

DRAFT

the expedited identification and installation of Iraqi judges, tribunal investigators, and prosecutors to staff the IST.

- The Secretary of State will assist the RCA in recruiting and selecting, in consultation with CPA, international advisors and international investigative or forensic teams to assist the IST, and in advising the IST regarding its rules of evidence and procedure. The Secretary of State may also assist the RCAO by contacting other governments and requesting that they provide their full cooperation in collecting all evidence and contacting witnesses located within their territory that are relevant to IST investigations.
- The Director of Central Intelligence and the collected Intelligence Community: will provide historical and archival research support to the RCAO as appropriate; will serve as liaison between the RCAO and foreign government intelligence services to assist in investigations as needed; and will provide to RCAO support supplemental to the main efforts of DOD/CPA, for information security. Cleared RCAO personnel with a demonstrated need to know shall be given appropriate access to relevant captured documents and their analysis. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) within the Intelligence Community will make available to RCAO appropriate documents in ISG possession, custody or control that are relevant to RCAO and IST investigations, and ISG will coordinate with RCAO liaison to facilitate the declassification and handling of such materials.

DRAFT

March __, 2004

USD staff
O&C
USD comments
3/31/04

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-###

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: United States Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal

The investigation and prosecution of members of the former Iraqi regime and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws represent key elements in the establishment ~~restoration~~ of democratic self-government ~~in to the people of Iraq~~. The successful establishment and operation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) is vital to the success of our national security, foreign policy, homeland security, law enforcement and defense strategies, and is critical to protecting and advancing U.S. America's interests. The IST statute provides ~~mandates~~ for the appointment of %international advisors to assist the Tribunal Investigative Judges, Prosecutors, Trial Chamber Judges, and Appeals Chamber Judges in the performance of their duties. The United States must take its place in the provision of that international assistance.

Therefore, I direct the following:

- All relevant Departments and Agencies of the United States Government (USG), as set forth below, shall provide necessary assistance to the Iraqi people to establish a fully functioning, independent IST that reflects internationally accepted concepts of due process and the rule of law.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/036555

TAB B
1

DRAFT

- The Attorney General shall appoint a Regime Crimes Advisor (RCA) to the IST. The ~~RCA Regime Crimes Advisor~~ will lead and supervise ~~U.S. American~~ advisors and certain international advisors, collectively known as the Regime Crimes Advisor's Office (RCAO), to continue the related work begun by the CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice (OHRTJ). Specifically, the RCAO will assist IST investigators, prosecutors and investigative judges, direct ~~U.S. American~~ advisors to the IST, and serve as USG liaison to the Iraqi Governing Council (and the successor Iraqi Government after June 30, 2004) regarding IST investigations and prosecutions ~~to the Iraqi Governing Council (and the successor Iraqi Government after June 30, 2004)~~. The RCA will assist the Governing Council in establishing, staffing, and administering the IST. The RCAO will serve as the lead Coalition office to assist the IST in coordinating all assistance to the IST by foreign governments, law enforcement agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, and other USG agencies in Iraq. The RCAO will also serve as the lead Coalition office supporting the IST measures to ensure the security and safety of witnesses and victims of crimes under investigation by the IST.
- The Department of Justice (DOJ) will assist the RCA to select a team of advisors that will deploy to Iraq. The DOJ and the RCA will assemble and deploy squads of investigators, under FBI leadership, drawn from ~~F~~ federal, State or local law enforcement agencies. The RCA may deploy these teams or elements of them within Iraq in accordance with the investigative plan. The RCAO may make use of any IST-related facilities and projects established or begun by OHRTJ, and coordinate this continued use after ~~30~~ June 30, 2004 with the appropriate Iraqi authorities. The DOJ will provide administrative support such as paralegals and secretaries to the RCAO.
- The RCA will supervise all USG advisors and mentors to the ~~IQT~~. RCAO personnel will work closely with the Iraqis supporting the IST, and ensure, where appropriate, that training and technical assistance ~~are~~ is provided.
- The RCA will supervise and coordinate forensic and exhumation efforts by USG or third-nation elements in support of IST investigations. The RCA will also support Iraqi forensic efforts in support of IST investigations. The RCA may deploy personnel to locations outside Iraq.
- Concurrent with its mission to ~~At the conclusion of the RCAO's mission to~~ support the IST, the RCAO will ensure that electronic or paper copies of all appropriate unclassified documents and information collected during its investigations are made available ~~transferred~~ to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights to assist the Ministry's continuing efforts to identify missing persons and to preserve a historical record of the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein's regime. In the event transfer of certain documents would interfere with investigative and prosecutorial efforts, transfer will be made at the conclusion of the RCAO mission.

DRAFT

- The CPA, in coordination with the Public Affairs Directorate of the National Security Council staff, will prepare a strategic communications plan directed at both Iraqi and international audiences concerning the activities of the IST and the role of the RCAO in support of the IST. Thereafter, all RCAO public affairs and public diplomacy activities will be closely coordinated with CPA's Strategic Communications Office before any public releases. In addition, all RCA public affairs activity will comply with any relevant rules and guidelines that the IST may ~~adopt~~ ~~enact~~ governing pretrial and trial publicity.
- The RCAO shall function as a component within the CPA, and the RCA shall report to the Administrator of the CPA, ~~the Administrator~~.
 - The Attorney General may augment the RCAO with a Budget Officer to manage all expenditures in support of the IST, from funds appropriated for that purpose. The RCAO will have review and approval authority, within the expenditure process now employed by CPA, for all IST-related funds.
 - The Attorney General, through the Deputy Attorney General, may, in consultation with CPA, provide input to the RCA regarding substantive legal and investigative matters.
- Following the transfer of full governmental authority to the transitional Iraqi administration, ~~and the recognition of the sovereignty of that administration,~~ all responsibilities of the CPA with respect to the RCAO will devolve upon the Secretary of State, acting through the Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
- The heads of all other ~~U.S.-nited States~~ law enforcement agencies and organizations will be prepared to support the RCA with personnel or resources as needed.
- Using funds appropriated to support the IST, the Department of Justice will support and sustain RCAO personnel in Iraq, ~~to include~~ including: housing/billeting; transportation within Iraq; food/medical support; communications access and linkup; compound security and armed escort outside of Baghdad; security for investigative teams and forensic sites in the field; and weapons and related weapons training plus necessary personal protective gear. The RCAO, in consultation with the CPA, will also coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior for personal and physical security of Iraqi IST installations and facilities, judges and personnel.
- The Secretary of Defense will assign to the RCAO from the ~~M~~military Departments an agreed number of Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAG) officers to serve as advisors to the IST, ~~who will serve under RCAO operational control~~. The Department of Defense will also provide secure access to and

DRAFT

transport of Iraqi prisoners for interviews; provide access to seized Iraqi documents and assistance with issues of classification and declassification; and provide departmental expertise in military history, law of war, and international law issues, ~~to including~~ e-assignment of additional personnel, as appropriate.

- The Administrator of the CPA and the Secretary of State will support the RCAO by assisting the Iraq Governing Council in establishing IST infrastructure and court facilities, and in the expedited identification and installation of Iraqi judges, tribunal investigators, and prosecutors to staff the IST.
- The Secretary of State will assist the RCA in recruiting and selecting, in consultation with the Administrator of the CPA, international advisors and international investigative or forensic teams to assist the IST, and in advising the IST regarding its rules of evidence and procedure. The Secretary of State may also assist the RCAO by contacting other governments and requesting that they provide their full cooperation in collecting all evidence and contacting witnesses located within their territory that are relevant to IST investigations.
- ~~The Director of Central Intelligence and the collective elements of the~~ ed Intelligence Community, as appropriate, will; provide historical and archival research support to the RCAO as appropriate; will serve as liaison between the RCAO and foreign government intelligence services to assist in investigations as needed; and will provide to RCAO support supplemental to the main efforts of DOD/CPA, for information security. Cleared RCAO personnel with requisite security clearances and a demonstrated need to know shall be given appropriate access to relevant captured documents and their analysis. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) will provide access to appropriately cleared RCAO staff or cleared RCAO approved individuals to documents in the possession of the ISG. Materials will be declassified make documents available to RCAO and declassify appropriate material in accordance with the policy guidance that has been developed between the CPA and the TSG regarding Iraq document exploitation in support of the Iraq Special Tribunal. DoJ will provide all resources required for such support.
- ~~The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) within the Intelligence Community will make available to the RCAO appropriate documents in ISG possession, custody or control that are relevant to RCAO and IST investigations, and the ISG will coordinate with an RCAO liaison to facilitate the declassification and handling of such materials.~~

COORDINATION

Department of Defense
Office of General Counsel

Jim Haynes

March 26, 2004

Under Secretary of Defense
For Intelligence

Dr. Cambone

March 29, 2004

APR 07 2004

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Special Forces

We have a problem with CIA hiring away our Special Forces people and paying them more money. What do you propose we do about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040504-11

.....
Please respond by

4/23/04

OSD 11712-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036560

April 5, 2004
EF-9144
I-04/004591

UZBEKISTAN

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: SecDef
SUBJECT: Certifying Uzbekistan

4/9
If we can possibly do it, I want to make sure that Uzbekistan gets certified. I have no idea where the State Department is on that at the present time.

Please check into it, and then let's do everything we can to get it right. In my view they have made darn good progress and responded to the things I raised with them. They are not perfect, but they are moving in the right direction. As I understand it, that is the test.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040504-1

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

Sir.
Response attached. C4/9
✓/r. Det 4/12
LTC Swape

SAUG04

OSD 11714-04

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 17, 2004

SUBJECT:

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR:azn
041704.02

Please respond by: _____

30
*4/21/04**Closed by*
desk note
4/21


IRAQ

19 APR 04

OSD 11715-04

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: April 17, 2004

SUBJECT:

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041704.02

Please respond by: _____

4/19/04

OB
5/18

OSD 11715-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036563

~~SECRET~~

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 17, 2004

SUBJECT:

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041704.02

Please respond by: _____

4/19/04

DR 4/21

Response attached

c 4/20

~~SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036564

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

APR 19 2004

749

580

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Gen. **Dick** Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Transport by Air

Why are we sending 90 percent of everything by air? I just got a stomach ache when I heard that. That would just be an enormous waste of money - like a billion and a half dollars.

Please check that and get back to me. People are convinced that **is** what is happening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041304-10

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

DR 4/22

Response attached
C 4/20

19APR04

OSD 11728-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036565

7201

done

April 1, 2004

452T

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Meeting on Tanker E-mail

I simply have to solve this tanker issue. Let's get the e-mail meeting on fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-8

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

1 APR 04

OSD 11735-04

April 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Formers

Please have someone put together a list for me of all the living former Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Advisers and CIA directors, and then give me back the attached list.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/12/04 List of former Secretaries of State and Defense and former **National** Security Advisers.

DHR:dh
040104-2

.....
Please respond by

4/16/04

4/3 -
Attached. We have
done this before and the
list we are using for
invites reflects earlier
reviews.

D. Rita

4/2

Former Secretaries of State:

Madeleine Albright
Warren Christopher
James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
George Shultz
Alexander Haig, Jr.
Henry Kissinger

Former Secretaries of Defense:

William Cohen
William Perry
Richard Cheney
Frank Carlucci III
Caspar Weinberger
Harold Brown
James Schlesinger
Melvin Laird
Robert McNamara

Former National Security Advisors

Samuel Berger
Tony Lake
Brent Scowcroft
Colin Powell
John Poindexter
Robert McFarlane
William Clark
Richard Allen
Zbigniew Brzezinski

Former CIA Directors

John Deutsch
Jim Woolsey
Robert Gates
William Webster
Stansfield Turner
George H.W. Bush

APR 14 2004

EF-9261

I-09/005098

Iceland

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iceland and the Sinai

How much longer are we going to be trying to get the proper arrangements in
Iceland and in the Sinai?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041304-2

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

4/16/04

C 4/16

→ SD

I am working to get Jan Brzezinski
to Iceland by the end of April
to inform the GOI that US assets
will come out this summer.
Hadley so far is cooperating.

(Handwritten initials "BR" circled)

Regarding Sinai, we may be able to
do a more ambitious move than
earlier envisioned. I am meeting
with my folks (Rodman et al.) today
to review in light of this week's
Sharon visit. We'll request a time to
brief you soon.

Doug Feith

11-L-0559/OSD/036569

OSD 11738-04

14APR04

5/3/51

D.A.

19APR04

11-L-0559/OSD/036570



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

MAY 19 2003

MAR 29 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ANDREW MARSHALL *Am*

SUBJECT: Creation of an Organization to Explore the Information Aspects of Warfare

BACKGROUND

Central to most of ideas about how warfare will change in the future is the notion that the information and communication technologies should lead to new operational methods and ultimately to major changes in warfare. We also already see that precision strike is now possible in ways that it was not in the more distant past, and that our ability to coordinate the actions of a wide variety of platforms or units, even if they are widely separated geographically, is now possible in a way that was never possible before. Information or superior information has always been important in warfare. Napoleon's success can be seen as due to his ability to use effectively available information and the staff that he created to support his operational command efforts. There is reason to think that information will be more central in the future than in the past. Therefore, a key competitive area in warfare is likely to be based on being better at getting and using information than one's opponent. One ought to start from a better position through superior investment, better organization for exploiting information, training, etc. As combat begins one would try to improve one's position by attacking and otherwise screwing up including deception the opponent's information acquisition and processing capabilities and defending against his efforts to similarly act upon our information gathering and processing systems. The problem is that we don't have an adequate basis for an analysis of the information aspect warfare, nor for measuring the level of superiority we have in any particular situation. We talk about information advantage, but there are few metrics. Also, our ability to model the information aspects of warfare is very poor, and hence difficult to include in any combat models that we have.

4/13/51

29mar02



U07509 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/036571

SUGGESTION

Create a RAND of the 1950's organization and provide it with a broad but clear mission statement. Such a statement might be something like the development of the science of the information aspects of warfare. The idea would be to bring together a very bright set of people and set them to work over an extended period thinking through the role of information in warfare and developing appropriate analytic tools, metrics and significantly improving our ability to model the contribution of information to the outcomes of combat. This is likely to be a decade long effort and not too expensive, although the bureaucratic obstacles to starting such a new Federal study organization would have to be negotiated with the Congress. I don't think this requires a lot of people; the numbers initially could be quite small, on the scale of 20-25 people in the organization. In any case, the key thing is picking the management and, as in the analogy with RAND, that means finding a Frank Colbohm and people like Charlie Hitch and John Williams to establish its character and provide initial intellectual leadership. Because there are no real experts in this area you would need to think about growing future Albert Wohlstetter and Herman Kahns. So young bright people with appropriate academic backgrounds that are willing to focus on concrete problems are what you need. Ideally, if I could, I would start two of these organizations and have them compete way to see which one could provide the best analytic framework for this area, the best case studies of the role of information in warfare, etc.

FOR ~~SMIA~~

10:11 AM

2/16

TO: Steve Cambone
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: April 16, 2004
SUBJECT: Attached

FILE

384

Look at the attached. It shows that people have some security depending on threat level.

I would like to know what security they actually have had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was.

See the attached.

Thanks.

SIR,
LTG CRADDOCK INQUIRED ABOUT
THIS SNOWFLAKE SO I THOUGHT
YOU MAY NEED THE INFORMATION
AS WELL. ORIGINAL RESPONSE
ATTACHED. LISTED ATTACHMENT
INCLUDED BEHIND.

VR/CDR NOSENZO
6/14

DHR/azn
041604.01

Attach: Attachment B, Info Memo to Cambone from DUSD-CI&S Re: Protective Service Operations

Please respond by: 4/23

16 Apr 04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

MAY - 3 2004

384

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: Protective Service Operations

- This responds to your question (Tab B), *"I would like to know what security they actually had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was"* concerning protective service operations conducted by each Military Department (Service).
- Each Service reported data (Tab A), by month that reflects the total number of personnel used to provide personal protection to each proteegee. Personal protection is provided by special agents (A) and when applicable are supported by drivers, administrative, and military police, which we call "support" (S).
- In the Services' report, each of the last 12 months is color-coded to show the threat level as determined by the responsible Services' field commanders.
 - Determining a threat to an individual while lacking a specific and credible threat information is subjective. The overall threat levels published by DIA, Department of Homeland Security, and COCOMs are taken into consideration, however the following are other factors field commanders consider when determining the overall threat:
 - Terrorism (kidnapping, assassination)
 - Criminal activities (kidnapping for ransom, assault or murder)
 - Civil disobedience (embarrassment of activities by demonstrators)
 - Wrong place, wrong time (natural disaster, victim of another's accident)
 - Association and/or proximity to another threatened person (collateral effects)

3 May 04

16 Apr 04

Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODUS 53 CI&S, (b)(6)

OSD 11740-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036574

- When the Services reported threat level for each month, they used the following general criteria:
 - LOW: No significant threat to protectee or the protectee is not exposed to the general population.
 - MEDIUM: General information, which shows the protectee may be targeted, based on his/her position or the protectee is exposed to the environment where the terrorist or criminal threat level is assessed as medium.
 - HIGH: Credible and specific information that shows the protectee is targeted and/or the protectee is exposed to ~~an~~ environment where the terrorist or criminal threat level is assessed at ~~high~~ or critical.
- TAB (C) was previously provided to you and is attached for background.

COORDINATION: DUSD (CI&S); Army CID; Air Force OSI; Navy NCIS

High - Red

S = support

[illegible]

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
III CORPS CDR													
CG, CFC-A													
CG, CJTF-180													
C, OMC-A													
CPA Augment ****													
JFCOM		A-0 / S-1	A-0 / S-1			A-0 / S-1							A-0 / S-2
SOUTHCOM***	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18
USARSO	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8
Total:	A-471s-322	A-471s-322	A-471s-323	A-47/S-322	A-47/S-326	A-47/S-325	A-471s-322	A-476320	A-471s-321	A-471s-322	A-471s-325	A-471s-325	A-471s-326
* Total agent count includes all required agents ISO OSD/JCS Metro Mission on a daily basis													
** Travel Only													
*** Numbers Includes Residence Security and Travel Team													
**** Agents provide support in ITO only													

Threat Levels:

Low - Green

Medium - Yellow

High - Red

NAVY LED PROTECTION

A = Agent

S = support

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
Washington, DC													
CNO			A-3/S-2		A-3/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2		A-41s-2	A-41s-2
Travel Support			A-6		A-13	A-4	A-31		A-10	A-11		A-4	A-4
Total	A-21s-2	A-91s-2	A-91s-2	A-61s-2	A-16/S-2	A-61s-2	A-331s-2	A-251s-2	A-13/S-2	A-14/S-2	A-71s-2	A-81s-2	A-81s-2
SECNAV			A-3		A-3	A-3	A-3	A-3	A-4	A-4		A-4	A-4
Travel Support					A-4	A-13	A-4	A-5		A-25			A-14
Total	A-2	A-7	A-3	A-3	A-7	A-16	A-7	A-8	A-42	A-29	A-14	A-44	A-18
COMNAVNUKPROP			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support									A-1	A-1			A-3
Total	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-1	A-4
CMC			A-2/S-2		A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2		A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2
Travel Support			A-5			A-1	A-2	A-4	A-4				A-4
Total	A-8/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-5/S-2	A-4/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-4/S-2	A-6/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-19/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-6/S-2	A-7/S-2
Asst CMC			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support						A-3		A-2	A-1				
Total	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-4	A-1	A-3	A-2	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1
Europe													
COMNAVEUR	A-12	A-12	A-12	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-10	A-9	A-8	A-8	A-8
Travel Support			A-10	A-6	A-2					A-6		A-9	
Total	A-22	A-31	A-22	A-17	A-13	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-10	A-15	A-8	A-17	A-8
COMSIXTHFLT	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5
Travel Support	A-3	A-10	A-3	A-1	A-5						A-6	A-4	
Total	A-8	A-15	A-8	A-6	A-10	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-11	A-9	A-5
CAOC 7													
Travel Support													
Total	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-3	A-5	A-4	A-5
Bahrain													
COMUSNAVCENT													
Travel Support													
Total	A-6	A-7	A-6	A-5	A-5	A-6	A-10	A-8	A-6	A-6	A-8	A-8	A-9

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
Hawaii													
COMPAC			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support			A-2						A-7			A-5	A-2
Total	A-1	A-9	A-3	A-16	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-8	A-1	A-1	A-6	A-3
COMPACFLT			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support					A-2							A-7	A-2
Total	A-1	A-1	A-20	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-8	A-3
Japan													
COMSEVENTHFLT													
Travel Support													
Total	A-1	A-3	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-5	A-3	A-1	A-3	A-2
Iraq													
CPA BASRAH													
CPA HILLAH													
Total				A-4	A-12	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-18	A-18

Threat Levels:

Low - Green

Medium - Yellow

High - Red

AIR FORCE LED PROTECTION

A = Agent

AF Principals have Agent Only Details

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
SECAF	A-14	A-10	A-6	A-4	A-9	A-10	A-1	A-11	A-3	A-9	A-6	A-4	A-14
USECAF	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-7	A-3	A-3
CSAF	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-4	A-6	A-6	A-2	A-9	A-2	A-2
VCSAF	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1
USAFE	A-9	A-9	A-14	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-11	A-9	A-9	A-9
NORTHCOM	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-8	A-6	A-12
SOCOM										A-1			
AFMC/CC													
ACC/CC													
AMC/CC													
AFSOC/CC													
AFSPC/CC													
PACAF/CC													
AETC/CC													
TRANSCOM/CC													
USCENTAF/CC													
SOUTH AF/CC													
CFACC/CC								A-3		A-4	A-12	A-5	A-7
Deputy CFACC/CC													
3rd AF/CC													
12th AF/CC													
13th AF/CC													
CPA Principals													
Chief of Defense (ChoD) Philippines													
ChoD Uzbekistan													
ChoD Colombia													
ChoD Jordan													
ChoD Japan													
ChoD Hungary													
ChoD Bulgaria													
Military of Defense (MoD) Vietnam													
NATO Ministerial								A-70					
Global Air Commander Conference							A-35						
Middle Eastern Air Symposium									A-20	A-20			
Total	A-43	A-49	A-52	A-45	A-48	A-50	A-86	A-138	A-95	A-78	A-80	A-54	A-88

11-L-0559/OSD/036580

Threat Levels:
No color code
annotated: Threat
level is assessed by
lead PSO agency

AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCY LED PROTECTION

A = Agent

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
President of the U.S	A-3	A-1		A-2				A-4	A-2			A-4	
Vice President of the U.S											A-6		A-5
Sec Def		A-1							A-7			A-2	
Deputy Sec Def				A-4					A-4	A-4	A-5	A-6	A-4
CJCS			A-2		A-3			A-3	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4
VCJCS					A-5				A-4	A-4	A-4		
CENTCOM	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1
Deputy CENTCOM						A-2							
SOUTHCOM										A-2			
J5 SOUTHCOM							A-1						
U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador						A-1			A-1				
US Naval Forces SOUTHCOM								A-1					
US Naval Forces Europe/CC						A-2							
Secretary of Energy											A-3		
Chief, US Military Training, CENTCOM											A-2		A-1
President of Latvia													A-1
US SECDEF for Policy												A-1	
USSS					A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-8	A-3	A-4
Total	A-4	A-3	A-3	A-7	A-13	A-10	A-6	A-13	A-27	A-19	A-33	A-21	A-20

US Army Criminal Investigation Command

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Military Police SPT</u>
Sec of Defense	World Wide	Sec Rumsfeld	22	0
Dep Sec of Def	World Wide	Sec Wolfowitz	14	0
CJCS	World Wide	Gen Meyers	7	0
VCJCS	World Wide	Gen Pace	8	0
Sec Army	World Wide	Act Sec Brownlee*	0 fulltime	0
CSA	World Wide	Gen Schoomaker	2	0
VCSA	World Wide	Gen Casey	0 fulltime	0
CENTCOM (RET)	World Wide	Gen Franks (Ret)	1	0
SHAPE	World Wide	Gen Jones	10	0
USAREUR	World Wide	Gen Bell	1	8
DEP EUCOM CDR	Europe	Gen Wald	1	43***
NATO U.S. Rep	NATO	LTG Kinnan	1	15
KFOR	KFOR	TF FALCON	1**	11**
SFOR	SFOR	COMSFOR	1**	13**
CG CFLCC	CENTCOM	LTG McKiernan	1**	12**
DCG CFLCC	CENTCOM	MG Speaks	1**	10**
V Corps CDR	CENTCOM	LTG Sanchez	1**	15**
III Corps CDR	CENTCOM	LTG Metz	1**	10**
CG, CFC-A	AFGAHNISTAN	LTG Barno	1**	12**
CG, CJTF-180	AFGAHNISTAN	BG(P) Austin	1**	15**
C, OMC-A	AFGAHNISTAN	MG Wastin	1**	10**
CPA Augmentation	ITO	CPA	27	120**
Metro Team/Residence	CONUS	Principals 1-4	49	0
Travel Team	World Wide	Principals 1-7	19	0
ATOIC	Pentagon		3	0
* Will change with new SEC Army			Total PSU SA-	174
			Total MP SPT-	286

** BMM and only while deployed

*** Also performs residence and installation security and travel team

Air Force Office of Special Investigations

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Military Police SPT</u>
USAFE	Ramstein AFB	Gen Fogelsong	9	By Threat Level
NORTHCOM	Peterson AFB	Gen Eberheart	4	2 Auth/1 Assigned
SECAF	Andrews AFB	Hon Sec Roche	2	By Threat Level
Dep SECAF	Andrews AFB	Hon Sec Teets	1	By Threat Level
CSAF	Andrews AFB	Gen Jumper	2	By Threat Level
VSAF	Andrews AFB	Gen Moseley	1	By Threat Level
CENTCOM	Mac Dill AFB	Gen Abizaid	1	By Threat Level
AFMC/CC	Wright-Patterson	Gen Martin	1	By Threat Level
ACC/CC	Langley AFB	Gen Hornburg	1	By Threat Level
AMC/CC	Scott AFB	Gen Handy	1	By Threat Level
AFSOC/CC	Mac Dill AFB	Gen Hester	1	By Threat Level
AFSPC/CC	Peterson AFB	Gen Lord	1	By Threat Level
PACAF/CC	Hickham AFB	Gen Begert	1	By Threat Level
AETC/CC	Randolph AFB	Gen Cook	1	By Threat Level
CPA	Baghdad, Iraq		14	By Threat Level
TOTAL SA			41	

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Additional SPT</u>
SECNAV	Washington D.C.	Hon England	5	By Threat Level
CNO	Washington D.C.	ADM Clark	3	By Threat Level
Cmdt Marine Corps	Washington D.C.	GEN Hagee	3	By Threat Level
NCISHQ	Washington D.C.		6	
COMUSNAVEUR	Naples, Italy	ADM Johnson	10	By Threat Level
COMSIXTHFLT	Gaeta, Italy	VADM Ulrich	3	By Threat Level
DEPCON CAOC	Larissa, Greece		3	By Threat Level
COMPAC	Hawaii	ADM Fargo	1	By Threat Level
COMPACFLT	Hawaii	ADM Doran	1	By Threat Level
COMSEVENTHFLT	Yokosuka, Japan	VADM Willard	1	By Threat Level
COMFIFTHFLT	Bahrain	VADM Nichols	1	By Threat Level
Counter Intel	CENTCOM AOR		20 USMC	
Travel/CPA Support	World Wide/Iraq		44	

TOTAL SA 101

TOTAL DOD SA 315 TOTAL SPT- 286 (+)

MAJ Oliver Rose/CIOP-OP/ (b)(6)

APPROVED BY: COL Palgutt/ (b)(6)



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

MAY - 3 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: Protective Service Operations

- This responds to your question (Tab B), *"I would like to know what security they actually had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was"* concerning protective service operations conducted by each Military Department (Service).

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

*John Craddock -
This is
standable with a
little bit of interpretation.
Bottom line: if
these individuals are to
have protective details,
the #s seem right.*

*SC
5/3/04*

with that reflects the total number of
on to each protectee. Personal
and when applicable are supported by
which we call "support" (S).

months is color-coded to show the
e Services' field commanders.

while lacking a specific and credible
overall threat levels published by DIA,
id COCOMs are taken into
are other factors field commanders
ll threat:

nation)
; for ransom, assault or murder)
nent of activities by demonstrators)
ral disaster, victim of another's

o another threatened person (collateral



11-L-0559/OSD/036584

Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODU



SI&S), (b)(6)

OSD 11740-04

April 12, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: CPA Comments

Please edit this, and make it absolutely bullet-proof. Tell Carpenter we are going to move it around, so he is aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/6/04 Comments of Scott Carpenter

DHR:dh
041204-13

.....
Please respond by 4/15/04

OSD 11741-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036585

020CPA

12APR04.

Comments of Scott Carpenter, Director, Governance Team, Coalition
Provisional Authority: April 6, 2004

- Carpenter said that without the efforts of Ahmed Chalabi, CPA would not have achieved:
 - The law on direct foreign investment.
 - The flat individual and corporate income tax.
 - The November 15 agreement.
 - The Transitional Administrative Law.
- Carpenter also said, “we go to Chalabi on a day-to-day basis to solve problems.”

April 12, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable George Tenet
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: CPA Comments

Attached are some comments by the Coalition Provisional Authority's Director of the Governance Team, which are worth considering as we prepare for the meeting ahead.

Attach.
4/6/04 Comments of Scott Carpenter

DHR:dh
041204-12

*Hold
for
Smith
to edit
attachment*

11-L-0559/OSD/036587

APR 14 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Steele Update on Iraq

I think you may want to get this memo from Jim Steele over to Petraeus, so he is aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/19/04 Steele e-mail to DepSecDef re: Update

DHR:dh
041204-10

.....
Please respond by 4/19/04

*Sent by
LTC Cavoli
for the Chairman*

OSD 11742-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036588

IRAO

14 APR 04

4/12/04

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

SECDEF —

From: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD
Sent: Friday, March 19, 2004 9:33 PM
To: Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD
Subject: FW: Update

FROM JIM STEELE TO
DEPUTY

FYI

Sir -- thought you might want to see this email from Jim Steele to my boss.

V/r-- Bill

To be sent

C 3/20

-----Original Message-----

From: Steele, James (SES-5) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 19, 2004 11:39 AM
To: Wolfowitz, Paul, Dr, OSD
Cc: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; (b)(6)
Subject: Update

Bill, please be sure that Paul gets this.

Paul,

Here's an update on how I see the security situation and our response to the threat. I'd like to follow it up with a meeting with you either here or in DC.

- The security situation is not improving as it relates to the terrorist threat. There is improvement in law enforcement, but it remains spotty. These are my subjective assessments and may to some degree appear at odds with some of the metrics (i.e. number of Iraqi security forces, recruit and TIP graduates, equipment fill, etc.) that are being used to gauge our success. Effective Iraqi security forces, particularly the police, are the essential component in achieving our strategic objectives here. Demonstrated performance is the real measure of effectiveness.
- I consider the lack of effective leadership within the Ministry of Interior as the most significant impediment to improving the security situation. The problem begins at the top. The Interior Minister, Nouri Betran, is incompetent and dishonest. He consistently blames the US for the lack of security in that we have not provided assistance in the form of requested equipment. He and his INA party members (including Alawi) are soft on the Ba'athists and are making a concerted effort to reincorporate them into the government (including the police). I have addressed this repeatedly with Bremer, who by and large concurs with my assessment of the problem, but is unwilling to challenge the IGC by sacking one of its appointed ministers. This problem is further aggravated by the lack of an effective Senior Advisor to the MOI. The net result is the MOI, which is the key to our security objectives and withdrawal plans is marginal at best.
- General Ahmed K. Ibrahim is the latest victim of Betran's incompetence and our unwillingness to challenge him. In my opinion, Ahmed is the most competent and courageous Iraqi leader in MOI. He has been and continues to be our most loyal ally. Betran has orchestrated his removal from his post as Deputy Minister and assignment to the Foreign Ministry for subsequent transfer out of Iraq, perhaps to New York. Despite describing Ahmed in glowing terms and tell him that we need 10 more like him, Bremer has acquiesced to the reassignment as an accommodation to the IGC and Interior Minister as well as concern for Ahmed's safety. As you might expect, the enemy consider him the number one Iraqi target for assassination.


3/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/036589

- The enhanced role of CENTCOM in training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, especially the police, is a needed change. This is not only true for the reasons listed above, but because the police have suffered from a lack of support across the board, including from both the JTF and CPA. The MSCs have been reluctant to expend their resources on the police because CPA-MOI supposedly has that responsibility. Furthermore the MSCs would much prefer to field and support ICDC for which they are responsible and have complete control. In fairness, the support from the MSCs has ranged from excellent to poor. The quality of the police in Mosul is quite good as a direct result of the efforts of the 101st Commander. The results in Baghdad are at the opposite end of the scale. I am hopeful that the change to military control will cause the MSCs to assume greater ownership of the police across the board, especially as it relates to advising and mentoring the police leadership.
- The training program for the police is largely ineffective. We transplanted the ICITAP effort in Kosovo and with little change have attempted to implement it here. The security situation alone makes it nearly unworkable, but the constraints of time and the prior conditions within the police make the plan totally inappropriate. ICITAP has had problems everywhere, including Panama where I observed them firsthand. They simply cannot deal with a program of this size. That is why they create "model precincts" that are impressive to visitors, but fail to address the need in a comprehensive way. At my insistence and Bremer's direction, the training program has been modified to address the leadership problem. Unfortunately, it remains an afterthought effort and will probably be of marginal value unless CENTCOM focuses on it. Using effective military leaders, preferably those with law enforcement experience, to act as mentors to Iraqi police leaders is probably the only way to make real improvement in the near future.
- The 8-week recruit training course is a good starting effort, but requires a 24-week follow on mentorship program to produce a qualified basic policeman. Therein lies the problem. INL is not fielding the civilian police mentors in required numbers for a host of reasons, mostly security and equipment related. Those that are fielded are likely to go to the model precincts. Given the limited number of civilian police mentors, I believe they should be linked up with police chiefs and precinct and station commanders – not as recruit mentors. The other problem with the 8-week program is that it is alien to the existing police system. The Iraqi police, like all of their neighboring police, are organized along military lines. I predict that our efforts to unwind that system will not survive beyond July. I suspect the graduates of the 8-week program will not qualify for leadership positions in the police without going back to some extended academy education program like existed prior to the war.
- The 3-week TIP program is useful, but at present does not address the key issue – leadership. I proposed that the TIP be changed to a TIP II leadership course focused on mid-level officers. Those officers are attending the current TIP and are intermixed with policemen of all ranks. Why not frontload the officers and focus on making them more effective leaders? While Bremer agreed with the concept, nothing has changed on the ground.
- The fact that we are still unable to access the supplemental funds is impossible to explain.
- On a brighter note, our efforts to create an inter-ministerial working group to address counter-terrorism looks promising. It will have the benefit of some experts like Brian Jenkins and Bruce Hoffman from Rand. The first challenge will be the Shiite religious period of Arb'een in early April.

Paul, as you may gather from this litany, I am a very concerned about what is and is not happening in the security area here. While I have high respect for Bremer, he is consumed by governance issues and relying on others to address the security problem. Please don't consider my comments as denigrating the dedicated efforts of many both in and out of uniform. I need your advice and counsel regarding my continued role here. I'm not accustomed to failure and see this mission as too important to the Nation to let it falter. I look forward to hearing from you.

APR 5 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: LTG John Craddock 
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Threat Assessment for Service Chiefs

I would like to know what the threat assessment is that causes the four Service Chiefs to have personal security. We need to review that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-14

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

380.01

SAPROA

OSD 11743-04

APR 5 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Personal Security Forces for Services

I would like to know what the personal security forces are in each of the Services, what they were last year, and what they are planned to be for next year.

It seems to me we are living in a world where that needs to be addressed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-15

.....
Please respond by

4/16/04

OSD 11744-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036592

380.01

5 APR 04

~~SENSITIVE~~

APR 27 2004

IRAQ

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Sistani, *A*

Please clean up this piece on Sistani that you gave me and then send it to anyone who you think ought to have it from me.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Sistani Rep Mtg

DHR:dh
042604-9

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

OB
4/28

OSD 11745-04

27 APR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/036593

~~SENSITIVE~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

Subject: FW: Sistani rep meeting at CPA-SC --SENSITIVE REPORT--

(CPA South Central (Mike G. Galters office))

CPA-SC Senior PolAd [Fadi Petro] receives Sistani Office representative at CPA-SC HQ.

22 April, 2004.

Sayyed Maytham Faisal Mazhboub (protect) is a close contact and personal friend of GA Ali Sistani. Maytham has had access to GA Sistani for the past 15 years. Maytham is a moderate and a respected notable in the city of Najaf/Kufa. He is not a cleric, and he is not employed by Sistani, but is an independently wealthy and a religiously inclined man who has had direct involvement in the Hawza.

The purpose of the meeting was to establish a direct relationship with CPA [regional]. He claimed that many Baghdad visitors led them to believe that there was a solid conduit to CPA-Baghdad but that they were beginning to lose faith in this and wanted to build their own relationship at this point. He indicated grave dissatisfaction in dealing with multiple interlocutors who all claim they were sent by Amb Bremer to "solve the problem" and the episodic nature of their involvement. Some, he claimed, had even gone as far as asking for a photograph with GA Sistani [IGC member Muwaffaq Al Ruba'i] for what they interpreted as an attempt at proving they met with him and gaining increased credibility when they quoted him. He stated that Sistani understands many are speaking in his name and that he has to do something about that and is looking at making a direct office to office connection with a "real live American officer" in the CPA so there is no misunderstanding. He knows of Mike, Hume and I [from back when we first made our rounds with the Ayatollahs], and sought us out.

Note: He did not indicate at any time that he had a message from Sistani. However, at the close of the meeting, Maytham stated that he would report his meeting results directly to Sistani and requested that I meet with a closer contact of Sistani [NFI] this coming week. He stated that this person will come to CPA-SC to meet. He did not mention a name, nor did I ask, but he mentioned the person is a cleric and an associate of GA Sistani. I believe that final selection of this person will come out after Maytham briefs GA Sistani.

Here is a report of the key points he made:

1. Coalition Forces were seen in some neighborhoods [Hayy Zahra] and were refreshingly received. He stated that the people that want peace welcome this action. Indicating that US Forces are welcome in their midst.
2. Any city where there is no Law and no Authority there is a problem, and thus is the case in Najaf and Kufa. The sovereign should never abandon his [people] during a crisis; neither should he yield his authority to any person that is not properly appointed. Here he is indicating the obvious, asking the US to regain control from the forces that now [occupy government offices] in Najaf. He mentioned US success in Kut, and wished for a similar outcome where the US was able to regain control and push back the militia.
3. He further commented that Najaf has fallen into the hands of the so called Jaysh Al Mahdi, a group of thieves, murderers, he goes on...that have armed themselves beyond any comprehension, taken police stations, released all the prisoners, and looted the government offices...all while the

coalition forces watched. He went on to say that anyone that worked with the CF has been targeted and many now are in jails and are being tried in so called Shari'a courts, some have been executed and still the Coalition stands by without interfering. He mentioned that [collaborators] are being systematically pursued, arrested, and detained daily and that the families have nowhere to go and complain—just like the old days under Saddam. Fear and Intimidation now rule the city again.

4. He stated that Sistani has done his duty [as a religious leader]; he sent a delegation asking MAS to leave the city if he intended to fight the coalition and spare the city and shrines from inherent destruction. He stated that the delegation warned MAS that the coalition will respond with might for every bullet Sadr Militia [SM] expended. He went on to explain that Sadr's inner circle was now in charge of key [military] decisions and that MAS remained removed from direct involvement, but that MAS was adamant about not backing down in the face of too much pressure—didn't look good—and that MAS was personally convinced that he could win and keep/control Najaf/Kufa.
5. He affirmed that most of the hardened MAS militants in the streets manning positions were strangers [from outside the city], and more likely from Thawra city [Sadr City] in Baghdad. He wondered how they could have traveled, unobstructed—to Najaf—and taken control so easily, and remain in control in the face of the mighty coalition that liberated Iraq. He said that people were beginning to draw dangerous conclusions from such a situation and that lest the coalition regain control that it would be hard to mobilize the citizens to help or cooperate later. They live in fear of retribution for any misconstruction made by the Sadr thugs...this is like living under Saddam only now it was 1991 all over again.
6. He stressed that Najaf is not Fallujah. He stated that Fallujah is full of former Baathists, foreign fighters from all over the Middle East to include Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Islam, former Iraqi military, former Iraqi Intelligence, and former Iraqi Special Services, many that benefited from the regime for years. Najaf is different. You do not have any military commanders, or any security apparatus, or any Sunni opposition. You have people that never benefited from the regime but were systematically oppressed and persecuted for the past 35 years. You don't have any former regime elements, or anyone fighting against an occupation—we are still thankful you liberated us, and Sistani has stated that since you announced you are leaving and given a date then you are not truly occupiers—so the dynamics are different and you can count on the people to support you to a limit if you were to go after him more aggressively. We hear the planes overhead daily and nightly, we know the troops are in the outskirts of the city, and we await a solution. It is my understanding here that he is indicating that they expect a US offensive to take back the town and remove MAS and his militia [using Kut as an example], but cautioning against prolonged fighting and collateral damage control [meaning the Shrines].
7. He described the Najaf Police as traitors that must be fired once the city is liberated. Stated that they were obedient dogs when Saddam was in power, and their paychecks were a fraction of what they are now. He displayed outright disdain for the great betrayal that they committed in giving over the city to Sadr's criminals. He then said they would have never thought of doing that under Saddam, but it was easier now since there was no perceptible punishment by the local government/coalition, but that the outcome of not cooperating with MAS was taken more seriously.
8. Stated that Sadr was a cancer that needed to be removed or else it would get worse fast and that you would either have to amputate [give up Najaf] or be chasing the disease that was spreading ever so much faster. He urged some solution that would rid them of this future [Shi'a] Saddam. He went on to develop the Saddam analogy by showing that Sadr has surrounded himself with a circle much like Saddam's that would protect the leader as long as they were benefiting from him—currently that consisted of feeding of his spoils—like police cars and weapons, monies they plundered and influence they now enjoy along with its inherent respect. He stated that GA Sistani has declared that all government property had to be returned.

The meeting lasted two hours and was rather pleasant in tone. Maytham is a friendly fellow that likes to make analogies and funny remarks. One joke he made about Sadr that is worth mentioning goes like this: A mother mosquito tells her child not to go near any people, she feared for his life, but the little mosquito didn't listen, he came home that evening and told his mother, mom, why did you ask me to stay away from the people, they really like me, when I went near them today they all started clapping for me... [he motioned with his hands how we try to kill a mosquito] he said this was Sadr, he was that naïve & stupid. We then had a catered lunch [actually cooked by the wife of one of our Iraqi staff—it was delicious] in our office followed by the usual barrage of tea and Pepsi.

Again, before we said our final good-bye's [which we did several times as usual] he mentioned that he would brief Sistani personally and re-contact our office for a future meeting with a closer associate. Direct contact with Maytham is done through our Hawza interlocutor Ala', who has been faithfully with us for almost a year now. He has relocated his family to Hilla [with relatives] after several death threats received in his home by phone and paper under the door.

Very Respectfully,

Fadi Petro

Fadi Petro
Senior Political Advisor to the Regional Director
CPA-South Central, Hilla, Iraq

Mobile: (b)(6)

Pager: (b)(6) enter: (b)(6)

Local: (b)(6)

Thuraya: (b)(6)

Iridium:

Mobile:

APR 5 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland Defense Domestic Intelligence Highlights

I keep getting these things, and there is no report. Why should you waste time sending them in to me if there is nothing on them? It is kind of silly and a waste of everyone's time.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/1/04 Homeland Defense Domestic Intelligence Highlights

DHR:dh
040104-17

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

DRH 4/11

4/5

Sec Def

- You are right — makes no sense.*
- We have told DIA to stop putting this in*
- We will do a better job of screening the folder for "blank" reports before sending to you.*

CHTR04

OSD 11746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036597

C

APR 5 2004

337

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

PAUL BURGER

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Schedule Meetings on Minow Report and E-mails

I really do have to solve the Minow report, and I have to solve the e-mails on McCain. This calendar has to reflect that.

This has to be done. We have to stop it. Please give me my calendar for Friday and let me see it, and for all of next week. Set time aside today for me to go over my calendars for Friday, Saturday, Sunday and all through next Friday. I want to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-16

.....
Please respond by

4/2/04

Done

4/2/

OSD 11747-04

5 APR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/036598

6:4
1600
720
EF-9192
04/004826

APR 07 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: MOU for PRTs in Afghanistan

We need to talk about what the status is of an MOU for the PRTs in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040604-4

.....
Please respond by

4/23/04

To: Sec Def

Paul Butler

6/18

DA 6/19

Sir,
Response attached
vr/CDR Nosw20
6/18

OSD 11766-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036599

file

June 15, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Paul Butler
Jim Haynes
Larry Lanzillotta

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Liability Insurance

b19

Please look into this subject of liability insurance for selected senior Defense Department officials, and then explain to me how we could implement it here in the Department.

As you will note, the Department of State already has such a program. It strikes me it would be a useful thing for us to do here, but we would have to figure out whether or not the Government would pay any portion, as it does at State, if it is legal, if we have authority, who we would include, and who we wouldn't include and why.

15
to
3
04

Please come up with a simple proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/14/04 SecState fax re: Professional Liability Insurance

DHR:dh
061504-4

.....
Please respond by

7/16/04

DR 7/2
Sir,
Response attached.

4/2
LtCol Greg Lemayel
7/30


OSD 11777-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036600

2004104

~~FOUO~~

August 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Liability Insurance

I want to sign **up** for that liability insurance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080904-15

.....
Please respond by 8/22/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036601

ASD 11777-af

019

9 Aug 04

20 Jul 04

To: SecDef

From: Paul Butler

Re: Liability Insurance

I wish 8/4
performed
senior mil
could get
this! J

August 3, 2004

204 212-5 PM 2:56

8/9

- Attached is a copy of Ray Dubois snowflake response outlining the terms of the liability insurance available to DoD employees. Bottom line, most employees at the GS-15 level and above are eligible and can be reimbursed up to \$150 of the yearly premium. (The premium, however, is not expensive and is in the \$290 range).
- The coverage is available for either \$500k or \$1 million and covers liability and up to \$100k in attorneys' fees. (One caveat is coverage for "pre-existing conditions." I have looked at the application form and it asks whether the applicant is aware of any pending "claims or allegations" which presumably would not be covered by a policy obtained now).
- You asked whether coverage extends beyond separation from the government. General Counsel's office has informed me that if the employee resigned or retired (as opposed to being fired), they would be covered.
- As the last paragraph of Ray's memo states, the current plan is to publicize the availability of the insurance in the next quarterly edition of Personnel HiLites, published by WHS Human Resources Directorate.

TSA SD	8/5
SRMA SD	8/5
MA SD	8/5
EXEC SEC	8/8

OSD 11777-04


11-L-0559/OSD/036602



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO



048819
COMM-FLE
SECURITY/AD-OPS

2004-07-20 10:30 AM

July 20, 2004, 10:30 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: Professional Liability Insurance Reimbursement Program

- The attached snowflake requests information regarding a program for professional liability insurance reimbursement within DoD.
- DoD implemented this program beginning in FY 2000. Pursuant to the DoD program, qualified employees may be reimbursed up to one-half the cost incurred for professional liability insurance, not to exceed \$150.00 per year.
- The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires agencies to reimburse qualified employees for up to one-half the cost incurred for professional liability insurance. The Act permits agencies some discretion on the specific amount to be reimbursed, provided the total yearly payment does not exceed one-half the cost of the premium. WHS operates this program for employees assigned to OSD as well as the JCS and activities receiving operational support from WHS.
- Qualified employees under the statute include law enforcement officers, supervisors, and management officials covered under the general schedule (GS) and those above the GS-15. Military personnel and non-appropriated fund supervisors and managers are not covered. Since the Program was implemented, WHS Human Resources Directorate has processed 15 claims for reimbursement. It does not have a record of claims for reimbursement sent directly to DFAS by administrative officers of other DoD organizations.
- Liability insurance obtained by employees covers legal expenses and damages awarded in the event that employees are sued for actions taken in the course of their duties.
- The Professional Liability Insurance Reimbursement Program will be publicized in the next quarterly issue of the WHS Human Resources Directorate's Personnel Highlights, a widely distributed on-line publication disseminated throughout OSD and other WHS-supported organizations.

Prepared by: David Bauer,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/036603

OSD 11777-04

720
~~FOUO~~

August 6, 2004

TO: Gen. George Casey

CC: Gen. **Dick** Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: 30-day Assessment

Your overall 30-day assessment is excellent.

Thank you so much.

DHR:dh
080604-1

.....
Please *respond* by _____

OSD 11819-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036604

020 A 7

6 Aug 04

1561-1630
Scanned

June 17, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D-R*
SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

Taylor
(D)

What do you recommend on this eight-year four-star for the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
061704-3

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

PW
Who do you
approve?
(Signature)

7/1
8/8/9
175004

145004

SIR,
Response attached.

VR

LT Col Greg Lengyel
8/4

PA 8/9

MEMO TO: Secretary ~~Rumsfeld~~

DATE: August 3, 2004

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz 

SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

Don,

You asked me what I would propose concerning the personnel and assignment policies in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. In the short term, specifically the next four years, I endorse the CJCS recommended course of action, a course of action with which the SECNAV and CNO are in agreement: maintain the four star stature of the Naval Reactors Director, but reduce the tour length to four years, renewable to eight. I've attached the CJCS's original memo at Tab A.

I believe, however, that the question you raise, as well as several associated personnel and assignment issues, should be studied. E.g.:

- Despite rising nuclear carrier numbers and declining submarine numbers, the Naval Reactors directorship continues to reside with the submarine officers. Should this change?
- Another issue is the command of nuclear aircraft carriers. By law, dating from the 1920's, an aviator qualified officer must command a carrier. Given the sensitivity of nuclear safety issues and the complexity of these ships during the series of refueling overhauls now confronting the Navy, should consideration be given to sharing command of these capital ships with nuclear trained surface or submarine officers during these overhaul periods?
- The Naval Nuclear Propulsion program tends to get first call on that segment of the Naval officer corps with engineering and scientific aptitude. Is the platform-centric organizing principal of

210 Navy (384)


3 Aug 04

14 Jun 04

Naval Reactors appropriate for such a large percentage of these key members of 21st century officer corps? Is there another pool of manpower with which to operate the older technology represented by nuclear reactors (perhaps raising the retirement age of existing nuclear officers) thereby freeing up a larger percentage of the younger, technically capable officers to other needs of our nation's defense?

Reducing the term of the Naval Reactors Director to four years will require a legislative change, presumably as part of the FY'06 Authorization. With your approval, I would ask the Navy to come back with recommendations on the three questions above, as well as on the question of reducing the Director's term to four years in time to have a total package ready for the FY'06 submission.

Go ahead and task the Navy



AUG 9 2004

Prepare a tasker for SecDef signature _____

Other _____



UNCLASSIFIED

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1892-04

1 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *PHM 6/25*

SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- **Question.** What do you recommend on this eight-year four-star for the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program? (TAB A)
- **Answer.** I recommend the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program remain a four-star position, however, the Department should propose to revise the tour length in FY06 NDAA. An eight-year appointment is too long. The director should be appointed to serve an initial term of four-years with the option to serve additional one- or two-year terms not to exceed a total of eight years.
- **Analysis.**
 - Retaining the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program as a four-star position is commensurate with the level of responsibility for the safe operation of over 100 nuclear reactors.
 - Reducing the initial term from eight to four-years while retaining the option for additional one- or two-year terms will provide greater flexibility to manage the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
 - Revising the term of the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program requires the concurrence of the Secretary of Energy as well as a change to the current law.
 - The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations concur with this proposal.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff;

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/036608

OSD 11872-04

210 Navy (384)

150104

145004



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

Pub 12

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC _____

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, 695-3341 *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- At your earlier direction, Dan Dell'Orto met with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to obtain their views about the grade (O-10) and term of appointment (8 years) of this position.
- The Secretary of the Navy believes that any proposed change in either the grade level or term of appointment is sensitive.
- The grade level is significant because of the Navy's outstanding nuclear safety record.
- Were the grade level reduced, any subsequent safety problems likely would be attributed to that reduction.
- An 8-year term is unduly long and permits the incumbent to outlast at least one Administration, and possibly two.
- The Chief of Naval Operations agreed that any proposed change in either grade level or term of appointment would be controversial and possibly particularly difficult in an election year because the submarine community would mobilize to oppose any change.
- Having a 4-star officer (although it does not have to be a submariner, it historically has been) in this position provides the submarine community with an edge over both the surface and aviation community neither of which has a Navy uniformed advocate above the two-star level.
- Interestingly, ADM Clark does not believe that either the Department of Energy or the Senate would oppose a change in this position unless the submarine community sways them.

210 Navy (384)

14 Jun 04

OSD 11872-04



11-L-0559/OSD/036609

- The position as currently structured is an anachronism during a period of transition from a threat- to a capabilities-based defense and a platform centric system to an information centric system.
- Consideration should be given to a Senior Executive Service person for this position, as the Executive Order contemplates, as this would remove the position from the operations role and the submarine advocacy role.
- ADM Clark was very complimentary toward ADM Skip Bowman, the incumbent, who has handled himself as well as anyone could in this position.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, (b)(6)

November 7^D, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Navy Nuclear 4-Star

(3)

I think it is time to end the 8-year assignment for the Navy nuclear 4-star and possibly move it to a 3-star.

Please talk to Vern Clark and Gordon England, and see what we might want to propose next year by way of legislative change.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110703-8

.....
Please respond by 12/12/03

DR 6/17

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
6/16

U22310 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/036611

September 27, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Levin Request

18A9

Carl Levin gave me the attached material last Thursday when I was testifying on the Hill.

Please get back to me by Wednesday with a proposed draft response to him.

Thanks.

Attach.

- 9/23/04 Levin List of Documents Not Yet Received from SecDef & USDP
- 8/05/04 Levin Letter to SecDef re: Pre-war Intel docs
- 6/30/04 Levin Letter to USDP re: **Iraq** docs
- 9/22/04 Levin Document Requests Update

DHR:ss
092704-17

27 SEP 04

.....
Please respond by 9/29/04

5 AUG 0

From Carl Stein
to Sec Rumsfeld

September 23, 2004

List of documents not yet received from Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary Feith in response to Senator Levin's requests

- 1) Six items requested of Secretary Rumsfeld on August 5, 2004, to which there has been no response.
- 2) "Reviews of or contributions to" documents produced by other agencies (promised on Feb. 26, then he said on June 14 that he had not agreed to do so, and would have required permission of other agencies).*
- 3) Two binders of documents being reviewed for executive privilege (promised on May 12). ✓
- 4) ORCON documents (unspecified number) being reviewed by the CIA for release approval (promised on May 12).
- 5) Communications from Secretary Feith's Policy office (OUSDP) personnel to other agencies and offices related to the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda from September 2001 through April 2003.*
- 6) Documents related to information from detainees, or from defectors provided by or assisted by the Iraqi National Congress (the latter promised on Feb. 26, then he said there were none on June 14).
- 7) SASC received documents contained in a Feith June 29 response to SSCI, which were responsive to a previous Levin request but which Feith said on June 14 could not be found. Therefore, it appears there are likely to be similar documents and communications from other staff that should be provided.

* Items 2-7 relate to requests to USD Feith, and are summarized in Senator Levin's June 30, 2004 letter to USD Feith. That letter clarified his request to include documents from other personnel and organizations within the OUSDP, in addition to the documents from the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG). On August 16, DOD provided to SASC the October 27 answers to the SSCI's QFRs from July 10 hearing, without any reference to the June 30 letter.

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS
 WAYNE ALLARD, COLORADO
 JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA
 SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE
 JOHN ENSIGN, NEVADA
 JAMES M. TALCENT, MISSOURI
 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
 LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
 ELIZABETH DOLC, NORTH CAROLINA
 JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
 ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
 JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
 JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND
 DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII
 BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
 E. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA
 MARK DAYTON, MINNESOTA
 EVAN BROW, INDIANA
 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK
 MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS

JUDITH A. ANSLEY, STAFF DIRECTOR
 RICHARD D. DEBBES, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

August 5, 2004.

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to request additional documents related to my inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. Four of the documents I am requesting apparently have already been provided to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). Where relevant, I am including the page number from the 9/11 Commission report, with the reference in brackets.

- 1) September 14, 2001, Memo from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept." [p.559]
- 2) September 17, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Preventing More Events." [p.559]
- 3) September 18, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Were We Asleep?" [p.559]
- 4) September 20, 2001, Memo from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Secretary of Defense, "Briefing Draft." [p.560]
- 5) All documents related to the DOD document identified as "Suggested Additions for CIA's 20 August Draft on Iraqi Support for Terrorism," which was provided to the Committee on January 15, 2004. This includes, but is not limited to, any cover memo; e-mails and other written communications regarding the document or the draft CIA paper; the draft CIA paper; and CIA's response to the DOD document.
- 6) All documents and communications, including e-mails, related to your request to the Intelligence Community to declassify statements about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, which you referred to in your press conference of September 26, 2002, and in your comments to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce on September 27, 2002, including, but not limited to, the statements themselves.

I would ask that you provide the documents in response to this request by August 20, 2004. *Thank* you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS
WAYNE ALLARD, COLORADO
JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA
SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE
JOHN ENSIGN, NEVADA
JAMES M. TALENT, MISSOURI
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
ELIZABETH DOLE, NORTH CAROLINA
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND
DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII
BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA
MARK DAYTON, MINNESOTA
EVAN BAYH, INDIANA
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK
MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS

JUDITH A. ANSLEY, STAFF DIRECTOR
RICHARD D. DEBOBES, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

June 30, 2004.

The Honorable Douglas J. Feith
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
2000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing in further pursuit of my request of November 25, 2003 for documents from your office related to Iraq. With your most recent letter of June 14, it appears you believe you have provided all the documents that are relevant to my request, other than documents being reviewed to determine if they are protected by executive privilege, or awaiting CIA release approval. I am concerned that you may be defining my request in a manner that limits both its scope and your response. There are some documents that you should have provided long ago, and I request that you provide them without delay, as described below.

Based on the information we already have received, it seems unlikely that there are no documents related to the subject of my inquiry. For example, you have stated on a number of occasions that new information from detainees was important in helping your office to develop its perspective on the links between Iraq and al Qaeda. Given the importance you have attached to this new information, it seems unlikely that not even one single document or record was created related to the debriefings of such detainees, whether by personnel in the Office of Special Plans (OSP) or the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) or by anyone else in the Policy office. If, upon further review, there are any such documents, please provide them.

Your letter of June 14 states that you "did not undertake" to provide "reviews of or contributions to" documents produced by other agencies. You had never previously denied your intent to provide the requested documents, and your explanation of the necessity to obtain release permission from other agencies is neither necessarily true, nor sufficient reason to withhold such documents. Clearly, you can provide your office's reviews of other agencies' documents, as you have already done in part with the briefings on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. You should also be able to provide any contributions or suggestions given by your office to other agencies, whether or not they contributed to subsequent documents of those agencies.

11-L-0559/OSD/036616

You have already provided one document that your office initiated to provide such input to the Intelligence Community relative to a draft CIA report concerning Iraq's support for terrorism, an example in which it appears you did not need, seek, or obtain any release permission. Please provide all such contribution documents, records and communications.

Furthermore, I would point out that the three different versions of the briefings produced by your office and provided to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the staffs of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the Vice President (OVP), respectively, on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship were, in essence, reviews of intelligence documents. As you have acknowledged, your staff met with Intelligence Community analysts after you briefed the DCI in August, 2002 in order to present your views on the intelligence. It should be a straightforward matter to provide all additional documents and records, as well as communications, related to this meeting and these briefings, including information related to why and on what basis the changes were made to the three different versions of the briefing.

Your unilateral withholding of your complete October 27, 2003 responses to the SSCI's Questions for the Record is unacceptable. Your previous actions have demonstrated that there is no reason to withhold the information. For instance, you have already provided to SASC a portion of your October 27 responses, as well as your complete responses to Senator Rockefeller's Questions for the Record from the same hearing. Also, you have provided to the SSCI all the documents provided to SASC in response to my request, and did not deny them such material as being proprietary to SASC. Why the double standard? I would also note that the Intelligence Community is providing to SASC all the documents it is providing to SSCI in response to its inquiry. The fact that I am on the SSCI is not relevant. By withholding the information from SASC, it prevents the SASC staff from reviewing the material. Please provide all the remaining material from your October 27 responses.

As to the issue of the two binders of documents being reviewed for executive privilege, your letter of June 14 states that "I did not say in my May 12 letter that the President has claimed executive privilege with respect to any of the documents you have requested." I remind you that unless the President has claimed executive privilege, documents are not protected by such privilege. Please provide the status of this review (which appears to have been under way for two months), including how many documents are being reviewed, a brief description of each document being withheld for review, and when we can expect documents to be provided or privilege asserted.

With respect to the ORCON documents mentioned in your May 12 letter that are being reviewed by the CIA, how many documents have you sent for review, and will you provide them on a rolling basis if they are approved for release on a rolling basis, rather than waiting for all of them to be reviewed?

Finally, based on the documents you have provided, it is clear that there are relevant documents that were prepared by, and communications from, individuals within your Policy office but outside of the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), including the Policy Support office. I am concerned that by asking for documents, records, and communications from the OSP and PCTEG groups, SASC would be missing a substantial amount of important and relevant information that has a bearing on our inquiry. Accordingly, I would ask that you provide all documents and communications from all persons within your Policy organization from September 2001 through April 2003, related to the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda

Please provide the requested documents no later than July 15, 2004.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carl Levin". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping "C" and a long, horizontal stroke at the end.

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner

September 22, 2004

^{Cu}
SEN. LEVIN DOCUMENT REQUESTS ON INTEL INVESTIGATION

- There are **2 outstanding requests from Sen. Levin** seeking documents relating to pre-war intelligence on Iraq and Policy's Office of Special Plans:
 1. **An August 5 letter to you** with 6 separate requests for documents. We expect to answer this one shortly and to provide most of the documents requested, although there are probably fewer than Levin expects.
 - a. The first 4 requests seek memos from the Deputy and Doug Feith written to you in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Although there are deliberative process privilege claims that could be made, these documents were given to the 9/11 Commission and the plan is to produce them.
 - b. The remaining 2 requests are looking for documents relating to the project on Iraq-al Qaida links and any requests you sent to CIA to declassify documents. We have some responsive documents but are still searching for others.
 2. **A June 30 letter to Doug Feith** seeking very broad categories of documents from the entire Policy organization on pre-war Iraq policy and intel. The request is still under Policy and General Counsel review. Policy has already responded to Levin as follows:
 - Policy staff has spent over 1800 person-hours searching files, reviewing documents and answering Levin's questions and document demands.
 - A team of three career DoD officials reviewed thousands of pages for any documents related to his inquiry
 - Feith's office sent five binders full of documents, plus several hundred more pages of documents at various times, showing what Special Plans and Policy Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group did – all of it proper. PCTEG
- Levin's minority inquiry duplicates the SSCI's investigation of Special Plans and PCTEG.
 - Mr. Feith testified before the full SSCI (of which Levin is a member) and answered 51 written questions for the record – nearly all on the same subjects as Levin's minority inquiry. SSCI staff also interviewed 14 Policy staff members for more than 30 hours.

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS
 WAYNE ALLARD, COLORADO
 JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA
 SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE
 JOHN ENSIGN, NEVADA
 JAMES M. TALENT, MISSOURI
 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
 LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
 ELIZABETH DOLE, NORTH CAROLINA
 JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
 ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
 JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
 JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND
 DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII
 BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
 E. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA
 MARK DAYTON, MINNESOTA
 EVAN BAYH, INDIANA
 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK
 MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS

JUDITH A. ANSLEY, STAFF DIRECTOR
 RICHARD D. DEBOES, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

2001 AUG -9 PM 1:43

August 5, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to request additional documents related to my inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. Four of the documents I am requesting apparently have already been provided to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). Where relevant, I am including the page number from the 9/11 Commission report, with the reference in brackets.

- 1) September 14, 2001, Memo from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept." [p.559]
- 2) September 17, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Preventing More Events." [p.559]
- 3) September 18, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Were We Asleep?" [p.559]
- 4) September 20, 2001, Memo from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Secretary of Defense, "Briefing Draft." [p.560]
- 5) All documents related to the DOD document identified as "Suggested Additions for CIA's 20 August Draft on Iraqi Support for Terrorism," which was provided to the Committee on January 15, 2004. This includes, but is not limited to, any cover memo; e-mails and other written communications regarding the document or the draft CIA paper; the draft CIA paper; and CIA's response to the DOD document.
- 6) All documents and communications, including e-mails, related to your request to the Intelligence Community to declassify statements about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, which you referred to in your press conference of September 26, 2002, and in your comments to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce on September 27, 2002, including, but not limited to, the statements themselves.

I would ask that you provide the documents in response to this request by August 20, 2004. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner



POLICY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENT AT TAB E
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

OCT 20 2004

The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-8050

Dear Senator Levin:

I have reviewed your two October 6, 2004 letters to the Secretary of Defense. *The* shorter one, dealing with document requests, does not acknowledge the substantial efforts my office and I have made in response to your minority inquiry and the voluminous documents we have provided, as summarized in an attachment to Secretary Rumsfeld's October 1, 2004 letter to you and re-attached here (Tab A).

You included in your shorter October 6 letter a list entitled "Outstanding Information Requested from DoD." The list contains some errors. It refers to "outstanding" requests for documents that, as explained in my June 14, 2004 letter to you and Tab E of Secretary Rumsfeld's October 1, 2004 letter to you, we have not found, despite diligent efforts. Tab E of the Secretary's October 1 letter is re-attached here (at Tab B). Your list refers also to documentation that you say we did not provide about an interview with an Iraqi defector. That interview was not classified and not an intelligence de-briefing; it was a meeting between an Iraq exile and a Policy staff member doing unclassified research. I explained that interview in my June 29, 2004 letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts, a copy of which I sent to the SASC together with the relevant documents. In other words, these requests are not "outstanding."

I have **also** reviewed your longer October 6, 2004 letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, which dealt with CIA comments on our "Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al-Qaida Contacts (1990-2003)." We prepared the Summary in response to a request from the SSCI for intelligence community documents to which I had alluded in testimony before the SSCI. We did not write it as a paper for use within the Administration. Nor did we write it as a comprehensive analysis of the subject of Iraq-al-Qaida connections.

In July 2003, I had briefed the SSCI that in 2002 some Policy staff members believed that certain intelligence reports were not reflected adequately or at all in finished intelligence analyses on the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship. The SSCI asked me, among other

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENT AT TAB E



11-L-0559/OSD/036622

questions for the record, to provide those reports. As I explained in my answer to the SSCI, I attached to my answer a list of the requested documents along with the Summary, which highlighted the main points in those documents on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. To reiterate: The Summary responded to the SSCI's request for the reports.

The Summary was not intended to press a particular conclusion on the SSCI, which in any case had access to all the views of the intelligence community and to underlying documents. By the time the Summary was created, the matter of the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was an historical rather than a policy issue, given that the Saddam regime had fallen months earlier.

Your letter says that (1) I did not request CIA clearance on the Summary until after you asked that a copy of it be sent to the SASC, and (2) I did not reflect CIA's modifications in our January 2004 Addendum to the Summary. Neither of those points is correct, however.

I did request CIA approval in October 2003, before submitting the Summary to the SSCI. My staff provided the Summary to the CIA on October 24, 2003 and highlighted the urgency of a response. The CIA said that it would try to provide clearance by October 27, 2003. The Summary was part of the classified annex to our answers to questions for the record that the SSCI had issued on September 26 with a due date of October 3. We wished to be responsive and were already overdue. *So*, though I had not yet received formal word back from the CIA, I released the answers, with the Summary, to the SSCI on October 27. From that date until receiving the CIA's December 10, 2003 letter that you mentioned, my office received no CIA comments on the Summary.

The *Weekly Standard* published an article in November 2003 that purported to quote from the Summary. DoD issued the attached November 15, 2003 press statement (Tab C) that was coordinated with other agencies. I personally discussed the initial draft press statement with Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin, and after further discussion with others, the CIA cleared the press statement, which said that "the provision of the classified annex to the Intelligence Committee was cleared by other agencies and done with the permission of the Intelligence Community."

After the *Weekly Standard* article was published, the SASC, HASC and HPSCI all requested copies of what I had sent in October 2003 to the SSCI. Before honoring those requests, my office, for the second time, requested CIA permission because the initial permission related to providing the Summary to the SSCI only, rather than to the other committees. The CIA's December 10, 2003 letter responded to this second request and

referred to some required "additions, deletions and/or source document clarifications" that were detailed in the comments attached to the letter.

You say that DoD's January 15, 2004 transmittal letter, sending the Summary and Addendum to the SASC, was wrong in stating that the Addendum contained the CIA's proposed modifications to the Summary. You mention, as examples, items #8, #9, #10 and #33, but you do not explain what you mean.

I have reviewed these and the other items in the Addendum, and the CIA's December 10, 2003 comments. I do not see any misstatement in DoD's January 15, 2004 transmittal letter (attached at Tab D without attachments), which says that the Addendum "contain[s] the substance of the CIA's proposed changes." The Addendum refers to every change the CIA requested. The CIA did not ask us to include its commentary about the requested changes; rather, it asked us to make specific modifications, and we made them. None of the CIA's requested changes altered the substance of the Summary.

For example, in item #8 the CIA asked us to delete the phrase "from a well placed source;" the Addendum does so, and replaces the deleted phrase with "from the source described in the italicized paragraph above." The CIA made no comment on this italicized paragraph, except to ask that we not refer to Senior Executive Memoranda. In item #9 the CIA asked us to replace "from the same source" with "from the same foreign government service as #8" and to replace "field comment" with "foreign government service comment;" the Addendum does that. In item #10 we replaced "according to sensitive CIA HUMINT reporting (same source as #8)" with "according to the same foreign government service report as item #8," just as the CIA asked, and we included a reference to an additional source document that the CIA asked us to add.

With respect to item #33, we cited three sources, i.e., one raw intelligence report and two products produced after that raw report. The CIA did not ask us to make any specific changes to our text, but pointed out that the earlier raw report contradicted one of our comments, which was, however, supported by the later products that we cited. As the raw report had been cited to support the main proposition of item #33 and not to support the comment in question, we replaced the reference to the raw report with a reference to a later finished product supporting the main proposition, while retaining the references to the other two sources. It bears repeating: Those other two sources, which post-dated the raw report at issue, supported the challenged comment in our Summary. So it was reasonable to conclude that the raw report was ultimately judged by the Intelligence Community to be either untrue or no longer true regarding that comment. The CIA did not express any objection to the way in which we responded regarding item #33 (nor to our responses regarding any of the other items). If the CIA's judgments on

these matters have changed since we prepared our Addendum, that would have no bearing on the adequacy of our response to its December 10, 2003 comments.

By letter of January 15, 2004, we sent the CIA the Summary¹ and a memo entitled "Response to CIA Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al-Qaida contacts (1990-2003).'" That letter and memo (both attached at Tab E, without ORCON attachments) explained how we dealt with the CIA's requests and responded to questions the CIA had raised in its December 10, 2003 letter about source documents and citations. After sending that letter and memo we received from the CIA no further comments, questions, or requested changes. Had the CIA raised any further concerns, we would have worked with it to resolve them.

Your allegations have an accusatory tone. If you had called me or asked to meet and discuss these matters, we could have cleared up the misunderstandings that underlie your allegations. The matters at issue hinge on complex textual and historical analysis. A stream of confrontational correspondence is less productive than a civil dialogue would have been.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,



Douglas J. Feith

Attachments: as stated

cc (with attachments): Senator John Warner
 Senator Pat Roberts
 Senator John D. Rockefeller IV
 Representative Peter Hoekstra
 Honorable Porter Goss

August 9, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meetings on Intel Legislation

In addition to Steve Cambone, we will want to have someone in the group who is a DoD military representative from either General Myers or General Pace.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080904-6

W
50.09

9 AUG 04

OSD 11996-04

July 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Costs for Iceland

I would appreciate getting hard facts on what it costs us to stay in Iceland. Please break it down for each category of activity we are doing there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-14

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

Iceland

2650104



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 12 AM 9:35

INFO MEMO

August 11, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *Tina W. Jonas*

SUBJECT: Iceland

- In response to your request regarding the annual costs to maintain U.S. forces in Iceland, the Department spends about \$239 million annually as shown below:

(Dollars in Millions)			
<u>Category</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
Operation & Maintenance (O&M)			
Base Operations	101	3	104
Radars	-	19	19
Total O&M	101	22	123
Military Personnel	66	39	105
Family Housing Operations	11	-	11
Total	178	61	239

- The Department maintains 2,464 military and civilian personnel (642 Air Force and 1,822 Navy personnel) at the Naval Air Station Keflavik in Iceland, along with HH-60G search and rescue helicopters, a detachment of 4 deployed P-3s (rotating every 6 months), and an Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance operation.
- The Navy P-3s are a rotational detachment from a deployed squadron, split between U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command. The P-3 deployment cycle maintains a rotation base of three squadrons (one deployed, two in interdeployment training cycle).
- Under the Aerospace Expeditionary Force construct, the Air Force rotates four F-15s, one KC-135, and one HC-130 and crews to Iceland every 3 months.

OSD 12088-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036628

- o The mission of Naval Air Station Keflavik is to maintain and operate facilities, and provide services and materials to support aviation activities and Navy's operating forces. Iceland also provides the primary divert airfield for the North Atlantic.
- The Air Force uses the Navy's facilities and reimburses the Navy for the support provided. The Air Force operates the radars (\$19 million) for air control and defense. The radars feed the Icelandic air traffic control system.
- o For FY 2005 and later, the Air Force has not budgeted for Iceland because it wants to remove its forces. The Air Force will continue to support Iceland until they get approval to leave. The Air Force believes that it can provide for Icelandic defense through force projection.
- Ending the Air Force presence in Iceland would save \$22 million annually (base support and radar costs) and would relieve pressure on the low density/high demand search and rescue crews and aircraft.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: John M. Evans

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

July 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Costs for Iceland

I would appreciate getting hard facts on what it costs us to stay in Iceland. Please break it down for each category of activity we are doing there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-14

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12088-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036630

~~FOUO~~

TAB

August 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

830

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Muslim Forces

John Abizaid talked about calling it a "bridge force" of Muslim countries and trying Morocco and Tunisia. **Where do we stand on that?**

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080204-4

.....
Please respond by

8/5/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12101-04

TAB

11-L-0559/OSD/036631

72
~~FOUO~~

TAB A

July 26, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*,
SUBJECT: NATO Working Hours

Please let me know whether or not NATO really does have a 35-hour work week that is imposed on civilian and military alike, and whether or not we ought to find a way to waive it for a military organization during wartime or permanently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-34

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

OSD 12103-04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

04 JUL 27 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/036632



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CHIEF OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CM-1984-704 AUG 12 PM 12:16
12 August 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{F&A} *VR/R 11 AUG 04*

SUBJECT: NATO Working Hours

- **Question.** "Please let me know whether or not NATO really does have a 35-hour work week that is imposed on civilian and military alike, and whether or not we ought to find a way to waive it for a military organization during wartime or permanently. Thanks." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** NATO has set 38 hours as the normal workweek for civilian and military alike. However, depending on requirements of the unit or staff section, both categories of personnel can work extra hours (and normally do). Additional information is attached (TAB B).
- There is no real advantage to waiving the official NATO working hours. Based on current NATO personnel rules (approved by the North Atlantic Council), military and civilian working hour rules apply in peacetime as well as wartime. Personnel work the hours necessary to complete their tasking.
- **Analysis.** US military personnel assigned to the US Delegation and US Mission to NATO, as well as Joint Staff officers who have served in NATO previously, indicate that NATO working hours is not an issue that impacts staff officer availability.
- Current NATO working hour policies provide the flexibility to support operations in both wartime and peacetime. However, civilian overtime pay costs rise during wartime or when circumstances demand extended working hours. Therefore, any change to the current policies will have negligible impact on the execution of NATO operations since provisions are in place for personnel to work as required to complete tasking.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/036633

OSD 12103-04

6 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: NATO Working Hours.

1. Purpose. To provide information on NATO working hours.

2. Key Points

- NATO has set 38 hours as the normal workweek for civilian and military alike. However, depending on requirements of the unit or staff section, both categories of personnel can work extra hours (and normally do).
 - For military and category A and L (executive and officer level) civilians, there is no extra compensation for working over 38 hours per week. Category B and C civilian personnel (clerks, secretaries, etc) can be made to work overtime but are paid an additional 33 percent for nights and 50 percent for weekends.
 - In addition, regardless of national working hour laws, military and civilian personnel may not work less than the mandated 38 hours when assigned to a NATO position. For example, military or civilian staff from France, a nation with a mandated 35-hour workweek, must still work the full 38 hours. It is up to the member nation to provide any extra compensation for the three-hour delta. In contrast, US civil service employees working at NATO agencies must still work a statute minimum of 40 hours weekly.
 - The only NATO employees to whom the 38-hour workweek does not apply are Local Wage Grade contract employees such as mechanics, gardeners, and cleaners. In their case, the working hour statutes of the host nation apply. National delegations and liaison offices (which do not fall under NATO personnel rules) work the hours set out by their national authorities.
- There is no real advantage to waiving the official NATO working hours. Based on current NATO personnel rules (approved by the North Atlantic Council), military and civilian working hour rules apply in peacetime as well as wartime. Personnel will work the hours necessary to complete their tasking.
 - The only difference is the extra expense of paying overtime for B and C grade civilians. If this additional expense becomes excessive, a

Tab B

suspension of overtime pay can be enacted, if necessary, by either suspending the benefits for the duration of a conflict or through a change to the normal working hours. This requires NAC approval.

- Current NATO working hour policies provide the flexibility to support operations in both wartime and peacetime. However, civilian overtime pay costs **rise** during wartime or when circumstances demand extended working hours. Therefore, any change to the current policies will have negligible impact on the execution of NATO operations since provisions are in place for personnel to work as required to complete tasking.

Prepared by: Walter L. Sharp, LTG, USA
Director, J-5, (b)(6)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

Col <i>cox</i>	US Mil Del (NATO)	3 August 2004
Col Karns	USNMR SHAPE	3 August 2004

*Advance
copy*

August 16, 2004
SEP 16 08 58 20

TO: Steve Cambone
Mira Ricardel
Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Huntsville Trip and Missile Defense

I feel a little out of touch with missile defense. Since I am going to speak in Huntsville on Wednesday, I would appreciate it if someone would prepare some questions and appropriate responses for me, so I can refresh myself.

If it looks like it could be a problem and my head is elsewhere on intelligence reform and the like, I may have Ron Kadish (if he is going to be there) join me in responding to questions.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
081604-11

.....
Please respond by 8/17/04

333 SD

16 Aug 04

PROPOSED Q&A's FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD
7th Annual Space and Missile Defense Conference
Huntsville, AL
August 18, 2004

Q1. What is the current budget for missile defense? Will the trend continue?

A1: The Fiscal Year 2005 missile defense budget is \$10.2B, an increase from the Fiscal Year 2004 missile defense budget of \$9.0B. The President is committed to the defense of this nation and its allies, and the development, deployment, and sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System is a big part of that commitment,

Q2. How are the rules of engagement being developed for the missile defense system? Has all of the necessary training been accomplished?

The U.S. Strategic Command has overall responsibility for operation of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Combatant Commands are responsible for planning, management, and day-to-day operation of the fielded elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. In the case of launching ground-based interceptors from Fort Greely, Alaska, that responsibility lies with Commander, Northern Command.

The Ballistic Missile Defense System will be manned by highly trained military personnel. A number of missile defense system operators completed the advanced training and certification in order to meet the strict standards required to operate and maintain the missile defense equipment. Additional operators are currently going through the training regime. This training is a cooperative effort among the Missile Defense Agency, Combatant Commanders, and the military services.

Q3. There has been lots of criticism of deploying a missile defense system without adequate testing. What is the basis for your confidence in deploying a missile defense system?

The full range of missile defense testing—from our extensive modeling and simulation and hardware-in-the-loop tests to our ground and flight testing—makes us confident that what we deploy will **work** as intended. We do not rely on intercept flight tests alone to make final assessments concerning system reliability and performance. Our flight tests are important building blocks in this process, but the significant costs of these tests combined with the practical reality that we can only conduct a **few** tests over any given period of time **mean** we have to rely on other kinds of tests to prove the system. System capabilities assessed for deployment will be based on test events planned for Fiscal Year 2004 as well as data collected from flight- and ground tests and simulations over the past several years.

We conduct other **kinds** of tests that provide valuable information about the progress we are making and the reliability of the system. Integrated ground tests, for example, are not subject to flight test restrictions and can run numerous engagement scenarios over the course of a few weeks. Our modeling and simulation activity is **an** even more powerful system verification tool. It is important to understand that in the Missile Defense **Program** we use models and simulations, **and** not flight tests, as the **primary** verification tools. This approach **is** widely used within **the** Department, especially when complex weapon systems are involved.

We will continue both ground and flight tests after our initial capability is put on alert. We still have a test bed for continuing development even though we take advantage of the test bed to provide limited defensive capability (where we have had none before.)

Q4. With deployment occurring shortly, how are the fielding activities progressing? Will we be ready?

As I stated in my speech, on July 22, 2004, we emplaced the first interceptor at Fort Greely, Alaska. **Up** to five more interceptors will be emplaced at Fort Greely by the end of 2004, with **up** to 18 interceptors emplaced by the end of 2005 including those at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

Preparations for communications support at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya, Alaska are on track. Over 112,000 miles of fiber optic cables connecting major communication nodes are **in place**, along **with** nine satellite communications **links**. We are **in the process of** upgrading the Early Warning Radar at Beale Air Force Base and **are** well underway building the sea-based X-band radar. **Our** brigade at Schriever Air Force Base and battalion fire control nodes at Fort Greely are connected to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center in Colorado. The command control between combatant commanders, so essential to providing situational awareness, is progressing well and is on schedule. Upgrades to the Cobra Dane Radar are on schedule. The Chief of Naval Operations has identified the first group of Aegis ships to be upgraded with a ballistic missile defense capability, and the work to install the equipment on the first ship is underway.

Q5. You said in your speech that you're deploying a limited operational capability, what does that mean?

Fielding activities are progressing well. **Construction** of the silos and buildings at Fort Greely, Alaska required for the initial operational capability are complete. The first Ground-based Interceptor was installed in its silo at Fort Greely, Alaska on 22 July 2004. Assembly, shipment, and emplacement of the remaining Ground-based Interceptors are progressing according to schedule and will be available in October 2004.

We **will** field a system that provides some capability that **we** do not have today with the knowledge that we **will** continue to improve that system over time. **Our** strategy **is** to build on this beginning to make the BMD system increasingly more effective and reliable against current threats and hedge against changing future threats.



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

301 O DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACTION MEMO

August 16, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: MICHAEL W. WYNNE, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

AUG 18 2004

SUBJECT: Contingency Funded MILCON Projects for Raven Rock Mountain Complex
(RRMC), Site-R

- The purpose of this action memorandum is to obtain SecDef signature on letters of notification to Congress approving the two MILCON projects at RRMC/Site-R (TAB A).
- WHS requests approval to proceed with two MILCON projects at Site-R using contingency funds (TAB B). The projects, a Fire Station and Upgrade to the Helipad, cost \$5,357,000.
- The two projects are vital to the success of Site-R's mission and must be completed by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005.
- 10 USC 2804 gives SecDef authority to carry out MILCON projects not authorized by law if deferral of the project to the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interests (TAB C). Section 2804 also requires a 21-day congressional notification and wait.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve projects by initialing below and sign letters to Congress at TAB A.

Approve *MD* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: USD(C), OGC, and ASD(LA) (TAB D).

Attachments:
As Stated

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2 8/18
EXEC SEC	M 8/18

Prepared by: Lt Col Steve Bradshaw, IRM, (b)(6) Aug 4, 2004 2004-2455-47c



11-L-0559/OSD/036641

030 12249-04

600.1

16 AUG 04



PENTAGON RENOVATION &
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
100 BOUNDARY CHANNEL DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-3712



JUL 23 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS/
INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT

Handwritten signature: Howard G. Fisher 7/28/04
THRU DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES

SUBJECT: Contingency Funded MILCON Projects for Raven Rock Mountain Complex,
Site-R

- References: (a) Memorandum (S/N), Joint Staff, DJSM-0240-04, 09 March 2004,
Subject: Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC) Site-R Master Plan
(U).
(b) Memorandum (S/N), ASD-HD, 6 Apr 2004, Subject: Raven Rock
Mountain Complex Site-R Master Plan (U).

Reference RRMC/Site-R Master Plan approved by you. As discussed during your recent visit to Site-R, this plan contained two Near Term projects for the construction of an External Fire Station and Repair and Upgrade of the Existing Helipad.

This memorandum provides the packages detailing justification for pursuing funds and authorization of these projects under 10 USC 2804, which provides the SecDef authority to carry out MilCon projects not authorized by law if deferral of the project to the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interests. I believe these projects meet that criteria.


Since these requirements are urgent in nature, request you identify whether contingency funding of \$5,357,000.00 is available under the authorization allowed in Section 2804 of Title 10, U.S.C. I believe that deferral of these projects into the next authorization cycle would be inconsistent with national security and national interests in ensuring that RRMC Site-R is COOP ready and capable.

I have attached the DD Forms 1390 and 1391 at Tab B, and request they be forwarded with your endorsement to the SecDef for approval. We will be ready to award

11-L-0559/OSD/036642


Handwritten: AM 01690-04

these projects by 30 August 2004.


Michael R. Sullivan
Director

Attachment:
As stated

1. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)							FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM							2. DATE June 2004																											
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex							4. COMMAND Washington Headquarters Service							5. AREA CONSTRUCTION COST INDEX 0.89																											
6. PERSONNEL			(1) PERMANENT			(2) STUDENTS			(3) SUPPORTED			(4) TOTAL																													
			OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN																														
a. AS OF																																									
b. END FY																																									
7. INVENTORY DATA (\$000)																																									
a. TOTAL ACREAGE																																									
b. INVENTORY TOTAL AS OF																																									
c. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY																																									
d. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM												\$2.17'																													
e. AUTHORIZATION INCLUDED IN FOLLOWING PROGRAM																																									
f. PLANNED IN NEXT THREE PROGRAM YEARS																																									
g. REMAINING DEFICIENCY																																									
h. GRAND TOTAL												\$2.17'																													
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td colspan="3" style="padding: 5px;">a. CATEGORY</td> <td colspan="2" style="padding: 5px;">b. COST (\$000)</td> <td colspan="2" style="padding: 5px;">c. STATUS</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">(1) CODE</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">(2) PROJECT TITLE</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">(3) SCOPE</td> <td style="padding: 5px;"></td> <td style="padding: 5px;"></td> <td style="padding: 5px;">DESIGN START</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">STATUS COMPLETE</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>Helipad Upgrade</td> <td></td> <td>\$2,171</td> <td></td> <td>31 August 2004</td> <td>31 May 2005</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>Anticipated 3 Months for Design</td> <td>Anticipated 6 Months for Construction</td> </tr> </table>														a. CATEGORY			b. COST (\$000)		c. STATUS		(1) CODE	(2) PROJECT TITLE	(3) SCOPE			DESIGN START	STATUS COMPLETE		Helipad Upgrade		\$2,171		31 August 2004	31 May 2005						Anticipated 3 Months for Design	Anticipated 6 Months for Construction
a. CATEGORY			b. COST (\$000)		c. STATUS																																				
(1) CODE	(2) PROJECT TITLE	(3) SCOPE			DESIGN START	STATUS COMPLETE																																			
	Helipad Upgrade		\$2,171		31 August 2004	31 May 2005																																			
					Anticipated 3 Months for Design	Anticipated 6 Months for Construction																																			
10. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS The RRM, Site-R helipad must be able to support the CJCS OPOD 3-03 Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans (JEEPs), it currently does not. This Design/Build construction project provides the necessary upgrades and supporting helicopter parking area to meet the JEEPs requirements as well as providing upgrade to meet the frangibility requirements of UFC 3-360-01.																																									
11. OUTSTANDING POLLUTION AND SAFETY DEFICIENCIES																																									
<table style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">A. Air Pollution</td> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: right;">(\$000)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>B. Water Pollution</td> <td style="text-align: right;">\$0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C. Occupational Safety and Health</td> <td style="text-align: right;">\$0</td> </tr> </table>														A. Air Pollution	(\$000)	B. Water Pollution	\$0	C. Occupational Safety and Health	\$0																						
A. Air Pollution	(\$000)																																								
B. Water Pollution	\$0																																								
C. Occupational Safety and Health	\$0																																								

1. COMPONENT		FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION		2. DATE	REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex			4. PROJECT TITLE RRMC - Near Term Project - Heliport Upgrade		
5. PROGRAM ELEMENT	6. CATEGORY CODE	7. PROJECT NUMBER 3.02	8. PROJECT COST (\$000) \$2,171		
<p>IMPACT IF NOT PROVIDED: The RRMC helipad would be unable to fully support the Joint Chiefs emergency evacuation plans (JEEPs)</p> <p>ADDITIONAL: N/A</p>					
<p>12. Supplemental Data:</p> <p>Schedule Milestones:</p> <p>Contract Award..... 30 August 2004</p> <p>Design Start..... 31 August 2004</p> <p>Design Complete..... 30 December 2004</p> <p>Construction Start..... 31 October 2004</p> <p>Construction Complete..... 31 May 2005</p> <p>Anticipated Schedule Duration..... 9 Months</p>					
<p>13. Signatures:</p> <p> Date <u>7/26/2004</u></p> <p>Michael R. Sullivan, Director, Pentagon Renovation and Construction Program Office</p>					

1. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)	FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT DATA		2. DATE 2004106124	REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL DD-A&T(A)1610																																																																	
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex		4. PROJECT TITLE RRMC - Near Term Project - Heliport Upgrade																																																																			
5. PROGRAM ELEMENT	6. CATEGORY CODE	7. PROJECT NUMBER 3.02	8. PROJECT COST (\$000) \$2,171																																																																		
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>ITEM</th> <th>U/M</th> <th>QUANTITY</th> <th>UNIT COST</th> <th>COST (\$000)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>02 Site Work</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$577.56</td> </tr> <tr> <td>03 Concrete</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$992.02</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13 Special Construction</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$5.35</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15 Mechanical</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$159.08</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16 Electrical/IT</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$144.37</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SUBTOTAL</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$1,878.37</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Contingency (8.0%)</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$150.27</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4">ESTIMATED CONTRACT COST:</td> <td>\$2,028.64</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4">Supervision, Inspection & Overhead (7.0%)</td> <td>\$142.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4">TOTAL REQUEST</td> <td>\$2,170.64</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4">TOTAL REQUEST ROUNDED</td> <td>\$2,171.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4">EQUIPMENT FUNDED FROM OTHER APPROPRIATIONS</td> <td>N/A</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>					ITEM	U/M	QUANTITY	UNIT COST	COST (\$000)	02 Site Work	LS			\$577.56	03 Concrete	LS			\$992.02	13 Special Construction	LS			\$5.35	15 Mechanical	LS			\$159.08	16 Electrical/IT	LS			\$144.37	SUBTOTAL	-			\$1,878.37	Contingency (8.0%)	-			\$150.27	ESTIMATED CONTRACT COST:				\$2,028.64	Supervision, Inspection & Overhead (7.0%)				\$142.00	TOTAL REQUEST				\$2,170.64	TOTAL REQUEST ROUNDED				\$2,171.00	EQUIPMENT FUNDED FROM OTHER APPROPRIATIONS				N/A
ITEM	U/M	QUANTITY	UNIT COST	COST (\$000)																																																																	
02 Site Work	LS			\$577.56																																																																	
03 Concrete	LS			\$992.02																																																																	
13 Special Construction	LS			\$5.35																																																																	
15 Mechanical	LS			\$159.08																																																																	
16 Electrical/IT	LS			\$144.37																																																																	
SUBTOTAL	-			\$1,878.37																																																																	
Contingency (8.0%)	-			\$150.27																																																																	
ESTIMATED CONTRACT COST:				\$2,028.64																																																																	
Supervision, Inspection & Overhead (7.0%)				\$142.00																																																																	
TOTAL REQUEST				\$2,170.64																																																																	
TOTAL REQUEST ROUNDED				\$2,171.00																																																																	
EQUIPMENT FUNDED FROM OTHER APPROPRIATIONS				N/A																																																																	
10. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION Provide improvements to the existing RRMC helipad that will allow it to continue supporting the Joint Chiefs emergency evacuation plans (JEEPs). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The existing pad footprint will remain. The pad concrete will be replaced, repaired, cracks will be filled and the pad will be sealed. The pad will be required to meet the weight requirements for JEEPs. • The existing asphalt apron will be replaced with concrete. • The lighting for the heliport will be upgraded to meet the requirements of TM 5-811-5. • A new AC power panel will be installed to provide power for the lighting and misc. equipment • The existing RRMC helipad will be re-striped to meet the requirements of TM 5-823-4. • The existing Air Traffic Control Observation building will be removed to allow for the construction of aircraft parking area to meet the JEEPs requirement. • A new 33.5m² X 45.7 m² (110' X 150') concrete parking area will be installed to allow for aircraft parking. • The existing security fencing around the existing helipad will be replaced to meet current fragility guidelines of UFC 3-260-01 • A new asphalt entrance will be provided from the existing access road. • A tie in to the new fire water line and fire hydrants will be installed at the site. This will allow firefighters to fight fires at the Heliport - this capability currently does not exist. 																																																																					

11-L-0559/OSD/036647

1. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)	FY. 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT DATA		2. DATE 2004106124	REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL DD-A&T(A)1610																																																																																											
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex			4. PROJECT TITLE Near Term Project (Fire Station/ Aux HazMat Response)																																																																																												
5. PROGRAM ELEMENT	6. CATEGORY CODE	7. PROJECT NUMBER 3.01	8. PROJECT COST (\$000) \$3,186																																																																																												
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>ITEM</th> <th>U/M</th> <th>QUANTITY</th> <th>UNIT COST</th> <th>COST (\$000)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>02 Site Work</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$583.63</td> </tr> <tr> <td>03 Concrete</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$486.73</td> </tr> <tr> <td>04 Masonry</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$89.09</td> </tr> <tr> <td>05 Metals</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$356.52</td> </tr> <tr> <td>07 Thermal</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$171.38</td> </tr> <tr> <td>08 Doors/Windows / Glass</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$182.51</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10 Specials</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$22.52</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14 Conveying Systems</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$71.24</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15 Mechanical</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$437.55</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16 Electrical/IT</td> <td>LS</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$202.74</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SUBTOTAL</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$2,756.30</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Contingency (8.0%)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$220.50</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ESTIMATED CONTRACT COST</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$2,976.80</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Supervision, Inspection & Overhead (7.0%)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$208.38</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TOTAL REQUEST</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$3,185.18</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TOTAL REQUEST ROUNDED</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>\$3,186.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQUIPMENT FUNDED FROM OTHER APPROPRIATIONS</td> <td>NIA</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>						ITEM	U/M	QUANTITY	UNIT COST	COST (\$000)	02 Site Work	LS			\$583.63	03 Concrete	LS			\$486.73	04 Masonry	LS			\$89.09	05 Metals	LS			\$356.52	07 Thermal	LS			\$171.38	08 Doors/Windows / Glass	LS			\$182.51	10 Specials	LS			\$22.52	14 Conveying Systems	LS			\$71.24	15 Mechanical	LS			\$437.55	16 Electrical/IT	LS			\$202.74	SUBTOTAL				\$2,756.30	Contingency (8.0%)				\$220.50	ESTIMATED CONTRACT COST				\$2,976.80	Supervision, Inspection & Overhead (7.0%)				\$208.38	TOTAL REQUEST				\$3,185.18	TOTAL REQUEST ROUNDED				\$3,186.00	EQUIPMENT FUNDED FROM OTHER APPROPRIATIONS	NIA			
ITEM	U/M	QUANTITY	UNIT COST	COST (\$000)																																																																																											
02 Site Work	LS			\$583.63																																																																																											
03 Concrete	LS			\$486.73																																																																																											
04 Masonry	LS			\$89.09																																																																																											
05 Metals	LS			\$356.52																																																																																											
07 Thermal	LS			\$171.38																																																																																											
08 Doors/Windows / Glass	LS			\$182.51																																																																																											
10 Specials	LS			\$22.52																																																																																											
14 Conveying Systems	LS			\$71.24																																																																																											
15 Mechanical	LS			\$437.55																																																																																											
16 Electrical/IT	LS			\$202.74																																																																																											
SUBTOTAL				\$2,756.30																																																																																											
Contingency (8.0%)				\$220.50																																																																																											
ESTIMATED CONTRACT COST				\$2,976.80																																																																																											
Supervision, Inspection & Overhead (7.0%)				\$208.38																																																																																											
TOTAL REQUEST				\$3,185.18																																																																																											
TOTAL REQUEST ROUNDED				\$3,186.00																																																																																											
EQUIPMENT FUNDED FROM OTHER APPROPRIATIONS	NIA																																																																																														


10. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION

New Fire Station of approximately 790m² (8,500sf.) which will include:

- A single story Truck Bay capable of accommodating 4 Fire trucks w/trailers, able to maintain a temperature no lower than 4.5 degrees C. (40 degrees F.) – 279m² (3000 SF)
- A two story office with billeting, both floors equal approximately 511m² (5,500 SF)
 - Office for Firefighter Administration and Watch Room.
 - Kitchen/Lounge that would support the (5) Billeted Firefighters.
 - Billeting for (2) helicopter pilots.
 - Small Lounge/Kitchenette for Pilots.
 - Men and Women Lavatories
 - Laundry Room
 - Storage Rooms
 - Physical Training Room (PT)
 - Necessary Communications and Equipment Rooms to support, Fire Fighters, Air Control/Observation and Presidential Weather.
 - Air Traffic Control Observation requires a glassed area of approx. 21m² (225 SF) to replace the current Helicopter Control/Observation Bldg.
 - Presidential Weather requires office and map rooms of approx. 93m² (1000 SF).

Ancillary Fire Station Building which will include:

- Approximately 186m² (2,000 square feet)
 - Capability of housing the Hazmat Response Trailer
 - Capability of housing the Special Rescue Trailer
 - Humidity Control – Minimal HVAC
 - Communications (Telephone)
 - Electrical Power

I. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)	FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT DATA (Continuation)		2. DATE 2004/06/24	REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL DD-A&T(A)1610										
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex		4. PROJECT TITLE Near Term Project (Fire Station / Aux HazMat Response)												
5. PROGRAM ELEMENT	6. CATEGORY CODE	7. PROJECT NUMBER 3.01	8. PROJECT COST (\$000) \$3,186											
11. REQUIREMENT: ADEQUATE: SUBSTANDARD:														
<p>PROJECT: Design and construct a new Fire Station of approximately 790m² (8,500 SF) and a 186m² (2,000 SF) Ancillary HazMat Response Bldg. Included in the scope will be a single story Truck Bay capable of accommodating 4 Fire trucks w/trailers, able to maintain a temperature no lower than 4.5 degrees C (40 degrees F), billeting for up to 5 Fire Fighters and two helicopter pilots, Air Traffic Control area, requiring a glassed area of approx. 21m² (225 SF) to replace the current Helicopter Observation Bldg. and a Presidential Weather office and map rooms of approx. 93m² (1000 SF).</p> <p>REQUIREMENT: The work required is to support the Facility's mission and to mitigate facility vulnerabilities as identified by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.</p> <p>CURRENT SITUATION: There is no existing Fire Station. All fire fighting equipment is placed in the roadways within the facility creating life/safety issues. The existing Presidential Weather facility is inside the Complex and does not meet current mission requirements. The existing air traffic control center does not meet mission parameters and violates the Guidelines for Airfield Frangibility Zones.</p> <p>IMPACT IF NOT PROVIDED: If this requirement is not authorized the facility vulnerabilities as identified by DTRA will continue and the life/safety issues will continue.</p> <p>ADDITIONAL: N/A</p>														
<p>12. Supplemental Data:</p> <p>Schedule Milestones: TBD</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Contract Award.....</td> <td>30 August 2004</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Design Start.....</td> <td>31 August 2004</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Design Complete.....</td> <td>31 December 2004</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Construction Start.....</td> <td>30 November 2004</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Construction Complete.....</td> <td>31 July 2005</td> </tr> </table> <p>Anticipated Schedule Duration..... 11 Months</p>					Contract Award.....	30 August 2004	Design Start.....	31 August 2004	Design Complete.....	31 December 2004	Construction Start.....	30 November 2004	Construction Complete.....	31 July 2005
Contract Award.....	30 August 2004													
Design Start.....	31 August 2004													
Design Complete.....	31 December 2004													
Construction Start.....	30 November 2004													
Construction Complete.....	31 July 2005													
<p>13. Signatures:</p> <p> Date <u>7/27/2004</u></p> <p>Michael R. Sullivan, Director, Pentagon Renovation and Construction Program Office</p>														

10 U.S.C.A. § 2804



United States Code Annotated Currentness

Title 10. Armed Forces (Refs & Annos)

Subtitle A. General Military Law (Refs & Annos)

Part IV. Service, Supply, and Procurement (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 169. Military Construction and Military Family Housing

Subchapter I. Military Construction

→ § 2804. Contingency construction

(a) Within the amount appropriated for such purpose, the Secretary of Defense may carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law, or may authorize the Secretary of a military department to carry out such a project, if the Secretary of Defense determines that deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest.

(b) When a decision is made to carry out a military construction project under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress on that decision. Each such report shall include (1) the justification for the project and the current estimate of the cost of the project, and (2) the justification for carrying out the project under this section. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the 21-day period beginning on the date the notification is received by such committees or, if earlier, the end of the 14-day period beginning on the date on which a copy of the notification is provided in an electronic medium pursuant to section 480 of this title.

CREDIT(S)

(Added Pub.L. 97-214, § 2(a), July 12, 1982, 96 Stat. 155, and amended Pub.L. 102-190, Div. B, Title XXVIII, § 2870(3), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1563; Pub.L. 108-136, Div. A, Title X, § 1031(a)(35), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1600.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

1982 Acts. House Report No. 97-612, see 1982 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 441.

1991 Acts. House Report No. 102-60, House Conference Report No. 102-311, and Statement by President, see 1991 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 918.

2003 Acts. House Conference Report No. 108-354 and Statement by President, see 2003 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1407.

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

11-L-0559/OSD/036651

<http://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000082640001535641B...> 3/1/2004

10U.S.C.A. § 2804

Amendments

2003 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 108-136, § 1031(a)(35), inserted "or, if earlier, the end of the 14-day period beginning on the date on which a copy of the notification is provided in an electronic medium pursuant to section 480 of this title" before the period at the end.

1991 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 102-190 struck out provision permitting project to be carried out upon committee approval prior to end of 21-day period.

Effective and Applicability Provisions

1982 Acts. Section effective Oct. 1, 1982, and applicable to military construction projects, and to construction and acquisition of military family housing before, on or after such date, see § 12(a) of Pub.L. 97-214, set out as a note under § 2801 of this title.

American Digest System

Armed Services ☞ 28.

United States ☞ 79 to 91.5.

10U.S.C.A. § 2804, 10USCA § 2804

Current through P.L. 108-198 (End) approved 12-19-03

Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

11-L-0559/OSD/036652

~~FOUO~~

Cust XTRA
↓

M P-X 1 Reg
502
8/19
me
8/19

August 19, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Site-R Proposal

Please look at the attached recommendation from Mike Wynne to spend \$5 million for Site-R. I can't believe it is necessary, what do you think?

You handle it anyway you want, but it **worries** me.

Thanks.

Attach,

8/16/04 Wynne Action Memo to SecDef re: MILCON projects. **OSD 12249-04**

DHR:ss
081904-2

.....
Please respond by

9/3/04



Talked w/ VAdm Stawidis.

This package was returned to Ray DuBois for his personal review to answer the Secretary's questions — with input from Paul McHale who determines the capability need at Site R.


Patterson 8/19

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

8/19/04
[Signature]

August 19, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Site-R Proposal

Please **look** at the attached recommendation from Mike Wynne to spend \$5 million for Site-R. I can't believe it is necessary, what do you think?

You handle it anyway you want, but it worries me.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/16/04 Wynne Action Memo to SecDef re: MILCON projects. OSD 12249-04

DHR:ss
081904-2

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036654

COORDINATION

**SUBJECT: Contingency Funded MILCON Projects for
Raven Rock Mountain Complex, Site - R**

DATE

ASD(LA)	<u>Mr. Dan Stanley</u>	<u>Aug 6, 2004</u>
OGC	<u>Mr. Daniel J. Dell-Orto, as revised</u>	<u>Aug 11, 2004</u>
USD(C)	<u>Ms. Tina W. Jonas</u>	<u>Aug 12, 2004</u>



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20510-6028

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committees.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Member



11-L-0559/OSD/036656



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6015

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable David R. Obey
Ranking Member

11-L-0559/OSD/036657





DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member

11-L-0559/OSD/036658





DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repaired upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Robert Byrd
Ranking Member

11-L-0559/OSD/036659



~~FOUO~~ Cent. XTRA
↓
M P-XTRA
50
8/19

August 19, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Site-R Proposal

Please look at the attached recommendation from Mike Wynne to spend \$5 million for Site-R. I can't believe it is necessary, what do you **think**?

You handle it anyway you want, but it worries me.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/16/04 Wynne Action Memo to SecDef re: MILCON projects. OSD 12249-04

DHR:ss
OS1904-2

.....
Please respond by

9/3/04



Talked w/ VAdm Stawicki.

This package was returned to Ray DuBois for his personal review to answer the Secretary's question — with input from Paul McHale who determines the capability need at Site R.

Patterson 8/19

6001

19 Aug 04

16 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036660

Dist. 21 August 2004



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 7 2004

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20510-6028

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committees.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Member

OSD 12249-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036661

600.1

17 SEP 04

16 AUG 04



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 7 2004

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6015

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Chairman of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely of Paul Wolfowitz, is written over a horizontal line.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable David R. Obey
Ranking Member

OSD 12249-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036662



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 7 2004

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section **2804** of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely of Paul Wolfowitz, is written below the "Sincerely," text.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Robert Byrd
Ranking Member

OSD 12249-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036663



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 7 2004

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul Wolfowitz", is located below the "Sincerely," text.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member

OSD 12249-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036664



FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE
3A287

~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000

SECRET

2004 AUG 17 11:02 AM

INFO MEMO

August 17, 2004, 9:00 AM

OSD 11020-04

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: A. K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation

SUBJECT: Military Detailees

- The Office of Force Transformation currently does not have any military detailees assigned.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: T. J. Pudas,

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036665

OSD 12260-04

~~FOUO~~

FT
Rec'd 8/4/04

August 3, 2004

TO: Senior OSD Staff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Detailees

Please review the number of military detailees you have in your office. Determine if the number has crept up over the years, and if there might be some way you can reduce the number. Please report back.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/21/04 Dir, Admin & Mngmnt memo to SecDef re: OSD Military Detailees [OSD 11020-04]

DHR:dh
080304-4

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

OSD 11020-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036666



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

JUL 21 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Military Detailees

- At a senior staff meeting, you raised a concern regarding the number of military detailees to the OSD staff. You asked all of your Principal Staff Assistants to review detailees working for them and revalidate their assignments or return them to their parent units. Currently, there are **55** military detailees assigned as outlined on the attached.
- The assigned detailees are concentrated primarily in OUSD(AT&L) (15), OUSD(P) (16), OUSD(P&R) (11) and OUSD(I) (4). The OUSD(C) currently does not have any military detailees assigned. Additionally, the OGC has 7 military detailees and both ASD(NII) and WHS have 1 assigned. The assigned numbers are in rough proportion to the size of the components' permanently assigned staff.
- Military detailees are typically detailed to the OSD staff for one year or less and remain permanently assigned to their parent organization's roles. Temporary details are authorized to support unforeseen temporary requirements, workload surges, or as a short term measure where the knowledge and skills are not otherwise available from within the organization. Many are detailed to provide temporary, but specific, military expertise required for the Global War on Terrorism and some are detailed for an educational/training experience. Additionally, roughly 10 percent of existing detailees are performing a liaison function between OSD and their parent unit.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

cc:

Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Prepared By: Carol L. Walker, (b)(6)

TSA SD	7/26
SRMA SD	
MA SD	7/27
EXEC SEC	11/23

11-L-0559/OSD/036667

OSD 11020-04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 8/17/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: INCOMING
OSD CONTROL **OSD 12260-04** DOC **8/17/2004** ATTACHMENT: DOR **8/17/2004** SIGNATURE CASE:
FROM **FTD CEBROWSKI** TO: **SECDEF**
SUBJECT **MILITARY DETAILEES**
KEYWORDS
COMMENTS

FN
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS **OSD 11020-04** SEC U OCN
STATUS CODE DECISION
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 1 COORDINATION
SUSPENSE STATUS PACKAGE VIEW:
INCOMING

CREATED BY: **gordon**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
ADC RWI
DSD RWI
ES OWI

11-L-0559/OSD/036668

7201
~~FOUO~~

August 13, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Chinese Proverbs

John—

You seemed interested in one of the Chinese proverbs I used the other day. Here are some more I picked up on various trips to China.

Thanks.

Attach.
Chinese Proverbs

DHR:dh
081304-5 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 12289-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036669

China

13 AUG 04

Chinese Quotations (Proverbs)

(Collected by Don Rumsfeld during a 1994 visit to the PRC)

"The dragonfly that barely touches the water."

"Sometimes it is necessary to kill a chicken to frighten the monkeys."

"The wind through the tower presages the coming of the storm."

"Watching the flowers on the galloping horse."

"Rain will fall, and widows will remarry."

(Mao Tse-tung's comment on receiving the report that his Defense Minister's, Lin Pio, airplane had crashed.)

"When the water recedes, the stone emerges."

(An old proverb used most recently to suggest that Quiao Shi, Chairman, Standing Committee, National People's Congress, whose name means "stone," will ultimately succeed Deng Xiaoping, but only after one or two others serve briefly.)

July 27, 1995

server(G:)/mso/winword/files/frequentlyuseddocs/chinesesayings.doc

7201
~~FOUO~~

August 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Review of NATO Air Defense Requirements

What is the timetable on having NATO review its air defense requirements?

Dick—my impression is that NATO countries are probably wasting money with their current air defense arrangements. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-8(ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

8/27/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12291-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036671

NATO 384

15Aug04

August 19, 2004

TO: Andy Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Family Day, September 27, 2004

Regarding my last correspondence on Family Day, I misinformed you. Their goal is to get the proclamation now, so they can publicize the event all across the country.

Could you see if you could do that? I've attached the note from Joe Califano.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
081904-1

.....
Please respond by _____

006

19 Aug 04

**FACSIMILE****THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE
At Columbia University**

(b)(6)


Main Phone**Date:** August 12, 2004.**To:** The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense**Fax:** (b)(6)**From:** Joseph A. Califano, Jr.**Direct Phone:** (b)(6)**Direct Fax:** (b)(6)**#of Pages (Including this cover):** 2

Dear Don,

Many thanks, but The White House missed the point (see attached memo). We know President Bush will issue another Proclamation declaring *Family Day* on September 27, 2004. We want the Proclamation now so that we can get the President credit for it and publicize the event all over the country. Could you, or someone in your office, make that point to Andy Card?

I know you have more important things to do. Many thanks.


Sincerely,


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.**CASA Account code:** 150_

The information contained in this telecopy message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under any applicable law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address via the US Postal Service. Thank

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 2004

TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: HARRIET MIERS 
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

This note responds to your memo of July 28th to Secretary Andrew Card. The White House will be proclaiming September 27th Family Day. The Family Day Proclamation has been issued annually for a day in September since 2001. Please let me know if this is the information you wished. If I may be of any further assistance to you please let me know.

Thank you.

August 4, 2004

TO: Joe Califano
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

Attached is a note I just received on the Family Day Proclamation.

Regards,

Attach.
8/4/04 WH memo to SecDef


DHR:dh
080404-11

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036675

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 2004

TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: HARRIET MIERS 
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

This note responds to your memo of July 28th to Secretary Andrew Card. The White House will be proclaiming September 27th Family Day. The Family Day Proclamation has been issued annually for a day in September since 2001. Please let me know if this is the information you wished. If I may be of any further assistance to you please let me know.

Thank you.

July 28,2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

Andy —

Joe Califano asked me to help again this year in encouraging the President to make a Presidential Proclamation in regards to Family Day. They would like to have an opportunity to publicize it in plenty of time.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/13/04 Califano letter to POTUS

DHR:dh
072804-15

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036677



The National Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse
at Columbia University

May 13, 2004

The President
The White House
Office of Presidential Messages
and Proclamations
Washington, D.C. 20502

Faxed to (b)(6) 5/13/04

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to request a Presidential Proclamation for Family Day: **A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children**, an initiative of The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) at Columbia University. Each year since its inception in 2001, you have issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming **Family Day**. A copy of each proclamation is attached.

Since 1996, CASA research has consistently shown that the more often children eat dinner with their families, the less likely they are to smoke, drink or use illegal drugs. **Family Day - A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children** is a national effort to promote parental engagement as a simple, effective way to reduce substance abuse by children and teens and raise healthier children. **Family Day** emphasizes the importance of regular family activities in parent-child communications and encourages Americans to make family dinners a regular feature of their lives. In addition to your proclamation, the governors of 35 states and more than 200 cities and counties have issued **Family Day** proclamations each year. Last year your mother, former First Lady Barbara Bush, appeared in television spots to publicize **Family Day** and Jamie Lee Curtis did the same on the radio.

Also attached are background information on **Family Day**, CASA, a copy of the letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., President of CASA, to Mr. Andy Card, and the response from Melissa Bennett. We would like the proclamation by June 15, 2004 because of our request to The Office of Scheduling for a June presidential ceremony to publicize **Family Day**.

If you need further information, please contact me at (b)(6) and (b)(6). Thank you.

Sincerely,


Kathleen Gerard
Director of Development

Enclosures

Board of Directors

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Chairman and President

Lee C. Bollinger
Columbia Bush
Kenneth I. Chenault
Jamie Lee Curtis
James Dimon
Peter A. Dolan
Mary Fisher
Victor F. Ganz
Leo-Arthur Kelmenson
Donald R. Krough
David A. Kessler, MD.
Manuel T. Pacheco, Ph.D.
Joseph J. Plumeri II
Shari E. Redstone
R. John Rosenwald, Jr.
Michael P. Schulhof
Louis W. Sullivan, M.D.
John J. Sweeney
Michael A. Wiener

Directors Emeritus

James E. Burke (1993-1997)
Betty Ford (1992-1998)
Douglas A. Fraser (1992-2005)
Barbara C. Jordan (1992-1998)
LaSalle Leffall (1992-2001)
Nancy Reagan (1995-2000)
Linda J. Rice (1992-1998)
George Rupp (1993-2000)
Michael I. Sovern (1992-1993)
Frank C. Wells (1992-1994)



FAMILY DAY, 2003

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Children thrive in loving families where they are taught, nurtured, and comforted. By spending time with our children and stressing the importance of making the right choices, parents and other family members help them develop into confident, successful individuals.

Families can help secure a healthy tomorrow for their children by providing guidance, staying involved, and serving as role models. I am committed to supporting strong families and strong marriages to help ensure that every child grows up in a safe, loving family. Statistics show that children from two-parent families are less likely to end up in poverty, drop out of school, become addicted to drugs, have a child out of wedlock, suffer abuse, or become a violent criminal. Because stable families should be the central goal of American welfare policy, I have proposed spending up to \$300 million a year to find the most effective programs to strengthen marriage.

Parents play a critical role in discouraging harmful behavior such as experimenting with alcohol, drugs, and tobacco. Research shows that teens often listen to their parents when it comes to decisions about harmful substances and risky behaviors. Regular family activities provide opportunities for parents to communicate important messages and enhance their relationships with their children. Recent studies from the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University found that teens from families who eat dinner together were less likely to use illegal drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, while teenagers who rarely eat dinner with their parents were more likely to engage in these unhealthy activities.

Families and all Americans can act together to educate our youth about the dangers of drug and alcohol and help them grow into healthy, responsible, compassionate citizens. In order to ensure a brighter future for our Nation, and safe, healthy, and happy lives for our children, our children must learn that avoiding harmful substances is an ongoing responsibility. As we work to educate our next generation about making healthy choices, we renew our commitment to the American family.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim September 22, 2003, as Family Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day by engaging in activities to strengthen the relationships between parents and children and help fight against substance abuse and risky behaviors.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-eighth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-eighth.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

IN REPLY REFER TO:

2011 AUG 20 PM 3:20

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General W. L. Nyland, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps *WLN*

Subj: KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR)

- The Marine Corps response regarding the Secretary of Defense's inquiry on how the Services maintain contact with members of the IRR is at Tab A.
- Since 9/11, the IRR has proven to be a valuable manpower pool that the Marine Corps has utilized to meet both Joint and internal Individual Augmentation requirements. To date, we have activated a total of 3,974 IRR members in support the Global War on Terrorism. Their service has been instrumental to the successful accomplishment of the Marine Corps war fighting mission.
- The keys to this success have been twofold: first, the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS), our automated personnel and pay system that administers both Active and Reserve component personnel in one integrated system, has enabled us to efficiently and seamlessly activate and manage IRR members; and second, our perspective that the IRR is an integral part of the Marine Corps Reserve and should be utilized to the fullest extent possible during both peacetime and wartime.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Maj Chris Mace, (b)(6)

Copy to: SecNav

OSD 12463-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036680

Remind them of their service obligation:

- Following the Transitional Recruiting briefs every Marine receives when departing Active Duty, "Welcome to the IRR" information is mailed to each Marine as they are joined to the IRR. Both the Transition brief and the IRR information stress the Marine's remaining service obligation and explain the requirements and/or options for reserve participation.
- The Mobilization Screening card also reminds IRR Marines of their remaining service obligation,

Etc (other efforts):

- Upcoming SNCO and Officer Promotion Board announcements with application instructions are mailed out annually to all eligible IRR Marines.
- Upcoming Professional Military Education opportunities with application instructions are mailed out annually to all IRR Marine Officers.
- Promotion warrants and congratulatory letters are mailed to all selected IRR Marines.
- The Mobilization Screening card also encourages them to visit specified Marine Corps informational websites.
- "Notification of Change in Reserve Status" letters are sent to all IRR members identified as non-participants, which explains their status, identifies remaining service obligations, and offers options for increased participation.
- All Officer promotion selects and non-selects in the IRR are called personally.
- MOBCOM maintains a Solicitation Cell that calls IRR members to find volunteers for board membership and short fuse ADSW opportunities.
- The Solicitation Cell also calls IRR members to identify their availability for activation billets which correspond with their rank, MOS, and related military or civilian experience.
- RDOL offers members the ability to search for duty opportunities while offering commands the ability to search for qualified individuals.
- The Customer Service Center (CSC) operating at MOBCOM offers assistance and guidance to all Marines, including IRR members. The CSC is available through a toll-free phone number or a web-based interactive database that provides a direct link to RDOL.
- The Reserve Counterpart Training (RCT) budget is dedicated specifically for funding IRR Marines interested in conducting periods of training with active or reserve units in their occupational field.
- The Mobilization Training Unit (MTU) program offers a viable alternative for participation to IRR Marines who cannot perform regularly scheduled drills but still desire to perform duty. MTU members participate in a non-pay status but still receive inactive points credited towards a reserve retirement. MTUs are assigned project-oriented missions, and develop flexible schedules around the needs of its members.

Marine Corps Efforts to Keep in Touch with the IRR

The Marine Corps takes a multi-faceted approach in maintaining contact with its 58,000+ IRR population and views its IRR members as a vital asset in supporting both peacetime and wartime requirements. In fact, the Marine Corps recognizes that 30% of its Selected Reserve is comprised of Prior Service Marines recruited from the IRR. The Marine Corps Mobilization Command (MOBCOM) in Kansas City is responsible for the day-to-day administration and maintenance of the IRR. We believe the effort we put into maintaining contact with IRR Marines directly increases the availability and interest of our IRR Marines. Since 11 Sep 01, 3,974 IRR Marines have been activated as Individual Augments in support of the Global War On Terrorism while countless others have volunteered for duty and transferred to the Selected Reserve.

In response to SecDef's questions - know where they are, know what their health is, know what they can do, remind them of their service obligation, etc. - the following is submitted:

Where they are:

- An annual Mobilization Screening card is mailed to every IRR Marine during the month of their membership anniversary, which requests updates to contact and personal information.
- All direct phone calls to IRR Marines are used as opportunities to obtain updates of contact and personal information.
- The Reserve Duty On-Line (RDOL) website provides IRR members a means of volunteering for activation and other duty opportunities. The registration process in RDOL captures contact information that is automatically fed into the Marine Corps Total Force System.

-

Know what their health is:

- The Mobilization Screening card also requests info about IRR Marines' health status.
- All direct phone calls to IRR Marines are also used as opportunities to obtain updates on their health status.
- Medical/dental records are sent to MOBCOM when a Marine transfers to the IRR.
- MOBCOM maintains these records and conducts health verification record reviews whenever an orders request is initiated on an IRR member.
- Medical status is verified during all contacts via correspondence, phone or electronically.

Know what they can do:

- The registration process in RDOL also captures Civilian Employment Information (CEI) data, self-professed language capabilities and foreign countries visited.

~~FOUO~~

7/27/04
July 26, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Keeping in Touch w/IRR

Please let me know what you are going to do **to** get the Services to stay in touch with their Individual Ready Resewe **folks** – **know** where they are, **know** what their health is, **know** what they can do, remind them **that** they have an obligation, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-30

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036683

20 AUG 04

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: System Administrator [postmaster@iraq.centcom.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, August 20, 2004 5:07 PM
To: CablesESO@osd.smil.mil
Subject: Delivered: Iraq Border Issue



Iraq Border Issue

<<Iraq Border Issue>> Your message

To: COL James Barclay (barclayj@iraq.centcom.smil.mil); MAJ Anthony Hale (halea@iraq.centcom.smil.mil)
Subject: Iraq Border Issue
Sent: Sat, 21 Aug 2004 01:11:37 +0400

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

Barclay James COL MNF-I CG XO on Sat, 21 Aug 2004 01:06:44 +0400
MSEXCH:MSEExchangeMTA:IRAQ:VICTEXEBIZS01
Hale Anthony MAJ MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp on Sat, 21 Aug 2004 01:06:44 +0400
MSEXCH:MSEExchangeMTA:IRAQ:VICTEXEBIZS01

August 21, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Brief

Andy—

We have an Afghanistan strategic update if there happens to be time during the day on Monday. I didn't want to have you be surprised.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082104-19 (to computer).doc

Afghanistan

21Aug04

11-L-0559/OSD/036686

OSD 12480-04

August 21, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Global Posture Reaction

Mr. President—

Attached is a summary of some of the immediate reactions to your announcement with respect to global posture adjustments. I thought you might like to see it.

We look forward to seeing you on Monday.

Respectfully,

Attach.

8/20/04 DASD (Strategy) memo to SecDef re: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech

DHR:dh
082104-10 (ts computer).doc

OSD 12481-04

3a0.2 Strategic

21 Aug 04

04872

INFOMEMO

1-04/011142-STRAT

DepSecDef

AUG 20 2004

USD/P

PDUSD/P

AUG 20 2004

8/20

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy

SUBJECT: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech(U)

Here is an update on recent reactions to the President's posture announcement on August 16. Public Affairs reports that coverage overall has been 90% positive.,

- Foreign reaction, especially official statements, has been almost universally positive, while domestic reaction has been somewhat more mixed.
 - Domestic media tends to emphasize US politics, while foreign media gives more prominence to the strategic value of the review.
- In general, those who have done sufficient fact-finding (e.g. Wall Street Journal and BBC) have responded vary positively.

DOMESTIC

- Op-eds offer expected election-season political commentary, such as Ron Asmus's critical Aug 18 piece in the Washington Post.
 - But op-eds Charles Krauthammer in the Post and Marcus Corbin in Baltimore Sun were
- Most editorials – like the Washington Post, Boston Globe, and Detroit Free Press – offer a generally understanding, if mixed, viewpoint. Some common themes are:
 - Credit for the Administration's strategic rationale;
 - Support for long-overdue moves in Europe;
 - Concern about impact in Korea; and
 - criticism for announcing the changes at a campaign event.
- Only a few editorials have been decisively positive or negative:
 - The Wall Street Journal's good piece was the result of time we invested with their editorial Writers.
 - The New York Times' negative editorial was expected – they wrote negative piece on US-German relations
 - a The Philadelphia Inquirer produced an oddly negative and speculative editorial, which we have responded to via a letter to the editor.

2

FOREIGN

- Foreign **official** reaction has been **positive** – testimony to our **consultation** efforts over the past 9 months.
 - Ranges from very positive (Australia, Italy) to surprisingly
- In foreign **media**, the review's **strategic** aspects have received **significant** attention, along with stories on local impact and speculation about US political motives.
- See the attached paper for samples of both official and press statements from allies and interested parties.

WAY AHEAD

- Your up-ed is being finalized.
- We will continue to respond to negative editorials via letters and to push out op-eds like Doug Feith's piece in the August 19 Washington Post.
- We will encourage combatant commanders to speak out,
- We will approach selected Defense Policy Board members – such as Harold Brown, James Schlesinger, and Barry Blechman – to write op-eds and take interviews.
- SASC plans a hearing on 20 September.

ATTACHMENT: As stated.

Prepared by: Mike Brown and Sean Smeland, Strategy, (b)(6)

SEIDF → we've asked DIA if they can provide any insight into reactions from N. Korea, China, or France. Zandberg

SAMPLE OF FOREIGN REACTION

Official

- Karsten Voigt, German PM Schroeder's coordinator for US relations: "This is positive...a success story."
- UK MoD: "The UK government and NATO have been consulted ... but it is too early to say what impact there will be on US deployments in the UK"
- Italy MFA: "Absolutely not [a symbol of a weaker commitment]. The Cold War is a thing of the past."
- Japan MFA: "Japan welcomes the review of the US military framework that will better suit the global security environment and further contribute to peace and stability."
- South Korea MFA: "The South Korean government has been well aware of this plan."
- Australia MoD: "It will improve the US capability to contribute to international efforts to defeat global threats."
- Russia's MoD: "I don't see anything alarming in these plans."

Note: No official commentary reported yet from China, France, Singapore, or India.

Press

- Germany: *Deutsche Welle* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* - likely negative impacts on the German economy and local affinities for US troops, but also the need for NATO to improve its own capabilities.
- UK: *BBC* and *Financial Times* - largely favorable discussion of the strategic rationale and implications, but speculation on the fate of UK-based F-15s.
- Japan: *Japan Times* and *Asahi* - praise for the strategic rationale, and detailed reporting on specific proposals for posture in Japan.
- South Korea: *Korea Herald* - focuses exclusively on impact in Korea and ongoing Future of the Alliance talks.
- Australia: *Sydney Morning Herald* - new posture may weaken deterrence in Korea.
- Singapore: *The Straits News* - quotes from President, very little discussion of strategy or implications in Asia.
- India: *The Hindu* - cursory discussion of the rationale, with quotes from the President and critics.
- France: Minimal exposure in French press, mostly quotes from the Resident and critics.

Note: Little press commentary to date from China or Russia.

4



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

2005 JAN 10 PM 3:39

December 23, 2004, 12:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM William J. Haynes II, **GENERAL COUNSEL**

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Passports

- You asked (Tab A) whether providing courtesy diplomatic passports for life to former Secretaries of State should be extended to former Secretaries of Defense, in light of the nature of the world today.
- The State Department **Foreign** Affairs Manual (**FAM**) provides at section 1311.3-3c., "Diplomatic Passports," that:

Courtesy diplomatic passports are diplomatic passport books that are issued, for tourist purposes only, to certain former high-ranking **U.S.** Government officials, such as former Presidents, Vice Presidents, Cabinet Secretaries and Foreign Service Chiefs of Mission who were career government employees. These passports are issued **at the** Department to a very limited number of retired USG employees and their spouses. The prescribed fees are charged. (Emphasis added.)

- We are informed that the Department of State changed this policy in late 2003. Under current policy, former U.S. Presidents, Vice Presidents, Secretaries of State, Career Ambassadors, and their spouses or widows/widowers **are** provided courtesy diplomatic passports for life. Such passports:
 - do not, in and of themselves, afford the bearer any privileges and immunities;
 - are subject to prescribed fees, just as for a "regular" or "tourist" passport;
 - may be used only for personal travel; and,



11-L-0559/OSD/036691

OSD 12492-04

014.33

23 Dec 04

20 Aug 04

04

- still require the bearer to obtain/present a visa when presenting the “courtesy” diplomatic passport for entry to a foreign country, as do travelers on “regular” or “tourist” passports.
- Prior to November 2003, courtesy diplomatic passports also were provided to present and former U.S. Supreme Court Justices, and to all Foreign Service Officers who had **served as** Ambassadors **and** their spouses or widows/widowers.
- Due to a series of incidents involving attempted **entry** by such passport bearers into foreign countries without visas, and their requests for special privileges, State Department revised the policy and now provides diplomatic passports only to the individuals listed above (not including former Cabinet Secretaries).
- Conclusions
 - Courtesy diplomatic passports issued to former **U.S.** Government officials do not afford to them any special protections, privileges or immunities. As a matter of current policy, State Department does not issue them to former Cabinet Secretaries (except for former Secretaries of State).
 - Nevertheless, in light of frivolous judicial initiatives in several **countries** **in** recent years, it would seem reasonable to ask the State Department to revisit their current policy. We have **drafted** a memo (Tab B) **from** Under Secretary Feith to Under **Secretary** Grossman for this purpose. (Mr. Feith recommended extending the request to include former high-ranking agency officials and retired senior military officers, as well **as** former Cabinet Secretaries.)

RECOMMENDATION Approve USDP sending the memo at Tab B.

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Other: _____

COORDINATION USDP

~~FOUO~~

August 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Diplomatic Passports

D.R.

I'm told all former Secretaries of ~~State~~ travel on diplomatic passports for life. I think this courtesy should be extended to Secretaries of Defense.

The nature of the world today is such that this would be helpful. It's conceivable that it is reciprocal in other countries, but I'm not sure. Please tell me how you think we should handle *this*.

Thanks.

DHR:aa
082004-11

Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12492-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036694

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS (MARC GROSSMAN)

FROM Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Passports

Currently, only former **U.S.** Presidents, Vice Presidents, Secretaries of State, Career Ambassadors and their spouses or widows/widowers **are** provided courtesy diplomatic passports for life. The Foreign Affairs Manual, however, provides that such passports may **also** be issued to former high-ranking officials, such as Cabinet Secretaries.

Although courtesy diplomatic passports do not afford special protections, in light of recent judicial actions in some countries, such a passport might facilitate travel through foreign countries. I think you may want to consider issuing these passports to former Cabinet Secretaries and other former high-ranking agency officials, and retired senior military officers, such as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders.

~~FOUO~~

August 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Diplomatic Passports

D.R.

I'm told all former Secretaries of State travel on diplomatic passports for life. I think this courtesy should be extended to Secretaries of Defense. ¹

The nature of the world today is such that this would be helpful. It's conceivable that it is reciprocal in other countries, but I'm not sure. Please tell me how you think we should handle this.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
082004-11

.....
Please respond by _____

014.33

20 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12492-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036696

7201
~~FOUO~~
TAB A

August 5, 2004

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Georgia Train and **Equip**

833

What kind of a proposal do we have to maintain Georgia "train and equip" efforts with some training of their folks and periodic visits?

Thanks.

DHR:cn
DR:504-S

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

Georgia

S Aug 04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~
OSD 12691-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036697



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CH-2012-204
25 August 2004 25 AUG 25 PM 4:49

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{F32} *VRK 25 AUG 04*

SUBJECT: Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) Sustainment

- **Question.** "What kind of a proposal do we have to maintain Georgia 'train and equip' efforts with some training of their folks and periodic visits?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** USEUCOM has developed the Georgia Capabilities Enhancement Program (GCEP) to follow up GTEP, which prepared Georgian forces for counterinsurgency operations on Georgian territory.
- **Analysis.** GCEP will be conducted using Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) focused on improving GTEP-trained units to battalion-level operations capability to include:
 - Organizing, training and equipping one NATO-Compatible Infantry Brigade (1 lth BDE) with an emphasis on creating new support units.
 - Providing uniforms and C4I equipment to GTEP battalions and staffs.
 - International Military Education and Training courses focused on US/NATO interoperability, including improvements to the English Language Training System.
 - Creating an effective UH-1H helicopter unit to NATO standards.
- I fully endorse GCEP as the right way ahead for the Georgian Armed Forces and our security cooperation focus.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5 (b)(6)

OSD 12691-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036698

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

August 5, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Georgia Train and **Equip**

833

What kind of a proposal do we have to maintain Georgia "train and equip" efforts with some training of their folks and periodic visits?

Thanks.

DHR:dr
OSD 504-5

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~
OSD 12691-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036699

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD (DASD-ISP Eurasia)	Mr. Harrison	10 August 2004
USEUCOM ECJ-5	COL Anderson	10 August 2004
USEUCOM ECJ-5 (RUE)	LTC Timm	10 August 2004
USEUCOM ECJ-5 (Georgia)	MAJ Sweetser	10 August 2004

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

7201
August 21, 2004

Swap 30 Sep 1500
8/27

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Response to Senator McCain

Please get an answer to John McCain on the attached letter he sent to John Handy.

Thanks,

Attach.
8/20/04 McCain Ltr to Gen. Handy

DHR:dh
0826044 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

*Jeff Lieb #
Status?*

4027
277 000
20 Aug 04

11-L-0559/OSD/036701

OSD 12693-04

JOHN MCCAIN
ARIZONA

CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

United States Senate

August 20, 2004

General John W. Handy, USAF
Commander
Air Mobility Command

(b)(6)

Dear General Handy:

I write regarding your statements recently reported in *U.S. News and World Report* that "I am not a missile man, but I have stuck my finger through significant pieces of metal," and "I could poke a hole into the corroded areas of the airplanes." The quotes were characterized as supporting the acquisition of new air refueling tankers for the Air Force.

As you are aware, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a thorough analysis of alternatives regarding the tanker replacement program. As you also know, this was precipitated by findings of a Defense Science Board task force that, among other things, there is no evidence that corrosion poses an imminent catastrophic threat to the KC-135 fleet mission readiness and that the Air Force's maintenance regime is well poised to deal with corrosion and other aging problems. In fact, the findings indicate that the Air Force's claims of unmanageable corrosion problems and cost growth were overstated. It also found that the KC-135E can fly to 2040. These findings disproved assertions to the contrary repeatedly made by civilian Air Force leadership regarding the purportedly urgent need to lease 100 Boeing 767s. In other words, the 'dominating rationale' cited by the Air Force to Congress for having taxpayers pay billions of dollars more for leasing Boeing's KC-767A tankers than they would for buying them outright, has been conclusively shown to be without merit. The Air Force's representations on this issue remain a matter of continuing investigative concern. I discussed my concerns about such misconduct in a letter to the Secretary, dated July 28, 2004.

Aspects of that deal, ranging from the how the original Air Force proposal passed through Congress outside the normal budget process to the improper conduct of senior executives at the Boeing Company, have been exhaustively reviewed and fundamentally criticized by the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; the Department of Justice; the Defense Department's Office of the Inspector General; the Defense Science Board; the Congressional Budget Office; the General Accounting Office; the Congressional Research Service; the Office of Management and Budget; the Defense Department's Office of Programs, Analysis and Evaluation; the Institute for Defense Analysis; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; National Defense University and others. Notably, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card and former Defense Department Comptroller General

301 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-2004
(202) 224-2224

400 South Capitol Road
Suite 2-100
Tucson, AZ 85710
(602) 927-2200

600 East Arizona
Baltimore Group
Suite 1100
Phoenix, AZ 85018
(602) 923-2410

400 West Park Boulevard
Suite 200
Tucson, AZ 85711
(602) 979-0204

Toll Free 800 966-9666
(602) 923-2122
(602) 923-0170

2 88 OK

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER


2 AUG 25 2004 10:43AM

11-L-0559/OSD/036702

Dov Zakheim have also weighed in with serious concerns about various aspects of the tanker program. Regrettably, your comments reflect a disturbing trend that I recently noted in my letters of March 12, 2004 and July 28, 2004 to the Secretary of Defense, whereby Air Force uniformed officers continue to publicly support an acquisition strategy that has been conclusively shown to be a folly.

I hope that you will agree that the path forward on the tanker replacement program that the Secretary of Defense ordered needs to be conducted objectively, independently, and free from political pressure. As such, it is not well-served by such commentary.

Sincerely,



John McCain

cc: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

NO 881 P. 3

AUG 15, 2004 10:43AM

3



UNITED STATES TR

A.O. _____
ACTION FOR SCOTT AIR
COORD _____
DUE _____

Does This
Close Out The
McCain/Handy/
Materon?
~~NOT FOR SECRET~~
has seen

OSD Copy

9/23

D
14 September 2004

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington DC 20510-0505

Dear Senator McCain

Thank you for your letter regarding tanker recapitalization, 20 Aug 04. I was disheartened to read the *U.S. News and World Report* account of a "fight between the Air Force and the Senate" in the sentence leading into my quote regarding the health of our KC-135Es. I share your eagerness to learn the results of the KC-135 Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and the OSD-led Mobility Capability Study (MCS). Rest assured I have no preference or agenda regarding an acquisition strategy or a particular tanker platform. I continue to take very seriously my responsibilities to provide robust aerial refueling capabilities to combatant commanders around the globe in support of our nation's objectives.

Sincerely

John W. Handy
JOHN W. HANDY
General, USAF
Commander

cc:

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

11-L-0559/OSD/036704

OSD 14471-04

D8D

JOHN MCCAIN
ARIZONA

CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

241 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0303
(202) 224-2235

2004 AUG 26 AM 6:32

United States Senate

4450 SOUTH RURAL ROAD
SUITE B-130
TEMPE, AZ 85282
(480) 887-6288

2400 EAST ARIZONA
BALTIMORE CIRCLE
SUITE 1150
PHOENIX, AZ 85016
(602) 952-2410

450 WEST PASEO REDONDO
SUITE 200
TUCSON, AZ 85701
(520) 870-6394

TELEPHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED
(202) 224-7132
(602) 062-0170

August 20, 2004

General John W. Handy, USAF
Commander
Air Mobility Command

(b)(6)

Dear General Handy:

I write regarding your statements recently reported in *U.S. News and World Report* that "I am not a muscle **man**, but I have stuck my finger through significant pieces of metal," and "I could poke a hole **into** the corroded areas of the airplane." The quotes were characterized as supporting **the** acquisition of **new air** refueling tankers for **the** Air Force.

As you **are** aware, **the** Secretary of Defense has ordered a **thorough analysis** of alternatives regarding the tanker replacement program. As you **also** know, this **was** precipitated by findings of a Defense Science **Board task** force that, **among** other **things**, there is **no evidence** that corrosion poses **an imminent** catastrophic threat to the KC-135 fleet mission readiness **and** that **the Air Force's** maintenance regime is **well poised** to deal **with** corrosion **and** other aging problems. In fact, the **findings** indicate that **the Air Force's** claims of unmanageable corrosion problems **and cost** growth were overstated. It **also** found **that** the KC-135E can **fly** to 2040. These findings disproved assertions to **the contrary** **repeatedly** made **by civilian** Air Force leadership **regarding the** purportedly **urgent** need to lease 100 Boeing **767s**. In other words, **the** 'dominating rationale' cited by the **Air Force** to Congress for **having** taxpayers **pay** billions of **dollars** more for leasing Boeing's KC-767A tankers **than** they **would** for buying them outright, **has** been conclusively **shown** to be without merit. The Air Force's **representations** on this issue **remain** a **matter** of continuing investigative concern. I discussed my concerns about **such** misconduct in a letter to **the** Secretary, dated July 28, 2004.

Aspects of that **deal**, ranging **from** the how the original Air Force proposal passed **through** Congress outside **the** normal **budget** process to the **improper** conduct of senior executives **at** the Boeing Company, have been exhaustively reviewed and **fundamentally** criticized by the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; the Department of Justice; the Defense Department's Office of the Inspector General; the Defense Science **Board**; the Congressional **Budget** Office; the General Accounting Office; the Congressional **Research** Service; the Office of Management **and** Budget; the Defense Department's Office of **Programs, Analysis** and Evaluation; the Institute for Defense **Analyses**; the **Industrial** College of the Armed **Forces**, National Defense University **and** others. Notably, White House Chief of **Staff** **Andy** Card and former Defense Department Comptroller **General**

OSD 12693-04

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

NO. 881 P. 2


AUG 25 2004 10:43AM

11-L-0559/OSD/036705

Dov Zakheim **have also weighed in with** serious concerns about **various aspects** of the **tanker** program. Regrettably, your comments reflect a **disturbing** trend that I **recently noted** in **my** letters of March **12, 2004** and July **28, 2004** to the Secretary of **Defense**, whereby **Air Force** *uniformed* officers continue to **publicly support an** acquisition strategy that has **been** conclusively shown to *be* a folly.

I hope that **you** will **agree** that **the path forward** on the tanker replacement program that the Secretary of **Defense** ordered **needs** to be **conducted** objectively, independently, and **free from** political **pressure**. **As** such, it **is** not well-served **by** such *commentary*.

Sincerely,



John McCain

cc: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ✓

August 25, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Transforming the USG

Attached is a short draft presentation on transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st century. This brief is obviously in an early stage.

Andy, it seems to me that these are the kinds of national security, homeland security and other issues that you folks in the White House are considering. Clearly, they don't fit neatly into the responsibilities of any single department or even into any one of the White House councils. But then, the problems we face in the world don't fit neatly into any one department or into any one of the various White House councils.

In any event, we have folks in DoD who have been thinking about some of these things. If anything here is of interest to you, the Vice President or Condi, let me know. We would be happy to try to be helpful. If you would like to talk about *any* of these ideas, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/20/04 Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st Century

DHR:dh
082104-20 (is computer).doc

310.1

25 AUG 04

Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st Century

23 August 2004

**This briefing is classified
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**

Draft Working Papers Not Subject to FOIA

8/20/2004

1.

11-L-0559/OSD/036708

Purpose

- Public attention generated by 9/11 Commission report and Congressional hearings have focused Nation on need to improve national security
- Opportunity for Administration to:
 - Go beyond 9/11 Commission recommendations
 - Go beyond the issue of terrorism
 - Prepare for broader challenges of 21st century
- Consider whether the USG might:
 - Restructure ***institutions***
 - Create or realign ***authorities***
 - Take further ***action***

~~FOUO~~

Restructure Institutions – Illus frafive Ideas

- **Domestic intelligence** – Go beyond law enforcement approach and integrate with foreign intelligence while duly preserving civil liberties?
- **Strategic Communications** – Create entity in the USG that draws on US private sector prowess in media, IT, advertising, and entertainment?
- **NSC and HSC** – Restructure organizations?
- **US Country Teams** – Transform US Embassy Country Teams for 21st century operations?
- **UN and other international institutions** – Reorganize to prevent crises and assist member states that lack capacity for effective governance?
- **National Guard** – Organize, train and equip the National Guard for homeland defense?

8/20/2004

~~FOUO~~

3

~~FOUO~~

Create or Realign Authorities – Illustrative Ideas

- **Interagency “Jointness”** – Increase through “Goldwater-Nichols” for whole USG?
- **Build Local Capacity** – Help international partners build their capacity to counter enemies and replace US forces
 - Seek additional authorities for: “Train and Equip,” Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), Global Peace Operations Initiative
- **Homeland Security** – Is it time for review of how USG responsibilities and authorities are allocated to ensure right capabilities and assets address **key** problems?
- **Congress** – Streamline Congressional oversight (e.g., Joint Committees; smaller committees; merged authorization and appropriation committees) and speed nomination/confirmation process?

8/20/2004

~~FOUO~~

4

~~FOUO~~

Take Action – Illustrative Ideas

- **Bio-Defense** – Launch Strategic Bio-Defense Initiative?
- **Common Threat Assessments** – Implement initiative to develop common threat assessments with key allies and partners?
- **Non-Governmental Action** – Mobilize private philanthropies and utilize public-private partnerships to promote educational reform and economic development in Muslim world?
- **Civilian/Military Recruiting and Retention** – Review incentives/disincentives for public/military service?

812012004

~~FOUO~~

5

~~FOUO~~

Way Ahead

- Assign tasks to refine ideas and develop action duties, set deadlines, develop metrics, track progress
- Recommend to Congress actions requiring new legislation
- Develop draft Executive Orders where appropriate

8/20/2004

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036713

Back-up Slide


8/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/036714

Additional Illustrative Ideas

- Establish standing USG planning function for building & maintaining coalitions
- Establish "National Security University" educational system for interagency
- Expand unconventional warfare, civil affairs and foreign internal defense capabilities
- Establish Deputy National Intelligence Director to serve as all-source intelligence "archivist" and Chief Information Officer for Intel Community
- Re-evaluate USG national security roles and missions (a "QDR" for USG)
- Build civilian reserve forces international stability & reconstruction operations, homeland security and intelligence
- Strengthen weak governments so that they can increase their legitimacy and authority **over** "ungoverned" territory/populations via civic action projects

August 21, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Status of Commissions

Please give me a report on where we stand on the commissions. It seems to be going very slowly. What's up?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082104-2 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

OSD 12765-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036716

015

21 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~



GENERAL COUNSEL


GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 26 PM 5: 54

INFO MEMO

August 24, 2004 1902

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Start of Military Commission Trials

- On June 29, 2004, the Appointing Authority (AA) referred charges to a Military Commission for trial in the cases of al Bahlul of Yemen, al Qosi of Sudan, and Hicks of Australia. On July 14, 2004 the Appointing Authority referred charges to a Military Commission for trial in the case of Hamdan of Yemen.
- The Presiding Officer of the Military Commission set separate initial hearing dates in each of the four cases which began this week at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), as follows:
 - o U.S. v. Hamdan – Tuesday, August 24, 2004;
 - o U.S. v. Hicks – Wednesday, August 25, 2004;
 - o U.S. v. al Bahlul – Thursday, August 26, 2004;
 - o U.S. v. al Qosi – Friday, August 27, 2004.
- The initial appearance for each case will likely include:
 - o An advisement of the Accuseds' rights;
 - o A reading of the charges against each accused;
 - o An entry of the Accuseds' pleas (guilty/not guilty);
 - o Setting a schedule for future trial dates;
 - o Setting a schedule for dates that Prosecutors and Defense Counsel will be required to give notice of witness requests, discovery issues, and evidentiary issues;
 - o Setting a schedule for dates that Prosecutors and Defense Counsel will be required to file motions.
- The initial appearance for each case may also include argument of motions by Prosecutors and Defense Counsel, including:
 - o Motions Challenging the Jurisdiction of the Military Commission;
 - o Motions Challenging the Presiding Officer and Appointing Authority for Conflict of Interest;



11-L-0559/OSD/036717

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12765-04


- o Motions for Protective Orders for Classified or Protected Information.
- The initial appearances in each of the first four cases are expected to attract wide media attention.
 - o 78 media representatives will be in GTMO to watch the hearings.
 - 8 media representatives will view the hearings from inside the trial room.
 - 70 media representatives will view the hearings through closed-circuit television at another location at GTMO.
 - o 5 representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will also view the hearings from inside the trial room.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: ~~None~~ *Tab 1*

Prepared By: Capt. Sean Connolly, (b)(6)

August 21, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: **Status** of Commissions

Please give me a report on **where** we stand on the commissions. It seems **to be** going **very** slowly. What's **up**?

Thanks.

DNR:dh
082104-2 (1s computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

OSD 12765-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036719

August 25, 2004

TO: Gen. "Hoss" Cartwright

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D-R-M*

SUBJECT: Crawford Briefings

Good job at the briefings down in Crawford!

I think we're off to a good start getting the President comfortable with this new capability.

We'll be back in touch with you on tying **up** some loose ends.

Regards,

DHR:dh
082504-26 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

337

25 Aug 04

OSD 12796-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036720

7/27/04

July 26, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Keeping in Touch w/IRR

Please let me know what you are going to do to get the Services to stay in touch with their Individual Ready Reserve folks – know where they are | know what their health is, know what they can do, remind them that they have an obligation, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-30

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04.

326

26 Jul 04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 8/31/2004

NR 083104

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC

ATTACHMENT:

OSD CONTROL OSD 12903-04

DOC 7/26/2004

DOR 8/30/2004

SIGNATURE! CASE:

FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD

TO UPR

SUBJECT KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE IRR

KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE

COMMENTS CAF. NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.

FN 326

SEC U

OCN072604-30

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED

SUSPENSE

DOC SUSPENSE

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

PACKAGE VIEW:

SUSPENSE STATUS

FRONT OFFICE DOC

WFO MEMO

-- CREATED BY: lawson --

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES

ADC R

11-L-0559/OSD/036722



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 AUG 20 PM 4: 51

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

August 20, 2004, 1200

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Keeping in Touch w/IRR

- You asked what we are going to do to get the Services to stay in touch with their IRR members and ensure that they know the members' location, health, military skills, civilian skills, and to make sure that members were aware of their obligations, requirements and opportunities.
- Currently, all Services are using, to various degrees: Exit briefings as members separate from active duty; "Welcome to the IRR" letters; annual screening mail-outs; electronic media (web-sites), telephonic contact, and letters related to promotions, physical status, military and civilian skills status, and security clearance status, as well as obligations, requirements and opportunities. Additionally, all Services update data when IRR members perform any type of duty.
 - Each Service also has some version of a "participating IRR" – a more active IRR population with whom there is regular contact.
- To locate members who fail to respond to any of the above, Services contract with various commercial sources to include credit companies and the postal service. To help in this area, we have submitted a legislative proposal that will allow the Internal Revenue Service to provide the Services with address information on those members we have not been able to locate through other means.
- To enhance contact efforts, at a recent conference on the IRR, the following initiatives were proposed and being reviewed by the Services for implementation: Institutionalized programs to inform all military members of their total service obligations; annual "virtual musters;" increased resourcing for physical musters; annual military service obligation and expectation reviews for both active and reserve members; and, a DoD-wide portal for input of required personal information.
- The most crucial effort being undertaken is the development of a DoD-wide program to educate service members, the public, and the Congress on the IRR, and the obligations, responsibilities and opportunities of IRR members. This is being developed specifically to create proper expectations.

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P)

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/036723

OSD 12903-04

7/27/04

July 26, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Keeping in Touch w/IRR

Please let me know what you are going to do to get the Services to stay in touch with their Individual Ready Reserve folks – know where they are, know what their health is, know what they can do, remind them that they have an obligation, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-30

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04,

8/5/04

~~FOUO~~

August 4, 2004

W
e
b

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mobilization

Please get back to me with proposed legislative changes.

Also tell me what the implications of full mobilization are. Our discussion with the **Congress** might be that we have a choice—either we **go to full** mobilization, or they give us additional flexibility during a national emergency.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080404-9

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

4 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12904-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 30 PM 5:01

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD/P&R

SUBJECT: Snowflake — Mobilization Legislation

- You asked about proposed legislation relating to mobilization of the Guard and Reserve (TAB B).
- We support six proposals for the FY-2005 Defense Authorization Act (a more detailed description of each proposal is at TAB A):
 - Mobilize to Train — Allows reservists to be mobilized to train for their pending mobilization, be released from active duty, and then be mobilized later to deploy (House and Senate provisions).
 - Reserve Accounting and Management — Eliminates the 180-day end strength restriction and allows reservists to voluntarily serve on active duty for up to three years without counting against active duty end strength or grade ceilings (House provision).
 - Consolidated Bonuses — Allows reservists to qualify for a bonus under the same authorities and the same conditions as active duty members (House provision).
 - Foreign Language Proficiency Pay — Increases monthly pay for proficiency in a critically needed foreign language (House provision).
 - Accession and Training Requirements — Provides flexibility to reduce the minimum 8-year service obligation and 12-week basic training requirement for selected individuals accessed with unique specialty civilian skills (Senate provision).
 - Auxiliaries — Provides a structure for services to use retirees, veterans and private citizens who volunteer to support non-combat defense missions. (Neither House nor Senate provision).
- Our goal is to ensure these proposals are included in the conference report.

RECOMMENDATION: None

Prepared By: Mr. Tom Bush, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

OSD 12904-04



11-L-0559/OSD/036726

TAB

A

Legislation Related to Mobilization

House	Senate	Proposal	Description
\$522	\$521	Mobilize to Train	Allows guard and reserve members to be mobilized to train for future mobilization missions, be released from active duty, then mobilized later for a scheduled deployment.
\$404	—	Reserve Strength Accounting and Personnel Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creates a new strength accounting category for guard and reserve members serving voluntarily on active duty or full-time National Guard duty to provide operational support. Eliminates the 180-day active duty end strength accounting threshold that has been a barrier to using reserve volunteers. Allows reservists to remain in this category for 3 years without counting against active duty end strength and field grade or senior enlisted grade ceilings.
\$615 §617 §618 §619	—	Consolidation of Bonus Authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allows guard and reserve members to qualify for the active duty accession, enlistment, reenlistment, retention and conversion bonuses under the same conditions as active duty members. Use contingent upon demonstrated need and availability of funds. Provides greater flexibility in responding quickly and appropriately to officer and enlisted personnel shortfalls, regardless of component.
\$616	—	Foreign Language Proficiency Pay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increases monthly pay for members who maintain proficiency in a critically needed foreign language. Converts the pay from an incentive pay, which is paid only when a reservist is in a duty status (the so-called 1/30th rule) to a bonus, which will allow reservists to be paid at the full monthly rate since it does not require reservists to be in a duty status to receive the pay.
—	§576	Service Obligation/ Basic Training Requirement	<p>Provides flexibility to reduce the minimum military service obligation and basic training requirement for select individuals accessed because of their unique specialty civilian skills (such as linguists):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allows SecDef to specify a lesser minimum military service obligation —law currently specifies 6 to 8 years. Allows SecMilDepts to specify a lesser required period of basic military training during war or national emergency —law currently specifies a minimum of 12 weeks.
—	—	Auxiliaries	<p>Provides structure for the services to use volunteers to perform non-combat missions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide an opportunity for military retirees, veterans and private citizens to support the military by offering their services. Air Force could expand missions assigned to the Civil Air Patrol and improve its oversight of that organization. Army, Navy, Marine Corps could establish auxiliaries.

TAB

B

8/5/04

~~FOUO~~

August 4, 2004

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mobilization

Please get back to me with proposed legislative changes.

Also tell me what the implications of full mobilization **are**. Our discussion with the Congress might **be** that we have a choice—either we go to full mobilization, or they give us additional flexibility during a national emergency.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080404-9

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04


~~FOUO~~

OSD 12904-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036730

August 31, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Olympics



Now that the Olympics have been successfully completed, I want to thank you and the EUCOM team for your assistance on the security issues associated with the games. With the eyes of the entire world quite literally focused on Athens, your team helped to assure a secure environment for the athletes and spectators.

Regards,

DHR:ss
083104-14

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 13015-04

July 27, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arthur Fletcher

Please figure out how to get an answer to Arthur Fletcher.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/21/04 Fletcher ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
072704-8

.....
Please respond by _____

8/24
1630

~~FOUO~~

July 22, 2004

I-04/009872
EJ-0239

UN

TO: Doug Feith

 **SecDef**
SUBJECT: Memo to SecState

Now that we have taken the action of getting our people protected who have been involved in UN missions, don't you think it is important for us to send a note to Colin Powell telling him that in the future he ought to be aware that we need to let the UN know that we will not be putting US citizens into situations where they would be at risk?

Thanks.

DHR db
072204-8

.....
Please respond by

7/30/04

J 8/31 9/1

Sir,

Response Attached.

V/R, (0013)

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13061-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036733

2250104



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

EP 1 2004

UN

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Risk of the ICC and US Participation in UN Peace Operations

State has been doing some good work in lining up additional ICC Article 98 agreements and reminding the UN that the US willingness to participate in peacekeeping operations will be affected by whether we get proper ICC-related protections. It is important that we keep pressing on this matter which grows more important as we continue to fight the global conflict we are in.

By the way, shouldn't we stop referring to the ICC as the "Rome Statute"? As I see it, one of the main problems with the treaty is that the parties arrogate to themselves the right to legislate for other countries -- that is, for countries that aren't parties to the treaty. We should stress that the ICC agreement is a treaty, not a statute.

Isn't that correct?

1 Sep 04



OSD113061-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036734

file

May 20, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: First Prison Visit

What was the date I was at the Abu Ghraib prison the first time? Was it before or after Abizaid told Myers that this was a big deal?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-4

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

.....

383.6

DR 8/31

SecDef —
You first visited on
6 Sep 2003 — before
Gen Abizaid told Myers that
this was a big deal.

C 5/20

20 May 04

OSD 13111-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036735

72
May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hamre Piece

Attached is an interesting memorandum by John Hamre.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hamre, John. "Should America Just Walk Away from Iraq?" CSIS Memorandum, May 17, 2004.

DHR:dh
051904-8

.....
Please respond by _____

19 May 04
OSD 13112-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036736

CSIS MEMORANDUM

To: CSIS Board of Trustees, Supporters, and Friends

From: John J. Hamre

Date: May 17, 2004 (Number 137. Three Pages)

Re: **Should America just walk away from Iraq?**

All over Washington I am now hearing this question asked: Is Iraq a lost cause? Should we just find a way to pull out as soon as possible? I honestly believe the answer to both is no. It is clear, however, that we are less in control of the situation every day – which may indeed be our exit strategy.

Washington is still reeling from the terrible pictures from the prisons. They have become a metaphor for all that has plagued us this past year. It seems that Washington (and our Baghdad headquarters, I fear) has been cut off from what is really happening on the ground in Iraq. We have managed Iraq policy through our hopes and aspirations, not through a realistic assessment of the conditions on the ground.

It appears, though, that the Administration is now embracing a new strategic direction that is more realistically grounded on conditions in the field. After the uprising in April, senior leaders in the Administration finally realized the path they were on was not working. They correspondingly made three critical decisions:

First, they abandoned the sweeping “de-Baathification” policy that excluded past managers from participating in the building of a new Iraq.

Second, they decided to reinforce our troop levels in the region, committing to a major deployment for at least the next 18 months. There is no question that the political folks in the White House would have preferred to pull the troops out rather than to move more in, that would have been a far more popular move domestically. Instead, the President decided that his entire presidency now rests on success in Iraq.

Third, they chose to stay with the concept of “indigenization” of Iraqi security, but with a surprising twist. They agreed to let a former Saddam general take charge of the security of Fallujah. It seemed completely incongruous when it first came up. I believe it was more than just a pragmatic solution to avoid a bloody battle, which would have only served to strengthen the uprising elsewhere in Iraq. In fact, it represents a new power-sharing strategy in Iraq. We can see this even more starkly in Najaf, where the radical Shi’ite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, has holed up with his small army. Instead of launching an all out assault on them, we have sealed off the region in order to allow the most pragmatic Shia religious and political leadership the time to finally decide that they want to remove al-Sadr and his forces.

Both of these instances—turning Fallujah over to a former Saddam general and letting Shi’ite leaders disarm al-Sadr—are indeed defacto power-sharing decisions. We have

decided to let local political leaders have direct authority on the street, so long as it stays within the boundaries we find acceptable - which is why we are keeping 135,000 troops in the country indefinitely. In effect we are saying "you run things at the local level, and so long as it doesn't threaten national unity, we will leave you alone."

This still begs the question of how we create a viable national government. Here is where the tragedy of the prisoner abuse scandal will haunt us. Some 80% of Iraqi citizens now want America to leave as soon as possible. That, in combination with the fact that Ambassador Paul Bremer has publicly stated that U.S. and coalition forces would withdraw if asked to do so by a future Iraqi government, now presents a significant dilemma. No new Iraqi government will have legitimacy with its citizens unless it confronts America. If America selects the new government, it won't be legitimate. If the Iraqi people pick the government, it is likely to be anti-American. The challenge now is to create a new process to produce a legitimate government, without it being seen as America's product.

Last weekend CSIS sponsored a very high level private conference in a quiet setting outside of London. It was a productive few days that invited very frank and open discussions. The participants agreed that the primary problem we face in Iraq is to prevent it from sliding into factional strife - effectively breaking it up into three constituent parts. Based off of that premise, they outlined a path which I think makes good sense.

1. Immediately seek a new United Nations resolution.
2. Recruit a "national unity" council to replace the Iraqi Governing Council. This national unity council should explicitly include opponents of America's involvement, not just the segment of Iraqi leadership that embraces America's role.
3. Accelerate the use of former Baathists to assume administrative functions within the government. These Baathists should be required, however, to first pledge their support to the Iraqi national unity council.
4. Appoint a U.S. Presidential envoy of unquestioned influence and integrity (Jim Baker was considered a representative candidate) who could undertake a new outreach to Middle East capitals. The purpose of the outreach would be to listen to each of their perspectives, and enlist their support for the remainder of this agenda.
5. Under the umbrella of a UN resolution, establish a Reconstruction Implementation Council patterned after the mechanism developed for Kosovo. This takes the international legitimization effort out of the day-to-day politics of the UN and into the hands of a group that is committed to solving the problems in Iraq. Notionally the Council would include each of Iraq's regional neighbors (including Iran), along with 8-10 other countries willing to

commit a legitimate effort to helping the new government of Iraq get on its feet. This formula allows us to incorporate the regional countries, but in a forum where they can't dominate the deliberations.

6. Seek to involve the Arab League in concrete steps. Let supportive Arab capitals take the lead in developing an agenda that the Arab League could embrace for the reconstruction of Iraq.
7. Re-engage on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Dr. Condoleezza Rice has been given the lead in this area, and she should *visibly* make it a priority during the next 3 months.

This seems to me a very pragmatic path to answer the opening question of this memo: Is the situation in Iraq lost? No, it is not lost - but the path to success now largely rests in the hands of others.

Sorry, this memo is a bit longer than usual, but I felt the topic merited a more in depth discussion. I am always grateful to hear your thoughts and comments. Please feel free to contact me with your reactions at JHapre@csis.org.

END

May 24, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Timeline

Here are some edits for this paper on what has been going on in Iraq.

Thanks.

Attach.
2004 Timeline

DHR:dh
052404-36

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 13113-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036740

383.6

24 May 04

May 17, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Events in Context

Please assign someone to pull together for me what was going on between January 13 when the abuse was discovered and the day that *60 Minutes* ran it – everything that was going on in the world and what DoD was doing, what we were working on, so I have a good sense of that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-21

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

Sec Def —

First Cut

C 5/21

OSD 13114-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036741

2004 Timeline (13 Jan - 28 Apr)

Date	Event
13 Jan 04	SPC Darby reports cases of abuse at Abu Ghraib
16 Jan 04	LTG Sanchez orders criminal investigation
18 Jan 04	Suicide bomber attacks American CPA headquarters in Baghdad
20 Jan 04	POTUS delivers State of the Union Address
23 Jan 04	Iraq Chief Weapons Inspector (David Kay) steps down
26 Jan 04	Afghanistan's constitution becomes law
28 Jan 04	30,000 more soldiers approved by SecDef
31 Jan 04	Pakistan fires top nuclear scientist for selling data to Iran and Libya
1 Feb 04	Hundreds of Muslims killed during pilgrimage
1 Feb 04	Super Bowl XXXVIII - Force Protection
2 Feb 04	POTUS calls for independent commission to study the country's intelligence-gathering operations
2 Feb 04	POTUS releases budget
3 Feb 04	Ricin found in Senate office
4 Feb 04	SecDef budget testimony
5-8 Feb 04	Wehrkunde Conference in Munich
5 Feb 04	CIA Director says intelligence could have overestimated the actual Iraqi arsenal
5 Feb 04	Protests in Haiti / Armed rebels take control of Gonaïves
5 Feb 04	U.S. Begins Fingerprinting Foreign Visitors
7 Feb 04	Bomb kills dozens in Moscow subway
10 Feb 04	SecArmy task IG to analyze internment, EPW & detention policies, practices & procedures
10-11 Feb 04	Suicide bombs kill dozens of Police and Army applicants in Iraq
11 Feb 04	POTUS proposes Seven-point plan to prevent proliferation of nuclear equipment
11 Feb 04	President Bush's National Guard records released
12 Feb 04	Iranian nuclear plans found undermines Tehran's credibility
15 Feb 04	Sudanese conflict re-intensifies
18 Feb 04	Train explosion kills hundreds in Iran
19 Feb 04	Pentagon Officials arrive at USAFA to investigate allegations of sexual assaults on female cadets
20-26 Feb 04	SecDef travel to CENTCOM AOR
23 Feb 04	Army cancels Comanche program
29 Feb 04	U.S. Marines enter Haiti
4 Mar 04	Judge convicts three in "Virginia Jihad" case
7 Mar 04	Israeli army raids refugee camps
8 Mar 04	Iraq TAL approved by Governing Council
9 Mar 04	Tenet testifies to SASC

2004 Timeline (13 Jan - 28 Apr)

12 Mar 04	MG Taguba completes investigation
12 Mar 04	South Korean President Roh impeached
18 Mar 04	SecState labels Pakistan "major non-NATO ally"
19 Mar 04	Taiwanese President Chen shot on eve of elections
20 Mar 04	Charges preferred against six U.S. soldiers
22 Mar 04	Israeli forces kill Hamas leader
22 Mar 04	US/ROK Exercise -- Foal Eagle '04
23 Mar 04	SecDef testifies to 9/11 Commission
26 Mar 04	NATO pledges ships & aircraft to help safeguard Olympics
27 Mar 04	Growing doubts on vaccine in military; some refuse, citing lack of Iraqi anthrax
28 Mar 04	Terrorism cited in Uzbekistan violence
29 Mar 04	NATO expansion - 7 new countries admitted
1 Apr 04	White House admits to withholding Clinton administration terrorism documents
3 Apr 04	Madrid bombing suspect kills himself
4 Apr 04	U.S. troops attacked in coordinated effort order by al-Sadr in several Iraqi cities
6 Apr 04	LTG McKiernan (CG, CFLCC) approves Taguba report
13 Apr 04	Pakistani scientist reports North Korea possesses nuclear weapons
14 Apr 04	Bin Laden offers truce to Europe
	Hamas Leader Killed in Gaza
18 Apr 04	New Spanish Prime Minister recalls troops <i>in Iraq</i>
20 Apr 04	<i>MS</i> Bush picks U.N. envoy as Ambassador to Iraq
21 Apr 04	Ex-Pentagon official admits job deal - civilian got Boeing offer while overseeing Air-Tanker contract
21 Apr 04	Five coordinated suicide attacks in Basra kill 68 people
22 Apr 04	Train ignites massive explosion in North Korea
27 Apr 04	China rejects wider elections for Hong Kong
28 Apr 04	60 Minutes II report on Abu Ghraib
28 Apr 04	BG Kimmitt updates public on status of investigations
28 Apr 04	North Korea nuclear estimate rises -- # of bombs to 8

May 17, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Events in Context

Please assign someone to pull together for me what was going on between January 13 when the abuse was discovered and the day that *60 Minutes* ran it - everything that was going on in the world and what DoD was doing, what we were working on, so I have a good sense of that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-21

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

Sec Def —

First Cut

C 5/24

OSD 13114-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036744

TRAD

17 May 04

2004 Timeline (13 Jan - 28 Apr)

Date	Event
13 Jan 04	SPC Darby reports cases of abuse at Abu Ghraib
16 Jan 04	LTG Sanchez orders criminal investigation
18 Jan 04	Suicide bomber attacks American CPA headquarters in Baghdad
20 Jan 04	POTUS delivers State of the Union Address
23 Jan 04	Iraq Chief Weapons Inspector (David Kay) steps down
26 Jan 04	Afghanistan's constitution becomes law
28 Jan 04	30,000 more soldiers approved by SecDef
31 Jan 04	Pakistan fires top nuclear scientist for selling data to Iran and Libya
1 Feb 04	Hundreds of Muslims killed during pilgrimage
1 Feb 04	Super Bowl XXXVIII - Force Protection
2 Feb 04	POTUS calls for independent commission to study the country's intelligence-gathering operations
2 Feb 04	POTUS releases budget
3 Feb 04	Ricin found in Senate office
4 Feb 04	SecDef budget testimony
5-8 Feb 04	Wehrkunde Conference in Munich
5 Feb 04	CIA Director says intelligence could have overestimated the actual Iraqi arsenal
5 Feb 04	Protests in Haiti / Armed rebels take control of Gonaïves
5 Feb 04	U.S. Begins Fingerprinting Foreign Visitors
7 Feb 04	Bomb kills dozens in Moscow subway
10 Feb 04	SecArmy task IG to analyze internment, EPW & detention policies, practices & procedures
10-11 Feb 04	Suicide bombs kill dozens of Police and Army applicants in Iraq
11 Feb 04	POTUS proposes Seven-point plan to prevent proliferation of nuclear equipment
11 Feb 04	President Bush's National Guard records released
12 Feb 04	Iranian nuclear plans found undermines Tehran's credibility
15 Feb 04	Sudanese conflict re-intensifies
18 Feb 04	Train explosion kills hundreds in Iran
19 Feb 04	Pentagon Officials arrive at USAFA to investigate allegations of sexual assaults on female cadets
20-26 Feb 04	SecDef travel to CENTCOM AOR
23 Feb 04	Army cancels Comanche program
29 Feb 04	U.S. Marines enter Haiti
4 Mar 04	Judge convicts three in 'Virginia Jihad' case
7 Mar 04	Israeli army raids refugee camps
8 Mar 04	Iraq TAL approved by Governing Council
9 Mar 04	Tenet testifies to SASC

2004 Timeline (13 Jan - 28 Apr)

Date	Event
11 Mar 04	Madrid train bombing
12 Mar 04	MG Taguba completes investigation
12 Mar 04	South Korean President Roh impeached
18 Mar 04	SecState labels Pakistan "major non-NATO ally"
19 Mar 04	Taiwanese President Chen shot on eve of elections
20 Mar 04	Charges preferred against six U.S. soldiers
22 Mar 04	Israel forces kill Hamas leader
22 Mar 04	US/ROK Exercise -- Foal Eagle '04
23 Mar 04	SecDef testifies to 9/11 Commission
26 Mar 04	NATO pledges ships & aircraft to help safeguard Olympics
27 Mar 04	Growing doubts on vaccine in military; some refuse, citing lack of Iraqi anthrax
28 Mar 04	Terrorism cited in Uzbekistan violence
29 Mar 04	NATO expansion - 7 new countries admitted
1 Apr 04	White House admits to withholding Clinton administration terrorism documents
3 Apr 04	Madrid bombing suspect kills himself
4 Apr 04	U.S. troops attacked in coordinated effort order by al-Sadr in several Iraqi cities
6 Apr 04	LTG McKiernan (CG, CFLCC) approves Taguba report
13 Apr 04	Pakistani scientist reports North Korea possesses nuclear weapons
14 Apr 04	Bin Laden offers truce to Europe
17 Apr 04	Hamas Leader Killed in Gaza
18 Apr 04	New Spanish Prime Minister recalls troops <i>in Iraq</i>
20 Apr 04	<i>US</i> Bush picks U.N. envoy as Ambassador to Iraq
21 Apr 04	Ex-Pentagon official admits job deal - civilian got Boeing offer while overseeing Air-Tanker contract
21 Apr 04	Five coordinated suicide attacks in Basra kill 68 people
22 Apr 04	Train ignites massive explosion in North Korea
27 Apr 04	China rejects wider elections for Hong Kong
28 Apr 04	60 Minutes II report on Abu Ghraib
28 Apr 04	BG Kimmitt updates public on status of investigations
28 Apr 04	North Korea nuclear estimate rises -- # of bombs to 8

May 19, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Desert Storm Compensation

Please make sure someone looks into that issue of compensation being sought by American POWs who were captured during Desert Storm.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-12

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

DR 6/25
C 6/24
Sir,
Response attached.
vr / CDR Nosenzo
6/24

OSD 13116-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036747

246

19MAY04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

24475

June 24, 2004 12:00 PM

FOR: LTG CRADDOCK

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: Status of SECDEF Snowflakes #051704-26 and #051904-12

- You asked for a status update
- Snowflake 051704-26 Subject: Senator Leahy
 - We checked the Correspondence and Control System and cannot find anything from Senator Leahy regarding Bagram. We are currently checking with his staff.
- Snowflake 051904-12 Subject: Desert Storm Compensation
 - This has been passed between Policy, P&R and OGC. OGC will respond with status of the litigation.

240
24 Jun 04

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflakes

19 May 04

OSD 13116-01

11-L-0559/OSD/036748

May 17, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Leahy

Senator Leahy said I did not ever answer his question on 6/25/03 in Bagram.
Please find out what I answered. I want to read it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-26

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

Sir,
Response attached.
vr
/CDR Nosenzo
6/24

DR 6/25

C 6/24

Ira 9

17 MAY 04

OSD 13126-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036749



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

6/24

June 24, 2004 12:00 PM

FOR: LTG CRADDOCK

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: Status of SECDEF Snowflakes #051704-26 and #051904-12

Leahy

- You asked for a status update
- Snowflake **051704-26** Subject: Senator Leahy
 - We checked the Correspondence and Control System and cannot find anything from Senator Leahy regarding Bagram. We are currently checking with his staff.
- Snowflake **051904-12** Subject: Desert Storm Compensation
 - This has been passed between Policy, P&R and OGC. OGC will respond with status of the litigation.

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflakes ,

051704-12
17 May 04

OSD 13126-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036750

6/17
1230

TO See let

May 25, 2004

Paul Butler

REF-9713
I-04/007268

pwb

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Police Training in Afghanistan and Iraq

I would like a report on what police work has been done in Afghanistan by whom, at what numbers, over what period of time, what the State Department has done what the Germans have done, etc.

I would like the same thing for Iraq. I would like to know precisely what the Department of State has done, how many instructors they have, how many people they have trained, were they are on schedule, are they behind schedule, etc.

Please get it pulled together for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-13

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

[Handwritten mark]

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nasim
6/18
8/2

Afghanistan

25 MAY 04

07-05-04 14:03 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/036751

OSD 13127-04

4812

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef
USD(P) *[Signature]* 4/16
I-04/007446-SO
JUN 9 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

sub FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

SUBJECT: Police Training in Afghanistan and Iraq (U) *[Signature]*

- You asked a number of detailed questions about police training in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here is a *summary*, followed by a detailed explanation for Afghanistan (Tabs A-B) and Iraq (Tabs C-D).
- The State Department has been slow to start police training in both countries. DoD is working with State, providing equipment and infrastructure in Afghanistan and training in Iraq.

Afghanistan

- The State Department has now picked up momentum and will meet the initial objective of training 20,000 police by July, one month behind schedule.
- The supervision of deployed police, providing adequate equipment and infrastructure, and building the managerial capacity of the Ministry of Interior are the most significant challenges.

Iraq

- Sustaining police training and mentoring programs as multi-faceted as those we have in Iraq is a complex task that will require substantially more planning and resource allocation.
- Rapidly boosting the total numbers of Iraqi security forces on duty has been relatively easy, but now the emphasis must shift to a sustained effort to boost the quality of the police force.

COORDINATION: Tab E

Attachments:
As stated.

Prepared by: Cara Abercrombie and MAJ Terry Davis, SO/LIC Stability Operations.

(b)(6)

OSD 13127-04

09-06-04 16:38 IN

Afghanistan

9 JUN 04

25 JUN 04

TAB

A

Afghanistan Police

- Together with Germany, the US will likely meet the Government of Afghanistan's goal of 50,000 trained national and highway police and 12,000 border police by December 2005, provided Germany accelerates its border police training.
- In the past year, the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has trained 12,558 patrolmen. See slide at Tab B.
- INL has constructed a Central Police Training Center in Kabul and five (of seven) Regional Police Training Centers (RTCs). There are 35 US trainers in Kabul and 450 US-trained Afghan trainers in RTCs and Kabul.
- Approximately 25 German trainers train commissioned and non-commissioned officers in one- and three-year programs at the national police academy in Kabul. Since 2002, they have trained 3,700 national police, with 1,500 more in training. They have also trained 750 border police.
- INL is just beginning to address the following key challenges:
 - Ministry of Interior capacity: INL is in the process of contacting a Ministry of Interior reform package. Starting July 1, INL will embed 30 senior level police advisors within the Ministry to oversee reform and development of plans and standards.
 - Equipment and Infrastructure: INL has provided communications linking provincial police chiefs (32) to the Ministry of Interior. INL also provides equipment and supplies, and contributes to an international fund for salaries.

DoD is providing \$60M of Counternarcotics funds this year to CENTCOM to increase police capacity, including providing equipment and infrastructure.
 - Outstanding critical needs include: police station infrastructure, weapons and weapons training, communications, specialized equipment and vehicles.
 - Germany, with US support, solicited donations for these requirements at the May 18-19 Afghan Police Reconstruction conference in Doha.
 - Mentoring/monitoring: CFC-A is deploying military Mobile Assistance Teams to help assess local police units' procedures, administrative capacity, training and deployment plans, infrastructure and equipment.
 - CFC-A will provide findings to INL with the goal of energizing INL programs.

TAB

B



Security - Police

Summary as of 24 May 04:

Lead Nations:	<u>Germany and U.S.</u>	
Jun '04 Goal:		20,000*
Current Trained:	3,600	12,558
	750 border.	
Increase since 22 March	600	3600

Assessment: Currently on track to reach goal of 20,000 police by June 2004.

* national police, border police & highway patrol combined

German Training Goals and Status:

- Rebuild Kabul police academy and commence 3 year (officers) and 1 year (NCO) programs – construction completed, Academy training underway.
- Provide trainers for two US regional training centers – underway.
- Assist Ministry of Interior with organizational reform-planning underway, but transferred to U.S.

Deputies Version - as of 2 June, 2004

US Training Goals and Status:

- US Program will build 7 Regional Training Centers (RTCs) for Police, Border Police, and Hwy Patrol in same cities as first 7 PRTs.
- Program has already completed rebuilding Kabul training facility. -Gardez, Mazar, Kandahar, Jalalabad & Konduz RTCs operational with capacity of 1,000 students each.
- Herat and Bamiyan RTCs planned Spring
- Attrition rate for trainees after graduation is ~~is~~ than

Afghan Initiatives and Status:

- MOI developed a comprehensive reform program which includes revenue generating initiative such as traffic regulations and a fine system as well as development of a new payroll and financial management system. INL is reviewing proposals and will make selections shortly.
- MOI completed deals to purchase weapons from the Czechs, which have been delivered and is negotiating a deal to purchase vehicles from Russia. USG continues to assist with negotiations for a weapons donation from Ukraine.

TAB

C

OSD/deg
6/10/04

Iraq Police

- DoD's lead role in training Iraqi police is an unusual arrangement driven by unusual circumstances. When the environment in Iraq permits, State will assume its normal lead role in training local police forces.
- The 2004 Supplemental allocated \$1.147B to train and equip Iraqi Police. The administration of that money is divided between DoD and INL.
- As of 8 June 2004, Iraq had approximately 89,000 police officers on the payroll. See chart at Tab D.
 - o Select coalition Military Police have conducted Transition and Integration Program (TIP) training at fifteen sites country-wide since June 2003.
 - 21,055 police officers have graduated from one of the 3-week (TIP) programs.
 - o With State Department INL funding, Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) developed the eight-week basic skills training program used at facilities in Jordan and Baghdad. To date, 5,707 recruits have received this training.
 - Jordan Academy will reach its full capacity of 3,000 students by this summer.
 - Academies in Baghdad and Mosul currently have a cumulative capacity of over 1500 and plan to expand the cumulative number to 2500 students.
 - o INL is preparing to establish a training center in Baghdad to provide specialty training such as fighting organized crime, anti-terrorism, and drug enforcement.
 - INL will establish agreements with ICITAP and various U.S. law enforcement agencies to provide trainers.
 - INL will provide the field support.
 - o Mentoring/monitoring: INL is planning to fund 500 U.S. Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA) in Iraq. Nearly 300 are currently in country. IPAs are responsible for supervising the field training and mentoring of Iraqi police after they receive classroom training.

TAB

D



Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary

	Required	On Duty			Total On Duty	In Academy Training	In TIP Training	Total On Duty & In Training
		Untrained	TIP Trained	Academy Trained				
Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 1	89,369	62,236	21,055	5,707	88,998	1,883	500	91,381
Dept of Border Enforcement (DBE) 2	20,420	0	0	179	18,307	101	0	18,408

	Required	On Duty	In-Training	TOTAL
Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) 3	35,000	4,057	2,753	6,810
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) 4	40,556	33,343	1,667	35,010



Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary (cont)

	Required	On Duty	In-Training	TOTAL
Facilities Protection Service (Ministries & MSCs) (FPS) 5	73,992	73,992	120	74,112
	Total Required: 259,337			Total on Duty and in Training: 225,721

1. New requirement from MNF-I 22 Apr based on better census data. IPS implementing new reporting procedures
2. OSC SITREP 29 Apr. DBE includes Border Police, Customs, Immigration, Nationality. There is no TIP training for DBE but Border Police received basic sentry training
3. MNF-I C3 Effects NISF Roll-up
4. **OSC SITREP 29 Apr. ICDC includes the 36th ICDC BN**
5. FPS requirements changed by Ministries. Numbers are estimated. Source OSC SITREP

**Number required and total on duty reflects best available data in the wake of recent combat operations.
Re-assessments and updates are continuing**

TAB

E

COORDINATION

Police Training in Afghanistan and Iraq

ISA/NESA	Paul Hulley	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)
SO/LIC CN	DASD Marybeth Long	3 June (Draft) / 8 June (Final)
J5/ADDPM-A	COL Kevin Wilkerson	3 June (Draft) / 8 June (Final)
J5/ME	LTC John Hall	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)
CPA	Matthew Gerke	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)
OSD GC	Chuck Allen	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)
OSD(C)	Mary Tompkey	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)

MAY 25 2004

TO: Pete Geren
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: ICRC Fix

I do think it is important that we send a high-level representative, like Tillie Fowler, to meet with the ICRC, and we ought to include someone like Eliana Davidson. But before we do, we ought to have already implemented the fix that we believe is appropriate, so we can brief them on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052104-9

..... 88.88888888881

Please respond by _____

383.6

25 May 04

MFR

May 24, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Inform Senator Bennett

At 1510 hrs, 28 May, I informed Powell Moore that David Martin may break the Hong Suite. Powell indicated that he would call Senator Bennett (Hong is the shoplifting incident)

If the situation changes with respect to Karpinski, please make sure you inform Senator Bennett.

15/28 323.6

Thanks.

Attach.

5/20/04 Moore memo to SecDef, response to SecDef memo #052004-8

DHR:dh
052404.31

.....
Please *respond* by _____

24 May 04

HOT

May 20, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Bennett

Powell Moore, I would like you to report back to me within 48 hours on what you are going to do with Senator Bennett on precise steps. Specifically I am thinking about surprise visits, an officer at the prison all the time, that type of thing.

Pete Pace, you should help him get a good answer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-8

.....
Please respond by 5/22/04

Sir,
Response attached *C 5/21*
U/R. *DA 5/24*
LTC Swopple

11-L-0559/OSD/036766

OSD 13130-04

383.6

20 May 04

24 May 04



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

May 20, 2004 5:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

Subject: Response to Senator Bennett, SECDEF Snowflake # 052004-8

- As soon as you informed me on the afternoon of May 19 that Senator Bennett had spoken with you about a floor statement he planned to make, I called him to make sure that we had a clear definition of the information he needed and to reaffirm your offer of support. He advised me that he had already made his statement right after his conversation with you.
- Moreover, he said that a primary purpose of his call to you was to be able to say in his floor statement that he had passed along his suggestions about fundamental approaches commanders should take to avoid similar situation in the future. These included surprise inspections and ensuring there is a duty officer at the prison at all times, day or night. He cited General Eisenhower's principle that "areas that are not inspected deteriorate." I have underlined these suggestions in the attached statement and have given them to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- After reviewing his speech, we advised him that he misinterpreted the meaning of a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand (GOMOR). GOMORs are originated by general officers, not necessarily directed at them. No general officer has received a GOMOR regarding this incident, as his floor speech stated. Brigadier General Karpinski received a letter of admonishment rather than a GOMOR.
- Senator Bennett and his staff have expressed appreciation for our support.

cc: General Peter Pace
The Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflake
Floor Statement

11-L-0559/OSD/036767

OSD 13130-04

DA 529

383.6

20 May 04

24 May 04

THIS SEARCH	THIS DOCUMENT	THIS CR ISSUE	GO TO
Next Hit	Forward	Next Document	New CR Search
Prev Hit	Back	Prev Document	HomePage
Hit List	Best Sections	Daily Digest	Help
	Contents Display		

PENTAGON RESPONSE TO IRAQI PRISONER ABUSE -- (Senate - May 19, 2004)

[Page: S5741] [GPO's PDF](#)

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, last week, along with a number of my colleagues, I went up into the room on the fourth floor in the Capitol where the Defense Department, the State Department, and the CIA come to brief us on classified information. I sat in a darkened room where we saw a slide show of the photographs that had been taken of Americans inflicting abuse on Iraqi prisoners. The pictures were revolting, they were disgusting, and they left us all with a sense of outrage that this had gone on, outrage that Americans had been involved in anything such as this.

I did not look forward to the experience. Indeed, I made the initial decision not to go. Then I decided: No, if I am going to be involved in examining what is here, I have to see the evidence, as revolting as it may be.

The sense of outrage that I and my colleagues felt about this was shared by all Americans, but in one sector of American society it seems to be even greater than anyplace else. There are some in this society who might not be able to guess what that sector is. But I would say the outrage that has been the strongest has come from those who serve in the American military.

Duty, honor, country--these are the watch words of the American military, and they were violated by those who took those actions in the prison in Baghdad. They did not do their duty. They dishonored the uniforms they wore as they abused those prisoners, and they brought disgrace on the country whose Constitution they had taken an oath to uphold and defend.

The sense of outrage is nationwide, but it is particularly focused among those who have sworn to uphold duty, honor, and country and saw their fellows in uniform violate those principles.

I rise to discuss this today because today is the first court-martial coming as a result of the investigations that have been conducted into this activity. This morning in Baghdad, Army SPC Jeremy Sivits pled guilty, was convicted, and sentenced to a 1-year imprisonment, reduction in rank, and a bad conduct discharge.

Now, there are those in our society who have less faith in the military, who say: These courts-martial are a part of a coverup; this is an attempt to gloss over what has happened; one cannot trust the military to investigate themselves; and we need a whole series of investigations by outside groups.

I believe the facts are that we will find out more what happened from the courts-martial than we would find out from any degree of investigation conducted elsewhere. I offer as a demonstration of the fact that the military can be trusted to act in matters of this kind the following chronology of what has happened with respect to this incident.

We now know that the abuse of the prisoners took place in the last quarter of 2003. We do not know the exact dates, but sometime toward the end of that year the alleged detainee abuse occurred. On January 13, 2004, SPC Joseph Darby opened an e-mail thinking he was going to see pictures that he described as a travelogue; a history of the performance of a particular unit. Instead, what had been downloaded on his computer were the photographs that my colleagues and I saw in room 407 of this building.

Specialist Darby was absolutely stunned. What did he do? Here were his fellow soldiers engaged in activity that was clearly in violation of everything he had been taught, people he wanted to feel close with and identified with, people who, perhaps, were his friends. What would he do? He did his duty, and he provided a CD of the abuse photos to the Army Criminal Investigation Command, or the CID, on January 13, 2004. On January 14, the CID began its investigation--no attempt to cover up. No attempt to hide or turn away from the fact that there was a potential difficulty. They began the next day, and they notified people up the chain of command of what they were doing.

On January 16, just 2 days later, Brigadier General Kimmitt announced that there would be an investigation by

[Page: S5742] GPO's PDF

Central Command. It had gone up all that way, that quickly. In just 3 days they were at the top levels of Central Command.

Two days after that, BG Janis Karpinski, who was the commander at Abu Ghraib prison, was admonished and suspended from her command. She was relieved just 2 days after this reached the attention of Central Command.

Additionally, the Abu Ghraib chain of command was suspended, from the battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel, all the way down. Just 2 days after this was brought to the attention of Central Command, the entire group was relieved.

Now, on January 19, a combined joint task force requested that Central Command appoint an investigating officer, and on January 31, Major General Taguba was appointed to conduct the investigation.

On February 10, the Secretary of the Army tasks the inspector general to conduct an analysis of the internment detention policies, practices, and procedures. It goes beyond just the prison: Look at the whole Army and our procedures to see what can be done to prevent this from happening again.

On March 12, General Taguba completed his investigation and briefed the commander of joint task force 7, Lieutenant General Sanchez. Also on March 12, Lieutenant General Helmly, who was the commander of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, directed that Command's inspector general to conduct an assessment of training for Reserve personnel on the issues of detainee treatment, ethics, and leadership to see if the training had broken down in a way that would cause this to happen. All of this was going on--the military acting on its own.

On March 20, the first charges were preferred

against six accused and announced by Brigadier General Kimmitt at a press conference. This is not something that got discovered by some investigative reporter digging in behind the scenes. This was something that was announced by the military after they had done a careful examination and moved in a way to protect the rights of every individual.

At that announcement, no names or units were identified so that they would not compromise the due process of those who were being accused.

On April 15, Major General Fay, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, appointed an investigative officer to examine the circumstances with respect to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. That is the group where the commander was relieved within 2 days of discovering that there was an allegation of a problem.

On May 1, Lieutenant General Sanchez issued a memorandum of reprimand to six general officers and one letter of admonition to a member of the 800th Military Police Brigade as recommended by Major General Taguba. This is not something that they passed off to the GIs, the sergeants, the corporals, and the privates. This is something they took care of at the general officer level. Six general officers received a memorandum of reprimand. That is a career-ending experience for a general officer.

Then on May 7, Secretary Rumsfeld announced the independent review panel headed by former Defense Secretary Jim Schlesinger, including retired Air Force General Chuck Homer, former Representative Tillie Fowler, and former Defense Secretary Harold Brown. And then, today, on May 19, the first court-martial has taken place and Specialist Sivits was found guilty and sentenced.

The lesson that comes from this list of actions is a lesson that the world should heed. The lesson for Iraqis and other nations is that this is how democracies handle their problems. This is how Americans face the difficulties that arise when there is a breakdown that occurs within our military. We do not hide it. We do not pretend it did not happen. We do not strive to find excuses. We act in the way consistent with the rule of law.

I hope everyone in the world would recognize the difference between the way we have responded to this and the way al-Qaida has responded to this. We have responded to it by exercising the rule of law and seeking those responsible. They have responded by taking an innocent American civilian, who had nothing whatever to do with any of this, and cutting off his head, live and in color on international television. That is the difference between Americans and al-Qaida when faced with a problem.

So that is the first lesson I hope the world will take from the way we are handling this. The lesson that the military should take from this is that the rules are there to be obeyed. The lesson that should go forward from Specialist Sivits' court-martial, from the six general officers who got the memorandum of reprimand and from the investigations that are still going forward is that if the rules are broken, you end up in Fort Leavenworth.

That is the lesson that should come out of this for the American military, and I believe it is being received there.

The lesson for the commanders, those who are now responsible and who have taken over to replace those who were relieved, is this. It comes from a statement by General Eisenhower, who knew something about military discipline. He said: "Areas that are not inspected deteriorate."

Let's go back to Specialist Sivits for a moment and find out from his statements relating to his court-martial what really happened. I am quoting now from the Washington Post:

Sivits told investigators that the abuse would not have happened had higher-ranking members been present. "Our command would have slammed us," he said. "They believe in doing the right thing. If they saw what was going on, there would be hell to pay."

That statement echoes testimony given by one of the initial investigators on the case. During a session similar to a grand jury proceeding, Tyler Pieron, an Army criminal investigator, said the abuses occurred, "after the chain of command had changed shifts and gone home."

* * * * *

Sivits said he did not report the abuse to his commanders because [he was told not to by a friend] "and I try to be

friends with everyone. I see now where trying to be friends with everyone can cost you."

I spoke with Secretary Rumsfeld this morning about this lesson, the lesson of command. It is fine to change the command, but we must examine what caused the problem and change the procedures. Even though the rules were there, the procedures broke down. There was not a duty officer on duty. We have been told that this abuse took place between 2 and 4 in the morning when no one was around. I raised with Secretary Rumsfeld the importance of seeing to it from now on that the new commanders of the prison make sure there is a duty officer there all night long.

Back to Eisenhower's dictum, there should be snap, surprise inspections. People in the prisons should never know when someone might drop in, unexpected and unannounced, to see what is going on. Secretary Rumsfeld concurred. I believe that is the lesson that command should receive from this experience, and I believe it is the lesson they will learn and they will follow.

As sorry as this chapter is in our proud military history and as deep as this stain has become upon America's honor, it is not the first time we have seen such chapters. It is not the first time we have endured such stains. I wish I could say it is the last time this will happen, but even in this morning's news we are hearing that there are more pictures, that it may have been more widespread than we thought. With human beings as imperfect as they are, it is inevitable that at some point in the future someone else will break the rules, violate his oath, and take actions that will cause all Americans to mourn, as we do over these actions.

Given that history, that it has happened before and perhaps will happen again, we should remember what we did as a nation when it happened before and what we are doing now. We dealt with it. We went after those who were responsible, discovered who they were, gave them their full due process, but when they were convicted, they were punished. They were dealt with. Then we made the changes that were necessary to see to it that it wouldn't happen again. Then we got past it.

We have not allowed those past chapters in our history to deter us from our destiny as a nation. We should do the same thing now. We are in the process of discovering who the guilty are. We are in the process of conducting courts-martial. Specialist Sivits is just the first. Charges have been

proffered against others and additional courts-

[Page: 557431 GPO's PDF

martial will be forthcoming. We are in the process of making the changes--not just the change of command but the change in procedures to see to it that this will not happen again.

As we have done in the past, we must get through this and not let it deter us from our overall goal of why we are in Iraq. We must not fixate on this stain on our honor to the point that we become so muscle-bound that we cannot proceed forward in our mission.

What is our mission? Speakers who have addressed this before me have made that clear. Our mission is to provide freedom and security for the people of Iraq. I believe that means freedom and security for the Middle East generally. I believe that means transforming the world in which Americans live and an increase of freedom and security for our Nation as well. These are worthy, indeed noble goals, and we must not be deterred from seeking them by preoccupation with this particular outrage.

I close with a conversation I had over the weekend. Like many of us over the weekend, I went home to Utah and I participated in Armed Forces Day. It was a poignant Armed Forces Day for a variety of reasons, because many of

the people who were there were families of those in the military who were there without their family member--that is, children, husbands, wives, mothers and fathers of Utahns who are serving in this war and who are not home with their families to enjoy the delightful spring day at Murray City Park where everyone was having a picnic and a good time. Set up in that area was a series of flags, one flag for each individual who had fallen in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Of course, the majority of flags were American flags, but I was struck by the number of British flags, Italian flags, Polish flags, Spanish flags--one I did not recognize, an Ukrainian flag, an Estonian flag. We are providing the leadership, but many countries in the world are responding to us as we launch on this mission.

On Armed Forces Day I sat next to a colonel. He was not a Utahn; he had come to participate in the activities. We visited over lunch. With the Army, he has been in Kosovo, he has been in Bosnia, he has been in Afghanistan, he has been in Iraq, and he was on his way back to Iraq.

I said to him: Colonel, tell me what it is like. You have been there, you have been on the ground. Tell me what it is like. He gave me an answer we hear a lot. Indeed, it was the first sentence out of his mouth that comes out the same as many others. He said: Well, things are not nearly as bad as the U.S. press would have you believe. Things are really going fairly well in many parts of the country. But we have problems.

We talked about some of the problems. He made this observation that I think should keep us thoughtful as we address our mission in Iraq. He said: You know, whether it is Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq, the same thing is true: Those people are just like us in that all they want is to have their children be able to walk out of the door and be safe on the street, to be able to go to school without intimidation and learn what they need to learn to get a decent job and live a decent life. That is all they want in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, or Iraq--just like us. That is what we want in America. To bring that to Iraq and give the people of Iraq that opportunity, with their wives and their children and their grandchildren, unfortunately requires force of arms.

Americans, British, Italians, Poles, Spaniards, Ukrainians, Estonians, are willing to risk their lives to bring about that goal. We must never lose sight of the importance of that mission or of the sacrifice that has gone into achieving it. We must never turn back simply because there are those who have put a stain on American honor by the way they have behaved.

I pay tribute to the Armed Forces. I pay tribute to the chain of command that is dealing with these challenges. I pay tribute to those who are willing to face the problems and not back away from them or cover them up. We must support them in their efforts. We must not smear the entire establishment because of the actions of a few.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THIS SEARCH

[Next Hit](#)

[Prev Hit](#)

[Hit List](#)

THIS DOCUMENT

[Forward](#)

[Back](#)

[Best Sections](#)

[Contents Display](#)

THIS CR ISSUE

[Next Document](#)

[Prev Document](#)

[Daily Digest](#)

GO TO

[New CR Search](#)

[HomePage](#)

[Help](#)

May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and let me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/29/04 DuBois ^{INFO} ~~page~~ on DoD Advisory Boards*
~~5/14/04 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef, OSD 76611-04~~

DHR:dh
052504-20

.....
Please respond by *6/25/04*

334

25 May 04

Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.disa.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory board meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
 - As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- Department advisory boards are independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past 15 years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees are also required to fill out financial disclosure reports if the board they serve on makes recommendations that could affect the expenditure of government funds in the future. Board members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated directly for their work.

- The General Counsel of the Department of Defense notifies advisory committee members by letter to contact the Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO) for advice concerning ethics issues relating to their appointment. SOCO assures that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports are completed before their first meeting. Committee members also complete a Foreign Activities Questionnaire and execute a disqualification from participation in any particular matters involving financial interests listed on the confidential financial disclosure report. SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to the Committee members. A guide for current committee members is distributed at a committee meeting and can be found at <http://www.defenselink.mil/dodnc/defenseethics> under "ethics resource library" and under "DoD guidance."
- Advice provided to the Department has been critical to current transformation efforts, keeping the Department informed on cutting edge issues from the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science and technology developments. This advice cannot be drawn exclusively from internal government sources. We simply do not have the expertise or those with professional networks with access to the kind of information needed. This advice often has a direct impact on future military operations and the welfare of the war fighter.
- If the Department were to use survey instruments and contractual arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs would be significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees as a collateral duty to their principal duties.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

As of 04/29/2004

Type of Committee: Statutory (Total - 25)

Presidential (Total - 1)

Discretionary/Established by Secretary of Defense (Total - 34)

Committee Name	Type	Description
<u>Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (ACDE)</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDoS), on improvements to achieve and maintain a high quality public educational program through secondary school for minor dependents in overseas areas as defined in section 1411, Public Law 95-561, as amended.
<u>Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction</u>	Statutory	Assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving weapons of mass destruction. Examines response capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
<u>Air University Board of Visitors</u>	Discretionary	Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.
<u>Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Executive Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Studies the ARMS Initiative and reviews the Army's plan for its implementation; makes specific findings and recommendations concerning the concept, executability, and overall soundness of the plan; assesses government and industry expectations for the ARMS Initiative; evaluates the incentives being proposed under the ARMS Initiative Implementation Plan (AIIP); reviews and makes specific recommendations on the applicability and adequacy of the loan guaranty program and planning grants; reviews and determines which existing public laws, regulations, and policies are currently available to fulfill the ARMS Initiative; and, reviews and comments on the Army's plans for Plant Reutilization, Emergency Planning, and the Disposal of Excess Plant Equipment.

<u>Armed Forces Epidemiological Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as a continuing scientific advisory body to the Surgeons General of the military departments and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) providing them with timely scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development and research needs for the prevention of disease and injury and promotion of health.
<u>Army Education Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and the Army's senior leadership with expert and continuous advice on Army educational programs. Advice provided relates to educational policies, school curriculums, educational philosophy and objectives, program effectiveness, facilities, staff and faculty, instructional methods, and other aspects of organization and management.
<u>Army Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and major Army Commanders on scientific, technological, and acquisition matters of interest to the Department of the Army.
<u>Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
<u>Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Superintendent and the Secretary of the Navy on naval graduate education programs, assessing the effectiveness of the school in accomplishing its mission and inquires into the curricula, instruction, physical equipment, administration, state of the student body, fiscal affairs, and other matters relating to the operation of school programs.
<u>Board of Regents, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</u>	Statutory	Provides advice and guidance to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the operation of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences; to assure that said operation is in the best tradition of academia and in compliance with the appropriate accreditation authorities,

<u>Board of Visitors, Joint Military Intelligence College</u>	Discretionary	
<u>Board of Visitors, Marine Corps University</u>	statutory	examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost
<u>Board of Visitors, National Defense University</u>	Discretionary	students, curricula, educational methods, research, facilities, and administration of the National Defense University (NDU). Principal components of NDU are: Armed Forces Staff College,
<u>Board of Visitors, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security (WHINSEC)</u>	Statutory	Provides to DoD expert advice on the operations and management of the Institute. Inquires into the curriculum, instruction, physical Equipment, fiscal affairs and academic methods of the Institution and any other matters that it or the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. Reviews WHINSEC curriculum and determines whether it complies with applicable U.S. laws and regulations consistent with U.S. policy goals toward the Western Hemispheres and adheres to U.S. doctrine appropriately

<u>Chief of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as advisor to the Chief for developing policy and procedures for Corps Programs; ascends and advises upon natural, social and cultural resource management issues associated with Corps plans, projects and programs; provides advice aimed at both identifying and resolving existing environmental issues with new or expanded Corps missions; advises on the development of workable methods for quantifying natural, social and cultural resource management costs and benefits of Corps programs and in expressing these in terms of both their tangible and intangible consequences; and, explores and advises on new directions where the Corps, acting as the national engineering agency, can continue to solve not only the engineering and economic aspects of new challenges, problems, and opportunities, but also those environmental features for which it has responsibility.
<u>Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides an avenue of communications by which a distinguished group representing scientific, academic, engineering, and political communities may advise the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on questions related to national seapower. In pursuing its objectives, the CEP may operate in committees composed of selected Panel members to conduct detailed examinations of matters related to national seapower.
<u>Defense Acquisition University Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Advise the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on "organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities and other matters of interest" to the DAU, as directed by 10U.S.C. 1746.
<u>Defense Advisory Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense about issues concerning Reservists and their civilian employers, to include recommending policies and priorities for employer support actions and programs.
<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters pertaining to military personnel testing; reviews the calibration of personnel selection and classification tests to ensure the accuracy of resulting scores; reviews relevant validation studies to ensure that the tests have utility in predicting success in technical training and on the job; reviews ongoing testing research and development in support of the enlistment program; and, makes recommendations for improvements to make the testing process more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and the Military Services.

<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary
<u>Defense Business Board</u>	Discretionary	Makes recommendations to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) on effective strategies for implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Environmental Response Task Force II</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned.
<u>Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of Advisors</u>	Discretionary	the
<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	and technical expertise and advice on current and long-term mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides a link between the scientific/technical and military operations and ration: o comb s control
<u>Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Secretary for Policy with independence, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy; focus upon long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the
<u>Defense Science Board</u>	Discretionary	

<u>DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Military Departments with advice and recommendations on the conduct of economical and effective research and development programs in the field of electron devices.
<u>DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children, and Children with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
<u>DoD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense on the actuarial status of the DoD Education Benefits Fund; furnishes advice and opinion on matters referred to it by the Secretary; reviews valuations of the Fund; and, provides periodic reports to the Secretary and President and Congress on the status of the fund as required.
<u>DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 3306 of Public Law 102-484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices.
<u>DoD Historical Advisory Committee</u>		the Secretary of Defense, Departments, and the heads of such may choose to participate, regarding the professional historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the DoD. These include: historical, archival, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs
<u>DoD Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries</u>	statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the DoD Medicare-Eligible retiree Health Care Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the DoD under DoD retiree health care programs for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries.

<u>DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit programs.
<u>DoD Wage Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Makes recommendations regarding wage surveys and wage schedules for blue-collar employees to the Department of Defense Wage Fixing Authority.
<u>Inland Waterways Users Board</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of the Army on matters relating to construction and rehabilitation priorities on the commercial inland waterways and harbors of the United States.
<u>Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council on nuclear weapons systems surety matters that relate to protecting against inadvertent nuclear detonation or plutonium dispersal.
<u>Missouri River -- North Dakota -- Task Force</u>	statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>Missouri River -- South Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>National Security Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, on matters involving Signals Intelligence production, Information Security, science, technology, business procedures and management related to the mission of the NSNCSS.
<u>National Security Education Board</u>	Statutory	Develop criteria under the National Security Education Act of 1991 for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants to U.S. citizens and institutions; provide for wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under the Act; establish qualifications for persons desiring scholarships or fellowships, and for institutions of higher education desiring grants under the Act. The Board will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy & Resources), who is the designated representative of the Secretary of Defense.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	name disability tools rule sabilities matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Navy)</u>	Discretionary	Operations Executive Board in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet ASW developments and related technologies, critically review programs which potentially impact SSBN survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define ASW and SSBN survivability threats.
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	on Pathology scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFIP central laboratory of pathology for the Department of

<u>Semiconductor Technology Council</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education.
<u>U.S. Strategic Computing Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides technical and scientific advice of qualified scientists and representative views of the scientific community to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) during the development of the SI tifi n ord
<u>Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board</u>	statutory	Provides recommendations to the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Council on environmental research and development activities as prescribed in statute and assume additional advisory responsibilities as directed by the Council.
<u>Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism.
<u>Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Charter</u>	Discretionary	
<u>Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee.
<u>USAF Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.

<u>USAF Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	recent scientific information as it applies to the Air Force; reviews and evaluates long-range plans for research and development and provides advice on the adequacy of the Air Force program; recommends usually promising scientific developments for selective Air Force emphasis and new scientific discoveries of techniques for practical application to weapon or support systems; makes a variety of studies designed to improve the Air Force Research and Development Program; and, serves as a pool of
<u>U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Board</u>	Statutory	review research and recommends priorities of projects in consonance with the needs field and the objectives of the Chief of
<u>U.S. European Command Senior Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Commander, U.S. European Command with advice, guidance, and assistance toward fulfilling its mission.
<u>U.S. Joint Forces Command Transformation Advisory Group (TAG)</u>	Discretionary	command processes.
<u>U.S. Military Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	ne, cal cade
<u>U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	discipline, al affairs, academic Naval Academy that the Board 60 days of its annual meeting, recommendation to the President of the

file

May 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

M

SUBJECT: Records of Prior Service

One of the investigators probably ought to take a look at the record^s of the people who were charged with problems in Abu Ghraib, and see what their records looked like in Bosnia and possibly Afghanistan, since apparently some of them were there also.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051404-7

Please respond by

6/18/04

DH 8/4

Sir,

Response attached.

v/r.

Lt Col Greg Lengyel
8/4

313.5

60 10/11/04

08/04
August 3, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Pete Geren/MG Maples

SUBJECT: Answer to Your 14 May 2004 Snowflake Question:
Records of Prior Service

You said, "One of the investigators probably ought to look at the records of the people who were charged with problems at Abu Ghraib, and see what their records looked like in Bosnia and possibly Afghanistan, since apparently some of them were there also."

- Bottom line: Background checks of U.S. Army personnel so far identified in the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib did not reveal indicators of aberrant behavior.
- OUSD(I) tasked the Director of the Army Staff, Headquarters U.S. Army, to have the Army's Central Adjudication Facility (handles background investigations relevant to the granting of security clearances) review the records of all individuals that were in some way connected to the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse investigation.
- A review of U.S. Army records revealed information on three of these individuals "that might have been indicative of potential abuse behaviors." Those indicators included: violation of a restraining order, disorderly conduct, and counseling for an adjustment disorder. **None of these three soldiers, however, have so far been implicated in the Abu Ghraib abuses and there is no record of misconduct by the three while on active duty in the Army in any other theater of operations.**

May 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Interrogation Methods

Please give me a copy of the paper people are waving around showing the authorized interrogation methods. I need to see what they have, and whether it is something I have already seen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051404-4

.....
Please respond by 5/18/04

Forwarded to Sec Def
by Fav 5/14

FILE (COP)

Response Attached

5/14
C

383.6

14 May 04

INTERROGATION RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Approved approaches for

All detainees:

Direct
Incentive
Incentive Removal
Emotional love / Hate
Fear Up Harsh
Fear Up Mild
Reduced Fear
Pride & Ego Up
Futility
We Know All
Establish Your Identity
Repetition
File & Dossier
Rapid Fire
Silence

Require CG's Approval:

Requests must be submitted in writing

Change of scenery down
Dietary Manip (monitored by med)
Environmental Manipulation
Sleep Adjustment (reverse sched)
Isolation for longer than 30 days
Presence of Mil Working Dogs
Sleep Management (72 hrs max)
Sensory Deprivation (72 hrs max)
● Stress Positions (no longer than 45 min)

Safeguards:

- ~ Techniques must be annotated in questioning strategy
- ~ Approaches must always be humane and lawful
- ~ Detainees will NEVER be touched in a malicious or unwanted manner
- ~ Wounded or medically burdened detainees must be medically cleared prior to interrogation
- ~ The Geneva Conventions apply within CJTF-7

EVERYONE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING COMPLIANCE TO THE IROE.
VIOLATIONS MUST BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO THE OIC.

The use of the techniques are subjects to the general safeguards as provided as well as specific guidelines implemented by the 205th MI Cdr, FM 34-52, and the Commanding General, CJTF-7



7201
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

INFO MEMO



U-0429/DR

May 24, 2004

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: L.E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Mr. Nicholas Berg

(U) The JTF-CT queried CIA-CTC, NSA, TTIC, and FBI regarding terrorism information related to Mr. Berg.

(U) What we know. Most of what we know regarding Mr. Berg's activities results from FBI interviews and Press reporting. It appears Mr. Berg was an independent business owner looking for contract opportunities in Iraq. He does not appear to have had a direct link to terrorism, though in 2002 he may have inadvertently provided passwords for computer access to individuals with al-Qaida links.

(U) On 25 March, the U.S. military contacted the Mosul Operations Base (MOB) regarding a U.S. citizen detained at an Iraqi police station in Mosul. The U.S. person was identified as Nicholas Berg. Mr. Berg was detained by Iraqi Police on 24 March after being observed by the police in a taxicab in Mosul. The Iraqi Police deemed Mr. Berg to be suspicious (NFI), although they had no information indicating he was involved in any illegal or terrorism-related activities. Iraqi Police subsequently notified the U.S. military.

(U) Mr. Berg was interviewed by FBI agents in Mosul between 25 and 26 March, and again on 3 April. Mr. Berg told agents he entered Iraq through Jordan to establish working relationships in the "antenna tower" business and to acquire contracts for his business, Prometheus Towers. Mr. Berg stated he had previously traveled to Mosul in late 2003. During the March interview, Berg told agents he was a "politically active Jew," and believed he could inconspicuously move in Iraq because he thought he could "blend in." FBI Agents and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) officials emphasized the dangerous Iraqi environment to Mr. Berg. Prior to Mr. Berg's CPA-assisted release on 6 April, he was offered financial assistance to safely depart Iraq. According to CPA representatives, Mr. Berg declined the assistance.

(U) In 2002, Mr. Berg was interviewed by FBI officials in Philadelphia after determining his computer account at the University of Oklahoma had been used by suspected al-Qaida member Zacarias Moussaoui. While attending the University, Mr. Berg compromised his

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036790

OSD 13135-04

000.5

24 May 04 17 May 04

computer account by providing his UserID and password to an unknown individual from a nearby flight school. The flight school used some University of Oklahoma facilities and dorms but did not have computer access. Following compromise of the computer account, Mr. Berg's logon information was passed to students at the flight school on a regular basis and became widely used by numerous individuals, including Moussaoui. During the 2002 FBI interview, Mr. Berg did not recognize a photo of Moussaoui or his name. The FBI assesses Mr. Berg was not otherwise connected to Moussaoui or terrorism-related activities.

(U) What we don't know. Beyond those indicated in press, we don't know who Mr. Berg's contacts were in Iraq.

(U) The exact nature of his activities in Iraq.

(U) The circumstances of his capture – where, when and specifically by whom.

(U) What we assess. Both Press reporting and information learned from interview with FBI officials suggest he remained in Iraq for business purposes. Apparently, Mr. Berg traveled extensively in this endeavor and appeared to shun normal precautions, such as using security personnel beyond a driver.

Prepared By: DIA, J2/JITF-CT, (b)(6)

MAY 8 2004

DIA? any
info?
C/S/25

May 17, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Nicholas Berg

0005

Has anyone figured out who Nicholas Berg was and what he was up to? It certainly sounds strange.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-27

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

MAY 25 2004 response attached

DR 5/26

17MAY04

OSD 13135-04

May 17, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
Tiger Team

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Abusing Prisoners

Attached is a note I received from Andy Marshall, which is of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/12/04 Director, Net Assessment memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
051404-3

.....
Please respond by _____

383.6

1731 450



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

C 5/14
P 5/14

12 May 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Am*

SUBJECT: Abusing Prisoners

You may be deluged with advice on this matter, but you may find the attached two items sent to me by old friends of interest. The essence of the results of experiments and experience is that normal human beings when put in the position of guarding prisoners often will mistreat them. Close supervision is required to see that it does not happen.

I will send copies to Tillie Fowler and Jim Schlesinger.

In any case, you have my best wishes and support.



11-L-0559/OSD/036794

Ferguson, Eric, CIV, Net Assessment

From: Paul Berenson (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 11:17 AM
To: Marshall, Andrew
Cc: Cheney, Richard; Warner, Senator John; Christie, Tom
Subject: Abusing Prisoners is a Natural Human Tendency of Prison Guards

Dear Andy;

The reference to the prisoner tests I requested in my e-mail below has been provided to me. It is as follows:

Eaney, C., Banks, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1973). Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison. *International Journal of Criminology and Penology*, 1, 69-97).

This is a famous psychological test that is known as the 'Stanford Prison Experiment' that was conducted by Prof. Philip Zimbardo and associates in 1971. Prof. Zimbardo is currently a Professor of Psychology Emeritus at Stanford, and is a former President of the American Psychological Association.

As stated below, and in the subject title, the tests demonstrate that abusing prisoners is a natural human tendency of prison guards who are normal human beings. Psychotics and sadists would behave much worse including murder, which apparently also happened in Iraq.

This can be overcome by good training, and an appropriate command environment, neither of which apparently existed in Iraq. The MPs who were assigned to prison guard duty claimed they had no special training as prison guards, and the Commanding General from MI apparently passed the word that he would like the MPs guarding the prisoners to 'soften them up' for questioning. Given these conditions, it was inevitable the prisoners would be mistreated.

I suggest you pass this information to the Secretary of Defense and the military leadership so they are aware of the cause of the problem, and can take action to ensure it doesn't happen again. None of this excuses the behavior of the enlisted personnel who abused the prisoners, but it is unfortunate they will be punished for behaving in a way that could be expected in the environment in which they were put.

I will probably be getting additional information from my e-mail network that I will pass to you if I believe it may be helpful.

I hope this is useful

Very respectfully,

Paul Berenson

(b)(6)

Paul Berenson (b)(6) wrote:

Dear Colleagues:

You may find the subject statement shocking, but it is true, and apparently not widely recognized. None of the commentary or testimony on Iraqi prisoner abuse gave any indication that anyone was aware of this fact. Most important, it applies to normal, average people, not just psychotics or sadists who will behave worse than the average person. The guards behavior in Iraq is probably more common than anyone is willing to comprehend.

I first became aware of this about 40 years ago when I read a description of a famous experiment conducted by a psychology or sociology professor at a university. I would like to get a reference to this paper so that I can send it to the Secretary of Defense, et al;

11-L-0559/OSD/036795

5/10/2004

please help me in any way you can in finding a description of this experiment. Professors of psychology or sociology are likely to know of documentation of this experiment.

The experiment was conducted by the professor randomly splitting a group of randomly selected normal male students into two groups; one group became the prisoners, and the other group became the prison guards. He then put the prisoners in makeshift cells in a prison environment, and observed what happened. Very quickly, the guards, who were otherwise

quite normal, began to abuse the prisoners in various ways. The abuse started with mild abuse, but quickly got worse. The abuse got so bad that the professor had to terminate the experiment early. I also recall that the professor was forbidden to run any more experiments like this.

What this tends to show is that people given absolute power and control over other people tend to abuse them. This same phenomenon tends to happen in non-prison environments such as fraternity hazing. You can probably think of other examples.

An extreme example of this tendency is genocide. Prof. Rudy Rummel, who devoted his life to documenting and understanding government mass murder summarized his conclusion in Rummel's Power Principle: "Power kills; absolute Power kills absolutely". His work is documented in his monumental book, "Death by Government" for which he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

It is important that this natural tendency for human beings to abuse people under their absolute control be recognized in order to counter it. If we can find the paper describing the experiment, it should be read by all who will be prison guards so they recognize the tendency they have to abuse prisoners, and can fight the tendency.

Please help me find the paper or a description of this experiment.

Nothing I say above should be misconstrued to justify or excuse the unacceptable behavior of U.S. prison guards in Iraq.

Thanks for your help

Paul

Ponomareff, Dmitry F, CIV, Net Assessment

While a 1st Lt, Military Police Corps, 32nd Infantry Division, Wisconsin National Guard Division, when it was mobilized 1961-62 : During Survival Escape and Evasion training, following the procedure of our host unit at Fort Lewis, the 4th Infantry Division, our MPs were used to guard and harrass troops in a fake PoW cage. In their attempt to make things "realistic," our lads became a bit too zealous, and officers from other units and out MPs complained, I met with division chief of staff, and it was stopped. When the Stanford experiment results were published a decade or so later, I was not surprised.

At Fort Irwin, while I was Acting Provost Marshal in the "Exercise Bristle Cone" maneuvers - 1962 - I received a command letter from a four-star general asking for details on reports that Military Intelligence interrogators (Reservists called up from the Washington, D.C. area) had roughed up Aggressor PWS and taken away their outer clothing and sleeping bags when they put them out in our compound on a cold desert night. Our MPs had given the "PWS" their sleeping bags - fortunately.

These and other experiences, including the day-to-day leadership challenge of keeping police discretion on a tight leash, heightened my sensitivity to these issues. Many years later, when I had gained some reputation as a military historian, in full expectation that difficulties along these lines would arise in the future, I wrote two pieces on the subject:

"Preventing Atrocity in Low Intensity Conflict," MILITARY REVIEW 63:11 (November 1983).

"Thinking the Unspeakable: On Cruelty in Small Wars," SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 1:1 (April 1990).

Reportedly they showed "The Battle of Algiers" in defense circles before the Iraq War to sensitize them to these very pitfalls. Did they use it as a training film?

11-L-0559/OSD/036797

511012004

May 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

Attached is a most interesting letter from Art Laffer on the subject of Iraq. I think you will find it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/18/04 Laffer ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-31

.....
Please respond by _____

OB
5/26

OSD 13137-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036798

IRAQ

19MAY04

✓
3/1

-----Original Message-----

From: Jax Schluederberg

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2004 1:35 PM

To: Nancy Pardo

Subject: Letter From Dr. Arthur Laffer

cc: L.D.P. Taylor
LTG Graddock

February 18, 2004

②

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

Because of my experience with the domestic economy of Vietnam in the 1970-1974 period under George Schultz and my work on a post-Castro transition plan for Cuba with the Cuban American National Foundation, when it was ably led by Jorge Mas Canosa (who passed away five years ago), I thought you might be interested in my two-cents worth (which has been discounted even below two cents). Rather than criticizing what I may not have fully understood of the Bremer and CPA plans, I've limited myself to what I consider essential do's and don'ts for creating an economically viable society out of a war-ravaged former totalitarian state.

- A. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reestablishing markets is the absence of a viable stable-valued means of payment and store of value (currency). To foster economic interchange, merchants, workers, savers and investors need a currency they can count on both over time and across space. This currency has to be stable in value over time to satisfy the needs of small savers, and to provide a basis for contracts and it has to be readily acceptable everywhere both inside and outside the region to facilitate trade and investment flows.

I can't begin to tell you how depressing it was to the local economy of Mexico in 1976 when the peso started to collapse after having been stable for years and years. Likewise, Argentina's recent abandonment of the currency peg (under de la Rúa) and the subsequent financial collapse is a tragedy of immense proportions. Our own return to dollar credulity in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan was the *sine qua non* of America's renaissance. Time and again countries are forced to relearn the powerful dictum of a sound money.

Iraq does not have the ability nor does it have powerful enough political institutions to pursue, maintain and monitor its own currency *de novo*. Iraq, if it is to have its own currency at all, must have that currency immutably linked to the dollar or euro. My personal suggestion would be to use either euros or dollars as the domestic currency of

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized *de facto*, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.

Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.

- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full cloth of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for your continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Bucci
Catherine Mainardi
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer
Laffer Associates
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340
San Diego, California 92121

(b)(6)

May 19, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressman Buyer

Congressman Buyer said yesterday that he is a JAG officer and w dumped him on his fanny. I don't know what that is all about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-6

Please respond by

6/4/04

Sir,

Responses attached.

vr/
CDR Nosenzo

6/21

OSD .13139-04

TOTAL P.01

11-L-0559/OSD/036803



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004 - 5:00 PM

Paul Butler

6/21
PWB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: MR. POWELL MOORE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Congressman Buyer - SNOWFLAKE

- The attached information paper responds to your note of May 19, 2004, which states: "Congressman Buyer said yesterday that he is a JAG officer and we dumped him on his fanny. I don't know what that is all about."
- The information paper provides a brief background on Congressman Buyer's discussion with Army Reserve in early 2003 concerning volunteering for active duty and reiterates longstanding DoD policy concerning the limitations on active duty by serving U.S. Congressmen.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only.

Attachment:
As stated

326

14 Jun 04

19 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/036804

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Background for Response to SecDef Concerning Congressman Buyer

- ❑ This information paper responds to the SecDef note of May 19, 2004, which states: “Congressman Buyer said yesterday that he is a JAG officer and we dumped him on his fanny. I don’t know what that is all about.”
- ❑ In early 2003, Congressman Steve Buyer from Indiana’s 4th District, a colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps officer in the Army Reserve who served the first Gulf War before his election to Congress in 1992, discussed with the Reserve volunteering for active duty. He was granted leave of absence from Congress March 20, 2003, after telling House leaders had been called to serve in
- ❑ To be mobilized under current statutory authority, a Reservist must be in the Ready Reserve.
 - 1) Members of Congress occupy a “key position” and must serve in the Standby Reserve rather than the Ready Reserve. (The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained individuals who are not required to perform training. This is the Department’s solution to the ticklish question of whether Members of Congress can constitutionally also serve in the military.)
 - 2) Members of the Standby Reserve may be transferred back to the Ready Reserve when the reason for the member’s transfer to the Standby Reserve no longer exists. They may be ordered to active duty voluntarily only if the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, determines that not enough qualified Ready Reservists are available in the categories required. (With over 4,000 judge advocates in the Ready Reserve, transferring Congressman Buyer from the Standby Reserve to the Ready Reserve would have been inappropriate.) Congressman Buyer’s case did not meet this test, and no such determination was made.
- ❑ Congressman Buyer was subsequently informed by _____ of the Army in a letter, that while the Army appreciated his willingness to serve, _____ would not be safe for him or those who might serve with him to have a _____ in a war zone—an important ancillary consideration in this
- ❑ The Department has used identical reasoning for the other case that has arisen, a similar request from Congressman Kirk.

720
August 25, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Coalition Reduction/Adjustment Plan

Please find out from the Joint Staff when they are going to produce a plan to work with the coalition to lance the boil, and allow some of them to reduce some numbers and adjust what they are doing in a way that helps them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082506-23 (is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

9/3/04

SIR _____

- This is a joint project between Policy & Joint Staff.
- High priority project - they want to get it right.
- you will see first brief on 9/8/04.

V/R

Jim

Copy to:

- DJS
- J5
- MSD(P)
- D-MSD(P)

ITC 9

25 Aug 04

720

20 May 04



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

5/20

May 18, 2004

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer *5/18/04*
SUBJECT: Abu Ghraib Draw-Down and Demolition

This memo provides a plan for the draw-down and demolition of Abu Ghraib prison that allows the President to announce immediately that evacuation will commence by June 1 and demolition will begin no later than August 31. The plan consists of rapidly constructing 2,000 "quick-build" temporary beds in eastern Baghdad for criminal detainees, and another 2,000 "quick-build" beds for security internees at Camp Bucca near Um Qasr. Immediately thereafter, we will construct an additional 2,000 "quick-build" at both locations for total of 8,000. Finally, work will commence on a 4,000-bed permanent facility in Baghdad which will open within two years. The project will cost about \$200M. The Iraqi Governing Council has requested closure of Abu Ghraib, so we will execute this plan using money from the Iraqi Development Fund.

It is possible to begin destruction of Abu Ghraib sooner, perhaps by June 30. This would require execution of the plan described above, and temporarily relocation of about 3,000 security detainees in tent facilities at Camp Bucca and relocation of 1,400 criminal detainees at detention centers in Baghdad and Mosul. But this course of action has several important disadvantages. First, it requires two mass movements instead of one, and to more distant locations, with all the considerable risks of transportation. Second, large numbers of detainees will await permanent internment in temporary camps that are substandard. Without adequate protection from the summer heat, we would expect the same thing we observed last summer -- riots, mass escape attempts, greater difficulty with accountability and control, and greater threats to our soldiers. Third, prisoners will lack access to families and to legal counsel; and trials will not be feasible from a logistical standpoint.

For all these reasons, we would expect further criticism from human rights organizations, and think we may undercut the very objectives we are trying to symbolize with our commitment to close Abu Ghraib. These risks outweigh a gain of two months, so unless instructed to the contrary, I will proceed with the first option.

CC: Dr. Rice

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

May 20, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Gen. **Dick** Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: List of Steps

We have to pull together a list of all the steps that have been taken in DoD, Central Command and Southern Command since this was reported.

We need a master list of all of what has been done to correct the situation. I listened to Sanchez's testimony. He has done a lot, so has Abizaid, so have we. We need the list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-14

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

*Provided to SD
June 21, 2004
during Geren-Myers meeting*

OSD 13144-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036809

W
8
4
6

COMNAV

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN SINCE REPORTS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB EMERGED

- **SECDEF Actions**
 - MG Miller JTF GTMO assessment
 - VADM Church Detainee Ops & Interrogation Review
 - Schlesinger Panel
 - SECNAV England GTMO review panel
 - Established policy on "Investigation of Deaths of Detainees in the Custody of the Armed Forces of the United States"
 - Establishing Detainee Ombudsman
 - Named Hon. Schlesinger as ICRC Envoy
- **INVESTIGATIONS/ASSESSMENTS/REVIEWS (see attached)**
- **CHAIN OF COMMAND**
 - Streamlined chain of command at Abu Ghraib, unifying responsibility for detention operations, law enforcement, investigations, and disposition of criminal cases under a single entity to improve efficiency (under MG Geoff Miller)
 - Added general officer responsible with responsibility for all detention and interrogation operations, Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations, to Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I) staff
 - Placed Military Police under tactical control of Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations for detention and interrogation support mission
 - Appropriate units are task organized under MNF-I
 - All lapses of accountability, escapes and disturbances are reported to the Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations and Commander MNF-I
 - Units conducting internment/resettlement operations have command policies that are brief and prominently posted.
- **ACCOUNTABILITY**
 - Immediately initiated criminal investigation at Abu Ghraib and requested appointment of investigating officer to conduct separate admin investigation under Army Regulation 15-6
 - Seven Courts-martial ongoing – additional Courts-martial likely to result from ongoing investigations

383.6

21 Jun 04 2 May 04

OSD 131 44 -04

- Suspended key members of chain of command of unit responsible for detainee security at Abu Ghraib
- Over 130 criminal investigations underway in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps
- DETENTION FACILITIES:
 - Improved force protection measures to protect coalition forces and detainees
 - Prominently displayed Geneva Conventions and facility rules in English and detainee language in all camps
 - Implemented plans to upgrade facilities for soldiers and detainees
 - Improved overall facility conditions for detainees at Abu Ghraib
- DETAINEE PROCESSING:
 - Increased rate at which detainee case files were reviewed and recommended for release or continued internment to ensure only those detainees posing a threat to security were detained
 - All detainee transfers are conducted using biometric automated system
 - Segregated males, females and juveniles within detention facilities so that no contact exists
- GENERAL, DETAINEE OPERATIONS:
 - Issued orders and command policies reinforcing the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions.
 - Reissued memorandum regarding: "Proper Treatment of Iraqi People During Combat Operations"
 - Issued policy memorandum number 18, entitled "Proper Conduct During Combat Operations," which emphasized need to treat all Iraqis with dignity and respect. This policy memorandum also contained a summary for distribution down to individual soldier level providing clear guidance and mandating training on:
 - ✓ Law of war and rules of engagement
 - ✓ Treating all persons with humanity, dignity and respect
 - ✓ Using judgment and discretion in detaining civilians
 - ✓ Respecting private property
 - ✓ Treating journalists with dignity and respect
 - Improved standard operating procedures for detainee operations:
 - ✓ Published comprehensive procedures for handling and treatment of detainees in all theater detention facilities

- ✓ Detention rules of engagement/rules for use of force and principles of Geneva Convention are briefed at every shift change and guard mount
- ✓ Reviewed procedures on detention, interrogation and detention facility administration and published to lowest level

- TRAINING:

- o Conduct routine training at each guard mount on daily detention tasks and standards
- o Use lesson learned in serious incidents and review for future efforts
- o Mobile training teams deployed to assist in training Military Police and Medical Treatment Teams; used Guantanamo Detention Facility Teams to improve individual and unit knowledge
- o CPA provided training on Arab cultural awareness

- INTELLIGENCE:

- o Established system for intelligence fusion that decreases information cycle time (collection, analyze, disseminate)
- o Refined transfer criteria to support continued rapid exploitation of high value detainees and release of low value detainees
- o Assigned Joint Intelligence Task Force – Counterterrorism personnel at primary theater interrogation facilities to expedite exchange of counterterrorism information between agencies
- o Established weekly Interservice Agency Targeting Board to focus HUMINT collection and targeting efforts within the theater to provide information sharing, internee access & tasking protocols
- o Re-prioritized HUMINT requirements.
- o Multinational Force – Iraq (MNI) assumed responsibilities for all HUMINT collection and analysis and received additional manning

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Report Handling:

- o Working with Congress and the ICRC to establish protocols for sharing appropriate ICRC documents
- o Take Red Cross findings seriously and address them
- o Mandated all Red Cross reports and working papers would be addressed to Commander Multinational Force – Iraq, and designated Judge Advocate General Multinational Force – Iraq as single entry point for those reports and papers
- o Changed handling process of Red Cross reports so they go via Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations to Commander Multinational Force – Iraq and higher authority as rapidly as possible

720

File

May 20, 2004

774

452F

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: F-15 Basing

Here is a note from Jim Jones that is a concern. It seems to me you ought to make sure the basing concepts go through the tank.

Please come back to me with the views of the Chiefs and your views as to how we ought to proceed.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/18/04 EUCOM memo to SecDef re: F-15 Basing Proposals, Based on 27 April Discussions

DHR:dh
052004-17

.....
Please respond by 6/11/04

20 MAY 04

OSD 13147-04

rec'd 5/18/04

5-18-04 0011 5/20

To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: F-15 BASING PROPOSALS, BASED ON 27 APRIL DISCUSSIONS.
MR SECRETARY,

AS I WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE 27 APRIL MEETING WITH GENERALS PACE, JUMPER, AND HANDY, I WOULD APPRECIATE AN OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER SOME THOUGHTS WITH REGARD TO THE F-15S AND THE BASING PROPOSALS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED.

BY WAY OF PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSION, THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SOME OF MY THOUGHTS CONCERNING THIS ISSUE:

1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

A. REDUCED CAPABILITY IN THEATER CLOSEST TO WESTERN EDGE OF "GREATER MIDDLE EAST"..... MEANS GREATER RESPONSE TIMES AND SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER SUPPORT PACKAGES FOR CONUS BASED DEPLOYMENTS.

B. IMPACT OF DIMINISHED ABILITY TO LEAD NATO'S AIR FORCES.

C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES WITH REGARD TO U.K., ESPECIALLY IF ANNOUNCED NOW.

D. DISPROPORTIONAL RELIANCE ON CONUS BASED FORCES TO SUPPORT U.S. MISSIONS IN 91 COUNTRY THEATER

2. NATO/EUCOM TRANSFORMATION:

A. IMPACT ON NATO AIR POLICING/AIR DEFENSE THROUGH REDUCED USAF ASSETS IN THEATER.

B. REDUCED CAPABILITY TO SOURCE U.S. AIR FORCE ROTATIONS/CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE.

C. ALLIES WILL CONCLUDE THAT SUCH A REDUCTION IS NOT TRANSFORMATION, BUT IS A FORCE CUT.

D. POSSIBLY UNBALANCES EUCOM JOINT BASING PROPOSAL PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED.

3. THEATER RESPONSE FORCES:

A. GUARANTEED ACCESS FROM U.K. BASES, THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN WHERE WE BASE OUR FORCES.

B. F-15 PAYLOAD IS TWICE THAT OF THE F-16, SOLE DELIVERY PLATFORM OF SOME OF OUR BEST STANDOFF WEAPONS.

C. EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON CONUS BASED AIR FORCES, WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE/PROVIDED.

4. FORWARD PRESENCE:

A. MAINTAINING MIX OF FIGHTERS FORWARD SUPPORTS SECDEF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND RECENT 10-30-30 TO EACH SERVICE.

B. REDUCES BY A FACTOR OF TWO STRATEGIC LIFT REQUIREMENTS (TON-MILE/TANKER/ TIME REQUIREMENT), AND DEPLOYMENT TIME LINES.

C. REMOVES DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS LEFT IN EUROPE

D. COMBAT UTILIZATION DATA FOR EUCOM BASED SQUADRONS SUPPORTS CURRENT EUCOM FOOTPRINT PROPOSALS

E. NEXT 12 MONTHS, F-15S ALONE TO TAKE PART IN 17 MISSIONS IN THEATER.

5. US/UK SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:

A. HISTORICAL IN NATURE. UK WILL BE HIT BY NAVEUR DEPARTURE AS WELL. POLITICALLY, A BAD TIME FOR MR. BLAIR.

B. OFFSET PROPOSED (MOVING OUR 24/7 HQ FROM GERMANY) DISADVANTAGES US BY MISALIGNING AND SEPARATING OUR OWN HQ. LIKELY WILL NOT BE CONVINCING TO UK THAT IT REPLACES 3 SQUADRONS. WILL BE EXPENSIVE.

6. SUMMARY:

A. CONCERNED WITH EMERGING PATTERN SIGNALING U.S. CHANGE IN VALUE OF FORWARD BASING AND FORWARD PRESENCE.

B. NEED TO THINK ABOUT HOW WE WILL LEAD, AND WHAT IT IS WE WILL LEAD WITH IN THE FUTURE. VACUUMS WILL BE FILLED, MOST LIKELY BY E-U. POSSIBLE FUTURE QUESTIONING OF U.S. LEADERSHIP IN BILLET'S TRADITIONALLY 'RESERVED' FOR US.

C. F-16 BASING IN TURKEY NOT YET RESOLVED. HOPE TO DO SO AT APPROPRIATE TIME. MANY US/TU ISSUES ON TABLE AT PRESENT.

D. FROM BOTH THEATER AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, RECOMMEND NO REMOVAL (OR ANNOUNCEMENT OF INTENT TO REMOVE) OF F-15'S AT THIS TIME

E. APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT VIEWS IN PERSON AT YOUR CONVENIENCE.

*Very respectfully,
Jim*

SJS 04-03602

21 May 2004

DISTRIBUTION J-1, J-8,
OCJCS/LC

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

/SF-774/ F-15 BASING

1. The attached is referred to J-5 for CJCS REPLY in collaboration/coordination with J-8, OCJCS/LC, and the Services.
2. The suspense for this action is 9 June 2004, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.

Joint Secretariat

7201
file

May 20, 2004

775

383.6

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security Arrangements

Between June 1 and June 30 we have to get a new negotiating team in to negotiate how the security arrangements are going to work. It should probably be led by DoD.

We need to decide how we are going to work with Iraq on Iraqi detainees, what we are going to do with the Iraqi Police, and the like.

Maybe we could have Gen. Casey head up the group and start working with Negroponte. Maybe one of the outcomes would be to set up a Consultative Group fashioned to work out issues going forward between CENTCOM, the new US Mission and the new Iraqi government.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-31

.....
Please respond by

5/28/04

20 MAY 04

OSD 13152-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036817

(b)(6)

JCS SJS

From: Nosenzo, Thomas E, CDR, OSD (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 7:35 AM
To: (b)(6) JCS SJS
Subject: RE: SF-803 PRESS IN CENTCOM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I do not close out snowflakes until the Secretary returns them to me

SF-803: Closing this action at the joint staff assumes the Chairman concurs with Mr. Di Rita's memo. If that is the case the Chairman should pass the information at roundtable or by some other means.

SF-661 and SF-680: 25 June extension approved.

SF-775: closed - Feith is here, Wolfowitz let the delegation.

r/
CDR Nosenzo

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) JCS SJS
[mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2004 10:07 AM
To: Nosenzo, Thomas E, CDR, OSD
Cc: Koles, Robert E, Lt Col, JCS SJS; Leonard, Kevin A, COL, JCS SJ
Subject: SF-803 PRESS IN CENTCOM

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir,

Just checking to make sure SF-803 was closed out with Mr Di Rita's memo to SecDef, 15 June 2004. The Joint Staff action has been closed.

I am attaching a copy of the tasker for SF-803 and of Mr Di Rita's memo.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Chief, Assignment and Control Branch
Joint Staff Actions Division

(b)(6)

<<SF-803 Tasker.pdf>> <<Di Rita memo.pdf>>

SJS 04-03601

21 May 2004

DISTRIBUTION J-1, J-5,
OCJCS/LC

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

/SF-775/ SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. The attached is referred to 5-5 for CJCS REPLY in collaboration/coordination with OCJCS/LC.
2. The suspense for this action is 28 May 2004, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.


Joint Secretariat

May 20, 2004

775

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Security Arrangements

Between June 1 and June **30** we have to get a new negotiating **team** in to negotiate how the security arrangements are going to work. It should **probably** be led by DoD.

We need to **decide** how we are going to **work** with **Iraq** on **Iraqi** detainees, what **we** are going to do with **the** Iraqi Police, and the like.

Maybe we could have Gen. Casey head **up** the group and start working **with** Negroponte. Maybe one of the outcomes would be to set up a Consultative Group fashioned to **work** out issues going forward between CENTCOM, the new US Mission and the new Iraqi government.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-31

.....
Please *respond* by 5/28/04

May 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

c c : Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Envoy for Global Defense Posture

I did not have a chance to use the information on the envoy for global defense posture with the President.

It probably should be prepared as a memo from Paul to the interagency and do it at that level.

Thanks.

Attach.

Global Defense Posture: Update and Next Steps.

DNR:dh
052004-39

.....
Please *respond* by

6/4/04

OSD 13153-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036821

320.2 Strategic

20 May 04

NT Done

Global Defense Posture: Update and Next Steps

- ❑ **DoD and interagency** analysis and recommendations are nearly complete...it is time to move into the **next phase ..implementation**, including ongoing consultations and negotiations
- ❑ **Broad outreach effort** with Allies and Congress to date...all accept our rationale...we'll continue at more detailed level as we go public
- ❑ Two key thoughts...
 - First is a **keynote speech**, linked to our Hill and Allied outreach plans...we could use military academy graduations as a setting
 - SecDef speaks at West Point, 29 May
 - President speaks at Air Force Academy, 2 June
 - Second, it may be time for a Presidentially-appointed **special envoy** for posture negotiations
 - Show our **seriousness of purpose**
 - Critical for getting **flexible legal arrangements** for access and usability by our forward forces

Potential Candidates – Special Envoy for Global Posture

~~Jim Ellis~~, Commander, United States Strategic Command

~~John Keane~~, former Vice Chief of Staff, US Army.

~~William Schneider~~, resident fellow of American Enterprise Institute; Chairman, Defense Science Board; former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance

~~Chris Williams~~, Partner, Johnson and Associates; Defense Policy Board member

~~Dov Zakheim~~, (soon to be) Partner, Booz Allen Hamilton

Attributes:

- Good negotiator, detail-oriented
- Solid understanding of strategic rationale behind posture proposals
- Positive international stature/reputation
- Acceptable to State and White House
- Responsive to SecDef
- Protective of DoD equities
- Integrity, no perception of conflict of interest
- Willing to travel

SPECIAL ENVOY FOR GLOBAL POSTURE NEGOTIATIONS

Talking Points:

- I recommend a Presidentially-Appointed Special Envoy to conduct negotiations for the global defense posture review.
- Our allies have been receptive to our consultations on this subject
- As we transition into the next phase, we would benefit from having a Special Envoy to convey the significance of the negotiations both for the USG and the host country.
- The envoy will need not just diplomatic stature, but a ~~firm~~ grounding in the strategic rationale for the review and an ability to protect DoD equities.

For background only:

The presumptive negotiator from State, Ambassador Barbara Bodine, has not represented well DoD's concerns in several recent negotiations.

Global Posture: potential special envoys and attributes

Jim Ellis, Commander, United States Strategic Command

Tillie Fowler, Partner, Holland & Knight; Chair, Defense Policy Board; former member of Congress

John Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff, US Army

William Schneider, resident fellow of American Enterprise Institute; Chairman, Defense Science Board; former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance

Chris Williams, Partner, Johnson and Associates; Defense Policy Board member

Dov Zakheim, (soon to be) Partner, Booz Allen Hamilton

Attributes:

- Good negotiator, detail-oriented
- Solid understanding of strategic rationale behind posture proposals
- Positive international stature/reputation
- Acceptable to State and White House
- Responsive to SecDef
- Protective of DoD equities
- Integrity, no perception of conflict of interest
- Willing to travel

May 12, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Fingerprints

What is the status of this item I have circled on detainee fingerprints?

Thanks.

Attach.

5/6/04 HSC Deputies Committee Meeting Summary of Conclusions

DHR:dh
051204-2 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

*OB
5/26*

OSD 13155-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036826

383.6

12 May 04

05/11

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

HSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

For Your Information

DATE: May 6, 2004
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM

The Homeland Security Council (HSC) Deputies Committee (DC) met to discuss four topics: enhancing rail security of toxic-by-inhalation hazards; fingerprint sharing; the success of continuity of operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) programs; and Presidential Emergency Action Directives (PEAD).

The following ~~was~~ agreed to by the attendees:

1. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Transportation (DOT) should begin to implement the seven-step plan for enhancing the security of TIR shipments by rail presented to the deputies. Specifically, DHS and DOT, as appropriate, will:
 - a. Begin implementing short term recommendations (within Actions 1, 2, 3, and 4) immediately, existing authorities permitting; and
 - b. Establish a regulatory working group that will, in close coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other appropriate agencies, evaluate and recommend options for any rulemaking necessary to implement the actions contained in Actions 3, 5, 6, and 7.
2. The Department of Defense (DOD) will provide all fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists in its possession to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as soon as possible after the Secretary of Defense and the DOD General Counsel approve the transfer. Estimated completion of the transfer is within 90 days. DOD will continue to provide such fingerprints to the FBI as they are collected from known or suspected terrorists in the future. In addition, DOD will seek to implement policies such that: (a) fingerprints compatible with FBI standards are collected from all detainees before they are released from detention; and (b) DOD deploys electronic systems to the field that can collect fingerprints compatible with FBI standards. The Department of Justice (DOJ) will provide technical and other assistance to DOD to implement these policies.
3. The major findings and recommendations of the end-to-end review of COOP/COG will form the basis for a final report and phased implementation plan that will be presented to the Enduring Constitutional Government Coordinating Committee (ECGCC) by June 15, 2004.
4. Deputies will advise their own Department and Agency general counsels to work with HSC's Office of General Counsel and the White House Counsel's Office to:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036827

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

- a. Update those Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEAs) assigned by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to their respective Department or Agency; and
- b. Compile or update individual Department and Agency compilations of Secretarial emergency authorities.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036828

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL HOFMANNExecutive Secretary
Department of State**MR. PAUL CURRY**Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury**CAPT WILLIAM MARRIOTT, USN**Executive Secretary
Department of Defense**MR. JAMES MCATAMNEY**Counsel for National Security Affairs
Department of Justice**MR. FRED SCHWIEN**Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce**MS. ANN AGNEW**Executive Secretary
Department of Health & Human Services**MR. MICHAEL DANNENHAUER**Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Transportation**MR. KENNETH HILL**Executive Secretary
Department of Homeland Security**MR. JOSEPH HAGIN**Assistant to the President
& Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations**MS. HARRIET MIERI**Assistant to the President
& Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy**MS. MARY KRUGER**Director, Office of Homeland Security
Environmental Protection Agency**MR. JOEL KAPLAN**Deputy Director
Office of Management & Budget**MR. GREG SCHULTZ**Executive Secretary
National Security Council**MR. DAVID LEITCH**Deputy Assistant to the President
& Deputy Counsel**MR. PHILLIP SWAGEL**Chief of Staff
Council of Economic Advisors**MS. SHANA DALE**Chief of Staff & General Counsel
Office of Science & Technology Policy**MR. V. PHILLIP LAGO**Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency**COL EDWARD SNEAD, USA**

Secretary, Joint Staff

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036829

UNCLASSIFIED / ~~FOUO~~

MS. MARY INCONTRO
Counsel to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

MR. JOHN BRENNAN
Director
Terrorist Threat Integration Center

President
... / Affair

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee Meeting Summary of
Conclusions.

Please find attached the Summary of Conclusions from the Homeland Security Council Deputies
Committee on Thursday, May 6, 2004.



Laura L. Flippin
Special Assistant to the President
& Executive Secretary
Homeland Security Council

ATTACHMENT

TAB A - Summary of Conclusions

UNCLASSIFIED / ~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036830

May 12, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fingerprints

What is the status of this item I have circled on detainee fingerprints?

Thanks.

Attach.

5/6/04 HSC Deputies Committee Meeting Summary of Conclusions

DHR:dh
051204-2 (s computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/036831

25/11

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~HSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS*For Your Information*

DATE: May 6, 2004-
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM

The Homeland Security Council (HSC) Deputies Committee (DC) met to discuss enhancing rail security of toxic-by-inhalation hazards; fingerprint sharing; the int success of continuity of operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) programs; and Presidential Emergency Action Directives (PEAD).

The following was agreed to by the attendees:

1. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Transportation (DOT) should begin to implement the seven-step plan for enhancing the security of TIR shipments by rail presented to the deputies. Specifically, DHS and DOT, as appropriate, will:
 - a. Begin implementing short term recommendations (within Actions 1, 2, 3, and 4) immediately, existing authorities permitting; and
 - b. Establish a regulatory working group that will, in close coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other appropriate agencies, evaluate and recommend options for any rulemaking necessary to implement the actions contained in Actions 3, 5, 6, and 7.
2. The Department of Defense (DOD) will provide all fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists in its possession to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as soon as possible after the Secretary of Defense and the DOD General Counsel approve the transfer. Estimated completion of the transfer is within 90 days. DOD will continue to provide such fingerprints to the FBI as they are collected from known or suspected terrorists in the future. In addition, DOD will seek to implement policies such that: (a) fingerprints compatible with FBI standards are collected from all detainees before they are released from detention; and (b) DOD deploys electronic systems to the field that can collect fingerprints compatible with FBI standards. The Department of Justice (DOJ) will provide technical and other assistance to DOD to implement these policies.
3. The major findings and recommendations of the end-to-end review of COOP/COG will form the basis for a final report and phased implementation plan that will be presented to the Enduring Constitutional Government Coordinating Committee (ECGCC) by June 15, 2004.
4. Deputies will advise their own Department and Agency general counsels to work with HSC's Office of General Counsel and the White House Counsel's Office to:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

HSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

For Your Information

DATE: May 6, 2004
LOCATION: white House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM

The Homeland Security Council (HSC) Deputies Committee (DC) met to discuss four topics: enhancing rail security of toxic-by-inhalation hazards; fingerprint sharing; the interagency success of continuity of operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) programs; and Presidential Emergency Action Directives (PEAD).

The following was agreed to by the attendees:

1. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Transportation (DOT) should **begin** to implement the seven-step plan for enhancing the security of TIH shipments by rail presented to the deputies. Specifically, DHS and DOT, as appropriate, will:
 - a. Begin implementing short term recommendations (within Actions 1, 2, 3, and 4) immediately, **existing** authorities permitting; and
 - b. Establish a regulatory working group that will, in close coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other appropriate agencies, evaluate and recommend options for any rulemaking necessary to implement the actions contained in Actions 3, 5, 6, and 7.
2. The Department of Defense (DOD) will provide all fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists in its possession to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as soon as possible after the Secretary of Defense and the DOD General Counsel approve the transfer. Estimated completion of the transfer is within 90 days. DOD will continue to provide such fingerprints to the FBI as they are collected from known or suspected terrorists in the future. In addition, DOD will seek to implement policies such that: (a) fingerprints compatible with FBI standards are collected from all detainees before they are released from detention; and (b) DOD deploys electronic systems to the field that can collect fingerprints compatible with FBI standards. The Department of Justice (DOJ) will provide technical and other assistance to DOD to implement these policies.
3. The major findings and recommendations of the end-to-end review of COOP/COG will form the basis for a final report and phased implementation plan that will be presented to the Enduring Constitutional Government Coordinating Committee (ECGCC) by June 15, 2004.
4. Deputies will advise their own Department and Agency general counsels to work with HSC's Office of General Counsel and the White House Counsel's Office to:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036833

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

MS. MARY INCONTRO
Counsel to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

MS. KRISTEN SILVERBERG
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy

MR. JOHN BRENNAN
Director
Terrorist Threat Integration Center

MS. CAROL KUNTZ
Assistant to the Vice President
for Homeland Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee Meeting Summary of
Conclusions.

Please find attached the Summary of Conclusions from the Homeland Security Council Deputies
Committee on Thursday, May 6, 2004.



Laura L. Flippin
Special Assistant to the President
& Executive Secretary
Homeland Security Council

ATTACHMENT

TAB A - Summary of Conclusions

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036834

72

file

May 10, 2004

770

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Approval for Compensation

Please make sure that the people down below know that we have to approve at
OSD-level the compensation system for the abuses to the Iraqi detainees.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051004-12

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

383,6

10 May 04

OSD 13157-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036835

SJS 04-03325

11 May 2004

DISTRIBUTION J-2, J-3, J-5,
OCJCS/LC

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

/SF-770/ APPROVAL FOR COMPENSATION

1. The attached is referred to J-5 for CJCS REPLY in collaboration/coordination with J-2, J-3, and OCJCS/LC.
2. The suspense for this action is 14 May 2004, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.

Joint Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/036836

May 10, 2004

TO: Jim Roche

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Increase in Air Force

I am concerned about the continued rise in the number of forces in the Air Force. I don't understand why it is so high. I can understand the increases in the Army and the Marines, but I am having trouble understanding the increases in the Air Force.

Please explain and indicate if, in fact, it is a potential problem, what the plan is to deal with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051004-6

.....
Please respond by 5/21/04

*5/21
CS/20*

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
5/20/04



RECEIVED
MAY 11 2004

OSD 13160-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036837

320.2

10 May 04



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

21# 5/24

MAY 19 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Increase in Air Force

Since we discussed this subject in January, we've taken several actions to return to endstrength by the end of FY05, the original goal. Providing numerous opportunities for leaving the active force and limiting accessions this year and next to our most needed skills should get us there.

With the implementation of two periods of Stop Loss for OEF and OIF, we disrupted the normal departure patterns of our people. The aggregate impact of a strong commitment to the GWOT, success in obtaining long sought improvements in the compensation package, including pay raises, pay table reform, BAH improvements, and a variety of special pays and bonuses for hard-to-fill skills, combined with an uncertain economy, caused our people to stay at unprecedented rates that initially were masked by the Stop Loss which was in place until July 2003. In short, we are experiencing great demand to enter the Air Force; at the same time, retention is very high. This "good news" is causing us an endstrength problem. At present, we are 20,000 over endstrength.

320 2

Recognizing this by November 2003, we began reduction measures with opportunities for service in the Air Reserve Component (ARC), rollbacks in dates of separation and active duty service commitments, inter-service transfers, ROTC-to-ARC commissions, and bonus commitment waivers. These efforts only yielded about 2,500 additional departures, so we significantly increased the population eligible for each of the measures and added an aggressive retraining program of individuals in overage skills. This is already moving some people to critical skills and to the ARC, the Army or civilian life. This alone could yield about 9,800 in FY04 and FY05.

19 May 04

Simultaneously, we have restricted recruiting for the rest of FY04 and through FY05 only to maintain or correct skill balances across our force. This translates to reductions of approximately 2,000 recruits in FY04 and 11,000 in FY05. The combination of all of these actions should bring us down to authorized endstrength by the end of FY05.

From a force stability standpoint, reducing accessions by a third in one year is very significant, but also creates some opportunities. We can correct skill imbalances, transform training programs, eliminate ARC training backlogs, and return to authorized endstrength without breaking faith with our current force. While some will believe this warrants reducing our recruiting and training budgets, that would be counterproductive for this brief training pause. We appreciate your support in that regard.


10 May 04

OSD 13160-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036838

We will track the effects of these actions along a ballistic trajectory, with increases likely for a few months. Nevertheless, we intend to be at authorized levels by the end of FY05. I'll keep you apprised as we go forward. John Jumper and I will be monitoring this on a monthly basis.

James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James G. Roche". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "James" being the most prominent.

May 4, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Next Briefing on Hill

The next time there is going to be an op-intel briefing up there, I think we ought to have the Department of State do it, since what they are doing is now quite important.

Also, we ought to think about having the CIA do one at some point, and get the burden spread away from Defense toward all the other departments and agencies that are doing things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050404-7

.....
Please respond by 5/21/04

OSD 13163-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036840

350 09

4/24/04

May 3, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Captain Morel

There is a Captain Morel who was killed recently, within the last month or so, and I met his father at Bethesda last weekend.

Please see if you can get me his father's address. Then give me this letter back, and I will dictate a note to his father.

Thanks.

Attach..
4/16/04 Letter to **family** of Captain Morel.

DHR:dh
050304-20

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

2004 5/20
Response Attached
@ 5/18

3 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/036841

Judd, Peter, MSG, OSD

From: BYoung (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 4:42 PM
To: Peter.Judd (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Issue

Peter.

Here is the information you asked for:

Mike Morel
P.O. Box 366
Martin, TN 38237

Phone: (b)(6)
Fax: (b)(6)

Regards,
Brian

-----Original Message-----

From: Judd, Peter, MSG, OSD (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 12:32 PM
To: 'BYoung (b)(6)'
Subject: Issue

Brian,

When the SecDef was there visiting he met the father of a Captain Morel. Would you happen to have a mailing address for the father? The SecDef wants to write him a letter.

Regards,
Peter W. Judd
MSG, USA
Enlisted Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense

14 April 2004

To The Fam of Captain Morel:

We have never met and I didn't know your son but I was moved to write to you after reading several articles in the Commercial Appeal following his death.

First, I must confess to you that I have experienced many conflicting feelings about the US presence in Iraq, so upon reading about your son my first thought was how sad and how senseless. But throughout the days since news of his passing was first reported, I have often thought of him — and I can't explain why.


Except that, over these days I have come to see that what your son was doing and why he died surpasses any single war or conflict. He died, defending or if you will — promoting and protecting the fundamental principle of this great Nation FREEDOM. That concept is so much bigger than any political party, agenda or election. That alone makes him a true American patriot and hero — at least to me! And I am profoundly moved.

From everything I have read and heard about Brent he was a good, noble and fine man. While I can't begin to comprehend your loss; I appreciate his (and your) sacrifice. I am humbled by his courage and commitment. Over the weeks and months to come, may God continue to bless you with love and the comfort of his grace and the love and

support of family and friends. Please know that through God your son has truly impacted my life and, I think, changed me ~~to~~ for the better! My deepest sympathy — you are in my thoughts and prayers!

Many Blessings,
A grateful American

May 3, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq Weekly Update

Here are some good metrics that Lamar Alexander sent along.

Why don't you see the extent to which they have been incorporated into our Iraq Weekly Update, and, if they have not, consider incorporating them.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/22/03 Senator Alexander ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
050304-25

.....
Please respond by 5/21/04

OSD 13173-0

11-L-0559/OSD/036845

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 OCT 23 AM 10:01

✓
10/23

October 22, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1300 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,


Thank you very much for your letter of the 16th and the copy of the one pager you are working on to explain the administration's plan to win the peace.

The one-pager is moving in the right direction. Fully developed, it should persuade Americans of our goal, our plans and our progress toward the goal.

Since you asked, here are my suggestions:

1. Set a clear overall goal: Operation Iraqi Democracy.
2. Set a timetable for accomplishing the goal and withdrawing most American forces: for example, January 1, 2005 or 2006.
3. Establish a set of measurable objectives which, taken together, add up to a plan to meet the goal. These should specify pre-war levels, post-war levels, today's levels, today's goal, and the goal for January 1, 2005 (or 2006). I've appended a list of suggested measurable objectives that are easy to understand.
4. Report publicly on the objectives once a week.
5. In every speech you, the President, Vice-President, Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice and other key officials make, refer briefly to that week's progress report: "As our weekly progress report on our plan to build democracy in Iraq showed, electricity before the war was at 3300 megawatts, our goal for January 1, 2005(or 2006) is 6000 megawatts, we are at 4217 megawatts today which is 1217 more than before the war, and right on schedule for our goal; on crude oil production, etc.

Sincerely,



U17594 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/036846

Suggested objectives (should be measurable and simply presented):

- ✓ Electricity (megawatts produced, % of Iraqis w/ power)
- ✓ Schools (# of schools open, % of boys & girls attending)
- ✓ Health care (# of hospitals operating, % receiving services)
- ✓ Governance (timetable to a constitutional democracy)
- ✓ Crude oil production (barrels produced, shipped)
- ✓ Police (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Militia (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Water (gallons of water available, # of Iraqis w/ fresh water access)
- ✓ Prisons (# of prisons, # of beds for prisoners, # of prisoners)
- ✓ Iraq Troops (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Troops from other countries (# of troops, # of countries)
- ✓ US Troops (overall #, reserve, and active duty)
- ✓ Food (# of malnourished Iraqis, amount of food available)
- ✓ Unemployment (# and/or %)
- ✓ TV/Radio (# of stations, # of Iraqis receiving)
- ✓ Etc.

August 27, 2004

O: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Paul McHale
Jim Haynes

ROM: Donald Rumsfeld *P. Rumsfeld*

UBJECT: DoD Responsibilities Paper

lease take a **look** at the attached **paper**. It is a problem **that** concerns me, and I **don't** know the answers. **If** you have thoughts or suggestions on it, **let me know**.

My thought is to send it to the Vice President, **Andy Card, Condi Rice and** Frank
Rosenzweig to get them **thinking about** these issues.

Let me know what you think soon.

Thanks

Attach:
Department of Defense Responsibilities

11R.dh
2604-2 (to computer) doc

.....
Please respond by

9/1/04

844

384

27 Aug 04

OSD 13218-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036848

~~FOUO~~

August 27, 2004

SUBJECT: U.S. Department of Defense responsibilities for homeland security, prior to September 11, 2001, on 9-11, and today

Homeland Security Assignments and Responsibilities:

DOD never has had, and does not have today, primary U.S. Government responsibility:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.
- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

Responsibility for those functions rests with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and the FBI, the Department of State, CIA and various other U.S. agencies.

Not only does DOD not have primary responsibility for any of those functions, DoD is expressly limited by federal law, including the Posse Comitatus Act, from participating in most U.S. law enforcement activities.

DOD's role has been, and is today, restricted to the following:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats and attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM)
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - "Render safe" a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.
 - Provide support for designated "National Special Security Events," such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Convention, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036849

August 27, 2004

Comment:

I am deeply concerned that the September 11th Commission, the press, Members of the U.S. Congress, and many Americans are not aware of the very limited role of the U.S. Armed Forces in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the USA, by law and Executive Order.

However, notwithstanding DoD's limited role and the general misunderstanding about our role, it is clear that, in the event of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack on the U.S. from within the U.S., the following would occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take charge, but techcally not in the lead role, only in a supporting role; specifically, DoD will be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore has not organized, trained or equipped to do, and
- 2) When the dust settles, blame will be placed on DoD for:
 - Not preventing the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and is not DoD's assignment;
 - Not instantaneously responding to mitigate the attack after it occurs, even though DoD is not authorized, funded or permitted by law to organize, train, equip or deploy to do so.

This unusual situation raises some questions:

Does the current USG arrangement and allocation of responsibilities still make sense?

If not, what might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies?

In either case, what might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be reduced?

~~FOUO~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 1, 2004 - FGH HC 9/2
0700

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Redrafted Memo on USG Responsibilities for Homeland
Security

384

Don,

I met with the recipients of the attached snowflake and we produced the redraft you requested.

I'm available to discuss it further if you wish.

1 Sep 04

27 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036851 OSD 13218-04

~~FOUO~~
DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

SUBJECT: USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

Situation Today:

Since September 11, 2001, the Administration has made substantial progress to protect America from terrorist attacks. Among other measures, we have established:

- The Department of Homeland Security.
- A National Bio-Defense Strategy and stockpiles of biological vaccines.
- United States Northern Command.
- The Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

As a result of these and other initiatives, America is safer today than it was prior to the 9/11 attacks, although we must continue to improve America's homeland security.

Homeland Security Roles and Responsibilities:

However, in the event of another major terrorist attack, we will certainly ask ourselves what else we might have done to prevent it or mitigate its consequences. One issue that concerns me is that roles and responsibilities for homeland security are still not as clearly defined as they might be. Now that we have almost two years of experience with the Department of Homeland Security and the new USG organization for homeland

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS
~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036852

security, it may be an appropriate time to evaluate the assignment of roles and responsibilities for homeland security. We also need to consider how we can better educate the American people about those roles and responsibilities. It is important for the American people to have realistic expectations about the role the U.S. Armed Forces might play in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the United States, as defined both by law and executive policy. I am reminded of the polls taken in the 1990s which showed that Americans believed erroneously that we have a capability to shoot down a ballistic missile targeting the U.S. There is a great deal the U.S. military can do in the event of a terrorist attack, but there are limits on that capability and—as a matter of law and policy—there may be things we should not do.

Across the **USG**, there have been several major homeland security exercises over the past several years. We could use their results to evaluate where gaps may exist in the USG homeland security concept and determine if changes are warranted with respect to statutes, authorities, policies, missions, resources and training, etc. Evaluations, moreover, could help to identify any legal considerations that might limit the military from providing support to any Lead Federal Agency and that could impede effective command and control.

Homeland security roles and responsibilities **are** spread among the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, the FBI, the CIA and various other **U.S** agencies:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through **U.S.** ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.

- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

DOD does not have primary responsibility for any of those functions. Its traditional role has been largely restricted to the following:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats **and** attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM).
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - “Render safe” a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.
 - Provide support for designated “National Special Security Events,” such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Conventions, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

Comment:

In the event of a catastrophic nuclear or biological attack on the territory of the United States, the **following** would likely occur, **as** it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take action, but

technically not in the lead role, only in a supporting role. Specifically, DoD may be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore may not have organized, trained or equipped to do, and

2) When the dust settles, the American people may well ask why DoD did not:

- Prevent the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and it is not DoD's assignment;
- Instantaneously respond to mitigate the attack after it occurs.

Recommendation:

Given this situation, the Administration may wish to undertake a quick review to provide recommendations for the following types of questions:

- What might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies to ensure that the right capabilities and assets will address key problems?
- Should we further organize, train and equip the National Guard and the reserves for homeland defense?
- Has DoD allocated sufficient force structure to homeland defense, particularly to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic attack?
- What might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be reduced?

UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY

CH-202604 SEP -2 PM 3:50
2 September 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBW 9/1*

SUBJECT: DOD Responsibilities Paper

- **Issue.** "Please take a look at the attached paper. It is a problem that concerns me, and I don't know the answers. If you have thoughts or suggestions on it, let me know. My thought is to send to the Vice President, Andy Card, Condi Rice and Fran Townsend to get them thinking about these issues. Let me know what you think." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** I agree with your concerns that there are misconceptions regarding the military's roles and responsibilities in the event of another catastrophic domestic event.
- **Discussion.**
 - We should first ensure that all of DOD has the same understanding regarding military roles, missions, and responsibilities in Homeland Security. A discussion involving your staff and mine would be useful to consolidate views.
 - We have conducted several HLS exercises over the past few years. We can use their results to evaluate where gaps exist in the USG concept for protecting its borders and citizens. Some gaps exist in WMD response, maritime defense and security, and counter-terrorism.
 - An assessment of these gaps in USG capability would tell us if any DOD changes are warranted with respect to statute, authorities, policy, mission, resources and training, etc. Evaluations will identify any legal considerations that limit the military in providing support to any Lead Federal Agency (LFA) and which may impact Command and Control requirements.
 - I agree a note to key members of the interagency, mentioning this review process, may get them thinking about their respective roles and responsibilities.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTG W. L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 13218-04

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/036857

August 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Paul McHale
Jim Haynes

844

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: DoD Responsibilities Paper

Please take a look at the attached paper. It is a problem that **concerns me**, and I don't know the answers. **If** you have thoughts or suggestions on it, **let me know**.

My thought is to send it to the Vice President, Andy ~~Card~~, Condi Rice and ~~Fran~~ Townsend to get them thinking about these issues.

Let me know what you think soon.

Thanks

Attach.
Department of Defense Responsibilities

DHR:dh
082604-2 (is computer) doc

.....
Please respond by 9/1/04

OSD 13218-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036858

~~FOUO~~

August 27, 2004

SUBJECT: U.S. Department of Defense responsibilities for homeland security, prior to September 11, 2001, on 9-11, and today

Homeland Security Assignments and Responsibilities:

DOD never has had, and does not have today, primary U.S. Government responsibility:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.
- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

Responsibility for those functions rests with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and the FBI, the Department of State, CIA and various other U.S. agencies.

Not only does DOD not have primary responsibility for any of those functions, DoD is expressly limited by federal law, including the Posse Comitatus Act, from participating in most U.S. law enforcement activities.

DOD's role has been, and is today, restricted to the following:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats and attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM)
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - "Render safe" a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.
 - Provide support for designated "National Special Security Events," such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Conventions, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036859

August 27, 2004

Comment:

I am deeply concerned that the September 11th Commission, the press, Members of the U.S. Congress, and many Americans are not aware of the very limited role of the U.S. Armed Forces in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the **USA**, by law and Executive Order.

However, notwithstanding DoD's limited role and the general misunderstanding about our role, it is clear that, in the event of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack on the U.S. from within the U.S., the following would occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take charge, but techcally not in the lead role, only in a supporting role; specifically, DoD will be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore has not organized, trained or equipped to do, and
- 2) When the dust settles, blame will be placed on DoD for:
 - Not preventing the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and is not DoD's assignment;
 - Not instantaneously responding to mitigate the attack after it occurs, even though DoD is not authorized, funded or permitted by law to organize, train, equip or deploy to do so.

This unusual situation raises some questions:

Does the current USG arrangement and allocation of responsibilities still make sense“?

If not, what might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies?

In either case, what might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be reduced?

7201
May 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Comparison to Vietnam

FYL

Attach.
Undated: "Vietnam? No Comparison"

DHR:dh
050304-28

.....
Please respond by —

16440
3 May 04
OSD 13219-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036861

Vietnam? No Comparison.

- It's difficult to recall of an instance in which guerillas alone have ever won a war. They can:
 - Harass.
 - Ambush.
 - Mine roads.
 - Occasionally shoot down a helicopter.
 - Occasionally mass for an attack (like in Ramadi last week).
- But these things don't win wars, *unless they break the will of the stronger power*. Guerillas stand a better chance of winning when they:
 - Have a coherent political strategy;
 - Can serve as an auxiliary to a conventional force;
 - Enjoy the benefit of an external sanctuary;
 - Have the support of a sympathetic population;
 - Supplied by a major client state.
- Has Iraq become, as some have claimed, "George Bush's Vietnam?" Hardly. Iraq is not like Vietnam:
 - There is no conventional North Vietnamese Army to distract us from organizing to fight a guerilla war.
 - There is no coherent anti-coalition strategy like Hanoi's "armed struggle" and "political struggle."
 - There is no external sanctuary of the scope enjoyed by Hanoi.

- There is no overwhelming sympathy from the population.
 - There is no major client state supplying the guerillas.
- With time and perseverance, an army can always defeat guerillas acting alone especially if that army:
 - Organizes for counter-guerilla operations;
 - Develops good intelligence and acts on it quickly;
 - Isolates the guerilla strongholds (prevent them from entering or leaving);
 - Systematically identifies, captures, or kills trapped guerillas;
 - Gains and keeps the support of the local population;
 - Secures the borders.

We are doing these things in Iraq today and we will win. Iraq is not like Vietnam.

7201
May 3, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
David Chu
Pete Schoomaker

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*

SUBJECT: Stop-Loss Implications

Please keep me posted on the potential implications of stop-loss.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/12/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
050304-29

.....
Please *respond* by 5/21/04

OSD 13220-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036864

320.2

31504

April 12, 2004

**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)**

C4/12
D4 5/3

VOTE FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Sir:

Attached is an update on the stop loss issue, which I understand arose again this weekend. I urge that we focus our argument for the policy on the benefit to unit readiness and cohesion.



David S. C. Chu

Attachment

TALKING POINTS

(April 12, 2004)

SUBJECT: Stop Loss Update

- To maintain cohesion among deploying units during periods of train-up, in-theater service, and redeployment, a program called "Stop Loss" is employed. It presently affects about 21,000 from the Active Components and 24,000 from the Reserves. Only Army presently is using Stop Loss.
- Stop-loss restrictions bar voluntary separations or retirements for Soldiers in designated units throughout their deployment, and up to 90 days after their unit returns to its home station. In addition, a stop-movement policy suspends the normal rotation of soldiers into and out of affected units.
 - o Most deployed soldiers are not affected because they have service obligations that extend beyond their deployments.
- The use of Stop Loss is driven by concerns over unit performance, and the recognized requirement to maintain unit cohesion down to the squad and crew level, which contributes to the safety and the effectiveness of units.
- Stop Loss plans are reviewed quarterly. Presently, the Army must employ Stop Loss, in light of its substantial numbers participating in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The other Services have for now suspended employment of Stop Loss.
 - o Navy and the Marine Corps terminated use of the program in May 2003. About 2,600 Sailors were affected by the program during FY 2003, as were 3,400 Active and 5,600 Reserve Marines.
 - o Air Force discontinued use of the program in June 2003. About 8,500 Airmen in the Active and Reserve Component were affected by Stop Loss during FY 2003.

Prepared by: W. J. Carr, OUSD(PR), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/036866

720
May 3, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Embed Forces

My personal view is we ought to keep US forces embedded in the Iraqi forces, so we have a first-hand view of how well they are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050304-11

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 13221-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036867

IMAP

3 May 04

413
1150

20

421
41 May
0630

May 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Speech by Laura Bush

Paul Butler
5/18

Please get me a copy of Laura Bush's speech to the Congressional wives recently. Apparently it listed a lot of things that can be done for service people's families. I think it would be a good thing if David Chu did a press briefing on that sometime.

Please let me see the speech.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050304-7

.....

Please respond by 5/7/04

Sir,
Speech attached.
ur/CDR Nosenzo
5/19

C5/19
DR
5/24

OSD 13222-04

3 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/036868

Remarks by First Lady Laura Bush at the Congressional Club First Lady's Luncheon Washington Hilton

AS DELIVERED

MRS. BUSH: Thank you, Mary for your warm welcome. I always look forward to this lunch and to spending time with each of you. Special thanks to Lea Ann and to Cecile for organizing this beautiful lunch. Congressman Tauzin and Cecile are in our thoughts and prayers. Lynne Cheney and other cabinet member wives thank you for being here today. President Bush and I appreciate your and your husband's dedication to our country. And we appreciate the dedication of every member of the United States military, the National Guard and Reserve, and America's veterans like Joe Bartlett who is here today. I'm happy to hear that Janet Flower's son, P.F.C. Andrew Flowers is doing well. His eagerness to return to his unit in Iraq is evidence of his commitment and courage.

The President and I are inspired by the dedication of our men and women in uniform. We visit with soldiers at bases all over the world -- and perhaps one of our most moving visits was at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. One of the remarkable men we met at Walter Reed was Staff Sergeant Michael McNaughton. He stepped on a land mine near



Kabul while serving with the Louisiana National Guard. His right leg had to be removed above the knee and he was fitted with a prosthetic leg. Michael had been a great runner and he and the President exchanged stories about their favorite past time.

President Bush encouraged Michael to get well so that someday they could take a run together. Sergeant McNaughton held the President to his promise, and last week they ran together around the South Lawn at the White House. Sergeant McNaughton is still

working for the National Guard where he enlisted after September 11th because he said he "needed to do something."

The men and women of the United States military answer this call every day as they defend freedom around the world. Over the last year, the world has witnessed the skill and resolve of our military from Korea to Kosovo to the Middle East. We've seen their courage and their decency to the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. Our military men and women have helped to free fifty million people from the oppression of two brutal regimes. They are supplying villages with their first taste of clean water, delivering medicine and supplies to hospitals and schools. Our troops and their coalition partners have refurbished over a thousand schools so millions of children can study and learn again.

Our soldiers' compassion is not simply part of their mission -- it's part of their character. We will never forget their commitment to our country, nor will we forget the men and women who have fallen in service to America. All of those who serve in our military deserve our utmost respect -- and so do those who serve behind the front lines -- their families and children. As I've traveled to military bases, I've become aware of the special challenges that face military families. Like many families and like some of you, President Bush and I have moved a lot -- five times -- and we've lived in six different homes. Moving, packing and hoping our children will be happy in a new home is something many of us can relate to. And so is change. For us and for military families, change means moving and starting over; but it also means new friends, and new challenges. A military families' determination to make a home wherever they are matches their loved ones devotion to duty. Separation and transition are part of a military child's life, and they accept their duty with brave hearts.

There are more than one million military children around the world, and 800 thousand children go to public and Department of Defense schools in your neighborhoods. A military child may move as many as six to nine times from kindergarten to high school. By her senior year, a child will have attended six elementary and middle schools and

two or more high schools -- often in different states. This constant change has a huge impact -- both academically and socially -- on children. Many school districts are not prepared to help military children transition from one school to another.

There is no systematic process that ensures that records, grades, and accomplishments transfer with a military child. And this is a problem for many children, not just military children, in our highly-mobile society. Many students lose their class rank after transferring, and many fall behind in class requirements because their new school will not grant credits for their previous coursework. Many children who were athletes at their old school miss the opportunity to play sports because they miss tryouts.

Some students, like Renee, deal with the challenge of not graduating. Renee lives with her sister and her sister's husband, a soldier. As a senior, she recently moved to her fourth new high school. Renee's new school has more graduation requirements. She must pass a test and have a year of computer science. Her new school requested that Renee's previous school grant her a reciprocal diploma. But the school refused. Renee is receiving special help and support from her new school, but she may not graduate on time. This is a common problem for many military children and their families. But it doesn't have to be this way.

When an Air Force officer was asked what he needed in Iraq, he said, "Please don't send cookies, care packages, or socks. Just help take care of our children." Our country has always supported its military -- in times of war there were community efforts to roll bandages and knit socks. We have a great capacity to care for the home front. Now is the time for a new Victory garden. In this garden, we can tend to the needs of military children. You can host a PTA group and talk about how your school can help ease transition for military children and families. You can volunteer at military bases and installations in your home states and read to children or host local events at libraries. Establish a parenting support program for military spouses in your neighborhood and help with home repairs and baby sitting.

The USA Freedom Corps started a program called "On the Homefront" to provide Americans with opportunities to support our troops and their families. More than a thousand volunteers from Rebuilding Together have repaired homes for military families while their spouses are deployed. With her two sons in Iraq, Marylyss Murray couldn't do all of the home improvements she needed. An army of volunteers in Tulsa helped Marylyss put a new roof and a fresh coat of paint on her home.

Volunteers from the Salvation Army in Cleveland, Ohio are collecting diapers and blankets to throw a group baby shower for military wives. And members of the VFW started a community-wide Adopt-A-Unit program to support military units in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We can show our appreciation for our troops and their families by getting involved in our communities. The members of the United States military pledge their lives to protect ours, and we can support them by supporting their loved ones. The Military Child Education Coalition is working to do just that. The coalition's founder, Dr. Mary Keller, works with schools and families to help military children with transition. While working as an Assistant Superintendent in Texas, Dr. Keller had more than 16 thousand students from neighboring Fort Hood in her school. She noticed that many of the military children who had transferred could not keep up. She gathered educators, military experts, and parents at her kitchen table and formed a coalition to help these students. She began as a volunteer and soon moved to working full time as Executive Director of the Coalition. Some of the funds from today's luncheon will benefit the Coalition. Dr. Keller can provide you with more information on how you can help military children -- children like Kiara who deserve not only a great education, but our support.

A sixth grade student in Louisiana, Kiara wrote a poem titled "I Serve Too." It reads, "I'm a military child, I stay strong when my dad goes away. If there is a war and my dad is detached, I will help him fight back. With my braveness and courage I can stay strong, my family's support helps me carry on. Whenever we move, I start over again, I have to go to a new school, and make new friends. Even though people think I'm a military brat,

I just don't quite see it like that. My daddy helps defend our country, so we can live in peace and harmony. So all the military children help their mothers and fathers because we serve too, we're their sons and daughters."

With your help, we can fulfill our duty on the home front -- and the hopes of every military parent who prays "help take care of our children." Thank you for this lovely lunch and for your generous contribution to the Military Child Education Coalition.

July 1, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Actions to Respond to Senator McCain

*File
sent as A Doc
TN 7/12*

1. Please draft a letter to Senators McCain and Warner, addressing the e-mails and what our approach is going to be.
 - Include references and attachments listing the things we have done: actions we have taken, studies we have initiated, and corrective steps taken. Include a list of what he has requested and all we have given him – the number of documents, the number of pages, etc.
2. I need a copy of the ICAF report and a briefing – I have not seen it. I assume it is okay to send it to McCain.
3. We need an attachment that answers the allegation that the briefing from Tinker was "doctored." I am uncomfortable letting that thought sit there. If it wasn't, we should say so. If it was, we should do something about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063004-9

.....
Please respond by

*Call in
to Dell'orto
1115...*

1 July 04

OSD 13223704

MEMO FOR: SECDEF

8 JUL 04

FROM: LTGCRADDock

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SEN MCCAIN

YOU ASKED THAT I FOLLOW-UP WITH DAN DELL'ORTO ON THE ATTACHED SNOWFLAKE.

DAN REPORTS THAT AT A MEETING THIS MORNING ON THE HILL WITH SASC AND SEN MCCAIN STAFFERS ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD FOR THE EMAILS, THE MCCAIN STAFFERS HAVE NOW CHANGED THEIR REQUEST. THE FORMER REQUEST AT ISSUE - EMAILS FROM A FEW INDIVIDUALS (WYNNE, ROCHE, ETC.) FOR A FINITE PERIOD HAS NOW BEEN EXPANDED TO ALL EMAILS ON THE LEASING SUBJECT GENERATED BY APPROXIMATELY 26 PERSONS IN THE DEPARTMENT.

DAN SAYS THIS HAS TURNED ALL UPSIDE DOWN. HE WILL BE MEETING WITH LARRY DI RITA, POWELL MOORE, DAVE PATTERSON (DEPUTY'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT) LATER TODAY TO SORT OUT WHERE WE NOW ARE AND WHAT WE NOW THINK WE MAY HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR. AFTER THAT MEETING, HE WILL PROVIDE YOU A WRITTEN UPDATE OF HIS ASSESSMENT OF THIS NEW SITUATION.

ON THE ICAF REPORT - I HAVE LOOKED AT THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - YOU WOULD NOT BE FULFILLED. AFTER LARRY, PAUL AND I LOOKED AT IT, WE ALL AGREED YOU NEED TO BE BRIEFED ON THE FINDINGS. THAT IS SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY, 17 JULY.

DAN IS STILL WORKING ON THE RESPONSE TO THE ALLEGATION THAT THE TINKER BRIEF WAS DOCTORED.

7201
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Statistics

7/12
074
HOT
C 7/12
LTG C
PB

Ask some research office fast to get me separate information for both the Mexican and Canadian borders:

1. The number of border patrols the US has. ✓
2. How many kilometers the border is.
3. How many border patrol per 100kilometers of border.

384

Then get the separate numbers for both the United States and New York City:

1. Number of police officers.
2. Total population.
3. How many police officers per 100,000 population.

I would like it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070204-4

.....
Please respond by: _____

RESPONSE ATTACHED

C 7/12

File Forwarded as
A Doc

S. Gandy

TN 7/12
OSD 132 24-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/036876

July 2, 2004
4:20 PM

FOR: SecDef

FROM: Mr. Paul Butler

SUBJECT: Answer to Your July 2, 2004 Snowflake Requesting Border Patrol & Police Statistics

Border Patrol Information

(Note: the size of an actual border patrol varies based on the situation; data compiled below reflects individual border patrol officers)

- Number of border patrol officers the US has:
 - Along the US-Mexican border: 9,838 (total border length is 3,141 km)
 - Along the US-Canadian border: 983 (total border length is 6,416 km)
- Number of border patrol officers per 100 km of border:
 - Along the US-Mexican border: 313 officers/100 km of border (or 3/1 km)
 - Along the US-Canadian border: 15 officers/100 km of border (or .15/1 km)

Police Information

- Number of police officers serving in:
 - The United States overall (federal, state, local): App. 870,000 (total US population is app. 285 million)
 - New York City: App. 38,000 (total New York City population is app. 8 million)
- Number of police officers per 100,000 population:
 - The United States overall: 305
 - New York City: 475

Source of Data: US Department of Homeland Security, July 2, 2004

Attach:
July 2, 2004 Snowflake, subj: Statistics

OSD 132 24 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/036877

7209
CLOSE HOLD

May 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RL*
SUBJECT: Najaf and Karbala

Please take a look at this memo from Schlesinger. If you think it is useful, see if you can sterilize it send it to whoever you think ought to have it, in a way that it won't hurt anybody.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Schlesinger e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-34

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

11-L-0559/OSD/036878

CLOSE HOLD

OSD 13226-04

RL

17 May 04

CLOSE HOLD

LTG Graddock

D4 5/11

(b)(6)

OSD

This message is sent to Secretary Rumsfeld from James Schlesinger:

Don:

I'm not there. Can't vouch for this information.

But I thought it essential to pass it along.

Handwritten notes and signatures: "none with lead?", a circled "D", and a signature.

CLOSE HOLD: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION. PLS HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

The following is some information and analysis based on discussions with Tribal Sheikhs, local leaders and members of the Hawza in Najaf and Karabala regions;

1- Sadrites [militiamen] are openly engaged in anti-Sistani rhetoric in the streets, tearing his picture and cursing his name.

Sadr sees himself as the Iraqi Marja'iyah [i.e., the source of emulation/religious authority] first and foremost, and above any foreigners claiming this right [note: Sistani, Fayyad, Ghurayffi are all foreign—non-Iraqi]. All Sadr [ref the father] students claim Marja'iyah status and feel they are by default the true sources of religious authority, while the rest [Sistani, Fayyad, etc.] follow a sort of hierarchy. [Note: the Moslems do not have a church, anyone can issue a fatwa and there is no hierarchy, however the clerics do yield to one leader from among their peers in their immediate location, i.e. Sistani in Najaf or Iraq...but that status does not extend to Bahrain or Lebanon for example].

Already Sadr has killed the only other Iraqi Grand Ayatollah [Quoi] who posed a threat to his advancement, and after that he then surrounded Sistani's home and threatened him with death. That may happen again as Sadr feels his leadership position is vulnerable as he was isolated from the traditional Marja'iyah by the Coalition Forces (CF) presence on the outskirts of Kufa. The CF pull-back has not done much to quell that situation; in fact it has exacerbated the tension.

Indeed, the Hawza did not side much with the CF, but they did not side with Sadr either and announced they do not support any such activity by his forces which resounds through his mind right now. The CF withdrawal has put those who didn't support Sadr in a precarious situation. In the words of the delegation, they are scared, they realize they are dealing with a dangerous kid and do not trust him to be wise when he is feeling vindictive.

2- Indeed, anti-Sadrites [but not necessarily pro-coalition anymore] were hoping for a strong CF stand against Sadr.

While not expecting a CF military attack necessarily, they did NOT want to see CF pull back, which really troubles them. Sadr to them is the new Shi'a Saddam, and they fear him outright, and are afraid they will have to obey him if we do not fix this situation—and they are looking for US leadership. One suggestion was an attempt to isolate Najaf from Kufa and deal with two different but smaller

11-L-0559/OSD/036879

4/22/2004

CLOSE HOLD

problems, (nfi -- just relaying their view at this point.

3- Next step—they may start looking for a local solution, and if they start that, intricate warfare patterns will become evident moving towards a civil war pitting tribal and religious groups against one another which could become the norm rather than an all-out intifadah against the occupation. If Sadr is not diffused before we hand over sovereignty, then we will definitely see this after 30 June.

4- Moqtada Al Sadr is already searching for a governor for Najaf and for a Police Chief. He occupies all the key government sites, has checkpoints at all the main roads [using police Motorola's to call in spot reports], has control over the Shi'a Shrines and their funds, his government is slowly but surely manifesting itself.

5- The Hawza has declared, behind closed doors, that Sadr is not a Moslem, and urged that we get this message.

Their explanation:

There are 5 tenets in the Shi'a religion that are inviolable. These are

1. Belief in God,
2. Belief in the Prophet Mohammad,
3. Belief in Justice,
4. Belief in the resurrection, and
5. Belief in the Imams [mainly Ali, but all 11 and the coming of the 12th and last Imam].

If you betray any of these 5 principles then you are not a Moslem.

Here is what MAS has done to deserve such condemnation...his troops are chanting [note: all chants are pre-approved] very controversial slogans that portray him above Imam Ali and the Prophet Mohammad. Here is a translation of the slogans: 1. **Please excuse us Ali, Sadr is the Imam** [min rukhsitaq ya Ali, Muqtada huwa al Wali] and 2. **Please excuse us Batool** [aka the Prophet's daughter and wife of Ali-Fatima AL Zahra] **Muqtada is the Prophet** [min rukhsitek ya Batool, Muqtada huwa al Rasool], in Arabic they rhyme.

For this, Sadr is now considered a MURTAD, which means a REJECT— meaning from the religion of Islam. Sadr taking the place of the two holiest men in Shi'a Islam [the Prophet and 1st Imam], making himself larger than the 12th Imam who hasn't appeared yet, and larger than the Prophet of Islam altogether, is blasphemy and he is being condemned for it, secretly so far out of fear of him, but it will get out and spread .

They affirmed the people of Najaf and Kufa are on our side and against MAS/SM. Sadr must be taken down, brought to Justice, and or killed in the process, but he cannot remain in Kufa/Najaf to control/terrorize the Shrine cities unopposed. This goes for his entire team. (Sadr has ordered 400 cleric turbans, 200 white, 200 black, distributing them out to key associates for cover and protection.)

FINAL COMMENT:

Our strategy of negotiating with Sadr after he has committed still more outrages, murdered Coalition soldiers, seized two cities, desecrated two sacred Shi'ite shrines, and defied both Iraqi law and the Coalition's authority is unwise, ineffective, against our own interests, and morally unjustifiable. Is this why we fought the war?

11-L-0559/OSD/036880

4/22/2004

CLOSE HOLD

With every passing day our credibility is falling as our local friends and other incountry sources are advising. We need to give the people of Karbala', Kufa, and Najaf the justice and protection they deserve by using military force to put an end to Sadr's rebellion as soon as possible. If Sadr and his forces escape from this situation to fight another day, we will have sown the seeds of disaster and guaranteed that Iraq's future will be anything but democratic.

These points re Najaf apply equally to Karbala. Sadr will not go away peacefully; moreover, we have to be seen to be driving him from the field, or else we will have lost all credibility -- especially when the real struggle comes, with the Badr taking the lead, in the months following the dissolution of CPA.

The people of Karbala want to see Sadr humiliated, but they cannot do so by themselves as they have no weapons or leadership.

Moreover, it was painfully obvious at a recent meeting that the Abd al-Mahdi al-Karbalawi (al-Sistani) representative clearly did not want this stalemate to end. He wanted no armed confrontations to occur within the "holy city of Karbala" and opposed a citizen's demonstration against Sadr, **meaning that it suits the Iranian agenda perfectly to have our indeciveness prolonged as long as possible.** SCIRI/Badr/Abd al-Mahdi/Iranians all know Sadr and his Militia cannot threaten their control of Karbala, but Sadr's Militia is very useful in telegraphing to everyone here just who it is that can be relied upon to provide long-term security for the city -- SCIRI/Badr.

While we are losing time with negotiations that can only lead to a smoke and mirrors solution to the Sadr problem, the Governor, at the initiative of a local Sheikh (Muslim al-Taa'i of the Husayn al-Sadr marj'a in al-Kazimiyya), has obtained permission from the Ministry of Awqaf (religious endowments) in Baghdad to turn the al-Mukhayyam Mosque (MAS headquarters in downtown Karbala) into a health clinic. While this is not a carte blanche to launch a missile into the al-Mukhayyam, it clearly shows that local civic leaders are doing all they can to pave the way for the removal of MAS influence from their city. After order is restored and the Ministry of Awqaf order can be implemented, this will be a tremendous humiliation for MAS as it will leave him with no base in this city. It remains to be seen, though, whether sufficient calm will be restored to allow the local government to seize the al-Mukhayyam and convert it into a center that serves the people of Karbala rather than one which threatens them.

In the meantime, Sadr's Militia continues to disturb our sleep almost nightly with scattered mortar attacks near or on our base camp. Just enough harassment to let us and everyone else know they are still there and defying us. How much more of this are we going to put up with? When are we going to start playing

"No-more-Mr.-Nice-Guy"? How about a few U.S. forces to take the initiative and start attacking the SM checkpoints in the northeastern suburbs of Karbala?

When SM militiamen start taking casualties, they will start to melt away. There aren't more than 300 of them, if even that many, in the whole city, according to informed U.S. military sources on the ground here. It is a mistake to have our forces simply surround Najaf while negotiations are going on and leave tidying up Karbala for another day. Every day of delay is subtracting from our ability to influence what is going on in this province. Soon we will have no credibility at all.

⁷²⁰¹
CLOSE HOLD

May 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Karbala Report

Here is another memo from Jim Schlesinger. If you think it is useful, see if you can sterilize it send it to whoever you think is appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/22/04 Schlesinger e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-36

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

11-L-0559/OSD/036882

CLOSE HOLD

OSD 13227-04

DR

17 May 04

(b)(6)

OSD

cc: LTG Craddock only

CLOSE HOLD: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION. PLS HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

This report comes from US personnel in Kerbala who have been shelled virtually every night by mortar fire in Karbala. This has gone on now for more than three weeks. They are recommending Coalition Forces become proactive in striking back at those who are trying to kill them every night, and if nothing else, at least allow US Special Forces to take out the positions which they know that Sadr's Militiamen are holding. Reportedly the US military are willing to take the fight to the enemy, but their requests for permission to do so are being turned down in Baghdad.

They also are seeking guidance on the overall plan to bring the crisis with Sadr to a close. Although negotiations are going on in Najaf and Falluja, Sadr's Militia (SM) in Karabala is operating as an independent force and is slowly occupying more and more real estate. The Tribal Democracy Center, taken over by the SM two days ago, is only two blocks away from the entrance to the US compound in which the governorate buildings and our Women's Rights Center (WRC) are located. If SM takes the WRC or one of the other high-rises near the city center, they will be able to direct their fire directly, and at close range, at the all-too-symbolic center of governance for this province. If they take the downtown area, they will release the dangerous criminals being held in the local jail and turn them against us in attacks on our base camp. At present, the SM's attention is drawn primarily to taking the city center, but our base camp will become their next principal target after the governance center falls. The mortars which have so far been missing us will then start to fall in our camp, and there will inevitably be casualties.

Moreover, we will not be able to hold meetings downtown with the Governor and Provincial Council, and as civil servants will not be able to come to work, the local government will come to a standstill. Indeed, if the center of governance falls, the Governor and PC will have become entirely superfluous and all of our work in reforming the local government will have been in vain. You will then have to face the prospect of negotiating directly with some MAS-appointed government, which will only deal with us in bad faith, I assure you. These people will not go away until we drive them out. They see our current posture as cowardice and their nightly mortar attacks are demonstrations of their contempt for us. We must use our legitimate force to control this situation, and use it quickly.

The province's civic leaders also need us to provide a word of hope and guidance, but we have none to offer. Without our leadership and some reason to hold out hope, their morale will finally collapse, and we will face the same problem in Karbala -- JAM occupying the rabbit-warren of old city streets and lanes near the shrines -- that we already have in Najaf.

Karbala can be saved if we act in time.

I know that this is a difficult time to be asking for your personal attention to the problems of Karbala, which seems relatively quiet compared to all else that is being reported from around the country. The situation is actually quite serious, however, especially given the special symbolic significance of this city.

This matter undoubtedly is receiving your utmost attention, but we and other governance teams in Iraq would appreciate some guidance on what to expect in the near future. What is our game plan?

4/23/2004

CLOSE HOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/036883

CLOSE HOLD

=====

We are now on Day 19 of the Mahdi Army siege in Karbala, with no end in sight and a complete absence of direction as to how this will all play out. I have not been in the State Department that long, but I spent twenty years of battles trying tough litigation cases and I learned a few things along the way that I believe in good faith apply here. (1) negotiating with people whose word cannot be trusted is a useless exercise and an affirmative demonstration of lack of resolve; (2) the failure to decide on a plan is to decide; (3) the failure to act is an affirmative act of omission.

(1) From all reporting we receive from Najaf and from what we know of the criminal, brutal acts of the Mahdi Army here in Karbala, negotiating with Sadr and/or his Mahdi Army lieutenants is nothing but a useless exercise. We will get no where with the word of thugs and only demonstrate to all in Karbala our lack of resolve to actually support our mission here by attempting to engage in civilized discussion with terrorists and murderers.

(2) Throughout this crisis, we have had no direction or guidance from Baghdad as to the way out. The failure of Baghdad to provide us with decisive guidance that we can pass on has eroded the confidence of the Karbala civic leaders and citizenry in us (CPA) and our CF. By failing to decide and/or advise us on what the plan is, we have not only failed the province of Karbala, we are failing ourselves as we are held virtual hostages in our Camp Juliet. We have been subject to water and food rationing as well as nightly mortar and RPG attacks that cause us to run at break-neck speed to our bunkers for safety. We dare not to venture out of Camp Juliet for fear of facing what has now become an almost virtual certainty that we will be ambushed if we don't hit a IED first. As the days pass, the odds are stacking up against us that one of those nightly mortars is going to find its way to a CPA human target. We need and deserve to know what decisions have been made for Karbala. If they haven't been made, then who do we need to impress that some course of action needs to be planned for Karbala? The failure to decide is costing us dearly with credibility and I just don't want it to cost us a life as well.

(3) What is most incredulous to me is that our CF are either unwilling or unable to engage the Mahdi Army directly. Our special forces are repeatedly attacked, yet they are denied the green light to attack known Mahdi Army strongholds in Karbala. Our 1BCT advises it will only engage the Mahdi Army in Karbala if our nascent provincial council will give it permission. The failure of CF to affirmatively address the Mahdi Army siege has resulted in the Mahdi Army taking control of a significant portion of the city (including our almost-ready-to-be-opened Tribal Democracy Center) and poised to take over other strategic locations which will allow the domino-effect of taking control of the governorate building and police station. I am not a military strategist, but it is apparent to me that the failure to timely and directly engage the Mahdi Army in Karbala has allowed them to fortify their positions, pinpoint weak but strategically important positions to seize and has bolstered their confidence that they will not be touched in their efforts to take over this province. CPA and CF are being attacked daily and nightly, yet we see no firm resolve to respond. Maybe it is lack of a good night's sleep for too many days, or maybe it is the very real and present danger we are in here in Karbala, but I am beginning to feel unprotected and unsupported in our mission's efforts.

John, I am but one voice, but I'm looking for answers. Pass this up your chain of command or not, but please know I always appreciate that you encourage my most candid assessment.

CLOSE HOLD

4/23/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/036884

720
CLOSE HOLD

May 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Sistani Representative

Here is another memo from Jim Schlesinger. If you think it is useful, see if you can sterilize it send it to whoever you think is appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Schlesinger e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-35

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

Ira 9

17 May 04

OSD 13228-04

CLOSE HOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/036885

CLOSE HOLD

all 5/17

From Dr.
Schlenger

CC: LTG Graddock only

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

CLOSE HOLD: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

Meeting with Sistani Office representative

22 April, 2004.

Sayyed Maytham Faisal Mazthboub (protect) is a close contact and personal friend of GA Ali Sistani. Maytham has had access to GA Sistani for the past 15 years. Maytham is a moderate and a respected notable in the city of Najaf/Kufa. He is not a cleric, and he is not employed by Sistani, but is an independently wealthy and a religiously inclined man who has had direct involvement in the Hawza.

The purpose of the meeting was to establish a direct relationship with US personnel in the southern region. He claimed many Baghdad visitors led them to believe they were a solid conduit to CPA-Baghdad but Sistani and his interlocutors were beginning to lose faith in this and wanted to build their own relationship at this point. He indicated grave dissatisfaction in dealing with multiple envoys who all claimed they were sent by Amb Bremer to "solve the problem" and the episodic nature of their involvement. Some had even gone as far as asking for a photo with GA Sistani [IGC member Muwaffaq Al Ruba'i for one] for what they interpreted as an attempt to prove they met with him and gain increased credibility when they quoted him.

He stated Sistani understands many are speaking in his name and knows he has to do something about that; thus he is looking to make a direct office-to-office connection with a military office in CPA south so there is no misunderstanding. He knows of us from back when we first made our rounds with the Ayatollahs, and sought us out.

Note: He did not indicate at any time that he had a message from Sistani. However, at the close of the meeting, Maytham stated that he would report his meeting results directly to Sistani and requested a meeting for a closer contact of Sistani [NFI] with us this coming week at our locale. He did mention the person will be a cleric and an associate of GA Sistani, once one to be determined after Maytham briefs GA Sistani.

Here are key points Maythem made:

1) Coalition Forces were seen in some neighborhoods [Hayy Zahra] and were refreshingly received. People who want peace welcome this action, indicating US Forces are welcome in their midst.

In any city where there is no law and no authority there is a problem, as is the case in Najaf and Kufa. The sovereign should never abandon his [people] during a crisis, nor should he yield his authority to any person not properly appointed. [Here he is indicating the obvious, that the US regain control from the forces now occupying government offices in Najaf.] He mentioned US success in Kut, and wished for a similar outcome where the US was able to regain control and push back the militia.

2) Najaf has fallen into the hands of the so called Jaysh Al Mahdi (Sadr's Militia), a group of thieves, murderers who have armed themselves beyond any comprehension, taken police stations, released all the prisoners, and looted the government offices...all while the coalition forces watched. Anyone who worked with the CF has been targeted and many now are in jails and are being tried in so called Shari'a courts, some have been executed and still the Coalition stands by without interfering. "Collaborators" are being systematically pursued, arrested, and detained daily and their the families have no where to go and complain—just like the old days under Saddam. Fear and Intimidation now rule the city again.

3) Sistani has done his duty [as a religious leader]; he sent a delegation asking Sadr to leave the city if he intended to fight the coalition and spare the city and shrines from inherent destruction. He stated that the delegation warned Sadr the coalition would respond with might for every bullet the Sadr Militia [SM] expended. Sadr's inner circle is now in charge of key [military] decisions and Sadr remains removed from direct involvement, but remains adamant about not backing down in the face of too much pressure—which in his view

11-L-0559/OSD/036886

CLOSE HOLD

4/23/2004

000.71 SD

17 May 04

CLOSE HOLD

doesn't look good—in that Sadr is personally convinced he could win and keep/control Najaf/Kufa.

4) Most of the hardened MAS militants in the streets manning positions are in fact strangers [from outside the city], and more likely from Thawra city [Sadr City] in Baghdad. It is unclear how they could have traveled unobstructed to Najaf, and taken control so easily, and remain in control in the face of the mighty coalition that liberated Iraq. He said that people were beginning to draw dangerous conclusions from such a situation, and unless the coalition regain control, it would be hard to mobilize the citizens to help or cooperate later. They live in fear of retribution for any misconception made by the Sadr thugs...this is like living under Saddam only now it was 1991 all over again.

5) Najaf is not Fallujah. Fallujah is full of former Baathists, foreign fighters from all over the Middle East to include Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Islam, former Iraqi military, former Iraqi Intelligence, and former Iraqi Special Services, many that benefited from the regime for years. Najaf is different in that it does not have any military commanders, security apparatus, or Sunni opposition, but instead people who never benefited from the regime but were systematically oppressed and persecuted for the past 35 years. There are no former regime elements or anyone fighting against an occupation—but people still thankful US liberated us. Sistani has stated that since US announced its departure on a given date then US not truly occupiers—so the dynamics are different.

6) The people in Najaf can be counted on to support you to a limit if US were to go after Sadr more aggressively. Hearing planes overhead day and night, knowing US troops are in the outskirts of the city, Najaf awaits a solution (ie, they expect a US offensive to take back the town and remove Sadr and his militia [ala Kut]. He cautioned against prolonged fighting and collateral damage [meaning the Shrines].

7) The Najaf Police are traitors who must be fired once the city is liberated. They were obedient dogs when Saddam was in power, and their paychecks were a fraction of what they are now. He displayed outright disdain for the great betrayal they committed in giving over the city to Sadr's criminals. They would have never thought of doing that under Saddam, but it was easier now since there was no perceptible punishment by the local government/coalition, but that the outcome of not cooperating with Sadr was taken more seriously.

8) Sadr is a cancer that needs to be removed or else it will get worse fast and then require either amputation [give up Najaf] or chasing after a disease that is spreading fast. Some solution that would rid them of this future [Shi'a] Saddam is needed ASAP. Re the Saddam analogy, Sadr has surrounded himself with a circle much like Saddam's to protect him as the leader so long as they are benefiting from him—currently that consists of sharing his spoils—like police cars and weapons, monies they plundered and influence they now enjoy along with its inherent respect. GA Sistani has declared all government property must returned.

The meeting lasted two hours and was rather pleasant in tone. Maytham is a friendly fellow that likes to make analogies and funny remarks. One joke he told about Sadr worth mentioning goes like this:

A mother mosquito tells her child not to go near any people as she feared for his life, but the little mosquito didn't listen. He came home that evening and told his mother, mom, why did you ask me to stay away from the people, they really like me, when I went near them today they all started clapping for me...[he motioned with his hands how we try to kill a mosquito] he said this was Sadr, he was that naïve & stupid.

In departing he again mentioned he would brief Sistani personally and re-contact our office for a future meeting with a closer associate.

11-L-0559/OSD/036887

4/23/2004

CLOSE HOLD

7201
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 1, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Instruction

J 9/2

I look forward to receiving an additional instruction from me concerning the slave trade with young women.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/30/04 DSD memo: "Combating Trafficking in Persons in the Department of Defense"
[U19895/03]

DHR:dh
070104-13

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

add 9/2

Sir,

Response Attached

Y/R, COB

380.01

150104

OSD 13237-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036888

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

20 October 2004 - 2000 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DANIEL J. DELL'ORTO, PDGC

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)


Sir:

Please note that the Deputy's decision with comments:

"Other: Don't send the letter, unless she
raises the issue again. It would
only be irritating at this stage."

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
OSD 13274-04

250

18 OCT 04

19 AUG 04

OSD 13274-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036889



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

DEP SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
OTHER-PW
OCT 20 2004
w/ CMTS

ACTION MEMO

October 18, 2004, 11:33 AM

Paul Butler

FOR:

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:

Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

- You asked whether someone should clarify to Major General Kathryn Frost the distinctions between the political activity rules that apply to military personnel and those that apply to civilian employees.
- On July 16, 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army denied MG Frost's request for waiver from certain political activity restrictions. She then forwarded the request to the Secretary of Defense, on whose behalf the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) denied it on August 17, 2004.
- Because MG Frost has not had further communications with the Office of the Secretary, taking additional steps on this matter would be unnecessary. As a courtesy, however, it would not be inappropriate for me to send her the letter at TAB A. It discusses the legal basis on which her request was denied. It also reiterates the limited activities related to her husband's campaign in which she may participate.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve TAB A by initialing below.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____ Other Don't send the

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)

TSA SD	10/19
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	X 10/20
EXEC SEC	M 10/19

PRS/PRD ITEMS

DATE RECEIVED IN OSD: 10/19/04
SUSPENSE DATE: 9/13/04
RECEIVED IN C&D: 10/19/04
DAYS LATE: 36

letter, unless she raises the issue again. It would only be irritating at this stage.



11-L-0559/OSD/036890

OSD 13274-04



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600**

Major General Kathryn G. Frost
Headquarters, Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

Dear General Frost:

On July 16, 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army denied your request for waiver from certain political activity restrictions. You then forwarded the request to the Secretary of Defense, on whose behalf the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) denied it on August 17, 2004.

As support for your argument that the Department of Defense (DoD) had relaxed the restrictions, you made reference in the request to section 734.307 of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations. I discuss below the reasons for which this section is inapplicable. I also reiterate the limited activities related to your husband's campaign in which you may participate.

Section 734.307 provides that a civilian employee covered by subpart C of the regulations may appear with the employee's spouse in a political advertisement or a broadcast and urge others to vote for the employee's spouse. Members of the armed services, however, are subject to DoD Directive 1344.10, not to the OPM regulations. Still, some of the civilian rules are persuasive in determining whether a service member may participate in political activities — specifically the rules in subpart D of the regulations, which apply to members of the Senior Executive Service (SES), employees of the National Security Agency (NSA), and other similarly situated employees.

This is the case because the rules in subpart D of the regulations are analogous to the rules in DoD Directive 1344.10, just as the duties of service members are analogous to those of NSA employees and the duties of senior commanders to those of SES officials. Subpart D employees, for example, may not participate in political campaigning and neither may military personnel. In contrast, employees covered by subparts B and C of the regulations are subject to less restrictive rules. For example, not only may they participate in a political campaign, but they may even manage one. Section 734.307 applies to employees covered by subpart C and thus fails to be persuasive.



11-L-0559/OSD/036891

Conversely, section 734.405 is persuasive because it applies to subpart D employees. This section provides that an employee may attend a political function with the employee's spouse, stand in the receiving line, and sit at the head of the table during a political dinner honoring the spouse. It also states that the employee may appear in photographs of the candidate's family that might be used in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature. In the same manner, ~~an~~ active-duty major general and senior commander may participate in these limited activities when out of uniform. The officer and the subpart D employee alike, however, are prohibited from taking an active role in the political campaign of the officer's spouse, speaking on behalf of or representing the spouse at political events, hosting an event honoring the spouse, or participating in media interviews.

The OPM regulations therefore fail to support your request for waiver. They instead confirm the Under Secretary's denial.

Please contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Daniel J. Dell'Orto
Principal Deputy General Counsel



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



APR 29 2004

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial. Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Army Chief of Staff

THRU: Secretary of the Army

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. I respectfully request reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of Army. 12 Apr 04, denial of my request for waiver ~~from~~ certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1341.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I requested this waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04, so I may participate in the campaign for my husband, Congressman Marlin Frost.

2. Specifically, I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language even contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions. Likewise, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. 731.307, civilian federal employees are permitted to participate in a spouse's political campaign. Examples of authorized participation include attending a fundraiser, standing in the receiving line, sitting at the head of the table, and urging others to vote for his or her spouse.

} Note to
my David

4. In order to comply with regulatory requirements and departmental policy, I have been forced into the role of silent spouse when I accompany my husband to various events that are critical to the success of his campaign. The spouses of today's political candidates, whether male or female, are expected to take a much more active role than in the past. As a result of my enforced silence even when appearing in public, my husband's supporters may question my loyalty, and his opponents may take advantage of the fact that I must remain silent in the face of criticism against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates; or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.

6. The reason given for denying my original waiver request was that "HQDA policy follows the DoD policy." However, DoDD 1344.10 has vested authority in the Secretary of the Army to consider waiver requests based on individual situations. If my request continues to be denied, I ask that the specific reasons for such denial be provided to me.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Army Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/036893

~~FOUO~~

August 19, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *7A*
SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Here is a request that I have not reviewed carefully.

Please get into it and get with the Deputy Secretary to figure out the proper course of action.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/5/04 AAFES memo to SecDef[OSD 11853-04]

DHR:dh
081904-5

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036894

OSD 13274-04

000.1

19 AUG 04

5

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

9 September 2004 - 2027 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DAN DELL'ORTO
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)


Sir:

The Deputy's comments to you on the attached read:

" Dan -
I agree that Paragraph 2 of her April 29 letter goes much further,
but paragraph 3 implies that she thinks she is more restricted
than civilian employees. Should someone clarify that for her?
PW"

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Hornick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachments:
OSD 13274-04

Suspense: Monday, 13 September 2004

250

9 SEP 04

19 AUG 04

09 SEP 2004



From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

Don -

I agree that #2

of her April 29 letter
goes much further

but #3 implies that
she thinks she is more
restricted than civilian
employees.

Should someone clarify
that for her?

PW



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
174 670 - 3 11:11:57

NE 9/7
JCL
9/8 9/7
9/9

INFO MEMO

September 2, 2004, 10:00 A.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

DJ Dell'Orto

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)


- You asked for information about the regulation concerning the participation of civilian employees in a spouse's political campaign. You also asked whether some limited waiver allowing Major General Kathryn G. Frost to stand in a receiving line, for example, was appropriate.
- Under the Hatch Act, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has issued regulations in 5 C.F.R. §§ 734.307 and 734.405 that address the issue specifically. One section appears in the subpart with the least restrictions. The other appears in the subpart that applies to members of the Senior Executive Service (SES), employees of the National Security Agency (NSA), etc., who are subject to more restrictive rules.
 - Under the subpart with less restrictions, section 734.307 provides that employees who are a candidate's spouse are subject to the same rules as other employees covered by this subpart. For example, they may attend a spouse's fundraiser, "stand in the receiving line," and "sit at the head table." They also may appear with the spouse in a political advertisement or broadcast and urge others to vote for the spouse.
 - Under the subpart with more restrictions, section 734.405 provides that employees may attend a political function with the spouse. For example, they "may stand in the receiving line and sit at the head of the table during a political dinner honoring the spouse." The section also states that they may appear in photographs of the candidate's family that might appear in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature.
- Members of the armed services are not subject to the Hatch Act, but the applicable rules (published in DoD Directive 1344.10) are analogous to the more restrictive rules in it. (Under one rule, service members—like NSA employees—may not participate in political campaigns.) The directive does not address the specific

SA SD	<i>DX</i>
SA DSD	<i>Valentin 9/8</i>
SRMA DSD	<i>N 9/8</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 9/3</i>



OSD 13274-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036897

issue at hand, but it requires the use of rules of reason and common sense when determining whether an activity should be prohibited. For this reason, service members have not been prohibited from attending political functions, standing in the receiving line, or sitting at the head table with the spouse (as long as they are out of uniform). Nor have they been prohibited from appearing in photographs of the candidate's family that might appear in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature. 

- In her request, however, MG Frost does not seek a waiver to engage in such activities. Rather, she wishes to take an active role in her husband's campaign, representing him at events that he cannot attend and speaking on his behalf. Because such activities are not allowed by the directive (or by the analogous Hatch Act provision) and waivers have not been granted previously, the Acting Secretary of the Army and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) denied the request. If MG Frost wishes instead to stand with her husband in a receiving line, for example, she does not require a waiver. ✓

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)

Military Assistant Note

To: Mr. Alcides Ortiz
From: CDR T. L. Copenhaver
Date: 9/1/2004
Re: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial 2 (SNOWFLAKE)

Sir,

Attached is a waiver request by MajGen Frost from certain prohibitions against political activities. While reviewing the package, the DEPSECDEF had some additional questions he would like answered. Please respond to DEPSECDEF's concerns and prepare a memo for Mr. Dell'Orto to send to the Deputy.

Response is due by COB on 2 September 2004. Please note that Mr. Dell'Orto's response is due to DEPSECDEF on 3 September 2004.


v/ ~~Tom Copenhaver~~
r. Tom Copenhaver

CC: Mr Dell'Orto, Col Reed

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

1.Sep.04-0700

MEMORANDUM FOR: GC, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Gentleman,

The DSD reviewed the attached package and wrote the following questions referencing the 29 Apr 04 letter, paragraph 3: "What is ^{the} ~~his~~ referring to here? Is some limited waiver for spouses to at least stand in receiving lines, etc. appropriate? Specifically 5 C.F.R. 734.302 and a DoD decision to relax restrictions.
Thank You.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Helmick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: ~~9 Aug 04~~

3 Sep 04

~~SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036900

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

August 19, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Here is a request that I have not reviewed carefully.

Please get into it and get with the Deputy Secretary to figure out the proper course of action.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/5/04 AAFES memo to SecDef [OSD11853-04]

DHR:dh
081904-5

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036902

OSD 13274-04



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

OFFICE OF THE

224 AUG -9
AUG 05 2004



SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Secretary of Defense
FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. Request for a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I am requesting this waiver so that I may participate in the campaign of my husband, Congressman Martin Frost. This request follows two earlier requests to department of the Army that have been denied. //

2. I requested a waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04. It was denied by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, by letter dated 12 Apr 04. I requested reconsideration by letter dated 29 Apr 04 and asked that, if my request was denied, I be given the specific reasons. The 16 Jul 04 denial states that granting this waiver "would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral."

3. I respectfully submit to you that the political neutrality of the Department of the Army will not be adversely impacted should you grant my request for waiver. When the restrictive language of DODD 1344.10 and AR 600-20 was drafted, it was unlikely that anyone anticipated that a service member would be married to a Member of Congress. The current Administration has emphasized that strong marriages are central to a strong America. Therefore, I would plead that the ability of anyone to fully participate in the life of his/her spouse is central to a strong marriage - recreation, avocation, or career. To restrict me, as a result of my military service, is to communicate that marriage within the military is less relevant than that of the private sector. My husband's constituents and potential voters do not now, nor would they in the future, presume my advocacy for my husband or my participation on his behalf to be anything other than my support for or belief in the man I love. No one would view action on my part either as violating Army neutrality in an election or as a service endorsement of any candidate - rather the expected support of the wife. //

4. Specifically, I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates, or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband. //

5. I do not believe that allowing me to participate in my husband's campaign under these conditions would cause a reasonable person to perceive that the integrity of the Army or the Department of Defense has been compromised. For this reason, and the reasons outlined in my previous letters, I respectfully ask that you expeditiously approve my request.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DA Ltr, 16 July 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr, 29 Apr 04
3. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
4. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Acting Secretary of the Army

11-L-0559/OSD/036903

OSD 11853-04

TAB

1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

JUL 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters,
AAFES, P. O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of waiver denial, DOD Directive 1344.10/AR 600-20

Your request for reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1's denial of your request to be allowed to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.

This denial is based on a careful review of DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3 (Enclosure 1) and AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3A(2)(c) (Enclosure 2), which prohibit members of the Army on active duty from participating in political campaigns. Granting the requested exception would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral.

As an additional matter, I recommend that you request your spouse's political campaign to delete all references to your duty position on its internet website to remove even the appearance that as an Army officer you are participating in a political campaign.

My point of contact for this action is Chaplain (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, (b)(6)


R. L. Brownlee

Acting Secretary of the Army

Encl



TAB

2



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



APR 29 2004

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial. Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Army Chief of Staff

THRU: Secretary of the Army

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. I respectfully request reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of Army, 12 Apr 04, denial of my request for waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I requested this waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04, so I may participate in the campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. Specifically, I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language even contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions. Likewise, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. 734.307 civilian federal employees are permitted to participate in a spouse's political campaign. Examples of authorized participation include attending a fundraiser, standing in the receiving line, sitting at the head of the table, and urging others to vote for his or her spouse.

4. In order to comply with regulatory requirements and departmental policy, I have been forced into the role of silent spouse when I accompany my husband to various events that are critical to the success of his campaign. The spouses of today's political candidates, whether male or female, are expected to take a much more active role than in the past. As a result of my enforced silence even when appearing in public, my husband's supporters may question my loyalty, and his opponents may take advantage of the fact that I must remain silent in the face of criticism, against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates; or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.

6. The reason given for denying my original waiver request was that "HQDA policy follows the DoD policy." However, DoDD 1344.10 has vested authority in the Secretary of the Army to consider waiver requests based on individual situations. If my request continues to be denied, I ask that the specific reasons for such denial be provided to me.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cc: Army Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/036907

TAB

3



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

1 2 APR 2004

DAPE-HR-L

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

1. Your 26 Feb 04 request for a waiver under AR 600-20, to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.
2. This denial is based on a careful review of AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3a(2)(c) and DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3. DOD policy prohibits members of the Armed Forces on active duty from participating in campaigns. In this regard, HQDA policy follows the DOD policy.
3. My responsible officer for this action is the Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, CH (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, (b)(6)

F. L. HAGENBECK
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1

TAB

4



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



FEB 26 2004

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

Lieutenant General F. L. Hagenbeck
Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Pentagon 2E736
Washington, DC 20310


1. I respectfully request a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), AR 600-20. I am requesting **this** waiver in order to campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. In today's multi-media political campaign, spouses of candidates are expected to take an active role in the campaign. I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; host events at my home for him; and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe that the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of my candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language ever contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My previous request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions.

4. I have of course refrained from these activities since our marriage, in compliance with regulatory requirements and departmental policy. As a result, my husband's supporters have questioned my loyalty, and his opponents have taken advantage of the fact that I had to remain silent in the face of criticism against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AXFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or DoD; solicit or receive campaign contributions from a member of the Armed Forces or from a civilian employee of the United States; or use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates.


KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

11-L-0559/OSD/036911

TAB B



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

1745
9/25
D/K

INFO MEMO

August 20, 2004, 4:00 P.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

- On February 26, 2004, Major General Kathryn Frost requested a waiver from certain political activity prohibitions. (Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 provides that service members on active duty may not engage in campaigning.) In the request, at TAB 1, she expressed her wish to take an active role in her husband's campaign for reelection to the U.S. House of Representatives.
- The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army denied the request on April 12, 2004 and the Acting Secretary of the Army affirmed such determination on July 16, 2004. See TABS 2 and 3.
- On August 5, 2004, MG Frost forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a request for reconsideration, at TAB 4. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD(P&R)) coordinated this action with my office and denied the request on August 17, 2004. See TAB 5.
- The determination by USD(P&R) constitutes final resolution of the matter. Any further action is therefore unnecessary.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)

8/25
Batterson



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



FEB 26 2004

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, XR 600-20

Lieutenant General F.L. Hagenbeck
Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Pentagon 2E736
Washington, DC 20310

1. I respectfully request a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), AR 600-20. I am requesting this waiver in order to campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. In today's multi-media political campaign, spouses of candidates are expected to take an active role in the campaign. I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; host events at my home for him, and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe that the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language ever contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My previous request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions.

4. I have of course refrained from these activities since our marriage, in compliance with regulatory requirements and departmental policy. As a result, my husband's supporters have questioned my loyalty, and his opponents have taken advantage of the fact that I had to remain silent in the face of criticism against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or DoD; solicit or receive campaign contributions from a member of the Armed Forces or from a civilian employee of the United States; or use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

11-L-0559/OSD/036914



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

12 APR 2004

DAPE-HR-L

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, **AR 600-20**

1. Your **26 Feb 04** request for a waiver under **AR 600-20**, to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, **is denied**.
2. This denial is based on a careful review of **AR 600-20**, paragraph 5-3a(2)(c) and DODD **1344.10**, paragraph 4.1.2.3. DOD policy prohibits members of the Armed Forces on active duty from participating in campaigns. In this regard, HQDA policy follows the DOD policy.
3. My responsible officer for this action is the Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, CH (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, (b)(6)

F. L. HAGENBECK
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

JUL 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters,
AAFES, P. O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of waiver denial, DOD Directive 1344.10/AR 600-20

Your request for reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1's denial of your request to be allowed to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.

This denial is based on a careful review of DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3 (Enclosure 1) and AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3A(2)(c) (Enclosure 2), which prohibit members of the Army on active duty from participating in political campaigns. Granting the requested exception would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral.

As an additional matter, I recommend that you request your spouse's political campaign to delete all references to your duty position on its internet website to remove even the appearance that as an Army officer you are participating in a political campaign.

My point of contact for this action is Chaplain (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, (b)(6)

R. L. Brownlee

Acting Secretary of the Army

Encl.



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

OFFICE OF THE
204 MG-9
AUG 05 2004



SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Secretary of Defense

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. Request for a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I am requesting this waiver so that I may participate in the campaign of my husband, Congressman Martin Frost. This request follows two earlier requests to department of the Army that have been denied.

2. I requested a waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04. It was denied by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, by letter dated 12 Apr 04. I requested reconsideration by letter dated 29 Apr 04 and asked that, if my request was denied, I be given the specific reasons. The 16 Jul 04 denial states that granting this waiver "would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral."

3. I respectfully submit to you that the political neutrality of the Department of the Army will not be adversely impacted should you grant my request for waiver. When the restrictive language of DODD 1344.10 and AR 600-20 was drafted, it was unlikely that anyone anticipated that a service member would be married to a Member of Congress. The current Administration has emphasized that strong marriages are central to a strong America. Therefore, I would plead that the ability of anyone to fully participate in the life of his/her spouse is central to a strong marriage - recreation, avocation, or career. To restrict me, as a result of my military service, is to communicate that marriage within the military is less relevant than that of the private sector. My husband's constituents and potential voters do not now, nor would they in the future, presume my advocacy for my husband or my participation on his behalf to be anything other than my support for or belief in the man I love. No one would view action on my part either as violating Army neutrality in an election or as a service endorsement of any candidate - rather the expected support of the wife.

4. Specifically, I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates, or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.

5. I do not believe that allowing me to participate in my husband's campaign under these conditions would cause a reasonable person to perceive that the integrity of the Army or the Department of Defense has been compromised. For this reason, and the reasons outlined in my previous letters, I respectfully ask that you expeditiously approve my request.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DA Ltr, 16 July 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr 29 Apr 04
3. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
4. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cc: Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 11853-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036917



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



AUG 17 2004

Major General Kathryn G. Frost
Headquarters, Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202


Dear General Frost:

I regret that I must deny your request for a waiver from certain prohibitions contained in Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 and Army Regulation 600-20,

As the Supreme Court has ruled, "keeping official military activities . . . wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind . . . is wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control." *Greer v. Spock*, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); *see also* 42 U.S.C. § 1972. To maintain this neutrality, Department of Defense officials and active-duty members of the Armed Forces must avoid even the appearance of political partiality.

The participation of an active-duty Major General and senior commander in political campaigning would violate this standard.

Sincerely,



David S. C. Chu

cc:

Acting Secretary of the Army



11-L-0559/OSD/036918



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004-09-02 11:11:57

INFO MEMO

September 2, 2004, 10:00 A.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

- o You asked for information about the regulation concerning the participation of civilian employees in a spouse's political campaign. You also asked whether some limited waiver allowing Major General Kathryn G. Frost to stand in a receiving line, for example, was appropriate.
- o Under the Hatch Act, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has issued regulations in 5 C.F.R. §§ 734.307 and 734.405 that address the issue specifically. One section appears in the subpart with the least restrictions. The other appears in the subpart that applies to members of the Senior Executive Service (SES), employees of the National Security Agency (NSA), etc., who are subject to more restrictive rules.
 - o Under the subpart with less restrictions, section 734.307 provides that employees who are a candidate's spouse are subject to the same rules as other employees covered by this subpart. For example, they may attend a spouse's fundraiser, "stand in the receiving line," and "sit at the head table." They also may appear with the spouse in a political advertisement or broadcast and urge others to vote for the spouse.
 - o Under the subpart with more restrictions, section 734.405 provides that employees may attend a political function with the spouse. For example, they "may stand in the receiving line and sit at the head of the table during a political dinner honoring the spouse." The section also states that they may appear in photographs of the candidate's family that might appear in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature.
- o Members of the armed services are not subject to the Hatch Act, but the applicable rules (published in DoD Directive 1344.10) are analogous to the more restrictive rules in it. (Under one rule, service members—like NSA employees—may not participate in political campaigns.) The directive does not address the specific



issue at hand, but it requires the use of rules of reason and common sense when determining whether an activity should be prohibited. For this reason, service members have not been prohibited from attending political functions, standing in the receiving line, or sitting at the head table with the spouse (as long as they are out of uniform). Nor have they been prohibited from appearing in photographs of the candidate's family that might appear in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature.

- In her request, however, MG Frost does not seek a waiver to engage in such activities. Rather, she wishes to take an active role in her husband's campaign, representing him at events that he cannot attend and speaking on his behalf. Because such activities are not allowed by the directive (or by the analogous Hatch Act provision) and waivers have not been granted previously, the Acting Secretary of the Army and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) denied the request. If MG Frost wishes instead to stand with her husband in a receiving line, for example, she does not require a waiver.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)

Military Assistant Note

To: Mr. Alcides Ortiz
From: CDR T. L. Copenhaver
Date: 9/1/2004
Re: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial 2 (SNOWFLAKE)

Sir,

Attached is a waiver request by MajGen Frost from certain prohibitions against political activities. While reviewing the package, the DEPSECDEF had some additional questions he would like answered. Please respond to DEPSECDEF's concerns and prepare a memo for Mr. Dell'Orto to send to the Deputy.

Response is due by COB on 2 September 2004. Please note that Mr. Dell'Orto's response is due to DEPSECDEF on 3 September 2004.


v/r, Tom Copenhaver

CC: Mr. Dell'Orto, Col Reed

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

1 Sep 04-0700

MEMORANDUM FOR: GC, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Gentleman,

The DSD reviewed the attached package and wrote the following questions referencing the 29 Apr 04 letter, paragraph 3: "What is ~~the~~^{the} referring to here? Is some limited waiver for spouses to at least stand in receiving lines, etc. appropriate?
Specially 5 CFA. 734.302 and a DOD decision to relax restrictions.
Thank You.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Helmick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: ~~9 Aug 04~~

3 Sep 04

SECRET

11-L-0559/OSD/036922

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

August 19, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Here is a request that I have not reviewed carefully.

Please get into it and get with the Deputy Secretary to figure out the proper course of action.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/5/04 AAFES memo to SecDef [OSD 11853-04]

DHR:dh
081904-5

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04


~~FOUO~~

OSD 13274-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036924



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Secretary of Defense

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. Request for a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I am requesting this waiver so that I may participate in the campaign of my husband, Congressman Martin Frost. This request follows two earlier requests to department of the Army that have been denied.
2. I requested a waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04. It was denied by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, by letter dated 12 Apr 04. I requested reconsideration by letter dated 29 Apr 04 and asked that, if my request was denied, I be given the specific reasons. The 16 Jul 04 denial states that granting this waiver "would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral."
3. I respectfully submit to you that the political neutrality of the Department of the Army will not be adversely impacted should you grant my request for waiver. When the restrictive language of DODD 1344.10 and AR 600-20 was drafted, it was unlikely that anyone anticipated that a service member would be married to a Member of Congress. The current Administration has emphasized that strong marriages are central to a strong America. Therefore, I would plead that the ability of anyone to fully participate in the life of his/her spouse is central to a strong marriage - recreation, avocation, or career. To restrict me, as a result of my military service, is to communicate that marriage within the military is less relevant than that of the private sector. My husband's constituents and potential voters do not now, nor would they in the future, presume my advocacy for my husband or my participation on his behalf to be anything other than my support for or belief in the man I love. No one would view action on my part either as violating Army neutrality in an election or as a service endorsement of any candidate--rather the expected support of the wife.
4. Specifically, I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates, or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.
5. I do not believe that allowing me to participate in my husband's campaign under these conditions would cause a reasonable person to perceive that the integrity of the Army or the Department of Defense has been compromised. For this reason, and the reasons outlined in my previous letters, I respectfully ask that you expeditiously approve my request.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DA Ltr, 16 July 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr, 29 Apr 04
3. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
4. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 11853-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036925

TAB

1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

JUL 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters,
AAFES, P. O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of waiver denial, DOD Directive 1344.10/AR 600-20

Your request for reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1's denial of your request to be allowed to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.

This denial is based on a careful review of DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3 (Enclosure 1) and AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3A(2)(c) (Enclosure 2), which prohibit members of the Army on active duty from participating in political campaigns. Granting the requested exception would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral.

As an additional matter, I recommend that you request your spouse's political campaign to delete all references to your duty position on its internet website to remove even the appearance that as an Army officer you are participating in a political campaign.

My point of contact for this action is Chaplain (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, (b)(6)


R. L. Brownlee

Encl

Acting Secretary of the Army



TAB

2



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



APR 29 2004

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Army Chief of Staff

THRU: Secretary of the Army

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. I respectfully request reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of Army, 12 Apr 04, denial of my request for waiver **born** certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I requested this waiver by letter **dated** 26 Feb 04, so I may participate in the campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.
2. Specifically, I would like **to** be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot **be** present; speak on his behalf to organizations; **and** participate in media interviews.
3. I believe the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful **those** who crafted the language even contemplated the situation where a military member would **be married to** a politician. My request for a waiver in 2000 **was** denied. However, a recent decision by **the** Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions. Likewise, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. 731.307, civilian federal employees are permitted **to** participate in a **spouse's** political campaign. Examples of authorized participation include attending a fundraiser, standing in the receiving line, sitting at the head of the table, and urging others **to** vote for **his** or her spouse.
4. In order to comply with regulatory requirements and departmental policy, I have been forced into the role of silent **spouse** when I accompany my husband **to various** events **that** are critical **to** the success of **his** campaign. The **spouses** of today's political candidates, whether male or female, are **expected to** take a much more active role **than** in the past. As a result of my enforced silence even when appearing in public, my husband's supporters may question my loyalty, and his opponents may take advantage of the fact **that** I must remain silent in the face of criticism against him.
5. I will not wear my **uniform** or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation **to** interfere with my duties **as** the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates; or campaign **on behalf** of anyone but my husband.
6. The reason given for denying my original waiver request was **that** "HQDA policy follows the DoD policy." However, DoDD 1341.10 has vested authority in the Secretary of the Army to consider waiver requests **based** on individual situations. If my request continues to be denied, I ask **that** the specific reasons for such denial **be** provided **to** me.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Army Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/036929

TAB

3



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

12 APR 2004

DAPE-HR-L

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

1. Your 26 Feb 04 request for a waiver under AR 600-20, to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.
2. This denial is based on a careful review of AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3a(2)(c) and DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3. DOD policy prohibits members of the Armed Forces on active duty from participating in campaigns. In this regard, HQDA policy follows the DOD policy.
3. My responsible officer for this action is the Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, CH (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, (b)(6)

F. L. HAGENBECK
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1

TAB

4



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202




FEB 26 2004

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

Lieutenant General F. L. Hagenbeck
Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Pentagon 2E736
Washington, DC 20310

1. I respectfully request a waiver from cemin prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), AR 600-20. I am requesting this waiver in order to campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.
2. In today's multi-media political campaign, spouses of candidates are expected to take an active role in the campaign. I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; host events at my home for him, and participate in media interviews.
3. I believe that the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language ever contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My previous request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions.
4. I have of course refrained from these activities since our marriage, in compliance with regulatory requirements and departmental policy. As a result, my husband's supporters have questioned my loyalty, and his opponents have taken advantage of the fact that I had to remain silent in the face of criticism against
5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or DoD; solicit or receive campaign contributions from a member of the Armed Forces or from a civilian employee of the United States; or use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates.


KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

11-L-0559/OSD/036933

TAB B



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

1745
9/25
DJE

INFO MEMO

August 20, 2004, 4:00 P.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

- o On February 26, 2004, Major General Kathryn Frost requested a waiver from certain political activity prohibitions. (Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 provides that service members on active duty may not engage in campaigning.) In the request, at TAB 1, she expressed her wish to take an active role in her husband's campaign for reelection to the U.S. House of Representatives.
- o The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army denied the request on April 12, 2004 and the Acting Secretary of the Army affirmed such determination on July 16, 2004. See TABS 2 and 3.
- o On August 5, 2004, MG Frost forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a request for reconsideration, at TAB 4. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD(P&R)) coordinated this action with my office and denied the request on August 17, 2004. See TAB 5.
- The determination by USD(P&R) constitutes final resolution of the matter. Any further action is therefore unnecessary.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)

6/25
Dallman



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



FEB 26 2004

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

Lieutenant General *F L. Hagenbeck
Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Pentagon 2E736
Washington, DC 20310

1. I respectfully request a waiver From certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), AR 600-20. I am requesting this waiver in order to campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. In today's multi-media political campaign, spouses of candidates are expected to take an active role in the campaign. I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; host events at my home for him, and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe that the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language ever contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My previous request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions.

4. I have of course refrained From these activities since our marriage, in compliance with regulatory requirements and departmental policy. As a result, my husband's supporters have questioned my loyalty, and his opponents have taken advantage of the fact that I had to remain silent in the face of criticism against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply AAFES or DoD; solicit or receive campaign contributions From a member of the Armed Forces, or from a civilian employee of the United States, or use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

11-L-0559/OSD/036936



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

12 APR 2004

DAPE-HR-L

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, **AR** 600-20

1. Your 26 Feb 04 request for a waiver under **AR** 600-20, to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.
2. This denial is based on a careful review of **AR** 600-20, paragraph 5-3a(2)(c) and DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3. DOD policy prohibits members of the Armed Forces on active duty from participating in campaigns. In this regard, HQDA policy follows the DOD policy.
3. **My** responsible officer for this action is the Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, CH (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, (b)(6)

F. L. HAGENBECK
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

JUL 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters,
AAFES, P. O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of waiver denial, DOD Directive 1344.10/AR 600-20

Your request for reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1's denial of your request to **be** allowed to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.

This denial is based on a careful review of DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3 (Enclosure 1) and AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3A(2)(c) (Enclosure 2), which prohibit members of the Army on active duty from participating in political campaigns. Granting the requested exception would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral.

As an additional matter, I recommend that you request your spouse's political campaign to delete all references to your duty position on its internet website to remove even the appearance that as an Army officer you are participating in a political campaign.

My point of contact for this action is Chaplain (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, (b)(6)



R. L. Brownlee

Acting Secretary of the Army

Encl



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Secretary of Defense

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. Request for a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive **1344.10**, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I am requesting this waiver so that I may participate in the campaign of my husband, Congressman Martin Frost. This request follows two earlier requests to department of the Army that have been denied.
2. I requested a waiver by letter dated **26 Feb 04**. It was denied by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, by letter dated 12 Apr **04**. I requested reconsideration by letter dated 29 Apr **04** and asked that, if my request was denied, I be given the specific reasons. The **16 Jul 04** denial states that granting this waiver "would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral."
3. I respectfully submit to you that the political neutrality of the Department of the Army will not be adversely impacted should you grant my request for waiver. When the restrictive language of DODD **1344.10** and **AR 600-20** was drafted, it was unlikely that anyone anticipated that a service member would be married to a Member of Congress. The current Administration has emphasized that strong marriages are central to a strong America. Therefore, I would plead that the ability of anyone to fully participate in the life of his/her spouse is central to a strong marriage – recreation, avocation, or career. To restrict me, as a result of my military service, is to communicate that marriage within the military is less relevant than that of the private sector. My husband's constituents and potential voters do not now, nor would they in the future, presume my advocacy for my husband or my participation on his behalf to be anything other than my support for or belief in the man I love. No one would view action on my part either as violating Army neutrality in an election or as a service endorsement of any candidate – rather the expected support of the wife.
4. Specifically, I will **not** wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates, or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.
5. I do not believe that allowing me to participate in my husband's campaign under these conditions would cause a reasonable person to perceive that the integrity of the Army or the Department of Defense has been compromised. For this reason, and the reasons outlined in my previous letters, I respectfully ask that you expeditiously approve my request.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DA **Ltr**, 16 July 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr, 29 Apr 04
3. DAPE-HR-Ltr, 12 Apr 04
4. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 11853-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036939



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



AUG 17 2004

Major General Kathryn G. Frost
Headquarters, Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202


Dear General Frost:

I regret that I must deny your request for a waiver from certain prohibitions contained in Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 and Army Regulation 600-20.

As the Supreme Court has ruled, "keeping official military activities . . . wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind . . . is wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control." *Greer v. Spock*, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); *see also* 42 U.S.C. § 1972. To maintain this neutrality, Department of Defense officials and active-duty members of the Armed Forces must avoid even the appearance of political partiality.

The participation of an active-duty Major General and senior commander in political campaigning would violate this standard.

Sincerely,



David S. C. Chu

cc:
Acting Secretary of the Army



11-L-0559/OSD/036940

September 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Archbishop George

How do you think I should answer the attached letter from Francis Cardinal George?

Thanks.

Attach.
08/19/04 Letter to SecDef from Francis Cardinal George

DHR:ss
090704-35

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

33550

750904

ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO

Office of the Archbishop



Post Office Box 1979
Chicago, Illinois 60690-1979

August 19, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld,

It was good to hear from you at the Commercial Club luncheon on August 6, and I thank you for your clarity and courtesy in responding so graciously to my question about the future of the Christian communities in Iraq. As I mentioned, the Archbishop of Baghdad, here three weeks ago, and others in Iraq have said exactly what you said about the improvement in the lives of ordinary Iraqis because of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States and its coalition partners.

The question of the Christian minority in Iraq is complicated, as you know, by the history of the treatment of Christian and Jewish minorities in officially Muslim lands. The state of dhimmitude imposed by Sharia is not really compatible with contemporary standards of freedom, both personal and religious, yet it seems Iraq cannot become simply a Western style constitutional democracy. Is there conceptual room for a culturally and even in some sense officially Muslim state which would not impose Sharia? My contacts with Muslim political scientists here leave me puzzled, which is why I put the question to you. I hope that someone, in the midst of the immediate turmoil, is working toward such an order. The alternative is the flight of most of the Christians in Baghdad, a phenomenon already occurring.

Thank you for your dedicated service to our country. You and your family, as well as your work, are daily in my prayers.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Francis Cardinal George".

Francis Cardinal George, OMI
Archbishop of Chicago

OSD 13281-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036942



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 27 2004

Archbishop Francis Cardinal George
Archdiocese of Chicago
Post Office **Box** 1979
Chicago, IL 60690-1979

Dear Archbishop George:

Thank you for your letter and kind words. I enjoyed the opportunity to speak at the Commercial Club Luncheon.

You raised an important question in your letter. My impression is that the Interim Iraqi Government is committed to establishing a system that respects all of the ethnic and religious diversity in that country.

It is a tough road ahead, but I believe the Iraqis are up to the task.

With best wishes,

OSD 13281-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036943

335811

27 Sep 04

19 Aug 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Archbishop Francis Cardinal George
Archdiocese of Chicago
Post Office Box 1979
Chicago, IL 60690-1979

Dear Archbishop George:

Thank you for your letter and kind words. I enjoyed the opportunity to speak at the Commercial Club Luncheon.

You raised an important question in your letter. My impression is that the ~~Interim~~ Iraqi government is committed to establishing a system that respects all of the ethnic and religious diversity in that country.

It is a tough road ahead, but I believe the Iraqis are up to the task.

With best wishes,

CSC
EX R6486
M

Archbishop Francis Cardinal George
Archdiocese of Chicago
Post Office **Box** 1979
Chicago, IL 60690-1979

Dear Archbishop George:

Thank you for your letter and kind words. I enjoyed the opportunity to speak at the Commercial Club Luncheon.

You raised an important question in your letter. My impression is that the interim Iraqi government is committed to establishing a system that respects all of the ethnic and religious diversity in that country.

It is a tough road ahead, but I believe the Iraqis are up to the task.

With best wishes,

Prep for
Secret
Signature

Archbishop Francis Cardinal George
Archdiocese of Chicago
Post Office Box 1979
Chicago, IL 60690-1979

Dear Archbishop George:

Thank you for your letter and kind words. I am pleased
~~that you~~ enjoyed the Commercial Club Luncheon.

opportunity to speak at
I appreciate your thoughts regarding Christian and
Jewish minorities in Iraq. You raise some important questions
that I will pass along to the appropriate folks.

With best wishes,

*You raised an important question
in your letter. My impression
is that the interim Iraqi government
is committed to establishing
a system that respects all
of the ethnic and religious
diversity in that country.*

*Prep for SecDef
Signature*

*It is a tough road ahead, but I believe the Iraqi and
Prime Minister Alawi ~~have~~ ^{are} up to the
task.*



Paul Butler

9/14

ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO

Office of the Archbishop



Post Office Box 1979
Chicago, Illinois 60690-1979

August 19, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld,

It was good to hear from you at the Commercial Club luncheon on August 6, and I thank you for your clarity and courtesy in responding so graciously to my question about the future of the Christian communities in Iraq. As I mentioned, the Archbishop of Baghdad, here three weeks ago, and others in Iraq have said exactly what you said about the improvement in the lives of ordinary Iraqis because of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States and its coalition partners.

The question of the Christian minority in Iraq is complicated, as you know, by the history of the treatment of Christian and Jewish minorities in officially Muslim lands. The state of dhimmitude imposed by Sharia is not really compatible with contemporary standards of freedom, both personal and religious, yet it seems Iraq cannot become simply a Western style constitutional democracy. Is there conceptual room for a culturally and even in some sense officially Muslim state which would not impose Sharia? My contacts with Muslim political scientists here leave me puzzled, which is why I put the question to you. I hope that someone, in the midst of the immediate turmoil, is working toward such an order. The alternative is the flight of most of the Christians in Baghdad, a phenomenon already occurring.

Thank you for your dedicated service to our country. You and your family, as well as your work, are daily in my prayers.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Francis Cardinal George".

Francis Cardinal George, OMI
Archbishop of Chicago

OSD 13281-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036947

~~FOUO~~

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleeza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Strategic Plan on Afghanistan

Why don't we get the Department of State, which is the lead agency on Afghanistan, to present a strategic plan on Afghanistan. I'm concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-3

AFGHANISTAN

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13293-04

2 Sept 04

11-L-0559/OSD/036948

7201

25 May - 1400
Scanned
1:05 PM
Call
6/1

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 24, 2004

SUBJECT: **Detainees**

383.6

Colin Powell said that Prime Minister Howard of Australia has got problems with two detainees. He hears they were mistreated in Baghram.

Please get somebody looking into it.

Thanks.

29 May 04

DHR/azn
050804.05

*Sec Def -
I've asked VCIS for an
investigation of the Hicks and
Habib cases, to be completed by 6/18.*

Please respond by:

*6/5. I have informed Secretary
Powell and the Australian Ambassador.
Paul W.*

24 MAY 04

OSD 13371-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036949

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 24, 2004

SUBJECT: **Detainees**

Colin Powell said that Beg has an issue. He is the UK detainee. Please look into it and get to Paul Wolfowitz, and have Paul get back to me and to Secretary Powell.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
050804.06

Please respond by: _____

See attached letter.

PW

OSD 13372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036950

1:07 PM

25 May 2004

Scanned

W 83.6

24 MAY 04

JUN 21 2004

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Warning

I read in the newspapers that President Putin says that he warned the US Iraq was planning terrorist attacks. Please check to see what he said and when pre-war.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061804-9

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

JUL 1 2004

*response attached
vr/CDR Noseny
7/2*

*File - forwarded
as 'A' Doc
TN/7/12*

OSD 13373-04

RUSSIA

21 JUN 04

1618-
1000

Uncl.

NESA

May 18, 2004
J-04/006914
EF-9633

IRAD

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: What Did Not Happen

Did someone in your shop ever pull together a list of all the things we planned for that did not happen?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051804-6

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

Paul Butler

Per 6/14

Sec Def

Exec Sec
Close this
Out - Unclass
version sent to
Sec Def
Paul Butler
7/23
Response attached.
vr/ [Signature]
6/14

OSD 13374-04

received 6/14
13-00-04 15442 IN

18 MAY 04

72
~~FOUO~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Ray Dubois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Updated Status of DoD Directives

I would like an update on the status of DoD Directives through September 1, so I can see what kind of progress we are making.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/21/03 DoD Directives Memo from SecDef to Ray Dubois

DHR:ss
090704-31

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13471-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036953



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2004 SEP 17 11 37 16

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Status *Ray DuBois 9/9/04*

In response to your attached September 7 snowflake requesting the status of the DoD Directives review, the chart at Tab A shows our status as of September 3.

- At the outset of the Directives review effort, 654 directives were reviewed for currency, and a total of 396 were identified for revision or cancellation (327 for revision and 69 for cancellation).
- To date, 193 have been submitted for formal coordination, and 70 (revisions and cancellations) have been signed by the DepSec.
- Many of the remaining 133 Directives are under internal review within their own components.
- e As the attached status chart indicates, two components (Policy and Intelligence) are lagging behind the others in completing their submissions for formal coordination. My staff is working with these components to help expedite the work they have in progress.
- e On July 12, I forwarded you the report at Tab B reflecting our progress. During a meeting on September 7, you noted this report and a question about its accuracy was raised. We reviewed the data and determined that the July 12 report was indeed accurate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Harold Neeley, ESCD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/036954

OSD 13471-04



~~FOUO~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Ray Dubois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Updated Status of DoD Directives

I would like an update on the status of DoD Directives through September 1, so I can see what kind of progress we are making.

Thanks..

Attach.
06/21/03 DoD Directives Memo from SecDef to Ray Dubois

DHR:ss
090704-31

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/036955

OSD 13471-04

TAB A

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
9/03/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>DEPSECDEF SIGNED</u>
USD(AT&L)	111	37	74	54	(73%)	21
USD(P)	66	11	55	7	(13%)	0
USD(C)	15	8	7	6	(86%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	98	94	58	(62%)	23
USD(I)	55	8	47	10	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	7
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	1
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	5
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	15	(27%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	5
TOTALS:	654	258	396	193	(49%)	70

* Of the 193 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

TAB
B

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
7/9/04**

COMPONENT	TOTAL NUMBER	CERTIFIED CURRENT	TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED	SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*	% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED	SIGNED
USD(AT&L)	108	37	71	50	(70%)	15
USD(P)	66	11	55	6	(11%)	0
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	(83%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	103	89	49	(55%)	18
USD(I)	58	8	50	11	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	6
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	0
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	4
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	14	(25%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	1	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	1
TOTALS:	654	264	390	178	(46%)	54

* Of the 178 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



ACTION MEMO

September 7, 2004, 10:00 AM

Paul Butler
PWB
9/14

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

- In response to your previous comment about reviewing any claims arising from Abu Ghraib allegations, Jim Haynes and Pete Geren sent you a draft memo (Tab B) that would have directed the Army (responsible for claims in Iraq) to submit any such claims packages to you.
- Your note of August 25 (Tab C) instead suggests delegating such review responsibility. Thus, I recommend proceeding with a process similar to the one set out in Jim Haynes' memo, with such claims being forwarded to the Secretary of the Army, who would review and act on the cases or, in his discretion, forward to me cases that raise particularly sensitive issues.
 - An example might be a claim not payable under any claims statute, in which case the Secretary of the Army could consider alternative authorities (e.g., emergency and extraordinary expense (EEE) authority) and either use such an authority to provide compensation himself or forward the claim to me with a recommendation.
- The attached memorandum for your signature (Tab A) directs the Secretary of the Army to take action to ensure completed reports of the foreign claims commission, or investigations under other applicable claims statutes, are forwarded to him for appropriate action.
- Army reports that nine detainee-related claims have been submitted, and five allege abuse/mistreatment at Abu Gharib prison. Six claims allege that death occurred as a result of abuse/mistreatment during detention. (Tab D)

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memorandum at Tab A.

Attachments: As stated.

COORDINATION: General Counsel

TSA SD	9/1/3
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	M 9/9

11-L-0559/OSD/036960

OSD 13474-04

383.6

75204

25A4904



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301



August 13, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Pete Geren *Pete Geren*

SUBJECT: Compensation for Abuse of Iraqi Detainees

Attached is an Action Memo from Jim Haynes proposing a way ahead for processing claims of abuse by Iraqi Detainees.

The proposal has been approved by CJCS, ASA and OGC. The only dissent came from Mr. Di Rita. He questioned whether you should, "really be the one to review all claims. Doesn't feel right to me."

Mr. Haynes explained to Mr. Di Rita that he believed the memo reflected your guidance and moved it forward for your consideration without change.

The memo and the coordinating documents are attached for your consideration.

TSA SD	8/16
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	M 8/16

OSD 10688-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036961



(Regenerated @ Col Cooper's request 8/13/04 JB)

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ORIGINAL

ACTION MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUL 12 PM 5:55

July 13, 2004, 2:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Processing of **Claims** by Iraqi **Detainees** Based on Allegations of
Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

- We understand ~~that~~, because of the sensitivity of allegations of **personal injury/abuse and** mistreatment by Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghraib prison, **you** will review all claims based on **such** allegations.
- The U.S. Army **has** claims responsibility in Iraq. The attached memorandum for **your** signature at Tab A **directs** the **Secretary** of the Army to forward to you, via **my** office, the completed **report** of the foreign claims commission, or investigation **under** other applicable claims **statutes**.
- These reports will contain a thorough **analysis** of:
 - whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign **Claims Act** or other claims **statutes**;
 - whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign **Claims Act** or other claims **statutes**; and
 - a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if **any**.
- If it is concluded that ~~the~~ claim is not payable **under** the Foreign **Claims Act** or **any other** claims **statute**, we will identify alternative authorities **under** which the claim could **be** paid, if you determine ~~that~~ payment is otherwise appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION: **Sign** the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments: **As** stated.



OSD 10688-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036962



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

A

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY


SUBJECT Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

The U.S. Army has claims responsibility in Iraq. Because of the sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment of Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghraib prison, I will review all claims based on such allegations.

Prior to my review, such claims will be investigated by a foreign claims commission under the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. 2734, or investigated under other applicable claims statutes. The report of investigation will include a thorough analysis of whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, and recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any.

The report of the foreign claims Commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes, will be forwarded to me, via the Secretary of the Army and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, the Secretary of the Army will identify alternative authorities under which the claim could be paid and a recommendation whether such payment is appropriate.

Copy to:
C CS
CDR, USCENTCOM USD (P)
DD General Counsel



11-L-0559/OSD/036963



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20315-0200

B

JUN 18 2004

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Brownlee".

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

Printed on Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/036964



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-2000

CH-1827-04
10 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE

Subject: Processing of **Claims** of Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of
Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft memorandums to the
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army.¹

2. I recommend one correction to the ACTION MEMO to the Secretary of
Defense:

Second bullet, second sub-bullet. Change as follows: "whether the
claimant ~~is~~ **is** a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims
statutes; and"

REASON: Clarity.

3. No other changes required.


RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

OGC memorandum, 1 June 2004, "Processing of **Claims** by Iraqi
Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and
Mistreatment"

2	GENERAL COUNSEL
1	DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
3	IA
	7/15/04

Hab

From:

Sent:

To:

Cc:


Sub:

Lauren
CJCS
attach

We're
the ab
becau

So, do you think we could get a SOLIC, PDUSDP, or USDP coordination on this today? I'm hoping you'll find that
it is an and somewhere and that the right people have already looked at it.

Thank you, chuck

PD approval 
approve _____
disapprove _____
Other _____

7/19/17



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

JUN 01 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of
Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

Because of the unique sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment of Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghariib prison, the Secretary of Defense has indicated his intent to review all claims based on such allegations.

The Department of the Army has claims responsibility in Iraq. We have prepared a memorandum for signature by the Secretary of Defense that directs the Secretary of the Army to forward to the Secretary of Defense, via the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the completed reports of foreign claims commissions or investigations under other applicable claims statutes. These reports will contain a thorough analysis of: (1) whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes; (2) whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes; and (3) a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any. If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or any other claims statute, the reports forwarded by the Secretary of the Army will identify alternative authority under which the claim could be paid, should the Secretary of Defense determine that payment is otherwise appropriate.

Please provide your comments and coordination by the close of business June 5, 2004 on the proposed action memo and memorandum to be signed by the Secretary of Defense. TAB A. My point of contact for this matter is Ron Neubauer (703-697-0174); neubauer@dodgc.osd.mil.

Daniel J. Dell'Orto
Principal Deputy

Attachments:
As stated





GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1800

DRAFT

May 27, 2004, 5:00 PM

ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

- We understand that, because of the unique sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment by Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Gharib prison, you will review all claims filed based on such allegations.
- The U.S. Army has single service claims responsibility in Iraq. The attached memorandum for your signature directs the Secretary of the Army to forward to you, via my office, the completed report of the foreign claims commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes. Tab A. These reports will contain a thorough analysis of:
 - whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes;
 - whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes; and
 - a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any.
 - If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or any other claims statute, my office will identify alternative authority under which the claim could be paid, if you determine that payment is otherwise appropriate.

Recommendation: Sign memorandum at Tab A.

Attachment: As stated

Coordination:
Secretary of the Army
CJCS
USD (P)





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of
Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

The U.S. Army has claims responsibility in Iraq. Because of the unique sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment of Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghraib prison, I will review all claims based on such allegations. Prior to my review, such claims will be investigated by a foreign claims commission under the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. 2734, or investigated under other applicable claims statutes. The report of investigation will include a thorough analysis of whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, and a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any. The report of the foreign claims commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes, will be forwarded to me, via the Secretary of the Army and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, the Secretary of the Army will identify alternative authorities under which the claim could be paid.

Copy to:

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
USCENTCOM
USD (P)
DoD General Counsel



TOTAL P. 84



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-0000

CH-1827-04
10 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE

Subject: Processing of Claims of Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of
Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft memorandums to the
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army.¹

2. I recommend one correction to the ACTION MEMO to the Secretary of
Defense:

Second bullet, second sub-bullet. Change as follows: "whether the
claimant ~~is~~ is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims
statutes; and"

REASON: Clarity.

3. No other changes required.


RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

1. OGC memorandum, 1 June 2004, "Processing of Claims by Iraqi
Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and
Mistreatment"

2	GENERAL COUNSEL
1	DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
3	EA
	210001

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

30 August 2004 - 1625 Hours


MEMORANDUM FOR: OGC

SUBJECT: Processing Iraqi Detainee Claims

Sir,

Please draft a proposal to SD from DSD ref the attached document.

Very respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Stephen T. Ganyard', is written over the typed name.

Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 21Sep04

Attachment: As Stated

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/036971

INFORMATION PAPER

JACS-TCF
2 Sep 2004

SUBJECT: Detainee Claims and Investigations

1. **Purpose.** To provide a summary of specific claims for personal injury stemming from allegations of mistreatment at US military detention facilities in Iraq.

2. Claims.

a. The US Army Claims Service has three open claims pending investigation alleging personal injury as a result of detention at US military detention facilities. These investigations are almost complete.

(1) Hassan, Alaa Ahmed. Colonel (Iraqi Navy or Marines) Hassan alleges US forces captured him on 21 March 2003 while aboard his tugboat in the northern Persian Gulf and took him to a US Navy ship. While on US Navy ship, COL Hassan alleges that he was flexicuffed, shoved by two US sailors, and slipped on the deck of the ship, where he injured his foot. He alleges he received no medical treatment other than having his foot wrapped in a bandage, and that his foot has never properly healed. However, in another interview, COL Hassan alleged that he broke his leg while in Camp Bucca, a US detention facility in Am Qser. He alleges elbow injury from his hands flexicuffed behind his back overnight. COL Hassan alleges damages of \$20,000 and medical and travel costs to a foreign country for surgery on his elbow. Prior coordination with the US Navy resulted in no information of his detention. Investigation is completed and is pending recommendation for denial as he is not a proper claimant. Processed under the Foreign Claims Act.

(2) Shaltout, Hassam. Mr. Shaltout is a Canadian citizen who is a resident alien in Los Angeles, California, who was in Iraq with a peace organization. Mr. Shaltout also claims to be an employee of Gamin Europe, and to have sold products for that company prior to entering Iraq. US Marines detained him in Baghdad on 9 April 2003, and sent him to Camp Bucca. Mr. Hassan claims that he was beaten and tortured at the camp, and that his property, including \$119,000 in cash in his hotel room, which he was not allowed to secure while detained, was stolen from him. Mr. Shaltout alleges \$350,000 in personal injury (depression, PTSD, hearing loss in left ear, and aggravation of previously existing glaucoma and of a preexisting hernia) and property loss. Claimant and military police interviewed. Interviewed apprehending Marines and treating physician. Processed under the Military Claims Act. Investigation completed, pending drafting of recommendation.

(3) Saleh, Haidar Muhsin. Mr. Saleh is a Swedish citizen, who alleges that US military personnel detained and imprisoned him in el-Najaf, el-Dewaniya, and

Abu Ghraib, Iraq; tortured; and stole \$79,000 cash and a Mercedes Benz automobile worth \$3,000. He alleges \$100,000 in personal injury (insomnia; depression; PTSD; injury to left leg, right hand, and head) and property damage. Mr. Saleh submitted an amended claim on 8 Jun 2004, and now alleges \$3.5 million in personal injury. Investigation completed and pending drafting of recommendation. Processed under the Foreign Claims Act.

b. The US Army Claims Service received three claims on 7 Jul 04 alleging wrongful death as a result of detention at US military detention facilities. The Service will process under the Foreign Claims Act. On 16 July 2004, this Service requested CID reports, if any, of these named individuals.

(1) Aziz, Abdul Hasan Khashan (claimant). The claimant alleges that his son, Mawafiq Abdul Hassan Khashan, was arrested by US forces in May 2003 and detained at Abu Ghraib prison. In August 2003, the claimant was notified to pick up his son's body at the Al Shua'a police station. Identification of the body is in question. The claimant alleges \$7,000.00 in damages.

(2) Shamy, Abus Farhan (claimant). The claimant alleges that his son, Mosa Abas, died as a result of a bullet wound sustained while detained at Abu Ghraib prison. The claimant alleges \$5,000.00 in damages.

(3) Abdul-Kalil, I'lbam (Mrs.) (claimant). The claimant alleges that her husband, Asa'ad Abdulkarim Abduljali, was detained on 4 Jan 04 at the Asad Air Base (or aboard the Al Asad) and was tortured and killed on 9 Jan 04. The deceased had seven (7) minor children. The claimant alleges \$50,000.00 in damages.

c. The US Army Claims Service received three claims in Aug 04 alleging wrongful death as a result of detention at a US military detention facility. This Service will process the claim under the Foreign Claims Act.

(1) Shalan, Najia (Mrs.) (claimant). The claimant alleges that her husband, Loay Ibrahim, died on 19 Apr 04 as a result of his detention at Abu Ghraib. The claimant alleges \$3500.00 in damages.

(2) Menem, Ashraf Muhamed Abdul (claimant). The claimant alleges that his father, Dr. Mohammed Abdul Menem Mehmud, died on 31 Jan 04 as a result of his torture at Abu Ghraib prison. The claimant alleges \$10,000.00 in damages.

(3) Khamees, Shamsa Salman (claimant). The claimant alleges that her husband, Jassim Anoon Ayaash, died on 16 Aug 03 while in the custody of coalition forces. The claimant alleges \$50,000.00 in damages.

d. The US Army Claims Service has received notice of one potentially compensable event (PCE) in Iraq, yet there has not been a claim filed.

(1) Oday, Kareem (deceased). Name of family member is unknown at this time. US forces detained on 10 Sep 03, 4 months later, it was reported to the family that he died. No further information is available at this time and this Service is attempting to confirm actual receipt of a claim.

LTC Charlotte Herring/JACS-TCF/DSN (b)(6)
Charlotte.herring@claims.army.mil

21 Aug. 0849
Scanned

August 25, 2004

W
83.6

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Processing Iraqi Detainee Claims

I **just** looked at these memos ~~from~~ Haynes and Geren. There is no way in the world I am going to decide all **these** things. I either have to delegate it to you, or we have to delegate it to the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of ~~Staff~~ of the Army or somebody.

Please come back with **your** best proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/13/04 Geren memo [OSD #10688-04]

7/13/04 Haynes (GC) memo to SecDef re: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees

DHR:dh
082504-21 (is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

9/24/04

25 Aug 04

OSD 13474-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036975


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

✓ Sec Def
Signed.

TO C&D
PLEASE DISTR

7/11 9/15



GENERAL COUNSEL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

9/7/04

DEPSECDEF

Per your request, I
recommend you sign the attached.

W. H. Hays

OSD 13474-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP. 15 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of
Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

The U.S. Army has claims responsibility in Iraq. Because of the sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment by Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghraib prison, I ask that the Secretary of the Army review all claims based on such allegations and act on them in his discretion.

Prior to this review, such claims will be investigated by a foreign claims commission under the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. 2734, or investigated under other applicable claims statutes. The report of investigation will include a thorough analysis of whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, and a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any.

The report of the foreign claims commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes, should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army. If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, the Secretary of the Army will identify alternative authorities under which compensation could be provided and either take such action in appropriate cases or forward the claim to the Deputy Secretary of Defense via the General Counsel of the Department of Defense with a recommendation whether such payment is appropriate.

copy to:
CJCS
CDR, USCENTCOM
USD (P)
DoD General Counsel



OSD 13474-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036978

383.6

15SEP04

25AUG04

September 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Abizaid

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Using Kuwait to Relieve Pressure in Iraq

As we discussed at the SVTC this morning, I'd be interested in your assessment of how we could use Kuwait as a basing site to reduce the number of forces actually operating in Iraq and use the U.S. to reach back as well. This may be useful as we look ahead to allied roles.

KUWAIT

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090804-6

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

8 Sep 04

8/17
1000

720
~~FOUO~~

August 17, 2004

600

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: (b)(6) Letter

Let's answer this nice letter from (b)(6) tell her it was good to hear from her and we appreciate her support. See if we can get her a tour of the Pentagon and suggest she get a tour of the Capitol by writing her Congressman.

Thanks.

Attach
Letter from (b)(6)

DHR:ss
081704-6

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04

17 Aug 04

CSC
LETTER PLEASE
in 9/1

4 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13547-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036980

Dear Donald,

I have been waiting until it would be a good time to write to you. I had hoped that these times were better in the world.

I can just imagine the stress of your job. I'm also proud that you are the Secretary of Defense.

I don't know what all there would have done.

I pray that George Bush will get elected again.

We met in Little Rock a number of years ago. I was then President of the Republican Women Club.

I grew up in Northbrook and I remember my father campaigning for you when you first ran for Congress.

We corresponded for a few years when you were in Chicago.

Then I was excited when you became

OSD 13547-04

Secy. of Defense. What an honor and privilege
to serve under President Bush.

My son and I are going to
Washington D.C. the week of August 30th.
I would also like to see you.

If at all possible could you get
us passes for the White House and the
oval office? If there are any other places
that we need passes we would love to
see as much as possible.

Thank you for all your help.

Sincerely

(b)(6)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 9 2004

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your thoughtful letter and kind words. I appreciate them a great deal.

Unfortunately, postal security delays prevented me from getting your letter until just recently. However, the next time you plan a trip to Washington, please call my Front Office at (b)(6) to arrange a Pentagon tour. For a tour of the Capitol, you might contact your Congressional Representative.

I hope your visit to D.C. was pleasurable.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 13547-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036983

CSC Go SMOOCH

Sm 9/6

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your thoughtful letter and kind words. I appreciate them a great deal.

Unfortunately, postal security delays prevented me from getting your letter until just recently. However, the next time you plan a trip to Washington, please call my Front Office at (b)(6) to arrange a Pentagon tour. For a tour of the Capitol, you might contact your Congressional Representative.

I hope your visit to D.C. was pleasurable.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Sam

Let me get this until 9/6.
I will be in the office until 9/6.

Sam



HEALTH AFFAIRS

7201
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

SEP 02 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *W. Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Bird Flu

- You inquired as to potential implications for DoD regarding Bird Flu. (TAB A)
- Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Thompson delivered a memo to the President discussing the threat of Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) on August 26, 2004. This memo outlined steps the United States Government is taking to prepare for the potential that this strain of influenza (H5N1) could cause an influenza pandemic. The Department of Defense has been an active participant in the interagency planning process over the past six months.
- Important recent developments include:
 - Bird Flu is now considered endemic in Southeast Asia. Poultry flocks continue to turn up with the virus at unprecedented levels such that no expert in the field expects that it will go away on its own. A recent report from China indicates the H5N1 virus has now been found in pigs as well.
 - Scientists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and at the World Health Organization (WHO) are very concerned this virus will develop the ability to be transmitted human to human, raising the potential for a worldwide influenza pandemic.
- Secretary Thompson's memo summarized the work done to date and the way forward.
 - HHS has released their Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. DoD has participated with HHS in the development of this plan, and contributed on aspects of the plan that affect us.

OSD 13556-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036985

- Expanded surveillance efforts are already underway to ensure the earliest possible detection of the emergence of an H5N1 strain that can cause a pandemic. DoD participates in this effort through its overseas labs and the DoD Global Emerging Infections System (GEIS).
- The National Institutes of Health has launched an initiative to develop and test potential vaccine candidates against the H5N1 strain and has taken actions to ensure the most rapid and effective production of vaccine should a pandemic occur. DoD has been working with them to ensure we will have access to an effective vaccine as quickly as possible to protect our forces worldwide.
- HHS has purchased 1.3 million treatment courses of the antiviral drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu), which is the only suitable antiviral drug against this particular form of influenza. The strategic national stockpile should have 2.3 million doses by December 2004. DoD is procuring a stockpile of Tamiflu and will position it forward in the Pacific theater and CENTCOM to be used for our forward deployed forces, if needed. DoD will also participate in a September 13, 2004 conference with HHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs to establish a common operational strategy for the deployment and use of antivirals during a pandemic outbreak.
- HHS and the White House have prepared documents to add a pandemic strain of influenza to the President's executive order for quarantine authority.
- HHS has contracted with an independent body to perform an interim assessment of the nation's pandemic preparedness. My staff is also finalizing DoD guidelines for pandemic influenza preparedness to ensure synchronization with the national plan.
- We will continue to participate in the interagency planning process to ensure that DoD will be maximally prepared in the event of an influenza pandemic. I will keep you informed.

COORDINATION: TAB B

cc:

USD (P)

USD (P&R)

CJCS

VCJCS

Prepared by: COL Steve Phillips, FHP&R, (b)(6) PCDOCS#69842/R69941

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

28 August 2004 - 1005 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR ASD(HA)


SUBJECT: Bird Flu

Sir,

Please prepare a DSD draft response to SD, reference the attached SD Snowflake.

Thank you

Very Respectfully



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC

Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

ATTACHMENT: As Stated

SUSPENSE: 01Sep04

Cal XTRA

1800
8/27

August 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Bird Flu

Please find out what the President was talking about with respect to the Senate-Secretary Thompson memo on bird flu and see if there are any implications for DoD.

Thanks,

DHR:dh
082704-1 (is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

9/3/04

Bird Flu Snowflake

COORDINATION

DASD (FHP&R)

Ms. Ellen P. Embrey

Concur 9/1/04


Cos (HA)

COL Thoru Kurlmel

Concur, 9/1/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S. C. Chu

 David S. C. Chu —
9 Sep 04

Bird Flu- Update

COORDINATION

DASD (FHP&R)

Ms. Ellen P. Embrey

EP 9/1/04

Cos. (HA)

COL Thorn Kurinel

PDASD (HA)

Mr. Ron Richards

USD (P&R)

Dr. **David S.C.** Chu



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

SEP 02 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Bird Flu

- You inquired as to potential implications for DoD regarding Bird Flu. (TAB A)
- Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Thompson delivered a memo to the President discussing the threat of Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) on August 26, 2004. This memo outlined steps the United States Government is taking to prepare for the potential that this strain of influenza (H5N1) could cause an influenza pandemic. The Department of Defense has been an active participant in the interagency planning process over the past six months.
- Important recent developments include:
 - Bird Flu is now considered endemic in Southeast Asia. Poultry flocks continue to turn up with the virus at unprecedented levels such that no expert in the field expects that it will go away on its own. A recent report from China indicates the H5N1 virus has now been found in pigs as well.
 - Scientists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and at the World Health Organization (WHO) are very concerned this virus will develop the ability to be transmitted human to human, raising the potential for a worldwide influenza pandemic.
- Secretary Thompson's memo summarized the work done to date and the way forward.
- HHS has released their Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. DoD has participated with HHS in the development of this plan, and contributed on aspects of the plan that affect us.

710

25 Sep 04

27 Aug 04

OSD 13556-04

11-L-0559/OSD/036991

- Expanded surveillance efforts are already underway to ensure the earliest possible detection of the emergence of an H5N1 strain that can cause a pandemic. DoD participates in this effort through its overseas labs and the DoD Global Emerging Infections System (GEIS).
- The National Institutes of Health has launched an initiative to develop and test potential vaccine candidates against the H5N1 strain and has taken actions to ensure the most rapid and effective production of vaccine should a pandemic occur. DoD has been working with them to ensure we will have access to an effective vaccine as quickly as possible to protect our forces worldwide.
- HHS has purchased 1.3 million treatment courses of the antiviral drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu), which is the only suitable antiviral drug against this particular form of influenza. The strategic national stockpile should have 2.3 million doses by December 2004. DoD is procuring a stockpile of Tamiflu and will position it forward in the Pacific theater and CENTCOM to be used for our forward deployed forces, if needed. DoD will also participate in a September 13, 2004 conference with HHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs to establish a common operational strategy for the deployment and use of antivirals during a pandemic outbreak.
- HHS and the White House have prepared documents to add a pandemic strain of influenza to the President's executive order for quarantine authority.
- HHS has contracted with an independent body to perform an interim assessment of the nation's pandemic preparedness. My staff is also finalizing DoD guidelines for pandemic influenza preparedness to ensure synchronization with the national plan.
- We will continue to participate in the interagency planning process to ensure that DoD will be maximally prepared in the event of an influenza pandemic. I will keep you informed.

COORDINATION: TAB B.

cc:

USD (P)

USD (P&R)

CJCS

VCJCS

Prepared by: COL Steve Phillips, FHP&R, (b)(6) PCDOCS#69842/R69941

Bird Flu Snowflake

COORDINATION

DASD (FHP&R)

Ms. Ellen P. Embrey

Concur **9/1/04**


Cos (HA)

COL Thorn Kurlmel

Concur, 9/1/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S. C. Chu


9 Sep 04

Bird Flu- Update

COORDINATION

DASD (FHP&R)

Ms. Ellen P. Ernbreys

200 9/1/04

Cos (HA)

COL Thom Kurinel

PDASD (HA)

Mr. Ron Richards

USD (P&R)


Dr. David S.C. Chu

Cal XTRA

1800
8/27

August 21, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Bird Flu

Please find out what the President was talking about with respect to the Senate-Secretary Thompson memo on bird flu and see if there are any implications for DoD.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082704-1 (in computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920
INFO MEMO

September 10, 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *AMM*


SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

I did not attempt to flesh out the short sketches of alternative futures in my 24 February note. Ideally a team of people should do that, but since you are interested I will next week send you what I and a couple of people in my office can do.

Attachments:

TAB A. 10/07/04 Memo from SecDef to Mr. Marshall re: Alternative Futures and
02/24/04 Memo from Mr. Marshall re: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years.

Prepared by: MSgt Riche



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



11-L-0559/OSD/036996

OSD 13644-04

September 7, 2004

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

I was just re-reading your February 24, 2004 memo (attached). Have you gone ahead and attempted to flesh out several alternative futures? If so, I'd like to see them.

Thanks.

Attach.

02/24/04 Memo from Andy Marshall to SecDef re: Assumptions for Next **Two** or Three Years

DHR:ss
090704-14

.....
Please *respond* by 9/10



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

PH 917

R-1

24 February 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Andy Marshall *Am*

SUBJECT: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

Here are my thoughts:

1. Major geo-political structure of the world will be as it is now. A possible Economic/banking crisis in China could affect its relative position some. Therefore, the main uncertainties that should be taken account of in DoD planning concern:

- How the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, N. Korea play out over the next few years.
- The fate of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines; where governments could change or internal unrest increase. Some changes could be very favorable and others create major problems.
- Large casualty terror events in the U.S., Western Europe.
- Constant high rate of scientific and technological advance leading to some surprises.

2. An effort to flesh out three to four alternative futures could be mounted. A team of people is needed to cover the wide range of knowledge necessary for intelligent speculation.

7.



11-L-0559/OSD/036998

OSD 09729-041



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

INFO MEMO

201 SEP 1 11 3 12

September 10, 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Acmm*

SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

I did not attempt to flesh out the short sketches of alternative futures in my 24 February note. Ideally a team of people should do that, but since you are interested I will next week send you what I and a couple of people in my office can do.

Attachments:

TAB A, 10/07/04 Memo from SecDef to Mr. Marshall re: Alternative Futures and
02/24/04 Memo from Mr. Marshall re: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years.

Prepared by: MSgt Riche, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



11-L-0559/OSD/036999

OSD 13644-04

381

105204

75204

72
September 10, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Gen. Abizaid
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Manning at General Sanchez's HQ

At the recent Congressional hearings on Abu Ghraib, there were several questions concerning the manning at General Sanchez's Headquarters. I'd like to see a lay down of the manning requests and how we filled them over the relevant period.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091004-6

.....
Please respond by 9/15/04

OSD 13665-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037000

Iraq

10 Sep 04

9/13 1400

~~FOUO~~

August 15, 2004

I-04/04016
ES-0461

Ukraine

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Link Ukraine to NATO

I want to find ways to better link Ukraine to NATO.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-15 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/10/04

15 Aug 04

OSD 13759-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037001

17-03-04 14:32

~~FOUO~~

August 17, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from George Peugeot

Please read this letter from George Peugeot and tell me what you think we ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach
Letter from George Peugeot

DHR:ss
081704-5

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

TO: SecDef
From Paul Butler

We are in the process of drafting a response back from you thanking Mr. Peugeot for his letter and stating that we have forwarded to Homeland Defense for consideration and they will be in touch. I've spoken to Pete Verga (Paul Meltale's deputy) and he is going to study the proposal and get back to Mr. Peugeot about his ideas. I also sent a copy to Lin Wells to look at.

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13798-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037002

CSC

GO SMOOEN

W/ DEAR GEORGE

Mr. George L. Peugeot
President
S.P.A. Industries, Inc.
305 Crestwood Village
Northfield, IL 60093-3403

Dear Mr. Peugeot:

Thank you for your letter regarding the development of a national intelligence system.

You addressed some important issues. I have forwarded the information on to Homeland Defense for consideration. Someone from that end will be in touch with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

M 9/10 → Check with
Cathy and
Unclear if he is a
first name basis with Mr. Peugeot.
Although Peugeot addresses him as Secretary
Rosenfeld, there is personal info in the
letter. Thanks
Paul

Paul Butler
9/10

S.P.A. INDUSTRIES, INC.
305 CRESTWOOD VILLAGE
NORTHFIELD, ILLINOIS 60093-3403

Phil's Den's copy

G.L. PEUGEOT
PRESIDENT

(b)(6)

August 4, 2004



Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

(b)(6) send their regards. (b)(6) does too except his stroke has taken away his speech. However, his cognitive powers are almost at 100%.

I am consulting on my coming book with two outstanding geniuses. (b)(6) and associate. Both are working 24-7 for America. I have finished the book and it is headed to the publisher. Paul Wolfowitz has a very rough draft. Condoleezza Rice will get one.

Phil's brother, (b)(6) a Michigan State Police trooper at the time, wrote you a speeding ticket sometime in 1979. You were north bound on I-196 just north of South Haven Michigan. You were headed for a vacation at Saugatuck with your family. (b)(6) still remembers how courteous you were. I guess it is a small world.

(b)(6) has a strong past in information technology. While with the Michigan State Police he developed their Uniform Crime Reporting system that integrated reports from over 500 local police agencies. This application not only met the FBI requirements for the national Uniform Crime Reporting, but it also created a data repository that could be used for crime analysis and pattern detection across multiple police agencies.

He also developed a Major Case Investigation system that was recognized by the Department of Justice. He then went into the private sector working for EMC in the development and implementation of Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Security applications for industry.

Recently he served as an instructor for the roll-out of Homeland Securities' Airport Security Screener effort in 2002. He is currently working on the Department of Defense roll-out of the CHCS II Military Medical Treatment Facility medical system.

(b)(6) past experience came to light as he worked editing my manuscript. I asked him if his system would be used to provide a large scale national intelligence service and if so why he had not offered it. He told me if could. However, in the past the necessary national integration of law enforcement, etc, information had not been possible for the same reason pointed out in the 9/17 Commission report. I asked him to take a look at the new Department of Homeland Security to see if it offers anything.

He got back to me a couple of days later saying that the new DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection unit would be appropriate. He also identified a Dr. Ruth A David, who is on the Homeland Security Advisory Council, as bring a possible point of

contact through which the applicability of Phil's system could be explored. As past Technical **Advisor** to the Director of the CCIA and current CEO of Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER) it would appear that she would have the background and interest in this area.

I feel **such** a meeting with him is a must.

My guys, veterans, are still 100% behind you and so is Phil. The current emphasis on developing a **single** point national intelligence system is obvious and valid. Whatever structure the new Intelligence Czar appears in—the fact remains that he will need valid “intelligence” to work with. Something beyond a large scale collection of “reports”.

Offering a functional Anti-Terrorist Intelligence System along with the Missile Defense System would give President Bush some powerful campaign ammunition **and** delight the voters by providing solutions instead of the hollow “promises” the other fellow is hawking.

Phil can be reached at (b)(6)

Sincerely yours,


George Pegeot

Chicago-Denver-Palm Beach-Cincinnati-Holland
Since 1975

11-L-0559/OSD/037005



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 13 2004

Mr. George L. Peugeot
President
S.P.A. Industries, Inc.
305 Crestwood Village
Northfield, IL 60093-3403

Dear George:

Thank you for your letter regarding the development of a national intelligence system.

You addressed some important issues. I have forwarded the information on to Homeland Defense for consideration. Someone from that end will be in touch with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 13798-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037006

9-13-04

<
et*

September 14, 2004

TO: Ryan Henry
Mira Ricardel
John Rood

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Gen. Cartwright

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Revision 5 to STRATCOM Plan

STRATCOM

While I have approved ongoing work on Revision 5 to the STRATCOM Plan, I noted several provisos:

- Policy, working with STRATCOM and appropriate outside expertise, needs to ensure we have the political-military context for the scenarios in which we would use the options provided for in the revisions.
- We also need to consider how to bundle or package the options in sensible ways so that decision-makers can use them under pressure and quickly.
- Throughout the process, we must consider the reliability (or unreliability) of our intelligence and capture the effect of that factor.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091404-1

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

OSD 13867-04

14 SEP 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037007



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 14 PM 4:13

ACTION MEMO

CM-2043-04
13 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *14/11/10*

SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs (CA)

- **Question.** "When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** The **Army** has completed its study of the issue. VCSA was briefed on 26 Aug and approved a recommendation that all CA and PSYOP units remain assigned to US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).
- **Analysis.** TAB B summarizes **Army** staff briefing to the VCSA. TAB C is a VCSA memorandum giving the USASOC Commander his recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the scheduling of a meeting with you, USD(P), CSA, CMC, CDRUSSOCOM and me to review the Army recommendation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

OSD 13900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037008

322

13SEP04

21 APR 04

APR 27 2004

755

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-14

.....
Please respond by 5/9/04

OSD 13900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037009

30 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Army "Tiger Team" Briefing to Vice Chief of Staff

1. Purpose. To summarize latest Army briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
2. Key Points. On 26 August, the CA/PSYOP Tiger Team (CAPOTT) briefed the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) on options for the assignment of CA units.
 - The CAPOTT presented the following findings:
 - CA (and PSYOP) forces can best support operations by remaining under US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Reassigning CA to **Army** Forces Command would not increase Army interest in these activities, improve the transition to post-combat stabilization operations, nor support the Army Campaign Plan.
 - Addressing CA and PSYOP challenges requires partnership between US Army Forces Command and USASOC.
 - Operations would benefit ~~from~~ creation of a full-time strategic-level Civil Military Operations (CMO) planning/coordination capability.
 - The Army should consider elevating CMO to a doctrinal "battlefield operating system."
 - USASOC must redesign the current CA **and** PSYOP force structure for modularity and use Total Army Analysis to review AC/RC *mix*.
 - Extending the Reserve Component CA **branch** to *the* Active Component and creating a PSYOP branch would promote the management, professionalism and availability of those officers.
 - VCSA approved the findings and gave the following guidance:
 - Continue to work the force structure for CA and PSYOP.
 - Determine how to integrate CA, PSYOP and supported units per the Army Campaign Plan. This should include Combat Training Centers.
 - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation plan.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

86 AUG 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310**

SUBJECT: Results of **G-3** Directed *Civil Affairs* (CA) and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

1. **As** per our meeting and your request for assistance on **29 April 2004**, I convened a Civil **Affairs** and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The Team **also** analyzed **two** additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of **the Army Staff**, selected Army major commands, and selected outside agencies. It ensured **all** doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities **issues were** reviewed **and considered**.

2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces could best support the Army **by** remaining under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation Model's emphasis on modularity **will** assure that this capability **is** realized **as CA** and **PSYOP** staff planners will **be** assigned down to the BCT UA level. **The Tiger Team** recommends that **USASOC should** redesign the current CA and PSYOP *force* structures for modularity and **relook** the AC/RC mix.

3. During the conduct of the Tiger Team review and assessment the **following** three concepts were developed:

a. **Concept 1 - USACAPOC**, with all currently assigned forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to **support modularity**.

b. **Concept 2** - HQ USACAPOC with all **CA** and PSYOP Forces reassigned to JFCOM.

c. **Concept 3** - SOF supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.

4. Recommendation: The CAPOTT endorses **Concept 1** by utilizing the comparison criteria of Training/Readiness, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with FORSCOM to **support** transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.


11-L-0559/OSD/037011

SUBJECT: Results of **G-3** Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (**CAPOTT**)

5. Although this constitutes the closure of this Tiger Team, the **members** are available to assist in **any** capacity. We need to continue to **build** on the **momentum** gained **thus far**. Furthermore, **USASOC's** pursuit of branches for **CA** and **PSYOP** will **help** to increase professionalism, management, and availability of the **officers** in those branches.

6. The POC for this action is COL Jose Olivero, HQDA, G-3, **MOSO-SOD** (b)(6)

(b)(6)



RICHARD A. CODY
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

COL Milburn	USJFCOM	29 July 2004
COL Bennett	USSOCOM	28 July 2004
COL Wright	Army	5 August 2004
COL Van Dyke	USMC	10 August 2004

APR 27 2004

755

W
e
e

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-14

.....
Please respond by 5/9/04

27 APR 04

OSD 13900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037014

30 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject **Army** 'TigerTeam' Briefing to Vice Chief of Staff

1. Purpose. To summarize latest Army briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
2. Key Points. On 26 August, the CA/PSYOP Tiger Team (CAPOTT) briefed the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) on options for the assignment of CA units.
 - The CAPOTT presented the following findings:
 - CA (and PSYOP) forces can best support operations by remaining under US Army **Special** Operations Command (USASOC). Reassigning CA to Army Forces Command would not increase **Army** interest in these activities, improve the transition to post-combat stabilization operations, nor support the Army Campaign Plan.
 - Addressing CA and PSYOP challenges requires partnership between US Army Forces Command and USASOC.
 - Operations would benefit from creation of a full-time strategic-level Civil Military Operations (CMO) planning/coordination capability.
 - The Army should consider elevating CMO to a doctrinal "battlefield operating system."
 - USASOC must redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structure for modularity and use Total Army Analysis to review AC/RC mix.
 - Extending the Reserve Component CA branch to the Active Component and creating a PSYOP branch would promote the management, professionalism and availability of those officers.
 - VCSA approved the findings and gave the following guidance:
 - Continue to work the force structure for CA and PSYOP.
 - Determine how to integrate CA, PSYOP and supported units per the Army Campaign Plan. This should include Combat Training Centers.
 - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation plan.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

26 AUG 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310

SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations
Tiger Team (CAPOTT)


1. As per our meeting and your request for assistance on **29 April 2004**, I convened a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The **Team also analyzed** two additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of the **Army Staff**, selected Army major commands, and **selected** outside agencies. *It* ensured all doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities issues **were** reviewed and considered.
2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces could **best** support the Army by remaining under the Army **Special** Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation **Model's** emphasis on modularity will assure that this capability is **realized** as CA and **PSYOP** staff planners will be assigned **down to** the BCT UA level. **The** Tiger Team recommends that USASOC **should** redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structures for modularity and relook the AC/RC mix.
3. During the conduct of the Tiger Team review and assessment the following three concepts were **developed**:
 - a. **Concept 1** - USACAPOC, with all currently assigned forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to support modularity.
 - b. **Concept 2** - HQ USACAPOC with all CA and PSYOP Forces reassigned to JFCOM.
 - c. **Concept 3** - SOF supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.
4. Recommendation: The CAPOTT endorses **Concept 1** by utilizing the comparison criteria of Training/Readiness, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with FORSCOM to **support** transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.

11-L-0559/OSD/037016

SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

5. **Although** this constitutes the **closure** of this Tiger Team, the **members** are available to assist in any capacity. We **need** to continue to build on the momentum gained thus far. Furthermore, **USASOC's** pursuit of branches for **CA** and **PSYOP** will help to increase professionalism, management, and **availability of the** officers in **those** branches.

6. The POC for this action is COL Jose Olivero, HQDA, G-3, **MOSO-SOD**, (b)(6)
(b)(6)


RICHARD A. CODY
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

COL Milburn	USJFCOM	29 July 2004
COL Bennett	USSOCOM	28 July 2004
COL Wright	Army	5 August 2004
COL Van Dyke	USMC	10 August 2004

12 Jul 04

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: John Hamre Proposal

Where do we stand on Hamre's proposal? I think it is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604E.0215

Attach: Hamre's Developing Strategy re: Rising Demand for Entitlement benefits for Reservists 3/12/04

OSD 13916-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037019

326

6 JUN 04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

From: John J. Hamre

Date: March 12, 2004

Subject: Developing a strategy concerning the rising demand for entitlement benefits for reservists

First, let me thank you for the time you gave us yesterday to go through the "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" study. It is just the half-way mark in our work, but we felt this was the crucial foundation for what follows. You have brought the department to a remarkable position where change is possible. It is now feasible to take the next step that until now was not possible — genuine integration of key staff functions.

Phase 2 of the study will examine new combat missions, UCP changes, and the acquisition process, as well as continuing our work on the interagency process. In a separate but closely related effort, we'll be looking at the role of the Guard/Reserve components. It is this last item that I want to raise with you in this memo.

We have already started work on the Guard/Reserve issues. I have been startled, however, to see the momentum in Congress for a sweeping enlargement of pay and benefits for reservists due to the strains of current deployments. There is legitimate worry here, but a blind expansion of benefits will undermine the reserves as it will practically price them into the same cost structure of active-duty personnel. If that is the case, the general purpose of the reserves is significantly diminished.

I have met with staff directors on the Senate side, but they frankly don't have a plan to deal with the steamroller that is heading their way.

My sense is that everyone needs a firebreak to separate the passions of the current problems from a rational assessment of the role, structure and management of Guard/Reserve forces for the future. The traditional method of building a firebreak is to create a commission in order to buy time. This won't be enough this year. You need some commission-like process to get a dispassionate look at the role/structure/management issues, but you also have to create an escape valve for the political pressures of this year.

As I mentioned yesterday, I would propose that you request a 2-year authority to establish an "exceptional relief" process for active duty and reserve personnel who have suffered extraordinary hardship as a result of recent deployments. The authority would allow you to empanel a 5 (pick a number) person review board that would hear hardship cases. This board would have the authority to grant no-interest loans to military personnel. The board's decisions would be final, though Congress would retain the authority to pass private relief legislation (a very rare event).

This gives members of Congress something to act on without locking the Department into a long-term entitlement, or giving benefits to 100% of the population to solve a problem that plagues only 1% of the community.

— Ideally this initiative would come from the Joint Chiefs as a relief measure for the total force, allowing you to work with members of congress to guide it towards being the dominant policy path to head off the steamroller of benefits enlargement. I know that we spoke yesterday about the idea possibly originating on the Hill. I am **happy** to help here, as well, but I honestly feel that it has gotten so far down the road that it will take the collective authority of the Chiefs to get attention to it.

The purpose of creating a firebreak is to create a new mindset about a problem. That is why you do need to accompany this with some kind of a commission.

I am prepared to build a commission to look at the Guard/Reserve issues. You can use **us** if you want, or create something yourself. If you want **CSIS** to **do** something here, I am happy to talk. One way or the other we will press ahead to examine the Guard/Reserve issues at the staff expert level.

We have examined the plans that the reserve components have launched under **your** direction already, and there **are** some exciting new ideas in the **works**.

Please let me **know** how I can help. **And, thank** you again for the **chance** to brief you yesterday.

END



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

September 13, 2004 - 9:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: John Hamre Proposal - SNOWFLAKE

- You asked where we stand on John Hamre's proposal (attached).
- We have met with John and his staff to discuss the roles and missions of the Reserve components and how we might shape future compensation and benefits.
- The Small Business Administration already has a program that provides some of the relief John proposes. The first loan under this new program was granted just months after the September 11th attacks, and to date the SBA has granted 186 loans totaling \$16,144,400.
- While we were not successful in getting John's proposal considered this year (it requires legislation), the Senate authorization bill includes a provision that would establish a 13-member commission to assess the roles and missions of the National Guard and Reserve, and compensation and benefits provided to reservists. It would take up this idea.
- In the meantime, the President has proposed expanding educational benefits for mobilized Reservists, and you have approved added compensation and incentives for those who serve more than one year in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additional bonus authority for the Reserves, sponsored by the Administration is in the House Authorization Bill, and the conference must also adjudicate the vast difference between the Senate position on Reserve health benefits and that of the House (which follows the Administration's recommendations).
- The DoD Advisory Committee on Military Compensation is scheduled to begin work in October to review the long-term appropriateness of our pay and benefits structure. It is a good place to assess the net effect of all these changes, and will be able to consider the results of research we're now conducting on actual income loss by Reservists.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Tom Bush, OASD(RA), (b)(6)

OSD 13916-04



11-L-0559/OSD/037022

12 Jul 04

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: John Hamre Proposal

Where do we stand on Hamre's proposal? I think it is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604E.02ts

Attach: Hamre's Developing Strategy re: Rising Demand for Entitlement benefits for Reservists 3/12/04

OSD 13916-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037023

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: John J. Hamre

Date: March 12, 2004

Subject: Developing a strategy concerning the rising demand for entitlement benefits for reservists

First, let me thank you for the time you gave us yesterday to go through the "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" study. It is just the half-way mark in our work, but we felt this was the crucial foundation for what follows. You have brought the department to a remarkable position where change is possible. It is now feasible to take the next step that until now was not possible — genuine integration of key staff functions.

Phase 2 of the study will examine new combat missions, UCP changes, and the acquisition process, as well as continuing our work on the interagency process. In a separate but closely related effort, we'll be looking at the role of the Guard/Reserve components. It is this last item that I want to raise with you in this memo.

We have already started work on the Guard/Reserve issues. I have been startled, however, to see the momentum in Congress for a sweeping enlargement of pay and benefits for reservists due to the strains of current deployments. There is legitimate worry here, but a blind expansion of benefits will undermine the reserves as it will practically price them into the same cost structure of active-duty personnel. If that is the case, the general purpose of the reserves is significantly diminished.

I have met with staff directors on the Senate side, but they frankly don't have a plan to deal with the steamroller that is heading their way.

My sense is that everyone needs a firebreak to separate the passions of the current problems from a rational assessment of the role, structure and management of Guard/Reserve forces for the future. The traditional method of building a firebreak is to create a commission in order to buy time. This won't be enough this year. You need some commissionlike process to get a dispassionate look at the role/structure/management issues, but you also have to create an escape valve for the political pressures of this year.

As I mentioned yesterday, I would propose that you request a 2-year authority to establish an "exceptional relief" process for active duty and reserve personnel who have suffered extraordinary hardship as a result of recent deployments. The authority would allow you to empanel a 5 (pick a number) person review board that would hear hardship cases. This board would have the authority to grant no-interest loans to military personnel. The board's decisions would be final, though Congress would retain the authority to pass private relief legislation (a very rare event).

This gives members of Congress something to act on without locking the Department into a long-term entitlement, or giving benefits to 100% of the population to solve a problem that plagues only 1% of the community.

- - — Ideally this initiative would come from the Joint Chiefs as a relief measure for the total force, allowing you to work with members of congress to guide it towards being the dominant policy path to head off the steamroller of benefits enlargement. I know that we spoke yesterday about the idea possibly originating on the Hill. I am happy to help here, as well, but I honestly feel that it has gotten so far down the road that it will take the collective authority of the Chiefs to get attention to it.

The purpose of creating a firebreak is to create a new mindset about a problem. That is why you do need to accompany this with some kind of a commission.

I am prepared to build a commission to look at the Guard/Reserve issues. You can use us if you want, or create something yourself. If you want CSIS to do something here, I am happy to talk. One way or the other we will press ahead to examine the Guard/Reserve issues at the ~~staff~~ expert level.

We have examined the plans that the reserve components have launched under your direction already, and there ~~are~~ some exciting new ideas in the works.

Please let me know how I can help. And, thank you again for the chance to brief you yesterday.

END

~~FOUO~~

September 13, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wrap-up Paper on Detainee Issue

I need the wrap-up paper on the detainee issue. I would like to see a draft soon. I want to know who is responsible for producing it. Please set a tentative schedule when this document will be finished and a plan as to what we are going to do with it.

Please get a draft to me no later than Wednesday, Sept. 15.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-32

.....
Please respond by 4/15/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037026

OSD 13918-04

2004 9 15 11:07 AM
SECRET

383.6

13 SEP 04

September 13, 2004

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Friday, Sept 17 Lunch

On Friday, let's have McLaughlin in for lunch, rather than Jerry Johnson. And, if Porter Goss has been confirmed, include him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-31

Please respond by _____

7004 SEP 15 41:19:26
SECURITY INFORMATION

000000SD

13 SEP 04

September 13, 2004

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photograph for George Tenet

I want to give George Tenet a photo when he comes in – it is in the bottom drawer of my credenza.

Thanks..

DHR:ss
091304-27

.....
Please respond by _____

72
~~FOUO~~

September 13, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Lunch on Friday

Please tell me who Jerry Johnson is - the person I am having lunch with on Friday. Please tell me what it is about.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-28

.....
Please respond by _____

He is our new
White House Fellow.
Paul Butler wanted you
to have some time
with him.
Not lunch - free fire
Just go there

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13951-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037029

2004 SEP 15 11:10:26
C-100
C-100

091304-28

091304-28

7201
~~FOUO~~

September 13, 2004

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lunch with Tenet

I would like to have George Tenet in for lunch sometime.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-30

.....
Please respond by _____

2004 SEP 15 11:10:26

George Tenet

000.7150

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13932-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037030

13 SEP 04

September 13, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Background for SASC Hearing

Please pull together the following information for this year:

- The total number of people in DoD who are involved in responding to Congress and preparing materials for Congress.
- The number of Congressional inquiries we have responded to.
- The number reports we have submitted to Congress.
- The number of hearings the members of DoD (military and civilian) have testified before.
- The number of different different people in DoD that have testified.
- The number of briefings that have been held for Congressional Members and staff.
- Anything else along these lines you can think of.

I am going to need this information when I am on the Hill next week.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-21

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/037031

OSD 13933-04

032

13 SEP 04

September 13, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Jim Stavridis
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: NASCAR Race

The staff should have asked me if I had ever been to a stock car race. All the press said I had never been to one and, as you now know, I went to several back in the late 1940s.

DHR:ss
091304-16

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 13934-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037032

September 13, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Continuity of Personnel

2004 SEP 15 11 19 AM
SECDEF/SECSTATE
2004

2004

I am convinced that people should serve longer in their posts. A logical corollary to that is that careers will be longer for successful people.

Please have your folks to think this through and get back to me, before Oct. 1, with some options as to how this might be accomplished.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-18

.....
Please respond by _____

2004

OSD 13940-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037033

September 13, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Release of Detainee Treatment Paper

Do you think this DoD Detainee Treatment Paper could be put on the DoD website, sent to Members of Congress and given to the press *corps*?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/08/04 DoD Detainee Treatment Paper

DHR:ss
091304-20

.....
Please respond by 9/21/04

383.6

13 Sep 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037034

13942-04

Detainee Treatment: Forward Momentum of DoD Implementation



8 September 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/037035



Moving Forward on Abu Ghraib and Detainee Operations

- The Department of Defense has aggressively investigated issues associated with detainee abuse and is committed to addressing shortcomings and improving detainee operations.
 - We began the process of assessing detainee operations and implementing change before the abuses at Abu Ghraib were reported. Changes and improvements have been implemented when appropriate, without waiting for the results of investigations.
 - As we continue to improve operations, the Department now has, or will soon have, insight and recommendations gained from 11 major investigations and assessments
 - Many of the proposed fixes are already completed or underway
 - We continue to consolidate and address the conclusions from the various assessments
- The Department is taking a top-to-bottom approach
- Improvements are occurring simultaneously in OSD, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commands

Improvements are already underway across the spectrum of Policy, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities

Detainee Operations: Forward Momentum of DoD Implem.

OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED

Department of the Army Inspector General Assessment

GTMO

Afghanistan

IRAQ

C
O
R
R
E
C
T
I
V
E

A
C
T
I
O
N
S

Army Reserve Assessment of Reserve Training with Focus on MI and MP

11-L-0559/OSD/037037



OSD Actions

- Established Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA) office
- Established a Joint Detainee Coordinating Committee on Detainee Affairs chaired by DASD-DA
- Issued policy "Handling of Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross"
- Issued policy "Procedures for Investigations into the Death of Detainees in the Custody of the Armed Forces of the U.S."
- Initiated a department-wide review of detainee-related policy directives

OSD is organized to integrate fixes with USG and DoD policy, and to streamline the flow of information throughout the Department



Joint Staff Actions

- Created Joint Staff Detainee Affairs Division to address worldwide detainee operations
- Drafted Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques & Procedures on Detainee Operations by the Air, Land, & Sea Applications Center
- Expediting publication of Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations (Joint Publication 3-63)
- Including Joint Interrogation Operations in “Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations” (Joint Publication 2-01)
- Added Detainee Operations to “Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States.” (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01C)

**Joint Doctrine for detainee operations and interrogations
is already being developed**



U.S. Army Actions

- Initiated Army assessments of detainee operations in summer of 2003 at the request of the Combatant Commanders
- Reviewed findings & recommendations from 3 Army assessments, two investigations, and 2 DoD reviews
 - Completed more than 950 interviews, compiling more than 10,000 pages
 - Gained combat experience of more than 300,000 soldiers
- Revising Army regulations on detainee operations
- Developing clearer lines of responsibility between Military Police and Military Intelligence

The Army is improving its practices based on lessons learned



U.S. Army Actions

- Established Provost Marshal General in September 2003
 - Army executive agent for detainee operations
- Developed detainee operations integration plan -- prioritized plan addressing policy, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities
- Synchronized Army with joint policy and doctrine
- Established Detainee Operations Oversight Council
- Providing training and augmentation for detainee operations
 - Sending corrections specialists, lawyers, interrogators, medical personnel
- Making technical assistance visits
- Improving detention facilities

Army is adapting to support the warfighter



Navy/Marine Corps Actions

Navy:

- DepSecDef established the Administrative Review Process
 - Gordon England (SECNAV) appointed Designated Civilian Official
 - Established Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants
- DepSecDef established the Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Marine Corps:

- Coordinating with Army on enemy detention and interment operations , regarding doctrine development, training, and other pertinent issues.
- Deployed corrections specialists to Iraq and GTMO to provide oversight, training, inspection, and operational support for all detainee
- Continues to provide pre-deployment training (in conjunction with the Army) on detainee operations and the Geneva Conventions.

Navy and Marine Corps are contributing to improved processes.



Central Command Actions

- Assigned general officer to be responsible for all detention and interrogation operations, Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations, to Multinational Force – Iraq
- Require all lapses of accountability, escapes and disturbances to be reported to the Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations and Commander Multinational Force – Iraq
- Protecting coalition forces and detainees through improved force protection
- Upgrading facilities for soldiers and detainees
- Issued interrogation policies reiterating application of Geneva Conventions and requiring all interrogations be conducted in lawfully and humanely

**CENTCOM has reorganized for improved management;
its facilities are safer for U.S. personnel and detainees**



Central Command Actions

- Accelerated review process for detainee case files for release or continued internment decisions
- Using biometric automated tool set for all detainee transfers to improve accountability
- Mandated and conducted training down to the individual level on CENTCOM policy “Proper Conduct During Combat Operations”. This policy memorandum provides guidance and requires training on:
 - following the law of war and rules of engagement
 - treating all persons with humanity, dignity and respect
 - using judgment and discretion in detaining civilians
 - respecting private property

**CENTCOM has improved detainee accountability and processing;
its policy is distributed widely and is enforced.**

10



Southern Command Actions

- Reviewing compliance with Standard Operating Procedures on a periodic basis
 - o Secretary of the Navy Inspector General team inspection (May 04) – no deficiencies noted
 - o Established Joint Task Force Internal Standarduation Team
 - o Dedicated a Field Grade officer to ensure all Standard Operating Procedures are followed
 - o Inspecting 4 specific areas weekly, 15 other areas inspected monthly
- Hosting American Corrections Association visit with Detention Operations Group to compare procedures in use at U.S. detention facilities
- Video Recording all Forced Cell Extractions
 - o Reviewing every tape for compliance with proper procedure
 - o Keeping historical archives of all videos.
- Reviewing Standard Operating Procedures and processes to ensure adequate leader supervision
 - o Require Commander Joint Detainee Operations Group (Colonel) approval for detainee movement and body searches
 - o Require Commander Joint Task Force (General Officer) approval for segregation over 30 days

**SOUTHCOM is verifying compliance with
Standard Operating Procedures.**



Improvements across all components and across the breadth of recommendations

Examples :

Policy

- ICRC Reporting
- Autopsies

Doctrine

- Joint Detainee Ops
- Army MI/MP relationship
- Army Detainee Ops

Organization

- DASD-DA
- Joint Detainee Coord Cmte
- JS – Detainee Ops Div

Training

- Army MP/MI
- Marine Corps Correction
Specialists

Leadership

- Deputy Cdr for Detention
Ops -Iraq

Personnel

- MI/MP Force Structure
Reviews

Facilities

- Improvements in detention
facilities



Holding Personnel Accountable

- General Officer suspended from command
- Investigated over 250 allegations of abuse
 - Army referrals to date: 45 Courts-Martial, numerous Article 15s and General Officer Letters of Reprimand (GOMOR)
 - Administratively separated 13 Soldiers from Army
 - Closed 120 of 225 cases.
 - 12 Marines have been Court-Martialed
 - A number of other Courts-Martial are pending
 - Article 32 investigation of 4 U.S. Navy members of Special Warfare Command
 - Information provided to Department of Justice for investigation of contractors
 - Numerous unit-level Article 15 Non-Judicial Punishment actions underway for Army and Marine Corps (not normally reported outside command channels.



Summary

Improvements are already underway across the spectrum of Policy, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities

OSD is organized to integrate fixes with USG and DoD policy, and to streamline the flow of information throughout the Department

Joint Doctrine for detainee operations and interrogations is already being developed

The Army is improving its practices based on lessons learned

The Army is adapting to support the warfighter

Navy and Marine Corps are contributing to improved processes

CENTCOM has reorganized for improved management; its facilities are safer for Soldiers and detainees

CENTCOM has improved detainee accountability and processing; its policy is distributed widely and enforced

SOUTHCOM is verifying compliance with Standard Operating Procedures

September 13, 2004

TO: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
Lt. Gen. Sharp
VADM Willard

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: QDR

310.1
2004 SEP 15 11:10:26
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

As we move forward toward the QDR, we should ensure that we look at several key issues. In particular, we should examine how we can create longer tour lengths so people learn their jobs. Equally important, we must focus on creating Standing Joint Task Forces and headquarters. Additionally, this QDR should look at DoD roles in homeland security, intelligence, counter-terrorism and tracking individuals, force sizing constructs, space investment, medical benefits, and global force posture. This is not an all-inclusive list, but should be helpful as we start this process.

Also, think through how we can take advantage of the good thinking available at the Defense Science Board, Defense Policy Board, and Defense Business Board.

The SLRG process should be valuable as we move forward on this QDR. Please come back to me soon with a lay-down of the dates and sessions for the process.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-22

.....
Please respond by _____

130409

September 13, 2004

TO: *Mary Claire*
Andy Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: October Carrier Visit

Please get Mary Claire thinking about the upcoming October aircraft carrier visit and develop a program that includes:

- How we want to handle these folks.
- Who greets them upon arrival at the airport.
- How we treat them on the carrier.
- A timeline for the day (since they will not be overnighing, I gather they would fly out early and have lunch aboard the carrier).

Next, I would wash this list I have approved with the appropriate people and see if you can get any ideas of any mistakes we have made (people that should be on the list and are not, or vice versa).

Thanks.

Attach.

9/13/04 Memo from Andy Hoehn to SecDef re: Proposed Invitees for Oct. Carrier Visit

DHR:ss
091304-26

.....
Please respond by _____

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion

Please give me the history of this benefit, with a particular emphasis on how it works in Congress as between the Ways and Means Committees and the Armed Services Committees. I'd also be interested in thinking through how we might creatively leverage similar arrangements as we continue to find good incentives for the force.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-7

.....
Please respond by

9/10

*Tom - DID I
already ask you
about this?*

Henry

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037051



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY
2004 NOV 15 PM 3:01



November 3, 2004, 9:11 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Prior to the Korean conflict, income tax benefits for members of the Armed Forces were part of individual revenue acts passed to finance war efforts, and the exclusion was not dependent on combat zone designation.
- Beginning with the Korean conflict, the law excluded military compensation earned in a combat zone.
 - o The Internal Revenue Code exclusion is generally triggered by the President establishing a combat zone by Executive Order, not by Congressional action.
 - o Presidents have designated five combat zones: Korea, Vietnam, Arabian Peninsula, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Korea and Vietnam have been terminated.
 - o Treasury regulations allow the Secretary, or his delegate, to extend combat zone tax benefits to members serving outside of but in "direct support" of the combat zone.
- Congress acted only twice to extend combat zone tax benefits to members by establishing in law Qualified Hazardous Duty Areas: the Former Yugoslavia (1995) and Kosovo (1999).
 - o Both of these bills originated in the House Ways and Means Committee.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTC Janet Fenton, USA, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/037052

OSD 13958-04

~~FOUO~~

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion

Please give me the history of this benefit, with a particular emphasis on **how** it works in Congress as between the Ways and Means Committees and the *Armed* Services Committees. I'd also be interested in thinking through **how we might** creatively leverage similar arrangements as we continue to find good incentives for the force.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-7

.....
Please respond by

9/10

*G.S.
Get Answer*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037053