Projects.** Currently, 14 Service and 2 combatant commander programs could reduce the HLS and AT/FP manpower footprint when fielded. All are funded and on track.
 - **Types of Programs.** Unmanned systems, remote sensors and weapon platforms, integrated access control, command and control, perimeter detection/surveillance, and waterside security.
 - **Status of Programs.** Three programs are available now for the Services and combatant commanders to purchase. Eight programs will be available within 1 to 3 years. Approximately \$6M in additional funding to the Services could accelerate five programs to production in less than 1 year.
- **Other Efforts.** In addition to leveraging technology, less manpower intensive solutions for HLS and FP are being considered as we review and prioritize all requirements that compete for our limited resources (e.g., instead of using manpower to physically protect an asset, we may harden the supporting facility, modify existing plans or do nothing and accept risk).

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen G. S. Newbold, USMC; Director of Operations;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/8961

TAB

C



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
APR 4 2002

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

SUBJECT: Military Manpower Senior Level Review Group Follow-up

Ron

Thank you for agreeing to lead an effort to evaluate opportunities to exploit technology as a means to release military manpower so that the Services can transform their manpower structure to better meet the requirements of the new strategy.

Please include representatives from each of the Services and the Joint Staff as you conduct this review. Ms. Jeanne Fites, my DUSD for Program Integration will provide a representative to assist you as well. I know that you are currently looking at ways technology could be used to reduce the manpower currently performing force protection duties. I am confident that there are other areas in which we can use existing or emerging technology in innovative ways to reduce our dependence on military manpower.


Charlie Abell reported to me that you indicated that you would like to meet with us as you get started on this effort. I welcome the opportunity to discuss this with you at your convenience.

In order to meet the Secretary's suspense, I would appreciate receiving an interim report on your progress during the week of May 13-17. I will look for your final report not later than June 14, 2002.

David S.C. Chu



March 20, 2002 7:58 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Force Protection

W
2
2

I would like to know what we are doing in R&D and technology development to get technological ways to handle force protection that makes it less manpower intensive.

Steve: we should make sure the DPG includes this.

Thanks.

DH:dh
032002-5

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

11-L-0559/OSD/8964

U09093 /02

20MAR02



ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 MAY 31 PM 2:23

Sila M. Calderón
GOBERNADORA

May 24, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Army South have established a fruitful collaboration in our Island. My Administration wholeheartedly supports its permanent operations here at Fort Buchanan. I write to offer you my assistance to ensure many more productive years for Army South in Puerto Rico.

Our Island features strategic advantages and preparedness capabilities vital to Army South's continuing success. Puerto Rico's geographic location provides ease of access to all points throughout the Caribbean, Central and South America. Moreover, Puerto Ricans are committed to a strong national defense and have served with distinction in the United States Armed Forces in all major international operations: in both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, the Balkans and now in the war against terrorism. Our skilled, bilingual workforce is a unique asset for Army South to accomplish its goals in overwhelmingly Spanish-speaking Latin America. Also, recruitment on the Island is up for all military branches, consistent with our substantial rates of voluntary service relative to other jurisdictions.


The Puerto Rican people support Army South's key defense role, and value its important economic contributions to our community. Some advocates of relocating Army South claim there is a sentiment against its operations in Puerto Rico; however, all the evidence is to the contrary. In fact, staff in the Government Reform Committee who visited Fort Buchanan last year did not report any such sentiment. I trust you agree with me that permanently operating in Puerto Rico offers Army South, like no other United States jurisdiction, the ideal conditions for long-term growth and success.

Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
Page 2
May 24, 2002

I am ready further to work closely with you for Army South to remain in Fort Buchanan and look forward jointly to review this matter at the earliest opportunity possible.

Please accept my best personal regards.

Sincerely,



Sila M. Calderón
Governor



11-L-0559/OSD/8966



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

JUN - 6 2002

300 JUN - 7 11 08 04



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Honorable Sila M. Calderón
Governor, Puerto Rico
P.O. Box 9020082
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00902-0082

Dear Governor Calderón:

Thank you for your inquiry regarding the future stationing of United States Army South. Understandably this matter is of interest to the citizens of Puerto Rico as well as the many thousands of active duty, Reserve, National Guard, veterans, and military retirees there.

The stationing of U.S. Army South is part of an overarching effort that will touch military units around the world. In October 2000, the Department of Defense began the Quadrennial Defense Review, the deliberate process of reviewing defense strategy, force structures and stationing options. We entered this review aware of a Congressional mandate to reduce all headquarters by 15 percent and redirect these positions to front line units. Ultimately, this review will be measured against the goals and objectives found in the President's National Security Strategy and the emerging National Military Strategy.

The Puerto Rican people have a proud military tradition and have defended Democracy on behalf of a grateful nation with unparalleled service and devotion. I fully understand your concern over a decision that will surely touch so many in Puerto Rico. The decisions made regarding United States Army South will certainly consider these concerns. Your offer of assistance and support is most appreciated. Thank you again for your letter.

Respectfully,

Thomas E. White

(24 May 02)

Printed on Recycled Paper

U09116-02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 19 2002

The Honorable Sila M. Calderón
Governor of Puerto Rico
P.O. Box 9020082
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00902-0082

Dear Governor Calderón:

I received your recent letter concerning the Army's Southern Command headquarters. While I have not as yet been briefed on any proposals to relocate the command, there are alternatives and the Army is always seeking to ensure our forces are stationed in locations where they can best be trained, maintained, and housed, and where the U.S. military is welcomed and well treated.

I appreciate having the benefit of your views in this matter, though.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

U10009 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/8968

322

19 June



COMPTROLLER

SECRET
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100


CEASE 1000
SECRET 1000
MAY 31 2002 5:07



INFO MEMO

May 31, 2002, 3:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report on Incremental Funding

- The CRS reported that the Department's fiscal year (FY) 2003 budget request set new precedents for procuring items through incremental financing schemes and ignores the Department's longstanding full funding policy. The DD(X), CVN(X), C-17, and the Air Force tanker lease proposal were cited as programs that the Department has incrementally funded or is considering to incrementally fund.
- The Department's full funding policy states that the total cost of a weapon should be fully funded in the year the item is procured. There are two exceptions:
 1. advance procurement for long-lead time materials and
 2. advance procurement of items that have been approved for serial production under multiyear contracts.
- The reasons to avoid incremental funding include:
 - It creates liabilities in following fiscal years and limits the Department's and Congress' flexibility to make rational planning decisions;
 - If follow-on funding is not appropriated, there is no useable end item;
 - It reduces cost consciousness as increases in cost can simply be added to subsequent increments.
- The first DD(X) ship is budgeted incrementally in Research and Development (R&D). Though this is a departure from how we have funded ships in the past, it makes sense to fund the first ship in R&D consistent with other acquisition programs. By funding this way, the ship design will not be "locked in," thereby



11-L-0559/OSD/8969

U091367/02

allowing changes in the ship design to be more easily made as new technologies are developed. Following ships will be fully funded in the procurement accounts similar to how we budget other weapons systems.

- The CVN(X) has advance procurement for long lead materials, nuclear components, and detail design efforts consistent with how previous aircraft carrier programs were funded. Construction of the CVN(X), however, is currently "split funded" over two fiscal years (i.e., FY 2007 and FY 2008). I intend to revisit this split funding in the upcoming Program/Budget review and hope to be able to fully fund the ship in FY 2007.
- The C-17 multiyear procurement (MYP) plan reflects a departure from the Department's MYP funding policy. In this case, not only will advance procurement funds be used to buy long lead items and items in economic quantities, but it will also incrementally fund the fabrication of aircraft. This strategy allows the Air Force to sustain the current 15 aircraft per year production rate even though the budgeted amounts fully fund only 10 to 14 aircraft per year.
- The Air Force proposal to lease tankers is currently being debated within the Department and is not currently in the FY 2003 budget request.
- Programs are reviewed during the budget review to ensure adequate funding.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Ron Garant, (b)(6)

Note:

I have instructed my staff to ensure full funding of programs. Pete Aldridge is in complete agreement. We have, yet again, to change DoD "culture."

- Dov

11-L-0559/OSD/8970

May 13, 2002 7:41 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CRS Report

Please tell me what this Congressional Research Service report on the Pentagon not fully funding assets is about.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/13/02 Nathan Hodge, "Report: Pentagon Strays from Fully Funding Assets," *Defense Week*

DHR:dh
051302-6

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

11-L-0559/OSD/8971

2109138-02

intuitive appeal and it makes his strategy more enticing than if it were just about power. At the same time, it doesn't make it any less risky. It means we could be fighting a lot of wars around the world."

In Iraq, Daalder says he prefers tackling the problem of weapons of mass destruction through United Nations weapons inspectors before considering military action, as some in the administration have advocated.

Similarly, Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development at the University of Maryland, College Park, believes keeping Hussein contained is preferable to a military attack that could destabilize Iraq and the whole region. Hussein is "ruthless and ambitious, but not a madman," Telhami says. "I think we should continue to deter him and limit his power."

Wolfowitz has expressed skepticism about the ability of inspectors to detect Hussein's work on weapons of mass destruction and views inspectors as only "part of a solution."

The larger solution, he says, is still on the president's drawing table. "There are some very big decisions that only the president can make," he says.

Then, the world may know the full measure of Wolfowitz's influence.

Pentagon correspondent Tom Bowman contributed to this article.

New York Times
May 13, 2002

7. Bees Learning Smell Of Bombs With Backing From Pentagon

By Andrew C. Revkin

Scientists working for the Pentagon have trained ordinary honeybees to ignore flowers and home in on minute traces of explosives, a preliminary step toward creating a buzzing, swarming detection system that could be used to find truck bombs, land mines and other hidden explosives.

The research, under way for three years, initially focused on using bees to help clear minefields. But the effort has broadened, the scientists say. In two tests last summer,

before the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, trained bees picked out a truck tainted with traces of explosives.

The work is in its early stages, and bees, like bomb-sniffing dogs, have limitations. They do not work at night or in storms or cold weather, and it is hard to imagine deploying a swarm to sniff luggage in an airport. But they also have extraordinary attributes, including extreme sensitivity to scent molecular trails and the ability to cover every nook around the colony as they weave about in search of food.

Pentagon officials acknowledge that the idea of bomb-sniffing bees has a public relations problem, a "giggle factor," as one official put it. But that official and scientists working on the project insist the idea shows great potential.

"It appears that bees are at least as sensitive or more sensitive to odors than dogs," said Dr. Alan S. Rudolph, program manager for the Defense Sciences Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which is overseeing the experimentation.

The Air Force Research Laboratory at Brooks Air Force Base, in Texas, has just completed an analysis of a round of tests of bees' bomb-sniffing ability and confirmed that they found the explosive chemical more than 99 percent of the time, project scientists said.

In coming weeks, the team plans the first field tests of a new radio transmitter, the size of a grain of salt, that could allow individual bees to be tracked as they follow diffuse trails of bomb ingredients to a source. Such a system would help if bees were used to search a wide area for hidden explosives.

But such sophisticated technology would not be necessary at, say, a truck stop, where the clustering of alerted bees would be apparent.

Scientists involved in the project said bees were also being considered for sniffing out illicit drugs, which release more volatile chemicals into the air and are easier to trace than explosives.

For many years, biologists, notably a group at the

University of Montana, have been training bees to prefer different scents, using sugar as a reward. After one bee learns the new cue, it somehow transfers that knowledge to others. Within hours, an entire hive, and sometimes adjacent hives, switch to searching for the new scent.

Scientists have found that it takes less than two hours to use sugar-water rewards to condition a hive of honeybees to eschew flowers and instead hunt for 2,4-dinitrotoluene, or DNT, a residue in TNT and other explosives, in concentrations as tiny as a few thousandths of a part per trillion.

In tests of 12 trained bee colonies last summer at the Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio, one to two bees an hour were seen flying around uncontaminated controls, while "we were getting 1,200 bees an hour on the targets," said Philip J. Rodacy, a chemist in the explosives technology group at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque. Sandia, the Southwest Institute and the University of Montana are among many institutions contributing to the research.

One idea is to place a hive of trained bees near important security checkpoints to guard against potential terrorists, Dr. Rudolph of the defense research agency said. But he added that much more work had to be done before that could happen.

"It's not straightforward to move from watching bees hovering around a box to watching trucks parking in a weigh station for a minute," he said. "This is not a capability until we know how predictable it is."

The work is a facet of a much broader effort overseen by Dr. Rudolph to exploit the chemical sensitivity and mobility of bees, as well as moths and other insects, so they can scour broad areas for a whiff of a chemical. Over all, the Pentagon has spent \$25 million since 1998 on researching what it calls controlled biological systems, traits of animals that might be turned into war-fighting technologies.

Scientists are also exploring whether moplake insect

hairs can be used to screen the air for releases of biological or chemical weapons. Early tests have shown that bees are an efficient sampling mechanism for airborne bacterial spores, including those of a close cousin of the anthrax bacteria, said Dr. Jerry J. Bromenshenk, an entomologist at the University of Montana.

He and other researchers there have developed "smart hives" that monitor the comings and goings of the insects and, with equipment developed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, sip the air as bees return, to test for explosives.

Defense Week

May 13, 2002

Pg. 2

8. Report: Pentagon Strays From Fully Funding Assets

By Nathan Hodge

According to a report issued last week by the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress' non-partisan research arm, the Pentagon is chipping away at a longstanding budget policy that mandates full funding of weapons systems.

The Congressional Research Service, or CRS, suggested that, in the Pentagon's latest budget submission, the military may be setting "new precedents" for procuring items through incremental types of funding.

"Such precedents could further circumscribe the full-funding policy," the report reads. "This, in turn, could limit and complicate Congress' oversight of DOD procurement programs, or require different approaches to exercise control and oversight."

Since the 1950s, Congress has required the Pentagon to fully fund the total cost of a weapon in the year the item is procured; that policy is spelled out in an executive-branch circular from the Office of Management and Budget. But the Pentagon regularly uses alternative strategies for funding costly items, especially Navy ships.

There are two main exceptions to full-funding policy. Congress routinely approves

April 25, 2002 1:05 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting w/John Handy at TRANSCOM

My recollection is that some 36% of deployment orders were not signed until after the latest date for doing what the deployment order proposed. I am told that number now has been moved down to 20%.

I would like Feith and Pace to figure out what is going on. If this building is so complex that it cannot function, and we are so totally wrapped around our anchor chain, we are going to have to take layers out.

Please get back to me within the next 14 days with a proposal. One idea might be to include a tracking process to show the dates each DoD element receives a deployment order, how many people it goes to, and a proposal as to how we can limit the number of days each person can have it. We should reduce the number of places they have to go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042502-15

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

DIRITA

Larry Di Rita

5/24

114-0559/OSD/8873
U09173-02

CJCS Response Attached

TAB A

370

25 Apr 02

5/23

V/R

Ed

COPY TO: DEP SEC DEF for coordination

May 20, 2002 1:27 PM

TO: John Stenbit
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Clearance Backlog

Larry Di Rita
7/30

Please give me a simple piece of paper that tells me what has happened to the security clearance backlog since I came in January 2001, and where it is today. In addition, please tell me what you propose to do to work off the rest of the backlog.

Please put it in simple English, so I can understand it without having to ask you for an explanation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-23

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

5/25
Response attached

Larry Di Rita

7/30

SPN

5/31 25/31

20 May 02



COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SECRET HAS BEEN

REV 1 2102

INFO MEMO

May 22, 2002 5:32 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT *JPS*

SUBJECT: Security Clearance Backlog

- You asked me to explain the handling of the security clearance backlog from January 2001 to the present.
 - The backlog of security clearance cases has been steadily diminishing. When you assumed office in January 2001, there was a backlog of 456,127 cases pending before the Defense Security Service (DSS). Normally, DSS has a backlog of 120,000 to 150,000 cases, because there is a lapse time of 75 to 120 days to complete each case, depending upon the level of investigation. So while there was a backlog of 456,127 cases in January 2001, the excess backlog (above normal workload) was about 300,000 cases.
 - Today, DSS has a backlog of 148,391 (within the desired workload range). However, about 40,000 of these are old cases that are more complex and take longer to complete.
 - The way we worked down the DSS backlog was to stop giving DSS new cases. From May 2001 to March 2002, new cases were given to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to handle, while DSS worked off the backlog of old cases.
- You also asked me to explain how we propose to work off the rest of the backlog.
 - By the beginning of this year, DSS was progressing at solid rate, indicating that we should consider giving new cases back to DSS.
 - First, though, we ran a pilot of 1,000 new cases to see if DSS could keep up with the new work while continuing to make progress with the old cases. DSS proved that it could, and today we are in a transitional period of moving new work back to DSS. We expect DSS will continue to meet standard case completion times while completing work on the aging cases that are more complex. The standards range from 75 days for secret-level investigations, up to 120 days for reinvestigations of personnel with top secret or SCI clearances.
 - We expect that by the middle of fiscal year 2003, OPM will only handle DoD civilian and a few basic-level military investigations.

380.01

22 May 02

Prepared by: CAPT Hanson, C3]

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/8975

U09228 /02



COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 22 2002

INFO MEMO

May 22, 2002 5:32 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT *JPS*

SUBJECT: Security Clearance Backlog

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 - The backlog of security clearance cases has been steadily diminishing. When you assumed office in January 2001, there was a backlog of 456,127 cases pending before the Defense Security Service (DSS). Normally, DSS has a backlog of 120,000 to 150,000 cases, because there is a lapse time of 75 to 120 days to complete each case, depending upon the level of investigation. So while there was a backlog of 456,127 cases in January 2001, the excess backlog (above normal workload) was about 300,000 cases.
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 - We expect that by the middle of fiscal year 2003, OPM will only handle DoD civilian and a few basic-level military investigations.

380.01

22 May 02



Prepared by: CAPT Hanson, C31 (b)(6) 59/OSD/8976

U09228 /02

May 20, 2002 1:27 PM

TO: John Stenbit

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security Clearance Backlog

Larry Di Rita
7/30

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Please put it in simple English, so I can understand it without having to ask you for an explanation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-23

.....

Please respond by 06/21/02

5/25
Response attached

*Larry Di Rita**7/30**SPB**5/31 25/31**20 May 02**380.01*

U09227 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/8977

June 3, 2002 11:10 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hekmatyar

If Hekmatyar is going to go after us, maybe we ought to go after him. Let's talk.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/31/02, AP, "Afghan Warlord Calls for Holy War on U.S., Britain," *Dallas Morning News*

DHR.dh
060302-18

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

3 Jun 02

pine military headquarters on the island and remain behind when Filipino troops go out to hunt the enemy.

Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, has recommended Americans be allowed to go with patrols and give on-the-spot advice as Filipino troops pursue the rebels, officials said.

Though the Special Forces advisers are prohibited from engaging in combat, U.S. medics have entered combat zones at least three times in recent months to retrieve and treat Filipino wounded.

Accompanying local troops as they scour Basilan's jungles could put Americans in greater danger, obviously, and Congress asked months ago to be notified if the Pentagon wanted to do that. Defense officials said they would give notification.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is considering the idea and was expected to talk with Fargo this week about the recommendation, officials said. Also, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz began an Asian trip last night that includes a weekend visit to the Philippines.

The Philippine government is expected to approve the idea, Pentagon officials said.

Another question is whether the American training program should be extended beyond the sixth months agreed to by the two governments.

Officials have said they believe the American trainers, and sophisticated equipment they brought with them, have raised Filipino troop morale and resulted in the killing and surrender of some rebels.

But the effort has not completely destroyed the group nor accomplished perhaps the biggest unspoken goal of the U.S. deployment: winning freedom for the Burnhams.

A Muslim rebel leader said today that he would release his last remaining Filipino hostage, but he did not mention the Burnhams.

Abu Sabaya, a leader of Abu Sayyaf, said in an interview with RMN Radio that he

will release Filipino nurse Ediborah Yap "any moment."

Washington Times

May 31, 2002

Pg. 10

37. Americans Training

Georgian Military

U.S. training of military officers in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia will make it harder for terrorists to find safe haven in the region, the commander of the American trainers said yesterday.

Lt. Col. Robert M. Waltemeyer said 70 Green Berets and other trainers began Monday their 21-month program of helping upgrade a poorly financed Georgian military.

The \$64 million U.S. program, which also will give Georgians weapons, ammunition, uniforms, communications and other equipment, is part of a global counterterrorism effort.

Dallas Morning News

May 31, 2002

38. U.S. Cluster Bombs Complicate Afghan Cleanup

Mine-laden Kandahar may take years to rid of explosives, U.N. says

By Associated Press

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The use of cluster bombs during the U.S.-led attacks in Afghanistan has pushed back efforts to clear this mine-laden city by at least a year and raised doubts about a plan to rid the region of unexploded ordnance by decade's end, U.N. officials said Thursday.

Efforts to clear the region of bomblets, known as BLUs, have become the top priority for U.N.-backed de-mining teams in five southern provinces, where they are scattered in 46 areas.

"They are just waiting to explode," said A.G. Asalati of the U.N. Regional Mine Action Center. "Many parts of Kandahar are contaminated ... and some BLUs are near populated areas."

Organizations such as British-based Landmine Action have estimated that the United States dropped nearly

125,000 bomblets on Afghanistan, based on a Pentagon statement that about 600 cluster bombs were used by early December.

Each cluster bomb contains 202 bomblets, 7 percent to 15 percent of which are thought not to have exploded.

Afghanistan's two decades of warfare left an estimated 5 million to 10 million mines littering the country, the vast majority of them left by the Soviets during their 10-year occupation of the country.

Mr. Asalati said the U.N. agency had hoped to clear Kandahar of the mines by the end of 2001, but the cluster bombs had delayed that timetable by at least a year.

Since February, de-miners have managed to clear bomblets from all but six areas encompassing about 40 square miles. The United States has provided them with maps of many strike areas and helped train the de-miners in neutralizing cluster bombs and bomblets.

The International Committee for the Red Cross estimates that about 3,000 Afghans are maimed each year by land mines. According to U.N. estimates, 100,000 people have been injured or maimed over the past 23 years.

As many as 150 to 300 people were killed each month in 2001 by mines or unexploded ordnance, according to U.N. figures. In 1993, Afghanistan had an average of 20 to 24 casualties per day — up to 8,500 deaths a year, according to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Children are the most common victims. Tied to a bed at the Red Cross-run Mir Wais Hospital in Kandahar, 13-year-old Mohammed Raffia screamed in pain as doctors adjusted the bandages that covered his head. In a nearby bed, his friend Niaz Mohammed, 16, lay with his right hand missing.

The two teenagers were injured during the weekend as they watched over their grazing herd of cows and sheep in the town of Bagh-a-Pul, near a former Taliban tank regiment.

"Niaz saw something and picked it up. It exploded," said his father. Niaz is the second

of four sons be injured in four months, he said.

Local authorities say the area, near a former Taliban weapons depot, is one of the few places near drought-plagued Kandahar that still has some vegetation.

However, the area is also littered with minefields and unexploded ordnance left when U.S. and coalition forces methodically bombed the depot.

Bending over a yellow bomblet about the size of two soft drink cans, mine clearer Nazar Mohammad, 55, sweated profusely as he cleared the area around it before fitting a small amount of plastic explosive to destroy the bomblet.

"I hate these things," said Mr. Mohammad, a mine clearer for 18 years. "They are more dangerous than mines; they will explode on touch."

When it explodes, a bomblet breaks into tiny steel fragments honeycombed into the casing — an explosion so powerful that it will fuse limestone and can kill anyone within 100 feet.

Mr. Mohammad was even more frustrated because he has already cleared the area twice — first of Russian mines, then of mines laid by rebels.

Dallas Morning News

May 31, 2002

39. Afghan Warlord Calls For Holy War On U.S., Britain

Ex-Pakistan spy chief warns hard-liner should not be underestimated

By Associated Press

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — An Afghan warlord with links to Iran and Pakistan's powerful spy agency has called for a holy war against the United States and Britain and vowed to rally like-minded radicals, such as al-Qaeda, under one banner to do battle.

"I invite all the believers to be united and to be ready for war to liberate your country from the foreign oppressors," Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said in a handwritten letter circulated in Afghanistan and to some of his followers in Pakistan. A copy of the Pashtu-language letter

***** -COMM. JOURNAL- ***** DATE JUN-03-2002 TIME 17:57 P.01

MODE = TRANSMISSION

START=JUN-03 17:55

END=JUN-03 17:57


| STN NO. | COM | ABBR NO. | STATION NAME/TEL.NO. | PAGES | DURATION |
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***** -OSD/ ESC

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(b)(6)

May 31, 2002 8:05 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Offer of Assistance

Attached is a letter I received in the mail. I don't know the individual, but I found it interesting. Is it something one of your folks might want to look into?

Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/09/01 Rambod ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
053102-10

11-L-0559/OSD/8981

U09230 /02

231.2

31 MAY 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 31 2002

October 9, 2001

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense of The United States
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Defense Secretary,

The September 11, 2001 unspeakable acts of terror that threaten our freedom and liberty cause me to write to you.

Because of my respect for your principles, integrity and determination to get the job done, I would be honored as an American, to openly offer to you and my country, my skills, knowledge and experience should you find need of them.

Briefly, I am an American citizen of Iranian descent, a successful business owner and administrator living in Los Angeles and Taos. I left Iran in 1978 during the revolution and I am privileged to live my life in the United States.

I am a private pilot, have an MBA degree. I am fluent in French, the Iranian language, Farsi (I also have an understanding of Iranian culture and politics). I am tactful, diplomatic and personable. I am a clear thinker and focused planner with the ability to analyze problems and situations.

I have no interest in a political career or in living in Iran though both my great grandfather and father were prominent in government. My great grandfather was (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

He was one of the few popular political figures during the Shah, known for his honesty and integrity.

If our current Administration is intent on removing the Islamic regime from power in Iran, consider me, I am at your service.

Kindly keep this communication confidential as my Mother and other relatives live in Iran.

Respectfully yours,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/8982



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. (b)(6)

Thanks so much for your letter of October 9.
Unbelievably, it just arrived in my hands from Nat Troy.

I will have someone here think a bit about that, and
we will get back in touch with you.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. M. Gates", written in a cursive style.

May 31, 2002 9:40 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Testifying w/Powell

On this invitation from Biden, I think we probably shouldn't do this.

Colin told me I will have to do it when the treaty is up there, so if we need a way to ease the fact that I don't want to this, say that obviously I will be available if and when the treaty comes before the Committee.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/29/02 DepSecDef note to SecDef, 05/24/02 Biden ltr to SecState

DHR:dh
 053102-25

.....
 Please respond by 06/04/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 01 2002

31 MAY 02

5/31

SecDef -
Concern with
you. I have
advised Powell
that we should
decline this on
D.R.

6/3

ASD/LA -

Powell Moore -

He'll pass. we can
discuss. Be sure State/Biden know.

DR

Larry Di Rita

4/4

11-L-0559/OSD/8984

U09268 /02

Snowflake

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 31 2002

CD
has
seen

SP-3
5/30

25/50

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: May 29, 2002

FROM:

Paul Wolfowitz

PW

SUBJECT: Biden Invitation to Testify

Don,

Colin gave me the attached letter from Biden inviting the two of you to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee. He had heard that you were receptive to the idea of testifying. However, I think he's concerned about the precedent of the two of you testifying together, including the fact that it would open you up to requests from seven other committees.

Learn.
forget for me
I tell Glin

11-L-0559/OSD/8985

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN

PAUL E. SARBANES, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT
JOHN F. TERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, MINNESOTA
BARBARA BOXER, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT G. TORRINO, NEW JERSEY
BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA

JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
RICHARD S. LUGAR, INDIANA
CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA
GORDON H. SMITH, OREGON
BILL VIST, TEXAS
LINCOLN D. CHAFFE, RHODE ISLAND
GEORGE ALLEN, VIRGINIA
SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS
MICHAEL B. ENZI, WYOMING

ANTHONY J. BLANKEN, STAFF DIRECTOR
PATRICIA A. MENDENBY, REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8225

May 24, 2002

The Honorable Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I invite you to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations, at a full Committee hearing on developments in Afghanistan. Depending on your schedule, we will hold the hearing either at 10:15 a.m. on Tuesday, June 11 or at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, June 20 in Dirksen Senate Office Building, room 419. Secretary Rumsfeld has been invited to testify as well.

My colleagues and I very much appreciate your regular closed door briefings on Afghanistan. However, it has been six months since this Committee has held an open hearing on a country at the top of our nation's foreign and security policy agenda and of concern to the American people. The Committee hopes you and Secretary Rumsfeld will address developments in four areas, as appropriate: (i) the war on terrorism; (ii) internal politics and governance; (iii) the security situation; and (iv) humanitarian aid and development assistance.

I will appreciate your submitting 100 copies of your prepared statement and an additional copy on disk at least two working days in advance of the hearing. If you have any further questions, please have your staff contact Jonah Blank, at (b)(6)

I look forward to seeing you and hearing your views.

Sincerely,



Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman

RECEIVED
MAY 29 AM 9:17
LEGATIVE AFFAIRS

11-L-0559/OSD/8986

TAB A

December 9, 2002 5:15 PM

#347

Done 12/24

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Forces in Key Provinces

no for

Why don't we resurrect that idea of taking coalition forces and putting them in several key provinces, so they are spread around Afghanistan, since we are going to be switching over to less kinetics, and tie them in with the Afghan battalion.

Please have a proposal for that when I get back.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-50

.....

Please respond by 12/13/02

9 Dec 02

U09282 /03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/8987

June 3, 2002 1:26 PM

TO: Service Secretaries
Under Secretaries

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

This recent report about wasteful spending bothers me and I know it does you, too.

I sure hope that when you have all investigated the problems here, that we don't decide there is no one to be held accountable. These sound like very poor decisions, and we are never going to change the culture around here without imparting the appropriate sense of urgency about our responsibilities as stewards of taxpayer money.

Please look into this and into our spending practices generally and let me know what course of action you recommend.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hoffman, Lisa; Scripps Howard News Service, "\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought by Army and Air Force," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 05/30/02

DHR:dh
060302-29

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

U09302 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8988

3Tun02

Seattle Post-Intelligencer
May 30, 2002

\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought By Army And Air Force

By Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service

WASHINGTON -- A \$24,000 sofa and armchair. An \$1,800 pillow. And \$45,800 in silver and china. Such accoutrements would cause little surprise if found in the abodes of the wealthy and well-known.

But government auditors discovered these pricey items -- and many more -- not in a mansion but at Air Force and Army bases in Saudi Arabia, the rest of the Persian Gulf, Europe and the Balkans.

In a just-released report, the General Accounting Office informed Congress that its auditors found a number of "seemingly unneeded expenditures" made by the Air Force and Army in 2000 and 2001.

"As much as \$101 million in contingency operations funds were spent on questionable expenditures" -- a small fraction of the estimated \$2.2 billion examined by the investigators, but troubling nonetheless, the report said.

Among those were \$4,600 worth of "white beach sand" for an air base in the Arabian desert and a \$3,400 Sumo wrestling suit for another.

The Army came in for criticism for duplicating purchases of computers and office equipment at its bases in Bosnia to the tune of \$2.3 million.

Rather than using equipment already there or sharing new items, four successive Army units heading for Bosnia bought their own sets of equipment, the GAO said.

That struck the auditors as particularly wasteful, given that the Army has stocked more than 2,000 computers, 865 printers, 91 copiers and "a multitude of other office equipment" in the area. However, Army officials said that differences in missions and training of the various units serving in Bosnia necessitated some of the equipment purchases.

The auditors blamed Pentagon and Army superiors for failing to provide the clear guidance and strict oversight needed to rein in such practices.

The Air Force was also criticized for an array of what the GAO deemed unjustified and excessive spending, including:

At al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, the service bought a \$2,200 coffee table.

At Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, it bought a \$24,000 loveseat and arm chair and \$9,800 worth of Halloween decorations.

At al Jaber Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the questionable spending included an \$1,800 "executive high-back" pillow, a \$3,000 computer tutorial titled "The Intelligent Investor" and \$19,000 worth of decorative "river rock."

At various Air Force installations in the Persian Gulf region, the service bought a \$35,000 golf cart, a \$16,000 corporate golf membership and \$5,333 in golf passes.

Military experts claim that such recreational items can be a useful tool for building good relations with officials of a host country, whom base officers can invite for, say, a friendly round or two of golf.

The GAO report said Pentagon officials generally agreed that better oversight is needed to prevent wasteful spending.

June 4, 2002 8:02 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Yemen

My recollection is that King Abdullah of Jordan has a good relationship in Yemen and can conceivably be helpful to us there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060402-8

TENET

4 Jun 02

11-L-0559/OSD/8991

U09308 /02



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010
INFO MEMO

June 4, 2002, 08:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec _____

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L) *Butt 6/4/02*

SUBJECT: De-Mining

- You provided USD (AT&L) Tori Clarke's comments on Mr. Gingrich's November 12, 2001, email, which proposed a campaign to eliminate landmines in Afghanistan and a robotics de-mining competition. You asked if it is possible to do that (TAB A).
- Currently, we have unmanned systems - Miniflails and Standardized Robotics Systems (TAB B) - operating in Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan. Our systems in Afghanistan are used to clear anti-personnel and anti-tank mines to protect our operational forces.
- The Department has a solid de-mining research and development program. AT&L is developing robotic technologies that make mine clearing more efficient and safer for our personnel. There are two ongoing ACTDs and one potential FY04 candidate focused on countermining technologies that could have de-mining applications. Additionally, DARPA is pursuing a range of de-mining initiatives as well as robotic technologies that could potentially be adapted for use in de-mining. We welcome good ideas that compete favorably in the program reviews.
- Mr. Robert Andrews, PD, SO/LIC, previously responded to Mr. Gingrich's email and sent you a follow-up Information Memorandum on May 3, 2002. I concur with Mr. Andrews' points and do not feel it is necessary to respond to Mr. Gingrich again.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Michael Toscano, S&TS/LW, (b)(6)

I plan to meet with Dick Darwin who has some ideas in this area. Butt

snoutlake

5/2

April 22, 2002 1:13 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: De-Mining

Attached is a memo from Newt Gingrich on de-mining. Do any of you think it is possible to do that?

Thanks.

Attach. 11/12/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Taking the Mines Out of Afghanistan

DNR:dh
042202-20

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

5/23

- Torie Response attached.
- Note: This should go to Aldridge, too.
DARPA* must have some-
thing going. I have
sent Aldridge a copy.

D. R. H.

* ACTD's
may also address

11-L-0559/OSD/8993

5/23 *M. C. L.*

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie Clarke
CC: DEPSECDEF
Doug Feith
Robert Andrews
VADM Giambastiani
Larry DiRita
DATE: May 22, 2002
SUBJECT: De-Mining

It is possible to do what Newt Gingrich suggests regarding de-mining.

As you know, there is considerable money and clout behind the international movement to eliminate landmines altogether. It is likely they would react strongly and negatively to such a program with a massive public relations effort: "Why don't you work as hard at eliminating landmine use at all?"

Recommendation. Consider co-opting the anti-landmine community somewhat by:

a. Committing resources to an effort to develop landmine alternatives. DoD launched a number of efforts to examine alternatives to anti-personnel mines, which are currently under review by the Bush Administration. The following are some of the landmine alternates under review:


- The Man In The Loop (MITL) Non Self Destruct Alternative system
- The Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM)
- Self-Healing Minefields

b. Landmine alternatives studies performed by the National Academy of Sciences and Los Alamos National Laboratories (as well as DoD studies) concluded that non-lethal technologies alone are not viable replacements for anti-personnel landmines, but can be useful in certain military operations. The following non-lethal landmine alternatives are now under evaluation:


- The Modular Crowd Control Munition
- A Kevlar capturing net
- A high velocity, air vortex ring munition
- An electrical stun, anti-mobility device

c. Encouraging other countries to join the de-mining campaign. Since 1993, the United States has provided over \$35 million to support humanitarian demining efforts in Afghanistan. In FY 2001, through the State Department's Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, the U.S. allocated \$2.8 million to sustain such mine action activities in Afghanistan as mine awareness and demining training, and mine detection and clearance operations. We could increase that amount.

MINE CLEARING SYSTEMS



Mini-Flail



Abrams Panther with Standardized Robotics System

snawake

7/24

April 22, 2002 1:13 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: De-Mining

DR

471.6

Attached is a memo from Newt Gingrich on de-mining. Do any of you think it is possible to do that?

Thanks.

Attach.

11/12/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Taking the Mines Out of Afghanistan

DHR:dh
042202-20

.....
Please respond by 05/10/02

5/23

- Torie Response attached.
- Note: This should go to Aldridge, too.
DARPA* must have some-
thing going. I have
sent Aldridge a copy.

22 Apr 02

I like

1. A.T.D.
2. also address

11-L-0559/OSD/8997

U0933712/02

TAB A

December 27, 2002 2:56 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: French Ports

Do you think we ought not to have ships go near French ports if they are going to have those kinds of demonstrations? There are plenty of other places we can go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122701-29 (in computer)

Please respond by

01/10/03

1/22
Myer's Response attached

11-L-0559/OSD/8998

U09404 1/03

Tab A


• 12/13
0600

December 4, 2002, 5:00 PM

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Gordon England

RE: Stop Loss



We could not agree more – both Navy and Marine Corps see stop loss as a “least preferred” force shaper. We do not like to use it - but some times we have had too.

326

Navy: Ended the use of Stop Loss in August 2002.

(A)

- The last Sailor will be released from the program by 31 December 2002

Marine Corps: Selectively finds stop loss necessary in a few instances.

- Have 171 Marines under Stop Loss
- Used for force protection and low- density high-demand skills
- Judicious use limitis impact to a small number of Marines

Bottom Line: The Maine Corps continues to very selectively use Stop Loss when it makes best sense. Navy has been able to use other force shaping tolls and has no plans to re-implement it.

4 Dec 02

SB3
12/1/02

~~SECRET~~

8:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 2, 2002

SUBJECT:

Set a meeting with Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace, Wolfowitz, Feith, Billingslea,
Cambone to discuss the Welch Assessment Panel on Special Operations.
Someone from the Welch panel should come and brief us and answer questions.

We need to do it the first week of December. Here's my copy, and I will need it
back for the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120202.01

*1215 -
1315
Sat 7 Dec*

*Holland Sacun
Wam Blair w/ Welch
JG Cartwright*

Attach: Welch Draft Report 11/26/02 - SECRET

Please respond by: _____

12/6

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/9000

U09484 /03

322

22 Dec 02

3/12/02

March 11, 2002 4:04 PM

010

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Attorneys

I would like a study done of how many attorneys there are in the Defense Department and where they are located.

I would also like to consider the possibility of whether or not to eliminate the separate legal functions in a number of the activities, centralize them and reduce the number by some non-trivial fraction.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-56

.....

Please respond by 05/01/02

11 MAR 02

05/20/02 11:11:30

May 20, 2002 5:17 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Modernizing Logistics

What do you think about getting PriceWaterhouseCoopers into help us think through logistics alone, as this Newt Gingrich e-mail suggests?

Attach.

Newt Gingrich e-mail to SecDef, "Taking the Cost Out" 05/03/02

MMH:dh
052002-54

.....
Please respond by 06/11/02

6/6/02

Don —

Yes. We will set it up. We also have a Joint Logistics Board — OSD, Services, DA, JCS — who are thinking through this problem. They have established a "Future Logistics Enterprise" to address end-to-end distribution.

Pete

May 20, 2002 5:17 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Modernizing Logistics

What do you think about getting PriceWaterhouseCoopers into help us think through logistics alone, as this Newt Gingrich e-mail suggests?

400

Attach.

Newt Gingrich e-mail to SecDef, "Taking the Cost Out" 05/03/02

DHR:lh
052002-54Please respond by 06/11/02

6/6/02

Don —

Yes. We will set it up. We also have a Joint Logistics Board — OSD, Services, DA, JCS — who are thinking through this problem. They have established a "Future Logistics Enterprise" to address end-to-end distribution.

Pete

20 May 02

11:50
1650
SHOWHARE

October 31, 2002 2:41 PM

000.71 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Attendees at Meetings

You have to start telling me who is in a meeting with me. I notice, for example, for the 1:30 to 2:00 p.m. meeting with Mr. Kheir, there is no indication of who is supposed to be in the meeting, and it is not a one-on-one.

Also, I notice that in the materials, like this Jordan paper (b)(6) is keeping, she is not putting down the people who are in the meetings from the country, which I need.

Thanks.

Attach.
Foreign Report: Jordan

DHR:dh
103102-16

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02

11/16

(b)(6)

Let's be sure we follow up with the staff who work these meetings to get the right headcount. Let's usually someone from Policy. D. Rita

*11/18
DI Rita*

31 Oct 02

U09581 / 03

JORDAN

Meetings in Jordan:

- 11/19/83 Amman, Jordan
Dinner hosted by HRH Hassan bin Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan
Meeting re: Middle East:
-Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan
-Foreign Minister Kasim
- 12/14/83 Amman, Jordan Re: Middle East
Minister of Information Adnan Abu Odeh
Crown Prince HRH Hassan bin Talal
Control Officer Imbrie
Political Officer Turco
Walid Jumblat.
- 1/28/84 Amman, Jordan – Re: Middle East; King of Jordan Hussein bin Talal

Meetings with Jordanian Dignitaries:

- 3/30/76 Washington, DC ~ State dinner hosted by President & Mrs. Gerald Ford,
met Hussein bin Talal and Queen Alya, King and Queen of Jordan
- 3/31/76 Meeting with King Hussein bin Talal
- 3/31/76 Reception honoring President and Mrs. Ford (reciprocal)
hosted by King and Queen, Hussein bin Talal and Queen Alya.
- 10/13/76 Meeting with Zayyid Bin Shaker, Jordanian Armed Forces CINC
- 5/20/82 Chicago, IL - Hosted dinner at Ritz-Carlton on behalf of Mid-America
Committee. Guests:
H.E. Abdul Hadi Majali, Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S.
H.E. Amer Kahammash, Minister of the Royal Court
H.E. Ragai, Dageni, Director of the Office of the Crown Prince
HRH Hassan bin Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan
- 2/21/83 **London, England** – Re: Middle East, King of Jordan Hussein bin Talal
and Armed Forces CINC Zayyid Bin Shaker
- 4/5/01 One-on-one luncheon @ Pentagon with King Abdullah of Jordan
- 4/24/01 With Gen. Shelton (CJCS) met Lt. Gen. Malkawi, Chairman of Joint
Chiefs of Jordan

9/27/01 King of Jordan Abdullah @ Four Seasons Hotel, Washington, DC

2/1/02 King of Jordan HRH King Abdullah II @ Four Seasons Hotel,
Washington, DC.
Prime Minister of Jordan Ali Abu Ragheb
Minister of Foreign Affairs Marwan Muasher
Director of General Intelligence Sa'ad al-Khayr

3/11/02 Military Worldwide Coalition Against Terrorism Luncheon
@ Pentagon, Photo op w/SecDef – Representative from Jordan was
present.

5/6/02 King of Jordan HRH King Abdullah II @ Four Seasons Hotel,
Washington, DC w/Prime Minister Abu Raghieb, Foreign Minister
Muasher, DCM Hassan

7/31/02 King of Jordan HRH King Abdullah II @ Four Seasons Hotel,
Washington DC w/Dr. Crouch,

November 26, 2002 10:08 AM

TO: Honorable Clay Johnson
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: SEC

230.02

Here is a letter I received from a person I have known somewhat over the years,
John Levin. I do not know Burton Malkeil, but for what it's worth, here it is.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/13/02 John Levin ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
1117023

26 Nov 02

U09582 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/9007

JOHN A. LEVIN & CO., INC.
ONE ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
25TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10020
(212) 332-8400

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 17 2002

November 13, 2002


The Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Room 3E880
The Pentagon
Washington, DC (OSD) 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I know you are overwhelmed and all our thoughts are with you but knowing your central role in decision-making, I want to take the liberty of saying that I believe several people have spoken on behalf of Burt Malkiel to head the SEC. Perhaps you know Burt and his outstanding qualities, integrity, judgment and knowledge of all aspects of the securities industry. He has been a long term Director of Vanguard and understands the public interest, has been an outstanding Director of our company, and is a frequent columnist for the Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and other publications. More fundamentally, he was on the Council of Economic Advisers, is a Professor at Princeton, and has written a number of well-regarded books. I have attached his c.v.

Burt really is first-rate and a very measured person who also has an excellent public persona. All the best.

Sincerely,



John A. Levin

JAL:reb
enclosure

January 2002

**RESUME
BURTON G. MALKIEL****HOME ADDRESS**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DATE OF BIRTH

(b)(6)

EDUCATION

1943-1949 Boston Latin School
1949-1953 Harvard College, B.A., June 1953
1953-1955 Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, M.B.A., June 1955
1960-1964 Princeton University, Ph.D., January 1964

MILITARY SERVICE

1955-1958 First Lieutenant in the Finance Corps of the U.S. Army

BUSINESS CAREER

1958-1960 Associate in the Investment Banking Department of the Wall Street investment banking firm of Smith Barney & Co.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE

1975-1977 Member, Council of Economic Advisers

ACADEMIC CAREER

1964-1966 Assistant Professor, Economics Department, Princeton University
1966-1981 Director, Financial Research Center, Princeton University
1966-1968 Associate Professor, Economics Department, Princeton University
1968-1981 Professor, Economics Department, Princeton University
1969-1981 Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor

January 2002

1974-1975 Chairman, Economics Department, Princeton University

1977-1981 Chairman, Economics Department, Princeton University

1981-1988 Dean, Yale School of Organization and Management and William S. Beinecke Professor of Management Studies

1988- Chemical Bank Chairman's Professor of Economics, Economics Department, Princeton University

PROFESSIONAL POSTS

Director, The Vanguard Group of Investment Companies (\$500B assets); Member, Compensation Committee, Audit Committee

Director, The Vanguard Group (Ireland) Limited

Director, Prudential Insurance Company of America (\$300B assets); Chairman, Investment Committee; Member, Executive Committee, Dividend Committee

Director, BKF Capital Group; Member, Strategic Planning Committee, Audit Committee, Compensation Committee

Director, The Jeffrey Company (\$2B Private Investment Company)

Director, Neuvis Corporation (Internet software)

Investment Committee, Pew Charitable Trusts

Chairman, New Products Committee, American Stock Exchange

MEMBERSHIPS

American Finance Association (President, 1978)

American Economic Association

American Philosophical Society

Various government and non-government commissions and advisory boards

Editorial Boards: *Emerging Markets Review*; *Applied Financial Economics*

January 2002

AWARDS, HONORS

Smith Breeden Prize for best article in the *Journal of Finance*, 2001

Third Annual Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy Award, *Journal of Portfolio Management*, volume year 2000-2001

Honorary Doctor of Humane Letters Degree from the University of Hartford, June 1971

Phi Beta Kappa

Harvard Business School Alumni Achievement Award for 1984

PUBLISHED BOOKS

International Monetary Arrangements: The Problem of Choice, (co-editor with Fritz Machlup, and author of position paper), Princeton, 1964.

The Term Structure of Interest Rates: Expectations and Behavior Patterns, Princeton University Press, Princeton, December 1966.

Strategies and Rational Decisions in the Securities Options Market, (with Richard E. Quandt), MIT Press, Cambridge, 1969.

A Random Walk Down Wall Street, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1973; Revised College Edition, 1975; Second College Edition 1981; Fourth Edition, 1985; Fifth Edition, 1990; Japanese Edition, 1993; Chinese Edition, 1996; Sixth Edition, 1996; Seventh Edition, 1999; Japanese Edition, 2000; Seventh Edition Paperback, 2000; Italian Edition – *A zozzo per Wall Street*, printed November 2001 and a Russian Edition, printed 1999. Also, selected chapters of book (German translation) in "Strategie und Zufall an der Borse," Zurcher Kantonalbank Publisher, Zurich, Switzerland, October 1988, pp. 29-109. In pasen aleatorio por Wall Street, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1992.

Managing Risk in an Uncertain Era: An Analysis for Endowed Institutions, (with Paul B. Firstenberg), Princeton, 1976.

The Inflation-Beater's Investment Guide, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1980. Revised paperback edition Winning Investment Strategies, 1982.

Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices, (with John G. Cragg), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

Global Bargain Hunting: An Investor's Guide to Profits in Emerging Markets, (with J.P. Mei), Simon & Schuster, New York, January 1998.

January 2002

The Index Fund Solution (with R. Evans), Simon & Schuster, New York, 1999.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Approximately 150 published articles



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

2002 JUN 12 14 0 23

June 11, 2002, 4:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Military Support to Wildland Fires - Western Region

- The Department of Defense (DoD) has initiated support to the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) for wildfires in the western United States (Colorado, Utah, and California). An execute order was issued today tasking a Defense Liaison Officer in accordance with a memorandum of agreement between NIFC and DoD.
- The Director of Military Support issued a planning order in April that was coordinated with the Services, Commander, Joint Forces Command, the other regional and specified commanders, and Defense Agencies.
- Due to the intensity of the fires, it is anticipated that DoD may be asked, within the next several days, to provide up to eight Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems (MAFFS) from the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.
- To provide a historical perspective, in 2001, MAFFS aircraft supported NIFC efforts from Gowen Field, Boise, Idaho, Klamath Falls, Oregon; and Port Hueneme, California. Seventy-two MAFFS personnel provided 20 days of support flying over two hundred hours on 175 sorties that delivered just less than eight million pounds of fire retardant. Department of Defense also provided two battalions in support of the efforts to suppress western wildland fires.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Kathryn A. Condon

(b)(6)

CF:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

U09591 / 02

11-L-05594-SD/9043



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SECRET
2002 JUN 12 PM 5:31

INFO MEMO

May 29, 2002, 7:46 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Pete Aldridge, USD(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

12 JUN 2002

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. Art Money to the Defense Science Board

- Dr. Bill Schneider, Chairman, Defense Science Board (DSB) cleared the appointment of Mr. Art Money with Ms. Jackie Arends prior to my approval of his appointment.
- Mr. Money has particular expertise in the area of Radio Frequency Signal Intelligence (RF SIGINT) and significant experience in intelligence issues. His appointment will strengthen the Board's expertise in the intelligence area as it continues to grapple with these issues in the War Against Terrorism.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: CDR Brian Hughes/DSB


(b)(6)

2002 JUN 12

11-L-0359 OSD/9014

U09684 /02

May 16, 2002 2:51 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
 SUBJECT: Art Money

How did Art Money get on the Defense Science Board?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 051602-20

.....
 Please respond by 05/31/02

5/20
 → To: Pote Aldridge
 Please advise
 Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
 5/21



COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JUN 12 PM 6:10

INFO MEMO

June 12, 2002 9:19 AM

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *for* JOHN P. STENBIT *Cheryl J. G. 6/12/02*

SUBJECT: Galileo

- In reply to your question about the technical problems with Galileo, the overriding problem is the potential overlay of our military code. If that happens, and a Galileo receiver falls into the wrong hands, we would have to jam their signal in an area of conflict, and our signal would be jammed as well. We can mitigate this problem, but at increased difficulty.
- We have no problem with the EU's moving forward, provided they meet our four objectives:
 - That the performance of any civil terminal be better in the presence of both GPS and Galileo satellites in the field of view than with one or the other alone.
 - That there be no interference with the frequency used by our military codes.
 - That Galileo does not initiate a regulatory regime that would force the U.S. to have a Galileo receiver in order to fly aircraft in Europe, or on ships to enter European ports.
 - That NATO not be expected to fund the Galileo shortfall through member nations' military funding.
- Perhaps the greatest problem with GPS at the current time is that both the HASC and the SASC reduced the funds we asked for to increase the power of the next several GPS satellites, once again postponing some easily provided anti-jam protection for this most valuable system. We need to make sure we provide the best GPS system before we worry about what the Europeans are doing.

Prepared by: Ray Swider, C31 (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/9016

U09688 /02

10:27 AM

TO: John Stenbit

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

DATE: June 8, 2002

SUBJECT: GALILEO

I need a very simple one-pager explaining to me what the technical problems are with Galileo.

Thanks.

DHR/asm
060802.12


6/15/02

Please respond by: _____

11-L-0559/OSD/9017

1030
Snowflake

April 29, 2002 9:32 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Invitation for Kazakhstan

I think we probably ought to invite the Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan to the U.S. when they put their liaison people in Tampa.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
042902.3

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

6/6

TO: USD(P)
Yours for action.



Larry Di Rita

4/7

Larry Di Rita

29 Apr 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9018

U09708 /02

October 1, 2002 2:45 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: SEC

Why don't you get me invited to the SEC sometime?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-S2

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

001150

10CT02

U09781 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9019

October 3, 2002 8:07 AM

W
W
W

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Travel *DR*

Would you please give me something that shows the travel (location, number of days, whether business or pleasure) of the senior civilians, through assistant secretary, for this year.

I watched it for the CINCs last year. I would like to see it for the Service Chiefs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100302-2

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

U09782 /03

30C102

11-L-0559/OSD/9020

October 7, 2002 2:48 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Compliments from Safire

I saw Bill Safire the other night and he said, "You have that fellow Marc Thiessen over there. He's doing a good job for you." He mentioned particularly the House and Senate Testimony and the Arlington Cemetery piece.

As an old speechwriter, he ought to know!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-55

.....
Please respond by _____

33550

100702

U09783 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9021

October 7, 2002 2:41 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photographers

I think we should maybe get the military photographer of the year and have him do our photographs, and figure out some alternative for Helene Stikkel and Robert Ward.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-52

.....
Please respond by 10 / 18 / 02

U09784 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/9022

06050

700702

October 7, 2002 7:24 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: United Way

We have this big United Way campaign on. I'm worried about it. Those people seem to have trouble with corruption and wrongdoing. I am reluctant to give my money to it, and I'm worried about asking people in the Pentagon to.

Would you please have someone look into it? Please tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100701-3

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

U09786 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9023

005

170202

October 7, 2002 8:05 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Top Ten

Please let me see the latest version of the top ten priorities, and let's make sure we pass it out to all the key people, so they know where we ended up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-14

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

U09787 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9024

020000

020000

October 8, 2002 10:11 AM

TO: MSg (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Events at River Entrance

ADVANCE
COPY GIVEN

600

I would like to be told what these big events are out on my front lawn down here. Whenever there is something going on out there like that, please put a note in my box telling me who it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100802-14.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

10/9/02

Sir,

I have talked with all the correct offices to let me know when events will take place, so that I can let you know.

V/R

MSG (b)(6)


800202

U09788 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9025

October 9, 2002 9:03 AM

000.715D

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Grady Means

Please get Grady Means from PriceWaterhouseCoopers in and let me meet him. I would like to talk to him. Apparently he is technology-oriented and very bright.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-12

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

Direct # @ Price Waterhouse Cooper ^{10/9}
(b)(6)

Sharon -

Home
(b)(6)

Please see if
we can track him down.



900202

U09789 /03

10/28
asked
Calvin M.

October 9, 2002 8:24 AM

TO:

(b)(6)

*Shirley
copy given*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

D

SUBJECT: Testimony

When you give out my testimony on Iraq, don't give out all the Q&As that were asked by the members, just give the prepared testimony as it was prepared, not as it was delivered.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-5

.....
Please respond by _____

IRAQ

90CT02

U09791 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9027

October 9, 2002 8:57 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Bruce Jette

Why don't you meet Bruce Jette, who Newt Gingrich mentioned to you? He worked for Keane. See what you think of him and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
100902-9

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

000.115D

902702

U09792 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9028

October 9, 2002 9:00 AM

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Candidates

Why don't you sit down with Newt Gingrich—he is running around all over the country meeting bright people. Please get the names of the people, and find out what he thinks their best qualities are, so we can have a good list of those folks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-10

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

231.2

90CT02

U09793 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9029

October 9, 2002 9:01 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Col. Warner

Please get from Newt the rest of Col. Warner's name, the Army intellectual who is BG-promotable. I think we ought to meet him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-11

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

10/9

Col James Warner, I'll

track him down.

D. Rita

U09794 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9030


210 Army

900202

October 9, 2002 9:24 AM

322

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Earlier Jointness

Please tell me who responds to my request in yesterday's staff meeting as to ways we can improve jointness at an earlier stage. I would like to see a list of who was in the meeting and who actually responds.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100902-18

.....

Please respond by 10/25/02

90CT02

U09795 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9031

01/15 1530
snowflake

October 10, 2002 12:27 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Substantive Documents

You really probably should give me copies of things you have signed that are substantive, so I can get a look at them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101002-9

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

10/15
Seedorf -
I'll get better at
it. Sorry.
Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
10/15

U09796 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9032

020 T5H

10 Oct 02

October 11, 2002 9:04 AM

*Answer
10/17 given out*

000.71WH

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POTUS Meeting

I want a meeting with the President every week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101102-12

.....

Please respond by 10/15/02


11OCT02

U09797 /03

October 15, 2002 1:54 PM

001.15D

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Invitations

I'm still not getting to look at the invitations I receive or the press invitations I get.
I would like to get a sense of who is asking me to do what.

Please let me see some of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-35.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

10/16
Sec Def -
You are seeing a lot
more. I'll ~~be~~ open up
some more.

D. Rita

1502102

U09798 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9034

October 16, 2002 8:00 AM

373.24

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Accomplishments Paper

Please add to that accomplishment paper that we stopped calling it national missile defense and call it ballistic missile defense, which changed the whole focus.

Also add the decision for missile defense to go for R&D.

Then show me how you have changed it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101602-9

.....

Please respond by 10/25/02

160CT02

U09799 103

11-L-0559/OSD/9035

October 16, 2002 7:07 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*,
SUBJECT: October 15 NSC Meeting

On both Sunday and Monday, my staff called over to see if the NSC meeting at 8:55 a.m. on Tuesday, October 15, 2002 was plus one or just principals. We were told both times it was just principals. I arrived, and there was McLaughlin, Kelly, Libby, Hadley and Joseph. It turned out it was plus one, or more.

Also, I'm told you have directed that your staff not tell my office who the attendees will be at an NSC or PC meeting. Why is that?

That the paper didn't arrive until shortly before the meeting (the afternoon of October 14) makes it difficult for everybody.

DHR:dh
101502-40

334NSC

16 OCT 03

U09800 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9036

October 16, 2002 9:02 AM

TO: Bill Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA

SUBJECT: Thanks

If I have not thanked you for your comments on "Need for Urgency & Teamwork" paper, I do so now. Your remarks are excellent.

DHR:dh
101602-17


U09801 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9037

020202

160202

October 16, 2002 9:05 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Need for Urgency Paper

020 D00

Would you please get somebody to take Bill Schneider's comments and incorporate them into our "Need for Urgency" paper. I think they are first-rate. He is one smart fellow. Then let me see it.

Thanks.

Attach.
07/30/02 Schneider Paper

DHR:dh
101602-18

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02.

160CT02

U09802 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9038

SECDEF HAS SEEN

BILL SCHNEIDER
8/20

OCT 16 2002

COMMENTS ON
Need for Urgency & Teamwork:
Building Multiple Leadership Centers
(07/30/02 draft)

① T/A
fx

The comments offered below reflect a review of the 7/30 draft. Current thinking may have moved well beyond the points mentioned there based on subsequent discussion.. To begin with, the section, *The Way Ahead* that was treated last (section 8) in the draft is addressed first here, followed by comments on subsequent sections of the paper. *The Way Ahead* addresses a number of department-wide cross-cutting issues that will affect the more specific issues raised elsewhere in these comments.

The Way Ahead

There a number of cross cutting issues can be helpful in implementing more specific objectives described subsequently in these comments.

Consider the following additional initiatives:

- Employ output metrics to manage DoD activities. The DSB has produced a study on the subject of methodology to create output metrics to better manage DoD resources. This effort can be updated and refined if desired.
- Use the broadened role of JFCOM to establish annual exercises that are intended to test, not demonstrate increasingly demanding capabilities of the military forces.
- Establish a full-time panel of recently retired Combatant Commanders to assist OSD in implementing transformation, jointness, etc.
- Change system testing practices to incorporate testing throughout the development cycle (see DSB study on testing) to improve system performance, lower costs, and decrease product cycle time.
- Rationalize the national security (DoD + NNSA) science and technology infrastructure, refocus science and technology investment to couple directly to future requirements in the context of a reformed and shortened acquisition process, and fund the development of systems engineering and integration skills.
- Software is both the most pervasive enabler of modern military capabilities and the most enduring source of cost, performance, and scheduling problems in the DoD. Failure to reform software development and maintenance will adversely affect the DoD's ability to achieve its transformation aspirations..
- Restructure the management of intelligence around its products rather than its tools. The organizing theme of the intelligence community that focuses on the

means by which intelligence is collected rather than ends to which that intelligence is put is an important source of the problems that are so apparent today. The DSB has developed a proposal (either for a joint study with the intelligence community, or solely for the DoD) to develop this theme.

- The extent to which the DoD will be able to effectively transition from the industrial to the information age will depend on its ability to convert information to knowledge and to manage that knowledge effectively. The management of this knowledge will be the most important characteristic that will enable the DoD to use that knowledge. Models in the commercial sector of how this can be done are abundant.
- Missile defense needs to become a core competence of the DoD. Three essential architectures (war fighting, systems, and technology) should be the first deliverable from the R&D program – supported by a plan to provide end-to-end simulation of the “system of systems” that makes up the layered BMD architecture.

Specific comments on other points in the briefing follow.

1. The First 18 Months – Highlights (Accomplishments)

To this list could be added a few other significant points that reflect on administration themes for defense transformation.

- Emphasis on precision targeting and prominence given to precision weapons procurement (e.g. post *Enduring Freedom* acquisition of JDAM).
- Establishment of a positive relationship with the news media that has set the stage for a credible public discussion of post *Enduring Freedom* options in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
- The emphasis on transformation has facilitated a focus on the centrality of information technology and decision dominance to achieve the President’s aspirations.
- The extension of the transformation theme to the full scope of DoD activities has created a constructive set of expectations that place all stakeholders on notice that the no area of DoD activity will be excluded from transformation.
- The NPR makes it possible to begin to develop a 21st century approach to the nuclear weapons program and organization that will ensure its role as a contributor to the broad aims of dissuasion contained in the document.

2. Where is the US likely to more vulnerable and/or in need of improvement over the next 5 to 10 years?

- The security of information should be included.
- Greater investment should be made in a *rationalized* DoD and (S&T) base that sheds superfluous capability (e.g. DoD facilities that are creating technologies better done in the civil sector), and focuses investment on S&T needed for defense transformation. (See the 2001 DSB Summer Study)
- The DoD is likely to become vulnerable to “training surprise” (i.e. focused investment by adversaries in highly specialized training that exploits US vulnerabilities) because the DoD under funds/undervalues training in its modernization programs. (See 2000 DSB study on Training).
- DoD modernization has been adversely affected by a secondary consequence of the rationalization and consolidation in the defense sector during the 1990s; the loss of the industry's experienced cadre of systems engineering and integration professionals. The DoD needs to invest to rebuild these crucial skill sets.

3. What USG/DoD organizational circumstances create vulnerabilities and/or the need for improvement over the next 5 to 10 years?

To this list should be added:

- The reliability of the nuclear stockpile, and the absence of a path to create nuclear weapons appropriate to the requirements of 21st century dissuasion.
 - In addition to the need to recruit skilled experts, systems engineering and integration specialists must also be included.
 - Adequate investment in training is required.
4. In the next 5 to 10 years, what systems/capabilities/activities are like to be of relatively greater utility?

1st Tier

- Ballistic missile defense

- Reliable and less costly unmanned systems
- Timely and reliable logistics
- Rapid assimilation and assurance that the lessons of military operations will be "learned."
- The outsourcing tasks that do not reflect DoD-core competencies will parallel similar trends in the defense industry (i.e. in the defense industry, the core competence is systems engineering/integration, not technology).
- Effective operational deception/asymmetry will only emerge from a modern planning process that will produce speed-surprise precision.
- Improved Chem.-bio defenses should be a first tier, not a second tier activity.

2nd Tier

- Stealth, land/sea/air
 - Suppression of enemy air defenses using standoff munitions from heavy bombers
5. In next 5 to 10 years, what systems/capabilities/activities are likely to of relatively less utility, or of relatively less utility, useful as a deterrent but very expensive – need to assess tradeoffs?
 - Strategic/tactical nuclear forces based on Cold War concepts of operation, weapons (e.g. legacy warhead and weapon systems), and support misallocate resources and diminish effectiveness. The infrastructure supporting strategic/tactical nuclear forces needs to be modernized to place this capability on a lower-cost/sustainable path.
 6. Over the next 5 to 10 years, which relationships/regions could take on:

Greater Importance

- *Ad hoc* coalitions of the willing to respond to specific regional or global threats

....Relatively Greater Danger


- Iraq and North Korea are omitted from the list.

....Relatively Less Danger

- Russia is less certain than Western/Central Europe to pose less danger to the US

7. Countries the US is/or could be allied with over the next 5 to 10 years

- Concern about the regional consequences of WMD/missile proliferation could produce situation-dependent alliance relationships in support of missile defense deployments without establishing a more broadly based alliance relationship, e.g.
 - Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Nepal, selected European states, Canada, Taiwan, and Russia.


William Schneider, Jr.

19 August 20, 2002

October 16, 2002 8:07 AM

334NSC

TO: LTG Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Attending NSC Meetings

I don't know who is telling the NSC whether or not I plan to attend meetings, but I would like you to stop doing it. You can't know who is going to actually go, so having you or others tell them who is coming is probably not helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101602-4

.....

Please respond by 10/18/02


16 OCT 02

U09803 /03

October 17, 2002 10:33 AM

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret)

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Military Appointments

We have to lay out the entire year ahead in military appointments, so we get lead time on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101702-18

.....
Please respond by 11 / 01 / 02

U09805 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9045

210

17 Oct 02

October 21, 2002 12:05 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Speechwriting

People keep giving me things that have phrases like: "all nations who support." A nation is not a "who."

They keep personalizing nouns that cannot be personalized. Please have someone talk to them about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102102-16

.....
Please respond by 11/01/02

350.601.52

21 Oct 02

U09806 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9046

October 21, 2002 5:50 PM

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT:

Meetings with President

*Admission given
12/17/02*

When you get a format for the meetings with the President, please show it to me. Then I will edit it so we can do it.

For example, today I met with the President at the National Security Council meeting from 8:55 to 9:45 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. The subjects were Turkey, Jordan, Jiang Zemin's visit and the UN resolution on Iraq. Leave a space for comments.

Also today, at 2:55 p.m. I met with the President. He introduced me to one of his classmates from Yale, wife's name Laura, from Greenwich, Connecticut. I then met alone with the President for about three minutes and talked to him about the Wednesday NSC meeting, where I had been told he wanted to meet with Gen. McNeill and Gen. Franks. He said, "Who is General McNeill?" I said he is the general in charge of Afghanistan. He said, "Well, I don't need to meet with him." I said that General Franks, General Myers and I suggest that General Franks meet on SVTC. He said, "Fine. That's the way to do it. I just kind of want to stay in touch."

I met in the Oval Office from 3:00 to 3:15 p.m. for a pre-brief on the meeting between the President and Lord Robertson. From 3:15 to 4:00 p.m., I was in the meeting when the President met with Lord Robertson.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102102-18

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

U09807 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9047

031.1 WH

21 Oct 02

October 22, 2002 7:30 AM

TO:

(b)(6)

Advance copy

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Incident in Chicago

020 SD

There was an explosion of some kind, a loud blast, that people in the neighborhood seem to think was a bomb of some kind in front of Marcy's house in Chicago. It was in the street, just to the middle of her line with her neighbor. About 20 people rushed outside to see what had happened.

Marcy called the FBI, but no one ever called back. She left a message.

I have no idea what it was, but it might be worth someone thinking about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102202-7

22 Oct 2002

Sir,

Please.

I spoke with Marcy again (after our conversation). It was a strange incident. As I indicated earlier, we're going to run several agents through New Mexico to Portland and Chicago this week to speak with all of your children, the FBI and the other respective police agencies regarding the investigation in Santa Fe and other potential safety issues. I hope to be able to get my arms around all of the facts, stories, and information available so that we can get a comprehensive big picture. They are also going to work with the NM State Police and Paul on monitoring the demonstration in Taos and identifying response procedures should the demonstration get out of hand and pose a threat to your property.

22 Oct 02

V/R

[Signature]

U09808 /03

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/9048

October 22, 2002 7:17 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Scheduling Time this Week

*Advance
copy sent*

020 SD

I need time to do the memos for the other CINCs if Feith is not going to do them.

I need time this week alone for a couple of hours to work on the Security Cooperation Guidance paper.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102202-2

.....

Please respond by 10/25/02

22 Oct 02

U09809 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9049

October 28, 2002 9:03 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Burial in Arlington

Can the spouses of people who are eligible for burial in Arlington Cemetery be buried there also? For example, could Joyce be buried there, assuming I am eligible? Am I eligible?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102802-21

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02

687

28 Oct 02

U09810 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9050

October 28, 2002 2:34 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: FBI Report

*ADVANCE
10/29 6:00 PM*

Iraq

If the FBI does not give me a report on Iraqi terrorism in the US by Wednesday,
please call over to Director Mueller's office and ask for it.

Thanks.

DIIR Jh
102802-29

.....
Please respond by 10/30/02

*DeLancey -
He 1st of this morning
(Wolfe by gave it to
him).
J*

*Larry Di Rita
10/29*

28 Oct 02

U09811 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9051

October 28, 2002 3:58 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Time During Defense Policy Board

In the future, when the Defense Policy Board is in, I would like you to keep my day more open, so I can see some of the members individually.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102802-31

.....

Please respond by _____

334

28 Oct 02

U09812 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9052

10/31 show
100

October 30, 2002 7:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Side Visits

091.112

It can have an enormous impact to the benefit the Department if I stop by and see a CHOD when he is visiting Myers/Pace or a policy person when he is visiting Feith or Wolfowitz, or if I make a brief stop by at a reception in an embassy. It ends up being only 20 minutes worth of effort, with minimum travel, but it can have far-reaching results.

I think you ought to get someone to prepare a list for me of all the people who are coming into the building on a daily basis, and I ought to start looking at the invitations more carefully. We ought to find a way to make these brief contacts.

Please see me with a plan as to how I am going to be able to get my voice heard on these things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103002-4

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

11/1
Col Bucci
Feith on 10/30/02
shod mty
30 Oct 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9053

U09813 /03

Larry Di Rita
11/4

10/31
1600

Snowflake

October 31, 2002 6:56 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invitation from Djibouti

When I went down to visit with him yesterday, the CHOD for Djibouti invited me to Djibouti. Let's put that on the list of people who have invited me to something.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103102-4

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02

10/31
Adlene -
Do you keep track of list?
DHL

Larry Di Rita

11/4

Djibouti

31 Oct 02

U09814 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9054

10/31
1600
snowflake

October 31, 2002 6:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Call to Marty Hoffmann

Please have Steve Herbits call Marty Hoffmann and talk to him about the security problem for the family.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103102-6

.....
Please respond by 11/03/02

10/31 -
Okay. I spoke
with Steve.

Ferry
Larry Di Rita

11/1

020 SD

31 Oct 02

U09815 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9055



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100




JUN 14 PM 5:31

INFO MEMO

OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION

June 14, 2002, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Budget

- We should look into a 2-year budget. The major stumbling block has been the congressional appropriations committees which have never been receptive to a biennial budget. They have consistently viewed biennial budgeting as an executive branch attempt to reduce their constitutional oversight role.
- Regardless of congressional action, we are looking at streamlining the internal Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) process. We have an on-going PPBS reform effort with Ken Krieg. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) also directs the Senior Executive Council (SEC), under the leadership of the Secretary of the Navy, to work with the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself to undertake the replacement of the current rigid PPBS with a more streamlined and integrated process.
- My personal view is that we do not need to do all phases of the PPBS with equal intensity every year. Once an administration's planning guidance construct is in place and we have programmed funds to achieve the planning guidance goals and objectives, subsequent reviews should simply focus on fine-tuning the defense program based on fact-of-life changes.



U09816-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9056


- I envision a 4-year cycle where we conduct an intensive planning and programming process in the first year of an administration and then conduct budget execution reviews that focus on performance in the years we do not conduct intensive programming. These execution reviews will help inform the annual budgets and will also incorporate the kinds of fact-of-life changes that inevitably arise (changes in inflation assumptions, new legislated requirements, program slippages, etc.). If the proposed legislative change to shift the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the second year of an administration is adopted, the QDR will occur the same year as an execution review.
- I will approach the appropriations committees to see if there is any receptivity to a biennial budget. In the meantime, I will work closely with Secretary England to recommend internal changes that reduce the rigidity and duplication of the convoluted PPBS chart illustrated.

COORDINATION: None

I also will work with OMB, as appropriate, regarding an execution review.

Prepared By: John Roth, (b)(6)

May 22, 2002 8:43 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Budget

Should we go back and try to get a two-year budget?

Thanks.

Attach.

05/01/02 USD(P&R) Memo to SecDef re: PPB [U07677/02]

DHR:dh
052202-12

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9058

May 8, 2002 8:17 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Budget

Should we go for a biennial budget?

Thanks.

Attach.

05/01/02 USD(P&R) to SecDef re: PPB [U07677/02]

DHR:dh
050802-18

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9059

49
730

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS



SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

May 1, 2002 - 12:00 PM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 08 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 24 May 02*

SUBJECT: PPB a Joke?

- A third of the "plumbing" in the chart you circulated (Tab A) reflects not PPB but a variety of documents whose content might usefully be considered in its deliberations (most of the entries in red). There's a useful question whether all those are needed, or needed so frequently (e.g., National Security Strategy - once an administration should ordinarily be enough).
- The chart is also more complex than it need be by trying to show how three sequential budgets intersect (03, 04, and 05), and by trying to show processes, actors, and products on one page. The underlying process is actually quite simple: you (and the President) give your guidance, the Military Departments submit their program proposals (POMs), you review them (program review), and a budget is produced.
- But the burdens could be substantially reduced if we moved to a biennial budget (tried before, rejected by the Congress), and automated production of the budget based on your program decisions (there's no reason to reproduce these manually as the Budget Estimate Submission, as is currently the case).

RECOMMENDATION: None required.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment: As Stated


Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock (b)(6)

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 6/7 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | 5/17 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 5/17 |

11-L-0559/OSD/9060

U07677 /02

DEFENSE PPB SYSTEM



- 0. President's Strategic Guidance
- 1. National Security Strategy
- 2. JSR/National Military Strategy
- 3. Defense Program Projection
- 4a. Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
- 4b. Chairman's Program Recommendations

- 5. Defense Planning Guidance
- 6. Program Objectives Memoranda
- 7. Program Review
- 8. Chairman's Program Assessment

- 9. Program Decision Memoranda
- 10. Budget Estimate Submissions
- 11. Program Budget Decisions
- 12. President's Budget

* Potential Defense Resources Board (DRB)/Expanded DRB
 * Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) & Revised NMS

2/02 GS
 OJCS(J5/J8)
 OUSD(P)
 ODPAE
 OUSD(C)

April 23, 2002 7:58 AM

TO: Under Secretaries
Service Secretaries
Chairman, JCS
Vice Chairman, JCS
Service Chiefs
PDUSD(P)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PPB System

Attached is a chart that was used in a briefing recently to explain the Defense PPB system.

When I saw it, I asked if it was a joke. It turns out it is apparently not meant to be a joke.

It struck me that those of us in the Senior Review Group ought to think about whether maybe it is a joke, even though it is not intended to be one.

Regards,

Attach.
2/02 Defense PPB System slide

DHR:dh
042302-1

.....
Please respond by _____

s/y
Chu response attached
4/2/02

Larry Di Rita
5/6

11-L-0559/OSD/9062

U07237 /02

October 31, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fixing Process

I am tired of getting these materials in such user-unfriendly shape. I want this process fixed, like we fixed the ISR process. These documents should be in English. Reduce the number of people who sign-off. Make the process move faster.

It is a waste of everyone's time to handle something this poorly. On something like this, I want to be able to tell if it has been approved by Gen. Myers and Doug Feith.

This package seems to suggest they are going to deploy from May 15 to November 10 and another team June 1 from November 27. May and June are past. What is up?

I want the process revamped. I want to get briefed on how it is going to be handled in the future with a model package. I am not going to approve anything until I can understand it.

Thanks.

Attach.
OASD(C3I) Controlled Item in pouch

DHR:dh
103102-7

.....
Please respond by 11/15/02

U09816 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9063

3/2

3/08/02

October 31, 2002 11:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Israeli CHOD

I ought to see the Israeli CHOD when he is in town.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103102-14

.....
Please respond by 11/15/02

ISRAEL

310802

U09817 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9064

May 8, 2002 8:17 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Budget

Should we go for a biennial budget?

Thanks.

Attach.
05/01/02 USD(P&R) to SecDef re: PPB [U07677/02]

DHR:dh
050802-18

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

110.01

8 May 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 17 2002

SINGAPORE

His Excellency Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Defence
Republic of Singapore

Dear Dr. Tan:

I wanted to express my gratitude for your nation's
pledge of assistance-in-kind towards U.S. operations in
Afghanistan.

Your pledge of \$10 million demonstrates
Singapore's serious commitment to the fight against
terrorism. The United States is pleased to be joined by
Singapore in this critical endeavor.

Your support means a great deal.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

17 JUN 02

U09886 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9066

His Excellency Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Defence
Republic of Singapore



Dear Dr. Tan:

Larry Di F...

4/4

I wanted to ~~personally~~ express my gratitude for
your nation's pledge of assistance-in-kind towards U.S.
operations in Afghanistan. ~~This money will help ensure~~
~~free people everywhere can live in peace.~~

~~Your pledge of \$10 million is a great step in~~
~~supporting people world wide as they unite in the fight~~
~~against terrorism.~~ *Commitment demonstrates Singapore's*
serious commitment

~~Thanks again.~~ Your support means a great deal.

to the fight against
terrorism.
We are the United States
is honored to be joined
by Singapore
in this critical endeavor.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

His Excellency Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Defence
Republic of Singapore

Dear Dr. Tan:

Thank you so much for your letter and your
nation's pledge of assistance-in-kind towards operations
in Afghanistan.

This contribution is a great help in fighting
terrorism.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Please show policy (Baker)
This doesn't do it.
D.H.K.

personally express gratitude

*people world wide
united in fight against terrorism*

*this \$ will help some
people
free men & women everywhere
can live in peace*

SWA

*LOAN DEPT
5/23*

*Take for action
KAE 5/23*

2002 MAY 23 PM 4:03

May 2, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Singapore

Please be sure I send a personal note thanking the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Singapore for the \$10 million contribution toward U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

I want to see the draft.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050202-8~~SECRET~~

Please respond by 05/10/02

MAY 20 2002

SWT
?*DHR*
Larry Di Rita
*5/20**Larry*
Let me
see letter
we
10/9
DR



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

2002 APR 17 PM 5:21

MAY 02 2007

INFO MEMO

April 16, 2002, 2:21 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Singapore

- You may recall that at this morning's staff meeting I mentioned that Singapore had agreed to contribute \$10 million in assistance-in-kind to the Global War on Terrorism. I attach a self-explanatory letter from Defense Minister Tony Tan.

Attachments:

As stated

COORDINATION: NONE

Sec Def-

*May want to
hold for Lee Kuan Yew*

meeting.

DLT

Larry Di Rita

5/1

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 4/30 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | 5/1 |
| MA BUCCI | 5/1 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 4/30 |

11-L-0559/OSD/9070

U06896 /02



AMBASSADOR
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
3501 INTERNATIONAL PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20008
TEL: (202) 537-3100
FAX: (202) 537-0876

April 16, 2002

Dr Dov Zakheim
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
Fax: (703) 693-0582

Dear *Undersecretary Zakheim,*

Could you please forward the attached faxed letter from Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Tony Tan, who is also Singapore's Minister of Defence to US Secretary of Defence, The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld. Singapore has pledged US\$10 million in kind towards US operations in Afghanistan.

The original letter will be sent to you once we receive it.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Chan Heng Chee'.

CHAN HENG CHEE

11-L-0559/OSD/9071



DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE
SINGAPORE

11 April 2002

The Honourable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
United States of America

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I am pleased to inform you that the Government of Singapore has considered the request of the United States Government for assistance-in-kind, and will pledge US\$10 million in kind towards the US operations in Afghanistan.

Singapore stands firm in our support for the international fight against terrorism, and this contribution underscores our commitment to support this effort. We regard the fight against terrorism as an endeavour of the highest importance. The civilised world must and will succeed in this endeavour.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Tonytan'.

DR TONY TAN KENG YAM

FFISOB
02/08/02 + 0508

May 6, 2002 9:44 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Africa

Please take a look at these three pages on Africa. It looks to me like there is an enormous opportunity for the war on terrorism.

Please fashion something for me to send to Gen. Ralston, with a copy to Gen. Myers and a blind copy to Gen. Jones, asking them if they would consider these things as they travel around and deal with those countries.

Thanks.

Attach.
384572AI 5-02, 759824AI (B00431) 5-02, 384573AI 5-02

DHR:dh
050602-12

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

6/17
Col Bucci *6/18/02*

See attached response.

Y/K
Lauren Haber

6/18/02

05-07-02 06:44 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/9073

U09971 /02

June 17, 2002 2:39 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tracking Down Taliban

What do we need to do to get the CIA interested in tracking down the Taliban as well as the Al Qaeda?

Please let me know what I can do.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
061702-43

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

Afghanistan

17 June 02

* * * COMMUNICATION RESULT REPORT (JUN.19.2002 4:09AM) * * *

| FILE MODE | OPTION | ADDRESS (GROUP) | TTI RESULT | PAGE |
|---------------|--------|-----------------|---------------|--------|
| 911 MEMORY TX | | (b)(6) | OK | P. 2/2 |

REASON FOR ERROR

E-1) HANG UP OR LINE FAIL
E-3) NO ANSWERE-2) BUSY
E-4) NO FACSIMILE CONNECTION**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED****OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES DIVISION****FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET**

Telephone: Comm: (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6)
Facsimile: (b)(6)

To: GEN Franks**CC: GEN Myers****Facsimile #:****DSN**

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/9075

* * * COMMUNICATION RESULT REPORT (JUN.19.2002 4:10AM) * * *

| FILE MODE | OPTION | ADDRESS (GROUP) | TT1 RESULT | PAGE |
|---------------|--------|-----------------|---------------|--------|
| 912 MEMORY TX | | (b)(6) | OK | P. 2/2 |

REASON FOR ERROR

E-1) HANG UP OR LINE FAIL
E-3) NO ANSWERE-2) BUSY
E-4) NO FACSIMILE CONNECTION**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED****OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES DIVISION****FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET**

Telephone: Comm: (b)(6) DSN (b)(6)
Facsimile: (b)(6)

To: GEN Franks**CC: GEN Myers****Facsimile #: DSN (b)(6)**

11-L-0559/OSD/9076

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

**OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES DIVISION**

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Telephone: Comm: (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6)
Facsimile: (b)(6)

To: GEN Franks

CC: GEN Myers

Facsimile #: DSN (b)(6)

From: Secretary of Defense

Office/Desk: Executive Secretary

Subject: Tracking Down Taliban

Number of Pages Including Cover: 2

COMMENTS:

| SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION | |
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| SECDEF | |
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| EXECSEC | |
| DEPSECDEF | |
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| FILE | |
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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 19 2002

The Honorable Sila M. Calderón
Governor of Puerto Rico
P.O. Box 9020082
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00902-0082

Dear Governor Calderón:

I received your recent letter concerning the Army's Southern Command headquarters. While I have not as yet been briefed on any proposals to relocate the command, there are alternatives and the Army is always seeking to ensure our forces are stationed in locations where they can best be trained, maintained, and housed, and where the U.S. military is welcomed and well treated.

I appreciate having the benefit of your views in this matter, though.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

U10009 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9078

322

19 Jun



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

JUN - 6 2002

2002 JUN -7 AM 9:04



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Honorable Sila M. Calderón
Governor, Puerto Rico
P.O. Box 9020082
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00902-0082

Dear Governor Calderón:

Thank you for your inquiry regarding the future stationing of United States Army South. Understandably this matter is of interest to the citizens of Puerto Rico as well as the many thousands of active duty, Reserve, National Guard, veterans, and military retirees there.

The stationing of U.S. Army South is part of an overarching effort that will touch military units around the world. In October 2000, the Department of Defense began the Quadrennial Defense Review, the deliberate process of reviewing defense strategy, force structures and stationing options. We entered this review aware of a Congressional mandate to reduce all headquarters by 15 percent and redirect these positions to front line units. Ultimately, this review will be measured against the goals and objectives found in the President's National Security Strategy and the emerging National Military Strategy.

The Puerto Rican people have a proud military tradition and have defended Democracy on behalf of a grateful nation with unparalleled service and devotion. I fully understand your concern over a decision that will surely touch so many in Puerto Rico. The decisions made regarding United States Army South will certainly consider these concerns. Your offer of assistance and support is most appreciated. Thank you again for your letter.

Respectfully,

Thomas E. White

U09116-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9079



ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAY 21 PM 2:23

Sila M. Calderón
GOBERNADORA

May 24, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Army South have established a fruitful collaboration in our Island. My Administration wholeheartedly supports its permanent operations here at Fort Buchanan. I write to offer you my assistance to ensure many more productive years for Army South in Puerto Rico.

Our Island features strategic advantages and preparedness capabilities vital to Army South's continuing success. Puerto Rico's geographic location provides ease of access to all points throughout the Caribbean, Central and South America. Moreover, Puerto Ricans are committed to a strong national defense and have served with distinction in the United States Armed Forces in all major international operations: in both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, the Balkans and now in the war against terrorism. Our skilled, bilingual workforce is a unique asset for Army South to accomplish its goals in overwhelmingly Spanish-speaking Latin America. Also, recruitment on the Island is up for all military branches, consistent with our substantial rates of voluntary service relative to other jurisdictions.

The Puerto Rican people support Army South's key defense role, and value its important economic contributions to our community. Some advocates of relocating Army South claim there is a sentiment against its operations in Puerto Rico; however, all the evidence is to the contrary. In fact, staff in the Government Reform Committee who visited Fort Buchanan last year did not report any such sentiment. I trust you agree with me that permanently operating in Puerto Rico offers Army South, like no other United States jurisdiction, the ideal conditions for long-term growth and success.

Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
Page 2
May 24, 2002


I am ready further to work closely with you for Army South to remain in Fort Buchanan and look forward jointly to review this matter at the earliest opportunity possible.

Please accept my best personal regards.

Sincerely,



Sila M. Calderón
Governor



11-L-0559/OSD/9081

June 17, 2002 4:55 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Elections in the Middle East

The far right column of this table indicates dates of elections in the Middle East. I thought you might want to see them.

Regards.

Attach.
06/13/02 Elections in the Middle East

DHR:dh
061702-56

.....
Please respond by _____

Middle East

17 Jun 02

PASS TO DR. LUTI, DASD/NESA

13 June 2002

Elections in the Middle East

| Country | Type of Election | Next Election | Frequency |
|----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Bahrain | Legislative ¹ | none | Oct 2002 |
| | Municipal ² | May 2002 | scheduled regularly |
| Egypt | Legislative ³ | Oct 2000 | Oct 2005 |
| | Executive ⁴ | 2005 | 2005 |
| | Municipal | Apr 2002 | scheduled regularly |
| Israel | Legislative/Executive | May 1999 | 2003 |
| | Executive ⁵ | Feb 2001 | none |
| | Municipal | scheduled regularly | scheduled regularly |
| Jordan | Legislative ⁶ | Nov 1997 | none |
| | Municipal | Jul 1999 | scheduled regularly |
| Kuwait | Legislative | Jul 1999 | Jul 2003 |
| | Municipal | Jun 1999 | Jun 2003 |
| Lebanon | Legislative | Aug 2000 | Aug 2004 |
| | Executive ⁷ | 1998 | 2004 |
| | Municipal ² | May 1998 | scheduled regularly |
| Oman | Legislative ⁸ | Sep 2000 | Sep 2003 |
| Qatar | Legislative ⁹ | none | 2003 |
| | Municipal ² | Mar 1999 | scheduled regularly |
| Saudi Arabia | none | na | na |
| United Arab Emirates | none | na | na |
| Yemen | Presidential | Sep 1999 | Sep 2006 |
| | Legislative | Apr 1997 | Apr 2003 |
| | Municipal ² | Feb 2001 | scheduled regularly |

¹ Emir Hamad bin Isa Khalifa declared Bahrain a constitutional monarchy in Feb. 2002. The upcoming legislative elections will be the first held under the National Action Charter, which was approved in a Feb. 2001 referendum.

² Municipal elections held for the first time.

³ For the People's Assembly (Majlis al-Sha'b).

⁴ The People's Assembly nominates the President. The nomination must then be approved in a referendum.

⁵ Beginning with the next election, the Israeli PM will no longer be directly elected. Instead, Israel will return to a traditional parliamentary system.

⁶ King Abdullah II dissolved parliament in June 2001. New elections have not yet been scheduled, but many expect them in the fall of 2002.

⁷ The legislature chooses the president, who then appoints the PM in consultation with legislature.

⁸ Only for lower chamber (Majlis al-Shura), which has only limited power to propose legislation.

⁹ New constitution expected this year that should set legislative elections for 2003.

* * * COMMUNICATION RESULT REPORT (JUN.19.2002 4:14AM) * * *

| FILE MODE | OPTION | ADDRESS (GROUP) | TTI RESULT | PAGE |
|---------------|--------|-----------------|---------------|--------|
| 914 MEMORY TX | | (b)(6) | OK | P. 3/3 |

REASON FOR ERROR

E-1) HANG UP OR LINE FAIL
E-3) NO ANSWERE-2) BUSY
E-4) NO FACSIMILE CONNECTION**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED****OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES DIVISION****FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET**

Telephone: Comm: (b)(6)

Facsimile: (b)(6)

To: GEN Franks**CC: GEN Myers****Facsimile #:****DSN**

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/9084

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (JUN.19.2002 4:12AM) * * *

TTI

| DATE | TIME | ADDRESS | MODE | TIME | PAGE | RESULT | PERS. NAME | FILE |
|---------|--------|---------|------|-------|------|--------|------------|------|
| JUN.19. | 4:11AM | (b)(6) | ES | 0'58" | P. 3 | OK | | 913 |

: BATCH
M : MEMORY
S : STANDARD
A-: ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
1-: MILSTD MODE

\$: TRANSFER
@ : FORWARDING
F : FINE
G-: RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
> : REDUCTION

11-L-0559/OSD/9085

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

**OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES DIVISION**

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Telephone: Comm: (b)(6)
Facsimile: (b)(6)

To: GEN Franks

CC: GEN Myers

Facsimile #: DSN (b)(6)

From: Secretary of Defense

Office/Desk: Executive Secretary

Subject: Elections in the Middle East

Number of Pages Including Cover: 3

COMMENTS:

| SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION | |
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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 25 2002

Honorable Richard B. Cheney
President of the Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on April 30, 2002 the President of the United States approved a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) that specifies the missions and responsibilities, including geographic boundaries, of the unified combatant commands.

In keeping with the statutory requirement periodically to review the UCP and to recommend necessary changes to the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I conducted an extensive review, working in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commanders. The events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing war on terrorism highlighted the requirement to adjust the UCP. In undertaking this effort, we had three primary goals:

1. To organize U.S. Armed Forces most effectively to address threats to the territory and security of the United States along with the air and maritime approaches;
2. To ensure that we maintain a proper organizational and institutional focus on the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces; and
3. To update any remaining Cold War organizational approaches that may impede effective planning and execution of future military operations.

The revised 2002 Unified Command Plan makes great strides in all of these areas. It includes changes that accomplish the following:

- Establishes a new combatant command, called U.S. Northern Command, effective October 1, 2002, assigned the mission of defending the United States and providing support to civil authorities.
 - The area of responsibility for the new command will be the continental United States (including Alaska), Canada, and Mexico.
 - Adjoining waters to approximately 500 nautical miles (including Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Cuba, and the Bahamas) will be included in the U.S.



11-L-0559/OSD/9087

U10023 /02

322


25 Jun 02

Northern Command area of responsibility to provide for effective defense of air and maritime approaches.

- The Commander of U.S. Northern Command will also be assigned duties as Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
- Refocuses U.S. Joint Forces Command on experimentation and transformation of U.S. Armed Forces and strengthens its ability to be the trainer and provider of joint military forces.
 - We will do so by divesting U.S. Joint Forces Command of its existing geographic area of responsibility. This change will lead to the transfer of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) responsibilities, a four-star NATO command, from U.S. Joint Forces Command to another U.S. four-star commander as agreed through a coordination process with our NATO allies.
- Assigns all previously unassigned countries and territories, effective October 1, 2002:
 - The 48 contiguous United States (CONUS) and the District of Columbia, Canada, and Mexico to U.S. Northern Command;
 - Transfers responsibility for Alaska from U.S. Pacific Command to U.S. Northern Command, effective October 1, 2002 (forces in Alaska will remain assigned to U.S. Pacific Command);
 - Russia to U.S. European Command, recognizing that U.S. Pacific Command will have responsibilities in Eastern Russia;
 - Caspian Sea to U.S. European Command; and
 - Antarctica to U.S. Pacific Command.

We have begun the next review of the unified command structure and will likely be proposing in the near future a merger of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld", with a stylized, sweeping flourish at the end.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 25 2002

Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the House
2369 Rayburn House Office Building
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on April 30, 2002 the President of the United States approved a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) that specifies the missions and responsibilities, including geographic boundaries, of the unified combatant commands.

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1. To organize U.S. Armed Forces most effectively to address threats to the territory and security of the United States along with the air and maritime approaches;
2. To ensure that we maintain a proper organizational and institutional focus on the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces; and
3. To update any remaining Cold War organizational approaches that may impede effective planning and execution of future military operations.

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- Establishes a new combatant command, called U.S. Northern Command, effective October 1, 2002, assigned the mission of defending the United States and providing support to civil authorities.
- The area of responsibility for the new command will be the continental United States (including Alaska), Canada, and Mexico.




11-L-0559/OSD/9089

U10023 /02

- Adjoining waters to approximately 500 nautical miles (including Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Cuba, and the Bahamas) will be included in the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility to provide for effective defense of air and maritime approaches.
- The Commander of U.S. Northern Command will also be assigned duties as Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
- Refocuses U.S. Joint Forces Command on experimentation and transformation of U.S. Armed Forces and strengthens its ability to be the trainer and provider of joint military forces.
 - We will do so by divesting U.S. Joint Forces Command of its existing geographic area of responsibility. This change will lead to the transfer of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) responsibilities, a four-star NATO command, from U.S. Joint Forces Command to another U.S. four-star commander as agreed through a coordination process with our NATO allies.
- Assigns all previously unassigned countries and territories, effective October 1, 2002:
 - The 48 contiguous United States (CONUS) and the District of Columbia, Canada, and Mexico to U.S. Northern Command;
 - Transfers responsibility for Alaska from U.S. Pacific Command to U.S. Northern Command, effective October 1, 2002 (forces in Alaska will remain assigned to U.S. Pacific Command);
 - Russia to U.S. European Command, recognizing that U.S. Pacific Command will have responsibilities in Eastern Russia;
 - Caspian Sea to U.S. European Command; and
 - Antarctica to U.S. Pacific Command.

We have begun the next review of the unified command structure and will likely be proposing in the near future a merger of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,



U10023 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9090



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 25 2002

Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on April 30, 2002 the President of the United States approved a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) that specifies the missions and responsibilities, including geographic boundaries, of the unified combatant commands.

In keeping with the statutory requirement periodically to review the UCP and to recommend necessary changes to the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I conducted an extensive review, working in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commanders. The events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing war on terrorism highlighted the requirement to adjust the UCP. In undertaking this effort, we had three primary goals:

1. To organize U.S. Armed Forces most effectively to address threats to the territory and security of the United States along with the air and maritime approaches;
2. To ensure that we maintain a proper organizational and institutional focus on the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces; and
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- The area of responsibility for the new command will be the continental United States (including Alaska), Canada, and Mexico.




11-L-0559/OSD/9091

U10023 /02

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 - Antarctica to U.S. Pacific Command.

We have begun the next review of the unified command structure and will likely be proposing in the near future a merger of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,



cc:
 Honorable John Warner
 Committee on Armed Services
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510-6050



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 25 2002

Honorable Robert Byrd
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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
11-L-0559/OSD/9093

U10023 /02

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Sincerely,



cc:
 Honorable Ted Stevens
 Committee on Appropriations
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 25 2002

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6028

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on April 30, 2002 the President of the United States approved a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) that specifies the missions and responsibilities, including geographic boundaries, of the unified combatant commands.

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11-L-0559/OSD/9095

U10023 /02

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Sincerely,



cc:
 Honorable Ted Stevens
 Subcommittee on Defense
 Committee on Appropriations
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510-6028



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 25 2002

Honorable Bob Stump
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on April 30, 2002 the President of the United States approved a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) that specifies the missions and responsibilities, including geographic boundaries, of the unified combatant commands.

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11-L-0559/OSD/9097

U10023 /02

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Sincerely,



cc:
 Honorable Ike Skelton
 Committee on Armed Services
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515-6035

11-L-0559/OSD/9098



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 25 2002

Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6015

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on April 30, 2002 the President of the United States approved a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) that specifies the missions and responsibilities, including geographic boundaries, of the unified combatant commands.

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
11-L-0559/OSD/9099

U10023 /02

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Sincerely,



cc:
 Honorable David Obey
 Committee on Appropriations
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515-6015

11-L-0559/OSD/9100



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 25 2002

Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6018

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on April 30, 2002 the President of the United States approved a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) that specifies the missions and responsibilities, including geographic boundaries, of the unified combatant commands.

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11-L-0559/OSD/9101

U10023 /02

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Sincerely,

cc:

Honorable John P. Murtha
 Subcommittee on Defense
 Committee on Appropriations
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515-6018





PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



ACTION MEMO

POLICY

1-02/007944

DSD INFO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUN 14 2002
FOR POLICY (Dr. Stephen A. Cambone)

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification of the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP)

Section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code requires Congressional notification not more than 60 days after establishing a new combatant command; or significantly revising the missions, responsibilities, or force structure at an existing combatant command. The President's approval of UCP 2002 requires such notification. Congressional Members and staff have been briefed extensively on the revisions to the UCP. The attached letters will provide formal Congressional notification of the President's approval of the UCP on April 30, 2002.

Recommendation: That you sign the eight letters at TAB A.

Attachments:
As stated

DASD/Strategy

Stephen A. Cambone

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 6/14 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 6/14 |

Prepared by: Amanda Dory, OUSD(P)/Strategy, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/9103

U10023 /02

COORDINATION PAGE

I-02/007944

Formal Congressional Notification for the 2002 Unified Command Plan

Coordination:

Joint Staff/J-5 _____ 4 June 2002 _____

OGC _____ 12 June 2002 _____

ASD/LA _____ 31 May 2002 _____

Please provide coordination by Monday, 3 June 2002

Cal (b)(6) for pick-up

11-L-0559/OSD/9104



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

DJSM-0517-02
04 June 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Subject: Formal Congressional Notification of the 2002 Unified Command Plan

1. Thank you for providing the opportunity to coordinate on your letter¹ providing congressional notification of the 2002 Unified Command Plan required by title 10. I concur in the letter (with enclosures) as written.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Commander Hornbeck, (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John P. Abizaid".

JOHN P. ABIZAID
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Reference:

- 1 OUSD(P) memorandum, 28 May 2002, "Formal Congressional Notification for the 2002 Unified Command Plan (I-02/007944)"

COORDINATION PAGE

I-02/007944

Formal Congressional Notification for the 2002 Unified Command Plan

Coordination:

Joint Staff/J-5

OGC

ASD/LA

4 June 2002

Da J. DeL'Pito as received 6/12/02
Principal Deputy GC
31 May 2002

Please provide coordination by Monday, 3 June 2002

Call (b)(6) for pick-up

11-L-0559/OSD/9106

ACTION MEMO

POLICY

1-02/007944

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

**FROM: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY (Dr. Stephen A. Cambone)**

SUBJECT: Formal Congressional Notification of the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP)

Section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code requires ~~formal~~ Congressional notification ~~within 60 days for changes in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).~~


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Recommendation: That you sign the letters at TAB A.

Attachments:
As stated

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Prepared by: Amanda Dory, OUSD(P)/Strategy,



COORDINATION PAGE

I-02/007944

Formal Congressional Notification for the 2002 Unified Command Plan

Coordination:

Joint Staff/J-5

OGC

ASD/LA

W. R. H. 6/3/02

Please provide coordination by Monday, 3 June 2002

Call (b)(6) for pick-up

11-L-0559/OSD/9108

Snowflake

#245

June 1, 2002 3:44 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: India and Pakistan

We might want to think about doing some war gaming as to what the United States would or should do—politically, economically and militarily if or when there is a conventional conflict between India and Pakistan, if or when there is a nuclear conflict.

We could get some outside outfit to do it discreetly, I would think, and have it look like they are doing it on their own.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060102-6

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

India

15 Jun 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9109

U10114 /02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ST-1
200 JUN 21 10:05 85

ACTION MEMO

CM-375-02
21 June 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/20*

SUBJECT: Naming the Command Resulting from the Merger of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM

- Attached briefing slides indicate seven potential names for the merged command considered by the Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM, USSPACECOM and the Services.
- Top three names, according to the pros and cons developed, included US Global Operations Command (USGOCOM), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and US Strategic Operations Command (USSTOCOM).
- None of the alternatives is clearly superior to the current name, U.S. Strategic Command, and there are real costs associated with changing the name.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve recommendation to retain the name U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), for the merged command.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG George W. Casey, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/9110

U10174 /02

Top-3 Potential Names

- **US Global Operations Command (USGOCOM)**
 - Definition: “Global: World-wide; total, comprehensive. Operations: A process or series of acts aimed at producing a desired result or effect; a military or naval action or campaign.”
 - Pros: Describes the function of the merged command. “USGOCOM” follows same naming convention as “US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).”
 - Cons: Could be perceived by some as attempt to achieve US hegemony. Term “global” could be perceived as implying diminished importance of regional commands.”
- **US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)**
 - Definition: “Strategic: Designed to destroy the military potential of an enemy.”
 - Pros: Does not require a name change. Still captures nature/mission of the command.
 - Cons: Nuclear connotation. Only captures part of the space mission. Might create perception of “hostile take-over” of USSPACECOM. Might create perception and reality of reduced emphasis on tactical and operational contributions.
- **US Strategic Operations Command (USSTOCOM)**
 - Pros: Slight name change. Accurately captures strategic effects expected from the command in terms of strategic attack, defense and information operations.
 - Cons: Only captures part of the space mission. Might create perception and reality of reduced emphasis on tactical and operational contributions. Might be confused with USSOUTHCOM and USSOCOM.

Potential Names Also Considered

- **US Global Command (USGLOBECOM)**
 - Definition: “Global: Worldwide; total, comprehensive.”
 - Pros: Describes nature of the command’s perspective.
 - Cons: Could be perceived by some as attempt to achieve US hegemony. Term “global” could be perceived as implying diminished importance of regional commands.
- **US Phalanx Command (USPHACOM)**
 - Definition: “Phalanx: A close formation of spearmen carrying overlapping shields; a close-knit or compact body of people, especially one **unified by a common goal**”
 - Pros: Describes having both offensive and defensive capabilities.
 - Cons: Esoteric.

Potential Names Also Considered (Cont.)

- US Strategic **Forces** Command (USSTRATFORCOM)
 - Definition: “Forces: A group organized or available for a certain purpose.”
 - Pros: Indicates change.
 - Cons: Does not adequately capture emerging missions.
- US Strategic and Space Command (USSTRAT-SPACECOM)
 - Pros: Indicates change while showing retention of current missions.
 - Cons: Does not adequately capture emerging missions.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

July 11, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TESTING AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

322

SUBJECT: Designation of U.S. Strategic Command

I have determined that the name of the Command resulting from the merger of
U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command will be U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM).

(11 July 02)



R U10693-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9114

June 14, 2002 11:06 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Video Images

Please get me some information on these video images that are available to the general public and what we think about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

NY Times article: "Spy Photos Could Put Troops at Risk"

DHR:dh
061402-2

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

6/22

To: John Stenbit -

*Please prep a
short assessment for
SecDef review.*

D. H. T.

*Larry Di Rita
6/21*

Spy Photos Could Put Troops at Risk

By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS

WASHINGTON, June 13 — A British satellite enthusiast warned NATO several months ago that images taken by American spy planes patrolling the Balkans were easily accessed by civilians. Pentagon officials said tonight.

The Defense Department, which acknowledged the apparent breach, has decided to do nothing to halt the transmissions on the grounds that the material is not classified and does not jeopardize allied troops.

The video images are being captured by remotely controlled American aerial drones on NATO patrols over the former Yugoslavia. The images are then transmitted by a commercial satellite to American intelligence agencies and NATO.

But for months civilians with satellite televisions have been able to pick up the transmissions, which have included images of American troop movements in Kosovo, according to the British newspaper, The Guardian.

John Locker, a British engineer who specializes in tracking commercial satellites, discovered the spy plane transmissions last November, the newspaper said. He tried repeat-

ing the transmissions and found that they were being received by a large number of people in the Balkans. The Guardian said that the Pentagon had been aware of the problem for some time but had decided not to take any action.

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General Links Milosevic to Kosovo

THE HAGUE, June 13 (AP) — The former chairman of NATO's military committee testified today that Slobodan Milosevic, the former Yugoslav leader, indicated in fall 1998 that he was planning a campaign to wipe out the ethnic

forces out of Kosovo.

During talks at the pr

White Palace in Belgrad

1998, General Nauman

atmosphere was

drink of brandy

Milosevic

ance

3:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 13, 2002
SUBJECT: Early Bird

Take a look at the attached article, "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in US Military." Why don't you find someone in the general counsel's office to review what our policies are and whether we are doing things properly.

342.18

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061302.01

Attach: "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in US Military", *Newhouse.com*
David Wood, Newhouse News Service, June 11, 2002

Please respond by: 6/26/02

6/22
To: GC -
Please give me feedback
an assessment. Thanks.
D. Di Rita
6/21
13 Jun 02

U10221 /02

nation costs, compared to killing the program after its Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase ends in April 2003, according to a letter last week from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Congress.

17. Myers: Command And Control Interoperability Problems Persist

(Defense Daily)....Hunter Keeter

DoD continues to have problems with the interoperability of its numerous command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, according to Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

18. Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands Of Foreigners In U.S. Military

(Newhouse.com)....David Wood, Newhouse News Service

...The Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from.

19. Secrecy On Missile Defense Grows

(Washington Post)....Bradley Graham

As the Pentagon boosts spending and intensifies development of a national antimissile system, it is also taking steps to shield the program from Congress and the public as well as traditional oversight measures within the Defense Department.

CONGRESS

20. Levin Questions Missile Defense Agency's Classification Policy

(Inside Missile Defense)....Thomas Dully

Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said this week he would do everything he can to make public information regarding the Bush administration's national missile defense flights tests after the administration decided last month to classify the targets and decoys used in those tests.

21. War With Iraq Isn't Inevitable, Says Armed Services Committee Chairman

(European Stars and Stripes)....Lisa Burgess

Despite media reports that claim President Bush has decided to wage war against Iraq, neither a majority of administration officials, members of Congress nor military officers is committed to the prospect, a senior senator said Monday.

22. Lawmakers Sue Over ABM Pact Withdrawal

(Washington Post)....Neely Tucker

Thirty-one members of Congress sued the Bush administration in federal court yesterday, charging that President Bush violated the Constitution when he decided earlier this year to drop a 30-year-old nuclear weapons pact with Russia.

23. 'We Should Have' Known, Goss Says Of 9/11

(Washington Post)....Dana Priest and Juliet Eilperin

With six years of access to highly classified CIA information about Osama bin Laden, Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.), co-chairman of the joint congressional panel examining the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies, has come to some bold conclusions about the Sept. 11 attacks.

24. Party Leaders Favor Security Agency

(Washington Post)....Bill Miller and Juliet Eilperin

Leaders of both parties in Congress yesterday supported the idea of creating a Department of Homeland Security by Sept. 11, even as they hinted they might seek substantial changes to President Bush's proposal for the biggest reorganization of the federal government in more than 50 years.

NAVY

25. Navy Clears Some F-14s To Return To Carrier Duty; Others Need Fixes

(Norfolk Virginian-Pilot)....Dale Eisman

The Navy has cleared 45 of its F-14 Tomcats to return to full duty but will have to replace the nose wheel assembly on more than 20 percent of the planes inspected since it suspended carrier operations on all 156 Tomcats last week.

"This can't be a U.S.-only [issue]...I am particularly dismayed that our coalition partners can't get together on this," Myers said. "This isn't a matter of big dollars either. It is a matter of where to put investment."

However, allies—even those within the NATO alliance—have invested very little of their comparatively smaller defense budgets in C4ISR capability.

During the 1999 Bright Star exercise, for example, and the war over Kosovo a few months later, a mismatch among allied C4I capabilities was highlighted as an area in need of improvement (Defense Daily, Nov. 3, 1999).

In the United States, the military services have taken steps to improve their own interoperability as well as the relationships deployed units have with allied forces. For example, the Navy has enjoyed some measure of success with its Coalition Wide Area Network (CWAN) concept, which has to date been used in support of multi-national training events and the war over Afghanistan.

The CWAN concept is to build a network that could be used for any operation and would remain as a "lasting infrastructure, including web servers built on the concept of 'web-centric warfare,' for future engagements, according to Vice Adm. Dennis McGinn, deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and resources.

Newhouse.com

June 11, 2002

18. Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands Of Foreigners In U.S. Military
By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

ELKRIDGE, Md. -- His heart remains at home deep in the heart of Africa, 12,000 miles away. But one day recently, Thierry Dany Osungs raised his right hand and in a steady voice swore to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, becoming one of the tens of thousands of citizens of other countries who

enlist and serve in the U.S. military.

Non-citizen soldiers embody an old and honorable tradition of dual loyalty that dates back at least to the American Revolution. For generations of immigrants, military service has been a reliable means of earning a living as well as eventual citizenship.

But today, the services are enlisting growing numbers of non-citizens at a time when the United States is trying to tighten restrictions on immigration and aliens because of concerns about terrorism.

U.S. officials acknowledge there are serious weaknesses in the federal safeguards against criminal aliens or terrorists entering the country and obtaining the status of permanent resident that is required for military service. There are evident weaknesses as well in the procedures the Defense Department uses to check and approve potential enlistees.

Last year almost 8,000 foreigners were sworn into U.S. military service, a 30 percent increase from 1995 and about 4 percent of all those who signed up in 2001. The Pentagon does not keep count, but if all alien enlistees served a typical four-year term, there could be more than 30,000 on active military duty.

Once they're sworn in, they are eligible to serve as machine gunners, artillerymen and helicopter crewmen. They may drive tanks, load bombs onto jet strike fighters, handle explosives, rig parachutes and man guardposts and checkpoints.

Citizenship is required for officers, however, and in general, only officers can become qualified to pilot aircraft. Exceptions are made for senior enlisted helicopter aviators who attain the rank of warrant officers.

But in fact, the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from.

"There are so many, it becomes unmanageable to try to track them all," said Army Lt. Col. James P. Cassella, a Pentagon spokesman.

Acquiring permanent U.S. resident status requires background and fingerprint checks. And Defense Department officials said once an alien applies to enlist in the armed services, he or she must again undergo FBI fingerprint checks and an extensive background investigation, as well as pass medical screening and an intelligence test.

Once in the service, aliens may not hold any jobs that require a security clearance, a further measure that keeps them away from sensitive technology and information.

"I don't feel uneasy about this," said Frank Shaffery, deputy director of recruiting for the Army, citing an extensive network of checks and background investigations designed to weed out unsavory or untrustworthy individuals. "But as with any system, a person -- any person -- could misrepresent themselves. U.S. citizen or not."

However, the problem of aliens obtaining permanent resident status by fraud "is pervasive and serious," the U.S. General Accounting Office reported after an investigation earlier this year. The GAO said immigration officials "believe that some aliens are using the benefit application process to enable them to carry out illegal activities such as crimes of violence, narcotics trafficking and terrorism."

The job of weeding out such individuals falls to notoriously overworked military recruiters, and it can be a difficult one. Until last week, Army recruiters could call an 800 number at the Immigration and Naturalization Service to make sure an applicant's papers weren't forged. But that service is no longer available, and Shaffery said he did not know why. INS officials could not immediately explain the matter.

To double-check against enlisting illegal or criminal aliens, military applicants like Osungs are fingerprinted here at the Military Entrance Proc-

essing Station outside Baltimore.

Osungs' prints were sent electronically to the FBI, which is supposed to automatically check both its database and that of the INS to ensure the applicant has no criminal record or other legal blots on his record. Osungs' fingerprint check turned up no "hits" from the FBI.

But the Justice Department's inspector general, Glenn A. Fine, said there are "significant deficiencies" in these systems, and that matching up the FBI and INS fingerprint databases is a goal that "remains years away."

Military applicants also undergo an extensive background check by the Defense Security Service or the White House Office of Personnel Management. But these background checks do not have to be completed before the applicant is sworn in and receives military training.

One applicant was sworn into the Marine Corps 18 months ago and is serving on active duty, even though OPM is still struggling to complete his background check. Navy Petty Officer Glenn Sprague said.

And while aliens are supposed to be limited to serving a single four- or six-year term unless they first become American citizens, a spot check turned up evidence that even this rule is not rigorously enforced.

One Marine sergeant, a Filipino by birth and by citizenship, said he recently re-enlisted for another four years. He seemed surprised that that was illegal. "Nobody ever mentioned any limit to me," he said.

Other aliens, who enlisted before the single-term rule went into effect, are serving full careers as non-citizens in the U.S. military.

"I enlisted in November 1982 and it's been a good life, if you don't mind working hard," said Navy Petty Officer Pornchai Boonmasi, a 41-year-old who was born in Ban Lopburi, Thailand. He has served as a fireman apprentice and a boiler technician on two warships and has been stationed in



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



October 21, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Identifying and Locating Non-Citizens Serving in the Military

I have learned that the Department's ability to identify and locate non-citizens who are serving in the military is degraded by the lack of accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

Our inability to retrieve this data limits our ability to identify and rely upon military personnel whose country of origin, background, and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

I have been advised that the necessary infrastructure to provide this information exists today, but that our capability is precluded by incomplete and inconsistent data collected during our initial recruiting process. As a result, these problems directly and adversely affect the DMDC database and our security clearance/investigations database.

I request that each of you, working with the Military Departments as necessary, ensure that information regarding the place of birth and citizenship status of all non-citizen military members is collected, entered, and kept current in the Military Departments' personnel databases, the DMDC database, and in our information systems pertaining to DoD security clearances and investigations.

Paul Wolfowitz

cc: Secretaries of the Military Departments

U13976-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9120

342.18

21 Oct 02



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

JUN 19 2002

USDP



In reply refer to:
I-02/009107-ME

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

19 JUN 2002

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

SUBJECT: Status of Pakistan C-130E Aircraft Request

• **BACKGROUND:**

- GOP asked for six C-130s in a letter of request to DSCA. The GOP intends to fund the C-130s with their \$75M FY02 supplemental funds.
- The C-130s, with engine and avionics upgrades, will cost \$70M.

• **ACTIONS TAKEN:**

- DSCA submitted the Congressional notification package to State 4 June.
- The USAF is building the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). Expected completion: early July.

• **STATUS:**

- Funding is subject to passage of the FY02 Supplemental by the Congress.
- State expects challenges from some Congressional members and State has asked DoD for more detailed OEF justification.

• **NEXT STEPS:**

- ISA/DSCA will provide additional OEF justification to State by 26 June.
- USDP will call Under Secretary of State Bolton as necessary.

Prepared by: Lt Col Bernice Beckwith, MEAN/ME, (b)(6)

Dap DIR, DSCA *Rodman*

PD&S/ISA

11-L-0530 OSD/9121 01-10299 /02

Snowflake

EF1838C¹²

4:22 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 13, 2002

SUBJECT:

The Pakistanis say they are waiting for approval from State for C-6130s. What's the story?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061302.11

Please respond by:

6/21/02

6/17

USDP -

ISA has lead. Suspensions 6/19.

✓/K L¹²

✓ Commercial contracts

11-L-0559 OSD/9122 06-17-02 09:59 IN

Snowflake

EF1838CLW

4:22 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 13, 2002

SUBJECT:

The Pakistanis say they are waiting for approval from State for C-6130s. What's the story?

Thanks.

Pakistan

DHR/azn
061302.11

Please respond by:

6/21/02

6/17

USDP -

ISA has lead. Suspensions 6/19.

✓/K L W

13 Jun 02

✓ Commercial contracts

11-L-05590SD/9123 06-17-02 1905300 /02

JUN 17 6:23:16

November 4, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cables

Please talk to Cables and explain to them that when they call my house and ask for me, Joyce assumes they need me to come to the phone right away, when in reality they could give her a message to pass on to me.

I would appreciate it if they would say whether or not it is urgent. I may be in the shower or outside. If all they want to do is let me know there is a secure fax for me upstairs, they can just tell Joyce that. If all they want to do is tell me General Craddock needs to speak to me, but it is not time sensitive, that would be a help.

I end up running to the phone to talk to Cables, and they tell me something like Paul Wolfowitz is going to send me a fax in two hours—something they could have passed to Joyce just as easily.

There must be some way to work this out so it is not quite so inconvenient.

Thanks.

DHR:gh
110402-3

.....
SECDEF HAS SEEN

Please respond by 11/04/02

To: Sec Def

Sir,
I have briefed Cables and explained how you desire them to handle calls in the future. I will follow up to ensure compliance.

COL Bucci 11/4

11-L-0559/OSD/9124

U10342 /03

09050

11Nov02

November 4, 2002 11:57 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Approval Process

The more I think about it, the more the idea that some guy named Tarbell, five layers down from me who I have never met, is the one who was signing off on the boats for Iraq bothers me.

We have so many interagency committees and so many low level people sitting on them and making decisions for this Department that I don't agree with. How in the world do we get that stopped?

Please take a look and show me all the interagency committees you have, who is representing us and what our linkages are to that person, so that I have some sense that we're properly represented.

I know Tarbell is gone now, but it is the principle of the thing. We need to see who is representing this Department and get ourselves comfortable with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110402-12

.....
Please respond by 11/22/02

U10344 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9125

310.1

4 Nov 02

November 6, 2002 4:43 PM

Done
12/2

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quarterly Reports

322

I am not sure I am getting much out of these quarterly reports from the combatant commanders.

One thought is to cut them to every four months or every six months. The other is to tell them to discontinue them and simply have them send me one or two pages on important issues that they feel ought to be called to my attention whenever they feel something ought to be called to my attention.

Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110602-18

.....
Please respond by 11/15/02

6 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9126

U10345w/03

147
5600
showfile

November 6, 2002 9:25 AM

337

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Staff Meetings

Please get me the list of the staff meetings I currently have and who is invited—the senior staff, the roundtable, and anything else I have on a regular basis, so I can have the list in front of me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110602-7

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02

done
Larry Di Rita
11/7

6 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9127

U10346w/03

November 7, 2002 11:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gifts

There is a question about giving people knives. In some countries, it is bad luck and they cannot accept it without payment. It is true in Russia, and it is true in Kyrgyzstan and other countries.

Please ask Protocol to be careful about who we give that nice knife to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110702-6

.....
Please respond by 11/15/02

DR

7 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9128

U1034700/03

November 7, 2002 2:05 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: PA on Trip

333 SD

What do you think about having Kevin Kellems come on one part of the trip and
Bryan Whitman come on the other?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110702-9

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02

11/8
SEC DEF -
All discuss with you
D. White

7 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9129

U103481W/03

November 8, 2002 10:24 AM

TO: Joyce
CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Travel Coordination w/Paul Wolfowitz

333 SD

I am going to stay in Washington until Tuesday, December 24, so Paul Wolfowitz can go to Florida with his daughter. He is going to leave late on Friday, December 20, and return about 2 p.m. on Tuesday, December 24. I plan to take off from Andrews to go to Taos around 3 p.m. on December 24.

I have to land in Taos by dusk, so we should find out what time I have to leave Andrews. Paul will need to land about one hour before I take off.

Larry, please work that out with Paul and give him the precise times.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110802-9

8 NOV 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9130

U103494/03

November 8, 2002 8:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet w/Haig

Please have Al Haig come in for a 25-minute visit sometime.

Thanks.

DHR dh
110802-7

.....

Please respond by 12/6/02

000.71 SD

2 NOV 02

November 8, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Today's Calendar

000.71 SD

I need 15 minutes to sit down with Paul Wolfowitz on our calendars. Please schedule it for today.

I need time today to get ready for the German MoD meeting. I don't see any pre-brief on it, I am not ready, and I haven't had time to read this three inches worth of cables and papers that have come in.

Please make sure I have a good German interpreter for the Struck meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110802-4

.....

Please respond by _____


Larry Di Rita

8 Nov 02

November 12, 2002 9:56 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Envelope

3/1.1

The envelope you had delivered to my house on Monday from PACOM was open when it arrived to me.

Thanks.

DI:R,jh
 111202-27

Please respond by _____

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 14 2002

SecDef

Standard procedure for sending items to you via courier is to put the document in an envelope and seal it before departing Cables. Upon arrival, the courier is to open the envelope and provide the document to you.

We failed to follow procedure. Upon arrival, the courier opened the envelope, then gave you it and the document.

We will do some training to ensure all know the proper procedure.

12 NOV 02

C 11/14

U1035211/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9133

November 12, 2002 12:17 PM

682

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arlington Cemetery

It looks to me as though I qualify under section 2-4 e (1) since I held an elective office of the U.S. Government and had served honorably in the Armed Forces.

What about under items (3) or (4)? What do those mean?

Thanks.

Attach.
AR 290-5

DHR:dh
111202-40

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

12 Nov 02

U10353W/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9134

c. No one will be buried in a memorial section. These sections are designated for the erection of memorial markers in memory of those individuals specified in paragraph 3-4.

2-4. Persons eligible for ground burial in Arlington National Cemetery.

a. Any active duty member of the Armed Forces.

b. Any retired member of the Armed Forces. A retired member of the Armed Forces, in the context of this paragraph, is any retired member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps or Coast Guard, or any present or former member of a Reserve component, who has been retired for disability or performed at least 20 years of active duty or active reserve service which qualifies him or her for retired pay either upon departure from active service, or at age 60.

c. Any former member of the Armed Forces separated for physical disability before 1 October 1949 who has served on active duty (other than for training) and who would have been eligible for retirement under the provisions of 10 USC 1201 had that statute been in effect on the date of the separation.

d. Any former member of the Armed Forces whose last active duty (other than for training) terminated honorably and who has been awarded one of the following decorations:

- (1) Medal of Honor
- (2) Distinguished Service Cross (Air Force Cross or Navy Cross)
- (3) Distinguished Service Medal
- (4) Silver Star
- (5) Purple Heart

e. Persons who have held any of the following positions, provided their last period of active duty (other than for training) as a member of the Armed Forces terminated honorably—

- (1) An elective office of the United States Government
- (2) Office of the Chief Justice of the United States or of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
- (3) An office listed, at the time the person held the position, in 5 USC 5312 or 5 USC 5313
- (4) The chief of a mission who was at any time during his tenure classified in class I under the provisions of 411 of the Act of 13 August 1946, 60 Stat. 1002 as amended (22 USC 866).

f. The spouse, widow, or widower, minor child, and at the discretion of the Secretary of the Army, unmarried adult dependent child of any of the persons listed in a through e above.

(1) The term "spouse" refers to a widow or widower of an eligible member, including the widow or widower of a member of the Armed Forces who was lost or buried at sea or officially determined to be permanently absent in a status of missing or missing in action. A surviving spouse who has remarried and whose remarriage is void, terminated by death, or dissolved by annulment or divorce by a court with basic authority to render such decrees regains eligibility for burial in Arlington National Cemetery unless it is determined that the decree of annulment or divorce was secured through fraud or collusion.

(2) An unmarried adult dependent child may be interred in the same grave in which the parent has been or will be interred, provided that the child was incapable of self-support up to the time of death because of physical or mental condition. At the time of death of an adult dependent child, a request of interment will be submitted to the Superintendent of Arlington National Cemetery. The request must be accompanied by a notarized statement from an individual who has direct knowledge of the marital status and degree of dependency of the deceased child; the name of that child's primarily eligible parent; and the military service upon which the burial is requested. A certificate from a physician who has attended the decedent as to the nature and duration of the physical and/or mental disability must also be submitted for approval to HQDA (DAAG-PED), WASH, DC 20314, before interment.

g. Widows or widowers of service members who are interred in Arlington National Cemetery as part of a group burial may be interred in the same cemetery but not in the same grave.

h. The surviving spouse, minor child and, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Army, unmarried adult dependent child of any person already buried in Arlington.

i. The parents of a minor child or unmarried adult dependent child whose remains, based on the eligibility of the parent, are already buried in Arlington.

j. An honorably discharged former member of the Armed Forces may be interred in the same grave as a close relative who is the primary eligible for interment in the gravesite, provided (a) the close relative is already interred; (b) the former member is without minor or unmarried adult dependent children; (c) the former member will not occupy space reserved for the spouse or minor or unmarried adult dependent child of the primary eligible; (d) the burial is sanctioned by all close relatives of the primary eligible; (e) the former member's spouse waives his or her entitlement, on the basis of the former member's service, to interment in Arlington; and (f) the cost of moving or recasketing/revaulting remains as a result of the burial will be borne by the party requesting the interment.

2-5. Assignment of gravesites.

a. Under present policy of the Department of the Army, only one gravesite is authorized for burial of a service

member and eligible family members. This policy applies to Arlington National Cemetery except when the Director, Casualty and Memorial Affairs, specifically determines this is not feasible.

b. Gravesites will not be reserved.

c. Reservations made in writing, before the one-gravesite-per-family policy was established, for gravesites adjoining those of next of kin previously interred, will remain in effect as long as the reservee remains eligible for burial in Arlington.

2-6. Persons eligible for inurnment of cremated remains in the Columbarium in Arlington National Cemetery.

a. Any member of the Armed Forces who dies on active duty.

b. Any former member of the Armed Forces who served on active duty (other than for training) and whose last service terminated honorably.

c. Any member of a Reserve Component of the Armed Forces whose death occurs under honorable conditions while he is—

(1) On active duty for training or performing full-time service under Title 32, USC;

(2) Performing authorized travel to or from that duty or service;

(3) On authorized inactive duty training including training performed as a member of the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard (Section 502 of Title 32, USC); or

(4) Hospitalized or undergoing treatment at the expense of the United States for injury or disease incurred or contracted under honorable conditions while he is on that duty or service, performing that travel or inactive duty training, or undergoing that hospitalization or treatment at the expense of the United States.

d. Any member of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps of the Army, Navy, or Air Force whose death occurs under honorable conditions while he is attending an authorized training camp or on an authorized practice cruise, performing authorized travel to or from that camp or cruise, or hospitalized or undergoing treatment at the expense of the United States for injury or disease incurred under honorable conditions while attending that camp or cruise, performing that travel, or undergoing that hospitalization or treatment at the expense of the United States.

e. Any citizen of the United States who, during any war in which the United States has been or may hereafter be engaged, served in the Armed Forces of any government allied with the United States during that war, whose last service terminated honorably by death or otherwise, and who was a citizen of the United States at the time of entry on such service and at the time of death.

f. Commissioned officers, United States Coast and Geodetic Survey (now National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), who die during and subsequent to the service specified in the following categories and whose last service terminated honorably are eligible for inurnment of their cremated remains in the Columbarium regardless of time of death—

(1) Commissioned officers assigned to areas of immediate military hazard described in the Act of 3 December 1942 (56 Stat. 1038; 33 USC 855a) as amended.

(2) Commissioned officers serving in the Philippine Islands on 7 December 1941.

(3) Commissioned officers actually transferred to the Department of the Army or the Department of the Navy under the provisions of the Act of 22 May 1917 (40 Stat. 87; 33 USC 855).

g. Any commissioned officer of the United States Public Health Service who served on full-time duty after 29 July 1945. If the service falls within the meaning of active duty for training as defined in 38 USC 101(22), or inactive duty training as defined in 38 USC 101(23), death must have resulted from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in line of duty. Also, any commissioned officer of the Regular or Reserve Corps of the Public Health Service who performed active service prior to 29 July 1945 in time of war; while on detail for duty with the Armed Forces; or while the service was part of the military forces of the United States pursuant to executive order of the President.

h. Spouses, minor children and adult dependent children as described in paragraph 2-3f; and the same categories of spouses and children of the persons listed in a through g above.


2-7. Selection of the Columbarium for inurnment.

a. Those persons eligible for ground interment in Arlington National Cemetery under paragraph 2-4 above are also eligible for inurnment in the Columbarium. However, once the initial interment is made in a gravesite, each additional interment in Arlington of eligible members of the family unit must be made in that gravesite.

b. In the event the Columbarium is selected for inurnment of a family member, the cremated remains of all eligible surviving members must be inurned in that facility if disposition of remains is in Arlington.

2-8. Persons eligible for burial in Soldiers' Home National Cemetery.

The Board of Commissioners of the US Soldiers' and Airmen's Home will prescribe rules governing burial in the Soldiers' Home National Cemetery.

November 9, 2002/Di Rita 

MEMO TO SECDEF

Re: Arlington National Cemetery

You asked for the guidelines for burial at Arlington National Cemetery.

They are attached, together with the guidelines for placement of ashes in the columbarium.

11-L-0559/OSD/9137

November 12, 2002 12:23 PM

TO: (b)(6)
CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mailing List

000.71 SD

Please set a 15-minute meeting for you and me to go over this mailing list idea.

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef Memo to Arlene, re: Mailing List [102802-7]

DHR:dh
111202-42

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

12 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9138

U103541W/03

October 28, 2002 8:00 AM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Mailing List

Please develop a mailing list for me of people I would like to send selected items from time to time.

It should include my sister Joan, Valerie, Marcy, Nick, Jim Denny, Ed Brennan, Percy Bonevick, Ned Jannotta, John Madigan, Ross Jannotta, George Shultz, Alan Greenspan, the former Secretaries of Defense, the former Secretaries of State, the former NSC advisers, the former CIA directors, the members of the Defense Policy Board, the members of the Defense Science Board, and the members of DACOWITS. I will just put on those lists who I want.

Thanks.

DHR dh
102802-7

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9139

November 12, 2002 3:54 PM

11/13

333 SD

TO: [redacted]
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Black Tie

SECDEF
COPY 504

Larry Di Rita
11/13

Please be sure to let me know if there are any black tie events in Prague or Chile.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111202-70

Please respond by 11/13/02 SECDEF HAS SEEN 11/13

NOV 14 2002

see Def

Will do As of now
the evening events in both
Chile & Prague are identified
as Business suit, but we will
stay on top of it and advise
it it changes.

Nikita

12 Nov 02

U10355 /03

November 12, 2002 7:18 AM

322

TO: Combatant Commanders
Commanders

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Quarterly Reports

In the past, the pattern has been for Commanders to send in a quarterly report. On reflection, I haven't found them very useful. They seem to come off as somewhat forced. Therefore, I recommend they be discontinued.

Instead, I would suggest that if and when you have something you feel I should know, please put a single subject on a single piece of paper and send it to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110802-12

.....
Please respond by _____

12 Nov 02

U10357M/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9141

November 12, 2002 1:40 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Budget

11/0.01

I want to see every single movement that takes place in the budget. Larry, please set up regular weekly meetings, so I can be brought up to date on what everyone is thinking about doing and so we know what is going on.

I want to know precisely every reserve, and I want control over the reserves. I don't want the controls left in OMB, the Comptroller shop or PA&E.

Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace and I want to be involved in these things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111202-48

.....

Please respond by 11/26/02

12 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9142

U103581W/03

November 12, 2002 1:57 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Semantics

381

I like the idea that we should talk about transforming systems, rather than transformation.

You might want to talk to Marc Thiessen and the speechwriters about that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111202-55

.....
Please respond by —

12 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9143

U10359 / 03

November 12, 2002 2:31 PM

TO: Arlene

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Foreign Contacts

At the *Fortune* dinner last night, I saw Ehud Barak, the former Prime Minister (Israel), Prince Bandar's son (Saudi Arabia) and the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Minister Li.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111202-63

.....
Please respond by _____

091.112

12 Nov 02

November 12, 2002 3:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Review

I think I ought to meet with my key appointees and direct reports individually and kind of review two years with them and talk about the period ahead.

Please see me on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111202-69

.....

Please respond by 11/26/02

337

12 Nov 02

November 13, 2002 1:05 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photograph

Please see if you can get the White House to give us the photograph near the Cabinet Room that shows the National Security Council in the Situation Room. I would like to have it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111302-10

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

11/14

Sydney Short

Please advise.

D. Rita

Larry Di Rita

11/14

11-L-0559/OSD/9146

U10362-1/03

339 NSC

13 Nov 02

November 13, 2002 1:07 PM

TO: (b)(6)
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
 SUBJECT: Jim Denny Background Sheet

230

Please get a copy of Jim Denny's background sheet and send it over to Andy Card and Josh Bolten with a note:

Attached is the background sheet on Jim Denny, who has the kind of skills and background that might be useful for the Webster post that is now vacant or the SEC, either one.

Regards,

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 111302-11

.....

Please respond by 11/15/02

13 Nov 02

November 13, 2002 1:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boy Scouts

Andy Card tells me that the Boy Scouts want me to be their honoree this year. I told him that it was against the rules of the Pentagon—isn't that right? They want to use it for a fundraiser.

Thanks.

DHR dh
111302-12

Please respond by 11/15/02

SECDEF HAS SFF

11/13
Sec Def -

It is correct that ~~the Boy Scouts cannot~~ you cannot accept an award for the purposes of an organization's fund-raising objectives

You would probably be able to accept the honor itself if there were no fund-raising associated with it.
D.R.

*Call
Andy's decline
I don't want it*

U111302-12
10559/080/9148

335 SD

13 Nov 02

November 14, 2002 10:09 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Advance Notification on Gen. Franks

337

I should have had Tom Franks to dinner last night. If I had known he was going to be in town a day or two before, I could have thought about it.

I think I have indicated to you before that when he is in town I want to try to have dinner with him—alone or with Joyce—and have a chance to talk to him.

Please find out when he is going to be in and let me know in advance, so I can make my own arrangements.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111402-22

.....

Please respond by 11/26/02

19 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9149

U1036511/03

November 14, 2002 10:05 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meetings w/Franks

337

I want to control exactly who will be in any meeting with Gen. Franks from now on.

We had exactly the wrong group in the meeting yesterday. Apparently I need to start looking at the list. I want to keep it very lean. There is no reason in the world for Paul Wolfowitz to have both of his generals sitting there the whole time. I don't want either one of them in there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111402-21

.....

Please respond by _____

14 Nov 02

November 14, 2002 10:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col Brilli
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gen. Myers at DCI Lunch

*ADJUTANT
COPY SENT*

Gen. Myers should join me for the Tenet lunch tomorrow.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111402-28

.....
Please respond by 11/15/02

337 CIA

14 Nov 02

C 11/15

November 14, 2002 9:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial

Larry Di Rita

Please take a look at this note from Joe Johnston and the article saying that the panel on the memorial was all one-way. What do you think?

000.4

Thanks.

Attach.

11/11/02 Johnston ltr to SecDef and article by Catesby Leigh, "The Wrong Way to Remember"

DHR:dh
111402-12

.....

Please respond by 12/6/02

*11/15**Sec Def -*

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 14 2002

It is probably accurate. But like the old saying goes,

I don't know art, but I know what I like.

~~discrepancy~~ A project like this is bound to arouse artistic passion

for or against.

11410559/OSD/152

Larry Di Rita

11 Nov 02

Joseph F. Johnston, Jr.

(b)(6)

11 Nov 02

Dear Don + Joyce -

I enclose an article from last Friday's Wall St. Journal by Catesby Leigh, whom I have come to know & who is a well-respected critic of art and architecture. Catesby is a Princeton graduate and a real scholar of traditional architecture. I think his article speaks for itself. I had lunch with Catesby recently and we discussed this issue. His argument is that the jury for the Pentagon memorial was packed with "modernists" who will not even consider a traditional design.

Obviously, you have more important things on your plate, but I thought you would be interested in this.

We are greatly encouraged by the recent election. Things seem to be moving in the right direction.

Regards,

Joe

The Wrong Way to Remember

By Catesby Leigh

Ground Zero has received most of the attention of late, but the planes of Sept. 11, lest we forget, did their deadly work in Washington as well as New York. A memorial is planned for the Pentagon crash site, and a jury has now chosen six finalist designs. As it happens, Military-City.com is offering an unofficial online plebiscite for anyone who wants to vote for the best among them.

I'll go with "none of the above." The finalist ideas for the memorial—all designed for a roadside site in front of the Pentagon façade demolished in the terrorist attack—are that bad.


One plan calls for a Rubik's cube-style wall with 184 parts—the number of victims at the Pentagon and aboard American Airlines Flight 77. Set in a clearing in a rectangular grove with 184 trees, the wall is meant to be dismembered, or deconstructed, so the ugly voids that result can serve as a record of loss. Parts can be shared with victims' families or hometowns. How thoughtful.

Another proposal, dubbed the Pentagon New Day Memorial, tugs at the heartstrings more gently and is conceived as an interactive tabula rasa, a make-your-own memorial. It features a maze of 184 glass slabs standing perpendicular to one another. The maze is on a granite island in a reflecting pool and can be accessed from the surrounding landscape at several points. Cool air flowing from below causes condensation, which allows visitors to engage in finger-painting of sorts. The sentiments they register on the glass fade away with the next morning's dew. (The upper parts of each slab will be inscribed with a victim's name.)

Yet another plan offers a sunken plaza with a stark, polished wall in whose upper portion the Pentagon's reconstructed façade is reflected. In the plaza, a long table-slab is surrounded by 189 block-like seats—including five for Flight 77's hijackers. How generous! Vine-covered walls are fronted by flower beds, surely intended to calm the suicidal impulses sparked by this dismal setting.

It gets worse. We also have a proposed dark pavement from which 184 "life recorders," concrete boxes inspired by the "black boxes" aboard aircraft, protrude. Orange on the outside (as black boxes, in fact, are) and filled with water, the "life recorders" have two-way mirrors on their bottoms. They would reflect the sky by day and be lit from below at night. The mirrors would be etched with names and their glass encasements could even contain mementoes.

Then there's the plan for a "memorial field" with 184 "memorial units" consisting of benches shaped rather like desktop staplers. Below are water-filled aluminum wells that also light up at night. Concrete seats are cantilevered over



Top: a sunken plaza and table with seats commemorating those who died at the Pentagon, including the hijackers! **Above:** glass slabs on which visitors may write.

them. The stapler-benches, in turn, are arrayed in "age lines" (determined by the victims' years of birth): Fifty-nine benches face one way (for the airline passengers), 129 the opposite. Like, weird.

And last, the coup de grâce: a low, marble, pedestal-like mound without a statue. No statue? Why, the visitor is the statue!

These designs not only reflect the profound influence of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on juries but also a failure to

select a single traditional entry from the pool of 1,126 proposals. Dino Marcantonio, an architecture professor at Notre Dame, submitted an outstanding classical design. It is focused on a lofty cenotaph enriched with swags and floral motifs and crowned with a pediment with anthemia and eagles. Guarded by two lions, the cenotaph sits on a handsome terrace whose reflecting pool is girded by Japanese cherry trees.

This design would create an inspiring work of civic art, providing a strong architectural accent that would allow the rather bland 1930s-vintage, stripped-classical idiom of the Pentagon façade to serve as an appropriate backdrop. And because the design is conceived in truly monumental terms, the cenotaph, unlike the finalist proposals, would create an appealing landmark along Route 27, which the memorial site abuts.

For centuries, artists accorded primacy to the sculptural and architectural elements of memorial design. Not one of the finalists, however, creates a landmark or complements the architecture of the Pentagon as Mr. Marcantonio's plan does, and here again Maya Lin's Vietnam memorial, which gives undisputed primacy to landscape, plays a role. Indeed, her walls are implanted in the Mall's landscape and defer to it.

Not coincidentally, no less than three of the seven design professionals in the Pentagon competition's 11-member jury (which includes Terence Riley, the Museum of Modern Art's chief curator of architecture and design) are landscape architects. All the finalists are anti-monumental in their deference to the landscape. Unfortunately, this approach all too often leads to disaster, as with Lawrence Halprin's sprawling Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial in Washington's West Potomac Park.

Also noteworthy is the reliance on tactile and interactive elements in several of the finalist schemes. You can't get much closer to nothingness than the New Day Memorial's maze of glass slabs, so the designers give a sentimental emphasis to touch and personal response. Visitors sitting at the table in the sunken plaza become actors on a minimalist stage set. And of course those mounting the silly pedestal-mound are themselves the crowning work of "art."

The wheel-reinventors could use some good, stiff competition, but they won't get it as long as juries are packed with those who, favoring modernist reductionism, disqualify traditionalist designs. We have classical architects and sculptors who could vastly enrich the mix. Let them have their say, perhaps on juries with layman majorities that can better judge whether the ancient wisdom or the current wisdom has more to offer.

How bad are the six design finalists for the Pentagon's 9/11 memorial? Let's see . . .

grasp that memorial's true nature. Maya Lin's black, name-etched wall is an exceptional artifact—a minimalist memorial to a deeply controversial conflict. Its extreme simplicity is widely regarded as a virtue rather than a defect.

Juries have routinely sought the same kind of radical novelty in the past two decades. But as the Pentagon competition suggests, the reinvent-the-wheel syndrome easily descends to farce. There is a warning here for the decision-makers involved with choosing New York's 9/11 memorial, now much under debate.

Given the poor quality of these emphatically untraditional schemes, however, this disturbing to note that the jury did not

Mr. Leigh writes on architecture and fine art from Washington

11-055975 SP79154

November 14, 2002 8:22 AM

331.3

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Civilian Use of PX

I do want to get an answer as to why civilians cannot use the PX.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111402-2

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

14 Nov 02

November 14, 2002 9:06 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Round Table

I don't think we can keep skipping the round table. It is the one meeting I have where I feel I really get some people going on stuff—of course, that's except when I am meeting with you!

But I do think we are starting to skip it too often, and it is not right.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111402-11

.....

Please respond by _____

337

14 Nov 02

U10377w/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9156

November 15, 2002 7:35 AM

Done 11/14

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Paragraph 8

You were going to give me paragraph 8 of the new resolution so I could see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111502-6

.....
Please respond by _____

1229

15 Nov 02

Text of UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq: November 8, 2002

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

[Adopted as Resolution 1441 at Security Council meeting 4644, 8 November 2002]


PARAGRAPH 8

8. *Decides* further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;

Settele, James, CDR, OSD

From: Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS\CCD
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 8:07 AM
To: Settele, James, CDR, OSD
Subject: Text of UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq November 8,
Importance: Low

I think this is it.
js



[Print Friendly Version]

Text of UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq: November 8, 2002

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

[Adopted as Resolution 1441 at Security Council meeting 4644, 8 November 2002]

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,

Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,

Recognizing the threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,

Deploing the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

Deploing further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

Deploing the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,

Deploing also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,

Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,

Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq's continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,

Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,

Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;

4. *Decides* that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;

5. *Decides* that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

6. *Endorses* the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;

7. *Decides* further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq:

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available;

- All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA;

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998);

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities;

- Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient United Nations security guards;

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles;

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;

8. *Decides* further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

10. *Requests* all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

11. *Directs* the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

12. *Decides* to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;

13. *Recalls*, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex

Text of Blix/EI-Baradei letter

| | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| The Executive Chairman | The Director General |

8 October 2002

Dear General Al-Saadi,

During our recent meeting in Vienna, we discussed practical arrangements that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. As you recall, at the end of our meeting in Vienna we agreed on a statement which listed some of the principal results achieved, particularly Iraq's acceptance of all the rights of inspection provided for in all of the relevant Security Council resolutions. This acceptance was stated to be without any conditions attached.

During our 3 October 2002 briefing to the Security Council, members of the Council suggested that we prepare a written document on all of the conclusions we reached in Vienna. This letter lists those conclusions and seeks your confirmation thereof. We shall report accordingly to the Security Council.

In the statement at the end of the meeting, it was clarified that UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be granted immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, including what was termed "sensitive sites" in the past. As we noted, however, eight presidential sites have been the subject of special procedures under a Memorandum of Understanding of 1998. Should these sites be subject, as all other sites, to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, UNMOVIC and the IAEA would conduct inspections there with the same professionalism.

H.E. General Amir H. Al-Saadi
Advisor
Presidential Office
Baghdad

Iraq

We confirm our understanding that UNMOVIC and the IAEA have the right to determine the number of inspectors required for access to any particular site. This determination will be made on the basis of the size and complexity of the site being inspected. We also confirm that Iraq will be informed of the designation of additional sites, i.e. sites not declared by Iraq or previously inspected by either UNSCOM or the IAEA, through a Notification of Inspection (NIS) provided upon arrival of the inspectors at such sites.

Iraq will ensure that no proscribed material, equipment, records or other relevant items will be destroyed except in the presence

of UNMOVIC and/or IAEA inspectors, as appropriate, and at their request.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may conduct interviews with any person in Iraq whom they believe may have information relevant to their mandate. Iraq will facilitate such interviews. It is for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to choose the mode and location for interviews.

The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) will, as in the past, serve as the Iraqi counterpart for the inspectors. The Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre (BOMVIC) will be maintained on the same premises and under the same conditions as was the former Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The NMD will make available services as before, cost free, for the refurbishment of the premises.

The NMD will provide free of cost: (a) escorts to facilitate access to sites to be inspected and communication with personnel to be interviewed; (b) a hotline for BOMVIC which will be staffed by an English speaking person on a 24 hour a day/seven days a week basis; (c) support in terms of personnel and ground transportation within the country, as requested; and (d) assistance in the movement of materials and equipment at inspectors' request (construction, excavation equipment, etc.). NMD will also ensure that escorts are available in the event of inspections outside normal working hours, including at night and on holidays.

Regional UNMOVIC/IAEA offices may be established, for example, in Basra and Mosul, for the use of their inspectors. For this purpose, Iraq will provide, without cost, adequate office buildings, staff accommodation, and appropriate escort personnel.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may use any type of voice or data transmission, including satellite and/or inland networks, with or without encryption capability. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may also install equipment in the field with the capability for transmission of data directly to the BOMVIC, New York and Vienna (e.g. sensors, surveillance cameras). This will be facilitated by Iraq and there will be no interference by Iraq with UNMOVIC or IAEA communications.

Iraq will provide, without cost, physical protection of all surveillance equipment, and construct antennae for remote transmission of data, at the request of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Upon request by UNMOVIC through the NMD, Iraq will allocate frequencies for communications equipment.

Iraq will provide security for all UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel. Secure and suitable accommodations will be designated at normal rates by Iraq for these personnel. For their part, UNMOVIC and the IAEA will require that their staff not stay at any accommodation other than those identified in consultation with Iraq.

On the use of fixed-wing aircraft for transport of personnel and equipment and for inspection purposes, it was clarified that aircraft used by UNMOVIC and IAEA staff arriving in Baghdad may land at Saddam International Airport. The points of departure of incoming aircraft will be decided by UNMOVIC. The Rasheed airbase will continue to be used for UNMOVIC and IAEA helicopter operations. UNMOVIC and Iraq will establish air liaison offices at the airbase. At both Saddam International Airport and Rasheed airbase, Iraq will provide the necessary support premises and facilities. Aircraft fuel will be provided by Iraq, as before, free of charge.

On the wider issue of air operations in Iraq, both fixed-wing and rotary, Iraq will guarantee the safety of air operations in its air space outside the no-fly zones. With regard to air operations in the no-fly zones, Iraq will take all steps within its control to ensure the safety of such operations.

Helicopter flights may be used, as needed, during inspections and for technical activities, such as gamma detection, without limitation in all parts of Iraq and without any area excluded. Helicopters may also be used for medical evacuation.

On the question of aerial imagery, UNMOVIC may wish to resume the use of U-2 or Mirage overflights. The relevant practical arrangements would be similar to those implemented in the past.

As before, visas for all arriving staff will be issued at the point of entry on the basis of the UN Laissez-Passer or UN Certificate; no other entry or exit formalities will be required. The aircraft passenger manifest will be provided one hour in advance of the arrival of the aircraft in Baghdad. There will be no searching of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or of official or personal baggage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA will ensure that their personnel respect the laws of Iraq restricting the export of certain items, for example, those related to Iraq's national cultural heritage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may bring into, and remove from, Iraq all of the items and materials they require, including satellite phones and other equipment. With respect to samples, UNMOVIC and IAEA will, where feasible, split samples so that Iraq may receive a portion while another portion is kept for reference purposes. Where appropriate, the organizations will send the samples to more than one laboratory for analysis.

We would appreciate your confirmation of the above as a correct reflection of our talks in Vienna.

Naturally, we may need other practical arrangements when proceeding with inspections. We would expect in such matters, as

with the above, Iraq's co-operation in all respect.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed)

Hans Blix
Executive Chairman
United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission

(Signed)

Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

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November 15, 2002 7:38 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Authorizations Team

What do you think about getting some people who served as chief executives of states or companies in the House and Senate and former military people, like Mark Kirk, and forming a team to work on getting our authorizations freed up. Certainly Liddy Dole and Lamar Alexander and any former governor or former CEO would be good candidates.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111502-7

.....
Please respond by 11/26/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9165

U103800/03

110.01

15 Nov 02

November 15, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Radio Interview

I saw C-span coverage of the Infinity radio interview. In the future, I would like you to tell me if it is going to be on television. I would have combed my hair or arranged the seating a little differently. I was thinking it was purely radio, with just some photographs being taken.

Please give me a copy of the tape.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111502-8

.....
Please respond by 11/26/02

000.7750

11 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9166

U103824/03

November 15, 2002 8:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Invite

The MoD of Kazakhstan invited me to visit Kazakhstan, at the request of the President. We should add that to my list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111502-11

.....
Please respond by _____

Kazakhstan

15 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9167

U10384-1/03

November 15, 2002 9:02 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Follow Up on Kazakhstan MoD

The MoD of Kazakhstan asked to meet with me privately, and we did. LTG Craddock came in a little late, but basically he talked about the President deciding to run for reelection in 2006. He is confident he will win.

He likes his personal relationship with me—we both have cauliflower ears! He wanted us to be aware of the human rights situation and that he is working it. I told him it was a matter of importance here in the US and mentioned the journalist who had been arrested.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111502-12

.....
Please respond by _____

KAZAKHSTAN

15 Nov 02

November 15, 2002 11:56 AM

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. PaceFROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Flag Officer Tenure

It seems to me that our country would be better served if our generals and admirals spent more time in each billet to which assigned and more total time on active duty.

What are the personnel assignment criteria—service and joint—that drive us to move our senior leaders so frequently? What can we do to change that?

If we want to keep good officers on active duty longer, what changes to pay and retirement benefits, if any, should we be thinking about for those who serve beyond 30 years?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111502-14

.....

Please respond by 12/13/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9169

U103861/03

210

15 Nov 02

10:37 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 16, 2002
SUBJECT: **Smart Sanctions**

We've got to get a National Security Council process going on stopping this smart sanctions business. There are just too many things that are getting through that are dual use that are going to end up killing coalition forces.

Let's get that shoved into the Deputy's Committee or into the Principal's Committee and start raising cane about it. Smart sanctions are ridiculous.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
111602.01

Please respond by: _____

11/25

334 NSC

16 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9170

U10387.../03

10:59 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 16, 2002
SUBJECT: **Prince Bandar**

Make sure you get back to me with what Bandar said to the president and then you probably ought to confirm with Tom that he ought to talk to Abdullah or Sultan or both.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
111602.02

Please respond by: _____

125

Saudi Arabia

16 Nov 02

18-NOV-02 10:38 DE:

(b)(6)

A:87001

(b)(6)

PAGE:023

November 17, 2002 1:15 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Total Information Awareness

I think using our military commission advisors to look into this Total Information Awareness question is at least worth thinking about.

Please take a look at it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/16/02 *Washington Post* editorial: "Total Information Awareness"

DHR:dh
11/17/02,18

.....
Please respond by

12/6/02

U10389w/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9172

Saturday, November 16, 2001

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER


Total Information Awareness

ANYONE WHO deliberately set out to invent a government program with the aim of identifying the Oval Office's enemies could hardly have improved on the Information Awareness Office. Tucked away in the outer reaches of the Defense Department, bristling at people and trying to stay out of the spotlight, the office is headed by Admiral John M. Ponder, the Pentagon administrator who was convicted in the wake of the Iran-contra scandal of falsifying counts of arms to Congress, destroying official documents and obstructing the congressional inquiry into the affair. That notwithstanding, there have already been some fascinating revelations in recently published information about the office, including allegations that it is headed by the former Intelligence Hall (it isn't) and that Adm. Ponder has compiled a computer dossier on every American he hasn't or not yet.

In fact, the program is still a research project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the high-tech innovator who helped create the Internet—and who claim that this project is equally benign. Among other things, the Information Awareness Office is trying to find ways of better identifying potentially dangerous people by using video cameras and mathematics, and of processing large amounts of data from different sources so as to predict and prevent terrorist attacks (the "Total Information Awareness System"). Police tracking the Washington sniper suspects might, for example, have caught them more quickly with the help of a computer program that could simultaneously search their motel records, their immigration

and voter histories, and the travel violations tied to their Chevrolet Caprices.

Yet, given both the context and the content of the program, DARPA should hardly have been surprised by the bad publicity. For however well intentioned and innovative it may be, this is the worst technology and the potential for abuse is enormous. It is unfortunate that those who are people a week in fact will never find out whether it is possible to find their names—and thereby, undoubtedly, computer dossiers on every one really do come to be added to the list.



Identify a person through a video camera, then construct a database of society's members possible, and the whole legal system designed to protect privacy has got to catch up with this technology. Congress needs to take a direct interest in this project, and the defense secretary should appoint an outside committee to oversee it before it proceeds. Privacy concerns need to be built into the technology from the beginning—in the public codes, after being fully acquainted with the possibilities that it is to be built at all.

Finally, everyone involved might also want to consider whether Adm. Ponder is the best person to direct this extremely sensitive project. Though his criminal convictions were overturned on appeal, his record of lying to Congress hardly makes him an ideal protector of the legal system, and his conduct of four courts hardly makes him an advertisement for government competence. Even his choice of logo calls into question his tact and taste. Adm. Ponder's presence on this project, the lack of clear public information about it, and the absence of any real oversight already indicate a serious lapse of judgment.



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

December 3, 2002, 7 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes II*

SUBJECT: Total Information Awareness – Federal Advisory Committee

- DARPA's Total Information Awareness ("TIA") program may be important to American security. But it has been heavily criticized in recent weeks as a threat to fundamental civil liberties.
- I am in the process of establishing a Federal Advisory Committee to review the civil liberty and related issues implicated by TIA. An Advisory Committee can improve the TIA program and help quell public criticism by (a) helping to surface and sort through issues implicated by TIA, and (b) educating the public about TIA.
- To be effective (and consistent with the law), the TIA Federal Advisory Committee must be politically balanced, and must include experts in civil liberties, privacy, technology, and management.
- You asked whether our military commission advisors should look into the TIA program. Some, but not all, of the military commission advisors are qualified to serve on the TIA Advisory Committee.
- I am now organizing the core of the TIA Advisory Committee. Core members could include Griffin Bell, Lloyd Cutler, and Zoe Baird. (All are willing to serve.) I am also talking with Gerhard Casper and Newt Minow. The Advisory Committee should also include non-lawyers. I am in the process of finding suitable non-lawyer candidates.
- Pete Aldridge is also looking into some management improvements for the TIA program.
- I will keep you abreast of these developments.

cc: Pete Aldridge
Tori Clarke



11-L-0559/OSD/9174

November 17, 2002 4:18 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Leadership Outcomes

I was not given the outcomes of the leadership elections in the House and Senate, Republican and Democrat. I need to dictate notes and telephone people when things like that happen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111702 21

.....
Please respond by _____

11/18

*Shera -
Powell has this
info. just fax
it to us. Thanks
L*

000.1

17 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9175

U10390w/03

TOM OSBORNE
3RD DISTRICT, NEBRASKA

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
AND THE WORKFORCE

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

JUN 25 2002
2002 JUN 25 AM 6:55

607 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

(b)(6)

DISTRICT OFFICES

815 DILL AVENUE, SUITE 3
GRAND ISLAND, NE 68803

(b)(6)

21 EAST 70TH STREET
SCOTTSDALE, NE 68081

(b)(6)

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2703
June 25, 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Pentagon, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am writing to express my support for the proposed merger of the United States Space Command and the United States Strategic Command and the placement of that new command at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha.

I understand that a proposed merger of the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command was studied in 1993 and at the time infrastructure and technology hampered the integration of the two U.S. commands. I understand that technological advances and similar mission tasks are enabling you to reconsider the merger of the two commands.

Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado will be the new home of the Northern Command that is scheduled to begin operations on October 1, 2002. Because Peterson Air Force Base will be the headquarters for the new Northern Command, I believe that Offutt Air Force Base would be an excellent location for the new merged U.S. command and would complement the current missions at Offutt Air Force Base. U.S. Strategic Command missions are Deterrence, Intelligence, Operation and Logistics, and Command and Control. The Nuclear Posture Review also showed that the U.S. Strategic Command would be looking at a mission of non-nuclear weapon capabilities.

The U.S. Strategic Command has also been instrumental in Operation Enduring Freedom. Intelligence personnel from the U.S. Strategic Command have provided important intelligence information in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Offutt Air Force Base is also home to the Intelligence Operations Center, Weather Support Center, Force Status Readiness Center and other support offices. The U.S. Strategic Command headquarters is also the home to 1,300 military personnel, 400 civilians and 800 contractors.

I understand that the merger of the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command is very likely. I encourage you to consider Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha as the permanent home of the new merged command.

I appreciate you taking this request into consideration.

Best Wishes,

TOM OSBORNE

Member of Congress

11-L-0359/OSD/9176

FILED ON RECEIPT

U10391 / 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 28 2002

322

The Honorable Tom Osborne
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2703

Dear Representative Osborne:

Thank you for your letter regarding the merger of U.S. Space Command with U.S. Strategic Command and recommending the location of this merged command at Offutt Air Force Base.

As you may know, we have announced that Offutt is indeed the preferred alternative for the site of the new command. A final decision awaits the completion of required impact and environmental assessments.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

28 Jun 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9177

U10577 /02

November 17, 2002 4:34 PM

TO: Tom White
Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Turbulence

Attached is a memo I got from Gordon England in response to the subject I raised with him. It strikes me that he is on the right track. I hope you folks are looking at similar activities.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/14/02 SecNav memo to SecDef re: Turbulence

DHR:dh
11/17/02:23

.....
Please respond by

12/6/02

370

17 Nov 02

November
December 14, 2002

TO: SECDEF

FR: Gordon England

RE: Turbulence

Mr. Secretary,

You're right – turbulence is hurting us in two areas, and we have been working for some time to reduce these problems:

People

1. **Longer Tours** - We are reviewing our specialty areas for longer tours. For example, we have teams studying our shore facilities, our ship maintenance programs and our acquisition personnel to see if we can extend tour length to four years. Our thinking is to keep people in their current positions longer and promote them in a current job rather than having to move to an open promotable position. Still a work in progress.
2. **Homebasing** - we are encouraging sequential tours in the same homebase to knock down the personal turbulence created by a moving van showing up every 18 months - it saves money too!
3. **Unit Integrity** - The rotation of people in and out of our Combat Teams are being synchronized to maximize unit integrity from training through deployment. This minimizes rotation while improving unit cohesion.

Processes

1. **PPBS** - This morning we had a long scheduled offsite meeting with the leadership of the Navy/Marine Corps and Secretariat to examine new approaches for our PPBS processes. As a result of that meeting, we will be moving to a process that relies more on financial modeling and less on budget building from the bottom up. Immediately, this will yield a higher degree of stability in over 50% of our budget. It will also allow the leadership team to concentrate on the truly variable part of our budget. Further, by having extensive financial modeling, we can do "what-if" off line analysis that otherwise is unavailable as a management tool.

2. **Maintenance, Modernization and Recapitalization** – Commercial company personnel intermixed with retired and active military are examining a wide range of processes across the Navy. In almost every case, they are recommending that we stabilize our change processes, our funding approaches, our decision processes, etc. Turbulence is a hallmark of the way we do our business and drives our costs. Based on the recommendations of these studies, we will be modifying many of our processes to bring more stability and predictability in the way we do business.
3. **Facilities** – We're getting ready for 2005 (BRAC) by studying the way we manage facilities with an eye toward coming out of the BRAC with "nothing extra, but nothing missing" in the number, type, and size of facilities we need to enable the warfighters to get the mission done. Shrinking the number of our facilities will help us with our personnel and financial stability.

We won't rest here. Thanks for asking.

To: CDR Settele

**Please distribute w/BCC to Gordon England that says
"Thanks - DR"**

**Thanks,
Delonie**

0-431
11-L-05597/OSD/9181

Snowflake

November 17, 2002 4:40 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Document

Thanks for showing me that Israeli document. I think you ought to get it to Abizaid and Franks. It is interesting—certainly well worth considering.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111702.25

.....
Please respond by _____

*Israel**17 Nov 02*

11-L-0559/OSD/9182

U10393w/03

November 17, 2002 5:07 PM

SUBJECT: Discuss w/CJCS

I want to talk to Gen. Myers. I am told by a member of an ODA team that they had to get up in the middle of the night and shave their beards. They were told every person, regardless of what they were doing, had to shave his beard.

Either the information Myers is getting about how innocent the general is who made the comment is wrong, or this is like a rule of engagement, where someone gives an order and then everyone down the line takes 10 percent off of it and wants to cover their tails.

In any event, I don't like it, I am unhappy about it and the argument that the rules need to be obeyed is baloney if the rules are wrong, because everyone is misinterpreting them down the line. If we want rules to be obeyed, they have to be sensible, and they have to be exactly what they were intended to be and everyone at each level down can't feel that they can modify the darn things.

I am convinced that some overeager general who had been in his position for about 15 minutes and was trying to make a name for himself mucked up and we have a whole chain of command protecting him.

DHR dh
:11702 30

337

17 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9183

U10394m/03

June 24, 2002 10:48 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
 CC: ADM Ellis
 J.D. Crouch
 Gen. Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Nuclear Posture

A-47161

Attached is a paper by Mike May on an alternative nuclear posture.

Mike was my SALT negotiator when I was SecDef in the 1970s. He is an interesting fellow. Please take a look at this for me and see if you think there are things here that we need to be thinking about.

Thanks.

Attach.
 May, Michael. "An Alternative Nuclear Posture" 06/04/02

DHR:dh
 062402-23

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

24 Jun 02

June 4, 2002
Michael May

An Alternative Nuclear Posture

A portion of President Bush's 2002 nuclear posture was released or leaked recently¹. The posture is largely silent on international cooperation and largely negative on arms control. The main relatively new trend in the posture is that the US will be prepared to use nuclear weapons in a much wider range of circumstances than before, with a particular emphasis on tactical uses². Supporting that trend, the posture states that the infrastructure for those expanded missions will be built up, including the design and production of new nuclear weapons; and that arms control measures, such as SALT II and the CTBT, will not stand in the way. Such an emphasis in a declaratory policy has not been seen since the days of "flexible response" forty or so years ago, when tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe and elsewhere.

Such a posture may be superficially attractive in an era when there is fear of hostile states or terrorist groups using nuclear weapons against the US. Yet, it is just in that light, and in the light of what nuclear weapons are actually useful for, that what is emphasized in the posture is needlessly imprudent. At the same time, what is absent or de-emphasized is essential to meet coming threats and take advantage of coming opportunities.

The posture explicitly increases the nuclear threat, particularly the tactical nuclear threat, to possible US adversaries, some of which are named. This emphasis on building up and widening the nuclear threat increases the motivation of states, which could find themselves on the US target list, to improve and extend their own nuclear force, or to get one if they don't have it. The fear of nuclear attack has been a strong motivator for building and protecting a nuclear force. It was a prime motivator for the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and arguably India.

The benefits to US security in return for this increased motivation of proliferation are marginal. The posture could be thought of as a warning against nuclear proliferation. If so, it is not an effective warning. The US has demonstrated means of discouraging nuclear proliferation that are more usable and less risky than the threat of tactical nuclear weapons. Emphasizing the tactical US nuclear threat adds little. It is unlikely that the US would use nuclear weapons against a country just for acquiring nuclear weapons. If the posture is meant as a warning it adds only adds marginally to the deterrent and dissuasion means that the US

¹ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm> Page references below are to this document.

² [Nuclear weapons] provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force... Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. (p. 7)

has already. At the same time, by advertising that the US is preparing to use new tactical nuclear weapons, the posture may add to the incentives an adversary has, not only to acquire, but to use or demonstrate it can use nuclear weapons of its own.

The posture states that there will be new nuclear weapons for various missions. But again the help is marginal and comes at high cost. Nuclear weapons don't help much with the kinds of missions the US prepares for and carries out, including the ones noted in the posture, such as digging out very deep underground facilities and developing small nuclear weapons for discriminate use¹. Both offer operational as well as political difficulties for marginal increased utility. Deep underground facilities are very difficult to destroy without large nuclear explosions, and are usually more vulnerable through their outlets for communication and action. Small nuclear weapons have only marginally more effectiveness than US conventional weapons against most targets of force projection, are more difficult to use, and carry all the risks of first use if used against a non-nuclear opponent. In the area of biological weapons, it is unlikely that nuclear weapons would provide the US a better counter against the most effective delivery methods than do current and planned non-nuclear alternatives.

On balance, from what has been released, the posture would increase the main threats to the US today (nuclear proliferation, nuclear force buildups, and nuclear use by states other than the US) in return for marginal or unusable US advantages. That is the opposite of what a nuclear posture should do. Given the overwhelming US conventional advantage and the relative invulnerability of the US to all but nuclear weapons, the US nuclear posture should aim at minimizing the chances of the worst outcomes rather than seek marginal gains. The present posture only makes sense if the US is confident it will be the last or only power to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. But there is no ground for such confidence.

At the same time, it is true that a new nuclear posture is needed, one that takes into account relevant new developments. Below I attempt to sketch out what such a posture could look like. First, however, some of the relevant new developments are noted briefly.

1. The Cold War order is gone. That's good in most ways, but there is a drawback. Security prospects and alignments for many states are now less clear than they were. The Cold War lines separating nuclear rivals were unmistakable: they had been drawn in blood and through serious crises. It's good they are gone, but it's not good that the lines are now fuzzy. Rivalries remain among the US, Russia, and China, and between other nuclear or nuclear-capable countries. Several of them concern zero-sum issues such as military dominance over territory. In this climate of uncertainty, rivals are maneuvering for advantage. Uncertainty about what are central interests makes for instability in crises.

¹ pp. 46-48

2. The US has gone from a military posture of defense and deterrence to one of military expansion. NATO expansion, military agreements with former Soviet republics, a much increased presence and unilateral action (with the UK) in the Middle East, unilateral or NATO action in the Balkans, and attempts to increase the role and range of Japanese forces (the most modern in the world after those of the US), these moves, rightly or wrongly, have brought US forces much closer to Russian, Chinese, and other countries' areas of vital interest than before. The Pentagon has given top priority to offensive projection forces. President Bush's statement that his highest priority is the military reinforces the emphasis on the offense. Militarily, the US is not a status-quo power, the US is on the move.
3. There are now several demonstrations of the relative ease with which nuclear weapons can be acquired. North Korea, a poor nation of 17 million people, made and separated plutonium, perhaps enough for one or more weapons, with very little help. South Africa made at least six weapons with essentially no help. Iraq and Pakistan, both in hostile surroundings and neither with a good technical and economic infrastructure, went all or most of the way. Pakistan got help from China and Iraq from the world's markets. So could other countries. There are probably fifty countries that could obtain nuclear weapons if they so wished, and many of them could get at least a marginal capability surreptitiously.
4. US vital security interests and those of its key allies (aside from Israel) are essentially unthreatened except for the possibility of nuclear proliferation or instability. Except for that possibility, Western and Central Europe are safe, so is Japan. South Korea faces a dangerous possible adversary, but that adversary is vastly outgunned, isolated, and trying, albeit clumsily and overaggressively, to find some road to international acceptance. Who dominates Taiwan is vital to China, not to the US. Who dominates former Soviet republics is vital to Russia, not to the US. Persian Gulf oil is needed by the US economy over the short run⁴, but it is vital to the sellers.
5. US conventional force superiority (which is anything but conventional), manifested by high-precision, well-informed, relatively invulnerable weapon delivery systems, is not likely to be challenged for some time. It is other countries, not the US, that may need to have recourse to nuclear weapons to offset conventional superiority.

In addition to these changed aspects of the landscape, three aspects that have not changed are relevant and often overlooked.

1. The US has a great comparative advantage over its potential adversaries with the tools of diplomacy, economics, and international organizations. No one, not Russia or China or Islamic extremists can use these tools more effectively than the US. On the US road to superpowerdom, these tools have been more useful than the military (though the military was necessary). The US won a Cold Peace, not a Cold War. The outcomes of the various wars (in Korea, in

⁴ Though the cheapest to bring to market, Gulf oil is sold at approximately the price that it would take to replace it with more expensive oil. It plays a role in keeping prices from going up, but, given time, it could be replaced.

Vietnam, in the Middle East) were ambiguous or worse, but the outcome of the peaceful competition was not.

2. Nuclear weapons are equalizers. They make winning a war far more costly, and, in the case of states with significant protected nuclear weapon systems, they make winning impossible. In most cases, tactical nuclear weapons, if introduced into a theater, would disadvantage the US more than its foes. Nuclear weapons are effective against expensive concentrated means of force projection, such as port facilities, air bases, and fleet units including carriers. They are comparatively ineffective against dispersed and less expensive targets such as mobile or hidden missile launchers. Escalation to threats of destruction of cities so obviously can lead to disaster that getting useful results without taking risks of escalation is what much of nuclear policy has been and must be about. The US has plenty of capability to pursue its interests without nuclear confrontation.
3. Non-proliferation requires willing adherents and the only lasting ground for such adherence is security. This truth points to the other major defect of the nuclear posture, its almost total lack of attention to the international dimension of nuclear weapons control. Most states under the Cold War regime came to feel secure in giving up the nuclear weapons option. That regime is gone. In the troubled regions of the world, securing adherence to nuclear non-proliferation on the basis of each state's national security must be done over again. The nuclear posture betrays a negative view of non-proliferation agreements and arms control in general that is not supported by history. Lasting settlements on the basis of security have minimized proliferation.

What kind of nuclear posture follows from these remarks? I cannot pretend to answer the question fully, but here is a brief list of suggestions.

1. An updated strategy for minimizing the demand for nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal.⁵ Such a strategy would take into account the changed situation in the parts of the globe where nuclear proliferation is most likely, East, South, and Western Asia. These parts of the world contain most of the world's population and will in a few decades have most of its wealth. Several states there have nuclear weapons, a number more could readily have them. The prime purpose of a US nuclear posture should be to deal constructively with this prospect. That can only be done by minimizing the demand or perceived need for nuclear weapons. To that end, a stable security order is needed, in which the various states, whether the US likes their internal governance or not, have a reasonably assured chance of peaceful survival if they themselves are peaceful. Continued US military expansion and unilateral disregard of sovereignty do not serve that purpose. They are more likely to motivate nuclear proliferation than nuclear limitations.
2. A strategy for nuclear arms reductions that could include eventually limitations on the Chinese and other arsenals. The US and Russia are the main but not the only candidates for arms reductions and limitations. That

⁵ Vertical proliferation refers to the augmentation of an existing nuclear force. Horizontal proliferation refers to a state newly acquiring nuclear weapons.

they have most of the weapons does not mean that they pose most of the threat. After the first hundred or so survivable weapons, it matters less and less how many a state has. To go beyond the US and Russia, a framework is needed based on international law and recognition that will be applicable to the various regions of the world where nuclear rivalries threaten. Such international recognition provides the only lasting basis for extending arms limits to most states. We do not know at present what the final content of the recently agreed treaty between the US and Russia will be, but the provisions of such a treaty should provide the pattern for later agreements, especially as concerns international verification. Finally, the reductions must be real, not illusory. In the recent US-Russia agreement, redefinition of numbers of weapons to be limited and delays in implementation amount to a step backward in the US position on reductions⁶.

3. A policy basis for addressing the problem of nuclear terrorism. President Bush and other administration spokespeople have repeatedly addressed the risk of nuclear terrorism. The US nuclear posture should correspondingly propose and lay the groundwork for both unilateral and multilateral actions to minimize that problem. Any solution to the problem of keeping nuclear weapons and materials out of the billions of shipments that crisscross the world will require international cooperation on standards, procedures, cost sharing, and the like. Money and agreements are needed toward these goals. A modern nuclear posture should establish the policy basis for securing those resources and agreements. The problem of inadequate safeguarding of nuclear materials and weapons in locations abroad has been addressed through added appropriations recently but the nuclear posture does not lay the policy basis for continued action or for the needed international cooperation in this regard, nor does it address the problem of safeguarding and, as needed, disposing of the hundreds of tons of excess nuclear weapon material. Measures to address nuclear terrorism, particularly involving nuclear weapons and weapons materials, should be an essential, permanent part of a modern nuclear posture, on a par with nuclear deterrence.
4. A reconsideration of the problem of minimizing the risks of accidental nuclear launch while at the same time maintaining invulnerability of the reduced deployments. The nuclear posture briefly mentions the "rigorous safeguards" on US weapons systems and proposes to deal with the problem of accidental or unauthorized launch of "certain foreign forces" via nuclear missile defense. That is at best a partial and certainly a distant remedy. At present, a number of nuclear weapons systems are on alert under conditions where maintaining the human infrastructure for such a system will become more difficult in the US as well as elsewhere. Bilateral and multilateral measures could alleviate this problem. While details may be classified, the policy basis for such measures should appear in a nuclear posture.
5. A policy basis for updating and broadening the C³I systems. Some of this is in the present nuclear posture statement. Missing is an international aspect to

⁶ Pp. 50 ff. Specifically, only operationally deployed warheads are to be counted, others are to be kept in reserve. Reductions are to be made by easily reversible downloading. Delivery systems will not be retired. The effective date for reductions beyond START I is postponed beyond 2007. START II is rejected.

warning and control, something that would begin to reassure states that are subject to nuclear threat or potential nuclear threat. This would be a long-term program that would use US technical leadership cooperatively to reassure all states involved. That is needed now in South Asia. Later, it could help limit crises with Russia and China, and help prevent proliferation in the Middle East. President Reagan, with a portion of Star Wars, and, before him, President Eisenhower, with Open Skies, had something of the kind in mind. It is time to begin thinking about how this would look in modern form.

In summary, a new nuclear posture is needed, but it should not bring nuclear weapons back into the forefront of regional deterrence. That is likely to set into motion a process of growing insecurity under conditions where time and the spread of technology are not working for the US, and the assumption that the US will be the only state to effectively threaten or use nuclear weapons is not likely to be valid very long. Nuclear deterrence continues to be needed, but, where it can be effective, it exists in abundance already. Emphasizing the occasions for wider nuclear use, stating that the infrastructure to permit such use will be built up and that arms control agreements will not stand in the way of carrying out new nuclear missions, all this adds little to deterrence and is not need for conventional war-fighting. It adds an unknown amount to incentives for nuclear proliferation.

What is missing from the present posture, and what is essential in today's world, is a policy basis for international agreements to deal with the dangers of proliferation to unstable states, terrorism, and the risk of accidents as human infrastructures change. Despite its claims of going beyond Cold War concerns, the present posture in fact goes back to early Cold War arguments and neglects current realities. Easier nuclear proliferation and possible nuclear terror are dangers of our globalized world. These dangers can only be dealt with through cooperation among the nations; unilateral US policing won't work. Any forward-looking nuclear posture must provide for such cooperation. Cooperation won't work unless the United States plays its role. It may not work anyway. If it does not, our children and grandchildren can look forward to slaughter that will make World War II and other twentieth-century disasters look like child's play.

2800 words

18-NOV-02 10:37 DE:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

PAG.:021

November 17, 2002 10:00 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D,*
SUBJECT: Congressional Responses

I need to see the answers we have given to questions asked by Members of Congress.

Thanks.

Attach.

09/23/02 SecDef memo to Di Rita, Moore

DIHR dli
11/17/02

.....
Please respond by 11/26/02

032

17 Nov 02

U1039610/03

11-L-05597OSD/9191

1:38 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Runsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 23, 2002

SUBJECT:

I need an answer to Taylor on chem-bio. And I would like to know what a chem-bio unit costs, and whether or not any cities or states have them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092302.10.a

Please respond by: _____

9/30

Snowflake

November 17, 2002 10:00 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Anti-Drug Efforts

I think we need to get out of the anti-drug effort in Latin America. We aren't stopping drugs from being used in the US, and we certainly aren't stopping their production. They are just moving things around.

It seems to me like a waste of the taxpayers' dollars when we need to focus our effort on the war on terrorism.

Let's figure out how to change this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
11/17/02, 5

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

Latin America

17 Nov 02

SHOWHIDE

November 17, 2002 11:14 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Book on Bin Laden

There is a CIA person who wrote a book, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, on Osama Bin Laden and signed it "Anonymous." I should get a briefing from him. I am told it is a briefing I should get.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111702.9

.....
Please respond by _____

To: SHARON CURCIO

PLEASE HOLD FOR WHEN
LARRY RETURNS.

THNX -
DEONWIE

000.5

17 Nov 02

11-L-0559²⁹/OSD/9194U10398^{PT}/03

Snowflake

November 17, 2002 4:14 PM

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TM*

SUBJECT: Answer to Congressman Abercrombie

I have never been given the answer we sent Abercrombie on 300 people in NORTHCOM. It has been way too long to not have answered it. I need to see what was sent fast, because I want to meet with Eberhart again and know what I am talking about.

Please get it for me by the time I get back from Prague.

Thanks.

DLR:dh
11/17/02

.....
Please respond by

11/25/02

11/2

Sec Def -

See Powell's

note, next under.
I agree that it does not
seem we have failed to
answer any specific question
for Abercrombie. We do
need to hear from Eberhart on
and staff. Then can provide
info to

LARRY DI RITA
12/6

U103991/03

26

11-L-0559/OSD/9195

Abercrombie. DLR:cg 11/17/02



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

FOUO
INFO MEMO

November 26, 2002 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: Congressman Abercrombie's concerns on USNORTHCOM
Response to Snowflake 111702.20

- Rep. Abercrombie (D-HI) sent you a letter dated July 26, 2002, in which he expressed his doubt regarding the need for a new combatant command responsible for homeland defense. He attached a paper that synthesized his thoughts relating to homeland defense, along with several newspaper articles and a list of related questions he posed during a previous briefing on USNORTHCOM. (Tab A)
- You thanked the congressman in a letter dated July 31, 2002, and informed him that you had provided a copy of his attachments to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Tab B). Doug Feith's staff viewed the packet as 'informational' in nature, and no further action was taken.
- On September 18, 2002, you and Rep. Abercrombie engaged on this issue during a HASC hearing on Iraq. A review of the transcript (Tab C) does not indicate that there are any pending interrogatories from this exchange.
- You met with GEN Eberhart on November 15, 2002, and indicated your intent to continue the discussion regarding the USNORTHCOM HQs construct at a later date. You are currently scheduled to meet with GEN Eberhart on December 18, 2002.

11-L-0559/OSD/9196

NEIL ABERCROMBIE

1ST DISTRICT, HAWAII

WHIP-AT-LARGE



SECRET

2002 JUL 29 01:05

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON
RESOURCES

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

July 26, 2002

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for the productive discussions we have enjoyed regarding the establishment of Northern Command. I promised to further consider your position, as well as my own. I offer the attached paper as a synthesis of my thoughts on the many topics we have discussed.

There is no doubt that we need to reorganize for new and emerging missions that address threats we could hardly have imagined ten years ago. I strongly believe that there are alternatives to insure we expend our resources in the most efficient manner.

I am also attaching three articles of interest. The first reviews actions taken in Hawaii using available resources to bolster our ability to respond and defend against terror. The second is about the training drills currently underway in Hawaii to integrate state, local, and federal response to a terrorist act. The third is a recent editorial from the Honolulu Star-Bulletin about Posse Comitatus.

For your reference, I am including the original questions I submitted for the record when Northern Command was first announced. Finally, I have included the relevant pages from the FY2003 Defense Emergency Response Fund to illustrate that this is not a "no cost" initiative.

As always, I look forward to your comments. I certainly hope we can continue the healthy dialog on this issue.

Neil Abercrombie
Sincerely,
Neil Abercrombie
Member of Congress

ATTACHMENTS:

"Tuning Up Security in the Islands" by Craig B. Whelden

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11-L-0559/OSD/9197

"Emergency Response Teams Focusing Drills on Terrorism" by William Cole
"Keep Armed Forces Out of Law Enforcement" unattributed
Questions for the Record submitted 24 April 2002
Excerpts from the FY2003 Defense Emergency Response Fund Budget Justification

CC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Mr. Powell A. Moore
White House Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs, Mr. Nelson Litterst

NA:js

The "plan" to establish a United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) raises a number of questions. The Senate has already held confirmation hearings for the new combatant commander, General Ralph Eberhart. By General Eberhart's own testimony, the form and organization of NORTHCOM are not known. The Department of Defense (DoD) is rushing headlong into a complete reshuffling of the military command structure at the very moment the rest of the federal government is reorganizing to meet the homeland threat. It is unwise to restructure every institution in government at the very time we require a seamless and integrated approach to homeland defense.

The main thrust of the effort seems to be consolidation of all the various competencies DoD brings to bear in response to the threat to our homeland. We already have such structure in place and additional layers of command will further remove the Department from the people it is to serve. Our scarce resources (human, capital, and time) are best used improving and expanding upon our current institutions. We need to trust talented and capable leaders in all walks of life to do their jobs.

The following as points of departure offer the basis for what should be a careful and considered discussion.

We already have a capable and competent command structure

There is no need or requirement to stand up a new combatant command. We have a robust and capable military command structure that already fulfills the roles and missions envisioned for NORTHCOM. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) can execute combatant command authority over military forces within our borders. JFCOM could either directly command the forces within our borders through component commanders, or stand up a sub-unified command to fill that role. The sub-unified commander would absorb Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) and the Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS), yet be permanently funded and manned. With a sub-unified commander focusing on homeland defense and consequence management, the JFCOM commander can continue to focus on joint experimentation and training. All U.S. based forces (less Pacific specific units on the west coast) are already assigned to JFCOM. In light of this additional responsibility for JFCOM, divesting the role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) is a wise move.

Projected Costs

The expenses of standing up a new command are many and will certainly exceed the \$25 million for construction and \$41 million for personnel requested in the fiscal year 2003 Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF). With modern communications, many functions do not have to be co-located for efficiency. By distributing work centers at various bases, JFCOM would maintain staff integrity while reducing risk of a catastrophic attack. Instead of improving a building or moving people to a new base, we can put our capital into communications modernization to facilitate coordination between all the organizations currently working in their own "bubbles" of influence.

The National Guard is already doing these types of missions

We employ National Guard troops under Title 32 USC to fight the War on Drugs. The State Governors retain control of the National Guard even though the federal government may provide pay and other resources. Each Governor prepares a plan that is submitted to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for review and approval. The NGB already has a close relationship with all the State Adjutants General. Further, each state National Guard Headquarters has a Plans, Operations, and Military Support Office (POMSO). Channels of communication already exist to support this relationship. This relationship can easily be broadened to encompass Homeland Security. We can leverage this coordination/execution chain and enhance it to provide the quick and responsive support local first-responders need. As for more traditional warfighting missions, the National Guard has long executed Air Defense of the Homeland through the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). It should not be different on the ground or at sea. Although this capability must be enhanced and expanded, there is no need for an entire combatant command to "recreate the wheel".

Coordination with Federal Departments and Agencies

Coordination is key to successful military support to civilian authority. Liaison offices currently exist in the combatant commands to key federal departments and agencies. This liaison can be expanded to encompass homeland defense. There is no need to create a military command to enhance military to agency coordination. We have already established the structures to accomplish quick and effective coordination. We need to build on what we have in place, not create new, ill-defined organizations. Civilian agencies with responsibility for homeland security could easily tie-in to the Joint Forces staff to provide government wide liaison and coordination.

The Homeland Security Strategy tasks NORTHCOM to "update plans to provide military support to domestic civil authorities in response to natural and man-made disasters and during national emergencies". NORTHCOM is tasked with "homeland defense" without fully defining what that entails. The relationship between DoD and the proposed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is sketched out (They would participate as appropriate in homeland security training that involves military and civilian emergency response personnel) but the relationship between NORTHCOM and DHS is not addressed. To execute effectively, the relationship between the two organizations must be defined. Particularly troubling is the lack of definition of how military operations (Homeland Defense) are to be integrated with protecting the homeland (Homeland Security).

Posse Comitatus Act of 1878

DoD has not outlined the ramifications of the Posse Comitatus Act regarding Homeland Defense to Congress. There are several situations where military forces may be required to execute classic military operations in support of law enforcement officers. Border security, interdiction of shipping, and combat air patrols come to mind. The Act states that the military may not be used in a domestic law enforcement role "unless participation in such activity by such

member is otherwise authorized by law" 18 U.S.C. 1385. There is clearly a need for a review of applicable laws and regulations, yet it was not until the July 2002 National Homeland Security Strategy that the administration addressed the need for review as a "major federal initiative". With a careful analysis, the Act can be modified to allow certain pre-authorized missions. Minor modifications would close the "seams" that terrorists and criminals can exploit because they know that they need not immediately fear military forces in the direct aftermath of an attack on U.S. soil.

Resources and Funding

Like all combatant commands, NORTHCOM would have a relatively small permanent staff. Forces will be assigned for each mission as required. Since forces are trained and equipped by the individual services, this creates a problem similar to that faced by Special Operations Command (SOCOM) when it was conceived. Congress recognized then that the services were not putting a priority on procurement of special operations specific equipment. Congress created a funding line specifically for SOCOM, the only command so authorized. Likewise, establishment of a dedicated funding line for those capabilities that specifically support the homeland defense mission is advisable. JFCOM is ideal for this responsibility as it is already responsible for creating joint doctrine and training joint forces. This will enable cradle-to-grave responsibility for new equipment and training that will enhance our ability to respond to domestic crises. The existing structure of our forces here in the continental U.S. is ideal for executing this type of forward thinking procurement.

The Way Ahead

What can we immediately do to effectively improve our posture to respond to and mitigate threats without unnecessarily creating more bureaucracy? Efforts currently underway in Hawaii offer some insights. Though not unique to Hawaii, they are mirrored throughout the country in every state and municipality. We must encourage this homegrown approach. Some examples of Hawaii action as described by Army Major General Craig Whelden, Deputy Commanding General U.S. Army Pacific are:

- Identification of over 150 mission essential vulnerable assets throughout the state.
- Establishment of effective liaison between federal, state and private organizations to find and fill the seams in coverage and responsibility.
 - Civil Defense, Coast Guard, National Guard, and Active Duty military
 - Police Departments, state health organizations, utility companies
 - FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Customs Service, Secret Service, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
- Establishment of a Joint Intelligence Fusion Cell for two-way communication of critical information over both classified and protected networks.
- Multi-agency training, 7 major exercises so far to work out coordination and jurisdiction issues.
- Army and Marine counter-terror units are on alert as a Quick Reaction Force for immediate deployment anywhere in the state.
- New command and control suites at military bases for collaborative planning, with plans to field them to civil agencies.
- Establishment of an FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force, fully operational by the Fall of 2002.

This list is not all-inclusive but serves to highlight what we are already doing with available resources. These are the actions we should be encouraging and expanding throughout the nation. Once we leverage the organizations and structures we already have in place, we can then hold an informed discussion on the creation of new military and civilian agencies. Of note is that of the initiatives described above, almost all of them depend on responsive and interoperable communications. All of the initiatives depend on caring, competent, and motivated leaders who know how to creatively accomplish their mission. We need to trust these dedicated and talented people to do their jobs.

These concerns about NORTHCOM in no way obviate the need to continue operations against those responsible for the September 11th terrorist attacks, nor should they sidetrack efforts to streamline the Defense Department's support to civil authority here in the United States. However, I believe that there is insufficient cause for a rush to change when we may already possess the institutions and structure required to execute military support to domestic authority. When talking about bureaucracy, less is better and doing *some thing* is not the same thing as doing the *right thing*. We have an opportunity to create a real support base for homeland defense without adding a redundant bureaucracy.



HonoluluAdvertiser.com

Published on: Sunday, July 7, 2002

COMMENTARY

Tuning up security in the Islands

By Craig B. Whelden

Those old enough to remember can tell you exactly what they were doing 60 years ago when told of the attack on Pearl Harbor. My dad was a student at Purdue University, trying to decide whether to study or go see a movie. Events of that day eventually sent him to China, piloting C-47s in support of Gen. Claire Chenault's Flying Tigers.

I was in the seventh grade when told of the John F. Kennedy assassination. And I was working at a camp in England, staring at a small black-and-white television at 3 a.m., when Neil Armstrong uttered those famous words: "One small step for man ... one giant leap for mankind."

Where were you on Sept. 11, 2001?

I was at a conference in Crystal City, Va. — just across from the Pentagon — when told that the two World Trade Center towers had been hit. We were trying to find a television when, minutes later, a woman ran into the room to announce that an explosion had occurred at the Pentagon.

We all ran outside to witness a rising black plume above America's most recognized symbol of military power. My first instinct was to call my wife in Hawai'i, as she believed my meeting that day was in the Pentagon. I found that my cell phone couldn't connect, so I ran up to my room, where I finally got through. It was 4 a.m. in Hawai'i and 10 a.m. on the East Coast. The governor had not yet been notified, I found out later.

I then went over to the Pentagon where I found cool heads — in the midst of a chaotic scene — all trying to help. Hundreds of people were outside the building trying to organize litter teams. Medical people, firefighters, police officers, Pentagon security people and the FBI were all there, but it quickly became evident that there was no central point for coordination.

I suspected there would be a need for military support, in manpower, communications and logistics, so I approached an FBI agent and asked who was "in charge." After glancing around, he replied: "I guess I am."

Later, I learned that what he really meant was that the FBI was in charge of the crime scene. The FBI was not in charge of the overall response. That was the fire department's domain.

When I asked the FBI agent if he had communications, he pulled out a cell phone and his telling expression made clear to me that it had failed him more than a few times, just as mine did for me.

Over time, we cobbled together a coordination cell centered on the Army's Old Guard ... the 3rd Infantry Regiment from nearby Fort Myer. We placed their command vehicle in the center of the field facing the

crash site and gave each of the responding agencies a radio-equipped Army liaison. We told them that if they needed something from the military to notify the liaison officer, who would then communicate this need to the command post. They would then try to source that requirement from the many installations throughout the Military District of Washington.

Over the next few hours, the Army — and many other agencies — provided food, water, fuel, generators, lights, cabling and manpower to a multi-agency effort. By nightfall, the field in front of the crash site looked like a miniature city.

Why do I tell this story?

It's because the Army in Hawai'i is the U.S. Pacific Command's executive agent for JRAC — joint rear area coordination, a task normally accomplished in a wartime theater of operation, but in this case for the state of Hawai'i.

As I learned in the days following Sept. 11, some of the same shortfalls I witnessed at the Pentagon existed in Hawai'i and — I would guess — in almost every other community in America.

Let me review what we've done — in partnership with state, local and federal authorities — in recent months:

- We have identified more than 150 "mission-essential vulnerable assets," or MEVAs, throughout Hawai'i: facilities and capabilities essential to the military and to the efficient running of the state. These assets have been thoroughly assessed and security needs addressed.
- Hawai'i used the military's Force Protection Condition rating system to establish its statewide, color-coded, alert warning system. This was done last October and was then used by Gov. Tom Ridge's Office of Homeland Security as a model for creating a national system in recent months.
- We have worked closely with state Civil Defense, the Coast Guard, the National Guard, the Honolulu Police Department, state health organizations, utility companies and federal agencies — the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Customs Service, Secret Service and Federal Aviation Administration — to identify and close "seams" in our collective efforts to secure Hawai'i's soil and the great people who live here.
- We established a Joint Intelligence Support Element and a Law Enforcement Information Fusion Cell to pull together force protection requirements, local law enforcement information and, as the law permits, selected domestic intelligence and information across a broad spectrum of sources. After analysis, we forward the results to those having a need to know on both the military and civil side. This is done through both a secure Internet connection for classified information and in a "law-enforcement sensitive" category through a password-protected site on the Asia Pacific Area Network.
- We have established a multi-agency training program and have, to date, conducted seven major training exercises with more planned: on quick response, on general security awareness and on military support to civil authorities.
- We have established Army and Marine Quick Reaction Forces, or QRFs, capable of moving on short notice by air or road to anyplace in the state.
- We have established a secure communications system capable of interface with civil authorities.

- We fielded a new command-and-control suite at key military installations, dedicated to homeland security. This three-screen, interactive system facilitates collaborative planning with write-board, voice, video and chat features. Twelve more systems are planned for use by the state to provide even closer civil-military coordination.

- We are helping to establish and staff an FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force, a charter given to field offices by the U.S. attorney general before Sept. 11 with a goal of having all task forces established by 2005.

Hawai'i's will be up and running by the end of this summer, pending receipt of top-secret security clearances for all task force members, an effort now under way.

All this has not been easy, as these agencies have not historically worked together. But I suspect what we are doing in Hawai'i is a microcosm of what Tom Ridge is facing on a national scale.

We clearly have advantages in Hawai'i: geographic, a large military presence and an 'ohana spirit that helps to transcend normal bureaucratic and cultural barriers. Because of the unique circumstances, we are, I believe, ahead of the national effort.

And, while these are all improvements over what we had before Sept. 11, there is more that can be done:

- We could use remote-controlled, closed-circuit cameras that can zoom in on suspicious activity and take film or still photography that could then be rapidly compared against a national database.
- We need "sniffers" that can detect explosive, chemical or biological materials from outside a vehicle in seconds.
- We need to review the way area networks are linked to see which — local, state, national — should be "in the loop." We need an enterprise system that allows all governmental networks to be under one umbrella to ensure we have access to a common database and the ability to efficiently move from one network to the other.
- We need systems that provide what the military calls a "common operating picture" that provides situational awareness so we are seeing the threat in the same way.
- We need simple, secure Web-based training to provide opportunities to those on the front lines — whether civil or military — to gain proficiency in the use of all these tools. We'll need to train distributively across military, interagency, state and local boundaries to ensure we're at one standard.

Most of this technology exists but, perhaps most importantly, we need to break down bureaucratic barriers and government stovepipes, realizing that the new enemy will look for seams to exploit. Achieving such goals may require legislative solutions, such as was done for the military in the mid-'80s with the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

My point is simply this: Sept. 11 changed the way we view national security, in ways we could only have imagined just 10 months ago. This war on terrorism is a long-term investment and will require the mustering of all our talents and skills in an unprecedented, seamless and permanent fusion of local, state and federal capabilities. It also will require partnering with the brightest minds in the commercial sector.

We are all anxious to see what comes out of the Office of Homeland Security. I cannot imagine that

some of the things mentioned here are not on the "to do" list.

This country has a long history of rallying in times of crisis. Millions of Americans have heeded the call to service to our flag and to the nation it represents.

These principles are clearly illustrated in Steven Spielberg's "Saving Private Ryan." The film depicts the story of what Tom Brokaw calls "The Greatest Generation" — one to which my father belonged — and it profiles whom Time magazine labeled as among the top 20 icons of the 20th century: the American GI.

The movie ends with Pvt. James Francis Ryan standing over Capt. Miller's Normandy grave 50 years later with his family at his side. He turns to his wife and with tears in his eyes says, "Tell me I've led a good life. Tell me I'm a good man."

This movie, and the story it tells, says a lot about the institution to which the greatest generation belonged ... the institution to which I now belong: the Army.

Those same values, so aptly demonstrated by generations past, are the reason we live in the greatest country in history.

You can believe that our ancestors are watching to see how we respond to this latest threat against our nation. I know that we won't fail them, and to me, the reason is clear. It's simply because we are Americans.

Maj. Gen. Craig B. Whelden is the deputy commander, U.S. Army Pacific, and is stationed at Fort Shafter.

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Posted on: Thursday, July 11, 2002

Emergency response teams focusing drills on terrorism

By William Cole
Advertiser Military Writer

Yesterday, it was a cruise ship colliding with a cargo vessel three miles off Koko Head.

The cruise ship's 2,000 passengers — some covered with oil — had to be evacuated to the Coast Guard station at Sand Island.

In June, it was a radiological "dirty" bomb discovered at a Schofield Barracks building meant to replicate an office building in downtown Honolulu.

Early November brought a scenario in which a janitor stumbled on a substance in the locker room at Aloha Stadium that was making people sick.

Since Sept. 11, Hawaii's emergency responders have been a busy bunch as they've drilled not only for natural disasters like hurricanes and tsunamis, but also the threat of terrorism.

In 2001, the state had eight major anti-terrorism exercises, said National Guard spokesman Maj. Chuck Anthony. Two more were planned, but they were interrupted by the real thing on the East Coast.

By the end of this year, 19 major exercises will have been held relating to terrorism and/or weapons of mass destruction.

"We've doubled the number of exercises related to terrorism since last year," Anthony said. "There's no doubt that the intensity level has gone up since 9/11."

The two-day Coast Guard "Kai Po'ino 2002" exercise being held through today had been planned for more than a year, but 14th Coast Guard District spokeswoman Lt. DesaRae Atnip said the rescue and interoperability training has an anti-terrorism benefit.

More than 250 participants — including role players — teamed with members of 25 federal, state and local agencies who formed a "Unified Command" to respond to the ship collision scenario. Today's drill includes a 225-foot Coast Guard buoy tender responding to an oil spill.

"Even though the exercise wasn't specifically targeted to homeland security, every time you work together with all the other agencies, you gain significant benefit from that," Atnip said. "With homeland security, one of the keys is we all work together."

Maj. Gen. Craig B. Whelden, deputy commander of the U.S. Army Pacific, recently said anti-terrorism Army and Marine "Quick Reaction Forces" have been established and are capable of moving on short notice by air or road anywhere in the state.

Whelden also said more than 150 "mission-essential vulnerable assets" have been assessed for security needs; command and control suites for homeland security have been set up at key military installations; and an FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force should be operating by the end of the summer.

But Whelden also said the attacks on Sept. 11 showed that interoperability among emergency responders is just as important.

"By doing these drills, we get to see the capabilities of the other people and what equipment they have," said Capt. Robert Butchart, who is assigned to Hazmat 1 out of the Kalihi Uka station. "Maybe the Fire Department's radios don't work with the state and federal agencies' radios, and we have to go back and see how we can correct the problem, or maybe communicate in another way."

To further improve preparedness, U.S. Army Pacific Command recently contracted with Eastport, Maine-based Sytex Inc., a military services company, for a team of six individuals with Special Forces experience to provide classroom and field training on terrorism awareness.

As part of the \$244,000 contract, the two-week program planned for September will include attempts to gain entrance to bases without proper identification and the placement of packages that could be bombs near gates, Army officials said.

During yesterday's exercise, 135 role players were treated and processed at the Coast Guard Integrated Support Command Sand Island station. Included as part of the simulation was oil contamination, and some of the cruise ship "passengers" had to walk through a shower rinse-off that for the exercise came without a drenching.

The role players were organized by 16-year-old Erik Swanson for his Eagle Scout project with Troop 304 out of Red Hill.

Kevin Barr, 13, a senior patrol leader with Troop 304, was on his third scenario of the day by early afternoon — this time with an identity card saying he was a 28-year-old foreign national.

"It's pretty good," he said of the exercise. "It helps the kids know, and even the adults, what a real scenario would be like."

Reach William Cole at wcole@honoluluadvertiser.com or (b)(6)

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Honolulu Star-Bulletin
July 23, 2002

Keep Armed Forces Out Of Law Enforcement

The Issue: The Bush administration may seek to assign the armed forces the additional duty of assisting in law enforcement as part of the war on terror.

Former Pennsylvania Gov. Thomas Ridge, the nation's chief of homeland security, has broached the idea of using the armed forces to help enforce the law as the nation mobilizes against terrorists. It is a bad idea that should be rejected if necessary changes in the law are brought before Congress. Senators Inouye and Akaka and Representatives Abercrombie and Mink should vote against it.

The Posse Comitatis law was enacted in 1878, during the nation's westward expansion, to keep the soldiers out of the sheriff's business. That act codified what had been a tradition since the beginning of the Republic, which is that the police protect citizens from internal threats while soldiers defend the nation against external enemies.

It is a good law that has withstood the test of time. Among the reasons Americans are still free men and women is that our armed forces have been kept out of politics and law enforcement, unlike many nations where they have become a law unto themselves.

Moreover, the armed forces of 2002 are one-third smaller than the armed forces of 1990 but have the same, if not more, missions around the world. They are stretched thin, the latest figures showing that more than 30 percent are ashore or afloat outside the continental United States on any given day. They cannot take on more duties without diluting their attention to their primary mission.

Last, military men and women, especially those in elite units like paratroopers and Marines, do not make good cops. They are trained, physically and mentally, to kill people and break things with maximum violence. Turning them around to apply that measured, calibrated use of force that is expected of police officers is asking too much. In its simplest terms, soldiers search and destroy while the police search and capture.

If homeland security requires a militia, which also would accord with American tradition, let it be the members of the National Guard, who already are quasi-law enforcement troops under the control of the state governors. Here, too, a word of caution: The National Guard should be trained in the tactics and techniques of a calibrated application of force. Badly trained Guardsmen can cause tragedy, as witness the four student protesters who were killed and the nine wounded by poorly prepared National Guard troops at Kent State University in Ohio in 1970, during demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.

America does not need that again.

Questions for the Record, UCP Change Briefing, 24 April, 2002, Rep. Abercrombie

- In the DERF, you lay out expenditures of \$25 million for construction and \$41 million for personnel, office space, etc. How were those figures derived, and will you provide a copy of that analysis to this committee?
- Secretary Rumsfeld in his press briefing said that NORTHCOM will be in support of civil authority. How will the Commander of NORTHCOM be tied into various federal, state, and local departments and agencies? What freedom of action will NORTHCOM have in a crisis, or will all support be directed by the Secretary of Defense?
- The administration has stated that no changes to Posse Comitatus are requested or required. Wouldn't it be better to address these issues now, in the relative calm before the next crisis? What training will be provided to insure that military forces don't respond as we now train them...with overwhelming force and firepower?
- How will the Guard and Reserve tie into NORTHCOM? Links already exist between the Guard, FEMA, and DoD. Exactly how does NORTHCOM improve the current relationship? Is this another layer of command and control bureaucracy?
- The National Guard already flies missions in support of NORAD and air defense. Will the Guard take the lead in the ground component of NORTHCOM? What of designating a Guard officer as the Deputy Commander?
- Isn't locating 3 separate four-star headquarters in Colorado Springs akin to saying "shoot here" to anyone with a weapon of mass destruction? (Headquarters of SPACE Command and Air Force SPACE Command are the other two four-star headquarters in Colorado Springs)
- What consultations were held with our Canadian bilateral partners prior to announcing NORTHCOM and its NORAD role? Are the Canadians being co-opted into going along with the U.S. simply because we'll do it anyway with or without them?
- What consultations lead U.S. planners to believe that Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) is either: a) not important and will be eliminated by NATO, b) will be filled by another U.S. officer, c) will be based in the U.S.? Is this part of a larger NATO restructure or is it an attempt to spin-off NATO responsibilities? Is SACLANT relevant to the NATO mission?
- Recent press coverage focuses on NORTHCOM support to civil authority during and after an attack. Combat air patrol, ship interdiction, and securing borders all are proactive measures taken before, or upon indications, of an attack. What are the intrinsic military missions envisioned for the command involved in interdiction and active defense?
- With our serious reservations as to the requirement for NORTHCOM and the desire to understand its mission and scope, wouldn't it have been proper to brief this body before holding a press briefing?
- In order to better support the needs of Special Operations forces, SPECIAL OPERATIONS Command has its own funding line. Due to the special and unique nature of Homeland Defense missions, are you planning on seeking similar budget authority for NORTHCOM?
- The President's National Homeland Security Strategy briefly mentions coordination between DoD and the proposed Department of Homeland Security. Although NORTHCOM is mentioned, there is not a discussion of the relationship between the combatant command and the DHS. How will NORTHCOM, as the DoD command charged with executing Homeland Defense coordinate with and execute support to civil authority as outlined in the Homeland Security Strategy?

FY2003 Budget Estimates
Defense Emergency Response Fund
February 2003, Department of Defense

HOMELAND SECURITY

http://www.dlic.mil/comptroller/fy2003budget/budget_justification/pdfs/derf/fy2003_derf.pdf

ARMY

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|--|-----------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,AR | 1 | Land Forces System Readiness | Enhanced Secure Communications to Reserve Components | NA | 5,900 |

Provides increased network capabilities to ensure throughput and reliability to support the dissemination of information in support of command and control in the areas of mobilization, training, and data exchange.

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,ARNG | 1 | Long-Haul Communications | Classified Network | NA | 86,200 |

Funds secure interstate National Guard Bureau voice, video, and data transmission for classified traffic. Provides additional hardware, software, and engineering support for every network operations center to expand the network capability to allow classified/secure communications over each of these transmissions.

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,ARNG | 1 | Communications / General | Classified Network | NA | 48,500 |

Funds secure the intrastate National Guard voice, video, and data transmission for classified traffic. Each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia needs the capability to secure these transmissions to over 1600 Headquarters units and other locations across the enterprise.

HOMELAND SECURITY

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> Enhanced Secure Communications to Reserve Components | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|--|-----------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,AR | 1 | Land Forces System Readiness | | NA | 25,600 |

Improves the robustness and integration capabilities to interconnect the AR-NET and GUARD-NET to establish an Army -wide sustaining base network that links FEMS/State homeland defense centers and Army tactical networks

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> Enhanced Secure Communications to Reserve Components | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--|-----------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,AR | 1 | Base Operations Support | | NA | 30,700 |

Expand the hardening, redundancy and Information Assurance protection for network infrastructure. Increases network capability to ensure throughput and reliable connectivity to CINCs, Army tactical networks, and FEMA/State homeland defense.

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> Enhanced Secure Communications to Reserve Components | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--|-----------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,AR | 4 | Servicewide Communications | | NA | 2,400 |

Enables the Army Reserve to integrate rapidly into joint organizations and provide support to Joint and Army C4/IT systems and concepts through digitization and digital connectivity.

HOMELAND SECURITY

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|---|---|-----------------|--------------------------|
| OPA | 2 | 43, Information Systems Security Program - ISSP | Information Systems Security Program - ISSP | NA | 15,700 |

Secure Terminal Equipment in support of AC/RC Homeland Security requirements. Funds COMSEC New Equipment Training (NET) support associated with Digital Transfer Devices (DTD) and automated Key Management devices. Contributes to secure tactical and strategic data and voice communication links through procurement of Link and Trunk Encryptors.

TOTAL CINC HOMELAND SECURITY - ARMY

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| OMARNG | 134,700 |
| O&M,AR | 64,600 |
| OPA | <u>15,700</u> |
| TOTAL | 215,000 |

CINC HOMELAND SECURITY - ARMY

65

11-L-0559/OSD/9213

HOMELAND SECURITY

THE JOINT STAFF (TJS)

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,DW | 4 | The Joint Staff | CINC for Homeland Security | NA | 41,000 |

The DoD will stand-up a new CINC for Homeland Security to support the War on Terrorism. Pending final determination of the location and composition of the CINC for Homeland Security Headquarters, the DoD has placed the funding under the cognizance of The Joint Staff. The \$41.0 million requested in FY 2003 provides the funding for the operation of the new headquarters. The estimate includes \$15.0 million to lease interim facilities, to move personnel and equipment from existing locations to temporary locations until permanent facilities are refurbished, and to provide temporary office space for those personnel who will be displaced by the location of the new headquarters. The estimate also includes \$10.0 million to pay for the civilian personnel compensation for employees of the new headquarters. Also, the estimate includes \$12.0 million to pay for supplies, office equipment, and services to support the headquarters as well as headquarters travel.

HOMELAND SECURITY

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| MC,DW | 2 | Facility Refurbishment | Facility Refurbishment | NA | 25,000 |

The DoD will standup a new CINC for Homeland Security to support the War on Terrorism. The requested funding will refurbish existing facilities to support the new headquarters and includes costs of anti-terrorism and force protection upgrades to any existing facility, creation of secure spaces for classified information processing, and upgrades to the facilities to meet current standards.

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>Budget Activity</u> | <u>Line Item</u> | <u>Requirement</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| PDW | 1 | Major Equipment, TJS | C4I Equipment and Connectivity | NA | 15,000 |

The DoD will standup a new CINC for Homeland Security to support the War on Terrorism. The requested funding supports the procurement of C4I equipment, secure and non-secure local area network equipment, Global Command and Control System connectivity, and office equipment.

TOTAL CINC HOMELAND SECURITY - TJS

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,DW | 41,000 |
| MC, DW | 25,000 |
| PDW | <u>15,000</u> |
| TOTAL | 81,000 |

TOTAL CINC HOMELAND SECURITY

| <u>Appropriation</u> | <u>(\$ in Thousands)</u> |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| O&M,DW | 41,000 |
| O&M,AR | 64,600 |
| OMARNG | 134,700 |
| OPA | 15,700 |
| PDW | 15,000 |
| MILCON, DW | <u>25,000</u> |
| TOTAL | 296,000 |

CINC HOMELAND SECURITY – TJS

67

11-L-0559/OSD/9215



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 31 2002

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-1101

Dear Representative Abercrombie:

Thank you for sending your ideas on Northern Command and the newspaper articles. I have provided a copy to Doug Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. We will continue to work with you and other members of the Committee as we proceed toward the October 1, 2002, commissioning of the Command.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

U12309 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9216

House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Iraq, Day One

HUNTER:

Mr. Abercrombie?

ABERCROMBIE:

Yes, just as a follow up. General, I want to make sure that I understand, because this is for the record. You're actually contending that this Northern Command is going to take over the responsibility for the nation with respect to terrorist attacks in local communities and first response, that they will have that authority.

MYERS:

Congressman Abercrombie, no. Absolutely not. That's not what I intended at all. I just said that the roles of the Department of Defense did not change for the stand up of Northern Command, but for once we'll have a command with a commander that will worry about the planning and training or support to lead federal agencies or civil agencies or state agencies in responding to disasters, be they natural or be they terrorist disasters. And that's all I said. I said we'll have a command to help find the balance that Congressman Taylor was talking about.

ABERCROMBIE:

Well, how is that going to be any different from what's required by the Joint Forces Command right now, other than the fact that you're going to spend \$300 million to put it together just to get started so it can start worrying?

MYERS:

I think it's having one person in charge of it. Right now in the Department of Defense you have several people in charge of this. And I

think putting one person that says, "That's my job, is to protect the American people. That's my..."

ABERCROMBIE:

You're answering my question by saying that person's going to be in charge. Are they or are they not? The question here is the practical realities involved. Is the Department of Defense going to participate in some way other than consulting? Is the Northern Command supposed to consult with the 50 states, who are already on their way to doing this?

The president has already said or is in the process or has vetoed the supplemental bill that we put forward to try and fund some of these things. Now, you've got to make a decision. I don't think you need this Northern Command. I'd like to see the \$300 million go into financing what Representative Taylor was talking about so responders can do this under the National Guard all across the country. How is the set up of the Northern Command supposed to aid and assist in one iota what Representative Taylor was putting forward?

MYERS:

I'll go back to my original comments, Congressman. Right now in the Department of Defense there are several entities that are responsible for whatever it is the Department of Defense is going to be asked to do to respond to either, as I said, natural disasters or chemical or biological or nuclear attack. What we want to do, and we have one entity then that's responsible for their defense -- what we want to do is put that responsibility under one command.

We think the situation has changed sufficiently, strategic environment has changed sufficiently, not just since September 11. This is an issue that goes back, as you remember, Congressman...

ABERCROMBIE:

Are they local forces to be in charge, General, or is the Northern Command supposed to be in charge of, I guess, national civil defense?

MYERS:

As I said, the roles of the Department of Defense will not change. In most cases, we'll be in support of lead federal agencies or other civil agencies, be they state or even more local.

ABERCROMBIE:

So the Department of Defense does not intend to fund in any way, shape or form all of these requirements at the local level.

MYERS:

I don't know what requirements you're talking about.

ABERCROMBIE:

The requirements we're talking about is to be able to respond to a terrorist attack, which you contend has to have a Northern Command in order to respond.

MYERS:

Well, the department's certainly going to fund the part of that that are the responsibility of the department.

ABERCROMBIE:

It will fund the Northern Command so that you will have this gigantic new bureaucracy set up, initially drawing on apparently over-staffed other commands, because that's where you're getting the people from, so all the commands now must be over-staffed, because you're able to bring in apparently hundreds of people...

MYERS:

Congressman, when we stand this Northern Command up -- I may have to correct this record -- my recollection is it'll be the smallest combatant command that we have in the United States armed forces. It'll be the smallest.

As you said, we are not adding people to this, we're taking people from other staff reductions that have been mandated by Congress, by the way, that 15 percent cut. We're going to take manpower from those positions and put some of those, not all of the, of course, but some of those in this new Northern Command headquarters.

ABERCROMBIE:

What are they going to do?

RUMSFELD:

Let me leap in here, if I may, Mr. Congressman?

ABERCROMBIE:

By all means, Mr. Secretary.

RUMSFELD:

The Unified Command Plan allocates responsibilities throughout the world. Heretofore we have not had certain portions of the world covered by a unified or specified commander. They included Russia, the United States, Mexico, Canada and some other portions, water portions of the world. As we proceeded, we decided that given the changes in the world, we should allocate every portion of the globe to a commander and a command.

The cost for this command is going to come out of other commands. And the idea that it's going to be \$300 million and a bunch of people milling around wasting money is just not going to be the case.

Second...

ABERCROMBIE:

Despite the fact -- excuse me, Mr. Secretary -- the way it's proposed right now in the Joint Forces Command budget.

RUMSFELD:

What I said is correct. The roll of the Department of Defense will not change with respect to the United States of America in this important sense. We're not asking the posse comitatus be changed, we're not suggesting that we go into a roll where we're the principal and other state, federal, local agencies support us. We would be functioning, as we have in the past, in a supporting role.

The general was exactly correct when he said that, at the present time we've got NORAD that functions in a supporting role to some extent; we've got DAMS (ph); the Army manages a whole host of things; we had 5,000 or 6,000 people at Salt Lake City for the Olympics.

ABERCROMBIE:

All of which exist, Mr. Secretary, without a Northern Command and apparently function very well, unless you're saying that they have not done a good job to this point.

See, what I'm trying to say, Mr. Secretary is...

RUMSFELD:

I hear you.

ABERCROMBIE:

... is actually we're doing a good job. And I can tell you Hawaii is only one part of the 50-state picture which is doing an excellent job of preparing for this, and they have excellent relationships, like with General Smith (ph) in the 25th out in Hawaii. The Department of Defense is very well represented. And the coordination is already there.

What they need is support, and they don't need another command to come in on top of this. And the question has yet to be answered whether this Northern Command will in any way, shape or form support what is already being accomplished in all the 50 states.

How is it to support it, other than by standing there nodding its head?

RUMSFELD:

I guess I don't know what you mean by, you say, how will it support all the things that are already being done so well by the 50 states? Any state can do what it wants. Any city can do what it wants. They can have their fire department. They can have chem- bio outfits. They can do these things.

ABERCROMBIE:

Who is going to pay for what is required of them under the kinds of scenarios that you are outlining to us.

RUMSFELD:

Who pays...

ABERCROMBIE:

... that are likely to occur if we go to war with Iraq?

RUMSFELD:

Who pays is a function of what the Congress and the executive branch decide whether it's a federal responsibility. If so, which department or agency, which state or local governments have to do what. That's a mix that the Congress and the executive branch sorts out every year, as they make their decisions.

ABERCROMBIE:

Fair enough. Fair enough. Thank you.

November 18, 2002 9:26 AM

TO: Bill Luti

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: David Kimche

I had dinner Saturday night with David Kimche. He is a friend from almost 20 years ago, when I was Middle East envoy.

His contact numbers are as follows:

(b)(6) (home) (b)(6) (mobile) (b)(6) (Fax)

e-mail: (b)(6)

Dr. David Kimche
President
Israel Council on Foreign Relations
21 Arlozorov St.
POB 4293
Jerusalem 91042 (b)(6) (b)(6)

The next time you see me, please talk to me about him. He knows a lot about the Kurds and Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111802.1

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9223

U10401-1/03

11-0-71 SD

18 Nov 02

November 18, 2002 10:02 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *YH*

SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

We have to get a review of the Oil-for-Food program. It is just a sieve, and I cannot imagine why we allow it to go on. Smart sanctions do not work.

Please get some data, let people know it is not working and get on with life.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111802 4

.....

Please respond by 12/6/02

005

18 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9224

U10402-103

November 18, 2002 3:11 PM

TO: Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Next Year's Ministerial

I'm told the Canadians offered an airplane to bring a bunch of the Caribbean Ministers of Defense down to Santiago. It strikes me that next year it might be a nice thing for the US to offer an airplane to pick up in Miami any of the Ministers of Defense who would like to come down to the meeting. I think it is an awfully nice thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR dh
111802.6

.....
Please respond by *12/1/02*

091.112

18 Nov 02

November 18, 2002 6:20 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Invitation from Brazil

Please make a note I was invited to Brazil by the lame duck. I don't know if it will hold for the new one or not.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111802.8

.....
Please respond by _____

Brazil

18 Nov 02

November 19, 2002 2:45 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Foreign Invitations

The MoDs of Brazil and Colombia invited me to visit.

Thanks.

DHR dh
111902 3

.....
Please respond by _____

333 SD

19 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9227

U10405th/03

November 19, 2002 2:49 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: F/A-22 Generals

Please give me a report on these two generals who were fired—how long they had been on the job and what they did wrong.

Thanks.

Attach.

Whittle, Richard. "Two Generals Booted From F/A-22 Program," *Dallas Morning News*, November 19, 2002

DHR dh
111902 S

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9228

U10406w/03

210

19 Nov 02

AIR FORCE

18. **Two Generals Booted From F/A-22 Program**

(*Dallas Morning News*)....Richard Whittle

The Air Force shook up the leadership of the F/A-22 Raptor program Monday, replacing two generals a week after disclosing a possible \$690 million cost overrun on the stealth fighter jet.

NATO

19. **Bush Seeks New NATO At Summit Meeting**

(*New York Times*)....Elisabeth Bumiller

This week, President Bush travels to Prague for his first NATO summit meeting, seeking to redefine the mission of the trans-Atlantic alliance and to win support from its members for a possible assault on Iraq, officials said today.

20. **New Size, Scope, Mission In Store For NATO**

(*Los Angeles Times*)....David Holley

NATO leaders will declare at a summit here this week a new focus on the global fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, edging the Western alliance further away from its roots as an anti-Soviet defense group.

21. **NATO Ambassadors Agree On Response To Terror Threats**

(*Baltimore Sun*)....Associated Press

Ambassadors from the 19 members of the NATO alliance agreed yesterday on ways to respond better to new threats from terrorists or rogue states.

ASIA/PACIFIC

22. **North Korea Clarifies Statement On A-Bomb**

(*New York Times*)....Howard W. French

North Korea today clarified a statement made in a weekend radio broadcast that appeared to claim publicly, for the first time, that the country possesses nuclear weapons.

23. **South Korea: Trial For G.I. Sergeant**

(*New York Times*)....Don Kirk

A court-martial began for Sgt. Fernando Nino, who is charged with negligent homicide in the deaths of two teenage girls who were crushed by an American military vehicle in June.

24. **U.S. Base In Japan Hit By Mystery Raid**

(*New York Times*)....Unattributed

Two projectiles were fired at an American military base near here on Monday night and a two-foot-long firing tube with burn marks was found in a park nearby, the Japanese police said today.

AFRICA

25. **African Port May Become U.S. Base**

(*New York Times on the Web*)....Associated Press

One of the largest ports on the Red Sea stands eerily idle, its huge cranes motionless in the oppressive heat. Yet this sleepy town on the southern tip of Eritrea could become a base for U.S. troops in the war on terrorism and Saddam Hussein.

AFGHANISTAN

26. **Afghanistan To Get More U.S. Troops**

(*New York Times on the Web*)....Associated Press


Additional U.S. military civil affairs troops will be sent to Afghanistan and will work with the first U.S.-trained Afghan soldiers to help improve security, the U.S. government's coordinator for Afghanistan said Monday.

27. **O'Neill, In Afghanistan, Promises To Push \$2.3 Billion Aid Bill**

(*New York Times*)....Carlotta Gall

Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill confirmed the Bush administration's support for reconstruction in Afghanistan

November 19, 2002 3:01 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraqi Determination

12990

As an example of the seriousness and determination with which Saddam Hussein pursues weapons of mass destruction, here is an unclassified statement indicating that they have forgone something like \$103 billion in oil revenues since 1992 because of their unwillingness to give up weapons of mass destruction.

Thanks.

SECRET

Attach.

11/16/02 Response to question on economic impact of Saddam's failure to comply

DHR:dh
11/19/02.7

.....
Please respond by _____

19 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9230

U10407w/03

16 November 2002

Memorandum

In response to a request for an unclassified answer on how much Iraq may have been hurt economically by Saddam's failure to comply with Security Council resolutions and by uncertainty in the region over Iraq's WMD programs:

The starkest aggregate measure of the opportunity cost of Saddam's intransigence may be oil revenue. If sanctions had been lifted in January 1992, Iraq could have earned at least an additional \$103 billion in oil revenue, adjusted for inflation and expressed in current dollars.

- This assumes Iraq would have taken three years to repair Gulf war damage to its oil export and production infrastructure and return to its prewar crude oil export level of 2.6 million barrels per day.
- The additional revenue available to put back into Iraq's economy would have been less, to the extent that Baghdad used some of the additional oil income to make war reparations and payments on its debt. (U)

Alternatively, the figures for gross domestic product (GDP) cover much more than the oil industry and represent economic output as a whole, rather than a revenue stream. If Saddam had complied with UN resolutions, Iraq's economy in 2002 would have generated at least \$24 billion in additional output, resulting in an estimated real GDP of \$81 billion, almost the same as its pre-Gulf war level.

- This figure assumes exceptionally rapid real growth—averaging 33 percent annually—in 1992-94 as Iraq restored oil production and exports and other damaged infrastructure and average annual real growth of 5 percent in 1995-2002.
- Inflation-adjusted per capita GDP under this scenario would have been about \$3,400, compared with current estimates of \$2,300. (U)

Uncertainty in the region because of Iraq's WMD programs probably has not had a significant negative impact on Iraq's economy. Iraq's eight-year war with Iran in the 1980s, its statist economic policies, and UN sanctions have done far more to discourage economic investment and growth. (U)

November 19, 2002 7:43 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hoon Letter

OK

Please give me that piece of paper on Hoon and I dictated a note asking you if we had thanked Hoon or if we had done anything by way of honors for that individual. I am going to have a bilat with Hoon, and I should discuss it with him.

Thanks.

DHR dh
11/19/02 24

.....
Please respond by _____

- Noted!*
- Navy Working on Silver Star
 - To present after returns from SAS assignment


Done
11/25
Larry Di Rita

19 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9232

U10408⁰⁰¹/03

November 19, 2002 7:44 PM

TO: Gen. Hill
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Force HQ

I received your note concerning the idea of a standing joint task force headquarters and will give it a great deal of thought promptly.

It was good to see you in Chile.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

DHR:dh
111902.20

cc: Gen Myers

Southcom

U10410-103

19 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9233

U18639-02

November 23, 2002 1:16 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Materials for Gen. Franks

Please call Col. Bucci tomorrow and make sure that Gen. Franks gets copies of the materials I told him I wanted him to make sure the Vice President got. Franks has to see them as well.

Thanks.

DER dh
112302 1b

.....
Please respond by SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 26 2002

*Copies were provided to Gen Franks this morning,
25 November*

C u/25

CENTCOM

23 Nov 02

November 23, 2002 2:47 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Status

What is the status on the settlement on the big contract dispute on the weapons system that Cheney cancelled?

Thanks.

DHR dh
112302 5

.....
Please respond by

12/13/02

160

23 Nov. 02

U10412¹⁰/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9235

ever American troops are here for military exercises.

"We know for a fact that there are some countries which do not have treaties but have been attacked anyway," he said. "They are just the same so it's not an argument for or against any particular place or countries."

However, Renato Reyes Jr., spokesman for Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), said the MLSA is a "treaty of treason," which is a product of secret negotiations excluding the Filipino people and the Senate.

"It is a way of getting ahead of an open and national public debate that would surely expose all its provisions inimical to national interest, territorial integrity and sovereignty," he said in a statement.

Bayan will hold a rally today at the foot of Chino Roces (formerly Mendiola) Bridge to express their indignation at the MLSA, he added.

He said mid-level Filipino and American military officials should not be allowed to determine foreign policy or to violate territorial integrity and sovereignty.

"It is an insult to the Senate and the Filipino people that these mid-level military officials, acting on behalf of presidential whims, could overturn the historic Senate verdict of 1991," he said.

He said the MLSA violates the country's national sovereignty and territorial integrity because it practically transforms the entire Philippines into a military outpost, transit point and recreation spot of American troops.

"The MLSA gives US military vessels unlimited and indefinite access to our ports while having no provisions for weapons inspections and thus gives no assurances regarding the entry, storage and projection of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from Philippine territory," he said.

The MLSA was signed by Philippine Navy Commodore Ernesto de Leon and US Army

Col. Mathias Velasco, a representative of the US Defense Department.

--Marichu Villanueva

Wall Street Journal
November 22, 2002

30. Turkey Seeks To Parlay Base Access Into Cash

By Neil King Jr. and Hugh Pope, Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal

Turkish officials want to know why the U.S. can't manage to swap air-base access for tennis shoes and underwear.

Washington's reluctance to offer even limited trade perks in return for crucial help in the war on terrorism is becoming a big issue among poorer U.S. allies, and nowhere more so than in Turkey. The Pentagon hopes to use Turkey's modern air bases for military action against Iraq that could be just weeks away. But despite many U.S. promises, the Bush administration has been politically unable to give Turkey any sort of trade assistance this year.

"Our relationship with the U.S. is addressed as a strategic partnership," said one frustrated Turkish official. "But we believe that the economic and trade aspect of this is way behind what it should be."

A key irritant came to a head this week, when the Senate failed to pass legislation granting Ankara limited duty-free access to the U.S. market. The Turks have pleaded with the White House all year to allow them to establish so-called qualified industrial zones, as exist in Jordan and Israel. But the effort fizzled Wednesday, when the Senate adjourned until next year without passing a bill containing the trade provisions.

Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell repeatedly lobbied the Senate to approve the Turkish trade zones. A U.S. trade official said the administration was deeply frustrated by

what happened in the Senate, and plans to resume the fight for the industrial zones next year. For Ankara, it's a far cry from the first Gulf War, when Turkey -- a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- also played a crucial role and the U.S. helped arrange more than \$1 billion in Arab-state aid to compensate it.

Today, many in Turkey fear the U.S. will offer simply a watered-down version of the trade status Jordan received in 1996. Textiles and footwear would be excluded, while the president could bar any products deemed "import-sensitive." Some senators vow to oppose the industrial zones unless they exclude duty-free steel.

Turkey isn't the only ally feeling stifled on the trade front. The administration has rebuffed all of Pakistan's requests for greater market access despite that country's help combating Taliban and al Qaeda forces in neighboring Afghanistan. U.S. textile interests vigorously opposed the requests.

Turkey's border with northern Iraq would almost certainly be used as a staging or transit area in a U.S. attack. American and British fighter jets have used southern Turkey's Incirlik air base for missions over Iraq for more than a decade, and the Pentagon wants to maintain that privilege in wartime. The administration also is concerned that Turkey show restraint with its Kurdish minority and not intervene in the Kurdish-held areas of northern Iraq.

U.S. pressure on Turkey comes at a time of political unrest over the country's economic travails. Turkey's election last month, which ousted a longstanding government, revolved largely around the economy. Turkish officials, as a result, are keen to receive significant assistance from the U.S. to avoid a new financial crisis that might arise as a result of an Iraq war. They want

billions of dollars of debt relief, particularly the cancellation of about \$5 billion in U.S. loans used to buy military equipment. Ankara blames its economic woes and its \$126 billion foreign debt load partly on the backlash from the 12-year-old sanctions on Iraq, which was once Turkey's second-biggest trading partner.

So far there is little sign that Turkey will get significant U.S. assistance. House Speaker Dennis Hastert was in Turkey this week to meet the new prime minister, Abdullah Gul, and to stress Turkey's central role in the region's stability. He said at a dinner with business executives that he would support a free-trade agreement with Turkey -- though the U.S. has no such plans. Lawmakers traveling with Mr. Hastert said Congress is unlikely to approve large outlays for Turkey anytime soon.

After months of delay, Turkey did receive \$228 million in direct U.S. aid this fall after it agreed to take over leadership of the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. The U.S. also has supported Turkey's \$16 billion International Monetary Fund reform program, and ensured that since 1997 Iraq has been obliged to send half of its oil exports through a trans-Turkey pipeline.

Washington Post
November 22, 2002
Pg. E6

31. Defense Dept. Allows Northrop-TRW Merger

By Greg Schneider

The Pentagon has approved Northrop Grumman Corp.'s proposed purchase of TRW Inc. and passed the matter on to the Justice Department for final action, sources familiar with the situation said yesterday.

The \$7.8 billion deal, which would create a defense, aerospace and information technology powerhouse big enough to rival industry leader Lockheed Martin Corp., has-

Thd we gets A-10

page 2

November 23, 2002 3:10 PM

SUBJECT: Talk to Gen. Franks

I need to talk to Gen. Franks about a quick reaction force for the UK's work on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

DHR dh
112302.7

Dr

UK

23 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9237

U10413⁰⁰¹/03

November 23, 2002 3:35 PM

TO: ~~Jim Roche~~ Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: F-18 Facility

I talked to Paul O'Neill the other day, and he said he had looked at an F-18 facility in St Louis and said it was excellent—under budget and ahead of schedule

Thanks.

DHR dh
112302.13

.....

Please respond by _____

452 F

23 Nov 02

November 23, 2002 3:41 PM

#339

Bef PROVIDED today

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Desert Badger

370

I think we need to review Desert Badger in the context of the new circumstance and our new force deployments. Please get them scheduled.

We discussed this with Minister of Defense Hoon, and I think we need to have proposals for several things—if a plane is shot down and the person is rescued, the person is captured but not rescued, or the person is killed

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112302.14

.....
Please respond by


12/20/02

23 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9239

U10415w/03

June 24, 2002 10:32 AM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Chechnya Urban Warfare

Here is some material I received from Andy Marshall on Chechnya and Urban Warfare that might be of interest to you.

Regards.

Attach.

06/13/02 Net Assessment memo to SecDef re: Chechnya and Urban Warfare

DHR:dh
062402-21

Rumsfeld

2456012

U10417 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9240

SECRET HAS SEEN

06/13/2002

June 13, 2002

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andrew W. Marshall

SUBJECT: Chechnya and Urban Warfare

Fundamentally, the answer to whether we are studying Chechnya is, "Yes." Russian experiences in Chechnya, as well as those of the Chechens, have been well documented. Several organizations, both in and outside the government, have taken steps to learn from the conflict.

I have included a small packet of information you may find useful to pass on to Mr. Gingrich. The below individuals may serve as good references for him should he seek additional information.

- Dr. Russell Glenn, RAND, (b)(6)
- Mr. Duane Schattle, DASD R&P, (b)(6)
- Mr. Dave Dilegge, Adroit Systems Inc., (b)(6)
- Mr. Lester Grau, FMSO Ft. Leavenworth, (b)(6)

An overview of the subject literature highlights the following salient items:

- * Urban warfare involves extremely complex terrain, spreading not only out and up, but also down – all of it well cluttered with obstacles and canalizing features.
- * *and blue force tracking* Communications are extraordinarily difficult making command and control of forces problematic.
- * Targeting is complicated not only by the difficulty of finding the enemy in such complex terrain, but also by the desire to preserve the city's infrastructure as much as possible. This has implications for the tactics and munitions used.

Andy
A. W. Marshall

11-L-0559/OSD/9241

May 20, 2002 5:15 PM

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chechnya and Urban Warfare

Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich. Do you think someone in your shop could take a look at this issue?

Attach.

Newt Gingrich e-mail to SecDef, "Chechnya, Urban Warfare and Guerilla Movements"
05/03/02

DHR:dh
052002-53

.....
Please respond by 06/11/02

Answer Attached

11-L-0559/OSD/9242

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com (Newt Gingrich)
Sent: Friday, May 03, 2002 9:02 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Cc: kernan@jfc.com.mil; john.keane@hqda.army.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: chechniya

for secdef, depsecdef
Chechniya, urban warfare and guerilla movements
from newt May 3, 2002

there should be a cell at DIA or somewhere studying Chechniya and developing a lessons learned to share with JFCOM, SOCOM, Fort Benning, Quantico, etc.

Urban warfare and defeating guerilla movements are two of the most demanding challenges we face. This is a case study in real time of a major power trying to defeat forces in exactly those conditions.

Is someone studying this systematically and sharing the lessons learned?

If so who are they so I can learn from them.

copy provided to D. Rita Wolfowitz

A Representative Sampling of Efforts to Learn from Chechnya

Office of the Secretary of Defense. OSD has published the "DOD Urban Operations Roadmap," a comprehensive treatment of urban warfare efforts within the Department. [As follow-on, the Joint Staff (J-8) is currently drafting the "Urban Operations Master Plan." See contact information for Col Schmidle, J8.]

-- POC is: Duane Schattle, DASD-R&P, (b)(6)

Joint Staff (J-8/DMAD). Currently has lead/oversight for Urban Warfare until 31 Dec 02. Exercises function via the Urban Operations Senior Steering Group/Joint Urban Operations Special Study Group.

-- POCs are: Col Robert Schmidle, USMC, and LtCol Joe Perry, USMC, at (b)(6) LtCol Perry chairs the Study Group.

U.S. Joint Forces Command. The Urban Operations Senior Steering Group (JS/J-8) is presenting a recommendation to the JROC to designate JFCOM the Executive Agent for Urban Operations. The designation would become effective 1 Jan 03. An IPT has already been formed within JFCOM (J-9).

U.S. Army

- Center for Army Lessons Learned. CALL maintains an online web site dedicated to MOUT. CALL posts notices for relevant conferences and working groups as well as links to articles, publications, newsletters and presentations.

-- website: <http://call.army.mil/homepage/mout.asp>

- National Ground Intelligence Center. NGIC has performed some classified work, to include formation of an Urban Operations Intelligence Task Force. NGIC has also produced a SECRET-level brief on the Chechnya lessons learned.

-- POC is: Dr. Bob O'Connell, (b)(6) (Dr. O'Connell's primary focus is on S&T (thermobarics, etc.))

- Foreign Military Studies Office. One of FMSO's primary "topical" items is that of the Chechnya conflict.

-- POCs are: Lester Grau and Timothy Thomas, (b)(6)

- Military Operations in Urban Terrain/ Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstration. The U.S. Army sponsored the MOUT ACTD, completing it nearly two years ago. The event showcased much of what other programs have developed to determine promising technological solutions to difficult C2, targeting, and force protection problems.

- Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk, LA. The JRTC permanent OPFOR uses tactics derived, in part, from Chechnya lessons.

- RAND. In its role as an FFRDC for the Army, RAND has compiled much information on Chechnya to include a paper entitled, "Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat." RAND also sponsors an annual conference on urban warfare operations.

-- POC is: Russ Glenn, (b)(6)

USMC

- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. MCIA has compiled significant information on urban warfare/Chechnya lessons learned, presenting much of the material in its publication "Urban Warfare Studies: City Case Studies Compilation" (April 1999).

-- POCs are: Capt Erwin Dick, (b)(6) Mr. Mike Kaiser (b)(6) (b)(6) and Mr. Art Speyer, (b)(6)

- Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. Information paper on Chechnya lessons derived from personal interviews of 20 former Chechen commanders.

- Project Metropolis. ProMet is a MCWL initiative with an opposition force (OPFOR) that uses tactics derived from Chechen lessons learned.

-- POCs are: Col Randy Gangle, (b)(6) and Fred McConnell, (b)(6) (b)(6)

- Project Lincolnia. This is a project being run by the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO), a center co-sponsored by the USMC (MCWL) and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. CETO is funded by Congress. Project Lincolnia seeks to address urban warfare issues at the operational level of war.

-- POC is also Col Gangle, (see above)

Other

- Mr. Dave Dilegge, Adroit Systems Inc., serves as Senior Urban Operations Analyst. Mr. Dilegge is a former Marine who previously worked at MCIA. He contributed both to MCIA's "Urban Warfare Study" and OSD's "Urban Operations Roadmap." In his spare time, he maintains a web site dedicated to urban operations.

-- POC is: (b)(6)

-- website: <http://www.urbanoperations.com>

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)

Links to Urban Combat Operations information.

- [FM 3-06, Urban Operations \(DRAFT\) CADD, CGSC](#)
- [DoD Urban Operations Journal](#)
- [CSS MOUT/Urban Operations Resource Page](#)
- [The Urban Operations Journal](#)
- [Combined Arms MOUT Taskforce](#)

Urban Combat Operations - Articles:

• Center for Army Lessons Learned articles

- [STREETFIGHTING: The Rifle Platoon in MOUT](#)
- [CALL Newsletter No. 00-7: Civil Disturbances](#)
- [Use of the Multiple Launch Rocket System \(MLRS\) in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain \(MOUT\)](#)
- [Use of Mortars in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain \(MOUT\)](#)
- [CALL Newsletter No. 99-16: Urban Combat Operations](#)
- [CALL Newsletter No. 98-10: Fighting Light/Heavy in a Restricted Terrain](#)
- [Replace Battle Drill 6](#)
- [JRTC MOUT Complex](#)
- [Battles From Cortina \(3-D MOUT\)](#)

• Foreign Military Studies Office publications

- [Russian Lessons Learned from the Battles for Grozny](#)
- [A 'Crushing' Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 2000](#)
- [Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned](#)
- [The Second Chechen War: The Information Component](#)
- [Combat Stress in Chechnya: "The Equal Opportunity Disorder"](#)
- [A Weapon For All Seasons: The Old But Effective RPG-7](#)
- [Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny](#)
- [Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and Operation Rio](#)
- [Handling the Wounded in a Counter-Guerrilla War: The Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya](#)
- [Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas](#)
- [Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience](#)
- [Soft Log and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny](#)
- [The Battle of Grozny: A Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat](#)
- [Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter](#)
- [Urban Warfare Communications: A Contemporary Russian View](#)
- [Viral Hepatitis and the Russian War in Chechnya](#)
- [Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya](#)

• DoD Urban Operations Journal

- [Newsletters for 2000](#)
- [Newsletters for 2001](#)

• School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) courses - Intro to Urban Warfare

- [Lessons](#)

• USMC MOUT website articles

- [Urban Operations Journal Somalia Site](#)
- [Urban Analysis - A Need at All Levels of Operation and Command and Particularly for Marine Expeditionary Forces](#)

• The Urban Awareness Concept

• **Other Publications**

Armor Magazine

- Light/Heavy Integration at the Joint Readiness Training Center - Armor Magazine July-August 1998
- How Armor was Employed in the Urban Battle of Seoul - Armor Magazine September-October 2001
- Modifying the Abrams Tank for Fighting in Urban Areas - Armor Magazine July-August 2001
- Mountain Cavalry Recon in Built-Up Areas - Armor Magazine July-August 2001
- UAVs Validated In West Bank Fight - Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 May 02, page 26
- Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century's End - Dr. Roger Spiller, CGSC (click Cancel if password is requested)
- Anticipating the Nature of the Next Conflict -- EmergencyNet News
- The Urban Battlefield and the Army: Changes and Doctrine, Dr. Roch Legault, Royal Military College.
- Building a Better Trojan Horse
- DoD Urban Operations Journal - Slumlords Aerospace Power in Urban Fights MOUT ACTD Program Handbooks -->
- 5/20 Infantry - MOUT Standard Operating Procedures
- USA CGSC Student Report - MEDICAL IMPLICATIONS OF COMBAT IN CITIES
- Signal Magazine - Echoes of Chechnya Warfare Resound in Moscow, Quantico

Rand Institution

- RAND - CF-162-A, Capital Preservation
- RAND - MR-1173-A, Mars Unmasked
- RAND - DB-322-A, Corraling the Trojan Horse
- RAND - DB-270-JS/A, ... We Band of Brothers
- RAND - MR-780-A/DARPA, Combat in Hell
- RAND - MR-1007-A, Marching Under Darkening Skies
- RAND - MR-1132-A, The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations
- RAND - MR-1289-A, Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat
- RAND - The Urban Area During Support Missions Case Study: Mogadishu
- Armed Forces Journal International - The Indirect Approach
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101 Meade Ave
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Regional Analysis Branch
Europe/Eurasia Section
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Section 1 Introduction

Background

As the forward deployed expeditionary element of United States military power, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) must be prepared to react quickly and effectively in the most unconventional of theaters. Given this unique warfighting mission, the Marine Corps has had much experience throughout its history operating in urban environments. In this decade alone, Marines have deployed in several major peacekeeping operations; all have required a concentration of force in major urban centers. Operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia have proven that military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) are complex and challenging. Preparing for the demands of urban operations requires continual innovations in strategy, operations, tactics, and technology.

In the future, Marine will face urban environment situations where different categories and activities will be conducted concurrently. Missions such as humanitarian assistance operations; peace operations; and full-scale, high-intensity combat may occur simultaneously within three city blocks. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has labeled this concept the "three city block war." Integrating and coordinating these varying missions — each of which has its own operational characteristics — will challenge Marines to use their skill and determination in imaginative ways. The presence of large numbers of noncombatants and the potential difficulty in distinguishing noncombatants from hostile forces will further complicate the task of operating in the urban environment.

The Marine Corps has recognized these challenges and is staging URBAN WARRIOR exercises to test new tactics and equipment designed to make the USMC the leading U.S. force in MOUT. For example,

as part of URBAN WARRIOR, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) has sponsored:

- Three URBAN WARRIOR Limited Objective Experiments that examined small unit combined arms operations in the urban environment;
- Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (MOUT ACTD) experiments that examined the use of man-portable shields and breaching technologies; and
- The first Responder LTA, a medical assessment examining new tactical possibilities for hospital corpsmen in urban warfare.

Overview

In 1997, in light of the probability of future operations in urban environments, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) was tasked to provide a preliminary assessment of urban warfare lessons learned in support of the CSEEA Joint Wargame. Three scenarios across the spectrum of conflict from mid- to low-intensity were chosen to represent urban operations. The lessons are drawn from:

- Russian military operations in urban areas of Chechnya (with focus on the fighting in Grozny) between 1994 and 1996;
- Israeli experiences operating in urbanized southern Lebanon during Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE in 1982; and
- British military experiences in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1996, with special emphasis on the period 1969 to 1976 when the British Army had the lead in security operations.

Lessons Learned

Analysis of the Russian, Israeli, and British military operations in urban terrain yielded the following overall strategic, operational, tactical, and technical lessons.

Strategic Lessons

- ❑ Military action cannot solve deep-seated political problems, but can buy time for politicians to search for political solutions.
- ❑ It is difficult to get well-defined policy objectives to which the military can work steadily and logically.
- ❑ Contrary to expectations, urban operations are neither short-lived nor low cost.
- ❑ Lines of command and control are often unclear and/or conflicting in urban operations, especially when police and military units are intermingled.
- ❑ Problems with disjointed command structures can be exacerbated by too much senior leadership at the operational level.
- ❑ Operations can also suffer when there is a lack of continuity in the senior command structure.
- ❑ Local paramilitary forces are likely to receive outside assistance.
- ❑ Concern for civilian casualties and property damage declines as casualties among security forces rise.
- ❑ When security operations begin to achieve results, the enemy may start attacking targets in the security forces' homeland and/or their personnel stationed abroad.
- ❑ Paramilitary operations more often aim at achieving political advantage rather than military results.
- ❑ A distinct advantage accrues to the side with less concern for the safety of the civilian population.

Operational Lessons

- ❑ It is important to have a well-developed military doctrine for urban operations, but that is not enough in and of itself.
- ❑ Situation-oriented training in urban warfare and tactics greatly improves military effectiveness and reduces losses.

- ❑ Clear rules of engagement are essential in urban combat situations.
- ❑ Even clear rules of engagement, however, are sometimes difficult to enforce, especially in the face of mounting losses among the security forces.
- ❑ The tempo of operations in an urban environment is so intense that personnel tend to "burn out" quickly.
- ❑ Overwhelming firepower can make up for organizational and tactical deficiencies in the short-run if one is willing to disregard collateral damage.
- ❑ Urban combat is extremely manpower-intensive and produces significant attrition of men and materiel among the attackers.
- ❑ Psychological operations are a key element of any military operation in an urban environment.
- ❑ Urban operations are very infantry-intensive affairs that produce large numbers of casualties.
- ❑ Urban operations usually stress the logistics system because of unusual requirements and abnormally high consumption rates in some classes of supply.
- ❑ The spatial qualities and perspective of urban and conventional warfare differ — urban combat is vertical in nature, whereas conventional combat is horizontal.
- ❑ Special forces are useful in urban settings, but are often misused because conventional force commanders do not understand how to use special skills effectively.
- ❑ The large-scale movement of urban non-combatants can significantly hinder military operations.
- ❑ Noncombatants cannot be counted upon to behave sensibly.
- ❑ Strategic bombing and close air support can be used to shape the battlefield, even in an urban setting.
- ❑ Standard military unit configurations are often inappropriate for urban combat.
- ❑ Failure to understand the importance of civil affairs can carry a high price.
- ❑ Amphibious operations can have an important role in urban warfare — especially in achieving tactical surprise.

Tactical Lessons

- ❑ Rigorous communications security is essential, even against relatively primitive enemies.
- ❑ Night operations are especially difficult to carry out in an urban setting.
- ❑ Forces operating in cities need special equipment not in standard tables of organization and equipment.
- ❑ Tanks and armored personnel carriers cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support.
- ❑ Trained snipers are very cost effective, but likely to be in short supply.
- ❑ If patrolling is central to the strategy of the security forces, it will be different from conventional combat patrolling and must be well coordinated.
- ❑ Fratricide is a serious problem in cities because it is harder to identify friend from foe.
- ❑ Major civilian structures in cities (e.g., hospitals, churches, banks, embassies) are situated in tactically useful locations, command key intersections, and/or are built of especially solid construction. Therefore, such facilities are especially useful to urban defenders.
- ❑ Direct-fire artillery can be a valuable tool in urban combat, provided collateral damage is not a major concern.
- ❑ Small unit leadership, especially at the junior non-commissioned officer level, is critical to tactical success in urban operations.
- ❑ Recovering damaged armored vehicles is more difficult in urban areas.
- ❑ Intelligence, especially from human sources, is critical to successful urban operations.
- ❑ Hit-and-run ambushes by small groups are the favorite tactic of urban paramilitary forces.
- ❑ Tracked vehicles are preferable to wheeled vehicles in situations where large amounts of rubble litter the streets. Otherwise, wheeled armored vehicles are preferable.
- ❑ Helicopters are not well suited for urban combat, but are quite useful in redeploying forces and supplies to just behind the forward edge of operations.

- ❑ Soldier loads must be dramatically reduced because urban warfare requires greater individual agility.
- ❑ Soldiers sometimes either deliberately misuse or modify non-lethal technologies to make them more harmful than intended by their designers.
- ❑ Very accurate and up-to-date maps are essential for successful urban operations.
- ❑ Shock value of artillery fire diminishes over time.

Technical Lessons

- ❑ Some military equipment will probably have to be modified in the field to counter enemy tactics and equipment.
- ❑ Small arms, though not decisive, play a disproportionately significant role in the outcome of urban battles.
- ❑ Individual flak jackets significantly reduce urban casualties.
- ❑ Smoke enhances survivability in urban situations, but carries significant operational penalties (e.g., impedes visual communications, taxes driving skills of vehicle operators, and slows the overall rate of advance).
- ❑ Mortars are highly regarded by both attackers and defenders in urban operations, but may be less effective than anticipated.
- ❑ Machineguns may be more valuable than assault rifles for urban combat.
- ❑ Air defense guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets.
- ❑ Heavy machineguns still offer good defense against close air attack, especially helicopters.
- ❑ Commercial off-the-shelf technologies can be employed successfully for military purposes in cities.
- ❑ Rocket propelled grenades are omnipresent and very effective weapons in urban combat.
- ❑ Armored vehicles require more protection when operating in cities and have a different distribution than for a conventional battlefield.
- ❑ Remotely piloted vehicles can provide real-time intelligence, but analysts have considerable difficulty achieving accurate interpretation.

- ❑ The enemy often employs homemade weapons — even chemical weapons — against security forces.
- ❑ Lightly protected armored vehicles have limited value in urban terrain.
- ❑ Combat engineering equipment, especially armored bulldozers, is a critical asset in urban combat.
- ❑ Cluster munitions are very effective in cities, provided collateral damage is not a major concern.
- ❑ Although available, artillery-fired precision-guided munitions were seldom used in urban operations.
- ❑ Air-delivered precision-guided munitions were more commonly employed than artillery-fired precision-guided munitions when not hampered by bad weather.
- ❑ Bunker-busting weapons are invaluable for urban warfare.
- ❑ Non-lethal technologies were seldom used for urban combat missions; instead, they were employed for crowd control and riot suppression.
- ❑ Extensive use of non-lethal weapons can become counterproductive because demonstrators can build up an immunity to their effects, especially the shock value of such weapons.
- ❑ Conventional military radios are likely unsuitable for urban operations and work poorly in built-up areas.

Conclusion

In the future, U.S. forces are likely to engage in low- to mid-intensity operations in developing or underdeveloped parts of the world. It is also likely that a large percentage of these operations will draw U.S. forces into MOUT. According to United Nations estimates, the urban population of developing countries worldwide increases by about 150,000 people each day, with the most pronounced growth occurring in Africa and Asia. By the year 2025, three-fifths of the world's population — 5 billion people — will live in urban areas. In some developing nations, the pace of urban population growth will exceed the development of city services. Housing, water, and jobs will be in short supply, giving rise to poverty, disease, and crime. Over-crowded conditions

will create an environment of social and economic tension that might eventually find a violent outlet.

The Russian, Israeli, and British examples of MOUT serve as examples of a military strategy being adopted by weak conventional as well as non-conventional forces around the world. Weaker forces — realizing themselves inferior to larger, better equipped militaries in the areas of conventional battlefield tactics, heavy artillery, armor, and advanced command and control technology — attempt to compensate through asymmetrical means such as guerrilla warfare on urban terrain. By using the familiar terrain of their native cities to launch guerrilla operations against intervening conventional armies, the Chechens, the PLO, and the paramilitaries of Northern Ireland exploited the Russian, Israeli, and British forces' inability to adapt their tactics and technology to the urban environment. As this analysis has shown, these conventional forces learned that fighting an unconventional war in an urban environment poses a set of difficulties and challenges completely alien to military combat in any other type of terrain. Though the Russians, the Israelis, and the British demonstrated capabilities to adapt to the challenges faced in their respective MOUT, in each instance the lack of preparedness made the operation more time consuming and costly than originally anticipated.

The near certainty that the National Command Authorities will again deploy U.S. Marines to urban environments, combined with the mandate to reduce casualties and collateral damage, requires that the U.S. concept for future MOUT address and prepare for the unique challenges that will be faced. The Russian, Israeli, and British experiences illustrate that factors such as the granularity of urban terrain and the presence of noncombatants can combine to create friction that can potentially erode the effectiveness of basic operational capabilities. Therefore, meeting the challenge of future MOUT must continue to be a multi-step process requiring an examination of doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and support systems. As this analysis highlights, it is essential that U.S. military planners study and understand the nature of the urban environment and its implications for operational- and tactical-level evolutions.

Section 2

Russian Experience in Chechnya



The Chechen people have a long history of resisting Russian control. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, they began in earnest to seek full independence. During 1994, Chechnya fell into a civil war between pro-independence and pro-Russian factions.

In December 1994, Russia sent 40,000 troops into Chechnya to restore Russian primacy over the break-away republic. After reaching the Chechen capital of Grozny, 6,000 Russian soldiers mounted a mechanized attack. This attack was launched simultaneously from three directions and featured tanks supported by infantry riding in BMP armored personnel carriers. Instead of the anticipated light resistance, Russian forces

encountered heavy resistance from Chechens armed with "massive amounts" of antitank weapons. The Russian attack was repulsed with shockingly high losses. It took another 2 months of heavy fighting, and changing Russian tactics, to finally capture Grozny. The following Russian troop losses occurred between January and May 1995:

| | Killed | Wounded | Missing | Captured |
|------------------------|--------|---------|---------|----------|
| Defense Ministry | 1,947 | 5,693 | 376 | --- |
| Total (Federal Troops) | 2,805 | 10,319 | 393 | 133 |

The initial Russian campaign against irregular Chechen forces can be broken into two primary phases. Phase One, running through the end of February 1995, consisted of the initial intervention, the repulse of the first assault on Grozny, and the eventual capture of the city 2 months later. This phase involved some of the most extensive urban combat of the campaign since operations focused primarily on Grozny. Phase Two, extended from March through June 1995, consisted of antipartisan operations in the Chechen countryside to gain control of the rest of the country.

By late August 1996, Yeltsin's national security advisor brokered a cease-fire that eventually resulted in the total withdrawal of Russian security forces from Chechnya.



Strategic Lessons

Lesson 1



Military operations could not solve deep-seated political problems. Almost 2 years of covert and open military operations in Chechnya failed to prevent the local government from asserting its administrative and political independence from Moscow. In the end, Boris Yeltsin was forced to remove all Russian military and interior forces from Chechnya. Although the two sides still openly disagree on Chechnya's ultimate status, Russian newspapers report that "Chechnya today is living its own life, separately from Russia." Even the protocol that surrounded the signing of the final agreement suggested a meeting between leaders of sovereign states.

Lesson 2

Local military commanders could not get clear policy guidance to which they could work steadily and logically. Just after Russian military forces entered Chechnya in mid-December 1994, Izvestia was reporting "a visible split" within the top leadership of the Ministry of Defense over the nature and wisdom of the operation. Later that same month, the new Russian military commander in Chechnya found his headquarters in "tumult and disarray." Poor or conflicting policy guidance continued over the next 2 years; e.g., when Yeltsin's national security advisor announced a cease-fire in August 1996, the Russian regional military commander said no such agreement had been signed nor had he received orders to cease hostilities

Lesson 3

The confusion generated by the minimal or conflicting policy guidance was exacerbated by poorly defined lines of command and control. There was no direct, unified chain of command for the operations in Chechnya. Command and control was spread among the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) resulting in commanders not knowing who was on their flanks nor the missions of neighboring forces. Poor lines of communications were also responsible for many incidents of "friendly fire." Additionally, the North Caucasus Military District Command structure (the district that included Chechnya) was bypassed and operational decisions were sent directly from the Russian Minister of Defense to local commanders. Similarly, the overall operational headquarters lacked an on-going staff planning relationship with the assault units entering Chechnya from separate axes. Poor coordination between units and services ultimately led to slow rates of advance and sometimes opened Chechen escape avenues.

Lesson 4

Overall, Russian command lacked continuity and was plagued by too much senior leadership at the operational level. Russian units fighting in Chechnya experienced at least eight major changes in senior command between December 1995 and August 1996. The former Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Airborne troops, Colonel-General Achalov, also claimed that there was "too much [flag-level] leadership" on the scene. (Other



sources said there were as many as 100 general officers on the operational scene. If true, that would equate to about one general officer per every 3,000 to 4,000 Russian soldiers in Chechnya.) Achalov further explained that the presence of so many general officers was a problem because "they confused one another" and "lied to put themselves in the best light."

Lesson 5

Contrary to initial expectations, operations in Chechnya were neither of short-duration nor low cost. At the outset of the operation, then Defense Minister Pavel Grachev publicly boasted that he could "settle" Grozny in just 2 hours with one parachute regiment and subdue all of Chechnya in 72 hours. He was later proven wrong by his own admission. Instead, it took 2 months to subdue Grozny the first time only to lose it to a second rebel counterattack in August 1996. Operations were also far from low cost. The first Russian assault column to enter Grozny, for example, lost 105 of 120 tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs). The Russians lost about 70 percent of the 200 tanks committed to the New Year's Eve 1994 assault on Grozny. Overall, Russian sources estimate that the Russian army lost about 18 percent (400 vehicles) out of its total armored vehicle force of 2,221 over the course of the campaign. Russians casualties were also high — perhaps constituting as much as 12.5 percent of their total entering force in Chechnya through March 1995 — 6 months before the second battle for Grozny where Russian casualties were "appalling." Civilian losses were also high. Then Russian National Security Advisor, Alexander Lebed,



estimated that 80,000 civilians were killed in the fighting in Chechnya and another 240,000 wounded through September 1996.

Lesson 6

When Russian security operations began achieving results, the Chechens started attacking targets within Russia. By May 1995, Russian security forces controlled major Chechen cities and operations were spreading into rural villages. A 100-man Chechen raiding party seized hostages in the Russian town of Budyonnovsk in June 1995. After Russian security forces botched a hostage rescue attempt, the Chechens escaped with a major propaganda victory. The Budyonnovsk operation was repeated in January 1996 when Chechen President Dudaev's son-in-law seized a hospital and maternity home in the town of Kizlar. Events in Kizlar played out as they had in 7 months prior in Budyonnovsk: an unsuccessful rescue attempt by Russian security forces, large numbers of Russian civilian casualties, escaping terrorists, and a major Chechen propaganda victory.

Lesson 7

It was difficult to unite police and military units into a single, cohesive force. Efforts to combine disparate Ministry of Interior internal troops with regular Army units were problematic at several levels. First, Ministry of Interior troops were not designed, equipped, or organized for large-scale combat operations nor did they regularly train with units from the armed forces. Considerable antagonism existed between the army and Ministry of Interior forces, with the military regarding Ministry of Interior troops as incompetent and unreliable.



Lesson 8



Distinct advantage accrues to the side with less concern for the safety of the civilian population. Russian security forces initially obeyed orders to minimize civilian casualties. Chechen fighters took military advantage of this situation. Chechen civilians stopped truck convoys, punctured fuel tanks and tires, and even set vehicles on fire in the early days of the conflict without reprisal from Russian security forces. Lacking nonlethal, crowd-control equipment and apparently confused by inappropriate rules of engagement, Russian troops stood by and took no action. Chechen commanders even deployed guns close to schools or in apartment building courtyards to discourage Russian attacks. This was a relatively painless exercise for Chechen commanders since most ethnic Chechens had already fled the cities to stay with relatives in the countryside; the residue was mostly ethnic Russians.

Lesson 9

Concern about civilian casualties and property destruction declined as casualties among security forces rose. Over time, early Russian concerns about harming civilians and destroying property declined as troops grew frustrated trying to distinguish enemy fighters from similarly attired noncombatants and as

their own losses mounted. Reports of "rampaging" Russian soldiers engaged in looting, arson, indiscriminate arrests, torture, and summary executions of civilians increased. Initially, Russian use of heavy weapons in cities was restrained; eventually, however, restraint dissolved. At one point, 4,000 artillery detonations per hour were counted in Grozny. (In comparison, Serbian shelling of Sarajevo reached only 3,500 artillery detonations per day.)

Lesson 10

Chechen forces received extensive outside assistance. The Russians claimed that the Chechens received up to 5,000 volunteers from 14 different countries — some who had combat experience elsewhere in the Caucasus or Afghanistan. In the 2 years prior to the Russian incursion, Chechen forces amassed a significant inventory, including 35 tanks; 40 armored infantry vehicles; 109



artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars; 200 air defense weapons; and vast quantities of small arms and man-portable antitank weapons. According to the Russian military, up to 80 percent of those weapons were unintentionally provided by the Russians themselves when the Chechens seized them from unprotected military warehouses and abandoned Russian military bases in the region. The Chechens supplemented these seizures through purchases from corrupt Russian military officers and arms dealers. After the invasion, Russian soldiers remarkably continued to supply Chechen forces with consumables either out of greed or carelessness. On one occasion, drunken Russian troops sold a tank and an armored combat vehicle to Chechen separatists for \$6,000. On another occasion, Russian troops unloaded and left behind boxes of ammunition from armored infantry vehicles to make room for looted household articles.

Operational Lessons

Lesson 11

Having well-developed military doctrine for urban warfare is not enough in and of itself. The Soviet military had considerable post-World War II experience operating in cities: Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), Prague (1968), and Kabul (1979). The Russian military also inherited an extensive body of formal urban warfare doctrine from its Soviet predecessor. Despite this sound theoretical grounding in urban doctrine, Colonel General Achalov (the former Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Airborne Troops), claimed that "no one ever taught anyone anything" when assessing the "blunders" in Chechnya.

Lesson 12

Situation-oriented training would have improved Russian military effectiveness. Russian tactical training standards for squads, platoons, and companies mandates 151 hours of total instruction, of which only 5 or 6 hours are dedicated to urban warfare. Given overall reductions in Russian training, it is unlikely most troops ever received those 5 or 6 hours of instruction. Nor were there any mock-up training ranges of the city or individual blocks, as prescribed by Russian military doctrine and World War II Soviet army prac-

tice. Instead, Russian troops had to rely on sources like the instructional pamphlet prepared by the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces for those fighting in Chechnya. Because the lack of funds limited the number of copies printed, soldiers had to share them and pass them along on an ad hoc, individual-to-individual basis. The situation was probably best summed up by Colonel A. Kostyuchenko of the Ground Troops Main Combat Training Directorate: "[I]t so happened that, for our part, the tactics and methods of conducting combat operations in a city found no place in combat training programs."

Lesson 13

Inadequate training in even the most basic maneuver and combat skills inhibited Russian operations. Poor Russian combat performance can be traced to an overall lack of training in fundamental military skills. The army conducted no division-level exercises in the 2



years prior to the Chechnya conflict. In that same period, regimental, battalion, and company exercises were reduced over 75 percent. No joint exercises were held between Ministry of Interior troops and the Russian army. Even individual skill training was reduced; consequently, some half-trained units refused combat or their commanders held them out. Operational deficiencies due to training shortfalls were not confined to ground force units. Russian accounts of air force operations in Chechnya also revealed that pilots were not psychologically prepared for combat; had "squandered their skills in employing their weapons;" and had problems flying in adverse weather because of reduced peacetime training. Such readiness concerns also led 11 Russian generals to tell the Russian Duma that Russian forces were not prepared for such operations.

Lesson 14

Urban combat is extremely manpower-intensive and produces significant attrition of men and materiel among the attackers. The Russians discovered that a 5:1 manpower advantage (consisting mostly of infantry) was sometimes not enough since they had to guard every building they took. Attrition rates for both men and materiel were also high. For example, Russian military officials, known for understating losses, admitted that 200 soldiers died and another 800 were wounded in about 3 days of fighting during the second battle for Grozny in August 1996. These casualty figures were in line with earlier Ukrainian estimates that Russian security force losses during the 31 December 1994 attack on Grozny were 600 dead and 300 prisoners of war. Materiel losses were also extreme; e.g., an element of the 131 *Maikop* Motorized Rifle Brigade lost 17 of 20 armored vehicles in just 1 day of fighting near the presidential palace during the first battle of Grozny.

Lesson 15

Overwhelming firepower can make up for organizational and tactical deficiencies in the short-run if one is willing to disregard collateral damage. When all else failed, the Russians fell back upon their least inventive option — overwhelming firepower — to take Grozny. Heavy-handed use of massed artillery and air-delivered ordnance allowed Russian security forces to gain control of Grozny after 2 months of fighting.

Lesson 16

The sudden requirement to deploy to Chechnya, coupled with the unique supply problems posed by the Chechen operating environment, overwhelmed the already fragile Russian military logistics system. The Russian Office of the Inspector General concluded that the Ministry of Defense's efforts to carry out a partial mobilization of the transportation system to support Russian security forces in Chechnya was "an outright failure." This was hardly a surprising finding since Colonel-General V. Semenov of the military council of the ground forces had sought to have the entire campaign postponed before it commenced on the grounds that military equipment was in a sorry state, more than a third of the army's helicopters could not fly, and emergency supplies had already been partially consumed. Those deficiencies in the logistics system translated into some soldiers entering Grozny without weapons or ammunition for machineguns on armored vehicles. Russian army supply officers were also



unprepared for the abnormally high demands for hand and smoke grenades; demolition charges; and disposable, one-shot ant-tank weapons generated by fighting in cities. Similarly, air force units entered the conflict with only 50 percent of the prescribed norms for fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and food. The military logistics system also failed to supply enough clothing for troops going into the field. Even the graves registration and burial system broke down. Mistakes were so common that parents and wives had to travel to Chechnya to identify their loved ones from a pile of bodies "stacked like cordwood." Parents or wives were also sometimes forced to pay for the burials, since many military regions lacked the money to do the job as required by regulation. These inherent, structural limitations of the Russian military logistics system were exacerbated by the difficulties of operating in Chechnya. Poor roads limited ground transport and military supply convoys were subject to ambush and delays by crowds of unarmed Chechen civilians blocking roads. Poor weather also restricted shipments by air.

Lesson 17

A lack of high-quality intelligence made operations more difficult and dangerous for Russian security forces. During the pre-invasion planning phase, senior Russian officers were forced to rely upon 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scale maps because they lacked better-suited 1:25,000 or 1:12,500 scale maps. Current aerial or satellite intelligence was limited because the satellites had been turned off to save money and few aerial reconnaissance missions had been conducted. Lower-level commanders fared even worse — many had no or outdated (1984) maps and photographs. Eventually, the Russian army's cartographic service had to prepare a new set of maps from aerial photographs taken during the course of the fighting. The lack of adequate maps made it more difficult for Russian forces to coordinate their actions or to surround and fully cut off Grozny.

Pre-invasion intelligence assessments of Chechen military capabilities were severely inaccurate as both senior and troop-level commanders were shocked by the degree and intensity of Chechen resistance in Grozny. After the initial assault on Grozny, some Russian prisoners of war did not know their location; others asked reporters to "tell me who is fighting whom?" Despite these early



intelligence failures, little was done to rectify the situation beyond initiating more aerial surveillance. As late as March 1996, the Russian Minister of the Interior was still complaining that poor reconnaissance and intelligence had allowed Chechen military forces to enter Grozny again without warning. Interior Minister Kulikov went on to say that the "outrageous negligence" of local authorities had resulted in "heavy fighting and losses." Kulikov's blistering attack produced few results since Chechen military forces recaptured Grozny in August 1996, again with no intelligence warning.

Lesson 18

The spatial qualities and perspective of urban and conventional warfare are very different. Urban warfare is more "vertical" in that operations routinely reach up into buildings and down into sewers. The "vertical" character of fighting in an urban setting worked both for and against Russian troops. On the positive side, Russian troops were able to attack buildings from the top downward, thereby achieving surprise and allowing them to bypass strong, ground-level defenses. On the negative side, "the whole city [was] armed with a grenade launcher in every third floor window." Also, snipers operated regularly from roof-tops, deep within upper-floor apartments, and from basements, making them difficult to spot. Chechens operating in this manner posed a serious problem since the guns on many Russian armored vehicles lacked sufficient elevation and/or depression to deal with these threats. Also, discussed in later lessons, few Russian armored vehicles were capable of resisting top attacks.

Lesson 19

Composite units were generally unsatisfactory. At the start of campaign, few Russian units (even elite units like the *Kantemirovskaya* and *Tamanskaya* divisions) were up to authorized strength. Battalions were often manned at only 55 percent or less. Consequently, many units were "fleshed out" with last minute additional personnel and equipment. According to one report, up to 60 percent of the tanks and armored vehicle crews were formed enroute to the initial offensive. Similarly, the Chief of Staff of the 805th Guards Artillery Regiment complained that his battalions only received a small percentage of the trained crews necessary to fire its weapons. Many of the last-minute additions to the ranks of the 805th Guards Artillery Regiment, including officers, had to learn their trade "on the fly." In some cases, soldiers did not even know the last names of their comrades before entering battle. Some military districts also resorted to creating ad hoc regiments of "volunteers" and sending them to Chechnya. The Volga and Transbaikal military districts, for example, packaged genuine volunteers with conscripts into new, ad hoc regiments and sent them to Chechnya under armed guard. These ad hoc regiments generally exhibited poor unit cohesiveness, were difficult to command, and sometimes lacked essential equipment. In the opinion of Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Boris Gromov (hero of Afghanistan), "the considerable forces that were mustered piecemeal across Russia were simply unable to collaborate without training."



Lesson 20

Fratricide was a serious and continuing problem throughout the campaign in Chechnya because it was difficult to tell friend from foe, especially in cities. Fratricide occurred frequently among Russian forces in Chechnya because, in the words of one Russian commander, it is "unbelievably difficult" to differentiate friend from foe. In one particularly egregious case, an Interior Ministry regiment fought a 6-hour battle with an army regiment. Part of the problem stemmed from both sides using equipment (tanks, APCs, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), etc.) of the same origin. Chechen forces, for example, wore Russian pattern camouflage coveralls and other items of military dress obtained from former Soviet army stores in Chechnya. Usually this was not a deliberate attempt to disguise Chechen fighters as Russians, although Chechens used this ruse to carry out operations to discredit Russian soldiers with the local populous. Wide-scale use of nonstandard uniforms within Russian forces made combat identification even tougher, especially with elite troops who affected a "Rambo" look. Russian troops were also allowed to wear civilian clothing to make up for the inability of the supply system to provide standard issue or to overcome poor military quality control standards. Fratricide was also caused by poor coordination between different branches of the security forces. Although the ground forces made up the majority of the troops at the beginning of the campaign, federal forces also included Ministry of Interior troops, Naval Infantry, and Spetsnaz reconnaissance troops under the control of the military intelligence branch. Miscommunications between ground forces and tactical air support crews also led to numerous cases of fratricide.

Lesson 21

Standard Russian military unit configurations were inappropriate for urban combat. The nature of urban warfare led the Russians to employ a novel configuration of assault detachments consisting of infantry reinforced with heavier fire support and combat engineer assets than found in standard formations. The recommended configuration for such a group was: three motorized rifle platoons; one tank

company; one flame-thrower (Shmel) platoon with nine launcher teams; two Shilka or Tunguska air defense guns; one UR-77 line-charge minefield breaching vehicle; one combat engineer squad; one medical team; and one technical support squad.

Lesson 22

Foregoing peacetime maintenance is a false economy. The Russian army in Chechnya suffered the consequences of poor peacetime maintenance of armored vehicles and automotive equipment. On the road march into Grozny, for instance, two out of every ten tanks fell out of formation due to mechanical problems. In another case, the Russians were only able to find one regiment's worth of functioning armored vehicles from an entire division's inventory.

Lesson 23

The potential of special forces for urban operations was never realized in Chechnya. Both foreign and Russian military observers agree that special forces, properly used, would have been of great value in Grozny. Units like the Alpha and Vypel teams were never sent, despite Alpha team's previous success of capturing the Afghan presidential palace in Kabul with "little blood." Spetsnaz troops, which were deployed, would have been excellent in reconnaissance and covert operations, but instead were wasted spearheading the assault column into Grozny on New Year's Eve; this action occurred because conventional force commanders did not know how to properly exploit Spetsnaz capabilities. Even when Spetsnaz were committed in their traditional reconnaissance role, serious problems developed. Teams were frequently inserted without adequate means to extract them, usually due to poor coordination of or cooperation with helicopter units. Teams also lacked radios and other essential equipment.

Lesson 24

The nature of cities tends to channel combat operations along narrow lanes of activity. Because combat conditions in Grozny were characterized by narrow fields of view, limited fields of fire, and constricted avenues of approach, operations tended to be channeled



along certain pre-ordained lines of march — well-known and heavily defended by Chechen fighters.

Lesson 25

Psychological operations, especially disinformation, were central to both Chechen and Russian strategies. From the onset, both groups realized that domestic and foreign perceptions of the war were almost as important as the actual ground situation. Thus, both sides tried to shape the news media's coverage of the war. For the Russians, this meant a well-orchestrated campaign of withholding information and spreading deliberate disinformation. This campaign ran from military officers in the field, through government-controlled news services, up to senior government officials. The Russians: spread false information about the timing and nature of military operations; used "black" operations to mask Russian involvement; lied about the type of weaponry used against targets in civilian areas; and under-reported the extent of their own military losses. The Russians also sought to shape perceptions by hindering the activity of news correspondents in the war zone. Other Russian psychological operations included

dropping leaflets from aircraft and appealing to Grozny citizens over loudspeakers to lay down their arms and not provoke Russian forces; jamming Chechen radio broadcasts and destroying the local television station; and conducting useless talks to gain time and to intimidate the Chechens. Likewise, the Chechens, too, used disinformation. They also staged major news/propaganda events like the raids on the Russian towns of Budyonovsk and Kizlar to embarrass Russian security forces. There were also reports of Chechens, dressed in Russian uniforms, carrying out acts to discredit Russian forces with the civil population.

Lesson 26

Strategic bombing can be used in urban operations to shape the battlefield, especially during the early phases. The Russians employed MiG-31 (Foxhound), Su-27 (Flanker), Su-25 (Frogfoot), Su-17 (Fitter), and Su-24 (Fencer) short-range bombers to strike 873 Chechen targets, including bridges, petroleum facilities, ammunition dumps, road networks, fortified areas, military equipment repair facilities, command and control facilities, and enemy airfields. The Russians also employed Tu-22M3 (Backfire) long-range bombers to close approach and escape routes around the cities of Gudermes, Shali, and Argun.

Lesson 27

The Russian Air Defense Force "closed" Chechen airspace even before Russian troops entered Chechnya. The commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Defense Force claimed that, as early as August 1994 (5 months prior to Russian security forces entering Chechnya), his command was ordered to "close" Chechen airspace to ensure that further mercenaries, weapons or ammunition were not airlifted into Chechnya. This meant that opposition forces would be limited to on-hand equipment if the air blockaded remained effective.

Tactical Lessons

Lesson 28

Rigorous communications security is essential, even against relatively primitive enemies. Apparently, much Russian tactical radio traffic was broadcast in

the clear. This allowed the Chechens to enter the Russian tactical air control radio net in order to redirect Russian air assets against their own troops. At other times, Russian forward air controllers broadcast their own coordinates in the clear only to have Chechen artillery fire directed against them shortly thereafter.

Lesson 29

According to Russian after-action assessments, night fighting was the single most difficult operation in Chechnya for infantry forces. This assessment was based on a shortage of night vision equipment and inadequate training. As a result, some units used vehicle headlights and other visible light sources to conduct night operations — a tactic explicitly forbidden in army directives. Such use of headlights and searchlights was initially rationalized as a means to shock Chechen forces. Instead, it made Russian forces more vulnerable to Chechen counterfire.

Lesson 30

Tanks and APCs cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support. The Chechens fielded antitank hunter-killer teams, equipped with "massive amounts of antitank weapons," which keyed upon the engine noise from Russian armored vehicles. Once these hunter-killer teams converged upon Russian armor, they would volley-fire RPG-7 and RPG-18 antitank missiles from above, behind, and the sides. Russian armed vehicles had trouble dealing with these forces for a variety of reasons; e.g., poor visibility from the vehicles and insufficient elevation/depression of on-board armament. Armor columns not accompanied by



dismounted infantry experienced staggering losses (in the initial assault on Grozny, up to 70 percent tank loss rate). As one Russian airborne commander noted after the battle, "[W]ithout infantry cover, it was really senseless to bring tanks into the city."

Lesson 31

Forces operating in cities need special equipment not usually found in Russian tables of organization and equipment. The Russians came to believe each soldier needed a rope with a grappling hook for entering buildings. Additionally, lightweight ladders were found invaluable for assaulting infantry.

Lesson 32

Firing tracer ammunition in cities makes the user a target for snipers. Russian forces eventually stopped using tracer ammunition in night fighting since it directed enemy snipers back to the source of the fire. Later, army policy in Chechnya totally banned using tracer ammunition — night and day — because of the severity of the sniper problem.

Lesson 33

Trained snipers were essential, but in short supply. The Russian army, although well prepared on paper for fighting a sniper engagement, proved totally unready for the quantitative and qualitative demands of sniper operations in Chechnya. Russian snipers were both under equipped and poorly trained for the conditions they faced in Chechnya. Besides the traditional technique of firing from rooftops, the Chechens used unexpected tactics in their own sniper operations; for example, they fired from deep within rooms of buildings, not from the window ledges as Russian countersniper teams expected. Consequently, Russian sniper operations were less effective than anticipated.

Lesson 34

Obscurants are especially useful when fighting in cities. Russian forces made extensive use of smoke and white phosphorus to screen the movement of forces during city fighting. Every fourth or fifth Russian artillery or mortar round was either smoke or white phosphorus. (The Russians claimed that white phosphorus had the added benefits of toxicity, readily penetrated

Chechen protective masks, and was not banned by treaty.) They also found tear gas very useful in Grozny.

Lesson 35

Armored combat engineering vehicles can perform important, specialized urban combat missions. The Russians found that armored combat engineering vehicles were indispensable for removing obstacles (a serious impediment to urban movement) and for mineclearing. The Russians employed the IMR, a multirole engineer vehicle fitted to a tank chassis. The IMR has a bulldozer plow on the front and a traversing crane in place of the turret. The crane has a bucket or cargo boom at the end depending upon the job. (There are two versions of this vehicle: the IMR built upon a T-55 chassis, and the IMR-2 based on the T-72 chassis.) The Russians also extensively used the UR-77, a minefield breaching vehicle based on a modified 2S1 self-propelled howitzer chassis. This vehicle has a rocket-propelled line charge launcher mounted on the hull rear for explosive breaching of minefields. The Russian army recommended every assault group include two IMRs and one UR-77.

Lesson 36

Recovering damaged armored vehicles is especially difficult in cities. The Russians discovered that rubble/debris, narrow streets, sniper fire, and the shortcomings of recovery vehicles themselves made armored vehicle recovery extremely difficult and perilous.

Lesson 37

Hit-and-run ambush attacks by small groups were the favorite tactic of the Chechens. The Chechens normally operated in groups of 15 to 20 fighters; these groups would further subdivide into smaller groups of 3 to 4 for combat missions. Each small group would generally include a sniper, a grenade launcher operator, and at least one machinegun operator. These units, employing antitank weapons and Molotov cocktails, then lay in wait to ambush Russian forces. Ambushes sometimes involved heavier weapons like artillery. In this case, the Chechens would use one or two artillery pieces, fire a few rounds, then flee. The Chechens used ambush tactics against helicopters as well.

Lesson 38

Direct-fire artillery can be a valuable tool in urban combat, provided collateral damage is not a major concern. Upon entering Grozny, the Russians found it difficult to employ artillery in an indirect mode because of the buildings and lack of fire-direction specialists. They also found that technical deficiencies in the main guns of most Russian armored vehicles made them incapable of dealing with entrenched snipers and shoulder-fired antitank grenade launchers (RPG) teams on the upper floors of buildings. Thus, the Russians employed artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and the 82-mm Vasilek automatic mortar as direct fire weapons, usually at ranges of 150 to 200 meters.

Lesson 39

A failure of small unit leadership, especially at the NCO level, was a primary cause of Russian tactical failures in Grozny. The Russians have recognized that urban warfare often devolves into actions of small groups. Unfortunately, the traditional Russian lack of a professional NCO corps, coupled with a shortfall of 12,000 platoon leaders on the eve of the campaign in Chechnya, crippled its small unit operations.

Lesson 40

Tracked armored vehicles are preferable to wheeled armored vehicles in urban warfare. The Russians discovered urban combat generated vast amounts of rubble — debris that wheeled vehicles had trouble traversing. Tracked vehicles, by contrast, could readily negotiate urban rubble.

Technical Lessons

Lesson 41

When operating in cities, armored vehicles require more protection and that protection needs to be distributed differently than for conventional battlefield operations. Russian armor arrays, optimized across the frontal arc for NATO central front engagements, provided inadequate protection in the urban conditions of Chechnya. Problems with the T-72 in Grozny centered upon cata-



strophic ammunition fires and inadequate protection against top attacks from shaped charges. Survivability of the T-80 was also criticized by the Russian Minister of Defense, especially its vulnerability to top attacks from shaped charges. Diagrams of Russian armored vehicles in public Russian assessments showed the majority of lethal hits against tanks and infantry fighting vehicles occurred on their upper surfaces, especially through the turret roofs and engine decks, as well as from the rear. Colonel General Sergei Mayev, Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces for Armaments, estimated that 98 percent of tanks destroyed in urban operations were hit in places where the design did not permit installation of reactive armor. These same Russian assessments also emphasized that armored vehicles in Grozny were subjected to extensive, multiple attacks. Every armored vehicle had to deal with six or seven attacks by antitank systems, mostly RPGs. These vulnerabilities should not have surprised senior Ministry of Defense officials since Russian tank designers say they consciously shifted the bulk of armor protection to the frontal arc to deal with the

anticipated threat to tanks — NATO tanks and antitank weapons firing against advancing Russian armor columns. Severe weight limitations, imposed by the Ministry of Defense, forced designers to make this trade-off.

Lesson 42

RPGs can be used against helicopters. There is at least one recorded instance of the Chechens using an RPG to down a Russian helicopter.

Lesson 43

Air defense guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets. The Russians found that the ZSU-23-4 Shilka and the 2S6 Tunguska air defense guns were very useful against multistory buildings because their guns had sufficient elevation to hit targets in the upper stories. Air defense weapons worked so well in this ground suppression role that Russian authorities eventually recommended that urban assault formations routinely include Shilkas and Tunguskas.

Lesson 44

Heavy machineguns still offer good defense against close air attack, especially from helicopters. Improvised Chechen tactical air defenses, consisting of truck-mounted 23-mm cannons and 12.7-mm heavy machineguns mounted on 4 x 4 utility vehicles damaged about 30 helicopters and destroyed 1 other. Other reports indicate that Chechen ZSU-23-4s also destroyed at least one, possibly two Russian SU-25 ground-attack fighters.

Lesson 45

Both sides employed commercial off-the-shelf technologies for military purposes. As previously mentioned, Russian soldiers were allowed to substitute civilian clothing for inadequate, missing or cumbersome military counterparts. This proved a problem since it made identifying friend from foe more difficult. Chechen experience was more positive. They constructed ad hoc air defense systems by mating ZU-23-4 23-mm air defense cannons on civilian KAMAZ trucks and by placing 12.7-mm heavy machineguns on Toyota Land Cruisers, Jeeps, and the Russian civilian UAZ-469. Similarly, the Chechens put mortars on civilian-type trucks to improve their tactical mobility and lessen their vulnerability to Russian counterbat-



tery fire. Chechen forces also employed Western-made, civilian radios for tactical communication during the second battle of Grozny. Finally, the Chechens turned industrial chemicals into home-made chemical weapons. [Refer to Lesson 48 for details.]

Lesson 46

Non-lethal technologies were seldom used. There are no reports of Russian forces using nonlethal technologies, except tear gas. It is not clear whether the absence of nonlethal technologies was the result of conscious Russian tactical decisions or because their inventory did not offer them this option. Regardless, the lack of nonlethal systems put Russian convoy crews at a disadvantage when confronted by unarmed civilians blocking roads.

Lesson 47

Tactical communication proved very difficult in Grozny. Part of the problem stemmed from design practices that incorporated Russian army preference to fight from within armored infantry vehicles that led to infantry tactical communications located inside or dependent upon the BMP or BTR infantry fighting vehicles. Once the infantry dismounted their vehicles, radios became hard to reach and communication was cumbersome. City buildings also disrupted the signals of Russian military radios. Their short-term, tactical solution to this problem was to establish ground-based and aircraft-based relay stations. Russian commentators, however, noted that ultimately the military will have to acquire radio equipment better suited for urban

operations, like mobile cellular telephone networks. Ministry of Interior units, equipped more like police forces, tended to have a much wider selection of small tactical radios, including individual radios, that could operate in cities. However, they had difficulty communicating from the small unit level to higher headquarters or with the military services.

Lesson 48

Indigenous forces can improvise crude chemical weapons. Because Chechen forces had no access to military chemical weapons, they improvised their own by using on-hand supplies of industrial chemicals. Using chlorine gas, they built chemical mines that were remotely detonated by radio signal.

Lesson 49

The cabs of supply trucks must be armored. As in Afghanistan, the Russian army in Chechnya soon discovered that it was essential to armor the cabs of trucks, even those convoyed. Unarmored supply columns proved especially lucrative targets for snipers and roving bands of Chechen fighters. In addition, trucks were very vulnerable to both antipersonnel and antitank landmines; about 600 trucks and unarmored vehicles were destroyed over the course of the campaign. Numerous casualties resulted from the absence of mine protection on standard support vehicles. Although the Russian army developed armored versions of the standard Ural 5-ton truck for convoys in Afghanistan, none were manufactured in quantity nor deployed in the Chechen theater. The Russian army is now looking at a variety of armor packages for logistics vehicles for contingency operations.


Lesson 50

"Bunker busting" weapons are invaluable for urban warfare. The highest acclaimed weapon in Chechnya was the RPO Shmel. (A measure of its importance is that 512 Shmel gunners received decorations for their service in Chechnya.) Although officially called a flame-thrower, it more closely resembles a rocket launcher in Western armies. Unofficially, it is called "pocket artillery" by Russian troops. Shmel is a single-shot, disposable weapon resembling a large LAW or AT-4 rocket launcher. The rocket grenade is equipped with a thermobaric incendiary mixture that

can also be described as a fuel air explosive. It is intended primarily to attack enemy troops in confined spaces such as bunkers or interior rooms. It also has a secondary use against lightly armored vehicles. In Grozny, it was widely used against Chechens entrenched in buildings, especially snipers.

Lesson 51

Some Russian equipment was modified while in the field to counter enemy tactics and equipment. The Russians resurrected the Afghanistan concept of add-on armor to address problems that surfaced in Grozny. This led to the development of *reshetka* armor that resembled a set of venetian blinds fabricated out of steel bars. It works on the principle that the majority of RPGs striking the *reshetka* screens become trapped between the bars or disintegrate without the fuses detonating their shaped charge warheads. *Reshetka* screens were first displayed at the Kubinka armored test range trials during a hastily called conference in January-February 1995 to examine the Chechen campaign lessons to date. These *reshetka* screens were then deployed to Chechnya in February 1995. Additionally, some tanks and APCs were outfitted with cages made from wire mesh that stood about 25 to 30 centimeters away from the hull armor. These wire mesh cages were intended to defeat both RPGs and Molotov cocktails. The Russians also mounted 240-mm rockets on helicopters for the first time in Chechnya as a field expedient to gain sufficient standoff range as protection against tactical air defenses. [Refer to Lesson 52.]



Lesson 52

Helicopters need standoff weapons. Widespread Chechen use of 23-mm cannons and 12.7-mm heavy machineguns encouraged Russian helicopter gunships to employ their weapons at ranges of 3,000 meters or more. Helicopter crews, repeating tactics from Afghanistan, found that antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) were very effective for attacking hardened targets with precision. The preferred type was the radio-command guided Shtrum (AT-6 Spiral). The longer ranged ATGMs, such as Shtrum, gave the helicopter crew sufficient standoff range to foil Chechen air defense guns. (After Afghanistan, the Russians also developed a high explosive warhead using thermobaric principles for helicopter-fired ATGMs, but there were no reports of such weapons being used in Chechnya.) Smaller caliber rockets, such as like the 57-mm S-5 series and the 80-mm S-8 series), although effective, lacked sufficient range to put them outside the reach of Chechen tactical air defenses. Consequently, Russian crews experimented with the 240-mm S-24 rocket for attacking targets protected by air defenses. This appeared to be a field expedient since the Russians had never attempted to integrate S-24s with helicopters for fear the rocket plume might stall the engine when the helicopter moved forward.

Lesson 53

Helicopters are not suited for urban combat. This verdict — delivered by the Commander of Russian Army Aviation, Colonel General Vitaliy Pavlov — was surprising since Russian military doctrine specifies the preferred method of capturing a building is from the top-down, with troops helicoptered into position. That part of Russian doctrine notwithstanding, Colonel General Pavlov claims Russian doctrine also specifies that helicopters are too vulnerable to rooftop snipers and ambushes in urban setting.

Lesson 54

The Russian air force made extensive use of precision-guided weapons when not hampered by bad weather. The Russians made large-scale use of laser-guided bombs and missiles fired from the Su-24. These weapons destroyed key bridges and communications facilities with greater precision than previously

possible. Russian use of precision-guide munitions, however, was severely limited by the frequent appearance of rain and fog over the battlefield, especially during the initial march to Grozny when "weather conditions were appalling and the use of precision weaponry was impossible."

Lesson 55

Inadequate on-board navigation systems and poor radar limited the use of helicopters in adverse weather and at night. Technical shortcomings of on-board radar and navigation forced the Russians to employ Mi-24 helicopters mostly during the day and fair weather when visibility exceeded 1.5 kilometers and pilots could clearly see their targets. According to Colonel General Pavlov, Commander of Russian Army Aviation, these rules meant that 95 percent of the days in February 1995 were listed as "non-flying days."



Lesson 56

The Russians did not use precision-guided, artillery-fired munitions despite having such rounds in their inventory. The Russians had the necessary equipment to carry out precise artillery strikes with weapons such as the laser-guided Krasnapol, Santimetr artillery rounds, and the guided Smelchak mortar rounds. However, none of these were used in Chechnya. International Defense Digest, quoting unnamed sources in the Russian "higher command," claimed that senior commanders considered highly advanced munitions too expensive to be "wasted" in Chechnya. These munitions may also have been considered unnecessary by tactical commanders who received the bulk of their fire support from direct fire artillery working close (150 to 200 meters) to the targets. At such close range, accuracy could be achieved without resorting to "expensive" precision-guided artillery munitions.

Lesson 57

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were used extensively in Chechnya. Russia used UAVs in combat for the first time in Chechen. One such vehicle was the *Sterkh*, which has two modular payloads: a recon-



naissance package with a daylight, stabilized TV camera with a real-time transmission system; and an electronic warfare jamming package. The *Sterkh's* chief shortfall is its limited durability — between 5 and 10 landings. The Russians also used the sensor-carrying *Shmel* remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), which could operate up to 2 hours out to a range of 60 kilometers. Apparently, the UAVs were used primarily by Russian airborne forces who judged them extremely successful, particularly as a way of saving the lives of reconnaissance team members.

Project Metropolis



Several related reports
from MCWL are
listed on last two
pages - "X-Files"

Now Available for download: ProMet After Action Report

Purpose: To solve critical warfighting issues related to conducting Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT).

Hypothesis: "That properly trained and equipped Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) can successfully operate in the urban battlespace, while incurring lower than historically expected casualty rates."

Program Description: Project Metropolis (ProMet) is a continuation of urban warfighting experimentation begun during the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's Urban Warrior (UW) experimentation series. The project built on the two key lessons learned during UW:

1. That the majority of problems can be resolved with better training, and
2. That units must employ combined arms teams to be effective.

Based on these two fundamental points, ProMet focused in Increment One and Two on developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to enable Marines to fight and win in the "Block 3" MOUT environment, while reducing casualties from the historical 30-40% to 20% or less. As these TTPs were developed, they were incorporated into a comprehensive urban warfighting training package that was forwarded to Training and Education Command (TECOM) in December of '00.

ProMet has shifted its focus reconnaissance in Increment Three to address the challenges of "Blocks 1 and 2", urban rotary wing operations, and urban ground reconnaissance. In conjunction with developing the TTPs and their associated training lessons, ProMet is evaluating the value of selected technologies. The project began in June of 1999 and is projected to continue through 2002. The specific objectives for the project are:

- Develop urban warfighting TTPs
- Draft a comprehensive MOUT curriculum for hand-off to TECOM
- Determine the "right" things to teach
- Determine the "best" way to teach them
- Validate the TTPs through experimentation at the squad, platoon, company and MAGTF combined arms level
- Determine the training time required to achieve individual and unit "proficiency" to win in the urban battlespace and reduce casualties
- Determine the required training frequency to maintain individual and unit proficiency
- Determine the relative value of selected technologies

- Develop recommendations for improvements to existing MOUT facilities

Project Schedule

Increment 1 - Block 3 MOUT Experimentation

Phase I - 7 June - 30 July '99

- Established a Quantico based task force to execute Project Metropolis
- Conducted a review of existing MOUT training curriculums
- Identified the "good, bad, and missing" TTPs
- Reviewed experiment results from Urban Warrior, MOUT ACTD, and other appropriate venues

Phase II - 1 August - 30 September '99

- Drafted initial training curriculum based on Phase I review and analysis
- Visited formal schools to discuss status of MOUT instruction

Phase III - 1 October - 31 December '99

- Trained I MEF MOUT instructors in with new MOUT training curriculum
- Conducted TTP validation experiments using MOUT instructors from TBS
- Conducted SME MOUT conference to review and provide comments on required content for Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST)
- Revised BUST training curriculum and lesson plans

Phase IV - 1 January - 29 February '00

- Trained infantry, engineers, tanks, AAV, LAV, and CSS personnel from First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) with new BUST training curriculum at Camp Pendleton MOUT facility
- Conducted "proficiency" training with I MEF forces
- Conducted combined arms TTP development experiments with I MEF at Ft. Ord, CA
- Revised BUST training package based on lessons learned

Phase V - 1 March - 31 May '00

- Conducted BUST basic essential skills test (BEST) to evaluate effect of break in training for forces trained in Phase IV
- Conducted new equipment training using previously trained I MEF forces
- Conducted MOUT instructors at SCLA for 2nd MARDIV and 4th MARDIV personnel

11-L-0559/OSD/9276

- Conducted limited combined arms team and technology experimentation at Southern California Logistics Airfield (SCLA) (former George AFB), Victorville, CA
- Revised BUST training package based on lessons learned

Phase VI - 1 June - 31 August '00

- Trained MOUT ACTD infantry company using BUST training package
- Participated in 4th MARDIV exercise at Ft. Knox MOUT facility
- Drafted MOUT training concept
- Revised training package
- Drafted Increment 1 report, based on the results of Phases I through V

Increment 2 - Company/Battalion/MAGTF Experimentation

Company(rein) Phase - 1 September - 31 December '00

- Submitted BUST package to TECOM for review and inclusion in Marine Corps training
- Submitted MOUT instructor course training package to TECOM for review
- Conducted BUST for company (rein), engineers, tank, AAV, LAV, CSS personnel at SCLA
- Conducted company (rein) level combined arms experiments and TTP development at SCLA
- Revised BUST and MOUT instructor training curriculum
- Submitted proposed infantry MOUT individual training standards (ITS) to TECOM

Bn(-)/MAGTF Phase - 1 January - 30 April '01

- Conducted BEST evaluation of previously trained forces during company phase
- Conducted Bn(-)/MAGTF level combined arms (including rotary wing survivability issues) experiment at SCLA
- Provided Doctrine Division, MCCDC a proposed revision to the MOUT section of MCWP 3-11.2, Marine Rifle Squad
- Assist MEFs in establishing MOUT instructor cadre and training program
- Began assessment and analysis of company and battalion level experimentation
- Publish Increment 2 report

Increment 3 - MOUT, UGR, and Rotary Wing Experimentation

Block 1 and 2 MOUT

Research Phase - 1 February - 31 March '01

- Interview personnel returning from Block 1 and 2 deployments/commitments
- Research and determine Block 1 and 2 MOUT training requirements
- Coordinate with allies and other US services, agencies, and training establishments

Training Package Development Phase - 1 April - 30 September '01

- Revise Block 1 and 2 portions of SPMAGTF MOUT curriculum
- Develop Block 1 and 2 MOUT instructors training package
- Conduct initial platoon level evaluation during KB(X) - Jul '01
- Revise training package based on lessons learned

Platoon/Company(rein) Phase - 1 October - 28 February '02

- Train instructors with revised training curriculum
- Train experiment forces with revised training package
- Conduct Block 1 and 2 company MOUT experiment - Jan/Feb '02
- Conduct assessment
- Revise training package

MAGTF Phase - 1 March - 30 September '02

- Conduct proficiency evaluation
- Train experiment forces
- Conduct MAGTF experiment in conjunction with Millennium Challenge-02 (MC-02) - Jul '02
- Conduct assessment
- Revise training package
- Draft Increment 3 report

Urban Combined Arms Exercise (UCAX) - 1 January '01 - 30 September '02

- Develop concept using input from other experiments
- Determine support requirements
- Conduct initial trail during MC-02 - Jul '02
- Revise concept
- Deliver UCAX package for review

Urban Ground Reconnaissance (UGR)- 1 January '01 - 30 September '02

Research Phase - 1 January '01 - 30 May '01

- Identify deficiencies
- Conduct UGR conference - Mar '01
- Develop POA&M
- Allocate tasks to reconnaissance units for TTP development
- Identify candidate technologies

Developmental Phase - 1 June '01- 31 May '02

- Develop TTPs
- Procure candidate technologies
- Identify and experiment with supporting technologies
- Conduct limited objective experiments (LOEs)
- Revise TTPs as required

Finalization Phase - 1 June - 30 September '02

- Evaluate TTPs during MC-02 - Jul '02
- Revise TTPs
- Publish report
- Deliver TTPs, ITS, and training package for review

Urban Rotary (URW) Wing Operations- 1 November '00 - 30 September '02

Research Phase - 1 November '00 - 1 March '02

- Reviewed information on previous studies conducted
- Conducted liaison with other DOD services and agencies to determine current TTPs being utilized
- Continue to collect information on URW operations and aircraft survivability

Development Phase - 1 February '01 - March '02

- Conducted initial URW experimentation during Bn(-)/MAGTF experiment - Feb '01 at SCLA
- Experimented with six-line brief during Bn(-)/MAGTF experiment - Feb '01 at SCLA to determine effectiveness
- Conduct additional experiments to evaluate current and proposed TTPs

- Conduct URW conference to discuss experiment results
- Adjust TTPs as required
- Identify technologies that can benefit URW survivability studies
- Begin planning for Joint URW LTA - April '02

Finalization Phase - 1 March '02 - 30 September '02

- Conduct Joint URW LTA - Apr '02
- Publish LTA report
- Conduct experiments to determine impact of threat systems on URW operations
- Integrate RW assets into UCAX during MC-02- Jul '02
- Revise TTPs
- Conduct URW conference to finalize inputs to T&R manual
- Submit findings for inclusion in T&R manual

X-Files

What are the X-Files? ([Click here to jump to the download section of this document.](#))

- The X-Files are pocket-sized, useful, clear information that can be quickly read.
- They convey a synthesis of learning from experiments with MOUT tactics, techniques, and procedures, and some enabling technologies that can help us fight and win battles on urbanized terrain.
- They are an evolving body of knowledge that will be refined and inserted into the Marine Corps Combat Development System when the Urban Warrior experiments are concluded.
- The X-Files use post training analysis and feedback from Marines. They are not doctrine, nor are they standing operating procedures (SOPs).

If you have any questions about the X-Files, please e-mail the [MCWL Synthesis Center](#).

To download the X-Files: The X-Files have been converted to the Portable Document Format (PDF) from Adobe. If you don't have the latest Adobe Acrobat Reader, please follow this link to the Adobe web page, and install it on your system.

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"In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart - conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war."

General Charles C. Krulak, USMC


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The *Urban Operations Journal* also contains original material submitted by site visitors as well as urban operations related studies, papers and articles that, if not posted here, would be "gathering dust" on the shelves of our military and civilian institutions. The successful conduct of urban operations is difficult at best and we can ill afford to relearn lessons already learned or to ignore the problem - we cannot "wish it away" in anticipation of the next Desert Storm.

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Urban Warfare Lessons Learned in Chechnya

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[Article by Leonid Zolotov: "Storming Cities is a Great Art"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The practice of conducting combat operations to seize cities has currently outrun the theory.

In currently effective regulatory documents a corresponding place is given to laying out recommendations on organizing and conducting the defense of cities and on seizing them. But more than ten years have passed since the adoption of these rules. In this connection the need has arisen to review, supplement, and refine the regulations and instructions. The experience of two Chechnya campaigns has presented us with many lessons, not so much positive as negative in issues of training and conducting combat operations in general, and, in particular, in the city of Grozny, where the most fierce street battles took place both in 1994-1995 and in 1999-2000.

Theory and History

At one time, especially with the appearance of nuclear weapons, the point of view prevailed that in a future war cities would not play as large a role as they did in World War II. But the experience of local wars and armed conflicts overturned that theory. Cities were and still are the main, attractive target for military operations. The very character of cities has largely changed; their lay-out has become more diverse, the sizes of many of them has changed, the number of floors and density of strong, stone structures has increased, the structure of city territories has become more complex, their architecture has changed, the length of underground transportation lines has grown, and transportation networks have become more branched.

All of this gives a basis for concluding that combat operations in urban regions will become

more frequent. Whereas during the Great Patriotic War in the course of army offensive operations troops had to seize 15-20 cities with populations of 50-70,000 inhabitants, now the number of such targets has doubled and even tripled. The conclusion proceeding from this is that combat operations in urban conditions will become a common event.

The conduct of combat operations in urban conditions, whether defensive or offensive, is a great art. In tactical estimates one must first of all not count on possible numerical superiority, but on the tactical art of the commander and staffs and the combat mastery of the troops.

Practice is Outrunning Theory

Currently a situation has developed in which combat practice is outrunning the development of theory. For example, take the development of methods of training for and conducting special operations to seize cities in internal armed conflicts. In the course of both the first and second Chechnya wars, the command of the United Grouping of Troops, which was created to seize Groznyy, did not have at its disposal theoretical recommendations on how to isolate the city from the inflow of arms, munitions, and mercenaries from abroad and other regions; how to blockade and subsequently surround it; how to cut off groups of illegal armed formations and de-organize their command and control systems; and how to conduct the information-psychological struggle. All of this had to be worked out in the course of the operation. And it is understood that all this was done not without mistakes.

Leaning on accumulated experience, one should, even if post factum, fill in the blank spaces allowed in the theory. It is necessary to consider how regulatory statutes have become obsolete in training for and conducting operations to seize cities and conducting defensive operations, taking into consideration the new level of development of the means of armed struggle, particularly precision weapons, increased mobility, and the electronic equipping of command and control.

In an armed conflict not all methods of operations in cities are applicable, which were worked out for wars during which all existing strike weapons were to be used in unlimited quantities. In addition to this, the acting regulatory documents do not reflect that joint special operations in cities are conducted by united groupings of troops (forces). In practice it turned out that hastily created improvised combined operational groupings from various departmental structures operated individually in accordance with uncoordinated plans, which, naturally, could not but reflect negatively on the results of the operation.

In drawing up recommendations for the actions of command and control organs in joint special operations, one must not allow the repetition of those mistakes which took place in regard to the rushed creation on a new basis of command and control "centers" and combined operational groups from representatives of various departmental security structures, which were not subordinate to each other. The precise coordination of troop leadership is particularly important in operations in complex urban conditions.

Particulars

Assault operations in cities are particularly complicated for the troops. The point is that in these conditions the use of armor is limited. If we turn to history, then the graphically expressed mass use of tanks and self-propelled artillery guns (SAU) took place only during the storming of Berlin and in suppressing the putsch in Budapest in 1956. The skillful, creatively thought out use of tanks in assault groups and detachments in Berlin reduced to a minimum the losses of

armored vehicles. Fire from tanks and SAU during the storming of Berlin permitted crushing heavily defended facilities and targets at distances exceeding the depth of the assault groups' combat missions. The advance of tanks took place only after a complete clean-up of adjacent buildings and structures by infantry.

The massive use of tanks and SAU in crushing the putsch in Budapest in 1956 was less successful, where unjustifiably large losses of armored vehicles were permitted by hand grenades, small arms, and incendiary mixtures used by the rebels on armored targets from the basements and from all floors of adjacent buildings. In Budapest it was not believed to be possible to completely clear buildings and structures of the population, who often threw grenades in bouquets of flowers and bottles of incendiary mixtures into the open tops of armored transporters and on the roofs of the motor-transmission compartments of tanks and SAU's.

We now possess much rich factual material which makes it possible to analyze and work out directions for developing forms and methods of operational and tactical actions in cities. After researching the experience of combat operations, we are coming to the conclusion that the basic burden of a struggle with the enemy in street battles falls on combined-troop units and subunits. In structure they are more adapted to combat operations in cities, both in defense and offense. Experience shows that motorized-rifle subunits are able to defend any city facility, dispersing themselves on several floors, in basements and underground transportation lines, and in undeveloped sectors of terrain. But for this it is necessary to prepare thoroughly beforehand, so that they, upon occupying a defense in strong stone and reinforced concrete buildings, can create a multi-layer, multi-tiered fire system.

Motorized riflemen must be taught so that during an attack they can move along narrow streets and alleys, through gaps in the walls of buildings and stone fences, along underground transportation lines, and if necessary, along the roofs of apartment buildings, clearing apartments one after another by storm.

It is important to consider that the light arms of the subunits will not permit them to defeat an enemy located in strong buildings and structures. Therefore, motorized-rifle subunits need the support of artillery, flamethrowers, engineering-sapper subunits, and aviation.

The urban environment limits the use of infantry combat vehicles and armored transporters as a consequence of their increased vulnerability. Nevertheless, with skillful use, they can operate sufficiently effectively in street battles.

Aviation plays an important role in the city, however, experience shows that many difficulties are associated with its use. The close contact of the sides in the course of a battle and the extremely convoluted line of the front complicates the use of unguided weapons on targets located in the direct vicinity of one's own troops. It is rather difficult for the crews of airplanes and helicopters to find small targets amidst city ruins, smoke, and dust and destroy them with the weapons onboard. In connection with this, a company of air controllers is required in the combat formations of motorized-rifle and tank battalions to guide aircraft to the targets and for target indication.

Battles in Grozny showed that the use of machinegun and cannon fire and small-caliber bombs by aviation to destroy the enemy in buildings is not very effective. Guided aerial bombs and missiles which permit delivering strikes on specific buildings, city structures and enemy fire weapons are most suitable of all for these targets. Incendiary bombs, cluster bombs, and tanks [containers] for igniting targets occupied by the enemy and also to destroy their manpower and

equipment in areas of concentration were rather widely used in the course of the battles.

Subunits of unpiloted aerial vehicles can be used for aerial reconnaissance. In regard to combat helicopters, then an increase in their vulnerability to fire from PZRK [man-portable AAM systems], antiaircraft machineguns, and small arms from the roofs, garrets, balconies, and windows of the upper stories of building has been noted.

Artillery in the City

The densely developed terrain substantially limits maneuvering and concentrating artillery, reduces the range and effectiveness of its fire, and decreases the destruction radius of its shells and rounds. Direct and semi-direct aimed fire, to which 30-50 percent of the total amount of artillery must be enlisted, acquires decisive significance in these conditions. Experience has shown that the use of 122-mm and 152-mm self-propelled howitzers for direct and semi-direct aimed fire is poorly effective because of design particulars and because of insufficient protection from antitank weapons in a close battle. Therefore, special large-caliber assault weapons with increased protection against antitank weapons are needed to destroy buildings, structures and shelters.

The dense build-up of urban territory and the constant presence of dust and smoke in the atmosphere reduces the effectiveness of the use of artillery shells and rounds. Self-propelled mortars are widely used in cities. Their high-trajectory fire ensures the destruction of targets in the dead spaces formed between buildings and also on squares, wide streets, and undeveloped sectors.

The use of trailered mortars is also associated with great difficulties because of the increased vulnerability of tractor-trailers to fire of all types and also because of the difficulties in moving through streets and sectors saturated with mine and explosive barriers, barricades and obstacles.

Fire strikes on the enemy during the battle in Grozny included fire raids for destruction and suppression, directly aimed fire, and fire support. But such a typical scheme is not always acceptable because of insufficient artillery. One must take into consideration that the use of antitank missiles and barreled artillery is difficult here. Urban conditions complicate the selection of fire positions for artillery. The allocation of a significant quantity of troops and equipment is necessary for its protection. Because of this, it is very important to ensure the precise interaction of artillery and motorized-rifle subunits.

Sappers and Flame Throwers

On the one hand, carrying out engineering measures to camouflage and protect troops and increasing the effectiveness of engineering obstacles is easier in the city, but on the other hand, engineering reconnaissance is more difficult, and engineering support for maneuvers, forcing rivers and canals, and carry out fire-fighting measures are more complicated. Making passages in obstacles and barriers, destroying defensive installations, and de-mining facilities, clearing streets, and supporting target assaults acquire important significance.

Experience has shown that combined-troops commanders do not make skillful use of RKhBZ [radiation, chemical, and biological protection] subunits. And flame-throwing subunits are irreplaceable during a battle in a city. Operating as a component of an assault group, flame throwers are capable of destroying sheltered fire points, taking lightly-armored equipment out of

action, and creating fire sequences. Aerosol equipment plays an important role in masking combat formations, blinding enemy fire points, covering maneuvers, supply and evacuation routes, and creation false fire sequences.

Supporting Combat Operations

A battle in a city causes increased expenditures of rockets and ammunitions of every type, including incendiary, concrete-piercing, and smoke. Under these conditions, the number of tasks to restore arms and military equipment that have gone out of operation sharply increases. Here is a typical example: of 3,500 units of armored vehicles lost in Chechnya over the first three months of the operation of 1995, the basic part falls to the battle for the city of Grozny. Moreover, the majority of combat damage was considered to be heavy. What does this say? On the one hand, it testifies to the unskillful use of armored vehicles during the battle in the city, and on the other hand it testifies to the weak organization of technical support.

There were many shortcomings in rear support. Autonomy was not always achieved in the rear relation of combat operations of units and subunits. It was necessary to create increased reserves of material resources in the battalions and regiments, particularly of ammunition, fuel, food supplies, and water. The business as usual attitude is unacceptable here. For example, the scheme for bringing up material resources established for field conditions -- division-regiment-battalion -- underwent changes, which under these conditions forced the higher levels (division-regiment) to deliver material resources directly to the battalions.

Medical support was built on the basis of realizing the principle of maximally possible proximity of medical aid to the wounded and sick. For this purpose it was necessary to include a field medic in each company and a doctor with self-dressing equipment at each battalion medical center, and a surgeon, anesthesiologist and additional nurses at each regimental medical center.

The Main Thing Is Combat Spirit

Moral-psychological support during combat operations in cities must be directed toward forming a high combat spirit in the servicemen, a stable moral-psychological state, and readiness to carry out combat missions in the circumstances of a street battle. The extremely complex and extremely stressful character of battle in the city physically and morally exhausts the personnel. The constant threat of a sudden attack by the enemy from around a corner, the effective actions of his snipers, grenade throwers, the conduct of battle in small groups in confined spaces (buildings, basements, underground transportation lines), fire and destruction, and the danger of mines requires extreme self-discipline from servicemen and maintaining constant readiness for battle. Fatigue, loss of alertness, and carelessness were the main reasons for unjustified combat losses.

[CEPMST]

[Description of Source: Moscow Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye in Russian -- Weekly independent military newspaper published by the Boris Berezovskiy-financed Nezavisimaya Gazeta.]

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November 23, 2002 3:47 PM

Done 12/13

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JFCOM Response

337

Here is a memo I sent to ADM Giambastiani, and here is his response.

Please take a look at it, and tell me whether or not you think we are properly arranged.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/25/02 CDR, JFCOM memo to SecDef re: Follow Up from Combatant Commanders Conference

DHR:dh
112302.16

.....

Please respond by 12/13/02

12/13
RESPONSE
ATTACHED

23 Nov 02

U10417-03

11-L-0559/OSD/9294

11/25/02 4:06 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone

SUBJECT: JFCOM Response on Training and C2

ADM Giambastiani's reply to your memo of September 9 is attached.

You asked me if we are properly arranged with respect his reply.

We are.

Ed will control a considerable amount of training money over the coming FYDP. He will be able to support joint training.

As he points out, however, getting component commanders to free for joint training the forces assigned to the Combatant Commanders is the key. I'd suggest you explore with Gen. Myers how to effect the change Ed identifies.

I would expect both the Joint and component commanders will be unenthusiastic about a change. The joint commanders would become more responsible for training. The component commander will be reluctant to surrender the time of his Service forces for joint training.

On C2 suites, in the program we are proposing Ed would gain control over the development of the Deployable Joint Command and Control suite. It is to be the basis for the SJFHQ.

11-L-0559/OSD/9295

10/28

September 9, 2002 9:39 AM

②

TO: ADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Follow-Up from CINCs Conference

①

What do you think about pulling together the budget information I mentioned in the meeting with the combatant commanders—with respect to exercises and training? Please see if we can categorize it as service-centric, joint and combined.

②

Another interesting question that came up there was that each command had their own distinctively different suite. That is worrisome.

Someone also said that they don't train on their own suite, and that it should be treated as a weapon system, which it isn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090603-7

.....
Please respond by 10/15/02

10/25/02

SECDEF -

RESPONSE TO ① AND ②
ATTACHED.

V/R
Ed

02 SEP 11 11

TOTAL P.02

October 25, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense

CC: Gen Myers

From: ADM Giambastiani *V/R Ed*

SUBJECT: Follow-Up From Combatant Commanders Conference

- A. Exercises and Training Budgets. The short answer to part (A) for exercises is listed below (source JCS J8).

| | Service-Sponsored (\$M) | | | Joint (\$M) | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|
| | FY 01 | FY 02 | FY 03 | FY 01 | FY 02 | FY 03 |
| Major Exercise Costs | 433.3 | 450.4 | 462.7 | 567.8 | 568.0 | 608.8 |

For training, we've found it's too hard to cull out the relevant information without applying a significant effort due to the way the services have the data coded. The ability to capture dollars spent on the various types of training may provide a useful "Jointness" metric. However, building on my Navy experience, a change in the mindset of our component commanders in building their exercise and training plans may be a useful method of approaching the problem. Service force providers typically meet service training requirements first, using remaining assets to populate Joint exercises. A better construct may be to reverse this priority – meeting Joint training requirements first. Services would then look for ways to meet some portion of their unit level training requirements, where feasible, in the context of Joint exercises. Remaining training assets could then be placed against whatever additional service-centric training is considered necessary. General Larry Ellis, the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces Command and my Army Component Commander, has given just such intent to his exercise planners. I plan on exploring this initiative with my other component commanders. While I'm not sure it will work across the board, I think it's a path to explore.

- B. Command and Control Suites. To no one's surprise, combatant commanders have developed distinctively different command and control suites or stand-alone capabilities because of the lack of any joint system of meeting their needs – something we recognize is a priority to fix. I agree that command and control suites should be treated as weapons systems and battle staffs need to be trained on them. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) initiative -- with concurrently developed personnel, procedures, and materiel -- will provide the

core solution. A prototype has been stood up, and we are moving out on developing the SJFHQ. The Deployable Joint Command And Control (DJC2) system will provide a significant part of the sustained material and technical solution. Funding is approved for DJC2 and its program office will open in January 03. The Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System developed by the JFCOM Joint Battle Center demonstrated an interoperable and robust, end-to-end command and control system easily integrated yet adaptable to commander's unique requirements. The Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System shows what we can do today with innovation and technology - this is the sort of thing that we need. Right now it is being tailored for use by General Franks and his staff and used on his recent flight to the theater. We will transition this capability to the other combatant commanders this year, as well as put it in the SJFHQ and at the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) in Tampa, FL -- your on-call JTF commander's command and control provider. Additionally, LTG McNeill is using the training and procedures he received in preparation for Millennium Challenge for Joint Task Force 180's current mission in Afghanistan. I expect we will be able to provide all future JTF commanders with these capabilities prior to deployment, in addition to providing the requisite training.

November 23, 2002 3:21 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photos of Traveling Press

When you give me the pictures of the press, please don't use a separate page for each person. It is helpful to have all the faces on one piece of paper, which we finally got done.

Thanks.

Attach.
Traveling Press

DHR:dh
112302.10

.....
Please respond by


12 | 6 | 02

000.71

23 Nov 02

U10418w/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9299



Matt Kelley
AP



Nick Childs
BBC



Brian Hartman
ABC Pool Producer



Ann Scott-Tyson
Christian Science Monitor



Charlie Aldinger
Reuters



Jean Michel Stoullig
AFP



Jim Garamone
AFIS



Jamie McIntyre
CNN - CHILE



David Ensor
CNN - NATO



Michael Tackett
Chicago Tribune



Wayne Boyd
ABC Camera



Tom Squitieri
114-0559/OSD/9300

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 23, 2002 3:18 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Plan

I just took a look at this "National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism." I had not seen it before.

What is it about? Do we agree with it? Was Policy involved?

Thanks.

Attach

October 2002 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism

DHR db
1123029.....
Please respond by12/20/02


U10419w/03

OPTIONAL: RECLASSIFICATION OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DATE: 05/01/2003 BY: 11-L-0559/OSD/9301~~TOP SECRET~~
11-L-0559/OSD/9301

000.5

23 Nov 02

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION



OFFICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20541

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20541

RE: [REDACTED]

DATE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

November 25, 2002 6:30 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Air Force Job Cuts & Sen. Voinovich

Here is an article about Senator Voinovich. You might want to talk to him. I thought you were working closely with him. I cannot imagine why he is fussing at us.

Thanks.

Attach.

Gaffney, Timothy R. "Air Force Job Cuts Surprise Senator," *Dayton Daily News*, November 20, 2002.

DHR:dh
112502-1

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

020 AF

25 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9303

U1042011/03

subscale versions of the system.

Another option, which received massive attention in the mainstream press last year, is the FB-22, a Lockheed Martin concept to enlarge the aircraft, adding to its range and payload capacity.

"As things emerge, you see what would be the payoff for something that has longer range, but doesn't have to defend itself quite so well," Jumper said when asked whether the FB-22's could fill all or part of that gap.

The FB-22, unlike the UCAV, is a paper airplane; no test vehicles exist. However, Lockheed Martin officials say it would be about 80 percent common to the F/A-22, which the Air Force is procuring and testing.

In the meantime, a "red team" of experts is investigating a recent revelation that the F/A-22 test program may be as much as \$690 million over budget. The service announced the possible overrun in engineering, manufacturing and development Nov. 7.

Jumper told ITAF the cost problems are not related to the production of the aircraft, which is constrained by OSD's cost cap, but they appear to be associated with delays in the test program.

"It is getting test airplanes off the production line, getting them outfitted appropriately for the test business and then getting them out to Edwards [Air Force Base, CA.] and then getting them on this test treadmill to burn down these points," the general said.

Lockheed Martin spokesman Greg Caires said the issue of delayed deliveries "doesn't sound like an epidemic," adding that he feels the company will deliver the final three jets on time as expected in calendar year 2002.

In 2001, aircraft Nos. 5 and 6 were delivered late to the Air Force by a "month or so," he added.

Delays in testing could force the service to extend the

initial operational test and evaluation phase of the effort further. Already, service officials have said testing will finish at least four months later than its earlier April 2003 date.

"We have said all along that our development is event based. We are not going to proceed to the next event until we are thoroughly convinced ... the testing in the current phase is done well and thoroughly," Jumper said. "Every phase depends on the success of the previous phase. If that means stretching it out, then we've agreed to that."

"That doesn't mean I am happy with it," the chief of staff added.

Defense acquisition chief Pete Aldridge suggested in a briefing for reporters this week that the overrun could be reconciled by further trimming the number of F/A-22s bought by the service.

"One way to pay for it is to cut the numbers of F/A-22s, and we may have to do that," Aldridge told reporters Nov. 20. Aldridge added that the Pentagon's Cost Analysis Improvement Group, whose cost figures usually run higher than the service's, did not predict the potential shortfall.

The potential problem was revealed in time to make necessary adjustments to the FY-04 through FY-09 budget, which is now under review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and will be submitted to Congress next February.

Yet, if the magnitude of the overrun is as high, or even higher, than \$690 million in the coming years, the service is likely to have problems swallowing the bill, according to military sources.

Jumper said he replaced the test leadership of the F/A-22 test effort. Maj. Gen. Wilbert "Doug" Pearson assumed command of the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards in July 2001, and Jumper said test sortie generation has doubled under his leadership.

The Air Force's program

executive officer for fighters and bombers since 2001, Brig. Gen. William Jabour, was replaced with Brig. Gen. Richard Lewis, director of the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization on the Joint Staff. Jabour was the F-22 System Program Office director prior to his assignment as REO. Brig. Gen. Mark Shackelford, the most recent SPO director, was also replaced with Brig. Gen. Thomas Owen. Similarly, Lockheed Martin assigned Ralph Heath, a company strategist, to replace Robert Reardon as the executive vice president and general manager for the F/A-22.

John Ogg, a member of the senior executive service and the lead engineer at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, is leading the investigation into the F-22 cost problems. His report is expected at the end of the month, and Aldridge will review the cost problems during a Dec. 5 Defense Acquisition Board meeting.

--Amy Butler

Dayton Daily News
November 20, 2002

17. Air Force Job Cuts Surprise Senator

Voinovich concerned about lack of information
By Timothy R. Gaffney,
Dayton Daily News

U.S. Sen. George Voinovich on Tuesday asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to explain the Air Force's unexpected plans to eliminate hundreds of civilian jobs in all major commands, including one that employs thousands of civilians at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

In a strongly worded letter, Voinovich, R-Ohio, said he was concerned about a possible disproportionate impact on Wright-Patterson, home of the Air Force Materiel Command, and its effect on his efforts to reshape the Defense Department's civilian work force "to meet the demands and expectations of future national security

threats."

Voinovich also expressed concern "with the general lack of information available to myself and other members of the Ohio congressional delegation."

"After receiving word that the impending cuts would in fact take place, my office contacted the Air Force to receive information about the scope of the cuts and the reason for them. None was available," Voinovich wrote.

His office released a copy of the letter late Tuesday afternoon to the Dayton Daily News. The newspaper last week reported the Air Force was planning to eliminate more than 700 civilian jobs within AFMC and an unknown additional number across the Air Force.

Base officials said the reductions stem "from significant unexpected budget cuts" that run through 2009.

At virtually the same time Voinovich's letter went out, Air Force headquarters issued a written response to questions the Daily News asked last week about the manpower reductions.

The Air Force said it's eliminating jobs as part of an effort to "increase competitive sourcing and privatization, reduce management headquarters, and maintain (2002) end strength levels."

It also said the Air Force is "reviewing ways to transform our operations and processes to free up end strength and dollars for higher mission priorities."

Other lawmakers have been pressing the Air Force for answers as well.

Saxbe Chambliss, R-Georgia, is "very concerned about the Air Force making reductions in force, especially when there are so many critical operations around the world," said Angie Lundbergh, Chambliss' press aide in Washington.

Chambliss is a member of the House Armed Services Committee, and his district includes the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, an AFMC unit whose director said it has

November 25, 2002 6:56 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Major Programs

I think you are going to have to engage the rest of the Department of Defense, besides the Services, on the major programs.

I am concerned, I have been asking since June, and I don't have anything on the agencies or the big personnel issues. Someone has to grab hold of it, so when we start totaling things up and looking at reserves, we are not fooling ourselves. You cannot do that until you have the entire Department.

I am worried about the way you are thinking about it at the present time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112502-6

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9305

U10421 / 03

100.54

25 Nov 02

11/26
1100
snowflake

November 25, 2002 10:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: James Mead

020 SD

James Mead stopped me and said we went to college together. Apparently he wrote me, and I wrote back with my autopen, "Dear Mr. Mead." He would like me to send him the same letter again, but addressed, "Dear Jim," because he would like it for his grandchildren.

Could you please find his original letter if possible, otherwise I will just dictate a note to him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business Card

DIIR dh
112502-20

..... 12/10

Please respond by 12/13/02

*SecDef -
His original letter
is attached - he
sent it in.*

*Also, I'll note that
this appears to be
signed by the real
thing, not the machine.
D. Rita*

25 Nov 02

U10423W/03
11-L-0559/OSD/9306

Larry Di Rita

12/10



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

AUG 20 2002

Mr. James Mathews Mead
Attorney at Law
2455 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007

Dear Mr. Mead,

Thanks so much for your card and note.

As fate would have it our mutual friends, (b)(6)
(b)(6), were all here at my
house on Kalorama last month, as the class of '54
celebrated our 70th birthdays. Unfortunately, Bill Ellis
passed away some years back.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/9307

JAMES MATHEWS MEAD
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2455 P STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC, 20007

(b)(6)

MEMBER
DC, FL AND PA BARS

November 25, 2002

The Honorable
Donald H. Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary,

It was indeed a pleasure exchanging a few words with you and being introduced to Joyce at Christ Church yesterday.

As I mentioned, if the name Jim would be written over Mr. Mead in the salutation of your letter of August 20, 2002, it very much would be appreciated. And my grandchildren would be thrilled.

The greatest thing about being the bicker chairman at Cap during the winters of 1950 and 1951 was getting to know four of the greatest guys on the Princeton campus: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Could anyone find nicer people? And their coming to Cap made me look good as a bicker chairman.


Also, it was in the role of bicker chairman that I picked up the nickname, as Jim Baker would recall, "The Black Pope."

(b)(6) a senior partner at Goldman in London, and who was on three national championship teams at Harvard, just called. When I told him I was writing to you, he said; "Please tell The Secretary that I would very much like to have him as my guest for a squash or tennis match, or both, at the Queens Club in London."

Mr. Secretary, I feel a bit guilty bothering you with such a pica-yune request. But as I said, it would be great for my grandchildren.

My best wishes to Joyce and to you and to your children.

Respectfully,



PS: As to the current issue of People Magazine, my wife (b)(6) and my two daughters registered their votes for you 18 months ago.

11-L-0559/OSD/9308

J.M.


JAMES MATHEWS MEAD
ATTORNEY AT LAW

2455 P STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/9309

November 25, 2002 10:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Scorecard of Support for Afghanistan

I need someone to get me a scorecard as to what countries have promised and what countries have done for Afghanistan—not just the Afghan National Army, but Afghanistan in general.

I also note that Russia is not mentioned on this paper, so apparently it is incomplete.

Please see if Dov or someone will pull together a decent scorecard, then let me see it and we will figure out how we go after countries.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/18/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Support for the Afghan National Army (ANA)
[U18432/02]

DHR:dh
112502-23

.....
Please respond by 12 / 20 / 02

Afghanistan

25 Nov 02

U10424w/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9310

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 25, 2002 8:17 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Money to ANA

Let's get a list of all the money like this \$50 million referred to here that is going to go into the Afghan National Army, whether it is in dollars or in kind. We need to keep a tally.

Thanks.

Attach.

Cable 02 2759093, TOR 231411Z OCT 02, ABU DHAB 05771

DHR:dh
102502-5Please respond by 11/08/02

*Get Sloan card
Phone
R/18*

*Larm -
Get AN Answer
DR*

*11/21
Attached
BHK*

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
THIS TEXT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9311

1/1/19
0800



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

277 NOV 13 AM 9:53



November 18, 2002, 9:00 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 25 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Support for the Afghan National Army (ANA)

- You asked for a summary of the support provided to the Afghan National Army (ANA) to date by the U.S. and international community.
- To date, the United States and the international community have delivered \$93.965 million in support to the ANA.
- The United States has contributed \$84.08 million in support for the ANA. The U.S. contribution accounts for 89.4 percent of all support delivered to the ANA to date. Tab A provides the details of U.S. support.
- The international community has provided \$1.56 million in cash donations to the ANA. Tab B provides the details of this support.
- The international community has provided \$8.325 million in In-Kind assistance to the ANA. Tab C provides the details of this support.
- The international community has pledged an additional \$98.35 million in cash/In-Kind assistance to the ANA, but has not yet delivered the cash/items. Once this support is delivered, the ANA will have received approximately \$192.315 million in support. Tab D provides a summary of these pledges.
- Taking into account donations and pledges, there is a \$350 million shortfall in FY03 funding for the ANA. State, Policy, and my office are working together to close this gap.

COORDINATION: Tab E.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Josh Boehm, (b)(6)

| | |
|-----------------------|-------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 1/23 |
| SR MA CRADDOCK | 11/23 |
| MA BUCCI | |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 11/16 |

11-L-0559/OSD/9312

U18432 /02

We are focusing on
UAE (\$50m) and Qatar

TAB A – U.S. Government Funding (\$84.08 million)

- \$50.00 million of FY 2002 supplemental Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds.
- \$20.00 million of FY 2002 supplemental Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds.
- \$7.00 million of FY 2002 reprogrammed FMF funds.
- \$1.78 million of FY 2002 reprogrammed PKO funds.
- \$3.80 million to “Quick Start” ANA training. This includes:
 - \$2.00 million of Presidential Drawdown authority.
 - \$0.85 million of CINC Initiative Funds.
 - \$0.95 million of Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (EEE) authority funds
- \$1.50 million of EEE authority for a Ministry of Defense contractor assessment study.

TAB B - International Cash Donations (\$1.56 million)

| COUNTRY | AMOUNT (\$) | TYPE OF SUPPORT |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| France | \$0.56 million | ANA salaries |
| Qatar | \$0.05 million | ANA salaries |
| Luxembourg | \$0.90 million | ANA Trust Fund Deposit |
| Finland | \$0.05 million | ANA Trust Fund Deposit |

TAB C - In-Kind Contributions Delivered (valued at \$8.325 million)

| COUNTRY | AMOUNT (\$) | TYPE OF SUPPORT |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| France | \$3.0 million | ANA Training |
| Slovenia | \$1.68 million | Weapons/Equipment |
| Ukraine | \$1.13 million | Weapons/Ammunition |
| Bulgaria | \$0.65 million | Weapons/Ammunition |
| Romania | \$0.485 million | Weapons/Ammunition |
| Greece | \$0.60 million | Air Lift/Equipment |
| Korea | \$0.30 million | Medical Support |
| Denmark | \$0.30 million | Air Lift |
| Italy | \$0.15 million | Equipment |
| Switzerland | \$0.03 million | Equipment |

TAB D - Assistance In Kind Pledged but not Delivered (\$98.315 million)

| COUNTRY | AMOUNT (\$) | TYPE OF SUPPORT |
|----------------------|--------------------|---|
| United Arab Emirates | \$50.00 million | Vehicles/Communications Gear |
| United Kingdom | \$17.50 million | Salaries/Communications Gear/ Afghan MoD Support |
| India | \$10.50 million | Vehicles/Driver Training |
| Hungary | \$7.33 million | Weapons/Ammunition |
| Lithuania | \$5.12 million | Weapons/Ammunition |
| Croatia | \$3.18 million | Ammunition |
| Korea | \$2.00 million | Communications Gear |
| The Netherlands | \$2.00 million | ANA Salaries |
| Albania | \$0.53 million | Weapons/Ammunition |
| Germany | \$0.19 million | Vehicles |

COORDINATION

| | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| USDP/SOLIC | Dr. Joseph Collins | November 14, 2002 |
| USCENTCOM (J-5) | COL (P) Joseph Orr | November 13, 2002 |
| JCS (J-5) | LTC Pat Antonietti | November 13, 2002 |

Snowflake

October 25, 2002 8:17 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Money to ANA

Let's get a list of all the money like this \$50 million referred to here that is going to go into the Afghan National Army, whether it is in dollars or in kind. We need to keep a tally.

Thanks.

Attach.

Cable 02 2759093, TOR 231411Z OCT 02, ABU DHAB 05771

DHR:dh
102502-5

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02 11/15/02 per Cat. 2011

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

11-L-0559/OSD/9318

November 25, 2002 11:45 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Reza Pahlavi

If Reza Pahlavi, the son of the Shah of Iran, is around Washington sometime, I would like to have him in to the office and talk to him.

Please arrange it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112502-27

.....

Please respond by 12/20/02

IRAN

25 Nov 02

12:45 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Cc: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 26, 2002

SUBJECT: **File Review**

I need to see Doug Feith on his file.

In the meantime, jab him on what are we doing about the Russian detainees at GITMO. I need to know today.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112602.02

Please respond by: _____

11/27/02

Russia

26 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9320

U10426-1/03

November 26, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DARPA

Please get me a representative list of the things DARPA does, so I can use it in an answer on the work Poindexter is doing.

Thanks.

Attach.

Davis, Bob. "War on Terrorism Provokes Massive Federal R&D Move," *Wall Street Journal*, November 25, 2002.

DHR:dh
112602-5

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

020 DARPA

26 Nov 02

establishment. The Bush White House proposed to more than double counterterrorism funding to \$2.9 billion, with more than half the money going to the NIH. Congress hasn't finished work on appropriations, but it is likely to approve an amount of that size. The additional money will be used to develop vaccines effective against a broad range of biological agents and also to construct secure laboratories. The new Homeland Security Department will have an agency with a budget of \$200 million specifically devoted to researching new technologies, but it isn't expected to get any funds until fiscal 2004.

The Pentagon is boosting its biological-warfare effort, including a program to look for anthrax remedies. It is also focusing on information technologies, long an expertise of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which funded initial research into the Internet and high-speed computing. The agency got a 21% boost in funding to \$2.7 billion, and set up the Information Awareness Office under the direction of former Reagan National Security Adviser John Poindexter, who was at the center of the Iran-Contra scandal.

Decoding Challenge

Info DARP & what else

Apart from developing a computer system to search through massive databases for patterns of behavior that might signal terrorist activities -- for instance, purchasing large amounts of chemicals -- the office wants to improve software to transcribe and decipher foreign-language messages. "The scary thing about Poindexter is what kind of data he gets his hands on," says Henry Kelly, president of the Federation of American Scientists. "But searching for unusual patterns you can't anticipate is one of the more interesting challenges" in computing.

Unlike the 1990s, when government research was explicitly designed to boost commercial industries, the post-Sept. 11 focus is on filling government needs to protect soldiers from biological attack, reinforce buildings and search for terrorists. But the more limited focus may yet produce more commercial spinoffs. In the past, the government tried to anticipate the needs of industry, and often was mistaken. Now, the government's needs for improved security are similar to industry's needs -- and both need new technologies to accomplish their goals.

"Everybody expects to see some payoff," says Jack Marburger, President Bush's science adviser. "Enhancements in the instrumentation [needed] to discover new things give you totally different technologies." And those technologies ultimately can become the bases of new industries.

<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2002/e20021125137888.html>

[RETURN TO TOP](#)

Baltimore Sun
November 23, 2002

Military Research Explores Various Nonlethal Weapons

Technologies are meant to incapacitate opponent

By Associated Press

QUANTICO, Va. - The military is studying microwave and laser weapons as technologies to take the fight out of combatants without killing them, officials said yesterday.

Snowflake

November 26, 2002 7:50 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Iceland

Please get back to me on the Iceland matter.

Is January good enough, as Colin has proposed, or is December necessary? I just don't know enough about it. Please ask J.D. Crouch.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112602-9

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

Iceland

26 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9323

U10428w/03

November 26, 2002 7:53 AM

TO: VADM Jacoby
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Former Yugoslav Republics

Iraq

Is DIA the outfit that ought to be checking into the Former Yugoslav republics' work in Iraq on the deep underground facilities?

Thanks.

DHR:db
112602-10

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

26 Nov 02

November 26, 2002 7:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DCI's Meeting at CENTCOM

George Tenet said he and I have to talk about his meeting at CENTCOM. Please get it set up for today or tomorrow.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112602-11

.....
Please respond by 11/27/02

*Scheduled already -
Wed. 10 am - 11
11/27 SVTC w/ Tenet
Fanks, etc*

*SVTC cancelled
will have to schedule
next week*

000.71 SD

26 Nov 02

Snowflake

November 26, 2002 8:13 AM

Nato 337

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: NATO

Whoever in your outfit came up with the NATO response force deserves a lot of credit. It made a big difference at the Summit.

You also already know, I am sure, what a wonderful job Lisa Bronson did on the chem-bio effort.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112602-15

.....

Please respond by _____

26 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9326

U10431w/03

9:07 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: **SecDef Gifts**

Here's a bunch of checks that I have used to pay for gifts received, that have not been cashed. I think what we ought to do is talk to the ethics people to see if I just make those checks payable to some charity after a year or two. Maybe that will work.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.11

Attach: Checks not cashed ledger

Please respond by: _____

12/2/02

005

27 Nov 02

U10432w/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9327

November 25, 2002 10:16 AM

TO: Arlene

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Things Paid for

Please make sure on the list of things I have paid for in terms of gifts that we have that money I paid to sit in the box at the Redskins game for ten minutes. It was \$400 or \$500, as I recall.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112502-22

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

Sir -

Yes - that item is on NP's list of gifts paid for - the check was actually \$700.00
Please note: that check, and others, remains uncashed - I have attached a list of reimbursed gifts that you wrote a check for, but remains unpaid (uncashed).
v/r,

Arlene

11-L-0559/OSD/9328

Checks not cashed - as of 9/30/02 bank statement

| <u>Ck #</u> | <u>Date</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Payee</u> | <u>Comment</u> |
|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| 3486 | 5/22/2001 | \$30.00 | General Wesley K. Clark | Reimbursement for book <u>Waging Modern War</u> |
| 3956 | 11/20/2001 | \$30.00 | Michael Beschloss | Reimbursement for book <u>Reaching for Glory</u> |
| 3963 | 12/11/2001 | \$24.99 | Richard C. Levy & Assoc. | Reimbursement for "Spirit of America" trivia game |
| 3973 | 12/28/2001 | \$25.00 | Coca Cola | Reimbursement for commemorative pins |
| 3974 | 12/27/2001 | \$25.00 | Michael F. Cox | Reimbursement for Pentagon paperweight |
| 3978 | 1/16/2002 | \$180.00 | Samuel Aaron Int'l Jewelers | Reimbursement for flag pin |
| 3979 | 1/22/2002 | \$700.00 | Daniel Snyder | Reimbursement for skybox seats |
| 4085 | 4/22/2002 | \$55.80 | Torie Clarke | Reimbursement for films |
| 4094 | 5/20/2002 | \$40.00 | Max Boot | Reimbursement for book <u>The Savage Wars of Peace</u> |
| 4103 | 6/20/2002 | \$763.00 | U.S. Treasury | Payment for gifts received |
| 4120 | 7/31/2002 | \$1,279.06 | Dr. Richard L. Burton | Payment for hand surgery expenses |

8:53 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: November 27, 2002
 SUBJECT:

110.01

Please make sure that you achieve what you said about making sure that the budget baseline is what we decide, rather than what the services decided the year before.

Tell me what I have to do to help.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 112702.10

Please respond by:

11/30

27 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9330

U10433/03

7:54 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: **Video**

The tape you gave me on the Foreign Press Club remarks was only about one-third of it. Something was broken, the tape or something.

Could I have a fresh one?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.06

Please respond by: _____

11/27

060 SD

27 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9331

U10434w/03

9:12 AM

ADDED TO
#333

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: Briefing POTUS

I think we need to brief the president next week after Thanksgiving on 2+10. It is past time. Let's get it done.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.12

Please respond by: _____

12/2/02

337
WJH

27-Nov-02

U1043510/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9332

November 12, 2002 3:46 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POTUS Brief

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

I met with the President this morning. He said he would like to get briefed on where we stand on the 2-plus-6.

Please get me a briefing so I can see if it is ready for the President.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111202-68

.....
Please respond by

11/15/02

U04337-03

11-L-0559/OSD/9333

Snowflake

9:36 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: **Ivanov Phone Call**

*Advance
copy sent*

Russia

Let me know when we know what the topic of Ivanov's call is on Monday,
December 2nd.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.16

Please respond by: _____

11/27/02

27 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9334

U10436 / 03

Snowflake

June 25, 2002 10:00 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Training Afghan Army

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich—it has a lot of appeal. It seems to me that maybe we ought to put a major press on in Afghanistan and really train up the Army fast, get other countries to help, get some money behind it and put a major push in.

Please have Tom Franks look at it also and get back to me in the next week with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

06/02/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Training Afghans

DHR:dh
062502-29

.....
Please respond by 07/02/02

Afghanistan

05 Jun 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9335

010437 /02

Copy sent to Dr Wolfowitz

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, June 02, 2002 2:17 PM

JUN 25 2002

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Cc: john.keane@hqda.army.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: training afghans

for secdef,depsecdef
from Newt June 2,2002
training afghans

I do not understand the current force development program for Karzai's government. We are currently training too few troops with too long a timetable.

I assume we want Karzai to be able to control the major cities and the transportation corridors while recognizing that in the next few years it will be impossible to control the whole country. Essentially Afghanistan will be a confederation with a limited urban central government and substantial residual power in rural areas. In this sense Afghanistan has many of the patterns of emerging modern governments in the 17th century. The capital has to be the strongest center of power in the country but it cannot actually extend its reach everywhere.

Over time modernization, the world economy, and the spread of communications (cell phones in this sense are subversive of local warlords) will draw more and more Afghans into the modern world and away from local allegiances but that process will take a decade or more even if there is a stable central government and safe corridors of transportation (the sine qua non of the system working).

The key to Karzai's ability to establish the safety which must underpin any government and any economic development is to have a reliable, paid force that is trained and equipped adequately to defeat any direct challenge from warlords. The goal should be to define the cities and corridors to be held and the maximum forces that could be brought to bear against Karzai's central army.

The army should be designed from day one as an Afghan national Army with commitment to a central government and not as a new form of warlordism. The United States should provide money for the troops salaries, training, and airpower and intelligence assets to ensure this force would win any direct engagement.

We apparently are capable of training 600 men at a time but have chosen to train only five units in phase one. That would give Karzai only 3000 regulars. That is far too small an army.

We should start with the number needed (probably 30,000 to 50,000) and then train the appropriate number of battalions as rapidly as possible. Our goal should be to

6/3/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9336

have a fully trained Afghan army in the field within two years so Karzai would clearly head the dominant force in Afghanistan. Operations above company level probably require American advisers for a long time. We should consider hiring retired army and marine officers and non coms through organizations like General Vuono's company (which trained the Croatians with decisive effect) and actually place in the field enough retirees to help the Afghan system function for its first five years. They could extend the pool of professionals to include British and Turkish retired officers and non coms and similar competent militaries.

An Afghan Army with American training, equipment, intelligence assets and airpower backing could almost certainly defeat any of the warlords who decided to contest Kabul's power in a regular military fight. The key would be to restrict the ambitions of the central government for the first decade so its control of the major cities, the transportation corridors and therefore the most important parts of the economy would be adequate. There are no circumstances where we could field enough forces to control all of rural Afghanistan even through proxies.

We are currently doing too much not to be involved and too little to ensure victory. We need to budget funds and retired personell to ramp up to a 30,000 to 50,000 man force as soon as possible.

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (JUN.26.2002 10:00PM) * * *

TTI

| DATE | TIME | ADDRESS | MODE | TIME | PAGE | RESULT | PERS. NAME | FILE |
|---------|--------|------------|------|-------|------|--------|------------|------|
| JUN.26. | 9:57PM | COMPATIBLE | G-TS | 2'53" | P. 4 | OK | | 033 |

* : BATCH
M : MEMORY
S : STANDARD
A-: ASYNC MODE


C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
1-: MIL STD MODE

\$: TRANSFER
@ : FORWARDING
F : FINE
G-: RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
> : REDUCTION

11-L-0559/OSD/9338

9:39 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: **POTUS Bill Signing on 12/2/02**

If I need to say anything at the DoD authorization bill signing here on Monday,
please get me some remarks by Friday.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.17

Please respond by: _____

11/28

335 WH

27 Nov 02

9:41 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: November 27, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Staff Meeting**

337

I will need some notes for the staff meeting on Tuesday, December 3rd. One of the topics might be the ethics briefing, and suggesting we have Steve Epstein brief them and their immediate staff after doing a review.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 112702.19

Please respond by: _____

12 | 1

27 Nov 02

9:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: **MoD Spain**

Spain

I think I need to do more than that with the Minister of Defense of Spain. He's very supportive. I think I should have lunch for him or something.

Is he having a reception on the night of the 2nd or the 3rd. That's a country that's been helpful to us, and we want to be helpful to them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.20

Please respond by: _____

*11/27**27 Nov 02*

11-L-0559/OSD/9341

U10439th/03

9:56 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: **Franks SVTC**

Someone tell me the topic of this SVTC with Franks on December 4th.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.21

Please respond by: _____

11/27

0605D

27 Nov 02

10:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 27, 2002

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

I want to make sure I have dinner with Franks on Wednesday or Thursday if he's free and I'm free. Also, I need to have time with him when he's in here next week. Don't let him get booked or me get booked without me getting engaged in it closely.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.26

Please respond by: _____

000.71 SD

27 Nov 02

9:57 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: **Calendar**

Please get Torie to explain to me what that interview is at 11:00am on December 4th with Hyatt.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.22

Please respond by: _____

11/27


000.71 SD

27 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9344

U104424/03

10:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: **Calendar**

I think I will probably not make it to the Jumper house on December 5th, and I will probably have to stay at the reception a little longer.

Thanks.


DHR/azn
112702.24

Please respond by: 11/27

020 SD

27 Nov 02

9:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: November 27, 2002
SUBJECT: PC

Before anyone accepts anything for me at a PC meeting, or a luncheon at the White House, I need to know the topic, the event and then I need to decide whether I want to send Paul. I have got to get some work done in December.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112702.23

Please respond by: _____

11/27

339 NSC

27 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9346

U1044411/03

→ PLS FAX to COL DAVIS

11/2

2:00 PM

1730
1212

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
DATE: November 29, 2002



SUBJECT:

Make sure you fill Doug Feith in on what I told you about Burundi planning. The White House is going to try to push it. We ought to be doing some planning but we ought to be doing it the way I described it to you.

Thanks.

DIR/azn
112902 02

Please respond by:

12/5

Burundi

29 Nov 02

9:41 AM

2/20

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 29, 2002

SUBJECT: Reference CTC 2002-40118 - 11/18/02

Let's file 2/19

How are we going to get the money needed to help the Pakistanis end the Madrasas schools?

We need a major effort if it is to be accomplished. We could attach some strings.

Please give me a *recommendation*.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112902.9

Please respond by:

12/10

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 29 2003

Barth Henry

USG funding in FY02 for Madrassah reform was \$34M with \$13.7M from DoD. DoD funded wireless internet access and satellite radio receivers to connect Pakistani schools; and to distribute educational content developed by State, USAID, and the Pakistani Ministry of Education. FY02 funds are sufficient to complete our program for Pakistan. DoD has \$16.8 in the FY-03 supplemental, now under review by OMB, which may allow expansion of this program to other countries.

U1044614/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9348

29 NOV 02

3/20

~~TOP SECRET~~

2:00 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

On this CIA paper on the possibility of an invasion of Baghdad, I would think IO ought to let it be known that if that happens, people who do that are going to be considered war criminals for putting civilians at risk.

long

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112902.10

Attach: TS NESA IA 2002-20176CH - 11/22/02

Please respond by: _____

12/15~~TOP SECRET~~*When Accompanied By
Attachment*

11-L-0559/OSD/9349

U10447w/03 *020106E*

2:43 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

CC: Jim Roche
Pete Aldridge
Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone
Peter Teets
L. D. Rite

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld JR

DATE: November 30, 2002

SUBJECT: **National Security Space and Satellite Program**

Attached is a memorandum received from William Schneider on the subject of the national security space and satellite program.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
113002.06

Attach: Memo dated 11/27/02 From Dr. William Schneider, Jr.

11-L-0559/OSD/9350

U10448w/03

471.96

3600002



William Schneider, Jr.

MEMORANDUM

November 27, 2002

TO: Hon. Don Rumsfeld

FROM: William Schneider, Jr.

SUBJECT: Systemic problems in the management and financing of the national security space and satellite programs.

This memorandum is a follow-up to my discussion with Steve Cambone earlier this week. Tom Young (Chairman of the DSB's task force reviewing the national security satellite programs) and I met with Steve to discuss the findings of the DSB panel. Steve thought it would be constructive for me to summarize some of my concerns.

1. Present funding dilemma: The core of the administration's transformation aspirations are embedded in the implementation of fundamental changes in the C4ISR system. The most enduring contribution to transformation will be made in future systems, not the legacy systems. Nevertheless, the cost of funding the legacy systems (e.g. FIA) compromises the ability to fund the transformational systems.

2. Cost estimation methodology: A flawed system to estimate costs in the national security satellite programs has grossly underestimated the ultimate cost of completing these programs. Costs are currently estimated at the 50% probability level, i.e. the probability that the final cost of the system will be at the estimated price is 50%. There is a statistical flaw in this assumption (the underlying distribution is skewed; the data are not normally distributed). Experience over a large number of systems indicates that these systems must be priced at the 80% probability level to incorporate an adequate reserve to complete the project. Thus, in the case of FIA, if it is properly budgeted at the 80% level, the final cost will be 47% higher than is currently being budgeted to "fix FIA." Similarly, almost all of the major national security space related programs that were addressed by the study are under funded. Unless OSD funds these increases from non-C4ISR accounts or finds additional sources of "new money," the administration's transformational programs will be the source of funding for legacy systems.

3. An approach to resolution of the dilemma: The DSB panel recommends that systems should be funded consistent with criticality. The most contentious legacy system - FIA - needs to be addressed with a view toward a lower-cost interim solution to mitigate the risk of gaps in coverage, while protecting the investment in transformational C4ISR systems. In the longer term, apart from "fixing" the systemic problems identified in the DSB report, the C4ISR implications of non-C4ISR programs needs to be recognized.

cc D. Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/9351

3:29 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

copy given to
Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 30, 2002

SUBJECT:

I need a one-hour meeting for the Round Table early in the first week of
December.

Thanks.

*Just Myer or Pace
P.W.
D.F.*

*Lane
John C.*

337

DHR/azn
113002.9

only

Please respond by:

12/3

30 NOV 02

10:56 AM

TO: ~~Don Dell'Orto~~ Tim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: November 30, 2002
SUBJECT:

Would you please show me what the succession line is for Secretary of Defense and what the succession line is for Chairman of the Chiefs.

I would like to look at those two and then tell me how I can change it. Can I do it or do I have to get the President to do it? Or do I have to get Congress to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
(13002 03)

Please respond by: _____

12/15

U10450W/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9353

12/15

301100007



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

December 6, 2002, 12:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Order of Succession for Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

- You asked about the lines of succession for the Secretary and the CJCS, and whether you had the authority to change the order of succession.
- Order of Succession for the Secretary.
 - By law, the Deputy Secretary of Defense is next in the line of succession to serve as the Acting Secretary.
 - By Executive Order issued consistent with the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, President Clinton designated the order of succession after the Deputy Secretary. See Executive Order 13000, April 24, 1996 (Tab A).
 - You may recommend changes to E.O. 13000.
- Order of Succession for the CJCS.
 - By law, the Vice Chairman (VCJCS) acts as CJCS until a successor CJCS is appointed.
 - By memorandum to you consistent with 10 U.S.C. § 154(e), President Bush has directed that a member of the Joint Chiefs shall serve as successor, depending upon the time of year the vacancy occurs (Tab B). Also, by memorandum to you (Tab C), the President has added the Commander of the Strategic Command to the order of succession.
 - The President could delegate his authority to designate a CJCS successor to you.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Jim Smyser (b)(6) and Helen Sullivan, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/9354

E1. ENCLOSURE 1

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13000

Title 3—

The President

Executive Order 13000 of April 24, 1996

Order of Succession of Officers To Act as Secretary of Defense

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 3347 of title 5, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Succession to Act as the Secretary of Defense. (a) In the event of the death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Secretary of Defense, the incumbents holding the Department of Defense positions designated below, in the order indicated, shall act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense as Acting Secretary of Defense:

- (1) Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- (2) Secretary of the Army.
- (3) Secretary of the Navy.
- (4) Secretary of the Air Force.
- (5) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.
- (6) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
- (7) Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
- (8) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
- (9) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.
- (10) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
- (11) Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
- (12) The Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, in the order fixed by their length of service as permanent appointees in such positions.
- (13) Under Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, in the order fixed by their length of service as permanent appointees in such positions.
- (14) Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force whose appointments are vested in the President, and General Counsels of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, in the order fixed by their length of service as permanent appointees in such positions.

(b) In the event of the temporary absence or temporary disability of the Secretary of Defense, the incumbents holding the Department of Defense positions designated in paragraph (a) of this section, in the order indicated, shall act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense as Acting Secretary of Defense.

(1) In these instances, the designation of an Acting Secretary of Defense applies only for the duration of the Secretary's absence or disability, and does not affect the authority of the Secretary to resume the powers of his office upon his return.

(2) In the event that the Secretary of Defense is temporarily absent from his position, the Secretary may continue to exercise the powers and fulfill the duties of this office during his absence, notwithstanding the provisions of this order.

(c) Precedence among those officers designated in paragraphs (a)(12)-(14) of this section who have the same appointment date shall be determined by the Secretary of Defense at the time that such appointments are made.

(d) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, an officer shall not act for or exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense under this order if that officer serves only in an acting capacity in the position that would otherwise entitle him to do so.

Sec. 2. Temporary Nature of Succession. Succession to act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense pursuant to this order shall be on a temporary or interim basis and shall not have the effect of vacating the statutory appointment held by the successor.

Sec. 3. Revocation of Prior Executive Order. Executive Order No. 12787 of December 31, 1991, is hereby revoked.

William Clinton

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 24, 1996.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 2001

2001 JUL 12 PM 2:09

OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby designate the following officers to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the circumstances described in section 154(e) of title 10, United States Code, during the period indicated in Calendar Year 2001 and in succeeding calendar years:

| | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Period of Designation: | Designated Officer: |
| January 1 to March 31 | Chief of Naval Operations |
| April 1 to June 30 | Chief of Staff, U.S. Army |
| July 1 to September 30 | Commandant of the Marine Corps |
| October 1 to December 31 | Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force |

If the member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified in this schedule is absent or disabled, or the office of that member is vacant, the next available member in the rotation will act as and perform the duties of the Chairman. Such service outside the usual time shall not alter the member's serving during his usual time in the rotation.

Pursuant to the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I further designate that, in the event that neither the Vice Chairman nor any of the above-specified members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are available to do so, one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, in the order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position, will act as and perform the duties of the Chairman. Such Vice Chief or Assistant Commandant may continue to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed, or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases, or one of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff becomes available to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman.


14-L-0559/OSD/9357

W00925 /01

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 28, 2002

11-0559-03 PM 1:35


OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

This memorandum supplements my memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, subject as above, dated July 11, 2001.

Pursuant to that memorandum and the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, in the event that none of the officers designated in the July 11 memorandum is available to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, is designated to act as and perform the duties of Chairman. The Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, will act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman is appointed, or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases, or one of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or one of the Vice Chiefs or Assistant Commandant becomes available to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman.



11-L-0559/OSD/9358

W00392 /02

10:51 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 30, 2002
SUBJECT: **Economists' Weekend**

See this invitation from George Shultz. Joyce and I did it two years ago and it was certainly interesting, educational and enjoyable.

Can you think of any reason I should be out in that part of the world during that period?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
113002.01

Attach: Memo dated 11/27/02 Re: Economists' Weekend

Please respond by: _____

12/10

501.1 SD

30 NOV 02

U10451M/03

11-L-0559/OSD/9359

MEMORANDUM
November 27, 2002

Handwritten signature and initials, possibly "RBR" and "C101".

George Shultz called me last night and invited Joyce and me to the Economists' Weekend on Friday, February 21, 2003 at Cypress Point. It starts Friday night with dinner and it ends Sunday morning.

It is with wives and it is Shultz, Walt Wriston, Milton Freedman, Gary Becker, Marty Anderson, Gehardt Caspar. I told him there was no way I could stay at his place because it is owned by Bechtel and he said I could probably stay at Cypress Point and pay. That would be what I would probably have to do.

DHR/azn
112702.03

11-L-0559/OSD/9360

2:34 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

D.R.

DATE: November 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

Shouldn't I have condemned the terrorist attack in Mombassa? We seem to not have a system to do those types of things. Let me know what you propose.

Thanks.

Kenny

DHR/azn
112902.14

Please respond by:

12/6

11-L-0559/OSD/9361

U10452^W/03

29 Nov 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 28 2002

The Honorable Tom Osborne
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2703

Dear Representative Osborne:

Thank you for your letter regarding the merger of U.S. Space Command with U.S. Strategic Command and recommending the location of this merged command at Offutt Air Force Base.

As you may know, we have announced that Offutt is indeed the preferred alternative for the site of the new command. A final decision awaits the completion of required impact and environmental assessments.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/9362

U10577 /02

322

28 Jun 02

The Honorable Tom Osborne
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2703

Dear Representative Osborne:

Thank you for your letter regarding the merger of the U.S. Space Command with the U.S. Strategic Command and recommending the location of this merged command at Offutt Air Force Base. ~~I have asked General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to address your recommendations. He will get back to you as soon as possible.~~

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Acknowledgement letter: U10391-02

☐ OK as is; finalize and SOM*

☐ Change verbiage as noted;
finalize and SOM*

☒ Use this to close action; no further reply
required; finalize and SOM*

☐ Please see me

* SOM signature as 'Donald Rumsfeld'
unless otherwise indicated.

With Fixes

4/28

As you may know, we have announced that Offutt is indeed the preferred alternative for the site of the new command. A final decision awaits the completion of required analysis and impact and environmental assessments.

10/1/02

4/28

TOM OSBORNE
3rd District, Nebraska

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
AND THE WORKFORCE
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JUN 26 AM 6:55

507 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20315

(b)(6)

DISTRICT OFFICES:

819 DAVIS AVENUE, SUITE 3
GRAND ISLAND, NE 68803

(b)(6)

21 EAST 20TH STREET
SCOTTSBLUFF, NE 69361

(b)(6)

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2703
June 25, 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Pentagon, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am writing to express my support for the proposed merger of the United States Space Command and the United States Strategic Command and the placement of that new command at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha.

I understand that a proposed merger of the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command was studied in 1993 and at the time infrastructure and technology hampered the integration of the two U.S. commands. I understand that technological advances and similar mission tasks are enabling you to reconsider the merger of the two commands.

Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado will be the new home of the Northern Command that is scheduled to begin operations on October 1, 2002. Because Peterson Air Force Base will be the headquarters for the new Northern Command, I believe that Offutt Air Force Base would be an excellent location for the new merged U.S. command and would complement the current missions at Offutt Air Force Base. U.S. Strategic Command missions are Deterrence, Intelligence, Operation and Logistics, and Command and Control. The Nuclear Posture Review also showed that the U.S. Strategic Command would be looking at a mission of non-nuclear weapon capabilities.

The U.S. Strategic Command has also been instrumental in Operation Enduring Freedom. Intelligence personnel from the U.S. Strategic Command have provided important intelligence information in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Offutt Air Force Base is also home to the Intelligence Operations Center, Weather Support Center, Force Status Readiness Center and other support offices. The U.S. Strategic Command headquarters is also the home to 1,300 military personnel, 400 civilians and 800 contractors.

I understand that the merger of the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command is very likely. I encourage you to consider Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha as the permanent home of the new merged command.

I appreciate you taking this request into consideration.

Best Wishes,

TOM OSBORNE
Member of Congress

11-L-0559/OSD/9364

U10391 / 02

June 27, 2002 8:41 AM

TO: Gen. Eberhart
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NDU

I received a note suggesting that the new Northern Command might need a place to think through and wrestle with some problems. National Defense University seems to be a logical place where that kind of activity could be located. Just a thought.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062702-8

.....
Please respond by _____

352 NDU

27 Jun 02

June 27, 2002 8:38 AM

TO: Adm. Abbott
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NDU

The Homeland Security Department may well need to think through and wrestle with some problems. It struck me that National Defense University is a logical place to provide some assistance on that. You might want to think about that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062702-7

352 NDU

27 Jun 02

June 3, 2002 12:01 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements

Please take a look at this memo from Andy Marshall on acquisition and cross-servicing agreements. I think he has a good point.

See if you think we are doing it right, if the agreements are written properly and if they are really appropriate for the future. Then get back to me with a report at some point.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated Marshall memo to SecDef re: Priorities for Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements and 04/08/02 SecDef memo to Marshall [040802-15]

DHR:dh
060302-24

.....

Please respond by 06/28/02

092.2

3 Jun 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9367

U10598 /02

April 8, 2002 8:12 AM

TO: Andy Marshall
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
 SUBJECT: Agreements

How should we be establishing priorities to move forward on acquisition and cross-servicing agreements with the attached countries?

Thanks.

Attach.
 Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSAs)

DHR:dh
 040802-15

.....
 Please respond by 05/03/02

UConn 31
 Conifer 5
 Pascom 9

ANDY MARSHALL RESON
 ATTACHED.

U/R
 Ed

8 Apr 02

092,2



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-8999

ACTION MEMO

2002 JUL -1 AM 10:40

CH-387-02
1 July 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 11 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RB/6/29*

SUBJECT: Military Dependents in High-Risk Areas

- Given the ongoing nature of the War on Terrorism and heightened security concerns for American personnel stationed overseas, we need to take a hard look at DOD policies allowing military dependents to be assigned in high-risk areas. Presently, dependents are living in places approved as designated combat zones, imminent danger pay locations or qualified hazardous duty areas.
- To ensure a prudent policy is being followed, the OSD-DOS review should look at the assignment policies associated with military dependents in hazardous duty locations, to include consideration for their early return if necessary. With the Department of State having a major responsibility for US citizens overseas, efforts started last year should be reenergized to develop an OSD and Department of State interagency working group to confirm we have proper safety procedures in place.

RECOMMENDATION: OSD lead a review of assignment policies associated with DOD dependents in hazardous duty locations. OSD, in conjunction with the Department of State, reenergize an interagency working group to review safety procedures for dependents located in high-risk areas.

Approve *DR* JUL 11 2002 Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria I. Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

Copy to: DR Chu (USD-P) 7/8

| | |
|-----------------------|----------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | <i>7/7</i> |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | <i>4-7/9</i> |
| MA BUCCI | <i>5-10/10</i> |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | <i>6-7/2</i> |

11-L-0559/OSD/9369

U10626 /02

292

150102

COORDINATION

Dr Chu

USD (P&R)

(b)(6)


27 Jun 02

sniffle

6/19/02

June 18, 2002 8:58 AM

200.4

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Tour Length and Time in Service

Please take a look at this article. I am really concerned that I have been here almost a year and a half, and we have not done a dadburn thing on two things that I consider exceedingly important—namely, lengthening tours and lengthening the amount of time people stay in the Service.

When is something going to happen?

Thanks.

Attach.

Loeb, Vernon. "'Up or Out' System Should Go, Army Author Writes in New Book,"
Washington Post, 06/18/02

DHR:dh
061802-9

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02

18 Jun 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9371

U10628 /02

'Up or Out' System Should Go, Army Author Writes in New Book

By VERNON LOEB
Washington Post Staff Writer

With military "transformation" dominating debate at the Pentagon, Army Maj. Donald Vandergriff argues in a new book that the key to creating the future force lies not in high-tech weaponry but in reform of an "industrial-age" personnel system that breeds careerism and robs fighting units of the cohesion they need to win wars.

Coming on the heels of the military's high-tech success in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, Vandergriff's thesis that personnel reform is the key to military transformation cuts directly against the grain, challenging the conventional wisdom espoused by Pentagon officials and many defense intellectuals that technology is the key to transformation.

An outspoken land-warfare theorist, Vandergriff seems to be just the kind of analyst Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld would want inside his newly created transformation shop, given Rumsfeld's own professed interest in personnel reform.

But Vandergriff has been passed over for promotion by the Army and is now advancing his reform agenda from Georgetown University's ROTC program, where he is an assistant professor of military science awaiting retirement.

He takes full advantage of this independence in his new book, *The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs*, and blasts away at the pillars of Army personnel management, including the "up or out" system that requires officers either to be promoted or to retire.

"Up or out" is but one manifestation of the personnel reforms instituted by Gen. George C. Marshall after World War II to ensure a constant infusion of youth and enable the Pentagon to mobilize rapidly for a possible World War III. Others include a large officer corps necessary to lead that mobilization and a rapid obsolescence to ensure those officers have the necessary skills.

But all these years later, Vandergriff argues, Marshall's system has produced a top-heavy Army with 50 percent more generals than necessary and officers obsessed with promotions that are based on pride, personnel files, not character, leadership or war-fighting capabilities.

The personnel system is not doing anything right, Vandergriff 39 told a group of congressional aides, military officers and defense analysts last week during a hearing on Capitol Hill, noting that the Army has 50,000 people transferring from one assignment to another at any given time.

He said the hype surrounding the tech-centric revolution in military affairs could ultimately spell defeat on the battlefield. Even against the Iraqis, for example, more capable, more trained U.S. troops have lost in recent conflicts.

The Army cannot wish away the real threats in the world while the mindless technological development of the sterile industrial-age personnel



Army Maj. Donald Vandergriff, who is retiring from the service, has written a new book in which he harshly critiques the Army's personnel system.

system, Vandergriff writes. "Until we prepared to face future, unwelcome threats and defeat them the only way they can be defeated by showing the right to the enemy rapidly and by being better at their way of fighting than they are."

Vandergriff once opposed to new technology in the battlefield. But after reflecting by the commanders on better trained ground units, he said, would have made the stage of World War II in eastern Afghanistan a fatal event, instead of an air operation that pushed hundreds of al Qaeda fighters out the back door and into Pakistan.


In place of the current personnel system, Vandergriff proposed policies that would emphasize unit cohesion, not individual experiences. Such policies, he said, would enable more 250 soldiers to stay together for as long as they can, in order to hone their skills, to develop combat opportunities.

Instead of "up or out," Vandergriff proposed a "down or out" system that would allow more officers the opportunity to concentrate on skills that make them good at what they're doing.

Under the proposed new Army thinking, those who choose to remain at a given rank and level will not be looked upon as failures. "The only way to lose is if they fail to perform at a level that is unacceptable in the Army chain of command,"

5/24/02

May 23, 2002 8:21 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Reduce PCS, Lengthen Tours and Time in Service

200.4

I want to reduce the number of permanent changes of station, lengthen tours and lengthen time in service. What do we do to get it done?

Please see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052302-10

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9373

110629 /02

23 MAY 02

5/14/02

May 13, 2002 10:04 AM

200.4

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Time in Position

Will the two of you please get together and tell me what I should do to get time in position increased from what appears to be somewhere between 18 to 28 months up to 26 to 36 months.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/07/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Personnel Movements and Unit Cohesion
[U07938/02]

DHR:dh
051302-21

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

13 MAY 02



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

July 11, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TESTING AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

322

SUBJECT: Designation of U.S. Strategic Command

I have determined that the name of the Command resulting from the merger of
U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command will be U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM).

(11 July 02)



R U10693-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9375



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



2002 JUL -2 14 0:49

ACTION MEMO

POLICY

~~SECRET~~ HAS BEEN

I-02/009329
June 28, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 28 2002

FROM: Stephen Cambone, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Name of the Command resulting from the Merger of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command

- You asked for my comments and recommendation on the Chairman's memo (attached at A) in which he provides alternative names for the command resulting from the merger of Strategic Command and Space Command and recommends that the name "U.S. Strategic Command"(USSTRATCOM) be used for the merged command.
- I concur with General Myers' recommendation; retaining the name "U.S. Strategic Command" has the benefit of not requiring a name change while capturing the nature and mission of the merged command. *concur*
- If you agree the attached memo at Tab B for your signature would promulgate your decision.

Recommendation: Sign memo at TAB B designating the name as U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

Attachment:
As mentioned

Prepared by: Burgess Laird (b)(6)

*7/3 -
SecDef -
Agreed. You should sign
last page if you so decide.*

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 7/3 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI | 47/8 |
| MA BUCCI | 7/18 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE | 7/2 |

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
11-L-0559/OSD/9376

U10693 /02

Action
7/8

July 1, 2002 3:02 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: STRATCOM/SPACECOM

We have to get a name for STRATCOM/SPACECOM. My instinct is to just leave it called STRATCOM.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070102-42

.....

Please respond by 070102-42

7/8

SECDEF —
all concurred
with you.
V/R
ED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000

SEC 1

2002 JUN 21 14:00:25

ACTION MEMO

CM-375-02

21 June 2002

SECRET HAS SFCR

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 6/20

SUBJECT: Naming the Command Resulting from the Merger of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM

- Attached briefing slides indicate seven potential names for the merged command considered by the Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM, USSPACECOM and the Services.
- Top three names, according to the pros and cons developed, included US Global Operations Command (USGOCOM), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and US Strategic Operations Command (USSTOCOM).
- None of the alternatives is clearly superior to the current name, U.S. Strategic Command, and there are real costs associated with changing the name.

322

RECOMMENDATION: Approve recommendation to retain the name U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), for the merged command.

Approve *RM* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG George W. Casey, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

(21 Jun 02)

I 02/009329
U10174 /02

received 6/26 0945

June 25, 2002 4:32 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: \$10 Billion

*000
61*

Please give me a piece of paper in English that I can send to Andy Card explaining what the \$10 billion is for. He obviously doesn't understand it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-75Please respond by 07/02/02

6/26.

Sir,

There are duplicates.

Tasked to P/B with

6/28 response.

U/R

Steve

25 Jun 02

June 25, 2002 2:25 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: \$10 Billion

We need a piece of paper that tells people what the \$10 billion is for.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-69

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9380

July 1, 2002 3:18 PM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: NSC 68

I just took a look at NSC 68, written by Paul Nitze. Do you think we ought to have something like this today? We clearly don't have anything like it.

381

The NSC was supposed to produce a national security strategy a year ago June, and it still hasn't done it.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.
NSC 68

DHR:dh
070102-45

1 Jul 02

U10733 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9381

June 18, 2002 8:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: NSC 68

7

Please get me a copy of NSC 68, written by Paul Nitze. Paul Wolfowitz can tell you how to get it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 061802-6

Please respond by Jun/28/02

SECRET HAS BEEN

JUL 6 2002/19

Attached

D, Rth

Larry Di Rita

92, 46/21

SFO

6/21

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security

(April 14, 1950)

*A Report to the President
Pursuant to the President's Directive
of January 31, 1950*

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Washington,] April 7, 1950

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3. Means

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Conclusions

Recommendations

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following report is submitted in response to the President's directive of January 31 which reads:

That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.

The document which recommended that such a directive be issued reads in part:

It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudices the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R.

ANALYSIS

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

II. Fundamental Purpose of the United States

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

III. Fundamental Design of the Kremlin

The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.

The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of ideas and Values between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design

A. NATURE OF CONFLICT

The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the conflict between idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.

The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only that measure of self-discipline and self-restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society.

From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.

For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their

choice.

The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For the breadth of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power--the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will--all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system--even Gandhian non-violence is not acceptable--for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive.

The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism," is a device to divide and immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.

The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.

The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.

Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.

B. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our

objectives in peace and war must take account of it.

1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength.
2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.
3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions.

All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.

There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our overall objectives. They do not include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these objectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our allies in the enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more certain.

The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) ... are fully consistent with the objectives

stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system.

C. MEANS

The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.

Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.

The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.

The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient in seeking to carry out its fundamental design. Thus it can make the best of several possible worlds, conducting the struggle on those levels where it considers it profitable and enjoying the benefits of a pseudo-peace on those levels where it is not ready for a contest. At the ideological or psychological level, in the struggle for men's minds, the conflict is worldwide. At the political and economic level, within states and in the relations between states, the struggle for power is being intensified. And at the military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful not to commit a technical breach of the peace, although using its vast forces to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an aggressive foreign policy, and not hesitating through its agents to resort to arms in favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry out its fundamental design is being pressed, therefore, with all means which are believed expedient in the present situation, and the Kremlin has inextricably engaged us in the conflict between its design and our purpose.

We have no such freedom of choice, and least of all in the use of force. Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society, but it is also an act which cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas. The idea of slavery can only be overcome by the timely and persistent demonstration of the superiority of the idea of freedom. Military victory alone would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the fundamental conflict, for although the ability of the Kremlin to threaten our security might be for a time destroyed, the resurgence of totalitarian forces and the re-establishment of the Soviet system or its equivalent would not be long delayed unless great progress were made in the fundamental conflict.

Practical and ideological considerations therefore both impel us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.

For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can flourish, and by fighting, if necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality of our free society and to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses Soviet military power to back up and serve the Kremlin design. It does not hesitate to use military force aggressively if that course is expedient in the achievement of its design. The differences between our fundamental purpose and the Kremlin design, therefore, are reflected in our respective attitudes toward and use of military force.

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.

But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the *Federalist* (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." The mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either case we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore, within the limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities

A. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

The Kremlin's design for world domination begins at home. The first concern of a despotic oligarchy is that the local base of its power and authority be secure. The massive fact of the iron curtain isolating the Soviet peoples from the outside world, the repeated political purges within the USSR and the institutionalized crimes of the MVD [the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs] are evidence that the Kremlin does not feel secure at home and that "the entire coercive force of the socialist state" is more than ever one of seeking to impose its absolute authority over "the economy, manner of life, and consciousness of people" (Vyshinski, *The Law of the Soviet State*, p. 74). Similar evidence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe leads to the conclusion that this same policy, in less advanced phases, is being applied to the Kremlin's colonial areas.

Being a totalitarian dictatorship, the Kremlin's objectives in these policies is the total subjective submission of the peoples now under its control. The concentration camp is the prototype of the society which these policies are designed to achieve, a society in which the personality of the

individual is so broken and perverted that he participates affirmatively in his own degradation.

The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its control is the elimination of resistance to its will and the extension of its influence and control. It is driven to follow this policy because it cannot, for the reasons set forth in Chapter IV, tolerate the existence of free societies; to the Kremlin the most mild and inoffensive free society is an affront, a challenge and a subversive influence. Given the nature of the Kremlin, and the evidence at hand, it seems clear that the ends toward which this policy is directed are the same as those where its control has already been established.

The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy are limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion, and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. In any event, the Kremlin's conviction of its own infallibility has made its devotion to theory so subjective that past or present pronouncements as to doctrine offer no reliable guide to future actions. The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality.

With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin's strategic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that we are not only the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between it and world domination, we are also the only power which could release forces in the free and Soviet worlds which could destroy it. The Kremlin's policy toward us is consequently animated by a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its strategy has been one of attempting to undermine the complex of forces, in this country and in the rest of the free world, on which our power is based. In this it has both adhered to doctrine and followed the sound principle of seeking maximum results with minimum risks and commitments. The present application of this strategy is a new form of expression for traditional Russian caution. However, there is no justification in Soviet theory or practice for predicting that, should the Kremlin become convinced that it could cause our downfall by one conclusive blow, it would not seek that solution.

In considering the capabilities of the Soviet world, it is of prime importance to remember that, in contrast to ours, they are being drawn upon close to the maximum possible extent. Also in contrast to us, the Soviet world can do more with less--it has a lower standard of living, its economy requires less to keep it functioning, and its military machine operates effectively with less elaborate equipment and organization.

The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full because the Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is inescapably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world-wide revolutionary movement, because it is the inheritor of Russian imperialism, and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict, and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's militancy. This dynamism serves to intensify all Soviet capabilities.

Two enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret police, are an outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In the Party, it has an apparatus designed to impose at home an ideological uniformity among its people and to act abroad as an instrument of propaganda, subversion and espionage. In its police apparatus, it has a domestic repressive instrument guaranteeing under present circumstances the continued security of the Kremlin. The demonstrated capabilities of these two basic organizations, operating openly or in disguise, in mass or through single agents, is unparalleled in history. The party, the police and the conspicuous might of the Soviet military machine together tend to create an overall impression of irresistible Soviet power among many peoples of the free world.

The ideological pretensions of the Kremlin are another great source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet system with communism, its peace campaigns and its championing of colonial peoples may be viewed with apathy, if not cynicism, by the oppressed totalitariat of the Soviet world, but in the free world these ideas find favorable responses in vulnerable segments of society. They have found a particularly receptive audience in Asia, especially as the Asiatics have been impressed by what has been plausibly portrayed to them as the rapid advance of the USSR from a backward society to a position of great world power. Thus, in its pretensions to being (a) the source of a new universal faith and (b) the model "scientific" society, the Kremlin cynically identifies itself with the genuine aspirations of large numbers of people, and places itself at the head of an international crusade with all of the benefits which derive therefrom.

Finally, there is a category of capabilities, strictly speaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should be taken into consideration. The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from the utterly amoral and opportunistic conduct of Soviet policy. Combining this quality with the elements of secrecy, the Kremlin possesses a formidable capacity to act with the widest tactical latitude, with stealth, and with speed.

The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people.

That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion, fear, and denunciation. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very survival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron curtain around it and the iron bars within it, not by any force of natural cohesion. These artificial mechanisms of unity have never been intelligently challenged by a strong outside force. The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet evident.

The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-known ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. These excessive requirements can be made good only through extreme coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to effect its independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.

In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the best and potentially the strongest instincts of men, and deny their most fundamental aspirations. Against an adversary which effectively affirmed the constructive and hopeful instincts of men and was capable of fulfilling their fundamental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove to be fatally weak.

The problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin vulnerability. In a system where supreme power is acquired and held through violence and intimidation, the transfer of that power may well produce a period of instability.

In a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of, its own dynamism. This dynamism can become a weakness if it is frustrated, if in its forward thrusts it encounters a superior force which halts the expansion and exerts a superior counterpressure. Yet the Kremlin cannot relax the condition of crisis and mobilization, for to do so would be to lose its dynamism, whereas the seeds of decay within the

Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.

The Kremlin is, of course, aware of these weaknesses. It must know that in the present world situation they are of secondary significance. So long as the Kremlin retains the initiative, so long as it can keep on the offensive unchallenged by clearly superior counter-force--spiritual as well as material--its vulnerabilities are largely inoperative and even concealed by its successes. The Kremlin has not yet been given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot within its system.

B. ECONOMIC

The Kremlin has no economic intentions unrelated to its overall policies. Economics in the Soviet world is not an end in itself. The Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to do with economics, is to utilize economic processes to contribute to the overall strength, particularly the war-making capacity of the Soviet system. The material welfare of the totalitariat is severely subordinated to the interest of the system.

As for capabilities, even granting optimistic Soviet reports of production, the total economic strength of the U.S.S.R. compares with that of the U.S. as roughly one to four. This is reflected not only in gross national product (1949: USSR \$65 billion; U.S. \$250 billion), but in production of key commodities in 1949:

| | U.S. | USSR | USSR and EUROPEAN ORBIT COMBINED |
|---------------------------------------|-------|---------|--|
| Ingot Steel (million met. tons) | 80.4 | 21.5 | 28.0 |
| Primary aluminum (thousand met. tons) | 617.6 | 130-135 | 140-145 |
| Electric power (billion kwh) | 410 | 72 | 112 |
| Crude oil (million met. tons) | 276.5 | 33.0 | 38.9 |

Assuming the maintenance of present policies, while a large U.S. advantage is likely to remain, the Soviet Union will be steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the U.S. by continuing to devote proportionately more to capital investment than the U.S.

But a full-scale effort by the U.S. would be capable of precipitately altering this trend. The USSR today is on a near maximum production basis. No matter what efforts Moscow might make, only a relatively slight change in the rate of increase in overall production could be brought about. In the U.S., on the other hand, a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized. The fact remains, however, that so long as the Soviet Union is virtually mobilized, and the United States has scarcely begun to summon up its forces, the greater capabilities of the U.S. are to that extent inoperative in the struggle for power. Moreover, as the Soviet attainment of an atomic capability has demonstrated, the

totalitarian state, at least in time of peace, can focus its efforts on any given project far more readily than the democratic state.

In other fields--general technological competence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc.--the gap between the USSR and the U.S. roughly corresponds to the gap in production. In the field of scientific research, however, the margin of United States superiority is unclear, especially if the Kremlin can utilize European talents.

C. MILITARY

The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination. The Soviet Union actually possesses armed forces far in excess of those necessary to defend its national territory. These armed forces are probably not yet considered by the Soviet Union to be sufficient to initiate a war which would involve the United States. This excessive strength, coupled now with an atomic capability, provides the Soviet Union with great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression from taking any action in opposition to its tactics which would risk war.

Should a major war occur in 1950 the Soviet Union and its satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to undertake and carry out the following campaigns.

- a. To overrun Western Europe, with the possible exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas; to drive toward the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East; and to consolidate Communist gains in the Far East;
- b. To launch air attacks against the British Isles and air and sea attacks against the lines of communications of the Western Powers in the Atlantic and the Pacific;
- c. To attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska, Canada, and the United States. Alternatively, this capability, coupled with other actions open to the Soviet Union, might deny the United Kingdom as an effective base of operations for allied forces. It also should be possible for the Soviet Union to prevent any allied "Normandy" type amphibious operations intended to force a reentry into the continent of Europe.

After the Soviet Union completed its initial campaigns and consolidated its positions in the Western European area, it could simultaneously conduct:

- a. Full-scale air and limited sea operations against the British Isles;
- b. Invasions of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas;
- c. Further operations in the Near and Middle East, continued air operations against the North American continent, and air and sea operations against Atlantic and Pacific lines of communication; and
- d. Diversionary attacks in other areas.

During the course of the offensive operations listed in the second and third paragraphs above, the Soviet Union will have an air defense capability with respect to the vital areas of its own and its satellites' territories which can oppose but cannot prevent allied air operations against these areas.

It is not known whether the Soviet Union possesses war reserves and arsenal capabilities sufficient to supply its satellite armies or even its own forces throughout a long war. It might not be in the interest of the Soviet Union to equip fully its satellite armies, since the possibility of defections would exist.

It is not possible at this time to assess accurately the finite disadvantages to the Soviet Union which may accrue through the implementation of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. It should be expected that, as this implementation progresses, the internal security situation of the recipient nations should improve concurrently. In addition, a strong United States military position, plus increases in the armaments of the nations of Western Europe, should strengthen the determination of the recipient nations to counter Soviet moves and in event of war could be considered as likely to delay operations and increase the time required for the Soviet Union to overrun Western Europe. In all probability, although United States backing will stiffen their determination, the armaments increase under the present aid programs will not be of any major consequence prior to 1952. Unless the military strength of the Western European nations is increased on a much larger scale than under current programs and at an accelerated rate, it is more than likely that those nations will not be able to oppose even by 1960 the Soviet armed forces in war with any degree of effectiveness. Considering the Soviet Union military capability, the long-range allied military objective in Western Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from a major war or, in any event, to delay materially the overrunning of Western Europe and, if feasible, to hold a bridgehead on the continent against Soviet Union offensives.

We do not know accurately what the Soviet atomic capability is but the Central Intelligence Agency intelligence estimates, concurred in by State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy Commission, assign to the Soviet Union a production capability giving it a fission bomb stockpile within the following ranges:

| | |
|-------------|--------|
| By mid-1950 | 10-20 |
| By mid-1951 | 25-45 |
| By mid-1952 | 45-90 |
| By mid-1953 | 70-135 |
| By mid-1954 | 200 |

This estimate is admittedly based on incomplete coverage of Soviet activities and represents the production capabilities of known or deducible Soviet plants. If others exist, as is possible, this estimate could lead us into a feeling of superiority in our atomic stockpile that might be dangerously misleading, particularly with regard to the timing of a possible Soviet offensive. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union experiences operating difficulties, this estimate would be reduced. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union is acquiring certain materials essential to research on and development of thermonuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union now has aircraft able to deliver the atomic bomb. Our Intelligence estimates assign

to the Soviet Union an atomic bomber capability already in excess of that needed to deliver available bombs. We have at present no evaluated estimate regarding the Soviet accuracy of delivery on target. It is believed that the Soviets cannot deliver their bombs on target with a degree of accuracy comparable to ours, but a planning estimate might well place it at 40-60 percent of bombs sorted. For planning purposes, therefore, the date the Soviets possess an atomic stockpile of 200 bombs would be a critical date for the United States, for the delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage this country.

At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stockpile and if it is assumed that it will strike a strong surprise blow and if it is assumed further that its atomic attacks will be met with no more effective defense opposition than the United States and its allies have programmed, results of those attacks could include:

- a. Laying waste to the British Isles and thus depriving the Western Powers of their use as a base;
- b. Destruction of the vital centers and of the communications of Western Europe, thus precluding effective defense by the Western Powers; and
- c. Delivering devastating attacks on certain vital centers of the United States and Canada.

The possession by the Soviet Union of a thermonuclear capability in addition to this substantial atomic stockpile would result in tremendously increased damage.

During this decade, the defensive capabilities of the Soviet Union will probably be strengthened, particularly by the development and use of modern aircraft, aircraft warning and communications devices, and defensive guided missiles.

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VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities—Actual and Potential

A. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.

This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid and contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are trying to do.

The policy of striving to develop a healthy international community is the long-term constructive effort which we are engaged in. It was this policy which gave rise to our vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations. It is of course the principal reason for our long continuing endeavors to create and now develop the Inter-American system. It, as much as containment, underlay our efforts to rehabilitate Western Europe. Most of our international economic activities can likewise be explained in terms of this policy.

In a world of polarized power, the policies designed to develop a healthy international community are more than ever necessary to our own strength.

As for the policy of "containment," it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other likeminded nations. One of the most important ingredients of power is military strength. In the concept of "containment," the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment." Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment"--which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion--is no more than a policy of bluff.

At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct of a policy of "containment" that we always leave open the possibility of negotiation with the USSR. A diplomatic freeze--and we are in one now--tends to defeat the very purposes of "containment" because it raises tensions at the same time that it makes Soviet retractions and adjustments in the direction of moderated behavior more difficult. It also tends to inhibit our initiative and deprives us of opportunities for maintaining a moral ascendancy in our struggle with the Soviet system.

In "containment" it is desirable to exert pressure in a fashion which will avoid so far as possible directly challenging Soviet prestige, to keep open the possibility for the USSR to retreat before pressure with a minimum loss of face and to secure political advantage from the failure of the

Kremlin to yield or take advantage of the openings we leave it.

We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental aspects of "containment." In the face of obviously mounting Soviet military strength ours has declined relatively. Partly as a byproduct of this, but also for other reasons, we now find ourselves at a diplomatic impasse with the Soviet Union, with the Kremlin growing bolder, with both of us holding on grimly to what we have, and with ourselves facing difficult decisions.

In examining our capabilities it is relevant to ask at the outset--capabilities for what? The answer cannot be stated solely in the negative terms of resisting the Kremlin design. It includes also our capabilities to attain the fundamental purpose of the United States, and to foster a world environment in which our free society can survive and flourish.

Potentially we have these capabilities. We know we have them in the economic and military fields. Potentially we also have them in the political and psychological fields. The vast majority of Americans are confident that the system of values which animates our society--the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual, and the supremacy of reason over will--are valid and more vital than the ideology which is the fuel of Soviet dynamism. Translated into terms relevant to the lives of other peoples--our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from anxieties, bafflement, and insecurity.

Essentially, our democracy also possesses a unique degree of unity. Our society is fundamentally more cohesive than the Soviet system, the solidarity of which is artificially created through force, fear, and favor. This means that expressions of national consensus in our society are soundly and solidly based. It means that the possibility of revolution in this country is fundamentally less than that in the Soviet system.

These capabilities within us constitute a great potential force in our international relations. The potential within us of bearing witness to the values by which we live holds promise for a dynamic manifestation to the rest of the world of the vitality of our system. The essential tolerance of our world outlook, our generous and constructive impulses, and the absence of covetousness in our international relations are assets of potentially enormous influence.

These then are our potential capabilities. Between them and our capabilities currently being utilized is a wide gap of unactualized power. In sharp contrast is the situation of the Soviet world. Its capabilities are inferior to those of our allies and to our own. But they are mobilized close to the maximum possible extent.

The full power which resides within the American people will be evoked only through the traditional democratic process: This process requires, firstly, that sufficient information regarding the basic political, economic, and military elements of the present situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed. Having achieved a comprehension of the issues now confronting this Republic, it will then be possible for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will and a solid resolute expression of that will. The initiative in this process lies with the Government.

The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian way because, in seeking to protect and fulfill the individual, it demands of him understanding, judgment, and positive participation in the increasingly

complex and exacting problems of the modern world. It demands that he exercise discrimination: that while pursuing through free inquiry the search for truth he knows when he should commit an act of faith; that he distinguish between the necessity for tolerance and the necessity for just suppression. A free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses--the excesses of a permanently open mind wishfully waiting for evidence that evil design may become noble purpose, the excess of faith becoming prejudice, the excess of tolerance degenerating into indulgence of conspiracy and the excess of resorting to suppression when more moderate measures are not only more appropriate but more effective.

In coping with dictatorial governments acting in secrecy and with speed, we are also vulnerable in that the democratic process necessarily operates in the open and at a deliberate tempo. Weaknesses in our situation are readily apparent and subject to immediate exploitation. This Government therefore cannot afford in the face of the totalitarian challenge to operate on a narrow margin of strength. A democracy can compensate for its natural vulnerability only if it maintains clearly superior overall power in its most inclusive sense.

The very virtues of our system likewise handicap us in certain respects in our relations with our allies. While it is a general source of strength to us that our relations with our allies are conducted on a basis of persuasion and consent rather than compulsion and capitulation, it is also evident that dissent among us can become a vulnerability. Sometimes the dissent has its principal roots abroad in situations about which we can do nothing. Sometimes it arises largely out of certain weaknesses within ourselves, about which we can do something--our native impetuosity and a tendency to expect too much from people widely divergent from us.

The full capabilities of the rest of the free world are a potential increment to our own capabilities. It may even be said that the capabilities of the Soviet world, specifically the capabilities of the masses who have nothing to lose but their Soviet chains, are a potential which can be enlisted on our side.

Like our own capabilities, those of the rest of the free world exceed the capabilities of the Soviet system. Like our own they are far from being effectively mobilized and employed in the struggle against the Kremlin design. This is so because the rest of the free world lacks a sense of unity, confidence, and common purpose. This is true in even the most homogeneous and advanced segment of the free world--Western Europe.

As we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence, and a sense of moral and political direction, so those same qualities will be evoked in Western Europe. In such a situation, we may also anticipate a general improvement in the political tone in Latin America, Asia, and Africa and the real beginnings of awakening among the Soviet totalitariat.

In the absence of affirmative decision on our part, the rest of the free world is almost certain to become demoralized. Our friends will become more than a liability to us; they can eventually become a positive increment to Soviet power.

In sum, the capabilities of our allies are, in an important sense, a function of our own. An affirmative decision to summon up the potential within ourselves would evoke the potential strength within others and add it to our own.

B. ECONOMIC

This difference in emphasis between the two economies means that the readiness of the free world to support a war effort is tending to decline relative to that of the Soviet Union. There is little direct investment in production facilities for military end-products and in dispersal. There are relatively few men receiving military training and a relatively low rate of production of weapons. However, given time to convert to a war effort, the capabilities of the United States economy and also of the Western European economy would be tremendous. In the light of Soviet military capabilities, a question which may be of decisive importance in the event of war is the question whether there will be time to mobilize our superior human and material resources for a war effort (cf. Chs. VIII and IX).

A few statistics will help to clarify this point [Table 1].

The same point can be brought out by statistics on the use of important products. The Soviet Union is using 14 percent of its ingot steel, 47 percent of its primary aluminum, and 18.5 percent of its crude oil for military purposes, while the corresponding percentages for the United States are 1.7, 8.6, and 5.6. Despite the tremendously larger production of these goods in the United States than the Soviet Union, the latter is actually using, for military purposes, nearly twice as much steel as the United States and 8 to 26 percent more aluminum.

Table 1. Percentage of Gross Available Resources Allocated to Investment, National Defense, and Consumption in East and West, 1949 (in percent of total)

| COUNTRY | GROSS INVESTMENT | DEFENSE | CONSUMPTION |
|------------------------|------------------|---------|-------------|
| USSR | 25.4 | 13.8 | 60.8 |
| Soviet Orbit | 22.0 (a) | 4.0 (b) | 74.0 (a) |
| U.S. | 13.6 | 6.5 | 79.9 |
| European NAT countries | 20.4 | 4.8 | 74.8 |

(a) crude estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]

(b) Includes Soviet Zone of Germany; otherwise 5 percent. [Footnote in the source text.]

Perhaps the most impressive indication of the economic superiority of the free world over the Soviet world which can be made on the basis of available data is provided in comparisons (based mainly on the *Economic Survey of Europe, 1948*) [Table 2].

Table 2. Comparative Statistics on Economic Capabilities of East and West

| | U.S. 1948-49 | EUROPEAN NAT COUNTRIES | TOTAL | USSR (1950 PLAN) | SATELLITES 1948-49 | TOTAL |
|---|--------------|------------------------------|-------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| Population (millions) | 149 | 173 | 322 | 198 (a) | 75 | 273 |
| Employment in non- agricultural establishments (millions) | 45 | - | - | 31 (a) | - | - |
| Gross National Production (billion dollars) | 250 | 84 | 334 | 65 (a) | 21 | 86 |
| National income per capita (current dollars) | 1700 | 480 | 1040 | 330 | 280 | 315 |
| Production data (b): | | | | | | |
| Coal (million tons) | 582 | 306 | 888 | 250 | 88 | 338 |
| Electric power (billion kwh) | 356 | 124 | 480 | 82 | 15 | 97 |
| Crude petroleum (million tons) | 277 | 1 | 278 | 35 | 5 | 40 |
| Pig iron (million tons) | 55 | 24 | 79 | 19.5 | 3.2 | 22.7 |
| Steel (million tons) | 80 | 32 | 112 | 25 | 6 | 31 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------|-----|------|------|-----|------|
| Cement (million tons) | 35 | 21 | 56 | 10.5 | 2.1 | 12.6 |
| Motor vehicles (thousands) | 5273 | 580 | 5853 | 500 | 25 | 525 |

(a) 1949 data. [Footnote in the source text.]

(b) for the European NAT countries and for the satellites, the data include output by major producers.
[Footnote in the source text.]

It should be noted that these comparisons understate the relative position of the NAT countries for several reasons: (1) Canada is excluded because comparable data were not available; (2) the data for the USSR are the 1950 targets (as stated in the fourth five-year plan) rather than actual rates of production and are believed to exceed in many cases the production actually achieved; (3) the data for the European NAT countries are actual data for 1948, and production has generally increased since that time.

Furthermore, the United States could achieve a substantial absolute increase in output and could thereby increase the allocation of resources to a build-up of the economic and military strength of itself and its allies without suffering a decline in its real standard of living. Industrial production declined by 10 percent between the first quarter of 1948 and the last quarter of 1949, and by approximately one-fourth between 1944 and 1949. In March 1950 there were approximately 4,750,000 unemployed, as compared to 1,070,000 in 1943 and 670,000 in 1944. The gross national product declined slowly in 1949 from the peak reached in 1948 (\$262 billion in 1948 to an annual rate of \$256 billion in the last six months of 1949), and in terms of constant prices declined by about 20 percent between 1944 and 1948.

With a high level of economic activity, the United States could soon attain a gross national product of \$300 billion per year, as was pointed out in the President's Economic Report (January 1950). Progress in this direction would permit, and might itself be aided by, a buildup of the economic and military strength of the United States and the free world; furthermore, if a dynamic expansion of the economy were achieved, the necessary build-up could be accomplished without a decrease in the national standard of living because the required resources could be obtained by siphoning off a part of the annual increment in the gross national product. These are facts of fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States (cf. Ch. IX).

2. Intentions. Foreign economic policy is a major instrument in the conduct of United States foreign relations. It is an instrument which can powerfully influence the world environment in ways favorable to the security and welfare of this country. It is also an instrument which, if unwisely formulated and employed, can do actual harm to our national interests. It is an instrument uniquely suited to our capabilities, provided we have the tenacity of purpose and the understanding requisite to a realization of its potentials. Finally, it is an instrument peculiarly appropriate to the cold war.

The preceding analysis has indicated that an essential element in a program to frustrate the Kremlin design is the development of a successfully functioning system among the free nations. It is clear that economic conditions are among the fundamental determinants of the will and the strength to resist subversion and aggression.

United States foreign economic policy has been designed to assist in the building of such a system

and such conditions in the free world. The principal features of this policy can be summarized as follows:

1. assistance to Western Europe in recovery and the creation of a viable economy (the European Recovery Program);
2. assistance to other countries because of their special needs arising out of the war or the cold war and our special interests in or responsibility for meeting them (grant assistance to Japan, the Philippines, and Korea, loans and credits by the Export-Import Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank to Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Iran, etc.);
3. assistance in the development of underdeveloped areas (the Point IV program and loans and credits to various countries, overlapping to some extent with those mentioned under 2);
4. military assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty countries, Greece, Turkey, etc.;
5. restriction of East-West trade in items of military importance to the East;
6. purchase and stockpiling of strategic materials; and
7. efforts to reestablish an international economy based on multilateral trade, declining trade barriers, and convertible currencies (the GATT-ITO program, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, the IMF-IBRD program, and the program now being developed to solve the problem of the United States balance of payments).

In both their short and long term aspects, these policies and programs are directed to the strengthening of the free world and therefore to the frustration of the Kremlin design. Despite certain inadequacies and inconsistencies, which are now being studied in connection with the problem of the United States balance of payments, the United States has generally pursued a foreign economic policy which has powerfully supported its overall objectives. The question must nevertheless be asked whether current and currently projected programs will adequately support this policy in the future, in terms both of need and urgency.

The last year has been indecisive in the economic field. The Soviet Union has made considerable progress in integrating the satellite economies of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy, but still faces very large problems, especially with China. The free nations have important accomplishments to record, but also have tremendous problems still ahead. On balance, neither side can claim any great advantage in this field over its relative position a year ago. The important question therefore becomes: what are the trends?

Several conclusions seem to emerge. First, the Soviet Union is widening the gap between its preparedness for war and the unpreparedness of the free world for war. It is devoting a far greater *proportion* of its resources to military purposes than are the free nations and, in significant components of military power, a greater *absolute* quantity of resources. Second, the Communist success in China, taken with the politico-economic situation in the rest of South and South-East Asia, provides a springboard for a further incursion in this troubled area. Although Communist China faces serious economic problems which may impose some strains on the Soviet economy, it is probable that the social and economic problems faced by the free nations in this area present more than offsetting opportunities for Communist expansion. Third, the Soviet Union holds positions in Europe which, if it maneuvers skillfully, could be used to do great damage to the Western European economy and to the maintenance of the Western orientation of certain countries, particularly Germany and Austria. Fourth, despite (and in part because of) the Titoist' defection, the Soviet Union has accelerated its efforts to integrate satellite economy with its own and to increase the degree of autarchy within the areas under its control.

Fifth, meanwhile, Western Europe, with American (and Canadian) assistance, has achieved a record level of production. However, it faces the prospect of a rapid tapering off of American assistance without the possibility of achieving, by its own efforts, a satisfactory equilibrium with the dollar area. It has also made very little progress toward "economic integration," which would in the long run tend to improve its productivity and to provide an economic environment conducive to political stability. In particular, the movement toward economic integration does not appear to be rapid enough to provide Western Germany with adequate economic opportunities in the West. The United Kingdom still faces economic problems which may require a moderate but politically difficult decline in the British standard of living or more American assistance than is contemplated. At the same time, a strengthening of the British position is needed if the stability of the Commonwealth is not to be impaired and if it is to be a focus of resistance to Communist expansion in South and South-East Asia. Improvement of the British position is also vital in building up the defensive capabilities of Western Europe.

Sixth, throughout Asia the stability of the present moderate governments, which are more in sympathy with our purposes than any probable successor regimes would be, is doubtful. The problem is only in part an economic one. Assistance in economic development is important as a means of holding out to the peoples of Asia some prospect of improvement in standards of living under their present governments. But probably more important are a strengthening of central institutions, an improvement in administration, and generally a development of an economic and social structure within which the peoples of Asia can make more effective use of their great human and material resources.

Seventh, and perhaps most important, there are indications of a let-down of United States efforts under the pressure of the domestic budgetary situation, disillusion resulting from excessively optimistic expectations about the duration and results of our assistance programs, and doubts about the wisdom of continuing to strengthen the free nations as against preparedness measures in light of the intensity of the cold war.

Eighth, there are grounds for predicting that the United States and other free nations will within a period of a few years at most experience a decline in economic activity of serious proportions unless more positive governmental programs are developed than are now available.

In short, as we look into the future, the programs now planned will not meet the requirements of the free nations. The difficulty does not lie so much in the inadequacy or misdirection of policy as in the inadequacy of planned programs, in terms of timing or impact, to achieve our objectives. The risks inherent in this situation are set forth in the following chapter and a course of action designed to reinvigorate our efforts in order to reverse the present trends and to achieve our fundamental purpose is outlined in Chapter IX.

C. MILITARY

The United States now possesses the greatest military potential of any single nation in the world. The military weaknesses of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, however, include its numerical inferiority in forces in being and in total manpower. Coupled with the inferiority of forces in being, the United States also lacks tenable positions from which to employ its forces in event of war and munitions power in being and readily available.

It is true that the United States armed forces are now stronger than ever before in other times of apparent peace; it is also true that there exists a sharp disparity between our actual military strength and our commitments. The relationship of our strength to our present commitments, however, is not alone the governing factor. The world situation, as well as commitments, should govern; hence, our military strength more properly should be related to the world situation confronting us. When our military strength is related to the world situation and balanced against the likely exigencies of such a situation, it is clear that our military strength is becoming dangerously inadequate.

If war should begin in 1950, the United States and its allies will have the military capability of conducting defensive operations to provide a reasonable measure of protection to the Western Hemisphere, bases in the Western Pacific, and essential military lines of communication; and an inadequate measure of protection to vital military bases in the United Kingdom and in the Near and Middle East. We will have the capability of conducting powerful offensive air operations against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity.

The scale of the operations listed in the preceding paragraph is limited by the effective forces and material in being of the United States and its allies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Consistent with the aggressive threat facing us and in consonance with overall strategic plans, the United States must provide to its allies on a continuing basis as large amounts of military assistance as possible without serious detriment to the United States operational requirements.

If the potential military capabilities of the United States and its allies were rapidly and effectively developed, sufficient forces could be produced probably to deter war, or if the Soviet Union chooses war, to withstand the initial Soviet attacks, to stabilize supporting attacks, and to retaliate in turn with even greater impact on the Soviet capabilities. From the military point of view alone, however, this would require not only the generation of the necessary military forces but also the development and stockpiling of improved weapons of all types.

Under existing peacetime conditions, a period of from two to three years is required to produce a material increase in military power. Such increased power could be provided in a somewhat shorter period in a declared period of emergency or in wartime through a full-out national effort. Any increase in military power in peacetime, however, should be related both to its probable military role in war, to the implementation of immediate and long-term United States foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and to the realities of the existing situation. If such a course of increasing our military power is adopted now, the United States would have the capability of eliminating the disparity between its military strength and the exigencies of the situation we face; eventually of gaining the initiative in the "cold" war and of materially delaying if not stopping the Soviet offensives in war itself.

VII. Present Risks

A. GENERAL

It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history. Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the great problem of the free society, accentuated many fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirement of freedom. We would face the fact that in a shrinking world the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. The Kremlin

design seeks to impose order among nations by means which would destroy our free and democratic system. The Kremlin's possession of atomic weapons puts new power behind its design, and increases the jeopardy to our system. It adds new strains to the uneasy equilibrium-without-order which exists in the world and raises new doubts in men's minds whether the world will long tolerate this tension without moving toward some kind of order, on somebody's terms.

The risks we face are of a new order of magnitude, commensurate with the total struggle in which we are engaged. For a free society there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are never wholly attained, are always in the process of being attained. But defeat at the hands of the totalitarian is total defeat. These risks crowd in on us, in a shrinking world of polarized power, so as to give us no choice, ultimately, between meeting them effectively or being overcome by them.

B. SPECIFIC

It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war. The preferred technique is to subvert by infiltration and intimidation. Every institution of our society is an instrument which it is sought to stultify and turn against our purposes. Those that touch most closely our material and moral strength are obviously the prime targets, labor unions, civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for influencing opinion. The effort is not so much to make them serve obvious Soviet ends as to prevent them from serving our ends, and thus to make them sources of confusion in our economy, our culture, and our body politic. The doubts and diversities that in terms of our values are part of the merit of a free system, the weaknesses and the problems that are peculiar to it, the rights and privileges that free men enjoy, and the disorganization and destruction left in the wake of the last attack on our freedoms, all are but opportunities for the Kremlin to do its evil work. Every advantage is taken of the fact that our means of prevention and retaliation are limited by those principles and scruples which are precisely the ones that give our freedom and democracy its meaning for us. None of our scruples deter those whose only code is "morality is that which serves the revolution."

Since everything that gives us or others respect for our institutions is a suitable object for attack, it also fits the Kremlin's design that where, with impunity, we can be insulted and made to suffer indignity the opportunity shall not be missed, particularly in any context which can be used to cast dishonor on our country, our system, our motives, or our methods. Thus the means by which we sought to restore our own economic health in the '30's, and now seek to restore that of the free world, come equally under attack. The military aid by which we sought to help the free world was frantically denounced by the Communists in the early days of the last war, and of course our present efforts to develop adequate military strength for ourselves and our allies are equally denounced.

At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military force, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation. In the only terms in which it understands strength, it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin, that those who lack it are decadent and doomed. In local incidents it threatens and encroaches both for the sake of local gains and to increase anxiety and defeatism in all the free world.

The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles of power, and the inability (for different reasons) of either side to place any trust in the other, puts a premium on a surprise attack against us. It equally puts a premium on a more violent and ruthless prosecution of its design by cold war, especially if the Kremlin is sufficiently objective to realize the improbability of our prosecuting a preventive war. It also puts a premium on piecemeal aggression against others, counting on our

unwillingness to engage in atomic war unless we are directly attacked. We run all these risks and the added risk of being confused and immobilized by our inability to weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course based on a rational assessment of each.

The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed in taking all needful measures to maintain the integrity and vitality of our system is great. The risk that our allies will lose their determination is greater. And the risk that in this manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt and recrimination, may present us with ever narrower and more desperate alternatives, is the greatest risk of all. For example, it is clear that our present weakness would prevent us from offering effective resistance at any of several vital pressure points. The only deterrent we can present to the Kremlin is the evidence we give that we may make any of the critical points which we cannot hold the occasion for a global war of annihilation.

The risk of having no better choice than to capitulate or precipitate a global war at any of a number of pressure points is bad enough in itself, but it is multiplied by the weakness it imparts to our position in the cold war. Instead of appearing strong and resolute we are continually at the verge of appearing and being alternately irresolute and desperate; yet it is the cold war which we must win, because both the Kremlin design, and our fundamental purpose give it the first priority.

The frustration of the Kremlin design, however, cannot be accomplished by us alone, as will appear from the analysis in Chapter IX, B. Strength at the center, in the United States, is only the first of two essential elements. The second is that our allies and potential allies do not as a result of a sense of frustration or of Soviet intimidation drift into a course of neutrality eventually leading to Soviet domination. If this were to happen in Germany the effect upon Western Europe and eventually upon us might be catastrophic.

But there are risks in making ourselves strong. A large measure of sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the American people. They will be asked to give up some of the benefits which they have come to associate with their freedoms. Nothing could be more important than that they fully understand the reasons for this. The risks of a superficial understanding or of an inadequate appreciation of the issues are obvious and might lead to the adoption of measures which in themselves would jeopardize the integrity of our system. At any point in the process of demonstrating our will to make good our fundamental purpose, the Kremlin may decide to precipitate a general war, or in testing us, may go too far. These are risks we will invite by making ourselves strong, but they are lesser risks than those we seek to avoid. Our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated from lack of the will to maintain it, than from any mistakes we may make or assault we may undergo because of asserting that will. No people in history have preserved their freedom who thought that by not being strong enough to protect themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.

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VIII. Atomic Armaments

A. MILITARY EVALUATION OF U.S. AND USSR ATOMIC CAPABILITIES

1. The United States now has an atomic capability, including both numbers and deliverability, estimated to be adequate, if effectively utilized, to deliver a serious blow against the war-making capacity of the USSR. It is doubted whether such a blow, even if it resulted in the complete destruction of the contemplated target systems, would cause the USSR to sue for terms or prevent Soviet forces from occupying Western Europe against such ground resistance as could presently be mobilized. A very serious initial blow could, however, so reduce the capabilities of the USSR to supply and equip its military organization and its civilian population as to give the United States the prospect of developing a general military superiority in a war of long duration.

2. As the atomic capability of the USSR increases, it will have an increased ability to hit at our atomic bases and installations and thus seriously hamper the ability of the United States to carry out an attack such as that outlined above. It is quite possible that in the near future the USSR will have a sufficient number of atomic bombs and a sufficient deliverability to raise a question whether Britain with its present inadequate air defense could be relied upon as an advance base from which a major portion of the U.S. attack could be launched.

It is estimated that, within the next four years, the USSR will attain the capability of seriously damaging vital centers of the United States, provided it strikes a surprise blow and provided further that the blow is opposed by no more effective opposition than we now have programmed. Such a blow could so seriously damage the United States as to greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential.

Effective opposition to this Soviet capability will require among other measures greatly increased air warning systems, air defenses, and vigorous development and implementation of a civilian defense program which has been thoroughly integrated with the military defense systems.

In time the atomic capability of the USSR can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.

3. In the initial phases of an atomic war, the advantages of initiative and surprise would be very great. A police state living behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage in maintaining the necessary security and centralization of decision required to capitalize on this advantage.

4. For the moment our atomic retaliatory capability is probably adequate to deter the Kremlin from a deliberate direct military attack against ourselves or other free peoples. However, when it calculates that it has a sufficient atomic capability to make a surprise attack on us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating a military situation decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be tempted to strike swiftly and with stealth. The existence of two large atomic capabilities in such a relationship might well act, therefore, not as a deterrent, but as an incitement to war.

5. A further increase in the number and power of our atomic weapons is necessary in order to assure the effectiveness of any U.S. retaliatory blow, but would not of itself seem to change the basic logic of the above points. Greatly increased general air, ground, and sea strength, and increased air defense

and civilian defense programs would also be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the free world could survive an initial surprise atomic attack of the weight which it is estimated the USSR will be capable of delivering by 1954 and still permit the free world to go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. Furthermore, such a build-up of strength could safeguard and increase our retaliatory power, and thus might put off for some time the date when the Soviet Union could calculate that a surprise blow would be advantageous. This would provide additional time for the effects of our policies to produce a modification of the Soviet system.

6. If the USSR develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U.S., the risks of greatly increased Soviet pressure against all the free world, or an attack against the U.S., will be greatly increased.

7. If the U.S. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the USSR, the U.S. should for the time being be able to bring increased pressure on the USSR.

B. STOCKPILING AND USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

1. From the foregoing analysis it appears that it would be to the long-term advantage of the United States if atomic weapons were to be effectively eliminated from national peacetime armaments; the additional objectives which must be secured if there is to be a reasonable prospect of such effective elimination of atomic weapons are discussed in Chapter IX. In the absence of such elimination and the securing of these objectives, it would appear that we have no alternative but to increase our atomic capability as rapidly as other considerations make appropriate. In either case, it appears to be imperative to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground, and sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons.

2. As is indicated in Chapter IV, it is important that the United States employ military force only if the necessity for its use is clear and compelling and commends itself to the overwhelming majority of our people. The United States cannot therefore engage in war except as a reaction to aggression of so clear and compelling a nature as to bring the overwhelming majority of our people to accept the use of military force. In the event war comes, our use of force must be to compel the acceptance of our objectives and must be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

In the event of a general war with the USSR, it must be anticipated that atomic weapons will be used by each side in the manner it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives. In view of our vulnerability to Soviet atomic attack, it has been argued that we might wish to hold our atomic weapons only for retaliation against prior use by the USSR. To be able to do so and still have hope of achieving our objectives, the non-atomic military capabilities of ourselves and our allies would have to be fully developed and the political weaknesses of the Soviet Union fully exploited. In the event of war, however, we could not be sure that we could move toward the attainment of these objectives without the USSR's resorting sooner or later to the use of its atomic weapons. Only if we had overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the USSR be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we progressed toward the attainment of our objectives.

In the event the USSR develops by 1954 the atomic capability which we now anticipate, it is hardly conceivable that, if war comes, the Soviet leaders would refrain from the use of atomic weapons unless they felt fully confident of attaining their objectives by other means.

In the event we use atomic weapons either in retaliation for their prior use by the USSR or because there is no alternative method by which we can attain our objectives, it is imperative that the strategic

and tactical targets against which they are used be appropriate and the manner in which they are used be consistent with those objectives.

It appears to follow from the above that we should produce and stockpile thermonuclear weapons in the event they prove feasible and would add significantly to our net capability. Not enough is yet known of their potentialities to warrant a judgment at this time regarding their use in war to attain our objectives.

3. It has been suggested that we announce that we will not use atomic weapons except in retaliation against the prior use of such weapons by an aggressor. It has been argued that such a declaration would decrease the danger of an atomic attack against the United States and its allies.

In our present situation of relative unpreparedness in conventional weapons, such a declaration would be interpreted by the USSR as an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a clear indication that we intended to abandon them. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such a declaration would be taken sufficiently seriously by the Kremlin to constitute an important factor in determining whether or not to attack the United States. It is to be anticipated that the Kremlin would weigh the facts of our capability far more heavily than a declaration of what we proposed to do with that capability.

Unless we are prepared to abandon our objectives, we cannot make such a declaration in good faith until we are confident that we will be in a position to attain our objectives without war, or, in the event of war, without recourse to the use of atomic weapons for strategic or tactical purposes.

C. INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

1. A discussion of certain of the basic considerations involved in securing effective international control is necessary to make clear why the additional objectives discussed in Chapter IX must be secured.

2. No system of international control could prevent the production and use of atomic weapons in the event of a prolonged war. Even the most effective system of international control could, of itself, only provide (a) assurance that atomic weapons had been eliminated from national peacetime armaments and (b) immediate notice of a violation. In essence, an effective international control system would be expected to assure a certain amount of time after notice of violation before atomic weapons could be used in war.

3. The time period between notice of violation and possible use of atomic weapons in war which a control system could be expected to assure depends upon a number of factors.

The dismantling of existing stockpiles of bombs and the destruction of casings and firing mechanisms could by themselves give little assurance of securing time. Casings and firing mechanisms are presumably easy to produce, even surreptitiously, and the assembly of weapons does not take much time.

If existing stocks of fissionable materials were in some way eliminated and the future production of fissionable materials effectively controlled, war could not start with a surprise atomic attack.

In order to assure an appreciable time lag between notice of violation and the time when atomic weapons might be available in quantity, it would be necessary to destroy all plants capable of making

large amounts of fissionable material. Such action would, however, require a moratorium on those possible peacetime uses which call for large quantities of fissionable materials.

Effective control over the production and stockpiling of raw materials might further extend the time period which effective international control would assure. Now that the Russians have learned the technique of producing atomic weapons, the time between violation of an international control agreement and production of atomic weapons will be shorter than was estimated in 1946, except possibly in the field of thermonuclear or other new types of weapons.

4. The certainty of notice of violation also depends upon a number of factors. In the absence of good faith, it is to be doubted whether any system can be designed which will give certainty of notice of violation. International ownership of raw materials and fissionable materials and international ownership and operation of dangerous facilities, coupled with inspection based on continuous unlimited freedom of access to all parts of the Soviet Union (as well as to all parts of the territory of other signatories to the control agreement) appear to be necessary to give the requisite degree of assurance against secret violations. As the Soviet stockpile of fissionable materials grows, the amount which the USSR might secretly withhold and not declare to the inspection agency grows. In this sense, the earlier an agreement is consummated the greater the security it would offer. The possibility of successful secret production operations also increases with developments which may reduce the size and power consumption of individual reactors. The development of a thermonuclear bomb would increase many fold the damage a given amount of fissionable material could do and would, therefore, vastly increase the danger that a decisive advantage could be gained through secret operations.

5. The relative sacrifices which would be involved in international control need also to be considered. If it were possible to negotiate an effective system of international control the United States would presumably sacrifice a much larger stockpile of atomic weapons and a much larger production capacity than would the USSR. The opening up of national territory to international inspection involved in an adequate control and inspection system would have a far greater impact on the USSR than on the United States. If the control system involves the destruction of all large reactors and thus a moratorium on certain possible peacetime uses, the USSR can be expected to argue that it, because of greater need for new sources of energy, would be making a greater sacrifice in this regard than the United States.

6. The United States and the peoples of the world as a whole desire a respite from the dangers of atomic warfare. The chief difficulty lies in the danger that the respite would be short and that we might not have adequate notice of its pending termination. For such an arrangement to be in the interest of the United States, it is essential that the agreement be entered into in good faith by both sides and the probability against its violation high.

7. The most substantial contribution to security of an effective international control system would, of course, be the opening up of the Soviet Union, as required under the UN plan. Such opening up is not, however, compatible with the maintenance of the Soviet system in its present rigor. This is a major reason for the Soviet refusal to accept the UN plan.

The studies which began with the Acheson-Lilienthal committee and culminated in the present UN plan made it clear that inspection of atomic facilities would not alone give the assurance of control; but that ownership and operation by an international authority of the world's atomic energy activities from the mine to the last use of fissionable materials was also essential. The delegation of sovereignty which this implies is necessary for effective control and, therefore, is as necessary for the United

States and the rest of the free world as it is presently unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

It is also clear that a control authority not susceptible directly or indirectly to Soviet domination is equally essential. As the Soviet Union would regard any country not under its domination as under the potential if not the actual domination of the United States, it is clear that what the United States and the non-Soviet world must insist on, the Soviet Union at present rejects.

The principal immediate benefit of international control would be to make a surprise atomic attack impossible, assuming the elimination of large reactors and the effective disposal of stockpiles of fissionable materials. But it is almost certain that the Soviet Union would not agree to the elimination of large reactors, unless the impracticability of producing atomic power for peaceful purposes had been demonstrated beyond a doubt. By the same token, it would not now agree to elimination of its stockpile of fissionable materials.

Finally, the absence of good faith on the part of the USSR must be assumed until there is concrete evidence that there has been a decisive change in Soviet policies. It is to be doubted whether such a change can take place without a change in the nature of the Soviet system itself.

The above considerations make it clear that at least a major change in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that "... the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure ... their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field.... As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy."

In short, it is impossible to hope that an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.

IX. Possible Courses of Action

Introduction. Four possible courses of action by the United States in the present situation can be distinguished. They are:

- a. Continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies;
- b. Isolation;
- c. War; and
- d. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under a, with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked.

The role of negotiation. Negotiation must be considered in relation to these courses of action. A negotiator always attempts to achieve an agreement which is somewhat better than the realities of his fundamental position would justify and which is, in any case, not worse than his fundamental position

requires. This is as true in relations among sovereign states as in relations between individuals. The Soviet Union possesses several advantages over the free world in negotiations on any issue:

- a. It can and does enforce secrecy on all significant facts about conditions within the Soviet Union, so that it can be expected to know more about the realities of the free world's position than the free world knows about its position;
- b. It does not have to be responsive in any important sense to public opinion;
- c. It does not have to consult and agree with any other countries on the terms it will offer 'And accept; and
- d. It can influence public opinion in other countries while insulating the peoples under its control.

These are important advantages. Together with the unfavorable trend of our power position, they militate, as is shown in Section A below, against successful negotiation of a general settlement at this time. For although the United States probably now possesses, principally in atomic weapons, a force adequate to deliver a powerful blow upon the Soviet Union and to open the road to victory in a long war, it is not sufficient by itself to advance the position of the United States in the cold war.

The problem is to create such political and economic conditions in the free world, backed by force sufficient to inhibit Soviet attack, that the Kremlin will accommodate itself to these conditions, gradually withdraw, and eventually change its policies drastically. It has been shown in Chapter VIII that truly effective control of atomic energy would require such an opening up of the Soviet Union and such evidence in other ways of its good faith and its intent to co-exist in peace as to reflect or at least initiate a change in the Soviet system.

Clearly under present circumstances we will not be able to negotiate a settlement which calls for a change in the Soviet system. What, then, is the role of negotiation?

In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free countries will require, as a condition to firm policies and adequate programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union on equitable terms. It is still argued by many people here and abroad that equitable agreements with the Soviet Union are possible, and this view will gain force if the Soviet Union begins to show signs of accommodation, even on unimportant issues.

The free countries must always, therefore, be prepared to negotiate and must be ready to take the initiative at times in seeking negotiation. They must develop a negotiating position which defines the issues and the terms on which they would be prepared--and at what stages--to accept agreements with the Soviet Union. The terms must be fair in the view of popular opinion in the free world. This means that they must be consistent with a positive program for peace--in harmony with the United Nations' Charter and providing, at a minimum, for the effective control of all armaments by the United Nations or a successor organization. The terms must not require more of the Soviet Union than such behavior and such participation in a world organization. The fact that such conduct by the Soviet Union is impossible without such a radical change in Soviet policies as to constitute a change in the Soviet system would then emerge as a result of the Kremlin's unwillingness to accept such terms or of its bad faith in observing them.

A sound negotiating position is, therefore, an essential element in the ideological conflict. For some time after a decision to build up strength, any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general settlement along the lines of the Berkeley speech by the Secretary of State could be only a tactic.'

Nevertheless, concurrently with a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be desirable to pursue this tactic both to gain public support for the program and to minimize the immediate risks of war. It is urgently necessary for the United States to determine its negotiating position and to obtain agreement with its major allies on the purposes and terms of negotiation.

In the second place, assuming that the United States in cooperation with other free countries decides and acts to increase the strength of the free world and assuming that the Kremlin chooses the path of accommodation, it will from time to time be necessary and desirable to negotiate on various specific issues with the Kremlin as the area of possible agreement widens.

The Kremlin will have three major objectives in negotiations with the United States. The first is to eliminate the atomic capabilities of the United States; the second is to prevent the effective mobilization of the superior potential of the free world in human and material resources; and the third is to secure a withdrawal of United States forces from, and commitments to, Europe and Japan. Depending on its evaluation of its own strengths and weaknesses as against the West's (particularly the ability and will of the West to sustain its efforts), it will or will not be prepared to make important concessions to achieve these major objectives. It is unlikely that the Kremlin's evaluation is such that it would now be prepared to make significant concessions.

The objectives of the United States and other free countries in negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from the ideological objectives discussed above) are to record, in a formal fashion which will facilitate the consolidation and further advance of our position, the process of Soviet accommodation to the new political, psychological, and economic conditions in the world which will result from adoption of the fourth course of action and which will be supported by the increasing military strength developed as an integral part of that course of action. In short, our objectives are to record, where desirable, the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union and to facilitate that process by making negotiation, if possible, always more expedient than resort to force.

It must be presumed that for some time the Kremlin will accept agreements only if it is convinced that by acting in bad faith whenever and wherever there is an opportunity to do so with impunity, it can derive greater advantage from the agreements than the free world. For this reason, we must take care that any agreements are enforceable or that they are not susceptible of violation without detection and the possibility of effective countermeasures.

This further suggests that we will have to consider carefully the order in which agreements can be concluded. Agreement on the control of atomic energy would result in a relatively greater disarmament of the United States than of the Soviet Union, even assuming considerable progress in building up the strength of the free world in conventional forces and weapons. It might be accepted by the Soviet Union as part of a deliberate design to move against Western Europe and other areas of strategic importance with conventional forces and weapons. In this event, the United States would find itself at war, having previously disarmed itself in its most important weapon, and would be engaged in a race to redevelop atomic weapons.

This seems to indicate that for the time being the United States and other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement on the control of nonatomic forces and weapons and perhaps on the other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satellites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union should accept agreements promising effective control of atomic energy and conventional armaments, without any other changes in Soviet policies, we would have to consider very carefully

whether we could accept such agreements. It is unlikely that this problem will arise.

To the extent that the United States and the rest of the free world succeed in so building up their strength in conventional forces and weapons that a Soviet attack with similar forces could be thwarted or held, we will gain increased flexibility and can seek agreements on the various issues in any order, as they become negotiable.

In the third place, negotiation will play a part in the building up of the strength of the free world, apart from the ideological strength discussed above. This is most evident in the problems of Germany, Austria, and Japan. In the process of building up strength, it may be desirable for the free nations, without the Soviet Union, to conclude separate arrangements with Japan, Western Germany, and Austria which would enlist the energies and resources of these countries in support of the free world. This will be difficult unless it has been demonstrated by attempted negotiation with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept treaties of peace which would leave these countries free, under adequate safeguards, to participate in the United Nations and in regional or broader associations of states consistent with the United Nations' Charter and providing security and adequate opportunities for the peaceful development of their political and economic life.

This demonstrates the importance, from the point of view of negotiation as well as for its relationship to the building up of the strength of the free world (see Section D below), of the problem of closer association--on a regional or a broader basis--among the free countries.

In conclusion, negotiation is not a possible separate course of action but rather a means of gaining support for a program of building strength, of recording, where necessary and desirable, progress in the cold war, and of facilitating further progress while helping to minimize the risks of war. Ultimately, it is our objective to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union (or a successor state or states) on which the world can place reliance as an enforceable instrument of peace. But it is important to emphasize that such a settlement can only record the progress which the free world will have made in creating a political and economic system in the world so successful that the frustration of the Kremlin's design for world domination will be complete. The analysis in the following sections indicates that the building of such a system requires expanded and accelerated programs for the carrying out of current policies.

A. THE FIRST COURSE--CONTINUATION OF CURRENT POLICIES, WITH CURRENT AND CURRENTLY PROJECTED PROGRAMS FOR CARRYING OUT THESE POLICIES

1. Military aspects. On the basis of current programs, the United States has a large potential military capability but an actual capability which, though improving, is declining relative to the USSR, particularly in light of its probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. The same holds true for the free world as a whole relative to the Soviet world as a whole. If war breaks out in 1950 or in the next few years, the United States and its allies, apart from a powerful atomic blow, will be compelled to conduct delaying actions, while building up their strength for a general offensive. A frank evaluation of the requirements, to defend the United States and its vital interests and to support a vigorous initiative in the cold war, on the one hand, and of present capabilities, on the other, indicates that there is a sharp and growing disparity between them.

A review of Soviet policy shows that the military capabilities, actual and potential, of the United States and the rest of the free world, together with the apparent determination of the free world to resist further Soviet expansion, have not induced the Kremlin to relax its pressures generally or to

give up the initiative in the cold war. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has consistently pursued a bold foreign policy, modified only when its probing revealed a determination and an ability of the free world to resist encroachment upon it. The relative military capabilities of the free world are declining, with the result that its determination to resist may also decline and that the security of the United States and the free world as a whole will be jeopardized.

From the military point of view, the actual and potential capabilities of the United States, given a continuation of current and projected programs, will become less and less effective as a war deterrent. Improvement of the state of readiness will become more and more important not only to inhibit the launching of war by the Soviet Union but also to support a national policy designed to reverse the present ominous trends in international relations. A building up of the military capabilities of the United States and the free world is a pre-condition to the achievement of the objectives outlined in this report and to the protection of the United States against disaster.

Fortunately, the United States military establishment has been developed into a unified and effective force as a result of the policies laid down by the Congress and the vigorous carrying out of these policies by the Administration in the fields of both organization and economy. It is, therefore, a base upon which increased strength can be rapidly built with maximum efficiency and economy.

2. Political aspects. The Soviet Union is pursuing the initiative in the conflict with the free world. Its atomic capabilities, together with its successes in the Far East, have led to an increasing confidence on its part and to an increasing nervousness in Western Europe and the rest of the free world. We cannot be sure, of course, how vigorously the Soviet Union will pursue its initiative, nor can we be sure of the strength or weakness of the other free countries in reacting to it. There are, however, ominous signs of further deterioration in the Far East. There are also some indications that a decline in morale and confidence in Western Europe may be expected. In particular, the situation in Germany is unsettled. Should the belief or suspicion spread that the free nations are not now able to prevent the Soviet Union from taking, if it chooses, the military actions outlined in Chapter V, the determination of the free countries to resist probably would lessen and there would be an increasing temptation for them to seek a position of neutrality.

Politically, recognition of the military implications of a continuation of present trends will mean that the United States and especially other free countries will tend to shift to the defensive, or to follow a dangerous policy of bluff, because the maintenance of a firm initiative in the cold war is closely related to aggregate strength in being and readily available.

This is largely a problem of the incongruity of the current actual capabilities of the free world and the threat to it, for the free world has an economic and military potential far superior to the potential of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The shadow of Soviet force falls darkly on Western Europe and Asia and supports a policy of encroachment. The free world lacks adequate means--in the form of forces in being--to thwart such expansion locally. The United States will therefore be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of reacting totally to a limited extension of Soviet control or of not reacting at all (except with ineffectual protests and half measures). Continuation of present trends is likely to lead, therefore, to a gradual withdrawal under the direct or indirect pressure of the Soviet Union, until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. In other words, the United States would have chosen, by lack of the necessary decisions and actions, to fall back to isolation in the Western Hemisphere. This course would at best result in only a relatively brief truce and would be ended either by our capitulation or by a defensive war--on unfavorable terms from unfavorable positions--against a Soviet Empire compromising all or most of Eurasia. (See Section B.)

3. Economic and social aspects. As was pointed out in Chapter VI, the present foreign economic policies and programs of the United States will not produce a solution to the problem of international economic equilibrium, notably the problem of the dollar gap, and will not create an economic base conducive to political stability in many important free countries.

The European Recovery Program has been successful in assisting the restoration and expansion of production in Western Europe and has been a major factor in checking the dry rot of Communism in Western Europe. However, little progress has been made toward the resumption by Western Europe of a position of influence in world affairs commensurate with its potential strength. Progress in this direction will require integrated political, economic, and military policies and programs, which are supported by the United States and the Western European countries and which will probably require a deeper participation by the United States than has been contemplated.

The Point IV Program and other assistance programs will not adequately supplement, as now projected, the efforts of other important countries to develop effective institutions, to improve the administration of their affairs, and to achieve a sufficient measure of economic development. The moderate regimes now in power in many countries, like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, will probably be unable to restore or retain their popular support and authority unless they are assisted in bringing about a more rapid improvement of the economic and social structure than present programs will make possible.

The Executive Branch is now undertaking a study of the problem of the United States balance of payments and of the measures which might be taken by the United States to assist in establishing international economic equilibrium. This is a very important project and work on it should have a high priority. However, unless such an economic program is matched and supplemented by an equally far-sighted and vigorous political and military program, we will not be successful in checking and rolling back the Kremlin's drive.

4. Negotiation. In short, by continuing along its present course the free world will not succeed in making effective use of its vastly superior political, economic, and military potential to build a tolerable state of order among nations. On the contrary, the political, economic, and military situation of the free world is already unsatisfactory and will become less favorable unless we act to reverse present trends.

This situation is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. Unless a decision had been made and action undertaken to build up the strength, in the broadest sense, of the United States and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to build up our strength.

This is true despite the fact that the United States now has the capability of delivering a powerful blow against the Soviet Union in the event of war, for one of the present realities is that the United States is not prepared to threaten the use of our present atomic superiority to coerce the Soviet Union into acceptable agreements. In light of present trends, the Soviet Union will not withdraw and the only conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of influence and of no influenced "settlement" which the Kremlin could readily exploit to its great advantage. The idea that Germany or

Japan or other important areas can exist as islands of neutrality in a divided world is unreal, given the Kremlin design for world domination.

B. THE SECOND COURSE--ISOLATION

Continuation of present trends, it has been shown above, will lead progressively to the withdrawal of the United States from most of its present commitments in Europe and Asia and to our isolation in the Western Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not from a conscious decision but from a failure to take the actions necessary to bring our capabilities into line with our commitments and thus to a withdrawal under pressure. This pressure might come from our present Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless they have confidence in our determination to accelerate our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.

There are some who advocate a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. Superficially, this has some attractiveness as a course of action, for it appears to bring our commitments and capabilities into harmony by reducing the former and by concentrating our present, or perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the defense of the United States.

This argument overlooks the relativity of capabilities. With the United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the probability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia, probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power, which would, even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it and as an obstacle to the imposition of its kind of order in the world. There is no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete submission to its will. Therefore isolation would in the end condemn us to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with drastically limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with the Soviet Union. (These are the only possibilities, unless we are prepared to risk the future on the hazard that the Soviet Empire, because of over-extension or other reasons, will spontaneously destroy itself from within.)

The argument also overlooks the imponderable, but nevertheless drastic, effects on our belief in ourselves and in our way of life of a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. As the Soviet Union came to dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned their former friends and allies. As the Soviet Union mobilized the resources of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities, and heightened its threat to our security, some would be tempted to accept "peace" on its terms, while many would seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented system which would permit the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.

Under this course of action, there would be no negotiation, unless on the Kremlin's terms, for we would have given up everything of importance.

It is possible that at some point in the course of isolation, many Americans would come to favor a surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the area under its control, in a desperate attempt to alter decisively the balance of power by an overwhelming blow with modern weapons of mass destruction. It appears unlikely that the Soviet Union would wait for such an attack before launching one of its own. But even if it did and even if our attack were successful, it is clear that the United States would face appalling tasks in establishing a tolerable state of order among nations after such a war and after

Soviet occupation of all or most of Eurasia for some years. These tasks appear so enormous and success so unlikely that reason dictates an attempt to achieve our objectives by other means.

C. THE THIRD COURSE--WAR

Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of "preventive" war--in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies--is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly. Some further argue that the free world is probably unable, except under the crisis of war, to mobilize and direct its resources to the checking and rolling back of the Kremlin's drive for world dominion. This is a powerful argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong. The case for war is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advantage for the free world in a long war and perhaps to win an early decision.

The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone would not force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow.

Apart from this, however, a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be morally corrosive. Many would doubt that it was a "just war" and that all reasonable possibilities for a peaceful settlement had been explored in good faith. Many more, proportionately, would hold such views in other countries, particularly in Western Europe and particularly after Soviet occupation, if only because the Soviet Union would liquidate articulate opponents. It would, therefore, be difficult after such a war to create a satisfactory international order among nations. Victory in such a war would have brought us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental ideological conflict.

These considerations are no less weighty because they are imponderable, and they rule out an attack unless it is demonstrably in the nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way or about to be delivered. (The military advantages of landing the first blow become increasingly important with modern weapons, and this is a fact which requires us to be on the alert in order to strike with our full weight as soon as we are attacked, and, if possible, before the Soviet blow is actually delivered.) If the argument of Chapter IV is accepted, it follows that there is no "easy" solution and that the only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.

D. THE REMAINING COURSE OF ACTION--A RAPID BUILD-UP OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE FREE WORLD

A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated is the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character. The potential strength of the free world is great; its ability to develop these military capabilities and its will to resist Soviet expansion will be determined by the wisdom and will with which it undertakes to meet its political and economic problems.

1. Military aspects. It has been indicated in Chapter VI that U.S. military capabilities are strategically more defensive in nature than offensive and are more potential than actual. It is evident, from an analysis of the past and of the trend of weapon development, that there is now and will be in the future no absolute defense. The history of war also indicates that a favorable decision can only be achieved through offensive action. Even a defensive strategy, if it is to be successful, calls not only for defensive forces to hold vital positions while mobilizing and preparing for the offensive, but also for offensive forces to attack the enemy and keep him off balance.

The two fundamental requirements which must be met by forces in being or readily available are support of foreign policy and protection against disaster. To meet the second requirement, the forces in being or readily available must be able, at a minimum, to perform certain basic tasks:

- a. To defend the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas in order that their war-making capabilities can be developed;
- b. To provide and protect a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for victory are being built up;
- c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies can be brought to bear;
- d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks; and
- e. To provide such aid to allies as is essential to the execution of their role in the above tasks.

In the broadest terms, the ability to perform these tasks requires a build-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior for at least these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not essential to match item for item with the Soviet Union, but to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada and an adequate defense against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of communication to these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up our strength, we enlarge upon our technical superiority by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential of the United States and our allies.

Forces of this size and character are necessary not only for protection against disaster but also to support our foreign policy. In fact, it can be argued that larger forces in being and readily available are necessary to inhibit a would-be aggressor than to provide the nucleus of strength and the

mobilization base on which the tremendous forces required for victory can be built. For example, in both World Wars I and II the ultimate victors had the strength, in the end, to win though they had not had the strength in being or readily available to prevent the outbreak of war. In part, at least, this was because they had not had the military strength on which to base a strong foreign policy. At any rate, it is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination.

Moreover, the United States and the other free countries do not now have the forces in being and readily available to defeat local Soviet moves with local action, but must accept reverses or make these local moves the occasion for war—for which we are not prepared. This situation makes for great uneasiness among our allies, particularly in Western Europe, for whom total war means, initially, Soviet occupation. Thus, unless our combined strength is rapidly increased, our allies will tend to become increasingly reluctant to support a firm foreign policy on our part and increasingly anxious to seek other solutions, even though they are aware that appeasement means defeat. An important advantage in adopting the fourth course of action lies in its psychological impact--the revival of confidence and hope in the future. It is recognized, of course, that any announcement of the recommended course of action could be exploited by the Soviet Union in its peace campaign and would have adverse psychological effects in certain parts of the free world until the necessary increase in strength has been achieved. Therefore, in any announcement of policy and in the character of the measures adopted, emphasis should be given to the essentially defensive character and care should be taken to minimize, so far as possible, unfavorable domestic and foreign reactions.

2. Political and economic aspects. The immediate objectives--to the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a necessary though not a sufficient condition--are a renewed initiative in the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the United States takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and for dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.

At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to engage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance, and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.

A program for rapidly building up strength and improving political and economic conditions will place heavy demands on our courage and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. But half-measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they will be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. Budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.

A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives. It would probably involve:

1. The development of an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives.
2. A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks listed in Section D-1.
3. A substantial increase in military assistance programs, designed to foster cooperative efforts, which will adequately and efficiently meet the requirements of our allies for the tasks referred to in Section D-1-e.
4. Some increase in economic assistance programs and recognition of the need to continue these programs until their purposes have been accomplished.
5. A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.
6. Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.
7. Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.
8. Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.
9. Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.
10. Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs.
11. Increased taxes.

Essential as prerequisites to the success of this program would be (a) consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and (b) a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of present international trends.

The program will be costly, but it is relevant to recall the disproportion between the potential capabilities of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds (cf. Chapters V and VI). The Soviet Union is currently devoting about 40 percent of available resources (gross national product plus reparations, equal in 1949 to about \$65 billion) to military expenditures (14 percent) and to investment (26 percent), much of which is in war-supporting industries. In an emergency the Soviet Union could increase the allocation of resources to these purposes to about 50 percent, or by one-fourth.

The United States is currently devoting about 22 percent of its gross national product (\$255 billion in 1949) to military expenditures (6 percent), foreign assistance (2 percent), and investment (14 percent), little of which is in war-supporting industries. (As was pointed out in Chapter V, the "fighting value" obtained per dollar of expenditure by the Soviet Union considerably exceeds that obtained by the United States, primarily because of the extremely low military and civilian living standards in the Soviet Union.) In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 percent of its gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last war), an increase of several times present expenditures for direct and indirect military purposes and foreign assistance.

From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American

economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living. After allowing for price changes, personal consumption expenditures rose by about one-fifth between 1939 and 1944, even though the economy had in the meantime increased the amount of resources going into Government use by \$60 \$65 billion (in 1939 prices).

This comparison between the potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States also holds true for the Soviet world and the free world and is of fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States.

The comparison gives renewed emphasis to the fact that the problems faced by the free countries in their efforts to build a successfully functioning system lie not so much in the field of economics as in the field of politics. The building of such a system may require more rapid progress toward the closer association of the free countries in harmony with the concept of the United Nations. It is clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice. It also seems clear that a unifying ideal of this kind might awaken and arouse the latent spiritual energies of free men everywhere and obtain their enthusiastic support for a positive program for peace going far beyond the frustration of the Kremlin design and opening vistas to the future that would outweigh short-run sacrifices.

The threat to the free world involved in the development of the Soviet Union's atomic and other capabilities will rise steadily and rather rapidly. For the time being, the United States possesses a marked atomic superiority over the Soviet Union which, together with the potential capabilities of the United States and other free countries in other forces and weapons, inhibits aggressive Soviet action. This provides an opportunity for the United States, in cooperation with other free countries, to launch a build-up of strength which will support a firm policy directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design. The immediate goal of our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world backed by adequate military strength is to postpone and avert the disastrous situation which, in light of the Soviet Union's probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability, might arise in 1954 on a continuation of our present programs. By acting promptly and vigorously in such a way that this date is, so to speak, pushed into the future, we would permit time for the process of accommodation, withdrawal and frustration to produce the necessary changes in the Soviet system. Time is short, however, and the risks of war attendant upon a decision to build up strength will steadily increase the longer we defer it.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In return, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development.

Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following statement of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:

14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system.
15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the USSR is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist countries.
16. The risk of war with the USSR is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States.
 - a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out.
 - b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the determination of the United States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or through U.S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take.
17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.
18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal development, important among which are:

- a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity.
- b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.
- c. Internal political and social disunity.
- d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures.
- e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace.
- f. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through vacillation of appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.
- g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics.

Although such developments as those indicated in paragraph 18 above would severely weaken the capability of the United States and its allies to cope with the Soviet threat to their security, considerable progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation upon which adequate strength can now be rapidly built.

The analysis also confirms that our objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of war, as stated in NSC 20/4 (para. 19), are still valid, as are the aims and measures stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Our current security programs and strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims, and measures:

19.

- a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence, and stability of the world family of nations.
- b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN Charter.

In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:

- a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.

- b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.
- c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the USSR and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.
- d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:

- a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.
- b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.
- c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.
- d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.
- e. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.
- f. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.

In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans, however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States political, economic, and

military objectives which is now imperative.

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program--harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives--is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.

This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the

initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

Recommendations

That the President:


- a. Approve the foregoing Conclusions.
- b. Direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the President, and with the participation of other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, to coordinate and insure the implementation of the Conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as necessary to achieve our objectives. For this purpose, representatives of the member Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, and other Departments and Agencies as required should be constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for consideration by the National Security Council.

NOTES

1. Marshal Tito, the Communist leader of Yugoslavia, broke away from the Soviet bloc in 1948.
2. The Secretary of State listed seven areas in which the Soviet Union could modify its behavior in such a way as to permit co-existence in reasonable security. These were:
 1. Treaties of peace with Austria, Germany, Japan and relaxation of pressures in the Far East;
 2. Withdrawal of Soviet forces and influence from satellite area;
 3. Cooperation in the United Nations;
 4. Control of atomic energy and of conventional armaments;
 5. Abandonment of indirect aggression;
 6. Proper treatment of official representatives of the U.S.;
 7. Increased access to the Soviet Union of persons and ideas from other countries. [Footnote in the source text. For the text of the address delivered by Secretary Acheson at the University of California, Berkeley, on March 16, 1950, concerning United States--Soviet relations, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 27, 1950, pp. 473-478.]

Snowflake

July 1, 2002 10:15 AM

TO: Ambassador Blackwill, New Delhi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Cables

Thanks so much for your cables. They were helpful, and I appreciate it.

Regards.

DHR:dh
070102-15

INDIA

170102

11-L-0559/OSD/9429

1110743 /02

July 1, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
Gen. Kadish

CC: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: UK and Missile Defense

UK

I have received several calls from Geoff Hoon asking for us to make sure that we talk to him first before we get anything in the press about things we want out of the UK with respect to missile defense. I noticed an article about our missile defense people going around the world asking for cooperation.

Let's make sure you are closely wired into the policy people before you start doing things like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070102-7

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

170102

July 1, 2002 3:44 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Franks
Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan and NGOs

I just looked over this NGO relationships paper. It is worrisome. We are not doing a thing to help Karzai with these issues, nor is State.

It is inexcusable. What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.
06/29/02 CJCS Talking Points

DHR:dh
070102-49

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

150102

UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF HAS SEEN

CCJ5

TALKING POINTS

JUN 01 2002

6/30

SUBJECT: NGO Relationships with CJCMOTF and Activities in Afghanistan

SUMMARY. The following information is provided regarding the relationship between the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) and the UN, NGOs, and USAID and the status of Non-Governmental Organizations and activities functioning in AFG.

- CJCMOTF works closely with the UN, IOs/NGOs, and USAID to eliminate duplication of effort, coordinate, and share information among all participants.

- CJCMOTF has a close working relationship with the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC). The UNJLC attends weekly meetings that the CJCMOTF co-chairs with the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) to discuss and update issues. Various NGOs also attend these meetings.

- CJCMOTF also coordinates with IO/NGOs at semi-weekly meetings conducted at the AACA office. The CJCMOTF keeps the IO/NGO community informed of location and status of its projects by submitting information to the UNJLC's Afghan Information Management System (AIMS) website. CJCMOTF has transferred nine previously approved OHDACA funded projects to various NGOs.

- CJCMOTF meets weekly with USAID representatives to coordinate issues and communicates frequently to resolve issues. The CJCMOTF is currently monitoring one project, the Sultan Rasia School in Mazar-e-Sharif, originally approved for OHDACA funding and subsequently transferred to USAID. Additionally, a Memorandum of Understanding is currently being staffed to co-locate a limited number of USAID personnel with Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) to facilitate HA project identification and execution.

- As of Jun 02, the CJCMOTF financed approximately \$4M of Humanitarian Assistance projects in the following sectors:

| | |
|------------------|---------|
| • Agriculture | \$.7M |
| Bridge/Road | \$.01M |
| Hospital/Medical | \$1.1M |
| Irrigation | \$.2M |
| Other | \$.1M |
| Schools | \$1.6M |
| Water Wells | \$.4M |

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11-L-0559/OSD/9432

UNCLASSIFIED

- An estimated 370 Non-government Organizations (NGO), International Organizations (IO), and United Nations (UN) agencies are working in AFG.

- Primary United Nations organizations functioning in AFG consist of: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations Development Program, World Health Organization, World Food Program, and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

- Major Non-governmental organizations functioning in AFG consist of: International Committee of the Red Cross, International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps, Hope Worldwide, HALO (Hazardous Area Life Support Organization) Trust, GOAL (Irish NGO), and Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development.

- Funding

- USAID currently manages approximately \$184M for FY 2002 for Afghan relief and reconstruction. USAID categorizes funded programs into seven major "sectors". Sectors and allocated funds are as follows:

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| • Humanitarian/Recovery (Food) | \$77M |
| Humanitarian/Recovery (Non-Food) | \$22M |
| Agriculture/Rural Economy | \$45.5M |
| Improving Health Care | \$10.7M |
| Educational Opportunities | \$ 6.7M |
| Stability/Good Governance | \$21.3M |
| Other | \$.5M |

- Top 5 recipients USAID is financing through grants (approximately \$109M) this year are as follows:

- United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP):
✓ \$77.3M for road construction, logistics support, food procurement and vehicle purchase.

- International Organization for Migration (IOM):
✓ \$10.14M for IDP care and transportation, and women's programs.

- International Rescue Committee (IRC): \$7.6M for
✓ water/sanitation, health education, Cash For Work, food and shelter, and seed.

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11-L-0559/OSD/9433

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- GOAL (Irish NGO): \$7.1M for shelter, water/sanitation, seeds, construction materials, food, Food For Work, and Cash For Work.

- Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED): \$6.9M for camp management, infrastructure rehabilitation, non-food items, coal, food, IDP shelter, and earthquake response.

- UN has financed \$851M worth of projects throughout its agencies.

- NGOs not funded by the United Nations or USAID have reported committing an estimated \$911.24M worth of projects in AFG.

- The International Community pledged over \$1B for Afghan reconstruction at the Tokyo Donors' Conference. To facilitate donor contributions, currently exceeding \$1B, the UN and other donors established the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund that is managed by the World Bank. USAID will be the major implementers of the bulk of the US government assistance.

Approved By C. A. D'Angelo
C. A. D'Angelo
COL, USA
Chief, J5-CMO Div

Prepared By Mark Martin
Mark Martin
MAJ, USA
CCJ5-CMO
24 Jun 02

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/9434

1
STANDARD FORM 64
FF 2064 L 67
2002 AUG 16 PM 3:32
USD/P 2/10/02
INFO MEMO

I-02/010249-HA&APL

AUG 12 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 8/12/02

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

You asked about coordination between CENTCOM and NGOs and about what we are doing to help Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) President Hamid Karzai.

What is Working Well: Coordination between DoD civil affairs personnel and representatives from the UN, NGOs, and the Afghan government.

- ATA Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani directs weekly meetings with the UN, NGOs, and DoD civil affairs representatives. DoD civil affairs personnel coordinate their assistance plans with various local and national Afghan officials, as well as USAID.
- As you know, DoD and State are also working on new plans to improve high-level coordination with the ATA on both Afghan civil and military reconstruction.

What Needs to be Improved: Ensuring that international assistance reinforces the ATA.

- There is a need to improve the capacity of Afghan ministries to do their work. With UN and U.S. help, Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani has established 12 program secretariats to manage international community assistance. UN personnel will work in each secretariat to help form the core of an effective Afghan Government office.
- The Principals have directed USG agencies to channel, as much as possible, assistance and reconstruction money through the Afghan Ministry of Finance. This will strengthen the ATA.
- State officials have discussed requiring NGOs to provide their plans to the appropriate Afghan program secretariat in order to receive U.S. funds. State and USAID should implement this idea as soon as possible and even consider requiring ATA approval of NGO plans in the longer term.

Prepared by: Michael J. McNerney, Stability Operations, (b)(6) 2-02 14:53 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/9435

U1 3582 /02

AFGHANISTAN

12 AUG 02

- State and Treasury are pressing Tokyo donors to fulfill their pledges. President Bush will send a letter to leaders of key international donor governments asking them to increase their assistance.
- USAID personnel will soon co-locate with DoD civil affairs teams throughout Afghanistan, thus increasing the synergy of their work.

Joe Collins, DASD (Stability Operations) will travel to Afghanistan on August 14, 2002. Upon return, he will provide further analysis and recommendations.

COORDINATION: Next under.

Attachment:

As stated

**Coordination
(Afghanistan and Non-Governmental Organizations)**

| | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|---|
| GC | William J. Haines II | <u>July 19, 2002</u> <u>Copy of USDP revisions</u> <u>provided August 5, 2002</u> |
| Director, Joint Staff | LTG John Abazaid | <u>July 25, 2002</u> <u>Copy of USDP revisions</u> <u>provided August 5, 2002</u> |
| DASD, NESA | William Luti | <u>July 16, 2002</u> <u>Copy of USDP revisions</u> <u>provided August 5, 2002</u> |

July 1, 2002 2:38 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
DOUG FEITH
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Afghan Army

When are you going to get a proposal to me as to what we ought to do about the Afghan National Army?

Thanks.

DIR:dh
070102-32


.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

150102

November 12, 2002 11:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: 2003 Travel

Please schedule a one-hour meeting with Doug Feith, you and me so we can sketch out travel for next year, and make sure I have my travel folder with me.

I think it is important that we do some things we have not done for a couple of years now. I am getting concerned about them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111202-38

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

U10761 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9439

333 SD

12 Nov 02

12:34 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 9, 2002

SUBJECT: **Speech Writers**

Let's start using some more interesting words. The vocabulary seems to be restricted and I think it is helpful and adds to the interest of remarks if words that are not currently being used in people's vocabulary, are added into speeches and remarks.

Just last night I was reading something and I saw the words "providence" and "ardor" and it crossed my mind that neither one are we using.

Why don't you think about that and let's add that interest element.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
110902.13

Please respond by: 11/25

U10762 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9440

350.001 30

9 Nov 02

12:30 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 CC: Col. Bucci
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: November 9, 2002
 SUBJECT: Calendar

Why don't you go ahead and schedule that oral history. I am the only one left who needs to be done. I think it is with Dr. Goldberg.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 110902.11

Please respond by:

11/23

12/1
 Col Bucci -
 Good thing to
 do in late December
 after everyone has gone.
 D. Rita
 (December 23?)

DI Rita

12/2

11-L-0559/OSD/9441

U10766 /03

000.71

SD

9 Nov 02

December 4, 2002 7:01 AM

TO: John Stenbit
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Secure Communications

The secure communications are not good. Calls seem to keep breaking and going out.

Why can't we get a better system on airplanes, in the office and in cars. There isn't a time I have a secure call that it doesn't drop for some reason and have to be replaced.

Maybe it is just too complex a task to achieve, but I would have thought that with all the money we spend, we ought to be able to figure out how to do it a bit better.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120402-1

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

U10768 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9442

211

4 Dec 02

October 9, 2002 9:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: End Strength Meeting

Please set a meeting for October 15 for Paul Wolfowitz to report back to me on this memorandum on end strength, with David Chu, Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace, Gen. Craddock, Di Rita and me.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/01/02 SecDef memo to DepSecDep re: End Strength [100102-13]

DHR:dh
100902-19

.....
Please respond by _____

U10770 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9443

320.2

900702

October 28, 2002 8:02 AM

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Protests

Please find out what was said about me or what posters there were on me at the various protests in Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington, Taos, etc. I would like to have a sense of what they are complaining about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102802-8.....
Please respond by 11/08/02

1 Nov 2002

Sir,

We've assembled a series of articles and photos pertaining to the anti-war protests in Taos and various other locations. There is an indexed tab at the front of the book. Of particular interest might be Tabs 1 and 2 which depict articles related to the demonstration and photos of the actual march on your El Prado property. Tab 3 also includes several items collected from the rally site.

V/R

(b)(6)

U10772 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9444

02057

380402

October 29, 2002 7:15 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Attire

When we have a dinner like we did last night and list the attire as "business suits," then the military have to change clothes before they come. I think it is fine if the military come in uniform.

Why don't we find what the proper phrase is, so when we have a dinner in the future, we can let the military people come any way they want.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102902-1

.....
Please respond by 11 | 08 | 02


U10774 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9445

420

1900502

October 10, 2002 12:14 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: House Gymnasium Dinner

In the future, I want to go to the House of Representatives Gymnasium Dinner. I missed it this year, and people mentioned it to me because I was there last year.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101002-4

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

601.1 SD


16 Oct 02

U10775 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9446

12:43 PM

4

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: November 26, 2002

SUBJECT:

(b)(6)

tells me this cell phone has an address in Maryland and clearly it is a fake and someone is ripping me off.

You better have Dell'Orto look into it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112602.03

Please respond by:

12/5/02

U10776 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9447

3/1/3

26 Nov 02

November 25, 2002 9:28 AM

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld

DN

SUBJECT: Cell Phone

Before we try to figure it out, please double check that cell phone and make sure it isn't one being used in New Mexico by any of my crew, and make sure it isn't Joyce's or one of my kids. One way would be to find out where the phone calls were made to and from, then we can maybe figure out if it is anyone connected to me.

Thanks.

DHR dh
112502-9

Please respond by

12/6/02

Larry di Rocco

FAXED

11/25/02 - C/M

11:20am

11-L-0559/OSD/9448

1075 1030
snowflake

2:51 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: November 26, 2002
SUBJECT:

← Sir.
attached.
→

Larry Di Rita

12/4

Give me that Evan Thomas quote to show to Joyce.

Thanks.

DHR/szn
112602.06

Please respond by:

12/5

U10779 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9449

02059

2002 Nov 26

Conversation between Don Imus and Evan Thomas of Newsweek

Imus-"Rumsfeld doesn't come up looking great, does he? (In reference to Bob Woodward's book Bush at War)

Thomas-"Well, he's the guy, who's, there's always somebody left standing, you know, after, after, musical chairs, and he was it. He, Rumsfeld's a very prickly proud guy, he doesn't give a damn about reporters, he really doesn't. He's not faking it, he really doesn't care. And so when Woodward came to him with the usual demands, unstated demand, you know, you pay or you play, he wouldn't play and he's the one who comes off looking badly. The reason, it's not so much Woodward is out to get Rumsfeld, that's the wrong way of looking at it. The point is that in, if you read Woodward's books, he always has, he'll have these meetings and he'll have, the characters will be looking at each other, and weighing each other and thinking about each other, and that's how they get their point of view across, so you have Colin Powell looking at Rumsfeld, or you have Condoleezza Rice looking at the president, but you never have Rumsfeld looking at anybody else, so Rumsfeld never gets to give his point of view and as a result, everybody's doubts or skepticisms about Rumsfeld come through but not the other way around.

Imus-"Didn't Rumsfeld poke Woodward in the chest or something with his fingers?

Thomas-"Yeah, there's this weird scene, weird scene outside the Pentagon, this is in Woodward's book, where Woodward said he just ran into Rumsfeld by chance and uh, uh, they start talking and Rumsfeld jabs three fingers into Woodward's chest knocking him off balance. Now, I talked to Rumsfeld's people yesterday, they say that never happened. Rumsfeld just says it never happened.

Imus-"Does Woodward say it happened?"

Thomas-"Yeah, I saw Woodward last night actually after Larry King and he said, yeah, absolutely it happened, he doesn't know what Rumsfeld is talking about.

Imus-"I wonder if uh, uh, in this struggle between Rumsfeld, Cheney, Colin Powell and, if, uh, it's personal.


Thomas-"Well this is a complicated subject, you know because the, these guys generally up to Woodward don't leak. So, up to this point they did a pretty good job of presenting a fairly united front and the feeling always was that, these are grownups, you know, they're not out to get each other, they're people at the end of their careers who are trying to do the right thing, they really have nothing to lose and they're not aspiring to some higher job and so that as a war cabinet goes they get along pretty well, and I think that's generally true. However, there are some serious tensions beneath the surface, particularly between, uh, apparently Rumsfeld and the others, and those tensions come out in Woodward's book.

Imus-"I guess, implicitly in my question was we hope it is."

Thomas-"No, you hope it is."

Imus-"Yeah, well, of course, yeah."

Thomas-"No, but actually I hope it isn't because these guys, you know, they're dealing with very difficult decisions and you need, you want some trust between them. Uh, you know, they're trying to decide whether to go to war here, and, uh, I hope they trust each other."



To: S. To C 1/7

December 2, 2002 4:05 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

SUBJECT: Robotics

Please have someone give me a readable report on what DARPA or the Army, Navy or Air Force are doing with respect to robotics for urban warfare.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120202-21

.....
Please respond by 12/18/02

1/7
George Stedred
1/7

400.112

2 Dec 02

U10701 /03



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 27 2003

INFO MEMO

December 20, 2002, 0800 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: E.C. Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) *EC Aldridge 12/24/02*

SUBJECT: Robotics for Urban Warfare

- On December 2, 2002, you asked for a report on what DARPA or the Services were doing with respect to robotics for urban warfare. *WAB*
- The report is at TAB B.
- Sensors, control mechanisms, and artificial intelligence capabilities for unmanned systems to conduct urban warfare are maturing but are not ready for fielding today. The Services are adapting fielded unmanned systems to provide general Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), communication relay, and precision munitions/sensor delivery (i.e. UAVs conducting external surveillance of buildings and streets, and UGVs delivering explosives for breaching and building entry). The Services also have been conducting experiments to develop Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP's) for urban operations.
- Action: None required. For information only.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments: as stated

Prepared By: Michael Toscano, (b)(6)




REPORT ON DARPA/SERVICE ACTIVITY WITH RESPECT TO ROBOTICS FOR URBAN WARFARE

December 20, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9454





UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES FOR URBAN WARFARE

The Services and DARPA have been experimenting with Unmanned Air Vehicles in urban operations for the past several years, particularly the Army's Dismounted Maneuver Battle Lab and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. UAVs with *specialized* urban warfare capabilities (i.e., ability to fly in urban canyons, inside buildings, etc.) are still developmental. This mission presents problems with communications, guidance, obstacle avoidance, restricted flight envelopes and survivability of hovering platforms. However, UAV systems developed principally for other tactical missions can be used for urban operations. Examples are the Air Force's Predator, the Marine Corps' Pioneer, and the Army's Shadow 200 and Hunter systems. These UAVs can provide general Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) support (i.e., conducting external surveillance of buildings, streets, open areas) as well as communications relay. Some UAVs can also deliver precision munitions or unattended sensors. The following fielded and developmental systems can be used in support of urban operations. Note: Hovering platforms are particularly vulnerable to ground fire.

| SYSTEM | MISSION | CAPABILITIES | NUMBER EXISTING | ESTIMATED UNIT COST | EXAMPLE |
|---|------------------------------------|---|--------------------|------------------------|---|
| <u>SOCOM Fielded Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Pointer | Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 10 lbs 3 NM Range 1 Hr Endurance 2 lb Payload | 24+ | \$35K |  |
| <u>Marine Corps Fielded Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Dragon Eye | Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 4.5 lbs 2.5 NM Range 1 Hr Endurance 1 lb Payload | 19 | \$10K |  |
| <u>Air Force Fielded Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System | Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 7 lbs 5 NM Range 1.5 Hr Endurance 1 lb Payload | 48 | \$25-30K |  |




11-L-0559/OSD/9455

UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES (cont)

| SYSTEM | MISSION | CHARACTERISTICS | NUMBER EXISTING | ESTIMATED UNIT COST | EXAMPLE |
|--|--|---|--------------------|------------------------|---|
| <u>Navy Pre-production Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Fire Scout No Production Planned | Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 2250 lbs 110 NM Range 6+ hrs Endurance 200 lbs Payload | 3 | \$4.75M |  |
| <u>Marine Corps Developmental Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Dragon Warrior IOC TBD | Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 250 lbs 50NM Range 3-5 hrs Endurance 35 lb Payload | 2 | \$1M |  |
| <u>OSD/AS&C Developmental Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Tern (XUAV ACTD) IOC 2002 | Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 60 lbs 430 NM Range 7 hrs Endurance 30 lbs Payload | 5 | \$67K |  |
| Camcopter (XUAV ACTD) IOC 2002 | Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 150 lbs 110 NM Range 6 hrs Endurance 55 lbs Payload | 1 | \$350K |  |

11-L-0559/OSD/9456



UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES (cont)

| SYSTEM | MISSION | CAPABILITIES | NUMBER EXISTING | ESTIMATED UNIT COST | EXAMPLE |
|--|--|--|--------------------|------------------------|---|
| <u>DARPA Developmental Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Micro Air Vehicle (ACTD) IOC 2004 | Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 5 lbs 5 NM Range 40 Min Endurance 1 lb Payload | 100 | \$10K |  |
| Organic Air Vehicle IOC 2003 | Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 25 lbs Range TBD Endurance TBD 10 lbs Payload | 18 | \$50K |  |
| A160 Hummingbird IOC TBD | Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance | 4000 lbs 1500 NM Range 24+ hrs Endurance 300+ lbs Payload | 3 | \$5-7M |  |





UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES FOR URBAN WARFARE

UGVs have been used in limited real world urban warfare operations in the following mission areas: bomb damage assessment, sewer and tunnel reconnaissance, defeating booby traps and obstacles, and force protection/EOD. Other applications that can be performed by UGVs in urban warfare are clearing buildings, interior mapping of buildings, placing demolitions, casualty evacuation, and all-weather persistent surveillance. DARPA started the Tactical Mobile Robots (TMR) program in 1997 to address the issues arising from small UGVs in Urban Warfare. Most of the systems developed for the TMR (PACKBOT, URBOT, Talon) have transitioned to the OSD-led, Service-conducted Joint Robotics Program for advanced development and user experiments. Most UGVs today are operator driven, with limited autonomous functionality. The Army, Marine Corps and SOCOM have and continue to experiment with UGVs to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for urban warfare operations.

UGVs with applications in Urban Warfare are shown below.





| SYSTEM | MISSION | CAPABILITIES | NUMBER EXISTING | ESTIMATED UNIT COST | EXAMPLE |
|--|---|--|--------------------|------------------------|---|
| <u>Joint Robotics Program and Service Fielded Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Remote Ordnance Neutralization System (RONS) | Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) | 600 lbs Fiber optic and RF Capabilities Multiple EOD Payloads | 230 | \$170K |  |
| All-Purpose Remote Transport System (ARTS) | Explosive Ordnance Disposal / Force Protection | 8000 lbs Line of sight control Multiple EOD/Force Protection payloads | 43 | \$280K |  |

UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES (cont)

| SYSTEM | MISSION | CAPABILITIES | NUMBER EXISTING | ESTIMATED UNIT COST | EXAMPLE |
|--|---|---|--------------------|------------------------|---|
| <u>Joint Robotics Program and Service Developmental Systems</u> | | | | | |
| PACKBOT IOC 2003 | Reconnaissance and Surveillance | 45 lbs Up to 8 hrs Fiber optics comms, Multiple sensors and cameras | 10 | \$53K |  |
| URBOT IOC 2003 | Reconnaissance and Surveillance | 65 lbs Up to 8 hrs Multiple sensors And cameras | 5 | \$80K |  |
| MINI-FLAIL IOC 2003 | Countermine/ Obstacle Clearing | 2500 lbs 300 m Line-of-Sight Multiple anti-personnel mine payloads | 17 | \$155K |  |
| GLADIATOR IOC 2006 | Reconnaissance and Surveillance / Direct Fire / Target Acquisition/ Scouting | 1600 lbs Line-of-Sight Sensors and weapons payload | 1 | \$350K |  |

11-L-0559/OSD/9459

UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES (cont)

| SYSTEM | MISSION | CAPABILITIES | NUMBER EXISTING | ESTIMATED UNIT COST | EXAMPLE |
|--|--|--|--------------------|------------------------|---|
| <u>Joint Robotics Program and Service Developmental Systems</u> | | | | | |
| TALON IOC 2003 | Explosive Ordnance Disposal/ Reconnaissance and Surveillance | 80 lbs Up to 12hrs Fiber optic comms, Multiple sensors and cameras | 33 | \$60K |  |
| MATILDA IOC 2003 | Reconnaissance and Surveillance/ Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Detection | 50 lbs 1 km Range Multiple payloads | 50 | \$50K |  |
| <u>DARPA Developmental Systems</u> | | | | | |
| Bio-Robotics Scorpion IOC TBD | Reconnaissance and Surveillance | 25 lbs 1 hr Small sensors and cameras | 2 | \$75K |  |
| RHex IOC TBD | Reconnaissance and Surveillance | 16 lbs 1 hrs Small sensors and cameras | 5 | \$35K |  |

11-L-0559/OSD/9460

December 2, 2002 4:04 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Air Force Study

*Larry Di Ann
12/14*

I would like to see that Air Force study on the C-130 and the Stryker that Duncan Hunter was talking about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120202-20

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

*Sir -
Here are the charts you requested.*

*SK
12/12*

452 C

2 Dec 02

U10782 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9461



U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEES
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
AND FACILITIES
CHAIRMAN
MILITARY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
PANEL ON TERRORISM
CHAIRMAN
MERCHANT MARINE
OVERSIGHT PANEL

November 19, 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Chairman Duncan Hunter and I recently met with representatives of the Army regarding the Stryker combat system. The results of the meeting can best be summed up by Chairman Hunter when he said, "We were told in the late 1990's that we were in need of a lighter, more transportable, deployable, and survivable light armored infantry system. The Stryker has been proposed to be that system. However, it is neither lighter, nor more deployable, survivable or transportable than systems we already have."

The Army attempts to make numerous arguments to disprove Chairman Hunter's statement, but without success. A discussion of each argument follows.

Transportability

The initial requirement regarding Stryker transportability for 1000 nautical miles aboard C130 aircraft is seldom achieved. I have enclosed two charts from Air Mobility Command that show flight distances of the C130 aircraft with Stryker aboard. As you will see, there are a number of instances where-in the loaded C130 cannot take off. After being presented with this information, the Army now claims that, "We always intended to use the C-17 for Stryker deployment, we just oversold the deployment capability of the C-130. And, second, that much of the Stryker transportation will be done by sea lift."

That simply was never Congressional policy makers understanding; in fact, we were told just the opposite. As a matter of fact, the situation involving strategic air lift capability and availability was and is in extremely short supply. The leadership of the Air Mobility Command continues to remind us of the need for more C-17s and/or to rebuild the C-5 fleet, and this is without the newly added Stryker "final leg" deployment mission. Any fair minded person knows that the initial C-130 requirement was identified because of the shortage of strategic lift and the availability of tactical C-130 short field assault capability.

REPLY TO

328 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3003

(b)(6)

100 HIGH ST SUITE 301
MT HOLLY, NJ 08060-1498

(b)(6)

7 HADLEY AVE.
TOMBS RIVER, NJ 08753-7939

(b)(6)

1 MAINE AVENUE
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08002-2051

(b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/9462

Further, if the Stryker is to be moved by ship, then the global rapid deployment target laid down by the Chief of Staff of the Army - a brigade to be in place within 96 hours - will not come close to being met. The issue of early entry - of taking down an enemy without a buildup - is mission critical but seems to have disappeared from the Army's planning. It seems that for the Army to make this point, they must have changed their operational concept. Also, heavier combat vehicles in the Army's current inventory can be moved by ship, so with this in mind, why should we buy the Stryker in the first place?

Ground Mobility

The rationale for a wheeled vehicle has been developed by the Army based on "speed over the road and getting to the fight faster while having ground mobility to enable rapid change of position, and the ability to hide."

The Army wins the argument that the Stryker at 60 mph is faster over the road as compared to the M113. However, this does ignore the fact that with RPG armor, the speed of the vehicle at 44,000 lb is significantly slower, and there are serious questions about the ability of the transmission and universals to hold up with the added weight.

The Army argument now takes on a different dimension. Their argument regarding "getting to the fight faster" is presumably a comparison with the speed of tracked vehicles. However, it should be pointed out that ground mobility is far more important than speed.

With that in mind, Stryker's off road mobility varies with terrain. If the ground is hard and dry, it will perform reasonably well. If the ground is wet or boggy or churned up or otherwise less than ideal (which is normally the case in the kind of locations the Army is likely to have to fight), then tracks win every time. This was recently proven in Afghanistan where the Marine LAVs, although lighter than the Stryker, had great trouble in moving across the terrain, even when on rough roads while the local rock greatly damaged their tires. The Army's arguments seem to be based on road travel, which is an unrealistic assumption.

The Army's notion that "wheels allow the Army to fight better in smaller, more dispersed operational groups" depends entirely on terrain. It would seem that if the Army wants to fight in only "good terrain," that is one thing, but if the Army wants to have all its options open and be able to maneuver off-road, hide in places like wooded areas and swamps, then tracks will prove better almost every time.

Armor

The Army's position on armor is that the Stryker is adequately armored up to 14.5mm and that RPG applique has been ordered.

The fact is that there are reported problems with wheel well 14.5mm protection resulting from live fire testing at Aberdeen. Further, at the Army's admission, the wheel wells cannot be fitted with applique for RPG protection because of the turning involved with the front two sets of steering wheels. I was first informed of the seriousness of this weakness by an American who helped train the Afghan fighters to kill Soviet wheeled vehicles by hitting them with RPGs in the wheel wells. More recently, I have confirmed that weaknesses such as this are just what U.S. soldiers and marines are trained to exploit.

Assault Landing

The Army's current position is that the inability of the C-130 to accomplish "assault landings" does not matter. The Army explains what they meant in the original assault landing requirement as follows: "The problem with the assault landing issue is with the definition of assault landing and the miscommunication between the Army and the Air Force. The Army meant an unimproved landing strip, 3000 ft long and 90 ft wide, and the Air Force meant a 'threatened area'...It never was intended to use the C-130 with a Stryker in the area that is threatened."

The fact is that a C-130 is not capable of "assault landing" with the 40,000 lb Stryker on board, and the notion that assault landings will not be required is ludicrous. Intra-theater means you fly from a safe base into the war zone and that, in itself, suggests threat. This is exactly why the Air Force installs armor on their C-130s in these situations. Consider Bosnia where assault landing were a constant feature to avoid snipers.

Air Drop

The Army correctly states that air drop is not a requirement. But why not?

The fact that the Army is not thinking this way shows a lack of tactical rigor and a "passing over" of well known and proven air assault techniques. Of course, the alternative, in the case of a recently secured airfield, will be an assault landing.

Urban warfare

The Army position is that the Stryker is superior in urban warfare. This is subject to serious question for several reasons:

1. The Stryker requires a space of 112ft in diameter to accomplish a 180 degree turn. In urban warfare, this would be a huge disadvantage. By contrast, the M113A3 and other tracked vehicles "axis turn." Consider a scenario in a typical middle eastern street where a blockade has been rolled in front of a Stryker. The Army should explain a likely successful tactic to be used in this type of situation.
2. The Stryker cannot climb over cars while tracked vehicles such as the M113 can. In urban battles, cars can be chained together to form blockades as in Mogadishu. This would seem to be a serious weakness of the Stryker.
3. The use of rudimentary weapons of war must also be considered. Would not the Stryker's tires present a vulnerability to be exploited by molotov cocktails?

Cost

The Army's position is that the cost of the least expensive Stryker is \$1.2 million. However, estimates run as high as an unbelievable \$6 million per copy, when research and development costs are considered as well as funds which are being transferred from other accounts. Therefore, it would appear that an independent examination of the cost by DOD is a essential to determine what the exact costs will be.

Meanwhile, the cost to upgrade the M113A3 is \$400,000 per copy. To up armor some of the existing 15,000 M113s currently in stock to 14.5mm armor level for an estimated \$100,000 leaves \$300,000 for a more powerful engine and other modifications.


Conclusion

Chairman Hunter was nearly 100 percent correct. The Stryker proposal presents a weapons system that is heavier than other already available systems, and is less transportable, deployable, and survivable. However, there is one additional aspect inherent in the Stryker program which appears to have been overlooked: it costs at least 3 times as much as the M113 alternative.

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
November 19, 2002
Page 5

I hope you will find this information to be helpful. My intention was to share what I have learned with you, in hopes you will find it useful. Thank you in advance for your attention to this issue.

Sincerely,



JIM SAXTON
Member of Congress

cc: Dr. Stephen Cambone

Encl.

HJS/emk

11-L-0559/OSD/9466

Employment Challenges

Take off Performance

| Airfield | Runway | Elevation | Temp (Fahrenheit) | | Max Take off Gross Weight | | Flight R w/40,000 Cargo | |
|--------------------|---------|-----------|----------------------|-----|------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------|--|
| | | | High | Low | Day | Night | Day | |
| Seeb, Oman | 11,774' | 48' | 93 | 86 | 154,000 | 155,000 | 280 | |
| Doha, Qatar | 15,000' | 35' | 108 | 90 | 148,000 | 154,000 | | |
| Shamsi | 9,120' | 2,441' | 99 | 90 | 140,000 | 143,000 | | |
| Jacobabad | 9,950' | 180' | 107 | 93 | 150,000 | 154,000 | | |
| Bagram | 9,856' | 4,895' | 99 | 64 | 126,000 | 139,000 | | |
| Kabul | 11,483' | 5,871' | 93 | 70 | 124,000 | 135,000 | | |
| Qandahar | 10,500' | 3,312' | 97 | 72 | 137,000 | 148,000 | | |
| Karshi Khanabad | 8,194' | 1,365' | 99 | 77 | 147,000 | 154,000 | | |

11-L-0559/OSD/9467

Employment Challenges

Take off Performance

| Airfield | Runway | Elevation | Temp (Fahrenheit) | | Max Take off Gross Weight | | Flight R w/38,00 Carg | |
|--------------------|---------|-----------|----------------------|-----|------------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|--|
| | | | High | Low | Day | Night | Day | |
| Seeb, Oman | 11,774' | 48' | 93 | 86 | 154,000 | 155,000 | 620 | |
| Doha, Qatar | 15,000' | 35' | 108 | 90 | 148,000 | 154,000 | 260 | |
| Shamsi | 9,120' | 2,441' | 99 | 90 | 140,000 | 143,000 | | |
| Jacobabad | 9,950' | 180' | 107 | 93 | 150,000 | 154,000 | 230 | |
| Bagram | 9,856' | 4,895' | 99 | 64 | 126,000 | 139,000 | | |
| Kabul | 11,483' | 5,871' | 93 | 70 | 124,000 | 135,000 | | |
| Qandahar | 10,500' | 3,312' | 97 | 72 | 137,000 | 148,000 | | |
| Karshi Khanabad | 8,194' | 1,365' | 99 | 77 | 147,000 | 154,000 | 390 | |

11-L-0559/OSD/9468

December 2, 2002 8:09 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hiltermann Piece in *International Herald Tribune*

draft

Someone should write a letter to the editor on this Hiltermann article. This is pretty bad. Please get it drafted and let me look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hiltermann, Joost R. "Who Minded Iraqi Mustard Gas in 1983?" *International Herald Tribune*, November 29, 2002.

DHR:dh
120202-12

.....

Please respond by 12/7/02

12/2 -

see below

*Torne's drafting
one up. Separately.*

*Dick Allen checked
in to say how angry he
is because Hiltermann
is affiliated with a group behind*

2 Dec 02

U10784 103 *Dick Allen is a board member.*

11-L-0559/OSD/9469 *asked Torne to consider asking
to do a letter, too. Dike to*

International Herald Tribune
November 29, 2002

Who Minded Iraqi Mustard Gas In 1983?

Rumsfeld should know

By Joost R. Hiltermann

WASHINGTON - In warning against a possible Iraqi chemical or biological strike against U.S. troops, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked last week that "there's a danger that Saddam Hussein would do things he's done previously - he has in the past used chemical weapons."

Rumsfeld should know. Declassified State Department documents show that when he had an opportunity to raise the issue of chemical weapons with the Iraqi leadership in 1983, he failed to do so in any meaningful way. Worse, he may well have given a signal to the Iraqis that the United States would close its eyes to Iraq's use of chemical weapons during its war with Iran, providing an early boost to Iraq's plans to develop weapons of mass destruction. As President Ronald Reagan's special envoy for the Middle East, Rumsfeld in December 1983 made the first visit by a U.S. official of his seniority to Baghdad, where he met President Saddam Hussein and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Iraq had broken off diplomatic relations with the United States in June 1967. Now both sides hoped that the talks in Baghdad would facilitate a resumption of formal ties.

The visit came at a time when Iraq was facing Iranian "human wave" assaults that posed a serious threat to the regime. In response, Iraq had started to use chemical weapons on the battlefield - primarily mustard gas, a blister agent that can kill. This was known in Washington at least as early as October 1983. State Department officials had raised the alarm, suggesting ways of deterring further Iraqi use. But they faced resistance. Washington, while taking a formal position of neutrality in the Gulf conflict, had started a pronounced tilt toward Iraq, providing it with significant financial and political support. As talking points and minutes of the meetings show, the aim of Rumsfeld's mission was to inform the Iraqi leadership of America's shifting policy in the Middle East. It was also intended to explore a proposal to run an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian port of Aqaba (a U.S. business interest involving the Bechtel Corporation), and to caution the Iraqis not to escalate the war in the Gulf through air strikes against Iranian oil facilities and tankers (which Washington feared might draw the United States into the war).

There is no indication that Rumsfeld raised U.S. concerns about Iraq's use of poison gas with Saddam Hussein. But in a private meeting with Tariq Aziz, he made a single brief reference to "certain things" that made it difficult for the United States to do more to help Iraq. These things included "chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." There is no record of further discussion of chemical weapons or human rights at these meetings, which covered the length and breadth of the warming relationship. Rumsfeld did, however, place considerable emphasis on the need for Iraq to prevent an escalation in the Gulf conflict via attacks on Iranian oil installations and tankers. Certainly nothing suggests that he told the Iraqi leadership to take care of "certain things" before diplomatic relations could be restored.

The senior U.S. diplomat in Baghdad reported a few days later with evident delight that "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level." But, he noted, "during and following the Rumsfeld visit we have received no commitment from the Iraqis that they will refrain from military moves toward escalation in the Gulf."

The record of the war suggests that, flush with their new confidence in U.S. backing, the Iraqis may have felt that they were now less restrained. They attacked Iranian oil facilities and ended up drawing the United States into the war, in 1987.

In the first Iranian offensive after Rumsfeld's visit, in February 1984, Iraq used not only large amounts of mustard gas but also the highly lethal nerve agent tabun. It was the first recorded use of the nerve agent in history. In November 1984, shortly after Reagan's re-election, diplomatic relations between the Washington and Baghdad were restored.

Iraq made increasing use of chemical weapons on the battlefield and even against civilians. This culminated in the wholesale gassing of the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988, causing the deaths of several thousand innocent men, women, and children.

Eventually Iraq was able to force a cease-fire with Iran after eight years of fighting.

The American public should demand a full accounting for the support its leadership provided Iraq in the past, including its green light to chemical weapons use - weapons that Washington is belatedly claiming should be destroyed.

The writer, Middle East project director for the International Crisis Group, is preparing a book on U.S. policy toward Iraq, with partial support from the Open Society Institute and the MacArthur Foundation. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

December 2, 2002 7:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Awards

Please let me know what awards I can give, or the Department can give, for civilians, for military, for foreigners, whatever, and generally what purpose they have.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120202-4

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

2/10
Ray Du Bois
Please advise.
J. Rumsfeld
Larry Di Rita
2/10

U10785 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9472

0005

5 Dec 02

December 3, 2002 7:05 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Service Secretaries

The three Service Secretaries tell me they sent me a letter months ago with some ideas on a process. Do you know where that is? I am sure I saw it, but I don't recall it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120302-3

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

U10786 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9473

020 Dog

3 Dec 02

December 4, 2002 7:16 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *YR*
SUBJECT: Japanese Press

Here are all the business cards of the Japanese press people I saw at the Japanese Embassy last night. They all said they wanted interviews. I told them you were in charge!


Thanks.

Attach.
Business cards


DHR:dh
120402-3

.....
Please respond by _____

000.7150

 **HIRO-TSUGU AIDA**
KYODO NEWS
WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF

ROOM 400, NATIONAL PRESS BLDG.,
20045, U.S.A.

 (b)(6)

<http://home.kyodonews.jp/>

U10789 /03

11 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9474

December 4, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: Arlene

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: VP Function

We are going to go to the Vice President's function here on Friday, December 13, but if Margaret Robson is also going, we will want to go with her. If I am out of town, Joyce would go with her.

Thanks.

Attach.

VP Invitation for 12/13

DHR:dh
120402-6

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

Sir -

*You are currently
scheduled to return to
Andrews at 11 pm on
Friday, Dec. 13, from
your trip to the Horn/ME*

0011SD

U10700 /03

4 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9475

December 4, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: (b)(6)
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: (b)(6) Birthday

We may want to do something about (b)(6) birthday on January 4.
 At the present time, you are holding the Wizards tickets.

Please check with us around December 20, before I go to Taos, to see if anything has changed and we want to do something with (b)(6) in which case we would give up the tickets. One thought is we might want to go see "Les Misérables," which is the last day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 120402-5

.....

Please respond by 12/20/02

335 SD

4 Dec 02

U10791 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9476

December 4, 2002 1:42 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Prince Bandar

Let's make sure I get that appointment with Prince Bandar, and I would like Gen. Myers with me, and Doug Feith, if he is in town.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120402-29

.....

Please respond by 12/20/02

*5 December -
SecDef -
We are told he is
away from Washington
for 2 weeks.
D, Rita*

U10792 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/9477

*Saudi
ARABIA*

4 Dec 02

December 4, 2002 9:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Extension for Gen. Hayden

I met with Mike Hayden and told him the President, the Vice President, George Tenet and I all are pleased with the work he is doing and would like him to extend.

He said his five years will end in April 2004 and that the extension we have agreed to on a handshake is that he will stay until September 2004.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120402-21

.....
Please respond by _____

U10793 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9478

040750

10/11/02

December 4, 2002 10:03 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Off-the-Record Session

I think we ought to think about having an off-the-record session with the press before Christmas. Pam Hess asked some good questions down there, and that is the kind of thing we might want to discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120402-22

.....

Please respond by 12/20/02

It's Saturday, 12/7

U10794 103

11-L-0559/OSD/9479

000.71 SD

4 Dec 02

December 4, 2002 9:52 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Briefing

When do I get the briefing on "Eligible Receiver"?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120402-19

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

SIR,

*12/5
1430*

*IT'S ON THE
LIST OF JOINT STAFF
BRIEFS WAITING TO
BE SCHEDULED, IN THE
QUEUE" *W
g
W**

*W/R
CDRS.*

U10795 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9480

4 Dec 02

December 4, 2002 8:18 AM

Protocol
~~Public Affairs~~
~~Protocol~~

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Photos

Please send photo #2 to (b)(6) #3 to (b)(6) #4 to (b)(6)
 (b)(6) and #5 to (b)(6)

Thanks.

Attach.
 Photos

DHR:dh
 120402-18

.....
 Please respond by 12/15/02

0605D

U10797 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9481

4/Dec 02

12/12 1330
Larry Di...
12/16

TO: SecDef
FROM: Torie Clarke
DATE: December 6, 2002
SUBJECT: Photos


As a matter of course, your photographers regularly provide copies of trip photos to the other people appearing in the pictures. We did that in this case as well. We will continue this practice in the future.

11-L-0559/OSD/9482

December 4, 2002 8:16 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Declaration

When the declaration comes in, I don't think any of us ought to comment on it until we have come to some sort of administration-wide understanding of what we want to say.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120402-16

.....
Please respond by _____

U10799 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9483

381

4 Dec 02

December 4, 2002 8:13 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Discuss w/Abizaid

I would like to talk to General Abizaid about Soup Campbell and Metzger, but don't tell him that is what I want to talk about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120402-14

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

U10800 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9484

000.7150

4/Dec 02

46 snowflake
1600

3/0 Cambone (v)

Larry Di Rita
3/5

December 4, 2002 8:10 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Soup Campbell

Please see me about Soup Campbell, the Air Force general at CIA.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120402-12

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 20 2003

12/21

Cambone does not know
what he has done
for us. Never hears from
him, sees him, has no view.
Jacoby may have better insight.

L. R. L.

U10802 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9485

040 CIA

4 Dec 02

① Ash S.L.
+ Ash Jacoby
[Signature]

② Ash S.L.
+ develop on
options on him

December 4, 2002 8:02 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get this Peters cartoon in the *Dayton Daily News* of George Bush with a chain saw. If you could get an original of that, I would love it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/09/02 *Newsweek*, p. 31.

DHR:dh
120402-8

.....
Please respond by 1/3/03

U10805 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9486

3355D

4 Dec 02

Perspectives

"No one will be forgiven."

Israel Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon**, on simultaneous terrorist attacks on an Israeli-owned beach resort and an Israeli charter jetliner in Kenya




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"Right now I'm fulfilling my contract ... I'm 100 percent sure that after this I'm done." **Michael Jordan**, on returning for a third year with the Washington Wizards

"Stab someone for no reason then set them on fire, throw them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before everything goes black, spit on their face." Passage labeled "Satan's mission for you this week," posted on the Internet by a Michigan high-school student. A federal judge ruled that suspending the student is a violation of free speech.

"Public morals? What are those?" Mexico City lawmaker **Francisco Solís**, on posing for a political-magazine photograph wearing only the logo of his National Action Party as a fig leaf




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"We will go where the facts lead us." Former secretary of State **Henry Kissinger**, on his appointment to head the investigation into Washington's intelligence failures prior to the September 11 attacks

"It's like going to a very inexpensive spa." Former Providence, R.I., mayor **Vincent Cianci Jr.**, on reporting to a federal prison in Fort Dix, N.J., to serve a five-year, four-month sentence for heading a bribery scheme out of City Hall

"New York is a town of big mouths. If we chill dissent and stop being the city of big mouths, the nation loses something vital, even if it doesn't realize that now." Former New York Civil Liberties Union director **Norman Siegal**, on New York's police commissioner wanting to give officers more elbow room to photograph, tape and infiltrate political and social organizations to uproot terror networks



© 2002 J. KELLEY—TIMES PICTURE

"Dear Governor-elect Racine, congratulations to you, your family and staff on your recent election! I would like to take this opportunity to welcome you to one of the most rewarding and challenging jobs in America." Florida Gov. **Jeb Bush**, in a letter accidentally issued to Doug Racine, who lost Vermont's election

"At Theo's age, Alexander the Great was already general manager of the world." **Leslie Epstein**, on his 28-year-old son, Theo Epstein, being employed as the 10th general manager of the Boston Red Sox

"It is my goal to be a future, undisputed bantamweight champion. My proven athletic ability and competitive nature will help this dream become a reality." Former Olympic figure skater **Tonya Harding**, on her debut as a professional fighter before the Feb. 22 Mike Tyson-Clifford Etienne bout

QUOTATION SOURCES FROM TOP TO BOTTOM, LEFT TO RIGHT: THE WASHINGTON POST, ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE WASHINGTON POST, ASSOCIATED PRESS, NEW YORK TIMES, ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE WASHINGTON POST, ASSOCIATED PRESS, TORONTO STAR, ASSOCIATED PRESS

DECEMBER 9, 2002 NEWSWEEK 31

11-L-0559/OSD/9487

December 5, 2002 10:30 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reward Programs

I have no confidence in the reward programs that are going on. The President was left with the impression that they are working. I don't think they are working at all.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120502-6

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

U10804 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9488

000.5

5 Dec 02

December 5, 2002 4:37 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iceland

Why don't we get those airplanes out of Iceland? We have a perfect excuse. We have Afghanistan going on and the possibility of Iraq, and it just seems to me that if we can't make a good argument for it now, there is no time we can make a good argument.

If they can't come here until January, why don't we send someone to Iceland to talk to them?

Seize the moment!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120502-17

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

U10806 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9489

Iceland

5 Dec 02

snovflake

December 6, 2002 11:30 AM

Dave
12/7

ADVANCE COPY
SENT

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gifts on Trip

I want to know what gifts we are planning to give when there is a gift exchange. I see that on the trip it says what I am going to receive, but not what I am going to give.

005

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120602-21

.....

Please respond by 12/6/02

Response attached
12/6

U10807 /03

6 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9490

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(ERITREA, ETHIOPIA, DJIBOUTI & QATAR)

(9 - 14 Dec 02)

| | Meeting With | Title | Previous Meeting | Previous Gift Exchange | Proposed Gift to US | Proposed Gift to THEM | Gift we gave on this trip |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| ERITREA | Afworki Isaias | President | No | N A | | Sterling Silver Knife | |
| | Ephrem Sebhat | Minister of Defense | No | N A | Silver Jebina* | 3" Medallion | |
| ETHIOPIA | Zenawi Meles | Prime Minister | No | N A | Painting | Sterling Silver Knife | |
| | Gemedo Abadula | Minister of Defense | No | N A | | 3" Medallion | |
| | | Minister of Foreign Affairs | No | N A | | | |
| | Mesfin Seyoum | Chairman of Defense | No | N A | | Paperweight | |
| | Lt Gen Samora Yenus | | No | N A | | Paperweight | |
| DJIBOUTI | Ismail Omar Guelleh | President | No | N A | | Colt Pistol | |
| | Ongourch Kifleh Ahmed | Minister of Defense | No | N A | | 3" Medallion | |
| | Maj Gen Fathi Ahmed Houssein | Chairman of Defense | No | No | | Paperweight | |
| QATAR | Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani | Amir | Yes, 10 01 | None | | Buffalo Box | |
| | Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir Al Thani | Minister of Foreign Affairs | No | N A | | 3" Medallion | |

*silver gourd used for serving coffee

12/6/2002

1

2:44 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/9491

6/25 snowflake
24 03

June 18, 2002 8:53 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Servicemen Protection Act

6/25
I think we should call Hyde and DeLay and urge them to get the Servicemen Protection Act passed fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061802-8

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

24 JUN 2002

→ SecDef -

Nearly identical versions
of the American Servicemen's
Protection Act are included in both
House and Senate versions of the
FY '02 Supplemental.

So, all we need to do is get the

Supp. passed.

U10808 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9492

Paul W.

6/25
DIRITA 2

18 June 02

December 6, 2002 9:59 AM

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calendars

Here are some more calendars to be put with the file. You should make sure you have out there the latest, most recent, accurate calendars for every single day. I am putting the ones out that I have, but you should make sure they are the accurate ones and that things are crossed off if they never happened.

Thanks.

Attach.
Calendars

DHR:dh
120602-20

.....

Please respond by _____

U10809 /03

020 50

6 Dec 02

December 6, 2002 9:55 AM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Communication

Please work with (b)(6) so that when she is not there, you can communicate with Joyce in a way that keeps her tuned into the calendar. She thought we were going to the Jumper function last evening instead of me staying for the Korean function.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120602-17

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

U10810 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9494

02.5D

6 Dec 02

December 6, 2002 11:06 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Arnold Punaro

I think we ought to think about getting Punaro more fully engaged to help us push this effort through. He could brief the Congress, DoD, and the outside world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120602-16

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

U10811 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9495

334

6 Dec 02

December 6, 2002 9:52 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Appropriations Bills

Please get the number of pages of the final appropriations bills since 1963 through today, so we can see how many pages it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120602-15

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

U10812 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9496

110,01

6 Dec 02

December 6, 2002 8:39 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*
SUBJECT: U.S.-ROK Alliance 50th Anniversary

We ought to think through carefully what we want to do for the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Korean alliance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120602-12

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

U10813 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9497

ROR

6 Dec 02

~~TOP SECRET~~

346

December 6, 2002 7:04 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz Tom White
Gen. Myers Gordon England
Pete Aldridge Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: China

Attached is a Top Secret memorandum on Chinese weapons. I would appreciate it if the addressees of this memo would coordinate a response to this memo and assure me that the Department is aggressively addressing the U.S. capabilities that will be necessary to deal with these Chinese activities.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/04/02 Senior Executive Memorandum

DHR:dh
120602-1

Please respond by 01/03/03


U10814 /03

~~TOP SECRET~~UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED12/11/02 05:59:00 PM 0498
UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN

1710 510W/1400

December 7, 2002 2:55 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 


SUBJECT: Meet w/Torie Clarke

I need to sit down with Torie Clarke to talk with her about Doug Feith, Paul Wolfowitz and info operations. Larry probably ought to be there.

Thanks.

DLR:dh
120702-15

.....
Please respond by 12/10/02



U10815 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9499

413.51

7 Dec 02