

720
September 15, 2004

TO: David Chu
cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
VADM Staser Holcomb
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tour Lengths

Please send me the data we discussed on the tour lengths for our senior people as soon as you can.

Also, I want to see some specific suggestions for how we can lengthen tours at all levels in our military quickly. What are the mechanisms by which we will actually put this idea in place?

At a minimum, it seems to me that this idea should be embedded in the QDR and all upcoming guidance to the Services.

I am sure there are policy documents, instructions, and other mechanisms – such as operational “fleet up” concepts for Commanders – that can quickly move us in the direction of having people stay in a job long enough to really learn what they are doing and maximize their contributions.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-2

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

OSD 13987-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037054



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 15 2004

Mr. Thomas E. Dannemiller, Jr.
Lit Entertainment, Inc.
201 Crandon Boulevard, #130
Key Biscayne, FL 33149

Dear Mr. Dannemiller:

Thank you so much for your role in my visit to the
Chevy Rock & Roll 400 NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series race.
It was a pleasure to be involved in the day's excitement.

I do appreciate your efforts. You helped make the trip a
success.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Z. R. [unclear]".

OSD 13989-04

September 13, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You Notes for NASCAR Event

Who is handling the thank you notes for the NASCAR Event? It was terrific and there are about five or six people we should thank. One of them is Herbert Ames - he was just terrific. Who is he? Douglas Fritz was another person who was helpful (their cards are attached).

Please get the draft thank you notes to me soon, so I can take a **look** at them.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business Cards for Herbert Ames and Douglas Fritz.

DHR:ss
091304-12

.....
Please respond by _____

THE AMES COMPANY

COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE

HERBERT F. AMES
843-667-0954

P.O. BOX 710
FLORENCE, SC 29503



THE ACTION TRAIL

Douglas S. Fritz
President

(804) 329-7823

(804) 329-3835 Fax

Email: dfritz@rir.com
600 E. Laburnum Avenue / Richmond, Virginia 23222

OSD 13089-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037056

333SD

13 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 15 09:01 August 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

~~837~~
837

SUBJECT Caspian Sea Security Initiative

Because of the seam between CENTCOM and EUCOM and the Caspian Sea our Caspian Sea security initiative is getting uneven attention, much more from EUCOM than CENTCOM, given CENTCOM's busy agenda.

What do you propose we do about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-17 (15 computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/10/04

OSD 14001-04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

July 2, 2004

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letters

Let's make sure I write letters to Keith Kellogg, General Kicklighter, Reuben Jeffery and some of these people who are leaving.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070204-1

Please respond by

7/9/04

8/30

8/30

*Please
Exec Sec - Chas
D. Holt*

*Please Draft letter to
each member for
their work in Iraq Task.
D. Holt*

*C.M. (Mick)
LTC US Army Ret.
copy*

*→ Quarterly
Interagency Transition Planning Team*

20122

650.04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 16 2004

Mr. Reuben Jeffery, III
National Security Council
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20504

Dear Reuben:

Thank you for your contributions as the
Representative and Executive Director for the Coalition
Provisional Authority.

You and your team did important work in helping
guide the transition to a free Iraq. I do appreciate your
leadership and commend you for a job well done.

Sincerely,



201.22

16 Sep 04

250104

OSD 14013-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037059



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 16 2004

Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, USA

(b)(6)

Dear Mick:

I thank you for committing your time and energy as the Director of the Interagency Transition Planning Team. You did a fine job.

You and your team made important contributions in the efforts to establish a free Iraq. Your work continues to be crucial in achieving this goal.

I do appreciate your leadership on this issue.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Thank to Mick

201.22

16 Sep 04

250104

OSD 14013-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037060

Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, USA

(b)(6)

Dear Mick:

I thank you for committing your time and energy as the Director of the Interagency Transition Planning Team. You did a fine job.

You and your team made important contributions in the efforts to establish a free Iraq. Your work continues to be crucial in achieving this goal.

I do appreciate your leadership on this issue.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

*Prep for Sec Sec
Signature*

Paul B. ...

9/14

Mr. Reuben Jeffery, III
National Security Council
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20504

Dear Reuben:

Thank you for your contributions as the
Representative and Executive Director for the Coalition
Provisional Authority.

You and your team did important work in helping
guide the transition to a free Iraq. I do appreciate your
leadership and commend you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

FYI ...
needs to be couriered.
- ESE 9/8

Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg

(b)(6)

Dear General Kellogg:

You did a fine job during your time as the Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Thank you for your important contributions. You and your team laid the foundation for a free Iraq, and I commend your dedication and commitment to this goal.

Sincerely,



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 18 2004


Lieutenant General Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., U.S. Army

(b)(6)

Dear Keith,

Your note meant a great deal to me. Know that I appreciate your support as well as your outstanding service to our country.

/Warm regards,



OSD 07317-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037064

33 SD

18 May 04
11 May 04



11 MAY 2004

Mr. Secretary

Sir

You hang in there! You are
doing great and you have a super
Team. I would not have you to
hang if I did not believe in you.
Do not let them gain you down.

335
S

JA

Krista

Kallag
LTC(A), USA

11 May 04

OSD 07317-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037065

Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 2:24 PM
To: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Subject: RE: names and titles
Importance: High

Carrie (b)(6)

1. We don't have anything official for a mailing address for Reuben Jeffery. He now works over at the White House. The Sit Room (b)(6) may be able to point you in the right direction. He signed his memos to SecDef as "Reuben Jeffery II" → *Letter to NCS: Natl Sec Council*
1600 Penn Ave NW 20504

However, according to <http://www.theultimates.com/white/>, his address is (b)(6)

(b)(6)

2. Keith Kellogg (address from May 2004 SecDef note, cy attached)

Lieutenant General Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., U.S. Army

(b)(6)

(FYI: his address is (b)(6) according to <http://www.theultimates.com/white/>)

3. General Kicklighter

Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, U.S. Army

"Mick".

Still working this one - may be able to get confirmation on his mailing address from someone in the building; will let you know what we find out;

however according to <http://www.theultimates.com/white/>, his address is (b)(6)

(b)(6)

v/r,

John

-----Original Message-----

From: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 11:29 AM
To: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Subject: names and titles

Dear John :

I have a question for you -- do you have the full names, titles, and addresses of Keith Kellogg, Gen. Kicklighter, and Reuben Jeffrey? I have to do ltrrs to them and need that info. If you have it, that would

9/8/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/037066

Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, September 08, 2004 10:39 AM
To: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Subject: RE: names and titles
Importance: High

Carrie Sue,

Good morning.

1. Jeffery: Representative and Executive Director for the Coalition Provisional Authority
2. Kellogg: Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer, Coalition Provisional Authority
3. Kicklighter: Director, Interagency Transition Planning Team

v/r,

John

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD
Sent: Wednesday, September 08, 2004 8:00 AM
To: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Subject: RE: names and titles

Dear John - can you please also tell me what they did here -- i know that Gen Kicklighter was the Director of the Interagency Planning Team, for example...
Thanks -- CSC

-----Original Message-----

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 2:24 PM
To: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Subject: RE: names and titles
Importance: High

Carrie Sue,

1. We don't have anything official for a mailing address for Reuben Jeffery. He now works over at the White House. The Sit Room (b)(6) may be able to point you in the right direction. He signed his memos to SecDef as "Reuben Jeffery III"

However, according to <http://www.theultimate.s.com/white/>, his address is (b)(6)
(b)(6)

2. Keith Kellogg (address from May 2004 SecDef note, cy attached)

Lieutenant General Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., U.S. Army
(b)(6)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 16 2004

Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg

(b)(6)

Dear General Kellogg:

You did a fine job during your time as the Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Thank you for your important contributions. You and your team laid the foundation for a free Iraq, and I commend your dedication and commitment to this goal.

Sincerely,

OSD 14013-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037068

20122

16 Sep 04

250104

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef ____
1-04/012468-ES

ES-0772
USDP 10/13/04

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Subject: DoD Directives

- You directed that Policy update 100% of its assigned DoD Directives by the end of this year and, if that is not possible, to respond to you.
- I met with Director Administration and Management's (DA&M) staff on 15 July to devise a work plan to manage Policy's directives workload that was compatible with ensuring policy-setting support to you.
 - o Of Policy's 66 assigned directives, 11 were current, 53 needed to be revised and 2 to cancel. Of the 53 directives to revise, 5 were in DoD coordination at the time.
 - o To accelerate our revision effort while sustaining policy-setting support to you, we committed with DA&M to produce one directive per month for each of my 5 components.
 - o The process began in August and we propose to complete it in June 2005.
- Status now is 7 revisions in DoD coordination and 1 signed into effect.

Recommendation: That we continue with our work plan to produce 5 revisions a month to complete effort in June 2005.

Approved:  Other: _____

OCT 15 2004

OSD 14072-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037069

10-12-04 P02:06 IN

04/10/15

300.8

13 OCT 04

16 SEP 04

12.3
1.0930

~~FOUO~~

USP

September 16, 2004

ES-0772

04/012468-ES

TO: Distribution

SUBJECT: DoD Directives

Attached is a summary of progress -- or lack thereof -- being made on the updating of DoD Directives. The information is self-explanatory.

I would like to see **everyone** up to 100% by the end of this year. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know.

Thanks.

ATTACH
9/16 DUESS MEMO TO SECDEF RE: DoD DIRECTIVE RENEW STATUS REPORT
DHR:es
091604-3

.....
Please respond by 9/30/04

7B Sec Def

10/15

Policy response for addressing A's directives
is at last page

Paul Butler

10/4

11-09-04 12:50 13

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037070

OSD 14072-04



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

ORIGINAL
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SEP 10

2004 SEP 10 10 17 16

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review status Report

In response to your attached September 7 snowflake requesting the status of the DoD Directives review, the chart at Tab A shows our status as of September 3.

- At the outset of the Directives review effort, 654 directives were reviewed for currency, and a total of 396 were identified for revision or cancellation (327 for revision and 69 for cancellation).
- To date, 193 have been submitted for formal coordination, and 70 (revisions and cancellations) have been signed by the DepSec.
- Many of the remaining 133 Directives are under internal review within their own components.
- As the attached status chart indicates, two components (Policy and Intelligence) are lagging behind the others in completing their submissions for formal coordination. My staff is working with these components to help expedite the work they have in progress.
- On July 12, I forwarded you the report at Tab B reflecting our progress. During a meeting on September 7, you noted this report and a question about its accuracy was raised. We reviewed the data and determined that the July 12 report was indeed accurate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	9/10
OPMA SD	9/10
MA SD	R 9/13
EXEC SEC	M 9/10

Prepared by: Harold Neeley, ESCD (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/037071

13471-04

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
7/9/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>SIGNED</u>
USD(AT&L)	108	37	71	50	(70%)	15
USD(P)	-6 6	1f	55	6	(11%)	0
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	(83%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	103	39	49	(55%)	18
USD(I)	58	8	50	11	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	6
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	0
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	4
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	14	(25%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	1
TOTALS	654	264	390	17%	(46%)	54

* Of the 178 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
9/03/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>DEPSEC'D SIGNED</u>
USD(AT&L)	111	37	74	54	(73%)	21
USD(P)	66	11	55	7	(13%)	0
USD(C)	15	8	7	6	(86%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	98	94	58	(62%)	23
USD(I)	55	8	47	10	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	7
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	1
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	5
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(84%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	15	(27%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	5
TOTALS:	654	258	3%	193	(49%)	70

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~~FOUO~~

September 16, 2004

TO: Distribution
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: DoD Directives



300.8

Attached is a summary of progress -- or lack thereof -- being made on the updating of DoD Directives. The information is self-explanatory.

I would like to see everyone up to 100% by the end of this year. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know.

Thanks.

ATTACH
9/10 PUBDOD MEMO TO SECDEF RE: DOD DIRECTIVE REVIEW STATUS REPORT
DHR:ss
091604-5

.....
Please respond by 9/30/04

165204

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14072-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037074



ORIGINAL

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

20150910 10 7:16

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Status Report

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- As the attached status chart indicates, two components (Policy and Intelligence) are lagging behind the others in completing their submissions for formal coordination. My staff is working with these components to help expedite the work they have in progress.
- On July 12, I forwarded you the report at Tab B reflecting our progress. During a meeting on September 7, you noted this report and a question about its accuracy was raised. We reviewed the data and determined that the July 12 report was indeed accurate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	9/10
SRMA SD	
MA SD	R 9/13
EXEC SEC	M 9/10

Prepared by: Harold Neeley, ESCD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/037075

OSD 13471-04



**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
9/03/04**

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**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
7/9/04**

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DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	1
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ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010**

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
204 OCT -3 PM 12:12

UNCLASSIFIED

**RESPONSE TO SNOWFLAKE FOR THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

As of October 7, 2004, 11:45

DEPSEC

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

- In the attached snowflake, you asked me to let you know if we were not going to complete our review of ow DoD Directives (DoDD).
- Barring any coordination delay from other components, I expect to complete the review of all but one of the 111 directives originally belonging to my office.
- DoDD 4100.15, "Commercial Activities Program" will not be completed because both the Senate and House versions of the FY05 Transportation/Treasury Appropriations bill prohibit the implementation of a revised OMB Circular A-76, which this directive implements for the Department. Updating it is on hold until this prohibition is resolved.

Attachment:
As Stated

Prepared by: Julie K. Bigler/Director for Administration

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

OSD 14072-04



11-L-0559/OSD/037078

~~FOUO~~

USA

September 16, 2004

TO: Distribution

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: DoD Directives

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I would like *to see everyone up to 100% by the end of this year*. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know.

Thanks.

ATTACH
9/16/04 DUBOIS MEMO TO ARLBERG RE: DoD DIRECTIVE REVIEW STATUS REPORT
DHR:es
091604-5

.....
Please respond by 9/30/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14072-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037079



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

2004 SEP 14 PM 7:16

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Status Report

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COORDINATION; NONE

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	9/10
SRMA SD	
MA SD	R 9/13
EXEC SEC	M 9/10

Prepared by: Harold Neeley, ESCD, (b)(6)

OSD 13471-04



11-L-0559/OSD/037080

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
9/03/04**

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USD(P)	66	11	55	7	(13%)	0
USD(C)	15	8	7	6	(86%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	98	94	58	(62%)	23
USD(I)	55	8	47	10	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	7
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	1
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	5
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	15	(27%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	5
TOTALS:	654	258	396	193	(49%)	70

* Of the 193 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
7/9/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>SIGNED</u>
USD(AT&L)	108	37	71	50	(70%)	15
USD(P)	66	11	55	6	(11%)	0
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	(83%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	103	89	49	(55%)	18
USD(I)	58	8	50	11	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	6
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	0
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	4
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	14	(25%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	1
TOTALS:	654	264	390	178	(46%)	54

* Of the 178 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

Here's some material on health transformation that Gingrich is working on. Is there anybody that can be helpful here at DoD? Do you have your head into those issues?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D.02ts

Attach: Gingrich email 3.20.04 RE: Tricare

Please respond by: 6/23 8/19/04

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037083



HEALTH AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

SECRET

2004 SEP 17 PM 5:10

INFO MEMO

SEP 16 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

- You requested information regarding electronic health records. (TAB B)
- To answer your question, our heads are very much into the issues raised by Gingrich. I meet periodically with him and his staff to exchange ideas on electronic health records and health information technology. We have provided him demonstrations on the military electronic health record, as well as a number of other advanced technologies in use today within the Department of Defense.
- I admit to some bias, but based on my experience in the private sector, the Military Health System is pursuing information technology and its application to all phases of our business far more aggressively **than** the vast majority of private sector health organizations and companies. (See TAB A)

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Connie Gladding, IMT&R/IPI&EL, (b)(6) PCDOCS 69124,
69345,69892

11-L-0559/OSD/037084

OSD 14122-04

INFORMATION PAPER

DoD Health Transformation through Information Technology

The DoD is a leader in the use of health information technologies to improve health care access, quality, population health management and force health protection.

I have met with Mr. Gingrich on a periodic basis to exchange ideas on the electronic health record and health information technologies in general. My staff has shown Mr. Gingrich and his staff the military electronic health record and a number of advanced technologies in use today within DoD. Health information technologies are being used to facilitate DoD's health and business transformation include:

- **Composite Health Care System** – Provides an electronic health record at all military treatment facilities that includes laboratory, pharmacy and radiology computerized physician order entry and results retrieval, registration, appointing and scheduling, and documentation of the patient encounter capabilities.
- **TRICARE Online** – Provides health care benefits information, health and wellness information, a secure personal health journal and online appointing capabilities at over 300 military treatment facilities.
- **Telehealth** – Provides interactive consultations in radiology, mental health, dermatology, pathology and dental care between remote locations and medical referral centers.
- **Military Health System Data Repository** – A centralized data warehouse containing patient encounter information from military treatment facilities and private sector providers, financial data, demographics and other data. It is used in our strategic planning, performance monitoring, population health management and business management.
- **Pharmacy Data Transaction System** – A centralized data repository of all prescriptions processed for DoD beneficiaries, whether obtained in military treatment facilities, 50,000 retail pharmacies across the U.S., or through our mail order system. The system processes over 411,000 prescription transactions per day. It gives DoD amazing capability to know what is happening with all pharmaceutical services (over \$5B per year), and helps prevent tens of thousands of adverse drug reactions every year for our beneficiaries.
- **Joint Medical Asset Repository** – A web-based system that provides comprehensive information on the location, movement, status and quantity of medical equipment, supplies, pharmaceuticals and units of blood in the Military Health System.

- Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support – This system combines business process re-engineering with leading edge technologies to provide state-of-the-art capabilities supporting DoD medical logistics, electronic commerce and commercial best practices.
- Computer/Electronic Accommodations Program – Provides assistive technology and accommodations for DoD and other Federal employees with disabilities. It is available to employees, patients and family members, Pentagon survivors and wounded soldiers with visual, hearing, dexterity and cognitive disabilities.

Key to transforming health care is an enterprise architecture; data, security, communication and interoperable standards; and implementation of a robust computing and communication infrastructure. The Military Health System enterprise architecture is aligned with the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture and Federal Health Architecture. DoD is a leader in the Consolidated Health Informatics initiative to develop and adopt common health standards for all Federal agencies.

I fully support the President's Management Agenda on health care reform. DoD assisted the Department of Health and Human Services (Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology) in developing national strategies for transforming health care through the use of technologies such as the electronic health record. DoD, in response to a Presidential Executive Order, recommended approaches for providing affordable health information technologies to rural and medically underserved communities. DoD will continue to collaborate and share technology products, outcomes, benefits and lessons learned with HHS, other Federal agencies, and the private sector.

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6.2004

SUBJECT: **Electronic Health Records**

Here's some material on health transformation that Gingrich is working on. Is there anybody that can be helpful here at DoD? Do you have your head into those issues?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D.02ts

Attach: Gingrich email 3.20.04 Re: Tricare

Please respond by: _____

23

8/19/04

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037087

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 10:34 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.OiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)jack.patterson@osd.mil;
david.chu@osd.mil; william.winkenwerder@ha.osd.mil
Cc: john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; (b)(6)
Subject: electronic health records and tricare-the aarp example-newt

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 3/ 20/04

transforming tricare for greater member satisfaction and better health and lower cost (the trifecta of health transformation)

everything being described for an electronic health record below could apply even more to the military and military retirees and we could have an electronic health record up and running for the members to use as well as their doctors and hospitals by September one of this year.

aarp is very excited about rolling out an electronic health record by January for the 2.2 million 65 year olds who will be getting the new Medicare benchmark physical exams in 2005.

building further on friday's lunch conversation

so we can explain why an electronic health record would be truly empowering for the new medicare benchmark physical:

it would be really helpful if aarp might have or develop the following data:

the new 65 year olds are different from their parents (remember your magazine cover with the model-60 is 30,a little much,I think it is 45 and I am 60)

1. how many more years will the average 65 in 2005 probably live and how long will the longest probably live
2. how many of the 2.2 million will probably reach 80 and how many will probably reach 90 and the same for 100 (this lets us know that in 2020,2030,and 2040 we will have this many people still using their electronic health records compared to the

3/20 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/037088

frequency of paper records being lost, copied, fedexed etc.)

3. how often will this generation of 65 year olds travel each year, how many will go out of state, how many will go out of country

this explains why accessing your records from anywhere on the net is so important

how many will actually move out of state to live somewhere else than where they are now

how many have children or grandchildren who live out of state

this kind of data would enable us to build an overwhelming case for starting in January with an electronic health record as a matter of convenience and safety for the health of "the new 65 year olds"

if you put all this together it might make a great article for the magazine along with a story about what England is actually doing (I met last night with the people from IDX who are partnering in two of the five English electronic health record regions and they were very very encouraging). you could also tie it into explaining your website development at aarp

thanks for helping with this
newt

3/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/037089



The Center for Health Transformation Vision Statement

*The Center for Health Transformation is dedicated to creating a 21st Century Intelligent Health System in which knowledge **saves** lives and **saves** money for every American.*

Years 2004-2030

==

Years 1903-2003

This explosion of knowledge is moved from laboratory to market by a venture capital-licensing-royalty system of unprecedented power and ability. The potential for production is being radically expanded by the rise of China and India as the lowest cost producers on the planet.

Zones of Transformation

This scale of change will require America to undergo profound transformations if we want our children and grandchildren to live in the **most** productive economy in the world creating the **highest** value-added jobs and the greatest wealth, especially for retirees.

We will have to transform:

1. National security
2. Math and science education
3. Health and healthcare
4. From bureaucratic public administration to entrepreneurial public management
5. Tax code
6. Litigation system

For more on this go to www.healthtransformation.net/.

It will be the natural pattern for the system to revert to the traditional behavior unless leadership consistently reorients it to the new **transformational** model and sets **metrics** of achievement which only a transformation **could** achieve.

When faced with change on this **scale**, leadership **has** to learn not to say "No, because." but practice saying "**Yes, if.**"

In health we not only have to **transform** for the future but we have to transform to catch up with the last thirty years. Look for example at ATM's, self-service **gas** stations with credit cards. Travelocity, e-tickets and cell phones.

Four Key Drivers of Health Transformation will be:

- Patient safety and patient outcomes
- Information and communication technology
- A system and culture of quality
- Individual knowledge, responsibility and power to choose

The Center for Health Transformation's 2004 Key Strategies for Transforming Health

1. Create information-rich health savings accounts to both incentivize and empower the individual.
2. Create secure electronic health records with expert systems to maximize minimize errors, reduce inefficiencies and improve.
3. Develop a new system of health
4. Create a **buyers'** market for pharmaceuticals by building a transparent system for individuals, doctors, and pharmacists of price and efficacy information about prescription drugs and medically appropriate over-the-counter drugs. The system would have an open formulary with **an** "after-pay" rather than a co-pay (a "Travelocity" for drug purchasing).
5. Create a system and culture of rapid adoption of solutions that result in better outcomes at lower cost for both the public and private sector.
6. Establish **an** intellectually credible, accurate system for capturing the *cost and benefits* of better solutions, better technologies and better outcomes in order *to* create a technically correct model of return on investment for solutions resulting in better outcomes at lower cost.
7. Develop a real-time continuous research database and discover-develop-deliver ability (turning cancer into a chronic disease by 2015 and eliminating preventable complications from diabetes by 2015).
8. Knit together these electronic systems into a virtual public health **network** for health protection against natural outbreaks and a bioshield against deliberate biological attack.
9. By implementing the first eight strategies, turn health and healthcare from a problem into an opportunity, making it the leading creator of high-value jobs and foreign exchange **eaming** in American society (including **as** a first step the creation of an undersecretary of commerce for health).

For more information on transforming health and healthcare in America visit our web site at www.healthtransformation.net

CORRESPONDENCE TASKER

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Date: 8/12/2004

Control Number: 0115824

Route To: ASD HA

External Reference:

Controlling Organization: ADMIN/CCO

Document Date: 6/6/2004

Original Suspense Date: 8/19/2004

Document Originator: SECDEF/ RUMSFELD

Current Suspense Date: 8/19/2004

Create Date: 8/12/2004

Signature Level: USD

Subject: SNOWFLAKE-- ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS

Action: Prepare for Signature

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

8/12

S: 18 AUG to HA
TO: IMT&R and TMA
COORD W/ C+PP and
FH P+R.

cor Please prepare memo
to SECDEF thru P+R
on the subject in
thememo. Included
both IT and other
Clinical innovations
MHS is working
on.

Thanks.
Call me for color
commentary.

Coz S

Signature: _____

Date/Time: _____

Printed

Name: _____

Electronic Health Record Snowflake

COORDINATION

USD.(P&R)

DR. CHU

David L. Chu 17 Sep 04

Electronic Health Record Snowflake

COORDINATION

MHS CIO	Concurred, 8/25/04
DASD (FHP&R)	Concurred, 8/30/04
DASD (C&PP)	Concurred, 9/1/04
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	Concurred, 8/26/04
Chief of Staff, TMA	Concurred, 9/8/04
Deputy Dir, TMA	Concurred, 9/9/04
Chief of Staff (HA)	<u>Concurred, 9/13/04</u>
APDASD (HA)	<u>N/A</u>

Response to Honorable Newt Gingrich Memo to the Secretary of Defense Regarding
Snowflake–Electronic Health Record

COORDINATIONS

MHS CIO Concurrred, 8/26/04

DASD (FHP&R) Concurrred, 8/30/04

DASD (C&PP) Concurrred, 9/1/04

Dir, Program Integration, TMA Concurrred, 8/26/04

JCC/TMA
Chief of Staff, TMA *forwarded February 9-3 04*
QUILA 9/3

Deputy Dir, TMA _____

Chief of Staff (HA) _____

APDASD (HA) _____

Response to Honorable Newt Gingrich Memo to the Secretary of Defense
Regarding SNOWFLAKE - ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD

COORDINATIONS

		<u>DATE</u>
MHS CIO	see below	Aug. 26, 2004.
DASD (FHP&R)	<u>Ed Dubroy*</u>	<u>8/30/2004</u>
DASD (C&PP)	_____	_____
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	_____	_____
Chief of Staff, TMA	_____	_____
Deputy Dir, TMA	_____	_____
Chief of Staff (HA)	_____	_____
APDASD (HA)	_____	_____

*the paper from Newt is much broader than electronic health records and speaks to "drivers of health transformation" and "9 strategies for transforming health" which are much more relevant to what we are doing to transform the MHS (but included are the info technologies we have discussed)

The current response deals w/ IT only - okay but I think we are missing opportunity to talk about subjects "in quotes" above. - Ellen

Response to Honorable Newt Gingrich Memo to the Secretary of Defense
Regarding SNOWFLAKE - ELECTRONIC *HEALTH* RECORD

COORDINATIONS

		<u>DATE</u>
MHS CIO	<u>JOB</u>	<u>8/25/04</u>
Chief of Staff (HA)	_____	_____
APDASD (HA)	_____	_____
DASD (FHP&R)	_____	_____
DASD (C&PP)	<u>JWS For Dr. Tornberg</u>	<u>1 Sep 04</u> <u>31 Aug 04</u>

Response to Honorable Newt Gingrich Memo to the Secretary of Defense
Regarding SNOWFLAKE - ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD

COORDINATIONS

		<u>DATE</u>
MHS CIO	see below	Aug. 26, 2004
DASD (FHP&R)		
DASD (C&PP)		
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	SEEN	8/26
Chief of Staff, TMA		
Deputy Dir, TMA		
Chief of Staff (HA)		
APDASD (HA)		

September 17, 2004

TO: Paul McHale
Gen Ed Eberhart
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime Issues in Homeland Defense

I'd like to see an interim report or brief that outlines how we are doing on addressing maritime issues with regard to homeland defense and DoD responsibilities. I know there is considerable work and thought ongoing, but my sense is that we need to have a plan in place now to respond to maritime terrorist threats in a layered fashion - essentially a Maritime NORAD concept.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-6

.....
Please respond by 10/10/04

384

1750p04

OSD 14125-04

~~FOUO~~

September 17, 2004.

TO: Paul McHale
Gen Ed Eberhart
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime Issues in Homeland Defense

I'd like to see an interim report or brief that outlines how we are doing on addressing maritime issues with regard to homeland defense and DoD responsibilities. I know there is considerable work and thought ongoing, but my sense is that we need to have a plan in place now to respond *to* maritime terrorist threats in a layered fashion - essentially a Maritime NORAD concept.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-6

.....
Please respond by 10/10/04

OSD 14126-04

~~FOUO~~


11-L-0559/OSD/037100

September 17, 2004

TO: Gen Ed Eberhart
LTG Steven Blum, National Guard

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul McHale

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Hurricane Response

Thanks for all the hard work preparing for and responding to Hurricanes Frances, Charlie, and Ivan. Both of your organizations made major contributions to ensuring the safety and well being of hundreds of thousands of Americans – well done. I know there is more hard work in the days ahead, as the Southeast recovers from these storms, and I thank you for it.

DHR:ss
091704-4

.....
Please respond by _____

000,92

17 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

September 17, 2004

TO: Gen Ed Eberhart
LTG Steven Blum, National Guard

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul McHale

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Hurricane Response

Thanks for all the hard work preparing for and responding to Hurricanes Frances, Charlie, and Ivan. Both of your organizations made major contributions to ensuring the safety and well being of hundreds of thousands of Americans – well done. I know there is more hard work in the days ahead, as the Southeast recovers from these storms, and I thank you for it.

DHR:ss
091704-4

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037102


~~FOUO~~

September 17, 2004

TO: Gen Ed Eberhart
LTG Steven *Blum*, National Guard

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul McHale

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld



SUBJECT: Hurricane Response

Thanks for all the hard work preparing for and responding to Hurricanes Frances, Charlie, and Ivan. Both of your organizations made major contributions to ensuring the safety and well being of hundreds of thousands of Americans – well done. I know there is more hard work in the days ahead, as the Southeast recovers from these storms, and I thank you for it.

DHR:ss
091704-4

.....
Please *respond by* _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14127-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037103

SEP 20 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith
Tom O'Connell
GEN John Abizaid
Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Drug Labs in Afghanistan

We need to get our hands around the drug labs in Afghanistan and what our approach is going to be. There are many questions:

- What exactly constitutes a drug lab?
- How big are they?
- How many people work there?
- Do we have reliable intelligence as to their locations?
- What are the ROE for hitting them?

Before we undertake a mission like that, we would need to coordinate within the interagency and get everyone on board.

Please get back to me with some thoughts on all this soon.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-5

.....
Please respond by 10/10/04

205ep04


September 17, 2004

TO: VADM Keith Lippert, DLA

c c : GEN Dick Myers
GEN Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: DLA SLRG Brief



After receiving your briefing at yesterday's SLRG, I was impressed with the excellent progress you have achieved at DLA over the past three years. I am delighted you will be around to keep at it – experience helps. So does energy and enthusiasm.

334

Thanks for all you are doing.

DHR:ss
091704-2

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 14197-04

17 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

September 7, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: EUCOM Memo

Please tell me what this memo from **EUCOM** is about.

Thanks.

Attach.

09/03/04 EUCOM Memo to SecDef re: Africa Clearing House Initiative

DHR:ss
090704-46

.....
Please respond by

9/17/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037106

OSD 14274-04

AFRICA

9 SEP 04

04 9/17



COMMANDER
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

ECCC

3 September 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 1000
Defense Pentagon, Washington DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Africa Clearing House initiative

1. Purpose. US European Commands Africa Clearing House (ACH) initiative is a major part of the command's overall strategy of security cooperation in Africa. This memorandum outlines the 'way ahead' of the program.
2. Discussion. The ACH is a forum for security assistance coordination, collaboration, and de-confliction among donor nations and an information exchange forum between NATO, the EU, and key partner countries. The inaugural ACH conference was hosted and co-chaired by the Luxembourg Army and EUCOM in May 2004. Representatives from thirteen countries, the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade, European Union Military Staff, the African Center for Strategic Studies; and OSD participated. The regional focus of this first conference was West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The next ACH conference is scheduled for 22-23 November 2004 and will focus on the North Africa and Pan-Sahel regions.
3. Way Ahead. The ACH initiative was implemented to maximize the impact of EUCOM's theater security cooperation program in Africa. It provides a forum that focuses on the mutual strategic interests of the United States and its allies, an environment that promotes coordination of strategy and investments to further those interests. The overall objective is to provide a common strategy for security providers, share objectives, and create a mechanism to match objectives with resources. To more fully realize the initiative's potential, the command will amplify the scope of ACH and further deepen cooperation with major partners.
 - a. EUCOM is looking to broaden the scope of ACH by further identifying shared objectives throughout Africa. Our goal is to raise the shared awareness within the community of security providers—coordinate all national efforts by bringing visibility to each nation's investments, identify overlaps and disconnects, close gaps, and eventually influence national engagement strategies. The annual Africa Exercise Coordination Meeting will be included in the next ACH conference to more effectively link current exercise plans and develop future exercise contributions focused on ACH objectives.

Tab A


ECCC

SUBJECT: Africa Clearing House Initiative

b. EUCOM will expand cooperation by forming regional working groups aligned with current African regional organizations and the African Union's (AU) Response Force concept to coordinate efforts on broader trans-regional issues such as military education, sovereign control, and border and maritime security. Several partners have already shown strong interest in chairing those regional working groups. Additionally, we will assess whether or not we should increase the frequency of the conference.

c. Capitalizing on the momentum generated by the May 2004 conference, where the major ACH partners and participants agreed to support the development of an "engagement database" to link ACH-generated objectives with the engagement activities of contributing nations, we plan to invite representatives from both the AU and Africa regional security organizations to participate in the next conference. The database will be organized by region and support the AU Regional Response Force (ARRF) development.

4. Conclusion. The May 2004 baseline ACH conference was an excellent beginning. Cooperation between EUCOM and major sponsor partners is growing. EUCOM's multinational effort in support of ECOWAS is an example of what can be accomplished within the context of such cooperation. Our work with the ACW will help export that success to other regions on the African continent.



JAMES L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corp

CF:
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 SEP 21 AM 11:30
CH-2062-04
21 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *ST 9/10*

SUBJECT: EUCOM Memo

- **Issue.** "Please tell me what this memo from EUCOM is about." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The USEUCOM memorandum provides an update on its efforts to coordinate security cooperation efforts in Africa with US allies who have mutual strategic interests.
- **Discussion.** USEUCOM is attempting to maximize the effectiveness of limited US security assistance by establishing a forum where NATO, European Union and other allies can coordinate activities and/or funding to achieve shared regional security objectives.
 - Africa Clearing House (ACH) *serves* as a multinational clearinghouse for interested countries to share information on their security cooperation and/or engagement programs in order to deconflict events and determine areas on which to cooperate.
 - ACH is a step forward in meeting one of the USG's G-8 commitments approved in June 2004 to develop a clearinghouse mechanism for Africa.
- Additionally, the African Exercise Coordination Meeting (a CJCS-sponsored event which has met annually since May 1998) will be incorporated into the ACH. This will support improving both allied engagement and the peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations capabilities of African militaries.
- The initial ACH conference was hosted and co-chaired by the Luxembourg Army and USEUCOM in Senningen, Luxembourg (May 2004). Representatives from more than 15 countries and/or organizations (including OSD/International Security Affairs-Africa) participated.
- USEUCOM will host the next ACH Conference, 13-14 December 2004, in Stuttgart, Germany.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 14274-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037109

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

September 7, 2004

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: EUCOM Memo

Please **tell** me **what** this **memo** from EUCOM is about.

Thanks.

Attach.

09/03/04 EUCOM ~~Memo~~ to SecDef re: Africa Clearing ~~House~~ Initiative

DHR:ss
090704-46

.....
Please respond by

9/17/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037110

OSD 14274-04

004 9/7



COMMANDER
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

ECCC

3 September 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 1000
Defense Pentagon, Washington OC 20301-1000

SUBJECT Africa Clearing House Initiative

1. Purpose. US European Commands Africa Clearing House (ACH) initiative is a major part of the command's overall strategy of security cooperation in Africa. This memorandum outlines the 'way ahead' of the program.
2. Discussion. The ACH is a forum for security assistance coordination, collaboration, and de-confliction among donor nations and an information exchange forum between NATO, the EU, and key partner countries. The inaugural ACH conference was hosted and co-chaired by the Luxembourg Army and EUCOM in May 2004. Representatives from thirteen countries, the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade, European Union Military Staff, the African Center for Strategic Studies, and OSD participated. The regional focus of this first conference was West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The next ACH conference is scheduled for 22-23 November 2004 and will focus on the North Africa and Pan-Sahel regions.
3. Way Ahead. The ACH initiative was implemented to maximize the impact of EUCOM's theater security cooperation program in Africa. It provides a forum that focuses on the mutual strategic interests of the United States and its allies, an environment that promotes coordination of strategy and investments to further those interests. The overall objective is to provide a common strategy for security providers, share objectives, and create a mechanism to match objectives with resources. To more fully realize the initiative's potential, the command will amplify the scope of ACH and further deepen cooperation with major partners.
 - a. EUCOM is looking to broaden the scope of ACH by further identifying shared objectives throughout Africa. Our goal is to make the shared awareness within the community of security providers—coordinate all national efforts by bringing visibility to each nation's investments, identify overlaps and disconnects, close gaps, and eventually influence national engagement strategies. The annual Africa Exercise Coordination Meeting will be included in the next ACH conference to more effectively link current exercise plans and develop future exercise contributions focused on ACH objectives.

Tab A


ECCC

SUBJECT: Africa Clearing House Initiative

b. EUCOM will expand cooperation by forming regional working groups aligned with current African regional organizations and the African Union's (AU) Response Force concept to coordinate efforts on broader trans-regional issues such as military education, sovereign control, and border and maritime security. Several partners have already shown strong interest in chairing those regional working groups. Additionally, we will assess whether or not we should increase the frequency of the conference.

c. Capitalizing on the momentum generated by the May 2004 conference, where the major ACH partners and participants agreed to support the development of an "engagement database" to link ACH-generated objectives with the engagement activities of contributing nations, we plan to invite representatives from both the AU and Africa regional security organizations to participate in the next conference. The database will be organized by region and support the AU Regional Response Force (ARRF) development.

4. Conclusion. The May 2004 baseline ACH conference was an excellent beginning. Cooperation between EUCOM and major sponsor partners is growing. EUCOM's multinational effort in support of ECOWAS is an example of what can be accomplished within the context of such cooperation. Our work with the ACH will help export that success to other regions on the African continent.



JAMES L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corps

CF:

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff


Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Col. Wheeler	USEUCOM	15 September 2004
Mr. Whelan	DASD (ISA/AF)	15 September 2004

September 21, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Paper on Terrorism

Attached is an interesting paper on the problem of terrorism and the global struggle our country is engaged in.

Respectfully,

Attach.

"A View from the Eye of the Storm" by Haim Harari

DIIR:ss
092004-20

000.5

21 Sep 04

A View from the Eye of the Storm

Talk delivered by Haim Harari at a meeting of the International Advisory Board of a large multi-national corporation, April, 2004.
Haim Harari is one of Israel's foremost physicists and Ex-president of the Weizmann Institute of Science.

"As you know, I usually provide the scientific and technological "entertainment" in our meetings, but, on this occasion, our Chairman suggested that I present my own personal view on events in the part of the world from which I come. I have never been and I will never be a Government official and I have no privileged information. My perspective is entirely based on what I see, on what I read and on the fact that my family has lived in this region for almost 200 years. You may regard my views as those of the proverbial taxi driver, which you are supposed to question, when you visit a country.

I could have shared with you some fascinating facts and some personal thoughts about the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, I will touch upon it only in passing. I prefer to devote most of my remarks to the broader picture of the region and its place in world events. I refer to the entire area between Pakistan and Morocco, which is predominantly Arab, predominantly Moslem, but includes many non-Arab and also significant non-Moslem minorities. Why do I put aside Israel and its own immediate neighborhood? Because Israel and any problems related to it, in spite of what you might read or hear in the world media, is not the central issue, and has never been the central issue in the upheaval in the region. Yes, there is a 100 year-old Israeli-Arab conflict, but it is not where the main show is. The millions who died in the Iran-Iraq war had nothing to do with Israel. The mass murder happening right now in Sudan, where the Arab Moslem regime is massacring its black Christian citizens, has nothing to do with Israel. The frequent reports from Algeria about the murders of hundreds of civilian in one village or another by other Algerians have nothing to do with Israel. Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait, endangered Saudi Arabia and butchered his own people because of Israel. Egypt did not use poison gas against Yemen in the 60's because of Israel. Assad the Father did not kill tens of thousands of his own citizens in one week in El Hama in Syria because of Israel. The Taliban control of Afghanistan and the civil war there had nothing to do with Israel. The Libyan blowing up of the Pan-Am flight had nothing to do with Israel, and I could go on and on and on.

The root of the trouble is that this entire Moslem region is totally dysfunctional, by any standard of the word, and would have been so even if Israel would have joined the Arab league and an independent Palestine would have existed for 100 years. The 22 member countries of the Arab league, from Mauritania to the Gulf States, have a total population of 300 millions, larger than the US and almost as large as the EU before its expansion. They have a land area larger than either

the US or all of Europe. These 22 countries, with all their oil and natural resources, have a combined GDP smaller than that of Netherlands plus Belgium and equal to half of the GDP of California alone. Within this meager GDP, the gaps between rich and poor are beyond belief and too many of the rich made their money not by succeeding in business, but by being corrupt rulers.

The social status of women is far below what it was in the Western World 150 years ago. Human rights are below any reasonable standard, in spite of the grotesque fact that Libya was elected Chair of the UN Human Rights commission. According to a report prepared by a committee of Arab intellectuals and published under the auspices of the U.N., the number of books translated by the entire Arab world is much smaller than what little Greece alone translates. The total number of scientific publications of 300 million Arabs is less than that of 6 million Israelis. Birth rates in the region are very high, increasing the poverty, the social gaps and the cultural decline.

And all of this is happening in a region, which only 30 years ago, was believed to be the next wealthy part of the world, and in a Moslem area, which developed, at some point in history, one of the most advanced cultures in the world. It is fair to say that this creates an unprecedented breeding ground for cruel dictators, terror networks, fanaticism, incitement, suicide murders and general decline. It is also a fact that almost everybody in the region blames this situation on the United States, on Israel, on Western Civilization, on Judaism and Christianity, on anyone and anything, except themselves. Do I say all of this with the satisfaction of someone discussing the failings of his enemies? On the contrary, I firmly believe that the world would have been a much better place and my own neighborhood would have been much more pleasant and peaceful, if things were different. I should also say a word about the millions of decent, honest, good people who are either devout Moslems or are not very religious but grew up in Moslem families. They are double victims of an outside world, which now develops Islam phobia and of their own environment, which breaks their heart by being totally dysfunctional. The problem is that the vast silent majority of these Moslems are not part of the terror and of the incitement but they also do not stand up against it. They become accomplices, by omission, and this applies to political leaders, intellectuals, business people and many others. Many of them can certainly tell right from wrong, but are afraid to express their views.

The events of the last few years have amplified four issues, which have always existed, but have never been as rampant as in the present upheaval in the region. These are the four main pillars of the current World Conflict, or perhaps we should already refer to it as "the undeclared World War III." I have no better name for the present situation. A few more years may pass before everybody acknowledges that it is a World War, but we are already well into it.

The first element is the suicide murder. Suicide murders are not a new invention but they have been made popular, if I may use this

expression, only lately. Even after September 11, it seems that most of the Western World does not yet understand this weapon. It is a very potent psychological weapon. Its real direct impact is relatively minor. The total number of casualties from hundreds of suicide murders within Israel in the last three years is much smaller than those due to car accidents. September 11 was quantitatively much less lethal than many earthquakes. More people die from AIDS in one day in Africa than all the Russians who died in the hands of Chechnya-based Moslem suicide murderers since that conflict started. Saddam killed every month more people than all those who died from suicide murders since the Coalition occupation of Iraq. So what is all the fuss about suicide killings? It creates headlines. It is spectacular. It is frightening. It is a very cruel death with bodies dismembered and horrible severe lifelong injuries to many of the wounded. It is always shown on television in great detail. One such murder, with the help of hysterical media coverage, can destroy the tourism industry of a country for quite a while, as it did in Bali and in Turkey. But the real fear comes from the undisputed fact that no defense and no preventive measures can succeed against a determined suicide murderer. This has not yet penetrated the thinking of the Western World. The U.S. and Europe are constantly improving their defense against the last murder, not the next one. We may arrange for the best airport security in the world. But if you want to murder by suicide, you do not have to board a plane in order to explode yourself and kill many people. Who could stop a suicide murder in the midst of the crowded line waiting to be checked by the airport metal detector? How about the lines to the check-in counters in a busy travel period? Put a metal detector in front of every train station in Spain and the terrorists will get the buses. Protect the buses and they will explode in movie theaters, concert halls, supermarkets, shopping malls, schools and hospitals. Put guards in front of every concert hall and there will always be a line of people to be checked by the guards and this line will be the target, not to speak of killing the guards themselves. You can somewhat reduce your vulnerability by preventive and defensive measures and by strict border controls but not eliminate it and definitely not win the war in a defensive way. And it is a war. What is behind the suicide murders? Money, power and cold-blooded murderous incitement, nothing else. It has nothing to do with true fanatic religious beliefs. No Moslem preacher has ever blown himself up. No son of an Arab politician or religious leader has ever blown himself. No relative of anyone influential has done it. Wouldn't you expect some of the religious leaders to do it themselves, or to talk their sons into doing it, if this is truly a supreme act of religious fervor? Aren't they interested in the benefits of going to Heaven? Instead, they send outcast women, naive children, retarded people and young incited hotheads. They promise them the delights, mostly sexual, of the next world, and pay their families handsomely after the supreme act is performed and enough innocent people are dead. Suicide murders also have nothing to do with poverty and despair. The poorest region in the world, by far, is Africa. It never happens there. There are numerous desperate people in the world, in different cultures, countries and continents. Desperation does not provide anyone with explosives, reconnaissance and transportation. There was certainly more despair in

Saddam's Iraq then in Paul Bremmer's Iraq, and no one exploded ? himself. A suicide murder is simply a horrible, vicious weapon of cruel, inhuman, cynical, well-funded terrorists, with no regard to human life, including the life of their fellow countrymen, but with very high regard to their own affluent well-being and their hunger for power. The only way to fight this new "popular" weapon is identical to the only way in which you fight organized crime or pirates on the high seas: the offensive way. Like in the case of organized crime, it is crucial that the forces on the offensive be united and it is crucial to reach the top of the crime pyramid. You cannot eliminate organized crime by arresting the little drug dealer in the street corner. You must go after the head of the "Family". If part of the public supports it, others tolerate it, many are afraid of it and some try to explain it away by poverty or by a miserable childhood, organized crime will thrive and so will terrorism. The United States understands this now, after September 11. Russia is beginning to understand it. Turkey understands it well. I am very much afraid that most of Europe still does not understand it. Unfortunately, it seems that Europe will understand it only after suicide murders will arrive in Europe in a big way. In my humble opinion, this will definitely happen. The Spanish trains and the Istanbul bombings are only the beginning. The unity of the Civilized World in fighting this horror is absolutely indispensable. Until Europe wakes up, this unity will not be achieved.

The second ingredient is words, more precisely lies. Words can be lethal. They kill people. It is often said that politicians, diplomats and perhaps also lawyers and business people must sometimes lie, as part of their professional life. But the norms of politics and diplomacy are childish, in comparison with the level of incitement and total absolute deliberate fabrications, which have reached new heights in the region we are talking about. An incredible number of people in the Arab world believe that September 11 never happened, or was an American provocation or, ever, better, a Jewish plot. You all remember the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mr. Mouhamad Said al-Sahaf and his press conferences when the US forces were already inside Baghdad. Disinformation at time of war is an accepted tactic. But to stand, day after day, and to make such preposterous statements, known to everybody to be lies, without even being ridiculed in your own milieu, can only happen in this region. Mr. Sahaf eventually became a popular icon as a court jester, but this did not stop some allegedly respectable newspapers from giving him equal time. It also does not prevent the Western press from giving credence, every day, even now, to similar liars. After all, if you want to be an anti-Semite, there are subtle ways of doing it. You do not have to claim that the holocaust never happened and that the Jewish temple in Jerusalem never existed. But millions of Moslems are told by their leaders that this is the case. When these same leaders make other statements, the Western media report them as if they could be true. It is a daily occurrence that the same people, who finance, arm and dispatch suicide murderers, condemn the act in English in front of western TV cameras, talking to a world audience, which even partly believes them. It is a daily routine to hear the same leader making opposite statements in Arabic to his people

and in English to the rest of the world. Incitement by Arab TV, accompanied by horror pictures of mutilated bodies, has become a powerful weapon of those who lie, distort and want to destroy everything. Little children are raised on deep hatred and on admiration of so-called martyrs, and the Western World does not notice it because its own TV sets are mostly tuned to soap operas and game shows. I recommend to you, even though most of you do not understand Arabic, to watch Al Jazeera, from time to time. You will not believe your own eyes. But words also work in other ways, more subtle. A demonstration in Berlin, carrying banners supporting Saddam's regime and featuring three-year old babies dressed as suicide murderers, is defined by the press and by political leaders as a "peace demonstration". You may support or oppose the Iraq war, but to refer to fans of Saddam, Arafat or Bin Laden as peace activists is a bit too much. A woman walks into an Israeli restaurant in mid-day, eats, observes families with old people and children eating their lunch in the adjacent tables and pays the bill. She then blows herself up, killing 20 people, including many children, with heads and arms rolling around in the restaurant. She is called "martyr" by several Arab leaders and "activist" by the European press. Dignitaries condemn the act but visit her bereaved family and the money flows. There is a new game in town: The actual murderer is called "the military wing", the one who pays him, equips him and sends him is now called "the political wing" and the head of the operation is called the "spiritual leader". There are numerous other examples of such Orwellian nomenclature, used every day not only by terror chiefs but also by Western media. These words are much more dangerous than many people realize. They provide an emotional infrastructure for atrocities. It was Joseph Goebbels who said that if you repeat a lie often enough, people will believe it. He is now being outperformed by his successors.

The third aspect is money. Huge amounts of money, which could have solved many social problems in this dysfunctional part of the world, are channeled into three concentric spheres supporting death and murder. In the inner circle are the terrorists themselves. The money funds their travel, explosives, hideouts and permanent search for soft vulnerable targets. They are surrounded by a second wider circle of direct supporters, planners, commanders, preachers, all of whom make a living, usually a very comfortable living, by serving as terror infrastructure. Finally, we find the third circle of so-called religious, educational and welfare organizations, which actually do some good, feed the hungry and provide some schooling, but brainwash a new generation with hatred, lies and ignorance. This circle operates mostly through mosques, madras's and other religious establishments but also through inciting electronic and printed media. It is this circle that makes sure that women remain inferior, that democracy is unthinkable and that exposure to the outside world is minimal. It is also that circle that leads the way in blaming everybody outside the Moslem world, for the miseries of the region. Figuratively speaking, this outer circle is the guardian, which makes sure that the people look and listen inwards to the inner circle of terror and incitement, rather than to the world outside. Some parts of this same outer circle actually operate as a result of fear from, or

blackmail by, the inner circles. The horrifying added factor is the high birth rate. Half of the population of the Arab world is under the age of 20, the most receptive age to incitement, guaranteeing two more generations of blind hatred. Of the three circles described above, the inner circles are primarily financed by terrorist states like Iran and Syria, until recently also by Iraq and Libya and earlier also by some of the Communist regimes. These states, as well as the Palestinian Authority, are the safe havens of the wholesale murder vendors. The outer circle is largely financed by Saudi Arabia, but also by donations from certain Moslem communities in the United States and Europe and, to a smaller extent, by donations of European Governments to various NGO's and by certain United Nations organizations, whose goals may be noble, but they are infested and exploited by agents of the outer circle. The Saudi regime, of course, will be the next victim of major terror, when the inner circle will explode into the outer circle. The Saudis are beginning to understand it, but they fight the inner circles, while still financing the infrastructure at the outer circle. Some of the leaders of these various circles live very comfortably on their loot. You meet their children in the best private schools in Europe, not in the training camps of suicide murderers. The Jihad "soldiers" join packaged death tours to Iraq and other hotspots, while some of their leaders ski in Switzerland. Mrs. Arafat, who lives in Paris with her daughter, receives tens of thousands Dollars per month from the allegedly bankrupt Palestinian Authority while a typical local ringleader of the Al-Aksa brigade, reporting to Arafat, receives only a cash payment of a couple of hundred dollars, for performing murders at the retail level.

The fourth element of the current world conflict is the total breaking of all laws. The civilized world believes in democracy, the rule of law, including international law, human rights, free speech and free press, among other liberties. There are naive old-fashioned habits such as respecting religious sites and symbols, not using ambulances and hospitals for acts of war, avoiding the mutilation of dead bodies and not using children as human shields or human bombs. Never in history, not even in the Nazi period, was there such total disregard of all of the above as we observe now.

Every student of political science debates how you prevent an anti-democratic force from winning a democratic election and abolishing democracy. Other aspects of a civilized society must also have limitations. Can a policeman open fire on someone trying to kill him? Can a government listen to phone conversations of terrorists and drug dealers? Does free speech protect you when you shout "fire" in a crowded theater? Should there be death penalty, for deliberate multiple murders? These are the old-fashioned dilemmas. But now we have an entire new set. Do you raid a mosque, which serves as a terrorist ammunition storage? Do you return fire, if you are attacked from a hospital? Do you storm a church taken over by terrorists who took the priests hostages? Do you search every ambulance after a few suicide murderers use ambulances to reach their targets? Do you strip every woman because one pretended to be pregnant and carried a suicide bomb on her belly? Do you shoot back at someone trying to kill you, standing deliberately behind a group of children? Do you raid

terrorist headquarters, hidden in a mental hospital? Do you shoot an arch-murderer who deliberately moves from one location to another, always surrounded by children? All of these happen daily in Iraq and in the Palestinian areas.

What do you do? Well, you do not want to face the dilemma. But it cannot be avoided. Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that someone would openly stay in a well-known address in Teheran, hosted by the Iranian Government and financed by it, executing one atrocity after another in Spain or in France, killing hundreds of innocent people, accepting responsibility for the crimes, promising in public TV interviews to do more of the same, while the Government of Iran issues public condemnations of his acts but continues to host him, invite him to official functions and treat him as a great dignitary. I leave it to you as homework to figure out what Spain or France would have done in such a situation. The problem is that the civilized world is still having illusions about the rule of law in a totally lawless environment. It is trying to play ice hockey by sending a ballerina ice-skater into the rink or to knock out a heavyweight boxer by a chess player. In the same way that no country has a law against cannibals eating its prime minister, because such an act is unthinkable, international law does not address killers shooting from hospitals, mosques and ambulances, while being protected by their Government or society. International law does not know how to handle someone who sends children to throw stones, stands behind them and shoots with immunity and cannot be arrested because he is sheltered by a Government. International law does not know how to deal with a leader of murderers who is royally and comfortably hosted by a country, which pretends to condemn his acts or just claims to be too weak to arrest him. The amazing thing is that all of these crooks demand protection under international law and define all those who attack them as war criminals, with some Western media repeating the allegations. The good news is that all of this is temporary, because the evolution of international law has always adapted itself to reality. The punishment for suicide murder should be death or arrest before the murder, not during and not after. After every world war, the rules of international law have changed and the same will happen after the present one. But during the twilight zone, a lot of harm can be done. The picture I described here is not pretty. What can we do about it? In the short run, only fight and win. In the long run - only educate the next generation and open it to the world. The inner circles can and must be destroyed by force. The outer circle cannot be eliminated by force. Here we need financial starvation of the organizing elite, more power to women, more education, counter propaganda, boycott whenever feasible and access to Western media, internet and the international scene. Above all, we need a total absolute unity and determination of the civilized world against all three circles of evil. Allow me, for a moment, to depart from my alleged role as a taxi driver and return to science.

When you have a malignant tumor, you may remove the tumor itself surgically. You may also starve it by preventing new blood from reaching it from other parts of the body, thereby preventing new

"supplies" from expanding the tumor. If you want to be sure, it is best to do both. But before you fight and win, by force or otherwise, you have to realize that you are in a war, and this may take Europe a few more years. In order to win, it is necessary to first eliminate the terrorist regimes, so that no Government in the world will serve as a safe haven for these people. I do not want to comment here on whether the American-led attack on Iraq was justified from the point of view of weapons of mass destruction or any other pre-war argument, but I can look at the post-war map of Western Asia. Now that Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are out, two and a half terrorist states remain: Iran, Syria and Lebanon, the latter being a Syrian colony. Perhaps Sudan should be added to the list. As a result of the conquest of Afghanistan and Iraq, both Iran and Syria are now totally surrounded by territories unfriendly to them. Iran is encircled by Afghanistan, by the Gulf States, Iraq and the Moslem republics of the former Soviet Union. Syria is surrounded by Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Israel. This is a significant strategic change and it applies strong pressure on the terrorist countries. It is not surprising that Iran is so active in trying to incite a Shiite uprising in Iraq. I do not know if the American plan was actually to encircle both Iran and Syria, but that is the resulting situation. In my humble opinion, the number one danger to the world today is Iran and its regime. It definitely has ambitions to rule vast areas and to expand in all directions. It has an ideology, which claims supremacy over Western culture. It is ruthless. It has proven that it can execute elaborate terrorist acts without leaving too many traces, using Iranian Embassies. It is clearly trying to develop Nuclear Weapons. Its so-called moderates and conservatives play their own virtuoso version of the "good-cop versus bad-cop" game. Iran sponsors Syrian terrorism, it is certainly behind much of the action in Iraq, it is fully funding the Hizbulla and, through it, the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it performed acts of terror at least in Europe and in South America and probably also in Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia and it truly leads a multi-national terror consortium, which includes, as minor players, Syria, Lebanon and certain Shiite elements in Iraq. Nevertheless, most European countries still trade with Iran, try to appease it and refuse to read the clear signals. In order to win the war it is also necessary to dry the financial resources of the terror conglomerate. It is pointless to try to understand the subtle differences between the Sunni terror of Al Qaida and Hamas and the Shiite terror of Hizbulla, Sadr and other Iranian inspired enterprises. When it serves their business needs, all of them collaborate beautifully. It is crucial to stop Saudi and other financial support of the outer circle, which is the fertile breeding ground of terror. It is important to monitor all donations from the Western world to Islamic organizations, to monitor the finances of international relief organizations and to react with forceful economic measures to any small sign of financial aid to any of the three circles of terrorism. It is also important to act decisively against the campaign of lies and fabrications and to monitor those Western media who collaborate with it out of naivety, financial interests or ignorance. Above all, never surrender to terror. No one will ever know whether the recent elections in Spain would have yielded a different result, if not for the train bombings a few days earlier.

But it really does not matter. What matters is that the terrorists believe that they caused the result and that they won by driving Spain out of Iraq. The Spanish story will surely end up being extremely costly to other European countries, including France, who is now expelling inciting preachers and forbidding veils and including others who sent troops to Iraq. In the long run, Spain itself will pay even more. Is the solution a democratic Arab world? If by democracy we mean free elections but also free press, free speech, a functioning judicial system, civil liberties, equality to women, free international travel, exposure to international media and ideas, laws against racial incitement and against defamation, and avoidance of lawless behavior regarding hospitals, places of worship and children, then yes, democracy is the solution. If democracy is just free elections, it is likely that the most fanatic regime will be elected, the one whose incitement and fabrications are the most inflammatory.

We have seen it already in Algeria and, to a certain extent, in Turkey. It will happen again, if the ground is not prepared very carefully. On the other hand, a certain transition democracy, as in Jordan, may be a better temporary solution, paving the way for the real thing, perhaps in the same way that an immediate sudden democracy did not work in Russia and would not have worked in China. I have no doubt that the civilized world will prevail. But the longer it takes us to understand the new landscape of this war, the more costly and painful the victory will be. Europe, more than any other region, is the key. Its understandable recoil from wars, following the horrors of World War II, may cost thousands of additional innocent lives, before the tide will turn."

September 20, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jordan as Regional Center of Excellence in Counter-Terrorism
Operations

Your idea about Jordan focusing on Counter-Terrorism makes sense. Please work with the Joint Staff and Policy.

Let's get some specifics on what that would mean and how we would energize the concept.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-18

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

Jordan

20 Sep 04

7201
~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Mark Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paper on Terrorism

Attached is an interesting paper you might want to read.

Thanks.

Attach.
"A View from the Eye of the Storm" by Haim Harari

DHR:ss
092004-19

.....

Please respond by _____

000.5

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14304-04

DR 8404

A View from the Eye of the Storm

Talk delivered by Haim Harari at a meeting of the International Advisory Board of a large multi-national corporation, April, 2004. Haim Harari is one of Israel's foremost physicists and Ex-president of the Weizmann Institute of Science.

"As you know, I usually provide the scientific and technological "entertainment" in our meetings, but, on this occasion, our Chairman suggested that I present my own personal view on events in the part of the world from which I come. I have never been and I will never be a Government official and I have no privileged information. My perspective is entirely based on what I see, on what I read and on the fact that my family has lived in this region for almost 200 years. You may regard my views as those of the proverbial taxi driver, which you are supposed to question, when you visit a country.

I could have shared with you some fascinating facts and some personal thoughts about the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, I will touch upon it only in passing. I prefer to devote most of my remarks to the broader picture of the region and its place in world events. I refer to the entire area between Pakistan and Morocco, which is predominantly Arab, predominantly Moslem, but includes many non-Arab and also significant non-Moslem minorities. Why do I put aside Israel and its own immediate neighborhood? Because Israel and any problems related to it, in spite of what you might read or hear in the world media, is not the central issue, and has never been the central issue in the upheaval in the region. Yes, there is a 100 year-old Israeli-Arab conflict, but it is not where the main show is. The millions who died in the Iran-Iraq war had nothing to do with Israel. The mass murder happening right now in Sudan, where the Arab Moslem regime is massacring its black Christian citizens, has nothing to do with Israel. The frequent reports from Algeria about the murders of hundreds of civilian in one village or another by other Algerians have nothing to do with Israel. Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait, endangered Saudi Arabia and butchered his own people because of Israel. Egypt did not use poison gas against Yemen in the 60's because of Israel. Assad the Father did not kill tens of thousands of his own citizens in one week in El Hamma in Syria because of Israel. The Taliban control of Afghanistan and the civil war there had nothing to do with Israel. The Libyan blowing up of the Pan-Am flight had nothing to do with Israel, and I could go on and on and on.

The root of the trouble is that this entire Moslem region is totally dysfunctional, by any standard of the word, and would have been so even if Israel would have joined the Arab league and an independent Palestine would have existed for 100 years. The 22 member countries of the Arab league, from Mauritania to the Gulf States, have a total population of 300 millions, larger than the US and almost as large as the EU before its expansion. They have a land area larger than either

the US or all of Europe. These 22 countries, with all their oil and natural resources, have a combined GDP smaller than that of Netherlands plus Belgium and equal to half of the GDP of California alone. Within this meager GDP, the gaps between rich and poor are beyond belief and too many of the rich made their money not by succeeding in business, but by being corrupt rulers.

The social status of women is far below what it was in the Western World 150 years ago. Human rights are below any reasonable standard, in spite of the grotesque fact that Libya was elected Chair of the UN Human Rights commission. According to a report prepared by a committee of Arab intellectuals and published under the auspices of the U.N., the number of books translated by the entire Arab world is much smaller than what little Greece alone translates. The total number of scientific publications of 300 million Arabs is less than that of 6 million Israelis. Birth rates in the region are very high, increasing the poverty, the social gaps and the cultural decline.

And all of this is happening in a region, which only 30 years ago, was believed to be the next wealthy part of the world, and in a Moslem area, which developed, at some point in history, one of the most advanced cultures in the world. It is fair to say that this creates an unprecedented breeding ground for cruel dictators, terror networks, fanaticism, incitement, suicide murders and general decline. It is also a fact that almost everybody in the region blames this situation on the United States, on Israel, on Western Civilization, on Judaism and Christianity, on anyone and anything, except themselves. Do I say all of this with the satisfaction of someone discussing the failings of his enemies? On the contrary, I firmly believe that the world would have been a much better place and my own neighborhood would have been much more pleasant and peaceful, if things were different. I should also say a word about the millions of decent, honest, good people who are either devout Moslems or are not very religious but grew up in Moslem families. They are double victims of an outside world, which now develops Islam phobia and of their own environment, which breaks their heart by being totally dysfunctional. The problem is that the vast silent majority of these Moslems are not part of the terror and of the incitement but they also do not stand up against it. They become accomplices, by omission, and this applies to political leaders, intellectuals, business people and many others. Many of them can certainly tell right from wrong, but are afraid to express their views.

The events of the last few years have amplified four issues, which have always existed, but have never been as rampant as in the present upheaval in the region. These are the four main pillars of the current World Conflict, or perhaps we should already refer to it as "the undeclared World War III." I have no better name for the present situation. A few more years may pass before everybody acknowledges that it is a World War, but we are already well into it.

The first element is the suicide murder. Suicide murders are not a new invention but they have been made popular, if I may use this

expression, only lately. Even after September 11, it seems that most of the Western World does not yet understand this weapon. It is a very potent psychological weapon. Its real direct impact is relatively minor. The total number of casualties from hundreds of suicide murders within Israel in the last three years is much smaller than those due to car accidents. September 11 was quantitatively much less lethal than many earthquakes. More people die from AIDS in one day in Africa than all the Russians who died in the hands of Chechnya-based Moslem suicide murderers since that conflict started. Saddam killed every month more people than all those who died from suicide murders since the Coalition occupation of Iraq. So what is all the fuss about suicide killings? It creates headlines. It is spectacular. It is frightening. It is a very cruel death with bodies dismembered and horrible severe lifelong injuries to many of the wounded. It is always shown on television in great detail. One such murder, with the help of hysterical media coverage, can destroy the tourism industry of a country for quite a while, as it did in Bali and in Turkey. But the real fear comes from the undisputed fact that no defense and no preventive measures can succeed against a determined suicide murderer. This has not yet penetrated the thinking of the Western World. The U.S. and Europe are constantly improving their defense against the last murder, not the next one. We may arrange for the best airport security in the world. But if you want to murder by suicide, you do not have to board a plane in order to explode yourself and kill many people. Who could stop a suicide murder in the midst of the crowded line waiting to be checked by the airport metal detector? How about the lines to the check-in counters in a busy travel period? Put a metal detector in front of every train station in Spain and the terrorists will get the buses. Protect the buses and they will explode in movie theaters, concert halls, supermarkets, shopping malls, schools and hospitals. Put guards in front of every concert hall and there will always be a line of people to be checked by the guards and this line will be the target, not to speak of killing the guards themselves. You can somewhat reduce your vulnerability by preventive and defensive measures and **by** strict border controls but not eliminate it and definitely not win the war in a defensive way. And it is a war. What is behind the suicide murders? Money, power and cold-blooded murderous incitement, nothing else. It has nothing to do with true fanatic religious beliefs. No Moslem preacher has ever blown himself up. No son of an Arab politician or religious leader has ever blown himself. No relative of anyone influential has done it. Wouldn't you expect some of the religious leaders to do it themselves, or to talk their sons into doing it, if this is truly a supreme act of religious fervor? Aren't they interested in the benefits of going to Heaven? Instead, they send outcast women, naive children, retarded people and young incited hotheads. They promise them the delights, mostly sexual, of the next world, and pay their families handsomely after the supreme act is performed and enough innocent people are dead. Suicide murders also have nothing to do with poverty and despair. The poorest region in the world, by far, is Africa. It never happens there. There are numerous desperate people in the world, in different cultures, countries and continents. Desperation does not provide anyone with explosives, reconnaissance and transportation. There was certainly more despair in

Saddam's Iraq then in Paul Bremmer's Iraq, and no one exploded himself. A suicide murder is simply a horrible, vicious weapon of cruel, inhuman, cynical, well-funded terrorists, with no regard to human life, including the life of their fellow countrymen, but with very high regard to their own affluent well-being and their hunger for power. The only way to fight this new "popular" weapon is identical to the only way in which you fight organized crime or pirates on the high seas: the offensive way. Like in the case of organized crime, it is crucial that the forces on the offensive be united and it is crucial to reach the top of the crime pyramid. You cannot eliminate organized crime by arresting the little drug dealer in the street corner. You must go after the head of the "Family". If part of the public supports it, others tolerate it, many are afraid of it and some try to explain it away by poverty or by a miserable childhood, organized crime will thrive and so will terrorism. The United States understands this now, after September 11. Russia is beginning to understand it. Turkey understands it well. I am very much afraid that most of Europe still does not understand it. Unfortunately, it seems that Europe will understand it only after suicide murders will arrive in Europe in a big way. In my humble opinion, this will definitely happen. The Spanish trains and the Istanbul bombings are only the beginning. The unity of the Civilized World in fighting this horror is absolutely indispensable. Until Europe wakes up, this unity will not be achieved.

The second ingredient is words, more precisely lies. Words can be lethal. They kill people. It is often said that politicians, diplomats and perhaps also lawyers and business people must sometimes lie, as part of their professional life. But the norms of politics and diplomacy are childish, in comparison with the level of incitement and total absolute deliberate fabrications, which have reached new heights in the region we are talking about. An incredible number of people in the Arab world believe that September 11 never happened, or was an American provocation or, even better, a Jewish plot. You all remember the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mr. Mouhamad Said al-Sahaf and his press conferences when the US forces were already inside Baghdad. Disinformation at time of war is an accepted tactic. But to stand, day after day, and to make such preposterous statements, known to everybody to be lies, without even being ridiculed in your own milieu, can only happen in this region. Mr. Sahaf eventually became a popular icon as a court jester, but this did not stop some allegedly respectable newspapers from giving him equal time. It also does not prevent the Western press from giving credence, every day, even now, to similar liars. After all, if you want to be an anti-Semite, there are subtle ways of doing it. You do not have to claim that the holocaust never happened and that the Jewish temple in Jerusalem never existed. But millions of Moslems are told by their leaders that this is the case. When these same leaders make other statements, the Western media report them as if they could be true. It is a daily occurrence that the same people, who finance, arm and dispatch suicide murderers, condemn the act in English in front of western TV cameras, talking to a world audience, which even partly believes them. It is a daily routine to hear the same leader making opposite statements in Arabic to his people

and in English to the rest of the world. Incitement by Arab TV, accompanied by horror pictures of mutilated bodies, has become a powerful weapon of those who lie, distort and want to destroy everything. Little children are raised on deep hatred and on admiration of so-called martyrs, and the Western World does not notice it because its own TV sets are mostly tuned to soap operas and game shows. I recommend to you, even though most of you do not understand Arabic, to watch Al Jazeera, from time to time. You will not believe your own eyes. But words also work in other ways, more subtle. A demonstration in Berlin, carrying banners supporting Saddam's regime and featuring three-year old babies dressed as suicide murderers, is defined by the press and by political leaders as a "peace demonstration". You may support or oppose the Iraq war, but to refer to fans of Saddam, Arafat or Bin Laden as peace activists is a bit too much. A woman walks into an Israeli restaurant in mid-day, eats, observes families with old people and children eating their lunch in the adjacent tables and pays the bill. She then blows herself up, killing 20 people, including many children, with heads and arms rolling around in the restaurant. She is called "martyr" by several Arab leaders and "activist" by the European press. Dignitaries condemn the act but visit her bereaved family and the money flows. There is a new game in town: The actual murderer is called "the military wing", the one who pays him, equips him and sends him is now called "the political wing" and the head of the operation is called the "spiritual leader". There are numerous other examples of such Orwellian nomenclature, used every day not only by terror chiefs but also by Western media. These words are much more dangerous than many people realize. They provide an emotional infrastructure for atrocities. It was Joseph Goebbels who said that if you repeat a lie often enough, people will believe it. He is now being outperformed by his successors.

The third aspect is money. Huge amounts of money, which could have solved many social problems in this dysfunctional part of the world, are channeled into three concentric spheres supporting death and murder. In the inner circle are the terrorists themselves. The money funds their travel, explosives, hideouts and permanent search for soft vulnerable targets. They are surrounded by a second wider circle of direct supporters, planners, commanders, preachers, all of whom make a living, usually a very comfortable living, by serving as terror infrastructure. Finally, we find the third circle of so-called religious, educational and welfare organizations, which actually do some good, feed the hungry and provide some schooling, but brainwash a new generation with hatred, lies and ignorance. This circle operates mostly through mosques, madras's and other religious establishments but also through inciting electronic and printed media. It is this circle that makes sure that women remain inferior, that democracy is unthinkable and that exposure to the outside world is minimal. It is also that circle that leads the way in blaming everybody outside the Moslem world, for the miseries of the region. Figuratively speaking, this outer circle is the guardian, which makes sure that the people look and listen inwards to the inner circle of terror and incitement, rather than to the world outside. Some parts of this same outer circle actually operate as a result of fear from, or

blackmail by, the inner circles. The horrifying added factor is the high birth rate. Half of the population of the Arab world is under the age of 20, the most receptive age to incitement, guaranteeing two more generations of blind hatred. Of the three circles described above, the inner circles are primarily financed by terrorist states like Iran and Syria, until recently also by Iraq and Libya and earlier also by some of the Communist regimes. These states, as well as the Palestinian Authority, are the safe havens of the wholesale murder vendors. The outer circle is largely financed by Saudi Arabia, but also by donations from certain Moslem communities in the United States and Europe and, to a smaller extent, by donations of European Governments to various NGO's and by certain United Nations organizations, whose goals may be noble, but they are infested and exploited by agents of the outer circle. The Saudi regime, of course, will be the next victim of major terror, when the inner circle will explode into the outer circle. The Saudis are beginning to understand it, but they fight the inner circles, while still financing the infrastructure at the outer circle. Some of the leaders of these various circles live very comfortably on their loot. You meet their children in the best private schools in Europe, not in the training camps of suicide murderers. The Jihad "soldiers" join packaged death tours to Iraq and other hotspots, while some of their leaders ski in Switzerland. Mrs. Arafat, who lives in Paris with her daughter, receives tens of thousands Dollars per month from the allegedly bankrupt Palestinian Authority while a typical local ringleader of the Al-Aksa brigade, reporting to Arafat, receives only a cash payment of a couple of hundred dollars, for performing murders at the retail level.

The fourth element of the current world conflict is the total breaking of all laws. The civilized world believes in democracy, the rule of law, including international law, human rights, free speech and free press, among other liberties. There are naive old-fashioned habits such as respecting religious sites and symbols, not using ambulances and hospitals for acts of war, avoiding the mutilation of dead bodies and not using children as human shields or human bombs. Never in history, not even in the Nazi period, was there such total disregard of all of the above as we observe now.

Every student of political science debates how you prevent an anti-democratic force from winning a democratic election and abolishing democracy. Other aspects of a civilized society must also have limitations. Can a policeman open fire on someone trying to kill him? Can a government listen to phone conversations of terrorists and drug dealers? Does free speech protect you when you shout "fire" in a crowded theater? Should there be death penalty, for deliberate multiple murders? These are the old-fashioned dilemmas. But now we have an entire new set. Do you raid a mosque, which serves as a terrorist ammunition storage? Do you return fire, if you are attacked from a hospital? Do you storm a church taken over by terrorists who took the priests hostages? Do you search every ambulance after a few suicide murderers use ambulances to reach their targets? Do you strip every woman because one pretended to be pregnant and carried a suicide bomb on her belly? Do you shoot back at someone trying to kill you, standing deliberately behind a group of children? Do you raid

terrorist headquarters, hidden in a mental hospital? Do you shoot an arch-murderer who deliberately moves from one location to another, always surrounded by children? All of these happen daily in Iraq and in the Palestinian areas.

What do you do? Well, you do not want to face the dilemma. But it cannot be avoided. Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that someone would openly stay in a well-known address in Teheran, hosted by the Iranian Government and financed by it, executing one atrocity after another in Spain or in France, killing hundreds of innocent people, accepting responsibility for the crimes, promising in public TV interviews to do more of the same, while the Government of Iran issues public condemnations of his acts but continues to host him, invite him to official functions and treat him as a great dignitary. I leave it to you as homework to figure out what Spain or France would have done in such a situation. The problem is that the civilized world is still having illusions about the rule of law in a totally lawless environment. It is trying to play ice hockey by sending a ballerina ice-skater into the rink or to knock out a heavyweight boxer by a chess player. In the same way that no country has a law against cannibals eating its prime minister, because such an act is unthinkable, international law does not address killers shooting from hospitals, mosques and ambulances, while being protected by their Government or society. International law does not know how to handle someone who sends children to throw stones, stands behind them and shoots with immunity and cannot be arrested because he is sheltered by a Government. International law does not know how to deal with a leader of murderers who is royally and comfortably hosted by a country, which pretends to condemn his acts or just claims to be too weak to arrest him. The amazing thing is that all of these crooks demand protection under international law and define all those who attack them as war criminals, with some Western media repeating the allegations. The good news is that all of this **is** temporary, because the evolution of international law has always adapted itself to reality. The punishment for suicide murder should be death or arrest before the murder, not during and not after. After every world war, the rules of international law have changed and the same will happen after the present one. But during the twilight zone, a lot of harm can be done. The picture I described here is not pretty. What can we do about it? In the short run, only fight and win. In the long run - only educate the next generation and open it to the world. The inner circles can and must be destroyed by force. The outer circle cannot be eliminated by force. Here we need financial starvation of the organizing elite, more power to women, more education, counter propaganda, boycott whenever feasible and access to Western media, internet and the international scene. Above all, we need a total absolute unity and determination of the civilized world against all three circles of evil. Allow me, for a moment, to depart from my alleged role as a taxi driver and return to science.

When you have a malignant tumor, you may remove the tumor itself surgically. You may also starve it by preventing new blood from reaching it from other parts of the body, thereby preventing new


"supplies" from expanding the tumor. If you want to be sure, it is best to do both. But before you fight and win, by force or otherwise, you have to realize that you are in a war, and this may take Europe a few more years. In order to win, it is necessary to first eliminate the terrorist regimes, so that no Government in the world will serve as a safe haven for these people. I do not want to comment here on whether the American-led attack on Iraq was justified from the point of view of weapons of mass destruction or any other pre-war argument, but I can look at the post-war map of Western Asia. Now that Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are out, two and a half terrorist states remain: Iran, Syria and Lebanon, the latter being a Syrian colony. Perhaps Sudan should be added to the list. As a result of the conquest of Afghanistan and Iraq, both Iran and Syria are now totally surrounded by territories unfriendly to them. Iran is encircled by Afghanistan, by the Gulf States, Iraq and the Moslem republics of the former Soviet Union. Syria is surrounded by Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Israel. This is a significant strategic change and it applies strong pressure on the terrorist countries. It is not surprising that Iran is so active in trying to incite a Shiite uprising in Iraq. I do not know if the American plan was actually to encircle both Iran and Syria, but that is the resulting situation. In my humble opinion, the number one danger to the world today is Iran and its regime. It definitely has ambitions to rule vast areas and to expand in all directions. It has an ideology, which claims supremacy over Western culture. It is ruthless. It has proven that it can execute elaborate terrorist acts without leaving too many traces, using Iranian Embassies. It is clearly trying to develop Nuclear Weapons. Its so-called moderates and conservatives play their own virtuoso version of the "good-cop versus bad-cop" game. Iran sponsors Syrian terrorism, it is certainly behind much of the action in Iraq, it is fully funding the Hizbulla and, through it, the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it performed acts of terror at least in Europe and in South America and probably also in Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia and it truly leads a multi-national terror consortium, which includes, as minor players, Syria, Lebanon and certain Shiite elements in Iraq. Nevertheless, most European countries still trade with Iran, try to appease it and refuse to read the clear signals. In order to win the war it is also necessary to dry the financial resources of the terror conglomerate. It is pointless to try to understand the subtle differences between the Sunni terror of Al Qaida and Hamas and the Shiite terror of Hizbulla, Sadr and other Iranian inspired enterprises. When it serves their business needs, all of them collaborate beautifully. It is crucial to stop Saudi and other financial support of the outer circle, which is the fertile breeding ground of terror. It is important to monitor all donations from the Western World to Islamic organizations, to monitor the finances of international relief organizations and to react with forceful economic measures to any small sign of financial aid to any of the three circles of terrorism. It is also important to act decisively against the campaign of lies and fabrications and to monitor those Western media who collaborate with it out of naivety, financial interests or ignorance. Above all, never surrender to terror. No one will ever know whether the recent elections in Spain would have yielded a different result, if not for the train bombings a few days earlier.

But it really does not matter. What matters is that the terrorists believe that they caused the result and that they won by driving Spain out of Iraq. The Spanish story will surely end up being extremely costly to other European countries, including France, who is now expelling inciting preachers and forbidding veils and including others who sent troops to Iraq. In the long run, Spain itself will pay even more. Is the solution a democratic Arab world? If by democracy we mean free elections but also free press, free speech, a functioning judicial system, civil liberties, equality to women, free international travel, exposure to international media and ideas, laws against racial incitement and against defamation, and avoidance of lawless behavior regarding hospitals, places of worship and children, then yes, democracy is the solution. If democracy is just free elections, it is likely that the most fanatic regime will be elected, the one whose incitement and fabrications are the most inflammatory.

We have seen it already in Algeria and, to a certain extent, in Turkey. It will happen again, if the ground is not prepared very carefully. On the other hand, a certain transition democracy, as in Jordan, may be a better temporary solution, paving the way for the real thing, perhaps in the same way that an immediate sudden democracy did not work in Russia and would not have worked in China. I have no doubt that the civilized world will prevail. But the longer it takes us to understand the new landscape of this war, the more costly and painful the victory will be. Europe, more than any other region, is the key. Its understandable recoil from wars, following the horrors of World War II, may cost thousands of additional innocent lives, before the tide will turn."

~~FOUO~~

September 21, 2004

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: TRICARE

I asked for an update on your E-mail on transforming TRICARE. Here is a response – it appears they're hard at it.

Thanks for your help.

Regards,

DHR:ss
092104-2

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14371-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037135

313

21SEP04

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

Here's some material on health transformation that Gingrich is working on. Is there anybody that can be helpful here at DoD? Do you have your head into those issues?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D.021s

Attach: Gingrich email 3.20.04 Re: Tricare

Please respond by:

6/23 8/19/04

Sir
Response attached
at Tab A.

V/R
Lt Col Lengyel 7/21

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037136

9/20
1130



HEALTH AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 17 PM 5:0

INFO MEMO

SEP 16 2004

avi Butler
9/20
RWB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

- You requested information regarding electronic health records.
- To answer your question, our heads are very much into the issues raised by Gingrich. I meet periodically with him and his staff to exchange ideas on electronic health records and health information technology. We have provided him demonstrations on the military electronic health record, as well as a number of other advanced technologies in use today within the Department of Defense.
- I admit to some bias, but based on my experience in the private sector, the Military Health System is pursuing information technology and its application to all phases of our business far more aggressively than the vast majority of private sector health organizations and companies. (See TAB A)

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

TSA SD	9/20
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2 9/20
EXFO SD	M 9/20

Prepared by: Connie Gladding, IMT&R/IPI&EL, (b)(6) PCDOCS 69124,
69345,69892

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037137

INFORMATION PAPER

DoD Health Transformation through Information Technology

The DoD is a leader in the use of health information technologies to improve health care access, quality, population health management and force health protection.

I have met with Mr. Gingrich on a periodic basis to exchange ideas on the electronic health record and health information technologies in general. My staff has shown Mr. Gingrich and his staff the military electronic health record and a number of advanced technologies in use today within DoD. Health information technologies are being used to facilitate DoD's health and business transformation include:

- **Composite Health Care System** – Provides an electronic health record at all military treatment facilities that includes laboratory, pharmacy and radiology computerized physician order entry and results retrieval, registration, appointing and scheduling, and documentation of the patient encounter capabilities.
- **TRICARE Online** – Provides health care benefits information, health and wellness information, a secure personal health journal and online appointing capabilities at over 300 military treatment facilities.
- **Telehealth** - Provides interactive consultations in radiology, mental health, dermatology, pathology and dental care between remote locations and medical referral centers.
- **Military Health System Data Repository** – A centralized data warehouse containing patient encounter information from military treatment facilities and private sector providers, financial data, demographics and other data. It is used in our strategic planning, performance monitoring, population health management and business management.
- **Pharmacy Data Transaction System** – A centralized data repository of all prescriptions processed for DoD beneficiaries, whether obtained in military treatment facilities, 50,000 retail pharmacies across the U.S., or through our mail order system. The system processes over 411,000 prescription transactions per day. It gives DoD amazing capability to know what is happening with all pharmaceutical services (over \$5B per year), and helps prevent tens of thousands of adverse drug reactions every year for our beneficiaries.
- **Joint Medical Asset Repository** – A web-based system that provides comprehensive information on the location, movement, status and quantity of medical equipment, supplies, pharmaceuticals and units of blood in the Military Health System.

- **Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support** – This system combines business process re-engineering with leading edge technologies to provide state-of-the-art capabilities supporting DoD medical logistics, electronic commerce and commercial best practices.
- **Computer/Electronic Accommodations Program** – Provides assistive technology and accommodations for DoD and other Federal employees with disabilities. It is available to employees, patients and family members, Pentagon survivors and wounded soldiers with visual, hearing, dexterity and cognitive disabilities.

Key to transforming health care is an enterprise architecture; data, security, communication and interoperable standards; and implementation of a robust computing and communication infrastructure. The Military Health System enterprise architecture is aligned with the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture and Federal Health Architecture. DoD is a leader in the Consolidated Health Informatics initiative to develop and adopt common health standards for all Federal agencies.

I fully support the President's Management Agenda on health care reform. DoD assisted the Department of Health and Human Services (Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology) in developing national strategies for transforming health care through the use of technologies such as the electronic health record. DoD, in response to a Presidential Executive Order, recommended approaches for providing affordable health information technologies to rural and medically underserved communities. DoD will continue to collaborate and share technology products, outcomes, benefits and lessons learned with HHS, other Federal agencies, and the private sector.

Electronic Health Record Snowflake

COORDINATION

MHS CIO	Concurred, 8/25/04.
DASD (FHP&R)	Concurred, 8/30/04
DASD (C&PP)	Concurred, 9/1/04
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	Concurred, 8/26/04.
Chief of Staff, TMA	Concurred, 9/8/04.
Deputy Dir, TMA	Concurred, 9/9/04.
Chief of Staff (HA)	<u>Concurred, 9/13/04</u>
APDASD (HA)	<u>N/A</u>

Electronic Health Record **Snowflake**

COORDINATION

USD (P&R)

DR. CHU

David L. Chu 17570 cl

Get rid of this

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

Page 1 of 1

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 10:34 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil;
david.chu@osd.mil; william.winkenwerder@ha.osd.mil

Cc: john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; (b)(6)

Subject: electronic health records and tricare-the aarp example-newt

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 3/ 20/04

transforming tricare for greater member satisfaction and better health and lower cost (the trifecta of health transformation)

everything being described for an electronic health record below could apply even more to the military and military retirees and we could have an electronic health record up and running for the members to use as well as their doctors and hospitals by September one of this year

aarp is very excited about rolling out an electronic health record by January for the 2.2 million 65 year olds who will be getting the new Medicare benchmark physical exams in 2005.

building further on friday's lunch conversation

so we can explain why an electronic health record would be truly empowering for the new medicare benchmark physical:

it would be really helpful if aarp might have or develop the following data:

the new 65 year olds are different from their parents (remember your magazine cover with the model--60 is 30,a little much,I think it is 45 and I am 60)

1. how many more years will the average 65 in 2005 probably live and how long will the longest probably live
2. how many of the 2.2 million will probably reach 80 and how many will probably reach 90 and the same for 100 (this lets us know that in 2020,2030,and 2040 we will have this many people still using their electronic health records compared to the

3/20 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/037142

frequency of paper records being lost, copied, fedexed etc.)

3. **how** often will this generation of 65 year olds travel each year, how many will go out of **state**, how many will go *out* of country

this **explains** why accessing your records from anywhere on **the net is** so important

how many will actually move out of state to live somewhere else than where they are now

how many have children or grandchildren who live out *of* state

this kind of data would enable us to build an overwhelming case for starting in January with an electronic health record as a matter of convenience and safety for the health of "the new 65 year olds"

if you put all this together it might make a great article for the magazine along with a story about what England is actually doing (I met last night with the people from IDX who are partnering in two of the five English electronic health record regions **and** they were very very encouraging). you could also tie it into explaining your website development at aarp

thanks for helping with this
newt

3/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/037143

September 22, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Presentation Additions

bag

Doug Feith and I were talking about your briefing at the Combatant Commander's Conference. The point you make about the fact that we are doing well and the enemy has not won any tactical engagements might be more persuasive if it were linked to some metrics. For example:

The enemy's goals are:

- To frighten away police recruits; but the fact is recruitment numbers for security forces are up.
- To frighten away Army recruits; but the fact is recruitment numbers are up.
- To scare folks to impede commerce; but the fact is commercial activity is up.
- To stop the political process; but the facts are:
 - The National Conference took place successfully this summer.
 - Work on an Afghan constitution continues.
 - Work on January elections continues.

2252404

In addition, it is important to address some of those points that are getting raised in the press, such as the arguments that:

- The enemies in Iraq seem to be growing in numbers.
- The enemies seem to be able to launch more attacks per day than in past months.
- The enemies seem to be increasing the casualties per week on the part of both Iraqi and Coalition forces.

Comments that address each of those arguments would be persuasive. When you get it pulled together, please send me a copy.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-24

.....
Please respond by _____

September 22, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Training Iraqi Security Forces

IRAQ

Mr. President,

Here is the biweekly update to the Iraqi Security Forces plan. Progress is being made. The key high level points are:

- We are "on track" with nearly 100,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security forces on the ground performing their duties today.
- All are equipped with weapons and have completed a serious and well-run training regimen.

I know there is a great deal of data in the attached briefing. The pages I find useful are # 2, # 14, # 27, and # 33, which are summaries of progress and current status. For convenience, I have placed tabs on those charts.

I will continue to forward this information every two weeks or as things change significantly.

Respectfully,

Attach.
9/20/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
092204-6

OSD 14427-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037146

~~FOUO~~

22SEP04

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Iraqi Security Forces Update


20 September 2004

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037147

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

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- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service


Only

Ministry of Interior Forces

Ministry of Interior Forces Projection – New Plan

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


Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Objective 	20 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
Regular Iraqi Police*	90K / 135K	41%	43%	46%	50%	85% / 56%
Dept of Border Enforcement**	16K / 32K	89% / 44%	90% / 45%	91% / 45%	92% / 46%	100% / 62%
Emergency Response Unit	270 / 270			55% / 55%	77% / 77%	100% / 100%
Special Police Regiments***	1,200 (2 Reg) / 1,200 (2 Reg)					100% / 100%
Public Order Battalions***	3,600 (9 Bn) / 3,600 (9 Bn)					100% / 100%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police are considered trained based on training by coalition forces, but capabilities are uneven across the force
- *** Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipping schedules are still being determined, and recruiting has just begun

Legend

-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037150

Ministry of Interior Forces Projection

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Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

	End state	20 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
Regular Iraqi Police*	135K police					56%
Dept of Border Enforcement**	32K	44%	45%	45%	46%	62%
Emergency Response Unit	270 police			55%	77%	100%
Special Police Regiments***	1,200 police (2 Regiments)					100%
Public Order Battalions***	3,600 police (9 Battalions)					100%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police are considered trained based on training by coalition forces, but capabilities are uneven across the force
- *** Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipping schedules are still being determined, and recruiting has just begun

Legend


-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Iraqi Regular Police Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	38,921 (+3,626)
Training	3,065 (-414)
Untrained	42,964

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037152


Iraqi Police Service Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	94,120 (+1,027)
Vehicles	5,985 (+62)
Radios	13,586 (+341)
Body Armor	43,766 (+1,275)
Police Trained and In Training	41,986 (+3,212)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT




Civil Intervention Force* Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	0
Training	0
Untrained	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date




* **Mission:** Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and counterinsurgency.

Civil Intervention Force Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	0
Vehicles	0
Radios	0
Body Armor	0
Civil Intervention Force Trained and In Training	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date




As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


11-L-0559/OSD/037155


Emergency Response Unit* Training

For Official Use Only


Current Status	
Status	Number
Ttrained	76 (-7)
Training	0**
Untrained	0

 Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date

 On Track to achieve projected goal by target date

 Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date

** Next basic training course begins on 25 September with 75 recruits




* Mission: Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.

Emergency Response Unit Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	500
Vehicles	0
Radios	300
Body Armor	270
ERU Forces Trained and In Training	76 (-7)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date



As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037157

Border Enforcement Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	14,313
Training	463* (-22)
Untrained	1,375



Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date




On Track to achieve projected goal by target date



Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date

* Current trainees were previously trained at unit level and are now retraining under the new program of instruction at the Jordan Academy

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT



* Recruiting Projection: 2,000 per month until 32K force achieved end of May '05
 Training Throughput: 2,000 (800 recruits and 1,200 previously trained at unit level)
 End State: Legacy and new border personnel trained to one established standard
 (recycle of previously trained personnel to new standards by end of Oct '05)

Border Enforcement Procurement Status


For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	16,442
Vehicles	1,870 (+72)
Radios	1,627
Body Armor	4,000
Border Guards Trained and In Training	14,776 (-22)

↑ Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date

↔ On Track to achieve projected goal by target date

↓ Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037159

Ministry of Interior Forces: Man, Train, and Equip

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		MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING							
							WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR	
FORCE	COMPONENT	AUTH	ON DUTY	UN-TRAINED	IN TRAIN-ING	TRAIN-ED	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H
Iraqi Police	IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	135K	84,950	42,964	3,065		213,185	↑ 94,120	22,395		67,565		135,000	
	CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	↑ 4,920		0	0		11,490		1,002		10,240		4,800	
	EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270		0	0		1,020	500	58		352		270	
Dept of Border Enforcement		32,000	↓ 16,151	1,375	463*	14,313	42,601		8,271		8,271		28,626	
TOTAL		172,190	↓ 101,177	44,339	3,528*		268,296	↑ 111,062	31,726		86,428		168,696	

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40 - 69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

* DBE trainees have been previously trained, and are retraining under a new POI

** Some Radios on hand, but they are an interim capability only

(Does not include 73,992 personnel in Facilities Protection Service)

Only

Ministry of Defense Forces

Iraqi Armed Forces Projection

Only

Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;"> Original Plan Revised Plan </div> Objective	1 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
18 Battalions (27,000 soldiers)			50% 50%	50% 50%	100% 100%
9 Battalions (6584 soldiers)					88% 88%
45 Bn 32K Soldiers 65 Bn 62K Soldiers					100% 100%
1 Battalion (828 soldiers)	50% 50%	50% 50%	55% 55%	60% 60%	95% 95%
1 Special Mission Unit (451 soldiers)	25% 25%	25% 25%	25% 25%	40% 40%	70% 70%

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT




Iraqi Armed Forces Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

	End state	13 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
Iraqi Regular Army	18 Battalions (27,000 soldiers)				50%	50%
Iraqi Intervention Force	9 Battalions (6584 soldiers)				88%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	65 Battalions (62,000 soldiers)				42%	100%
Commando Battalion	1 Battalion (828 soldiers)	50%	50%	55%	60%	95%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	1 Special Mission Unit (451 soldiers)				40%	70%

Legend

	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


11-L-0559/OSD/037163

Regular Army* Battalions

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training	6
Initial Capability	3
Independent Operations	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*** Mission:**

- Defend Iraq against external threats.
- When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.

One Battalion=757 Soldiers

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037164

Regular Army Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	15,432
Vehicles	1,768
Radios	1,034 (+13)
Body Armor	6,137
Trained and in Training Battalions	9




Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date



On Track to achieve projected goal by target date



Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date




Iraqi Intervention Force* Battalions

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training	6
Initial Capability	3
Independent Operations	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*** Mission:**

- To conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas
- To assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can establish and maintain law and order

One Battalion= 648 Soldiers

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


11-L-0559/OSD/037166

Iraqi Intervention Force Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 3,300
Vehicles	↔ 152
Radios	↔ 1,593
Body Armor	↔ 2,741
Trained and In Training Bns	↔ 9

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date



As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037167

Commando* Battalion

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Current Status

Status	Number
Trained	467 (+33)
In training	0
Untrained	0




Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date



On Track to achieve projected goal by target date



Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date



* Mission: Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion


• One Battalion=828 Soldiers

Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force* (ICTF)

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Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	114 (-27)
In training	75
Untrained	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



***Mission:** Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorism function


The Task Force is organized with 451 soldiers

Special Operations Forces* Procurement Status

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Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	1049 (-225)
Vehicles	122(+55)
Radios	115
Body Armor	780 (+175)
Special Operations Force Trained and In Training	656(+5)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*Special Operations Forces procurement is a combination of Commando Battalion and the Counter-Terrorism Task Force


As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

Iraqi National Guard* Battalions

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Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training	↔ 0
Initial Capability	↔ 8
Recruiting / awaiting equipment	↔ 57

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



***Mission:**

One Battalion=896 Soldiers


- Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to the Ministry of Interior.
- Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security

Iraqi National Guard Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 37,635
Vehicles	↔ 758 (+31)
Radios	↓ 427*
Body Armor	↓ 23,320**
Trained and In Training Bns	↔ 8

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



* Radio delivery to units delayed by diversion of assets to recent contingency operations. More than 4,000 on hand and will be distributed starting this week.

**Body armor delivery delayed due to a contractor default; working with contracting office to speed delivery.

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037172




Ministry of Defense Forces: Man, Train, Equip

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National Guard numbers reflect increased authorization for six division HQs, 20 brigade HQs, and 65 battalions

		MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING							
FORCE	COMPONENT	REQ'D	O/H	UN-TRAINED	IN TRAINING	TRAINED	WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR	
ARMY	IRAQI ARMY	27,000	12,699	0	7,910		23,606	15,432	2,298	1,769	3,596		20,949	
	IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	41,405	0	2,744	38,661	68,760	37,635	2,142		11,208		62,032	
	IRAQI INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584		0	5,489		8,850		583		1,798	1,599	6,584	2,741
	IRAQI SPECIAL OPS FORCE	1,967		0	75		2,473	1,049	408		1,368		1,967	
AIR FORCE		502	206	0	39		383	0	34		21		502	
COASTAL DEFENCE FORCE		409		0	130	282	486	12	15	15	156		409	
TOTAL		98,366	62,795	0	16,387	46,408	104,558	57,428	5,480	2,819	18,147		71,152	32,988

Legend

-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Note: Iraqi National Guard equipment "on hand" numbers are being reverified following the August Mahdi Militia uprising.

NATO Training in Iraq

Only

Training Implementation Mission assessment was submitted to Atlantic Council on 15 September

Atlantic Council decision delayed when France and Belgium
vetoed on 17 September

Atlantic Council proposal includes:

- Coordination between NATO and MNF-I would best be achieved through
a dual-hat arrangement of the MNSTC-I Commander

- Linking NATO's engagement to a NATO supported Iraqi training,
education and doctrine center

- Continued provision of NATO advice and mentoring to Iraqi operational
and strategic level HQ staffs

- Assistance in the coordination of training and equipment offers


- Provision of complementary out-of-country training

Coalition Contributors – MNF-I

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MNF-I = 33 Countries									
Albania	73	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,837	New Zealand	5	Tonga	51
Australia	388	Estonia	47	Latvia	133	Norway	9	Ukraine	1,610
Armenia	0	Georgia	162	Lithuania	114	Poland	2,493	United Kingdom	7,918
Azerbaijan	300	Hungary	288	Macedonia	31	Portugal	129	US	137,216
Bulgaria	475	Italy	3,352	Moldova	10	Romania	744		
Czech Rep.	92	Japan	800	Mongolia	132	Singapore	33		
Denmark	533	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,471	Slovakia	103		
								Total	161,959

Iraqi Forces On Hand- 163,972	
Police Service	84,950
Civil Interv. Force	0
Emer. Response Unit	76
Dept. of Border Enf.	16,151
Army	12,699
National Guard	41,405
Intervention Force	7,417
Special Ops Force	656
Air Force	206
Coastal Defense Force	412



Facilities Protection Service 73,992

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Man:

- 7,541 available and qualified recruits now awaiting shipment to training.
- ING Conference held in Baghdad to discuss manning and the authorization of 6 division HQs, 20 brigade HQs, and 65 battalions
- Baghdad IPS district-level meetings held at New Baghdad, Salhiyah, Karadah, and Mansour HQs
- Counterterrorism Unit, Emergency Response Unit, and Dignitary Protection demonstrations held for Iraqi Interim Government Prime Minister and Minister of State
- Facilitated an Iraqi Police Service – Iraqi National Guard Coordination Conference focused on Baghdad law enforcement
- CPATT continued work to coordinate a contracted Provincial SWAT team training plan

Train:

- 927 Highway Patrol members trained and on-duty
- 112 law enforcement students started specialized policing classes on 11 September:
 - Basic Criminal Investigation, Post-Blast Investigation, Kidnap Negotiation, Mid-Level Leadership, and Internal Controls at Adnon
- 1,101 law enforcement students graduated on 16 September:
 - Iraqi Police Service Basic Training at the Jordan International Police Training Center (976 grads)
 - Basic Criminal Investigation, Counter-Drug Investigation, Organized Crime, and Internal Controls at Adnon Palace (125 total grads)
- Next Basic Courses: 18 September at both Baghdad and Jordan Academies (max 2,500 students)
- New regional police academy opened in Sulaymaniyah for 250 students

Equip:

- Equipped 3rd Brigade (Regular Army) with for operations in 1 Infantry Division Area of Operations
- Issued the following equipment this week:
 - Iraqi Police Service: 1,027 Weapons, 62 Vehicles, 341 Radios, and 1,275 Body-Armor Vests
 - Department of Border Enforcement: 72 Vehicles

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Build:

- 45 border forts are under construction or renovation, and 210 additional forts are under contract
- Began construction of three regional police academies
- \$3.1 million was obligated to reconstruct 24 police stations in Anbar Province
- Completed Baghdad Iraqi Police Service Main HQ Operations Room; Training is in progress (Ops Room IOC 30 September)

Mentor/Employ:

- CPATT CG and Iraqi Police Service Chief chaired a 15 September Civil Intervention Force Command Selection Board
- Mol Salary Team (CPATT and Mol staff) visited Basrah to help with an MND-SE Department of Border Enforcement Operations & Maintenance budget
- Iraqi Police Service Qualifying Committee data collection continued (2,500 complete and estimated completion date for Baghdad Region remains 30 September)
- Iraqi Air Force Seeker squadron conducted its first unsupervised operational flight on 15 Sept from Basrah
- 1st Brigade (-) redeployed from operations in An Najaf to Baghdad on 14 Sept 04 in order to begin reconstitution for follow on operations
- 3rd Brigade (-) (Brigade Tactical Assault Command Post and 7th Battalion) began deploying to forward operating bases vicinity Samarra for operations with 1st Infantry Division

Funding:

- Hearings conducted on IRRF realignment of \$1.8B into the Security Sector
- Congressional notification forwarded on 7 September for realignment of funds within the Security Sector for additional Iraqi National Guard equipment, the First Responder Network, and the Sulaymaniyah Academy
- Justification for Funding (\$210M) from the FY05 Defense Appropriation Bill forwarded to MNF-I on 16 Sept.

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/037177

Security and Law Enforcement Funding

For Official Use Only

Development Fund for Iraq*

\$1.0B Funds Allocated

\$998.7M (95%) Obligated

\$1.0B (100%) Committed

\$1.3M Committed awaiting on J7 resolution

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund**

\$2.417B Apportioned

\$1.374B (57%) Obligated

\$2.176B (90%) Committed

\$241.1M (10%) Uncommitted Balance--but "earmarked"
for known requirements

- **\$1.8B IRRF Realignment at Congress for decision**
- **\$210M FY05 Defense Appropriation Bill justification to MNF-I**

FORCE	COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER TRAINED
IRAQI POLICE	Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training (Phased Out) 8 Week Academy	30,102 (TIP) 8,819 (Academy)
	Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Academy	0
	Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Academy	76
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT		4 Week Academy	14, 313
ARMY	Iraq Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	4,789
	Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: Put into operations (over watched) at initial operations capability, generally 8 weeks; full operations capability follows (In progress)	38,661
	Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks MOUT Training: 6 Weeks	1,928
	Iraqi Special Ops Force	Field Training Provided by USJSOTF (Ranger/SFOD Type Training)	581
AIR FORCE		Basic Training: 8 Weeks 4 Months Pilot Training (IP)	167
COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE		Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In progress)	282

September 22, 2004

TO: Gen Ed Eberhart

c c : Paul McHale
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Jim Haynes
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rnmsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime NORAD

We need to have a post-911 arrangement that makes sense – like the one we have in the air. Essentially, we need a Maritime version of NORAD to deal with homeland security on the seas.

Top priority is fixing the air-to-ship capability right now.

I would like to see the interim report fast – by 10 October, please – then a fully considered plan shortly thereafter.

The ROE will be particularly important, as well as the relationship between Navy and Coast Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092204-4

.....
Please *respond* by 11/30/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14451-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037180

Northcom

225404

September 23, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings

You did nice work up on the Hill yesterday. Your comments incorporated just the right balance of quiet confidence in the long term outcome, with strong cautions about the tough fight ahead.

We all appreciate the difficult challenges you shoulder in CENTCOM. You're doing an excellent job.

DHR:ss
092304-7

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 14476-04

335 SD

235-04

9/27
1613



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

For Official Use Only - Pre-decisional SEP 27 PM 12:02

ACTION MEMO

SEP 28 2004 9/27
9/30

September 22, 2004, 4:55 PM

Paul Butle
9/27

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting US

SUBJECT: SECDEF Snowflake Tasking Regarding: C-130J Program History and a Letter to Senator McCain Addressing C-130J Safety

- I request your approval to ~~the~~ ^{dispatch} the attached letter (TAB A) in response to Senator McCain's concerns regarding the C-130J cost and capability, which he mentioned in recent 9-11 hearings. My letter seeks to assure Senator McCain that the Department will review the C-130J program to ensure we acquire a safe and mission-capable weapon system.
- Mr. Patterson prepared an info memo (TAB B) for you to send to the Secretary if you desire. It is an accurate assessment of the situation.

RECOMMENDATION: That Deputy Secretary of Defense sign and forward the info memo to SECDEF, and approve the response to Senator McCain, by initialing:

Approve SW Disapprove _____
SEP 29 2004

COORDINATION: ARA, GC, LA, Compt, and AF (TAB C)

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared By: Col Jim Edge, (b)(6) 200 1-2757 174

TSA SD	9/27
SA DSD	9/28
SRMA DSD	9/29
EXEC SEC	9/27

JCL 9/28



11-L-0559/OSD/037182

OSD 14693-04

452c

22 SEP 04



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SEP 29 2004


The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0303

Dear Mr. Chairman,

In the recent 9-11 Commission hearings and in other correspondence, you raised concerns with Secretary Rumsfeld about the cost and capability of the C-130J aircraft. The Department has the C-130J program under review, including its ability to conduct its intended mission, the aspects of commercial procurement, and the associated recommendations of the Inspector General.

In coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I have identified the C-130J as a special interest acquisition program and I will continue my active engagement with organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Transportation Command, and customer representatives, such as the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. The Department stands ready to brief you or your staff on our progress to date, as well as the plan to achieve full C-130J operational capability.

Sincerely,


Michael W. Wynne
[Acting]



11-L-0559/OSD/037183




DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

~~For Official Use Only - Pre-decisional~~
INFO MEMO

September 21, 2004, 9:42 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense  SEP 29 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Tasking Regarding: C-130J Program History and a Letter to
Senator McCain Addressing C-130J Safety

Don,

Senator McCain's reference to the problems with the C-130J during your hearing before the SASC originates in a DoD IG July 23, 2004 report critical of the Air Force C-130J acquisition program. The report was prompted by allegations to the Defense Hotline concerning the Defense Contract Management Agency's oversight of Lockheed Martin's performance on the C-130J aircraft as well as F-22 and C-5 aircraft.

The IG report states that with regard to the C-130J, the Air Force "conditionally accepted 50 C-130J aircraft at a cost of \$2.6 billion even though none of the aircraft met commercial contract specifications or operational requirements." The report goes on to say that the Air Force paid Lockheed Martin "more than 99 percent of the C-130J aircraft's contracted price" for an aircraft that cannot perform its intended mission. The IG also concluded that the acquisition of the C-130J as a commercial item, without the benefit of certified cost or pricing data, was unjustified, and that the Air Force and OSD failed to manage and oversee the program effectively.

My initial look at the C-130J program reveals the following:

1. Lockheed Martin developed the C-130J with approximately \$1 billion of its own money for sale in the commercial market. The U.K. bought the aircraft before the U.S.
2. The C-130J program started with a contract in 1995 for two C-130J aircraft as a modification to an existing C-130H-model contract.
3. First delivery of two aircraft planned for 1997, did not deliver until 1999. But, in 1996 the government, with encouragement from Congress, signed a 5-year option contract which authorized us to purchase 35 C-130Js from FY 1997-FY2000.



11-L-0559/OSD/037184

4. The initial 35 aircraft could not meet the commercial contract specification, and Lockheed established a 3-phase block upgrade to bring the aircraft up to specification, at its own cost. The Air Force agreed.
5. In December 2000, the Air Force agreed to another 5-year option to purchase 20 additional aircraft from FY2001-FY2003.
6. You and the Secretary of the Air Force inherited a problem aircraft program.
7. The Air Force, again with Congressional support, in 2003 awarded Lockheed a 6-year multi-year contract for 60 more C-130Js.
8. The Air Force has made a great effort to correct deficiencies. The aircraft however, still has not been released to perform key missions such as: low level formation flight, formation flight in instrument meteorological conditions, heavy equipment airdrop, and weather penetration reconnaissance ("hurricane hunting").
9. Bottom line: Senator McCain's comments and the IG report raise valid concerns.

I have directed Mike Wynne to work with the Air Force to provide me a deficiency mitigation plan that includes:

- a) a history of the program, including what went wrong, how it's going to be fixed, and
- b) execution milestones for fixing problems.

Additionally, I've asked Mike to provide a letter (**attached**) back to Senator McCain outlining what we are going to do to get the C-130J capable of meeting its operational mission requirements. I will provide you monthly progress reports.

COORDINATION: Acting USD(AT&L)

Attachment:
As Stated



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY,
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10-0303

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In the recent 9-11 Commission hearings and in other correspondence, you have raised concerns about the cost and capability of the C-130J aircraft. The Department recognizes that we should review the C-130J program, including its ability to conduct its intended missions, the aspects of commercial procurement, and the associated recommendations of the Inspector General.

In coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will review the program and will engage organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Transportation Command, and representatives from the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. I will share my findings with you.

Sincerely,

Michael W. Wynne
Acting



11-L-0559/OSD/037186

UNCLASSIFIED

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

30 August 2004 - 0930 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: **USD AT&L**


SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake on the "C-130 Issue"

Sir,

The DSD has asked that you please take the attached snowflake for action by providing a complete history on the C-130J program to include all the contract, performance and capability problems. Additionally, please provide:

1. A list of each deficiency that exists; a detailed plan for fixing the deficiency with milestones, and expected date for achieving operational capability.
2. What compensation is due the government for deficiencies and waivers'?
3. What is the breakout of investment by the government and investment by the contractor?
4. What did the government do differently to comply with the "commercial" approach to contracting for the C-130J?
5. A letter to Senator McCain that explains what the Air Force and Department of Defense are doing to ensure the Department is acquiring a safe **and** mission capable weapon system.

Very respectfully,



Stephen P. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 3 September 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/037187

Re-coordination on Letter

LA	Mr. Stanley for Mr. Moore	September 16,2004	Concur
GC	Mr. Larsen	September 16,2004	Concur
AF	Dr. Sambur	September 20,2004	Concur
Compt	Mr. Henke	September 16,2004	Concur
ARA	Dr. Spruill	September 16,2004	Concur

SNOWFLAKE

~~FOUO~~

1800 / 19 Aug 04 -
JDP HC'D TO ATUL
FOR ACTION

17 Aug - 1105
Scanned

August 18, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Issue

Senator McCain raised the question of a \$2-3 billion problem with a C-130 aircraft that cannot be used in combat. Please figure out **what** is going on with that, take care of it and **tell me what** you are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
081804-6

.....
Please respond by

9/10/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14695-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037189

452 C

18 Aug 04



7201
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



2004 SEP 27 PM 2:51

ACTION MEMO

September 20, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Captain William P. Marriott, Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake#081504-5, "Thanks for Support to Troops"

- You stated, "I think I ought to get thank you notes off to all the people who visit our troops at the hospitals or do USO work, if they are doing any significant amount" (TAB A).
- A list of 25 individuals and 25 organizations, representing those who have significantly supported our troops and/or their families, are provided at TAB B. Details of their support are provided at TAB B1 and TAB B2.
- An example letter has been prepared for your review/signature to one of the individuals (TAB C1) and one of the groups/organizations (TAB C2).
- If approved, I will prepare similar letters for all individuals and groups for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the list of supporters and enclosed letters for your signature.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments: As stated

9/26
Please Get a GC coord. (see 5000)
Larry D. Pitts
9/27
D. K. L.

TSA SD	9/27
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	M 9/24

Prepared by: CPT Thomas Burke, OSD/EXEC SEC

(b)(6)

OSD 14715-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037190

INDIVIDUALS

Dennis Farina
Drew Carey
Gary Sinise
Henry Rollins
Joan Jett
Neal McCoy
Robin Williams
Toby Keith
Wayne Newton
World Wrestling Enterprise
David Bellamy
Howard Bellamy
Joe Diffie
David Lee Murphy
Lee Roy Parnell
David Clayton-Thomas
Mel Tillis
Deborah Allen
Heather Kinley-Mendenhall
Jennifer Kinley-Hughes
Michelle Wright
Patty Loveless
Charlie Daniels
Billy Ray Cyrus
Diamond Rio

ORGANIZATIONS

The Oak Ridge Boys
YMCA of the USA, Inc.
Armed Services YMCA of the USA, Inc.
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
United Services Organizations, Inc.
National Military Family Association, Inc.
Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Inc.
The Spirit of America Tour
Angels of Mercy
Camp Flashhh
Lindsay Project
Operation Interdependence
Handy Man Hotline Materials
USA Cares
Camp Wonderland
Operation Gratitude
Glory Boots
Pay it Forward
United Through Reading
Adoptaplatoon
Operation Hero
Family Support Center • School Supplies
Missoula Children's Theater
Cannon Enlisted Spouses Club
Andrews Home Educators

Groups and individuals who have performed for *Celebrities on Tour*:

DENNIS FARINA

c/o Kami Putnam

Gersh Agency

130 W. 42d St., Ste 2400 (23d & 24th Floors)

New York, NY 10036

Pacific Handshake – Japan, Okinawa – 21-30 Dec 03

Operation Starlight – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain – 22-30 Dec 01

Christmas Handshake – Europe, Norway – 21-30 Dec 02

DREW CAREY

c/o Messina Baker Entertainment

955 Carillo Drive Str. 100

Los Angeles, CA 90048

Qatar, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Singapore, Diego Garcia – 19-23 Dec 02

Europe, Norway – 23 Nov-01 Dec 02

Kuwait, Iraq – 24-30 Sep 03

Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE – 20-27 Jan 02

Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01

Korea – 30 Jun-07 Jul 02

GARY SINISE

c/o Patrick Whitesell

Endeavor

9701 Wilshire Blvd.

Beverly Hills, CA 90212

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03

Singapore, Diego Garcia, Korea – 16-27 Feb 04

Italy – 02-09 Jul 03

Italy, Germany – 02-05 Sep 03

HENRY ROLLINS

7615 Hollywood Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90046

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar – 01-08 Dec 03
Kuwait, Iraq – 22-28 May 04
Honduras – 10-13 Aug 04

JOAN JETT

c/o Kenny Laguna
Blackheart Records Group
155 E. 55th St., Ste 6H
New York, NY 10022

Okinawa, Japan – 10-16 Oct 03
Puerto Rico, Guantanamo Bay – 22-26 Oct 01
Bahrain, Turkey – 28 Dec 01-06 Jan 02
Oman, Pakistan, Afghanistan – 22 Sep-02 Oct 02

NEAL McCOY

Neal McCoy Fan Club
c/o Patsy Williams
610 Standard Street
Longview, TX 75604

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03
Bahrain, Kuwait – 25-29 Nov 02
Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01
Germany, Hungary, Bosnia, Italy – 2-19 Nov 01

ROBIN WILLIAMS

MBST Entertainment
c/o Tanner Gibson
345 North Maple Drive, Suite 200
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Turkey, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan – 13-20 Oct 03
Iraq, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Kuwait – 14-19 Dec 03.

TOBEY KEITH

T.K.O Artist Management
1107 17th Ave S. Wall Center
Nashville, TN 37212.

Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia – 23 May-05 Jun 02
Germany, Kuwait, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan – 27 May – 06 Jun 04

WAYNE NEWTON

c/o Erin Miel, Inc..
6730 South Pecos Road
Las Vegas, NV 89120.

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03
Korea – 30 Jun-06 Jul 04
Bahrain, Kuwait – 25-29 Nov 02.
Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01
Korea – 30 Jun-07 Jul 02
Korea – 30 Jun-03 Jul 03
Germany, Hungary, Bosnia, Italy – 12-19 Nov 01

WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT(WWE)

c/o Vincent K. McMahon
1241 East Main Street
Stamford, CT 06902.

Iraq – 12-17 Dec 03
Korea – 29-30 Oct 02.
Kuwait, Iraq – 15-20 Jul 03

Groups and Individuals who have performed, free of charge, for *Spirit of America*:

THE BELLAMY BROTHERS:

DAVID BELLAMY

Bellamy Brothers Partners
13917 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

HOWARD BELLAMY

Bellamy Brothers Partners
13917 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

US Coast Guard Training Center - March 14

MR. JOE DIFFIE

9435 Weatherly Drive
Brentwood, TN 37027

Keesler AFB - June 6

DAVID LEE MURPHY

PO Box 121682
Nashville, TN 37212

LEE ROY PARNELL

317 Jocelyn Hollow Circle
Nashville, TN 37205

Fort Polk - June 6

DAVID CLAYTON-THOMAS

Antoinette Music Prod. Ltd.

715 Route 304
Bardonia, NY 10954

Fort Lewis - June 9

MEL TILLIS

Mel Tillis Enterprises
PO Box 305
Silver Springs, FL 34489

Charleston AFB - June 19

Robins AFB - June 20

DEBORAH ALLEN

104 Broadley Court
Franklin, TN 37069

HEATHER KINLEY-MENDENHALL

5560 Quail Covey Trail
Pegram, TN 37143

JENNIFER KINLEY-HUGHES

6809 Bridgewater Drive
Nashville, TN 37221

MICHELLE WRIGHT

214 Lancelot Lane
Franklin, TN 37064

Submarine base New London - August 13

Langley AFB - August 14

MCAS New River - August 15

PATTY LOVELESS

c/o Mike Robertson Management
1227 17th Avenue South

Nashville, TN 37212

Wright-Patterson AFB - July 16

CHARLIE DANIELS CDB, Inc.

17060 Central Pike
Lebanon TN 37090

Dyess AFB - June 20

Mountain Home AFB - July 27

Fort Irwin - October 22

DIAMOND RIO:

MARTY ROE
GENE JOHNSON
BRIAN PROUT
DANA WILLIAMS
JIMMY OLANDER
DAN TRUMAN

c/o Modern Management, Inc.
1625 Broadway, Suite 600
Nashville, TN 37203

Fort Sill - September 12

THE OAK RIDGE BOYS:

DUANE ALLEN
JOE BONSALE
WILLIAM LEE GOLDEN
RICHARD STERBAN

The Oak Ridge Boys, Inc.
88 New Shackle Island Road

Henderson, TN 37075

Fort Leonard Wood – September 12

Fort Knox – October 7

BILLY RAY CYRUS

c/o Terry Elam

Fitzgerald-Hartley Company

1908 Wedgewood Avenue

Nashville, TN 37212

Wright-Patterson AFB – October 8

Non-profit Organizations Providing “Significant” Support during OEF/OIF

Mr. Ken Gladish,
National Executive Director,
YMCA of the USA, Inc.
101 N. Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606

Provides support to Reserves and National Guard and their family who don't have access to support structures typically available on military installations. Support varies by the needs of the community and include free or reduced membership for using their facilities; counseling and mentoring programs; respite child care; summer camps; and generally reaching out to these military families across the country.

Frank Gallo, RADM, USN (Ret)
National Executive Director,
Armed Services YMCA of the USA, Inc.
6359 Walker Lane Suite 200
Alexandria, VA 22310

150 program centers throughout the world providing programs that complement those on military installations. Programs are targeted to junior enlisted personnel (who are single or married with families) and the Guard and Reserves. Programs are either free or at little cost and include childcare and school age care, counseling, youth and teen mentoring programs, and many national programs that focus on “building strong kids, strong families, and strong communities.” Nearly 250,000 people were provided services in 2003 that would have otherwise not been available or affordable.

Mr. David Coker
Executive Director
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
1401 Rockville Pike Suite 600,
Rockville, MD 20852

There are 26 Fisher Houses adjacent to military medical centers and six houses near Veteran Affairs medical facilities. Annually, more than 7000 families of wounded and injured service member's stay in furnished Fisher House-provided living quarters while they are visiting.

In response to OIF/OEF...while the government funds one trip for two family members to visit their wounded loved one, the Fisher House recognized that the presence of family members, including spouses, children, and parents, are a key factor in the healing

process, and would require multiple airline trips. Since January, the Fisher House has distributed about \$300,000 in free airline tickets, donated by five airlines.

Mr. Edward Powell
President
United Services Organizations, Inc
211 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 22201
Arlington, VA 22201

At 125 locations, worldwide, the USO continues to provide touch of home services such as free Internet and e-mail access, recreation services, travel assistance, and family events. Celebrity entertainment continues to be hugely popular with troops and highly valued by commanders because it provides that needed morale boost. Recent entertainers volunteering their time and talent in Southwest Asia included Wayne Newton, Robin Williams, Ruth Pointer, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gary Sinise, Drew Carey, Jessica Simpson, and Jay Leno.

USO has distributed more than 300,000 Operation USO Care Packages since the program began in September 2002 as a way for the American people to show their support. The packages include items such as prepaid international calling cards, disposable cameras, toiletries, snacks, and playing cards. The USO opened a center in Kuwait last December and recently opened centers in Qatar and Vicenza, Italy.

Ms. Candace A. Wheeler
President
National Military Family Association, Inc.
2500 North Van Dorn Street, Suite 102
Alexandria, VA 22303-1601

NMFA serves the seven uniformed services. In addition to their advocacy for military families through testimony, newsletters and legislative updates, NMFA had two significant projects during OEF/OIF. One is published research -*Sewing the Home Front: An Analysis of Military Family Support from September 11, 2001 through March 31, 2004*. A second major contribution was the initiation of "Operation Purple" in the summer of 2004. Operation Purple served more than 1000 youth at camps throughout the US and Guam. The residential camps were for military youth whose parent was deployed

Ms. Roxanne Spillett
President
Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Inc.

1230 W. Peachtree Street, NW
Atlanta, GA 30309

Continuing strong partnership with DoD with every military youth center belonging to B&GCA and participating in their exception staff training programs and other national contests and events. During OEF/OIF they provided two special programs. One is "Opening our Doors" in which they opened their hearts and their doors at Boys and Girls Clubs worldwide, for children and families impacted by deployment, including the Guard and Reserves. The second, "A Time for Smiles" was a large donation of toys and games to programs for military children. Additionally, DoD youth programs have received over \$2.5 million in B&GCA grants this past year.

Robert M. Rosenthal
The Spirit of America Tour
4444 Riverside Drive, Suite 303
Burbank, CA 91505

Mr. Rosenthal is a former entertainment industry attorney who founded a charitable foundation, called the Robert and Nina Rosenthal Foundation, dedicated to providing free celebrity entertainment to military installations in the Continental United States. This foundation provided free celebrity concerts at 18 US military installations in calendar year 2003 and will provide a total of 20 free celebrity concerts at US military installations during 2004.



FISHER HOUSE FOUNDATION, INC.

*"Dedicated to our greatest national treasure
our military service men and women and their loved ones"*

FOR RELEASE

On or After August 24, 2004

Contact: Jim Weiskopf

jweiskopf@fisherhouse.org

RECIPIENTS SELECTED FOR 2004 "NEWMAN'S OWN" AWARDS

PRESENTATION HELD IN PENTAGON ON AUGUST 24, 2004

The Honorable Charles S. Abell, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), assisted in the presentation of \$50,000 in grants to 16 volunteer organizations for their innovative programs to improve military quality of life.

Mr. Abell joined Kenneth Fisher, Chairman, Fisher House Foundation; Tom Indoe, Chief Operating Officer of Newman's Own; and Dave Smith, Vice President, Military Times Media Group, in a August 24, 2004 ceremony at the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes where recipients of "The Newman's Own Awards" were announced.

"Angels of Mercy," sponsored by the American Legion Auxiliary Unit 270 of McLean, Virginia, is a program to support wounded and injured Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) service members and their families. Auxiliary members visit patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center at least once a week, bringing them clothing and comfort items, providing home cooked meals to OIF/OEF families, and hosting special events. It was judged as the best entry and will receive a \$10,000 grant. Fifteen other organizations shared \$40,000 in grants.

This is the fifth year that Newman's Own, Fisher House Foundation, and Military Times Media Group have jointly sponsored the program which seeks to reward ingenuity and innovation for volunteer organizations working to improve military quality of life. The challenge was straightforward: "Present an innovative plan to improve the quality of life for your military community and receive funding to carry out the plans."

A total of 64 entries were received. Six judges, two from each of the sponsoring organizations, evaluated each entry based on the organization's impact to the respective communities, creativity and innovation. To be eligible, each organization was required to certify that it was a private or non-profit organization operating with authority of a military installation commander. Every organization submitting an entry will receive a certificate of recognition from Paul Newman.

OVERALL WINNING ENTRY (\$10,000 GRANT)

"Angels of Mercy," sponsored by the American Legion Auxiliary Unit 270 of McLean, Virginia, is a program to support wounded and injured Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) service members and their families. Auxiliary members visit patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center at least once a week, bringing them clothing and comfort items, providing home cooked meals to OIF/OEF families, and hosting special events. For further information, contact Marian T. Chirichella at Auxiliary270VAR@aol.com.

\$5,000 GRANTS

"Camp Flashhh," is a free program for children with special needs and their families at Camp Pendleton, CA, sponsored by the Camp Pendleton Armed Services YMCA. "Flashh" stands for "Families Laughing and Sharing Hugs, Hopes and Happiness," and it permits special needs families to experience new adventures, to escape from the daily routine, and provide a unique bonding experience. For further information, contact George Brown at gbrown@camppendletonsymca.org.

The **"Lindsay Project,"** sponsored by the Washington PAVE (Parents Advocating for Vocational Education) at Fort Lewis, WA, is a volunteer project named after a young child with Special needs who could not participate in community events. The program uses liaisons in each troop unit to reach out to families with children with special needs, with an emphasis on deploying units. The results have been decreased returns of deployed service members for family problems. For further information, contact Heather Hebdon at hhebdon@washingtonpave.com.

\$4,000 GRANTS

"Operation Interdependence®," a civilian-to-military delivery system® administered by a Fallbrook, CA nonprofit organization streamlines the delivery of packages to deployed service members. Care packages were overwhelming the military distribution system, so by repackaging individual care packages into platoon sized boxes with 50 civilian rations (c-rats)® and sending them in bulk, it has simplified the delivery process to individuals in deployed units. For further information, contact Albert R. Renteria at oi@arrenteria.com.

"Handy Man Hotline Materials," a program of the Connecticut National Guard Family Program, reduces stressors on families of deployed Guardsmen by having everyday household problems diagnosed and repaired, or referred to competent businesses at no cost for the labor. The Hotline is manned by volunteers, but funds are needed to purchase materials for the repair, or needed tools and equipment. For further information, contact Louis P. Preziosi at ctnngf@sbcglobal.net.

"USA Cares," a Radcliff, KY nonprofit, works to compliment an overburdened network of both information and financial support to service men and women and their families, while protecting the privacy and dignity of the individual. Rather than giving money to individuals, USA Cares pays utility companies or repair shops, or donates gift cards for food. The focus is on Reserve and National Guardsmen without a military installation or support network. For further information, contact Roger Stradley at rstradley@usacares.us.

"Camp Wonderland," sponsored by the Missouri National Guard Wonderland Foundation is a single one-week camp session for 95 special needs campers. Operated by volunteers, the organizers work in joint partnership with the Missouri Department of Mental Health's Division of Mental Retardation and Development Disabilities, focusing on mentally challenged family members of Missouri National Guardspersons. For further information, contact Wade Johnson at wade.johnson@mostlo.ang.af.mil.

\$3,000 GRANTS

"Operation Gratitude" is a California National Guard sponsored nonprofit, all-volunteer organization that has sent 21,150 care packages plus letters of support to service members deployed overseas. The organization obtains the names of service members through inquiries on its website, then sends packages as requests are received. For further information, contact Carolyn Blashek at cblashek@aol.com.

\$2,000 GRANTS

"Glory Boots" and "Pay It Forward," are both programs of the Mothers of Military Support (MOMS) of the 81st Armor Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA. The group became a distributor of desert boots with sewn soles and ankle support that are sent to deployed unit members; and they became a conduit for the public to purchase gift cards that given anonymously to families of deployed service members. For further information, contact Elizabeth Johnston at momsevent@aol.com.

"United Through Reading," a program sponsored by the Family Literacy Foundation of San Diego, CA facilitates supportive relationships for children through families and friends reading aloud to them. Its focus is more than 150 deploying ships and Navy/Marine Corps units, Permitting military parents and other family members to stay connected with their children by reading aloud on videotapes that are mailed home. For further information, contact Britta Justesen at britta@read2kids.org.

"Adoptaplatoon" a Kingston, NH nonprofit promotes morale lifting mail, care packages and other support measures to deployed service men and women through "platoon moms," and thousands of volunteers. The platoon mom ensures that each participating service member in a unit receives mail any special needs or requests. For further information contact Fran Dobson at fran@adoptaplatoon.org.

\$1,000 GRANTS

"Operation Hero" a program of the San Diego Armed Services YMCA is a free ten-week after school enrichment program for children of armed services personnel to help them succeed in school and to help them develop self-esteem through counseling from trained social workers and individualized homework assistance. The program targets dependents of deployment service members who are identified by school personnel as having difficulties. For further information, contact Blaine McCafferty at blaine@asymcasd.org.

"Family Support Center - School Supplies" a program of the Daughters of the American Revolution, Mt. Hood, OR Chapter, works with the children of the activated members of the 939th Air Refueling Wing and 304th Rescue Squadron based at the Portland, OR Air Base. The goal is to ease stress and tension experienced by military families who may lack some of the material items as other children. For further information, contact Robin Hammond at rhammond@camcqcinc.com.

"Missoula Children's Theater" is the nation's largest children's theater program, and the sponsoring organization, the William T. Sampson Elementary School Parent Teachers Organization from the Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has requested a grant to help pay for a team of actors/directors and their equipment to travel to Guantanamo to develop and produce a full-scale musical with 40-50 military children in the cast. For further information, contact Kathy Arlinghaus at kathyarlinghaus@yahoo.com.

"Cannon Enlisted Spouses Club" is a group of enlisted spouses who share common Air Force bonds like deployments and family separation and adjusting to new places to live, promote fellowship and serve as a resource for others at Cannon Air Force Base. The group's projects include scholarships, childcare and meals, and welcome packets for newly arriving families. For further information, contact Kris Keick at heicks@cox.net.

"Andrews Home Educators" is a nonprofit support group made up of home school families who are affiliated with Andrews Air Force Base (80 families with 192 children). The group coordinates the use of an base facilities for home school families and offers a full range of activities to improve the educational experience of the children. For further information, contact Debbie Sanzone at jdsanzone@comcast.net.

David Bellamy
Bellamy Brothers Partners
1349 17 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

Dear Mr. Bellamy,

Thank you so much for all you have done to support
our troops, both at home and overseas. Your ~~personal~~
~~interest in bringing~~ entertainment and comfort to ~~our~~ men
and women in uniform will not soon be forgotten!

*committed to
bringing*

All of us at the Department of Defense appreciate
~~everything you do, David, for our fine armed forces. It is~~
~~great work you are doing.~~



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


My best wishes and thanks for your inspiring work.

All the best,

Mr. David Coker
Executive Director
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
1401 Rockville Pike Suite 600
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear Mr. Coker,

 
Thank you so much for all you and the Fisher House Foundation do on a daily basis to help ~~our~~ armed forces and their families. Your contributions bring comfort and much needed support to ~~our~~ proud men and women in uniform, and for that I am truly grateful.

  
All of us at the Department of Defense appreciate everything the Fisher House Foundation is doing for our fine armed forces. It is great work you are doing.

My best wishes and thanks for your inspiring work.

All the best,

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
SECURITY CLASS

2004 SEP 27 PM 2:54
August 15, 2004 2:54

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thanks for Support to Troops

I think I ought to get thank you notes off to all the people who visit our **troops** at the hospitals or do USO **work**, if they are doing any significant amount.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-5 (1s computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 8/27/04

335 SD

15 Aug 04

OSD 14715-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037207

September 27, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Views by Bill Schneider

Attached are the additional views Bill Schneider attached to the Scowcroft Report.
They are worth reading.

Attach.
12/31/01 Additional Views to the Scowcroft Report by William Schneider, Jr.

DHR:ss
092704-12

350.009

27-Sep-04

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

William Schneider, Jr.

While I share the views and recommendations of the Commission concerning the challenges and opportunities facing the Intelligence Community (IC) and our current and planned capabilities, I disagree with its recommendations concerning the reorganization of the IC (Task 4, *Organizing for Success*). If the Commission's reorganization recommendations were implemented, I believe that the ability of the IC to respond to the President's aspirations to transform the nation's national security posture could be sharply diminished.

The need to transform the IC to meet 21st century international security requirements

The international security environment of the 21st century no longer permits the United States to predict the nature of threats posed to its interests. As a result, the US military posture cannot be optimized against well-understood threats, as was the case during the Cold War. For this reason (among others), public policy aims to transform US military capabilities to those that are far more agile, flexible, and adaptable than the legacy force structure of the Cold War. To meet this requirement, intelligence must not simply be "good" or "better"; it must be exquisite. In the words chosen by the Commission to characterize the requirement, "US intelligence will not meet the demands of the future if our intelligence agencies continue with business as usual."

To permit the US national defense posture to adapt to new threats, the IC will need to provide deep insights into the nature of US adversaries, their capabilities, vulnerabilities, resources, infrastructure, personnel, and most closely held secrets. At the highest level of national policy, the transformation of the IC is needed to strengthen the hand of American diplomacy, and permit the national leadership to anticipate and act before future threats pose overwhelming problems for US security.

It is the tactical or operational requirements of the armed forces that pose the most compelling challenge for the transformation of the intelligence community. The impact of the military applications of information technology and the intelligence that supports that capability will be fundamental; Twenty-first century warfare requires US military forces to conduct operations within the decision cycle of its adversaries if it is to prevail in future conflict. Intelligence information to support military operations will need to be collected from multiple sources, processed and fused into an actionable form, and delivered to military users in a timely manner. This processed intelligence information will often need to be transmitted directly to the seeker in a weapon system to permit US forces to bring a fleeting target under attack in a matter of seconds, not minutes or hours or days as is now the case. Moreover, extraordinary precision in the location of targets will be required as well to permit discriminate targeting, and a reduction in the risk of unintended casualties from friendly fire and collateral damage to non-combatants. These demanding intelligence requirements for 21st century warfare are affirmed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Vision 2020.

Role of shared DCI-DoD responsibility for the management of IC

The responsibility for the management of IC is shared between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. This unique managerial arrangement reflects the special circumstances surrounding the uses of intelligence information within the government. The DoD is both the collector and user of an overwhelming fraction of intelligence information – more than three fourths of all intelligence collected by the US government. Moreover, the DoD's need for timeliness and precision are unique and on a scale without parallel within the US government.

Notable IC difficulties during the 1990s in predicting crucial international developments have had powerful implications for US security. These difficulties included a failure to predict developments such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in India, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. This failure to predict these developments remind us that the IC must jointly serve both DoD and non-DoD interests as well.

The need to jointly serve the “national” or “strategic” intelligence requirements of the US government with the demanding “tactical” or “operational” DoD applications for the conduct of military operations establishes a need for shared management of the IC. The Department of Defense cannot transform its military capabilities to meet 21st century requirements without access to intelligence that meets its needs for timeliness and precision. Its interaction with elements of the IC most directly associated with producing such intelligence is intimate and routine, and led by personnel directly managed by the Secretary of Defense, but with shared responsibility for tasking and resource allocation with the DCI. This “creative tension” between intelligence collectors and users is a constructive managerial model for which there is strong empirical support.¹

The new administration has undertaken constructive measures that have mitigated some of the most damaging failures of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to coordinate. The failure of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to meet regularly during the late 1990s when some of the most egregious and damaging lapses in coordination took place has been replaced since January 2001 by frequent meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. The exigencies imposed by wartime intelligence demands have further strengthened this collaborative relationship.

¹ The tri-cornered relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the NRO for the management of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has been affirmed in the report of a recent statutory body, The National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office. See *The Report of National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office*,” (Washington: Government Printing Office, November 2000), p 44. In the report, the Commissioners unanimously concluded that “the tri-cornered arrangement among the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and NRO Director has at times provided great strength to the NRO because it has allowed the NRO Director to draw on the resources and benefit from the advocacy of two major forces in the Intelligence Community and the DoD.”

Limitations of the Commission's reorganization recommendations

The Commission has recommended that the authority to manage and appoint the leadership of the major DoD agencies in the IC (the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and other special programs) be shifted from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI.

Doing so would, in my view, perpetuate the IC's institutional weaknesses that have adversely affected its post-Cold War performance. Further, the proposed reorganization is likely to produce a result that is orthogonal to the modernization aspirations the Commission.²

1. The Commission's recommendation to centralize management of the IC agencies under the DCI would perpetuate the obsolete organizing principle of the IC around the *means* by which intelligence is collected rather than *ends* served by national intelligence.³ It is the flawed underlying organizational concept of the IC that focuses on collection disciplines that produces the performance problems for the IC from the perspective of the user of intelligence – not whether the DCI or the Secretary of Defense leads the collection management function. Moreover, centralizing the management of these important intelligence collection disciplines will greatly increase the “distance” of these organizations from the user. Such an outcome is precisely opposite to the underlying need for the modernization of the intelligence function. The example of the manner in which the *Predator* unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is employed in support of US military operations in Afghanistan offers an informative example of the constructive interplay between *users* and producers of intelligence. In this case, intelligence collectors operating under the control of users collaboratively participate in meeting the needs of *users*. This model is more appropriate to the support of 21st century military operations than the supplier-user model that would be created if the major defense-related intelligence organizations are subordinate to the DCI.
2. The intense needs of the DoD to improve the timeliness and precision of intelligence information make the responsiveness of the IC crucial. By moving away from the constructive tension of shared responsibility for the IC between collector and user as the Commission proposes, the responsiveness of the IC to the warfighter is at risk. In practice, diminished responsiveness by the IC is likely to produce undesirable bureaucratic pathologies. It is likely that the DoD will be forced to create parallel capabilities to those controlled by the DCI within elements of the DoD that are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program to assure responsiveness to the immediate tactical requirements of the *armed* forces.

² The Commission seeks to create national intelligence that reflects “seamless integration across intelligence disciplines, operational agility, and analytic prowess that are necessary to support the President and the NSC in the 21st century.”

³ The Secretary of Defense has directed that the Defense Science Board establish a Task Force to study the concept of managing foreign intelligence by focusing on ends vice means to study the organizational and operational implications of such an organizing principle.

3. Institutionalizing the existing informal DoD-DCI collection management function (called the Collection Management Center in the report) would burden the IC by adding yet another coordinating bureaucracy to the excessively baroque existing structures with little value-added to the user of intelligence. The Commission's view of the coordination difficulties between the DoD and the DCI were influenced by an exceptional period in the late 1990s when the Secretary of Defense and the DCI never met. This practice has been reversed by the new administration. Similarly on a smaller scale, the informal coordination process between the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Director of the NRO has been successfully maintained for nearly 40 years (apart from exceptional 1997-2001 period) when the DoD function was delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In this respect, it would be constructive for the DCI to participate more directly in the intelligence dimension of the Defense Planning Guidance process to better assess the intelligence implications of DoD modernization initiatives.
4. Appropriating funding to the DCI rather than to the Secretary of Defense jeopardizes the ability of the government to maintain the secrecy of patterns of resource allocation within the IC. Moreover, such a change does not address the most important problem – the allocation of resources within the IC to adjust to changes in priorities. The IC budget is assembled two years in advance of execution. The fast-breaking international security environment will not permit the IC to be effective unless its resources can be reallocated in a timely manner to respond to contingencies that could not have been anticipated when the budget was created. The DCI's authority should be strengthened by the repeal of the 1997 statutory provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act. The statutory provision prevents the DCI from reallocating funding within the IC without the agreement "of the Secretary or the head of the department which contains the affected element or elements." The provisions of the 1997 legislation were insufficiently mitigated in Section 105 of the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act.

Draft 02

31 December 2001

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 28 AM 8:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks,

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
090704-41

.....
Please respond by 9/14

320.2

7 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 14746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037213



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 23 AM 9:55

INFO MEMO

CM-2086-04
27 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 9/27*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

- **Question.** "Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Yes. OSD(P&R) has the Department of Defense lead using the process developed by OSD(Policy) last year. The Joint Staff uses the Joint Staff Action Processing system to manage actions for which it has the lead.
- **Analysis**
 - The Joint Staff will assist OSD(P&R) in developing its briefing and revising the action agenda. The current action agenda is attached (TAB B).
 - The OSD(PA&E) DOD Balanced Scorecard **risk** metrics and the Joint Staff/OSD(P&R) co-chaired Force Management Functional Capabilities Board also track force level initiatives.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

copy to:
DUSD(P&R)

Prepared By: VADM Robert F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

OSD 14746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037214

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

700 00 000

2004 SEP 26 AM 8:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo.

DHR:ss
09070441

.....
Please respond by 9/14

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 14746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037215

WORKING PAPER

Version #6

September 7, 2004

SUBJECT: “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force”—Are current U.S. military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress *on* the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The **U.S.** can afford whatever military force level is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be a mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in force levels, we increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

Background: The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” *of the* U.S. military, *but* have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

WORKING PAPER

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037216

WORKING PAPER

- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

- Develop Iraqi capacity to conduct police and other security tasks;
- Increase international military participation in Iraq; and
- Increase actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and other threats to stability.

In any event, the current stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned (J7 lead with J1/J3/J8/J5)

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things — "mass" — versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Tab A

WORKING PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/037217

WORKING PAPER

Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military — US, and international—elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate **mix** for the 21st century. The task **is** to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands **of** the 21st century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will **seek** ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which **it** was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. **An** approach that permits only peace or **war**, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit *more* nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.

WORKING PAPER

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037218

WORKING PAPER

- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world **is** moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People (filled with JS/J3/J6)

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed **up** so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end **strength**” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. OSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. **This will** require a diplomatic effort to substantially reduce the *current* restrictions

WORKING PAPER

and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, **Kosovo**, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD **will** continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

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- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology (J8 lead with J4/J5/J6)

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD **will** invest in technology to substitute for human force protection — sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by **as much as** 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, **m** and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency (J8 lead with J1/J2/J3/J4)

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.

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- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired “effects” and “outcomes,” rather ~~than~~ simply responding to requests ~~for~~ numbers of things—troops or platforms.
- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Layering. DoD components’ reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices ~~from~~ inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC “operational availability” studies’ recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

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- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

5. Policy (JS lead with JS)

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to **pare** down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the **U.S.** requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to **provide** protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

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easy and more expensive course ~~of~~ increasing force levels. We owe *the* American people no less.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/ End Strength

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Tab A 2

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TAB B
Final DRAFT Version 10 (as of 11 Oct)

ACTION AGENDA – REDUCING STRESS ON THE FORCE
(without increasing military end strength)

1. Lessons Being Learned

Action Item	Near-Term Action	Mid-term Action
a. Contingency plans	<p>USD(P) - Update Contingency Planning Guida to include action items from 18 Aug SECDEF “Operational Availability Action Items” memo (Sept 03).</p> <p>CJCS – Within 6 months of Contingency Planning Guidance publication, update Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Direct Combatant CC’s to delineate forces required to seize the initiative, additional forces required to achieve SDTE objectives, and follow-on forces required to achieve objectives of win decisive.</p>	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process that encompasses the full spectrum of military operations. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Implement a new Defense Readiness Reporting System that uses adaptive planning constructs for force readiness assessment (IOC in FY04)</p>
b. Jointness	<p>CDR JFCOM – Publish & oversee implementation of DoD’s Integrated Interoperability Plan as tasked in the Transformation Planning Guidance. (Nov 03)</p>	<p>CJCS - Develop DPG language supporting initiatives that improve jointness and add synergy to joint force operations. (Dec 03).</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Implement Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System to capture joint experience and training of military personnel. Ensure personnel systems uniformly define and track joint training qualifications and experiences for the selection of qualified personnel for joint assignments. (Oct 04).</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
3. Training and Exercises	<p>USD P&R – Update the Training Transformation Implementation Plan as appropriate to include lessons from recent real world experience (Jan 04).</p> <p>CDR JFCOM – Implement an initial Joint National Training Capability training event in FY04.</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Evaluate progress on implementing the three enabling Training Transformation capabilities (Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, Joint National Training Capability, Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability), and recommend adjustments, if required, for POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM - Create a Joint National Training Capability to routinely incorporate joint context into major Service training events (FY 04)</p>
1. Global Force Management	<p>CJCS – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p>	<p>USD(P) – Oversee implementation of the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study. (ongoing)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p> <p>USD(P&R) – work with CJCS to implement capabilities-based force allocation into defense readiness assessment and planning (June 04).</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
. Reserve/Active Force balance	<p>Service Secretaries – Develop plans and propose program or budget changes (if appropriate) to implement the SECDEF “Rebalancing the Force” memo and the 18 Aug SECDEF Operational Availability memo (Oct 03).</p> <p>USD(P&R) and Secretary of Army – work with PA&E to develop Army program changes that decrease reliance on the Reserve Component for “swiftly defeat” & high demand units. (Oct 03)</p>	<p>USD(P) – Work with USD(P&R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation. (Dec 03)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM: In conjunction with Service Component Commands (SCCs), identify and implement plans and procedures in support of JFCOM’s roles as the single Force Provider for the supported Combatant Commanders.</p>
. Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets	<p>Service Secretaries – Brief SECDEF on actions taken to better align manpower skills with assigned missions and develop Budget Change Proposals, if appropriate, to initiate support of rebalancing the Force efforts. (Oct 03)</p>	<p>USD(P) – Work with USD(P&R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation (Dec 03)</p> <p>USD(P&R)- with USD(I) and CJCS, conduct a study of DoD’s organic language, regional, and cultural expertise skill requirements. Recommend options to realign skill sets to meet foreign language requirements. (Aug 04)</p> <p>CJCS: With Services, identify each Service’s need to provide support for other Service, allied, and coalition units in support of full spectrum operations. Determine if there is a need to realign manpower to support this mission area. (Jun 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
g. Time on Operational Duty	Service Secretaries – Assess options to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	USD (P&R), CJCS, Service Secretaries – Develop action plan to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission (Aug 04). CDR JFCOM: Identify actions, plans, methods and capabilities to track rotations of forces within the overall mobilization process. (Aug 04)
h. Precision Weapons		USD(AT&L) – with D, PA&E, CJCS and USD(P), develop plan for long-lead analysis needed to inform-QDR as to impact of current and projected precision weapons programs on logistics and manpower requirements. (Dec 03).
i. Deployments	CDR JFCOM - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	USD(P&R) – with CJCS and Service Secretaries define interactions between manpower, personnel management, and training systems to ensure these systems and supporting deployment processes are integrated. (Oct 06)
j. Relief in Place	CJCS – work with Services and USD (P&R) to develop a common definition of “relief-in-place.” (Nov 03)	Service Secretaries - Develop and implement procedures to better execute relief-in-place operations, to include conducting the operations in less time and doing so using best practices learned across all Services (Dec '03)
k. SJFHQ		USD(P) – Identify next steps for SJFHQ implementation in DPG for POM 06 action. (Dec 03)

2. People

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Military Out of Ton-Military Jobs	USD(P&R) – Work through the Defense Human Resource Board to identify opportunities for civilian-military conversions. As appropriate, work with PA&E or Comptroller to develop a Program Review Issue or Budget Change Proposal on civilian-military conversions. (Oct 03).	USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and 1 USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department's efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not "military essential." (Dec 03)
b. Core Competencies	Service Secretaries – Continue progress toward achieving the President's Management Agenda (PMA) competitive sourcing initiative via the A76 process or divestiture using a core competency approach (on going)	<p>USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department's efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not "military essential." (Dec 03)</p> <p>Service Secretaries – develop options for divesting non-core competency missions in POM 06-11, including plans for completing the required PMA review by FY09. (Aug 04)</p>
c. Contract Employees	USD(C) – Consider whether a legislative proposal is needed to allow DoD to more judiciously use contractors in an expeditionary role for short duration missions and for other missions that are not military core competencies. (Jan 04)	USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department's efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not "military essential." (Dec 03)
d. Education	CJCS – Complete/ implement Joint Professional Military Education initiatives	Dir, OFT – With USD P&R, develop options for a transformational education program for consideration in QDR. (Jan 05)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Coalition Forces		<p><u>USD(P)</u> – Ensure increased availability and readiness of coalitions forces is a key issue for the next Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p><u>USD(P)</u> – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
f. Allies	<u>USD(P)</u> – Develop options for expanding the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)	<p><u>USD(P)</u> – integrate appropriate direction in the Security Cooperation Guidance on sharing transformation with allies and accelerating their ability to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. (Jan 04)</p> <p><u>USD(P&R)</u> – Develop a plan to implement common training and readiness assessment with Allies. (Oct 04)</p>
g. Backfill		<p><u>USD(P)</u> – Develop appropriate direction to Regional Component Commanders in the Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p><u>USD(P)</u> – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
h. Indigenous Forces	<u>USD(P)</u> – Develop a plan to expand the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)	<u>USD(P)</u> - Update the Security Cooperation Guidance (Jan 04) to direct Regional Component Commanders to increase the availability and capability of host nation security personnel.

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
Reserve Forces	<u>Service Secretaries</u> – Review current policies and practices to ensure judicious and prudent use of reserve forces. Inform USD(P&R) of the results of this review. (Dec 03)	<u>JSD(P&R)</u> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04) <u>CDRJFCOM</u> : Develop plan for a consolidated Joint Mobilization Process focused on reengineering existing systems and plans for JFCOM's role as the single mobilization command.
Volunteers	<u>Service Secretaries</u> – Develop and implement initiatives that enhance unit and individual volunteerism per the 9 July SecDef “Rebalancing the Force” memo. Brief DepSecDef NLT. Oct 03.	<u>JSD(P&R)</u> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04) <u>CDRJFCOM</u> : Develop plans, systems and procedures to standardize coordination and command and control for Service Component Commands in the management and tracking of volunteers. (Aug 04)
Holidays		<u>USD(P&R)</u> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Component mobilization policy documents. (April 04)
Call Ups	<u>CDRJFCOM</u> – Identify changes in Joint doctrine, policy, and law required for new deployment and mobilization process reform and recommend to SECDEF improvements to RC mobilization considering NE/OEF/OIF lessons learned. (Jan 04) <u>USD(P&R)</u> - In coordination with CDRJFCOM develop “Quick Wins” initiatives from OIF lessons learned for SECDEF consideration. Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (Sep 03)	<u>USD(P&R)</u> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04). Develop appropriate legislative proposals to implement deployment and mobilization process reforms. (Jan 04)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
m. Incentives	USD(C) and USD(P&R) - assess options to offer incentives for extended deployments and develop a Budget Change Proposal or Management Initiative Decision as appropriate for DepSecDef consideration (Oct 03).	
n. Peace Operations Initiative		USD(P) – Revise Security Cooperation Guidance as appropriate to better focus security cooperation efforts on increasing the ability of allies and partners to participate in peace operations. (Jan 04) USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa . (Dec 03).
o. Intelligence	USD(I) – Identify desired capabilities and shortfalls in <i>our</i> ability to generate actionable intelligence, including a concrete interagency plan for improving horizontal integration of intelligence. (Dec 03)	USD(I) - Develop action plan to strengthen actionable intelligence (Aug 04)

3. Technology

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Information Age	ASD(NII) – Develop options to accelerate the implementation of the GIG and use of new information technologies and concepts to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel. (Nov 04)	ASD(NII) – with CJCS, conduct long-lead analysis for QDR of potential effects of C4 systems on reducing US.-based and deployed personnel. (Jan 05). See associated action in section 4.b.
b. Logistics	USD(AT&L) - Review all Major Defense Acquisition Programs to ensure they emphasize smaller logistics requirements and footprints. (Nov 03)	USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to reduce logistics and support requirements. (Jan 04) CJCS – Consider the impact of improved systems on logistics, mobility and personnel requirements in <u>Operational Availability 04 Study</u> . (Mar 04)
c. New Technologies		USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to substitute for human force protection. (Jan 04)
d. Lethality	Secretary of the Army - Complete fielding of Stryker Brigade Combat teams IAW PDM I, FY04-09. (1 st Stryker deploying to OIF in Oct 03, 2 nd Stryker BCT ready in mid-FY04).	USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to lighten the deployed footprint while retaining lethality. (Jan 04)
e. U.S. and Coalition Transformation	CDRJFCOM – Develop a coalition experimentation plan to examine key interoperability needs of coalition partners. (Dec 03)	USD(P) - Update Security Cooperation Guidance to identify regional coalition transformation priorities. (Jan 04)

4. Efficiency

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Organization of Forces	Service Secretaries – Describe the capabilities required within each Service to drive modular design at appropriate levels and brief options for implementation by Dec 03.	CDRJFCOM – with CJCS and D, OFT, conduct long-lead QDR analysis of options for modular force organizations. (Jan 05)
b. Global Reach Back	Service Secretaries and Combatant Commanders – Identify capabilities that lend themselves to reachback. Propose near-term joint options to increase reliance on reachback to help reduce the forward footprint. (Dec 03)	USD(P) – With ASD (NI) and CJCS, develop “Global Reach Back” DPG direction for POM 06 development and QDR preparation, with emphasis on organizing the Reserve Component to optimize reachback opportunities. (Dec 03). See associated action in section 3.b.
c. Force Allocation	CJCS – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).	CDRJFCOM – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef “Operational Availability Action Items” Memo). USD (P&R) – work with CJCS to capture capabilities-based assessments in defense readiness assessment and adaptive planning tools. (July 04)
d. Procurement	Services – establish preferred munitions requirements prior to Service FY 06 POM development. (Jan 04)	USD(AT&L) - Develop S&T priorities and metric for new technologies that achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure. (Jan 04) USD(P) – Develop Defense Planning Guidance direction for munitions funding priorities. (Dec 03)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Strategic Lift	CJCS – Assess strategic lift requirements for warfighting scenarios specified in the Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar '04).	Service Secretaries – Implement recommendations 2a and 2e from Secretary's 18 August "Operational Availability Action Items" memo in POM 06. (Aug 04) Service Secretaries. Initiate action on DepSecDef approved recommendations of the Advanced Mobility Concept Study (AMCS) for development of future strategic mobility capabilities (Aug 04).
f. Rotation Ratio	CJCS – develop an action agenda to implement SECDEF approved Elaborate Crossbow III initiatives. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving near-term stress on the force. (Oct 03) USD(P&R) – work with D,PJA&E and Services to develop options to reduce rotation ratio by transporting crews to their platforms. (Nov 03)	Service Secretaries – assess options for reducing rotation ratios and make necessary programmatic adjustments by POM 06 (Aug 04)
g. Headquarters Layering	CJCS, USD(P&R), USD(P) – Leveraging previous work, assess near-term ways to further reduce the number of headquarters and combine headquarters activities. Brief SLRG in Oct 03. USD(C), Service Secretaries, and CJCS – Implement near-term budget and program changes as directed in 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Dec 03)	USD(P) – with USD(P&R) and CJCS, develop Defense Planning Guidance that examines ways to further reduce DoD's headquarters staff structure. (Dec 03). CJCS – Conduct study of Combatant Command manpower utilization as directed in the 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Oct 04)
h. Best Practices		USD(P&R) – Propose options to establish a process to identify and move best Human Resource Management practices among DoD Components. (Jan 04)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Planning Tools	<p>USD(P&R) – Report to Deputy Secretary on progress in implementing new Defense Readiness Reporting System assessment tools (Nov 03).</p> <p>CDRJFCOM - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF and identify the capabilities need in planning tools to execute this new process. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03</p>	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p>
j. Operational Availability	<p>CJCS - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving stress on the force. (Sept 03)</p>	
k. Strategic Warning	<p>USD(I) – Identify Intelligence shortfalls impacting the ability to generate increased strategic warning. (Jan 04)</p>	<p>USD(I) – In preparation for QDR 05, assess options to mitigate strategic warning shortfalls (Jan 05).</p>
l. The Right Skills	<p>CJCS - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. (Sept 03)</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – with the Services, extend provisional unit concepts to capitalize on the skills of the Individual Ready Reserve and recent retirees.</p>
m. Safety	<p>USD(P&R) – Form a Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) to govern the Department's mishap reduction efforts (Sept 03)</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Develop an enterprise mishap reduction system to provide actionable data to DoD leadership (July 04)</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Work with USD(AT&L) to develop DPG language guidance to direct the Department's efforts to aggressively move on the 50% mishap reduction effort (Dec 03).</p>

5. Policy

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
1. US Foreign Commitments	USD(P) - Develop prioritized list of long-term foreign commitments where US could reduce or discontinue its	USD(P) - Develop plan to pare down long-term US commitments (Apr 04).
1. U.S. Non-Military Skills		<p>USD(P) – Develop Defense Planning Guidance language on stability operations to guide POM 06 development. (Dec 03)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
2. U.S. Worldwide Footprint		USD(P) - Oversee implementation of Global Posture (IGPBS) initiatives (ongoing)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD(Policy)	Col Kelly	10 September 2004
OSD(Personnel & Readiness)	Mr. Gallant	16 September 2004

~~FOUO~~

SEP 28 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleeza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: ADM Blair's Testimony to Senate Appropriations Committee

Attached is the statement by ADM Dennis Blair before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Intel Reform. It is well worth reading. The first sentence says it all.

Attach.

9/21/04 ADM Blair's Statement before the SAC

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OSD 14794-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037239

Senate Appropriations Committee Testimony

21 September 20, 2004

Senator Stevens, members of the Committee.

(1) When planning or conducting a military operation, intelligence is one of the absolute key supporting functions – like ammunition, transportation and communications. (1)

Perhaps in the past intelligence capabilities funded by the National Foreign Intelligence Program – NFIP – primarily supported national-level policy makers. No more. NFIP programs provide intelligence support that is integral to military planning and operations at the tactical level. The National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Information Agency are combat support agencies. They are involved with military plans and operations from the early stages – intelligence preparation of the battlefield – through all stages of conflict. I recommend that their operations, funding, personnel policies and effectiveness continue to be determined primarily by the Secretary of Defense, then integrated with other intelligence programs by the National Intelligence Director.

To me it makes no sense for an official outside the Department of Defense to determine DoD requirements, then to provide funds to DoD ,then to monitor programs. That would be like the Department of Transportation deciding what kind of and how many trucks DoD needs, then providing funding to the Department and monitoring truck usage.

I strongly favor a powerful National Intelligence Director who is not the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. That Director should have a large and competent requirements, programming and budgeting staff, comparable to the Joint Staff, PA&E and the Office of the Comptroller in the Defense Department. However the Department of Defense should originate the programs of DoD combat support agencies as a part of building the Defense capabilities this country needs. The NID, assisted by a competent staff, should then integrate the requirements of all government customers and providers of intelligence. In many cases DoD combat support agencies will be collecting intelligence of use to others besides the

armed forces. The NID needs to ensure that these capabilities are included and integrated.

In case of strong differences between the NID and the Secretary of Defense, the issue should be taken to the White House for solution. With a strong and capable staff providing data-based recommendations, the NID should have no fear about seeking these decisions.

But what about the current war on terrorism – can't we do better? Isn't good, shared intelligence the key to success?

Yes, if we put someone besides an intelligence official in charge of planning and conducting that war.

Intelligence works when it is driven by commanders and operators or by officials with line responsibility. It does not work when it is generating its own objectives and requirements. To assign a National Counter Terrorism Center reporting to the NID the responsibility for planning the war on terrorism is like making a football team's scouts the head coach. A head coach wants tremendous scouts – he wants to know everything possible about the opposing team – on game day he wants the scouts up in the spotter's booth predicting what the opposing team's next play will be – but it is the coach who must call the plays. He knows what his players can and cannot do, not the scouts – he knows what other games he must play – not the scouts.

The fastest way to fix intelligence in the war on terrorism is to designate the head coach. Right now we have a committee conducting the war - the CIA is conducting part of the war, DoD is conducting part of the war, FBI is conducting part of the war, DHS is conducting part of the war, the Departments of State and Treasury are conducting other parts. The results are predictable. Our adversary is moving faster than we are, we are missing opportunities in internal friction, and the intelligence services are doing their best, particularly the TTIC, but they are doing it in a vacuum, rather than as part of operations to defend against and destroy terrorism. It may be that we need several teams to win this war – one for the United States headed by DHS, several joint interagency task forces overseas headed by either DoD or CIA officials. But right now we have none.

There are many other aspects of current intelligence reform proposals that are good – improving sharing, upgrading networks, increasing professional standards. However I strongly recommend against two proposals in various bills:

- To give the NID overall responsibility for the NFIP budget activities in the Department of Defense;

- To place the NID in charge of developing the strategy for the war on terrorism.

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer questions.

September 27, 2004

TO: Lt Gen Mike Hayden
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Materials to Steve Cambone

I notice I am receiving some materials out of your organization on a regular basis that Steve Cambone is not receiving. How is that decision made and who can we talk to to assure Steve Cambone receives the same materials which are sent to me?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-27

.....
Please respond by 10/4/04

312

27 Sep 04

OSD 14796-04

720
TAB A

~~FOUO~~

NO FORN DISSEM
SECRET//NOFORN

2004 SEP 21 PM 2:40
September 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Pete Pace
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

2A

SUBJECT: "Preparation of the Battlespace"

848

I am concerned that the old phrase "preparation of the battlespace" may no longer be appropriate terminology for a variety of reasons, including potential inaccuracy and misimpressions that it can convey.

Please think through what terms may be more appropriate in today's world. In the GWOT, the entire world is the "battlespace" in the old sense, and it can be harmful to telegraph U.S. "preparation."

Thanks.

DHR:jh
090204-1

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 14817-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037244

September 27, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Meet the Press

Nice job on Sunday doing "Meet the Press." You told the story honestly and accurately, and came across well. Thanks for taking the time to do it.

DHR:ss
092704-30

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 14844-04


11-L-0559/OSD/037245

000.77

27 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

July 26, 2004

TO: Ryan Henry
CC: Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: ICRC Visit

Here is another ICRC cable you should **look** into.

Thanks.

Attach.

AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD Cable O2410562JUL 04

DJR:dh
072604-24

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

3836

26 Jul 04

~~FOUO~~

OTTUZYUW RUEHGBA0239 2061056-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241056Z JUL 04
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0350
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUCAACC/CDR USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0008
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000239

~~SECRET~~

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ICRC, PTER, IZ

SUBJECT: USEB 142: DISCUSSIONS WITH ICRC BAGHDAD REGARDING
VISIT TO CAMP ASHRAF

REF: A) SECSTATE 140713, B) GENEVA 001861, C) USEB 79/BAGHDAD
128, D) GENEVA 2033, E) SECSTATE 155080

1. ~~(SBO)~~ SUMMARY. IN A JULY 20, 2004 FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH U.S. OFFICIALS, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) BAGHDAD HEAD OF DELEGATION CHRISTOPHE BENEY CLARIFIED THAT THE TWO REMAINING BARRIERS TO AN INITIAL ICRC VISIT TO CAMP ASHRAF TO ASSESS CONDITIONS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH RESIDENT MEMBERS OF MUJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ (MEK) WERE ICRC'S SECURITY CONCERNS AND ICRC'S PREFERENCE FOR NOTIFYING A SENIOR MEMBER OR MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT (IIG) PRIOR TO TRAVEL. BENEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, SEE AN INITIAL VISIT TAKING PLACE BEFORE AUGUST. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(SBO)~~ EMBASSY POLITICAL-MILITARY COUNSELOR NEUMANN, MNF-I DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS MAJOR GENERAL MILLER, AN EMBASSY NOTE TAKER, AND LAWYERS AND OFFICERS FROM THE EMBASSY AND MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ (MNF-I) MET ON JULY 20, 2004 WITH ICRC BAGHDAD HEAD OF OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHE BENEY IN A FOLLOW-UP TO THEIR JULY 12, 2004 MEETING, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEPARTMENT. (REF E)

3. ~~(SBO)~~ MG MILLER OPENED THE MEETING BY NOTIFYING THE ASSEMBLED THAT 3,840 OF 3,843 MEK MEMBERS RESIDENT AT CAMP ASHRAF HAD

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: X DEPSEC: / EXECSEC: /
C&D: / CCD: / CABLE CH: / FILE: /
USDP: / DIA: / OTHER: KG / PA / GC /
USDI: / PER SEC: / COMM: /

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

DIRJS /

NAGELMAN /
WAYMAN /
HENRY /

ICRC communications are provided to DoD as confidential, restricted-use documents. As such, they will be safeguarded the same as SECRET/NODIS information using classified information channels. Dissemination of ICRC communications outside of DoD is not authorized without the approval of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

11-L-0559/OSD/037247

SIGNED AN AGREEMENT REJECTING VIOLENCE AND PARTICIPATION IN TERRORISM. MG MILLER SAID HE BELIEVED ICRC HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE FINAL DISPOSITION OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE MEK AND IN PASSING THIS DISPOSITION ALONG TO THE USG AND TO OTHER HUMANITARIAN NGOS.

4. (S) ICRC BAGHDAD HEAD OF DELEGATION BENEY REMARKED THAT THIS WAS GOOD NEWS AND THAT, WHILE HE HAD SUGGESTED AT THE PREVIOUS MEETING THAT A BETTER DEFINITION OF THE STATUS OF THE MEK HAD BEEN A PREREQUISITE FOR ICRC INVOLVEMENT, THE INFORMATION OFFERED BY MG MILLER WOULD HELP IN PERMITTING THE PLANNING OF AN INITIAL VISIT BY A SMALL ICRC TEAM TO CAMP ASHRAF.

5. (S) ICRC BAGHDAD HOD BENEY CONTINUED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ICRC HAVE CONTACT WITH THE IIG BEFORE EMBARKING UPON ANY INTERVIEWS AT CAMP ASHRAF, AND SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO MEET WITH IIG PRIME MINISTER ALLAWI ON THE MATTER. WHEN AMBASSADOR NEUMANN POINTED OUT THAT PM ALLAWI'S TRAVEL PLANS CURRENTLY RENDERED HIM UNAVAILABLE, HOD BENEY AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR NEUMANN THAT DEPUTY PM SALIH WOULD ALSO BE A SUITABLE INTERLOCUTOR.

6. (S) MG MILLER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE ICRC HAD EXPRESSED SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE PAST WHEN CONSIDERING TRAVEL TO CAMP ASHRAF. HE NOTED THAT HIS CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF ROAD CONDITIONS ALONG THE MAIN COALITION SUPPLY ROUTE TO CAMP ASHRAF PUT THE RISK AT LOW-TO-MODERATE AND SAID THAT SECURITY CONDITIONS HAD IMPROVED IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS A LOW PROBABILITY OF DANGER TO ANY ICRC TEAM INSIDE CAMP ASHRAF. HOD BENEY CONCURRED THAT HE WAS MORE AND MORE COMFORTABLE, AS TIME PASSED, ABOUT SECURITY ON THE ROAD IN QUESTION.

7. (S) HOD BENEY SAID THAT A VISIT COULD POSSIBLY TAKE PLACE AFTER THE END OF THE MONTH [JULY]. MG MILLER ASKED WHETHER THE VISIT MIGHT NOT TAKE PLACE EARLIER, EXPLAINING THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE EARLIER THE VISIT, THE MORE EFFECTIVE IT WOULD BE. HE REMARKED THAT THREE THOUSAND PEOPLE WERE CURRENTLY AWAITING A SENSE OF THEIR FUTURE DISPOSITION AT THE CAMP.

8. (S) HOD BENEY REPLIED THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE RESIDENTS OF CAMP ASHRAF. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY DETERMINATIONS THE ICRC WAS ABLE TO MAKE WERE WHETHER PEOPLE AT THE CAMP WERE FREE AND WILLING TO LEAVE THE CAMP AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD THE OPTION OF TRAVELING TO A THIRD COUNTRY [OUTSIDE IRAQ AND IRAN]. THE ICRC WAS NOT, HOD BENEY SAID, ABLE TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER MEK MEMBERS WERE ELIGIBLE FOR REFUGEE STATUS.

9. (S) HOD BENEY SAID THAT THE ICRC DID HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY, HOWEVER, IN OFFERING A PRAGMATIC EXPLANATION OF THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO MEK MEMBERS RESIDENT AT CAMP ASHRAF. HE NOTED THAT THE PRIVACY OF ICRC INTERVIEWS WAS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE

PROCESS, AND THE ICRC WOULD NEED TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF MEK LEADERSHIP DURING VISITS TO CAMP ASHRAF.

10. ~~(S)~~ MG MILLER SAID THAT MNF-I COULD SUPPORT AN ICRC TEAM OF UP TO TWENTY MEMBERS AT CAMP ASHRAF, INCLUDING ACCOMMODATION, BOARD, AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED. HE ALSO OFFERED MNF-I ASSISTANCE IN ENSURING THAT MEK MEMBERS PROVIDED SUITABLE PRIVATE INTERVIEW SPACES FOR A SECOND, POST-ASSESSMENT ICRC VISIT.

COMMENT

11. ~~(S)~~ HOD BENEY DID NOT REPEAT HIS EARLIER CONTENTION THAT THE USG WOULD NEED TO PROVIDE A CLARIFICATION OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE MEK RESIDENTS AT CAMP ASHRAF BEFORE THE ICRC COULD CONSIDER VISITING THE CAMP. NOR DID HE EXPRESS THE OPINION THAT SECURITY CONCERNS PRECLUDED THE ICRC'S TRAVEL TO CAMP ASHRAF AT THE PRESENT TIME. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, COMMIT TO AN INITIAL ICRC ASSESSMENT VISIT TO CAMP ASHRAF, NOR TO EVENTUAL COMPREHENSIVE ICRC INTERVIEWS WITH MEK MEMBERS.

12. ~~(S)~~ HOD BENEY'S INTRODUCTION OF A NEW CRITERION FOR ICRC ENGAGEMENT (HIS PERSONAL NOTIFICATION OF THE IIG) AND HIS SILENCE IN RESPONSE TO MG MILLER'S REQUEST FOR AN ACCELERATED ICRC VISIT SCHEDULE BOTH INDICATE THAT IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT HOD BENEY SEES THE COMMENCEMENT OF ICRC VISITS TO OR INTERVIEWS AT CAMP ASHRAF AS LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

13. ~~(S)~~ DEPUTY PM SALIH TOLD DCM ON JULY 20 THAT HE HAD MET WITH THE ICRC AND ENCOURAGED THEM TO VISIT THE CAMP (NOTE: HE DID ASK THAT THEY PUT THE REQUEST IN WRITING.). SALIH QUERIED US AT LENGTH ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE CAMP RESIDENTS, ESPECIALLY WHETHER THEY HAD HEAVY WEAPONS (NOT ANY MORE) OR WERE TRAVELING TO BAGHDAD TO "AGITATE."

NEGROPONTE

SECDEF V2

ACTION

INFO CHAIRS(*) CHAIRS TESTBED(*) SECDEF-C(1)
SECDEF-C(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*) DIR:PAE-RAM(*)
ESC-SMTP(*) ESC AGENT ALL TRF(*) SECDEF WASH DC(*)
OSDONNIPRDA(*) OSDONSIIPRDA(*)
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//
+USDP:

(U, 6, 8)

1

CJCS V6

ACTION

INFO CHAIRMAN DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED(*) SJS-C(*)
SJS-C(1) NMCC:CWO(*) CMAS(*) J3(*) CMAS(1) J5(*)
J4:LRC(*) JSAMS(*)

(U, 8)

2

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

3

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/037249

July 16, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Pete Geren
Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Detainee Statement

Where is the latest draft of the overall detainee statement? We need to start pulling the threads together.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071604-4

.....
Please respond by 9/31/04

383.6

165010V

July 16,2004 MEMO TO SECDEF from Di Rita

Attached is the draft statement on Detainee operations that we are attempting to validate by everyone who is in a position to validate it.

The first sentence is solid.

The second sentence is solid for Iraq, and we are confirming that it is solid for Afghanistan and Guantanamo.

This statement will leave some people wanting more, but when it is bulletproof we will be able to use it.

DRAFT STATEMENT ON DETAINEE OPERATIONS AND THE ICRC

**The International Committee of the Red Cross has access to all
Defense Department detention operations.**

**All detainees in (Iraq, Afghanistan and GTMO) have been
assigned Internment Security Numbers and are registered with
the ICRC.**

DRAFT

July 28, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response on Torture

When people write expressing concern about torture and abuse, we ought to have a packet of unclassified materials that we can send them that show what has been authorized, why what was authorized was not torture, that it was humane, and that it was within the law.

We also need to point out that any activities that occurred that were not authorized have been or are being investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted.

The materials need to be bullet-proof.

I would like it within a week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072804-5

.....

Please respond by 8/5/04

383.6

28 Jul 04

720
~~FOUO~~

July 28, 2004

SUBJECT: Policy v. Legal

We have to decide if we want to address the Department of State on a policy basis as opposed to a legal basis on some of these issues.

DHR:dh
072804-14

040 STATE

28 JUL 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037254 **OSD 14856-04**

September 29, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve Call Ups

At the present time the Army has been authorized to call up roughly 6500 Individual Ready Reservists (IRR). My understanding is that the Army currently has called up nearly 4000, thus far. Of those already scheduled to report, roughly three-fifths have shown up for duty.

Background:

- Each of the services has Individual Ready Reserves.
- Everyone who serves in the military today is a volunteer.
- Each volunteer incurs an eight-year obligation, either on active duty, in the Selected Reserve, or in the Individual Ready Reserve; or a combination thereof.
- If on active duty or in the Selected Reserve – training every month – the Army knows their addresses, phone numbers, medical condition and skill proficiency.
- If in the Individual Ready Reserve, the Army may not know their current addresses and phone numbers, skill proficiency, physical condition, or personal circumstances.

326

29 Sep 04

Therefore, when Individual Ready Reservists are called up, it is expected that only about two-thirds will show up ready to serve and that there will be special situations with respect to the remainder.

By "situations," I refer to the fact that a few may be dead, a few in jail, some in the hospital or physically incapacitated; some may have moved and we may have incorrect addresses. Some may have personal circumstances that make it impossible for them to come on active duty. For example, the Department has exempted several IRR members because they hold civilian positions considered more critical to national security.

In any event, there are a lot of good reasons why the Army will not get 100% when they call up the Individual Ready Reserves, and they know that. It is no surprise. A number of exemptions have already been issued.

I am told there are eight individuals whom we know received their notices and have not responded. These eight cases are currently being reviewed. The Army reports that an IRR member ordered to active duty over a year ago was declared AWOL last June.

AWOL determinations will be reviewed by senior Army officials before they are made.

DHR:ss
092904-7

SEP 30 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Michael Bayer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: SEC

DR

Please think through how we can connect the Service Secretaries again and get something like the SEC, or a redesigned SEC, functioning.

We need to link them, and we need *to* include them more. And I need to get better connected to them.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-12

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 14965-04

040

2004-09-30

August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF
SECURITY
2004 SEP 30 11:11:11

O: Ray DuBois
C: Gen. Dick Myers
ROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

Yuma a question was raised about illegal immigrants coming into the firing
range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting our training.

Please look into that.

Thanks,

HR:dh
B2704-9 (to computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

684

27 Aug 04

OSD 15010-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037258



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

701 SEP 30 AM 11:41

INFO MEMO

ACQUISITION
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

Ray DuBois 9/20/04

In the attached snowflake, dated August 27, 2004, you requested information about illegal immigrants coming into the Yuma firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting training. Discussions with the Marine Corps, the Department of Interior and Department of Homeland Security yielded the following information.

- Tab A is an Info Memo from the Commandant of the Marine Corps describing impact on training on the Goldwater Range from undocumented aliens in the Yuma region entering the range. The problem has been exacerbated by increased enforcement along the border east and west of the Goldwater Range. The range has been closed 208 times from May through July 2004 with 733 training hours lost.
- Inter-departmental and inter-agency coordination is currently worked at the regional level through the Borderland Management Task Force. The Commandant calls for the establishment of inter-departmental (with Department of Homeland Security and the Department of the Interior) strategic coordination task force under the DoD Range Sustainment Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT). The OIPT is co-chaired by the DUSD(I&E), DUSD(Readiness), and the Principal Deputy Director Office of Test & Evaluation.
- ODUSD(I&E) staff have initiated contact with Department of the Interior and Department of Homeland Security headquarters staff to identify the appropriate points of contact for further coordination as required to support the Commandant. Formal coordination will occur through the existing Range Sustainment Working IPT process, with the Marine Corps leading the staff working group.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Jan Larkin, (b)(6)




11-L-0559/OSD/037259

OSD 15010-04

August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 20 AM 11:41

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

In Yuma a question was raised about illegal immigrants coming into the firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting our training.

Please look into that

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082704-9 (to computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

OSD 15010-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037260



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY, REFER TO:

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Hagee 9/15

SUBJECT Undocumented Aliens Aboard Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma Training Ranges

- MCAS Yuma is responsible for 1.2M acres of land that encompasses the ~~Barry~~ M. Goldwater Range. The Goldwater Range shares a 37-mile border with Mexico. The Border Patrol, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and DoD all have statutory and regulatory interests in activities occurring aboard the Goldwater Range. An area map is contained in Tab A.
- Heightened Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement activity (both under Department of Homeland Security) in Tucson, San Diego, and El Centro has resulted in increased smuggling of aliens in the less resourced Border Patrol's Yuma sector (Goldwater Range inclusive).
- Snapshot of Border Patrol Yuma sector (as of Jun 04): Over 86,000 alien apprehensions; 1,183 of those aliens from 47 countries (other than Mexico); 25 alien heat related deaths (11 were aboard the Goldwater Range); 2nd quarter alien apprehensions up 81%; MCAS Yuma detains approximately 260 aliens per month.
- During the last 12 months, aliens and other trespassers have significantly interrupted training by causing closure of the Goldwater Range 208 times, ranging from 20 minutes to 10 hours per closure. These range closures averaged one per day from May through July 04 and totaled 733 DoD training hours lost to date.
- The DoD Overarching Implementation Process Team (OIPT) on Range Sustainment should formally establish a coordination task force with senior officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Interior in order to strategically coordinate decisions that affect the missions of each Department near international borders.

COORDINATION: NONE.


Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Major John M. Manson

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/037261

MCAS Yuma & Goldwater Range



TAB (A)

August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 30 AM 11:50

O: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Land Exchanges in Arizona

I talked to Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano when I was in Phoenix this past week. She indicated she had talked to Secretary of Interior Gayle Norton about working with **BLM** and DoD to do land exchanges around several military bases in Arizona. It sounded like a **good** idea to me.

Please look into it and get back to Dennis Burke, her chief of staff, to get **more** information from him.

Thanks.

HR:db
12704-11 (is computer).doc

Please respond by

9/24/04

601

27 Aug 04

OSD 15011-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037263



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 30 11:49

INFO MEMO

ACQUISITION
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

Ray DuBois 7/30/04

SUBJECT: BLM and DoD Land Exchanges in Arizona

In the attached snowflake dated August 27, 2004, you outlined your conversation with Arizona Governor Napolitano on land exchanges around several military bases involving the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Department. An update on our effort follows.

- In July 2004, the Department of the Interior was briefed by the Olympia Group, a private development group based in Scottsdale and Las Vegas. Olympia officials plan to acquire land from multiple landowners under the flight path immediately outside Luke Air Force Base and exchange these consolidated private tracts with developable land managed by Interior's BLM. Olympia currently has under contract approximately 6,000 acres owned by 17 landowners.
- A land exchange of this nature would require Federal legislation. Senator John McCain and Senator Jon Kyl, along with Congressman Trent Franks, have been approached by the Olympia Group to introduce such legislation.
- Interior's initial response was that there is no direct benefit for the BLM to pursue these types of exchanges, but they are willing to work such projects in pursuit of the appropriate broader National interest.
- DUSD(I&E) staff contacted and discussed the proposal with Governor Napolitano's staff. Additional information was requested and will be forwarded by the Governor's staff.
- DUSD(I&E) will continue to work with the Air Force, Department of Interior, and Governor Napolitano's office to determine the current status of the proposal, track any new Federal land exchange legislative proposals, and explore ways to take advantage of this opportunity, if appropriate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Bruce Beard, (b)(6)

* R- ARIZONA , LUKE AFB in his District,



11-L-0559/OSD/037264

OSD 15011-04

August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 30 AM 11: 50

TO: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Land Exchanges in Arizona

I talked to Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano when I was in Phoenix this past week. She indicated she had talked to Secretary of Interior Gayle Norton about working with BLM and DoD to do land exchanges around several military bases in Arizona. It sounded like a good idea to me.

Please look into it and get back to Dennis Burke, her chief of staff, to get more information from him.

Thanks.

SR: dh
2704-11 (is computer).doc

Please respond by

9/24/04

OSD 15011-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037265

September 29, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte
Gen John Handy

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Medical Transport of Korean Boy

Leon, it was a good idea to take that young Korean boy home on your aircraft; and
John, nice job working out the complexities of the transport.

Those kind of humanitarian gestures mean a great deal. Thanks for thinking of it.

DHR:ss
092904-3

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15081-04

580

295204


~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte
Gen John Handy

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Medical Transport of Korean Boy

Leon, it was a good idea to take that young Korean boy home on your aircraft; and John, nice job working out the complexities of the transport.

Those kind of humanitarian gestures mean a great deal. Thanks for thinking of it.

DHR:ss
092904-3

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15081-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037267

September 29, 2004

TO: RADM Adam Robinson

CC: Gordon England
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Visit to Bethesda

The visit I made to Bethesda Naval Hospital was extremely well run. You and the team out there made excellent use of our time, and I was particularly impressed with the evident care provided to our wounded Marines.

You are clearly running a first-class hospital – thanks for all you are doing.

DHR:ss
092904-9

.....
Please respond by _____

33550

27 Sep 04

OSD 15082-04

7201
~~FOUO~~

file

September 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SOUTHCOM's Haiti Request

Please get back to me on what SOUTHCOM'S request is for an assessment team in Haiti and let's look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092904-5

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

Haiti

Sir,
Response attached.
DR
Lt Col Lengyel
9/30

30 SEP 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037269

OSD 15136-84

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
September 21, 2004
2004 OCT -1 PM 2:37

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: HUMINT Effort in QDR.

We ought to think about a major HUMINT effort in the QDR.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-30

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 15174-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037270

~~SECRET~~

SEP 22 2004

SECRET
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TO: Ryan Henry
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Item for the QDR

One of the QDR items should be:

- How do we leverage the National Guard?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092104-5

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15175-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037271

7201
~~FOUO~~

file

KK's
copy

October 25, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: QDR Item

Here's a memo from me to Dick Myers and his response. I agree, this has got to be part of the QDR. I assume you agree.

Thauks.

Attach.
9/27/04 SecDef Memo to Gen. Myers re: Idea for QDR
10/22/04 ~~Gen~~ Myers Memo to SecDef re: Capability to build Security Forces in Other Countries

DHR:ss
102504-9

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

~~SecDef~~
Yes,

Ryan Has this on
LIST.

DR 10/26

KJK

10/26/04

cc Ryan Henry

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037272

U15176-04

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

868

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

One of the things that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference ~~was~~ the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries.

Should we push that issue into the QDR?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-20

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

DR 10/25

Sir,

Response attached.

Y/R

Lt Col Lengyel

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15176-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037273



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2133-04:05
22 October 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 10/21

SUBJECT: Capability to Build Security Forces in Other Countries

- **Question.** "One of the things that came up in the Comhatant Commanders Conference was the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries. Should we push that issue into the QDR?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** Yes. Given the challenges facing the United States now and in the future, the Department of Defense will require some capability to build security forces in other countries. The QDR should consider this issue within the broader force sizing and interagency context.
- **Analysis**
 - Training foreign security forces is tied directly to increasing the capability of US allies and other potential coalition partners, improving our ability to conduct multinational operations and to prevail against adversaries.
 - Currently, training of foreign security and police forces includes programs executed by at least seven different departments, agencies and coalition partners. The President's Global Peace Operations Initiative begins to address the problem and we should continue to support it.
 - **Our** analysis during the QDR should address DOD's role as part of the overall US government effort and how we can most efficiently and effectively train security forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

copy to:

USDP

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director J-5;

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037274

OSD 15176-04

DA 10/25

~~FOUO~~

~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~

September 27, 2004

092704-1 11 2 44

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Ryan Henry

cc: Jim Thomas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

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Should we push that issue into the QDR?

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DHR:as
092704-20

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 15176-04

~~FOUO~~

~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037275

28-09-04 15:10 IN



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-PI-33-04

22 October 2004

2004 OCT 22 09:12:05

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 10/21

SUBJECT: Capability to Build Security Forces in Other Countries

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 - Our analysis during the QDR should address DOD's role as part of the overall US government effort and how we can most efficiently and effectively train security forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

copy to:

USDP

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director J-5; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 15176-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037276

~~FOUO~~

TAB

September 27, 2004

868

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

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Should we push that issue into the QDR?

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DHR:ss
092704-20

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/037277

OSD 15176-04

~~FOUO~~

INFORMATION RETENTION

September 27, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Ryan Henry

cc: Jim Thomas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Salafist Factor

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, then the **USG** needs to have plans to deal with them.

First, do you folks agree that is the case?

If so, what do you propose by way of a plan to deal with it?

Shouldn't the U.S. have a major program to **fund** moderate schools? Should that be part of the QDR effort?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-19

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 15177-04

~~FOUO~~

INFORMATION RETENTION

11-L-0559/OSD/037278

28-09-04 15:10 IN

In reply refer to ES-0898 & 04/013054-ES

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

September 28, 2004

ZET 101-1 10 9 07

TO: Ryan Henry
CC: Steve Cambone
Ken Krieg

SUBJECT: Draft of QDR

Please **give** me a draft (in bullet points) of what you think the QDR should include; what we hope to get out of it; and what it should and should not be.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-5

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

OSD 15178-04

~~FOUO~~

29-09-04 17:19 0255

11-L-0559/OSD/037279

September 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
VADM Tim Keating
ADM Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: System for Managing Force Rotation

It would be helpful to have a briefing showing me the system for managing force rotation that was in place in 2001 when we arrived, as well as the current system we are using. It seems to me we are still using an industrial-age approach and are not fully single-sourcing through JFCOM.

My suspicion is that there is still considerable room for growth, and it would be interesting to see your plans for further consolidation and improvement.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
093004-14

.....
Please respond by 10/21/04

OSD 15186-04

3202

3052404

October 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note from Mike De Long

IRAQ

Attached is a note from Mike De Long that might be of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/30/04 Memo to SecDef from Mike De Long

DHR:ss
100104-8

.....
Please respond by _____

10 OCT 04

OSD 15187-04

30 September 2004

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Sir,

Lt Gen (Ret) Mike De Long called at 2:30 pm. He returned from Iraq yesterday and offered the below listed points for your consideration. If you would like more elaboration, or have any questions, he is available, and we can arrange a call.

He had numerous meetings with important tribal leaders, and heads of several Iraqi corporations. They gave him several insights. Generally, their view of the importance of the coming elections is the same as PM Allawi's. There are a few additional views.

They feel that between 13 – 16 out of the 18 provinces in Iraq are ready for the elections, want them, and will hold them relatively successfully. The others are problematic. The leaders feel that if elections are held, and any of the provinces are left out, it will cause such a feeling out alienation that it could lead to a civil war. They were adamant that all provinces need to participate.

Next, they urged the U.S. and the Coalition to at strongly to crush the insurgents. The use of force in the right cause is respected, and any backing off, or moderation will only be cause for problems later.

Lastly, given a choice, the leaders do not want any expatriates in the government. They respect Allawi, but really want someone like themselves, that stuck it out under Saddam. They resent the outsiders, even the good ones.

Very Respectfully,



COL B

~~FOUO~~

October 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note from Mike De Long

Attached is a note from Mike De Long that might be of interest.

Thanks.

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DHR:ss
100104-8

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15187-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037283

30 September 2004

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Lastly, given a choice, the leaders do not want any expatriates in the government. They respect Allawi, but really want someone like themselves, that stuck it out under Saddam. They resent the outsiders, even the good ones.

Very Respectfully,



COL B

~~FOUO~~

September 21, 2004

ES-0825

I-04/012624

000.5

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM:

SUBJECT: Department of Treasury and Department of Justice Participation and
Progress in GWOT.

Please get back to me with a sense of how Treasury and Justice are doing with their tasks in the GWOT. At the Combatant Commander's Conference, it was clear that we don't have an accurate sense of how they are doing in stopping funding streams and working other interagency pieces that belong to those two departments.

If we can understand what they are doing and how much progress they are making, perhaps we could encourage them to do even more.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-17.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

2152004

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15196-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037285

SECRET

701 OCT -1 PM 4:20


500

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

October 1, 2004

Captain Marriott,

On September 23, USDP Feith sent the attached memo to Steve Hadley.. (tab 1) He will organize the briefings.


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

1 OCT 04

OSD 15196-04

21 SEP 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037286

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR STEVE HADLEY

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *89/23/04*

SUBJECT: Justice and Treasury GWOT Efforts

At our recent Combatant Commander's conference, some of the Combatant Commanders asked how Justice and Treasury are doing with their efforts in the Global War on Terrorism.

It might be a good if they briefed their efforts at an upcoming Deputies Committee meeting.

Thanks.

— and then briefed the PC.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037287

~~FOUO~~

September 24, 2004

ES-0875
I-04/012866

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Tom O'Connell

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Process for Handling High Value Detainee Release Requests

We will shortly begin to receive recommendations from GEN Casey and the Iraqis to release a number of the high value detainees.

Please set **up** a process in the building that evaluates each situation and provides recommendations to me in a measured way.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-7

.....
Please *respond* by 10/8/04

OSD 15197-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037288

SECRET
11-07-04 11:02:30


Policy Executive Secretariat Note

October 1, 2004

Captain Marriott,

USDP met with Policy, JS, OGC and USDI staff on Sept 30 as follow up to the Sept 29 roundtable. Policy staff is working on an action plan to transfer responsibility of Iraqi detainees (both HVDs and other Iraqi detainees).

We are scheduled to brief the Deputy on Monday, Oct 4.

UP


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

0 SD 15 97 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037289

~~SECRET//NO FORN DISSEMINT~~

June 14, 2004

EF-9872

I-04/008049

TO: Bill Luti

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

What do we do about accelerating the Afghan security forces and making sure the budget is right?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-29

OSD 15261-04


.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

August 4, 2004

Captain Marriott:

Mr. Feith handed a copy of the attached brief to the SecDef yesterday afternoon, 3 August.

JR.

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/037290

~~SECRET//NO FORN DISSEMINT~~

AFGHANISTAN

14 Jan 04

August 25, 2004

11-0559

037291-04

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Kissinger Transcripts

Please check with the White House Counsel on paragraph six of this memo concerning the Kissinger transcripts and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/17/04 William Rogers e-mail to Kissinger.

DHR:dh
082504-1 (1a computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

9/3/04

0 SD 15347-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037291




**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600**



INFO MEMO

October 4, 2004 9:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II 

SUBJECT: Kissinger Transcripts

- You asked me to check on the release of transcripts of Dr. Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations with or about you. (Tab A)
- The transcripts were made when Dr. Kissinger served in the Nixon and Ford Administrations.
- Nixon-era transcripts.
 - Most of these transcripts were released by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) on May 26, 2004.
 - Only those conversations mentioning national security information that is still classified were withheld. No privileges were asserted.
 - The released transcripts included a few telephone conversations with you and several more conversations about you. NARA reported that no telephone conversations with or about you were withheld.
- Ford-era transcripts.
 - Although a final decision has not been made on whether to release these transcripts, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and White House Counsel (WHC) have concluded that Dr. Kissinger's telephone conversations with or about you (and other members of the President's Cabinet) should be withheld as privileged under the Freedom of Information Act.
 - The Department of State is currently cross-referencing the portions of transcripts released in Dr. Kissinger's memoirs with a list of transcripts DOJ and WHC have recommended be withheld to ensure a privilege is not claimed for transcripts already released publicly.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared By: Christine S. Ricci, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC), (b)(6)



0 SD 15347-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037292



HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dear Don -

After our lunch and my conversation with Joyce I have asked Bill Rogers to run up the status of the telecons we discussed. I am enclosing his report based on his meeting together with a trusted ex-Foreign Service Officer of the material.

I expect no media interest but should there be you can be sure that I will respond in a manner & exemplifying my very high regard for you as a problem solver and my affection for you as a person and a friend.

Warm regards



TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR - 350 PARK AVENUE - NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 - (212) 759-7810

A-127-4

AUG 17 2004

Jesse Incao

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2004 1:49 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Draft Revised Note Re phone notes Rumsfeld

Dear Henry:

You asked that I sum up the situation with respect to your telcons.

1. The collection now being made public includes both your White House conversations as Security Adviser and your State Department conversations as Secretary. In other words, everything -- with sizable gaps -- from January 1969 to January 1977.

2. National Archives has already released the Nixon material, after culling out personal and security matters. Archives put the telcons in its public reading rooms several months ago. The release was required by, and followed carefully, the special Nixon records legislation. There has been a good deal of interest in the papers, but precious little media notice.

3. The State Department will make the telcons for your tour as Secretary available for FOIA release within the next few days. Like the National Archives, State has also culled out personal and classified material.

4. References to Rumsfeld in this second instalment of papers are of two types: First, your conversations directly with him. These are a small fraction of the 8,000 pages. I would characterize them as businesslike and professional -- not suggesting a particularly intimate friendship, but certainly not personal or confrontational. Second are occasional comments to others touching on Rumsfeld's policy positions, for example his role in blocking the extension of SALT.

5. More broadly, I doubt that this second instalment covering your term as Secretary of State will cause any greater public sensation than the first.

6. In any event, I am now advised by the State Department -- I have had no direct link to the White House on this -- that it is unlikely that the conversations with or related to Rumsfeld will be made public. The White House has told State to withhold "for review by the WH/DOJ any transcripts containing any mention of the White House or the NSC, including discussions with or about persons who were either at the WH/NSC at the time the transcripts were made or with or about persons who are now senior officials of the current administration." State did not ask for my views as to this request.

I would, of course, be pleased to respond to any further questions.

Regards,

Bill

This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer.

William Rogers

William.Rogers@aporter.com



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO



October 6, 2004 - 10:00 AM

DEPSEC Action

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Nomination of MG Odierno for ACJCS—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- You asked about the progress on MG Odierno's nomination and confirmation during this session of Congress
- The background is as follows:
 - The Certification and Nomination arrived at the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 23 September,
 - We replied to the questions posed by the SASC on 30 September.
 - MG Odierno met with the SASC on 5 October.
 - Secretary Brownlee talked to both Majority and Minority Staff Directors in reference to this issue yesterday.
- The sense is that the meeting with MG Odierno and the SASC went well. In fact, barring any disagreement from the Minority, they are expecting the nomination to move this week.

RECOMMENDATION: If there is no action by Wednesday evening, I recommend that you call the Chairman.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Major Jered Helwig, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	Lo/7
EXEC SEC	M 10/6



11-L-0559/OSD/037296

OSD 15445-04

*Def
Sec
called
Sen W
on Wed PM
indications
were good
v/r
Jm
vrm*

4 OCT 6


~~FOUO~~

October 4, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
Charlie Abell

c c : Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Les Brownlee
GEN Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Nomination of MG Odierno for ACJCS

We need *to* find out what must happen to ensure Ray Odierno is confirmed during this session of Congress. If I need to make calls, go to the Hill, or do anything else, please let me know.

This is an important nomination: and we need to get it through the process without creating an unhelpful precedent. Please let me know what I need to do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100404-11

.....
Please respond by

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037297


OSD 154 45 - 04

~~FOUO~~

October 4, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
Charlie Abell

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Les Brownlee
GEN Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
100404-11

.....
Please respond by 10/6/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037298

OSD 15445-04

7209
~~FOUO~~

October 6, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Greenville Herald Banner Request

Let's set up a phone call with Melva Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner*.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/5/04 Memo from Powell Moore to SecDef re: Interview Request
SECDEF LETTER TO CONG. HALL
DHR:ss
100604-4

.....
Please respond by _____

0000.71SD

6 OCT 04

6 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15504-04

600704

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 2/1/2005

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC
OSD CONTROL **OSD 15504-04** DOC **10/6/2004** ATTACHMENT: DOR **2/1/2005** SIGNATURE CASE:
FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD TO TSADIRITA
SUBJECT GREENVILLE HERALD BANNER REQUEST
KEYWORDS DIRITA, L SNOW FLAKE
COMMENTS CAF - NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.
FN **000,7150** SEC U OCN 100604-4
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS **OSD 15561-04** **OSD 15538-04**
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
PAGES **1** ENCLOSURES **0**
SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:
FRONT OFFICE DOC
ACTION MEMO
FRONT OFFICE DOC

CREATED BY: reynolds

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES

11-L-0559/OSD/037300



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

R-R

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION MEMO

October 5, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

[Handwritten signature: Powell A. Moore]

000.7150

SUBJECT: SECDEF Interview Request

- SECDEF comment on childhood near-drowning incident.
- Rep. Ralph Hall contacted my office to ask that you speak to a reporter for his local paper. It seems that his constituent, Bill Salamon, claims that his father, Bud Salamon, saved your life in 1937.
- Melva Geyer writes for Rep Hall's district paper, the *Greenville Herald Banner*. She would like you to acknowledge the incident and "any other comments he might like to make or reaction to the resurrection of this memory." An article from the time is attached.

Sector 04

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef agree to the interview.

COORDINATION: NONE

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Comment: _____

Attachment:

As stated

OSD 15504-04

Prepared By: Claude Chafin, Special Assistant for Communications, ASD Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

6000704

11-L-0559/OSD/037301

Daily News - Index

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS, WEDNESDAY JULY 28, 1937

Publis

Year, No. 176 Official Newspaper of the State of Illinois

BUD' SALAMON SAVES 3 CHILDREN

Rescues 3 From Lake in as Many Minutes

Edgar ("Bud") Salamon, who, during the Fall, plays halfback with the Blue Ridge "perp" school down in North Carolina and in Summer does life-guarding at the Lee st. beach in Evanston, became a hero three times today in as many minutes.

Young Salamon, who lives at 927 Madison st., Evanston, was on duty in his lookout pinnacle when he saw Donald Rumsfeld, 5, sinking in the water a hundred feet off shore.

The life guard plunged in, brought Donald to shore, emptied the water out of him, restored his breathing and handed him over to

his frantic mother, Mrs. George Rumsfeld, of 1303 Judson av., Evanston.

Scarcely had he relinquished one youngster than another near-drowning required his attention. He swam furiously out to where a sand cavity had caused a nine-foot depth and rescued Nancy Belcher, 8, of 1213 Michigan av., Evanston.

Salamon's third rescue followed immediately. Joanne Rumsfeld, Donald's 7-year-old sister and the Belcher girl's playmate, had slipped into the same sand cavity death trap and was almost drowned when Salamon reached her.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON.

The Honorable Ralph Hall
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman,

Thanks so much for calling Powell Moore about
the article from 1937 that features Mr. Bill Salamon, the
father of your constituent.

It's all true! I remember it - it did in fact happen.

We would be happy to touch base with Melva
Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner* and will do so.

Best regards,



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 6 2004

The Honorable Ralph Hall
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Best regards,

OSD 15501-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037305

335 SD

6 OCT 04

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 6 2004

The Honorable Ralph Hall
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman,


Thanks so much for calling Powell Moore about
the article from 1937 that features Mr. Bill Salamon, the
father of your constituent.

WRONG
NAME

It's all true! I remember it – it did in fact happen.

We would be happy to touch base with Melva
Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner* and will do so.

Best regards,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense at the time, is written across the bottom of the letter. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent 'D' and 'M'.

Daily News-Index

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS, WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1957

PLATE

Official Newspaper of the State of Illinois

BUD' SALAMON SAVES 3 CHILDREN

FOR
FILES

Rescues 3 From Lake in as Many Minutes

Edgar ("Bud") Salamon, who, during the Fall, plays halfback with the Blue Ridge "prep" school down in North Carolina and in Summer does life-guarding at the Lee st. beach in Evanston, became a hero three times today in as many minutes.

Young Salamon, who lives at 927 Madison st., Evanston, was on duty in the lookout pinnacle when he saw Donald Rumsfeld, 8, sinking in the water a hundred feet off shore.

The life guard plunged in and brought Donald to shore, emptied the water out of him, restored his breathing and handed him over to his

his frantic mother, Mrs. George Rumsfeld, 612 N. Jackson st., Evanston.

Scarcely had he been handed over when another child, a girl, was drowning. Rumsfeld's mother called. He swam further out to where the sand cavity had caused a hole in the depth and rescued her. Her name is of 1213 Michigan st., Evanston.

Salamon's third rescue came immediately.

Donald's 3-year-old sister, a Balcher girl's playmate, fell into the water. She was rescued, brought to shore, and restored to breath. She was then handed over to her mother.



Bud Selamon of Evanston Ill. Saves three children from drowning in Lake Michigan in July of 1937. The children are L-R Joan Rumsfeld 7, Donald Rumsfeld 5, and Nancy Belcher 8. Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense)

~~FOUO~~

SEP 22 2004

863

Northcom

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ed Eberhart

I think Ed Eberhart is right -- he should go from 96 to **48** hours. Is that going to happen?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092104-10

.....
Please respond by 9/27/04

22SEP04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15507-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037310

October 7, 2004

TO: Ashley Kavanaugh

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Card for POTUS

Ashley,

Attached is a card from the Chinese-American woman who cuts my hair -- she is a big fan of the President.

Thanks.

Attach.


9/13/04 Note from Sou Ing Ly to POTUS


DHR:ss
100704-2

335w3

100704

MR. PRESIDENT & FIRST LADY





SEPT 13-04

. PRESIDENT & FIRST LADY,
it is election year,
you've been distre-
ssed busy, so do all your
things, including me.
With all my heart for
reelected. And, I
hope to be lucky enough
to hear from you & the
President. I like you and
love you very much. I
would be honored if you
could send me an autographed
card of your self.

You're a Star!

I will very much appre-
ciate your consideration

Respectfully

(b)(6)

October 7, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: The Debate

Mr. Vice President,

Joyce talked to our son Nick after your debate Tuesday evening. He said, "You know, next to dad, Vice President Cheney is the one for me!"

He's right! Good job.

Regards,

DHR:ss
100704-3

0001

7 OCT 04

September 29, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Directives from Bill Schneider

I asked Bill Schneider and his group to draft up some directives that I could send out -- implementing some of the things he said should be implemented.

What has happened with this?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-21

.....
Please respond by 10/6/04

9/29

Del

- SIR _____
- DRAFT
- Directive is next below, ready to go out for coord.
- Please sign memo to launch.

v/r Ji

~~FOUO~~

300.8

29 Sep 04

8 OCT 04

OSD 15584-04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000**



**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION**

SUBJECT: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities

I have reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004 Summer Study and am impressed with their efforts. This study provides some useful suggestions for reshaping our capabilities to exploit prewar opportunities and address postwar responsibilities. As highlighted by the DSB, the Department of Defense is part of a government-wide approach to the development of interagency capabilities critical to achieving U.S. objectives in the transition to and from hostilities.

The Under Secretary for Policy will be the focal point for implementation of DSB recommendations as captured in the attached draft directive. Please review and coordinate on the directive by October 30, 2004. You should begin identifying documents under your cognizance that need to be revised based on the new directive. In addition, identify those high priority actions that proceed from your responsibilities in the directive, but which should be undertaken separately.

Attachment
As stated





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 8 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
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Attachment:
As stated

OSD 15504-04




11-L-0559/OSD/037319

300.8

SECRET

DOD DIRECTIVES SYSTEM COORDINATION RECORD

1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (X one) <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOD DIRECTIVE <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> DOD INSTRUCTION		2. TYPE OF DOD ISSUANCE (X one) <input type="checkbox"/> DOD PUBLICATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NEW <input type="checkbox"/> ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION <input type="checkbox"/> REISSUANCE <input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE <input type="checkbox"/> CANCELLATION		3. TYPE OF ACTION (X one) <input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE <input type="checkbox"/> CANCELLATION	
3. SUBJECT (Title of Issuance) Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities					
3. FEDERAL REGISTER PUBLICATION REQUIRED (X one) <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					
3. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (X all that apply) <input type="checkbox"/> OMB <input type="checkbox"/> RCS <input type="checkbox"/> IRCN					
0. FORMS PRESCRIBED (X one) 11. PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS (X one) <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO					
12. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (X one) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A - Unlimited <input type="checkbox"/> B - Limited <input type="checkbox"/> C - Classified					
13.a. ACTION OFFICER NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (Print or type) Dr. McGinn, Jerry					
1. OFFICE DESIGNATION DUSDP					
1. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS 2000 Defense Pentagon, Room 4E830 Washington, DC 20301-2000					
14.a. ORIGINATING AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy) (Sign and print or type name) Mr. Ryan Henry					
1. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (b)(6)		e. FAX NUMBER (Include Area Code)		b. POSITION TITLE (Print or type) Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy	
1. E-MAIL ADDRESS jerry.mcginm@osd.mil		c. DATE FORM SIGNED October 7, 2004			
15. COORDINATING OFFICIALS (X all that apply) <i>Only those officials authorized in writing may coordinate on DoD issuances. For guidance on appropriate signature levels, see instructions for Item 16 and Chapter 7 of DoD 5025.7-M. The preprinted "X" indicates the MANDATORY COORDINATORS.</i>					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS DUSD (ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY) DUSD (LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS) DIR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING ATSD NUCLEAR CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS DIR DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY DIR MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY DIR DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY DIR DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY DIR DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY DIR OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION DIR DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY		
<input type="checkbox"/> UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY PDUSD (POLICY) ASD (HOME AND DEFENSE) ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY) ASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT) DUSD (POLICY SUPPORT) DIR DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY DIR DEFENSE POW/MP OFFICE DIR DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIR AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, OSD (2 copies) DIR PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY DIR WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR FORCE TRANSFORMATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR NET ASSESSMENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SECRETARY OF THE ARMY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SECRETARY OF THE NAVY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Identify) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Identify)		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS PDUSD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS) ASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS) DUSD (READINESS) DUSD (PROGRAM INTEGRATION) DIR DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY DIR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY DIR TRICARE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY DIR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY			16.a. COORDINATING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy) (Sign and print or type name)  b. POSITION TITLE (Print or type) Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy c. DATE FORM SIGNED October 7, 2004		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER DIR DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY DIR DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE DIR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE DIR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIR NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY DIR DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE DIR DOD COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY					

7. PURPOSE AND REMARKS (Continued)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SD FORM 106

ITEM 1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the security classification of the DoD issuance.

ITEM 2. TYPE OF ISSUANCE

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the type of DoD issuance.

ITEM 3. TYPE OF ACTION

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the type of action prescribed for the DoD issuance.

ITEM 4. DOD ISSUANCE NUMBER

For a new DoD issuance, leave this item blank for completion by the Directives and Records Division, WHS. For a revision, change, or cancellation of a DoD issuance, enter the existing number of the DoD issuance.

ITEM 5. COORDINATION SUSPENSE DATE

Enter the date that the coordination must be received by the originating OSD Component. For DoD Directives, the date must be no more than 20 working days (45 working days for all other DoD issuances) from the date this form is signed by the Originating Authorizing Official in Item 14.c.

ITEM 6. SUBJECT (Title of Issuance)

Enter the subject of the DoD issuance. It shall be no more than three lines in length.

ITEM 7. PURPOSE AND REMARKS

Enter the reason for the action and provide any supplementary or background information to support the action.

If the DoD issuance should be reviewed by DoD officials who are under the cognizance of an Under Secretary of Defense, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, or a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, make recommendations in this block.

ITEM 8. FEDERAL REGISTER PUBLICATION REQUIRED

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance must be published in the Federal Register. See Administrative Instruction No. 102.

ITEM 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Place an "X" in all boxes that apply. See DoD 8910.1-M.

ITEM 10. FORMS PRESCRIBED

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance prescribes or references forms.

ITEM 11. PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance addresses matters relating to the collection, maintenance, use or dissemination of personal information regarding U.S. citizens or aliens admitted for permanent residence.

ITEM 12. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Assign an appropriate distribution statement:

- A - Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
- B - Approved for release to U.S. Government employees and their contractors; distribution is limited.
- C - Classified; distribution approved by Office of Primary Responsibility only.

ITEM 13. ACTION OFFICER

Enter the action officer's name, office designation, complete mailing address, telephone number, fax number, and e-mail address.

ITEM 14. ORIGINATING AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy)

Obtain the signature of the Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy. This official authorizes the coordination of the DoD issuance.

ITEM 15. COORDINATING OFFICIALS

Place an "X" in the appropriate boxes to indicate which DoD Components should coordinate on the DoD issuance. If the DoD issuance shall be reviewed by DoD officials who are under the cognizance of an Under Secretary of Defense, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, or a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, make recommendations in Item 7. The preprinted "X" identifies the mandatory coordinators (General Counsel, DoD; the Inspector General, DoD; and the Director of Administration and Management, OSD.).

ITEM 16. COORDINATING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy)

Obtain the signature of the Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy. For additional guidance on the appropriate signature levels, see Chapter 7 of DoD 5025.1-M.

DoD Directives: Because Directives establish DoD-wide policy and are signed only by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, they are coordinated at the highest level. Coordinating officials shall be the Under Secretaries of Defense or their Principal Deputies, the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Principal Staff Assistants or their Principal Deputies who report directly to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries or Under Secretaries of the Military Departments or a Principal Staff Secretary.

DoD Instructions, Publications, and Administrative Instructions: Coordinating officials on these issuances may include any of the officials authorized to coordinate on a DoD Directive or any other official who is designated in writing to coordinate on such issuances by a Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy cited above.



Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 3000.cc
September 17, 2004

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities

References: (a) Section 113 of title 10, United States Code
(b) Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011, March 2004¹
(c) DoD Directive 5000.59, "DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Management,"
January 4, 1994

1. PURPOSE

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a), and the guidance and responsibilities assigned in reference (b), this Directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for planning, training, and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive:

2.1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Military Departments; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Combatant Commands; the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense; the Defense Agencies; the DoD Field Activities; and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter collectively referred to as the "DoD Components"). The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

2.2. Provides guidance on how DoD personnel and forces plan and operate, in concert with the Department of State, other Federal Agencies, coalition forces, and international and nongovernmental organizations, during the transition to and from hostilities to achieve U.S. goals and objectives.

2.3. This Directive supersedes any conflicting portions of other DoD issuances. Such instances shall be identified to the office of primary responsibility for this directive as listed at web site <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

¹ The SPG is classified SECRET/NOFORN. For access to the document contact the Director, Executive Services & Communications, refer to document control number OSD 75774-04.

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Transition to and from Hostilities. As used in this directive, this phrase means the activities over periods of time, which may be measured in years, before and after conflict, or during the turbulent periods after a state fails, conducted to assist in the restoration of stability, promotion of a productive economy, and establishment of representative governments in which minority rights are respected and protected. Achieving these ends could be made less challenging by shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities. These activities include, but are not limited to, stability operations, intelligence activities, and other activities such as strategic communication. These activities and capabilities may well enhance combat capabilities but are not designed for combat operations. Many of these capabilities and responsibilities may reside outside the Department of Defense. Accordingly, effective interfaces shall be established to bring these capabilities to bear on the problem at hand.

3.2. Strategic Communication. The employment of all elements of national information activities in an integrated and coordinated manner to inform or influence foreign or key audiences on the policies and interests of the U.S. Government. Strategic communication includes the activities of public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, defense support to public diplomacy, and information operations.

3.3. Stability Operations. Stability operations are military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability. These consist of global and regional military operations that establish, shape, maintain and refine relations with other nations. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving the US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. Stability operations help ensure unhindered access by the US and its allies to a global economy. These operations may include a wide array of tasks from combat operations, in order to remove isolated pockets of resistance, to peace enforcement, or security cooperation activities.

3.4. Stabilization. Efforts by the U.S. Government in coordination with coalition partners and other nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to create a secure and stable environment and to provide for the basic human needs of the population to include food, water, sanitation, and shelter.

3.5. Reconstruction. Efforts by the U.S. Government in coordination with coalition partners and other nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to create a stable and self-governing polity by establishing the rule of law, rehabilitating the economy, and otherwise improving the welfare of the people.

4. POLICY

4.1. Well developed capabilities to plan, coordinate, and conduct operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities are central and essential to implementing the Defense Strategy and achieving national security objectives. Accordingly, operations during

the transition to and from hostilities shall be explicitly addressed in DoD doctrine, education, training, exercises, and operational planning, and accorded priority and attention comparable to combat operations. These DoD efforts are part of a government-wide approach to the development of capabilities to transition to and from hostilities. The U.S. Government is institutionalizing long-term, rigorous, and sustained pan-government contingency planning and integration task forces to orchestrate the planning and execution of extended campaigns using multiple instruments of national power.

4.2. The capabilities of DoD Components, including active and reserve forces, special operations forces, and intelligence capabilities, to provide Service capabilities for joint and interagency operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities shall be measured by relevant metrics and reported and addressed in readiness reporting systems in the same manner as the readiness of DoD capabilities to conduct combat operations.

4.3. Intelligence activities, covert operations, and activities of special operations forces supporting the transition to and from hostilities shall be jointly planned, exercised, and overseen to assure that the capabilities of intelligence assets and special operations forces are harmonized, and are adequate in quantity, quality, geographic distribution and kind to ensure achieving national security objectives.

4.4. The development and fielding of technical collection systems to obtain the intelligence information required in the transition to and from hostilities shall be managed under a separate program with an operational focus sufficient to introduce these systems to the user community in the near term. This program shall field intrusive, close in, networked systems, such as tagging, tracking and locating (TTL) systems.

4.5. DoD intelligence efforts shall make maximum use of open sources. Data and communications architectures shall be designed to support and exploit information provided through open sources.

4.6. Foreign language skill and regional and cultural expertise are essential enabling capabilities for DoD activities and operations in the transition to and from hostilities. DoD programs for assessing, training, and promoting officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel shall be strengthened to ensure that DoD requirements in these skill areas are met the same as skills for combat operations.

4.7. Support shall be provided to the Department of State and other Federal departments and agencies to develop and enhance deliberate interagency planning skills and capabilities for the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Support shall include, but is not limited to, personnel, training, exercises, and analysis.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) shall:

5.1.1. Lead and coordinate DoD participation in, and support to, interagency deliberate planning processes and the development of interagency plans for activities and operations in the transition to and from hostilities.

5.1.1.1. Lead interagency effort to establish cross-government contingency planning and integration task forces focused on critical countries. This effort shall develop criteria for identifying countries or regions for which task forces are necessary and establish standard operating procedures for standing task forces.

5.1.1.2. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Regional Combatant Commanders, engage the Department of State and other federal agencies, coalition partners, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations at early and appropriate stages in the preparation of contingency plans.

5.1.1.3. Support the establishment and operation of the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (OSRO) at the Department of State and participation of OSRO in the planning and exercising of contingency plans.

5.1.2. Develop and oversee DoD policy for operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities, including peacetime activities and activities conducted during stabilization and reconstruction. DoD policy shall include planning and operations conducted with interagency and coalition organizations.

5.1.2.1. Serve as the DoD focal point for operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities and represent the Department of Defense on such matters with the National Security Council, the Department of State, other Federal agencies, State and local entities, foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.

5.1.2.2. Lead interagency effort with the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and other federal agencies to define functional responsibilities and capabilities (both current and planned) and develop procedures for execution during the different stages of the transition to and from hostilities.

5.1.2.3. Include guidance in the Defense Security Cooperation Guidance on the pre-conflict requirements for those countries and areas with the potential for U.S. military operations.

5.1.3. Advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on the adequacy of DoD capabilities to perform activities during the transition to and from hostilities, particularly in the critical areas of security, strategic communication, humanitarian affairs, and regional expertise including languages.

5.1.4. Develop and oversee policy for the implementation of DoD elements of strategic communication in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)).

5.1.4.1. Serve as the DoD focal point for strategic communication efforts, including defense support for public diplomacy, and represent the DoD on such matters with the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies.

5.1.4.2. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensure the military plans of the Combatant Commanders incorporate strategic communication components, including public affairs and defense support for public diplomacy.

5.1.5. Coordinate with the USD(I), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command to harmonize activities of Special Operations Forces and forces conducting covert operations or intelligence activities. In coordination with the USD(I), provide joint oversight of these activities.

5.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall:

5.2.1. Develop and oversee DoD intelligence policy and initiatives to support the transition to and from hostilities. Reform collection and analysis processes to incorporate open source information; transform all-source analysis including recruitment, training, and equipping; change intelligence procedures to include senior analytic personnel in both collection and classification decision making; and ensure that analysis is aligned with intelligence questions or problems.

5.2.1.1. Intelligence policy shall provide for nongovernmental and international organizations to have access, to the extent possible, to information that can facilitate their work, while still providing adequate protection to sensitive classified information and intelligence sources and methods.

5.2.1.2. Through the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency establish and sustain an enhanced capability to plan and execute open source analysis in support of all DoD Components. Separately identify funding for open source analysis activities in the Planning, Programming and Budget Execution process.

5.2.2. In coordination with the USD(P), provide joint oversight of Special Operations Forces and forces conducting covert operations or intelligence activities. Harmonize these activities in coordination with the USD(P), as stated in subparagraph 5.1.5.

5.2.3. Accelerate the transformation of Defense human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to provide sustained coverage and deep penetration of sufficient countries and regions to anticipate requirements and reduce the reliance on surging intelligence assets.

5.2.4. Establish and institutionalize a major program, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), for the development and fielding of technical collection systems to obtain the intelligence information required in the transition to and from hostilities. Among other capabilities, this program shall create a discipline of TTL, and to lead and manage DoD-wide efforts to develop and implement state-of-the-art TTL capabilities. The program shall include, but not be limited to, systems and collection analysis; prototyping, production, and deployment; counter-measures and counter-

intelligence; tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination and horizontal integration; and, research and development as needed. Identify DoD requirements for TTL targets of interest, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and others as appropriate.

5.2.5. Support the development, exercising, and red-teaming of intelligence campaign plans by the Combatant Commanders; and ensure that the intelligence campaign plans are properly resourced and directed to provide the information required to inform the Regional Combatant Commanders' portfolio of contingency operational plans. Direct the DoD elements of the Intelligence Community to prepare and maintain a portfolio of contingency intelligence campaign plans to support operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.2.6. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, ensure that intelligence career paths are adjusted to attract and keep in productive service the increasing quantity and quality of intelligence personnel that today's modern warfare demands not only during phases of intense combat, but especially in the transitions to and from combat, and in support of stability and reconstruction objectives. Intelligence career paths shall provide incentives for skilled personnel to develop and maintain deep and current expertise in specialized areas of importance for achieving national security objectives.

5.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) shall:

5.3.1. Identify and monitor, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(P), the USD(I), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders, DoD-wide requirements for foreign language speakers and personnel with regional and cultural expertise, including requirements for foreign area officer and enlisted specialists. Develop metrics to evaluate and report individual and unit capabilities and readiness in these skills. Ensure that the portfolio of skills available to the Combatant Commanders conform to the needs of the portfolio of contingency operational plans and intelligence campaign plans.

5.3.2. Reform curricula at senior service schools, service academies, ROTC programs, advanced officer and enlisted education programs to include foreign language education and regional area expertise, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.3.3. Expand opportunities for officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel to participate in regional and cultural education programs, including resident or on-line studies and exchange programs. Establish programs to maintain proficiency in regional and cultural affairs and language skills.

5.3.4. Expand opportunities, in coordination with the USD(P), the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for personnel from other Federal agencies to attend DoD schools to receive training in the deliberate decision-making and planning process and the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

5.3.5. Reform curricula at senior service schools and advanced officer and enlisted education programs, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to include preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations in the transition to and from hostilities. Curricula shall include operations in the interagency and coalition environments.

5.4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall:

5.4.1. Establish research, development, and acquisition programs to support DoD-wide capabilities to transition to and from hostilities. Give priority to technologies that enhance capabilities for tagging, tracking, and locating targets of interest; and force-multiplying technologies such as language translation devices and programs that facilitate operating in foreign cultures.

5.4.2. Revise acquisition processes to enable science and technology capabilities to be exploited rapidly and coherently in current operations.

5.4.3. Address modeling and simulation requirements for activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities identified by the Commander, Joint Forces Command, in accordance with reference (c).

5.4.4. Through the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, address requirements related to the activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities in the Defense Science and Technology planning process. Incorporate appropriate needs in the Defense Technology Area Plan and the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan and other planning documents. Support related Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).

5.4.5. Strengthen capabilities for contracting support for activities needed during the transition to and from hostilities. Capabilities shall include immediate response and diligent oversight.

5.5. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall:

5.5.1. Separately identify funds and resources required to support activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process.

5.5.2. Streamline and institutionalize procedures to enable the prompt disbursement and accountability of currency by local commanders in foreign countries in support of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on implementing public affairs elements of strategic communication programs and initiatives. Assist the USD(P) and the Regional Combatant Commanders in maximizing the effect of these critical communication capabilities.

5.7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network Information and Integration shall acquire sufficient communications capabilities to support all aspects of the transition to and from hostilities.

5.8. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

5.8.1. Reshape forces to provide stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. These forces shall achieve the following standards:

5.8.1.1. Actively train, practice, exercise, and rehearse.

5.8.1.2. Regularly evaluate readiness and validate plans.

5.8.1.3. Available on short notice.

5.8.1.4. Establish continuity in theater.

5.8.1.5. Capable of supporting multiple concurrent cumulative operations.

5.8.1.6. Capable of operating in a range of cultures and languages.

5.8.1.7. Capable of responding to an adaptive enemy.

5.8.1.8. Participate in an active experimentation program.

5.8.2. Strengthen and maintain programs for Foreign Area Officers and Enlisted Regional Specialists to support activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.8.3. Expand foreign language training programs to meet DoD-wide requirements for Active and Reserve Component personnel proficient in foreign languages, including personnel who would deploy with units.

5.8.4. Revise curricula in individual and unit training programs and senior service schools to meet requirements for the range of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities, in coordination with the USD(P&R), the USD(P), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.8.5. In coordination with USD(P), support approved interagency requirements for personnel or assistance, as directed by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, to develop and enhance deliberate interagency planning skills and capabilities for the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

5.8.6. Appoint a senior officer from each Military Service to lead and advocate stabilization and reconstruction initiatives.

5.9. The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy shall organize, train, and equip Army and Marine Corps Active and Reserve Components forces to conduct operations during the transition to and from hostilities. In consultation with the Commander, Joint Forces Command, explore and exercise innovative organizational constructs, e.g., modular units that combine personnel with a range of skills that support operations during the transition to and from hostilities. Stabilization and reconstruction operations will require support from combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities.

5.10. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.10.1. In coordination with the USD(P), determine the type and number of forces and other force requirements necessary for pre-hostilities, stabilization, and reconstruction.

5.10.2. Develop metrics, in coordination with the USD(P), to report the readiness of forces to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations in coordination with the Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of the Military Services.

5.10.3. Establish a program at the National Defense University to teach deliberate planning skills in the interagency environment. The program shall enlist personnel from DoD and other federal departments and agencies and shall teach planning for the range of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.10.4. Implement the policies and responsibilities as specified herein and facilitate the Commanders of the Regional Combatant Commands in the implementation their responsibilities.

5.11. The Commanders of the Regional Combatant Commands shall:

5.11.1. Develop and maintain contingency operational campaign plans spanning the transition to and from hostilities, including activities and operation during peacetime, stabilization, and reconstruction, for their respective areas of operation. These operational campaign plans shall be supported by intelligence campaign plans that include realistic collection and exploitation plans for the timely delivery of actionable information, and metrics that enable the intelligence plans to be exercised and their readiness evaluated. Campaign plans shall also include appropriate of strategic communication elements and shall be coordinated with the respective Chiefs of Mission.

5.11.2. Designate the Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander as the Joint Commander for stabilization and initial reconstruction operations. This commander shall be responsible for detailed planning, exercises, and execution of stabilization operations.

5.11.3. Establish offices for regional expertise outreach to support country and regional planning and operations. These offices shall work closely with Country Teams, Directors of the Regional Centers for Security Studies, U.S. and foreign academia, think tanks and other centers of expertise, and involve experts in ongoing activities, as appropriate.

5.12. The Commander, Joint Forces Command shall:

5.12.1. Develop and publish joint doctrine for stabilization and reconstruction operations during the transition to and from hostilities. Use simulation techniques where appropriate to meet training objectives.

5.12.2. Identify required modeling and simulation capabilities and issues to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with DoD Directive 5000.59 (reference (c)).

5.12.3. Participate, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Defense Science and Technology planning process to ensure requirements for stabilization and reconstruction operations during the transition to and from hostilities are supported by Defense Technology Objectives and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). Recommend sponsors for ACTDs as appropriate.

Davis. Rose CIV WHS/ESD

From: Munson, Mark, CIV, OSD-ODA&M
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 3:49 PM
To: Davis, Rose CIV WHS/ESD
CC: Meiners, Regina, CIV, OSD-ODA&M; Wooten, Broderick, SSG, OSD-ODA&M
Subject: Action Package 15666-04 on Elevating DoD Executive Issues

Importance: High

Ms. Davis:

You can close that action out. Mr. DuBois was directly and personally involved in that action and it was active from May 2004 into early January 2005. However, O&MP as the lead office for the initiative working it on behalf of the DA&M was never able to reach closure. In discussions with us in January, Mr. DuBois indicated that it was dead. Sorry we didn't think to engage ESD pro-actively to close it out. Since we had worked hard on the effort and thought it had a lot of merit, perhaps we hoped it would begin breathing again. In any case, close it out.

Thank you.

Mark Munson
O&MP/ODA&M Staff
(b)(6)

310.1

-----Original Message-----

From: Davis, Rose CIV WHS/ESD
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 3:43 PM
To: Munson, Mark, CIV, OSD-ODA&M
Subject: Action Package 15666-04

Mr. Munson,
Can you tell me if the package you prepared, "Elevating DoD Executive Issues, dated 10/07/04 still open? I am reviewing open signature packages.

Thank You
Rosemary Davis
WHS/ESD
(b)(6)

OSD 15666-04

70504

ACTION MEMO

SECRET
2004 OCT 17 17

October 7, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Elevating DoD Executive Issues

- In the attached snowflake, you directed us to: "... find out what the Air Force system is to elevate issues. Then come up with a proposal as to how we can implement that throughout the entire Department." After significant vetting and some modifications to my original proposal, I have reached agreement with your closest advisors.
- Accordingly, I recommend the establishment of a DoD Executive Issues Management Team as a standing organization led by a political appointee (e.g., Dick McGraw) as the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management (SA-EIM). The team shall have an O-6 who serves as the SA-EIM's deputy and as a special assistant to the Chairman for joint issues. Three O-5s will form the main body of the team, along with one administrative assistant. The SA-EIM will have a seat at The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting. For day-to-day matters, he will report to The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense; however, when the urgency of an issue dictates, he has the authority to report it directly to you and the Deputy. This process does not replace current arrangements, including sensitive-information exchanges within the senior political team.
- When an issue is raised by the SA-EIM that requires attention, it will be addressed in The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting. When Joint issues are involved, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or his designee will be invited to participate. If a special Crisis Action Team is required, it will be stood-up as appropriate.
- Six months after stand-up, we will formally review the structure and process, evaluate its effectiveness, and determine whether or not any modifications need to be made—to include disestablishment of the team. A charter for the team and process is provided at TAB A.

COORDINATION: Coordination with William Haynes, Powell Moore, Larry Di Rita, Paul Butler, Pete Geren, Dave Patterson, Mike Maples, and Dick McGraw is reflected at TAB B.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve this proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Attachments: As stated

OSD 15666-04

Prepared by: Mark A. Munson, Sr., (b)(6)
11-L-0559/OSD/037333

A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE ISSUES MANAGEMENT TEAM

1. PURPOSE

This Charter establishes the mission, organization, membership, and functions of the Department of Defense Executive Issues Management Team (DoD EIMT).

2. APPLICABILITY

This Charter applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as “the DoD Components”). This Charter shall also apply to the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense unless the Inspector General of the Department of Defense has decided that an executive issue raises a conflict of interest with Inspector General activities.

3. MISSION

The mission of the DoD EIMT is to bring a more focused, reliable, and disciplined approach in elevating executive issues to the attention of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

4. DEFINITION

An executive issue includes, but is not limited to, an incident, event, or problem at any level within the Department that could have a negative impact on the Department because of its sensitivity or egregious nature. For purposes herein, an executive issue is reported without solutions or options accompanying the report of the issue.

5. ORGANIZATION, MEMBERSHIP, AND STAFF

5.1. The DoD EIMT shall be composed of 6 members:

5.1.1. Led by a full-time Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, who shall be a senior non-career appointee, responsible for the ongoing collection, continuing review, comprehensive evaluation, and timely disposition of information on emerging, highly visible, and consequential executive issues of interest to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

5.1.2. A senior officer in the grade of O-6 shall serve in a dual capacity as the Deputy to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management and as a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Executive Issues Management.

5.1.3. A permanent, full-time team, which consists of three military officers at the grade of O-5, one each from the Army, Navy/Marine *Corps*, and Air Force shall conduct the information gathering, analysis, and reporting. At least one team member shall be an expert on Information Technology and shall be responsible for maximizing the use of data-mining software as an aid in identifying emerging issues. Administrative assistance shall be provided by an appropriate out-sourced contractor.

5.2. The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting will be the forum for the elevation of relevant executive issues identified by the DoD EIMT and shall oversee the executive issues process.

5.3. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense will convene a Crisis Action Team when an issue of great magnitude has emerged that requires close attention and prompt action by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. The Crisis Action Team, composed of appropriately assigned members from across the Department, shall meet until the situation has been resolved.

6. FUNCTIONS

6.1. The DoD EIMT, under the day-to-day management and oversight of the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, shall:

6.1.1. Scan all sources, including domestic and foreign media and DoD channels, with a 360-degree method of operation using a variety of tools, techniques, and processes.

6.1.2. Assemble and organize information that is accurate, factual, timely, and compelling.

6.1.3. Identify leading indicators for early warning.

6.1.4. Submit issues and reports, as required, to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense through The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, when the urgency of an issue dictates, the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management has the authority to immediately report it directly the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, in coordination with The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.5. Have access to all meetings, as appropriate, to further inform the process.

6.1.6. Provide follow-up assessments, in coordination with The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, as needed, on previously reported items.

6.1.7. The DoD EIMT shall NOT replace or supplant existing reporting arrangements and relationships between the:

6.1.7.1. Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.7.1. OSD Principal Staff Assistants and the Heads of DoD Components who report directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.7.2. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.2. The OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) who report directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense shall submit a copy of their Weekly Activity Reports on Thursday of each week to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management.

6.3. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

6.3.1. Provide information to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, when appropriate, or promptly upon request.

6.3.2. Take action to encourage commanders or executives in the field to identify and report emerging or potential problems.

6.3.3. Promptly elevate issues to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management to serve as an early warning to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense that a problem has been identified with real or potential DoD-wide ramifications.

6.4. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy secretary of Defense shall invite the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or his designee, as appropriate, to The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting when executive issues are on the agenda.

7. ADMINISTRATION

7.1. A weekly summary report of executive issues shall be submitted to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense via The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

7.2. The Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management shall:

7.2.1. Be nominated by the DA&M and selected by the Secretary of Defense.

7.2.2. Report to The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for day-to-day matters.

7.2.3. Assemble and prepare reports/issues for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall keep the members of The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting apprised of activities appropriately.

7.2.4. Monitor the progress of follow-on actions and issues.

7.2.5. Maintain and safeguard records and ensure their appropriate disposition when they are no longer required in active files.

7.2.6. Be a member of The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting.

7.2.7. Meet with the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or the Vice Director's designee, when necessary, to ensure that Joint and Combatant Command issues are being identified and addressed.

7.3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall nominate three candidates for their respective officer positions at the 0-5 level to serve on the Executive Issues Management Team. (The Secretary of the Navy may nominate a mix of Naval and Marine Corps officers for the Navy billet.)

7.4. The Director, Washington Headquarters Services, shall provide personnel resources and such other technical, administrative, and logistical support to the DoD EIMT, which shall be located in the Pentagon.

7.5. Six months after Secretary of Defense approval to stand up the DoD EIMT and the associated executive issues process, the DA&M shall lead a formal review of the structure and process and determine its effectiveness providing recommendations for modifications or continuance.

8. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Charter is effective immediately.

B

LIST OF COORDINATING OFFICIALS
Department of Defense Executive Issues Team

October 7, 2004

Official & Position	Coordinating Date	Status
LARRY DI RITA	September 24, 2004	Substantive comments on linkage with the Joint Staff regarding Joint/Combatant Command executive issues; met w/ Mr. DuBois on 9/27; comments accepted and accommodated
POWELL MOORE	September 17, 2004	Concur
WILLIAM HAYNES	September 17, 2004	Concur w/ comments; accepted and incorporated
MG MIKE MAPLES	September 8, 2004	Concur
PAUL BUTLER		Awaiting resolution of issues identified by Di Rita and Geren.
DAVE PATTERSON	September 22, 2004	Concur
PETE GEREN	September 21, 2004	Concur w/ comments (concerned about using the Geren-Maples Group in an oversight role, since the Geren-Maples Group is not a permanently established entity and was convened to address detainee issues only); met w/ Mr. DuBois 9/21 to discuss; comments accepted and accommodated
DICK McGRAW	September 14, 2004	Concur

file

May 20, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Elevating Issues

Please talk to Jim Roche and find out what the Air Force system is to elevate issues.

Then come up with a proposal as to how we can implement that throughout the entire Department. I would like a first cut at it done within the next four days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-24

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

SIR,
Response attached.

v/r
LT Col Lengyel

9/13

11-L-0559/OSD/037341

OSD 15666-04

05
11

2004
05
11

October 8, 2004

TO: GEN Doug Brown
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Special Operations Retention Initiatives

We had an interesting discussion yesterday about the need for innovative approaches in dealing with the retention of our special operations personnel.

340

Please develop new ideas along the lines we discussed, including an assessment of whether it makes sense to give our folks flexibility to go off active duty for a period to time. We need to knock down any bureaucratic barriers that stand in the way of what makes sense and provides the best overall retention rates.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100804-15

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

OSD 15680-04

50408



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO



November 23, 2004, 4:14 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: *David S. C. Chu a doc of*
~~Special~~ Operations Retention Initiatives — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- We are working General Brown's incentive proposals for Special Operations Forces (SOF) with the Services.
- All Services agree on increasing targeted retention bonuses for SOF war fighters.
 - These will be set to achieve optimal retention levels.
 - We will seek to minimize unintended effects on other specialties and personnel.
- We are exploring all flexibilities for Service members, including special operations personnel, to leave active duty for a period of time and return.
 - A recent law change aids the seamless transition for members to and from the Reserves and active duty.
- After a review of the special operations retention analysis and incentives next week, I expect to issue instructions to the Services to initiate a robust incentives program for special operations personnel beginning on January 1, 2005.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: C. Witschonke,

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/037343

OSD 15680-04

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=FEB-23 01:29

END=FEB-23 01:30

FILE NO.=480

STN NO.	COMM.	RBBR NO.	STATION NAME/TEL NO.	PAGES	DURATION
001	OK	2	(b)(6)	001/001	00:00:18

***** - ***** - *****
- - -

October 8, 2004 ✓

TO: GEN Doug Brown
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Operations Retention Initiatives

We had an interesting discussion yesterday about the need for innovative approaches in dealing with the retention of our special operations personnel.

Please develop new ideas along the lines we discussed, including an assessment of whether it makes sense to give our folks flexibility to go off active duty for a period to time. We need to knock down any bureaucratic barriers that stand in the way of what makes sense and provides the best overall retention rates.

Thanks.

DHR:s
100804-15

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

(Signature)

CDR's PFor SECDEF SOF Retention

1. Sir, thank you for your support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) retention initiatives. I believe the quickest and most effective retention action we can take is to get approval for our current proposal offering targeted retention bonuses to our SOF operators. We are near the finish line with this proposal, and I am requesting you approve it. We will continue to work with the OSD staff to secure funding.

2. Additionally, we are offering our troops and their families educational incentives. We inaugurated our Enlightened Warrior program which will provide "SOF-friendly" degree programs available on-line through four nationally accredited universities. We have also partnered with the University of South Florida to enable SOF personnel who are within a year of completing their undergraduate degrees the opportunity to transfer as full-time students.

3. We will also pursue additional authorities, not currently legislated under USC Title 10, to enable our headquarters to actively engage in personnel force management. The current language allows us to monitor our force, but we need authorities to actively manage our force.

4. Regarding short-term breaks in service, I am interested in the idea of sabbaticals for our troops. Our staff is researching alternatives and developing options.

5. I appreciate your active engagement in SOF retention issues. We will do what makes sense to provide the best overall retention rates.

6. Respectfully, Doug

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PIA*
SUBJECT: Shooting Down of Aircraft

2004 OCT 12 PM 1:13

GROUP OF TWO
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

010

If we did shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all that?

Please look into it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-12

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

20 Seroy

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15800-04



GENERAL COUNSEL


GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFORMATION MEMO

2011 OCT 12 PM 1:12

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: DoD Claims Process After Shooting Down an Aircraft

- This replies to your request, "If we shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all this?" We do know what our legal authorities are.
- The United States is not compelled to pay compensation unless Congress and the President have waived sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a traditional legal principle that states that a government is immune from suit unless the government consents. In the United States, we consent by statute.
- The United States has not waived sovereign immunity for combat activities. The shooting down of an airliner by the military in defense of the United States is a combat activity. Therefore, there is no statutory authority to pay compensation after shooting down an aircraft in defense of the United States.
- In such cases, two principal options are available if the President determines that compensation should be paid. One is to use emergency and extraordinary expense funds to pay compensation. We used this option when we mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Kosovo. The other is to obtain specific statutory authority to pay compensation. We used this option after 9/11.
- When statutes authorize the United States to pay Compensation for combat activities, the Military Departments investigate, adjudicate and settle claims worldwide. We have a very large, efficient and effective claims system. In some cases if a claim is not settled to the satisfaction of the claimant, the claimant may sue the United States.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoDOGC (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/037347

OSD 15800-04

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Shooting Down of Aircraft

2004 OCT 12 PM 1:11

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

If we did shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all that?

Please **look** into it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-12

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15800-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037348

June 8, 2004

TO: General Mike Hagee

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Rotation Plan

I note we are going to be meeting on Thursday.

I also understand you are going to come up and defend the 7-month rotation, as opposed to a 12-month rotation.

I would like you to be prepared to make a presentation as to how you would do a 12-month rotation if, in fact, we decide that it is necessary to get the Marines into the same rhythm as the Army. Currently, a disconnect occurs when you cannot replace each Marine with another Marine, and we end up having to bring in Army units to replace Marines. It causes a disjointed effect in the rotations.

Therefore, I would like to see your best approach as to how you would do it and what other adjustments you would make, if we asked the Marines to start using 12 months.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-23

.....
Please respond by

6/10/04

OSD 15850-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037349

320.2

8 Jun 04

TO: Mira Ricardel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*
DATE: June 2, 2004
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Are you positive that the State Dept. is not going to certify Uzbekistan? If that is so, we've got to get to work on it. Get Paul Wolfowitz to talk to Hadley, and draft a memo from me to Secretary Powell and a memo to me for my POTUS file that I want to talk to the President about Uzbekistan.

Thanks.

DHR/azm
060204.04ts

Please respond by: _____

G | 8

OSD 15851-04


11-L-0559/OSD/037350

UZBEKISTAN

274004

TO: Larry Lanzilotta
Ken Krieg

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: DoD Budget

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. I think it is an idea worth exploring.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604A.01ts

Attach: Gingrich email 11/23/03

Please respond by: 6/21

OSD 15852-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037351

110.01

270404

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:33 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: longterm help for the dod budget

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt 11/23/03


longterm room for the dod budget

you should take the non military functions of retirement and medical care and see if the President would be willing to move them to Veterans Affairs.

In the long run if these numbers are going to grow in an uncontrollable way you should look at getting them out of your line and into another line.

the current system makes the defense budget look bigger than it really is in defense terms.

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

Take a look at this paper that you got a copy of originally and let's discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604F,01ts

Attach: Thoughts and Ideas 12/1/03

Please respond by: 6/20

OSD 15854-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037353

33350

674404

12/1/03
For: DR
CC: DiRita
12/1/2003
Thoughts and Ideas

cc: L. DiRita

Bingo— On the Thanksgiving visit,

There were some interesting articles this week in the WSJ suggesting the Bush WH is committed to 'going over the heads' of the news media to get their message directly to the people. One or two compared it to Nixon and Reagan efforts in a similar vein. Of course, we agree completely—but would urge them to figure out ways to & it rather than set off a media reaction by saying they are going to do it. The preannouncement of PR activity is always a mistake,

Spotted

To break the news concentration in Baghdad, they might consider rotating briefings among several cities. After all, the reporters are sort of captive to the US Gov't for information. If such information is offered in cities outside the Sunni triangle, they will have to follow (and may see interesting stories along the way).

The single most effective manner of communication is to provide the public with access, on something of a regular basis, to the handful of Bush Administration spokesmen with a high degree of credibility (certainly including Rumsfeld, Powell, Cheney, Rice and Wolfowitz—but there could well be others),

The most popular and effective broadcasts during the war were the daily DOD briefings by Rumsfeld and Meyers. [The Tuesday --- November 25, 2003 Pentagon briefing underlined it again.] They were carried live and rebroadcast in the evenings. No one really cared to hear Dan Rather's interpretation of what Rumsfeld had said if they could get the information directly from the source. We need to duplicate this opportunity, perhaps on a weekly basis, in a predictable time slot accessible to the public (without appearing to dictate it!). Essentially, the Administration would be bypassing the middleman in one avenue of news delivery.

DW

Have a joint briefing every other week with Bremer from Iraq and DR / General Meyer live from the Pentagon. Bremer needs visuals (for pictures). Do it at 8 PM and capture the cable networks live.

For: DR
CC: DiRita
12/1/2003
Thoughts and Ideas

At the White House Fellows annual meeting, the **most** popular panel by far **was** a wide ranging conversation between Justices Scalia and Beyer, lightly moderated by a 10th Circuit **judge** who was a former **Fellow**. Apparently this **also** had been done at a 10th Circuit **judicial** retreat and was **equally** popular. *It was the interplay between the two justices that was so informative.*

It is true that something like this happens each Sunday on the morning talk shows (detailed time with a top Administration spokesman without too much moderation), but it's an awkward time slot for **most** of the viewing public,

Consider instead making *two* of our **list** [Rumsfeld, Powell, Cheney, Rice and Wolfowitz-- but there could well be other] available on a **regular** weekly **basis**, perhaps for C-span, **so** that viewers would have a predictable evening **time slot** to tune in. Rather than a press conference or some other format, **it would** be the conversational interplay between them that would be the attraction--and **give** the Administration the opportunity to present its **case** directly to the viewing public in a low **key** manner. It would even help **disarm** gossip about feuds, **personalize** our heroes, and accomplish **all sorts** of good **works**.

3

Gimmicks **like** the Deck of Iraqi **Cards** **are** tough and can be dangerous, but there must be some way to quantify (**chart**) peaceful progress in reopening **schools**, restoring electrical power, etc. Remember the Misery **Index**? **We** should coming up with a Freedom Index or a Normalcy Index.

7

The **most** promising Iraqi improvement **is** the flow of their oil. Remember, **it was** supposed to **pay** for much of their recovery. Perhaps **we** could chart that and show how that money **is** flowing back into security and **social** improvements.

401.

Rummy and **his boss** are both branded **as** gunslingers that have no concern for the families of the **soldiers** who have given their life. I know this **is** not true but the reputation **is** widespread. Even my hard-line wife **has** doubts.

I suggest an event where **both** the President and Don **can show** genuine concern might help a lot, even if the opponents and **pundits** of the east greet it cynically. Then it must be followed up in some meaningful way---- over **and** over again.

44

For: DR
CC: DiRita
12/1/2003
Thoughts and Ideas

Bush should do a David Frost **like** interview in the US before Christmas or between Christmas and New Year's. He can either do a major network or all the cable anchors (Hume, Williams, Browne and maybe CNBC). Bush's core character and empathy will emerge. He can talk about the success of Iraq—the sacrifice—and restate his determination.

A joint Bush, Rumsfeld, Powell press conference or prime time conversation would be dramatic. Critics would argue the President should not share the stage with others—that it somehow demeans the office of President. But, wouldn't this be "Bush like"? He has the confidence to have the others with him—he runs the show, takes the lead.

One suggestion **was** mooted **somewhat** by the President's trip to **the** families of fallen **soldiers** in **Colorado** three **days** ago. [*And the Thanksgiving trip.*] **The idea was** for **DR** and the President (**and** their wives?) to **make** a much more concerted effort to visit with **and express** gratitude to the *families of those who have lost sons and* daughters in Iraq **and** to those soldiers who have **been wounded**. **RN** was **always** very conscious of the troops, their sacrifices, **and** did **all** he **could** to support them and express appreciation to them, **RN's** trip to visit the troops in Vietnam **and** the homecoming event at The White **House** for the American POWs remain in my mind **as two** of the great events in **RN's** presidency. President Bush and **DR** need a **sustained** effort to **show** their fatherly **sides**, not **just** their warrior sides. Gratitude **is** a powerful force to **inspire** continued sacrifice.

7

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Ivy Football Assn. Dinner NYC

Can you check the calendar to determine when the State of the union might be and whether there is any reason to believe that Jan. 27, 2005 is a problem.

Then get this back to me so I can make a final decision in the next month.

What are your thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604B.02ts

Attach: Invitation/Hoover 1/27/05 Ivy Dinner @ NYC

Please respond by: 6/20

OSD 15855-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037357

001.15D

6JUN04




GEORGE P. SHULTZ
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW

VIA FACSIMILE
(b)(6)

HOOPER INSTITUTION

ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE



May 10, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Don,

It is my pleasure to inform you that you have been selected as Princeton University's honoree for the Ivy Football Association dinner at The Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York on January 27, 2005. It was my honor to represent Princeton at the 2003 event, and on behalf of the Princeton Football Association, I invite you to accept this honor.

The Ivy Football Association promotes and celebrates Ivy League football. It is composed of the Ivy League football alumni associations, and it has a strong Princeton connection. Stanislaw Maliszewski, '66, founded the organization, and its current president is Cosmo Iacavazzi, '65.

The purpose of the January 27 dinner is to recognize one distinguished alumnus from each of the eight Ivy League universities who has played football, but more importantly, has distinguished himself in his chosen career. The dinner is held bi-annually, and the 2001 and 2003 dinners were huge successes. In fact, in 2003 the event had to be moved to the Waldorf Astoria from The Pierre Hotel in order to accommodate the greatly expanded guest list. At least 1100 guests are expected for the 2005 dinner.

For the first time, a portion of the proceeds of the 2005 event will help to fund the National Football Foundation and Hall of Fame's "Play it Smart Program." This program assists inner city kids by encouraging them to learn from football experiences.

The master of ceremonies will be Jack Ford, Yale, '72 (a fine defensive back), who did an outstanding job of emceeing the dinners in 2001 and 2003. Jack formerly reported for ABC News' Good Morning America, anchored his own ESPN show, Sports Reporter II, hosted NBC's Today Show, and currently co-hosts a syndicated morning talk show. Jack will introduce the honorees, and each will address the audience for about five minutes.

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
May 10, 2004
Page Two

If Joyce **would** like to accompany you, the Ivy Football Association **would** be pleased to include her **as** their guest. Charlotte joined me and **had** a thoroughly **enjoyable time**.

The audience will consist primarily of **individuals** who have played football at the eight **Ivy League** schools **and their** spouses. Of course, you **may** talk about **anything** you like, but **I'm** sure the **audience** would be interested in hearing **how playing** football for Princeton influenced your development and how it may have contributed to **your success**.

All of the Ivy League **athletic** directors **and** head football coaches will attend the dinner, **and the Ivy Football Association** plans to invite **the** university presidents **as** well. The evening **is** a wonderful way to celebrate **and** promote Ivy League football, **as** well as to encourage cooperation **and** cohesion **among the** eight **institutions**.

You will be joined at **this** event by a distinguished group. **At this** point, William V. Campbell, **Chairman** of Intuit, Inc., will be Columbia's honoree; Jeffrey R. Immelt, **Chairman** and **CEO** of General Electric, will be Dartmouth's choice; and Charles B. Johnson, **Chairman** and **CEO** of **Franklin** Templeton Investments, will **represent** Yale. You will be **notified** of the other **four** honorees as they become **known**. I have attached lists of those **who** were honored at the first two dinners.

I encourage **you to** accept **this** honor **and** enjoy **a** memorable evening with many of your **friends**.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz

Attachments

The Ivy Football Association Dinner

Thursday, January 25, 2001

***The Pierre Hotel
New York City***

***Honorary Chairman, Governor George E. Pataki,
Master of Ceremonies, Jack Ford of ABC News***

Honoring:

**JOE PATERNO
Head Football Coach
Penn State University
(Brown '50)**

**RUSSELL F. WARREN, M.D.
Surgeon and Chief, New York Hospital for Special Surgery
(Columbia '62)**

**RICHARD B. LOYND
Chairman of the Executive Committee
Furniture Brands International
(Cornell '50)**

**WILLIAM H. KING, Jr.
Partner, McGuire Woods
(Dartmouth '63)**

**DANNY M. JIGGETTS
Sportscaster, Fox Network
(Harvard '76)**

**JAMES S. RIEPE
Vice Chairman, T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.
(Pennsylvania '65)**

**JOHN F. MCGILLICUDDY
Former Chairman and CEO, Chemical Banking Corporation
(Princeton '52)**

**KURT L. SCHMOKE
Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
(former Mayor of Baltimore, Maryland)
(Yale '71)**

The Ivy Football Association Dinner

*Wednesday, January 22, 2003
The Waldorf-Astoria Grand Ballroom
New York City*

*Governor George E. Pataki, Honorary Chairperson
Master of Ceremonies, Jack Ford of ESPN, Yale '72*

HONORING

PAUL J. CHOQUETTE, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Gilbane Building Company
BROWN '60

ALLISON F. BUTTS
Chief Executive Officer
Next Wave, LLC
COLUMBIA '64

CHARLES F. KNIGHT
Chairman
Emerson
CORNELL '57

HENRY M. PAULSON, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
DARTMOUTH '68

TOMMY LEE JONES
Academy Award Winning Actor
HARVARD '69

DAVID S. POTTRUCK
President and Co-Chief Executive Officer
Charles Schwab Corporation
PENNSYLVANIA '70

GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Former Secretary of State
Reagan Administration
PRINCETON '42

KENNETH L. WOLFE
Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Hershey Foods Corporation
YALE '61

TO: Hon. Melvin Laird

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

I just once again reread your February 11th memo and found it helpful. If you have other thoughts and suggestions as we go along, please do let me have them.

Thanks, my friend.

DHR/azn
060604F.02ts

OSD 15856-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037362

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(b)(6)

February 11, 2004

Personal and Confidential

Dear Rummy:

You **asked** me to be frank on how things are going - thought I would cover **several** items off the top of my head **and** send **them** to you on the private **fax** number you provided me.

All-Volunteer Total Force Planning

Thanks for putting me in touch with General Schoomaker. I believe my suggestions on the Reserve and Guard were as helpful to him **as** his suggestions were to me. Evidently, the General's recent study shows the preferred length of service for Guard **and** Reserves to be one full year for emergencies in a four-year period. When Dave Packard and I looked at it in connection with the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force Concept, eight months **was** the call-up period in emergencies in every two-year period as needed. Things have changed, but it is still within a few months. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves **are** somewhat different in several respects, which we discussed in detail. The Guard, Army Reserves, **and** Marine Reserves, to some extent, have not done **as** well **as** planned in restructuring. When I took over **as** Postmaster General **during** the Postal strike, we had a few non-regular units ready to be helpful. Thankfully, the strike did not last long. Not only were we short of Postal and Communications Reserve units, but also we were dreadfully short of police, fire, government infrastructure units, etc. These types of units do not have a great deal of appeal to the **Army** Reserves or Guard for regular or summer training exercises, but **are** the type of duty which can be supplied best in times of crisis. Anyway, we had a good visit and I **am** glad you are getting the message across to our friends on Capitol Hill through your briefing at lunch a week ago Monday.

Air National Guard

The President's record of volunteering for the Air National Guard is available to **you**. This was a question discussed in a Public Affairs briefing when I was in the Pentagon. **Bush's** service in **Texas**, transfer to Alabama, and subsequent request to attend graduate school were all reviewed **after** receiving **an** inquiry. His record, which ended in **an** Honorable Discharge, should be officially disclosed. Public disclosure and transparency are the best policy. As I remember the record, **Bush** certainly did not desert; he did not go to **Canada**; but rather, he volunteered, served, and **then** requested **an** early **out** to attend graduate school. **Many** young people, in and out of military service, requested **an** early out or deferment for higher education up until the time we ended college deferments in the Nixon Administration, went to the lottery system **and** established

11-L-0559/OSD/037363

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
February 11, 2004
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the All-Volunteer Force. Do not let anyone make this an issue to divide the military and veteran votes in November. You have the record, dates, etc.

Iraq Briefing

You were somewhat upset with me for walking out of the briefing last year on the Middle East situation. I hope you have gotten over it. The briefing was so formalized there was no opportunity to raise questions or make suggestions, only listen. Noone is required to follow **anything** we old timers say, but sometimes it does not hurt to listen. Some of us have listened to Defense Department briefings for years on the Defense Appropriations Committee – we learned a great deal of the pitfalls, all the way from Engine Charlie to seven years of the light at the end of the tunnel with McNamara.

Having spent some time in the Middle East, all the way **from** Turkey to Afghanistan; **Pakistan** to Iraq, and everywhere else, the briefers and your Deputy seemed to have no idea of the politics of the area. Even when I visited **Iraq** for the first time in **1953**, as one of the youngest members of the House Appropriations Committee, the political and economic situation was quite clear. After our successful mission to save Kuwait and our failure to guarantee our friends in the North and the Shiites **any** degree of safety before we pulled out, the inevitable of our present problem should have been obvious. By giving the idea that it would be a cakewalk this time after we failed them the last **time**, was disturbing. My comments to you were honest **as** I thought the briefing was not based on any degree of realism or **firm** intelligence. The Defense Department should always present a guarded picture of all its proposed combat operations. **As** I told you in your first week in office, you can believe the third assessment report on any operation if they concur with the first two – and even then you can be disappointed.

Intelligence Failures

Rummy, you will remember my admonition in your office in February 2001 as you just took office – appoint your own men and women to top intelligence posts. You can change most of these jobs yourself – I listened to these agencies for many years. I got a great deal of grief for changing DoD top positions, but you cannot believe the difference it made. The big three in intelligence usually spend most of their time confirming past reports. The Community would not even confirm the fact that Russians were conducting MLRV tests in **1968** when we had electronic test verification, which had not been presented first **by them**. The President will not win politically by defending his choice of a holdover CIA Director even if he is a good friend. The Director is in the past and the President could “die on his sword” in the future. **You** will recall that Kennedy fired Dulles very quickly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Dulles read about his departure in the newspaper. I served on the Intelligence Committee in Congress when it **was** truly “secret” and appointed by the Speaker with only five members of the House. It does not

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
February 11, 2004
Page Three

hurt a President to fire people for a failure he should not bare. Ike always **said**, "politics is sometimes tough, especially on your friends."

Cheney and Full Disclosure

Cheney's unwillingness to divulge the names of individuals meeting with **him** on energy policy continues to be a mistake. Because of his background after leaving government, transparency and full disclosure should have been his number one concern. Now as this issue is taken all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, he **will** be **further** brought into the public spotlight even to the point of embarrassing one of our friends on the Supreme Court. Dick did nothing **wrong** - he talked to the right people, but it is the **perception** of a cover up that counts. This was all unnecessary as I told Dick, Lynne and Libby from the start - they thought I **was nuts**!

The Election

We do not want a one-term presidency like the one we had with George, Sr. or Jerry. When talking with you last week, it seemed not to register. This is the track the Administration is on, and if we do not change course, we could be headed for defeat. **You** are the only one in the Cabinet that understands national policies and the facts of life about national elections.

Ike won big on the Korean War issues - "I will go there myself immediately after the election." George W. did not win the last election - Clinton and Gore lost it. Jerry and George, Sr. lost their re-election bids - Carter and Clinton won these elections by default. **Nixon** won his first election on our country's discontent with the Vietnam War (Johnson and McNamara). Nixon won his second term because of Vietnam - the fact we had removed all combat troops by Election Day from Vietnam, ended the draft, and established the All-Volunteer Force. McGovern had no place to go with his anti-defense **and** anti-Vietnam war message. Even then, we took McGovern seriously - we beefed up government purchase orders **from** toilet paper, cars, airplanes, trucks, tanks, etc. in the last weeks of the fourth quarter of fiscal 1973 and the first quarter of fiscal 1974. We may have done too much of this, but you can never take a national election for granted. These were all purchases approved by Congress **for** the fiscal year in question. We just moved them **up** a little earlier. I can **go** on and on about **why** I think **an** incumbent should never be defeated. The President has all the tools at his disposal. He must exercise them wisely and remember that the presidency **is** much more important **than** supporting friends. Nixon finally realized that after the second election - there would have been no Watergate exposé in his second term if he would of cleaned house (Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and others months earlier). The Presidency is too important for the President to take blame or perhaps the fall for the incompetent advice he received **from** the intelligence community or any others. **All** Presidential elections are about how the President is **perceived** as a true leader.

I

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
February 11, 2004
Page Four

Another View of Perception

I will never forget the weekend Jerry pardoned Nixon. We were partners in a two-day golf tournament at Burning Tree. (By the way, we were just one stroke behind the tournament leaders with the extrastrokes our golf handicaps gave us). I left Jerry Saturday night firmly convinced he would not pardon Nixon until some of us organized a group of Senators and House Members to call upon Ford at the White House, to show for the first time public **support** to put the Nixon matter behind us. John Stennis had suggested this pardon approach to Bryce Harlow and me. He felt we could get a group of thirty or so to publicly call on **Nixon** after such a meeting. Instead, Phil Buchanan, Haig, and others were pressing for a dramatic pardon move to wipe the slate clean. That Sunday morning shock had a great deal to do with Jerry losing the election. Imagine my disappointment when we teed off at 12:30 p.m. that Sunday in our golf tournament. Jerry asked me what I thought of what he had done earlier that morning on the pardon. My response on the first tee **was**, "Jerry, I'll tell you what I **think** of it **after we finish** this round - we have a chance to **win** the tournament this afternoon, and we can discuss this after our round." The pardon was right, but the public **was** not properly prepared for the Sunday morning shock. **Thus** another case of *perception* playing a big part in a national Presidential election.

Anyway, Rummy, I have rambled around in dictating **this** note - you asked for it. Tear it up after you have read it, but remember I do **love** you and Joyce. **Your** plate is full, but by putting on an extra fill-court press, we may be saved and win in November.

Regards,



Mel Laird

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

VIA FACSIMILE

11-L-0559/OSD/037366

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

I ran across this paper that Newt Gingrich sent to a number of people back in January '03. It struck me you might want to read it. I am sure you are aware of the kinds of comments he makes and I know you've made enormous progress, but nonetheless I thought it might be of interest to you.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D03ts

Attach: Gingrich email 1.04.03 Re: Why the data you get may be wrong

Please respond by: _____

OSD 15857-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037367

322

6 June 04

From Newt Gingrich
Cc D. Rita
Wofford #2

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, January 05, 2003 12:08 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil
Cc: stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil; ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: why the data you get may be wrong
for secdef, depsecdef
from Newt 1/04/03
why the data you get may be wrong

Every senior person in the Bush Administration I have talked with about the budget problems has been struck by the gap between their information and the facts I am asserting. This memo will help explain how misleading are the reports you are getting.

the following memo is long but it explains better than anything I have seen why you are getting such poor quality of information and such dishonest answers about what we need and what has to change. I urge you to read it. This is a successful mid-level Army officer:

note the terrible comment

"Beware the fidelity of survey data. The atmosphere of fear in the Army is impossible to overstate. Years of conditioning to zero-defects and fear of offending have resulted in answers to survey questions that will be generally lukewarm at worst. More importantly, survey data is manipulated by the chain of command. While I was in Kosovo, yet another of a seemingly endless line of "Blue Ribbon Panels" traveled there to sound a group of captains reference retention. Prior to the arrival of the panel, the senior officers dictated that no maintenance or headquarters company commanders would participate, knowing that these are the most thankless command positions. Additionally, the senior officers further weeded by name the remaining line commanders."

FYI, a remarkably prescient letter by an Army officer responding to a CSIS study.
Dave

13 December 2002

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street N. W Washington DC, 20006

Dear CSIS,

I read with great interest your report entitled "American Military Culture in the 21st Century." I thought you might be interested in my thoughts as I read the report.

11-L-0559/OSD/037368

1/6/2003

For your information, I am a single white male Army battalion operations officer, thirty-nine years old, no dependents. I have seventeen years of service in Korea, Europe, the Balkans and the US, to include time in the 2nd Infantry, 101st Air Assault, and 1st Armored Divisions. I also served as an observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and have instructed at West Point and the Aviation Officer Basic Course.

1. In my opinion, Army basic training is no longer a rite of passage. I cannot write with any authority on what occurs there, but weekly I receive the graduates. New soldiers are increasingly undisciplined, rebellious, and more concerned with their rights than their responsibilities. They often have little sense of teamwork or duty. My suspicion is that the "Army of One" mentality (in place long before the phrase was coined) is teaching them to ask not what they can do for their country, but what their country can do for them. Army recruiting strategy with its offers of money and more money is where this pathology begins.

Since there is apparently little quality control in basic training, active units receive, relatively unmodified, the raw product of American Society. I would prefer to see

(A) Recruiting based on the Marine model, because one gets what one asks for. The USMC asks for young men who wish to serve their nation and challenge themselves, while the Army asks for people who want money.

(B) Even if it means a smaller Army, I would prefer to see some quality control in basic training. In short, if recruits do not meet rigid standards of ethics, behavior, and performance, they should not be allowed into the service, period.

(C) Basic training that is a tradition based and challenging rite of passage. Bottom line: Recruits must join the Army, not the other way around.

2. I do not agree that soldiers identify with the Army as the report contends. Junior officers and soldiers identify with their small units, and senior officers and NCOs with their staffs (commanders and command sergeants major excepted). I believe that the importance of service identity is overstated, and that now is the time to transition to one service.

The payoff in procurement and standardization would be immense, without damaging unit cohesion. The other side of the coin, however, is that morale is so poor and unit cohesion at the lower levels so weak due to years of over commitment, under resourcing, micromanagement, and social engineering, that morale needs some intensive shoring up. I believe there are some ways to do this:

(A) Give us back our officer and NCO clubs. They may not be efficient, but they are effective in building esprit de corps and strengthening the ever-weakening line between the ranks.

(B) Power down. Our company commanders are no longer that, but instead

▼ "company managers." Let's get brigade commanders and division commanding generals out of company physical training programs, and instead focused on directing their staffs to do more than crank out endless taskings which do not support battalion essential combat tasks.

(C) Allow units to develop and propagate unit specific symbols and insignia at the battalion level.

(D) Recruit regionally and field units on the now defunct COHORT model.

(E) Organize in multifunctional regiments on the USMC model.

3. I do not believe as the report contends that we have demonstrated military prowess in Desert Storm, Bosnia, or Kosovo. The report did not mention Somalia in this vein, a conflict that demonstrates how bad things can get when we face a resolute enemy. Therefore, the "lessons of success" learned in the Balkans and Desert Storm need some perspective.

What we have demonstrated is that because we have a lot of money, we can overcome an enemy that does not fight, or is more concerned with criminal activities than military engagements. I believe that, should we face a resolute enemy in open combat, the results would be catastrophic (Bunker Hill, Bull Run, Kasserine Pass, Task Force Smith, Vietnam, Somalia).

America, between its major wars, has a long history of demanding efficiency rather than effectiveness from its Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the Armed Forces are not IBM or Microsoft, nor are they the Department of Interior or Bureau of Weight and Measures.

Efficiency rather than effectiveness in peacetime translates to heavy casualties in the opening weeks of the next real conflict.

4. I was interested in the comment of the report that "military culture by definition must differ significantly from civil culture in a democratic society." I could not agree more, which is why I am perplexed at the Herculean efforts in the last ten years to civilianize the military.

5. Beware the fidelity of survey data. The atmosphere of fear in the Army is impossible to overstate. Years of conditioning to zero-defects and fear of offending have resulted in answers to survey questions that will be generally lukewarm at worst. More importantly, survey data is manipulated by the chain of command. While I was in Kosovo, yet another of a seemingly endless line of "Blue Ribbon Panels" traveled there to sound a group of captains reference retention. Prior to the arrival of the panel, the senior officers dictated that no maintenance or headquarters company commanders would participate, knowing that these are the most thankless command positions. Additionally, the senior officers further weeded by name the remaining line commanders.

The best survey or interview is the one in which the interviewee does not realize he

is being interviewed. If you want to know what the Army is thinking, just listen to soldiers converse in bars. Pay particular attention to junior NCOs and officers.

6. Because captain retention is so poor, Department of the Army has chosen to make captains from lieutenants at three years of service. Additionally, the selection rate for captain was this year 99%. This decision is typical of the kind of shortsighted decision making common at senior levels. The long-term result is incompetent captains, whose poor leadership creates disgruntled soldiers and NCOs who resign or do not reenlist. The captains themselves, frustrated that they cannot perform as expected, will also resign as soon as they can.

Recommend fewer officers of higher quality. If this means a smaller Army, so be it.

7. Casualty and risk aversion, euphemized in the Army as "force protection," have expanded beyond all logical proportion. In Kosovo, I actually heard a brigade commander say "The worst thing we can do here is discharge a weapon." I tend to take the more traditional view that the worst thing a military force can do is fail in its mission.

8. Commanders and other leaders within the Army are daily faced with the following conundrum: Follow the regulations, or accomplish the mission. Our penchant for risk aversion and micromanagement has done away with judgment, while regulations reproduce themselves at an alarming rate. The cynicism and stress on integrity the above conundrum creates is a huge burden.

One of the reasons junior officers join the Army is for the opportunity to exercise their judgment. If platoon leaders are not allowed to do this, why have them? Put a pile of regulations in their chairs. Soldiers requiring management can consult the regulations, judgment no longer required.

9. "Proper" race and gender relations, currently propagated in the Army by the much despised and canned "Consideration of Others" program, has guaranteed the poorest possible social climate. We have taught a generation of soldiers to see themselves not primarily as soldiers, but as African-Americans who happen to be soldiers, or females who happen to be soldiers. Worse yet, we have taught them not to be polite and respectful, but instead to carry chips on their shoulders, searching for someone to offend them. The result in the loss of unit cohesion has been devastating as soldiers are isolated in social fear. Additionally, the never-ending stream of "African-American Months" and "Asian-Pacific American Months" has done nothing more but accentuate differences. Recommend we have "American Soldier Year" and be done with it. The self-fulfilling prophecies created by racial and gender hypersensitivity are assisting in the destruction of morale.

10. Technology, as useful as it is, has helped to create slaves to perfection and intense micromanagers. The man-hours wasted on just the right color for PowerPoint presentations number in the millions, while subordinate commands

await the "perfect" operations order. Junior officers watch senior officers slave away on presentations for generals and ask themselves "Do I want to be doing that in three years?" Perhaps if the generals would refuse to accept this kind of waste, the colonels would follow suit. Additionally, nobody wants a corps commander in their tank or cockpit with them. Recommend we stop the search for real time terrestrial omniscience at the higher levels, and start trusting our subordinates again.

Human nature dictates that what can be known will be known. The question is, just who needs to know it? Does the theater commander really need a monthly report on venereal disease cases in platoon X? I think not, but he gets one by name and social security number.

11. We have entered an interesting and twisted period in military sociology when abuse is not defined by the institution or the senior, but rather by the subordinate. The ramifications of this environment are self-evident. Schofield's venerated definition of discipline is often quoted to justify this position: "The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment." Nowhere in this statement does Schofield indicate that the private soldier should define "harsh and tyrannical."

12. The Army has long been wedded to what I have come to think of as the "Chase your tail" method of training. As we move from execution to execution, the training of subordinates suffers. We do so much so rapidly that little is done correctly. We "check the block" and move on to the next task. I recently saw a corps G-3's annual training calendar, of which he was exceedingly proud. Not a block of empty space on it. When then, do the division, brigade, battalion, and company commanders, not to mention platoon leaders and NCOs, have time to train as they wish? Either the Corps G-3 knows every platoon's training needs better than platoon leaders, or there is something very wrong. Here in USAREUR my battalion requires 397 days to meet the annual training requirements placed on us by higher headquarters.

Simultaneously, my battalion services endless garrison support taskings and those of higher headquarters to resource someone else's training. Meanwhile, company commanders are chided by general officers for not giving their soldiers predictability. One does not know whether to laugh or cry.

The solution for this problem is simple...slow down. We can do a few things very well or we can do a great many things poorly. There is no middle ground. Long ago the military developed the concept of main and supporting efforts, as well as mission essential tasks. If we would employ these concepts, everything would not be a priority, and unit focus would not shift from day to day. Movement is not necessarily progress, nor is constant reorganization.

13. The study made much of married soldiers and soldiers with dependents,

asserting that these are stabilizing influences. Apparently no one interviewed any company commander known to me, some of whom spend upwards of half their time dealing with family abuse, teens in trouble, dependent related alcohol and drug problems, unwed pregnant soldiers, single soldiers who have no plans to care for their children in the event they deploy, etc., etc. I remember several years ago a USMC general suggesting that junior Marines should not be married. He was pilloried in the press, but I think he was correct. Recommend that the services accept no first term married soldiers, and that all unwed pregnancies be immediately discharged.

14. Soldiers generally are not opposed to deployments. The problem lies in the perceived value of the deployment. If I am to ask my soldiers to separate from their dependents for six months once every two years, I must give them a good reason to do so. Police work in Kosovo is not what I consider worthy of that kind of sacrifice. We do more, but it is meaningless. I cannot overstate the cynicism that this situation creates.

15. I similarly cannot stress enough the importance of swift, bold decisions to solve these problems, or at least to acknowledge them. I am aware that the Army is a large organization averse to change. I am similarly aware, however, that many of these problems were apparent ten years ago. Executive summary after executive summary, panel after panel, committee after committee, task force after task force, with no tangible results other than new headgear (make no mistake, even the lowliest private sees that pitiful measure for what it is).

Soldiers have lost patience. Having taught at West Point, I maintain an active correspondence with dozens of junior officers I met there. I do not know one who is planning on staying in the army past his initial commitment. Company commanders are refusing second commands, and captains are refusing first commands in favor of resignation. Lieutenant colonels and colonels are also refusing commands. These actions were very rare...almost unthinkable ten years ago, yet they are all around us today. We have a problem that requires serious effort.

Our greatest threat is not criminals in Kosovo, weapons of mass destruction, or Osama Bin Laden. Our enemy is domestic: rock bottom morale. We wonder which of two unpalatable situations we face...either the senior leadership does not recognize the low morale, or they do recognize it and do not care. In my opinion, anything we do which distracts or keeps us from solving the morale problem is tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

16. The report repeatedly suggests that military service is not fun anymore. There is no truer statement. Most everything we had that made the service fun has been taken away from us. The net result of the loss of fun or job satisfaction is a "workaday" attitude. I see in myself and in more and more officers a view of my service as just a job, rather than a way of life. I never thought I would see it that

way, and was surprised and saddened when I did. The Army I joined is not the Army I am in, and I believe I am betrayed. Idealism has met reality, and those two concepts are too far removed from one another.

I am aware that as I have written, my comments have become increasingly emotional and urgent. I have allowed this to happen, and you receive this letter without edit. Those of us who live in this environment day in and day out are extremely frustrated, and I wanted you to read that frustration, unvarnished.

Finally, one of the "things" that frustrates me most is the lack of survey feedback. Armies of lab coated technicians and sociologists sally forth from Washington annually to poke us, prod us, and test us. As they snap closed their briefcases, they always promise us feedback. In seventeen years, I have seen feedback twice, once when Prof. C. Moskos provided me some directly at my request, and once when I saw your report a few days ago, purely by accident. The average soldier does not demand immediate solutions. He does, however, harbor the hope that his senior leadership recognizes problems and takes positive, effective action to solve them.

Thank you for your time, patience, and study.

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Gingrich**

W
S
2

Here is an old Gingrich item on Peacekeeping as a Doctrine. Do you know what has happened in the intermittent period?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D04s

Attach: Gingrich email 4.16.03 - Peacekeeping as Doctrine.

Please respond by:

6/21

SecDef —

6/8

- The Army's Peacekeeping Center did not close
- It stayed open, not under the Army War College, but under the U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
- TRADOC is working closely w/ JFCCOM concerning stability operations doctrine — and Neat is involved/advising.

6 JUN 04

OSD 15870-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037375

6/8

From Newt Gingrich

cc Duran

Craddock

Wolfowitz

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From:

(b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, April 17, 2003 1:22 PM

To:

(b)(6)

@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil

Cc:

jaimie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil; damicorj@js.pentagon.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil;
giambastiani@jcom.mil

Subject: peace keeping as a doctrine

for secdef,depsecdef

from newt 4/16/03

(1)

peacekeeping as a doctrine

the following article about closing the Army's center for peacekeeping doctrine does raise the question who should be studying this and who should be developing the doctrine for peacekeeping.

It is obvious that we are going to continue to do peacekeeping. Some agency should own the doctrine development for this activity.

newt

Chicago Tribune

April 15, 2003

Army Institute To Be Shut Down

Critics hit loss of training center for peacekeeping

By Douglas Holt, Tribune staff reporter

WASHINGTON -- Even as the U.S. military grapples with the largest peacekeeping effort in a generation, the Army is shutting down its only institute devoted to such operations, prompting protests from inside and outside the Pentagon.

Since its creation in 1993 at the Army War College, the Peacekeeping Institute has struggled against a military culture that sees itself as a war-fighting machine that should leave peacekeeping to others.

But in a sign that peacekeeping skills are useful in modern conflicts, the institute's former director, Col. George Oliver, has been deployed overseas to work with the Pentagon-led reconstruction effort of Iraq.

In a March 14 memo obtained by the Tribune, Oliver pleaded with Army Secretary Thomas White to keep the center open, telling him he "made a mistake" by ordering its closing along with other staff cutbacks.

The Peacekeeping Institute, in Carlisle Barracks, Pa., will close Oct. 1. A Jan. 30

Army news release said its functions and mission will be absorbed at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Ft. Monroe, Va.

A spokesman for the training command, however, said Monday that it has no plans to accept the institute's charge.

"I can tell you that no functions from the Peacekeeping Institute are being transferred to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, nor are they being transferred to TRADOC," said spokesman Harvey Perritt.

Rumsfeld supports closing

Lt. Col. Gary Keck, a Pentagon spokesman, said that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld supports closing the institute. He added, however, that the decision to close the institute was the Army's.

Oliver, in his letter written five days before the war in Iraq began, said: "When the announcement came that the Institute would close, no one thought it was a good idea.

"Most felt that such an institute was needed more now than when it was formed in 1993. With the war on terrorism going on in Afghanistan and the threat of war looming in Iraq, the goal of winning the war could be overshadowed by losing the peace. PKI personnel are currently involved in efforts to 'win the peace' in both Afghanistan and Iraq," Oliver wrote.

An Army spokesman denied that the shutdown signals any reduction in the importance placed on peacekeeping but said it is emblematic of the "hard choices we have to make" in operating in as efficient a manner as possible.

Out of a \$81 billion annual Army budget, the Peacekeeping Institute ran on \$200,000 a year.

Experts said that it sends the wrong signal at a critical time in Iraq but that the move fits with the Bush administration's dislike of peacekeeping missions.

'It does not make sense'

"It does not make sense," said David Segal, director of the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland.

But Segal said the Army has performed peacekeeping missions grudgingly, whether in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina or after Hurricane Andrew.

As a candidate, Bush voiced disagreement with then-Vice President Al Gore on the

use of troops for peacekeeping. "He believes in nation building," Bush said. "I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and, therefore, prevent war from happening in the first place."

After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, administration officials built a case for a pre-emptive war in Iraq to remove a threatening regime and pave the way for democracy. The administration also said the war could be managed with such precision that the Iraqi people would inherit a relatively intact country.

So far, the military has fared better at fighting than civil order. While troops immediately secured oil fields to protect them from sabotage, they were unable to protect civilian assets such as hospitals, banks and the national museum from looting.

Some experts speculate the current difficulties might reinforce the military's reluctance to take on the task of dealing with the aftermath of war.

"This may be a convenient way to carry out an agenda that I think was clear from the campaign rhetoric of this administration, which was: 'We don't do peacekeeping. We don't do nation building. We don't escort kids to school,'" said William Durch, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a research institute in Washington.

In the letter to Army officials, Oliver said Iraq likely will need military peacekeepers.

"The nature of security in the world today [and tomorrow] demands a large pool of well-trained professional peacekeepers," he wrote. "Today over 80 nations have peacekeeping centers, institutes and organizations dedicated to this emerging field. With PKI's closure, the United States military will be devoid of any such organizations."

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

Why don't you and Pete take a look at this list of general officers that we've got over in Iraq. It is hard for me to believe that this makes sense.

Why don't we see if we can't manage it better?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D.06ts

Attach: GO List for Multi-National Force

Please respond by: _____

6/25

OSD 15871-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037379

file

801

IRAQ

6 JUN 04

	OST	LTG David H. Petraeus	Commanding General (Inbound)	USA	Multi-National Force Iraq APO AE 09342
	OST	BG Andrew MacKay (CAN)	CPATT	COA	Multi-National Force Iraq APO AE 09342
	CPA	LTG(Ret) Jeffrey Oster	CPA Exec		CPA Building, APO AE 09315
	CPA	COL(P) Joseph Schroedel	Deputy Commander, Gulf Region Division, CPA	USA	
14	CPA	BG Stephen M. Seay	US Dep to Director CPA IRAQ	USA	
15	ISG	MG Keith Dayton	ISG	USA	Multi-National Force Iraq APO AE 09342
16	CPA	BG Usher	CPA	USMC	
	Other General Officers				
17	GRD	MG Ronald Johnson	CG, USACE (Med-Evac'd)	USA	CPA Building, APO AE 09315
	C3, MNF-I	BG Janos Isaszegi (Departed; Italy Fill inbound)	Dep C3	COA	Multi-National Force Iraq APO AE 09342
18	Cmd Grp, MNC-I	BG Richard Formica	C3 (Effects)	USA	Multi-National Corps Iraq APO AE 09342
	Division MSCs				
19	1st Infantry Division	MG John R. Batiste	Commanding General	USA	1st Infantry Division APO AE 09392
20		BG Steve Mundt	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Infantry Division APO AE 09392
21		BG John Morgan	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	1st Infantry Division APO AE 09392
22	1st Armored Division	MG Martin Dempsey	Commanding General	USA	1st Armored Division, Unit 93054 APO AE 09324-3054
23		BG Mark Hertling	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Armored Division, Unit 93054 APO AE 09324-3054
24		BG Curtis Scaparrotti	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	1st Armored Division, Unit 93054 APO AE 09324-3054
25	1st Cavalry Division	MG Peter W. Chiarelli	Commanding General	USA	1st Cavalry Division APO AE 09344
26		BG Jeffery W. Hammond	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Cavalry Division APO AE 09344
		COL(P) Mike Jones	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	

	13th COSCOM	COL(P) James Chambers	Commander	USA 13 COSCOM APO AE 09391
27	Cmd Grp, MNF-I	BG Carter Ham	MND-North CDR	USA TF Olympia APO AE 09342
28		BG Timothy J. Wright	CG, Multinational Task Force North, 88th Infantry Division (Forward)	USA
29	I MEF	LTGen James T. Conway	Commanding General	USMC I Marine Expeditionary Force
30		MajGen Keith Stalder	Deputy Commanding General	USMC I Marine Expeditionary Force
31	1st MARDIV	MajGen James Mattis	Commanding General	USMC 1st Marine Division
32		BrigGen John F. Kelly	Deputy Commanding General	USMC 1st Marine Division
33	1st FSSG	BrigGen Richard Kramlich	Commanding General	USMC 1st Force Service Support Group
34	3d MAW	MajGen James Amos	Commanding General	USMC 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
	Separates			
35	2d Med Bde	BG James F. Reynolds	Commander	USA 2d Med Bde APO AE 09342
36	ACCE	BG Robert P. Steel	ACCE	USAF
37	Data Masked	BG Marke E. Gibson	DATA MASKED	USAF

SJS No: 04-03939	Date/Time: 06/08/2004 17:08	SJS Date Changed: 05/14/2004 17:03	CJCS Has Seen: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
To Chief AD: <input type="text"/>	Editor: <input type="text"/>	Red Tag: <input type="checkbox"/>	Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
VCJCS Has Seen: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
Subject: SF-801/ GENERAL OFFICERS IN IRAQ			
Summary: MEMO FROM THE SECDEF TO CJCS, CC TO DEPSECDEF. "WHY DONT YOU AND PETE TAKE A LOOK AT THIS LIST OF GENERAL OFFICERS THAT WE'VE GOT OVER IN IRAQ. IT IS HARD FOR ME TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MAKES SENSE. WHY"			
Addressee: <input type="text"/>		Keyword: RUMSFELD	
How Referred: CJCS REPLY			
Distribution: GFO, OCJCS/LC			
Originator Data Originator: OSD/SD Originator No.: SF 060604D.06TS Originator Name: RUMSFELD		Assignment Directorate: GFO J Division: GFO Action Officer: GNELZI, THOMAS D, LTCOL, AO Phone: (b)(6)	
Suspension Data Current SJS Suspension: <input type="text"/> Originally: 06/24/2004 Current J Suspension: <input type="text"/> Originally: 06/24/2004 Current Orig. Suspension: <input type="text"/> Originally: 06/25/2004 Changes: <input type="text"/>		Completion Data Time: <input type="text"/> Chgs: <input type="text"/> Date: <input type="text"/> Date Completed: 06/14/2004 Signed: <input type="text"/> Who: SHIELDMA How Completed: BEING ANSWERED UNDER 04-03864 Special Instructions: <input type="text"/>	

11-L-0559/OSD/037382



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

04-03864
CM-1844-04
15 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/15*

SUBJECT: Locations

- **Question.** "Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** TAB B shows where the general and flag officers in Iraq are located.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

TAB A

8:39 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Richard Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 2, 2004
SUBJECT: Locations

CJCS HAS SEEN

JUN 03 2004

Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR/asm
060204.07

Please respond by: _____

6/10

04 JUN 03 PM 1:34

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037384

USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

Multi-National Force - Iraq

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
Commander	9/10	USA	LTG Sanchez	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement to arrive 30 Jun
DCG	9	Coalition	Coalition-LTG McColl	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG (Embassy based position)	8	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	MG Stratman, USA arrives 30 Jun
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition-AirCmdr Jones (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG Detainee Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, G	Baghdad, Iraq	
Chief of Staff	8	USMC	MajGen Weber	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCS Intel	8	USA	MG Fast	Baghdad, Iraq	BG DeFritas, USA arrives Aug
Deputy Intel	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	UK Fills
DCS Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, T.	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement BG Fil arrival TBD
DCS Ops	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Molan (Aus)	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy C3	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	Italian fill (BG Isaszegi departed)
Dep Dir, Ops/CICB	7	USA	BG Kimmit	Baghdad, Iraq	Brig Gen Lessel, USAF arrives 1 Jul
DCS Strategy, Policy & Plans	8	USAF	MajGen(S) Sargeant	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy Pol/Mil	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
Coalition Ops	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
C4I	7	USAR	MG Detamore	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement requested for 1 Aug
DCS Log	8	USA	BG West	Baghdad, Iraq	MG Minetti, ARG arrives 15 Jul
C7/DCG Eng	8	USA	MG Johnson	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Bostick arrives July
C9	7	USAR	BG Davidson	Baghdad, Iraq	

CDR, Air Cbt Contingency Element	7	USAF	Brig Gen Steel	Baghdad, Iraq	
MND-North Cdr	7	USA	BG Ham	Mosul, Iraq	TF Olympia
CG MNTF North, 88th Inf Div (Fwd)	7	USARG	BG Wright	Mosul, Iraq	

DCG/OST-I	9	USA	LTG Patraeus	Baghdad, Iraq	
CMATT	8	USA	MG Eaton	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Schwitters arrives 20 Jun
CPATT	8	Coalition	Coalition - BG MacKay	Baghdad, Iraq	

Ch, Iraq Survey Group	8	USA	MG Dayton	Baghdad, Iraq	BGen McMenamin, USMC arrives 15 Jun
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Multi-National Corps - Iraq

Cdr, MNC-I	9	USA	LTG Metz	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Graham (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Canada	MG Natynczyk (Can)	Baghdad, Iraq	

USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

Chief of Staff	7	USA	BG Troy	Baghdad, Iraq	
C3	7	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	Requirement TBD
C3 (Effects)	7	USA	BG Formica	Baghdad, Iraq	
C7	7	USA	BG Pollman	Baghdad, Iraq	

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
CG, 1st Armored Div	8	USA	MG Dempsey	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Hertling	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Scaparrotti	Al Hillah, Iraq	
CG, 1st Infantry Div	8	USA	MG Batiste	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Mundt	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Morgan	Tikrit, Iraq	
CG, 1st Cavalry Div	8	USA	MG Chiarelli	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Hammond	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Jones	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, 13th COSCOM	7	USA	BG Chambers	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	
CG, 2d Med Bde	7	USAR	BG Reynolds	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, I MEF	9	USMC	LtGen Conway	Al Asad, Iraq	
DCG I MEF	8	USMC	MGen Stadler	Al Asad, Iraq	
CG, I MarDiv	8	USMC	MGen Mattis	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
ADC 1stMarDiv	7	USMC	BGen Kelly	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
CG, 1st FSSG	7	USMC	BGen Kramlich	Al Taqaddum, Iraq	
CG, 3d MAW	8	USMC	MGen Amos	Al Fallujah, Iraq	

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

OSAMOD

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
Spl Asst to LTG(Ret) Oster	7	USMC	BGen Usher	Baghdad, Iraq	Backfill not required
DCdr, Gulf Region Engr Div	7	USA	COL(P) Schrodel	Baghdad, Iraq	
US Dep to Dir, CPA Iraq	7	USA	BG Seay	Baghdad, Iraq	

TAB C

COORDINATION

USA	COL Bruno	8 June 2004
USAF	Capt McKaskill	4 June 2004
USMC	Maj Sylvester	4 June 2004
USCENTCOM	LtCol Moscovic	8 April 2004

Tab C

6/22
1257

720

In reply refer to EF-9822 & 04/007757-ES

EF-9822

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Singapore

DS
The Ambassador to Singapore says there is a serious disconnect between the Policy shop and the S&T DSCC folks. He thinks we ought to be able to do better by Singapore than we are doing.

Do you know anything about it? Please look into it.

Thanks.

DHR/azg
060604BL07ts

Please respond by: 6/25

TO See Def

Paul Butler

6/23

*Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
6/24*

OSD 15872-04

08-06-04 15:24 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/037388

Singapore

6 JUN 04



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

DepSecDef
USD(P) *[Signature]* 4/21
I# 04/007757-ES

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs
(Mr. Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *[Signature]* 18 JUN 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Regarding Comments by U.S. Ambassador to Singapore

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on comments that Ambassador Lavin made regarding "S&T DSCC". Amb Lavin meant to refer to ISA/DSCA, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which oversees security cooperation and foreign military sales.
- I spoke with Amb Lavin, who clarified that:
 - He did not mean to imply there was a serious disconnect between Policy and DSCA (which, as I reminded him, is part of Policy); and
 - He advocated giving "Singapore a piece of candy each year" to be symbolic of and to incentivize our close bilateral relationship, citing the early release of the Longbow as an example of a case coordinated through and timed by Policy.
 - He cited the AIM-9X as something we should offer Singapore to enhance the F-15 package in an upcoming fighter competition with Eurofighter and Rafale.
- My response and recommended position on this issue are:
 - The system governing the transfer of arms for Singapore is cumbersome, but the cases of AMRAAM and Longbow showed that we could make the system work for a priority country like Singapore.
 - We should do our best to expedite the process in the future, starting with the AIM-9X/F-15 case.

Attachments:

Tab 1: SecDef question

Tab 2: Coordination

Prepared by: Elizabeth Phu, ISA/AP, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/037389

21-06-04 09:27 IN

COORDINATION

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA
(Peter C.W. Flory)

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, ISA/AP
(Richard Lawless)

Principal Director, ISA/AP
(John Allen)

Director, Middle East, Asia, North Africa/DSCA
(Ed Ross)

TDY

APL RPL 10 Jan

APL 10 Jan

Copy provided

June 9, 2004

TO: The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Document and E-mail Request

I know you are aware of the request by the Senate Armed Services Committee and by Senator McCain for a series of documents and e-mails relating to the Boeing tanker-lease proposal.

The Department sent the attached letter to Senator Warner, which he has shown to Senator McCain. It is my understanding that Senator McCain was dissatisfied with our proposal and is considering asking for the Senate Armed Services Committee or the Senate Commerce Committee to subpoena the Department of Defense to produce the documents and e-mails Senator McCain requested in his letter, which I have also attached.

My plan is to be as cooperative as we can be. Senator McCain is holding up a number of the President's DoD nominations. It is increasingly difficult to run the Department with so many key open positions, and particularly during a war.

The only reason I would not be fully cooperative is if the President decided it was a matter of privilege. I am at the point where I believe the interests of the Department and, absent advice to the contrary, the interests of the Administration are that we provide these materials to the Committee. Please let me know if you agree; and, if not, which documents the President wishes to withhold.

Please let me know if it is appropriate for me to proceed in a manner that is consistent with what I see as the interest of the Department of Defense and, I believe, the interest of the Administration.

Sincerely,

Attachments a/s

DHR:dh
060704-7

OSD 15873-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037391

45aT

95un04

720
C6/10
June 8, 2004

I-04/007774

EF-9832

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: More Coalition Forces

Are we going to get the new Iraqi government to ask for more Coalition forces?

I think we ought to do it, and we ought to do it formally. We ought to get the State Department to ask them to do it, and we ought to ask them to do it when our team goes out there.

We ought to want more Coalition forces, so we can relieve the pressure on our forces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-18

.....
Please respond by

6/25/04

→SD

6/9/04

6/14

We are working this matter in three ways:

1. I'll reinforce this message with CPA (Bremer).
 2. We'll push in the Coalition Working Group, an interagency group that meets daily and gets diplomatic cables and other efforts done.
 3. DSD will raise with Iraqis on his trip.
- Doug Feith

OSD 15874-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037392

TEN 6/10



3:23 PM

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 1, 2004
SUBJECT: **SecDef Correspondence**

6/1/04

Find out if I am sending a letter to the family of every person who was killed since I have been Secretary of Defense and if I am sending a letter to everyone who retires after 20 or 25 years.

I would like to see the letters if they are being sent and if not, I would like to start doing it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.34

Please respond by: _____

6/14

15 Jun 04

OSD 15875-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037393

1. C15/27

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

From: Jeffery, Reuben CPA [Reuben.Jeffery@osd.mil]
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 1:09 PM
To: Helmick, Frank BG OSD; Ganyard, Stephen COL OSD
Cc: Craddock, John J Lt Gen OSD; Butler, Paul CIV OSD
Subject: FW: Economic Points

U

fyi-some good news. rj

-----Original Message-----

From: Fleischer, Michael Mr. (CIV) [mailto:fleischerm@orha.centcom.mil]
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 1:00 PM
To: Jeffery, Reuben CPA
Subject: Economic Points

Although you'd never know it, the Iraqi economy has been improving steadily for months.

- Unemployment, put at over 60% in the aftermath of the war, had dropped by early 2004 to about 28%. A recent survey in some of the big cities indicates that fewer than 10% of households have no one working. Some of the employment gain is related to government spending but much stems from private enterprise, largely Iraqi or Iraqi expatriates. It is not clear how the events of recent weeks have affected the economy's generation of jobs, but there is reason to think that job creation has fundamental strength and will continue.
- A consumer led expansion has been driving the economy almost since war's end. At first, consumers snapped up goods like satellite dishes. Then came consumer appliances and cars. Now, the range of goods has expanded to include toys, bicycles, motor scooters, home and office furniture, and, increasingly, luxury items. On one block in Karradah there is a store selling elegant clocks and lamps of all kinds. There is no sign that consumer demand is flagging.
- Businesses too are spending. Factory managers are hiring. Shop owners are renovating their stores and new commercial buildings are rising from the ground up. This business investment is being fueled by an entrepreneurial community, including many wealthy exiles, who see opportunity on Iraq's near horizon. The return of the exiles, with their money, is especially encouraging. Their confidence, borne of a more intuitively accurate sense of ground truth in Iraq than we can have, is a solid indicator of hope for the future.
- The macro-economic forces in Iraq are favorable. The bulk of the reconstruction spending has not yet rolled into the economy. Its effect will be enormous and positive. Six months from now we will be talking about shortages of skilled Iraqi labor and in 18 months most every Iraqi who wants a job will have one. As reconstruction efforts tail off over time, foreign investment will pick up the slack. Even in the face of uncertain security, seminars and presentations to international firms with an interest in Iraq continue to be full.
- The coalition continues to work with a large number of Iraqis with ambitious business ideas. These people almost never mention the issues in Najaf, Karbala, and Kufa, and they never mention Abu Ghraib. Rather, they speak of expanding markets and Iraq's future role in the world or regional economy. They truly demonstrate that in most parts of the country, the doors are open for business.
- The CPA itself continues to work every day with Iraqi counterparts dedicated to all aspects of Iraq's new civil society: rebuilding its power and water systems, performances by the Iraqi Symphony, launching housing construction projects, making micro-loans (including the first in the Fallujah area). Events have the past two months have been distressing but they have not stopped the Iraq's advance toward a better future.

Reuben – let me know if this isn't what you were looking for and I will go back at it.

Regards,

11-L-0559/OSD/037395

5/27/2004

7:05 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 2, 2004
SUBJECT: **9/11 Commission**

Keep me posted on how we are going to get the 9/11 Commission thing turned around. Should we start meeting with some of those Commissioners again individually? We can't let it go forward like that.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060204.01

Please respond by: _____

6/12

OSD 15884-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037396

500.5

26 June 04

9:34 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: **Istanbul Summit**

For the Istanbul Summit, has the United States been asked to provide any security with respect to the air cover? I am surprised if we haven't, given the fact that the effort we made in Prague was so necessary. I am surprised it is not necessary for Istanbul. What's the story?

Thanks.

DHR/azm
060204.13

Please respond by: _____

6/10

*NATO 337**24 June 04***OSD 15886-04**



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

7201
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
20 OCT 12 11:05



ACTION MEMO

October 8, 2004; 4:15 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 8 Oct 04

(Signature and Date)

SUBJECT: Longer Tours—and Longer Tenure—SNOWFLAKE

- You asked for a proposal initiating action on your desire that senior officers serve longer tours (Tab B).
- I believe three steps will accomplish your objective:
 1. Announce that you expect most four-star officers to serve at least four years in their posts (Tab C lists four-star posts, and average tenure over the past decade).
 2. Confer with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the three-star posts that should likewise carry a tenure of three or four years, with the balance assumed to be two-year tours (Tab D lists three-star posts, nominating as four year candidates those that are normally "capstone" posts—i.e., last post of career).
 3. Invite the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to provide you with a similar list for one and two-star officers, for your review and approval.
- This is a simple approach, to begin changing our culture. Actual tours may vary somewhat from the new norms—and you may want some to be of intermediate length. As such a system is implemented, it will be critical to encourage prompt retirement of those not advancing, and to assure those staying longer will be properly compensated. (The latter requires statutory change and will require your personal backing. We have already failed twice to persuade Congress.)
- Memoranda to initiate this action are attached for your consideration.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum to the Service Secretaries and CJCS at Tab A.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Lernes Hebert, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/037398

OSD 15889-04

210(3+4)

8 Oct 04

20 Sec 04

TAB

A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHIEFS OF SERVICES**

SUBJECT: Expectations for the Tenure of Senior Officers

Senior officers must enjoy sufficient tenure in their posts to be effective. They must have sufficient time to size up what is to be accomplished, to develop the appropriate plans to put those plans into effect, and to see them through to success.

Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest that the average time in post for our flag officers is frequently less than two years. This is too short.

As we plan for the future, we should assume that those confirmed for a four-star post will typically serve at least four years in that position. This should likewise be the expectation for several of our three-star posts, and I will be meeting with you to discuss the posts where longer tenure could be meritorious. A list of three-star billets with recent tour averages is provided to aid in this review.

I invite you to provide me, in advance of our meeting, but no later than November 1, 2004, your recommendations on tenure length for the one and two-star posts in your domain. I will ask the Chairman and Combatant Commanders for their recommendations on joint positions.

cc: CJCS



11-L-0559/OSD/037400



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Tenure of Senior Officers in Joint Assignments

We must give senior officers assigned to joint posts sufficient tenure to be effective. Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest the average is often less than two years. For some operational posts this may be acceptable. But in other cases this will not be enough time to size up the situation, decide what must be accomplished, and see the plans through to success.

In consultation with the Combatant Commanders, I would like your recommendations on the tenure we should expect for those officers occupying joint assignments in the grades of O7 through O9. I look forward to discussing these recommendations with you at your earliest convenience.

cc: Combatant Commanders



11-L-0559/OSD/037401

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Joint/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, J-6, Joint Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
(Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency)	Joint/External			3
(Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command				3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	24	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	47		3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
(Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force)				

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander in Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Army/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH				

TAB

B

9/21/04

~~FOUO~~

SEP 20 2004

OFFICE OF
SECURITY
2004 OCT 13 AM 10:05

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Two Major Initiatives

I plan to put forth a major initiative with respect to longer tours for people and, for those that are successful, somewhat longer service.

I am also going to put forth a major initiative for Standing Joint Headquarters, so that when we have to fight a next war, we will have the headquarters set up, and won't end up with the headquarters half-filled when the war is over. I have been pushing this for three years, but the resistance is powerful.

We need to get both of them done. Please get back to me with proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Joint Manning Timeline (2 pages)

DHR:ss
091304-25

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

TAB

C

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-10 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Commander, US Central Command	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	37	3.1	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Commander, US Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	29	2.4	4
Commander, US Northern Command	Joint/External			4
Commander, US Pacific Command	Joint/External	33	2.8	4
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US Southern Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	4
Commander, US Special Operations Command	Joint/External	34	2.8	4
Commander, US Strategic Command	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	48	4.0	2*
Vice Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	35	2.9	2*
Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	36	3.0	4*
Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	25	2.1	4
Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	27	2.2	4
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	34	2.8	4
	Air Force	26	2.2	4
Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	25	2.1	3
Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command	Army	30	2.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Forces Command	Army	18	1.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	36	3.0	4
Chief of Staff, USA	Army	49	4.1	4
Commanding General, USA Europe and Seventh Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Vice Chief of Staff, USA	Army	20	1.7	3
Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	48	4.0	4
Assistant, Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	25	2.0	3
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (SEA-08)	Navy	72	6.0	8*
Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	42	3.5	4*
Commander, US Atlantic Fleet	Navy	25	2.1	4
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe	Navy	30	2.5	4
Commander, US Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	4
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	22	1.8	3

*Statutory Tour Length

11-L-0559/OSD/037408

TAB

D

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Joint/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Joint/External			3
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	24	2.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel	Air Force	47	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force			3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force			2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander in Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander, Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Amy/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps				4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Naw	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Naw	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Nawv			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Naw			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Nawv	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Naw	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Nawv			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Naw	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Naw	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander, Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Naw	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Nawv	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH Fleet	Navy			2

4/21/04

~~FOUO~~

SEP 20 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Two Major Initiatives

RECEIVED

SEP 21 2004

I plan to put forth a major initiative with respect to longer tours for people and, for those that are successful, somewhat longer service.

I am also going to put forth a major initiative for Standing Joint Headquarters, so that when we have to fight a next war, we will have the headquarters set up, and won't end up with the headquarters half-filled when the war is over. I have been pushing this for three years, but the resistance is powerful.

We need to get both of them done. Please get back to me with proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Joint Manning Timeline (2 pages).

DHR:ss
091304-25

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

210 (384)

205 ep cy

~~FOUO~~

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-10 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Commander, US Central Command	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	37	3.1	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Commander, US Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	29	2.4	4
Commander, US Northern Command	Joint/External			4
Commander, US Pacific Command	Joint/External	33	2.8	4
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US Southern Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	4
Commander, US Special Operations Command	Joint/External	34	2.8	4
Commander, US Strategic Command	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Commander, US Transportation Command	Joint/External	33	2.7	4
Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	48	4.0	2*
Vice Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	35	2.9	2*
Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	36	3.0	4*
Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	25	2.1	4
Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	27	2.2	4
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	34	2.8	4
Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	26	2.2	4
Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	25	2.1	3
Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command	Army	30	2.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Forces Command	Army	18	1.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	36	3.0	4
Chief of Staff, USA	Army	49	4.1	4
Commanding General, USA Europe and Seventh Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Vice Chief of Staff, USA	Army	20	1.7	3
Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	48	4.0	4
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	25	2.0	3
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (SEA-08)	Navy	72	6.0	8*
Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	42	3.5	4*
Commander, US Atlantic Fleet	Navy	25	2.1	4
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe	Navy	30	2.5	4
Commander, US Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	4
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	22	1.8	3

*Statutory Tour Length

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Army/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases-Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH Fleet	Navy			

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Joint/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, J-6, Joint Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Joint/External			3
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	24	2.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	47	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force			3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force			2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States				
Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander in Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

11-L-0559/OSD/037417

*Statutory Tour Length

June 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: AUSMIN

Done - 6/23

Australia

Please tell me what time the Australian Ministerial meetings are on July 7.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062204-4

.....
Please respond by _____

To SecDef

Attached is a draft itinerary I received from.

I'm told Australians appreciated opportunity to host a dinner but declined and are happy with ending the Ministerial quickly.

Paul

*Paul Butler
6/22*

aaJuno4

DRAFT Agenda
AUSTRALIA-U.S. MINISTERIAL MEETING
JULY 7, 2004
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Wednesday, July 7, 2004

Session I: War on Terrorism (0900-1045)

- Welcoming Remarks (Secretary Powell) 0900-0905
- Iraq (U.S. lead) 0905-0940
- CT Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Australia lead) 0940-1005
- Nonproliferation 1005-1045
 - Proliferation Security Initiative (Australia lead)
 - President's NP initiatives (Global Partnership) (U.S. lead)
 - Iran/IAEA (U.S. lead)

Break (1045-1055)

Session II: North Asia (1100-1145)

- China-Taiwan (Australia lead) 1100-1120
- Korean Peninsula (U.S. lead) 1120-1145

Working Lunch (1145-1315)

- Indonesia (Australia lead) 1215-1230
- Southeast Asia Security
 - Regional Maritime Security Initiative (U.S. lead) 1230-1245
 - Five Power Defense Arrangement (Australia lead) 1245-1300
- Other topic(s), as desired 1300-1315

Session III: Bilateral/Alliance Issues (1320-1500)

- Global Posture Review (U.S. lead) 1320-1340
 - Joint Combined Training Center
 - Special Forces
 - Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)/C4
- Interoperability Study, Phase II (Australia lead) 1340-1400
 - Combined Review and Implementation
 - Releasability and Disclosure Issues
- Defense Materiel Issues (Australia lead) 1400-1440
 - Joint Strike Fighter update
 - Aegis system
 - ITAR Exemption
 - Trade and Buy America
- Missile Defense (U.S. lead) 1440-1500

Signing Ceremony (1515-1525)

- Missile Defense Framework MOU signing ceremony
- Statement of Interoperability signing

Joint press availability (1530-1600)

720
~~FOUO~~

SECURITY
701 OCT 13 11:24

OCT 06 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting

How are you going to **fix** this problem where you have uneven performance by different states that shows we end up with weak recruiting?

Thanks.

Attach.
USD(P+R) Memo to SecDef 9/20/04
DHR:ss
100504-9

.....

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15894-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

11-0559-037422

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

October 13, 2004 - 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*
13 Oct 04

SUBJECT: Uneven Guard Recruiting — SNOWFLAKES

- You asked how we might deal with uneven state recruiting performance for the National Guard, to preclude adverse effects on our overall national capability (Tab A).
- The overall objective, of course, is to meet strength goals. A state with weak recruiting could still meet its goal through improved retention.
- For that reason, we will focus on jurisdictions with persistent shortfalls in end strength. Preliminary analysis produces nine candidates: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and Virgin Islands.
- I have asked that a plan be developed by Thanksgiving that would give us a "way ahead" on reductions in states with both weak recruiting and persistent end-strength shortfalls. Our goal would be to start making adjustments early in the new year. We will work with Ray DuBois on any BRAC implications (Tab B).
- This is also an opportunity to rebalance, by taking reductions in areas where we have generous capacity, and adding units in skills that are in short supply.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

cc: Mr. DuBois

OSD 15894-04



11-L-0559/OSD/037422

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~

OCT 06 2004

201 OCT 13 11:10:24

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Recruiting

How are you going to **fix** this problem where you have uneven performance by different states that shows we end **up** with weak recruiting?

Thanks.

Attach.
USD(P+R) Memo to SecDef 9/20/04
DHR:ss
100504-9

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15894-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037424



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

INFO MEMO

2004 SEP 28 PM 6:14

September 28, 2004 - 5:00 PM

Paul Butler

9/29 fmb

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Current Recruiting and Retention Results

- Active recruiting continues to meet quality and quantity goals (Tab A). But the Army FY 2005 Delayed Entry Program ("reservations") is about half the preferred size. The Army is deploying additional recruiters and using existing bonus authority more aggressively. We will know in about two months if these steps are sufficient to sustain needed results. In the meantime we are looking at expanding other programs (e.g., Blue to Green).
- Reserve recruiting is satisfactory except for the Army National Guard (Tab B). Indeed, the Air National Guard had a banner month in August (130% of goal) and may therefore make its number for the full year. The Army National Guard will fall short about 5,000. We will be focusing on state by state results, and accelerating restructuring from states with weak recruiting to those with stronger recruiting, among other actions.
- Active retention: Navy and Air Force retention rates reflect force shaping initiatives aimed at balancing manpower skills and assisting with force reduction. All active components continued to experience retention success through August of FY04 (Tab C).
- Reserve attrition continues to be favorable (Tab D). Survey results predict worse attrition in the future, but it has not yet occurred. New bonus authority in the House version of the authorization bill would help significantly.

+

RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

Attachments :

As stated

TSA SD	9/29
SRMA SD	
MA SD	8/25 7/25
EXEC SEC	8 9/29

Prepared by: CAPT Wellock, (b)(6)

OSD 14845 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037425


TAB

B

~~FOUO~~

10/6/04 16A
NDP

OCT 06 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
David Chu
CC: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Adjusting of Guard and Reserve Units

Please be sure to talk to Ray DuBois about how you plan to adjust the Guard and Reserve Units to fit recruiting and how that might link to BRAC.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100504-19

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037427

29
June 24, 2004

TO: Gordon England
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: H.T. Johnson

Thanks for your note about H.T. Johnson. I understand Mike Wynne is talking with him about how we might keep him engaged.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/23/04 SecNav memo to SecDef

6/22/04 ASecNav(I&E) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
062404-5

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15897-04

020NAVY

29JUN04

1/23
16.5

June 23, 2004

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England

Re: HT Johnson


Mr. Secretary,

Attached is a letter of resignation for Mr. HT Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for I&E. HT has been planning to resign for some time, but he is more than willing to forego other opportunities and serve in a non-PAS but leadership position to manage the DoD BRAC process. As you may be aware, HT Johnson is a retired **four-star** Air Force general and served on the 1993 BRAC Commission. He is quite likely the most capable person in the DoD to run the BRAC.

In my judgment, BRAC is somewhat like the National Security Personnel System, meaning it is at least as complex as designing an aircraft carrier, but with much greater implications for the Department. I strongly urge your personal consideration to have HT Johnson perform this responsibility for you. Timing is important as HT will be leaving on July 16 unless a BRAC leadership role is available.

Thanks.

Gordon



Eric.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

June 22, 2004

Memorandum Thru the Secretary of the Navy, 1000 Navy Pentagon,
Washington DC 20350

For the Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington DC
20310

Subject: ~~Letter~~ of Resignation

I have thoroughly enjoyed working for you and Secretary England but it is time for me to move on to other endeavors. Consequently, I am forwarding this copy of my resignation to the President. It has been a distinct pleasure and an honor to serve as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment). The experience has had a profound and lasting effect on me.

I have the utmost respect and admiration for the noble men and women who serve this great Nation. It has been a privilege to serve you, the Administration, and the Nation.

Hansford T. Johnson
Hansford T. Johnson

7/1330

72

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Questionnaire

Let's make sure with Senator Warner that if we do send up Fran Harvey for Army, and switch him out of the communications job, that they won't require a new questionnaire that he will have to fill out. Please see if that is the case, on a confidential basis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062404-11

.....
Please respond by 6/30/04

ExecSec

RdN

close out snowflake.

OSD 15898-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037431

230.02

24 Jun 04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 2, 2004.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Powell A. Moore", is written over a horizontal line.

Subject: Response to Snowflake regarding Questionnaire

- Fran Harvey will be allowed to submit the questionnaire that he submitted last November, unless there have been changes and these changes should be included in the resubmitted questionnaire. Moreover, there undoubtedly is a new tax return for calendar year 2003 for which the Committee will ask.
- Concerning the advance policy questions, the advance policy questions for the position of Secretary of the Army will be different than ones for the Assistant Secretary of Information and Network Integration. New responses will be requested.

Attachment:
SECDEF Snowflake 062404-11

11-L-0559/OSD/037432

~~FOUO~~

June 26, 2004

6/24

334 NSC

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PCs and NSCs on Iraq

We regularly have PCs and NSCs on Iraq, where the Pentagon always briefs. There is a great deal more going on in Iraq beyond security, including governance, essential services, the economy, the diplomatic side of keeping our coalition partners in the game, getting additional partners, solving the MEK issue, progress in developing the ministries, plans for the elections, solving the Kurd displacement issues, etc.

We ought to suggest to the NSC when they try to schedule Iraq briefings with DoD briefing that other departments should put together briefings on other subjects of interest. We need to make it clear that Iraq is not simply a security issue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062504-1 (tr computer).doc

Please respond by _____

6/28/04

DR 7/1

→ SD

~~FOUO~~

I've had better luck pushing for such non-DoD briefings at DC meetings than at PC or NSC meetings. I'll continue to work this with Hadley.

Doug Feith

OSD 15899-04

265440A

file

June 29, 2004

T-04/0088/17
ES-0006

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT ASEAN

The intel suggests we ought to strengthen our relationships with the ASEAN countries.

Please give me a list of them, and tell me what we are doing with them and what we might do in addition.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062904-1 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

7/12/04

DA 8/30
J 8/30

Sir,

Response attached.

V/R,

Lt Col Lemmyel 8/30

OSD 15900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037434

09M

29 Jun 04

AUG 24 2004

DepSecDef

USD(P)

I# 04/008817-ES

FS-0006

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Mr. Peter W. Rodman) (b)(6)

26 AUG 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Regarding Strengthening Relations with ASEAN (U)

- (U) You asked what are we doing with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and what more we might do.

Background:

- ASEAN was established in 1967.
- Its founding members: Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia.
- Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995.
- Laos and Burma joined in 1997. Cambodia became a member in 1999.

US Relations with ASEAN Core Countries:

- (U) **Thailand:** Thailand, a treaty ally, has deployed troops to OEF and OIF. Thailand is considering leaving a "remnant" of its troops behind when their second deployment to OIF ends in September. State and DoD are looking for ways to support this through the use of FMF to underwrite the upgrading of Thai peacekeeping training facilities.
- (U) **The Philippines:** We are re-assessing defense relations with the Philippines in the wake of Manila's decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq. **YOU'VE BEEN FORWARDED A SEPARATE MEMO ON THIS SUBJECT.**
- (U) **Singapore:** A crucial friend that has provided critical facility access. We are developing a bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement.
- (U) **Malaysia:** Under PM Abdullah Badawi, who succeeded Mahatir in late 2003, bilateral relations have improved. We should keep defense relations professional and low key and support Malaysian efforts to promote moderate Islam.
- (U) **Indonesia:** Recent cooperation with the FBI investigations of the Timika murders opens the possibility of expanding mil-mil ties with Indonesia.

US Relations with "New" ASEAN Members:

- (U) **New Members** - Burma, Laos, and Cambodia joined ASEAN largely as the result of Malaysia's desire to include all the Southeast Asian countries (including Burma) in the Association in time for the 50th founding anniversary.
- (U) **Vietnam:** Bilateral defense relations are improving. A second USN ship visit was conducted in July/August 2004.
- (U) **Cambodia:** After consulting select lawmakers and Hill staffers, we are prepared to recommend restoring low-level military-to-military activity focused on counterterrorism assistance.
- (U) **Laos:** U.S.-Lao relations have improved. Laos signed an Article 98 Agreement in December 2003, continues to cooperate in POW/MIA operations, poppy eradication and controlling amphetamine production, and has assisted with regional CT efforts and acceded to some CT conventions.
- (U) **Burma:** U.S. relations with Burma remain tense in the wake of Burma's refusal to release Aung San Suu Kyi and recognize the 1990 election results. Burma is slated to take the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2006, a potential embarrassment for ASEAN. The U.S. should continue to work with ASEAN to bring pressure on Burma.

What More Can Be Done:

- (U) With the "core" countries, we are seeking expanded training opportunities, consolidating access arrangements, and sustaining and expanding commitments to supporting OIF.
 - In the case of the Philippines, we are reevaluating our military relationship in the wake of the Philippines withdrawal from Iraq. We will have a "way ahead" paper to you shortly. *(Sent August 27, 2004)*
- (U) With "new" members, the potential for expanding defense relations is limited either by the nature of the regime (e.g., Burma) or by the limited potential for meaningful defense relations (e.g., Laos).
- (U) The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a security forum established under ASEAN in 1996, has also recently established an annual Security Policy Conference for Vice Minister-level defense officials.
 - The U.S. is a full member of the ARF. OSD should plan to play an active and ongoing role in this new conference, including sending a senior OSD official to the inaugural Security Policy Conference in Beijing in October.

REVIEWED BY:

PD, ISA/AP A 12 Det

DUSD/AP A 12 RPL 12 Det

PDASD/ISA [Signature]

COPY TO:

Joint Staff J-5 APAC

June 30, 2004

7/2
1730
Paul Butler
See Det

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressman Hunter's Legislation

Please make sure we get a copy of Duncan Hunter's legislation on being able to acquire materials fast. Apparently it passed the House.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063004-7

.....
Please respond by

7/2/04

7/8
C7/7
Sir,
Response attached.
w/CDR Wosenzo
7/7

7/2
1430

OH 7/8



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 2, 2004 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Powell Moore", written over a horizontal line.

Subject: Response to SECDEF Snowflake regarding Congressman Hunter's Legislation,
063004-7.

- Attached is H.R. 4323, an Act to amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.
- The House passed it on June 14, 2004.

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflake
H.R. 4323

400

224028 301100

108th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 4323

AN ACT

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.

HR 4323 EH

108th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 4323

AN ACT

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY TO RESPOND TO COMBAT EMERGENCIES.

(a) IN GENERAL- Chapter 141 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

Sec. 2410p. Rapid acquisition authority to respond to combat emergencies

(a) **RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY-** The Secretary of Defense may rapidly acquire, in accordance with this section, equipment needed by a combatant commander to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities.

(b) **PROCESS FOR RAPID ACQUISITION-** Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a process for the rapid acquisition authority provided by subsection (a) and submit to Congress a detailed explanation of the process, including procedures to be followed in carrying out the process. The process shall provide for the following:

(1) A requirement that the process may be used only to acquire the minimum amount of equipment needed until the needs of the combatant commander can be fulfilled under

existing acquisition statutes, policies, directives, and regulations.

'(2) A goal of awarding a contract for the equipment within 15 days after receipt of a request from a commander.

'(3) In a case in which the equipment cannot be acquired without an extensive delay, a requirement for an interim solution to minimize the combat capability deficiency and combat fatalities until the equipment can be acquired.

'(4) Waiver of the applicability of all policies, directives, and regulations related to--

'(A) the establishment of the requirement for the equipment;

'(B) the research, development, test, and evaluation of the equipment; and

'(C) the solicitation and selection of sources, and the award of the contract, for procurement of the equipment.

'(5) Such other procedures or requirements as the Secretary considers appropriate.

'(c) **WAIVER OF CERTAIN STATUTES-** For purposes of exercising the authority provided by subsection (a) with respect to equipment, laws relating to the following shall not apply:

'(A) The establishment of the requirement for the equipment.

'(B) The research, development, test, and evaluation of the equipment.

'(C) The solicitation and selection of sources, and the award of the contract, for procurement of the equipment.

'(d) **LIMITATIONS-** The rapid acquisition authority provided by subsection (a) may be used only--

'(1) after the Secretary of Defense, without delegation, determines in writing that there exists a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities; and

'(2) to acquire equipment in an amount aggregating not more than \$100,000,000 during a fiscal year.

'(e) **SOURCE OF FUNDS-** For acquisitions under this section to be made during any fiscal year, the Secretary may use any funds made available to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year.

'(f) **NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS AFTER EACH USE OF AUTHORITY-** The Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees within 15 days after each use of the authority provided by subsection (a). Each such notice shall identify the equipment to be acquired, the amount to be expended for such acquisition, and the source of funds for such acquisition.

'(g) **COMBATANT COMMANDER-** In this section, the term 'combatant commander' means the commander of a unified combatant command with authority for the conduct of operations in a specific area of responsibility or who otherwise has authority to conduct operations at the

direction of the President or Secretary of Defense.'.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

'241 Op. Rapid acquisition authority to respond to combat emergencies.'.

Passed the House of Representatives June 14, 2004.

Attest:

Clerk.

END

file

June 30, 2004

TO: Eric Ruff

c c : Larry Di Rita
Matt Latimer

Larry Di Rita FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

7/20 SUBJECT: Roger Hedgecock Interview

Please give me a copy of the transcript of my interview with the San Diego talk show host Roger Hedgecock on June 30, and also give it to Matt Latimer.

Matt - please take a look at the transcript of this interview, and see if you can polish it up so we can use some of that material. It felt pretty good.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
063004-8

.....
Please respond by 7/4 104

7/20
good
done
7/22
Sir,
Reply attached.
v/r
LT Col Lengyel
7/20
OSD 15905-04

Det 7/22

FROM: Larry Di Rita 
TO: SecDef
DATE: July 13, 2004
SUBJECT: Roger Hedgecock Interview

You asked for a copy of the Hedgecock transcript. I am attaching one for your review. We also provided one for Mrs. Rumsfeld earlier.

We have provided the transcript to the writing team and Matt is using the the material as he develops future products for your use.



United States Department of Defense.

News Transcript

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?><http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040630-secdef0949.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>+1 (703) 428-0711**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Wednesday, June 30, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Roger Hedgecock, Newsradio 600 KOGO

Q: [In Progress]... he has been prominent in a number of private-sector firms and in a number of cabinet and congressional positions throughout his lengthy career, which began back in 1957. Secretary Rumsfeld, welcome to KOGO.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, thank you very much. Actually, my career began before 1957. I was a Navy pilot back in 1954. And even before that, I lived in Coronado, California, as a young man during World War II when my father was stationed out on an aircraft carrier.

Q: Well, there you go.

SEC. RUMSFELD: [Laughter]

Q: And you know, we love to hear that because there are obviously a lot of military people in San Diego and we have been through this station doing something called "Operation Homefront" mobilizing our listeners to help military families with, what, the broken transmission, the repair of the fence, whatever it is they need, during this time when their loved ones are deployed. So I want you to know that, that we're standing behind our military families.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I read that you were doing that and I do congratulate you and thank you for it. It's a wonderful thing that you do. And goodness knows, the families serve and sacrifice just as the men and women in uniform do and we're grateful to all of them.

Q: You bet. Secretary Rumsfeld with us. Let me get down to business here. You just got back from this NATO meeting in Turkey and I guess it's unclear to me how much, if at all, can we depend on our NATO partners with respect to any aspect of the burden we're carrying in Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, we've got I think it's 32 countries currently helping us in Iraq and I think that of those, probably 16 or 17 are NATO countries. And any numbers of others are NATO Partnership for Peace countries -- countries that are loosely affiliated with NATO. So we're really getting a good deal of support from the NATO countries individually. NATO as an institution's role in Iraq, thus far, has been restricted to helping the Polish Ukraine division in force generation and support.

But at the conference in Istanbul that I just returned from last evening, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed to take an additional step with respect to Iraq and that is to provide training and equipment assistance for the Iraqi security forces, which is a good thing. It's going to be a centralized activity supported by NATO countries to assist in training and equipping the Iraqis, so that they can take over responsibility for the security of their country.

Q: And those forces, we're reading a lot today, The Los Angeles times has a couple of articles about the people

11-L-0559/OSD/037445

in Iraq willing to sign up, even though they know it's a very dangerous duty to be policemen and in the new army to take this step toward freedom. Are they really up to the task? We found in Fallujah, unfortunately, what, a couple of months ago that some of those people were not ready and, in fact, joined the insurgents when push came to shove.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, what you have is as we went from zero to 226,000 Iraqis serving in various security forces today -- some in the army, some in the site protection force, some in the border patrol, still others working with the police and others in what's called the new Iraqi National Guard. It used to be called the Civil Defense Corps. When you go from zero to 226,000 in a year, obviously, you're going to have to do some vetting that requires you to make some changes. On the other hand, we've seen an uneven situation, but I would say overwhelmingly positive.

The police and the national guard and the site protection people received varying degrees of training. The army gets the most training and the best equipment, the other security forces get somewhat less training and less equipment. So if they're up against some well-armed terrorist that have rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47s and they have small weapons and side arms and pistols, obviously, they're going to get into a difficult dust-up. And you're correct, some of them have decided that the better part of valor is to move away and try it again another day. On the other hand, the idea that has been left by some that these forces just run and hide in their barracks is just flat untrue. More than 400 of them have been killed already, so they're not sitting around with their fingers in their ear, they're out there on the front line helping to provide security for the people of Iraq and God bless them for it.

And you're quite right, not only is it a dangerous business, but these folks are standing in line to be recruited to go in all of those security services and that's a wonderful thing because they're betting on the future of their country.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld with us. Let's talk about the size of the armed forces -- big issue here in San Diego, as I mentioned with the big military contingent in our community. We've got a situation where some of these folks have been held beyond their enlistment terms. The Reserves, of course, have been called up sometimes repeatedly. Private security people and other support contracts replacing what used to be duty done by armed forces personnel and now we've got headlines today on the recall of the Ready Reserves. You were once in the Ready Reserves; you know what that's about. Have the armed forces of the United States got enough people to do the tasks required?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We have in the active force about 1.4 million people. And in the Guard and the Reserve and if you include the Individual Ready Reserve, the people who are not training in ready units, we go up to somewhere over 2.3 million people. At the present time, we have about 200,000 in the Central Command's area of responsibility.

Now think of that. The force is stressed and we're only sustaining 200,000-plus in the Central Command region out of a total of 2 million. So the question is, well, why is that. Why is it stressful if you're sustaining a relatively small force percentage-wise and yet you find it's difficult? Well, one of the folks here, General Schoomaker, puts it this way. He says, think of rain barrel. And you've got a rain barrel filled with water. And you turn the spigot on and you can only access 10 percent of it because the spigot's up at the top of the rain barrel. See, you're only accessing a very small portion of that water.

Now the choice you have is to get a bigger barrel -- increase the size of the armed forces in this case -- or move the spigot down and figure out ways that you can have access to more of those people. And that's what we're doing. We're in the process of doing just that. We've got probably 300,000 military people who are engaged in tasks that could every bit as easily be conducted by civilians. We don't use contractors as skillfully and successfully as we probably could. We have a number of Reserve and Guard people who have either never been called up or have been called up very rarely over their entire careers. While at the same time, we have guard people that have been called up too frequently because they happen to be in a skill set that the United States, for whatever reason, didn't have on active duty.

So what we need to do is to manage the force smarter. We need to rebalance the reserve components -- the guard and reserves -- with the active force, so that we have the right people on active duty and the right skill sets there. We need to make better use of civilians -- both contractors and civilian employees -- and stop over-using uniform personnel in things they need not do. And my estimate is that if we do that skillfully, we'll find that we're probably sized about right, although we do need to increase the force, when we have a crisis like we have with respect to a war in Afghanistan after September 11th or a conflict in Iraq. But we can do that. We have emergency powers and we've increased the -- for example -- the army by something like 25[000] or 30,000 people over the last 2.5 years.

Q: Under any circumstances, Mr. Secretary, would a draft be necessary in the future, as you contemplate it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I can't imagine it. I just can't imagine it. There are people who can argue that a draft is a good thing because it gives everyone a chance to serve and understand the military and national service. Although it really never did, it never drafted women, only men, and it exempted people who were in school and people who were married and people who were teaching and a whole lot of exemptions they had. But in terms of the need of the services, goodness no, we're perfectly capable of increasing the incentives and the inducements to attract people into the armed services.

As a matter of fact, despite all the talk about the stress on the force, today we still are having very good results with respect to recruiting and retention. And we do not have a problem of attracting and retaining the people we need in the military. And if we ever did get to that point we should, in my view, do exactly what you do in the private sector and that's increase the pay and increase the incentives and the inducements, so that you can have the kind of skills and the numbers of people you need to help defend our country. We're very fortunate to have so many people raise their hand and say, "I want to volunteer to go in the United States Armed Forces," and they say, "send me" and God bless them for it.

Q: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In a related issue, and it's a big issue here in San Diego particularly in terms of supplying the military, Congress appropriates this money and then the Pentagon through all these mysterious ways, finally gets around to buying the stuff that soldiers need. And there's been a lot of controversy about whether the soldiers out there -- Marines and the soldiers -- are getting the body armor, the armored Humvees, all that. And Duncan Hunter, a congressman from this area, that's a chair of the Armed Services Committee in the House, has legislation that he calls "the rapid acquisition authority" because he's so frustrated with the time it takes, the lag time between the money getting appropriated and the stuff actually getting out to the soldiers and Marines. Do you support that kind of legislation, that approach?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I have not had a chance to read that precise proposal, but Duncan Hunter, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, of course, is a very strong supporter, a stalwart supporter of the men and women in uniform and he's a former service man himself. And he has paid a great deal of attention on the subject of shortages in areas that needed to be adjusted, for example, like body armor and up-armored Humvees.

There's been a little bit of misunderstanding about the body armor. There always has been ample amounts of body armor. But from time to time, people developed new techniques and new materials that can, in fact, provide additional capabilities. And so what they developed were some inserts that would go into the body armor that the service people had. And the manufacturer of that had to ramp up and produce it. But of course, it was new. It was brand-new stuff. And as a result, there were some people out there who did not have it in the early period and they ended up having to use people who were out in the spear point of the war getting the early portions -- the early deliveries -- of these inserts for their body armor. And people who were in the rear areas did not have it. Then what happened was during the course of the war, it turned out that the rear areas were vulnerable to attacks. Convoys and combat support people were vulnerable to attacks as well. And so it's been a task of seeing that it can get out there as fast as it possibly can.

The Humvees, of course, also were designed to have a certain ability to resist various types of attacks. When you then decide that you want to increase that capability by adding armor to an existing Humvee's protection capability, then you have to manufacture it and you have to attach it and see that it's there. The reality is that even a tank can be destroyed, and you've seen pictures of tanks and they're fully armored, not just up-armored Humvees, but they're fully armored.

Q: Well, this issue was taken up in the opinion journal in The Wall Street Journal opinion page by Brendan Miniter on Tuesday on this issue of the Hunter legislation. It passed the House. And the interesting thing was that Mrs. Pelosi abstained after criticizing this very thing, the administration not getting necessary equipment to the troops. She abstained on this bill. But it did pass 285-97 and goes over to the Senate. So I think on behalf of Mr. Hunter, although I haven't talked to him, but this rapid acquisition authority addresses an issue of bureaucratic lag time that simply is not up to -- in the minds of many people -- the need. Do you agree with that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I do. I think basically what we have is we've had over our history since World War II basically an idea that we were either in war or we were in peace and that we were in peacetime constraints. And of course, since we don't have a declaration of war and we're not in World War III, all of those peacetime constraints and procedures and auditors and contract rules and competitive bidding, all of that pertains. And the effect of it is that you end up in a war on terror, like we're in, losing lives and yet you are still required to adhere to the rules of peacetime, because we don't have gradations of between war and peace and therefore we need to find a way to live in this 21st century where threats can come at you from the shadows and from ungoverned areas in ways that are not predictable, as they were, for example, during World War II or during the Cold War, for that matter.

Q: Secretary Don Rumsfeld, the secretary of defense. A couple of other issues I want to get to were weapons of mass destruction and the Supreme Court rulings. And so quickly, on the weapons of mass destruction, obviously, the opposition to the administration says we should never have invaded. The Bush administration lied about the WMD, never found any, never were any, etcetera, etcetera. Now, I'm reading recent reports in fairly easily accessible published accounts that Syria is holding the weapons of mass destruction or some of them, that others were destroyed, that others might still be hidden in Iraq, etcetera. What is the status on WMD? And if Syria is holding any of them and you guys know about it, how come we haven't heard about it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, let me respond this way. The decision to go to war was a concern on the part of, first, the president, then the Congress of the United States and ultimately the United Nations that Saddam Hussein had had weapons of mass destruction, had used them on his neighbors in Iran and had used them on his own people in Iraq -- chemical weapons -- that he was known to have various other WMD programs and that he was required by the United Nations over a period of some 17 resolutions to file a declaration declaring what he had. And everyone agreed he had filed a fraudulent declaration as to what weapons of mass destruction he had. The debate as to whether to go to war was not whether or not he'd filed a fraudulent declaration. Everyone agreed to that. The only question was should you give him another chance, should you wait and go 18 resolutions or 19 resolutions, another five years or however many.

Now what's actually happened? Right now you have the Iraqi Survey Group, which is a multinational group that's out there reviewing documentation and looking at suspect WMD sites. I was with the Polish minister of defense this weekend in Istanbul, Turkey at the NATO Summit. And in the course of that, he pointed out that his troops in Iraq had recently come across -- I've forgotten the number, but something like 16 or 17 -- warheads that contained sarin and mustard gas.

Now these are weapons that we always knew Saddam Hussein had that he had not declared and they have tested them and I have not seen them and I have not tested them, but they believe that they are correct that these, in fact, were undeclared chemical weapons -- sarin and mustard gas -- quite lethal and that is a discovery that just occurred within the last period of days. If you think about -- most people remember the image of where Saddam Hussein was captured in that hole -- that pit that he was living in. That pit, that hole in the ground was probably big enough to hold chemical and

biological weapons sufficient to kill tens of thousands of people. And therefore, it is not hard to hide things in a country the size of California. It's quite easy to hide things. In fact, we finally found a bunch of jet aircraft that they've buried underground.

In answer to your question on Syria, there have been a lot of intelligence speculation and rumors and chatter about the fact that Saddam Hussein may have placed some of his weapons of mass destruction in Syria prior to the start of the war. Until that can be validated and proved, you'll find people in the administration not talking about it.

Q: All right. Let's talk about the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in a somewhat surprising ruling on the rights of enemy combatants has kind of put the administration in a tough spot -- because I suspect I can almost smell lines of lawyers lining up -- to file lawsuits in federal courts on behalf of these enemy combatants at GTMO and maybe otherwise, what's going to be the administration response, at least as far as Department of Defense?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, thus far, it's been silence and consideration. I was in Turkey and so I was not back here. I just came in last night and really have not had time to talk to people who have studied several decisions -- three or four. My guess is what they'll do is they will fashion a plan that will enable us to move forward in as reasonable a way as makes sense, given the fact that we are in a new -- we have new set of facts in the world. We have a large number -- small percentage wise, but a large numbers -- of tens of thousands of extremists radicals who are determined to kill innocent men, women and children using terror as their weapon of choice to terrorize the world into making it fit an image that they would want. That is to say a world that has a small handful of clerics running it, an end of nation states and bringing down moderate regimes of that religion and preventing the cultures of other nations in other parts of the world to influence what they prefer to see as the way they want life lived.

This is a very dangerous threat to the world. It's a dangerous threat because they are the kinds of people who go around cutting off people's heads and cutting off their hands and as we saw Saddam Hussein putting pliers in their mouth, pulling their tongues out and cutting them off, shoving people off the tops of buildings, filling up mass graves with tens of thousands of bodies. These are people who have little or no respect for human life and they are determined and we need to be equally determined.

The problem we've got is they know precisely what they want. They have a strategy, they have a plan. They are determined to prevent democracy from prevailing in Afghanistan. They're determined to prevent it from prevailing in Iraq. And the rest of the world is still trying to figure out what's happening. The rest of the world, we see terrorist attacks in Bali, we see it in Madrid, we see it in Turkey and in the United States and in Indonesia. But the world is still trying to sort through all this and what it really means, while the enemy knows what they're doing and they're determined to prevent the kinds of progress that is occurring in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

We need to have -- as they say in the military, a more common threat assessment in the world of the moderates, the people who were not running around trying to tell everyone else how they must live their lives. And we're in a long struggle, a serious struggle, where human life is at risk. And we need to be resolute. We need to be steadfast. We need to recognize the nexus between extremists and weapons of mass destruction means not simply 300 people can be killed or 3,000 people as on September 11th, but it means 300,000 or potentially millions of people can be killed to the extent extremists, as we've seen recently on television cutting people's heads off, to the extent those people gain access to still more powerful weapons, biological weapons, for example, or radiation weapons.

So we're in a critical time in the history of the world. We need to allow free people to come to free decisions about what it really means, but we don't have the luxury of being careless or inattentive.

Q: So with regard to these enemy combatants then, do you think these military tribunals which have been announced will begin processing these people in terms of trials? Do you think the folks at GTMO are going to be moved somewhere else? What's the response?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, as I say, I'm sorry I'm just not in the position to respond. I'm not a lawyer. The lawyers are poring over these decisions trying to find out what the implications are. And at some point, there'll be policy meetings that will take the best legal judgments and come to some conclusions about what the appropriate steps might be. We have to constantly recognize that what we are are a free people and that is our essence. And we cannot give up our rights and the things we value so much, simply because we're terrorized by terrorists. We have to learn how to live in this 21st century. And that means we have to, with respect to the peacetime constraints on contracting but so, too, with laws and interpretations and procedures. We have to find a way to live in this world that protects the men and women and the children in our country. And by golly, we're determined to do that and at the same time, protect them in a way that's consistent with the values that we have and the freedom we respect so much and the thing that makes it the single most productive and free society on the face of the earth.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld. I know you have to go. I want to ask you if you can give us an update or any information at all of a Camp Pendleton Marine who was held captive, Cpl. Wassef Ali Hassoun. What's the update on him?

SEC. RUMSFELD: As I say, I've been overseas and traveling until late last night and I would be reluctant to try to pretend that I could give you a precise update. We have people who can do that, but I'm not in that position.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, we appreciate your time. Thank you for your service. I have an opportunity to say that on behalf of all of us here in San Diego. And please be aware that at least in this part of the media, we are concerned about those military families in supporting them during this tough time for them, too.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, we appreciate that a great deal. And as someone who was selling newspapers at the Coronado Ferry on VJ Day in 1945, I want to say hello to all those folks out in that part of the world. It's a wonderful part of the world.

Q: Indeed, it is. Thank you very much for being with us here at KOGO.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you.

Q: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040630-secdef0949.html>

June 15, 2004

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Session

Colin Powell went to the Joint Session for Karzai and I didn't, and it looked bad.
We were told he wasn't going to go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061504-13

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15906-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037451

Afghanistan

15 Jun 04

8/15

FYI

9:40 a.m.

Memorandum To: SecDef

From:

Mary Claire Murphy

Mary Claire

Re:

Karzai Joint Session of Congress

Just FYI,

I just got a call from Sec. Colin Powell's scheduler that late last night,

Secretary Powell **DID** in fact decide to back out of the King Abdullah

meeting at the WH, and re-arranged his schedule so that he could be at the Joint

Session of Congress this morning with President Karzai.

June 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan Detainees

I was confused as to what Karzai was talking about in terms of detainees. He apparently was referring to the fact that it takes too long to get them processed in Afghanistan, not the GTMO folks.

Please set up a process, and tell me what you propose to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-30

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

OSD 15907-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037453

72
June 14, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Seating Charts

Please have your folks put down who these people are when they prepare a seating chart, so it is on the seating chart.

For example, it should show on the chart that Qasimi of Afghanistan is the Minister Advisor for Legal & International Affairs and what Salih's title is. It doesn't show it on the seating chart. It is really unhelpful. If I am looking at the seating chart, I need to know what their jobs are.

Thanks.

Attach.

Protocol read-ahead for 6/14 Karzai visit

DHR:dh
061404-27

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15908-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037454

Afghanistan

14 Jun 04

**READ AHEAD: HONOR CORDON, MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT KARZAI OF AFGHANISTAN**

FROM: Ms. Mary Claire Murphy, Director of Protocol, (b)(6)

Monday, June 14, 2004

3:00 p.m.

River Entrance/SecDef Dining Room

You have agreed to host an Honor Cordon and a meeting with His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan. (See Tab 1 for read ahead from Policy.) You last met here with President Karzai February 2003.

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. (9) vs. Afghanistan (9), (List of participants at Tab 2.)

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

3:00 p.m. You greet President Karzai curbside, for the Honor Cordon.

You and President Karzai are escorted to the Dining Room. He will sign the guest book followed by a photo. (See Tab 3 for seating.)

3:25 p.m. Meeting Concludes. You and President Karzai will be escorted to the 911 Memorial for a brief tour.

3:35 p.m. You and the President arrive at the Memorial.

3:40 p.m. You and the President step outside of the building for a press avail near the cornerstone.

3:45 p.m. Press avail concludes. You bid President Karzai farewell and return to your (approx.) office escorted by Mary Claire Murphy and Security.

Attachments

Tab 1	Read Ahead (from Policy)
Tab 2	List of participants (from Policy)
Tab 3	Seating (from Protocol)

**List of participants for SecDef meeting with the President of Afghanistan
June 14, 2004**

Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Honorable Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Honorable Zal Khalilzad, United States Ambassador to Afghanistan
The Honorable Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
Lieutenant General Tome Walters, Director of DSCA
Dr. Bill Luti, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Special Plans, Near Eastern and
Southern Asia
Lieutenant General John Craddock, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Mr. Kurt Amend, Note taker


Afghanistan Delegation

His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan
His Excellency Abdullah Abdullah, Foreign Minister
His Excellency Ali Ahmad Jalali, Minister of Interior
His Excellency (Dr.) Zalmay Rassoul, National Security Advisor
His Excellency SaidTayeb Jawad, Ambassador of Afghanistan (Tentative)
Mr. Enayatullah Qasimi, Minister Advisor for Legal & International Affairs
Mr. Amrullah Salih, National Directorate of Security
Mr. Mohammad Umar Daudzai, Chief of Staff, Office of the President
Mr. Jawed Ludin, Spokesperson

SECDEF meeting with President Karzai of Afghanistan

Monday, June 14, 2004 3 p.m.

SecDef Dining Room

Mr. Amend, notetaker		Mr. Ludin Spokesperson
Dr. Luti		Mr. Qasimi
Mr. Rodman		Dr. Zalmay Rassoul National Security Advisor
Mr. Feith		HE Abdullah Abdullah MOFA
SecDef		President Karzai
Gen Myers		HE Ali Ahmad Jalali Minister of Interior
Amb Khalilzad		HE SaidTayeb Jawad Afghan Ambassador
LTG Walters		Mr. Salih
LTG Craddock		Mr. Daudzai Chief of Staff

June 14, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Nominations

Andy Card claims that the military nominations will go out of the White House today, including Casey.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-26

.....
Please respond by _____

SECDEF

A bunch of noms did clear the WH on 6/14 ... 9 out of 17 ... including Casey/Cody.

There are still some critical noms there.

- Broadwater (to go to COS, EUCOM) is the most time-critical
- John Craddock, since we need to get him confirmed in July
- DJS, J-3, J-4

OSD 15935-04

The CNO (Clark) reappointment, package having been in the SASC for months, now is critical. He must be confirmed by 7/19.

11-L-0559/OSD/037458

Staser 6/15

012

6/19

14 JUN 04

10/21
7922
Paul Butler
TO SecDef

PWB
6/23

EF-9913
04/008302

June 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Previous Foreign Meetings

When I am meeting with somebody I have met with previously, and in the previous meeting they had asked me for certain things, my briefing for the current meeting ought to explain what was asked the last time and what has happened in the intervening period.

They seem not to do that. Each one seems to start fresh.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-18

.....
Please respond by _____

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

June 21, 2003

Captain Marriott,

Please see attached memo from Mr. Feith to Policy offices concerning "Read Aheads for Meetings with Foreign Dignitaries."

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 15936-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037459

TEN
6/23
SIR,
Response attached.
v/cor Nasenzo
6/23

C 6/23
W 6/24

02050

1450404



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



JUN 18 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND
DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *JF 6/18/04*

SUBJECT: Read Aheads for Meetings with Foreign Dignitaries

Reminder regarding read aheads:

Show the meeting start and end times, how to address the guest (e.g., Your Royal Highness, Mr. Minister or Mr. Smith) and pronunciations.

Using the templates as a checklist will help.

Read aheads should refer back to the previous meetings with the Foreign Dignitary. What was discussed? What is status of the action items from the previous meeting? Put background information and recommended talking points within the same set of bullets.

To do quality control properly, we need the read aheads, if possible, two days before the meeting.

Thanks.



11-L-0559/OSD/037460

720
June 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Report on Investigative Oversight

Attached is a report on detainee abuse you should be aware of and have the appropriate people look into.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/10/04 Deputy IG ltr to SecDef re: Status of Detainee Abuse Investigative Oversight

DHR:dh
061404-16

.....
Please respond by _____

145004
OSD 15938-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037461



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

SecDef -
~~For your Information~~
C611
DA 6/14

June 10, 2004

FOR: SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: L. Jerry Hansen, Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT: Status of Detainee Abuse Investigative Oversight

- For the week ending June 4, 2004, the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) reported an increase of 18 new detainee abuse investigations bringing the total to 127 investigations. Of the 127 investigations, 69 were in a facility and 58 others. Twenty-four cases were unit investigations conducted by commanders. Of the 127 investigations, 39 involved the death of a detainee - 35 in a facility and 4 others.
- For the week ending June 4, 2004, three new death investigations were reported: two involved deaths due to natural or undetermined causes, and a third occurred after an engagement between soldiers and civilians in An-Najaf. Subsequent to the engagement, two wounded Iraqis were captured. One of the injured was deemed terminal by a medic. When the medic departed, a US Army captain allegedly shot the detainee in the head, killing him. The investigation is continuing.
- Other CID misconduct investigations included 14 new assault cases and one sexual assault case (bringing the number of sexual assault cases to four). In the latter, a detainee at Abu Ghraib reported that a translator sodomized another detainee while a female soldier took photos. Investigation continues.
- The 14 new assaults cases were largely initiated based on reports by detainees in Iraq. In two cases, robbery was also alleged. One case involved a Special Forces soldier in Afghanistan who was alleged to have assaulted several citizens believed to be affiliated with the Taliban. One of the 14 cases was determined to be unfounded. No new investigations were reported this week from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.
- The attached chart depicts current weekly reporting to the Office of Inspector General of all investigations, inquiries, reviews, etc., concerning detainee abuse in the Department.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As Stated

cc: Special Assistant to SecDef (Mr. Pete Geren)

Prepared By: Jim Pavlik, Dir., Investigative Policy & Oversight,



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037462

June 14, 2004

TO: ExecSec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Charles Wick

Recently Charles Wick sent me a letter. I would like to get it and see if I answered it. If not, I want to answer it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
(K) 1404-5

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15939-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037463

W 355D

14 Jun 04

June 14, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
Col. Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Saleh

When I have this Saleh man in for lunch or a meeting, I want Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, Bill Luti and probably Bill Winkenwerder. If someone wants to suggest someone else to be added, we could do that.

His competence is generally in Afghanistan and Iran.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-1

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15940-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037464

Yemen

14 JUN 04

June 14, 2004

TO: Mary Claire

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: OSD Support for Reagan Events

You and your team really stepped up for the Reagan ceremonies this past week. It was terrific that you did it, and did it so well by all reports.

Thanks so much.

DHR:dh
061104-10

.....
Respond by _____



335 SD

1474404

OSD 15941-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037465

S.1g

June 14, 2004

7/20
J

330 11

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Maria Shriver

Larry Di Rita
7/20

I am told that Schwarzenegger's wife, Maria Shriver, does an awful lot for the military wives at Camp Pendleton and other places in California. Would you please check into that?

We should know what she is doing and whether or not we should thank her. Should other people be doing similar things?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061104-8

.....
Please respond by _____

7/22

Sir,
Reply attached.
v/r,
Lt Col Lengyel
7/20

14 JUN 04

OSD 15942-04

FROM: Larry Di Rita

TO: SecDef

DATE: July 13, 2004

SUBJECT: Maria Shriver

all 7/22

We are considering events for Maria Shriver to participate in.

The attachment highlights what she has done and areas in which she is interested. We will continue to develop opportunities where she might be appropriate and helpful

She may be in Washington soon and apparently has expressed an interest in meeting with you.

OK ☒ Write her & say I'd like to
see her when she is in

Discuss ☐

D. C

all 7/22

Outreach to U.S. Troops
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and California's First Lady Maria Shriver

Past:

- Governor Schwarzenegger meets with U.S. and coalition service members throughout the Persian Gulf. Schwarzenegger also showcases newest movie Terminator 3 (July 2-3,2003).
- Mrs. Shriver speaks at Specialist Pat Tillman's memorial service, HP Pavilion, San Jose, California (May 3,2004).
- Governor Schwarzenegger meets with 500+ service members (including the injured), and escaped hostage Thomas Hamill at Ramstein Air Base, Germany (May 4,2004).

Future:

- Mrs. Shriver intends to make issues surrounding military families, where a spouse is deployed overseas, a high priority. Two issue examples provided were:
 - (1) availability of adequate grief counseling for surviving spouses; and
 - (2) requirement that surviving spouses vacate base housing within six months.

Upcoming USO Events Designed to Support the Troops:

- NFL players assisting with opening of USO Center in Qatar
Date: June 28 (T)
- Morale tour with actor Vince Vaughn
Locations: Afghanistan, Kuwait and Iraq
Dates: June 28-July 5
- Fourth of July tour with Wayne Newton, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Lewis Dix and Miss USA
Location: Korea
Dates: July 2-5
- USO/Walter Reed visit to Manhattan (troops to receive tickets to David Letterman Show, Broadway, sporting events)
Date: July 14
- USO musical show with the band Sugar Ray at the return of the USS Ronald Reagan
Location: San Diego, California
Dates: July 22-23
- USO Gala honoring our troops with Wayne Newton
Dates: October 14

JUN 14 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Rotations

I just got briefed by the Marines. I asked them to tell me why they should not do 12-month rotations and why they should do the 7 months they are doing.

I would be interested to hear from you as to why you think you should keep doing 12-month rotations, and, if you were to change to 6, 7, 8 or 9 months, how you would do it and what would be the pros and cons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-23

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

OSD 15943-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037469

300.2

1474404



~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310
26 JUL 2004



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths

In response to your June 14, 2004, memo, while the Army would prefer to reduce deployment durations to six or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six months is the optimal deployment length, allowing the Army to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the stresses separation generates on our volunteer force. However,

- There is insufficient depth within the Army's Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12 months without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the Army's ability to meet CENTCOM's total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the Army's combat unit deployment length to nine months could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by shortening unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current 12-month rotation policy, meeting CENTCOM's requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom 3 and Enduring Freedom 6 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units – measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers. This number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operation Iraqi Freedom 4 and Enduring Freedom 7.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15943-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037470

3202

26 Jul 04

14 Jun 04

June 10, 2004

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ray Reynolds

Let's get a letter off to Ray Reynolds from the Iowa Army National Guard. That is a nice e-mail he sent out.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/8/04 E-mail

DHR:dh
061004-17

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15944-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037471

IRAQ

10JUN04

Joyce Rumsfeld

From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) <taaron@aripub.com>; (b)(6) <dbarile@MWAV.com>; (b)(6) <Chris.fitzgerald@abnamro.com>; <bruce@devicetech.net>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)>; (b)(6) <Hahnsix@Ameritech.net>; <Dhenley@formcometal.com>; (b)(6) <therese.ikoma@cna.com>; <Sjager21@attbi.com>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)>; <Sparks@Pwnzor.com>; (b)(6) <hmentel@Royaldie.com>; (b)(6) <m.morford@sbcglobal.net>; <Sid.Paterson@plitek.com>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)>; <Tomr@micro-solutions.com>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)>; <schumani@bellsouth.net>; <softconf@mc.net>; <rsope@imt.net>; (b)(6) <htopping@rtcind.com>; (b)(6) <(b)(6)>
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 7:06 AM
Subject: well said

Subject: Fw: The Real Story

This is a letter from Ray Reynolds,
 a medic in the Iowa Army National Guard, serving in Iraq:

As I head off to Baghdad for the final weeks to say thanks to all of you who did not believe the media. They have done a very poor job of covering everything that has happened. I am sorry that I have not been able to visit all of you during my two week leave back home.

And just so you can rest at night knowing something is happening in Iraq that is noteworthy, I thought I would pass this on to you. This is the list of things that has happened in Iraq recently: (Please share it with your friends and compare it to the version that your paper is producing.)

- * **Over 400,000 kids have up-to-date immunizations.**
- * School attendance is up 80% from levels before the war.
- * Over 1,500 schools have been renovated and rid of the weapons stored there so education can occur.
- * The port of Uhm Qasar was renovated so grain can be off-loaded from ships faster.
- * **The country had its first 2 billion barrel export of oil in August.**
- * Over 4.5 million people have clean drinking water for the first time ever in Iraq.
- * The country now receives 2 times the electrical power it did before the war.
- * 100% of the hospitals are open and fully staffed, compared to 35% before the war.
- * Elections are taking place in every major city, and city councils are in place.
- * Sewer and water lines are installed in every major city.

- * Over 60,000 police are patrolling the streets.
- * Over 100,000 Iraqi civil defense police are securing the country.
- * **Over 80,000 Iraqi soldiers are patrolling the streets side by side with US soldiers.**
- * Over 400,000 people have telephones for the first time ever
- * Students are taught field sanitation and hand washing techniques to prevent the spread of germs.
- * An interim constitution has been signed.
- * Girls are allowed to attend school.
- * Textbooks that don't mention Saddam are in the schools for the first time in 30 years.

Don't believe for one second that these people do not want us there. I have met many, many people from Iraq that want us there, and in a bad way. They say they will never see the freedoms we talk about but they hope their children will. We are doing a good job in Iraq and I challenge anyone, anywhere to dispute me on these facts. So If you happen to run into John Kerry, be sure to give him my email address and send him to Denison, Iowa. This soldier will set him straight. If you are like me and very disgusted with how this period of rebuilding has been portrayed, email this to a friend and let them know there are good things happening.

Ray Reynolds, SFC
Iowa Army National Guard
234th Signal Battalion



June 10, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mails

We are moving ahead on the e-mails. They are sorting them now. Before they go up, we are going to have to make sure that Roche knows they are going to go up, and that the people who are mentioned in the e-mails know about it.

We do not want to simply do it. We want to make sure it is done right.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-16

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15945-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037474

413.51

10 Jun 04

file

6/14/04

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Nuc-Chem-Bio

[Handwritten signature]

JUNE 9

I got briefed by the Defense Science Board yesterday on dealing with nuclear weapons. It is kind of a single shot, just like yours was a single shot on chemical.

In any event, it was a pretty good briefing. Bill Schneider set it up. I told him I would get him a hearing with Tom Ridge and Spence Abraham. I have talked each of them, and they both have agreed.

Would you please coordinate that, so that it happens? I would like you to see and see what their reaction is. You can call their offices, and remind them that is what I talked to them about and that they agreed they would like to see the briefing.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
061004-14

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

Sir,
Response 4/11/04
7/24
14 Jun 04
7/22
COLB
OSD 15946-04

DB 7/24

July 22, 2004

To: Secretary of Defense
From: Ken Krieg 
cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Bill Schneider
Subject: Snowflake on Nuc-Chem-Bio (attached)

Stan Szemborski and I met yesterday with Rich Wagner, chair of the DSB task force, who briefed you June 9.

We had a very good conversation on his work and agreed on exchanging data and ideas for inclusion in the follow-up work that we are doing coming out of last week's SLRG on combating weapons of mass destruction.

In particular, we had a very good discussion on thinking through how to characterize the cost-benefit and capabilities evaluation of the broader portfolio of investments on active defenses. It was an extremely worthwhile conversation.

Rich Wagner has a meeting scheduled with Secretary Ridge for next week and a meeting with Secretary Abraham in the next couple of weeks (it was originally scheduled for this week, but the Secretary had to move his schedule around). I will work with Rich to make sure you get their reactions.

11-L-0559/OSD/037476

June 9, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
c c : Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Hunter-Rogers Petition

If we have not gotten a thank you to Duncan Hunter and Rogers and all the people on that list by now, there is something wrong with our system.

My impression is that it takes way too long to get responses to Congressional mail. Please show me what tracking system you have, how it works and what the average time for responses is.

In addition, please get to me fast with notes with respect to the Hunter-Rogers petition.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-10

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15947-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037477

032

9 Jun 04

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Warner Matter

Please have someone contact Ray DuBois, and tell him that I need him to get back to me and tell me how we handled the matter with John Warner and the Eisenhower Corridor date.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-6

.....
Please respond by _____


OSD 15948-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037478

032

25 Jun 04

June 10, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Non-lethal Riot Agents

I need someone in your shop to craft a memo from me to the President about the non-lethal riot agents problem.

We are not able to do the things we ought to be able to do. Apparently the treaty is so restrictive that we are able to use lethal force, but not non-lethal force, which is of course an unfortunate outcome. I am sure it was not the intent of the treaty.

Let's see what we can fashion for me to begin to work on this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-2

.....
Please respond by

6/25/04

OSD 15949704

11-L-0559/OSD/037479

370.61

107404

June 9, 2004

TO: Pete Geren

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Warner

What is the status on this May 13 letter from John Warner?

Thanks.

Attach.
5/13/04 Sen. Warner Ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
060904-23

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

Closed (urgently) 6/16/04

SD provided with
answer - IDW meeting
w/ Mr. Geren + Mr. Murphy
in June 16, 2004.

OSD 15952-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037480

1383.6

400004

MAY - 13 '04 (THU) 17:32

S A S C

TEL

(b)(6)

P. 002

pu 49

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United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8050

May 13, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your participation and assistance in facilitating the recent hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by certain members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Committee has held two important hearings, to date, but the complexity of this issue requires that more hearings be held to establish a body of fact needed for oversight by the Senate. The Committee fully understands that the availability of some witnesses and material is affected by the conduct and completion of ongoing investigations, as well as operational requirements in Iraq.

On behalf of the Committee, I request that the following officials be made available to testify, in open session, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, at an early date: Ambassador Paul Bremer, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority; General John P. Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command; Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Honorable William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, USA, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), as well as the senior Judge Advocate General Officer who was responsible for the legal review of authorized interrogation techniques; Major General George R. Fay, USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army; Major General Barbara G. Fast, Director for Intelligence, J-2, CJTF-7; Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, USA, Deputy Commander for Detainee Operations, CJTF-7; Major General Donald J. Ryder, USA, Provost Marshall General, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, USAR, Chief, Army Reserve; and Lieutenant General Stephen H. Blum, USANG, Chief, National Guard.

To date, in scheduling, the Committee has tried to meet your requirements, and we hope to continue such cooperation in arranging the earliest possible date for appearances of these witnesses. Given that some witnesses may need to remain in Iraq for operational reasons, we are open to exploring the option of video teleconferences for some hearings.

11-L-0559/OSD/037481

The objective of **these** hearings will be to document all aspects of detainee operations in Iraq, **including: the policy for the treatment of detainees in Iraq; the chain of command at Abu Ghraib prison; military doctrine and procedures for the conduct of interrogations; the readiness of military units in Iraq to conduct detainee operations; the evolution of interrogation policy and procedures in Iraq, as it related to the overall security situation; and, the status of completed and on-going investigations into detainee and interrogation operations in Iraq. As the body of fact concerning the mistreatment of prisoners is assembled, the Committee may determine the need for additional military and civilian witnesses from the Department.**

During the hearing conducted by the Committee on May 11, Lieutenant General **Keith B. Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army**, discussed the interrogation techniques authorized for use in Iraq. He testified that all interrogation techniques, including those requiring specific approval from higher authority before being employed, were deemed to be lawful and acceptable under the Geneva Convention. Subsequent inquiries by the Committee have determined that the evaluation of so-called "harsh approaches" has been the subject of significant discussion and legal review within the Department of Defense. The Committee requests that all legal reviews and related documentation concerning approval of interrogation techniques for use in Department of Defense intelligence gathering operations, including in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, be provided to the Committee.

The Department has been cooperative in providing documents and materials regarding allegations of prisoner abuse in Iraq. The Committee's standing request for all relevant documentation, including International Committee of the Red Cross reports to the Department on abuse of prisoners in U.S. military custody, is important in carrying out our oversight responsibilities.

As you determine the availability of witnesses and requested materials, please have your staff coordinate with Mr. Charles W. Alsup (b)(6) of the Committee staff, to determine specific hearing dates and administrative arrangements.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter,

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,



John Warner
Chairman

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

720
June 9, 2004

TO: Pete Geren

cc: / Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld. *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter to MG Miller

How have we handled this letter from Jane Harman to Geoff Miller? Did we do what was suggested to just refer it to Porter Goss? How did we answer it?

Thanks.

Attach.

5/21/04 Cong. Harman Ltr to MG Miller

DHR:dh
060904-22

.....
Please respond by

6/18/04

Closed 6/16/04
(w/ing)

SID briefed on status
on June 16, 2004. I am
meeting w/ Mr. Geren +
Mr. Ingles.

OSD 15953-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037483

383.6

920004

04619

RAY-21-2004 FRI 05:25 PM HOUSE INTELLIGENCE

FAX NO. (b)(6)

P. 02

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 L. CHRISTINE HENLEY, DEMOCRATIC COUNSEL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-8415

May 21, 2004

*SecDef -
 Have heard this
 will be in the
 press shortly etc*

Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, USA
Deputy Commander for Detainee Operations
for Multi-National Force Iraq
Commander Joint Task Force 7
Headquarters Command Group
CPA-APO AE 09335

Dear General Miller:

Less than 24 hours ago, you met with the Committee to discuss detainee and interrogation policies and practices. While I appreciate your willingness to appear, I am dismayed that information emerging immediately after your briefing raises questions about the candor and accuracy of your statements.

A Pentagon briefing for reporters yesterday provided new details about the development of interrogation policy for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to the briefing, as reported in today's *Washington Post*, the original policy approved by Secretary Rumsfeld in late 2002 was almost immediately challenged by military lawyers, triggering an intense, three-month debate among legal experts, intelligence officials, and others. In particular, Defense Department officials reportedly confirmed yesterday that a group of senior military attorneys sent a memo on February 5, 2003. This debate led to the issuance of new guidelines in April 2003.

In addition, press reports about the contents of the October 12, 2003 interrogation policy issued by General Sanchez, a copy of which has not been provided to us, seems to indicate a role for Military Police that goes well beyond the passive intelligence collection role that you have described.

Finally, there were also press reports yesterday evening regarding an alleged Delta Force detention facility near the Baghdad International Airport that engages in coercive interrogations.

While the substance of your briefing to the Committee cannot be publicly discussed, we depend upon your complete candor and full

NO. 826

ONLINE-WOOLN30

MAY 21, 2004 5:27PM


11-L-0559/OSD/037484

Major General Geoffrey D. Miller
May 21, 2004
Page Two

disclosure. If information is *only* provided in response to a question that is phrased in precisely the right way, it is virtually impossible for Congress to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibility.

I am disappointed and request a prompt explanation of the gaps and discrepancies in your presentation.

Sincerely,



Jane Harman
Ranking Democrat

June 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gingrich Memos

Please make sure all of these Newt Gingrich memos get to Geren, Maples and Cambone.

Thanks.

Attach.
Gingrich memos

DHR:dh
060904-21

Please respond by _____

OSD 15954-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037486

383.6

9 Jun 04

cc: Bulter
Craddock

2/6/4

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: for secdef-close abu ghraib immediately-newt

RJ

from Newt
5/08/04

close Abu Ghraib immediately

this prison is a symbol of everything wrong in saddam's dictatorship and now a symbol of american violations of the rule of law

closing it would be a significant symbolic step towards 'cleaning things up'

it should be announced immediately and done within 30 days

the closing should be a public event when the last door is closed

newt

11-L-0559/OSD/037487

5/8/2004

CC: LTG Craddock
Butler
Di Rita

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2004 8:03 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@ack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: we are on a slippery slope in apologizing-newt

From Newt
5/5/04

I am very worried about the tone that is building. We are on the edge of slipping from Reaganism into Jimmy Carterism

I am submitting the following op ed today

A SUICIDAL DOOUBLE STANDARD by Newt Gingrich

The coverage of the violations of American law against Iraqi prisoners is in grave danger of setting a suicidal double standard for America and the Arab world. Americans must be very careful in explaining how we feel and what we will do. Otherwise our enemies will use our own words as an excuse to establish a suicidal double standard for behavior.

Some Americans did a terrible thing. They will be investigated and where guilty punished. We do this because we protect our own constitution and we live under the rule of law.

The incident is something to be condemned.

The process of exposing the wrongdoing, investigating the charges, having a fair and honest trial of the accused with a presumption of their innocence until proven guilty, and punishing the guilty is something we should be proud of and clear about.

Explaining our anger at these misdeeds and our determination to punish the wrong doers is appropriate. Appearing overly contrite or overly apologetic will be a big mistake.

The anti-American left is already on radio and television exploiting this as an opportunity to exploit and opportunity to condemn America.

The primary Arab media said nothing when the Syrian dictator destroyed Honna and killed 30,000 plus innocent people.

11-L-0559/OSD/037488

5/5/2004

The primary Arab media said nothing when Saddam used poison gas on his own people and created 300,000 anonymous graves.

One CNN official wrote an article admitting that they had deliberately covered up and ignored Saddam's atrocities to retain access to Baghdad. A policy of caution which of course is not reflected in their coverage of charges against America.

The primary Arab media said nothing negative when Americans were mutilated and drug through the streets of Fallujah.

The primary Arab media said nothing negative when two gunmen ambushed a woman last Sunday in her station wagon and at point blank range methodically killed her four daughters age two to eleven, killed the eight month old baby she was carrying, and then killed her.

One American newspaper, with a half page dedicated to the allegations of brutality in Iraq, referred to the Sunday killing of a mother and five children as "violence marred the Sunday Likud election". No outrage, no shock, no horror, just another day of viciousness and brutality by our enemies.

There is a suicidal double standard building where Arab viciousness, terrorism, mutilation, and barbarism are normal behavior not to be commented on but any American error, including those we will uncover and punish ourselves, are proof of our guilt.

This is the road to Jimmy Carterism.

We should firmly state our commitment to our values, our condemnation of any American acts which violate those values and our explicit commitment to punish the guilty within a process of fairness and the rule of law.

With equal firmness we should demand of the Arab governments and the Arab media their condemnation of barbarism, brutality and terrorism in their own communities.

Finally, we should angrily reject anyone who would smear the 200,000 plus courageous decent men and women who have risked their lives for a free Iraq and a safe America. Any effort by the anti-American left of the Arab world to generalize this into a smear on America or on America's armed forces should be totally, directly, repudiated and condemned.

cc Craddock
Butter

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 8:19 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: urgent Tilly Fowler on Monday.

from Newt 5/10/04

(C)

Urgent

you do not have time for Tilly Fowler to do an investigation and then report

you need to move Tilly front and center today so the country starts to focus on the investigation rather than the scandal

if Tilly Fowler is going to be your lead on the outside review of the prisoner scandal you should try to get her to the meeting with the President at the Pentagon today.

Time is not on our side.

The House and Senate members need to see something to get them to calm down and hold off as the bad news keeps coming.

Tilly would have real credibilitiy on the hill. The investigations she conducted in the Clinton administration while she was still on the House Armed Services Committee and the investigations she conducted for you at the DPB can all be laid out for the press as proof of why she is the right person.

She should be:

1. built up in the press today and tomorrow
2. sent to the Hill for the week to meet with members and find out what questions they want answered
3. be given unlimited access to people and information
4. add three non-DPB prosecutors to her panel to increase credibility (the DPB is too insider for our critics to take its report as totally reliable)

11-L-0559/OSD/037490

5/10/2004

5. have a consistent press operation both in the **US** and in Baghdad

the news is going to get worst and the Republican members on the Hill will start breaking ranks this week unless they have something to cling to

Tilly can be the person who lets them have an answer back home and to the media and in the floor debates when the Democrats are attacking

This must happen early this week or the whole situation could unravel with stunning speed

you want Tilly rather than secdef to be the person answering questions on next sundays shows

then she can go do the investigation with a lot of publicity from Baghdad

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 2:59 PM
 To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil
 Subject: secdef from newt

Copy provided to LT6
 Craddock only!

per Newt's request.

(C)

F+R

for secdef.
 from newt 5/08/04.

the urgent need for a strategic plan to redefine the prison scandal.

Trent Lott never understood how dangerous his situation was until it was too late.

As Speaker I never understood the corrosive power of constant hammering until I had been deeply weakened. Even when the charges were totally phony the weight of their being charged had impact and the repetition was debilitating and distanced my allies who got tired of defending me,

Dan Quayle never understood how he was being defined until the definition became unshakable.

The current moment is much more dangerous than people realize and it cannot be solved by tactical steps taken in response to events.

You have to assume that this scandal has just began.

There are active opponents of President Bush who would love to use this scandal as a method of weakening and defeating the President.

There are active opponents of American policy in Europe, the Middle East and the American news media who are delighted and invigorated by a chance to keep us on defense and to potentially define us as hypocrites and incompetents at best and willing doers of evil at worst.

There are supporters of the President who will see dumping the Secretary of Defense as an inexpensive way of saving the President.

There are Republicans in the House and Senate who have had their feelings hurt over the last three and a half years by you and your team who will see this as an easy way of getting even.

All of these forces come together to create efforts to undermine, exaggerate, and exploit which will go on until one of four things happen:

11-L-0559/OSD/037492

5/8/2004

1. you leave and a new face is given a honeymoon;
2. the corner is turned and your visible action steps and clear explanations give you dominance over your critics;
3. the issue burns out and other issues replace it in the media's attention span;
4. the election occurs and the issue is made moot.

I assume 1 is not going to occur. I would deeply, passionately oppose your leaving because it would cripple the President with his base (it would be an act of Jimmy Carterite weakness) and it would be an historic injustice to you and a significant weakening of our national security capability at a key point in this war on terror.

The the best option is to turn the corner by taking such visible actions and explanations that your critics leave the field because they are losing.

It is very dangerous to assume that you can simply outlast the issue because it will take on a life of its own and new problems will erupt to keep you on defense.

Turning the corner requires three immediate steps in parallel:

1. create a very small strategic advisory group to think beyond each day and to develop action plans that enable you to regain the offense. This kind of group cannot have daily responsibilities and have to be tasked with redefining the entire set of issues onto terms favorable to you and the President. Three possible members of such an informal advisory group would be Randy Evans (my attorney and Hastert's attorney and a world class litigator who instinctively thinks strategically and works at regaining the offense by redefining the fight), Paul Johnson (the Washington head of Fleishmann-Hillard the most respected public relations firm in the world and the largest public relations contractor with the federal government--both Powell and Ridge recently praised their work-- and a good former House Republican administrative assistant from Michigan); and Bob Walker--now the head of Walker-Wexler and a board member of Hill and Knowlton. A small kitchen cabinet of these kind of outside strategic thinkers would give you far more options and would enrich dramatically what Dirita is trying to get done. They would also give you a lot of connectivity with realities that may not be obvious inside the Pentagon.

2. Establish a series of action items that can start rolling out Sunday night or Monday on a daily basis so you are back being in charge and getting things done. Time in the short run is not on your side and you have to reestablish a sense of command and clarity. Two examples would be closing the prison and appointing an outside civilian group of three prosecutors to review everything outside the military chain of command and ensure that the American rule of law is reestablished both for this problem and as doctrine and regulations for future occupations (prosecutors who had served in the military or graduated from the academies would be ideal).

11-L-0559/OSD/037493

5/8/2004

3. You need to establish a mantra of determination to uncover what happened, punish the guilty, reestablish faith and trust with the Iraqi people by proving that a democracy protects the innocent and punishes the guilty and ensuring that safeguards are built to prevent this from happening in the future. Clinton developed a mantra in december 1995 of saving medicare, medicaid, education and the environment which they knew polled well and which they repeated maniacally. You need a similar mantra of guidelines you can use with the media, the congressm the public and the military and then use to communicate with Iraqis and the Middle East

These three steps would optimize your ability to start getting things under control and get back on offense

Let me know how I can help.

cc: Craddock
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:02 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: for secdef-urgent from newt ON PACE AND RESILIENCE

for secdef
from newt 5/11/04

④

URGENT-PACE AND RESILIENCE

This is a difficult period.

you remain the most expensive and most valuable national security asset this country has.

Because the problems are geoeing to be very complex and involve great conflict (there is an election going on at home, we have active enemies overseas, and we have a world media that loves to bash Americans so conflict is unavoidable), your health, energu, optimism and resilience are vital.

George Marshall had three heart attacks before World War Two and his doctor told him he could either learn to work a limited day and delegate like crazy or he could train his successor because after the fourth heart attack someone new would be Chief of Staff. Marshall later said this was the advice which enabled him to run a global war.

You should follow Marshall's regimen:

1. Take one full day a week off and a weekend every three weeks;
- 2, set priorities of which managing Iraq, handling the principals level national security council and dealing with the media and Congress should belong to you (you are the closer, no one else can do these three); everything else should be explicitly delegated with Wolfowitz and Myers coordinating the delegated zones;
3. outside Iraq, nes media and Congress you should only be asked to decide things which myers and wolfowitz can't decide.

you MUST pace yourself to retain energy and resilience

11-L-0559/OSD/037495

5/11/2004

cc Craddock
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 11:20 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: immediate publicity for Fowler and the investigative mission-newt

It is vital to get Fowler in the media as soon as possible. This will move the spotlight from the pictures and problems of the past to the investigations and reforms of the future.

She should do media through the sunday shows and then we will have imprinted that we are in a new stage with a new set of leaders who are looking at everything from a fresh viewpoint.

This will embolden our allies to argue our case and it will calm down and satisfy the independents who are undecided. Because of Tilly's reputation and personality it will also calm a lot of the liberal Democrats and force them to slow down and wait for the report.

This only occurs if she is in the media enough to force through the message that we are in a new period with a new personality.

Simply appointing the DPB group and then having them disappear into an investigative mode accomplishes nothing in the near future and it is the near future that is critical.

Furthermore Tilly is a new face and a new personality and this will give the media an opportunity to be positive and interested in someone new. She will almost automatically lower the rhetoric and the intensity of the coverage.

Tilly has a very clear set of messages she can stick to. They will be very reassuring to the American people and yet will not prejudice the investigation in any way.

Her primary talking points ought to be:

1. she has done a number of investigations and there is a systematic pattern of finding the facts, exposing and prosecuting the guilty, and learning what we need to change to improve the future:

2. as a former member of Congress she will work very hard to meet the concerns of her former colleagues in the House and Senate and to ensure that when the investigation is done they will be satisfied with the report as they have been

11-L-0559/OSD/037496

5/11/2004

satisfied with other reports she has made in the past.

3. as someone who has sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution she knows full well how precious our commitment to the rule of law and our belief that every person is endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights is. She believes fully that those principles extend to anyone under American custody and she will approach these investigations with those principles in mind.

4. Schlesinger and she have been reassured that they are leading an independent investigation with full access to the facts and with full ability to learn and explore wherever it leads to. She is convince the President and the Secretary of Defense are serious about getting at the truth and she intends to be very tough in ensuring that they get the truth.

5. She fully expects to brief her former colleagues and to satisfy their interest in every aspect of this difficult problem. She is taking the time to ask their adviser and to ascertain their concerns so that when the report is done it will have more than met congressional expectations.

6. as a former elected official she realizes fully the obligation federal officials owe the American people and she will do everything she can to ensure that people look back on this period as a sad moment of failure in a great system and that they will be convinced problems have been fixed, systems have been improved, the guilty have been punished, and America is upholding its obligations to its own citizens and to people around the world. That is why she is willing to take time off from her job at the law firm to undertake this assignment for the Secretary and the President.

June 9, 2004.

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Results of Interrogations

We ought to have something that shows the kinds of information that interrogations have produced by way of intelligence to save people's lives.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060904-19

.....
Please respond by

6/18/04

Closed - 6/16/04
~~to~~

SID provided with
Results of interrogations
being back on June 16, 2004
ICW meeting w/ Mr. Geren
4ME Mptbr.

OSD 15955-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037498

383.6

070004

TO me Goren
May 21, 2004
9:30 AM

May 21, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Examples

We should try to get unclassified examples of the intelligence value that has been achieved by interrogations. Information has enabled us to capture other terrorists and to save people's lives. Let's try to do this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-37

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Theater Interrogation Operations Highlights

(July 03 - May 04)

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Intelligence Gathered

- **Order of Battle:** Foreign Fighters, Sunni-Arab Resistance, Terrorist Groups
- **Spentech Technology:** Former Regime R&D, WMD capabilities, VBIED cell research, covert MAMPAD exploitation, proliferation
- **Counterintelligence:** Former Iraqi Intelligence Service, Force Protection
- **Political/Military:** Iraqi Tribal Groups, Religious fundamentalist politics, Former Regime Elements
- **C3I Structure/Strategic Alliances:** Financiers, Third country ties, weapons, foreign fighter, financial support, and Anti-coalition emergent leadership

Intelligence Produced

- Interrogation led to capture of Saddam Hussein
- Insurgent/terrorist C2 structures, weapons caches, financial support and operating bases
- Over 4,000 interrogations under combat conditions resulting in 1,000+ reports since July 03.

Key Operational Support

- **Top 55 of Former Regime:** Bada Corps disarmament, Combat Operations in Fallujah, Ramadi, An Najaf, Karbala, Al Kut, Kut, Mosul's M.L.M., Force Protection, Former Regime, 30 Jun 04 transfer to sovereignty

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results- what did we do with this?
Winter 03	Detainee gave information that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein. Arrested for his support of Saddam Hussein since the fall of Baghdad. Detainee provided information on other Saddam enablers. Interrogations included information on some of Saddam's wealth being smuggled into a third country. Over 70 Intelligence Reports produced.	Facilitated capture of Saddam Hussein and other Ba'ath Party officials. Information of distribution of Saddam Hussein's wealth.
Winter 03	Interrogations provided initial profiles of associates of Saddam Hussein. Also detainee stated that a relative knew the locations of hidden weapons caches due to his position and influence. Over 200 Intelligence Reports produced.	Used information to locate and destroy weapons caches.

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results- what did we do with this?
Detained Spring 04	Detainee was captured in association with a major, known terrorist organization. Detainee provided critical information on the group's communications. Detainee provided geographical information about other terrorist agents. Detainee has also provided information concerning the organization's financial methods and details on the structure, tactics, and messaging. Over 20 Intelligence Reports produced.	Currently exploiting networks. Developing leads on agents. Building a comprehensive understanding of this organization's role and agenda in Iraq.
Summer 04	Detainee provided general information on three previous locations of Saddam Hussein. Reported on Ba'ath Party cells outside of Iraq. Gave insight into former regime insurgent groups. He believed that only two people in Iraq would know of WMD existence. Names were passed to Iraq Survey Group. Over 200 Intelligence Reports produced.	Biographic and location information since capture of 3 of top 55 mass warner. Helped identify former regime elements involved in oil pipeline sabotage.

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results- what did we do with this?
Winter 04	Key leader in global terrorist organization. Provided information on media venues for various terrorist propaganda operations. Interrogations have shed light on foreign fighter support before the coalition invaded Iraq. Nearly 30 Intelligence Reports produced.	Provided current and past terrorist network structure. Information used to target and attack the terrorist network.
Spring 04	Provided information on the activities of Muqtada al-Sadr and his organization to include the breakdown of the Office of Muqtada Al Sadr (OMS) throughout Iraq, Sadr's security procedures, OMS financing, and Sadr's key lieutenants. Nearly 10 Intelligence Reports produced.	Aided in the capture of other members of Sadr's network, including key lieutenants.

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results- what did we do with this?
Winter 04	Detainee is an intelligence officer from the former Iraqi Intelligence Service. He served as an agent and trainer. Detainee reported reliably on the location of Sadr's family in a third country, as well as his movement patterns and hiding places in Najaf. 11 Intelligence Reports published.	Identified leader of uprising in Fallujah. Positively identified other former regime intelligence officers.
Winter/ Spring 04	Detainee is suspected of being associated with the Zarqawi network. A Foreign Fighter that entered Iraq to join the jihad against coalition forces. Detainee provided information on a safe house location associated with the marshalling of foreign fighters from a neighboring country into Baghdad. Detainee claims to have met with Zarqawi on three separate occasions. 8 Intelligence Reports published.	Provided actionable intelligence in support of current operations.

[illegible]

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED.	Results—what did we do with this?
Spring 64	<p>Detainee claimed to have been in the process of performing his duties (JPF Internal Affairs). Subject was involved in attacks on Coulton and JPF forces. Subject transported weapons and ammunition for Maglada's Militia between locations. Detainee was in the possession of a bulletproof vest, a weapon, and an unknown amount of mixed currencies. Detainee provided extensive information regarding structure and organization of Maglada's Militia. Detainee provided information on how and where to find both forged and real passports from other countries (including national courthouses).</p>	<p>Used detainee to positively identify captured members of insurgent group.</p>

10 Intelligence Reports published.

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - What did we do with this?
Spring 84	<p>Detainee is a confirmed foreign fighter from a neighboring country. Detainee was detained during a raid to apprehend another High Value Target. He was captured with two other foreign nationals and two Iranis.</p> <p>Detainee admitted to infiltrating into Iraq to fight Jihad against Coalition Forces. States that he has become disillusioned with the cause and desires to return to his country. Detainee stated that he was misled into thinking that Coalition Forces were raping and killing innocent Iraqi Muslims, he says he now knows this is not true. According to detainee he has spent 3 1/2 years in the US learning English.</p>	<p>Gained insight into recent foreign fighter recruiting. Identified other countrymen involved in this recent fighting</p>

Date Received	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Summer 83	Detainee reconfirmed biographical data given during previous interrogations. He provided names and titles of department directors at the Iraqi Nuclear Agency and reconfirmed current locations of the agency. Detainee was willing to go into Baghdad to pinpoint locations of people wanted by Coalition forces.	Used information to identify anti-coalition individuals associated with those with the ability to proliferate nuclear information.
Fall 03	Multiple Intelligence Reports Detainee stated the man who attempted to recruit him to join a ship in the Gulf was in Iraq. He said he had a photo of the man and his name was Latif one month prior to the start of the war. Subject was the former SOI director Ned Baghdadi four days prior to the fall of Baghdad and no one has seen him since. Stated that he would be able to provide trouble makers if given a list of Iraqi intelligence Agents.	Continue to detain for suspected crimes against humanity.
	6 Intelligence Reports	

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	how it was obtained	Results - what did we do with this?
July 03	Discussed Saddam's security tactics to include doubles. Discussed Saddam's whereabouts, most access detainees had to Saddam Hussein. Detainees had witnessed Saddam's sons remove millions of dollars from Iraq and had knowledge of the distribution. To Saddam in Iraq around the beginning of April	body issue Saddam's banks see saw	Coalition Forces were able to recover or trace some of the funds from Saddam's distribution.
July 03	1 captured in the possession of the following York bank account statement for over 20 foreign passport day planner listing most days from 1981 to 1991. (JH) (AD) (S)	less S, was for (ers)	Passed to the JH.

Multiple Intelligence Reports

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Fall 93	General Officer claiming to have relinquished his Baghdad Party membership in 1992 so that his position as head of a humanitarian committee would be viewed as more diplomatic than political. Detainee claims that the Republican Guard had knowledge of Captain Michael Speicher's fate. Detainee reported that Iraqi POWs who refused to come home after the Iran/Iraq war were working with Iranian supported groups and performing attacks on coalition forces.	Information on Speicher passed to ISG. Provided information on Iranian influence in post-Saddam Iraq.
Winter 94	Multiple Intelligence Reports published. Detainee is well known in a regional terrorist organization. Provided information on various personalities, insurgent group leaders, and routes into to a specific border country and details for an unspecified assassination plot. 16 Intelligence Reports published.	Resulted in raids against insurgent supply routes and names of regional insurgent and terrorist leaders.

theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

IIS Sponsored IED and VBIED Project

The Explosives sections of the Iraqi Intelligence Service's (IIS), were created to supply the IIS, Saddam Fedayeen, and the Iraqi military with explosives, detonators, and the vessels used to conceal the explosives. Due to the projects specializing mainly in the creation of IEDs and VBIEDs,

Through Interrogations of the detained IIS project members, the Coalition learned of bomb making techniques that were proliferated to various anti-coalition groups in Iraq that continue to improve upon and develop these IEDs and VBIEDs.

The intelligence from the project allowed Coalition Forces to conduct raids against several bomb producing cells and to develop several countermeasures to IED employment.

June 9, 2004

TO: Pete Geren

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings on Detainees

I hope you folks are keeping a master list of all the briefings before Congress, to everybody, where we talked about detainees, including the breakfasts here.

It seems to me we are going to want to have that list and maybe get it out there soon to blunt the attack that we are not talking to Congress, we are not briefing them, and they don't know what is going on, because they do, and we should have that list. We should think about getting it into the hands of our friends up there.

Let me see what it looks like.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060904-17

.....
Please **respond** by 6/18/04

OSD 15957-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037503

383.6

9 Jun 04

June 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Roles and Missions

Let's think through who we want to be at a meeting with Brownlee, Schoomaker, Myers, Pace, and maybe Jim Haynes to talk about roles and missions and the fact that it ought to go up from McKiernan through the Army chain.

We ought to figure out who is supposed to do what, and whether or not we need some clarification in administrative orders or the law.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060904-15

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15960-04

W
2
6

9 Jun 04

June 9, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thoughts for the Remarks on Abuse Issue

383.6

The first thing that has to be said is that we know there is still more information to come, investigations are underway, and new information will develop as the investigations are completed. That having been said, there are some things that can be asserted now:

1. At least thus far, we have not seen anything that suggests that a senior official of the US Government, military or civilian, authorized or encouraged guidance or authorization to those managing custody of detainees that permitted them to use torture or to treat any detainee in anything other than a humane manner as directed by the President.
2. Further, thus far, we are not aware of any detainee who was, despite the President's instructions, tortured or treated in an inhumane manner for the purpose of interrogation.
3. The photos from Abu Ghraib depict mistreatment of detainees, but thus far our information shows that any such mistreatment would be contrary to the guidance, instructions, procedures and techniques that have been in place at various times since September 11, 2001.

DHR:dh
060904-8

Please respond by _____

970004

OSD 15967-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037505

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Meet w/Gingrich

Let's get Newt Gingrich in for lunch, so I can talk to him about his discussion on the size of the Army. Maybe have Pete Schoomaker there.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/4/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
060904-6

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15969-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037506

060.7150

9 Jun 04

cc: Craddock
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 8:27 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: the army is too small-newt

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt 6/04/04

it is untenable to argue the Army is the right size

it is a direct contradiction of the Secretary's warning at West Point that we are in the early stages of a long war

it is impossible for average Americans to believe that the Army is the right size but we have to rely on reservists and guardsmen on a continuing basis and we now have to extend service involuntarily

I do not care what the studies and higher ups are telling you as an Army brat who went through the Eisenhower reductions in forces in the late 1950s as a child this combination of events is going to weaken the Army

finally, it is impossible to explain to the American people why the Army is the right size when their neighbors are called up and service is involuntarily extended

I cannot defend the current size and when asked I am going to say the Army should be larger

Kerry will win this debate

this is a repetition of the 1960 Nixon mistake of defending America's strength against Kennedy's charge of a missile gap--the country decided Kennedy was right even though he was wrong

for the first time in decades Republicans are now on the weakness side of a defense issue and giving the Democrats an easy way to be on the pro-defense side of more strength.

You should call for a significant increase in Army end strength and a significant increase in the Army budget to cover that cost without eating into the rest of the Army's program

11-L-0559/OSD/037507

6/7/2004

if this is a long war then let's start acting like its a real war and budget accordingly

to repeat: I personally cannot defend the smaller Army position and I would support a substantial increase in both Army strength and the Army budget

this is both a national security and a political issue and the administration is wrong on both

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Airline Tickets

Please have somebody look into the facts behind this article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Margasak, Larry. "Pentagon Wasted Millions on Airline Tickets, GAO Says." *Washington Post*, June 9, 2004, p. 8.

DHR:dh
060904-3

.....
Please respond by

6/25/04

OSD 15972-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037509

62487

62487

Washington Post
June 9, 2004
Pg. 8

Pentagon Wasted Millions On Airline Tickets, GAO Says

By Larry Margasak, Associated Press

The Defense Department spent an estimated \$100 million for airline tickets that were not used over six years and failed to seek refunds even though the tickets were reimbursable, congressional investigators say.

The department compounded the problem by reimbursing employee claims for tickets the Pentagon bought, the investigators said.

To demonstrate how easy it was to have the Pentagon pay for airline travel, the investigators posed as defense employees, had the department generate a ticket and showed up at the ticket counter to pick up a boarding pass.

The General Accounting Office of Congress issued the findings in two reports on the Pentagon's lack of control over airline travel, copies of which the Associated Press obtained yesterday. A prior report, issued last November, found that the Pentagon bought 68,000 first-class or business-class airline seats for employees who should have flown coach.

"At a time when our soldiers are patrolling the streets of Iraq in unarmored Humvees, and when the Bush administration is asking for record defense spending, Secretary [Donald H.] Rumsfeld is letting hundreds of millions of dollars that could be used to protect our troops and our country go to waste," said Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky (D-Ill.), one of three lawmakers -- along with Republican Sens. Charles E. Grassley (Iowa) and Susan Collins (Maine) -- who ordered the studies.

The GAO estimated that between 1997 and 2003, the Defense Department bought at least \$100 million in tickets that were not used or used only partially by a passenger who did not complete all legs of a flight. The waste went undetected because the department relied on individuals to report the unused tickets. They did not.

The Pentagon said in a written statement that it is working to ensure it receives credit in the future for each unused ticket.

"We take this deficiency in our procedures very seriously and are moving swiftly to establish proper management controls. The long-term answer will be the automated Defense Travel System [DTS] that controls the travel order and payment process from beginning to end," the statement said. "DOD is researching the data presented in the GAO report and will continue to pursue the amounts we determine are recoupable."

The reimbursable tickets had no advanced purchase requirements, minimum or maximum stays or penalties for changes or cancellations under department agreements with the airlines.

While one GAO report focused on the unused tickets, the second investigation found potential fraud. It said the department paid travelers for tickets the department bought and reimbursed employees for tickets that had not been authorized.

11-L-0559/OSD/037510

- A limited review of records for 2001 and 2002 identified 27,000 transactions totaling more than \$8 million in reimbursements to employees for tickets bought by the government. These figures represent only a small portion of the potential fraud, the GAO said.

It is a crime for a government employee knowingly to request reimbursement for goods and services he or she did not buy.

7201
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEP 21 2004

2004 OCT 13 PM 3:1

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Manning of **Standing** Joint ~~Task~~ Forces

We **simply** have to **address** the problem of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of fighting wars. Please come back to me with a proposal.

Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the wars are over. That is **not** acceptable in this day and age. Please come back with a **first** cut at a **proposal** soon – no later than Oct. 1. **This** is something we have been wrestling with in the **building** for 3 and a half years. We have to adapt to the imperatives of the 21st century.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Manning Timeline

DHR:sa
091304-17


.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

0 SD 15980-04

TAB A

11-L-0559/OSD/037512


CJTF-7 Manning Timeline



- activated
- J1 receives Phase IV JMD from CJTF-7
- Instruction published
- DETCOM forwards multiple JMD changes to JFCOM
- informs DETCOM that the JMD is frozen for P&SR
- 6 23 Jan 04: JFCOM, JS J1 P&SR: Services agree to source 598 of 640 (93%) IAs in CJTF-7 Phase IV IA requirements
- 7 11 Feb 04: JFCOM releases message tasking Services to fill CJTF-7 IA requirements.
- 8 15 Apr 04: P&SR for MNF-I/MNC-I. End of CJTF-7 JMD
- 9 15 May 04: MNF-I/MNC-I stand-up. CJTF-7 stands down
- 10 15 Jun 04: MNF-I/MNC-I FOC



CJTF-7 Manning Timeline





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

10 OCT 2004
CM-2119-04

13 October 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Manning of Standing Joint Task Forces

- **Issue.** "We simply have to address the problem of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of fighting wars. Please come back to me with a proposal. Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the wars are over. ...Please come back with a first cut at a proposal soon--no later than Oct. 1." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** USJFCOM is developing a concept on forming, training and sustaining Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ). To address immediate manning concerns, a short-term solution will be provided to you by the end of October.
- **Discussion**
 - Regional combatant commands are on track establishing Standing Joint Force Headquarters in fiscal year 2005, as directed by the 2003 Defense Planning Guidance.
 - USJFCOM is developing a process for forming and sustaining future JTF HQs. It is taking a comprehensive approach, in collaboration with the Services, combatant commands and other agencies, which includes organizing, equipping and training future JTF HQs.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: RADM Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

0 SD 15900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037515

TAB A

SEP 21 2004 204 OCT 13 PM 3:30

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Manning of Standing Joint Task Forces

We simply have to address *the problem* of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of *fighting wars*. Please come back to me with a proposal.

Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the wars are over. That is not acceptable in this day and age. Please come back with a first cut at a proposal soon – no later than Oct. 1. This is something we have been wrestling with in the building for 3 and a half years. We have to adapt to the imperatives of the 21st century.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Manning Timeline

DHR:s
091304-17

.....
Please respond by 9/29/04

OSD 15980-04

TAB A

11-L-0559/OSD/037516

~~FOUO~~

October 13, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith
VADM Jim Stavridis
Paul Butler
AMB J.D. Couch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Romania



I should not have gone to see the base in Romania. It leaves the impression that I might select it, and, if I don't, it turns out to be a negative for our friends in Romania.

Let's avoid this in the future.

Thanks.

DHR:as
101304-1

.....


Please respond by _____

ROMANIA

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16010-04

13 Oct 04

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: June 6, 2004
SUBJECT: **William Mayer Article**

Let's make sure we get that William Mayer "D-Day" article out to as many people as you possibly can, as fast as you can. Send it out internally, and let's get it into the *Early Bird*.

Get a copy sent to Andy Card as well.

Possibly you might want to get it to the press people on the traveling team back at the Pentagon.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604F.06ts

Attach: If D-Day Had Been Reported

Please respond by: _____

OSD 16112-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037518

006

6 JUN 04

Date: 6/4/2004 10:25:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From: "Schmautz, Kurt" <Kurt.Schmautz@mail.house.gov>
To: "Dayton, Soren" <Soren.Dayton@mail.house.gov>, &"Latimer,
(b)(6)"
Sent from the Internet (Details)

If D-Day Had Been Reported On Today

by William A. Mayer

Tragic French Offensive Stalled on Beaches (Normandy, France - June 6, 1944) - Pandemonium, shock and sheer terror predominate today's events in Europe.

In an as yet unfolding apparent fiasco, Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower's troops got a rude awakening this morning at Omaha Beach here in Normandy.

Due to insufficient planning and lack of a workable entrance strategy, soldiers of the 1st and 29th Infantry as well as Army Rangers are now bogged down and sustaining heavy casualties inflicted on them by dug-in insurgent positions located 170 feet above them on cliffs overlooking the beaches which now resemble blood soaked killing fields at the time of this mid-morning filing.

Bodies, parts of bodies, and blood are the order of the day here, the screams of the dying and the stillness of the dead mingle in testament to this terrible event.

Morale can only be described as extremely poor--in some companies all the officers have been either killed or incapacitated, leaving only poorly trained privates to fend for themselves.

Things appear to be going so poorly that Lt. General Omar Bradley has been rumored to be considering breaking off the attack entirely. As we go to press embattled U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's spokesman has not made himself available for comment at all, fueling fires that something has gone disastrously awry. The government at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is in a distinct lock-down mode and the Vice President's location is presently and officially undisclosed.

Whether the second in command should have gone into hiding during such a crisis will have to be answered at some future time, but many agree it does not send a good signal.

Miles behind the beaches and adding to the chaos, U.S. Naval gunships have inflicted many friendly fire casualties, as huge high explosive projectiles rain death and destruction on unsuspecting Allied positions.

The lack of training of Naval gunners has been called into question numerous times before and today's demonstration seems to underlie those concerns.

At Utah Beach the situation is also grim, elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne seemed to be in disarray as they missed their primary drop zones behind the area believed to comprise the militant's front lines. Errant paratroopers have been hung up in trees, breaking arms and legs, rendering themselves easy targets for those defending this territory.

On the beach front itself the landing area was missed, catapulting U.S. forces nearly 2,000 yards South of the intended coordinates, thus placing them that much farther away from the German insurgents and unable to direct covering fire or materially add to the operation.

11-L-0559/OSD/037519

were wounded in the haphazardly coordinated attack, which seems to have no unifying purpose or intent. Of this number at least 3,000 have been estimated as having been killed, making June 6th by far, the worst single day of the war which has dragged on now--with no exit strategy in sight--as the American economy still struggles to recover from Herbert Hoover's depression and its 25% unemployment.

Military spending has skyrocketed the national debt into uncharted regions, lending another cause for concern. When and if the current hostilities finally end it may take generations for the huge debt to be repaid.

On the planning end of things, experts wonder privately if enough troops were committed to the initial offensive and whether at least another 100,000 troops should have been added to the force structure before such an audacious undertaking. Communication problems also have made their presence felt making that an area for further investigation by the appropriate governmental committees.

On the home front, questions and concern have been voiced. A telephone poll has shown dwindling support for the wheel-chair bound Commander In Chief, which might indicate a further erosion of support for his now three year-old global war.

Of course, the President's precarious health has always been a question. He has just recently recovered from pneumonia and speculation persists whether or not he has sufficient stamina to properly sustain the war effort. This remains a topic of furious discussion among those questioning his competency.

Today's costly and chaotic landing compounds the President's already large credibility problem. More darkly, this phase of the war, commencing less than six months before the next general election, gives some the impression that Roosevelt may be using this offensive simply as a means to secure re-election in the fall.

Underlining the less than effective Allied attack, German casualties--most of them innocent and hapless conscripts--seem not to be as severe as would be imagined. A German minister who requested anonymity stated categorically that "the aggressors were being driven back into the sea amidst heavy casualties, the German people seek no wider war."

"The news couldn't be better," Adolph Hitler said when he was first informed of the D-Day assault earlier this afternoon.

"As long as they were in Britain we couldn't get at them. Now we have them where we can destroy them."

German minister Goebbels had been told of the Allied airborne landings at 0400 hours.

"Thank God, at last," he said. "This is the final round."

720
June 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: News Coverage

Duncan Hunter says his staff is doing a summary. They found out that the *Washington Post* did something like 50 or 60 articles on D-day and the Normandy invasion, and they did something like 107 on Abu Ghraib already.

You might want to talk to his staff about it. That is kind of an interesting fact. Don't use the numbers, because they are still working them up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-9

.....
Please respond by

6/18/04

OSD 16113-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037521

006

8 Jun 04

EF-9825
04/007758
C6/9

June 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Trip to Taiwan

W
W
W

I don't think it is a good idea for Brigadier General Allen to go to Taiwan right now. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-14

.....
Please respond by 6/11/04

DR 6/9

NOTE FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DTF by LHA 6/9/04*

Per today's roundtable, BG Allen will not go.

OSD 16114-04

8 Jun 04

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 6, 2004
SUBJECT: **Witness**

IRAQ

I notice that people are talking about me being a witness in Saddam Hussein's trial and also at an Abu Gahrib soldier's trial.

Do you know anything about it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604.07ts

Please respond by: _____

6/15

WA 7/8
C 7/6

Sir,
Response attached.

v/cdr Nosenz
7/6

6JUN04

OSD 15116-04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

June 29, 2004, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Potential Testimony at Trial of Saddam Hussein or Courts-Martial of
Soldiers Accused of Abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison

- You asked about the potential of being called as a witness at either the trial of Saddam Hussein or at the courts-martial of soldiers charged with offenses at the Abu Ghraib Prison.

Saddam's Trial

- The Iraqis intend to try Saddam before the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for crimes against humanity and other crimes against the Iraqi people. The IST is not yet up and running – its procedures, including those related to witness requests, have yet to be promulgated.
- Media reporting suggests that Saddam's defense counsel may request you as a witness, citing your service as President Reagan's Special Middle East Envoy in the 1980s.
- The defense team could try to call high-profile witnesses as in the Milosevic case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Milosevic has listed President Clinton, Secretary Albright, Secretary Christopher, and General Clark as witnesses he would like to call. Due to delays in the case, including the replacement of the senior judge due to serious illness, this list has not yet been litigated.
- Such requests for senior U.S. officials or former officials, if approved by the court, present issues for the USG since the purpose would be to provide testimony about governmental rather than private actions. Testimony related to one's actions in a diplomatic capacity, such as your service as Special Middle East Envoy, present a significant additional factor that the USG would need to consider before deciding whether or not to provide the testimony.



11-L-0559/OSD/037524

- Since the IST process has not yet taken shape, it is too early to make an accurate assessment. My preliminary view, however, is that it is unlikely that the IST would order your testimony based on either your current or previous capacity. //

Court-Martial Cases

- Civilian defense attorneys for soldiers charged in Abu Ghraib cases have stated that they intend to call you and other senior civilian and military officials as defense witnesses.
- At recent pretrial hearings for two soldiers, however, counsel sought testimony from other senior officials but did not seek to compel your testimony. The military judge ordered that defense counsel be given the opportunity to interview GEN Abizaid, LTG Sanchez, and their subordinates. These interviews could lead to requests for certain senior officials to appear as witnesses at trial.
- Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the defense counsel must demonstrate the relevance and materiality of expected testimony; this requirement helps guard against frivolous requests for senior officials as witnesses.
- Even if defense counsel can meet the threshold of relevance and materiality, the trial counsel (prosecutor) could first seek other means to obtain the evidence deemed relevant. Normally, the trial judge would work with the attorneys to obtain the evidence deemed relevant by means other than the witness's attendance in court. The parties could agree to stipulate to facts or to the statement that the witness would be expected to offer were he or she to appear in court.
- My assessment is that it is unlikely in these cases that a court-martial would require your testimony. //

10:10 AM

TO: Ron Sega

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

Attached is a letter from a friend from college who is talking about a composite that has been developed. Are you aware of it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.04

Attach: Ltr. from Mac Williams to SD

Please respond by: 6/10

OSD 16117-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037526

451

17 Jun 04

May 19, 2004

②

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld

Dear Don,

Time will be precious at our 50" so I wanted to write some thoughts to share with you.

You know how I value our friendship. From the mats and Cap & Gown to Pensacola, to the nasty phone calls as you checked out in a new aircraft, to your meeting with Grant and the thoughts that we have shared by mail, you know how I feel about you and the jobs you have done.

Enough of that- Several questions- Why are we court marshaling a young (misguided) soldier so quickly yet- Saddam is no where near a trial which should result in his death? ②

Some people have really let you down in Iraq. My friend Alex said we aren't getting the information that we should. There is a fine line as to what can be done to help catch the other bad guys but I know that somehow you will squeeze out the information that you need to save other servicemen.

One thing for the future- A Princetonian from Houston has developed a composite material with which he can make a vehicle that will stop an RPG and/or a 50 caliber bullet!! It would weigh 20% of the armored Humvee and provide the needed protection for the occupants. When you get back to D.C. would you please advise me to whom we might speak to explore a demonstration of the material? I have seen the material and it is truly amazing, 1/5 the weight of steel yet stronger!!

Dick Respass got a physics degree from Princeton, is an E.R.M.D. and has developed several cars in the past for auto racing. I recruited him years ago (as a single wing center) and have stayed in touch with him over the years. He is Class of '70 and a real character. We would love to talk to the proper procurement people, as the material could be a real breakthrough for your vehicles. Is Roy Du Boise still working for you? ①

If you have time to talk with my Granddaughter it will be great. She would be a great catch for Princeton!! My best always to you and Joyce.

Best Regards, *always*

Jim
Jim MacWilliam

11-L-0559/OSD/037527

11:01 AM

TO: Les Brownlee

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Media**

Would you please give me a one-pager on that point you made about WWII and D-Day, and how the press would be carrying it if they had 24/7 news back then.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.12

Please respond by: _____

6/7

OSD 16119-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037528

006

154204



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
INFO MEMO

June 7, 2004, 2:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Media, D-Day, and 24/7 news coverage

*Brownlee -
Mr. Secretary -
Shogren is
what you had in
mind*
Lee

- Secretary of Defense's note of June 1, 2004, 11:01 A.M., requested a one-page response on World War II and D-Day, and how the press would be carrying it if they had 24/7 news back then.
- One-page information paper attached. Conclusion is that media technology and practices developed over the past sixty years might have proven disastrous at Normandy - and perhaps are dysfunctional now.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: LTC John Shaw,

(b)(6)

Information Paper: Thoughts on D-Day and Current Media Practices

1. Current media practices might have led to some of the headlines below and put the campaign at risk in several ways: shaking the confidence of the American public and the troops, inviting premature Congressional or Administration involvement, and compromising the operational plan itself or the deception plan upon which operational success depended.
2. TOP SECRET OVERLORD PLAN CALLS FOR MASSIVE AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ASSAULTS IN NORMANDY!! With today's 24/7 news cycle it might be impossible to keep news of such a massive operation a closely guarded secret. The tendency of news "leaks" and news organizations putting the public's "right to know" above all other considerations would likely lead to premature compromise.
3. GERMANS DUPED; NORMANDY THE MAIN ATTACK!!! Allied deception plans depended upon Germans believing the main attack would be the Pas de Calais, even after landings at Normandy had already occurred. A complex charade portrayed an entire dummy army commanded by Patton scattered across the southeastern English countryside. Given the intrusiveness of international reporting today and the rapidity of media distribution, could this secret have been kept? Would the media have revealed what they could find of the war plan, perhaps indirectly by the virtue of retired senior officers who know our organizational habits so well they can inevitably connect the dots while on international broadcasts?
4. LANDINGS BOTCHED; HUNDREDS DEAD ON THE BEACHES!!! War is usually untidy. A lot can look wrong even when things are going well overall. A media tendency to focus negatively on the sensational or tragic distorts the overall picture. While D-Day was a striking success, with the bulk of nine divisions ashore on the first day and casualties far more modest than anticipated by operational planners, nevertheless a lot went wrong. The 116th regiment in the very first wave took extremely heavy casualties before making their way onto shore, amphibious tanks sank in rough seas, Rangers attacked positions already emptied of their guns at Pont du Hoc, paratroopers were widely scattered, some landing craft hit the wrong beaches, the Air Corps missed key designated targets, and French civilians were killed in preparatory bombardments. The larger success of getting tens of thousands ashore with thousands of tons of equipment in the face of stiff opposition might be lost in media reports that focused on these negative events. How would the public and the troops have reacted to a real time fixation on those things that went wrong?
5. EISENHOWER MAY BE CALLED BACK FOR HEARINGS; MANY CALL FOR MARSHALL AND STINSON TO RESIGN; FDR REELECTION IN DOUBT! Congress and the Administration understandably want to contribute to mission success. Alarming news or apparent controversy can trigger their intervention – often unnecessarily or prematurely. Eisenhower launched in uncertain weather, significant tensions lurked beneath the apparent amity of the uniformed allies, and much went wrong on the first day. Allied military leaders worked through all of this successfully. How dysfunctional would the distraction have been if they had had to respond in real time to their political leadership to every rumor or whiff of controversy?
6. Tensions among operational security, the delegation of command authority and the freedom of the press present an enormous challenge to the conduct of modern warfare. Media technology and practices developed over the past sixty years might have proven disastrous at Normandy – and perhaps are dysfunctional now.

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pace

11:35 AM

793

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Round Table**

Do you have any thoughts on this paper from Steve Cambone? Do you think it is OBE or is there something we ought to be doing. Let's talk at Round Table.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.15

Attach: Thoughts on Next Steps in Iraq 5/28/04 - Cambone

Please respond by: _____

6/8

OSD 16121-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037531

IRAP

1 Jun 04

28 May 2004, 10:10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ

The handover of sovereignty is a ready-made opportunity to reset DOD relationships with State and CIA to ensure closer cooperation and greater effectiveness in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Iraq.

Following are thoughts on steps you might consider taking to reset those relationships:

- Host a meeting with the Secretary of State, the DCI, Ambassador Negroponte, and General George Casey.
 - Agenda:
 - Settling the question of, "Who's in charge?"
 - Establishing a communications plan so that each of you is kept informed of the activities of the other and coordination is done expeditiously on important issues;
 - Clarification on "lanes in the road in Iraq."
 - Creation of a State-DOD-CIA support group in Washington, D.C., to back-stop Baghdad. It could be State-chaired and held accountable for resolving issues or, if they cannot resolve them quickly, for referring them to you, the Secretary of State, and the DCI.
- DOD team. This could be an opportunity to put a new face on DOD's lead for Iraqi affairs. It would have the advantage of freeing the OSD Policy shop from detailed day-to-day support while, at the same time, allowing for the creation of a more operationally and technically oriented mission support staff.

SC

11-L-0559/OSD/037532

- It should be dedicated to the “back-office work” that would be needed to support Negroponte and Casey.
 - This mission support staff should be a combined staff drawn from across OSD, the services, and the Joint Staff.
 - It could be led by a senior DOD career civilian (e.g., Pete Verga, Lisa Bronson, etc.).
 - It should have a military deputy drawn from either the services or the Joint Staff.
 - It might occupy the spaces to be vacated by the CPA.
- Extending your influence over the DOD portion of the mission in Iraq. I have spoken with General Casey about the organization of his headquarters. I urged him to create a “strategy cell” whose sole purpose would be to give strategic direction to the military campaign in Iraq. The essence of that direction would be to craft military operations explicitly and specifically to support the broader political objectives we are pursuing and to identify those political, economic, reconstruction, and communications, etc., tasks to be directed by the U.S. Mission or the Iraqi government in support of military operations.
 - This might very well be the conduit through which you, the CJCS, General Abizaid, and General Casey might communicate and plan. As such, it would also serve as your channel for communication through Casey to Negroponte.

Whether you would embrace any or all of the above is, in my view, less important than your consideration of how we might make use of the transition of sovereignty to make a “new start” in our approach to affairs in Iraq. I believe that this can and should be done without any suggestion of dissatisfaction with the current arrangement. Instead, it should be presented as the recognition of the fact that circumstances on the ground are changing and that we are adjusting, in an appropriate manner, how we are going to deal with those circumstances.

11:39 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Time Line**

This Time Line is getting better. Let's bring it up to date to June 1st, let's add the Abu Ghraib photos, and I think maybe the suspension of the tanker is a pretty big thing, and maybe a few points where we show what percentage of our 48 Presidential Appointees are filled, and update this on a quarterly basis. I think that is important to show. Then ask some other people what else might be added.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.16

Please respond by: _____

6/10

OSD 16122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037534

383.6

174404

✱

[illegible]

66. *Chlorophyll a* is the primary photosynthetic pigment in most plants. It is a green pigment that absorbs light energy and converts it into chemical energy. It is found in the chloroplasts of plants and algae. *Chlorophyll a* is the most abundant and essential pigment for photosynthesis. It is responsible for the green color of plants and algae. It is found in the chloroplasts of plants and algae. *Chlorophyll a* is the most abundant and essential pigment for photosynthesis. It is responsible for the green color of plants and algae. It is found in the chloroplasts of plants and algae.

35

Dec

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


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Draft

Timeline



2001




Draft

Timeline



2002




Draft

Timeline



2003




Draft

Timeline



2004



11:56 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Working Draft 2/9/04 – A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint
And Expeditionary Mindset**

This working draft Army White Paper of an Army at War is excellent! I saw the February 9th draft. I assume you have a later one. When you get it finished, I would like a copy to send over to the President.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.19

Please respond by: _____

OSD 16125-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037540

000.5

17 Jun 04

Serving a Nation at War

A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset

(Draft Army White Paper)



Strategic Context

Our Army is serving a Nation at war. To win this war the Nation must meld all elements of our national power in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign to defeat those who challenge our very way of life. This is not a 'contingency,' nor is it a 'crisis.' It is a new reality that Soldiers understand all too well: since 9/11, more than a battalion's worth killed in action, more than a brigade's worth severely wounded. Their sacrifice has liberated more than 46 million souls from oppression. As these words are written, the Army is undertaking the largest rotation of forces in its history, and 9 of its 10 active divisions—all but the 2 ID already committed to Korea—will have seen action in Afghanistan or Iraq. More than 128,000 reservists have been activated in the last 2 years, and more than 300,000 Soldiers are forward deployed. We are an Army at War.

For any war, as Clausewitz pointed out, it is essential to understand "the kind of war on which (we) are embarking." Although **the fundamental nature** of war is constant, its methods and techniques change, chameleon-like, to match the strategic context and operational **capabilities at hand**. The United States is driving a rapid evolution in the methods and techniques of war. Our

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that it is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."

Clausewitz, *On War*

A cursory examination of the ideas in competition may forecast the depth and duration of this conflict. The United States, its economy dependent on overseas resources and trade, has launched a wave of globalization in both markets and ideas. Regions and countries prepared to participate in this phenomenon have benefited. For others, it has precipitated failure, resentment, and rejection. Especially in the Muslim world, while some have embraced modernity, others remain content with the traditional patterns of Islam, and a few are irreconcilably opposed to the modernizing influences of the West. Committed to preserving the secular authority of religion, and intolerant of any faith other than Islam, their ideas directly conflict with western ideas of religious freedom and secular pluralism. Even reduced to a one or two percentage of the Islamic world, this pool of irreconcilables poses a threat of several *million* potential combatants.

And this is but one of the challenges we currently face. In the Far East, North Korea's threatened nuclearization risks intensifying more than 50 years of unremitting hostility, and North Korea is not the only potential enemy actively seeking weapons of mass destruction. Today, moreover, we confront a growing risk that such weapons will find their way into the hands of non-state groups or individuals anxious to apply them to our homeland, and with no homelands of their own to protect. Meanwhile, the technologies — particularly information technologies — that underwrite our current conventional military advantages are highly fungible, and it is not unrealistic to foresee a time when regional competitors may achieve parity or perhaps even superiority in "niche" military technologies tailored to their political ambitions. Concurrently, we see emerging operational concepts and capabilities that will enable us to pursue ways of war that are increasingly rapid, simultaneous, and non-contiguous. These future operational requirements loom even as we must pursue our current conflict.

Some might equate our current challenge to the Cold War but there are critical distinctions :

- Our non-state adversaries are not satisfied with a "cold" standoff, but instead seek at every turn to make it "hot."
- Our own forces can't focus solely on future overseas contingencies, but also must defend bases and facilities both at home and abroad today.
- Because some of our adversaries are not easily deterred, our national strategy is not "defensive" but "preventive."
- Above all, because at least some current adversaries consider "peaceful coexistence" with the United States unacceptable, we must either alter the convictions prompting their hostility or destroy them outright by war.

That is neither the context nor the strategy for which we designed today's United States Army. Therefore the Army must meet the supreme test of all armies: *to rapidly adapt to circumstances which it could not foresee*. Fundamental to that adaptation will be our rapid evolution to *a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset*.

Expeditionary

The Army is no stranger to expeditionary operations. WWI saw deployment of the American Expeditionary Forces, WWII the Allied Expeditionary Force, and since WWII the Army has executed a wide array of operations involving the temporary deployment of ground forces to distant places. But by some today, the United States Army is no longer perceived to be "expeditionary." That perception is largely an artifact of the prolonged forward stationing of Army forces during the Cold War, when the Army focused on known rather than hypothetical threats, on developed rather than austere theaters, and on rapid reinforcement rather than contingency deployment. Historically, such conditions have been the exception rather than the rule, and so they are today.

Some might argue that the primary distinction of an expeditionary operation is its short duration. Neither history nor strategic guidance – which calls for expeditionary forces capable of sustained operations – confirm such a definition. Others view expeditionary

as speed of responsiveness, but this perception, too, is not complete. In the Cold War the United States was prepared to reinforce Europe with 10 divisions within 10 days, but this responsiveness was not perceived as “expeditionary.” The reason for this is significant: in the Cold War we knew exactly where we would fight and we met this requirement through prepositioning of units or unit sets in a very developed theater. The uncertainty as to where we must deploy, the probability of a very austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival throughout the battlespace, pose an entirely different challenge – and the fundamental distinction of expeditionary operations.

This challenge is above all one of mindset, because American soldiers are predisposed with good reason to seek certainty, planning, preparation and synchronization in the application of force. We have engaged repeatedly in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity, to be sure, but always viewing such operations as the exception rather than the rule. That must no longer be the case. In this globalized world, our enemies shift resources and activities to those areas least accessible to us. As an elusive and asymmetric enemy seeks refuge in the far corners of the earth, the “norm” will be short notice operations, extremely austere theaters of operation, incomplete information – indeed, the requirement to fight *for* information, rather than fight *with* information. This is the essence of the expeditionary mindset we seek.

Joint

The touchstone of our style of warfare is combinations, a style in which no nation on earth can match us. Each of our armed services excels in combining a wide array of technologies and tools in each dimension—land, air, sea and space—to generate a synergy that overwhelms our opponents. Today, that same emphasis on combinations extends beyond single service to joint operations. No longer satisfied merely to deconflict the activities of the several services, we now seek joint *interdependence*.

Interdependence is more than just interoperability, the assurance that service capabilities can work together smoothly. It is even more than integration to improve their collective efficiency and tempo. Instead, joint interdependence combines service capabilities to maximize their complementary rather than merely reinforcing effects, concurrently using each to offset the vulnerabilities of the others. There are several compelling reasons for doing so:

- First, modern technology has extended the reach of weapons far beyond their “dimensions of origin.” For example, land-based cruise missiles threaten ships at sea, and land-based air defenses pose challenges to air, sea and even space-based capabilities. Defeating the mirror-image threat within a service’s primary dimension of interest will no longer suffice.
- Second, in addition to achieving daunting supremacy within the air, maritime, and space dimensions, our sister services are developing increasingly powerful capabilities that can influence land combat directly.

- Third, the very nature of expeditionary operations argues for leveraging every potential tool of speed, operational reach, and precision, the very strengths offered by our sister services.

The central prerequisites of a commitment to interdependence are broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each service's capabilities, clear agreement about how those capabilities will be committed in any given operational setting, and absolute mutual trust that, once committed, they will be employed as agreed.

At the strategic level, interdependence has pervaded the Army's thinking for over a century. Bereft of organic strategic lift, we can neither deploy nor sustain ourselves without the support of the other services. But our commitment to interdependence has not always extended to the tactical level. Constrained by the tyranny of terrain, ground forces operate in an environment in which movement and observation are restricted, command and control are fragile, and the risk of surprise is omnipresent. That inherent friction encourages a preference for organizational autonomy and redundancy, and tends to prejudice soldiers against relying on others for essential ingredients of tactical survival and success. In the past, moreover, that prejudice too often has both prompted and been reinforced by inter-service rivalries reflecting concerns far removed from the practical imperatives of the battlefield.

An Army at War can't afford that indulgence. War has a bad habit of exposing theories built upon prejudice rather than proof, and Iraq and Afghanistan have been no different. The "air or sea or land"-power debates are over. Our collective future is irrefutably joint. To meet the challenges of expeditionary operations, the Army can and must embrace the capabilities of its sister services right down to the tactical level. In turn, that will require us to develop operational concepts and capabilities that are joint from the outset, not merely as an afterthought.

Campaign Quality

While our two magnificently successful campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq provide a tantalizing glimpse of the nascent power of jointness and of the unarguable need for expeditionary capabilities,

" ... even within Iraq itself, there are different challenges based on where you are. MG Dave Petraeus (101st Division in Mosul, northern Iraq) is doing a great job in the north, with the demographics he has up there. But that differs from what MG Ray Odierno (4th Infantry Division, Tikrit area) is doing. MG Chuck Swannack (82nd Airborne) has a different challenge in the west. And BG Marty Dempsey in the 1st Armor Division has Baghdad and he deals with entirely different conditions. And we are working with Coalition Forces, the British in particular, and with the Poles I think we are learning a lot, but at the same time we are learning that we can't forget there are other challenges out there that the Army has to be prepared to face. So right up front I will tell you that we are very mindful that you can't apply all of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan to the responsibilities that the Army has to defend the nation and be part of the joint team."

GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff

those same experiences also demonstrate that neither the duration nor the character of even the most brilliantly conducted campaign is readily predictable. Especially in wars intended to liberate rather than subjugate, decisive victory implies winning a competition of ideas, and thereby fundamentally changing the conditions that prompted the conflict. Long after the defeat of Taliban and Iraqi military forces, we continue to wage just such campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The campaigning qualities of an Army thus entail not only its ability to conduct sustained combat operations throughout a battlespace of shifting scope, but also its ability to adapt its operations to unpredictable but often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army's preeminent challenge, then, within the joint framework, is to reconcile the agility and responsiveness to conduct rapid expeditionary deployments with the power, durability and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes.

"Are You Wearing Your Dogtags?"

"Are you wearing your dogtags?" Does the question surprise you? It might if you view peace as the norm, and war the exception. But our new reality is simple:

- a conflict of irreconcilable ideas
- a desperate pool of potential combatants numbering in the millions
- adaptive adversaries seeking our destruction by any means possible
- an evolving asymmetric threat that will relentlessly seek shelter in those environments and methods for which we are least prepared.
- a foreseeable future of extended conflict in which we can expect to fight every day, and in which real peace will be the anomaly.

This new reality drives the transformation underway in the United States Army. Be it "mindset," "culture," or "attitude," it is the lens that shapes our perception and interpretation of the future, and governs our responses to its challenges. It is the logic for a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. Are you wearing your dog tags?

"On September 11th, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country ... With the passing of months and years, it is the natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behind us, as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, is understanding, and it is false ... These terrorists target the innocent and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished. ... The evil is in plain sight ... We will face these threats with open eyes, and we will defeat them."

President Bush in London, Nov 19, 2003

Changing for Conflict

The Center of Our Formations

In a time of profound change, the United States Army can rely on only one certainty: The American Soldier will remain the center of our formations. In today's conflict, indeed, the Soldier is the weapon of choice. Able to fight even when deprived of nearly every tool but his or her skill, courage, and determination, the Soldier remains the irreplaceable foundation of the dynamic array of combinations that America will generate to defeat our enemies in any expeditionary environment. As the ultimate combination of sensor and shooter, the American Soldier is irrefutable proof that people are more important than hardware and quality more important than quantity.

Making Soldiers more effective and survivable is the first requirement of adaptation to a joint and expeditionary environment. However much the tools of war may improve, only

"Every Soldier is a Soldier first, regardless of whether they're a truck driver or a typist, a maintainer or infantryman. While technology has helped the Army become more lethal and effective, individual Soldiers still do the fighting ... technology has to enhance the human dimension. ... Warfare fundamentally is a human endeavor. It's a test of wills. It's a test of things deep within us."

Army Chief of Staff
General Peter J. Schoomaker

Soldiers with the capacity to endure the hardships of war can exploit them. Their very identity will evolve as the specialization that contributed so effectively to industrial age warfare gives way to greater flexibility, multifunctionality, and a warrior ethos. That ethos reflects the spirit of the pioneers who built our homeland, of whom it rightly

was said: "*The cowards never came. The brave arrived. The tough remained.*" It is a subtle, aggressive but controlled spirit based on quiet competence. It is recognition that closing with an enemy is not simply a matter of killing, but rather imposing one's will on that enemy to achieve the nation's purpose. It is the ultimate responsibility reserved only for the professional whose responsibility and discipline can moderate war's inevitable brutality.

Just as the Nation's expectations are evolving to reflect the realities of our current conflict, so too will expectations of Soldiers and their families. They will expect field duty before garrison duty. They will expect tactical movements and combat drills before drill and ceremony. They will expect deployment before reassignment. They will expect surprise before certainty. They will measure quality of life in terms of meaningful deployments and service to the Nation.

As brave and tough Americans join the United States Army, our values and training will transform them into warriors of character. Bound to each other by integrity and trust, they will learn that in the United States Army, every Soldier is a leader, responsible for what happens in his or her presence regardless of rank. They will value learning and adaptability at every level, particularly as it contributes to *initiative*: creating situations

for an adversary, rather than reacting to them. They will learn that the Army reflects an ethos of selfless service to the nation—a warrior culture, not a corporate one. And they will learn that it is not important who gets the credit, either within the Army or within the joint community; what's important is that the Nation is served.

Organizing for Conflict

Confronting an adaptive adversary, no singular solution will succeed, no matter how elegant, synchronized, or advanced. its very 'perfection' will ensure its irrelevance, for an adaptive enemy will relentlessly eliminate the vulnerabilities it seeks to exploit and avoid the conditions necessary for its success. Instead, the touchstones of Army Transformation are diversity and adaptability. The Army must retain a wide range of capabilities while significantly improving their flexibility and versatility. Building an expeditionary Army with campaign qualities will require versatile forces that can mount smaller and shorter duration operations routinely without penalty to the Army's ability to transition to larger and more prolonged campaigns.

Modular Units. A key prerequisite to achieving that capability is developing more modular tactical organizations. The Army's force design has incorporated tailoring and task organization for decades, but primarily in the context of a large conventional war in which all echelons from platoon to Army Service Component Command were deployed. This presumption of infrequent, large-scale deployment allowed the Army to centralize certain functions at higher echelons of command, and implicitly assumed that deployment would largely be complete before employment began. Moreover, presuming peace to be the default condition, the Army garrisoned the bulk of its tactical units with a view to economic efficiency and management convenience rather than combined arms training and rapid deployment. Above all, the Army designed its capabilities to satisfy every tactical requirement independently, treating sister service capabilities as supplementary.

These presumptions no longer apply. Simultaneous employment and deployment increasingly characterize Army operations, and those operations are increasingly diverse in both purpose and scope. Tailoring and task organizing our current force structure for such operations renders an ad hoc deployed force and a residue of partially dissembled, non-deployed structure. The premium now is on effectiveness at lower levels vice efficiency at macro levels. Peace will be the exception, and both tactical organizations and garrison configurations must be designed for expeditionary deployment, not simply improvise it. Force design must catch up with strategic reality.

Our strategic reality is the need for smaller, more agile units ... and more of them. Increasingly, ownership of capabilities by echelons and even by services matters less than how those capabilities are allocated to missions. if the Army can leverage its sister service's mobility, speed, and flexibility to meet its mission requirements, all the better. Being expeditionary is far less about deployability than it is about operational and tactical agility, including the ability to reach beyond organic capabilities for the required effects. We must expand our view of Army force design to encompass the entire range of

available joint capabilities. At the end of the day, squads and platoons will continue to win our battles, but no one can reliably predict which squads or platoons will come into contact with the enemy or when. In an expeditionary environment, they must be so well networked with other joint capabilities that whichever are in contact can win.

Nor is such joint interdependence unidirectional. The more modular the Army's capabilities, the better we will be able to support our sister services, whether by the air defense protection of an advanced sea base, compelling an enemy ground force to mass and thereby furnish targets for air attack, or exploiting the transitory effects of precision fires with the more permanent effects of maneuver.

Although divisions have long been the nominal measure of the Army's fighting strength, recent operations increasingly have witnessed deployment and employment of multi-functional brigade combat teams of various types in varying combinations. In the future, by shifting to brigade combat teams as our basic units of maneuver, endowing them routinely with adequate combat, combat support, and sustainment capabilities, and assuring them connectivity to higher and joint assets, we can significantly improve the tailorability and scalability of the Army's contribution to the overall joint fight. At the same time, the inherent robustness and self-sufficiency of brigade combat teams will enhance their ability to deploy rapidly and fight on arrival.

Modular Headquarters. The transformation of our headquarters will be even more dramatic than that of our units, for we will sever the routine association between headquarters and the units they control. At division level and higher, headquarters will be stripped of organic subordinate formations, becoming themselves streamlined modular organizations capable of commanding and controlling any combination of capabilities, Army or Joint. For that purpose, the headquarters themselves will be more robust, staffed to minimize the requirement for augmentation from subordinate organizations. They will have separable, deployable command posts for rapid response and entry; home station operations center to minimize forward footprints, and network-enabled organizations, capable of commanding of supporting joint and multinational forces.

Today, because our tactical headquarters elements lack the necessary joint interfaces, we have to improvise these when operations begin. That must change. Every division-level headquarters will need to be capable of managing Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) operations. Similarly, every corps-level headquarters must be designed from the outset with enough permanent sister service staff positions to permit it to receive and employ a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) plug, enabling it to serve with equal effectiveness as a Joint Task Force or JFLCC headquarters, command Army tactical units directly, or act as the Army Service Component Command.

Stabilizing the Force. Paradoxically, an Army that seeks maximum flexibility through modular units and headquarters must simultaneously maximize unit cohesion where it counts, within our companies, battalions and brigades. Once again, our altered strategic context is the driver. In the past, our approach to unit manning reflected the industrial age in which our forces were developed. People were treated as interchangeable parts, and

their administrative availability was valued more highly than their individual and team proficiency. At the unit level, manning and equipping reflected a 'first-to-last' strategic deployment system. Peace was the paradigm, and late deploying units could be filled out at leisure, typically by individual replacements, during the expected prolonged transition from peace to war.

At a time when continuous conflict has become the default condition, in which major portions of our Army will repeatedly be deployed and employed, such an approach to manning won't work. We must make two significant changes:

- First, we will shift the logic of our force structure from a scenario basis to a rotation basis, for we will need an adequate level of capability not only for employment, but also for training, refitting, and rest. An adequate rotation base is needed to allow units to cycle through these operational phases.
- Second, the tiering of readiness by 'early' and 'late' deployers will disappear – because there will be no 'late deployers', merely 'future deployers' who are at different stages of their rotation cycle.

To satisfy the recurring commitments anticipated in an Army at War, units must sustain a level of readiness that far exceeds the ability of an individual manning system. The effects we seek are broad: continuity in training, stability of leadership, unit cohesion, enhanced unit readiness and combat effectiveness, and greater deployment predictability for Soldiers and their families. To achieve them we will need to undertake the most significant revision in manning policy in our Army's history.

Our first task is to redesign the Army's force structure to support unit rotation. The next is to establish unit manning by synchronizing Soldier's tours with those units' operational cycles. While accidents and casualties will preclude eliminating individual replacement altogether, routine attrition of deployed units must be minimized. Our final task is to establish home basing, stabilizing the assignment of Soldiers and their families at home stations and communities across recurring rotations.

Why Force Stabilization: An Individual Replacement on the Road to Baghdad

"... I graduated from Ranger School March 14th and reported to Fort Bragg a week later. By April 2nd I was on a plane headed to Kuwait. I figured I'd get to recover and spend time learning my battalion with some time as a staff assistant. My Battalion Commander says I lived every infantry officer's dream because I was given a platoon immediately. My platoon and company were engaged in combat the night I met them. The next morning I led my platoon as the company main effort in a raid across the bridge in the battle of As Sawana. In the morning light I did not recognize my PSG or RTO as I had not seen their faces in light. They looked very different from how I had pictured them in my mind." (United States Military Academy Graduate, Class of 2002)

As any personnel manager would tell you ... “this changes everything.” And so it will. Today’s individual soldier and leader development programs, for example, were not designed to accommodate force stabilization. They must change. Current command tour policies do not accommodate force stabilization. They must change. There have been many previous attempts to experiment with force stabilization, but those attempts always focused narrowly on only a few portions of the Army and invariably failed as a result. Stabilizing the force can be achieved only through a comprehensive redesign.

Adjusting the Total Force Mix

Changes required in our Reserve Component (RC) organizations will match—indeed, may exceed—those in the Active Component (AC). RC forces will remain a vital part of the Army’s deployable combat power, but their allocation among functional requirements must change both to accommodate the demands of an expeditionary environment and in recognition of the RC’s expanded role in homeland security. In any case, an industrial age approach to mobilization no longer will suffice. To accommodate the uncertainties of today’s conflict environment, RC mobilization must take less time and allow more granular management of individual and unit readiness, mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and post-deployment recovery.

The near term requirement is to adjust the AC/RC mix so that AC forces can execute the first 30 days of any deployment without regard for the nature of the commitment, and thus with whatever functional capabilities are required. For that purpose, some high demand, low density capabilities currently found only in the RC must be reincorporated in the active force. At the same time, while RC units will not be expected to deploy in the first 30 days, they will require responsiveness measured in *hours* for security operations within our homeland. That, and the need to build predictability into RC deployments so that RC forces can expect routinely to deploy no more than one year in six, will require increasing the proportion of high demand, low density units in the RC as well.

Finally, the arguments for shifting to rotation-based unit manning rather than individual replacement apply as much to the RC as to the AC. As with the AC, therefore, a way must be found to reconcile unit mobilization, training and deployment with the personnel overhead account (Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students -- TTHS).

Training and Education

To change the mindset of an Army, few tools are as important as its programs of training and education. The United States Army has long set the standard among the services and across the world in its commitment to soldier and leader development. This strong legacy is our fulcrum from which to leverage change. We train for certainty while educating for uncertainty. This conflict poses both.

Individual Training. The certainty confronting today’s Soldiers is overseas deployment and probable combat. Many will enter combat within weeks or months of their basic and

advanced individual training. Thrust into a conflict in which potential adversaries number in the millions, our soldiers must believe and demonstrate that quality is more important than quantity, people are more important than hardware. On the battlefields we face, there are no front lines and rear areas. The rear is often the front, and there are no "secure" garrisons or convoys. Soldiers are warriors first, specialists only second.

"We don't have the luxury of time right now. We graduate soldiers, and a short time later they are deploying ... When soldiers arrive in Baghdad and get off the planes and into Humvees, they are immediately thrust into combat operations. ... They have to go in with a mind-set that they will engage and kill the enemy on their first day in country."

SFC Gallagher, IET Trainer

The warrior experience will be tough; Soldier training must be stressful, beyond the comfort zone. We must move beyond the 72-hour field

conflict of daunting ambiguity and complexity, Soldiers will need a fundamental attitude of *multifunctionality* rather than *specialization*, *curiosity* rather than *complacency*, and *initiative* rather than *compliance*.

Collective Training. Our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) drive the tactical culture of the Army. They are the linchpin of our extraordinary battlefield success over the past several

"Dispersed fighting, whether the dispersal is caused by the terrain, the lack of supplies, or by the weapons of the enemy, will have two major requirements - skilled and determined junior leaders and self-reliant, physically hard, well-disciplined troops. Success in future land operations will depend on the immediate availability of such leaders and soldiers, ready to operate in small, independent formations."

Field Marshal William Slim, WW II

That reluctance, however, violated the "task-condition-standard" requirements of Army training doctrine, since a joint context has become an inevitable condition of every Army employment. Recognizing that, we have begun introducing joint, interagency, and multinational components into our key training experiences at both the "dirt" CTCs and our Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) for division and corps headquarters. We also are proactively supporting establishment of the Joint National Training Center (JNTC) and routinely introducing consideration of joint effects in our home station

training. All these efforts will make Soldiers expert in the application of joint capabilities at every organizational level.

Additional change is underway at the CTCs. In very short order, the threat environment has been transformed to reflect the complexity and ambiguity experienced by our deployed forces, not only at the Joint Readiness Training Center, but also at the National Training Center. Transforming the training mindset will not be as easy, for we must shake a legacy of planning-centric rather than execution-centric collective training. We need battle drills rather than rock drills, and units conditioned to fight for information, not wait passively to *receive* it. Integrated with force stabilization cycles, CTCs will be the capstone experience for forces preparing to rotate to their deployment phase.

Education. Just as training must reflect the hard certainties of the conflict before us, individual Soldier and leader education must address the uncertainties of those we may confront in the future. George C. Marshall once said that an Army at peace must go to school. Our challenge is to go to school while at war. The need to teach Soldiers and leaders *how to think* rather than *what to think* has never been more clear. To defeat adaptive enemies, we must out-think them as well as out-fight them.

Adaptive leaders must instinctively eschew mirror-imaging, for an asymmetric enemy will relentlessly seek areas of vulnerability and surprise. We also must exploit our own asymmetric advantages, particularly information, but be cautious in relying on them. We can have perfect knowledge without understanding. Appreciation of context transforms knowledge to understanding, and only education can make that context accessible to us. Technology can enhance human capabilities, but at the end of the day, war remains more art than science, and its successful prosecution will require battle command more than battle management. Only education informed by experience will encourage soldiers and leaders to meet the irreducible uncertainties of war with confidence, and to act decisively even when events fail to conform to planning assumptions and expectations.

Greater emphasis on adaptive execution will require us to rethink a military decision-making process (MDMP) that hasn't changed in its essentials for nearly half a century, and that was devised originally to assure systematic planning of set-piece operations by relatively inexperienced and untrained leaders. As we improve leaders' skill and knowledge, that rote style of decision-making can be replaced with a more artful application of leader knowledge and intuition that encourages greater adaptation and initiative within the commander's intent. Planning will become iterative rather than linear, more a framework for learning and adjusting than a rigid template for action. Adjusting the MDMP thus will allow us to capitalize on the American soldier's inherent versatility, our growing ability to acquire and process information, and the increased rapidity with which planning adjustments can be disseminated, coordinated, and transformed into effective action.

To that end, the Army already has begun to refocus institutional learning, shifting Center for Army Lessons Learned collection assets from the CTCs to forward employed units. Similarly, recognizing that a learning-driven organization has no room for a culture of