

12/9/1700



August 27, 1004

file

TO: Pveil.Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senate Briefings

Do you have any record of who attended the briefings I have given in the Senate Intel Room. Have Kerry or Edwards attended? I cannot remember seeing them, although I do recall that Kerry attended on meeting at a Pentagon briefing

Please look at both the ones we conducted at the Pentagon and the ones we conducted in S-407 and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082604-113 computer1.doc

Please respond by 9/10/04

DR
To SecDef *DR 12/14*
Paul Butler
12/13

M L 12/14

350.09

27 Aug 04

OSD 00326-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039054

NOV 23 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Attendance at Op-Intel Briefings

Did we ever figure out how many of our Op-Intel briefings Edwards and Kerry attended?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
112204-27

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

DA 12/14

December 9, 2004 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to your questions about Senators Kerry and Edwards

- The information we previously gave you about participation of Senators Kerry and Edwards in ops/intel briefings is correct. We do have, however, records indicating that Senator Kerry came to the Pentagon for two meetings with you.
- On Monday morning, September 24, 2001 at 7:45 a.m. you had a one-on-one breakfast with Senator Kerry in your office. To the best of my recollection, I was the only other attendee. The meeting must have materialized at the last minute because we have nothing in our archives to indicate that a "read ahead" was prepared for you.
- He was also one of 56 Senators who came to the Pentagon in late summer and early fall of 2002. Our records indicate he was here on September 5. As you recall, we conducted a series of breakfast meetings for members of the House and the Senate on weapons of mass destruction leading up to the vote on the Iraq resolution in October of 2002. Senator Edwards received two invitations to these briefings and he did not accept either.

350.09

9 Dec 14

Attachments:

- SECDEF Snowflake 082604-1
- SECDEF Snowflake 112204-27

27 Aug 04

September 1, 2004

TO: Col Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Ray DuBois re: Corridors

Please arrange a meeting for me with Ray DuBois to discuss corridors. I think there should be one for women, one for Hispanics, and one for Secretaries of Defense. I would like to talk to him about how we fix them; reduce the duplications.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-9

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

609
1 Sep 04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

D

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: Naming and Dedication of Pentagon Corridors

I spoke w/ Powell Moore. Sen. Warner spoke against re-naming; see attached

• The following is provided in response to your request for information regarding dedicated corridors and exhibits in the Pentagon.

9 Presidents Corridor - Contains a picture and brief history panel of each U.S. President, including the current one. Location: 3A10-3C 10.

9 Corridors and exhibits dedicated to military leaders.

Arnold Corridor - Dedication date unknown. Location: 4E8.

Bradley Corridor - Dedicated June 1972. Location: 2E8.

Eisenhower Corridor - Dedicated May 1970. Rededicated in June 1985. Location: 3E8-9.

*%
↑*

MacArthur Corridor - Dedication date unknown (1980s). Location: 3A4-5.

Marshall Corridor - Dedicated April 1976. Location: 3E4.5-5.

9 Corridors/Exhibits dedicated to groups, organizations, and other individuals.

Kruzel Exhibit - Dedicated in January 1996. Joseph J. Kruzel was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy who died in an accident while traveling outside Sarajevo in Aug 1995. Location: 4D7-8.

- African Americans in Defense of Our Nation Location: 3A2 - 3E2
- ANZUS Location: 2A2-3
- Buffalo Soldiers Location: 2A5
- Chiefs of Staff of the Army Location: 3A5-3E5
- Civil Servants Location: 2A2-3
- Correspondents Location: 2E5-6

Hall of Heroes/Medal of Honor	Location: Pentagon Concourse
Joint Chiefs of Staff	Location: 2A8-2E8
Marine Corps Commandants	Location: 4A-E5
Military Women	Location: In Storage
Native Americans in Defense of Our Nation	Location: 2A1
NATO	Location: 2A9-10
POW/MIA	Location: 4E7-8
Secretaries of the Army	Location: 3A5-3E5
Secretaries of Defense	Location: 2A8-9
Secretaries of the Navy	Location: 4A5-4E5
Secretaries of War	Location: 2A4-5
Soldiers and Signers of the Constitution	Location: 2A4-2E4
USO	Location: Corridor 2, Ramp to Concourse
9-11 Memorial Quilts	Location: 4th Corridor, 1st floor

- The Federal government already has recognized President Ronald Reagan in a number of ways.
 - There are two major facilities in the Washington D.C. area: The Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., dedicated in 1998, and the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, renamed in 1998.
 - The Department of Defense has named the aircraft carrier **USS Ronald Reagan**, commissioned 2003, and Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, Marshall Islands, dedicated 2000, after the President. } ★

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: None

Prepared by: Ralph Newton, (b)(6)

Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL

From: Snow, Howard, CIV, OSD-LA**Sent:** Thursday, June 10, 2004 7:34 AM**To:** Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL**Subject:** Warner wishes to keep "bi-partisan nature" of name for Pentagon**DEFENSE****Warner Weighs in Against Frist's Proposal to Rename the Pentagon After Reagan****BY JOSEPH C. ANSELMO, CQ STAFF WRITER**

The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee cautioned Wednesday that renaming the Pentagon for former President Ronald Reagan might not be the best way to honor his memory.

Sen. John W. Warner, R-Va., took to the Senate floor to emphasize the importance of retaining the "bipartisan nature" of the headquarters of the U.S. armed forces.

His comments appeared aimed at heading off a proposal by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., to rename the Pentagon the "Ronald Reagan National Defense Building."

On June 7, Frist submitted amend-

ments to the fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill (S 2400 — S Rept 108-260) that would rename the Pentagon and the Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency in Reagan's honor.

Warner diplomatically did not directly mention Frist's amendments, but noted the rejection of a proposal to rename the building in honor of former president and five-star Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower after he died in 1969. One of the main reasons, Warner said, "is that that building stands as a symbol of the bipartisanship that must be present as we work with the men and women of the armed forces."

Warner said Congress needed to honor Reagan, but cautioned that lawmakers

"have got to give a **lot** of careful thought and be mindful of how we've recognized other commanders in chief . . . in terms of their contributions to the defense of the country. But we'll come **up** with an idea."

Warner declined to comment further after his remarks.

Frist's aides also moved to play down the amendments, saying they were filed **only** to put ideas **on** the table. An aide said the majority leader was forming a group of senators to review a wide variety of proposals to honor Reagan.

Republican lawmakers also have floated various proposals to put Reagan's likeness on the clime, the \$10 bill or the \$20 bill. ♦

Howard Snow

September 1, 2004

TO: David Chu
Ray DuBois
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Director

2107-04 (344)

Attached is some material on the Director of Naval Nuclear propulsion. My instinct is that eight years is too long. I would like to get it changed so it is four years with the possibility of adding one, two, three or four years.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef re: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

DHR:dh
090104-18

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

1 Ser...



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, O. C. 20301-1600

Dublin

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC _____

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, 695-3341 *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- o At your earlier direction, Dan Dell'Orto met with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to obtain their views about the grade (O-10) and term of appointment (8 years) of this position.
- The Secretary of the Navy believes that any proposed change in either the grade level or term of appointment is sensitive.
 - o The grade level is significant because of the Navy's outstanding nuclear safety record.
 - o Were the grade level reduced, any subsequent safety problems likely would be attributed to that reduction.
 - o An 8-year term is unduly long and permits the incumbent to outlast at least one Administration, and possibly two.
- o The Chief of Naval Operations agreed that any proposed change in either grade level or term of appointment would be controversial and possibly particularly difficult in an election year because the submarine community would mobilize to oppose any change.
- Having a 4-star officer (although it does not have to be a submariner, it historically has been) in this position provides the submarine community with an edge over both the surface and aviation community neither of which has a Navy uniformed advocate above the two-star level.
- Interestingly, ADM Clark does not believe that either the Department of Energy or the Senate would oppose a change in this position unless the submarine community sways them.

- The position as currently structured is an anachronism during a period of transition from a threat- to a capabilities-based defense and a platform centric system to an information centric system.
- Consideration should be given to a Senior Executive Service person for this position, as the Executive Order contemplates, as this would remove the position from the operations role and the submarine advocacy role.
- ADM Clark was very complimentary toward ADM Skip Bowman, the incumbent, who has handled himself as well as anyone could in this position.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, (b)(6)

11/10
1000

~~FOUO~~

September 1, 2004

I-04/011745

ES-0622

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Salah Shakir Letter

Please have someone respond to the attached letter from Salah Shalur

Thanks.

Attach.
6/23/04 Letter from Salah Shakir

DHR:ss
090104-8

.....
Please respond by 9/10/04

Close this
out
PWB


Paul Butler
11/10

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

November 9, 2004

Captain Marriott,

ASD/ISA, Peter Rodman, responded to Mr. Shakir on October 21, 2004. A copy of the letter is attached for your records.

UP

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00329-05

0000

15004



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2300

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

21 OCT 2004

Mr. Salah Shakir
Vice President of Information Technology/Student Services
Rend Lake College
Ina, IL 62846

Dear Mr. Shakir:

Thank you for your letter on how the United States can take the offensive to "diminish and weaken the al-Qaeda tenor." Your suggestions are very helpful.

We know that al-Qaeda's rationalization for terrorism is a distortion of Islam. This point carries the *most* weight coming from authorities within the Muslim world, some of whom you mention. I hope that thoughtful adherents of Islam will **speak** out more forcefully against the hijacking of this great faith by ideological extremists. Moderates like yourself are on the front lines in this struggle.

Once again, thank you for your advice and comments. I encourage you to take your message to the broader Muslim community.

Sincerely,

Peter W. Rodman



6/23/2004



By: Salah Shakir

Vice President of Information Technology/Student Services

Rend Lake College

Ina, IL 62846

(b)(6)

I am an American/Iraqi who is working in southern Illinois. **I** got frustrated with being on the defensive with **war** against **terror**. **I** would like **to** see the **US** on the offensive side. Want to help and **this** is **my** way.

Diminish and Weaken Al-Qaeda Terror

The basis of the Al-Qaeda group's recruitment of new members - getting bigger and stronger - is based purely on religious motivation. The religious motivation is: "If you kill an infidel, you will go to Heaven? Killing infidels (non-believers) is part of a Jihad (holy war). Though most of Al-Qaeda's targets are infidels, many of their attacks have caused death to believers. The justification used for **killing** believers is that the believers also will **go to** Heaven **for** their cause. **Most** of their recruits are **young** in age and in **an** early stage of **their** knowledge of the Islam religion. The way to stop the growth of this group **and** to diminish **and** weaken their organization and its causes is **through** the use of religious motivation **and** reasoning.

A little background on the Islam religion - it is based on five pillars:

- The Profession of Faith
- The Five Daily Prayers
- Almsgiving
- Fasting
- Pilgrimage to Mecca

However, some followers have added Jihad **as** a sixth pillar. Quran is the holy book of Islam. The **Quran** is a record of the exact words revealed by God through the angel Gabriel to the prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Not one word of its 114 chapters (suras) **has** been changed over **the** centuries, **so** the **Quran** **is** in **every** detail the unique and miraculous text which was revealed to Muhammad (PBUH). When it comes **to** the Halal (permissible) and **Haram** (forbidden) aspects of life, Muslims depend first on the **Quran** and secondly on the Hadith (saying) **of** the prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

Unfortunately, **some** Muslims such **as** the Al Qaeda group took the **Quran** as a literal explanation and followed it. The fact is that the Quran has a literal explanation but also is

dependent on the time in which it was written. **All Muslim Shariah (Islamic laws) are written** on the most basic of life's issues. When an issue without a relevant Shariah arises in Muslim life in **any** country, the top Sheik (Muslim cleric) in that city, country **or** community will make a Fatwa (legal opinion concerning Islamic law) about the matter. On certain major issues, a group **of** Sheiks or Muslim organizations - and there are many of them - will make the Fatwa.

To diminish and weaken Al-Qaeda, there must be a Fatwa from one **or** more of the well-recognized Islamic organizations proclaiming that Al-Qaeda and its actions are against what Islam stands for. **This** Fatwa should be well publicized in the Middle East countries. **This** will discourage young Muslims from joining Al-Qaeda or any similar groups, and it will place considerable doubt in new recruits. This might sound simple, but I believe this is a way of fighting religion with religion.

Here are some well-known Islamic groups:

Iraq - City of Al-Najaf: Shaii majority which will put Iran in agreement
Egypt- Alazhar Mosque
Saudi Arabia- Should come from the Saudi government

Here are some Islamic organizations that may **help** in the process:

Council **on** American-Islamic Relations
1050 **17th** St. NW, Suite **490**
Washington, DC **20036**
Tel: (202) 659-CAIR (2247)
Fax: (b)(6)
Email: (b)(6)
URL: www.cair-net.org

Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA)

Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)

7201
~~FOUO~~

file

September 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Phoenix Speech

I'd like a tape of the Phoenix speech – I have not received one yet.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-3

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

DR 9/1

SIR,

THERE WAS NOT A TAPE FROM
PHOENIX. I HAVE ATTACHED
A TRANSCRIPT.

v/r,

(b)(6)


~~FOUO~~

OSD 00330-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039068

300-11100

100000



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Transcript

On the Web:

[http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?](http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?secdef1262.html)
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040826-secdef1262.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>
or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Thursday, August 26, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld Speech to The Greater Phoenix Leadership, Biltmore Hotel, Phoenix, AZ

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you very much. I thank you very much. I'm not a poet. [Laughter] I'm not even close to a poet. There's some character who took my press briefings and tried to turn them into poetry and failed. [Laughter] Thank you, folks. It's very nice to be with you. We're in an August afternoon in Phoenix and I'm delighted to see so many folks here. And I thank each of you for coming. I appreciate your being here. Bill, thank you for those words, and Mr. Mayor, a pleasure to see you. Mr. President, Mr. Speaker and my friends from Congress here. It's always good to see you, and Congressman Flake and Congressman Heintz and Mrs. Heintz. I also was pleased to see Mrs. Stump. I don't know where she's sitting, but – there you are. Good to see you. And so many distinguished guests and public officials and members of the armed services.

I thought what I'd do is to take a few minutes to talk about some of the issues we've been hearing about and reading about and then comment on the global war on terror and then respond to questions, which I look forward to.

Last week, the president announced that we are making progress in our efforts to reposition U.S. military forces and capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The world has certainly changed markedly since the end of the Soviet Union. But military deployments and arrangements really have not changed very much. They've been reduced, but they're pretty much in place where they were when the Cold War ended.

During the Cold War, it was assumed that our forces stationed abroad would defend from static positions. This, of course, is no longer the case, and we know that. Today the enemies we face are fighting from small cells located in almost every corner of the world. And the task today is to stay on the offensive against them. We cannot know precisely where our forces may have to operate. We used to know. We used to be looking for a tank invasion from the Soviet Union across the North German plain and that's why we had so many forces in Northern Europe. So our forces today have to be flexible and they have to be agile and they have to be light and they have to be rapidly deployable, usable, not fixed, and capable of going almost anywhere in the world on short notice.

If you think about it for a number of years now or even before September 11th the DoD has been working on concepts to guide our security presence around the world. And we know that adjusting our footprint or our force posture is an essential component of our strategy. These proposed changes are designed to allow us to deploy capable forces rapidly anywhere in the world on short notice, to push more military capability forward while shifting some 60,000 to 70,000 service members and roughly 100,000 of their dependants from foreign bases to U.S. bases, creating a lighter footprint abroad, which allows us to focus on speed, precision and technically advanced capabilities, rather than simply on mass and sheer numbers, which are really increasingly formulations of the last century.

It's awfully hard for people to change and adjust to that. We've developed over my lifetime the idea that more is better and so we talk about numbers of things, ships, guns, tanks, planes, people – ignoring the reality that if you have, for example, a 10 dumb bombs and you have a smart bomb that can do what 10 dumbs can do and you reduce from 10 dumb bombs to five smart bombs, you have not reduced your capability. In fact, you've dramatically increased your capabilities. But getting people to think that way is not an easy thing. We've also, looking at our posture to help us build new relationships in the world, we've developed a number of new relationships, if you think about it, since 9/11 – Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Yemen – so many countries that we have been working with, this global coalition against terror is now something like 85 or 90 nations, probably the largest coalition in the history of mankind. And our adjustments should make it easier for the United States to work with our allies and friends on military operations to train, to operate, exercise together to complement doctrine and tactics and to exploit the new technologies with them. Our new arrangements also have the added advantage of improving the lives of U.S. military families. Deployments in a number of cases will be shorter and they'll be rotational for training and exercises often lasting weeks or months, rather than years. Military families will find somewhat more stability, fewer permanent changes of station, and as a result, less disruption in the lives of spouses and children in schools.

In a political year, I suppose it's inevitable that these important proposals which we've been working on for some three years now, would lead to a discussion and that's a good thing. Some of the concerns expressed, no doubt, are well intentioned and useful. We've spent the last two years talking to our friends and allies and to members of Congress and working through these issues, proposals of such magnitude deserve examination and they deserve debate and discussion. And let there be no doubt, these are significant changes and they will affect our country's force posture for many decades to come.

At the same time, I think most reasonable observers recognize that our existing force arrangements are relics of a time long passed. We still have two heavy divisions in Germany to defend against a Soviet tank attack. Those two divisions did not help prevent September 11th. They did not prevent the hijackers from organizing and planning their attacks in Hamburg, Germany, for that matter. We've stationed thousands of U.S. troops on the border with North Korea to defend South Korea. South Korea today is a nation that is no longer impoverished. After 50 years, they are not defenseless and thanks, in major part, to the stability our alliance has provided, South Korea today is a thriving nation with a robust democracy with a vibrant economy and a modern army of some 600,000. Our commitment to that country and to peace on that peninsula remains as strong as ever and it will be going forward. In fact, our relationship with Korea is, I think, an excellent example of what changes to our global posture really can accomplish.

For some time now, we've been investing in substantial sums, taxpayers' dollars, billions of dollars in improved military capabilities that are appropriate for the situation on the Korean Peninsula. We're increasing our naval and airpower in the region and we're moving more precision weapons and increased firepower to South Korea. At the same time, we would be relocating our forces away from the demilitarized zone and where they were located in very vulnerable garrisons and cities near that zone and we'll be shifting them southward into two hubs – an air hub and a sea hub – well beyond the range of North Korean artillery.

Today we have the means and the intent to strengthen our deterrent power and our defensive capability while decreasing our overall footprint, and we're doing so, and it would be unwise not to do so. While current arrangements may be comfortable for people and familiar, both in our country and in foreign countries, our current arrangements are -- let's face it, they're obsolete. And we need to deal with the world as it is, not the way it used to be, or even the way we'd like it to be. We have to deal with it as it is. Changes have to be made. They will not be made precipitously, but they will be made. And indeed, it's a plan that will be rolled out over probably as many as four, five, six, seven, eight years. We're in a fortunate position that we don't have to be a supplicant. You can go to these countries and work our arrangements and make sure that we have the right Status of Forces Agreements and access and cross-servicing agreement, and that the neighboring countries are willing to adjust to our needs to move our forces as required by the United States. As we visit with countries, we'll determine which is best by way of new arrangements, and then proceed to work out those details. As a result, there'll be no major announcement beyond what the president has announced. Rather, there will be a series of announcements that evolve as each piece of this is worked out. And we are certainly continuing to consult with Congress and with our friends and allies, as we move forward to meet our responsibility to serve the American people.

Let me make a couple of comments about missile defense. Meeting the new reality of this century also drives our approach to missile defense. In the past few weeks, up in Alaska, the first interceptor was put into the ground. By the end of this year, we expect to have a limited operational capability against incoming ballistic missiles. This represents, in my view, a victory for hope and vision over skepticism. More than 20 years ago, I was in the White House when President Reagan gathered a group of individuals and made his announcement and gave his vision for a missile defense system. Now that's long time ago. And today, roughly two dozen countries, including some of the world's most dangerous regimes, possess ballistic missiles and they are energetically working to increase the range and destructive capability of those missiles. A number of these states are estimated by the U.S. intelligence community to have nuclear, biological and chemical programs.

North Korea, for example, is working to develop and deploy missiles capable of reaching not just their neighbors, such as Japan, but our country as well. The same can be said of Iran. More countries are developing and sharing information, and I think it is notable to think what just recently happened with respect to Libya where they made an admission that dramatically demonstrated this point. Fortunately, their announcement was that they wish to just discontinue those programs and have been working with the United States and the United Kingdom to do so.

History has taught us that weakness is provocative. And the longer the delays in deploying even a limited defense against these kinds of facts, the greater the likelihood of an attempted or threatened strike. Additionally, without any defense against missiles, terrorists and rogue regimes could use the threat of an attack to try to intimidate America and/or our allies. As enemies continue to adapt and evolve, so must our capabilities. That's why the president directed us to pursue an innovative approach to the development and the deployment of missile defenses. Rather than waiting years, sometimes decades for a fixed and final architecture, as has been the norm with the many weapons systems, we will be deploying an initial set of capabilities that will evolve over time as technologies evolve over time.

The way ahead will have its share of ups and downs – we know that. Any development of a new technology, leading-edge technologies, has ups and downs, successes and what people call failures. I was in the pharmaceutical business and invested heavily in research and development. And folks did not just simply get up one morning to discover an important new therapy for people. They went out and they tried things that worked and that didn't work. And each thing that

didn't work was part of that learning process and so, too, in weapons and defense systems capabilities. All cutting-edge endeavors include trial and error, but we will continue to benefit from leadership that combines vision with resolve and to simply learn from each of the so-called failures.

Let me also say a word or two about the national debate taking place with respect to the so-called reforms of the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission has provided a useful service in my view, by surfacing some important issues and challenges and some problems. These are the decisions that the United States Congress and the executive branch, the president, are ultimately going to have to decide. Indeed, the president has already implemented a number of the commission's recommendations. And I spent Monday with him where he spent the better part of the day reviewing a number of additional thoughts and suggestions that have come up. It seems to me that this is the proper approach. Whether it's a government and a bureaucracy as large as ours and with the ramifications of change so enormous. It is true, you can carefully think about these issues and think them through carefully before implementing things. We are at war, and we need to get it right. We need to make the changes we need to make, but the old saying is the truth and that is that, to he who tears down what is falls the responsibility of putting in place something better. And it isn't the kind of thing that we want to be making many mistakes about.

Last, let me make a comment a bit on Iraq and Afghanistan. I recently returned from Afghanistan a couple weeks ago. I must say that each time I go there, I am just struck by the changes, by the improvements, by the energy you see in the streets, the activities. And I know there are some folks there's some folks here who've spent some time in Iraq and Afghanistan and the thank-you needless to say, for being willing to do that. But if you drive through portions of Afghanistan, you'll see construction is well along on the major highways which connect the major cities of that country, and which are so critically important to their economy.

The Afghan security forces are being trained and equipped and have and have acquitted themselves quite well and in several recent activities. I visited an election center on this last trip and saw a room not quite this big filled with computers and young folks, Afghans, busily working on the election and the registration process. Here's a country that has suffered terribly under Soviet occupation, has had years of drought, had a ghastly civil war and had suffered under the repression of the Taliban regime and has no real experience with democracy as such, as we think of it. And people were estimating they might get three or four million people to register for this first election, which is coming up. In fact, there are now over 10 million that have registered. And I'm told that something in excess of 40 percent of them are women. And needless to say, the Taliban didn't even let women walk around unaccompanied by men, and they didn't let them go out uncovered and they didn't let them wear colored shoes and they didn't let any of them fly kites and the idea of getting women to -- willing to go out and register to vote is a striking accomplishment. The Afghans are clearly enthusiastic about these first early steps towards democracy. In Iraq, the economy is growing, the currency has been reasonably steady. We all know that people are being killed and wounded and many, many are Iraqis are being killed every week. The stock market is open, however. They fielded an Olympic soccer team. We've gone from zero to something like 220,000 Iraqi security forces of which 110,000 are properly trained and equipped and functioning. I've spent some time on the phone this morning with Gen. Casey and Gen. Abizaid, our senior military commanders there and they are impressed that they have a reasonably large number of experienced Iraqi forces that are in the Najaf area and are attempting to sort through that difficult situation with the holy shrines of the Shia faith.

Now most of the media attention this week has been on the fighting in Najaf, but it's interesting that this month we also had the Constituent Assembly council, a group conference that met elected people to serve. And in the words of at least one newspaper, it is putting Iraq on the road to a constitutional democracy. Progress is mixed. It's good with the bad. And we all recognize that. People have been killed and wounded. And it isn't easy to build a free country when terrorists are determined to try to attack every sign of success -- every activity. They systematically try and assassinate a government leader or a mayor, city council members, police chiefs. They are attempting to dissuade people from joining the Iraqi Security forces, that the Iraqi security forces have people standing in line to become policemen, national guard, and regular army, border patrol, site protection and facilities protections people.

Everyone that looks at it and sees this mixture of what's taking place to do it. And clearly, the difficult and the bad is struck by just how hard it is to go from where they were -- a vicious dictatorship -- to something approximating a freer economic system, a free political system. And Afghanistan and Iraq are becoming free nations that differ in almost every respect from the terror regimes that they replaced. They are countries that will be assisting in the global war on terror. And to serve as examples to discredit, it gives credit to extremist ideology. And I would think to the extent they're successful, and I believe that each of those countries has a terrific crack at being successful. The effect on that region will be enormous. It is a region that needs models, it needs examples. And for all the enemies' cunning and ruthlessness, I think that those of us in this country and in the case of Afghanistan, some 26 other nations that are helping -- in the case of Iraq, some 32 countries that are offering assistance -- we have an enormous advantage and that is that the great sweep of human desire is for freedom. And that is on our side, let there be no doubt. So we pray for their success and for the success of our soldiers and men and women, volunteers all, who are risking their lives to help those folks. Fifty million people between the two countries, have a crack at being free people. And their noble work of people in uniform will bring a more peaceful planet and a more secure nation for those of us here at home. And with that, I thank you and will be happy to respond to questions.

[Applause]

Now, do you have microphones? Look at that. Why does somebody stick their hand up and the mic will start

wandering over and then we won't have to – look at this – see all kinds of hands. Terrific. Yes, sir.

Q: Can you comment on the stability of the government of Pakistan?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes, sir. We are – those of us in the world engaged in the global struggle against extremists are so fortunate that President Musharraf and his team are in power in Pakistan. He has, without question, one of the most difficult tasks of any governmental leader that I can think of. And he lives in a tough part of the world. He has an element within his country that obviously has tried to assassinate him on several occasions recently.

He's a courageous leader and a thoughtful leader and he is a superb partner in this global war on terror. He had troubles along his borders with Afghanistan. The Pakistan government has been aggressive in helping us deal with the al Qaeda and put pressure on them. He has tribal areas that run along that border and just as we have in our country special rules in tribal areas. So, too, there the pattern has been that the Pakistani military stayed out. And of course, it was being used as a haven for both the Taliban and the al Qaeda. And he has changed fast. He's moved forces in there and he has been working the problem. And I just am so – all of us in the United States government are so grateful that he's there and he is being successful in putting pressure on the terrorists. The more pressure that is put on the terrorists in countries like Afghanistan and others, the more difficult it is for them to recruit, the more difficult it's going to be for them to raise money, the more difficult it is for them to move money, the more difficult it is to move from place to place, to communicate with each other. Everything's harder if we have the countries that are willing to step up, and it does require people to step up. It requires physical courage and political courage. He's got large numbers of people in Pakistan who don't like what he's doing and are against it. And sometimes in our country – and Mr. Mayor, you know that – president of the senate -- when someone's against you, they run against you, they vote against you or they talk against you – that's one thing. In that part of the world, they don't just do that; they go after you. And it is a different circumstance. So I have a lot of confidence in him and the work they're doing and, as one citizen of this country and I'm grateful that he's a part of the coalition. Question.

Q: What are we doing in our country to protect our borders along Mexico and Canada where most of the terrorists have come through? I travel across the southern part of this state and into Texas. I mean, it's scary to see what I see as I'm out there and about, visiting and traveling, how easy it is to come into this country without being checked you know.

SEC. RUMSFELD: It's true all over the world that borders are a problem. They're porous – we have trouble in our country. We know that all of us can see our borders are relatively porous, not just north and south but so, too, from the oceans. And the Department of Defense is not involved in the subject of this – border guards. Now that is the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard are the ones responsible for that. So I'm not an expert. I am an expert about the problems of borders – the Syrian borders of Iraq and the Iranian border of Iraq. And I know a lot about that -- a lot more than I do about your borders here. And so, too, in Afghanistan, they border with Pakistan and the border with Iran. And everyone – our country and what we're doing in those two countries – we have to do a cost-benefit ratio. To try to seal a border is a monumental task. It's a terribly expensive task. It has – and you are constantly asking yourself are you better off trying to do that or something else? And so those calculations are made by the Department of Homeland Security and by the state and local government in states that have borders. And of course, they're also made by the Department of Defense with respect to our situations around the world.

The terrorists are smart. They're not dumb. They're clever. And they prefer to stay alive, although there are certainly suicide bombers who don't prefer to stay alive. But to the extent we are successful, and go to school on them and arrange ourselves to put maximum pressure on them, they then go to school on us. And it's a dynamic constantly changing situation. And to the extent you do a better job on borders, you raise the price, raised the cost of them and then you deal with that. On the other hand, they then turn to another direction and take advantage because the terrorists can attack any place, using any technique, and it's physically impossible to defend everywhere at every moment against every technique.

I was President Reagan's Middle East envoy back in the early '80s after the Marines were killed – 241 of them in the Beirut Barracks. And of course, it was a truck bomb going into the barracks and killing all the Marines. And very soon, you began to see these barricades, the concrete barriers like it's around all buildings. Fair enough, so the terrorists saw that and they saw they couldn't get a truck through, so they're started lobbing rocket-propelled-grenades at buildings over the barriers. So the next thing, you go down to Corniche in Beirut and you look and they draped wire mesh over buildings to bounce these rocket-propelled grenades off. So the terrorists saw that and what did they do? They started hitting soft targets. People going to and from work, people at home. And those asymmetrical attacks have an infinite number of opportunities and places that they can attack or times they can attack or techniques they getting used to attack. So defense really becomes a vastly – a more expensive way to do it and less certain way to do it than offense. And that is why you simply have to find those terrorist networks and root them out where they are and deal with the countries that provide the haven for the terrorists. And that is the only way that we can have success. The second part of that equation is that you have to do defense, to be sure, or else it's easy for them. But we have to do the offense.

And the other thing we have to do is we have to look at the intake. What's going on in this world that people are successfully training other people to believe that it's in their interest to go out and kill innocent men, women and children. How do we develop a confidence in ourselves that to be sure, we're defending the American people, which is our job and we've got to do that, and then take every step to do that, and particularly, as these weapons get more powerful. But we also have to reach out and engage the world on this subject and see that we get people within countries like Pakistan, within countries like Saudi Arabia, trying to squeeze down the finances that are going into the training schools and training camps.

And try to reduce the attractiveness of the people to come into that business of killing innocent men, women and children. It isn't enough simply to be successful in rooting them out because more come in. And so our task is big. This is not something that's going to be over in a year or two or three. This is a lot more like the Cold War that took 40 or 50 years than it is the World War II, where there'll be some final signing ceremony on the U.S.S. Missouri. This is a tough, tough task that we have got ahead of us, but we can do it. Questions, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I just want to thank you for the work you're doing and the commitment that you have made public service. We really appreciate you being here. [Applause] Thank you. Two quick questions. Would you talk a little bit about North Korea and China and the impact that China potentially has on this whole equation, and also talk a little bit about Iran and some of the comments that we've read recently about what's going on there? Thank you.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes, sir. North Korea is a -- it's a tragedy. If you think about it, here's a country the same size as South Korea, same people and 50 years after the war, South Korea is booming. It's an economic miracle, it's successful. The people are free. And in North Korea, the -- above the demilitarized zone, if you look down from a satellite at night, it's black, with a pinprick of light in Pyongyang, the capital, and south of the DMZ, it's just brilliant light.

They've just lowered their -- within the last year or two, they lowered the height to get in the North Korean military down to the 4'10" for adults because of starvation. Under 100 pounds and you get in the North Korean military now. They've got concentration camps with tens of thousands of people from several locations. People that have tried to get out are killed. Not unlike East Germany and when we see people trying to get across the wall in Berlin.

The government is busy as probably the principal proliferator of ballistic missile technology. They're good at it. They have developed long-range ballistic missiles and they've been helping a lot of other countries develop them. They're on the terrorist list. They've engaged in terrorist acts. They are involved with the drug trade, basically the prescription drug trade -- illegal. They're involved with counterfeiting. All in all, not your first choice as a neighbor. The people are terribly repressed. They're a danger. They're a danger in two ways. They're a danger to the South Koreans and they're also a danger as a proliferator. I do not know of certain knowledge what their nuclear capability is, or their chemical or biological capability. We know they've announced -- they claim they have nuclear weapons. We know our intelligence community has assessed that they probably have two or three nuclear weapons. And they are now -- they change their story periodically and therefore are not really reliable as a gauge as to what they've got in mind. We are trying -- the United States with Russia and Japan, South Korea and China -- attempting to engage in talks with them to see if it might not be possible for them to adjust their behavior. And begin behaving in a way that is less threatening to the rest of the world. How that will work remains to be seen.

I will say this -- the partnership between the United States and South Korea is solid. The military capability of our combined countries in that part of the world is healthy. This program that we have in place under a superb commander, Gen. Leon LaPorte has been looked at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It's been looked at by the former combatant commanders in charge of Korea and to a person, they are convinced that what we are doing is a good thing and it will not weaken the deterrent. It will not create an instability and, indeed, it will in fact, improve our military capabilities to deal with any conceivable threats in that part of the world.

Iran -- I just can't believe. When you think of that country -- intelligent people, educated people, an interesting history and they're being governed by a small handful of clerics in a manner that is notably different from all their neighbors -- most of their neighbors anyway -- and they know it. It isn't like North Korea where they control every single thing. People in Iran see television and they hear radio. People can go off the borders and come in. People from our country go into Iran and see these people. They know that they're being denied the opportunity for that country, because of its behavior with respect to nuclear development, they are being denied interaction with the rest of the world to their detriment. And when one thinks of how fast that country switched from the Shah of Iran to the Ayatollahs, one has to think that at some point in the future it might switch again. And I don't know what their behavior is going to be with respect to the International Atomic Energy Commission [sic], but it's been uneven and bumpy thus far. And you have to hope that the international community will behave in a responsible way and create sufficient pressure on that government. Again, a terrorist state that's actively involved with funding and assisting terrorists, there are al Qaeda leadership in Iran today. Iran is a country that is a principal sponsor of Hezbollah, along with Syria, where they send weapons and terrorists down through Damascus into Beirut and then into Israel. So it's a country that is off to the side with the international community and the hope is that the international community will behave in a way that will persuade them that that is not in their interest.

The one thing we know is that the problem of proliferation is a serious one. In fact, every month that goes by, as these weapons get more lethal, more dangerous, it is a more serious problem. We also know that there isn't any way in the world that one country can do much about proliferation. It is one of those things that, by definition, requires the cooperation of a lot of countries to work together to see that we behave in this planet in a rational way so that we create lots of disincentives for people can engage in those kinds of trafficking of weapons of mass destruction or missile technology. Lots of disincentives, and a lot of incentives for those countries to behave in a way that they are a part of the civilized world. It is -- I am hopeful about Iran. And you might see -- particularly the young people and women -- whose behavior is particularly restricted in Iran, serve as a force over time to help put that country on a path that makes more sense to the civilized world. Question -- way in back. I'm getting the hook. [Laughter] We'll make it the next to the last question.

Q: Thank you. In an environment, where every imperfection in the war on terror and the war against Iraq is a major

story, in an election environment particularly and in the world's greatest democracy, how do you sustain a long-term political will necessary to fight the kind of war on terror that you're talking about where the good news is rarely heard. The progress that you've spoken of only comes out in forums like this? How do we do that long-term?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, that is just a critical central core question for our society. There is absolutely no way in the world that we can be militarily defeated in Afghanistan or Iraq, or even in the global war on terror, and I say militarily defeated. The only conceivable way that we could lose and [Inaudible] think of who wins – is because of a calculation over time that the cost and the pain in dollars and in human lives is too great and it's not worth it. And if that balance shifted to that point, it would say to the world that there isn't a willingness to sustain that level of effort. [Inaudible] you [Inaudible] terrorism, were we to do that.

<Audio Gap>

Vietnam war, 58,000 dead. Those are large numbers and they're heartbreaking and anyone who goes out to the field in Iraq to Afghanistan, or goes to Walter Reid Hospital and Bethesda Hospital as I do. You just cannot help but think of the lives not lived, think of the wounded whose lives will be lived totally differently and not ask yourself about the cost. And then if you look down from a satellite on Korea and see what's happening today, the cost in human life today in North Korea, and the energy and the vitality and the success and the opportunities of the people in South Korea, make it worthwhile. And your question goes to democracy – in a dictatorship, the leadership can do what they want. In a democracy, you have to lead not by command, but by persuasion. And we simply have to find the words to make sure that the people in our country and the people in our coalition and those countries understand that it is worth it, that freedom is important and that it is true that each generation needs to make that sacrifice that we talk about on Memorial Day and that time – over time and when one looks back, you nod and say, well, my goodness, yes, that was worth it. Of course, it was. But at the time, when you see, as you point out, day after day after day, the drumbeat of negative stories about this and Afghanistan, that in Iraq and the impressions people have which are not balanced. And no historical context. When you think of what went on in Japan, how many years that took to build a democracy that became a bulwark for freedom in the Cold War. In Germany, to turn that fascist regime into a democracy – amazing accomplishments.

Thomas Jefferson, I think, said about our country, trying to struggle from where we were to a democratic system and it took us how many years? We didn't have a constitution between 1776 and 1789, I guess. And he said, "One ought not expect to be transported towards democracy on a featherbed." And that's true. It is tough. And what's going on in Iraq and Afghanistan today is tough. And it's a bumpy road and it is not a smooth path. And what we need is – and where do I come out in your question? I come out with we're going to make it. And why do I say that? I say it because our system works. The American people have a good center of gravity. They've got some kind of an inner gyroscope that resets itself. They can be blown by the wind and all overwhelming amount of bad news and be swayed. But down deep inside, the people of this country get it. They know that there are things that are worth fighting for. They know that the values they believe in are worth defending. And they are smart enough and wise enough over time to have the will to sustain that effort. I've got a lot of confidence in them myself. We'll make this the last question. Yes, sir.

Q: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, my name is Barry Wong. I just wanted you to know my brother's served in the Navy Seabees in Iraq from San Diego. But I just want to make a statement, Mr. Secretary, that...

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, no. This is for questions.

Q: Oh, questions. OK. It's a question, then.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Just put a question mark there.

Q: OK. I'll put a question mark there. I'm a lawyer. I can do that. But I want to applaud you for the realignment and I work with the Luke Air Force Base Fifth and the Sixth fighter wing and I just want to let you know that Luke Air Force Base is important to this community, that as you go through the base realignments that you keep the Luke Air Force Base in mind, because we love them. The business community loves them, and we want to keep Luke Air Force Base. And we want to add another mission to the joint strike fighter. We would love to have him here.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Give him the hook! [Laughter]

Q: And Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you're interested in base realignment and interested in saving bases like Luke Air Force Base? [Laughter] [Applause]

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you. [Laughter] Folks, if you see somebody, you know, at an airport, or a restaurant or somewhere walking around in uniform, tell them "Thank you." [Applause]

UNKNOWN: Thank you all for being here. Thank you.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040826-secdef1262.html>

~~FOUO~~

file

September 1, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Numbers

847

I'd like to start getting a report for everything since September 11 that combines the number who have died - killed in action, as well as non-combat deaths - and the number who have been wounded. Please show it by country (or area), and add it up. I think it is already over 1100, including Afghanistan.

It seems to me we ought to start using that number, which is more accurate.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-2

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Please respond by 9/10

VCJCS/EA DP/9

Closed at
RT on
10 Sep

Dave, FYI Also flowing
up via JSAP

DR
Paul

104 SEP 1 2004

~~FOUO~~

703

1 Sep 04

September 3, 2004

TO: Dr. David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tour Lengths

I think we need to do something about tour lengths.

I am convinced one of the problems in this department -- why mistakes are made and why antiquated systems are not modernized -- is because people serve in their positions too short a time. They simply never get their arms around the challenges, problems and tasks that need to be done.

Please get back to me with some ideas as to how this can be fixed.

Be bold.

Thanks,

DHR:ss
090304-9

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Please respond by _____

2004

3 Sep 04

September 7, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Investigations

I understand that the Army will brief me soon on its investigation of two detainee deaths in Bagam.

I know you share my dissatisfaction that it has taken almost two years to get to this point.

When you brief me on this latest investigation, I'd like, at a minimum, to learn such information as:

- What units were involved, and their training history?
- The leadership at Bagram at the time.
- The relevant reporting relationships.
- What other units were present in the area?
- Regarding detention facilities in Afghanistan, what policies for detention and interrogation were in place then, and what are they now?
- A history of the investigation
- What corrective actions have been initiated?

In addition, I look forward to your recommendations on how to fix the seemingly profound systemic problems in the Army identified in the Kern and Mikolashek reports.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090304-10

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Please respond by 10/1/04

SECRET

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September 7, 2004

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Meeting with David Chu

Please arrange a meeting with David Chu regarding longer tours and longer service – time and position, particularly. I also want to discuss Standing Joint Task Forces.

I am convinced this is part of the problem we are having in redeployment, Joint Staff, Abu Ghraib and management of prisons, as well as in intelligence – people are simply not in their jobs long enough.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090704-5

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Please respond by 9/17/04

05/11/00

05/11/00

September 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Peter Pace
Lt. Gen. Skip Sharp
Col. Will Grimsley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Force Brief

We delivered the Iraqi Security Force brief to the President today. I know your team worked hard over the past several weeks to sharpen and improve the material. It will be a very useful instrument as we go forward.

Thanks for the good work – now let's focus on monitoring and delivering what we promised.

DHR:ss
090804-2

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Please respond by _____

TRIS

090804-2

September 8, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
Gen. Mike Maples

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Thank You

33104

In preparing for my press conference yesterday, the Geren-Maples group produced an excellent information package, which included some very sharp Q & A and a well-organized summary up front. It was very helpful – please pass along my thanks to the folks who worked on it.

As a general comment, the work of your team has been indispensable to helping the Department of Defense through some significant challenges over the past months – well done.

DHR:ss
090804-4

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Please respond by _____

SEP 04

September 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arabs in Chechnya

RUSCIN

Please do all you can to find ground truth on the media reports that there were some number of Arab militants among the Chechen forces that took hostages in Beslan.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090804-5

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Please respond by 9/17/04

800-450-0000

September 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Our Korean Allies

We should all be looking for on-the-record places to thank the Koreans for their contributions in Iraq, particularly as they are about to become the third largest contributor of troops after the U.S. and U.K.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090804-7

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Please respond by _____

Korean

090804-7

September 10, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Meeting with Chris Cox

Please talk to Chris Cox. He is going to be very involved with the Intel process and he would very much like to talk to you. I told him I would set it up. The sooner, the better because once we end up with a bill we are restricted, now we are not. And, I think your advice would be helpful to him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091004-7

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Please respond by _____

OSD 00341-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039083

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10 SEP 10 11

September 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Schoomaker
Secretary Brownlee

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DRM*

SUBJECT: Army Restructuring

As you work to restructure our Army around the Brigade Combat Team concept, I understand we are creating light and heavy BCTs from our light and heavy divisions. Have we given thought to the interchangeability and interoperability of the units so created?

I would be interested to know how you intend to tackle this task – it is clearly central to our efforts to reshape the military in the 21st century.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-1

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Please respond by 10/10/04

OSD 00342-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039084

020707

15 SEP 04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

September 23, 2004, 9:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

Beauder

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Army Restructuring

- Interchangeability and interoperability were fundamental factors in developing our Infantry and Heavy Modular Brigade Combat Teams.
- Standardized designs for Infantry, Heavy and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams allow for rapid reconfiguration to support Combatant Commander missions across the entire spectrum of operations – they are scaleable and tailorable.
- Each Brigade Combat Team is inherently combined arms and has numerous capabilities (Signal, Field Artillery, Military Police, Engineer and Sustainment) to enable full spectrum operations. These Brigade Combat Teams are standing combined arms organizations that require minimal augmentation., if any.
- Infantry, Heavy and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams include receptacles for joint plugs to leverage capabilities from our sister services (e.g., joint fires) which enhances joint interdependency – central to our efforts in reshaping the military for the 21st century.

COORDINATION: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Prepared By: COL Wesley McClellan, (b)(6)

322

23 Sep 04

15 Sep 04

OSD 00342-05

September 16, 2004

TO: Gen. Schoomaker

c c : Les Brownlee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Army Tour Lengths

When we talked about your changes we also discussed the length of current Army tours – 12 months in Iraq. I believe you were going to come back to me with a proposal to shorten it to six or nine months. I would be curious to hear what your thinking is.

When you do come back, be sure you include the effect it will have upon rotations over the coming period.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091604-19

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Please respond by _____

2004

16 Sep 04



~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



OCT 1 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths

In response to your September 16, 2004, memo, while the Army would prefer to reduce deployment durations to six or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six months is the optimal deployment length, allowing the Army to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the stresses separation generates on our volunteer force. However:

- There is insufficient depth within the Army's Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12 months without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the Army's ability to meet CENTCOM's total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the Army's combat unit deployment length to nine months could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by shortening unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current 12-month rotation policy, meeting CENTCOM's requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 04-06 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units - measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers. This number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 05-07.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00344-05
4090366

11-L-0559/OSD/039087

2004

1 Oct 04

16 Sep 04

September 17, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Counter-Narcotics Activity

Please get back to me on what we need to do legally to get the Department of Justice and everyone in the U.S. Government aboard on the counter-narcotics activity in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-3

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Please respond by 10/4/04

17 Sep 04

September 20, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wall Street Journal Editorial

With regards to Friday's Wall Street Journal editorial -- I don't recall ever saying we have to wait until more Iraqi troops are trained. In fact, I said just the opposite.

Gen Myers said it at a press briefing where I was present. Please check to see if that's right .

Attach.
9/17/04 Wall Street Journal Editorial re: The Enemy in Iraq

DHR:ss
092004-14

.....
Please respond by 9/23/04

0007

203000

September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper

c c : Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Mike Wynne
Ken Krieg
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Predator and other UAV Production

Please get back to me very soon with a plan to increase production of the Predator and other UAVs, consistent with an understanding of limiting factors (industrial capacity, C2, training of operators, etc.)

Clearly, the Combatant Commanders, especially General Abizaid, can fully utilize more of them.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-16

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

4528

092004-16

September 24, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rep. Thaddeus McCotter

Let's have Thaddeus McCotter in sometime with a group of Congressmen. He's impressive.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/23/04 Memo from SecDef re: Congressman in Briefing
Bio for Thaddeus McCotter

DHR:ss
092404-2

.....
Please respond by _____

022

24 09/04

~~FOUO~~

September 23, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressman in Yesterday's Briefing

Please give me the name of the congressman who spoke about anarchy in yesterday's House briefing. Please give me his background sheet. He seemed like a smart guy.

Please pass his name to Powell Moore.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092304-8

.....
Please respond by _____

Sir,

The individual's name is Thaddeus G. McCotter, Rep, 11th Dist of Mich. Legislative Affairs is getting a full Bio.

VIR, COL B

→ ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039093

Thaddeus McCotter
R-MICHIGAN



(b)(6)

Military Service: None
Career: Lawyer
Elected: 2002 (First Term)

Important Issues	Support	Oppose
Iraq use of force (10/11/02)		
Iraq Supplemental (10/17/03)	X	
Iraq Supp: Grant Vs Loan (10/16/03)	X	

GWOT Travel	Trips	Date
Iraq	1	10-11/03
Afghanistan		
GTMO		

Bases / Major Defense Industry
None

Issues and Concerns

- Met with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in Spring 2004. He has many Caldeans in his District and suggested that they be used as translators.

- Wants the intelligence panels to have more authority over how intelligence is gathered. "Intelligence information is only as credible as the sources. If you have greater access to some of the methods and sources for the intelligence, you could make better assessments." (7/04)

- Co-sponsored - *HR 2797*, to improve the readiness of State defense forces and to increase military coordination for homeland security between the States and the Department of Defense. (8/18/03)


- A self-described conservationist.

- Major Industry in district is auto manufacturing.

*Assistant Majority Whip.

- Committees: Budget, International Relations, Small Business.

- Won election in 2002 with 57.2% of the vote.



[Home](#)

About Thaddeus

[About Thaddeus](#)

[Contact](#)

[Enter Thaddeus's Photo Gallery](#)

[Constituent Services](#)

A life-long resident of southeast Michigan, U.S. Representative Thaddeus McCotter was elected to the 108th Congress in 2002 to represent the citizens of Western Oakland and Western Wayne Counties.

[Visit DC](#)

[Issues and Legislation](#)

Despite his status as a Freshman member, Congressman McCotter received a waiver from the Speaker of the House to serve on three key committees: the Budget Committee; the International Relations Committee; and the Small Business Committee. He was also named an Assistant Majority Whip.

[Newsroom](#)

[District Resources](#)

Congressman McCotter has focused on preserving and promoting manufacturing and small businesses, because he knows they form the back bone of our community's economy. He has steadfastly supported Winning the War on Terror and increasing our homeland security; tirelessly fought to reduce taxes and the size and scope of government; and, most importantly, Congressman McCotter has dedicated every effort to listen to and serve his constituents.

Washington, DC
415 Cannon House
Office Building
Washington, DC
20515
202.225.8171 tel

(b)(6)

Congressman McCotter is a graduate of Catholic Central High School; the University of Detroit; and the University of Detroit Law School. He is a bar admitted attorney by profession. Thaddeus and Rita McCotter, a registered nurse, have three young children, George, Timothy, and Emilia. The McCotter family lives in his home town of Livonia. Congressman McCotter travels to and from our nation's capital every week to serve our community.

District
17197 N. Laurel
Park Dr.
Suite 16L
Livonia, MI 48152
734.632.0314 tel

(b)(6)

September 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Ops-Intel Session and Testimony

We had a good couple of days on the Hill. The ops-intel session provided a good opportunity to get our message out, and the Global Posture Testimony – while covering a variety of topics – was likewise an excellent forum for the Department.

We all know how hard you and the LA team worked to put together over ten hours of time in front of Congress – thanks for all you do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-5

.....
Please respond by _____

38011
38011

September 24, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Borders

I would like you to put together a team of people to think about what we can do about the borders. I am convinced that if we did a curfew, UAVs or some kind of focus and imposed a penalty on people who are breaking through the borders there would be a deterrent effect.

Let's get some folks thinking about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-8

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

7201

24 SEP 04

September 24, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legal Authorities in Afghanistan

Please get back to me with the answer on this legal authorities question in Afghanistan if we need to go after drug labs.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-9

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

Afghanistan

24 SEP 04

September 24, 2004

TO: David Chu
Charlie Abell

cc: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Tapping the Beer Keg

W
M
C
S

It is very important that we lay out, in a clear and systematic way, how we can “lower the spigot” on the various Service “beer kegs” – in other words, how can we fully tap into our available manpower to use it most efficiently.

We should be able to show where the spigot is located today and how we can lower it over what period of time, using metrics to show the progress we have made already.

We need to know the points of friction that will tend to impede our progress and the steps we need to take to accelerate this process for each of the Services.

I would like to see this brief in about 30 days. Use outside help if you think it useful.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-12

.....
Please respond by 24 OCT 04

W
M
C
S

September 27, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Manning for Staffs in Iraq

T...

I would like to see us re-do the charts in the Strategic Overview that show the status of manning the staffs in Iraq. They are somewhat misleading and should be fixed.

Also, we need to make sure that decisions about the level and timing of manning those staffs is managed from here in DC, not by the Services.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-1

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: COL Bucci
CC: (b)(6)
Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dates for the Calendar

Please put the following key dates on my calendar:

- Oct. 9: Afghan Elections
- Oct 9: Australia Elections
- Oct. 31: Ukraine Elections
- Jan. 2005: Iraq Elections

It would be helpful for me to have a list of these, and any other important international election dates.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-16

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00359-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039101

September 27, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Salafist Network

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, it is interesting that I have never had a briefing by anyone in the interagency process in a PC or an NSC on what the USG battle plans are to go against those centers of gravity.

The Department of Treasury has the finances, and State should have the spiritual networks.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-23

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

Handwritten notes on the right margin, including "C.I.P." and "10/15/04".

10/1
1145

~~FOUO~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 27, 2004

push To Sec Def

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Salafist Network

310.1

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, it is interesting that I have ** 1* never had a briefing by anyone in the interagency process in a PC or an NSC on what the USG battle plans are to go against those centers of gravity.

The Department of Treasury has the finances, and State should have the spiritual ** 2* networks.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-23

OSD 00361-05

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

10/1/04

DR 11/11

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS
THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES

→ SD

Re: ** 1*

Re: ** 2*

On Sept 23 I sent the attached memo to Hadley. He will organize the briefings.

This is why we drafted for you the ^{attached} memo you sent to the President on creating task forces to counter ideological support for terrorism. The President hasn't yet responded to your July 30 memo. Yesterday I pushed Hadley yet again on getting going on it and I think that this time he may be able to get action. OSD 00361-05

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

Doug Feith

11-L-0559/OSD/039103

1 OCT 04

September 28, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Ryan Henry
Andrew Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Global Posture Execution

How do you think we ought to execute the Global Posture changes?. Should we try to get a retired four-star and make him a deputy assistant secretary to work the problems?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-15

.....
Please respond by 10/3/04

September 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Service Training

Please see attached memo.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
Memo "Security Service Training for Other Countries"

DHR:ss
092804-19

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

353

27 02-10

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

SUBJECT: Security Service Training for Other Countries

The U.S. Military needs to organize -- to provide security service training for other countries.

The Marine Corps ought to step up and take that role -- but we need a major effort on it -- to get funded and organized to do it.

DHR:ss
092004-32

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039106

September 30, 2004

TO: David Chu
Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots

Immediately following the election, please start the process of redirecting the absentee ballot responsibility. (The Federal Voting Assistance Program or FVAP), for everyone except the military, to the Department of State.

DoD should handle just the military, since the military is less than half the total. People think of the embassies as the logical place to be helpful on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
093004-18

.....
Please *respond* by 10/29/04

014187
093004-18

10:45 AM

January 9, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Mr. President -

Attached for your possible interest is a note about Tom Franks saying some kind words about you.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
010904.24

Attach: "Former General Defends Invasion of Iraq In Speech" Palm Beach Post,
1/7/03

335 W#

9 Jan 04

OSD 00461-04

91

Palm Beach Post
January 7, 2004

Former General Defends Invasion Of Iraq In Speech

By Ron Hayes, Palm Beach Post Staff Writer

In the months after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks led 150,000 American soldiers to war in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq.

Most of the soldiers are still there, but Franks, who retired last summer as head of U.S. Central Command, has traded his camouflage fatigues for a business suit and the lucrative lecture circuit.

Tuesday afternoon, Franks opened the 2004 Speaker Series at The Society of the Four *Arts* with a few hoary jokes, a passionate defense of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, sentimental references to his grandchildren, a few swipes at the media and a declaration of friendship and respect for President Bush that cynics might have heard as a ringing non-endorsement endorsement.

"It's been five months since I retired," the four-star general began, "and I've learned that if you want a car to move you have to get in the front seat."

But he soon turned serious.

"On September 11, 2001, Americans recognized our vulnerability to attack from without, and every day since then the world has come to recognize what a superpower on steroids looks like," he said.

"Saddam Hussein had a bad holiday season," Franks said with a gleeful cackle, and "Osama bin Laden, dead or alive, is not today in Afghanistan planning the next attack." However, he offered no evidence to support that assertion.

At one point, Franks criticized the media for its coverage, but later praised the policy of embedding journalists with troops in Iraq. "I do not believe we have had very much accurate reporting from Iraq since the embedded journalists left," he said. "More embedding right now would satisfy me."

As for his personal plans now that others are doing the fighting, Franks said, "Samuel Thomas (his grandson) will require a lot of knee-bouncing."

And Franks is writing a book, as well as giving lectures.

"The schedule is about the same," he quipped, "but the pay is a helluva lot better."

He was given a standing ovation.



January 12, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: State of the Union

Andy—

Is there any chance the Cabinet spouses can get invited to the State of the Union?

Thanks.

DEIR:dh
011204-30

0001

12 Jan 04

OSD 000539-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039110

January 13, 2004

TO: Gen. Leon LaPorte
CC: ADM Ed Giambastiani
Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief from JFCOM

Please make sure you get Ed Giambastiani's latest briefing looking at lessons learned through the Iraqi eyes. It is enormously important for you to see it in connection with your current work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-4

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

Iraq

13 Jan 04

OSD 00560-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039111

January 13, 2004

TO: Gen. Leon LaPorte
CC: ADM Ed Giambastiani
Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief from JFCOM

Please make sure you get Ed Giambastiani's latest briefing looking at lessons learned through the Iraqi eyes. It is enormously important for you to see it in connection with your current work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-4

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

OSD 00560-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039112

January 13, 2004

TO: Jay Garner
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Handwritten signature]*
 SUBJECT: Wagee Barzani

I have Paul Wolfowitz working on the Wagee Barzani matter. Thanks so much for letting me know.

Regards,

DHR:dh
011304-12

IT-9

13 Jan 04

OSD 00562-04

January 13, 2004

TO: The Honorable Tillie Fowler

c c : Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Torie Clarke

What do you think about getting Torie Clarke on the Defense Policy Board?

DHR:dh
011304-13

334

13 Jan 04

OSD 00563-04



January 13, 2004

TO: Newt Gingrich

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Thanks for your suggestion on recruiting. It is helpful. I will push it.

DHR:dh
011304-9

340

13 Jan 04

OSD 00565-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039115

January 13, 2004

TO: Honorable George Tenet
CC: ADM Ed Giambastiani
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief from JFCOM

Please make sure you get briefed by Ed Giambastiani's people on the latest lessons learned view from the Iraqi standpoint. It is very important.

Let's talk about it after you have seen the briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-3

Iran

13 Jan 04

OSD 00569-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039116

January 14, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: State of the Union

If there are any drafts of the State of the Union, I would sure like to see one. I am told you are already at draft #5 or #6. It would be a help to see it before it is finished.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
011404-10

000.1

14 Jan 04

OSD 00607-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 14 2004

Sergeant Chnstopher Chandler, USMC
1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
Box 555564
Camp Pendleton, California 92055-5564

33550

Dear Sergeant Chandler:

Congratulations on successfully completing jump school!

Your courage and determination inspire us all.

I wish you all the best in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

14 Jan 04

OSD 00615-04

Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD

From: Hahn GySgt Patrick T [HahnPT@mfp.usmc.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 11:42 AM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Cc: Sims Col Terron D; Weisz LtCol Bradley E; Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S; Hoch GySgt Frederick W; Hopkins SSgt Joshua A
Subject: RE: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Ms. Generous,

Good morning, I have contacted the unit and they verified that he was inbound to them, by the time the letter arrives, he should be there.

The mailing address for Sgt Chandler is: 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
Box 555564
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5564

Please let us know if you need any further assistance.

V/R
GySgt Hahn
Office of the Chief of Staff
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD [mailto:Monica.Generous@osd.pentagon.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 3:31 AM
To: 'Hoch GySgt Frederick W'; Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Cc: Sims Col Terron D [HQMC]; Weisz LtCol Bradley E; Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S; Hahn GySgt Patrick T
Subject: RE: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Hello GySgt Hoch,

[need to propose a compromise. || am told] the Secretary would like the letter to be mailed directly to Sgt Chandler, so I need his address, please.

We are happy to send a courtesy copy through your chain of command.

Thank you,
Monica Generous

-----Original Message-----

From: Hoch GySgt Frederick W [mailto:HochFW@mfp.usmc.mil]
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 8:43 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Cc: Sims Col Terron D; Weisz LtCol Bradley E; Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S; Hahn GySgt Patrick T
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Hi Ma'am,

In ref to the Subject letter, the correct chain of command is as follows:

From: SecDef's address
To: Sergeant Chris T. Chandler
Via: (1) Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
(2) Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
(3) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(4) Commanding Officer, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Once signed, our mailing address for the letter is as follows:

Commander
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
Box 64139
Camp Smith, HI 96861-4139

Let me know if you have any other questions.

V/r,
GySgt Hoch
Staff Secretary's Office
Marine Forces Pacific

-----Original Message-----

From: Weisz LtCol Bradley E
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 3:08 PM
To: Hoch GySgt Frederick W
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Gunny,

Yours for action. Thanks.

LtCol Weisz

-----Original Message-----

From: O'Neal Col Michael C
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004, 2:58 PM
To: Weisz LtCol Bradley E
Cc: Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Brad,
Contact the SECDEF's secretary and provide the necessary addressing information so that Sgt Chandler's letter is properly routed. You might also correct the Unit title line for 1st LAR while your corresponding with her. See Col Sims note about any emails that we choose to send.

S/f
Col O'Neal

-----Original Message-----

From: Sirns Col Terron D
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 11:25 AM
To: O'Neal Col Michael C
Cc: Musca Col Joseph II
Subject: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Col O'Neal:

Secretary Rumsfeld would like to address a letter of congratulations to Sgt Chris Chandler upon successfully completing jump school. Sgt Chandler has a prosthetic leg. Per the info below, Sgt Chandler has orders to Camp Pendleton, 1st LAR Bn and is scheduled to report for duty around mid Jan04.

I believe it is appropriate for the Secretary's staff to address the letter for endorsement via Sgt Chandler's MARFORPAC chain of command. Please contact Ms. Monica Generous, Office of the Secretary of Defense, on 703 692-7134 and provide her guidance to address the letter to MARFORPAC or as you deem appropriate.

Please courtesy copy DMCS on emails to the Secretary's POC, and let me know if any other assistance is needed.

Thank you,

Colonel Terron Sims
Office of the Director Marine Corps Staff (DMCS)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Warner Capt Gilbert A
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 3:07 PM
To: Tatum Sgt Patrick L
Cc: Sirns Col Terron D; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S
Subject: RE: SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Sgt Tatum,

Sgt Chandler detached from this Headquarters during Dec 03 and is directed to report to 1st LAR for duty on or about 15 Jan 04. He is currently on annual leave, travel, etc. The official mailing address for the Command is:

1stLt Light Reconnaissance Battalion
Box 555564
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055

The Command SgtMaj (CCed above) is the point of contact for any

other questions. As I stated above he will check into I MEF on 15 Jan 04 and will be engaged in the checking-in process for one to two days before going to 1st LAR. Additionally, it should be noted that 1st LAR is slated for deployment.

The SgtMaj's info is SgtMaj Nohl, (b)(6)

Let me know if you have any questions

R, Capt Warner
Force Adjutant
MARFORLANT

Tel: DSN: (b)(6) COMM: (b)(6)
Fax: DSN: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Tatum Sgt Patrick L
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 4:06 PM
To: Warner Capt Gilbert A
Cc: Sims Col Terron D
Subject: SGT CHADLER, CHRIS T.

Sir,

As discussed on the phone, SecDef would like to write a letter of congratulations to subject name Marine. If you could please verify the Marine's Unit address. Thank you for your time in this matter.

Sgt Patrick L. Tatum
Administrative Office of the
Director, Marine Corps Staff

(b)(6)

tatumpl@hqmc.usmc.mil

✓

Sergeant Christopher Chandler, USMC
[LtCol Sims from the CMC's office is researching Chandler's address for us.]

Dear Sergeant Chandler:

Congratulations on successfully completing jump school!

Your courage and determination inspire us all.

I wish you all the best in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

11/2 1000
Mr. D:
FOR REVIEW
M 1/12
MONICA → Prep for SD sig
M 1/13 Durnan 1/12

Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD

From: Hoch GySgt Frederick W [HochFW@mfp.usmc.mil]
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 8:43 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Cc: Sims Col Terron D; Weisz LtCol Bradley E; Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S; Hahn GySgt Patrick T
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Hi Ma'am,

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From: SecDef's address
To: Sergeant Chris T. Chandler
Via: (1) Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
(2) Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
(3) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(4) Commanding Officer, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Once signed, our mailing address for the letter is as follows:

Commander
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
Box 64139
Camp Smith, HI 96861-4139

Let me know if you have any other questions.

V/r,
GySgt Hoch
Staff Secretary's Office
Marine Forces Pacific

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LtCol Weisz

-----Original Message-----

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Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 2:58 PM
To: Weisz LtCol Bradley E

Cc: Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

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Col O'Neal

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Thank you,

Colonel Terron Sims
Office of the Director Marine Corps Staff (DMCS)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Warner Capt Gilbert A
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 3:07 PM
To: Tatum Sgt Patrick L
Cc: Sims Col Terron D; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S
Subject: RE: SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Sgt. Tatum,

Sgt Chandler detached from this Headquarters during Dec 03 and is directed to.

report to 1st LAR for duty on or about 15 Jan 04. He is currently on annual leave, travel, etc. The official mailing address for the Command is:

1stLt Light Reconnaissance Battalion
Box 555564
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055

The Command SgtMaj (CCed above) is the point of contact for any other questions. As stated above he will check into 1 MEF on 15 Jan 04 and will be engaged in the checking-in process for one to two days before going to 1st LAR. Additionally, it should be noted that 1st LAR is slated for deployment.

The SgtMaj's info is SgtMaj Nohl, DSN 365-1994.

Let me know if you have any questions.

R, Capt Warner
Force Adjutant
MARFORLANT

Tel: DSN: (b)(6)

COMM: (b)(6)

Fax: DSN: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Tatum Sgt Patrick L
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 4:06 PM
To: Warner Capt Gilbert A
Cc: Sims Col Terron D
Subject: SGT CHADLER, CHRIS T.

Sir,

As discussed on the phone, SecDef would like to write a letter of congratulations to subject name Marine. If you could please verify the Marine's Unit address. Thank you for your time in this matter.

Sgt Patrick L. Tatum
Administrative Office of the
Director, Marine Corps Staff

(b)(6)

tatumpl@hqmc.usmc.mil

Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD

From: Sims Col Terron D [SimsTD@hqmc.usmc.mil]
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 4:28 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT. CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

FYT.

> ___--Original Message-----
> From: Sims Col Terron D
> Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 4:25 PM
> To: O'Neal Col Michael C
> Cc: Musca Col Joseph I
> Subject: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT. CHANDLER, CHRIS T.
>
> Col O'Neal:
>
> Secretary Rumsfeld would like to address a letter of congratulations to
> Sgt Chris Chandler upon successfully completing jump school. Sgt. Chandler
> has a prosthetic leg. Per the info below, Sgt. Chandler has orders to Camp
> Pendleton, 1st LAR Bn and is scheduled to report for duty around mid
> Jan04.
>
> I believe it is appropriate for the Secretary's staff to address the
> letter for endorsement via Sgt Chandler's MARFORPAC chain of command.
> Please contact Ms. Monica Generous, Office of the Secretary of Defense, on
> (b)(6) and provide her guidance to address the letter to MARFORPAC
> or as you deem appropriate.
>
> Please courtesy copy DMCS on emails to the Secretary's POC, and let me
> know if any other assistance is needed.
>
> Thank you,
>
> Colonel Terron Sims
> Office of the Director Marine Corps Staff (DMCS)
> DSN (b)(6)
>
>

7:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 6, 2004
SUBJECT: Sgt. Chandler

Why don't we write a note to this fellow, Sgt. Christopher Chandler, who jumped with a prosthetic limb.

Thanks.

*Carrie Sue!
do a draft*

DHR/azn
10604.08

Attach: DefendAmerica News Article: "US Marine Corp Sgt. Christopher Chandler"

Please respond by: _____

[Signature]

1

00615-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039128

Profiles

U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Christopher Chandler

Marine With Prosthetic Limb Jumps into History Books

By U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Isaac Pacheco

FOR BENNING, Ga., Dec. 19, 2003 -- High above the asphalt in Alabama, on the side, the deafening roar of a C-130 transports the instructor's urgent commands. The troops tilt their heads and respond instinctively. In the dim light, the U.S. Army Basic Airborne Course instructor can see only a few of their faces.

The troops remain focused on the task at hand and the orders of their instructor, not realizing this jump represents history in the making.

This was the first class to graduate a Marine who had been retained on active duty with a prosthetic limb.

Sgt. Christopher Chandler, an Air Force, Colo., native, lost his left leg from a land mine while providing security on a peacekeeping mission in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He was one of the first service members injured in the Global War on Terror, but unlike some of his wounded counterparts, he refused to let the incident diminish his spirit.

"I didn't have time to feel sorry for myself," Chandler, a maintenance technician for Headquarters Company, Marine Forces Atlantic, explained. "While I was in the hospital, other injured troops visited me. I saw that compared to them I had nothing to complain about."



Mentally preparing for his final jump, Sgt. Christopher Chandler grabs hold of his static line and awaits the go signal from his instructor. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Isaac Pacheco

It's been said that the truest test of one's character is not what he does with success but what he makes of defeat. Chandler stepped up to the challenge of jump school in the face of seemingly impossible odds. He jumped into the history books Dec. 10, becoming the only Service member retained on active duty to graduate the course with a prosthetic leg.

"I think any obstacle in life can be overcome if you believe in yourself," Chandler exclaimed. "I hope this will make it easier for other people with prosthetics who want to go through (jump school) next time. As long as they won't be extra baggage, and they can pull their own weight and accomplish the



Lt. Col. Kirk Rice, commanding officer of Marine Detachment Fort Benning, pins on Sgt. Christopher Chandler's jump wings during the drop and e graduation ceremony. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Kevin J. Rickett

"After his injury and the loss of his leg, Chandler had to go before a Naval review. They had to make a decision as to whether he should be retained on active duty," Rice explained. "He was able to demonstrate to the Physical Evaluation Review Board that he was fit for return to full duty with no limitations. I think his success will open the door for the retention of service members who have lost a limb. It clearly demonstrates that given certain conditions, they can and should be left on active duty."

Chandler had to undergo another battery of physicals, paperwork and interviews before the airborne school would accept him. Yet, he was able to keep his sense of humor throughout the ordeal.

"Obviously, the school was going to ask questions because they were concerned about my safety and the safety of the other students," Chandler explained. "They wanted to know if I was even capable of completing the tasks they had for me. I finished all the tasks with an advantage. After all I have one less ankle to trip me up, he was the hardest like me. I don't really like to run. The other guys in my class really motivated me to keep going."

One classmate said Chandler's motivation came from within and spread to the people around him.

"I was in Kandahar with him when he had his accident, and this is the first time I've seen him since then," said Sgt. Ryan Scheucher, platoon sergeant, 2nd Intelligence Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force. "If you'd known him before the accident, what he's doing right now would come as no surprise. Both in uniform and out, he's always just been one of those guys who just shuts up and gets the job done. If anything, since his accident I see a little more fire in his eyes. He gets up and he goes. He doesn't do anything to skyline himself or to showboat. If it's in the scope of his duty, he just does it."

Chandler's enthusiasm and tireless commitment inspired many of his classmates and set the standard for them to follow.

"The first time I even realized he had a prosthetic leg was during one of our PT (physical training) sessions, and he was just smoking these little 18 year olds out there," said Air Force Staff Sgt. Brian Mayer, Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, N.C. "He's an inspiration because you have all these perfectly healthy people who wash out and quit while he stays in and makes it. That's a real testament to his character."

Other jump school students credited Chandler with helping them make it through the course when they were struggling.

Rock

mission. Hopefully, they won't have to put up with as much as I had to.

Chandler not only rose to the challenge but also exceeded even his own expectations when he was selected as the class' noncommissioned officer honor graduate.

"He captures the heart and soul of what it means to be a U.S. Marine," said Lt. Col. Kirk Rice, commander, Marine Corps Detachment, Fort Benning. "I mean he exemplifies all of our core values—honor, courage, and commitment. This is a courageous young man. He fought to be retained on active duty and asked for a chance to come to airborne school as a reenlistment bonus."

Chandler faced many challenges and trials during the course of his airborne training revolution, but none so rigorous as the medical boards he faced to stay on active duty.

He motivated me because at first I felt kind of down and I didn't like the course because it was so hard, but then I saw that he was doing it with only one leg and that inspired me and let me know that I could do this," said Army Sgt. Fatima Hickman, Company B, 203rd Infantry, 4th Support Bn., here. "He could have done anything else but he chose to continue in the military and to go forth with what he wants to do. He's not letting his prosthetic leg stop him from being the Marine he wants to be."

And what did Chandler have to say to his detractors: to the people who said an amputee would never make it through the school.

"I don't have to say anything to people who said I couldn't make it," he retorted. "I just graduated."

<http://www.defendarmerica.mil/profiles/dec2003/pr121903a.html>



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2005 JAN - 7 PM 3:10
CH-2267-05
7 January 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Memo on Abuse of Detainees Under Department of Defense Control

1. You requested I review the proposed draft memo to you from the President on abuse of detainees under Department of Defense control.
2. While the draft memo is substantially correct, I am deeply concerned about the tone. The memorandum does not focus on the positive developments; instead, it relies on past incidents to paint a bleak picture and casts the Department of Defense in a negative light. It places too much emphasis on the punishment and actions taken against those guilty of the abuse and too little emphasis on actions already taken to ensure such abuses will not occur again. In addition, this memo fails to put the abuse problem into a meaningful context; our forces have captured and held tens of thousands of detainees, with those leveling accusations of abuse numbering only in the dozens. A single instance of abuse is one too many, but recent press reports imply that abuse is systematic and widespread. This memo does nothing to dispel that notion.
3. As drafted, the memo further implies that detainee abuse is rampant and ongoing. As you are aware, the issues of abuse mentioned in the numerous articles occurred primarily in 2002 and 2003. While instances of alleged abuse have occurred recently, when it has occurred, it has been immediately reported, investigated and appropriate corrective action has been taken.
4. Our staffs should work together to change the draft memo if possible. This could be a positive exchange if done right. If the draft memo doesn't change, we need to generate a response memo, highlighting the positive, ongoing actions taken to address allegations of detainee abuse. In addition, I recommend such a response also highlight the good work of our forces involved in detention operations.

Richard B. Myers
 RICHARD B. MYERS
 Chairman
 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECDEF DECISION:
 APPROVED: _____
 DISAPPROVED: _____
 OTHER: _____

Reference:
 1 Draft Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of Defense, undated, "Abuse of Detainees under Department of Defense Control"

383.6

7 JAN 05

29 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

12/29/04 10:21 AM

December 29, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Lt. Col. Greg Lengyel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Draft Memo

To: Paul Woffowitz
Gen
Larry Di Rita
Doug Fertk
Steve Cambone
Jim Haynes



Attached is a sensitive draft memo.

It's not been signed or sent. I'd like you folks to check it and make sure it is accurate. If you have any suggestions on tone or handling of it, let me know.

We also ought to draft how we would respond to this. My impression is that the data in here is inaccurate, and needs to be updated and amended.

Please get back to me soon,

Thanks.

ATTACH.
12/29 BUTLER MEMO TO SECDEF 12/27 MEMO TO RICE
DHR:ss
122904-18 (ss)

.....
Please respond by 1/4/05

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00622-05

To: SecDef

12/29/04

From: Paul Butler *fab*

Attached is a copy of the draft memo we discussed last night. As far as we know, it is still a draft. I relayed the message to the Deputy last night. I'm trying to find out if he has spoken with Steve Hadley. I'll report back as soon as I know something.

2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 27, 2004

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH:

JOHN BELLINGER

PROM:

BRAD WIEGMANN

SUBJECT:

Abuse of Detainees under Department of Defense
Control

As you requested, attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he send a memorandum to the secretary of Defense on the detainee abuse issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment 8

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memorandum to Secretary of

Defense

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Abuse of Detainees under Department of Defense Control

Purpose

To sign a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on abuse of detainees in Department of Defense control.

Background

There have been many reports this year of abuse of detainees in the control of our military, most prominently the episode at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, but also reports concerning other incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan and FBI reports that have recently come to light concerning alleged abuse of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. These allegations have been or are being investigated by the Department of Defense. To date over fifty individuals have been referred to courts martial for various types of misconduct and others have been administratively disciplined. The Independent Panel, established by Secretary Rumsfeld and headed by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger made a number of recommendations this summer to improve detainee operations to ensure that abuse does not recur, and the other investigations that have been conducted into detainee abuse have also made numerous recommendations. The Department of Defense is working through these recommendations and implementing reforms and some investigations remain ongoing.

The repeated reports of detainee abuse this year have been damaging to the image of the United States abroad and have been disturbing to many Americans here at home. The memorandum at Tab A expresses your concern about this issue, while also,

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
Vice President's
Chief of Staff

expressing continued confidence in our military, and emphasizes to the Secretary of Defense the importance of continuing his efforts and making the results of the investigations and corrective actions known to the American people. It sends a clear message from you as Commander-in-Chief that you expect all detainees in the custody of our military to be treated humanely and consistent with applicable law and asks the Secretary of Defense to convey this message to our commanders in the field.

Concurrence: NSC/Legal

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Abuse of Detainees under Department of Defense
Control

The United States has the finest military force in the world, and
our

and

prevent such abuses from occurring in the future. You have my full support in working toward these objectives; You should also reemphasize to commanders in the field that they must work to ensure that all detainees under the control of our armed forces are treated in a lawful and dignified manner.

OSD#	SF#	Subject	TO:
13900-04	042304-14	Location of Civil Affairs	JCS
00052-05	112404-2	Joint CONOPS	JCS
00622-05	122904-18(ts)	Draft Memo	Butler
78963-04	120204-9	Pentagon Entry	JCS
79005-04	112404-6	NATO	USP
75306-05	123004-10	Protecting Officials	JCS

LT col lengthen,

can you pls indicate if
you show those open or closed?

TO: →

THANKS,
JASON
 ESD

To: SecDef

January 21, 2005

From: Paul Butler

cc: Deputy

CJCS

Larry Di Rita

Doug Feith

Steve Cambone

Jim Haynes

Pete Geren

Subject: Snowflake response on draft POTUS memo on detainees

You issued a snowflake (Tab A) asking the group listed above to review the draft memo from POTUS to you on detainees for accuracy and to develop a draft response. ~~Our~~ latest information is that there is no current plan to send the POTUS memo to you. Accordingly, the group decided that the proposed way ahead ought to be a memo from DoD to the NSC updating the status of detainee investigations. The attached draft memo for your review (Tab B) suggests that the memo come from the Deputy to Steve Hadley and that it review the record of investigations thus far and also address the need for interagency action on detainees in order to reinforce that this is not an issue under the sole control of DoD.

573,6

21 Jan 05

29 Dec 04

OSD 00622-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039140

~~FOUO~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

December 29, 2004

To: Paul Wolffowitz
Gen Myers
Larry D. Rife
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
Jim Haynes
Pete: Eversen

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Lt. Col. Greg Lengyel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Draft Memo

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We also ought to draft how we would respond to this. My impression is that the data in here is inaccurate, and needs to be updated and amended.

Please get back to me soon.

Thanks.

ATTACH -
12/29 BUTLER MEMO TO SRDEF 12/27 MEMO TO RICE

DHR:m
122904-18 (a)

.....
Please respond by 1/4/05

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~FOUO~~

PROPOSED MEMO FROM DEPSECDEF TO NAT'L SECURITY ADVISOR

The Department of Defense is nearing closure on the investigations and assessments of detainee operations and known causes of abuse. I would like to update you on the status of these efforts and to raise several related issues to your attention.

As you know, DoD aggressively investigates allegations of detainee abuse. It is holding individuals accountable for their actions, and is taking steps throughout the Department to minimize the possibility of future abuse. To date, more than fifty service members have been referred to courts-martial and others have been disciplined through administrative action. Any allegations of abuse that arise in the future will be investigated and appropriate corrective action will be taken.

Since September 11, 2001, our forces have detained tens of thousands of fighters on battlefields around the world, and have conducted tens of thousands of interrogations. The vast majority of U.S. service members have conducted themselves with honor. Their efforts have been critical to the success of our operations. Our forces will continue to capture and detain individuals who commit or assist those who commit hostile acts against the United States, and our coalition partners. Our forces will take appropriate and lawful steps to obtain intelligence from detainees that assist us in defeating our enemies and saving American lives.

To ensure we conduct these activities in accordance with the President's order to treat all detainees humanely, Secretary Rumsfeld has commissioned several major reviews, including the Schlesinger Panel and review of detention and interrogation activities by Vice Admiral A. T. Church. The latter review – the “Church Report” – is nearing completion, and we intend to brief its results to the Congress and the public in the near future.

Altogether, the eleven major reviews, assessments and investigations have produced over five hundred specific recommendations for improving detention operations, many of which DoD has already implemented. These reviews and ongoing DoD reform efforts are intended not only to improve operations but to communicate clearly to the American people, to the world and to the U.S. military that detainee abuse is not something we tolerate and that when it happens we act vigorously to uncover it, to punish those responsible and to implement fixes.

We would like to brief the Principals Committee on the results of the several reviews and reports conducted by DoD, and on the efforts DoD has underway or completed to improve detention operations. In discussing these issues, all agencies

ought to be forthcoming with information they have about abuse allegations or other problems with detention operations.

As DoD moves ahead with implementing reforms to detention operations, **the** USG should also reexamine its basic policies in light of three years **of** experience in Global War on Terrorism experience. Some fixes needed to prevent or address detainee abuse require action by-or cooperation with other USG Departments and agencies. Long-term solutions to USG detainee policy issues require interagency attention: What is the plan for accelerating development of Iraqi and **Afghan** justice and **prison** capacity? How can the USG help strengthen the legal authority of Coalition partners to detain terrorists and their supporters? The Deputies Committee should be asked to meet on these issues in the near **future**.

~~FOUO~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

December 29, 2004 11

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Lt. Col. Greg Lengyel
FROM: msfeld DA

To: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Myers
Larry D. Rife
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
Jim Haynes

SUBJECT: Draft Memo

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Thanks.

ATTACH -
12/29 BUTLER MEMO TO SECDEF 12/27 MEMO TO RICE
DHR:es
122904-18 (2)

.....
Please respond by 1/4/05

~~SENSITIVE~~
~~FOUO~~

OSD 00622-05

383

29 Dec 04

To: SecDef

12/29/04

From: Paul Butler *fab*

Attached is a copy of the draft memo we discussed last night. As far as we know, it is still a draft. I relayed the message to the Deputy last night. I'm trying to find out if he has spoken with Steve Hadley. I'll report back as soon as I know something.

2

720
~~FOUO~~

To: RPA
J. Amello
11/24/04

READIES

November 23, 2004

2005 JAN 16 11:03:03

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gordon England
Jim Roche
Fran Harvey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Relieving Stress on the Force

Thank you for the good work on the "Tapping the Beer Keg" brief.

I'd like to see a template developed so that each Service can report on their progress in each of the areas you addressed – freeing up military for deployment by contracting, cross-training and deploying among the individual Service, task force organizing, developing visibility, and so forth.

DHR:ss
112304-3

.....
Please respond by 1/5/05

~~FOUO~~



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2005 JAN 10 11:03

PERSONNEL AND
 READINESS

INFO MEMO

January 6, 2005 1:38 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel and Readiness)

David S. C. Chu 7 January 05

SUBJECT: Relieving Stress on the Force—"Tapping the Beer Keg" SNOWFLAKE
 (TAB A)

- After our November 23 discussion on force sustainment strategies, you asked us to return with a template that the Services could use to report on their progress in implementing these practices.
- We worked with the Army and JFCOM to craft an appropriate template for reviewing these initiatives.
- The template prompts the Services to list and quantify initiatives that alleviate OIF/OEF sourcing shortfalls (TAB B). We will review these data with the military departments over the next two weeks.
- Our intent is to empirically highlight the extent to which these good ideas have been implemented and discuss the potential for additional opportunities across the Department.
- We will schedule a session with you later this month to review our findings and recommend a way forward.

COORDINATION: As stated

Attachments:
 As stated

Prepared By: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., Director, Readiness Prog & Assessment

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/039147

OSD 00656-05

TAB

A

TO: RPA
J. Amello
11/24/04

J. Amello

November 23, 2004

2005 NOV 16 11:09:03

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gordon England
Jim Roche
Fran Harvey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Relieving Stress on the Force

Thank you for the good work on the "Tapping the Beer Keg" brief.

I'd like to see a template developed so that each Service can report on their progress in each of the areas you addressed - freeing up military for deployment by contracting, cross-training and deploying among the individual Service, task force organizing, developing visibility, and so forth.

DHR:ss
112304-3

Please respond by 1/5/05

~~FOUO~~

TAB

B

Force Management Initiatives:								
No.	Initiative Title	Cat.	Affected Capability Areas	Component	Affected UIC or Community	General Description	Sourcing Effects	Remarks
1	Example: Retraining the 30th ESB	B1	CB	G	WWASFF (note: this is the 30th ESB)	Element: Enlisted personnel retrained by the 30th ESB in order to provide skills in order to fill specific sourcing requirements for 04-06 rotation.		Used to fill specific sourcing requirements for 04-06 rotation.
2								
3								
4								
5								

Key Fields:

- Initiative title
- Initiative type
(e.g. contracting out, civilianizing, cross training)
- Affected capability area
(e.g. air power, civil affairs, military police)
- Component
- Affected UIC or community
- Detailed description
- Units & Billets affected
- Remarks

Directions:

The following provides a column-by-column explanation for how each service will record their progress in force management initiatives. The reporting template accompanies these instructions.

- **Initiative Number:** Give each initiative a unique number (1, 2, 3 etc). If multiple rows are used to describe the effects of individual initiatives, use an outline numbering schema (1.1, 1.2, 1.3, etc) to identify subordinate rows.
- **Initiative Title:** Give each initiative a unique title.
- **Category:** Use one or more of these of these category codes as they apply. If the initiative does not fit any one or combination of categories, please use the category "E" and explain using the remarks column.

— Category A: Finding substitutions for military personnel

- * *A1: Using contract personnel:* Using contractors to satisfy military requirement to free up military assets. (Ex: Using contractors to satisfy CONUS positions thereby freeing up military personnel.)
- * *A2: Using civilian personnel:* Using contractors to satisfy military requirement to free up military assets. (Ex: Using Federal civilians to satisfy CONUS or theater requirements in lieu of military personnel.)

— Category B: Increasing the supply of high-demand skills

- * *B1: Cross training:* Training individuals to perform *outside* their general occupational field. This may or may not involve cross-Service solutions. (Ex: Training artillerymen for infantry positions).
- * *B2: Skill broadening:* Training individuals on a wider variety of skills within their general occupational field. This may or may not involve cross-Service solutions. (Ex: Training a larger pool of personnel on core "IMP-type" skills.)
- * *B3: Restructuring skills:* Shifting endstrength from low-demand skills areas to high-demand areas. (Ex: Reducing billets for musicians and increasing the number of billets for truck drivers)

— Category C: Increase the number of deployable units

- * *C1: Taskforce organizing:* Create units/organizations from individuals or small detachments. (Ex: Pulling elements from several guard or reserve units to create a deployable unit)
- * *C2: Adding forces structure:* Increase endstrength to suit demand

— **Category D: Assign personnel based on planned deployment status** (Ex: Ensure that returning “red-lined” personnel are not assigned to units likely to deploy imminently. Conversely, ensuring that available, high-valued personnel are not assigned to non-deploying positions (such as headquarters or infrastructure.)

— **Category E: Other / Not listed**

- **Affected Capability Areas:** The following are the capability areas used in OIF/OEF sourcing exercises. Identify which area(s) are affected by each initiative. Use one or more codes as they apply:

- * All: All capability areas
- * Other: Other/ Not listed: Affects a capability area that is not listed here
- * AG: Adjutant General
- * AP: Air Power
- * AV: Aviation
- * CA: Civil Affairs
- * CB: Combat
- * CH: Chaplains
- * CM: Chemical
- * CF: Combatant Forces
- * CS: corps support
- * EN: Engineering
- * F: Finance
- * FS: Fire Support
- * HQ: Headquarters
- * IO: Information Operations
- * MS: Medical
- * MH: Military History
- * MI: Military Intelligence
- * MP: Military Police
- * OD: Ordinance
- * PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
- * PO: Psychological Operations
- * PA: Public Affairs
- * QM: Quartermaster
- * SEC: Security Forces
- * SC: Signal Corps
- * TN: Trainers
- * TC: Transportation
- * WS: Waterside

- **Component:** List the affected component:

- * A: Active Duty
- * G: Guard
- * R: Reserve

- **Affected UIC or Community:** Explain which unit(s) was (were) affected by this initiative. For those initiatives that targeted specific UICs, please list them. If the initiative covers an entire skill area or community (thereby affecting many UICs), you can just list the applicable skill area or community.
- **General Description:** Use this space to provide enough explanation for a reader to understand how the initiative was executed, the expected duration and implementation plans.
- **Sourcing Effects:** Use this section to quantify how the initiative directly contributes to GWOT and other ongoing missions. Entries will be in the form of the units and associated billets sourced as a result of each initiative. List the GWOT forces according to the applicable OIF rotation (04-06, 05-07, 06-08, and beyond). Effects for other missions should be entered in the "other" column. Use the remarks column for all amplifying text.
- **Remarks:** Use this space to provide enough explanation for a reader to understand extenuating circumstances, impacts the initiative accomplished beyond those listed in the "sourcing" columns, and possible negative or second order effects associated with the initiative. Be sure to discuss mitigation strategies for any negative impacts.

SECRET
DEC 14 2004
2005 JAN 10 AM 10:14

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Ben Carson

This fellow, Dr. Ben Carson, is a brilliant neurosurgeon at Johns Hopkins. The letter is self-explanatory. Please take a look at this, tell me what you can do about it, and keep me posted.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/10/04 Letter from Dr. Ben Carson to SecDef.

DHR:ss
121304-36

.....
Please respond by _____



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

2005 JAN 04 10:10:14

HEALTH AFFAIRS

JAN 04 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Dr. Ben Carson's concern about Mr. Bryan Sims' inability to enter Army due to history of brain surgery.

- Dr. Carson contends Mr. Sims was qualified to enter the Army despite brain surgery performed when a child (TAB A).
- Army's waiver authority denied a waiver of the condition.
- We have asked Army's Neurosurgery consultant to review the record and call Dr. Carson to discuss the case.
- I have sent a letter to Dr. Carson explaining this situation and asking him to discuss the case with the Army consultant (TAB B).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Colonel Bengel, C&PP,

(b)(6)

PCDOCS

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/039156

OSD 00661-05

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
DEC 14 2004
205 111 13 11 12 14

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Ben Carson

This fellow, Dr. Ben Carson, is a brilliant neurosurgeon at Johns Hopkins. The letter is self-explanatory. Please take a **look** at this, tell me what you can do about it, and keep me posted.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/10/04 Letter from Dr. Ben Carson to SecDef

DHR:ss
121304-36

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039157

OSD 00661-05

Neurological Surgery

600 North Wolfe Street/ Harvey 811
Baltimore, MD 21287-8811
410-955-7888 / Fax: 410-955-0626

Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., M.D.
Professor and Director of Pediatric Neurosurgery


December 10, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary ~~Rumsfeld~~:

It has been a long time since we have communicated, but I have certainly watched what you are doing with pride and pleasure. I am delighted that you will be staying on as Secretary of Defense, and I think I can speak for all the other directors at Kellogg that we certainly miss you. As you know, Carlos will be joining you in the Cabinet soon and as you probably know, I am a member of the President's Council on Bioethics.

I am writing to explore the possibility of cutting through what seems to be insurmountable military bureaucracy on behalf of one of my patients. His name is Bryan Sims, and he is currently in the Corp of Cadets at the North Georgia College and State University, the Georgia Military College. Since he was a small boy, he has wanted to be a member of the United States Army and has geared his education in that direction. About 10 years ago, he had a cyst in his brain which I treated by inserting a shunt. This cyst has subsequently resolved, and the shunt became non-functional. It has not functioned for several years now. Unfortunately, the military has a policy that says someone with a shunt cannot join the Army, apparently, according to Dr. Dalleri and Dr. Wong who have been dealing with his particular case. Needless to say, the young man is heartbroken and his family is devastated. They are considering having the shunt removed to see if possibly that will alter the opinions of the doctors aforementioned. As a physician, I always look at benefit-to-risk ratios when considering surgery and to put someone asleep and extract something from their brain, which carries it's own inherent set of risks just to be in compliance with a ruling which is largely irrelevant since the patient does not have Hydrocephalus which is the condition for which shunts are usually placed and since the shunt is no longer functional and is no longer needed, would not carry a favorable benefit-to-risk ratio.



This young man is meeting **all** of the **standard** qualifications of **the Army** for **physical** training at his school and **has even** gone **through a mini** basic **training course** **satisfactorily**. I think **our** military could benefit from having dedicated soldiers who **want** **nothing** more **than** to **dedicate** **their** lives to defending **our nation**. I would be **most** appreciative if you could intervene for this young man.

Thanks for **your** attention to **this** matter, **and thanks** for the **wonderful** job you are doing for our **nation**. We are extremely proud of you.

With **warm** regards,



Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., M.D.
Director of Pediatric Neurosurgery
Professor of Neurological Surgery,
Oncology, Plastic Surgery, and Pediatrics

/alj

11-L-0559/OSD/039159



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Dr. Benjamin S. Carson
Professor and Director of
Pediatric Neurosurgery
Johns Hopkins
600 North Wolfe Street/Harvey 811
Baltimore, MD 21287-8811

Dear Ben,

Thanks so much for your note. I am delighted you wrote and I thank you so much for your kind words of support.

I'm going to ask Dr. Bill Winkenwerder to take a look at this and get back to you. He is in charge of all health affairs for the Department. He's a good man, and someone you ought to know, anyway. I hope something can be worked out.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

JAN 04 2005

HEALTH AFFAIRS

Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., M.D.
Professor and Director of Pediatric Neurosurgery
600 North Wolfe Street/Harvey 811
Baltimore, MD 21287-8811

Dear Dr. ^{Ben}Carson:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your December 10, 2004 letter to Secretary Rumsfeld in the matter of Mr. Bryan Sims. The Secretary asked that I investigate this matter and see what I can do.

Accession medical standards for entry into the U.S. military are governed by Department of Defense Instruction 6130.4, "Criteria and Procedure Requirements for Physical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Armed Forces." The Army's application of this Instruction is contained in Army Regulation 40-501 "Standards of Medical Fitness." It is our policy to access only those personnel who can be immediately deployed world-wide to perform unrestricted military duties under harsh conditions without the need for prescription medication or specialized medical treatment.

The Services have the authority to waive any condition to meet their manpower needs. In this case, the waiver authority for the Army determined that retention of a foreign object and the fact Mr. Sims had undergone brain surgery precluded against granting such a waiver. However, my staff has prevailed upon the Army Surgeon's office to have their neurosurgery consultant obtain and review the medical record in detail. He will then speak with you about Mr. Sims' case.

I trust this explanation of our policy will be helpful to you.

Bill

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD

I have asked the Army Medical Department to take a most careful look at this situation and to speak directly with you. It was good to speak with you and I hope we have the chance to ~~talk~~ ^{talk} ~~discuss~~ ^{discuss} ~~again~~ ^{again} in the near future —

COORDINATION

Dir, C&PPI

CAPT Jack Smith

JMS 28 Dec 08

CoS, HA

COL Thom Kurlmel

PDASD, HA


Dr. Steve Jones

Letter from Dr. Ben Carson - Snowflake

COORDINATION

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S. C. Chu


7 January 2011

~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Write Honorees

I would like to get a list of the Kennedy Center honorees, so I can Write some of them a note.

I also want to write Billy Joel, so try to get his address.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120804-14

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

335 50

8 Dec 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00685-05



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27TH ANNUAL KENNEDY CENTER HONORS

2004 HONORS

The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts announced the selection, by its board of trustees, of the individuals who will receive the Kennedy Center Honors of 2004. Recipients to be honored at the 27th annual national celebration of the arts are:



The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts announced the selection, by its board of trustees, of the individuals who will receive the Kennedy Center Honors of 2004. Recipients to be honored at the 27th annual national celebration of the arts are: actor, producer, writer and director; husband-and-wife actors, writer and producers; singer and composer; soprano and composer and conductor.

"This year the Kennedy Center honors not the usual five but six extraordinary individuals whose unique and abundant artistry has contributed significantly to the cultural life of our nation and the world," said Kennedy Center Chairman Stephen A. Schwarzman. "They are a film artist whose talents are astonishingly diverse; a greatly revered couple of stage and screen; a pop music icon who also composes stunning musical film and theater scores; an operatic superstar of unsurpassed artistic achievement; and one of the most influential American composers of the past four decades."

The annual Honors Gala has become the highlight of the Washington cultural year. The

THE KENNEDY CENTER
HONORS
PHOTOS FROM 26TH
KENNEDY CENTER

Stop by the kiosks in the Hall of States and see
visit the Kennedy Center to view videos of past

2004 Honorees will be saluted by stars from the world of the performing arts at a gala performance in the Kennedy Center's Opera House on Sunday, December 6, to be attended by the President of the United States and Mrs. Bush, and by artists from around the world.

The President and the First Lady will receive the Honorees and members of the Artists Committee, with the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees at the White House on Sunday evening, December 5, prior to the gala performance. The Boeing Company is the exclusive underwriter of the 2004 Kennedy Center Honors events, which concludes with a supper dance in the Grand Foyer.

The Kennedy Center Honors will be bestowed the night before the gala on Saturday, December 4, at a dinner, hosted by the Secretary of State Colin Powell.



Candice Bergen, Michael Douglas, and Annette Bening praise the career of Jack Nicholson

The Honors Gala will be taped for broadcast later in December for the 27th consecutive year as a two-hour prime time special.

George Stevens, Jr., who created the Honors in 1978 and co-wrote the show for the 27th consecutive year. The show has been honored with five Emmy's for Outstanding Program as well as Outstanding Contribution to Television.

Delta Air Lines, the official airline of the Kennedy Center Honors broadcast, will provide transportation for the performers and guests who will be coming to Washington for the Honors Gala. Boeing is the exclusive underwriter of the Kennedy Center Honorees' Luncheon and special event on Saturday, December 4, the Kennedy Center Honors weekend.

The Honors recipients are recognized for their lifetime contributions to American culture through the performing arts: whether in dance, music, theater, opera, motion pictures or television. The primary criterion in the selection process is excellence. The Honors are not designated by art form or category of artistic achievement; the selection process, over the years, has produced balance among the various arts and artistic disciplines.


Members of the Kennedy Center's national artists committee, as well as past Honorees, made recommendations of possible Honorees. Among the artists making recommendations were: Dan Aykroyd, Christine Baranski, Angela Bassett, Joshua Bell, Adrien Brody, Dave Brubeck, Cy Coleman, Benicio Del Toro, Michael Douglas, Suzanne Farrell, Renee Fleming, Morgan Freeman, Rosemary Harris, Paloma Herrera, Philip Seymour Hoffman, Nathan Lane, Yo-Yo Ma, Nadja Salerno-Sonnenberg, Steven Spielberg, Meryl Streep and Pinchas Zuckerman.



Julie Andrews
Van Cliburn looks on

Michael M. Kaiser, President of the Center, expressed the Center's gratitude to the many individuals in the Honors program. "In addition to recognizing our most treasured artists, the Kennedy Center Honors program supports the many performing arts initiatives, education and public service programming, and national programs that make the Center's presentations accessible to all."

Exclusive Underwriter



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11-L-0559/OSD/039166

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~~SECRET~~

The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts
2700 F Street, NW
Washington, DC 20566
Tickets and information: 800-444-1324 or 202-467-4600
Administrative Offices: 202-416-8000
Contact Us

January 4, 2005
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CBS to Broadcast "Kennedy Center Honors" Dec. 21; Tony Winners McDonald and Headley Perform

Related Information

Email this Article
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By Andrew Gans
and Kenneth Jones
17 Dec 2004

CBS-TV will broadcast the 27th annual "Kennedy Center Honors" Dec. 21 at 9 PM ET. Caroline Kennedy hosts.

The two-hour gala evening pays tribute to the 2004 Kennedy Center Honorees: actor Warren Beatty, husband-and-wife acting couple Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee, pop and Broadway composer Elton John, opera star Dame Joan Sutherland and composer-conductor John Williams. The honorees were saluted Dec. 5 at the Kennedy Center's Opera House. President and Laura Bush were among the evening's guests.

Warren Beatty was honored with tributes from Academy Award winners Faye Dunaway and Jack Nicholson; Tony Award winners Brian Stokes Mitchell and Audra McDonald as well as recent Broadway debuter Sean Combs saluted the careers of Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee; Marilyn Horne paid tribute to fellow opera star Joan Sutherland; Steven Spielberg took part in the John Williams segment; and Elton John was honored by appearances from Billy Joel, Heather Headley, Kid Rock, Fantasia and Robert Downey, Jr.

About this year's inductees, Kennedy Center Chairman Stephen A. Schwarzman said in a statement, "This year the Kennedy Center honors not the usual five but six extraordinary individuals whose unique and abundant artistry has contributed significantly to the cultural life of our nation and the world. They are a film artist whose talents are astonishingly diverse; a greatly revered couple of stage and screen; a pop music icon who also composes stunning musical film and theater scores; an operatic superstar of unsurpassed artistic achievement; and one of the most influential American composers of the past four decades."

Warren Beatty is the Hollywood film actor and director. ("Bonnie and Clyde," "Heaven Can Wait," "Bulworth"), Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee are icons of black theatre in America. Elton John is the British pop writer who wrote scores to "The Lion King" and *Aida*, Joan Sutherland is the operatic superstar and composer John Williams is known for his Hollywood movie scores ("Jaws," "Star Wars," "Raiders of the Lost Ark").

PL

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

January 12, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 15 Jan 04

014.35

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote During the 2004 Elections

- The memorandum at TAB A emphasizes the importance of command support and the personal attention of Voting Assistance Officers in providing the opportunity for Uniformed Services members, their dependents, and overseas citizens to vote in the 2004 elections.
- The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) has been striving to ensure every Uniformed Services member, their voting age dependents, and overseas citizens have the opportunity to vote in the 2004 elections. Key to the effectiveness of the Program's efforts is the involvement of command leadership in emphasizing the Program and the support commands provide to Voting Assistance Officers in carrying out their duties.

COORDINATION: TAB B

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memorandum at TAB A

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: John Godley, FVAP,

(b)(6)

1/14
DR
Chu -
Please hold until
he can be briefed on
the FVAP - We
He has questions on - We
will debrief second
D. R.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCC	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>1/16</i>

1/20
12 JAN 04




March 15, 2004

**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)**

NOTE FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Attached at Tab A are talking points on Uniformed Services voting preparations for the 2004 elections.

At Tab B are memoranda to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Combatant Commanders for your signature.



David S. C. Chu

Attachments

TALKING PAPER

March 16, 2004 — 12:02 p.m.

SUBJECT: Absentee Voting Preparations for the 2004 Elections

- The Secretary of Defense is the Presidential Designee [to carry out the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, which covers the voting rights of the Uniformed Services and their family members - both CONUS and OCONUS - as well as all US citizens outside the United States.
- The Department publishes a biennial Voting Action Plan laying out programmatic responsibilities. Each Service has assigned a Senior Service Voting Representative (of General or Flag rank) and a Service Voting Action Officer, who is responsible for the program.
- There are more than six million potential voters: 3.7 million overseas civilians not affiliated with the Government; 1.4 million military; 1.3 million dependents of voting age; and .1 million federal civilian employees. Past Absentee voting:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Uniformed</u>	<u>Federal Civilian</u>	<u>Civilian (non-federal)</u>
2000	69%	65%	37%

- The Federal Voting Assistance Program Office (FVAP) has been visiting mobilization sites (7 sites) and major installations. To date, 43 Voting Assistance Officer Training workshops have been completed at 41 installation sites. An additional 144 workshops are scheduled through August 2004. In addition, Voting Assistance Officer Training is offered on-line, on compact disc, and in book form.
- All States now accept the on-line version of the Federal Post Card application. We have been monitoring voting during the Primaries to detect problems and implement necessary corrective actions before the General Election.
- The NDAA FY02 directed the DoD to conduct an electronic voting demo (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE)), for 2004. In view of the inability to ensure legitimacy of votes that would be cast in the Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment thereby bringing into doubt the integrity of the election results, the Department took immediate steps to suspend the use of the system to register or vote via the Internet.
- We have established September 3 – 11, 2004, as Armed Forces Voter Registration Week to ensure timely voter registration. Absentee Voter Week will be scheduled for October 11 – 15, 2004, to ensure absentee ballots are completed and mailed prior to the general election.

11-L-0559/OSD/039171

Talking Points

Uniformed Services Voting Preparations for the 2004 Elections

- There are more than six million potential voters: 3.7 million overseas civilians not affiliated with the Government; 1.4 million military; 1.3 million dependents of voting age; and .1 million federal civilian employees.
- Absentee voting participation in the past:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Uniformed</u>	<u>Federal Civilian</u>	<u>Civilian (non-federal)</u>
1988	64%	64%	38%
1992	67%	79%	31%
1996	64%	68%	37%
2000	69%	65%	37%

- Voting Assistance Officers are the key to success of the absentee voting program. This is true at CONUS bases as well as overseas. We are pushing materials to the theater and training Voting Assistance Officers at every opportunity.
- The Federal Voting Assistance Program Office (FVAP) has been visiting mobilization sites and major installations to inform commanders on voting program requirements and to train Voting Assistance Officers.
- FVAP has scheduled voting workshops to be conducted in Qatar and Bahrain to train Voting Assistance Officers already in theater. Federal Post Card Applications and Write-In Absentee Ballot forms are pre-positioned in theater.
- The **NDAA FY02** directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct an electronic voting demo (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE)), for 2004. In view of the inability to ensure legitimacy of votes that would be cast in the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE), thereby bringing into doubt the integrity of the election results, the Department took immediate steps to suspend the use of the system to register or vote.
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October 29, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo for POTUS on Military Voting

Please prepare for me a brief (one-page) memo to the President explaining what has been done by the Department of Defense on absentee ballots and voting for military personnel.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102903-8

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

3/16
Response Attached

*Tom -
Pls see if this
ever was done.
I don't recall seeing
it - he wants
it to inform the
POTUS*

3/13
U222337/03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 17 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
COMBATANT COMMANDERS

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote During the 2004 Elections

As the men and women of our Uniformed Services serve around the world defending democracy and freedom, we are reminded of our precious right as Americans to choose our national leaders. Today, more people around the world than ever before hold this most fundamental democratic right—the right to vote. This year, Americans at home and abroad will vote in elections to fill Federal, state and local offices. We will be voting to elect the President and Vice President, 34 U.S. Senators, the entire U.S. House of Representatives, 13 State Governors, and hundreds of local officials. The outcome of these elections will shape the nation's future.

For the men and women of our Uniformed Services, the opportunity to register and cast their ballots in the 2004 elections will depend significantly on the assistance and support they receive from Service and command voting programs and from the Voting Assistance Officers assigned to their units. Those serving overseas, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, and mobilized National Guard and Reserve units, will face the additional challenges of the availability of election information and materials and the lengthened time it takes to receive and return their absentee ballots through the mails. I want your support for the following:

- Ensure command support of the voting program at all levels of command. Personal involvement of commanders is crucial to effective implementation of the voting program. Assign quality officers the duty of Voting Assistance Officers and comment on their performance as a Voting Assistance Officer on their evaluation reports. Voting Assistance Officers must be given the time and resources needed for them to perform their duties effectively, including the opportunity to complete a Federal Voting Assistance Program Training Workshop.
- Publicize the identity and location of Voting Assistance Officers within each major command, on each installation, and within each unit. Service, command, installation and unit websites should maintain prominent voting information links for the benefit of Service members.



OSD 00737-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039174

014.35


17 MAR 04

12 JAN 04

- Service Voting Assistance Officers must establish and maintain a directory of major command and installation Voting Assistance Officers and have the means by which to effectively and rapidly communicate with them and their subordinates. I will be asking Dr. David Chu to meet with the Senior Service Voting Representatives regularly between now and election day to get updates and act quickly to resolve any problems.
- Voting materials, including the Federal Post Card Application and the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot must be distributed to all units, and unit Voting Assistance Officers must be aware of the availability of such materials. These materials are available in book form, on CD and on the Internet at <http://www.fvap.gov>. I want to ensure each Service member is handed the Federal Post Card Application and is offered assistance in completing the form if needed.
- Use your command and public information capabilities to support the September 2004 Armed Forces Voter's Week and designate other special days to inform members and families of absentee voter registration and voting procedures ensuring that all voters are registered to vote by the end of September. I want each of you to designate the week of October 11-15th as Absentee Voting Week. If overseas voters complete and mail their ballots by October 15, their votes will reach any precinct in time to be counted.

We will not recommend any party or candidate. Our mission is to ensure every Service member and their families have the opportunity to vote in the appropriate Primary, Special, Runoff and General Elections and to ensure that their votes are counted.

Voting is both a privilege and a responsibility of citizens in a democracy. It is our responsibility, as leaders of the Armed Services, to do everything we can to ensure that our Service members and their families exercise their right to vote.





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 17 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote During the 2004 Elections

014.35

As the men and women of our Uniformed Services serve around the world defending democracy and freedom, we are reminded of our precious right as Americans to choose our national leaders. Today, more people around the world than ever before hold this most fundamental democratic right—the right to vote. This year, Americans at home and abroad will vote in elections to fill Federal, state and local offices. We will be voting to elect the President and Vice President, 34 U.S. Senators, the entire U.S. House of Representatives, 13 State Governors, and hundreds of local officials. The outcome of these elections will shape the nation's future.

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17 MAR 04

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- Publicize the identity and location of Voting Assistance Officers within each major command, on each installation, and within each unit. Service, command, installation and unit websites should maintain prominent voting information links for the benefit of Service members.
- Service Voting Assistance Officers must establish and maintain a directory of major command and installation Voting Assistance Officers and have the

12 JAN 04




means by which to effectively and rapidly communicate with them and their subordinates. I will be asking Dr. David Chu to meet with the Senior Service Voting Representatives regularly between now and election day to get updates and act quickly to resolve any problems.

- Voting materials, including the Federal Post Card Application and the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot must be distributed to all units, and unit Voting Assistance Officers must be aware of the availability of such materials. These materials are available in book form, on CD and on the Internet at <http://www.fvap.gov>. I want to ensure each Service member is handed the Federal Post Card Application and is offered assistance in completing the form if needed.
- Use your command and public information capabilities to support the September 2004 Armed Forces Voter's Week and designate other special days to inform members and families of absentee voter registration and voting procedures ensuring that all voters are registered to vote by the end of September. I want each of you to designate the week of October 11-15th as Absentee Voting Week. If overseas voters complete and mail their ballots by October 15, their votes will reach any precinct in time to be counted.,

We will not recommend any party or candidate. Our mission is to ensure every Service member and their families have the opportunity to vote in the appropriate Primary, Special, Runoff and General Elections and to ensure that their votes are counted.

Voting is both a privilege and a responsibility of citizens in a democracy. It is our responsibility, as leaders of the Armed Services, to do everything we can to ensure that our Service members and their families exercise their right to vote.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David Chu". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal line extending to the right.



7201
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

DBB
1/12/05

ACTION MEMO

2005 JAN 07 05:00

COMPTROLLER

January 7, 2005, 5:00 PM

DepSec Action _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

Paul Butler

SUBJECT: Appointments of Mr. John Madigan and Mr. Jerry Lindauer to the Defense Business Board (DBB).

- On July 19, 2004, you directed Larry DiRita to put Mr. John Madigan on the DBB. Also, Mr. DiRita requested that Mr. Jerry Lindauer be named to the Board. Their biographies are attached.
- As of January 1, 2005, three of the 20 DBB member seats are open.
- Gus Pagonis supports the nominations of both Mr. Lindauer and Mr. Madigan. Both men have outstanding private sector experience that will contribute to the continuing work of the DBB.

RECOMMENDATION: That you indicate your preferences to proceed with the appointments of Mr. Madigan and Mr. Lindauer to the DBB.

COORDINATION: None required.

1. Mr. John Madigan:

Yes *JR* JAN 12 2005

No. _____

2. Mr. Jerry Lindauer:

Yes *JR* JAN 12 2005

No. _____

Attachments:

As stated

MA SD	SMA DSD	<i>SR</i>	<i>1/12</i>
TSA SD	SA DSD	<i>1/11</i>	
EXEC SEC	<i>M/1/11</i>		
ESR MA	<i>BH 1/10</i>		

Prepared by: Tom Modly/Executive Director (b)(6)

OSD 00744-05

334

SONOS

195104



John W. Madigan

Mr. Madigan has been a director at Morgan Stanley since June 2000. Mr. Madigan retired as Chairman of Tribune Company, a leading media company with television and radio, broadcasting, newspaper publishing and interactive businesses, in December 2003. He served as chief executive officer from May 1995 through December 2002. He was elected to the Tribune board of directors in 1975, the same year he joined the company as vice president/chief financial officer. He is Chairman of the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the McCormick Tribune Foundation, a director of the Associated Press and AT&T Wireless Services. Additionally, Mr. Madigan is a trustee of Northwestern University, Illinois Institute of Technology, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center and The Museum of Television & Radio in New York.



Jerry Lindauer, Chairman

As Chairman of Security Broadband Corp, Jerry Lindauer brings strong leadership in strategic planning, government relations and corporate development. A well-respected spokesman for the cable industry for twenty-three years, Mr. Lindauer served as Chairman of the Board of the National Cable Television Association (NCTA) from 1990-1991 and was a member of that board for over two decades. He served on the Board of Directors for C-SPAN and was a founding member of the Cable Alliance for Education.

Mr. Lindauer was a Principal and Partner with Prime Cable where he was instrumental in acquiring, operating and divesting major cable TV properties representing a subscriber base of over one million customers and valued in excess of \$4 billion. Mr. Lindauer began his career in telecommunications by joining Communications Properties, Inc., in 1977. He became Senior Vice President in charge of franchising and regulatory activity when the company was purchased by Times Mirror in 1979. Mr. Lindauer was also President of Times Mirror Security, later acquired by Westec.

During his twenty-year career as a Marine Corps Officer, Mr. Lindauer was a military assistant in the office of the Secretary of Defense. He also served as an Infantry Company Commander in Vietnam and was awarded two Bronze Stars and a Purple Heart among other decorations. He continues his involvement in his community and his commitment to education by serving on the Board of Trustees of Bellarmine University and on the Board of the Longhorn Foundation at the University of Texas at Austin. He is also a member of the Society of Fellows at the Aspen Institute. Mr. Lindauer, a father of two, is a graduate of Bellarmine University and the University of Texas School of Law.

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

July 19, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John Madigan on DBB

I would like to **put** John Madigan on my Defense Business Board.

Thanks.

DHRdh
071904-26

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

Call Tina Jones

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039181

~~FOUO~~

July 19, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John Madigan on DBB

I would like to put John Madigan on my Defense Business Board.

Thanks.

DHRdh
071904-26

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

Call Tina Jones

334

19 Jul 04

~~FOUO~~



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(b)(6)

7201
~~FOUO~~
2005 12 15 PM 11:05

December 15, 2004
I-04/016967
ES-1703

READ

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Update on Coalition

I have not received an update from the two of you on where we stand on getting ahead of the curve with the coalition. I now see that Poland is starting to pull back their troops, and they may do more now that six or seven of them were killed or injured in a helicopter crash.

We simply have to get ahead of the curve, and we have to get the Department of State involved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-9

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

15 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/039185

OSD 00761-05
15-12-04 14:24 IN.

7201

C 1/15
1/20



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

January 12, 2004, 8:42PM

curran
1/15

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

ww
JAN 12 2004

SUBJECT: Final Report - Malaria Cases Among Joint Task Force Liberia Participants

• This memo is provided to summarize the findings of a Navy and Marine Corps medical investigation on the malaria cases that occurred among the Joint Task Force Liberia participants. The previous report is provided at TAB A. A conference report on the results of the medical investigation is provided at TAB B. All patients have since recovered and have been discharged from the hospital.

• **Key Facts:**

- 225 personnel in Quick Reaction Force went ashore in Liberia.
- 80 cases of malaria have been diagnosed and treated.
- 51 clinical cases with positive smear for malaria parasites; 29 with negative smears.
- 71 Marines; 7 Navy; 1 Army; 1 civilian.
- 2 cases of cerebral malaria; 1 case of acute respiratory distress syndrome.

• **Medical investigation revealed:**

- Mefloquine prophylaxis was readily available to the Quick Reaction Force and the drug potency and formulation were adequate.
- This strain of malaria (*P.fakiparum*) demonstrated some decreased susceptibility to mefloquine, but is not likely to have been a significant factor.
- Laboratory tests of serum mefloquine levels suggested a majority of Quick Reaction Force members tested did not comply with required dosing schedule. This finding contrasted with early information that was based solely on the patients' self-reports.
- Bed nets were not used on shore due to net design and mission requirements.
- Local insect control of malaria vectors was not feasible.
- DEET repellent was available, but the majority of personnel did not routinely use it. Most uniforms had not been adequately treated with permethrin repellent.
- Routine pre-deployment training for physicians did not adequately cover malaria.

• It is my understanding from HQ, USMC that an investigation into this incident is ongoing by the EUCOM Judge Advocate General — although I have not been

70

///

12 Jan 04

///

OSD 00791-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039186

informed on any of the details. This is a very preventable disease, and we were fortunate that the failure to prevent it did not result in loss of life. The lesson relearned is the critical importance of command leadership in implementing the preventive medicine program. //

COORDINATION: USD P&R David S.C. Chu, 5 Jan 04

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs),

(b)(6)

TAB

A



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

SEP 23 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Update - Malaria in Marines from Liberia as of 23 Sep 03

- This provides an update to the previous response to your snowflake dated September 10, 2003 (TAB A).
- There have been a total of 80 presumed cases of the severest type of malaria, *Plasmodium falciparum*, among the 225 US forces who were ashore in Liberia (from 12-28 August 2003). There have been no new cases detected in the last five days.
- Five were seriously ill but have recovered. There have been no deaths. Three patients remain hospitalized at National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda.
- There are several preventive (prophylactic) drugs for the prevention of malaria. Because of the likelihood that the *P. falciparum* in Liberia is resistant to the oldest such drug (chloroquine), the Marines ashore were prescribed mefloquine, a newer drug developed for such a situation.
- The occurrence of these cases prompted initial concerns that the mefloquine had failed to prevent the cases. As a result, those now ashore in Liberia are taking another drug, doxycycline, until test results return on the effectiveness of mefloquine and/or resistance of this malaria strain.
- Factors being investigated:
 - Is the parasite resistant to mefloquine?
 - Were the supplies of mefloquine fully potent?
 - Did the Marines fully adhere to the prescribed schedule of taking mefloquine ?
 - Did the Marines fully comply with other protective measures designed to protect them from the mosquito vectors, i.e., use of bed nets; use of repellants on uniforms, bed nets, and skin?

11-L-0559/OSD/039189

11/5909-03

- The investigation encompasses:
 - An anonymous survey **of** affected Marines.
 - Measuring mefloquine concentration in patients' **blood** to determine **if** it was adequate for prevention. This test is being conducted at the CDC.
 - Possibility of parasite resistance to mefloquine. Testing underway at Walter Reed **Army** Institute of Research.
- I have been briefed twice by the investigative team, and I am pressing them for prompt, accurate answers. **Early** indications **are** that some amount of non-adherence to prescribed medication schedules is at least partly responsible, but all the possible explanations have not been fully explored.
- Subsequent to the completion of lab tests, I expect a near complete picture to emerge within 10 days, and I will provide **further** information to you at that time. Policy and procedure implications for line and medical leadership will be pursued, based **upon** final results of the investigation.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Francis L. O'Donnell, MD, MPH, DHSD, FHP&R
PCDOCS #55146

(b)(6)

TAB

B

Malaria Outbreak Among Members of JTF Liberia Consensus Conference Report

9 October 2003

Contents of Brief

Organizations Represented.....	3
Background Information.....	4
Questions. data and answers:	
1. Was there a problem with the availability of mefloquine?.....	7
2. Was there a problem with generic medication’s potency or formulation?.....	8
3. Were Marines taking mefloquine according to requirements?.....	9
4. Was the malaria parasite resistant to mefloquine?	10
5. Was DEET available for use?.....	11
6. Were permethrin-treated utilities available for wear?	12
7. Were bed nets used?.....	13
8. Was local insect control adequate?.....	14
9. Were the medical staff adequately trained in diagnosis and management of malaria?.....	15
10. Can U.S. Forces deploy to highly malarious areas without suffering similar malaria outbreaks?	16
Recommendations.....	17
Continuing and Future efforts.....	19

Organizations Represented

- Food and Drug Administration
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
- World Health Organization
- Walter Reed Army Institute for Research
- Naval Medical Research Center
- Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
- U.S. Air Force Medical Support Agency
- Joint Chiefs of Staff - J4
- Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
- Naval Medical Education and Training Command
- DoD Global Emerging Infections System
- Marine Forces, Atlantic
- II Marine Expeditionary Force
- National Naval Medical Center
- Naval Environmental Health Center
- Naval Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit – Sicily
- Headquarters, Marine Corps, PP&O
- Commander Amphibious Task Force
- Marine Expeditionary Unit **26**
- Navy Disease Vector Ecology and Control Center
- Naval Forces Europe
- Joint Task Force - Liberia
- U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command
- U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
- Headquarters, Marine Corps, Health Services
- U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General

Historical Experience

- Navy/Marines – 62 cases worldwide from 1997-2000.
- Somalia – 1993 – 106 cases in Marines
– 127 cases U.S. Army
- Sierra Leone – 1996 – 6 cases in Marines
– 91 cases British Army
- Nigeria - 2001 – 7 cases with 2 deaths,
U.S. Army Special Forces

JTF Liberia Outbreak

- Total of JTF spending any time ashore – 290.
Quick Reaction Force – 225.
157 of MEU surveyed during investigation.
- 80 cases treated:
 - 1 civilian, 1 U.S. Army, 7 U.S. Navy, 2 FAST Marines.
 - 69 Marines of 26th MEU.
- 51 cases by positive smear, 29 by clinical criteria.
- Historical predicted malaria risk: 11-50% for unprotected personnel.
USMC experience:
 - 69/157 (44% attack rate) for 26th MEU members spending nights ashore.
 - 80/290 (28% attack rate) for JTF members spending any time ashore.

Pre-deployment Analyses and Intelligence

- Liberia known to be highest risk area for multiple vector-borne diseases.
- Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team, JUL 03:
 - limited in scope
 - assessed infrastructure, public health, sanitation, and security threats
 - focus on future civilian relief efforts vice deploying forces.
- JTF-L OPORD preventive measures consistent with survey, intelligence and recommendations from AFMIC, CDC and WHO.

1. Was there a problem with the availability of mefloquine?

- Mefloquine dispensed to Marines.
 - Verified by survey.
 - Verified by presence of tablets in Marines' pockets upon arrival at NNMC Bethesda.
 - Verified by presence of mefloquine in serum samples.
- MEU members were taking mefloquine prior to entering Liberia.
 - Verified by mefloquine metabolite levels.
- ANSWER: No. Mefloquine readily available.

2. Was there a problem with generic mefloquine's potency or formulation?

- Mefloquine met all FDA requirements.
 - Tablets removed from Marines' pockets produced predicted blood levels in test subjects.
 - Chemical analysis by FDA within standards.
 - FDA recommends continued use of current generic mefloquine formulation.
- ANSWER: No. Mefloquine potency and formulation was adequate.

3. Were Marines taking mefloquine according to requirements?

- Steady-state ratio of mefloquine metabolite (MMQ) present in 93 of 133 indicating past use.
- Protective mefloquine (MQ) levels present in 19 of 133 specimens indicating recent use.
- Only 7 of 133 had both protective MQ and adequate MQ/MMQ ratio.
 - Inadequate levels noted despite the survey indicating 95% of Marines claimed no missed doses.
- **ANSWER:** No. Lab data indicates inadequate compliance with required dosing schedule.

4. Was the malaria parasite resistant to mefloquine?

- Testing at Walter Reed Army Institute for Research did NOT reveal clinically significant resistance.
 - Consensus remains that mefloquine is the drug of choice for Liberia.
- ANSWER: No. Resistance not a factor.

5. Was DEET available for use?

- 290 personnel surveyed.
- DEET use:
 - Possession of DEET was a repeated inspection item.
 - 79/290 (27%) used some type of repellent at least once.
 - Only 19 of these used 12-hour DoD-issued DEET formulation.
 - Majority used less-effective non-DoD supplied or non-DEET repellent.
- ANSWER: Yes. Long-acting DEET was available. However it was not routinely used. Other DEET formulations were more commonly used though less effective as repellents.

6. Were permethrin-treated uniforms available for wear?

- 290 surveyed. 36 (12%) wore permethrin-treated utility uniforms ashore.
 - Unable to obtain bulk permethrin for treatment, only aerosol available aboard ship.
 - Only desert utilities were treated by aerosol prior to deployment.
 - Woodland utilities worn ashore, appropriate to local environment.
- Aerosol spray can is the least effective method available for treatment.
- ANSWER: No. Few adequately treated uniforms available for use ashore in Liberia.

7. Were bed nets used?

- Bed nets not carried ashore due to:
 - Weight restrictions
 - No cots to hold poles.
 - Sleeping on paved/hard surface precluding pole use.
 - Assumed short stay with minimal exposure.
- Current issue bed net system requires soft surface for poles or cot to effectively deploy.
- ANSWER: No. Not used due to net design and mission requirements.

8. Was local insect control adequate?

- Requirements to analyze and implement insect control exceeded ARG/MEU capabilities.
 - Minimal mosquito abatement equipment routinely carried with ARG/MEU
 - No mosquito abatement expertise routinely included in ARG/MEU T/O
- Analysis requires:
 - Traps and microscope
 - Expertise to count and speciate
- Site survey following outbreak revealed:
 - Mosquito risk widely and equally spread across region
 - Large local human reservoir of malaria
 - Highly mobile mosquito species, travel > 1 mile.
- **ANSWER:** No. Local control for malaria vectors not feasible given broad distribution, and limited ARG/MEU capabilities.

9. Was the medical staff adequately trained in diagnosis and management of malaria?

- Recent formal training for one physician, who established initial diagnosis and implemented treatment.
- No laboratory technicians had recent formal training.
- No formal pre-deployment refresher training received.
 - Early diagnosis and treatment decreases morbidity and mortality in malaria.
 - Treatment requires medications not used for prophylaxis and not routinely included in AMAL.
- **ANSWER:** No. Routine pre-deployment training does not include infectious disease refresher for physicians or lab techs.

10. Can U.S. Forces deploy to highly malarious areas, without suffering similar malaria outbreaks?

- Current policy and procedures for personal protective measures effective.
- Current chemo-prophylaxis effective.
- Currently complex regimen makes implementation difficult.
- ANSWER: Yes. Present policies and measures, if routinely applied to each individual ground force combatant, are adequate to prevent malaria in Liberia and other malarious areas.

Recommendations: Near Term

- Provide USMC-wide guidance requiring:
 - Permethrin treatment for all uniforms and bed nets deployment using best available techniques.
 - Use only DoD sustained-release DEET or DEET/S formulations.
- Provide routine tropical medicine refresher training for MEU medical staff during pre-deployment work.
- Add Malarone and oral quinine medications to the medical supply list.
- Operational planners and chain of command should emphasize awareness/assessment of infectious disease threat.
- Improve training and equipment of ARG/MEU Preventive Medicine technicians to enhance infectious disease control capability.

11-L-0559/OSD/039208

Recommendations: Long-term

- Permethrin treat uniforms at the factory during procurement.
- Procure and distribute improved mosquito net system as USMC standard issue.
- When OPLANS indicate potential for entry into high malaria-risk area, obtain and assure ARG/MEU capability for continuous onsite assessment and abatement of health threats.

Medical Continuing Efforts

- Malaria antibody testing of blood samples.
- Continue ongoing monitoring for emerging permethrin resistance in mosquitos.
- Continue evaluation of these malaria parasites for mefloquine resistance.

Medical Research and Development

- Field-use malaria test kit.
- “Fire-and-forget” solutions to reduce complexity:
 - Support malaria vaccine research.
 - Support malaria medication research.

~~FOUO~~

DEC 29 2004

TO: CAPT Bill Marriott
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Barry Golomb

Please handle.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/20/04 Letter from Barry Golomb to SecDef

DHR:as
122704-19

.....
Please respond by 1/7/05

CSC-
Please draft
note for SD signature
Thanks,
Col E.

335 SD

29 Dec 04

22 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

7

*Barry Golomb
Attorney & Counselor at Law*

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

E-Mail: Golomb@NCSL.com

Residence

(b)(6)

✓ Florida

(b)(6)

*Telephone
Facsimile*

Facsimile Cover Sheet

Date: December 20, 2004

To: Hon. Donald Rumsfeld

Telephone Number: (b)(6)

Fax Number: (b)(6)

Number of pages, including this Cover Sheet: 2.

Message:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I write to offset the unjustified criticism leveled at you and the calls for your resignation or removal which have received so much publicity recently.

I am a veteran of World War II, a volunteer enlistee at the age of 18, with just under a year of combat service in Europe, mostly as a noncommissioned artillery forward observer attached to infantry with the 45th Infantry Division. That does not make me an expert on procurement, tactics, strategy or anything else, but it may put me ahead of most of the people shooting their mouths off these days, including Senator Kerry. I fought on open roads, hedgerows, open fields, and the streets of cities, notably Nuremberg, which we took block by block, house by house, and room by room, and at Aschafenburg, renowned as the only place where Hitler's Volksturm actually fought. I was awarded five (5) battle stars. I was, reputedly, the second American into Dachau and the second American through the Siegfried Line. I had never heard of body armour. I had a lot of gall, but I did not think I knew more about how to fight a war than did the then Secretary of Defense and the then ranking generals, Marshall and Eisenhower, or my Army Commanders, Patton and Hodges.

335 SD


22 Dec 04

I have the good soldier's appreciation of real leadership - at all levels, and I **have** at least some ability to recognize it. You may have done ~~some~~ things which, debatably, are called mistakes, although I don't know of any that I would classify that way, but, in my view, you have done an outstanding job and I sincerely hope that you will remain Secretary of Defense for the balance of the President's term - naysayers to the contrary notwithstanding.

Like President Bush, who is such an idiot, moron, etc., that he earned an MRA from Harvard, I also attended Harvard - for an undergraduate AB and a JD c.l., - where I had the privilege of hearing the unveiling of the Marshall Plan in 1947 - and I've been practicing law since 1951, serving in various minor offices in the process. Only my age kept me from applying for a position in Pres. Bush's first administration and, again, in the present administration. [I'm now 80.]

What I want to emphasize is that *the* criticism of your performance in office, like the criticism of the President's, makes it very difficult for me to live up to my mother's injunction never to believe oneself to be superior to anyone else; it is difficult not to feel superior to people who level at you and at the President such ridiculous complaints as are now current. For whatever it may be worth, I want you to ~~know~~ that there is at least one lawyer, ex-judge, ex-combat-soldier who hopes sincerely that you will keep up the good work and continue to fight the good fight on behalf of all of us; our lives and freedom, and those of our children and grandchildren, may well depend upon your doing so.

Respectfully,



Barry Golomb

cc: Hon. George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 11 2005

Mr. Barry Golomb

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Golomb:

Thank you so much for your recent letter. I appreciate your observations on our efforts in Iraq.

I also wish to also convey my thanks to you, Mr. Golomb, for your service in the United States Army during WWII. We owe our freedom to you and others who served.

Sincerely,

[Handwritten signature]

335 SD

11 January

OSD 00805-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039215

22 Dec 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECURITY

✓
1/29

ACTION MEMO

2004-11475-04 2:50
20 January 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard J. Myers, CJCS *RJM/10*

SUBJECT: Death Investigation

- **Issue.** Your request -- "Please take a look at this letter to President Bush, dig into it and get a proper response. I would like to see it." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** The proposed letter to Mrs. Hull is attached at TAB B. The US A-10 friendly fire investigation is complete.
- The classified report was provided to the UK Political Advisor (POLAD) at HQ USCENTCOM-Tampa on 8 October 2003, and the redacted-releasable version was provided on 19 November 2003. The POLAD delivered the documents to the UK Provisional Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), whose staff does NOT want to conduct a next-of-kin notification briefing until after the holidays. USCENTCOM will not issue a press release on the investigation until after Mrs. Hull receives her notification briefing.
- **Analysis.** The President received a letter from Mrs. Susan Hull, the wife of the British soldier killed by a US A-10 by friendly fire in Iraq. She asked the President to use his influence to speed the US inquiry into the incident. The President subsequently met with her and provided a hand-written note stating that he would pass on Mrs. Hull's request for a speedy completion of the investigation.

293

RECOMMENDATION: Approve letter at TAB B.

Approve *RJ* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB C
AN 29 2004

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Col Ron Williams, USAF; OCJCS/LC (b)(6)

205 JAN 04

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SG MA CRADDOCK	<i>1/29</i>
MA BUDD	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>1/21</i>

OSD 00815-04

TAB A

628
December 16, 2003

To: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ~~Death~~ Investigation

1/28
Please take a look at this letter to President Bush, dig into it and get a proper response. I would like to see it;

Thanks.

Attach.

11/20/03 Hull letter to POTUS

DHR:dh
121603-3

.....
Please respond by 12/23/03

✓ 1/27
Sir,
Response attached.
Original attachments
included behind.
vr/cdr Nosenzo
1/29

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/039217

*Cards need to
re-write for
inquiry*

*J.C.
Dun-*

President Bush

3 Fern Brook Lane
Gillingham
Dorset
SP8 4PL

20th November 2003

Dear President Bush,

May I firstly thank you for allowing me the opportunity to have met with you today. I hope you can understand that I have also decided to write, in the event that I may not have been able to adequately convey my thoughts to you in person.

I would like to ask for your assistance concerning the investigation into the death of my husband, Lance Corporal of Horse Matthew Hull. He died on the 28th March this year, in Iraq, following an attack on his vehicle by an American A-10 aircraft.

I wish to emphasise that I am not, and neither was my husband, in any way politically minded. Matthew went to war as a professional soldier, believing in what he was doing and with my support. I have no issue over the justification of the conflict. I do, however, wish to see a resolution to the inquiry surrounding his death.

At the time of writing I have been informed by the British Ministry of Defence that they have completed their investigation and it has been forwarded to the coroner. However, no inquest can be opened until all the facts are with the court and so we still await the US investigation report.

It is impossible for me to convey to you how difficult the past eight months have been. There has been so much to contend with that at times the pressure and emotional distress have been overwhelming. I am sure you are aware that due to the circumstances of his death, there has been much media speculation and interest, and this has added to the difficulty of coming to terms with losing my husband. I know that the conclusion of the investigation will help allow me to begin to move forward through my grief by ending my personal torment of wondering how and why my husband died.

I sincerely hope you can begin to somehow understand, or at least empathise with, my own wishes and those of Matthew's family. If so, I respectfully ask for you to use your influence over the US bodies concerned with this investigation, and press for it to be completed quickly.

I thank you for your time in reading this letter.


Yours Sincerely,

Susan Hull
Mrs Susan Hull

TabA

TAB B

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20318 -9999



Mrs. Susan Hull

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. Hull,

On behalf of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, please accept sincere condolences of the loss of your husband Matthew. He was a dedicated military professional who faithfully served his country and the cause of freedom.

The investigation regarding this unfortunate incident has been completed by US Central Command. The results will be provided to the appropriate British military authorities. US Central Command officials have been informed that the British military authorities will contact you to discuss the results.

May the loving memories of Matthew's life be a source of strength and comfort to you and your family in the days ahead.

Sincerely,

RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/039219

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

**Deputy Staff Judge Advocate
USCENTCOM**

Mr. Barry Hammill

23 Dec 03

11-21
0670



CHAIF

Should we tell
RSTOS ?

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard J. Myer

SUBJECT: Death Investigation

SECDEF NOTE 1/29

293

- Issue. Your request -- "Please take a look at this letter to President Bush, dig into it and get a proper response. I would like to see it." (TAB A)
- Answer. The proposed letter to Mrs. Hull is attached at TAB B. The US A-10 friendly fire investigation is complete.
- The classified report was provided to the UK Political Advisor (POLAD) at HQ USCENTCOM-Tampa on 8 October 2003, and the redacted-releasable version was provided on 19 November 2003. The POLAD delivered the documents to the UK Provisional Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), whose staff does NOT want to conduct a next-of-kin notification briefing until after the holidays. USCENTCOM will not issue a press release on the investigation until after Mrs. Hull receives her notification briefing.
- Analysis. The President received a letter from Mrs. Susan Hull, the wife of the British soldier killed by a US A-10 friendly fire in Iraq. She asked the President to use his influence to speed the US inquiry into the incident. The President subsequently met with her and provided a hand-written note stating that he would pass on Mrs. Hull's request for a speedy completion of the investigation.

29 JAN 04

RECOMMENDATION: Approve letter at TAB B.

Approve RA Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Col Ron Williams, USAF; OCJCS/LC, (b)(6)

20 JAN 04

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SA MA CRADDOCK	1/29
MA BUCCI	
EYECSEC MARRIOTT	1/21

OSD 00815-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039221

7201
~~TOUG~~

file

September 2, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Timetable for Paramilitary Issue

Please advise as to the timetable you plan on with regards to analyzing the paramilitary issue we discussed with Cong. Goss.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-9

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

DA 10/1
Sir,
Response Attached.
VR
1 COLB
9/30

~~TOUG~~

OSD 00818-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039222

100
101
102
103

254604

02/11/04 90/1

30 September 2004, 08:45

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone *SC*

SUBJECT: Paramilitary Issue

We are pursuing this on two tracks.

SOLIC is working on "unconventional warfare" - e.g., should DoD have performed the NILE mission in Iraq?

I am working on the broader issue of whether covert action (CA) should be as closely associated with HUMINT as it is today, or whether CA is an operational activity not unlike that of a Combatant Commander. If so, then it might be possible to distribute the missions among various departments and agencies.

The advantage of the latter is that it expands the pool of available talent and distributes the workload.

It also distinguishes those efforts to collect intelligence (HUMINT) from those with an operational objective. My concern is that, at the level of CIA/CTC, the nearly indistinguishable role of the DO in HUMINT and CA deprives us of broader application for HUMINT and a potential for a bias to be developed in assessing the efficacy of CA.

I'll work this over the next 30 days or so.

SC
to/mh
Gray -
VADM S said
they discussed
(Cambone & SD)

370.64

30 SEP 04

2 SEP 04

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Stress on the Force Memo – An Update

Please take the lead with Gen. Pace on updating my Stress of the Force Memo. We need to know how we are doing in each of the areas set out. Gen. Dick Myers suggested a good format, with a bar for each line showing our progress with perhaps one or two explanatory bullets below.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-6

.....
Please respond by 9/10

3162

25104

September 2, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: U.S. Russia Partnership Proposal from Cong. Weldon

Please take a look at this proposal by Cong. Curt Weldon and let me know what you would like to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/7/01 Cong letter to Pres. Bush and US Russia Partnership Proposal

DHR:ss
090204-4

.....
Please respond by 9/10

2 SEP 04

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

November 7, 2001

President George W. Bush
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Bush:

As you prepare for the upcoming summit with President Putin, we commend the positive approach you have established with Russia. Too often, the focus of our bilateral relations has been on defense and security - precisely the issues on which our interests often collide. It would be more useful, as we move forward with a Russian policy for the 21st century to take a more holistic approach - one that takes into account Russia's myriad concerns as well as our own.


Therefore, in consultation with many of the leading experts on Russia, we propose a series of bipartisan initiatives to engage Russia on issues such as the environment, energy, economic development, health care - as well as defense and security. We call this proposal "A New Time, A New Beginning." Some of these are new ideas, but many are not. Many of these initiatives are already underway, and need additional support to make even greater progress.

Such engagement is in the U.S. interest as well as Russia's. If the United States and Russia cooperate on issues across the board, Russia will be more likely to work closely with America on the national security issues that matter most to us - missile defense, the war against terrorism, and proliferation.

We encourage you to review the enclosed proposal and hope that some of these initiatives will prove useful to you in the ongoing discussions between Russia and America. We look forward to working with you to forge a new relationship that will benefit both our countries.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,





James Buckley
Mike Cote

Dana Rohrer

Bud Cramer

Mr 7U

Wickat

Carina Gray

Cliff Edwards

Bo Clemens

John Est

Quetta J.

John E. Petersen

Marcy Kaptur

Henry Hyde

John Linder

Ray Wicker

Walter Byrd

Mark Linder

Wendy

Wm T. Little

John Hayes

Nick Smith

Ed Mackin

Christopher Hayes

And Kenyon

Gene Moore

Jim McLaughlin

Charles H. Taylor

Gene Miller

George W. Nettleton, Jr.

Sam Brown

Ralph M. Hall

J. J. Porter

Fred Lytle

Cass Ballenger

Nathan Deal

Clarence H. ...

Frank Fallon Jr.

W. Schrock

Jimmy ...

Robert E. ...

D. ...

Jack ...

Rod Blagojevich

J. Eaton

Jim ...

Mike ...

Van Hilleary

Ed Royce

Bob Filner

Tom ...

Danny ...

James Greenwood

Kari Brown

Pat G. Bandy

Alexandra Hunt

Phil English

John L.

Tom Allen

OO Oakes

Robert E. Ad

Mike Doyle

Shelley Moore Caputo

MS Simmons
CT/2

W. Todd Alin

Connie Morella
Jim Maloney

Cass Ballenger
Nathan Deal

Page 6:

Jerry Weller
Jim Gibbons
Jim Ryun
Judy Biggert
Jerry Costello
Eddie Bernice Johnson
Stephn Horn
Kay Granger
Ed Scrock

Tom Davis
Randy Cunningham
Gary Condit
Randy Forbes
Steven LaTourette
Joe Skeen
Bob Borski
Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Chris Smith

Page 7:

Adam Putnam
Frank Pallone
Ed Schrock
Johnny Isakson
Robert Andrews
Bernie Sanders
Nick Lampson
Rod Blagojevich

Jim Saxton
Jim Turner
Mike Ferguson
Van Hilleary
Ed Royce
Bob Filner
Luis Gutierrez
Danny Davis

Page 8:

Jane Harman
Rick Boucher
Christopher John
Todd Akin
Dave Weldon
Bart Gordon
Virgil Goode Jr
Alan Mollohan
Frank Wolf

Hilda Solis
Rush Holt
Carrie Meek
Amo Houghton
Paul Kanjorski
Bob Goodlatte
Doug Bereuter
John Shimkus
J.D. Hayworth


Page 9:

James Greenwood
Kevin Brady
Bob Brady
Melissa Hart
Phil English
John Thune

Tom Allen
George Gekas
Robert Andrews
Mike Doyle
Shelly Moore Capito
Rob Simmons
Todd Akin

U.S. RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP

*A New Time
A New Beginning*



ПАРТНЕРСТВО
США И РОССИИ

*Новые Времена
Новые Начинания*

U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP

*A New Time
A New Beginning*

Rep. Curt Weldon
E-mail: curtpa07@mail.house.gov
Web: www.house.gov/curtweldon
Capitol Office: 2466 Rayburn Bldg. 20515
Phone: (b)(6)
Fax: (b)(6)

September 3, 2004

TO: Ray Dubois
CC: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Amend Info Memo to Add Year

Please enter in the year (after the weeks and months) on the attached Info Memo, so that it is easier to read.


Thanks.

Attach.
8/31/04 Dubois Info Memo to SecDef Re: Casualty Report (12996-04)


DHR:ss
090304-4

.....
Please respond by

9 | 10 | 04



done - 9/12



2900002

2004 AUG 31 PM 2:43

INFO MEMO

J 9/11

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

Pub FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

Ran DuBois 8/31/04

SUBJECT: Operation Iraqi Freedom -- Week Ending 28 August 2004 Casualty Report

1. Weekly Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Casualty Update. For the period August 22 - August 28, 2004, there were 12 deaths (9 killed in action; 3 non-hostile) and 180 wounded in action. The attached chart depicts OIF casualties by week since the start of combat operations on March 19, 2003. Death totals do not include one captured soldier.

OIF U.S. Military Casualties by Week	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA	WIA Not RTD
Combat Operations - 19 Mar 03 thru 30 Apr 03	138	109	29	542	426
19 Mar - 22 Mar *	11	8	3	21	16
23 Mar - 29 Mar	49	46	3	152	114
30 Mar - 05 Apr	40	30	10	134	102
06 Apr - 12 Apr	22	22	0	167	130
13 Apr - 19 Apr	8	1	7	37	38
20 Apr - 26 Apr	7	2	5	23	21
27 Apr - 30 Apr *	1	0	1	8	5
Post Combat Ops - 1 May thru Present	835	617	218	6374	3414
01 May - 03 May *	2	0	2	6	6
04 May - 10 May	7	1	6	7	5
11 May - 17 May	6	2	4	12	7
18 May - 24 May	9	0	9	4	4
25 May - 31 May	13	5	8	25	20
01 Jun - 07 Jun	7	3	4	40	30
08 Jun - 14 Jun	4	2	2	34	20
15 Jun - 21 Jun	8	5	3	19	15
22 Jun - 28 Jun	11	8	3	42	36
29 Jun - 05 Jul	4	1	3	51	31
06 Jul - 12 Jul	12	5	7	39	27

TSA SD	<i>0/1</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>2/1</i>
	<i>11/9/11</i>

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11-L-0559/OSD/039235

OSD 12996-04

OIF U.S. Military Casualties by Week	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA	WIA Not RTD
13 Jul – 19 Jul	9	4	5	64	30
20 Jul – 26 Jul	16	13	3	58	50
27 Jul – 02 Aug	7	6	1	43	27
03 Aug – 09 Aug	11	2	9	31	23
10 Aug – 16 Aug	7	4	3	31	20
17 Aug – 23 Aug	7	3	4	36	23
24 Aug – 30 Aug	9	3	6	50	36
31 Aug – 06 Sep	5	2	3	45	29
7 Sep – 13 Sep	6	4	2	71	38
14 Sep – 20 Sep	10	8	2	58	38
21 Sep – 27 Sep	5	2	3	59	37
28 Sep – 04 Oct	10	6	4	53	31
05 Oct – 11 Oct	6	6	0	82	55
12 Oct – 18 Oct	12	9	3	100	60
19 Oct – 25 Oct	9	5	4	102	62
26 Oct – 01 Nov	13	11	2	113	65
02 Nov – 08 Nov	34	32	2	124	71
09 Nov – 15 Nov	26	25	1	79	45
16 Nov – 22 Nov	10	6	4	56	38
23 Nov – 29 Nov	10	6	4	49	32
30 Nov – 06 Dec	5	4	1	49	23
07 Dec – 13 Dec	11	6	5	82	45
14 Dec – 20 Dec	7	3	4	57	34
21 Dec – 27 Dec	13	10	3	59	29
28 Dec 03 – 03 Jan 04	9	6	3	53	28
04 Jan 04 – 10 Jan 04	11	11	0	63	32
11 Jan 04 – 17 Jan 04	6	4	2	31	20
18 Jan 04 – 24 Jan 04	10	8	2	39	25
25 Jan 04 – 31 Jan 04	14	12	2	35	21
01 Feb 04 – 07 Feb 04	4	3	1	24	11
08 Feb 04 – 14 Feb 04	9	4	5	49	27
15 Feb 04 – 21 Feb 04	6	5	1	43	32
22 Feb 04 – 28 Feb 04	2	0	2	28	14
29 Feb 04 – 06 Mar 04	2	1	1	23	13
07 Mar 04 – 13 Mar 04	11	8	3	62	33
14 Mar 04 – 20 Mar 04	18	9	9	104	61
21 Mar 04 – 27 Mar 04	10	6	4	80	48
28 Mar 04 – 03 Apr 04	12	10	2	115	69
04 Apr 04 – 10 Apr 04	65	65	0	543	300
11 Apr 04 – 17 Apr 04	27	23	4	295	145
18 Apr 04 – 24 Apr 04	16	14	2	159	89
25 Apr 04 – 01 May 04	28	25	3	182	94

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11-L-0559/OSD/039236

OIF U.S. Military Casualties by Week	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA	WIA Not RTD
02 May 04 – 08 May 04	25	20	5	166	92
09 May 04 – 15 May 04	12	8	4	187	90
16 May 04 – 22 May 04	16	11	5	150	78
23 May 04 – 29 May 04	16	14	2	181	64
30 May 04 – 05 Jun 04	17	16	1	120	53
06 June 04 – 12 June 04	6	5	1	125	65
13 June 04 – 19 June 04	9	7	2	140	61
20 June 04 – 26 June 04	12	12	0	165	78
27 June 04 – 03 July 04	11	10	1	110	57
04 July 04 – 10 July 04	20	14	6	94	46
11 July 04 – 17 July 04	12	7	5	102	53
18 July 04 – 24 July 04	11	11	0	166	72
25 July 04 – 31 July 04	5	5	0	124	65
01 Aug 04 – 07 Aug 04	18	15	3	209	103
08 Aug 04 – 14 Aug 04	8	6	2	205	89
15 Aug 04 – 21 Aug 04	24	21	3	192	92
22 Aug 04 – 28 Aug 04	12	9	3	180	52
Total Deaths & WIA 19 Mar 03 thru 28 Aug 04	973	726	247	6916	3840
* Partial Week					

2. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Suicide Rate Update. The “SI & Pending – Apparent SI” column includes confirmed SI cases and unresolved cases that are still under investigation per 100,000 members. The “SI & Pending – All Cases” includes the other categories as well as other deaths under investigation such as drowning or drug overdoses where it has not been determined if the loss was accidental or purposeful. For each category, the death count used to determine the rate is shown in parentheses.

OIF U.S. Military Suicide & Pending Rates (per 100,000 members)	Confirmed Self-Inflicted (SI)	SI & Pending – Apparent SI	SI & Pending – All Cases
As of 28 Aug 04	9.5 (29)	10.8 (33)	15.1 (46)

Reference Notes:

1) The suicide rates in other major (long duration) wars include: Desert Shield – Desert Storm was 2.7/100,000; Vietnam War was 14.5/100,000; peacetime DoD average since 1980 is 11.5/100,000.

2) The CY2000 civilian population suicide rates are 17.5/100,000 for males and 4.1/100,000 for females. Using an approximate OIF deployment mix of 90% males and 10% females, an adjusted rate for comparison of OIF military suicides to civilian suicides is 16.2 suicides/100,000.

September 3, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Attached is a memo concerning what we need in Afghanistan. Where do you think we are?

Thanks.

Attach.
Afghanistan Presentation for POTUS (09/02/04-2)

DHR:ss
090304-7

.....
Please respond by 9/10/04

Afghanistan

2004-09-03

September 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Presentation for POTUS

I need a memo for the President on Afghanistan that sets forth what to do about:

- Pulling together the Afghan security forces so they can take over security responsibility.
- Strengthening the U.S. Embassy.
- Zal's security and, when necessary, his replacement.
- Marginalizing the warloads, their militaries and their legions.
- Sealing the borders and increasing tax revenues.
- Marginalizing Iranian influence.
- How to deal with the narcotics problem.

DHR:ss
090204-2

September 7, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Two Memos from Joe Schmitz


Please take a look at these two memos from Joe Schmitz and tell me what you think I should do with them.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/24/04 Action Memo from Joseph Schmitz to SecDef re: Detainee Policy & Interrogation Standards for Afghanistan and 08/02/04 Action Memo from Joseph Schmitz to SecDef re: Working Relationship Principles for Agencies & Offices of IG.

DHR:ss
090704-13

.....
Please respond by 9/17



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
 INSPECTOR GENERAL
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
 ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ACTION MEMO

JUN 24 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Joseph E. Schmitz*
 Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Immediate need to clarify Department of Defense Detainee Policy and Interrogation Standards for Afghanistan

- Bagram Air Base interrogators are using an unsigned SecDef Memorandum as "guidance" for conducting interrogations. During my recent trip to Afghanistan I found that the current SecDef "guidance" being followed at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, is the attached unsigned memorandum. By all reports last week at Bagram Air Base, this unsigned SecDef "guidance" has been widely circulated as policy guidance to commanders and soldiers engaged in interrogating detainees. However, the commanders and staff (e.g., SJA and IG) associated with the interrogations at Bagram Air Base were uniformly uncertain as to whether the SecDef guidance had ever been signed.
- Compounding the confusion over whether or not it was ever signed, the attached SecDef "guidance" purports to apply standards for "techniques" limited to both "interrogation of unlawful combatants held at Bagram," and "to use only at strategic interrogation facilities." To the knowledge of the leadership at the Bagram Control Point, the only DoD strategic interrogation facility is at GITMO.
- In order to immediately dispel confusion, I have already notified the CJTF76 Inspector General and Staff Judge Advocate that the unsigned memorandum currently in circulation was never signed. I have also discussed this matter and my actions taken with VADM Church.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef immediately clarify that the previously circulated, unsigned Memorandum was never signed, and promulgate interrogation policy guidance for use at Bagram and other detention facilities under U.S. Central Command control.

APPROVE: _____ DISAPPROVE: _____

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Thomas F. Gimble, Deputy IG-Intel,

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~REGRADED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
 WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE~~

Less Enclosure

11-L-0559/QSD/039241

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

77072.04

Buechner, Barton D., OIG DoD

From: Schmitz, Joseph E., OIG DoD
Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 5:25 PM
To: 'blockg@cjtf76.centcom.mil'
cc: Buechner, Barton D., OIG DoD; Marty Carpenter (E-mail)
Subject: Unsigned SecDef Memorandum- FOUO

Sensitivity: Private

Colonel Block: I verified today that the non-letterhead, unsigned SecDef "MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, US CENTRAL COMMAND," hand-dated "16 APR 03," a copy of which you shared with me at Bagram Air Base last week, was never signed. Even as we address the issue at the OSD level, I recommend you do at your level whatever your Commander thinks is reasonable and prudent to ensure that any doubt among the interrogators as to the existence of a signed version of the hand-dated "16 APR 03" SecDef MEMORANDUM is dispelled: there is no such signed document (other than the one similar in form and substance, but applicable only to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, dated April 16, 2003, which SecDef declassified and released today). Feel free to call or e-mail if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks again for your assistance in Bagram last week.

Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

(b)(6)



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

ACTION MEMO

August 2, 2004. 5:25 pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspector General

DepSec Action

- You should sign the memorandum at Tab A forwarding to the DoD agency heads and their Inspectors General the subject principles as issued on July 9, 2004, by the Chairman of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and the Vice Chairmen of the PCIE and Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) to the members of the President's Management Council (PMC) (see Tab B).
- These principles were developed by the PMC, PCIE, and ECIE to help federal agencies "work most effectively together" with their respective Offices of Inspectors General. The principles provide that the OIG and the agency should strive to:
 - Foster open communications at all levels
 - Interact with professionalism and mutual respect
 - Recognize and respect the mission and priorities of the Agency and the OIG
 - Be thorough, objective, and fair
 - Be engaged, knowledgeable, and provide feedback
- I will continue to practice these key principles with the Department, and I remain committed to fulfilling my statutory duty under the IG Act to "keep[you] and the Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of [DoD] programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action" (IG Act, §2(3)).

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign the memorandum at Tab A issuing to DoD agency heads and their Inspectors General the "Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspector General" recently issued by the President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by John Crane, Assistant Inspector General for Communications and Congressional Liaison, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/039243

11577-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: "Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspector General"

You get what you inspect, not what you expect. Stated differently, what you measure improves.

Last month, the Chairman of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency issued the attached "Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspector General." For those of you with your own inspectors general, please discuss the attachment with your inspector general with a view toward clearly defining what the two of you consider to be a productive relationship, and then, as the Chairman of the President's Council states, "consequently manage toward that goal in an atmosphere of mutual respect."

In addition to the attached guidance, I would encourage each of you to utilize the various Offices of Inspectors General within this Department not as a "way out" whenever you face difficult leadership challenges, but rather as independent and valuable tools to assist all of us in leadership positions to make better decisions and otherwise to measure improvements in the way we take on instances of fraud, waste, and *abuse* that inevitably pop up from time to *time*.

I will continue rely to upon my Inspector General to help me inspect and measure improvements throughout this Department. I encourage you to do the same.

Attachment:
As stated



PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL on INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL on INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY



JUL 9 2004

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY

FROM:

4 Clay Johnson III, Deputy Director for Management of OMB and
Chairman, President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency, and
Executive Council on Integrity & Efficiency

[Handwritten signature] Gaston Gianni, Inspector General, FDIC and
Vice Chairman, President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency
[Handwritten signature] Barry Snyder, Inspector General, Federal Reserve Board and
Vice Chairman, Executive Council on Integrity & Efficiency

SUBJECT:

Agency and OIG Working Relationships

We encourage you to use the attached set of principles developed by the PMC, PCIE, and ECIE to help your departments/agencies and the Offices of Inspectors General work together most effectively.

11-L-0559/OSD/039245

WORKING RELATIONSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR AGENCIES AND OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Inspector General (IG) Act establishes for most agencies an "independent and objective" Office of Inspector General (OIG) and sets out its mission, responsibilities, and authority. The IG is under the general supervision of the agency head. The unique nature of the IG function can present a number of challenges for establishing and maintaining effective working relationships, **which** fundamentally rely upon mutual trust between not only the agency head and the IG, but also between the agency head's other immediate subordinates and the IG. The following relationship principles provide some guidance for agencies and OIGs.

To work **most** effectively together, the Agency and its OIG need to clearly define what the two consider to be a productive relationship and then consciously manage toward that goal in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

By providing independent and objective information to promote government management, intelligent risk-taking, and accountability, the OIG contributes to the Agency's success. The OIG is an agent of positive change, focusing on eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse, and on identifying problems and recommendations for corrective actions by agency leadership. The OIG provides the agency and Congress with objective assessments of opportunities to be more successful. The OIG, although not under **the** direct supervision of senior agency management, must keep them and the Congress fully and currently informed of significant OIG activities. Given the complexity of management and policy issues, the OIG and the Agency may sometimes disagree **on** the extent of a problem and the need for and scope of corrective action. However, such disagreements should not cause the relationship between the OIG and the Agency to become unproductive.

To work together most effectively, the OIG and the Agency should strive to:

Foster open communications at all levels. The Agency will promptly respond to OIG requests for information to facilitate OIG activities and acknowledge challenges that the OIG can help address. Surprises are to be avoided. With very limited exceptions, primarily related to investigations, the **OIG** should keep the Agency advised of its **work** and its findings on a timely basis, and strive to provide information helpful to the Agency at the earliest possible stage.

Interact with professionalism and mutual respect. Each party should always act in good faith and **presume** the same from the other. Both parties share as a common goal the successful accomplishments of the Agency's mission.

Recognize and respect the mission and priorities of the Agency and the OIG. The Agency should recognize the OIG's independent role in carrying out its mission with the Agency, while recognizing the responsibility of the OIG to report both to the Congress and to the Agency Head. The OIG should work to carry out its functions with a minimum of disruption to the primary work of the Agency.

Be thorough, objective, and fair. The OIG must perform its work thoroughly, objectively and with consideration to the Agency's point of view. When responding, the Agency will objectively consider differing opinions and means of improving operations. Both sides will recognize successes in addressing management challenges.

Be engaged. The OIG and Agency management will work cooperatively in identifying the most important areas for OIG work, as well as the best means of addressing the results of that work, while maintaining the OIG's statutory independency of operation. In addition, agencies need to recognize that the **OIG** also will need to carry work that is self-initiated, congressional requested, or mandated by law.

Be knowledgeable. The OIG will continually strive to keep abreast of agency programs and operations, and Agency management will be kept informed of OIG activities and concerns being raised in the course of OIG work. Agencies will help ensure that the OIG is kept up to date on current matters and events.

Provide feedback. The Agency and the OIG should implement mechanisms, both formal and informal, to ensure prompt and regular feedback.

September 7, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: IG Report

Please keep me posted on this IG Report on the CPA.

Take a look at it and ask yourself a question – whether or not it is an unrealistic expectation on their **part** -- given the ~~war~~ zone circumstance of CPA.

Thanks.

Attach.

- 08/30/04 Info Memo from Tina Jonas re: CPA IG Draft Audit (12901-04)
- 08/30/04 Info Memo from Tina Jonas re: Audit of KBR Restore Iraqi Oil Contract (12900-04)
- 08/31/04 Info Memo from Tina Jonas re: Weekly Report (13036-04)
- 07/12/04 CPA IG Draft Report on Oversight Funds (04-OXX)

DHR:ss
090704-28

.....
Please respond by _____



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

2004 AUG 30 PM 4:39



INFO MEMO

August 30, 2004 11:30 AM

J 9/1

Pub →

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Inspector General (IG) Draft Audit:
Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries Through the National Budget
Process

- On August 23, 2004, Mr. Joe Benkert (Iraq Support Group) briefed the Deputy on the findings of a draft audit on CPA oversight of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).
- The draft audit concludes that CPA failed to provide adequate oversight of \$8.8 billion in DFI funds provided to the Iraqi Ministries (Executive Summary at Tab A).
- The Deputy will send a letter to Ambassador Bremer seeking his input on both this audit and on a letter to you from Senators Wyden, Harkin, and Dorgan on this issue (letter at Tab B).
- In addition, the CPA IG has agreed to reopen the audit to include the views of Ambassador Bremer and key members of his staff, who were not interviewed for the draft audit, but who were responsible for management of the DFI.
- CPA Order 95, published June 4, 2004, codified a requirement for Iraqi ministries to submit monthly financial reports to the Ministry of Finance. The Iraq Support Group is working with the US embassy in Baghdad and former CPA staff to obtain any records of spending reports prepared by the Iraqi ministries.
- The Iraq Support Group and Ambassador Bremer's CPA staff will continue to work with the CPA IG to address the issues raised in the report.
- Mr. Benkert will prepare a response to the Senators' letter.

COORDINATION: Iraq Support Group

Prepared By: David Norquist, (b)(6)

MA SD	<i>2/1</i>
SRMA SD	<i>2/1</i>
MA SD	<i>2/1</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 8/31</i>



OSD 12901-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039248



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 30 PM 4: 25

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

August 30, 2004, 12:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 - DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Tina W. Jonas

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *Tina W. Jonas*

SUBJECT: Audit of Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) Restore Iraqi Oil Contract

- Restore Iraqi Oil (NO) is a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) contract totaling \$2.6 billion. The COE has requested Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audits to establish a final price.
- Later ~~this~~ week, DCAA will issue audit reports on three task orders written for the import and distribution of fuel products to meet the domestic needs within Iraq from February 7, 2004 through March 31, 2004. The reports will state that KBR has failed to support the reasonableness of fuel prices from its Kuwaiti subcontractor.
- During the same period, the Defense Energy Supply Command (DESC) began to assume responsibility for supplying fuel to Iraq. DCAA found that DESC was able to obtain lower prices, primarily due to transportation costs, despite the fact that the same subcontractor performed work for both KBR and DESC.
- There has been considerable congressional and press scrutiny of prices paid for gasoline under these task orders due to allegations of overcharging.

COORDINATION: None

SA SD	<i>9/1</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>2 9/1</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>11 8/31</i>

Prepared by: William H. Reed, DCAA Director,

(b)(6)

OSD 12900-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 AUG 31 PM 4: 47

August 31, 2004, 12:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report 08/31/04

• **Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Execution.** The budget close-out is executing on plan. The Office of Management and Budget approved around \$2.2 billion from the \$25 billion reserve fund for force protection, Army modularity requirements, and higher than anticipated current fuel costs.

• **Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).** The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has apportioned \$120 million of the \$25 billion contingency war reserve funding. These funds will finance near-term CERP requirements for Iraq. We are working with the Joint Staff and operational commanders to develop a financial plan for the remainder of the \$300 million of the fiscal year 2005 CERP authority.

• **Afghan Army Acceleration.** On August 23, \$94 million of fiscal year 2004 Supplemental funding was released under Train & Equip Authority. The money will be used to pay for accelerating the enhancement of the Afghan Army's capabilities.

• **Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).** On August 17, 2004, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) issued an audit report on a Kellogg, Brown & Root's (KBR) \$502.7 million proposal under the LOGCAP III contract. Over \$75 million has been challenged in the proposal. Additional details were provided in a separate memo.

• **Audit of Restore Iraqi Oil Contract.** DCAA is nearing completion of three audits of KBR's proposal for final prices on three Task Orders for the import and distribution of fuel products. The reports will be critical of the high prices paid by KBR to supply domestic Iraqi fuel needs. A separate memo was sent to you on August 30, 2004.

• **Interagency Task Force Report.** In response to the Government Accountability Office report entitled, "Some DoD Contractors Abuse the Federal Tax System with Little Consequence," an Interagency Task Force was established. The Task Force has identified four recommendations for DoD that will significantly improve the effectiveness of the Federal Payment Levy Program. This will result in a better exchange of information between agencies and increase the number of tax levies collected. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service is implementing these recommendations.

COORDINATION: None

TSA SD	9/1
SRMA SD	
MA SD	9/1 <i>JS</i>
EXEC SEC	49A

11-L-0559/OSD/039250

OSD 13036-04

Draft Report

~~For Official Use Only~~

Office of the Inspector General
Coalition Provisional Authority

Report Number 04-OXX
(Project No. D2004-DCPAAC-0007)

July 12, 2004

Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process

Executive Summary

Introduction: Until June 28, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was the authority responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq. In May 2003, the United Nations Security Council assigned responsibility to the CPA for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), and it required that DFI funds be used in a transparent manner for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, the disarmament of Iraq, the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.

Objective: The objective of the audit was to determine whether the CPA established and implemented adequate managerial, financial, and contractual controls over DFI funds that were provided by CPA to interim Iraqi Ministries through the national budget process.

Conclusion: The CPA did not provide adequate stewardship of over \$8.8 billion in DFI funds provided to Iraqi Ministries through the national budget process. Specifically, the CPA did not establish and implement adequate managerial, financial, and contractual controls over the funds to ensure they were used in a transparent manner.

- **Managerial Controls.** The CPA did not clearly assign authorities and responsibilities over DFI funds provided to Iraqi Ministries nor did it issue clear guidance regarding the procedures and controls for disbursing the funds. Further, the CPA did not staff the CPA Ministry of Finance/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with sufficient personnel to perform oversight of budget execution, and staff turnovers hindered financial oversight.
- **Financial Controls.** The CPA did not exercise adequate fiduciary responsibility over DFI funds provided to Iraqi Ministries. Additionally, although the CPA published approved national budgets on the Internet, it was not transparent what the DFI funds provided to the Iraqi ministries were actually used for. Lastly, the CPA did not maintain adequate documentation to support budget spend plans, cash distributions, or budget disbursements made by coalition forces.

Draft Report

~~For Official Use Only~~

Draft Report

~~For Official Use Only~~

- **Contract Controls.** The CPA did not adequately control contracting actions with DFI funds. Specifically, CPA senior advisors and staffs did not provide oversight of Iraqi Ministry procurements or contracting operations, and ministry senior advisors executed contracts that were not in compliance with Memorandum 4. This occurred because the CPA issued procurement and contracting policy, but did not implement any procedures to determine compliance with the policy or monitor contracting actions in the Iraqi ministries.

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 19, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:


We are writing about recent press reports that indicate \$8.8 billion in Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) money cannot be accounted for. The reports indicate that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was in charge of the money throughout the period in question, allocated the money to Iraqi ministries earlier this year, prior to the termination of the CPA. The CPA apparently transferred this staggering sum of money with no written rules or guidelines for ensuring adequate managerial, financial or contractual controls over the funds.


Among the disturbing findings are that the payrolls of the ministries, under CPA control, were reportedly padded with thousands of ghost employees. In one example, the report indicates that the CPA paid for 74,000 guards even though the actual number of guards couldn't be validated. In another example, 8,206 guards were listed on a payroll, but only 603 real individuals could be counted. Such enormous discrepancies raise very serious questions about potential fraud, waste, and abuse.


The reports raise anew very serious questions about the quality of the CPA's oversight and accountability in the reconstruction of Iraq. Iraq is now a sovereign nation, but it is clear that the United States will continue to play a major role in the country's reconstruction. It is therefore imperative that the U.S. government exercise careful control and oversight over expenditures of taxpayer dollars. Continued failures to account for funds, such as the \$8.8 billion of concern here, or Halliburton's repeated failure to fully account for \$4.2 billion for logistical support in Iraq and Kuwait, and the refusal, so far, of the Pentagon to take corrective action are a disservice to the American taxpayer, the Iraqi people and to our men and women in uniform.

We are requesting a full, written account of the \$8.8 billion transferred earlier this year from the CPA to the Iraqi ministries, including the amount each ministry received and the way in which the ministry spent the money, as well as a date certain for when the Pentagon will finally install adequate managerial, financial and contractual controls over taxpayer dollars and DFI expenditures in Iraq. We look forward to hearing from your office in the next two weeks.

Sincerely,


Ron Wyden


Tom Harkin


Byron Dorgan

11-L-0559/OSD/039253

January 20, 2004

TO: Ambassador Van Galbraith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

Van—

I hope you have a good trip to Iraq. It sounds like a good idea to me.

Regards,

DHR:dh
012004-20

333

20 Jan 04

January 20, 2004

TO: Kiron Skinner
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Op-ed

I received a copy of your recent op-ed. An interesting thesis!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
01 1604-8

000.7

20 Jan 04

OSD 00836-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039255

January 20, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Articles on Warfare in Iraq

Iraq

Attached is an article a fellow named Lind wrote and Pete Schoomaker sent me.
Also attached is General Dempsey's response.

I would be curious to know what your response is.

Thanks—regards.

Attach.
Lind, William S. "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare" (undated)
BG Dempsey's Response to 4th Generation Warfare Article (undated)

DIIR:dh
012004-32

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

20 Jan 04

Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare

William S. Lind

Rather than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. The framework is the Four Generations of Modern War.

I developed the framework of the first three generations ("generation" is shorthand for dialectically qualitative shift) in the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps. Marines kept asking, "What will the Fourth Generation be like?", and I began to think about that. The result was the article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.

The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With the Treaty of Westphalia, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars - families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises - using many different means, not just armies and navies (two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue). Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves.

The First Generation of Modern War runs roughly from 1648 to 1860. This was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs from the fact that the battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian" - uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank - were products of the First Generation and are intended to reinforce the culture of order.

The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight (an 18th century's soldier's main objective was to desert), rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.

The problem ever since has been a growing contradiction between the military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of order that was once consistent with the environment in which it operated has become more and more at odds with it.

Second Generation warfare was one answer to this contradiction. Developed by the French Army during and after World War I, it sought a solution in mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The goal was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Centrally-controlled firepower was carefully synchronized, using detailed, specific plans and orders, for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, in a "conducted battle" where the commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.

Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. The focus was inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.

Second Generation warfare is relevant to us today because the United States Army and Marine Corps learned Second Generation warfare from the French during and after World War I. It remains the American way of war, as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq; to Americans, war means "putting steel on target." Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of most firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine's formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps' desert warfare training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is true at the Army's Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, "I don't know why I have to teach you all this old French crap, but I do."

Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare.

Third Generation warfare is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's rear and collapse him from the rear forward: instead of "close with and destroy," the motto is "bypass and collapse." In the defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where forces attempt to hold or advance a "line;" Third Generation warfare is non-linear.

Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process and method (in war games in the 19th Century, German junior officers were routinely given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders). Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but never the method ("Auftragstaktik").

Initiative is more important than obedience (mistakes are tolerated, so long as they come from too much initiative rather than too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in reality they had broken with the culture of order.

Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.

Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian West's oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war, invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army.

Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes) and a poisonous ideology of "multiculturalism," is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war - which is by far the most dangerous kind.

Where does the war in Iraq fit in this framework?

I suggest that the war we have seen thus far is merely a powder train leading to the magazine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a wide variety of Islamic non-state actors, directed at America and Americans (and local governments friendly to America) everywhere. The longer America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance that the magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all.

For almost two years, a small seminar has been meeting at my house to work on the question of how to fight Fourth Generation war. It is made up mostly of Marines, lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, with one Army officer, one National Guard tanker captain and one foreign officer. We figured somebody ought to be working on the most difficult question facing the U.S. armed forces, and nobody else seems to be.

The seminar recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the ideas it has come up with, and use this column to that end. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the whole task may be hopeless; state militaries may not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they do.

But for what they are worth, here are our thoughts to date:

If America had some Third Generation ground forces, capable of maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away with few casualties. To fight such battles we need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S. Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilometers.

Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions, but might some be open to a chivalric code governing how our war with them would be fought? It's worth exploring.

How U.S. forces conduct themselves after the battle may be as important in 4GW as how they fight the battle.

What the Marine Corps calls "cultural intelligence" is of vital importance in 4GW, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Marines seemed to grasp this much better than the U.S. Army.

What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces? The seminar thought minds were more important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. SOF understand this.

One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people.

Unfortunately, the American doctrine of "force protection" works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here's a quote from the minutes of the seminar:

There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate

with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives.

What "wins" at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 4GW is decided. Marlin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.

We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.

What can the U.S. military learn from cops? Our reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops; are we taking advantage of what they know?

One key to success in 4GW may be "losing to win." Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it is very difficult to recreate it. Here's another quote from the minutes of the seminar:

"The discussion concluded that while war against another state may be necessary one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the 'honors of war,' tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat 'civilized' so they can survive the war institutionally intact and then work for your side. This would be similar to 18th century notions of civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is always a serious mistake but one that Americans are prone to make. This is because the 'football mentality' we have developed since World War II works against us."

In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war between the forces of 4GW and Brave New World. The 4GW forces understand this, while the international elites that seek BNW do not. Another quote from the minutes:

"Osama bin Ladin, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security but it is also leadership by example. It may make it harder to separate (physically or psychologically) the 4GW leaders from their troops. It also makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their

followers. This contrasts dramatically with the BNW elites who are physically and psychologically separated (by a huge gap) from their followers (even the generals in most conventional armies are to a great extent separated from their men). The BNW elites are in many respects occupying the moral low ground but don't know it."

In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Italians in many ways were more effective than the Germans. The key to their success is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus, the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion as more effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines did not want to fight. What lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?

How would the Mafia do an occupation?

When we have a coalition, what if we let each country do what it does best, e.g., the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. firepower and logistics, maybe the Italians the occupation?

How could the Defense Department's concept of "Transformation" be redefined so as to come to grips with 4GW? If you read the current "Transformation Planning Guidance" put out by DOD, you find nothing in it on 4GW, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two wars we are now fighting. It is all oriented toward fighting other state armed forces that fight us symmetrically.

The seminar intends to continue working on this question of redefining "Transformation" (die Verwandlung?) so as to make it relevant to 4GW. However, for our December meeting, we have posed the following problem: It is Spring, 2004. The U.S. Marines are to relieve the Army in the occupation of Fallujah, perhaps Iraq's hottest hot spot (and one where the 82nd Airborne's tactics have been pouring gasoline on the fire). You are the commander of the Marine force taking over Fallujah. What do you do?

I'll let you know what we come up with.

Will Saddam's capture mark a turning point in the war in Iraq? Don't count on it. Few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam's capture may lead to a fractioning of the Baath Party, which would move us further toward a Fourth Generation situation where no one can recreate the state. It may also tell the Shiites that they no longer need America to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in their struggle for free elections.

If the U.S. Army used the capture of Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. But I don't think we'll that be smart. When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems nobody in the American military gets it.

Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General Mattis, commander of I MAR DIV, to ask his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of taking time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools. "Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation," Mattis said. "It doesn't give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead."

Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as General Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation warfare. He said in his missive, "Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the '4th Generation of War' intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say, 'Not really.'"

Well, that isn't quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel, but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just "the extension of politics by other means." And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces. When I am asked to recommend a good book describing what a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually suggest Barbara Tuchman's *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century*.

Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call "terrorism," are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.

As I have said before in this column, most of what we are facing in Iraq today is not yet Fourth Generation warfare, but a War of National Liberation, fought by people whose goal is to restore a Baathist state. But as that goal fades and those forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe. A good example is the advent of female suicide bombers; do

U.S. troops now start frisking every Moslem woman they encounter? The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.

General Mattis is correct that none of this is new. It is only new to state armed forces that were designed to fight other state armed forces. The fact that no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy reminds us that Clio has a sense of humor: history also teaches us that not all problems have solutions.

BG Dempsey's Response to 4th Generation Warfare Article

It's probably not possible for me to respond to this without sounding defensive. However, since it's important that we capture the right lessons from our experience in OIF-1, I'll give it a shot.

I completely agree that it is necessary we be prepared to fight both state and non-state actors. Whether this is some generational evolution or simply a variety of enemies using whatever they have at their disposal against us is a matter best left to academia.

Beyond that one point of agreement, I've got to push back on several of the other ideas in the essay:

1. "One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people." I assume that the idea here is that once they get to know us, they'll trust us. That is a significant oversimplification of a very complex issue. We meet with "the local people" constantly and at every level. We've learned that Arabs are very friendly but very private. The ones who are already inclined to support us will befriend us to a point, but they will want to keep us at arms length. Furthermore, no amount of "integration" will change the opinion of those who think ill of us for what we represent. HUMINT follows success not friendship. Prove that you can take the bad guys off the street, and HUMINT goes up. No question that cultural awareness is good and that we should avoid being seen as excessively provocative. Also no question, in my mind at least, that they expect us to be who and what we are--the best fighting force in the world. For now, and until their own security forces are fully functioning, they're looking to us for security not friendship. Finally, Arabs are not put off by our basing and force protection. They can be critical if we inconvenience them in their daily lives by impeding traffic and denying them access to parts of the city. Having Armies live on well-protected bases outside of cities makes perfect sense to them. Having Armies living inside their cities does not. We're accounting for that by setting up the enduring base camps on the periphery of the city.

2. "We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology." This is simply nonsense. As I've told our soldiers over here, they--not our weapons--are what terrifies the terrorist. We are visible proof that men and women, blacks and whites, Christians, Muslims, and Jews can work together toward a common goal. We fight for positive ideas like individual rights, diversity, and freedom. Our enemies fight for negative ideas like personal gain, exclusion, and oppression. We only become the "weaker party" when we forget that.

3. "Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, thereby creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generational forces." First of all, from our perspective the war in Iraq is succeeding. The rogue regime of Sadaam Hussein is gone. We are on the offensive against terrorism. We don't know what shape the future Iraq will take, but there is every reason to be hopeful that it will be better than the old Iraq. Time and money will influence the outcome in a way that was impossible when the Baath Party was in power. Second, the initial invasion didn't destroy the state. Sadaam Hussein destroyed the state through 25 years of nepotism, favoritism, corruption, and neglect. We have made and continue to make herculean efforts to improve the quality of life for Iraq's people, and they know it. From their perspective, admitting that we've improved their lives would incur a psychological debt, a debt they are unwilling to incur. So, they will continue to be openly critical of our efforts.

4. "When it comes to Fourth Generation War, it seems nobody in the American military gets it." An incredible statement. We have made frequent adaptations in very nearly every system and function of the Division, and I know every US Army Division has done the same. We have learned never to believe we are as good as we can be, and we remain aware that pride of "authorship" is probably the most dangerous enemy we face in this environment.

The forces that follow us will probably not find the Iraq they think they will find. It will either be better or it will be worse. As we have, they will have to adjust. If under Mr. Lind's influence they arrive with well-established and pre-conceived notions about how to operate, they will probably be wrong.

As I write, we're fighting three different "kinds" of enemy in Iraq: the former regime, terrorism, and organized crime. We're also fighting against the emergence of religious extremism--mostly radical Sunni religious extremism--that in the long run may be the most dangerous influence the new Iraq will face. Overarching all of this, we are in competition for the popular support of the Iraqi people. For now, we have it, but that popular support has a shelf life, and we are working hard to "buy time" so that we can reduce the enemy forces to a level where the new Iraqi security forces can handle them.

Finally, I appreciate all you are doing to get us thinking about our profession and how we operate.

V/R BG Marty Dempsey

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January 20, 2004

TO: Honorable John Lehman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Terrorism

Attached is a speech I gave on October 17, 1984. I would like you to read it. If you think it is worthwhile, you might want to send it to other members of the Commission. I particularly call your attention to pages 6 and 7, and the fact that the speech was given 20 years ago.

Thanks for your call on Sunday.

Warm regards,

Attach.
Rumsfeld, Donald. Speech given on the awarding of George Catlett Marshall Medal, October 17, 1984.

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P. 61

REMARKS OF

DONALD RUMSFELD

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
G.D. SEARLE & CO.

On the Awarding of

THE GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEDAL

Presented By

JOHN W. DIXON
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

OCTOBER 17, 1984
WASHINGTON, D.C.

11-L-0559/OSD/039268

John W. Dixon, Chairman, Council of Trustees
The Association of the United States Army.

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, please join me at the podium. I am going to read *the citation* for the George Catlett Marshall Medal:

To Donald Rumsfeld for selfless Service to the United States of America:

His many and varied contributions are in the tradition of that great American public servant whose memory is perpetuated by this Award. In his service to both the executive and legislative branches of the government, Mr. Rumsfeld's duties have been performed with dedication and devotion.

In 1962 following three years as a naval aviator he was elected to the United States Congress as a Representative from Illinois, where he served for seven years, resigning in 1969 to become a member of the President's cabinet. During the succeeding five years he served variously as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Assistant to the president, Counsellor to the President, Director of the Economic Stabilization Program, and as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

He was recalled to Washington for the transition to the Presidency of Mr. Ford and in October of 1974, was appointed Chief of Staff of the White House. The following year he became the 13th Secretary of Defense, a position he held until January 1977.

And as an aside, while Ambassador to NATO, our honoree gained a tremendous insight into the value of landpower in Europe, which was later transferred to provide full support for Army requirements when he did become Secretary of Defense.

After 1977, returning to private life as a businessman, Mr. Rumsfeld continued his commitment to the public good by service on the president's Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Japanese Relations, and as Chairman for the Committee for the Free World.

In November 1983, he, then again, answered his country's call as the president's Personal Representative for the Middle East, during the crisis there. His willingness to accept this nearly impossible task is indicative of his dedication to the principle of public service as the highest form of patriotic citizenship.

with admiration and respect, the Association of the United States Army presents the George Catlett Marshall Medal to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, presented in Washington, D.C., the 17th day of October, 1984.

**REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD
OCTOBER 17, 1984**

Chairman Dixon, as the Army group just sang, "I," too, "am proud to be an American," as I know everyone in this room is.

Secretary Stahr -- my friend of a great many years, former Secretary of the Army Marty Hoffman -- Secretary Jack Marsh, it's hard to believe we were elected to Congress so many years ago, with our offices just three doors away, back in the days of Carl Vinson, Judge Smith, and spittoons.

General Bernie Rogers, my respects to you for your superb service to our country and our Alliance. General John Wickham, for whom I developed the highest regard during our work together when I was in NATO, in the White House, in the Pentagon. John, I like your sign, "Landpower," and that's coming from a broken-down ex-Navy pilot. John, please give my regards to General Vessey, a person I worked closely with during my time as Middle East Envoy.

We have a man who has not been introduced this evening, and I would like to do so. He is one of the truly great European statesmen of our time. He is sitting down there with General Dutch Kerwin, his Excellency, Joseph Luns, former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Joseph Luns was also a yeoman of signals in the Royal Dutch Navy. It reminds me of the wonderful story about the Navy man who rose through the ranks, finally became Captain with his four stripes, and was assigned a battleship, one of the top "black-shoe" posts one can hold as a Naval officer. He was steaming around in the Atlantic and was called from his quarters to the bridge and told, "There's a light out there." The Captain told the yeoman of signals, "Signal them to bear starboard." Back came the signal from ahead saying, "Bear starboard yourself." Well, this Captain knew he was on a battleship, three football fields long, a floating city. He said, "Signal that light again to 'Bear starboard now'." But back came the signal, "Bear starboard now, yourself." So the Captain, feeling full of himself with his great, big battleship, said, "Signal again and tell them, 'Bear starboard, I am a battleship'." And back came the signal, "Bear starboard yourself, I am a lighthouse."

Well, Joseph Luns is truly a lighthouse for our Alliance.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by this award. Few men shine as bright in modern history as General Marshall -- his dedication, his character, his contributions to freedom. He was truly a mighty warrior and a man of peace.

To be included among the distinguished group who have received this medal strengthens the gratitude I have always felt for the opportunity to serve, and for the privilege of serving **with** some of the most talented of our fellow citizens, the men and women, military and civilian, who keep the peace and defend freedom.

And Chairman John Dixon, I thank you for your introduction, even though it makes me sound like I can't hold **a job**. You know, an introduction like that makes it sound like you got up one morning and then just tripped from success to success. And it's **nice** to hear those things. The only problem is there are people in this room like former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, sitting down there -- Marty Hoffman and Jack Marsh who know the truth. They were with me all those years. And the truth really goes something like this.

I left the Navy, knocked on doors in Washington to **try to get a job**, was hired by a Congressman, managed two of his campaigns, and lost them both. I had an **0** and **2** record.

I remember when I was in Congress. I was young, thirty years old, and I was thrilled. I was ready to go out there to do **a job** for my country. I received in the mail a dissertation on Congressmen across the country. When I came to the section on the 13th District of Illinois, my District, **it** said:

"Now here is the exception that proves the rule. Rumsfeld is distinguished principally by his total lack of social, financial, and political standing in the community."

You laugh. At age 30, it wasn't so funny. I woke **up** my wife and said, "Listen to this, Joyce. This is terrible." She listened, looked at me, and said, "Yes, it is, Don." But go back to sleep because it's tough to argue with."

I bounced **from** that success to the Office of Economic Opportunity -- that was the "War on Poverty." It had been run by Sargent Shriver, the only American war run by **a** sergeant. It was tough. I came home one night, reached in the icebox for a beer, and there was **a** note that my wife, Joyce, always supportive and helpful, had taped up on the door of the icebox. It said:

"He tackled **a job** that couldn't be done, With **a** smile, he went right to it. He tackled **a job** that couldn't be done, and couldn't do **it**."

Well, I bounced back from that, and one day, George Shultz came into my office when he was Secretary of Treasury, and said, "Don, the President and I have decided that you should be in charge of the Wage-Price Controls for the United States of America." I said to George, "But I don't believe in them." He said, "I know, Don that's why we want you to do it."

That's when I learned the truth of that wonderful statement by H. L. Mencken that, "For every human problem, there's a solution that's simple, neat, and wrong." We found it.

So, John, as I listened to your introduction, I liked it, but from where I have been, it has seemed more like a roller coaster. In fact, your introduction reminded me of that comment by Speaker Sam Rayburn when he said:

"What are we doing sitting here weak and dumb, when for two drinks we could be strong and smart."

Knowing that I knew General Marshall only through the pages of history, and anticipating this evening, I thought about two friends of mine who worked with General Marshall. Ambassador Andre deStærcke, the unique and valued 25-year Dean of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, said that the extraordinary thing was the mature calm that General Marshall brought into every situation, a contagious calm. He recalled Winston Churchill observing that:

"In Marshall's heart, he had many shocks, but he never seemed surprised. That, if anyone could save us, it would be Marshall."

And John McCloy, that great statesman and your second Marshall medal honoree, said:

"Of all the people, great and near great, I have seen and known, he comes the closest to wearing the mantle of true military greatness and statesmanship. He was always a gentleman, as well as the commander."

Just as he was a mighty warrior, yet a man of peace, so, too, America strives for balance, for peace, and freedom through strength. And we do so in a very difficult world.

- Tens of thousands dead in the Iran/Iraq war,
- Well over 100,000 Soviet troops still in Afghanistan,
- Mine explosions in the Red Sea,
- Continued shellings and bombings in Lebanon,
- Terrorist attacks in Israel,
- Guerrilla war in Central America,

- Thousands of Vietnamese in Cambodia,
- Soviet missile deployments against Europe.

We see all of these, and more, in any given month on television and in the press. And all of this is to say nothing of the attacks on free world leaders we have seen in recent years -- President Reagan shot, President Sadat killed, the Pope wounded, the Korean Cabinet bombed, and, last week, Prime Minister Thatcher and her Cabinet attacked.

It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that ours is a dangerous world, a world in transition.

In assessing our world and our country's circumstance in it, several things stand out:

- We believe in freedom and we pray that others may enjoy it, but we know it is rare, it is precious, and its preservation is not automatic.
- We value our independence and believe in self-determination for others, but daily we see nations across the globe attempting to impose their will on their neighbors.
- We know ours is an interdependent world, and increasingly so, where what happens elsewhere from a political, economic or security standpoint, makes a great deal of difference to us here in the United States.
- It is a world where the relationships between nations are multifaceted -- political, economic, and security -- and that these aspects interact and impinge one on another in the minds of Parliaments, Presidents, and the people.
- It is a dynamic world. I was born in 1932, and in that year there was one superpower, Great Britain, and only 65 nations. Today there are more than 160 nations, and the Soviet Union probably has more troops in little Czechoslovakia than the entire British Army of the Rhine.
- We have seen technology evolve, communications and transportation are near instantaneous: and, given the power and reach of weapons today, it is clear that no portion of the globe is invulnerable, and that we no longer will have the luxury of leisurely preparation.

Recently, I was reminded of Churchill's phrase, "The Unnecessary War", when I read a Vermont Royster column in The Wall Street Journal. He wondered whether those born after World War II clearly see that it need not have happened, had so many in Poland; France, and Britain not ignored "the gathering storm", and, here in America, had more realized that those two great oceans had become ponds.

Those who prayed for peace were not more nor less moral, nor were those who marched in America to protest the horrors of war. But war came, because weakness invited it.

Those in Europe who laid down their arms, or had none, had peace. It was a peace of occupation and subjugation. And when war came, blame rightly fell on those in authority who had not maintained their strength and their freedom. There were debates. Some said, "Prepare." Others said, "No, it would be provocative." It's like that fable about the man, the boy, and the donkey walking down the street. People pointed and said, "Isn't it terrible that the strong man is riding the donkey and making the small boy walk?" So they changed places and people pointed and said, "Isn't that terrible, that strong young boy is riding the donkey and making the poor old man walk," So they both got on the donkey, the donkey came to the bridge, exhausted, fell into the river and drowned. And, of course, the moral of the story is, if you try to please everybody, you'll lose your donkey.

But I see reason for encouragement in the United States and elsewhere in the world. For, despite the cries to cut our defenses and for withdrawal and neutralism, those ideas are now under challenge, as they must be. There is a growing resistance to the idea that any human condition is acceptable, as long as it includes peace. We see more and more discussion and debate about our world and America's role in it which reflect perspective and realism.

One of the most significant events in my adult life has been the massive shift in power away from the United States to the Soviet Union. It is clear. And there is no question but that shift has injected fundamental instabilities into the world equation. That the instabilities we see in the world are increasing at the time when that shift in the balance of power has occurred is not mere coincidence.

At the Marshall Award seminar in April, Secretary Marsh pointed out that the types of possible conflict in the world today range from terrorism through guerilla war, conventional conflict to nuclear. A great deal of thinking is given to the risks at the nuclear end of the spectrum, as opposed to the probabilities at the lower end of the spectrum.

Certainly, the reality of terrorism and its urgency today is clear. **As** Middle East Envoy, one rubs up against that problem each day.

Several facts about terrorism have been dramatically brought home in recent years:

- First, as Lenin wrote with characteristic terseness, "The purpose of terrorism is to terrorize."
- Terrorism is growing. In the 30 days ending last week, it is estimated that there were 37 terrorist attacks, by 13 different organizations, against the property or citizens of **20** different countries.
- Increasingly, terrorism is not random nor the work of isolated madmen. Rather, it is state-sponsored, by nations using it as a central element of their foreign policy. State-sponsored terrorism is estimated to be eight times more lethal. In short, terrorism has **a** home.
- Terrorism is nothing more nor less than "the sustained clandestine use of force to achieve political purposes." It is a great equalizer, a force multiplier. It is cheap, deniable, yields substantial results, is low risk, and thus far, generally without penalty.
- And, terrorism works. **A** single attack by a small weak nation, by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations or force tribute from wealthy nations. Unchecked, state-sponsored terrorism is adversely changing the balance of power in our world.
- While security is important, terrorist attacks can take place at any time, any place, using any technique. Regrettably, it is not possible to defend every potential target in every place, at all times, against every form of attack. Defense has its limits and its costs.
- Terrorism is **a** form of warfare, and must be treated as such. **As** with other forms of conflict, weakness invites aggression. Simply standing in **a** defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. Terrorism must be deterred.

- As is abundantly clear, the principal targets of terrorism are the values and the interests of democratic nations, and particularly the United States of America.

- In my judgement, terrorism, even today, is dangerously underestimated.

There are ways to deter terrorism, not to stop all terrorism, or to eliminate all casualties, for casualties will continue at some level, but at least to deter the growth of terrorism. And, as a country, we best get about it.

Today there are two superpowers, the United States and the soviet Union. The Soviet Union is a superpower not because of the pervasiveness of its political ideology and certainly not because of the dynamism of its economy. It is a superpower purely and simply because of things, ships, guns, tanks, planes, missiles, raw military power, and the options and opportunities they provide.

There is a danger in becoming fascinated with the nuances, subtleties, and intricacies of foreign policy and diplomacy, and, in focusing on them, ignore that they are either underpinned with power or they are not. To the extent they are not, sovereignty is at the sufferance of others.

Today the Soviet Union is in a vastly different set of circumstances than was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Jack March and I were first running for Congress. 'As a result, we must conduct ourselves as a country in a manner that reflects the reality that we do not have an excess of power today. Our goal cannot be simply to manage a crisis or conflict brilliantly -- not with the power and reach of weapons today. Our goal must be to manage ourselves in a way that a crisis is less likely to occur. Given the narrower margin for error and the long lead times involved, we have to behave with a longsightedness, good sense, and willingness to invest before the fact, so that we assure our ability to contribute to peace and stability in the 1980's and 1990's.

Dr. Robert Tucker, in his article "In Defense of Containment," wrote that many today are calling for alternative policies to containment, and such calls are understandable. The alternatives are three, "confrontation, condominium, or withdrawal." While admitting the burdens of a policy of containment, staying power, steadiness of purpose, the disadvantages and burdens of each of the alternatives are vastly greater.

Indeed the record shows that containment, peace through strength, has permitted a measure of prosperity, progress and

stability that is truly remarkable, and it has been power, our deterrent strength, that has enabled America to be a nation of peace.

This, General Marshall knew and lived, for he was a man of peace.

As our leadership today, he sought a world of peaceful settlements, in which freedom and human rights are respected, a world of justice.

We seek a world where we will not read, as we did last week, of a family of five Czechoslovakians, attempting to swim the Mur River to freedom, three of whom drowned. I did not know them, but I understand and feel connected to them. Freedom is precious.

We recognize the value and uniqueness of an America -- where a Mung family, the Thaos from Laos, after being forced from their country, living in a refugee camp in Thailand for over two years, can come to the United States, receive help in settling, go to our schools, learn our language, find jobs, and become a part of America. I know this family. Joyce and I saw Vang Thao, age six or so, climb sleepily down from a TWA aircraft at midnight, with his family, at the last gate at O'Hare airport in Chicago, tattered, in need of medical attention, and carrying a badly battered teapot, one of the few possessions of the Thao family. And today, a few short years later, Vang is in school, speaking and writing English, in his words in a recent letter to us, "Getting A's and doing my best," grateful for the friendships he has found in America, enthusiastic about growing into young manhood, and optimistically looking forward in freedom and peace;

Over my years in public life, one question has recurred. I have been asked over and over again, "Where are the great leaders, Mr. Rumsfeld? Where are the giants today?"

I answer, "They are there, and they will be there when they are needed. Let there be no doubt."

And, I ask in return, "Don't you suppose in the 1920's and the 1930's people also asked, 'Where are the great leaders, where are the giants?'"

We now know where they were. They were people whose names we had never heard, who were being paid a few thousand dollars a year, posted in dry, unpleasant forts all across the country and the world, moving their families every few years, bringing their children up in difficult circumstances, stuck in the same rank for eight, ten, twelve years, neglected by Congress, and whose

patriotism, dedication, and service were at great cost to themselves and their families, and were essentially without appreciation by the American people, whom they served.

It was not until World War II, when the need was urgent, that the American people discovered that the great leaders were there. Imagine our cause's good fortune that individuals of such character, stature, leadership qualities, and dedication, rose out of that difficult, rigorous, and thankless environment.

And when the call came, there, among the anonymous group, was a Dwight Eisenhower, an Omar Bradley, a Patton, a McAuliffe, a MacArthur, a Taylor, a Grunther, a Lemnitzer, and an Abrams, and others.

What a wonderful thing it says about the military, about the United States Army. Despite all the hardships, the lack of support, of recognition, or even awareness, on the part of the American people, when the need came, they were there. Doesn't it tell us something about an institution that can attract, develop, foster, retain, encourage and motivate individuals of that size?

And yes, there was a George Marshall, the mighty warrior, the man of peace.

It is a tribute to the institution of the United States Army, it is a tribute to each of you who has served or is serving. You are truly a national asset, a blessing for the people of our country, for our values, our freedom, and for our best hopes and aspirations for the world.

Each of you can, as I am doing, look out across the sea of patriots here this evening and know that the giants are here, some in this room, and they will be there if needed.

You have my unbounded admiration for what you do, for how well you do it, and, most importantly, for why you do it. It is worth it, for those of us privileged to be Americans, **for** the world, for America truly is the standard of freedom, **for** that Czechoslovakian family swimming for freedom, **for** the Laotian family, the Thaos, and for the millions of Americans and the people across this globe who cherish freedom.

Thank you and God bless you.

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January 20, 2004

TO: Members of the Senior Level Review Group

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Terrorism

Attached are some remarks I made at the Association of the U.S. Army some 20 years ago, on October 17, 1984, that I thought might be of interest. I particularly call your attention to pages 6 through 9.

Regards,

Attach.

Rumsfeld, Donald. Speech given on the awarding of George Catlett Marshall Medal, October 17, 1984.

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Please respond by _____

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20 Jan 04

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REMARKS OF

DONALD RUMSFELD

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
G.D. SEARLE & CO.

On the Awarding of

THE GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEDAL

Presented By

JOHN W. DIXON
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

OCTOBER 17, 1984
WASHINGTON, D.C.

John W. Dixon, Chairman, Council of Trustees
The Association of the United States Army.

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, please join me at the podium. I am going to read the citation for the George Catlett Marshall Medal:

To Donald Rumsfeld for selfless service to the United States of America:

His many and varied contributions are in the tradition of that great American public servant whose memory is perpetuated by this Award. In his service to both the executive and legislative branches of the government, Mr. Rumsfeld's duties have been performed with dedication and devotion.

In 1962 following three years as a naval aviator he was elected to the United States Congress as a Representative from Illinois, where he served for seven years, resigning in 1969 to become a member of the President's cabinet. During the succeeding five years he served variously as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Assistant to the President, Counsellor to the President, Director of the Economic Stabilization Program, and as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

He was recalled to Washington for the transition to the Presidency of Mr. Ford and in October of 1974, was appointed Chief of Staff of the White House. The following year he became the 13th Secretary of Defense, a position he held until January 1977.

And as an aside, while Ambassador to NATO, our honoree gained a tremendous insight into the value of landpower in Europe, which was later transferred to provide full support for Army requirements when he did become Secretary of Defense.

After 1977, returning to private life as a businessman, Mr. Rumsfeld continued his commitment to the public good by service on the president's Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Japanese Relations, and as Chairman for the Committee for the Free World.

In November 1983, he, then again, answered his country's call as the president's Personal Representative for the Middle East, during the crisis there. His willingness to accept this nearly impossible task is indicative of his dedication to the principle of public service as the highest form of patriotic citizenship.

With admiration and respect, the Association of the United States Army presents the George Catlett Marshall Medal to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, presented in Washington, D.C., the 17th day of October, 1984.

**REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD
OCTOBER 17, 1984**

Chairman Dixon, as the Army group just sang, "I," too, "am proud to be an American," as I know everyone in this room is.

Secretary Stahr -- my friend of a great many years, former Secretary of the Army Marty Hoffman -- Secretary Jack Marsh, it's hard to believe we were elected to Congress so many years ago, with our offices just three doors away, back in the days of Carl Vinson, Judge Smith, and spittoons.

General Bernie Rogers, my respects to you for your superb service to our country and our Alliance. General John Wickham, for whom I developed the highest regard during our work together when I was in NATO, in the White House, in the Pentagon. John, I like your sign, "Landpower," and that's coming from a broken-down ex-Navy pilot. John, please give my regards to General Vessey, a person I worked closely with during my time as Middle East Envoy.

We have a man who has not been introduced this evening, and I would like to do so. He is one of the truly great European statesmen of our time. He is sitting down there with General Dutch Kerwin, his Excellency, Joseph Luns, former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Joseph Luns was also a yeoman of signals in the Royal Dutch Navy. It reminds me of the wonderful story about the Navy man who rose through the ranks, finally became Captain with his four stripes, and was assigned a battleship, one of the top "black-shoe" posts one can hold as a Naval officer. He was steaming around in the Atlantic and was called from his quarters to the bridge and told, "There's a light out there." The Captain told the yeoman of signals, "Signal them to bear starboard." Back came the signal from ahead saying, "Bear starboard yourself." Well, this Captain knew he was on a battleship, three football fields long, a floating city. He said, "Signal that light again to 'Bear starboard now'." But back came the signal, "Bear starboard now, yourself." So the Captain, feeling full of himself with his great, big battleship, said, "Signal again and tell them, 'Bear starboard, I am a battleship'." And back came the signal, "Bear starboard yourself, I am a lighthouse."

Well, Joseph Luns is truly a lighthouse for our Alliance.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by this award. Few men shine as bright in modern history as General Marshall -- his dedication, his character, his contributions to freedom. He was truly a mighty warrior and a man of peace.

To be included among the distinguished group who have received this medal strengthens the gratitude I have always felt for the opportunity to serve, and for the privilege of serving with some of the most talented of our fellow citizens, the men and women, military and civilian, who keep the peace and defend freedom.

And Chairman John Dixon, I thank you for your introduction, even though it makes me sound like I can't hold a job. You know, an introduction like that makes it sound like you got up one morning and then just tripped from success to success. And it's nice to hear those things. The only problem is there are people in this room like former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, sitting down there -- Marty Hoffman and Jack Marsh who know the truth. They were with me all those years. And the truth really goes something like this.

I left the Navy, knocked on doors in Washington to try to get a job, was hired, by a Congressman, managed two of his campaigns, and lost them both. I had an 0 and 2 record.

I remember when I was in Congress. I was young, thirty years old, and I was thrilled. I was ready to go out there to do a job for my country. I received in the mail a dissertation on Congressmen across the country. When I came to the section on the 13th District of Illinois, my District, it said:

"Now here is the exception that proves the rule. Rumsfeld is distinguished principally by his total lack of social, financial, and political standing in the community."

You laugh. At age 30, it wasn't so funny. I woke up my wife and said, "Listen to this, Joyce. This is terrible." She listened, looked at me, and said, "Yes, it is, Don." But go back to sleep because it's tough to argue with."

I bounced from that success to the Office of Economic Opportunity -- that was the "War on Poverty." It had been run by Sargent Shriver, the only American war run by a sergeant. It was tough. I came home one night, reached in the icebox for a beer, and there was a note that my wife, Joyce, always supportive and helpful, had taped up on the door of the icebox. It said:

"He tackled a job that couldn't be done. With a smile, he went right to it. He tackled a job that couldn't be done, and couldn't do it."

Well, I bounced back from that, and one day, George Shultz came into my office when he was Secretary of Treasury, and said, "Don, the President and I have decided that you should be in charge of the Wage-Price Controls for the United States of America." I said to George, "But I don't believe in them." He said, "I know, Don that's why we want you to do it."

That's when I learned the truth of that wonderful statement by H. L. Mencken that, "For every human problem, there's a solution that's simple, neat, and wrong." We found it.

So, John, as I listened to your introduction, I liked it, but from where I have been, it has seemed more like a roller coaster. In fact, your introduction reminded me of that comment by Speaker Sam Rayburn when he said:

"What are we doing sitting here weak and dumb, when for two drinks we could be strong and smart."

Knowing that I knew General Marshall only through the pages of history, and anticipating this evening, I thought about two friends of mine who worked with General Marshall. Ambassador Andre deStaercke, the unique and valued 25-year Dean of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, said that the extraordinary thing was the nature calm that General Marshall brought into every situation, a contagious calm. He recalled Winston Churchill observing that:

"In Marshall's heart, he had many shocks, but he never seemed surprised. That, if anyone could save us, it would be Marshall."

And John McCloy, that great statesman and your second Marshall medal honoree, said:

"Of all the people, great and near great, I have seen and known, he comes the closest to wearing the mantle of true military greatness and statesmanship. He was always a gentleman, as well as the commander."

Just as he was a mighty warrior, yet a man of peace, so, too, America strives for balance, for peace, and freedom through strength. And we do so in a very difficult world.

- Tens of thousands dead in the Iran/Iraq war,
- Well over 100,000 Soviet troops still in Afghanistan,
- Mine explosions in the Red Sea,
- Continued shellings and bombings in Lebanon,
- Terrorist attacks in Israel,
- Guerrilla war in Central America,

- Thousands of Vietnamese in Cambodia,
- Soviet missile deployments against Europe.

We see all of these, and more, in any given month on television and in the press. And all of this is to say nothing of the attacks on free world leaders we have seen in recent years -- president Reagan shot, President Ceausescu killed, the Pope wounded, the Korean Cabinet bombed, and, last week, Prime Minister Thatcher and her Cabinet attacked.

It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that ours is a dangerous world, a world in transition.

In assessing our world and our country's circumstance in it, several things stand out:

- We believe in freedom and we pray that others may enjoy it, but we know it is rare, it is precious, and its preservation is not automatic.
- We value our independence and believe in self-determination for others, but daily we see nations across the globe attempting to impose their will on their neighbors.
- We know ours is an interdependent world, and increasingly so, where what happens elsewhere from a political, economic or security standpoint, makes a great deal of difference to us here in the United States.
- It is a world where the relationships between nations are multifaceted -- political, economic, and security -- and that these aspects interact and impinge one on another in the minds of Parliaments, Presidents, and the people.
- It is a dynamic world. I was born in 1932, and in that year there was one superpower, Great Britain, and only 65 nations. Today there are more than 160 nations, and the Soviet Union probably has more troops in little Czechoslovakia than the entire British Army of the Rhine.
- We have seen technology evolve, communications and transportation are near instantaneous; and, given the power and reach of weapons today, it is clear that no portion of the globe is invulnerable, and that we no longer will have the luxury of leisurely preparation.

Recently, I was reminded of Churchill's phrase, "The Unnecessary War", when I read a Vermont Royster column in The Wall Street Journal. He wondered whether those born after World War II clearly see that it need not have happened, had so many in Poland, France, and Britain not ignored "the gathering storm", and, here in America, had more realized that those two great oceans had become ponds.

Those who prayed for peace were not more nor less moral, nor were those who marched in America to protest the horrors of war. But war came, because weakness invited it.

Those in Europe who laid down their arms, or had none, had peace. It was a peace of occupation and subjugation. And when war came, blame rightly fell on those in authority who had not maintained their strength and their freedom. There were debates. Some said, "Prepare." Others said, "No, it would be provocative." It's like that fable about the man, the boy, and the donkey walking down the street. People pointed and said, "Isn't it terrible that the strong man is riding the donkey and making the small boy walk?" So they changed places and people pointed and said, "Isn't that terrible, that strong young boy is riding the donkey and making the poor old man walk." So they both got on the donkey, the donkey came to the bridge, exhausted, fell into the river and drowned. And, of course, the moral of the story is, if you try to please everybody, you'll lose your donkey.

But I see reason for encouragement in the United States and elsewhere in the world. For, despite the cries to cut our defenses and for withdrawal and neutralism, those ideas are now under challenge, as they must be. There is a growing resistance to the idea that any human condition is acceptable, as long as it includes peace. We see more and more discussion and debate about our world and America's role in it which reflect perspective and realism.

One of the most significant events in my adult life has been the massive shift in power away from the United States to the Soviet Union. It is clear. And there is no question but that shift has injected fundamental instabilities into the world equation. That the instabilities we see in the world are increasing at the time when that shift in the balance of power has occurred is not mere coincidence.

At the Marshall Award seminar in April, Secretary Marsh pointed out that the types of possible conflict in the world today range from terrorism through guerilla war, conventional conflict to nuclear. A great deal of thinking is given to the risks at the nuclear end of the spectrum, as opposed to the probabilities at the lower end of the spectrum.

Certainly, the reality of terrorism and its urgency today is clear. As Middle East Envoy, one rubs up against that problem each day.

Several facts about terrorism have been dramatically brought home in recent years:

- First, as Lenin wrote with characteristic terseness, "The purpose **of** terrorism is to **terrorize**."
- Terrorism is growing. In the 30 days ending last week, it is estimated that there were 37 terrorist attacks, by 13 different organizations, against the property or citizens of 20 different countries.
- Increasingly, terrorism is not random nor the work of isolated madmen. Rather, it is state-sponsored, by nations using it as a central element of their foreign policy. State-sponsored terrorism is estimated to be eight times more lethal. In short, terrorism has a home.
- Terrorism is nothing more nor **less** than "the sustained clandestine use of force to achieve political purposes." **It** is a great equalizer, a force multiplier. It is cheap, deniable, yields substantial results, is low risk, and thus far, generally without penalty.
- And, terrorism **works**. A single attack by a small weak nation, by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations or force tribute **from** wealthy nations. Unchecked, state-sponsored terrorism is adversely changing the balance of power in **our** world.
- While security is important, terrorist attacks can take place at any time, any place, using any technique. Regrettably, it is not possible to defend every potential target in every place, at all times, against every **form** of attack. Defense has its limits and its costs.
- Terrorism is **a** form of warfare, and must be treated as **such**. As with other forms of conflict, **weakness** invites aggression. Simply standing in **a** defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. Terrorism must be deterred.

- As is abundantly clear, the principal targets of terrorism are the values and the interests of democratic nations, and particularly the United States of America.'

- In my judgement, terrorism, even today, is dangerously underestimated.

There are ways to deter terrorism, not to stop all terrorism, or to eliminate all casualties, for casualties will continue at some level, but at least to deter the growth of terrorism. And, as a country, we best get about it.

Today there are two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is a superpower not because of the pervasiveness of its political ideology and certainly not because of the dynamism of its economy. It is a superpower purely and simply because of things, ships, guns, tanks, planes, missiles, raw military power, and the options and opportunities they provide.

There is a danger in becoming fascinated with the nuances, subtleties, and intricacies of foreign policy and diplomacy, and, in focusing on them, ignore that they are either underpinned with power or they are not. To the extent they are not, sovereignty is at the sufferance of others.

Today the Soviet Union is in a vastly different set of circumstances than was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Jack March and I were first running for Congress. 'As a result, we must conduct ourselves as a country in a manner that reflects the reality that we do not have an excess of power today. Our goal cannot be simply to manage a crisis or conflict brilliantly -- not with the power and reach of weapons today. Our goal must be to manage ourselves in a way that a crisis is less likely to occur. Given the narrower margin for error and the long lead times involved, we have to behave with a longsightedness, good sense, and willingness to invest before the fact, so that we assure our ability to contribute to peace and stability in the 1980's and 1990's.

Dr. Robert Tucker, in his article "In Defense of Containment," wrote that many today are calling for alternative policies to containment, and such calls are understandable. The alternatives are three, "confrontation, condominium, or withdrawal." While admitting the burdens of a policy of containment, staying power, steadiness of purpose, the disadvantages and burdens of each of the alternatives are vastly greater.

Indeed the record shows that containment, peace through strength, has permitted a measure of prosperity, progress and

stability that is truly remarkable, and it has been power, our deterrent strength, that has enabled America to be a nation of peace.

This, General Marshall knew and lived, for he was a man of peace.

As our leadership today, he sought a world of peaceful settlements, in which freedom and human rights are respected, a world of justice.

We seek a world where we will not read, as we did last week, of a family of five Czechoslovakians, attempting to swim the Mur River to freedom, three of whom drowned. I did not know them, but I understand and feel connected to them. Freedom is precious.

We recognize the value and uniqueness of an America -- where a Mung family, the Thaos from Laos, after being forced from their country, living in a refugee camp in Thailand for over two years, can come to the United States, receive help in settling, go to our schools, learn our language, find jobs, and become a part of America. I know this family. Joyce and I saw Vang Thao, age six or so, climb sleepily down from a TWA aircraft at midnight, with his family, at the last gate at O'Hare airport in Chicago, tattered, in need of medical attention, and carrying a badly battered teapot, one of the few possessions of the Thao family. And today, a few short years later, Vang is in school, speaking and writing English, in his words in a recent letter to us, "Getting A's and doing my best," grateful for the friendships he has found in America, enthusiastic about growing into young manhood, and optimistically looking forward in freedom and peace.

Over my years in public life, one question has recurred. I have been asked over and over again, "Where are the great leaders, Mr. Rumsfeld? Where are the giants today?"

I answer, "They are there, and they will be there when they are needed. Let there be no doubt."

And, I ask in return, "Don't you suppose in the 1920's and the 1930's people also asked, 'Where are the great leaders, where are the giants?'"

We now know where they were. They were people whose names we had never heard, who were being paid a few thousand dollars a year, posted in dry, unpleasant forts all across the country and the world, moving their families every few years, bringing their children up in difficult circumstances, stuck in the same rank for eight, ten, twelve years, neglected by Congress, and whose

patriotism, dedication, and service were at great cost to themselves and their families, and were essentially without., appreciation by the American people, whom they served.

It was not until World War 11, when the need was urgent, that the American people discovered that the great leaders were there. Imagine our cause's good fortune that individuals of such character, stature, leadership qualities, and dedication, rose out of that difficult, rigorous, and thankless environment.

And when the call came, there, among the anonymous group, was a Dwight Eisenhower, an Omar Bradley, a Patton, a McAuliffe, a MacArthur, a Taylor, a Grunther, a Lemnitzer, and an Abrams, and' others.

What a wonderful thing it says about the military, about the United States Army. Despite all the hardships, the lack of support, of recognition, or even awareness, on the part of the American people, when the need came, they were there. Doesn't it tell us something about an institution that can attract, develop, foster, retain, encourage and motivate individuals of that size?

And yes, there was a George Marshall, the mighty warrior, the man of peace.

It is a tribute to the institution of the United States Army, it is a tribute to each of you who has served or is serving. You are truly a national asset, a blessing for the people of our country, for our values, our freedom, and for our best hopes and aspirations for the world.

Each of you can, as I am doing, look out across the sea of patriots here this evening and know that the giants are here, some in this room, and they will be there if needed.

You have my unbounded admiration for what you do, for how well you do it, ana, most importantly, for why you do it. It is worth it, for those of us privileged to be Americans, for the world, for America truly is the standard of freedom, for that Czechoslovakian family swimming for freedom, for the Laotian family, the Thaos, and for the millions of Americans and the, ... people across this globe who cherish freedom.

Thank you and God bless you.

January 21, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iraq—the Continuing Debate

Mr. President—

General Schoomaker sent me the attached two papers. One is written by William Lind, who is critical and concerned. Also attached is a response to Lind's concerns by General Dempsey, our division commander in the Baghdad area.

It struck me that you might like to see the discussion that is taking place among Army thinkers.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

Lind, William S. "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare" (undated)
BG Dempsey's Response to 4th Generation Warfare Article (undated)

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Iraq

21 Jan 04

Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare

William S. Lind

Rather than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. The framework is the Four Generations of Modern War.

I developed the framework of the first three generations ("generation" is shorthand for dialectically qualitative shift) in the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps. Marines kept asking, "What will the Fourth Generation be like?", and I began to think about that. The result was the article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.

The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With the Treaty of Westphalia, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars - families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises - using many different means, not just armies and navies (two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue). Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves.

The First Generation of Modern War runs roughly from 1648 to 1860. This was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs from the fact that the battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian" - uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank - were products of the First Generation and are intended to reinforce the culture of order.

The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight (an 18th century's soldier's main objective was to desert), rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.

The problem ever since has been a growing contradiction between the military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of order that was once consistent with the environment in which it operated has become more and more at odds with it.

Second Generation warfare was one answer to this contradiction. Developed by the French Army during and after World War I, it sought a solution in mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The goal was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Centrally-controlled firepower was carefully synchronized, using detailed, specific plans and orders, for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, in a "conducted battle" where the commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.

Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. The focus was inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.

Second Generation warfare is relevant to us today because the United States Army and Marine Corps learned Second Generation warfare from the French during and after World War I. It remains the American way of war, as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq: to Americans, war means "putting steel on target." Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of most firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine's formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps' desert warfare training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is true at the Army's Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, "I don't know why I have to teach you all this old French crap, but I do."

Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare.

Third Generation warfare is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's rear and collapse him from the rear forward: instead of "close with and destroy," the motto is "bypass and collapse." In the defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where forces attempt to hold or advance a "line;" Third Generation warfare is non-linear.

Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process and method (in war games in the 19th Century, German junior officers were routinely given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders). Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but never the method ("Auftragstaktik").

Initiative is more important than obedience (mistakes are tolerated, so long as they come from too much initiative rather than too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in reality they had broken with the culture of order.

Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.

Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian West's oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war, invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army.

Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes) and a poisonous ideology of "multiculturalism," is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war - which is by far the most dangerous kind.

Where does the war in Iraq fit in this framework?

I suggest that the war we have seen thus far is merely a powder train leading to the magazine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a wide variety of Islamic non-state actors, directed at America and Americans (and local governments friendly to America) everywhere. The longer America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance that the magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all.

For almost two years, a small seminar has been meeting at my house to work on the question of how to fight Fourth Generation war. It is made up mostly of Marines, lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, with one Army officer, one National Guard tanker captain and one foreign officer. We figured somebody ought to be working on the most difficult question facing the U.S. armed forces, and nobody else seems to be.

The seminar recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the ideas it has come up with, and use this column to that end. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the whole task may be hopeless; state militaries may not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they do.

But for what they are worth, here are our thoughts to date:

If America had some Third Generation ground forces, capable of maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away with few casualties. To fight such battles we need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S. Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilometers.

Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions, but might some be open to a chivalric code governing how our war with them would be fought? It's worth exploring.

How U.S. forces conduct themselves after the battle may be as important in 4GW as how they fight the battle.

What the Marine Corps calls "cultural intelligence" is of vital importance in 4GW, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Marines seemed to grasp this much better than the U.S. Army.

What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces? The seminar thought minds were more important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. SOF understand this.

One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people.

Unfortunately, the American doctrine of "force protection" works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here's a quote from the minutes of the seminar:

There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate

with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives.

What "wins" at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 4GW is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.

We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.

What can the U.S. military learn from cops? Our reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops; are we taking advantage of what they know?

One key to success in 4GW may be "losing to win." Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it is very difficult to recreate it. Here's another quote from the minutes of the seminar:

"The discussion concluded that while war against another state may be necessary one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the 'honors of war,' tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat 'civilized' so they can survive the war institutionally intact and then work for your side. This would be similar to 18th century notions of civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is always a serious mistake but one that Americans are prone to make. This is because the 'football mentality' we have developed since World War II works against us."

In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war between the forces of 4GW and Brave New World. The 4GW forces understand this, while the international elites that seek BNW do not. Another quote from the minutes:

"Osama bin Ladin, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security but it is also leadership by example. It may make it harder to separate (physically or psychologically) the 4GW leaders from their troops. It also makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their

followers. This contrasts dramatically with the BNW elites who are physically and psychologically separated (by a huge gap) from their followers (even the generals in most conventional armies are to a great extent separated from their men). The BNW elites are in many respects occupying the moral low ground but don't know it."

In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Italians in many ways were more effective than the Germans. The key to their success is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus, the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion as more effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines did not want to fight. What lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?

How would the Mafia do an occupation?

When we have a coalition, what if we let each country do what it does best, e.g., the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. firepower and logistics, maybe the Italians the occupation?

How could the Defense Department's concept of "Transformation" be redefined so as to come to grips with 4GW? If you read the current "Transformation Planning Guidance" put out by DOD, you find nothing in it on 4GW, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two wars we are now fighting. It is all oriented toward fighting other state armed forces that fight us symmetrically.

The seminar intends to continue working on this question of redefining "Transformation" (die Verwandlung?) so as to make it relevant to 4GW. However, for our December meeting, we have posed the following problem: It is Spring, 2004. The U.S. Marines are to relieve the Army in the occupation of Fallujah, perhaps Iraq's hottest hot spot (and one where the 82nd Airborne's tactics have been pouring gasoline on the fire). You are the commander of the Marine force taking over Fallujah. What do you do?

I'll let you know what we come up with.

Will Saddam's capture mark a turning point in the war in Iraq? Don't count on it. Few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam's capture may lead to a fractioning of the Baath Party, which would move us further toward a Fourth Generation situation where no one can recreate the state. It may also tell the Shiites that they no longer need America to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in their struggle for free elections.

If the U.S. Army used the capture of Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. But I don't think we'll that be smart. When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems nobody in the American military gets it.

Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General Mattis, commander of I MAR DIV, to ask his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of taking time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools. "Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation," Mattis said. "It doesn't give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead."

Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as General Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation warfare. He said in his missive, "Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the '4th Generation of War' intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say, 'Not really.'"

Well, that isn't quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel, but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just "the extension of politics by other means." And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces. When I am asked to recommend a good book describing what a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually suggest Barbara Tuchman's *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century*.

Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call "terrorism," are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.

As I have said before in this column, most of what we are facing in Iraq today is not yet Fourth Generation warfare, but a War of National Liberation, fought by people whose goal is to restore a Baathist state. But as that goal fades and those forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe. A good example is the advent of female suicide bombers; do

U.S. troops now start frisking every Moslem woman they encounter? The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.

General Mattis is correct that none of this is new. It is only new to state armed forces that were designed to fight other state armed forces. The fact that no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy reminds us that Clio has a sense of humor: history also teaches us that not all problems have solutions.

BG Dempsey's Response to 4th Generation Warfare Article

It's probably not possible for me to respond to this without sounding defensive. However, since it's important that we capture the right lessons from our experience in OIF-1, I'll give it a shot.

I completely agree that it is necessary we be prepared to fight both state and non-state actors. Whether this is some generational evolution or simply a variety of enemies using whatever they have at their disposal against us is a matter best left to academia.

Beyond that one point of agreement, I've got to push back on several of the other ideas in the essay:

1. "One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people." I assume that the idea here is that once they get to know us, they'll trust us. That is a significant oversimplification of a very complex issue. We meet with "the local people" constantly and at every level. We've learned that Arabs are very friendly but very private. The ones who are already inclined to support us will befriend us to a point, but they will want to keep us at arms length. Furthermore, no amount of "integration" will change the opinion of those who think ill of us for what we represent. HUMINT follows success not friendship. Prove that you can take the bad guys off the street, and HUMINT goes up. No question that cultural awareness is good and that we should avoid being seen as excessively provocative. Also no question, in my mind at least, that they expect us to be who and what we are--the best fighting force in the world. For now, and until their own security forces are fully functioning, they're looking to us for security not friendship. Finally, Arabs are not put off by our basing and force protection. They can be critical if we inconvenience them in their daily lives by impeding traffic and denying them access to parts of the city. Having Armies live on well-protected bases outside of cities makes perfect sense to them. Having Armies living inside their cities does not. We're accounting for that by setting up the enduring base camps on the periphery of the city.

2. "We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology." This is simply nonsense. As I've told our soldiers over here, they--not our weapons--are what terrifies the terrorist. We are visible proof that men and women, blacks and whites, Christians, Muslims, and Jews can work together toward a common goal. We fight for positive ideas like individual rights, diversity, and freedom. Our enemies fight for negative ideas like personal gain, exclusion, and oppression. We only become the "weaker party" when we forget that.

3. "Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, thereby creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generational forces." First of all, from our perspective the war in Iraq is succeeding. The rogue regime of Sadaam Hussein is gone. We are on the offensive against terrorism. We don't know what shape the future Iraq will take, but there is every reason to be hopeful that it will be better than the old Iraq. Time and money will influence the outcome in a way that was impossible when the Baath Party was in power. Second, the initial invasion didn't destroy the state. Sadaam Hussein destroyed the state through 25 years of nepotism, favoritism, corruption, and neglect. We have made and continue to make herculean efforts to improve the quality of life for Iraq's people, and they know it. From their perspective, admitting that we've improved their lives would incur a psychological debt, a debt they are unwilling to incur. So, they will continue to be openly critical of our efforts.

4. "When it comes to Fourth Generation War, it seems nobody in the American military gets it." An incredible statement. We have made frequent adaptations in very nearly every system and function of the Division, and I know every US Army Division has done the same. We have learned never to believe we are as good as we can be, and we remain aware that pride of "authorship" is probably the most dangerous enemy we face in this environment.

The forces that follow us will probably not find the Iraq they think they will find. It will either be better or it will be worse. As we have, they will have to adjust. If under Mr. Lind's influence they arrive with well-established and pre-conceived notions about how to operate, they will probably be wrong.

As I write, we're fighting three different "kinds" of enemy in Iraq: the former regime, terrorism, and organized crime. We're also fighting against the emergence of religious extremism--mostly radical Sunni religious extremism--that in the long run may be the most dangerous influence the new Iraq will face. Overarching all of this, we are in competition for the popular support of the Iraqi people. For now, we have it, but that popular support has a shelf life, and we are working hard to "buy time" so that we can reduce the enemy forces to a level where the new Iraqi security forces can handle them.

Finally, I appreciate all you are doing to get us thinking about our profession and how we operate.

V/R BG Marty Dempsey

7201

63



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000**

201 JAN 22 PM 1:26

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

January 15, 2004, 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. ~~Chen~~ USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chen

SUBJECT: SLRG -- SNOWFLAKE

We will be pleased to provide this to you monthly, focusing on recruiting, retention, spouses' attitudes, etc. We will provide the first report one week before your 3 February testimony.

In addition, we are preparing charts for your Congressional testimony on

- Recruiting and retention
- Numbers of reserves and guard called up, and the percentage this represents of the guard and reserves
- The half to one million dollars that people receive after retirement, and the composition of this package of benefits.

Prepared By: Jeanne B. Fites, DUSD(PI), (b)(6)



TAB

7:57 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

658

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT Force Rotation

We need to take a look at force rotation over a couple of years in Iraq and worldwide and see what it adds up to.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010804.06

Please respond by:

1/15/04 1/15/04

OSD 01011-04

Tab



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 JAN 22 11:11:01

CM-1483-04

22 January 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

SUBJECT: Force Rotation


- **Question.** "We need to take a look at force rotation over a couple of years in Iraq and worldwide and see what it adds up to." (TAB)
- **Answer.** The Joint Staff will host a combatant command and Service general and flag officer seminar, ELABORATE CROSSBOW IV, on 4 - 5 February 2004. The purpose of the effort is twofold: to establish and implement a recurring Global Force Management process and to address joint sourcing options for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM 3, ENDURING FREEDOM VI and other global commitments through FY 2006. A decision brief based on ELABORATE CROSSBOW IV results is tentatively scheduled for a mid-February presentation to you.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8;





UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

January 12, 2004, 1:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu
12 Jan 04

SUBJECT: Ft. Bragg Troop Visit - Snowflake

- Mrs. Marissa Huggins, widow of Staff Sergeant Jamie L. Huggins USA, relayed that she did not receive a rebate of \$750.00 offered by GM for the purchase of a vehicle for anyone on active duty in Afghanistan or Iraq.
- Staff Sergeant Huggins was killed in Iraq on 26 October 2003.
- Mrs. Huggins purchased a 2004 Chevrolet Tahoe on 29 November 2003.
- The automobile purchase is not related to any DoD or overseas auto sales programs.
- The GM rebate program is only applicable to active duty personnel and not transferable to other family members. The rebate program did not consider the "surviving spouse" issue.
- After consultation with Mrs. Huggins' casualty assistance officer, the automobile dealership and Automotive Information Systems, Inc. (rebate program coordinator) approved the \$750.00 rebate for Mrs Huggins.
- We will speak to her casualty assistance officer again in thirty days to confirm that she did receive the rebate.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: Mark Ward, OFF, ODUSD(MC&FP),

(b)(6)

Mark Ward
1/16/04



PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

C&A 1-21-04

MCFP
per PO
JBL
24 Dec

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December ²³~~18~~, 2003
SUBJECT: **Ft. Bragg Troop Visit**

Please talk to General Motors. Find out what their policy is. We were told by the widow of a soldier killed in OIF that GM gives a \$750 rebate on the purchase of a GM vehicle for anyone on active duty in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Her husband was wounded and died two weeks before their car purchase. She did not get the rebate. See if you can figure out what the policy is. We will want to get back to her. at some point. I believe her name is Melissa Huggins.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
121903.02tscorn

Please respond by: _____ 1/10/04

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 30, 2004

2005 JAN 13 PM 4: 07

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we look at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, **was** involved in, but we should also **look** at other activities that the Boeing person who pled guilty was involved in.

We have a responsibility to **look** out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact that each **of** them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We know they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 01028-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039309



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2005 January 13, 2005 12:55 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun (Final Response to Your Memo of November 30, 2004)

- Your Memo (Tab A) asked if Darleen Druyun or Michael Sears, both of whom have pled guilty to criminal charges, committed any other "crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged." This Memo supplements my December 1, 2004 Info Memo (Tab B), and my Deputy's January 6, 2005, Memo to your Special Assistant (Tab C).
- Although Sears' recent polygraph examination identified no further criminal activity by Sears, Boeing, Druyun or any other DoD officials, my staff continues to cooperate with Department of Justice prosecutors and others regarding potential civil litigation associated with Druyun and Sears, which activities may well uncover additional facts responsive to your 30 November Memo.
- Earlier this week, I had constructive meetings with both Senator McCain's staff and Senator Grassley's staff regarding Boeing and Druyun. Senator Grassley's staff provided me with a 1993 letter from Senator Grassley objecting to a purported Air Force exoneration and promotion of Druyun "one month after the [DoD] Inspector General recommended that she be disciplined for improper or illegal behavior" (Tab D), in response to which the Undersecretary of Defense at the time wrote to Senator Grassley, "You may be assured that we would not retain Mrs. Druyun in her present position if we felt it would jeopardize the integrity of defense acquisition" (Tab E).
- Over the next ten years, the Air Force IG investigated Druyun five times but failed to substantiate any allegations. Most recently, the Air Force IG investigated Druyun for allegedly providing "inaccurate or misleading" information to Senator McCain's staff about the 767 Tanker proposal. My December 20, 2002, letter to Senator McCain (Tab F), reported the results of that Air Force IG investigation, concluding, "I continue to believe that Ms. Druyun's response to you should have been more forthcoming." In light of this conclusion, along with my Office's 1993 "factual allegations" against Druyun, I recommend that neither you nor any other DoD official suggest, as did Marvin Sambur last Wednesday on *60 Minutes*, that Druyun's reputation was "spotless."
- Finally, I have instructed my staff to continue coordinating and cooperating with the other two addressees of your 30 November Memo (Mike Wynne and Jim Haynes), as appropriate, as well as with the Defense Contract Management Agency in its ongoing review of Druyun-related contracts and programs to identify any other instances of potentially criminal activity not yet prosecuted.
- As an ancillary matter of "good news," based on Druyun's plea admission that she had negotiated inflated payments to Boeing in connection with an AWACS software upgrade contract, in December 2004 the Air Force definitized a portion of the contract at an approximate savings of \$6 million. Boeing subsequently agreed to repay an additional \$8.6 million in overcharges.

COORDINATION: None

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

Prepared by: Richard T. Race, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations,

(b)(6)

cc: DoD General Counsel
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

~~FOUO~~ ~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~ OSD 01028-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039310

TAB

A

November 30, 2004

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we look at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, was involved in, but we should also look at other activities that the Boeing person who pled guilty was involved in.

We have a responsibility to look out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact that each of them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We know they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

TAB

B



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 222024704

INFO MEMO

December 1, 2004 5:30 pm

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Boeing Suspension Regarding the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program

- After you suggested yesterday that we should be looking not only at Department of Defense contracts that might have been tainted by Darleen A. Druyun but also by any other "criminals" associated with Ms. Druyun, the General Counsel volunteered that The Boeing Company, Incorporated, (Boeing) has also been "partially debarred" from government contracting as a result of criminal allegations. Attached, for your convenience, is a brief description of this matter, which was included with my October 8, 2003, Quarterly Update to you.
- Following is a brief summary of my Office's involvement in that matter. Even before receiving your "snowflake" of yesterday, I had already instructed my staff to share whatever information we can with the Acting Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L), who agreed yesterday to address your concerns about contracts tainted by any other "criminals" associated with Ms. Druyun.
- Since September 5, 2002, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, jointly with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Inspector General, have been investigating allegations that Boeing used Lockheed Martin Corporation's proprietary documents to successfully bid on Air Force contracts for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. On July 24, 2003, the Air Force suspended (a temporary measure short of debarment) three Boeing divisions and three former Boeing employees from government contracting. The affected Boeing divisions are the Launch Systems Division, Chicago, IL; Boeing Launch Services, Chicago, IL; and the Delta Programs Division, Huntington Beach, CA. To date, the divisions are still under suspension, and the investigation continues.
- I will respond more fully to your "snowflake" within the time you requested (1/13/05).

Attachment: As stated.

cc: Acting USD (AT&L); General Counsel

Prepared By: Charles W. Beardall, Acting Deputy Inspector General,

(b)(6)

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~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039314

OSD 19325-04

TAB


C



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

FOR: Mr. Paul W. Butler, The Special Assistant to the SECDEF

FROM: Mr. Richard T. Race, First Assistant to the Inspector General  JAN 6 2005

SUBJECT: OIG Actions Regarding USAF KC-767/Boeing Matter

- On September 16, 2004, the Secretary of Defense transferred responsibility for the ongoing production of documents concerning the KC-767A Tanker Aircraft Program for the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. The collection of documents is estimated at 1 million unclassified pages and 100,000 classified pages. To date, approximately 72,466 pages comprised of 11,753 unclassified documents have been provided to the SASC.
- In a letter dated May 3, 2002 we responded to Senator McCain's request to "assess the Air Force's decision in selecting the Boeing 767 rather than the Airbus A330 for its air refueling tankers."
- In a separate letter, also dated May 3, 2002 we responded to Senator McCain's request for data on the Air Force's contractual arrangement with investment entities concerning the Boeing KC-767A lease that Air Force officials refused to provide him.
- August 29, 2003. We issued "Assessment of DoD Leasing Action" (D-2003-129) in response to a request from the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). The assessment reviewed "the decision process used by the Air Force and OSD to lease the Boeing 767 Tanker Aircraft and to assess whether DoD interaction with Congress following the Lease Decision Memorandum signed May 23, 2003, was timely and reasonable."
- March 29, 2004. We issued audit report, "Acquisition of Boeing KC-767A Tanker Aircraft" (D-2004-064) in response to request from the Deputy Secretary of Defense that addressed problems with the procurement and acquisition strategies for the program.
- December 15, 2004. We completed a review requested by the Secretary of Defense that assessed the processes and procedures used to collect the documents from January 2001 to the present. This review was provided to your office on December 23, 2004.
- Ongoing: Assessment to determine the key decisions that were/were not made by DoD acquisition officials concerning the execution of procurement and acquisition strategies for the Boeing 767A Tanker Aircraft acquisition program. This assessment should be complete by mid-February 2005.

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11-L-0559/OSD/039316

- Ongoing: Administrative investigation, at request of Senators Warner, Levin, and McCain, into allegations that Secretary Roche attempted to influence OMB on the 767 tanker lease by using his position and Government email when recommending the brother of an OMB official for employment at Northrop Grumman.
- Ongoing: Criminal investigative and prosecution actions regarding conspiracy by Ms. Druyun and Mr. Sears to violate conflict of interest statutes continue. Sentencing of Mr. Sears scheduled for February 18, 2005. Ms. Druyun reported for incarceration on January 3, 2005. Defense Criminal Investigative Service continues to assist the Department of Justice (DoJ) with the criminal investigation/prosecution and potential DoJ civil litigation.
- Ongoing: We provided an initial response on December 1, 2004 to the SECDEF's November 30, 2004 request to examine other DoD activities that Ms. Druyun and Mr. Sears were involved in. A final response is due NLT January 13, 2005.
- Also, in response to your November 30 2004 Memo, I have instructed my staff to thoroughly review the responses from my seven previous subpoenas relating to Boeing and Druyun (four subpoenas to Boeing and three subpoenas to three other contractors), with a view towards: (a) considering additional subpoenas and/or expanding the scope of the ongoing criminal matter to include, as you wrote in your Memo, "crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged"; and (b) to the extent permissible, considering ongoing activities of the two other addressees of your 30 November Memo (Mike Wynne and Jim Haynes) "with a view toward avoiding duplication and ensuring effective coordination and cooperation" (IG Act, Section 8(c)(9)).

COORDINATION: None

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11-L-0559/OSD/039317

TAB

D

JAN. 12. 2005 10:07AM

(b)(6)

NO. 3429 P. 2/4

- 135 SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501
(202) 224-3744
TTY: (202) 224-4479
- 721 FEDERAL BUILDING
210 WALNUT STREET
DES MOINES, IA 50309-2140
(319) 284-4890
- 206 FEDERAL BUILDING
101 1st STREET SE
CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 52401-1227
(319) 383-8832

United States Senate

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501

May 5, 1993

(b)(6)

The Honorable Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon, Room 33880
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Les,

I am writing to praise your decision to hold four senior Air Force officials accountable for financial mismanagement on the C-17 contract and to raise two questions about Ms. Darleen Druyun.

First, I would like to commend you for taking this decisive step. You have sent a clear, unambiguous signal of zero tolerance toward dishonesty in the department's acquisition process. This is the best kind of deterrent to future failures of discipline and integrity. You deserve a lot of credit for having the courage to do what had to be done.

Second, I am somewhat baffled by the complete omission of Ms. Druyun's name from available documents bearing on your decision in this important matter.

The Inspector General has suggested that Ms. Druyun may have engaged in either improper or illegal conduct in connection with C-17 progress payment number 97 that resulted in a potential violation of the Antideficiency Act and other statutes. For these reasons, the Inspector General recommended that disciplinary action be taken against her and four other senior officials. You chose to discipline the four other officials but not her. Why did you decide not to punish Ms. Druyun?

Ms. Druyun presently occupies a key position in the "acquisition management area." She is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. She was placed in this position in February 1993 - one month after the Inspector General recommended that she be disciplined for improper or illegal behavior.

In view of your decision to banish Generals Barry and Nauseef and Mr. Hixenbaugh from the "acquisition management area" and in view of the fact that the Inspector General has yet to resolve all

Committee Assignments:

FINANCE
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY

JUDICIARY
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
11-L-0558/OASD/039319

BUDGET
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING
U 84060-93

JAN. 12. 2005. 10:07AM

(b)(6)

NO. 3429 P. 3/4

the issues surrounding possible Antideficiency Act violations, is it wise to leave Ms. Druyun in such an important "acquisition management" post?

Your thoughts would be appreciated. A response is requested by May 12, 1993.

Sincerely,

Chuck Grassley
Charles E. Grassley
U.S. Senator

CEG/chm

TAB

E



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

08 JUN 1993

ACQUISITION

Honorable Charles E. Grassley
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1501

Dear Senator Grassley:

This is in response to your May 5, 1993, letter to Secretary Aspin regarding financial mismanagement on the C-17 contract.

You asked why the Secretary decided not to punish Mrs. Darleen Druyun and is leaving her in an important management post, whereas four other officials were disciplined. The Secretary and I carefully considered all of the evidence in this matter and concluded that punishment of Mrs. Druyun was not appropriate and that she should continue to hold her present position. Mrs. Druyun's involvement with the C-17 contract was limited and did not warrant action similar to that taken with regard to the other officials.

You may be assured that we would not retain Mrs. Druyun in her present position if we felt it would jeopardize the integrity of defense acquisition.

Sincerely,

John M. Deutch



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OFC 20 2002

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-0303

Dear Senator McCain:

This is in further response to your letters of April 25, 2002, to the Secretary of Defense and this office that expressed concern regarding the lack of information made available to you concerning possible leases of aircraft from the Boeing Corporation. In particular, you questioned the Air Force denial of your request for "the name of the outside investment entity that provided advice and analysis on leasing arrangements, including the lease the Air Force is now pursuing with Boeing." Your question to the Air Force on the matter--"Who are the Wall Street experts which provided advice to SAF/AQ [Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)] on aircraft leasing?"--received the following response dated April 18, 2002: "SAF/AQ cannot provide an answer to this question without violating the analysts' and their **firms'** specific requests for confidentiality."

In response to your concerns, we requested the Inspector General (IG) of the Air Force to conduct an investigation into allegations that Ms. Darleen A. Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition and Management), and others improperly withheld information from you regarding the identity of an outside entity that provided advice on tanker leasing arrangements. Our preliminary review of the matter suggested that Ms. Druyun's terse response to you, even if factually accurate, was at best extremely poor judgment. Subsequently, we advised the Air Force IG that we uncovered information suggesting that Ms. Druyun's response may have been inaccurate or misleading.¹

The Air Force IG recently completed his investigation into the matter and did not substantiate wrongdoing on the part of Ms. Druyun or others. Based on sworn testimony from eight witnesses and relevant documentation, the Air Force IG determined that Ms. Druyun genuinely believed that she had an obligation to protect the identities of the "Wall Street experts" who provided advice to the Air Force. Her views were based on the assumption that the identities of the sources should be treated as "source selection sensitive" and, therefore, subjected to release restrictions imposed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Section 423 of Title 41, United States Code, "Restrictions on disclosing and obtaining contractor bid or proposal information or source selection information."

¹ My initial response to you of May 3, 2002, advised that, prior to May 1, 2002, the Air Force had no written contractual relationship with an outside investment entity to provide aircraft leasing advice and had obtained aircraft leasing advisory services from Babcock & Brown LP beginning May 1, 2002, via subcontract with Anteon Corporation, a prime Air Force consulting contractor. We had found no indication of a confidentiality agreement between the Air Force and Anteon or Babcock & Brown LP.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039323

I continue to believe that Ms. Druyun's response to you should have been more forthcoming. On the other hand, I have no reason to question the Air Force IG's determination that the allegation that "Ms. Druyun abused her authority by wrongfully refusing to disclose to Senator John McCain the identities of nongovernmental entities that provided investment advice and analysis to the Air Force concerning leasing of tanker and special airlift mission aircraft" was not substantiated. In view of Ms. Druyun's retirement from the Federal service effective November 15, 2002, we find insufficient basis to pursue the matter further. Nevertheless, your insistence on accountability in this situation has reemphasized the requirement to provide accurate, responsive information to Members of Congress, as reflected in Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz' letter to you of July 15, 2002.


Because information in this letter may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the letter is designated ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. Please refer any requests for this letter to the FOIA/Privacy Act Office, Office of Administration and Information Management, Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202-4704.

Please contact me or Mr. John R. Cranc, Director, Office of Congressional Liaison, at

(b)(6)

if we may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,


Joseph E. Schmitz

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable John Warner
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039324



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

JAN 14 2005

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

Reference the attached snowflake at (TAB A), here are the steps I have taken to address all of our concerns in this matter:

- o On November 19, 2004, I tasked the Military Departments, Missile Defense Agency, and the Special Operations Command to perform self-assessments of their acquisition organization and process. The Defense Science Board Task Force I established is reviewing their assessments and their acquisition management structures. The Task Force will brief me on February 2, 2005.
- At my direction on December 13, 2004, a multi-service/agency team led by the Deputy Director, Defense Contract Management Agency began reviewing contract actions involving Darlene Druyun. Their findings will also be briefed to me on February 2nd.
- o On December 16, 2004, I sent a letter to Harry Stonecipher, Boeing CEO, asking him to examine his own practices. I specifically asked him to examine Mr. Sears' role in Boeing's business with the Department. His December 21, 2004, reply states he is currently reviewing Mr. Sears' role and will share the results with us this month.
- o Today, I sent a memorandum to the ASN (RD&A) asking him to conduct a review of the F/A-18 program, in which Mr. Sears was also involved. I also have asked the Inspector General (IG) to look into the dealings of Ms. Druyun's husband. I understand that the IG is also assisting the Justice Department on issues associated with the Druyun/Sears convictions.
- o I will continue to coordinate with the General Counsel and the IG as these reviews proceed and report back to you on the findings.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Nancy Dowling/DPAP/PAIC/ (b)(6)

cc: DSD, GC, IG

11-L-0559/OSD/039325

OSD 01028-05

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we **look** at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, was involved in, but we should **also look** at other activities that the Boeing person who pled guilty was involved in.

We have a responsibility to **look** out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact **that** each of them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We know they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

7201
~~TAB A~~
~~FOUO~~

10/29

October 29, 2004

889

J-3 action pls.
Top 10 Iraq 2 ks.
230

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq's Borders

Do you feel we've got a decent **plan from** Casey on how to deal with the borders of Iraq? I don't. What do you **propose**?

Thanks.

DHR:as
102904-15

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039328

OSD 01101-05

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 1/18/2005

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT:
OSD CONTROL **OSD 01116-05** DOC **12/8/2004** DOR **1/18/2005** SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM **SECDEF RUMSFELD** TO **MAS STAVRIDIS**

SUBJECT **COST FOR A SOLDIER**

KEYWORDS **STAVRIDIS, J USC UPR SNOW FLAKE**

COMMENTS **CAF. NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.**

FN SEC U OCN **120804-7**

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS **OSD 16953-04**

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION

PAGES **1** ENCLOSURES **0**

SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:
FRONT OFFICE DOC
INFO MEMO

CREATED BY: **lawson**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
ADC R

11-L-0559/OSD/039330



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

January 14, 2005, 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Cost for a Soldier

- We calculated what it costs to organize, train and equip an American soldier to serve in Afghanistan or Iraq. We also estimated how many Afghan or Iraqi soldiers could be recruited, trained, equipped and deployed for the price of one U.S. soldier. These costs are summarized in the following table:

	U.S.	Afghan	Iraqi
Cost to recruit, train, equip, and deploy an individual soldier	\$107,000	\$1,800	\$6,500
Number of soldiers for the price of one U.S. soldier	1	54	15

- While determining the answer to your questions, we also calculated the sustainment costs of these soldiers once they have been deployed. These costs are summarized in the following table:

	U.S.	Afghan	Iraqi
Projected annual sustainment costs for an individual soldier	\$79,000	\$10,700	\$38,900

COORDINATION: None.

cc:
J-8

Prepared By: John Evans. (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004

P+R *USD (c)*
TO: ~~VADM Jim Stavridis~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *P*
SUBJECT Cost for a Soldier

Please see if you can find someone to do the calculation as to what it costs to organize, train and equip an American soldier to serve in Afghanistan. And then figure out how many Afghan soldiers we could recruit, train, equip and deploy for the price of one US soldier.

Then do the same calculation for Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120804-7

.....
Please respond by

~~12/10/04~~
01/16/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 01116-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039332

- Afghanistan
 - Monthly US Soldier Cost approx \$54,000
 - US monthly cost per ANA soldier is approx \$44,500
- Iraq
 - Monthly US Soldier Cost approx \$30,500
 - US monthly cost per Iraqi Security Force \$16,700

Sustain
-retire
-medical

12/9
Sir —
you asked for
these #'s...
v/e
jm

→ Re-run but include
medical, retirement, etc.
sustainment,

S

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

0305
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

September 16, 2009 PM 4:45

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

857

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tina Jonas
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq
mm

We need some basic "rules of thumb" reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include:

- Cost per soldier per month / year
- Total Cost per month / year

I'm sure there are other good metrics. I think it would be helpful to have these in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to U.S. and local forces as well as our longer range planning in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-5

.....
Please respond by 23 sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/039334

NOV 16 2009

1121
2



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0900

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CM-2136-0704 OCT 25 PM 4:45
25 October 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RAM 10/24*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

- **Issue.** "We need some basic 'rules of thumb' reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include: **Cost per soldier** per month/year, **Total Cost per month/year**... it would be helpful to have **these** in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to **US** and local forces as well as our longer range planning in **both** countries." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** Monthly per US Service member cost for **Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)** is **\$30.5K**; annual per Service member cost is **\$365.9K**. **Total US cost per month** for OIF is **\$4.2B**; **annual total cost** is **\$50.5B**. Monthly per US Service member cost for **Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)** is **\$53.7K**, **annually \$644.6K**. Monthly total **US costs for OEF** is **\$752M**, **annually \$9.0B**. **Only operational and recurring costs (TAB B) are included in these figures. Differing force packages, operational concepts, logistics networks and other cost elements for OIF and OEF result in higher costs in Afghanistan.**
- **Discussion.** **You must** be careful when using these figures to estimate savings from future force reductions. **The cost avoidance will be less than the per Service member cost.** A **drawdown plan** is required to compute cost avoidance. The drawdown strategy would describe **how much of the support structure remains in place as ground combat elements redeploy.** Since **the more costly support will likely drawdown more slowly than the ground combat elements,** costs will not **go down at the per Service member rate** described above. In addition, **the per Service member cost avoidance must be offset by the costs of a prolonged US sustainment of the Afghan National Army (ANA).** Another rule of thumb for the **security costs** is **the FY 2005 US costs to build the Iraqi security force and the ANA.** The **US cost per Iraqi security force member** is **\$16.7K** and **per ANA soldier** is **\$44.5K**. The **US costs for Iraq are lower** because the Iraqi government **offsets costs** for Iraqi security.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral R. F. Willard, USN; Director J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/039335

OSD 16953-04 *1/2*

TAB B

Operational and Recurring Costs

- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation **ENDURING FREEDOM** (OEF) are calculated by using the burn rate; that is, the average of the monthly costs per contingency operation. The burn rate costs are the recurring, operational (incremental) costs that Services and agencies report through the Defense Finance and Accounting System to Congress.
- These costs include both direct and indirect costs for OEF.
 - Direct Service costs include full pay and allowances for Guard and Reserve, incremental pay for active duty personnel (allowances such as imminent danger pay and family separation pay), personnel support, operations support, transportation and military construction.
 - Other direct costs include depot maintenance, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency operations, Defense Intelligence Agency operations, other intelligence and the Defense Health Program.
 - Indirect costs in support of OEF include costs for **USCENTCOM** Headquarters in Qatar, military overstrength, military construction in Southwest Asia external to Iraq and Afghanistan, the military tribunal and defense health care costs for military personnel in Southwest Asia, external to Iraq and Afghanistan. Since these costs are contingency related and must be reported as a contingency cost, they are shown as a cost against the first contingency in the Global War on Terrorism, OEF.
- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM** reflect only direct costs incurred for Iraq.

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USDC

MS. TINA JONAS

9/28/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/039337

Tab C

720
TAB A

3:25 PM


TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: January 5, 2004
SUBJECT: **Kuwait**

Apparently everything is going to be going in and out of the same port in Kuwait.
Have you **folks looked** at using an alternative to spread it around a little **bit**?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.12

Please respond by: _____

1/17/04


Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/039338



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1478-04
22 January 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 1/21*

SUBJECT: Kuwait

- **Question.** "Apparently everything is going to be going in and out of the same port in Kuwait. Have you folks looked at using an alternative to spread it around a little bit?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM analyzed all feasible air and seaports as debarkation and embarkation options. Kuwait City International Airport and the seaport at Ash Shuaybah, Kuwait, best support movement requirements in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 2 (OIF 2). Kuwait Naval Base will be utilized to offload amphibious shipping and ammunition. Umm Qasr, Iraq, is currently being utilized for limited container offload operations to relieve the strain on Ash Shuaybah.
- **Analysis.** For OIF 2, USCENTCOM reviewed the possibility of movement by air and ground lines of communication through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey. The requirement for timely approval from these countries and political considerations precluded most options. In addition, the reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI) required in theater at multiple sites would further complicate an orderly and timely rotation of forces. These factors precluded USCENTCOM from choosing several other primary ports.
- Additional actions to relieve air and seaport strain during OIF 2 include utilizing C-17 aircraft for intra-theater movement of personnel from Iraq to Turkey. Onward movement to destination will be accomplished by contracted commercial airlift from Incirlik Air Base. Finally, units requiring minimal integration training prior to deployment into the theater (decreased RSOI) such as I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) and 82nd Airborne Division will be transported directly into Iraq on inter-theater airlift.

COORDINATION: TAB B.

Attachments:

As stated

copy to:

DepSecDef

Prepared By: VADM Gordon Holder, USN; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/039339

OSD 01123-04

TAB A

3:25 PM


TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: January 5, 2004.
SUBJECT: **Kuwait**

Apparently everything is going to be going in and out of **the** same port in Kuwait.
Have you folks looked at using an alternative to spread it around a little bit?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.12

Please respond by: _____

1/17/04


Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USCENTCOM	MG Mortensen, USA	12 January 2004
USTRANSCOM	Col Richtsmeier, USMC	12 January 2004

January 13, 2005

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information to McCain

Senator McCain told the Vice President he sent three letters to us complaining to somebody in the Department that we are sending him too much material - things he does not need. The VP said McCain said, "I don't need testimony that I heard when I was sitting in the Committee."

One day we are not sending enough; now we're sending too much. McCain said he did not trust the Air Force, so the OSD General Counsel's office started handling it. Then McCain said he didn't trust them, so we had the Inspector General handle it, and it is that office that currently handles it.

Someone needs to speak to the IG's office and see if they can separate information McCain thinks he does not need or want. I'm reluctant to not send him anything, because he could say we are not sending him everything. It is a difficult problem. Maybe we try to separate things we think he would want from things we think he may not want, but continue to send him everything.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
011105-3

.....
Please respond by 1/27/05

452 T
13 Jan 05
22 OCT 04

January 13, 2005

TO:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

FROM:

TO Sec Def

1/13

SUB:

From Paul Butler

Sena

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wher

Subject: McClain letters complaining
of too much material being
sent to him

One

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F

ExecSec and Legislative Affairs have
found no letters addressed to you or
the Deputy on this topic. The only
letter we've found is a letter from
Sen. McClain dated Oct. 22 to Joe
Schmitz. In one sentence on the
second page he says that public
transcripts, press releases, etc need
not be produced. (Letter is attached
to snowflake - comment is highlighted
on page 2).

We will work with IG to develop
a protocol to segregate out those documents

To Dave Patterson
From Paul Butler

Dave -

Please send
sent into SecDef
Snowflake to the
you call IA and
they segregate to
does not want. Max
index a list of the
are not sending
his staff the index
want to see some
index we can see

22 OCT 04

156-0559/GSD/039344

125

ARIZONA
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0300
(202) 224-2235

4450 SOUTH RURAL ROAD
SUITE 9-120
TEMPE, AZ 85282
(480) 897-6283

2400 EAST ARIZONA
BILTMORE CIRCLE
SUITE 1150
PHOENIX, AZ 85016
(602) 952-2410

450 WEST PASEO REDONDO
SUITE 200
TUCSON, AZ 85701
(520) 670-6336

TELEPHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED
(202) 224-7132
(602) 962-0170

United States Senate

October 22, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE AND FIRST CLASS MAIL

The Honorable Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Re: Production of Tanker-Refated Documents Requested by Congress

Dear Mr. Schmitz:

It was a pleasure meeting with you and your colleagues on Friday, October 8, 2004. As I indicated during our meeting, I have been concerned about the Defense Department and the Air Force's failure to produce documents responsive to congressional requests related to the tanker matter, most recently the mail between Secretary Roche and OMB senior official Robin Cleveland. Accordingly, I welcome your office's involvement in helping assure the integrity of the Defense Department and the Air Force's production of all responsive documents. With this letter, I highlight some issues that we discussed during our meeting.

First, in my view, your office's involvement in this effort does not relieve the Defense Department or the Air Force of their obligation to produce all responsive documents fully and completely. In other words, notwithstanding your office's welcomed involvement in the Defense Department and the Air Force's production of documents, if it is discovered that any more responsive documents are improperly withheld, I expect that whatever recourse needs to be taken will be directed at the Defense Department and/or the Air Force (and those officials within them responsible for not producing these documents). On Friday, October 1, 2004, my staff conveyed my view in this regard to John Sullivan, the Deputy General Counsel to the Defense Department.

Second, I understand that you are obtaining from the Defense Department and the Air Force certifications as to the completeness of their production of documents as to each request-

452T

22 OCT 04

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11-L-0559/OSD/039345
IG, DOD OCL

99%

01130-05
P. 02

category. When your office completes its production of all documents responsive to each of these categories, please indicate whether you have received these certifications.


Third, my staff also told Mr. Sullivan that no redactions were to be made to documents for "responsiveness" or "relevance." As my staff conveyed to Mr. Sullivan, such redactions fall outside the August 11, 2004, agreement made among me, Chairman Warner, White House Counsel, and the Defense Department. As such, I expect that your office will not be making such redactions before producing them.

Fourth, your office need not produce hearing transcripts, press releases, and other publicly available material that might otherwise be responsive to the requests for documents.

Finally, during our meeting you expressed concern about the provision in the August 11, 2004, agreement that documents produced be redacted for the names of, or references to, Members of Congress. You indicated that, in your view, the use of resources required to make these redactions is particularly burdensome and, under the circumstances, questionable. I understand that the Defense Department has provided your office with about 57 compact discs and two xerox boxes of potentially responsive documents, totaling about 700,000 pages. In addition, I understand that the Air Force produced voluminous documents in response to Senate requests related to the tanker replacement program. But, the number of documents actually produced remains relatively modest. In that context, I agree that all reasonable measures that can alleviate undue burden on your end should be undertaken. Given your salient concerns and our desire to expedite our review of the documents you produce, this element of the August 11th agreement should probably be revisited. By copy of this letter to those below, I ask that our staff work together to do this.

Thank you for your continuing assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



John McCain

cc: The Honorable John Warner, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense
The Honorable Judge Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President
The Honorable Bill Frist, Senate Majority Leader

January 26, 2004

TO: Honorable William Cohen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Topics for Discussion

Bill—

As you requested, here is what I believe was your list of breakfast topics.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cohen-Rumsfeld Breakfast Topics.

DHR:dh
012604-1

000 7150

26 Jan 04

OSD 01161-04

Cohen-Rumsfeld Breakfast topics

DOE issue

Iraq sanctions -

Iraq – Mobile CBN

Iran buildup

Syria CW/BW .

NMD

NATO – EU

NATO enlargement

Israel – tech transfer issues

Jordan

MEADS – Germany/Italy

China – Taiwan

Indonesia

N. Korea/S. Korea

Okinawa

Force Protection

TAC Air allocations

QDR

V-22 panel

Export Control

APL

ICC

Ukraine/Georgia

Mixed Gender Training

C-17/C-5A

Tricare

Housing allowances

Plan Colombia

Anthrax

Vieques

CTBT – Shali Report

Start 3 numbers

Bosnia/Kosovo

Army Transformation

Homeland defense


Budget plus-up over FYDP

India/Pakistan

Base closings



O MUNDO FOI ATACADO



ABOUT

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- ▣ Services

About Us

The Cohen Group opened its doors in January 2001 with the objective of helping multinational clients explore opportunities overseas as well as solve problems that may develop. A strategic alliance with Piper Rudnick, a national law firm specializing in business, real estate and technology, empowers The Cohen Group with the unique ability to provide our clients with truly comprehensive tools for understanding and shaping their business, political, legal, regulatory, and media environments.

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The Cohen Group's reach extends internationally where our Principals have developed great expertise and relationships with key political, economic and business leaders and acquired valuable experience with the individuals and institutions that affect our clients' success abroad.

TOP

The Cohen Group
 1200 19th Street, NW
 Suite 400
 Washington, DC 20036
 202-689-7900 voice
 202-689-7910 fax

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January 24, 2004

TO: Ambassador Nick Burns
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Belgian MoD

I am sure you are wired into what is going on with the Belgian MoD. It is outrageous.

Any thoughts?

DHR:db
012404-3

Belgium

24 Jan 04

OSD 01162-04

January 13, 2004

TO: Dina Habib Powell, Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel and Deputy to the Chief of Staff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Don*

SUBJECT: Powell Moore (background sheet attached)

As you know, Powell is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. He would be a fine ambassador for one of the former Warsaw Pact or Soviet bloc countries, particularly one that may be part of the NATO expansion.

As you will see in his background sheet, he served in the Department of State. He has done a first-rate job here at the Pentagon, has an enormous following on Capitol Hill and knows the issues.

Regards,

Attach.
Moore Background Sheet

DHR:dh
011304-15

0220 LA

13 Jan 04

OSD 01163-04

POWELL A. MOORE

Powell A. Moore is Chief of Staff for Senator Fred D. Thompson, Republican of Tennessee and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. He has held this position since September 1, 1998.

Active in public policy affairs in Washington for more than 30 years, Moore is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs under President Reagan and has served on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan.

Moore began his Washington career in 1966 as Press Secretary to Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia and served in this capacity until Senator Russell's death in January of 1971. He then joined the Nixon Administration, first serving as Deputy Director of Public Information for the Department of Justice and later as a member of the White House Legislative Affairs staff.

He left the White House in 1975, and for the subsequent six years, engaged in government relations and legislative affairs consulting, representing a variety of corporations and associations.

Moore returned to the White House in January 1981 on the day following Ronald Reagan's inauguration as the 40th President of the United States. As Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs during 1981, he managed the Senate component of the legislative affairs office at the White House.

In January of 1982, President Reagan nominated him to be Assistant Secretary of State for Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs, and he was confirmed by the Senate on February 4, 1982. As Assistant Secretary of State, Moore traveled with Congressional delegations to more than 35 countries and participated in meetings between U.S. Congressional leaders and 19 heads of state.

During his service in two key legislative affairs positions of the Reagan Administration, he assisted President Reagan in realizing a number of significant legislative achievements. He managed the Senate confirmation strategy for several of President Reagan's high level nominations, including the historic nomination of Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.

Moore worked on the presidential campaign staffs of Richard Nixon in 1972, Gerald Ford in 1976, and Ronald Reagan in 1980. He also worked as a volunteer for the presidential campaigns of George Bush in 1988 and 1992 and Bob Dole in 1996.

After leaving government in late 1983 and before returning in 1998, Moore advised and represented business interests as Vice President for Legislative Affairs of the Lockheed Corporation and as a consultant. In this capacity, he compiled a substantial list of measurable public policy achievements on behalf of a wide variety of clients.

Moore was born in Milledgeville, Georgia on January 5, 1938. He graduated from the University of Georgia in Athens in 1959 after attending preparatory school at Georgia Military College in Milledgeville. The University of Georgia's Henry W. Grady School of Journalism selected him as its Outstanding Alumnus for 1985, and he was similarly honored by Georgia Military College in 1986. After graduation, he was commissioned as an officer in the United States Army where he served for three and one-half years with tours in Baumholder, Germany, and Fort Benning, Georgia. After leaving the Army and before coming to Washington, he worked as a weekly newspaper editor in Georgia.

(b)(6)

OCT 06 2004

TO: David Chu
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fellowships

I spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York yesterday, and found four colonels. I don't know how many others are assigned up there.

I would like to see the full rack up of all the fellowships: who is assigned where all over the world for non-military duties like that - how many to the State Department, how many to Congress, etc.

We need to get our arms around it. While some number of fellowships is desirable, we should do a complete baseline examination of exactly where our troops are serving. Let's ensure we are getting maximum benefit for the buck.

Please get back to me with a complete lay-down and your recommendations for changes -- soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100504-15

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

080

6 OCT 04

November 4, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Innovative Health Care Options for the Force

106

You mentioned that you were working on some new ideas for health care packages for our forces, including some kind of medical savings account concept.

I'm very interested in seeing your ideas so we can consider moving forward on a pilot project or even some wholesale changes.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110404-17

.....
Please respond by 12/1/04

4 pages

December 16, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fringe Benefit Computation

I looked at this letter. I just can't believe that that is the correct number for the fringe benefit computation for me. It looks way too low.

You ought to check into how they do the computing, and whether or not Syd Sullivan is calculating it properly, and including everything that's personal, which he must.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/9/04 Letter to SecDef ~~from~~ H. Becker

DHRss
121604-16

.....
Please respond by _____

430

16 Dec 04

OSD 01178-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039357



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1 155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



Honorable Donald R. Rumsfeld

09 DEC 2004

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to amendments made to the tax code in **1984**, the Department is required to place a value on the personal use of the official vehicles and drivers and provide this value to employees for use in preparing their tax returns. Under IRS regulations, commuting is considered personal use and the term "employer" includes the Federal Government. You fall under the scope of the regulations because of the portal-to-portal service given you by this Department.

We have calculated this amount, based on our best information regarding your use of the Government furnished vehicle. The period covered this year is from November 1, 2003 to October **31, 2004**. This amount will appear on a separate **W-2** form, which you will be receiving in the near future. Attached is a work sheet explaining this amount. You may wish to share this information with your tax accountant or attorney.

Please have your staff contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,


Howard G. Becker
Howard G. Becker
Director

Attachment:

a/s

ATTACHMENT

PORTAL TO PORTAL 2004 FRINGE BENEFIT COMPUTATION
FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

The **Commuting Valuation Rule** (Business-Orientated Security Concerns) bases the taxable benefit on \$1.50 value for each one-way commute of an employer-furnished vehicle. This rule applies only to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The figure for the number of one-way commutes is based on information provided by your office.

$$613 \text{ trips} \times \$1.50 = \mathbf{\$919.50}$$



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

JUL 17 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE *ARMY*
ASSISTANT FOR ADMINISTRATION
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE *NAVY*
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE *AIR FORCE*

Subject: Accounting for Home-to-Work Transportation Fringe Benefits

The purpose of this memorandum is to **clarify** the Department's duty to account for the home-to-work transportation that is provided to certain senior officials of the Department.

You are reminded that Government vehicles may be used only for **official** purposes. Statute provides that certain specifically delineated senior officials may be provided home-to-work transportation (31 U.S.C. § 1344); such use is considered official use. However, home-to-work transportation is considered a "fringe benefit" and is thus taxable to the official. Treasury regulations §§ 1.61-21 and 1.132-5 describe the method used to determine the value of the fringe benefit, and that value is reflected in a **W-2** prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for the official. All other use of Government vehicles is considered official use, for the benefit of the Government, and is not a taxable benefit to the official.

For purposes of determining which trips are considered "home-to-work" transportation, you should consider each trip that originates at the official's residence, and each trip that terminates at the official's residence, as "home-to-work" transportation, regardless of the number of intermediate stops. The only exception to this rule is that trips that originate or terminate at the official's residence as **part** of a TDY/TAD trip are provided **to** Government travelers as a non-taxable reimbursable expense.

If you have questions concerning this matter, please do not hesitate to contact John S. Albanese in the WHS Office of General Counsel (b)(6)
albanesj@dodgc.osd.mil).


Raymond F. DuBois
Director

7.17.03

11-L-0559/OSD/039360



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

8772
205 JAN 16 11 18 57

INFO MEMO

14 JAN 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration & Management

Ray DuBois 1/14/05

SUBJECT: Fringe Benefit Computation

430

- In the attached snowflake, you asked that I verify again this year that you are paying as much as you are supposed to pay for your DoD-provided home-to-work transportation fringe benefit.
- We continue to take a very conservative approach in this area, and consider all trips originating or terminating at any of your residences as taxable events. I issued guidance in 2003 that clearly directs this approach (also attached). This assures that you pay all that you should be paying, and nothing less.
- The taxable portion of your home-to-work transportation is predicated upon the fact that you receive security protection. In such cases, the taxable benefit imputed for home-to-work transportation, as established by Treasury Regulation sections 1.61-21 and 1.132-5, is \$1.50 for each trip.
- Your personal driver and the head of your security detail have provided data in response to our request for an accounting of your use of this fringe benefit. I am confident that they have provided data in accordance with applicable guidance, and that the accounting for taxable year 2004 is correct.

14 Jan 05

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Howard Becker, (b)(6)

16 Dec 04

OSD 01178-05

December 16, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Friuge Benefit Computation

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12/9/04 Letter to SecDef from H. Becker

DHRss
121604-16

.....
Please respond by _____



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1 155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



Honorable Donald R. Rumsfeld

09 DEC 2004

(b)(6)

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Please have your staff contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,



Howard G. Becker
Howard G. Becker

Director

Attachment:

a/s

ATTACHMENT

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FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

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$$613 \text{ trips} \times \$1.50 = \$919.50$$



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

JUL 17 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT FOR ADMINISTRATION
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE


Subject: Accounting for Home-to-Work Transportation Fringe Benefits

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You are reminded that Government vehicles may be used only for official purposes. Statute provides that certain specifically delineated senior officials may be provided home-to-work transportation (31 U.S.C. § 1344); such use is considered official use. However, home-to-work transportation is considered a "fringe benefit" and is **thus** taxable to the official. Treasury regulations §§ 1.61-21 and 1.132-5 describe the method used to determine the value of the fringe benefit, and that value is reflected in a W-2 prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for the official. All other use of Government vehicles is considered official use, for the benefit of the Government, **and** is not a taxable benefit to the official.

For purposes of determining which trips are considered "home-to-work" transportation, you should consider each trip that originates at the official's residence, **and** each **trip** that terminates at the official's residence, **as** "home-to-work" transportation, regardless of the number of intermediate stops. The only exception to this rule is that trips that originate or terminate at the official's residence as **part** of a TDY/TAD trip are provided to Government travelers as a non-taxable reimbursable expense.

If you have questions concerning this matter, please do not hesitate to contact John S. Albanese in the WHS Office of General Counsel (b)(6) albanesj@dodgc.osd.mil.


Raymond F. DuBois 7.17.03
Director

11-L-0559/OSD/039365

10:40 AM

TO: Col. John Baxter
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 9, 2004

SUBJECT:

Can you check and see if Walter Reed Hospital has a higher than normal incident of staph infection? I've heard of two incidents recently which make me wonder.

Thanks.

DIR/azt:
010904.23

Please respond by: 1/15/04



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

204 JUN 27 11:05

INFO MEMO

JAN 22 2004

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Incidence of Staph Infections at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC)

- This memo is provided in response to your snowflake of January 9, 2004 (TAB A), subject as above. An Executive Summary from the Commander, Walter Reed Healthcare System, is attached (TAB B).
- Walter Reed Army Medical Center constantly monitors infection rates and prevalence of certain antibiotic resistant species. Surveillance indicates WRAMC maintains a lower than normal incidence rate for staph infections in comparison to national standards.
 - o WRAMC incidence of nosocomial (hospital-acquired) infections consistently fall below numbers reported by the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance system.
 - o WRAMC also falls well below the mean and median of nationally reported hospitals for incidence of antibiotic resistant species, particularly methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus. The most recent data available shows methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus comprised 31% of all WRAMC staph isolates compared to National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance reported ranges of 21-67% (median of 45%; mean of 51%) for intensive care units and 24-58% for non-intensive care units (median of 43%; mean 41%).
 - o A 2002 study found the vast majority of WRAMC patients came into the hospital already colonized with methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus, and very few patients (only 4.5% in our study) actually acquired the organism at WRAMC.
- Methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus is a growing problem nationally with the overall prevalence increasing the same way penicillin resistant staph aureus increased in the 1950's and 1960's. All military hospitals continually monitor and make every effort to prevent transmission of multi-drug resistant organisms to susceptible patients.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *W. Winkenwerder, Jr.*

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: LTC Strawder, OASD (HA) (b)(6)

OSD 01183-04

TAB

A

10:40 AM

TO: Col. John Baxter

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 9, 2004

SUBJECT:

Can you check and see if Walter Reed Hospital has a higher than normal incident of staph infection? I've heard of two incidents recently which make me wonder.

Thanks.

DIR/azc
010904.23

Please respond by: _____

1/15/04

11-L-0559/OSD/039369

TAB

B

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

15 January 2004

(U) Incidence of staph infections at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC). (U) (MCHL-DC) SECDEF recently heard of two cases of staph infections at WRAMC and questioned if WRAMC has a higher than normal incidence of staph infection. The Infection Control Service at WRAMC monitors infections, nosocomial infection rates, and certain antibiotic resistant species. Ventilator associated pneumonias, Blood stream infections and urinary tract infections are nosocomial infections that are monitored and reported quarterly. These data are also reported by a large number of outside institutions to the CDC and compared through the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) system. WRAMC incidence of these nosocomial infections consistently fall below the NNIS Standards. The incidence of antibiotic resistant species, particularly methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is also closely monitored. At WRAMC MRSA is monitored by comparing the percentage of MRSA isolates to all other staph aureus isolates. In 2002 (the most recent data available) MRSA comprised 31% of all WRAMC staph isolates in the microbiology laboratory. The 2002 corresponding NNIS data reported ranges of 21-67% with a median of 45% (mean of 51%) for intensive care units and 24-58% for non-intensive care unit locations with a median of 43% (mean of 41%). WRAMC falls well below the mean and median of the nationally reported hospitals. In 2002 a prospective surveillance project was conducted to examine WRAMC's effectiveness of controlling the spread of resistant organisms and in particular MRSA. The vast majority of WRAMC patients actually came into the hospital already colonized with MRSA. These patients comprise more than 50% of the infections that occur in hospitalized patients, and very few patients (only 4.5% in our study) actually "acquire" the organism at WRAMC. There is no evidence that WRAMC has a higher rate of infections compared to the remainder of the country overall. MRSA is a growing problem nationally with the overall national prevalence increasing exactly the way penicillin resistant staph aureus increased in the 1950's and 1960's. We will continually monitor for nosocomial infections and make every effort to prevent transmission of multi-drug resistant organisms to our susceptible patients.

Thomas M. Fitzpatrick, COL, MC, DCCS, WRAMC (b)(6)
E-mail: thomas.fitzpatrick@na.amedd.army.mil

APPROVED BY: Jonathan H. Jaffin, COL, MC, Commander WRHCS

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/039371

1-27-04

January 27, 2004

Advance copy sent to Dr. Chu 1/27 0830

TO: David Chu
cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Statistics

I need the data soon—tomorrow—as to:

1. The percentage of Reserves that have never been called up or not been called up in five or ten years.
2. The percentage of Reserves and Guard used in each of the Services for Iraq so far.
3. The number of people under stop-loss and stop-move.

I would like the data to be arranged in a way that is persuasive.

Please get me the first draft no later than Wednesday, January 28, so we can get it reworked the rest of the week before the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012704-9

.....
Please respond by 1/28/04

OSD 01258-04



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

OSD

2004 JUN 28 10:06:01

January 28, 2004, 1400

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Statistics -- SNOWFLAKE

- You requested specific information regarding percentages and numbers of Reserve component members called-up, and not called-up, for mobilizations over time, and the number of Total Force members impacted by Stop Loss.
- Attached is an Information Paper that I believe answers your questions and provides an accurate picture of Reserve component mobilizations, using current DoD personnel data.
- The information provided:
 - is consistent with the approach that has been used and explained over the past year.
 - shows that about 38% of the Selected Reserve force has been involuntarily called-up for the current operation – or that about 62% has not been called-up.
 - shows that only a small percentage of the Selected Reserve has been called-up more than once since 1996.
 - describes the use of the Selected Reserve as the base population for calculations vice the Ready Reserve (which also includes the Individual Ready Reserve).
 - depicts the number of Active and Reserve members impacted by Stop Loss and Stop Move.
- This information also supports the rebalancing actions initiated by the Department.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P),



OSD 01258-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039373

Statistics

1. Reserve Members Involuntarily Called-up:

e

	Desert Shield/Storm (Aug 90-Aug 91)	Haiti (Sep 94-May 96)	Bosnia (Dec 95-Present)	Southwest Asia (SWA) (Feb 98-Present)	Kosovo (Apr 99-Present)	ONE/OEF/OIF (Sep 01-Present)
# RC Invol Called-Up*	239,187	6,250	32,404	6,108	11,426	338,221

- e Since 09/11/01 we have involuntarily mobilized about 338,221 members of the Selected Reserve, or about 38% of RC members filling structured billets (877,060). This means that about 62% of Selected Reserve members have not been called-up.

(Note: The baseline does not include the approximately 283,000 members in the RC manpower pool - the Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard.)

- e Of the 338,221 RC members who have served/are serving in the current operations, 11,802 have served in previous operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, or SWA) going back to Dec 1995. (This equates to about 1.3% of the SelRes force of today)
- e Additionally, of the 338,221 members who have served/are serving in the current operations, 15,982 have been called up more than once for this contingency. (This equates to about 1.8% of the SelRes force of today).
- e So, overall, less than 4% of the SelRes force of today has been involuntarily called-up more than once since 1996.
- e A review of the overall numbers called-up, and those who have been called up more than once, shows that the stress (or usage) is focused in certain areas. This has led to the force rebalancing efforts that have been initiated in DoD.

2.

Ø of Selected Reserve

ARNG	USAR	USNR	USMCR	ANG	USAFR	USCGR	TOTAL
135,737	93,943	20,506	24,725	31,775	24,013	7,522	338,221
39.1%	44.4%	23.5%	60.3%	29.5%	32.4%	98.3%	38.6%

- 3. Members Impacted by Stop Loss:** The current Army Stop Loss policy applies to approximately 20,342 Active Component, and 25,538 Reserve Component soldiers involuntarily extended beyond eligible separation or retirement dates.

- Active Component Stop Loss affects soldiers/units deployed, or preparing to deploy, in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM/ENDURING FREEDOM, and continues through redeployment to permanent duty stations plus 90-days.
- Reserve Component Stop Loss affects Ready Reserve soldiers assigned to an alerted or mobilized unit, and continues up to 90-days after demobilization.
- For the Active Component the Army has elected to Stop Move, in support of OIF1/OEF4, 27,397 Soldiers and, in support of OIF2/OEF5, 5,628 Soldiers.
- Currently, only the Army is utilizing Stop Loss or Stop Move policy:
- Stop Loss and Stop Move policies are a necessary tool during periods of conflict or national emergency. The decision to execute such policy is driven by the need to maintain unit readiness, and the intent to keep units intact down to the squad and crew level thereby ensuring the best trained and cohesive fighting force on the battlefield. The unit rotation schedule and pace of execution does not allow for incorporating newly assigned personnel into trained units before redeployment. Impact on retention is a consideration the Services heavily weigh when deciding to execute Stop Loss or Stop Move actions. While the impact is being closely monitored, historical review and current leading indicators would suggest retention trends, currently half of all first term enlistments stay in, deviates little after a Stop Loss or Stop Move period.

7:35 PM

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 18, 2004
SUBJECT: **Fowler Panel Recommendations**

Attached is a response from the Air Force on the Fowler recommendations. Please pull together the responses from all the services and give me your recommendations.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021804.24

Attach: Air Force Response to Fowler Panel Recommendations 1/22/04

Please respond by: _____

3/1/04

1000.5

18 Feb 04

22 Apr 04

OSD 01280-04



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

2004 JAN 22 PM 1:51

(D)

JAN 22 2004

Tourman
2/10

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Air Force Response to the Fowler Panel Recommendations

The purpose of this memo is to provide an update of the Air Force actions regarding recommendations in the "Report of The Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the US Air Force Academy."

We are in the process of implementing each of the 21 recommendations (many of which were also recommended by the Air Force Working Group's Report), with the exception of #18, #15, and #14. Recommendation #18 concerns the issue of cadet infractions committed in association with a sexual assault. We discovered in our review, that one of the major reasons cadets did not report sexual assaults was for fear of getting themselves and their peers in trouble based on cadet infractions that occurred along with the sexual incident (e.g., underage drinking, fraternizing, being off base without authority). In order to increase reporting of this already underreported crime, we decided to provide amnesty from cadet discipline to both cadet victims and witnesses in these circumstances. This allows them to come forward with the promise of absolution from cadet discipline for their infractions. (We allowed for three exceptions: the alleged perpetrator, the senior ranking cadet in attendance, and any witness who covers up the incident or hinders the reporting or investigation of the incident.) I spoke with Mrs. Fowler regarding this plan and she concurred. Since the Agenda for Change, this amnesty policy has not extended to actions under the Honor Code or the UCMJ. With the Academy's migration from cadet discipline to conventional Air Force administrative and UCMJ corrective actions, the amnesty concept will be applied to these corrective actions for the same types of misconduct. Amnesty will continue to be inapplicable to Honor Code violations. It is our plan to implement this policy for one year from its inception and then review it on an annual basis.


As to Recommendation #15, I conferred with Mrs. Fowler and she agreed that the management of our ~~CASIE~~ program is a function of command and should, therefore, be managed by someone in the chain of command. This is a change from her Recommendation #15 that states the psychotherapist should manage this program.

With regard to Recommendation #14, the issue of opening another avenue of confidential reporting for cadets, we are currently in the final stages of formulating an appropriate policy that differs somewhat from Mrs. Fowler's recommendation but

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JAN 22 2004	
AIR FORCE	
OSD 01280-04	
S2/for/130	

* CASIE - CADETS MAL 0559/OSD 089377
Integrity & Education

responds to the spirit of it. We are developing a new policy to be applicable to the entire Academy (including cadets and non-cadets). The preferred and encouraged route for reporting sexual assault is to command authorities. When reporting through command channels, the victim's privacy will be protected and details of the incident, including names of the victim and alleged perpetrator, will be provided to appropriate authorities. However, victims will now have an option to report sexual assault to a designated counselor in the Cadet Counseling Center in lieu of reporting to command. (The option of discussing a sexual assault with a chaplain or an off base counseling service remains.) Counselors will have limited confidentiality, will not be in the Academy chain of command, and will not divulge names to command authorities absent extreme circumstances (e.g., when the safety of the victim or other Academy personnel is at risk); they will report the relevant facts, without identifiers, to appropriate authorities while continuing to provide victims the counseling they need and encouraging them to provide information to command authorities when ready. The command chain retains the potential of overriding the limited confidentiality in extreme circumstances and AFOSI retains the option of appealing a decision not to override to the Secretary. Also, no organization of cadets or victim peers will be an official assault reporting channel, counselor or investigator; instead, selected cadets will be trained to guide victims to established sources of professional care. I am confident this new policy will balance the needs of commanders to maintain good order and discipline with the needs of victims who have suffered a traumatic experience. When finalized, we will forward our plan to Dr. Chu and his staff.



James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment:
Fowler Recommendations

cc:
AF/CC
USD (P&R)

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

After performing the study required by H.K. 1559 and reviewing the policy changes being implemented by the *Agenda for Change*, the Panel has made various recommendations throughout this report. Those recommendations, organized according to the major area of this report to which they apply, are summarized below.

Awareness and Accountability – Section III

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- Receive candid and complete disclosure by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Academy Superintendent of all institutional problems, including but not limited to, all gender related matters, cadet surveys and information related to culture and climate and incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assaults. (Page 49)

6. The Panel recommends that the Air Force prepare a legislative proposal to revise 10 U.S.C. § 9355. The suggested revisions should include both the foregoing and following recommendations:

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- Requiring that any individual who accepts an appointment as a Board member does, thereby, pledge full commitment to attend each meeting of the Board, and to carry out all of the duties and responsibilities of a Board member, to the fullest extent practical;
- Terminating any Board member's appointment who fails to attend or fully participate in two successive Board meetings, unless granted prior excusal for good cause by the Board Chairman;
- Providing clear oversight authority of the Board over the Academy, and direct that, in addition to the reports of its annual meetings required to be furnished to the President, it shall submit those reports and such other reports it prepares, to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force, in order to identify all matters of the Board's concerns with or about the Air Force Academy and to recommend appropriate action thereon; and
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7. The Panel recommends that the Air Force conduct the same review of Non-Commissioned Officer assignment policies and tour lengths at the Academy as it is conducting for officer assignments policies. (Page 56)

8. The Panel recommends that the Academy draw upon climate survey resources at the Air Force Personnel Center Survey Branch for assistance in creating and administering the social climate surveys. Further, the Panel recommends that the Academy keep centralized records of all surveys, responses, and reports and keep typed records of all written comments (not abbreviated or paraphrased) – to be provided as an appendix to any report. All such reports must be provided to Academy leadership. (Page 58)

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10. To ensure the safety of every cadet, the Panel recommends that the Academy implement a policy permitting unrestricted (*i.e.*, no explanation required at any time) private access to telephones for the use by any cadet, including Fourth-Class cadets, in an emergency. (Page 62)

11. The Panel recommends that the Center for Character Development education instruction be mandatory for all cadets. The Panel further recommends the cadet curriculum require completion of at least one course per year that emphasizes character values, for which cadets shall receive a grade and academic credit. (Page 68)

12. While the Panel appreciates that the demands on the time of new cadets are significant, we recommend reassessing the training calendar to place prevention and awareness training at a time of day in which cadets will be most receptive to the training session. (Page 73)

13. The Panel recommends that the Academy focus on providing better training to the trainers of prevention and awareness classes including enlisting the aid of faculty members who are well-skilled in group presentation techniques that are effective and energize the cadets, developing small group training sessions which will be more effective than large audience presentations, developing training sessions that educate the students on the reporting process and Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigatory practices and procedures, and establishing a review process for training session materials that includes the use of the

Academy Response Team and cadet cadre or some other multi-disciplinary group of experts.
(Page 74)

Intervention and Response to Sexual Assault – Section VI

14. The Panel recommends that the Air Force establish a policy that achieves a better balance of interests and properly employs psychotherapist-patient counseling, and its associated privilege, for the benefit of cadet victims. The Panel recommends that the Academy's policy for sexual assault reporting clearly recognize the applicability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and that the Academy staff the Cadet Counseling Center with at least one Victim Advocate provider who meets the legal definition of "psychotherapist." Further, the Panel recommends that the individual assigned to serve as the initial point of reporting, whether by "hotline" or in person, be a qualified psychotherapist who has completed a recognized rape crisis certification program. Optimally, the Victim Advocate psychotherapist should be in charge of the sexual assault program within the Cadet Counseling Center and will provide direction and supervision to those assistants supporting the assigned psychotherapists.
(Page 80)

15. The Panel recommends that the Academy establish a program that combines the existing CASIE program with a Victim Advocate psychotherapist managing the program, and which offers cadets a choice in reporting either to the psychotherapist or to a cadet peer. If reports to CASIE representatives continue to be considered non-confidential, then the Panel recommends that cadets be clearly advised of this fact and further advised that a confidential reporting option is available through the Victim Advocate psychotherapist. As an alternative, it is possible for CASIE cadet representatives to come within the protective umbrella of the psychotherapist-patient privilege if they meet the definition of being an "assistant to a psychotherapist." (Pages 86-87)

16. The Panel recommends that once the psychotherapist reporting option is fully implemented, the Air Force Academy conduct a thorough review of the CASIE program with a view toward either reducing the size of the program or eliminating it entirely. As an interim measure, the Panel recommends that the Academy consider modeling the CASIE program after the Respect Program at West Point, and expand the program to include assisting cadets with issues such as homesickness, respect for fellow cadets and academic difficulties. (Page 87)

17. The Panel recommends that the Academy create a web site devoted to educating cadets about sexual assault. (Page 87)

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. The Panel recommends that the Air Force review the West Point and Naval Academy policies to encourage reporting of sexual **assault** and **adopt** its own clear **policy** to encourage reporting. (Page 91)

19. The Panel recommends that the Academy **ensure** that the Academy Response Team is **always** proactively involved in cases in which the victim and potential witnesses are also alleged to have committed misconduct. The Panel also recommends that the Academy Response Team continue to **remain** involved in a case, in the event that a **particular** allegation is suspected to be false. (Pages 94)

20. The Panel recommends that the Air Force Office of Special Investigations Academy detachment participate fully in the recently established Academy Response Team and use it for informing and educating Academy leadership, victim advocates and CASIE representatives of their responsibilities and limitations. AFOSI's educational efforts should include programs that provide a basic understanding of how and **why** it takes certain investigative **actions**, and the benefits of timely reporting and investigation of all sexual assault incidents. (Page 99)

21. The Panel recommends that the **Academy** take measures to ensure that transportation to the hospital, **and any** other necessary logistical support, is **always** available to a cadet who chooses to receive a rape kit examination. In particular, transportation must be provided by an **appropriate** individual, such as the psychotherapist or Academy Response Team member, who will be discreet and can address the victim's emotional needs during the long car trip to the hospital. (Page 100)



SECRET
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 2004 JAN 21 11:13:51
WASHINGTON

JAN 22 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Air Force Response to the Fowler Panel Recommendations


The purpose of this memo is to provide an update of the Air Force actions regarding recommendations in the "Report of The Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the US Air Force Academy."

We are in the process of implementing each of the 21 recommendations (many of which were also recommended by the Air Force Working Group's Report), with the exception of #18, #15, and #14. Recommendation #18 concerns the issue of cadet infractions committed in association with a sexual assault. We discovered in our review, that one of the major reasons cadets did not report sexual assaults was for fear of getting themselves and their peers in trouble based on cadet infractions that occurred along with the sexual incident (e.g., underage drinking, fraternizing, being off base without authority). In order to increase reporting of this already underreported crime, we decided to provide amnesty from cadet discipline to both cadet victims and witnesses in these circumstances. This allows them to come forward with the promise of absolution from cadet discipline for their infractions. (We allowed for three exceptions: the alleged perpetrator, the senior ranking cadet in attendance, and any witness who covers up the incident or hinders the reporting or investigation of the incident.) I spoke with Mrs. Fowler regarding this plan and she concurred. Since the Agenda for Change, this amnesty policy has not extended to actions under the Honor Code or the UCMJ. With the Academy's migration from cadet discipline to conventional Air Force administrative and UCMJ corrective actions, the amnesty concept will be applied to these corrective actions for the same types of misconduct. Amnesty will continue to be inapplicable to Honor Code violations. It is our plan to implement this policy for one year from its inception and then review it on an annual basis.

As to Recommendation #15, I conferred with Mrs. Fowler and she agreed that the management of our cadet CASIE program is a function of command and should, therefore, be managed by someone in the chain of command. This is a change from her Recommendation #15 that states the psychotherapist should manage this program.

With regard to Recommendation #14, the issue of opening another avenue of confidential reporting for cadets, we are currently in the final stages of formulating an appropriate policy that differs somewhat from Mrs. Fowler's recommendation but

responds to the spirit of it. We are developing a new policy to be applicable to the entire Academy (including cadets and non-cadets). The preferred and encouraged route for reporting sexual assault is to command authorities. When reporting through command channels, the victim's privacy will be protected and details of the incident, including names of the victim and alleged perpetrator, will be provided to appropriate authorities. However, victims will now have an option to report sexual assault to a designated counselor in the Cadet Counseling Center in lieu of reporting to command. (The option of discussing a sexual assault with a chaplain or an off base counseling service remains.) Counselors will have limited confidentiality, will not be in the Academy chain of command, and will not divulge names to command authorities absent extreme circumstances (e.g., when the safety of the victim or other Academy personnel is at risk); they will report the relevant facts, without identifiers, to appropriate authorities while continuing to provide victims the counseling they need and encouraging them to provide information to command authorities when ready. The command chain retains the potential of overriding the limited confidentiality in extreme circumstances and AFOSI retains the option of appealing a decision not to override to the Secretary. Also, no organization of cadets or victim peers will be an official assault reporting channel, counselor or investigator; instead, selected cadets will be trained to guide victims to established sources of professional care. I am confident this new policy will balance the needs of commanders to maintain good order and discipline with the needs of victims who have suffered a traumatic experience. When finalized, we will forward our plan to Dr. Chu and his staff.



James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment:
Fowler Recommendations

cc:
AF/CC
USD (P&R)

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

After performing the study required by H.R. 1559 and reviewing the policy changes being implemented by the *Agenda for Change*, the Panel has made various recommendations throughout this report. Those recommendations, organized according to the major area of this report to which they apply, are summarized below.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

2004 JAN 29 PM

AF:
What is
CASE?

JAN 22 2004

000,5

DID AF talk
to Tillie about
her view on their
proposed #14?
Jaymie

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Response to the Fowler Panel Recommendations

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of implementing each of the 21 recommendations (many of which are included by the Air Force Working Group's Report), with the 14. Recommendation #18 concerns the issue of cadet association with a sexual assault. We discovered in our review, that one of the reasons why reporting of sexual assaults was for fear of getting themselves and their peers in trouble based on cadet infractions that occurred along with the sexual incident (e.g., underage drinking, fraternizing, being off base without authority). In order to increase reporting of this already underreported crime, we decided to provide amnesty from cadet discipline to both cadet victims and witnesses in these circumstances. This allows them to come forward with the promise of absolution from cadet discipline for their infractions. (We allowed for three exceptions: the alleged perpetrator, the senior ranking cadet in attendance, and any witness who covers up the incident or hinders the reporting or investigation of the incident.) I spoke with Mrs. Fowler regarding this plan and she concurred. Since the Agenda for Change, this amnesty policy has not extended to actions under the Honor Code or the UCMJ. With the Academy's migration from cadet discipline to conventional Air Force administrative and UCMJ corrective actions, the amnesty concept will be applied to these corrective actions for the same types of misconduct. Amnesty will continue to be inapplicable to Honor Code violations. It is our plan to implement this policy for one year from its inception and then review it on an annual basis.

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
3 Feb 04

22 Jan 04

11-L-0559/OSD/039391

EX-100	01	01	01
MR CRADDOCK			
OSD	0	280	04
MARSHALL		52	1/30

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James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment:
Fowler Recommendations

cc:
AF/CC
USD (P&R)

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

December 1, 2004

2005 JAN 21 AM 6:57

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Friedman on DBB

Let's think about putting Steve Friedman on the Defense Business Board.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-27



Please respond by 12/21/04

1/A
Tom Modley / F. NA Jonas

Please let
disans Mr. Also,
what is the status of
Indiana?
D. Rita

~~FOUO~~

OSD 01304-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039393



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JAN 21 AM 7:00

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

January 19, 2005 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas

SUBJECT: Steve Friedman and the Defense Business Board (DBB)

- I spoke with Steve Friedman today about your interest in having him serve on the DBB. Steve told me that he is currently weighing prospective opportunities that may preclude him from serving on the Board. Steve also mentioned that he had spoken to you recently about his situation.
- The DBB currently has one open position for a new member. We will hold this position open until Steve's situation is resolved.

Prepared by: Thomas Modly (b)(6) // January 19, 2005

OSD 01304-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039394

December 1, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 JUN 21 AM 6:57

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120104-27

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

1/8
Tom Modley F.N.A. Jonas

Please let
Lizans know. Also,
what is the status of
Indiana?

Di Rita

720

January 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: January 24 Event

Attached is some material my staff received from Richard Perle in response to our inquiry about the conference that was held by a consortium of Iranian-American groups last weekend at the Washington Convention Center.

Iran

Attach.
1/14/04 e-mail

DHR:dh
012904-8

275 January

Gay Gill

1-28-; RAY

(b)(6)

4 pages

From: Brian Lord**Sent:** Wednesday, January 14, 2004 9:03 AM**To:** (b)(6)**Subject:** Mr. Richard Perle-AEI

Hi, Gay. Here is some more information about the event and the issues involved in it. Please also find more information which the client put together and is attached to this email. Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you.

Brian Lord

Premiere Speakers Bureau

Dear Mr. Perle,

The January 24 event at the Washington Convention Center is intended to pay tribute to the victims of the devastating earthquake in the southern Iranian city of Bam, where by some accounts nearly 70,000 people perished.

All aid for the victims would be coordinated through the American Red Cross, as few, if any, have any confidence that the Iranian regime would provide the survivors with funds and goods donated from outside the country.

Already, there have been many reports of thousands of blankets, tents and sacks of rice being diverted from Bam to the warehouses of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. In one case, 35,000 blankets disappeared. In another case, sacks of rice sold in the markets of northern Iran had labels, indicating that they had been sent for the victims of the tremor in Bam.

At the same time, the participants, most of whom Iranians, are coming together to state their support for the demands of the Iranian people for a secular, democratic government, which they hope to be erected through a United Nations supervised referendum for regime change.

After all, in the eyes millions of Iranians, particularly those in the exile community, the ruling clerics are held entirely responsible for the staggering dimensions of the tragedy in Bam.

Some 25 years of neglect and plundering of Iran's national wealth has left the tens of thousands of those in Bam and other cities across the country vulnerable to such natural disasters. When a similar quake struck the northern Iranian city of Rudsar in 1990, 35,000 were killed. Obviously, nothing has been done or will be done to prepare the nation for such tragedies.

Many of the organizations and associations that have sponsored this event, while pursuing differing professional objectives, share the view that if there is going to be any hope for the situation in Iran to improve, it would be after the current regime is unseated and replaced with a government, which shows respect for the rights of its own citizens and abides by internationally recognized norms of conduct. Iranians are yearning for a government that would devote its policies, resources and attention to improve the lives of Iranians instead of spending billions of dollars to WMD programs, supporting subversive groups that oppose a peaceful Middle East and sponsoring terrorism outside Iran.

In short, given that everything about Iran is inevitably political, those active in various cultural, academic or professional causes outside Iran are necessarily politically oriented and most, if not all, opposed the current

regime.

The organizers have already made it clear that the distinguished speakers who would participate in the event ought to address some of the concerns enumerated above, particularly the issue of a referendum as the last peaceful means to regime change in Iran. Many are inspired by President Bush's unequivocal and repeated messages to the Iranian leadership that it must heed the demands of the Iranian people for democracy or lose the last claim to its legitimacy.

If the current political crisis, emanating from the row over the upcoming parliamentary elections, is any indication, however, Iran's turbaned rulers are unlikely to take the President's advice. The intolerance shown by the dominant faction towards its bed fellows, the so-called moderate faction of the government, speaks volumes about how ordinary Iranians, non-conformists and dissidents have been treated in all these years.

The Iranian Diaspora in the United States in general and the sponsoring organizations in particular are aware fully of Mr. Perle's views on Iran and the approach he has promoted in dealing with regime that would result in the emergence of a humane, responsible and accountable government in that tormented land. This explains why among the many distinguished scholars and political dignitaries, they chose to invite him to join others to address this gathering so as to demonstrate to the millions of suffering Iranians at home that they are not alone and that their cry for freedom is being heard and echoed here in the United States.

If I can be any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully,

Nasser Rashidi
Public Relations-USA, INC.

RE: EVENT IN SOLIDARITY WITH EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS IN IRAN

1. The event, "In Solidarity with Earthquake Victims in Iran and an evening for Iranian Resistance," is scheduled for Saturday, January 24, 2004 at the Grand Ball Room of Washington Convention Center. Some where between 4,600 to 5,000 people (depending on the seating arrangement) would be attending the event, which will begin at 5:00 pm and continue until midnight, with speeches and artistic performances by American and Iranian performers. The event will be broadcast in its entirety live via satellite in Iran, the United States, Europe and the Middle East.
2. **Partial list of sponsoring organizations and associations:**
 - US for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran;
 - AdHoc Committee for Iran Solidarity Evening (ACISE);
 - Iranian-American Community of Northern Virginia (I.A.C.of NV);
 - Iranian-American Cultural Association of Missouri (IACA-MO);
 - Colorado's Iranian-American Community (CIAC);
 - Iranian-American Society of Texas (IAS-TX);
 - Association of Iranian Americans in New York (AIA-NY);
 - Society of Iranian Americans in Dallas (SIA-D);
 - Iranian-American Community of New Mexico (IAC-NM);
 - Association of Iranian-American Scholars in Southern California (AIAS-SC);
 - National Coalition of Pro-Democracy Advocates (NCPDA);
 - Committee in Support of Referendum in Iran (CSRI);
 - National Committee of Women for a Democratic Iran (NCWDA);
 - Women's Freedom Forum (WFF);
 - Public Relations-USA (PRUSA);
 - Near East Policy Research (NEPR);
 - Sa'atchi Jewelers of New York.
3. All proceeds from the event will go to the victims through the American Red Cross.
4. **Partial list of U.S. dignitaries expected to attend and speak at the event:**
 - Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS);
 - Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX);
 - Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL);
 - Congressman Thomas Tancredo (R-CO);
 - Congressman Bob Filner (D-CA);
 - Dr. Mervyn Dymally, former member of the United States House of Representatives from California;
 - Prof. Daniel Pipes, Director of the Peace Institute;
 - Prof. Raymond Tanter, Adjunct Scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy;
 - James Akins, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia;
 - Prof. Donna M. Hughes, Women's Studies Program, University of Rhode Island;
 - Mr. Steven Schneebaum, Patton Boggs LLP;

- Mr. Paul F. Enzinna, Baker Botts LLP;
- Mr. Ronald G. Precup of Carpenter, Precup LLP.

5. Partial list of foreign dignitaries invited to attend and speak at the event:

- Lord Alton of Liverpool;
- Lord Corbett of Castle Vale;
- Paolo Casaca, member of the European Parliament from Portugal;
- Ms. Perline Frohm, member of the European Parliament from Denmark;
- Prof. Maurice Danby Copithorne, Special Representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission on the situation of human rights in Iran (1991-2001);
- Prof. Marc Henzelin of International Swiss Law firm, IA LIVE;
- Prof. Jean-Yves de-Cara, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law expert at the University of Lyons, France,
- Several distinguished Sheikhs, tribal leaders and scholars from Iraq (who will discuss the situation in Iraq and Iranian meddling in that country).

6. Partial list of Iranian dignitaries and political, cultural figures:

- Ayatollah Jalal Ganje'i, renowned scholar on Islamic studies and Islamic fundamentalism. He studied Islamic jurisprudence and Shia *fiqh* at the Grand Seminary in the Holy city of Najaf, Iraq in 1960s;
- Moslem Eskandar Filabi, Olympic Wrestling Champion, Iranian national hero and representative of Iranian athletes and sports champions in exile;
- Dr. Mohammad Ghorbani, World Wrestling Champion;
- Amb. Parviz Khazai, former Iranian Ambassador to Sweden and Norway;
- Mr. Mansour Lavai, from the Iranian Zoroastrian Community in the United States;
- Ms. Mahvash Attarzadeh, from the Iranian Jewish Community in the United States;
- Mr. Parviz Sayyad, the most renowned Iranian actor and activist in Iran's exiled artistic community;
- Andranik Khachatourian, Iranian-Armenian conductor, composer and song writer;
- Professor Hossein Saeedian, University of Kansas;
- Professor Hossein Jahansouz, Merk Laboratories;
- Professor Ali Parsa, University of Californian, Los Angeles (UCLA);

12:48 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 9, 2004

SUBJECT: **Beyond Goldwater Nichols**

Attached is John Hamre's preliminary report. I think he's got some good ideas. What do you say we get you, Gen. Pace, Paul Wolfowitz and possibly Steve Cambone and whoever else you would like; possibly Adm. Keating.

We can sit down with Hamre and whoever he wants to bring and have him give us a report. We will see what we think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030904.07
020904.07

Attach: Hamre 2/3/04 memo Re: Progress on study "Beyond Goldwater Nichols"

Please respond by: _____ 3 _____

030 001

9 Feb 04

OSD 01330-04

26 Jan 04



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: John J. Hamre 
Date: February 3, 2004
Subject: Progress on our study "Beyond Goldwater Nichols"

Mr. Secretary, a year back we met with you at the outset of a study we planned to undertake in order to examine concepts for the next phase of reform for the Defense Department. Throughout the past year we have met extensively with experts in and outside the Department. We have met with the individuals you directed us to contact, as well as each of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries, and many members of your senior leadership team. We are now in the process of briefing our findings. We anticipate issuing a public report in March.

I would like to use this memo to briefly indicate some of the more significant ideas we will be proposing. If at any time you wish to be briefed in more detail, however, we would be honored to do so.

Integrating OSD and the Joint Staff

We started with a threshold question: Has the Joint Staff evolved to the extent that its capabilities overshadow that of the OSD staff? Our conclusion was that we are now at a stage where we need to integrate aspects of the Joint Staff and OSD.

It is our view that there needs to be an independent Joint Staff in key operational areas, but that others can be integrated. We already have an integrated OSD-Joint Staff in one key area—the J2. The J2 is the operational intelligence arm for both you and the Chairman. In the other J directorates, however, there is some duplication with OSD. We understand that some duplication is desirable as we need divergent perspectives in key areas, but in several other areas the duplication is wasteful, counterproductive and inefficient. We will, therefore, recommend that you retain the J2, J3, J5, and J8. We believe that the J7 should be disbanded, since most of its functions now logically belong to the Joint Forces Command. Our proposal for the J6 is contained in the next section of this memo.

When it comes to the J1 and the J4, we believe that these staffs can be integrated into OSD (USD, Personnel and Readiness and USD, Acquisition, Technology and

11-L-0559/OSD/039402

Logistics respectively). In these instances, the general/flag officer would become a military assistant to the under secretary. The J4 has always been a capable officer with modest duties. By contrast, it has always been hard to recruit a talented individual to head up logistics in the acquisition directorate of OSD. We feel that these are logical ways to integrate.

Remove Title 10 authority from the Military Departments

Our second major recommendation concerns the need for true enterprise-wide solutions for command, control and communications. We know that 25 years of pushing interoperability has still not corrected the problem of inter-service communication on the battlefield. We argue that it will not be possible to get truly seamless communications as long as the acquisition process for C3 systems remains a service-specific authority.

We believe that you should create a new program 12 that is for enterprise-wide C3. The acquisition of C3 would be assigned to a Joint Battle Management C2 Command. The J6 would be disestablished and assigned the JBMC2 Command leadership. The JBMC2 would be given the same kind of acquisition authority that the Special Operations Command or the ballistic missile defense directorate have. The Commander, JBMC2 would report to you through USD C31. (I know you will not agree with this, but we believe that USD Intelligence should be reconfigured as USD C31.)

We understand that this recommendation will engender a good deal of controversy with junior officers and retired senior officers, but we believe that the senior leadership of the military departments is genuinely open to this idea.

Unification of Secretariats in Military Departments

We understand that there has been considerable progress in this area, but we believe that the staffs for the service chiefs and the service secretaries can be completely integrated, with one very important exception. The general counsel should be accountable only to the Service Secretary.

Revitalizing civilian leadership in the Department

We were surprised to find the widely held view that the professional cadre of civilians in the Department is weak and deteriorating. We found a strong desire among military personnel to want to strengthen their civilian counterparts. In general, military officers believe that their ideas are now seriously impeded by weakness in OSD and in the military secretariats. We have developed a series of recommendations to help strengthen civilian leaders. We also believe that you need the authority to deploy civilians and will have some recommendations in this regard in our final report.

Improving Interagency Coordination

We believe that there are serious deficiencies in the interagency process. The non-defense departments lack the capacity to support their obligations. There are inadequate mechanisms for coordination and follow up to ensure that we have the resources and actions we need in order to follow through. I know that there are developments under way to strengthen the various department capabilities, but we need to learn more about those initiatives before we go final on our report.

Second Phase of the Study

Let me reiterate that we are prepared to meet with you at any time in order to review these ideas, as well as others that go beyond the major recommendations I have summarized above. We have also deferred some topics to the second phase of this study. In the second phase we intend to examine new missions and new organizational concepts for operations. I am aware that you have done a lot to advance new organizational concepts for operational missions. We have not yet had a chance to examine these ideas, but will do so this spring. We also intend to examine the questions regarding the role and structure of the National Guard and Reserve components, a topic that virtually everyone has argued that there is an urgent need to examine. We will accelerate our efforts in this area. I would especially welcome any perspective you have in this regard.

END

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PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

2004 JAN 26 AM 8:34



POLICY

INFO MEMO

EF-8289
January 26, 2004
I-04/000998-PDUSDP

DRY ROW
1/27/04

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSECDEF

USDPEM/mandel
1/29/04

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" Report of Meeting with John Hamre, CSIS (U)

- (U) On Friday, 23 January, I met with Dr. John Hamre and discussed CSIS' current "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" ideas:
 - (U) Integrating parts of Joint Staff and OSD in J1(Manpower/Personnel), J4(Logistics), J6 (Communications), and J7(Plans) functions
 - (U) Restructuring the active reserve mix
 - (U) Deploying DoD civilians
- (U) John Hamre will be conducting his first public "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" briefings in two weeks on Capitol Hill.
- (U) To give a clearer understanding of the CSIS proposals, John Hamre will send a private memo to you, through me, highlighting the points he presented at our meeting.
- (U) I expect to receive the memo in the next few days and will provide it to John Craddock upon receipt.
- (U) The information contained in the memo may be the subject of some "member questions" during your upcoming Hill testimony.

Prepared by: Steven Netishen, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT IN CHARGE	<i>[Signature]</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	

11-L-0559/OSD/039405

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 01330-04
29-01-04 12:43 PM

7201
TAB

~~FOUO~~

DEC 27 2004

923

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief Senator Sessions

Jeff Sessions needs a briefing on UAVs, Army UAVs in particular. He thinks we are not paying enough attention to the Army's needs for UAVs.

Thanks.

DHK:ah
122204-13

.....
Please respond by 1/20/05

4522

27 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/039406

OSD 01370-05

February 3, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Statutory End Strength

320.2

It is not clear to me that I should have re delegated the President's authority during a period of national emergency to waive any statutory end strength ceilings for that fiscal year to the Services.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to whether or not you think that was a good idea, or whether we think now maybe we ought to hold it **up** here so we know what is going on.

Thanks.

Attach.
USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Statutory End Strength [OSD 01375-04]

DHR:dh
020304-4

.....
Please respond by 2/16/04

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OSD 01375-04

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2004 JAN 30 PM 4:03

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2004 - 11:00 AM

manman
2/2

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Statutory End Strength

David S. C. Chu 30 January 04

- As you know, Congress sets maximum peacetime end strength in the National Defense Authorization Act. (FY04 active duty numbers at Tab A). In the FY02 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress increased the Department's peacetime latitude to exceed these limits (10 U.S.C. 115, Tab B):
 - The Secretary of Defense, in the national interest, may increase active duty end strength by up to 3 percent; and
 - The Secretary of a military department, if such action will enhance manning and readiness, may increase his Service's authorized end strength for that fiscal year by not more than 2 per cent.
 - Together, these increases may not total more than 3 percent.
- Congress also establishes minimum end-strengths for active duty personnel under 10 U.S.C. 6916, which, for FY04, are the same as the maximum strengths (Tab C). This statute does not have a waiver provision.
- During this period of national emergency, the President delegated to you his authority under 10 U.S.C. 123a to waive any statutory end strength ceilings for that fiscal year (Tab D), and you have re delegated that authority to the Service Secretaries.

COORDINATIONS: Tab E

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DIRA	<i>MAN</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>2/2</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>2/2</i>
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>ca 1/30</i>

OSD 01375-04



FY 04 National Defense Authorization Act

SEC. 401. END STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE FORCES.

The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of September 30, 2004, as follows:

- (1) The Army, 482,400.
- (2) The Navy, 373,800.
- (3) The Marine Corps, 175,000.
- (4) The Air Force, 359,300.

TAB A

Service: Get by LEXSTAT®

TOC: United States Code Service: Code, Const. Rules, Conventions & Public Laws > /.../ >

CHAPTER 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE > § 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization

Citation: 10 USC 115

10 USCS § 115

UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
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*** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-187, APPROVED 12/16/03 ***
*** WITH GAPS OF 108-173, 177, 178 and 183. ***

TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART 1. ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
CHAPTER 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

♦ GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION

10 USCS § 115 (2003)

§ 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization

(a) Active-duty and Selected Reserve end strengths to be authorized by law. Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each fiscal year for each of the following:

(1) The end strength for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for (A) active-duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for active-duty personnel, and (B) active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve personnel.

(2) The end strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the armed forces.

(b) Limitation on appropriations for military personnel. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for--

(1) the use of active-duty personnel or full-time National Guard duty personnel of any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) unless the end strength for such personnel of that armed force for that fiscal year has been authorized by law; or

(2) the use of the Selected Reserve of any reserve component of the armed forces unless the end strength for the Selected Reserve of that component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

(c) Military technician (dual status) end strengths to be authorized by law. Congress shall authorize for each fiscal year the end strength for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force. Funds available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year may not be used for the pay of a military technician (dual status) during that fiscal year unless the technician fills a position that is within the number of such positions authorized by law for that fiscal year for the reserve component of that technician. This subsection applies without regard to section 129 of this title. In each budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the end strength requested for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force shall be specifically set forth.

TAB B

11-L-0559/OSD/039410

(d) End-of-quarter strength levels.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and include in the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the President's budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year the Secretary's proposed end-of-quarter strengths for each of the first three quarters of the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, in addition to the Secretary's proposed fiscal-year end-strengths for that fiscal year. Such end-of-quarter strengths shall be submitted for each category of personnel for which end strengths are required to be authorized by law under subsection (a) or (c). The Secretary shall ensure that resources are provided in the budget at a level sufficient to support the end-of-quarter and fiscal-year end-strengths as submitted.

(2) (A) After annual end-strength levels required by subsections (a) and (c) are authorized by law for a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall promptly prescribe end-of-quarter strength levels for the first three quarters of that fiscal year applicable to each such end-strength level. Such end-of-quarter strength levels shall be established for any fiscal year as levels to be achieved in meeting each of those annual end-strength levels authorized by law in accordance with subsection (a) (as such levels may be adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

(B) At least annually, the Secretary of Defense shall establish for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) the maximum permissible variance of actual strength for an armed force at the end of any given quarter from the end-of-quarter strength established pursuant to subparagraph (A). Such variance shall be such that it promotes the maintaining of the strength necessary to achieve the end-strength levels authorized in accordance with subsection (a) (as adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

(3) Whenever the Secretary establishes an end-of-quarter strength level under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2), or modifies a strength level under the authority provided in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives of that strength level or of that modification, as the case may be.

(e) Authority for Secretary of Defense variances for active-duty and Selected Reserve end strengths. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is in the national interest, the Secretary may--

(1) increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to not more than 3 percent of that end strength;

(2) increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B) for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of that end strength; and

(3) vary the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(2) for a fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of any of the reserve components by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of that end strength.

(f) Authority for service Secretary variances for active-duty end strengths. Upon determination by the Secretary of a military department that such action would enhance manning and readiness in essential units or in critical specialties or ratings, the Secretary may increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) for a fiscal year for the armed force under the jurisdiction of that Secretary or, in the case of the Secretary of the Navy, for any of the armed forces under the jurisdiction of that Secretary. Any such increase for a fiscal year--

(1) shall be by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of such authorized end strength; and

(2) shall be counted as part of the increase for that armed force for that fiscal year authorized under subsection (e)(1).

(g) Adjustment when Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy. The authorized strength of the Navy under subsection (a)(1) is increased by the authorized strength of the

Coast Guard during any period when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy.

(h) Certain active-duty personnel excluded from counting for active-duty end strengths. In counting active-duty personnel for the purpose of the end-strengths authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1), persons in the following categories shall be excluded:

- (1) Members of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty under section 12302 of this title.
- (2) Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty under section 12304 of this title.
- (3) Members of the National Guard called into Federal service under section 12406 of this title.
- (4) Members of the militia called into Federal service under chapter 15 of this title [10 USCS §§ 331 et seq.]
- (5) Members of reserve components on active duty for training.
- (6) Members of reserve components on active duty for 180 days or less to perform special work.
- (7) Members on full-time National Guard duty for 180 days or less.
- (8) Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve on active duty for more than [than] 180 days to support programs described in section 1203(b) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(b)).
- (9) Members of reserve components (not described in paragraph (8)) on active duty for more than 180 days but less than 271 days to perform special work in support of the combatant commands, except that
 - (A) general and flag officers may not be excluded under this paragraph; and
 - (B) the number of members of any of the armed forces excluded under this paragraph may not exceed the number equal to 0.2 percent of the end strength authorized for active-duty personnel of the armed force under subsection (a)(1)(A).
- (10) Members of reserve components on active duty to prepare for and to perform funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans in accordance with section 1491 of this title.
- (11) Members on full-time National Guard duty to prepare for and perform funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans in accordance with section 1491 of this title.

HISTORY:

(Added Nov. 5, 1990, P.L. 101-510, Div A, Title XIV, Part H, § 1483(a), 104 Stat. 1710; Dec. 5, 1991, P.L. 102-190, Div A, Title III, Part B, § 312(a), 105 Stat. 1335; Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 401(c), Subtitle B, § 415, Title V, Subtitle B, § 513 (a)(1), Title X, Subtitle F, § 1061(c), Title XV, § 1501(c)(3), 110 Stat. 286, 288, 305, 442, 498; Nov. 18, 1997, P.L. 105-85, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle B, § 413(b), Subtitle C, § 522(i)(1) 111 Stat. 1720, 1736.)

(As amended Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle B, § 415, 113 Stat. 587; Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, § 1, 114 Stat. 1654; Dec. 28, 2001, P.L. 107-107, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle C, §§ 421(a), 422, 115 Stat. 1076, 1077; Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 403, 116 Stat. 2525; Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 403(a), (b), 117 Stat. 1450.)

HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES

Explanatory notes:

The bracketed word "than" has been inserted in subsec. (h)(8) as the word probably intended by Congress.

The amendment made by § 1 of Act Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, is based on § 422 of Subtitle C of Title IV of Division A of H.R. 5408 (114 Stat. 1654A-96), as introduced on Oct. 6, 2000, which was enacted into law by such § 1.

A prior § 115 (Act Nov. 16, 1973, P.L. 93-155, Title VIII, § 803(a), 87 Stat. 612; July 14, 1976, P.L. 94-361, Title III, § 302, 90 Stat. 924; Nov. 9, 1979, P.L. 96-107, Title III, § 303 (b), 93 Stat. 806; Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-513, Title III, § 102(a), (b), 94 Stat. 2840; July 10, 1981, P.L. 97-22, § 2(b), 95 Stat. 124; Dec. 1, 1981, P.L. 97-86, Title IX, § 902, 903, 95

11-L-0559/OSD/039412

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TOC: [United States Code Service: Code, Const, Rule&Conventions & Public Laws > /.../ >](#)

[CHAPTER 39. ACTIVE DUTY > § 691. Permanent end strength levels to support two major regional contingencies](#)

Citation: 10 USC 691

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10 USCS § 691

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*** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-187, APPROVED 12/16/03 ***
*** WITH GAPS OF 108-173, 177, 178 and 183 ***

TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART 11. PERSONNEL
CHAPTER 39. ACTIVE DUTY

◆ GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION

10 USCS § 691 (2003)

§ 691. Permanent end strength levels to support two major regional contingencies

(a) The end strengths specified in subsection (b) are the minimum strengths necessary to enable the armed forces to fulfill a national defense strategy calling for the United States to be able to successfully conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.

(b) Unless otherwise provided by law, the number of members of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) on active duty at the end of any fiscal year shall be not less than the following:

- (1) For the Army, 482,400.
- (2) For the Navy, 373,800.
- (3) For the Marine Corps, 175,000.
- (4) For the Air Force, 359,300.

(c) The budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year as submitted to Congress shall include amounts for funding for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) at least in the amounts necessary to maintain the active duty end strengths prescribed in subsection (b), as in effect at the time that such budget is submitted.

(d) No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used to implement a reduction of the active duty end strength for any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for any fiscal year below the level specified in subsection (b) unless the reduction in end strength for that armed force for that fiscal year is specifically authorized by law.

(e) [Repealed]

(f) The number of members of the armed forces on active duty shall be counted for purposes of this section in the same manner as applies under section 115(a)(1) of this title.

TAB C

11-L-0559/OSD/039413

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

Sec. 123a. - Suspension of end-strength limitations in time of war or national emergency

(a) DURING WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY- If at the end of any fiscal year there is in effect a war or national emergency, the President may waive any statutory end strength with respect to that fiscal year. Any such waiver may be issued only for a statutory end strength that is prescribed by law before the waiver is issued.

(b) UPON TERMINATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY- Upon the termination of a war or national emergency with respect to which the President has exercised the authority provided by subsection (a), the President may defer the effectiveness of any statutory end strength with respect to the fiscal year during which the termination occurs. Any such deferral may not extend beyond the last day of the sixth month beginning after the date of such termination.

(c) STATUTORY END STRENGTH- In this section, the term 'statutory end strength' means any end-strength limitation with respect to a fiscal year that is prescribed by law for any military or civilian component of the armed forces or of the Department of Defense.'

COORDINATION SHEET

General Counsel

D J Dell'Act *re-edited 1/15/04*
Principal Deputy

DUSD. (PI)

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)

TAB E

COORDINATION SHEET

General Counsel

W DUSD (PI)

A. Gallant

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 JAN 30 11:40:03

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2004 - 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Statutory End Strength

David S. C. Chu 30 January 04

- As you know, Congress sets maximum peacetime end strength in the National Defense Authorization Act. (FY04 active duty numbers at Tab A). In the FY02 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress increased the Department's peacetime latitude to exceed these limits (10 U.S.C. 115, Tab B):
 - The Secretary of Defense, in the national interest, may increase active duty end strength by up to 3 percent; and
 - The Secretary of a military department, if such action will enhance manning and readiness, may increase his Service's authorized end strength for that fiscal year by not more than 2 per cent.
 - Together, these increases may not total more than 3 percent.
- Congress also establishes minimum end-strengths for active duty personnel under 10 U.S.C. 6916, which, for FY04, are the same as the maximum strengths (Tab C). This statute does not have a waiver provision.
- During this period of national emergency, the President delegated to you his authority under 10 U.S.C. 123a to waive any statutory end strength ceilings for that fiscal year (Tab D), and you have re delegated that authority to the Service Secretaries.

COORDINATIONS: Tab E

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)

OSD 01375-04



11-L-0559/OSD/039417

FY 04 National Defense Authorization Act

SEC. 401. END STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE FORCES.

The **Armed** Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of September 30, 2004, as follows:

- (1) The Army, 482,400.
- (2) The Navy, 373,800.
- (3) The Marine Corps, 175,000.
- (4) The Air Force, 359,300.

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[CHAPTER 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE > § 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization](#)

Citation: 10 USC 115

10 USCS § 115

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*** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-187, APPROVED 12/16/03 ***
*** WITH GAPS OF 108-173, 177, 178 and 183 ***

TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART 1. ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
CHAPTER 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

• **GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION**

10 USCS § 115. (2003)

§ 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization.

(a) Active-duty and Selected Reserve end strengths to be authorized by law. Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each fiscal year for each of the following:

(1) The end strength for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for (A) active-duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for active-duty personnel, and (B) active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve personnel.

(2) The end strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the armed forces.

(b) Limitation on appropriations for military personnel. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for--

(1) the use of active-duty personnel or full-time National Guard duty personnel of any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) unless the end strength for such personnel of that armed force for that fiscal year has been authorized by law; or

(2) the use of the Selected Reserve of any reserve component of the armed forces unless the end strength for the Selected Reserve of that component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

(c) Military technician (dual status) end strengths to be authorized by law. Congress shall authorize for each fiscal year the end strength for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force. Funds available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year may not be used for the pay of a military technician (dual status) during that fiscal year unless the technician fills a position that is within the number of such positions authorized by law for that fiscal year for the reserve component of that technician. This subsection applies without regard to section 129 of this title. In each budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the end strength requested for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force shall be specifically set forth.

11-L-0559/OSD/039419

(d) End-of-quarter strength levels.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and include in the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the President's budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year the Secretary's proposed end-of-quarter strengths for each of the first three quarters of the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, in addition to the Secretary's proposed fiscal-year end-strengths for that fiscal year. Such end-of-quarter strengths shall be submitted for each category of personnel for which end strengths are required to be authorized by law under subsection (a) or (c). The Secretary shall ensure that resources are provided in the budget at a level sufficient to support the end-of-quarter and fiscal-year end-strengths as submitted.

(2) (A) After annual end-strength levels required by subsections (a) and (c) are authorized by law for a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall promptly prescribe end-of-quarter strength levels for the first three quarters of that fiscal year applicable to each such end-strength level. Such end-of-quarter strength levels shall be established for any fiscal year as levels to be achieved in meeting each of those annual end-strength levels authorized by law in accordance with subsection (a) (as such levels may be adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

(B) At least annually, the Secretary of Defense shall establish for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) the maximum permissible variance of actual strength for an armed force at the end of any given quarter from the end-of-quarter strength established pursuant to subparagraph (A). Such variance shall be such that it promotes the maintaining of the strength necessary to achieve the end-strength levels authorized in accordance with subsection (a) (as adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

(3) Whenever the Secretary establishes an end-of-quarter strength level under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2), or modifies a strength level under the authority provided in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives of that strength level or of that modification, as the case may be.

(e) Authority for Secretary of Defense variances for active-duty and Selected Reserve end strengths. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is in the national interest, the Secretary may--

(1) increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to not more than 3 percent of that end strength;

(2) increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B) for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of that end strength; and

(3) vary the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(2) for a fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of any of the reserve components by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of that end strength.

(f) Authority for service Secretary variances for active-duty end strengths. Upon determination by the Secretary of a military department that such action would enhance manning and readiness in essential units or in critical specialties or ratings, the Secretary may increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) for a fiscal year for the armed force under the jurisdiction of that Secretary or, in the case of the Secretary of the Navy, for any of the armed forces under the jurisdiction of that Secretary. Any such increase for a fiscal year--

(1) shall be by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of such authorized end strength; and

(2) shall be counted as part of the increase for that armed force for that fiscal year authorized under subsection (e)(1).

(g) Adjustment when Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy. The authorized strength of the Navy under subsection (a)(1) is increased by the authorized strength of the

Coast Guard during any period when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy.

(h) Certain active-duty personnel excluded from counting for active-duty end strengths. In counting active-duty personnel for the purpose of the end-strengths authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1), persons in the following categories shall be excluded:

- (1) Members of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty under section 12302 of this title.
- (2) Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty under section 12304 of this title.
- (3) Members of the National Guard called into Federal service under section 12406 of this title.
- (4) Members of the militia called into Federal service under chapter 15 of this title [10 USCS §§ 331 et seq.]
- (5) Members of reserve components on active duty for training.
- (6) Members of reserve components on active duty for 180 days or less to perform special work.
- (7) Members on full-time National Guard duty for 180 days or **less**.
- (8) Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve on active duty for more than [than] 180 days to support programs described in section 1203(b) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(b)).
- (9) Members of reserve components (not described in paragraph (8)) on active duty for more than 180 days but less than 271 days to perform special work in support of the combatant commands, except that
 - (A) general and flag officers may not be excluded under this paragraph; and
 - (B) the number of members of any of the armed forces excluded under this paragraph may not exceed the number equal to 0.2 percent of the end strength authorized for active-duty personnel of the armed force under subsection (a)(1)(A).
- (10) Members of reserve components on active duty to prepare for and to perform funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans in accordance with section 1491 of this title.
- (11) Members on full-time National Guard duty to prepare for and perform funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans in accordance with section 1491 of this title.

HISTORY:

(Added Nov. 5, 1990, P.L. 101-510, Div. A, Title XIV, Part H, § 1483(a), 104 Stat. 1710; Dec. 5, 1991, P.L. 102-190, Div. A, Title III, Part B, § 312(a), 105 Stat. 1335; Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div. A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 401(c), Subtitle B, § 415, Title V, Subtitle B, § 513 (a)(1), Title X, Subtitle F, § 1061(c), Title XV, § 1501(c)(3), 110 Stat. 286, 288, 305, 442, 498; Nov. 18, 1997, P.L. 105-85, Div. A, Title IV, Subtitle B, § 413(b), Subtitle C, § 522(i)(1) 111 Stat. 1720, 1736.)

(As amended Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div. A, Title IV, Subtitle B, § 415, 113 Stat. 587; Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, § 1, 114 Stat. 1654; Dec. 28, 2001, P.L. 107-107, Div. A, Title IV, Subtitle C, §§ 421(a), 422, 115 Stat. 1076, 1077; Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div. A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 403, 116 Stat. 2525; Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div. A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 403(a), (b), 117 Stat. 1450.)

HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES

Explanatory notes:

The bracketed word "than" has been inserted in subsec. (h)(8) as the word probably intended by Congress.

The amendment made by § 1 of Act Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, is based on § 422 of Subtitle C of Title IV of Division A of H.R. 5408 (114 Stat. 1654A-96), as introduced on Oct. 6, 2000, which was enacted into law by such § 1.

A prior § 115 (Act Nov. 16, 1973, P.L. 93-155, Title VIII, § 803(a), 87 Stat. 612; July 14, 1976, P.L. 94-361, Title III, § 302, 90 Stat. 924; Nov. 9, 1979, P.L. 96-107, Title III, § 303 (b), 93 Stat. 806; Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-513, Title I, § 102(a), (b), 94 Stat. 2840; July 10, 1981, P.L. 97-22, § 2(b), 95 Stat. 124; Dec. 1, 1981, P.L. 97-86, Title IX, § 902, 903, 95

11-L-0559/OSD/039421

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[CHAPTER 39. ACTIVE DUTY > § 691](#). Permanent end strength levels to support two major regional contingencies

Citation: 10 USC 691

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10 USCS § 691

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*** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-187, APPROVED 12/16/03 ***
*** WITH GAPS OF 108-173, 177, 178 and 183 ***

TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART II. PERSONNEL
CHAPTER 39. ACTIVE DUTY

4 GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION

10 USCS § 691 (2003)

§ 691. Permanent end strength levels to support two major regional contingencies

(a) The end strengths specified in subsection (b) are the minimum strengths necessary to enable the armed forces to fulfill a national defense strategy calling for the United States to be able to successfully conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.

(b) Unless otherwise provided by law, the number of members of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) on active duty at the end of any fiscal year shall be not less than the following:

- (1) For the Army, 482,400.
- (2) For the Navy, 373,800.
- (3) For the Marine Corps, 175,000.
- (4) For the Air Force, 359,300.

(c) The budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year as submitted to Congress shall include amounts for funding for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) at least in the amounts necessary to maintain the active duty end strengths prescribed in subsection (b), as in effect at the time that such budget is submitted.

(d) No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used to implement a reduction of the active duty end strength for any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for any fiscal year below the level specified in subsection (b) unless the reduction in end strength for that armed force for that fiscal year is specifically authorized by law.

(e) [Repealed]

(f) The number of members of the armed forces on active duty shall be counted for purposes of this section in the same manner as applies under section 115(a)(1) of this title.

11-L-0559/OSD/039422

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

Sec. 123a. - Suspension of end-strength limitations in time of war or national emergency.

(a) DURING WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY- If at the end of any fiscal year there is in effect a war or national emergency, the President may waive any statutory end strength with respect to that fiscal year. Any such waiver may be issued only for a statutory end strength that is prescribed by law before the waiver is issued.

(b) UPON TERMINATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY- Upon the termination of a war or national emergency with respect to which the President has exercised the authority provided by subsection (a), the President may defer the effectiveness of any statutory end strength with respect to the fiscal year during which the termination occurs. Any such deferral may not extend beyond the last day of the sixth month beginning after the date of such termination.

(c) STATUTORY END STRENGTH- In this section, the term 'statutory end strength' means any end-strength limitation with respect to a fiscal year that is prescribed by law for any military or civilian component of the armed forces or of the Department of Defense.'

COORDINATION SHEET

General Counsel

D. J. Dell'Acta *as edited 1/15/04*
Principal Deputy

DUSD (PI)

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)

COORDINATION SHEET

General Counsel

for DUSD (PI)

A. Gallant

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM. (b)(6)

January 28, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Dov Zakheim
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bu

*Advance
copy sent
1/28 1330*

We are going to h
don't want to leav
very long.

DHR:dh
012804-10

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

*Response from Acting
Sec Army attached.*

@ 1/31

110.01

28 Jan 04

OSD 01387-04

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 31, 2004
SUBJECT: **Budget Proposal for Army**

I sent a memo to Les Brownlee about how we were going to pay for the Army situation. I got a memo back from him. I cannot tell if he's agreeing with me or not. I want to know precisely whether or not he agrees with my memo.

I do not want a separate memo and have two ships passing in the night.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
103 104.19

✓ 2/2

Respond by: _____

- SecDef -*
- No ships are passing in the night.
 - See Brownlee's memo in response to a snowflake you sent the Deputy. (red tab) on 28 Jan
 - you sent out a more detailed summary, with more guidance, on 30 January. To DepSecDef, Brownlee, Schoemaker, and Zatkum.
 - At this point no daylight between your guidance & Army effort.

1100



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

✓
2/2

INFO MEMO

January 29, 2004, 2:00 p.m.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

Brownlee

SUBJECT: Budget Proposal for Army

110.01

- This responds to your January 28, 2004, comments regarding the Army's budget proposal. (~~Feb 1~~)
- I share your concern about quickly clarifying and unifying a position on the issue of increasing Army capabilities and the impact any such increase would have on the Army's budget. To that end, my staff has been fully engaged with your staff (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)) coordinating the size, intent, and cost of this initiative.
- The answer, in short, is that the Army will use the temporary increase in strength levels you have authorized, in combination with internal restructuring and other efficiencies, to transform while responding to the demands of the on-going war on terrorism. We will not need the Department of Defense to request additional supplemental funding in fiscal year (FY) 2004. We will address FY 2005 costs in a FY 2005 supplemental.
- We are providing your staff detailed responses to questions, but in the meantime I wanted to assure you the Army and your staff are fully engaged on this issue and will speak with one voice.

29 Jan 04

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As Stated

Prepared By: Mr. Bill Campbell (SES), (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	1/31
MA BUGGI ROSENZO	1/31
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	28 Jan 1:30

28 Jan 04

OSD 01387-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039428

January 30, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Middle East Roadmap

Condi—

Attached is a paper that was dropped off to me by a long-time friend of mine, David Kimche. It is self-explanatory. He thinks that this approach, with a modest headquarters in Cairo, possibly even including Turkey, would be acceptable to all the countries involved.

Why don't you take a look at it and tell me if it is anything you want to get involved in.

Regards,

Attach.
"Restoring the Ceasefire and Resurrecting the Roadmap" (undated)

DHR:dh
013004-7

Middle East

30 Jan 04

OSD 01392-04

The enclosed paper was developed by a group of high level Israelis and Palestinians acting in their private capacities. These ideas are offered in the spirit of providing suggestions for restoring the cease-fire and resurrecting the roadmap. This meeting occurred as part of the Track Two Mid-East Program sponsored by the UCLA Burke Center for International Relations. It was held at the Dead Sea Marriott in Jordan November 7-8, 2003.

Participants included:

Abed Alloun
David Kimche
Mohammed Rashid
Zeev Schiff
Ephraim Sneh
Steven Spiegel
Rapporteur, Anita Sharma

Restoring the Ceasefire and Resurrecting the Roadmap

Executive Summary

This document was prepared by a group of Israelis and Palestinians who were committed to focusing on the immediate present and ways of restoring the ceasefire and resurrecting the roadmap. In this purpose it differs markedly from other recent private Israeli-Palestinian efforts that focused on a permanent settlement. In the light of the formation of the new Palestinian government, the group is also trying to take advantage of this opportunity and prevent the deterioration of any remaining understandings still in effect. The group also believes that the inevitable deterioration that would occur if nothing is done would lead to a worsening of attitudes toward the United States in the region. The group is confident that its new proposals will address some of the past problems that the parties confronted and therefore improve the prospects for success. It recommends that the primary elements of the renewed initiative should be:

- An indefinite ceasefire between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israelis, which would be monitored by a Trilateral Committee (TC) consisting of Israel, the PA, and the United States.
- The issue of the security fence is addressed below with the fundamental emphasis that it should be basically along the Green Line.
- A series of measure of outlined below and overseen by the Trilateral Committee.
- A Middle East Association on Terrorism (MEAT) should be established, consisting of the United States, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine and the Iraqi Governing Council, with headquarters in Cairo.
- As a corridor between Phases I and II of the roadmap, a pilot program should be implemented in Gaza, which would be based upon the evacuation of Israeli settlements following the achievement of a period of stabilization and full cessation of terror.
- Improvement of the economic situation is critical to the success of the peace process. A long-term Economic Roadmap is presented below.

Introduction

The U.S. backed plan for peace, the "Roadmap," is on the verge of collapse. Only the United States can break the vicious circle and jumpstart the process again. It can do so by bringing the two parties to fulfill their commitments to the Roadmap. When both sides take the measures they are committed to, a constructive momentum can be created.

The U.S. administration concentrates its efforts now in stabilizing Iraq and in its reconstruction. The administration is reluctant to invest energy and attention, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The common wisdom in Washington considers it as a useless distraction.

We, a group of Palestinians and Israelis, firmly believe that the U.S. interest requires a renewed effort. An American success in reviving the Roadmap, resuming of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, cessation of hostilities and terror, a relief of the suffering of both peoples, a progress towards a two-state solution—all these would strengthen the U.S. position in the region, and would create an atmosphere which is more favorable to the United States and its interests. It will demonstrate that the only stabilizing power in the region is the United States. A major Israeli-Palestinian violent confrontation would be interpreted as a failure of President Bush's policy, will increase anti-American feelings, and would encourage the adversaries of the United States.

The Ceasefire

Now that the Abu Ala government has formed, the first step should be to negotiate an indefinite ceasefire between the PA and Israel (in contrast to the previous cease fire which was between the PA and the militant groups and had a time limit of three months)

Immediately after the establishment of the ceasefire, a Trilateral Committee consisting of the United States, Israel and the Palestinians would be established. It would not only supervise and monitor the ceasefire, but would determine the reciprocal measures that would have to be taken and their timing. Examples of the necessary measures include:

For Palestinians:

1. take practical steps to prevent Hamas, Jihad, Al-Aqsa Brigades and others from being able to resort to terror;
2. shut down workshops which produce explosives, rockets, mortars;
3. dismantle illegal militias and the clandestine network which prepare terror operations;
4. curb illegal weapons smuggling;
5. make sure that no political organization has a military arm.

Immediately upon its formation the Committee should commission an examination of current Palestinian security forces capabilities and the additional force and training the forces may require in order to fulfill their obligations under this plan. Enhancing the efficiency and organization of the Palestinian security system must be addressed.

For Israelis:

1. releasing of substantial numbers of prisoners and detainees;
2. lifting of part of the roadblocks between Palestinian villages and towns;
3. more permits for Palestinians working in Israel;
4. measures for reviving trade and Palestinian business activity;
5. dismantling illegal outposts as indicated in the text of the roadmap.

With regard to the release of prisoners and removal of roadblocks, the installation of social services and the need for Palestinian reform, the following could act as guidelines to the Trilateral Committee:

- a. The Security Fence—If construction of the security fence continues, it should be basically along the green line. Efforts should be made to facilitate the movement of people during daylight hours via access points. A priority will be given to the construction of two terminals out of the five projected in the Jenin [Galame] and Tulkarem areas. Of course no fence can be the basis of the final border between the two states.
- b. Prisoners—Israel must be encouraged to release incrementally a significantly larger number of prisoners than it has so far discussed. Of the more than 6000 security prisoners in Israeli hands, only some 600 can be defined as having 'blood on their hands' and are therefore ineligible for release according to Israeli definition.
- c. Barriers—Israel should be urged to remove roadblocks and closures and allow the gradual restoration of freedom of movement for the Palestinians between towns and districts. The handover of towns by the IDF to the Palestinian Authority is, however, in itself insufficient. One of the major problems in the present situation is the cut in links between the villages and their provincial centers. Villagers need to be able to visit neighboring towns. Their well-

being depends on it. It is, therefore, necessary to address the removal of the IDF presence from districts, and not only from towns, so that a real improvement in the daily lives of the people can be attained. Again, gradual withdrawals will serve as reinforcing confidence building measures over time. As a pilot project, the Israeli and Palestinian security authorities should jointly consider the handing over of two security barriers to the Palestinian Authority, whether they are in Area A or B.

- d. Social Services—The disastrous economic situation of the Palestinian people enables the extremist Islamist organizations to strengthen their position by supplying social services that are otherwise unavailable. This activity on their part has increased to such an extent that there exists a real danger that a majority of Palestinians would become further radicalized and vote for Hamas if given the opportunity. There is, therefore, an urgent need for immediate and coordinated help to the PA so that it can be seen as the party which brings an improvement in the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian populace.
- e. Palestinian Reform—The constitutional reforms demanded in the roadmap must be completed, and elections should be held at such a time when the present Palestinian government feels fit to hold them. An improvement in the Palestinian economic conditions would significantly enhance the prospects that the PA would win the elections and become the consensus Palestinian source of power. In addition, the Palestinians must be pressured to expand their security judicial and legal reforms to meet the commitments they have made to the international community.

The Mid-East Association on Terrorism (MEAT)

The core problem remains the continuation of violence and terror which threatens the successful implementation of the roadmap. In the past the assumption had been that if the Palestinians take action against terrorist elements within their own community, the problem of terrorism could be solved. Of course it is true that the Palestinians must take action; however, the problem is more complex than originally envisioned. Neighboring states, especially Syria, harbor Palestinian terrorist leaders who are ultimately the decisive factor in determining Hamas actions, often against the wishes of leaders inside the territories. Unless this problem is addressed energetically, it will be very difficult to eradicate terrorist acts.

We should also remember that Iran provides the lion's share of funding for Islamic Jihad and certain Gulf states are still the primary source of financial support to Hamas. We therefore urge the creation of a U.S. led regional association, the Mid-East Association on Terrorism (MEAT) to combat terrorism which would include the United

States, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine and the Iraqi Governing Council, with headquarters in Cairo. This association would be an ongoing operation to address such issues as state-harboring of terrorists; official and private funding of terrorist organizations and their affiliates, and illegal supply of weapons.

The Palestinians will not be genuinely successful until external sources end financial support for terror, which must continue to be a top priority of U.S. policy. External sources encompass many different avenues, including Iran and Arab governments and other international fundraising efforts. Incitement to violence from outside sources such as certain Arab satellite media must also be addressed on an urgent basis.

Until governments in the region take a clear, demonstrable stand, backed up by actions, against terrorism—specifically, to cease all forms of support for those groups that use terror in Palestine and Israel—they will be considered to have aided and abetted terror. All the states in the region should make a clear and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The MEAT may eventually become a platform for expanding cooperation and dialogue in other spheres.

The Role of the Arab States

To restore peace and quiet and reengage the peace process, it would aid immeasurably if Egypt and Jordan returned their ambassadors to Israel, and other Arab states, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Qatar initiate the resumption of diplomatic ties with Israel. Arab states can further encourage the Palestinian leadership toward peaceful reconciliation while preventing the continuation of illicit activity, including arms smuggling. The Saudi initiative should be addressed in a more positive manner through constructive dialogue.

The Gaza Pilot

A detailed proposal called the Roadmap Reinforcement Package (RRP) is contained in addendum 1. Its main emphasis is on a pilot project in Gaza premised on nine months of the cessation of hostilities and terror in and from Gaza. Based on the termination of violence, the Israeli government will evacuate the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli troops which protect them.

The Economic Roadmap

It is clear that the success of the roadmap depends very much on an economic one. The current economic conditions in the PA may have a negative impact on the Palestinian public's support for implementation of the roadmap. An improvement of the economic situation may help convince the population that the roadmap has produced tangible results and a change in their lives. The financial and fiscal reforms carried out by the Palestinian Minister of Finance in recent months should be commended. The proposal tackles both the immediate term and the medium-to-long term.

Phase I

Labor

Work permits should be increased to about 50,000, assuming that the Israeli market can absorb them. The Palestinian G.N.P. depends for the foreseeable future on this element and therefore it is important to use this vehicle. Israel will also increase the number of permits for businessmen to travel to Israel.

Financial and Economic support

1. Israel should accelerate the transfer of collected duties to the P.A. An immediate transfer of about \$200 million (U.S.) could have a dramatic effect on the budgetary situation of the P.A.
2. Continued delays in disbursement from countries in the region such as Kuwait, Libya and Qatar, who have not delivered on their funds, jeopardize the viability and stability of the Palestinian government. Failure to receive this money could result in salaries not being paid, and will undermine the Abu Ala government. It is imperative that the US government exert its influence immediately, using all necessary measures, in the strongest possible way.
3. The international community, including G-8 and some Arab countries, should also devise an emergency fund of about \$1 billion (US) to finance immediate projects with the aim of enhancing job creation and, in addition to the funds transferred from Israel, for the following four financial purposes:
 - a. Palestinian budget support
 - b. Direct support to Palestinian families in dire economic conditions

- c. Support early retirement of advance aged public sector employees to allow the entry of younger ones
 - d. Support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
 - e. Start work on rebuilding Gaza airport
4. U.S. and E.U. should grant special duty-free entry to joint Israeli-Palestinian products from the joint industrial zones and joint enterprises.
 5. A joint Israeli-Palestinian decision on the creation of several industrial parks and an international donor community decision to assist in their establishment and functioning. Such industrial parks can create between 10,000 – 15,000 jobs.
 6. Both sides should re-activate the Joint Economic Committee.

Stages II and III

In these stages the aims should be to further stabilize the Palestinian economic situation, and further ameliorate the labor conditions, the infrastructure and other related issues.

1. Housing – A massive movement on this matter can transform the Palestinian economic and political environment. This entails, of course, serious questions of financing, the creation of a mortgage market, etc.
2. A – Infrastructure – a comprehensive plan has to be put in place dealing with transportation, telecommunication and energy.
B – Start operational activities of the Gaza airport including cargo facilities (subject to the bi-lateral agreement), and begin work on the Gaza port.
3. Water is a major cause of friction between all neighbors in this sub-region of the Middle East. The U.S., E.U., and the World Bank, together with Israel, the P.A. and Jordan, should prepare a plan to improve the use of existing water resources and desalination on a regional basis.
4. Environment – The proximity of Israel, the P.A. and Jordan makes it necessary to develop coordinated projects to improve conditions and protect against environmental damages that can be created by an accelerated process of building and industrialization.
5. Tourism – All countries in the region suffered from the impact of both September 11, 2001 events and the intifada. A joint action plan including joint promotional activities will encourage third countries' tourists, who are a major source of income.

All of the above items will need major financial support from the international community (Israel included.) This can be achieved through the creation of a fund of \$2 – 4 billion (U.S.) which will finance directly, help to raise funds by guarantees, and channel other available funds.

Trade

Bilateral trade with Israel is of utmost importance to the Palestinian economy. The current economic regime is based on the Paris agreement of 1994, which established a custom union between Israel and the PA.

The absence of borders and a Palestinian government were major factors in tilting the balance towards a custom union rather than a Free Trade Agreement. So were the considerations of labor in Israel and the wish to enter the Israeli market duty free.

Both sides should review the bilateral trade relations with the view of strengthening trade and removing restrictions. Both sides should minimize the obstacles to bilateral trade and should create a sufficient number of crossing points, with the necessary security facilities to allow the free flow of goods.

The E.U. and the U.S. should, for a limited period, consider removal of certain customs limitations on Palestinian goods with no other sales outlet.

Economic Reforms

Throughout all phases, the Palestinian Government should continue the economic and financial reforms, with the assistance of the international community and institutions. All financial transfers to the Palestinian Government should be governed by existing policies and transparency.

Why will this plan work when previous efforts met with little success?

1. Stronger U.S. support is essential to assure that both parties will implement the measures to which they are obligated.
2. Abu Mazen failed to receive adequate support either from the United States or Israel in order to succeed. Palestinians, both in the public as well as in the leadership, perceived that he conceded too much without receiving anything in return.
3. Unlike previous efforts, this one would be underpinned by a regional association to address problems of terrorism.
4. Unlike previous efforts, there would be no time limits to the ceasefire and it would include Israel.

5. This proposal is unique because it involves a trilateral committee comprised of the United States, Israel and the Palestinians to monitor the ceasefire.

Why should the United States embark on this effort now?

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is no stable status quo—conditions either improve or deteriorate. The elapse of time without any initiatives will only aggravate the conflict. It will further threaten American interests in the region as escalating tensions will exacerbate anti-American sentiment and increase the chances for increased terrorist activity. The growing despair on both sides offers an unusual opportunity for achieving success. The time is ripe to restore the ceasefire and resurrect the roadmap.

Addendum 1

Roadmap Reinforcement Package (RRP) (Fourth draft April 8, 2003)

The international Roadmap is the only plan that has the support of all parties to the conflict as well as the personal commitment of President Bush to its implementation. The object of the Roadmap Reinforcement Package (RRP) proposed below is to energize the Roadmap and give it concrete shape thus providing a visible demonstration of the prospects of progress towards a full peace agreement. The RRP will consist of three phases to be implemented over twelve months as an integral part of and in parallel to other agreed elements of the Roadmap:

Phase 1: 3 Months

During the first phase of the RRP, the two sides undertake the following:

A. Security measures

- The IDF will redeploy to positions outside the cities, town, and refugee camps of the Gaza Strip (G.S.) to avoid unnecessary friction with the population.
- Palestinian security forces will be granted full access to the areas vacated by the IDF and will deploy within them, with the object of imposing law and order, providing security and preventing any acts of violence against Israel or Israelis originating from the areas under their control.
- Palestinian security forces will ensure that there will be no para-military or illegal armed groups or forces operating in the areas under their control.
- The PA and government of Israel (GOI) will commence security coordination and exchange of intelligence.
- With the commencement of the RRP, the IDF will refrain from any preventive attacks, targeted operations against Palestinians, or incursions into areas under PA security control. PA security forces will assume full responsibility for responding to any sporadic acts of violence.
- Subject to the cessation of violence, the IDF will withdraw to the lines of September 28, 2000 in the Gaza Strip. as soon as possible and no later than the end of the first phase of the RRP.

B. Economic measures

Parallel to improved security conditions, the GOI will take steps to improve the economic welfare of the inhabitants of the G.S including:

- Granting a minimum of 5,000 work permits per month.
- Allowing for the repair and rehabilitation of major infrastructural projects in the G.S, including Dahaniya airport, Electricity, Gas, and Desalination projects.
 - Reactivating the full fishing zone.
 - Reactivating and expanding the industrial zones in Karni and Erez.

- Lifting restrictions on the import and export of goods from the G.S., contingent on security arrangements.

C. Other measures

In tandem with other agreed steps in the Roadmap, the first phase of the RRP will also comprise the following additional measures:

- The GOI will freeze all settlement activities in the G.S.
- The PA will act to end hostile incitement and propaganda.
- The GOI and PA will implement three parallel pilot projects on the West Bank.
- With the commencement of the first phase of the RRP, the PA will resume full security control in Jenin area, and the IDF will withdraw fully to the lines of September 28, 2000 as soon as possible and no later than six weeks, subject to the cessation of violence. The industrial park in Mukeible north of Jenin will be revived with support from Federal Republic of German (FRG).
- As above, the PA will resume full security control in the Qaliqiyah area and the IDF will withdraw fully to the lines of September 28, 2000 as soon as possible and no later than six weeks, subject to the cessation of violence. Steps will be taken to improve the economic situation of the Palestinian residents of the area.
- As above, the PA will resume full security control in Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahur, and the IDF will withdraw fully to the lines of September 28, 2000 as soon as possible and no later than six weeks, subject to the cessation of violence. An international effort led by the Government of Italy and other EU states will be directed at rehabilitating the hotels and tourist infrastructure and encouraging the return of tourists to the area.
- Similar arrangements for Nablus will be agreed upon, contingent upon the success of the above projects.

NOTE: The PA and the GOI agree that progress in implementing the RRP in the Gaza Strip is not contingent on progress in the West Bank or vice versa. The same applies to the different areas of the West Bank mentioned in (C) above.

D. Monitoring and Implementation

A U.S led committee including the EU, the UN and Russia will be established to monitor the progress of the RRP and decide the move from one phase to another in the G.S. The committee will be the final adjudicator in settling any disputes between the parties over the implementation of the RRP. Decisions of the committee will be taken by consensus.

Phase 2: 6 months

Upon the approval of the committee, the second 'Stabilization' phase of the RRP will commence. The Stabilization phase will last for six months and will build upon the achievements of the first phase. Subject to the cessation of violence, it will reinforce progress by:

- Measure taken by the PA to maintain and consolidate security arrangements agreed and implemented in phase one
 - Further agreed Israeli withdrawals, and the expansion of PA areas of control in the G.S. subject to the same terms as above.
 - Further steps to improve the economic and living conditions in the G.S.
 - Palestinian prisoners will be released.
 - Measures taken by the GOI allowing freedom of movement and access in the G.S. and facilitating movement in and out of the Strip.
 - The GOI and the PA will reinstate previously agreed safe passage arrangements between the G.S. and the West Bank.
 - The GOI will take steps to allow for the rehabilitation of Gaza Seaport.

Phase 3: 3 months

Upon the successful completion of the Stabilization phase as agreed by the Monitoring and Implementation Committee, the third and final phase of the RRP will begin. The third and final phase will last for three months, and will build on the achievements of the first and second phases. By the end of the third and final phase of the RRP, and as agreed by the Monitoring and Implementation Committee.

- The IDF will implement a full and final withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the G.S.
- All Israeli settlements in the G.S will be evacuated
- The PA will assume full security and administrative control of the entire territory of the Gaza Strip
- All other relevant elements of the RRP, and other agreed steps taken within the framework of the roadmap will remain operative.

All elements of the RRP are to be seen as parallel to and part of the Roadmap.

1-27-04

January 27, 2004

Advance copy sent to Dr. Chu 1/27 0830

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statistics

I need the data soon—tomorrow—as to:

1. The percentage of Reserves that have never been called up or not been called up in five or ten years.
2. The percentage of Reserves and Guard used in each of the Services for Iraq so far.
3. The number of people under stop-loss and stop-move.

I would like the data to be arranged in a way that is persuasive.

Please get me the first draft no later than Wednesday, January 28, so we can get it reworked the rest of the week before the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:db
012704-9

.....
Please respond by 1/28/04

OSD 01400-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039443

SECRET
017 2 1 0 15



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2004, 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu 30 Jan 04

SUBJECT: Statistics--SNOWFLAKE

- You requested specific information regarding percentages and numbers of Reserve component members called-up, and not called-up, for mobilizations over time, and the number of Total Force members impacted by Stop Loss.
- Attached is an Information Paper that I believe answers your questions and provides an accurate picture of Reserve component mobilizations, using DoD personnel data as of December 31, 2003.
- The key facts are as follows:
 - About 36% of the Selected Reserve has been involuntarily called-up for the current operations.
 - Conversely, about 64% has not been called-up.
 - Since December 1995, about 42% have been called-up.
 - About 20,342 (1.4%) Active and 25,538 (2.9%) Reserve members are currently impacted by Stop Loss
- This information also supports the rebalancing actions initiated by the Department.

Attachment
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)



Statistics

1.



	Desert Shield/Storm (Aug 90-Aug 91)	Haiti (Sep 94-May 96)	Bosnia (Dec 95-Dec 03)	Southwest Asia (SWA) (Feb 98-Dec 03)	Kosovo (Apr 99-Dec 03)	ONE/OEF/OIF (Sep 01-Dec 03)
# RC Invol Called-Up*	239,187	6,250	32,404	6,108	11,426	319,193

- From September 11, 2001 through December 31, 2003 we have involuntarily mobilized about 319,193 members of the Selected Reserve, or about 37% of RC members filling structured billets (875,609). This means that about 63% of Selected Reserve members have not been called-up.
(Note: The baseline does not include the 287,332 members in the RC manpower pool - the Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard.)
- Of the 319,193 RC members who have served/are serving in the current operations, 11,802 have also served in previous operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, or SWA) going back to Dec 1995. (This equates to about 1.3% of the SelRes force of today)
- Additionally, of the 319,193 members who have served/are serving in the current operations, 15,982 have been called up more than once for this contingency. (This equates to about 1.8% of the SelRes force of today).
- So, overall, less than 4% of the SelRes force of today has been involuntarily called-up more than once since 1995.
- A review of the overall numbers called-up, and those who have been called up more than once, shows that the stress (or usage) is focused in certain areas. This has led to the force rebalancing efforts that have been initiated in DoD.

2. Reserve Members Called-Up (ONE/OEF/OIF) & % of Selected Reserve

ARNG	USAR	USNR	USMCR	ANG	USAFR	USCGR	TOTAL
125,353	87,758	20,052	23,290 31,599	31,599	23,737	7,404	319,193
36.2%	41.5%	23.0%	57.3%	29.4%	32.0%	95.0%	36.5%

(%’s do not account for SelRes attrition over 2 years - therefore %’s may be overstated)

3. Members Impacted by Stop Loss:

Approximately 20,342 Active Component, and 25,538 Reserve Component members.

The above information does not account for attrition in the Selected Reserve.

We have not normally calculated percentages using the IRR/ING population - since only a limited number (about 6,000) have been called-up for the current operations, and none could legally be mobilized (involuntarily) for Bosnia, Kosovo, or SWA operations.

1-27-04

January 27, 2004

*Advance
copy sent to Dr. Chu
1/27 0830*

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statistics

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1. The percentage of Reserves that have never been called up or not been called up in five or ten years.
2. The percentage of Reserves and Guard used in each of the Services for Iraq so far.
3. The number of people under stop-loss and stop-move.

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Please get me the first draft no later than Wednesday, January 28, so we can get it reworked the rest of the week before the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012704-9

.....
Please respond by 1/28/04

TO: David.Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
DATE: January 9, 2004
SUBJECT: Reserve Forces

We are going to have to make sure that the services, when they finish rebalancing, that I can see how many units are still going to be in the newly balanced reserves and guard who have never been called up or have not been called up in 13 years and have only been called up once every decade.

Thanks .

DHR/azn
01090402

Please respond by: _____

~~1/14/04~~ 1/15/04

OSD 01401-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039447



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2004 – 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Visibility – SNOWFLAKE

- We will put in place a data system that meets the objectives you outlined (Tab A).
- For this hearing cycle, we compiled a short paper that describes the Department's rebalancing effort, and that you reviewed, asking that I summarize its main points. Tab B provides the requested summary.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)



TAB

A

TO: David, Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 9, 2004
SUBJECT: Reserve Forces

We are going to have to make sure that the services, when they finish rebalancing, that I can see how many units are still going to be in the newly balanced reserves and guard who have never been called up or have not been called up in 13 years and have only been called up once every decade.

Thanks..

DHR/asm
01/09/04

Please respond by: _____

1/14/04 *1/15/04*

OSD 01401-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039450

TAB

B

Cohesive Rebalancing Strategy to Reduce Stress on the Force

STRATEGY

- Move later deploying AC forces forward in the plan and early deploying RC forces later in the plan; shift assets between combatant commanders
- Introduce innovative management techniques:
 - Enhance volunteerism to provide trained, ready individual reservists and units who can respond immediately without requiring mobilization (e.g. aircrews, transportation support, PSYOPs, IMAs)
 - Expand the use of reachback to reduce the footprint in theater through virtual connectivity to CONUS locations (e.g. IO, intelligence, finance)
 - Streamline the mobilization process to improve responsiveness; provide additional resources to enhance readiness of RC units
- Rebalance capabilities by converting lower priority structure to higher priority structure both within and between the AC and RC.

Multiple approaches are needed to resolve force imbalances.

OBJECTIVES

- Enhance early responsiveness: Structure forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during early stages of a rapid response operation
- Resolve stressed career fields: Structure forces to limit involuntary mobilization to reasonable and sustainable rates.
- Employ innovative management practices: Achieves the greatest degree of flexibility while reducing stress on critical career fields and the need for involuntary mobilization
 - Continuum of Service – a new availability and service paradigm on a scale from 0-365 days, provides greater flexibility for supporting Dept's mission
 - Enhanced volunteerism, reachback, and rotational overseas presence are additional approaches
 - Mobilization process improvements – underway, already reduced approval timeline significantly; continuing to work

RESULT

The Department's cohesive rebalancing strategy has resulted in about 10,000 changes in military spaces both within and between the Active and Reserve components in FY 03; and about 20,000 in FY 04. The FY 05 budget supports an additional 20,000 changes.

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Fran Harvey

451

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter from Richard Gamin

Attached is a letter I received from a very bright man, Richard Garwin. It has some interesting thoughts that you might take advantage of.

Thanks.


Attach.

12/10/04 Richard **Garwin** letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
121404-8

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

14 Dec 04



(b)(6) (b)(6)

P. 01/02

Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights NY 10598-0218

(b)(6)

FAX: (b)(6)

INTERNET: (b)(6)

December 10, 2004

(via FAX to (b)(6))

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

I saw excerpts from your meeting with the troops in Kuwait, and just now (Thursday, 10:30 pm Washington time) I saw on C-SPAN a session with LGEN Steven Whitcomb about armored vehicles.

I thought that Whitcomb did a good job, but the reporters were very smart, and had good questions.

Whitcomb said that there was no shortage of material, no shortage of vehicles, and no shortage of people, and they were making good progress against their schedule.

But there are two problems. First, a lot of trucks don't seem to have armor at all, and a good many HUM-Vs do not have armor.

Whitcomb said that the Congress has provided \$1.2 B, and so there was no shortage of armor. But he said also, "I don't know the specifics."

LGEN Whitcomb should not have had to appear without "knowing the specifics."

The troops in the field are highly motivated to protect themselves and their colleagues. If they can do the job with steel and glass they scrounge from landfills, they can do the job a lot better with steel and glass that are provided from U.S. military stores, that they they can mount on their own vehicles. Our people are smart, and they are motivated, and when they are not in combat they have a good deal of time to do what needs to be done.

If we don't have the materiel ready, we should (and should have) consider getting such materiel produced for us by China or other places where there are people who are hungry and capable. We don't need to have them produce the best we know how to do— only

something that is pretty good. For instance, one should note that our vehicles suffer IED attacks from the right, much more than from the left. Therefore, if one has a shortage of time or materiel, the right side should be armored more heavily than the left.

I do not expect my Secretary of Defense to go out there with a drill and wrench or a welding torch, but I do expect the Army and the Marines to be beating down the doors with expedient armoring schemes.

And these should be practiced in a competition, so that we don't have totally unarmored trucks carrying people in one of these high-speed convoys.

We are where we are, but the question is what can be done in four weeks, for instance.

I am in Washington until Saturday, available by Email at RLG2 at us.ibm.com, in the remote event that anyone wishes to contact me.

very best regards.

Sincerely yours,



Richard L. Garwin

RLG:jah:4345DHR:121004.DHR

JAN 31 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: Gen Dick Myers
GEN Pete Schoomaker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Dr. Garwin

I think you ought to go ahead and get an appropriate letter back to Dr. Garwin. I have read your memo. Why don't you handle it and tell him I asked you to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/14/04 SecDef Memo to DSD, et al.
12/10/04 Letter to SecDef from Dr. Richard Garwin

DHR:ss
012805-5

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

451
31 garwin

14 Dr. 04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0700

INFO MEMO

January 19, 2005, 5:00 p.m

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army
Peter J. Schoomaker, General, Chief of Staff, Army *19.06.05*

SUBJECT: "Letter from Richard Garwin". (Army Measures to Protect Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV)).

- The purpose of this memo is to respond to your memo dated, December 14, 2004, regarding a letter from Richard Garwin. (Tab A)
- All TWVs used in conduct of operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) [Iraq and Afghanistan] will have some level of armor protection (Level I, II, or III) by March 2005.
- The Army is working diligently to meet CENTCOM TWV protection requirements by evaluating both materiel and non-materiel solutions to provide the maximum protection possible for Soldiers conducting missions in TWVs.
- The Army is using three distinct levels of TWV armor protection. The first category, referred to as level I, refers to fully integrated armor installed during production and retrofit. The second, level II, includes officially approved add-on armor kits that can be installed on vehicles, either in the United States or in the theater of operations. Finally, the third category, level III, includes locally fabricated armor using approved steel, which provides added protection as an interim measure until a level I or II kit can be applied. Together, these various levels, along with ongoing efforts to assess and test other technological improvements will ensure that all TWVs involved in operational missions are equipped with the best protection available.
- No later than February 15, 2005, all TWVs operating in Iraq outside of forward operating bases will have some level of armor protection. The J4 led fusion cell is ensuring that all services are working together to achieve up-armorings sooner than the February 15, 2005 objective.

451

19 JAN 05

14 DEC 04

SUBJECT: "Letter from Richard Garwin" (Army Measures to Protect Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV)).

- Considerable efforts as well as significant progress have been made in the endeavor since late 2003, and the pace has been accelerated in response to the rapidly changing operational requirements. The initial priority was placed on up-armorizing light tactical wheel vehicles, primarily the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle, by a combination of increased production and providing add-on armor kits for older vehicles. The requirement for armorizing these vehicles has escalated dramatically from a few hundred in March 2003 to over 8,000 by December 2004. The Army has already provided over 6,000 and expects to meet current requirements by March 2005. The priority has now shifted to providing armor protection for medium and heavy TWVs. Current Level I and II requirements will be met by June 2005.
- Up-armorizing is not the only solution to protect Soldiers from the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. The Army is aggressively integrating a host of capabilities and measures in an effort to better protect Soldiers and TWVs. Units in theater have successfully employed IED countermeasures to reduce their vulnerability to IEDs. Units in theater are adapting and evolving their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter enemy IED tactics. All Army units conduct live, virtual and constructive predeployment training at home station and at our training centers using the most current lessons learned provided by units currently operating in theater. When possible, almost all of the Army's predeployment training encompasses a training period for units of no less than six months in length and immerses the Soldier in a realistic theater-like combat environment. Our commanders and Soldiers in theater not only rely on armor protection, but also realize that force protection requires the integration of a host of different capabilities. Thus, up-armorizing is not the only solution to protect Soldiers.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: ~~None~~ As stated

Prepared By: LTC Ed Agee, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen **Dick** Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Fran Harvey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

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
Attach.
12/10/04 Richard Garwin letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
121404-8

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/039459



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218
(914) 945-2555

FAX: (b)(6)

INTERNET: (b)(6)

December 10, 2004

(Via FAX to (b)(6))

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Secretary of Defense
US . Department of Defense
1000 Defense: Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

r. 02/02

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
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very best regards.

Sincerely yours,



Richard L. Garwin

RLG:jah:4345DHR:121004.DHR

** TOTAL Pffie.02 **

11-L-0559/OSD/039461



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

10 FEB 2005

Mr. Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, New York 10598-0218

Dear Mr. Garwin:

Secretary Rumsfeld asked that I write to you regarding the Army's ongoing efforts to improve the armored protection for our wheeled vehicles. This is a critically important subject to both the Army and other United States military forces, especially for those forces operating today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army is working diligently to meet United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV) protection needs by evaluating both materiel and non-materiel solutions to provide the maximum protection possible for Soldiers conducting missions in TWVs. The Army recently established an Armoring Task Force to accelerate fielding of armor solutions to the force.

Since the fall of 2003, when the insurgency in Iraq began to intensify, there were approximately 250 armored TWVs in theater. With the support of Congress, acting in full partnership with industry, the Army has dramatically increased the pace of both production and fielding. By the end of this month, at least 32,000 TWVs in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters will be protected. Most important, after February 15, 2005, no vehicle carrying an American Soldier will leave a protected base without armor. This overall effort has increased the number of armored vehicles in theater by a factor of over one-hundred since August 2003.

The Army is using three distinct levels of TWV armor protection. The first category, level I, is fully integrated armor installed during production and retrofit. The second, level II, includes officially approved add-on armor kits that can be installed on vehicles, either in the United States or in the theater of operations. Finally, the third category, level III, includes locally fabricated armor using Department of the Army approved steel, which provides added protection as an interim measure until a level I or II kit can be applied. Together, these various categories, along with ongoing efforts to assess and test other technological improvements, will ensure that all TWVs involved in operational missions are equipped with the best protection available.

11-L-0559/OSD/039462

451
10 Feb 05
14 Dec 04
R 01419-05

It is also important to note that up-armorizing is not the only solution to protect Soldiers from the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. Our commanders and Soldiers in theater not only rely on armor protection, but also realize that force protection requires the integration of a host of different capabilities, such as employment of IED countermeasures to reduce unit vulnerability to IEDs. Units in theater are adapting and evolving their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter enemy IED tactics. Furthermore, all Army units are conducting live, virtual and constructive predeployment training at home station and at our training centers using the most current lessons learned provided by units currently operating in theater.


The nature and extent of the challenge has changed rapidly over the past months, and the Army has made every effort to adjust rapidly to the escalating requirement we face in providing the best protection possible to our Soldiers. With excellent support from the Department of Defense, Congress and Industry, we have made considerable progress and have additional initiatives underway to meet those requirements.

Thank you for your professional and personal interest in this vitally important area, and we appreciate your continuing support for our military forces and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,

Francis J. Harvey

120



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 24 2005

Mr. and Mrs. Robert C. Jones

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Jones,

Thank you so much for your Christmas card. I deeply appreciate your good wishes and kind words of support.

I also thank you for your service to our country, and wish you all the best in the New Year.

Sincerely,

3355 ✓

24 Jan 05

28 Dec 04

OSD 01463-05

Mr. and Mrs. Robert C. Jones

(b)(6)

FL

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Jones,

Thank you so much for your Christmas card. I deeply appreciate your good wishes and kind words of support.

I also thank you for your service to our country, and wish you all the best in the New Year.

Sincerely,



Paul Butler
1/21

re: shorttake request

hamp
CSL 12/29

~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: CAPT Bill Marriott
CC: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Note to Mr. & Mrs. RC . Jones

Please draft a nice note back to these folks who sent this Christmas card. It is quite interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
Christmas Card from Mr. and Mrs. Robert C. Jones

DHR:sa
122704-13

.....
Please respond by 1/3/04

CSC-
Please draft note
as requested.
Thanks,
E

33551D

28 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 01463-05




Best Wishes For



Merry Christmas & Prosperous New Year
for you Sir and your family!
We former U.S. Marines don't believe
the media liars!
Respectfully R.C. + M.J.

James
Kangas
Kangas Florida
Please forward our
RFID number
to our friends
V.P. +





God Bless
You Honorable
Secretary of Defense
Our Wife D.J. (Nickname) and
Myself R.C. (Nickname) do pray for and
stand in support of your every decision!
I am a former President on your actions to defend
and protect America and our troops
equip and protect America and our troops
in the middle east & around the world!
I will bear from me
regularly support, encourage
& thank Honor
You!
D.J.

February 2, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
 Dr. Condoleezza Rice
 Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Intelligence Commission

334

Attached is a Newt Gingrich op-ed piece that apparently is in the works.

I very much agree with his point that the commission ought to be focused on the 21st century challenges. Unfortunately, the draft I have seen of the commission keeps leaving out the subject of asymmetric threats.

Attach.
 2/1/04.Gingrich e-mail: "The Right Intelligence Commission".

DHR:dh
 020204-3

2 Feb 04

OSD 01479-04

cc: LTG Craddock
D. Rita

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, February 01, 2004 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@jack.patterson@osd.mil;
 stephen.cambone@OSD..mil
Cc: damicorj@js.pentagon.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: the right intelligence commission-newt

the following is a proposed op ed I am submitting,

Newt

America does not need a narrowly focused commission looking only at the question of American intelligence on Iraq.

America does not need a backward oriented commission that only seeks to find fault.

America does not need one more cycle of self righteous politicians undermining and demoralizing the intelligence professionals who risk their lives and risk their careers rendering judgement about secret dictatorships with inadequate information and inadequate resources.

Intelligence professionals especially do not need to be lectured by the very politicians who cut their funding, undermined their capacity for human intelligence, and established systems of oversight which periodically lead to scapegoating but seldom lead to serious reform or improvement.

However, America does need a thorough review of the new, harder, and more complex 21st century worldwide intelligence challenges which have become obvious since 9/11.

The weakening of the intelligence community began with the Church Committee and was compounded by the Carter administration's dismantling of our human intelligence capability (as Ambassador David Kay noted in his recent testimony). It was then further compounded by the Clinton Administration's starving the intelligence community of resources.

It is now time for a commission aimed at strengthening the intelligence community rather than undermining it.

The President should establish a commission on 21st Century American intelligence requirements in the age of weapons of mass murder (biological and chemical) and

mass destruction(nuclear).

The commission should begin by reviewing the level of denial and deception countries now use to hide their programs. The Iranian, Libyan, North Korean, and Iraqi examples are four of the cases the commission should review.

The scale of Pakistani scientist involvement in the illegal international arms trade including nuclear capabilities and the involvement of North Korea in systematic illegal international arms deals should be a focus of the commission.

The commission should also review foreign intelligence efforts around the world and the degree to which they know more or less than the American intelligence community.

Finally, the Commission should make recommendations about the size, structure, and culture of intelligence to fit it for the extraordinary challenges of a 21st century worldwide war involving weapons of mass murder and weapons of mass destruction.

This is the right kind of commission focused on the right questions and it would be an asset to the intelligence community.

This is a Commission appropriate to a time when we are each day seeing new terrorists threats, new bombings around the world, and new losses of American life.

It is time to rise above political concerns and put the country's needs first. This is a real war and we need a Commission appropriate to waging war.,

February 3, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Draft Remarks

Attached are draft remarks that I may use ^{tomorrow} ~~today~~ in my hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

I would appreciate any suggestions you might have fast.

Regards,

Attach.
Draft remarks

DHR:dh
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000.5

3 Feb 04

OSD 01533-04

DRAFT 3

INSERT ON WMD/PRESIDENT'S NEW INTELLIGENCE COMMISSION
[1494 Words, 11 Minutes]

- During my confirmation hearings before this Committee three years ago, I was asked what would keep me up at night. I answered: "intelligence."
- I said that because the challenge facing the intelligence community then and today is truly difficult. Its task is to penetrate closed societies and organizations – to try and learn things that our adversaries don't want us to know, often not knowing precisely what it is they should be looking for – while our adversaries know precisely what it is they don't want us to know. That is a very tough assignment.
- Intelligence agencies are operating in an era of surprise – when new threats can emerge suddenly with little or no warning, as happened on September 11th. And it is their responsibility to warn policymakers about threats *before* they emerge, to try to connect the dots before the fact -- so we can take action to protect the American people.
- They must do this in an age when their margin for error has all but disappeared. In the 21st century, we are dealing with multiple potential adversaries – terrorist networks and terrorist states – that are pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them. The consequences of underestimating a threat could be the losses of not hundreds or thousands of lives, but potentially tens of thousands of lives, or more – losses that but for timely warning and response might otherwise be averted.

DRAFT 3

- The men and women in the intelligence community have a tough, and often thankless job. If they fail, the world knows it. And when they succeed – as they often do – their accomplishments often remain secret. Though we cannot discuss those successes in open session, it would be worth the Committee's time to hear of them. They are many and they are impressive.
- We are blessed that so many fine individuals have stepped forward to serve in the intelligence community, and are willing to work under great pressure, and in more than a few cases risk their lives.
- They faced a difficult challenge in the case of Iraq. They knew the history of the Iraqi regime – its use of chemical weapons on its own people and its neighbors. They knew what had been discovered during the inspections after the Persian Gulf War – much of which was far more advanced than the pre-Gulf War intelligence had indicated. They were keen observers of the reports of UNSCOM in the 1990s. And they and others did their best to penetrate the secrets of the regime of Saddam Hussein after the inspectors were kicked out in 1998.
- It was the consensus of the intelligence community – and of successive administrations of both parties and the Congress that reviewed the same intelligence – and much of the international community -- that Saddam Hussein was pursuing WMD.
- An objective look at Saddam Hussein's behavior throughout that period reinforced that conclusion. He did not behave like someone who was disarming and wanted to prove he was doing so. He did not open up his country to the world – as Kazakhstan, Ukraine,

DRAFT 3

and South Africa had previously done – and as Libya is doing today.

- Instead, he chose the path of deception and defiance. He continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions, when he could have had the sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed. Why? His regime filed what almost everyone agreed was a fraudulent declaration with the United Nations, and ignored the "final opportunity" afforded him by UNSC Resolution 1441. Why?
- The Congress, and the national security teams of both the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration, looked at essentially the same intelligence, and came to the same conclusion: that the Iraqi regime posed a gathering danger and had to be changed.
- There was no debate in the U.S. or the UN as to the nature of the problem.
- In the end, a large Coalition of nations decided to enforce the UN's resolutions. And as a result, the Iraqi people are now free.
- David Kay, the Director of Central Intelligence's Special Advisor, served in Iraq for some six months, directing the work of the Iraq Survey Group – the ISG. He and the ISG have worked hard, under difficult and dangerous conditions. They have brought forward important information. Dr. Kay is a scientist and an experienced weapons inspector. He has outlined for this Committee his hypothesis on the difference between pre-war estimates of Iraq's WMD and what has been found thus far, on the ground.

DRAFT 3

- While it is too early to come to final conclusions, given the work still to be done, there are several possibilities:
 - It's possible the WMD did not exist at the start of the war – possible, but not likely;
 - It's possible they existed, but were transferred in whole or in part to one or more countries;
 - It's possible it was dispersed and hidden throughout Iraq;
 - It's possible it was destroyed;
 - It's possible Iraq had small quantities and the capability for a rapid build up;
 - Or, it's possible that it was a big charade:
 - That Saddam Hussein fooled the world;
 - That Saddam Hussein fooled his own people;
 - Or even that Saddam Hussein was fooled *by* his own people, who told him he had capabilities he really didn't have;

- It is the job of Dr. Kay's successor and the Iraq Survey Group to pursue this issue wherever the facts in Iraq take it. It is a difficult task. Think: it took us some ten months to find Saddam Hussein – a human being. Interestingly, that hole he was found hiding in was large enough to hold enough weapons of mass destruction to kill thousands of human beings. And unlike Saddam Hussein, such objects, once buried, can stay buried. So they are no less difficult to find. Iraq is the size of California -- the chances of finding something buried in the ground without being led to it is minimal.

- As Dr. Kay has testified, what we have learned thus far has not proven Saddam had the things our intelligence indicated he had. On the other hand, the Iraq Survey Group's work has not concluded. There are some 1,300 people in the ISG in Iraq,

DRAFT 3

working hard, at personal risk, to find ground truth. When that work is complete, we will know more. While the evidence has not confirmed what we thought we knew, it also has not proven the opposite.

- Whatever the outcome, it is important that we seize the opportunity to derive lessons learned to inform the future. In DoD, Joint Forces Command has done an extensive review of the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom from the perspective of both Coalition forces and the Iraqi perspective. These lessons learned are helping identify ways our intelligence performance can be improved for the future.
- In addition to lessons learned from Iraq, it is important that we step back, and take look at the bigger picture -- that we examine whether U.S. intelligence capabilities are properly structured to meet the threats and challenges of the 21st century.
- The President has announced he will form a Commission on Strengthening the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States to do this. The Commission will review the past successes of the intelligence community, as well as cases where it has been less successful, to examine whether the intelligence community is properly organized and has sufficient skills among its agents and analysts and proper resources and the appropriate authorities to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
- Intelligence is not perfect. It is more art than a science. We do not, will not, and cannot know everything that is going on in the world. If at this important moment we mistake intelligence for irrefutable evidence, analysts will be reluctant to inform policymakers of what they think they know, what they know that

DRAFT 3

they don't know, and what they think. Policymakers bereft of intelligence will find themselves unable to make the prudential judgments necessary to protect our nation.

- I believe the President did the right thing in Iraq. I advised the President based on the intelligence we all saw – just as everyone here made their judgments, and cast their votes, based on that same information.
- The President has sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the nation. With respect to Iraq, he took the available evidence into account. He took into account September 11th. He took into account Saddam Hussein's behavior. He took into account his ongoing defiance of the UN, and the fact that until the end, the Iraqi regime was still shooting at U.S. and UK aircraft and their crews that were enforcing the UN resolutions in northern and southern no-fly zones.
- He went to the United Nations – and the Security Council passed a 17th resolution giving Iraq a "final opportunity" to disarm. And he went to this Congress – and based on that same intelligence, you voted to support military action if the Iraqi regime failed to take that "final opportunity." And then, after that "final opportunity," the President gave Saddam Hussein a final ultimatum – and only then, when all meaningful alternatives had been exhausted, the Coalition liberated Iraq.
- I believe that the world is today safer, and the Iraqi people are far better off.

##

February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Senator Collins and Union Issues w/NSPS

I just read your February 2 memo on the National Security Personnel System.

I should mention that besides seeing the articles in the press about union leaders complaining, Senator Collins raised it in my hearing. She obviously is hearing from them, and she expressed how deeply concerned she was. I don't know why she is concerned, and she didn't say.

Nonetheless, it seems to me that you ought to find a way to keep her informed as you go along, so she knows what is going on and is at least informed, if not in agreement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-14(is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

230
8 Feb 04
20 Jan 04

OSD 01559-04

2/8



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

February 2, 2004 - 11:28 AM

*DLU
2/3*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 2/2/04*

SUBJECT: National Security Personnel System (NSPS) Design--SNOWFLAKE
noted in memo

- We are already using our new authorities. We have implemented voluntary early retirement and buyout authority (helping close Roosevelt Roads), and will soon implement our authority to hire highly qualified experts and federal annuitants (which will immediately assist the Department in recruiting for hard-to-fill jobs).
- Most of the remaining steps to create a new civil personnel system require joint action with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as well as collaboration with employee unions.
 - o I met with Clay Johnson, Deputy Director for Management, OMB, on January 20, and with Kay Coles James, Director, OPM, on January 30, to discuss OPM involvement.
 - o OPM would like a more intrusive and time-consuming approach than we are pursuing, but Clay Johnson is working to help us maintain our schedule--first 300,000 DoD employees brought under NSPS by the start of FY05. We held our first national level meeting with unions on January 22 to discuss the labor relations system, per the statutory requirement, with subsequent meetings scheduled for late February. While the meeting with the unions was friendly, in other forums some union leaders have stated their opposition to the concepts we are advancing.
- We have three major tasks ahead:
 1. Create the rules for how people will be hired, managed, evaluated and rewarded in the new system. To do so, we are building on the lessons learned from our demonstration programs, reflected in what we call our "Best Practices" initiative. This was developed in collaboration with the Military Departments and Defense Agencies; they are all participating in the working and review.



SPL ASSISTANT DIR P&R	2/3
SR MA CHADWICK OSD	2/3
MA BUSH NORRIS	2/3
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	2/3

11-L-0559-04

groups we have established for the design effort. We aim to have a consensus draft completed before the end of the month for OPM review.

2. Design the new employee appeals procedures. We will be working with the Merit Systems Protection Board, since it will be the interim reviewing authority for actions taken. We will also be involving the unions, since this is one of the issues of greatest concern to them.

3. Structure the new labor management relations system. We will be working closely with the unions as required by statute, sharing our initial ideas with them this week (and with OPM first).

- Throughout the design process, we will be seeking the best advice we can secure, both inside and outside the Department. For example, the General Counsel recently convened his Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinating Committee to advise us on the appeal process; we asked the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to assist us with labor/management relations; and we have asked the Defense Business Board its advice on structuring blue collar wages.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Brad Bunn, ODUSD(CPP), (b)(6)

For Civil Service in 2003, No Shortage of Defining Events

By Stephen Barr

Sunday, December 28, 2003; Page C02

As the year draws to an end, there's no doubt that 2003 represents a turning point for the civil service.

Asked to identify the most significant civil service development in 2003, a number of experts pointed to the new law that allows the Department of Defense to establish its own pay and personnel system.

The National Security Personnel System, as the Pentagon calls it, will overhaul how 746,000 defense civilians are paid, promoted and disciplined. Its approval by Congress and the president came a year after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which was granted the authority to revamp its work rules for 180,000 employees.

Once the two departments have their systems up and running -- probably in about two years -- more than half of the civil service will be outside the General Schedule, the system of 15 grade levels and 10 pay rates per level that has provided uniformity and stability to the federal government since shortly after World War II.

John M. Palguta, a vice president with the nonprofit Partnership for Public Service, said 2003 represents "the beginning of the end for the federal government's outdated, inflexible pay and job classification system established by the Classification Act of 1949."

He added, "It's now only a matter of time before the General Schedule fades away entirely, and 2003 will be marked as the beginning of its end."

Paul C. Light, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a New York University professor, said: "I think the DoD breakout is the most significant event not just of the past year, but of the past 25. It has the potential to remake the civil service system. If done well, it could open the way to a new era in high-performance government. If done poorly, it could confirm every worst fear of how politics has come to shape personnel policy. I'm betting on [Defense Undersecretary] **David Chu** to produce the right plan, but am worried that DoD managers lack the training to implement the system effectively. They're being asked to do things they've never done before."

There were other developments, however, that were viewed as just as important by federal employees who work outside the Beltway and outside the defense-homeland security arena.

Paul Barnes, regional commissioner for the Social Security Administration in Atlanta, said changes that provide greater flexibility in hiring won his vote for most significant development of 2003. "Replacing people when they retire -- hiring new people -- is a huge deal for us," Barnes said.

Software improvements at USAJobs, where the government posts job openings on the Internet, has "allowed us to significantly reduce how long it takes to hire quality people," he said.

In addition, he said, the new federal career intern program allows managers to establish local job registers. That leads to fewer people turning down job offers and helps managers address their needs, such as recruiting bilingual employees to help serve the growing Hispanic population in the Southeast, Barnes said.

George Lydford, a revenue agent with the Internal Revenue Service in Phoenix, said, "My opinion is the budget deficit is the most significant thing that is happening now, and it will affect federal employees more later than now."

The deficit, he said, "will cause the government to tighten its belt. . . . At some time down the road, it is going to have to be paid for, so the programs of the federal government -- the civilian part -- will be cut or severely reduced until we won't be able to hire the staff we need."

Sonya Kimberlin, an Agriculture Department community development manager in Scott County, Ind., cited the "continuing resolution" -- the interim funding measure that keeps the government open through Jan. 31 because not all appropriations bills were enacted by the Oct. 1 deadline.

The CR "does not allow us to effectively deliver our programs," Kimberlin said. "Our customers don't understand why we don't have any more control over our funding. It makes us look like 'the typical government program' that they hear about." She added, "We don't like getting the negative image caused by that."

As part of Agriculture's rural development agency, Kimberlin helps provide housing loans for people building or purchasing their first home. Under the CR, she said, her office can spend at a rate equal to 25 percent of last year's budget.

"It puts our customers in a hardship," she said.

E-mail: (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/039484

January 20, 2004

1/31

TO: David Chu
cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Pete Geren
Powell Moore

→ David Chu -

Where are you on this. An update to SecDef would be helpful. Thanks
D. L. H.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Redesign of DoD Civil Service

Here is an article highlighting our national security personnel system.

3/20/04

From what I understand of the legislation, we have an opportunity to redesign the DoD civil service in a manner that better fits the times.

2/2

How confident are we that we are prepared to take advantage—soon—of the authorities granted in the law?

Is a product of that scope likely to bubble up out of our existing organization, or should we be thinking about finding some world-class personnel expertise to give us some thoughts and guidance?

SD
I am asking David if he has specific names.
V/R

Please get back to me soon with your thoughts.

Thanks.

Attach.

Barr, Stephen. "For Civil Service in 2003, No Shortage of Defining Events," *Washington Post*, December 28, 2003, p. C2.

Sir,
Response attached. Original attachment included behind.
V/R
CORNOSEN
2/3

DHR:dh
122903-4 (1s computer)

Please respond by

2/13/04

1/27

OSD 01559-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039485



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

SECRET

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

February 9, 2004 - 3:30 PM 2004 FEB 9 6:01

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*
SUBJECT: Senator Collins and Union Issues w/NSPS—SNOWFLAKE

- We are seeking a meeting with Senator Collins (attached), and have already met with her staff. We hope that Senator Warner will join that meeting. We are also seeking meetings with Congressmen Hunter and Davis to keep them informed, too.
- The union comments received thus far signal opposition to any change in the status quo. We held our initial meeting with the unions on January 22, 2004, inviting their suggestions. The unions declined to make any, and asked for DoD's ideas as the basis for beginning a dialogue. We circulated these last Friday (after first briefing Hill staff)—hence the union comments you are seeing today. The strident reactions indicate that we will need to redouble our efforts to make this a constructive dialogue. Mr. Gage, head of American Federation of Government Employees, *our* largest union, did not attend the initial meeting himself, but sent relatively junior representatives.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

Attachment:
As Stated

cc: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
Mr. Powell Moore, ASD(LA)

230

9 Feb 04



OSD 01559-04



CLOSE HOLD

February 3, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
 Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
 Dr. Condoleezza Rice
 Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Draft Executive Order for the Commission on Intelligence

334

Mr. President —

I am concerned about the latest draft Executive Order.

I continue to feel strongly that for a decent Commission product, it will require that there be a rule for a quorum requiring that at least six or seven of the nine members be present for the conduct of business. I have chaired a couple of these commissions and served on six or seven. It will either produce a "Commissioners' product" or a "staff product." If it is a staff product, it will not be unanimous and will likely end up gathering dust on a shelf. Only if the Commissioners do the work, participate in drafting and are available to defend it is the Report likely to have impact.

Further, the country will not be well served if the only issue addressed by the Commission is counterproliferation, weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Commission should look forward, as well as back. That says to me that the Commission must look at the kinds of asymmetric threats our country faces in the 21st century. It would be a mistake to narrowly limit their charter.

3 Feb 04

Besides cyber-threats, there are a variety of new technologies and nano-technologies that can and will be used as means of conducting asymmetric attacks on the US and our friends and allies around the world. This Commission needs to be able to look at what we are facing in the broadest context. All that is required is to change a few words in two or three places, and the Commission will have that flexibility. The way it is currently written, they will not. I believe that would prove to be a big mistake. In at least the early portion of the 21st century, the US is not likely to be facing wars against big armies, navies or air forces. Instead, we

CLOSE HOLD
11-L-0559/OSD/039487

OSD 01570 04

CLOSE HOLD

are certain to be faced with a range of asymmetric challenges. It is those attacks that we have the responsibility to be prepared to deter and defend against.

I am sorry to bother you with this, but I have sent in these suggestions twice, and they seem to never find their way into the draft Executive Order. I don't know where they are being derailed, but I do think they are important enough for you to at least be aware of these concerns.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
020304.1S

CLOSE HOLD

are certain to be faced with a range of asymmetric challenges. It is those attacks that we have the responsibility to be prepared to deter and defend against.

I am sorry to bother you with this, but I have sent in these suggestions twice, and they seem to never find their way into the draft Executive Order. I don't **know** where they are being derailed, but I do think they are important enough for you to at least be aware of these concerns.

Respectfully,

P.S. Note for Andy Card: For the benefit of whoever has the pen and is doing the drafting of the Executive Order, I have attached a copy that has penciled in additional suggestions.

Attach.

Draft 2/3/04 11:17 AM

DHR:dh
020304.1S

CLOSE EOLD
DRAFT 2/3/2004 11:17 AM

Strengthening
COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS

DESTRUCTION

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established, within the Executive Office of the President for administrative purposes, a Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Commission").

Sec. 2. Mission. (a) For the purpose of advising the President in the discharge of his constitutional authority under Article II of the United States Constitution to conduct foreign relations, protect national security, and command the armed forces of the United States, and to ensure the most effective counterproliferation capabilities of the United States, the Commission shall assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). In doing so, the Commission shall examine the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals) relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery, and other asymmetric capabilities.

other asymmetric capabilities

(b) With respect to that portion of its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order that relates to Iraq, the Commission shall specifically examine the intelligence prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and compare it with the findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other relevant agencies or organizations concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of Iraq relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery.

(c) With respect to its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order, the Commission shall—

and unprovoked spaces

development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, ^{or} use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ^{Thin} and related means of delivery [in closed societies]; and

*Non relevant
of interest*

and asymmetric capabilities

(including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). The Central Intelligence Agency and other components of the Intelligence Community shall utilize the Commission and the resulting report.

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Sec. 3. Membership. The Commission shall consist of nine members designated by the President, one of whom the President shall designate as Chairman and one of whom the President shall designate as Vice Chairman. Members shall be citizens of the United States.

Sec. 4. Meetings of the Commission and Direction of Its Work. The Chairman of the Commission shall convene and preside at the meetings of the Commission, determine after consultation with other members of the Commission its agenda, direct its work, and, as appropriate to deal with particular subject matters, establish and direct subgroups of the Commission that shall consist exclusively of members of the Commission. The Vice Chairman shall perform the functions of the Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman, or when the position of Chairman is vacant.

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Sec. 5. Access to Information. (a) The Commission shall have full and complete access to information in the possession, custody, or control of any executive department or agency to the maximum extent permitted by law and consistent with Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended. Heads of departments and agencies shall promptly furnish such information to the Commission upon the request of the Chairman. The Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure the expeditious adjudication of the clearances necessary for the members of the Commission to have access to all information that it may require.

(b) Promptly upon commencing its work, the Commission shall adopt, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Commission for physical, communications, computer, document, personnel and other security in relation to the work of the Commission. The Secretary of

Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly and jointly report to the President their judgment whether the security rules and procedures adopted by the Commission are clearly consistent with the national security and protect against unauthorized disclosure of information required by law or executive order to be protected against such disclosure. The President may at any time modify the security rules or procedures of the Commission to provide the necessary protection.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) In implementing this order, the Commission shall solely advise and assist the President.

(b) In performing its functions under this order, the Commission shall, subject to the authority of the President, be independent from any executive department or agency, or of any officer, employee, or agent thereof.

What a testimony, Congress
Corbett

(c) This order does not impair or otherwise affect the authorities of any department, agency, entity, officer, or employee of the United States under applicable law.

(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative or legislative proposals.

(e) The Director of the Office of Administration shall, with the assistance of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, provide or arrange for the provision of administrative support and funding for the Commission consistent with applicable law. The Director of the Office of Administration shall ensure that such support and funding meets the Commission's reasonable needs and that the manner of provision of support and funding is consistent with the authority of the Commission within the executive branch in the performance of its functions.

(f) Members of the Commission shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission. Members who are not officers or employees in the executive branch, while engaged in the work of the Commission, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701 through 5707); consistent with the availability of funds.

(g) The Commission shall have a staff headed by an Executive Director. The Chairman shall hire and employ, or obtain by assignment or detail from departments and agencies, the staff of the Commission, including the Executive Director. The Chairman shall obtain the concurrence of the Vice Chairman for employment of the Executive Director.

(h) If an individual who is a member of the Commission is also an elected or appointed holder of office or employment in the legislative or judicial branch of the United States Government--

(i) nothing in this order shall affect the conduct of such individual in the individual's capacity as such holder of office or employment; and

(ii) no rule, regulation or order of such branch shall affect the function of the individual in the individual's capacity as a member of the Commission.

(i) The term "Intelligence Community" is given the same meaning as contained in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(j) The term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is given the same meaning as contained in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).

Sec. 7. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 8. Termination. The Commission shall terminate ~~thirty~~ days after the date on which its report is due to the President under section 2 of this order.

cyber -

February 8, 2004

✓
318

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Charter of Intelligence Commission

Please **give** me the final draft of the charter of the Intelligence Commission the President set **up**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-9 (1s computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 01570-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039494

Handwritten notes on the right margin, including a vertical list of numbers and other markings.

Received @ 3:00pm Thursday. Thursday - noon 2/5
Carbone's edits - sent back to
WH @ 5:30 Thursday. *Handing next version.* DRAFT

EXECUTIVE ORDER

COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND OTHER RELATED THREATS of the 21st Century.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established, within the Executive Office of the President for administrative purposes, a Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Commission").

Sec. 2. Mission. (a) For the purpose of advising the President in the discharge of his constitutional authority under Article II of the United States Constitution to conduct foreign relations, protect national security, and command the armed forces of the United States, in order to ensure the most effective counterproliferation capabilities of the United States, the Commission shall assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other related threats of the 21st Century and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). In doing so, the Commission shall examine the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of such foreign powers relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century. *their*

(b) With respect to that portion of its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order that relates to Iraq, the Commission shall specifically examine the Intelligence Community's intelligence prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and compare it with the findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other relevant agencies or organizations concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of Iraq relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery.

(c) With respect to its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order, the Commission shall—

(i) specifically evaluate the challenges of obtaining information regarding the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery in closed societies; and

and other related threats of the 21st Century

(ii) compare the Intelligence Community's intelligence concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction programs and other related threats of the 21st Century in Libya prior to its recent decision to open its programs to international scrutiny and in Afghanistan prior to removal of the Taliban government with the current assessments of organizations presently examining those programs.

and other foreign powers as agreed by the

(d) The Commission shall submit to the President by March 31, 2005, a report of the findings of the Commission resulting from its examination and its specific recommendations for ensuring that the Intelligence Community of the United States is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other related threats of the 21st Century, and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). The Central Intelligence Agency and other components of the Intelligence Community shall utilize the Commission and its resulting report.

*-Chair
as agreed
under
Sec. 3*

Sec. 3. Membership. The Commission shall consist of nine members designated by the President, two of whom the President shall designate as Co-Chairs. Members shall be citizens of the United States. It shall take six members of the Commission to constitute a quorum.

Sec. 4. Meetings of the Commission and Direction of Its Work. The Co-Chairs of the Commission shall convene and preside at the meetings of the Commission, determine after consultation with other members of the Commission its agenda, direct its work, and assign responsibilities within the Commission. *A quorum shall consist of one Co-Chair and six members.*

Sec. 5. Access to Information. (a) To carry out this order, the Commission shall have full and complete access to information in the possession, custody, or control of any executive department or agency to the maximum extent permitted by law and consistent with Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended. Heads of departments and agencies shall promptly furnish such information to the Commission upon request. The Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure the expeditious processing of all appropriate security clearances necessary for the members of the Commission to fulfill their functions.

(b) Promptly upon commencing its work, the Commission shall adopt, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Commission for physical, communications, computer, document, personnel, and other security in relation to the work of the Commission. The Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly and jointly report to the President their judgment whether the security rules and procedures adopted by the Commission are clearly consistent with the national security and protect against

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unauthorized disclosure of information required by law or executive order to be protected against such disclosure. The President may at any time modify the security rules or procedures of the Commission to provide the necessary protection.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) In implementing this order, the Commission shall solely advise and assist the President.

(b) In performing its functions under this order, the Commission shall, subject to the authority of the President, be independent from any executive department or agency, or of any officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(c) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authorities of any department, agency, entity, officer, or employee of the United States under applicable law.

(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(e) The Director of the Office of Administration shall, with the assistance of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, provide or arrange for the provision of administrative support and funding for the Commission consistent with applicable law. The Director of the Office of Administration shall ensure that such support and funding meets the Commission's reasonable needs and that the manner of provision of support and funding is consistent with the authority of the Commission within the executive branch in the performance of its functions.

(f) Members of the Commission shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission. Members who are not officers or employees in the executive branch, while engaged in the work of the Commission, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701 through 5707), consistent with the availability of funds.

(g) The Commission shall have a staff headed by an Executive Director. The Co-Chairs shall hire and employ, or obtain by assignment or detail from departments and agencies, the staff of the Commission, including the Executive Director.

(h) The term "Intelligence Community" is given the same meaning as contained in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(i) The term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is given the same meaning as contained in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).

Sec. 7. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or

procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 8. Termination. The Commission shall terminate thirty days after the date on which its report is due to the President under section 2 of this order.

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CLOSE HOLD

February 3, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Draft Executive Order for the Commission on Intelligence

054

Mr. President—

I am concerned about the latest draft Executive Order.

I continue to feel **strongly** that for a decent Commission product, it will require that **there** be a rule for a **quorum** requiring that at least six or seven of the **nine** members be present for the conduct of business. I have chaired a couple of these commissions and served on **six** or **seven**. It will either produce a "Commissioners' product" or a "staff product." If it is a staff product, it will not be unanimous and will likely end up gathering dust on a shelf. Only if the Commissioners do the **work**, participate in drafting and are available to defend it is the **Report** likely to have impact.

Further, the **country** will not be well served if the only **issue** addressed by the Commission is counterproliferation, weapons of **mass** destruction and their delivery systems. The **Commission** should **look forward, as well as** back. That **says** to me that the **Commission** must look at the kinds of asymmetric threats our **country** faces in the 21st century. It would be a mistake to narrowly **limit** their charter.

5 Feb 04

Besides cyber-threats, there are a variety of new technologies and nano-technologies that can and will be used **as** means of conducting asymmetric attacks on the US and our friends and allies around the world. **This Commission needs** to be able to look at what **we** are facing in the broadest **context**. All that is required is to change a few words in two or three places, and **the** Commission will have that flexibility. **The** way it is currently written, they will not. I believe that would prove to **be** a big mistake. In at **least** the early portion of the 21st century, the **US** is not likely to be facing wars against big **armies**, navies or air forces. **Instead, we**

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CLOSE HOLD

are certain to be faced with a range of asymmetric challenges. It is those attacks that we have the responsibility to be prepared to deter and defend against.

I am sorry to bother you with this, but I have sent in these suggestions twice, and they seem to never find their way into the draft Executive Order. I don't know where they are being derailed, but I do think they are important enough for you to at least be aware of these concerns.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
020304.JS

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CLOSE HOLD

are certain to be faced with a range of asymmetric challenges. It is those attacks that we have the responsibility to be prepared to deter and defend against.

I am sorry to bother you With this, but I have sent in these suggestions twice, and they seem to never find their way into the draft Executive Order. I don't know where they are being derailed, but I do think they are important enough for you to at least be aware of these concerns.

Respectfully,

P.S. Note for Andy Card: For the benefit of whoever has the pen and is doing the drafting of the Executive Order, I have attached a copy that has penciled in additional suggestions.

Anach.
Draft 2/3/04 11:17 AM

DHR:dh
020304.1S

9

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DRAFT 2/3/2004 11:17 AM

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Stronger
COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established, within the Executive Office of the President for administrative purposes, a Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Commission"). *Intelligence*

Sec. 2. Mission. (a) For the purpose of advising the President in the discharge of his constitutional authority under Article II of the United States Constitution to conduct foreign relations, protect national security, and command the armed forces of the United States, and to ensure the most effective counterproliferation capabilities of the United States, the Commission shall assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). In doing so, the Commission shall examine the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals) relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery, and other asymmetric capabilities. *and* *other asymmetric capabilities*

(b) With respect to that portion of its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order that relates to Iraq, the Commission shall specifically examine the intelligence prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and compare it with the findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other relevant agencies or organizations concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of Iraq relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery.

(c) With respect to its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order, the Commission shall—

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with the current assessments of organizations presently examining those programs.

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(d) The Commission shall submit to the President by March 33, 2005, a report of the findings of the Commission resulting from such examination and its specific recommendations for ensuring that the Intelligence Community of the United States is organized, equipped, trained, resourced, and possessed of the appropriate authority to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and

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Sec. 3. Membership. The Commission shall consist of nine members designated by the President, one of whom the President shall designate as Chairman and one of whom the President shall designate as Vice Chairman. Members shall be citizens of the United States.

Sec. 4. Meetings of the Commission and Direction of Its Work. The Chairman of the Commission shall convene and preside at the meetings of the Commission, determine after consultation with other members of the Commission its agenda, direct its work, and, as appropriate to deal with particular subject matters, establish and direct subgroups of the Commission that shall consist exclusively of members of the Commission. The Vice Chairman shall perform the functions of the Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman, or when the position of Chairman is vacant.

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Sec. 5. Access to Information. (a) The Commission shall have full and complete access to information in the possession, custody, or control of any executive department or agency to the maximum extent permitted by law and consistent with Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended. Heads of departments and agencies shall promptly furnish such information to the Commission upon the request of the Chairman. The Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure the expeditious adjudication of the clearances necessary for the members of the Commission to have access to all information that it may require.

(b) Promptly upon commencing its work, the Commission shall adopt, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Commission for physical, communications, computer, document, personnel and other security in relation to the work of the Commission. The Secretary of

11

Defense, the **Attorney General** and the Director of Central intelligence shall promptly and jointly report to the President their judgment whether the security rules and procedures adopted by the Commission are clearly consistent with the national security and protect against unauthorized disclosure of information required by law or executive order to be protected against such disclosure. The President may at any time modify the security rules or procedures of the Commission to provide the necessary protection.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) In implementing this order, the Commission shall solely advise and assist the President.

What is testimony to Congress
General

(b) In performing its functions under this order, the Commission shall, subject to the authority of the President, be independent from any executive department or agency, or of any officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(c) This order does not impair or otherwise affect the authorities of any department, agency, entity, officer, or employee of the United States under applicable law:

(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative or legislative proposals.

(e) The Director of the Office of Administration shall, with the assistance of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, provide or arrange for the provision of administrative support and funding for the Commission consistent with applicable law. The Director of the Office of Administration shall ensure that such support and funding meets the Commission's reasonable needs and that the manner of provision of support and funding is consistent with the authority of the Commission within the executive branch in the performance of its functions.

(f) Members of the Commission shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission. Members who are not officers or employees in the executive branch, while engaged in the work of the Commission, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701 through 5707), consistent with the availability of funds.

(g) The Commission shall have a staff headed by an Executive Director. The Chairman shall hire and employ, or obtain by assignment or detail from departments and agencies, the staff of the Commission, including the Executive Director. The Chairman shall obtain the concurrence of the Vice Chairman for employment of the Executive Director.

(h) If an individual who is a member of the Commission is also an elected or appointed holder of office or employment in the legislative or judicial branch of the United States Government--

(i) nothing in this order shall affect the conduct of such individual in the individual's capacity as such holder of office or employment; and

12

(ii) no rule, regulation or order of such branch shall affect the function of the individual in the individual's capacity as a member of the Commission.

(i) The term "Intelligence Community" is given the same meaning as contained in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C.401a(4)).

(j) The term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is given the same meaning as contained in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).

Sec. 7. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 8. Termination. The Commission shall terminate thirty days after the date on which its report is due to the President under section 2 of this order.

gk-

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February 2, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Jaymie Durnan

Mr. President—

I am forwarding the enclosed letter to you from Jaymie Durnan. He is a fine talent who has decided, for personal reasons, to withdraw from consideration for the position to which you nominated him.

We will miss him; he has served the Administration well.

Respectfully,

Attach.
1/20/04 Durnan memo to President Bush

DHR:dh
020204-24

0205D

2 Feb 04

OSD 01574 04

January 20, 2004

Memorandum for the President of the United States

Through the Secretary of Defense

From: Jaymie Durnan, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jaymie Durnan". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name in the "From:" line.

Subject: Resignation

I respectfully request that you withdraw my name from consideration by the Senate Armed Services Committee for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations & Environment).

As I have discussed with Secretary Rumsfeld, I have been commuting to New Hampshire every weekend for the last three years and I need to reconnect with my four children who live there with my ex-wife.

I have requested a resignation date of June 30, 2004.

I am proud of having served my country in such perilous times and I pray for success in the war on terrorism.

720

February 4, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Wehrkunde Remarks

Condi—

Here is the early draft of the remarks for Wehrkunde. If you have any thoughts, please feed them in soon.

Thanks.

Attach.
Draft Wehrkunde remarks.

DHR:dh
020404-3

356.001 SD

4 Feb 04

DRAFT 2

REMARKS BY U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD H. RUMSFELD
MUNICH CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY
FEBRUARY 7, 2004
MUNICH, GERMANY

Good morning. [Dr.] Horst [Teltschik], ministers, parliamentarians, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you so much. It's a pleasure to see so many old friends.

I am delighted to be back in Munich for this important gathering. I have been coming to this conference over many years now – both during my years in government and also as a private citizen. I have always found the exchanges of ideas both informative and invigorating.

But just as fascinating has been watching all the remarkable changes that have taken place from year-to-year, between our meetings -- and the last year has been no exception.

Indeed, I would suggest that few periods have been filled with more dramatic change – in the world and in the Atlantic Alliance – than the 12 months since we last met.

Consider what has taken place in that brief period of time:

In one year, NATO has undergone more positive change than in perhaps most ten-year periods in the history of the Alliance:

- In June, we streamlined the NATO Command Structure, and stood up a new command to drive Allied transformation.
- In September, NATO helped Poland and Spain stand up a new Multinational Division in south central Iraq;
- In October, we stood up a new NATO Response Force designed to deploy in days or weeks, instead of months or years.
- In December, we stood up the initial rotation of the new NATO Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Battalion.
- And, at this moment, we are preparing to welcome seven new members to the Alliance at the Istanbul Summit.

DRAFT 2

When we last met, NATO had never undertaken a mission outside of the North Atlantic area.¹ In August, NATO went "out of area" for the first time in its history – sending forces to Central Asia to take over leadership of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

When we last met, the Iraqi people lived in fear of a cruel dictator, who was in brazen defiance of his 17th UN Security Council Resolution. The world still hoped for a peaceful solution – and Saddam Hussein faced a choice: to prove that he was meeting his international obligations to disarm, or face the consequences of his continued defiance. He chose unwisely. And today, because 35 nations² came together to enforce the will of the free world, Saddam Hussein spends his days not in a palace, but in a jail cell; and the Iraqi people are moving along the tough path of building a free society from the ruins of decades of tyranny.

The Coalition effort in Iraq is contributing to results beyond one country, or even one region. In North Africa, for example, Libya's leader took stock of Saddam Hussein's fate, and decided that voluntary disarmament was the better path. In December, Libya agreed to disclose and eliminate all of its chemical and nuclear weapons programs, as well as all ballistic missiles beyond a 300 km range and a 500 kg payload – and to submit to inspections and monitoring by the United States and international organizations, so Libya's compliance can be confirmed.

Last week, Libya handed over 55,000 pounds of equipment and documents to the U.S. relating to its nuclear and missile programs, including long-range ballistic missile guidance sets and centrifuge parts used to for uranium enrichment. The week before, Libya handed over a payload of sensitive documents, detailing the development of its nuclear weapons program – and Libyan authorities are providing information that will not only assist with the dismantling their WMD programs, but also in stopping the worldwide proliferation of these dangerous capabilities.

As we proceed, our approach with Libya will be the same as it was with the former Soviet Union: "trust but verify." But by its actions thus far, Libya has announced to the world: we want to disarm and prove we are doing so.

Now compare Libya's recent behavior to the behavior of the Iraqi regime. Saddam Hussein also had an international obligation to give up his weapons of mass destruction, and prove that he had done so. He could have opened up his country to the world – just as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa had previously done – and just as Libya is doing today.

¹ Ian Brzezinski says the term "North Atlantic area" includes the Balkans and the United States, where NATO has conducted recent operations.

² Including the United States.

DRAFT 2

Instead, he chose the path of deception and defiance. He repeatedly forced UN inspectors out of the country – and did everything in his power to undermine their work when they were allowed in. He continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions, when he could have had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed.

His regime passed up the “final opportunity” afforded him by Resolution 1441 to prove that his programs were ended and his weapons were destroyed.

Not only did he pass up that final opportunity – his defiance continued even *after the fall of his regime*. As Secretary Powell pointed out recently op-ed, the Iraq Survey Group found evidence that:

[QUOTE] “. . . elaborate efforts to shield illicit programs persisted. . . even after the collapse of Hussein’s regime. . . . In a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction, computer hard drives were destroyed, files were burned, and equipment was carefully cleansed of all traces of use – and done so in a pattern that was clearly deliberate and selective, rather than random.”
[UNQUOTE]

Think about that: even after the statues of Saddam Hussein were falling in Baghdad, the Iraqi regime continued to hide and destroy evidence.

We may never know why Saddam Hussein chose the destruction of his regime over peaceful disarmament. But we know this much for certain: it was *his* choice. And if he had chosen differently – if the Iraqi regime had taken the steps Libya is now taking – *there would have been no war*.

The last 12 months have provided the world’s rogue regimes with two different models of behavior – the path of cooperation and the path of defiance. And the lessons of those experiences should be clear: the pursuit of weapons of mass murder can carry with it costs. By contrast, leaders who abandon the pursuit of those weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to better relations with the and free nations of the world.³

As the recently released EU Security Strategy makes clear, the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. . . . [and] the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.”

On September 11th, we saw the willingness of freedom’s adversaries to kill on a massive scale – and in the months since, the killing has continued: in Bali and Baghdad, Jakarta and Jerusalem, Casablanca and Riyadh, and Mombassa and

³ Last two sentences in this paragraph are based on language from both President’s announcement of the Libya agreement and Vice President Cheney’s address in Davos.

DRAFT 2

Istanbul. Unless the spread of these dangerous capabilities is stopped, such attacks will likely only grow bolder – and still more deadly.

In a world where a small minority of extremists have the power to kill innocents on a mass scale, every other hope of mankind is threatened – our aspirations for economic growth, opportunity for our people, and the alleviation of disease. What good are our efforts to slow the global spread of AIDS, for example, if terrorist networks and terrorist states are successful in gaining access to virulent bio-weapons than can kill millions? What happens to prosperity, when years of progress can be wiped out in an instant by a WMD attack that destroys millions of jobs, billions in lost GDP, and untold innocent lives?

To prevent the spread of these weapons to terrorist networks, we must work together to accomplish three important goals:

First, we must strengthen multi-lateral cooperation to stop spread of WMD.

That is why, in May of last year, the United States and 10 other like-minded countries launched the PSI – the Proliferation Security Initiative – a new international coalition to interdict shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials at sea, in the air, and on the ground.

The PSI was launched with Australia, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, France, and Spain – and in the months since Canada, Denmark, Norway, Singapore, and Turkey have all joined the effort. Together, we have already had several important successes – including interdictions of nuclear and chemical weapons components. We urge all governments to consider how they might contribute, or expand their contributions, to this important initiative.

Second, we must strengthen our alliances – and alliance capabilities. The United States is transforming both our Armed Forces, and our global force posture – so we can improve our ability to work with our Allies and to meet our security commitments. NATO is also transforming – launching the new NATO Response Force and the new Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Battalion.

But if these are to become real Alliance capabilities, then Allies must be willing to make the necessary reforms and investments. Today, the trends are not promising. ⁴[Germany recently announced that it is closing 100 unneeded military bases – a positive step. But instead of investing those savings in new 21st century military capabilities, it has also announced that it is reducing its defense budget by some \$33 billion. Or take the study recently released by Canadian university, which concluded that if Canada does not turn around the decline in its defense budget, its air force and its army or navy may cease to exist by 2013.]

⁴ You indicated we should leave this in for now, but that you might cut it.

DRAFT 2

The problems will only grow worse if the decline in Allied defense investments is not reversed. The credibility and relevance of the NATO Alliance depend on it.

Third, we must wage war not just on terrorist networks, but also on the ideology of hatred that they seek to spread. Professor Bernard Lewis has put it eloquently: “The war against terror and the quest for freedom are inextricably linked, and neither can succeed without the other.”

That is why President Bush recently outlined what he calls a “forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East.” Promoting democratic change in this region is a matter of international security. Because, as he put it, “so long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export.”

Governments across the Middle East and North Africa are beginning to see the need for change. Morocco now has a diverse new Parliament, and the King has called for it to extend rights to women. In Bahrain, citizens recently elected their own Parliament for the first time in three decades. Oman has extended the right to vote to all its adult citizens. Qatar has adopted a new constitution. Yemen has a multiparty system. Kuwait now has a directly-elected national assembly. And Jordan held historic elections last summer.

We must encourage still further progress – and NATO can make an important contribution to this initiative. Through the expansion of the Alliance, NATO has helped the nations emerging from the “East Bloc” transform their societies and claim their rightful place in the West. And through the Partnership for Peace, it has helped build relationships and linkages with many newly independent nations that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

By engaging these countries, NATO has been a catalyst for military reform. But because ours is an alliance of democracies, the desire to be more closely associated with this alliance of free nations makes it a catalyst for political reform as well. We have seen evidence of this in Georgia, where democratic progress is taking place – progress that Georgia’s new leaders insist was inspired by the Georgian people’s desire to turn West and become a full member of the community of free nations.

Our challenge is to think creatively about how we can harness the power of this Alliance to contribute to similar democratic progress across in the Middle East. For example, we should look at ways to expand NATO’s “Mediterranean Dialogue” so the Alliance can better engage the nations of North Africa and the Middle East. This should be at the top of our agenda in Istanbul.

**

Let me close by saying that our objective is not simply to defend the free world, but to expand it. In 1941 there were only about a dozen democracies on the face of the Earth. Yet by the close of the 20th century, there were more than

DRAFT 2

120. And now, at the start of the 21st century, two more nations – Iraq and Afghanistan -- have thrown off the shackles of tyranny and joined the ranks of the free.

Some have expressed doubt about the capacity of Middle Eastern people for democracy and self-government. Many said the same thing about Germany and Japan at the end of World War II. But because the Allies were steadfast, freedom did take root in both countries. And today Japan has sent its Self-Defense Forces to Iraq – the first time Japanese forces have deployed outside the country since World War II. Germany has sent its forces to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. And many of the recently liberated nations of Europe have been at the forefront of the effort to help the Iraqi and Afghan peoples recover their freedoms and maintain them.

It teaches us an important lesson: that the seeds of freedom, when planted, can do more than simply take root where they're sown. They can have the power to spread freedom across the globe.

That is why it is so critical that our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan succeed. Because once seeds of freedom are sown in Middle Eastern soil, they can spread across the region – just as they here across Europe during the course of the last half-century.

Those are our goals: strong and capable alliances; a growing coalition to stop the spread of weapons of mass murder; and a free Middle East, where there is opportunity for all, and the ideology of terror holds no attraction for a new generation brought up in the bright light of freedom.

Thank you. I'd be happy to respond to questions.

##

7:14 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: January 5, 2004
SUBJECT: Hearings on Active/Reserve Forces

Give me a time table on this David Chu memo on when I'm going to get told what things we are going to do, and when I will be getting briefed.

Thanks..

DHR/azn
10504.04

Attach: Snowflake to Chu 11/3/03 Re: Hearings on Active/Reserve Forces

Please respond by: _____ 1 | 10 | 04

326

5 Jan 04

OSD 01665-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039515

11/3/03
1139

11/3
October 30, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hearings on Active/Reserve Forces

copy to [unclear]

Unless there is a good reason not to, I am inclined to ask Congress for hearings this year on the issue of the Active/Reserve **mix**, stress on the Reserve component and the like. We have a lot of members who want to help, and we want these issues examined in a systematic way.

Please get back to me quickly with a proposal after you have discussed it with Larry Di Rita and Powell Moore.

Thanks.

.....
Please respond by 11/7/03

clh

12/31

SecDef - Based on the SLRG meeting just prior to the holidays, in which this issue was discussed, we are developing a series of proposals with Dr. Chu, Joint Staff, etc. Next SLRG will review it. Pete Geren has the lead.

U21069 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/039516

DR *DR* *DR*

7:30 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT:

Let's find out who actually gave the order on the aircraft issue and who took the order as though it were valid and executed on it. I am referring to the AIR CAP cover that just took place in the last week without my knowing about it.

I think someone said it was transportation safety and they must have given it to someone in NORAD. We've got to get that ironed out so it doesn't happen again.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.08

Please respond by: _____ *1/15/04*

384

5 Jan 04

January 21, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressman Blunt

ANY News?

V/R
Jaymie
burnan
213

326

Congressman Blunt saw me last night and said he would like to visit on the Guard and Reserve sometime. Why don't we get him down for breakfast or lunch. He is impressive.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012304-1

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

OSD 01686-04

21Jan07

January 21, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressman Blunt

ANY News?

v/r

Jaymie

Sullivan
213

Congressman Blunt saw me last night and said he would like to visit on the Guard and Reserve sometime. Why don't we get him down for breakfast or lunch. He is impressive.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012104-1

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

OSD 01686-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039519

1/14
DF02

1/31

January 13, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
 Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Congressional Breakfast on End Strength

Powell:
Dire 7/14
Raymond
Murtha 2/3

We are thinking about having a bipartisan breakfast with Ike Skelton, possibly Murtha and maybe Ellen Tauscher, some of the leaders in the "end strength" issue. We could get Schoomaker, Chu and Myers or Pace and have a discussion—to start to get them to consider this key issue before the season opens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-14

.....
 Please respond by 1/23/04

0 0 01689-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039520

320.2

13 Jan 04

1/14
DFO

1/30

January 13, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Breakfast on End Strength

Powell:
Di Rita
Jay
Burnham
2/3

We are thinking about having a bipartisan breakfast with Ike Skelton, possibly Murtha and maybe Ellen Tauscher, some of the leaders in the "end strength" issue. We could get Schoomaker, Chu and Myers or Pace and have a discussion—to start to get them to consider this key issue before the season opens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-14

Please respond by 1/23/04

OSD 01689-04

February 2, 2004

*Advance
copy provided*

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

CC: *DOV Zakheim*

SUBJECT: Halliburton

I have to be ready to answer questions on Halliburton. Apparently there is a new story today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020204-21

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 01691-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039522

1/5/04

January 2, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Issues

Attached is a piece of paper Joyce gave me from a meeting she had in Norfolk.

It is pretty clear that one of the toughest-problems we have is to see that there are internal communications that are effective.

What process do we have to train people and to monitor and track and see what kind of a job people do in terms of that?

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated paper

DHR:dh
010204-28

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

cc: David Chu —

*Ask MCDP to
prepare a note to
Mr. Di Rita and
LTG Craddock providing
them our views
S: Jan 16*

OSD 01735-04



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

January 13, 2004 3:00 PM

FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu, Director of

SUBJECT: Snowflake — Military Issues

- The Secretary of Defense requested information on the availability, quality, and cost of telecommunication services for deployed Service members (**Tab A**).
- U.S. Central Command provides two phone services that enable Service members to call anywhere in the world — *Health, Morale and Welfare* (HMW) calls using official phone lines and *unofficial telecommunications* provided by the Armed Service Exchanges. HMW calls are made during non-duty hours so as not to interfere with the mission. On average, 50,000 HMW calls are made each day, representing **45** percent of all calls made using official phones. Nearly 4.4 million calling minutes each month are connected using unofficial telephone service.
- HMW calls use the Defense Information System Network (DISN) and unofficial calls use the AT&T commercial network. Both systems are supported with commercial uplinks and bandwidth support, which are constrained by limited infrastructure. HMW calls are netted to installations in the U.S. where they are switched to the commercial network that the service member designates. These connections may result in interference, especially when using satellite telephones.
- The cost per calling minute is more expensive for unofficial calls than for HMW calls. HMW calls to the U.S. are charged at domestic rates (from U.S. point of entry to service member's home), while unofficial calls are charged at international rates (from overseas point of origin to Service member's home). Unofficial calling rates range from \$0.19 per minute to \$1.00 per minute. The Armed Services Exchanges and AT&T are continually working to reduce the unofficial calling rates.
- The PDUSD(P&R) initiated a pre-deployment information campaign to prepare Service members, families and friends for the unavoidable challenges of communicating from theater. The Armed Services are working to improve the availability of telecommunication services, acceptance of gifts or donations of calling cards, and to lower the calling rates.



OSD 01735-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039524


- The FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act requires that prepaid phone cards, or equivalent telecommunications benefit, be provided without cost to Service members serving in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The telecommunications benefit may not exceed \$40 or 120 calling minutes each month. The military departments are working on ways to measure the current level of “free service” provided through the DoD official phone service and donations and, if there is a shortfall, are determining other methods to fully implement the Act.

RECOMMENDATION: None. ~~For Information Only.~~

COORDINATION: Tab B

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: George McNamara, Resale Activities & NAF Policy, ODUSD(MCFP), 
 (b)(6) 1/17/04

TAB

A

1/5/04

January 2, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Issues

Attached is a piece of paper Joyce gave me from a meeting she had in Norfolk.

It is pretty clear that one of the toughest-problems we have is to see that there are internal communications that are effective.

What process do we have to train people and to monitor and track and see what **kind** of a job people do in terms of that?

Thanks..

Attach.
Undated paper

DHR:dh
010204-28

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

cc: David Chu —

*Ask MOP to
prepare a note to
Mr. Di Rita and
LTG Craddock providing
them our views
5: Jan 16*

*Don't
give to me
a Norfolk
for your
job see*

Information flow: The overarching issue is that leadership needs to **keep** soldiers informed. **As much** information **as** reasonable **should be** put **out**, and the chain of command should ensure it is disseminated. Then, when information is **unknown** or can't be passed out later it isn't such an important issue. Soldiers **will** have **learned** to **trust** the leadership.

Reservist:

- Activated and prepared, then sat locked on Fort Eustis, little training, not allowed to leave for a month ...no details of what was happening until nearly the last minute before deployment.
- While waiting to deploy, and locked down on post, were put in ancient barracks that for much of the time had no toilets or running water.
- Told the unit would return in the Fall, then changed dates, then decided that half the unit would return, half stay until the Spring. Now it appears the unit will finally return to the US (the half of the unit still remaining.)
- Reservists are very uncertain about their return...there are many rumors that the Army will leave them alone a month or so then re-mobilize. High level leadership should do what it can to explain the needs of the Service and what will probably happen.

Active:

- Never clear what process was used to tell **people** what **was** going on. One of the first units to deploy, then watched exact same units come after and very quickly redeploy to their home stations. (Probably are good reasons...soldier deserve to know.)
- Followed **this up** with many uncertainties **about** final redeployment schedule.
- Pace **of** operations...some units still in Iraq are being alerted about deployment to other regions such as the Balkans or Afghanistan soon after their return. May be necessary, but doesn't do much for morale.

All:

- Telephones...AT&T are gouging the soldiers. often not easy to find: and hard to make connections in the States. Connections, when made, are very poor. Fort Benning operators are being wonderful helping soldiers make connections.
- Environmental leave policy should **be** stated...let soldiers, officers and enlisted, **know** what the policy is **and** where they stand.

Intel Com

TAB

B

**COORDINATION
SNOWFLAKE - MILITARY ISSUES**

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CRA 1-21-04

EF-8365
I-04/001430
February 2, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
JAYMES
FROM:
SUBJECT: UK and Article 98.2 Agreement

Draft

0/5

Here is a good letter from Geoff Hoon. Please dig into it and let's come up with a proposal by March 1.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/28/04 Hoon ltr to SecDef

2 FEB 04

DHR:dh
020204-23

.....
Please respond by 3/1/04

SecDef

3/10

3/11
3/12

Draft to Hoon attached

arry Di Rip
3/11

28 JAN 04

04-02-04 16:01 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/039531

01740-04



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2EU

ESC

2004 FEB -5 PM 2: 55

Telephone: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)

MO 13/3/2C
MO 612015

28 January 2004

Gen Donald

When we met on 7 January, you asked about progress on our two states concluding an Article 98.2 Agreement. I undertook to look into this on my return to the UK. I have now done so.

When we first discussed a possible draft agreement in July 2002, the UK said that it was prepared, in principle, to sign an agreement in a suitable form. We also undertook to persuade EU partners that such agreements were consistent with Article 98.2 of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC). We succeeded in this and a common set of EU Guiding Principles concerning such bilateral agreements were agreed in September 2003.

However, the draft agreement presented by US State Department officials in July 2002 presented some problems. Chief amongst these was the broad range of persons categorised as exempt from transfer to the ICC. We understand Article 98.2 to cover military personnel and other official visitors; our legal advice – consistent also with the EU Guiding Principles – is that it cannot be extended to cover such a broad category as “nationals”.

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

OSD 01740-04


11-L-0559/OSD/039532



Recycled Paper

UK and US officials discussed informally some ways of addressing these problems in a new draft agreement, but we have received nothing further from State Department officials to date.

I can assure you that the UK remains fully prepared to work with the US on a suitably worded Article 98.2 Agreement which would not conflict with our obligations under the Rome Statute of the ICC or with the EU Guiding Principles on concluding such agreements. Perhaps your officials could get in touch with ours to discuss this matter further?

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Yours sincerely' followed by a stylized signature.

GEOFFREY HOON



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 15 2004

The Right Honorable Geoffrey Hoon, M.P.
Secretary of State for Defence
Room 203, Old War Office Building
Whitehall, London SW1A 2EU
UNITED KINGDOM

Dear Geoff:

Thank you for responding to my question on the status of negotiations for an Article 98 agreement. Your letter confirms my understanding of where negotiations stand.

It is true that the U.S. has not provided a new Article 98 text that comports with the EU Guiding Principles. We have offered several options informally that we hoped could bridge our differences, but so far we have been unsuccessful.

The U.S. has now signed Article 98 agreements with 82 countries; thirty-four of these agreements are with Parties to the ICC Treaty. There is a growing base of support for the view that the U.S. Article 98 agreement text is consistent with the ICC Treaty.

As you know, it is a matter of principle that the U.S. Government protect all Americans and that the U.S. should not be subject to a treaty of which we are not a party. We are not trying to interfere with the right of any other country to participate in the ICC.

I believe the ICC issues of controversy between us are matters of interpretation that should be resolvable consistent with the key interests of the U.S. and UK. Various lawyers have various views on the relevant language, but I think that the political will to accommodate each other on our respective key interests should allow us to reach agreement. It's important that we do so.

Can we designate high level policy people from our departments and from State and the FCO to meet with instructions to find a solution?

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/039534

OSD 01740-04

015

15 MAR 04

28 JAN 04

24
0802
1/14 1400

7201



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

FEB 5 2004

Administration
& Management

ACTION MEMO

Sam
[Signature]
2/1/04

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration And Management

Ray DuBois

2/5/04

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

- In an October 27 snowflake (Tab E) you expressed concern about the currency of DoD directives. Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) were asked to conduct a review of all Directives under their purview to determine if they should be canceled, revised or continued in effect (Tab D).
- On December 16 you were provided with a listing of the 653 Directives presently in effect, including 50 the PSAs identified for cancellation and 334 they earmarked for revision.
- To assist PSAs in this effort and convey a sense of urgency, I implemented an accelerated coordination timeline, communicated in a January 30 memo (Tab C). To date, only 53 of the 384 Directives identified for cancellation or revision have been submitted for coordination. To get this done by the April 5 target date, we need to start seeing significant numbers moving into the staffing process very soon.
- In response to your snowflakes of January 31 (TAB B), regarding Service and Joint Staff directives, recommend we follow up with a memo for your signature directing them to update and ensure compliance once the DoD directives have been revised.
- To demonstrate your personal interest in this effort, the memorandum for your signature at Tab A tells the PSAs to take a personal interest in this endeavor and to release their proposed revisions and cancellations for coordination as soon as possible.

3008

ST Feb 04

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

ASSTANT DIR	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA CRADDOCK	
BUCCI	
COED MARIOTT	<i>2/6</i>

OSD 01776-04

Mirelson, Pam, CIV, WHS/ESCD

From: Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2004 10:51 AM
To: Mirelson, Pam, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Subject: RE: Memo for SecDef Sig on Directives

Thanks
Brett

-----Original Message-----

From: Mirelson, Pam, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2004 10:51 AM
To: Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL
Subject: Memo for SecDef Sig on Directives

Brett,

Jaymie Durnan had sent the paper back to us saying we should move the suspense to get revisions/cancellations into coordination from April 5 to Mar 15. Larry Curry had a hallway conversation with him and explained that making it too soon would be counterproductive. Jaymie agreed to an April 1 suspense. We have changed the memo and returned it to the ExecSec.

Pam



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

I understand that

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

MARCH 15, 2004

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. **You** identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel, and I expect these actions to be completed by April 5, 2004. To date, very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared. ~~At this rate, our goal for updating and disseminating the Department's policies is in jeopardy.~~

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.

*Change it,
otherwise you
will get it
but then -*





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

JAN 30 2004

Administration
& Management

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago, you reviewed the DoD Directives under your purview and identified 384 that you intend to revise or cancel. The suspense for completion of these actions is April 5, 2004. To date, only 49 revisions or cancellations have been prepared and disseminated for coordination. At this rate, our goal for updating and disseminating the Department's policy will not be met.

It is imperative that draft revisions or cancellations of all the directives you earmarked be placed in coordination as soon as possible. To assist you in this effort, I have approved an initiative to accelerate the coordination process. Effective immediately the maximum amount of time allowed for coordination is 20 working days from the date a directive is formally proposed for revision or cancellation.

As the Secretary so aptly stated, "September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake." I ask that you engage your organization with the same sense of urgency as we approach this deadline. Questions may be referred to Mr. Neeley at (b)(6)


Raymond E. DuBois

11-L-0559/OSD/039538



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 29 2003

Administration
& Management

**MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

Reference: DA&M Memorandum, "Mandatory Review of DoD Issuances for Currency,"
dated December 30, 2002.

In the referenced memorandum, addressees were requested to **certify** the **currency** of all DoD issuances under their cognizance that were over five **years** old. Since that **effort** was initiated, the Secretary of Defense has noted out-of-date DoD Directives and **has** directed that they **be** reviewed and recertified for **currency**. **He is** concerned that **the** DoD Directives should reflect recent actions **taken** within the Department to respond **to** world events and the realignment **of** functions.

Because **the** Secretary **has asked** for a **current** listing **of** all directives, a **timely** review and certification of each directive (see attached list) **is** required **by the responsible** Principal **Staff Assistant (PSA)**. **Your** response is **requested** by November **21, 2003**, and shall indicate **whether the listed** directives are **current**, **need revision** **or** should be **cancelled**. Upon receipt and compilation of **your** input, **this** information will be provided to **the** Secretary.

For directives **no** longer current, proposed **revisions** should be **processed** through **the** DoD Directives System for signature **by the** Deputy **Secretary of** Defense within **90** **days**. **Requests** to cancel a directive should be processed **within 45** days. **The support** and cooperation of coordinating officials are requested to ensure that these suspenses **are met**.

In order to facilitate implementation of a systematic **review** process **for** **maintaining the** currency of DoD Directives, **the mandatory** review period **for** directives in DoD Directive **5025.1**, "DoD Directives System," will **be** reduced **from five** years to **two** years. This change is effective immediately and will **be** reflected in a forthcoming revision to **that** Directive.

11-L-0559/OSD/039539

Your certification of the listed directives should be provided to the Directives and Records Division, C&D, 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 501, Arlington, VA

(b)(6) My action officer is Mr. H.D. Neeley, chief, Directives and Records Division, who may be contacted at telephone (b)(6) or by e-mail at (b)(6)


Raymond E. DeBor

Director

Attachment:

AS stated

October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Old Directives

I don't know if you were in the room when we found out that the SOLIC directive is dated 1995. It seems to me that you ought to set up a system where we review every directive that exists, listed by date and name, and let me look at it. I can select the ones I want to start having people review, so that we can get them up to date.

September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It may require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I am sure there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102403-17

.....
Please respond by _____

U18026 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/039541



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by April 1, 2004. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...".



11-L-0559/OSD/039542

OSD 01776-04

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Where do we stand on getting all of the joint staff and chairmen of the joint chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
103 104.1 2

Respond by: _____

2/12/04

300.8

31 Jan 04

Feb 04

OSD 01776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039543



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

3008

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Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.

13 Feb 04

5 Feb 04



OSD 01776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039544

February 20, 2004
February 18, 2004

TO: Art Cebrowski
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
David Chu
ADM Ed Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Transformation and Leadership

381

I received your ideas concerning transformation and the DoD academies and institutions. You might want to wash it by Ed Giambastiani at JFCOM, and maybe David Chu.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/6/04 Dir, OFT memo to SecDef [OSD01809-04]

DHR:dh
021804-2

.....
Please respond by 3/1/04

25 Feb 04

6 Feb 04

OSD 01809-04

219
1300

SECRET

✓
2/6



FORCE TRANSFORMATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

2004 FEB -6 PM 2:00

February 6, 2004, 10:00 AM

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Office of Force Transformation *AK Cebrowski 2/6*

SUBJECT: Cultural Change and Education for Transformation

e You have rightly said that culture is at the heart of transformation. We have taken the temperature of the cultural change within the force. This is included in the Strategic Transformation Appraisal that you have tasked me to do. I look forward to providing it to you.

• As revolutionaries have taught us "If you are going to break the grip of the old culture, you have to seize control of schools." Accordingly, I have begun several efforts with the Department's academic institutions. These are summarized in the enclosure.

e Ultimately, cultural change is a leadership issue. The selection of the leaders for our academic institutions and schoolhouses is key to influencing the attitudes, values, and beliefs of these future leaders. I recommend that you consider this an item of personal interest as we move forward with our transformation agenda.

Enclosure:
Office of Force Transformation Initiatives

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	2/16
SR MA CRADDOCK	2/16
MA BUCCI <i>Nosanto</i>	2/16
EXECSEC MARIOTT	2/9

**Overview of
Office of Force Transformation (OFT) Initiative:
Education for Transformation**

“If you are going break the grip of old culture, seize control of the schools”

Background:

One of the major challenges of transformation is developing leaders with the competencies to size, shape, operate, and **change** the force. Over the past several months OFT has held a series of workshops with key stakeholders to explore in some depth key aspects of the human elements of transformation: education, innovation, and cultural change.

These workshops identified the previously unarticulated need for:

- **Balancing the Curriculum:** Our schools need to balance their curriculum to ensure that our future leaders are prepared to deal with the challenges of transformation: sizing, shaping, operating and changing an **information age force**.
- **An Increased Focus on Research:** Our schools’ current capabilities for cutting edge research that can support transformation are limited. A research initiative oriented to multi-enterprise collaboration can get our learning institutions working together efficiently to advance understanding of the rapid pace of globalization and technological innovation and the implications for US forces, those of our allies and coalition partners, inter-agencies and industry, as well as the forces of potential adversaries.
- **High Quality Continuing Education:** The leaders of today and those of tomorrow need and deserve access to high quality information and analytic approaches to emerging topics of significance to transformation, such as network-centric operations, innovation & experimentation, and capabilities based planning. This content needs to be provided at times and places and in formats that are convenient to our leaders, suggesting short and modular courses.

With the intent of contributing to near-term progress towards these goals, OFT is initiating the following educational initiatives:

- **Transformation Chair Program**

The Office of Force Transformation will work to establish a Transformation Chair at each major DoD learning institution (e.g., Senior Service Colleges, Military Academies, and Postgraduate Schools). The

objective is to establish an authoritative champion for transformational studies at each major institution to create courses, spur research, and help providers of existing curriculum incorporate transformational considerations. The intent of the Office of Force Transformation is to create a network of educators who are resourced and have the incentives to collaborate in the development and offering of cutting edge courses on fundamental elements of transformation. The Transformation Chairs will initially be supported by a series of Network Centric Operations case studies funded by the Office of Force Transformation. Other case studies, examining innovation, experimentation, and cultural change are planned.

- **Transformation Research Program**

The Office of Force Transformation is initiating a Transformation Research Program with the objective of providing faculty at DoD institutions with resources to perform advanced research that supports goals of Defense Transformation. This program will provide research grants in the range of \$25-200K per year. The program is structured to facilitate collaborative research between military and civilian educational institutions domestically and internationally.

- **Transformation Short Courses**

The Office of Force Transformation, in collaboration with faculty from DoD educational institutions and the institutions of selected Allied and Coalition partners, will develop and offer a range of short course on topics of significant importance to Defense Transformation. Courses to be offered in the near-term include *Network-Centric Operations* and *Innovation & Experimentation*.

- **Transformational Leadership Certificate Program**

The Office of Force Transformation, in collaboration with NDU's School for National Security Executive Education, is developing a Transformational Leadership Certificate Program. This program is geared to provide Military and Civilian leaders with a high quality educational experience. It is specifically focused on preparing future leaders with the knowledge and skills to size, shape, resource, and change the force. Courses will be offered in both short and longer formats.



FORCE TRANSFORMATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

2004 FEB -6 PM 2:27

February 6, 2004, 10:00 AM

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Enclosure:

Office of Force Transformation Initiatives

11-L-0559/OSD/039549

OSD 01809-04

COORDINATION: None

cc: DEPSEC

Attachment: DEPSEC

Attachment: Office of Force Transformation Initiatives

Prepared by: Terry J. Pudas, Deputy Director, Force Transformation, (b)(6)

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720

913AM

TO Tom O'Connell

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM :

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: Rewards Program

EF-8071
I-04/000200

000.5

I think \$160,000 in reward money is amazingly low. I can't imagine why we haven't done more.

Please see me on it.

Thanks.

DHR/arn
10504.03

Ref: Rewards Program Update

Please respond by: 1/15/04

✓
1/14
5 Jan 04

Sir,
Response attached. Original attachment included behind.
vr/cdr Noseny
1/12/03

09-01-04 18:27 IN

OSD 01813-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039553